



**NATIONAL**  
**DEMOCRATIC**  
**INSTITUTE**  
**FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**Algeria's June 5, 1997  
Parliamentary Election**

*Prepared by*

*The National Democratic Institute for  
International Affairs*

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## THE JUNE 5, 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN ALGERIA

### *Acknowledgments*

This report is based on information gathered by members of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs' (NDI) study mission to the Algerian legislative election on June 5, 1997. From May 27 to June 9, NDI organized a 13-member study delegation to join the United Nations (UN) coordinated election observation mission to Algeria's legislative election. This report also draws on information gathered by NDI's election consultant, Jean Lavoie, who arrived in Algeria one month before the election to study the pre-election campaign environment.

NDI expresses its thanks to the Algerian government for allowing the Institute to witness Algeria's historic election and is particularly appreciative of the hospitality extended to NDI during its stay in Algeria. NDI extends its appreciation to the Ambassador of Algeria to the United States, Ramtane Lamamra, for his timely response to inquiries and his willingness to assist the Institute's efforts. The Institute thanks the State Department and USAID for their support, encouragement and financial contribution to the project, and wishes to extend special appreciation to Ambassador Ronald Neumann, Robert Ford, Peter Vrooman, Michael Ratney, and Katherine Koch. NDI thanks the United Nations Election Assistance Unit, and in particular Robin Ludwig, for her patience in assembling a large and diverse monitoring effort. NDI also wishes to highlight the efforts of the UN Secretariat in Algiers, Francisco Cobos, Terry Burke, Leonard Caza, Marianne Rude and local staff who, under thankless and virtually impossible conditions, managed to coordinate logistical support, security and briefing materials for 106 international delegates. Finally, NDI would like to thank its delegates who volunteered their time, experience and expertise. Working long hours under difficult circumstances, they contributed measurably to the study mission.

This report was written by NDI Program Assistant Arsala Deane and NDI Senior Program Officer Olga Milosavljevic and compiled and edited by NDI Middle East and North Africa Regional Director Leslie Campbell. NDI Intern Mira Sucharov contributed substantial sections and NDI Intern Dalia Brahimi provided background research. NDI assumes full responsibility for the accuracy of this report.

### *Special Note*

Due to the violent unrest associated with the five-year battle between the Algerian government and the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an Islamist party founded in 1988, the Algerian government provided the UN observers with a significant security contingent drawn from the ranks of the army, gendarmerie and secret forces. The security personnel carried out their duties courteously and professionally. However, a number of the observers reported difficulties in evaluating the election objectively due to constraints on their independence to move and meet with people freely. While NDI and its team members appreciated the importance of the security provisions accorded by the Algerian government, several of NDI's delegates felt that the security measures provided may have compromised the independence necessary to conduct a proper analysis of the election. As a result, this report is a snapshot of the campaign

period and the election based on the individual experiences of NDI team members and is not intended as a comprehensive analysis of the election process as a whole.

### *Executive Summary*

The June 5, 1997 parliamentary election in Algeria marked the country's second attempt to hold parliamentary elections and the third time citizens were asked to vote in national elections since the canceled 1991 parliamentary election. Notwithstanding a number of significant flaws, Algeria's 1997 election marked a further evolution toward democratic and pluralistic government, both through the regime's limited moves toward opening up the electoral process and through the maturation of the major opposition political forces in the country.

While it is difficult to determine the electoral effect of the continuing banishment of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the two major legal Islamist alternatives Sheik Mahfoud Nahnah's Movement for a Peaceful Society (HMS - formerly Hamas) and the Islamic Renaissance Movement (Ennahda) led by Abdallah Djaballah campaigned effectively, winning almost 40 percent of the parliamentary seats. Parties representing two different ideological tendencies among the Berber population split Berber support evenly, while the former ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN) managed to remain a significant political force. The newly minted Democratic National Rally (RND), widely perceived as the vehicle of the military regime, dominated the campaign and the election but failed to win an absolute majority of the parliamentary seats. Louisa Hanoun's Party of Workers (PT) picked up four seats giving the outspoken and effective Hanoun a parliamentary platform.

The Algerian election seemed significant in two further respects. First, the government took initial steps, even if imperfect, to incorporate political parties into the electoral process by creating independent, multilevel, multiparty election monitoring committees known as the Independent Commune Commission for the Monitoring of Elections (CCISEL), the Independent *Wilaya* Commission for the Monitoring of Elections (CWISEL) and the Independent National Commission for the Monitoring of Elections (CNISEL). Second, the opposition political parties demonstrated long-term commitment to a democratic political process by remaining in the electoral process and agreeing to take their seats in the newly elected parliament even in the face of a less than fair election process and despite lodging several major complaints.

After a two-and-a-half-day UN briefing from May 28 to 30, NDI's 13-member team was deployed to 11 *wilayas* (counties or states) throughout Algeria from May 31 to June 6, 1997. NDI's team members were deployed in diverse regions of Algeria, and were able to observe voting in small desert villages and towns and surrounding rural areas in Southern Algeria in Mascara, Ouargla, Illizi, Bordj BouAridj, Eltaref, and Naama. Other NDI team members observed voting in Western Algeria in cities of Tipaza and Oran and their surrounding rural areas; and in the East in the towns of Souk Ahras and Kenchala. NDI members also observed voting in the capital city of Algiers.

The NDI team was generally impressed by the peaceful and orderly conduct of the election and the professionalism of the polling officials -- both for the special (i.e., military and mobile/itinerant) vote -- held from June 2 to 5 and for the June 5 civilian vote. The civilian vote seems to have demonstrated the best hopes for Algeria's future. Citizens came out to vote in reasonable numbers, and they were able to choose from 39 political parties representing a broad spectrum of political views. In those polling stations visited by the NDI team, the atmosphere on election day was devoid of violence and fear.

However, those team members who witnessed the special vote and the counting of special voting ballot boxes felt that there had been two distinct elections: the civilian election held June 5 and the military component of the special election held in the days prior to June 5.<sup>1</sup> The military component of the special vote, arranged to provide security forces the opportunity to exercise their right to vote prior to election day, lacked transparency and may have been affected by security/military interference. Opposition party representatives and international observers were unable to determine the exact schedule and location of much of the special voting. Police and military voted at turnout levels nearing 100 percent, and ballot boxes and materials were stored inconsistently and sometimes insecurely. Problems in special voting point to the hurdles that continue to challenge Algeria's efforts to build a stable and viable democracy.

This report presents a brief description of the election preparations, the pre-election campaign and the conduct of the election as observed by the NDI team, and suggests possible future work in the area of democratic development in Algeria.

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. Political Context**

Algeria held its second multiparty parliamentary election on June 5, 1997. This election came at a critical time for Algeria, a country that had then experienced five years of rampant violence which has now left at least 60,000 dead. The violence was triggered in January 1992, when the military-backed, secular government annulled the country's first multiparty parliamentary election, in which the Islamic Salvation Front, known as the FIS, had dominated in the first round in December 1991. The bloody insurgency that followed polarized the country. As the June 1997 election approached, the mass support once enjoyed by the FIS seemed to have slowly faded as Algerians grew increasingly tired of the fear and instability that had prevailed over the last five years. The conflict between the Algerian government and the military wing of the FIS also resulted in an overall skepticism of politics and government intentions among Algerians. In this context, political parties emerged seeking compromise and dialogue, offering a unique opportunity for Algerians to break from the past. Legal Algerian political parties

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<sup>1</sup> The three different types of voting (civilian and special which include military and mobile/itinerant) are addressed in Section III of this report.

represented a spectrum of views including Islamist, Berber, Statist and Marxist and they displayed a great deal of resilience in their dealings with the military-backed government over the last several years. Despite serious frustrations with the government, the parties attempted to participate in the political process within the boundaries of established laws and through existing political institutions.

In the June 5 election, 39 political parties competed for 380 seats in parliament. Despite cynicism regarding the political process since the canceled 1991 election, the legal political parties took an active role in campaigning and competing for this election. The results of the election, although marked by some serious irregularities, have been accepted by the parties which have assumed their new positions in parliament. The will of the parties to participate in a multiparty election and the government's commitment to opening up the political arena to its competitors, demonstrates that Algeria is interested in seeking a peaceful resolution to the current conflict. If Algeria's experiment with multiparty governance works, it could mark a step toward democracy in North Africa. Nonetheless, although they are marginalized due to the continuing violence in the country, FIS supporters remain a political force on the Algerian landscape, and their continued disenfranchisement may bring into question the legitimacy of the newly elected parliament.

#### B. United Nations Coordination and NDI's Role

In March 1997, at the request of Algerian President Liamine Zeroual, the UN sent a pre-election team to assess election preparations and to recommend whether the UN should organize an observation effort. The UN team reported that the security risks were manageable, the technical election preparations were "dazzling" and all the major political forces they met with were ready and willing to participate in the election process. Based on the pre-election team's findings, the UN agreed to coordinate an international observer mission of interested member states but declined to sponsor its own delegation or issue its own statement. The Algerian government also invited the Organization of African Unity and the Arab League to organize separate observer delegations. Individual nongovernmental organizations or countries were not invited to observe the election.

In March 1997 NDI was invited to organize the American contribution to the UN-coordinated mission. The Algerian government agreed to NDI's participation, but only under UN auspices. The UN agreed to facilitate the logistical and security preparations. In total, 30 countries sent delegations totaling 106 international observers. After in-depth discussions by NDI program planners and NDI Board Members regarding the Algerian political and security environment, the Institute agreed to organize a thirteen person *study mission* (rather than an observation delegation) to work under the auspices of the UN-coordinated elections observer

mission.<sup>2</sup> The 13-member NDI team, the single largest contribution to the UN-coordinated observation effort, included NDI election observer veterans, Middle East and North Africa experts and political party and campaign organizing experts. Recognizing that the need for special security arrangements would hamper the Institute's ability to implement a comprehensive and credible observation effort, NDI decided not to organize a traditional observation mission and to issue no election statement of its own.

The UN placed a four-member advance team in Algeria, with its first representative arriving in Algiers on April 14. The team followed security developments, assessed technical election preparations and oversaw logistics for the member state delegations.

To gather information on the technical election preparations and the political environment preceding the election and to inform NDI team members prior to their arrival in Algeria, NDI placed Jean Lavoie, a veteran political analyst and election advisor, in Algiers on May 8. He remained in the country through June 15, 1997. During the pre-election period, Lavoie met with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), election officials and political parties. He also worked under the coordination of the UN election advance team and served as the UN's first long-term observer by acting as the UN Algiers regional office director. By May 26 the UN had opened three additional regional offices with NDI staff members and other long term observers to assess the campaign period in cities in the west in Oran, in the east in Constantine and in the south in Ouargla. As a result, NDI was able to gain a limited sense of the election atmosphere prior to election day. The NDI advance observers met with the regional offices of the major political parties and learned about the role of the CWISELs, CCISELs and the election administrative offices. The NDI advance observers were also instrumental in briefing the 106-member delegation during the UN briefing sessions about the political environment and campaign issues in these regions.

The goals of NDI's study mission were:

- 1) to study the election process as part of the UN election observation effort and assess whether the election adhered to international standards of fairness;
- 2) to demonstrate U.S. interest in and support for an open and fair political process in Algeria, promote electoral transparency, and enhance Algerian and international confidence in the electoral process; and
- 3) to learn more about the Algerian political environment and the country's possible transition to a multiparty, parliamentary system.

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<sup>2</sup> See Appendix N for NDI's decision memo and Appendix K for the U.S. government's letter of invitation to NDI.

## II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND

### A. A Colonial Legacy

The French colonization of Algeria which began in 1830 established a pervasive non-democratic legacy in the country. The one million French colonists who streamed into Algeria in the 19th and 20th centuries remained within the French parliamentary system, while the local Algerians were governed by a quasi-representational colonial administration. In 1962, following an eight-year civil war led by the revolutionary National Liberation Front (FLN) against the French administration, Charles de Gaulle withdrew from a country that lacked the civil servants and professionals needed to function independently of France.

In the aftermath of the declaration of independence, national elections were held in 1962 under the tutelage of the FLN, and twice in 1963 -- the latter two in the form of a constitutional referendum and a presidential election. Following the 1962 election, the FLN, under Ahmed Ben Bella, swiftly declared itself Algeria's only legal political party. Three years later, Ben Bella was ousted by then-Minister of Defense Houari Boumediene who was replaced after his death in 1978 by Chadli Bendjedid in another FLN-orchestrated election.

### B. From the 1988 Protests to the 1991 Election

By 1988, deteriorating economic conditions and increasing government corruption led to violent popular uprisings. Bendjedid enlisted the help of the military to quell the unrest, resulting in 500 civilian deaths. At the same time, however, Bendjedid introduced significant, long-term reforms by mandating multiparty participation in future elections. The subsequent contest took the form of municipal elections in 1990, with the FIS winning 54 percent of the popular vote.

With its newfound power, the FIS began making many changes at the local level based on its Islamic platform and demanded that Bendjedid hold a multiparty parliamentary election, which he did in December 1991. After the first round, with the FIS having won 188 seats compared to 15 for the FLN, it was clear that the Front was poised to win. The military-backed regime immediately intervened, removing Bendjedid from power and canceling the election -- an act that sparked five years of violent civil strife.

Without the second round of voting, the parliament remained in limbo, with only half the seats having been allotted during the first round. A five-member High State Council (HSC) was selected to replace Bendjedid until his term expired at the end of 1993.

### C. The Transitional National Council and Zeroual, 1992-1995

In May 1994 a National Transitional Council was established with 200 appointed members and Minister of Defense Liamine Zeroual was inaugurated as head of state. Having

begun to act successfully as a bridge between the military and the populace, Zeroual announced a presidential election for the fall of 1995. During this time, the FLN began to experience internal dissention, and moderate Islamist alternatives that emphasized peaceful compromise began to emerge.

#### D. The Presidential Election of 1995

In an effort to end the violence several parties, including the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), the Parti des Travailleurs (PT), the FIS and the FLN, gathered in a meeting in Rome in late 1994 and early 1995 to discuss reform options under the auspices of the Community of Saint Egidio. The parties, now known as the Saint Egidio group, put forward a plan for peace in Algeria, the Platform of Rome, which involved dialogue with the banned FIS. Rejected by the Algerian military regime, this plan marks the point at which the FLN joined the opposition camp and Zeroual and his military backers disembarked from party politics. As a result of the refusal to accept the Rome Platform, the FFS and the FLN boycotted the presidential election.

With the regime having amended the electoral code to allow opposition parties to field presidential candidates, three candidates contested the incumbent, military-backed Zeroual. Zeroual emerged with 61 percent of the vote for a five-year term in the 1995 presidential elections. Sheikh Mahfoud Nahnah of the Islamist Hamas party came in second with 25 percent of the vote, while Said Saadi of the Berber Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and Noureddine Boukrouh of the Algerian Renewal Party (PRA) won nine and four percent of the vote, respectively.

Although considered reasonably fair by some outside observers, the election took place amidst significant tension. The threat of violence on election day from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the ban on the FIS and the boycott by the FLN and the FFS had the potential to keep voters away. Despite these risks, however, the Interior Ministry reported a 75 percent voter turnout. Tight security arrangements successfully averted the GIA's efforts to disrupt the election and allowed for the peaceful conduct of balloting. The results of the election imbued Zeroual with a new legitimacy.

#### E. The Constitutional Reforms of 1996

In 1996 the Algerian government and opposition parties engaged in a series of dialogues on the topic of national reconciliation and in preparation for legislative elections. Despite intermittent frustration between the four major opposition parties and the government, the major political parties remained engaged in the political process. Despite the urging of several opposition parties, Zeroual still refused to include the FIS in his series of discussions.

The government continued to implement reforms, despite the mixed results of the dialogues with the opposition, and, in October 1996, Zeroual announced a series of political reforms, including the creation of a proportional representation system and an appointed upper

chamber within the national legislature called the Council of the Nation. A third of this Council would be selected by the president, with the rest chosen by the municipal and regional bodies. The upper chamber would approve legislation introduced by the lower house by a three-fourths majority vote. However, concurrent with these liberal reforms was the expansion of presidential powers at the expense of legislative powers. The new system would allow the president to wield effective veto power and would allow the president to rule by decree between parliamentary sessions and during a state of emergency.

Zeroual wished to legitimize his proposed reforms and neutralize significant party opposition to the reforms through a constitutional referendum. Most of the major opposition political parties argued that the reforms and upcoming referendum were unconstitutional because they were drafted and were being implemented by the unelected Transitional National Council. They argued that a parliamentary election should be held first and that only an elected parliament was empowered to revise the constitution and present those changes to the public through a referendum.

Thus, in the weeks leading up to the constitutional referendum of November 28, 1996, the GIA escalated its violent campaign by targeting high-profile figures and conducting random terrorist attacks on civilians. The government responded by deploying large numbers of military and paramilitary forces which managed to control violence prior to the vote.

As in 1995, voting was conducted in an atmosphere of tension with military troops guarding the polling sites. Opposition parties were not allowed to send their representatives to observe the election and were denied media access, and most opposition parties, in fact, boycotted the referendum. Similarly, the foreign press was granted little freedom of movement to review election activities. The referendum was conducted without incidence of violence and served to enlarge the regime's sphere of power. However, in a sign that discontent persisted, violent attacks against civilians escalated immediately after the referendum.

On January 25, 1997, Zeroual convened an extraordinary session of the Transitional National Council to legislate the constitutional changes introduced by the November referendum. Highlights of the new law included decreasing the number of deputies in the lower house of parliament to 380; mandating that two thirds of the 240-member upper house be appointed by elected local authorities, with the other third being appointed by the president; prohibiting parties from referencing religion or ethnicity in their names or party platforms; mandating a minimum of 16 representatives out of 25 *wilayas* to be present at party conventions; and requiring that party leaders reside in Algeria.

### **III. LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK**

For the parliamentary election, the Algerian government adopted a multimember constituency, proportional representation system, whereby parties submitted one list for each *wilaya* they wished to contest. In the 1997 parliamentary election, 7,747 candidates competed

for 380 seats in Parliament; 39 parties participated, with those parties submitting 685 lists of candidates in 48 *wilayas*. In addition, there were 51 lists of independent candidates. Only four parties submitted lists in all 48 constituencies, including the eight seats representing Algerians residing abroad. The Ministry of Interior had the administrative responsibility for organizing the election at all levels.

#### A. Campaign Laws

The election law does not offer great detail regarding the rules of the campaign period. The main issues it regulates are the location of rallies and posters, access to media, and campaign financing. Specifically, it states that candidates may be reimbursed for campaign expenses based on the number of votes received, and that candidates and political parties are prohibited from receiving funding from foreign sources.

#### B. The Election Administration

The Interior Ministry placed permanent administrative bodies at all levels to prepare for election day. Forty-eight *wilayas* made up the 48 constituencies, with approximately 47,000 polling stations located throughout the 1,541 communes. Two or more polling stations constituted a voting center. The number of voters could not exceed 800 in any one polling station. There were also 1,000 mobile/itinerant polling stations for the nomadic populations and those living in inaccessible areas, and approximately 750,000 votes were expected to come from Algerians living abroad.<sup>3</sup>

Each *wilaya* was assigned an administrative office by the Ministry of Interior, called the Bureau of Regulations for the Election (Direction de la Reglementation Affairs General), known by the acronym DRAG, and was responsible for all technical election preparations at the *wilaya* level. The DRAG organized voter education programs, assigned and regulated areas in which party posters could be placed, organized voter lists and technical preparations and coordinated public areas for political parties to conduct their meetings and rallies.

#### *Candidate and Party Eligibility*

A candidate had to be an Algerian citizen for a minimum of five years and had to be at least 28 years old. Candidate lists had to be compiled and submitted no later than April 12, 1997, 45 days before the election. Each list was to be submitted under the aegis of a political party. If a candidate wished to run as an independent, his/her independent list would have to be

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<sup>3</sup> Information taken from UN Consultant Ronald Gould's memo about Algeria's election preparations. The memo was written after his visit to Algeria in March 1997, to assess whether the UN should organize an election observation mission.

accompanied by at least 400 signatures of the voters in that constituency for each seat to be filled. No candidate could run in more than one list or more than one constituency.

Eight of the 380 parliamentary seats were set aside for the diaspora population, most of which resides in France. The citizens living outside of Algeria voted in the *wilaya* of their last residency, birth place of ancestral origin. Members were to be elected for a five-year term. Seats were distributed proportionally by *wilaya* with one seat representing 80,000 people, with a minimum of four seats per *wilaya*. A maximum of 23 parties could run in one *wilaya* and a minimum of eight parties had to run in a *wilaya*. In order to win a seat, a party had to gain five percent of the votes for that *wilaya*.

### *Voter Lists*

Approximately 17 million out of a population of approximately 30 million Algerians were registered to vote for the June 1997 election. The Interior Ministry organized a sophisticated computerized system that connected all the voting centers and polling stations to their respective communal and *wilaya* level election administration apparatuses. The computerization of the voter lists since the 1995 presidential election resulted in more accurate lists as almost one million duplicate names and names of the deceased were deleted. In accordance with the election law, the political parties, members of the CNISEL, CWISEL, CCISELS, and the public had access to voter lists. Several parties, however, complained that they were not given permission to view the voter lists for the special vote.

### *Voter Eligibility*

To vote, a citizen had to be 18 years of age and his/her name had to appear on the voter registration list of the commune of his/her residence. Voter ID cards were distributed, although they were not required for voting as long as the voter's name was on the registration list.

### C. The CNISELs, CWISELs, CCISELs

On February 27, 1997, the President and all the major political parties worked together to create the Independent National Commission for the Monitoring of Elections, known by the acronym CNISEL. The commission was created with the endorsement of all the major political parties to act as an independent body to observe the election process as a whole. The commission represented all political parties that registered candidates in at least 12 constituencies. It also included representatives from two human rights groups, one representative of the executive and three distinguished citizens chosen by the commission. Subcommissions known as CWISELs or the Independent *Wilaya* Commission for the Monitoring of Elections were established at the *wilaya* level. At the commune level<sup>4</sup>, subcommissions known as the

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<sup>4</sup> Algeria has 1,541 communes in 48 *wilayas*.

CCISELs or the Independent Commune Commission for the Monitoring of the Elections were established.

For the June 1997 election, the CNISEL, CWISELs, and CCISELs were vested with the power to monitor the campaign environment and monitor adherence to the election law, field complaints from political parties and direct them to the Ministry of Interior, and observe the voting and counting on election day. These commissions, however, wielded no legal authority to resolve issues submitted to them. The implementation of the election remained firmly in the hands of the Walis (governors) and the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, the commissions at the *wilaya* and commune levels were forbidden from issuing statements to the press. On election day, representatives of these commissions were issued credentials by the Wali (governor) allowing them to be present during the vote and the ballot counting at the polling station, commune and *wilaya* levels.

#### D. Election Preparation Activities

##### *Training and Conduct of Polling Officials*

The training of polling officials was conducted by an administrative office of the Ministry of Interior, called the Bureau of Regulations for the Election or Direction de la Reglementation Affairs General (DRAG) in each *wilaya*. The polling officials during election day seemed professional and well prepared for their job. In the polling stations observed by NDI, the polling officials maintained an orderly, disciplined environment and did not allow any efforts to influence voting. For example, in the *wilaya* of Tipaza, one observer noted that one party had asked two women party workers to stand at the entrance to the polling station to influence women to vote for their party. The polling officials immediately ordered these women out of the voting center.

##### *Voter Education*

The administration made an effort to conduct voter education programs nationally through newspapers, radio and television to explain the new system of voting. Prior to the election, the government ran many television advertisements encouraging citizens to register for the election. The government also ran several voter education advertisements informing citizens of voting procedure and the importance of voting. Newspapers printed detailed instructions on how to vote as well. The illiterate and itinerant population, however, in many cases lacking access to TV or radio, were not provided information on voting procedures.

## E. Election Observers

### *Lack of Nongovernmental Domestic Observers*

No domestic civic groups organized an election monitoring program for the June 1997 election. Upon consultation with several NGOs, it was unclear to NDI whether the NGOs were simply not interested in such an activity or whether they felt that there was not enough political freedom to conduct such a program. Conversations with government and administration officials indicated a benign ignorance of the importance of such efforts at best and hostility towards the idea at worst. Some NGOs expressed an interest in organizing an observation program for the next legislative election, however.

The only domestic non-party observers present were members of the CNISEL, CWISEL, and CCISEL who received credentials to enter voting areas and observe on election day. In general, it seemed as if these groups were able to freely access the voting areas on election day and were able to observe the counting at the polling station and at the commune and *wilaya* level.

### *Political Party Pollwatchers*

Each polling station was allowed up to five political party representatives. If competing parties in a given commune were unable to agree on how to distribute pollwatcher positions among themselves, then pollwatcher slots were allocated by a lottery conducted by the local CCISEL.

Once pollwatcher slots were assigned, the political parties drew straws for the privilege to observe at each polling station and thus could not plan a pollwatching strategy in advance. Political parties had to submit a list of representatives and their photos to the *daira* (the administrative level between the commune and *wilaya* levels) offices by May 27, in order to gain observer credentials. Several parties, however, were unaware of the deadlines or did not receive their credentials in time to distribute them before election day.

## F. Description of Voting and Counting Process

### *Mobile/Itinerant Voting*

The itinerant or mobile/itinerant voting process was designed to facilitate voting for the nomadic population and for citizens living in mountainous, desert or other sparsely populated areas of Algeria. In most cases, polling officials would travel to the voters living in these areas, bringing all the necessary voting materials. They would set up a voting site, allow voters to cast their ballots and move on to the next remote area in the commune. Due to the vast distances involved, mobile/itinerant voting took place in most cases over multiple days, from June 2 to 5. Once the voting was completed, the itinerant ballot boxes were transported to their designated polling center, where they were kept until the counting on June 5. The ballot boxes were

guarded by the polling officials or by personnel selected by the Wali. While party representatives were allowed to accompany the mobile/itinerant polling truck and observe the voting, they were not permitted to remain with the ballot boxes overnight.

### *Military Voting*

In order to allow the army, gendarmerie, police and firefighters to exercise their right to vote, a special voting process was established and was to be held on June 2. The earlier date was chosen to enable army and police personnel to provide security at the polling stations on election day. Once deployed, NDI team members found that each Wali had the power to decide when the special vote would occur in his *wilaya* -- June 2, 3 or 4. In some cases, special voting was extended over two days. Special polling stations were located in military barracks, police stations and fire stations. In most cases, polling officials were senior ranking officers.

After the vote was completed, the ballot boxes were stored in the barracks or police headquarters, and, in some cases, in civilian voting centers. Like the itinerant boxes, the military ballot boxes were assigned to civilian polling centers where the boxes would be opened and ballots counted at 7:00 p.m. on June 5.

According to the election law, the military vote was supposed to be administered in the same way as the civilian vote. This meant that special ballot boxes should have been treated just as civilian boxes were. In practice, however, the interpretation of this clause and hence the particular implementation of the process -- including who was allowed to remain with the military ballot boxes for the 72 hours between the vote and the count -- was left to the discretion of the Wali in each *wilaya*.

### *Civilian Voting*

Civilian voting took place on June 5. Voters would go to a fixed polling station in their commune. In general polling stations were set up at schools. The polling stations were guarded by the military or volunteer armed civilians. Polling stations were sometimes segregated by gender, according to the preferences of the commune.

Polling stations were to stay open from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., but *wilayas* were allowed to extend the voting period by one hour if necessary. The polling station committee comprised five members including the Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary, and two Assistants, all of whom were appointed by the Wali. Elected officials or relatives of candidates were excluded from these positions. There were usually four polling stations to a voting center, however two was the minimum required to constitute a voting center. At each polling station up to 800 voters could cast their ballots. Mobile/itinerant polling stations could accommodate up to 400 voters each.

### *The Count and Consolidation of Votes*

Counting took place at each polling station immediately following the closing of the polls at 7:00 p.m., at which time all mobile/itinerant and military ballot boxes were brought to their assigned civilian polling centers to be counted along with the civilian ballot boxes. The counting process was open to the general public as well as to all political party representatives. Any citizen was allowed to enter the polling station to watch the counting process.

According to the election law, two citizens were selected to assist in the counting by holding up each ballot for scrutiny. If no citizens were present at the end of the day, the polling station committee would proceed with the count themselves. According to the law, once the counting was completed, the protocols (result sheets) had to be produced and the results posted on the door of the polling station. In some *wilayas* this procedure was followed; however, in others this procedure was ignored. The protocols were then transmitted to the commune level. The results were consolidated at the commune level and then were passed on to the *wilaya* level to be combined with all the results from that particular constituency. These results were then passed on to the national level. Just days before the election, the Interior Ministry and Constitutional Court decreed that political party representatives, international observers and any citizen observers would be permitted to observe the consolidation process through to the *wilaya* level. However, several NDI team members noted that they and other Algerians were denied access to the consolidation process at the *wilaya* level.

The government established administrative electoral commissions at the *wilaya* and commune levels (not to be confused with the CNISELs, CWISELs, and CCISELs, which only had the capacity to monitor the election process and receive and record complaints). The electoral commission at the communal level was composed of four members appointed by the Wali and was responsible for consolidating the results at the commune level. The electoral commission at the *wilaya* level included three magistrates appointed by the Ministry of Justice. These commissions were responsible for consolidating and transmitting the results. The only results considered final were those pronounced and consolidated by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court was also charged with adjudicating all formal complaints regarding the election process before announcing the official results.

### *Complaints and Appeals Procedure*

Parties submitted their complaints to the CCISEL at the commune level. The CCISELs would note (and in some cases investigate) complaints and then submit them with comment to their respective CWISEL. If the complaint was not resolved at that level, it would be directed to the Wali. If the Wali was unable to resolve the matter, the complaint would be sent to the national level, the CNISEL. The CNISEL would bring complaints to the attention of the Ministry of Interior.

#### IV. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

##### A. Political Parties

Algeria's political party law was promulgated in March 1997 under President Zeroual and calls for "commitment to democracy," "adherence to political pluralism," and the refraining from "diverting... [party] resources for the purpose of setting up a military or paramilitary organization." The law is distinctive for its prohibitions against parties displaying sectarian loyalties. Thus, Article 5 states that "no political party may...found its establishment or its action on a religious, linguistic, racial, gender, corporate, or regionalist basis." Given the legal existence of Islamic and Berber parties, however, in practice the law prohibits only sectarian affiliation as expressed in the party's name. Parties are also prohibited from affiliating or coordinating with foreign organizations.

The following is a description of the main parties in the Algerian political spectrum, including those political organizations that were banned, and as those that boycotted the election.<sup>5</sup>

**Algerian Renewal Party** (*Parti pour le Renouveau de l'Algerie* -- PRA). Founded during the domestic unrest of 1988, the PRA is a moderate Islamic party focusing on economic issues from a liberal and intellectual framework. In the June 1997 election, the PRA attempted to field an Islamic platform with a democratic face.<sup>6</sup> The PRA had the highest proportion of women candidates.

(Leader: Nouredine Boukrouh)

- 1995 presidential election: received 4 percent of the vote
- two members were appointed to the January 1996 cabinet
- June 1997 election: 0 seats

**Democratic National Rally** (*Rassemblement National Democratique* -- RND). Widely perceived as a pro-Zeroual party, the RND was created on February 21, 1997 by members of organizations linked to the FLN. Its platform includes restoring peace and stability, privatizing state-owned companies, and implementing a social welfare scheme. The party's creation elicited strong reactions from many of the other parties. The FFS stated that the RND is "the recycling

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<sup>5</sup> Information on Algeria's political parties prior to the June 1997 election is drawn from Arthur S. Banks, Alan J. Day and Thomas C. Muller, eds., *Political Handbook of the World: 1997* (Binghamton, NY: Binghamton University, 1997), pp. 16-19. Data from the 1997 election results are taken from *El Moudjahid* (10 June 1997).

<sup>6</sup> *El Watan* (in French; 4 March 1997), p. 3.

instrument of the old figures of the system.”<sup>7</sup> The RND has attempted to “help people forget the FLN,” while at the same time drawing on the FLN’s “heritage” as the triumphant revolutionary party which led Algeria’s war for independence from France.<sup>8</sup>

(Leader: Abdelkader Bensalah)

- June 1997 election: 156 seats

**Islamic Renaissance Movement** (*Ennahda; Movement de la Renaissance Islamique -- MRI*).

Ennahda is a small, moderate Islamic party which campaigned in the June 1997 election on a platform of “peace.” The legalization of an Islamist party and lenience toward the Ennahda’s open Islamist agenda shows that as in the case of MSP or Hamas, the government has attempted to promote Ennahda -- with limited success -- as an acceptable alternative to the FIS.

(Leader: Sheikh Abdallah Djaballah)

- June 1997 election: 34 seats

**Islamic Salvation Front** (*Front Islamique du Salut -- FIS*). Formed in 1989 as an Islamic opposition party with the aim of adopting and enforcing Shari’a law throughout society, the FIS garnered a majority in the June 1990 municipal election. The FIS’ subsequent victory in the first round of legislative election in December 1991 prompted the military-backed FLN government to cancel the election, resulting in five years of civil war. Similarly, the FIS was prohibited from participating in the 1995 presidential election which it asked its supporters to boycott. Following the 1995 presidential elections and despite urging from several of the opposition political parties, the government continued to refuse to open a dialogue with the FIS and to regard it as an illegal party. The government maintained its prohibition on the FIS’ participation in Algerian political life and in the 1997 legislative election. The FIS boycotted the June 1997 election, citing them as “rigged in advance and neither free nor fair.”<sup>9</sup> After the June 1997 election, the FIS vowed that it would continue to resist all attempts by the government to establish a Western-style democracy.

(Leader: Dr. Abassi Madani)

- June 1997 election: boycotted/banned

**Movement for Democracy in Algeria** (*Mouvement pour la Democratie d’Algerie -- MDA*).

Founded in May 1984 by former president Ahmed Ben Bella with the stated aim of “achiev[ing] pluralism and beginn[ing] Algeria’s apprenticeship in democracy.” The party was legalized in early 1990, however, and went on to be one of the signatories to the national reconciliation pact drafted by opposition groups in early 1995 in Rome. The MDA was one of the few legal political parties to boycott the June 1997 election. Like the FFS, the MDA felt strongly that the

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<sup>7</sup> *El Watan* (in French; 8 March 1997), p. 3 (FBIS).

<sup>8</sup> *El Watan* (in French; 4 March 1997), p. 3 (FBIS).

<sup>9</sup> *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (in Arabic; 4 April 1997) (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts).

FIS should participate in these election and that the prohibition on its participation “means that there will be no genuine dialogue and that the elections will not express the views of the Algerian street.”<sup>10</sup> The party also felt that Zeroual’s recent reforms such as the creation of a second parliamentary chamber<sup>11</sup> and the general atmosphere of instability and insecurity prevailing in the country<sup>12</sup> would render the election nondemocratic. The MDA’s agenda included “halting... the bloodshed and...return[ing] to peace”; expanding popular participation; and “restor[ing] national sovereignty which is being threatened by the foreign banks and the IMF.”<sup>13</sup>

(Leader: Ahmed Ben Bella, former President of the Republic).

- June 1997 election: boycotted

**Movement of a Peaceful Society** (*Listes du Mouvement de la Societe pour la Paix* -- MSP; formerly **Ham**as). Distinct from the Palestinian Hamas and having changed its name following the introduction of the constitutional amendment which prohibited references to religion in party names, the MSP is a moderate Islamic party influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and firmly committed to working within the existing political framework to push for change. The MSP advocates “coexistence” with groups espousing contradictory views, the cessation of terrorism, the liberation of political prisoners and the phased implementation of an Islamic state - - yet one which would “respect...individual liberties.” The Algerian government sees Hamas as an acceptable alternative to the outlawed FIS. In 1995 the MSP filled two junior portfolios in the Zeroual government.

(Leader: Sheikh Mahfoud Nahnah)

- 1995 presidential election: Sheikh Nahnah came in second, with 25 percent of the vote
- June 1997 election: 69 seats

**National Liberation Front** (*Front de Liberation Nationale* -- FLN). The FLN was founded in 1954 on a platform of socialism, nonalignment and pan-Arabism. Under President Bendjedid, in the 1980's, the party shifted its mandate to one of economic liberalization and limited political opening. Having led the eight-year war of independence against France in the 1950's and 1960's, the FLN came to assume complete control over Algerian politics. Economic problems and increasing government corruption led to popular uprising in the late eighties. In June 1991, Bendjedid resigned as FLN president in the government’s attempt to appear less under the control of the FLN.

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<sup>10</sup> Interview with Ahmed Ben Bella, *Al-Majallah* (in Arabic; 13-19 April 1997), p. 27 (FBIS).

<sup>11</sup> Report on telephone interview with Khaled Bensmain, coordinator of the Movement for Democracy in Algeria, by Salah Jamil; *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (10 April 1997), p. 4 (FBIS).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

In December 1991, the government held its first multiparty election, in which the FLN won 15 seats while the FIS won 188 seats in the first round of the legislative election. Anxious that the FIS could sweep this election as it did the 1990 municipal elections, the government canceled the second round of the legislative election and the FLN retained its prominence in the appointed National Transitional Council and High State Council. By late 1994, the FLN joined the opposition camp alongside the FIS and FFS and chose to boycott the 1995 presidential election. In January 1996, under Boualem Benhamouda, the FLN distanced itself from the opposition. (Leaders: Chadli Bendjedid, former President of the Republic; and Boualem Benhamouda, current).

- June 1997 election: 62 seats

**Rally for Culture and Democracy** (*Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie* -- RCD). The RCD was established by FFS members who supported the FFS' stance on Berber issues, "economic centralism," linguistic pluralism and separation of religion and state, but who were adamantly opposed to the FFS' support for dialogue with the FIS. The RCD is the most ardent supporter of the military struggle against Muslim guerillas. The RCD's leader, Mohamed Ouramadane Tiziri, was assassinated in early 1994, apparently by Islamists opposed to the RCD's professed secularism and its unwillingness to consider dialogue with the FIS. The current leader, Said Saadi, founded the first human rights movement in Algeria. The RCD based its 1997 platform on economic reform and eliminating corruption and mismanagement. It envisions a broad-based democratic coalition as an alternative both to the "fundamentalist camp" as well as to the "ruling regime."

(Leader: Said Saadi)

- 1990 municipal elections: two percent of the popular vote
- 1995 presidential election: nine percent of the popular vote
- June 1997 election: 19 seats

**Republican National Alliance** (*Alliance Nationale Republicaine* -- ANR). The ANR was formed in early 1995 by several former government officials and is formally opposed to compromise with the FIS. The ANR's leader, Redha Malek, formerly prime minister in 1993 and Algerian Ambassador to the United States, failed to obtain the necessary number of signatures of support to run for the 1995 presidential election. In the June 1997 election, the ANR presented a platform of economic reform, including restructuring the public sector.

- June 1997 election: 0 seats

**Socialist Forces Front** (*Front des Forces Socialistes* -- FFS). The FFS is Algeria's oldest opposition political party and was created in 1963 in opposition to then-president Ahmed Ben Bella. The party draws its support for its strong social justice and minority rights agenda from Berbers and middle-class urbanites. The FFS worked primarily as an underground movement until it was legalized in 1989 when multiparty politics was introduced to Algeria. Unlike the RCD, the FFS sees dialogue as the only peaceful solution to Algeria's civil conflict and thus advocates talks with the banned FIS. Due to its compromise stance vis-a-vis the FIS, the government views the FFS with suspicion. The FFS boycotted the 1990 municipal elections

arguing that legislative balloting should occur first but agreed to field 300 candidates in the December 1991 legislative election. Its platform for the 1997 election focused on a "mixed economy" and a more equitable distribution of income, dialogue with the FIS, greater regional autonomy and official recognition of the Berber language. The FFS joined the FIS and the FLN in endorsing the 1995 peace plan, and when Zeroual rejected the peace plan, the FFS boycotted the 1995 presidential election. During the lead-up to the June 1997 election, the FFS was the strongest critic of the current regime, while also having called for Zeroual to begin talks with the FIS. Despite opposition to the process which led to the 1997 legislative election, the FFS remained committed to working within the process and participated in the 1997 election. (Leader: Hocine Ait Ahmed).

- June 1997 election: 20 seats

**Socialist Workers Party** (*Parti des Travailleurs* -- PT). Granted legal status in early 1990, the PT supports Trotskyite "radical socialism," nonpayment of Algeria's external debt and secular government. By 1994, the PT was calling for dialogue with the FIS. Party leader Louisa Hannoun is an outspoken critic of corruption, structural rigidity in government and the lack of free political expression in Algeria.

(Leader: Louisa Hannoun)

- June 1997 election: four seats

### **Independents**

- June 1997 election: 11 seats

Fifty-one independent candidates ran for election in Algeria. They represented a wide spectrum of political views ranging from secularists and leftists to Islamists.

### *Other Small Parties*

**Progressive Republican Party** (*Parti Republicain Progressiste* -- PRP).

The party was founded in 1990.

(Leader: Khadir Driss )

- June 1997 election: three seats

**Social Liberal Party** (*Parti Social Liberal* -- PSL).

(Leader: Ahmed Khelil)

- June 1997 election: one seat

**Union for Democracy and Liberty** (*Union pour la Democratie et la Liberte* -- UDL).

A relatively small party seen as a centrist formation.

(Leaders: Mouley Boukhalafa and Turki Zaghoul)

- June 1997 election: one seat

### *Nonparty political organizations*

**Armed Islamic Group** (*Groupe Islamique Arme -- GIA*). The GIA emerged in the mid-1980's as the most militant of the underground Islamist organizations and has waged a violent, terrorist campaign to bring down the military backed government, targeting police, government officials, journalists, feminists, civilians, and, since 1994, foreigners. The group reportedly advocates establishing an Iranian-style "theocracy" in Algeria and staunchly opposes dialogue with the government. The GIA originally a splinter group from the FIS, views itself as a rival to the FIS and is rumored to have targeted FIS supporters and leaders.

(Leaders: Antar Zouabri, Abdelhaq Layada and Mohammed Said).

- June 1997 election: boycotted

**Islamic Salvation Army** (*Armee Islamique du Salut -- AIS*; previously the **Armed Islamic Movement**). Sometimes referred to as "the military wing of the FIS," the AIS is an underground Islamic party which emerged in the aftermath of the canceled election of 1991. Unlike the GIA (see above), the AIS claims that it attacks "official" government and police targets. In early 1995, the AIS indicated that it would accept any peaceful solution with the government, as long as the proposal was endorsed by the FIS.

(Leaders: Said Makhloufi, Sheikh Abdelkader Chebouti, Madani Merzak and Ahmed Ben Aicha).

- June 1997 election: boycotted

### B. The Campaign Environment

The government made public commitments to contain violence during the election process in order to encourage maximum participation in the election. Nevertheless, the campaign period, lasting from May 16 to June 3, began amidst a climate of tension with two car bombs having exploded the day before in Algiers and with more than 40 people tortured and killed in villages near the capital the day before the official start of the campaign period. Reports from NDI's field representative in Algiers described the city as quiet yet filled with tension and a general feeling of pessimism about the election and its ability to bring change. More generally, the four cities visited by NDI team members during the campaign period were devoid of the general excitement and anticipation that often accompanies an election. Strictly designated rally and poster areas deprived the cities of many of the positive images that tend to dominate a city during an election period.

Despite a downbeat atmosphere in Algeria's cities, it appeared that multiparty politics took root relatively quickly, as parties took on the role of campaigning and addressing Algeria's problems. Although NDI team members were unable to ascertain the actual popular support for the parties contesting the election, they were impressed by the sheer number of parties participating and the variety of platforms represented, ranging from moderate Islamic parties (Hammas/MSP and Ennahda) to liberal parties (RCD and Social Liberals) to democratic socialists (FFS).

However, opposition parties demonstrated their lack of campaign experience by largely spending their allotted media time complaining about government regulations rather than advocating viable policy solutions. The lack of proactive campaign messages was also manifest in public meetings. Party leaders promised "jobs" without explaining how they would redistribute government resources, and "peace" -- a prominent theme throughout the campaign -- without detailing their strategy for obtaining it.

Important national issues such as improving the social and economic systems, enhancing security, eliminating corruption, reducing unemployment and increasing the availability of housing were widely debated by political parties and the media. The media enjoyed an unprecedented amount of freedom as they were able to cover the campaign period and interview opposition candidates relatively freely. Some parties, in particular the MSP (formerly Hamas) complained, however, that their campaigns received little coverage, in relation to coverage allotted to other parties.

### C. Concerns Raised during the Campaign

The NDI team was not present in Algeria during the entire pre-election and campaign period. However, NDI's advance representative Jean Lavoie did arrive in Algeria in early May and had the opportunity to talk with political parties regarding election preparations. Lavoie, along with the four person NDI advance team that arrived eight days before the election, heard several party complaints during the campaign period about the technical and political constraints they faced.

In several *wilayas* during the campaign, some parties, in particular the government-oriented RND, were accused of receiving funding from the government, and some RND candidates were reportedly using government resources, including cars, access to media and technical and staff assistance. In addition, the MSP and Ennahda parties were reportedly receiving foreign funding.

Several parties lodged complaints relating to government regulation of media campaigning. While the electronic media time allocations were fairly allocated in principle -- with the number of hours determined by the parties' respective number of lists -- implementation of this regulation was imperfect, such as in the case of the Socialist Workers Party (PT). Some parties also reported that their messages were censored or "edited" by the government-run broadcast stations.

Media censorship came to the fore when the Socialist Workers Party (PT) complained that its videotaped message was not broadcast during its assigned time slot and no prior or subsequent explanation for the cancellation was given. In the message, party leader Louisa Hanoun criticized the government's cancellation of the second round of the 1991 legislative election and charged that the large number of killings committed by the military against civilians had nothing to do with the government's stated intention of dissolving extremist Islamic groups.

Moreover, several political parties protested the stipulation that all political broadcasts had to be in Arabic. This regulation effectively prevented the candidates from reaching the Tamazight-speaking Berber population and some French speakers. Given the high level of illiteracy in the country -- with only 500,000 out of almost 30 million people having access to print media -- radio and television were crucial avenues for disseminating political messages.

The government provided for equal and secure access to public venues for party campaign meetings and public rallies. To ensure safety and minimize violence, government security personnel cleared and checked the meeting spaces and sometimes guarded them during the event. Some opposition parties complained that government personnel control over the government-appointed locations for rallying and campaigning infringed upon their ability to reach out to their supporters as many activists feared the perceived repercussions of being seen in "government" spaces supporting opposition political parties.

The dramatic, last minute increase in the number of mobile/itinerant polling stations in three *wilayas* a few days before election day exacerbated existing suspicions regarding these special votes. For example in the *wilaya* of Setif, the number of mobile/itinerant voting stations increased from roughly 200 to almost 500. Many parties suspected that the government was seeking to increase the pool of more readily manipulated voters. When questioned, government officials were unable to articulate reasons for the sudden increase.

Parties also complained to several NDI delegates about the Ministry of Education's decision to bar teachers from sitting on regional and local electoral commissions until May 26 after the conclusion of annual exams. The decision was criticized because a large number of teachers are known to support opposition parties. By not freeing teachers to serve on election commissions, opposition representation on those commissions was reduced. Opposition parties had argued for a later election day specifically to avoid this conflict but their requests were ignored.

Additionally, some NDI team members heard complaints that citizens were intimidated into voting. Some party representatives stated that many of their supporters who did not vote in the 1995 presidential election were denied a number of government services when they were unable to prove that they had voted in that election.

All of these complaints were submitted to the CNISEL, which presented them to the Ministry of Interior. However, little direct action was taken by the Ministry, and the CNISEL possessed neither the political will nor an effective strategy to pressure the government into addressing party complaints. Over time, the CNISEL's inability to represent the parties undermined its utility in the eyes of the parties. In short, government control over the parties' ability to disseminate their message, regulations on public rallies and campaign advertising and the powerlessness of the CNISEL rendered a campaign environment lacking much enthusiasm, despite party efforts to motivate and excite voters.

## V. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER EFFORT

### A. Security Arrangements

The UN deployed 106 international observers in 40 of the 48 *wilayas*. The UN distributed its observers widely throughout the country to get maximum coverage of the election. However, NDI delegates noted several impediments which interfered with their ability to carry out observation efforts.

As security was of great concern to the UN and its observers, the Algerian government provided a well-organized system to ensure the safety of the international observers. Once deployed to a particular part of the country, each observer was assigned a government official called an "accompagnateur" who accompanied the observer at all times along with a large police and paramilitary contingent. Observers stayed in government houses and were provided meals by government agencies.

During deployment, the NDI team was able to meet with political parties and NGOs. Unfortunately, due to the heavy security and the presence of "accompagnateurs," meeting non-government actors was sometimes difficult as opposition groups and NGOs were intimidated by the number of government personnel and party representatives present at every meeting. In this environment, some Algerians doubted the neutrality of the international election observers.

All travel between appointments and differing locations was conducted under the guard of the observer team's personal security detail. Travel within urban areas involved a two-car convoy surrounding the observer team's car and a minimum of four security personnel, the accompagnateur and a driver. Travel in between *wilayas* or major urban areas entailed at least an additional two-car security convoy provided by the gendarmerie or the communal guard (though the *Walis* could use their own discretion and deploy far greater numbers of security personnel as they deemed necessary or appropriate). Although the NDI team members appreciated the Algerian government's efforts to ensure their security, in some cases the security affected the NDI delegates' ability to conduct spontaneous checks on polling sites or talk to Algerian citizens.

Overall the NDI team had varied experiences. While some NDI delegates felt that their work was unhindered by government and security presence, many of NDI's delegates felt that the preponderant presence of security personnel and government officials (such as the accompagnateurs) hampered their ability to meet nongovernmental actors privately and in several instances served to intimidate opposition political parties and NGOs. They also felt that their credibility as independent, international observers was compromised.

## B. The Observer Delegations and UN Deployment Strategy

The UN Election Assistance Unit committed only to *coordinate* the election observer exercise in Algeria -- coordination being one of the least intensive options for UN election intervention. By choosing a low level of assistance and relying almost completely on member states for the provision of observers and funding, the UN contributed to a number of serious problems. First, the UN became almost completely reliant on the Algerian government for security, logistical support, transportation, housing and meals for observers (outside of Algiers). Second, the UN had little or no control over the qualifications and quality of observers supplied by member states. Third, the quality and integrity of the observation effort was compromised by the late arrival of most of the member state observer delegations.

While a large number of observers eventually arrived in the country --106 in total -- some member states sent observers who were often unwilling and unable to do the work required for a serious observation effort. In some isolated cases the observers were blatantly biased toward the Algerian government and unwilling to engage in any criticism, however constructive, of the election process. Despite the best efforts of the UN election advance team in Algiers, the number of unqualified observers, their late arrival and the lack of means to control the activities of individual observers made it impossible to build a cohesive and effective observer group.

The UN divided the 106 observers into roughly 53 teams of two and deployed them to 40 of the 48 *wilayas*. The head of the UN election advance team intended to assign deployments according to a scientific model of random sampling which took into account the number of polling stations in each *wilaya* as well as the characteristics of those polling stations--mobile/itinerant, military or fixed--in order to ensure that the delegation's conclusions would be representative of the entire election process and not skewed. Unfortunately the deployment scheme did not use any political criteria to inform the scientific framework. For example, there was no attempt to ascertain which *wilayas* were more or less electorally important.

Ultimately, the deployment plan was only partially implemented according to the original UN methodology. Uncertainty regarding the precise number of observers until the day before the elections as well as the security concerns of many observers about being deployed outside Algiers required that the UN election advance team modify its initial plan significantly.

UN constraints also raised doubt among many of the political parties and NGOs about the credibility of the international election observation effort. The need to accept Algerian government accommodation, transportation and hospitality may have impaired the credibility of the effort. Additionally, the three international observer efforts --the UN, the OAU and the Arab League-- failed to coordinate effectively resulting in unnecessary redundancies in the deployment of observers. The international observation effort was also hampered by the absence of credible, impartial, domestic observers.

### C. Observers Election Statement

The 40 UN observer teams were organized into four regional groups, and, upon returning to Algiers, were charged with appointing a regional rapporteur and providing a written report after completing a regional debriefing. This process was completed successfully and the regional rapporteurs retired to write a draft statement to be released to the public and to the media. More than half of the election observers left Algeria before the June 8 review of the draft election statement, with the understanding that the report would reflect a compendium of the regional consensus reports. Unfortunately, some of those who stayed behind wished to make substantive changes to the draft report. The rapporteurs drafted a statement that reflected a broad consensus of the majority of observers and resisted attempts at major changes to the findings. Tensions within the remaining observer group, though, caused the cancellation of a planned press conference and subsequently caused some confusion among domestic and international media representatives.

The official statement released by the UN observer delegation (appendix 1) reflected the varying experiences of different observer teams. While noting that the majority of observers experienced no problems in observing the vote, and generally praising the technical aspects of the election, the statement noted that some observers felt that their freedom was limited by strict security arrangements. While drawing attention to the Algerian Government's efforts to encourage voting by security forces and in remote areas, the statement also notes that the special and itinerant voting was flawed. The UN observers' statement concludes without characterizing Algeria's 1997 election as free and fair or not free and fair -- a conscious choice of the drafting group given the widely divergent opinions within the delegation as a whole.

## VI. FINDINGS

The Algerian government took extraordinary measures to ensure that all Algerians could exercise their right to vote. Special voting stations were established allowing the gendarmerie, police, communal guard, military and firefighters to vote several days prior to the regular June 5 election, when they would provide security for voters. The government also went to great lengths to guarantee that Algeria's nomadic population and citizens living in sparsely inhabited areas were able to vote through an mobile/itinerant voting scheme. Procedures were also put in place to allow Algerian nationals living abroad to exercise their right to vote. The NDI team noted significant differences, however, between the security, organization and conduct of the civilian, military and mobile/itinerant elections.

### A. The Civilian Vote

The civilian vote took place on June 5, 1997. The NDI team was generally impressed by the atmosphere on election day and did not observe instances of intimidation or violence on June 5. The team was also impressed by the professionalism of the polling officials and the set up of the polling stations and the voting centers. Only a few technical irregularities were observed,

none of which the NDI team felt could have affected the overall outcome of the election. In general, election day was conducted in a manner that ensured Algerians the right to vote in a safe and free atmosphere.

For the civilian vote, NDI's delegates did not find that the military troops which were deployed to protect voters created an intimidating atmosphere. According to observer accounts, the election was conducted in a peaceful environment, without any observed cases of intimidation by the security forces. By contrast, NDI's team members did note an intimidating environment at polling stations for the military vote and the mobile/itinerant vote.

The NDI team observed that many families arrived together in large groups to vote. Women and men were generally directed to separate polling stations. Citizens seemed calm and lined up in an orderly fashion to cast their ballots. In general, NDI observers found with the exception of Algiers, citizens came out to vote in large numbers and many voters told NDI team members that they were voting for the return of peace and the end of violence in their country, rather than for a specific ideology or party. Older citizens in particular came out in large numbers to vote. Most striking was the number of unaccompanied elderly women, usually widows, who came enthusiastically to participate in the election. Many of them did not know how to vote or have a clear idea about candidate choices, but they were determined to exercise their right to vote.

Most people voted in the morning and many polling stations saw a 40 percent turnout by noon. While voting slowed during the afternoon it picked up again by early evening. While turnout was reasonably high nationally, with 65 percent of those eligible voting (including military and itinerant/mobile voting), turnout in Algiers barely reached 25 percent. NDI observers noted that there was a downbeat atmosphere in Algiers on election day. The low turnout in Algiers can be explained at least partly by the explosion of three bombs in the capital just days before the election and a higher than average level of urban voter skepticism surrounding the elections.

Security arrangements were formidable and seemed to ensure a generally safe balloting environment. In a few cases, armed guards were observed inside polling stations which may have intimidated voters. However, most guards performed their duties efficiently and discreetly and were not observed interfering in the balloting process.

The NDI team noted that the registration lists were accurate, and NDI team members saw very few incidences of voter omission from the voter lists. Most voters presented a voter I.D. card and a second form of I.D. which was checked against the registration list and was retained until the individual had cast his/her ballot. In some instances, if a voter did not have a voter I.D. card, s/he could present a secondary form of identification and would be allowed to vote as long as his/her name was on the voter list.

The responsibility of training party representatives as observers rested on the local party headquarters. As a result, the level of pollwatcher preparedness was mixed depending on local party initiatives. Some pollwatchers did not know who they were representing nor the platforms of the parties they represented. Others were not certain what their rights and responsibilities as pollwatchers were, or how to document irregularities effectively. NDI team members observed that MSP (previously Hamas) seemed to have launched the most comprehensive pollwatcher training program, while the FLN, RCD and RND seemed to have provided more sporadic training to their pollwatchers.

All party representatives wore a picture I.D. card. In most cases, NDI team members witnessed only one or two party observers present at each polling station instead of the legally allowed maximum of five party pollwatchers per polling station. A wide variety of reasons were given for the conspicuous lack of party pollwatchers. Throughout the day, NDI delegates found CCISEL observers doing their rounds of the polling stations in their commune.

#### B. Voting Process at the Polling Station

At the polling station, a voter submitted his/her voter identification card and a second I.D. card to a polling official. The voter's name was checked against the voter list. At the polling station, voters encountered a table arrayed with stacks of ballots. The ballots were supposed to be arranged in alphabetical order, although that was not the case in some *wilayas*. After collecting each party's ballot, the voter would proceed to the voting booth. Inside the voting booth, the voter picked the ballot of the party of his/her choice, placed it in an envelope, and discarded the rest of the ballots in a garbage can in the booth. The voter then put the envelope in the ballot box and was given back his/her identity card which was stamped to indicate that s/he had voted. Proxy voting was allowed for citizens who were disabled or too ill to vote, or who were living abroad temporarily. In *wilayas* where a large number of parties were contesting the election, a degree of chaos and confusion ensued. Since 23 parties competed in the *wilayas* of Tipaza and Oran, for instance, voters had to pick up 23 ballots.

The new system created much confusion among illiterate and elderly voters who were overwhelmed at the sight of a table lined with many stacks of paper and the laborious task of sorting through such a large number of ballots. By midday, the polling stations looked extremely disorderly as garbage cans inside polling booths spilled out onto the floor with discarded ballots.

This system also created a problem regarding discarded and unused ballots. In many cases, polling stations had more ballots than number of voters, and polling officials were not given adequate instructions on how to account for these extra ballots. This issue was particularly worrisome in the case of leftover ballots at the end of the special voting process -- potentially leaving thousands of ballots unaccounted for days prior to the civilian vote. In some cases, NDI team members saw extra ballots from the special vote being discarded in an open dumpster. In other cases extra ballots were burned, while in still other cases the extra ballots were diligently guarded and kept.

### C. Special Vote

While several NDI's team members were able to observe voting, they faced significant obstacles in receiving information about special voting. After persistently requesting to observe special voting, most NDI team members were able to witness some part of the vote. Only in a few instances, and after a great deal of insistence, were some NDI team members allowed to randomly select special voting centers to visit. In most instances, various excuses were given to NDI team members and they were forced to observe special voting in sites selected and largely orchestrated by the Walis. The special vote included two types of voting: military and mobile/itinerant.

The atmosphere surrounding the military vote was tense and was not conducive to ensuring that citizens could make an independent choice. Military voting was conducted at military headquarters or barracks. The polling officials were military personnel rather than civilian government officials. In many instances, soldiers were lined up in formation, and their names would be read off the registration list by a senior member of the military personnel. With their supervisors looking on, soldiers would march up to the voting area in two's or three's. They would salute their commander and the polling officials and proceed to vote. In a few polling stations, NDI team members found that the whole voting process was being videotaped and photographed. The military, wanting to ensure a 100 percent turnout, in one case even got the sick out of bed to participate in the voting. By mid-morning most special voting was complete, with a turnout of almost 100 percent in most cases.

NDI team members found few political party representatives at the military vote. Most parties claimed that they were not informed of the locations where the special vote would take place. Other parties told NDI team members that special voting was not transparent from the beginning, and they would not waste their resources in sending pollwatchers. None of the party representatives the NDI team met with were able to obtain voter lists for the military vote or information on military polling station locations.

The team also learned that there was little opportunity for security personnel to access information about their electoral options. No party activity or propaganda was permitted on security bases or in security offices. In theory, special voters were able to go into town or attend civilian rallies but it was unclear how many felt comfortable enough to do so. When some NDI team members approached special voters waiting to vote, the commanders at the base became anxious and discouraged NDI team members from asking questions.

In a couple of cases, NDI team members were told that in the military, voting was mandatory. Nowhere in the election law is this noted. Such a provision, if it existed, would inappropriately serve to distinguish the rights and responsibilities of civilian and military voters.

Once the voting was complete, the ballot boxes of the military vote were stored at military headquarters or government offices to be carried to assigned polling stations on June 5,

to be counted with the rest of the election results. No observers, international or domestic, were permitted to watch over the ballot boxes for the three intervening nights. Moreover, since neither international nor political party observers were provided with a schedule or locations of the mobile/itinerant voting, few observers were able to witness the process. In several cases, NDI observers were prohibited from seeing where the ballot boxes would be stored until they were transported to their designated polling center on June 5.

Mobile/itinerant polling was conducted with the five-member polling station committee riding in a truck with all the relevant election materials. The truck would come to a halt when it approached a population cluster and set up the polling materials. In some cases, instead of driving out to the voters, polling was organized at a voting center in the commune and voters would have to find the station themselves. Voters were required to submit their voter I.D. cards and a second form of I.D. Producing adequate identification was a problem for the nomadic population. Some voters were unable to vote because they were registered in a neighboring *wilaya* or commune. Literacy was another concern for the nomadic voters. Some of them did not know the procedure required for voting and others did not know which ballot to select. In Naama, an NDI team member noted several spoiled ballots during the count, illustrating that many voters did not understand the voting procedure.

The mobile/itinerant boxes were generally stored at a voting center in the commune. Members of the polling station committee were selected to guard the box day and night until June 5, when it would be counted with the rest of the ballots. No party representatives were permitted to guard the ballot boxes.

Many parties could mobilize neither the human nor the financial resources to observe the mobile/itinerant voting. They could not recruit sufficient numbers of volunteers and did not have access to resources such as cars. With few exceptions parties did not manage to work together to pool their limited resources to observe the itinerant vote.

As noted earlier, most opposition parties reported that they were not able to observe the mobile/itinerant and military voting. In some cases their representatives were not provided credentials, the location of the polling stations, or a schedule of the mobile/itinerant voting. As one party official stated, "the military and mobile/itinerant voting was a total blackout." NDI also noted that many parties did not possess the organizing skills or the popular support to mobilize effective pollwatcher efforts and seemed resistant to pool resources with other parties to maximize their limited resources.

The major opposition parties lodged several procedural complaints. First, they felt that leaving the mobile/itinerant ballot boxes attended only by government officials for up to 72 hours -- from the time of balloting as early as June 2, until the vote counting on June 5 -- did not provide an adequate guarantee of transparency. Second, several parties complained that mobile/itinerant voting schedules were not made available in advance to party representatives,

further diminishing the parties' ability to observe the mobile/itinerant vote. Several NDI delegates were also unable to obtain mobile/itinerant vote schedules.

It should be noted that the electoral significance of the special voting is unclear. The exact number of military and security force voters was not released publicly but according to unofficial estimates provided to NDI by Algerian government sources, special voters accounted for approximately 3 percent of the total number of eligible voters. Given that voter turnout was observed at close to one hundred percent for military and security voting, compared to fifty percent to sixty five percent for the general voting population, the relative weight of the special voting was greater than 3 percent. Unofficially, one Algerian government official estimated that special voting accounted for 8 percent of the actual votes cast nationwide.

Many observers reported that most of the votes cast by military and security forces were for the party closest to the ruling regime and the military, the RND, giving the special voting a greater chance at having an effect on the election outcome. The electoral system in place in Algeria, a proportional system which allocated seats to parties based on their relative performance within an individual *wilaya*, meant that the flaws in the special voting and a strong tendency of military support for the RND over other parties, could have affected the allocation of Parliamentary seats in *wilayas* with a large military presence.

#### D. The Counting Process

The counting was to be conducted shortly after the closing of the polls at 7:00 pm and was to be done at the polling stations. Late on voting day many *Walis* announced that voting would be extended until 8:00 pm, although NDI observers did not notice many voters arriving at polling stations after 7:00 pm.

The vote count began with the emptying of the ballot boxes and the placing of the envelopes on tables in stacks. In instances where there were voters present at the close of the polling station, they were asked to participate in the counting process--opening envelopes, reading out loud the vote cast and/or showing the actual ballot to all those present. Two polling officials marked off the vote as one polling official opened the envelope, held up the ballot for all observers to scrutinize, and called out the letter of the party.

The vote count was open to all Algerians to observe. There was a large diversity of ballots cast for different parties and the results at the polling stations seemed to reflect a competitive election process. Polling officials conducted the count in a professional manner. In many cases, CCISEL representatives were present. Party representatives also observed the count, but as in the polling, rarely did NDI team members find all five party representatives. The results of the count were posted either inside the station or on the outside door, and the president of the voting center would report the results to the commune and *wilaya*. In some cases, NDI team members were barred from witnessing the consolidation of the count at the commune level

and *wilaya* level. However, those who witnessed the consolidation of the count at the commune and *wilaya* levels found no problems with the procedure.

Although NDI team members witnessed a similar counting process during the special (military and mobile/itinerant) vote count, the results of the voting were, in most cases, remarkably different. In most civilian polling places turnout varied widely and ballots were cast for many different parties. In almost all observed instances of military and police voting, turnout was close to 100 percent with the votes cast almost exclusively for the party closest to the regime, the RND. Notwithstanding the party preference of the security forces for a pro-regime party, a turnout of almost 100 percent for any party is an unusual occurrence in most transparent elections. Given the lack of transparency and neutrality in the administration of the special vote process, and given that the results of the special vote varied so much from the results for the general population, the NDI team members who observed *wilayas* with a large military presence felt that the special voting shortfalls seriously undermined an otherwise reasonable election day.

## VII. POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS

### A. Reaction of the Political Parties to the Results

Some parties have complained that the distribution of parliamentary seats was not conducted according to the election results. Some parties believe that the government produced a set of “official” results that does not correspond with the “real” results. The “official” results are those that have awarded the RND a majority in the parliament, while some parties claim that the majority of the seats were won by the MSP.

While fraud may not have occurred, the parties believe that there was ample opportunity to tamper with the results of the special vote, as those ballot boxes were in the hands of the government for a period of up to 72 hours. Consequently, some parties believe that the will of the people was not truly reflected by the inclusion of the special and military votes.<sup>14</sup>

### B. Party Complaints about Election Day Procedures

Although several political parties alleged problems with election day procedures and the vote count process, NDI team members were not able to substantiate many of their claims. However, the party concerns regarding the special and mobile/itinerant voting were shared by the NDI and UN team. The following is a list of complaints received from parties.

The main complaint parties made was directed at the lack of transparency accorded to the special voting (military and security forces and the nomadic vote). When asked, government

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<sup>14</sup> Total “fixed” polling stations were 32,440. The number of polling stations for the special vote (including military and mobile/itinerant) were 5146.

officials refused to provide party observers with voter lists and locations for the special vote. Some parties received information for the mobile/itinerant vote, but it was always at the last minute, and the parties did not have enough time to organize the resources needed to follow the mobile/itinerant voting. Parties were concerned that the ballot boxes for the special voting were kept for 72 hours by military or government personnel, without supervision by any other group. They fear that tampering with the results may have occurred during this period, as the results of the special vote differ radically from the results of the civilian vote.

Political parties in several *wilayas* complained about the lack of voter education efforts and illiterate voters not being accommodated. Unlike the ballots used in the 1995 presidential election, the ballots did not have pictorial symbols or photographs representing the parties. The use of letters rather than numbers to identify the parties was raised as a concern for illiterate voters. As one observer noted, some of the letters look very much alike -- the letters of the FFS and Ennahda, and those of the MSP and PRP, for example.

Parties were frustrated by the CNISEL's inability to represent them during the legislative election. While parties proceeded to file their complaints with the CNISEL, the CNISEL often did not act to resolve complaints but simply recorded them and made them known to the administration. The commission's inability to address party complaints in an effective manner undermined the effectiveness of the commission. As a result, parties are now negotiating with the President to establish a similar commission for the local election, but one with wider powers.

A number of parties have complained, as they did before the election, about the dramatic increase of mobile/itinerant stations in some *wilayas*. They believe that it was changed merely to facilitate fraud.

Although 39 parties competed in the election, some Algerians feel that in refusing to address the problem of the role of the FIS in the political process, the government has not completely embraced the concept of multiparty politics. Throughout the election process and during the post-election period, the government was criticized for not allowing the outlawed FIS, a major contender in the canceled 1991 election, to participate in this election. This issue, however, remains a point of controversy and no final conclusions have been reached. Certain sections of the population believe that the level of violence allegedly instigated by the FIS and other outlawed groups has effectively made it impossible for them to participate in the democratic process at any point in the future. Others believe that engaging them in dialogue and including them in the process is necessary for the restoration of peace and stability. As one senior political actor stated in a recent interview, "Elections based on the exclusion of the major political tendency will never...be a means of genuine democratic construction."<sup>15</sup> This issue is not openly debated, and when it is discussed, it is done in vague terms.

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<sup>15</sup> Darwish, Qusai Saleh, "Algerian Regime 'not serious' about solving the country's crisis," Mideast Mirror (translation of article from Al Sharq Al Awsat), July 7, 1997.

Parties were frustrated by the law stipulating that only five party representatives would be present at each polling station. As a result, for the *wilaya* of Algiers, for example, a *wilaya* with roughly 3,000 polling stations and 16 parties competing, a single party could not observe more than 20 percent of the total polling stations. Parties also wished to have election results provided to them on paper signed by a polling official, in addition to being posted in each polling station.

### C. Formation of the New Government

Despite the parties' disappointment over the conduct of the election process and the allocation of parliamentary seats, they have generally accepted the outcome and have taken their respective places in the parliament.

The government was formed on June 26 when Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia selected his cabinet. While the RND received most positions, the MSP and FLN received seven posts each. The ministries allotted to the MSP include industry, transport, tourism, fishing and environment. Eleven women won parliamentary seats. The president and the parliament have recently agreed to hold local elections on October 23, 1997.

The following shows a breakdown of the results by party. These are the official results, approved by the Constitutional Court, although they have been challenged by political parties.

Party Name	Number of Votes	Number of Seats
RND	3,533,434	156
MSP	1,533,154	69
FLN	1,489,285	62
Ennahda, MN or MRI	915,445	34
FFS	527,848	20
RCD	442,271	19
Independents	475,476	11
Worker's Party	194,493	4
Progressive Republican Party PRP	65,371	3
Union for Democracy and Liberty, UDL	51,090	1
Social Liberal Party PSL	36,521	1
Other Parties (30)	1,263,925	0

## D. General Conclusions

Notwithstanding the serious shortcomings detailed in this report, the Algerian government took steps toward holding genuine multiparty elections. In a region not noted for fair elections or representative governments and in the midst of a crisis of violence and domestic unrest, Algeria has persevered in holding multiparty elections and has gone to great lengths to ensure citizens' right to vote in safety and security. The 1997 parliamentary election was notable for its provisions for equal state media access provided to all political parties, political party participation in the electoral process and a high level of technical preparation. However, the election fell short of popular and political party expectations and changes in some aspects of electoral administration could greatly increase popular confidence in the next set of elections.

## VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The extraordinary military and security measures necessary for the peaceful conduct of elections in Algeria highlight the fundamental weaknesses of the political system. Within this political context, even the best administered election process could fall short of the conditions necessary for a truly legitimate exercise of the democratic process. Recognizing that the larger political questions in Algeria are beyond the scope of this report, the NDI team puts forward the following recommendations for positive change based on their observations of the 1997 Parliamentary election:

1. While NDI appreciates the importance of the efforts taken by the Algerian government to ensure that military, paramilitary, police and firefighting personnel could vote in the parliamentary election, changes should be made to the election law and to the administration of the election law to ensure that military (special) and civilian voting are subject to the same rules and guarantees of openness.
  - Special voting should be held as close to the general voting day as possible.
  - Where possible, administration of special voting should be by civilian personnel, and, where this is not feasible, care should be taken to ensure that high ranking officers do not influence voting by lower ranking personnel.
  - Voting information and campaign materials for all parties should be freely available to all special voters.
  - Arrangements should be made to allow party representatives to have the option of personal contact with special voters.
  - The same election day rules should be applied to special voting as to general civilian voting. If voting is not mandatory for civilians, it should not be mandatory for military voters.

- When special voting is completed, independent civilian election officials should process the votes and voting materials, in the same manner as civilian votes, in the presence of political party election observers.

-Party representatives should have access to all stages of the special voting process, and should have full information regarding dates, times and locations of voting.

2. While the independent commissions for monitoring the election process, the CNISEL, CWISELs, and CCISELs represent one way of organizing political party participation in the political process, the number of political party complaints directed at these organizations illustrate that they did not have the trust and confidence of the majority of parties. Greater efforts need to be taken to allow the party and independent representatives to play a more vital role in the election planning and monitoring process, and, over the long term, a fully independent and permanent election commission should be developed.
3. Media time and access provisions should be enforced fairly and diligently, particularly in the electronic media. A fully independent election commission would be the best guarantor of the amount and quality of media access for each registered political party. Complaints received about fair media access during the course of an electoral campaign should be handled expeditiously.
4. An effective program of political party election monitoring is crucial to increase public confidence in the election process. While the law allows up to five party observers, few polling stations had all five. With 39 parties running, and only five pollwatchers per polling station, it was difficult for any one party to comprehensively assess the outcome of the election. The level of party observation could be increased by allowing more than five observers in a polling station and providing transportation for party pollwatchers to follow the itinerant polling process, but, ultimately, it is the responsibility of parties to recruit, train and deploy an adequate number of party observers.
5. To ensure maximum public and party confidence in the election results, polling station officials should provide party representatives with official copies of the election results (*proces-verbal*) at the end of the counting process at each polling station.
6. Although the government took steps in making sure that voting was available to the nomadic population and those living in inaccessible areas, better coordination is necessary to ensure a higher turnout and more accessibility for these voters. Election materials describing party candidates and platforms should be distributed in remote areas. Voting schedules should be distributed well in advance to allow voters to be in the appropriate location on election day, and greater efforts need to be made to provide voter education, particularly for illiterate and itinerant voters. Permitting the use of the party

insignia or symbols on the ballot would greatly facilitate voting for the illiterate population.

7. While political party election monitoring is important, civic organizations should be encouraged to play a larger role in the electoral process, particularly in the areas of voter education and election monitoring. Nonpartisan monitoring should be encouraged and domestic monitors should receive accreditation.

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Appendix C: Post Election Report from observer Christopher Lehmann

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## **APPENDIX A**

## MISSION D'OBSERVATION INTERNATIONALE CONJOINTE

### COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

Alger, le 8 juin 1997

Suite à la demande du Président de la République Algérienne, 30 pays ont répondu positivement en envoyant 106 observateurs qui ont été déployés sous la coordination des Nations-Unies dans 40 des 48 wilayate d'Algérie pour couvrir les élections législatives du 5 juin 1997.

Les observateurs internationaux tiennent à remercier le gouvernement algérien pour les avoir invités à participer à cette importante étape du processus démocratique de l'Algérie. Ils remercient les autorités pour avoir mis en place tous les dispositifs nécessaires à leur sécurité et désirent exprimer leur gratitude envers le peuple algérien pour l'hospitalité avec laquelle il les a accueillis.

Bien que les observateurs aient pu circuler sans se sentir menacés, plusieurs ont éprouvé des difficultés à exercer leurs fonctions avec toute l'indépendance et la liberté de mouvement nécessaires pour évaluer de façon objective ces élections. Plusieurs observateurs ont estimé que la sécurité a pu servir de toile de fond pour accroître le degré de contrôle sur les activités de la délégation alors que d'autres ont considéré que leurs responsabilités ont pu être exercées sans contraintes.

Il est à signaler que des plaintes des partis politiques ont été reçues au bureau de coordination électorale des Nations-Unies et qu'elles continueront à être discutées avec les autorités concernées.

A cause de la courte période pendant laquelle la majorité des observateurs ont été présents en Algérie, il a été impossible pour la plupart d'entre eux de participer pleinement à l'observation de la campagne électorale. D'où leur décision de ne pas se prononcer sur les commentaires recueillis pendant la période précédant ces élections par seulement cinq d'entre eux.

En ce qui concerne la journée du 5 juin, les observateurs ont été impressionnés par la préparation matérielle et logistique des élections, le professionnalisme des membres des bureaux de vote et l'harmonie dans laquelle le scrutin s'est déroulé. Ils ont été satisfaits de l'ordre et de la discipline avec laquelle les Algériens se sont prévalus de leur droit de vote et de l'efficacité avec laquelle les bulletins de vote ont été comptés sur les lieux du scrutin.

Pour ce qui est des étapes de la consolidation des résultats aux niveaux communal et des wilayate, la majorité des observateurs ont pu suivre sans problème majeur l'ensemble du processus, alors que d'autres se sont vus refuser l'accès par certaines commissions électorales des wilayate.

Relativement aux bureaux de vote spéciaux, la majorité des observateurs qui les ont suivis partagent l'opinion que le processus ne fournissait pas suffisamment de garanties de neutralité et de transparence. Tout d'abord, pendant la période entre la clôture des bureaux spéciaux et le dépouillement des bulletins de vote, il a été difficile pour les observateurs et les représentants des partis politiques d'observer la sécurité des urnes. Plusieurs observateurs ont remarqué l'absence des représentants des partis politiques dans la majorité des bureaux de vote spéciaux. Dans certains cas, des partis n'ont pas jugé opportun d'avoir des représentants. Toutefois, selon certains partis, la principale raison de leur absence était le manque d'information sur le lieu et temps prévus pour le début du scrutin.

En ce qui concerne les bureaux de vote itinérants, les observateurs ont été impressionnés par les efforts déployés par le gouvernement algérien pour encourager la participation de l'électorat dans les régions éloignées du pays. Cependant, plusieurs partis politiques ont fait part aux observateurs du manque d'informations sur l'horaire de départ et de l'itinéraire des caravanes et également du fait qu'ils n'étaient pas autorisés à les suivre. L'observation exprimée dans le paragraphe précédent concernant la sécurité des urnes s'applique aussi dans ce cas-ci.

Les observations mentionnées ci-dessus ont été exposées dans un esprit constructif. C'est le souhait des observateurs qu'elles aideront le gouvernement algérien dans ses activités électorales futures.

# **UNOFFICIAL**

## ***ENGLISH TRANSLATION***

### **Press Release**

**Joint International Observer Group**

**Algiers**

**June 8, 1997**

Following the request of the President of the Republic of Algeria, 30 countries have responded by sending 106 observers who were deployed to 40 of the 48 wilayate of Algeria under the coordination of the United Nations to cover the June 5<sup>th</sup> legislative elections.

The international observers thank the Government of Algeria for inviting them to participate in this important step in the Algerian democratic process. They would like to thank the authorities for having provided all the means necessary to assure their security. Furthermore, they express their gratitude to the people of Algeria for their hospitality.

Despite the fact that international observers were accorded freedom of movement, a number of them experienced some difficulties in evaluating these elections in objective manner due to insufficient independence and restrictions on their freedom of movement. Some observers felt that their security arrangements could have served as a means to augment the degree of control over their activities while others felt unimpeded in their activities.

It has to be noted that the office of the United Nations Electoral Coordination Secretariat received complaints from the political parties and it continues to discuss these complaints with the appropriate authorities.

Due to the brief period during which the majority of the observers were present in Algeria, it was impossible for most of them to fully observe the electoral campaign. The observers have decided not to comment on reports received by the mission's five long term observers during the pre-election period.

Regarding election day, the observers were impressed by the technical and logistical preparations of the elections, the professionalism of the polling station officials and the calm which characterized the balloting. They were satisfied with the order and discipline with which Algerians exercised their right to vote and the efficiency with which the ballots were counted at the polling stations.

Regarding the stages of the consolidation of the results at the communal and the wilaya level, the majority of the observers were able to follow the consolidation process without major problems. However, some observers were denied access to the consolidation process by certain electoral commissions at the wilaya level.

Concerning the special voting stations, the majority of observers who monitored them agreed that the special voting process did not provide sufficient guarantees of neutrality and transparency. First of all, between the closing of the special balloting and the counting of the special ballots, it was difficult for the observers and the party representatives to assure the security of the ballot boxes. Some observers noted the absence of party representatives at the majority of special voting stations they visited. In certain cases, the parties did not feel it opportune to deploy their party representatives. However, according to some parties, the main reason for their absence was the lack of information provided to them regarding the times and places scheduled for the beginning of the balloting.

Concerning the itinerant voting, the observers were impressed by the efforts employed by the Algerian government to encourage the participation of voters in the remote regions of the country. However, some political parties informed the observers that they lacked the information regarding the departure of the itinerant caravans and voting schedule. The political parties also noted that they were not authorized to follow them. The observations expressed in the preceding paragraph regarding the security of the special ballot boxes apply to the security of the itinerant ballot boxes as well.

The aforementioned observations are offered in a constructive spirit. It is the hope of the observers that these remarks will assist the Algerian government in its future electoral activities.

## **APPENDIX B**

## **Algeria Election Study Mission Participant Biographies**

*The National Democratic Institute sent a 12 person team to participate in the United Nations coordinated election mission for the June 5 parliamentary elections, contributing the largest delegation to the UN mission. NDI was asked by the State Department to organize the U.S. delegation to the UN observation mission.*

### **Andre Yawo Akou**

Andre Yawo Akou is the Regional Field Representative for East and South Africa at the African-American Labor Center (AALC). He has been at the AALC since 1978, after studying Industrial Relations at Harvard. His work involves observing and monitoring labor, trade union, socio-economic, and political development, and violations of trade union and labor rights. His publications include "African Trade Union News," and "Labor and Development."

Mr. Akou has worked in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Togo and Ghana. He has monitored elections and participated in observer missions in Kenya, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Benin, and Chad.

### **Maura Brueger**

Maura Brueger is a community and government affairs specialist for King County Executive Ron Sims in Seattle, Washington. She has been active with the Democratic Party in Washington for several years, serving as a congressional campaign consultant and as the manager of a campaign for governor. She worked as a media specialist for The '95 Project, an issues advocacy program in Seattle that contributed to a coalition of progressive and labor organizations.

Ms. Brueger worked with the National Democratic Institute from 1991-1993, where she managed political party-building programs in Zambia and South Africa, and women's political empowerment programs in Kenya and Eastern and Central Europe. She helped create a voter education and election monitoring organization in Romania for their first democratic elections. This included supervising the recruiting and training of over 7,000 volunteers, producing voter education materials, and organizing public candidate forums. She has participated in election monitoring in Bulgaria, political party training in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, a pre-election training program in Angola, and in writing an election monitoring handbook.

### **Leslie Campbell**

Leslie Campbell is the National Democratic Institute's Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa. Prior to becoming regional director, Mr. Campbell directed NDI's programs in Bosnia and Croatia, and served as an NDI consultant to the Russian parliament. In his work with

NDI Mr. Campbell has been involved in election processes in Russia, Georgia, Bosnia, Albania, Croatia, and Yemen.

Prior to joining NDI, Mr. Campbell served as the Chief of Staff to the Leader of the New Democratic Party in the Canadian House of Commons and as an advisor to the Premier and Cabinet in the Province of Manitoba. Mr. Campbell has extensive campaign experience at the national, provincial, and local level, was co-director of the 1992 Canadian national constitutional referendum campaign, and participated in the Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform. Mr. Campbell holds a Master of Public Administration degree from Harvard University.

### **Arsala Deane**

Arsala Deane works with NDI on election related projects in the Middle East and in the past on Asia. She helped organize and participated in NDI's international election observation mission to Bangladesh and organized and supported NDI's election study mission in the Philippines. Ms. Deane helped manage NDI's legislative assistance program with the Palestinian Legislative Council and has assisted in developing and running NDI's parliamentary program on ethics in Turkey. She recently helped organize and participated in NDI's election study mission in Algeria for the June 5 parliamentary elections. Ms. Deane graduated with a B.A. from Georgetown University in International Relations with a concentration in Middle Eastern history and politics.

### **Mary Jane Deeb**

Mary-Jane Deeb is the Editor of The Middle East Journal, and is a professor of International Relations at the American University in Washington, D.C. She has also taught at Georgetown University and at George Washington University. She is the author of Libya's Foreign Policy in North Africa, and co-author of Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development. She is the co-editor with Mary E. King of Hasib Sabbagh: From Palestinian Refugee to Citizen of the World; and is currently co-editing a manuscript on Gender and Politics in the Middle East, with Mary Ann Tetreault. She has also written over fifty articles, book chapters, and book reviews, for numerous publications. In the 1980s during the civil war in Lebanon, Ms. Deeb worked for the United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia, UNICEF, Amideast, and the US Agency for International Development. She is a frequent commentator on the mass media, and has appeared on CNN, ABC World News Tonight, and CBS Evening News.

### **Adib A. Faris**

Adib Faris is a Lebanese-American who grew up in Lebanon. He is currently the Logistics Coordinator for the Middle East and Asia at NDI. He recently helped organize and participated in NDI's Algeria election study mission. Prior to joining NDI, Mr. Faris worked at the International Management Development Institute of the University of Pittsburgh, where he

worked on the design, planning and implementation of short term management programs for government and public sector officials from developing countries.

Mr. Faris is an Arabic speaker who has with worked with officials from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman along with Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand. He is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh with an B.A. in Political Science

### **Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua**

Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua is President of Analysis Inc., a non-profit political analysis firm founded in 1969 in San Juan, Puerto Rico. He is a political analyst for radio, television and newspapers, and is the author of a dozen books. He served in the State Department of Puerto Rico (1958), and the Office of the Governor of Puerto Rico (1962-1967). He was a member of the Hispanic Advisory Group to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977-1980, the Jimmy Carter observer team to the Panama elections in 1989 and ten other observer missions for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

Mr. Passalacqua is a graduate of the Harvard Law School, 1962, and was a professor at Yale University's Political Science Department (1987-88, 1990-91). He is the founder of the Harvard International Law Journal (1961), and the National Association of Hispanic Journalists (1982). He has published in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times and the Miami Herald.

### **Gebreselassie Gebremariam**

Mr. Gebreselassie Gebremariam is Director of the Egypt Office of the African-American Labor Center (AFL-CIO). A naturalized U.S. citizen of Ethiopian origin, he has served in this capacity since 1993. Beginning in 1979, he worked as a Program Officer, and assumed regional responsibilities for West Africa and East Africa until he became Country Director for Sudan in 1987, and then Regional Director for North, Central and West Africa in 1989. Prior to joining the center, Mr. Gebremariam served as special assistant to the Minister of the Interior of the Government of Ethiopia (1973-1978) and as Assistant Secretary General for the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (1966-1973).

Mr. Gebremariam has Master of Arts in Economics from Wayne State University in Michigan, and degrees in Law and Public Administration from the University of Addis Ababa. He has traveled extensively in Africa and Europe for conferences and meetings on labor and related economic issues on behalf of the AFL-CIO.

### **Carol Lancaster**

Carol Lancaster is a visiting fellow at the Institute for International Economics and on the faculty at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University. Between 1993 and 1996, she served

as Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. (USAID). Prior to 1993, Dr. Lancaster was an assistant professor at Georgetown University, a visiting fellow at several think tanks and a consultant for the World Bank and the United Nations. She served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs (1980-1981) and on the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State (1977-1980). She has been a Congressional Fellow on the staffs of Senator Dick Clark and Congressman David Obey and a budget examiner in the Office of Management and Budget.

Dr. Lancaster is the author of numerous articles and monographs and is currently completing a book for the Twentieth Century Fund on foreign aid in Africa and beginning a monograph on the future of U.S. aid for the Institute for International Economics. Her Ph.D. is from the London School of Economics.

### **Christopher Lehmann**

Christopher Lehmann works for the U.S. Department of Justice, as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. Since 1994, he has also served as Chief of Civil Racketeering Litigation for that office. He has broad experience with federal civil litigation, including complex cases involving organized crime, environmental enforcement, civil rights, voting rights and financial institution fraud. He currently also serves as his office's District Election Officer, handling cases and investigations that involve possible criminal or civil violations of federal election law. Chris previously spent four years with the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department as a trial attorney handling litigation under the Voting Rights Act. During that period, he also frequently supervised teams of federal election observers sent to monitor volatile election sites throughout the United States.

He has participated in past NDI delegations to the Cote d'Ivoire, Bangladesh, and most recently, in Yemen. He recently taught at the Department of Justice's Advanced Civil Trial Advocacy Course in Washington, D.C., and has been an adjunct Professor of Law at the Brooklyn Law School. He received a J.D. from the Washington University School of Law, in St. Louis, and a B.A. from the School of International Service at American University

### **Olga Milosavjevic**

Over the past three years Ms. Milosavjevic has worked with the Middle East Regional Director to design programs in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza and Yemen, as well as several regional programs. She has worked on numerous election related programs including election study missions to the 1991 and 1992 legislative elections in Albania and the 1995 municipal elections in Jordan and Bulgaria, coordinated a joint election observer mission with The Carter Center to the January 1996 legislative council elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, participated in NDI's international observer mission to the 1997 Yemeni parliamentary elections and managed NDI's study mission to the 1997 Algerian legislative elections. Prior to working in

the Middle East, Ms. Milosavjevic worked with NDI on Southeastern Europe programs in Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.

### **Mara Rudman**

Mara Rudman serves as the Minority Counsel to the Committee on International Relations for the U.S. House of Representatives. She has been working as the Democratic Counsel since 1993. Ms. Rudman participated in NDI's program in March 1997 explaining the role of the US Congress staff to Namibian parliamentary staff members. Prior to her work in Congress she was an associate for Hogan & Hartson, an education-oriented litigation practice. She also has experience as a law clerk in the Southern District for Florida and as a Public Defender with the Harvard Defenders.

Ms. Rudman received her J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1990. She served as Editor-in-Chief of the Harvard Human Rights Journal, as an instructor for the Legal Methods Program, and as a field researcher in Jerusalem and Belfast for the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice. She has been published in Harvard Human Rights Journal. Ms. Rudman received her bachelors degree, summa cum laude, from Dartmouth College.

## **APPENDIX C**

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Leslie Campbell, NDI

FROM: Christopher Lehmann

DATE: June 13, 1997

RE: Algerian Parliamentary Elections, June 5, 1997

### I. INTRODUCTION

I have summarized below my observations from the Algerian Parliamentary elections held from June 2-5, 1997. I was deployed, from May 31 to June 6, to the Wilaya of Naama, along with Do Tat Chat, a member of the Vietnamese Delegation.

Naama is located on the border with Morocco, several hundred kilometers to the south of Oran. It is a transitional area of high steppe giving way to the northern reaches of the Sahara Desert. The two principal towns are Mecheria (pop. about 60,000) and Ain Sefra (pop. about 35,000). Most of the rest of the population is either clustered near to oases, or is nomadic in the true sense of the word. Naama is one of the smaller Wilayas in terms of total population and registered voters (89,289), and has four seats in the national parliament.

Our overall experience was similar to that of other teams who had problems trying to do and see what they wanted. We were accompanied by significant amounts of security at all times, and had to move about by entourage. We were assigned three accompagnateurs, who viewed their job not only as facilitating our observation and security, but as substantively participating in all aspects of our work. If we had allowed them to do so, they would have gladly programmed our entire stay.

There was one Arab League delegate in Naama (an Egyptian) and one OAS delegate (a member of parliament from South Africa, who spoke neither French nor Arabic, and who arrived without an interpreter). Although the OAS delegate requested that he be allowed to accompany us, and though we agreed to this, he was not permitted to do so. A separate program was arranged and conducted by Wilaya officials for these two delegates.

My Vietnamese counterpart was an extremely hard working and cooperative individual, who took his role quite seriously. We were always able to agree on observation plans and strategies; presenting a unified front was extremely helpful when it came to dealing with the local Algerian authorities.

As was true for many of the other teams, we were unable to do any spontaneous observation, even when we determined the program. In almost all instances, advance notice of our intended

visits had been communicated ahead of us. Our relationship with local authorities was often strained and tense, and on one occasion it was necessary to make a formal protest to the United Nations (when, on the first day, an accompagnateur said we had no right to attend political party rallies). Because of these and other restrictions, we were unable to do "observer" coverage as that term is normally understood.

## II. PRE-ELECTION ACTIVITIES

### A. Meeting with the Wali

Our meeting with the Wali was cordial, but substantive. He was quite willing to explain the entire election process from top to bottom, and it was quite clear that he not only controlled it, he micromanaged it. All election officials (with the exception of the three member Electoral Commission of the Wilaya) had been chosen by the Wali. Though it is not required by law, the Wali had appointed seven member committees for all fixed Bureau de Vote (five regular members plus two alternates in all instances). Primary administrative responsibility for the election rested with the Director General of the Wilaya, to whom a 50 person Elections Bureau reported (these persons were actual government employees who were separate and apart from the various election day committees).

According to the Wali, the CWISEL and the CISELS had only an observer role. They had "nothing to say in the administration of the election" and were "not involved in the conduct of the election."

Contrary to the information we were provided with at the UN briefings, the Wali said that the rule in his Wilaya was that voters must present both their voter card and a second form of photo identification (ID card, passport, drivers license) in order to vote. The voter card alone was inadequate. We were to find that this rule was, in fact, widely enforced throughout the Wilaya on election day.

### B. Meetings with Political Parties Prior to Election Day

Like many of the other teams, we experienced difficulties in meeting privately with representatives of political parties. It was only after a stern confrontation with our local accompagnateurs, a protest to the United Nations, and a telephone call to the Interior Ministry in Algiers that we were able to proceed with these meetings under our terms--i.e., meetings arranged at our discretion and without any government representatives being present. Even then, we usually had security people hovering as close as possible to the door of whatever room we were in. At the beginning of our first such meeting (when the tension level with our local accompagnateurs

was still particularly high), the electricity happened to go out just as we began our meeting (the only prolonged outage we experienced during six days in Naama). The following topics were among those discussed at length with the political party representatives:

### 1. Special Voting

The biggest concern of the various political party representatives we talked to was with the special voting, and, to a lesser degree, the mobile voting. Political party representatives had obtained absolutely no information on special voting--they did not know when it would occur, where it would occur, or how many voters were involved in the process. Indeed, they were surprised when we told them, on Sunday, June 1, that special voting was scheduled to take place the following day. As an obvious result, political parties were unable to make any arrangements to have party observers present for such voting. Even the CWISEL was clueless as to special voting--they had no information about it, and expressed surprise at the notion that party representatives could be allowed to observe it.

The lack of information about special voting also meant that the parties had been unable to extend their campaign activities to such voters. As an FFS candidate pointed out, the military voters didn't know what their choices would be, as such voters had no access to campaign materials and no information about the positions of the various parties.

As a result of this lack of access to the special voting, party representatives had no faith in it. They advised us, repeatedly, to watch this voting, and more particularly, to watch the counting of such ballots, if we could. They believed that almost all of the special vote would go to RND. Concerns were frequently voiced about the security of the special boxes during the days (and nights) before the count. More than one candidate was of the opinion that during the last election (the Presidential), the special boxes had been opened and the ballots changed prior to the count. Hammas had specifically requested that the CWISEL make a request that observers be allowed to spend the night with the special boxes (which the CWISEL apparently did), but no answer had been received from the administration on this matter as of the day before special voting was to commence.

### 2. Mobile Voting

With regard to the mobile voting, party representatives had two principal concerns: first, they had incomplete information about the location, commencement and routes of this voting, and second, they lacked the resources to accompany all the itinerant boxes. Hammas was particularly concerned with the second point; they simply did not have the resources to provide

transport for enough observers to accompany all mobile boxes. Noting that the law was silent on whether party observers were to be provided with such transport in the same manner as the mobile election workers, they had raised the issue of transport of party observers with both the CWISEL and the Wilaya administration. As of the day before the election, however, they had gotten no answer (and, indeed, the arrangements we observed during the actual mobile voting seemed haphazard and inconsistent, see below).

In sum, party plans with regard to the mobile voting were to observe what they knew about and could afford to do. The uneven coverage of mobile boxes by political party representatives which we later observed was consistent with these stated plans.

Because political party observation of mobile boxes was not expected to be universal, the same concerns that were expressed about the security of the special boxes during the nights prior to the count were also raised with regard to mobile ones.

3. Fixed Voting

No problems were expected by the parties at the fixed polling places. However, the FFS candidate did note that all election officers had been hand-picked by the Wali, and that the security police had investigated their backgrounds; he alleged that as a result, people with party affiliations other than RND had been eliminated from the rosters of election day workers.

4. The CWISEL

Political party representatives did not generally view the CWISEL as effective. While several parties (FFS, Hammas) reported making complaints or requests to the CWISEL, the CWISEL had not been responsive, and answers or solutions had not been forthcoming. Candidates for the PRA, FFS and Hammas all said that party representatives on the CWISEL were intimidated by the Wali and were afraid to voice complaints. Indeed, when we met with the CWISEL (with our accompagnateurs in attendance), we were informed by the CWISEL chair that the CWISEL had received "no complaints from any political parties" during the pre-election period.

It also appeared that there were communications problems between the CWISEL, the CISELs and the parties. For example, the day before mobile voting was to begin, the CWISEL itself had no information on which political party representatives were assigned to go out with which box (we were told this decision was made at the CISEL level, and this information was maintained by each individual CISEL). Political

party representatives also complained that they were unsure which mobile boxes their party representatives were assigned to. Such information must be conveyed in advance of election day, because (as our own experience confirmed), once the mobile boxes depart in the morning, it is virtually impossible to catch up with or find them during the course of the day.

#### 5. Observer credentialing

In the Wilaya of Naama, at least, the names of all political party observers had to be submitted to the Daira offices by the Tuesday before the elections (May 27), along with photos, so that credentials could be issued. As we subsequently observed, on election day, political party observers had to be properly credentialed in order to gain access to the polling places. The Parti Travailleurs raised a particular issue which may have been limited to this party. They claimed that they had not been informed of the Tuesday deadline, and had submitted their credentialing information on Wednesday, May 28. As a result, almost all of their proposed observers had been rejected--and on election day, we did not, in fact, find any PT observers.

While no other parties raised this credentialing issue, the effect is to make it difficult or impossible to make last minute replacements for absent political party observers. Indeed, it may have been that the parties themselves did not know or understand the rules regarding credentialing of observers, because at our meeting with the CWISEL (on the day before special and mobile voting was to start), the members were unsure how they would handle the issue of vacancies among the five political party observers in a given site. In fact, as discussed below, most polling sites we observed had fewer than five observers.

#### 6. Official support for the RND

While we have no specific evidence that the RND party received special benefits from the administration, a number of political party representatives voiced the belief that the RND was flagrantly favored by the administration. Among other things, party representatives complained that RND candidates had received the use of administration autos, and had been given 3-4,000 T-shirts for use in the campaign.

#### 7. Illiteracy

Political party representatives were concerned about the lack of accommodation for illiterate voters. Often mentioned was the fact that the ballots had no pictures on them (unlike the presidential election), and that this made it unnecessarily confusing for illiterate voters. Complaints were also voiced about the use of letters, rather than numbers, to identify the

parties (the argument being that voters of limited education were more familiar with numbers than with letters).

### III. ELECTION DAY ACTIVITIES

#### A. Special Voting

Like the political parties, we ourselves had difficulty obtaining information about special voting. It took several requests over a two day period, as well as a second meeting with the Wali, and a telephone call to the Interior Ministry in Algiers before we finally received a list of special polling places, late in the evening of June 1. Of the 24 special polling places, we were able to visit only eight. It turned out that many of the special boxes were itinerant, and had been taken out to troops on maneuver (at least, this is what we were told when we asked to see them). No schedules were available for any of these special itinerant boxes. Nor was information available on how long such special itinerant voting would continue. My attempts to ascertain whether special itinerant voting would continue over a three day period were unsuccessful. Our visits to the eight special boxes we were able to visit were clearly choreographed; in all cases we were clearly expected in advance.

Boxes 64, 65 and 66, which were all on a large army base in the Commune of Mercheria, were typical of what we saw. Upon our arrival we were greeted by the senior base commander, who accompanied us throughout our inspection. As we approached the polling stations, we observed what appeared to be entire units of soldiers waiting in formation, on the parade ground, to vote (our visit here was around 10:00 a.m., and it appeared that there were still at least 350-400 soldiers in formation). Loud military music was being blasted over loudspeakers. The soldiers were moved line by line, retaining formation, into the polling places. Inside the polling place, all of the polling officials appeared to be senior military officers (over 40, with stars and distinguishing emblems on their uniforms). Voting proceeded with formality; soldiers would enter, salute, and stand at attention before the election committee while they were processed. In addition to the regular election rosters, poll officials were also using a separate computer list, off of which names were being checked in sequential order as soldiers voted. While the soldiers could vote in an ostensibly private booth, there were also a videocamera photographer and a still photographer in the polling place, both shooting pictures while we were present (this may have been primarily to document our visit, but this does not lessen the potentially intimidating effect of the use of such equipment on voters).

Voting procedures were similar at the other military bases we visited. In no instance were political party representatives present at the special polling places.

Technical irregularities were observed. The most serious was an unlocked ballot box, observed around 8:45 a.m. The box was then locked (or relocked) in our presence upon our arrival (I noted this on a UN form, but unfortunately, do not have a copy of the form identifying the exact Box number). Other irregularities included the use of lists other than (and in addition to) regular voting lists on which to record the names of those who voted, and inconsistent ID requirements--in some places soldiers needed only their voter card to vote; in other places, both the voter card and a photo ID were required. A final irregularity occurred during the count (see discussion, below) when we observed that tally sheets being completed, in part, by a person other than the election officials assigned to that box, and who was not present for the count at that box.

As the security of the special boxes during the three days (and nights) prior to the count was of great concern to the political parties, we inquired about the storage of the boxes at all places we visited. We were uniformly told that the box would remain on the base in the office of the senior commandant. We attempted to make a "surprise" visit to one of the smaller bases in the evening of June 2, in order to verify the storage of the boxes. We were unable to observe the box in situ, however, as it was carried into the room into which we had been ushered. The box was locked but not sealed, except with scotch tape and paper. The keys to the box were kept in a safe, in an office on the base.

#### B. Mobile Voting

We spent two full days observing mobile voting. On Tuesday, June 3, we travelled with one box for the entire day (Box No. 5 in the Commune of Moghrar). On Wednesday, June 4, we travelled with Box No. 5 in the Commune of Naama in the morning, and Box No. 5 in the Commune of Ain Ben Khalil in the afternoon. The sheer distances involved limited our ability to see other boxes in action. And, despite the obvious and sophisticated communications equipment available to our security detail and accompagnateurs, they seemed to be utterly at a loss to tell us where other mobile boxes had been, might be or currently were.

In our very limited experience, we found that mobile voting involved the expenditure of enormous amounts of time and energy on behalf of a relatively small number of voters. For example, in Box 5 of Moghrar, there were 529 registered voters, of whom 105 had voted on the first day, and an additional 52 voted on day 2; in Box 5 of Naama, there were 706 registered voters of whom 91 voted on the first day, 73 on the second, and 31 more by midday on the third; in Box 5 of Ain Ben Khalil, there were 1,138 registered voters of whom 57 had voted on the first day, 72 on the second, and 72 on the third.

Because of the nomadic nature of the rural population of the Naama region, there was no specific schedule, nor did rural mobile voting involve village-to-village trips. Rather, teams literally set out across steppe or desert in search of Bedouin encampments, picking different general areas or directions on different days. When tents were spotted, the teams stopped, inquiries were made, and if everything was in order, people voted.

Election workers travelling with the mobile teams seemed well-trained, serious, and very hard working. Party representation varied, and it must be noted that our visits were hardly unannounced, so there was time and opportunity to insure that a party representative was added to the mobile team. When we travelled in Moghrar, there was a five member election committee (3 men; 2 women) and one representative from the CISEL (from ANR) who traveled with them in the same conveyance. In Naama, the composition of the election committee was the same, and again, one CISEL member (FLN) was traveling with them. We were told the CISEL representative changed daily for this box. In Ain ben Khalil, however, while the election committee composition was the same, there were actually five CISEL representatives (Hammam, PNSD, FLN, ANR and RND) who were travelling along in a separate vehicle which they had pooled their party resources to rent. The same five representatives were travelling with the box for all four days, and were sleeping at night in the place where the box was kept. A similar arrangement was reportedly being used in the one other mobile box in the Ain ben Khalil Commune. It is interesting to note that in our four days of observation this was the only box (special, mobile or fixed) in which we found a full complement of five party workers.

Voting procedures appeared to be standard among the three mobile teams we observed. In all cases, voters were required to have both their voter card and another form of ID (with photo). This sometimes proved to be a problem among the nomadic voters, with the result that a number of persons were not allowed to vote because they were missing one or the other of the necessary cards. Other people did not vote because they were not registered at all, or because they were registered in another neighboring Commune or Wilaya--a particular problem for nomadic persons living near the Commune or Wilaya boundaries.

Literacy is clearly an issue for some of these nomadic voters. While the committees were efficient, they were not terribly helpful beyond telling voters they must pick one of the fifteen ballots and put it in the envelope. Explanations about voting procedures were neither detailed nor delivered with particular patience. Some of the older men we observed looked visibly perplexed by the process. We could not actually observe the women (all of whom, I was informed, are illiterate) because

they vote inside their tents. When they are finished, the ballot box is carried over to the tent so they can vote by reaching out from under a flap.

Procedures varied for the fourth and final day of itinerant voting. Most, but not all, of the boxes go out for the fourth day of voting. In some cases, however, the boxes are set up for all or part of the day at a Centre de Vote in the Commune. I was informed that voters who are registered in a mobile box must at some point actually find that box, or be found by them. When I press this point, I was informed that the voter could always go to town late on the regular election day and meet up with the box at the Centre de Vote (as long as they did so prior to the 7:00 p.m. closing). Given the large proportion of mobile voters who are not actually found by the mobile team during the four days of mobile voting, it would appear that for many nomadic voters, the opportunity to vote is still actually somewhat limited, and that much of the burden of finding the box and voting remains with the voter (with the catch-22 that even if such a voter makes an effort to get to the Commune center, he or she must time the visit to coordinate with the presence of the mobile team).

We observed one instance of storage of the mobile boxes. It was taken to the corner of a dormitory room in a school where we were told the two presidents of the Commune would sleep with it. The box itself was not otherwise locked away in any special place. It was "sealed" with paper and scotch tape.

### C. Fixed Voting

On election day, June 5, 1997, we were able visit a total of 24 Bureaux de Vote, located in eleven separate Centre de Vote, in seven different communes within the Wilaya. These included both male and female boxes. As the UN statement suggested, voting at the fixed boxes on election day went smoothly and was largely devoid of any technical irregularities.

At no fixed Bureau de Vote did we find a full compliment of five party observers, though there was always at least one. Despite talk at the CWISEL about filling observer vacancies on election day, such arrangements were clearly not made. Indeed, many of the Bureau de Vote had only one or two observers. For example, a CISEL representative informed us on election day that there were only 21 credentialed observers for the 63 Bureau de Vote in the commune of Mecheria.

In all cases, the observers we did find wore a picture credential. In one instance, at Mercheria, we were present when a representative of the Mayor's office arrived with copies of the ID cards given to the credentialed observers. He was checking the polling place to verify that the political party observers in

a given Bureau de Vote were the ones who were supposed to be there and that they were wearing their credentials.

Security arrangements were consistent with what we were advised to expect in the UN briefing. There were occasional instances of armed guards either inside the polling places or controlling access to the individual Bureau de Vote--though this was the exception rather than the rule.

Registration lists were highly accurate (probably the most accurate I have ever seen, anywhere). In no instance did someone come in with a voter card and not find their name on the list. Procedures seemed to be consistent throughout the Wilaya. Voters must present their voter card and another form of ID, with a photo. Voters who did not have both forms of ID were not allowed to vote, even if their name was on the list. While no record was kept of voters who were turned away, most boxes acknowledged that at least a few voters had been turned away because they did not have both a voter card and a second form of ID (these numbers were highest in the mobile boxes, which reported as many as 25-30 voters in this category). Lost voter cards could be replaced on election day if the voter could get to one of the (computerized) offices that had the capability of issuing new cards. In Mecheria, such an office was set up right inside the main polling center.

Voting seemed to have been largely completed by about 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon. We saw few voters thereafter, and observed no last minute rush before the 7:00 p.m. closings.

#### IV. POST-ELECTION ACTIVITIES

##### A. Counting

We chose to watch the vote count at Box 36, a Special Box in the Commune of Ain Sefra. A total of 6 fixed boxes (Nos. 30-35) and 4 special boxes (Nos. 36-39) were counted at the particular Centre de Vote we had selected, so this provided a good opportunity to compare the counting procedures in the two different types of boxes.

We arrived at the Centre de Vote at 6:45 p.m., just as the special boxes were being hand carried into the school from the nearby military base by the respective election committees (the special box committees were now in civilian clothes). We had given no advance notice of our intention to watch the count at a special box, and upon our arrival at the room designated for Box No. 36, the election committee seemed extremely startled and unnerved by our presence.

Counting began in both the civilian and special boxes shortly after 7:00 p.m. While there were numerous political party observers at this Centre de Vote, they remained at the civilian boxes, and none of them initially came over to observe the special vote count (it is possible they were not even immediately aware of precisely what was occurring in these other adjacent school rooms).

Box 36 had 560 registered voters, of whom all 560 had voted. The count proceeded as follows: The envelopes were spread out on the table, then sorted into stacks; each envelope was then opened, the ballot unfolded, and held up for all to see as the identifying party letter was called out. It quickly became apparent that almost all of the ballots have been cast for RND; only FLN among the other 15 parties received any votes. The sole spoiled ballot contained both an RND and an FLN ballot. The final tally was exactly 500 votes for RND, 59 for FLN and 1 spoiled. None of the other 13 parties received any votes.

We were joined at about 7:30 p.m. by an observer from Hammam, who remained for the duration of the count. It was unclear if our presence gave him the impetus to stay. None of the other special boxes appeared to have political observers for the count. A few members of the CISEL, along with other party observers, occasionally poked their heads into our room for a few minutes, but did not stay.

During the count, I attempted to survey the other rooms. In another special box, my presence was challenged by a well-dressed man, with a lapel pin, who looked more like special security than military. He demanded to know, in a threatening way, who I was and where I was from. I told him I was from the United Nations and asked if he had a problem with that. The atmosphere in the other special boxes was extremely tense and unwelcoming. Given such a reception, it is easy to understand why the political party observers avoid these rooms.

The atmosphere in the civilian boxes was completely different. These counts appeared to be going relatively smoothly, and all appeared to be observed by political party monitors. The vote in these boxes was divided among the 15 parties.

While Box 36 was by no means the largest at this polling place (one of the other special boxes had almost twice as many voters), it was the last to finish. It was clear that our presence significantly slowed the counting process. There was quite a bit of paper work to be completed after the actual counting process was done, and to speed this up, the commander brought in a committee member from another special committee to assist. This individual was not present for the count in Box 36, but nevertheless completed tallied forms for the box.

## B. Consolidation

We were permitted to watch the consolidation at both the Commune and Wilaya levels. No irregularities were observed. The process at the Commune level was quite open and was well attended by political party observers. No observers, of course, were present at the Wilaya level where the Judicial Tribunal consolidated returns.

## C. Analysis of Results

While the results I was able to obtain are unofficial, and partial, they reveal some interesting trends about voting in the Commune of Ain Sefra.

### 1. Basic Figures

Total registered:	23,919
Special registered:	3,421
Civilian registered:	20,498
Votes cast:	17,021
Special votes cast	3,421
Civilian votes cast:	13,600
Spoiled ballots:	922
Special spoiled ballots:	4
Votes counted:	16,099
Special votes counted:	3,417
Civilian votes counted:	12,682

### 2. Ballot Spoilage

Spoilage rates seemed high, possibly reflecting confusion on the part of illiterate voters. Of the 17,021 ballots cast in the commune, 922 (5.4%) were spoiled and, therefore, not counted. This spoilage was almost entirely among the civilian voters (only 4 spoiled ballots occurred in the special boxes). If anything, spoilage rates may have been even higher in rural areas, where voters appeared even more confused about the process; Ain Sefra is an urban commune, and only 2 of its 43 boxes were itinerant.

### 3. Turnout

Turnout at the special polling places was 100% (3,421 out of 3,421 registered voters). Overall turnout was 71.16%. However, when the special voters are removed, turnout among civilian voters was actually only 66.35%, and when spoiled ballots are factored in, the percentage of civilians who actually voted and had their votes counted drops to 61.87%.

#### 4. The military vote

In Ain Sefra, military voters comprise a significant portion of the electorate, representing 14.3% of the registered voters. However, because military voters vote in disproportionately high percentages, as compared with civilian voters, the military vote actually constituted 20.1% of the votes cast. And because spoilage was much lower among military voters, the military vote actually accounts for 21.2% of the votes counted.

As noted above, almost all of the military votes went to RND; the pattern we observed in Box No. 36 was repeated in the seven other boxes in Ain Sefra. Of a total of 3,417 military votes cast in Ain Sefra, 3,205 (93.8%) went to RND. Almost all of the rest were for FLN.

The effect of the military vote is to give RND a huge lead before the civilian votes are even cast--in other words, 21% of the votes have already gone to RND before the first civilian vote was cast on June 5, 1997. The civilian voters are left to split up the remaining 78% of the votes among the other 15 parties.

Not surprisingly, RND was the first place party in the Commune of Ain Sefra. However, if the special ballots are removed from the count, and the civilian vote is left to stand on its own, RND drops from first place to fifth place, behind Hammas, FLN, MN and PRA.

#### 5. Data for the Wilaya

Because we were given only 45 minutes notice on Friday morning that we were leaving the Wilaya to return to Algiers, we did not have an opportunity to get complete box by box data for the entire Wilaya. However, to the extent we did get Wilaya wide data, it was consistent with the observations made above about the Commune of Ain Sefra.

#### V. Conclusions

While it is difficult to draw conclusions about the entire Algerian election from observation of one wilaya, the following concerns and recommendations are noted:

1. Lack of transparency in special and mobile voting. Whether or not actual fraud occurred, the political parties believe this to be the case. Some of this skepticism could be eliminated by fully opening the special and mobile voting to political party observation, and by making better arrangements for the securing of ballot boxes prior to the count. There also needs to be much more dissemination of information to the

political parties about the time and place of the mobile and special voting. Provisions also need to be made for political party observers to accompany itinerant voting.

2. Unsealed boxes. Given that boxes sit around for up to three days before counting, there needs to be better sealing than two locks and some scotch tape--for example, something as simple as the use of sealing wax could go a long way to ensuring the boxes were not tampered with.

3. Accommodation of illiterate voters. The high spoilage rate is one indication of the problems illiterate voters face. The use of pictures or party symbols on the ballots would be one simple way to deal with this problem. Beyond this, there is also a need for greater voter education--this needs to be done both by the authorities and by the political parties themselves.

4. Fewer restrictions on observation by Political Party observers. While the law allows up to five observers, this was never the case. One problem was that smaller parties could not fill all of the observer slots that they were given, whereas bigger parties, which could have filled the slots, had lost out in lotteries or whatever other means was used to divide up the slots among parties. The level of political party observation could be generally increased by (1) allowing more than five party observers in a given polling station, (2) removing or lessening the credentialing requirements, and (3) providing transportation to party representatives so that they can more easily accompany mobile boxes.

## **APPENDIX D**



# African - American Labor Center

المركز الأفريقي الأمريكي للعمل  
AFL - CIO

Lane Kirkland  
President  
THOMAS R. DONAHUE  
Secretary - Treasurer  
Patrick J. O'Farrell  
Executive Director



1400 K Street, NW • Suite 700 • Washington, DC 20005  
Tel. : (202) 789 - 1020 FAX : (202) 842 - 0730 TWX : 710 - 822 - 1115

Egypt Office  
8, Road 279, Villa El Baraka, New Moadi, Cairo / Egypt  
P.O Box 51 / 11742 New Moadi, Cairo Tel. 3531661

July 21, 1997

Les Campbell  
Director, Middle East Programs  
The National Democratic Institute  
1717 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.  
Fifth Floor  
Washington DC. 20036

Dear Less:

I hope your trip back home from Algiers was safe and agreeable. I just received a copy of the UN statement on the legislative elections, and it seemed to me a fairly accurate summary of the views of the majority of elections observers.

As you would recall, I had made an oral report on my observations on how things went in El Tarf, Eastern Algeria where I was posted together with a Vietnamese participant from the UN observer team and one participant each from the Arab League (AL) and the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The following is a summary of my oral report for your records. For convenience, I have divided my comments to the pre election period May 31 through June 4, and election day June 5/1997, and a summary and personal comments.

## I. Pre Election Period

Upon arrival at EL Tarf on May 31, we were taken to the *Wali's* (governor's) office where we were welcomed by the *Wali* and offered a set of documents on the *Welaya* (state). During the briefing, we learnt that the *Welaya* had 567 polling stations. Four legislative districts were at stake. Only 15 political parties were competing. The other parties did not think they had a chance of success in the *Welaya*. We were then

taken to a newly built mansion for the *Wali* (he had not moved into the new residence yet) which served as our residence and headquarters for the week we were there. We had dinner with him that evening, and we were introduced to our entourage which numbered about 15. At the dinner, the *Wali* assured us that he will do all he can to facilitate our work. We asked him that we wanted to visit the electoral commission, offices of political parties, and the members of the judiciary who will supervise the ballot counting on election night. He readily agreed. He also gave us a program for our stay—a mixed of business and tourism as he perceived our mission.

The next day, June 1, a meeting with the political parties was arranged at the *Welaya*. We were told that for security reasons it had to be at the *Welaya* and not in their individual offices. About five political parties came to the meeting, and they all expressed satisfaction about the preparations which had been made for the election. When we asked them what kind of campaigning they had done, there was very little which has been done in terms of explaining their political program to the people either through the media or rallies. A couple mentioned that party representatives from Algiers had come to address party loyalists. Asked if the government had put restrictions on their movements or ability to campaign, they said no. Later in the week, some (mainly from FLN and El Nahda) came to tell us individually that they did not have free access to the media, and that they have not been free to campaign. One gave us an example of a lady who was detained for distributing party's leaflets door to door. We also visited the electoral commission's office which was well organized. The *Welaya* also had an impressive election data processing center with computers which had information on election centers, list of voters etc. At lunch time, we were joined by the presiding judge of the tribunal for supervising the counting of ballots and election results. He said he will welcome us on election night and gave us a long sermon of how democratic Algeria is. During the meeting, he was accompanied by two representatives from the national electoral commission in Algiers who volunteered to answer questions on the electoral process.

On June 2, we went to visit the first special voting place, a site pre determined by the UN sampling process. This was a communal police voting center. Representative of four political parties were present. We stayed throughout the voting and every thing went well. The ballot boxes were locked in our presence after the last person voted. Then,

came the question of where the boxes would be stored until election day. The officers said they will keep the boxes. The political parties either wanted to have one of the two keys, or designate a person to watch them until they are transferred to the commune for counting. The officers refused. Then, we suggested if they would agree to having them sealed. They also refused to do that, insisting that the law does not require them to do so. We then went to a military polling station where voting was in progress. There were no representatives of political parties. The president of the election committee told us that all the parties were invited to send representatives, but they chose not to do so. At the end of the day, we asked if the *Wali* could do something to assure the political parties that the ballots from the special polling places would be secured from being tampered with by any body. He could not do anything. We visited army and navy polling stations the next day and the problem remained unresolved. The only assurance we got was that the guardians have been sworn to protect the integrity of the ballots.

On June 4, we were informed that the *Wali* had decided that voting at mobile polling stations will be held on election day on June 5. Our understanding had been that these elections were to be held before. But we were told that the law empowered the *Wali* to make the changes, and he had made that decision before our arrival. We tried unsuccessfully to find out if he had given the parties sufficient notice about the change. We could not find out when that decision was made.

## II. Election Day

The first polling station we were going to visit was about two hours drive from our residence. In order to be there around 8.00 am, we had to inform our escorts about our travel plans the night before, but we did not tell them the exact polling station to preserve the surprise element in it. It turned out that the sample polling station which was selected was a female polling station. The five election officers were there and the election materials were in order. There was no line of voters. When we left the polling station after waiting for an hour and half to visit other polling stations, not a single voter had turned up. We were told that women have to take care of the kids and the house while the men were voting. They also had to prepare meals and feed the family, and then go to vote in the after noon. We checked later in the day to see how the turn

out was and we were told that about 70 % of the registered voters had voted.

We visited about 15 polling stations throughout the day. The election officers were competent, the political parties were represented, and election materials were available. There were always more ballots than the number of registered voters, and one always wondered what would happen to the extra ballots. The election officers told us that the ballots were mimeographed papers and some of the copies were bad, which made it necessary to have extra ballots.

During our observations at the polling stations, we talked to representatives of political parties for their views on how the voting was going. They all said that things were going according to the law. However, it was evident that there were a number of representatives of political parties who did not know much about the parties they were representing. In fact, one of the representatives (a woman) was just hired by the party to sit for them for that day, and did not know anything about the party itself. We also talked to the voters themselves, and asked them how they decided to vote for candidates. Many knew the FLN, (the only legal party for most of the years of Algeria's independence), and had heard something about *HAMAS* and *EL - NAHDA*, but not much about the 12 other parties which were competing. Then, there was the problem that the candidates or the parties were represented by letters only. Illiterate voters had difficulty identifying the candidates of their choice. Some came with literate relatives who could help. And others seemed to just cast their vote for the candidate or party whose ballot box was on top of the 15.

We also had a chance to visit one mobile polling station. Things looked OK there too. The only complaint the parties had, was that they did not have a schedule of where the mobile team was going and at what time. So, they could not inform their supporters to come and vote at a given place and time. They claimed that only the party supporting the government had such an information.

At 7.00 PM, we went to an election center to observe the closing and ballot counting. The count went very smoothly. The total number of ballots (including spoiled ballots) matched the number of people who were marked as having voted. When we finished at the election center, we went to the commune. There were a lot of people including

representatives of political parties watching the counting. We were happy to note that the figures from the polling station we had observed at closing time were correctly reported.

Around 10.00 PM, we went to the tribunal for the total count of the votes at the *Wali*, the judge told us that only a few communes had sent in the results, and that he would start counting when the majority of the ballots were in. Counting started at 1.30 PM on the 6th of June, and lasted until 2 am. I stayed there until the final results were tallied. I had missed my going away reception while watching the returns to the disappointment of my hosts. By then, the *Welaya* had issued its own results from its computer center. My hosts could not understand why I spent so much time with the tribunal when in fact the same information was available at the *Welaya*. The judge's office had only one computer, and did not have as competent a staff as the *Welaya*, and so counting the ballots took for ever. The counting was transparent, and most of the political parties were present, although their number kept declining as the process went late into the night.

Three complaints were lodged before the judge during the counting process. One, a party representative complained that the number of people who voted in one polling station exceeded the number who were registered by 10. Second, another party representative complained that in one polling center there was a difference of 5 votes between those reported as having voted at closing time and the final count, meaning five people were allowed to vote after closing time. Third and more serious, the FLN representative complained that at Shubaita Mokhtor commune a person entered the polling center, broke the ballot boxes and dumped the ballots on the floor. This involved 2000 votes. The ballots were discarded, and the man was put in goal. The judge promised to investigate all three complaints, but decided to announce the results anyway because the vote differences between the winners and losers were so big that the outcome of the investigation would not affect the results of the election. Based on the vote count, FLN won two seats, EL Nahda won one seat, and RND (the government party) won one seat.

The final results were the same as those of the *Welaya*. The judge was kind enough to give me a hand written statement of the count, because I had no time to wait for the printing of the results (he had trouble with his printer also). The result of the election tally is attached.

### III. Summary and Personal Comments:

To summarize, the election process in this part of the country went reasonably well. Itinerant voting, and voting among the police and the military were questionable. But, this did not seem to be a significant factor in the election outcome in this part of the country. Out of 567 polling stations, only 26 were military, police, and paramilitary. What was evident, was that neither the voters nor the political parties were really ready for free and democratic multiparty elections. They had lived under a military dominated one party state for over thirty years and not enough political education has been offered to prepare them for such elections. This may be an area where NDI with its vast experience in civic education in developing countries could be of help to the Algerians. The problem is vast and may be beyond the financial resources of NDI, but at least it can design exemplary programs for others to follow.


On personal relations, our accompagnateurs were determined to watch all our movements. So when I went to call the UN security officer to confirm that I had arrived safely at my destination, some body came in to the room. When I told him I did not need him, he sent my interpreter to be with me and asked him to report on my conversation. Throughout our stay, there was an obvious paranoia about our movements and actions. This is the first time that the Algerian bureaucracy, which is full of proud FLN veterans, has been subjected to an outside inspection and so their uneasiness is understandable. To their credit also, every time I asked them I wanted to be on my own, like when I talked to voters and political party representatives, they left me alone. My UN team mate, a Vietnamese diplomat who had served in Algeria was too shy to ask questions and did not want to do anything which in his judgment may not be acceptable to the Algerian government. Then, we were also forced to be with the observers from the OAU and the Arab League. They did not have as strict and as detailed observation requirements as we. So, many times, they did not want to go to as many places as we wanted to go, or spend as much time as I wanted at a polling station. So, in the eyes of the government people, I ended up being the bete noire who wanted to scrutinize everything they were doing. I felt a little uncomfortable, but also challenged to do the assignment.

In conclusion, I want to express my appreciation for your leadership under what seemed to be difficult circumstances to you personally, because of the lack of cooperation of the authorities in the

part of the country where you were assigned. The fact that the UN leadership was weak did not help either. I also want to congratulate you for working so hard to help in making the final UN document reflect the varied views of the US delegation. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to work with such a great team!

Greetings to the NDI staff who were so helpful during our stay in Algeria.

Sincerely,



Gebreselassie Gebremariam

CC: American Center for International Labor Solidarity (AFL-CIO)

## Elections Legislatives du 05 Juin 1997

## Synthèse des résultats P.V de Communes

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Bureaux_ :	507	
Inscrits_ :	202044	
Votants_ :	163806	Taux_ : 81.07%
Abstentions_ :	38238	
Exprimés_ :	160455	Taux_ : 97.95%
Bulletins Nuls_ :	3351	

Listes	Voix	Taux	Sièges
FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE	59566	37.12%	2
PARTI NAT. POUR LA SOLIDARITE ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT	644	0.40%	0
PARTI DU RENOUVEAU ALGERIEN	2528	1.58%	0
PARTI DE L'UNITE POPULAIRE	2516	1.57%	0
PARTI DES TRAVAILLEURS	3642	2.27%	0
RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONNEL	1339	0.83%	0
MOUVEMENT DE L'ENTENTE NATIONALE	1858	1.16%	0
MOUVEMENT DE LA NAHDA	25197	15.70%	1
PARTI ALGERIEN POUR LA JUSTICE ET LE PROGRES	836	0.52%	0
MOUVEMENT DE LA SOCIETE POUR LA PAIX	8245	5.14%	0
PARTI DE LA JUSTICE SOCIALE	1452	0.90%	0
MOUVEMENT NATIONAL DE LA JEUNESSE ALGERIENNE	5036	3.14%	0
MOUVEMENT NATIONAL POUR LA NATURE ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT	731	0.46%	0
ALLIANCE NATIONALE REPUBLICAINE	2084	1.30%	0
RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL DEMOCRATE	44781	27.91%	1

## **APPENDIX E**

## MEMORANDUM

**TO:** Les Campbell, Regional Director, Middle East  
**FROM:** Adib Faris, Logistics Coordinator  
**RE:** Algeria election observations (Borj Bou Arriredidj)  
**DATE:** 18 June, 1997

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Here are my observations and comments about my week long stay at Borj Bou Arriredidj. I will attempt to break it down point by point of issues that were of concern and then a general overview of the entire week.

### **Political Parties**

I met with all parties at the wilaya the second day I was in BBA. There were a total of 15 parties on the ballot. Aside from the usual pleasantries, four parties emerged as "genuine" and wanted further meetings. HMS, An Nahda, FFS and RND. The FFS in the Borj were the most willing to criticize the administration and we would eventually meet with them at their party headquarters. Their primary concerns were the special vote ballot boxes, the administrations' favorable treatment of RND, and the intimidation of the voters in isolated areas of the wilaya. These sentiments were echoed by HMS and An Nahda. All the above mentioned parties were well organized with lots of literature and materials. HMS even had pens with their logo and BBA on the pen. All parties also followed the rhetoric of a desire for Algeria to move forward and not sink into a violent cycle again.

### **Administration (Wilaya)**

The administration was well organized and I had a feeling they knew all the movements of the parties and perhaps due to the fact that it was such a large wilaya with very isolated pockets of populace that the administration had a firm grip on all activities political or otherwise. It is interesting to note that the Wali's previous posting was Blida from 1993 to 1995. I would think that the posting to BBA was compensation for the Blida posting. This wilaya unlike Ouargla had no significant resources except for some agricultural activities and generally I consistently saw people sitting around all day with no significant work being done.

### **Special Vote**

I traveled 50 km to a town called Mansoura to view police voting and all seemed orderly and another town called Ghaafra, I found the fact that in both cases the voting was completed before 11:00 am. The military barracks in BBA was a superb show with music blaring I

rummaged through the unused ballots and noticed that RND ballots were the only ballots not in the trash. This started the debate about whether RND was the presidents party a point continuously denied by the administration. There were no political party observer in BBA for the special vote. There was no doubt that the special vote was not transparent and that you essentially were required to vote for RND. I do not know if there should have been concern to follow or have knowledge of the location of ballot boxes because I do believe to a person that military/security forces voted for RND.

### JUNE 5

I traveled to 12 voting centers all over the wilaya, I will simply write the irregularities I witnessed. I saw security forces in inside two of the voting center which was a clear violation, these occurred in isolated regions and not in the city. I noticed that they had the unused ballots thrown in garbage bags with the numbers of the office on the bag. I also saw a woman reach down a rip all the unused ballots in the booth and keep the torn ballots. Everything else that day seemed to run smoothly. There were political party observers in every office we visited with HMS having the most representatives. We were allowed to witness the count and I did not see any irregularities during the vote count at the wilaya. The seven seats available went as following:

RND: 2 seats  
FLN: 2 seats  
HMS: 2 seats  
AnNa: 1 seat

### General Comments

In general, BBA was a sleepy wilaya with not much at stake. The administration was in complete control of all aspects of political and social life. The population is not well educated and the illiteracy rate is quite high, especially among women. There seems to be severely high unemployment and the wilaya has several impoverished, isolated areas. However despite all these hurdles, I believe there is tremendous potential for BBA but alas as the rest of the country much of the population is spoon fed by the state administration.

The political parties seem anxious to work with us and perhaps there will be opportunities in the future in a country which I can write without a doubt has tremendous resources and potential that must be harnessed soon or risk the rise of an disenchanting and potentially once more violent population demanding a share of the incredible wealth of Algeria.

I would like now to thank you, Olga and Arsala on what was an unique experience and for all your patience and advise. I believe this to have been an important mission not only aiding in my development with NDI but along with being a memorable lifelong experience.

## **APPENDIX F**

6/7/97  
12:20am

Report: Constantine and Region

The UN observers in the Constantine region felt that in general the elections on the 5th of June were well organized.

However, their observation experiences were diverse, depending on the wilayas to which they were assigned. A summary of those experiences follows:

**\*\*The government of Algeria provided a high level of security in response to requests of the governments of observer delegations and the United Nations. The high level of security led in certain cases to constraints on the observer missions.**

**\*\*A number of UN observers (e.g., those in Oum el Bouaghi, Kenchela, Tizi Ouzou, Mila, Batna, Constantine and Souk Ahras) had no trouble determining their schedule, modifying it on short notice or in meeting with political parties in party offices or elsewhere of the observers' choosing.**

**\*\*Several observers were quite limited in their ability to set their programs and in modifying their schedules on short notice. In some cases (e.g., Jijel and Setif), observers had to inform Wali of their visits to polling stations well in advance. Observers in Oum el Bouaghi were refused permission to attend a meeting of a political party for security reasons. Observers in Msila were denied access to two individuals from a political party who had a complaint of mistreatment by the authorities.**

**\*\*A number of UN observers were limited in their access to the vote consolidation at the wilaya level (Setif, Batna) and one delegation (Setif) was not permitted to stay throughout the entire vote consolidation at the commune level.**

**\*\*A number of observers expressed a concern about the arrangements for storing the voting boxes from the «advance voting bureaus» (i.e., special and itinerant voting bureaus where votes took place on June 2 and 3). These boxes were under the supervision of the military or other agencies of the government without the presence of independent observers during the period between the time the voting was completed and the votes were counted. (See the Annex for the percentage of special and itinerant voters in each wilaya.) Some observers observed that special voting boxes were sealed at the closure of the voting bureau.. Others observed that they were not sealed at the closure of the voting bureau. remarked that the boxes of special and itinerant bureaus were not sealed at the closure of voting. Finally, several observers found it difficult to ascertain the schedule for the stops of the itinerant voting bureaus and were concerned that arrangements for the storage of these boxes after they were closed and before they were opened for the vote count did not include supervision by parties independent of the government.**

TO: Les Campbell and Jean Lavoie  
FROM: Juan Garcia Passalacqua

REPORT OF ORAN DELEGATION  
(EXACTLY AS APPROVED 6-7-97 AT 10:58, 10 MEMBERS PRESENT)  
NO OTHER SENTENCE WAS AUTHORIZED

1. No comment on campaign, since we were constrained by time and security.
2. Security was a constraint on our job of observation as a whole.
3. Distinguish our observation of the special bureaus from our observation of June 5 bureaus.
4. In most Wilayas there was an absence of political party observers in the special bureaus. Two complaints from parties were filed with U.N.
5. Registration system was efficiently computerized.
6. From 8 AM to 8 PM on June 5 we observed a process that was technically exemplary, but two members of the Oran delegation filed one complaint each from Hamas and Nahda with U.N.
7. The counting at the polling station level was transparent.
8. At the commune level, consolidation was open to observers.
9. At the Wilaya level, magistrates were open to observers.
10. We observed a determination to move forward in the democratic process.

## **APPENDIX G**

## **MEMORANDUM**

**May 27, 1997**

**To: Algeria Election Study Mission Delegates**

**From: Les Campbell, Olga Milosavljevic, Arsala Deane, Adib Faris, and Jean Lavoie**

**Re: Terms of Reference - Algeria Election Study Mission**

Thank you for agreeing to be a delegate on NDI's Algerian election study mission. This is an exciting and important time to be in Algeria and we appreciate your willingness to contribute to the success of this unique NDI endeavor.

### **Background:**

The June 5 Parliamentary elections will be Algeria's second attempt to hold legislative elections and the third time that voters will be asked to cast ballots in national elections since the canceled 1991/1992 parliamentary elections. The Algerian Government has invited the United Nations, the Organization for African Unity and the Arab League to monitor the elections and all three organizations have accepted.

The United Nations has agreed to coordinate an international delegation of approximately 100 persons sponsored by individual member states. The U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, Ronald Neumann, and the U.S. State Department asked NDI to organize the American contribution to the U.N. effort. Recognizing that NDI's ability to carry out traditional observation methodology would be hampered by the need for special security arrangements, the Institute offered to undertake a limited election study mission in which no statement would be issued by NDI immediately following the election. The Institute plans to prepare a more comprehensive report in late June that will explore prospects for future programs to support Algerian democratic development based on our observations over the last three weeks and based on your recommendations and findings.

The Algerian Government has not invited any non-governmental organization to take part in the monitoring effort, and, although both the governing and most of the opposition parties have encouraged NDI to be active in Algeria, NDI's involvement in this election is under the coordination of the United Nations.

NDI consultant Jean Lavoie arrived in Algeria on May 7 and is coordinating the UN's Algiers regional office where he has been meeting with election officials and political parties and investigating complaints of pre-election irregularities. He has also been analyzing the "campaign atmosphere".

NDI Program Officer Olga Milosavljevic arrived in Algeria on May 18 and traveled to the city of Oran in eastern Algeria, where she and Italian Observer, Giovanni Degilia opened the UN's Oran

regional office. NDI Program Assistant Arsala Deane arrived in Algeria on May 23 and traveled to the city of Constantine, in western Algeria, to open the UN's Constantine regional office. Arsala Deane was joined in Constantine by Indian observer Ranjit Singh on May 26. On May 27, NDI Logistics Officer, Adib Faris and Olga Milosavljevic traveled to the southern town of Ourgla to open the last UN regional office.

**Objectives of the mission:**

- 1) To demonstrate international support for Algeria's 1997 Parliamentary elections by contributing constructively to the United Nations coordinated election observation mission in Algeria.
- 2) To use NDI's participation in the UN coordinated international observer team to conduct an informal assessment of the prospects for democratic development in Algeria, and to inform possible future NDI programs.

**Your Task:**

Your main task is to observe the Algerian elections on behalf of the UN to the best of your ability in accordance with the UN terms of reference included in your briefing book. Please reread the UN terms of reference carefully. Instructions, forms, and briefings for this task will be provided in two days of UN organized briefings on Thursday, May 28 and Friday May 29. Please follow the instructions of the UN coordinators carefully and faithfully.

Your secondary task is to provide NDI with a broader assessment of the 1997 Algerian election based on your experiences as an election observer and your impressions of the overall legitimacy of the election process.

On Wednesday, May 27 you will observe campaign related events in Algiers and meet with representatives of political parties in the Hotel Aurassi in the evening. On Thursday, May 29 the U.N. has prepared morning briefings with government and election officials on the technical aspects of the election and the afternoon will consist of a briefing on Algerian history, culture and politics. In the late afternoon there will be a discussion of the characteristics and structure of the main political parties and an update on the state of the election campaign.

On Friday May 30 you will receive detailed instructions on your role as a UN observer, and be given the various forms you are to fill out on election day. On Friday afternoon you will break into regional groups to receive a political briefing on the region you will be deployed in. You will be deployed in teams of two observers, one NDI observer and one observer from another national delegation, with a translator as necessary.

On Saturday May 31 you will travel to your deployment area and will begin a series of meetings with local officials and political parties to familiarize yourself with the local situation and to observe advance "special" and "itinerant" balloting. On election day, June 5, you will observe the opening of a specific polling site and will be free to travel to several other polling sites throughout

the day. You will observe the closing of a polling site and observe the counting of the ballots at that site. Once the on-site balloting is finished you will observe the consolidation of the results at the commune and Wilaya (district) level. You will report to the Algiers UN coordination office at regular intervals, and, when election related activities are finished in your deployment area you will return to Algiers for de-briefing. De-briefing should be completed on June 7 and 8 and most delegates will leave Algeria on June 8.

We will also schedule NDI delegation meetings as needed but you are encouraged to integrate with the broader observer team as much as possible. NDI does not plan to issue a statement on the election but the NDI delegation should contribute their comments and observations to the full UN team. There may be a report issued by the UN coordination secretariat and NDI's role in that report, if any, will be discussed fully with the NDI delegation before any decision is made.

In addition to the UN debriefings, the NDI delegation will meet to discuss their broad impressions of the Algerian election and the prospects for democratic development in the country. Delegates are encouraged to provide written comments after the mission is completed.

### **The UN and NDI**

This mission marks the first time that NDI has formally joined a UN Election Assistance Unit coordinated election observation effort. The unique circumstances of this election, the ongoing security threat and the need for an unusual amount of Algerian government coordination made an NDI/UN collaboration practical and useful to both organizations. While NDI has a good relationship with the Algerian government and with opposition parties, the Algerian government has not invited any international NGO's to take part in this election. NDI's presence in Algeria was encouraged but only if it was under the UN umbrella.

The UN was invited to coordinate the election effort but has very few resources. NDI was able to contribute experienced staff members to open and staff regional offices and to do pre-election political analysis. NDI, by organizing the "U.S. Delegation" to the election, will also contribute the single largest observer delegation. In addition, NDI will contribute financially to the common costs of running the coordination office.

The benefits of the joint effort are many, but the collaboration is not without its downside. Although NDI is an NGO and organizes international delegations, this particular delegation is the U.S. contribution to the UN team. Because it is the biggest delegation with the most resources, the possibility of causing resentment among other country delegations exists. Some of the countries contributing to the UN mission lack financial resources or lack election experience.

Notwithstanding the cooperative relationship we anticipate, some issues may arise where tensions could come to the surface. Please refer all questions and comments on the NDI/UN relationship to Les Campbell, who will work with UN coordinator Francisco Cobos to resolve any issues that

arise. The question of NDI participation in the preparation of an election statement will be discussed among NDI delegates at the earliest opportunity.

### **Logistics and organization**

Logistical and organizational issues are shared between NDI and the UN. Roughly speaking, NDI is responsible for all arrangements to get you to and from Algeria, and the UN and the Algerian government are responsible for logistics within the country including the details of deployment travel. NDI is responsible for the payment of the costs of NDI delegates and per diem allowances. NDI will also provide you with a deployment package including first aid kits, water, toilet paper and emergency money.

NDI will pay the cost of meals at the El Aurassi Hotel, and the cost of any group meals outside the hotel. Please charge meal and laundry costs to your room (minus alcohol). Please clear your bill of personal phone charges when you check out and NDI will be billed for the remaining costs. Delegates deployed outside of Algiers will receive \$20.00 a day for incidentals (meals will be covered), and no receipts are required. The UN will bill NDI for travel costs.

Again, thank you for the contribution of your time and energy and we hope you enjoy the experience.

## **APPENDIX H**

## LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

5 JUNE 1997

### ALGERIA

## Code of Conduct for International Observers Coordinated by the United Nations

At the request of the Government of ALGERIA, the United Nations has been invited and has agreed to assist in providing coordination and support to international observers covering the legislative elections scheduled for 5 June 1997.

To this purpose, the United Nations will establish in Algeria an Electoral Assistance Secretariat (UN-EAS) headed by a UN-coordinator, in order to coordinate and support the activities of international observers, including long term international observers.

### Article 1 : International Observation

International observation means the observation of the various stages of the electoral process by international observers under the coordination of the United Nations provided that they are duly accredited by the National Sub-Committee for International Observers (SCNOI).

### Article 2 : Scope of International Observation

International observation of the electoral process consists essentially of the following activities :

- 1/ to observe and assess the electoral lists;
- 2/ to observe the access to and the use of public media;
- 3/ to observe the course of the electoral campaign;
- 4/ to observe the voting process, especially the compliance with the procedures established in the Algerian Law;
- 5/ to observe the vote count and the issuance of the electoral results.

### **Article 3 : Duration of International Observation**

International observation shall begin when the international observers receive the identification cards from the SCNOI and will end with the issuance of the election results.

### **Article 4 : Algerian Citizens**

Algerian Citizens who are considered as such under the prevailing legislation are accepted as international observers even if they are also citizens of another state.

### **Article 5 : Duty to cooperate**

1- The SCNOI as well as the central and local States institutions, shall fully cooperate with and offer to the international observers the guarantees and other facilities necessary for them to fulfill their mission.

2- the Algerian Government will ensure the security and safety of the international observers.

### **Article 6 : Identification and Accreditation of International Observers**

The international observers, duly recognized and accredited, will receive an identification card from the SCNOI.

### **Article 7 : Rights and Privileges of the International Observers**

All accredited international observers acting under the coordination of the United Nations enjoy the following rights and privileges :

- 1) to obtain a multiple entry visa to the country;
- 2) to enjoy, for the needs of their mission, freedom of movement throughout the country;
- 3) to communicate freely with all the legal political parties and other civil society organizations of the country;

- 4) to obtain the relevant documentation relating to the electoral process;
- 5) to have access through the UN-EAS to the Independent National Commission for the Surveillance of Legislative Elections (CNISEL);
- 6) to seek clarifications through the UN-EAS from all the institutions involved in the electoral process on matters connected with the activities of international observation of the elections;
- 7) to observe the voter count and the issuance of the electoral results;
- 8) to observe the participation, as authorized by the Algerian Law, of the political parties in the organs or structures connected with the electoral process;
- 9) to open up regional and local offices within the country in order to ensure the successful performances of their mission;
- 10) to have freedom of access to all polling stations and counting centers;
- 11) to have freedom to observe all electoral materials (ballots boxes, ballot papers, etc...) which are to be used;
- 12) to communicate the findings of their observation to the UN-EAS;
- 13) to designate a spokesperson who, on behalf of the joint international observers group, will deliver at the appropriate time an official statement on the conduct of the electoral process.

#### **Article 8 : Obligations of the International Observers**

1- Accredited international observers acting under the coordination of the United Nations shall have the following obligations :

- 1.1 to respect the Constitution and the Laws of Algeria;
- 1.2 not to interfere in the internal affairs of Algeria;

1.4 no to make individual statement about the electoral process;

1.5 to maintain strict impartiality during all their mission and not to indicate or express any bias or preference with reference to any party or candidate;

1.6 to identify themselves, immediately, to any interested party;

1.7 to only carry, wear or otherwise prominently display the prescribed identification card and any other identifying material issued by the UN-EAS;

1.8 to refrain from giving direct or indirect assistance to any party in connection with the elections and on polling day, and specially to refrain from communicating with voters with a view to influencing how they vote, or attempting to establish how they have voted, or any other manner interfering with the secrecy and orderly conduct of the voting and counting process;

1.9 to refrain from carrying, wearing and display any electoral material or any other article of clothing emblem, colors, badges, or other items denoting support for or opposition to any party or candidate, or with reference to any of the issues in contention in the elections;

1.10 to abide by this Observer Code of Conduct and by the security guidelines prepared by the UN-EAS;

1.11 to return all materials and equipments supplied by the SCNOI immediately after the end of their mission as observers.

2- The SCNOI may, at any moment, revoke the accreditation and put an end to the activity of any international observer who violated the obligations stipulated in the present article.

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## **APPENDIX I**

## **ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER (for NDI team)**

### **Opening of the Polls and Election Day Observation (pink and white forms)**

- 1) Which political parties were present during the opening of the polls?
- 2) When were the party and international observers allowed to enter the polling station? What were they able to see? (not clear what we will be allowed to see, we have heard that observers will only be allowed to enter polling stations at 8am and at that point will see the empty ballot box and sealing of the box, were you allowed to see the envelopes counted? what else was done in the presence of the observers?)
- 3) How many voters had voted by proxy when you arrived at the polling station?
- 4) Were women and/or illiterate voters generally voting on their own? Or were they receiving assistance in casting their ballot? If yes, who?

### **Closing of the Polling Stations and the Count**

- 1) During the count did other party or ngo observers or ordinary citizens arrive to observe the count? If yes, which parties or ngos, or how many private citizens?
- 2) Were the election results, at each polling station, made public -- announced or posted?
- 3) During the closing of the polling station, what was done with the disposed of ballots (those in the trash bins)?
- 4) During the closing, where were the extra (unused) envelopes and ballots placed?
- 5) Did the number of the ballots in the box match the number of people who were marked as having voted on the list? (Including spoiled ballots) Too many? Too few?
- 6) At the commune level (first point of consolidation) were the results announced? At the wilaya level?
- 7) Which political parties were present during the count? (Polling station, commune and wilaya level?)
- 8) At the commune and/or wilaya levels did the polling station count change? What explanation for why was given?

### Mobile Polling Station Forms (green)

- 1) How were voters informed in advance of the mobile station's schedule?
- 2) On June 3 and 4 did the mobile polling station schedule adhere to the announced schedule? (Were they on time? Did they remain in their designated locations as predetermined?)
- 3) Which parties observed the mobile vote? Did the five designated parties remain with the box throughout the day? (How long have the parties been with the box?) How did they travel? (Types of vehicles? Did they share vehicles?)
- 4) At the end of the mobile voting period, how were any extra ballots handled? Where were they placed? Were they counted and were the number of extra ballots recorded?
- 5) Were the ballot boxes sealed with two locks? Who has the two keys?

### General Issues to Track

- 1) Exclusion Zones -- what kind of campaign materials did voters see in their town during the campaign?

## **APPENDIX J**

الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية

## إنتخاب المجلس الشعبي الوطني

الدائرة الإنتخابية: ميلة

5 جوان 1997

قائمة: حركة مجتمع السلم

**HARAKET MOUDJTAMAA ES-SILM**

- |                        |                      |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 — DJAABOUBE Lachemi  | 1 - الهاشمي جعبوب    |
| 2 — KAHALESNANE Salah  | 2 - صالح كحل السنان  |
| 3 — ABBAS Mohamed Said | 3 - محمد السعيد عباس |
| 4 — ABDERREZAK Khider  | 4 - خيضر عبد الرزاق  |
| 5 — BEKHOUCHE Naamane  | 5 - نعمان بخوش       |
| 6 — SOLTANI Nourredine | 6 - نور الدين سلطاني |
| 7 — GHERRAF Norreddine | 7 - نور الدين غراف   |
| 8 — HAMOUDA Rabah      | 8 - رابح حمودة       |
| 9 — KHENIOU Mouloud    | 9 - المولود خنيو     |
| 10 — ZOUAD Abdelmadjid | 10 - عبد المجيد زواد |
| 11 — ANÇAR Mouloud     | 11 - مولود عنصر      |

# أ.ص

## إنتخاب المجلس الشعبي الوطني

الدائرة الإنتخابية: ميلة

5 جوان 1997

قائمة: حزب العمال

**PARTI DES TRAVAILLEURS**

- |                             |                      |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 — GHELLAM Sabri           | 1 - صابري غلام       |
| 2 — BOUCHAMA Mohammed       | 2 - محمد بوشامة      |
| 3 — LAOUAR Nourreddine      | 3 - لعور نور الدين   |
| 4 — ALI - KHELLAF Belkacem  | 4 - بلقاسم علي خلاف  |
| 5 — ROUBACHE Nacer - eddine | 5 - نصر الدين روباش  |
| 6 — RABHI Abdelaziz         | 6 - عبد العزيز رابحي |
| 7 — GHECIL Salim            | 7 - سليم غسيل        |
| 8 — BELHI Khelifi           | 8 - خليفي بلحي       |
| 9 — MALEK Abdelkrim         | 9 - عبد الكريم مالك  |
| 10 — KHALFAOUI Boudjemaa    | 10 - بوجمعة خلفاوي   |
| 11 — TATACHE Tayeb          | 11 - الطيب ططاش      |

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الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية

## إنتخاب المجلس الشعبي الوطني


الدائرة الإنتخابية: ميله

5 جوان 1997

قائمة: حزب جبهة التحرير الوطني

**PARTI DU FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE**

- |                            |                       |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 — MENSOUR Abderrahmane   | 1 - عبد الرحمن منصور  |
| 2 — GOUMIDI Abdelhamid     | 2 - عبد الحميد قوميدي |
| 3 — KELOUZ Ahmed           | 3 - أحمد كلوز         |
| 4 — OUDINA Zakaria         | 4 - زكرياء أوزينة     |
| 5 — LARGUECHE Said         | 5 - السعيد لرقش       |
| 6 — MEHAZZEM Mokhtar       | 6 - مختار محزم        |
| 7 — DIB Rahima             | 7 - رحيمة ذيب         |
| 8 — CHAIBE - LAIN Boudjema | 8 - بوجمعة شايب العين |
| 9 — HACHELAF Madani        | 9 - مداني حشلاف       |
| 10 — CHEBAT Noureddine     | 10 - نور الدين شباط   |
| 11 — BOUCHOUCHA Said       | 11 - السعيد بوشوشة    |



الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية

## إنتخاب المجلس الشعبي الوطني

الدائرة الإنتخابية: ميلة

5 جوان 1997

قائمة: التجمع من أجل الثقافة والديمقراطية

RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LA CULTURE ET LA DEMOCRATIE

- |                            |                          |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 — BICHAOUI Lakhdar       | 1 - لخضر بيشاوي          |
| 2 — BENHAFED Ghenoudja     | 2 - غنوجة بن حافظ        |
| 3 — HANOUTI Hocine         | 3 - حسين حانوتي          |
| 4 — KERRAS Boudjema        | 4 - بوجمعة كراس          |
| 5 — AHRAOU Samir           | 5 - سمير أهراو           |
| 6 — MERZOUG Abdelali       | 6 - عبد العالي مرزوق     |
| 7 — BOUDHOUS Messaoud      | 7 - مسعود بوآلدهوس       |
| 8 — MAALI Abderrahim       | 8 - عبد الرحيم معلي      |
| 9 — HANOUTI Farid Abdenour | 9 - فريد عبد النور حنوتي |
| 10 — HAMMAR Abdenour       | 10 - عبد النور حمار      |
| 11 — ZEROUAL Miloud        | 11 - ميلود زروال         |

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## إنتخاب المجلس الشعبي الوطني

الدائرة الإنتخابية : ميله

5 جوان 1997

قائمة : التجمع الوطني الديمقراطي

RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL DEMOCRATIQUE

- |                       |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 — BENDAKIR Essaid   | 1 - السعيد بن داكير   |
| 2 — BOUGHEDDA Rachid  | 2 - رشيد بوغدة        |
| 3 — REDJEL Djamel     | 3 - جمال رجال         |
| 4 — MIMOUNE Ahmed     | 4 - أحمد ميمون        |
| 5 — GOUGA Tahar       | 5 - الطاهر قوثة       |
| 6 — NAAMOUNE Said     | 6 - السعيد نعمون      |
| 7 — MENIA Mohammed    | 7 - محمد منيع         |
| 8 — RIHANE Hamlaoui   | 8 - حملاوي ربحان      |
| 9 — LAIBI Abdelhafid  | 9 - عبد الحفيظ لعاببي |
| 10 — GUELLIL Malika   | 10 - مليكة قليل       |
| 11 — GUERMAT Azeddine | 11 - عز الدين قرماط   |

## **APPENDIX K**



United States Department of State

*Washington, D.C. 20520*

March 27, 1997

Mr. Kenneth D. Wollack  
President  
National Democratic Institute for  
International Affairs  
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Wollack:


As you are aware, the process of democratic reform in Algeria is of particular concern for this Administration. Democratic elections in this area of the world are rare, and those in countries convulsed by violence and issues of Islamic extremism are even rarer. We, therefore, view the upcoming legislative elections on June 5 as an important crossroads. If carried out under reasonably free and fair conditions, these elections could allow the people of Algeria to move beyond the devastating violence that has marked these last few years. For this reason, representatives of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and others in the Department of State have been in touch with your staff regarding the prospects for these elections, the possibility of an international observer mission, and possible avenues for U.S. support. (In this vein, I want to thank NDI for organizing the roundtable with NGO representatives and the Algerian ambassador last week.)

We are particularly interested in prospects for NGO participation in a UN-coordinated international observer mission for the June 5 elections. Even absent a broader program of electoral assistance to Algeria -- which is, of course, the ideal situation -- we believe an international monitoring mission could make an important contribution to Algeria's political development. Specifically, it would hold these elections to an important standard of transparency and fairness and, at the same time, demonstrate to the Algerian government the importance the U.S. and others attach to Algeria's political evolution. It could also set the stage for future democracy development assistance to Algeria, its political parties and NGOs.

Now that the United Nations Secretary General has taken a formal decision to send an election monitoring mission, we would encourage NDI to give serious consideration to taking the lead in organizing a U.S. non-governmental component of the UN effort. We are aware of the serious security concerns surrounding such a mission. Your participation, of course, would presuppose a clear understanding of that environment and a solid commitment on the part of the United Nations to address participants' security concerns. For our part, we would be prepared to provide you with as much security-related information as possible, including oral briefings, on which to base your planning. I am attaching a cable message to you from Ambassador Ronald Neumann in Algiers, which addresses some of the concerns raised during the meetings at NDI.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts. Given the UN's desire to deploy an advance mission as early as the first half of April, I would like to get a sense of NDI's interest and willingness to coordinate U.S. NGO participation in an Algeria monitoring mission as soon as possible, preferably by April 4. We will of course be closely coordinating with USAID's Global Democracy Center on this matter. In the meantime, please call on us if you need any additional information. I also encourage you to be in touch with the United Nations and the Algerian Government directly.

Sincerely,



David Welch  
Acting Assistant Secretary  
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

Enclosed: 3/27/97 message from Ambassador Neumann

## **APPENDIX L**

## MOIC - JIOG

MISSION D'OBSERVATION INTERNATIONALE CONJOINTE/ JOINT INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER GROUP  
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS - ALGERIA : 5 JUNE 1997

### Deployment of Observers - Explanation of Wilayas (Departments) Chosen

The modality used for selection of these departments takes into consideration various aspects of the elections. One important category is the total number of Polling Stations by department. After taking into account the quotient resulting from the division of the total of polling stations in the whole country by the number of observer teams (1 team consists of 2 observers), this figure is divided by the total number of polling stations per department to determine number of teams allocated to each department (this results in a figure between 0 and 4). This calculation guarantees that observers will be present in adequate numbers according to the number of polling stations (i.e. because number of polling stations is a reflection of number of registered voters and, therefore, population of a department). The number of seats allocated per department in the National Popular Assembly is based on the population (i.e. 80,000 people = 1 seat).

The following categories use the random sample to select specific Polling Stations for the opening, closing and count of the fixed polling stations, and observation of voting at mobile and special polling stations. With this total of **five categories**, a chart was made with all the different departments. Departments with more than three categories are selected for observation. The number of teams depends on a balance of the number of teams in the different categories.

With the random sample we also ensure that the specific polling stations selected are the ones where observers will go to observe the opening and closing. During the day, recommended itineraries are given to the teams to enable them to cover as many polling stations as possible on Election Day. It is very important that the selected polling stations are those observed as their selection criteria was designed to allow us to report substantively with a desirable degree of confidence.

In summary, the five categories are :

- total polling stations in the country
- opening of polling station
- close/count at polling station
- special stations
- mobile stations

$$\frac{\text{Total number of polling stations in country}}{\text{number of observer teams}} = \frac{37586}{50} = 751.72$$

$$\frac{\text{total polling station (Wilaya level)}}{751.72} = \text{number of teams}$$

$$\text{Wilaya Adrar : total polling stations} = \frac{257}{751.72} = 0.34 \text{ teams}$$


= 0 teams deployed

## **APPENDIX M**

**LES PARTIES POLITIQUES**  
**ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES - ALGERIE**  
**5 JUIN 1997**

FLN	Front de Liberation Nationale
PSD	Parti Social Democrate
RCD	Rassemblement Pour La Culture et la Democratie
PNSD	Parti Nationale Pour la Solidarite et le Developpement
PRA	Parti du Renouveau Algerien
PSL	Parti Social Liberal
FFS	Front des Forces Socialistes
PR	Parti Republican
PT	Parti des Travailleurs
PUP	Parti de L'Unite Populaire
RNC	Rassemblement National Constitutionnel
PRP	Parti Republicain Progressiste
MJD	Mouvement de la Jeunesse Democratique
MEN	Mouvement de L'Entente Nationale
RA	Rassemblement Algerien
ANDI	Alliance Nationale des Democrates Independants
MN	Mouvement de la Nahda
MA	Mouvement Amel
MAJD	Mouvement Algerien Pour la Justice et le Developpement
FNB	Front National Boumedieniste
UDL	Union pour la Democratie et les Libertes
PAJP	Parti Algerien Pour la Justice et le Progres
MSP	Mouvement de la Société Pour la Paix
FFP	Front des Forces Populaires
RNA	Rassemblement National Algerien
PJS	Parti de la Justice Sociale
PNDS	Parti National Democratique Socialiste
MNJA	Mouvement National de la Jeunesse Algerienne
MNNO	Mouvement National plour la Nature et le Developpement
ANR	Alliance Nationale Republicaine
RND	Rassemblement National Democrate
PST	Parti Socialiste des Travailleurs
MSA	Mouvement Social pour l'Authenticite
PLJ	Parti Libérateur Juste
FDUN	Front du Djihad pour l'Unite Nationale
PAD	Parti de l'Authenticite de Demain
MPA	Mouvement du Peuple Algerien
ALP	Algerian Liberal Party
BN	Bloc National

## **APPENDIX N**



1717 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.  
Fifth Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20036  
(202) 328-3136 Fax: (202) 939-3166  
E-Mail: [demos@ndi.org](mailto:demos@ndi.org)  
Home Page: <http://www.ndi.org>

## DECISION MEMORANDUM

TO: Paul Kirk

FROM: Kenneth Wollack

DATE: April 11, 1997

RE: Algeria: A Proposal for an Election Study Mission

---

The June 5, 1997, parliamentary elections in Algeria have the potential to serve as a major turning point for Algeria and could serve as an important step in its ascent out of the political chaos that has reigned since the canceled 1992 elections.

While political violence has continued, over the last year and a half, moderate, peaceful political parties have been engaged in a series of multilateral and unilateral discussions with the government leading to the preparations for these elections. At various points, the parties involved in these discussions have boycotted certain meetings accusing the government of not taking their points of view seriously. A great deal of distrust persists between the main opposition parties and the government at a variety of levels. Nevertheless, the main opposition parties, the Rally for Democratic Culture (RCD), Socialist Forces Front (FFS), Islamic Society Movement and the Islamic Al-Enahada parties have agreed to participate in these elections. If conducted fairly, these elections may serve as a crucial step toward national reconciliation -- closing a bloody chapter in Algeria's history which was triggered by an election and could be solved, in part, by an election. For the next step to be taken, the legitimate opposition parties must perceive these elections as free and fair.

All the main opposition parties and the main governing National Liberation Front (FLN) have visited NDI and welcomed its support for Algerian democracy. Each has encouraged NDI to participate in a credible international observation effort in order to help ensure that the election process is fair. Opposition parties as well as Embassy analysts and Algeria scholars have explained that these elections could provide an important opportunity for the government to gain the confidence of the moderate and peaceful opposition parties and to provide a political arena in which a variety of Algerian voices could be heard -- an elected parliament. By inviting the UN, OAU and the Arab League to participate in these elections the Algerian government has demonstrated that it is keen to gain international acceptance of this election process. The UN has



agreed to *coordinate* an international observer mission of interested member states, though it will not issue a statement of its own.

The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs David Welch and the US Ambassador to Algeria Ron Neuman have asked NDI to take the lead in organizing a U.S. nongovernmental component of the UN effort (see attached letters). Ambassador Neuman has repeatedly noted that the parties NDI has met with each returned to Algiers to express gratitude for their meetings with NDI and the information provided by NDI. Likewise, Algeria scholar William Quandt and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Gulf Affairs Art Hughes have concurred that there is an important role for NDI to play in Algeria at this time.

This memo outlines an option for NDI involvement in the Algerian election for consideration and identifies areas of concern. In this memo, I am recommending that NDI augment the UN advance team with an NDI representative and send a small team to study the election process for election week. Participating in these elections could afford NDI three opportunities. First, the upcoming parliamentary elections in Algeria could mark a turning point in the country's struggle to stop the slide toward anarchy and NDI is uniquely positioned to provide constructive and welcome support. Second, NDI's presence and contacts with all the major parties could contribute to opposition party confidence in the election process that takes place and perhaps to the political process that follows. Third, given how little is known about Algerian political reform, NDI could use this opportunity, under UN security arrangements, to gain a more in depth understanding of Algerian politics and to assess possible program possibilities modeled after NDI's programming in Lebanon (technical support to democrats from afar, no staff presence in country). Our presence early in the Algerian transition process would give NDI a foot in the door should the political environment stabilize in the future.

## **Background**

Algeria is infamous for its 1991/2 parliamentary elections in which early reports of the results showed the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) leading in the polls. A nervous military apparatus and the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) quickly moved to cancel those elections for fear of losing grip on political power they had held since Algeria gained independence from France in 1962.

Shortly after the elections were canceled, a bloody conflict erupted between the FIS and the regime. Although the FIS initially enjoyed popular support both electorally and in its confrontation with the government, several years of increasingly bloody and gruesome conflict and the rise of the rival GIA (Armed Islamic Group), have made the Algerian population weary of the violence. Popular support for the FIS seems to have diminished between 1992 and the 1995 presidential elections.

### ***A Change in Political Environment***

The political environment since the 1991/2 elections has changed significantly. As the FIS and the GIA became increasingly associated with the violence that ravaged the country and the population tired of the insecurity that accompanied the violence, support for the FIS waned. At the same time, alternative Islamist parties such as the Islamic Society Movement and the Islamic Al-Nahdah Movement emerged to represent credible and peaceful options.

Since the canceled 1992 elections, the government has continued to hold elections, and Algerians have braved threats of violence to vote. Despite the fact that the two main secular opposition parties boycotted and the FIS was not allowed to participate in the 1995 presidential elections, 75 percent of eligible voters turned out to vote. Even with a few accusations of ballot stuffing and miscounts which favored the government-backed candidate who won 61 percent of the vote, the Islamic Society Movement's candidate, Sheik Nahnah, received the second largest number of votes with 25 percent of the vote. President Liamine Zeroual became the first Arab leader to win his post through reasonably competitive direct elections and to have popular electoral credibility. These elections were seen, by analysts inside and outside Algeria, as the first step on the path to national reconciliation and demonstrated that a viable Algerian political process was emerging, despite continued violence committed by largely marginalized groups.

The 1995 presidential elections were followed by a series of dialogues between the Algerian government and opposition parties on the topic of national reconciliation and in preparation for parliamentary elections. Despite intermittent frustration between the four major opposition parties and the government, the major political parties remain engaged in the ongoing process. With all the major parties having agreed to participate in the upcoming elections and the government's record of maintaining effective election day security, June's parliamentary elections are likely to be hotly contested and voter participation is anticipated to be high.

With the apparent decline in support for the extreme elements, and with the full participation of the main opposition parties, a plausible and solid center could emerge. A large portion of the public believes in moving the process forward, as do the major political actors. Representatives of the opposition and governing parties have met with NDI in Washington and have expressed a strong interest in NDI assistance and presence in Algeria. The Algerian government is prepared to accept serious international scrutiny of the elections. In this environment, NDI's observations and recommendations could carry persuasive weight.

### ***The UN and International Participation***

Last month the UN sent a pre-election team led by Ron Gould of Elections Canada to Algeria to assess election preparations. Ron has participated in previous NDI programs and visited NDI's offices on March 19 to brief us on election preparations. Attending the briefing meeting were Maxine Isaacs, Tom Melia, Les Campbell and other senior NDI staff. The UN team returned to report that the security risks are manageable, the technical election preparations are "dazzling" and that all the major political forces they met with were ready and willing to participate in the election process. While Canada, China, Germany, Greece, India and Spain

have already agreed to participate in the UN coordinated effort, France, the only other single country that could have a major influence on the conduct of this election, is choosing not to involve itself. This leaves the U.S. and NDI in a unique position to contribute to the Algerian electoral process.

### **NDI contact with Algeria**

Over the last year, NDI has had contact with Algerians representing a large portion of the political spectrum. We invited a representative of the Algerian Human Rights League to NDI's regional domestic election monitoring summit in Jordan in June 1996. At the request of the U.S. Embassy in Algiers, we sent basic NDI political party and election materials to the Embassy, which were distributed to a variety of political parties in Algeria during the summer of 1996. Shortly thereafter, NDI met with a host of Algerian political party officials, ranging from the ruling FLN to the Islamic Society Movement, during their visits to Washington. We also hosted a two-hour session with six visiting political parties on a US study tour sponsored by USIA in October.

The fact that these parties and individuals were traveling to Washington and meeting with the State Department, NDI, IFES and IRI demonstrates that they are part of a process and are seeking solution to the political impasse that persists in Algeria. It also illustrates a broadening of Algerian contacts beyond France and the new found importance being placed on the United States as a source of advice and guidance.

Throughout this period the State Department has maintained contact with NDI and expressed its interest in supporting the Algerian political/electoral process. It has sought to draw on NDI's experience to devise possible scenarios for U.S. support of the process underway. In February 1997, U.S. Ambassador Neuman, visited NDI to brief us on the political reforms underway, and described the upcoming election process as a critical step in building opposition party and popular confidence the political process. At that time, he challenged NDI to look beyond the immediate issues of political violence and consider seriously the importance of these elections as a possible means for national reconciliation and regional stability.

### **Rationale: Why Algeria Matters**

Since independence in 1962, Algeria has played a prominent role in Third World politics and regionally. With the collapse of socialism internationally in the late 1980s, Algeria led the way in experimenting with multiparty democracy. Some argue that this experiment did not succeed because the government moved too quickly, holding elections before a broad spectrum of political forces had the opportunity to organize and build popular support (thus allowing the FIS to fill a political vacuum which in turn led to the military crackdown). The country has paid dearly for this experiment. In the interim, credible, peaceful Algerian political parties have emerged into sophisticated, well-organized political organizations articulating a spectrum of Algerian views.

With a population of 28 million, Algeria is a substantial country in the Middle East. The government of Algeria is trying to emerge from its current political abyss by creating the political space for a viable political center to emerge. Its success in nurturing a political center and pulling itself out of this crisis, could serve as an important example in a region increasingly confronted with challenges from its political extremes.

The stakes are high in these elections and the Algerian government sees them as critical to bringing long term stability to Algeria. It is seeking to bring the main opposition parties more firmly into the process. Pressure to "do right by these elections" is all the greater as a result of the problematic November 1996 referendum in which the opposition accused the government of stifling its attempts to organize a "Vote NO" campaign. The accusations of heavy handedness with the referendum diminished the credibility the government had earned from the success of the 1995 presidential elections.

### **Security Considerations**

The State Department officially discourages travel to Algeria but stops short of formal prohibitions. The State Department feels that American citizens are not at specific risk under current conditions but emphasizes the need for extreme caution and recommends that people traveling in Algeria have substantial protection. For the purposes of election related work the UN, in cooperation with the Algerian government, will provide secure accommodations, protected travel relying heavily on Algerian security forces, and ongoing security advice.

The Algerian government can be expected to expend every possible effort to provide a secure environment and UN security officials are satisfied with the Algerian governments stated undertakings. U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, Ron Neumann recently sent NDI a cable expressing satisfaction with the performance of Algerian security provided for his use.

On April 4, the State Department Diplomatic Security Division arranged a security meeting on Algeria for NDI staff. The purpose of the meeting was twofold; to update NDI on general security issues in Algeria, and to start the process of developing a specific security strategy for an election study mission.

While being very clear that there are clear and ongoing risks in operating in Algeria, State Department security officials offered suggestions for minimizing risks.

Drawing on experience from past elections in Algeria, the climate prior to election day is expected to be volatile. Insurgent groups may use intimidation tactics to dissuade high voter turnout. However, in the past, the Algerian government has utilized every possible security resource on election day to protect voters, and the two most recent elections saw negligible violence. (The 1995 presidential elections and 1996 referendum vote.

The State Department emphasized two requirements for maximizing safety. Individuals

living and traveling in Algeria must be extremely sensitive to potentially dangerous situations and must avoid taking unnecessary chances, and NDI and UN officials have to pay attention to the current rhetoric of insurgent groups. The FIS, in particular, tends to broadcast their intentions, and this can be used as a clear warning sign for foreigners. The State Department recommends specific hotels and travel arrangements that are secure and have been without incident in the past.

One recommendation for an election study mission is that NDI consider focusing on certain highly populated and hotly contested regions where the election results will be crucial, rather than risking travel to insurgent strongholds or trying to travel to remote areas. Furthermore, the delegation should avoid too much advanced planning, as spontaneity will guard against targeted attacks.

Because the armed groups in Algeria tend to avoid protected or fortified targets, have not carried out suicide attacks, and use relatively low tech equipment security officials believe it is possible to take reasonable precautions to minimize risk.

*The working assumption regarding any involvement in Algeria is that the security situation will be reviewed on a weekly, daily, if need be, hourly, basis and all involvement would remain contingent on adequate security provisions. That is, NDI would reserve the right to terminate its involvement immediately at any time, if (the Middle East Team, NDI President or NDI Board of Directors) deems it appropriate/necessary.*

*Reasons to terminate NDI involvement could include:*

- a change in the methods or technology used by armed insurgents*
- a distinct change in rhetoric used by the insurgents including specific threats issued regarding the election*
- a judgement by UN, State Department or Embassy officials that security risks are no longer manageable*

## **Proposed NDI Support**

- I. Augment the UN Advance Team** The UN plans on placing a two-to-three person advance team in Algeria as soon as possible. It will follow political and security developments, assess technical election preparations and prepare member state delegation logistics. NDI could negotiate to add a fourth person to that team who would be afforded all the UN security arrangements to serve as an NDI field representative. This person would be a french speaker with a strong background in NDI election delegations and would report regularly to NDI Washington.

The advantage of placing an NDI person with the UN team is that NDI can rely on the experience and analysis of a seasoned NDI veteran and provide the UN team/Algerian Government/Algerian political actors with significant NDI comparative technical assistance on an as needed basis. Based on NDI's status as an NGO and based on the relationships we have developed with the major political parties in Algeria, the NDI representative could play an important role in listening to opposition party complaints and raising them to the relevant bodies. That person's observations would augment information gathered by the formal UN team and further NDI's understanding of political and security developments. In addition, NDI would develop important contacts with key government officials and gain a better sense of the government's motivation for the political reform it has instituted. Security risks would be minimized by the full UN security arrangements provided to its own core team.

- II. NDI-Organized Election Study Mission** Assuming that the nature of the security provided to international observers will compromise NDI's ability to spontaneously and freely assess election preparations prior to and on election day, NDI would not be able to organize a normal delegation that could meet NDI's internal standards for election observation. However, NDI could organize a small, informal study mission to the Algerian elections, in which no statement assessing the elections would be made. NDI would view the mission as an opportunity to meet the actors, study the political culture and dynamics and explore possible future programming ideas (modeled after the low profile Lebanon programming). We believe this modest effort is appropriate and would allow NDI to have some positive impact on the election process and would allow us to gain valuable contacts.

This option would only be considered provided security arrangements were appropriate. This option provides a feasible alternative to a full blown international observer effort since security arrangements provided by the Algerian government are likely to call into question the integrity of a genuinely independent international observer effort. It would satisfy NDI's institutional integrity vis-a-vis election monitoring, provide NDI with the maximum opportunity to gain a sense of the political lay of the land, allow NDI to gain access to important decision makers in Algeria (not possible from the US) and satisfy USG interests.



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The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Calling on a global network of volunteer experts, NDI provides practical assistance to civic and political leaders advancing democratic values, practices and institutions. The Institute works with courageous democrats who are struggling to promote peaceful political reform. It establishes partnerships with political leaders who have begun the difficult task of building stable pluralistic institutions and creating better lives for their citizens.

Democracy depends on: legislatures that represent citizens and oversee the executive; independent judiciaries that safeguard the rule of law; political parties that are open and accountable; and elections in which voters freely choose their representatives in government. Acting as a catalyst for democratic development, NDI bolsters the institutions and processes that allow democracy to flourish.

Since 1983, NDI has compiled a remarkable record of achievement. Strictly nonpartisan, the Institute supports the efforts of democrats in every region of the world to:

***Build Political and Civic Organizations:*** NDI helps build the stable, broad-based and well-organized institutions that form the foundation of civil society. Democracy depends on these mediating institutions, which link citizens to their government and to one another by providing avenues for participation in public policy.

***Safeguard Elections:*** NDI is the world leader in election monitoring, having organized international delegations to monitor elections in dozens of countries worldwide, helping to ensure that polling results reflect the will of the people.

***Promote Openness and Accountability:*** NDI responds to requests from leaders of government, parliament, political parties and civic groups seeking advice on matters from legislative procedures to constituent service to the balance of civil-military relations in a democracy. NDI works to build legislatures and local governments that are professional, accountable, open and responsive to their citizens.

International cooperation is key to promoting democracy effectively and efficiently. It also conveys a deeper message to new and emerging democracies that while autocracies are inherently isolated and fearful of the outside world, democracies can count on international allies and an active support system. Headquartered in Washington D.C., with field offices in 38 countries, NDI leverages the skills of its highly committed staff by enlisting volunteer experts from around the world, many of whom are veterans of democratic struggles in their own countries and share valuable perspectives on democratic development.





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