

PN ARF 362

Conference on Title IX Implications of CORDS and  
USAID Programs and Operations in Vietnam

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## INTRODUCTION

A conference was convened in Saigon on 19 - 22 April 1971 to analyze the participation emphasis in selected rural development programs in Vietnam to see what can be learned from this experience for application to development assistance elsewhere. Participants included Mission officers directly responsible for programming and implementing those activities and AID/Washington officers responsible for programming world-wide assistance activities supported by the Agency for International Development.

The conference focused on programs eliciting maximum popular participation in the development process and specifically examined the degree, the type and the duration of participation. Papers were presented on strengthening local government, on community development and people's groups, and on land reform, farmers' organizations and rural credit. To facilitate discussion, the presentations were grouped, and programs concerning local government, self-development and rural development were analyzed separately by ad hoc committees which subsequently presented their findings to the conference. A fourth committee considered the overall process of development and the criteria it would be necessary to apply in order to achieve effective application of lessons learned in Vietnam to development programs elsewhere.

It was not possible in the space of four days to sufficiently examine many of the major issues to achieve unanimity of opinion, or even broad consensus, among the conferees. Complicating the problem of objective analysis were the vast differences in social, political and economic conditions not only among the various regions of South Vietnam, but even among various groups within a single region. Additionally, different groups of Americans working in the program areas under consideration often had significantly differing points of view.

There were some further complications in arriving at a consensus on transferability of Vietnam programs to other areas. Policy requirements dictated by the direct participation of the U.S. in the war as a combatant led to the establishment of unique funding levels and a massive staff who intervened at practically every level of host country policy formulation and program implementation. Several conferees felt that the unlikely possibility of repeating these levels of funding and personnel staffing made it almost inconceivable to attempt to introduce these programs into other countries. Some of the conferees did not see anything particularly new or different about the technical aspects of the programs presented to the conference and tended to view the overriding concern with political impact as their only distinguishing characteristic. Typical of the lack of consensus among the conferees was the expression of opinion of one group that the political aspects of development are an unavoidable area of concern, while another group held that the explicit political nature of the Vietnam programs per se renders them non-transferable.

It should be recognized that the programs considered by the conference were

necessarily but a small sampling of the CORDS and USAID programs and operations in Vietnam. Moreover, the limitations of time made objective analysis more complicated. For example, the presentations in the various program areas focused on the period since the beginning of 1968, although several of the programs were initiated or had direct antecedents in previous years. Since questions about the military situation, constitutional and political processes and long-term economic policies were beyond the scope of the conference, it was difficult to systematically establish what is so significantly different at present that indicates certain programs which have failed in whole or in part to produce useful results in the past can now be considered to be attaining program objectives.

The conferees were impressed by the Mission's comprehensive approach to pacification and development, but the sheer dimensions and scope of this comprehensiveness made the task of evaluating transferability of Title IX aspects of individual programs particularly intricate. Fundamental considerations beyond the scope of the conference, such as the apparent improvement in the military situation, clearly have had an impact on the social, political and economic environment in South Vietnam in diffuse and not easily distinguishable ways that complicate singling out individual programs and discerning their individual impact and relative success or failure. In the absence of broad consensus on most of the central issues addressed by the conference, this report is limited to delineating the various programs presented and the subsequent discussions of them.

### LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The two presentations on local government improvement asserted that the fundamental actions that had the most far-reaching effect in strengthening local government in South Vietnam involve the election of village and hamlet governments and province councils; the extension of greater power and authority to villages; improved hamlet, village and province administration; and the encouragement of local social, political and economic development activities. Specific actions by the Vietnamese government which were encouraged and supported by the USAID and MACV/CORDS include the following:

- a. The institution of village and hamlet elections.
- b. The implementation of a comprehensive training program for local officials.
- c. The initiation of an Accelerated Pacification Campaign which extended village/hamlet government to hitherto insecure and uncommitted areas.
- d. The increase of village revenues and the broadening of village taxation authority.
- e. The reorganization and reinforcement of the village administrative staff to provide more efficient local administrative services.
- f. The institution of province and village development programs with funds channelled directly to these levels for local development projects.
- g. The election of province councils.

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- h. The initiation of nation-wide planning based on identification of local development priorities.
  - i. The creation of new autonomous cities which can provide the governmental framework for coping with the massive problems generated by urbanization.
  - j. The granting of authority to Village Chiefs over local security forces.
  - k. The establishment of Province Mobile Assistance Teams that provide on-the-spot instruction and guidance to village and hamlet administrators.

Two fundamental assumptions underlie the strategy of reinforcing local government. The first is that certain necessary functions are either badly done or not done at all when essential decision-making takes place at levels higher than the locality most directly concerned. The second is the recognition of a social focus and traditional organization at the village level which, given the proper stimulation, could mobilize favorable public opinion towards the government and resistance to the Communist insurgents. The stimulation in this case was decentralization of decision-making authority in matters vital to the village interest. Repeated confrontations occurred during the conference between participants who advocated the position that existing programs to strengthen local government were in fact bringing about real decentralization of authority and those who were skeptical about how meaningful any decentralization to date may have been. <sup>2</sup>

The primary goal of strengthening local government is not as easy to define as would appear at first glance. Two schools of thoughts existed both among the Mission representatives and among the participants from AID/Washington. One group held that the requirements of local security were incompatible with attaining meaningful popular participation, since central direction and coordination of local activities is necessary to assure that momentum in pacification programs can be maintained throughout the country. The opposing view was that motivation of the rural masses is essential to the pacification process and that only through meaningful popular participation in decisions that intimately affect the lives of local inhabitants can mass motivation be achieved. <sup>3</sup>

There was general agreement, however, that consensus-building in the bureaucracy at province level and higher is absolutely essential to any strategy of decentralization. The perception of a real security threat has had a catalytic effect on the entire system. The Tet offensive of 1968, which brought Communist forces into practically every major urban area, was the stimulus for the decision to arm the people. Other landmark decisions about decentralization of control, especially about operational concerns which are of particular immediacy at the village level, were made in the aftermath of the Tet offensive. The necessity of countering the Communist strategy to capture the allegiance of the people provided the leverage for steps by the government to increase opportunities for popular participation in governmental decisions.

The hypothesis is that popular participation in identifying local needs and in specifying local priorities is meaningful to rural citizens. Hence, the response by local government to the felt and expressed needs of local citizens should have a measurable political pay-off either in terms of

non-cooperation with the Communists or in willingness to participate in government-sponsored activities which have objectives that are not strictly local in scope. One example cited was the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF), an activity where participation has certain compulsory aspects. Where previous civilian militia programs foundered, PSDF has apparently flourished. The significant difference seems to be that previous militias were tied closely to a higher chain-of-command, while the PSDF is under strictly local command. The delegation of operational control of local security forces to village chiefs who are dependent upon a voting constituency for re-election seems to have produced a significant mutuality of interest between local officials and local citizens in providing for the common defense. However, the spill-over from this area where mutuality of interest in popular participation is clearly defined to areas less well-defined, such as the political linkage between village council and province council in lobbying for specific decisions by the province chief, has yet to be proven.

Another purpose of strengthening local government is the recognition that failure to respond to rising expectations could be politically dangerous and in fact could be turned to the advantage of the Communists. Stimulating popular participation in the articulation of local aspirations must be closely geared to government capacity to respond. This relationship suggests guidelines for relative emphasis between strengthening local government and its capacity for voicing the will of the people and the reinforcement of central government institutions to provide the required services. <sup>4</sup>

The means for accomplishing the above purposes had less to do with massive AID funding for projects than it did with steady and continuous persuasion of key GVN decision-makers of the necessity of certain courses of action. Although the field advisory staff who spent at least some of their time on local government improvement was fairly massive, there were never very many Americans involved at the key points of contact. <sup>5</sup>

The autonomy of local government and its ability to render decisions reflecting local aspirations is directly proportional to its capacity to raise local revenues to carry out those decisions. Only with the achievement of self sufficiency can local government be truly independent; only if the people participate in the financing of their local government institutions can they expect those institutions to be truly responsive to their needs. Hence, while the initial inputs may be central government revenues or foreign assistance funds, the proof of the pudding is in the raising of local revenues. <sup>6</sup>

#### LOCAL SELF-DEVELOPMENT

The two presentations on local self-development indicated that the goal of community development and people's organizations is to weld the disparate elements of a village into a community capable of effective self-defense, effective self-government and effective self-development through concerted community action. It was noted at the outset that the group of programs in this area were conceived of, and implemented, in an integrated, interrelated fashion. Thus, a significant change in the combination of factors having an

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effect on one program would in all likelihood impact on the others. In concept, a successful defense of a hamlet by the People's Self-Defense Force would probably inspire greater confidence in the members of a People's Common Activity Group engaged in building a bridge that they, too, would be able to attain their objectives.

The individual local self-development programs are tailored for specific purposes. The Village Self-Development program is designed to stimulate group participation as a cooperative unit on projects of mutual interest to members of People's Common Activity Groups (PCAGs). PCAGs are funded through the elected Village Council, so a natural constituency relationship is formed based on what amounts to political patronage. Since the village council also has the responsibility for establishing the village budget and setting its goals and objectives, Village Self-Development funds do double duty, first as resources for specific project implementation in response to articulated popular aspirations, and secondly as seed money to establish the precedent of using the village budget to perform necessary local services.

Fundamental to the local self-development programs presented to the conference is the notion that certain overriding mutual interests such as public safety or commercial enterprise cut across family lines. By providing resources and a framework for organization for mutual benefit, the various programs induce family members to involve themselves in the wider community.

Several of the conferees voiced serious reservations about whether extra-familial activity could actually be induced for a sustained period of time in a society based so strongly on the extended family. They noted that the insecurities of war were disincentives for cooperation beyond the family and that most surveys of such community groups as PCAGs and PSDF units indicated that the extended family was still the basis of organization of these groups. The response of the proponents of the programs was that even though the foundation for organization might be the extended family, once the family members engaged in a public activity, the benefits accrued to a wider portion of the community than just the family. They were aware of the implications of community in their joining such a group, and while it may appear to be barely nascent social progress, it represents for Vietnam a significant step towards social change.<sup>7</sup>

While the primary means of stimulating popular participation in these programs is the availability of resources, secondary reinforcement comes from achieving successes. The surveys of villages where PCAGs have been operative for the past three years indicate that each succeeding year sees a larger number of participants who voluntarily contribute larger quantities of resources to achieve their objectives.

The inputs for most of the community development programs have been relatively massive since the government started out with the immediate goal of

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effecting the programs in each village and hamlet in the country. Since the GVN national budget is already overcommitted, foreign assistance funding is critical to success. Plans currently call for a gradually increasing village contribution until the self-development programs are also self-financing.

There was a thread of incredulity running through the period of the conference that any mass organization decreed by the government could really attract voluntary participation in the true sense. There was doubt that program incentives were actually eliciting group responses; instead it was postulated that pre-existing groups adopt program resources without exhibiting any lasting changes in social behavior or outlook. Fueling the controversy was speculation among the conferees that there may be significant differences in intent between the U.S. program officers and their Vietnamese counterparts involved with these programs.<sup>9</sup>

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Even in areas of Vietnam where participation in self-development programs appears to have been most active, it is extremely difficult to single out which factors were most important. Was it military operations that created an umbrella for progress? Was it particularly effective community leadership? All that seems certain is that there is a proliferation of community-wide activities in a significant number of rural villages which only recently were insecure.<sup>10</sup> However, qualitative evaluation, as opposed to quantification, is much more difficult: opinions among the conferees about the type and degree of participation varied so widely that it would appear too early to make any prediction about the probability of program continuation without massive U.S. support.

### RURAL DEVELOPMENT

The three rural development programs presented to the conference are comprehensive in scope, but, with the exception of the Land-To-The-Tiller program, are being implemented in a strictly tentative fashion. The overall goal of these programs is to make every farmer the owner of his land, to give him access to reasonable credit and to offer him purchasing and marketing mechanisms that will both protect his tenure on the land and furnish him the opportunity for financial success.

It seems at this point that the Land-To-The-Tiller program to deliver title for the land he farms to every tenant farmer in South Vietnam stands a fair chance of success. Modestly trained village land cadres are now on station in the large majority of villages; village land adjudication committees are set up and in some cases functioning; quite a large number of applications for title have been received from tenants and are being processed and even landlord declarations of holdings available for redistribution under the law apparently are being processed at a reasonable rate to assure that the ultimate objective of complete redistribution within three years from the program's inception may be met.

The picture is not nearly so positive in the areas of rural credit and farmers' organizations. Although the Agricultural Development Bank has increased its assets enormously over the past few years, and although government-subsidized private rural banks are being opened at an accelerating rate, institutional credit still accounts for only a small fraction of the estimated rural credit market. This indicates that even if the farmer is relieved of paying rents, he is still trapped by usurious credit rates. This difficulty is compounded by the lack of any really substantial farmers' organization which is well-enough organized and packs enough political clout to protect the small farmer. While progress is being made towards expanding the availability of effective farmers' associations, cooperatives and unions, there appears to be significant reluctance on the part of the GVN to permit farmers' organizations to progress to the point where they are politically meaningful.

Cooperatives, moreover, under President Diem were an organizational vehicle for larger farmers, loyal to the government, and not at all geared to the needs of small farmers, tenants and recently ex-tenants. Since the objective of Land-To-The-Tiller is to break up the larger holdings and leave only small farmers and ex-tenants on the land, there is some question about whether resurrecting cooperatives is feasible on a large scale, given the low repute in which they are held by the target group.

A point was made during the conference that no land reform program was ever successful that did not include the establishment of farmers' organizations powerful enough to assure the farmer protection. Yet even the Tenant Farmers' Unions, which have begun to play an active role in the Land-To-The-Tiller program, have not been able to achieve more than a fragmented constituency. Hence, institutional credit and effective farmers' organizations remain significant areas of concern in the accomplishment of over-all rural development goals. If these problems can be addressed successfully, it would appear that there is a reasonable chance for the landless peasants who work much of the land of South Vietnam to become small proprietors with a stake in developing stability in the rural areas.

The sheer scale of the change in land tenure patterns the Land-To-The-Tiller program will bring about makes forecasts of ultimate political impact and reactions to the program so much speculation. For the present, most of the large landlords have been gone from their holdings for some years, and the delivery of title to the tenant farmer is merely recognizing the status quo. For the future, when the intricate system of rural usury and economic controls now in force is finally broken, if in fact it ever is, very substantial political changes may well be in store. It was postulated that President Thieu is gambling that his pitch to the tenant farmer will ultimately free him from dependence on the military and the other urban-oriented, elitist, conspiratorial political groups who have long controlled Vietnamese politics. Although present evidence is far too flimsy on which to base hope, a shift away from these groups towards the essentially conservative small farmer may represent a good bet for political stabilization.

## OVERVIEW

The fourth ad hoc committee addressed itself to issues that cut across program lines, both from the standpoint of Vietnam programs and from the perspective of overall development objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the other areas of the world where we are providing development assistance. After lengthy discussion of issues raised during the conference, this committee attempted to formulate certain criteria for transferability that would be useful in determining how much of the Vietnam experience would be applicable elsewhere, and which lessons, both positive and negative, could be drawn from the Vietnam experience that might suggest solutions to problems encountered in other countries.

There was no less controversy among the members of the fourth ad hoc committee than there was among the conferees at large. It was possible, however, working with a smaller group, to get a more thorough airing of opinions and points of view, and as a result something close to a consensus was achieved on certain key points.

The first area of agreement was the need for qualitative research. The process of participation does not lend itself to measuring techniques we now use. Nor has the type or degree of participation been a subject of explicit concern in our program analyses. Measuring techniques for assessing the meaning of varying kinds of participation in value systems different from our own must be developed and applied. We must be able to answer such questions as: Just what interests the target group? What is meaningful to them and their society? What natural groups exist in this society? How is this society changing? How will the changes we contemplate affect present and future participation? Will an appeal to acquisitive instincts or emphasis on material incentives stimulate or suppress attitudinal and motivational change?

Time frame was another issue which committee members agreed to be a central consideration in any development process or program. It was agreed that policy pressures often impose time frames which not only are unrealistic in terms of local Vietnam custom, but which may commit the U.S. to a course of action that may be counterproductive to our interests by producing failure and frustration.<sup>11</sup>

Another central consideration was the notion of absorptive capacity of a given system. Overloading an indigenous system will only establish the efficacy of U.S. inputs and tell nothing about the state of the target system or its rate of change. Overwhelming indigenous capacities is related to the problem of time frame, in that in our impatience to get things done we tend to push too far, too fast.<sup>12</sup>

Social organization and realistic appraisal of the possibilities of social change were also considered fundamental to the effective design of development programs. Questions such as which social unit forms the basis for natural organizations in a given culture and whether or not it is possible to alter that unit (or whether in fact such alteration would be desirable) appear to need answers of far greater sophistication than those on which we currently base program estimates and projections.<sup>13</sup>

The problems of leadership for program implementation at all levels were considered crucial. Social action programs whose success or failure is determined by the quality and motivation of indigenous leadership are too often embarked upon without due thought to the motivations and concerns of the indigenous program managers. This raises the important question of whether we rush a program into existence before the host government's officials have arrived at a positive conclusion that the program is needed or worthwhile.

A related leadership issue is the institutionalization of military leadership in non-military roles when participatory programs are pursued simultaneously with military actions, and whether such institutionalization creates an anti-democratic, anti-participatory bias in the host government. It was recognized that in a national emergency the military is necessarily a key element in preserving the national identity, but the long-term effects (of maintaining a military establishment in political power) on democratic institutions and popular participation in the development process have not been fully studied.<sup>14</sup>

#### CRITERIA FOR TRANSFERABILITY

The general caveat of the committee's recommendations of criteria for determining the transferability of Vietnam programs to other countries was the dual necessity of identifying the nature and the systems of values of the society to which a program will be adapted, and for suppressing as far as possible American cultural biases in making such an assessment.

Within the limitations of that warning, the following specific criteria for assessing potential transferability of the programs presented to the conference were recommended by the committee:

- Make a realistic determination of what the host government can be reasonably expected to achieve at the conclusion of the program; services initiated and supported by foreign assistance can create levels of expectation that the host government of its own cannot satisfy.

- Keep American program inputs to the bare minimum required to overcome inertia and maintain momentum; more meaningful participation may evolve if the U.S. does less rather than more.

- Adjust program time frames to assure maximum effect from U.S. inputs; such adjustment requires both a rational evaluation of the management potential of the host government and a realistic appraisal of the magnitude of social change involved.

- Maintain analysis of political repercussions of program execution; the manner in which programs are carried out at the local level may produce political impact that deviates in important respects from program objectives, especially where the host government attempts to use foreign assistance resources to bleed or to suppress dissent or otherwise avoid accommodation to natural political groups and forces.

In situations where the host government faces a security threat, careful study must be given to the manner in which development assistance is administered; the process of reestablishing security may result in the perpetuation of a military government that is biased against the establishment of democratic institutions and the encouragement of popular participation in the development process.

An overall evaluation of development objectives must be made prior to the introduction of a program; attempts to balance the effects of modernization must take into account the necessity both for encouraging the development process and for protecting popular participation, since the process of modernization tends to favor a small upper and middle class at the expense of the technologically unsophisticated.

An important aspect of initiating any new program is consensus-building in the bureaucracy for program objectives; Title IX-related programs should attempt to increase the level of responsiveness of government officials to the will of the people.

NOTES

1. List of Participants

Mr. John R. Mossler, Mission Director  
 Mr. George D. Jacobson, ACofS, CORDS

[Attended introductory session only].

Princeton Lyman, Chairman, AID/W  
 MacDonald Salter, AID/W  
 Jerome French, AID/W  
 Ray Urquart, AID/W  
 Gloria Gaston, AID/W  
 Bruce Patchen, AID/W  
 Robert Ayling, AID/W  
 Albert Swing, AID/Thailand

[Primary Washington participants].

Norman Sweet, CORDS/PP&P  
 Dr. Thomas Thorsen, USAID/ADLD/PA  
 Tom Chapman, CORDS/DD/PA MR3  
 Robert Craig, CORDS/NLD MR4  
 Kenneth Quinn, CORDS/CDD  
 Steven Young, EMB/ECON.  
 Richard Hough, USAID/ADLR  
 Jewett Burr, USAID/ADLR

[Primary Mission participants].

Aubrey Elliot, CORDS/CDD  
 Will Muller, USAID/ADLR  
 Gerald Hickey, RAND Corporation  
 Roger Darling, AID/Office of Rural Development  
 Dr. Dennis Rondinelli, CORDS/CDD  
 Gene Schroeper, USAID/ADFA/SUP  
 Ray Fitzgerald, USAID/ADFA/SUP  
 Ben Ferguson, Special Assistant, ACofS, CORDS  
 Robert Pace, EMB/POL  
 Capt. Richard W. Haynes, MACV/DCS/Economic Affairs  
 Richard Parkinson, CORDS/CDD  
 Gerald Ungar, Mission Rapporteur  
 James Teague, CORDS  
 William Sommers, USAID/ADPA  
 Richard Ehrlich, AID/W Rapporteur

[Conference attendees].

2. The substance of the argument of those participants who expressed skepticism about whether meaningful decentralization of decision-making authority has taken place, or indeed can take place, centers on the elitist resistance by the civil bureaucracy and the military officer corps to any meaningful devolution of their monopoly of power. Local leadership at the village and hamlet level differs radically in their concepts of value systems and their social, cultural and political orientation from the small class of

educated urban elite from which civil bureaucrats and military officers are exclusively drawn. Certain conferees expressed serious reservation about whether an elite class could be persuaded of the political inevitability of the rise to power of the majority culture represented by the village and hamlet leaders. This was cited as the primary reason for GVN opposition to holding Province Chief elections, since popularly elected Province Chiefs would undoubtedly be more representative of those who elect them than of those who now appoint military Province Chiefs.

3. The argument about mass motivation did not make much of an impression on those conferees whose focus was the technical aspects of program implementation. The technical position essentially was that first priority must be given to strengthening the institutions of central government in order that they may be able to respond to the additional requirements that more autonomous local governments will necessarily generate. Mass motivation, according to this view, is less important than tangible results.

4. The argument over which must come first, popular demands or capacity to respond, was never really resolved. Only the consensus that raising adequate local revenues could be a solution to the problem stilled the argument.

5. There was divergent opinion about the importance of start-up funds for training and other projects. It was generally conceded, however, that the host government could "make do" with available assets for almost every local government improvement project, if only the appropriate officials were properly motivated.

6. The raising of adequate local revenues to satisfy the highest priority local requirements was viewed as the ultimate solution to the problem of overly-paternalistic central government. One problem left unanswered was the question of how to set national development goals and raise the necessary revenues if the localities hoard the resources.

7. Dr. Hickey contested whether radical social change could ever be brought about in a traditional society such as Vietnam's. He was challenged by a conferee who cited the urbanization phenomenon and its effect on family structures. It was observed that under the pressures of war new relationships were being formed outside the family which seemed to function as effective social mechanisms.

8. There was a continuing debate over whether "give-away" programs were of any lasting utility. The Mission representatives were generally of the opinion that some pump-priming was required in Vietnam if only to off-set some of the negative experiences the villagers had suffered. Overcoming residual suspicion between the people and government officials was one of the initial objectives of the program, and it was only with the attainment of increased confidence through positive reinforcement that the nature of the program could be shifted from its focus on bricks-and-mortar projects to the process of organization, cooperation, planning and community spirit.

9. It was suggested that one of the government's covert intentions was to bleed support from the existing socio-political groupings which currently have some measure of support in the countryside. In response, Dr. Rondinelli noted that PCAGs, PSDF activities, Coops and other people's groups seemed to thrive best in those areas where those socio-political groups are most established. It would appear that through the promotion of government-sponsored organizations and the resources that become available through them, these groups enhance their own image and position.
10. Also mentioned as examples of the types of participation elicited by these programs were misappropriation of funds and other cases of malfeasance. It was argued that detecting public mismanagement and learning how to vote undesirable incumbents out of office could be considered political pay-offs of the community development programs, not to mention the positive management experience gained by the local authorities in the vast majority of communities where the programs are run correctly.
11. A recurring matter of contention in the conference was the definition of certain programs as short-term, high-impact activities in response to enemy threat. The fundamental assumption in this definition is counter-insurgency is also a short-term activity. Experience shows just the opposite to be true, as several of the conferees repeatedly pointed out, and the "short-term, high-impact" programs, carried from year to year, actually turn out to be long-term, low-impact propositions that are both wasteful of resources and excellent examples of inefficient planning that indigenous counterparts are quick to pick up and slow to forget.
12. Overloading the system applies just as well to the potential for behavioral change as it does to logistics channels and administrative chains. One conferee spoke of the perpetual willingness of Americans to believe that if they perform an activity for the indigenous counterpart responsible for its accomplishment, the counterpart will automatically continue the pattern when left to his own devices. Programmers tend to overestimate both the appreciation of counterparts for the essential elements of an activity and the capacity of U.S. advisors to estimate the magnitude of change required to influence an ingrained pattern of behavior.
13. The fact that there is still a raging debate over whether or not the extended family can be effectively bridged within the life of programs designed to elicit extra-familial behavior was used to support this argument. It was pointed out that there have been U.S. assistance missions operating in Vietnam since 1950, but we have yet to determine some of the basic social characteristics of the Vietnamese towards whom our assistance programs are presumably directed.

14. This question sparked the greatest controversy of the conference, and the rift it opened between groups of conferees was unhealed at the end of the conference. The essence of the argument on one side was that it is necessary to tolerate certain limitations of freedom and suspension of democratic processes in order to establish stability and internal security; the opposite argument was that repression and unwillingness to institute essential reforms, conditions that in themselves foster insurgencies, are the bane of military governments, and any attempts to paper over the fundamental nature of a regime only serve to make us out as politically inept in the eyes of a jaundiced population. The latter group held that using U.S. resources to mask the true nature of the regime was serving only to defer real reforms, a delay which in the long run could result in declining stability and a Communist takeover.