VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY IN INDONESIA:
A RISK ASSESSMENT

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A RISK ASSESSMENT

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### ACRONYMS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>BNPT</td>
<td>National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme)</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>Counter-Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>DPRP</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Front Pembela Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUI</td>
<td>Forum Umat Islam</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HTI</td>
<td>Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JAT</td>
<td>Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNPB</td>
<td>West Papua National Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>LJ</td>
<td>Laskar Jihad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMI</td>
<td>Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MRP</td>
<td>Papuan People’s Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua)</td>
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<td>MSI</td>
<td>Management Systems International</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUI</td>
<td>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Nahdatul Ulama</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional</td>
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<td>PKS</td>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</td>
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<td>TNI</td>
<td>Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia)</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VE</td>
<td>Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>VE/I</td>
<td>Violent Extremism and Insurgency</td>
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<td>VIE</td>
<td>Violent Islamist Extremism</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report draws on and synthesizes published sources to assess the current and prospective risk of violent extremism and insurgency (VE/I) in Indonesia. It does not attempt to offer an in-depth analysis of VE/I in Indonesia, but rather it seeks to provide an overview of key drivers, mitigants, actors, and trends in order to inform the future development of USAID Indonesia’s strategy and programs. The framework used to make this assessment is based on “Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming,” produced for USAID by Management Systems International (MSI).

The trajectory of Violent Islamist Extremism (VIE) in Indonesia over the last decade is nicely summarized by the following analysis:

The collapse of Suharto’s regime and Indonesia’s transition towards democracy gave impetus to the emergence of various Islamist groups competing for the liberated public sphere. The most radical among these groups—such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Laskar Jihad (LJ), and the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI)—rejected participation in the existing system, calling instead for violent jihad. The radical and militant groups’ success waging jihad in Indonesia’s conflict areas paralleled the phenomenal development of the Islamist media in the country, which played a crucial role in disseminating propaganda and directing public opinion. The pressures of the Indonesian government and pro-democracy Muslim groups against violent Islamist discourse and jihadist activism, however, have gradually forced the transnational Islamist groups to leave behind their high profile politics and shift towards a strategy of implementing the shari’a from below at the grassroots level. No longer seeing violent jihad as a relevant means for realizing their goals, many groups now argue that da’wa is more appropriate to foster Indonesian Muslims’ awareness of their duty to uphold the supremacy of the shari’a. These groups also believe that nonviolent endeavors are more suitable to Indonesia’s current situation and crucial to defend Muslim solidarity and the long-term struggle for a comprehensive Islamic order.1

Ten years after the Bali bombings, violent Islamist extremism appears to be in remission. As a result, VE/I in its current form does not pose a serious threat to the effective functioning or the integrity of the Indonesian state. It is highly unlikely that any act of terrorism – even a major one – would pose a serious threat to Indonesia’s political stability. And even if there were a larger and more lethal separatist insurgency in Papua, the rest of the country would be little affected by it. Therefore, the potential negative impact of VE/I in Indonesia should not be exaggerated.

That said, violent extremism and armed insurgency present a continuing challenge to the Indonesian government, the country’s political and religious leaders and to democratic norms and processes more generally. There are a number of negative consequences of VE/I that, individually and collectively, make it a significant problem for Indonesia. These include: 1) the loss of innocent lives, 2) damage to the economy, 3) intensifying sectarian and ethnic mistrust, animosity and conflict; 4) undermining basic human rights, the rule of law and democratic freedoms including freedom of religion, 5) enlarging the internal security function of the police and the military, which increases the risk of abuse by both, 6) undermining Indonesia’s stature regionally and globally.

VE/I is likely to remain a continuing problem requiring adept handling by political and religious leaders. Islamist ferment, including by groups prepared to use violence, is likely to continue in Indonesia. As Hasan observes: “In terms of their organizational structures, the transnational Islamist groups have generally been broken; their leaders and members, in general, have become mired in internal debates and conflicts. However,

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1 Hasan, pg 122.
as social movements, embedded in interpersonal networks and informal nodes of activism, they retain deep roots and a long vision of establishing an Islamic state. Extremist groups will continue to evolve, taking on new forms and adopting new strategies and tactics. Over time, as Indonesian society becomes more Islamic in its orientation, it is likely to be more, not less accepting of Islamist agendas. The challenge of protecting the rights and lifestyle choices of minority populations in the face of majoritarian religious values will continue to be an important test of the quality of Indonesia’s democracy.

In Papua, significant historical, socio-economic and cultural grievances, combined with frustration over national government responses, continue to fuel a low level, diffuse and intermittent insurgency. For the Indonesian government, a potent separatist movement in Papua represents a threat to both its national integrity and its international standing. The handling of Papuan grievances and aspirations is and will continue to be another important test of the quality of Indonesia’s democracy. It is possible that this situation will be resolved through the efforts of skilled and committed leaders, but it seems equally possible that it will fester and/or deteriorate.

Is Indonesia up to the challenge of preventing and containing VE/I? The answer will depend on the wisdom, skill and priorities of multiple actors, including political and religious leaders at the national and local levels, leaders of the Army and police, educators, the media and civil society groups. If the recent past is any predictor of the future, the picture will be a mixed one, with some successes and failures and plenty of compromises and ambiguity.

This analysis suggests the following four implications for USAID Indonesia’s programming:

1. **The importance of Indonesian capacity to monitor and analyze trends with regard to violent extremism.** The Mission and/or other donors should ensure that Indonesia has the capacity it needs to monitor and analyze violent extremism. If this capacity is inadequate, USAID and/or other donors should consider supporting the development of university and think tank capacity to monitor and analyze taklim, media and internet discourse, local ordinances, and the extremist teaching in schools.

2. **Civic discourse on pluralism and tolerance.** Going forward, it will be more not less important that there are robust and influential mechanisms for informed civic discourse on pluralism, religious freedom and minority rights. If these are not adequate USAID should consider supporting efforts to have such a dialogue within NU and Muhammadiyah, in high schools and universities, and in the media.

3. **Education remains key.** The Mission already recognizes the importance of quality education to Indonesia’s future. From the CVE perspective, it will be important to continue to monitor and improve the quality of education – including civic education – in madrassah and pesantren.

4. **The need for success in Papua.** Addressing the grievances and aspirations of the Papuan people is, perhaps, the last unfinished element of building the Indonesian nation-state. Therefore, although Papua is far from Jakarta, what happens there it is central to the future of democracy and good governance in Indonesia. For this reason, it is important that Special Autonomy – or an improved version of it – work in Papua. In support of this, USAID should support monitoring and analysis of Special Autonomy; the identification of reforms needed; political and human rights education; and strengthening connections and dialogue between opinion leaders in Papua and Jakarta.

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2 Hasan, pg 140. Emphasis added.
### Summary Assessment of VEI in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key factors</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Current level of VEI activity</td>
<td>Low to moderate</td>
<td>Islamist groups have weakened and terrorism has declined, but both Islamist groups and militant separatists in Papua enjoy some support and are evolving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Overall capacity of state and society to respond to VEI</td>
<td>Moderate/mixed</td>
<td>Government and religious leaders generally have been slow to mount effective responses, but can be effective when there is domestic and international pressure to act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Likely trajectory of VEI over next 3-5 years</td>
<td>Continuing low to moderate level of VE/I.</td>
<td>The level will depend on how Islamist and separatist groups evolve and the effectiveness of responses by political and religious leaders and security apparatus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nature of the threat posed by VEI</td>
<td>Level of threat posed by VEI:</td>
<td>The specific costs of VEI in Indonesia include: 1) the loss of innocent lives, 2) damage to the economy, 3) intensifying sectarian and ethnic mistrust, animosity and conflict, 4) undermining basic human rights, the rule of law and democratic freedoms including freedom of religion, 5) enlarging the internal security function of the police and the military, which increases the risk of abuse by both, 6) undermining Indonesia’s stature regionally and globally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To economic growth and development: Low</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To political stability and democracy: Low/medium</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- To societal cohesion and harmony: medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Implication for USAID (or “Development response”)</td>
<td>- Monitor for signs of an increase in VEI.</td>
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<td>- Adapt existing programs to target the evolving nature of VEI.</td>
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<td>- Support meaningful efforts to address Papuan grievances.</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

This report draws on and synthesizes published sources to assess the current and prospective risk of violent extremism and insurgency (VE/I) in Indonesia. It does not attempt to offer an in-depth analysis of VE/I in Indonesia, but rather it seeks to provide an overview of key drivers, mitigants, actors, and trends in order to inform the future development of USAID Indonesia’s strategy and programs. The framework used to make this assessment is based on “Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming,” produced for USAID by MSI. Section II enumerates the key drivers and mitigants of VE/I in Indonesia, with a focus on Violent Islamist Extremism (VIE). Section III describes the current situation with regard to VIE. Section IV describes recent Indonesian responses to VIE. Section V discusses regional conflicts and insurgencies, with a focus on Papua. Section VI provides an assessment of current and future VE/I risk and outlines some implications for USAID programming.

A. The challenge of assessing violent extremism in Indonesia.

Assessing and forecasting the risk of violent extremism (VE) in Indonesia is challenging given Indonesia’s complexity and dynamism. Indonesia is, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, both a majority Muslim nation with the world’s largest Muslim population and a nation with an ethnically and religiously diverse population. As a result, there is an ongoing tension between increasing Islamized society and politics and the semi-secular pancasila state created in 1945. Prior to 1998 this tension was managed through a combination of repression, cooptation and accommodation; today, in democratic Indonesia, the options available are cooptation and accommodation. Moreover, the Indonesian state has some of the characteristics of a relatively strong state – such as a highly institutionalized bureaucracy and military capable of projecting their reach across the archipelago – but in practice it often performs more like a weak state. Therefore, the state’s ability to address VE/I varies over time and from place to place. As a result, Indonesia has been home to several regional insurgencies and a variety of Islamist extremist organizations, including Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

Since 1998 Indonesia has been an electoral democracy with multiple political parties (including Islamist parties), decentralized governance, vibrant civil society (including huge Muslim social organizations) and a free media (including Islamist-oriented publications). But after 15 sometimes tumultuous years, Indonesian democracy is still a work in process and this is especially true with regard to the interaction of Islam and politics.

Overall, Indonesia is an economic development success story: decades of relatively strong macro-economic growth and generally sound development programs have resulted in a significant improvement in living standards for the majority of the Indonesian people. But the benefits of economic growth and development are increasingly unevenly distributed, corruption is widespread and a youth bulge is creating a large pool of unemployed youth. Therefore, the relationship between socio-economic factors and VE is complex and defies simple characterization.

The character of VE in Indonesia is shaped by three types of influences that are distinct but inter-related:

3 In particular, this report draws heavily on the analysis of Sidney Jones and the International Crisis Group (ICG).
4 With a total population of around 230 million, at the last census more than 1000 separate ethnic categories were listed. The largest single group is the Javanese, at about 41 per cent of the population, next are the Sundanese (West Java) with about 15 per cent, but after that there is a multiplicity of much smaller groups.
5 Pancasila refers to the five principles that have been Indonesia’s national ideology since 1945. Included in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution, they are: belief in “One and Only God,” just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives, and the realization of social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.
• **International influences** including ideas, ideology and funding emanating from the Middle East; Southeast Asian Islamist activism; and Western – largely US – policies and actions that may be seen by Indonesians as impacting on Islam, either globally or in Indonesia.

• **National-level influences** including national politics and policymaking, which often have a religious dimension; the behavior of Indonesia’s two huge Muslim social organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama; the performance of the Army and police; and macro-economic growth and stability.

• **Regional and local level influences** include regional and local political dynamics (which often are distinct from national politics); inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations at the regional and local level, the performance of the Army and police; and the level of economic opportunity.

The relative importance of these influences changes over time; but generally speaking they all play a role in shaping how VE plays out in Indonesia.

Finally, within Indonesia there are multiple transmision belts linking Islamist discourse at the global, national and local levels. These include influential/charismatic religious figures; the rich network of formal and informal Islamic groups and networks (including mosques, schools, study groups, etc); and Islamist publications and internet sites.

**B. Insurgency and other violence in Indonesia.**

Non-Islamist violence in Indonesia falls into three general categories: 1) armed insurgencies seeking regional independence or autonomy, which often have a religious and/or ethnic dimension to them, 2) inter-ethnic violence, which often has a religious dimension to it, and 3) political violence, often associated with criminals and thugs for hire (“premanism”). Indonesia’s separatist insurgencies (today principally Papua, but previously in Aceh, East Timor and the Moluccas) are complex phenomena; while they share some common characteristics, the dynamics of them are highly location specific. USAID Indonesia knows these situations well and it is beyond the scope of this report to discuss the issue of separatism in any detail. Therefore this report will briefly address the situation in Papua, the handling of which poses important challenges to a democratic Indonesia. This report will not address inter-ethnic and political violence in any detail because, while they can be important instruments for violent extremists, they aren’t forms of extremism per se.

## II. DRIVERS AND MITIGANTS OF VE/I

In Indonesia there is a complex and fluid mix of political, societal and socio-economic drivers of and mitigants to VE/I. We will focus first on the drivers of and mitigants to violent Islamist extremism (VIE).

**A. Drivers of Violent Islamist Extremism**

In Indonesia, the current drivers of VIE are more political and cultural than socio-economic. The underlying dynamic is the assertion of Islamist politico-religious agendas in the context of a complex polity and society simultaneously undergoing rapid political and social change, including Islamization.

**Islamization.** Over the last several decades Indonesian society has gradually become more overtly Islamic. While the increase in religiosity has been primarily an individual and societal dynamic, it also has implications for the political realm. According to Noorhaidi Hasan:

> As a result of the Islamization process over the last two decades, Islam has increasingly served as a determining variable behind political negotiations, becoming the most important frame of reference for many Indonesians to reflect upon the socio-political system they imagined capable of bringing about justice and attaining veritable development. Keeping pace with the growing influence of Islam
on politics, Indonesia has witnessed new global forms of religious identity, whose impact is mediated by specific, historically situated local institutions. The expansion of this so-called “glocal” Islam appears to be correlated with the accentuation of religious symbols in the public sphere, the increase of personal religiosity as well as the proliferation of Islamic institutions and new lifestyles.6

Most Indonesian Muslims are moderate and tolerant and many hold syncretic religious beliefs. Therefore, while Islamization doesn’t necessarily fuel Islamic extremism, it does create a larger pool of Muslims supportive of or at least sympathetic to Islamist views and agendas. Beginning in 1998, the freedom and turmoil following the fall of Soeharto provided political space and opportunities for hardline Islamists to organize, recruit and mobilize followers. Decentralization has also created opportunities for extremism at the local level. According to the ICG:

With the advent in 2005 of direct local elections including at the district level, hardline groups have found it expedient to lobby locally for policy changes, from banning alcohol to closing Ahmadiyah mosques. As in other democracies, politicians are most open to influence in the run-up to elections, and local groups are likely to carry more weight than outsiders, although support from national organisations for local causes can also be effective. *Amar ma’rif nahi munkar* morality campaigns also tend to work better at the local level, with locals mobilised to undertake raids on known dens of iniquity or join protests against local Christian, Ahmadiyah or, more rarely, Shi’a institutions. Many municipalities and districts may have their local branch of FPI but also boast their own various mosque youth groups, anti-apostasy organisations and Islamist forums and fronts that find sympathetic officials to support their efforts.7

**Transnational influences.** International Islamist influences have also been an important dimension of VIE in Indonesia. According to Hasan:

The efflorescence of transnational Islamist discourse and activism in the final years of Suharto’s New Order regime provided the foundation for the explosion of militant Islamist groups in the political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia. These groups mobilized members and aspiring mujahidin to stand shoulder-to-shoulder and fight jihad in Indonesia. The key success to the movements’ mobilizing process lies in the preexisting Islamist networks which had become so widespread across the country alongside the efflorescence of Islamist ideology. Taking the form of Islamic study cells, da’wa groups, madrassa clusters, mosques, and media, among other things, these networks allow individuals opportunities to interact, negotiate, and establish conceptual and motivational frameworks for their actions. Emphasizing that what happens in Indonesia is directly connected to the perceived global crisis in the Muslim world, the groups presented the shari’a, khilafa (caliphate) system and jihad as the only solution to curb the ongoing crises afflicting Indonesia. These groups questioned the format of the modern nation-state while expressing their profound interest in the establishment of Indonesia as an Islamic state.8

**Rejection of secularism, nationalism and democracy.** Although Indonesia is roughly 86% Muslim, the Indonesian constitution is essentially -- though not completely -- secular. Indonesia’s 1945 constitution intentionally avoids designating Islam as Indonesia’s official religion. Instead, it provides for freedom of religion and accords "all persons the right to worship according to their own religion or belief.” The first tenet of *Pancasila*, the national ideology since 1945, similarly declares belief in one God (without specifying which God). Nor does the constitution privilege shari’a law.9

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6 Hasan, pg 129
7 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism”, pg 9-10
8 Hasan, pg 125-126
9 As part of its Special Autonomy, Aceh is the only province authorized by the central government to implement shari’a law, and non-Muslims in the province are exempt from it.
As a result, Islamist groups have long chaffed at what they perceive to be the Indonesian state’s bias against Islamic law and governance. Some groups (such as Jemah Islamiyah and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia) also reject the notion of an Indonesian nation-state and instead seek a supra-national Islamic Caliphate comprised of Muslim populations across Southeast Asia. In addition to this, Islamists are disdainful of Indonesia’s messy, sometimes chaotic and frequently corrupt democratic politics. They view democracy as being Western and un-Islamic and consider certain human and political rights as being un-Islamic and sinful.

**Rejection of religious pluralism.** Religious tolerance has long been a delicate balancing act in Indonesia. The vast majority of Indonesians are Sunni Muslims; however there are also significant populations of Christians, Hindus, Shia Muslims and indigenous religious groups. Since independence, Indonesia’s religious pluralism has been recognized and protected, if imperfectly. Islamist militants are vehemently opposed to both Muslim “deviants” (such as the Ahmadiyah sect) and Christian proselytizing. They also oppose efforts to promote pluralism and “liberalism” within Indonesian Islam.

**“Islam under threat.”** Islamist militants see Indonesia’s modernization and development as a process of Westernization that is undermining Islamic values and practices. The FPI founders, for example, argue that Islamic values are under attack from “Western decadence, secularism, liberalism and immorality, accelerated by rapid democratic reform.” This plays out in a variety of arenas, including the theological (attacks on “liberal” Islam); cultural (efforts to ban Western music, movies, concerts); and social and moral (women’s clothing, combating drinking and prostitution).

**Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation.** Poverty and under-development continue to afflict a significant minority of the Indonesian population; but poverty itself probably is not a significant driver of VIE. Instead, given Indonesia’s relatively rapid, but inconsistent and uneven, socio-economic development, the more important driver almost certainly is frustrated expectations and relative deprivation.

Indonesia is home to the world’s fourth largest population of young people, according to the World Bank, and it is struggling to cope with youth unemployment of 20-30%. Un- or under-employed youth, especially those in urban areas are very aware of the middle- and upper- class lifestyles and values on display in Indonesia’s cities. (And those in rural areas are exposed to urban affluence through television and other media.) It shouldn’t be surprising that some of these young men would come to resent the affluence and status that they see but cannot attain. According to Bamualim “…in terms of membership, Islamic protest movements share a number of characteristics. One important common element is that they appeal to the same categories of persons who sense a gap between the status quo and their aspiration. The FPI laskars (soldiers) feel marginalized and isolated because of economic injustice and the unfair distribution of assets in the context of the hegemony of other groups in the city.”

Transnational influences can help to define and legitimate this disaffection. According to Hasan:

Islam as a global symbol of resistance to Western political and cultural imperialism has gained further appeal especially among young Indonesian Muslims who have faced conditions of high unemployment. It is because of this kind of symbolic power associated with global Islam that youths appear to engage with Islam in the attempts to construct identity. These youths in fact serve as important entrepots in the flow of global Islamic revival messages, creatively translating those messages into lifestyles, fashion, arts, music, novels, books, institutions, and organizations. The messages, in turn, influence multiple social and political fields and inform the construction of a collective, transnational identity.

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10 Bamualim, pg 272
11 Ibid.
12 Hasan, pg 135
Transmission belts for VIE. Finally, as noted in the Introduction, various “transmission belts” facilitate the dissemination of extremist ideas, networking and mobilizing. These include:

- **The media:** A vigorous media umbrella has served as a conduit and has played a crucial role in facilitating the transnational political and religious expansion to a large segment of Indonesian Muslims, who accepted reluctantly the rhetoric of calling others to “true” Islam. By playing on transnational issues that sparked debates across the world, especially those on protracted conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, and the Philippines, the Islamist media facilitates the Islamists’ attempts to create solidarities and expand networks. The mushrooming of the Islamist periodicals has complemented and facilitated the widespread distribution of Islamist books in Indonesia. Since the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, thousands of Islamist books have been published. Some books have appeared that clearly champion and propagate jihadist discourse and ideologues.

The Internet appears to be a space for the militant Islamists to develop roots and propagate their jihadist discourse in Indonesia and abroad. Utilizing the Internet, the pamphlets produced to glorify their thoughts and activities can instantly reach readers scattered across Southeast Asia countries where Islamist networks have been established. The Internet also serves as an interactive channel linking the militant Islamists and people all over the region.

Nevertheless, the Islamist media is not unified, but rather fragmented. Like the Islamist movements themselves, they have been engaged in the competition for the leading position on the discursive map of Indonesian Islam. Multiple actors offer different interpretations and meanings. Debates and controversies frequently erupt out of this competition especially over the prerogatives to define boundaries and interpret religious symbols and doctrines.

- **Majelis taklim:** Majelis taklim are regular gatherings for religious learning and practice that have become widespread among Indonesian Muslims, gaining prominence also in public discourse about national religiosity. According to ICG:

  The popularity of taklim as both a way to obtain religious instruction and a form of entertainment has soared with the post-Soeharto lifting of restrictions on freedom of association and assembly. They can attract anywhere from a few dozen to several thousand participants, and the teaching can encourage moderation, fanaticism or anything in between, depending on the speakers. For years, a popular Jakarta-based preacher named AA Gym held forth in his taklim on the rewards of entrepreneurship, and his followers were the essence of middle-class moderate Muslims… Religious groups across the ideological spectrum use taklim as a way of building a membership base, and extremist groups are no exception.14

### B. Mitigants of Violent Islamist Extremism

Over the last 15 years Indonesia has weathered financial and political crises, regional insurgencies, and terrorist attacks. While it is vulnerable to traumas such as these, it also has demonstrated considerable resilience in response to such challenges. With regard to VIE, there are several important mitigants that have helped to limit its appeal and impact. These include:

**Broad public support for Pancasila and pluralism.** A majority of the Indonesian elite and people are comfortable having society, politics and government informed and influenced by, but not dominated or

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13 This section is drawn from Hasan, pgs-136-138.
14 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism”, pg 10.
bounded by, Islamic values and practices. Many Indonesian Muslims respect and value Indonesia’s historical pluralism and tolerance and are wary of sectarian religious and political agendas. Therefore, public support for pancasila, with its useful ambiguity, remains high and there is only limited support for the application of shari’a law. These longstanding and widely held public attitudes help to limit, though not eliminate, the appeal of extremist views.

The moderating influence of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Indonesia’s two huge Muslim social organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are the most important organizational embodiments of the moderating values described above. As such, they are central to the success of any efforts to undertake broad-based, institutional responses to VIE. NU, which is more traditionalist and rural, is thought to have 40 million members; Muhammadiyah, which is more modernist and urban, has some 30 million. Both organizations have affiliated political parties, schools, women and youth wings, charitable organizations, media outlets, etc. While they promote differing versions of Sunni Islam, both embrace pluralism and reject militancy, terrorism and intolerance.

Fragmented Islamic authority. Islam in Indonesia is not monolithic or hierarchical. While this results in multiple, and frequently competing, voices and interpretations of Islamic doctrine, it also means that no single interpretation or group can dominate discourse. This provides openings for extremists, but it also means that the views propagated by extremist groups compete against the views of multiple, more moderate groups.

Democracy, political parties and civil society. Indonesian has a multiparty political system, competitive elections, multi-tiered governance, fairly robust civil society (including the two behemoths, NU and Muhammadiyah) and a free media. Indonesia’s largest political parties are pluralist while also (and some analysts believe, increasingly) associating themselves with Islamic values and symbols. There also are multiple, more genuinely Islamist parties, but electoral support for them has declined in recent elections. (See Annex B.) As a result of Indonesia’s democratic politics, governments tend to enjoy legitimacy, there are channels (albeit imperfect ones) for expressing and redressing grievances, and political exclusion is relatively low. These positive aspects of Indonesian democracy limit -- but by no means eliminate -- the breadth and intensity of dissatisfaction with “the system.”

The government’s anti-terrorism efforts. Indonesia’s religious and political elite were slow to recognize the risks VIE poses to Indonesia, but since the 2002 Bali bombings, the government has become more committed to and effective in combating VIE. Police and law enforcement efforts have made it much more difficult for terrorist groups to organize, train, and execute attacks. However, as will be discussed below, national and local government officials are reluctant, for political and other reasons, to restrict or punish hardline Islamist groups that promote violence and sometimes engage in it themselves.

III. VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM TODAY

A. Overview

Ten years after the Bali bombings, VIE continues to exist in Indonesia and remains a potentially serious problem. According to Sidney Jones, in 2010 and 2011, the number of plots seemed to skyrocket, and this was taken as evidence that the police were falling down on the job. Seven separate groups were uncovered in 2011; the total number of deaths from terrorist crimes in 2010 was 10, all of them police officers, and in 2011, three, again all police.16

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15 This and the following section draw heavily on analysis by Sidney Jones and ICG.
Currently, the impact of Islamist extremism is most felt by religious minorities in Indonesia, both non-Muslim and Muslim. According to Sidney Jones:

The focus on foreigners has receded to the background and is likely to stay there - even the killing of Osama bin Laden at American hands did not bring it back … For the last two years, the focus of Indonesian terrorists has been overwhelmingly on domestic targets, primarily the police, but also local Christians. In the absence of other local drivers for radical recruitment, especially after the ending of communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso, the issue of “Christianization” can be exploited for recruitment purposes.17

According to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom:

In some parts of Indonesia a culture of impunity exists in which extremist groups operate with few consequences, harassing places of worship, extracting protection money from religious minorities, pressuring local officials to detain and restrict allegedly heterodox religious groups, and recruiting potential members for terrorist activities. This is not only a religious freedom concern, but a threat to Indonesia’s tradition of tolerance and its democratic future.18

B. The changing character of VIE

The characteristics, composition and goals of extremist groups are changing. According to ICG: “On the jihadi side, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has weakened and splintered, the result of ten years of anti-terrorist operations, leadership loss and internal rifts. None of the groups that have arisen since have had the same combination of size, depth of leadership, ideological rigour, geographical scope, international linkages, or commitment to training, supported by a network of schools.”19 According to Sidney Jones: “As larger jihadi organisations like Jemaah Islamiyah have fragmented, new groups have emerged without the trained leadership or lengthy recruitment and indoctrination process that characterised the old ones … In the past, there were clear ideological lines within the radical fringe between Islamist thugs and jihadists. Today those lines have blurred, making deterrence more difficult.”20

Islamist terrorists today can be divided into two broad categories: those favoring suicide bombings or ‘martyrdom operations’ (istiyyadat) and those favoring secret, targeted assassinations (igtiyalat), aimed particularly at the police.21 According to ICG, the concept of jihad fardiyah (individual jihad) has also found its way into Indonesian jihadi thinking. This is “the notion that if war against Islam’s enemies is an obligation for all Muslims, then it is permissible to wage it without a large organisation or a command from an imam. Two or three people, even single individuals, working on their own can contribute to the global jihad. Small groups are thus ideologically justified, even if the primary reason for their emergence may be the desire to avoid detection or the failure of larger organisations to satisfy the thirst of younger militants for action.”22

According to Sidney Jones, the new generation of militants comes from several sources: “members of old groups like Jemaah Islamiyah that have since fragmented, leaving some members isolated and not in regular touch with a leadership that has moved away from violence; disaffected members of the same groups that are looking for more militant homes; fugitives from earlier operations; former high-risk prisoners or men they

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18 US Commission on Religious Freedom, 2012. According to the Commission’s report: “Since the 2008 Joint Ministerial decree “freezing” their religious activity, at least 50 Ahmadiyah mosques have been vandalized, 36 mosques and meeting points forcibly closed, and three Ahmadiyah followers killed in mob violence … During the reporting period, extremist groups forcibly closed or vandalized as many as 60 religious venues of religious minority groups other than Ahmadiyah, an increase from the previous year. Most cases were reported in West Java, with others in East Java, West Lombok, West Sumatra and Madura.”
19 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism,” pg 9-10
22 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism,” pg 9-10
recruited inside, inadequately monitored after their release; younger siblings of slain or detained terrorism suspects; members of the military wing of Jamaah Ansorut Tausid (JAT); others who have taken part in military training (tadrib) who want to test their skills; and new groups inspired by radical preachers who seek arms and training from any of the above or who teach themselves bomb-making from the internet.”23

The path they take toward radicalization differs. According to Jones, “many more are coming from state high schools than from pesantrens, and while many come from fairly poor backgrounds…there are also among them well-educated university students. What they have in common is exposure to radical preachers who convince them that officials who do not enforce Islamic law are thought oppressors; that Muslims who subscribe to any law other than shariah are apostates; that Christians and Jews are the natural enemies of Islam; and all of the above are legitimate targets.”24

According to ICG, these men represent a generational shift from the jihadis trained abroad or who got their first combat experience a decade ago in the two major post-Soeharto communal conflicts in Ambon, Maluku and Poso, Central Sulawesi. They are less skilled, less experienced and less educated than the Afghan and Mindanao alumni, most of them coming from poor backgrounds and relying on petty trade for their livelihood.25 According to ICG:

Anti-vice raids and actions against non-Muslim minorities are becoming a path to more violent jihadism in Indonesia. The 2011 suicide bombings of a police mosque in Cirebon, West Java and an evangelical church in Solo, Central Java were carried out by men who moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing “deviance” to using bombs and guns. They show how ideological and tactical lines within the radical community have blurred.26

IV. INDONESIAN RESPONSES TO VIE

The Indonesian government’s response to Violent Islamist Extremism has been mixed. It has included relatively effective intelligence gathering and police operations, but a mixed record preventing extremism by addressing the enabling environment for extremism. This mixed CVE picture is in large part attributable to the complex politics that influence responses to VIE.

A. The politics of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

Local and national level political considerations influence the Indonesian government’s CVE efforts. At the local level, the advent of decentralization and local elections has made local politicians more susceptible to pressure from hardline groups – or willing to appear more Islamic in order to preempt such groups -- especially in the run-up to elections. As a result, numerous local ordinances enforcing Islamic values have been adopted. And even though they are of doubtful constitutionality, the national government has been reluctant to challenge them. According to Sidney Jones, “If the government cannot move against the mayor of Bogor who defies a Supreme Court ruling on the construction of a church, it is hardly likely to take on the much touchier task of identifying sources of extremist teaching.”27 Moreover, according to Jones, many Muslim leaders at the district level remain convinced that the terrorism issue is a plot by the police to divert attention from corruption scandals and keep the counter-terrorism funds flowing.28

25 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism,” pg 1.
26 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism,” pg 1.
At the national level, “the lack of any whole-of-government approach to countering extremism is striking.”

According to Sidney Jones:

This is partly because no one can agree on the nature of the threat. With less than a dozen people killed by terrorists each year for the last five years, many don’t see why it should get so much attention…For many in the human rights community, hard-won freedom of expression will be at risk if the government starts targeting hate speech or trying to control the content of Friday khutbah (prayers). In much of the Muslim community, the fear is that Islam will be stigmatized.

The coalitional nature of Indonesian national politics and government, which results in multi-party cabinets, also contributes government inaction and incoherence. According to Ken Ward:

[In] the absence of one or two near-majority parties, multiparty government has been unavoidable in Indonesia since 1998, and governing coalitions have always found it wise to include some Muslim parties in their ranks. Political leaders such as President Yudhoyono and Megawati, his predecessor, have often chosen to ignore provocations from Muslim organizations rather than risk a backlash that could have a negative impact either on coalition stability or on future electoral prospects.

Finally, there also is no consensus in the Indonesian Muslim community on what constitutes unacceptable speech or incitement to violence. According to ICG:

Many of the more radical clerics openly talk of how shedding the blood of a particular group – thaghtat, kafir, Ahmadiyah or others – is permissible (balat) or that certain kinds of institutions, such as mejid dhimir, are permissible to attack. It is clear from the Cirebon case that this can provide direct inspiration to the commission of violence, yet there is virtually no discussion on the consequences of such speech, let alone how to go about discouraging it.

B. Government Responses

Detachment 88 (Densus 88) and law enforcement. Detachment 88 or Densus 88 was formed within the Indonesian Police after the 2002 Bali bombings by JI. With support from Australia and the US, it has been fairly effective in intelligence gathering and killing or capturing suspected terrorists. In February 2010 it discovered and disbanded an extremist training camp in Aceh. Twenty-six men were killed by police and several dozen remained on the wanted list. The total number of suspects arrested and charged was close to a hundred, with about a dozen more released after questioning. In 2011, there were 93 people arrested on terrorism charges, 121 prosecutions, and seven pending cases involving 33 defendants. In June, radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment based upon his support for the terrorist training camp in Aceh.

But Densus 88 also has been criticized for excessive use of lethal force. It has been involved in a number of operations against separatists in Papua and Maluku, with officers saying their participation was justified because the nation’s Law on Terrorism categorizes armed insurgence as an act of terrorism. It has been linked to a string of incidents in which Papuan independence leaders have been arrested and killed. On June 14 a security unit led by Densus 88 shot and killed Mako Tabuni, the Secretary-General of the West Papua National Committee (KNPB). Tabuni, who was unarmed, was shot at least six times by the security element in the Cendrawasih University area in Abepura.

30 Ibid.
31 Ward, pg 153.
32 ICG: “From Vigilantism to Terrorism,” pg 12.
33 See the US Department of State 2011 Report on Terrorism and Sidney Jones, “The Ongoing Extremist Threat.”
The National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme or BNPT). BNPT was created in September 2010 to coordinate everything from intelligence-gathering to prevention efforts. Long in gestation, it was fast-tracked after the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings and became the instrument for bringing the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) more formally into counter-terrorism activities. According to Sidney Jones:

There are many parts of the BNPT that are not working smoothly but the most disappointing is the prevention directorate – which is led by a respected TNI officer. No one in the section has any experience with radical movements, let alone with prevention strategies. … There is another problem with the military getting involved in terrorism. Indonesia has prided itself on treating terrorism as crime, to be addressed by civilian law enforcement agencies, rather than a war, to be fought by the military. It has been scrupulous about arresting suspects and bringing them to trial, seeing them as criminals with the potential for rehabilitation rather than enemies to be eliminated. Granted, some of those deemed rehabilitated turned out to be recidivists who rejoined their old networks on release, but that should not discredit the assumption that the individuals concerned are redeemable – particularly when one looks at their ages. If anything, it should lead to an intensified effort at prison reform.34

Deradicalization efforts. According to a 2010 Rand report, there is no Indonesian rehabilitation program in the sense of the centrally driven, highly structured, and well-resourced programs implemented in Singapore and Malaysia. According to Rand:

It is probably more accurate to speak of an Indonesian approach to rehabilitation, which was developed and implemented by the leaders of Detachment 88—Indonesia’s special counterterrorism police unit—in the course of its interaction with JI detainees … The Indonesian approach to deradicalization operates at two levels: It seeks to develop intelligence on the terrorist network and to return detainees to society. The key objective is not to change the mindset of the terrorists but to obtain intelligence on the terrorist network in order to disrupt it and prevent terrorist attacks.35

BNPT is aware of the importance of cooperating with the mainstream Muslim organizations and has signed MOUs with at least 8 Islamic institutions to implement educational counter-terrorism programs and has organized seminars on deradicalization in cooperation with MUI and other Muslim organizations. These have been met by criticisms and counter seminars by Islamist organizations, which portray BNPT as anti-Islam.36

According to Rand, from a terrorism-prevention perspective, Indonesia’s program has been very successful in eliciting information that has enabled the police to disrupt the terrorist network in Indonesia. Additionally, the Indonesian approach has succeeded in inducing high-ranking detainees to recant and denounce violence and to work with the police to persuade other detainees to cooperate.37 However, the Rand report also notes that of several hundred militants detained since the October 2002 Bali bombing, only 20 are considered reformed and are actively working with police. There have also been cases of recidivism. At least 20 recidivists were involved in the terrorist network uncovered in Aceh in March 2010, including some who had previously been arrested for ordinary crimes, such as drugs and, in one case, murder.38

Counter-radicalization efforts. Indonesia has some 800,000 mosques and 30,000 Islamic schools, so it is a huge challenge to undertake retail-level efforts to counter radicalization. Moreover, according to ICG, “The fusion of religious vigilantism in the name of upholding morality and orthodoxy with jihadism vastly complicates the government’s counter-radicalisation task. While most people are willing to condemn

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36 RSIS 2012 brief
37 Rand 2010 pg 109
38 Ibid, pg 115
terrorism, hardline vigilantes often have support from officials in government and quasi-government institutions like the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), especially at the local level.”

As a result, according to Sidney Jones, Indonesia’s handling of non-terrorist extremism has been “abysmal.” According to Jones, “After a period of decline, groups like the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), the coalition of which it is a part, Forum Umat Islam (FUI), and a host of smaller “anti-apostasy” groups appear to be stronger than ever, with apparent political backing from officials at the local and national level. They have been allowed to systematically intimidate Christian congregations, the Ahmadiyah community, and other sects deemed “deviant,” gay activist groups and others, with little fear of intervention, let alone prosecution by police, except when their actions result in serious physical injury.”

Although the politics of countering radicalization are tricky, the ICG observes: “In democratic Indonesia, there is an understandable reluctance to promote stricter enforcement of laws against incitement or spreading hatred that were used in the recent authoritarian past to suppress dissent. Still, the government could set an example by setting standards for any taklim taking place on government property or in government-assisted schools, and withdrawing funding or other forms of support from institutes or individuals that promote hatred. And Jones warns: “The potential for cooperation between jihadis and other extremists should give an urgency to the prevention programme of the BNPT, but the programme will be doomed to failure unless a policy of zero tolerance for religious vigilantism and protection of minority rights is in place more widely.”

V. REGIONAL INSURGENCIES

Care should be taken in discussing armed separatist movements in Indonesia alongside Islamist extremist groups. Both use violence against the state, but there are important differences between them and therefore they should not be conflated. First, armed separatist movements in Indonesia typically haven’t adopted terrorism as a central tactic. Second, both globally and in Indonesia, the demands of separatists tend to be negotiable (i.e., through the provision of greater autonomy) whereas the goals and demands of VIE groups tend to involve a fundamental reordering of government and society. Third, despite the prior point, the Indonesian state has tended to view separatism as a greater threat to national security and integrity than Islamist extremism, and therefore has used military force and other forms of repression against separatists more readily than against VIE groups. Finally, Indonesia’s separatist movements aren’t fundamentally anti-Western and in fact usually seek support from the West. Indeed, some separatist movements (e.g. in East Timor and Aceh) have received varying degrees of international legitimation.

As noted in the introduction, the dynamics driving regional conflicts and insurgencies in Indonesia are complex and situation-specific. A great deal has been written on these conflicts since 1998 and USAID Indonesia has extensive hands-on experience with them. Therefore, in this section we offer only a brief overview of these dynamics, with a focus on the situation in Papua.

A. Drivers and mitigants of regional insurgencies

In general terms, the drivers of regional insurgencies and conflicts are what might be expected given Indonesia’s geographic expanse, history, and ethno-religious diversity. Although the significance of specific drivers varies from place to place, in general they include: 1) historic over-centralization and political repression; 2) economic exploitation by Jakarta; 3) abuses by security forces, and 4) a desire to protect distinct ethno-national identities in the face of powerful Indonesian/Javanese cultural influences. The fall of Soeharto

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39 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism,” pg 1.
41 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism,” pg 12.
allowed for debate, organizing, and mobilization at the regional level that hadn’t been possible under the New Order. In Aceh, the separatist rebellion was fuelled by a desire for political and religious autonomy as well as greater control over oil and gas. Papua’s continuing low intensity insurgency has been fuelled by its contested incorporation into Indonesia in 1969, Papuans being ethnically different from the rest of Indonesia, and Papuans feeling marginalized and exploited by the Indonesian government.

At the same time, several factors have mitigated the scope and intensity of armed separatist movements. First, over a 30 year period the Soeharto regime forged a relatively strong sense of nationhood through the use of a common language, nationwide TV and radio broadcasting, and the creation of a state apparatus (bureaucratic and military) that extended to the farthest reaches of the archipelago. Second, Indonesia’s post-1998 political party law, which requires that parties be essentially national, not regional, puts a damper on regional political movements. Third, since 1999 decentralization (“regional autonomy”) has given more authority and resources to local elites. However, power was devolved not to the large provinces, but to the much smaller districts. According to Aspinall, this has had the effect of fragmenting politics and splitting political identities. When political actors seek power at the district level, it makes little sense for them to appeal to large ethnic constituencies of the sort that could potentially be state-challenging. As a result, according to Ed Aspinall:

> More than twelve years after democratisation began, there is remarkably little organised ethnic conflict in Indonesia, and ethnicity rests only lightly on national politics. Not only has the incidence of communal violence declined sharply, but new modes of inter-ethnic coalition building and cooperation have emerged. This is most visible in the direct elections of local government heads that are held every five years in the country’s 33 provinces and more than 500 districts. In areas which are ethnically mixed, a new political norm has emerged during these elections: the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions.

That said, Ambon and Poso remain potential flashpoints, the first because of the failure of any reconciliation at a grassroots level, the second because of the number of inducted jihadists still active. And as Sidney Jones notes, they are not the only places where tensions that may stem from completely non-religious causes, like land disputes, have the potential to fall out along religious lines, with radical websites fanning the flames.

Finally, in response to the armed separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, both provinces were granted “special autonomy.” Although there are differences between the two arrangements, in general “special autonomy” is supposed to enhance the three provinces’ political and fiscal autonomy and give them greater control over their resources. In the case of Aceh, this included allowing the formation of regional political parties, which now dominate politics in Aceh. Special autonomy serves as a mitigant to VEI to the extent that it addresses or reduces the grievances that contribute to extremism. In the case of Aceh special autonomy has been a significant mitigant; in the case of Papua, it has not.

**B. Papua/Papua Barat**

Papua and Papua Barat (West Papua) are Indonesia’s eastern-most provinces; the former shares a land border with Papua New Guinea. Prior to 2003 the two provinces were a single province, Papua, which was incorporated into Indonesia in 1969 through the controversial, UN-supervised “Act of Free Choice.” Papua/West Papua comprise a huge land area and are thinly populated, originally by Melanesian Papuans.

43 According to Edward Aspinall, because of the ban on regional parties, “the contentious ethnic politics of the early years of the transition were never crystallised, captured or perpetuated by the party system. See Aspinall, 2010.

44 Aspinall, 2010.

45 Ibid.

Although resource rich (and home to huge Freeport McMoRan mines) Papua’s development lags behind the rest of Indonesia.

Under the Soeharto government’s transmigration program, many Javanese Indonesians emigrated to Papua. Today, as many as half of Papua’s 3.6 million inhabitants are from Java. Cultural differences between indigenous Papuans and Indonesians and complaints about the Javanization of Papua have fuelled mistrust and tensions. Cultural differences have been aggravated by indigenous people’s perceptions that they have been left behind economically by a flood of Indonesian immigrants.

Opposition to Indonesian control of Papua has existed since 1963. This opposition takes two forms: those in favor of a federation with Papua New Guinea (PNG), and those whom prefer independence as West Papua or "West Melanesia." Since the 1960s the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM) has waged a low-level but diehard guerilla separatist campaign. The OPM has mounted attacks against Indonesian government outposts, private and government-controlled businesses and civilian settlements. OPM supporters have conducted various protests and flag-raising ceremonies for independence or federation with PNG. Although the OPM is a marginal military and political actor, the fact of its existence has justified an intimidating Indonesian military and police presence in Papua, which has led to periodic human rights abuses. For the Indonesian government in the post-Soeharto era, an effective separatist movement in Papua represents a threat both to the integrity of the Indonesian nation-state and to Indonesia’s regional and international stature. In 2001, "Special Autonomy" status was granted to Papua province, although to date, implementation has been partial. (In Aceh the 2005 peace agreement allowed for local political parties and empowered local police to keep the peace. In Papua national security forces from outside the province enforce internal security and are seen by many as an occupying force.) In 2003 Papua was split into the provinces of Papua and West Papua.

Since 2007, the Yudhoyono government has been promoting a “new deal” for Papua, aimed at accelerating development through better infrastructure, education and social services. But in the last few years, the provinces have seen a surge in violence, accompanied by protests, attacks, and counterattacks by armed groups, and attempts by the government to suppress the growing dissent. These activities have intensified in recent years with the establishment of the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), a pro-independence group from the central highlands that is closely linked to two groups abroad, International Parliamentarians for West Papua and International Lawyers for West Papua.

The government has been growing increasingly concerned about the internationalization of the independence struggle. According to ICG, “The government’s worst fear is that the activities of these groups could lead to delegitimisation of the 1969 Act of Free Choice... This concern has led to sometimes excessive use of force against pro-independence actions, harsh penalties for non-violent use of independence symbols like the Morning Star flag, frequent instances of torture and ill-treatment of suspected separatists, surveillance of politically active civil society groups, creation of parallel institutions to compete with and undermine community groups and tight restrictions on international access to Papua. Such actions play into the hands of groups like the KNPB who believe heavy-handed actions by security forces help their cause abroad.”

According to ICG: “The two sentiments that define the political impasse in Papua are frustration on the part of many Papuans that “special autonomy” has meant so little, and exasperation on the part of many Indonesian government officials that Papuans are not satisfied with what they have been given. The gulf between the two might be reduced by dialogue, but any prospect of serious talks is hampered by an unwillingness of Jakarta to treat the problem as essentially a political, rather than an economic one.”

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47 ICG: Dynamics of Violence in Papua, pg 1.
48 ICG: The Deepening Impasse in Papua, pg. 1.
Finally, as the ICG notes, the imperatives of development and security seem to operate at cross-purposes. In an attempt to respond to mounting grievances, in September 2011, President Yudhoyono signed a decree creating the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (Unit Percepatan Pembangunan di Papua dan Papua Barat, or UP4B). Although an earlier draft decree empowered the unit to address sensitive but important topics such as conflict mediation and human rights, the final version focused almost exclusively on development issues, such as poverty, education, health, and infrastructure. But access to Papua remained tightly controlled. Few foreign journalists and human rights researchers can visit independently without close monitoring of their activities.

VIASSESSMENT OF VE/I RISK AND PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS

A. Defining the potential impact of VE/I in Indonesia

Violent extremism and insurgency continues to be a challenge to the Indonesian government, to the country's moderate religious leaders and to society more generally. But in its current form, VE/I doesn't pose a serious threat to the functioning or integrity of the Indonesian state. Any single incident of terrorism – even a major one – is unlikely to threaten Indonesia’s political stability. And even if there were a larger and more lethal separatist insurgency in Papua, the lives of most Indonesians would be little affected by it. Therefore, the risk and potential negative impact of VE/I should not be exaggerated.

However, there are a number of negative consequences of VE/I -- and some of the state’s responses to it. These include:

- The loss of innocent lives;
- The negative impact on the economy;
- Fueling sectarian and ethnic mistrust, animosity and conflict;
- Damaging basic human rights, the rule of law and democratic freedoms including freedom of religion;
- Enlarging the internal security function of the police and the military, which increases the risk of abuse by both; and
- Damaging Indonesia’s regional and international stature and credibility.

These negative consequences of VE/I make it a significant ongoing problem for Indonesia.

B. Current and future VE/I risk

The biggest risk currently and going forward regarding violent extremism is not being aware of and responsive to the changes occurring among Indonesian Islamists. According to Hasan:

Transnational jihadism in Indonesia has constantly shifted and transformed along with the changes taking place both at the global and local levels. In terms of their organizational structures, the transnational Islamist groups have generally been broken; their leaders and members, in general, have become mired in internal debates and conflicts. However, as social movements, embedded in interpersonal networks and informal nodes of activism, they retain deep roots and a long vision of establishing an Islamic state … The only remaining hope for the militant jihadist groups is the mushrooming of the da‘wa groups which designate youth as the main target while adopting an accommodative strategy to Islamize society at the individual levels. Although the presence of such groups seemingly delegitimizes the jihadists’ struggle to enforce the shari‘a and
establish an Islamic state, their growing influence among youths has no doubt broadened the Islamist constituencies that can potentially be drawn into the jihadist orbits. This is especially so if the state and civil society forces fail to demonstrate their commitment for good governance and accountability and systematically campaign for democracy and human rights.49

According to Sidney Jones: “There are indications that some of the jihadi groups see their longer term goals, such as the wider application of Islamic law, being fulfilled only in coalition with other groups that might not be prepared at this stage to use violence. To the extent that groups like the FPI are allowed to flourish, the jihadi cause is also served.”50 Therefore, according to ICG, “The blurring of vigilantism and extremism means that the government must develop a strategy, consistent with democratic values, for countering clerics who use no violence themselves but preach that it is permissible to shed the blood of infidels (kafir) or oppressors (thaghut), meaning government officials and particularly the police.”51

Woodward warns that if the government does not take action against FPI, “the government faces equally serious short-term and more perilous long-term risks. In the short term is risks alienating political constituencies opposed to communal violence and supportive of human rights agendas. The more serious long-term risk is the possibility of institutionalizing communal violence in much the same way that it has been in South Asia.”52

Ten years after the Bali bombings, Islamist extremism continues to exist in Indonesia and will remain a potentially serious problem. Although currently it appears to be in remission, violent extremism is evolving and will take new forms and adopt new strategies and tactics. Over time, as Indonesian society becomes more Islamic in its orientation, it is likely to be more, not less accepting of Islamist agendas. The challenge of protecting the rights of religious minorities in the face of majoritarian beliefs and values is and will continue to be an important test of the quality of Indonesia’s democracy.

In Papua significant historical, socio-economic and cultural grievances, combined with frustration over national government responses, continue to fuel a low level, diffuse and intermittent insurgency. The handling of Papuan grievances and aspirations is and will continue to be another important test of the quality of Indonesia’s democracy. It is possible that this situation will be resolved through the efforts of skilled and committed leaders, but it seems equally possible that it will fester and/or deteriorate.

C. Program Implications

A central element of the US National Strategy for Counter-terrorism is to “counter al-Qa’ida ideology and its resonance and diminish the specific drivers of violence that al-Qa’ida exploits.” The strategy seeks to do this by “strengthening bulwarks against radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization to violence in the name of al-Qa’ida and focusing in particular on those drivers that we know al-Qa’ida exploits.”53 The Strategy goes on to state that:

CT efforts in Southeast Asia have improved markedly in recent years as key countries in the region have enjoyed significant CT successes and put effective pressure on the region’s most lethal terrorist organizations. Despite these successes, the region remains potentially fertile ground for local terrorist organizations that share al-Qa’ida’s ideology and aspirations...[The goal is] ensuring that the threat from terrorism does not undergo a resurgence in the years ahead and that al-Qa’ida’s senior

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49 Hasan, pg 140.
51 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism,” pg 1.
leadership is compelled to look at regions other than Southeast Asia for resources, support, and a potential safe haven.54

What can and should USAID Indonesia do to address the sometimes lethal mix of political violence, violent extremism, terrorism, and insurgency that continues to exist, though diminished, in Indonesia? In this concluding section we identify some of the implications of this VE/I risk assessment for USAID Indonesia’s programs.

Most generally, the Mission should keep in mind that *traditional development projects aren’t usually effective tools to address VE/I*. When designing programs intended to address VE/I, the Mission should bear in mind the observation contained in the CVE Programming Guide:

> Historical trends, as well as more recent ones, suggest that frustrated expectations for economic improvement and social mobility are a far more frequent source of VE than mere economic deprivation. More often than not, discontent arises not so much from the system’s failure to deliver, but from its inability to keep up with expectations – especially those of the educated, upwardly mobile and achievement-oriented elites that emerge through modernization, economic development, and globalization. There is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that relative deprivation and frustrated expectations – for economic benefits, political power, and/or social status – can be important drivers of VE... What is critical here is not so much the material grievances that social marginality produces, but the far more dangerous message that acute forms of social exclusion may convey to those who are its victims: state and society alike have turned their back and given up on you. 55

Therefore, it should be remembered that while projects that build schools and roads or offer employment opportunities are valuable for a variety of developmental and political reasons, they do not necessarily help to counter the drivers of VE/I. In Papua, for example, these drivers are rooted in a complex mix of historical and cultural grievances, a sense of political and economic marginalization, and the failure of “special autonomy.”

Additionally, four other points flow from this analysis:

1. **The importance of Indonesian capacity to monitor and analyze trends with regard to violent extremism.** The Mission and/or other donors should ensure that Indonesia has the capacity it needs to monitor and analyze violent extremism. If this capacity is inadequate, USAID and/or other donors should consider supporting the development of university and think tank capacity to monitor and analyze *taklim*, media and internet discourse, local ordinances, and the extremist teaching in schools.

2. **Civic discourse on pluralism and tolerance.** Going forward, it will be more not less important that there are robust and influential mechanisms for informed civic discourse on pluralism, religious freedom, and minority rights. If these are not adequate, USAID should support efforts to have such a dialogue within NU and Muhammadiyah, in high schools and universities, in the media, etc.

3. **Education remains key.** The Mission already recognizes the importance of quality education to Indonesia’s future. From the CVE perspective, it will be important to continue to monitor and improve the quality of education – including civic education – in madrassah and pesantren.

4. **The need for success in Papua.** Addressing the grievances and aspirations of the Papuan people is, perhaps, the last unfinished element of building the Indonesian nation-state. Therefore, although Papua is far from Jakarta, what happens there it is central to the future of democracy and good governance in Indonesia. For this reason, it is important that Special Autonomy – or an improved version of it – work in Papua.

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54 Ibid, pg 17.
support of this, USAID should support monitoring and analysis of Special Autonomy; the identification of reforms needed; political and human rights education; and strengthening connections and dialogue between opinion leaders in Papua and Jakarta.
## ANNEX A: SUMMARY OF DRIVERS OF VE/I IN INDONESIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VE Drivers and Mitigants</th>
<th>Relevance in Indonesia</th>
<th>Current Salience</th>
<th>Trend/Prospective Salience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Socio-economic drivers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Frustrated expectations/relative deprivation</td>
<td>Increasing educational attainment and media connectivity heighten aspirations. Also increasing income inequality, urbanization and rapid social change.</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Likely to continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Social networks and group dynamics</td>
<td>Multiple Islamist transmission belts, including mosques, internet and media, schools and taklim.</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Very likely to continue, with at most limited restrictions by the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Unmet socioeconomic needs</td>
<td>Poverty, high youth unemployment</td>
<td>Low for VIE/Moderate for Papua</td>
<td>Poverty declining, but youth unemployment likely to remain high.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Political drivers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Islamist political aspirations</td>
<td>Both national and transnational Islamists reject “Western” and secular democracy and values and seek to replace them with government based on shari’a law.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very likely to continue, but strategies and tactics will evolve. More reliance on <em>dakwah</em> and more nuanced and strategic use of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Government tolerance of Islamist militancy</td>
<td>Government tolerates Islamist rhetoric and militancy because of a mix of politics, empathy and ineptitude.</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Likely to continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Endemic corruption and elite impunity</td>
<td>Corruption part of the Islamist critique of the political system. Corruption in police also allows extremists to access arms.</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
<td>Likely to continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Historical grievances</td>
<td>In Papua, native Papuans have historical grievances over incorporation into and mistreatment by the Indonesian state.</td>
<td>High/moderate</td>
<td>Likely to continue, but may be less important to younger Papuans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Political/military encroachment  | In Papua, native Papuans resent heavy Indonesian/Javanese political and security presence. | High/Moderate | Likely to continue, but a segment of the Papuan population have strong economic and political ties to Indonesia. 
6. Government repression/HR violations  | In Papua there is a history of repression and HR abuses at the hands of Indonesian security forces. | Moderate | Likely to continue.

## C. Cultural drivers

1. Proactive religious agendas  | Both national and transnational Islamists reject *pancasila*, pluralism and “Western” values and seek adoption of Islamic values and institutions. | High | Islamist religious agendas will continue to be promoted by small groups of committed Islamists through a mix of non-violence and militancy. Continuing Islamization likely to increase the pool of Indonesians receptive to Islamist agendas.
2. “Islam under siege”  | A sizable portion of Indonesian Muslims believe Islam is threatened internationally, and also in Indonesia by Westernization, liberalism, secularism, etc. | Moderate | Likely to continue.

## D. Mitigants/Resiliencies

1. Broad public support for Pancasila and pluralism  | Indonesia’s national ideology and identity value pluralism and tolerance in the context of Muslim-majority society and politics. | High | Likely to continue, but commitment to pluralism and tolerance may gradually decline over time due to Islamization and majoritarian politics.
2. Existence of influential moderate Muslim social organizations  | Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah play important moderating roles. | High Moderate | Likely to continue, but NU and Muhammadiyah’s influence varies depending on leadership and location.
3. Democratic politics provide channels for articulating and addressing grievances without resorting to violence.  | Indonesian democracy is characterized by decentralized governance, significant political/electoral competition, and vibrant civil society and media. Therefore, multiple channels exist to articulate and address grievances in non-violent ways. | Moderate nationally; Moderate/Low in Papua | Nationally, Indonesian democracy is gradually consolidating; but the role of Islam in politics continues to evolve. “Pluralist” parties becoming more Islamic and Islamist parties searching for new strategies and approaches. In Papua, there may be less satisfaction with the outcomes of Indonesia’s “democratic” politics and governance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Fragmented Islamic authority</th>
<th>The absence of hegemonic Islamic authority results in a pluralistic approach to Islam. This gives some space to hardline Islamists, but it also makes it difficult for them to dominate discourse.</th>
<th>Moderate/ Low</th>
<th>Likely to continue.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Government anti-terrorism efforts.</td>
<td>Police relatively successful at apprehending suspected terrorists and degrading the operational capacity of terrorist groups. But government much less committed to curtailing extremism targeted at religious minorities.</td>
<td>Moderate/ low</td>
<td>Likely to continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Armed separatism addressed through political compromise.</td>
<td>Jakarta has responded to separatism by implementing decentralization nation-wide and “special autonomy” in Aceh and Papua.</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Special autonomy seems to be making a difference in Aceh, but to date it has failed as a framework for addressing political, cultural and socio-economic grievances in Papua.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX B: ISLAMIST GROUPS AND OTHER KEY ACTORS

A. Islamist Groups

Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Congregation or JI). JI is an al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization whose main objective is to establish a pan-Islamic republic, incorporating Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines. JI has its roots in the Darul Islam movement, a radical Islamist/anti-colonialist movement founded in Indonesia in the 1940s. JI was founded in Malaysia in 1993, by Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, both men returned to Indonesia, where Abdullah Sungkar established contact with Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network. JI’s violent operations began during the communal conflicts in Maluku and Poso. It shifted its attention to targeting US and Western interests in Indonesia and the wider Southeast Asian region following 9/11 and the start of the US-led war on terror. JI killed hundreds of civilians in the first Bali bombing on October 2002 and it is strongly suspected of carrying out the 2003 JW Marriott hotel bombing, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing, the 2005 Bali bombing and the 2009 JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotel bombings. Over the last five years most of JI’s leaders such as Hambali, Abu Dujana, Azahari Husin, Noordin Top and Dulmatin have either been captured or killed.

In recent years, JI has “moved towards a greater focus on dakwah and education. In many areas its leaders have set up their own dakwah organizations, offering speakers for Friday prayers or broadcasting sermons over the radio… Some fifty Islamic boarding schools, or pesantrens, also remain loosely affiliated to JI and are still the preferred places for JI members to send their own children. They are also places where fugitive mujahidin can generally be assured of refuge… JI’s public face and one of its most influential thinkers is Abu Rusdan — and it is an indication of how this largely clandestine organization has evolved that it even has a public face.

JI’s leaders say they remain as committed to jihad as ever, but that there is no point in martyrdom operations against a much stronger enemy. Mujahidin, they say, need to build up their strength first through training and education and generate community support for jihad through religious outreach (dakwah). JI’s withdrawal from active jihad has created a pool of younger militants, frustrated by this passivity and eager for action. They are thus available for recruitment by other groups, and some found their way to Aceh.

Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) JAT comes closest to being a successor to JI, but it is a very different phenomenon. JAT emerged as a challenge to the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) after a leadership dispute led to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s resignation from the latter in July 2008. It set up an office in Solo as well as regional (wilayah) and district (mudiriyah) branches, mostly on Java but also in Nusa Tenggara Barat. JAT drew on three main pools: former MMI members, JI, and teachers at the Ngruki school.

Ostensibly an above-ground advocacy organisation for the application of Islamic law, JAT has had from the beginning a clandestine military component whose members have taken part in organised military training and occasionally in violence. It exemplifies the blend of jihadism and vigilantism and has a hisbah (morality department), committed to enforcing the amar ma’ruf nahi munkar principle through mass actions. One of JAT’s primary contributions to radicalization has been the sponsorship of taklim across the country by extremist preachers who have encouraged attendees to see the Indonesian government as the enemy. These

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56 JI also established recruiting, training, financial and operational links with militant groups in the Philippines including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Rajah Sulaiman movement (RSM).
58 Ibid, pg 93.
59 Ibid, pg 97.
taklim have replaced Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) as a primary vehicle for recruitment, but it is not so much that preachers identify likely cadres at these meetings as that action-oriented young people can find the leaders they are seeking and form their own cells.

JAT has been hit hard by the Aceh arrests in 2010-11 and its survival may depend on the dynamism of Ba’asyir’s two sons, Abdul Rahim and Rasyid Ridho. In February 2012, the United States designated JAT a foreign terrorist organization.

**Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).** Hizb ut-Tahrir is a transnational Islamist movement that has been active in Indonesia since the early 1980s. It openly proclaimed its existence in the political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia in 2000 by calling itself the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Its objective is to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state that would be merged into a global caliphate or Muslim superstate. HTI views Indonesia’s existing political system as illegitimate and thus refuses to participate in the general elections. It is anti-Western and rejects capitalism, democracy, liberalism and pluralism. Unusually for a radical group, HTI strictly eschews violence, though its rhetoric is often strident and inflammatory. HTI also opposes terrorism, but contrives to depict terrorist attacks that have taken place in Indonesia as the result of Western manipulation and conspiracies. Although HTI retains some elements of the clandestine life it led when it was first set up, it has provoked surprisingly little hostility from the Indonesian political mainstream or security authorities.

According to Ken Ward:

> [HTI] is likely to continue to grow and remain the source of a powerful critique of Indonesia’s status quo. It seems clear that HTI’s outreach to mainstream politicians and organisations is effective in enhancing its legitimacy, and that its view of the world provides a compelling ‘meta-narrative’ for its supporters. HTI’s strategy, combining radical ideology, vitriolic rhetoric and nonviolent action, is a formidable one that may allow it to continue growing in a country where 62 percent of Indonesians have said that the West is bad for the Muslim community. But its members will have to be exceptionally patient and steadfast given that their objective is so ambitious and that there is no evidence that it can be soon achieved.

**Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front or FPI).** FPI was founded in 1998, apparently with the backing from military and police generals. The organization’s aim is the implementation of shari’a law in Indonesia. It is loosely organized with offices around the country open membership totaling perhaps 150,000. For years the FPI has attacked businesses, bars, brothels and people they deem to be violating Islamic law. Recently, hundreds of FPI members demonstrated against Jakarta’s Christian deputy governor-elect, calling on the City Council to revoke all bylaws granting him authority to oversee Islamic institutions and affairs.

**Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council or MMI).** Founded in Yogyakarta in 2000, MMI is an umbrella organization for political parties, NGOs, civil society organizations, and individuals committed to transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state. MMI sees the enforcement of the shari’a as an action necessary to resolve the problems afflicting Indonesia. MMI was led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, on whom was bestowed the title *Amirul Mujahidin* (“the leader of holy warriors”). MMI publishes conspiracy-laden and vehemently anti-Semitic and anti-American books through Wihdah Press and its own magazine, *Risalah Mujahidin*, lobbies political officials, and in 2001 and 2003, held high-profile national conferences. Muhammad Jibril, son of Jemaah Islamiyah leader Muhammad Iqbal Abdurrahman, runs Ar-Rahman Media, its multimedia publishing house.

**Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (LMI).** LMI is a paramilitary wing of MMI.

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60 Hasan, pg 126  
61 Ward, pg 149.  
It is important to note that among these and other militant groups there is what the ICG has termed an “interlocking directorate of radical movements in the metropolitan Jakarta area and beyond.” 63 According to Bernard Plattdasch:

Members of these organizations tend to be connected through holding more than one membership at the same time. The secretary general of Forum Umat Islam (FUI), for example, was HTI deputy-chairman Mohammad al-Khatthath. The chairman of FUI is Mashadi, a DDII member and a founding member and former MP of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice Prosperity Party, PKS, then Partai Keadilan, Justice Party or PK), now Indonesia’s leading Islamist party…Hizbut Tahrir has…shown few qualms about building an enduring alliance with the more militant FPI, whose members have regularly carried out raids on nightlife spots, churches they declare to be constructed illegally, and Ahmadiyah-owned property. FPI activists, in turn, have provided the security personnel for FUI demonstrations.64

B. Other Key Actors

Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. As noted above, Indonesia’s two large Muslim social organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah both embrace pluralism and reject militancy, terrorism and intolerance. However, they differ on where the danger posed by VIE lies. According to ICG:

For NU, the problem is salafism, the ultra-puritan stream of Islam that not only preaches intolerance toward non-Muslims but also regards NU’s traditional practices as *bid'a* (unwarranted innovations) Salafis (as opposed to the more political salafi jihadis) may not use violence, it argues, but they employ “psychological terrorism” by accusing NU members of not being real Muslims. Many Muhammadiyah members in rural areas see anyone fighting for Islamic law as deserving of support, even if they may not agree with the tactics used.65 Some in Muhammadiyah see PKS as the problem, an organization that has moved into Muhammadiyah schools and mosques.66

Islamist political parties. What exactly constitutes an Islamic party in Indonesia is subject to debate. Of the 38 parties contesting the 2009 national elections, ten can be regarded as “Islamic” because they have either a formal ideological basis in Islam or rely on an overtly Islamic identity for most of their support. These 10 Islamic parties fall into two broad categories: Islamist and pluralist. Islamist parties formally proclaim an Islamic identity and seek, to varying degrees, to apply Islamic law more extensively in politics and society. All Islamist parties list Islam as their ideological foundation and many have policies for greater *shari'a* implementation. By contrast, pluralist Islamic parties have as their basis the religiously neutral state ideology of Pancasila and eschew pro-*shari'a* agendas. While not ideologically Islamic, religious identity is nonetheless a primary factor in their electoral support and most are embedded in particular sections of the Muslim community.67

Islamic parties such as the PKB and the PAN, and the mass organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah they are respectively affiliated with, have seen their political influence constantly dwindle in the last few years. Likewise, more radically oriented Islamist parties have failed to mobilize the electorate and consequently saw their share of votes decline considerably in the general elections in April 2009… The most successful Islamist party of the 2004 elections, the PKS, increased its share of votes only marginally from 7.3% to 7.8% between 2004 and 2009. The results, however, were still a far cry from the anticipated 15% to

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64 Plattdasch, pg 9.
65 ICG, “From Vigilantism to Terrorism,” pg 11.
According to Michael Buehler, “the weak cohesion of political parties and the new pressures such organizations have become exposed to in recent years, have made it difficult to engage in programmatic politics. Both Islamic and Islamist parties (as well as secular parties) depend on clientelistic strategies to mobilize the electorate. This greatly undermines their Islamic message and credibility.”

But according to Greg Fealy, “Islam’s role in Indonesian politics is changing rapidly, and it would be wrong to assume that the declining Islamic party vote signals the disappearance of faith as a political factor. Rather, the 2009 elections show that Islam’s impact is more diffuse and subtle than before and it can no longer regarded as the exclusive preserve of Islamic parties. All of the major non-Islamic parties combine Islamic appeals in their campaign messages.”

**The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulema or MUI).** The MUI was founded in 1975 with a mandate to advise the Indonesian government on Muslim affairs and to function as its liaison with the Muslim community. Its actual purpose was to buttress the Soeharto regime’s Islamic legitimacy by rubber-stamping its religious and social policies. MUI is not an official body; rather it is something of a hybrid in that it is government funded, but not controlled…Unlike similar organizations in neighboring Malaysia and Singapore, MUI does not speak for the government. Its *fatwa* are purely advisory and it does not have the authority of power to enforce them…The Indonesian government ignores MUI pronouncements it disagrees with, but rarely criticizes it directly.

Since the democratic transition of 1998 MUI has become much more independent. It presents itself as an official body and the voice of the Indonesian Muslim community as a whole. MUI is self-regulating. Because it strives for inclusiveness, conservative and Islamist groups are over represented. A loose coalition of radical organizations that has effectively captured the *fatwa* council and uses it to advance intolerant and *Shari’ah* centered agendas. It has drifted steadily in a conservative direction but has consistently condemned anti-state terrorism. This has led critics to conclude that MUI is an authoritarian and unrepresentative body without legitimate authority. NU and Muhammadiyah have their own *fatwa* councils and do not take MUI rulings seriously. The current Indonesian administration is more inclined to consider MUI advice than earlier post-Suharto governments because it depends on Islamist groups, including PKS, for parliamentary support.

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69 Ibid, pg 60.
70 Fealy, “Indonesia’s Islamic parties in decline,” 2009.
72 Ibid.
ANNEX C: WORKS CITED


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