ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS: PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE 2001

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SAMPLE:	1,500 NATIONAL WITH OVERSAMPLES IN SELECT REGIONS (300)
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I. Introduction

Between the dates of September 10 - 20, 2001, 1500 adults from across Ukraine were interviewed for the latest national opinion survey commissioned by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). The total sample includes a nationally representative sample of 1,200 face-to-face interviews of adults 18 years of age and above. An oversample of 300 was completed for central Ukraine. The sample was weighted and is representative of the adult population by age, gender, and region.

All surveys are subject to errors caused by interviewing a sample rather than the entire population. The theoretical margin of error for a sample of 1,500 is +/- 2.5 at a 95 percent confidence level.

The project director and principal analyst for this latest Ukrainian survey was Thomas Carson, Ph.D. Rakesh Sharma co-authored this report. Nathan Van Dusen provided the final formatted report and tables. Interviewing was completed by SOCIS-Gallup, Kyiv, under the direction of Sergiy Stukalo. Olga Ostapenko, SOCIS, directed the data processing and the completion of the final data set.

This is the eighth national survey commissioned by IFEs in Ukraine. Each survey responds to unique issues and questions at the time of that study. Taken as a whole, the IFES series employs a common methodology in sampling, questionnaire design, and project management. All efforts are taken to produce a unified body of work that maintains continuity and comparability over time. Previous project directors include Elehie Natalie Skoczylas and Gary A. Ferguson.

This survey report:

- Provides current data on the expected turnout for the 2002 elections for Supreme Rada, expectations about these elections, and attitudes toward the electoral process;
- Updates trend data on political efficacy and interest in politics collected by IFES beginning in 1994;
- Examines attitudes toward political parties and their support in the context of the upcoming elections;
- Analyzes key election issues, including: general satisfaction and confidence in institutions, corruption, political and economic reform, and judicial and legal reform;
- Assesses support for political rights, NGOs, and civic participation in Ukraine;
- Evaluates perceptions of information available on political and economic developments, as well as the overall performance of Ukrainian media; and
- Summarizes variations in attitudes across social groups and geographical regions in Ukraine.

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II. Executive Summary

The September 2001 survey detailed in this report is the latest in a series of public opinion polls commissioned in Ukraine by the International Foundation for Election Systems, a body of work initiated in 1994. The main topic in this year's survey is the upcoming elections to the Supreme Rada, scheduled for March 2002. As such, many new questions appeared in the questionnaire designed for this study. Where appropriate, trend data is included on key indicators of political efficacy, satisfaction and confidence in social institutions, attitudes toward political rights and civic participation, and the extent of political and economic information available to the public. This report provides insight into public attitudes that will affect participation in the upcoming election, and presents some key concerns regarding the fairness of the election so that international and Ukrainian organizations may position resources to foster confidence in the electoral process.

One overall theme may be initially drawn from these analyses. The Ukrainian electorate seeks solutions to current problems and a break from the intense politicking that has characterized much of Ukraine's short democratic history. With significant pressure exerted on the political elite from both external (Russia and the West) and internal (business leaders) forces, the problems of the average Ukrainian are frequently underemphasized in the decision-making process. This presents critical challenges to Ukrainian democracy and has edged Ukraine to a decisive moment in its history. The need for substantively basic issues to be addressed is palpable, considering the issues of importance that Ukrainians have highlighted in this year's survey.

In particular, the electorate is looking for solutions that improve the overall economic conditions of the country and the financial condition of families. These were the key issues identified by respondents for the upcoming election:

- Improving the well being of people (41%)
- Dealing with employment (26%)
- Solving economic issues (28%)
- Reforming pensions (12%).

These issues are priorities regardless of what the political parties respondents support, and despite their commitment to participate in the elections. Secondary expectations include:

- Combating corruption and crime (8%)
- Health care (7%)
- Education (5%)
- Improving the tax system (5%).

Delivering on these issues is important. Evaluations of the previous election for the Supreme Rada in 1998 show that 58% chose a party based on the political program of that party. Fewer (19%) made a choice based on the 'personality' of the party or its leader. Of those who were able to remember the party they had voted for in 1998, 42% were satisfied with their choice while 39% were dissatisfied with their choice. When those who were satisfied were asked for the reason for their satisfaction, the two most frequent responses were approval of the political program carried out by the party and the belief that the party had delivered on its promises. Those who were dissatisfied with their choice in 1998 primarily opined that the party did not deliver what was promised.

Political parties and their leaders must convince the public that they have platforms worthy of support, and that they can deliver on these solutions. If the 1998 elections can be taken as a good barometer, a party's platform is much more likely to impact voter choice than personality of the party or leader 1998. During the 2001 campaign, the effectiveness of the messages that parties deliver about the important issues cited above will go a long way toward determining which parties do well at the polls come March 2001.

Electoral Support and Behavior

The September data is consistent with previous findings in its anticipation of high voter turnout, with nearly 80% stating they are likely to vote.

Though they are committed to voting, the electorate prepares for this upcoming election with skepticism. A plurality does not expect that their lives will change as a result of the upcoming election (46%). Of those who do anticipate change, however, more believe there will be positive change (23%) than those who believe there will be negative change (5%). Twenty-six percent "don't know."

A plurality of respondents (43%) does not believe that the 2002 election will be free and fair. On a positive note, however, there has been an increase in the percentage that believes the election will be free and fair, with 32% indicating a positive outlook this year, as opposed to 17% in December of 2000. Among the reasons given for this opinion are that elections in Ukraine have not been fair in the past, that there is much corruption among politicians and voters, and that there is fraud in the electoral system.

Political Attitudes

Interest in politics has fallen slightly since the December 2000 survey (62% at least 'somewhat interested' in 2001, 65% in 2000), and fewer people believe that voting gives them influence (30% compared to 34% in 2000). Seventy-three percent believe politics is too complicated to understand, and 75% believe that they have no influence on developments in Ukraine. Though both of these percentages are slightly down from the December 2000 survey (76% politics too complicated, 80% have no influence), they still indicate a general lack of faith in the political process.

A majority does discuss politics (56%), and a large percentage does attempt to influence friends and acquaintances with their opinions (41%). These findings indicate an active political culture, one that is undermined by a general lack of confidence in elections and political institutions.

Attitudes toward Political Parties

Political parties are thought to be 'necessary' for the development of democracy in Ukraine by a majority of the respondents (55%). Only 2%, however, are members of political parties. When asked what party represents their views and interests, more respondents chose the Communist party (16%) over any other party. The People's Rukh was second at 5%. Support for the Communist Party has steadily declined from a high in January 2000 of 22%.

Thirty-six percent believe that the formation of party blocs is a positive development for democracy. Fifteen percent believe that the formation of blocks would be a negative

development, and 17% believe they will have 'little influence' on democracy. Nearly one-out-of three 'do not know' about this.

Seventy-three percent either state that there are no clear differences between political parties or that, if there are, they are unable to identify those differences. Among those who perceive differences between parties, these differences are based on ideology, economic and political policy, and approach to foreign relations.

Dissatisfaction and Confidence

Eight-five percent of respondents claim dissatisfaction with the situation in the country. However, the underlying trend in the data indicates that there is some positive development over time because fewer are 'completely dissatisfied' than in the previous surveys commissioned by IFES (46% in 2001 compared to no less than 58% in previous surveys).

A majority of respondents profess a 'Great Deal' or 'Fair Amount' of confidence in Ukraine's armed forces (70%), the Church (66%), the Media (61%), and the State Security Services (54%), while a plurality express similar sentiment concerning the Council for Security and Defense (48%).

Institutions in whom respondents do not express a great deal of interest are the Cabinet of Ministers (34%), Local Authorities (32%), Supreme Rada (31%), the Presidential Administration (27%), the National Bank (28%), and the Police (26%).

Political Direction and Reform

According to a large majority of respondents, political reforms are moving too slowly in Ukraine. Fifty percent state that political reforms are not moving fast enough while 19% state that they are not taking place at all. An additional 46% do not believe that Ukraine is now a democracy, but the majority of these respondents believe it is headed in this direction. Thirty percent believe Ukraine is a democracy, and 20% reply, "Don't Know."

When respondents were asked whether it would be best for Ukraine to pursue formal union with Russia or membership in the European Union, there are nearly equal levels of support for both options. Forty percent supported political union with Russia while a slightly lesser percentage supported membership in the European Union (34%). A further 16% favor strict neutrality and 11% do not know. The youngest respondents 18-25 (46% Europe, 25% Russia) and those with higher levels of education (40% Europe, 33% Russia) and standard of living (43% Europe, 14% Russia) are oriented more toward Europe than Russia.

Economic Direction and Reform

Economic reforms are also believed to be moving too slowly by the majority of respondents (77% too slowly or not at all).

When asked whether they prefer a market or state-controlled economy, respondents are nearly split between the two. Support is slightly higher for a market (32%) rather than a state controlled economy (26%), but 30% prefer a point in-between the two. Fourteen percent do not know.

Judicial and Legal Reform

Ukrainians are divided in their attitudes toward legal and judicial bodies. The Constitutional Court (45%) and Supreme Court (44%) inspire greater confidence among respondents than public prosecutors (32%) or local courts (27%).

One reason for the low confidence in local courts may be that many believe the decisions of local courts are heavily influenced by outside interests (44%). The Constitutional Court and Supreme Court are seen as less susceptible to such pressures (19% and 22%, respectively).

Few respondents were aware of the recent debates in the Rada over judicial and legal reforms (67% did not know versus 34% that did). But when asked whether these reforms were important, majorities of those who did know about the debate (82%) and even those who did not know about the debate (55%) stated that these reforms were important.

Regardless of party affiliation, a majority supports judicial reform, and among those that support judicial reform, 56% are 'very likely' to vote and another 28% are 'somewhat likely,' -- a total of 84% stating they probably will vote (compared to 74% likely to vote among those who don't think the judicial reforms are important). Judicial and legal reform is also an important issue among uncommitted voters with 52% of those who do not support a party saying that they support judicial reform, and 60% that do not know which party they support also supporting judicial reform.

Corruption

Fifty-five percent of respondents believe corruption is 'very common', and 60% believe it is very serious. Even given these high percentages, it is worth noting that these percentages are down from previous IFES surveys since 1997. In each of these surveys, at least 62% thought corruption was very common (with a high of 75% in 2000) and at least 67% felt that it was very serious (with a high of 81% in 2000).

In most cases, Ukrainians are more likely to say that corrupt acts are never justified when these acts can only be performed by officials (personal use of public money 89%, benefiting from privatization 86%, taking bribes 84%, officials helping associates 70%) than if the corrupt actions are done by ordinary citizens (claiming benefits not entitled to 66%, cheating on taxes 56%, taking money for vote 80%).

Civic Participation and NGOs

Few (22%) adult Ukrainians have attempted to contact an elected official. Of these attempts, two out of three resulted in a response, and a few achieved a partial response (16% of those respondents who had contacted an official). The remaining 19% did not gain a response. Respondents who received a response were more likely to be dissatisfied than satisfied with the outcome of the response: 54% compared to 46% satisfied.

The September data indicate an increase in the percentage that believe NGOs are either 'essential' or 'very necessary.' Combining these responses shows that a majority believes they are necessary (62%) compared to 22% who do not. This compares to 35% in the 2000 survey. However, few (6%) are members of an NGO and only 2% would be willing to volunteer for an

NGO. A further 40% agree that NGOs can deliver some social services more effectively than state institutions while 32% do not agree with this sentiment.

Public Information and Media

Sixty-one percent of respondents have a 'Great Deal' or 'Fair Amount' of confidence in the media. The media receives majority support despite the fact that the public complains of a general lack of adequate information on economic, political, and electoral developments.

There is majority support for freedom of the press with 51% stating that the state is never justified in restricting the rights of the media. At the same time, many Ukrainians realize that journalists are under pressure from government or other institutions. Forty-seven percent of respondents state that it is not safe for a journalist to express his or her real opinion about the situation in Ukraine. Only 29% feel that it is safe for journalists to express their opinions. Of those that feel that journalists are not safe, 45% believe that expressing their opinions could put journalists' lives in danger and 26% feel it could end in journalists losing their jobs.

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Further details are provided below organized into eight remaining sections, which include the conclusion and appendices. Following the Introduction and Executive Summary, above, Section III details differences among subgroups of Ukrainian society in attitudes toward elections. Political Attitudes (Section IV) updates long-running trend data collected by IFES on political efficacy and interest in Ukraine. Attention is drawn to the section on Attitudes toward Political Parties (Section V), where party and coalition support is featured. Section VI, Key Election Issues, is one main contribution of this report. Sections VII and VIII round out the main topics covered in IFES political surveys.

III. Electoral Support and Behavior

2002 Turnout Projections

A high turnout is projected for the Supreme Rada elections scheduled for March 2002. According to this survey's findings, nearly 80% of respondents are likely to vote, 51% of whom are 'very likely' to vote. This projection is consistent with findings from two previous IFES surveys. In both January and December of 2000, 75% of respondents indicated their intention to vote in the next Rada elections. Over time, between 75%-79% consistently state they plan to vote. This projection corresponds to the actual turnout in elections in parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

Figure 1. Likeliness to Vote in the Supreme Rada Elections, 2002
September 2001 (n=1,500)



'How likely is it that you will vote in the 2002 elections for the Supreme Rada? Is it very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely that you will vote in the next elections?'

Women are more likely to vote than men. Whereas 53% of women are 'very likely' and 28% are 'somewhat likely,' 48% of men are 'very likely' and 27% are 'somewhat likely' to vote. Respondents over 45 years of age are more likely to vote compared to those younger (56% for those 46-55, 54% over 55 compared to approximately 48% of the younger participants).

Likelihood of voting also varies according to party affiliation. The most committed voters are supporters of the Communist party (64% 'very likely' to vote compared to 59% of those affiliated with non-communist parties). Those who do not affiliate with any party are the least likely to vote: 20% of them are 'very unlikely to vote' which compares to only 2% of those who 'do not know' what party they support.

A more telling variation is among different ethnic groups. Those identifying themselves as Ukrainian are much more likely to vote (53% 'very likely') than ethnic Russians (46%) and 'other' ethnic groups (44%).[1] Less important is the variation across educational groups. The most likely voters are those that completed secondary education (though no specialized training)—57% 'very likely.' Less likely are those who have not completed secondary education – 46% 'very likely.' Commitment to vote declines with the size of the community: 59% of

[1] See Appendix 1 for the distribution of ethnic groups in the sample.

villagers are 'very likely' to vote, compared to only 44% of those in cities with a population exceeding one-half million people. Those in eastern Ukraine are less likely to vote than those in the west or intermediate areas between the two (44%, compared to 52% and 53%, respectively, are 'very likely' to vote). Kyiv has the lowest reported commitment to vote with only 43% 'very likely', which compares to a high of 66% in the Northwest region.[2]

Reasons for Not Voting

Twenty-one percent of the respondents are not likely to vote in the next elections, or stated that they 'do not know' if they will. Of these 316 people, most of them believe their vote will not count (62%). A few (18%) are not likely to vote because of personal reasons that they did not specify. Another 17% have not decided whether they will vote or not. Few (3%) firmly stated that they just do not want to vote.

Expectations About the Upcoming Election

Respondents were asked: "How do you expect that the results of the 2002 elections will change your life?" A plurality does not expect that their lives will change as a result of the election (46%). However, a positive finding is that many more expect a positive change in their lives (23%), compared to those who believe their lives will get worse from the result of the election (5%). Nearly one out of four 'do not know' how the election will affect them personally (26%).

Main reasons provided for optimism about the results of the upcoming election include:

- Hope for a better future (6%) and a sense Ukraine is moving in the right direction (2%);
- Positive change in the economic situation, or change in the tax system (3%); and
- Change of people in leadership (8%):(younger people taking office (3%), 'better people' taking office (3%), change in the composition of the Supreme Rada (2%)).

Few believe their lives will become worse as a result of the elections. The main reasons they list include:

- No confidence that the situation will improve (1%);
- Lack of trust in the honesty of those who come to power (2%); and
- Changing the government will not change the situation in Ukraine (1%).

Voting in 1998

The 2001 survey included several questions regarding the previous elections for the Supreme Rada in 1998. At that time, 1403 out of the 1500 were old enough to have voted. We asked these respondents about their participation in this election.

Of those eligible to vote in 1998, 82% claim to have voted and 11% did not (70% of registered voters actually voted).[3] The remaining 7% either do not remember or stated some 'other' response. According to those who say they voted:

- 22% voted for the Communist party;

[2] See Appendix 2 for regional classifications.
[3] Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine

- 9% voted for the People's Rukh of Ukraine;
- 3% voted 'against all parties';
- 42% 'do not remember' which party they voted for;
- 19% voted for one of the remaining parties running at that time; and
- 4% refused to mention the party they voted for.

Another 18% were not asked this question because they did not vote, do not remember if they voted, or had another reason why they could not answer. In total, 599 responded that they chose a party in the 1998 elections. These respondents were then asked the reason for their choices in this election. Of these 599 respondents:

- 58% chose a party because they supported the political program of the party;
- 19% made their choices because they 'liked the personality of the leader' of the party;
- 12% made their choices because someone advised them to vote this way, and they valued that advice; and
- 2% were 'strongly encouraged' to choose that party at their workplace.

Another 3% do not remember why they voted the way that they did or they had another reason.

In total, 252 (42%) were at least somewhat satisfied with their choices in 1998, while 235 (39%) were somewhat or very dissatisfied.

The main reasons why people <u>were satisfied</u> with their choices in 1998 included:

- Life is better under Communist rule (10% out of 252);
- Approved the program of the party (9%);
- Party/leader's words matched their deeds (9%);
- Trusted or sympathized with the party or leader (18%);
- The party represented the concerns of ordinary people in Ukraine (7%);
- The party fought for Ukrainian independence (3%); and
- Personal convictions (9%).

The main reasons why people <u>were not satisfied</u> with their choices in 1998 included:

- The party did not fulfill their promises (62% out of 235);
- Corruption (9%);
- The party did not make it into office (16%); and
- Internal problems made the party ineffective (4%).

It is unfortunate that 42% could not remember which party they voted for and another 4% refused to mention the party. Analyses based on respondent's recall of the 1998 election are strongly biased by the large number that did not identify their choices at that time. However, the general pattern of response does provide useful information for the upcoming elections.

Respondent satisfaction was largely a function of identification, trust, and delivery, with delivery taking the lion's share. This is further reinforced by the findings on dissatisfaction, where lack of delivery was cited by an overwhelming majority of respondents.

Will the 2002 Supreme Rada Elections be Free and Fair?

Though most people intend to vote, many do not expect that the next elections will be free and fair. More respondents stated that the elections will not be fair than reported that they will be (43% versus 32%). Another one out of five respondents is uncertain.

The overall lack of faith in the upcoming elections raises concern, but the September findings indicate an increase in the level of confidence in the upcoming elections compared to data from December 2000. At that time, only 17% stated the 2002 Supreme Rada elections will be free and fair, and 71% stated that they will not be.

Figure 2. Confidence in the Supreme Rada Elections, 2002 (n=1,500)



'How likely is it that the 2002 elections for Supreme Rada will be free and fair: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not likely at all?'

In total, 650 (43%) out of 1500 stated the upcoming election will not be free and fair. These respondents were then asked the reason for their opinion. Corruption, 'everything is bought or sold,' or bribing and coercing voters was mentioned by a plurality (42%) of this group. Another 25% believe the elections will not be fair because 'elections have never been' or because of the experience of the last elections. Other reasons cited by this group are included in Figure 3.

The remaining 850 respondents stated that either the elections will be fair (32%), or that they 'do not know' if they will be (24%). These respondents were then asked, 'What will be the most important factor that ensures the next Supreme Rada elections will be free and fair?' According to 33% of this group, the main factor that will ensure fair elections will be the presence of international and domestic observers. Another 18% stated that the participation of representatives from different political parties will ensure fair elections. Other reasons cited by this group are also included in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Expectations about the Supreme Rada Elections, 2002

Reasons Election Will Not Be Fair (n=650)		Reasons Election Will Be Fair (n=850)	
Corruption, bribery	42%	International and domestic observers	33%
Elections have never been fair	25%	Participation of representatives from different political parties	18%
Electoral fraud	22%	Electoral legislation	16%
Government will not allow fair elections	8%	Local electoral committees	13%
Distrust elections	7%	Other	3%

'What is the main reason why you expect that the 2002 electons for Supreme Rada will not be free and fair?'
'What will be the most important factor that ensures the next Supreme Rada elections are free and fair?'

In summary, 43% of the total sample does not believe the 2002 elections will be fair because elections in Ukraine have not been in the past, there is much corruption among politicians and among voters, or there is fraud in the electoral system. Observation on election day or the participation of different political parties' representatives in the electoral process are the main factors that will enable a fair election. However, only 32% believe that the elections will be fair. While this is less than encouraging, the recent September data does indicate, over time, a rise in confidence that these next elections will be free and fair.

Most Important Issues for the 2002 election

Economic conditions and the financial condition of families are the main issues for these elections. This question was asked in an open format, and more than one answer was possible. The primary issues mentioned were:

- Improving the well being of people (41%);
- Employment (26%);
- Pension reform (12%); and
- Other economic issues.

Secondary issues mentioned were:

- Combating corruption and crime (8%);
- Health care (7%);
- Education (5%); and
- Improving the tax system (5%).

The issues important to those who are 'unlikely' to vote do not differ much from the overall national totals listed above. Those who 'do not know' if they will vote do differ in that 53% of them mention 'improving the well being of people' compared to 41% overall. Pension reform is also mentioned by 21% of this group, compared to 12% in total.

In the section below, respondents are classified into four categories depending upon their affiliation with political parties: supporters of the Communist Party, supporters of non-communist parties, supporters of no party, and those who 'do not know' which party they support. Issue preferences vary somewhat between respondents in these categories and the overall sample.

<u>Supporters of the Communist Party</u>

- 51% mention improving the well-being of people
- 17% mention pension reform

Supporters of non-communist parties

- 32% mention economic issues
- 6% mention tax reform (this group along with those who support no party weight the percentage mentioning tax reform)
- Are more likely to mention environmental issues than any other group

Supporters of No Party

- 37% mention improving the well-being of people
- 28% mention economic issues
- 29% mention employment issues

'Don't Know' who to Support

- 40% mention improving the well-being of people
- 23% mention employment issues
- 26% mention economic issues

IV. Political Attitudes

The 2001 data paints a discouraging portrait of political efficacy, which contrasts starkly with the high levels for political interest. Ukrainians do not draw away from political life, but exhibit little confidence in the ability of the average citizen to make an impact. The September findings indicate a lack of confidence in the electoral process and a low level of expectations concerning the upcoming Supreme Rada elections.

Political Efficacy

The 2001 data documents that the majority of Ukrainians remain unconvinced that they have influence over their political system. Twice as many disagree that 'voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in Ukraine' than agree with the statement (63% compared to 30%). A large majority agrees with the statement 'sometimes politics is so complicated that people like you can't understand what's really happening' (73% compared to 22% that disagree). Most agree with the statement 'people like you have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine' (75% compared to 18% that disagree). These figures are displayed below.

Figure 4. Political Efficacy (n=1500)

	2000 (n=1500)			2001 (n=1500)	
Agree or Disagree:	**Agree**	**Disagree**		**Agree**	**Disagree**
"Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making."	34%	62%		30%	63%
"Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like you can't understand what's really happening."	76%	20%		73%	22%
"People like you have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine."	80%	16%		75%	18%

Those 18-25 are the most likely to believe 'voting gives influence.' Among this group, 13% 'fully agrees' with this statement compared to the overall average of 9%. Many from this group also disagree that politics is 'too complicated' to understand: 21% 'rather disagree' and 5% 'fully disagree' compared to the total average of 16% and 6%.

Political efficacy rises with the observed standard of living[4] of the respondent and his/her level of education. Twenty-four percent of those from the highest standard of living category 'fully agree' that voting gives them influence, versus 9% overall. This percentage falls steadily as standard of living declines. In terms of education, 11% of those with the highest level of education 'fully agree' that voting gives them influence, and this figure declines to 6% for those who have not completed secondary education.

Respondents living in western Ukraine are less likely to agree that 'voting gives influence' than those living in either the east or intermediate areas:

- 7% fully agree in the west;
- 11% fully agree in the east; and
- 10% fully agree in the intermediate areas.

[4] Standard of living is based on the interviewer's assessment of respondent's socio-economic status (SES). There is a standard formula--developed by the research firm--that is employed by all of its interviewers.

There are important regional variations in the percentage of respondents who believe that voting gives influence:

- 20% 'fully agree' that voting gives influence in the South West region;
- 15% in the Southern region;
- 20% in the Northern region;
- 14% in the South Eastern region;
- 4% in Kyiv;
- 7% in the Western region;
- 6% in the North Eastern region;
- 8% in the North Western region; and
- 7% in the Central region.

Interest in politics

Interest in national politics remains high, and has been rising steadily over the past several years. More people are 'very interested' in politics (15%) than those 'not at all interested' (11%). In total, 62% are at least 'somewhat interested' in national politics, compared to 34% who are not. Very few (4%) state they 'do not know.'

Similarly, 14% are 'very interested' in local politics and 12% are 'not at all' interested. In total, 60% are at least 'somewhat interested' in local politics versus 35% who are not. As expected, interest in national and local politics is highly correlated (r =0.6). These findings are presented below.

Figure 5. Interest in National and Local Politics (n=1500)



'How interested are you in matters of politics and government?'
'What about your local community? How interested are you in the activities of your local government?'

Males are generally more interested in politics: 18% 'very interested' versus 13% of females. Interest declines steadily with standard of well-being and rises with education. Nineteen percent of those with the highest observed standard of living are 'very interested,' compared to 13% of those at the opposite end of the scale. Twenty-five percent of those with the highest level of education, compared to 10% who have not completed secondary school are 'very interested' in politics.

Ethnic variation is interesting and should be a topic of further analysis. While fewer ethnic Russians and those with 'other' ethnic identifications than Ukrainian believe they have influence, the level of interest in politics works in the opposite direction:

- 23% of the ethnic 'other' category are very interested;
- 17% of ethnic Russians are very interested; and
- 14% of ethnic Ukrainians are 'very interested' in politics.

These findings must be viewed in the context of time. Figure 6 displays the trend over time in average (mean) levels of political efficacy and interest (the higher the point, the higher the value of the trend line). Interest in Politics (T1 line) is measured on the Y1 axis. A point near the high value indicates that people are closer to the '4' value, or 'very interested' in politics. A point closer to the '1' value indicates that more people are 'not at all' interested. The trend line indicates a steady, but consistent rise in levels of interest in national politics starting from the June 1999 IFES survey. The September 2001 data indicates another statistically significant rise in this trend. Interest in national politics continues to rise.

Figure 6. Political Interest and Efficacy Over Time
Trend data: 1994 – 2001



Trends in political efficacy provide a mixed picture. The T14 line displays trends for the question, 'Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making.' The trend shows a steady drop in the number that agrees with this statement starting from the January 2000 survey. September 2001 indicates another significant drop. Fewer believe they have influence.

At the same time, fewer people agree that 'politics is too complicated' to understand, and that 'people like you have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine.' Between December 2000 and September 2001, fewer people are agreeing with these statements.

Interest in politics has risen over time, and fewer people believe that politics is too complicated to understand and that they have no influence on developments in Ukraine. At the same time, fewer people state that voting gives them influence. This highlights the low level of trust in the electoral process. Attitudes toward political life show a promise that is not reflected in the institution of voting.

Respondents were also asked, 'When you meet your friends, do you talk about politics?' Many people do, 23% 'often' and 33% 'sometimes.' Staying on the same theme, another question asked: 'When you yourself hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or colleagues to share your views?' Many often persuade others of their opinion (14%) and others sometimes do (27%). In comparison, 33% 'never do' and 18% rarely try. While more do not try to influence others (51%), a large percentage does (41%). These findings reinforce the indications of an active political culture, one that is undermined by a general lack of confidence that elections are fair, honest, and with results that reflect the will of the electorate.

Democracy and Social Order

Ukrainians have now had more than ten years of experience with democracy, but their country is still very much in a process of transition; the future is still uncertain. This uncertainty has dampened the euphoria experienced at the advent of the democratic era. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the data in the previous section indicates that Ukrainian confidence in the democratic process is still tentative at best. Considering the frequent association of the communist era with social order, IFES was interested in exploring potential correlations between lack of confidence and the perceived sense of order in democratic Ukraine.

Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement 'Democracy as a system is no good at maintaining order.' Thirty-five percent of respondents either completely or somewhat agree with this statement while 46% completely or somewhat disagree, and 20% 'Don't know.' Disagreement with the above statement is significantly related to age and education. Generally speaking, the more educated a respondent, the more likely s/he is to disagree with the view that democracy is no good at maintaining order. Younger respondents are also more likely to hold this positive view of democracy. Figure 7 provides data on this question.

Figure 7. Democracy Not Good at Maintaining Order?

		Education				Age				
	TOTAL	< Second.	Second.	Second. + Specialized*	Univ.	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55*	56+
Comp/Smwt Agree	**34%**	30%	37%	37%	30%	30%	29%	38%	36%	36%
Com/Smwt Disagree	**46%**	34%	45%	46%	63%	54%	55%	48%	49%	36%
DK	**20%**	36%	18%	18%	7%	16%	16%	14%	16%	28%

Agree or Disagree: 'Democracy as a system is no good at maintaining order.'
*Rounding error

IFES also asked respondents to agree or disagree with this statement: 'It is more important that leaders maintain order than protect freedoms.' More people agree with this statement (48%) than disagree (33%); 20% don't know. Respondents in the eastern part of the country are more likely to agree with this statement (51%) than those in the western part of the country (44%). Interestingly, even those in the West (considered to a more pro-democratic constituency) are more likely to choose order over freedoms (44% to 34%). There is also nearly universal preference for order over freedoms among major sub-groups in the population. Only the most highly educated are more likely to disagree with the statement than agree with it (47% to 41%).

If we cross-tabulate the responses from the previous two questions, we find that:

Group 1: Twenty-five percent of respondents agree with both statements,
Group 2: Twenty-five percent of respondents disagree with both statements, and

Group 3: Twenty-two percent give mixed responses to the two questions.

The remainder of the respondents reply, 'Don't Know' to one or both questions and are not included in the classification.

Younger respondents and those with higher levels of education are more likely to fall in the second, while older and less-educated respondents are more likely to fall in the first group.

The data above seems to indicate that order is a key concern for a great many Ukrainians and that they are willing to forego freedoms and democracy for order. This seems to be a telling indictment of Ukraine's democratic experience. But is this concern for order a concern that transcends all contexts or does it differ depending on the situation? IFES asked a series of questions to determine this.

Selective Suspension of Rights

Respondents were asked to respond to the following statements:

> *Next, I will read you a list of actions governments sometimes take to ensure order. Please tell me for each, whether the action can always be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified.*
>
> *A. Limit the activities of certain political parties*
> *B. Limit the rights of citizens to protest*
> *C. Limit freedom of the press*
> *D. Limit the authority of the courts*
> *E. Limit the activities of citizens' groups and unions*

Responses to these questions are presented in Figure 8 below.

Figure 8. Attitudes toward Restrictions On Freedoms (n=1500, in percent)



Figure 8 casts uncertainty on the order versus freedom preference noted above. When social freedoms are itemized, the responses reflect a general tendency for Ukrainians to value social

freedoms over authoritarian measures commonly invoked to maintain order. A majority of respondents feels that restricting press freedom (51%) and the authority of the courts (52%) is never justified, while a plurality (45%) feels that it is never justified to restrict the rights of citizens to protest. Even those who agree that their leaders should be more concerned with maintaining order than protecting freedoms are more likely to say that restriction of the press and courts is never justified (47% and 53%, respectively). However, when it comes to limiting the activities of political parties and unions or groups, a majority feels that these actions are at least sometimes justified (65% and 50%, respectively).

The majority's opposition to restriction of press rights or the authority of the courts might have something to do with the way these two institutions are judged by the public. Discussion later in this report will show that respondents have more confidence in the mass media, Constitutional court, and Supreme court than most of the other institutions in Ukrainian society.

In most cases, those with the highest level of education and those in the age group 26-35 are the most likely to say that a specific restriction is 'never justified'. Those who are not likely to vote in the next parliamentary elections are less likely to say that a restriction is 'never justified' than those who will definitely vote or are likely to vote.

V. Attitudes toward Political Parties

Necessity of Political Parties

There is a high level of support for the institution of political parties in Ukraine. This is evidenced by the majority of respondents that believe 'political parties are necessary' for democracy in Ukraine (55%). Few do not think that parties are necessary (18%) and many are unsure and state that they 'do not know' (20%). Despite this, the September 2001 data shows a decline in the percentage that believes parties are necessary as compared to the December 2000 survey. The trend for this question is depicted below.

Figure 9. Attitudes Toward Necessity of Political Parties
Trend data: 1994 – 2001



'Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy or not?'

One reason for the decline in the percentage professing the necessity of political parties may be that many respondents cannot distinguish one party from another. The recent data shows that only 21% believe there are clear differences between political parties. A full 79% of respondents state that either there are no clear differences between parties (48%) or that they are not sure if there are clear differences (31%). These figures represent an overall decline in the perception of differences from December 2000, when 30% of respondents felt that there were clear differences between political parties. At every point in which this question was included in the IFES surveys, fewer than 50% believed that the parties differed from each other.

Of the total, only 318 respondents believe there are clear differences. These differences are based on:

- Ideology (17% of this group, or 4% of the total sample);
- Economic reform (14%, 5%);
- The political course of the country (14%, 3%);
- Approach to foreign relations (6%, 1%); and
- There are differences, but do not know what they are (25%, 5%).

Choice of party

To gauge party identification, respondents to the survey were asked, 'Which political party do you think best represents your views and interest?' This provides some indication of which party they might choose in the next election. Results are displayed in Figure 10 below.

Figure 10. Party that Best Represents Respondents Views (n=1500)

	N	%
Agrarian Party of Ukraine (M. Hladiy)	22	1
All-Ukrainian Association 'Batkyivstchyna' (Yu.Timoshenko)	35	2
Communist Party of Ukraine (P. Symonenko)	234	16
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (Ya. Stetsko)	11	1
People's Rukh of Ukraine (G. Udovenko)	72	5
People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (V. Pustovoitenko)	33	2
Party 'Democratic Union' (O. Volkov)	7	<1
Green Party of Ukraine (V. Kononov)	65	4
Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukr.(A.Kinakh)	26	2
Party of Regions of Ukraine (M. Azarov)	10	1
Party 'Reforms and Order'(V. Pinzenyk)	26	2
Political Party 'Young Ukraine' (O. Doniy)	7	1
Political Party 'Labor Ukraine' (S. Tyhypko)	9	1
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (N. Vitrenko)	39	3
Selyanska Party of Ukraine (O. Tkachenko)	12	1
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United)(V.Medvedchuk,G.S	49	3
Socialist Party of Ukraine (O. Moroz)	35	2
Ukrainian People"s Rukh (Yu. Kostenko)	26	2
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (V. Zhuravskyi)	10	1
OTHER	46	3
NO ONE	306	20
DK	418	28

'Which political party do you think best represents your views and interests?'

As shown in the figure, nearly half (48%) state that they 'do not know' which party best represents their views or state that none of them do. The Communist Party of Ukraine draws 16% of the electorate in the September survey. This finding indicates a slight but significant decline over recent years. Previous IFES surveys show that previous answers to this question were:

- 18% (December 2000)
- 22% (January 2000)
- 16% (June 1999)
- 13% (July 1997)
- 14% (May 1996)

Subtracting support for the Communist Party and the 48% that does not specify a party leaves 36% distributed across the other parties listed above.

Party membership and Support

Two other questions included in the 2001 survey help to further elaborate these findings. The survey asked:

> *Are you a member of any political party? [If yes] (w)hich party is that?*
>
> *[If not] Are you a supporter of any political party, even if you are not a member? [If yes] Which party is that?*

Very few respondents state that they are members of any political party (2%). More do claim that they support a party, although they are not members (32%). Combining all these responses (which party represents their views, membership, and support) presents another view of political party affiliation. These results are presented below.

Figure 11. Party Affiliation (n=1500)

Party Affiliation	N	%
Non-communist party	601	37
Communist Party of Ukraine	232	16
No party	283	20
Do not know	383	28
Total	1500	101

Even combining different levels of party identification leaves a large percentage of the sample uncommitted to any specific party (48%), or unwilling to identify the party that they would support. Another 37% are distributed across other parties.

Support for Party Coalitions

The final outcome of the 2002 election will also be affected by the appeal of the various party coalitions that form for the election and their ability to attract votes. Overall, party coalitions tend to be viewed in more of a positive than a negative light. In response to the question, 'In your opinion, is the forming of party blocs a positive or negative development for democracy in Ukraine?':

- 10% stated this is 'very positive';
- 26% 'somewhat positive';
- 10% 'somewhat negative'; and
- 5% 'very negative.'

Others (17%) believe the forming of party blocs will 'have little influence.' It is also important to note that 32% claim they 'do not know.'

VI. Key Election Issues

The four sets of issues discussed in this section have direct bearing on the issue climate for next year's election. Dissatisfaction with the overall situation in Ukraine is at a high and critical level. The electorate will seek solutions to the political, social, and economic problems that face their country, but there appears to be wide latitude in the range of possible solutions that may win them over. There is considerable support for political union with either Russia or Europe. There is also considerable support for either a market or state controlled economy, or something unique and mixed between the two. Collectively, these two findings do not reflect a clear preference for the types of political or economic change preferred by the Ukrainian people. A fragile, but rising, impression that conditions may be improving in Ukraine and that the economy is improving lies behind this election. The data from this survey seems to imply that platforms need to deliver solutions and not focus solely on critiques of the existing order.

Satisfaction and Confidence

Overall Satisfaction. Few Ukrainians are satisfied with the situation of the country. Of the total sample, only 2% are generally satisfied and another 9% are 'somewhat satisfied.' That leaves 46% 'generally dissatisfied' and 39% 'somewhat dissatisfied.' The remaining 4% do not know.

The least satisfied respondents are ethnic Russians: 58% are 'generally dissatisfied', compared to 42% of ethnic Ukrainians and 46% of 'others.' Forty-nine percent of respondents in eastern Ukraine are 'generally dissatisfied', compared to 48% in the west and only 40% in the intermediate region.

On the other end, those who are satisfied are more likely to be from the intermediate regions (3% 'generally satisfied' and 12% 'somewhat satisfied') which compares to 1% 'generally satisfied' in the east, 2% in the west, and 9% 'somewhat satisfied' in the east and 6% in the west.

Again, these findings must be viewed in their historical context. While 85% of the sample population is dissatisfied with the situation of the country, the underlying trend in the data indicates a positive development over time. Figure 12 displays the trend in evaluations of the situation in Ukraine over time.

Figure 12. Satisfaction with the Situation over Time
Trend data



'Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today?'

It is evident that the vast majority of the population is dissatisfied. However, the figure also indicates a 13 percent decline in the percentage that is 'very dissatisfied' since the December 2000 survey and a 29% decline since the 1997 survey. While it's true that the percentage 'somewhat dissatisfied' has gone up since 1997, this increase (18%) is not enough to offset the decrease in those 'very dissatisfied'. At the same time, the percent 'very' or 'somewhat' satisfied has gone up by 7% since 1997 and 5% since the December 2000 survey.

This comment is not intended to distract attention from the overriding sense of dissatisfaction with the situation of the country. Such dissatisfaction provides ample ground for criticism of current policies and the direction of the country. At the same time, one should not discount the steady and significant rise in satisfaction.[5]

Confidence in institutions. Respondents to the IFES survey were asked about their level of confidence in various institutions and individuals in Ukraine. The data reveal that very few institutions in Ukraine inspire confidence among a large number of people and that most are not valued highly by the majority of respondents.

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[5] There is soft evidence of this outside of the data set. During last year's presentation of this data, the first author made a similar comment. This year's data further supports this claim. In conversations in Ukraine, the first author queried Ukrainians in Kyiv on this topic. In these conversations, several comments were made in support of the claim that the situation is improving in Ukraine:

- There is a general belief, at least in Kyiv, that the economy is doing well, and expectations are that it will improve in the next year.
- In relation to this, many people are finding work.
- The Hrvna is holding its value.
- Ukrainian products (light manufacture) are reappearing in the market place after being absent for several years.
- Foreign products are readily available, and there is an abundance of food in the shops.

These comments are suggestive and provide some basis for a belief that optimism may be on the rise in Ukraine. However, as noted by some other observers, the future performance of the Ukrainian economy will probably be adversely affected by a general decline in the world economic situation that many believe lies ahead. *It will be very unfortunate if a short-lived rise in optimism is reversed by factors beyond the control of Ukrainians.*

Respondents to the survey voiced high levels of confidence in Ukraine's security establishment. Seventy percent of respondents expressed a 'Great Deal' or 'Fair Amount' of confidence in Ukraine's armed forces, while 54% felt similarly for the state security services and 48% for the Council for Security and Defense. More respondents expressed confidence in these institutions than those who did not.

The Church and the mass media also received majority confidence ratings from respondents. The Church was the second highest-rated institution with 66% expressing confidence. The media also received high ratings with 61% of respondents expressing a 'Great Deal' or 'Fair Amount' of confidence in the media. IFES surveys since 1997 have shown an increase through the years in the opinion that adequate information is available on political and economic developments in Ukraine. This might account for the high confidence levels expressed toward the Ukrainian mass media.

Institutions that are responsible for implementing or enacting political and/or economic policies in Ukraine garner low confidence from a majority of respondents. This is probably a reflection of the majority dissatisfaction with political and economic conditions in Ukraine. Specifically, a majority of respondents expressed 'Little' or 'No' confidence in the Supreme Rada (59%), the Presidential Administration (59%), local authorities (59%), the Cabinet of Ministers (54%), and the National Bank (52%).

Among legal institutions, the Constitutional Court (45% confidence, 29% not) and Supreme Court (44% confidence, 31% not) have more respondents expressing confidence than not. More respondents did not have confidence in the other three legal institutions: public prosecutors (32% confidence, 49% not), local courts (27%, 56%), and the police (26%, 62%). In fact, respondents were least confident in the police and local courts out of all the institutions included in the survey. The fact that grass-roots level institutions are so devalued by respondents does not bode well for the effectiveness of Ukraine's legal system.

Respondents were also asked to rate important political personalities. A majority of respondents expressed little or no confidence in President Kuchma (60%) while only 30% expressed confidence in him. Viktor Yuschenko (43% confidence, 42% not) and Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh (37% confidence, 30% not) are the two highest-rated political personalities and the only ones in whom more respondents express confidence than not. A large majority expressed little or no confidence in Communist Party leader Olexander Moroz and presidential candidate Yulia Tymoshenko (61% and 69%, respectively). This report has previously stated that Ukrainians generally view the formation of political blocs for the next parliamentary elections in a positive light. A bloc headed by Mr. Yuschenko would seem to have a leg up on other blocs. Mr. Kinakh also has a positive rating, but it should be noted that 33% of respondents did not know enough about him to render an opinion. The "Don't know" figure was 15% for Yuschenko.

Figure 13 below lists data on these questions for both the 2001 and 2000 IFES surveys. 'Don't Know' figures are not reported. A composite rating based on responses is also presented: the higher the rating, the more confidence in the particular institution or leader.

Figure 13. Confidence in Select Institutions and Individuals

	September 2001, n=1500				December 2000, n=1500		
	Great Deal/Fair Confidence	Little/No Confidence	Rating		Great Deal/Fair Confidence	Little/No Confidence	Rating
Institutions							
Military	70%	19%	2.96		67%	24%	2.87
Church	66%	22%	2.97		62%	26%	2.90
Mass Media	61%	30%	2.68		NA	NA	NA
State Security	54%	26%	2.71		46%	34%	2.52
Council for Security/Defense	48%	31%	2.58		41%	38%	2.39
Cabinet of Ministers	34%	54%	2.19		26%	66%	1.98
Local Authorities	32%	59%	2.09		30%	63%	2.08
Supreme Rada	31%	59%	2.12		21%	73%	1.91
Presidential Administration	27%	59%	2.04		22%	67%	1.90
National Bank	28%	52%	2.03		25%	57%	1.97
Legal Institutions							
Constitutional Court	45%	29%	2.58		40%	40%	2.41
Supreme Court	44%	31%	2.52		NA	NA	NA
Public Prosecutor	32%	49%	2.20		32%	57%	2.10
Local Courts	27%	56%	2.06		Na	Na	Na
Police	26%	62%	1.95		22%	72%	1.95
Individuals							
Viktor Yuschenko	43%	42%	2.42		41%	48%	2.28
Anatoliy Kinakh	37%	30%	2.42		NA	NA	NA
Leonid Kuchma	30%	60%	2.02		29%	65%	1.99
Olexander Moroz	20%	61%	1.86		NA	NA	NA
Yulia Tymoshenko	17%	69%	1.70		NA	NA	NA

If one looks at the 'Great Deal/Fair Confidence' columns for both 2000 and 2001, it is interesting to note that these percentages have increased from 2000 to 2001 for all institutions and individuals that were present on both surveys. One of the most pronounced changes is for the Rada. While it's confidence rating has gone up by 10%, the number of respondents expressing a lack of confidence in the Rada has decreased from 73% to 59%. If one looks at the trend in composite ratings for the Rada and President Kuchma over previous IFES surveys (Figure 14), this is the first survey in which the Rada has a higher rating than President Kuchma. This might signal a shift in the perceptions of the president-parliament relationship in Ukraine.

Figure 14. Kuchma and Rada Ratings
Trend data, 1997 - 2001



Another important trend in Figure 13 is that although confidence ratings for President Kuchma have fallen over the past year, his opponents, most notably Mr. Yuschenko, have not been able to use this dissatisfaction to significantly raise their stature among the Ukrainian public.

Corruption

It is an understatement to claim that corruption is a vast and extensive problem in Ukraine. In everyday conversations, many Ukrainians connect the outcome of political and economic developments to the workings of oligarchs who are commonly believed to control the fate of the country. No person or organization seems free from the belief that, underneath the surface, someone on high (who will personally benefit from the result) directs all actions. This year's data reinforces the extent and severity of the hold corruption has on Ukraine. However, this report argues that corruption may not be as central of an issue as it was one year ago. A general rise in optimism and the expectation of economic development may be pushing corruption off the central stage that it has occupied in Ukraine since IFES' survey work began in 1994.

Extent of corruption. Two main questions have been asked over time on the topic of corruption:

> *In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption?*
>
> *And how serious is the problem of official corruption, meaning how much does it matter?*

Results from the 2001 survey are presented in the figures below. Both tables indicate a decrease in the perception that corruption is common and extensive. In Figure 15, the 2001 data show that 55% believe corruption is 'very common.' This compares to 75% one year ago. In all previous surveys, save 1996, more than 60% held this extreme position. This finding is supported by other questions on corruption.

Figure 15. How Common is Corruption?
Trend data: 1994 – 2001



'In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption?'

Figure 16 shows a similar trend. In September 2001, 60% stated that corruption is 'very serious.' While the figure is very high, and certainly unacceptable in a balanced society, 81% held that attitude in the previous year. This year's survey, in fact, recorded the lowest combined perception of corruption as 'fairly' or 'very serious' to date.

Figure 16. How Serious is Corruption?
Trend data: 1994 – 2001



'And how serious is the problem of official corruption?'

Similarly, 50% stated that the 'citizens of Ukraine accept official corruption as a fact of life.' Again, this finding is lower than observed in previous surveys (Figure 17). Those who answered that corruption is accepted as a way of life were then asked: 'And to what extent does this contribute to the problem of state (official) corruption?' The right-hand bar in the figure below shows the average, where a high value (4) represents the response 'very much,' and a low value

(1) represents 'not at all.' Points in-between represent the responses 'somewhat' and 'not very much.'

Figure 17. Acceptance of Corruption
Trend data: 1994 – 2001



'Do you think the citizens of Ukraine accept official corruption as a fact of life?'
'[IF YES] And to what extent does this contribute to the problem of state (official) corruption: Very much, somewhat , not very much, not at all?'

While fewer respondents believe that Ukrainians accept corruption as a way of life, those who do are stronger in their assessment that this acceptance does add to the problem. The bottom right-hand bar is at 3.55 out of a maximum value of 4.

The perception that corruption is common, serious, and accepted as a way of life has dropped from previous surveys. However, it is still a major concern in Ukrainian society.

Types of Corruption. This survey repeated a series of questions on the extent of and permissiveness toward different acts of corruption that originated in the 2000 survey.

> *Q. Please tell me for each of the following actions, whether the action can always be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified. (A high value means the action can never be justified, maximum = 3)*
>
> *Q. For each action, tell me if this activity occurs often here in Ukraine . . .Does it happen very often, sometimes, not very often, or never at all? (A high value means the action happens very often, maximum = 4)*
>
> A. Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to
> B. Cheating on tax if you had the chance
> C. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties
> D. Accepting money to vote for a politician or political party
> E. Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve businesses quickly
> F. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries
> G. High officials helping their associates in private business
> H. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials

Of the actions listed, A, B, and D are corrupt actions that anyone has the capacity to perform. Action C could be carried out by a wide range of people, including police officers, teachers, and government officials. E through H could only be carried out by relatively higher-ranking public officials. Figure 18 presents the results for the two questions. 'Don't know' and "No answer' responses are not reported.

The data from the 2001 survey replicates results observed last year. All actions listed in the table are reported to happen at least 'sometimes' by over 70% of the respondents. The most frequently occurring acts are 'taking a bribe' and the 'use of public funds' for personal benefit. Cheating on taxes is common, but accepting money to vote for a politician or candidate is relatively less so compared to the other acts.

The right hand panel indicates the level of acceptance of the various acts. None of these is accepted by a majority of the population. Cheating on taxes is the most accepted of these, where 32% believes it can 'sometimes' be justified. Claiming government benefits one is not entitled to can 'sometimes' be justified according to 22% of respondents.

Figure 18. Occurrence of, and Justification for, Corrupt Actions (n=1500, in %)

	How often does this action happen?		How often is it justified?		
	Often/ Sometimes	Not Very Often/Not At All	Always	Sometimes	Never
A. Claiming govt. benefits which you are not entitled to	75	10	4	22	66
B. Cheating on tax if you had the chance	85	6	5	32	56
C. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties	87	5	3	9	84
D. Accepting money to vote for a politician or political party	72	11	2	10	80
E. Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve business quickly	78	6	3	13	76
F. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries	83	5	2	6	86
G. High officials helping their associates in private business	82	5	4	18	70
H. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials	86	5	3	4	89

The use of public funds for personal benefit is 'never' justified according to 89% of the respondents. High officials benefiting from privatization is 'never' justified according to 86%. Accepting money to vote for a politician or party is an act that anyone capable of voting could carry out. This act is 'never' justified according to 80%. Generally, acts that can only be carried out by public officials are believed to be more taboo than corrupt acts that can be carried out by ordinary citizens.

These findings on corruption replicate results observed last year. This indicates that many attitudes toward corruption are highly stable, and are held by a consensus in Ukrainian society. Corruption may be less of a political topic than observed last year. However, Ukrainians remain adamant in their opposition to officials benefiting at their expense, and toward the electorate helping corrupt candidates reach office. Political candidates who are vulnerable to these charges will be at a clear disadvantage in their pursuit of public office.

Direction and Pace of Reforms

Findings from this year's survey indicate there is much support for political and economic reform in Ukraine. However, the direction of these reforms is not clearly indicated by respondents to the

survey. On the political front, there are three distinct groups. One group favors union with Russia, another favors membership in the European Union, and a third group would like to see some unique solution besides these two options. The same is true regarding the future development of the national economy. While more people favor a market versus a state-controlled economy, a sizeable group prefers a position in-between the two options.

Democracy in Ukraine. A plurality states that Ukraine is 'not a democracy' when asked, 'Is Ukraine a democracy?' Overall:

- 46% say Ukraine is not a democracy;
- 30% believe Ukraine is a democracy;
- 20% 'do not know'; and
- 3% give some other response.

In total, 454 respondents believe Ukraine is a democracy, and 1046 state that Ukraine is not a democracy, did not know or gave some other response. These 1046 were then asked, 'Is Ukraine moving toward a democracy or not?' Answers were split into three categories:

- 39% state that Ukraine is moving toward democracy, though it is not one now;
- 32% state it is not; and
- 29% state they 'do not know.'

To summarize,

- 30% say Ukraine is a democracy;
- 27% say Ukraine is not now a democracy, but it is moving in this direction;
- 23% say Ukraine is not a democracy and is not moving in this direction; and
- 20% just do not know.

These findings do indicate an increase in the number that believes Ukraine is becoming more democratic than observed in the previous survey. The trend data is presented in Figure 19.

Figure 19. Trend in Belief of Ukrainian Democracy
Trend data (1997 – 2001)



'Is Ukraine a Democracy?'

What is on the minds of respondents when they evaluate whether Ukraine is a democracy or not? This question was not included in the 2001 survey. The reason for this is because the 2000 survey included an open-ended question on this issue. We did not expect that attitudes on this issue would change considerably over the previous year. Questions about the definition of democracy touch upon the deeper level of individual beliefs rather than social attitudes. A large body of research on the formation of public opinion indicates that beliefs are more stable than attitudes, and show less variation over time. Last year's findings are briefly summarized below to provide some insight into what democracy means to respondents.

'The Meaning of Democracy'
Featured in the December 2000 IFES Report on Ukraine

The December 2000 survey followed up on this and asked respondents what they meant by the term. Respondents answered the question in their own words, and responses were thematically coded.

Six main thematic categories may be formed from the responses. According to these categories, democracy is:

- Human rights (55%: freedoms of speech, opinion, press, political choice, religion)
- Legally defined (18%: rule of law, equality of all in front of the law, justice)
- Politically defined (13%: power of the people, public access to power, transparency in government)
- Economically defined (16%: material prosperity, social welfare)
- National Sovereignty (2%)
- Other miscellaneous definitions mentioned by few (1%)

Political Reform. According to a large majority of respondents, political reform is moving too slowly in Ukraine. There is a clear mandate for increased movement toward reform:

- 50% state that political reforms are not moving fast enough;
- 19% state that political reforms are not taking place;
- 3% state that political reforms are moving too fast;
- 10% state that political reforms are moving at the right pace; and
- 18% 'do not know.'

Respondents' specific conceptions of political reforms are not uniform. On the issue of international orientation, Ukrainian society appears to be divided into three segments: those that favor entry into the European Union, those that favor union with Russia, and those that prefer a neutral position between these two options. Discounting the 11% that could not answer this question, the breakdown is:

- 40% favoring union with Russia;
- 34% favoring entry into the European Union; and
- 16% favoring strict neutrality.

The youngest respondents (those 18-25) are oriented more toward Europe than Russia:

- 46% favor entry into the European Union;
- 25% favor union with Russia;
- 19% favor neutrality; and
- 10 'do not know.'

Males are oriented more toward Europe than females. The comparison is:

- Union with Europe: 39% males, 29% females;
- Union with Russia: 37% males, 42% females;
- Neutrality: 15% males, 16% females; and
- Do Not Know: 9% males, 12% females.

Those with higher levels of education and observed standard of living are oriented more toward Europe:

- 49% of those in the highest (17% favor union with Russia) versus 23% in the lowest standard of living category, and
- 40% with the highest level of education versus 21% of those with the lowest (50% of whom favor union with Russia).

The ethnic divide on this issue goes in expected directions. Ethnic Ukrainians are much more in favor of union with Europe (38%) and ethnic Russians prefer union with Russia (66%). Ethnic 'others' are divided:

- 40% favor union with Russia;
- 30% favor union with Europe;
- 12% favor neutrality; and
- 9% 'do not know.'

Economic Reform. Connected with this discussion is the perception of economic reform. The mandate for reform is stronger on this issue. Overall, 77% believe reforms in the economy are going too slowly or are not happening at all, compared with 2% that state these reforms are moving too quickly. Only 9% believe economic reform is moving at the right pace, while 13% 'do not know.'

These results again provide a portrait of Ukrainian society that is split between three groups: those in favor of a market economy, those in favor of a state controlled economy, and those wanting some hybrid of the two.

Respondents were provided a picture of a scale in which different economic positions were given to them and asked the following question:

> *Here you see a picture with a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely planned by the state. Where on that scale should Ukraine be located in the future?*

Results indicate that:

- 14% favor the extreme point supporting a pure market economy;
- 18% indicate a weaker position in support of a market economy;
- 30% favor a point in-between a market and state controlled economy;
- 12% favor a weaker position in support of a state controlled economy;
- 14% favor the extreme point supporting a state controlled economy; and
- 14% 'do not know.'

In total, 32% favor a market economy versus 26% that do not. These results essentially replicate findings from last year. In December 2000:

- 32% favored a market economy;
- 32% chose a point in-between a market and a controlled economy;
- 27% favored a state controlled economy; and
- 10% did not know.

Support for foreign investment also remains high in this survey: 16% believe foreign investment is 'very important,' 31% say it is 'somewhat important,' 12% state it is 'not too important,' and 7% state it is 'not important at all.' An additional 21% volunteered the position that foreign investments 'are not needed at all.' Overall, 47% favor foreign investment versus 40% who do not.

The association between support for the market and one's judgment of the ideal international alignment for Ukraine is moderately linked (r=0.3). Figure 20 presents the cross tabulation of both attitudes.

Figure 20. Cross Tabulation of Support for Market Economy and Future Direction for Ukraine (n=1,500)

Support for . . .	Union with Europe	Point in-between	Union with Russia	Don't Know	Total
Market	16%	5%	8%	2%	31%
Point in-between	10%	5%	11%	3%	30%
State Controlled	5%	4%	14%	2%	25%
Don't know	3%	2%	6%	4%	14%
Total	34%	16%	40%	11%	100%

Of those that favor a market economy (statistics not displayed above):

- 51% favor union with Europe;
- 27% favor union with Russia; and
- 17% favor a point in-between these options.

Of those that favor a state-controlled economy:

- 18% favor union with Europe;
- 58% favor union with Russia; and
- 14% favor a point in-between the two poles.

This data indicates that there is a relationship between the type of economy preferred by a respondent and the future political system that respondent would like Ukraine to institute.

Regardless of economic and political scenarios for the future, there is a marked sense of optimism about the national economy in Ukraine reflected in the 2001 data. When respondents were asked to project the status of national economy in one year:

- 27% stated that it will be better;
- 46% stated it will be the same as it was in this year;
- 11% stated it will be worse; and
- 15% 'do not know.'

In contrast, the 2000 survey in December showed:

- 13% believed the economy would be better;
- 35% stated it would stay the same;
- 41% stated it would be worse; and
- 12% did not know.

There is a clear increase in optimism about the Ukrainian economy.[6] Those 18-25 and 36-45 years of age are the most optimistic (30% believe the economy will be better in one year compared to an overall average of 27%). There is no significant difference between the responses of males and females to this question.

[6] It is possible to interpret the response 'it will stay the same,' but this requires additional questions that were not included in the 2001 survey. Generally, this view represents opinions that the economy is better now, and it will be the same as this in the next year, and opinions that it is worse now and will continue to be bad in the next year. It is not possible to differentiate these responses in this year's survey.

Judicial and Legal Reform

Confidence in legal institutions is discussed above. Ukrainians are divided in their attitudes toward the different bodies. On the national level, the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court maintain high levels of public confidence: 45% and 44% of the public respectively, has at least some trust in them.[7] Local courts are viewed differently, and only 27% have some trust in them. These findings are reflected in other attitudes measured in the 2001 survey.

First, only 4% of the sample 'fully agree[d]' with the statement: 'If I were wrongly accused of a crime, I am sure that our judicial system would acquit me.' In contrast, 26% 'fully disagree[d]' with this statement, and another 33% 'somewhat disagree[d].' The remaining respondents 'somewhat agree' (19%) or 'do not know' (18%) if they would be acquitted.

The lack of faith in the judicial system seems directed mainly toward the lower courts. Respondents were asked:

> *As you may know, some people in Ukraine say that the courts are influenced by outside interests. Others say that this is not the case. For the three courts listed below, can you tell me how much influence you think outside interests have on the courts decision making?*

The following figures represent those respondents that feel outside interests have a significant amount of influence on decisions:

- 19% for the Constitutional Court;
- 22% for the Supreme Court; and
- 44% for the Local Courts.

Only 6% stated that outside interests have 'no influence' on local courts, compared to 11% for the Supreme Court and 14% for the Constitutional Court.

This underlies the support evident in this survey for judicial and legal reform. This topic is discussed next.

Awareness and support of judicial and legal reform. When Ukraine adopted its constitution on June 28, 1996, it established a five-year provisional court system. A mandate to construct a more unified and independent judicial structure was built into the constitution, and Ukraine proved ill prepared for the challenge. On the eve of expiration of the provisional system, a last minute, piecemeal initiative was pushed through the Rada to extend the life and functions of the judiciary. The Rada is now under increased pressure to deliver on the promises made over five years ago, but our survey indicates that many people are unaware of these debates, and a plurality is unable to articulate an anticipated impact of reforms. Overall, 67% have not heard of the recent Rada debates or do not know if they have heard about them. This leaves only 33% of respondents who know about the debates.

Regardless of level of awareness, there is a high level of support for court reform. Those who were unaware of the debate were asked, 'The Supreme Rada is now working on a law that will

[7] Notes from the fieldwork indicate that many respondents were confused about the difference between the Supreme and Constitutions courts.

create a more independent court system here in Ukraine. What is your opinion about such a new law, if it is passed?'

Among the 998 respondents who did not know about this reform:

- 17% state such reform is 'very important';
- 38% state it is 'somewhat important';
- 36% 'do not know' if it will be important; and
- Only 9% do not think this will be important.

The 502 respondents aware of the reform were asked, 'How important do you think it is for a law on the court system to be adopted by the Supreme Rada?'

Support among these respondents is high:

- 50% state it is 'very important';
- 32% state it is 'somewhat important';
- 13% 'do not know.'

The remaining 4% do not think this reform will be important.

Respondents were also asked if adoption of this law would have a positive or negative impact on the work of the courts. In total, 39% of the total sample believes reform of the court and efforts toward establishing a more independent judicial system will have a positive impact on the legal system in Ukraine. Another 20% state it will have both a positive and negative impact. Few (3%) believe this will have a negative impact.

Combining attitudes toward judicial reform, regardless of whether or not respondents are aware of its place on the agenda, indicates that 64% support judicial reform, 7% do not, and 28% 'do not know' whether it is important. This classification allows for a closer examination of the characteristics of these groups.

Relatively few people do not support judicial reform. They can be eliminated from the following analyses in order to concentrate on the characteristics of those who support it, and more importantly, the characteristics of those who do not know.

Among those who support judicial reform:

- 46% support non-communist parties / 74% of those who support non-communist parties also support judicial reform;

- 15% support the Communist Party of Ukraine / 67% of those who support the Communist Party also support judicial reform;

- 15% do not support any party / 52% of those that do not support any party support judicial reform; and

- 23% do not know what party they support / 57% of those that do not know what party they support do support judicial reform.

Further, among those who support judicial reform, 56% are 'very likely' to vote and another 28% are 'somewhat likely,' a total of 84% stating they probably will vote.

Among those who are not likely to vote, 45% support judicial reform. Among those who do not know if they will vote, 50% support judicial reform.

The overall message from the preceding analysis is that judicial reform is an issue that strikes a chord among all segments of Ukrainian society. Support is particularly high among those who affiliate themselves with a particular political party or who intend to vote in March 2002, but support remains high among ambiguous and non-voters as well.

VII. Civic Participation, Political Rights, and NGOs

Ukrainian civil society is still very much in its nascent stages and does not enjoy the level of support accorded to NGOs in the West. There is, however, as exhibited earlier, a strong interest in politics among all sectors of the population. The line of questioning on Civic Participation, Political Rights, and NGOs sought to discern the forms in which this interest may find its expression, both now and in the future.

Experience with elected officials

One aspect of civic participation is involvement in political life through contact with one's representatives. The September 2001 survey repeated a series of questions about citizen contact with government officials initiated in December of 2000. Respondents were asked:

> *Have you ever contacted your elected officials before to solve a problem in your life?*

Respondents who had contacted an elected official were then asked different questions about the level of official they contacted, how they had contacted that official, and the response from the official.

In last year's findings, only a minority (one out of four) of adult Ukrainians had attempted to contact an elected official, but most of them did arrange personal meetings with that person. This year's data replicates these findings: 22% have attempted to contact an elected official. Of these attempts, approximately two out of three resulted in a response, and a few recieved a partial response (16% of those respondents who had contacted an official). The remaining 19% did not gain a response.

Those who received a response were more likely to be dissatisfied than satisfied with the outcome of the response: 54% compared to 46% satisfied. This finding replicates previous years' results:

> *'At this point, the process appears to derail. Of those who received a response {298}, 50% were dissatisfied with the response they received. Most of them (35% of the 298 receiving a response), were "completely dissatisfied." A nearly equal amount reports satisfaction with the response they received (49% of 298). Of these, 20% were "completely satisfied."'*
> ***- IFES Report, December 2000***

Figure 21 summarizes that data on these questions from this survey.

Figure 21. Contact with Elected Officials

Percent Who Contacted an Elected Official = 22%	
Did elected official respond to you? (n=328)	
Yes	65%
Partially	16%
No	19%
Were You Satisfied With the Response? (n=264)	
Completely Satisfied	18%
Somewhat Satisfied	28%
Somewhat Dissatisfied	22%
Completely Dissatisfied	32%
Percent Who Did Not Contact Elected Officials = 76%	
Reasons for not Contacting an Elected Official (multiple response)	
Difficult to arrange a meeting	2%
There will be no result	23%
Problem not important enough	36%
Have to resolve own problems	26%
Do not trust them	8%
Other	2%

Most respondents did not attempt to contact their elected officials (76% or 1144 respondents). Main reasons for not contacting elected officials include:

- Lack of faith in elected officials ('there will be not result' (23% of 1144);
- 'Do not trust them' (8%));
- Difficulty in arranging a meeting (2%);
- The attitude that the problem was not important enough, or a sense that one has to rely on oneself to resolve problems (36% and 26%); and
- There has been little change over the last year in the percentage of respondents who have gone out and made contact with their representatives (22% in 2001, 24% in 2000).

Importance of Political Rights

IFES asked a series of questions on political rights in its surveys over the course of the last few years. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of specific rights. The list of rights is as follows:

- One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting;
- Honest elections are held regularly;
- The rights of minority ethnic groups are protected;
- All can freely practice the religion of their choice;
- All can form associations or unions without any government involvement;
- The private property of individuals is protected by law;
- The right to publicly criticize the government is protected; and
- Citizens have the right to form political parties.

In addition to these rights, this year IFES asked respondents to rate the importance of one other right:

- The rights of women are protected equally under the law.

Respondents can reply that a right is either 'very important', 'somewhat important', 'not very important', or 'not at all important.' Figure 22 below reports the percentage of respondents who reply 'very important' when asked about each of these rights.

Figure 22. Importance of Rights (% Replying 'Very Important)

	September 2001 (n=1500)	December 2000 (n=1500)	January 2000 (n=1484)	June 1999 (n=1484)	July 1997 (n=1484)	May 1996 (n=1544)
Private Property	61	65	62	55	77	69
Women's Rights	58	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Honest Elections	55	54	59	50	65	60
Freedom of Religion	50	54	56	46	60	57
Minority Rights	40	41	44	36	39	47
Free Speech	39	37	39	35	58	50
Choice of Parties	34	36	46	39	38	30
Freedom to Form Parties	26	21	24	22	22	27
Freedom of Association	25	25	25	23	23	29

'On this card you see a list of some rights many people believe are important. How important is it to you that the following rights be respected in Ukraine? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not important at all?'

As Figure 22 indicates, private property rights have consistently received the highest percentage of respondents calling them 'very important.' In the September 2001 survey, women's rights are accorded the second highest importance; after that, the pattern is mostly consistent with the pattern from previous surveys.

Not surprisingly, women in the 2001 survey are more likely to say the women's rights are very important than men (64% vs. 50%). Men are more likely to say that choice of parties, honest elections, free speech, and freedom of association are 'very important', whereas women are more likely to say that minority and religious rights are 'very important.'

The higher the educational achievement of a respondent, the more likely he or she is to say that a right is 'very important.' And generally, younger respondents are more likely to say a right is 'very important.' Finally, and not surprisingly, those who value order over freedoms are consistently less likely to say a right is 'very important' than those who value freedoms over order.

Support and membership in NGOs

The data continues to present a mixed picture of the role of NGOs in Ukrainian society. On one hand, NGOs are perceived as an important part of society. The September data indicate a sharp increase in the percentage that believe NGOs are either 'essential' or 'very necessary.' Combining these responses shows that a majority (62%) believes they are necessary compared to 22% who do not.

At the same time, almost no one belongs to an NGO or would be willing to volunteer their time to one. Only 6% are members and only 2% would be willing to work without pay for an NGO. Of the 82 members of NGOs, 55 (67%) would not volunteer time to work for one. Figure 23 summarizes this data.

Figure 23. Attitudes toward NGOs
Trend Data (1996 – 2001) (in percent)

		May 1996 (n=1484)	July 1997 (n=1484)	June 1999 (n=1484)	December 2000 (n=1500)	September 2001 (n=1500)
How necessary are these non-governmental organizations, or NGOs?	Essential	18	9	12	13	19
	Very Necessary	35	23	11	22	43
	Not Very Necessary	14	33	39	34	18
	Not at All Necessary	12	12	11	9	4
	DK/NA	21	15	23	23	16
Would you give your time to work for a non-governmental organization without being paid?	Definitely, Yes		22	5	8	2*
	Probably, Yes		38	20	31	
	Probably, No		15	14	12	
	Definitely, No		13	41	39	98*
	Depends		6	14	-	
	DK/NA		6	6	9	

*Only two response categories: yes, no.

Despite the low membership and volunteer statistics, NGOs do have a perceived role in society that earns them the evaluation that they are necessary. One way in which they may be necessary is in delivering some social services more effectively than the state does. When asked whether NGOs could deliver some social services more effectively than state organizations, the following responses were received:

- 40% agree that NGOs can deliver some services more effectively;
- 32% do not agree that NGOs can deliver services more effectively; and
- 29% do not know.

Religious Participation

Religious identification does continue to rise in Ukraine. Only 21% stated they do not identify with a religion. Of the remaining respondents:

- 26% identify with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchy;
- 9% identify with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Partiarchy;
- 29% identify themselves as Orthodox; and
- 8% identify themselves with the Greek Catholic Church.

The remaining 7% are distributed across various denominations and churches.

Attendance at church is reported as:

- 22% at least once a month;
- 28% a few times a year;
- 30% less than once a year or ‘depends’; and
- 18% do not attend church services.

According to December 2000 data:

- 38% identified with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church;

- 7% identified with the Russian Orthodox Church;
- 16% identified themselves as Orthodox Christians;
- 8% identified themselves with the Greek Catholic Church; and
- 22% did not identify with any church.

The remaining 9% were distributed across other denominations and churches.

Data on attendance from December 2000 indicate:

- 19% at least once a month;
- 26% a few times a year;
- 23% less than once a year or 'depends'; and
- 31% do not attend church services.

To restate: in December 2000, 22% did not identify with any church and 31% did not attend church services. In September 2001, 21% did not identify with any church, but only 18% do not attend church services.

VIII. Public Information and Media

The performance of media is a central factor and concern in the upcoming elections to the Supreme Rada. There is wide support for the institution of the media in Ukraine. Ukrainians are well aware of the position of the media in the power structure of the country, its economic vulnerability, and the unsafe position in which journalists are placed when carrying out their duties. Data presented earlier in the report indicates high levels of confidence in media, and public concern that media may be compromised by government attempts to maintain order in society. However, while the media is valued as a social institution, many respondents are critical of the specific performance of the media, particularly in providing adequate information on political and economic developments in Ukraine. Media as a 'fourth estate' that contributes to a system of checks and balances, a concept held in western society, is far from a reality in Ukraine.

Availability of Political and Economic information

The public is not satisfied with the amount of information available to them on political and economic developments in Ukraine. More than one out of three (34%) state that 'not very much' or 'no information at all' is available about political developments. The situation is worse concerning economic events: 54% state that there is not enough information. These data are presented in Figure 24 below.

Figure 24. Information about Political and Economic Developments (1)
Trend Data (1997 – 2001) (in percent)

		July 1997 (n=1200)	June 1998 (n=1200)	June 1999 (n=1200)	December 2000 (n=1500)	September 2001 (n=1500)
How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine?	Great Deal	3	5	5	12	8
	Fair Amount	21	25	36	48	49
	Not Very Much	56	52	47	32	31
	None At All	15	12	7	6	3
	DK/NA	5	6	4	2	2
How much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine?	Great Deal	2	2	5	7	4
	Fair Amount	15	22	32	39	35
	Not Very Much	55	55	51	43	48
	None At All	22	15	8	8	6
	DK/NA	7	5	5	3	3

While generally discouraging, the situation has been improving over the years. Concerning information about political developments:

- July 1997, 71% claimed that not enough information was available;
- June 1998, 64%;
- June 1999, 54%;
- December 2000, 38%; and
- September 2001, 34%.

This displays a steady increase in the perceived amount of information on national political developments over this time period. The trend has also been mostly positive for economic information:

- July 1997, 77% claimed that not enough information was available;
- June 1998, 70%;

- June 1999, 59%;
- December 2000, 51%; and
- September 2001, 54%.

This data is presented in Figure 25 below.

Figure 25. Trend in Lack of Political and Economic Information
(% Responding that 'Not Enough' or 'None At All' Information is Available)



Despite the improvement in information on political developments, most respondents feel that the media does not provide enough information for people to make 'wise choices when it is time to vote in the elections.' Seven percent of respondents stated that 'no information at all' was available that enabled them to make wise choices. Another 28% stated 'very little was available' and 27% stated there was 'not quite enough.' That totals 62% stating there is not enough information to make wise choices, compared to 28% that 'received enough information.'

Similarly, information about economic developments is still inadequate according to a majority of Ukrainians. Privatization is one of the key areas where information is needed, but 56% are not well informed on this issue (Figure 25, below).

According to the September data, information about local events is even more limited. Concerning the activities of local government, 68% stated there is 'not very much information available.' There appears to be very little coverage of the local budget and how the funds are used in the communities where people live. One out of two respondents claim they are 'not at all informed' about how their local budget is spent, and another 25% are 'poorly informed.'

Figure 25. Information about Political and Economic Developments (2)
September 2001 (n=1,500)

		Sept. 2001 (n=1500) %
How much information do you have about the activities of your local government?	Great Deal	3
	Fair Amount	21
	Not Very Much	42
	None At All	26
	DK/NA	2
	Not at all interested	6
How well informed are you about the government's efforts at privatization?	Well informed	4
	Somewhat informed	29
	Poorly informed	35
	Not at all informed	21
	DK/NA	3
	Not at all interested	8
How well informed are you about the budget in your [city or village] and how the funds are spent?	Well informed	3
	Somewhat informed	14
	Poorly informed	25
	Not at all informed	51
	DK/NA	2
	Not at all interested	5

Sources of information

Respondents were also asked to identify and rate their own sources of information. Overall, 85% rely on national television as one of their sources for information on political and economic developments. For 73% of the sample, national television is the **main** source of information about political and economic developments.

National and local newspapers and national radio are important sources of information as well, each gaining a total mention of approximately 40%. However, relatively few rely on these as a primary source of information.

Evaluations of media performance have to account for what appears to be relatively low expectations from the public. Many believe they do not receive adequate information about some key developments that affect their lives. This was discussed above. However, respondents perceive that the information they do receive is at least somewhat objective. National television receives the highest ratings for objectivity, followed by local radio, national newspapers, national radio, and the other sources listed below. 'Other' sources are rated highly by respondents; however, many of these sources include personal relations. These findings are given in the last set of columns below.

Figure 26. Sources of Information (n=1500)

Source	Total Mentions		Main Source		Objectiveness (%)				
	#	%	#	%	Very Objective	Somewhat Objective	Not Very Objective	Not At All Objective	DK
NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS	557	37	107	8	4	44	20	4	29
NATIONAL RADIO	571	38	94	7	4	47	17	3	29
NATIONAL TELEVISION	1273	85	1054	73	12	58	14	3	14
LOCAL NEWSPAPERS	614	41	67	5	3	40	24	7	27
LOCAL RADIO	362	24	21	2	3	36	20	5	37
LOCAL TELEVISION	499	33	44	3	4	44	18	4	30
OTHER	44	3	19	1	12	58	14	3	14

Objectivity scores may also be recalculated to provide average scores: 'very objective' = 4, 'somewhat objective' = 3, 'not very' = 2, and 'not at all objective' =1. This calculation produces the following scores:

- 2.7 for national papers;
- 2.5 for local papers;
- 2.7 for national radio;
- 2.6 for local radio;
- 2.9 for national television; and
- 2.7 for local television.

Looking at the averages above shows that national sources are consistently rated as more objective than local sources of information. In another series of questions, respondents were asked about their main sources of information on developments in the communities where they live. No single source emerges here as a dominant provider. The main sources listed include:

- Friends and acquaintances (22%);
- Local newspapers (20%); and
- Local television (16%).

Another 15% of respondents indicated that they receive no information at all about their local governments.

Respondents were next asked to evaluate the objectivity for each source they mentioned. These data are presented in the right hand columns of the figure below. Media sources for local information that received few mentions are omitted from the presentation of objectivity data because the counts are too low for valid percentages.

One interesting finding is that local officials are perceived to be at least somewhat valid sources of information by 80% of the 82 respondents that mentioned this source. After this, local radio is perceived as an objective source by 64%, though relatively few mention local radio as a source of information.

Figure 27. Sources for information on Local developments (n=1500)

SOURCES		# Who Use Source	OBJECT RATING LOCAL INFORMATION					Total
			Very Objective	Somewhat Objective	Not Very Objective	Not At All Objective	DK	
National Newspapers	#	17	Count Too Low For Percentages					
	%	1						
Local Newspapers	#	301						
	%	20	6%	46%	28%	4%	17%	100.00%
National Radio	#	16	Count Too Low For Percentages					
	%	1						
Local Radio	#	115						
	%	8	1%	63%	17%	4%	15%	100.00%
National Television	#	126						
	%	8	6%	47%	21%	6%	21%	100.00%
Local Television	#	241						
	%	16	4%	47%	29%	3%	17%	100.00%
Local Officials	#	35						
	%	2	20%	60%	3%	0%	17%	100.00%
Friends, Acquaintances	#	332						
	%	22	7%	42%	20%	7%	25%	100.00%
Other	#	11	Count Too Low For Percentages					
	%	1						
Get No Information	#	223						
	%	15						
Not Interested	#	42						
	%	3						
DK	#	41						
	%	3						
Total	#	1500						

Media safety

The public's perception of the objectivity and performance of media must be placed in the context of the pressures faced by journalists in Ukraine. Many media outlets are owned by political and economic elites. The public perception of these outlets is that many of them serve the political interests of their owners. Most respondents feel that it is not safe for a journalist to express his or her real opinion about events in Ukraine. The data from this year's survey suggest that the closely followed case of George Gongadze is only the most visible instance of suppression of journalists in Ukraine.

Respondents were asked, 'In your opinion, how safe is it for media in Ukraine to broadcast or print their true opinions, even if these opinions are critical of the government?'

According to the respondents, conditions for the media are:

- 'Very unsafe' (14%);
- 'Somewhat unsafe' (33%);
- 'Somewhat safe' (26%); and
- 'Very safe' (3%).

Twenty-three percent stated they 'did not know.'

Those who believe conditions are at least somewhat unsafe for journalists (n=707) were asked reasons for their answers. Multiple answers were possible. Reasons provided include:

- Dangerous for the journalist's life (45%);
- Journalists will lose their jobs (26%);
- Media outlets are dependent on the government, which acts corruptly (18%); and
- The press is not protected by law (4%).

Outright government censorship of the media was only mentioned by 3% of this group.

The preceding data can go a long way toward providing an explanation for why the media is highly rated as an institution, despite not providing adequate coverage of political and economic developments. The pressures exerted on the media in Ukraine by governmental and other institutions are recognized by the Ukrainian public and, seemingly, provide the media with some leeway for its failure to adequately provide information to Ukrainian citizens.

IX. Conclusion

This report has presented analyses and interpretation in six broad categories of public opinion as observed in Ukraine during September 2001. In the first half of the report, emphasis was placed on gauging the pre-election environment and anticipating the ingredients of electoral success or failure. These topics were elaborated in the sections on Electoral Support and Behavior, Political Attitudes, Attitudes toward Political Parties, and Key Election Issues. General areas of inquiry on the political process were grouped into the following categories: Civic Participation, Political Rights and NGOs, and Public Information and Media. The concluding remarks below will highlight important observations made in each of these topics and areas for future work.

Electoral Support and Behavior

The dominant theme in the first sections of this report is the extent to which Ukrainians are drawn toward or repelled from active engagement in the political process. The overall findings provide reason for optimism. Nearly 80% of respondents are likely to vote in the March elections, one of several indicators that the electoral process is taken as a serious responsibility. The finding that more people report to have voted in the last Supreme Rada election in 1998 (82% of those respondents who were eligible) than the actual turnout (70%) reinforces this interpretation. The 12% difference between the self-reported and the actual turnout is much greater than the margin of error for a survey of this type. Clearly, there is a well-established disposition toward electoral participation. Many of those who did not actually vote were uncomfortable in admitting this.

The commitment of the Ukrainian voter to the electoral process is encouraging, particularly in an economic and political climate that one would expect to invite disillusionment, and still further encouragement can be found in the figures representing confidence in the electoral process. While 43% do not expect fair elections in March 2002 (a perception commonly shared by ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians, and others), this is a significant improvement from the 71% that gave this same response in December 2000. Between December 2000 and September 2001, confidence in the upcoming election increased nearly 30%. Similarly, this finding reflects a higher level of confidence than exhibited prior to the 1999 presidential elections, when 58% had a negative outlook. Though further research in this area is necessary, it appears that increased confidence in institutions and a drop in the perceived frequency and seriousness of corruption are contributing factors.

In the context of electoral enthusiasm and confidence, it is important to note that there are sectors of the population that are noticeably less optimistic than others. Ethnic Russians and those who identify themselves as non-Russian and non-Ukrainian state they are less likely to vote (approximately 28% unlikely, compared to 19% for ethnic Ukrainians). Ethnic Russians and others are also more likely to "fully disagree" with the statement "voting gives influence"—approximately 40% compared to only 29% among ethnic Ukrainians. Respondents from urban areas are also less likely to vote in 2002 (15% unlikely, compared to 8% of rural respondents) or to feel confidenct in the impact of voting (66% feel that voting does not give influence, as compared to 54% of rural respondents).

A sector of the population that typically exhibits disaffection elsewhere, however, shows signs of a strong participatory ethic in Ukraine. Only 25% of respondents 18-25 are unlikely to vote, which compares to the overall average of 21%, a 4% difference. This contrasts sharply with age-group trends in the United States, where 18 to 24 year olds were 25% less likely to vote in the

1998 by-elections,[8] and with Western Europe, where 18 to 29 year olds were 8% less likely to vote in the early 1990s.[9] Ukrainian youth are also interested in politics: 47% are at least 'somewhat interested' compared to 62% overall, and are the most likely to 'fully agree' that 'voting gives influence,' 13% compared to the overall average of 9%. Building on this enthusiasm is a clear challenge to reform-minded political elites and groups interested in promoting democracy in general.

The high expected turnout for this election also necessitates further examination of the areas of democratic development and assistance that may be lacking. The turnout and confidence numbers suggest that channeling vast resources into a 'get out the vote' campaign may not be the most efficient strategy during the campaign and pre-election period. People already intend to vote, although nearly one out of four 'do not know' how the election will affect them personally (26%). This finding is mirrored in the high percentage (62%) that state they do not receive enough information to make informed decisions when it comes time to vote. Taken together, these findings indicate that the public is not well informed of what is 'at-stake' in this election. This is a telling indictment of political parties, the media, and civic groups in Ukraine. Clearly, they have failed to capture the imaginations of an otherwise politically active and interested electorate. Future assistance strategies should reflect an emphasis on connecting voters with the institutions that shape and implement policies. Additionally, work in the area of civic education, with an emphasis on teaching citizens how to engage the political process most effectively, may be advisable.

Attitudes toward Political Parties and Politics

The second picture is of political parties as an institution. There is less cause for optimism here. Political parties have few members. The 2000 IFES survey asked respondents what reasons would motivate them to join political parties. Nearly two-thirds (67%) replied that there is either 'no reason' or that they 'do not know' if there is a reason to join a political party. Supporting a political party is undoubtedly more important than membership. Up to 32% claim they support a party, though they are not members. This finding is somewhat superficial, however, as support for specific parties is temporary at best (with the exception of the Communist Party, which maintains a steady -- though slightly declining -- base of support). In recalling the 1998 elections, 42% could not (or did not choose to) remember for which party they voted. This corresponds with the finding that only 21% stated that there are 'clear differences' between the political parties.

This general trend against affiliation with political parties becomes more comprehensible when juxtaposed with Ukrainians perception of the importance of political parties within the political process. A full 20% 'do not know' whether political parties are 'necessary for democracy' in Ukraine, and another 18% believe that they are 'not necessary.' Respondents were also much more likely to agree that government should sometimes take actions that limit the activities of political parties to ensure social order (17% stating it can 'always be justified') than restrict the rights of citizens (7%), limit freedom of the press (5%), or limit authority of courts (5%).

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[8] *Source:* U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Education & Social Stratification Branch. Go to http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/cps1998/tab01.txt

[9] Eva Anduiza Perea, "Youth Turnout in National Parliamentary Elections," in *Youth Voter Participation: Involving Today's Young in Tomorrow's Democracy*, eds. Stephen E. Bennett and Wolfgang Hirczy de Mino (Stockholm: International IDEA, 1999), 27.

Attitudes toward political parties may reflect the current range of options available in Ukraine rather than longer-term developments in political engagement and efficacy. The bigger picture of political attitudes is more promising than orientations to political parties, even if this is the pressing need of the day. Interest in politics has been rising steadily from a low of 43% observed in June 1999 up to 65% in December 2000 and 62% in September 2001. A sizeable group discusses politics frequently and persuades others of their opinions. This finding is consistent with results from the previous December 2000 survey.

This fuller picture does not describe a society alienated from national political developments and turning away from engagement. It will be important to reassess these developments, or if people turn away from politics, after the elections.

Key Election Issues

Attitudes toward four different topics were presented as key election issues: Satisfaction and Confidence, Corruption, Direction and Pace of Reforms, and Judicial and Legal Reform. In addition, respondents were asked to identify, in open format, their own priorities for the new Rada. The orientation of Ukrainian voters to these issues gives a sense of where candidates might be successful in placing their energies. It also represents an important commentary on where progress has been made, and where future work needs to be done.

Consistent with the findings of past surveys, an overwhelming majority is dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine, and confidence is low in most institutions and individuals. Despite this, the 2001 data confirm a trend over time that suggests improvement in these areas. Dissatisfaction with the current situation in Ukraine has been consistently decreasing since 1997 and confidence in institutions and the economic outlook has been on the rise. In particular, it is interesting to note that, for the first time, confidence in the Supreme Rada is higher than that for either President Kuchma or for the Presidential Administration. Indeed, confidence in the Rada registered a 10% increase this year. Whether this support remains steady will be a key test of the integrity and promise of the March elections.

Attitudes toward corruption were captured in terms of both their prevalence and severity. On both accounts, the data reflects significant improvement. The perception that corruption is 'very common' dropped 20% to 55% in 2001. While this may be partially explained by a sharp increase in this perception in December of 2000 (perhaps in relation to the death of journalist George Gongadze), the 2001 percentage is lower still than any year since 1996. Respondents also view corruption as a less serious problem than in past years. While the trend data is encouraging, the sheer volume of respondents citing the prevalence and severity of corruption in Ukrainian society is still cause for concern. Most Ukrainians believe that corruption is both common and serious, a finding that should be noted by policymakers and advocates for Ukrainian democracy.

Political and economic reform is necessary according to the majority of respondents. Overall, 50% state that the pace of political reforms is going 'too slowly' and another 19% believe they are 'not happening at all.' Similarly, 57% state that the pace of economic reform is going 'too slowly' and 20% also state that economic reform is 'not happening at all.' This is a clear mandate for reform.

The direction of reform and what respondents mean by reform, however, is not clear. More work is needed here to better understand these issues. Whether they support a market or centrally planned economy, union with Russia or union with Europe, respondents are also likely to

complain about the pace of reforms. Reform can thus not be considered synonymous with democratization and open markets. Future research needs to provide respondents a checklist of different policies, for example, and measure their support for each option.

One reason for contradictory answers may lie with the public's limited understanding of the details of the reform agenda. An illustration of this is seen in the data regarding judicial and legal reform. A majority supports reform of the court system. Even those who did not know about this issue support it once they are informed of it. However, perhaps the most striking finding is that 36% 'do not know' what impact this will have. The high rate of 'do not know' responses may indicate a low level of belief that such reform will actually be accomplished, a wait and see attitude. More importantly, it may reflect a lack of knowledge about the content and scope of the reform. If the first scenario is true, perhaps only time will convince these people of the merits of such reform. If the second is true, then a widespread public information campaign is needed. Regardless of whether they know about this or not, a substantial portion of the public is in support these of efforts. Publicizing these developments would likely further this support.

This comment applies to other areas of reform, whether political or economic. Completing the picture of the public's understanding of and preferences for reform should be a high priority in future work on public opinion in Ukraine.

In addition to the specific issues addressed in the 2001 questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify the issues that are important to them in an open format. Issues cited were overwhelmingly economic in nature. Improving the well-being of people, providing jobs, and dealing with economic issues are the most important issues according to most of the respondents. Parties and candidates that are successful in setting the agenda on these issues will likely be favored in the upcoming elections.

Civic Participation, Political Rights, and NGOs

New and revealing information stemmed from the lines of questioning on political rights and NGOs this year. While the majority of perceptions regarding the importance of political rights remained consistent with past years, a new right was included in the list of options provided to respondents this year. Women's rights, appearing for the first time, registered second only to private property, with 58% identifying them as 'very important.' While, as expected, women are more likely to identify this right as being of importance, men also exhibited significant support. Further research in this area should focus on the specific challenges facing women in Ukraine and citizen-identified solutions.

The responses to questions on NGOs were some of the most revealing in this year's survey. Nineteen percent of respondents identified NGOs as 'essential' and 43% described them as 'very necessary,' the highest level of support ever recorded by an IFES survey. Further, a plurality (40%) noted that NGOs may be more effective in delivering some services than the state. Paradoxically, this year's survey also registered the lowest percentage of respondents (2%) that would be willing to donate their time in service of NGOs.

These findings beg the question of whether Ukrainian democracy does indeed end at the voting booth. While civil society is held in high regard and considered an important engine for service provision, Ukrainians seem uninterested in ensuring its success. This presents another area for further research. Why do Ukrainians see NGOs as so important if they are not willing to donate their time in their service, and vice versa? This also calls into question the sustainability of

Ukraine's nascent civil society (i.e. Can NGOs exist upon public support if the donor community withdraws financial support from them?) While this year's responses provide some grounds for optimism, they also raise more questions than they answer.

Public Information and Media

Clearly, media is held in high esteem by the public. A majority believes that the state is 'never justified' in restricting press freedom to ensure social order. However, the public seems to temper their expectations of media performance with the realization of the pressures journalists face in carrying out their duties. This finding is reflected in the 47% of respondents that believe it is unsafe for journalists to express their true opinions. Perhaps this explains why 61% state they are generally confident in the mass media (second only to the military and the church), while many also report they do not receive enough information about political and economic events in Ukraine. Not enough information is provided in order for Ukrainians to make informed decisions when it comes time to vote, according to 62%. And, while the trend regarding the amount of political and economic information available is generally positive, the public still feels unprepared.

Appendix 1. Data Tables

Section 1: Information Available in Society

Q1. How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine -- a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Great deal	3%	5%	5%	7%	12%	8%
Fair amount	21%	25%	36%	31%	48%	49%
Not very much	56%	52%	47%	47%	32%	31%
None at all	15%	12%	7%	10%	6%	3%
Don't know	5%	6%	4%	4%	2%	2%
No answer	✯	✯	✯	1%	✯	7%
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Q2. In your opinion, do you receive enough information about political developments in our country to make wise choices when it is time to vote in the elections? Do you receive enough information, barely enough, very little, or no information at all?

	9/01 (1500)
Enough information	28%
Barely enough	27%
Very little	28%
None at all	7%
Don't know	4%
No answer	7%
Total	**101%✓**

Q3. What about in your community? How much information do you have about the activities of your local government? Would you say you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no information at all?

	9/01 (1500)
Great deal	3%
Fair amount	21%
Not very much	42%
None at all	26%
Don't know	2%
No answer	6%
Total	**100%**

Q4. How much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine -- a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Great deal	2%	2%	5%	5%	7%	4%
Fair amount	15%	22%	32%	25%	39%	35%
Not very much	55%	55%	51%	51%	43%	48%
None at all	22%	15%	8%	14%	8%	6%
Don't know	7%	5%	5%	4%	3%	3%
No answer	✯	✯	✯	1%	✯	5%
Total	**101%✓**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**

Q5. In the last few years the government has begun the process to sell state owned enterprises such as energy and coal. How well informed are you about the government's efforts at privatization?

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Well informed	4%	4%
Somewhat informed	23%	29%
Not well informed	42%	35%
Not informed at all	28%	21%
Don't know	3%	3%
No answer	✯	8%
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q6. How well informed are you about the budget in your [city or village] and how the funds are spent? Are you well informed, somewhat informed, not well informed, not at all informed?

	9/01 (1500)
Well informed	3%
Somewhat informed	14%
Not well informed	25%
Not informed at all	51%
Don't know	2%
No answer	5%
Total	**100%**

Q7. What media are your main sources of information about political and economic events in Ukraine? MARK ALL

	9/01 (1500)
National newspapers	37%
National radio	38%
National television	85%
Local newspapers	41%
Local radio	24%
Local television	33%
Other	3%
Don't Know	2%
No answer	3%

Q8. Of all these you mentioned, which one do you rely on the most for political and economic news?

	9/01 (1500)
National newspapers	8%
National radio	7%
National television	73%
Local newspapers	5%
Local radio	2%
Local television	3%
Other	1%
Don't Know	2%
Total	**101%✓**

Q8A. And, which national newspaper do you rely on most? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED NATIONAL NEWSPAPER IN Q8]

	9/01
	(107)
Vechernie Vesti	5%
Vechernie Kiev	★
Vysokyi Zamok	10%
Holos Ukrainy	3%
Delovaya Ukrainy	3%
Den	3%
Express	11%
Kievskie Vedomosti	4%
Komsomol's'kaya Pravda	2%
Rabochaya Gazeta	2%
Segodnia	1%
Sil's'ki Visti	10%
Trud Ukraina	2%
Ukraina Moloda	1%
Uriadovyi Courier	1%
Facty I Commentarii	35%
Argumenty I Facty Ukraina	3%
Zerkalo Nedely	★
Kievskie Novosty	1%
Nasha Gazeta	1%
Bisness	1%
Other	3%
Total	**102%**

Q8B. And, which national radio station do you rely on most? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED NATIONAL RADIO IN Q8]

	9/01
	(94)
Ukrainian Radio 1	76%
Ukrainian Radio 2 "Promin"	15%
Ukrainian Radio 3	1%
Dovira-Nika FM	1%
Nashe Radio	4%
Radio Era	2%
Total	**99%** ✓

Q8C. And, which national television station do you rely on most? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED NATIONAL TELEVISION IN Q8]

	9/01
	(1054)
UT-1	11%
UT-2, 1+1	35%
Inter	51%
Novyi Kanal	✯
ICTV	2%
STB	1%
Total	**100%**

Q8D. And, which local newspaper do you rely on most? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED LOCAL NEWSPAPER IN Q8]

	9/01
	(67)
Sumshina	2%
Dialog	3%
Narodne Slovo	1%
Obryi	1%
Vechernie Cherkasi	1%
Misto	1%
Hryvnia	1%
Obukhovs'kyi Kraj	2%
Dnipr Vechernie	6%
Nashe Misto	4%
Kriminal'naya Hronika	5%
Mig	4%
Vibor	1%
Gart	3%
Vesti Nedginskie	1%
Sivershina	1%
Tavrija	1%
Veteran	2%
Slava Krasnodona	2%
Krest'janksaya Nedelja	2%
Rakurs	2%
Grif	1%
Chernomorsiky Mayak	5%
Vechernaya Odessa	4%
Krimskaya Pravda	20%
Eho	1%
Vechirnya Poltava	2%
Poltavs'kie Visnik	2%
Zorja Poltavshini	1%
Hryvnia Vechernie	3%
Vidomosti	2%
Postup	2%
Moloda Galichina	1%
Obolon	3%
Nosovskie Vesti	1%
Nashe Jittya	1%
Molodyi Bukovinets	4%
Chas	3%
Other	4%
Total	**106%** ✓

Q8E. And, which local radio station do you rely on most? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED LOCAL RADIO IN Q8]

	9/01
	(21)
Vidikon	35%
Europa Plus	7%
Lada	4%
L'vivs'ka Kvilya	24%
Luganskoe Radio	11%
Nashe FM	7%
Smiljans'ka Radio	3%
Cherkas'kyi Novini	2%
Oblasne Radio	7%
Total	**100%**

Q8F. And, which local television station do you rely on most? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED LOCAL TELEVISION IN Q8]

	9/01
	(44)
TRK Kiev	16%
Gravis	3%
Simon	5%
Oleksandrys'ky Kanal	1%
Kirovograd	2%
Ros	1%
7 Kanal	6%
10 Kanal	3%
11 Kanal	13%
32 Kanal	4%
Aleks	7%
TV-5	3%
Zaporodg'ye	2%
Khortitsa	8%
Odessa TV "Facty"	2%
Il'ichovskie Novosti	2%
Krim	2%
Hryvnia 1	4%
LKT	7%
LTB	4%
VDT	5%
Total	**100%**

Q8G. And, which other media do you rely on most? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED OTHER IN Q8]

	9/01
	(19)
ORT	37%
NTV	13%
Russkoe Radio	7%
Radio Liberty	12%
Voice of America	2%
Other	30%
Total	**101%** ✓

Q9. People can receive information about political and economic news from different sources. For each different source, please tell me how objective each one is in your opinion. Is it very objective, somewhat objective, not too objective, or not objective at all?

Q9A. National newspapers

	9/01
	(1500)
Very objective	4%
Somewhat objective	44%
Not very objective	20%
Not at all objective	4%
Don't Know	29%
Total	**101%** ✓

Q9B. National radio

	9/01
	(1500)
Very objective	4%
Somewhat objective	47%
Not very objective	17%
Not at all objective	3%
Don't Know	29%
Total	**100%**

Q9C. National television

	9/01
	(1500)
Very objective	12%
Somewhat objective	58%
Not very objective	14%
Not at all objective	3%
Don't Know	14%
Total	**101%** ✓

Q9D. Local newspapers

	9/01 (1500)
Very objective	3%
Somewhat objective	40%
Not very objective	24%
Not at all objective	7%
Don't Know	27%
Total	**101%✓**

Q9E. Local radio

	9/01 (1500)
Very objective	3%
Somewhat objective	36%
Not very objective	20%
Not at all objective	5%
Don't Know	37%
Total	**101%✓**

Q9F. Local television

	9/01 (1500)
Very objective	4%
Somewhat objective	44%
Not very objective	18%
Not at all objective	4%
Don't Know	30%
Total	**100%**

Q10. What is your main source of information about the activities of your local government, in general? You may mention other sources than those we just discussed.

	9/01 (1500)
National newspapers	1%
Local newspapers	20%
National radio	1%
Local radio	8%
National television	8%
Local television	16%
Local Officials	2%
Friends/Acquaintances	22%
Other	1%
No information available	15%
Not interested in local government	3%
Don't Know	3%
Total	**100%**

Q11. How objective is the information you receive about local government from [SOURCE MENTIONED IN Q10]. Is it very objective, somewhat objective, not too objective, or not objective at all?

	9/01 (1194)
Very objective	6%
Somewhat objective	47%
Not very objective	23%
Not at all objective	5%
Don't Know	20%
Total	**101%✓**

Q12. How do you get information about the local budget of your [city/town/village]? [MULTIPLE CHOICE POSSIBLE]

	9/01 (1500)
National newspapers	1%
Local newspapers	17%
National radio	1%
Local radio	8%
National television	2%
Local television	13%
Local Officials	6%
Friends/Acquaintances	14%
Other	1%
No information available	53%
Not interested in local government	5%
Don't Know	3%

Q13. In your opinion, how safe is it for media in Ukraine to broadcast or print their true opinions, even if these opinions are critical of the government? Is it very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat dangerous, or very dangerous?

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Very safe	3%	3%
Somewhat safe	17%	26%
Somewhat dangerous	42%	33%
Very dangerous	24%	14%
I don't care about this [VOLUNTEERED]	6%	--
Don't know	8%	23%
No answer	★	--
Total	**100%**	**99%✓**

Q14. [IF VERY OR SOMEWHAT DANGEROUS IN Q13.] Why do you believe it is dangerous for media to broadcast or print their true opinions? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES ACCEPTED]

	9/01 (707)
Risk loss of life	45%
Risk loss of employment	26%
Press is not protected by law	4%
Government power/media dependence	18%
Censorship (government or self)	3%
People avoid truth	3%
Other	4%
Don't Know	2%

Q15. What about in your personal conversations. When you meet your friends, do you talk about politics – often, sometimes, rarely or never?

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Often	24%	23%
Sometimes	34%	33%
Rarely	27%	28%
Never	15%	14%
Don't know	✯	2%
No answer	✯	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q16. When you yourself, hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or colleagues to share your views? IF YES, does it happen often, from time to time, or rarely?

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
No, never	30%	33%
Yes, often	16%	14%
Yes, from time to time	31%	27%
Yes, rarely	16%	18%
Don't know	4%	7%
No answer	✯	--
Total	**97%** ✓	**99%** ✓

Section 2: General Social and Political Attitudes

For questions 17 through 19, respondents were read statements reflecting specific political positions. For each statement, respondents were then given the following options: strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly agree. In past years, neither agree nor disagree was also an option. Don't know was volunteered by some respondents.

Q17. Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country.

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Strongly agree	7%	5%	11%	17%	13%	9%
Somewhat agree	21%	20%	24%	23%	21%	21%
Somewhat disagree	17%	26%	29%	25%	29%	31%
Strongly disagree	50%	33%	29%	27%	33%	32%
Neither agree nor disagree	2%	9%	2%	1%	--	--
Don't know	4%	6%	5%	6%	4%	8%
No answer	★	1%	★	1%	★	--
Total	**101%✓**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**

Q18. Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like you can't understand what's really happening.

	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Strongly agree	34%	36%	44%	37%
Somewhat agree	29%	34%	32%	36%
Somewhat disagree	19%	15%	14%	16%
Strongly disagree	11%	8%	6%	6%
Neither agree nor disagree	1%	1%	--	--
Don't know	4%	5%	4%	7%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**99%✓**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**102%✓**

Q19. People like you have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine.

	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Strongly agree	44%	46%	52%	46%
Somewhat agree	27%	27%	28%	29%
Somewhat disagree	14%	15%	11%	11%
Strongly disagree	9%	6%	5%	7%
Neither agree nor disagree	1%	★	--	--
Don't know	4%	4%	3%	7%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**100%**

Q20. How interested are you in matters of politics and government -- are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very interested	16%	14%	13%	15%	18%	15%
Somewhat interested	39%	36%	30%	35%	47%	47%
Not too interested	23%	23%	35%	30%	23%	23%
Not at all interested	20%	25%	21%	18%	11%	11%
Don't know	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	4%
No answer	✯	✯	✯	✯	✯	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Q21. What about your local community? How interested are you in the activities of your local government? Would you say you are very interested, somewhat interested, somewhat uninterested, or very uninterested?

	9/01 (1500)
Very interested	14%
Somewhat interested	46%
Not too interested	23%
Not at all interested	12%
Don't know	6%
Total	**101%✓**

Q22. In general, would you say that political reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at the right pace?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Too quickly	7%	13%	5%	6%	6%	3%
Too slowly	56%	45%	43%	38%	52%	50%
At the right pace	9%	8%	6%	9%	5%	10%
Reforms not happening	✯	✯	26%	21%	20%	19%
Reforms are late	--	--	--	3%	--	--
Don't know	27%	31%	19%	22%	16%	18%
No answer	1%	4%	2%	1%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**101%✓**	**101%✓**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Q23. Is Ukraine a democracy?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Yes	20%	19%	17%	31%	22%	30%
No	52%	55%	58%	50%	59%	46%
Other	8%	9%	10%	6%	2%	3%
Don't know	20%	15%	14%	12%	16%	20%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	✯	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**99%✓**

Q24. [IF Q23 = NO, OTHER, DON'T KNOW, NO ANSWER] Is Ukraine moving toward becoming a democracy or not?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (993)	1-2/00 (822)	11-12/00 (1174)	9/01 (1046)
Moving toward becoming a democracy	24%	22%	20%	35%	23%	39%
Not moving toward becoming a democracy	37%	36%	38%	38%	51%	32%
Don't know	19%	22%	25%	26%	25%	29%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Q25. Did you vote in the 1998 election for Supreme Rada?

	9/01 (1500)
Yes	78%
No, I was too young	5%
No, I could vote, but did not	11%
Other	3%
Don't know	4%
Total	**101%✓**

Q26. [IF YES TO QUESTION 25] What party did you vote for?

	9/01 (1162)
Communist Party of Ukraine	22%
People's Rukh Party	9%
For truth, for people, for Ukraine (bloc)	2%
Green Party	4%
People's Democratic Party	2%
Hromada	1%
Progressive Socialist Party	3%
Social Democratic Party (United)	3%
Agrarian Party	1%
Party for Reforms and Order	1%
Labor Ukraine (bloc)	★
National Front (bloc)	★
Party of Labor and Liberal Party (bloc)	★
Go, Ukraine (bloc)	★
Christian Democratic Party	★
Democratic Parties NEP (bloc)	★
Party of National & Econ. Development	★
Union Party	★
Ukrainian National Assembly	★
Social Democratic Party	★
Unidentified	2%
Voted Against All	3%
Don't Know	42%
Refused/NA	4%
Total	**99%✓**

Q27. [IF YES TO QUESTION 25[10]] Here is a card with a list of possible reasons for choosing a party when voting. Please use this list in considering your answer. What was your main reason to vote for the party you chose in the last election for Supreme Rada?

	9/01
	(599)
I supported the political programs of this party	58%
I liked the character of the leader	19%
This party was recommended to me by people whose opinion I valued	12%
I was strongly encouraged to at my workplace	2%
Other	7%
Don't Know	3%
Total	**101%** ✓

Q28. [IF YES TO QUESTION 25[11]] How satisfied are you with the choice you made when you voted? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?

	9/01
	(599)
Very satisfied	13%
Somewhat satisfied	29%
Somewhat dissatisfied	26%
Very dissatisfied	13%
Don't Know	19%
Total	**100%**

[10] In addition to those who answered no to question 25, respondents that either refused to answer question 26, or responded that they voted against all parties or didn't know who they voted for were not asked this question.
[11] Id.

Q29A. [IF VERY OR SOMEWHAT SATISFIED TO QUESTION 28] For what reason are you satisfied with your choice?

	9/01
	(252)
Life is better under communist rule	10%
I disapprove of recent reforms	★
Why vote, now that the USSR is no longer	★
I approve of their program	9%
Their words match their actions	9%
I like the characteristics of the party	2%
I trust/sympathize with the party	8%
I trust/sympathize with the party leader	10%
They support environmental causes	3%
They represent grassroots interests	7%
They have furthered a rural reform agenda	1%
They hold promise of a better life	1%
They are carrying out economic reforms	3%
I see Ukraine as an independent nation	8%
They see Ukraine as an independent nation	3%
The party has popular support	2%
Choice negatively impacted the opponent	1%
Personal Convictions	9%
Other	1%
Don't Know	13%
Total	**100%**

Q29B. [IF VERY OR SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED TO QUESTION 28] For what reason are you dissatisfied with your choice?

	9/01
	(235)
My party did not make it into office	16%
They did not fulfill their promises	62%
They offer little contact with the public	★
They do not provide information on their actions	1%
They are corrupt	9%
Their internal problems render them ineffective	4%
Other	2%
Don't Know	6%
Total	**100%**

Q30. How likely is it that you will vote in the 2002 elections for the Supreme Rada? Is it very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely that you will vote in the next elections?

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Very likely	46%	51%
Somewhat likely	29%	28%
Somewhat unlikely	10%	6%
Very unlikely	9%	7%
Don't know	6%	8%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q31. [IF VERY OR SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY, OR DON'T KNOW TO QUESTION 30] What is the reason why you [will not vote/ don't know if you will vote] in the 2002 elections for Supreme Rada?

	9/01 (316)
Personal reasons	18%
Voting doesn't matter	62%
Undecided about voting	17%
Do not want to vote	3%
Total	**100%**

Q32. Which political party do you think best represents your views and interests?

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Agrarian Party of Ukraine (M.Hladii)	✯	1%
Communist Party of Ukraine (P.Symonenko)	18%	16%
People's Rukh of Ukraine (G.Udovenko)	5%	5%
People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (V.Pustovoitenko)	5%	2%
Party of Greens (V.Kononov)	3%	4%
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (N.Vitrenko)	2%	3%
Selyanska Party of Ukraine (A.Tkachenko)	1%	1%
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) (V.Medvedchuk, G.Surkis)	4%	3%
Socialist Party of Ukraine (A.Moros)	4%	2%
Ukrainian People's Rukh (Yu.Kostenko)	1%	2%
Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (A.Kinakh)	1%	2%
Party "Democratic Union" (A.Volkov)	1%	✯
All-Ukrainian Association "Batkyivstchyna" (Yu.Timoshenko)	1%	2%
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (Ya.Stetsko)	✯	1%
Political Party "Young Ukraine"	1%	1%
Party "Reforms and Order" (V. Pinzenyk)	2%	2%
Labour Ukraine (S. Tigipko)	2%	1%
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (V.Zhuravsky)	1%	1%
Regions of Ukraine (Azarov)	--	1%
Other	1%	3%
No one	31%	20%
Don't know	15%	28%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**101%✓**

Q36. Elected deputies of the Supreme Rada will work on certain issues. In your opinion, which issues, that are the most important for you, should they work on first of all?[12]

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Raise in standard of living	30%	41%
Economic development	16%	28%
Resolve unemployment/ underemployment	15%	26%
Job security/creation of work	10%	--
Free access to public services (medical, education)	10%	13%
Law and order	8%	--
Better pensions	6%	12%
Eliminate crime and corruption	5%	8%
Payment of wage and pension arrears	4%	--
Decreased fees for community services	3%	--
Lowering of prices	3%	--
Agricultural reform	2%	4%
Solutions to environmental problems	--	2%
Improve the tax system	--	5%
Other	4%	1%
Don't know	18%	11%
No answer	3%	--

Q37A. How do you expect that the results of the 2002 elections will change your own life? Will it get better, will it not change, or will it get worse?

	9/01 (1500)
Will get better	23%
Will not change	46%
Will get worse	5%
Don't know	26%
Total	**100%**

[12] The question asked in December of 2000 differed slightly from this year's. It read as follows: "What are the most important issues to you that you expect your elected officials to work on when they are elected?"

Q37B. [IF WILL GET BETTER IN QUESTION 37A] For what reason will your life get better after the elections? [MULITPLE MENTION]

	9/01 (344)
General optimism	29%
Ukraine is moving in the right direction	6%
Better people will come to power	13%
Young people will come to power	12%
Positive change in the economy is likely	7%
Change in the tax system	3%
Change in the composition of the Rada	10%
Communists will come to power	3%
Victor Yuschenko will come to power	3%
Things cannot get worse	4%
Other	8%
Don't know	9%
Total	**107%** ✓

Q37C. [IF WILL GET WORSE IN QUESTION 37A] For what reason will your life get worse after the elections? [MULITPLE MENTION]

	9/01 (79)
General pessimism	18%
There are no honest people in power	34%
Economic problems will continue	9%
Changes in government will have no effect	16%
Change occurs too slowly	3%
Leadership needs to be replaced	10%
Other	3%
Don't know	7%
Total	**100%**

Q38. How likely is it that the 2002 elections for Supreme Rada will be free and fair: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not likely at all?

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Very likely	2%	5%
Somewhat likely	15%	27%
Somewhat unlikely	50%	25%
Very unlikely	21%	18%
Don't know	11%	24%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**99%** ✓

Q39A. [IF VERY OR SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY IN QUESTION 38] What is the main reason why you expect that the 2002 electons for Supreme Rada will not be free and fair? [MULITPLE MENTION]

	9/01 (650)
Elections have never been free and fair	15%
Official corruption	14%
Everything is bought/sold	13%
Previous elections were not free and fair	10%
Election results are predetermined	7%
Voters are bribed	10%
Administrative fraud	9%
Honest candidates can't come to power	6%
Voters are coerced	5%
Current government will disallow	8%
Election system and laws are flawed	3%
Election commission fraud	3%
General distrust	7%
Other	3%
Don't know	3%

Q39B. [IF VERY LIKELY, SOMEWHAT LIKELY, OR DON'T KNOW IN QUESTION 38] What will be the most important factor that ensures the next Supreme Rada elections are free and fair? [ONE CHOICE ONLY] Will it be

	9/01 (850)
Legislation will ensure free and fair elections in Ukraine	16%
International and local monitors and observers will be there on election day	33%
The Election Commissions consist of representatives of different political parties	18%
The local election commission is fair	13%
Other	3%
Don't know	19%
Total	**102%** ✓

Q40. Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy or not?[13]

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Yes, necessary	58%	46%	56%	56%	62%	55%
No, not necessary	28%	40%	29%	32%	18%	18%
Other	--	--	--	--	3%	6%
Don't know	14%	13%	15%	11%	16%	20%
No answer	★	1%	1%	★	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**99%✓**

For questions 41 and 42, respondents were shown a card listing possible answers and asked to rate their confidence in the institutions and individuals shown below utilizing the possible answers presented them.

Q41A. The Supreme Rada

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	2%	--	3%	4%	3%	4%
Fair amount	14%	--	18%	18%	18%	27%
Not very much	36%	--	39%	36%	40%	35%
None at all	43%	--	32%	31%	33%	24%
Don't know	5%	--	7%	10%	6%	10%
No answer	★	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q41B. Cabinet of Ministers

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	2%	--	2%	7%	4%	4%
Fair amount	14%	--	18%	30%	22%	30%
Not very much	36%	--	38%	30%	35%	32%
None at all	43%	--	31%	20%	31%	22%
Don't know	5%	--	10%	12%	7%	13%
No answer	★	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**

[13] For surveys conducted between July 1997 and February 2000, respondents were given the following options as a response: Necessary, Strongly; Necessary, Not Strongly; Not Necessary, Not Strongly; and Not Necessary, Strongly. Necessary, Strongly and Necessary, Not Strongly have been combined and included under the response "yes, necessary for democracy." Similarly, Not Necessary, Not Strongly and Not Necessary, Strongly have been combined and included under the response "no, not necessary for democracy."

Q41C. Presidential Administration

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	2%	--	2%	9%	3%	4%
Fair amount	19%	--	19%	28%	19%	23%
Not very much	31%	--	34%	28%	34%	31%
None at all	37%	--	32%	20%	33%	28%
Don't know	10%	--	11%	14%	10%	14%
No answer	★	--	2%	2%	1%	--
Total	**99%✓**	**--**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**100%**	**100%**

Q41D. Council for National Security and Defense of Ukraine

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	8%	11%
Fair amount	33%	37%
Not very much	20%	17%
None at all	18%	14%
Don't know	21%	21%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q41E. Local government bodies

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	3%	--	3%	6%	5%	4%
Fair amount	14%	--	22%	24%	25%	28%
Not very much	31%	--	34%	31%	35%	31%
None at all	48%	--	33%	26%	28%	28%
Don't know	4%	--	7%	11%	6%	10%
No answer	★	--	2%	2%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**101%✓**	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**

Q41F. National Bank of Ukraine

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	5%	--	4%	7%	5%	5%
Fair amount	19%	--	24%	23%	20%	23%
Not very much	24%	--	24%	20%	25%	23%
None at all	33%	--	26%	17%	32%	29%
Don't know	18%	--	20%	31%	17%	20%
No answer	1%	--	2%	2%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Q41G. Ukraine's military forces

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	21%	--	17%	28%	24%	24%
Fair amount	35%	--	42%	40%	43%	46%
Not very much	22%	--	15%	9%	12%	11%
None at all	14%	--	12%	7%	12%	8%
Don't know	8%	--	12%	14%	9%	10%
No answer	★	--	1%	2%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**99%✓**

Q41H. The Media

	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	9%
Fair amount	52%
Not very much	21%
None at all	9%
Don't know	10%
No answer	--
Total	**101%✓**

Q41I. State Security Service

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	11%	--	12%	16%	13%	13%
Fair amount	25%	--	32%	32%	33%	41%
Not very much	24%	--	17%	15%	17%	15%
None at all	22%	--	17%	12%	17%	11%
Don't know	18%	--	21%	23%	20%	20%
No answer	1%	--	2%	2%	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**--**	**101%✓**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q41J. The Church

	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	34%	32%	31%
Fair amount	30%	30%	35%
Not very much	9%	11%	11%
None at all	9%	15%	11%
Don't know	17%	11%	12%
No answer	1%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Q41K. Leonid Kuchma

	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	2%	20%	8%	7%
Fair amount	13%	29%	21%	23%
Not very much	32%	19%	28%	25%
None at all	32%	21%	37%	35%
Don't know	20%	9%	6%	10%
No answer	2%	2%	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q41L. Victor Yuschenko

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	12%	17%
Fair amount	29%	26%
Not very much	21%	18%
None at all	27%	24%
Don't know	10%	15%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q41M. Oleksandr Morros

	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	4%
Fair amount	16%
Not very much	25%
None at all	36%
Don't know	18%
No answer	--
Total	**99%✓**

Q41N. Yulia Timoshenko

	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	4%
Fair amount	13%
Not very much	22%
None at all	47%
Don't know	14%
No answer	--
Total	**100%**

Q41O. Anatoliy Kinakh

	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	7%
Fair amount	30%
Not very much	14%
None at all	16%
Don't know	33%
No answer	--
Total	**100%**

And how much confidence do you have in each of the following branches of the legal system to treat people with fairness and justice when making their decisions?

Q42A. Constitutional Court

	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	8%	15%	11%	13%
Fair amount	27%	28%	29%	32%
Not very much	20%	17%	22%	14%
None at all	16%	12%	18%	15%
Don't know	26%	26%	19%	27%
No answer	2%	2%	1%	--
Total	**99%** ✓	**100%**	**100%**	**101%** ✓

Q42B. Supreme Court

	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	11%
Fair amount	33%
Not very much	15%
None at all	16%
Don't know	25%
No answer	--
Total	**100%**

Q42C. Local Courts

	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	5%
Fair amount	22%
Not very much	29%
None at all	27%
Don't know	17%
No answer	--
Total	**100%**

Q42D. Public Prosecutors

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	5%	--	6%	8%	7%	7%
Fair amount	24%	--	31%	28%	25%	25%
Not very much	34%	--	25%	25%	28%	25%
None at all	28%	--	22%	21%	29%	24%
Don't know	8%	--	15%	16%	12%	19%
No answer	★	--	1%	2%	1%	--
Total	**99%✓**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**	**102%✓**	**100%**

Q42E. The Police

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	4%	--	4%	7%	6%	6%
Fair amount	17%	--	18%	19%	16%	20%
Not very much	32%	--	31%	27%	32%	27%
None at all	42%	--	36%	34%	40%	35%
Don't know	5%	--	10%	11%	7%	13%
No answer	★	--	1%	2%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**	**102%✓**	**101%✓**

As you may know, some people in Ukraine say that the courts are influenced by outside interests. Others say that this is not the case. For the three courts listed below, can you tell me how much influence you think outside interests have on the court's decision-making?

Q43A. Constitutional Court

	9/01 (1500)
No influence	14%
Some influence	35%
Great influence	19%
Don't know	32%
Total	**100%**

Q43B. Supreme Court

	9/01 (1500)
No influence	11%
Some influence	37%
Great influence	22%
Don't know	31%
Total	**101%✓**

Q43C. Local Courts

	9/01 (1500)
No influence	6%
Some influence	26%
Great influence	44%
Don't know	25%
Total	**101%✓**

Q44. Have you heard about the recent debate in the Supreme Rada regarding the new law to reorganize Ukraine's court system?

	9/01 (1500)
Yes	34%
No	63%
Don't know	4%
Total	**101%✓**

Q45. [If NO IN QUESTION 44] The Supreme Rada is now working on a law that will create a more independent court system here in Ukraine. What is your opinon about such a new law, if it is passed? Do you think such a law would be very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important for Ukraine?

	9/01 (998)
Very important	17%
Somewhat important	38%
Not very important	6%
Not at all important	3%
Don't know	36%
Total	**100%**

Q46. [If YES IN QUESTION 44] The Supreme Rada is now working on a law that will create a more independent court system here in Ukraine. What is your opinon about such a new law, if it is passed? Do you think such a law would be very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important for Ukraine?

	9/01 (502)
Very important	50%
Somewhat important	32%
Not very important	3%
Not at all important	1%
Don't know	13%
Total	**99%✓**

Q47. Do you think that adoption of this law will have a positive or negative impact on the working of the courts?

	9/01 (1500)
Mostly positive	39%
Both	20%
Mostly negative	3%
Don't know	39%
Total	**101%✓**

For questions 48 and 49, respondents were read statements and asked the extent to which they agreed with them. Their answers were confined to the following: strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly or disagree.

Q48. Democracy as a system is no good at maintaining order.

	9/01 (1500)
Strongly agree	12%
Somewhat agree	23%
Somewhat disagree	28%
Strongly disagree	18%
Don't know	20%
Total	**101%✓**

Q49. It is more important that leaders maintain order than protect freedoms.

	9/01 (1500)
Strongly agree	19%
Somewhat agree	29%
Somewhat disagree	22%
Strongly disagree	11%
Don't know	20%
Total	**101%✓**

Q50. Next, I will read you a list of actions governments sometimes take to ensure order. Please tell me for each, whether the action can always be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified.

Q50A. Limit the activities of certain political parties

	9/01 (1500)
Always be justified	17%
Sometimes be justified	48%
Never be justified	20%
Don't know	16%
Total	**101%✓**

Q50B. Limit the rights of citizens to protest

	9/01
	(1500)
Always be justified	7%
Sometimes be justified	35%
Never be justified	45%
Don't know	13%
Total	**100%**

Q50C. Limit freedom of the press

	9/01
	(1500)
Always be justified	5%
Sometimes be justified	31%
Never be justified	51%
Don't know	12%
Total	**99%** ✓

Q50D. Limit the authority of the courts

	9/01
	(1500)
Always be justified	5%
Sometimes be justified	22%
Never be justified	52%
Don't know	21%
Total	**100%**

Q50E. Limit the activities of citizens' groups and unions

	9/01
	(1500)
Always be justified	10%
Sometimes be justified	40%
Never be justified	29%
Don't know	21%
Total	**100%**

Q51. Here you see a picture with a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely centrally planned by the state. Where on that scale should Ukraine be located in the future?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
1 (Pure market economy)	11%	9%	9%	9%	14%	14%
2	14%	10%	11%	19%	18%	18%
3	224%	23%	26%	33%	32%	30%
4	12%	12%	15%	12%	13%	12%
5 (Centrally planned)	22%	26%	22%	14%	14%	14%
Don't know	14%	18%	16%	13%	10%	14%
No answer	2%	2%	1%	1%	✯	--
Total	**99%✓**	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**101%✓**	**102%✓**

Q52. In your opinion will the economic situation in Ukraine in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, or get worse?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Better than now	12%	10%	7%	16%	13%	27%
Remain the same	34%	38%	35%	35%	35%	46%
Get worse	45%	40%	44%	36%	41%	11%
Don't know	8%	11%	14%	13%	12%	15%
No answer	✯	✯	✯	✯	✯	--
Total	**99%✓**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**99%✓**

Q53. Thinking only of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Rada, the judiciary, and your local government. Which of these four, in your opinion, is most likely to resolve the economic problems FACING UKRAINE in the next year?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Executive branch	19%	17%	26%	--	23%	17%
--Presidency	--	--	--	30%	--	--
--Cabinet of Ministers	--	--	--	12%	--	--
Supreme Rada	18%	21%	19%	5%	19%	14%
Judiciary	13%	5%	3%	1%	4%	2%
Local government	2%	16%	11%	4%	8%	6%
All				15%	--	--
Only if they work together	--	--	--	--	--	37%
None	24%	23%	18%	18%	25%	12%
Don't know	22%	17%	22%	13%	20%	13%
No answer	2%	✯	✯	1%	✯	--
Total	**100%**	**99%✓**	**99%✓**	**99%✓**	**99%✓**	**101%✓**

Q54. In your opinion, how important are foreign investments to the economic recovery of our country? Are foreign investments very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not important at all to the economic recovery of Ukraine?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very important	26%	--	18%	17%	20%	16%
Somewhat important	29%	--	25%	28%	32%	31%
Somewhat unimportant	12%	--	17%	17%	17%	12%
Not important at all	18%	--	23%	23%	18%	7%
Not needed at all	--	--	--	--	--	21%
Don't know	15%	--	16%	16%	13%	14%
No answer	1%	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**101%✓**

Q55. There are different opinions about the best direction for Ukraine to go in the future. Some believe Ukraine's best hopes for the future lies in pursuing eventual membership in the European Union, others believe Ukraine's best hopes for the future lie in pursuing formal union with Russia, and still others believe that Ukraine should maintain strict neutrality. Which of these options do you think Ukraine should pursue?

	9/01 (1500)
Pursue union with Europe	34%
Pursue union with Russia	40%
Strict neutrality	16%
Don't know	11%
Total	**101%✓**

Q56. In general, would you say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at the right pace?

	9/01 (1500)
Too quickly	2%
Too slowly	57%
At the right pace	9%
Reforms not happening	20%
Don't know	13%
Total	**101%✓**

Q57. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Generally satisfied	✯	✯	✯	✯	1%	2%
Somewhat satisfied	2%	3%	2%	5%	4%	9%
Somewhat dissatisfied	21%	28%	29%	36%	33%	39%
Generally dissatisfied	75%	68%	65%	56%	59%	46%
Don't know	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%	4%
No answer	✯	✯	✯	✯	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**98%✓**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**100%**

Section 3: Experience with Government Officials

Q58. Have you ever contacted your elected officials before to help solve a problem in your life?

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Yes	24%	22%
No	75%	76%
Don't know	✯	2%
No answer	2%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q59. [IF NO TO QUESTION 58] Why haven't you ever contacted your elected officials before?

	11-12/00 (1125)	9/01 (1144)
Difficult to arrange an appointment	2%	2%
Not necessary	27%	--
Don't believe they will help/hopeless	32%	23%
Effort/cost greater than benefit	18%	36%
Work out my problems unassisted	10%	26%
Don't trust them	--	8%
Other	1%	2%
Don't know	8%	2%
No answer	2%	--
Total	**100%**	**99%✓**

Q60. Did the elected official respond to you?

	11-12/00 (352)	9/01 (328)
Yes	73%	65%
No	15%	19%
Partially	12%	16%
Don't know	✯	✯
No answer	✯	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q61. [IF 'YES' OR 'PARTIALLY' IN QUESTION 60] How satisfied were you with the response of this official?

	11-12/00 (298)	9/01 (264)
Completely dissatisfied	35%	32%
Somewhat dissatisfied	15%	22%
Somewhat satisfied	29%	28%
Completely satisfied	20%	18%
Don't know	1%	--
No answer	★	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q62. In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very common	67%	62%	62%	75%	67%	55%
Somewhat common	22%	26%	26%	18%	22%	31%
Not very common	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Not common at all	★	★	★	★	★	1%
Don't know	8%	8%	9%	5%	8%	11%
No answer	★	1%	1%	1%	★	--
Total	**99%✓**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**99%✓**	**100%**

Q63. And how serious is the problem of official corruption -- is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very serious	72%	69%	67%	81%	72%	60%
Somewhat serious	18%	21%	23%	15%	18%	27%
Not too serious	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	3%
Not serious at all	1%	★	★	★	1%	★
Don't know	8%	7%	8%	3%	8%	10%
No answer	★	1%	1%	★	★	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Q64. Do you think the citizens of Ukraine accept official corruption as a fact of life?

	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Yes	62%	56%	58%	50%
No	13%	22%	25%	28%
Don't know	22%	21%	16%	22%
No answer	2%	2%	1%	--
Total	**99%✓**	**101%✓**	**100%**	**100%**

Q65. [IF YES TO QUESTION 64] And to what extent does this contribute to the problem of state (official) corruption: Very much, somewhat, not very much, not at all?[14]

	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (876)	9/01 (754)
Very much	37%	63%	55%	60%
Somewhat	13%	16%	20%	24%
Not very much	4%	7%	7%	5%
Not at all	3%	4%	12%	3%
Don't know	5%	9%	5%	9%
No answer	38%	★	★	--
Total	**100%**	**99%✓**	**99%✓**	**101%✓**

Q66A. Next, I will read you a list of actions people sometimes do. Please tell me for each, whether the action can always be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified.

Q66A-1. Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Always be justified	6%	4%
Sometimes be justified	27%	22%
Never be justified	60%	66%
Don't know	6%	9%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**101%✓**

Q66A-2. Cheating on tax if you had the chance

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Always be justified	8%	5%
Sometimes be justified	38%	32%
Never be justified	48%	56%
Don't know	6%	8%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**101%✓**

Q66A-3. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Always be justified	4%	3%
Sometimes be justified	12%	9%
Never be justified	79%	84%
Don't know	4%	5%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**101%✓**

[14] This question delivered to all respondents in 1998 and 1999.

Q66A-4. Accepting money to voter for a politician or political party

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Always be justified	3%	2%
Sometimes be justified	9%	10%
Never be justified	80%	80%
Don't know	6%	8%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**99%** ✓	**100%**

Q66A-5. Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve businesses quickly

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Always be justified	4%	3%
Sometimes be justified	13%	13%
Never be justified	74%	76%
Don't know	8%	8%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q66A-6. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Always be justified	3%	2%
Sometimes be justified	5%	6%
Never be justified	86%	86%
Don't know	5%	6%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q66A-7. High officials helping their associates in private business

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Always be justified	4%	4%
Sometimes be justified	16%	18%
Never be justified	72%	70%
Don't know	7%	9%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**101%** ✓

Q66A-8. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Always be justified	3%	3%
Sometimes be justified	4%	4%
Never be justified	89%	89%
Don't know	3%	5%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**101%✓**

Q66B. Now, I will read the list to you again. For each, tell me if this activity occurs often here in Ukraine. Please use the answers listed on your card. Does [READ FROM LIST] happen very often, sometimes, not very often, or never at all.

Q66B-1. Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Happen very often	50%	46%
Sometimes	27%	29%
Not very often	9%	8%
Never at all	3%	2%
Don't know	10%	15%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q66B-2. Cheating on tax if you had the chance

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Happen very often	63%	60%
Sometimes	24%	25%
Not very often	5%	4%
Never at all	2%	2%
Don't know	6%	10%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**101%✓**

Q66B-3. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Happen very often	77%	71%
Sometimes	14%	16%
Not very often	3%	3%
Never at all	1%	2%
Don't know	4%	8%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q66B-4. Accepting money to vote for a politician or political party

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Happen very often	46%	48%
Sometimes	26%	24%
Not very often	10%	8%
Never at all	2%	3%
Don't know	17%	18%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**102%✓**	**101%✓**

Q66B-5. Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve businesses quickly

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Happen very often	64%	60%
Sometimes	20%	18%
Not very often	4%	4%
Never at all	1%	2%
Don't know	11%	16%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q66B-6. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Happen very often	71%	67%
Sometimes	15%	16%
Not very often	3%	3%
Never at all	★	2%
Don't know	10%	12%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q66B-7. High officials helping their associates in private business

	11-12/00 (1500)	**9/01 (1500)**
Happen very often	72%	64%
Sometimes	16%	18%
Not very often	2%	3%
Never at all	★	2%
Don't know	8%	12%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**99%✓**	**99%✓**

Q66B-8. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Happen very often	78%	70%
Sometimes	13%	17%
Not very often	3%	2%
Never at all	✯	2%
Don't know	5%	9%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

For questions 67 through 69, respondents were read a series of statements and asked the extent to which they agreed with each. Answer choices for these questions were as follows: strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, and strongly disagree.

Q67. If I were wrongly accused of a crime, I am sure that our judicial system would acquit me.

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Strongly agree	4%	4%
Somewhat agree	17%	19%
Somewhat disagree	33%	33%
Strongly disagree	34%	26%
Don't know	12%	18%
No answer	✯	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q68. In the free market economy, buyers need to rely on themselves and not expect the government to protect them in transactions.

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Strongly agree	27%	19%
Somewhat agree	26%	21%
Somewhat disagree	22%	26%
Strongly disagree	18%	22%
Don't know	7%	12%
No answer	✯	--
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Q69. A little bit of cheating is a normal part of all business activity.

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Strongly agree	18%	13%
Somewhat agree	22%	25%
Somewhat disagree	25%	26%
Strongly disagree	27%	20%
Don't know	8%	16%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q70. In your opinion, how much do most people in Ukraine rely on the shadow economy for their livelihood?

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
A great deal	30%	24%
A fair amount	34%	36%
Not very much	11%	14%
Not at all	5%	5%
Don't know	20%	22%
No answer	★	--
Total	**100%**	**101%✓**

Section 4: Support for Civic Organizations

Q71. On this card you see a list of some rights many people believe are important. How important is it to you that the following rights be respected in Ukraine? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not important at all.

Q71A. One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting.

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very important	38%	--	39%	46%	36%	34%
Somewhat important	28%	--	38%	36%	32%	36%
Not very important	17%	--	12%	9%	18%	15%
Not at all important	10%	--	4%	3%	8%	7%
Don't know	6%	--	5%	6%	5%	8%
No answer	1%	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**99%✓**	**101%✓**	**100%**	**100%**

Q71B. Honest elections are held regularly.

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very important	65%	--	50%	59%	54%	55%
Somewhat important	22%	--	34%	29%	29%	32%
Not very important	7%	--	6%	4%	6%	6%
Not at all important	3%	--	2%	2%	4%	2%
Don't know	3%	--	6%	6%	5%	4%
No answer	1%	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**--**	**99%✓**	**101%✓**	**99%✓**	**99%✓**

Q71C. The rights of women are protected equally under the law.

	9/01 (1500)
Very important	58%
Somewhat important	32%
Not very important	4%
Not at all important	2%
Don't know	5%
Total	**101%✓**

Q71D. The rights of minority ethnic groups are protected.

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very important	39%	--	36%	44%	41%	40%
Somewhat important	29%	--	39%	30%	33%	37%
Not very important	16%	--	11%	13%	13%	10%
Not at all important	8%	--	4%	3%	5%	4%
Don't know	7%	--	9%	9%	7%	9%
No answer	1%	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Q71E. The private property of individuals is protected by law.

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very important	77%	--	55%	62%	65%	61%
Somewhat important	16%	--	32%	25%	24%	30%
Not very important	2%	--	5%	4%	5%	4%
Not at all important	2%	--	2%	2%	2%	1%
Don't know	3%	--	6%	7%	3%	5%
No answer	1%	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**--**	**101%✓**	**101%✓**	**100%**	**101%✓**

Q71F. Citizens have the right to form political parties.

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very important	22%	--	22%	24%	21%	26%
Somewhat important	24%	--	28%	26%	28%	29%
Not very important	29%	--	30%	26%	30%	26%
Not at all important	16%	--	11%	13%	14%	11%
Don't know	8%	--	7%	11%	7%	8%
No answer	1%	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q71G. The right to publicly criticize the government is protected.

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very important	58%	--	35%	39%	37%	39%
Somewhat important	26%	--	32%	28%	34%	32%
Not very important	9%	--	18%	14%	15%	16%
Not at all important	3%	--	6%	7%	7%	5%
Don't know	4%	--	8%	10%	6%	9%
No answer	1%	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**--**	**100%**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**101%✓**

Q71H. All can freely practice the religion of one's choice.

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very important	60%	--	46%	56%	54%	50%
Somewhat important	26%	--	38%	28%	29%	32%
Not very important	9%	--	9%	8%	9%	9%
Not at all important	3%	--	2%	3%	4%	4%
Don't know	2%	--	3%	4%	3%	5%
No answer	★	--	1%	1%	★	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**	**99%✓**	**100%**

Q71I. All can form associations or unions without any government involvement.

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Very important	23%	--	23%	25%	25%	25%
Somewhat important	27%	--	28%	21%	27%	31%
Not very important	26%	--	26%	24%	25%	21%
Not at all important	14%	--	11%	13%	12%	11%
Don't know	10%	--	11%	16%	11%	13%
No answer	1%	--	1%	1%	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**101%✓**

Q72. How necessary are these non-governmental organizations, or NGOs-- essential, very necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (--)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Essential	9%	--	12%	8%	13%	19%
Very necessary	23%	--	11%	13%	22%	43%
Not very necessary	33%		39%	26%	34%	18%
Not at all necessary	12%		11%	16%	9%	4%
Depends	8%	--	3%	9%	--	--
Don't know	14%	--	21%	26%	22%	16%
No answer	1%	--	2%	2%	1%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**99%✓**	**100%**	**101%✓**	**100%**

Q73. Do you believe that non-governmental public organizations, NGOs, can deliver some social services more effectively than state organizations?

	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Yes	37%	40%
No	26%	32%
Don't know	37%	29%
No answer	1%	--
Total	**101%✓**	**101%✓**

Q74. Do you currently belong to any of these groups?

	9/01 (1500)
Yes	6%
No	95%
Total	**101%✓**

Q75. Are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for any NGO group?

	9/01 (1500)
Yes	2%
No	98%
Total	**100%**

Q76. Are you a member of any political party?

	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (--)	11-12/00 (1500)	9/01 (1500)
Yes	1%	--	2%	2%
No	98%	--	96%	98%
Don't know	1%	--	✯	--
No answer	✯	--	2%	--
Total	**100%**	**--**	**100%**	**100%**

Q76A. [IF YES TO QUESTION 76] Which party is that?

	9/01
	(30)
Communist Party of Ukraine	9%
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	7%
People's Rukh Party	19%
People's Democratic Party	2%
Green Party	3%
Party of Regions of Ukraine	21%
Social Democratic Party (United)	10%
Ukrainian National Assembly	3%
Other	4%
Refused/NA	24%
Total	**102%✓**

Q77. [IF NO TO QUESTION 76] Are you a supporter of any political party, even if you are not a member?

	9/01
	(1470)
Yes	32%
No	68%
Total	**100%**

Q77A. [IF YES TO QUESTION 77] Which party is that?

	9/01
	(466)
Agrarian Party of Ukraine	2%
All-Ukrainian Association "Batkyivstchyna"	5%
Communist Party of Ukraine	37%
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	1%
People's Rukh Party (Udovenko)	10%
People's Democratic Party	3%
Party "Democratic Union"	1%
Green Party	10%
Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs	2%
Party of Regions of Ukraine	2%
Party of Reforms and Order	2%
"Young Ukraine" Party	1%
Labor Ukraine	✯
Progressive Socialist Party	5%
Selyanska Party	✯
Social Democratic Party (United)	9%
Socialist Party	4%
People's Rukh Party (Kostenko)	2%
Christian Democratic Party	1%
"New Generation of Ukraine" Party	1%
All-Ukrainian Association "Hromada"	✯
Ukrainian National Assembly	✯
Yabluko Party	1%
"Our Ukraine" Bloc	1%
Women for the Future of Ukraine	1%
Other	1%
Total	**102%✓**

Q78. Do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties and blocs in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine?

	7/97	**5/98**	**6/99**	**1-2/00**	**11-12/00**	**9/01**
	(1200)	**(1200)**	**(1200)**	**(--)**	**(1500)**	**(1500)**
Yes, clear differences	31%	41%	40%	--	30%	21%
No, not clear differences	49%	39%	37%	--	51%	48%
Other	--	--	--	--	1%	1%
Don't know	19%	19%	21%	--	16%	31%
No answer	✯	1%	1%	--	1%	--
Total	**99%✓**	**100%**	**99%✓**	**--**	**99%✓**	**101%✓**

Q79. [IF YES TO QUESTION 78] What are the most important differences between the political parties and blocs?

	9/01 (318)
Ideological issues	17%
Different stands on economic reforms	14%
Different views of desirable political Course	14%
Different views toward foreign relations	6%
Availability of resources for development	3%
No differences	2%
Other	19%
Don't know	25%
Total	**100%**

Q80. Please consider the issues here in [MENTION CITY OR VILLAGE]. What is the most important problem here that needs immediate attention?

	9/01 (1500)
Employment and enterprise growth	28%
Provision of fuel	7%
Telephone communications	1%
Infrastructure development	9%
Street lighting	8%
Price regulation	5%
Public transport	3%
Road conditions	14%
Community services	5%
Wage arrears	3%
Social security	15%
Health care	6%
Environmental problems	4%
Education	8%
Combating crime	8%
Agriculture problems	5%
Water supply	10%
Other	3%
Don't know	16%

Section 5: Respondent Background

Q81. Gender

Male	45%
Female	55%
Total	**100%**

Q82. Age

18-25	15%
26-35	18%
36-45	18%
46-55	17%
56+	33%
Total	**101%✓**

Q83. What is the highest level of education you received?

Primary	5%
Incomplete secondary	14%
Complete secondary	30%
Secondary with vocational training	32%
Incomplete university	3%
Complete university	16%
Advanced degree	★
Refused/NA	★
Total	**100%**

Q84. What is your employment situation?

Full-time, one job	36%
Part-time, one job	6%
Part-time, multiple jobs	2%
Student	4%
Pensioner	34%
Unemployed	12%
Homemaker	6%
Other	1%
Refused/NA	★
Total	**101%✓**

Q85. What is your field of employment?

"Intellectual" Worker-Teacher, Journalist, Writer	7%
Executive or Professional at Senior-level (Government or Private)	8%
Executive or Professional at Mid-level (Government or Private)	19%
Skilled Laborer	43%
Unskilled Laborer	8%
Soldier, in Military Service	2%
Farmer	4%
Student	★
Other	8%
Don't know	1%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	**101%✓**

Q86A. Occupation – state sector

Industrial productions	21%
Construction	4%
Transportation, Communications	7%
Culture and "Nauka"	10%
Trade and Services	7%
Agriculture	3%
Security, Defense	4%
Other	8%
Refused/NA	37%
Total	**101%✓**

Q86B. Occupation – private sector

Industrial productions	7%
Construction	3%
Transportation, Communications	4%
Culture and "Nauka"	1%
Trade and Services	15%
Agriculture	4%
Security, Defense	1%
Other	2%
Refused/NA	63%
Total	**100%**

Q87. Are you currently owed any back wages or pension payments from your employer of the government?

Yes	13%
No	70%
Does not apply to me	14%
Don't know	2%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	**100%**

Q88. [IF Q87 = YES] For how long a period are you owed back payments?

One month or less	37%
Two months	21%
Three months	13%
Four months	4%
Five months	3%
Six months	2%
More than six months	14%
Don't know	4%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	**99%✓**

Q89. What is your marital status?

Married	60%
Single/Never Married	14%
Divorced/Separated	9%
Widowed	16%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	**100%**

Q90. How many people are in your family, who live with you and keep one household (including you)?

1	17%
2	26%
3	24%
4	21%
5	8%
6	4%
7	1%
8	1%
9+	★
Total	**102%** ✓

Q91. What is your nationality? Please pick the appropriate category from this list.

Ukrainian	75%
Russian	20%
Ukrainian and Russian	2%
Crimean Tatar	★
Polish	★
Hungarian	★
Gipsy	★
Jewish	★
Byelorussian	1%
Moldovan	★
Other	1%
Refused/NA	★
Total	**99%** ✓

Q92. What is the main language you speak in your home?

Ukrainian	46%
Russian	41%
Ukrainian and Russian	12%
Other	★
Total	**99%** ✓

Q93. With which church or religious group do you identify yourself?

Ukrainian Orthodox	26%
Other Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalna)	2%
Russian Orthodox	9%
Orthodox Christianity	29%
Roman Catholic	1%
Greek Catholic	8%
Protestant	1%
Muslim	1%
Jewish	✯
Other	2%
None	21%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	**102%** ✓

Q94. How often do you attend religious services?

Daily	✯
Multiple times weekly	3%
Weekly	9%
A few times a month	10%
A few times each year	28%
Once a year or less	14%
Depends	16%
Don't attend	18%
Don’t know	1%
Refused/NA	✯
Total	**99%** ✓

Q95. What best describes the current financial situation of you and your family living there with you?

Very poor, we do not have enough money for our most basic needs	21%
Poor, we barely have enough money to buy food, we rarely buy clothes	26%
Modest, we have enough to eat, we occasionally buy clothes, but we have nothing left over to save	39%
Moderate, we have some savings	13%
Above average, we have savings, and can afford a lot	1%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	**101%** ✓

Appendix 2. Details of the Sample and Fieldwork[15]

The 2001 survey was fielded between 14 – 20 September. Interviews averaged 52 minutes and ranged between 17 – 105 minutes in length, which was within the target designed for the questionnaire. Forty-four percent of the interviews were conducted in Ukrainian by request of the respondent, and 56% were conducted in Russian.

Interviewers rated respondents' level of cooperation. Less than 10% were rated as 'uncooperative.' Slightly under half (40%) 'cooperated, but gave little detail' in their responses, and another 40% were 'cooperative, and gave much detail.' Finally, 10% were rated as 'very cooperative' by the interviewers.

The sample represents the adult population of Ukraine aged 18 years and older. A random route method was used to select starting points for interviewing. After the initial start, an agreed upon interval was used by all interviewers to select the following households. Selection of respondents within the household was done using the random selection method of Closest Birthday. The data uses post-stratification weighting to achieve a representative sample of adult Ukrainians by age, gender, and settlement type according to statistics from the 1990 census.

Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
Gender				
Male	539	36	673	45
Female	961	64	827	55
Age				
18 – 25	157	11	219	15
26 – 35	188	12	264	18
36 – 45	247	16	272	17
46 – 55	250	17	256	17
56+	658	44	490	33
Education				
Primary and incomplete secondary	364	24	292	20
Secondary	437	29	453	30
Secondary + specialized training	444	30	477	32
Advanced study	255	17	279	19
Settlement Type				
City 500,000+	245	16	304	20
City 200,000 – 499,999	274	18	266	18
City 50,000 – 199,999	131	9	126	8
City 20,000 – 49,999	115	8	111	7
< 20,000	100	7	90	6
CTS	125	8	137	9
Rural	510	34	466	31
Region				
Kyiv	64	4	83	6
North	198	13	136	9
Center	321	21	185	12
North East	146	10	133	9
East	188	12	236	16
South East	140	9	173	12
North West	86	6	108	7
West	125	8	156	10
South West	51	3	63	4
South	120	8	150	10
Crimea	60	4	76	5

[15] This methodological section is based upon the report provided by SOCIS-Gallup.

Distribution of Sample of 1200+300 (oversample)

Region	Type of city	City names		Total # of urban respondents	Total # of rural respondents	Total for region	Over-sample	Total+ oversample
Kyiv	1	Kyiv	65	65	-	65		65
North	3	Zhytomyr	20					
	3	Chernigiv	20					
	4	Nizhyn	14					
	CTS*	Kyivs'ka oblast'	9	63	47	110		
	5	Mena	12					
	3	Bila Tserkva	15					
	5	Obukhiv	14					
	CTS	Chernigivs'ka oblast'	9	50	38		88	198
Center	3	Kirovograd	18					
	3	Cherkasy	20					
	4	Uman'	18					
	5	Znam'ianka	15					
	CTS	Kirovograds'ka oblast'	10	81	67	148		
	3	Vinnytsia	13					
	5	Kalynivka	11					
	3	Kirovograd	5					
	3	Oleksandriia	12					
	3	Poltava	15					
	5	Myrgorod	13					
	3	Cherkasy	3					
	5	Kam'ianka	19					
	CTS	Kirovograds'ka oblast'	3	94	79		173	321
North-East	2	Harkiv	49					
	3	Sumy	20					
	4	Konotop	11	80	27	107		
	4	Konotop	8					
	5	Bilopillia	11					
	CTS	Sums'ka oblast'	6	25	14		39	146
East	2	Donets'k	34					
	3	Lugans'k	31					
	4	Khartsyz'k	20					
	5	Avdiivka	17					
	5	Volnovakha	12					
	5	Lutugyne	11					
	5	Krasnodon	20					
	CTS	Donets'ka oblast'	11					
	CTS	Lugans'ka oblast'	11	167	21	188		188

Distribution of Sample of 1200+300 (oversample) (continued)

South-East	2	Dnipropetrovs'k	36					
	2	Zaporizhia	27					
	4	Novomoskovs'k	14					
	5	Tokmak	14					
	5	Apostolove	14					
	CTS	Dnipropetrovs'ka oblast'	9	114	26	140		140
North-West	3	Rivne	16					
	5	Zdolbuniv	14					
	CTS	Rivnens'ka oblast'	14	44	42	86		86
West	3	Ivano-Frankivs'k	16					
	4	Kolomyia	13					
	5	Tlumach	13					
	CTS	Ivano-Frankivs'ka oblast'	12					
	CTS	L'vivs'ka oblast'	12	66	59	125		125
South-West	3	Chernivtsi	21	21	30	51		51
South	2	Odesa	34					
	3	Kherson	20					
	5	Gola Prystan'	15					
	CTS	Odes'ka oblast'	10	79	41	120		120
Crimea	3	Simferopol'	22					
	5	Alushta	10					
	CTS	Republik Krym	9	41	19	60		60
TOTAL	34 cities + 13 cities			821+169	379+131	1200	300	1500

*CTS - City-type settlement

Fieldwork. Before the fieldwork, 50 interviews were carried out in a pretest of the questionnaire. Pretest interviews were conducted in Kyiv (25 interviews), Nizhin (13 interviews), and in two villages of Chernigivs'ka oblast' (12 interviews). Results of the pretest showed that the questionnaire worked well with respondents and that only some changes were required. Details of the fieldwork are provided below.

Details of the Fieldwork

Region	Dates of fieldwork	Number of sampling points (city+village)	Number of interviewers	Completed interviews	Uncompleted interviews	Number of contacts
Kyiv	14.09 – 18.09	1	7	65	200	265
North	14.09 – 20.09	15	18	198	186	384
Center	14.09 – 18.09	18	25	321	189	510
North-East	14.09 – 18.09	8	14	146	232	378
East	15.09 – 19.09	11	16	188	366	554
South-East	14.09 – 18.09	8	15	140	180	320
North-West	14.09 – 17.09	10	10	86	111	197
West	14.09 – 19.09	11	10	125	103	228
South-West	15.09 – 19.09	4	4	51	33	84
South	15.09 – 20.09	7	15	120	530	650
Crimea	14.09 – 18.09	4	5	60	56	116
TOTAL	14.09 – 20.09	97	139	1500	2186	3686

In total, 3686 households were contacted for this study, which resulted in 1500 completed interviews.

3686 household contacts
<53> not interviewed for 'criminal reasons'
<33> not interviewed due to inability to conduct (for example, illness of contacted)
<154> not at home
<664> not interviewed for 'other reasons'
2782
<366> not interviewed because of lack of time and inability to reschedule
2416 effective target sample
<254> not interviewed due to unwillingness to participate
<662> complete refusal
1500 completed interviews

$$\textbf{\textit{Refusal rate:}}\ \frac{\textbf{\textit{(unwilling to interview + refusal)}}}{\textbf{\textit{Effective sample}}} * 100 = \frac{(254 + 662)}{2416} = 38\% \text{ or } 62\% \text{ response rate.}$$

Appendix 3. Regional Classifications

Regional classifications are provided by SOCIS-Gallup based upon their own research. The following classifications are used in this report:

1. The NORTHERN Region: Kyivs'ka Zhytomyrs'ka and Chernigivs'ka oblasts;
2. The CENTRAL Region: Vinnits'ka, Kirovograds'ka, Poltavs'ka and Cherkas'ka oblasts;
3. The NORTHWESTERN Region: Volyns'ka, Rivens'ka and Khmelnits'ka oblasts;
4. The SOUTHWESTERN Region: Zakarpats'ka and Chernivets'ka oblasts;
5. The WESTERN Region: Lvivs'ka, Ivano-Frankivs'ka and Ternopil'ska oblasts;
6. The NORTHEASTERN Region: Kharkivs'ka and Sums'ka oblasts;
7. The EASTERN Region: Dnipropetrivs'ka and Zaporiz'ka oblasts;
8. The SOUTHEASTERN Region: Donets'ka and Lugans'ka oblasts;
9. The SOUTHERN Region: Odes'ka, Mykolajivs'ka and Khersons'ka oblasts;
10. Autonomous Republic of the Crimea.

These regions were furthered classified into three divisions: 1) west Ukraine, 2) east Ukraine and 3) an intermediate area in-between the east and west. This division was based mainly on geographic criteria, along the Dniepr river. Regrouping the SOCIS regions provides the following:

Regional Classifications*

Region	West	East	Intermediate	Total
Kyiv			83	83
Northern	75	61		136
Central	30	155		185
Northeastern		133		133
Northwestern			108	108
Southeastern		75	99	174
Western	78	78		156
Southwestern			63	63
Southern	150			150
Crimea	76			76
Eastern		137	99	236
Total	**409**	**639**	**452**	**1500**

*Weighted counts.

Volyn' oblast
Rivne oblast
Zhytomyr oblast
Chernihiv oblast
Sumy oblast
Kyiv oblast
L'viv oblast
Ternopil oblast
Khmetl'nytsk oblast
Poltava oblast
Kharkiv oblast
Luhansk oblast
Cherkasy oblast
Vinnytsia oblast
Zakarpattia oblast
Ivano-Frankivsk oblast
Chernivtsi oblast
Kirovohrad oblast
Dnipropetrovsk oblast
Donetsk oblast
Zaporizhzhia oblast
Mykolayiv oblast
Odesa oblast
Kherson oblast
Autonomous Republic of Crimea
Northern Region
Central Region
Northeastern Region
Eastern Region
Southeastern Region
Northwestern Region
Western Region
Southwestern Region
Southern Region
Crimea