COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A DECISION-MAKERS’ GUIDE

MARCH 2013

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This decision-makers’ guide to CBNRM in southern Africa is based on a series of stocktaking reports on CBNRM in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe as well as a draft report consolidating the findings of these stocktaking assessments. Ideas, insights and material from the authors of these reports (see section 8: Further Reading) are therefore incorporated in this decision-makers’ guide. A number of other reviews of CBNRM in southern Africa also provided a source of useful material and ideas (see References section).
**ABBREVIATIONS**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADMADE</td>
<td>Administrative Management Design Program for Game Management Areas</td>
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<td>BERDO</td>
<td>Bwanje Environmental and Rural Development Organization</td>
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<td>BVC</td>
<td>Beach Village Committee</td>
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<td>CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources</td>
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<td>CBA</td>
<td>Community-based Adaptation (to Climate change)</td>
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<td>CBE</td>
<td>Community-Based Enterprise</td>
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<td>CBFM</td>
<td>Community-Based Forest Management</td>
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<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community-Based Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community Driven Development</td>
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<td>CHA</td>
<td>Controlled Hunting Area</td>
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<td>CRB</td>
<td>Community Resources Board</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>GMA</td>
<td>Game Management Area</td>
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<td>HH</td>
<td>Household</td>
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<tr>
<td>HWC</td>
<td>Human Wildlife Conflict</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>International Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>JV</td>
<td>Joint Venture</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIFE</td>
<td>Living in a Finite Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>Natural Resources Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTFP</td>
<td>Non Timber Forest Product</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Protected Area</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rural District Council</td>
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<td>SABA</td>
<td>Sapitwa Beekeepers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAFIRE</td>
<td>Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMIF</td>
<td>Sustainable Management of Indigenous Forests</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAG</td>
<td>Village Action Group</td>
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<td>VNRMC</td>
<td>Village Natural Resources Management Committee</td>
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USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WMA  Wildlife Management Authority/Area
ZAWA  Zambia Wildlife Authority
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) has been implemented across Southern Africa for the past 25 years. Recent “stocktaking” reviews of CBNRM in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe indicate that although results are mixed, CBNRM has delivered positive conservation, rural development and governance impacts. The stocktaking reports and other regional and country reviews strongly indicate that positive impacts have been achieved where the key principles of CBNRM have been put into government policy and legislation. In contrast, where policy, legislation and implementation approaches have significantly compromised on these principles, CBNRM is failing to deliver the expected impacts.

The following are the key principles that emerge as being crucial for success:

1) In order to take management decisions, communities require rights over their land and resources, so that they can control access to resources and how they are used. They also need security of tenure (i.e. the knowledge that these rights will not be arbitrarily removed by government and are secure over time).

2) In order to take management decisions and in order to manage the distribution of benefits, communities need strong representative and accountable institutions. These institutions require members who have solid financial and organizational management skills.

3) Communities must be able to derive appropriate benefits from the resources that they manage. It is unlikely they will invest time, effort and finances into managing a resource if the benefits of management do not exceed the costs.

CBNRM therefore rests on the following assumptions: If a resource is valuable and communities have the exclusive rights to use, benefit from and manage the resource, then sustainable management is likely to ensue. The benefits from management must exceed the perceived costs and must be secure over time.

Across the region CBNRM has led to the generation of income for local communities. Generally, communities are using their CBNRM income for social projects, community infrastructure such as class rooms and buildings for clinics and support to the aged and the needy. In some cases, communities pay cash dividends to households or individual members. Where jobs are created through trophy hunting and tourism and where community members develop successful enterprises, CBNRM contributes to reducing poverty. CBNRM also helps to reduce poverty by empowering communities to manage their own affairs. Overall CBNRM has the potential to support rural development through:

- Generating new and additional discretionary income at community level for social welfare or other purposes such as infrastructure development;
- Providing jobs and additional income for some residents
- Increasing household assets (e.g. extra cash to buy a plough, a fridge or radio) and community assets (e.g. a vehicle for transport or community meeting hall)
- Providing land use diversification options in semi-arid and arid areas
- Providing livelihood diversification options for some residents
Building skills and capacity

Empowering marginalized and disenfranchised rural people through devolved decision making, fiscal devolution, improved advocacy and institutional development

Supporting local safety nets

Promoting sustainable natural resource management

Strengthening or building local institutions for common property resource management and driving local development

Because CBNRM gives value to habitats, it increased the incentives for local populations to protect the habitats and strengthen biodiversity. This increased value is reflected in the stabilization or growth of wildlife numbers in some countries where land has been set aside for community-based wildlife management and tourism. Given that wildlife management is less vulnerable to drought and other climatic conditions, CBNRM can be an important part of community-based adaptation to climate change.

The potential of CBNRM is not always being met across the region as the lessons and best practices have not been uniformly applied. There is much that policy makers and decision-makers can do to improve the positive impacts of CBNRM on economic growth, climatic adaptation, environmental health, and responsible local governance. This includes the following:

- Through legislation provide communities with clear and secure rights over land and resources and the ability to exclude others
- Develop CBNRM policies and legislation that allow communities to receive benefits that outweigh the costs of management – this could mean reassessing polices that provide for revenue sharing by government
- As a corollary of the above, ensure that those bearing the highest costs of resource management earn the highest benefit from their management inputs – government should raise income for the national benefit through normal taxes on wildlife-based businesses
- Promote the development of markets for natural resource products
- Commit sufficient financial and human resources to the provision of appropriate technical support and facilitation to build community capacity to manage their resources, develop business skills and manage their own organizations
- Ensure the development and implementation of monitoring systems that provide appropriate information for adaptive natural resource management, policy review and revision, and clear indications of progress or constraints

By putting in place these steps, policy makers and decision-makers can develop CBNRM as a powerful tool for conservation and rural development in southern Africa – a tool that can be incorporated into national development strategies and programs in order to complement existing development approaches. There are examples of this within the Southern African region.
1. CBNRM AND ITS ORIGINS

1.1 CBNRM DEFINED

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is a modern term that has emerged in general environmental and development usage over the past 25 years or so. However, it should be acknowledged that CBNRM is nothing really new. It is simply what rural communities have been doing for millennia. Through local institutions such as traditional leadership, religious beliefs and cultural norms, people managed their natural resources. In many cases, however, these institutions, norms and rules have become weakened by factors such as colonialism, centralization of authority in government, weakening of traditional authorities, population increase, war, etc. What is new about modern CBNRM activities is that they reaffirm the importance of community management of natural resources and attempt to create or recreate the conditions under which such management can successfully take place.

The following can be regarded as the essential elements of community-based natural resources management (Jones 2007):

a) **Management is based in a community.** It is difficult to define a “community” partly because there is clear differentiation within groups of people based on wealth, gender, age, status, main economic activity etc. However, experience shows that under the right set of circumstances, groups of people can cooperate to manage natural resources at the local level. Experience also shows that people need to choose to cooperate together to take collective decisions. This means that the community, or group of resource users, should be self-defining.

b) **CBNRM encompasses natural resources,** which generally mean renewable natural resources, including water, forests, fisheries, rangeland and wildlife (i.e. the resources people depend upon for their livelihoods).

c) **CBNRM involves management.** This implies that there should be some rules or regulations governing how, when, or in what quantity the resource can be used. These rules do not need to be written or contained in a legal document, but must be understood and agreed to by the resource users, and recognized and respected beyond the community.

CBNRM is often associated with communities receiving benefits from the use of different resources, particularly wildlife and forest products. However, from the above, it can be seen that CBNRM is primarily about the management of natural resources by groups of resource users. Benefits come from good management, but there is also a feedback loop. The expectation of continued benefits into the future becomes an incentive to maintain good management. This implies that benefits need to be earned by communities not received as hand-outs from the government. In order for CBNRM to be successful, a number of key conditions need to be in place (Jones 2007; Jones and Murphree 2004):

1) In order to take management decisions, communities need rights over their land and resources, so that they can control access to resources and how they are used. They also need security of tenure (i.e. the knowledge that these rights will not be arbitrarily removed by government and are secure over time).

2) In order to take management decisions and in order to manage the distribution of benefits, communities need representative and accountable institutions.
3) Communities must be able to derive appropriate benefits from the resources they are managing. They will be unlikely to invest time, effort and finances into managing a resource if the benefits of management do not exceed the costs.

CBNRM therefore rests on the following assumptions: *If a resource is valuable and communities have the exclusive rights to use, benefit from and manage the resource, then sustainable management is likely to ensue. The benefits from management must exceed the perceived costs and must be secure over time.*

Box 1 below summarizes the essence of CBNRM.

**Box 1. CBNRM at a glance**

At its core CBNRM aims to create the right incentives for an identified, defined group of resource users within defined areas to use natural resources sustainably. These incentives include enabling the resource users to realize tangible and intangible benefits from resource use and providing strong rights and tenure over land and the resource. CBNRM also aims to support the development of appropriate institutions and institutional arrangements for groups of resource users to control resource use.

CBNRM promotes conservation through the sustainable use of natural resources, enables communities to generate income that can be used for rural development and promotes democracy and good governance in local institutions.

In Southern Africa, most countries have introduced programs that aim to put the above conditions in place. Generally within Southern Africa, the objective of such programs has been the devolution of authority over natural resources (particularly wildlife and forests) from the state to defined groups of resource users on communal land.

It should be recognized that CBNRM is a strategy, whether applied as a conservation or rural development tool. It is not necessarily the appropriate strategy or tool for dealing with all conservation or rural development problems.

**1.2 ORIGINS OF CBNRM**

In the pre-colonial era, natural resource management (NRM) was largely regulated by traditional leaders, who allocated and designated land for different uses, decreed rules and regulations, and granted permission for extractive use (e.g., hunting, cutting trees for lumber). In the late 1800s and early 1900s, most of the traditional NRM arrangements were replaced by centralized command and control systems imposed by colonial governments. In most cases, post-independence governments perpetuated these centralized systems during the 1960s and 1970s. Overall, local leaders and communities were disempowered and no longer had the authority to manage their natural resources.

At the same time, governments often did not have the capacity to regulate the resources they claimed authority over. This situation, combined with high population growth often resulted in increased pressures on natural resources, loss of productivity of the land, loss of biodiversity, and encroachment on protected areas (PA).
CBNRM emerged as an attempt to address loss of biodiversity and land degradation by restoring some degree of control over land and natural resources to local communities. It is partly based on evidence from the practice of common property resource management which demonstrated that groups of resource users could manage resources sustainably if certain conditions were in place, particularly the right to take decisions regarding use of the resource (e.g. Ostrom 1990, Berkes 1989). This evidence also showed that the proper role for the government was as a partner who supported local communities in establishing and enforcing management rules.

In southern Africa CBNRM first emerged strongly through the Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) program in Zimbabwe. Participants derived positive benefits from the wildlife sector via trophy hunting and quotas for local use. Lessons and experience from these successes were replicated and adapted in Zambia’s Administrative Management Design Program for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) program, Botswana’s Natural Resource Management Program (NRMP) and later in Namibia’s communal conservancies supported by the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) program. Malawi and Mozambique also adopted many elements of participatory NRM or CBNRM in the 1990s, focusing more on forestry and non-timber forest products rather than wildlife.

A number of donors embraced CBNRM and provided substantial funds to support an array of programs in the southern Africa region. Major donors included the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). As a result of the positive contribution of CBNRM to conservation and rural development, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement recognizes CBNRM as an important conservation strategy. The protocol commits SADC states to establishing or introducing “mechanisms for community-based wildlife management” (SADC 1999:9).

1.3 THE TWO MAIN TYPES OF CBNRM

In Southern Africa two major forms of CBNRM have emerged. A major focus has been Formal CBNRM where a typical approach has been to establish or strengthen community-based structures that are legally recognized and to grant these structures conditional rights over resource use and management, including commercial uses that may involve partnerships with private sector companies. This form of CBNRM is usually characterized by the devolution of resource rights by the State to community structures and is mostly based on wildlife utilization, wildlife-based tourism and/or forestry.

The second major type of CBNRM in Southern Africa is Informal CBNRM where communities are using natural resources according to their own, often customary or traditional rules, and are able to exclude others without external intervention. In these circumstances, government may explicitly or implicitly recognize community authority to manage the resources or may simply not be in a position to intervene.

Mauambeta and Kafakoma (2010) draw a distinction between what they call organic and inorganic or imposed CBNRM. Organic CBNRM is defined as NRM that evolved within or emanated from a local community; it is often driven by traditional leaders, similar to informal CBNRM described above. Inorganic CBNRM is initially driven (or even imposed) by external stakeholders, and is often the product of donor funding. The lesson from Malawi is that organic CBNRM initiatives based on traditional values, beliefs and systems are very likely to be successful. In contrast, inorganic CBNRM
success requires a high quality capacity building component and a clear exit strategy. In general, strong leadership at the community level, but also at local and central government levels is essential for the attainment of CBNRM goals. In Namibia the national CBNRM program has characteristics of formal CBNRM that is also to some extent organic. The program is based on devolution of rights over wildlife and tourism from the state to communities, has been supported by donors, and has had a high quality capacity building component. However it is also based on demands by communities for rights over and benefits from wildlife established during socio-ecological surveys carried out by government and NGOs in several communal areas in the early 1990s. The development of CBNRM policy and legislation grew from these demands.

2. SOME KEY ASPECTS OF CBNRM

2.1 DIVERSIFICATION OF LAND USES

Often people think of wildlife utilization and agriculture and livestock farming as competing forms of land use, where one must be practiced at the expense of the others. However, this need not be the case. CBNRM provides the opportunity for communities to diversify their land uses and make their own choices about which mix of land uses they prefer. Throughout Southern Africa, CBNRM has added wildlife\(^1\) and tourism to the land uses already practiced at the community level - it does not aim to replace livestock and cultivation with wildlife and tourism.

It is clear however, that in the past wildlife and tourism have been undervalued as land uses on communal land yet have thrived on freehold land where the land owners had the right to manage and benefit from wildlife and tourism. Governments have focused mainly on the traditional rural mainstays of livestock and agriculture, often heavily subsidizing these activities. This has denied communal area residents access to and benefits from wildlife and tourism. However, wildlife and tourism can be productive forms of land use on communal land, particularly in more marginal areas and those less suited to cultivation.

Arntzen et al (2007) reviewed the existing economic analyses of wildlife and livestock as land uses across the region and found that generally these land uses were complementary, rather than directly competitive and each has comparative advantages in certain areas. Economically efficient land use and development planning should therefore include both. Wildlife operations are most appropriate in areas that have high-value species, sufficient wildlife density, low human populations, low livestock densities and good accessibility to the main tourism markets. Livestock production should concentrate on areas with proper market access and limited/less attractive wildlife resources (Arntzen et al 2007).

At the same time however, mixing livestock and wildlife as land uses can be advantageous for local communities who in any case diversify land uses and livelihood strategies as a means of coping with risk in arid environments with uncertain rainfall. Wildlife and tourism can provide important additional income in times of drought when crops fail and livestock are weak or dying. However

\(^1\) In particular CBNRM in Southern Africa has focused to a large extent on trophy hunting and its associated monetary benefits and this has been one of the more successful elements of CBNRM in the region.
crops and livestock will, for example, remain the mainstay for communities when national or international political or economic instability reduce tourism activity.

2.2 RE-EMPOWERMENT

Section 1.2 above, described how communities were disempowered by centralization of authority over natural resources initially by colonial governments. CBNRM provides opportunities for decentralization and re-empowering local communities through restoring rights and responsibilities over natural resources. Empowerment has been achieved through the following:

- Providing communities with secure rights over land and resources through legislation;
- Enabling communities to retain the income from sustainable resource use and enabling them to choose how to use this income;
- Supporting the development of accountable community institutions that can take decisions on behalf of local residents/resource users;
- Providing appropriate training and skills development to enable communities to manage their resources and engage in business activities.

2.3 UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS

There are some basic economic principles that form the foundation of CBNRM:

1) People are unlikely to invest time and effort in conserving something that belongs to someone else and over which they have no control;
2) People are unlikely to invest time and effort in conserving resources if the benefits of management do not exceed the costs;
3) Those people that bear the highest costs of management should receive the greatest benefits (particularly where people suffer costs from Human wildlife Conflict (HWC);
4) The management of resources is likely to become less efficient and less effective if decision-making is removed from the level at which the resources occur;
5) Wildlife and tourism in particular can provide important new and additional sources of community income, which in the past were denied to them for the reasons stated above.

The major implication of these principles is that CBNRM will be severely weakened or much less likely to succeed where:

- Communities do not have legal rights over land and resources and the ability to exclude others;
- CBNRM policies and legislation do not enable communities to receive sufficient benefit to outweigh the costs of management;
- Benefits from resource use are spread across the whole country or a whole district to people who are not bearing the costs of managing the resource;
- Markets for NR products are weak or non-existent.
2.4 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT SCALE

CBNRM focuses on small-scale social units of management as these are likely to be more effective in managing resources because of the possibility of continuous interaction between members of the management unit (Murphree 2000a). However, small units of management do not provide the appropriate scale for meeting the challenges of ‘fugitive’ resources such as wildlife, and particularly species such as elephants, which move across large areas of land, sometimes from national parks into communal land and even across international borders.

For these reasons it is important to find ways to manage some resources at a larger scale than the local level. Community conserved areas with rights over land and resources can form the building blocks for managing resources at larger scales, particularly in conjunction with protected areas.

In addition, small-scale management units, even if given authority by the state, do not act in isolation of the state. In the case of most CBNRM institutions in Southern Africa, the state retains various degrees of control over resources itself, which it has not devolved to the local management units. It is therefore important to provide appropriate mechanisms for some form of collaborative management between government wildlife and forestry agencies and community institutions. This can be achieved through formal agreements which allocate roles and responsibilities or through the development of joint management plans for resources in a landscape or for the landscape itself.

In this way, small-scale community conserved areas can combine with each other to manage resources, particularly wildlife, over larger areas of land. They can also combine with neighbouring protected areas to manage shared resources, particularly where there are no fences between parks and community areas, which is the case in several southern African countries. Increasingly protected area managers are realising the need to develop collaborative management partnerships with neighbouring communities in a protected landscape approach and that community-based institutions play an important foundation for this partnership (Brown et al 2005).

Box 2 below provides an example of how scaling up to the landscape level can take place with full community involvement.

**Box 2. Managing at Scale in Caprivi Namibia**

In the Mudumu North Complex (MNC) in Caprivi Region, Namibia, protected areas (PAs) and neighbouring communal area conservancies and community forests have combined to manage wildlife and other resources jointly. They carry out joint game monitoring and annual game counts, joint anti-poaching patrols, joint fire management and meet every month to coordinate activities. They take measures to identify and maintain wildlife movement corridors between communal land and protected areas and across international boundaries. This cooperation is based on recognition by all parties that they share the same resources and need to collaborate to ensure these resources are conserved and used sustainably (Jones 2010). Recently the MNC combined with another grouping of conservancies and a PA to form the Mudumu Protected Landscape Conservation Area Association, which also includes private sector tourism operators and officials from relevant government agencies.
3. CURRENT AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF CBNRM

CBNRM generates impacts across four main areas: Tenure rights and responsibilities (or empowerment), institutions and governance at the community level, building and managing the natural resource base, and various forms of economic benefit. These areas can be considered as the four pillars of CBNRM. The following provide an overview of these impacts across the region with some examples of successes drawn from different countries.

3.1 TENURE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Policy and legislation that guarantee local community rights to benefit from natural resources have been developed in most southern African countries in the past twenty five years. In Malawi, access to natural resources is considered a right for all citizens and this right is enshrined in the constitution (Mauambeta & Kafakoma, 2010). The National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1992 gives communities the right to participate in, and make decisions with respect to managing wildlife in Protected Areas. In the forest sector, rights have been granted to communities via the Department of Forestry Policy and Act of 1996 and 1997, respectively; the framework that embraces CBNRM was further reinforced by the community-based forest management (CBFM) policy supplement of 2001. At present, communities can hang beehives in many Forest Reserves; in others, they can collect resources such as thatching grass and firewood for subsistence purposes. In the fisheries sector, Beach Village Committees (BVCs) and traditional authorities have developed and enforce by-laws with respect to open and closed seasons, fishing gear, and mesh sizes. Overall, these rights are guided by the Fisheries Management and Aquaculture Policy of 2001.

Many stakeholders in Zimbabwe have observed that the current legislation does not go far enough in granting rights to local communities. Wildlife management rights have been devolved to Rural District Councils (RDCs), but “producer” communities do not benefit from these same rights (Mazambani & Dembetembe, 2010). Communities are consulted during the quota-setting process and they decide on how to use allocated revenue from trophy hunting and tourism. They are not, however, consulted on contracts with safari operators which are established and signed by RDCs; in some cases, this non-consultation has led to conflict.

There has been some facilitation of CBFM by the Forestry Commission in the western part of the country, but these initiatives are not enabled by legislation. Some community rights have been reclaimed through co-management arrangements whereby the use of forest resources – thatch, grazing land, medicinal plants, wild fruit, and honey – for subsistence purposes is granted. The Communal Lands Forest Produce Act of 1987 allows RDCs to grant permits to local communities for commercial use of natural resources. The southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources (SAFIRE) has used this opportunity to develop Non-timber Forest Products (NTFP) Community-based Enterprises (CBEs),
producing for example natural beverages, jam, and vegetables. This is equivalent to granting economic rights. Results have included a sense of resource ownership and acceptance of some management responsibility which are, in turn, reinforced by the economic benefit incentive.

In Zambia, the Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998 established the rights of local communities to use and manage natural resources in Game Management Areas (GMAs) and open areas. These rights include developing management plans, in consultation with the Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), on the integrated use of natural resources – plans that are expected to reconcile different land uses within GMAs. To exercise NRM rights, communities must apply to ZAWA for registration as CRBs (Nyirenda, 2010). CRBs are then divided into smaller Village Action Groups (VAGs). In the fisheries sector, local communities have rights to 25% of fish levy revenues via zonal committees. There has also been some encouragement of a sense of forest ownership and establishment of joint ventures with the private sector via the 1998 National Forest Policy. Legislation does guarantee the right to access and use NTFPs. Forestry legislation makes provision for Joint Forest Management Agreements between the government and communities, but has not been implemented except in a few pilot areas. The result is that communities cannot meaningfully engage in forest management and it is difficult for them to derive income from the sustainable use of forest products. Large timber harvesting concessions are provided to the private sector without any provision for community benefit.

CRB rights include the negotiation of co-management agreements, in collaboration with ZAWA, with hunting companies and photographic tour operators. CRBs specify the benefits that should accrue to them in these agreements. CRBs also participate in setting wildlife quotas, including the quota that is retained for GMA residents; they have the right to manage the wildlife within these quotas. CRBs also have rights to a share of revenue generated by wildlife utilization: 45% of animal fees and 20% of concession fees are allocated to them as community funds. The allocation of the revenue to communities is often slow and not very transparent. According to official policy, the use of these funds must be divided between wildlife management activities (45%), community projects (35%), and CRB administration (20%). Some stakeholders maintain that the transfer of NRM governance and rights to local communities is still generally insufficient. In addition, the Wildlife Act does not clearly define the use rights of CRBs and ZAWA mostly drives management activities and decision-making. Communities have realized that they play an important role in wildlife management and have started to demand a higher percentage of income.

The 1995 policy and 1996 legislation with respect to conservancies granted wildlife and tourism benefit rights to local communities in Namibia. Other natural resource sectors subsequently followed suite. Under the conservancy law, local communities have rights to manage “huntable” game for their own use; no quotas are legally required for this wildlife category (Jones, 2010) although the Ministry of Environment and Tourism encourages quota setting for its own control purposes. Conservancies may buy and sell game and may also establish contracts with trophy hunting companies for their trophy hunting quota. Similarly, they can contract with tourism companies to establish lodges or other tourism facilities within a joint venture framework. A tender process is usually followed in which conservancies stipulate that companies submitting tenders must address issues such as training of conservancy members to management level, establishment of a joint management committee with the conservancy, etc. In some cases conservancies are owners of the lodge infrastructure or joint shareholders in the tourism company. This approach to tourism in conservancies has been reinforced by the 2008 National Tourism Policy (but there is currently no legislation that supports the approach). Income from tourism and trophy hunting is received and managed directly by the conservancies with no interference from government.
Secure rights and tenure over land and resources are crucial for successful CBNRM. However in southern Africa, these rights are generally weak. Communal land is usually owned by the State. Government often retains considerable rights to decision-making over wildlife and large timber concessions are mostly controlled by government with few community rights or benefits. However, some countries are taking the lead in providing rights to communities:

Fisheries Conservation and Management Regulations in Malawi provide for empowerment of Beach Village Committees to scrutinize licenses, enforce fishing regulations and closed seasons, seize vessels, formulate and review regulations, and undertake environmental conservation. Legislation in Namibia gives communal area conservancies ownership over some species of game, enables conservancies to buy and sell game and enables them to retain all income and decide how to use it. The Land Law in Mozambique is the most advanced in the region, giving communities the opportunity to gain title and secure tenure over their land.

These rights-based approaches are the most likely to lead to long-term CBNRM success.

The Forest Act (no. 12) of 2001 enables representative community groups in Namibia to enter into a written agreement with government to establish community forests. After development of management plans, communities can manage and use forest products and control the grazing of livestock in the forest areas. Similarly, the Water Act No. 24 of 2004 grants rights to communities for the establishment of water point user or local water user associations. These associations put in place committees that are responsible for managing and maintaining the water resources, including management of finances. Charges for water management are established on a cost recovery basis.

Since the mid-1990s, the Mozambican government has recognized that local communities need to have a voice in NRM. Policies have been established requiring those who seek logging rights, land titles and safari licenses for a given tract of land to consult with the local communities who traditionally own or use the area (Brouwer, 2011). Moreover, for simple logging licenses and forest concessions, communities can block the activities in their traditional territories if they are not in agreement. However, there is generally a lack of compliance with the legislation (Forest and Wildlife Law of 1999) and improvement in the consultation process is needed. Communities can also apply for communal logging licenses and concessions; the Nipiodi community is the first to have been successful in obtaining a concession. In addition, the 1997 Land Law allows for communal land ownership. By early 2009, 337 communities had obtained this recognition from the State and had demarcated their lands. However, this only represents about 10% of the communities in Mozambique. The low percentage is probably due to several hurdles including cost and low capacity of human resources. Costs for the community land registration process generally range from US$2,000 to US$8,000 and are usually covered by supporting NGOs.

Although the government retains overall wildlife ownership rights, communities in Botswana are able to obtain wildlife quotas in Controlled Hunting Areas through policy directives. These quotas are usually sold to safari companies (Mbaiwa, 2011). This right dates to 1986 when the Wildlife Conservation Policy sub-divided Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) into Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs) that could be allocated to CBOs (through district-level Land Boards). CBOs normally receive 15-year leases for CHAs and possess management and use rights in the CHAs during this period. Options for managing the CHAs include community management, sub-leasing resource use rights to safari hunting and tourism companies (for a fee), and Joint Venture Partnerships where the local community holds shares in the partner company.

The sub-lease arrangement is the most common due, probably, to a lack of expertise and skills, as well as the capital needed to develop tourism activities. However in a few cases CBOs have entered...
into partnerships with tourism companies in the ownership and management of tourism developments. These arrangements are more empowering for communities but expose them to a higher degree of financial risk. Communities also have the right to harvest veld products in communal lands, provided they obtain a permit. In the CHAs, communities have use and commercialization rights for veld products (via the lease agreements with the Land Boards).

Originally the CBOs were able to retain all their wildlife and tourism income and decide how they wanted to use it, but the CBNRM Policy of 2007 directs communities to return 65% of income to a national trust fund. The money in the fund could be used to support other communities or the community earning the income could apply to get it back. This breaks the key link between benefit output and management input. According to Poteete (2009) the centralized collection and redistribution of wildlife revenues contradicts the logic of CBNRM, weakens incentives for conservation and disempowers the CBOs. The vetting of applications for disbursements from the fund also implies a loss of discretionary authority for CBOs which will have to satisfy centrally set priorities for the use of income. Government has also suspended the registration of single village CBOs, removing a key element of community choice.

3.2 INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE

Overall CBNRM in the region is helping to promote rural democracy through devolved use rights over natural resources to community institutions, devolved decision-making, the need to make decisions about the use of income, improved advocacy, and institutional development. The process of developing community institutions for NRM can be important in promoting democracy. This process usually includes the election of community representatives and the involvement of community members in developing constitutions that define the rights and responsibilities of the members and community management committees. Annual general meetings and the approval of budgets by community members also promote community involvement and decision-making.

CBNRM has also played an important role in enabling women to take up leadership positions in community institutions, gain new skills to take on new responsibilities such as financial management. Table 1 shows the number of community institutions across the region, the number of individuals or households involved and the impact on women’s empowerment.

These experiments in rural democracy have not been without challenges. In several cases CBO committees have taken all the major decisions themselves without involving members. In several countries there have been examples of mismanagement of funds in CBOs, including fraud. This was one of the main reasons stated by Botswana for removing the right of CBOs to retain all the income from wildlife use and tourism. In Zambia, particularly before the introduction of the CRBS, chiefs were capturing many of the benefits resulting from government revenue sharing with communities. In Namibia some conservancy committee members were awarding themselves large loans from community funds and in some conservancies large sums of money went missing.

One response to these governance problems is to call for more government regulation and interventions in CBO affairs. However one of the most important lessons to emerge from CBNRM in Southern Africa is that CBOs need time to experiment with different forms of governance to find out what works and what doesn’t.

In Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE communities such as Masoka and Mahenye, have gone through ups and downs in their local governance, but over time, sometimes with supportive external assistance, have managed to overcome their problems without the need for government regulation. This has also been happening in some areas of Namibia where there has been a clear evolution from situations where
committees were taking all the decisions, financial management was weak and members did not know what was happening to their money.

Over the past few years conservancy members in the Caprivi region have been demanding more accountability from their committees and removing committees that do not act in the interests of the members. At the same time there were major efforts by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to help conservancies improve their financial management and to improve the transparency of decision-making.

This is another important lesson – that good governance in CBOs needs appropriate external support to help create the conditions for the emergence of transparency and accountability. However, good governance cannot easily be imposed from outside – it needs to come from within. This is more likely when the income being received by CBOs is relatively high, or is perceived to be significant by community members. When this is the case, the community members take much more interest in what is being done with their money by CBO committees and are more likely to want to invest time and effort in becoming involved in decision-making.
Table 1. CBNRM institutions and involvement of women in southern Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Individuals/HH</th>
<th>Involvement of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>41 CBOs (2009)</td>
<td>150 villages/135 000 people (2006)</td>
<td>1 all-female CBO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td><em>Forestry</em>: 4 000 VNRMCs, <em>Fisheries</em>: 350 BVCs, <em>PA co-management</em>: 270 villages (Ali 2010)</td>
<td>1 million people involved in different forms of CBNRM (2010)</td>
<td>Increased participation due to CBNRM. Female headed institutions reported to be more accountable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 BUILDING AND MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES

Stocktaking assessments noted positive changes in natural resources that can be at least partly attributed to CBNRM in most of the countries that were studied. This is especially true for wildlife resources³. In Zambia, elephant have more than doubled in the Luangwa Valley since the 1980s from around 9 000 to about 18 600 and some other species in the valley such as impala and puku have also increased. The Luangwa Valley has been the focus of CBNRM activities for many years. There is a general consensus among stakeholders that CBNRM has contributed to sustaining and increasing the wildlife resource base in some areas (Nyirenda, 2010). However, there is no systematic information on the contribution of CBNRM and according to Simasiku *et al* (2008) quantitative evidence

³ One possible contributing factor for the positive trend in wildlife resources is that they tend to be the best monitored and thus are data-rich compared to other natural resources.

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² Extrapolation based on average numbers in the projects.

³ One possible contributing factor for the positive trend in wildlife resources is that they tend to be the best monitored and thus are data-rich compared to other natural resources.
suggests that in more than half of Zambia’s GMAs animal populations have declined, mainly due to poaching. They also reported that the natural habitats available to support wildlife in GMAs were shrinking throughout the country due to increased settlements, cultivation, traditional land claims and uncoordinated planning by government departments. In addition, declines in wildlife numbers are attributed to partial implementation of CBNRM where community rights are not well defined and benefits are not clear.

There are some indications that fish stocks have increased in traditionally protected fisheries in Zambia where community participation is robust (e.g., Barotse, Kariba). In addition, local forests outside of the National Forest network have generally been conserved through traditional values and the participation of local communities. In the agricultural sector, widespread adoption of conservation farming techniques has resulted in impressive yield increases: 5,000 kg/ha for maize as opposed to 1,100 kg/ha using traditional practices⁴. The Zambian approach to conservation farming appears to be a model that other CBNRM programs can learn from.

Wildlife populations have recovered in the northwestern and northeastern parts of Namibia (Figs. 1 & 2) since the advent of CBNRM (NACO, 2012).

![Figure 1. Population trends in key species in North West Namibia, 2002 - 2011 based on annual road counts (source: NACSO 2012). Fluctuations in some species such as springbok can be explained by movement in response to rainfall (and hence grazing) distribution in an open arid unfenced system and the inability of road counts to cover remote mountainous areas. Factors such as better rainfall and monitoring have also contributed to the recovery of wildlife numbers but the virtual cessation of poaching associated with the conservancy program has also undoubtedly contributed.]

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⁴ It should be noted that the conservation farming movement is considered to be a CBNRM approach in Zambia as it involves collective action such as cooperatives and Farmer Field Schools.
Figure 2. Population trends of key species in Caprivi Region Namibia, 2003 - 2011 based on an annual road and foot patrol count (source NACSO 2012).
Specific examples of increased populations include elephant and black rhino which have more than doubled since 1982 on communal lands. Namibia is the only country in Africa that is re-introducing black rhino to communal land – an indication of government confidence in CBNRM. Good recovery of the so-called desert lions was also noted between 1995 and 2007. Overall, population numbers of all predators are now significantly above pre-conservancy levels, reflecting an increase in the prey base, as well as increased tolerance by communities.

Stakeholders in Malawi noted that, generally, there have been positive impacts on the natural resource base where CBNRM has been practiced seriously (Mauambeta & Kafakoma, 2010). However, while quantifiable site-level examples exist, national-level data to confirm this observation is lacking. Poaching has decreased in PA landscapes where co-management agreements have been signed and animal populations have increased (see for example, the results in Majete Reserve depicted in Fig. 3). Elephant populations have stabilized with the participation of local communities in NRM in and around Vwaza Wildlife Reserve. Similarly, the bird population in the Lake Chilwa wetlands has recovered due to the NRM activities of a CBO. In the forest sector there are generally positive impacts on the natural resource base where CBNRM practices are supported by traditional leaders (Mauambeta & Kafakoma, 2010). Excellent results have been reported for projects and initiatives such as the Sendwe VFA and the Sustainable Management of Indigenous Forests (SMIF) project as well as in areas where BERDO and Sapitwa Beekeepers associations (SABA) have been active. Overall, stakeholders noted recovery of fish stocks linked to CBNRM in Lakes Malombe, Chilwa, and Chiuta and in some parts of Lake Malawi.

Positive impacts on the natural resource base linked to CBNRM are also apparent in Zimbabwe. Overall, during the peak years of the CAMPFIRE program (1989-2002), poaching stopped and

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5 The Namibia government does not provide numbers for security reasons.
communities were committed to living with wildlife. By 2005, overpopulation of some species was even noted on communal lands. The elephant population showed significant growth in the 13 principal wildlife districts: from 4,200 animals in 1998 to approximately 12,700 in 2000. This was equivalent to an increase in density from 0.45 animals per km² to 0.77/km². Hunting quotas, based on wildlife counts, for male elephants, lions and leopards also increased significantly during this same period. Observations with respect to wildlife habitat showed that the vast majority of habitat had been maintained in an intact state (Mazambani & Dembetembe, 2010). Nine of the thirteen wildlife districts preserved over 50% of their land in a “wild” state, i.e., allocated the land to wildlife habitat. In the forest sector, approximately 57,000 ha of woodlands outside of the Forest Reserve network were ably managed by communities (RMCs). In addition, 40,000 ha of bee forage woodlands were established and sustainably managed during the past 2 decades (Mazambani & Dembetembe, 2010). Overall, beekeeping activities constituted an incentive for woodland maintenance and effective management. Similarly, incidents of overharvesting in woodlands were reduced by more than 50% during this period.

At present and in general, wildlife resources in Mozambique seem to be increasing – recovering from decimation suffered during the civil war – while forest resources seem to be declining. However, there is no systematic evidence that CBNRM has improved the natural resource base (Brouwer, 2011). Even the existence of tools, such as management plans, does not seem to guarantee sustainable management of forest resources. Ultimately, improvements will depend on the willingness of the local communities and the government to enforce the rules and regulations stipulated in management plans, as well as to resist the lure of immediate profits in favor of long-term benefits (Brouwer, 2011). There is some anecdotal evidence that community involvement in fisheries helps reduce the use of destructive techniques.

Some aspects of government policy have favored conservation of natural resources in Botswana. For example, all trusts must incorporate NRM goals in their constitutions as well as develop natural resource management plans (Mbaiwa, 2011). Overall, it seems that CBNRM policy has changed local attitudes with respect to conservation: communities have accepted the new hunting regulations based on the quota system. (It should be noted that the hunting quota system is based on annual wildlife counts.) Several qualitative observations seem to point to positive effects of CBNRM on the natural resource base in some areas of Botswana: Poaching was noted to be lower in CBNRM areas compared to non-CBNRM areas in the Ngamiland District between 1998 and 2006 and human-wildlife conflict also seems to have been reduced. However, there is no quantitative data that shows that game populations have increased due to CBNRM.

A more recent report from game counts in northern Botswana found that 11 out of 14 species counted in Ngamiland including wildebeest, giraffe, tsessebe, lechwe and zebra, declined by an average of 61 per cent between 1996 and 2010, averaging a drop of 10 per cent each year (Chase 2011). The survey found that elephant numbers in northern Botswana had stabilised at around 130,000. The survey also found that while springbok numbers had declined in the Makgadikgadi Pans area other species such as oryx and ostrich were increasing, and most species counted were either stable or increasing in the Chobe National Park area, with roan and ostrich having declined slightly. More research is required to understand the extent to which wildlife movements, drought and poaching have contributed to these findings, particularly in Ngamiland which has been a focus of CBNRM activity in Botswana.
3.4 EARNING BENEFITS

CBNRM generates different types of benefits at different levels. It generates tangible or material benefits as well as intangible or nonmaterial benefits. It provides benefits at community level as well as at household or individual level.

3.4.1 COMMUNITY LEVEL BENEFITS

Community income

Financial benefits in the wildlife and forestry sectors tend to accrue mostly at the community level, with CBOs receiving income from photographic tourism, trophy hunting and forestry use payments. Table 2 provides a summary of aggregated community level income across the region6.

Table 2. Summary of aggregated community level income across the region in USS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Namibia</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006-2009:</td>
<td>7 400 000</td>
<td>2 800 000</td>
<td>1998: 60 000</td>
<td>303,000</td>
<td>186 268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative, economic data from CBNRM in Malawi is lacking at the national level. Nonetheless, data from some individual examples can be provided. At the CBO level, benefits are derived from membership fees, fines, permits, a percentage of park entrance fees, and, in some cases, transport services (Mauambeta & Kafakoma, 2010). Three CBOS around Lake Chilwa earned over US$24,000 from fishing in 2009. Income for members of the Sapiwa Beekeepers Association (SABA) also rose by 40% from 2002 to 2008. Earnings totaled over US$21,000 – for 2,417 members – in 2008. Other benefits at the collective level include marketing: beekeepers often consolidate their production and sell it all to a single, private sector buyer. It is easier to sell the honey this way to an established market as opposed to trying to sell it individually. There are also examples of CBOs using their earnings as a revolving credit source for members.

Social projects

Many communities across the region use their CBNRM income for various types of social project. In Zambia CRBs used their funds for community projects such as water points, schools, health clinics, feeder roads, and crop protection fences (Nyirenda, 2010). The non-disbursement of funds to households was partly due to the fact that no guiding policy existed for this sort of practice. Although when the distribution of income from hunting to registered individuals was piloted in the Luangwa Valley it was very popular and well received by communities. In Namibia a number of conservancies use funds for a range of social benefits, including school bursaries, water installations, cash for school development, soup kitchens for pensioners, contributions to traditional authorities and, in some cases, support for families affected by HIV/AIDS. Social infrastructure and agricultural processing initiatives were the most common community projects in Zimbabwe.

6 The amounts here represent income to communities not necessarily the total amounts generated by CBNRM activities. In cases such as Zambia for example, trophy hunting revenue is shared between government and communities.
Comprehensive information is lacking with respect to how communities use CBNRM income in Mozambique. Examples suggest that most communities use the revenue to invest in education (building schools), agro-processing (purchasing maize mills), agricultural production, social infrastructure (building bridges, boreholes, and markets), micro-credit initiatives, and transport (purchasing trucks to carry produce to markets).

3.4.2 HOUSEHOLD/INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS

Cash payments or dividends

Some communities use their part of their CBNRM income for household cash payments or “dividends”, but this is not a common practice, partly because some governments have issued guidelines or directives that income must be spent on social projects. Only the Lupande GMA in Zambia has provided household cash payments, but eventually stopped distributing funds to households due to the large human population to revenue ratio. In Namibia N$13,628,991, went to households in the form of wages or conservancy dividend cash payments in 2011. The Nyae Nyae conservancy in northern-eastern Namibia regularly makes cash payments to its members due to their need for cash income. They are San people who are among the most marginalized and poorest in Namibia. From 2004 to 2009 the conservancy paid each member N$300 annually and in 2010 the amount was increased to N$400 per member, an important cash injection for poor families in a remote rural area. In Botswana a few CBOs provided dividends to households. In Sankuyo village, these dividends nearly tripled between 1995 and 2005.

Employment

In Zambia 1,012 village scouts have been employed in wildlife management activities. In Namibia in 2011 there were 565 permanent jobs generated by tourism establishments in conservancies and 155 permanent jobs generated by trophy hunting. Conservancies themselves generated a total of 665 permanent jobs. A further 262 temporary jobs were generated by conservancies and tourism and hunting activities within conservancies. In 2007 in Zimbabwe 701 people were employed in various wildlife management activities linked to the CAMPFIRE program.

Enterprises

In Zambia, there are some examples of revenue impacts in the forest sector. Community members gained economic benefits from beekeeping and rattan production and processing in the Northwest and Luapula provinces. Similarly, the Itezhi-tezhi project, funded by DANIDA, provided revenue to about 800 households from carpentry and beekeeping activities. Other benefits that accrued directly to households in Zimbabwe from CAMPFIRE included revenue from honey and traditional medicine derived from gathered, wild plants. In 2007, 21 community-based enterprises supported by SAFIRE produced US$525 of revenue on average (the top performer earned approximately $10,000). The most lucrative enterprises produced baobab and marula oil. In Malawi, some beekeepers possess over 100 hives and harvest more than a ton of honey annually, the income from which provides a considerable boost to their livelihoods.

Game meat

During 2011 in Namibia, N$6.56 million worth of household game meat (386 tonnes) from various forms of hunting was distributed to households within conservancies, with additional amounts going to local schools and pensioners. In the Nyaminyami project in Zimbabwe, an average of 1,500 impalas per year – from 1989 to 2001 – provided meat at a subsidized price. Over 34,000 people
benefitted from the program in 2001. In Botswana local communities receive game meat from hunting safaris. This meat is distributed to community members – often the poor receive this benefit before other community members. In some instances, the meat is auctioned. There are studies that show that many households prefer this benefit to other CBNRM benefits such as employment.

3.4.3 INTANGIBLE/NON-MATERIAL BENEFITS

A review of CBNRM literature carried out by Arntzen et al in 2007 found consensus that nonmaterial benefits of CBNRM were very important in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana and may have been more important to communities than the material benefits generated at the time. Intangible benefits still appear to be important to communities.

Empowerment

Empowerment of local communities through encouraging self-esteem and pride, and reduced dependency on government emerges as important in all southern African countries that took part in the stocktaking. An important intangible benefit provided by CBNRM in Botswana for example is the increase or strengthening of social capital, through the development of networks, norms and trust that enable communities to act together more effectively to pursue shared goals. In Mozambique, Brouwer (2011) noted that several new policies and laws enabled greater local empowerment and promoted the participation of local people in decisions on natural resource use. Taken together, the new policies and laws constituted a new relationship between the State, local communities, and natural resources; the State was, in effect, recognizing that communities have rights with respect to these resources.

Exposure to business operation

Particularly in the wildlife and tourism sectors, community members have been increasingly exposed to various forms of business activity. They have gained greater understanding of the tourism industry as well as the requirements for operating their own small-scale businesses within the industry.

Skills and capacity

Throughout the region community members have received considerable training in a wide variety of skills and capacities:

- **Wildlife management**, including monitoring, game counts, law enforcement/ anti-poaching, quota setting, and human-wildlife conflict reduction and mitigation.
- **Business development and operation**, including marketing, business plans, managing contracts, operating camp-sites and similar SMEs, and understanding concepts such as turnover and gross versus net income.
- **Organizational development**, including office administration, employment policies, keeping asset registers, and vehicle and other asset management.
- **Financial management**, including budgeting, accounting, and procedures for authorizing spending.
- **Good governance**, including participatory development of constitutions, transparent financial management, approval of budgets by members, holding AGMs, communication between committees and members, and transparent decision-making by committees.
3.5 WHAT WORKED AND WHY?

The review of CBNRM impacts above shows that across the region there have been mixed results. However, the various stocktaking reports and other reviews of CBNRM in Southern Africa suggest that CBNRM has been most successful and resilient where implementation has most closely matched the main principles of CBNRM set out in Section 1 above.

3.5.1 RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE

CBNRM experience in the region demonstrates the importance of entrenching community rights in legislation and clearly defining these rights. Although the wildlife legislation in Zimbabwe devolves authority only as far as the RDCs, the legislation has been important in ensuring that wildlife management and the generation of income is still taking place in some CAMPFIRE Wards. By contrast in Botswana, community rights over wildlife and income generation from wildlife and tourism have never been strongly included in legislation and rely on policies that can be easily changed. As a result, the new CBNRM policy in Botswana, while affirming some important CBNRM principles, has the effect of disempowering CBNRM CBOs. Ultimately strong legal rights for communities are an important foundation for CBNRM sustainability. If legislation enables communities to control resources use and derive benefits from this, then communities are likely to continue to form CBOs to manage resources, even without external donor support. Even where rights are conditional, communities know that they can demand these rights according to the legislation, and that their rights will be secure over time.

Regional CBNRM experience has also demonstrated the importance of strong technical support and facilitation. This is important across all aspects of CBNRM, but has been crucial in the arena of community governance. Where this type of support has been lacking major governance problems have been experienced and governments have tended to withdraw community rights.

However, providing support for the emergence of conditions necessary for good governance is an important alternative to government regulation and intervention in the affairs of CBOs. Government and NGOs can assist in the emergence of these conditions through technical support in institutional development as took place in the early development of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe and in Namibian conservancies. In these two examples, officials and NGO personnel encouraged CBOs to:

- develop democratic constitutions with community participation,
- ensure that members approve budgets,
- ensure that community benefits are specifically budgeted for,
- ensure that community finances are properly and transparently managed.

The officials and NGO staff also helped the CBOs to develop the systems to implement these approaches as well as institutional monitoring that could help community members track progress in achieving good governance.

An important aspect of good governance is the equitable distribution of benefits so that elites do not capture benefits at the expense of the poor. Good technical assistance and facilitation that addresses the processes of community decision-making can go a long way to ensuring equitable benefit distribution. Donors and governments tend to focus on what communities spend their income on driven by a concern that income is not wasted and misused. However, more important is how decisions on spending are taken and who takes these decisions. For example, often CBO constitutions are drafted by a lawyer who might not even visit the community concerned. However, support agencies can help communities to develop constitutions in a participatory way that enables community members to decide on their own structures and put in place their own checks and balances.
on the powers of committee members. Simple “Dashboard” tools have been developed to help communities assess the status of governance in their CBOs, and support agencies can help to ensure that CBO Annual General Meetings are held in a transparent way that provides appropriate information to members for decision-making.

Clearly the type of technical assistance and facilitation described above cannot be provided forever. A stage has to be reached where communities are able to move forward without intensive external support. It is difficult to suggest how long it might take for any given community to reach “maturity”, particularly with regard to governance and institutional issues. However, experience indicates that the issues of accountability and transparency need to be addressed and appropriate systems put in place early in the development of community institutions. Once systems are in place and being used, then government agencies should monitor compliance with policy/legislation regarding governance, and assist communities to rectify the situation if they fall into non-compliance.

3.5.2 BENEFITS

There are two important aspects to consider regarding community benefits. One is the extent to which these benefits are providing an incentive for sustainable resource management. It is often difficult to identify a clear threshold at which benefits become sufficient to provide incentives for conservation. This is because the situation is different for each community, depending on their existing socio-economic status and depending on the predominance or otherwise of wealthy members of the community. Low levels of income might be important in a community where there are many poor people for whom even a small cash injection makes a difference. As indicated above, some communities may consider employment to be the primary benefit (e.g. in Namibia) while others may prefer meat (Botswana) or social projects (Zambia).

What seems clear is that communities do not only focus on the actual or potential cash income they receive but consider a wider range of benefits that CBNRM provides. For example, in Namibia household benefits are often low apart from employment and in some areas there is little funding for social projects. However, as indicated above, wildlife is increasing in CBNRM areas. One interpretation is that other factors such as empowerment - through rights over wildlife and the ability to choose how households spend their income - is an important factor in leading to conservation of wildlife. The right to choose how to spend income was particularly important to the Masoka community in Zimbabwe (see Box 4).

Sometimes even what most outsiders would consider low levels of income can be perceived by communities as an incentive for conservation. In the Caprivi Region in Namibia for example, community members in the Sobbe conservancy are maintaining an important elephant corridor between the Mudumu National Park in Namibia and the Sioma-Ngwezi National Park in Zambia to the north. Part of the reason they give for maintaining the corridor is the income they receive from elephant trophy hunting part of which is used for an annual payment of N$100 (US$12.5) per adult. In this community this amount seems to be at least one of the important incentives for conservation (Jones 2012). When hunting income was distributed to individuals in Lupande in Zambia, some communities were receiving as low as US$1 and yet they still mentioned this as one of the benefits they received from CBNRM.
The second important aspect of benefits is the extent to which the benefits are contributing to rural development. This is considered in sub-section 4.2 below.

**Box 4. The Right to Choose! The case of Masoka.**

Some governments and other organisations try to provide guidelines or instructions to communities as to how they should use their income. Often communities are told they must use the income for social projects and not household or individual payments. However, the flexibility to use income as they wish can be an important strategy for local development. In Masoka in Zimbabwe for example, income from wildlife has been used differently in different years. When harvests are good the community has opted mainly for social projects. But when times are bad and drought has reduced the crops, the community has often chosen to provide household payments or drought relief to households (Taylor and Murphree 2007). The flexibility to make choices enabled the community to adapt to different circumstances. It strengthened the ability of the Masoka community to cope during droughts and improve food security. The right to choose how to use their income is also an important part of community empowerment – as is the right to experiment with different approaches and learn from the experience.

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**4. HELPING TO SUPPORT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

**4.1 HARNESSING AFRICA’S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES**

Wildlife in Africa, particularly its charismatic large megafauna, is one of the continent’s comparative and competitive advantages. The wildlife of no other continent approaches the actual and potential value of that of Africa (Brown 2004). However, in the past the value of African wildlife has been systematically undervalued across the continent. This has been largely exacerbated and abetted by colonial policies and approaches, treating wildlife less as a valuable commodity and more as an interesting attraction, with some countries having never moved beyond these legacies.

In the arid parts of Southern Africa, covering over 60% of the region, the comparative advantage of wildlife becomes particularly important. In these areas wildlife has the potential to generate significant economic returns as a productive form of land use. This is especially true on marginal lands unsuited for other productive uses. CBNRM is playing an important role in adding value to African wildlife for local communities. It is helping to unlock the potential of wildlife (largely via trophy hunting) and wildlife-based tourism to contribute to rural development.
4.2 PROMOTING RURAL DEVELOPMENT

As indicated above, CBNRM generates a wide range of benefits for local communities. These benefits promote rural development in a number of different ways. Some contribute to poverty reduction, i.e. lifting people permanently out of poverty, while others contribute more to poverty alleviation, i.e. temporarily addressing the symptoms of poverty.

CBNRM can contribute to poverty reduction particularly where permanent jobs are created and successful businesses are established. In Malawi for example, income to bee keepers from honey production enables them to build permanent houses with metal roofs or make purchases of items such as motorcycles, bicycles, and fertilizer. Successful individuals generally attain food security and are able to pay school fees for their children.

Mazambani and Dembetembe (2010) observed that CBNRM can be the foundation for truly viable businesses and that these enterprises should not be treated as subsistence or boutique undertakings. In general, the development of CBES can increase community benefits and diversify livelihood options. Importantly, income from jobs and businesses enable households to build up assets that can help them get through hard times and cope with shocks such as droughts. People with few or no household or productive assets are usually more vulnerable to shocks.

Although cash payments to households or individuals are often small, they can still be significant in remote areas where jobs are few and there is little cash in the economy. Timing of such payments is also often important in order to increase their impact such as close to Christmas or when school fees are due. These payments can therefore help to alleviate some of the symptoms of poverty even if they do not lift people permanently out of poverty.

Moreover, the contribution of CBNRM to poverty reduction goes beyond the provision of jobs and income. The World Bank strategy for poverty reduction in Africa called Community Driven Development (CDD) recognises local empowerment as a form of poverty reduction in its own right (World Bank 2000). It emphasises the need to strengthen accountable, inclusive community groups and to improve governance, institutions and policies so that local and central governments and service providers, respond to community demand. The CDD approach also encourages the provision to communities of untied funds which allow them to choose their own priorities and implement their own programmes. CBNRM therefore, through its emphasis on the empowerment of communities in NRM, its emphasis on accountable community groups, and generation of community-level income is contributing to poverty reduction.

The main contribution of CBNRM programmes to poverty reduction is through diversification of livelihoods, creating buffers against risk and shocks and empowering and giving a voice to local communities. In many cases these contributions are being overlooked because they have not been recognized and are not being measured (Jones 2004).

A number of contributions to food security were also noted in the stocktaking reports:

- CBNRM concepts are currently employed in food security and livelihood programs (e.g., those focused on conservation farming and product marketing) (Zambia)
- CBNRM can and is making contributions to food security via mitigation of wildlife and livestock crop damage as well as soil and water conservation measures (Zambia)
- Similarly, CBNRM can and is enhancing food security and nutrition by scaling up production of honey, wild fruits, and game meat (Zimbabwe)
- Overall, increased income from CBNRM contributes to food security via increased purchasing power (Botswana)
In considering the impact of CBNRM on rural development, recognition needs to be given to the uneven distribution of resources across the rural landscape such that not all communities will be able to derive large amounts of income from sustainable use of high value species (Jones and Murphree 2004). Wildlife and tourism-based CBNRM can have its highest impact in areas where there are few other development options and where wildlife is an appropriate land use. However, sustainable management of grazing, forests, wetlands and other important resources and habitats on which people depend for their livelihoods is in itself a significant impact.

Given the multifaceted causes of poverty and the nature of most CBNRM activities there is a growing consensus that CBNRM is not having a major impact on poverty reduction (compared to poverty alleviation), and nor should it really be expected to (Arntzen et al 2007, Roe et al 2006, Jones 2004, Murphree 2000). In other words it does not lift many people permanently out of poverty. It does however, contribute to addressing some aspects of poverty and does contribute positively to improved livelihoods and rural development. CBNRM has to be viewed as one of a package of inter-linked and complementary strategies to address poverty at different scales within a national poverty reduction framework. Within such a national framework, CBNRM can be an important strategy for supporting livelihoods in marginalised and marginal rural areas while governments give attention to issues such as job creation in urban areas and creating the macro-economic conditions for growth (Jones 2004). CBNRM should be included in national poverty reduction frameworks where high value resources such as wildlife can provide community and household level benefits and/or where communities are highly dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods.

Box 5. The contribution of CBNRM to Rural Development

The following are the main contributions of CBNRM to rural development across southern Africa:

- Generating discretionary income at community level for social welfare or other purposes such as infrastructure development
- Providing jobs and additional income for some residents
- Increasing household assets (e.g. extra cash to buy a plough, a fridge or radio) and community assets (e.g. a vehicle for transport or community meeting hall)
- Providing land use diversification options in semi-arid and arid areas, many of which had been only marginally productive
- Providing livelihood diversification options for some residents
- Building skills and capacity
- Empowering and building the confidence of marginalised rural people through devolved decision making, fiscal devolution, improved advocacy, institutional development
- Supporting local safety nets
- Promoting sustainable natural resource management
- Strengthening or building local institutions for common property resource management and driving local development.

4.3 PREPARING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE

The causes and impacts of climate change are multi-faceted and exist at local, national and international levels. In Southern Africa it is widely accepted, that the climate will be hotter and drier
in the decades to come. According to Mfune et al (2009) climate change will adversely affect the ability of physical and biological systems to sustain human development including socio-economic development. Climate change will constrain the ability of the vulnerable, mainly the poor in many developing countries, to cope with adverse impacts because they have low capacity to respond (i.e. to develop mitigation measures or adapt). In Southern Africa, the combined effect of expected increases in temperature and increased drying will adversely affect most ecosystems and agriculture and livestock production. Arid and semi-arid countries in the region are expected to be most affected.

Adaptation is one of the main strategies for coping with the expected impacts of climate change. Adaptation is defined by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as, “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (Chishakwe et al 2012). It mostly aims to decrease vulnerability and increase the resilience and capacity to cope with climate impacts.

Community-based Adaptation (CBA) is a bottom-up approach that places the community at the centre of determining how to respond to the impacts of climate change and emphasises community participation that builds on the priorities, knowledge and capacities of local people. Important elements of local adaptive capacity include access to and control over natural, human, social, physical and financial resources as well as learning and collaboration. CBA also emphasises the importance of community institutions, with the goal of enabling communities to take action themselves based upon their own decision-making processes (Chishakwe et al 2012).

Clearly there is considerable synergy between CBNRM and CBA. Chishakwe et al (2012) in their review of the links between CBNRM and CBA suggest that specific CBNRM processes such as sustainable livelihoods, incentive-based approaches, devolution, and communal proprietorship can inform CBA to both reduce vulnerability and increase adaptive capacity. In general, successful CBNRM can result in more diversified and sustainable land use, thus increasing resiliency and contributing to climate change adaptation.

In addition connectivity between protected areas and between natural habitats is viewed as an important measure for addressing potential climate change impacts on biodiversity. Community conserved areas where land is set aside for wildlife and tourism can contribute to achieving connected natural and protected areas. Community Forestry in particular can contribute to mitigation where it leads to improved management and rehabilitation of woodlands and forests (including reforestation with drought-resistant tree species). Wildlife-based CBNRM is potentially a more viable land use option in future where climate stressed or climate changed areas may not support other, current land uses.

Sustainable land use often results in maintenance of, or increased tree cover which contributes to climate change mitigation. Also improved tillage practices such as conservation agriculture can contribute to mitigation through increasing the soil organic carbon content through permanent soil cover with crops and mulch, minimum soil disturbance, fallows, green manures, and crop rotations. Holistic community-based range management can also contribute to mitigation through enhanced carbon grasslands.

4.4. REVERSING BIODIVERSITY LOSS AND IMPROVING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES

Although wildlife-based CBNRM focuses on large game species, where CBOs set aside land for wildlife and tourism, they can maintain natural habitats on which other biodiversity depends. Binot et
al (2009) noted that the multi-species production systems under CBNRM wildlife-based programs should help to reduce pressure on rangelands compared to single-species systems such as cattle ranching and compared to agro-pastoral systems. Although limited, there were data showing that land which reverted to wildlife production after intensive use by livestock soon showed gains in diversity, resilience and ecosystem function.

Community forestry initiatives have also contributed to the maintenance of natural forests or the reduction of forest loss. In Zimbabwe for example, various CBNRM initiatives also promote integrated watershed management, soil conservation, and reforestation.

5. THE ROLES OF THE MAIN STAKEHOLDERS IN CBNRM

5.1. GOVERNMENT (POLICY MAKERS AND IMPLEMENTATION OFFICIALS)

Ideally government agencies should take the lead in coordinating and supporting CBNRM programs. This is important for continuity and sustainability. However CBNRM is a complex and multi-faceted program which requires a variety of competencies and expertise for its successful implementation. As a result it is unlikely that governments will have all the expertise and human resources to provide all the services required by CBOs. In these circumstances government agencies should be willing to request assistance from or sub-contract Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or other organizations and agencies. The core functions of government agencies in CBNRM should be the following:

1) Program Coordination

Provide overall coordination of the program including the establishment of coordination forums, liaison and networking with partners such as NGOs, private sector, other government departments, district and local governments and donors, and provision of program information, procedures and manuals;

2) Policy and legislation

One of the most important functions of government is to lead the participatory development, review and revision of policy and legislation that provides the enabling conditions for CBNRM.

3) Service provision

Government agencies should also provide extension and support service to CBOS as follows:

a) Identify support and training needs of CBOs;

b) Plan and implement specific support activities. In the wildlife sector for example, government agencies should provide technical advice and support for assessing wildlife utilization options, developing CBO wildlife management and zonation plans and for various aspects of wildlife management such as dealing with Human Wildlife Conflict, siting and use of water points, quota setting, monitoring, etc.

c) Work in partnership with other service providers where appropriate to ensure that these CBO support needs are met;
d) Handle administrative issues such as registration of CBOs in terms of legislation as appropriate;

e) Establish systems to monitor CBO compliance with policy and legislation;

f) Develop and maintain a national CBNRM monitoring system and data base.
5.2. TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES

The role of Traditional Authorities (TAs) in CBNRM will vary from country to country and can even vary within countries. Much depends on the extent to which they have the support of local communities. However, usually TAs have some role in land allocation and from this perspective alone, need to be involved with and supportive of CBNRM activities. In some countries new elected CBOs have come into conflict with TAs, where TAs perceive that the new institutions are taking over their authority over natural resources. Mechanisms need to be found for incorporating TAs into the new institutions and providing them with an appropriate role. This could include the following, depending on country contexts:

1) Endorsement of CBO applications for recognition/registration by government;
2) Representation on CBO committees either as a voting member but perhaps more appropriately as an observer;
3) Involvement in land use planning/zonation and NR management planning;
4) Assistance in conflict resolution;
5) Where appropriate, receipt of a portion of CBO income agreed by the TA and the CBO members, in recognition of TA support and services provided.

In order to prevent confusion and to clarify roles and responsibilities it is advisable to define the role of the TA and its relationship with the CBO in the CBO constitution. TAs are likely to require information about CBNRM initiatives and some awareness raising/training in order for them to play a supportive role in CBNRM implementation.

5.3. DONORS

As indicated by the stocktaking reports, donors have played an important role in the development of CBNRM in the region. However in some cases CBNRM activities appear to be donor driven and as a result, are less likely to be sustainable. Both the Zambia and Malawi reports noted that most CBNRM programs and activities in these countries were donor driven. Because of this, many initiatives were relatively short-lived (4 to 5 years) and, due to a lack of a viable exit strategy and no allocation of resources from the government to continue the activities, came to a stop when the project ended. Both Mauambeta and Kafakoma (2010) and Nyirenda (2010) maintain that donor-driven CBNRM is often imposed or inorganic and that organic CBNRM that emanates from the communities themselves is more likely to succeed.

Over time, some useful lessons regarding the role of donors have emerged:

1) CBNRM programs imposed by donors are less likely to succeed than those where there is strong in-country demand. Donor-funded projects often include a component on policy dialogue and development, which often translates into imposition of donor agendas. This is likely to create resistance.
2) Donor-funded programs are more likely to succeed when implemented by in-country organizations than by foreign consultants. A project implemented by foreign consultants is more likely to be viewed as something grafted on by donors and less likely to be fully accepted by host country officials who are treated as “counterparts” rather than as fully responsible implementers.

3) Mostly donor project horizons do not provide sufficient time to properly support the development for CBNRM. Experience from the region shows that CBNRM evolves as CBOs go through different stages of development, and as new challenges emerge. It takes time for CBOs to develop into democratic, transparent and accountable institutions. Good facilitation and technical support is required to support CBNRM development and evolution over time. USAID support over nearly 15 years to CBNRM in Namibia is a very positive exception to the usual donor approach to project support (see Box 5 below).

**Box 5. USAID and the LIFE Programme in Namibia**

The USAID support to CBNRM in Namibia provides a good example of how donor support can lead to positive, sustainable outcomes. First and foremost, the USAID-funded Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) Programme built on existing Namibian policy and legislation and an existing government and NGO CBNRM approach. Although WWF-US was contracted to administer LIFE, it saw its role as supporting the Namibian government and NGOs to provide services to the communal area conservancies. This meant that LIFE did not replace the government’s CBNRM programme, but rather supported it, enabling it to continue after LIFE came to a stop. Because of this, several years after the withdrawal of USAID funding, the Namibian programme is still strong and vibrant. The USAID support over nearly 15 years starting in 1992 provided a foundation for the Namibian CBNRM programme to evolve and provided space for the provision of appropriate facilitation and technical support to CBOs. It enabled implementers to focus on getting the processes and systems right without feeling too pressured to cut corners to provide product for the donor. This was an important contribution to what has been widely acknowledged as CBNRM success in Namibia.

5.4. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS/NGOS

Civil society organizations, particularly Non-Governmental Organizations can play an important role in the provision of services to CBOs, complementing and supplementing services provided by government. Several CBNRM functions are specialist activities, which require particular expertise and experience, which are unlikely to be found in government agencies. These include:

1) Organizational development (developing financial accounting systems, development of internal administrative policies and procedures and staff policies; development of management frameworks);
2) Governance and democracy (promoting the conditions that enable the emergence of good governance, including accountability and transparency in decision-making and financial management);
3) Enterprise development (identification of products, product development, business viability studies, development of business plans, marketing, operating procedures for accommodation facilities), training of community members to run businesses;
4) Joint Venture (JV) development and management (assisting CBOs to acquire a JV partner and training CBOs to manage the JV relationship and contract).

In Namibia the emergence of a coalition of NGOs, the Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organizations (NACSO) has greatly enhanced the provision of support to CBOs. NACSO provides an umbrella organization for coordination of support activities, development of common methods and materials, and the sharing of experiences.

**5.5 PRIVATE COMPANIES**

The role of private companies in CBNRM is most prominent in wildlife and tourism activities where communities seek to establish and run trophy hunting and photographic tourism ventures. In these instances the private companies usually provide capital and expertise for running the businesses. In addition they usually employ and train local community members. However the specific role of the private sector depends on the nature of the relationship with the community. For example, it is important for communities to have a good contract with the private company that spells out the nature of this relationship and the extent of the company’s contribution. In some cases in the region, communities have received donor funding as capital to establish their tourism infrastructure and employ the private sector simply as a management company. In other instances, communities have become shareholders with private investors in order to set up their tourism businesses.

When considering the most appropriate forms of collaboration between communities and private companies, it is important to retain flexibility of choice for the communities themselves. Some might choose to remain not much more than land lords collecting rentals and a percentage of turnover from the business. Others might choose to own the business themselves or become joint shareholders. Each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages.

The private sector also often plays a role in buying up and marketing various CBNRM products, such as honey, Devil’s Claw, etc. In these cases it can be beneficial for producers to enter into contracts with one buyer who can provide a fair and consistent price. CBOs can play a role in negotiating such contracts and finding “fair trade” buyers.

**5.6 LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

Local communities are at the heart of CBNRM. Their main role is the sustainable management of natural resources which they have authority over (whether de facto or through policy and legislation). In addition communities are developing their own businesses, negotiating and managing partnerships with the private sector, government and other communities, and managing the distribution of benefits from sustainable natural resource use.

An important means for CBOS to strengthen their role within CBNRM is to group themselves together into networks, coalitions, platforms or federations to (1) learn from each other, and (2)
advocate for support and policy that aligns with their interests and aspirations. A good example of such a group is the CAMPFIRE Association in Zimbabwe which brings together all the Rural District Councils that have appropriate authority over wildlife. This Association represents the interests of the RDCs in their relationship with central government, the private sector and donors.

6. HOW DECISION-MAKERS CAN MAKE CBNRM WORK

6.1 BEING SURE ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES

The principles of CBNRM are based on creating the right conditions for sustainable resource management and incentives and rights play a central role in these conditions. There is often the temptation by governments, donors or NGOs to intervene in order to remove risk of failure or to resolve problems that might emerge. However, there is good evidence from around the region that where the appropriate conditions are in place CBNRM can flourish. It is clear from the data and analysis provided above that CBNRM is about processes. To some extent it takes a leap of faith by decision-makers, government officials and implementers to accept that if the right conditions are in place, CBNRM processes will ultimately lead to a positive product.

Decision-makers should have faith in incentive-based approaches to conservation. They should promote light touch guidance and facilitation along with government monitoring of legal compliance as appropriate ways of supporting CBNRM, rather than heavy handed intervention that disempowers communities, reduces their decision-making authority and removes choice.


6.2 GETTING THE POLICY RIGHT

Policy and legislation are important for CBNRM because they determine the institutional arrangements for natural resource management. They determine who has access and control over resources, who may benefit from use and the roles and responsibilities of different institutions and social actors. Based on the stocktaking reports, and various other reviews of CBNRM in the region CBNRM policy should ensure that:

1) Economic and other incentives are in place that make investment in management of resources worthwhile.
2) The value of wildlife on communal land is unlocked by enabling it to compete on a level playing field with other land uses such as livestock which often enjoys various forms of subsidies.
3) Authority over resources is devolved by the central government to resource users/land holders;
4) Proprietorship (rights and tenure) over land and resources is vested in a defined group of people who choose to cooperate and within a defined jurisdiction;
5) Provision is made for the establishment of effective community institutions that can exercise devolved authority and for the definition of the relationships between these institutions and existing state institutions at different levels (e.g. central government, regional or district).

In addition, policy should be flexible and not too prescriptive. CBNRM policy needs to be flexible in order to take into account the diversity of cultures and of social organization within each country. CBNRM policy and legislation should enable local communities to find the best way to order their own affairs within their own local contexts, rather than trying to prescribe uniform approaches that government officials then have to enforce. Ultimately, the institutions developed for CBNRM need to be socially acceptable or they will not work.

Policy should be dynamic not static. It is unlikely that policy and legislation will “get it right” the first time because, when initiated, CBNRM is often a new and untried approach. Problems should be expected. Policy and legislation therefore need to be reviewed, based on lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation, and revised as appropriate.

The stocktaking reports identified a number of policy and legal gaps in CBNRM in the region. In particular CBNRM would be considerably strengthened if communities had strong land rights and tenure. In some countries revenue sharing between governments and communities reduces the amount of income received by CBOs from the wildlife on their land. This raises questions as to whether communities are receiving sufficient income to provide incentives for sustainable resource management (particularly where HWC increases the costs of living with wildlife). Also where governments share revenue from wildlife through annual payments to communities there is no clear link between community management effort and the income they receive.

In addition, in most countries in the region, CBNRM operates under sectoral policy and legislation resulting in separate programs for forestry, fisheries, wildlife, water etc. This in turns results in the proliferation of community institutions often with overlapping rights and responsibilities. The stocktaking reports point to the need for policy and legal revisions that harmonize sectoral CBNRM policy and legislation in order to align implementation better with the integrated way in which communities actually manage their land.
Decision-makers need to ensure that Communities have land and resource rights that are clearly defined in legislation and they can retain income from resource use; that Wildlife is recognised as a productive form of land use which should be promoted by government; that Policy and legislation are flexible, and not too prescriptive; and that NRM Sectoral legislation is harmonised as much as possible to avoid duplication and inefficiencies.

6.3 KEEPING IMPLEMENTATION TRUE TO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY

The stocktaking reports and other reviews of CBNRM in the region point to the need for CBNRM implementation to remain true to CBNRM principles and policy. Often policy and legal provisions become reinterpreted by those charged with implementation for a number of reasons. Government officials might resist what they perceive to be a loss of power to communities and try to block community decision-making. NGO personnel supporting CBOs might find it difficult to really let go and enable “their” communities to manage their own affairs.

In order to avoid government officials resisting CBNRM approaches, it is important for CBNRM to be institutionalized within government agencies charged with implementation. This includes ensuring that officials fully understand policy and legislation and the rationale behind it. It also often implies the need for retraining of officials so they are able to shift from direct implementation of resource management to the provision of extension support and technical services to communities. NGOs working with CBOs can help to clarify roles and responsibilities and pave the way for exit at appropriate times through the signing of some form of agreement with the CBO.
6.4 BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY, INSTITUTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The importance of building community capacity, institutions and accountability is also highlighted strongly in the stocktaking reports. Where capacity was weak and accountability of CBO committees to conservancy members was weak, CBNRM initiatives collapsed. Governments and other stakeholders need to be willing to invest time and resources in assisting communities to develop systems and processes for good governance.

At the same time it should be recognized that community institutions will go through peaks and troughs of performance. What is important is not so much the state of a community institution at a given time but how the institution responds to problems and crises. If the appropriate systems and processes are in place and communities have a sufficient stake in the continued functioning of a CBO, the institution is likely to be resilient and recover from crises.

Decision-makers need to ensure that good support is given to building the capacity of communities to manage their own affairs and to developing accountability and transparency in decision-making; Decision-makers should allow communities time and space to learn from their own mistakes.

6.5 DEVELOPING A SHARP BUSINESS FOCUS

Much of CBNRM depends on the sustainable use of resources, which further depends on businesses and markets that can generate income from this use. In order to be successful, CBNRM therefore needs the appropriate skills and expertise to help communities to develop successful businesses, whether it is a local honey producer or a luxury tourist lodge. This means also applying business principles that include consideration of demand for the product, the availability of markets, the availability of the means to reach the market, development of business plans, etc. These have often been missing in some past attempts to establish community-based enterprises. Another lesson is that businesses are better run by individuals instead of as community projects where no-one has full responsibility for success and no-one really bears the consequences of failure.

Decision-makers should enlist the support of business experts to guide enterprise development in CBNRM, and where appropriate encourage beneficial partnerships between communities and the private sector.
6.6 MONITORING AND ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT – LEARNING BY DOING

CBNRM implementation very much rests on the concept of adaptive management which put simply means learning by doing. It also means that management decisions can be taken using the best available information without necessarily having all the information at hand. This approach can work, however, only if appropriate monitoring is carried out to assess whether the current management decisions are appropriate. New data from monitoring can enable adjustments to be made and improved management to take place.

Decision-makers should ensure that monitoring and evaluation systems for CBNRM are developed and implemented so that better decisions can be taken, improved policy and legislation developed and increased benefits can be generated for communities.

7. CONCLUSIONS

CBNRM can be a powerful tool for both conservation and rural development in Southern Africa. It has produced positive results where it has been implemented most closely in line with its underlying principles. It has not succeeded so well and in some cases has failed where devolution of rights has not gone far enough, where communities have been prevented from receiving the full benefits from resource management, and where insufficient attention has been given to developing resilient institutions and good governance processes.

Decision-makers and policy makers in the region are in a position to build on the successes and take steps to avoid the failures of the past.

8. FURTHER READING


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