







PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE
NOVEMBER 2005

Findings from Survey and Focus Group Research

IFES
in Collaboration with
Democratic Initiatives Foundation

Applied Research Center
For Democracy And Elections

Bridging Theory and Practice

Funding Provided by

USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE – NOVEMBER 2005

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Фонд "Демократичні ініціативи"
Democratic Initiatives Foundation

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report details the findings from the latest IFES survey in Ukraine. IFES collaborated on this survey with Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF), based in Kyiv. This is the 14th public opinion poll conducted in Ukraine by IFES and some of the findings from earlier surveys will be referenced in this briefing paper. The two most recent surveys cited are the February 2005 post-election and September 2004 pre-election surveys. Both these surveys were conducted with 1265 respondents throughout Ukraine. The fieldwork for this most recent survey was conducted from November 2-15, 2005 with 1265 respondents throughout Ukraine. This sample comprised a national sample of 1,200 respondents and an over-sample of 65 respondents in Kyiv. The data has been weighted by region, age, and gender to be nationally representative for the adult (18+) population of Ukraine. The margin of error for a sample of this size is plus/minus 2.75%. In addition to the survey, IFES and DIF conducted eight focus groups in January 2006 with residents of Kyiv, Lviv, and Donetsk. Findings from the focus groups are provided in this report where appropriate. Fieldwork and data processing for both the survey and focus groups was implemented by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS).

Assessments of Socio-Political Situation in the Country

- More Ukrainians than not believe that the socio-political situation in the country has deteriorated rather than improved since the December 2004 second round of the presidential elections. A majority (57%) feel that there has been a great or slight decline in the economic situation in the country since the election, while only 13% believe that there has been an improvement in this area (26% think the economic situation is the same). Most Ukrainians also do not perceive an improvement in the fight against corruption since the December election. Slightly more than one in five (21%) feels that the there has been a great or slight improvement in the fight against corruption, whereas a majority of Ukrainians either feel that there has been no change (40%) or a decline in the fight against corruption (29%).

- These pessimistic sentiments also carry over to the political arena. Forty-three percent of Ukrainians believe that political stability in the country has declined since the December 2004 elections, compared to 14% who say it has improved, and a third (33%) who say it has remained the same. Slightly more Ukrainians believe that respect for human rights by the authorities has declined rather than improved since the election (27% versus 21%); while a plurality of 43% believe it has remained the same.

- Ukrainians have markedly different assessments of the state of Ukraine's relations with Russia and the West since the December election. A majority of Ukrainians (51%) believe that Ukraine's relations with Russian have declined since the December election compared to 11% who believe that they have improved. On the other hand, 38% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine's relations with western countries have improved compared to 9% who think that they have declined. A little more than a third in each case (37% for relations with Russia, 35% for relations with western countries) believes that relations have neither improved nor declined.

- While positive assessments of the demonstrations surrounding the Orange revolution still outnumber negative assessments, there has been a slight decline in positive assessments since the February 2005 survey. In this survey, 59% of Ukrainians strongly or somewhat agree that the use of demonstrations was a legitimate exercise of democratic rights. In the

February survey, 70% agreed with this statement. Fifty-eight percent in this survey agree that the demonstrations raised valid concerns about the fairness of the November 2005 second-round elections, compared to 65% in the February survey. Fewer Ukrainians also stress that the demonstrations played a role in furthering democracy in Ukraine (48% compared to 62% in February 2005 survey).

- Overall, the majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the economic and political situation in the country. More than four in five Ukrainians (83%) say that they are very or somewhat dissatisfied with the economic situation in the country, an increase in dissatisfaction from 75% in the October 2004 survey. More than three-quarters (76%) say they are dissatisfied with the political situation in the country, compared to 71% in October 2004. Seventy-three percent of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with both the economic and political situation in the country, while only 8% are satisfied with both.

- Forty-two percent of Ukrainians say that their family's economic situation is worse now than one year ago, while only 14% say that it is better. This represents a departure from the October 2004 survey where 26% stated that their family's economic situation had gotten better over the past year, and 27% said it had gotten worse. Ukrainians are also less optimistic about the future than in the October 2004 survey. In this survey, 14% believe that their family's economic situation will be better in one year, 24% think it will be worse, and 28% think it will remain the same. In the October 2004 survey, 22% thought their family's economic situation would get better and 14% thought it would get worse.

- Ukrainians generally do not perceive a difference in the pace of economic reforms in this year's survey compared to the October 2004 survey. Overall, 41% believe that economic reforms are moving too slowly (39% in 2004), 8% believe they are occurring at the right pace (14% in 2004), 5% believe they are occurring too quickly (4% in 2004), and 27% believe they are not occurring at all (22% in 2004).

Attitudes toward Politics and Political System

- Given a series of statements that could define what it means to live in a democracy, Ukrainians most often said the living in a democracy means the protection of human rights (57%), that everyone has work (42%), freedom of speech (41%), fair and consistent enforcement of the laws (40%), no official corruption (38%), freedom to vote (35%), and that retirees are looked after by the state (33%).

- In this survey, 26% of Ukrainians say that Ukraine is a democracy, compared to 50% who say that Ukraine is not a democracy. Compared to the October 2004 survey, these opinions represent a slight improvement as 59% in that survey said that Ukraine is not a democracy and 23% said it was. But opinions on this survey represent a decline in positive sentiment from the February 2005 survey in which 30% said that Ukraine is a democracy and 40% indicated it was not a democracy.

- Along with a decrease in the opinion that Ukraine is a democracy since the February 2005 survey, respondents on the November 2005 survey are also less likely to state that ordinary Ukrainians can influence political decision-making. Less than a quarter (23%) agrees that people like them can have influence on decisions made by the government, down from 30% in the February survey. There is higher agreement that voting gives ordinary people influence over decision-making (37%) but 53% disagree with this sentiment. This is a

reversal of opinions in the February survey where 53% agreed that voting influences decision-making and 40% disagree with this statement.

- On a positive note, the experience of the Orange revolution has not led to negative impressions of popular actions among the majority of Ukrainians. Sixty-eight percent of Ukrainians disagree with the statement that greater involvement by Ukrainian citizens in politics will lead to chaos and instability. Just 13% agree with this statement.

- When Ukrainians are asked whether they oppose or support President Yuschenko's dismissal of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko, there is a near split in public opinion with 40% saying they support her dismissal and 36% saying they oppose her dismissal. Those who support Tymoshenko's dismissal cite the ineffectiveness of her government, rising prices, lowered pensions, and her lack of integrity as reasons why they support her dismissal. Those who oppose her dismissal say that her government was effective and was going after corrupt elements in society, and many of these respondents say that Tymoshenko was impeded in her work.

- A plurality of Ukrainians (33%) says that the removal of Tymoshenko from office has decreased their confidence in the government. Thirty-one percent say that this has had no effect on their level of confidence in the government and 13% say that it has increased their level of confidence. Among those who oppose Tymoshenko's removal from office, 66% say their confidence in the government has decreased. Among those who support the removal, 42% say their level of confidence in the government remains unchanged and 28% say their level of confidence has increased.

- There has been a loss of confidence in national-level institutions and leaders since the February 2005 survey. The percent professing a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the president has fallen from 65% in the February survey to 46% in this survey. Forty-seven percent say they do not have much or any confidence in the president. Confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers has fallen from 57% to 36%, with a majority (55%) now saying this lack confidence in the cabinet. Confidence has also fallen for the *Verkhovna Rada*, from 54% in February to 37% in this survey. A majority (54%) still say they have confidence in the military, although this is a decline from 65% in the February survey.

Elections

- When asked for their likelihood of voting in the March 2006 parliamentary elections, 60% of Ukrainians say that they are very likely to vote in these elections and 25% say they are somewhat likely to vote. A majority of all major sub-groups in society say that they hare very likely to vote in the elections.

- While the majority of Ukrainians say that they are likely to vote in the March 2006 elections, there is a split in opinions on whether these elections will be fair. Thirty-eight percent of Ukrainians say that the election will be completely or somewhat free and fair, while 34% think that the March election will to be very or at all free and fair. These opinions represent a significant change from opinions in the February survey on the fairness of the December 2004 second round of the presidential election. In that survey, 57% of Ukrainians thought the December second round election was fair while 25% thought it was not fair.

- Along with a decline in the perceived overall fairness of elections, this survey also sees a decline in confidence in several aspects of the election process in Ukraine compared to opinions expressed in the February 2005 survey on the December second round of the presidential election. In this survey, 38% of Ukrainians agree that the results of elections accurately reflect the way people voted in an election while 44% disagree. In the February survey, 67% thought that the election results for the December 2004 second round accurately reflected the way people voted in that election. In this survey, 47% of respondents think that elections in Ukraine are competently administered. This compares with 68% in the February survey who thought the December 2004 second round election was competently administered.

- One area in which a high percentage of Ukrainians still profess confidence is in the role played by election observers. Two-thirds or more of all Ukrainians believe that the presence of each of domestic, international, and political observers has a positive impact on the fairness of the election process. While 59% believe that the media is thorough in its coverage of all parties and candidates, this does represent a drop from 72% in the February survey who expressed this sentiment about the December 2004 second round of the election.

- Fifty-six percent of Ukrainians state that they are informed about the electoral process in Ukraine, but there is less information on political developments in the country. Only 30% of Ukrainians say that they receive enough information about political developments to make a wise choice when voting. Thirty-eight percent say that they receive barely enough information to make a wise choice and 23% say they receive little or no information to make a wise choice when voting.

- Respondents on the survey were asked to name the party or bloc they would vote for in the parliamentary election if the election was to take place the following Sunday. Nineteen percent named the Party of Regions led by Viktor Yanukovych, 13% named Our Ukraine, 11% the Tymoshenko bloc, 4% each named the Communist party and the Socialist party, and 3% named the National party. It should be noted that 35% do not know or do not have enough information to make a choice yet. The Party of Regions has its core strength in Eastern and Southern Ukraine while both Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc are popular in Western and West-Central Ukraine.

Local Governance

- While there has been a deterioration of confidence in national-level officials and institutions since the February 2005 survey, this is not the case for local-level officials. Roughly the same percentage of Ukrainians as in February say that they have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in their city/village council (48%), while 42% lack confidence. A majority (51%) profess confidence in their mayors. Similar percentages also believe that these officials are effective in their work. Forty-nine percent have this opinion of their council (38% do not), and 52% of their mayors (37% do not).

- Twenty-two percent of all Ukrainians say that they have contacted local officials before to address an issue or help solve a problem. Rural residents are much more likely report having contacted local officials than residents of urban areas (32% versus 17%). Among those who have not contacted officials in the past, 36% have had no need to contact officials, while 29% say that they resolve their problems themselves. Twenty-one percent

have not contacted local officials because they do not think it will result in anything, and 12% say that they do not trust local officials.

- Among those who contacted local officials, 59% say they received a response from the official while 23% say they received a partial response. Eighteen percent did not receive any response. Fifty-nine percent of those who received a response say that they were satisfied with the response. Forty percent were not satisfied with the response.

- Respondents to the survey were asked whether they had seen an improvement, deterioration, or no change to three services provided by local governments. Sixteen percent have seen an improvement in their water supply over the past year, 13% have seen deterioration, and 61% have seen no change. Eleven percent have seen an improvement in their district heating, 13% have seen a decline, and 60% have seen no change. Twenty-four percent of those asked about their housing maintenance have seen a deterioration in this service compared to only 6% who seen an improvement. Forty-six percent have seen no change.

I. OPINIONS ON CURRENT SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY

This November survey of public opinion in Ukraine finds the majority of Ukrainians dissatisfied with the socio-political environment in the country. More Ukrainians believe that there has been a decline rather than an improvement in important aspects of the political and economic situation in Ukraine since the December 2004 second round of the presidential election. This dissatisfaction results in more Ukrainians saying that the country is on the wrong path than the percentage who say that Ukraine is on the right path.

Assessment of Socio-Political Situation

Three-quarters or more of all Ukrainians say that they are dissatisfied with the economic and political situation in the country, while a majority is dissatisfied with the foreign policy of the country (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Level of Satisfaction with Socio-Political Situation



"Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with each of the following? (n=1265)

The level of dissatisfaction in the country is at the same or somewhat higher level than that observed in the October 2004 IFES survey fielded right before the first round of the presidential election. This data highlights the relative ineffectiveness of the Yuschenko-Tymoshenko government to allay socio-political concerns during its time in power.

While dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation in the country is widespread, dissatisfaction with foreign policy exposes the regional cleavages that drive public opinion on many of the major issues in Ukraine. Residents of the eastern and southern regions (70% each) of are much more likely to say that they are dissatisfied with Ukrainian foreign policy than those in the western region (37%).

Poor Evaluations of Performance on Key Issues since December 2004

The Orange Revolution led to great hopes among the Ukrainian population that the country's performance in various key issues would improve in the future. In the February 2005 survey

conducted by IFES, respondents were asked whether they expected to see an improvement, decline or no change in these issues over the next two years. Sixty percent or more of all Ukrainians felt that the next two years would bring improvements in the economic situation in the country, in the fight against corruption, in the respect for human rights, and in relations with the west. A majority also felt that there would be an improvement in political stability in the country. The percent who expected an improvement vastly outnumbered those who expected a decline in all the sectors save one (relations with Russia).

IFES repeated the same question on this latest survey and asked respondents to evaluate whether there had been an improvement, decline, or no change in these issues since the December elections. The data in Figure 2 reveals that the positive expectations for change in February have been replaced by negative perceptions of actual events in the November survey.

Figure 2. Evaluation of Change in Key Sectors since December 2004 (in %)



"I will now read to you a list of important issues for Ukraine. Please tell me whether there has been an improvement, decline, or no change in each of these issues since the December 26 presidential elections. " (n=1265)

For all but one of the issues listed in Figure 2 (relations with the west), the percentage who say that there has been a decline outnumbers the percentage who say that there has been an improvement. The largest such difference is observed for perceptions of the economic situation. Fifty-seven percent believe that there has been a decline in the economic situation in Ukraine since the December elections versus only 13% who have seen an improvement.

This survey was fielded a month after the dismissal of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and her government by President Viktor Yuschenko, and it is not surprising that many more Ukrainians say that there has been a decline in political stability since the December elections than the percentage who say that there has been an improvement (43% versus 14%). Even though the survey was fielded before the emergence of the natural gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, many more Ukrainians even at this time felt that relations with Russia had declined rather than improved (51% versus 11%).

The fact that more Ukrainians believe that 70% of Ukrainians believe there has been a decline or no change in the fight against corruption is a telling indictment of the ineffectiveness of the governments appointed by President Yuschenko. The promise to fight corruption was one of the key rallying cries for the Orange revolution, and the Ukrainian public's negative assessment of this effort is a particularly negative indicator of the government's performance.

Those who voted for Yuschenko in the December 2004 second round of the presidential election are more likely to have positive evaluations of performance on these issues than those who voted for Viktor Yanukovych. But even among Yuschenko voters, more are likely to say that there has been a decline on many of these issues rather than an improvement.

Opinions on Economic Situation in Ukraine

Pessimism about the economic situation in the country is one of the primary factors in the negative evaluations of the socio-political environment in the country. When Ukrainians are asked to assess the current economic situation in the country, 86% describe it as bad or very bad, while 10% describe it as good or very good. Positive opinions of the economic situation have declined compared to a pre-election survey conducted by IFES in October 2004. In that survey, 76% described the economic situation as bad while 19% described it as good.

When asked whether their family's economic situation has gotten better or worse compared to one year ago, many more Ukrainians say that their family's economic situation has gotten worse over the past year than the percentage who say their family's economic situation has gotten better (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Family's Economic Situation Over Past Year (Trend)



"Is your family's current economic situation better or worse than one year ago?" (n=1265)

Forty-three percent of Ukrainians say that their family's economic situation has gotten worse over the past year, compared to only 14% who say it has gotten better. The percentage of Ukrainians who say that their family's economic situation is better has fallen from 26% in October 2004, while the percentage who says their family's economic situation is worse has risen from 27%.

Ukrainians are also more likely to be pessimistic rather than optimistic about economic conditions over the next year. Nearly a quarter of Ukrainians (24%) believe that their family's economic situation will get worse over the course of the next year, compared to 14% who believe that it will get better. Twenty-eight percent expect their family's economic situation to remain the same over the next year.

Concerns about Whether Ukraine is on Right Track

The generally negative perceptions of both the political and economic situation in the country have implications for Ukrainians' opinions on the overall direction of the country. Comparison of

the findings from this survey to those from the February 2005 survey shows that there has been a significant change in opinion on the question of whether Ukraine is on the right track (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Ukraine in the Right Direction (Trend)



"Do you think the results of the Dec. 26, 2004 Presidential elections have place Ukraine on the right track toward stability and prosperity in the future, or do you think that the results have placed Ukraine on a path toward instability and chaos in the future?" (n=1265)

While the percentage of Ukrainians who say that the country is on the right track has declined by more than half from February to November (43% to 21%), the percentage who say it is on the wrong track has increased nearly three-fold (12% to 33%). There is still a large percentage of Ukrainians (33%) who do not have an opinion on this question.

It is interesting to note the change in opinions on this question between those who voted for Yuschenko and Yanukovych in the December 2004 second round elections. In the February 2005 survey, the majority of Yuschenko voters were confident that the December 2004 election had placed Ukraine on the path to stability (68%), with only 2% saying it had not. By contrast, a plurality of Yanukovych voters were unsure about the future direction of Ukraine (40% don't know), while 29% thought Ukraine was on the wrong track and 7% thought it was on the right track.

In the November survey, a majority of Yanukovych voters are not confident that Ukraine is on the wrong path (66%). Yuschenko voters, on the other hand, have become more uncertain. While 38% of Yuschenko voters still think the country is on the right path, the percent who think it's on the wrong path has risen from 2% to 12%. In addition, many more Yuschenko voters are not uncertain about the direction of the country with 36% replying "don't know" to the question. This change in opinion over time among Yuschenko and Yanukovych voters echoes the perceived changes that have taken place in Ukraine between the two IFES surveys in February and November 2005.

II. OPINIONS ON LEADERS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORANGE REVOLUTION

There has been a decline in confidence in many national-level institutions and leaders since the February survey, and few governmental institutions are seen as being effective by the Ukrainian population. A majority is still supportive of the goals of the demonstrations surrounding the Orange Revolution, but many of these people are dissatisfied with the current situation in the country.

Confidence in Public Institutions and Leaders

The discussion in the previous chapter highlighted the dissatisfaction with the current socio-political situation in the country among a large percentage of Ukrainians. This dissatisfaction has obvious implications for the confidence that Ukrainians have in their governing institutions and leaders. Figure 5 below indicates that confidence in most national-level institutions and leaders has decline markedly since the February 2005 IFES survey in Ukraine.

Figure 5. Percent Professing Great Deal/Fair Amount of Confidence Trend (February to November 2005)



" I am now going to ask you about several government institutions and leaders, as well as other groups in society. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them." (n=1265)

Comparison of the percentage expressing a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the institutions between the February and November survey shows that there has been a large decline in confidence in central-level institutions. The percent professing confidence in President Yuschenko has fallen 21 points from 67% to 46%, for the cabinet of ministers from 57% to 36%, and for the *Rada* from 54% to 37%. By contrast, confidence in local-level institutions (local councils, mayors) has either stayed at about the same level or increased.

Opinions on the effectiveness of Yuschenko are split according to partisan affiliations. Among those who voted for Yuschenko in the December 2004 second round of the presidential election, 65% have confidence in him while 28% do not. Among those who voted for his opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, 23% have confidence in President Yuschenko and 72% do not. These partisan differences also characterize the evaluation of the *Rada* and the cabinet of

ministers. It should be noted that although the percentage of Ukrainians expressing confidence in the cabinet and the *Rada* has fallen from the February to the November survey, this percentage is still significantly higher than the historical trend in IFES surveys. In most IFES surveys in Ukraine, these two institutions have only elicited expressions of confidence from 15% to 20% of the population.

In addition to a lack of confidence in governing institutions, Ukrainians are also ambivalent about the effectiveness of many of these institutions. When asked to rate effectiveness of various institutions, as well as other non-governmental institutions, few institutions stand out for being seen as being effective by a clear majority of Ukrainians (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Effectiveness of Governmental and Non-Governmental Institutions (in %)



"And in your opinion, how effective are these institutions and leaders in carrying out the duties that are their responsibility?" (n=1265)

The media is most likely to be rated as being effective in carrying out its duties, and a majority also see as the military and their local mayors in being effective in their duties. Ukrainians are either ambivalent or negative about the effectiveness of other institutions. Slightly more think that the president is effective than those who think he is not effective (49% versus 43%). Ukrainians are split on the effectiveness of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko with 46% seeing her as being effective and 43% ineffective. When asked about current PM Yekhanurov (he was still in office at the time of the survey), more Ukrainians than not think he is effective (34% versus 22%), but a large percentage do not know enough about him to make that evaluation.

Participants in the focus groups were asked whether they have confidence in the current government to address the key issues facing the country. Some participants, particularly in Kyiv, expressed concern that the current government does not have a professional team that is able to overcome differences in political outlook. Most participants believe that the current government cannot do much because of the approaching election and because of the political tactics being employed by the various parties as the elections approach. They believe that real action will have to await the government that is formed after the March parliamentary elections.

Opinions on Orange Revolution

With dissatisfaction with the socio-political situation at a high level, and with decreased levels of confidence in many of the actors who were instrumental in the orange revolution, it would be appropriate to assume that these shifts in public opinion have impacted the support for the revolution that was plainly evident in the February 2005 IFES survey in Ukraine. The data from this survey indicates that there has been a decline in the percentage of Ukrainians who think that the orange revolution would have a positive impact, but even with this decline a majority still supports the goals of the orange revolution.

In both the February and November 2005 surveys, Ukrainians were asked to agree or disagree with three positive statements about the goals of the demonstrations that were the central event of the orange revolution. Figure 7 indicates that while there has been a decline in the percentage of Ukrainians who agree with these statements, a majority or near-majority of Ukrainians still have positive opinions of the demonstrations.

Figure 7. Support for Orange Revolution Demonstrations (% who Agree)



Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with these statements: (n=1265)
"The use of demonstrations was a legitimate exercise of democratic rights by those organizing and participating in the demonstrations."
"The demonstrations raised valid concerns about the fairness of the Nov. 21 second-round of the presidential elections."
"The demonstrations have played a role in furthering democracy in Ukraine."

About six in ten Ukrainians still agree that the demonstrations in November and December 2004 were a legitimate exercise of rights by the demonstrators, and that they raised valid concerns about the fairness of the Nov. 21 second round of the presidential elections. Fewer (48%) agree that the demonstrations played a role in furthering democracy, but they still far outnumber the percentage that disagrees that the demonstration have helped to further democracy (29%; 23% don't know).

Opinions on this question show a partisan and regional split. Those who voted for Yuschenko in the December 2004 second round and those in Western Ukraine and Kyiv are highly likely to

agree with these statements, while those who voted for Yanukovych and those in Eastern and Southern Ukraine are highly likely to disagree with these statements.

While there is still majority support for the goals of the demonstrations that were an integral part of the revolution, there is far less satisfaction with the results of the revolution. The previous chapter already discussed the drop from the February to the November survey in the percentage of Ukrainians who believe that the country is going in the right direction and the accompanying increase in the percentage who believe that the country is going in the wrong path. Respondents on this survey, as well as on the February survey were also asked to name the beneficiaries of the orange revolution: all Ukrainians, only some groups, or no one. The percentage of Ukrainians who believe that all Ukrainians benefited from the revolution has declined by almost half from the February to the November survey (53% February, 30% November). The percentage of Ukrainians who think that only some Ukrainians benefited from the revolution has stayed at about the same level (30% February, 27% November). The percentage who reply "Don't know" has increased from 8% to 27%, signalling ambivalence about the benefits of the revolution. It is notable that even among those who voted for Yuschenko, 28% reply "Don't know" on this question.

Socio-Political Profile of Ukrainian Population with Respect to Orange Revolution

The orange revolution was an important event in Ukraine's short democratic history that split the country along partisan, regional, and ethnic lines. Due to the polarity of opinions on the revolution on the February survey, IFES was able to combine responses on questions asking about opinions on the goals of the revolution and the expected impact of the revolution to create a profile of the Ukrainian population. The profile in the February survey was as follows:

- Revolutionary Enthusiasts (48%) – Strongly supported revolution and expected positive impacts
- Revolutionary Opponents (23%) – Strongly opposed to revolution, did not expect positive impacts
- Revolutionary Agnostics (29%) – Somewhat supported revolution, not sure of impacts

IFES repeated the same questions on this November survey and again created a socio-political profile of the Ukrainian revolution. The results show that there has been a significant change in the Ukrainian polity in the time from the February to the November survey.

Figure 8. Profile of Population



Figure 8 shows the profile of the Ukrainian population according to the data from the November survey. Instead of three groups in the population, there are now four groups. The biggest change from the February to the November survey is the break-up of the 'revolutionary enthusiasts' from the February survey into two groups: 'committed enthusiasts' and 'dissatisfied supporters'. Twenty-nine percent of the Ukrainian population can now be described as 'committed enthusiasts'. This part of the population has the same profile as the enthusiasts in the February survey. Nearly a quarter of the population is now classified as 'dissatisfied supporters.' This part of the population still supports the goals of the orange revolution but is dissatisfied with what has happened in the country since the December 2004 elections. As we will

see later on, this group is critical in determining the fortunes of the top three political parties in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the country leaves them open to appeals from not only the component parties of the orange coalition but also from the Party of Regions, the party that most stridently opposed the orange revolution.

There has been little change in the number of those opposed to the revolution, the committed opponents (25%) from February to November, and in those who are not committed either way, the agnostics (22%).

Opinions on Changes in Government

The November survey took place just a month after President Yuschenko dismissed the government of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. This break in the orange coalition represented a significant development in light of the upcoming parliamentary elections. To gauge popular opinion on this development, respondents to the survey were asked whether they supported or opposed Yuschenko's move to dismiss Tymoshenko from her post (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Opinions on Dismissal of Prime Minister Tymoshenko



"Do you support or oppose the dismissal of Yulia Tymoshenko from the post of prime minister?"

Figure 8 details the opinions on the national level and also compares the opinions of those who voted for Yuschenko and Yanukovych in the December 2004 second round of the presidential election. On a national level, there is a split in public opinion on Tymoshenko's dismissal, with 40% supporting the dismissal and 36% opposing it. However, there is a significant difference of opinion between those who voted for Yuschenko and those who voted for Yanukovych. A majority of Yuschenko voters oppose the dismissal while a majority if Yanukovych voters support it. This turning of Yuschenko supporters against one of his key decisions is a key development for his party, Our Ukraine, and its prospects in the March parliamentary election.

After this survey was fielded, but before the fielding of the focus groups, several parties in parliament engineered the dismissal of the Yekhanurov government that had been appointed by

President Yuschenko after the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government. This move plunged Ukraine into another uncertain situation, an uncertainty which will not be resolved till after the March parliamentary elections. Participants in the focus groups were asked for their opinions on the dissolution of the Yekhanurov government. Most participants in the focus groups, especially those in Kyiv and Lviv, believed that the dismissal was a mistake and was prompted by political posturing on the part of parties like the Party of Regions, the Social Democratic Party, and the Tymoshenko Bloc. Most participants believe that the dismissal has created uncertainty in Ukraine and is not good for the stability of the country, and they squarely placed the blame on the *Rada*. A minority of participants believed that this move was initially precipitated by Yuschenko's dismissal of the Tymoshenko government and he must share some of the blame. Since these events took place after the survey was fielded, opinions on this issue could not be queried in the survey and thus we cannot say for sure if the opinions expressed in the focus group represent the distribution of opinions in Ukraine.

III. OPINIONS ON VOTING AND ELECTIONS

There has been a decrease since the February survey in the belief that voting provides influence over decision-making and elected officials for ordinary Ukrainians. There has also been a decrease in the level of confidence in the election process in the country, and there is a split in Ukrainian public opinion on whether the March elections will be fair. More than three-quarters of Ukrainians say that they are likely to vote in this election, and the Party of Regions is the most often mentioned party when respondents are asked to state their party preference.

Opinions on Influence of Voting

The decreased levels of satisfaction with the socio-political situation in the country since the February survey has resulted not only in greater pessimism about the impacts of the orange revolution, but also in a decrease in the belief that elections and voting can provide influence to Ukrainian citizens. In the February survey, when respondents were asked whether elected officials would now be more responsive to their constituents than in the past, a clear majority had indicated that this would be the case. But this enthusiasm for the power of the vote has declined in the November survey (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Agree/Disagree: Elected Officials Will Be More Responsive



Agree/Disagree: "Elected officials in Ukraine will be more responsive to the needs of their constituents in the future than they have been in the past." (n=1265)

In February, a majority agreed that elected officials would be more responsive in the future, but this has declined to 27% in the November survey. The percentage who disagrees with this statement has increased from 29% in February to 49% in this survey. Among the four groups discussed in the socio-political profile of Ukrainians in the last chapter, the revolutionary enthusiasts are the only group among whom a majority still believe that elected officials will be more responsive in the future. By contrast, among dissatisfied supporters of the orange revolution only 6% hold this opinion while 73% disagree that elected officials will be more

responsive in the future. This data indicates that a large percentage of Ukrainians who may have thought that the orange revolution would instill more accountability in elected officials may have lost faith in this belief.

The decrease in belief that elected officials will become more accountable is also reflected in the fact that far fewer Ukrainians in the November survey agree that voting gives them influence over decision-making in Ukraine than the percentage who agreed with this statement in the February survey (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Agree/Disagree: Voting Gives Influence, Trend



Agree/ Disagree: "Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country."

Figure 10 presents trend data from IFES survey from 1999 onwards for this question. Up till the September 2003 survey, a clear majority in each survey had disagreed that voting gave them influence over decision-making in Ukraine. The pre-election survey conducted by Ukraine in October 2004 was the first time that those who agreed that voting gave them influence were not outnumbered by those who disagreed with this statement. Many Ukrainians correctly saw the 2004 presidential elections as a pivotal event in their country's young democracy and felt that they could influence decision-making in the country through voting.

The February survey was the first survey in which a clear majority agreed that voting gives them influence, but this opinion did not last for long and the November survey reverts to a familiar pattern where a majority of Ukrainians disagree that voting gives them influence over decision-making. Those who voted for Yuschenko in the December 2004 second round of the presidential election are split on the influence of voting (43% agree, 45% disagree) but the vast majority of Yanukovych voters disagree (70%).

The majority of participants in the focus group discussion echo the opinion expressed in the November survey. Most of the focus group participants are skeptical that it is possible to influence decision-making through voting. Many expressed the opinion that Ukrainians can only influence decision-making by acting as a group, whether when voting or through other types of activities. Many participants felt that the orange revolution had at least made people aware that that if they acted as a group through demonstrations, strikes, or other collective action, they

could influence events in the country. Participants in the focus groups in all three cities believe that they now have a blueprint for collective action that can affect change.

Evaluation of Election Process

In addition to a loss of confidence in citizens' ability to influence events through voting, there has also been a decrease in confidence in the election process in Ukraine since the February survey. Respondents to both the February and November surveys were asked to agree or disagree with several statements about the election process in Ukraine, with all the statements expressing positive sentiments about the election process. Figure 12 indicates that the level of agreement with these positive statements about the election process has fallen significantly since the February survey.

Figure 12. Opinions on Various Facets of Election Process



"Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements."

The figure above shows that there has been a decline in those who agree with many of the statements about the election process. Most importantly, the percentage of Ukrainians who agree that the results of elections reflect the actual votes cast has fallen from 71% to 38%. Residents of the eastern region of the country are far less likely to agree with this statement than those in the west.

There is a little less confidence in the media coverage of the elections. The percentage that says the media provides objective coverage has fallen from 72% to 46%. The percentage that says the media provides thorough coverage has fallen from 80% to 58%. The decrease in perceived thoroughness and objectivity of the media coverage is one reason why far fewer agree that they are informed about the election process in the country (87% February to 56% November).

There is still a high level of confidence in election observers. More than 65% in each case believe that domestic, political party, and international observers have a positive impact on the fairness of elections in Ukraine.

On the subject of election administration, there has been a large decline in agreement with the statement that elections are competently administered. In this case, there is little difference between those in the eastern and western parts of the country. When asked about the Central Election Commission (CEC), most of the focus group respondents state that they generally have positive impressions of the CEC. Many participants did state, however, that the CEC tends to be swayed by the government in power and does not always act in a non-partisan manner. This is especially the case for focus group participants in Donetsk who feel that the current CEC is partial toward the Yuschenko administration.

Still, many of the participants also believe that the present CEC has done a better job in preparation for the March elections than previous commissions and they expect this election to be the fairest that Ukraine has ever had. Many say that although there might be some falsification of election results, it will be on a much lower level than previous elections because the Ukrainian public is focused on the election, and also because the technical competency of the CEC has improved. Focus group participants had these opinions for both the parliamentary and local elections. But many participants are also worried that the composition of the regional and polling station election commissions, which for the most part did not change following the orange revolution, may still cause problems as officials in these two levels of election commissions may try to manipulate the results of the voting. But as in the case of the CEC, most participants believe that there is too much attention on the upcoming election for widespread falsification to take place even at the local and regional level.

This regional disparity in opinions on the fairness of the upcoming elections is also reflected in the survey responses. Overall, Ukrainians are split as to the fairness of the parliamentary elections (Figure 13).

Figure 13. Expected Fairness of Parliamentary Elections



"How free and fair do you expect the March 2006 elections to be?" (n=1265)

Thirty-eight percent of Ukrainians expect the election to be very or somewhat fair, while 34% expect it to be not very fair or not fair at all. There are significant differences of opinion on this question by region. Among those living in the eastern part of the country, 51% believe the

election will not be fair while 25% believe that it will be fair. Those living in the western region and Kyiv are more likely to think that the election will be fair (47% and 46%, respectively) than the percentage who say it will not be fair (23% and 30%, respectively). There are also partisan differences in opinion, as 52% of Yuschenko voters believe the election will be fair compared to only 24% of Yanukovych voters.

Likelihood of Voting

Despite the fact that a large segment of the population is skeptical about the integrity of the election process, the vast majority of Ukrainians say that they are likely to vote in the parliamentary elections. Sixty percent say that they are very likely to vote in the election and another 25% are somewhat likely to vote. There is little difference by region or partisan affiliation in the likelihood to vote in the parliamentary election. Among the few Ukrainians who say they are not likely to vote (7%), more than half say that it's because they do not trust politicians while slightly more than 10% say that they do not like any of the parties contesting the election.

Seventy-six percent of Ukrainians report that they are registered to vote, while 8% are not sure and say that they may be registered. Three percent say that they are not registered to vote and 12% give no response.

When asked whether they receive enough information to make a wise choice when voting, 28% of Ukrainians say that they receive enough information, 36% say they receive barely enough, 19% say they receive very little information, and 2% say they receive no information. Among those very likely to vote, 75% say they receive enough or barely enough information while 19% say they receive little or no information. Among those somewhat likely to vote, 58% say they receive enough or barely enough information while 29% say they receive little or no information. Those living the west-central part of the country are most likely to say that they receive little or no information to help make a wise choice when voting (30%), while those in the west (15%) are least likely to say this. Television is the more often-used source for information on the elections, with 71% mentioning private television channels and 53% mentioning state TV as a source. Local newspapers are mentioned by 49% while national newspapers are mentioned by 39%.

At the time of the survey in early to mid-November, when respondents were asked to name the party they would vote for if the election was held the following Sunday, the Party of Regions was mentioned most often (Figure 14 next page).

Figure 14. Party Preference



"If the elections to the Verkhovna Rada took place on this Sunday and the voting list included the following political parties [SHOW CARD], which of them would you vote for?" (n=1265)

The Party of Regions was mentioned by 19%, Our Ukraine by 13%, and the Tymoshenko Bloc by 11%. It should be noted that at the time of the survey 31% said that they did not have enough information to vote and another 4% said they don't know who they would vote for. There is little significant difference between those very likely or somewhat likely to vote on their support for various parties. Surveys conducted in Ukraine since this November survey have shown this undecided portion of the electorate shrinking, but have not shown much movement in the relative position of the top three parties and blocs in terms of preference. The Party of Regions is still expected to the top vote-getter in the election and Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko Bloc will vie for second place.

According to this November survey, there are definite patterns of party preference by region and by socio-political attitudes: The Party of Regions has its base of support in east and south, while Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko Bloc have their base of support in the west and in Kyiv. This finding continues to show the regional split in Ukraine. The data also indicates that Yuschenko voters in the presidential election are splitting their votes among the two largest components of the orange coalition. While 48% of those who voted for Yanukovych in December 2004 would vote for Party of Regions, those who voted for Yuschenko split their votes between Our Ukraine (25%) and Tymoshenko Bloc (19%).

Attitudes also differ by attitudes toward the orange revolution. Among Committed Enthusiasts for the Orange revolution, 32% would vote for Our Ukraine and 17% for Tymoshenko Bloc, while 29% are undecided .Among Dissatisfied Supporters of the revolution, 20% would vote for Party of Regions and 9% each for Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko Bloc. This is a key finding because dissatisfied supporters still support the goals of the revolution but many of them have moved away from supporting the orange parties because of their dissatisfaction with the situation in the

country. This is particularly the case in the eastern part of the country where 43% of this group would vote for the Party of Regions and only 4% support Our Ukraine or the Tymoshenko bloc.

Finally, party preference is also shaped by opinions on the current situation in Ukraine. Those who believe Ukraine is on path to stability primarily opt for Our Ukraine (31%) and Tymoshenko Bloc (19%), while those who believe Ukraine is on path to instability primarily opt for Party of Regions (38%).

Opinions on Political Parties

The focus group findings indicate that the primary reason that many people support a particular party is due to the party's leader. In the focus group discussions, most participants listed the party leader as the most important reason why they vote for a party. Even in most of the cases where participants cited particular issues, the party leader was a leading reason for their vote for a party. Most participants also reported that this is the same reason why they voted for particular parties in previous elections.

The party leader may be the most important reason for voting for a party, but most participants report that they can only name one or two other people on the voting list of the party other than the leader. Most participants said that they lack information on the individuals that make up the party lists, even for the three most prominent parties. Further, most of the participants say that they lack information on the platforms of the major parties competing in the election. This is despite the fact that many of the participants report that the parties provide free party propaganda to citizens. Cynicism seems to be the primary reason for a lack of information on party platforms, as many of the participants say that it is useless to know party platforms because they all promise the same thing and deliver little.

This cynicism about political parties is also evident in the survey data. When asked whether the major parties in Ukraine have proposals to address the issues impacting the country, only 13% say that most of the parties have clear proposals. Thirty-eight percent say that only some of the parties have clear proposal, 26% say that none of the parties have clear proposals, and 23% do not reply. The majority of Ukrainians also believe that political parties are self-interested as 53% say that the parties serve their own interests compared to only 9% who say that parties serve the interests of the Ukrainian people.

IV. ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY

A mix of political and economic meanings is attached to the concept of democracy in Ukraine. The percentage of Ukrainians who believe that Ukraine is not a democracy has increased since the February survey. Ukrainians lack confidence in the judicial system in the country, and a majority believes that major institutions have serious problems with corruption.

Meaning of Democracy

Respondents on this survey were give a series of 12 possible meanings of democracy and asked to pick up to five that they thought most signified what it means to live in a democracy. The 12 meaning were a mix of economic and political meanings attached to democracy, and each was mentioned with the frequency cited in Figure 15.

Figure 15. Meanings Attached to Democracy



"Listed on this card are several statements. Please pick any statement or statements that you think accurately define what it means for a country to be a democracy. You can choose up to five responses." (n=1265)

The most often cited meaning for democracy is the protection of human rights which was mentioned by 43%. Almost as many people mentioned that in a democracy, everyone has work (42%). Thus, of the top two reasons, one is political in nature and one is economic. The next two responses refer to political rights, the freedom of speech and fair enforcement of laws, while no official corruption is also mentioned by a large percentage of Ukrainians (38%). Thirty-three percent think that democracy means that retirees are looked after by the state and 24% believe that in a democracy, the state should support all who cannot work.

Rights central to a democracy such as the freedom of the press and the freedom of association are mentioned by fewer than 20% of Ukrainians. The figure above seems to indicate that for many Ukrainians the perceived economic and social welfare benefits of democracy are just as important as the political rights associated with democracy.

Decline in Perception that Ukraine is a Democracy

In the February 2005 IFES survey conducted in Ukraine after the orange revolution, there was a great deal of optimism not only because of the perceived impacts that the revolution would have on the socio-economic situation in the country, but also because of what the revolution meant for Ukrainian democracy. For this reason, the percentage of Ukrainians who felt that Ukraine is a democracy increased over previous IFES surveys in 2003 and 2004. But the findings from this survey indicate that half of all Ukrainians now believe that Ukraine is not a democracy, a substantial increase from the February survey (Figure 16).

Figure 16. Is Ukraine a Democracy?



In this survey, 50% say that Ukraine is not a democracy while 26% say that it is a democracy. The percentage saying Ukraine is not a democracy has increased by 10%, while the percentage saying that it is a democracy has decreased y 26%. As with opinions on other key issues in this survey, opinions on Ukrainian democracy are impacted by regional and partisan affiliations.

A majority of residents of the east and south are likely to say that Ukraine is not a democracy (67% and 58%, respectively), while few in these regions say that Ukraine is a democracy (9% and 19%, respectively). Forty percent of the residents of the western region are likely to say that Ukraine is a democracy while 33% do not believe that is the case. In Kyiv, 36% believe that Ukraine is a democracy but 49% do not think it is a democracy.

Those who voted for Yanukovych in the December second round of the presidential elections are far less likely to say that Ukraine is a democracy than those who voted for Yuschenko (12% versus 36%). A majority of Yanukovych voters believe that Ukraine is not a democracy (68%). Among Yuschenko voters, 38% believe that Ukraine is not a democracy.

As in previous IFES surveys, the likelihood of saying that Ukraine is a democracy decreases the more often respondents mention an economic meaning of democracy, and the likelihood of saying Ukraine is a democracy increases the more often respondents mention a political meaning of democracy. Dissatisfaction with the socio-economic situation in the country has

implications not only for confidence in pubic institutions and the direction of the country, but also on perceptions of democracy in Ukraine.

Opinions on Judicial Institutions

Referring back to Figure 14 where respondents are asked to attach a meaning to democracy, two of the top responses deal with law and order. These two responses are the respect for human rights and fair and consistent enforcement of laws. While these two aspects of the justice system are thought to represent the meaning of democracy by a significant percentage of Ukrainians, the lack of confidence exhibited by Ukrainians in their judicial institutions indicates that these aspects may not be the hallmark of the Ukrainian judicial system (Figure 17).

Figure 17. Confidence in Judicial Institutions



"How much do you trust each of the following judiciary and law enforcement bodies?" (n=1265)

For each of the institutions of the justice system, more Ukrainians say that they lack confidence in these institutions than the percentage who say that they have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in these institutions. The lack of confidence in judicial institutions increases with the proximity of judicial institutions to ordinary citizens. Thus, close to six in ten Ukrainians say that they lack confidence in the police, local courts, and public prosecutors. These institutions are are more likely to come in contact with ordinary citizens than the judicial institutions that do not come in contact with ordinary citizens (supreme court, constitutional court, and appeals court). This pattern of responses suggests that experience with the judicial system may be an important factor in the lack of confidence in the institutions that comprise this sector.

Seriousness of Corruption

The lack of confidence in the judicial system may partly be due to the perceived seriousness of corruption in the courts in Ukraine. Respondents to the survey were asked to assess the seriousness of corruption in several institutions in Ukraine. Similar to the findings on confidence in the judicial system, corruption is felt to be more serious among institutions with which ordinary citizens have relatively more contact than among institutions with which ordinary citizens have relatively less contact (Figure 18 next page).

Figure 18. Perceived Seriousness of Corruption among Select Institutions



"In your opinion, how serious is the problem of corruption at each of the following institutions -- is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?" (n=1265)

A majority in all cases believes that the institutions have serious problems with corruption. Institution with which ordinary citizens are likely to have frequent contact such as hospital, the police, courts, and educational institutions are felt to have the most serious problems with corruption. Revenue agencies such as the tax and customs authorities are also thought to have serious problems with corruption. While the central-level political institutions are less likely to be seen as having a serious problem with corruption, this may be because many Ukrainians are unaware of these institutions' activities. The percentage of respondents who say that they don't know about the seriousness of corruption in the central-level political institutions is significantly higher that the percentage of don't know responses for the other institutions.

V. LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Ukrainians are more likely to profess confidence in their local leaders than in national-level leaders. A majority is aware of Citizen Advisory Boards, but they are split on whether they influence the decisions of local governments. Most Ukrainians say that they have not seen changes in public services such as water supply and district heating over the past year. Only about a quarter of Ukrainians are aware of non-governmental organizations that are active in Ukraine, but more Ukrainians than not believe that these organizations are necessary for Ukraine. Ukrainians are more likely to have been engaged in civic activities than in the past.

Confidence in Local Institutions

In the discussion on confidence in institutions, local institutions were pointed out as being more likely to elicit confidence than national-level institutions. A majority of Ukrainians (51%) expressed confidence in their mayors, while 48% expressed confidence in their city or village council. In both these cases, residents of rural areas are more likely to express confidence in these institutions than those in urban areas.

Local institutions were also among the most highly rated institutions in terms of effectiveness. Fifty-two percent of Ukrainians believe that their mayor is effective in his or her duties, while 48% believe that their city or village council is effective in its duties. Rural residents are more likely to rate these institutions as being effective than urban residents.

Citizen Advisory Boards

The percentage of Ukrainians who say that their city or village local self-government has citizen advisory boards has stayed at 53% from the October 2004 survey to this survey (Figure 19).

Figure 19. Awareness of Citizen Advisory Boards, Trend



"Does your city/village local self-government have any citizen advisory boards?"

The percentage of Ukrainians aware of CABs in their community has increased from 39% in 2002 to 53% in this latest survey. Residents of the east-central (59%) and southern (57%)

regions of the country are most likely to be aware of the CABs, while those in the western region (47%) and eastern region (49%) are least likely to be aware.

CABs are intended to provide feedback from citizens to local government officials as the officials consider decisions on important issues facing the country. The data from the survey indicates that those Ukrainians aware of CABs are split on their effectiveness in influencing the decisions of their local self-government. Overall, 39% believe that the CABs are ineffective in influencing local government decision and 33% believe they are effective. Twenty-eight percent of those aware of CABs do not have an opinion on this question.

Residents of rural areas are more likely to say that their CAB is effective in influencing the decision of the local self-government (43%) than those in urban areas (28%). Residents of the western region are most likely to say that their CABs are effective (43%) while residents of the eastern region are most likely to say that they are ineffective (48%).

Contact with Local Officials

Less than a quarter of Ukrainians say that they have contacted an official in their local self-government to help with an issue or problem. Residents of rural areas are more likely to have contacted local officials than those in urban areas (32% versus 18%). Regionally, residents of Kyiv were least likely to have contacted a local official (13%). Among those who have contacted local officials in the past, 59% said that the local official they contacted responded to them. Twenty-three percent say that the official did not respond while 18% said that they received a partial response.

Figure 20. Satisfaction with Official's Response



"How satisfied were you with the response of the official?" (n=229)

Most of those received a response were satisfied with the response they received (59%). Forty percent were dissatisfied with the official's response. Residents of rural areas are more likely to be satisfied with officials' responses (68%) than those in urban areas (50%).

Among those who have not contacted officials in their local self-government in the past, many say that this is because they did not need to contact the officials. Thirty-four percent say that they have not had a need to contact public officials, and 27% say that they resolve their

problems themselves. But there is a significant percentage that expresses skepticism about the officials. Twenty-one percent say that approaching local officials will not solve anything, and 12% say that they do not trust local officials.

Quality of Local Services

When asked whether they had seen an improvement, decline, or no change in the quality of some specific services provided by their local governments, most Ukrainians have not seen much change (Figure 21).

Figure 21. Change in Quality of Services



A majority have not seen a change in the quality of the water supply and district heating, while 46% say this is the case for housing maintenance. In the case of housing maintenance (asked only in urban and semi-urban areas), 24% think that the quality of the service has deteriorated while 6% say it has improved. In the case of both water supply and district heating, the percentages of Ukrainians who say these services have deteriorated or improved are relatively equal. For each of these services, residents of the eastern part of Ukraine are most likely to say that services have deteriorated. For the water supply and district heating, residents of urban areas are much more likely than those in rural areas to say that the services have deteriorated.

Awareness and Perception of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Despite the role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the events of November and December 2004, awareness of NGOs has not increased over the past year. In the October 2004 survey conducted by IFES, 19% of Ukrainians reported being aware of an NGO that are active in Ukraine. In this survey, 18% of Ukrainians say that they are aware of an NGO active in Ukraine. Fifty-six percent are not aware of any NGOs active in Ukraine, 10% do not reply, and 16% do not know what a non-governmental organization is. The highest level of awareness of NGOs is in the east-central region of the country (23%) while the lowest is in the west-central part (11%). There is little difference in awareness of NGOs between rural and urban residents of Ukraine.

Those aware of NGOs were asked to name the sectors or issues on which these NGOs work. Among the sectors or issues identified were social welfare, gender and youth issues, the environment and Chernobyl, human rights, and general interests of the Ukrainian people.

Despite the fact that few Ukrainians are aware of NGOs, a plurality of those aware of what NGOs are, believe that these organizations are essential or necessary for Ukraine (Figure 22).

Figure 22. Necessity of Non-Governmental Organizations



"How necessary are non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, for Ukraine -- essential, necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?" (n=1060)

Forty-one percent of Ukrainians think that NGOs are either essential or necessary for Ukraine while 18% think that they are not very or at all necessary. Among those aware of NGOs in Ukraine, 70% believe that NGOs are essential or necessary. This compares to 33% among those not aware of NGOs active in Ukraine. Forty-four percent of these respondents don't know how necessary NGOs are for Ukraine.

Civic Engagement

Figure 23. Membership in Civic Groups



Most Ukrainians are not members of any civic group. When asked whether they are a member of any type of civic group, 80% reply that they are not members of any particular group. Trade unions are the largest membership organizations with 13% of Ukrainians reporting being a member of one. Five percent are members of political parties, while 1% are members of religious groups or local self-governance institutions. Membership in civic groups is at about the same level as in the October 2004 survey in Ukraine.

The influence of the orange revolution on popular perceptions towards civic engagement can be readily discerned from the survey and focus group results. In previous IFES surveys in Ukraine, no more than four or five percent of respondents have said that they have taken action to represent their interests. In this year's question, respondents were given a list of different types of civic participation and asked if they had taken part in the activity to express their views. Admittedly, this question is different from the one used on previous surveys, but the responses point to a higher level of engagement than in previous years. Nineteen percent of Ukrainians say that they have taken part in a protest or demonstration, 13% report contacting a public official, 8% have signed a petition, 5% have expressed their opinion in a newspaper or magazine, 4% called in a talk show, and 3% have sent in a SMS vote. There is little difference by age in these kinds of engagements. Repetition of this question on future surveys will help to determine if a substantial level of civic participation becomes a common feature in Ukraine or whether it is merely a temporary phenomenon that has resulted from the orange revolution's influence in making Ukrainians more likely to participate in the socio-political arena.

Conclusion: Ukraine's First Orange Year

Taras Kuzio

The surveys IFES conducted in February and November 2005 (the latter in collaboration with Democratic Initiatives Foundation) allow for an invaluable comparison of public opinion trends in the first year following the Orange Revolution under President Viktor Yushchenko. They provide a picture of shifting public opinion as the initial euphoria following the revolution wore off, and Ukrainians were confronted with a sociopolitical situation that was not significantly different (except for those in power) from the one that existed before the 2004 presidential elections. The dissatisfaction in the November survey is evidence of this realization.

The responses to the February survey—following the Orange Revolution—were imbued with optimism. Ukrainians had high expectations of large improvements in the economy, a renewed fight against corruption, increased political stability, better respect for human rights and improved relations with the West. There was less optimism about relations with Russia because of Russia's overt and heavy handed intervention in the 2004 elections in support of Viktor Yanukovych. Optimism about Ukrainian unity was also low because the 2004 elections had worsened Ukraine's inter-regional divide.

By the November survey, Ukrainian citizens felt that the Orange Revolution team had failed in key sociopolitical sectors. Declines were most notable in the economic situation, the fight against corruption, and political stability. Relations with Russia had worsened, and there was already little expectation that they would improve any time soon. It is little wonder that optimism about political stability decreased after the September 2005 crises. In that month, President Yushchenko dismissed the Yulia Tymoshenko government leading to a split in the Orange Revolution camp. Divisions in broad revolutionary coalitions, such as the one formed during the Orange Revolution, are common, but where Ukraine's case is different is that the split came very early in the first year of the Orange presidency. Also in September, President Yushchenko's entourage was accused of corruption leading to the dismissal of many business allies, such as Petro Poroshenko (secretary of the National Security and Defense Council).

To understand the real nature of the shift in public opinion between IFES' two surveys, it should be noted that the February results were most likely over-inflated by the unusually high expectations of Ukrainian citizens following the Orange Revolution. Such heightened expectations are common following revolutions, and in understanding the survey results one must distinguish between disappointment generated by unreal expectations and genuine disillusionment with the revolution. Unreal expectations include the belief that officials inherited from the Kuchma era would change their behavior and become less corrupt. Over the course of 2005, the number of Ukrainians who agreed that elected officials would become more responsive declined from 53 to 27 percent. However, such changes in the behavior of officials can only be expected over time, not in the short term. Another unrealistic expectation was that the economy (which Ukrainians will interpret in any survey as their standard of living) would dramatically improve after the Orange Revolution.

An important positive result seen in the comparison of surveys is that a majority of Ukrainian citizens still believe—despite growing disillusionment in the achievements of the Orange Revolution—that they had a right to protest election fraud. In IFES' analysis of the sociopolitical profile of Ukrainians, Dissatisfied Supporters and Committed Enthusiasts together make up 53 percent of the population, a figure surprisingly close to Yushchenko's result in the December 26, 2004 re-run of round two. In both IFES surveys, 59-70 percent believed that demonstrations

were a legitimate exercise of rights and 58-65 percent believed that the Orange protests raised valid concerns. Both sets of figures show that more Ukrainian citizens than the 52 percent who voted for Yushchenko in December 2004 agree Ukrainians have the right to protest. Therefore, some of those who voted for Yanukovych must have also supported the right of their fellow Ukrainians to protest.

Although a majority of Ukrainians still believe that it was their right to protest in the Orange Revolution, opinion is divided on the issue of whether the cancellation of the November 2004 elections was beneficial for all Ukrainians. From IFES' first survey to the second, the number of Ukrainians who believed the cancellation of round two of the 2004 elections was beneficial for all Ukrainians declined from 53 to 30 percent. This decline is due to the growth of those who responded 'Don't know' and 'Neither.' Those who believed the cancellation only benefited a select group remained the same (30 and 27 percent).

This decline in those who believe the November cancellation was beneficial is a reflection of the disillusionment that has grown within the Orange camp since the September 2005 crises. IFES' survey analysis shows in the development of a new and distinct group—Dissatisfied Supporters—who, while still supportive of the Orange Revolution, have become disappointed with the sociopolitical situation since the revolution. What IFES' poll reveals is how the Revolutionary Enthusiasts (48 percent of the population) in the February 2005 survey divided into Committed Enthusiasts (29 percent) and Dissatisfied Supporters (24 percent). An additional 5 percent of those belonging to one of these two groups joined after being identified as an Agnostic in the February survey. Therefore, despite a year of partial disappointments, 54 percent of Ukrainians continue to be supporters of the goals of the Orange Revolution. This, in turn, is a figure close to the number who voted for Yushchenko in December 2004. It is also similar to the number of Ukrainians in IFES' two surveys who continue to believe that the Orange protests were right and that there has been some progress in Ukraine's democratization.

The percentage of Revolutionary Opponents (or Committed Opponents) has remained remarkably stable in both surveys at 23-25 percent. These opponents provide the bedrock of support for Regions of Ukraine and the Communist Party in the March 2006 elections. Their opposition to President Yushchenko would remain solid no matter what policies the Orange team had pursued in their first year in office.

Upcoming Parliamentary Elections

Polls since IFES' November 2005 survey show that together Regions of Ukraine and the Communists may garner a third of the vote in March 2006, with Regions of Ukraine securing the largest faction in the 2006 parliament. Support for Regions of Ukraine has grown from 19 percent in IFES' November survey to 29 percent in other surveys.[1] Until the September 2005 crises, Regions of Ukraine had ratings similar to Our Ukraine. The growth of Regions of Ukraine's popularity to a point where it holds a 10 percent lead over Our Ukraine is a consequence of the September crises and split in the Orange camp.

Ukrainians who will vote for Regions of Ukraine will do so not because they like its leader, Yanukovych, but because of other factors, some of which are negative voting against Yushchenko. In of itself, this is unusual in Ukrainian politics as voters tend to vote for personalities rather than for party programs. However, this pattern does not hold true in the

[1] Regions of Ukraine obtained 29 percent in both the Democratic Initiatives and Ukrainian Sociological Service poll, January 2006 (http://www.dif.org.ua/), and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology January 2006 survey (www.kiis.com.ua).

case of Regions of Ukraine as Yanukovych has very high negative ratings, as do other opposition politicians (Viktor Medvedchuk and Leonid Krawchuk from the SDPUo, and Communist leader Petro Symonenko).

Therefore, the Communist and centrist opposition to the Orange camp have no leaders with positive levels of public support. Why then are Ukrainians likely to vote for them in the 2006 elections? As the IFES polls show, there is a hard core of Opponents to anything Orange (23-25 percent of the population), a figure that is less than the 44 percent who voted for Yanukovych in December 2004. Some Ukrainians will vote for Regions of Ukraine to exact revenge for what they see as a 'stolen' victory in 2004. Polls show that some Regions of Ukraine voters, and Yanukovych himself, believe that they honestly won the 2004 elections but that they were betrayed by Kyiv's elites, notably the then-President Leonid Kuchma and parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn.

A key factor in voters' party preferences for the 2006 election is their perception of stability in Ukraine. The number of Ukrainian citizens who believe that Ukraine is on a path to stability dropped by half between IFES' 2005 surveys. Interestingly, only a little over half (54-55 percent) in both surveys answered either positively ('stability') or negatively ('instability'). The numbers of 'don't knows' and 'neither' remained the same over the course of 2005.

Of those who believe that instability has grown in 2005, the main group are Yanukovych voters (up from 29 to 66 percent). Even among Yushchenko voters, the number who believe that Ukraine had become unstable increased six fold from 2 to 12 percent. Nevertheless, this percentage was five times less than that for Yanukovych voters.

Overall growth in the number of Ukrainian citizens who believe Ukraine to be unstable is not surprising. Among Yanukovych voters, it is a reflection of their 'we told you so' view that the Orange Revolution camp is unfit to govern. Critical rhetoric by Regions of Ukraine in the 2006 elections focuses on the alleged 'incompetence' of both Orange Revolution governments[2] and President Yushchenko. Other factors at work are the September 2005 crises and the lack of a clear strategy or discernable vision on the part of President Yushchenko for the country.

Economic Concerns and Party Preference

One of the most difficult issues to grapple with in these surveys is the attitude of Ukrainians toward the economy. In 2004, Ukraine's economy was officially Europe's fastest growing in at 12% GDP. Yet this high growth rate, and the economic situation in general, did not have a large impact on how voters made choices in the 2004 election.

The November survey found a large number of Ukrainians believed that the economic situation had worsened in 2005. Although GDP declined in 2005 (as compared to 2004), the overall socioeconomic situation did *not* worsen in 2005; rather, it actually improved. Government revenues grew dramatically from 23 percent in 2004 to 63 percent in 2005 as more of the economy emerged from the shadow economy, and more people started to pay taxes. Inflation was also lower in 2005 than in 2004, while Ukraine's international reserves doubled in 2005. In the social sphere, a wide range of improvements were made in payments to pensioners, state workers, and families and children.[3]

Ukrainians' negative attitudes towards the economic situation would seem to be a hangover from the transition of the 1990s. Annual surveys conducted by the Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology since 1994 asked: 'In your opinion, which of the following social groups

[2] Yulia Tymoshenko (February-September 2005) and Yuriy Yekhanurov (September 2005).
[3] See article by Ihor Zhdanov in *Ukrayinska Pravda*, February 16, 2006.

play a powerful role in shaping the Ukrainian state?' Each year the most influential group was 'Mafia, Criminal elements,' which received a low of 31 and a high of 49 percent.[4]

This bitterness among Ukrainian citizens about the 1990s transition (or in Ukrainian parlance 'primitive accumulation of capitol') is common to other regions of the former USSR. It may explain why surveys uncover a negative hangover effect when the issue of the economic situation is raised. Ukrainians may be unwilling to give credit for the economy to their government, regardless of the economic situation.

Ukrainian citizens' assessments of the economic situation in IFES surveys conducted between September 2002 and November 2005 show a very high level of disgruntlement. On average, 86 percent of Ukrainians are disappointed with their economic situation, and this figure only declines (to 76 percent) on the eve of the 2004 elections. Thus, 2004's high growth rate had no effect on voters' choices. Therefore, economics may not be a good indicator about how Ukrainian citizens will vote.[5] More influential factors line in voter region and language.

An important, but under-researched, explanation for voting behavior is negative voting. In all of Ukraine's presidential elections, negative voting has played an important role. In December 1991, Leonid Krawchuk won in round one as voters did not support the nationalist Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil. In 1994, the nationalist Krawchuk was defeated by the pro-Russian Kuchma. In 1999, Ukrainians voted against Communist leader Symonenko, rather than for Kuchma. In the 2004 elections, negative voting took place on both sides, against the 'criminal' Yanukovych and the 'nationalist' and 'American stooge' Yushchenko. Such negative voting creates a hard core of opponents in the Orange and Blue camps who will vote against the other side irrespective of the policies pursued by those in power.

Perceptions of Democracy and the Fight Against Corruption

Leaving aside concerns about political stability and the economic situation, 2005 was unquestionably a breakthrough year for Ukraine. This was the same year that Freedom House upgraded Ukraine from 'partly free' to 'free,' and it was the first CIS country to move into this category. 2005 was also the year that Reporters Without Frontiers and other international organizations commended Ukraine for its improved media situation.[6]

Ukrainian citizens understand 'democracy' as human rights, freedom of speech, the rule of law, and media freedom. But, Ukrainians also have a broader understanding of 'democracy' that they inherited from the former USSR. This broader definition includes areas that the United States and European Union would not normally subsume under 'democracy': the right to work, freedom from corruption, retirees looked after by the state, and state support of the unemployed. Western democracies provide state pensions, unemployment benefits or social welfare but are not totally free of corruption and do not guarantee full employment.

Therefore, when we ask Ukrainian citizens about their views on the progress of 'democracy' in their country, we need to evaluate their answers in this context. Between IFES' June 1999 and November 2005 surveys, 40-58 percent of Ukrainians believed their country was not a democracy. The three peaks in citizen disbelief in Ukrainian democracy are associated with political crises: the revelation of Kuchma's alleged involvement in the murder of journalist

[4] Natalya Panina ed., *Ukrainian Society 1994-2005. Sociological Monitoring* (Kyiv: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences and Democratic Initiatives, 2005).
[5] Dominique Arel and Valery Khmelko, 'Regional Divisions in the 2004 Presidential Elections in Ukraine: The Role of Language and Ethnicity', Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, September 29-October 1, 2005 (http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/news/danyliw_conf05.html)
[6] www.freedomhouse.org and www.rsf.org.

Heorhiy Gongadze (November-December 2000); 'Arise Ukraine!' mass anti-Kuchma protests (September 2003); and Yushchenko's poisoning, widespread pre-election day intimidation and violence (September-October 2004).

Confidence in state institutions has declined between IFES' two recent surveys. The most notable decline has been in the government and parliament, although local councils and mayors have seen a growth in public confidence. This decline in confidence in these two important institutions is a product of both unrealistic high expectations and the September 2005 crises. Although lamentable, public confidence of 36 and 37 percent in the November 2005 survey (in the government and parliament, respectively) remains far higher than in the Kuchma era.

A comparable decline is also seen in citizen confidence in President Yuschenko. Between the two surveys, IFES found that Yushchenko's ratings declined from 67 to 46 percent. Nevertheless, a 46 percent positive rating is better than Yanukovych's large negative rating and the negative ratings for other opposition politicians.

IFES' 2005 surveys highlight difficulties that Ukrainian authorities face in convincing the public that they are seriously tackling the issue of corruption. As these surveys show, Ukrainians believe that corruption is a major problem in all state institutions. However, the question remains: how do Ukrainians understand 'corruption'? In such surveys, Ukrainian respondents understand questions relating to 'corruption' as referring to high level abuse of office. These views of 'corruption' tie in with the commonly held view that individuals only enter politics to fulfill corrupt ends and not to defend the interests of voters.

Ukrainians do recognize that times have changed and that some effort is being made to battle corruption, but they also believe that there has been insufficient attention devoted to this task. Citizen disappointment about the struggle against corruption should be understood as their disappointment that Yushchenko' administration did not pursue the Orange Revolution slogan of sending 'Bandits to Prison!' to the extent that people expected. At the time, no one tried to define who these 'Bandits' were exactly. Most commonly, they were understood to be senior level officials in the Kuchma administration and Kuchma himself. Although lower and medium level officials were charged and imprisoned in 2005, not a single senior official was, which is a major source of disillusionment in the Orange camp.[7]

IFES' two 2005 surveys are an invaluable source of information about President Yushchenko's first year in office. The picture that emerges is complicated and at times even confusing. Some questions commonly asked of Ukrainians—such as questions about the economic situation, corruption, etc.—need further probing and investigation. IFES' surveys show that, while there is disappointment among Ukrainians about the outcome of the Orange Revolution, they also believe that Ukraine is moving towards greater democracy. This is heartening news for both the country and for the region.

[7] See T.Kuzio, 'Bandits to Prison': Old Guard Use Gas to Take Revenge in Ukraine Elections', *Jamestown Foundation, Eurasian Daily Monitor*, vol.3, no.13 (19 January 2006). Available at www.jamestown.org. The youth NGO Pora (It's Time) issued a poster for the 2006 elections entitled 'Why are they not sitting (in prison)?' with photographs of Yanukovych, Kuchma and Kivalov. See www.pora.org.ua

APPENDIX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS

Executive Summary: Focus Groups

- Evaluation of the current political situation in the country is dependent to a large extent on the political preferences of the respondents, but they are mostly negative: respondents are worried about the disorder and disagreements among Ukrainian politicians; their focus on political rivalries, and the absence of real actions towards resolution of actual problems. Positive evaluations of the current situation were mostly voiced by participants in the focus groups in Lviv.

- Among the participants in the Donetsk focus-groups, there is evident dissatisfaction with the current government; whereas participants in the focus-groups in Kyiv and Lviv put more stress on other aspects of the political situation – the parliament's jockeying ahead of the March elections, which lead to aggravations between political parties. Respondents are mainly interested in the pre-election campaign and closely monitor its course, because they are aware how the election results can influence their future and the future of Ukraine.

- Participants in all of the focus groups are concerned about the gas crisis, and because of this crisis, they are concerned about Ukraine's relations with Russia.

- The focus group discussions point to the Orange Revolution as having led to the creation of a civil society in Ukraine, as well as making citizens aware that they can utilize freedom of speech. Participants in the focus groups also noted the positive impact of the Orange Revolution on the international image of Ukraine. Some of the respondents had positive experience of the participation in protest initiatives (mainly during the Orange Revolution), of addressing public and official organizations, which results in the firm belief among these participants that such actions are effective.

- Most participants in the focus group have a negative appraisal of the socio-economic situation in the country, with the focus group participants in Donetsk being especially likely to hold this opinion. While participants in Kyiv and Lviv have negative perceptions of the economic situation, they are likely to cite the current socio-political as a negative influence on the economy. Among specific economic problems, participants worry most often about that of social security, which in their opinion has only gotten worse due to the failure of political actors to work properly.

- Most focus-groups participants think that the current government is incapable of solving the socio-economic and political problems affecting the country. This is mainly because of the political environment in which the government finds itself – conflict between political parties, the status of being a 'provisional', and because the current political team is not professionally qualified. The opinion that the government is not qualified to manage the problems is primarily expressed in the Donetsk focus groups. Respondents in Lviv and Kyiv are more likely to point to the uncertain political climate as a reason why the government cannot currently address the problems facing the country.

- The participants are of the opinion that both central and local governments have an influence on their lives. The primary reason participants give for thinking that local governments have influence on their lives is because they are closer to the people and can influence their lives in a direct way. But they also note that the decisions of the central authorities, which determine

general development of events in the country, are also important because they determine the course of action for local governments and citizens.

- Participation in elections and referendums was named as major source of influence that citizens can exert on political decisions in Ukraine. But participants point out that while voting in referendums can express the citizens' viewpoints, it is not necessarily the case that what citizens express through a referendum is followed by politicians. Significant skepticism about the possibility of influencing political decisions was expressed by the participants of the Donetsk focus groups, where there is a high level of negative attitude and a lack of support for the current authorities.

- There was a generally low level of awareness regarding election commissions' activities before the parliamentary elections. The dominant attitude is neutral, but there are also frequent demonstrations of distrust and suspicions in the national, regional, and local election commissions' actions with regard to the election. Although there are no objective reasons to think so yet, respondents rely on their experience with violations of the election process during the 2004 presidential elections to emphasize that these kinds of violations may still be possible for the parliamentary elections. The participants were also adamant that they would participate in the election to minimize the chances for falsification.

- In spite of the general skepticism with regard to the integrity of the election process, most participants believe that the parliamentary elections will be the fairest election in Ukraine's history, and especially in relation to the 2004 presidential elections. One reason why this view is expressed is because citizens are now more likely to take action to protect the integrity of the election. Another reason given by participants is that the organization of the elections has improved in the past year.

- Most participants believe that the presence of election observers improves the transparency and integrity of the election process. Respondents prefer international observers than Ukrainian observers. Participants in Donetsk prefer observers from the CIS countries while those in Lviv and Kyiv prefer observers from the OSCE and other Western organizations.

- Most of the participants say that they do not have much information on the proportional election system yet. Those who are at least a little informed about the system express concerns because the PR system depersonalizes the election, and because it decreases the personal responsibility of the deputies. Many participants feel that because parties are the ones who are voted for, most deputies will not be answerable to the constituency they nominally represent.

- Almost all the participants say that there is little pressure on voters to vote a specific way for the parliamentary elections, although they expect that this kind of pressure might increase with the approach of the elections. Still, they expect whatever pressure results to be far less than was experienced during the presidential elections. Most of respondents report that they would not use measures such as the hot lines to report instances of pressure because they do not believe these measures to be efficient.

- According to respondents, the main factor that limits equal access of all parties and blocks to mass media is money. Another possible factor is mass media owners' policy of partisanship and withdrawal of supporting form parties or individuals they do not support. Participants

report that they have easy access to programs of the political parties and blocks but most participants are passive to accessing these sources of information about parties.

- The primary factor in voting choice for most participants is the leader of the political party. Content of the parties' programs plays a minor role in the voting decision. The transition to the proportional system has not led to much change in looking at party leaders as a reason to vote for a party. Some of the participants, though, say that the PR system is worse because people want to vote for particular candidates, not for party lists.

- Almost all of the participants say that they are barely familiar with the candidate lists that have been put out by the political parties. At best, most can name the party's leader. According to some respondents, it is easy to access these lists, but most of people just don't try to do it. At the same time, the competing political parties don't try to inform the voters about their lists either. Many of the participants say that their may be candidates on party lists with unseemly pasts but that this is not likely to change their vote for a party because they have confidence in the party and its leaders.

- There are differences of opinion on regional lines as far as Ukraine joining the Common Economical Area and the NATO, but most participants believe that a referendum is not necessary for these issues. These participants say that regardless of the referendum, whoever is in power will make their decision according to their beliefs and not because of the referendum results. The issues of Ukrainian alignment are not important for most participants; they would like politicians to focus on the problems facing the country.

- Only some of respondents are aware of the fact that after the elections the parliament is going to elect the rime Minister. There is not a consensus on this issue with participants split on the issues. Those who know how the Prime Minister is going to be elected, say that they will vote for the political party or bloc whose representative they would like to see as future Prime Minister.

IFES
1101 15th Street, N.W. 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
Tel: 202.828.8507
Fax: 202.452.0804
www.IFES.org