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**FIRST EVALUATION OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES
POLICY AND TRAINING (EPAT) PROJECT
(936-5555)**

**USAID IQC No. AEP-0085-I-00-3003-00
Delivery Order No. 8**

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9. ESTIMATED DATE OF OBLIGATION
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B. QUARTER 4
C. FINAL FY 00
(Enter 1, 2, 3, or 4)

10. ESTIMATED COSTS (\$000 OR EQUIVALENT \$) -

A. FUNDING SOURCE	FIRST FY			LIFE OF PROJECT		
	B. FX	C. L/C	D. TOTAL	E. FX	F. L/C	G. TOTAL
AID APPROPRIATED TOTAL	1,600		1,600	35,500		35,500
IGRANT:	1,600		1,600	35,500		35,500
ILOAN:						
OTHER U.S. 1. Buy-Ins				40,000		40,000
OTHER U.S. 2.						
MOST COUNTRY						
OTHER COUNTRY						
TOTALS	1,600		1,600	75,500		75,500

11. PROPOSED BUDGET APPROPRIATED FUNDS (\$000)

A. APPROPRIATION	B. PRIMARY PURPOSE CODE	PRIMARY TECH. CODE				E. 1st FY 91		K. 2nd FY 92	
		C. GRANT	D. LOAN	F. GRANT	G. LOAN	I. GRANT	J. LOAN	L. GRANT	M. LOAN
(1) ARDN	750	090				1,600		1,750	
(2) EHR	750	790						550	
(3) PSEE	750	850						1,300	
(4)									
TOTALS						1,600		3,600	

A. APPROPRIATION	H. 3rd FY 93		I. 4th FY 94		LIFE OF PROJECT		12. IN-DEPTH EVALUATION SCHEDULE MM YY 09 93
	J. GRANT	K. LOAN	L. GRANT	M. LOAN	N. GRANT	O. LOAN	
(1) ARDN	2,150		1,900		18,500		
(2) EHR	550		550		5,000		
(3) PSEE	1,300		1,300		12,000		
(4)							
TOTALS	4,000		3,750		35,500		

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**Environmental and Natural Resources Policy and
Training Project (EPAT) Evaluation Report
Executive Summary**

*below long to respond it seems, identify
pub. concerns nation of how AID should work?*

1. Introduction

The original purpose of this evaluation was to assess the progress of this project over its first two years of activity in moving towards the achievement of its stated objectives. However, the evaluation team realized early in its work that the project is beset with fundamental problems and that a major restructuring will be required if the project is to realize its intended objectives. The evaluation team has concluded that numerous factors have contributed to the project's failure to make significant progress towards achieving its objectives. These include:

fundamental?

- 1) performance shortcomings of the lead implementing institutions - the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities, Inc. (MUCIA) and the Winrock International Environmental Alliance (WIEA);
- 2) performance shortcomings of the USAID EPAT management team.

*is the all the
assessments done
start of period
of a project?*

The key implementing institutions for EPAT are the USAID EPAT management team, MUCIA, and WIEA. The evaluation team has concluded that they have not shared a common vision of this project nor have they been disposed to work closely together to achieve its objectives. As a consequence, each bears a significant responsibility for the failure of this project to perform adequately.

2. Conclusions

As indicated in the following table, the project is not performing well (5 = exceptional performance, 1 = unacceptable performance), and major changes will be needed if it is to achieve its intended objectives. The lack of performance is attributable to shortcomings on the part of the implementing organizations (MUCIA, WIEA and the USAID EPAT management team) as well as to the way in which the project was structured.

EPAT Performance, Overall and by Implementing Agent

Activity	MUCIA	WIEA	AID	Overall
SOA Research	1		1	1
Applied Research		2	2	2
Information and Dissemination	3	3	3	3
Policy Dialogue		3	3	3
Institutional Strengthening		3	2	2
Human Resources Development	1	3	2	2
Cost Effectiveness	1	2	1	1
Coordination and Collaboration	2	2	1	2
Staffing	1	2	2	1
Management	1	2	1	1
Average Performance	1.43	2.44	1.8	1.8

The procurement was structured in a manner that allowed different consortia to win the grant and major contract. The evaluation team believes this was a serious mistake. The grant went to one consortium while the contract was awarded to another. This meant that the management plan that each consortium had built into their bids to insure the grant and contract parts of the project worked together was lost.

In terms of organizational performance, the evaluation team has found the performance of both MUCIA and the USAID EPAT management team to be unacceptable. MUCIA does not have an information system in place that will allow it to determine how much financial support has been or is now being provided by its EPAT grant to individual research activities/products. This means that neither MUCIA nor the USAID EPAT management team know with an acceptable degree of accuracy what research activities the MUCIA grant is paying for.

It has found the performance of WIEA to be less than what would be expected of a contractor, but still acceptable provided that certain actions enumerated below are taken.

Neither contractor performed adequately when it came to staffing the project:

- 1) Despite repeated expressions of concern from USAID, WIEA never assembled the economic talent that was called for and the evaluation team is not assured that this matter will be resolved satisfactorily in the foreseeable future.
- 2) MUCIA does not have the staff needed to oversee the research it is expected to undertake. It has never filled the research director position called for in its Cooperative Agreement, and the current acting chief-of-party does not have the qualifications to lead and manage its research activities. Staffing inadequacies are also the reason MUCIA's financial management was unacceptable for a significant period of time.

Rather than working to resolve these problems, the USAID EPAT management team has contributed to them. Their efforts have led to widespread charges of micro-management: they have angered, frustrated, and demoralized WIEA and MUCIA staff and research associates. Rather than effectively managing this project, they have created confusion over who is responsible for what. Most important, there is continuing confusion over who is in charge of developing and implementing the strategy to market this project to USAID bureaus and missions worldwide. And yet, while they have micro-managed certain parts of the project, the USAID EPAT management team has not stepped in and insisted on corrective actions when WIEA or MUCIA have failed to perform, *e.g.*, in terms of staffing the project adequately or developing an effective training strategy. It is time to turn over a new leaf and do away with past USAID management problems.

The evaluation team has given careful consideration to the lack of coordination and collaboration among MUCIA, WIEA, and the USAID EPAT management team. The USAID EPAT management team has been unable to effect the needed cooperation and collaboration

among the two consortiums that will be needed if the project is to succeed. The evaluation team does not believe USAID can cause the needed cooperation and collaboration to occur. The team has concluded that the project will not achieve its intended objectives so long as there is more than one lead implementation agency. This means, *inter alia*, that the USAID role should be reduced.

The evaluation team does not believe the EPAT Cooperative Agreement is an appropriate procurement vehicle for this project. It is quite clear what products or "deliverables" this project should generate, but the Cooperative Agreement does not allow USAID to hold MUCIA responsible for delivering these outputs. Indeed, with research monies becoming even more limited, the evaluation team questions the appropriateness of this procurement vehicle for any future USAID activities.

3. Recommendations

The evaluation team has concluded this project needs one lead organization. It has documented its reasons for concluding that MUCIA's performance has been inadequate. These conclusions, coupled with the conclusion that the Cooperative Agreement is an inappropriate procurement vehicle for EPAT leads to the following recommendations:

- 1) The evaluation team has documented the reasons for concluding MUCIA should lose its status as a lead organization. The team is not prepared to recommend exactly how this should be done, but a satisfactory outcome would be the conversion of its Cooperative Agreement to a subcontract with WIEA.
- 2) It is time for a fresh start: the USAID EPAT management team should be replaced by a single USAID project officer who has no prior experience with this project. The project officer should have two tasks: to insure that the contractor implements the project correctly and assist the contractor in marketing the project to other parts of USAID.

Pertaining to the WIEA contract, the evaluation team recommends the following actions:

- 1) terminate the human resource (education and training) component of the project in recognition that useful activities in this field can be conducted with greater flexibility under the institutional strengthening component of the project;
- 2) use core monies to develop expertise in the development and application of a small number of economic analytic tools to help in the formulation of environmental policies in developing countries;
- 3) make the tools the focal point of EPAT marketing activities worldwide;
- 4) use the information and dissemination activities of the project to support these initiatives through publication of the newsletter and dissemination of relevant economic research on environmental issues;

- 5) focus buy-in work on applying the analytic tools and developing them further in collaboration with developing country institutions;
- 6) develop a new strategic plan to carry out the above activities that takes into account what other USAID environmental projects are doing;
- 7) add two senior environmental economists with developing country experience to the core staff;
- 8) reduce the WIEA consortium to a workable number of support organizations, and
- 9) reconstitute and activate the WIEA TAG to play a key role in project strategic planning and implementation.

Finally, the evaluation team recommends that the project should be evaluated again in two years and not continued unless significant progress towards achieving its goals and objectives can be demonstrated at that time.

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1. Introduction

A. Purpose of the Evaluation

The Environmental and Natural Resources Policy and Training (EPAT) project was intended to result in developing countries adopting economic policies which promote environmentally sustainable development. Authorized as a ten-year project, EPAT is funded incrementally a year at a time. Started in October 1991, the project is being implemented through a five year, \$9.5 million cooperative agreement awarded to the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities, Inc. (MUCIA) and a five year, \$6.2 million level of effort contract awarded to the Winrock International Environmental Alliance (WIEA). The MUCIA team included three consulting firms while WIEA included Winrock International and seventeen partners.

The MUCIA group was also awarded a requirements contract intended for USAID buy-ins in support of its research activities with an upper limit of 250 person-months. The WIEA contract was intended to generate a significant level of USAID buy-in activity. The WIEA contract placed no limits on size of individual delivery orders, duration of delivery orders, or total buy-in activity conducted under delivery orders.

The project is scheduled to have a series of evaluations during its lifetime. The original purpose of this evaluation was to assess the progress of this project over its first two years of activity in moving towards the achievement of its stated objectives. By addressing a set of questions set forth in the scope of work for this evaluation, it was expected that certain problems would be identified and that the evaluation would offer a series of recommendations to deal with these problems. In more technical terms, it was expected that this would be a formative evaluation, *i.e.*, one in which the evaluation team would work closely with project staffs to clarify and then mitigate problems being encountered by the project.

However, the evaluation team realized early in its work that the project is beset with fundamental problems and that a major restructuring will be required if the project is to realize its intended objectives. The evaluation team has concluded that numerous factors have contributed to the project's failure to make significant progress towards achieving its objectives. These include:

- 1) performance shortcomings of the lead implementing institutions - the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities, Inc. (MUCIA) and the Winrock International Environmental Alliance (WIEA);
- 2) performance shortcomings of the USAID EPAT management team.

The evaluation team has also concluded that project design flaws, mistakes in procurement structure, and USAID procurement restrictions have contributed to poor project performance. However, these factors cannot be blamed for the project's shortcomings to date. If the people and organizations involved in the project's implementation had a common vision of what the project was intended to achieve and were committed to it, they could have overcome these latter three contributing factors.

The key implementing institutions for EPAT are the USAID EPAT management team, MUCIA, and WIEA. The evaluation team has concluded that they have not shared a common vision of this project nor have they been disposed to work closely together to achieve its objectives. As a consequence, each bears a significant responsibility for the failure of this project to perform adequately.

The evaluation outline reflects the fact that project problems have originated in various sources. After presenting the evaluation methodology employed in Section 2, Section 3 provides an overall assessment of project performance to date. In Section 4, the evaluation team's conclusions on the organizational performance of MUCIA, WIEA, and the USAID EPAT management team are presented. Section 5 discusses factors the evaluation team believes contributed to poor project performance. Conclusions are presented in Section 6 and supporting materials are included in the appendices.

B. Historical/Political/Bureaucratic Context

USAID issued its first Environment and Natural Resources Policy Paper in 1988. It then launched its "Environment Initiative" in February 1990, to guide the Agency's environmental and natural resource interventions to areas where assistance would have the greatest impact. The "Environmental Initiative" reflected growing recognition that, without sound management of natural resources, sustained economic growth might be jeopardized. Concern for the environment was not a new agenda item, environmental issues had just become more prominent.

The "Environmental Initiative" identified three areas in developing countries for focus. One area concerned strengthening environmental institutions, a second dealt with a set of priority problems specific to each of the geographic bureaus, and the third area dealt with global environmental policy and economics. The call for intervention was based on the following rationale:

Unsound economic policy and ineffective environmental laws, policies and regulations are among the most significant causes of environmental degradation in developing countries. If the relationship between economics and resource conservation were better understood, economic forces could be harnessed to benefit the environment while promoting development.

The release of the "Environment Initiative" was followed by two other important documents: the "Environment Strategy Framework" in the fall of 1991, describing the methodology and criteria for establishing an Agency-wide strategy, and finally the "Environment Strategy" in the fall of 1992. The latter provides guidance for all of USAID's projects and programs and recommends specific guidelines for solutions to environmental problems. It was the culmination of several years of planning and discussions within USAID beginning with the formation of the Environmental Working Group, an interbureau group set up in 1990 by the Administrator to develop an environmental strategy for the Agency.

The EPAT project was conceived and launched within this framework while the Environmental Working Group was developing the Agency's strategy. It was one of a series of centrally funded, worldwide environmental projects put out for competitive bid at the close of FY91. The centrally funded projects awarded since the end of FY91 have been accompanied by a number of

region-specific initiatives. During the last six months of 1991, each of three regional bureaus at that time, Africa, Asia and Latin America, all convened senior staff to explore the linkage of environmental activities with other bureau programs and to focus on key problems within each region. These workshops led to a series of region-specific environment strategy statements and subsequently to a number of new regional projects. The African Bureau established the Policy Analysis, Research, and Technical Support (PARTS) project as a follow on to its Natural Resource Management Support (NRMS) project, and the Asia Bureau created the United States/Asia Environmental Partnership as well as Environmental Support Project (ESP). The Latin America and Caribbean Bureau already had several regional environmental projects in place, including the Regional Environmental and Natural Resources Management (RENARM) project, but added several country-specific activities.

All these activities marked a significant expansion in the Agency's environmental portfolio. They took shape and occurred at a time when the United States was engaged in several bilateral and multilateral efforts to protect the environment. For example, the United States and members of the Group of Seven Industrialized Countries pledged to commit \$250 million toward a \$1.6 billion Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest in late 1991. A few months later, the United States and Japan agreed to provide funding of up to \$100 million each to establish National Environmental Resource Centers for the Management and Conservation of Natural Resources in four priority developing countries. These announcements were followed by U.S. participation in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992 as well as agreement on developing as much as \$50 million in environmental projects in FY92 as part of the U.S. contribution to the World Bank-administered Global Environmental Facility. Another \$20 million was pledged to the United Nations Environment Fund and \$15 million for the Montreal Protocol Facilitation Fund.

These political initiatives, combined with increased emphasis on the environment within the Agency, earmarked funding from Congress for environmental activities, and developments in the former Soviet Union, have resulted in a broad and impressive number of new environment activities. The total USAID portfolio in FY93 consisted of over 300 projects in 71 developing and former Soviet bloc countries and amounted to \$650 million. These projects, their focus and accomplishments are the subject of lengthy reports prepared by the Environment and Natural Resources Information Center (ENRIC) in response to the Agency's mandate to report to Congress on its environmental programs.

The EPAT project is now one of numerous regional and worldwide environmental projects. Both of the new regions of assistance, Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States, have developed their own regional environmental projects so that each geographic bureau now has at least one broad-based regional environmental project to support its technical assistance needs. Three of the bureaus, Asia, Eastern Europe and NIS, have also established cooperative agreements, notably with the Harvard International Institute of Development (HIID), to work on, among other things, the interrelationships between economics and environmental policy: the central mandate of the EPAT project. In addition, there is a sizable array of centrally funded worldwide projects that have the flexibility to be accessed for similar technical assistance and training, including but not limited to the following projects:

Project Name	Duration	Funding
Access to Land, Water, and other Natural Resources (ACCESS II)	1989-98	\$10 million for first five years
Agricultural Policy and Planning (APAP II)	1993	not available
Decentralization: Finance and Management (DFM)	1987-94	\$4.2 million
Development Strategies for Fragile Lands (DESFIL II)	1991-96	\$4 million
Environmental Education and Communication (GREENCOM)	1993-2001	\$24.5 million
Environmental Planning and Management (EPM II)	1994-2002	\$30 million
Environmental Planning and Technology (EPT)	not available	not available
Environmental Pollution Prevention (EP3)	1993-97	\$20 million
Forest Resources Management (FRM II)	1991-99	\$25 million
Forestry/Fuelwood, Research and Development (F/FRED)	1985-94	\$20.9 million
Implementing Policy Change (IPC)	1990-95	\$14.4 million
Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resources Management CRSP (SANREM)	1992-2001	\$26 million

The EPAT project must distinguish itself from these complementary and often competing environmental activities if it is to fulfill its stated purposes and sustain itself with buy-in activity. The project is now one of several with the potential capacity to focus on the interface between economics and environmental policy identified in the Environment Initiative.

C. Overall Project Philosophy

According to one of the EPAT project design officers, the project design evolved out of a sense that while there were numerous USAID projects that focus on certain technical aspects related to the environment, there was none at the time that focused on developing tools of economic analysis that could be used to assist in determining appropriate environmental policies in developing countries. The forms of economic analysis leading into dialogues with policy makers was seen as synthesizing by the project designers in the sense that through its focus on economic analysis, it would have relevance for all types of environmental projects. The forms of economic analysis ready for application in developing countries were to be included under a level of effort contract while the research needed to develop new models of economic analysis was to be carried out under a cooperative grant agreement. Moreover, the integration of economic analysis into environmental policy was one of the central mandates of the Administrator's Environmental Initiative.

From a reading of the project paper, the RFA, the RFP, and the minutes of the Pre-Proposal Conference, there can be little question that EPAT was intended to focus on economic analysis leading to policy dialogue:

What we are looking at is the economics for environment and development, and the dynamic linkages. That has to be driven and led, for this particular project, by the economist, and in order for the economist to do a complete job or comprehensive job, there has to be sensitivity to, awareness of, linkage with, and some multidisciplinary focus.
(Ken Baum, Pre-Proposal Conference)

Your question seems to raise the additional related question of what kind of effort, how much effort would we put under this project in doing natural resource surveys. That is, how much effort would this project put into looking at basic environmental conditions and trends, as a baseline if you will, for looking at policy change. The answer is very little.

(Russell Misheloff, Pre-Proposal Conference)

The project paper makes it clear that the designers believed there are some types of economic analysis ready to be applied to environmental policy issues while other types of analysis will require more research before they are ready for application. The forms of economic analysis ready for application in developing countries were to be included under the WIEA contract while the research needed to develop new models of economic analysis was to be carried out under MUCIA's cooperative grant.

2. Evaluation Methodology

A. Information Sources

The evaluation team's findings were based primarily on the analysis of information resulting from interviews of the USAID EPAT management team, MUCIA staff, and WIEA staff, and an extensive review of written materials generated for and by the project.

The interviews were based on a series of structured questions developed in advance by the evaluation team. Persons providing information were told that whatever they said would be held in strictest confidence and that while some of their quotes might be used in the evaluation report, they would be used in a manner such that the quotes could not be traced back to the source. The staffs of all three entities were interviewed at least twice formally by the team, with numerous follow-up questions resolved by telephone or fax.

The team also interviewed several individuals who worked formerly on the EPAT project for MUCIA or WIEA. In addition, interviews were held with past and present senior officials in MUCIA, Winrock International, and the Global/ENR office of USAID.

Interviews with project staffs and the USAID EPAT management team were held in the DC area. Interviews with other USAID staff in the regional bureaus were also held to gain some sense of how the project was regarded by its potential clients, both in USAID/Washington and in overseas USAID missions. All persons providing information to the evaluation team are listed in Appendix One to this report.

The written materials reviewed by the team are listed in Appendix Four. They included research papers, delivery order outputs, policy briefs, annual workplans, activity reports, and USAID project documentation.

Questionnaires were developed and sent to:

- 1) MUCIA/EPAT research team leaders;
- 2) WIEA/EPAT partners; and,
- 3) members of the WIEA/EPAT Technical Advisory Group (TAG).

All of the MUCIA/EPAT research team leaders responded to the questionnaire either in writing or by phone. Ten of the seventeen WIEA/EPAT partners responded by phone or in writing, and four of the six members of the WIEA/EPAT TAG responded by phone, or in writing, or by both means. A summary of the findings from the questionnaires are presented in Appendix Two to this report.

Field trips to obtain information on project impact were not given a high priority in the scope of work for this evaluation (see Appendix Five), presumably on grounds that the project was in its first phase and the project's objectives will take a number of years to realize. The evaluation budget allowed for one "site" visit. Kingston, Jamaica was chosen because WIEA has been working under a series of delivery orders to help strengthen the Jamaican Environmental Authority.

In addition, the evaluation team requested a budget supplement for one member of the team to attend a workshop in The Gambia held for USAID African environmental officers. The request was approved. An informal questionnaire was developed and administered verbally to environmental officers at The Gambia workshop to determine their knowledge of and potential interest in taking advantage of the services offered by the project. The report on this trip is presented as Appendix Three.

B. Project Complexities

It should be noted that certain pieces of information requested by the team were either not supplied at all or were not supplied in a timely manner. For example, MUCIA did not provide the team with information on the status of its synthesis papers until the end of March, nearly two months after this information was requested and only one week before the submission date of the team's draft evaluation report, leaving the team inadequate time to thoroughly review and assess them. MUCIA flatly refused to provide the evaluation team with requested financial information. Moreover, the USAID evaluation coordinator¹ was unable to arrange a follow-up meeting with a representative of USAID's Office of Procurement in order to clarify the team's understanding of certain procurement-related issues, nor was any response received from the EPAT Contracts Officer to the team's written questions about certain aspects of the procurement process.

¹ The USAID EPAT project officer also served as the USAID evaluation officer. When it became clear to the evaluation team that the project was not performing well, the team requested an alternative evaluation project officer to insure objectivity. USAID did not comply with this request but did agree to appoint a project coordinator to serve as the contact point between USAID and the team.

Most USAID projects have a single lead contractor/grantee with a USAID project officer supervising the work. In these cases, project performance and contractor performance are synonymous in the sense that project performance is the responsibility of the contractor. The EPAT project is far more complex. There are three key, active project players, with the performance of each important to the overall success or failure of the project: the USAID design/management team, MUCIA, and WIEA. In addition, the evaluation team has concluded the project design was flawed, and the decisions pertaining to contractor and grantee selection have contributed to poor project performance. With all of these factors involved, inadequate project performance could have been the result of many different combinations of performance on the part of the key project players. For example, it could be that project performance was inadequate even though one or more of the key players were performing adequately. In fact, the evaluation team has concluded that project performance and the performance of each of the key players have been inadequate. In what follows, criteria for assessing the performance of the project overall, MUCIA, WIEA, and the USAID EPAT management team will be set forth explicitly.

In addition to assessing project performance against stated objectives, the scope of work called for the evaluation team to address a set of questions. And while all of the questions pertain to project performance, they are sufficiently distinct to warrant specific answers. Consequently, this report includes a certain amount of redundancy: it assesses overall project performance, it assesses the performance of the three key project players, and it answers a separate set of questions related to project and player performance.

C. Defining Performance

In developing performance indicators for EPAT, the evaluation team started by determining what was called for in the project paper, the MUCIA cooperative agreement, and the WIEA contract. Unfortunately, very few performance yardsticks were set forth in these documents. Indeed, the only useful time-specific yardsticks were:

- 1) Sept. 1992 - publication of first synthesis documents
- 2) December 1992 - dissemination of first synthesis guidelines
- 3) January 1993 - core courses offered for the first time
- 4) January 1994 - first presentation of core courses in the field.

This failure to have a time-specific implementation plan meant the evaluation team had to develop some of its own yardsticks for acceptable project performance. The "what could be reasonably expected" criterion was employed in cases where it did not appear the contractor/grantee had performed in accordance with what was called for in the project paper. Of course, there is an element of subjectivity with this criterion. The evaluation team based its judgments on what it believed other contractors/grantees would have been able to accomplish if they had the responsibility to implement the project.

The project paper, the WIEA contract, and the cooperative agreement with MUCIA provide information on what the project is expected to accomplish and the responsibilities of USAID,

MUCIA, and WIEA in achieving its ends. The evaluation team took this information and developed performance criteria for each based on what the team believed could be reasonably expected from each group by the end of two years of project implementation. A table setting forth the evaluation team's criteria for performance is presented below. Each criterion is discussed in greater detail as it is applied to the project and its key actors. An "X" indicates which organization (s) had primary responsibility for implementation of the activity.

Indicators of Performance Adequacy after Two Years of EPAT Implementation, by Activity	Responsibility		
	MUCIA	WIEA	USAID
SOA Research - Each research team should have completed a group synthesis paper, synthesis guidelines, and be well on its way to identifying areas in which they, as teams, would focus energies to improve or develop new analytical methods.	X		X
Applied Research - A significant portion of delivery order activity should focus on economic analysis and collaboration with developing country institutions to which governments in those countries look for analytic support as part of the policy formulation process.		X	X
Information and Dissemination - Research findings and improved analytical methods will be disseminated through publications, workshops, networking and other means to host government decision makers, analysts, NGOs, academic and other research institutions, and USAID itself.	X	X	X
Policy Dialogue - A significant portion of delivery order activity should involve dialogue with host country, regional, international decision makers, and NGOs that influence policy on how economic policy can influence environmental conditions.		X	X
Institutional Strengthening - A significant portion of delivery order activity should involve strengthening developing country institutions which play a major role in analyzing or formulating host country economic policies that have important ENR impacts.		X	
Human Resources Development - Materials for proposed core courses should have been completed; in recognition that current project strategy not viable because of heavily subsidized competitive courses, an alternative strategy that is viable should have been developed and implemented.	X	X	X
Cost Effectiveness - Project performance should be measured against project costs.	X	X	X
Coordination and Collaboration - Project organizations should work closely together and with other USAID groups to insure that maximum progress is made towards achieving project objectives.	X	X	X
Staffing - Staff with technical expertise called for in the project paper should be recruited and employed on a timely basis.	X	X	X
Management - Management should keep activities on course, demonstrate effective communication skills and provide timely reports on activities and finances, and the reasons for changes in project direction.	X	X	X

In the following sections, these criteria will be used to grade the performance of the project overall and the performance of its three key players. The following grading system will be employed:

- 5 = exceptional performance
- 4 = better than acceptable performance
- 3 = acceptable performance
- 2 = less than acceptable performance
- 1 = unacceptable performance

Acceptable performance is defined as what could have been reasonably expected from a contractor/grantee, with allowance having been made for extenuating circumstances. Such a rating would generally warrant some changes, but for the most part, these changes would be marginal. A less than acceptable performance rating means that more substantive changes would be required for the project to achieve its stated objectives. An unacceptable performance rating means that even if major changes were undertaken, there is little chance that, with the project's existing structure and players, the project can achieve its stated objectives.

3. Project Performance

This section of the report examines overall project performance in each of the six project elements identified in the project paper and reiterated in the contract and cooperative agreement. Four additional areas, central to project implementation, are also addressed: cost effectiveness, coordination and collaboration, staffing, and management. The discussion in each area summarizes design expectations during the first phase of project implementation. It looks at how design expectations may have evolved since the contract and cooperative agreement were awarded, and finally it assesses performance based upon the contractor's, grantee's, and USAID's agreed expectations. Performance is then scored based on the criteria established in the preceding section on evaluation methodology.

A. Core State-of-the-Art Research

1. Design Expectations

Core state-of-the-art research is central to the entire EPAT Project. In the first 18-24 months of the project, the grantee and its various research teams were expected to devote considerable attention to synthesizing worldwide research and field experience in selected priority areas where economic policy impinges on environmental quality. Such syntheses were expected to identify useful analytical methods, document lessons learned, and result in publication of a series of guideline documents which would inform the training, policy dialogue and institutional strengthening components of the project. Expected early outputs of the synthesis phase included:

- 1) a manual to assist USAID field staff in integrating sustainable development concerns into their strategy development, programming, and policy analysis;

- 2) a closely related handbook describing the various steps in the process of identifying major environment and natural resource impacts, the policy or market failures which influence such impacts, and policy options to address market or policy failures; and,
- 3) a series of succinct papers drawing lessons from EPAT's assessment of worldwide research and field policy analysis and implementation experience in areas of interaction between economic policy and environment and natural resource management.

The synthesis papers were viewed as a critical first step in developing the research agenda. They were expected to be group activities that would focus the long-term research program and assist in identifying areas where there were opportunities for state-of-the-art, frontier research. Although the project paper presented a draft research agenda in some detail, selecting five environment and natural resource issues and five policy research modules, and recommending four types of research, the draft agenda was considered a first step in the research planning process. There was considerable latitude to interpret the proposed agenda and offer comments at the proposal stage. Modifications and changes were expected during implementation based in part on recommendations provided by an intra-USAID Project Committee and the WIEA TAG.

2. Implementation

The research strategy adopted by MUCIA in the course of implementing its cooperative agreement follows their proposal outline. That outline was based on the draft research agenda presented in the project paper, though it was organized somewhat differently. MUCIA subsequently mobilized research teams in six areas:

- 1) Population and the Environment;
- 2) Macroeconomics and the Environment;
- 3) Forest, Water and Watershed Management;
- 4) Energy, Industry and the Urban Environment;
- 5) Resource Pricing and Institutions; and,
- 6) Institutions and Implementation of Policy Change.

According to the cooperative agreement signed with MUCIA, publication of the first synthesis papers was expected in September 1992. This time table is similar to that reported in MUCIA's first annual workplan which stated that the research teams were to concentrate for the first year to 18 months on the synthesis papers as the first step in developing longer-term workplans.

Few if any MUCIA staff or research team members questioned the merits or rationale of doing the synthesis papers. The first annual workplan, dated August 1992, identifies as many as 17 synthesis papers on a variety of subjects. The second annual workplan for FY93 reports on the progress of the synthesis papers, indicating that "most of these papers are scheduled for finalization (and publication) early in 1993, with all the 'first round' synthesis papers to be

completed by the end of the second year (September 30, 1993)". The second workplan also describes specific research plans following up on the synthesis papers

The third annual workplan for FY94, dated November 1993, continues to refer to the synthesis papers, yet the publication program for the third year of the project shows no reference to the papers. The list of active "deliverables", however, includes references to eight synthesis papers. The workplan also indicates that several synthesis papers (at least three) are nearing completion and others are in circulation for review and comment.

3. Performance

The evaluation team believes that overall performance in this element of the project is unacceptable.

Failure to complete the synthesis papers in a timely fashion² has had a detrimental effect on the performance of the project's research component. Part of the problem in completing the papers may have been due to delays in mobilizing the research teams and misunderstandings in transferring funds from USAID to MUCIA so that there was a slowdown in research activities. Changes are also to be expected in prioritizing different research dissemination vehicles as evidenced by the increasing emphasis on policy briefs. But the fact still remains that the synthesis papers have not been completed, not to mention the guidelines, manual, and handbook that were expected to result from the synthesis papers. Consequently, there is no apparent rationale concerning how the individual activities of each research group relate to the overall group focus, and no real vision as to how the research will contribute to policy change. The synthesis papers were expected to be the foundation on which each group's longer term research program would be built, the basis on which research topics would be determined.

Without the completed group synthesis papers and guidelines to provide a basis for prioritizing policy issues for study, the research program has been left disorganized and unfocused. MUCIA's list of research papers in progress, recently compiled by the new MUCIA manager for administration, identifies 119 seemingly unrelated "deliverables". Few show any evidence of what might be considered state-of-the-art research. In fact, many are secondhand research pieces that have been done under other auspices. Discussions of the list of "deliverables" with members of the research teams led the evaluation team to conclude that there has been little interaction among research groups, between MUCIA and WIEA, and with institutions or researchers in developing countries (with the exception of some collaborative research efforts in Morocco and Turkey).

Difficulties in focusing and developing the research program have had a pronounced impact on the research teams. The Population and Environment Team is no longer functioning. The leader of the Resource Pricing and Institutions Team was terminated at the end of the second year of the project because he was unwilling to exercise management responsibility over members of his research team, and the team has since been disbanded. The level-of-effort for the work on Institutions and Implementation of Policy Change has subsequently been increased with

² The information and reasoning leading to this conclusion are presented in Section 4.A.2. below.

researchers added to the team. The three other teams are still operating, but, as was frequently stated in the interviews, there is significant dissatisfaction among several of the team members and frustration with what they view as USAID micro-management.

Staffing on the project is in similar disarray with turnover at every core position with the exception of the communications director. The reasons behind the turnover can be viewed in a variety of ways, but most important are the disruptions that inevitably result from such turnover in project implementation. MUCIA took over from the University of Wisconsin in March 1993, largely because financial reporting systems were in a state of confusion. The former training director was removed later that year, and no one was ever appointed to the research director position. The chief-of-party in MUCIA's proposal failed to take the position, and his replacement, Wil Candler, left the project at the end of January 1994. A replacement was not appointed prior to his departure to insure a smooth transition, though it was well known for some months that he would be leaving the project. Recruitment is now understandably difficult in light of the uncertainties surrounding project funding, and it is likely that there will not be a new chief-of-party for some time.

The MUCIA project is being maintained by the newly appointed manager for administration who is serving as acting chief-of-party. He has made a significant effort to improve MUCIA's management practices. Considerable effort has gone into straightening out financial reporting systems, identifying and cataloguing research efforts underway, and improving collaboration with WIEA. These are important steps, but they can not obscure the confusion and lack of focus surrounding the project and its failure to deliver the kind of research products of use to policy makers as well as to WIEA in marketing the potential technical assistance services available under the EPAT project.

B. Applied In-Country and Region-Specific Research

1. Design Expectations

Substantial in-country empirical research was to be carried out to enable researchers to test analytical methods and policy hypotheses developed under the core state-of-the-art research element. The project paper acknowledged that the line between core and applied in-country research was, and indeed should be, blurred. It even pointed out that there might be occasions where it would be desirable to field mixed contractor/research teams. It was quite clear, however, that in-country research was to be done at the request and with funding from individual missions or regional bureaus and in collaboration with host country government or non-governmental institutions. An explicit objective of that research was application of what is already known about environmental economic analysis and exchange of methodological approaches and insights among U.S. research institutions and host country collaborators.

2. Implementation

The relationship between core and applied research was not given further clarification at the time the project was implemented. The expectation was that the research team members would only carry out applied in-country research where such research was closely related to the core research program or in a subject area that had the potential to become an EPAT priority.

According to the USAID EPAT management team, buy-ins to the MUCIA cooperative agreement were not likely to occur until the third year of the project once the research was well underway. Their view was that MUCIA buy-ins were an opportunity to field-test and apply analytical methods developed by the core research program.

3. Performance

The evaluation team has graded overall performance in this element of the project as less than acceptable.

There have been only a few MUCIA buy-ins for in-country research. One involved a mid-term evaluation of the Philippine NRMS Project, a project on which Winrock was one of the implementors, a second was a series of desk studies for the Africa Bureau, and a third contract is in progress with the Water Resources Center in Egypt. Given the nature and limited number of buy-ins to date, it's difficult to argue that there has been any significant or sustained collaboration among MUCIA universities and host country institutions.

WIEA was viewed as the principal implementor of this element of the project, largely because applied research was likely to require rapid mobilization of research teams and be closely related to policy dialogue. An average of two applied, in-country research projects were initially expected to be underway at any one time. To date, WIEA has engaged in five such activities, including studies on debt-for-nature swaps and rice intensification in Madagascar, environmental planning and sustainable agriculture in Africa, and critical environmental issues in the Newly Independent States (NIS). These activities are in line with the essence of the EPAT project and its focus on economics and environment policy, but there were serious delays in mobilizing teams for the Madagascar studies, albeit not from lack of effort, and in completing all the desk studies undertaken in the first NRMS buy-in from the Africa Bureau.

It is especially important to note that the applied research activities undertaken to date have involved limited--if any--collaboration with host country institutions even though that was an explicit purpose of this element of the project. The Madagascar rice study does not identify any host country research collaborator, and the field work done for the Africa NRMS buy-in was largely intended to support a series of desk studies as opposed to initiate applied in-country research activities. In fact, the latter activity focusing on NIS environmental issues appears to place more emphasis on independent analyses of critical environmental issues and further steps for U.S. assistance than it does on collaboration and information exchange.

C. Information and Dissemination

1. Design Expectations

The EPAT project places considerable importance on information and dissemination. It calls for supporting wide dissemination of research and analysis findings in the form of publications, seminars, conferences and workshops, and puts emphasis on dissemination of models, other analytical methods and insights gained from project research. The project was expected to publish a periodic newsletter for an audience of up to 2,500 to keep USAID/Washington, USAID missions, participating U.S. and host country institutions, and others informed about all

aspects of the project. In addition, each core research project was expected to prepare a dissemination plan and budget, identifying publications and inputs to training and technical assistance activities, and to the extent requested by a USAID, the project was to engage in and fund targeted dissemination of research and analysis findings within a specific country.

2. Implementation

The expectations on information and dissemination changed little at the time of implementation. MUCIA was to develop a dissemination program for publications resulting from the core research program, and WIEA was to set up a program to distribute final reports from its technical assistance activities and *ad hoc* documents from seminar and workshop proceedings among its partner institutions. WIEA was initially contracted to publish the newsletter, but after consultations, it was agreed that it would be a joint responsibility of WIEA and MUCIA. The newsletter, published under a subcontract arrangement with the Institute for the International Research, has become a quality document with broad distribution. The initial schedule in WIEA's strategic plan called for three issues in 1992, four in each of the following three years, and three issues in 1996. The project has fallen one short of this target in each of its first two years of implementation.

3. Performance

The evaluation team finds that overall performance on this element of the project has been acceptable.

MUCIA has taken several steps in organizing its publication program. It has defined a portfolio of publications consisting of policy briefs, case studies, working papers, technical working papers, research reports, manuals and monographs, issued a style guide to insure consistency across authors, and developed a mailing list in collaboration with WIEA. The list has 2,187 entries, roughly half of which are government ministries, universities and research institutes/NGOs in developing countries. The remainder are donor organizations (including USAID Washington and field staff), international organizations, NGOs, and universities located in developed countries.

MUCIA has not adopted a formal, outside peer review system but rather relies on internal distribution of draft documents and collegial exchanges of views and comments. Final decision on publication is subject to the approval of the chief-of-party and USAID. The review and approval process and a number of presentation and layout problems have led to publication delays with the result that there has been a total of only nine publications through the end of FY93. Several more are reportedly in the works, but without a chief-of-party and many reports scheduled to arrive at the same time, delays are inevitable.

WIEA understandably places less emphasis on publications, but it does identify several types of publications to be prepared in its early activity reports. According to the February 1993 Activity Report, these have included at least nine technical reports on buy-in activities, two policy dialogues reporting on seminar proceedings, one discussion paper on environmental and natural resource policy issues, a catalogue of training and human resource opportunities, and two project

management guides. The technical reports are prepared for the client, the training catalogue was distributed to all USAID missions, and the management guides appear to be for project use. All project publications from both WIEA and MUCIA are listed and can be ordered through the newsletter.

WIEA progress reports since February 1993 do not give special attention to publications, nor do they report what is being done with seminars, workshops or audio visual aids to disseminate information. Recent progress reports tend to focus on the status and nature of buy-in activities and, to a lesser extent, on training and staff activities. Reporting on publications and information dissemination is largely confined to the newsletter. One assumes the technical reports and other papers from recent buy-ins are available from WIEA and by ordering them through the newsletter, but little attention appears to have been given to their dissemination or to drawing out lessons learned for input into other technical assistance or training activities.

Improvement could be made in promoting more conferences, seminars and brown bag lunches and in disseminating the findings of the core research program and the outcome of technical assistance activities. But the Team does wish to note the quality of the newsletter, the extent of its circulation, and MUCIA's efforts to solicit feedback on its publications.

D. Support for Policy Dialogues

1. Design Expectations

The EPAT project was expected to draw on its own and others' research and analysis to support both general and country-specific policy dialogue. The latter was subject to request and buy-in funding from USAID missions. Support for policy dialogue was to be provided through workshops or seminars, direct discussions with USAID or regional bureau staff, participation in policy discussions with host country governments, provision of short-term analytical project design or evaluation assistance, or provision of longer-term technical assistance to host country agencies in key economic or natural resource policy roles. The ultimate project goal was developing countries' adoption of economic policies which promote environmentally sustainable development. Core funding was available for initial site visits to countries to identify problems and options, set priorities, and prepare scopes of work for these activities. The overall objective was to foster closer communications among decision makers and to raise the level of awareness and understanding of how economic policies influence environmental quality. There was also a call for EPAT to maintain dialogue with other relevant USAID projects such as IPC, EPM and APAP so that the project team was well placed to identify the most appropriate sources of assistance.

2. Implementation

EPAT's success in promoting policy dialogue was always viewed as a function of WIEA's ability to generate buy-ins. While collaboration, coordination and information exchange with MUCIA research organizations were important, the project paper left little doubt that the requirements contractor had the lead responsibility for this element of the project. It estimated that the project

would provide short-term assistance to six USAID missions per year and longer-term policy dialogue or institutional strengthening support to an average of three missions per year.

3. Performance

In view of the project's early stage of implementation, the evaluation team concludes that overall performance on this component has been acceptable.

WIEA has progressed in developing buy-in activities. There were eight buy-ins totaling \$800,000 in the first year and 12 buy-ins worth \$1.8 million in the second. All but three of the buy-ins support policy dialogue, though all but two were buy-ins from a relatively small set of clients including the Africa Bureau, the NIS Task Force and its USAID counterparts, and the Madagascar, Jamaica and Egypt Missions. One of the two activities with other clients was EPAT's first buy-in from PPC to prepare a paper on "Guidelines for Aid Agencies in Environmental Economics" as a U.S. contribution to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. The other activity, for REDSO/E, involves convening a workshop on eutrophication problems in Lake Victoria. It was initially postponed because of coordination difficulties with the participating governments, but it has reportedly been rescheduled for later this year.

EPAT's repeat business could be viewed as a testament of its success, but other factors may have been more important. The four buy-ins from Madagascar occurred at a time when there was considerable NPA funds in the USAID's budget and no project vehicles through which to access technical assistance. That situation has since changed now that the KEPEM and SAVEM projects are in place, and future buy-ins are unlikely. The three Jamaica buy-ins were in effect bridge contracts to initiate action on the USAID's new DEMO project, now in the final stages of contractor selection. Although there may be another EPAT buy-in from the USAID/Jamaica, it is likely to be a relatively small, discrete assignment now that the DEMO project is nearing implementation. Future NIS buy-ins are also unlikely now that the NIS Environment Project has been contracted.

Six buy-ins from different offices in the Africa Bureau have been contracted to date. More buy-ins are expected next fiscal year because of the nature of the PARTS Project and the Africa Bureau's dependence on R&D projects to access technical assistance, but performance on these projects has been mixed³ and future buy-ins are likely to be considerably smaller.

WIEA faces numerous challenges in its drive to develop buy-in activities. Field personnel frequently have biases against centrally funded projects, and since most missions have at least one project with environmental objectives, there is a strong preference to work with the existing contractor. Similarly, all the regional bureaus have at least one broad-based regional environmental project to support their technical assistance needs, and there is an equally strong preference to work with that contractor. Three of the bureaus, Asia, Eastern Europe and NIS, have cooperative agreements with Harvard International Institute of Development (HIID), to work on, among other issues, the interrelationships between economics and environmental

³ See detailed discussion in Section 4B below.

policy--the central mandate of the EPAT project. There is also an array of centrally funded worldwide projects that have the flexibility to be accessed for similar technical assistance and training. Africa Bureau welcomes this array of projects and uses them judiciously to accomplish its goals, but its approach is unique among the regional bureaus largely because of its responsibility to manage the Development Fund for Africa (DFA). The problem for EPAT is that virtually all the remaining USAID African missions already have environmental projects in place.

Competing projects certainly present marketing difficulties for EPAT. But more important, the EPAT project has not distinguished itself from other centrally funded or regional projects. There has been no synergy between MUCIA and WIEA and limited collaboration on substantive aspects of the project. Synthesis papers have not been completed, nor has the project developed the economic and analytical tools necessary to market itself effectively. The lack of focus on the project's initial mandate, integrating economic analysis and environmental policy, is evident in the buy-in activities to date. Only five have had an explicit economic component and roughly a third of the level of effort expended on all activities has been by trained economists.

Several factors have no doubt contributed to EPAT's inability to create market demand for its services. The field of environmental economics is in its early stages of development, and economic techniques for environmental policy are not well developed. The project is also in its first phase of implementation. But there are other important factors over which there could have been control. Until recently, WIEA's core staff did not include a trained economist. This is likely to have affected collaboration with and interest in MUCIA's research program and limited the project's awareness of other ongoing environmental economics research as well as WIEA's networking ability to identify qualified economic consultants. At the same time, there has yet to be any effort to call on the economics expertise of the TAG, a committee set up during the best and final offer stage of contractor selection to address USAID's concerns about economic expertise on the project. As a result, EPAT staff may have missed opportunities to do the type of economic environmental policy work that was called for in the project paper for the simple reason that they are not economists. In at least one case, for example, EPAT could have provided economic technical assistance on cost recovery to the Natural Resource Conservation Authority in Jamaica if its marketing agent's had been more attuned to developing opportunities for economic technical assistance.

E. Institutional Strengthening

1. Design Expectations

The EPAT project, particularly its research, training and information dissemination activities, were designed to contribute to general institutional strengthening of host country, regional government, academic, research and other non-governmental organizations. There was also provision for institutional support to selected U.S. institutions to encourage collaboration among centers engaged in environmental policy and economic research.

Any country-specific institutional strengthening activities were subject to USAID approval and buy-in funding. Such activities were to target--but were not necessarily limited to--government institutions that shape host countries' economic policies. The support was to start with an

assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the organization and be followed by preparation of a long-term institutional strengthening plan defining the assistance to be provided by EPAT or other USAID project activities. Where appropriate, and subject to USAID approval, host country government, research or NGO institutions would be invited to participate in collaborative country-specific research, both as a form of institutional strengthening and a means of insuring relevance and practical application of the research.

2. Implementation

The WIEA contract calls for WIEA to provide support for institutional strengthening. Provision was made to access cooperating research institutions through buy-ins (though such requests were not expected) and a set-aside program was implemented to provide institutional support to U.S. institutions and researchers. The intention of the buy-in activities under the requirements contract was to strengthen developing country institutions' abilities to:

- 1) identify priority policy or market failures which contribute to environment and natural resource degradation;
- 2) analyze the environmental, economic and sociopolitical implications of present or proposed policies;
- 3) formulate and analyze feasible economic or market policy options to enhance environment and natural resource quality; and
- 4) monitor and evaluate implementation of the option (s) selected.

3. Performance

The evaluation team finds that overall performance in this project element is less than acceptable.

WIEA has since implemented eight buy-in activities in response to this element of the project. Three dealt with the Jamaican Natural Resources Conservation Authority. Another two were part of the KEPEM Project in Madagascar, and two others involved Egypt. The remaining buy-in was done on behalf of the Africa Bureau. All buy-ins have tended to focus on strengthening environmental institutions, developing work plans, assessing manpower needs, providing assistance on organizational matters, and related activities. None appear to have dealt with host country economic institutions or addressed the type of economic questions the project was designed to tackle.

The set-aside program was intended to provide funding to individuals and organizations that would not otherwise be part of the EPAT project, and in that sense, it is operating as designed. Over sixty ideas have been discussed and more than forty funded for generally less than \$15,000 each. Many of these initiatives seem to be making a contribution in promoting collaboration and supporting individuals and agencies in their work on economics and environmental policy. However, without a clearly defined core research program, it is not clear what type of research activities should be given the highest priority for funding under the set-aside program. As a consequence, it is not clear how many of these set-asides relate to the core research program, nor

is there any write-up laying out the objectives of the program. For set-asides not intended to relate to the core research program, it is questionable whether the amount of money awarded for these activities will be sufficient to have a significant impact on the research program or specific environmental policy issues in the field.

F. Human Resources Development

1. Design Expectations

Implicit in the EPAT project was the need to build indigenous human capacity to conduct economic/environmental policy studies and to formulate and execute appropriate policies to promote environmentally sustainable development. With these objectives in mind, the project was to support the development of two policy-related, U.S.-based core courses: one on economic policy and the environment and the other on environmental policy and regulation. These short courses, three to six weeks in duration, were to be informed by the core research program and integrate information from the synthesis papers. They were to be offered in the United States during the second year of project implementation. At the request and with buy-in funding from USAID missions or regional bureaus, the core courses would then be adapted for presentation in the field. Missions and other sponsoring agencies were expected to pay participant expenses to attend the courses.

Material from the two core courses was to be used in developing a shorter (less than one week) environmental awareness course intended for senior government and non-governmental officials. Other "spin-off" courses on such topics as natural resource pricing and environmental impact assessment were to be considered in light of a training needs assessment to be done under other USAID project auspices and in collaboration with the intra-Agency Project Committee and WIEA's TAG. Most if not all costs of implementing these courses was to be funded through buy-ins.

2. Implementation

Both MUCIA and WIEA were initially expected to share responsibilities for training. MUCIA was to implement the course on economic policy and the environment, and WIEA the core course on environmental policy and regulation. WIEA also held primary responsibility for the environmental awareness courses as well as any "spin-off" courses, though representatives of cooperating research institutions were to be included in the latter where appropriate. The training strategy in the project paper estimated that the core and environmental awareness courses would be offered a total of 24 times and have as many as 540 participants.

The training/human resources development element of the project has undergone several changes in the course of project implementation. After considerable effort in developing its core course, MUCIA decided to supplement WIEA's course rather than hold its own. That course, titled "Environmental Policy, Regulation and Management", was held in February 1993 with only four participants attending. Four others dropped out at the last minute, one for personal reasons and the others reportedly because of the availability of another heavily subsidized course to be offered under the Asia Bureau's cooperative agreement with HIID. An environmental awareness course was convened in late March in the Caribbean. Three other seminars, colloquia

and workshops have been convened with buy-in funding but on specific topics unrelated to the one core course that has been offered. Two human needs assessment/training studies have been completed and other workshops have been convened and are planned under various buy-in activities, but these latter activities are peripheral to the type of training that was expected to take place in the project design.

3. Performance

The evaluation team concludes that overall performance in this element of the project is less than acceptable.

EPAT has failed to develop and implement an effective training program. The availability of other subsidized training programs such as those offered by EPA's Environmental Training Institute and competition with other centrally funded projects like GREENCOM and the Energy Training Program are certainly problems, but they can not and should not obscure other problems specific to EPAT design and implementation.

First and foremost, the training element of the project is not workable in view of other heavily subsidized training programs. There is also a real question whether U.S.-based training for three to six weeks for host country participants at mission expense is a cost effective way of promoting environmental training. It may represent a misguided view about where such training should occur and who should be the target audience of training assistance. For example, there is significant need in developing countries to develop strategic plans for environmental training activities. In the evaluation team's view, a more cost-effective approach would be for project staff to assist in the development of these strategies and to offer an occasional course on how to leverage scarce environmental resources so as to have a multiple impact, i.e., training of trainers.

Second, neither MUCIA or WIEA has made any progress in defining a training strategy or developing a training niche. MUCIA has not met performance expectations or produced any documents to use for training with the exception of a training catalogue. WIEA has failed to harness the resources and expertise of its member institutions to develop its core course or the upcoming environmental awareness course. Tufts, in particular, has developed curricula for a variety of environmental courses and solicited the support of over a hundred institutions in the promotion of environmental education, yet there is no recognition of their capacity to assist in building an EPAT training program.

G. Cost Effectiveness

1. Design Expectations

The project paper and the cooperative agreement called for MUCIA to complete the first synthesis papers within the first 12 months of the project. The project paper and the WIEA contract placed a heavy emphasis on conducting economic analyses. The project paper, the cooperative agreement, and the contract all emphasize training courses as a means of realizing the project's goals. In recognition of the complex nature of this project, the project paper called for heavy involvement of USAID management.

2. Implementation

Among the EPAT/MUCIA research teams, there has been considerable lack of clarity on what they are supposed to be doing. And in the process, the goal of first completing group synthesis papers has been lost. Despite USAID's insistence that WIEA supplement its economic capabilities just before the contract was awarded, WIEA has failed to make effective use of its TAG. After considerable time and effort had gone into developing training course material and offering one core course, USAID, MUCIA, and WIEA realized that the training strategy is deficient because EPAT training courses cannot compete with heavily-subsidized courses being offered by other USAID and other donor projects. The USAID EPAT management team includes four persons.

3. Performance

The evaluation team finds the cost effectiveness performance of this project to be unacceptable.

To date, the project has cost more than \$4.6 million and is not on the way to achieving its stated objectives. Despite a four person USAID EPAT management team, MUCIA's group synthesis papers have not been completed, WIEA has not involved enough economists in its work, and training monies have been spent in support of a strategy that is not viable.

H. Coordination and Collaboration

1. Design Expectations

Both the requirements contract and the cooperative agreement make it clear that achievement of the goal and purpose of the project requires close coordination and collaboration among USAID, the contractors and the buy-in clients. According to the cooperative agreement, coordination and collaboration were needed to assure that:

- 1) The state-of-the-art research agenda is and remains attuned to the needs of USAID overseas missions, Washington-based regional bureaus and USAID assisted countries.
- 2) Research results and research methodologies of interest to USAID and to policy makers, researchers, non-governmental organizations and others in developing countries are made available in a timely fashion, and in forms appropriate for the intended audiences.
- 3) Research findings are used to underpin and support the dialogue on economic policy and the need for economic policy change which USAID and its constituent missions and bureaus undertake, both in a multilateral context and with the host governments of USAID assisted countries.
- 4) The field experiences of the requirements/LOE contractor are fed back into the design of the training courses undertaken by the cooperative agreement/requirements contract institutions.

2. Implementation

The mandate for coordination and collaboration was to be served through the creation of three distinct bodies: a Project Management Team, an internal USAID Project Committee to be chaired by the director of the former S&T/ENR Office; and the external (both to USAID and the institutions engaged to implement the project) TAG. The Project Committee was expected to meet no less frequently than semi-annually, and more often in the initial stages of the project. The TAG was expected to convene at least twice a year to review research and training plans and to advise project managers on the appropriate courses of action. In addition, WIEA established a Senior Technical Advisory Committee during the best-and-final-offer stage of contractor selection to address concerns about their core staffs' economic capabilities and to provide additional guidance on substantive economic issues related to project implementation. Steps were also taken to identify mechanisms for regular communication among the USAID Project Management Team and the two sets of contractors.

3. Performance

The evaluation team believes that overall project coordination and collaboration at both the formal and informal levels have been unacceptable.

Neither the internal USAID Project Committee nor the WIEA TAG has met on a formal basis. The TAG has been convened on two occasions, one year after the project was contracted in October 1992 and again in June 1993. Notes from the first meeting provide comments on the various elements of the project, reemphasizing the need to coordinate research and technical assistance needs and to meet at least twice a year. Little attention appears to have been given to how this coordination was to be accomplished or to provide direction for overall project implementation. No notes are available from the second TAG meeting (and the only member of the TAG interviewed during the evaluation was unable to attend), but it is apparent the TAG is not playing the advisory role it was intended to play.

Coordination and collaboration at the informal level has been even more problematic as evidenced by the agreements made at the EPAT retreat in December 1993. Those agreements iron out roles and responsibilities and develop new mechanisms for coordination and management. They also call for more and earlier communication, adhering to a "code of conduct," adopting measures to get clear and consistent messages from USAID, and developing a collective marketing strategy. The evaluation team applauds the purpose and goals of the retreat but is skeptical about whether the outcome will be beneficial, given that job descriptions and titles have not changed significantly from what was called for in the RFP and RFA. Interviews with project staff revealed that several staff now share in coordinating technical assistance activities and there is a division of labor according to geographic regions.

MUCIA and WIEA have cooperated in building a mailing list, publishing the newsletter, implementing the training course, exchanging project management information, and, to some extent, developing buy-in activities. But interaction on the substantive aspects of the project, in particular among the research team members and the WIEA core staff and their technical

assistance consultants has been very limited. Without such participation, it is difficult to see how the four coordination and collaboration objectives cited earlier will be accomplished.

By deciding to split activities under this project between two organizations that were not part of the same bidding partnership, it became the responsibility of the USAID EPAT management team to insure that the collaboration and coordination needed for this project to succeed took place. In fact, the USAID EPAT management team has done very little to promote such activities. It could have required regular meetings between the MUCIA Consortium and WIEA but it has not. It could have asked that WIEA team members be assigned to the MUCIA research teams but it has not. It could have also encouraged WIEA to use MUCIA researchers in its delivery order work.

Apparently, the USAID management team did authorize one seminar between the two groups that was supposed to result in a book on economic analysis and the environment. To date, the book manuscript has not been prepared, nor has the USAID management team made this a high priority.

I. Staffing

1. Design Expectations

As would be expected, the project design and RFA and RFP documents gave considerable attention to the staff that would be required to implement the project and to the qualifications, role and responsibilities of each team leader. The RFA called for a chief-of-party, research director, research module directors, dissemination director, and human resource director. The key positions provided for in the RFP included a chief-of-party, technical assistance coordinator, and a human resources director. Additional person months were allocated for key specialists that bidders would like to propose and for administrative, secretarial and logistic support for the key staff and the TAG. A fourth senior project economist position was provided as an option that could be exercised at some future date.

2. Implementation

MUCIA made several changes in its staffing pattern once the cooperative agreement was awarded. Their initial chief-of-party declined the position shortly after the cooperative agreement was awarded when offered a mission director position with the InterAmerican Development Bank in South America. MUCIA then attempted to recruit candidates from within MUCIA but eventually decided on an outside candidate brought to their attention by a member of the USAID Project Management Team. That candidate was not free to accept the position until April 1992, six months after the cooperative agreement was awarded, and was only available for two years before he had to return to the World Bank so that he would not jeopardize his retirement benefits.

MUCIA took similar license with replacing other candidates in their proposal. It proposed Paula Hirschhoff for dissemination director but replaced her with Ellen Maurer from the University of Wisconsin in its best-and-final offer. Sharon Pfeiffer filled the human resources director position, though no one was initially proposed in the MUCIA proposal, until she was terminated

in March 1993. Douglas Southgate was proposed as research director but was not available for the job when the project started. Jane Knowles of the University of Wisconsin was proposed by MUCIA to come to Washington for one and half years to get the project off the ground. MUCIA withdrew this offer in its best-and-final proposal and USAID agreed the activities Ms. Knowles was to have performed in Washington could be carried out in Wisconsin.

There has now been turnover at every core position with the exception of the communications director. The reasons behind the turnover can be viewed in a variety of ways, but most important are the disruptions that inevitably result from such turnover in project implementation. MUCIA took over from the University of Wisconsin in March 1993, largely because financial reporting systems were in a state of confusion. The former training director was removed later that year, and no one was ever appointed to the research director position. The chief-of-party in MUCIA's proposal failed to take the position, and his replacement, Wil Candler, left the project at the end of January 1994. A replacement was not appointed prior to his departure to insure a smooth transition.

The MUCIA project is being maintained by the newly appointed manager for administration who is serving as acting chief-of-party. He has made significant effort to improve MUCIA's management practices. Considerable effort has gone into straightening out financial reporting systems, identifying and cataloguing research efforts underway, and improving collaboration with WIEA. These are important steps, but they can not obscure the confusion and lack of focus surrounding the project and its failure to deliver the kind of research products of use to policy makers as well as to WIEA in marketing the potential technical assistance services available under the EPAT project.

WIEA's experience has been different but nonetheless difficult. The staff it proposed assumed their positions shortly after the contract was awarded: Stan Peabody as chief-of-party, Dave Barker as technical assistance coordinator, and Rich Tobin as human resources director, a position he shared with Mike Rock who was initially assigned to the project one-quarter time. In October 1992, WIEA sought approval from USAID to exercise the option for additional staff. The request was approved, and WIEA subsequently recruited an activity development manager, Catherine Jewsbury, in April 1993. Her title has since been changed to senior project economist, though she is no longer with the project and the position is currently empty.

There has now been turnover at every staff position on the WIEA contract with the exception of the human resources director. Stan Peabody left the project in March 1993 and was replaced, in order of succession, by three acting chiefs-of-party--Rich Tobin, Dave Seckler and Mike Rock. A new person has just filled the position on a permanent basis. Mike Rock is no longer engaged as a core staff member, though he continues to serve on the TAG. Dave Barker left the project in September 1993 and has been replaced. The administrative assistant/research assistant and the project secretary resigned quite recently, and the administrative officer is no longer working full time.

3. Performance

The evaluation team finds the staffing performance of the project to be unacceptable.

It is not unusual for successful bidders to propose alternative staffing patterns or have staff turnover in the course of implementation. While some changes are to be expected, the evaluation team feels that the overall performance in staffing the project has been unacceptable. MUCIA's failure to fill the research director position, choosing instead to assign those responsibilities to the chief-of-party, and its inability to recruit a chief-of-party available for the life of the contract in a timely fashion, both at the time the agreement was awarded and more recently when Wil Candler resigned, have left the project and the research program without leadership and direction. Staff turnover at WIEA has been equally problematic, but more important is their failure to staff the project with qualified economists.

J. Management

1. Design Expectations

All parties fully expected the EPAT project would be difficult to manage, largely because it involved a cooperative agreement for core research and related activities and a separate requirements contract for technical assistance. With this in mind, the project designers called on USAID to maintain a greater role in program direction and management than it would have with a single contractor. USAID's responsibilities were to include as many as nine different oversight, review and management activities. They were to be carried out by a project officer with assistance from other staff to be recruited under various USAID hiring mechanisms. These individuals would be joined by the lead research cooperator's and contractor's chiefs-of-party to form the Project Management Team. The team was expected to review project progress and activities, assure integration of the research and technical assistance activities, and make recommendations as appropriate. In addition, the project officer would be assisted by an intra-USAID EPAT Project Committee referred to earlier.

The contractors' were to perform activities typically associated with implementing and managing long-term USAID projects to keep them on course as well as to be accountable to USAID on project progress and finances. The cooperative agreement, in particular, called on MUCIA to provide a strategic plan within 60 days of executing the contract; a workplan within the same time frame as well as annual plans 45 days before the anniversary date of the cooperative agreement; activity reports every two months; progress reports semiannually; expenditure reports monthly; field activity reports as required by the delivery order; and reports to the TAG 45 days prior to their arranged meetings. WIEA is subject to similar reporting and management requirements, though there may be less emphasis on preparing annual workplans.

2. Implementation

The evaluation team has seen no written information prompting it to think that each contractors' project management and reporting responsibilities may have changed in the course of implementation. Yet MUCIA has shown little compliance with expectations. With the exception of its three annual workplans, the first delivered eight months late and the second

undated, MUCIA has not formally submitted any other reports that were brought to the evaluation team's attention. WIEA has taken greater efforts to comply with requirements, but its reporting has been erratic. Only one annual plan appears to have been submitted; progress reports do not cover the project implementation period and have not been submitted since September 1993; and activity reports not since December 1993.

The USAID EPAT management team is unusual in that it involves four members, one project officer (a direct hire) and three others through various contracting mechanisms. The USAID EPAT management team has not raised reporting as a problem in project implementation, but one questions how they are able to provide their oversight and management responsibilities without sufficient written information from their contractors. The EPAT retreat may have addressed these shortcomings, but the report provided to the evaluation team only lists a number of agreements regarding interpersonal working relationships and areas of responsibility. No attention is given to the status of project activities, laying out work plans for the future, or the longer-term vision for the project.

3. Performance

The evaluation team finds overall management performance on the project unacceptable.

Failure to comply with reporting requirements or to convene the TAG or the intra-Agency Project Management Committee are not serious problems in themselves. However, they seem to reflect the lack of the management characterizing the entire project.

The evaluation team has been told by the staffs of both the MUCIA Consortium and WIEA that having such a large USAID contingent involved with the project has generated considerable confusion over lines of responsibility. The USAID contracts office is concerned that two members of the team that it deals with regularly not having had adequate training in USAID's procurement regulations. And several incidents described to the evaluation team concerning the behavior of USAID EPAT management team in developing countries suggest that they do not have sufficient experience to be managing such a project.

K. EPAT's Overall Performance Rating

The evaluation team finds overall project performance less than acceptable. Attention is turned to the performance of the key implementing groups in the following sections.

Overall Project Performance

Activity	Score
SOA Research	1
Applied Research	2
Information and Dissemination	3
Policy Dialogue	3
Institutional Strengthening	2
Human Resources Development	2
Cost Effectiveness	1
Coordination and Collaboration	2
Staffing	1
Management	1
Average Performance	1.8

4. Assessment of Organizational Performance and Interrelationships

A. The MUCIA Consortium

1. Introduction

MUCIA has responsibilities for state-of-the-art research, information and dissemination, and human resources development. The evaluation team also examined MUCIA's performance in the areas of cost effectiveness, coordination and collaboration, staffing, and management.

A key question for the evaluation team is whether each research team is developing a focus that will lead it to the generation of new types of economic analysis that will be useful to USAID missions worldwide. The evaluation team finds little evidence that the needed focusing is taking place. Instead, there is considerable confusion among present and past research teams as to what the purpose of the research actually is. One of the research team leaders, when asked what rationale was used to determine what research to approve or disapprove, said it was that "Washington accepts or rejects research work plans without comment or explanation". Another researcher was instructed to "remove economic jargon from a paper" and when he had done so he was told "that it did not have enough economic analysis".

A number of working papers have been completed, but they, along with other evidence considered by the evaluation team, do not suggest the MUCIA consortium has a comprehensive vision of what its mission should be. The research was characterized by a member of the USAID EPAT management team as "scattered" and "a mixed bag". That person went on to suggest that over the next twelve months, the research program will start to take shape. He also suggested that one more turnover in staff and researchers will be needed before the EPAT/MUCIA research program can be effectively implemented.

The evaluation team does not agree with this assessment of the reasons for the lack of focus. As set forth in greater detail below, the evaluation team believes the lack of focus resulted from moving away from the strategy set forth in both the project paper and cooperative agreement for all research teams to start by completing a group synthesis paper.

To date, MUCIA's activities have cost USAID \$3.1 million; by the end of next year, they are projected to have cost \$5.4 million. The evaluation team believes that with research monies so scarce in USAID, an expenditure of \$3.1 million on research without convincing evidence that the research activities are leading to anything USAID needs or could effectively utilize is unacceptable. Based upon performance to date, the evaluation team does not believe waiting another year (which is projected to cost an additional \$2.3 million) to see results take form can be justified. More details on MUCIA's performance on state-of-the-art research, information and dissemination, human resources development, cost effectiveness, coordination and collaboration, staffing, and management are presented below.

2. State-of-the-Art Research

i. Synthesis Papers

The project paper and the MUCIA cooperative agreement indicate that work on this component should start by having each MUCIA research team develop a single, group synthesis paper on the research in their field. According to information supplied to the evaluation team by MUCIA (memo from Poulton to the evaluation team dated February 25, 1994), the synthesis papers were expected to serve four purposes in rough order of importance:

- 1) to achieve a reasonable consensus by the team as to the current state of knowledge;
- 2) to help knit the individual researchers into a team through work on this joint effort;
- 3) to provide a basis for prioritizing policy issues for study, and
- 4) to provide useful summaries of the state of knowledge for other researchers and development practitioners.

Poulton's listing of purposes for the synthesis papers is consistent with what is said on the subject in the project paper and the MUCIA cooperative agreement. It is clear that developing a team was intended to be a major purpose of the synthesis paper exercise and that getting individual researchers to work together on a group synthesis paper was seen as a vehicle for generating such team cohesion.

The evaluation team strongly endorses these reasons for writing the synthesis papers as the first step in the state-of-the-art research activities. It believes the emphasis on teamwork in generating the group synthesis papers is essential, because it will take such teamwork to develop analytical processes/products that will be useful to USAID missions and developing countries. Teamwork among the researchers is critical for several reasons:

- 1) It is highly unlikely that an individual researcher working in his/her area of expertise will develop a process/product that can be effectively introduced.

in developing countries; this is particularly true when dealing with environmental issues because of the recognized need for multi-disciplinary work.

- 2) The focus on policy makes matters even more challenging inasmuch as many excellent researchers have little or no experience in dealing with the immediate needs of decision makers for advice.
- 3) Once useful processes/products have been developed by each research team, it is important to have a cadre of experts fully aware of and supportive of each product to introduce the processes/products in developing countries.

The evaluation team reviewed the seven papers sent by Poulton on February 25, 1994 along with three others that MUCIA identified as synthesis papers. Detailed comments on these papers appear as Appendix Five to this report. A summary of the team's finding on each paper follows:

Of the ten synthesis papers provided by EPAT/MUCIA, the evaluation team finds that none of them qualify as completed group synthesis papers as called for in the project paper and the MUCIA cooperative agreement. The closest to qualifying is the group paper by the Macroeconomics Team which they indicate is incomplete because it does not yet include two important sections. The forestry paper by Gregersen *et al* will be published by the FAO as part of a book on assessing forestry project impacts. The paper by Honadle could be seen as the beginning of a group synthesis paper by the newly-created Institutions and Policy Implementation Team, but other members of the Team need to be heard from before that team has a true group synthesis paper.

The Schnoor paper is too superficial to qualify as an individual synthesis paper and Schnoor has been terminated from the Energy, Industry, and the Urban Environment Team. The Braden *et al* paper was written for the Resource Pricing and Institutions Team which has been disbanded.

Two of the lead authors of the other papers, Clay and Ness, are not members of any research team. While Clay was formerly a member of the Population and Environmental and Natural Resources Team, the evaluation team has no information on Ness' affiliation with the project.

Lead authors on the remaining papers (Arnold, Norman & Coates, and Tejani & Ascher), are not members of any research team, so it is unclear what role these papers will play in developing group synthesis papers.

In short, it is the conclusion of the team that none of these papers qualifies as a synthesis document in the sense that it represents the finished product of a group effort to assess the state-of-the-art, draw lessons from past experience, and provide the rationale for a research agenda as called for in the project paper and cooperative agreement.

For several reasons, it is the evaluation team's conclusion that MUCIA's performance in this area has been inadequate. First, the implementation schedule appearing in the project paper and cooperative agreement called for the first synthesis papers to have been completed by September 1992, or one year after project startup, with the dissemination of the first synthesis guidelines to take place in December 1992. Neither the project paper nor cooperative agreement makes clear

when all of the synthesis papers were to have been completed. The first MUCIA work plan calls for them to be completed within 18 months, or by March 1993, while later plans call for them to be completed within two years, or by September 1993. However, it is now more than two and one-half years after project startup. No group synthesis papers have been completed and no synthesis guidelines have been disseminated.

MUCIA argues there are three justifiable reasons for delays:

- 1) Project startup was actually delayed for several months because MUCIA's candidate for chief-of-party chose to take another job⁴;
- 2) Further delays resulted when the funding for research slowed because the University of Wisconsin believed the project would run short of funding even though USAID had made additional money available to the project⁵;
- 3) Annual work plans were approved that allowed for some delay in delivering synthesis papers.

Regarding the first two points, the evaluation team believes MUCIA should be held responsible for staffing the project on a timely basis and monitoring available funding accurately. The evaluation team does not believe work plans should have been developed and approved⁶ that allowed for delays in completion of the group synthesis papers.

The second reason for the evaluation team judging synthesis performance inadequate is because it was decided to allow individual team members to write their own synthesis papers. This occurred, according to a member of the USAID EPAT management team, because it agreed to "go along with the views of strong-willed academics."

This decision meant that the major justification for the synthesis papers, *i.e.*, bringing together and molding individual researchers into a team, would be lost. More specifically, the evaluation team believes that if individuals were allowed to work alone, the synthesis activity:

- 1) would not generate a reasonable consensus by the team as to the current state of knowledge;
- 2) would not help knit the individual researchers into a team through work on this joint effort; and
- 3) would not provide a basis for prioritizing policy issues for study.

⁴ The replacement chief-of-party did **not** join the project until February 1992.

⁵ According to the EPAT/MUCIA acting chief-of-party, USAID initially gave MUCIA \$300,000 to start the project. A later USAID memo indicating that an additional \$900,000 was being made available was apparently "lost in transmission" for several months, leading to the delays.

⁶ According to MUCIA's cooperative agreement, annual work plans were to be developed by MUCIA and approved by USAID. Consequently, ill-advised changes in them should be viewed as a joint responsibility of MUCIA and USAID.

As further evidence of inadequate performance of synthesis activity on both timing and lack-of-team effort grounds, the following information is relevant.

The Energy, Industry, and Urban Environment Team proposed a set of synthesis papers, one per team member.

We expect Duane Chapman will compile these papers for us. Unfortunately, the FY94 budget cuts are likely to affect severely the continued support for members of this team, including Duane Chapman, so at this time it is not clear what form the final product will take. (memo from Poulton to evaluation team dated February 25, 1994)

From the Population Team, we have a very useful synthesis paper from Gayle Ness ... which has only recently been published. The membership of this team has changed in such a way that it is not clear a full set of Synthesis Papers will be completed by the team. (memo from Poulton to evaluation team dated February 25, 1994)

In the case of Resource Pricing and Institutions Team, Dan Bromley was not effective as team leader in organizing the work of his team to produce the promised synthesis papers. Dan Bromley has now resigned, but we are still expecting to receive individual synthesis papers.... (memo from Poulton to evaluation team dated February 25, 1994)

In short, the implementation plan in the project paper called for the first synthesis papers to be published in September 1992. In fact, parts of the first synthesis paper were not received until a year later with drafts of two more not expected until the first quarter of 1994. And of those, only one, from macro economics, might be considered a partial team effort directed at achieving the purposes of the synthesis papers set forth above. It is questionable whether group synthesis papers will ever be forthcoming from the other teams.

MUCIA argues the synthesis papers were de-emphasized when it was realized that the teams possessed knowledge that without further research would be of interest to USAID missions and developing countries. As a consequence, considerable effort went into generating a number of "policy briefs" that summarized in reasonably simple terms what was known about certain fields and how this might be of value to policy makers. When the MUCIA chief-of-party was asked how he saw this information affecting change in developing countries, he said it would be accomplished by disseminating the policy briefs to policy makers. When asked how often he thought policy makers acted on the basis of written materials alone, he said "it was not within MUCIA's scope to do more than that".

The evaluation team does not understand why time was taken away from the synthesis papers to do policy briefs without a more plausible scenario for how they would be used to influence the decisions of policy makers. A more appropriate use of this information would have been for the research teams to have entered into arrangements with the consulting firms associated with MUCIA and with WIEA to promote this information into buy-ins for the respective groups. The evaluation team recognizes that this did not happen in large part because of the way the project

is structured. There is little or no synergy between various project groups, a problem that should be overcome.

MUCIA could argue that the synthesis papers were not needed; rather, the teams chose to move directly to defining and operationalizing their overall research agendas. A review of the work plans, the 119 "deliverables", and the draft papers to date does not suggest this is happening. For the most part, the papers remain discrete efforts of individual authors with little evidence of a growing commitment to focusing on a particular area in which to improve upon or develop new analytical methods, a finding that is hardly surprising in light of the absence of teamwork in the development of most of the synthesis papers⁷ or annual work plans.

ii. The Set-Aside Program

The set-aside program was intended to complement the work being carried out by organizations that are part of the MUCIA consortium. The set-aside program reflects the same lack of focus that typifies the work of most of the research teams. The *ad hoc* nature of these grants is reflected in the fact that 40 percent of the set-aside activities funded to date is not reported as being affiliated with any of the research teams. It appears that only the forestry team is using outside experts to link into their work through set-asides. To date, just under 40 percent of all set-aside funding is going for work that will complement the work of the forestry team. With 40 percent of set-asides supporting work of the forestry team and 40 percent of set-asides not associated with any research teams, only 20 percent of set-asides are being used to complement the work of the four other research teams.

In reviewing the set-asides, the evaluation team found that Jane Hall, a former member of the Energy, Industry and the Urban Environment Team, is scheduled to receive \$82,384 through set-asides, reportedly for the presentation of a midyear workshop and a policy brief. Given that average annual budgets for the research teams are only approximately \$110,000, the evaluation team questions such a large amount going to an individual who is no longer a member of a research team.

iii. Policy Briefs

One of the reasons offered for the delays in completing the synthesis papers was the recognition that the EPAT/MUCIA researchers already had valuable knowledge to transmit to the field. As a means of transmitting this information, it was decided to write a series of relatively simple summaries on project topics, *e.g.*, policy briefs that policy makers could read and use. The evaluation team believes the decision to write these papers was a mistake and seriously distracted from completing the group synthesis papers.

The logic of the state-of-the-art research component of the EPAT project was to isolate the researchers from field distractions to allow them to develop new economic analysis tools applicable to environmental policy issues. In contrast, the other major research component of this project, operated by WIEA, was intended to transmit and apply already-developed modes of analysis in developing countries. The evaluation team believes it is highly unlikely that

⁷ There is evidence of teamwork on the part of both the Forestry and Macroeconomics teams.

dissemination of policy briefs will have a significant impact on Third World policies. WIEA, in contrast, has the mandate and the resources to actively promote already-developed analytical methods. Rather than have the EPAT/MUCIA researchers take time away from their research, it would have been preferable for WIEA to have developed the policy briefs (possibly with some assistance from the EPAT/MUCIA researchers) and to have followed up with direct marketing efforts in developing countries. MUCIA, WIEA, and the USAID EPAT management team have argued that such forms of collaboration are not easily done because of contractual limitations, e.g., it is hard to hire the MUCIA teams to work on WIEA activities and *vice versa*. The evaluation team recognizes this problem and will have more to say about these restrictions in a later section of this report that focuses on project design and project structure.

iv. Overall Vision

A review of the annual research work plans of each research team attests to the lack of any comprehensive vision of how the work will contribute to project goals. In addition, the work plans do not demonstrate convincingly how the research of the individuals in each group would contribute to defining and operationalizing their overall research agendas.

From discussions with MUCIA core staff and reviews of the research in progress, it appears that little thought has been given to the model of social change this research would support beyond the distribution of research publications and a hope that they will be read and acted upon by senior policy makers in developing countries.

v. Uncertainty Over What Research the MUCIA Grant Is Supporting

It is been difficult to assess research progress in part because it is not clear what research products have been and are being financed by the project. The evaluation team was initially provided with a list of 119 "deliverables" by the MUCIA staff. Upon a review of these "deliverables", it became clear that some of these documents were earlier works, and that some of these had already been published elsewhere. Upon further investigation, the core MUCIA staff conceded that they did not know what research was actually being supported by the EPAT project and were still in the process of trying to find this out. Only on the day before the draft of this report was due did the evaluation team receive a memo that identified which of these 119 "deliverables" constituted original work paid for by the project. An (O) was intended to represent documents in which "the text is not consciously adapted from an earlier work." While the team has not had the time to make a complete review of all documents classified in that memo, it was notable that on the first page of the list, the following document appears with an (O) classification: Thomas A. White, "Landholder Cooperation for Sustainable Upland Watershed Management: A Theoretical Review of Problems and Prospects". The evaluation team already had received a printed EPAT copy of this document and on the cover page of this document is the following statement:

Work contributing to this paper was supported by funds from The United Nations Environmental Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The Pew Charitable Trusts, and the University of Minnesota.

The evaluation team had trouble understanding how this document could be classified as an (O) document inasmuch as it sounded as if it was a reprint of an article that was funded by other

sources. We pursued this matter with the EPAT/MUCIA acting chief-of-party. Specifically we asked:

- 1) Did MUCIA pay for the preparation of this document, and if so, how much?
- 2) Can this list and supporting classifications be used to determine what documents have been primarily financed by EPAT funds?
- 3) If the answer to the above question is no, can you provide us with such a list?

The EPAT/MUCIA acting chief-of-party responded that the data base that generates this list does not include financial information and that the cooperative agreement does not require MUCIA to maintain cost information by product. More specifically, Poulton's response (memo of April 7, 1994) to the evaluation team's query regarding how MUCIA grant monies were being used to support research activities follows:

...the cooperative agreement [does not] require MUCIA to maintain cost information by product. The cooperative agreement funds people, not products.... We continue to refine our data base to manage and track products.

If the Evaluation Team is interested in obtaining cost information by product, the Team might need to consult with AID as to whether the request is within the Scope of Work of the evaluation. If so, it could then be possible that AID might want to negotiate an amendment to the cooperative agreement with MUCIA regarding the appropriate definitions of all cost elements and products to be analyzed and the provision of additional resources to support that cost analysis.

The evaluation team concludes from this quote and the evidence set forth above that MUCIA does not have an information system in place that will allow it to determine how much financial support has been or is now being provided by its EPAT grant to individual research activities/products. The evaluation team is extremely troubled by this finding. At a time when USAID's research monies are increasingly scarce, the team believes these monies should be carefully budgeted so it is absolutely clear how much financial support goes into each research activity being funded.

vi. Conclusions

In sum, the evaluation team concludes that, as called for in the project paper and the cooperative agreement, each MUCIA research team should have completed a group synthesis paper, at least by the end of the second year of the project and that each team should be well on the way to developing new and/or improved methods of economic analysis in their area of expertise. The evaluation team concludes that MUCIA performed unacceptably on this activity because no group synthesis papers have been completed, no synthesis guidelines have been disseminated, and there is no indication that each team is well on its way to developing new and/or improved methods of economic analysis in their respective areas of expertise.

3. Information and Dissemination

Considerable effort has gone into packaging and disseminating documents; considerable effort has also gone into identifying mailing lists and other mechanisms to disseminate information to target audiences. Documents written before the project came into being by project researchers and others have been disseminated. The evaluation team has reviewed a collection of letters from recipients of publications praising the project's information and dissemination activities. The evaluation team suggests that consideration be given to charging Western audiences for this material at the earliest possible date. The evaluation team believes whether Western audiences are willing to pay for these materials is the true test of whether they are serving a useful end to Western readers. The evaluation team is not suggesting charging for these documents to developing country recipients on grounds that subsidizing such an information transfer is a useful USAID objective.

The value of the dissemination effort is reduced by the fact that the project is not yet developing new and/or improved methods of economic analysis. To compensate for this, the project paper called for the dissemination of information through publications, workshops, seminars, networking, and other means. To date, MUCIA has done little beyond dissemination of publications.

The evaluation team considers MUCIA's information and dissemination performance adequate.

4. Human Resource Development

According to the project paper, MUCIA was expected to develop a 3 to 6 week course on economic policy and the environment. Despite many months of paid work intended to generate the products for this course plus supplemental assistance from a USAID consultant not paid for by the project, acceptable products were never generated and the effort has effectively been abandoned.

The evaluation team heard that failure to deliver the materials for the core course was in part attributable to the growing realization that there was no market for the course. If that were the case (and the evaluation team believes there is not a market for the course), the USAID EPAT management team and MUCIA should have not allowed the work on the course to proceed until a realistic strategy for human resource development had been developed⁸.

MUCIA failed to recognize that the underlying strategy for education and training did not make sense and it failed to call a halt to existing activities until a new strategy was developed. The evaluation team finds MUCIA's human resources development performance unacceptable.

⁸The USAID EPAT management team claims it suspended work on the core course when it learned that another USAID project would offer a similar course. In fact, there were several heavily subsidized courses offered by other donors and US government agencies that predated USAID's decision to suspend course development. For example, the United Nations Environmental Program has offered a heavily subsidized four month environmental training program (including an economic analysis component) for Third World government officials at Tufts University for four years.

5. Cost Effectiveness

According to the project paper, the cooperative agreement, and MUCIA work plans, MUCIA should have, by the end of the second year:

- 1) published a first set of group synthesis papers;
- 2) disseminated synthesis guidelines on these papers; and
- 3) developed materials for a 3-6 week core course on economic policy and the environment.

It has not completed any of these tasks. The only project component it has performed acceptably on is information and dissemination. Because it has spend \$3.1 million and has not completed any of the other tasks, it receives an unacceptable rating on cost effectiveness from the evaluation team.

Since the evaluation team was unable to obtain detailed financial information from MUCIA, the team has decided it would be useful to develop a model budget of how much a group synthesis paper should have cost to complete.

Assume that for each group synthesis paper, five individual synthesis papers would have to be written and paid for first, and that teams would have had to come together for a meeting both before and after completion of the individual synthesis papers. The model budget data are presented in the following table.

Model Budget to Complete a Group Synthesis Paper

Activity	Cost
Preliminary Meetings	
Travel (3px\$300)	900
Per diems (3px\$150)	450
Fees (5px2dyx\$500)	5,000
5 Individual Synthesis Papers	50,000
(5papx\$10,000)	
Meeting to Discuss Group Synthesis Paper	
Travel (3px\$300)	900
Per diems (3px\$150)	450
Fees (5px2dyx\$500)	5,000
Group Synthesis Paper	20,000
Total	82,700

The evaluation team believes it has made generous assumptions about costs, and the costs are quoted at fully burdened rates. For example, the assumption is that each synthesis paper will cost \$10,000. Assuming an overhead rate of .7, this would allow more than \$5,800 (or almost 20 days at a daily rate of \$300) to complete each paper. The evaluation team notes that the authors are being asked to summarize a field in which they are the experts and 20 days to do this

should be more than enough. The evaluation team was told by MUCIA that over the last two years, each research team has had a budget of approximately \$110,000 per year, or \$220,000 since project inception. This means that each team had more than double the funding the evaluation team believes should have been required to complete the first product called for in the project paper and the cooperative agreement. The evaluation team finds it disturbing that not a single synthesis paper, group or individual, has as yet been published by a research team or team member.

6. Coordination and Collaboration

From discussions with research team members and a review of their writings, the evaluation team has concluded there has been virtually no interaction between MUCIA researchers or MUCIA staff/partners, despite areas in which work activities overlap. Further, MUCIA staff have not been significantly involved in any of the WIEA work, nor have WIEA staff been asked to join MUCIA research teams. Interviews with research team members uncovered little knowledge of what peers in their field were working on. And as was demonstrated by how long work on the core course was allowed to proceed before realizing they did not have a workable strategy, it is apparent that MUCIA management did not know of the other government sponsored environmental training programs already underway.

The evaluation team concludes the MUCIA coordination and collaboration performance has been less than acceptable.

7. Staffing

MUCIA has been derelict in its staffing responsibilities to this project. The chief-of-party proposed by MUCIA was not available at the time the project was supposed to start, and the replacement chief-of-party was actually identified by a member of the USAID EPAT management team. This person has proven to have been incapable of managing a research program. Under his management:

- 1) no synthesis papers have been completed, even though the first ones were due in the first 12 months of the project;
- 2) the evaluation team has concluded there is no focus to the research program;
- 3) the policy briefs are ill-conceived; and,
- 4) there is no evidence of progress in the development of policy tools.

The research director position for this project has never been filled. The original MUCIA proposal said Jane Knowles would become operations coordinator of the project and move to the DC office of the project for 18 months to get the project underway. This did not happen. The original MUCIA proposal said Paula Hirschhoff would also reside in the DC office as the dissemination director. This offer was also withdrawn in MUCIA's best-and-final proposal.

The chief-of-party came to the project on a leave of absence from the World Bank, and it was clear some time ago that he would be returning to the Bank in April. Despite this, MUCIA did

not have a qualified candidate available to replace Candler when he departed. It is now clear that the project will be without a permanent chief-of-party or a research director at least until this summer, and this is true despite the fact that the research program is in desperate need of developing a common vision/focus that will result in some research that will be useful to USAID.

The evaluation team concludes that MUCIA's staffing performance has been unacceptable.

8. Assessment of MUCIA Management

In terms of management, MUCIA had several responsibilities, each of which is assessed below.

i. Research and Training

As documented above, MUCIA has not been able to provide the evaluation team with an accurate listing of the research completed or underway that is being paid for out of project funds. Research team members have expressed considerable frustration and ignorance over how decisions are made concerning what parts of their work plans to fund and what parts to reject. The evaluation team concludes the research is not being managed in a way to expect that its results will be useful to USAID.

As indicated above, MUCIA was supposed to develop training materials for a 3-6 week core course. In February 1992, MUCIA management recruited a person to develop these materials. In March 1993, this person was dismissed without having completed acceptable course materials. The evaluation team believes MUCIA management was negligent in allowing this person to work for this period of time without completing the product she was hired to produce.

ii. Financial Management

Initially, the University of Wisconsin was responsible for the financial management of this project. It soon became apparent that the University could not manage this responsibility. As an example, USAID had made \$900,000 available to MUCIA. Somehow, MUCIA did not learn about these funds being available for several months. In the interim, the research program was cut back because of an imagined shortage of funds. In March 1993, MUCIA headquarters in Columbus, Ohio determined the University of Wisconsin could not manage project finances and took over the financial management. It also hired two persons to work out of project headquarters in Rosslyn with the aim of getting overall project management back on track. The evaluation team has been impressed by the acting chief-of-party's efforts to bring financial management under control.

Nevertheless, as pointed out by a member of the USAID EPAT management team, it has taken almost two years to "get out from under what the University of Wisconsin has done". The evaluation team questions whether an excessive amount of grant monies has been used for the financial management of this project. More specifically, the team questions whether staff monies that should have paid for researchers and travel monies that should have been used to get researchers together have not instead gone to financial management experts who were brought on to rectify problems created by the University of Wisconsin's failure to manage the finances effectively. The team notes that the research director slot has never been filled and that the

acting chief-of-party came to the project as a financial manager rather than because of his research credentials. At this point, no EPAT/MUCIA staffer based at EPAT/MUCIA headquarters in Rosslyn has the research credentials and experience to manage the research activities called for in the MUCIA cooperative agreement.

iii. Reports

MUCIA is expected to generate activity reports every two months, semiannual progress reports, monthly expenditure reports, and reports to the TAG. Reporting has been irregular.

The evaluation team concludes that MUCIA's management of this project constitutes unacceptable performance.

9. MUCIA's Overall Performance Rating

MUCIA's overall performance rating is presented in the following table. The implications of this rating will be discussed in the conclusions to this report.

MUCIA Performance

Activity	Score
SOA Research	1
Information and Dissemination	3
Human Resources Development	1
Coordination and Collaboration	1
Cost Effectiveness	1
Coordination and Collaboration	2
Staffing	1
Management	1
Average Score	1.43

B. Winrock International Environmental Alliance (WIEA)

1. Introduction

WIEA is charged with leadership in three of the six project elements: applied in-country and region-specific research, support for policy dialogue and institutional strengthening. It participates in information and dissemination and shares responsibilities with MUCIA for human resources development (education and training). Its performance in each of these project elements and in the four additional areas of cost effectiveness, coordination and collaboration, staffing, and management are discussed below and evaluated based on the criteria set out earlier. Much of the information presented here has been raised in the previous section examining project accomplishments. The emphasis is not to rehash that material but rather to offer a different perspective focusing on organizational performance.

In the course of considering WIEA's organizational performance, it is important to bear in mind that the WIEA contract comes with funding support of \$6.2 million over a five year period. There is no upper dollar limit on how much work can be performed under it, either in total or per individual delivery order. These features make it an extremely attractive contract for potential USAID contractors, particularly in comparison to an Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) for the provision of technical services.

The IQC is a much less expensive contracting vehicle for USAID than the WIEA requirements contract in that the IQC contractors get no financial support from USAID beyond those funds provided in each delivery order. In effect, they win a contracting mechanism but no financial support until they are contracted to perform specific services. The IQC is distinguished further from the WIEA requirements contract in that there are no upper limits on the amount of work that can be done, both under individual delivery orders and under the overall contract. Under the IQC, there is an upper time limit of 120 days on how long each delivery order can be operating.

The Environmental/Natural Resources IQC that expired in December 1993 was heavily utilized by USAID missions, raising questions as to the justification of the far more expensive WIEA requirements contract. A common justification for a requirements contract with core funding is that it will market something to missions that USAID/Washington feels is both important and not yet familiar and/or popular with USAID missions. But this would not seem to be the case with environmental and natural resources activities. This implies that the justification for the WIEA contract has to be that it is providing a particular form of technical expertise that has not yet "caught on" in USAID missions, such as economic analysis as it applies to environmental policy issues.

Thus, the performance of WIEA under its requirements contract should not be measured by the number of buy-ins received or follow-on buy-ins. It should be relatively easy to obtain buy-ins when USAID is paying an organization \$6.2 million to market for them. Rather, the key indicator is the number of buy-ins received that focus on the specific area of expertise that was sufficiently important to justify the EPAT project, *i.e.*, economic analysis applied to environmental policy issues, an area of expertise that missions are not likely to obtain through IQC contractors. An economic focus has only been predominant in five of WIEA's twenty buy-in activities to date.

2. Applied In-Country and Region-Specific Research

The relationship between applied research and the state-of-the-art research element being undertaken by MUCIA was fully distinguished in the project paper and the bidding documents. The expectation was that the two would blend together, *i.e.*, in-country research was to be carried out, with the concurrence and support of USAID missions, to enable those involved in the research program to develop and test analytical methods and policy hypotheses in an applied setting. By the same token the results of applied research technical assistance under WIEA buy-ins were expected to inform and feed back into the research program. This, of course, requires a high-level of cooperation and coordination among the contractors, and success was not necessarily expected until the research program became well developed and was fully

underway. Nonetheless, it is not too early to expect to see progress toward meeting these objectives.

According to WIEA's internal project status report, there have been five buy-in activities under this element of the project. These have included studies on debt-for-nature swaps and rice intensification in Madagascar, on natural resource management issues under two separate NRMS buy-ins from the Africa Bureau, and on critical environmental issues in the NIS. These studies have been in line with the essence of the EPAT project, *i.e.*, they account for three of the five buy-ins to date focused predominantly on economics. But these buy-ins have encountered problems. There were delays in mobilizing teams for the Madagascar studies, though not from lack of effort on WIEA's part. There were also delays in completing all the desk studies undertaken by the three research teams supported under the first Africa NRMS buy-in. The activity started in September 1992 and was not completed in October 1993. And while more than \$100,000 was spent on a series of desk studies by one team under this buy-in, its studies have not been finalized and disseminated.

However, WIEA's most important shortcoming in its applied research activities is that they have not been effectively coordinated with the MUCIA research program and there has been little collaboration with host country institutions, both explicit purposes of the project. The Madagascar rice study did not involve Madagascar institutions, the Africa NRMS studies have not solicited the participation of any African organizations, and the NIS activity was designed primarily to serve USAID bilateral assistance programming needs. Consequently, the evaluation team finds WIEA's performance in this element of the project to date less than acceptable.

3. Information and Dissemination

Although WIEA plays a supportive role, it does have a number of information dissemination responsibilities. A WIEA staffer has taken responsibility for assembling the newsletter and leadership in developing the mailing list. WIEA is also charged with disseminating the results of its technical activities in the countries where those activities occur as well as within USAID, to MUCIA researchers and its broader readership. To date, WIEA's performance has been acceptable, but improvement could be made in promoting more seminars and informal technical meetings and in compiling and disseminating lessons learned from its technical assistance activities. Reporting to USAID on progress and activities has been erratic and could be improved, and greater steps could be taken to actively distribute reports on buy-in activities as opposed to relying on requests from the newsletter.

4. Policy Dialogue

Support for policy dialogue has been the major focal point of WIEA's buy-in activities, but performance in this area has been mixed. The paper prepared for the OECD Development Assistance Committee, the Madagascar rice intensification study, the work supporting the World Bank pre-appraisal mission in Russia, and the three Jamaican DEMO project buy-ins have all been well received. Six other buy-ins are ongoing and can not be fully assessed, but in at least two other cases, performance to date appears to have been inadequate. A report has not been finalized for the Madagascar KEPPEM Bridging Technical Assistance buy-in, although comments

on a draft from the USAID mission were received more than nine months ago. More troubling is the failure to perform under the Africa Bureau NRMS buy-in referred to earlier. One team was expected to have completed several desk studies, including papers on integrated risk management, economic theory as it relates to the impact and design of NRM policy initiatives, and the Sahelian forestry code. These papers were not satisfactorily completed. Papers were written by other research teams under the buy-in on such topics as sustainable agriculture and tools of economic analysis were submitted to the USAID Project Management Team who have yet to take any action.

WIEA has enjoyed some success in developing buy-ins and repeat business in support of policy dialogue. The evaluation team consequently finds that WIEA's organizational performance has been acceptable, but feels strongly that concerted efforts are needed to engage more economists and economic analysis in project implementation. Future success is dependent on the project distinguishing itself from other contract vehicles by developing a set of applied, analytical tools and marketing them directly to USAID field missions.

For a buy-in contract of the sort the WIEA has, hands-on marketing directly to potential USAID clients is essential to insure that the buy-ins focus on economic analysis and that the contract is not a vehicle to satisfy every imaginable USAID technical assistance need. The WIEA staff agree with this sentiment but say the USAID EPAT management team has not been supportive of WIEA's efforts to market to the field, either by not allowing them to go on marketing trips or by interfering in the direct communication between WIEA staff and USAID clients.

Regarding the marketing issue, the USAID EPAT management team contends that it turned down some trips in part out of concern over the caliber of the people WIEA was proposing to send to the field. The evaluation team shares some of these concerns. Non-economists are not likely to make an effective marketing argument to USAID missions regarding the need for economic analysis in making environmental policy decisions. This was clear from the team's site visit to Jamaica where an obvious opportunity to do economic analysis was missed because WIEA had not involved economists in the Jamaica work.

5. Institutional Strengthening

WIEA has implemented nine buy-ins it considers responsive to the institutional strengthening element of the project. These included the three Jamaica DEMO activities, two completed buy-ins from both Madagascar and Egypt, and one buy-in each from Russia and the Africa Bureau. All have focused on strengthening environmental institutions, developing work plans, assessing manpower needs, providing institutional strengthening, and human resources development. WIEA organization performance in undertaking these activities has been acceptable. The major fault is that none has involved host country economic institutions, led to regular collaboration with host country research institutions, or examined the type of policy questions that the project was designed to address.

6. Human Resources Development

The human resources development element of the project involve having WIEA prepare a core course and a series of training and environmental awareness courses. The course was only taught once and only four students took it. As discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this report, there does not appear to be a market for this course because there are a number of similar courses offered that are heavily subsidized by USAID and other donors.

Under these circumstances, the evaluation team believes WIEA did an acceptable job. It questions why WIEA did not become more proactive in developing an alternative human resources development program, one that harnessed limited resources to have the greatest possible impact. WIEA should have drawn on its membership as well as its own experience in developing those alternatives. That experience appears to be considerable judging from the list of completed and planned human resource development activities that WIEA provided to the team.

7. Cost Effectiveness

It is useful to use the yardstick of an IQC to judge the cost-effectiveness of the WIEA contract. Under the recently-completed IQC for environment and natural resources, two of the three contractors reached the ceiling allowed under the IQC regulations governing the project. The IQC provides technical expertise in response to USAID mission requests and it costs USAID nothing beyond the costs of the specific delivery orders carried out under the contract. Since the WIEA contract includes \$5.7 million of core money, it clearly should be providing more than can be obtained under an IQC if it is to be cost-effective.

The purpose of the EPAT project is to develop and apply tools of economic analysis to environmental policy issues in developing countries. The justification for providing core monies to WIEA is the belief that it will take further work to develop these tools and convince USAID missions that they are needed. To date, WIEA has been involved in a number of delivery orders that have involved little or no economic analysis as applied to environmental issues. In part, this is attributable to WIEA not having an adequate number of economists involved in the marketing and implementation of its work orders. It is also in part attributable to needing "to get one's foot in the door" by doing work that USAID missions want done as a preliminary to convincing the missions that more economic analysis is needed.

To date, the evaluation team finds WIEA's performance on cost effectiveness to be less than acceptable because of its failure to focus adequately in its marketing and delivery order activities on economic analysis. This performance could improve in the future if and when WIEA focuses more of its energies on providing economic analysis in support of environmental policy.

8. Coordination and Collaboration

Coordination and collaboration problems have affected all aspects of WIEA's organizational performance. Poor working relationships among staff have led to at least two members leaving the project. These types of problems have evidently not been overcome, judging from some of the agreements the entire EPAT project staff felt compelled to make at the December project

retreat such as in their agreement on a "code of conduct." In addition, WIEA core staff have failed to interact effectively with MUCIA to take advantage of the core research program or to inform MUCIA of the research being done by WIEA members. Nor have they consulted with its Senior Technical Advisory Committee or drawn on the advisory services of the TAG.

Coordination and collaboration among WIEA partners are equally problematic. The core staff has not put sufficient time and effort into learning about all the partners' capabilities or developing an incentive and information structure that would allow all partners to work together in achieving project goals. Irregular communications on potential buy-in activities has led to growing dissatisfaction among the partners and the sense that a few firms are monopolizing the work. In fairness to WIEA, it should be said that this is not entirely accurate. But the perception is nonetheless a problem. Almost all partners have had some work on the project, though Winrock, MSI, IIR, TR&D and KBN have had roughly two-thirds the level-of-effort on the buy-in activities.

Working relationships between WIEA and the USAID EPAT management team have also been strained. Confusion about the roles and responsibilities of the USAID team has led to WIEA staff frustrations, many of which are reflected in the December retreat Agreements as well as in certain operating procedures. For example, WIEA staff have been asked not to meet with certain USAID staff unless at least two WIEA staff members are present. The fact that there is a need for such procedures is certainly a deterrent to effective coordination and collaboration. Although noting that WIEA is taking positive steps to address these types of problems, the evaluation team finds WIEA's coordination and collaboration performance to date less than acceptable.

9. Staffing

At the heart of WIEA's difficulties in fully implementing the project and coordinating its activities with USAID and MUCIA is a lack of leadership. Despite numerous WIEA staff complaints, it took a call from the USAID EPAT project officer to the Vice President of International Affairs of Winrock International to start the process to get WIEA's first chief-of-party removed. There was then a gap of a year before a permanent chief-of-party replacement took over. In the meantime, three chiefs of party, two of whom had concurrent responsibilities outside the project, have been acting in the intervening year. WIEA staff have become increasingly frustrated in the course of these changes; two administrative staff have recently resigned and a third is expected to leave shortly. Only two current staff members, neither of whom is a trained economist, are expected to be staying with the project.

New leadership at WIEA and two former acting chiefs-of-party, Mike Rock and Dave Seckler, are attempting to come to grips with many of the problems affecting project implementation. In an internal draft project status report shared with the evaluation team, WIEA's leadership acknowledged and explained internal management problems, technical weaknesses in the core team, an excessive number of partners in the WIEA consortium to communicate and work with, and lack of collaboration with MUCIA. Recognizing these problems is an important first step noted by the evaluation team. But the project has been underway more than two years, and Winrock leadership has yet to demonstrate its willingness to take decisive action. Moreover,

WIEA has failed to use a significant number of economists in their buy-in activities, draw on the expertise of the TAG, or maintain qualified economists on the core staff. Consequently, the evaluation team finds WIEA performance in this project element less than acceptable.

10. Management

WIEA's role in the EPAT project and its vision of how it intended to undertake its activities are described in the WIEA EPAT-TA Strategic Plan, a report completed one year after the project was started in October 1992. The Plan lays out the goals of WIEA technical assistance, describes the guiding principles to be used in accomplishing those goals, and identifies the major tasks to be undertaken in six different activity areas. Progress reports have been completed on an irregular basis since the Strategic Plan was developed but do not address progress as it relates to the targets set out in the Strategic Plan. Annual workplans have not been done since the first was completed in October 1992, ten months after its due date, and that was little more than a summary of the Strategic Plan.

Instead of focusing on tasks laid out in the Strategic Plan and preparing workplans to accomplish those tasks, WIEA project staff have spent too much time on developing buy-ins with little attention to the nature and scope of the project. Little or no effort has been put into developing specific economic tools or techniques to distinguish the project from other USAID regional and centrally funded environmental activities and to give the staff something substantive to market. The result is that buy-in activities have been opportunistic, a function of convenience and an attempt to please missions with little or no regard for the project's stated purpose of introducing economic analysis into environmental policy making. The twenty activities contracted to date bear little relationship to one another, and only five appear to have had an explicit economic focus. Any lessons learned are likely to be specific to particular contexts and probably not useful in advancing the overall goals of the project, *i.e.*, developing the linkages between economic analysis and environmental policy.

The WIEA draft project status report prepared during the course of this evaluation takes note of many of these management problems. It attempts to be proactive and begins to address the need for the project to be unique in order to justify its existence. After pointing out the difficulties in building a training program when other subsidized programs are available and in developing buy-ins, the report explains what action has been taken and, most importantly, what action is being contemplated to address project shortcomings and weaknesses. Some of the proposals under consideration are similar to those the evaluation team recommends in the concluding section of this report.

The major shortcoming of WIEA's internal Project Status Report is that it offers no concrete plan on how to operationalize the project's central mandate: integrating economic analysis and environmental policy. Attention is given to reprogramming core resources to prepare applied papers in six broadly defined areas or targets of opportunity, and there is talk of reconstituting the partnership group and the Senior Technical Advisor Committee. But the fundamental shortcoming of WIEA to date--its failure to use a sufficient number of economists in its delivery order and marketing work--remains and is likely to get more severe. The two economists previously working on the project have just left, and the incoming chief-of-party, an USAID

retiree, is not a professional economist. Thus, there are no economists currently on the core staff, exacerbating a problem that the evaluation team identified as WIEA's most important shortcoming in its implementation of the project. The evaluation team concludes management performance has been less than acceptable.

11. WIEA's Overall Performance Rating

WIEA's overall organizational performance on the eight elements addressed above averages 2.4 and is judged less than acceptable.

WIEA Performance

Activity	Score
Applied Research	2
Information and Dissemination	3
Policy Dialogue	3
Institutional Strengthening	3
Human Resources Development	3
Cost Effectiveness	2
Coordination and Collaboration	2
Staffing	2
Management	2
Average Performance	2.4

C. USAID EPAT Management Team

1. Introduction

USAID had developed an elaborate plan for the USAID management of this project in which USAID staff would be directly involved with the project and its contractors. Management responsibilities were assigned to a project officer within S&T/ENR. This person's duties were substantial and would need to be carried out effectively "if the project is to succeed." In the design of the project, USAID planned close involvement in the project including the following:

- 1) overseeing technical aspects of the contract solicitation and contractor selection;
- 2) reviewing and approving core research and training;
- 3) overseeing contractor work plans and reviewing/approving annual work plans;
- 4) receiving and reviewing all field requests for EPAT services;
- 5) overseeing the technical review of all project outputs;
- 6) reviewing and approving any changes in core personnel;
- 7) reviewing and approving the selection of consultants;
- 8) obtaining prior agreements to all buy-ins; and

- 9) scheduling and coordinating Project Committee and TAG activities, internal management reviews and external project evaluations.

To do this work, the USAID EPAT project officer would be assisted by USAID staff (the total is now four USAID staffers working on this project) and the EPAT project committee composed of the director of Global/ENR as chairman, the EPAT project officer as vice chairman, and representatives of appropriate R&D offices and other USAID/Washington bureaus.

In addition to the above, the USAID project officer was to chair an internal project planning and implementation team, called the Project Management Team (PMT), composed of the lead research cooperator and the contractor chief-of-party. The purpose of the PMT was to assure coherence and integration of plans and startup activities.

2. Implementation

Global/ENR made an early decision to involve itself in the implementation of EPAT to a greater extent than is normally the case for USAID projects. Consequently, the evaluation team has concluded that the USAID EPAT management team is as responsible for the performance on each component as are the contractor and grantee. The USAID EPAT management team was directly involved in the decision that allowed EPAT/MUCIA research teams to move away from completion of the group synthesis papers. It was negligent in not insisting that MUCIA provide timely reports as called for in the cooperative agreement. Regarding WIEA and its delivery order work, the USAID EPAT management team did not insist that WIEA make active use of its TAG, even though this unit was established in response to a USAID concern that WIEA involve more economists in its proposal. The USAID EPAT management team has been directly involved in the negotiation and execution of all delivery orders, just as it has been involved in developing the project's information and dissemination system.

Also, the USAID EPAT management team was directly involved in MUCIA's failed efforts to develop materials for a core course on economic analysis and environmental policymaking. The USAID EPAT management team should have concluded at an early stage that the human resource development strategy was not viable because of competing, subsidized training courses and should have worked with the contractor and grantee to develop an alternative strategy.

As a consequence of the above, the evaluation team gives the USAID EPAT management team the same performance scores on the component activities as were assigned to the project overall.

3. Cost Effectiveness

Normally, USAID assigns a single officer to manage a project. In the case of EPAT, there are four staffers involved. Assigning this number of people to a project that is not performing well necessarily results in an unacceptable cost-effectiveness score.

4. Coordination and Collaboration

If the EPAT project is to succeed, cooperation and collaboration between the organizations implementing it is essential. Those engaged in the state-of-the-art research must be informed by

those carrying out the delivery order work as to what is needed in developing countries just as those engaged in doing the delivery order work must be kept abreast of progress in the state-of-the-art research.

Most of the organizations interested in implementing the EPAT project bid for both the major contract and cooperative agreement in partnership with other organizations. And in recognition of the need for cooperation and collaboration, the bidders indicated in their proposals how they would insure that it took place. When the major contract and cooperative agreement were not awarded to the same partnership, the plans that had been worked out within each partnership for cooperation and collaboration were lost, making it incumbent upon the USAID EPAT management team to insure the needed cooperation and collaboration was forthcoming.

While there has been interaction between WIEA and MUCIA in building a mailing list, in publishing the newsletter, and in implementing training activities, the USAID EPAT management team has not been able to effect the level of cooperation and collaboration that will be needed if this project is to realize its objectives. Interaction on the substantive aspects of the project, in particular between the research team members and the WIEA core staff and their technical assistance consultants, has been virtually non-existent.

In addition to insuring cooperation and collaboration among the implementing organizations, the USAID EPAT management team has the responsibility to develop close working relationships between the project's implementing organizations with other USAID bureaus and USAID missions. The USAID EPAT management team told the evaluation team that it had been responsible for most of the marketing and consequent delivery orders that the project had received. The evaluation team was provided with a very different picture by EPAT staff members and senior officers in both MUCIA and Winrock International. They claimed that the EPAT management team interfered with their efforts to market the project and frequently would insist on relatively insignificant changes in delivery orders even after the orders had been agreed upon by EPAT staff and USAID missions.

The evaluation team concludes that the USAID EPAT management team's collaboration and cooperation performance was unacceptable.

5. Staffing

The EPAT management unit consists of four persons: a direct hire USAID employee as project officer and three others working for USAID under different contracting mechanisms. It is unusual for USAID to involve four persons in managing a single project. Aside from the cost of such a large involvement, there is a danger that both within the management team and between the team and EPAT staff, questions will arise about who is responsible for what. Serious questions of this sort have already arisen in the process of implementing this project. And despite a recent retreat at which attempts to define areas of responsibility were made, the evaluation team believes such problems will continue.

MUCIA and WIEA EPAT project staff have suggested that members of the USAID EPAT management team want to do the work that WIEA and MUCIA were hired to do. As an

example, they point to a recently-completed project proposal for Russia that involved two USAID management members as lead authors. Notably, a senior staffer at WIEA who was both an economist and a Russian expert was not even asked to comment on the proposal.

Representatives from WIEA and MUCIA also questioned the qualifications of the USAID EPAT management team for their jobs. In particular, they did not believe that members of the team had sufficient overseas experience to make sound judgments on behalf of the project.

The evaluation team shares these misgivings. For example, when the project officer was asked whether the overseas activities of the project involved a sufficient level of collaboration with host country institutions, he responded categorically that all field work was "necessarily done in collaboration with developing country institutions". As another example, the USAID EPAT management team did the project a disservice in Jamaica when a junior member of the team insisted on having lengthy meetings with senior Jamaican government officials to discuss a series of delivery orders being carried out by the project.

The USAID contracts office also raised questions about the qualifications of the USAID EPAT management team. In particular, there was concern that two members of the team were dealing with contractual matters even though neither of them had taken the USAID orientation course on the subject.

The evaluation team concludes that USAID staffing performance has been inadequate. Having a team of four persons is costly, and it has caused confusion over areas of responsibility. In addition, questions have been raised as to whether members of the team are qualified to act on behalf of the project.

6. Management

i. Chemistry

The above sections have provided details on certain performance shortcomings of the USAID EPAT management team. A less tangible but equally critical issue relates to the chemistry between USAID management and EPAT staff, the collegiality and the willingness to work through differences of opinion to acceptable outcomes. The following quote provides a representative picture of what the evaluation team heard about the USAID EPAT management team. It represents the views of nearly all MUCIA and WIEA EPAT staffs as well as the views of senior managers in both MUCIA and Winrock International that were expressed to the evaluation staff in strictest confidence. In the judgment of the evaluation team, the quote presents an accurate picture of USAID management of the project.

In all my years working with AID, I have never seen a more poorly managed project. This is the most egregious example of mismanagement that I have ever observed. The project is supposed to be responsive to field needs, but AID staff in DC are micro-managing this project to death. There are four AID staffers: they travel using project money; they control.

The team frequently heard complaints about USAID's micro-management of the project. Comments included "the biggest hindrance to the project was USAID management", or "R&D

held everything very closely, they controlled the team's movement and travel, and there was too much direct operational management". Comments on other points included: "it was very difficult to get USAID to focus on the strategic direction in which the project would go", and "USAID/Washington has been a major problem in getting in the middle of the relationship between EPAT and USAID missions and making it much more difficult to work effectively with the mission".

ii. Providing Clear Direction

Good management also involves the identification of problems and dealing with them in a timely fashion. The USAID EPAT management team was clearly remiss in failing to recognize early on the project's human resource development strategy was not viable and in developing an alternative strategy before significant resources had been devoted to developing materials for core courses.

The evaluation team was told by both MUCIA and WIEA managers that numerous action memos have been sent to the USAID EPAT management team to which responses have never been made.

iii. Completing Assignments in a Timely Fashion

The evaluation team heard numerous complaints about the USAID EPAT management team not completing work it had agreed to do in a timely manner. For example, various papers have been sent to the USAID EPAT management team for review and approval some time ago for which no response has been forthcoming. These include:

- 1) a paper on natural resource accounting that was submitted six months ago;
- 2) a paper resulting from an NRMS delivery order that was submitted more than four months ago;
- 3) a draft paper on sustainable agriculture that was sent to the USAID EPAT management team in September 1993;
- 4) a paper on the tools of economic analysis sent in six months ago, and
- 5) a report on environmental degradation in Madagascar that has not been acted upon, despite being sent over more than six months ago.

iv. Conclusions

The evaluation team concludes the management performance of the USAID EPAT management team has been inadequate. It appears that management decisions within the unit have been based on one or more of the following tenets, none of which are viable in the view of the evaluation team:

- 1) that if there is a problem in project implementation, USAID should add a staffer to help out rather than inform the contractors that failure to perform is grounds for project cancellation;

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- 2) that increased management by USAID can compensate for contractor inadequacies;
- 3) that micro-management will not destroy the incentives and drive for the contractors to perform in an imaginative fashion.

7. Summary

The performance scores of the USAID EPAT management team are presented in the following table.

USAID Management Performance

Activity	Score
SOA Research	1
Applied Research	2
Information and Dissemination	3
Policy Dialogue	3
Institutional Strengthening	2
Human Resources Development	2
Cost Effectiveness	1
Coordination and Collaboration	1
Staffing	2
Management	1
Average Performance	1.8

5. Other Factors Contributing to Poor Project Performance

A. Introduction

The evaluation team believes that certain elements in the project design in conjunction with contractor/grantee selection decisions have contributed to a project implementation strategy that is in part the reason for the project's poor performance. These include decisions pertaining to the implementing organizations, choice of procurement vehicles and restrictions, research approach, the model of social change underlying this project, and the viability of the training strategy. Each is discussed below.

B. Contractor Selection

The project design team considered two options in detail. The first was a single contract to carry out all activities under the project, including state-of-the-art and applied country research, information and dissemination, support for mission policy dialogue, institutional strengthening, and training. Under this option, the prime contractor would manage various subcontractors, *e.g.*, universities, research institutions and other private technical assistance providers.

The second option would involve:

- 1) one or more cooperative agreements to undertake core research and directly related applied in-country research and training activities; and
- 2) a separate contract to provide responsive technical assistance, applied in-country research and associated training.

In this second option, a major challenge would be to develop synergy between the two prime parties.

The USAID design team considered both options and chose option two - a cooperative agreement for core research and related activities and a separate contract for technical assistance and associated activities primarily in support of missions and host countries. The designers' rationale for choosing option two were that:

- 1) it would better insulate core research from the demands of responsive technical assistance, while at the same time insuring that resources were available to support missions;
- 2) research planning and management should be flexible and collaborative rather than fixed, as is required in a contract scope-of-work;
- 3) the cooperative agreement mechanism best allows for both cost sharing by U.S. institutions and support of collaborating LDC institutions once they are selected; and
- 4) in a field as rapidly evolving as this one, "AID should maintain a greater role in program direction and management than ...it would have with a single contractor as project manager".

The RFA and RFP were sent out by USAID on May 17, 1991. USAID made it clear to potential bidders that while there were to be formal mechanisms such as a project management team, a USAID project committee and an external technical advisory group to assist with the coordination and collaboration between the two contract groups, it was looking to the offerors to propose mechanisms that they would employ to insure effective coordination and collaboration.

Most of the organizations interested in EPAT bid in partnership with other organizations for both the cooperative agreement and the level-of-effort contract, with different organizations taking the lead on each. And in doing so, they provided a management/administrative plan by which the grant and contract activities would generate the synergy needed for the project to succeed.

On September 27, 1991, USAID awarded a cooperative agreement/requirements contract to the MUCIA Consortium. The total estimated amount of the grant was \$9.5 million. The MUCIA Consortium consisted of MUCIA universities plus three consulting firms and a nonprofit environmental organization. On September 30, 1991, USAID awarded the level of effort

contract to WIEA. The award of \$5.7 million was for five years, including support for 312 person/months of services. WIEA consisted of Winrock International and seventeen partners.

Both WIEA and the MUCIA Consortium had bid for both the major contract and the cooperative agreement. And in their bids, they had both proposed a management arrangement to insure close cooperation in the implementation of the major contract and the cooperative agreement. By awarding the grant and contract to different bidding groups, USAID effectively discarded the management plans set forth by each bidding group on how they would coordinate contract and grant activities. It then became the responsibility of the USAID EPAT management team to insure the cooperation and collaboration between the two lead organizations needed for the project to realize its intended goals.

C. Cooperative Agreements as USAID Procurement Vehicles

In attempting to determine what research activities project monies were paying for, the evaluation team was informed by MUCIA that under their cooperative agreement, they were not required to generate research products or "deliverables": "The cooperative agreement funds people, not products." Partially as a result of this, the evaluation team has been unable to determine what research has actually been supported with project monies. While not having contracting/procurement expertise, the evaluation team was struck by the looseness of a cooperative agreement in terms of requiring the recipient to deliver products or to perform other activities in an accountable manner.

With significant reductions in USAID research monies, the evaluation team believes consideration should be given to whether continued use of cooperative agreements is warranted. In the case of EPAT, the project paper went into considerable detail on what research products should be developed by the project. With such apparent clarity about what was needed, one can ask why a cooperative agreement rather than a contract was chosen as the contracting vehicle. Contracts are more effective mechanisms for generating research products than cooperative agreements because the research papers can be made required outputs.

More generally, the argument is made that a cooperative agreement or a grant is appropriate when it is not clear exactly what research is needed. The evaluation team questions this view. If one is concerned about allowing the universities to determine the content of the research program, the same process for determining the research program can be built into a contract as into a cooperative agreement. That is, the contract could specify that research topics will be determined by a panel of faculty members working with a USAID project officer. The contract could then require a number of "deliverables" or research products, with the topics determined by the faculty panel.

D. Subcontracting Bans

Under the WIEA contract, subcontracting is not allowed unless the subcontractor was included as a potential subcontractor in WIEA's bid. This was one of the provisions in the EPAT request for proposals, and it caused most bidders to generate long lists of partners. For example, there are 19 partners in WIEA. Assembling such a list is time consuming, expectations are raised, and communicating with such a number once the project is underway constitutes a formidable

management task. The survey of WIEA partners carried out by the evaluation team uncovered various expressions of confusion, frustration, anger, and distrust of project management. It is hard to determine what portion of these emotions are attributable to poor project management on the part of WIEA and what portion are attributable to having such a large number of partners/potential subcontractors.

When USAID officials were asked to explain the post-project award subcontracting ban, three answers were given. Without the ban:

- 1) contractors would subcontract with firms not qualified to do the work;
- 2) contractors would contract with firms that exceeded USAID's cost ceilings, and
- 3) USAID missions would force contractors to subcontract with developing country firms that were not qualified to do the work.

In light of the management problems WIEA management has encountered in trying to deal effectively with 19 partners, the evaluation team questions the justifications for the subcontracting ban. The prime contractor is ultimately responsible for the work carried out under the contract. The prime contractor is also expected to know USAID's cost regulations and to operate in accordance with them. In these circumstances, the team believes the prime contractor should be allowed to subcontract when it sees a need to do so.

E. Research Location and Dynamics

The state-of-the-art research of EPAT is for the most part being done by professors located at American universities. The evaluation team believes that collaborative research with developing country institutions will have a higher payoff, in terms of research findings as well as from the standpoint of institutional strengthening, both in developing countries and in U.S. institutions.

The choice of research topics is being done with very little input from WIEA or the consulting firms associated with the project. The evaluation team believes this is a serious mistake. WIEA because of its delivery order activities, and the consulting firms because of their activities throughout the developing world, are familiar with the research needs as seen from the standpoint of USAID missions and the governments of developing countries. In addition, WIEA and the consulting firms are in a position to know where there might be buy-in support for the state-of-the-art research that EPAT chooses to undertake.

The USAID EPAT management team did not want consulting firms to be involved in the state-of-the-art research. This apparently stemmed from a report on the experience of another project that had both research and field service components, the Agriculture Policy and Planning Project (APAP). APAP had a consulting firm as a single lead contractor and had to limit its field work in order to spend more time on the research it had agreed to carry out. The evaluation team discussed the APAP project with the project officer who restricted buy-in activities to insure that the research was completed. He indicated that with the restriction on implementation activities imposed, there was no problem in getting the research completed.

The evaluation team does not know what is the source of the bias against consulting firms doing research. When it comes to advancing the state-of-the-art in economic research, the evaluation team does not know of any *a priori* reasons or empirical evidence to justify favoring universities and academics over consulting firms and consultants.

Because of the way the EPAT project is currently being implemented, the state-of-the-art research is being carried out by one group while the applied research is being carried out by others. The evaluation team questions this segmentation.

There are perhaps subjects on which state-of-the-art research should be carried out separately from applied research, but the evaluation team does not believe economic analysis as applied to environmental policy is one of them. Indeed, as is argued elsewhere in this report, the evaluation team sees a critical need for both the state-of-the-art and applied research to be done in close collaboration with developing country institutions. The team sees little justification for doing any of this research in isolation from the economic, political, and social contexts of particular developing countries. Indeed, the evaluation team believes that collaborative research offers the greatest opportunity for advances both in state-of-the-art and applied research.

F. Model of Social Change

The model of social change underlying this project is briefly set forth in the project paper. It is that economic analysis on environmental policy issues will provide the inputs for a policy dialogue that will lead to desirable environmental outcomes. The analogy is taken from the economics sphere where over the last two decades, donors have made various forms of economic analysis the focus of policy dialogues with developing countries. While some positive economic outcomes have resulted from these dialogues, they have not always been successful. Since the 1950s, economic analysis has served as the basis for policy dialogues between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the governments of countries experiencing inflation and balance of payments problems. Many of these countries have agreed to reduce the rate of growth in domestic credit in return for IMF loans. In some instances, the governments have yielded to domestic political pressure and violated their agreement with the IMF. This experience has led to donor discussions of economic reforms that will be politically sustainable. Tentative conclusions are that while macro economic issues are complex, reform policies that do not have the understanding and backing of the citizens may not be sustainable.

In the case of environmental issues, it is clear that important questions of values are involved in how a developing country will view the tradeoffs between economic growth and environmental preservation, and these are likely to differ from those of the donors who take their direction from Western nations. And unlike policies having to do with the functioning of the economic system, citizens at all socioeconomic levels have daily contact with their environment and are likely to have strong views on policies relating to it. In the case of environmental policies, it is probable that a necessary component of an effective policy dialogue model is citizen education and involvement.

The recently-departed chief-of-party of MUCIA had a more limited view of the change model underlying the project. He believed the project would cause change through the dissemination of its publications.

The evaluation team is not sure what model of change is likely to be most effective when it comes to introducing environmental initiatives into developing countries. Most USAID environmental projects are moving ahead without giving sufficient attention to this important issue, and EPAT is no exception.

G. Training Activities

The EPAT project, like many other USAID environmental projects, has training activities as a major component. Unlike other projects, however, the EPAT project does not have funding to allow the project to put on heavily-subsidized courses⁹.

The evaluation team questions whether it is cost-effective for USAID to be funding U.S. contractors to teach environmental training courses to developing country personnel. There are a large number of environmental courses available to individuals from developing countries that are heavily subsidized by various U.S. government agencies. For the most part, these courses target on senior-level government officials. Their purpose is either to provide government officials located in environmental agencies with specialized types of training that will allow them to carry out their responsibilities or to provide government officials serving in other capacities with an introduction to environmental problems.

In contrast, relatively little funding has been made available for other areas where the return to USAID on training activities is likely to be considerably higher. For example, developing countries need assistance in the development of strategic plans for environmental education and training programs. Such planning should start with the recognition that the number of educators/trainers in the environmental field is extremely limited and that consequently, they should only be put to work where one can demonstrate a significant multiplier effect, *e.g.*, where the trainers will train trainers who will consequently train other trainers.

EPAT staff has recently reached the conclusion that they cannot compete with the more heavily subsidized training courses offered by other vendors. The question then becomes whether to increase the subsidy for EPAT training courses or terminate the education and training effort. The evaluation team recommends terminating this component and use the freed-up resources where they are likely to yield a higher return, such as in developing an expertise to assist developing countries with long term education, curricula development and planning activities for training.

⁹ The project has funding for the development of two 3-6 week "core" courses pertaining to economic analysis and environmental policies, but it does not have funding earmarked for the costs of presenting the courses, including travel and per diems for students and teachers.

6. Unique Project Features

A. Introduction

The evaluation team was asked to assess the unique features of this project. The unique features are:

- 1) a separate contract and cooperative agreement with no institutional overlap with the expectation that the institutions implementing the project would cooperate on certain training and other activities;
- 2) a requirements contract awarded to MUCIA;
- 3) the set-aside provision of the cooperative agreement;
- 4) implementation of core research through interdisciplinary teams from different institutions;
- 5) "option" provision in WIEA permitting increases in level-of-effort; and
- 6) lack of ceiling on buy-ins in the WIEA requirements contract.

Observations on each of these features follows.

B. A Separate Contract and Cooperative Agreement

The evaluation team does not believe the EPAT project will realize its stated objectives as long as the project has two lead implementing organizations. At the outset, the evaluation team hypothesized that such an arrangement would cause problems in terms of lack of understanding over who was responsible for what, counterproductive competition, and no synergy. The evaluation team was told by several other USAID project officers that USAID could not effectively manage such "a two-headed monster" in the sense of getting the two lead EPAT organizations, MUCIA and WIEA, to work together.

The problem is that such organizations have, over the years, built up a capability of managing the implementation of projects using their staffs and their worldwide networks of people and organizations. These staffs naturally look to supervisors within their organizations for direction and their loyalties are to these supervisors and their organizations. These organizations do not have incentive structures that would cause their staffs to try to work closely with other organizations that they will usually view as competitors. This is borne out by the experiences with the EPAT project to date in which there has been little significant interaction between the two lead implementing organizations.

C. A Requirements Contract Awarded to MUCIA

Both the EPAT grant and contract awards come with separate requirements contracts. The idea was that the WIEA requirements contract would serve as an immediate source of financing from missions interested in applying economic analysis to environmental policy issues while the MUCIA requirements contract would be limited to missions interested in supporting research on new forms of economic analysis of environmental issues.

As indicated above, the evaluation team does not believe that state-of-the-art research in this field should be separated out from applied research and consequently does not see the need for two distinct requirements contracts. In the case of the MUCIA contract, three large consulting firms with international reputations were MUCIA partners and were prepared to obtain buy-ins. The USAID EPAT management team decided that, for various reasons, buy-ins under this contract should not go to consulting firms in the first phase of project implementation. As a consequence, there has been only three buy-ins under the MUCIA contract. The MUCIA research teams have therefore had either little or no contact with developing countries. The evaluation team believes limitations on buy-ins was a serious mistake.

The set-aside provision calls for a minimum of 20 percent of the research portion of the MUCIA grant to be used for grants to individuals and organizations that are not part of the MUCIA consortium. MUCIA staff were very positive about the set-aside provision because it gave them a flexible pool of monies to use as needs arose. It is the one part of the EPAT project from which subcontracting is allowed with organizations not identified in the project proposal. Elsewhere in this report, the evaluation team questions the ban on subcontracting and consequently supports at least conceptually the set-aside provision.

D. Implementation of Core Research through Interdisciplinary Teams from Different Institutions

In principal, it is difficult to get individuals from the same organization to engage in interdisciplinary work because most incentives reward work within one's own discipline. The incentive problems are compounded when more than one organization is involved because each organization has its own internal incentive structure against which its employees are measured. An assessment of how well this worked within EPAT is given in Sections 3 and 4 above.

E. The "Option" Provision in the WIEA Contract Permitting Increases in Level of Effort

It is useful to build some flexibility in staffing levels and patterns into projects. However, the decision to increase staffing levels should not be made without weighing the relative costs and benefits of other means to achieve the same objectives. For example, USAID was concerned that not enough economists were involved in the WIEA work and consequently allowed WIEA to exercise the option provision by adding an economist to their staff. An alternative would have been for WIEA to activate its TAG, a group that was established prior to the contract award because of USAID's stated concerns that there were not enough economists reflected in WIEA's original project proposal.

F. The Lack of Ceilings on Buy-Ins in the WIEA Requirements Contract

It is relevant to note that the recently completed indefinite quantity contract (IQC) for environmental expertise was used to the limit by two of the three contractors holding it, indicating there is a USAID mission market for environmental expertise. Under the IQC contracting mechanism, the recipients receive no core support, and there are limits on the duration of each delivery order. In comparison, the WIEA contract, with more than \$5 million of core monies, should be expected to do more than is done under an IQC such as providing a

unique service that must be marketed to missions before they will be willing to support it out of their own funds.

7. Specific Questions Appearing in Scope Of Work

A. Introduction

There were specific issues raised in the evaluation team's scope of work that might not have been adequately covered above. Attention is now turned to these issues.

B. Effectiveness of Research Teams & Relationships Among Teams

As is true with other parts of this project, MUCIA researchers expressed considerable confusion and frustration over how the project was being managed. One of the original research teams has been terminated. Another research team has been effectively closed down because the team leader has all but officially resigned out of frustration in dealing with the research program decision makers. The evaluation team was told that on one team, certain researchers are not allowed to communicate directly with research decision makers on grounds that such communications would generate emotional explosions.

In the responses to the surveys administered to research team leaders, several indicated there was insufficient communication among the research teams and called for steps to increase the communications flow.

C. Effectiveness of "Set-Aside" Provision of the MUCIA Cooperative Agreement for Research

The set-aside provision of the MUCIA agreement was intended to allow MUCIA to involve individuals and organizations not part of the MUCIA proposal to be brought in on an "as needed" basis. While this is clearly a flexible contracting mechanism, it will be a challenge to integrate the research products resulting from its use into the overall research strategy of the project.

D. Effectiveness of Communications within MUCIA and WIEA

Among the MUCIA research teams, there appears to be an acceptable level of understanding about what other research teams were doing but no evidence of synergy among the teams. However, from discussions with research team members and a review of their writings, the evaluation team has concluded that the research teams are operating in something of a vacuum when it comes to what other forms of research on economic analysis as it applies to environmental policy are underway in other parts of the United States. For example, none of the researchers interviewed had read any of the work coming out of the Harvard Institute for International Development's cooperative agreements on this subject nor were they aware of the work on ecological economics being done at Tufts University, even though Tufts is part of WIEA.

There has been no involvement of anyone from WIEA in MUCIA's research activities and only recently has a WIEA representative been added to MUCIA publications committee.

E. Use of the MUCIA Requirements Contract for Research

As has been expressed elsewhere in this report, the evaluation team believes that the research with the highest payoff for this project would be done in collaboration with institutions in developing countries. The requirements contract could serve as an excellent vehicle for such collaborative research. However, due to the USAID EPAT management team's restrictive definition of what the requirements contract can be used for, there have only been three delivery orders issued, and none pertains to collaborative research.

F. Oversight Mechanisms to Insure Quality Research Products

Until recently, there has been no effective mechanism to either track or provide quality assurance for the research papers as they move from preliminary draft to publication. A tracking system has now been introduced. However, the tracking system will have to be adapted to insure quality outputs, once a common vision as to what research products are needed and how they should be generated has been developed.

8. Conclusions

As indicated in the following table, the project is not performing well, and major changes will be needed if it is to achieve its intended objectives. The lack of performance is attributable to shortcomings on the part of the implementing organizations (MUCIA, WIEA and the USAID EPAT management team) as well as to the way in which the project was structured.

EPAT Performance, Overall and by Implementing Agent

Activity	MUCIA	WIEA	AID	Overall
SOA Research	1		1	1
Applied Research		2	2	2
Information and Dissemination	3	3	3	3
Policy Dialogue		3	3	3
Institutional Strengthening		3	2	2
Human Resources Development	1	3	2	2
Cost Effectiveness	1	2	1	1
Coordination and Collaboration	2	2	1	2
Staffing	1	2	2	1
Management	1	2	1	1
Average Performance	1.43	2.44	1.8	1.8

The procurement was structured in a manner that allowed different consortia to win the grant and major contract. The evaluation team believes this was a serious mistake. The grant went to one consortium while the contract was awarded to another. This meant that the management

plan that each consortium had built into their bids to insure the grant and contract parts of the project worked together was lost.

But even with the awards going to separate consortia, the project could have succeeded if the three organizations primarily responsible for project implementation (USAID, WIEA, and MUCIA) shared a common vision of what the project should accomplish and a will to collaborate as a single team to make it work. Regrettably, this has not happened.

In terms of organizational performance, the evaluation team has found the performance of both MUCIA and the USAID EPAT management team to be unacceptable. Today, neither MUCIA nor the USAID EPAT management team know what research the MUCIA grant is paying for.

It has found the performance of WIEA to be less than what would be expected of a contractor, but still acceptable provided that certain actions enumerated below are taken.

Neither contractor performed adequately when it came to staffing the project:

- 1) Despite repeated expressions of concern from USAID, WIEA never assembled the economic talent that was called for and the evaluation team is not assured that this matter will be resolved satisfactorily in the foreseeable future.
- 2) Because of staffing inadequacies, MUCIA's financial management was unacceptable for a significant period of time; further, its chief-of-party departed several months ago and a permanent replacement has not been put in place.

Rather than working to resolve these problems, the USAID EPAT management team has contributed to them. Their efforts have led to widespread charges of micro-management: they have angered, frustrated, and demoralized WIEA and MUCIA staff and research associates. Rather than effectively managing this project, they have created confusion over who is responsible for what. Most important, there is continuing confusion over who is in charge of developing and implementing the strategy to market this project to USAID bureaus and missions worldwide. And yet, while they have micro-managed certain parts of the project, the USAID EPAT management team has not stepped in and insisted on corrective actions when WIEA or MUCIA have failed to perform, *e.g.*, in terms of staffing the project adequately or developing an effective training strategy.

The evaluation team has given careful consideration to the lack of coordination and collaboration among MUCIA, WIEA, and the USAID EPAT management team. The USAID EPAT management team has been unable to effect the needed cooperation and collaboration among the two consortiums that will be needed if the project is to succeed. The evaluation team does not believe USAID can cause the needed cooperation and collaboration to occur. The team has concluded that the project will not achieve its intended objectives so long as there is more than one lead implementation agency. This means, *inter alia*, that the USAID role should be reduced.

The evaluation team does not believe the EPAT cooperative agreement is an appropriate procurement vehicle for this project. It is quite clear what products or "deliverables" this project should generate, but the cooperative agreement does not allow USAID to hold MUCIA responsible for delivering these outputs. Indeed, with research monies becoming even more limited, the evaluation team questions the appropriateness of this procurement vehicle for any future USAID activities.

9. Recommendations

A. Introduction

Despite these conclusions, there is clearly a need and a mandate to further develop and apply tools of economic analysis to environmental policy issues. With the exception of two regional cooperative agreements, no other project in the USAID portfolio has a similar focus. Before getting to specific recommendations, the evaluation team offers its vision of how this project should work.

B. How the Project Should Work

There is a need for economic analysis to be applied to environmental policy issues, a need that is not yet fully appreciated by USAID missions. Some economic tools have already been developed that can have useful applications in developing countries while other tools need to be developed. In these circumstances, the EPAT project must "market" both the application of existing tools and the development of new tools directly to USAID missions and developing country institutions.

What existing tools should be applied, what new tools should be developed, and what processes should be employed to accomplish both? First, the evaluation team believes it is somewhat artificial to distinguish between existing tools and new tools: existing tools will need to be refined through applications in developing countries just as new tools need to be developed in the context of the economic, social, and political problems facing developing countries. If this distinction is somewhat superficial, there should at the very least be a high level of synergy between those working on the application of existing tools and those working on new tools. Second, the evaluation team believes the cost-effective approach to each activity involves collaborative work with governments, research institutions, colleges and universities in developing countries and that a critical performance indicator of this project in two years will be how many long term collaborative arrangements it has forged with developing countries.

To date, the EPAT project has not approached its tasks in this manner. The EPAT project has not determined what existing tools to promote and what new tools to develop. There has been little synergy between those developing new tools and those working to apply existing tools. In its delivery order work, it has failed to emphasize economic analysis and it has failed to emphasize the establishment of long term collaborative agreements with developing country institutions. There has been little progress on developing new tools, and this work has been done with virtually no input or collaboration with developing countries or with those working to apply existing tools.

The evaluation team believes that the ultimate success of this project depends on it developing a reputation for the development and application of a limited number of tools of economic analysis to environmental policy issues in developing countries, including natural resource accounting. If this is to happen:

- 1) the artificial barriers between those working to apply existing tools and those working to develop new tools must be ended;
- 2) attention should be focused on the development and application of a limited number of tools, and
- 3) the development and application of existing and new tools should be done in close collaboration with institutions in developing countries.

C. Specific Recommendations

The evaluation team has concluded this project needs one lead organization. The team has documented its reasons for concluding that MUCIA'S performance has been inadequate. These conclusions, coupled with the conclusion that the Cooperative Agreement is an inappropriate procurement vehicle for EPAT leads to the following recommendations:

- 1) MUCIA should lose its status as a lead organization. The evaluation team is not prepared to recommend exactly how this should be done, but a satisfactory outcome would be the conversion of its cooperative agreement to a subcontract with WIEA.
- 2) The USAID EPAT management team should be replaced by a single USAID project officer who has no prior experience with this project. The project officer should have two tasks: to insure that the contractor implements the project correctly and assist the contractor in marketing the project to other parts of USAID.

Pertaining to the WIEA contract, the evaluation team recommends the following actions:

- 1) terminate the human resource (education and training) component of the project in recognition that useful activities in this field can be conducted with greater flexibility under the institutional strengthening component of the project;
- 2) use core monies to develop expertise in the development and application of a small number of economic analytic tools to help in the formulation of environmental policies in developing countries;
- 3) make the tools the focal point of EPAT marketing activities worldwide;
- 4) use the information and dissemination activities of the project to support these initiatives through publication of the newsletter and dissemination of relevant economic research on environmental issues;

- 5) focus buy-in work on applying the analytic tools and developing them further in collaboration with developing country institutions;
- 6) develop a new strategic plan to carry out the above activities that takes into account what other USAID environmental projects are doing;
- 7) add two senior environmental economists with developing country experience to the core staff;
- 8) reduce the WIEA consortium to a workable number of support organizations, and
- 9) reconstitute and activate the WIEA TAG to play a key role in project strategic planning and implementation.

Finally, the evaluation team recommends that the project should be evaluated again in two years and not continued unless significant progress towards achieving its goals and objectives can be demonstrated at that time.

Appendix One: Persons Contacted

The persons contacted in the process of conducting this evaluation are listed in the following tables. The codes for response types are: I = interview, T = telephone discussion, Q = response to survey questionnaire.

USAID/Washington

Respondent	Response Type	No. of Contacts	Average Length (in hrs)
Ken Baum	I	2	2.5
Bonni van Blarcom	I	2	1
Bill Goodwin	T	1	0.5
Ron Greenberg	I	1	1.5
John Gaudet	I	1	1.25
Jim Hester	I	1	0.5
Twig Johnson	I, T	3	1.5
Gerald Kinney	I	1	2.5
Molly Kux	I	1	1
Joe Lentini	I	1	2.5
Dennis Long	I, T	2	1
Russell Misheloff	I	2	2
Tony Pryor	I	1	1.5
Stacey Tighe	I	2	1

USAID/Jamaica

Respondent	Response Type	No. of Contacts	Average Length (in hrs.)
Christopher Brown	I	1	1
Steve Reeve	I	2	2

MUCIA

Respondent	Response Type	No. of Contacts	Average Length (in hrs.)
Wilfred Candler	I	2	3
Diana Crowley	I, T	5	2
Bill Flinn	T	1	1
Ellen Maurer	I	1	0.5
Nick Poulton	I, T	4	2

MUCIA Research Team Members

Respondent	Response Type	No. of Contacts	Average Length (in hrs.)
Robin Barlow	T	1	0.5
Duane Chapman	Q	1	
Hans Gregersen	Q	1	
George Honadle	T	1	0.5
Terry Roe	Q	1	

MUCIA Contractors

Respondent	Response Type	No. of Contacts	Average Length (in hrs.)
William Levine, Abt Associates	I	1	2
Donald Mickelwait, Development Alternatives, Inc.	I	1	1
Jack Sullivan, Development Associates	I	1	1.5

WIEA

Respondent	Response Type	No. of Contacts	Average Length (in hrs.)
Dick Cobb	I	1	1.5
Robin Goodkind	I	1	1.5
Katherine Jewsbury	I	1	1
Earl Kellogg	I, T	2	1.5
Sandra Lock	I	1	1.5
Jane Mold	I	1	1.5
Mike Rock	I, T	3	2
David Seckler	T	1	0.5
Rich Tobin	I	3	1.5

WIEA Partners

Respondent	Response Type	No. of Contacts	Average Length (in hrs.)
Sandra Amis, Management Systems International	Q	1	
Faye Duchin, NYU Institute for Economic Analysis	T	1	0.5
Neva Goodwin, Tufts University	T, Q	4	0.5
Dennis King, King and Associates	T, Q	3	0.5
Faith Knutsen, Tropical Research & Development	T, Q	3	0.25
Jeanne Maltby, KBN Associates	I	1	1.5
Ernest Murphy, Development Assistance Corporation	Q	1	
Paul Spector, Institute for International Research	Q	1	
Walter Spofford, Resources for the Future	Q	1	
Pierre Crosson, Resources for the Future	T, Q	3	0.5
Tom Weaver, University of Rhode Island	Q	1	
Allan White, Tellus Institute	Q	1	

Others Associated with Project

Respondent	Response Type	No. of Contacts	Average Length (in hrs.)
David Barker, Management Systems International	I	1	2
Ed Farnsworth, Interamerican Development Bank, Jamaica	I	1	1
Winston McCalla, DEMO Consultant, Jamaica	I	1	1
Stanley Peabody, World Bank	I	1	1.5
Asif Shaikh, International Resources Group	I	1	1.5
Ken Shapiro, University of Wisconsin	T	1	0.25
Richard Thelwell, DEMO Consultant, Jamaica	I	1	1
Torrence Thomas, Environmental Foundation of Jamaica	I	1	1
Frank Tugwell, Heinz Endowments	T	2	0.5

Appendix Two: Summary of Survey Results Administered to EPAT Partners and MUCIA Research Team Leaders

The evaluation team sent out questionnaires to the 17 WIEA partner/associate institutions (10 out of 17 responded), six questionnaires were sent to the TAG of whom four responded, four questionnaires were sent to the MUCIA Consulting Institutions with three responding, and five questionnaires were sent to the MUCIA Research Team Leaders, all of whom responded. Set forth below are the questions asked and a summary of the responses received.

A. Questions for the WIEA Partners/Associates and Senior Technical Advisors:

1. Briefly describe the activities you have undertaken in this project. Do you plan to continue your participation in the EPAT project? If not, why not?

Answers: The answers ranged from we have not undertaken activities under EPAT, to others listing the projects which they had participated in. Some said they had participated in meetings with the chief-of-party. Two organizations said they did not plan to continue to participate in EPAT, and the reasons given by both related to poor USAID and WIEA management.

2. Are you satisfied with how the EPAT project has been managed, both in terms of the EPAT management team and the USAID EPAT management team? Explain.

Answers: On the positive side, comments were that EPAT appears to be well managed; in general we are satisfied with the way EPAT has been managed; and we believe the project has been adequately, if not superbly well managed. Negative comments included statements like we are completely dissatisfied with the EPAT project; the project has been totally mismanaged and it has brought out the worst in everyone; management structure was found to be somewhat cumbersome; EPAT management is not well informed as to our capacity; disapproved of MUCIA's approach of isolating university research in the U.S. and failing to collaborate with the research programs in developing countries; a lot of the problems with the project have originated with the USAID office and a first good step would be to reduce the USAID management to one person responsible for the overall project; USAID/Washington has been a major problem in getting in the middle of the relationship between EPAT and the field; and we are totally dissatisfied and we perceive a virtual lack of integration of the non-academic partners with those from academia.

3. Would you have preferred a different management/contractual arrangement for this project? If so, explain.

Answers: Except for one "no comment" and one statement that "with such a large consortium, it is difficult to imagine a managerial structure that would work better," all respondents said they would have preferred a different arrangement. Some comments included statements like - we are dissatisfied with the current situation whereby two to three firms monopolize most of the work orders; most of the work is going to three firms and very little is going to other partners; there needs to be far fewer subcontractors; the mechanism should be contracted as there are two major drawbacks to the present system, i.e., the research/requirements contracts were not let to

the same consortium and the Winrock Alliance is too loosely-knit an association to afford a real sense of Alliance membership. Other comments were that they would have preferred a more direct association with the project managers; the division of the project into two contracts has undermined the overall effectiveness of EPAT; a preference for a more rigorous system for informing the members of potential work; and finally, "I have never been in a situation where the management was as totally screwed up as in this one."

4. Do you get adequate information on project activities and possible roles for your organization in the project? If not, explain.

Answers: On the positive side, the answers included generally yes, we do now, and we receive regular notices. Negative responses were that the information has been inadequate and we get few notices of work orders; we have definitely not had adequate information; the work products have not been circulated and it would be helpful if they were, possibly through a more formalized procedure; and, we have been out of the loop and "I frankly do not know....We have not participated in any of the activities."

5. Do you see this project as an important vehicle by which your organization can provide technical assistance on environmental/natural resource policy development and training issues to developing countries?

Answers: There was one no, but the rest were positive, though most were qualified. Comments like EPAT has the potential to provide technical assistance; it has the potential to be a very important vehicle; the project could be important; and generally yes. Two unqualified responses were that EPAT is an important vehicle of providing environmental technical assistance to developing countries.

6. Do you think the number of organizations involved in this project is a) excessive; b) about right; or, c) too few. Explain.

Answers: Again, the answers varied. Several answered "about right" and one supported the large number of organizations saying that through the large number of members, EPAT provides "unrivaled expertise in the environmental private sector." Others were not so supportive. There were comments like it may be excessive given the total number of activities to date; it is excessive and four to five organizations would be ideal; there are too many partners but a lot of the problems have to do with the USAID management; and managing so many disparate organizations with different interests and modes of operation would be difficult under the best of management circumstances.

7. Do you have any sense of whether the supply of the type of services offered by EPAT exceeds the demand within USAID? If so, explain.

Answers: There were some interesting answers to this question. Some revealing answers were as follows: marketing EPAT is difficult, particularly when it is in competition for project design and evaluation with existing, simpler IQC contracting mechanisms; with the initiation of EP3, EHP, ASEAN, PRIDE and CIS environmental programs, EPAT is much less a unique set of

capabilities, though its economics capabilities are a distinctive feature; USAID has not done enough public relations or advertising for the EPAT project and the word has not gotten out in terms of what services are available; and "I do not know whether the supply of EPAT services exceeds the demand. But if you ask a slightly reworded question: Does the supply exceed the Missions' needs for such services the answer is clearly no. I believe that few of the Missions, perhaps none of them, currently knows how to contribute to sustainable development; they can use all the help they can get to assist them in determining how to ask the right questions as well as to devise the right answers."

8. What examples of collaboration between the MUCIA and WIEA parts of EPAT can you cite? Has it been effective in promoting the objectives of the project? Explain.

Answers: Many organizations answered that they had no personal knowledge of any collaboration, but that did not mean there wasn't any. Several answered that except for the joint submissions in the project newsletter, they were not aware of collaboration.

9. Are you aware of particular satisfactions or dissatisfactions on the part of EPAT's clients/potential beneficiaries? Explain.

Answers: Most respondents said they had no information. One said they thought the clients generally have been satisfied. Several noted that they were aware of a high level of satisfaction by USAID/AFR bureau environmental officers, and another said that EPAT is well regarded in Egypt.

10. Have you been involved with any part of EPAT's training activities? If so, what is your assessment?

Answers: Most respondents said they had not been involved in training. One said that the training activities in Egypt had been well received, and another said "Little training has been done. "Other USAID training programs are offered free whereas EPAT training requires payment by the beneficiaries".

B. Questions for MUCIA Research Team Leaders:

1. Are you satisfied with the process by which the overall topics of each research team were chosen?

Answers: One respondent said they were satisfied, but the others said they were not satisfied as their proposed topics were not accepted and there was not enough conceptual efforts identified.

2. In the interest of environmental and natural resource development, do you believe there are more important research topics than the ones currently being addressed by the research teams? If so, what are they?

Answers: One respondent was satisfied, one was not satisfied while the others were not responsive to the question.

3. Do you believe that USAID's involvement in defining the overall research topics and in determining particular research assignments under each topic has been: a) excessive; b) about right; or c) insufficient? Discuss.

Answers: One respondent said about right, one said there was insufficient involvement, while two said there was excessive USAID involvement and wrong advice had been given.

4. How do you see the results of your research team being translated into activities that will be beneficial to developing countries?

Answers: One responded that they expected to ultimately see results, one was non-responsive, but two others were more complete. One said that to get results, there needs to be agreement between the donors, the work product must be of quality and there needs to be effective presentations to decision makers. The other respondent said that there needs to be collaborative work with developing countries before the research can be beneficial.

5. As a means of affecting beneficial change in developing countries, to what extent have you involved developing country researchers/institutions in your research activities? What is your appraisal of the results/benefits?

Answers: Two respondents said they had involved developing country researchers/institutions, one proposed to do so and one respondent was non-responsive.

6. Have you had any contact with MUCIA associates (Abt Associates, Development Alternatives, Inc., Development Associates and/or World Resources Institute)? Do you see them as potentially valuable partners in making the results of your work have a beneficial impact in developing countries?

Answers: Two respondents said they had not had such contact but needed to, while two said they had contacts, were still planning to, but one noted that funding was needed to do this.

7. Have you had any contact with the Winrock International Environmental Associates (WIEA)? If yes, discuss.

Answers: Three respondents said they had not had any contact with WIEA, while one said they had.

8. Do you feel the level of communication among various parts of the EPAT project has been: a) insufficient; b) about right; or c) excessive? Discuss.

Answers: All respondents said that the level of communication was insufficient, and one added that there are costs involved in travel.

9. Regarding your own research team, did you have difficulty in recruiting your team members? If so, explain.

Answers: Two respondents said that they had no difficulty in recruiting, though one added they would have preferred more associate relationships. One had difficulty because people were leaving, and one was non-responsive.

10. Are you satisfied with MUCIA's management of this grant? Explain.

Answers: One respondent said they had no complaints, one had some problems, especially with central control over travel, one was expressly not satisfied and said they had a "miserable experience," and one also said they were not satisfied as there was too much money for logistics/overhead and too little for research, and said this was an "example of how a project should not have been designed."

C. Questions for MUCIA Consulting Institutions:

1. Briefly describe the activities you have undertaken in this project. Do you plan to continue your participation in the EPAT project? If not, why not?

Answers: One respondent said they would not continue, they had no access to the study groups and there would not be any buy-ins until the third year. Another said they had been involved in two opportunities but nothing materialized and they would not commit any further resources. Another respondent echoed this comment.

2. Are you satisfied with how the EPAT project had been managed, both in terms of the EPAT management team and the USAID EPAT management team? Explain.

Answers: All respondents said they were dissatisfied.

3. Would you have preferred a different management/contractual arrangement for this project? If so, explain.

Answers: All respondents said yes, with one explaining that the two contract approach undermined the overall effectiveness of EPAT.

4. Do you get adequate information on project activities and possible roles for your organization in the project? If not, explain.

Answers: One said no and that they were out of the loop, and the only information received was through newsletters and publications. The others said no and referred to publications only as their source of information.

5. Do you see this project as an important vehicle by which your organization can provide technical assistance on environmental/natural resource policy development and training issues to developing countries?

Answers: All answered no, that there was no significant roles for them.

6. Do you think the number of organizations involved in this project is a) excessive, b) about right, or c) too few? Explain.

Answers: All respondents answered that the number is excessive, and one said that the effort was too university oriented while another said there was no central control in any one university.

7. Do you have any sense of whether the supply of the type of services offered by EPAT exceeds the demand with USAID? If so, explain.

Answers: All expressed no knowledge of this and no feedback on which to base an answer.

8. What examples of collaboration between MUCIA and WIEA parts of EPAT can you cite? Has it been effective in promoting the objectives of the project? Explain.

Answers: All respondents said that apart from the joint submissions in newsletters, they had no knowledge of collaboration.

9. Are you aware of particular satisfactions or dissatisfactions on the part of EPAT's clients/potential beneficiaries? Explain.

Answers: All said they had no knowledge of this matter.

10. Have you been involved with any part of EPAT's training activities? If so, what is your assessment?

Answers: Two respondents said they had not been involved, and one said they had made proposal for a training activity, but had not received a response.

Appendix Three: Report of Trip to Attend the "Natural Resource and Environmental Policy Conference" in the Gambia, January 18-22, 1994, by Jesse Floyd

This report is divided into two major parts. The first states the purpose in attending the Gambia Conference, summarizes the major points in my interviews with USAID field project officers, and discusses major issues and observations. A complete list of the key respondents to the survey can be found at the end of the report. The second part looks at the Conference objectives, describes the format, and offers a preliminary assessment of its success. This report does not address the substance of the Conference itself. The expectation is that the Africa Bureau staff in Washington will issue a comprehensive report synthesizing the outcome of the Conference. In my view, that report will be a key measure of the Conference's success.

A. Purpose

Attend the Conference and solicit the views of agricultural/environment project officers on:

- 1) what they would like to do in the field of environmental policy;
- 2) what support they need to accomplish their objectives; and
- 3) where they intend to get that support.

B. Summary Findings:

- 1) Most if not all African Missions have environment/natural resource management projects in place. Most project officers are inclined to turn to these vehicles to access technical assistance because it's less work and there's generally a good working relationship with the local project contractor.
- 2) Project officers were generally skeptical about the capacity of centrally funded projects to fully meet their needs.
- 3) About half of the project officers had some knowledge of EPAT primarily through project publications. Although these were of interest, few found any direct relevance to their countries activities. Only three missions reported direct country experience with EPAT: Madagascar, Mozambique and Kenya.
- 4) Those project officers looking to EPAT for assistance in environmental policy were not necessarily interested in the project's economic focus. Environmental policy was conceived very broadly, and most felt that economic analysis as it related to environmental policy was not sufficiently developed as a natural resources management technique to be directly applicable to field activities.
- 5) Economic analysis as a tool for environmental policy received very little attention at the Conference. In fact, few project officers or Conference attendees seemed to place much importance on economics or have much

experience integrating economics with environmental policy. There was consequently little vision of how economic analysis might promote environmental policy change.

C. Discussion

Approximately 160 individuals attended the workshop: roughly a third were USAID direct hire and project staff; a third African nationals supported or involved in USAID activities; and a third Washington based USAID staff and representatives of the contractor and PVO/NGO community. Virtually all attendees were somehow related to USAID. I don't think any other donors participated with the exception of one person from the World Bank who happened to be in the Gambia.

I tried to meet with Tony Pryor, the key Conference organizer, early on the first day of the Conference to explain my purpose in attending and ask his advice on how I might best solicit the views of USAID field staff on their needs in environmental policy. He discouraged me from distributing the questionnaire I had prepared before my departure, stating that the project officers' time in the Gambia was limited, that they had a number of other responsibilities from which he didn't want them distracted, and that they probably wouldn't take the time or want to respond in writing anyhow. It was clearly inappropriate to ask to make any kind of presentation at the workshop or try and arrange a meeting with project officers outside Conference hours.

Under the circumstances, the best I could do was corner representatives from each of the USAID African Missions attending the Conference and conduct informal interviews. This subsequently became my major objective during the four days I was there, though I took the opportunity to raise questions about ongoing work and technical assistance needs in environmental policy wherever appropriate with other attendees. The questionnaire served as a guide for my interviews and a means of organizing my notes. I was not able to carry out a systematic survey and press each project officer for responses in all the areas that might have been of interest.

Tony Pryor's guidance turned out to be good advice. Project officers were excited and involved in the Conference and not especially inclined to talk about a centrally funded project they knew little about. It was a high energy atmosphere as well as an opportunity to take a break on the beach, and for many it was an opportunity to see old friends and colleagues. Intervening in all this, not to mention identifying whom I needed to contact, and getting respondents away from the Conference in such a way that they could focus on my questions were difficult.

The Director of the NRM division in Niger was one of the first project officers I contacted. We had dinner with a group of people, and though he was especially agreeable, I could never get him to focus on my agenda in any detail. He said the Mission had their project vehicles in place, e.g., Agriculture Sector Development Grant II. He felt these projects offered sufficient flexibility to contract technical assistance for environmental matters so that the Mission did not need to look outside their ongoing projects. His sentiments were reflected in comments by roughly two-thirds of the Mission representatives, including representatives from Guinea,

Senegal, Botswana, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Mali, the Gambia, and to a lesser extent Madagascar.

Numerous reasons were cited for turning to existing project vehicles as opposed to accessing centrally funded projects. Existing projects have available funds and are designed to access technical assistance. Funds for programming new efforts are scarce; centrally funded projects are generally regarded as high cost. There is a strong preference to work with a known quantity, and local contractors often have close working relationships with the Mission and enjoy their confidence. Most important, the management burden is much less, monitoring the work is less time consuming, and the responsibility for success or failure falls more directly on the contractor as opposed to the project officer. Accessing technical assistance through a buy-in to a centrally funded project, for example, requires separate budgeting, preparing a PIO/T, seeking Mission approval, continual follow-up, making travel and local arrangements for U.S. based consultants, accounting for their performance, monitoring their day-to-day work, evaluating their performance, and arranging for payment. Many of these tasks are either eliminated or simplified by working with the local contractor.

Virtually all USAID field based staff had some knowledge and experience with centrally funded projects. World Resources Institute's Cooperative Agreement for its Policy Consultative Group and the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure System were held in especially high regard. Some specific projects with which they were familiar and which they cited as being useful vehicles of technical assistance included Policy Analysis, Research and Technical Services (PARTS); Agricultural Policy and Planning (APAP); Implementing Policy Change (IPC); Environmental Policy and Management (EPM); Biodiversity Support Program (BSP); Access to Land, Water and Other Natural Resources (ACCESS II); Forestry/Fuelwood Research and Development (F/FRED); Environmental Education and Communication (GREENCOM); Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resources Management (SANREM); Decentralization: Finance and Management (DFM); and Food Security II. The track record was mixed; there were examples of good performance, but by and large project officers were skeptical of these projects capacity to fully meet their needs.

The EPAT project was known to roughly half of the project officers. Many were had seen EPAT publications, found them interesting, but of little value or direct application in their applied work. A couple officers who were familiar with the research program at MUCIA were especially negative about the usefulness or application of academic research to their country activities.

Only a few Mission project officers had direct experience with EPAT. Madagascar has had two buy-ins, but now that they have projects in place, the project officer is not inclined to turn to EPAT again. His experience was on the whole positive once the consultants were mobilized, but there were significant delays and some concern that EPAT/Washington did not fully understand what he wanted. Mozambique has some interest in using EPAT, and indeed Rich Tobin visited after the Conference, but their only interest is to have EPAT develop a scope of work and assist them with the environmental part of their Country Program Strategy. The mission has no plans or funds to implement environmental activities. The only other EPAT activity in the region is a proposed workshop on eutrophication in Lake Victoria. This activity did develop as an EPAT

buy-in, but the workshop was subsequently postponed because the Winrock representative in Nairobi failed to get appropriate country permission from officials in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania before preceding with organizing the conference. There is some question whether the workshop will ever take place.

Comments on the need for technical assistance in environmental policy ran the full gamut. Some commented that there was no need (Zimbabwe), others that they were not currently looking at policy questions (Guinea), and still others that there were no plans for environmental work (Mali and Mozambique). In one case where there was considerable interest in environmental initiatives (Cameroon), the mission was scheduled to close. Those that did express interest in environmental policy generally had a number of things in mind, including interest in environmental legislation and protection, institutional strengthening, land tenure, and incentive structures. Those that had identified specific needs that called for economic analysis in environmental policy, e.g., agricultural pricing in Senegal, knew where they wanted to go get those needs met and already had specific contract vehicles in mind to access the assistance required.

Training in environmental policy was only discussed on a few occasions. Those that did express some interest strongly preferred in-country training as opposed to U.S. based training, and most had very general, broad-based courses in mind like environmental impact assessment. Many project officers are looking to GREENCOM for training assistance even though that project was just contracted and requires buy-ins like EPAT and other centrally funded projects already in place. Rwanda appears to be the only possible exception. The mission is considering using EPAT for training if it can access the project through its natural resources management contract with Development Alternatives, Inc.

Two notable exceptions stood out in the course of conducting the survey. The two project design officers at the regional centers in Nairobi and Abidjan, Eric Loken and Paul Crawford, are especially open to using centrally funded projects. In the course of assisting missions in their regions with project designs, both officers have consistently built in extra money for buy-ins to centrally funded projects like EPAT with which they are very familiar. Both officers, however, are sympathetic to the needs and concerns of their counterparts in the various missions. They agree that buy-ins are considerably more work than accessing existing in-country projects, and they recognize that project funds for buy-ins are limited and that economics as it relates to environmental policy is not sufficiently developed as a NRM technique to be of interest to the mission project officers. Despite these problems, both Loken and Crawford believe in the EPAT project's potential and are doing their part to promote the project and educate their colleagues on how it might be of assistance.

D. Conference Objectives

The overall purpose of the workshop was to document lessons learned and identify problems and issues that need to be resolved in order to improve natural resource management/environmental programming in Africa. The specific objectives were to:

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- 1) Review the accomplishments to date and lessons learned from implementation of USAID's environmental/natural resources management (NRM) programs, especially those involved with policy reform and/or national environmental action plans (NEAPs).
- 2) Share experiences in designing and implementing such programs, outline key problems and constraints to implementation and monitoring and recommend approaches to resolve these constraints.
- 3) Initiate dialogue between country programs and develop opportunities for cross-country site visits and other ways to share information and experiences.
- 4) Provide detailed skills training and small discussion groups to address specific issues and needs, related to monitoring techniques, design and implementation approaches, or other requested activities.
- 5) Review the reorganization of USAID and other changes that will affect environmental/NRM programs in the future.

E. Conference Format

Opening remarks were made by a number of dignitaries, including the U.S. Ambassador to the Gambia, the USAID Representative, the Minister of Natural Resources, Tom Fox from World Resources Institute, and USAID African Bureau staff. These introductory/welcoming statements were followed by panel discussions on NRM experience in four countries: Botswana, Guinea, Senegal and Uganda.

The formal plenary presentations were completed in the early afternoon at which time the Conference broke up into small discussions groups of 12-14 participants. These discussion groups with supporting panel discussions were the focus of the remainder of the Conference with the exception of the last day. Saturday was devoted to concurrent demonstrations and discussions of different NRM tools and techniques, including GIS/GPS applications and various simulation exercises. Paper and report presentations were kept to a minimum during the Conference, though there were some concurrent topical sessions on Wednesday afternoon. Notable among these was a session on natural resource accounting by Glenn-Marie Lange, EPAT Consultant based at New York University, attended by about 30 participants. In addition, the organizers made provisions for poster sessions, *ad hoc* work groups and optional evening sessions on specific tools and techniques.

The Conference organizers adopted the small work group approach to enhance discussions among participants about their respective country experience and to solicit feedback on lessons learned in a cost effective manner. Their goal was to identify problems and issues that need to be resolved and to try and reach agreement on a series of specific actions to improve the design, implementation and monitoring of USAID-funded NRM projects.

Four themes were pre-selected by the organizers for discussion by the working groups:

- 1) participation and governance;
- 2) institutions;
- 3) natural resource management technologies; and
- 4) national and local planning.

The initial intention was for each participant to spend two work group sessions on two of the four conference themes. The first work group on each theme was expected to focus on participants' experience in implementing and designing programs in the field. The second work group was to focus on action, specifically on what steps can be taken to improve the quality of programs. The reality was that there was not sufficient time for all four work sessions, but since there were multiple groups per topic, there was time to get closure on each of the four themes. Some participants, however, were not pleased with their initial work-group assignments and disappointed not to participate in both the experience and action work sessions on the theme of their choice.

The results and consensus of the various work-groups were reported in plenary sessions throughout the week. These presentations were of particular interest, though somewhat difficult to follow since I did not participate in the work-group sessions. Their content will be compiled and edited by the Conference organizers and issued as the final report of the Conference.

F. Success in Meeting Objectives

The Conference was certainly successful in bringing key people together. It did create an opportunity to share information and experiences, and it did promote dialogue among the various actors involved in USAID project implementation. It was also an excellent opportunity to review the status of the reorganization process and examine its impact on environmental activities, but presentations on this subject were less than satisfactory. The process is still unfolding and there are many more questions than answers. Field staff were pleased not to be presented with a *fait accompli*, but they remain anxious about the eventual effects of the reorganization.

The Conference's success in meeting its substantive objectives is less certain. One day is hardly sufficient for detailed skills training as called for in the Conference objectives. I would imagine there was considerable interest in some of the NRM technique demonstrations and simulations on the last day of the Conference, but I was unable to attend.

With regard to the first two "process" objectives, participants were certainly able to reflect on lessons learned from USAID's NRM and environmental experience and discuss problems and constraints to project implementation. Less time appeared to be spent on reviewing USAID's accomplishments and identifying approaches to overcome implementation constraints. The result of these discussions was a series of panel presentations reporting on the outcome of the various work groups, listing key findings in each of the four theme areas identified by the organizers. The presentations seemed to concentrate on experience as opposed to action. They

were interesting but very general, often rambling with little attention to the implications such lessons might have on action or USAID project management and implementation. The size of the Conference and its ambitious objectives relative to its duration further complicated matters and undermined any real consensus on lessons learned, specific accomplishments or required action.

The content of the final report and its synthesis will be the real measure of the Conference's success in documenting and learning from USAID's Africa experience. Compiling that report and identifying implications or guidelines for future project implementation, however, will be a formidable challenge given the Conference's ambitious mandate and the far-ranging discussions on each of the four theme areas.

G. Persons Interviewed at The Gambia Workshop

Robert Armstrong and Charles Cutshall, USAID/Botswana
Paul Bartel, Botswana (PSC, personal services contractor)
Gary Bayer and Rob Clausen, USAID/Uganda
Gary Cohen, USAID/The Gambia
Paul Crawford, USAID/REDSO/WCA, Cote d'Ivoire
Kurt Fuller, USAID/Rwanda
Lance Jepson, USAID/Senegal
Eric Loken and Glenn Rogers, USAID/REDSO/ESA, Kenya
Robin Mason, USAID/Mozambique (PSC)
Catherine McIntyre, USAID/Mali
John McMahon, USAID/Cameroon
Stephen Millington, USAID/Madagascar
Curtis Nissley, USAID/Niger
Benson Phiri, USAID/Malawi (national)
S.K. Reddy, USAID/Guinea

Appendix Four: Written Materials Reviewed by the Team

A. EPAT/MUCIA Publications

Thomas A. White, "Landholder Cooperation for Sustainable Upland Watershed Management". Working Paper No. 1, July 1992.

Thomas A. White, "An Economic Analysis of the Maissade, Haiti", Integrated Watershed Management Project, Working Paper No. 2, July 1993.

Thomas A. White, "Peasant Initiative for Soil Conservation: Case Studies of Recent Technical and Social Innovations from Maissade, Haiti", Working Paper No. 3, July 1992.

Thomas A. White, "Peasant Cooperation for Watershed Management in Maissad, Haiti: Factors Associated with Participation", Working Paper No. 4, October 1992.

Douglas Southgate, "Shrimp Mariculture Development in Ecuador: Some Resource Policy Issues", Working Paper No. 5, November 1992.

Bruce A. McCarl, "Mathematical Programming for Resource Policy Appraisal Under the Multiple Objectives", Working Paper No. 6, November 1992, and Addendum March 1993.

Duane Chapman, "Environment, Income, and Development in Southern Africa: An Analysis of the Interaction of Environmental Macro Economics", Working Paper No. 7, January 1993.

Jan G. Laarman, "Evaluating Environmental Impacts of Rural Development Projects", Working Paper No. 8, September 1993.

Richard Brazee and Douglas Southgate, "A Mathematical Model for Developing Ethno-Biologically Diverse Tropical Forests", Technical Series Working Paper No. 1, May 1993.

Scott Grosse, "Schistosomiasis and Water Resources Development: A Re-evaluation of an Important Environment-Health Linkage", Technical Series Working Paper No. 2, May 1993.

Jean Albrecht, "Tropical Forest Conservation and Development: A Bibliography", Manual No. 1, April 1993.

T. Anderson, "Integrating Sustainability into Agroforestry Projects: A Workshop Framework for NGO Program Managers", Manual No. 2, September 1993.

Jerald C. Schnoor, "The Czech Republic", Case Study No. 1, June 1993.

Thomas Drennen and Duane Chapman, "Climate Change Policies and Energy Use in Developing Countries, Central Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States", Policy Brief No. 1, June 1992.

Charles Kolstad and Alexander Golub, "Environmental Protection and Economic Reform in Russia", Policy Brief No. 2, July 1993.

John P. Hoehn and David R. Walker, "When Prices Miss the Mark: Methods for Valuing Environmental Change", Policy Brief No. 3, August 1993.

Richard C. Porter, "Providing Urban Environmental Services in Developing Countries", Policy Brief No. 4, November 1993.

Hans M. Gregersen, J.E.M. Arnold, A. Lundgren & D. Gow, "Assessing Forest Project Impacts: Issues and Strategies", published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations with EPAT support.

J.E.M. Arnold with Ian Townson, "Non Farm Employment in Small-Scale Forest Bases Enterprise: Policy and Environmental Issues", March 1994.

Gayl D. Ness, "Population and the Environment: Framework for Analysis", January 1994.

B. MUCIA/EPAT Draft Research Documents

Jerald Schnoor, "Industrial Ecology and Developing Countries".

George Honadle, "Context and Consequence: Behavioral/Situational Perspective on Environmental Policy in Developing Countries", February 1994.

T. Graham-Tomasi, H. Mohtadi & T. Roe, "Macroeconomic Policy, Economic Performance, and Natural Resources: A Discussion of Key Issues".

William Ascher and Sonal Tejani, "The Effects of Population Growth on the Environment in the Rural Sector of Developing Countries".

D. Clay, M. Guizlo, and S. Wallace, "Population and Land Degradation", December 1993.

K. Norman and D. Coates, "Third World Women and the Environment: A Paradigm in Transition", January 1994.

J. Braden, R. Brazee, D. Holland, M. Mourato, "Natural Resource Use and Environmental Quality: The Role of the Price System".

C. Other MUCIA/EPAT Documents

MUCIA/EPAT Proposal in response to RFA, July 8, 1991.

First Annual Workplan, FY1992, August 1992.

Second Annual Workplan, FY1993, no date.

Third Annual Workplan, FY1994, November 1993.

Communications Campaign and Audience Response Notebook and Letters from Readers, assembled by Ellen Maurer.

List of Active Deliverables, January 17, 1994.

Status Report on EPAT/MUCIA Synthesis Papers, Memorandum from N. Poulton, February 25, 1994.

Writer's Guidelines.

Position Descriptions.

Mailing List Profile.

Organization Chart.

D. WIEA Documents

Agricultural Transformation in Africa, David Seckler, editor, 1993.

Intensifying Rice Production in the Lac Alaotra and Marovoay Regions of Madagascar, Technical Report No. 1, November 1992.

Jean Albrecht, "Tropical Forest Conservation and Development", April 1993.

Bruce A. Larson, "Changing the Economics of Environmental Degradation in Madagascar: Lessons from the National Environmental Action Plan Process", Draft Report, May 1993.

Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection in Developing Countries, WIEA Report in Economic Instruments for Environmental Management in Developing Countries, OECD Publication.

Directory of Training and Human Resource Opportunities, September 1993.

Novokuznetsk Component of Staff Appraisal Report, Russia: Environmental Technical Assistance Loan, Report prepared under the direction of R. Misheloff, October 1993.

EarthLine Newsletter, 1992/1-2, 1993/1-3.

Course Outline: Environment Policy, Regulation and Management, February 22 - March 24, 1993.

EPAT/WIEA Project Status Report, Internal Document, no date, transmitted with comments to Evaluation Draft Report, March 29, 1994. Also included WIEA's Human Resources Development Activities and Status of WIEA's Prospective HRD Activities as of March 11, 1994.

Retreat notes on Agreements, Areas for Potential Action, Roles and Responsibilities, Fax transmitted January 26, 1994.

List of EPAT Technical Advisory Group (TAG) Members.

TAG Inaugural Meeting Agenda and Meeting Notes, October 1992.

TAG Meeting Agenda, June 10-11, 1993.

Report to the Technical Advisory Group, May 17, 1993.

EPAT/TA Annual Plan, FY92-93, no date.

EPAT/TA Strategic Plan, Project Management Report No. 3, October 1992.

Progress Report No. 2, June 30 - December 31, 1992.

" " No. 3, January 1 - February 28, 1993.

" " No. 4, March 1 - August 31, 1993.

Activity Report No. 1, October 1 - June 30, 1992.

" " No. 2, June 30 - July 30, 1992.

" " No. 3, July 31 - September 30, 1992.

" " (unnumbered), October 1, 1992 - January 31, 1993.

" " " February 1 - March 31, 1993.

" " " April 1 - May 31, 1993.

" " " June 1 - July 31, 1993.

- " " " August 1 - September 30, 1993.
- " " " October 1 - November 30, 1993.

E. USAID Documents

Environmental and Natural Resources Policy and Training project paper, January 1991.

RFP No. W/R/-90-16, Environmental and Natural Resources Policy and Training (EPAT) Project No. 936-5555, May 17, 1991.

RFA No. AID/W/R-91-002A, Environmental and Natural Resources Policy and Training (EPAT) Project, May 17, 1991.

Amendments Number 01 for Solicitation Documents RFA AID/W/R-91-002A, AID/W/R-91-002B, and RFP W/R-90-16.

Minutes from the May 29, 1991 Pre-Proposal Conference, and List of Conference Attendees.

Right-Sizing the Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support & Research, draft report, 1993.

Summary Report, Bureau for Global Program, Field Support and Research, Unreviewed draft report, no date.

[Overview] Environment Center, draft report, January 26, 1994.

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Appendix Five: Comments on MUCIA Synthesis Papers

MUCIA provided the evaluation team with a list of "synthesis" papers just before the evaluation was completed. The following are comments on these papers.

1. Assessing Forestry Project Impacts: Issues and Strategies, by Gregersen, Arnold, Lundgren, Contreras, Montalembert, and Gow

"The present document provides decision makers with a view of the strategic context and the issues that need to be considered in developing an effective process for forestry project impact assessments." (p. 3) Only two of the authors of this document, Gregersen and Lundgren, are members of the EPAT forestry research team. None of the other authors work for developing country institutions. While the cover letter indicates the document was the result of a collaboration between the FAO, UNEP, The World Bank and EPAT, the document is copyrighted by the FAO and "prepared under the leadership of the Policy and Planning Division of the Forestry Department of FAO".

The document has two parts:

Part I - The New Generation of Forestry Projects

Part II - Assessing Forestry Impact on People

While not questioning the relevance of this material for the EPAT/MUCIA forestry team's synthesis paper, it is not a synthesis paper in the sense called for by the EPAT project in that it is not a combined effort setting the stage for the team's research focus (see Poulton, Memo to evaluation team, February 25, 1994).

For the above reasons, it does not qualify as a group synthesis paper for any EPAT/MUCIA research team.

2. Third World Women and the Environment: A Paradigm in Transition, by Norman and Coates (unpublished draft)

This work was funded by set-asides totaling \$25,000. The stated output was a synthesis paper. Neither author appears on any list of EPAT/MUCIA research team members that the evaluation team has seen.

While presenting an interesting description of the evolution of the thinking on gender and environment, it is not clear where this paper fits among the subject matter chosen to be the focus of research groups. But it does not qualify as a group synthesis paper for any EPAT/MUCIA research team.

3. Industrial Ecology and Developing Countries, by Jerald L. Schnoor (unpublished draft)

The author has been terminated from the Energy, Industry, and Urban Environment Team. The cover sheet states that the paper was "Submitted as a Policy Brief to the EPAT/MUCIA Project", so it clear that the author did not view it as a synthesis paper. As befitting the terms of reference for a policy brief, the paper provides a most basic introduction to the thinking in the field of industrial ecology.

For the above reasons, it does not qualify as a group synthesis paper for any EPAT/MUCIA research team.

4. Macroeconomic Policy, Economic Performance and Natural Resources: A Discussion of Key Issues, by Graham-Tomasi, Mohtadi, and Roe (unpublished draft)

The paper was written by all three members of the EPAT/MUCIA Macroeconomics Research Team and thereby qualifies as a group synthesis paper. The paper appears to be the beginning of a good group synthesis paper. As it indicates, it does not yet include a discussion of the political economy of policy reform or the choice of policy instruments for countries at different stages of institutional development.

5. The Effects of Population Growth on the Environment in the Rural Sector of Developing Countries, by Tejani and Ascher (unpublished draft)

This work was financed by set-asides totaling \$12,950. Stated outputs from this work included a working paper and a policy brief but not a synthesis paper. Neither author appears on any list of EPAT/MUCIA research team members that the evaluation team has seen.

The paper provides a quite comprehensive statement on the effects of population growth on the rural environment in developing countries. This paper would seem to be a useful input into a group synthesis paper of the Population and Environmental and Natural Resources EPAT/MUCIA research team. However, it does not qualify as a group synthesis paper for any EPAT/MUCIA research team.

6. Population and the Environment: Framework for Analysis, by Ness

The author does not appear on any list of EPAT/MUCIA research team members that the evaluation team has seen. The paper, dated January 1994, is labeled as coming from the USAID-funded EPAT/MUCIA project.

The paper states it is one of a series that the EPAT/MUCIA Population and Environmental and Natural Resources team is producing. "It begins by reviewing past and current models or frameworks that show how we think about the population-environment relationship. Subsequent papers will examine what we know about this relationship in the specific areas of land use, health, women, and development. A final paper will use all of these findings to develop a specific research agenda for the future." (p. 1)

9. Natural Resource Use and Environmental Quality: The Role of the Price System, by Braden, Braze, Holland, and Mourato (unpublished draft)

Two of the authors were members of the now-defunct Resource Pricing and Institutions Team. There is no reference to the EPAT project.

"The purpose of this paper is to promote understanding of how environmental and natural resource problems arise in market economies, and how markets and prices can be part of the solution to these problems.... The paper examines relationship between these environment and natural resource problems and the price system and government policies. The paper uses these relationships to illustrate types of corrective measures."

The paper provides a very basic introduction to the field, more in the spirit of policy briefs than what would be expected in a synthesis paper. It has an abbreviated bibliography.

It is unclear how this paper will be used inasmuch as the research team for which it was written has been closed down.

10. Context and Consequence: A Behavioral/Situational Perspective On Environmental Policy Implementation in Developing Countries, by Honadle (unpublished draft)

The author is the leader of the newly formed Institutions and Policy Implementation Team. This paper is stated to be a product of the EPAT project.

"This study will focus on how different settings set limits on the ways that policies produce results, how they impose different constraints on the strategy choices available, and how they often present unanticipated opportunities." (p.13)

Although extremely long (95 pages with an extensive bibliography) this draft would qualify as one of the individual synthesis papers of the Institutions and Policy Implementation Team that would be a useful input into the Team's group synthesis paper.

11. Conclusions

Of the ten synthesis papers provided by EPAT/MUCIA, the evaluation team finds that none of them qualify as completed group synthesis papers as called for in the project paper and the MUCIA cooperative agreement. The closest to qualifying is the group paper by the Macroeconomics Team which they indicate is incomplete because it does not yet include two important sections. The forestry paper by Gregersen *et al* will be published by the FAO as part of a book on assessing forestry project impacts. The paper by Honadle could be seen as the beginning of a group synthesis paper by the newly-created Institutions and Policy Implementation Team, but other members of the Team need to be heard from before that team has a true group synthesis paper.

The Schnoor paper is too superficial to qualify as an individual synthesis paper and Schnoor has been terminated from the Energy, Industry, and the Urban Environment Team. The Braden *et al* paper was written for the Resource Pricing and Institutions Team which has been disbanded.

Two of the lead authors of the other papers, Clay and Ness, are not members of any research team. While Clay was formerly a member of the Population and Environmental and Natural Resources Team, the evaluation team has no information on Ness' affiliation with the project.

Lead authors on the remaining papers (Arnold, Norman & Coates, and Tejani & Ascher), are not members of any research team, so it is unclear what role these papers will play in developing group synthesis papers.

Appendix Six: Cover Letter to Final Report of the Evaluation Team and USAID Memorandum of Meeting

Memorandum

To: USAID (G/ENR)
From: Checchi EPAT Evaluation Team
Date: August 10, 1994
Subject: Response to MEMORANDUM OF MEETING, Review of Checchi Draft Evaluation Report, July 1, 1994

Introduction

The MEMORANDUM suggests that the evaluation team has either ignored or not given careful attention to alleged "inaccuracies and unsubstantiated assertions" provided to the team earlier. This is not the case: careful attention has been given to all suggestions the team has received from USAID, MUCIA, and WIEA. That a certain suggested change has not been made reflects the team's judgment it is not warranted. So there can be no misunderstanding on how the evaluation team chose to deal with all points raised in the MEMORANDUM, this memo details how the team dealt with each suggestion with elaboration as needed.

Factual Errors

1. Suggested change made.
2. Suggested change made.
3. Suggested change made.
4. The evaluation team now refers to "mistakes in procurement structure" on page 1. The details of this point are elaborated on page 60.
5. The text now reflects "synthesizing" in the sense that the project, through its focus on economic analysis, has relevance for all types of environmental projects.
6. "at various American universities" has been deleted.
7. The text now makes this clear.
8. "contracis" has been replaced with by "projects".
9. The project paper is the document for which funding is approved, and as such is the key project document. To the extent that its intent is not reflected in procurement documents, the procurement documents are deficient, and it would be appropriate for us to comment on this. However, this is not a serious problem in the case of EPAT. Despite numerous shortcomings in both the contract and cooperative agreement *e.g.*, they both lack comprehensive implementation schedules, key language in the project paper, major contract, and cooperative agreement are the same. "and reiterated in the contract and cooperative agreement" has been added to the first sentence of the paragraph referenced.
10. We do not say they were. No change in text made.
11. The fact that the team is sent a set of papers that are called "synthesis papers" does not mean they qualify as synthesis papers. Our reasons for asserting that no synthesis papers have yet been completed are set forth in detail in Section 4.A.2, and a footnote noting this has been added to page 11. Our review of the papers sent to us by Poulton are presented in Appendix 5.

12. It is the judgment of the evaluation team that the research program is "disorganized and unfocused", in part because not a single synthesis paper has been completed. No change in text made.
13. There is no factual error. No change in text made.
14. Change in text made.
15. The last sentence in the paragraph referenced now reads: "The remainder are donor organizations (including USAID Washington and field staff), international organizations, NGOs, and universities located in developed countries."
16. "unedited" has been removed from the referenced paragraph as has the footnote pertaining to it.
17. Modifications in the text have been made to clarify our views on page 18. No change has been made in the text on page 31.
18. The text has been changed to read: "the training element of the project is not workable in view of other heavily subsidized training programs." Regarding the second point, later in the same paragraph we say:

In the evaluation team's view, a more cost-effective approach would be for project staff to assist in the development of these strategies and to offer an occasional course on how to leverage scarce environmental resources so as to have a multiple impact, i.e., training of trainers.
19. All three documents referred to call for the first synthesis papers to be completed by September, 1992, or within a year of project startup. All three documents call for all synthesis papers to be completed within 18 to 24 months. The text has been changed to read: "The project paper and the cooperative agreement called for MUCIA to complete the first synthesis papers within the first 12 months of the project."
20. The text has been changed to read: "it is apparent the TAG is not playing the advisory role it was intended to play."
21. The text has been changed to reflect USAID's comments.
22. The text has been changed to reflect USAID's comments.
23. The words "at least quarterly" have been deleted.
24. The USAID action has been noted in a footnote on page 34. However, the IIID program was the most recent in a long line of heavily subsidized courses offered by other donors and US government agencies. For example, the United Nations Environmental Program has offered a heavily subsidized four month environmental training program for Third World government officials (including an economic analysis component) at Tufts University for four years. It is the judgment of the evaluation team that the realization should have come sooner to USAID that the project did not have a viable training strategy.
25. The text now reads: "MUCIA did not have a qualified candidate available to replace Candler when he departed."
26. Factual corrections made. "attractive to potential USAID contractors" added.
27. While the newsletter is a joint MUCIA-WIEA responsibility, a WIEA staff person has been assigned the task of putting it together. The text has been modified to reflect this.
28. Some changes in the text have been made.
29. Text has been changed to: "When the major contract and cooperative agreement were not awarded to the same partnership...."

30. We promised not to reveal what persons we interviewed said to us. Based on our transcripts, our statement is a better reflection of what was said than what the USAID memo asserts. No change in text made.
31. Section has been rewritten to reflect USAID concerns.
32. Text now reads: "However, the tracking system will have to be adapted to insure quality outputs, once a common vision as to what research products are needed and how they should be generated has been developed."

Unsubstantiated Statements

1. Text now reads: "Discussions of the list of "deliverables" with members of the research teams led the evaluation team to conclude that there has been little interaction among research groups, between MUCIA and WIEA, and with institutions or researchers in developing countries (with the exception of some collaborative research efforts in Morocco and Turkey)."
2. These are judgments of the evaluation team. No change in text made.
3. The statement is absolutely confirmed through interviews with people who would know. No change in text made.
4. Text now reads: "The WIEA contract calls for WIEA to provide support for institutional strengthening."
5. Text now reads: "USAID, MUCIA, and WIEA realized that the training strategy is deficient because EPAT training courses cannot compete with heavily-subsidized courses being offered by other USAID and other donor projects."
6. The USAID EPAT management team has defined its workload to be large, thereby requiring a large management team. As is indicated in the Recommendations Section, the evaluation team believes the USAID management responsibilities should be cut back significantly so that a single project officer can manage the project with virtually all implementation responsibilities shifted to the contractor. No change in text made.
7. The incidents were discussed with Johnson and because of their highly personal nature, it was agreed that they should be spelled out in a confidential letter to him. This was done and the team is surprised he did not confirm there were several incidents at the USAID meeting leading to the USAID memo.
8. "Black box" reference has been withdrawn. Nevertheless, from its interviews with research team members, the evaluation team has concluded the rationales for work plan approvals/disapprovals are not clear. No further changes in text made.
9. The evaluation team's judgment that MUCIA does not have a comprehensive vision is based on discussions with team members, the reading of documents, and other evidence. Text has been changed to read: "A number of working papers have been completed, but they, along with other evidence considered by the evaluation team, do not suggest the MUCIA consortium has a comprehensive vision of what its mission should be."
10. It is unclear to the evaluation team why USAID wants clarification on this point since all parties are familiar with the work plan process. However, the word "altered" in the text has been replaced by "developed and approved" and the following footnote has been added to the relevant paragraph: "According to MUCIA's cooperative agreement, annual work plans were to be developed by MUCIA and approved by USAID. Consequently, ill-advised changes in them should be viewed as a joint responsibility of MUCIA and USAID."

11. & 12. We have substantiated both in the text on pp. 35 and 58 by referring to "discussions with research team members and a review of their writings".
13. The text has been amended to include a listing of the reasons for the evaluation team's conclusion.
14. Changes in text made.
15. The evaluation team believes the existing text is clear. No change in text made.
16. Changes in text made.
17. In the judgment of the evaluation team, the text is accurate. No change in text made.
18. "design flaws" has been replaced by "an excessive number of partners in the WIEA consortium to communicate and work with...." The decision to have 18 partners originally in the consortium was partly influenced by the procurement structure decision discussed elsewhere in the report to not allow any subcontracting once the cooperative agreement and major contract had been signed.
19. The first two sentences have been consolidated into the following: "Instead of focusing on tasks laid out in the Strategic Plan and preparing workplans to accomplish those tasks, WIEA project staff have spent too much time on developing buy-ins with little attention to the nature and scope of the project."
20. "some of" in the first sentence has been deleted. The evaluation team details these misgivings (and others) in various parts the report.
21. We stand behind the quote as representative. The solid evidence are the interviews we conducted, as we have stated. The following text has been added: "In the judgment of the evaluation team, the quote presents an accurate picture of USAID management of the project." The quote does not imply the USAID EPAT management team did anything that was not in compliance with USAID regulations.
22. Based on interviews with both MUCIA and WIEA staff, it has happened on numerous occasions and is the source of considerable frustration and irritation to both. No change in text made.
23. The evaluation has decided to keep this section in because of its relevance to choices made by the EPAT project. Going beyond the scope of work should not be seen as a negative. The text has been changed so it does not appear that the team knows of empirical evidence on this subject.
24. The text has been modified to meet the USAID objection.
25. The statement has been substantiated to the Evaluation Team in interviews with members of the research teams, and the text has been modified to reflect this.
26. The text has been changed to read: "It is the judgment of the Evaluation Team that rather than working to resolve these problems, the USAID EPAT management team has contributed to them." This is a summary statement and not the place to document these points. The documentation is presented in Section 4.C, the section that focuses on the performance of the USAID EPAT management team.
27. Changes in the text have been made. The text now includes the following quote: "The evaluation team concludes ...that MUCIA does not have an information system in place that will allow it to determine how much financial support has been or is now being provided by its EPAT grant to individual research activities/products." As evidence for the factual accuracy of this latter quote, we draw from Poulton's response (memo of April 7, 1994) to the evaluation team's query regarding how MUCIA grant monies were being used to support research activities:

...the cooperative agreement [does not] require MUCIA to maintain cost information by product. The cooperative agreement funds people, not products.... We continue to refine our data base to manage and track products.

If the Evaluation Team is interested in obtaining cost information by product, the Team might need to consult with AID as to whether the request is within the Scope of Work of the evaluation. If so, it could then be possible that AID might want to negotiate an amendment to the cooperative agreement with MUCIA regarding the appropriate definitions of all cost elements and products to be analyzed and the provision of additional resources to support that cost analysis.

28. No change in text made.



MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

Venue: USAID (G/ENR), July 1, 1994

Participants: T. Johnson, G/ENR
P. Church, PPC/CDIE
R. Misheloff, G/ENR
G. Standrod, G/PO
G. Kinney, M/FA/O/B/PCE

Subject: Review of Checchi draft EPAT Evaluation Report

Refs: (a) Contract No. AEP-0085-I-00-3003-00, Delivery Order No. 8
(b) May 4, 1994 draft "First Evaluation of the EPAT Project (936-5555)

USAID staff reviewed the May 1994 final draft report of the Checchi EPAT evaluation report and found it to be unacceptable as a deliverable under the referenced Delivery Order because the inaccuracies and unsubstantiated assertions it contains reduce any usefulness its recommendations might have for taking decisions regarding future management and direction of the project. The consensus of the meeting was that the report be returned to Checchi and Company, noting these shortcomings and requesting that they be addressed in a final deliverable.

The meeting participants also wished that the evaluation contractor be aware that USAID deems earlier written communications from USAID, from the USAID/G EPAT management team, and from EPAT's prime contractor and grantee to be part of the evaluation record. These earlier communications, in response to an initial draft evaluation report, and the April 6 G/ENR meeting with the EPAT evaluation team, call attention to many of the same inaccuracies and unsubstantiated assertions that remain in the current "final draft" version. In what follows, are factual errors and unsupported statements that USAID requests be addressed.

Factual Errors

1. **Title page:** The project number for EPAT is 936-5555, not 936-5517.
2. **Page 1, first paragraph and page 15, first paragraph of Section D:** EPAT was not "...intended to help developing country policy makers understand..." the uses of economic analysis and policy. It is not an awareness project, although awareness is obviously necessary. Instead, the project GOAL is adoption of economic policies which promote environmentally sustainable development. The Project PURPOSE encompasses awareness plus analysis and the capacity to perform analyses (thus the institutional strengthening and human resources development components of the project).

3. Page 1, same paragraph: It is not correct that "funds [for EPAT] were initially provided for five years..." The project was authorized for 10 years. The duration of the Winrock contract and MUCIA cooperative agreement are 5 years, but both the contract and cooperative agreement (and USDA RSSA) are incrementally funded a year at a time.
4. Page 1, last paragraph: USAID does not believe that "mistakes" were made in contractor selection by USAID. If the point of the report is that the choice of implementing contractors/organizations has negatively impacted project results, that should be specifically stated in those terms.
5. Page 4, 1st paragraph under section C: While the meaning of the term "synthesizing vehicle" is ambiguous, it seems to connote the notion that EPAT was thought of as having a special status vis a vis other USAID sponsored projects. This was never the case.
6. Page 5, 1st full paragraph: EPAT's design does not bar institutions other than American universities from participation in project sponsored core research.
7. Page 5, paragraph starting "Interviews with...": USAID regional bureau staffs did not attend Checchl evaluation team interviews with members of the USAID EPAT management staff.
8. Page 6, last paragraph, first sentence. "Most USAID contracts have a single lead contractor/grantee..." This is axiomatic. The point is that most USAID(W) projects have a single lead contractor or grantee, but there are frequently many contractors.
9. Page 9, Subhead 3 Project Performance. The report, among other things, "looks at how design expectations may have evolved since the contract and cooperative agreement were awarded and it assesses performance based on the contractor's, grantee's, and USAID's expectations. The Project Paper itself has no legal effect on the contractor or recipient (USAID). Technically the PP is an internal document. The contract itself (and/or cooperative agreement), regardless of how deficient, are to embody the sole agreement between the contractors and USAID. Expectations should be viewed in this context.
10. Page 10, 1st full paragraph: Winrock senior technical advisors were not mandated to make recommendations respecting the core research program.
11. Page 11, 2nd paragraph under "Performance": While the research program has not advanced as far as USAID had hoped it would at this stage, it is not true that "synthesis papers have not been completed." The reader's attention is directed to the "Status Report on EPAT/MUCIA Synthesis Papers" transmitted under cover of Nick Poulton's February 25, 1994 memorandum to the evaluation team, which clarifies that, as of the date of preparation, 7 synthesis papers had been published. (Note: The same error should be corrected on pages 17 and 35.)

12. Page 11, next paragraph: According to the evaluation team, the alleged "absence of synthesis papers has left the research program disorganized and unfocused." This is incorrect. As noted, 7 synthesis papers have been published so far. Several others are far enough along to be useful for purposes of defining and operationalizing research agendas for the MUCIA teams.

13. Page 11, same paragraph (also last paragraph page 32): The contention that "many [of the MUCIA research papers] are secondhand research pieces that have been done under other auspices" also needs to be clarified. Neither the synthesis papers nor the policy briefs (which together account for over half of the EPAT/MUCIA "research" documents published so far) were ever expected to contain material never seen elsewhere. Instead, both publication series were expected to bring together previous research for specific purposes -- agenda building in the case of the synthesis papers, and accessibility to a policy audience in the case of the policy briefs. Additionally, much of the work of the Forest, Water, and Watershed Management team has multiple sponsors, all of which are recognized in publications authored by team members. The Checchi evaluation team should note that, far from being a problem, USAID considers this kind of leveraging a plus. On one occasion, EPAT/MUCIA (with USAID concurrence) purchased reprints of an important paper which both institutions agreed should be readily available to EPAT's policy audience.

14. Page 13, 3rd paragraph: The team's contention that there were "...serious implementation problems in mobilizing teams for the Madagascar studies [listed earlier in the paragraph] is incorrect. The teams were mobilized quickly and to the complete satisfaction of the USAID mission. (The same mistake is made on page 39.) Explain the basis for evaluation assertion.

15. Page 14, 2nd paragraph under "Performance": USAID staff -- in Washington and in the field -- are also on the EPAT mailing list.

16. Page 14, next paragraph: The term "unedited" on the cover page of early working papers reflects the original intent to treat such papers as works in progress, thereby not requiring editing. In fact, USAID quickly changed its mind about this decision, and all documents have in fact been reviewed prior to publication for content and style. This should be noted.

17. Page 18, last paragraph: The team faults the "set-aside" program in part because "...many of these set-asides do not link into the core research program..." (Note: The report comes back to the same point on page 31.) The set aside program was designed to serve more than one purpose. USAID never intended that all activities under the set aside would tie in closely to the core research program. Note this fact and edit the text accordingly.

18. Page 20, 3rd paragraph under "Performance": USAID agrees that subsidized course offerings available to individuals from USAID-assisted countries are a problem for EPAT. However, the evaluation team's contention that this is evidence that the "training element

of the project was poorly conceived" is a mistake since the subsidized course offerings are rather recent developments, i.e. they post date the design of EPAT, and therefore were not taken into account in the design. Second, the Checchi team's comment that "... U.S.-based training ... for host country participants ... may represent a misguided view about where such training should occur and who should be the target audience..." (emphasis added) is too vague to be of any help. If it is to remain in the text, the Checchi team should explain why this might be a "misguided view," where training should be done, and who the "target audience" should be. The team's observation that "it offers no vision into the rationale for training" is incomprehensible. Does "it" refer to U.S.-based training, the length of the training, the fact that participant expenses are to be borne by USAID missions, or some combination of the above? Explain reasoning by which the team arrived at its conclusion.

19. Page 20, last paragraph: The statement that "the project paper and the cooperative agreement called for MUCIA to complete synthesis papers and guidelines within the first 18 months of the project" is incorrect. The time frame cited in both documents (and in the RFA) is 18 to 24 months.

20. Page 22, 2nd paragraph under "Performance": The implication that the TAG was to have "management responsibility" which it has not exercised is incorrect. The TAG was, and is, strictly an advisory body.

21. Page 23, last paragraph: The statement that Ellen Maurer replaced Paula Hirschhoff "once the contract [sic] was awarded" is incorrect. Ellen Maurer's name appeared on MUCIA's BAFO and she attended discussions of that document with USAID. The same error is made on page 36.

22. Page 24, top: The statement that "no one was ever proposed as the research director is incorrect. MUCIA proposed Douglas Southgate. Please note and correct. Same paragraph: The statement that Jane Knowles "was expected to come to Washington for one and half years..." is incorrect. Such a proposal did appear in the MUCIA proposal, but was withdrawn in the BAFO. At that time, USAID agreed that the functions which she was to perform could be carried out at the University of Wisconsin. The same error is made on page 36. Please note and correct.

23. Page 25, 1st paragraph under "Management": There is no reference in the design or bid documents to the Project Management Team meeting "at least quarterly." The RFA indicates that "the Team will meet on a regularly scheduled basis (as often as weekly in the initial stages of the project)..." (page 45) In fact, the Team meets weekly. Please note and correct.

24. Page 34, 2nd paragraph under "Human Resources Development" and page 35, last paragraph: The team observes that "...there was no market for the [MUCIA core] course", and therefore reprimands the USAID EPAT management team and MUCIA for having

"...allowed the work on the course to proceed..." (Note: See also page 48.) USAID came to realize that there is a limited market for a course such as the one MUCIA was developing when WIEA presented its core course for the first time in February - March 1993, and did not attract a sizable audience. At about the same time, USAID learned that HHD (with USAID sponsorship) would offer a course similar in some respects to the one MUCIA was planning. Further work on the MUCIA course was suspended at that time. In this respect, the reference to "...how long work on the core course was allowed to proceed before realizing they did not have a workable strategy,..." makes no sense. Please note USAID position and clarify.

25. Page 36, next paragraph: The Checchi evaluators indicate that "MUCIA should have recruited a replacement [for the departing chief-of-party] last summer..." In fact, a replacement for the Chief of Party acceptable both to MUCIA and to USAID was recruited last summer, and until he decided in November 1993 to accept another position, both MUCIA and USAID believed that he would start work on or about January 1, 1994 - before Dr. Candler's departure.

26. Page 38, 2nd paragraph: The total estimated cost of the Winrock contract, as amended to reflect exercise of option 1, is \$6.2 million, not \$5.7 million. It is not true that "the contract is projected to last for up to 10 years ..." The duration of both the Winrock contract and the MUCIA cooperative agreement is 5 years. "These two features [ten year contract [this is not true] with no ceilings] make it an extremely attractive contract....." Attractive for who?

27. Page 39, last paragraph: The report indicates that WIEA "has taken responsibility for the newsletter." The newsletter is a joint responsibility of the two implementing groups.

28. Page 42, last paragraph: The assertion that WIEA removed its first chief-of-party "in response to pressure from the USAID EPAT management team" is untrue. When individuals on the Winrock core staff alerted the USAID project officer that there were serious differences between the Winrock Chief of Party and others on the core staff, and USAID had confirmed that professional and interpersonal relationships had deteriorated severely, and were affecting staff performance, the USAID Project Officer, with the concurrence of most of the Winrock core staff, brought the matter to the attention of the Winrock Vice-President for International Affairs. The decision to remove the chief of party was made by Winrock with the acquiescence of the USAID management staff. The above allegation should be balanced with the above record of USAID actions.

29. Page 46, 4th paragraph. "When USAID chose to not award the major contract and cooperative agreement to the same partnership, the plans" This was not a threshold decision, it was based on the strength of the proposals submitted and the selection criteria.

30. Page 47, "5. Staffing". "The USAID contracts office also raised questions about the qualifications of the USAID EPAT management team." This is not quite accurate.

Concerns were raised about the level of training that USAID will commit to RSSA personnel. This is a very pervasive problem. An orientation course may or may not solve the problem. There is currently training for USAID project officers that is available.

31. Page 57, 1st paragraph: The evaluation team examines two alternatives for increasing the expertise in economics of the Winrock staff: a) exercising the option in the Winrock contract to expand the size of the core staff, and b) activating the Winrock Senior Technical Advisors. The two alternatives are not mutually exclusive. USAID permitted Winrock to exercise the option in its contract and urged Winrock to use its senior advisors to supplement its core staff, especially in substantive areas in which that staff was weak (particularly economics). USAID requests that these actions be noted and the point clarified. Note also that in USAID contracts the Options for increased Level of Effort are not discipline-specific.

32. Page 58, Section F: Quality assurance has always been a matter of concern under EPAT. All deliverables have been reviewed. The statement that the "tracking mechanism cannot be expected to provide the focus for research activities..." is accurate but irrelevant. No one ever contended that a tracking mechanism would provide focus.

Unsubstantiated Statements

1. Page 11, 4th full paragraph: The statement that "The list of 'deliverables'... demonstrates that there has been little interaction among research groups, between MUCIA and WIEA, and with institutions or researchers in developing countries..." needs to be clarified. How did the team glean the presence or absence of interaction from a list of titles?

2. Page 11, next paragraph: The assertion that alleged lack of focus is having "...a pronounced [negative] impact on the research teams" is unsubstantiated and, in USAID's view, inaccurate. USAID and MUCIA have made changes in the composition of the research program and the involvement of particular individuals for reasons having to do with personnel, management and the relative importance of particular topical issues to the Agency, not a lack of focus.¹ Explain the basis for this assertion.

3. Page 11, last paragraph. The evaluation asserts that the leader of the Resource Pricing and Institutions Team, was terminated because he was unwilling to exercise management

The evaluation team also introduces allegations of "USAID micro-management", which it says engendered "significant dissatisfaction" and "frustration" on the research teams, without establishing a causal linkage to the presumed lack of focus of the research program.

responsibility over members of his research team. How based in fact is this assertion? If it cannot be absolutely confirmed, its inclusion, beyond the leaders departures may not add value to the overall evaluation report.

4. Page 18, "2. Implementation". "In most cases it was assumed that WIEA....." Assumed by whom and upon what basis?

5. Page 21, first paragraph. "It has been realized that the training strategy is deficient". In whose opinion?

6. Page 21, section on "Performance": The statement (in the second paragraph) that "despite a four person USAID management team, MUCIA's group synthesis papers have not been completed, WIEA has not involved enough economists in its work, and training monies have been spent in support of a strategy that is not viable" is a false causal relationship. The report should note that the size of the USAID staff - 4 at present, but never 4 full-time on EPAT - is related to the management work load, not real or imagined problems of either of the project implementation consortia. Clarify.

7. Page 26, 3rd paragraph under "Performance": The Checchi evaluators' reference to "several incidents" of inappropriate behavior on the part of the "USAID EPAT management team in developing countries..." will require detailed clarification to be helpful. Please provide specifics. Given the small number of trips abroad which members of the USAID management team have taken, USAID questions whether there were "several incidents."

8. Page 27, 2nd paragraph under Section 4": The evaluation team made reference to the "little black box" in its previous draft. In response, USAID EPAT management staff indicated that the rationale for work plan approvals and disapprovals have always been made available to research team leaders and members. Disapprovals have sometimes been accompanied by suggestions/requests for modifications for improving methodology and/or for focussing on subjects which are topically important to USAID as well as development practitioners and policy makers and analysts in USAID-assisted countries. Please correct, clarify "little black box" characterization.

9. Page 27, next paragraph: As noted in response to the previous draft, the allegation that the working papers which have been completed to date "do not suggest [that] the MUCIA consortium has a comprehensive vision of what its mission should be" is disingenuous. Although some of the working papers which have so far been published are synthesis papers, they still constitute a small subset of a much larger program of research and publications which are still in process. That the team has found it difficult to discern a "comprehensive vision" from "reading" the small amount that has been published is hardly surprising. Edit and clarify.

10. Page 29 3rd paragraph. "The evaluation team does not believe work plans should have been altered to allow for delays in the completion of the group synthesis papers. Altered

by whom? and Sanctioned by USAID?

11. Page 35, last paragraph: The statement that "there has been virtually no interaction between MUCIA researchers..." should be substantiated.

12. Page 35, same paragraph (see also page 58, Section D): The point made about research team members having "...little knowledge of what peers in their field were working on" is also unsubstantiated. Elaborate.

13. Page 36, 1st paragraph under "Staffing": The team's conclusion that MUCIA's chief-of-party was "incapable of managing a research program" appears to be based on the following factual errors and assertions: 1. No synthesis papers were produced, 2. There is no focus to the research program, 3. The policy briefs were ill-conceived, and 4. No "tools" were developed. Please make explicit the basis for the team's conclusion.

14. Page 37, 2nd paragraph: The meaning and significance of this paragraph is unclear. Please clarify with supporting evidence.

15. Page 38, 4th paragraph. Why is it assumed that requirements contracts are more expensive than IQCs? Is this because the core contract subsidizes home office expenses?

16. Page 40 4. Policy Dialogue. "Written reports have not been prepared..." Clarify the meaning of prepared: Drafted? Submitted? Approved? This needs to be supported factually.

17. Page 40, 3rd paragraph under "Policy Dialogue" (repeated on page 46): The evaluators report that WIEA staff contend that "the USAID EPAT management team has not been supportive of WIEA's efforts to market to the field, either by not allowing them to go on marketing trips or by interfering in the direct communication between WIEA staff and USAID clients". This allegation is untrue. WIEA staff have included "marketing" activities on several trips abroad and have had considerable contact with various USAID clients. Of course, in a few instances, USAID management has felt that it was better positioned to approach particular potential clients by virtue of personal and professional associations, or because mission and/or regional bureau program managers told USAID/G staff that they did not wish to be marketed by contractors. The former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are cases in point. This role for USAID management appears to accord nicely with the evaluation team's restrictive perspective of what that role should be (see page 62). This discussion should be balanced with a factual record of USAID marketing efforts.

18. Page 43, 2nd paragraph. ".....design flaws in composition of WIEA consortium....." The report should not contain this type of loose language without factual support. Throughout much of the report which castigates USAID for not insisting on more economic analysis, the evaluation team repeatedly falls into a misconception. Both the contract and the cooperative agreement were openly and fully competed and were eligible to be bid on

by all sorts of corporations, non-profits, universities and so forth. Selection was made from what was available from the bids. It is conceivable that one organization, or team, could have won all of the EPAT implementing instruments, i.e. the contract and the cooperative agreement. The negotiation process leading up to the submission of a best and final offer does allow for some latitude in highlighting weaknesses and deficiencies in management structures and teaming arrangements, but the USG does have limits as to how directive it can be.

19. Page 43, "10. Management". "Failure to revisit the Strategic Plan or prepare annual work plans is indicative of the lack of focus and absence of vision WIEA has brought to the project." The report seems to really stretch to make a causal relationship here. The point may be that the Strategic Plan and annual work plans need and have needed greater attention.

20. Page 47, 2nd, 3rd and 4th paragraphs under "Staffing": The team here indicates that "EPAT" (presumably meaning Winrock) staff leveled various charges against the USAID EPAT management team, including basic incompetence. The team then goes on to say that it "shares some of these misgivings", without indicating which ones. Identify and substantiate which charges are valid and why.

21. Page 48, 1st paragraph: The quotation, which is designed to set the tone for the section (and in that respect succeeds admirably), is damning IF, as indicated, it "provides a representative picture of what the evaluation team heard...". If, on the other hand, it is only representative of the views of a small number of disgruntled staff, or persons who left the project involuntarily, or institutions whose (arguably inflated) expectations of the role they would play in EPAT were not fully realized, then the use of the quotation paints a highly distorted picture.² The team needs to show that its use of the quote is appropriate in the context of an objective evaluation. A suitable demonstration that the quote is appropriate for this report would require a) solid evidence that "it represents the views of nearly all MUCIA and WIEA EPAT staffs as well as the views of senior managers in both MUCIA and Winrock International ..." as claimed, and b) a statement by the evaluation team to the effect that in its own judgment the quote presents an accurate picture of USAID management of the project.

22. Page 48, 2nd paragraph under "Providing Clear Direction": USAID would not be surprised to learn that from time to time actions have "fallen between the cracks" in

² The allegation in the quotation that the USAID management staff overused project funds for travel needs substantiation and clarification. Travel by the USAID direct hire project officer, the RSSA staff assigned management responsibilities for EPAT, and the AAAS fellow working with the USAID management staff was always in accordance with USAID regulations, and, where appropriate, the regulations of their home agencies. The USAID direct hire project officer traveled very little during the period covered by this evaluation, never with project funding.

USAID/G. USAID doubts that this has happened "numerous" times, and would need creditable evidence before accepting the statement as fact.

23. Page 53, third paragraph. The evaluation team asserts that there is a bias against consulting firms doing research and suggests that a "review of the record would show that when consulting firms have been asked to do research, their product equals or exceeds that of universities". This seems to be nearly impossible to confirm by a review of the record and is well beyond the scope of the evaluation, in any case.

24. Page 54, first partial paragraph. USAID and IMF failed dialogues spawning demagogue military takeover cycles?? Cause and effect?? No extraneous factors?

25. Page 57, 1st paragraph under "B": The assertion that "certain researchers are not allowed to communicate directly with research decision makers ..." is unsubstantiated and, USAID believes, inaccurate. Document.

26. Page 59, last paragraph: After reciting a list of real and imagined shortcomings on the part of the project's implementing organizations, the Checchi evaluation team observes that "rather than working to resolve these problems, the USAID EPAT management team has contributed to them." To which of them did USAID management contribute? Lack of economic talent on the Winrock team? Alleged deficiencies in financial management on the part of MUCIA? The fact that MUCIA has been unable to fill the vacant chief-of-party position? The evaluation team does not say. Explain and document.

27. Page 59, insert 2 bottom. "Because of staffing inadequacies, MUCIA financial management did not exist for a significant period of time. Today, MUCIA still does not know what research its grant is paying for....." This is overly conclusive. This single statement is probably grounds for a law suit.

28. Page 61. "C. Specific Recommendations. [The evaluation team] "has documented that MUCIA's performance has been inadequate". Not to USAID's satisfaction.