



UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
OFFICE OF THE AID REPRESENTATIVE

American Emi  
Islamabad, Pak

ACTIVITY AUTHORIZATION AMENDMENT #1

Name of Country: Afghanistan  
Name of Activity: Education Sector Support  
Project Number: 306-0202

Pursuant to the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Education Sector Support Project was authorized on August 8, 1986 with a life of project funding of not to exceed Eight Million Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$8,900,000) in grant funds. This authorization is being amended to increase the life of project funding by Five Million Four Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$5,400,000) to a new level of not to exceed Fourteen Million Three Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$14,300,000) in grant funds, subject to the availability of funds in accordance with the AID/OYB allotment process, to assist in financing certain foreign exchange and local currency costs for the Project.

All other terms and conditions as provided for the original Activity Authorization, except as hereby amended, shall remain in full force and effect.

  
John H. Miller  
Acting A.I.D. Representative

3/9/88  
Date

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ATBAC FOR AID REP

R.O. 12358: W/A

PAIS: W/A

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: FUNDING AUTHORIZATIONS AND CONTRACT AMENDMENTS

REF: ISLAMABAD 26264

1. AID BUREAU CONCURS IN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE PROJECT AUTHORIZATIONS TO INCREASE LIFE OF PROJECT FUNDING AND PERMIT FY 99 FUNDING AS DESCRIBED IN REF PPL: I.E., INCREASING CEP PROJECT FROM DOLS 24.5 MILLION TO DOLS 39 MILLION AND EDUCATION PROJECT FROM DOLS 9.0 MILLION TO DOLS 14.5 MILLION. WE UNDERSTAND THESE PROJECTS AS WELL AS THE HEALTH PROJECT WILL BE FURTHER AMENDED AS APPROPRIATE IN FY 99 AFTER PROJECT ASSESSMENTS AND REDESIGNS. ASSUME NO FACH EXTENSIONS ARE REQUIRED AT THIS POINT SINCE C BRYNT PACH FOR BOTH EDUCATION AND CEP PROJECTS IS AUGUST 1999. ADVISE IF THIS IS INCORRECT.

2. WE CONCUR IN PRINCIPLE WITH AID/RFP'S USE OF QUOTE NOTWITHSTANDING UNQUOTE AUTHORITY AS BASIS FOR CONTINUATION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS ON A NON-COMPETITIVE BASIS FOR THE HEALTH, EDUCATION, COMMODITIES AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTS. CLEARLY IT WOULD BE DISRUPTIVE TO THE PROGRAM TO ENTER INTO A COMPETITIVE PROCESS TO CARRY OUT WORK WHICH IS IN MID STREAM.

3. IN THE CASE OF THE AYES CONTRACT FOR COMMODITIES, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT EXTENSION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO AN ADDITIONAL SIX MONTHS, GIVEN LACK OF AN AGREED OVERTHEAD RATE AND PROBLEMS WITH ACCOUNTING AND PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH O/AID/RFP BY JIM MURPHY (ARR/PPE). IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT PROGRAM'S DEPENDENCE ON THIS SINGLE CONTRACTOR FOR WIDER RANGE OF PROCUREMENT SERVICES. WE BELIEVE THE MISSION SHOULD SEEK TO PUT IN PLACE A SECOND, ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF SERVICES TO REDUCE THIS DEPENDENCY. WE PLAN TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE DURING REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED VEHICLE MAINTENANCE FACILITY. TERRY MCMAHON IS ALSO PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE FURTHER DURING UPCOMING PPT

JAN 17 1989  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*John*


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TRANSLATION OF PAPER PREPARED BY THE EDUCATIONAL COUNCIL SEVEN PARTY AL  
Urgent Proposals of Education  
Council.

October 23, 198

- 1- Considering promotion of primary education: Since a large number of students finished primary schools, promoting these primary schools inside Afghanistan to middle schools is necessary. Also we need to publish seventh class books within a few months, so that these students could be admitted to middle schools.
- 2- To solve the problem of ununiformity of curriculum in free Afghanistan it is necessary for the children of Mujahids and Refugees to follow the same curriculum in schools in Afghanistan or in those of Afghan commissioners in Pakistan. To achieve this objective, if you please approve the printing of additional books for schools in refugee camps in Peshavar as well as for those in Quetta.
- 3- Utilizing American scholarships for Afghans is very important, because one can at least renew his previous knowledge in one year to take an active part in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Therefore it would be very useful to expand and continue these scholarships.
- 4- Opening of Management Institute which has been approved previously, would be better to be done quickly.
- 5- As shortage of teachers in a free Afghanistan is a great problem. Therefore establishing teacher training courses would help to solve this problem.
- 6- Since a big number of Afghan teenagers actively participated in the Holy Jihad, or because of the lack of schools in their areas could not study, and now their age is not suitable for joining an ordinary school. They will be deprived from furthering their education, to alleviate this problem it is necessary to establish equivalency courses so they would be able to bring up their level and continue their study in ordinary schools.
- 7- As literacy courses in Afghan refugee camps in Peshavar have brought us good results, therefore the establishment of such courses inside Afghanistan will be fruitful.
- 8- Starting vocational courses for the handicapped, who are deprived from education, would help a great number of people to take themselves out of the situation where they have been a burden on others in their societies.



Source: UNO, Peshawar, 9/29/88

## Social Soundness Analysis

### 1. Social-Political Context

Establishing an educational program to operate inside Afghanistan from Pakistan has created a number of difficulties. Since United States citizens are not allowed in Afghanistan, usual standards of accountability and oversight are impossible. This has meant that special mechanisms have had to be developed to identify or initiate schools inside of Afghanistan. Problems of security are especially acute, and political arrangements must be carefully made so that the schools and their personnel are as safe as possible. Security issues were a concern in the first years of the project as some schools were bombed or shelled.

#### a. The Alliance

The war of liberation in Afghanistan has been going on for ten years now and may be nearing an end. The freedom fighters, called Mujahideen, are organized into seven resistance parties, called Tanzims, that are allied into a seven party alliance, called the Islamic Unity of the Afghan Mujahideen. The parties in the Alliance conduct the guerrilla war inside of Afghanistan, each party having from 10 to 50 thousand fighters. The seven parties vary in structure and organization, some being well organized and disciplined while others are not much more than a loose group of independent commanders.

Overtime, the parties have moved into non-military concerns, such as health and education, as they realize that the population in the liberated areas of Afghanistan and in the refugee camps of Pakistan must also be taken care of. Each of the parties operate a number of schools and hospitals or clinics inside Afghanistan, many with the help of AID, or other international assistance entities, largely PVOs.

The seven parties in the Alliance operate independently on most issues, but some cooperation is occurring. Each has its own schools for instance, but they cooperate on overall education strategy.

The Seven Party Alliance is a quasi-governmental organization and to some degree can be said to represent Afghans who opposed the Marxist government in Kabul and the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan. As such, the Alliance offers an organization through which humanitarian assistance can be channelled to most of the liberated areas of Afghanistan. The ESSP has and will continue to channel aid through the Seven Party Alliance.

Working through the Alliance, however, has its drawbacks. For one the various parties within the Alliance often fail to cooperate in meaningful ways. The leaders of the seven parties come from different ideological and religious backgrounds making cooperation at times difficult. In addition, the leaders of the seven parties were not leaders in Afghanistan before the war and, therefore, are not trusted or respected by all Afghans. The authority of the leaders of the Alliance is not based on the traditional Afghan political structure which rests on tribal or territorial power. Their authority is based rather on their ability to control resources that the international community channels to the Afghan cause through Pakistan. Since their headquarters is in Peshawar, while the war is conducted inside Afghanistan, many Afghans do not feel they have been a part of the real fighting.

The Alliance also does not represent people from all segments of Afghan society. The leaders of the seven parties, save one, are primarily from the area of Afghanistan that is near the Pakistan border. Therefore, people from the center, North and West of Afghanistan are under-represented. In addition, the leaders of the Alliance are all Sunni Moslems and, as a result, the estimated ten percent of the population of Afghanistan who follow the Shi'iah branch of Islam are not represented.

b. Regional Councils

Other power bases are evolving in Afghanistan as the war progresses. Regional councils, or Shuras, of commanders or traditional elders are emerging in some areas of Afghanistan. While these councils maintain minimal allegiance to the Alliance in Peshawar, they have increasingly staked out independent positions. These councils are acting as regional governments in their areas and are assuming more governmental roles. Councils exist in the north of Afghanistan, around Herat and in Kandahar, as well as a growing number of areas in other parts of Afghanistan. These councils can be used to channel humanitarian aid into Afghanistan, since they can sometimes better arrange for cooperation and security in their region than can the Alliance in Peshawar.

Working through these councils, however, also has disadvantages. Since they exist in Afghanistan they are hard to contact and to work with. Since they do not exist in all areas of Afghanistan, working with the councils is not an effective means of getting humanitarian aid to all parts of Afghanistan. Also, by working with the councils as opposed to the Alliance, the aid effort could encourage the regionalization of Afghanistan when efforts should be made to strengthen nation-building.

c. Individual Commanders

The third option for delivering humanitarian aid to Afghanistan is to work through individual commanders. Commanders are leaders who control a group of freedom fighters that can number from 10 to 50 thousand. They work closely with the civilian population in many areas, and organize schools and health clinics for the population in the areas they control. Most commanders also have connections with Alliance parties in Peshawar, but that connection varies from strong to virtually nonexistent.

By channelling humanitarian aid through individual commanders, some relief organizations feel they can exercise better control. By selecting only commanders thought to be trustworthy, relief organizations believe that they have a better chance of actually getting the aid to where it should go and have better accountability.

Working with individual commanders also has many of the disadvantages of working with the councils. For one, it does not encourage nation-building and could lead to a country composed of small fiefdoms. And by selecting just those commanders found to be honest according to Western criteria, aid is not distributed evenly or fairly in Afghanistan. The delivery success of the PVOs who choose to work with individual commanders is not demonstrably better and is certainly less extensive than those who work through the Alliance in terms of humanitarian resources actually delivered into Afghanistan.

2. Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries of the amended ESSP will be the village children of Afghanistan and those refugees who will soon return to Afghanistan.

a. Rural Primary Education

The major thrust of this component is continued support of the rural primary school program started in 1985. The direct beneficiaries will be the primary-aged children, 7-12, in rural Afghanistan. Indirectly all of Afghanistan will be aided.

Government-supported education in Afghanistan is relatively new. By the time of the war in 1978, only a small percentage of the rural boys and virtually none of the rural girls attended schools. The country had a literacy rate of around 10%, and was primarily confined to the cities. This situation has become worse since the war.

Education in the rural areas has been traditionally left to the village Mullah, or Islamic priest, and was confined to teaching the village children to chant parts of the Quran, the Islamic holy book. In rural Afghanistan, as in much of the third world, children are needed at an early age to help in the economic subsistence of the village. Little girls take care of the younger children, even at a young age, and both boys and girls are used in the fields or as shepherds. Village schools usually only offered classes to grade three, since children at that age were still too small to work. Beyond grade three, the drop out rate increased dramatically.

#### b. Adult Literacy and Manpower

The beneficiaries of the adult literacy and the manpower development components will be those Afghans who have lost the opportunity for education because of the war. These men and women have either been in refugee camps where education was not possible or have been fighting the war and thus unable to attend school. As the war winds down, these adults will want to participate in the reconstruction of the country and for this they will need to be given basic tools.

Adult education usually has not been successful in the past in Afghanistan, primarily because adult Afghans must work to survive and thus have little time for education. Also, historically in Afghanistan, basic skills, even literacy, was handed down from parents to children. The idea of going to a school to learn basic skills was foreign to the Afghans.

The usual way of doing things, however, may no longer be relevant. Many Afghans have not had the chance to acquire basic skills because of the disruptions of the war. While literacy among the children in the refugee camps is higher than before the war in Afghanistan, literacy among the adults is lower. The popularity of the Jihad literacy courses argue that there is a demand for adult literacy.

#### 3. Women in Afghan Education

There is no greater difference between Western society and Afghan society than the role of women. The Afghan view of the role of women is rooted not only in their own customs and heritage, but in the teachings of Islam as well. Yet the role of women varies greatly in different countries in the Islamic world, from one of almost complete freedom and equality, as in the upper class of Turkey or Syria, to that of virtually complete isolation as in Afghanistan or Yemen. In general, however, in almost all of the Islamic world the revival of conservative religious sentiment has meant that women have had to return to more conservative roles after many decades of progress. The education of women has suffered because of this.

In Afghanistan, women have only recently been included in the educational process. Traditionally, education was only thought to be appropriate for boys, since women were expected to be wives and mothers when they became adults, roles for which education was not thought to be necessary. In addition, many of Afghan codes that dictate proper behavior come from the conditions found in tribal societies. Tribal social structure is a particular form of social organization found primarily among peoples who are or have been nomadic. Not all ethnic groups have a tribal social structure. However, the Pushtuns, who have dominated Afghan society to the present, are organized into tribes, although the strength of tribal custom varies greatly from the Gilzai and other eastern tribal confederations which have a very strong tribal structure, to the Durrani Pushtun in the Kandahar area who are less organized on tribal lines.

In tribal society women are viewed as a valuable commodity. Marriages are arrangements between subtribes or clans for the purpose of settling disputes or the making of alliances between neighbors. The value of the women in this exchange is directly related to their virtue or purity. Women are not to be seen by strangers, and tribal codes generally proscribes that if a woman is found to have violated codes of purity, specifically virginity or marital fidelity, they are often killed, for their value to the tribe has been greatly diminished.

Education in this context is difficult. Convincing families to send their girls to schools violates norms of seclusion, even if the teachers are female. In addition, families generally fear that education of women may lead to other unwanted developments, such as westernization.

According to a World Bank study, by 1977 only 8.6 percent of girls between the ages 7 to 12 attended primary schools, while 51.2 percent of the boys of the same age attended school. Three percent of the girls attended middle school and only 1.4 percent of the girls of high school age were able to attend secondary school. These figures are among the lowest in any Moslem country. Nonetheless, until about the age of 12, girls attended primary schools with boys, and there were a limited number of female high schools, primarily in Kabul. Kabul University was co-educational. The veil (chador) as a measure of seclusion, was not common among all Afghans. For instance, it was not usually worn by tribal women and often not worn by village women. It was deliberately shed among elite women with the support of the progressive Mullahs. Prior to the 1978 extreme Marxist positions on women's rights, there was a gradual, but non-forced, progression away from seclusion and towards more equality.

Despite Marxist ideology regarding the equality of women, the Soviet invasion and the subsequent war of liberation made the already difficult situation even worse for women's education in the rural areas. While little is known about the situation in the cities, there is now virtually no education left in the countryside for boys or girls, except that which has been started by individual commanders or by cross-border efforts from Pakistan. Of these, most, if not all, do not include women.

The war has also increased the sensitivity of the Afghan people to women's education. Since compulsory education of women was an early agenda of the Marxist regime, many religious leaders of the resistance associate women's education with the Marxist government and are therefore strongly against it. In addition, the war in Afghanistan has led to the emergence of people with religious backgrounds in positions of leadership in the resistance, both inside and outside of Afghanistan. Thus, Afghan attitudes towards women's roles have become even more conservative.

Yet, despite a very conservative atmosphere, there have been some successful attempts at including Afghan women in education among the refugees. In the camp schools started by the Government of Pakistan, there are seventy-three girls primary schools and three middle schools. In addition, there is a high school for Afghan girls in Peshawar and several private schools that Afghan women attend.

PVOs working in the camps have been able to incorporate women into some of their activities. Although efforts to educate females in the camps often face stiff initial opposition from religious leaders, it often can be achieved if handled in a tactful and sensitive manner. Clearly, there are many women who would like to attend school and many families who would allow their girls to attend, but who fear the possible reprisal from the conservative political leaders who now dominate the Afghan scene.

Given the transitional character of the present educational project and the difficulty of cross-border monitoring, it would be difficult to attempt to include women in the rural primary education component, except in situations in which requests are made from inside Afghanistan for support of already existing schools. Some of the commanders are sympathetic to women and girls in the educational system.

So far, no request for female schools have been made to the ESSP and none are expected from the more traditional Islamic leaders. It is, however, anticipated that when Afghanistan is liberated the role of women in education will increase among more pragmatic and less ideological leaders. In the resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan the role of the women will be important and women must be included in educational planning at that time.

On the other hand, it is feasible to include women in educational projects in Peshawar and the manpower development program will include women. Clearly women will be critically important to the successful resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The redesign team has met with Afghan women leaders now in exile in Peshawar. They clearly expect to play a significant role in the future of Afghanistan and would like to participate in manpower training. The manpower development program will, therefore, include training for Afghan women.

#### 4. Education and Refugee Repatriation

The resettlement of the refugees back into Afghanistan is a large task fraught with many problems. While a number of agencies, led by the UNHCR, are preparing for the refugees' return, there remains several important questions:

-How many of the refugees will go back and how many will stay? Evidence from other refugee situations indicates that most usually do not go back unless conditions in the country of return are right. In almost all other refugee situations some fraction of the refugee population does not return even if all conditions are met.

-When will the refugees return? Their return will depend on the political situation in Afghanistan, security, the crop seasons, the rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure, and the whims of the political leadership.

-Where will they go? Since a large segment of the refugees have been out of Afghanistan for nearly ten years, there are some indications that many of the refugees will not return to their valleys and villages in Afghanistan, but rather to the major cities, primarily Kabul. This will put increased strain on the resources in those cities.

In this situation, planning an educational program that will aid in the repatriation process is difficult. The first needs of the returning refugees will be for food and shelter and then to the reconstruction of their economic subsistence. However, very soon after they return, there will be a need to establish schools. The experience in the camps has shown that the Afghans are very

interested in education and schools have been made readily available in the refugee camps. The refugees have come to expect schooling for their children. When these refugees return, they will expect schools inside Afghanistan as well.

Clearly, the goal should be to have schools in the areas to which the refugees will return. Yet, the method used to date to assist ESSP-supported schools in Afghanistan has not taken refugee return into account. The schools operated by the ECA have been placed in areas inside of Afghanistan where they can safely operate. Secure zones are areas inside Afghanistan where by definition there is little fighting and an area where there is a stable population. These areas are not the areas from which the refugees came, since refugees usually fled because of fighting in their area.

Table 3 in Section II, Background, shows the distribution of refugees by the province from which they came and the number of schools in each of those provinces. The provinces with the most schools are not necessarily the provinces with the most refugees. There are, for instance, 102 schools in Wardak Province, yet there are only 9,000 refugees from that province now in Pakistan. In Kandahar, the province from which the most refugees fled, there are 78 schools, and even these schools may not be in the areas to which the refugees will return. While it is to be expected that the AID-supported schools have not always been placed in areas where large numbers of refugees will return, this should be a priority in the future placement of schools. Even though this AAM places a limit on the amount of schools receiving full support (i.e., including teachers' salaries) at approximately 1,000, below the 1,610 that the ECA has given initial support, there will still be room to add new schools as schools thought to exist are not verified or as other schools drop-out. As these decisions are made, putting schools in the areas in which the refugees are going will be given a priority.