

PUBLIC
administration
IN
THE
SAIGON
METROPOLITAN
AREA

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Preface to the Vietnam Studies Publications

In 1955 Michigan State University began a program of technical assistance to the Government of South Vietnam, supported by a contract with the predecessor agency of the United States Agency for International Development. Through this program Michigan State University provided technical advisors in the broad field of public administration, including police administration. In recent years, most of this advisory service has been devoted to strengthening the teaching, in-service training, and research programs of the National Institute of Administration, an agency in Saigon created by the Vietnamese Government to strengthen the public service generally.

Members of the Michigan State University group have included specialists in the field of public administration, police administration, economics, anthropology, psychology, sociology and other special fields. In the course of over seven years of technical cooperation in Vietnam, members of the Michigan State University group have contributed a large number of surveys and studies of various types, training documents, and reports containing recommendations on various administrative problems.

This document is one of many prepared in Vietnam as a part of the work of the Michigan State University group. It was written for a specific purpose and under particular circumstances and should be read with these qualifications in mind. It is being reproduced and made available at this time for the use of the Agency for International Development, and is not intended for general circulation. We suggest that this study be used with the understanding that additional materials are available from the earlier MSUG studies which appeared in mimeographed form, and that it fits into the broad context of a technical assistance program as part of the U. S. foreign aid program in Vietnam.

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I | *Saigon: Panorama*

Saigon has been referred to variously as the Paris of the Orient and the Pearl of the East. Each is appropriate. Regardless of which description is used to eulogize the capital of the Republic of Vietnam, it remains a magnificent continental colossus which initially rose from the wastes of a swamp, providing an almost bewildering array of contrasts and even contradictions. A population primarily Vietnamese but saturated with a large percentage of naturalized "ex-Chinese" represents local manners, customs, religion, and general life-style. Today alongside and superimposed upon the manifestations of local life-style are the significant influences of two alien and basically distinct cultures, the French and the American.

Like most Asian nations, Vietnam has witnessed and survived military, political, and economic invasions from her oriental neighbors. These historic invasions had impressive impacts but actually did little to alter the foundations and the general framework of a life-style initially determined by geographical and seasonal factors and by oriental philosophy toward governmental, social and economic relationships of men acting individually or collectively.

The invaders did not represent orientations regarding proper human motivations and actions so completely alien to historic Vietnamese expectations as to irretrievably upset these expectations. It was as though an additional blanket had been added rather than a complete renovation of the sleeping quarters. However, many adjustments naturally occurred during the periods of Chinese conquest and many of these changes are today not separable from that which can be classified as Vietnamese tradition.

The French military, political, cultural, and economic invasion and the American cultural and economic invasion present completely different forms of impact than did the historic invasions. With the French arrival came the elements of a *train de vie* practically unknown in the East. Even more than the British or other imperialist thrusts into Asia, the French carried their nation and its attributes with them.

Like all colonial powers they came, saw, bargained, tricked, forced, and conquered. But their conquest was only partially for the glory of the motherland. It was even more for the proselytizing, in addition to subordinating, of entire peoples. Although the political merits of such a strategy are quite debatable, as witnessed by suicidal episodes encountered by the French in both Indochina and Algeria, the fruits of this tactic are immediately discernible even today.

The most distinguishing contradiction of Saigon is the fact that in many ways it is, and no doubt always will remain, a French city. It appears incongruous to any Eastern or Western visitor but Saigon proper is indeed the Paris of the Orient.

It is perhaps the most notable characteristic of Saigonese society that the French imprint is irretrievably imposed. This imprint is not simply a layer added to pre-French patterns. Rather, it has long been saturated into the Saigonese life-style. Although the greatest impact is found among the social elite, its omnipresence is the basis for this phase of Saigon's contradictions in comparison to practices and philosophy generally associated with the Far East.

Communication is the most obvious manifestation of the omnipresence of French influence.

Few adult-native Saigonese, i.e., those over thirty, do not have at least a rudimentary acquaintance with French, including the proprietors of the smallest shops. However this aspect of the alien imprint inevitably will fade away eventually due partly to passing of general interest and necessity but more particularly to the switch from spoken French to French as a foreign language in the Vietnamese school system.

The continued presence of fairly large numbers of French businessmen also lends to perpetuation of Gallic culture. The presence continues despite the fact it is today quite difficult for most Frenchmen to maintain entrepreneurial establishments in Saigon, chiefly because of governmental restrictions upon economic and commercial interests of foreigners.

Most of the remaining French maintain the traditions and expectations associated with the colonialists prior to 1954. Such expectations led to overt bitterness against the early post-1955 American impact. The new aliens in many ways represent the passing of the old order in the terms of reference of the former rulers more than did Vietnamese independence. Now, however, at least outwardly most French businessmen give the impression of having lost their anti-American feelings. This cordiality is not as typically expressed toward Americans, or for that matter toward Vietnamese, by the French in their organized social activities. French clubs still only begrudgingly admit non-French and refuse to relinquish control of the operations of such leisure-hour establishments. At the same time, as a matter of diplomacy, in order to appear receptive toward the current local economic and social elite, certain clubs tend to go out of their way to attract prominent Vietnamese and Chinese.

French commercial interests still are an important segment of the Saigonese economy. Import-export firms, rubber plantations, and numerous entirely locally operated enterprises provide a significant source of French investment. The number-one outward expression of investment from France is one of the Far East's finest hotels, Air France's Hotel Caravelle, where the tricolor is seen flying side by side with the national flag of the Republic of Vietnam. This structure serves to display all that is best of French manners and convenience. Even here, however, a sign of the time is underway in the form of a new Vietnam-Hilton Hotel to be constructed soon next to the Caravelle, the present prize of Saigon.

A number of the remaining French are French in reality but Vietnamese legally. Due to governmental business operation regulations a change of nationality appeared as the logical course of action for many who desired to continue their livelihoods in Saigon. This was an important step for many of the ex-colonialists partly because it did represent a formal change of status but also because it closed a door which, with few exceptions, could never be reopened. Legal blocks, such as passport regulations, keep the door firmly shut.

But more important, regardless of the extent to which they maintain vestiges of social life from another age, the French in Saigon today are expatriates rather than colonialists. It is interesting to project the extent to which the naturalized Vietnamese of French origin will in time acquire habits more Vietnamese than French. Such an occurrence is extremely unlikely due to strong ties of sentiment and pride to the *ancien regime* but due also to the perpetual reinforcement of colonial traditions by native Vietnamese.

Another manifestation of the French culture that cannot escape even the most casual visitor to Saigon is the style of architecture still prevalent but which serves as a constant reminder of former days. The color scheme of the ever-present stucco structures is almost impossible to describe. It is a terra-cotta, but not nearly so deep. It is a beige-peach, mostly peach, which probably started as a creme but became more rose until now it is describable only as a mildewed peach. But even this description is inaccurate.

These structures stand to remind one that this was a French community and that this influence will die very slowly. They also are a reminder that the French performed the impossible in turning a land filled with swamps and ponds into a bit of Paris. Perhaps the magnificent metropolis is a product of a brand of madness which can be understood only by the colonist mentality. Regardless of frequent inability to understand the rationale for the presence of such a colossus, any and all can sincerely appreciate the product of such a brand of madness, if indeed this is what is observed.

French influence is no less observable among the daily actions of Vietnamese themselves than it is in the commerce and architecture of Saigon. Streets are still better known by their French than by their post-1955 Vietnamese names despite the fact that the colonial names honored personages now held in infamy both officially and unofficially throughout Vietnam. Today these streets are typically crowded with French-built taxicabs and Vietnamese cyclos both operated by drivers who normally speak more French than Vietnamese words, at least with their foreign customers, during the course of a day's work. In fact, many of the cab drivers still know many streets only by their former, rather than by their new names. American influence also lends to the perpetuation of French street names because Americans find it easier to mispronounce French than Vietnamese terms.

In addition to the widespread use of the French language by the Vietnamese, other influences are found in religion and in educational

background. Catholicism, although the religion of only a small percentage of the population, is practiced by more persons in Vietnam than in any other country in the Orient. Despite the large numbers of Catholics as compared to neighboring countries, the French impact here still is only a relative one because these numbers are quite small compared to the total percentage of Catholics in the Philippines. In the spiritual realm, apparently the Spaniards were better proselyters than the French.

Nonetheless, the importance of Catholicism in contemporary Vietnam is a variable explaining much of the residual French influence. The main cathedral in Saigon is one of the most imposing structures in the community, and the Catholic churches throughout the nation are among the most important social influences in almost all of Vietnam's provinces.

The greatest influences of Catholicism are found among the refugee communities created following the post-Geneva exodus from North Vietnam and among the social elite in the cities. Entire refugee communities in various areas of the republic of Vietnam remain today as highly integrated villages in which social, economic, and governmental activities are performed chiefly on a cooperative basis with the local church and its priest serving as the primary sources for continued integration. A number of these villages have been de-populated in recent years as the villagers have moved to the Saigon area for the protection against the Viet Cong, the infiltrating Communist forces from North Vietnam who operate in alliance with Buddhist sects and with other dissident elements of the Vietnamese population.

In addition to the village refugees, many Catholic refugees are included among the present Saigon social elite. Catholicism among large segments of the urban social elite, including both those born in the North and those born in the South, stems to a certain extent from the important roles they or their parents played under the French. In fact, many significant Vietnamese figures were French citizens during the colonial period.

As important, however, is the educational training of most of the social elite. Nearly all Vietnamese professionals received formal higher education in France, as did large numbers of government officials and leaders of the Saigon business community. This educational background of government officials, business leaders, and professionals is found among the younger as well as among the older elements.

An observable but as of now negligible shift toward receiving higher education in the United States is found among the younger Vietnamese, partly because of the creation of quite numerous American participant grants. This shift has had an effect, but certainly not the ingrained mark of formal French schooling.

In Vietnam even today the principal formal, non-university education is French in style and in content, although it is a Vietnamese version of French education. The baccalaureate is the key to entrance into both higher level educational institutions and governmental positions of responsibility. Although only a small percentage of those having a French type of education, both in France and in Vietnam, are Catholics, the Roman Catholic influence upon the French educational system itself is perceptible in all who share this common educational background.

Because of the numerous aspects of this French orientation, the Saigon Prefecture presents a vivid example of an intermeshing of European manners with Far Eastern life-style. Both French and Chinese influence are omnipresent in non-governmental as well as governmental areas of citizenry activities. The former is most obvious in Saigon proper while the Chinese impact is naturally most keenly felt in Cholon. Currently, a third non-Vietnamese influence is to be particularly noted, namely, the increasing social and economic impact of hosts of visiting Americans. This last not only lends to the number of discernible Eastern-Western contradictions found in Saigon but also bears evidence of becoming increasingly significant as the Republic continues to eradicate what President Ngo Dinh Diem has termed the "cancer" of guerilla warfare.

In certain areas of Saigon, it is especially significant. Rue Catinat (Duong Tu Do) for example is referred to by numerous of the Saigonese as "The Far Western Avenue." The physical presence of large numbers of Americans in downtown Saigon makes comparisons such as this inevitable.

However, the real influence of non-European and non-Asian culture is seen in innumerable instances, most of which are hardly much less subtle than the prominence of American physical presence. It is manifested in entrepreneurial characteristics such as in shop adornment and furnishing techniques highly reminiscent of similar establishments in the United States, in the large numbers and extensive variety of American-made (or at least American-type) appliances and other wares, in the popularity of American music, in the widespread use of English in Saigon stores (although not too widely used in Cholon), etc.

It is further witnessed in such areas as increased real estate rentals (particularly homes and apartments), in much higher salary scales for domestic help, and in a current tendency even in the historic market area for merchants no longer to bargain concerning the prices of their wares.

Naturally this influence has been extremely valuable in terms of generally aiding the local economy. At the same time, nonetheless, the resultant trends have tended on occasion to upset certain local supply-and-demand balances, to cause many local residents to pay considerably more for various goods and services received than is typically warranted in terms of local conditions in the less American-influenced Saigon markets, and to substitute a certain amount of sheer commercialism for traditional emphasis upon rather high level craftsmanship.

In short, despite many advantages which could be readily listed, the "Far West" has had an impact upon social and economic norms that has wrought observable difficulties for many Saigon residents. To a certain extent such an impact is inevitable. An alien life-style superimposed upon another life-style cannot escape producing some hardships upon certain segments of the local population.

Partly, this can be explained by the anthropologists catch-all, "cultural lag," i.e., an inevitable period during which a proportion of a given population has not yet adopted the technological and social norms of the dominant social and economic portions of the community. This "lag" can be caused either by choice or necessity.

However, such a clear-cut explanation is inadequate. In addition to the definite existence of such a "lag" in the Saigon area, other factors enter, including: American spending habits based upon income levels disproportionate to those they receive in the United States; a natural tendency for the tourist (regardless if he remains in Saigon for two or more years) to be less than prudent in his daily budget; a desire (also quite natural) to maintain certain accustomed standards as regards typically American conveniences, such as modern appliances, etc.; a lack of appreciation for the accepted and expected standards of income of non-professionals among the Vietnamese (and even a feeling of guilt for paying domestic or office help at rates completely out of line with general practice in the United States); and, a general situation in which both governmental and non-governmental American agencies are "captive buyers" in the sense that they must pay rents, etc., demanded by local businessmen, (regardless of the extent to which prices are out of line with the average current market rates,) if certain minimum standards of living and working conditions are to be maintained.

As usual the blame, if such a term is ever appropriate under conditions created by necessities of local and international situations, for whatever inconveniences accrue to the impact of American influence, cannot be laid completely upon the participants whose actions result in that influence. Local realtors and merchants who follow the time-worn principle of *caveat emptor* and who cater almost exclusively to their most well-heeled clientele cannot escape receiving a portion of responsibility. Nor, for that matter, can the segments of the Siagonese population which refuse to take steps that would at least somewhat improve the living and salary standards of clerical and domestic help, etc., cast all of the first stones.

It can hardly be regarded as entirely bad that the expectation levels of large portions of the Saigon citizenry have been raised because of their experiences with the American community, which currently is a rather integral part of the larger community. What would be bad would be a situation in which these expectations had no possibility of fulfillment. The broader goals of both the American Aid Program and the Republic of Vietnam relate to making fulfillment of these expectations the rule rather than the exception. Because of such goals, Saigon is economically at a very important crossroad.

A number of the factors making Saigon a community of fascinating contrasts are not directly French or American, some are closely related to Chinese imprints upon economic activities of the city.

Saigon is a commercial center, ranging from the most exotic and modern wares to completely primitive hardwares. Its downtown area in its wealthy District Number One has some of the finest shops in the East. In most of the remainder of the commercial areas of the city, fine shops are sprinkled among establishments of medium-sized and small-sized merchants. The best shops sell expensive Vietnamese wares, including magnificent lacquer and handicraft work produced in nearby factors.

Other areas consist of extremely small shops huddled together in crowded quarters lining both sides of the streets. Some such blocks are entirely Vietnamese while others are completely Chinese. The largest market area provides a conglomeration of these extremely small commercial establishments selling everything from food to clothing and household goods at prices once low but constantly rising. Commerce in the market is reminiscent of Arabian nights or at least of a crowded Maxwell Street.

Finished goods and foodstuffs sold are mostly locally made and produced in Saigon or its surrounding areas, but many foodstuffs come from the southeast and from the fabulous mountain resort of Dalat, erected by the French in the home of the Rhade and Djarai.

Every day, farmers and agricultural produce suppliers in the surrounding provinces come to Saigon to sell their wares. Various forms of transportation are used to supply the urban population with necessary foodstuffs: trucks carrying mostly rice but some paddy (unhusked grains of rice) to Cholon are becoming increasingly popular as a means of transporting produce, although the Cholon rice mills currently are not in full operation and will not be one hundred percent operative until their transfer to Vietnamese owners; horse-drawn carts used by petty merchants, boats used especially by the Chinese on small canals, and junks carrying charcoal, salt, and dry fish used mostly on the canals but used also on the Saigon River, which are still popular, despite their inability to provide fast mobility, because they are economical to operate.

Vast variety in forms of transportation is also found in the streets of Saigon. The city is one of the most motorized communities in the world. Although rickshaws were in wide use both in Saigon and in Hanoi prior to World War II this well-known form of oriental transportation no longer exists in Vietnam. Bicycles, cyclos (a form of tricycle driven by manpower that is used both for human transportation and for delivery services), and horse-drawn carts of the market-bound farmers are the primary non-motorized means of transportation.

Private automobiles are plentiful among those in higher economic brackets, although little in use only a few years ago. Motor-scooters are everywhere and along with the ever-present motor-bikes and motor-cyclos (motorcycles in the shape of cyclos) add to the incessant noise level characterizing Saigon. Bicycles are favorites of all—especially school children—and take up a large portion of any street in the area.

Most characteristic of the motorized community, however, are its blue and light yellow colored (by prefectural regulation) taxicabs. Nearly all of the cabs today are Renaults because they are relatively inexpensive to purchase, despite the very high duty on importing automobiles, and because these four-horsepowered autos are relatively inexpensive to operate. The previously common Standard and Peugeot 203 taxicabs are few in number today because of their expense and because of difficulty in obtaining parts.

Chiefly because of the large numbers of taxicabs operating in the area, as well as for security reasons, the Prefecture has placed a number

of qualifications for receipt of taxicab chauffeur licenses, including: a certificate of morality (from the administrative district chief), an approved judicial record, and a health status certificate.

Cyclos and motor-cyclos (sometimes referred to as "the most dangerous form of transportation on earth") are also regulated somewhat in that drivers must receive special authorizations (e.g., younger people are not given authorizations, etc.). However, restrictions upon their operations are limited chiefly because their inexpensive fares make them very popular among the Saigonese working class. There are over 2,400 motor-cyclos in operation in Saigon today, and, according to the taxi, motor-cyclo, and cyclo drivers unions, over 20,000 families gain their incomes from the cyclo-driving business.

One attempt to outlaw motor-cyclos, because of their noise and cumbersome nature (which results in their occupying a large share of a street lane), and cyclos, because they represented an affront to individual dignity in the form of man-operations substituted for machine operations, resulted in complete failure. When the Prefecture finally decided to outlaw only cyclos, the government was forced to defer to working-class complaints and protestations from labor unions and other local association. This was a different result from that experienced in Bangkok where the Thailand government decided to compensate its forcibly unemployed cyclo drivers by giving them land in a resettlement area in the northeast of the country. It also is one of the few instances in which a popular protest has been successful in forcing the government to retreat from a decision.

An even greater contrast than the sight of motorized and non-motorized vehicles operating side by side, is the ever-present sight in Saigon of modern equipment operating along side hosts of manual laborers utilizing tools typically pre-dating the community's machine age. Construction projects abound in today's Saigon, many of them involving development programs of major proportions. However, working beside the bulldozers there always will be almost countless numbers of workers with hoes and other utensils of an age of non-mechanization. The products of this construction frequently are quite magnificent, modern structures providing most of the conveniences typically associated with the most advanced Western architecture.

However, the really fundamental contrast between a technologically dependent and resourceful community and a non-technologically advanced society frequently is presented by the building next door to the site under construction. The neighboring structure often is relatively

new and is the product of a blueprint displaying a modern architectural design. A few years before—and in some instances only a few months—its site was the scene of active mechanical and human energy similar to that currently underway on the new construction. But this relatively new building typically gives no signs of its newness, and even if it does provide the veneer of newness in its exterior, its rooms, halls, floors, and ceilings give an indication of being part of an ancient, or at least extremely time-worn building.

The lack of appreciation for preventive maintenance has produced innumerable symbols of a type of contrast in the Saigon area which epitomizes the difference between a community influenced by external forces but not thoroughly penetrated by their impact. There is even something at the philosophical level which renders the theme that a penny spent wisely is a dollar saved many times over. This was a lesson not learned even in the United States by the early robber barons and the original Horatio Algiers. As a result, their brand no longer pervades or controls American life-style or even the economic sphere.

To a certain extent it is the philosophy of mid-twentieth century corporation capitalism which strives to make its workers middle class types, with all that this implies, which has found the use of preventives to be good investments.¹ It involves a selfishness much more broadly based than any meager attempts to obtain gain on a day-to-day basis. In a term it involves an appreciation for long-range planning. There really is little analogy between contemporary Vietnam and 19th-century America except that effective planning is an absent factor in both instances. And in both instances substantial reasons no doubt could be offered to explain the phenomenon.

Despite the rationalizations that might be offered, the simple fact is that once a society has reached a certain economic level and when that level includes a minimum economic and social status acceptable to requisite segments of the population, then, that society can afford long-range selfishness. It can afford to lay aside prescribed resources for maintaining its balance on a developmental basis and it can afford to curtail immediate savings in order to insure continued development on a plane it sets as a goal.

The contrast between continual construction of excellent structures and failure to maintain adequately the building and machinery which make such structures of permanent value is a contrast between today and tomorrow. Technology can come to any age. Appreciation of the

¹Of course, the same tendencies are found in the present-day Soviet Union in its attempts to pacify its ever-growing middle class.

full impact of technology is the product of a particular form of life-style. Such a form takes time. It must be imprinted culturally through economic development and through education.

Once this life-style is obtained it is not without its deficiencies. However, even these are part of what is usually sought when a nation pursues what is generally assumed to be a progressive course. In Saigon, with its motorized vehicles and its adoption of industrial-age techniques of construction, the step toward full and effective utilization of its modern physical plants and its mechanized tools for construction and operations must wait for a day in the future.

The final contrast to be mentioned is one which cannot be measured but which is perhaps the most striking phase of daily Saigonese living. Saigon continues to be a tremendous center for commerce and for fast-moving trade in consumer goods. It continues to be the primary market for products from the rural areas, for imported goods received through its excellent port, and for manufactured goods (mostly light products) from the area's increasing number of factories.

Business in its restaurants, night clubs, and bars continues to increase rapidly, especially since the increased influx of American governmental and military personnel beginning during the latter part of 1961. Many of the restaurants and evening dining-drinking-dancing establishments are exquisite commercial enterprises despite their heavy trade.² And many of the restaurants continue to serve some of the world's best French and Chinese cuisine.

In short, Saigon in numerous ways can be classified as a boom town. Its crowded streets, shops and entertainment ventures give witness to this boom.

However, a trip down any Saigon street provides a striking reminder of the contrast between the Saigon commercial boom and the heavy hand of the cancer plaguing all of the Republic. In addition to the ever-present sight of immaculately white uniformed police, other colored uniforms are prominent sights, especially those of the military forces of the Republic and (on Mondays particularly) those of the blue-suited Cong Hoa Youth. Many of the uniforms are seen worn by drivers and riders of trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, and other forms of military transportation. Other uniforms can be noted in front of all public buildings and behind pillboxes and other security installations.

²Dancing is now prohibited in Vietnam, including dancing in private homes as well as in public places.

The all-important problem of Viet Cong infiltration into the territories of the Republic of Vietnam, thus, is to be noted only indirectly in Saigon itself. It stands as a bastion of security against the clandestine operations of an enemy that has rampaged the countryside since 1954, and has been exceedingly active since 1959. The presence of security forces in the commercial capital serves as a reminder, considerably deadening the joy of having become a boom town.

But this deadening only provides evidence of a situation which renders the prefecture's tasks much more difficult than those of the world's other large metropolitan areas. It certainly does not deter the community from continuing to carry out its normal activities at an ever-increasing pace. Perhaps this attitude of acceptance of persistent problems and of determination to continue and even to expand business and other forms of livelihood in the face of such problems is the key to explaining much of Saigonese life-style. It also displays dramatically the fact that no one can control Vietnam without first controlling Saigon.

The enterprising residents of this community have readily survived French, Japanese, and Viet Minh occupations, adopting such of the manners and practices of the occupants as they deemed necessary and advisable. They have adapted their daily actions over the past eight years to meet an unwelcome security situation which has hampered their relationships with the remainder of the country. And, they have managed to adopt enough of the practices of the relatively new American influence to assist them in intensifying their own economic development.

The many contrasts found in the Saigon metropolitan area are, thus, the product both of external forces and of the adaptability and enterprise of local inhabitants. In time, many of the contrasting and contradictory phenomena will pass away. The cultural "lag" mentioned earlier will almost completely evaporate in time, although many historic mannerisms certainly will never fade out. Saigon will always be first a Far Eastern metropolis. But, it increasingly will become an industrial as well as a commercial center and a modern metropolitan community rather than a medium-sized French city.

The current contrasts and the probable future development of Saigon present a context for problems of the prefecture which can be understood only in terms of that context. Public administration throughout the metropolitan area naturally reflects the economic, social, demographic, geographic, and security situations in contemporary Saigon and Vietnam. It also reflects the mixed impact of external influences

(notably French) superimposed upon historic Vietnamese forms and styles of governmental operations.

The French swayed the structure of local government as well as the processes of recruiting governmental personnel. The American influence has stemmed almost exclusively from its role in the area of training civil servants. Both impacts, however, have only served as influences. The basic patterns of government remain noticeably Vietnamese in both relationships with the population and among the public servants themselves.

2 | *The Evolution of the Citadel*

The background of the Prefecture of Saigon makes for very interesting reading. Unfortunately, only the highlights of its development can be presented here. Exact data concerning each stage of this development are impossible to obtain. Even the most diligent scholars of the prefecture's history find frequent cause for disagreement concerning such facets of change as location of once-prominent facilities that were destroyed in various periods of devastation. Fortunately, however, materials are available providing enough agreed-upon data to sketch in some detail the various stages of the city's evolution. It is important that this background be presented because it outlines the still quite noticeable impact of steps leading to contemporary public administration in the metropolitan area. In addition Saigon's stages of evolution describe the development of its present population composition and its current demographic and ecological disposition.

Certain confusion has occurred in recording the history of the Saigon area due to the separate but related evolution of Saigon and Cholon. This confusion is even found in the names of the two presently combined communities. However, although Cholon was officially annexed

to Saigon as late as 1954, the histories of the twin cities cannot be kept completely separate. Both have witnessed Cambodian Chinese, Vietnamese, and French occupation, and both have suffered destruction at the hands of invaders. Saigon and Cholon also were both early parties to the growth of Chinese economic influence, Vietnamese political and social impact, and French imprint in Indochina.

Recording the development of the two communities has been further complicated by their close relationships to important sections of what today is Gia Dinh Province, chiefly because their territorial expansions occurred at the expense of the countryside and villages of this province. Because of the significance of both Cholon and Gia Dinh Province to the development of the metropolitan area, the background of the Prefecture of Saigon of necessity must provide for their inclusion.

THE MARCH SOUTHWARD

The first communities recognizable historically as Vietnamese territory with governmental structures governed by Vietnamese were found in portions of what today is North Vietnam. Somewhat north of the Seventeenth Parallel was the southern boundary of what once was named Nam Viet. Portions of this area also bore in succession the names Xich Quy, Van Lang, and Au Lac prior to becoming recognized as Nam Viet. Prior to the periods of Chinese domination of the Nam Viet, which the conquerors named the Giao Chi, the history of the area is mostly legendary.

The accomplishments and origins of its early rulers are strictly based upon mythology rather than upon recorded chronological fact, although certain descriptions of the century preceding the Chinese occupation of 111 B.C. are based upon fairly authentic information. During the three major periods of Chinese domination lasting approximately one thousand years, although there were several intermittent periods of Vietnamese independence, the influence of the invaders pervaded throughout the Nam Viet. Beginning as early as the 1st century A.D., for example, the occupying mandarins taught principles of governmental organization and administration as well as agriculture to the Vietnamese.

Little territorial expansion of the old Nam Viet territory occurred during its thousand years of domination. However, following its independence a long period of gradual migration and conquest into the south began in the early part of the 10th century A.D. At this date the

Vietnamese still resided in their "ancestral" territory covering an area as far south as the Thanh Hoa Province bordered by the Gianh River, an area in the southern part of present North Vietnam.¹

This gradual movement toward the south included conquest and eventual settlement of the provinces of Quang Binh and Quang Tri, territories respectively just above and below the Seventeenth Parallel, during the 11th century. It later involved acquisition of two large "districts" which were as large as provinces today, through the marriage of the daughter of a king of the Tran Dynasty, Princess Huyen Tran, to a Champa King. Addition of these two districts, O and Ly (Thua Thien Province), brought the Vietnamese control over an area to the south about half way between the Seventeenth Parallel and the extreme southern territory of contemporary Vietnam later known as Cochinchina.

After the victory of Le Loi (later King Le Thai To) over the Chinese invaders in 1427, the setting was laid for a more aggressive march to the South. Two major barriers stood in the way of the Vietnamese, who at this time operated under the national name of Dai Viet: (1) the Chams in the central part of present Vietnam, who originally occupied the territory from Thanh Hoa Province to Cochinchina, and (2) the Khmer (Cambodians) who occupied most of the territory of what later became Cochinchina, including the present site of Saigon. The Khmer had exterminated the Phu Nam, who originally occupied parts of Cochinchina, in the 7th century and had settled the area in the 8th century.

The reign of Le Thanh Tong (1460-1497) marked the beginning of the intensified southern colonizing movement. During the colonizing period, the Chams offered military resistance on occasion and in other instances peacefully withdrew further to the south. Vietnamese settlement occurred southward along the coast, including both peaceful and forceful movements into Qui Nhon Province (1471), Phu Yen Province (1611), and Nha Trang Province (1653). Colonizing these Cham holdings expanded national territory and also assisted in insuring continued control of national boundaries. In order to stimulate Vietnamese settlement following armed conquest of the newly acquired territories, a special mandarinal position was established and assigned responsibility for recruiting "movable" segments of the Vietnamese, including volunteers, prisoners, and tax and military service violators. These movable segments were provided with armed protection for cultivating the waste lands of the Champa (Chiem Thanh) and the adjacent territories. As a result of these efforts, the Chams no longer constituted a nation after 1697.

¹At this stage, the nation was called An Nam.

Beginning in 1658 the march of Vietnamese colonialism became more intensified. In that year, the Khmer (Chan Lap or Cambodian) due to internal political problems and to external pressure from the Vietnamese, recognized the authority of the Hue Royal Court and of the House of Nguyen.² During the period from 1658 to 1759 the southern part of Cochinchina became Vietnamese as a result of infiltration and gradual, relatively peaceful invasion. By 1674 the House of Nguyen occupied Sai-Con (Saigon) as part of its expansion in Cochinchina.

In 1680 Chinese troops who came by junk as refugees from China, after refusing to acquiesce to the victors in the civil war against the Ming, provided an additional link for colonizing Cochinchina. In order to avoid a disturbance which the refugees might have caused and also in order to develop the lands over which it now held authority, the House of Nguyen allowed the Chinese troops to settle around the Dong Nai River area in the Mekong Delta. The Dong Nai River is to the north of Saigon; its source is in the southern part of Central Vietnam. The presence of the Chinese also provided troops for later conquest of Cambodian territories.

Vietnamese colonial expansion, in fact, finally reached all of the territory of Cochinchina in 1708 when Mac Cuu, a Chinese who had conquered the Cambodian province of Ha Tien located on the present Cambodian border, accepted the authority of the House of Nguyen. Mac Cuu in return was appointed permanent military governor of the province. However, the final control of all of present Vietnam by the Vietnamese did not occur until 1780 when Ha Tien was ceded to the House of Nguyen following the death of Mac Cuu's childless son Mac Thien Cuu. Between 1708 and 1780, the Vietnamese completed final consolidation of their southern holdings through transfer of the territories of Tam Bon and Loi Lap (1755) by the Cambodians and through continued settlement throughout Cochinchina.

The settlement of the refugees from Canton marked the entrance of the later sizeable influence of the Chinese in the south, although they were important in the Saigon area only after 1778. Chinese immigrants, who became mostly farmers and fishermen, occupied the Gia Dinh area, developing the lands around My Tho and Bien Hoa. Continuing their own migration into the south, the Vietnamese, after moving in 1693 into the Phan Thiet Province just north of Cochinchina, in 1698 moved into Bien Hoa and Gia Dinh around the present Saigon.

²By this time although King Le nominally was the ruler of the entire nation, Lord Nguyen was the Chua in the Southern territories of the Vietnamese nation, i.e., the Viceroy for Southern Vietnam. The House of Trinh held the position of Chua for North Vietnam.

HISTORIC SAIGON

Prior to the Chinese and Vietnamese migrations, the current site of Saigon was named Prei-Nokor by the Khmers. Prei-Nokor served as the seat of a pretender, or second King, to the Cambodian throne. At this time there was a small hamlet located on the Saigon site which was situated in the center of a forest next to a Khmer stronghold (fort). The few dwellings on the site were scattered over small hills surrounded by ponds and swamps. Prei-Nokor also included four villages in the present Saigon area: Phu Lam, at present a village located on the road to Tan An; Go Vap, today a district outside Saigon; Ba Diem, now a village six kilometers from Saigon on the road to Tay Ninh; and Cho Quan, a name still used to describe the section between old Saigon and old Cholon. Even at this date the hamlet and the villages were situated in a territory serving as a refuge for elephants, tigers, panthers, monkeys and crocodiles.

The next significant stage in the development of Saigon following the Chinese and Vietnamese migrations is closely tied to the political evolution in Vietnam during the 18th century rapid period of switches in the fortunes of the House of Nguyen.

For over a century the Houses of Trinh and Nguyen had skirmished for control of the nation with the former predominant in the North (Tonkin) and the latter predominant in the South (Annam and later also Cochinchina). In 1771 a third House entered the competition, the Tay Son. Following the fall of Hue to the Tay Son, the Nguyen fled southward, whereupon the Tay Son invaded Cochinchina. A series of successive periods of occupation of the Saigon area followed, with the Tay Son and the Nguyen each losing control on several occasions.

When the Tay Son invaded Bien Hoa in 1773 the Chinese traders residing and carrying on business in this area were forced to flee. The Chinese refugees from Bien Hoa finally settled (1778) in the area around the present site of Cholon. They named their new residence Ta Ngon or Tin Ngan. The Vietnamese pronunciation of the Chinese terms for the present Cholon sounded somewhat like "Saigon."

To add to the confusion in terms of recorded history of this era, the French after their arrival mistakenly began to apply the name "Saigon" to the area around what the Chinese had called Ben Nghi or Ben Thanh. This mistake provided the site of present-day Saigon with its final name. The Chinese had used Ben Thanh, meaning literally "quay" and "citadel" as a market for goods and commodities. Even today the Saigoneses refer to the Central Market as the Ben Thanh Market and to the core of Saigon as Ben Thanh Place.

After the conquest of Bien Hoa, for the next several years the city changed hands frequently. Phan Yen Province (Gia Dinh) was attacked by the Tay Son in 1782, who marched into "Saigon" and massacred some 2,000 Chinese residents.³ This massacre resulted from the Tay Son fear of the increasing numbers of Chinese and of the dominance of the Chinese over trade throughout the entire region.

After Nguyen Anh fled to Phu Quoc Island, midway between Cape Ca Mau and the Gulf of Thailand, the Tay Son turned north to victory in Tonkin over the Trinh and later over a Trinh-Chinese coalition. Despite their significant victories, the Tay Son were weakened enough in the south due to quarrels among themselves to provide Nguyen Anh with an opportunity to first reconquer Gia Dinh (1788) and occupy Saigon (1789) and then to reunify the entire country. In 1802 he proclaimed himself to be the Emperor Gia Long. He once again established the capital in Hue and changed the name of the country from An Nam to Vietnam.

Vietnam was united. Many almost phenomenal successes followed during the reigns of the Emperor Gia Long (1802-1819) and his successors, Minh Mang (1820-1840), Thien Tri (1841-1849), and Tu Duc (1847-1883). Both Cambodia and Laos became Vietnamese satellites despite certain interim setbacks for the Vietnam forces.

A much stronger national government was established with: (1) a greatly improved military establishment, and (2) a tightly knit centralization of authority based upon a hierarchical administrative network, wherein power originated in the person and office of the Emperor and filtered through the mandarin system and the village notables.⁴ Local governments lost most of the autonomy they historically enjoyed. Rapid advances were made in commerce, education, and administration. In short, the government of Vietnam following the fall of the Tay Son proved to be strong but despotic.

However, Nguyen Anh had not returned from Phu Quoc Island to Hue via Gia Dinh without assistance. He had been aided by French troops recruited by Evedue d'Adran (Pigneau de Behained of the Missions Etrangeres de Paris), the apostolic Delegate to South An Nam and later Royal Commissioner for South An Nam. After the French government withdrew from an agreement to aid Nguyen Anh instigated

³The exact number involved in the massacre is a disputed point among Vietnamese historians, but the quoted number usually ranges from 1,300 to over 2,000, although certain obviously inaccurate estimates place the total as high as 10,000.

⁴The extent to which authority actually was centralized during this period remains a disputed point.

at the Bishop's insistence, he personally recruited French troops to aid the Nguyen's return.

An important door had been opened, and later attempts to shut out the French proved increasingly futile. Gia Long permitted the Catholics to continue the proselytizing which had begun on a meager basis over two centuries before through efforts of the Dominicans, who were later followed by the Jesuits, and Franciscans, as well as the Missions Etrangeres. He even stimulated a minimum amount of trade with the French, although successfully excluding other foreign traders.

Attempts by his successors to prevent the rise of French influence through stern persecution of Catholics and refusals to permit the French to trade in Vietnam met with varied success but in the long run only delayed Gallic intervention. When the French-Spanish expeditionary force invaded Da Nang in 1858, the obvious excuse was the Nguyen persecution of Catholics. By 1885 the French suzerainty over Vietnam was completed.

Saigon thrived considerably between 1789 when the Nguyen returned and its conquest by the French in 1859. After vanquishing the Tay Son, Gia Long rebuilt the citadel in 1790 with the assistance of the French troops recruited by Eveque d'Adran. The citadel was a fortress with eight gates surrounded by a highway encircled by a moat. It was an octagonal structure constructed on a hill in the Tan Khai Hamlet in Binh Duong Canton of Gia Dinh Kinh (Gia Dinh Country). The center of the citadel was located on the site of the present Saigon Cathedral. Its external walls were bounded by the present Saigon streets of Le Thanh Ton (East), Phan Dinh Phung (West), Dinh Tien Hoang (North) and Cong Ly (South).

The Saigon Citadel was built with stone, by the side of an arsenal, sided by a civilian residential quarter including low, thatched houses. The commercial quarter faced the east. When Emperor Gia Long succeeded in defeating the Tay Son, the population returned in large number to the citadel and improved their dwellings and preferred to move to the west side of the citadel. By that time, the river and canal sides were paved with stones and brick for roughly one thousand meters. Some roads and streets were paved with stone but not well traced and maintained. The population of the citadel and its suburb was estimated to be about 180,000 Vietnamese and 10,000 Chinese. (Extract from the notebook of an American traveller, John White, who visited Saigon in 1819, *Bulletin de la Societe des Etudes Indochinoises*, 1942, Vol. 2)⁶

⁶The population figures are highly exaggerated, although population statistics in Vietnam, both historically and currently, are extremely sketchy.

Saigon became an important residential area for the Vietnamese in the south. The Chinese during the long period of peace in Cochinchina after 1789,⁶ recovered their previous economic position and made Cholen (Cholon) the most important market for the six neighboring provinces. Even legal restrictions on many of their activities did not deter them from economic advancement. These restrictions were rarely enforced chiefly due to bribery of the mandarins. The Chinese also expanded their activities and the facilities of Cholon without an abundance of financial support from the government, building roads and landing piers and digging canals with their own investments.

In 1802, when Gia Long declared himself to be Emperor of the unified Vietnam, the name of the Gia Dinh government seat (Gia Dinh Phu) was changed to Gia Dinh Thanh (Gia Dinh Town or Citadel) and its administration placed under the authority of a Tong Tran (Governor), an Hiep Tong Tran (Associate Governor), and a Pho Tong Tran (Deputy Governor). The area under the jurisdiction of this governing group was called the Phien An Country, which included Saigon and its surrounding rural areas, although their jurisdiction covered nearly all of the coastal and border areas of Cochinchina, including the provinces of Bien Hoa, Dinh Tuong (My Tho area), Ha Tien (by the Cambodian border), Binh Thuan (the farthest south province of central Vietnam, and Vinh Thanh (an old province no longer in existence.)

Several other administrative changes occurred in the Saigon area between the early part of the 19th century and the arrival of the French. The name Gia Dinh Thanh was changed in 1832 to Phien An Tinh Thanh (Phien An Town) and responsibility for its administration assigned to an An Bien Tong Doc (Border Governor). This administrator had jurisdiction over Phien An Country. Another name change occurred in 1834 when Phien An Country became Nam Ky Luc Tinh.

In 1836 following the devastation of Emperor Minh Mang's victory over the forces of Le Van Khoi, the Emperor ordered the construction of a new citadel. This new fortification was located to the northeast of the former structure in Nghia Hoa Village, Bing Duong District. After its construction, the administrative area in which it was situated was named Gia Dinh Tinh (Gia Dinh Province). The title of the An Bien Tong Doc was changed to Dinh Bien Tong Doc (Governor of Dinh Bien).

⁶For three years, 1833-1835, the Gia Dinh area was held by an adopted son of the former Governor General of Gia Dinh, Le Van Duyet, whose grave was desecrated upon Ming Mang's orders after the Emperor tried him posthumously. Le Van Khoi, the adopted son, died in 1835, and his troops along with his ally Father M. Marchard (the priest's role is one of dispute among Vietnamese scholars) fell victim to the forces of the Nguyen.

When the French invaded in 1859, they completely demolished the new citadel. However, in 1860 they built an armored concrete fortification, "the Caserne du Onzieme Regiment de l'Infanterie Coloniale." This new citadel was the beginning of contemporary Saigon. At the time of the construction of the French citadel it covered an area bordered by the following four present Saigon streets: Phan Dinh Phung, Nguyen Binh Khiem, Mac Dinh Chi, and Nguyen Du.

The Saigon area during the early days of the French occupation included some forty villages located around the citadel and along the Saigon River. Truong Vinh Ky, in his "Souvenirs historiques" enumerates several villages of prime importance during this period of Saigon's history: Hoa My, Tan Khai, Long Dien, Truong Hoa, My Hoi, Nam Chon, Long Hung, Cau Kho, Cho Quan, Tan Kieng, An Binh, Hoa Nghia (Truong Thi). A number of these former village names are still used by the Saigonese to designate specific quarters of Saigon.

STEPS TOWARD THE REPUBLIC

French administration of Saigon followed basically the same development as it did in other cities in Vietnam.⁷ Cochinchina became a French colony, under direct colonial administration, after France was ceded the provinces of Gia Dinh, Bien Hoa, and Dinh Tuong (My Tho) by the Treaty of 1862. A Direction General of Indigenous Administration was appointed following the French victory at Gia Dinh and this position was replaced by that of Governor General of the Colony of Cochinchina after signing the 1822 treaty. Saigon became the capital of the colony and the home of the Governor General. In 1878, a civilian, Le Myre de Vilers, was appointed Governor of Cochinchina.

In theory, the North (Tonkin) and the Central (An Nam) parts of Vietnam were not directly controlled by the French after the 1884 treaty. Instead they became French protectorates. Unlike the South where French officials formally replaced the mandarinates, in the North and Center the mandarins maintained their positions but henceforth had French "advisors" under the direction of Resident Superiors.⁸

However, the pretext of Vietnamese control outside Cochinchina was not carried over to control of the principal cities. By the Ordinance of October 3, 1888, the Vietnamese ceded Danang in An Nam and Hanoi and Haiphong in Tonkin to the French. These cities joined Saigon, which

⁷For a sketch of this development see Chapter Four.

⁸See the map of French Indochina at the conclusion of this Chapter.

was officially provided the status of being a French city in 1887, in having French mayors directly administer their affairs.

During the period of French rule Saigon was only the capital of Cochinchina. Hanoi was made the political capital of Indochina⁹; it also served as the cultural capital. The Governor General resided in Hanoi and all important administrative meetings were held there. Saigon became the economic capital because of its port and its location in relation to the rice fields of the Mekong Delta. The primary importance of Haiphong and Danang was that they served as ports for French commerce.

The French maintained complete mastery over Indochina, overwhelming occasional royalist and nationalist uprisings, until World War II. When the Japanese came they only occupied the country militarily at first, although they continually undermined the French position during their years of occupation. The new invaders, under the 1941 Darlan-Kats Accord, permitted the French to continue their civilian and administrative controls. The French, at least in principle, also were left with authority over social and economic controls. An Indochinese Army (and paramilitary groups) consisting of French, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians were allowed to remain intact. In addition, the French in principle maintained "full control" of the police, although the Japanese continuously pressured to receive favorable treatment for their own operations.

Early in 1945 the Allied successes convinced the Japanese that one of the only ways to nourish hope of continuing the war in the Pacific was to gain support from other nationality groups in the Far East. Due to the fact that the Vietnamese were eager for independence and that continued French importance in Indochina would have been detrimental in the struggle against the Allies, the Japanese decided to favor a Vietnamese nationalist government. Throughout the occupation, the Japanese had aided certain nationalist and other anti-French groups, although they had opposed the expanding Viet Minh (Vietnamese Independence Movement). The Japanese staged a *coup d'etat* and declared the existence of a Vietnamese nationalist government, which they proceeded to control.

Tran Trong Kim became prime minister. He appointed a Vietnamese mayor in Hanoi, Tran Van Lai, which remained the capital during the Japanese period, but this municipal official's tenure lasted

⁹Hue was the capital of An Nam and the seat of the royal government which on paper maintained its sovereignty.

only a few months. The prime minister also appointed a Vietnamese mayor in Saigon. During the period of the short-lived Tran Trong Kim regime, Vietnamese also assumed other administrative functions previously performed by the French: high French officials were discharged (including French mayors), although certain French as well as Japanese technicians were retained; and, beginning in 1945, the Vietnamese language was first used in official records and correspondence.

In August 1945, the Viet Minh through quick action took over from both the Japanese and the young government of Bao Dai and Tran Trong Kim. However, the control over Vietnam of the Viet Minh Provisional Government was short-lived. By agreement among the Allies, the British came to the area south of the Sixteenth Parallel to disarm the Japanese and the Chinese occupied the north for the same purpose.

In Hanoi the influence of the Viet Minh lingered. Although the Chinese aided anti-Viet Minh groups and finally permitted the French to reoccupy Hanoi, the chief of the Chinese mission, General Lu Han, and other mission leaders were bribed to permit the Viet Minh to continue its municipal administration activities.

In 1945 after creating the Provisional Government the Viet Minh abolished the municipal government and established popular revolutionary administrative councils both in Hanoi and in Haiphong. These councils were headed by a chairman and consisted of several commissioners; each commissioner was assigned special administrative responsibilities; e.g., economic affairs, political affairs, etc. Tran Duy Hung, an M.D., was appointed chairman (he is now the chairman of the Hanoi municipal council). Legally the chairman was to be elected, but under the guise of security necessities this became an appointed position.

The council and their chairmen, who were Communists, proved to be puppets of the party, receiving instructions informally from meetings of the party. Officially, orders to municipal officials were supposed to come directly from northern regional government authorities (the Viet Minh initially created north, central and southern regions in Tonkin) rather than from the Communist organization. Today, now that the party is itself the government of north Vietnam, the regions have been abolished and orders to municipal officials come directly from the central government.

During the very brief period during 1945 when the Provisional Government held control over Saigon, the Viet Minh also set up a chairman-commissioner scheme of government for the prefecture. However the Japanese surrendered in August, the British under General

Gracey arrived in September, and the French returned under General Leclerc in October. The French had already resumed their former operational system in Saigon two weeks before Leclerc's appearance, due to efforts of French paratroopers whom the British released from Viet Minh captivity. This began the long period of the "War of Resistance," with the French pitted against a coalition of Communist and nationalist parties. In the north the Viet Minh openly fought as Communists but in the south they pretended only to be nationalists.

In 1949 Bao Dai and French High Commissioner Bollaert reached an agreement making the former Emperor the Chief of State. The State of Vietnam was by then legally an independent nation but a member of the French Union. After this for the first time Saigon became the capital of Vietnam. When Ngo Dinh Diem became President, Saigon became the capital of the Republic of Vietnam.

CONCLUSION

It is not possible to describe the evolution of the Saigon metropolitan area without tying this evolution to the fortunes and development of Vietnam. Centuries of conquest were followed by periods of relative tranquility first under the Nguyen and then under the French. Conquest determined the national affiliation of Saigon. Infiltration and migration provided the basis for its Vietnamese-Chinese population matrix. Each set of conquerors influenced both its life-style and its framework for governmental and administrative operations.

The periods of peace permitted the expansion of an economic base constructed almost entirely upon extensive commerce. Saigon developed into a major port for both importing finished products and exporting raw materials. For many years Saigon served France as a source of supplies and as an outlet for its goods. Saigon also served as a broker for supplies to the remainder of Indochina and as a market for Vietnamese manufactured goods and agricultural produce.

The economic role of Saigon as well as the role of all Cochinchina and An Nam underwent numerous alterations following the Geneva Agreement in 1954. Partition of Vietnam placed the principal industrial areas in the North and thereby deprived Saigon commercial interests of their primary source of manufactured goods and heavy supplies (coal, etc). The new Republic of Vietnam was an almost completely agricultural country with the exception of the prefecture and three cities.

When the inevitable decline in commercial interchange with France was added to the permanent loss of the facilities and markets of the north, Saigon was forced to develop a number of its own industrial sites within its city limits and within the territories relatively close to the city. American assistance and trade aided in the development of new industry and provided a new source for extensive commercial intercourse.

However, even after twenty years of war, Saigon continues to be chiefly a commercial center. The old citadel has long been destroyed but the community still serves as a haven for migrants from terrorism and as the mainstay in the Vietnamese economy.

In mid-twentieth century, the government, the economic stability and development, and even the survival of the Republic depend upon relative prosperity in Saigon. The central government recognizes the metropolitan area's significance through price controls protecting its urban clientele from rampant inflation, through health and welfare programs (housing, hospitals, working condition controls, etc.), and through stringent security measures taken both by the military and by the Prefecture's police.

Today Saigon maintains its relative prosperity and in numerous phases of its commercial activities has reached the stage of being a boom town. It has acquired this posture despite two major features that threaten its continued economic development, namely, guerilla terrorism outside the prefecture and the cities, and aggravated internal conditions similar to urban problems that plague all of the world's metropolitan areas.

The first threat has hindered the prefecture's ability to obtain needed footstuffs, raw materials, manufactured handicrafts and other finished products. By disturbing normal agricultural activities and by hindering transportation of farmers and their wares, the Viet Cong have in time presented a serious threat to insuring needed food supplies for the capital and to preventing inflation in prices of rice, vegetables, and other necessary commodities. Fortunately, the Central Government has been able to protect the market and the buyers against both threats.

An important side effect for Saigon of the guerrilla actions in the countryside has been the influx of American advisory teams and the intensified American aid to Vietnam—both of which have tended to stimulate the Saigon economy more than that of the rest of the nation.

In the long run, hopefully, the second major threat is more important to Saigon's continued status as a boom town, or at least to maintaining a requisite minimum prosperity. Many of the prefecture's health and welfare problems are quite severe at present. An increasing population, as well as serious problems relating to housing, education, medical facilities, water, sewage, drainage, and land use—these are features that currently threaten prosperity. In the future, a combination of these features very well might cause a social and economic deterioration in the commercial base of the metropolitan area.

Appendage to Chapter Two

INDEPENDENCE PALACE, A SHORT HISTORICAL SKETCH*

For more than 80 years, what is usually described as the "colonial-style yellow stucco" palace, stood as the symbol of French rule in Indochina. Since 1954, when it was turned over to the Government of VietNam, the "Dinh Doc Lap" (Independence Palace) has become, in the eyes of the people, the living symbol of national independence.

During the first years of the French conquest, the residence of the Admiral-governors was a thatched house located on the present Grall Hospital ground. In 1861, Admiral Bonard had a more elaborate structure, "a magnificent wooden house," built on the grounds of the present Taberd High School. The frame of this "temporary palace" had been ordered from Singapore.

The local French-language paper *Le Courier de Saigon* reported in its issue of February 5, 1865, that "preliminary studies are now being conducted for the building of a mansion to serve as the permanent residence of the governor. A contest has been launched among the architects and an amount of 4,000 francs earmarked to be awarded for the best architectural design. A site of approximately 15 hectares, selected for its location on the highest point of the plateau of Saigon, is reserved for the mansion and its outbuildings as well as for a park, gardens and lawns. The trees are rather few on this site, so that everything is to be created. It is a vast and fertile field open to the imagination of the artists. Let us hope that their imagination will not remain inactive and that we will soon see the foundations of the building more worthy of the chief of our colony than the temporary shack in which he is now living."

The hope expressed by the *Courier de Saigon* was not fulfilled for we learn through another report in the same paper on April 20, 1865, that only one entry to the architectural design contest had been received by that date, in addition to the one the governor of Cochinchina had received from his colleague, the British governor of Singapore and the Straits Settlements.

*Feature essay reproduced from the *Vietnam Press* of March 8, 1962, (Evening), No. 2252, pp. D.1.

It was also reported that the construction site had been fenced off.

The site was the former pleasure garden of the famous Marshall Le Van Duyet, vice-king of Southern VietNam whose mansion was located where the Department of Foreign Affairs now stands.† The garden was known as "Vuon Ong Thuong" or "Garden of the Minister," a name by which the Saigonese still refer to Tao Dan Park, which was part of the garden.

The design, approved on Feb. 22, 1868, by Admiral Lagrandiers, was by the French Architect Hermite, a graduate of the Paris School of Fine Arts who had won the contest for the design of the Hong Kong City Hall.

On Sunday, February 23, 1868, the cornerstone laying ceremony took place.

Msgr. Miche, titular bishop of Dansara and assistant vicar apostolic of Cochinchina, made the following remarks after the dedication rite:

"The higher a man stands in dignity above his fellow men, and particularly when he rules over them, the heavier and the more numerous are his duties. The prominent host who will live in this future abode shall extend his solicitude to the remotest borders of our six provinces; upon him will weigh the heavy responsibility of a vast and complex administration; it is here, in his future consultations that the vital issues concerning the needs of the future of the country will arise; it is from here that a just, wise, firm and enlightened administration shall be directed, bringing movement and life everywhere. The task is great but heavy and we must all together pray in our minds as well as our hearts that the Creator of all things will lavish his treasure of enlightenment and strength upon the future hosts of this Palace."

Assisted by Hermite, Admiral Lagrandiere laid the cornerstone at 2 metres 60 cms. deep. The cornerstone itself was a block, 50 cms. to a side of blue granite from Bien Hoa into which had been sealed a lead coffer containing newly-minted gold, silver and copper coins bearing the likeness of Napoleon III.

Present in the colourful assemblage were the family of the Admiral and "several ladies whose state coaches were stationed at the entrance of the future park."

Construction materials such as granite blocks and bricks, were heaped all around the site, gaily decorated for the occasion with venetian poles hung with colored streamers and foliage garlands. The French tricolor was everywhere.

The governor's band and the band of the Naval Infantry sought to drown out the noise of firecrackers set off by workers.

The actual work started at a fast pace only after architect Hermite had returned from China with a certain number of skilled craftsmen hired from Hong Kong and Canton.

In its issue of Dec. 20, 1868, the *Courrier de Saigon* gave the following progress report on the construction work:

"The foundation is from 3 to 3m50 deep, representing a total of 2,436 cubic metres. 2,000,000 bricks have been used; the basement floor of fine blue Bien Hoa granite has been completed.

The floor above, serving as ground floor and where the reception halls are located, is completed up to the entablatures, that is to say 10 meters above the ground, and when the frame of the ground floor and that of the first floor (English - second floor, Ed.) have been installed, the basic construction work up to the first floor will be completed. If the iron frame is received as scheduled, this building could be inaugurated in January 1870.

†Historians disagree as to whether Le Van Duyet should properly be referred to as Viceroy or as Governor General.

The immense palm-leaf roof which shelters the construction site and the workers, and which is used for the first time as such, is, we believe, a welcome innovation under these climes," concluded the paper.

The construction work was supervised by the Department of Public Works. On Sept. 25, 1869, eighteen months after the cornerstonelaying ceremony, an informal celebration marked the completion of the gross construction work.

In the ball-room, illuminated with Chinese lanterns and electric light, a banquet was held attended by all the people who had contributed to the construction of the Palace. A speech was made by Architect Hermite. Then the Governor's band struck up the gay notes of the Reine Hortense. Dinner was followed by a ball which went on until the early hours of the morning. A certain number of those invited had not, however, been able to attend the party because of a "torrential rain."

Following are some figures concerning the materials used and a breakdown of manpower cost by Sept. 25, 1869: concrete - 581 cubic meters, granite blocks - 2,000 m3, sand - 2,890 m3., lime - 1,260 m3., granite stones - 600 m3., cement - 151 tons, bricks - 4,360,000 units, tiles - 100,000, frame wood - 802 tons, iron frame - 150 tons, masons' pay - 52,600 francs, carpenters - 22,105 francs, stone cutters - 25,661 francs, roof-coverers - 7,618 francs, blacksmiths - 305 francs, non-skilled workers - 32,580 francs.

The finishing and decoration work was carried on until 1875. The total cost of the Palace amounted to 4,714,662 francs, according to Jules Boissiere ("*L'Indochine avec les Francais*"), who gives the following description of the Palace:

"This Palace is 86 meters along its front; at its ends the main building is flanked with two pavilions; the main building is topped with a very impressive dome, monumental central steps, and two gently sloping driveways to the main entrance.

The ground floor, above the basement which shelters the kitchens and household staff, includes on the right, the offices of the Governor and his Cabinet and the archives; on the left, the dining room. In the middle, an immense hall connects the two wings; from this hall, a marble staircase leads up to the apartments of the first floor. In the hall at the far end is the reception hall, quite beautiful, which can accommodate about one thousand guests. The ceiling, richly decorated with gilt moulding, is supported by columns of the purest style."

The Palace later became the official residence of the Governor-General of Indochina. It was called the "Palais Norodom" — which was also the former name of Thong Nhut Boulevard — in commemoration of the visit to Saigon in April 1888 of King Norodom I of Cambodia, who concluded the protectorate treaty with France.

In 1945, after the Japanese coup, the Palace fell for some time into the hands of the Japanese, who then turned it over to the British occupation forces who in their turn returned it to the French.

During the last years of the Indochina war the residence of the Chief of the Vietnamese Government was the Gia Long Palace, the former residence of the French Governor of Cochinchina.

It was not until September 7, 1954, two months after President Ngo Dinh Diem formed his first Government, that, on behalf of VietNam, he received the Palais Norodom from French Commissioner General for Indochina, General Paul Ely, which since that day has become the Dinh Doc Lap. In the speech delivered on that occasion President Ngo Dinh Diem said:


"In living in this honoured structure, I want to consider myself merely as the trustee of all the Vietnamese people, from the most humble to the most illustrious, in particular of all those who, in one way or another during the years, shared in the common hopes, endeavors and sacrifices; all those who have endured their part of national sufferings."^a

^aA special committee, the Public Movement for the Renovation of Independence Palace, is now in charge of renovation of the colonial-style yellow stucco Palace following its partial destruction February 27, 1962 when it was bombed during an attack by two planes of the Vietnamese Air Force.


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SOUTHWARD EXPANSION OF VIETNAMESE TERRITORY (1069 - 1759)



FRENCH INDOCHINA



3 | *Analysis of the French Style of Administrative System*

The basic structure and pattern of operations of municipal administration in the Saigon Prefecture are based upon the system of government established by the French. The influence of the French administrative system is seen in the basic statutes for local government and administration and in the omnipresent role of the Vietnamese national government as a party to the public administration of municipal affairs.

The governmental structures of both France and Vietnam relegate urban government to a subordinate position and at the same time provide for the allocation of numerous functions affecting only municipal residents to agencies of the Central Government. These are typical practices under unitary forms of government. In Vietnam today, even more than in contemporary France, the subordination of urban government to the policies and administration of the Central Government is almost complete.

Despite this subordination, however, in actual current operations, municipal government agencies frequently act in a somewhat autonomous or semi-autonomous manner in the sense that their actions on a day-to-day basis are dependent more upon operational necessities than upon

statutory provisions. In theory, a tightly knit integrated system of local dependence upon various Central Government agencies has been established. In practice, numerous agencies of the prefecture depend only indirectly upon technical services of the central units. Although national controls over policies, personnel administration, and budgets operate to provide direct dependence, basically the prefecture carries out its assigned functions without calling upon national agencies.

While major policy questions are handled by appropriate sectors of the national government, operating decisions are usually made at the local level. Even in determinations concerning policy questions, however, prefecture officials are of importance as consultants. Their prestige, their expertise, and their positions as agents of implementation place them in situations favorable to their being used in advisory capacities.

In the final analysis, as Vietnam is a unitary nation, ultimate control over prefecture programs and actions does reside with the national government. In addition, regardless of the amount of leeway permitted to prefecture agencies and officials during administrative operations, local government in Vietnam is under the French-style tutelage system in which general control and power to make decisions concerning the legality of their actions are Central Government attributes.

PRINCIPLE OF THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

Napoleon's talents within the administrative arena are less heralded but certainly have been as far-reaching as his universally recognized talents within the military arena. Indeed, his administrative machinery innovations have been adopted in a considerable portion of the non-British influenced areas of the world. Former Jacobin Napoleon firmly installed Jacobin principles of integrated administrative organization, relying upon unity of command through development of a closely controlled authority pyramid.

Whatever possibility the Girondins and their successors might have had for successfully persuading France to emulate the American pattern of decentralization was completely lost following the impact upon administrative organization occurring during Napoleon's reign. Thus, the possibility was eclipsed for local communities in France to receive home rule, i.e., local determination as to form and structure of local government, or to be transferred political powers. Further, after the Napoleonic era, governments established in French colonies and

protectorates also were to be based upon principles of integrated administrative organizational structure under unitary forms of government.

Beginning in the early nineteenth century, in France even local determination concerning requisite governmental functions was greatly curtailed. Through the years French local governments have exercised a variety of optional functions agreed upon by proper deliberative procedures at the local level. France is much more flexible than Vietnam in this respect. However, the performance of even the local governmental optional functions has always been undertaken under the financial, or broader, surveillance and control of French central governmental agencies. Other forms of administrative discretion are permitted at the local levels of French governmental operations, but this discretion is within the limited framework superimposed by the central administration.

The most important principles governing the French administrative system are to be noted in the structure and operations of the contemporary Vietnamese administrative system, including: (1) unitary government, (2) centralization, (3) deconcentration, (4) integrated administrative structure, and (5) administrative tutelage. Although numerous governments operate according to varying mixtures of them, each of these principles is closely related to, and none is independent of, the others.

1. Unitary Form of Government

Under this doctrine, the national government possesses all powers and authority. It represents a unified structure. All regional and local units of government possess only that authority delegated to them. Thus, no transfer of power occurs, and the national government retains all administrative authority. Regional and local units are considered as children of the central unit.

In addition, the national government performs the following role in relation to lesser units:

- (a) it creates them;
- (b) it determines the form of organizational structure under which they operate;
- (c) it allocates functions to them and determines which functions they may assume;
- (d) it maintains financial controls over their operations-budgetary, taxation and expenditure;

- (e) it determines the forms of representation the population has at the local level and those the lesser units have at the national level;
- (f) it delineates lines of responsibility from agencies of lesser units to central agencies; and
- (g) it promulgates rules concerning *fonctionnaires*, including recruitment, assignment, and other personnel administration topics.

2. *Centralization*

Primary authority and responsibility is placed at a high level. Final decision-making authority rests with the chief of state or with secretaries, ministers, etc. Although officials at lower echelons make decisions, the direction—and even the reversing of these decisions—is in the hands of higher administrative levels. However, decisions made by lower levels are to be accepted by those under such jurisdiction. Ultimate control and coordination responsibilities reside at the highest level.

3. *Deconcentration*

Certain authority is delegated (never transferred) to lower-level officials to make decisions. This involves a form of delegation permitted under centralization, wherein ultimate authority is retained by higher levels. Centralization is more of a structural concept denoting the presence of authority, while deconcentration is more of an operational concept outlining the positions that are permitted to make certain decisions which are subject to review by higher authority.

4. *Integrated Administrative Structure*

A single administrator is assumed to have final responsibility and authority. The structure of an agency is scalar in nature, i.e., it resembles a pyramid with responsibilities defined on a subordinate-superordinate hierarchy and with final authority at the apex.

5. *Administrative Tutelage*

Both officials and agencies of the Central Government have guardianship powers over local governmental operations.¹ This role of guardian

¹Administrative tutelage can be exerted over both positions and actions. The concept assumes certain actions must be authorized by superior levels, and that such levels exercise budgetary and audit controls. At the same time, it is typically supposed that "arbitrary actions" by tutelage authorities are to be limited due to the availability of channels for appeals to designated alternate authorities.

permits the national government, represented by the national chief executive and Central Government administrators, to determine the legality of local decisions and to control the financial administration of local governments.

These French administrative system principles were formally initiated when the Jacobin dictatorship withdrew the powers given to the new departments which had been created by the Constituent Assembly in 1791. When Napoleon initiated the office of prefect for each department, deconcentration became the fundamental operational concept for administration of French local government. The prefects became the chief of state's other self in the departments, but their decisions were always subject to his review. Nonetheless, in time, prefects in France have become primarily agents of the Ministry of Interior.

FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Local government structure in Cochinchina was quite similar to that found even today in both France and Vietnam. In addition to the Saigon Prefecture, which was governed by a French mayor, Cochinchina was divided into three categories of local government; provinces (inspections), cantons, and communes (villages). The French also established both provincial and village councils of notables. Officials at these levels operated under the principle of deconcentration. Provinces received technical assistance from the chiefs of services in Saigon. French province chiefs governed their areas but delegated responsibilities to Vietnamese fonctionnaires.² By combining the An Nam and Tonkin Protectorates with Cochinchina and forming the Union Indochinoise, the French also developed a closely knit scheme for controlling the rest of Indochina.

Categories of local governmental structure in contemporary France follow basically the pattern imposed upon Cochinchina. Only two of the four tiers of French local government have been delegated significant administrative responsibilities, the department and the commune. Cantons are used only for military and electoral purposes, and *arrondissements* are only department subdivisions. There typically are 3 or 4 *arrondissements* in a department, with one serving the departmental capital. Both of the tiers serving as active administrative units formally

²Vietnamese mandarins were even sometimes called province chiefs. However, their role almost exclusively involved "indigenous affairs," i.e., rural government. They had no authority over French officials. In practice, they would request needed authorizations from a French province chief, who would then instruct French provincial technical agencies to provide specific services.

are to serve the national government in the first instance and the local residents' interests secondly, as do local units of Vietnam formally.

Departments are governed by prefects who are the principle local officers of Central Government tutelage. Prefects are appointed senior civil servants who represent the Central Government in administering the implementation of central administrative services and who are under the control of the Ministry of Interior. They are assisted by a *corps prefectural* assigned from national cadres who usually report to the prefect but who may report to appropriate Central Government ministries depending upon the services they are assigned to administer. The Central Government also appoints subprefects who serve as *chefs de cabinet* and chief *arrondissement* administrators.


Each department also has an elected *conseil general*. However, the prefect, in a manner similar to the Prefect of Saigon, initiates the departmental budget, attends council meetings, and disburses funds voted by the council. The Ministry of Interior, in turn, approves the departmental budget and agrees to loans requested by the council. All appropriate technical ministries exercise controls over departmental operation, although primary control rests in two ministries, Interior and Finance.

Communes are governed by mayors appointed by elected *conseils municipaux*. Council decisions can be vetoed by the prefect. The commune government is assigned mandatory functions, prohibited others, and permitted to adopt certain optional ones. Further, although the communes can levy taxes, maximum limits are set by the Central Government. In short, commune administrative operations adhere rather strictly to the principle of deconcentration.

Local governmental structure in Vietnam today bears considerable resemblance to the deconcentration in the French tiers of local government. The Vietnamese tiers, in order of size and scope of responsibility, are: provinces, districts, cantons, villages, and hamlets.³ Chiefs at one tier are responsible for the administrative actions of chiefs and other officials of the lower tier(s). Both the President of the Republic and the Department of Interior exercise primary authority over the operations of local government. The technical agencies, operating principally through the province chiefs' offices, also aid and direct administration at the local level.

³In addition there are four regional delegates (southeast, southwest, central highlands, and central lowlands) having no direct administrative responsibilities, serving as the President's representatives and acting in an advisory capacity. Most districts no longer have canton subdivisions and the present tendency is to eliminate this level. There are appointed provincial and village councils, although current plans are to make them elective.


ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM



I.G. Inspectorate General
 D.G. Directorate General
 Per.S.G. Permanent Secretariat General

* President is Head of National Defense Dept.
 and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF VIETNAMESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT



The Saigon Prefecture and the three Vietnamese local units holding the status of cities, Hue, Danang, and Dalat, are outside the regular tier arrangement. They are legal entities having their own budgets and owning their own property. However, both the prefecture and the cities are responsible to the Presidency, the Department of Interior, the Department of Finance, and various substantive agencies.

National government controls over the prefecture and the cities include: appointment and removal of certain officials; assignment of civil service personnel to perform as municipal *fonctionnaires*; technical services instructions; budgetary, expenditures (over 60,000\$VN), assessments, and tax levy approvals, as well as budget implementation assistance; and rulings on legality of administrative programs, actions, and procedures. These controls take the form of both coercive (orders, rules, etc.) and non-coercive (advice, technical assistance, etc.) national government actions. Each form of control, however, is exercised according to the principle of administrative tutelage.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED UNDER THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

Both the French and Vietnamese contemporary administrative systems provide for formal and legal patterns of national-local relationships which place the latter in a subordinate position. These patterns are based upon the concept of integrated administrative organization long advocated by significant numbers of administrative analysts. Recently, however, the principles of administrative integration have come increasingly under attack in important administrative circles.

A definite trend toward administrative decentralization, in the sense of delegation and even transfer of responsibility for decision making, although not in the sense of transfer of ultimate authority, is to be seen today in such important countries as the United States and the Soviet Union. This trend is explained partially because the ideal legal form of integrated administrative organization does not provide for the extent of control which it promises in principle. A further explanation is that administrative integration frequently has led to difficulties in terms of effective and efficient implementation of assigned functions.

Problems frequently encountered under integrated administrative organization typically are similar to those of unitary governments in general. Rigid controls pledged in theory according to both administrative principles may be undermined because of the presence of non-legal,

situational factors. Many of the difficulties are almost universal in that they are not necessarily peculiar to organizational integration or to unitary government.

Further, the existing difficulties are complicated by the fact that they are not necessarily consistent, but depend upon situational factors. First, organizational integration might produce operational delays and inaction because lower-level officials fear red tape or being overruled. Secondly, it might result (in certain areas of administrative activity) in excessive discretion being exercised by lesser officials who stack reports to higher authorities while using their own discretion in making decisions concerning local problems. Subordinate levels might adopt this second course because: (a) they feel controls many hierarchical strata away cannot adequately maintain surveillance over their day-to-day operations, or (b) they feel that higher-level understanding of local problems does not result in adequate sympathy for the administrative needs within their jurisdiction. In other instances, many of the difficulties are not encountered at all due to national and local situational factors or to effective administrative countermeasures to cope with them.

In other words, there is a possibility, and even a propensity, for certain types of difficulties to arise in practice when any government attempts to implement tenets of the French administrative system. All of these will not be encountered when one or more of the tenets is applied. Their incidence will relate to circumstances, including cultural, political, economic, administrative and social factors. Many of these determining factors will have long histories in a particular jurisdiction, while others will stem from emergency and personality factors. These reservations should be considered in evaluating the principles in relation to the frequently encountered difficulties presented here.

1. Deconcentration

In theory, this precept offers numerous advantages in terms of expediting administrative operations and of prompting administrative efficiency. In practice, many of these projected advantages are often consummated. However, deconcentration is extremely complex when implemented. Although authority remains at the highest ones, power (of varying degrees) is disbursed among several high levels. As a result, despite its implicit adherence to the scalar principle, officials have several masters.

Under the French system, for example: the Ministry of Interior, representing the national government (and the chief of state to whom it is responsible), maintains control over local agency administrative

activities through the offices of the prefects; the prefects control the tiers of local government through their own offices; and the technical services and finance ministries exercise controls through performance of their assigned functions and through their own personnel working under the prefects. A functionary acting upon problems of local government administration may well have responsibilities to all of these agencies. The prefects themselves encounter the same handicap.

If there is adequate cooperation and coordination among the various central agencies concerned there is no necessity for significant problems to arise, unless emergency or personality factors determine otherwise. Problems do arise, however, when differences in priorities among the involved agencies and units preclude effective coordination of all of their operating programs and policies.

The prefects have the responsibility to undertake programs and implement policies that are of concern to their entire area of jurisdiction; they must place highest priorities upon goals related to these programs and policies. Technical service ministries must place highest priorities upon their own programs, e.g., public health, housing, etc.; immediate implementation of specific technical service programs may not be consistent with the prefects' immediate goals for the areas under their jurisdiction and, therefore, may receive low priorities. In addition, the ministry in charge of finance may find the high priority programs of both the prefects and the technical services ministries are inconsistent with the program and procedures it has been assigned to oversee.

The problems related to conflicting priorities to a certain extent concern the interpretations of officials of agencies and units as to the composition of their mandates. The theory underlying deconcentration is that administrative operations are to serve the interest of the entire nation, rather than purely local or private interests which might tend to aid sections of the nation but disrupt the welfare of the country as a whole. Agencies and units receive their mandates in the spirit of this theory.

Naturally, officials at high levels may have several interpretations as to what constitutes the national interest, and such variations also may be found between higher and lower administrative agencies and units. These differences are frequently manifested in such topics as the relative benefit to the national interest of immediate financial soundness as compared to immediate provision of specific governmental services. They also are manifested in controversies concerning the

long-range benefits of placing specific governmental programs on a higher priority level than others.

2. Centralization and Integrated Administrative Structure

According to these two principles, officials at higher levels and at the highest level can intervene when there are dissimilarities in priorities and in interpretation among lower-level agencies and units. The Chief of State may even intervene because highest authority resides in his office.

However, innumerable administrative snafus are possible when superordinate use of authority to settle subordinate differences becomes common practice. The basis of any sound administrative system is that decision-making concerning problems within the jurisdiction of an agency or unit must be made by officials at that level, with external interference or intervention occurring only in exceptional instances (i.e., their incidence should be kept at a minimum). This rule becomes more essential the closer a particular decision is to the rung of day-to-day operating decisions along the hierarchy of rungs of areas of discretion legally available to a given agency or unit.

A number of difficulties are possible when superior administrative levels intervene excessively, i.e., overuse the authority they possess, in the activities of lower administrative levels. It possibly may result in undue delays in administrative actions and in general in inefficient administrative operations.

Lower-level administrative initiative may be stymied, and, even more important, programs may be stalled or auspicious moments for effectively making certain decisions may be lost forever. Subordinate levels may become fearful of making even relatively minor decisions without advance higher-level approval. In addition, it is possible under such circumstances that day-to-day lower administrative unit decisions may be received as less than authoritative.

A final possible difficulty is presented in the actions of the higher-level official who by choice or necessity feels he must frequently intervene in lower-level decision-making. He may be placed in a position where he is involved in many more decision-making activities—particularly more technical decisions—than his office can assume efficiently. Delegation of responsibility within his own office for making such decisions in itself frequently presents a problem.

The final product of these circumstances may be a situation in which all decision-making concerning matters under the authority of an agency or even of an entire government resides in the hands of one top official at a very high echelon. When this occurs, of course, the administrative system is no longer based upon deconcentration.

3. *Administrative Tutelage*

Application of this principle lessens the extent of local and lower level discretion but does not destroy it. Decisions are still made at these levels.

The need for approval by a higher administrative level of the legality of a specific lower-level decision may lead to excessive red tape and delay. Aware of this, subordinates may attempt circumvention through both action and inaction. The latter may take the form of inadequate relaying of information. The former may take any of a number of forms. Lower levels may sidestep higher levels because officials feel that circumstances are such that waiting for action from higher authority would have extremely deleterious effects upon administrative operations within their jurisdictions. Such circumvention frequently occurs in an informal vein, thereby making administrative actions only indirectly become *ultra vires* in nature. An excellent example of this type of informal circumvention is found in the Soviet Union (a federal rather than a unitary form of government) where it has become so prevalent it is institutionalized at numerous levels and is today a generally accepted administrative practice.

A further potential difficulty is that lower and local levels may become so unresponsive to problems within their own jurisdictions that effective administrative actions may be precluded. This presents a serious dilemma. If a local unit of government is not responsive to the policies of higher levels, its actions are illegal. At the same time, if its actions are not responsive to determined local needs because such actions would be contrary to higher level policies, its operations will be ineffective within its own jurisdiction.

Informal circumvention of the higher level's policy provides a possible solution to the dilemma, but it also provides the basis for innumerable administrative difficulties. When the higher level policies are somewhat ambiguous, as legal and formal declarations typically are in at least certain particulars, local level officials may be able to act according to the letter rather than the spirit of the policies. This may permit them to attempt actively to solve determined local needs but

removes their practices a step further away from higher level effective control. It also presents the further difficulty that day-to-day administrative necessities may be interpreted as being part of the national interest.

4. *Unitary Form of Government*

Local level administration operating in a unitary government faces numerous possible difficulties. Overlapping functional divisions at the central and local levels, dependence upon central agencies interested in numerous non-local as well as local functions, etc., frequently present multifold operating problems.

These problems, on occasion, are compounded by the fact many *fonctionnaires* operating through the local levels are directly responsible to Central Government agencies. This lessens the control of local officials over operations occurring within their jurisdictions and in general complicates lines of administrative responsibility. If *ad hoc* agencies also provide local services and are outside the regular local government structure, these lines are even more complicated.

In addition to difficulties arising because of problems encountered in operations, the legal foundation of dependency of local levels upon the Central Government consistently provides a basis for possible administrative difficulties. Formal authority is only delegated—never transferred—under the unitary scheme, and the authority that is exercised continues only at the grace of the parent unit.

The problem is that the Central Government may treat local units as stepchildren rather than as favorite siblings. Substantive power may be jealously guarded in the nation's capital at the expense of providing operating authority and responsibility to local units to permit them to act effectively.

Ability to exercise optional responsibilities may be withheld and thus deprive the local units of enough administrative leeway to meet contingencies peculiar to specific localities. If this last difficulty exists it will be complicated by the local unit's inability to alter its basic structure in an attempt to solve its own locality problems within the framework of its existing functional responsibilities.

Finally, the unitary scheme, by definition, presents built-in stumbling blocks because access to decision-making channels ultimately governing local government structure and administration is removed from the parties (community groups, individuals, and enterprises) immediately affected by the operations of local administration.

Removing officials, at least partially, from the necessity of strict accountability to the whims of local interests has the ostensible virtue of permitting the central agencies and their representatives operating at local levels to rise above local particularism and promulgate policies based upon current national needs and future desired improvements.

At the same time, access by affected local parties may be the only way to insure their acquiescence to and cooperation with governmental programs and operations. When deprived of this access, they may act in such a way as to render continued effectiveness of local administration considerably more difficult than warranted by the resources it has available as compared to the material problems it faces.

CONCLUSION

All of the principles concerning the form and structures indicated in the French type of administrative system simply serve to outline relationships. They concern lines of administrative responsibilities based upon a series of definitions of prescribed and proscribed relationships, including: definitions of superior-subordinate relationships; definitions of relationships within horizontal administrative patterns; definitions of relationships within vertical administrative patterns; definitions of staff and line relationships; and, definitions of relationships between central and local agencies and affected parties.

The principles define actions and relationships of lower levels that will be sanctioned by higher levels. They also generally outline the limits of discretion in decision-making permitted at each level of an administrative hierarchy. That is, they outline the extent to which officials at a given level can dictate the framework of relationships between their offices and (a) other governmental offices and officials, and (b) the population under their jurisdiction.

Implementation of the French style of administrative system, through actual operations involving the relationships defined in the principles, permits or prevents overlapping of administrative functional activities. Overlapping jurisdictions may occur: (a) in central agency relationships with lower levels and local units and with the population under the jurisdictions of the lower levels and local units; and, (b) in direct central agency relationships with subdivisions of local units and lower levels as opposed to local unit and lower level relationships with their own administrative subdivisions.

Finally, the relationships defined in the principles outline who has access to administrative decision-making. First, the relationships

concern the access of one administrative level to the decision-making channels of other (higher or lower) levels or units. Secondly, the relationships concern the access of parties affected by the operations of a particular level or unit both to the agency whose actions affect them and to higher levels of authority. Thus, the relationship help to determine the influence upon administrative decision-making both of various levels of government and of possible external non-governmental interested forces.

All of the possible difficulties encountered by the French style of administrative system stem from actual administrative relationships. They arise in the relationships accruing during administrative operations.

4 | *Legal and Administrative History of the Saigon Prefecture*

Although municipal administration in the Saigon Prefecture today reflects the influence of all of the principles of the French administrative system, it has undergone numerous changes and refinements during and after the French era. Each of these changes must be evaluated in terms of the administrative system itself and also in terms of the impact it has had upon administrative operations within the Saigon metropolitan area. Cholon's role throughout the pre- and post-French era has been closely linked to Saigon's municipal administration; this role of dependence was finally legalized in 1941 with the discontinuation of the political division of the two cities.

A brief outline of structural and administrative changes in Saigon-Cholon is presented here to give a broad picture of the major steps in the evolution of the organization and administration of the prefecture. These steps provide the background and to a certain extent provide the rationale for explaining numerous facets of contemporary administration. The basic framework for administrative operations actually has not changed considerably since July 11, 1908. Both the Bao Dai regime and the Republic adopted the major statutory provisions devised by the French. At the same time important changes have occurred in the operations of the prefecture. However, these changes

reflect more the increasing sophistication (common to most of the world's large communities) of procedures for expanding public services rather than revolutionary legal developments. Legally the prefecture is still influenced primarily by the principles of the French administrative system, and therefore is subject to the possible difficulties incumbent to that system.

LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

The following outline is based upon significant ordinances and *arretes* between 1877 and today affecting Vietnamese municipal administration and particularly the Prefecture of Saigon. Three primary divisions are presented in the outline: The French Era (including the Japanese period), the State of Vietnam Period during which Bao Dai served as Chief of State, and the Republic of Vietnam Period under President Ngo Dinh Diem.

A. *The French Era*

1. January 8, 1877: The positions of mayor and deputy mayor were made appointive offices with three-years terms. The Governor General of South Vietnam (Cochinchina) retained supreme administrative authority over the entire area including Saigon. In terms of administrative competence, the governor continued to act in a capacity somewhat similar to a departmental prefect with authority over the actions of the mayor.

2. March 23, 1882: The office of mayor and deputy mayor were made elective positions. Stringent restrictions were devised but certain Vietnamese as well as French residents were given suffrage. At this juncture, the candidates were always members of the French community.

3. October 17 and 20, 1887: Saigon was provided with the status of being a French city. The status of the mayor of Saigon became that of a mayor of a French commune.

4. October 3, 1888: The Vietnamese ceded Danang, Hanoi and Haiphong to the French. From this time until the latter part of the Japanese period these cities had French mayors.

5. July 11, 1908.¹ This ordinance reorganized the administrative organization of Saigon, Hanoi, and Haiphong.

¹Amended by ordinances of: December 17, 1909; October 16, 1914; April 29, 1915; January 19, 1916; August 31, 1922; September 14, 1926; September 11, 1927; and, May 4, 1929.

- a. Saigon was provided with the offices of mayor and two deputy mayors as well as with a municipal council. The members of the council were elected among both Vietnamese and resident French, and the proportion of council members for each group was fixed. However, voting restrictions placed upon Vietnamese residents were quite strict. Universal suffrage was not a guarantee of any ordinance until 1954.
- b. Cholon was provided with the office of mayor, which included the functions previously assigned to the province chief of Cholon. The Cholon mayor was placed under the authority of the mayor of Saigon. In addition, a Cholon municipal committee was established composed of members of the Saigon municipal council.

6. April 27, 1931: Saigon, Cholon, and their suburban territories were combined into an autonomous administrative area, the Saigon-Cholon Region. This unique administrative area was under the authority of the Governor General of Cochinchina and headed by a French administrator appointed by the Governor General who was given the title of "Administrator" of the Saigon-Cholon Region.²

An administrative council was created to assist the prefect. The offices of Saigon mayor and Cholon mayor were retained. Thus, at this time three separate French officials exercised administrative authority within the Region.

- a. An Arrete of December 14, 1931, issued by the Governor General of Indochina provided implementing procedures for the April 27, 1931 Ordinance. It also defined the boundaries of the autonomous Saigon-Cholon Region and the functions of the administrative (district chief) and of the municipal council of Saigon-Cholon. Although the municipal committee for Cholon was retained, the municipal council members were elected by residents of both Saigon and Cholon.

²Municipal and provincial administrators were appointed from among the *hors-classe des Services Civils of Administrateurs* (the "exceptional" class). Promising young French civil servants who had obtained their *licence en droit* usually began their career as an *administrateur adjoint des services civils*, moving through several classes of this rank. After promotion from the first class of this rank, they entered the exceptional class. The next highest steps in Vietnam, of course, were *resident superior du Tonkin*, *resident superior de l'An Nam*, and *gouverneur de la Cochinchine*.

7. December 19, 1941:³ This ordinance reorganized the Saigon-Cholon Region, establishing a single budget including all receipts and expenditures previously recorded in the separate budgets of Saigon, Cholon, and the Saigon-Cholon Region.

- a. In accordance with the December 19 ordinance, the functions of the mayor of Saigon and of the chairman of the municipal committee of Cholon were assigned to the administrator. In addition, the functions of the municipal council of Saigon and of the municipal committee of Cholon were assigned to the Administrative Council of the Saigon-Cholon Region. A December 28, 1941 Arrete of the Governor General of Indochina provided for implementation of the ordinance.

8. May 12, 1942: The Saigon-Cholon Region was divided into eighteen administrative subdivisions, "boroughs or quarters," each headed by a borough chief holding the honorific rank of canton chief. This Arrete was modified by the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cochinchina on July 31, 1947, and again on September 22, 1947.

9. September 26, 1947: The Arrete of this date was issued by the Prime Minister. It provided that the functions previously assigned to the offices of the administrator of the Saigon-Cholon Region, the regional administrative services chiefs, the administrative delegate of Saigon, and the special delegate for Cholon were to be assigned to the following offices with new titles: the prefect of Saigon-Cholon, the secretary general of the Region, the deputy prefect for Saigon, and the deputy prefect for Cholon.⁴

10. July 1, 1949: The prefect of Saigon-Cholon was to be appointed by decree on the proposition of the Governor of South Vietnam to the Minister of Interior.

- a. The prefect remained under the Governor's authority. He was assigned direction of all regional agencies relating to police, public buildings, public health, public works, and water and electricity supply and distribution. Under the control of the Prefectural Administrative Council of Saigon-Cholon and the authority of the governor, the prefect was

³Reorganization of Saigon, Hanoi, and Haiphong had previously occurred during the Japanese period by Ordinance of April 27, 1941.

⁴The functions of the secretary general and the deputy prefects were determined by the Prefect's Arrete of November 14, 1947.

in charge of: the management and custody of municipal properties; the operation of regional agencies and their accounts; the drafting and execution of the regional budget; and, the procedures for accepting contract bids.

- b. The staff of the regional agencies were placed under the authority of the prefect. He appointed certain categories of municipal employees with the approval of the governor. He also supervised civil servants detached from central government agencies who were assigned to serve the Region. These technical services cadres received their salaries from their respective central agencies. Other categories were appointed without the governor's approval, including employees hired on a temporary basis.

B. The Bao Dai Regime

1. June 30, 1951: This was an Arrete issued by the Vietnamese Prime Minister. It changed the name "Saigon-Cholon Region" to Prefecture of Saigon-Cholon.

2. December 27, 1952:

- a. *Decree No. 104-NV*: The eighteen quarters (administrative districts) of the prefecture were divided into seven boroughs under the direct authority of the Prefect. Each borough was placed under the authority of a borough council, including five councilors elected by universal suffrage. Each borough council selected a chairman and deputy chairman from among its membership.
 - i. The borough councils acted as: representatives of the residents of the borough *vis-a-vis* the prefectural authorities; and, delegates of the prefectural government, and consequently of the central government, in the boroughs.
 - ii. Borough council functions related to: general administration; police, health, and public works administration; security administration; and, ceremonial activities.
- b. *Decree No. 105-NV*: The Prefectural Administrative Council was reorganized to include the following members—The Prefect of Saigon-Cholon; fourteen Vietnamese councilors who also were chairmen and deputy chairmen of the borough councils; seven French councilors appointed by

Arrete of the Minister of Interior; and, one representative of the Chinese congregation in Cholon.

3. May 30, 1954: Three ordinances of this date reorganized urban administration in Vietnam. Ordinance No. 11 pertained to Saigon and provided that Cholon was to be administratively annexed to Saigon. Ordinance No. 12 pertained to Hanoi, Haiphong, Hue and Danang. The third ordinance, No. 13, dealt primarily with municipalities and chief towns of the provinces (chief liens). According to these three ordinances, urban incorporated areas were to take three forms: (1) Prefecture (Do Thanh); (2) Cities or Do Thi; and (3) Municipalities or Thi Xa.

- a. Public administration in the prefecture became the responsibility of the prefect, the prefectural council, and the borough chiefs.
- b. The prefect was to be a Vietnamese "chosen among the notables or high ranking officials" and was appointed by the chief of state's decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of Interior after consultation with the Government Regional Delegate.⁵ His assigned functions were basically those provided in 1947, e.g., direction of agency operations, budgetary controls, and appointing certain employees of the prefecture. However, he was to act as the Central Government's delegate to the newly established prefecture council.⁶

Four officers were assigned functions for assisting the prefect; The Director of Police, the Secretary General, the Deputy Prefect for Saigon, and the Deputy Prefect for Cholon.

- i. The Director of Police was appointed by the chief of state upon the recommendation of the Government Regional Delegate⁷ and the Minister of Interior. Informally, the prefect also was consulted. Although he was under the direct supervision of the prefect, he also received technical and many other instructions and forms of assistance from the Directorate of National Police and Security for South Vietnam.

⁵This position was basically the same as that of the former Governor of South Vietnam.

⁶The Administrative Council of which he had been chairman was abolished by Ordinance No. 11.

⁷Under Bao Dai and under the Republic until October 24, 1956 (Ordinance 57-A), the regional government delegates were given full authority to manage the administrative affairs within their jurisdictions and to supervise the actions of province chiefs. After this date, the regions were abolished as governmental units. The position of Government Delegate under the Republic of Vietnam only provides for inspecting, advisory, recommending, and ceremonial functions.

- ii. Both the secretary general and the deputy prefects were appointed by the Government Regional Delegate upon recommendation of the prefect. Their functions were essentially identical to those provided in the Prefect's Arrete of November 14, 1947. The secretary general acted on behalf of and under the direction of the prefect handling some certain general administrative and financial responsibilities. Both deputy prefects operated as delegates of the prefect, supervising the enforcement of laws and regulations as well as supervising and coordinating the administrative activities of the borough chiefs and the technical services.
- c. Both the administrative council and the borough councils were replaced by the prefecture council. As a transitory measure, borough councilmen elected on January 25, 1953 constituted the prefecture council. Their positions could be terminated at a date to be fixed by the Prime Minister upon the recommendation of the Minister of Interior.

Five councilmen were to be elected for three year terms from each borough by universal suffrage. Restrictions for voting and candidature included age (twenty-one and twenty-five respectively) and residence (borough requirements for voters and prefecture requirements for candidates). In addition, candidates had to be holders of a primary education certificate or its equivalent. Certain categories of persons were denied seats on the prefecture council including judges, Central Government employees, military personnel and the prefecture personnel. Only one election has been held for members of the prefecture council. Thirty-five members were elected in 1953.

The council was given certain deliberative powers relating to such functions as the budget, taxation, government loans, and the sale and purchase of properties costing over 100,000\$VN. In addition, it could express opinions on various prefectural problems, e.g., borough boundary changes. A chairman, two deputy chairman, and two secretaries served as officers of the council. The prefect was given broad control over council actions, including the right to protest against the council discussing matters not on the agenda, the right to speak at council meetings, the right to request re-examination of council decisions,

and the right to dissolve the council under certain extreme circumstances.

- d. Borough chiefs of each of the eight boroughs were to be elected by the councilmen representing a borough from among their own numbers. If selection by this means proved impossible the prefect could appoint a borough chief.⁸ The functions of the former borough councils were transferred to the borough chiefs who were to represent the prefecture in the boroughs but who had no statute making authority. Personnel were appointed to the borough administrative bureaus according to procedures determined by the prefect.

C. The Republic of Vietnam

1. August 24, 1956: Ordinance No. 13 of May 30, 1954 was changed. Former municipalities and chief towns were classified as villages. Under this new status, they no longer had mayors or elected municipal councils. Instead they were governed by a village council (Hoi Dong Xa) composed of three appointees of the province chief, i.e., the village chief, the police chief, and the finance officer, plus the youth delegate appointed by village youth associations. Hue, Danang, and Dalat became municipalities instead of cities.

2. October 22, 1956: The name of the Prefecture of Saigon was changed to Do-Thanh Saigon, literally translated "The Capital City of Saigon." However, the name "Prefecture" is still used in all administrative texts.

3. October 24, 1956: Ordinance No. 57-A refers to administrative reorganization of all local governments in Vietnam. Article 9 relating to cities reads as follows—"Cities are legal entities possessing autonomous budgets and public property." "Each city shall be governed by an appointed mayor (Thi Truong) and a city council." Only Saigon was to have a prefect (Do Truong).

4. March 23, 1959: Decree No. 74-TTP of this date supersedes Ordinance No. 11 of May 30, 1954. The principal effect of this decree was to intensify centralized administrative authority within the prefecture.

⁸The prefect also could assign the operations of borough affairs to a neighboring borough chief. He also could compel a borough chief to resign, although an avenue of appeal to the Administrative Court existed.

THE PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF THE PREFECTURE

Due to the importance of Decree No. 74-TTP of March 23, 1959, a translation of the text is presented below.

Text of Decree No. 74-TT of March 23, 1959

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM,

In view of the Decree No. 4-TTP dated October 29, 1955, as modified and supplemented by subsequent decrees, establishing the composition of the government;

In view of Ordinance No. 57-a dated October 24, 1956, governing reorganization of local government;

In view of Decree No. 143-VN dated October 22, 1956, changing the boundaries and names of Saigon-Cholon prefecture, as well as provinces and chief towns;

On the proposals of the Secretaries of State at the Presidency and for Interior,

DECREES:

Art. 1. The Prefecture of Saigon is an administrative unit possessing the status of a legal entity, an autonomous budget and capable of holding real property.

The Prefecture of Saigon is administered by a prefect.

At the prefect's side, a prefectural council is established to advise him on subjects stipulated in Article 17 of this decree.

CHAPTER ONE

I. THE PREFECT

Art. 2. The prefect is appointed by decree of the President of the Republic.

He is directly responsible to the President.

Art. 3. The prefect is the representative of the Central Government in the territory of the prefecture.

He directs all prefectural services and is responsible for public security and order: in emergency circumstances, he may call out the armed forces, and (if he does so) must immediately report to the Departments of National Defense and of Interior.

The prefect is authorized to make regulatory decisions on such subjects and within such limits as may be provided by law.

He is invested with the "Judicial" Police Authority ("autorite de la Police Judiciare" — "tu cach Tu Phap canh lai").

The prefect directs all affairs of prefectural organization, prepares and implements the budget.

He administers the public and private property of the prefecture, represents it in law, and assures the execution of its operations and contracts.

In the absence of legal provisions to the contrary, he appoints by *arretes* (incumbents to) all positions in the prefectural administration.

II. DEPUTY PREFECTS, CHIEF OF CABINET

Art. 4. The prefect is assisted by two deputy prefects.

The deputy prefects are appointed by decrees of the President of the Republic.

One of the two deputy prefects has the responsibilities of directing and supervising the activities of all boroughs (*arrondissements*) and the prefectural police services, taking care of the security situation and controlling all political and religious organizations as well as associations, syndicates, etc., in the prefecture.

The other deputy prefect is charged with coordinating activities of all other administrative and technical services under the jurisdiction of the prefecture.

The deputy prefects are the representatives of the prefect, under the orders and control of whom they exercise their responsibilities.

Within their respective assignments they may be granted permanent delegation of decision-making authority for specific types of prefectural government activities.

In case of the absence or incapacity of the prefect, a deputy prefect may be charged, by arrete of the President, with the expedition of the current affairs of the prefecture.

Deputy prefects are entitled to allowances in kind and in money equivalent to those of a "director of a departmental directorate having many services."

Art. 5. The chief of cabinet, directly responsible to the prefect, is charged with:

- Administrative management
- Confidential matters
- Special missions assigned by the prefect

He receives a salary and an allowance in kind and in money equivalent to those of a chief of cabinet in a department.

III. DIRECTOR OF PREFECTURAL POLICE

Art. 6. The directorate of the prefectural police is under the direct authority of the prefect.

The director of prefectural police is appointed by arrete of the President of the Republic.

He is immediately responsible to the prefect, but may correspond directly with the Directorate General of National Police and Security Services in regard to purely technical matters.

CHAPTER TWO

The Prefectural Council

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE PREFECTURAL COUNCIL

Art. 7. The prefectural council is composed of a number of councilors elected by universal direct suffrage: three councilors for each borough.

The duration of the councilor's term of office is fixed at three years, indefinitely renewable.

Election procedures of the prefectural council will be established by a subsequent decree.

The service of the prefectural councilors is unpaid.

The president of the council, alone, shall receive a representation allowance which will be fixed by the Secretary of State at the Presidency, on the proposal of the prefect.

The president of the prefectural council or any of the other councilors who are assigned a special mission may receive a compensation fixed by the same procedure.

Art. 8. The prefectural councilors may be removed from office by arretes of the President of the Republic upon recommendation of the prefect:

- On grounds of ineligibility determined, or incapacity occurring, after the election;
- For absence from three successive ordinary or special meetings of the council without reasons recognized as legitimate by the council;
- For refusal to perform duties assigned to them.

In addition, the councilors may resign voluntarily by sending a request under registered envelope to the Department of Interior. The resignation will be effective

on the date of receipt of the approving decision of the Secretary of State for Interior. In case there is no such decision, the resignation shall be effective a month after the date on which the request was sent.

The election of a new councilor shall be organized to replace the one who has resigned, except in case there remains only five months before the ordinary election of the prefectural council.

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PREFECTURAL COUNCIL

Art. 9. The prefectural council shall meet at least once every six months in ordinary session, upon the summons of the president of the council. The agenda and dates of meeting must have the prior approval of the prefect.

It (the council) may also meet in extra-ordinary session, if so requested by the prefect.

Art. 10. During the first meeting of each year, the prefectural council shall elect (from among its members) a president, a vice-president, and a secretary who shall compose the administrative committee.

Art. 11. The prefectural council may not legally meet in the absence of the prefect or his official representative.

Art. 12. The prefect or his representative may oppose (and thereby prevent) the discussion of all questions not listed in the agenda previously approved by the prefect.

The prefect or his representative must be granted the right to speak upon his request.

The following are considered *ipso facto* null and void:

—Resolutions regarding matters outside the jurisdiction of the council or taken outside of legal meetings.

—Proclamations which form a demand or emit political views.

Art. 13. The prefect or his representative may call upon the assistance of the deputy prefects or upon one or more officials of the prefecture, according to the nature of the subject under discussion. The council, even when it has constituted itself into secret session, may not bar the presence of these assistants of the prefect.

Art. 14. The detailed methods of executing the provisions of Articles 9 and 10 above, as well as the council's rules of organization and method of functioning, shall be the subject of an internal regulation (statute) prepared by the council, and approved by the Secretary of State for Interior.

Art. 15. The president of the prefectural council presides over and assures order in all meetings, with the facilities (mostly in personnel) provided by the prefect.

All sessions of the council shall be public, except when the council is requested by the prefect to meet in secret session or it is so decided by the majority of the council's members.

Art. 16. The minutes of all the council's sessions shall be sent to the prefect within seven days after the closing dates of the sessions.

III. THE POWERS OF THE PREFECTURAL COUNCIL

Art. 17. The prefectural council shall be consulted on the following matters:

—Budgets (principal and supplementary budgets).

—Taxes and subsidies.

—Bond issues.

—Acquisition and sale of properties belonging to the prefecture.

—Revision of boundaries of the prefecture and its boroughs.

—Other matters on which the prefect finds it necessary to consult the council.

Art. 18. All subjects presented to be deliberated during a session must receive the council's decisions within that session. On its closing date, all matters which have not been decided upon, shall be considered as approved by the council.

Art. 19. The council may, on its own volition, express its wishes or pass motions on all questions of a prefectural character.

If these wishes or motions are intended for publication, or if they are addressed to authorities other than the prefect, they must be transmitted through the latter.

CHAPTER THREE

Regarding the Budget

Art. 20. The prefectural budget shall be prepared by the prefect and presented to the President of the Republic for approval, after obtaining the advice of the prefectural council.

The prefect is the authorizing officer ("ordonnateur") of the prefectural budget, and may delegate permanent powers to an official designated by him to perform these duties under his control and responsibility.

All authorizations of expenditure are to be submitted for the prior approval of the controller of expenditure commitments (controleur des dépenses engagées).

Art. 21. Receipts from the following shall be applied to the prefectural budget:

- Taxes, property rents, royalties, contributions received to the profit of the Prefecture;
- The amounts received from additional percentage on taxes ("centimes additionnels") within the limits of a maximum fixed each year by arrete of the Secretary of State for Finance.
- The portion allocated to the prefecture on the basis of the total of all taxes collected on the territory of the prefecture to the profit of other budgets.
- Funds contributed by other interested agencies to carry out a common project (fonds de concours).
- Interest or (unexpended portions of) loans contracted for major public works.
- Revenues from property belonging to the prefecture.
- All other receipts the collection of which is authorized by existing laws.

Art. 22. The tax lists established for the prefecture shall be effective for collection, after being approved by the Secretary of State for Finance.

Art. 23. The prefectural budget shall provide for the total expenses of general administration, police, the road system, street lights, sanitation, education and, in general, for all expenses of a prefectural nature other than those chargeable to the national budget or other autonomous budgets.

The obligatory expenses of the prefectural budget are:

- Debts payable on maturity.
- Personnel costs.
- Expenses of maintaining material, buildings and roads, and of acquiring material on a current basis.
- Police costs.
- Charges in connection with gifts or legacies regularly accepted, and of endowments regularly constituted.

CHAPTER IV

Borough and Borough Chiefs

I. ORGANIZATION — APPOINTMENT OF BOROUGH CHIEFS

Art. 24. The territory of the prefecture is divided into several boroughs; the number and the boundaries of which shall be defined by arretes of the President of the Republic.

Such division shall not confer any administrative or financial autonomy upon the boroughs (thus constituted).

Each borough shall be composed of several quarters ("Phuong"); the number, organization and boundaries of which shall be defined by arretes of the Secretary of State for Interior, (see annex to this decree).*

Art. 25. Each borough shall be administered by a borough chief under the authority of the prefect.

Borough chiefs are government employees appointed by arrete of the President of the Republic.

Art. 26. Borough chiefs' salaries and allowances shall be borne by the prefectural budget. They receive allowances (in money and in kind) equivalent to those of a "delegation chief" (district chief) in the provinces.

II. BOROUGH CHIEFS' POWERS

Art. 27. The chief of a borough is the representative of the prefect in the borough, and exercises his functions under the authority of the prefect and the deputy prefects.

He has no power to issue regulations.

In his capacity, he is responsible for the enforcement of laws and regulations, and performs all special duties which may be assigned to him by the prefect.

He performs his responsibilities with the cooperation of the chief of the police precinct concerned.

He is empowered, specifically, to certify the authenticity of signatures in private legal documents, including genealogical acts (births, deaths, weddings) and transfers of property, to certify true copies, and to issue certificates of good character, of residence and of identity or any other provided by special regulations.

In matters of certification, he shall have the authority to act as chief of the borough in which the person ceding property lives (in case of transfers of things), or of the borough in which the head of the family lives (in case of genealogical acts).

He is also endowed with the powers to authorize private meetings on the occasion of receptions, marriages, funerals and anniversaries (such as social parties, weddings, burials, death anniversaries, sacrifices, etc.), and gatherings of religious organizations for ceremonial performances.

Art. 28. The chief of a borough is also assigned to act in the capacity of a registrar ("officer de l'Etat Civil") in his borough, under the control of the public prosecutor.

He is invested with the judicial police authority ("Tu Phap Canh Lai").

CHAPTER V

Miscellaneous Provisions

Art. 29. All members of the prefectural council currently serving at the date of signature of this decree shall continue their offices with new responsibilities (in the council) until the date of election of a new council. Their term of office will expire after the publication of the result of the election.

Provisionally, chiefs of boroughs currently in office shall retain their functions until their replacement by others.

Art. 30. All provisions contradictory to this decree are hereby repealed.

Art. 31. All Secretaries of State are charged, each as to that which concerns him, with the execution of this decree which shall be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam.

A COMPARISON

The principal changes in the current legal text for organization and administration in the prefecture as compared to the text it superseded are presented below.

Comparative table showing the difference between the 1954 and the present administrative organization of the Prefecture of Saigon (as fixed up by decree 74 TTP of March 23, 1959)

1954 Administrative Organization	Current Administrative Organization
<i>I. Prefect</i>	
Under the authority of the Government Delegate of South Vietnam	Under the authority of the President (The prefect's functions are practically the same).
<i>Assistants:</i>	<i>Assistants:</i>
a. Director of prefectural police	a. No change
b. Secretary general	b. Superseded by a chief of cabinet having the same rank as a departmental chief of cabinet.
c. Two deputy prefects, one each for Saigon and Cholon. Appointed by arretes of the Government Delegate of South Vietnam.	c. Two deputies for the entire capital city, one for security; political, and borough affairs and one for technical services. Appointed by Presidential arrete (and given the same rank as a departmental director).
<i>May be appointed acting Prefect:</i> the secretary general or one deputy prefect, by arrete of Governor of South Vietnam.	<i>May be appointed acting prefect:</i> one deputy prefect (chief of cabinet cannot be eligible for this appointment by presidential arrete.
<i>II. Prefectural Council</i>	
Was a <i>legislative assembly</i> Composition: 35 assemblymen (5 for each district) elected through universal suffrage organized in all districts (or boroughs).	Is a <i>consultative commission</i> Composition: 24 members (3 for each district, i.e., borough, and elected through the previous procedures).
<i>Term:</i> 3 years	<i>Term:</i> No change
<i>Functions:</i>	<i>Functions:</i>
Deliberative rights Consultative role	No deliberative rights. Consultative role: (a) prefect must consult the council on a certain number of questions. (b) prefect may request the council's opinion, at his discretion, when necessary.
Expression of aspiration or petition or motion.	Expression of aspiration or petition or motion.
Audit of the prefect's accounting records.	No right to audit prefect's accounting records.

Procedures and Organization

Prefect sets up the meeting agenda, with the concurrence of the chairman. Regular session every three months. Special session, if requested by 2/3 membership.

Secretariat includes

1 chairman)
2 vice chairmen) 5
2 secretaries)

A permanent committee in charge of the current operations between two regular sessions.

Sessions in private; (a) when requested by prefect, (b) when decided by majority of membership.

Internal regulations to be ratified by Governor of South Vietnam.

Records of deliberations must be forwarded to the prefect five days after the session, at the latest.

Resignation

Councilors may be pronounced as having resigned by arrete of the Governor of South Vietnam.

Prefect entitled to accept resignation tendered by councilor.

Procedures and Organization

Chairman sets up meeting agenda with the concurrence of the prefect. Regular session every six months. Special session, if requested by prefect.

Secretariat includes:

1 chairman)
1 vice chairman) 3
1 secretary)

No permanent committee.

Sessions in private; (a) when requested by prefect, (b) when decided by majority of membership.

Internal regulation to be ratified by the Ministry of Interior.

Minutes of session must be forwarded to the prefect seven days after the session, at the latest.

Resignation

Councilor may be pronounced as having resigned by presidential arrete.

Secretary of State for Interior holds this right.

III. Budget: No change, except that Council now has less significant deliberative rights but is vested primarily with consultative duties.

IV. Boroughs (districts) and their chiefs.

Prefectural area divided into 7 districts or boroughs. Borough chief elected among councilors living in the concerned boroughs. If it was impossible to elect a chief from the borough councilors, the prefect appointed a councilor from another borough with the concurrence of the borough councilors).

Prefectural area divided into 8 districts or boroughs. Each borough is in turn divided into many guilds or "phuong". Borough chiefs are *civil servants* appointed by a presidential arrete. No right of the borough chief as a councilor to follow up and supervise the prefect's activities.

One of the most interesting facets of the current decree is the close proximity of the status of the prefect with that of a province chief. His office, like that of chiefs of provinces, is now under the direct authority of the Presidency and receives instructions directly from the Presidency.

The two deputy prefects have basically the same responsibilities as do deputy province chiefs, i.e., internal security and administrative

affairs. Under the 1954 ordinance, members of the prefectural council also could be borough chiefs, but under the 1959 decree borough chiefs are civil servants, as are the district chiefs in the administrative hierarchy of the provinces.

In addition, boroughs now also have administrative subdivisions, the "phuong," which display somewhat the same organizational patterns as villages under the provincial administrative system. Finally, the prefect drafts the prefectural budget and submits it to the Presidency for approval, a provision providing for considerable administrative centralization quite similar to the centralization previously adopted at the provincial level.

5

*Current Administrative
Organization in Saigon*

There are over 12,000 employees under the authority of the prefect serving to implement the administrative responsibilities of the prefecture. The increase since 1959 when the number was less than 9,000 has occurred chiefly due to necessities for expanding the rolls of the elementary education service and the technical services. Security forces under the prefecture directorate of police remained at almost the same numbers during this period although their ranks continue to include a total far exceeding other public service ventures.

Thus, proportionately at least, the municipal administrative system is displaying some recognition of the essential nature of the problem of providing personnel to meet expanding metropolitan public service needs. However, the expansion which has occurred in the non-security based phases of prefecture administration only grazes the surface of allotting sufficient resources to the social, physical, health, economic, and related problems which are becoming increasingly troublesome both in Saigon and in its metropolitan area in Gia Dinh Province.

The SAIGON PREFECTURE ORGANIZATION CHART at the conclusion of this Chapter provides a broad picture of the administrative structure and program priorities of public administration in the metropolitan

area. From this chart and from the budget and personnel statistics tables it is readily observable that security administration is considerably more significant as compared to other public services than is typically found in most of the world's metropolitan areas.

However, even the obvious high priority to police administration outlined in the fiscal year and personnel statistics does not provide a fair and balanced image of the administrative scene in Saigon. Public works, including renovation and development are important, although the prefecture budgeted less appropriations for public works items in 1961 than in 1959. An attempt has been made at least to provide tentative projections for future land use and for provision of certain public services to lessen somewhat the current strains caused chiefly by population increases and poor land use and development.

The problem today is not one of lack of attention to metropolitan area needs. Rather, the problem is one of devoting too little of the area's resources and the prefecture's energies to solving those needs. At present, elementary schools and hospitals, etc., are being constructed; roads are being built and repaired; public health and safety controls have been formally adopted; new public services are receiving attention; and increasing numbers of personnel are being recruited and assigned to administer and carry out public services. However, these efforts and allocations of prefecture resources have not kept pace with the expanding public service requirements present in Saigon and most certainly have not prepared the metropolitan area for the inevitable rise in conurbation problems which will occur with each passing year.

To a certain extent the security situation provides a good excuse for not immediately increasing the allocation of financial and other resources of the area to such municipal responsibilities as land and economic development, renovation programs, and slum clearance and to such public services as public health, welfare, and education. No one would underestimate the necessity for maintaining maximum security and for devoting considerable attention to those segments of the economy which are essential to insuring national survival. At the same time, due to the tremendous significance of the Saigon area to the entire economy of Vietnam, it is also essential that attempts to solve numerous basic problems be given extremely high priority.

Basically, this means finding ways to devote a considerably higher proportion of the gross national product of the Republic of Vietnam to meeting metropolitan area needs. A very high percentage of GNP

is accounted for by economic activity within the Saigon area. Today a progressive development of effective municipal administration of public services is necessary if the economic base of the Saigon metropolitan area is to meet its share of projected economic advancement in Vietnam.

The SAIGON PREFECTURE ORGANIZATION CHART, although providing a general view of the lines of authority and responsibility of the administrative system for providing existing metropolitan area public services, is somewhat misleading in the sense that it oversimplifies the relationships occurring within the administrative structure of the prefecture.

BUDGET OF THE PREFECTURE OF SAIGON
(In Piastres)

RECEIPTS	FISCAL YEARS		
<i>Receipts from Tax Roll</i>	1959	1960	1961
Additional surcharge on license and land tax	208,000,000	220,000,000	233,000,000
Prestations	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000
Assimilated direct taxes	48,950,000	63,445,000	63,445,000
<i>Other Receipts</i>			
Taxes on appropriation of private property	9,800,000	9,830,000	9,830,000
Taxes on appropriation of public property	13,810,000	14,310,000	14,310,000
Water services leases	108,200,000	213,200,000	109,200,000
Miscellaneous income	29,220,000	28,930,000	27,000,000
Market leases	78,000,000	80,000,000	82,000,000
Garbages and manures vacuuming	1,000,000	1,500,000	1,600,000
Taxes on slaughter houses	36,000,000	32,000,000	35,000,000
Subsidies, other surcharge and loan payment	90,660,000	60,565,000	565,000
Income from contracts	11,960,000	12,820,000	12,820,000
<i>Delinquent tax collection</i>	51,000,000	65,000,000	137,830,000
TOTAL	688,000,000	803,000,000	728,000,000
 EXPENDITURES BY FUNCTION			
General administration	19,729,000	26,340,000	30,360,000
Economy and finance	62,522,000	169,035,000	64,712,000
Education	50,631,000	54,347,000	61,669,000
Security	277,610,000	281,075,000	299,413,000
Public works	229,971,000	228,230,000	220,539,000
Public health and social welfare	47,507,000	43,973,000	51,307,000
TOTAL	688,000,000	803,000,000	728,000,000

EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR COMPONENTS

Personnel	375,046,000	386,723,000	406,111,000
Materials	188,464,000	291,335,000	199,090,000
Public works	124,490,000	124,942,000	122,799,000
TOTAL	688,000,000	803,000,000	728,000,000

PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY THE PREFECTURE OF SAIGON IN 1961

<i>Agencies</i>	<i>Total</i>
Office of the prefect, and deputy prefects	33
Administrative and personnel office	54
Service of finance	154
Technical services	2,515
Economic service	24
Service of hygiene	811
Elementary education service	1,795
Animal husbandry service	768
Fire station	186
Savings bank	13
Low-cost housing office	21
<i>Administrative</i>	
<i>Districts (Offices)</i>	
District I	24
District II	34
District III	67
District IV	32
District V	75
District VI	38
District VII	19
District VIII	21
Prefecture directorate of police	5,701
Office of the municipal council	2
TOTAL	12,367

For instance it does not account for the required relationships between prefecture and Central Government officials and agencies. Nor does it account for the direct relationships between Central Government and municipal agencies as opposed to those relationships in which the prefect's office acts as an intermediary between agencies of these two levels. An outstanding example of this latter omission is the relationship of the prefecture's directorate of police and the prefect with the Directorate General of National Police and Security.

In addition, of course, the chart cannot account for the informal relationships both within the prefecture's administrative organization and between Central Government and prefecture officials. Regardless

of the formal relationship requirements described in the chart, informal non-prescribed interactions play a significant role in both decision making and operations of municipal agencies. It also only can insinuate but cannot consider the innumerable relationships, formal and informal, between prefecture agents and the population, including individuals community groups and enterprises.

The lines of communication and cooperation between central agencies and district officials are also omitted in the organization chart. The districts and their subdivisions cover the entire city. However, the relationships between their officials and central agencies vary considerably from district to district and from agency to agency. There are few formal requirements for relationships between the two levels, although they occur frequently.

For example, the prefecture service of hygiene must alert and cooperate with district and *phuong* chiefs when inoculations are to be given under the service's supervision to district residents. In addition, agencies must constantly provide information and guidance to district and lower-level officials concerning matters of technical concern under agency jurisdiction. Multifold prefecture division relationships with administrative districts and lower levels also are found in the operations of the directorate of police, especially the operations of police district offices.

Finally, the chart omits two other very important areas of responsibility and the relationships accompanying this responsibility. First, there is the significant role of the military in terms not only of security, including facilities and personnel within the Saigon area to insure security, but also of property requirements within the metropolitan area. Relationships with representatives of the Ministry of Defense frequently are necessary, for instance, when the prefecture wishes to develop a section of the area and construct public buildings on a piece of government property or on private property slated for future government use. Because of the defense necessities, considerable land is needed for military campuses, paramilitary training bases, etc.

Secondly, there are a large number of prefecture agency relationships beyond the legal boundaries of the city. Relationships with provincial, district, and village officials in Gia Dinh Province are numerous today and will continue to increase as the scope of prefecture public services within the province expands both to presently built-up unincorporated areas and to sections that are still almost exclusively rural in nature.

EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

I. Prefect, Chief of Cabinet, Deputy Prefect for Administrative Affairs, and Deputy Prefect for Security Affairs.

The basic framework for assigning functions and outlining authority and responsibilities for these top four executive positions is presented in the 1959 decree concerning the prefecture's administrative organization. They are also discussed in the section above comparing the 1959 decree with the 1954 ordinance. All are responsible to the Presidency directly or indirectly in regard to their administrative activities, although the Chief of Cabinet almost exclusively performs functions for which he is always immediately responsible to the prefect.

A. The prefect (Do Truong)¹ is the chief executive of the prefecture. As mentioned earlier his functions to a great extent are similar to those of a province chief. Because his functions and authority have already been outlined, only a few basic functions and responsibilities need be reviewed and elaborated in this section. He is responsible for Central Government policies (and represents the national government in the prefecture), primarily through his relationships with the President and the Ministry of Interior, but simultaneously he has responsibility for prefectural and certain metropolitan area politics.

Like all chief executives (heads) he is given authority to execute legal provisions and is accountable for their implementation. He also is in charge of directing and supervising the activities of all prefecture employees and agencies, although regular civil service cadres continue to receive information and instructions from the agencies that have temporarily detached them for service in the prefecture.

The prefect also has statute-making powers which he exercises by issuing *arretes* and other forms of rules and regulations. In addition, he has broad-gauged authority concerning prefectural council actions and procedures, including preparation of the budget for each fiscal year. Finally, the prefect has authority over the operations of the borough officials and officials of other tiers of the administrative subdivisions of the prefecture.

.B. The chief of cabinet has no legal authority to make decisions concerning important prefectural policy questions within the jurisdiction

¹Chief executives of Dalat and DaNang have the title of "thi trung." The chief of Thua Province also serves as mayor of Hue, although primary operational responsibility for Hue municipal administration is assumed by one of the province chief's deputies.

of the prefect. In fact, many of his functions concern matters of administrative routine such as signing papers on the prefect's behalf. However, his main role is to act in the capacity of a close assistant of the chief executive, with all that this activity implies. Because of this assignment, he reports directly to the prefect. Formally, he is responsible to the prefect for technical matters concerning administrative management, including financial administration and "confidential matters" as well as specific "missions" assigned at the discretion of the prefect.

C. Both of the deputy prefects are appointed by presidential decree. According to the 1959 legal text, the deputy prefect for internal security is to supervise and coordinate the operations of the administrative subdivisions of the prefecture (particularly the districts). However, as a result of administrative determination, this function has been assumed by the deputy prefect for administration. This second deputy is also responsible for supervising and coordinating the operations of the administrative and technical services agencies.

Today the deputy prefect for internal security supervises and coordinates the operations of the prefectural police and security agencies. He is responsible for prefectural functions related to security and political problems. The service of civic action is also under his jurisdiction and involves citizenship, political and civic education, including anti-Communist denunciation meetings. His internal security responsibilities are quite significant at present, as witnessed by the fact a major of the Vietnamese Army has been recently appointed to the position of deputy prefect for internal security.

2. Directorate of Prefectural Police

The 1959 decree only states that the directorate of prefectural police is to be appointed by the President and serves under the prefect's authority but also is to work directly with the Directorate General of National Police and Security. The central agency provides technical direction for activities of the municipal police and security forces.

Responsibility for the usual municipal law enforcement and police administration function is vested in the directorate of prefectural police and its subordinate agencies, including general police work, and crime prevention and detection. However, the prefectural police force is also burdened with security activities not typically required of municipal law enforcement agencies. As mentioned earlier, implementation of its assigned functions both necessitates allocation of a large percentage of the prefecture's budgeted expenditures and requires the

services of a considerable portion of the total number of municipal employees.

In order to administer implementation of these assigned functions, bureaus providing city-wide (and metropolitan area) coordination have been created. The bureaus of personnel and salary, as well as employees at the central office, primarily perform staff functions.² Information concerning political activities that might hinder security, and other forms of investigation are handled by the bureau of investigation. Relationships with the courts are chiefly the responsibility of the bureau of judicial affairs. In addition to these four bureaus, there is a separate traffic and road police office.

The second administrative arrangement for implementing police functions has been the creation of police districts. These districts coincide with the boundaries of the prefectural administrative districts. Each police district is under the jurisdiction of a chief of police and two deputy chiefs. The district offices are in charge of day-to-day service operation of the police force.

In addition to law enforcement within their jurisdictions, two of the police district offices supervise police practices in Gia Dinh Province. These practices are under the immediate supervision of the Police Precinct of Gia Dinh (covering sections of the province bordering Saigon) and the Police Precinct of Tan Binh (specifically covering a town in Tan Binh District in the Province). Police personnel permanently serving these two precincts are paid from provincial budgeted expenditures, although they are responsible to the district police chiefs.

The majority of the total number of personnel under the prefecture directorate of police are daily wage earners and less than two thousand are members of regular police and security cadres. Additional personnel are needed to serve the portions of the metropolitan area outside the city limits and still others are required for special security guard duties.

On the whole the popular image of the prefectural police is considerably more favorable than is the image of other municipal agencies. An extensive and intensive training program has contributed greatly to stimulate respect for its operations. Training has been supplemented, and efficiency has been greatly improved, through widespread use of advanced technical apparatus for police work. The current image, however, has been most significantly the product of an eradication of previous police corruption associated with the force's operations

²Including record keeping, accounting and other housekeeping functions.

under the French and particularly under Bao Dai. With few exceptions, bribery and other manifestations of corruption have disappeared. This is a rare attribute greatly appreciated by the local residents because it represents a departure from behavior patterns actually expected by the Vietnamese. In rural areas throughout the nation, it is still generally anticipated by historical conditioning that public servants will supplement their incomes by extra-legal and illegal activities.

3. *Public Services Administration.*⁵

Most of the agencies of municipal administration operate to provide both services and controls. In principle, these operations relate to the "general welfare" of the population under the jurisdiction of the municipality. General welfare, in turn, is something that is not concrete but rather is something defined in public policies. In Vietnam, the public policies formulated and promulgated to affect metropolitan area residents are products of agencies and officials of both the national and the prefectural administration. These policies concern the provision of services and controls for administratively determined phases of the general welfare relating primarily to public health, welfare, and convenience.

A number of the general welfare and control provisions are provided for through police and security administration. Other provisions are discussed in this section under the quite far-reaching heading of "public services." These public services include such municipal functions as the physical upkeep and improvement of streets, the construction and operation of clinics, the administration of elementary educational institutions, and a host of other functions assigned to specific agencies within the prefecture's administrative hierarchy. They also include such municipal functions as control and regulation of public health practices in restaurants and public safety practices in construction and maintenance of buildings.

Public policies concerning services and controls are the substantive aspects of municipal administration. Prefectural agencies and administrative subdivisions are the instruments created for implementing such policies. All administrative agencies are responsible to the prefect, and each also operates in connection with appropriate Central Government personnel. In addition, each agency discussed in this section is

⁵Only an attempt to draw a sketch of the public services offered to the metropolitan area is presented here. For detailed coverage of the functions of various agencies of the prefecture see: Tran Van Dinh, *Administration of the Saigon Municipality* (New Delhi, India: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1960).

under direct supervision of the deputy prefect for administrative affairs. Further, each displays the principles of the French type of administrative system in terms of their internal organizational structure especially the principle of integrated administrative organization. Their primary function is to solve metropolitan area problems through policy implementation, although certain levels must operate to provide staff services (including the offices of the deputy prefects) to other levels and to provide financial administration for acquiring and allocating funds to pay for operations of all levels of prefectural government.

A. THE TECHNICAL SERVICE

The technical service, like all prefecture agencies at this level, is headed by a chief of service. His appointment is made upon the recommendation of the Central Government's Department of Public Works and Communications. Public service functions assigned to this agency are assumed by appropriate subdivisions (bureaus) headed by chiefs of bureau. Construction (building streets, etc.), which is one of its principal functions, is undertaken directly by the bureaus in the case of relatively small-scale public works or is undertaken by private contractors if a large-scale public works project is involved. Technical personnel administering technical services are temporarily transferred from the public works or other central agencies. Lower-level employees, including daily wage earners, are employed directly by the technical service.

Nearly all of the public service functions of the technical service relate to the construction and maintenance of public works or to development of areas for future public works.⁴ For example, the bureau of public bridges and roads has both an east and a west (Cholon) branch for constructing, maintaining, and cleaning streets, bridges, sidewalks, and gutters.

Other functions of the technical service include: public park administration (Bureau of Plantation); clearing swamps and other areas in order to construct houses for sale to civil servants, victims of fire, etc. (Bureau of Government Building); buying and exchanging real estate for future development and public works construction (Bureau of Maps);⁵ and, granting authorizations for constructing industrial, com-

⁴The technical service, however, also has a bureau of official cars which handles both vehicles and city planning. This service also has responsibility beyond the city limits for the women's paramilitary training firing grounds.

⁵The low cost housing office, an *ad hoc* autonomous agency, is in charge of construction of residences. Priority for these homes is given to evacuees of slum cleared areas, persons who are victims of fire and other catastrophes, and civil servants. Houses are sold on installments. The domiciles are relatively inexpensive even though they frequently require additional investments by purchasers to make them completely livable.

mercial, and residential buildings as well as granting permits to repair buildings (Bureau of Authorization for Construction). Although this wide range of services and controls provides the formal framework for solving most of the metropolitan area's physical planning and development needs, in operation it falls far short of meeting those needs. This failure is dealt with in Chapter 7.

Two other public service functions are of particular importance both because they deal with essential services and because their scarcity presents one of the most serious problems in the metropolitan area, i.e., the Saigon water and electricity distribution systems. The water distribution system is formally under the Department of Public Works and Communications (including the General Directorate of Public Works and The National Water Supply Office). Operational supervision is a responsibility of the prefecture. However, collection from water users is assumed by the prefecture.

The electricity distribution system is still owned by a private contractor with the city, the Indochina Water and Electricity Company, although this contract has an expiration date. Personnel are hired and supervised by the electricity company, but the prefecture controls practices and prices and other phases of operations. The Department of Public Works and Communications also exercises technical controls over the electricity distribution systems in Vietnam's three cities as well as in Saigon.

Today there are three major projected programs outlined by the technical service to meet the increasing needs of the population of the metropolitan area. First, it is essential to expediate slum clearance projects in order to construct roads and to expand water and electricity facilities. This project naturally has resulted in less than enthusiastic cooperation on the part of the residents of the effected slum areas. When slum clearance does occur in these areas, the prefecture will exert efforts to resettle former residents. This will involve finding available quarters, \$1,000VN, and moving costs to new quarters. Some residents also will be permitted to purchase public low-cost housing.

Secondly, attempts are being made to acquire land for elementary school sites. However, certain of the suitable sites already have been pre-empted by the Department of National Defense. Other property which might be available sells for a price higher than the price-fixing committee (including representatives from the prefecture, the Directorate of Budget, and the Presidency) is willing to pay. Before purchasing property this committee either assesses a site at a price lower than its

owner is agreeable to accept or estimates that a certain sum is available which is less than the cost of available property. In either case, real estate owners usually prefer to sell to private purchasers rather than to the government. Due to the difficulty of acquiring land, a number of projects this year cannot be begun even though the technical service had budgeted sums remaining. Next year these funds will no longer be available.

Third, projections for future construction include emphasis upon building fire department annexes. Fire represents a definite hazard in the city chiefly because of the poorly constructed and overcrowded residences in the slum areas and also because of water supply shortages. At present there are only two main fire stations in the city, one located on Tran Hung Dao Street (the chief artery connecting Saigon with Cholon) and the other on Xon Chi Street. Expansion of present facilities for dealing with the problem of fires is a matter of high priority, especially since the President of the Republic has recognized the seriousness of the problem and has encouraged such expansion.

B. THE SERVICE OF HYGIENE

This agency is assigned three primary public service and control functions relating to public hygiene, preventive medicine, and operation of clinics and other institutions. A new bureau to control food hygiene, mostly involving restaurants and mobile food stands, also has been established but is not yet fully operational.⁶

The service of health receives technical assistance from the Central Government's Department of Health. It also submits reports to this central agency covering its activities (dispensaries, etc.) and statistics on births and deaths. Other legal relationships are mostly with the prefect, to whom it is responsible. However, contacts also are sometimes made with *phuong* and *khom* chiefs for disseminating information concerning public health topics and for cooperation in implementing such services as mass inoculations.

Public hygiene activities include the following functions:

- 1) removing dwellings built illegally on sidewalks and public lands;
- 2) preventing illegal constructions, usually involving squatters;

⁶A great deal of the food supplies, including meat, purchased in Saigon is sold at the sixteen market areas. Control of sanitary conditions at the markets is assigned to the Animal Husbandry Service. This agency also is in charge of rabies control and management of the Chanh Hung Slaughterhouse.

- 3) ordering violators of hygiene regulations to discontinue their abuses (relating to sewerage, latrine stations, poultry keeping, bus stations, harbors, public fountains, wells, swimming pools, and markets);
- 4) investigating hygienic conditions and examining construction applications for residences, restaurants, hotels, theaters, schools, and certain industries;
- 5) collecting garbage;
- 6) digging latrine sewers for private, public and military agencies;
- 7) issuing burial certificates, maintaining cemeteries, and issuing grave removal authorizations (usually after a "geomancy" chooses a plot of ground more auspicious for burying previously buried relatives);
- 8) controlling imports and use of certain goods, e.g., opium; and,
- 9) controlling the practices of doctors, dentists, pharmacists, and midwives.

Preventive medicine functions include;

- 1) preventing contagious diseases by organizing annual campaigns for vaccination against smallpox and cholera, and recently, with American aid and assistance, giving shots against diphtheria, tetanus, and whooping cough to children from the ages of two months to six years (this is a particularly important operation in the working class areas);
- 2) giving inoculations to people leaving the country and providing health certificate checks for incoming travelers at the airport and the harbor.

The service of hygiene also operates 33 institutions. This number does not include the regular in-patient hospitals directly under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health. Clinics, maternity hospitals, and mobile health units provide examinations and medicines free to residents of crowded working class areas. In 1961, the clinics gave 146,000 examinations and 55,000 medical treatments.

In addition to the above institutions, the agency operates a school health center at the Can Kho primary school for servicing all school children in the city, providing preventive injections, examining for contagious diseases, and giving dental care. It also assigns two to four personnel to each administrative district in the prefecture, and operates

three maternity hospitals and several maternity consultation rooms in Gia Dinh Province.

C. THE SERVICE OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION

This agency administers educational institutions below the secondary level within the prefecture. Secondary schools, technical schools, and institutions of higher learning are the responsibility of the national government. A Central Government agency, the Directorate of Elementary and Popular Education of the Department of Education, provides technical assistance and receives reports from the Prefecture Service of Elementary Education.

A serious shortage of teachers and classrooms has placed the elementary education unit in an extremely difficult position to carry out its functions effectively. Because of difficulties in acquiring sites for public school construction mentioned above, the prefecture on occasion has been forced to destroy existing structures to construct buildings providing additional classrooms although typically it simply expands existing structures by adding more floors.⁷

In order to recruit teaching and affiliated personnel the education service first receives approval from the prefecturate finance service (which determines if funds are available), then sends its request to the General Directorate of Civil Service (*Fonction Publique*), and finally receives approval of the Directorate of Budget. There are two major categories of regular teachers: graduates of the School of Pedagogy who are paid from the national budget, and non-graduates of that institution, who are paid from the prefecture budget. Personnel in the latter category are hired on a temporary basis after being recruited by the Department of Education.⁸

In addition to directing the operations of elementary education institutions, the education services supervises the extra-curricular activities of the *hieu doan* organization. Each school has a *hieu doan* (school group), with a leader and an assistant leader (*doi truong* and *pho doi truong*) elected by the pupils. A *hieu doan* is divided into *doi* (sub-groups) consisting of ten pupils. The teaching staff acts as inter-sub-group leaders (*lien doi truong*) and the school principal serves as the group leader. In principle, the *hieu doan* permits pupils to work

⁷See the section on prefectural education problems in Chapter 7.

⁸The Department of Education determines the professional competence of these instructors through competitive examination. To be admitted to this examination, candidates are required to have at least a four-year secondary school diploma. In the last examination there were only 107 budgeted positions although there were 4,200 candidates.

together (tend school gardens, etc.) and play together. However, due to the lack of playgrounds, the organization frequently exists solely on paper.

D. THE SERVICE OF ECONOMY

This is a new agency replacing a former bureau which was directly under the prefect's supervision. It has two operating bureaus, the economic control bureau and the economic and social affairs bureau. The first bureau is responsible for overseeing the activities of such establishments as barbershops, restaurants, and hotels as well as the operations of factories which might create neighborhood disturbances or hygiene problems. It also issues authorizations for professionals to begin their practices and for factories to begin operations.

The economic and social affairs bureau attempts to supervise through directive various prefectural activities relating to the following: Juvenile delinquency, prostitution, beggary, the *Khanh Hoi* day nursery, and labor accidents. Most of these activities are within the province of the directorate of police operations, but the service of economy performs such related functions as organizing re-education classes for juvenile delinquents. It also issues order to insure implementation of prefecture regulations, e.g., the service can order bars and hotels to close if they violate anti-prostitution regulations, and it can order bars and snack bars to improve their lighting or install glass windows in order to facilitate police controls.

E. THE FINANCE SERVICE

This service collects taxes, controls and accounts for salaries of prefecture personnel as well as district and *phuong* personnel, purchases materials, and prepares the budget of the prefecture. In performing these functions, it has more relationships with the Department of Interior than do other prefecture agencies.

The finance service purchases items costing less than 100,000\$VN simply upon the basis of lowest available price. Items costing more than this can be purchased only after proper bidding processes are finished. Following the completion of legal requirements (newspaper announcement, etc.) a decision is made by a committee composed of the deputy prefect for administrative affairs, the chief of service of the agency which initiated the purchase, and a representative of the finance service.

Budget preparation is carried out by the finance service upon instructions and approval (of budget drafts) by the directorate of the budget. The basic document accounts for both national obligatory public services of the prefecture (as well as Central Government ceilings on certain forms of municipal receipts) and requests of the prefecture agencies.⁹ The prefecture council votes on the budget, but the prefect and the President of the Republic can assume responsibility for prefectural approval of a budget if the council does not accept national obligatory expenditures or does not act quickly enough to approve a budget document. Final approval is made by the President.¹⁰

Budget execution is carried out by the finance service under the prefect's authority, although agencies of the national government maintain important controls concerning procedures and limits of assessments, taxes and expenditures.¹¹ The prefecture makes assessments which are approved by the general directorate of taxation. Taxes are then collected by the finance service with the prefecture retaining surcharges on licenses and real property. These surcharges are a percentage of the taxes due the national government which is determined by the Department of Finance but which cannot exceed two hundred percent. The remainder of the collected funds are transmitted to the Central Government. In addition to regular post-audits by the directorate of the budget this Central Government also pre-audits all prefectural expenditures exceeding 60,000\$VN.

F. THE PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE

Several categories of employees are involved in carrying out prefectural public services: the technical personnel who are actually members of national cadres of Central Government agencies and are recruited and subject to personnel regulations and benefits of the General Directorate of Civil Service—these civil servants are only temporarily transferred to the prefecture: the special municipal cadres, chiefly employees of the fire department, and auxiliary agencies; and, contractual, daily, and temporary employees.¹²

The personnel administrative service is concerned with the last two categories. This concern is expressed in numerous typical personnel

⁹Each Agency of the prefecture states its requirements on circulars distributed and returned to the Finance Service.

¹⁰See Chapter III of the text of the 1959 ordinance.

¹¹The various legal sources of revenue are listed in the 1959 ordinance. Although the city has a claim on national surtaxes, it does not have one on the national income tax, and there is no prefectural income tax. The prefecture also can borrow money directly and deposit it in the general treasury and also can borrow sums from foreign aid with the Central Government acting as a voucher.

¹²An additional category includes regular cadre police personnel and contractual and daily employees of the directorate of police.

administration functions, such as keeping personnel records, recruitment, and transfer. When a prefectural agency decides to hire personnel in the last two categories, it examines them and then requests the personnel and administrative service to engage them and set their conditions of employment.

However, a different procedure is followed in assigning national cadre personnel either to one of the prefectural agencies or to the districts and *phuongs*. An agency wanting new technical personnel first determines from the service of finance if funds are available and then a request is made to the Department of Interior and the Directorate of Civil Service. On other occasions members of national cadres are available and the Department of Interior asks the service of finance if it has necessary funds and if a prefectural agency needs such personnel.

Nearly all of the personnel employed by the prefecture work directly upon regular public services. At the same time a number of employees work part time, and a few are assigned to work full time, on other than prefectural functions. For example, each service of the prefecture has assigned personnel to visit the provinces and work on the strategic hamlet campaign; they give instructions and aid in work on psychological preparations for the new communities. Other prefectural employee activities of this nature include participation in the Cong Hoa Youth and various anti-communist programs.

In addition to its personnel administration functions, the personnel and administrative service handles other duties through its Civil Status and Military Affairs Bureau.¹³ These duties involve vital statistics such as birth, deaths, marriages, and residences. It also handles certain functions relating to military mobilization (in conjunction with the administrative districts), the municipal archives, and elections.

ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS

Saigon like the other three cities in Vietnam is divided into various administrative subdivisions for purposes of expediting a number of administrative, police, judicial, and social functions. In Saigon these subdivisions are known as municipal district boroughs (*quan*) as they are in Hue. Basically the same form of subdivisions in Danang are called villages (*xa*) and in Dalat are referred to as municipal divisions (*khū*).

¹³Although this bureau is formally a part of this service, it is directly responsible to the Prefect.

The administrative subdivisions in Saigon are further divided with four subordinate tiers present below the borough level. Three of these tiers actually are regional offices rather than legal entities, handling minor administrative, and social prefectural functions. These three are: the *phuongs*,¹⁴ which are somewhat larger than city blocks; the *khoms*, several of which constitute one *phuong*, and, the inter-family groups (*lien gia*). The smallest unit in this hierarchy of municipal subdivisions are the households which comprise the *lien gia*.

On paper the subdivisions hierarchy appears as a firmly woven thread from top to bottom. In some instances, the system operates in a manner approximating the plan for integrated superior-subordinate relationships, with policies being disseminated through each tier and policy implementation occurring at the last two tiers. Frequently, in practice, the plan represents only an ideal type. On occasion by choice and on other occasions by necessity, the program which purports to cover the entire population breaks down somewhere along the line. The principal reason usually is the difficulty in contacting or even keeping in touch with the populations in the slum conurbations. However, numerous operational problems have also naturally arisen due to the broad coverage of the system and the relatively small number of personnel who are supposed to carry out the extended responsibilities of the system.

I. Districts (Boroughs).

Saigon is now divided into nine districts.¹⁵ Boundaries of the administrative districts are identical to those of the police districts, although policemen can perform their duties across district lines. District chiefs (*quan truong*) are career civil servants appointed by presidential decree and continue to maintain their civil servant status after they receive their appointment

Responsibilities of the district chiefs are listed in the 1959 decree. They act somewhat as would mayors of small towns. In addition to acting as the representative of the prefect in the district, a district chief: assists in taking the census; performs certain law enforcement functions, e.g., he reports gambling within the district to the police, and is responsible for security maintenance; issues certificates, such

¹⁴*Phuong* means "guild" but refers to residents of the same section of a street rather than to persons having the same profession or occupation.

¹⁵The number of districts was changed from 8 to 9 in April 1962. Because current data relate to the old eight district system, the descriptions provided below concerning specific districts relates to the former arrangement.

as identity papers, voters' cards, and certificates of birth, death, residence, and good behavior (morality); authorizes meetings; and performs judiciary functions, such as, processing civil status papers and marriage applications. Nearly all of these activities are record-keeping functions.

He frequently cooperates with the district police chief in matters related to his responsibilities. For example, the two may consult on such topics as applications for meetings and issuance of good behavior certificates. The district chief also cooperates with agencies of the Central Government, e.g., one copy of all civil status papers which are processed may be sent to the Department of Justice.

Each of the district offices has a staff to assist the chief. This staff is headed by the senior clerk, who is the number-one record keeper and supervisor of the chief's assistants. Technicians are assigned (temporarily detached) by the prefectural services to work in the districts and are paid by their own agencies.

However, most of the employees of a district work on a daily wage basis, receiving their salaries from the prefectural budget. Among other things, this means that their salaries and terms of employment are not fixed by civil service standards. Generally, they receive 2,000\$VN to 5,000\$VN per month, can be released without notice, and do not participate in retirement funds or receive other fringe benefits.

2. *Phuongs*.

Phuongs comprise districts; there are from 5 to 6 such divisions within each district. The *phuong* chief is salaried and appointed by the prefect. He may or may not be a civil servant. Despite his official position he always has his office in his own home. Although he disseminates instructions and information received from the district chief, he does not assume all of the basic responsibilities of the latter. His role is rather that of an assistant and an intermediate agent between the district chief and lower tiers of the subdivisions system.

The translated Annex to the 1959 decree reorganizing organization and administration in the prefecture pertaining to responsibilities of *phuong* chiefs is presented below.

ANNEX

Decree No. 504 BNV/HC/ND of April 22, 1959,
subdividing each prefectural district into many
phuong (quarters)

DECREE:

Art. 1. The territory of the eight administrative districts of the Prefecture of Saigon are subdivided into many *phuong* (quarters).

Art. 2. The number of *phuong* and the boundaries of each *phuong* are defined as follows:^o

Art. 3. Each *phuong* is placed under the administration of a *phuong truong* (quarter head), appointed by the decree of the prefect, upon recommendations of the district chief.

Art. 4. The *phuong truong* should meet all the following requirements:

- minimum age of 30 and not over 60,
- in good health,
- in possession of a primary school certificate,
- good behavior, and has a clear judicial record,
- residence in the *phuong* concerned at least for two years,
- registered in the tax records, the basic tax amounts, at least 100 VN\$.

In case the candidate for the position of *phuong* head is an ex-civil servant he is exempted from the tax registration requirement, but should have had covered a minimum of six years' service in the government and not have been dismissed on disciplinary grounds.

In special cases, the prefect may designate a civil servant to assume the responsibilities of *phuong truong*.

Art. 5. The quarter head assumes the following responsibilities:

- Acts as liaison officer between the people and the prefecture,
- Relays the instructions received,
- Undertakes the census of population upon instructions of the district chief,
- Reports on the unusual occurrences in the *phuong*, which are detrimental to public order and security of the *phuong*,
- Provides cooperation in any social work, improvement of the people's living standards and youth organization.

Art. 6. The *phuong truong* is directly responsible to and subject to control by the district chief; relations between the *phuong truong* and other agencies should solely be maintained through the district chief.

A *phuong truong* may—for health reasons or severe mistakes, be relieved of all duties by a decree of the prefect, upon recommendations of the district chief.

Art. 7. In case a *phuong truong* is temporarily incapable of assuming his responsibilities, the prefect will assign them to the head of a neighboring *phuong* or to an official serving an interim.

Art. 8. The *phuong truong* are not entitled to the civil servants' status with the exception of civil servants who are appointed to these positions. Nevertheless, to make up for the expenses in transportation and the maintenance of correspondence, the *phuong truong* will receive a monthly payment, determined by the prefect.

Moreover, the quarter head will be reimbursed from the prefectural funds for expenditures on stationery which may not exceed a prefect-determined maximum.

Art. 9. The office of the *phuong truong* is at his private home.

A messenger is placed at the disposal of the quarter head to deliver correspondence and assist the quarter head in his office.

Art. 10. This decree is to be implemented by the prefect of Saigon.

^oThe text of the Annex has a lengthy description of *phuong* boundaries at this juncture. These descriptions are omitted here.

3. *Khoms*.

Khoms constitute *phuong*; there are about forty *khoms* (sub guilds) in each *phuong*. Each *khom* has a chief. This official is formally elected by the following procedures: *lien gia* chiefs are elected by residents and household heads in their area—and they in turn elect the *khom* chief. A *khom* chief is not a civil servant (although most are probably members of the National Revolutionary Movement) and receives no salary for his services. However, he receives an allowance to cover his expenses (office, travel, etc.) and sometimes has one or two clerks to serve as assistants.

The principal function of a *khom* chief is to receive and distribute instructions from the district and *phuong* chiefs and to execute orders issued by the district chief. Officially, he is supposed to act as an intermediate between the government and the population; he is what is referred to as a benevolent agent. In addition, he performs such sundry functions as census taking, establishing lists of persons who need identity cards and voters' cards, and solicitation for fund drives for those who have suffered from calamities.

The *khom* chief operates as an integral part of the subdivisions' hierarchy in order to carry out programs adopted by the prefecture. For example, if the prefect orders that a census be taken, instructions go first to the district chiefs and these instructions are disseminated down through the four lower tiers. At each stage of dissemination, the instructions become more specific concerning implementation of the census order. Data is then gathered at each tier and transmitted to the next higher tier.

Fingerprinting presents another example of the cooperative role of the several tiers in implementing a prefecture program. A mobile unit moves into an area for 1 or 2 weeks and assists the population, in cooperation with the *khom* chief, in filling out cards and placing their prints on the cards. The *khom* chief or *phuong* chief attests to a person's residence and distributes the cards. Finally, the cards are signed by the district chief.

4. *Interfamily Groups (Lien Gia)*.

The interfamily groups are just below the *phuong* level in the tier subdivisions system. They are composed of neighboring families. In principle, five families are to constitute a group, but in practice this number is flexible (five to twenty families inclusive). They are to serve as a liaison between the population and the prefecture hierarchy. Each

interfamily group has a chief selected for his "esteem" in the neighborhood who receives no salary.

The major function of the interfamily group chief is to inform the group concerning policies and instructions from the prefecture hierarchy. He prepares family census books (leaflets including the names of all household members), informs residents of dates to acquire identity and voter cards, conducts fund drives (for flood relief, etc.), asks residents to participate in demonstration, distribute literature concerning topics of current importance (e.g., the significance and methods of construction of strategic hamlets), recruits for the Republican Youth (male and female), checks to determine whether persons who are required to do so report for military mobilizations, and (as a security measure) attempts to discover the presence of strangers and activities of newcomers who fail to report their new residence.

He also has a number of social functions, including: promoting assistance among neighbors; asking residents to participate in communal work (alley cleaning, draining water, etc.); and promoting mutual aid, i.e., moral and physical assistance to the sick.

In order to perform his function of informing the members of his group the chief will hold group meetings. These usually are held in his home, although they are held rather infrequently in the city. Typically the meetings are poorly attended, while many of those who attend do so only perfunctorily. The agenda involves discussions of such topics as: health, social, and security problems in the group's area; where to get aid, facilities, and financial assistance to facilitate projects undertaken by the group; and current national developments of importance such as the strategic hamlets.

Within the core of the city, the role of the *lien gia* is not particularly significant. To a great extent this can be explained by typical urban patterns such as lack of knowledge about one's neighbors. However, other factors also enter, including wide differences in socio-economic level of neighbors. In addition, the adeptness of the chief in handling human relations almost invariably is an important factor in determining his success.

As a generalization it may be said that the *lien gia* scheme is more successful in the rural levels where the chief is usually an economic and social leader whose advice is highly respected. The city itself can be broken down along socio-economic lines in evaluating the *lien gia* effectiveness. In the middle and higher income areas in the core of the city, frequently the status of the chief is less than other members of

the group, and, subsequently, his prestige is not high enough to command the respect essential for carrying out his duties. He frequently does command this respect, however, in the outskirts of the city, in workers' areas, and in the slum areas.

5. Households.

Since the creation of the *lien gia* system, each household has had to designate a "legal" head. This need not be the person who exerts the most authority in a particular family, although usually the husband or principal wage earner obtains the distinction.

The main duties of the household head have been: to report to the interfamily group chief, and on occasion to the police, all changes in the numbers of members of his household, including all changes of addresses; to fill out infrequent questionnaires distributed for various census purposes; and, to receive instructions concerning participation in community development projects and other information pertaining to government projects of a nationwide or prefecture interest (Republican Youth, self-defense, etc.).

The family census sheets are almost invariably filled out because this is necessary before receiving a certificate of residence. This certificate is required in order to purchase a bicycle, motor-scooter, etc., and in order to obtain a certificate of morality.

Household heads also on occasion participate and represent their household at meetings with the interfamily group chief to discuss community development projects in their area, e.g., sewerage and drainage, as well as to discuss any number of problems involving block or street residents.

PREFECTURAL COUNCIL

Members of the prefectural council are the only popularly elected representatives of the prefecture. However, the only election which has been held was in 1953. Council members today are the same ones who were elected nine years ago.¹⁶

Their terms of office (three-year terms) were extended by Edict No. 9NV, January 17, 1956. The legal number of members has changed since 1953. At the time of the election, 35 members were elected (5

¹⁶The councils in Hue, Danang, and Dalat also were elected in 1953. Hue formally has 12 council positions, Danang has 16, and Dalat 9. All three councils typically act as committees of the whole. The Dalat Council is the only one with deliberative functions.

from each of 7 districts), but the 1959 decree provided for 24 members, 3 from each district. At present, the council has 19 members.

Today the prefectural council is a consultative body vis-a-vis the prefect, rather than a deliberative body. According to the 1959 decree, the council is to be consulted on matters relating to the budget, prefectural properties, etc., and also on any other matters deemed desirable by the prefect. However, its advice is not binding. Further, the prefect prepares its agenda, attends or is represented at its sessions, and can dissolve it if necessary.

The council meets twice a year in general session (January and July). The first assembly elects the executive board (chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary) and discusses reports. The second session deals with the prefecture's budget. If necessary, monthly meetings are also held. However, most of its activities center around the committees of three commissions: the administrative and economic commission; the financial and bid commission; and the technical, hygiene and social commission. Each councilman can be a member of more than one committee. A number of committees actually only provide council representation on prefectural and national government committees:

- Committee on Juridicial Assistance: provides legal assistance to defendants (two representatives)
- Committee on Military Mobilization (two representatives)
- Executive Board of the Saigon Savings Bank (three representatives)
- Committee on Prefecture Hygiene (two representatives)
- Committee on Prices within the Prefecture: Price control for foods, commodities, etc. (two representatives)
- Committee on Control of Materials and Cooked Food at the Pauper House (one representative)
- Committee on Cyclo Control (two representatives)
- Committee on Tricycles (two representatives)
- Committee on Taxi, Motor-Cyclo, and Lambretta Control (one representative)
- Committee on Slum Clearance (two representatives)
- Committee on Control of Slaughter Houses (two representatives)

- Committee on Film Censorship (one representative): representatives of the Directorate of Information, women's associations, etc.
- Committee on Administration of the Saigon Water Service (one representative).
- Committee on Division of Land for Taxation (three representatives): land within the Prefecture is divided into zones and taxes differ among zones, e.g., a middle-class residential area is taxed higher than a slum area.
- Committee on Price Control of Land Rental, Private Property, and Veranda and Balcony Taxation (two representatives): certain segments of Saigon land, houses, and apartments are subject to rent control; shops and houses having a veranda or a balcony hanging over sidewalks are subject to a special tax.
- Committee on Control of Pawnshop Auction Sales (three representatives)
- Committee on Examining and Releasing Residents of *Chanh Hung* Pauper House (one representative)
- Sub-committee on the National Lottery (one representative): the National Government of Vietnam operates lotteries; this sub-committee decides who is authorized to sell lottery tickets and receive benefits from their sale, e.g., widows of war veterans.

CONCLUSION

Prefectural organization and administration today involve not only provision of municipal services for Saigon and Cholon but also provision of numerous metropolitan services for portions of Gia Dinh Province. The latter includes a number of densely populated residential and commercial sections and also sections of industrial complexes quite important to the economy of the metropolitan area and of the entire nation. Although security problems receive predominant consideration in policies promulgated for governing this area, more typical municipal and metropolitan problems naturally also require considerable attention.

Current preliminary projections would even further expand the metropolitan area nature of prefecture administrative operations. These projections include large-scale development programs within the city

limits of Saigon but also include a wide belt of territory encircling Saigon. Extensive land development has already occurred within Saigon and steps have been initiated to develop certain sections of Dia Dinh.

Large areas within Cholon (particularly around its outskirts and in sections approaching Saigon) have been built up tremendously in a matter of a few years. Some of these newly developed sections of Saigon already present quite serious slum problems, while others have avoided this characteristic community blight. However, land development within the city is an extremely expensive proposition. It also is a very difficult proposition in previously developed sections which currently are slums because there are no existing facilities into which the overcrowded residents might be moved.

Fortunately, there are large areas mostly outside the official city limits, but some also within Saigon proper, that provide excellent potentialities for future development. These areas are quite physically accessible, although security problems frequently make them less than readily accessible. Today these areas consist almost exclusively of rice fields, tilled by farmers who frequently are also employed in Saigon, and defunct rubber plantations. Current preliminary projections for development include the possibility of zoning the agricultural sections, including industrial, commercial, and residential zones.

If consummated, these projections would require even further expanding the basic services offered by the municipality. Many of these services today are quite inadequate to meet the needs of the Saigon population. Considerable strains have been placed upon prefectural administrative agencies due to rapid population growth accompanied by problems related to education, housing (particularly slum conditions), sanitation (drainage, sewerage, water), and even electricity and telephone services. These and other economic and social problems are discussed in Chapter 7.

Many of these problems are also apparent in Gia Dinh. Although industries, warehouses, import-export concerns, Tan Son Nhut airport, as well as hospitals and built-up unincorporated sections of Gia Dinh need maximum security first, they also must receive at least minimum municipal services.


In short, the prefecture has quite serious metropolitan area problems. These problems are somewhat similar to those of all metropolitan areas, but they are intensified tremendously primarily by the seriousness of the problems of housing and sanitation which are in turn part of the broader problem of slums.

Despite the fact that many prefectural services are definitely inadequate to meet current needs, an extensive administrative network has been created to provide municipal administration for the area. This network operates in a wide number of fields providing large numbers of diverse public services. It is a particularly involved administrative scheme because the prefecture attacks most of the metropolitan area's problems in cooperation and even in conjunction with numerous agencies and officials of the Central Government. The principals of the French administrative system are vividly portrayed in practice through Republic-prefecture cooperation, chiefly in terms of finance, technical services, and personnel assignments.

The term "cooperation," of course, does not really capture the status of the relationships between the two governments. Numerous expanded legal requirements providing for prefecture dependence upon the Central Government and broadened controls by the national chief executive and the Central Government agencies are prominent themes in the current decree governing organization and administration in the prefecture.

However, the operations of municipal and metropolitan governmental administration in the Saigon area remain primarily aspects of the administrative responsibility of the prefect and the personnel under his jurisdiction. Although the lines of Central Government relationships with prefectural agencies and with the prefect are quite complex, the role of the city government, its chief executive, and its administrative personnel are considerably more significant in terms of day-to-day municipal government and administration in the area than is the role of the Central Government.

SAIGON PREFECTURE ORGANIZATION CHART



6 | *Land Use and Life Style in Saigon*

Saigon definitely is not a big city by most standards. In many ways it gives the appearance of being a small town. Most of its buildings are not over one or two stories high, and even its tallest structures can hardly be classified in the skyscraper category. It is predominantly a commercial center rather than an industrial one. The factory sections are not usually found in the most frequented shopping and market areas, but mostly are either located in truly industrial zones in (a) certain portions of the outskirts of the community, (b) across the river from the city in Gia Dinh Province, or (c) the broader metropolitan area in Gia Dinh.

Although Saigon does have a proletarian labor force of some size as does the entire area, the composition of this group is certainly not a replica of the historic Western industrial masses or the contemporary Western and Soviet Union middle-class factory laborers. In short, Saigon does not give the appearance of being a twentieth-century metropolis, as do for example Bangkok and Hong Kong in the East, and it definitely is not a prototype of a Western urbanized community.

CAPITAL HAS 43,960 FIRMS, 255,230 WORKERS¹

Saigon in 1961 had 43,960 businesses with 255,230 employees compared with 33,760 employing 191,030 the year before according to a census by the Manpower Directorate of the Labor Department. This represents an increase of more than 23 percent for the firms and more than 25 percent for the workers.

Of this total, commercial firms totalled 23,290 or 52.97 percent. Manufacturing firms accounted for 17.44 percent.

Ninety-four percent of the total or 41,280 firms have ten employees or less. Only 115 enterprises or .42 percent employ from 100 to more than 400 workers. This is due to the fact that most of the large businesses have their plants in Gia Dinh, outside the capital.

Transport workers are most numerous with 80,130 or 31.40 percent of the total of 255,230. Commercial enterprises follow next with 66,760 workers or 26.2 percent. Manufacturing businesses employ 58,600 workers or 23 percent.

The census also revealed that there are 2,640 foreign workers or 1 percent of the total. More than 5 percent of them work in the electricity and water supply area.

Of the total of 255,230 workers, 199,900 or 76.3 percent were men, 48,660 or 19.1 percent women, 3,970 or 1.6 percent were young boys from 14 to 18 years of age and 2,700 or 1 percent girls of the same ages.

Regarding occupational specialties, there were 2,430 or almost 1 percent experts and technicians, 117,930 or 46.2 percent specialized and 23,440 or 9.1 percent office workers. Executives reached 56,500 or 22.1 percent.

Saigon is not even very old in terms of being a bona-fide metropolis. In fact, many of its more important sections (especially residential ones) are of quite recent vintage. The new areas themselves represent both the best and the worst of Saigon's recent rapid growth. A mixture of slums and high-rent districts, as well as certain low-cost government housing developments, are steadily filling in the quite recently vacant sites in both Cholon and Saigon and in the once rather wide unoccupied section which earlier divided the two.

Certain both old and new sections of the community in reality are ghettos of ethnic groups, particularly Chinese (who for the most part are now naturalized Vietnamese) but certain sections are mostly French or American. Other areas are occupied almost exclusively by residents employed in a single trade, e.g., dockworkers. However, the most prevalent pattern of occupancy is found in what might be termed "mixed sections" where residential shacks abound behind various forms of business enterprises, and where diverse strata of Vietnamese society (from school teachers to peddlers) live side by side. Typically these latter areas are mixed only in terms of resident occupation, although in some instances a Chinese-Vietnamese mixture also is found.

¹Extract from the *Vietnam Press*, May 28, 1962 (Evening), p.H-1.

Today the principal problems facing the prefecture—including the old and new sections and both the heterogeneous and homogeneous parts—relate invariably to difficulties involved in land use within the metropolitan area, or, more specifically, they relate to the complications in providing basic public services stemming from current land use. Slums and near-slums are the universal and immediately observable conditions that ostensibly should be eradicated. But problems relating to slum clearance are only the most pressing manifestations of a series of existing prefectural difficulties following from improper land use, meager attempts at area development, inadequate provision of public services, and severely hindered planning implementation.

The products of these difficulties are seen today in extremely bad housing conditions on overcrowded sites, in deteriorating sanitary and health conditions, and in increasingly perilous educational and social problems. Ramifications of such products already are being felt economically and socially within the metropolitan area. They serve as a threat to future economic growth and as a source for potentially quite dramatic shifts in contemporary Vietnamese life style.

The subdivisions system mentioned earlier whereby interfamily groups and household heads serve to insure a certain vestige of social integration cannot cope with shifts of this magnitude. Although the prefecture's operations spread a net that in theory includes surveillance over and assistance to every person and group in the city, this omnipresent municipal role proves impossible at the day-to-day implementation stage. Further, possibilities for the municipal government to control and guide shifts away from an integrated neighborhood social system lessen with each step toward intensification of conurbation-associated problems.

A very brief outline of prefectural living conditions, ecology, and life style is presented in this chapter. The first section of this outline in very broad terms describes the current distribution of the population of the city and traces the most pressing problem areas affected by past and current improper land use. The succeeding section describes life style in a number of areas of the city. The outline provides an orientation to explaining social and economic developments that have recently occurred in the metropolitan area and that no doubt will continue to develop.

Many of the problems and changes found in Saigon and its environs are similar to those of all urbanized communities. Their incidence frequently is almost directly correlated with increases in density

of population and intensity of urban land use. Saigon, however, has witnessed many difficulties not typically accompanying urbanization. The soil, water supply, and climate all have tended to make rational land use in Saigon little short of impossible. In addition, security conditions have provided a stimulus for migration to the metropolitan area beginning some twenty years ago which has made programmed development almost a practical impossibility. The security situation plus the necessity for fast industrial development following the partition of 1954 and the current "boom-town" status of Saigon have culminated in an environment even further hindering rational planning implementation. Thus, nature, history, and public policy priorities have combined to make Saigon grow like Topsy.

Its metropolitan area nature has not yet been exploited for developmental purposes, partly because of security conditions and policy priorities and, also, partly because important segments of the unincorporated area are already too wrongly developed; Gia Dinh province also has its slums. Nonetheless, the obvious answer to many of the prefecture's current problems is to work on rational land development through careful planning implementation. In the long run this can be done only by building up and controlling development in the rice fields and rubber plantations in Gia Dinh Province. Such a program will require stringent zoning in the virgin territories in the unincorporated areas, but it also will require strict enforcement of renovation and developmental regulations and procedures within the confines of the Prefecture itself.

SAIGON LAND USE PATTERNS

From two accompanying maps it is possible to obtain a general view of the district, *phuong*, and street breakdown of the prefecture.² As mentioned earlier, although there are currently 9 districts only 8 are considered in this analysis because the 9th is not yet fully operational.

All of the areas within the city limits west of Cong Hoa and Ly Thai To streets are part of what once was the district of Cholon. This latter portion of the prefecture is primarily a Chinese commercial and residential section, although parts of it are as mixed as certain areas in Saigon. At present, Cholon consists of two major divisions: (1) the old quarter centered around the Khong Tu area and extending to Tran Quoc Toan street, and (2) the new sections which are increasingly

²An even broader picture of the community is given in the metropolitan area map immediately following the front cover of the text.

newer as one moves from the Khong Tu area toward Cong Hoa and Ly Thai To streets.

The eight district boundaries are as follows:

First District:

Thi Nghe canal, Saigon River, Ben Nghe canal, De Lattre de Tassigny, Hong Thap Tu, Hai Ba Trung streets to Thi Nghe canal.

Second District:

De Lattre de Tassigny street, Hong Thap Tu street, Cong Hoa avenue and Chuong Duong Quay.

Third District:

Hai Ba Trung street, Hong Thap Tu street, Ly Thai To avenue, military red-macadamized road from Tran Quoc Toan avenue to military road along Bao Ngan canal, limit of Gia Dinh province and Thi Nghe canal.

Fourth District:

Ben Nghe canal, Te canal, Trinh Minh The street (from Tan Thuan Dong bridge to the swing bridge).

Fifth District:

Cong Hoa avenue, Ly Thai To avenue, military red-macadamized road, military road along Bao Ngan canal, Trang Tu street, Ngo Nhan Tinh street, Tau Hu canal, Ben Nghe canal.

Sixth District:

Prolonged Le Dai Hanh street, Bao Ngan canal, Trang Tu street, Ngo Nhan Dinh street, Tau Hu canal, Ruot Ngua canal, Road Ruot Ngua canal to My Thuan bridge and municipal limit bound to prolonged Le Dai Hanh road.

Seventh District:

Lao canal, Doi canal, canal No. 1, Tau Hu canal, Ruot Ngua canal, road leading from Ruot Ngua canal to My Thuan bridge, provincial road No. 17, An Lac village boundary, Dinh canal, Cho Dem canal, Cung canal, An Phu Tay village boundary, Phong Duoc and Binh Dong villages boundary to Lao canal.

Eighth District:

Lao canal, municipal boundary, Ong Lon canal, Te canal, Ben Nghe canal, Tau Hu canal, canal No. 1 and Doi canal.

District One

This district includes downtown Saigon. It is the most important area within the community in terms of economic and social levels. There are relatively few private residences found here. Still, it does serve as a residential quarter for a number of members of the highest economic brackets of the city, including: (1) Vietnamese whose families have been wealthy for generations; (2) certain Chinese who are members of the highest economic class, most of whom have moved their residences away from their business establishments in Cholon; and (3) a number of foreigners, including numerous French businessmen and Americans.

Rents in this district are extremely expensive and "key money" is the highest in the entire metropolitan area.³ As a result, almost no small apartments are occupied by the Vietnamese and Chinese laboring class members, although a very few middle class Vietnamese do reside in the area. In addition, working class residences, mostly Chinese, are found in alleys and quarters behind businesses where the occupants work. This last residential pattern is predominant in Saigon and accounts for the rise of many of the area's slum sections. However, though slum conditions are not unknown in this district, they are nowhere as extensive as in other districts.

The downtown district is clustered with medium-sized and larger shops, arcade shopping sections, bars, offices, and other vestiges of thriving commerce. Here also are found the principal hotels, numerous government buildings (customs, taxation, Interior, etc.), the Bank of China, the American Embassy, the Saigon Cathedral, and the general post office. This is the only Saigon ever seen by casual visitors, and it provides an expression of the well-known Paris attributes of the community. Most significant, the downtown portion personifies the entire area's dependence upon commerce.

District Two

This district is one of the most active Vietnamese business sections. Along with its innumerable small- and medium-sized shops it also includes the most important shopping center, the Saigon Central Market. Many government agencies are also found here, especially along De Lattre de Tassigny to Hong Thap Tu and along Gia Long street. Independence Palace is also in this district.

³An explanation of key money is presented under "Housing" in Chapter 7.

In order to give a broad picture of commercial and residential patterns in this district, a general description of a few major street (*duong*) areas is presented below. This description is hardly a definitive statement concerning current land use but rather is only an outline of major patterns in the district.

Tran Hung Dao: This street is lined chiefly by medium-sized shops and businesses, e.g., shops selling tires and other auto accessories, office suppliers, cinema houses, and restaurants.

Gia Long (toward Cholon): Here are found numerous medium-sized shops, including small import firms (bicycles, etc.), printing shops, newspaper offices, etc. This is one of Saigon's most active streets.

Phat Diem: Toward Cong Hoa along Phat Diem and behind the rows of shop buildings and houses on Tran Hung Dao is one of Saigon's most extensive slum sections. Houses here are almost entirely constructed with wood slats and have thatch roofs and dirt floors. This is the residential area for cyclo drivers, proprietors of the smaller shops (some have shops immediately in front of their living quarters), etc. Slum sections such as this one consist of numerous rows of houses divided typically by winding alleys; the front rows frequently are occupied by persons in medium level income brackets, while the rows beginning 10 to 20 meters behind the front rows are in the slum category.

Pham Ngu Lao and Le Loi: This is a middle class and medium sized shop section. It includes residences and businesses for sundry types of occupations, including, tailors, pharmacists, M.D.'s, brokers, auto repairmen, etc.

Vo Tanh: Here and in the area around Bui Thi Xuan and Cong Quynh streets are located expensive apartment residences occupied by proprietors of medium-sized shops, government officials, M.D.'s, etc. This important residential area is in the middle of a very active business center.

Ben Chuong Duong: This is primarily a Chinese section, including shops and residences. The residential quarters are "mixed," although almost completely Chinese, because occupants of all economic levels reside here. A number of businesses in this area are involved in import-export activities, one of the more important phases of Saigon's economy.

Co Giang, Nguyen Cong Tru, Co Bac, Nguyen Van Sam: Residents in this area are mostly Vietnamese who settled in Saigon before World War II. Most are proprietors of medium-sized shops. Houses are

typically 30 to 40 years old and were constructed either with brick or concrete. This section is extremely overcrowded chiefly because of the presence of numerous small markets.

District Three

The largest district includes the former village of Hoa Hung and the old quarter of Da Kao. Theoretically it ends at the boundary of Gia Dinh Province. However, parts of Tan Binh District in the province, a built-up overcrowded area around the Adventist Hospital, cooperate administratively with the police from District Three, and Saigon police patrol this section of the province.

The third district is itself extremely heterogeneous both economically and socially. However, several sections provide some basis for a general breakdown of its land use and population composition.

Da Kao: The term "Da Kao" comes from the Cambodian, but the first residents of the quarter were Chinese. Today, it is primarily a residential section, consisting mostly of middle and upper class Vietnamese. Most of its commercial activities are carried out on Dinh Tien Hoang.

It has no slums except for the zone bordering the river. This zone is inhabited by laborers, clerks, etc. Most of its residents are refugees who have entered the area in waves (during the resistance period, the time of the wars against the sects, and currently from terrorism in the countryside). A parallel zone is also found across the river in Gia Dinh Province.⁴

Hai Ba Trung, Hien Vuong, Le Van Duyet, Hong Thap Tu: These streets cover a rectangular section of the district inhabited by the wealthiest Vietnamese in Saigon, including high-ranking GVN officials and Vietnamese industrialists. Other residents include: a few of the wealthiest Chinese; a large number of French (planters, bankers, big businessmen, importers, industrialists, M.D.'s, and technicians); and many Americans. There are no slums in this section. Naturally, rent is quite high in this area; the smallest villas (small house and garden) run from 10,000-15,000\$VN upward. It has a number of small shops on its outskirts operated mostly by Vietnamese.

Le Van Duyet to Ly Thai To and to Phan Thanh Gian: This is a relatively new section. It was developed for the most part about twenty years ago upon swamp land. Today, the section is overcrowded. In-

⁴The slum zone in the province is one of the worst areas physically in the region, chiefly because of drainage difficulties. A few kilometers away, however, in Gia Dinh Town (one of the area's older communities) there are adequate drainage, good roads, etc.

numerable small shops operate on both sides of the streets throughout the section. It provides the familiar Saigon pattern: residence areas located behind rows of shops on the main street.

However, the residential area behind the rectangle formed by Phan Thanh Gian, Cao Thang, Phan Dinh Phung, and Le Van Duyet present a much less typical picture. In this area are found rows of government-built modest homes sold on a credit basis at reasonable prices to civil servants and victims of fire and other catastrophes. Yet, behind the rows of planned construction is the typical slum area. This particular slum section is a residential quarter occupied mainly by Southerners. It also includes a large portion of 1954 refugees from the North, who found a location to settle without government aid. It is one of the most heterogeneous sections in Saigon, where low-level government employees, petty merchants, craftsmen, school teachers, taxi drivers, and taxi girls live side by side in overcrowded quarters.

Phan Thanh Giang to Gia-Dinh Province: Although this is a relatively new section mostly only 4 to 5 years old, it has a large slum zone. Small businesses (mostly Vietnamese) line the streets, and the invariable rows of slum quarters are found behind. No foreigners live here, although it has a number of Chinese inhabitants.

Tran Quoc Toan and Le Van Duyet to Gia Dinh Province: This section includes military grounds, the campus of the National Institute of Administration, numerous shops, and slums. It is inhabited by members of northern refugees, mostly craftsmen. Slums behind the rows of shops (and opposite the military grounds) are not overcrowded in this section, and are so categorized chiefly because of the materials used in housing construction.

District Four

This district is a peninsula next to downtown Saigon composed of two former villages, Khanh Hoi and Binh Hoi. In this district are found factories, warehouses, and shipping offices. A number of the factories were once French, but are now managed by Vietnamese and Chinese as well as by French. Importing is more important here than exporting; the chief export products are rice and rubber, although Vietnamese rubber has been somewhat priced out of the world market.

Due to the possibility of Viet Cong terrorism in this district, the Civil Guard makes regular night patrols. Thus far, the only Viet Cong infiltration of this sort has involved forced attendance at propaganda sessions.

Trinh Minh The: This is the main street in the district. Most of the factories are located here as are a number of importing concerns (mostly American equipment—caterpillars, industrial and agricultural machinery, etc.).

Van Don Quay: Factories on this street are mostly for light industry (cigarettes, soap, glassware, etc.). Chinese rice, coal, and charcoal warehouses are also located here.

Ton That Thuyet: The worst slums of the city are located in the entire district, but they are most concentrated in the sections behind Ton That Thuyet street and in Vinh Hoi. Here also are found the worst sanitary conditions in Saigon. Even today the slum portions of this district are swampy areas. Most of the houses are made with wood planks with thatch or iron sheet roofs; they are raised on wood pillars to clear the swamp beneath them. Residents include petty merchants, unskilled laborers, and Chinese and Vietnamese peddlers. The section has presented great problems concerning juvenile delinquency for prefectural law enforcement agencies.⁵

Hoang Dieu, Nguyen Truong To, Quoc Hung and Do Than Nhan: This is one fairly well-developed section in this district. It is primarily a residential section although it also has a number of bars, tea houses, and medium-sized middle-class shops. It is located across a canal which divides Khanh Hoi from the slum areas of the district.

District Five

This district includes three fairly distinguishable sections of Cholon: (1) a highly developed area, most of which is not over 40 to 50 years old; (2) a rather old area (80 to 100 years old) mostly inhabited by Chinese; and (3) the Phu Tho section, which is just under construction, and the fairly new Nguyen Tri Phuong area.

The first section includes about one half of the fifth district; it is the part nearest downtown Saigon. It includes many expensive apartment houses, occupied by Americans and better-off Chinese and Vietnamese but very few French. Major streets in this section are Nguyen Hoang—chiefly a residential section; Rousseau—primarily a Chinese residential area; Minh Mang—principally commercial (shops, restaurants, etc.); Hung Vuong—villa apartments, government agencies, hospitals (maternity, T.B.); Nguyen Trai and Phan Van Tai—predominantly Chinese residential area (middle and upper income) and mixed business

⁵The Binh Xuyen military sect once recruited chiefly from the slums in Khanh Hoi and Vinh Hoi.

areas (shops, restaurants, professional offices); Cong Hoa—mostly government agency offices, but also includes the School of Pedagogy, Faculty of Science, and the School of Foreign Languages as well as quite new (about five years old) residences for Americans and high-income Chinese.

Quay Ham Tu is one part of this first section deserving special mention. Quite old buildings are found all along the quay. Junk owners and other persons in various forms of delivering and moving business (truck drivers, etc.) live here. Small shipping yards also are located in this section for repairing and loading the junks.⁸ Vietnamese living in this area are almost all from the South, including dockworkers, etc. Both the Chinese and the Vietnamese residing here have the poorest standards of living in the city, although a number of high-income apartments also are found along the quay. The section is not a slum by many standards, because most of the old structures have concrete walls and tiled floors. However, it is extremely overcrowded, 3 or 4 families live in most apartments, most buildings have no light, and sanitation is extremely bad.

The second section of the fifth district includes the heart of Cholon. It covers the area between Tran Quoc Toan, Quay Ham Tu, and Quay Binh Dong. This is mainly a commercial quarter, inhabited almost exclusively by Chinese. Few Vietnamese feel they can compete in the quite closed Chinese business community in Cholon. Most of the proprietors of businesses here also live in the area. Frequently the wealthier Chinese live in the front row of houses, and the poor live in back rows on narrow lanes, streets, and alleys. Many persons also live in their shops while on other occasions owners live in rows immediately behind their shops and their employees live in rows further back.

In Cholon proper there is little differentiation between specifically residential and commercial areas. Twenty years ago streets in the area were divided by trade (shoe street, etc.) but today although a vestige of the division remains most of the streets display a mixture of commercial enterprises. Most of the buildings are quite low concrete structures with almost no ventilation. However, today multi-story buildings are being constructed alongside the old structures on the major streets. The entire area is overcrowded and water supply is insufficient to meet its expanding requirements (water from canals is used for washing clothes), but the now rather old electricity system makes Cholon better off in terms of electricity supply than most other areas of the city.

⁸These establishments are found along the quay into other districts.

The third section of District Five represents Saigon's most extensive attempts at development. The Nguyen Tri Phuong area stretches to Tran Quoc Tuan Street. It is a low-cost housing quarter built by the city, and was initially begun over a decade ago. The homes were sold mostly to civil servants on a long-term loan basis. A typical home constructed in this section at first had two rooms and a kitchen and sold for approximately 30,000\$VN; it had no ceiling, tiled floor, or fence, and sometimes no toilet. Improvements made by civil servant purchasers raised the capital outlay to about 50,000\$VN for each house. Many of these homes have now been re-sold for around 100,000 to 120,000\$VN. The government has built concrete public toilets in the areas as well as a market, dispensary, police station, and school. At present, the residents are predominantly Vietnamese, including many from the North.

Development in the section of the former village of Phu Tho and its surrounding area for the most part is newer than in the Nguyen Tri Phuong area. The popular horse racing track which attracts thousands of visitors every weekend is located in this section. Around the race track is a government-developed area of small but fairly well-designed homes for civil servants at the middle and upper brackets. They are sold on a long-term loan basis but need little initial improvements as do the Nguyen Tri Phuong residences. The front row of housing units are relatively large and surrounded by a yard, i.e., they are regular villas. Their price ranges from 200,000 to 300,000\$VN. Other rows sell for considerably less, one group costing about 70,000\$VN and an even less expensive group ranging approximately 40,000 to 45,000\$VN. The cheaper units consist of small two-room contiguous residences (called apartments) having no gardens.

Another low cost housing unit area in the triangle of Tran Quoc Toan, Le Dai Hanh, and Cong Trung—next to the race track—is about eight years old. Houses here are not primarily for civil servants but for victims of catastrophes. Most units sold initially for 20,000 to 25,000\$VN, although some ranged upwards to about 40,000\$VN. The area did not become popular rapidly because at first it was generally considered too far from the main portions of the city and it had no drainage. Now it is a fairly prosperous section occupied chiefly by middle-range civil servants and middle-class employees of private concerns.

The last portion of the Phu Tho section extends from the race track toward the boundary of District Three. Almost no private residences are found here: a military campus along Nguyen Van Thoai; a military warehouse, and, above the military campus area, the School of Commerce, the School of Electricity, and vocational schools.

District Six

This district includes the area of the former village of Phu Lam and beyond into the countryside. The main street of the area is Dai Lo Hau Giang which leads to the outskirts of town and eventually to Tan An about forty-five kilometers from Saigon. This is an extremely important artery for traffic to and from the city. The street was recently widened by the Prefecture and now has separate lanes leading into and going out of town. Present buildings here are mixed structures, some are concrete and some are of lighter material (wood, plank walls, etc.). Not long ago it was a slum area of low thatch cottages on both sides of the street. The prefecture cleared the street and moved the former residents; some compensation was given to the ex-occupants, and a number were allowed to purchase units in government-developed low-cost housing sections. Today considerable construction is being undertaken in the renovated section: both public buildings (the psychological warfare training center, etc.) and better quality shops have been built. The residential pattern here currently is a Chinese-Vietnamese mixture.

Beyond the residential and business areas of District Six is found a basically rural section. The rural portion stretches to Phu Dinh Village. It includes rice fields and a few orchards. Residences are mostly surrounded by bamboo cluster fences. A number of the farmers in this area are dock hands and day laborers in Saigon who return to their farms each evening; this working pattern is similar to that found in many villages and rural sections in the area surrounding the city.

District Seven

This district is a long strip below Cholon proper, west of Ngo Si Lien Street, which is bordered and divided by several canals. The quay Binh Dong and a portion of the canal Ruot Ngua are on the north and north-west. Its south, southeast and southwest boundaries include the road from the quarter of Binh Dong to the village of Phong Duoc and the Rach Cung canal. The road to the village of Rach Cat forms its western limits. Factories, warehouses, and swamps are scattered throughout the area, except in the fairly large agricultural sections located at the district's (and Saigon's) outskirts.

The core area of District Seven is a factory and residential area divided by the streets of Quay Me Coc and Quay Nguyen Duy. The eastern portion of this core area is lined with rice mills and rice warehouses, usually concrete structures 40 or 50 years old. Behind the front rows of concrete buildings is a densely populated area occupied by

members of the lowest economic class of the Cholon Chinese community, and also a large unused swamp and wasteland area. The residential section is relatively new and consists primarily of thatched roof cottages (*paillotes*) with bamboo walls. The unskilled workers living here work mostly in Cholon. At one time many of them worked in the neighboring factories, but with slackened production during the past five years large numbers now work elsewhere in the city. The eastern portion was the scene of the dramatic migration of Northern refugees in 1954. Factories, few of which were in operation at the time, served as sleeping and residential quarters for over 10,000 refugees. This group, mostly families of Vietnamese military personnel, slept on factory and warehouse floors until they could be relocated.

The western portion of the core area was formerly used chiefly for loading and unloading paddy, maize, etc., grown in the south; *Me Coc* in fact means "cereal." The occupants here are mostly Vietnamese who live in houses made of wood with roofs of tile. This is a relatively old settlement and in general better than many sections in the city. Residents here include artisans, petty merchants, and farmers who grow vegetables or rice in their farms across the *Kinh Doi* and *Lo Gam* canals.

Large agricultural sections are located across from these two canals but within the city limits of Saigon. These sections situated to the west and southwest of the core portion of the district consist of rice fields, vegetable gardens, and small hamlets. The hamlets are typical Vietnamese-type rural communities with thatched homes surrounded by bamboo fences; many of the residents go out to their fields during the day and return to the hamlet in the evening. The rural portion is not densely populated and contains both residents who are full-time farmers and residents who work in the city proper during the day.

District Eight

This district is located south of the *Kinh Doi* canal and west of the interprovincial road number five. It extends southward to *Gia Dinh* Province. There is little commercial activity in this district. Once a few factories operated in sites along the canal, but today these are for the most part not in operation. The pig and oxen slaughter house still does, however, employ a significant number of the residents of this area. The residents include both Chinese and Vietnamese.

Most of the small homes have tile rooms and wood walls. This is a new residential area occupied by members of Saigon's working class, including laborers working in the city proper, cyclo drivers, and ox cart drivers (who carry brick, tile, sand, and chalk for building contractors

but cannot operate in the core of the city). Some of the sites in this district also were developed on land distributed by the government to victims of fire. In addition to the newer quarters, slum sections are found along the Rach Xom Cui canal. Beyond the built-up sections are rice fields. However, they are decreasing in number both because of a considerable shift to vegetable farming and of the large number of sites now being used for housing construction.

SAIGON LIFE STYLE PATTERNS

The most significant statistical study of social and economic conditions in the Republic of Vietnam is a work published by the National Bank of Vietnam titled *Etude Sur Les Conditions de la Vie et les Besoins de la Population du Vietnam*.⁷ This section on life style in Saigon is based principally upon an analysis of the bank's two-volume statistical collection. Data were accumulated for the research study by the Mission Economie et Humanisme headed by Joseph Lebret, Research Director of the Centre National Francais de la Recherche Scientifique (Economie et Humanisme). Mr. Lebret was assisted by Alain Birou, a Research Center Sociologist, and Nguyen Van Khoa and Nguyen Quang Le of the National Bank of Vietnam.

The study by the Research Center is similar to research programs previously completed in Colombia and Brazil and included data collection in rural as well as in urban areas of Vietnam. In the analysis presented in this section, statistics relating solely to Saigon have been abstracted and compiled from each of the two volumes of the study. Statistical data outlined pertain only to lower middle and lower economic groups in Saigon, because the study purposely avoided surveying upper income level urban residents. The highest income groups considered earned no more than 6,000 to 7,000\$VN per month per family. This group, of course, due to its social and economic practices, provides the raw material for most of the municipal problems outlined in the previous section of this chapter concerning land use.

Data collected for the study pertain to two primary life style components, broadly classified as the standard of living level and the social level. The research project included a sample survey, questionnaires, and observations. A series of items was devised relating to various factors of each of the primary components. Each item was

⁷Data collection for the study was underwritten between 1957 and 1959 and the work was published in September 1959. Life-style in Vietnam has not changed enough since the study period to make its data inconclusive today.

scored on a 0 to 5 point scale; the scores were compiled through a computed average of questionnaire and observation tallies. Factors for computing and evaluating the standard of living level included the following: health and health facilities; "situation domestique" and household equipment; education and educational facilities; housing conditions; city planning and public health facilities; administrative facilities and public services; commerce and handicrafts; and, transportation. Factors computed concerning the social level were: culture and leisure; social and familial life; and, spiritual life. The five point scale for each item was as follows: 0, very low degree; 1, low degree; 2, strictly "acceptable" degree; 3, fairly good, and, 4, very good or excellent.

Six sections of Saigon were surveyed, according to a three-class categorization. Class A included two higher range workers areas, Tan Dinh in district one and Phu Giao a predominantly Chinese quarter in district five. Average family income in Tan Dinh was from 6,500\$VN to 7,000\$VN per month and 5,500 to 6,500\$VN in Phu Giao. Class B consisted of two middle range workers areas, D'Ayot (in district two along Nguyen Van Sam street where average incomes were 4,500 to 5,500\$VN) and Cao Thang (in district three with an average income of 3,500 to 4,500\$VN). The third category, Class C, included Hang Dinh and Vinh Hoi; the former is in district five with an average income of 1,800 to 2,500\$VN, and the latter is the slum area mentioned in the earlier description of district four which has a 1,500 to 2,000\$VN average income level. Class C represents the lowest range workers area.

A computed average, based upon the five point scale, for life style in the six sections, derived from a complicated system of varying weights assigned to items of both the standard of living level and the social level, attributes the following over-all rank to each section: Tan Dinh, 2.55; Phu Giao, 2.34; D'Ayot, 1.81; Cao Thang, 2.07; Hang Dinh, 1.59; and, Vinh Hoi, 1.27. The accompanying table, Saigon: SPECIFIC LIFE STYLE FACTOR SCORES, gives the computed score for each study factor for all of the sections surveyed. It also outlines the Research Center's computed projected averages for Saigon as a whole for each factor. The total life style projected average score for the entire city is 1.82.

Standard of Living Level

Health levels and health facilities scores relate to such factors as: availability of hospitals, dispensaries, drug stores, oriental medicine practitioners (an important factor in medical treatment received by both Chinese and Vietnamese in Saigon); proximity of health facilities to

SAIGON; SPECIFIC LIFE STYLE FACTOR SCORES
Average Score: 1.82

	PROJECTED AVERAGE FOR SAIGON- CHOLON	CLASS A		CLASS B		CLASS C	
		TAN DINH	PHU GIAO	D'AYOT	CAO THANG	HANG DINH	VINH HOI
<i>Social Level</i>							
Cultural & leisure ..	1.77	2.39	2.17	1.52	2.30	1.65	1.34
Social life	1.17	1.15	1.40	0.65	1.35	1.20	1.05
Religious	1.31	1.70	1.70	1.11	1.64	0.66	0.73
Familial	2.26	2.52	1.96	1.68	2.56	2.44	1.64
<i>Standard-of-Living Level</i>							
Education	2.53	3.55	2.50	2.61	3.11	1.44	1.61
Educational facilities	1.96	2.05	2.26	1.52	2.47	1.68	1.52
Situation domestique	1.71	2.50	1.76	1.10	2.30	1.43	1.30
Household equipment	1.73	2.75	2.95	2.20	2.00	1.70	1.10
Health	1.72	2.93	2.37	1.79	2.10	1.94	1.23
Health facilities	2.14	2.85	2.15	2.35	2.30	2.00	1.95
Transportation	2.34	2.88	3.70	2.05	2.52	1.88	1.76
Housing conditions..	1.60	3.31	3.44	2.10	2.31	0.86	0.53
Commerce & handicraft	2.21	2.35	2.60	2.35	2.25	2.50	1.95
Adm. facilities & public services	1.50	2.52	2.21	1.86	1.21	1.65	1.04
City planning	1.43	2.80	3.00	2.33	0.76	0.85	0.28

domiciles in sample; frequency of illnesses; gravity of certain diseases; general physical condition of persons included in the survey; percentage of available hospital beds and physicians and social workers relative to the population of a section; extent of prenatal and maternity public assistance; and, length of time between initial inquiries and receipt of medical care. Each factor was ranked on the five point scale. For example, percentage of physicians available relative to population was scored as follows: 0, one M.D. per 40,000 persons; 1, one M.D. per 30,000; 2, one per 20,000; 3, one per 10,000; and, 4, one per 5,000.

The projected general average for Saigon's health level is low (1.72). Over-all sanitary conditions account to a great extent for this score. In addition, a number of serious diseases are still prevalent, especially in the lower income laborers quarters, including diseases related (1) to the intestinal system and the respiratory organs, (2) to anemia and *avitaminose* (all illnesses due to vitamin deficiencies), and (3) to eye difficulties. Dysentery and malaria also are frequent in certain sections.

The low health level may be, in general, traced to a number of current community problems and public service inadequacies; e.g.,

insufficient middle and lower economic class understanding of rudimentary hygiene principles; prevalence of malnutrition and even of numbers of underfed persons in certain sections of the city; inadequate public sanitary facilities, including too few concrete public water closets; persistent use of various forms of toilet stools placed over drains and canals in the outskirts of Saigon; and continued dumping in open refuse pits dug in the earth, as well as depositing of garbage almost anywhere there is an open space. The garbage disposal problem is particularly acute in Vinh Hoi where deposits are made under houses raised by thin pillars above swamps and ponds and in other sections where homes are built over canals.⁸

Although health facilities in Saigon are inadequate, the presence of numerous hospitals somewhat alleviates a bad situation. At the same time, the number of hospital beds and physicians is insufficient to meet the area's needs. Drugstores generally are found in sufficient number and in convenient locations, although many of the newer medicines are not in adequate supply. The assistance to mothers given by midwives is generally satisfactory, but prenatal care and application of infant hygiene principles are typically absent or even nonexistent. Finally, there are almost no local corps of social workers to advise the sick or assist in organizing household affairs according to proper hygiene practices.

The *situation domestique and household equipment* levels are quite low in all of the sections surveyed and extremely low in Class C. Items studied as part of the analysis of the *situation domestique* included: lack of interest in home improvements; dirty home and clothing; lack of personal cleanliness and physical care; misuse and improper preparation of food; poor household budget practices; improper child breeding; quality of first care given to the sick in the home; and lack of home economics training and general ability to organize household affairs. Household equipment items were: presence of kitchen and other household (washing, etc.) appliances and utensils; means of heat used for cooking (charcoal, electricity, etc.); adequacy of water supply system (running water in home, distance from home to public fountain), and, techniques for depositing garbage and ways use to eliminate moths, flies, and mosquitoes.

Almost no households in Saigon have had the benefit of any form of home economics training. Combined with the lack of hygiene training, this has perpetuated improper and unhealthy living standards in many of the laboring class quarters. Household equipment is scarce in

⁸Only an outline of sanitary and other contemporary problems is presented in this section. Chapter 7 describes these topics in more detail.

the lowest income sections and inadequate for raising the style of living conditions in most workers' sections. Further, the supply of running water either through taps (less than twenty percent for homes in the survey) or communal fountains is far from meeting even normal household needs; in cases of fire or other situations requiring large amounts of water, the situation frequently is disastrous. Lastly, it is noteworthy that most of the dwellings in the survey would not even be classified as "houses" according to the French definition of the term because this designation is applied only to dwellings with running water and electricity; other dwellings are conveniently categorized as slums.

Housing conditions themselves also present serious difficulties throughout the entire city (1.60 total for Saigon). In Hang Dinh (0.86) and Vinh Hoi (0.53) the housing situation is particularly acute. Items used to compute ranks for housing condition levels included: building materials; roof type and state of walls, floor and roof; amount of space occupied by a home; population density per square meter; and number of families living in a house.

Generally speaking, houses in Saigon are too small for the residential demands made upon them. The average dwelling unit size in the survey was twenty square meters, but a significant number of homes are smaller. Although the extended family system is not common within Saigon proper, in most of the working class sections at least ten to fifteen percent of the homes are occupied by two or more families; in the survey when a house was occupied by only one family it received the top score of four. As the average family size in Saigon is 5.3 to 5.5, excluding domestics, the housing situation is in general worse than in the rural areas. Although the extended family system is practiced widely among non-urban Vietnamese, rarely does more than one family reside in each dwelling unit.

City planning and provision of *administrative facilities and public services* for the entire city scored only 1.43 and 1.50 respectively. Planning in Cao Thang (0.76), Hang Dinh (0.85), and Vinh Hoi (0.28) receives scores among the lowest for any category in the survey. Items included in the city planning computations were: drainage; sewerage; alignment of house rows and house proximity to street; pavements; gardens surrounding homes; street width, type of construction, lighting, and cleanliness; availability of water pipe networks; and availability of parks. Administrative facilities and public service items relate to; number of police patrolling streets in an area; availability of assistance from firemen; and, presence of post offices, letter boxes, telegraph offices, public phones, gathering places, and playgrounds.

Best average scores were computed for post office locations and mail distribution (two mail deliveries a day received a four score). Saigon has relatively few public halls or playgrounds so the score was low on this item. The most serious deficiency in terms of public services, however, is fire extinguishing. This is caused more by the lack of an adequate water supply and the residential land use (including housing construction and density) than by shortages in available firemen and volunteer fire fighting groups.

FIRE DESTROYED ELEVEN HOUSES IN CAPITAL SUBURB⁹

A fire late yesterday afternoon destroyed eleven wooden houses with sheet iron roofs on Phan Van Tri Street, some fifty meters from the Phan Van Tri-Cong Hoa intersection in Saigon's fifth district.

No casualties were reported but damages were estimated at 400,000VN\$.

Firemen said the blaze started when a woman, the wife of a policeman, spilled kerosene onto the floor while lighting an oil stove. They said she panicked and was unable to get the fire under control. It spread quickly to neighbouring houses.

Firemen rushed to the spot immediately and managed to get the flames under control in about half an hour.

One Cong Hoa Youth member and an unidentified bystander who assisted the firemen were overcome by smoke and taken to Saigon Hospital for treatment.

Emergency relief goods were distributed to the victims last night by the chief of the fifth district.

* * * * *

Commerce and handicraft level includes: the general situation of commercial activity; the presence of small handicraft shops; food supply availability, quality, and variety; location of market areas, street peddlers, and shops selling goods not purchased daily such as furniture and clothing. Goods distribution is found in all sections of the community, either under market circumstances or in an isolated row of shops. In general, the variety and quality of products for sale is satisfactory. Trading is very active and one finds large numbers of both Chinese and Vietnamese merchants in all of the districts in the city, although Vietnamese tradesmen are not typically found in Cholon. However, handicraft trade currently faces stiff competition from the widespread sale of manufactured products, including both locally produced and imported goods.

Transportation scores relatively high for each section included in the research study. Saigon as a whole scored 2.34. Items included in the transportation computation relate to: frequency of bus pick ups; amount of time necessary to get to town or to one's place of work; percentage of families owning cars, bicycles, motor bicycles, and scooters; and frequency of cabs, cyclos, and motor-cyclos during certain

⁹Extract from the *Vietnam Press*, Monday, May 21, 1962, p. H 6.

hours of the day. Although the regular bus line itinerary includes an inadequate number of routes, this is compensated for, to a great extent, by the fairly large number of cabs, cyclos, and motor-cyclos operating in the city. Due to the increasing number of bicycles, motorbicycles, and scooters (scored at 3.04 for Saigon by the Research Center), the gap created by inadequacies in total numbers of public means of conveyance is partially filled.

Educational level and educational facilities present one of the prefecture's most demanding problem areas. However, the educational level in Saigon at 2.53 is scored proportionately higher than in the rural areas. Items in the educational level computation included: percentage of teachers compared to total numbers of students; percentage of children in school, length of school attendance, and regularity of attendance; possibility for gifted children to continue their education; medical care given at school; and degree of literacy of adults.

Problems related to education in Saigon receive attention in the next chapter. However, mention should be made here of important problems pointed out by the statistics compiled in the study, namely: that a large percentage of children from families in middle and lower income brackets must interrupt their education; that 2 to 3 years of school attendance is a common maximum in certain sections of Saigon despite the legal provisions for 5 years of compulsory primary education; that in many of these same sections gifted children have practically no chance to continue their education; and, that medical examinations and care are clearly insufficient to meet the needs of the expanding school population.

Items computed to determine educational facility levels include: sufficiency of schools in terms of number and location; and, condition of school buildings, classroom equipment, desks, blackboards, windows, playgrounds, and lights. School buildings are fairly well located in Saigon. However, classrooms are extremely insufficient in numbers, school equipment is inadequate and playgrounds are almost nonexistent. Serious deficiencies are presented also in terms of total numbers of water closets and wash stands in school buildings, and in terms of lack of municipal funds for both school building and site improvement and for assisting needy pupils to continue their education.

Social Level

The cultural and leisure levels are based upon a wide variety of somewhat diverse factors, as are the other factors under the general heading

of Saigon social level. Factors studied included percentage of illiterates fourteen years old and over; number of available literacy courses, and post-primary general education complimentary and housekeeping classes; availability of public libraries, popular theaters, etc.; percentage of better educated persons in a section; percentage of households owning radios; attendance at cinema houses, festivals and gatherings; and, amount of leisure time for rest and relaxation, as well as the way such time was spent.

The cultural and leisure level score for Saigon was 1.77. Literacy classes, post-primary courses, and vocational education classes were found to be inadequate in number. Moving pictures are very popular, although the quality of most films is considerably less than favorable in terms of cultural development. Public gathering places are not numerous and public libraries are very few in number. However, Saigon does have information halls located mostly in worker areas (Vinh Hoi, etc.). Facilities in these halls consist of only a few tables and chairs, and the reading materials are limited to a few daily and weekly newspapers and books and other forms of literature prepared by groups such as the Women's Solidarity Movement. Statistics compiled in the study also indicate that reading at home is not a widely appreciated avocation in Saigon.

IN SAIGON WHERE TO BORROW A BOOK?¹⁰

by

Nguyen Khiem Cat

One day last week a foreign tourist, fresh from Europe, happened to remark to a long-time Saigon resident about this tropical city: "You have far more trees than books!" Startled, but with typical Oriental calm, the old-timer replied: "Are you really interested? If so, just slow down and listen to this." The man then reeled off the long list of Saigon libraries.

Saigon now has 12 large libraries, including 4 especially for students and young people, with an estimated 200,000 books of all types.

First, special mention should be made of the Central National Library, located at 34 Gia Long Street, which houses 150,000 books, and can sit close to 100 readers. The books range in age from 17th-century manuscripts of Vietnamese classical authors, poets and thinkers to contemporary works just off the press. In size they vary from eight-page poems to metres-thick encyclopedias. In value, they go from one-cent magazines up to museum-level material whose value and uniqueness tempt all rare book collectors.

This library is open daily to the public during office hours in the morning and as late as 8 p.m. in the evening. But caution! It is mostly useful to grave high-brows, not for fun. It also has a spacious branch near the sprawling Petrus Ky High School. Historically, the Central National Library is the former Saigon Library or Library of Cochinchina. It was renamed following the 1954 Geneva Agreements and was enlarged by books from the Hanoi Library.

¹⁰Feature extract from Vietnam Press, March 29, 1962 (morning), pp D 1 +.

As far as the number of books is concerned, the next-largest is the Historical Research Institute on Le Thanh Ton Street, which now has an estimated 25,000 books in Vietnamese, French, English and Chinese, mostly highly technical works. This figure includes 1,000-odd dictionaries in these four languages. This library is also designed for specialists, as it covers history, archaeology, geography, genetics, art, culture, geology, etc.

Ranking third in size is the library of the French Cultural Mission, 31 Don Dat, which boasts of some 20,000 books of all types and subjects. It also had a full range of French newspapers and magazines.

* * * * *

Saigon's most sophisticated library, in terms of architecture, is the American-run Abraham Lincoln Library on Le Loi Street. Fully air-conditioned and located in the busiest downtown section of Saigon, it often gives shelter to tired strollers. Its most outstanding feature is that it has a children's section, gives regular film shows on a TV-size screen and boasts of a modern filing system by which any newcomer can easily find the book he desires. A minor stock of French books is another of its features. Like the two above-mentioned libraries, the Abraham Lincoln Library lends books to thousands of borrowers a year.

Another major library is the newly-renovated Library of the National Institute of Administration, which claims to have upwards of 15,000 books and about 250 varieties of magazines, trade organs, newspapers and booklets covering the technical aspects of sociology, economics, politics, history. Classified along the Dewey pattern, a large part of its books are reference materials, which can be lent to readers, mostly students, teachers, researchers and so on. The library also houses a micro-film section, covering previous material of both old and modern times. It also helps readers acquire from foreign libraries materials which are not available in Saigon. What is more, this institution trains public servants in the operation of libraries at their Government services.

Worth mentioning is the library of the Vietnamese-American Association on Mac Dinh Chi Street which has some 7,000 books, mostly in English, and a 60-disc record library. Like the other libraries, it is open to the public during office hours in the morning as late as 9 p.m. every day.

Typical of the minor libraries here is that of the Popular Cultural Association on Phan-Ke Binh Street. It has about 4,000 books designed to meet the requirements of its members. Located in a quiet section of the city, this library is well frequented.

Last but not least, mention must be made of the many libraries run by University Colleges, high schools and foreign embassies scattered through the city. These libraries, like the others, also have a lending service for the city's reading public and are heavily visited. Besides the number of books in all these libraries, there are many millions of textbooks and novels now on sale in the bookstores.

"Now what's their common feature?" asked the tourist, already perplexed by the long list of facts and figures given him by the old-timer. "Everywhere in these institutions, noise and smoking are banned. That's my answer," the latter said to his chain-smoking inquirer.

* * * * *

Social life levels were computed through surveys of quite varied factors, including: frequency of social contacts, mutual aid and conflict among neighbors in a section; interest in improving the section and assisting neighbors, as well as presence of section improvement associations; understanding of community problems and sense of community

responsibility; number of block and quarter festivals or other gatherings; and representation of interests of a section before various facets of municipal administration.

Social life, in the workers areas especially, is handicapped by the absence of public squares and meeting places (except cinema houses and places of worship),¹¹ the lack of electricity, and weak purchasing power to afford existing sources of entertainment. There appears to be a general indifference to support physical improvement in the sections covered in the study. Consequently, the lack of active community development promotion associations is not surprising. The survey also indicated a general indifference to social injustice affecting neighbors, and a lack of awareness or general interest in municipal operations.

Family life levels in the working class sections included in the survey reflect the deleterious impact of poor living standards. Items studied included such factors as: the extent of free unions; extent of adultery; economic dependence and social situation of wives; etc.

Polygamy is rare (and also illegal at present), and the Research Center's statistics indicate that familial solidarity, in general, is relatively strong. However, in Vinh Hoi and other poorer working class areas the solidarity of the conjugal bond appears to be particularly weak. The economic independence of women is especially low among the Chinese in Phu Giao and D'Agot. Women in Vietnamese families have comparatively more economic independence. Frequently, this lack of dependence is found in lower economic sections because wives work, frequently as peddlers, etc. In both Vietnamese and Chinese homes, the social life of women is significant, although their activities in communal life are not particularly pronounced. Prostitution was common in most of the sections in the study. In addition, premarital sexual freedom was indicated to be widespread. As in the Vietnamese countryside, education concerning sexual behavior is almost non-existent.

ASSEMBLY PASSES MODIFIED "BILL FOR A HEALTHIER SOCIETY"¹²

The National Assembly yesterday again passed the "Bill for a Healthier Society" with modifications added by President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The 10-article measure, now known as the "Bill for Protection of Morality," was first approved by the Assembly last Dec. 21. A presidential message, dated Jan. 20, brought some modifications, the most important being the elimination of article 6 forbidding publication of all facts of an individual's private life, except in cases of libel decided by the courts.

The presidential message said this matter will be dealt with in another law.

¹¹Large numbers of Saigonese can be seen each evening around downtown Saigon, clustering mostly along the Saigon River and around the new monument to the Trung Sisters.

¹²Extract from the *Vietnam Press*, May 17, 1962, pp. H 1 +.

In article 2, prohibiting persons under 18 years of age from smoking and drinking beverages containing more than 12 percent alcohol and prohibiting dealers from selling to them, the fine has been reduced from 40-60 VN\$ to 20-60 VN\$.

For recurrent offenders, dealers can be given prison terms offrom 11 days to one month and fined from 200 VN\$ to 50,000 VN\$. In addition, their places of business can be closed down from seven days to one month.

The presidential message also lowers the fine from 40-60 VN\$ to 20-60 VN\$ specified in article 3 to be imposed on those under the age of 18 who see films and theatrical performances forbidden by the censorship board.

Article 4 modifies the prison sentences for those who practice or organize social dancing at any place, perform or stage dances offending good manners, and take part in certain types of beauty contests. Offenders now may be sentenced to from 11 days to three months in prison (formerly six days to three months) and fined from \$200 VN\$ to 50,000 VN\$.

The same modification (6 days to 11 days) was also made in article 5 prohibiting boxing contests and animal fights organized for commercial purposes.

The 6-to-11-day change, the message said, was made to conform with penal law in Central Vietnam.

To article 8, providing for fines of from 200 VN\$ to 50,000 VN\$ and prison terms of from 11 days to one year for prostitutes and their customers, the message added the following specification: All women will be considered as prostitutes who are surprised three times with three different men, practicing prostitution at any place, or caught at any place considered by the public prosecutor's department as one used for prostitution purposes.

* * * * *

Although the typical Saigonese family remains a fairly solid unit today, this solidarity is threatened in many quarters of the community due to the effects of slum conditions and to numerous other factors. For instance, there is a clear tendency among the younger residents of the city to emancipate themselves from the guardianship type of relationship historically characteristic of Vietnamese family life. This emancipation is facilitated by the general situation associated with urban living. Nucleus rather than extended families are the rule in Saigon and no doubt will become even more prevalent. Under these circumstances, parental control is becoming continually less effective.

Scores for *religious* or *spiritual life* were particularly low in the survey. For all of Viet Nam the average was 1.29 and for Saigon it was 1.31. In Hang Dinh, at 0.66, and Vinh Hoi, 0.73, the state of spiritual life is at its lowest ebb. Among the items computed were: penetration of religious ideals; comprehension and respect for religious principles; moral influence of priests and religious leaders; ancestor worship; and extent to which materialism (money making) was stressed at the expense of idealism.

For all Vietnamese urban areas penetration of religious ideals scored 1.26, recognition and practice of moral obligations 1.26, and comprehension of religious principles 0.80. The most persistent observation for all of Vietnam was the continued importance of ancestor worship. This practice is, of course, common to Buddhist practitioners (both for Pagoda goers and the non-attending Buddhists), but it is also common for many who profess not to be Buddhists, even among some who are Catholics.

WORLD PUBLICATION NOTES VIETNAM BUDDHIST PROGRESS¹³

In its February issue, the World Buddhism review published in Colombo, Ceylon, lauded the ever-increasing activities of the General Buddhist Association of Vietnam.

During the past five years, the review said, the Association has scored "encouraging results" in three directions: material, intellectual and spiritual.

The Association "has more than three million adherents and followers throughout the country in towns and cities as well as in remote villages," the magazine reported.

On efforts to disseminate Buddhist tenets among the Vietnamese people, World Buddhism quoted an Association official as saying:

"In addition to verbal propaganda, special classes have been organized first in Saigon and the suburbs for laymen wishing to learn some elementary principles of Buddhism.

"All these activities lead to the difficult problem of forming Buddhist cadres that our Sangha has solved by increasing Buddhist schools and institutes (four in 1956 and ten in 1961) and by creating a group of preachers, not mentioning the fact that some of our student-monks have been sent abroad to study.

"Our youths of both sexes from 6 to 25 years old, grouped as a Youth Movement, and incorporated in 600 lay associations of different levels receive an adequate religious education suitable for their aptitudes. Our intention is to make these 90,000 schoolboys and girls and students — one fourth of those who study at our private schools — continuators of our work of renovation, that we have been undertaking and following untirelessly from 1924."

The publication also enumerated the Vietnamese Association's achievements in the social welfare field. These include a clinic in Saigon which is now taking care of 250 people daily, free of charge.

"In Hue two hospitals and one maternity home, though still modest, render real services to the inhabitants who live far away from the Government's health services," the report from Vietnam said.

Repair of many pagodas "damaged or destroyed by the war" and construction of new ones also were listed among the Association's many achievements.

¹³Extract from Vietnam Press, April 17, 1962 (morning) pp. C 2 +.

7 | *Factors Affecting Public Policy and Municipal Administration in Saigon*

This chapter provides a description of numerous factors having a direct bearing upon the efficiency and effectiveness of public services within the Saigon metropolitan area. Many of the community problems associated with these factors, and directly or indirectly stemming from them, also are outlined. Most of these problems, especially those related to housing, pertain to the presence of slums in the prefecture and its surrounding environs. Others pertain in addition to broader substantive areas of community development such as business and industrial expansion, education, labor organization, and wage and price structure.

Data pertaining to the incidence and present situation of the factors also concern significant economic and social trends both in the Saigon area and throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Unfortunately, accurate statistical data are very difficult to obtain. Figures listed in this chapter are typically more approximations than representative of a completely reliable description of current conditions and trends. Yet, these statistics do aid in providing a comprehensive picture of the contemporary

social and economic situation in Saigon as well as of the current and potential public service problems associated with that situation.

POPULATION

The rapid growth in the population of Saigon during the last twenty years (1942-1962) has been stimulated primarily by the lack of security in the rural areas of Vietnam. With the beginning of the Japanese "occupation" in 1942, villagers, especially the more wealthy ones, felt the first signs of insecurity due to the operations of Japanese armed forces, as well as to the emergence of militant anti-Japanese groups, anti-colonialist parties, and politico-religious sects.

This situation became increasingly serious following the defeat of the Japanese in 1945 and the subsequent expansion of many nationwide movements for independence, a number of which contained a significant proportion of Communist leaders. The struggle for independence from 1946 to 1954 marked a period of extensive conflict and terrorism, particularly in the rural areas where most anti-colonialist strongholds were located.

From 1954 to the present time, insecurity in the countryside has resulted from subversive activities by anti-government forces, chiefly Communist led, but in other instances prompted directly by two major religious sects. For the last two years, Communist guerrilla forces appear clearly to be leaders and in other instances actually combatants in the struggle against the GVN. An unknown proportion of the Communist cadre leaders and guerrilla trainers have infiltrated from North Vietnam. Anti-government forces have gained support through various measures, including techniques ranging from personal intimidation to forced participation. These techniques have been executed by devastation, pillage, tax collection, etc.

In addition to the migrants from the south moving to Saigon to avoid an adverse security situation, the metropolitan area has been obliged to absorb large numbers of refugees from the north. An exodus of approximately 800,000 residents of North Vietnam occurred in 1954 and 1955 following the partition. Of this total, at least 100,000 are now residents of the prefecture. Further, perhaps as many as 100,000 northern residents had migrated to the Saigon area in the years immediately preceding the Japanese surrender.

Statistical data provided by the National Institute of Statistics of Vietnam in 1959 outline the following:

A. Republic of Vietnam	
Population	13,789,000
Area	171,655 sq. km.
Density	80 per. sq. km.
B. Saigon	
Population	1,383,200
Area	51 sq. km.
Density	26,000 per sq. km.
C. South Vietnam (former Cochinchina)	
Population	8,908,419
Area	67,873 sq. km.
Density	131 per. sq. km.

The population density for Gia Province was recorded as 905 per. sq. km., although because of migrations during the past two years this number today is closer to 1,000. Saigon's increases are almost phenomenal when compared to the estimated 1939 population figures of approximately 240,000 for Saigon and 300,000 for Cholon. In 1900 the population of all of Gia Dinh Province, including Saigon-Cholon, perhaps did not much exceed 200,000. Today Saigon includes approximately 85 percent of the total urban residents in the entire nation, although only some 12 percent of the population can be considered as urban.

Although completely accurate nationality and place of origin statistics for current residents of Saigon are impossible to obtain, the National Institute of Administration (NIA) and the Michigan State Advisory Group in Vietnam have completed studies giving some information on these topics. According to the NIA study,¹ there were 700,000 Chinese (60 percent of them in Saigon-Cholon) in 1952. This situation changed following a 1956 decree relating to Vietnamese citizenship: permanent residents who refused to become citizens of the Republic of Vietnam were to pay taxes of 2,000-3,000 \$VN a year and were forbidden to practice eleven different occupations. By 1961, the NIA study listed only 1.3 percent of the Republic's population as Chinese, while 97.4 percent were Vietnamese, and 1.3 percent were foreigners other than Chinese.

In terms of place of origin of Saigon residents, the NIA study provides the following statistics: 47 percent were born in Saigon, 20 percent in southern Vietnam (Cochinchina), 5 percent in the central section (Annam), 17 percent in the north, and 11 percent were not born in Vietnam.

¹Answers to Questionnaire On "Metropolitan Administration," prepared by the National Institute of Administration for the EROPA Tokyo Seminar of October 23-November 5, 1961 (Saigon: NIA, 1961).

The 1959 survey of employees of four representative medium-sized Saigon factories gathered pertinent data presented in the table below²

PLACE OF BIRTH	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Saigon and Saigon Suburbs	101	64.8	44	61.9	145	63.9
South Vietnam	28	17.9	15	22.5	44	19.4
Central Vietnam	5	3.2	—	—	5	2.2
North Vietnam	10	6.4	5	7.1	15	6.6
Total of Vietnam	144	92.3	65	91.5	209	92.1
Foreign	12	7.7	6	8.5	18	7.9
TOTAL	156	100.0	71	100.0	227	100.0

EDUCATION

The greatly expanding population of the prefecture naturally has placed added burdens upon the community educational system. Although during the past few years many new school buildings have been constructed and the total number of teachers has increased, these two necessities for effectively meeting educational needs are constantly falling behind even minimum requirements. In the countryside current educational problems are even more severe than in the city because terrorism frequently precludes operation of local school plants even where new structures have been built with the help of American aid funds. Within Saigon, of course, security conditions do not present a problem. The difficulties encountered by the prefectural educational system relate rather to urbanism and to inadequacy of public services and planning.

Primary Schools

Statistics for 1961 provided by the Saigon Service of Elementary Education show that the prefecture operated 38 primary schools, employed 1,687 teachers, and enrolled 103,118 pupils (57,641 boys and 45,477 girls). As mentioned in Chapter 5, the city administration operates only the public primary schools, while the Central Government operates public secondary education facilities. The educational system is supplemented by a wide array of private institutions.³

Major problems encountered by the prefecture in providing primary education center primarily around three significant current short-

²JAMES B. HENDRY, PAULINE NGUYEN VAN THO, and VO HUNG PHUC, *The Work Force in Saigon* (Saigon: MSUG, February 1960), Table 5.1, p. 92.

³Statistics on the private institutions are not reliable. However, the Service of Elementary Education estimates that in 1961 there were 507 private primary and elementary schools (most only involving tutoring), which employed 1,311 teachers (674 male and 637 female), and enrolled 52,029 students. Statistical data concerning higher education are presented below under "Vietnam at School."

ages: (1) financial resources for construction of additional school buildings; (2) land sites for locating new structures; and, (3) teaching personnel, equipment, and materials.

Due to the drastic shortages in educational facilities, the prefecture operates its primary schools on a rotating basis. Although over 400 new classrooms are required each year to meet an annual enrollment increase of approximately 20,000 pupils, at present the prefecture can at best provide for only about ten percent of the new classrooms. Students attend in shifts, with school hours running from 6:30 A.M. to 7:00 P.M. Each class meets only 2 or 3 hours a day. In this way, one room can be used for 4 or 5 classes, e.g., 6:30-9:00, 9:00-11:30, 11:30-2:00, 2:30-5:00, 5:00-7:00. By contrast, during the French era the normal school day lasted five hours.

The shift system permits the prefecture to enroll most eligible pupils. However, the typical number of students slated in a classroom is 70 as compared to 40 prior to 1955. Naturally, the large enrollments and limited class time greatly affect the quality of teaching. Individual attention to student needs is a practical impossibility. However, an even more serious problem is the fact that the classroom periods are so short there is only enough time for pupils (a) to reproduce texts written on the blackboard by the instructor, (b) to participate in rote drills, or (c) to take examinations.

Saigon's available land site shortages place a particularly acute burden upon the prefecture's primary education program. Today public lands are not available for school sites, chiefly because of security construction priorities mentioned earlier. Private land is extremely expensive, and the prefecture is unwilling to pay prices higher than those set by the price-fixing committee. As a result, the municipal government rarely can compete in land buying even when the education service has funds appropriated for such purchases. Due to the land shortage problem, the prefecture on occasion is even obliged to destroy existing structures in order to construct larger buildings.

Shortages of teachers is a problem for which no immediate solution is possible. The School of Pedagogy can supply only about 20 teachers each year, while about 200 are needed to meet estimated minimum adequate educational requirements. One of the most serious problems presented by the teacher shortage is the impossibility of finding replacements when regular instructors are absent. When they are ill or on leave, their classes are interrupted. Frequently, for example, when teachers take maternity leave classes are dismissed for as long as two

months.⁴ On other occasions, colleagues of an absent instructor oversee his classes, but they must also simultaneously teach their regular courses.

Secondary Schools

None of the secondary schools, government-operated or private, located within Saigon are under the jurisdiction of the prefecture, but are controlled by the Directorate of Secondary Education.

There are at present in the Saigon area ninety private secondary schools operated by Vietnamese, Chinese and French. All of these schools provide pupils with instruction in general education topics. A few still use French and Chinese as the language of instruction. In size, private secondary schools range from 1-room apartments with total enrollments of some 20 pupils to 30-room structures with enrollments of 4,000.

There are 8 Central Government-operated secondary schools, excluding 6 vocational training institutions which are also run by the government. The Saigon public secondary schools enroll over 11,000 pupils. Physical facilities are quite limited, and each year the number of applicants is generally from 7 to 10 times the number of students who can be accepted.

The lack of qualified teachers, especially for subjects newly introduced in the present secondary system is also a serious problem. The new courses include: Vietnamese language and literature, history and geography of Vietnam and other Asian countries, and, English. However, qualified instructors even in French and philosophy are not readily available. The present regulation sets the second part of the baccalaureate as a minimum requirement to teach in the four first grades of a secondary school. The *Licence es lettres* and *Licence es sciences* are requirements for teaching in the upper secondary school grades. However, many of the instructors only have the first baccalaureate.

Although serious problems are found in the operation of the public secondary schools, even more acute difficulties are presented in the organization and practices of the private ones. The private schools naturally are profit-making institutions, many of which obtain their student body through advertisements. Tuitions vary but private schools are definitely more expensive than public ones. Total per pupil costs may run as high as 1,000 to 2,000 \$VN each month. On occasion, personnel are hired because of their "fame" as authors of textbooks for examination candidates; their texts usually contain condensed lesson plans and ex-

⁴Every month an average of 50 to 70 teachers take maternity leaves.

amination "keys" to aid in memorization. Monthly salaries range from 30,000 to 50,000 \$VN to 7,000—15,000 \$VN, to 3,000—6,000 \$VN. School owners themselves may earn several million piasters a year, although a number of others are constantly on the verge of bankruptcy. The prosperous schools crowd 100 to 150 students in each classroom. Typically an entire year passes between examination periods for these pupils, while classroom teaching techniques depend almost exclusively upon various forms of endless speeches.

THE CONTEMPORARY VIETNAMESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

VIETNAM AT SCHOOL⁵

by P. H. M. Jones

The peoples of Asia, above all those who have recently regained independence, perhaps covet nothing so ardently as education. Apart from the conventional schools—very much in evidence in Asian countries on account of their high birth rate—Asian cities abound in crammers and schools of English where thousands of men and women seek the possibility of better jobs or a richer or more useful life. Asian office boys instruct themselves with a dogged persistence that their western congeners seldom attempt to emulate.

South Vietnam is no exception to this pattern. Although civil strife has been hardly interrupted since 1945, and education is not yet compulsory, the number of pupils in state secondary schools rose by over 300 percent and of university students by 625 percent between the academic years 1954-55 and 1961-62 (of course, the exodus from the North that followed the Geneva agreements of July 1954 had some effect on these figures). Thus the Lycee Gia Long, a state lycee for girls which had 22 classes and 1,200 pupils ten years ago, now has 82 classes, many of them "parallel," and 5,000 pupils who sit shoulder to shoulder. Half the classes are held in the morning and half in the afternoon, so that the building harbours in effect two separate institutions; *Fusine bourdonne du matin au soir*. Even so only 800 are admitted out of 6,000 candidates a year for entry into the lowest class.

While the number of Vietnamese state secondary schools rose from 29 to 101 between 1954-55 and 1961-62, the plan of studies, which is closely modelled on the French system, has hardly changed except that Vietnamese history and geography have been substituted for French, a process which had started before independence. For mathematics and the sciences French text books translated into Vietnamese are used. The Vietnamese lycees follow the same "cycles" of study as the French, the first cycle of four years leading to the *brevet d'enseignement secondaire*, which is taken at the age of fifteen or sixteen, the second of three years comprising the highest classes—Second and First followed by *Mathematiques Elementaires*, *Sciences Experimentales* or *Philosophie*—which take the two parts of the baccalaureate.

French also is the strictness with which examinations are administered in Vietnam. In 1960, out of just 16,000 candidates in all to the first part of the Vietnamese baccalaureate, 86 percent passed, and a little under half of the 4,700 candidates to the second half; in France last year the proportions were 59 percent and 61 percent. Certain reforms in the two parts of the baccalaureate, in particular abolition, except for modern languages, of the oral, which is held to make for unfairness, will

⁵Reproduced by permission from the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. (May 19, 1962).

be instituted from the next school year. These resemble reforms already enacted in France.

About half the pupils who enter Vietnamese-speaking secondary education reach the baccalaureate; many are satisfied with the *brevet*. For the latter the examination is the same for all students, but the Vietnamese baccalaureate may be taken in one of four divisions: *Math. Elem.* (mathematics, physics and chemistry with some philosophy, history and geography), *Sciences Ex.* (which has in fact less science than *Math. Elem.* but more philosophy etc.) Modern Letters (philosophy, French and English) and Classical Letters (Latin or Chinese). Very few candidates take Chinese; candidates in Latin come wholly from schools under religious management or from Catholic seminaries.

Among the candidates to the second part of the Vietnamese baccalaureate, the men go for the most popular divisions, Mathematics and Science, in about equal numbers, while the girls show a decided preference for Science. It is not that the young women of Vietnam have any exceptional bent for the exact sciences, but *Sciences Ex.* is recognised as the soft option. "Face" certainly plays a part in their motives for taking the examination at all: the *bachot's* the thing. Moreover while they may not know a great deal of science, the qualification will get them into any Faculty of the University they may choose, except Education. But science has perhaps some use as a preparation for pharmacy, which in Vietnam is a largely feminine calling.

A little over two-fifths of the present total of 208,000 secondary school pupils attend government schools. Secondary education is provided by both public and private schools, and these, both Vietnamese and French speaking, making four more or less clearly defined sections in all. The private schools, while of uneven quality, are very numerous for education is a paying business in Vietnam as elsewhere in the East.

On the "French" side the French Cultural Mission, which depends on the Ministry of Education at Paris, manages two lycees at Saigon, Jean-Jacques Rousseau

SECONDARY EDUCATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

	State Schools			
	SCHOOLS	CLASSES	TEACHERS	PUPILS
1959-60	69	1,158	1,514	62,130
1960-61	82	1,374	1,830	73,681
1961-62	101	1,602	2,046	86,228
	PRIVATE SCHOOLS*			
1959-60	307	2,025	3,374	101,806
1960-61	336	2,506	4,777	130,079
1961-62	315	2,254	4,469	121,629
Total				
1961-62	416	3,856	6,515	207,857

*Including "French" Schools

Source: Secretariat d'Etat a l'Education Nationale

for boys and Marie Curie for girls, a mixed lycee, the Lycee Yersin, at Dalat and colleges (rather smaller than lycees) at Tourane and Nhatrang. All these institutions have one or more primary classes or institutions attached, the whole group comprising at present almost 11,500 pupils, of whom between 6,000 and 7,000 are at the secondary level. Twenty-one religious institutions speaking French and following the French

curriculum, including 5 at Saigon, 4 at Hue and 3 at Dalat, instruct some 9,000 pupils and 9 lay and private Vietnamese institutions of the same program, some of which have primary classes, a further 8,000. In addition, some religious institutions and a large number of private Vietnamese schools give part of their instruction in French.

All these French speaking schools now send annually to the two parts of the French baccalaureate some 3,500 candidates. There were 728 successes in the first part of this examination, and 386 in the second part in 1957, but by 1960 the figures had risen to 1,130 and 701 respectively. For 1961 and 1962 further increases of 5 percent or 10 percent will probably be recorded.

Some 35 percent of the candidates to the second part of the French baccalaureate pass, the girls doing noticeably better than the men. Girl candidates are about 1 in 3 as against 1 in 6 for the Vietnamese examination. The popularity of science is even more marked than in the Vietnamese baccalaureate, and for the same reasons. Of the young men who passed the second part of the French baccalaureate last year, 44 percent took Sciences Ex. as against *Math. Elem.*, 36 percent and Philosophie (which includes literary studies), 20 percent. For the girls it was 52 percent, 5 percent and 43 percent.

Marie Curie has a commercial section, a six-year course leading not to the baccalaureate but to the *brevet d'enseignement commercial*.

Altogether there are about 200 French teachers, mostly *agreges* or *licencies*, in French secondary education in South Vietnam, around 100 in French primary education and some 70 more in the universities. These last depend not on the Cultural Mission but on the Vietnamese government, taking their orders from their superiors in the academic hierarchy.

That the Vietnamese and French speaking institutions should coexist in amity says much for the good sense of both parties. In the political climate of 1955 the United States might possibly have occupied the French position at this point, but certain private initiatives in this direction were not supported by the American government. Nor has independent Vietnam generally shown anything but friendship to the French educational presence.

EXAMINATION RESULTS IN "VIETNAMESE" SECONDARY EDUCATION

	BREVET		BACCALAUREATE PART 1		BACCALAUREATE PART 2	
	CANDI- DATES	PASSED %	CANDI- DATES	PASSED %	CANDI- DATES	PASSED %
1955	5,104	46.1	1,027	56.2	498	45.2
1956	9,713	33.4	3,492	21.9	733	52.2
1957	17,320	37.6	5,668	29.7	1,201	63.6
1958	27,057	34.2	7,234	36.8	2,052	63.7
1959	42,886	21.4	11,589	27.8	3,369	53.4
1960	54,469	18.3	15,992	36.0	4,734	48.4

Source: Annuaire Statistique de l'Enseignement

Many of the country's leaders and senior officials, having received a French training, are convinced of its value; and the French schools have always taken care to keep out of politics. Especially striking is the success of the college at Nhatrang, founded in 1955 when Franco-Vietnamese relations were at their worst, and in a region singularly hostile to the "colonialists;" Nhatrang now has five times more candidates for admission than it can accommodate. By and large the French primary schools have ten times as many applications as they have places. As a simple test in

knowledge of French is required for admission, thousands of Vietnamese children of five or six thus start their scholastic career with something like a competitive examination. The French secondary schools admit, mostly of course from French primary schools and again by semi-competitive examination, about one candidate in three. Pupils who fail to get into French primary or secondary schools are commonly placed in French-speaking Vietnamese institutions.

French education, with its long tradition, must have an initial advantage over the distinctively Vietnamese system, which is in course of development; the linguistic requirement also has its influence. Almost all the pupils of the French schools, young men and women alike, who pass the baccalaureate go on to higher education. Marie Curie for instance estimates that of its annual contingent of some 120 *baccalaureates*, 80 or so go on to the University — about 20 to the Faculty of Education, 20 or 30 to the Faculty of Letters and 30 or 40 to Science, Pharmacy or Medicine — and 5 or 10 more go to France to take advanced commercial or interpreter's courses or others that Vietnam cannot provide.

"VIETNAMESE" BACCALAUREATE
PART 2, 1961

	MEN		WOMEN	
	CANDI- DATES	PASSED %	CANDI- DATES	PASSED %
Sciences Ex.	2,283	55.4	726	58.8
Math. Elem.	2,768	53.0	114	45.6
Lettres Modernes	1,205	54.1	313	40.3
Lettres Classiques	164	73.8	1	nil
TOTAL	6,870	54.6	1,154	52.4

Source: Secretariat d'Etat a l'Education Nationale

Of the teachers in the French lycees and colleges the great majority is French. There are a few Vietnamese, mostly teaching distinctively Vietnamese subjects. The curriculum is identical with that of similar establishments in France except for some modification of the courses in French history and the addition of classes in the language, history and geography of Vietnam; four hours of Vietnamese a week are compulsory for the Vietnamese pupils, who constitute over 80 percent of the total. From the next school year (beginning in July 1962) the Mission will voluntarily introduce the programs in Vietnamese history and geography prescribed by the Vietnamese Ministry of Education for its own establishments.

South Vietnam has three universities, two of them created since the recovery of independence. The University of Saigon, by far the largest, descends from the Indochinese university founded at Hanoi in 1917. Under a cultural agreement signed between France and Vietnam in December 1949 this university became a Franco-Vietnamese institution under the style of the University of Hanoi. It comprised Faculties of Law, of Medicine and Pharmacy and of Science, a Higher School of Architecture and an Institut Propedeutique offering a preparatory course in French language and literature.

Its two centers, at Hanoi and at Saigon, merged at Saigon in October 1954 when the Hanoi center migrated to the South, and in the following May the University was handed over to the government of Vietnam to become, as the National University of Vietnam, an entirely Vietnamese institution. It received its present name in March 1957 on the establishment of a new university at Hue. Saigon now has Faculties of Law, Medicine, Pharmacy, Science, Letters and Education and a Higher School of Architecture with a total enrollment of nearly 13,000.

Eight years ago the number was only 2,000. This rapid increase in the student body has faced the University with almost insoluble problems of accommodation,

housed as it is in buildings scattered about the city and most of them destined originally to quite other purposes. The government has therefore set out to construct a spacious "university zone" in the district of Thu-duc, seven or eight miles from Saigon along the fine new highway to Bien-Hoa. It will comprise a Rectorate and buildings for the various Faculties (except Medicine, which is obliged to remain close to the hospitals of the city), halls of residence for men and women which will house 2,000 students in all, students' restaurants and common rooms. Work on the new Faculty of Education has already started and all the buildings are due to be finished, and the transfer from the present installations effected, by late 1965.

Slightly nearer the city a Teachers' Village is well on the way to completion. This will have eventually some 200 villas, shops, a market, a common room, a church and a temple etc. The prospective occupants can obtain from the government a loan on easy terms of 300,000 piastres, which suffices to put up a medium-size dwelling. Many have spent much larger sums, and as they have been free to build largely to their own liking the village exhibits a remarkable variety of architectural styles and a good deal of fantasy. A few villas are already occupied, though they still lack a piped water supply. Their residents travel to Saigon every day by car.

In Saigon itself a university hospital is to be built, with 500 beds.

The University of Hue was established by a decree of March 1, 1957, on the initiative of the President, who desired thus to embellish the old imperial city. It has an Institute of Sinology and Faculties of Law, Letters, Science, Education and Medicine; the last of these started to function in 1960-61. The Higher School of Fine Arts, which depended on the University of Hue, was at mid-1960 brought directly under the fine arts department of the Ministry of Education. Hue now has about 2,200 students.

While the Universities of Saigon and Hue are governmental institutions, the University of Dalat, which opened in 1958, was created by the bishops of Vietnam under the impulsion of the Archbishop of Hue, a brother of the President, and is financed from the funds of the Catholic Church in the country. The founders desired primarily to crown the edifice represented by the numerous Catholic primary and secondary schools and to ensure that the Church shared in the formation of the Vietnamese elite. The University is moreover designed to play a special part in the higher education of the clergy and of those who will teach in Catholic schools and no doubt it will like the Lycee Yersin attract persons—quite a numerous class even among Vietnamese—whose health will not stand the climate of Saigon.

Despite its origins the University does not propose to give an exclusively Catholic bias to its instruction as, for instance, do the Catholic universities of Canada. Less than a quarter of its teachers are Christian. There are now 463 students (some 30 percent of them Catholic) divided among Faculties of Education, Letters and Science. A large Catholic seminary at Dalat, the *Seminaire Pontifical Pie X*, will be affiliated to the university as Faculties of Theology and of Scholastic Philosophy. Dalat is a wealthy institution, which is due to be considerably enlarged in the near future. The instruction is absolutely free.

There is no entrance examination to Vietnamese universities, the baccalaureate being the standard qualification. But for entrance to the Faculties of Education an examination must be passed which, as teaching is a popular career, becomes in practice competitive. All the students in education receive a government grant, binding themselves in exchange to teach in secondary schools for a certain number of years after taking their degree.

Until 1957-58 law was the preferred study of Vietnamese youth, the *licence* in law being the surest passport into the civil service, which has traditionally been the young Asian's first objective. But recently *licencies* in law have had difficulty in finding openings. The Faculties of Science are now the most popular except, for

the moment, at Dalat; however they have a high proportion of failures at the examinations. At Saigon last year 577 young men and 200 women were studying in the preparatory year of the Faculty of Letters on the Vietnamese side; 401 men and 143 women were at the same stage on the French side. In the subsequent years Vietnamese Literature is by far the favourite course or "certificate" with 225 students in 1961-62 followed by Vietnamese Language (144), Practical English (121), Western Philosophy (107), French Literature (101), French Language (95), Oriental Philosophy (89) and others.

**"FRENCH" SECONDARY EDUCATION
IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

	SCHOOLS	CLASSES	TEACHERS		PUPILS	
			MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS
1954-55	4	94	97	65	1,753	1,369
1955-56	5	105	106	66	1,747	1,343
1956-57	5	110	105	68	2,028	1,585
1957-58	5	110	107	66	2,304	1,670
1958-59	5	116	99	64	2,278	1,782
1959-60	5	103	111	62	2,304	1,807
1959-1960						
LYCEE OR COLLEGE			TEACHERS		PUPILS	
J. J. Rousseau (Saigon)			48	12	1,515	17
Marie-Curie (Saigon)			24	36	10	1,433
Yersin (Dalat)			24	11	594	263
Tourane ^o			10	2	116	61
Nhatrang†			5	1	69	33
Total			111	62	2,304	1,807

^oClasses up to 1st only.

†1st cycle only.

Source: *Annuaire Statistique de l'Enseignement*.

For South-East Asia the academic level of the Vietnamese universities is well above average, partly because they have inherited the rigorous French tradition and partly because they enjoy the services of a number of Vietnamese who have won academic distinction abroad. Among these the present Minister of Education and Rector of the University of Saigon, Mr. Nguyen Quang Trinh, who is a Doctor of Science, teaches at Saigon in the Faculty of Science; the Foreign Minister M. Vu van Mau, an *agregé* in Law and the Minister of Health, M. Tran Dinh De, an *agregé* in Medicine, teach in the Faculties of their respective disciplines.

The government intends to maintain the present standards and not to tolerate, for instance, the production of second-rate doctors of medicine. Many Vietnamese qualifications are accepted by the universities of France, whose standards are as high as any in the world. In Letters and Science, out of the four certificates required for the *licence* (roughly equivalent to a good British B.A.) it is possible to take three that will be accepted as equivalent in France; in Medicine the preparatory year and first five years' studies and examinations are acceptable, and so on. However Vietnamese qualifications in law are no longer recognized in France, which has reformed its legal curriculum recently. France can supply most of the university teachers that Vietnam asks for, except in science. Other considerations apart, the authorities generally prefer to take French teachers, whose competence they can quickly estimate. Being indeed particular in this respect, and well acquainted with French seats of higher learning, they commonly demand teachers from Paris or, say, from Aix-Marseille (for letters) or from Montpellier or Bordeaux (for medicine). But the teachers and institutions of other Western countries are in general an unknown quantity.

As an exporter of higher education France enjoys moreover the important advantage that the wholly nationalized status of its universities enables a French teacher to work abroad for some years and then to return without difficulty to an equivalent post at home. When an American or British teacher returns home after a spell abroad he must seek, unaided, a new contract with a private institution.

The Vietnamese university system is supplemented by three higher schools for the training of civil, electrical and industrial engineers. There is also an agricultural college at Blao in the southern highlands. The level of the engineers' schools is comparatively low, being about equivalent to that of the French schools of Arts et Metiers; that is, rather below the level of the great French technical schools. Vietnam needs in fact too few highly qualified technicians to justify provision of first class training facilities; especially gifted pupils go to America or France or elsewhere. Ten or fifteen French teachers, who depend on the French Technical Mission, serve in these establishments, all of whose pupils receive a government grant.

Since independence Vietnamese education has confronted linguistic problems similar to those that have troubled other Asian countries. A medium of instruction had to be adopted and a policy worked out for the teaching of foreign languages, the latter being a vital question for a relatively small country desirous of assuring its communications for all purposes—political, cultural and technological—with the outside world.

The medium of instruction posed no question of principle; in every country it must normally be the national language. In state primary and secondary schools Vietnamese superseded French as the "vehicle" about 1950 (although Cambodia and Laos, the other states formerly comprised in French Indochina, still use French for most subjects in their state secondary education). For the universities however the matter is more complicated. Over a quarter of their teachers are foreign, a few teachers of English sent from Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the Colombo Plan and from the United States, four Germans provided under a program of aid from West Germany who teach (in French) in the Faculty of Medicine at Hue and the rest Frenchmen—about 45 provided by the French government and 20 or so, including a number of ecclesiastics, recruited by the Vietnamese authorities on the spot. The foreigners of course cannot teach in Vietnamese; moreover their Vietnamese colleagues often prefer to lecture in French, the language they have employed throughout their academic life.

At Saigon, at present, law and Vietnamese letters and, from 1961-62, the preparatory year in science, are taught in Vietnamese, except when a Frenchman is giving the course. Medicine, pharmacy and the remaining science courses are taught in French, though in science an attempt is being made to introduce Vietnamese into practical work, French is also the language of theses for a Doctorate. In the Faculty of Education Vietnamese, French or English is used according to the nature of the course. At Hue the language is French in the Faculties of Medicine and on the French side of the Faculties of Letters and Education. Dalat and the higher technical schools are wholly French speaking.

It is intended that the use of Vietnamese shall continue to spread in higher education (except at Dalat, where no Vietnamisation is in view) but the process will take some years to complete. The government intends however to ensure that students have some knowledge of foreign languages by maintaining within each discipline a certain proportion of courses and examinations in English or French, perhaps about a quarter of the total. French will of course always be used for courses of a peculiarly French character, and English for their English and American counterparts.

**EXAMINATION RESULTS IN "FRENCH"
SECONDARY EDUCATION
IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

	BREVET		BACCALAUREATE PART 1		BACCALAUREATE PART 2	
	CANDI- DATES	PASSED %	CANDI- DATES	PASSED %	CANDI- DATES	PASSED %
1955	4,800	25.5	1,300	34.5	475	62.7
1956	5,000	24.1	1,000	39.2	580	51.0
1957	3,900	31.5	2,106	34.6	803	48.1
1958	3,050	44.7	2,249	35.3	1,047	55.1
1959	2,544	44.6	3,788	26.1	2,076	24.4
1960	2,195	53.9	2,215	51.0	1,439	48.7

Source: Annuaire statistique de l'Enseignement.

In the years immediately following independence Vietnamese secondary education suffered severely from the fact that Vietnamese *licenciers* in Law and Letters, including teachers, rushed to join the civil service, where the disappearance of the French administration had left numerous vacancies; recruitment of qualified teachers fell off for the same reason. At the same time nationalist sentiment viewed the teaching of foreign languages as unimportant. In these circumstances the standard of state secondary education in general, and of language teaching in particular fell off sharply, so that students passing from Vietnamese lycees into the university had difficulty in following the courses given in French; later the same persons were further handicapped in that a fair working knowledge of English or French is essential for the securing of a good position in Vietnam. However the seriousness of the situation from the overall point of view was somewhat mitigated by the fact that while the French secondary schools have only about 10 percent of the national secondary school enrollment they supply a relatively high proportion of the university students. At Saigon around 30 percent of the students hold the French baccalaureate, and perhaps 60 percent of those who come out *licenciers*. In the first year of pharmacy there are at present 233 "French" *bacheliers* as against 662 with the Vietnamese qualification, in the first year of medicine 101 as against 114, and so on. The proportion with the French baccalaureate rises to 70 percent at Dalat.

**UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1961-62**

FACULTY	SAIGON	
	MEN	WOMEN
Law	2,421	240
Medicine		
Medicine	917	102
Dentistry	149	30
Pharmacy	640	621
Science	3,190	362
Letters	2,369	793
Education	523	115
Architecture	396	12
TOTAL	10,605	2,275

HUE

FACULTY	MEN	WOMEN
Law	194	11
Medicine	47	1
Sinology	98	31
Science	892	88
Letters	550	128
Education	180	37
TOTAL	1,961	296
DALAT		
Science	90	2
Letters	161	33
Education	140	37
TOTAL	391	72
GRAND TOTAL	12,957	2,648

Source: Secretariat d'Etat a l'Education Nationale.

Since 1958 the situation has been restored to some degree. In the Vietnamese secondary system two foreign languages, English and French, are studied, 1 for 6 hours a week from the beginning of the first cycle and the other for two hours a week during the second cycle. Moreover the classes in Vietnamese language and literature give occasion for some instruction in Chinese. Up to 1957 French was obligatory as the first foreign language. A change in regulations permitted English to take first place in 1959 and 1960, but last year French regained this position. About 60 percent of the pupils start with French at present.

STUDENTS IN FACULTY
OF LETTERS, SAIGON
1959-60

PREPARATORY CERTIFICATES	MEN	WOMEN	WOMEN %	TOTAL
Vietnamese Humanities	416	124	28.0	540
French Humanities	298	128	30.0	426
Certificates for <i>Licence</i>				
Vietnamese Literature	104	27	20.6	131
French Language	50	38	43.2	88
French Literature	42	30	41.7	72
Vietnamese Language	56	10	15.2	66
Practical English	44	16	26.7	60
History of Philosophy	45	8	15.1	53
History of Vn. and E. Asia ...	25	13	34.2	38
Vietnamese Civilization	14	20	58.8	34
Sinology	32	2	5.9	34
Ethics and Sociology	29	4	12.1	33
Practical French	22	10	31.3	32
Ethics and Metaphysics	17	7	29.2	24
Psychology	15	7	31.8	22
American Literature	11	9	45.0	20
English Language	14	4	22.2	18
English Literature	13	5	27.8	18
General Geography	9	2	18.2	11
TOTAL	1,256	464	27.0	1,720

Source: Annuaire Statistique de l'Enseignement.

Politics and fashion—the two are closely allied—have influenced these shifts in preference; after a honeymoon period the United States has lost some ground in Vietnamese affection, and relations with France have become almost cordial. In any case the practical value of English in Vietnam is still rather limited, French being appreciably more “job-worthy” and useful for general purposes.

The teaching of foreign languages in Vietnamese schools is still considered unsatisfactory—where in the world do the results of language teaching give satisfaction?—owing to inadequacy in the number and quality of the teachers. The Cultural Mission is helping the Vietnamese government to raise the level of French in the State schools, which now welcome this assistance, by supplying lecturers for the purpose. In consequence, twelve Frenchmen are now teaching French in Vietnamese lycees in Saigon and the Mission hopes to double that number by sending other teachers into the provinces in the next school year.

TRAINING IN FRANCE

Since 1960 the Government has again allowed recipients of grants from the French government, whom it nominates itself, and other students to go to France for training. Nearly 150 in all left for France in 1960 to pursue studies beyond the *licence* or courses unavailable in Vietnam; the number was certainly higher last year. In general these persons have no family or other connections with France and thus no idea of settling there permanently, unlike the several thousand Vietnamese students in that country since 1955 or earlier, whose reluctance to return to Vietnam is a source of annoyance. Some young Vietnamese go to the United States or to Australia or New Zealand under the Colombo Plan, but relatively few on account of the language difficulty.

Over the years Vietnam has learned to live with its crises and in some ways to treat them with indifference. The custodians, whether Vietnamese or French, of the country's education, scientific research and public health have persistently looked to the future, rejecting wherever possible the slipshod, the provisional and the *ad hoc*. In the realm of education this spirit is as strong as ever, being particularly evident in the projects entertained for the universities of Saigon and Dalat. But equally impressive are the efficiency and method that inform the Republic's educational system as a whole, which would be creditable even in surroundings of perfect peace.

URBAN RENEWAL

The urban renewal provisions which have already been adopted for the Saigon metropolitan area are more blueprint projects than implemented community development programs. In theory, Saigon's boundaries are in time to be extended and a large belt encircling the city is to be devoted to developmental purposes, including rationalized zoning for residential, commercial, and industrial growth and control. Although projected plans along these lines were made several years ago, little has been done to put them into effect. Today it is entirely possible that a series of new projections will be formulated by Vietnam's most famous architect, Ngo Viet Thu.

However, any renewal program will be difficult to implement under contemporary circumstances because of difficulties involved in altering present land use practices in the slum sections of the city and because of security conditions and problems beyond the city limits. At

present the area formally is supposed to be zoned, and building restrictions have been promulgated: The city zoning provisions require section lines for industry, villas, government agencies, etc. However, even subdividing has not been completed, and streets, house rows, etc., have not been accurately traced on official maps.

Several projected plans have been considered for developing the area beyond the city limits. A few years ago, for example, the area around Thu Thiem, a village in the peninsula across the Saigon River from districts three and four, was considered as a suitable developmental site. Among possible structures projected for moving to the Thu Thiem area were numerous government agencies, foreign embassies, the national assembly building, and higher education institutions. Nothing has been done to implement this project.

However, some implementation has been witnessed for other plans. One project for developing land on both sides of the Bien Hoa highway from Saigon to Thu Duc as an industrial park has been started with construction of a paper mill and a cement mill in Thu Duc. Also, part of the University of Saigon campus, including faculty residences, has been completed. Few faculty members desire to reside in the new quarters, however, due to security conditions in the area. Another project to keep the road to the airport as a primarily residential section also has met with success.

Government development programs that have been started in the area display a tendency for the government to build new structures on unoccupied land rather than to move present residents. Sections where development has thus far occurred include: the Nguyen Tri Phuong and Phu Tho area in the fifth district, the Binh Thoi and Phu Lam area in the sixth district, the Truong Minh Giang area in the third district, and the Chanh Hung area in the eighth district. The Saigon autonomous Low Cost Housing Office, in conjunction with the Directorate of Reconstruction and Urban Planning has administered development programs in those areas.

It is usually less expensive to compensate rice field owners than landowners in the city; there also typically are fewer protests concerning governmental actions. Residents in the lower working class areas who chiefly comprise the population of the slum sections do form a pressure group. The example mentioned earlier of labor group efforts to maintain cyclos and motor-cyclos is a case in point of their potential strength.

Building restrictions accompanying development projects have met with mixed success. Permission must be received to construct fac-

tories and large buildings, and it is given for building only in specified sections of the metropolitan area. Similar permission is required for housing construction, although this provision is frequently violated by the large number of squatters in Saigon. In addition, formally no construction is to occur on sites planned for roads, churches, hospitals, etc. Alignment (setback) regulations apply and are implemented in many of the non-slum sections because the prefecture builds the sidewalks and curbs.

HOUSING

The slum sections in general present the most pressing problem of the prefecture. They also make, as noted above, planning within the city extremely difficult to implement. Regulations relating to city planning quite simply are not enforced in the slums. Streets are not planned, controlled, or even traced on official maps, which makes it impossible to regulate housing construction through required city construction permits.

Further it is difficult to carry out effectively any public service functions in the slum areas. Alleys usually have developed from footpaths and are neglected. Few of them have lights. Drainage is almost non-existent. Streets and alleys are overrun with one to one and one-half feet of water frequently during the long Saigon rainy season. Lack of drainage, in turn, affects the underground phone wires making it difficult to get phone calls throughout the city for one or two days after a heavy rain; the phone wires are located in underground pipes with quite poor insulation making it almost inevitable that water will leak into the pipes.

Water and electricity supply is also quite inadequate. Only buildings located on streets even have water meters. Alley buildings cannot obtain meters for electricity because there are no poles in their areas. Frequently, alley residents rent extension wires from street building owners. They pay double the regular price for such extensions, which in theory are not permitted by the company. Firemen usually must carry water from the main streets. Much of the Saigon water pipe network is 40 to 50 years old, especially in the downtown area, and frequently almost useless due to rust. During the dry season, many of those homes having taps receive no water, except in small quantities at night.

Most of the homes in the slum quarters were constructed without the approval of the landowners. They also were built without the required prefectural approval of their physical outlay. The prefecture has been forced to tolerate these practices chiefly because housing needs for residents in the lower economic levels long ago reached drastic proportions. In fact, a great deal of the illegal housing construction

within Saigon has occurred on government-owned land. Frequently, between 1 and 5 years after a home has been completed, prefectural agents will approach squatters and require payment of land taxes and roof taxes (levies on assessments of each housing unit).

When squatters build on privately owned land on occasion they honestly do not know the name of the landowner because ownership of certain portions of prefectural real estate even today remains in the dubious category. At the same time much of the ownership of slum properties is recognized, because a large percentage is owned by a few wealthy Chinese. In fact, it has been estimated that one Chinese family may own as much as twenty percent of all of the land in Saigon. The Catholic church also is one of the largest property owners in the city.

Once a home is built on private property, it is pretty much a *fait accompli* according to Vietnamese legal procedures. It is almost impossible for the owner to require his land occupant to move. However, rent can be required, and frequently squatters save a certain sum each month to pay the landowner the back rent when and if he ever calls to collect.

Key money is an additional factor of tenant-landlord relations making the Saigon housing problem so acute. Rented homes in the prefecture are subject to rent control if constructed before 1947; if they were built after this date the owner legally can charge whatever price the market will bear. Today rents in the structures not subject to rent control typically are higher than most of the middle income and all of the lower income Vietnamese can afford. The informal technique to solve this problem has been key money. This is a sum of money given by a new tenant to a former tenant of a home whose rent is controlled.

For example, the former tenant might be paying a monthly rent of 600\$VN. An almost identical home next door built in 1950 probably would rent for between 2,000-2,500 \$VN. To purchase either house would cost at least 300,000 \$VN. The new tenant would pay perhaps 55,000 \$VN key money to the old tenant. Such a transaction is illegal. As the landlord legally cannot demand that the old tenant (who is paying only 600 \$VN) vacate the house, he usually is willing to accept a percentage of the key money, probably about twenty percent of the 55,000 \$VN. The landlord also, probably will raise the rent a minimal amount for the new tenant; this also is an illegal transaction.

Due to the wide use of the key money practice in Saigon, tremendous ranges in rents are found. For instance in a row of basically identical two-room homes with outside kitchens and owned by the same landlord rents have been known to range from 3,000 \$VN for newer

structures, to 1,200 \$VN for homes occupied by three or four tenants each of whom paid key money, to 300 \$VN for a home subject to rent control but which has had only one occupant.

The net result has been that rent control has failed to keep prices down, while newer structures are becoming increasingly expensive. The presence of large numbers of Americans in Saigon also has tended to greatly increase rents in certain sections of the city. American agencies cannot adopt the illegal key money practice, and in general are only concerned with the newer structures anyway. Thus, they pay what the traffic will bear. Saigon landlords not only charge premium prices to the American agencies, but require 24 (sometimes 36) months rent to be paid in advance. They then use the advances to construct new structures to rent to Americans at increased prices.

The 1959 MSUG survey of employees of medium-sized factories in Saigon showed the following in terms of monthly rentals for this relatively low income group.⁶

MONTHLY RENTAL IN \$VN	THATCH ROOF		METAL ROOF		TILE ROOF		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Less than 124\$VN	5	19.2	3	23.1	1	11.1	9	18.7
125-174\$VN	—	—	—	—	2	22.2	2	4.2
175-224\$VN	9	34.6	1	—	—	—	10	20.8
225-274\$VN	2	7.7	—	7.7	—	—	2	4.2
275-324\$VN	3	11.6	1	—	1	11.1	5	10.4
325-374\$VN	—	—	1	7.7	—	—	1	2.1
375 and over	7	26.9	7	7.7	5	55.6	19	39.6
TOTAL	26	100.0	13	100.0	9	100.0	48	100.0

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS CONDITIONS

The security situation throughout Vietnam during the past twenty years has been the prime mover in Saigon's phenomenal population expansion. However, this would have been an inadequate reason in itself for such large numbers of migrants and refugees to choose the capital, and thereby to provide the basis for its current housing, educational, and other major problems, if Saigon were not a thriving commercial center. The French developed Saigon in order to have a solid economic base in Indochina. Their success has been followed by even greater advances during the last eight years. Although, there is considerable dispute as to the actual extent of economic advancement in Vietnam since the creation of the Republic, this controversy is based upon varying interpretations as to the relative changes since the end of the war against the French. In

⁶HENDRY, *op. cit.*, Table A-X, p. 167.

Saigon this advance has been absolute. However, the commercial and industrial expansions of the community have also added to its public service problems relating to its stature as an urban center.

As mentioned earlier, official Department of Labor statistics list Saigon in 1961 as having 43,960 businesses and 255,230 employees (52.97 percent in commercial firms, 17.44 percent in manufacturing concerns), with 94 percent of the firms having ten or less employees. Figures released by the Department of Labor in May 1962, list fifteen firms in the city which employ more than 400: the Tan Mai Saw Mill, the Vietnamese Railway Administration, the Vietnamese Jute Society, the Breweries and Ice Plants of Indochina (BGI); the Tobacco Factory of Indochina (NIC), the Hiep Hoa Sugar Refinery, the Public Transportation Company, the Indochinese Tobacco Society, the Distillery Society of Indochina, the CARIC Company, the Vietnam Soap Company, the VINATEXCO Plant, the Shell and Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., and the Water and Electricity Company (CEE). Most of the manufacturing concerns in the Saigon metropolitan area are, however, located in Gia Dinh Province. The accompanying table, MAJOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM, lists firms which with only a few exceptions are in the metropolitan area.

Data from the 1960 *Statistics Year Book* provides information for comparing the significance of Saigon commerce with the remainder of Vietnam. This includes the number of business licenses issued and the costs of these licenses (based upon the profits of a firm). Eighty-nine percent of all firms in the country which were issued licenses costing from 8,000 to 100,000\$VN were located in Saigon, as were nearly 25 percent of all business concerns in Vietnam.

BUSINESS LICENSES ISSUED IN 1961
NUMBER OF LICENSES

LICENCE COST	SAIGON	GIA DINH	VIET NAM
25,000-100,000\$VN	226	7	8
8,000- 20,000\$VN	940	28	1,201
2,000- 7,000\$VN	5,987	144	7,979
600- 1,800\$VN	9,364	368	17,016
180- 500\$VN	15,778	3,600	44,568
Less than 160	8,777	8,156	94,500
TOTALS	41,072	12,303	165,542

The following two readings are included to provide a view of the types of industrial and handicraft projects promoted both by the commercial community and the Vietnamese government during the past few years. Such projects almost invariably involve American aid.

MAJOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM*
1955 through June 1961

COMPANY	PRODUCT	ANNUAL PRODUCTION
1955		
Societe Vietnamienne du Jute	Jute bags	3,000,000 units
Vietnam Ky-Nghe To-Soi	Rayon cloth	1,200,000 meters
1957		
Vinada	Tanned leather	128,000 sq. meters
Cophavina	Pharmaceuticals	3,096,000 ampoules 728,000 bottles 43,000 tubes
1958		
Phuong Toan	Soft drinks	25,000,000 bottles
Tran Van Tanh	Pharmaceuticals	6,780,000 ampoules 1,372,000 bottles 18,000,000 tablets 5,364,000 other
1959		
Long-Vit Vietnam	Duck feathers	1,800 tons
Vinatexco	Egg powder	2,000 tons
	Cotton yard	3,000 tons
Thuy Tinh Vietnam	Cotton fabric	8,780,000 meters
	Glass bottles	15,000 tons
Vietnam Cong-Thuong	Rubber camelback	400 tons
Lam Chau	Aluminum tubes	9,600,000 units
Truong-Van-Ben	Soap	4,800 tons
Pharmaceutique du Vietnam	Glycerine	60 tons
	Pharmaceuticals	40,320,000 tablets 8,136,000 bottles 11,256,000 ampoules 600,000 meters
Chan-A Vietnam Development Corp.	Cotton fabric	360 tons
Dong-Nai Ky-Nghe	Plastics	1,800,000 meters
Khai-Vinh	Unbleached cotton cloth	7,500,000 sq. meters
Vietnam Development Co.	Fish nets	
Vinh-Du Tinware	Dry-cell batteries	6,000,000 units
Tan-Mai	Metal containers	700 tons
Ning-Son	Wood panels (16mm thick)	385,000 sq. meters
	Coal	150,000 tons
Vimytex	Cotton yard	2,580 tons
	Cotton fabric	6,580,000 meters
Sin-Sang	Fish nets	8,000,000 sq. meters
Mai-thi-Diep	Unbleached cotton cloth	1,200,000 meters
Vinaspecia	Pharmaceuticals	9,400,000 ampoules 10,600,000 bottles 2,440,000 tubes
1960		
Dong-A	Textiles	4,390,000 meters
Vietnam Silo	Bagging of cement	80,000 tons
Quach-Tich-Ky	Paper	450 tons

COMPANY	PRODUCT	ANNUAL PRODUCTION
Saigon Blanket and Wool	Blankets	180,000 units
Vinatefinco	Textile finishing	24,219,000 meters
Vietnam Jute	Jute bags	3,000,000 units
Parsons & Whitmore	Pulp	6,000 tons
	Paper	9,000 tons
Nguyen-Van-Thinh	Buttons	69,120,000 units
Vietnam Chlorine and Alkali	Caustic soda	1,050 tons
	Hydrochloric acid	1,600 tons
	Bleaching power	560 tons
Vietnam Synthetic	Synthetic fabrics	1,000,000 sq. meters
Dai-Nam Ky-Nghe	Bicycle tires	500,000 units
	Bicycle tubes	1,000,000 units
Foremost Dairies	Canned Milk	12,000,000 units
Michelin Tire	Bicycle tires	1,500,000 units
	Bicycle tubes	1,500,000 units
Sicovina Tourane	Cotton yard	3,000 tons
	Cotton fabric	8,780,000 meters
Chan-Viet	Zippers	600,000 meters
	Elastic Braids	2,700,000 meters
Bui-Duy-Can	Paint	67,000 gallons
	Synthetic resin	142,000 gallons
	Copra oil	117,000 gallons
	Toilet soap	240 tons
<i>First Half</i>		
1961		
Intertexco	Cotton fabric	2,800,000 meters
Chan Viet Cong Ky-Nghe	Non-ferrous metals (rolling mill)	590 tons
Nguyen-Van-Diep	Iron pipe (foundry)	2,000 tons
Vimytex (Expansion)	Cotton yard	plus 2,000 tons
	Cotton fabric	plus 15,000,000 meters
Nam-Viet Fibrocement	Asbestos cement sheets	7,000 tons
Vietnam Automotive Battery	Storage batteries	30,000 units
Dong Phuong Ky-Nghe	Starch	2,100 tons
	Glucose	1,500 tons
Dong-Nai Ky-Nghe	Cotton fabric	1,300,000 meters
Vietnam Ky-Nghe To-Soi	Silk-screen printing	1,650,000 meters
Khai-Vinh (Expansion)	Fish nets	plus 7,500,000 sq. meters
Thanh My	Electrical wire	400 tons
Duc-Lap	Cocoon fiber products	1,500 tons
Vinatexco (Exp.)	Cotton yard	plus 2,000 tons
Steel rolling mill	Bars, rods, angles	18,000 tons
Hang Viet-Phat	Table oils	1,550 tons
	Industrial oils	700 tons
	Defatted rice bran	12,500 tons
Thanh Hoa	Rayon fabric	1,200,000 meters

United States Operations Mission to Vietnam, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1961, p. 76.

VIETNAM'S BUDDING DOLL-MAKING INDUSTRY*

By Nguyen Khiem Cat

First-time visitors to Vietnam call them good buys in Saigon's list of tourist merchandise; collectors brand them as imitations with variations and "local colour," promoters and artist claim them to represent a new field of cultural and commercial endeavour.

No matter which of these comments fits best, the things are there for everyone to see. They are the finished products of this country's budding doll-making industry.

Enterprising Saigon businessmen, in an effort to contribute to the country's cultural picture as well as in a better-late-than-never bid to win the tourist dollar,² have for several years now been exploring this new avenue. To their satisfaction they found that the venture, which had cost little in the trial stages, has paid off. The dividends reaped so far have been "most gratifying," they said. Even some sort of competition has begun among them, in both the fields of consumer-appeal and output.

Handicraft Status. The first Vietnamese dolls were made in the early fifties by housewives who took time off from their home chores, and who put their dolls on sale in some shops on fashionable Tu Do Street. The dolls at that time were basically plastic ones from Europe (with European features) dressed in generally badly-tailored Vietnamese costumes. Thus they offered little artistic value as souvenirs. The dolls were so expensive that only a very small fraction of them were bought by souvenir-hunting tourists. Vietnamese going abroad were also reluctant to buy them as gifts for foreign friends lest the latter get a wrong picture of Vietnamese workmanship and culture. So they gradually vanished from the shop-windows in downtown Saigon, shop-worn and unsold.

The new-generation dolls, now giving added colour and grace to Saigon's souvenir shops, are of cloth and their manufacture is patterned after the flourishing Japanese doll industry.

Saigon now has two enterprises engaged in this new craft. One is a family venture run by a prominent woman, Madame Tung Quang; the other is run by the Vietnam Handicraft Center (VHC) on a company basis.

Where the two differ is in the production scale, planning and variety of designs, with the VHC taking the lead. However they resemble each other in their manufacturing techniques, their handicraft status and avowed goals—art and the tourist dollar.

Why their manufacturing techniques are similar can be explained by the fact that both Madame Quang and Mr. Nguyen Minh Hoang, who is heading the VHC doll workshop, have studied doll-making in Japan. But the artist who took the lead in learning the booming Japanese craft is Madame Quang, who scored a one-year advance ahead of the VHC in production. Her "first" was credited on two scores: (1) she left for Japan more than half a year before Mr. Hoang, and (2) she started the craft on a family basis as soon as she returned and had not to pass through the red-tape and intricate planning that the VHC had.

Cultural Dolls. Madame Quang, who studied in Japan on her own, brought back with her a quantity of Japanese doll parts which she assembled, put into Vietnamese costume, and proudly dubbed "Bup Be Van Hoa" (Cultural Dolls). The name which sounds more artistic than commercial, not only won the admiration of snobbish doll lovers but also the sympathy of the most critical artists who had longed for something Vietnamese done in the field. Now although large numbers of VHC dolls have invaded Saigon souvenir shops and crowded Madame Quang's dolls out,

*Despite somewhat exaggerated reports of insecurity even in the outskirts of her sprawling capital, Vietnam has recently recorded a marked increase in the number of foreign tourists, since they are now allowed a 72-hour visaless stay in the country.

²Feature extract from the *Vietnam Press*, May 10, 1962 (morning), p. D1+.

the latter's name and fame are still attributed to any cloth doll in sight. The VHC has never given its own dolls any brand name.

The Van Hoa dolls, which first came onto the market early in 1960, were highly appreciated by tourists and Saigon's long-time foreign residents, even though they were priced as high as 1,200\$VN apiece, or about six times similar Japanese dolls. They mostly represented women of modern Vietnam with a scattering of women in wedding costumes, regional and historical dress.

Devised as a family undertaking, Madame Quang's doll workshop was and still is housed in her home, 39 Nguyen Dinh Chieu Street. A couple of years have passed but her workshop remains what it was at the beginning. Very few people have been allowed in and the enterprise continues to be run on a purely family basis. Both its staff and output still remain a closely-guarded secret to outsiders.

Not With An Eye On The Tourist Dollar. By the time Madame Quang was about to complete her Japanese trip, a young painter, Nguyen Minh Hoang, was sent to Japan to learn the same handicraft on a Colombo Plan scholarship. When Mr. Hoang returned to his country determined to take the lead in this field, Madame Quang's Japanese-patterned Van Hoa dolls were everywhere, on Tu Do Street, the hub of Saigon's small expensive shops. He greeted the event with both surprise and admiration.

"When I set out for Japan to study handicrafts I had not planned to concentrate on doll-making. Only after I had toured some Japanese doll workshops in Tokyo and Kyoto did I resolve to borrow Japanese techniques to give Vietnamese art a new field of endeavour. Nor did I have an eye on the tourist dollar, since I am no businessman. My employment at the VHC was decided on only after I returned from Japan. Therefore I had not thought that someone had gotten the lead over me in this field," the 26-year-old, Cholon-born painter told this reporter the other day.

In fact, during his nine months in Japan Mr. Hoang had planned to learn handicrafts ranging from rattan to bamboo work, in order to help give local products new designs and new touches of sophistication. He studied the doll craft for barely two months at a private school in Tokyo, the Sakurakai Doll School, where he took lessons in the assembling of doll parts.

He said he was not allowed to dig deeper into the craft's techniques, particularly that of making the "blank masks" with which the doll's faces are made. The school's director put those techniques off limits to him as well as to the Japanese students. She did not even allow the latter a glimpse at how to make blank masks, but agreed to sell masks produced by the school for their later use after graduation.

Faced with this monopoly and stung by a burning desire to avoid importing the masks later, the prize-winning* Vietnamese painter worked out the technique himself. With the fair knowledge of handicraft he had acquired both at home and in Japan, Mr. Hoang indulged in research with Japanese equipment and raw materials to develop a made-in-Vietnam blank mask. Six months later he and his assistants were successful.

(It is not known whether Madame Quang has attempted this intricate experiment as yet.)

The equipment consisted solely of a hand-operated press and the raw materials, crepe paper and cloth.

With home-made masks, Mr. Hoang asserted, we can save two-thirds the cost of imported ones and subsequently reduce the price of the finished goods and make them more "local-looking" thus more appealing to buyers.

*Mr. Hoang, whose canvases are of the representational school, has won 46,000VN\$ in various painting contests in the past five years. He contributed substantially to Vietnam's participation in the 1950 Osaka and 1961 Manila Fairs.

They Still Smack of Japan

Mr. Hoang admitted that the first thousands of Vietnamese cloth dolls made under the label of the Vietnam Handicraft Center (which pays him 7,000 piastres per month) were made with Japanese blank masks. Since August 1961, the number of imported masks used by the VHC workshop has been cut back drastically, as the new crop of homemade masks increases. After the old stock is exhausted in the near future his workshop will no longer have to import Japanese masks except for the crepe paper and cloth, which account for about five percent of the total cost of raw materials, including the local ones.

But, he warned, as long as Japanese mask moulds are used, Vietnamese dolls cannot exhibit genuine Vietnamese facial expressions and beauty. Mr. Hoang confessed that he and some friends have tried their hand at making Vietnamese mask moulds, but the results were "not yet very satisfactory."

"We have tried to give our dolls a more Vietnamese look with folded-lidded, wider eyes, fuller lips and more expansive gestures, but still they smack of Japan. We have made breakthroughs in the moulding of masks but still have to do so with moulds having lower and broader noses, wider eyes, higher cheek bones, less plump cheeks and so on," Mr. Hoang said.

However, he did not set any tentative date for developing Vietnamese mask moulds. "Anyhow," he explained, "when one buys a doll, one is more prone to be attracted by their ensemble beauty, whether Western or Eastern, rather than by their genuineness. Enough 'local colour' could have been found in the postures and the painted eyes and mouths, to which we have tried to give a strong Vietnamese touch."

"A poorly-sculpted Vietnamese face resulting from locally-made moulds," Mr. Hoang added. "Can well impair the value and beauty of the entire doll. We can't afford to lose our clients, particularly at a time when there has been no solid indication as yet that genuine facial expressions are what they want most from our products."

"Anyway," he pledged, "we are determined to develop Vietnamese blank masks for Vietnamese dolls. It's only a question of time and patience."

Second to None. The Vietnamese cloth dolls, in particular the VHC ones, are now rated as second to none (including the Japanese) in artistry and craftsmanship.

In addition to snatching the lead in novelty and variety from the Van Hoa dolls, the VHC dolls are now priced one-third less than the competition and have been welcomed by a wider range of clients. But still their price is about two-and-a-half times that of their Japanese equivalents.

Mr. Hoang disclosed that the VHC has been exploring ways to lower the price without cutting its profit. This can be done, he said, by stepping up production, cutting down the profit margin on the individual dolls, and by improving the workers' skills.

Mr. Hoang admitted that his workers are still a long way behind their Japanese counterparts, and "this is understandable."

The VHC doll workshop now employs 31 workers, including two other men who are designers helping Mr. Hoang arrange facial expressions and design new doll costumes and postures. The 28 women include 12 apprentices. In addition six Laotian women are studying the craft on an on-the-job basis. Recipients of 1,200-piastre scholarships from the Vietnamese Government, the six are scheduled to complete their courses this week. The workshop also grants free training to those interested in the craft.

Planned as a major VHC foreign currency-earner, 300 units are being turned out per month, featuring no fewer than 30 types. There are also 10 other types which have been produced on a trial basis. They range in height from 5 to 12 inches and in price from 200 to 800 piastres apiece.

The dolls are mostly women and little girls dressed in ancient, modern and tribal costumes, and in different postures. They also include a scattering of male

dolls in traditional clothes and soldiers with ancient uniforms and weapons; each range of costume and posture features Vietnamese culture at a different stage of national history. On sale are also sets of dolls featuring customs of ancient Vietnam such as in wedding and religious ceremonies, festivals and so forth.

"We have made our major task at present a deeper research into new ranges of costumes and postures. In other words, we must give our dolls both variety and new taste, and help collectors visualise our national culture as accurately as possible," Mr. Hoang said.

Other Dolls. But with more than half of the buyers being tourists and with the high price still frightening off local buyers, Vietnamese cloth dolls are still far from being a commercial hit. "We must further lower their price in order to win more local customers, as the Japanese producers have done. My hope is that each Vietnamese home will have a Vietnamese doll of one kind or another," Mr. Hoang said.

Vietnamese cloth dolls, according to Mr. Hoang, have been well appreciated at various exhibits abroad such as those at the Casablanca and Florence fairs early this year. But as things now stand, Vietnamese cloth dolls have no export surpluses.

In Mr. Hoang's view, diversification of dolls in terms of clothing and posture is not enough. There should be further diversification in terms of raw materials. He referred to the possibilities of making Vietnamese dolls of wood, plastics and foam-rubber.

In recent months the VHC has turned out a new range of "mural dolls" which can be hung on walls as a decoration. But these, like their Western counterparts, offer few Vietnamese expressions. Their value does not go beyond that of a decoration. But they have been well appreciated and sold out because of their low price (about 150\$VN apiece) and their small size. But their production is still carried out as a sideline.

In an apparent effort to give Vietnamese dolls a further chance, the VHC's joinery workshop has turned out a number of wooden dolls which look somewhat like Japan's popular Kokeshi dolls. Though cheap (about 70\$VN), very few of them have appealed to the tourists. Blamed for the lag are their weight and size, which few travelers' suitcases can afford.

Mr. Hoang disclosed that the most appealing and profitable range of dolls are the plastic ones, in which European countries lead the field, and the foam-rubber dolls, which are both cheap and easy to handle. He asserted that foam rubber doll techniques can be applied to the making of the present-day Vietnamese cloth dolls, because with foam rubber, doll-makers can give their products as many modifications as they desire, and this with little labour and cost.

Asked why he did not learn the technique of making clay-faced cloth dolls from Japanese artists, the Vietnamese doll-maker said that this is quite another field and demands higher artistry and more brainwork.

"Japan has tens of thousands of doll-makers and artists and 300 years of doll history to her credit, and what do we actually have behind us?" Mr. Hoang asked.

VIETNAM'S SILK INDUSTRY—A LONG-TIME WAR VICTIM BEING NURSED BACK TO STRENGTH⁹

By Nguyen Khiem Cat

In her long-range efforts towards self sufficiency in consumer goods, Free Vietnam has for the past eight years pumped billions of piastres into industrial and handicraft projects. Bringing into play all of the natural, human and foreign aid resources at hand, she has also concentrated on projects designed to nurse back to full strength a number of handicrafts which had either been disrupted or repeatedly

⁹Feature extract from the *Vietnam Press*, May 16, 1962 (Morning), p. D1 plus.

threatened with extinction by a long succession of wars that have plagued the country for the past 22 years.*

Among these war victims, major mention should be made of the country's centuries-old silk industry.

Family Enterprise

In the old days, the silk industry was carried out as a pure family enterprise in many provinces across the land. Silkworm breeding and silk weaving, which have provided fine material for Vietnamese folk songs and poems, were undertaken by individual farmers—mostly women and children—as a sideline or, at best as a means to meet their families' needs (from 5 to 8 metres per person per year).

Whether or not they were able to produce enough extra to sell, peasant families engaged in silk-making were mostly those which had spare land available for mulberry cultivation, on which silkworms are fed.

It was not until the turn of this century that a handful of promoters saw that silk-making could become a profitable handicraft. The first decade saw the mushrooming of silkworm centers in many provinces of North and Central Vietnam, mostly where the land was poor for food crops but propitious for mulberry cultivation. Some centers also specialized in cultivating mulberry trees and spinning and weaving silk. They worked on a full-time cooperative basis.

At the same time, the craft carried out on a family basis continued, these farmers still doubting the advantages of cooperative production. But their output was generally irregular and uncertain, mostly because of lack of experience and adequate planning.

The majority of these individual silk-makers did not band together until the second decade, when the cooperatives enjoyed booming business and gained a definite edge over them. The second decade also witnessed the departure of a large number of peasants from their age-old concept of one-crop economy—rice—and their entry into the silk industry, mostly on a cooperative basis.

Ups and Downs

With some technical guidance from the colonial administration, the craft was given added incentive to expand. The country's silk output rose to 200 tons in 1933 and 300 tons in 1939 from a bare 40 tons in the early 1900's. Export surpluses ranged from 60 to 140 tons a year in the late 1930's.

When the Second World War broke out and the links with France—Vietnam's top raw silk customer—were broken, promoters and producers cut down their silk production drastically and peasants turned back to rice. As the years wore on and the war's tempo increased, the country's silk production fell to 250 tons in 1944. The drop was partly blamed on a number of greedy farmers who shifted a fat part of their mulberry croplands to industrial plants (jute, ramie) that fueled some of the Japanese war industries. The lack of continued technical assistance from the colonial administration, which was having its own difficulties was also responsible for the decline.

When the national silk output further dropped to 150 tons in 1948 and then to an all-time low of 55 tons in 1953, the country was virtually stripped of its silk industry. The Indochina War and its devastating after-effects scattered most of the country's silk-producers. Along with its bankrupt economy, all of the country's once-thriving silk industry went down the drain.

It was not until the 1954 Geneva settlement of the Indochina War that the industry was given another chance to re-emerge. But as things now stand, it is still a far cry from its prewar standing.

Faced with the postwar consumers' increasing preference for synthetic ma-

*The Second World War beginning with the landing of Japanese troops in Indochina in 1940; the Indochina War (1945-54) and the grim war against Communist North Vietnamese guerrillas since 1958.

terials—far cheaper and brighter, though far less durable—and with the cold fact of the country's backwardness in silk spinning and weaving techniques, very few enterprising farmers and businessmen were brave enough to attempt to help bring the silk industry back to its prewar standing. The output south of the 17th parallel was 20 tons in 1959 and 30 tons in 1961, or a slim increase of 5 tons yearly. The increase was mostly credited to the Government's material and technical assistance for farmers and weavers.

(Corresponding figures for North Vietnam, which had once produced the bulk of the country's silk, have never been made available. Nor has its silk industry ever been given the wide publicity accorded to others. In view of its present food shortage and stumbling industrial "big leaps," knowledgeable observers say the Communists are not likely to take big chances with this production line).

Research and Advice

In the dual role of advisor and assistant the Vietnamese Government has taken a serious view of the possibilities of putting the country's silk handicraft back on its feet and expanding it further.

Most of the Government efforts toward this end have been channelled through the Vietnamese Handicraft Center. Animated with the grim determination to make handicrafts a major sector of the country's economic life, the center has for the past 4 or 5 years now been engaged in intensive research aimed at reviving them. Its efforts also aim at helping handicrafts catch up with the fast-moving techniques of advanced countries and making their finished products more appealing to the present-day customer, who is generally quicker to blame than to praise.

Emphasis in the research has been on silk, which, to quote a top center official, "is promising to mature into a full-fledged, national industry this decade." The other lines being promoted by the center include lacquerware, ceramics, silverware, mother-of-pearl, bamboo and rattan goods and the budding cloth-doll-making industry.

"We do agree that some of these handicrafts have become too old to be worth rejuvenating. But we see it incumbent upon us to conduct further research and not just let them die, as was once the case with silver and mother-of-pearl, or see their techniques monopolized by a handful of private concerns and sealed off to outsiders interested in learning and practising handicrafts on their own," said the official, Agricultural Engineer Nguyen Cong Huan.

The center's policy is to give local handicraft products new taste and fashionable designs and popularize them as widely as possible in order to promote competition between craftsmen. "This is instrumental in improving Vietnamese technique and lowering the prices of our products, which are considerably higher than their foreign counterparts," Mr. Huan noted, referring to lacquerware as a case most in point.

Big Strides

Besides the many branches and experimental and training stations scattered across the country, the center also keeps a spacious, well-stocked showroom on downtown Tu Do Street in Saigon. But the wares on show there feature only a very small fraction of the center's efforts at handicraft development. Very little silk, for instance, has been displayed there so far even though silk is a top line.

As far as silk is concerned the center has made big strides in the field of research, advice and assistance. Its efforts are twofold. One aims at improving the local silkworms and raising techniques and at stepping up production, the other is designed to improve and expand the cultivation of mulberry trees. The benefits of both these efforts reach the peasantry through the mediums of technical and financial assistance.

Acknowledging the dedicated cooperation of foreign experts in the early stages

of the center's life, Engineer Huan, who is now the center's technical manager, pointed out that the present silkworm developed by the center is the best ever known in this country's silk history. It resulted from the cross-breeding of selected native worms and Japanese or Afghan ones. Not only is it almost immune from diseases which affected native breeds in the old days, it is also wonderfully suited to the Vietnamese climate, mulberry, and raising facilities.

Its silk output has even surprised technicians. A cocoon of the Vietnamese-Japanese crossbreed, which thrives on the cool plateaus of Central Vietnam, can yield as many as 1,500 meters of quality thread; and that of the Vietnamese-Afghan crossbreed, which is getting along perfectly with the climate of the midlands and lowlands, can turn out 860 metres, compared with 214 metres of low-grade thread gotten from a native thoroughbred cocoon. The increases are thus roughly 7 and 4 times respectively.

Unhappy Job. Now that the center and its provincial stations are about to meet the country's needs with the new breeds, what remains to be done is to convince farmers that they can get more profits with the new breeds and that silkworm raising is more profitable than rice-growing in some areas.

"This takes time, because our peasants are very skeptical. Breeds distributed by the official breeding agencies in previous decades did not produce results and prejudiced them against our new breeds," said Mr. Huan. In areas where the center's breeds are sold to such silkworm raisers, sales agents often do the unhappy job of explaining the differences between the "tam trung tam (center-bred silkworms) and th "tam nha nuoc" (State-bred silkworm).

The question also remains of increasing the mulberry acreage to 4,000 hectares from the present 1,300 hectares to raise the national silk output to tentative self-sufficiency 100 tons—from the present 25 tons. Four-fifths of this come from Quang Nam, Central Vietnam.

Since the center has virtually no mulberry acreage of its own, it had recourse to the desperate resort of distributing 15-day-old worms to mulberry-growing farmers who cannot raise the worms themselves, and feed them for the remaining five days of their insect lives until they build their cocoons. The farmer and the center share the profits fifty-fifty, with the center purchasing back most of the farmers' cocoon crops.

Mr. Huan said this formula is advantageous on two scores. First it helps persuade the hesitant farmers of the advantage of silkworm raising and secondly it relieves the center from the burden of acquiring mulberry croplands which the center can hardly afford.

"It is this community development aspect of the project that accounts most for the prospect of developing the country's silk handicraft into a national industry," said Mr. Huan.

If all goes as scheduled, Vietnam expects to turn out 40 tons of raw silk next year and 100 tons—her total domestic needs—by 1966. (Japan, Asia's largest silk producer, turns out no less than 2,000 tons a year.)

The center also has fitted its provincial stations with special equipment to preserve silkworm eggs as long as three months. The equipment helps regularize the dispensing of hatched eggs to farmers and raisers, and thus avoid premature hatching for poor results or sometimes no results at all.

Fifty-Fifty Formula. The second problem confronting the center in its efforts at helping the country's natural silk industry boost concerns the cultivation of mulberry trees.

The center has successfully developed a new variety of mulberry which is the result of grafting Vietnamese trees with Thai trees.

In terms of assistance to raisers, the center has granted short-term crop development loans, free technical guidance and free mulberry stems for cultivation

in addition to the 50-50 formula successfully applied in many areas during the past few years.

At present, the center has successfully developed a new variety of young mulberry tree which, Mr. Huan said while showing this reporter the center's nursery, can grow without soil, i.e. on stone, pebble, broken bricks or the like, and which can flourish anywhere. The method, which is no secret in terms of modern science, consists of causing tiny (about 4 inches) mulberry cuttings to take root and grow by means of a "vegetable hormone" which the center develops from local material. The cuttings, which are water-sprayed in the daytime, are distributed free or sold at dirt-cheap prices to peasants as soon as they can take root.

Terming the center's development of the hormone "a major break-through" in research, Mr. Huan called the new mulberry growing method "an outstanding break with tradition." He asserted that this method can be applied to the mass-production of other trees, including fruit-bearing ones. The stems thus turned out by the center have been enough to cultivate hundreds of hectares.

In matters of training, the center has conducted short-term courses in Saigon and the silk-producing provinces. Students are anyone interested ranging in age from 12 to 80. Similar courses have also been held by the center in other handicrafts, with varying duration and teaching method depending on the subject. (Courses on the silk industry have also been conducted by the Department of Agriculture and the College of Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Husbandry at Bao Loc, 120 miles north of Saigon.)

"Now that we have proposed, it's up to the peasants to dispose," the portly engineer jested in referring to the possibility of increasing the mulberry crop and raw silk production. Mr. Huan was also optimistic about the possibility of nursing back the country's natural silk handicraft to more than its pre-war level, even making it a national industry.

Other Problems. But the 53-year-old, much-traveled specialist warned: "the problem wouldn't stop there."

Even with full-strength production of raw silk achieved, this country would be confronted with the inevitable problems of marketing and stiff competition from synthetic materials, either locally-made or imported. It is in this context that the center has already researched to make the future finished products easily marketable and more appealing, and to lower their prices. The center has been studying a wide range of new fabric designs, new silk clothing fashions, and more sophisticated uses of local silk in other than clothes.

The Government's future trade policies, of course, will play a large role in the destiny of this industry, Mr. Huan added.

Despite the continued emphasis given to development of commerce and industry in Vietnam especially in the Saigon metropolitan area, numerous difficulties plague the Saigon business community. The most serious, naturally, is the security situation. Sections of the country either under Communist control or which are currently the scenes of civil strife are hardly the most accessible markets for Saigon-produced goods. In addition, certain enterprises depend upon raw materials and goods grown or produced in the military operations zones, while others have plants or other forms of subsidiary activities in the country-side. Finally, many of the firms operating in the Saigon area are faced with serious security difficulties due to their dependence upon transported goods along insecure sections of Vietnam's highways and waterways.

A less serious but nonetheless extremely important difficulty encountered by Saigon businessmen is the high price of licenses combined with the heavy burden of various forms of taxation. For instance, business licenses listed by the Central Government as costing 200\$VN will cost considerably more than this amount because the prefecture can add a surcharge amounting up to 200 percent of the base rate; thus, the license might cost as much as 600\$VN. Added to the license charges are income and sundry other taxes. Income taxes in Vietnam are progressive but certainly not heavy burdens in themselves. However, businessmen keeping accurate records have been placed in a situation for some time where they have been forced to pay their income taxes, unlike other segments of the income tax paying public who up until the present period of strict enforcement have been perennial delinquents.

The most important burdens upon business operations among the sundry taxes are the production or *chiffre d'affaire* taxes, which are levies on the total value of goods produced. Shoe makers, tailors, and all types of producers except goldsmiths and restaurants, in theory are to pay a six percent tax on the price of their products. This tax goes to the national budget and is not subject to prefectural surcharges. For goldsmiths (dealers in gold, silver, precious stones, etc.) the production tax is considerably higher than for other producers, but its collection is rarely enforced. The six percent tax applies only to those businesses which keep accurate sets of records. As most of the smaller shops keep no record of their transactions, their production tax is based upon a flat rate. Each month the tax collector determines this rate arbitrarily upon the basis of his impression of the importance of a business concern. The production taxes for restaurants and hotels are based upon a ten percent rate of daily turnover. However, this is ten percent only of individual checks or bills amounting to 100\$VN and over.

Lastly, property taxes upon business concerns in Saigon are relatively high. An arbitrary assessment is first made including assessed valuations for sites, buildings, and equipment. Tax rates are then levied against the assessments and published in the annual tax report. Proprietors have a month to appeal but almost invariably such requests are denied. Practically no judicial recourse is available.

The combination of the tax levies places a severe burden upon many of even the most profitable business concerns in the area. On occasion the total is so great as to threaten the financial solvency of the entrepreneur. For example, quite recently the ownership of Cholon's largest restaurant, probably the most famous in Saigon, attempted to relinquish their business license due to the severity of current taxation.

They were pacified only by a compromise permitting payment of taxes in installments.

Another important difficulty faced by large numbers of Saigon businessmen in the late 1950's has been somewhat solved today, although it has given rise to even further difficulties. In 1956 foreigners were prohibited from practicing eleven occupations. A grace period of one year was allowed for Chinese and French residents, against whom the decree was directed, to become Vietnamese citizens or to liquidate their business assets. Nearly all of the Chinese adopted Vietnamese citizenship, although a significant but small number of wealthy Chinese refused to do so. The eleven prohibited occupations are:

1. All trade concerning fish and meat.
2. Millinery, grocery, foodstuffs.
3. All trade concerning charcoal and wood fuel.
4. All trade concerning petroleum products (except importing firms).
5. Brokers and second hand dealers.
6. All trade concerning clothing materials and fabrics (less than 10,000 meters for all categories); cotton yarns.
7. Iron monger (iron, copper, bronze).
8. Rice milling.
9. All trade concerning cereals.
10. Transportation of commodities and travelers by cars, ships or boats.
11. Commission agents and agencies (intermediary between sellers and buyers).

Those Chinese who elected to discontinue their occupations on occasion transformed their physical plants and began businesses not prohibited, e.g., some became goldsmiths. They frequently sold their old equipment to Vietnamese. As a result for the first time large numbers of Vietnamese are now operating rice mills. In Tan An Province, close to Cholon next to Gia Dinh Province, for example there are now approximately 100 Vietnamese operated rice mills; fifteen years ago there were none.

Unfortunately, however, a number of both Chinese and French

refused either to become Vietnamese citizens or to enter non-prohibited occupations. This group even today possess a significant portion of the idle capital in Vietnam, in gold, piasters, or foreign exchange. If these funds were to be re-invested it would provide a considerable stimulus to Vietnam's economic development. Officially, re-investment is somewhat difficult because only 49 percent of the capital of a new enterprise is supposed to be foreign exchange. This potential roadblock nonetheless already has been unofficially eliminated due to a number of informal waivers by the GVN concerning the maximum percentage of foreign investment capital.

Prices and Wages

One important difficulty which is of great importance to the over-all economic posture of the Saigon metropolitan area is that the purchasing power of the lower economic levels is extremely low. Most slum section residents can afford to make purchases, for instance, in the market areas and from pushcart operators on the streets but are unable to be of significant assistance in providing a large-scale market for Vietnam's most important budding industries.

However, Vietnam does have a legal minimum wage rate which is fairly strictly enforced for most types of business concerns, although this rate does not apply to domestics. This has proved to be an important factor in somewhat improving the status of the purchasing power of lower income groups. Throughout Vietnam the minimum wage rate for men is 42\$VN per day and 38\$VN for women. During 1960, the average daily wages of male and female skilled workers in Saigon were 102\$VN and 57\$VN respectively.⁹ Unskilled male laborers in Saigon averaged 72\$VN from June 1960 to December 1960, while the female unskilled workers' daily average was 56\$VN. By comparison, the average daily wages for the provinces of the southern part of Vietnam were: 95\$VN and 49\$VN, respectively for skilled male and female workers; and 63\$VN for unskilled male laborers and 49\$VN for unskilled female workers.

The available cost of living index for all of Vietnam also provides basis for judging the purchasing power of working and middle class groups. The index is based upon the base year of 1953 when the index number is classified as 100. Although little difference is found between the 1956 and 1961 data, an appreciable rise in the index is to be noted between 1959 and 1961. The increases are accounted for primarily by

⁹These statistics are from Supplement on Bulletin Economique De la Banque Nationale Du Viet Nam, No. 1 1961 (this publication was issued early in 1962.)

rising prices for clothing materials, charcoal, condensed milk, bread, and soft drinks.

COST OF LIVING INDEX FOR VIETNAM*
Base year—1953—100

	WORKING CLASS	MIDDLE CLASS
1956	139	144
1957	132	143
1958	130	140
1959	133	143
1960	131.5	143
1961	139.4	149.4 (first ten months)

Latest official statistics issued in May, 1962, show the following:

**HOUSING INDEX DROPS IN APRIL: WHOLESAL
PRICES RISE¹⁰**

The housing and accessories cost-of-living index dropped 3 percent in April due to a decline from the month before in prices of electric light bulbs, firewood and furniture, the National Institute of Statistics said in a recent report.

The wholesale price index, on the other hand, rose four points in April—216.1 compared with 211.9 in March. This was due to increased prices of both local and imported goods, the NIS said.

It added that slight drops were recorded last month in prices of pork, chicken eggs, vegetables, black pepper, chicken and brown sugar. But the decline was balanced by a slight advance in prices of beef, fresh fish, small shrimp, duck eggs and bananas and the April food cost index stood at 237 compared with 236.8 in March.

The clothing and accessories index rose 1.7 percent for the middle class and 1.2 percent for the working class in April, the report said. It added that the slight decrease in prices of cotton fabric, satin and artificial silk did not compensate for the increase in the cost of poplin, dacron and sewing machines.

Drug prices also rose last month and brought the miscellaneous index to 326.2 as compared with 324.1 in March.

The general cost-of-living index for all consumer goods in April was 2.4 percent more for the middle class and 1.7 percent more for the working class than in the same month last year.

LABOR

The following statement summarizes a message by President Ngo Dinh Diem concerning Vietnamese workers and their rights.

**SUMMARY OF THE LABOR DAY MESSAGE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
May 1, 1962¹¹**

During the last eight years, in spite of difficulties of all kinds and of the war we have been waging on three fronts against Communism, under-development and

*The index is derived from computing data given in the *Annual Bulletin Economique De La Banque Nationale Du Vietnam* for the years 1957-1961.

¹⁰Extract from the *Vietnam Press*, May 25, 1962 (morning), p. H3.

disunity, we have successfully carried out in Vietnam a policy of labor promotion and mass progress. Nobody could question the progress accomplished, the growing awareness of the workers of the part they can play in the economic and social development of the country. In addition to the "de-proletarianisation" of the masses, achieved through the Land Development and the Agrarian Reform Programs, the Government has encouraged the growth of the trade union movement, seen to a judicious implementation of the Labor code, helped to reach agreement on collective bargaining agreements and finally stepped up the industrialization of the country with a view to improving the workers' living standards.

Recently, in order to enable labor and management to take an active part in the strengthening of the national economy and in the social development of the country, the National Economic Council has been established, with 17 of its members, one third of the total membership, chosen from the working class. Shortly after its inaugural session, this council was given the opportunity to discuss a large-scale economic and social development draft plan, aimed at expanding agriculture, and developing industry and public equipment. The implementation of this plan is to secure full employment and the raising of the workers' living standards.

The Vietnamese workers, placed on an equal footing with the other social classes, are taking a direct part in the administration and management of economic affairs, thus directly contributing to the general progress of the country.

This is, moreover, in conformity with our policy of building a new society, in which the human person would be an end and the foundations of which would be fraternal community and justice, in contrast to the tyrannical regime of the Communists who exploit the workers for the benefit of Red Colonialism.

In the face of such substantial achievements accomplished in all fields, the panic-stricken Communists have stepped up their subversive activities, their acts of sabotage, murder and piracy, in order to impede our march forward.

The Government has consequently decreed a state of emergency and taken all necessary measures to check these aggressive activities and continue the task of economic and social development of the country.

The personalist revolution must reach the most remote hamlets and strongly influence the life of these basic social units of the Nation. The national program of establishing strategic hamlets is designed in fact to ensure security to each citizen, to defend the Republican regime and to protect the law down to the smallest hamlet and to achieve all those social, cultural and economic reforms which will improve the living conditions of the working class, in conformity with the policy of labor promotion and mass progress and with the new scale of values.

This program directly concerns the life of the working masses in urban as well as rural areas. Therefore, workers must take an active part in the establishment of strategic hamlets.

Let us all unite our efforts to exterminate the Communists—traitors to the fatherland, the workers and mankind—in order to preserve the Republic and carry through our personalist revolution.

Thanks to the heroic traditions of our people, to the patriotism and the strength of the workers, we will triumph, concluded the President.

In March 1962, it was officially announced that in Vietnam there were 565 legally recognized unions, including 467 workers' unions and 98 employers' associations. However, this number includes a large number of unions which are inactive and have quite small memberships;

¹¹Extract from the *Vietnam Press*, May 1, 1962, p. H1.

despite the fact that in 1961 it was claimed that formally there were 1,000,000 union members in Vietnam.

The four most important employers' associations are: the Confederation of Vietnamese Merchants and Industrialists; the Union of Vietnamese Industrialists; the Union of Rubber Planters; and the Association of Vietnamese Employers. Today the employers groups' groups are less united than are the workers' unions, and many of their actions are purely perfunctory in nature; the most pronounced exception is the Union of Rubber Planters.

According to statistics presented in the *Report of GVN Activities: 1954-1961* published in 1961 by the Department of Information, the total number of workers' unions showed the following increases between 1955

YEAR	NO. OF WORKER'S UNIONS
1955	239
1956	341
1957	342
1958	353
1959	396
1960	440
1961 (June)	450

and June 1961. Most of these groups were associated with three major Vietnamese workers' unions: the Vietnamese Confederation of Christian Workers; the Confederation of Vietnamese Workers; and the Vietnamese Labor Union. The first two are by far the most important workers' unions in Vietnam today. The Vietnamese Confederation of Christian Workers has approximately 200,000 members.

ARE WORKERS' RIGHTS RESPECTED IN VIETNAM?¹²

The labour policy of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is progressive and at the same time conforms to international conventions and the national customs. It is based on respect for human dignity and a sincere cooperation between management and labour. Its ultimate goals are among other things, to improve the living and working conditions of the workers and to help increase the national productivity.

A key watchdog of this policy, the Department of Labour, has made it its prime duty to use all legal and efficient means to enhance the standing of the labouring classes, safeguard their interests and to improve their living standards.

Unionist Freedom. Contrasting sharply with the defunct colonial regime under which free unions did not exist, the Vietnamese Government has solemnly recognized freedom of unions and the workers' right to strike as a means to defend their human rights and their interests in conformity with the present laws.

There are now five labour confederations throughout the country, four of them affiliated to international labour organizations. The five include the Vietnamese

¹²Feature extract from the *Vietnam Press*, April 30, 1962 (evening), p. D1 plus.

Confederation of Christian Workers, Vietnamese Confederation of Workers Unions and the Vietnam Labour Union.

On the management side there are two major organizations: the Employers' Association and the General Confederation of Industry and Commerce.

Respecting democratic principles, the Labour Department has never interfered with the union machinery, but has always kept in close contact with labour leaders while encouraging the training and advancement of union workers. To this end the Department had asked the International Labour Organization and friendly countries for special grants and scholarships to enable union officials to study abroad. The number of union officials receiving such grants will reach 42 by the end of this year.

Meanwhile, seminars on labour management and leadership have been held in the country with the help of the Labour Department. The number of union workers having attended these gatherings totalled 1948 persons from 1956 to 1959.

In view of the long-range task of national reconstruction, which among other things requires a perfect harmony between management, labour and the Government, a tripartite principle has been applied calling for the participation of these three parties in all questions dealing with the interests of each or all of them. The three parties are represented by delegates freely chosen by themselves.

There is also the Consultative Commission of Labour Welfare, which is consulted anytime there is a new labour regulation or law.

As far as labour disputes are concerned, there are labour tribunals and arbitration councils presided over by magistrates assisted by labour and management delegates (nominated in equal numbers) in their capacities as assessors or arbiters.

Special mention should also be made of collective labour contracts concluded between management and labour. In addition to their democratic nature, which reflects that of the Government's labour policy, these documents contain provisions which are more liberal than the Labour Code itself.

Lastly, there is the National Economic Council of 55 members, including 17 representatives of labour.

Labour Delegates

In enterprises having upwards of 100 employees, the workers can elect their own delegates. In the 1960-61 alone there were 1,625 delegates in 160 different enterprises throughout Vietnam.

The delegates' duties are to:

—help Labour Department and supervisory officials in the enforcement and observance of labour laws,

—transmit to the management the wishes and claims of the workers, and

—help create perfect understanding between labour and management.

Twenty-three training courses in the handling of their functions were held last year for 1,000 labour delegates.

Disputes and Their Solving

The major causes for labour disputes are usually the worker's demands for better working conditions, mis-understanding between labour and management, and violations of the Labour Code.

In almost all cases, Labour Department officials step in and help conclude some sort of agreement or compromise.

Improving the Workers' Living Standards

The Government's policy of labour promotion and collective advance, which has found eloquent expression in the agricultural field by agrarian reforms and de-

velopment assistance programs, has also been implemented for the benefit of workers in other fields. Its implementation has been carried out in the form of a series of decrees and orders providing for minimum wage, expansion of union freedoms and development and production aid for handicrafts and industrial projects.

The Labour Code fixes the work week at a 48-hour maximum, and also provides for paid annual vacations, weekly days off and rest periods for women who have just given birth and so on.

A social security system has been instituted to protect workers against labour risks. It stipulates the granting by the management of family allowances, compensation for labour accidents, dismissal allowances and half-pay for women on childbirth leave.

The Salary

A minimum salary has been established for workers in Saigon area since 1956 and for those throughout the country since 1957.

From 1956-59 the cost of living dropped noticeably and the workers' purchasing power improved accordingly. In 1960-61 the price of essential goods rose but the Government, alerted in time, took adequate measures to stop the rise. During the last months of 1961 and the first quarter of this year, a number of enterprises (Shell, Caltex, Esso, BGI, MIC, Bastos and CARIC) granted some pay raises to their employees.

In the meantime, the Labour Department has always urged enterprise owners to do everything they can to improve the living and working conditions of their workers on both the moral and material planes. Mention must be made in this connection of the establishments of first-aid services, maternity hospitals, nurseries and schools in various large enterprises ranging from factories to plantations.

Medical Welfare

Under the initiative and supervision of the Labour Supervision Service, many enterprises have provided medical facilities for their employees.

In major industrial and commercial enterprises there are now 230 first-aid stations, 329 first-aid kits and seven nurseries. The medical personnel serving these enterprises now amount to 46 physicians, 87 nurses and 167 first-aid workers.

On plantations there are four hospitals, 119 first-aid stations, and 24 maternity services. The medical personnel include 36 physicians, 148 nurses and first-aiders and 35 midwives.

Meanwhile, a commission to study and apply measures to prevent labour accidents has been created at the Labour Department. At the recommendation of this committee, many enterprises have purchased special equipment to help their employees avoid labour accidents or effects harmful to their health.

Labour Force

Since 1956 the Labour Department has been undertaking a survey of the country's labour force. In the Saigon area the survey program provides for (1) laying the groundwork for the survey, and (2) implementing it methodically and systematically.

According to the latest statistical data, Vietnam now has 5.6 million workers out of a population of 14 million, or 40 percent. Of the above figure, 4,171,500 people work in agriculture.

The Labour Department also faces another major problem—unemployment. An employment office has been set up in Saigon to help the unemployed seek jobs and management recruit personnel.

Professional Training.

From 1955 to April 1962, 10,814 specialized workers were trained by the Labour Department. They were among the 25,726 people attending more than 40

training courses sponsored by the Labour Department and among the 13,180 graduates from these courses.

Since 1955 the Department has also organized vocational training courses for adults having a low educational level. The free training covers subjects not taught in school such as auto repair, electricity, mechanical drawing, wood-working and tailoring.

Expansion of Labour Services

Before 1954 there were only two labour services in Saigon and Hue. Now these services include four directorates and 25 provincial branches, including six in Central Vietnam, five in the High Plateaus and 14 in Southern Vietnam.

International Activities

Since 1954 Vietnam has sent a delegation to the International Labour Conference in Geneva each year. Delegates also went to the Asian Technical Conference in Rangoon in November 1955, the U.N. Commission for the Abolition of Slavery in Geneva in August 1956, the International Conference on Labour Statistics in Geneva in 1957, the Asian Regional Conference at New Delhi in 1957, and to the Asian ILO Consultative Commission for Management.

In 1954 Vietnam was elected member of the Asian Consultative Commission and in 1960 assistant member of the ILO board of directors for 1960-63.

The above feature reading provides a fairly clear outline of current legal provisions relating to workers' rights in Vietnam. Special mention should be made, however, concerning the family allowance system which is of considerable significance in determining lower income workers' purchasing power. Without distinction, all employers in private business concerns contribute a percentage of their employees' wages to an official compensation fund, supervised by the Department of Labor. Payments from the fund constitute part of employee wages and are allocated on the basis of number of dependents. The government operates a similar system for its employees in that family allowances actually are part of regular salaries; extra compensation is provided for wives and for each child under the age of 16, and also for children up to the age of 21 if they continue to be students. Between 1955 and 1961 over 800 million \$VN were paid in family allowances to employees of private business firms.

YEAR	AMOUNTS PAID	WOMEN RECIPIENTS	CHILDREN RECIPIENTS
1955	99,721,313.00VN\$	17,020	48,391
1956	100,517,188.00VN\$	18,345	53,990
1957	110,394,473.00VN\$	18,776	53,368
1958	114,355,202.00VN\$	19,318	63,204
1959	122,388,223.00VN\$	20,190	68,549
1960	130,966,157.07VN\$	21,706	76,872
1961	145,381,237.83VN\$	24,314	87,540

HOW VIETNAM HANDLES EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS¹³

According to authoritative statistics, Vietnam's population increases by 2-3 percent each year and may double in 35 years if this trend continues.

So far there has been no important population movement in the country except for the exodus of nearly one million people in the wake of the 1954 Geneva Settlement of the Indochina War.

According to the same source, Vietnam's urban people now account for 20.7 percent of the entire population, (or 2,912,000 city-dwellers out of the total population of 14,068,000). Nearly 80 percent of the entire population lives in rural areas and on agriculture.

A population survey by the National Institute of Statistics in Saigon in 1958 gave the following data:

- 42.4 percent were between 0 and 14 years
- 55.6 percent were between 15 and 65 years
- 2.0 percent were upwards of 65 years

The non-working people dependant on the family wage-earners account for 80 percent.

Taking the three provinces of Thua Thien, Phong Dinh and Khanh Hoa as samples, the survey showed that:

- 45.2 percent were between 0 and 15 years
- 52.1 percent were between 15 and 65 years
- 2.7 percent were 65 or older.

Under the first five-year economic development plan, labour officials made it their duty to create 60,000 new jobs each. They based their forecasts on the then estimated 1.2 percent increase in the population each year during the period under review. But in reality the increase was from 2 to 3 percent so there had to be at least 200,000 new jobs yearly instead of 60,000 as originally estimated.

Another factor contributing to the pressing need to create new jobs is that country's work force from 10 to 19 years of age account for 20 percent of its entire labour force. The percentage will increase even further in the ten years to come.

The 200,000 new jobs which need to be created for the new generation of workers do not include jobs for the chronically unemployed.

From 1955 onwards, the demands for new jobs have tended to increase steadily, particularly in the provinces. A survey of 16 provinces considered "economically important" during the 1958-60 period showed that the number of workers rose from 90,000 in 1958 to 158,500 in 1960. A similar survey conducted in Saigon in 1961 placed the number of workers in the city at 255,230 compared with 209,780 recorded the previous year.

On the whole, Vietnam's labour force accounts for 40 percent of the entire population, or about 5.6 million workers out of 14 million people. According to 1961 statistics, the country's work force is broken down as follows:

Mining industry	0.02%	1,020
Processing industries	2.28%	123,600
Building	0.89%	50,000
Water and Electricity	0.05%	2,500
Commerce	3.65%	206,200
Transportation	2.59%	145,330
Minor occupations	0.62%	34,780
Agriculture	74.49%	4,171,500
Forestry	1.23%	69,000
Fisheries	3.38%	191,000
Plantations	0.99%	55,480
Public services	1.96%	109,510
Servants	3.57%	100,000

¹³Feature extract from the *Vietnam Press*, May 1, 1962, p. D1 plus.

There should be some reservations about the above statistics because exact figures for the agricultural labour force are still unavailable.

Of the 80 reports on labour sent in by the provinces, the largest number of unemployed is recorded in Gia Dinh. Most of the unemployed in this province are unskilled workers and peasants displaced by the war now raging in many rural areas from which they have fled to safety.

The employment office here said that many of the unemployed refuse jobs far from the Capital. A foreign industrial concern had wanted to recruit 100 workers for out-of-town jobs, but only 40 out of the 75 applicants accepted.

Of 200 odd applicants at the same employment service only three agreed to work far from town, or 14 short of the required number.

In the light of these facts, the source said, one can say that a large part of the unemployed recorded in Saigon and surrounding areas can be best rated as under-employed.

To help solve the problem the Government has spared no efforts toward developing new industries, handicrafts and land development projects. The basic requirement is still that security must be restored as soon as possible in rural areas, particularly in remote ones. Thence arises the necessity to create strategic hamlets on a national basis.

SECURITY

The Saigon metropolitan area faces problems unknown by almost all of the world's cities. Although the city has thus far avoided Viet Cong terrorism, with the exception of a few bomb attacks, it must be continually prepared administratively and militarily to cope with all contingencies relating to security. Gia Dinh Province is creating 279 strategic defense hamlets. Saigon has been organized for self-defense and is establishing strategic areas for the city. In addition, more stringent regulations have been adopted concerning meetings. It is unfortunate but inevitable that resources of the community have had to be devoted to this particular type of activity.

CITY DISTRICTS ORGANIZE FOR SELF-DEFENCE¹⁴

The people in the city districts have been busily building their self-defence organizations lately as was seen by a delegation of City Hall officials yesterday.

The group, headed by Prefect Vu Tien Huan called at three different self-defence communities in districts four, seven and eight to attend a demonstration of fire rescue work, and defensive action with or without weapons.

The characteristic common to the communities in the city and the strategic hamlets in rural areas is their fundamental structure. But in the city, except for isolated communities, the defenders do not have weapons other than poles and clubs because it is believed that the Viet Cong will not dare to attack but will merely venture into the community to distribute propaganda and sow disorder. In the remote areas the situation is different and so the defenders are armed with deadly weapons.

Visit at Hung Phu self-defence community, eighth district

District eight has 24,680 people and an area of 856,000 square metres divided

¹⁴Extract from the *Vietnam Press*, March 10, 1962 (Morning), p. H2.

into 5 sub-districts and 21 communities. To date 15 communities already have self-defence systems. People in the district have now and then been disturbed by undesired Viet Cong visitors who left propaganda literature in their houses or hoisted Communist flags.

Self-defence community 14, which the group visited yesterday, has a defence corps of 150 young men and adults with a permanent nucleus of 40. All of them are equipped with clubs and torches. Each night 15 people divided in three shifts take turns to mount guard in groups of two at the community hall while the three others patrol the area.

The community also has two messengers who, when needed can pedal to the neighboring police station to sound the alarm. At any sign of Viet Cong intrusion trumpets and drums beat for one minute, the defence corps men take their arms and check on the strangers they meet while the citizens light their torches and lamps.

Mr. Quy Ngo, leader of the district Cong Hoa Youth, yesterday staged an alarm for the visitors. Two men disguised as Viet Cong were to distribute propaganda literature in the community. As they began their work a patrol caught sight of them and chased them. People realizing the danger sounded the alarm while the messenger rushed to the community hall to call out two rescue sections. Immediately the search from house to house began. The manhunt continued until the two Viet Cong, harassed, made for the very path where the community had set up a trap.

To the visitors it was explained that the full participation of the community, proved by the shouts of the pursuers, has the effect of making the enemy wild and lose his nerve.

At District seven

The visitors later called at self-defence community one of district seven, one of the five completed in the district.

Here is a rather isolated community of about 815 people living in the open fields. Eighty-four men and 111 women make up the community's defence corps. Most of them are armed with clubs but some do have rifles.

The visitors, who called at the center at 8:30 p.m., left about midnight after witnessing a similar defence demonstration.

PRESIDENT PROMULGATES DECREE-LAW ON MEETING¹⁵

From now on no meetings can be held unless previously authorized by the prefect, province chiefs or mayors, according to a decree-law promulgated yesterday by the President of the Republic.

The decree-law, which has the effect of a regular law, is not applicable to meetings in public areas or election meetings. Some other exceptions are also mentioned in the document.

Applications for meeting permits must (1) be filed seven days in advance (except in extraordinary cases with valid reasons, in which case the period is reduced to 48 hours); (2) mention the place, hour, date, duration and purpose of the meeting and the number of participants; (3) state that applicants pledge to take all responsibility for the meeting.

Exempt from previous authorization are: (1) private meetings at headquarters officially provided for by the regulations and by laws of groups, associations, unions and firms, and (2) meetings of worker delegates in their firms and during their off-duty time as provided by Chapter IX of the Labour Code.

However, these meetings are subject to a declaration to be submitted to the

¹⁵Extract from the *Vietnam Press*, May 17, 1962 (Evening), p. H1.

local authorities 48 hours in advance. No such declaration is required in case of meetings during working hours.

Also exempt from previous authorization are gatherings for family affairs—weddings, funerals, etc. Only a declaration to the authorities 24 hours in advance is requested in these cases.

For security reasons, the prefect, province chiefs or mayors can forbid a meeting even if it has been previously authorized or declared.

The holders and participants of an unauthorized or undeclared meeting are liable to fines ranging from 500VN\$ to 50,000VN\$, and/or prison terms of from six days to six months.

The penalties will double in case of recurrence, the decree-law added.

AMERICAN POLICY

Because of the tremendous impact of contemporary American foreign policy and aid programs throughout the Republic of Vietnam, and especially in the Saigon metropolitan area, it appears appropriate to conclude this chapter on important factors effecting public policy and municipal administration with two extracts outlining the philosophy and intention of the United States' role.

ADDRESS By MR. ARTHUR Z. GARDINER BEFORE SAIGON ROTARY CLUB, MAY 10, 1962¹⁶

Preparing for tomorrow means building the cohesiveness of the nation, both politically and economically. This involves, in part, a free play of forces of capital, labor and management.

It means a struggle by all men of vision and good will. It means a continuing growth of the sense of responsibility by all people. There is in Vietnam a great loyalty to smaller social institutions, such as the family and the village. Loyalty must also be directed to the larger unit, the nation.

Preparing for tomorrow means a continuing struggle against rootlessness engendered by vast social change and the sense of frustration that develops out of the gulf between the individual's potentiality and his society's possibilities. The answer is social growth, the development of economic and other organizations to implement democratic ideas in which the individual can play a significant role.

It is in the development of her agricultural resources, for food and for industry, that the great hopes of your people must lie.

Both government and business have a responsibility in the rural field. The government's pricing policies should encourage agricultural production, and guarantee the farmer protection in the market place, through assurance of honest weights and measures. It should provide him with a constant flow of reliable technical information. Business, too, must seek means of providing the farmer with reasonable credit, must find means of educating him to the use of new techniques and products. Vietnam has not begun to realize the agricultural potential which modern methods can help to provide. The potential buying power of the countryside is tremendous and must be the mainspring of growth in Vietnam. Business can no longer be content with exploiting existing capabilities but must create new ones. Here Western technology has helped you more. There should be a fair division of benefits and gains between

¹⁶Extract from the *Vietnam Press*, May 12, 1962 (Evening), p. D1 =.

town and country, business and farm. This means well conducted programs of land tenure, credit, marketing, and the all important services of agricultural extension and advice.

On the question of capital, Vietnam faces serious governmental fiscal problems, which you have solved through foreign aid imports in the past. Times are changing. An example of the difficulties involves the development of local manufacturing capacity. When local production levels increase, they are reflected in terms of reduction of imports. No one can justify the importation of goods when local manufacturing can meet the needs. Taxes must be raised to meet the gap which foreign aid can no longer bridge. Those with a heavy stake in Vietnam's future must be prepared to meet their share of today's burden. It is the responsibility of capital to do that, and the great opportunities which are present in Vietnam for the useful growth of capital suggest it will have the means to meet its responsibilities. Vietnam's future will be safe in the hands of those who believe in the long-run benefits and steady growth of capital, not for the short-run, get-rich-quick profit.

The government, however, also faces the responsibility of helping improve the investment climate, both for Vietnamese and foreign businessmen. This means codifying rules, regulations and requirements, so they are clear for all to see. I am increasingly convinced that under fair terms capital from both Vietnamese and foreign sources will be ready to help develop your many untapped resources. The problem of government and business relations is one that requires good will on both sides. Government must realize that legitimate profits are the mainspring of growth and business must realize that irresponsible action today is the quickest way to assure that here will be no profits tomorrow.

The quality of many of your labor leaders in Vietnam is high. They have earned the respect of many, at home and abroad. You have organized good labor unions. In them, management must realize that the best hope for orderly relations with labor is through the trade union. This is a path to economic and political stability. And all of us should remember that the most important requirement of sound economic growth is skilled people . . . workers, but also people trained to be entrepreneurs, managers, bankers, engineers, agriculturalists, technicians of many varieties . . . people ready to welcome the challenge of economic change and the opportunities in it . . . people, above all, who are dedicated to the economic development of their country and to the high standards of honesty, competence, knowledge and performance that their country deserves.

What is needed beyond all else is businessmen leadership—especially in the form of the good example. Many of the people who can provide this—I might even venture to say *most* of these people—are in this room at this moment. In the hands of you leaders of professions and of enterprise rests the future growth of your nation. Already you, as managers of your nation's economy, have attracted great and favorable attention to Vietnam. In a few short years you have made great progress. Much work lies ahead of you. Your talents will face great challenges.

And so at this point I should like to enter a plea for your wholehearted support of that function of the good society which produces great managers: education. It was Disraeli, I believe, who said, "Upon the education of the people of this country the fate of this country depends."

The substantial growth of elementary education and of the technical and vocational education in Vietnam since independence has opened new and challenging vistas. It is this sphere, and in our USOM's contribution to this sphere of activity, that I shall for long recall.

VIETNAMESE—AMERICAN JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Following is the Vietnamese-American joint communique of January 4 on an

economic and social program "aimed at providing every Vietnamese with means for improving his standard of living:"

The Governments of Vietnam and the U.S. have announced a broad economic and social program aimed at providing every Vietnamese with the means for improving his standard of living. This program represents an intensification and expansion of efforts already made for the same purpose during the past few years.

Social facilities in the fields of education and health will be established throughout the country. Roads, communications, and agricultural facilities will be developed to bring increasing prosperity to the people.

Measures to strengthen South Vietnam's defense in the military field are being taken simultaneously, pursuant to the recent exchange of letters between President Kennedy and President Diem.

All of these steps—economic, social, military—demonstrate the desire of both the U.S. and Vietnamese Governments to do their utmost to improve the protection and prosperity of the Vietnamese people in the face of Communist guerrilla aggression and depredations directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi.

The Vietnamese and American Governments have worked out a comprehensive program as follow-up to the study made by the Joint Experts under the leadership of Professor Vu Quoc Thuc of Vietnam and Dr. Eugene Staley of the U.S. as well as later studies. Some measures have already been started. Others are in the advanced planning stage and will soon be under way.

The U.S. Government is furnishing additional aid to assist the Vietnamese Government in maintaining a level of essential imports which the Vietnamese Government could not otherwise finance. Priority will be given to imports required to meet the needs of the people, including the means of developing the industries of Vietnam, and luxury goods will be excluded in accordance with current conditions of austerity. The Vietnamese Government, as recently announced, has taken steps to increase greatly the piaster resources available to it for financing the piaster costs of security, economic and social programs.

With this combination of dollars and piasters, the Government of Vietnam, with U. S. material and advisory support, will carry out the following programs at village and hamlet levels and in cities:

1. To improve administration where the Government has the closest contact with people, training facilities for village officials will be set up.
2. The rural health program will be further developed. Maternity clinics have already been established in over half of the districts and first-aid stations in about two-thirds of the villages. The objective is to extend this program to achieve 100 percent coverage. A nation-wide program of inoculations against diphtheria, tetanus and whooping cough will be started. These programs will be concentrated in the near future in areas relatively free of Viet Cong domination and will be extended to other areas as the Viet Cong are suppressed.
3. The education program will also be expanded. Public primary schools have increased from 1,191 in 1954 to 4,668 in 1961. Over the same period the number of students has grown from 330,000 to 1,100,000. The goal is to extend primary schools to every village in the country. As with rural health facilities, the immediate aim is to expedite the extension of primary schools to all those villages in areas relatively free of Viet Cong and to extend them to villages in other areas as Communist guerrillas are eliminated.
4. Village communications are being developed, both to enable the receipt of radio programs broadcast over the national radio system now nearing completion, and to provide a means for village communication with dis-

trict headquarters. Such a communication system will make it possible to make emergency calls of any nature, for example, for emergency medical assistance.

5. New roads are being built to link rural communities with main highways and, in turn, with provincial and national centers. This program, already under way in many areas, will make it easier to ferret out Viet Cong guerrillas as at the same time it lays a potential for improving the lot of loyal citizens.
6. Adequate funds will be available to support and expand the agricultural credit system. It has already functioned successfully in many parts of the country, and as security is restored, an increasing number of farmers will be able to borrow money cheaply in order to increase their production and income.
7. A program to control pests and insects, especially in Central Vietnam where they have ravaged rice crops for the past two years, is ready to be launched on an extensive scale. It should materially improve the livelihood of peasants in the areas affected.
8. Special efforts will also be taken to enable the Montagnard population in the high plateau to share the progress in this region with their Vietnamese compatriots. Resettlement will be accelerated where necessary to remove the population from Viet Cong pressures. Increased resources available to the Government of Vietnam will assist in the construction of resettlement villages and will enable the subsidization of inhabitants where necessary until they become self-supporting. Many of the land development centers created during the past few years are now flourishing areas producing new crops like kenaf and ramie, and people living in them enjoy a bigger income than before. Similar prospects exist for the new resettlement centers for Montagnards, to which village improvements in health, education and communications will be extended.
9. Special efforts will be directed at reconstruction in the flood-stricken regions in the Mekong Delta. These will include regroupment of people into new villages to which health, education and communications benefits will be extended. Road and canal construction will also be involved.
10. Extensive programs of public works will be under taken to help relieve unemployment.
11. Industrial development, which has been marked in the past two years, will continue. In the field of cotton textiles, for example, a further investment of 6 millionUS\$ will go far toward making Vietnam nearly self-sufficient in cotton cloth. At the same time it will provide a living for thousands of workers.
12. Increased U. S. assistance for both immediate economic and social measures and longer-range development reflects the confidence of the U. S. Government in the future of Free Vietnam. Both the Vietnamese and the U. S. Governments also welcome the support and assistance of other governments in carrying forward these programs for ensuring the freedom of Vietnam and the increasing prosperity of the Vietnamese people.

CONCLUSION

The capital of the Republic of Vietnam presents both a portrait of urbanity and a unique combination of European and Asian attributes.

Although not surpassing the cultural and intellectual climate of old Hanoi, Saigon in many respects approaches its undoubted goal of representing the stereotype of a small Paris which has maintained and in some ways perfected the flavor of the Far East.

Saigon has a much greater percentage of educated elite than can be claimed by most of the world's former colonial jurisdictions. In addition, it has a well-established public education system providing educational and training facilities for the whole of its population. The elite of the city, primarily as a result of French influence, is generally mundane, sophisticated, and cultured. Further, the significant numbers of wealthy Chinese, who are both well educated and frequently affiliated with quite sophisticated Chinese international financial concerns, provide a sizable supplemental force to the existing Saigon upper class. Due to this rather extraordinary number and quality of economic and social elite, Saigon definitely has a current leadership potential impressive enough to meet successfully many of the problems normally associated with developing nations. There also is no serious question that this elite group is technically equipped to solve most Saigon metropolitan area public policy issues.

The inadequate utilization of this potential in terms of political leadership is the greatest paradox in contemporary South Vietnam. Unfortunately, the government generally has closed most possible avenues of access to exploiting the elite effectively. Simultaneously, the majority of the elite increasingly have displayed an ambivalent attitude toward Vietnamese political processes.

Saigon is a proud community. Its current situation has simply been a further example of how its population maintains a position of strength and hope (paradoxically in themselves rather than in their government) in the face of perils more demanding than the trials of Job. Its history has been far from a peaceful evolution. Rather, the sequence and attending horrors of colonialism, rebellion, and militant dispute among brothers has characterized the monumental development of a colossus from the swamp and the forest. The capital has resisted all attempts at destruction. It has precluded a return to its previous condition which the acts of many participants in the seemingly unending struggle over control of Vietnam appear to have as an unintended but nonetheless auxiliary goal.

Today, Saigon alone serves as the bastion of the Republic. At the same time, its residents are more apathetic observers than avid participants in the power struggle to maintain the presence of the existing national regime. Yet, the Saigonese, as a whole at least, have no sympathy

for the anti-Diem coalition. Their history and their urban climate make them less than responsive to the claims to power of the dominant element in the Viet Cong entourage, i.e., the Buddhist sects. However, these factors do not prevent widespread sympathy for the injustices claimed by the sects as grounds for reversing their traditional and religious opposition to communism.

Nor does the experience of Saigon residents give them cause to give wholehearted support to Communist claims, especially the demands for unification of Vietnam which pour from Hanoi. The community proletariat remains oblivious to Marxist proclamations, while the elite have reason to fear a Communist regime in the south. Despite the fact the Geneva partition simply divided the existing elite along geographical lines, with relatives maintaining many of the control positions on both sides of the Seventeenth Parallel, the urbane Saigonese see no profit in undermining the developing economy and the generally improving life style they have finally achieved. A Communist victory automatically would alter the base of their economic life, upon which their present prosperity rests.

At the same time, no strata of Saigon's residents can be classified as genuine supporters of the present regime. The lower strata expresses itself through apathy and quiet loathing, while the elite, feeling abandoned and betrayed by American unwillingness to force the Diem government to adopt what to them are considered as "progressive" measures, gradually are envisioning the rise to power of a "neutralist" regime. Naturally, the specifics of governmental public policy and of implementing "progressive" programs under the hoped for governmental succession have yet to be articulated.

Apathy on the part of nearly all of the population toward Saigon's political processes, which provide the operating milieu for the economic and social systems of the city, is particularly startling because these processes contain the key to explaining existing municipal administrative practices. On the one hand, the city is both the stronghold and the stepchild of the national government. All programs for administering the community must be in line with and subordinate to national policies. Today survival is the prevailing concept determining all governmental policies of the Republic. In view of this, it is not at all surprising that Saigon's role in assuring national survival is the underlying theme in Central Government promulgations concerning topics of a purely local nature.

It is imperative that the city remain safe from the perils prevalent

even immediately beyond the prefecture's boundaries. Police adequacy, more than any other factor, has provided necessary minimum protection from infiltration and terrorism. Although Saigon does serve the anti-Diem forces as a hiding place for unknown numbers of revolutionaries, the Viet Cong for whatever reason of strategy or necessity, have permitted the city to remain relatively tranquil. Because of its unique security status in a nation torn by civil strife, the city and the metropolitan area have served as a foundation for raising the nation's economy to new heights. As long as Saigon displays economic growth, the remainder of the country has potential for avoiding economic chaos. If the nation's economy were ever to falter, no hope whatsoever could be held for survival of the Diem government.

In addition to formal national influences, Saigon's political processes are largely determined by the central regime in terms of local political involvements. The French administrative system necessitates a significant national role in municipal government, but this is only a legal phase of control. By its stand on city council elections, the regime has silenced any possible legitimate democratic representative system in the prefecture. The council not only has ceased to be a representative body, but also has become no more than a perfunctory unit. Controls exercised by the Presidency, Interior, and Surrete also have stymied development of representative non-governmental organizations or organs of free expression. As a result, politics must either be militant or completely passive. In the absence of any legitimate groups or tactics for articulating and making claims for their programs, the non-Communist elite of the community have been driven to consider the advisability of "neutralism" as an alternative whereby they feel that regular political processes at least can exist.

In short, the population of Saigon continues its normal activities with zeal but with fatalistic forebodings concerning the future. In the countryside the die has been cast; Vietnamese oppose their countrymen each day and night. In the city, life has been better, expectations of higher living conditions are standard, and the urban public awaits its fate. Saigon residents fear and most hate the Viet Cong. But as there is no expression of favorable sentiment for what universally is considered a joke, i.e., the Republic, only one alternative would appear available, namely, a non-Viet Cong coup. In light of the history of the city and of the backgrounds of most of its residents such an alternative definitely is a plausible solution. But this possibility is a small one. Whether because of their despair over a generation of violent rebellions, of their acceptance of inevitable Communist victory, of their disillusionment with

democracy after experiencing life under the Republic, of their loss of faith in the United States, or of some entirely different reasons, the fact is that today at least the Saigonese are quite unlikely to participate in a revolt organized well enough to overthrow the existing government.

Ironically, in their own unwillingness to cast the die themselves, they blame the United States. They feel that the Americans should force governmental changes or abdications. The topic of American commitments and of heuristic steps in effectively sponsoring foreign policy goals presents debatable facets and one school of thought undoubtedly would support the Saigonese position, but in the present situation American determination to support the Republic provides residents of the city with rationalization for adopting a posture of no-position, i.e., of apathy. A former admiration for the United States partially accounts for such a rationalization. But more important is an underlying and even desperate desire for the entire mess simply to disappear. Saigon controls the nation but cannot control either the policies of the government or the form of opposition to the regime.

Neither the proletariat nor the elite of the city have any illusions about the consequences of a Viet Cong victory or of a prolonged Republican holding action. Both alternatives are considered distasteful. If a third force should evolve, e.g., the military or a currently unsung group sponsored by American aid, perhaps the existing apathy might become transformed into enlightened activism and provide a potent source for re-uniting South Vietnam. Unification with the north is impossible for a non-Communist regime.

However, the Republic is still the government ruling Saigon. American support for the regime is an accomplished fact. Saigon will continue to thrive economically, while the long-range stability of this prosperity remains shaky due to nation-wide conditions. In the years ahead, the metropolitan area must eliminate its conurbation deficiencies through implemented planning programs or even a period of peace in the country will not insure economic prosperity or improved living conditions. Such programs today, unfortunately, are not only generally impractical, but frequently impossible due to the security situation.

The future of Saigon rests in a complex web of world international politics. From the Communist camp, its fate resides basically in the outcome of the pro- and anti-Stalinist struggle currently represented by the Soviet Union and mainland China. Or rather, the ability of North Vietnam to once again side with Russia against an uneconomical and, in view of American sternness, relatively fruitless guerrilla war that does

not fit the current pattern of expansion through co-existence is the determining factor in the Communist orbit. From the Americans, Saigon must await possible intervention in Vietnamese domestic governmental affairs before the Republican regime alters existing policies that have caused popular apathy in the struggle for survival of the Republic. Such a change in American policy is unlikely. No doubt their usual patience will result in the advancement of the community regardless of the outcome of the latest in the series of difficulties which Saigon has faced throughout its history.

^oThe annex is included in Chapter Five under the description of current operations of the phuong.