# The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2012:

# Towards Equality of Opportunity

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# Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call "LAPOP Central," first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development

# Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
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We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University.

Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this "reduced core" with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The "Marginalization in the Americas Conference" was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we

plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the www.americasbarometer.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the AmericasBarometer *Insights* Report No. 73, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by

Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the "design effect" of the sample.[1] Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.[2]

[1] The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

[2] All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called "WT" which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT1500" that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Finally, in December 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

| Country | Institutions |
|---|---|
| | **Mexico and Central America** |
| **Costa Rica** | Universidad de Costa Rica; CCP; Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible |
| **El Salvador** | FundaUngo |
| **Guatemala** | asies |
| **Honduras** | FOPRIDEH Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras; Hagamos Democracia |
| **Mexico** | data Opinión Publica y Mercados; ITAM Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México |
| **Nicaragua** | Red Nicaraguense por la Democracia y el Desarrollo Local |
| **Panama** | CIDEM Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas |

| Caribbean | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Belize** | B&A Borge y Asociados | |
| **Dominican Republic** | Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. | UNIVERSIDAD intec Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo |
| **Guyana** | DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS DP | |
| **Haiti** | Université d'Etat d'Haïti ueh | |
| **Jamaica** | THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA | |
| **Suriname** | ANTON DE KOM UNIVERSITEIT VAN SURINAME | |
| **Trinidad & Tobago** | THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO | |

| Andean/Southern Cone | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Argentina** | UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA | CIPPEC |
| **Bolivia** | Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública | EMBAJADA DE SUECIA |
| **Brazil** | Universidade de Brasília | CNPq Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico |
| **Chile** | Instituto de Ciencia Política | PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE |
| **Colombia** | Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales | observatorio de la democracia |
| **Ecuador** | FLACSO ECUADOR | UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO / PRIME CONSULTING |
| **Paraguay** | IRD Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo | |
| **Peru** | ***IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos*** | |
| **Uruguay** | CIFRA | UM UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO |
| **Venezuela** | CISOR | ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN |

| Canada and United States | |
|---|---|
| **Canada** | UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL; YORK UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE; THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE |
| **United States** | VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY; MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES; PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina |

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Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

| Country/ Institution | Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted) |
|---|---|
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| **Mexico and Central America Group** | |
| Mexico | ●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados<br>●Dr. Vidal Romero, Professor of Political Science, Instituto Tecnológico de México (ITAM) |
| Guatemala | ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Associate Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA<br>●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES |
| El Salvador | ●Dr. Miguel Cruz, Visiting Assistant Professor, Florida International University ,USA<br>●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO |
| Honduras | ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA |
| Nicaragua | ●Dr. John Booth, Emeritus Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA |
| Costa Rica | ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, Costa Rica<br>● Ronald Álfaro Redondo, Doctoral Student, University of Pittsburgh, and Researcher, Universidad de Costa Rica, Estado de la Nación Project |
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| Belize | ● Georgina Pizzolitto, Coordinator of Special Studies, LAPOP Central |
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| Guyana | ●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants<br>●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants |
| Haiti | ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Research Coordinator of LAPOP and Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA<br>●Dr. François Gélineau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval |
| Jamaica | ●Mr. Balford Lewis, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona |
| Suriname | ●Dr. Jack Menke, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Suriname |
| Trinidad & Tobago | ●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine |
| **Andean/Southern Cone Group** | |
| Colombia | ●Dr. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Associate Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia<br>●Dr. Miguel García, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia |
| Ecuador | ●Dr. Juan Carlos Donoso, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco de Quito<br>●Dr. Daniel Montalvo, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco de Quito |
| Peru | ●Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor at the University of Delaware, USA, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima<br>● Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima |
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| Country/ Institution | Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted) |
|---|---|
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| Canada | ●Nat Stone, Professor, Marketing and Business Intelligence Research Program, School of Business, Algonquin College<br>●Dr. Simone Bohn, Associate Professor of Political Science, York University<br>●Dr. François Gélineau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval<br>●Dr. Keith Neuman, The Environics Institute |

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
November 2012

## Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at "0." When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.

# Part I:
# Equality of Opportunity and Democracy in the Americas

# Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

*Nicole Hinton, Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira, and Amy Erica Smith*

## I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. Individuals' life-chances are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation. In this chapter, we examine how opportunities (e.g., education) and barriers to opportunities (e.g., discrimination) are distributed across sub-groups within the Americas.

Key findings in this chapter include:

- Family background remains very important in the Americas. The education level attained by one's mother is strongly related to one's own educational attainment, income, and food security.

- Skin tone also matters across the Americas. On average those with lighter skin have higher personal incomes and educations, and are less vulnerable to food insecurity.

- Women in the Americas have slightly lower educational levels than men, but they have substantially lower incomes, even after taking education into account. They are also somewhat more likely to experience food insecurity.

- Wealth and education level are the largest (negative) predictors of food insecurity.

- Rates of self-reported discrimination in the workplace and school range from 3.6 - 23.4% across the countries in the Americas. Respondents with darker skin tones are more likely to report discrimination, but women report levels of discrimination that are no higher than those of men.

- About 11% of citizens in the Americas strongly agree that men should have priority in the labor market, but 36% strongly disagree with this notion.

- In 13 out of the 24 countries surveyed, at least one in every five people blames poverty among dark-skinned individuals on culture.[1]

- In every country but the United States, the public strongly supports the notion that government should work to reduce inequality. However, support for particular policies such as affirmative action is mixed, and in some countries the receipt of public assistance is stigmatized.

Before turning to our analyses of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, we briefly note existing research on (in)equalities in the Americas. A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.[2] More impressive have been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.[3]

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality also highlight the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. This matters because research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.[4] Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime.[5]

Inequality does not merely cause economic and social problems, but also *political* ones, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality can foment unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows that inequality can create public discontent,[6] foster political instability and violence,[7] and decrease trust in democracy.[8] Research using LAPOP data has shown that inequality seriously

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[1] The AmericasBarometer 2012 includes 26 countries; this question was not asked in the U.S. and Canada.

[2] Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. The AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

[3] López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

[4] De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank; Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2012. *The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers our Future*, New York, W.W. Norton & Company.

[5] Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

[6] De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

[7] Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1996. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," *European Economic Review* 40: 1203-1228; Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency." *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 425-52.

[8] Uslaner, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement." *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.

erodes interpersonal trust, the basic "glue" that holds together democratic societies.[9] Second, inequality is a political problem because solutions are largely a matter of public policy, and candidates running for office often compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that inequalities result in political systems paying more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, nations deviate from their commitment to political equality. This deviation represents a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of "perfect" equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime.[10] However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even if they may in part be the outcomes of effort and ability, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers' educational attainment alone.[11] Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the entire region. After assessing objective disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who *perceives* that they have been discriminated against in the labor market? Moreover, we examine what individuals think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally,

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[9] Córdova, Abby B. 2008. "Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies." Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

[10] Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[11] Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

in Section IV, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education (i.e., affirmative action).

## II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

This section reviews some previous research on inequality in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure I.1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.[12] The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean region stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand (per the x-axis), average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand (per the y-axis), the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income from one country and another are considered.




**Figure I. 1. Gini Indices by World Regions**

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. With the data shown in Figure I.2 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world, by ventile within each country. Since a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution, the fifth ventile (marked with the "5" on the X axis) refers to the 25$^{th}$ percentile of the country's income distribution, and the 20$^{th}$ ventile refers to the 100$^{th}$ percentile of the country's income

[12] See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yithaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562.

distribution.[13] The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia. The figure dramatically highlights the highly unequal living conditions in South America. Strikingly, the poorest 5% of Brazilians are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and are at the top percentile of the global income distribution. Overall, we see stark differences in the income distribution of Brazil.




**Figure I. 2. Positioning of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution**

Levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.[14] In Figure I.3 we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).

[13] Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3865.

[14] López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.




**Figure I. 3. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas**

Economic inequalities have improved in a number of Latin American countries. Many factors have been identified to explain the reduction in inequality, including increasing gender equality, greater education, and increased incomes.[15] With respect to gender, the Economic Commission for Latin America indicates that many women have entered and continue to enter the working population.[16] Also, women in Latin America are developing higher education levels and more equal playing fields at the workplace, though inequalities in treatment in the workplace certainly remain.[17] An increase in household incomes, particularly for those at the bottom of the income distribution, is another factor contributing to the increase in equality in Latin America over the last 20 years.[18] However as incomes increase over time, persisting gaps across industries hold parts of this region back in reaching more equitable incomes across the board.[19]

How will inequality continue to evolve over the next decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since the changes in inequality are arguably attributable to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.[20]

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[15]Gasparini, Leonardo and Nora Lustig. 2011 "The Rise and Fall of Income Inequality in Latin America." Working paper 1110. New Orleans: Tulane University.

[16] Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Social panorama of Latin America 2011*. Santiago, Chile: United Nations.

[17] Torregrosa, Luisita Lopez. 2012. "Latin America Opens Up to Equality." *New York Times*, May 2.

[18] Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Social Panorama of Latin America 2011*. Santiago, Chile: United Nations.

[19] Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Social Panorama of Latin America 2011*. Santiago, Chile: United Nations.

[20] Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

While economic inequality is important, so too are social inequalities; and, of course, these are often inter-related. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).[21] Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which "discounts" each dimension of the HDI based on a country's level of inequality. When IHDI is lower than HDI, inequality is present; and the larger the gap between the two indices, the greater the inequalities within the country. Figure I.4 demonstrates the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute and relative terms, Latin America and the Caribbean have the largest gap between the average HDI and the average IHDI in the world.




**Figure I. 4. Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions**

Figure I.5 presents the overall loss in human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this metric, the region loses 26% of its potential for human development because of persistent inequality.

[21] The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index running from 0 to 1, and measuring a country's average achievement in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and income (standard of living). Calculations are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).




**Figure I. 5. Overall Loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality**

Figure I.6 turns our attention to the importance of family background, and demonstrates important cross-national differences in the extent to which family status affects the level of education one attains. The figure allows one to discern differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with advantaged (light green bar) and disadvantaged (dark green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.[22] For example, the graph shows that a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica has odds of completing sixth grade on time that register at just over 80%, while his/her peer with an advantaged background is only slightly more likely (the odds are close to 90%) to complete sixth grade on time. By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have lowest probabilities of achievement. Most countries of Central and South America stand out as highly unequal.

[22] Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.




**Figure I. 6. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas**

## III. Equalities in Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas: A View from the AmericasBarometer

The previous section provided a bird's eye view of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But who is most affected by inequalities? And what do the citizens of the Americas *think* about equality and inequality of opportunity in the region? Questions included in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer allow us to assess the extent to which key measures of opportunity such as income and education differ across measures such as one's race, gender, and family background. We also take a detailed look at public opinion: who thinks they have been discriminated against, to what extent individuals perceive inequalities as natural or desirable, and what public policies might citizens endorse to redress inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently or have different employment opportunities.[23] Discrimination may occur either because of negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of "statistical discrimination," meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, and that women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are especially so.[24] Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labor market discrimination may be lower than often thought in many countries of Latin America.[25]

The first major social divide we examine is that between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, labor force participation rates among men and women have become more equal.[26] Moreover, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.[27] Furthermore, a gender gap in educational levels has also shrunk significantly.[28] So, the trend in gender discrimination is positive according to most studies.

Second, we examine divides by racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued economic and social inequalities, especially in terms of pay and occupation.[29] Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development.[30] Additionally, discrimination

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[23] For an overview of this literature, see Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

[24] Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. "Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil." *Review of Social Economy* 58(3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. "Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 27(6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. "The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach." *Económica* L(1-2): 9-37.

[25] Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, and Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. "Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, and Urzúa. 2009b. "An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, and Rajiv Sethi. 2009. "Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan and Máximo Torero. 2009. "Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

[26] Abramo, Laís, and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. "Women's Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America." *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

[27] Hite, Amy Bellone, and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 "Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure." *Latin American Research Review* 40(2): 50–82.

[28] Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. "The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean." SSRN eLibrary (April). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

[29] De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

[30] Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 359-72.

by race and ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the Americas.[31] Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race and ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data; however, utilizing state of the art measures of race and ethnicity, we attempt to achieve a more accurate estimation in the AmericasBarometer.[32]

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have long been considered the driving forces behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in some other parts of the Americas, trumping the effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited in the previous paragraphs, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas; therefore we take this into consideration throughout our analyses.[33]

We begin our analysis using the AmericasBarometer 2012 data by examining what citizens of the Americas of different gender, racial, and class-based groups, as well as ones living in rural versus urban areas, told us about their economic and social resources. The AmericasBarometer's 2010 and 2012 questionnaires included many measures of the social groups to which respondents belonged. Thus, we can assess respondents' racial and ethnic identities in two principal ways.[34] Question **ETID** (see the questionnaire in the appendix of this publication for all question items referred to in the text) simply asks respondents whether they identify as white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or other (with variation in the specific wording conditional on the country). In addition, beginning with the AmericasBarometer 2010, with the sponsorship of Professor Ed Telles from Princeton University, we pioneered the use of a skin tone palette.[35] At the end of each interview, interviewers are asked to rate the facial skin tone of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) (Figure I.7). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of individuals from varying groups across the region (see, for instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' ongoing sponsorship, we again included the tone palette in 2012.[36]

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[31] De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*

[32] Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[33] See, e.g., Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 73. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[34] The full text of all questions is provided in the Appendix.

[35] Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid.*

[36] In 2012, the skin color palette was used in 24 countries, except the US and Canada. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries.

**Figure I. 7. Skin Tone Palette Used in the AmericasBarometer**

In Figure I.8, we examine how skin tone and ethnicity are related to each other. We find that those who identify as black are rated as having on average significantly darker skin tones than those who identify as any other ethnicity, while those who identify as white are rated as being significantly lighter, on average. However, those who identify as indigenous, mulatto, and mestizo are all rated as having similar skin tones, averaging around 5 on the scale from 1 to 11. Thus, the skin tone scale appears to be highly effective at distinguishing those who identify as white from those who identify as black, with mestizos, mulattos, and the indigenous in the middle. Nonetheless, further ethnic distinctions may remain to be examined, and the meaning of ethnic categories may vary across countries.[37]

[37] For more detailed analyses by country, the reader is advised to consult LAPOP's series of country reports for the AmericasBarometer study, which are found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/country-studies.php.




**Figure I. 8. Skin Tone by Ethnicity, AmericasBarometer 2012**

We also included a number of questions on social and economic resources in the 2012 questionnaire. As in previous years, we included questions on education, family income, and household assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to ownership of flat-screen television sets and vehicles. The latter group of questions, found in the **R series**, is used to create a five-point index of quintiles of household wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country.[38]

We also included a number of new questions on social and economic resources in 2012. For the first time, we asked those respondents who reported working at the time of the interview about their personal incomes (**Q10G**). For respondents who were married or living with a partner, we sought to tap intra-household inequalities in income earned with question **GEN10**.

**GEN10**. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

(1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
(2) You earn less than your spouse;
(3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
(4) You earn more than your spouse;
(5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
(6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
(88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP

[38] This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a few questions on family background or class, in addition to the measures of household wealth. Question **ED2** examines family background by asking respondents to report their mother's level of education. In addition, self-identified social class is measured with question **MOV1**, which asks respondents whether they consider themselves to be upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, or lower class.

Finally, we included two new questions on food security developed by our team in Mexico in cooperation with Yale University, but now used in all countries: **FS2** and **FS8**.[39]

| Now I am going to read you some questions about food. | | |
|---|---|---|
| | No | Yes |
| **FS2.** In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food? | 0 | 1 |
| **FS8.** In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day? | 0 | 1 |

Taken together, these measures provide an important opportunity to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

We begin by examining the predictors of educational attainment. Thus, we first assess how gender, race, age, and size of place of residence affect educational status in the Americas, using linear regression analysis for 24 of the AmericasBarometer countries (excluding the United States and Canada).[40] As with all multiple variable regression analyses in this chapter, "country fixed effects" are included in the analyses as control variables (with Uruguay as the baseline), but these fixed effects are not shown in the figure for the sake of simplifying the presentation.[41] Country fixed effects help us remove from the analysis any country-level differences in the survey data that would distract us from focusing on the overall picture we find in the AmericasBarometer survey. Figure I.9[42] shows that the inputs negatively predict education level, except size of place of residence, which has instead a positive effect. Age is negatively

[39] These questions were administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions. As we noted again in a later footnote, an important caveat to analyses with these questions is the fact that scholars of food insecurity typically rely on a longer battery of questions for measurement.

[40] The variable TAMANO, "Size of Place of Residence," is recoded for this and all analysis in the report: 0, "Rural Area"; 1, "Small City"; 2, "Medium City"; 3, "Large City"; 4, "National Capital (Metropolitan Area)." Thus, higher values represent larger urban areas.

[41] In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical "0" line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning, that we can be 95% confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. For more information on reading and interpreting LAPOP graphs and figures, please refer to page xxix.

[42] As an additional analysis, we also included the measures for quintiles of wealth and mother's education as predictors in the regression analysis, and we find that both are strong predictors of educational attainment, contributing to a total R–squared value of 0.42 for the entire model. As one's wealth increases or mother's education level increases, the respondent's level of education increases.

associated with educational status. As one gets older, educational status declines. Those with darker skin tone and women have slightly lower levels of educational attainment, on average, than those with lighter skin tone and men. Finally, living in larger and more urban areas is associated with significantly higher levels of education, compared to rural residence.




**Figure I. 9. Determinants of Educational Level in the Americas**

We take a look at years of education between genders and among skin tones in Figure I.10. We find that the (dashed) line for women follows a similar pattern to that of men (solid line), with men having slightly more years of education on average, except for when skin tone is rated a 7. We find that years of education vary across skin tone. The average number of years of education starts out comparatively high on the left side of the figure (that is, at the lighter end of the skin tone scale) and then drops significantly as one moves to the mid-point of the skin tone scale, staying at comparatively low levels as one moves to the right side of the figure (darker tones). Citizens with skin tones rated a 5 or darker, on average, have two fewer years of education than do those with the lightest skin tones.




**Figure I. 10. Skin Tone and Years of Education in the Americas among Genders**

Next, we assess the extent to which family background affects educational level in the Americas.[43] Figure I.11 shows the respondent's average years of schooling (vertical, or y-axis) according to the level of education his/her mother obtained (horizontal, or x-axis). The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the two variables. As one would expect, the higher the level of education obtained by the mother, the higher the education level of the respondent. On average, when the mother of the respondent has had no education at all, the respondent has 5.8 years of education, whereas the average respondent whose mother had higher education obtained 14.1 years of education. In short, across the Americas, family status affects an individual's chances of higher levels of educational attainment.

[43] We did not include our measure of family background, **ED2**, in the multivariate regression model presented in Figure I.9. This question was only asked of half the sample (but see the prior footnote). In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many new questions were asked of split samples of respondents in order to maximize questionnaire space.




**Figure I. 11. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Respondent Educational Level in the Americas**

Are the same factors associated with education also associated with income? That is, how do personal incomes vary by age, race, gender, and the size of the place of residence? In Figure I.12,[44] we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of personal income among respondents who told us that they had a job at the time of the interview.[45] Gender and location of residence are the two most consequential predictors of personal income. All else equal, those living in urban areas have higher incomes than those living in rural areas, and women have lower incomes than men. Darker skin tone negatively predicts personal income. We see somewhat of an inverted u-shape in terms of age and income. For the former (age), the baseline category is the younger cohort (25 or under) and therefore the results in the figure should be read in comparison to the young. The figure shows that income peaks among those who are 36-45 years old, with all age cohorts except those 66 years or more having higher income than those in the baseline category of 25 and under.

[44] When including years of education within the regression analysis, the coefficient of skin tone moves closer to the zero mark but remains statistically significant, all age cohorts move to the right of the zero line and are statistically significant, and all other coefficients remain similar to their original state. Years of education is a strong positive predictor of income, and the standardized coefficient is the largest in the model. Once education is controlled, gender is the second most powerful predictor, and the R-squared is 0.3208.

[45] Income (both Q10NEW, family income, and Q10G, personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, with response categories corresponding to increasing ranges in the income distribution. The specific values of the categories vary by the income distribution in each country; see the questionnaires in Appendix C of each country report for the categories in each country. Once again, the United States and Canada are not included in the regression, and once again country fixed effects are included but not shown.




**Figure I. 12. Determinants of Personal Income in the Americas, among Respondents who Work**

The previous figure indicates that, on average, women have lower personal incomes than men in the region. Does this carry over into households in which both partners are employed? As noted above, with question **GEN10** we asked respondents who were married or who had an unmarried partner about their income versus their spouse's (or partner's) income. In Figure I.13 we examine differences between men and women in responses to **GEN10**, only among those who also said that they were employed. As the figure shows, a little more than half of employed men report earning more than their spouse/partner (52.0%) and this is similar to the percentage of employed women who report earning less than their spouse (53.8%). Across both bars, we see evidence that only just slightly more than one-tenth of the time does the employed woman earn a greater income than the employed spouse/partner. Roughly a third of men and women make the same as their spouse. This indicates that, within dual income homes, there is a tendency for the man to make more than the woman.




**Figure I. 13. Respondent's Versus Spouse's Income in the Americas, among Respondents who Work**

Figure I.14 examines the negative relationship between skin tone and personal income by gender (darker skin tone is indicated by higher values). Both men's and women's personal income begins to decline once one passes beyond the lightest skin tones (those scoring 1 or 2 on the measure). Income continues to decline until the middle range of the skin tone scale (6), when it mostly levels out for men while it trends downward in fits and start for women.




**Figure I. 14. Skin Tone and Personal Income in the Americas, among Respondents who Work**

Figure I.15 displays the relationship between age and personal income, by gender. The figure displays an inverted u-shape, as already identified in the regression in Figure I.12. Age groups that fall among the tails make less personal income than the age groups within the middle. Like in Figure I.14, income inequalities by gender are present here as well. We see at least a one unit difference in incomes between men and women for all age cohorts. The gaps are largest, however, in the middle of the age distribution, for those at the peak years in their earning potential.




**Figure I. 15. Age and Personal Income in the Americas, among Respondents who Work**

The multiple regression analysis also revealed that on average, considering the Americas as a whole, darker skin tone is associated with having lower personal income. This relationship exists even after taking into account educational levels. That is, the lower earnings of those with dark skin tone are not due simply to the fact that these individuals also tend to have lower levels of education. Race and ethnicity vary greatly across the Americas; the relationship between skin tone and earnings may vary substantially as well. In Figure I.16, we examine the relationship between skin tone and personal income in each country of the Americas. The figure presents the coefficient of skin tone in a separate linear regression model for each country, controlling for education, age, gender, and the size of the place of residence. We find, indeed, that the relationship between skin tone and income varies across the region. On the one hand, in Haiti and Suriname those with darker skin tone, on average, are found to earn slightly *more* than others. On the other hand, there is a set of eleven countries in which the association between skin

tone and personal earnings is negative.[46] Also, there is a group of eleven countries, from Bolivia to Chile, where there is no significant relationship between skin tone and income. However, the countries where the association is the most strongly negative include Jamaica, Guatemala, Mexico, and Uruguay.




**Figure I. 16. The Coefficient of Skin Tone in Predicting Personal Income across the Americas**

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background is associated with personal income in the Americas. In Figure I.17 we find evidence that higher levels of education obtained by the mother of the respondent indicate higher personal income reported by the respondent, which is similar to the result for educational attainment displayed earlier (in Figure I.11). More specifically, when the mother of the respondent has had no education at all, the adult child's average income is at 5.3 on the 0-16 income scale; whereas respondents whose mothers had higher education register an average of 9.3 on the personal income scale. Thus, there appears to be a clear intergenerational transfer of social and economic status in the Americas. One's opportunities with respect to education and income are connected to the advantages that one's parents (here, we examine the mother) were able (or unable) to achieve.

[46] The coefficients for skin tone in El Salvador and Argentina are statistically significant at p = .094 and p = .053, respectively.




**Figure I. 17. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Own Income in the Americas, among Respondents who Work**

Arguably the most critical basic resource to which individuals need access is food. We have seen that personal income is not distributed in a perfectly egalitarian fashion across the Americas. Does access to food follow similar patterns? In Figure I.18 we assess the percentage that said "yes" to either question **FS2** or **FS8** (described above), across the countries of the Americas. Levels of food insecurity vary greatly across the region. At the top end, we find the Caribbean countries, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, in all of which levels of food insecurity range between 40% and 50%. In Nicaragua and El Salvador, furthermore, about a third of respondents report that they have experienced some food insecurity in the past three months. At the other end of the spectrum, we find five countries (Suriname, Costa Rica, Belize, Brazil, and Chile) where levels of food insecurity are at or below 10%. Brazil's place, in particular, close to the bottom of the ranking of food insecurity would appear to represent a major triumph of recent economic and social policy in this country historically famous for inequality, and for periodic food shortages in some impoverished areas.[47]

[47] An important caveat for our analyses of food insecurity is the fact that typically this concept is measured using a longer battery of questions. Thus, it is possible that the AmericasBarometer missed some milder forms of food insecurity that a longer battery would have picked up on.




**Figure I. 18. Percent Experiencing Food Insecurity in the Countries of the Americas**

In Figure I.19 we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of food insecurity.[48] In this analysis, questions **FS2** and **FS8** are summed to create an index of food insecurity that runs from 0 to 2, where respondents who report higher values have higher levels of food insecurity.[49] Those in the bottom category (scoring 0) may have either low or no food insecurity. Our analysis reveals that wealth is the strongest predictor of food insecurity: those who have higher levels of wealth are most able to avoid food insecurity. Education follows a similar pattern: those who have the highest levels of education are also most able to avoid food insecurity. Even after controlling for wealth and education, however, skin tone is strongly associated with food insecurity: on average across the Americas, those with darker skin tone experience greater food insecurity. Those living in larger urban areas are more food insecure

[48] Like before, the analysis uses fixed effects, treating Uruguay as a comparison country; and it does not include the United States and Canada.

[49] These questions were asked of a split sample (that is, of only half of respondents). Since we already know that mother's educational level is a significant predictor of one's own level of education and income, we exclude it from the multivariate regression analysis here, but see Figure I.17.

than those living in rural areas, and women have greater levels of food insecurity than men. Age has little direct influence on food insecurity.[50]




**Figure I. 19. Determinants of Food Insecurity in the Americas**

In Figure I.20, we examine the relationship between age cohorts and food insecurity levels by gender. First, we see women are experiencing food insecurity at higher rates than men across all age cohorts. Moreover, we are seeing greater differences in food insecurity rates between genders among middle aged groups (46-55 years and 56-65 years). We see the biggest gap between genders in the 56-65 year cohort; women falling in this cohort experience an average rate of food insecurity of 25.6%, whereas men aged the same experience an average rate of 15.9%.

[50] We tested for a non-linear relationship between age and food insecurity, and did not find a substantively significant one.




**Figure I. 20. Age and Percent Experiencing Food Insecurity in the last 3 Months**

Figure I.21 shows the relationship between mother's educational attainment and food insecurity. The graph indicates that the greater the level of education attained by the mother, the lower food insecurity is likely to be in the adult child's household.

Overall, we see that mother's education level has a large influence in outcomes of the respondent as an adult. Respondents having mothers with low levels of education themselves experience lower levels of education, income and food security. On the other hand, higher levels of education of the mother translate into higher levels of education and income of the respondent, on average. Furthermore, higher levels of education of the mother indicate lower levels of food insecurity for the respondent.




**Figure I. 21. Mother's Educational Attainment and Food Insecurity in the Americas**

## Who Reports Discrimination?

In 17 countries of the Americas, we included questions tapping whether respondents perceived themselves to have been victims of discrimination. The questions were a slightly modified battery that had first been used in 2008; they were optional in each country, meaning that the country team heading the survey in each country chose whether to include the questions:

| Now, changing the subject, and thinking **about your experiences in the past year,** have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places? | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Yes | No | DK | DA |
| **DIS2.** In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government] | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 |
| **DIS3.** At work or school or when you have looked for work | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 |
| **DIS5.** In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place? | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 |

In Figure I.22 we report, for each country where question **DIS3** was asked, the percentage of respondents who said they had experienced workplace or school-based discrimination. We find that Trinidad & Tobago and Haiti have the largest percentages of reported discrimination at work or school, with values of 23.4% and 21.6%, respectively. Citizens of Venezuela reported the least amount of discrimination at the workplace or school, at 3.6%.




**Figure I. 22. Rates of Self-Reported Discrimination in the Workplace or School in the Americas**

Who reports that they have been the victim of discrimination at work or school? In Figure I.23 we use logistic regression analysis to examine determinants of self-reported victimization by discrimination within the Americas (specifically, those countries where this question was asked).[51] The most consequential predictors are age and size of place of residence. As one ages, one is less likely to report becoming a victim of discrimination at work or school. Those living in more urban settings are more likely to report being a victim of discrimination than those living in more rural areas. These results show that wealth is negatively associated with reports of discrimination at work or school, but the coefficient on education is the opposite (positive) and not statistically significant. Those with darker skin tone are more likely to report being a victim of discrimination compared to those with lighter skin tone. On this measure, then, perceptions of discrimination match the more objective indicators of discrimination (differences in education and income by skin tone, for example) that we reported earlier.

[51] The analysis thus includes the 17 countries; once again, country fixed effects are included but not shown.

Gender is shown to have no impact on self-reported victimization by discrimination at work or school. Recall that, as described above, the AmericasBarometer 2012 data *do* show income differentials among working men and women, even after taking into account gender differences in education. Thus, perceptions of discrimination are not always strongly related to objectively measured discrimination.[52]




**Figure I. 23. Determinants of Self-Reported Victimization by Employment or School Discrimination in the Americas**

To visually present some of the results from the regression analysis in greater detail, in Figure I.24 we compare the experience of discrimination at the workplace or school for respondents of varying skin tones, by gender. We see that as skin tone gets darker, self-reported discrimination at the workplace or school increases. Males (indicated with the solid line) with the lightest skin tone experience self-reported discrimination at work or school at an average rate of 6.4%, whereas males with the darkest skin tone self-report at a rate of 12.8%. Both genders observe similar positive patterns, a finding that was noted in the regression output in Figure I.23.

[52] See also Ñopo, et al. 2009. *Ibid.*




**Figure I. 24. Skin Tone and Self-Reported Employment or School Discrimination in the Americas**

Now considering age, in Figure I.25 we see that self-reported discrimination in the workplace declines as age rises and, again, that levels of discrimination do not differ greatly by gender. As men (solid line) and women (dashed line) increase in age, their likelihood of reporting workplace or school-based discrimination decreases. Females within the 16-25 cohort experience self-reported discrimination at work or school at an average rate of 13.6%, whereas females with the darkest skin tone self-report at a rate of 3.9%.




**Figure I. 25. Age and Self-Reported Employment or School Discrimination in the Americas**

## Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Inequality

The previous sections have shown that economic and social resources are not distributed equally across the Americas in different groups defined by gender, race, urban/rural status, and family background. They have not told us a great deal about why these inequalities persist, however. In particular, we have not yet assessed the extent to which differences in socioeconomic outcomes might be due in part to discriminatory norms or attitudes. The AmericasBarometer 2012 included several questions that provide a look at attitudes regarding the economic roles of men and women, and the economic achievements of different racial groups.

First, we examine norms regarding men's versus women's work. Many studies have suggested that citizens throughout the Americas continue to hold attitudes that imply different roles for men and women in the labor force.[53] In 2012, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, on a 7-point scale:

[53] Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented at the *Marginalization in the Americas* Conference, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

**GEN1.** Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

In Figure I.26 we examine the responses that the citizens of the Americas provided on a 1-7 scale. More than a third of the population strongly disagrees that men should have priority in the labor market. On the other hand, about 11% of the population in the region strongly agrees with this statement, and a combined 30% of respondents give the statement a "5," "6," or "7," indicating some level of agreement.




**Figure I. 26. Agreement that Men Should Have Labor Market Priority in the Americas**

Figure I.26 obscures substantial variation across countries. In Figure I.27 we present the average levels of agreement with this statement across the Americas. In the figure, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, for ease of comparison with other variables; higher values indicate greater agreement with the notion that men should have greater rights to jobs when there is not enough work. Citizens of the United States, Canada, and Uruguay agree least with the notion that men should be given priority for jobs, falling on the scale at 20.7, 21, and 21.7, respectively. On the contrary, individuals in the Dominican Republic and Guyana tend to feel most strongly that men should have priority for jobs at 54.9 and 51.8, respectively, on the 0-100 scale.




**Figure I. 27. Agreement that Men Have Labor Market Priority in the Countries of the Americas**

The AmericasBarometer 2012 also asked citizens across the Americas about their perceptions of the reasons for racial and ethnic inequalities. This round we included the following question in every country of the Americas, except the United States and Canada:[54]

**RAC1CA.** According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?
(1) Because of their culture, or
(2) Because they have been treated unjustly
(3) **[Do not read]** Another response
(88) DK
(98) DA

[54] This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.

In Figure I.28 we present the percentage of respondents who agreed that inequality was due to the "culture" of "people with dark skin." In each country surveyed, less than 35% of the population believes that culture explains why people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. The fact, though, that in just over half of the countries (13 of 24) at least one out of every five respondents blames poverty among dark skinned individuals on culture as opposed to deprivation of opportunities suggests that important levels of negative stereotypes based on skin tone persist across many places in the Americas. But, again, there is significant variation across countries, with higher numbers found in Guatemala, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Dominican Republic; and, conversely, we find the lowest numbers in Uruguay.




**Figure I. 28. Percentage Agreeing that Poverty among Those with Dark Skin Tone is Due to "Culture" in the Countries of the Americas**

Who reports that they agree poverty is due to "culture" in the Americas? In Figure I.29 we use logistic regression analysis to examine the profiles of those agreeing with the previous statement.[55] The results show that women are less likely to agree that poverty is due to culture, as are those who live in larger urban areas. Interestingly, wealth, education, skin tone, and age are not statistically significant predictors of attitudes on this measure.




**Figure I. 29. Determinants of Agreement that Poverty is Due to "Culture" in the Americas**

## IV. Public Opinion on Policy Proposals for Greater Equality in the Americas

What, if anything, should the governments of the Americas do about social and economic inequalities faced by their citizens? Answering this question fully is beyond the range of this report. Nonetheless, we outline here some commonly mentioned policy proposals, and present public opinion related to those proposals.

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked individuals across the region what they thought the role of the state should be in reducing inequality. In question **ROS4**, respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the following statement:

> **ROS4.** The [Country] government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

[55] Again, country fixed effects are included but not shown. The United States and Canada are excluded.

Responses to this question provide a first glimpse into the extent to which individuals agree, in the abstract, that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that governments should actively address. In Figure I.30 we present the average agreement with this statement in each country in the region. We have rescaled responses to run from 0 ("Strongly disagree") to 100 ("Strongly agree"). Across the Americas, there are high levels of agreement with the notion that the state should enact firm policies to reduce income inequality. The one exception is the United States, which stands out as the only country in the Americas in which the average response (47.2) falls on the "disagree" side of the scale mid-point (50). This finding is a recurring theme: on other questions in this ROS battery as well, citizens of the United States more strongly agree that individuals should care for their own well-being, without government involvement.[56]




**Figure I. 30. Agreement that the State Should Reduce Inequality in the Countries of the Americas**

[56] Corral, Margarita. 2009. "To What Extent Should Government Ensure Citizen Well-Being?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 16. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

## Conditional Cash Transfer and Public Assistance Programs

In the past two decades, many governments in the region have transformed their social assistance programs, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programs and keeping their children in school.[57] The most well-known and largest of these programs include *Oportunidades* in Mexico, *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, *Familias en Acción* in Colombia, and the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* in Argentina. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also widely expanded non-conditional social assistance programs. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are seen as being effective in assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region. The reduction in inequality and poverty in some of the region's most historically unequal contexts is widely attributed to these social assistance and CCT programs. In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, "CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the growth and weight of children, especially among the smallest."[58] However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programs depends, in large part, on how such programs are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policy-makers to develop well-planned and effective programs.[59]

In 2012, we measured levels of receipt of public assistance and CCT programs across the region using question CCT1NEW:

**CCT1NEW.** Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Levels of receipt of social assistance from the government vary greatly across the region. In Figure I.31 we present the percentage of respondents in each country of the region who said that some member of their household received public assistance. Bolivia has the largest percentage of individuals (54.9%) receiving public assistance while Honduras has the smallest percentage receiving public assistance (4.9%). The majority of countries shown in the figure have between 7% and 23% of their populations receiving public assistance.

[57] Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. "New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. "Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[58] Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. "Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490.

[59] Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. "Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean." Social Protection Working Paper #0605. The World Bank.




**Figure I. 31. Receipt of Public Assistance in the Countries of the Americas**

The 2012 AmericasBarometer provides an opportunity to assess what citizens of the region think about public assistance programs. While the survey did not ask directly about *support* for such programs, question **CCT3** did ask about attitudes towards recipients.[60]

**CCT3.** Changing the topic… Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

[60] This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.

Figure I.32 presents levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas. Per the LAPOP norm, responses have been recoded from the original 1-7 scale to a 0 to 100 scale. The data document a tendency for many individuals across the Americas to hold negative stereotypes (or at least to be unwilling to disagree strongly with such stereotypes) of those who receive public assistance. The public in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela, Canada, and Honduras tends at least slightly toward agreeing on average that social assistance recipients are lazy, with average scores above the midpoint of 50 on the 0-100 scale. The welfare stigma is lowest in Guyana, where individuals on average tend strongly toward the disagree end of the 0-100 scale (the mean for Guyana is 28.3).




**Figure I. 32. Belief that Public Assistance Recipients are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas**

## Affirmative Action

Another possible policy solution to inequality that has very recently attracted attention in some places within Latin America is affirmative action. While in the United States affirmative action has a history of several decades, in Latin America it is a very recent phenomenon, and has only been seriously considered in a handful of countries with the largest populations of Afro-descendants.[61] In August 2012, Brazil approved an affirmative action bill requiring half of slots in public universities to be reserved for public school students, and requiring states to reserve slots for Afro-descendants in proportion to their share of the population.

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked about support for affirmative action in every country of the region. Question **RAC2A** was administered to a split sample of respondents, who were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, on a scale from 1 to 7.

> **RAC2A.** Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree?

In Figure I.33 we examine support for affirmative action across the Americas. Here, again, responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison. Citizens in the United States and Canada on average disagree the most with this statement; average responses in both countries fall more than 20 units below the "disagree" midpoint (50). Thirteen out of the 23 countries tend toward supporting affirmative action, on average, in that those country means fall on the "agree" portion of the scale (that is, above 50).

[61] For further information on support for affirmative action in Brazil, see Smith, Amy Erica. 2010. "Who Supports Affirmative Action in Brazil?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 49. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




**Figure I. 33. Support for Affirmative Action in the Countries of the Americas**

## V. Conclusions

The great differences in the life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitute one of the most important political, social, and economic problems facing the governments of the Americas. While inequality has recently been improving in many countries of the Americas that have historically had the highest levels of inequality, we have seen that important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and where these then place them within their country's social milieu.

From the data reviewed in Chapter 1, we see the region still faces inequalities such as income differentials by location of residence, gender, and skin tones. Individuals residing in larger urban areas appear to have greater access to opportunities. Also, the data show that those of darker skin tone face inequalities in education, income and food insecurities. We see that family backgrounds significantly influence the outcomes of the respondent as well.

Turning to public opinion data, we find that across the Americas citizens perceive that they have been discriminated against in work or school. Nearly a third of citizens in the Americas believe that men deserve priority for jobs over women when times are tough. Likewise, negative stereotypes of those who are poor and have darker skin and those who receive welfare persist among some segments of the population, with important differences across countries. Understanding the nature of these barriers to equality in opportunity and outcome is important because these discrepancies may affect public contentment and political stability within the region, a point to which we later return in Chapter 3. First, however, we turn to an examination of political participation in Chapter 2.

## Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer* Insights *Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.[1] Unfortunately, because the 2010 survey in Haiti was focused on the earthquake's aftermath, skin color was not coded. Nonetheless, results from other countries are instructive.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.

**Differences in Educational Achievement by Skin Tone in the Americas**




[1] The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.

## Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer* Insights *Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php*.

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.[1] While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.

As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.

**Perceptions of Severe Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth, 2010 AmericasBarometer**




Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP




Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

[1] The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

## Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer* Insights *Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.[1] The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.

The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

**Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values**




Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP




Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

[1] The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**.

# Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

*Nicole Hinton, Mason Moseley, and Amy Erica Smith*

## I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to an assessment of how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. The chapter is divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits attention given its relevance to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that exist in the region.

Some key findings from this study of the Americas include:

- Voter turnout rates vary sharply by country. While gender gaps in turnout have converged over time, sizable gaps in turnout remain between those with the most education and wealth and those with the least education and wealth.

- Individuals with greater levels of wealth and education more often take on leadership roles in community groups and report higher levels of campaign work.

- Gender roles affect participation and leadership: female homemakers participate more in religious organizations and parent associations than do men and female non-homemakers, but female homemakers less often take on active roles in leadership.

- Men participate more in community improvement organizations as both members and leaders; they more often try to persuade others to take adopt their political positions; and, they are more likely to take part in campaign work.

- Skin tone is unassociated with most forms of political participation. However, on average individuals with darker skin tones are more likely to get involved in campaigns and to try to persuade others.

- On average, citizens of most countries disagree with the notion that males make better political leaders and, on average, they disagree with the notion that those with darker skin make bad politicians; *yet*, a sizable minority agrees with one or both of these discriminatory attitudes.

- On average, citizens of most countries agree with allowing gay persons and disabled persons to run for public office; yet, prejudices against gay or disabled persons are clearly evident in that sizable minorities disagree.

Beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.[1] An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

Why does unequal participation matter? In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.[2] Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart put forth several concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do individuals, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than those belonging to the lower classes. Second, lower turnout by poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, to the degree that policies better reflect the preferences of voters compared to non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas.

To the degree that traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies vote in lower numbers, then uneven voter turnout certainly has the potential to lead to inequalities in representation. And, unfortunately, past studies suggest that biased turnout often seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But, what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

Taking stock of what we know from studies focused on the United States, not only is turnout biased, but selected other forms of participation besides voting are actually *more* biased against certain groups.[3] For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap in turnout between rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.[4] Particularly in a day and age when money

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[1] Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

[2] Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

[3] In the U.S., see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *Journal of Politics*, 61 (4): 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

[4] Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few are able to exercise a comparatively high amount of political influence.

Inequalities in participation exist along lines of not only class and wealth, but also gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.[5] Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.[6] Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labor.[7] Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women can be strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.[8]

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, with national context and the distribution of material and social resources among groups playing important roles. Even in the U.S., which has historically been characterized by stark inequalities in the political resources and opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that some of the apparent differences across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.[9] In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization catalyzed important

[5] Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy D., Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, and Jennifer R. Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61(2): 205-218.

[6] Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. "Political Participation of Women in Latin America." *Western Political Quarterly*. 34(1): 156-173.

[7] Iversen, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. "Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences." *American Journal of Political Science* 21(4): 711-730.

[8] Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[9] Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid*. Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. "Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States." *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497. See also Kam, Cindy D., Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, and Jennifer R. Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to the Chasm: Gender and Participation among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Behavior* 61(2): 205-218.

indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.[10] Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous women, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.[11]

Unequal participation has consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day (or via other channels for citizen input), it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's (2003) cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.[12] In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g., education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more even processes of development.[13]

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, just as representatives from different racial and ethnic groups prioritize different issues.[14] Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by which participation and representation go hand in hand.[15] Thus, the potential effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

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[10] Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(9): 1123 -1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25(2): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[11] Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "'This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes." *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

[12] Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129–2155

[13] See also Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[14] Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

[15] Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

## II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section, we attempt to gauge (in)equalities in political participation in the Americas. To do so, we use data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys. While data from past studies indicate that significant disparities exist in terms of rates of participation across various social groups, we embark on this analysis with an open mind. Particularly given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic in Latin America and the Caribbean to date, the *a priori* possibility exists that rates of participation are relatively equal across socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

### Turnout

First, we examine turnout across the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured using question **VB2**.[16]

> **VB2**. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of (year of last presidential elections)?
> **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]**
> (1) Voted **[Continue]**
> (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**
> (88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**

In Figure II.1, we present self-reported turnout rates across the Americas. We stress that the rates are self-reported because over-reporting of voting is found in surveys throughout the world, both in the AmericasBarometer and in most other surveys. The results show that turnout is above 50% for all countries. The turnout rates show great differences *across* the countries of the Americas, such that turnout in Honduras is around 50%, while in Ecuador it is almost 90%. Similar to Honduras, Paraguay (60.6%) and Jamaica (61.5%) are among countries with lower turnout rates and similar to Ecuador, Peru (90.6%) and Uruguay (89.9%) are among countries with higher turnout rates. It is important to note that voting is compulsory in a number of countries in the region, while it is voluntary in others; these institutional differences certainly contribute to part of the cross-national variation in turnout.[17]

[16] In parliamentary countries, the question is revised to ask about the most recent general elections.
[17] Birch, Sarah. 2009. *Full Participation: A Comparative Study of Compulsory Voting*. United Nations.




**Figure II. 1. Self-Reported Turnout in the Countries of the Americas**

In Figure II.2 we take a closer look at self-reported turnout by examining the predictors of turnout rates in the Americas; specifically, we assess how gender, race, wealth, education, age, and size of place of residence are associated with self-reported turnout. As with all multiple variable regression analyses in this chapter, country fixed effects are included in the analyses (with Uruguay as the baseline), but these fixed effects are not shown in the figure for the sake of presentation.[18] We see that age cohorts have the largest power in predicting turnout rates, with all cohorts returning positive coefficients in comparison to the baseline category of 25 years and under. There is an inverted U-shape

[18] In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical "0" line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning that we can be 95% confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. For more information on reading and interpreting LAPOP graphs and figures, please refer to page xxix.

present: those in the middle age cohorts participate more than those who are comparatively young and those who are comparatively old. Wealth and years of education also positively predict turnout rates. However, measures for respondent's skin tone and gender are not associated with turnout. Thus, we do not find evidence of robust inequalities across sub-groups along measures of race/ethnicity (skin tone) or gender (female versus male); instead, we find that age, education, and wealth matter. Further, those who live in larger towns/cities are less likely to vote than those who live in smaller and more rural localities.




**Figure II. 2. Determinants of Voter Turnout in the Americas**

To explore the relationship between gender and self-reported turnout in more detail, in Figure II.3 we look at overall turnout rates by gender across the Americas since 2004. Overall self-reported turnout rates for both genders are between 73.5% and 76.5% across all years. The pattern shows a remarkable convergence of turnout rates across the sexes, and in 2012, women report participating in elections at a greater rate than men. This finding supports what survey data from the developed world has indicated in recent years: when it comes to electoral participation, women have largely closed the gap with men. Note, however, that these findings represent the average across the Americas. In two countries, Haiti and Guatemala, men still vote at statistically significantly higher rates than women; meanwhile, in Ecuador there is actually a "reverse" gender gap in which women vote more than men.[19] For more information on gender gaps in turnout within particular countries, the interested reader is referred to the LAPOP country reports based on the AmericasBarometer 2012.

[19] This analysis is based on multivariate logistic regression models controlling for age, skin tone, education, wealth, and size of place of residence.

**Figure II. 3. Turnout by Gender in the Americas, 2004-2012**

Thus, we find good news in that by 2012, inequalities in electoral participation by gender and ethnicity/race (per the skin tone measure) are limited. Nonetheless, turnout is not evenly distributed in a perfect manner in the Americas. The multivariate analysis indicates that across the Americas, social status is strongly associated with whether one's preferences are expressed on Election Day. Recall, further, that in Chapter One we found that one's mother's educational attainment is very strongly associated with one's own educational level. Thus, family background may also indirectly shape individuals' chances of representation in politics.

In Figure II.4 we present the levels of turnout for two different profiles of citizens in the Americas: first, a citizen who is in the top quintile of the wealth distribution in his or her own country and who has completed some higher education; and, second, a citizen who is in the bottom quintile of wealth and has no formal education. We see that the "social status" turnout gap is much larger than the gender gap. In 2012, 82% of those in the top wealth quintile and with higher education reported having voted in the most recent elections, as opposed to only 67% of those in the bottom wealth quintile and without formal education. Moreover, the gap in turnout between the most and the least advantaged citizens is larger in 2012 than in any previous AmericasBarometer measurement. This suggests that to the extent that inequalities in turnout persist in the countries of the Americas, they tend to be the result of socioeconomic inequalities, rather than gender or racial discrimination.




**Figure II. 4. Turnout by Social Status in the Americas, 2004-2012**

## Beyond Turnout

Turnout does not tell the whole story when it comes to political participation. Certainly there are many ways that individuals can engage in their democratic system besides just voting, and participation in these activities across groups may or may not conform to the patterns observed in turnout. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer surveys include an extensive battery of questions on forms of political participation beyond voting. Among numerous other topics, these questions inquire about whether and how often individuals contact their representatives, and if they take part in certain community organizations. By looking at how groups might differ in terms of their involvement in these types of political activities, we obtain a more holistic view of whether or not certain sub-sections of society have unequal influence in the political process.

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP has long included a series of questions to gauge whether and how frequently individuals participate in a variety of community groups. In 2012, we also included questions to measure whether a person who says that he or she participates takes a leadership role. The text of the **CP** battery is as follows:

| |
|---|
| I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. |
| **CP6**. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them…<br>(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never<br>(88) DK (98) NR |
| **CP7**. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them…<br>(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never<br>(88) DK (98) NR |
| **CP8**. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them…<br>(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never<br>(88) DK (98) NR |

After each question, respondents who said that they participated at least once or twice a year received a follow-up question (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

| |
|---|
| **CP6L**. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]** |
| **CP7L**. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]** |
| **CP8L**. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]** |

Figure II.5 presents levels of community participation in each country of the Americas (excluding the United States and Canada). Community participation is calculated as the average response to CP6, CP7, and CP8, and has been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents never participating in any group, and 100 represents participating very frequently in all groups. Figure II.6 presents the percentage of respondents in each of the same set of countries who said they had a leadership role in any community group.

On the first scale (Figure II.5), all countries score below the mid-point of 50, indicating low average rates of community participation. Argentina and Uruguay have the lowest community participation rates among all countries presented, with scores of 14.6 and 12.4, respectively.




**Figure II. 5. Community Participation in the Countries of the Americas**

Among those asked the follow-up questions about leadership roles (Figure II.6), community leader participation ranges from 6.3% (Argentina) to 29.8% (Haiti). Haiti and Guatemala fall close to the top of both graphs, indicating high community group member participation and community group leader participation. Much prior research carried out by LAPOP has shown that community participation is often quite high in poorer countries where citizens join together to create public goods.




**Figure II. 6. Community Leadership in the Countries of the Americas**

In Figure II.7 and Figure II.8, we present regression results of the determinants of participation and leadership among the citizens of the Americas, again focusing on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the respondents.[20] Being female has a large and positive association with community participation. On the other hand, leadership roles in community organizations are being assumed at fairly equal rates by both men and women. Thus, while women participate in general at greater rates, they are not more likely to assume leadership roles. We will unpack gender roles more in future figures. Skin tone has little predictive power for either community participation or leadership, indicating that within communities, color matters little when it comes to this kind of participation. Size of place of residence is negatively related to both community participation and leadership. Thus, as we found for the case of electoral turnout, across Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole,

[20] Once again country fixed effects are included but not shown (with Uruguay, again, the baseline country).

participation is higher in smaller and more rural places of residence. Also paralleling our results for turnout, we see that higher levels of wealth and education predict community participation and leadership positively. That is, those who are wealthier and have higher levels of education are more inclined to take on leadership roles. We see that each age cohort over age twenty-five is a positive predictor of both community participation and community leadership in comparison to the baseline age group of 25 years and under. Again similar to what we found for turnout, an inverted U-shape is present for the age cohorts in both figures. In other words, participation is low among the youngest and oldest age cohorts, but rises to the highest levels among those in the middle of the age distribution.




**Figure II. 7. Determinants of Community Participation in the Americas**




**Figure II. 8. Determinants of Leadership in the Americas**

In the preceding analysis, particularly in the model of community participation, we see two types of participatory inequalities by gender: first, women participate more than men in community groups; however, second, they do not take on leadership roles at the same level as men. Thus, women's representation among the leadership of these organizations, on average, is not proportional to their presence in the general membership. Furthermore, it is quite likely that rates of participation vary by women's positions in the labor market and family.[21] To take one look at this issue, we distinguish between female homemakers and female non-homemakers. Figure II.9 and Figure II.10 present these gender roles by the community participation variables separately (**CP6**, **CP7**, **CP8**), as well as the leadership variables separately (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, **CP8L**). In Figure II.10 (and the next figure), leadership is estimated *only* for those individuals who say they participate in the respective type of community group. We see that female homemakers participate more than female non-homemakers and males in religious organizations and parents' associations, but participate less than males in community improvement committees, where men also take on the highest percentage of leadership roles. Perhaps female homemakers participate within the community due to more time availability if they have no employment obligation. However, we see female *non*-homemakers have the largest percentages (by just slight amounts) of leadership roles in religious groups and parent associations, while female

[21] See, for instance, Iversen, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Batista, Frederico. 2012. "Gender and Community Participation in Latin America and the Caribbean." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 78. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

homemakers take on all three types of leadership roles at lower rates than either men or their non-homemaker counterparts.




**Figure II. 9. Gender Roles and Community Participation in the Americas**




**Figure II. 10. Gender Roles and Leadership in the Americas**

As with turnout, the multiple variable regression analysis again suggests that some of the most important inequalities in community leadership are related to socioeconomic status. In Figure II.11 we show the percentage taking a leadership role in each of the three types of groups for two different citizen profiles: first, those in the top quintile of wealth and with higher education; and, second, those in the bottom quintile of wealth, and with no formal education. The figure indicates the tremendous disparities in community leadership for the two types of citizens. For both community improvement committees and parent associations, the gap is 10 percentage points, while religious group participation is relative equal, with a gap in leadership of only 2 percentage points. Thus, while individuals across the socioeconomic spectrum become involved in community groups at fairly similar levels, the likelihood that a person who is involved in a community group will become a leader is very strongly related to social status.




**Figure II. 11. Percent Taking Leadership Roles in the Americas, by Wealth and Education**

Many individuals also participate in campaign related activities beyond simply voting. To gauge involvement in elections, we asked respondents questions **PP1** and **PP2**.

| |
|---|
| **PP1**. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**<br>(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never<br>(88) DK (98) DA |
| **PP2**. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006?<br>(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA |

In Figure II.12 and Figure II.13 we examine participation in campaign activities across the Americas. The first figure presents the percentage of respondents who reported they have "tried to persuade others" either "frequently" or "occasionally." The second presents the percentage who said they had worked for a campaign. Looking first at Figure II.12, the United States is at the top of the chart with 45.2% of its citizens, on average, trying to persuade others frequently or occasionally to vote for a party or candidate. The U.S. is followed by three Caribbean countries: the Dominican Republic, Guyana, and Suriname. On the lower end of the figure, we see that less than ten percent of citizens of Paraguay, Mexico and Bolivia try to persuade others frequently or occasionally on political issues.




**Figure II. 12. Political Persuasion in the Countries of the Americas**

Looking now at Figure II.13, in each country of the Americas fewer than twenty percent of respondents state they have worked in campaigns. Again we find a set of Caribbean countries at the very top of the comparative figure: Haiti and Suriname are the highest-ranked countries, with comparatively large portions of their populations participating in campaign work (18.1% and 18.0%, respectively); in contrast, less than 2% of citizens of Chile participated in campaign work.




**Figure II. 13. Political Campaign Participation in the Countries of the Americas**

Next, we explore this topic in more detail by examining through regression analyses the determinants of campaign participation and of working for a candidate or party in the most recent elections.[22] In Figure II.14 and Figure II.15, the results show that as respondents' level of wealth or education increases, they are more likely to report trying to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate and to engage in campaign work. Skin tone has a positive association with both forms of campaign involvement; thus, citizens with darker skin tones are more likely to attempt to persuade others and to engage in campaign work. We see a gender gap in persuasion and campaign work, with the coefficient for gender (female) falling on the negative side of both X-axes. Again, we see an inverted U-shape relationship for age, and all age cohorts over 25 are positively associated with

[22] The country fixed effects are included but not shown (with Uruguay, again, the baseline country).

persuasion and campaign work compared to the base age cohort of 25 years and under. The youngest are the least likely to try to get involved in campaigns in either forms, and those in their middle ages are the most likely to do so. Size of place of residence is a negative predictor of both types of participation (though not statistically significant in the first figure): overall and echoing earlier findings, we find those in more populous, larger towns participate less in political life.




**Figure II. 14. Determinants of Attempting to Persuade Other in the Americas**




**Figure II. 15. Determinants of Working for a Campaign in the Americas**

Again we look at gender roles and again we find differences, now with respect to persuasion and campaign work. The gender gap is clear in Figure II.16 across both forms of participation. In addition, the figure shows that female non-homemakers participate more than female homemakers[23].




**Figure II. 16. Gender Roles and Participation in Electoral Campaigns in the Americas**

[23]In Chapter 3, we consider participation in political protests. We find that the relationship between gender and the likelihood of taking to the streets is similar to that between gender and campaign work. While about 9% of men across the Americas say they have participated in a protest in the past year, only about 8% of female non-homemakers do so, and just 4% of female homemakers do (both differences are statistically significant). Taken together, these findings suggest that across the Americas, women, and especially homemakers, are less likely to engage in forms of contentious politics that involve potentially engaging with others with whom they disagree. This gender gap may indicate that in subtle ways women's voices are less likely to be heard in political debates.

As in previous analyses, we also find that socioeconomic differences are important in campaign participation. In Figure II.17 we examine the percentage of individuals getting involved in electoral campaigns in each of two demographic groups: those in the top wealth quintile and with higher education; and those in the bottom wealth quintile and with no formal education. We find that, among the most advantaged citizens, the percentage attempting to persuade others is twice as high as the rate found among the least advantaged citizens. Similarly, the percentage working for campaigns is three times higher for the most advantaged as opposed to the least advantaged. Thus, resources such as wealth and education translate into dramatically higher rates of involvement in electoral politics.




**Figure II. 17. Wealth, Education, and Participation in Electoral Campaigns in the Americas**

Through most of the analyses in this chapter, we have seen that skin tone is unassociated with political participation. This is indeed good news for those concerned about racial and ethnic inequalities in the region. In the models of campaign work and persuasion, however, we do find some differences by skin tone. Across the Americas, on average and controlling for wealth and education, those with darker skin tones are *more* likely to try to persuade others and to get involved in campaigns.

In Figure II.18 we examine this finding in greater detail, presenting the coefficient of skin tone from a logistic regression model of the determinants of campaign work, for each country of the Americas. The figure shows that there is great variation in the relationship between campaign involvement and race across the Americas, and that in one country, Panama, skin tone is negatively associated with campaign work. Nonetheless, there is a group of about ten countries where skin tone has a significantly or nearly significantly positive relationship to getting involved in campaigns. Interestingly, the top two countries, Bolivia and Peru, are ones with strong political movements among indigenous groups. Two other countries where this effect is seen, Brazil and Colombia, have strong political movements among Afro-descendants. For more information on race, ethnicity, and political participation in the countries examined here, the interested reader is encouraged to consult specific country reports based on the AmericasBarometer 2012.




**Figure II. 18. Skin Tone and Campaign Work in the Countries of the Americas**

Campaign participation – both attempting to persuade other voters, and working for campaigns or parties – is a highly contentious but important piece of democratic politics. When average citizens get involved in campaigns and try to persuade their friends, family members, and neighbors, they democratize the electoral process and help to stimulate broader interest in the election. In addition, campaign work may serve as a "gateway" into yet more intensive forms of political participation, such as running for office, since political candidates are often recruited and trained through working on others' campaigns. Thus, inequalities in campaign participation might be related to inequalities in political representation more generally. In this sense, we have seen some reasons for optimism and others for worry: persistent, though not large, gender gaps; larger gaps across social classes; and, little evidence of substantial inequality along the lines of skin tone.

## III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

One potential type of constraint on the participation by some individuals in political life is discriminatory attitudes. It is thus worth examining this question: How much do members of society support equal opportunities for minority groups? Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Individuals who think that women's place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, may be less likely to tolerate those groups' participation in public life, or to vote for such candidates. And, in turn, those attitudes can create barriers for selected individuals to participate in politics. In this section, we review the results from the AmericasBarometer for a number of questions that seek to quantify the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

We note that responses to these questions may be subject to what public opinion scholars call "social desirability bias," meaning that individuals may be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.[24] This means that even respondents who privately harbor discriminatory attitudes may give a "socially desirable," non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions could very well be lower than their actual levels in the population.

[24] Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments (see, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, de Jonge, Chad K., Meléndez, Carlos, Osorio, Javier and Nickerson, David W. 2012. "Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua." *American Journal of Political Science* 56: 202–217).

## Public Opinion towards Political Leadership by Women

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included three questions tapping attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.[25] The text of these questions is as follows:

| |
|---|
| **VB50.** Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?<br>(1) Strongly agree<br>(2) Agree<br>(3) Disagree<br>(4) Strongly disagree<br>(88) DK / (98) DA |
| **VB51**. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?<br>(1) A man<br>(2) A woman<br>(3) Both the same<br>(88) DK / (98) DA / (99) N/A |
| **VB52.** If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?<br>(1) A man<br>(2) A woman<br>(3) It does not matter<br>(88) DK / (98) DA / (99) N/A |

We first look at the mean levels of responses to question **VB50** across countries within the region**.** In Figure II.19 we display average scores on this measure by country using a 0-100 point scale on which strongly agreeing with the statement scores a 100 and strongly disagreeing with the statement scores a 0. Only one country, Guyana, scores above 50, indicating that, on average, the public in that country tends at least somewhat toward agreeing with the notion that men make better political leaders than women. The remaining countries score on the "disagree" side of the mid-point, with individuals in Brazil and Uruguay showing the greatest tendencies to disagree with the statement that men are better political leaders than women (mean levels of 28.2 and 26.6, respectively).

[25] VB51 and VB52 were administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.




**Figure II. 19. Belief that Men Make Better Leaders in the Countries of the Americas**

In Figure II.20, we present the proportion of respondents across the Americas as a whole who select each of the four response options: disagree strongly, disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The pie chart shows that, on average across the Americas, 7.1% and 18.6% of the average population strongly agrees or agrees with the statement, respectively. Conversely, close to 75% of the population either disagrees or strongly disagrees that men make better political leaders.




**Figure II. 20. Belief that Men Make Better Leaders in the Countries of the Americas**

In a fashion similar to that we depicted above, we present the results of questions **VB51** and **VB52**.[26] Figure II.21 shows the mean level of agreement with the notion that men are more corrupt political leaders than women in each country; Figure II.22 shows a pie chart depicting how citizens within the Americas view this notion. In addition, Figure II.21 shows the mean level of agreement with the idea that men are better than women at running the national economy in each country; Figure II.24 again shows a pie chart for the Americas as a whole. To create the comparative figures (Figures II.21 and II.23), responses to the original questions were converted to a 100 point scale where 100 signifies "men," 0 signifies "women," and 50 signifies "both are the same" or "it does not matter."

[26] These two questions were not asked in Canada.




**Figure II. 21. Beliefs Regarding Which Political Leaders are More Corrupt**

Considering views on who would be more corrupt as a politician, all countries in the region have mean values that fall towards the "men" side of the scale, meaning that the tendency is to agree to some extent with the notion that men are more corrupt political leaders. We see this result in the pie chart: 31.1% of citizens stated "a man," and only 4.8% stated "a woman." Importantly, however, nearly two-thirds of respondents say that "both are the same," the most egalitarian option. Citizens of the Dominican Republic (80.9) tend to agree the most that men are more corrupt political leaders. At the other end of the scale, the citizens of Panama (55.0) also agree, but fall only just above the midpoint indicating that "both are the same."




**Figure II. 22. Beliefs Regarding Which Political Leaders are More Corrupt**

Considering the question that asks who would be better at running the economy, almost all countries fall just below the midpoint, towards the "women" side (see Figure II.23). Thus, the average individual across the Americas is either indifferent or may tend toward believing a female politician would do better running the economy. The pie chart shows that nearly 60% of citizens report believing it does not matter and 27.2% feel that a woman would be better at running the national economy. Colombia ranks the lowest, showing a strong tendency to believe that women are better managers of the national economy, compared to men. Thus, and quite interestingly, despite the fact that a fair proportion of individuals across the Americas believe that men make better political leaders in general, when it comes to perceptions of corruption and economic competence, there is at least a slight tendency to believe men make more corrupt leaders and that women make better managers of the national economy. There are, of course, important cross-national differences, as noted above and shown in the figures.




**Figure II. 23. Belief that Men are Better at Running the National Economy**




**Figure II. 24. Belief that Men or Women are Better at Running the National Economy**

## Public Opinion towards Leadership by Those from Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included one question on attitudes towards people of darker skin in positions of political leadership, **VB53**.[27]

> Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.
> **VB53.** Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
> [Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous/native-(country)/First Peoples, "non-whites" in general]
> (1) Strongly agree
> (2) Agree
> (3) Disagree
> (4) Strongly disagree
> (88) DK / (98) DA / (99) N/A

In Figure II.25 we present the results for **VB53** in a similar fashion to previous questions, using the 0-100 point scale; in Figure II.26, we preserve the original scale. All countries fall toward the "disagree" side of the scale, scoring lower than the mid-point of 50, indicating a general tendency toward disagreeing with the notion that people with dark skin are not good political leaders. From the pie chart, we see that nearly 88% of citizens across the Americas disagree or strongly disagree with this statement, leaving around 12% agreeing at some level. At the top of the country chart, Chile (34.3) and Bolivia (32.9) have mean scores that are right around the "disagree" point (33.33) for the statement.[28] Again, we see Uruguay at the bottom of the scale at 15.4, with respondents on average strongly disagreeing with the notion that people with dark skin are not good political leaders.

[27] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.
[28] That is, responses are coded so that 0 means "Strongly disagree," 33.33 means "Disagree," 66.67 means "Agree," and 100 means "Strongly agree."




**Figure II. 25. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas**




**Figure II. 26. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas**

## Public Opinion towards Political Leadership by Homosexuals

As in 2010, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included question **D5** on attitudes towards gay persons running for public office. We can thus examine attitudes on this question in a manner similar to our analyses above.

> **D5.** And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

Figure II.27 displays the responses for the citizens of America. Respondents answered **D5** on a 1-10 scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disapproves) to 10 (strongly approves). The responses were then rescaled to the LAPOP standard 0-100 point scale. We now see Uruguay at the top of this chart with a score of 77.6, indicating that the Uruguayan public tends to approve of homosexuals being permitted to run for public office. We see that the citizens of Canada (77.8) and the United States (73.9) also register high levels of approval for this statement. Seven countries score above the midpoint on the 0-100 scale; in the remaining 19 countries, the average citizen disapproves, at least slightly, of gay persons being allowed to run for office. Haiti stands out for its extremely low average level of support for the right of gay persons to run for office: its average score of 8.5 is by far the lowest in the region. Figure II.28 shows that nearly 45% of citizens of the Americas strongly disagree that gay persons should be allowed to run for public office (responses of 1, 2, or 3 on the original 1-10 scale), whereas 28.5% of individuals strongly agree (responses of 8-10).




**Figure II. 27. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas**




**Figure II. 28. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas**

## Public Opinion towards Political Leadership by Individuals who are Disabled

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question on attitudes towards those who are physically disabled being allowed to run for public office.[29] Once again, we conduct a similar comparative and overall analysis of this question.

**D7.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office?

Question **D7** presented respondents with the same 1-10 scale. Figure II.29 shows a comparison across countries using a 100 point scale, with 100 indicating strongly approving and 0 indicating strongly disapproving. The United States and Uruguay are at the top of the chart, each with an average score of 88.8, indicating the citizens of these countries tend toward high levels of agreement with the notion that disabled persons should be permitted to run for public office. Almost all of the countries in the region have mean scores that fall on the approving side of the scale. Once again, we see Haiti falling at the bottom of the chart, with a score of 36.8. In Figure II.30 the pie chart emphasizes the fact that there is, *generally speaking*, a high level of agreement with the notion that handicapped individuals should be permitted to run for office: we see that 52.9% of citizens in the Americas strongly agree with the statement. Conversely, however, 15% of individuals strongly disagree that the disabled should be allowed to run for office, and another 5% give the statement a rating of 4, indicating weak disagreement. Thus, the average disabled person in the Americas lives in an environment in which one in every five adults he or she encounters disapproves on some level of his or her ability to run for office.

[29] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.




**Figure II. 29. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas**




**Figure II. 30. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas**

## IV. Public Opinion on Policy Proposals

Fortunately, for most indicators of political engagement, there seem to exist small discrepancies in rates of participation among men, women, and different racial groups, though discrepancies are somewhat higher across social classes. While we do find some differences in participation rates and some evidence of discriminatory attitudes, there are also reasons to be optimistic about the narrowing of gaps that have been of concern in previous years. Where inequalities in most forms of political participation remain, they are often related to class, rather than to gender or to race (skin tone). American democracies have made some improvements in terms of political equality. And, as the individual LAPOP country reports for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer show in more detail, differences may be more severe in certain countries than in others, which means that there might be lessons we can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation and increased norms of tolerance for the participation of all individuals, based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys.

### Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.[30] The general idea is that when members of marginalized groups see people like them on the ballot and in office, they are more motivated to participate in politics than they are where political role models are scarce. As presented earlier in this chapter, we saw that women participate within the community, but that leadership roles are often dominated by men. Quotas may not only affect participation directly, but also can affect societal norms: the presence of female political leaders may cause norms to shift so that fewer individuals believe men make better leaders than women. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. Unfortunately, however, as described in Special Report Box 5, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included one question, **GEN6**, enabling us to tap support for gender quotas across the Americas.[31]

> **GEN6.** The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

[30] Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 141-162; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf.

[31] This question was administered to a split (half) sample of respondents.

In Figure II.30 we find support for gender quotas, on average, in the countries of the Americas. The question was converted to fit a 0-100 scale with individuals who strongly agree scoring a 100 and those who strongly disagree scoring a 0 for the analysis. The scale was preserved to its original form for the analysis in Figure II.32. The average value for El Salvador falls at the top of the chart, indicating that there is significant agreement in that country that the state ought to require parties to reserve spots for women who feel strongly about reserving spots for female candidates. We also see the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Uruguay among the top four countries agreeing with the statement. According to the Quota Project, fourteen out of the twenty-six countries have implemented national gender quotas for public elections.[32] Seven out of the top ten countries on the figure have implemented these gender quotas. Individuals in Brazil, Canada, and Trinidad & Tobago return average scores that hover around the indifferent score, the midpoint of 50, which neither strongly agrees or disagrees with the statement. Overall from the pie chart, nearly 63% of the citizens of the Americas, on average, support gender quotas, providing an answer of 5, 6, or 7.




**Figure II. 31. Support for Gender Quotas in the Countries of the Americas**

[32] Quota Project. http://www.quotaproject.org/.




**Figure II. 32. Support for Gender Quotas in the Countries of the Americas**

## Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.[33] While about half of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public services.[34] One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in elections is less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, would suggest that compulsory voting may not always have the expected effects in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

## Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.[35]

[33] Lijphardt, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid*.
[34] Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.
[35] Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid.*; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid*.

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.[36] While the relationship between participation and socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,[37] material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

## V. Conclusion

This chapter began by examining political participation by demographic and socioeconomic characteristics in the Americas. The data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer presented self-reported turnout rates that are at least half or more of the adult population of each country. We see age, education, and wealth having strong associations with several modes of political participation, including turnout, community group membership, and community leadership. By contrast, skin tone, our proxy of race, has little relationship to most forms of political participation, on average across the Americas. Divisions between sexes and by gender roles are present, especially in terms of community participation, leadership roles, persuasion, and campaign work. However, the gender gap for electoral turnout has closed over time.

We then turned to examine public opinion related to the participation of various groups. On average, the majority of citizens of the Americas express non-discriminatory views related to the political participation of women, of individuals with "darker skin," of gay persons, and of the disabled. At the same time, though, at least 10% of the population does carry discriminatory views against each of the following types of leaders: that are gay, disabled, or dark skinned. For the average woman in the Americas, one in every four people she encounters believes to some degree that she is less capable as a potential political leader than a man. Gay persons are yet more likely to encounter political discrimination: over half of citizens in the Americas oppose at some level allowing gay persons to run for office. Thus, we see that barriers to political participation persist, though to different degrees across sub-groups and across countries of the Americas.

[36] Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working paper.
[37] Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

## Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer* Insights *Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.[1] In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?

The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

**Effects of Gender and Control Variables on Participation and Predicted Community Participation by Gender Roles**




Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP




Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

[1] To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.

## Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women's Political Participation

*This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php.*

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

**Predicted Probabilities for Men's and Women's Political Participation in Latin America**




Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women's group meetings.[1]

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas for the election of the party officials in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation[2]. The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

[1] The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women's group meetings, CP20.

[2] In 2014, there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

## Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer* Insights *Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.

Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.

Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

**The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout**






# Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

*Amy Erica Smith*

## I. Introduction

As we have seen, there are important ways in which economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas report social and political attitudes that would restrict the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences of unequal opportunities and discrimination for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perceptions of their political systems and the democratic regime? Might inequalities have consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

Considering average patterns across the Americas, some key findings presented in this chapter include:

- The proportion of citizens in each country of the Americas that reports that they have been discriminated against in government offices or public places in the past year is fairly small. However, those who self-identify as black or indigenous are *much* more likely to report discrimination.

- Women typically are not more likely to identify as having been targets of discrimination, despite evidence of discriminatory attitudes towards women in politics and the workplace in the previous two chapters.

- Experiences of discrimination are associated with *higher* internal efficacy, or citizens' belief in their own abilities in the political realm, while they are associated with *lower* external efficacy, or citizens' belief that politicians and political parties care about their interests.

- Those with higher levels of internal and, especially, external efficacy have much higher levels of support for the political system. Internal efficacy is related to support for democracy, though external efficacy is unassociated with this latter attitude. Finally, citizens with higher *internal* efficacy are *more* likely to take part in protests, while those with higher *external* efficacy have *lower* levels of protesting.

- Those who say they have been discriminated against, especially in government offices, have lower levels of system support, and they have double the rate of protest participation.

- Race and ethnicity have only minor associations with democratic support, *once* we take into account experiences of discrimination and efficacy.

- Women and, especially, homemakers have lower levels of internal efficacy, but they have higher levels of external efficacy, system support, and support for democracy. At the same time, they have lower levels of protest participation.

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own ability to make an impact on the political system and get things done. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.[1] Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy than do men, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher internal efficacy.[2] On the other hand, citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust may react by becoming empowered, and more mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy.

Discrimination might also affect "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. First, politicians might treat some groups of citizens better than others in the course of everyday personal interactions. Thus, members of discriminated groups may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences with specific politicians.[3] In addition, even citizens who have not had personal contact with politicians may well base their judgments of leaders' receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same group characteristics.[4]

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.[5]

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[1] Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

[2] Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[3] Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296. For evidence on police officers differentially targeting citizens based on perceived social class, see Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheendar Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 45 (1): 76-97.

[4] Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality." *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

[5] Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. "Politics as a Vocation." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. Thus, we assess whether discrimination shapes efficacy, and whether efficacy in turn shapes citizens' perceptions of democracy and their political systems.

But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders' ineffectiveness. This perception could lower evaluations of incumbents' performance and what is often called "specific political support": support for the particular people in office.[6] When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may spill over and depress "diffuse support," or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010 found that it was generally resistant to the effects of economic crisis.[7]

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. For example, in an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.[8] However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.[9]

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If individuals from groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of protest participation among such groups as well.[10] However, discrimination can also constitute a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.[11]

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[6] Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

[7] Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

[8] Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. "Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?" *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

[9] Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America." Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005."The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination," *Political Behavior* 27 (3): 285-312.

[10] Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

[11] Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary (2000), on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.[12] And other scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as "important rallying cries" during democratization,[13] and raise "the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action."[14] It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.[15]

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization might affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. We begin by considering who reports being the victim of discrimination across the Americas. Next, we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups relates to protest participation.

## II. Victimization by Discrimination

Before turning to analyses regarding discrimination's possible effects, we first consider levels of discrimination across the Americas. Discrimination is complex to define and harder still to identify, both for scholars and for the average citizen on the street. Discrimination involves the unequal treatment of equals; that is, it refers to treating a person worse than others who are similar except for some unique group characteristic, such as race or gender. Discrimination may involve actual negative attitudes towards the group, or it may be due to "statistical discrimination," meaning that negative traits are inferred from membership in certain marginalized groups. As detailed in Chapter One, in the AmericasBarometer 2012 we operationalized this definition in a battery of questions asking citizens whether, in the past year, they have been "discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people."

But how is one to know whether one has been "treated worse than other people"? In the real world citizens are almost never presented with clear counterfactuals; it is hard to know exactly how one would have been treated if one had a different gender or race. This is particularly problematic when many occupations and industries are segregated by sex – if almost all child care workers are

[12] Cleary, Matthew. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid*.

[13] Lovell, Peggy. 2000. "Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives*, 27 (6): 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. "Women's Social Movements in Latin America." *Gender and Society*, 4 (3): 354-369.

[14] Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency." *The American Political Science Review*, 81 (2): 425-452.

[15] Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethinicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review*, 25 (2), pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. "Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s." *Political Behavior* 11 (3):195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. "Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America." *Comparative Politics*, 31 (1): 23-42.

female, how is a female child care worker to know whether her low pay is due to the industry or to her sex? Moreover, many citizens – both men and women, white and black – may believe that it is natural and normal for some people to be treated differently from others. This may hold especially in the case of gender. In many ways, different treatment of the two sexes in the course of everyday life is entirely acceptable to most citizens, from opening doors for women to expecting men to carry heavier packages. For some citizens, differential standards may spill over into the political and economic realms, leading to differential treatment of men and women in politics and the workplace, without any conscious negative attitudes towards either sex. In the previous two chapters we have found sizable minorities of citizens of both sexes who agreed that men deserve labor market priority, and that they make better political leaders.[16] Thus, it is possible that woman could systematically obtain different outcomes in their political and economic interactions, without recognizing any clear discrimination.

Who believes they have been discriminated against? In Chapter One we examined who reported that they had been the victim of employment-related discrimination in the countries of the Americas (see Chapter One for the wording of question **DIS3**). We found that self-reports of being discriminated against at work or school were highest in Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, and Bolivia, and lowest in Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Younger citizens and those with darker skin tones were more likely to report discrimination. Strikingly, women were not more likely to report being discriminated against than men, even though across the region 28% of citizens agreed that men deserved priority in the labor market.

[16] There is a sizable and negative correlation between being female and GEN1, agreement that men deserve labor market priority (r = -.12); and between being female and VB50, agreement that men make better political leaders (for the recoded VB50, r = -.19). Nonetheless, 26% of women across the Americas agree that men deserve priority for jobs, and 19% agree that men make better political leaders.

But discrimination can also occur outside the labor market. In addition to work-related discrimination, the AmericasBarometer 2012 also asked the citizens of 17 countries about their victimization by discrimination in government offices and in public places in questions **DIS2** and **DIS5**.[17] In Figure III.1 and Figure III.2 we examine the percentage of citizens in each country who report that they have been the target of discrimination in each of those settings.




**Figure III. 1. Reported Experiences of Discrimination in Government Offices in the Countries of the Americas**

[17] See Chapter One for the wording of questions.




**Figure III. 2. Reported Experiences of Discrimination in Public Places in the Countries of the Americas**

At the country level, we find results that are quite consistent with those found for workplace discrimination. In every country of the Americas, less than a quarter of citizens report that they have been discriminated against. Citizens of the Caribbean tend to claim comparatively high levels of discrimination, while South Americans (with the exception of Bolivians) tend to claim much lower levels of discrimination. The country with lowest reported victimization by discrimination, for all three types of discrimination, is Venezuela. Other countries with very low levels of reported discrimination include Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Brazil. At the other end of the spectrum, Trinidad and Tobago is the country with the highest percentage of citizens reporting that they have been discriminated against, again in all three locales. As with work-related discrimination, Haiti comes in at second place for discrimination in public places; however, this country ranks only sixth for discrimination in government offices. Other countries with a high percentage of citizens reporting discrimination include Bolivia, Suriname, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic.[18]

[18] One might wonder how discrimination is related to the racial composition in a country. In analysis not shown here, we find that in countries with darker *average* skin tones, citizens are more likely to report discrimination. However, the

Which citizens identify as having been the victims of discrimination? In Figure III.3 and Figure III.4 we present the results of two logistic regression models that examine which personal characteristics make citizens more or less likely to report that they have been treated in a discriminatory fashion in government offices and in public places.[19] We first examine the extent to which discrimination is associated with a series of personal characteristics that are commonly believed to be the bases of discrimination: skin tone, ethnicity, wealth, education, gender and gender roles, and age. At the same time, we also control for the size of the place of the respondent's residence, since respondents in urban areas may be more likely to have encounters with discriminatory strangers. Finally, we control for political interest. Since we are assessing discrimination based on self-reports, those who are more politically aware may be more likely to recognize poor treatment as discriminatory. Similarly, while we would normally expect those with lower social status to experience higher levels of victimization, education might predispose individuals to recognize that negative experiences are due to discrimination.




**Figure III. 3. Determinants of Experiences of Discrimination in Government Offices in the Americas**

*variability* in the skin tones in the country, as measured by the standard deviation of this variable, is unrelated to the likelihood of reporting discrimination.

[19] Country fixed effects are included in the analysis, but not presented here.




**Figure III. 4. Determinants of Experiences of Discrimination in Public Places in the Americas**

While the models presented in Figure III.3 and Figure III.4 have some similarities, in other ways they present interesting differences. The first similarity is with respect to our proxy measure of race: across the Americas, on average darker skin tone increases the likelihood of reporting discrimination, but the association is statistically significant only for discrimination in public places. Once again, the reader should keep in mind that country fixed-effects have been included but are not shown.

Factors related to social status, meanwhile, present divergent results. Both wealth and education are associated with lower likelihoods of reporting disadvantaged treatment in public places. However, in the model of discrimination in public offices the pattern is different: education is associated with a *higher* probability, though wealth is still associated with *lower* probability of reporting discrimination. The fact that people with more education are more likely to report discrimination in public offices may be at least in part attributed to two factors, we suggest. First, individuals with higher levels of education may be more likely to spend time in public offices, a necessary precondition to being discriminated against in those locations. Second, education increases the likelihood that respondents are comfortable with terms such as “discrimination,” and are willing to label adverse encounters as discriminatory.

Next, results for gender are in some ways contrary to general expectations. Across the Americas, on average, women and especially homemakers report *lower* levels of discrimination in government offices. Furthermore, while women who are *not* homemakers report *more* discrimination

in public places, women who *are* homemakers report *less*. These findings echo those obtained from analysis of the determinants of reporting discrimination in the workplace or school (see Chapter One). The fact that women sometimes report less discrimination than men runs counter to our findings related to discriminatory attitudes. Recall that over a quarter of citizens in the 26 countries of the Americas agrees with each of two statements that are discriminatory against women's economic and political advancement: 28% agree that men deserve labor market priority over women (see Chapter One), and 26% that men make better political leaders than do women (see Chapter Two).[20] In some cases, women might not recognize treatment as discriminatory because they adhere to norms that give men priority. In other cases, women might not recognize discrimination simply because it is common, and because it has not been politicized as relevant. It may also be the case that some women spend less time in public places and government offices (e.g., homemakers, who report less discrimination in both instances examined here). Finally, it may also be the case that discriminatory attitudes about jobs and political participation do not spill over into general discriminatory treatment of women in public places or government buildings, where a different set of norms could be in operation. Gender roles appear to matter when examining reports of discrimination experiences, though, as we have noted that women who are not homemakers do report higher levels of discrimination in public places.

Figure III.3 and Figure III.4 also show that, across the Americas as a whole, the oldest cohort of citizens is least likely to report either kind of discrimination. This could in part be due to deference shown to the elderly, or to the fact that the elderly may spend less time in public places and government offices. It is also possible that older citizens may be less familiar and comfortable with the newer language of "discrimination." Finally, those with higher levels of political interest are *more* likely to report discrimination. We suspect that this is because those with higher levels of political interest may be more likely to perceive that negative encounters are the result of discrimination.

In Figure III.5 and Figure III.6, we further explore how ethnicity and gender are related to experiences of discrimination in public places and government offices.[21] Across the Americas as a whole, fewer than 10% of whites report either type of discrimination. By contrast, the rates of reporting discrimination are approximately double (or more) for respondents who identify as either black or indigenous.

In Figure III.5, as in the multivariate analysis presented above, we find that women who are not homemakers report levels of discrimination in government offices that are approximately similar to those of men, and levels of discrimination in public places that are slightly higher than those of men. However, women who are homemakers report the lowest levels of either type of discrimination. This may in part be due to these women's lower exposure to public spaces and to government offices, or to low levels of politicization of gender issues.

[20] 25.8% "agree" or "strongly agree" that men make better political leaders in response to VB50. Similarly, in answering GEN1, 29.7% respond with a 5, 6, or 7 (on a 1-7 scale) to the statement that "when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women."

[21] These figures are based on the raw data, rather than on predicted results from a regression analysis.




**Figure III. 5. Ethnicity and Experiences of Discrimination in the Americas**




**Figure III. 6. Gender and Experiences of Discrimination in the Americas**

Taken as a whole, these findings suggest a number of conclusions. First, self-reported victimization by discrimination varies greatly across the Americas, and tends to be highest in the Caribbean and lowest in South America (with the exception of Bolivia). Second, ethnicity and skin tone are related to discrimination in the ways one would expect, with those with darker skin and, as well, those identifying as black or indigenous much more likely to report that they have been discriminated against. Third, women often report lower levels of discrimination victimization, though there are some exceptions to this general tendency (female non-homemakers report greater levels of discrimination in public places).

## III. Inequality, Efficacy, and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included a number of questions to tap internal and external efficacy, as well as perceptions of representation. Two questions are part of the AmericasBarometer's long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

| |
|---|
| **EFF1.** Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? |
| **EFF2.** You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? |

These questions were both coded on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree"). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Not at all") to 7 ("A lot"). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.[22]

| |
|---|
| **EPP3**. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you? |

Questions measuring group characteristics and equality of opportunities have been described in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin tone, class, household wealth, intra-household inequalities by gender, and self-reported victimization by discrimination in government offices, public places, and employment situations.

We begin by considering the distribution of internal efficacy, **EFF2**, across the countries of the Americas (see Figure III.7). We find that citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities vary greatly across the region, with 8 countries reporting average levels of internal efficacy that are statistically significantly above the midpoint of 50 on the 0-100 scale, and 12 countries reporting average values that are statistically significantly below 50. At the top end, citizens in the United States, Canada, and Venezuela have the highest levels of agreement that they "understand the most important political issues of this country," and citizens in the U.S. have significantly higher levels than those in any other country. At the bottom end, citizens in Paraguay, Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala, and Haiti have the lowest levels of efficacy.

[22] EPP3 was administered to a split sample, meaning to half of all respondents in each country.




**Figure III. 7. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas**

How are social inequalities and experiences of discrimination related to internal efficacy? In Figure III.8 we use linear regression analysis to examine the association between internal efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences.[23] Interestingly, we find that those who say they were the targets of discrimination in government offices have *higher* levels of agreement that they understand the most important political issues in the country. It might be that those with higher internal efficacy are more likely to conduct business in government offices. Alternatively, the positive relationship between government discrimination and efficacy might be because negative experiences with public officials serve as a kind of information, perhaps leading citizens to believe that government officials themselves are the problem. This result also echoes previous LAPOP research indicating that

[23] The model includes country fixed effects that are not shown in the figure for ease of presentation.

experiences of crime and corruption victimization can indeed boost internal efficacy.[24] Nonetheless, we find that discrimination in public places has a nearly significant *negative* association with internal efficacy. That is, citizens who say they were treated discriminatorily in public spaces have somewhat lower levels of agreement that they understand the most important issues facing the country.




**Figure III. 8. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in the Americas**

Turning to other personal characteristics, we find that, after controlling for experiences of discrimination, skin tone is unrelated to internal efficacy. Women, however, have much lower levels of efficacy than do men, and homemakers appear to have lower levels of efficacy than do non-homemakers, though the coefficient is not quite statistically significant. Across the Americas, the youngest citizens – those who are 25 years and under (who constitute the comparison category in the analysis) – are the least confident in their own understanding of political issues. While efficacy may grow as citizens acquire expertise over time, comparatively low levels of efficacy among the youngest residents of the Americas are worrisome, as this signals the potential for alienation. And citizens of higher social status – the wealthier and, much more importantly, those with more education – are more convinced that they understand national politics than are those of lower status. Finally and not

[24] Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* No. 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

unexpectedly, citizens who are more *interested* in politics also believe they know more about political issues.

In Figure III.9 we explore in greater depth how personal characteristics and discrimination are related to citizens' belief in their ability to understand the political system in the countries of the America.[25] We find that citizens with higher education have levels of internal efficacy that are 18 points higher on the 0-100 scale than do citizens with no formal education. Age has a much smaller association with internal efficacy. We find that citizens in the 56-65 cohort have the highest levels of efficacy; however, these levels are just five points higher, on average, than those of the least efficacious group, the cohort between the ages of 16 and 25.[26]




**Figure III. 9. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in the Americas**

Gender and gender roles are also strongly associated with citizens' levels of internal efficacy in the bivariate analysis. Women who are not homemakers have levels of internal efficacy that are, on average, 5 points lower than those of men in their countries. Women who *are* homemakers, in turn, have internal efficacy levels that are 5 points lower than those of women who are not homemakers.

[25] These figures are based on the raw data, rather than on predicted results from the regression analyses.
[26] In almost every country, the minimum age for participation in the survey was 18. However, in Nicaragua 16 and 17 year olds were also allowed to participate, since the voting age in that country is 16.

Finally, in the bivariate analysis it appears that discrimination by the government, while statistically significant, is associated with just a 3 point boost on the 0-100 scale in citizens' perceptions that they understand the most important issues facing the country.

Now we turn to examine two variables that reflect citizens' perceptions that the political system represents and listens to them. In Figure III.10 and Figure III.11 we present the distribution of the variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** across the countries of the Americas.[27] At least at the country level, these two variables yield similar patterns of responses.[28] In general, most citizens in most countries are skeptical regarding whether politicians care about them; in no country in the Americas does the average citizen's response to either question reach even the midpoint of 50 on the 0-100 scale. Nonetheless, responses vary a great deal across countries.

[27] EFF1 asks citizens to what extent they agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the statement that "Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think." EPP3 asks, "To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?" Responses are captured on a 7-point scale running from 1 ("Not at all") to 7 ("A lot"). Responses to both variables are recoded to run from 0 to 100.

[28] At the individual level, these two variables are correlated at .45, with an alpha coefficient of .59; at the country level, they are correlated at .70.




**Figure III. 10. External Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas**

On both measures, Venezuelans are the citizens who most strongly feel that politicians and political parties are interested in what they think. Other countries with relatively high levels of external efficacy include Suriname, Uruguay, Guyana, Belize, and Nicaragua. At the other end of the spectrum, the country with the lowest average response on both variables is Costa Rica. Other countries where citizens are particularly skeptical that politicians are interested in people like them include Honduras, Brazil, the United States, and Trinidad and Tobago.




**Figure III. 11. Perceptions of Party Representation in the Countries of the Americas**

Which citizens of the Americas agree more that "those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think"? And who agrees more with the notion that "political parties listen to people like you"? In Figure III.12 and Figure III.13, we use linear regression analysis to examine the personal characteristics and experiences that lead citizens to report high external efficacy and strong perceptions of representation.[29] Important variables that may be associated with these two attitudes include victimization by discrimination, skin tone, wealth and education, gender and gender roles, and age, political engagement, and place of residence. Since most of these factors are associated with both attitudes in similar ways, we discuss the findings from the two models together.

[29] Both models include country fixed effects that are not shown for ease of presentation.




**Figure III. 12. Determinants of External Efficacy in the Americas: Leaders are Interested**




**Figure III. 13. Determinants of External Efficacy in the Americas:**

## Political Parties Listen

To begin, as expected we find that citizens who say they have been discriminated against in government offices agree less that politicians and parties care about them. Discrimination in public spaces is unrelated to either measure of external efficacy. Interestingly, discrimination at work or school also contributes to lower levels of agreement with the statement that "those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think," though citizens who say they were discriminated against in the workplace do not have significantly lower levels of agreement with the statement that "political parties listen to people like you."

Skin tone and ethnicity may be indirectly associated with external efficacy since, as we have seen above, these characteristics are associated with discrimination. Considering the direct relationship, however, we find that citizens with darker skin tone report higher levels of external efficacy, though the relationship is not statistically significant at standard levels.[30] As a caveat that applies to many of the analyses in this report, it is important to keep in mind that these results pertain to the region as a whole, and do not take into account country-specific differences that might exist in these relationships. For analyses at the country level, the interested reader is referred to LAPOP's country reports on the 2012 AmericasBarometer.[31]

Turning to markers of social status, in both models we find that household wealth is unassociated with external efficacy, but that citizens with more education have *lower* levels of agreement that politicians and political parties are interested in people like them. It is possible that parties and politicians are actually more responsive to the interests of citizens with lower levels of education in the Americas. However, it is also likely that education leads citizens to be more skeptical of their political systems in general (see, for instance, the findings for system support in Chapter Six).

Further, we find that gender, age, and the size of the place of residence are unassociated with the extent to which citizens agree that "the people who govern this country care about what people like you think." However, women tend to agree to a greater extent than men that "political parties listen to people like you," and citizens living in larger cities agree to a lesser extent than ones living in smaller cities. Finally, in both models we find that those who are more interested in politics report much higher levels of external efficacy.

To further understand what factors are associated with these two attitudes, in Figure III.14 and Figure III.15 we look more closely at how several of the most important measures are related to external efficacy and perceptions of party representation.[32] In bivariate analysis, we find few results that stand out. Educational level has a very weak association with external efficacy, and is associated

[30] The coefficient of skin tone in the first model is statistically significant at $p = .073$; and in the second model, it is statistically insignificant, with a p-value of .189. In analysis not shown here, we find that citizens who identify as black report lower efficacy. Those who identify as indigenous tend to agree to a greater extent that "political parties listen to people like them" than are their fellow citizens who identify as white. When the measures of discrimination are removed, skin tone is highly statistically insignificant in both models.
[31] Country fixed effects are, however, included in all models in this report.
[32] These figures are based on the raw data, rather than on predicted results from the regression analyses.

with just a 2 point drop in both variables on the 0-100 scale. Differences among ethnic groups in responses to the first attitudinal question are not statistically significant, though blacks have significantly lower levels of agreement that parties "listen to people like you" than whites, mestizos, and mulattos. The largest findings from Figures III.15 and III.16 are that government discrimination is associated with a 5 point drop in the first measure, and a 6 point drop in the second measure. Similarly, being discriminated against at work or school is associated with a 4.5 point drop in agreement that "those who govern the country are interested in what people like you think."




**Figure III. 14. Factors Associated with External Efficacy in the Americas**




**Figure III. 15. Factors Associated with Belief in Party Representation in the Americas**

## IV. System Support and Engagement with Democracy

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination may also affect more abstract political attitudes. As discussed above, discrimination could be seen as a failure of the political system, and could lower support for the general political system. Moreover, discrimination may shape system support indirectly, by contributing to lower levels of internal or external efficacy. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we tap a number of more general political attitudes; the most important of these are support for the political system and support for democracy in the abstract. In Chapter Six we describe in detail how these are measured, as well as the levels of these attitudes across the region and over time. In the present chapter, we consider how personal characteristics and experiences of discrimination are related to these attitudes that are so critical for democratic stability.

In Figure III.16 we use linear regression analysis to assess what individual attitudes, traits, and reported experiences predict levels of political support in the Americas.[33] First, we find that internal and external efficacy are both strongly associated with system support. In fact, external efficacy's association with system support is by far the strongest in the model.

[33] Country fixed effects are included in the analysis, but not reported here. Recall that variable EPP3 was asked of only a split sample; as a result, this model was estimated using only half of the respondents in each country.




**Figure III. 16. Determinants of Support for the Political System in the Americas**

Discrimination may affect system support in part through its indirect association with internal and external efficacy. Nonetheless, we also examine whether experiences of discrimination are directly associated with system support. Indeed, we find that those who say they have been discriminated against in the workplace and in government offices have lower levels of system support. Turning to skin tone, we find that those with darker skin tone have somewhat lower levels of system support than those with lighter skin tones, though the relationship is not quite statistically significant at standard levels.[34]

Echoing our earlier findings with respect to external efficacy, citizens with greater household wealth are more supportive of their political systems, while those with higher educational levels are less supportive. It may be that education makes citizens more aware of the extent to which their systems do not live up to the ideals they embrace.

Next, we find that women, and especially female homemakers, are more supportive of their political systems than are men. Age presents a curvilinear relationship with system support. The oldest citizens are most supportive, while citizens in the 26-35 year old age bracket have lower levels of system support than do the youngest citizens, those ages 16-25. The size of the municipality is negatively related to system support: those living in larger metropolitan areas have lower levels of system support. Finally, citizens who are more politically engaged apparently support their political systems more strongly, though the effect of political interest is not as overwhelmingly strong as in the previous models we considered. Admittedly, it is not clear whether political interest leads to system support, or instead whether system support leads to political interest, but it is clear that the two variables are related to each other.

[34] Skin tone is statistically significant at $p = .096$.

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination might also have spillover effects on support for democracy in the abstract. However, support for democracy has been found to be a relatively robust disposition within the Americas, and is often more resistant to negative experiences than is system support. As discussed in depth in Chapter Six, one way the AmericasBarometer assesses the extent to which citizens support democracy is by using a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill: "democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government." In we use linear regression analysis to assess how the set of personal traits we reported above are associated with agreement with the "Churchillian" statement.[35]




**Figure III. 17. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas**

[35] Country fixed effects are included in the model, but are not shown in the figure.




**Figure III. 17. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas**

As we suspected, the determinants of support for democracy are quite different from the determinants of support for the political system. Here, internal efficacy is strongly associated with support for democracy, while external efficacy has a much smaller positive relationship. Neither workplace nor government discrimination is associated with democratic support, but those who are discriminated against in public places tend to express slightly lower levels of agreement with the notion that democracy is better than the alternatives. Those with darker skin tone have somewhat lower levels of democratic support, while those who are wealthier and especially those with more education are more supportive of democracy in the abstract. The older one gets, the more likely one is to agree that democracy beats the alternatives. In addition, citizens who live in rural areas and smaller cities support democracy to a greater extent than do those living in very large or capital cities. Finally and not unexpectedly, those who are more interested in politics more strongly support democracy in the abstract.

Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that experiences of discrimination and marginalization may at times shake citizens' faith in their political systems across the Americas. However, most of these experiences have relatively little direct effect on how those citizens feel about the democratic system more generally.

## V. Protest Participation

Last, as we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, marginalization and discrimination may lead some groups – especially those that are highly politicized – to join social movements and participate in protest politics. Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that in at least some countries throughout the Americas, the act of protesting is becoming a more "normalized" method of political participation: "individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest."[36] In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked a number of questions related to protest, including most importantly **PROT3**.

**PROT3.** In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to PROT6]**

In Figure III.18 we examine the levels of political protest throughout the Americas. In every country of the region, a fairly low percentage of citizens says they have taken part in a demonstration. In all but five countries, in fact, fewer than 10% of citizens reports this kind of participation. Bolivia and Haiti are the countries with highest levels of protest participation: close to 18% of Bolivians and Haitians report that they have participated in a protest in the past year. Meanwhile, protest is also over 10% in Peru, Paraguay, and Chile. At the other end of the spectrum, only 2% of Jamaicans say they have taken part in a protest or demonstration in the past year. The rate of protest is at or under 5% in nine other countries, with particularly low rates registered in El Salvador, Panama, Venezuela, Mexico, and Suriname.

[36] Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno Morales. 2010. "The Normalization of Protest in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




**Figure III. 18. Participation in Protests in the Countries of the Americas**

Who protests in the Americas? In Figure III.19 we use logistic regression analysis to consider whether and how experiences of marginalization and discrimination are related to protest politics for citizens in the Americas.[37] First, we find that internal and external efficacy have contrasting relationships to protesting. Citizens who believe they understand the important issues facing the country are *more* likely to go protest; however, those who say the people governing the country are interested in people like them are *less* likely to take to the streets.

[37] Country fixed effects are included in the analysis, but are not presented here.




**Figure III. 19. Determinants of Protest Participation in the Americas**

Second, those who say they have been the targets of discrimination in public places, at work, or in government offices are more likely to take to the streets across the countries of the Americas. However, skin tone appears to be unrelated to protest participation. Third, turning to social status indicators, household wealth is not related to whether a citizen takes part in a protest, but those with more education are also more likely to demonstrate. Fourth, women in general are not significantly less likely to take part in protests, but those who are homemakers do have lower rates of participation. Fifth, older citizens have lower levels of protest participation, while those who live in larger and more urban environments have slightly higher levels.[38] Finally, those who are more interested in politics are much more likely to take part in protests.

In Figure III.20 we use bivariate analysis to explore further how protest participation is related to several variables from the analysis presented in Figure III.19.[39] First, we find that discrimination victims have nearly double the rate of protest of those who say they have not been victimized by discrimination. While about 7% of those who have not been the target of discrimination in the workplace or in government offices say they have taken to the streets in the past year, the rate is closer to 14% for those who say they have been discrimination victims. It turns out that efficacy has a weaker direct association with protest, at least in the bivariate analysis. Those with low external efficacy have

[38] In analysis not shown here, we find that citizens who are under age 25 *and* who have some higher education are much more likely to protest even than others within their age cohort or at their levels of education. 13.5% of current/recent university students have taken part in a demonstration in the past year, while only 7.3% of other citizens have done so.
[39] The figure is based on the raw data, rather than on predicted results from the regression analyses.

levels of protest participation that are just 1 percentage point higher than among those with medium or high external efficacy. And those with high internal efficacy have protest rates that are only 3 percentage points above those with low internal efficacy.




**Figure III. 20. Efficacy, Discrimination, and Protest Participation in the Americas**

## VI. Conclusions

Discrimination and marginalization have pernicious effects for democracy in the Americas. As we have discussed in previous chapters, they may lower economic productivity and efficient use of human capital. They may lead to uneven rates of conventional political participation across groups. This uneven participation in turn may distort public policy by affecting the extent to which political systems are able to receive and process the preferences of all citizens. And discrimination and marginalization may exacerbate inequality over the long term, as citizens who are initially advantaged may tilt the playing field further in their own favor.

In this chapter, we have considered another way in which discrimination and marginalization can affect democratic systems: by affecting citizens' engagement with and evaluations of their political systems. After initially exploring experiences of discrimination, we examined how discrimination is associated with internal and external efficacy, meaning how citizens feel about their own political abilities (internal efficacy) and about whether politicians care about people like them (external efficacy). We found that discrimination is associated with *higher* internal efficacy, at the same time that it is associated with *lower* external efficacy.

We then examined whether and how discrimination shapes the legitimacy of the political system more generally, including both system support and support for democracy in the abstract. Discrimination victimization might affect legitimacy in part through its association with efficacy. That

is, citizens who are confident in their political abilities and who believe that politicians are interested in them are probably more likely to grant their political systems high levels of legitimacy. Indeed, internal efficacy is associated with both system support and support for democracy, while external efficacy is very strongly associated with support for the political system. Moreover, experiences of discrimination are also directly related to the political system's legitimacy. That is, those who say they have been discriminated against at work/school or in government offices have lower levels of system support, while those who say they have been discriminated against in public places have lower levels of support for democracy.

Last, we considered whether discrimination is related to political protest. As expected, those who say they have been the victims of discrimination at work and in government offices are more likely to go out to protest. In fact, the rates of protest participation for discrimination victims are close to double those for citizens who report that they have not been victims of discrimination. Efficacy is also associated with protesting: citizens with higher internal efficacy are more likely to take to the streets, while those with higher external efficacy are less likely to do so.

As we will argue in Chapter Six, democratic stability hinges on legitimacy. While many democratic polities across the Americas appear increasingly stable and consolidated, weak citizen support for political systems and for the democratic rules of the game can spell trouble. Prior LAPOP work has found that when legitimacy drops, political systems may be more prone to lapses in the democratic order, including coups and other instability. In this sense, it is important to understand how discrimination and marginalization may shape the legitimacy and stability of political systems. Our findings here certainly do not indicate that discrimination constitutes an immediate grave threat to the democratic order in any political system of the Americas. Nonetheless, these findings do suggest that in many countries, the systematic disadvantages of some groups may contribute to a steady erosion of democratic and political support that may, over the long term, weaken democratic systems.

## Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer* Insights *Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?[1]

The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.




[1] For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

## Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support

*This box reviews findings from the paper "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America," by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.*

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.[1] The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.[2] Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

**Experiences with Discrimination in Eight Countries**




Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP




Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

[1] The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

[2] The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

## Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information

*This box reviews findings from the 2012 report "Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results," by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.*

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.

The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.[1] As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

**Average support for democracy, by year and survey**




**Percentage who have received information about candidates, by gender and year**




[1] This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government."

# Part II:
# Governance, Political Engagement and Civil Society in the Americas

# Part Two

In this section of the report, we analyze trends in support for democracy in the Americas through the lens of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. Our goal is to understand whether democratic institutions enjoy widespread support and whether the norms that make democracy possible are well accepted throughout the hemisphere. Democracy is strengthened when its basic principles are accepted, i.e. if most citizens believe in fairness, equality, and political tolerance as broad principles.[1] Democracy is also strengthened when citizens trust well-functioning institutions and support democratic norms. To the extent these attitudes are not widespread in the Americas, it is crucial to understand where and why. In this sense, the analysis below points to potential trouble spots where support for democracy may be weakening.

We seek to explain why democratic values are more concentrated among some groups and in some countries than in others. We focus on three general sets of explanations. First, democratic legitimacy may be strengthened when the national government performs well. Second, democratic support may be strengthened when citizens view that government is working effectively at the local level. Finally, support for democratic institutions might be less a question of short-term performance than a longer-term process of socialization and development.

Democracy is valued both as a good in itself and because citizens expect it may deliver tangible benefits.[2] It is not merely for giving people a "say" in policy. It also provides incentives for politicians to provide good public policies, or suffer the consequences at the ballot box.[3] It is the promise of an improved quality of life that leads many people to support democracy in the first place.[4] When democracy fails to deliver these goods, disenchantment creates opportunities for challengers to the democratic system. For example, democracies can and do survive recessions but economic crises tend to make the collapse of democracy more likely, especially if the country is poor.[5] Survey data from Latin America even suggest that a substantial number of citizens in the region consider economic outcomes more important than democracy. Similar dynamics may also exist with respect to corruption and crime; some scholars argue that political governance outcomes have a larger impact on democratic

[1] Prothro, James and Charles Grigg. 1960. Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement. *Journal of Politics* 22 (1): 276-94; Inglehart and Welzel 2003; Booth, John and Mitchell Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[2] See Easton, David. 1975. A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support. *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (4): 435-57; Inglehart and Welzel (2003) further differentiate diffuse support between "overt" support for democracy itself and "intrinsic" support for democratic values such as liberty, speech, and diversity. See Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2003. Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages. *Comparative Politics* 36 (1): 61-79

[3] Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, 1999. Elections and Representation. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, Bernard Manin, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[4] Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes. 2001. Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental? *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (3): 447-74.

[5] Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Feng, Yi. 1997. Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth. *British journal of Political Science* 27 (3): 391-418.

stability than economic outcomes.[6] Seeing favored candidates win election may also shore up support for democracy while continued electoral loss and political exclusion may lead citizens to reject elections as a means for distributing power.[7] The importance of performance concerns is magnified for the most vulnerable sectors of the population who have the most to lose from bad government performance.[8]

Yet democracy in the Americas has proved resilient to the various fluctuations of the economy and ongoing problems of corruption and crime. One reason is citizens are able to distinguish between the performance of the incumbent ruling party, the overall party system, the performance of democratic institutions, and democracy itself.[9] Elections in the Americas have provided ample opportunities for voters to throw out incumbents who have failed to improve the economy[10], keep crime rates down[11], or avoid scandals and prevent corruption[12], although this is by no means a foregone conclusion.[13]

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[6] Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies. *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (4): 485-514; Bratton and Mattes 2001, *Ibid*; Seligson, Mitchell. 2002. The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries. *The Journal of Politics* 64 (2): 408–433; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*; Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3); Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

[7] Anderson, Christopher, *Losers' consent : elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1 (March 1): 66-81; Ryan E. Carlin and Matthew M. Singer. 2011. "Support for Polyarchy in the Americas." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(11):1500-1526.

[8] Abby Córdova and Mitchell Seligson, 2010. Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Latin American Politics and Society* 52 (2).

[9] Raymond M. Duch. 1995. Economic Chaos and the Fragility of Democratic Transition in Former Communist Regimes." *Journal of Politics*. (February); Booth and Seligson 2009; Canache, Damarys, and Michael E Allison. 2005. "Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (3): 91-111.

[10] Remmer, Karen. 2003. Elections and economics in contemporary Latin America, in *Post-Reform Politics in Latin America: Competition, Transition, Collapse*, Carol Wise and Riordan Roett, eds. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution; Remmer, Karen L. 1991. The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s. *American Political Science Review* 85: 777-800.; Echegaray, Fabian. 2005. *Economic Crises and Electoral Responses in Latin America*. New York: University Press of America; Singer, Matthew M. forthcoming. Economic Voting in an Era of (Non)Crisis: Economic Voting in Latin America 1982-2010. Forthcoming in *Comparative Politics*; Stokes, Susan C. 2001. *Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[11] Arce, Moises. 2003. Political violence and presidential approval in Peru. *The Journal of Politics* 65 (2): 572–583; Holmes, Jennifer S. and Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres forthcoming. Security and Economic Voting: Support for Incumbent Parties in Colombian Presidential Elections. Forthcoming in *Democratization*.

[12] Fackler, Tim, and Tse-min Lin. 1995. "Political Corruption and Presidential Elections, 1929-1992." The Journal of Politics 57 (4): 971-993; Seligson, Mitchell. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* 34 (2): 381-404.

Incumbents have occasionally been forced out due to policy failures in non-electoral years via "popular coups"[14] yet these interruptions of the regular order of succession appear to have no lasting negative impact on democracy (yet).[15] These elections in recent years have resulted in widespread ideological shifts as voters seek to empower governments that will implement preferred policy agendas[16] and avoid the perceived policy mistakes of the past.[17] But if voters use electoral control to attempt to improve political, economic and social outcomes and these results are not obtained, they may begin to question the utility of elections as a mean of social change.

The majority of the literature linking support for democracy to government performance has focused on policy areas conceived at the national level like the economy or corruption. Yet most people are more likely to interact more with the local government than with national government officials and so it may be local government that exemplifies whether democracy is working or not. Moreover, crime and corruption may be issues that are affected most heavily by decisions made by the local-level officials who enforce the laws and with whom citizens interact. Local government can be particularly useful for helping facilitate contact with groups that have been traditionally disadvantaged at the national level, although many governments have failed to do so.[18] Previous studies have shown that evaluations of local government performance affect how citizens evaluate democracy as a whole.[19] Decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.

An alternative perspective on democratic attitudes is that they are not shaped by short-term performance concern but are rather the result of long term socialization processes that lead people to value participating in politics and to support the political rights of those they disagree with. Support for democratic values has been shown to strengthen democracy as citizens push for the expansion of political freedoms.[20] While support for democratic institutions and evaluations of democracy's performance are a function of short-term performance concerns, these values are fostered by economic

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[13] Manzetti, Luigi and Carol Wilson. 2007. Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support? *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (8): 949 -970.

[14] Llanos, Mariana and Leiv Marsteintredet. 2010. *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

[15] Hochstetler, Kathryn, and David Samuels. 2011. Crisis and Rapid Reequilibration: The Consequences of Presidential Challenge and Failure in Latin America. *Comparative Politics* 43: 127-145.

[16] Andy Baker and Kenneth F. Greene 2011. The Latin American Left's Mandate: Free Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies. *World Politics* 63 (1): 43-77

[17] Remmer, Karen L. 2012. The Rise of Leftist– Populist Governance in Latin America: The Roots of Electoral Change. *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (8): 947-42.

[18] West, Karleen. 2011. The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. *Papers from the AmericasBarometer*. Vanderbilt University.; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "'This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. 2009. "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.

[19] Hiskey, Jonathan, Seligson, Mitchell. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308; West, Karleen. 2011. The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. *Papers from the AmericasBarometer*. Vanderbilt University.

[20] Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

development and especially by the expansion of education.[21] The question is whether attitudes toward democracy can become sufficiently "consolidated"[22] that citizens will respond to weak performance by demanding political change but not reject democracy itself.

We take up these themes in the three subsequent chapters. **Chapter 4** looks at government performance on the three issues cited as the most important problems in the region: the economy, crime, and corruption. A positive finding of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey is that government performance is perceived to be improving. Citizens' assessments of the state of the economy, for example, are mixed but nonetheless have generally trended upward over the past 8 years. This pattern holds vis-à-vis fear of crime and perceptions of government corruption. In step with those positive shifts, life satisfaction in the region has increased as well. However, weak spots remain for democratic governance. Levels of crime and corruption remain high as does poverty and various forms of social exclusion. Moreover, the most vulnerable members of society remain the most negative about the national economy, as they are often excluded from its benefits. The traditionally marginalized are also the most fearful of crime in their neighborhood and homes, even if most victims of crime and corruption are wealthy. A final warning exists with regards to the frequency of being targeted for bribes, which has increased relative to previous years. Yet the overall positive trend can potentially strengthen democratic institutions in the region.

**Chapter 5** moves the focus toward local government. We examine who interacts with local government, whether or not they feel local government is effective, and their overall levels of satisfaction with local government. These data find substantial dissatisfaction with government effectiveness at the subnational level. Most people do not interact with local government and even fewer are satisfied with the response to their demands. We also find evaluations of key local government services are relatively low in the Americas. Moreover, there has been little improvement in evaluations of these services over time. Furthermore, people's trust in their local government is strongly influenced by their evaluation of local services and their interaction with local governments. Thus the weakness of local government remains a potential problem for the further consolidation of democratic attitudes in the region.

**Chapter 6** concludes with an analysis of recent trends in democratic attitudes. We begin by analyzing trust in democratic institutions and support for the rule of law. We then move to looking at support for the political regime and tolerance for the political rights of dissenters, two attitudes that Booth and Seligson have shown are conducive for democracy stability. While support for the rule of law, trust in democratic institutions, and support for the political system have increased over time, political tolerance and support for democracy have remained relatively stable. Government

[21] Lipset, Seymour M. 1994. The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address. *American Sociological Review* 59 (1): 1-22; Norris, Pippa. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. New York; Oxford University Press; Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 1999. What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies. *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (1): 30-62; Huang, Min-hua, Yu-tzung Chang, and Yun-han Chu. 2008. Identifying sources of democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis. *Electoral Studies* 27 (1): 45-62.

[22] See Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

performances on the economy, crime, and corruption affect attitudes toward democracy, as does local government quality. Yet the impact of these performance questions is more muted for general attitudes about the way in which government should work than for specific questions about how it is working now.

In general, democratic attitudes in the region appear to be stabilizing. But in many countries significant gulfs in support for democratic norms, institutions, and tolerance remain. Our analysis indicates increasing the capacity of state institutions tasked with economic policy, fighting crime, rooting out corruption and maintaining transparency will go a long way towards deepening the attitudinal and normative foundations of democracy in the Americas. A similar policy benefit can be expected to accrue from strengthening local governance, both in its ability to interface with citizens more consistently and in the ability to provide services more effectively. From a policy perspective, this implies a need for continued development and strengthening of democratic institutions across the Americas, and for monitoring the public's assessments of these efforts.

# Chapter Four: Questions of Performance: Economics, Corruption, Crime, and Life Satisfaction in the Americas

*Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory Love, Mollie Cohen, and Amy Erica Smith*

## I. Introduction

This chapter documents recent trends in government performance in the Americas. Specifically, it looks at economic performance, crime, and corruption, the three policy areas widely perceived as the most pressing problems facing governments in the region. These issues are important in their own right, but they also have implications for democratic support because it is the promise of an improved quality of life that leads many people to support democracy in the first place.[1] When democracy fails to deliver these goods, disenchantment may weaken support for democracy.[2] Similar dynamics may also exist with respect to corruption and crime; some scholars argue that political governance outcomes have a larger impact on democratic stability than economic outcomes.[3] The importance of performance concerns is expected to be especially large for the most vulnerable sectors of the population who have the most to lose from bad government performance.[4] Thus it is important to track how citizens evaluate these performance outcomes over time and across countries as they may highlight areas where democratic support is likely to be comparatively weak.

On balance, the analysis in this chapter presents good news: the average respondent in the Americas is more likely to have positive views of the economy, of the security situation, and of corruption levels in his or her country in 2012 compared to 2010. In tandem, average levels of

[1] Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes. 2001. Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental? *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (3): 447-74.

[2] Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*; New York: Cambridge University Press. Feng, Yi. 1997. Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth. *British Journal of Political Science* 27 (3): 391-418.

[3] Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies. *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (4): 485-514; Bratton and Mattes 200. *Ibid*; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* 64 (2): 408–433; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*; Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3): 99-128; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research,* (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

[4] Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, 2010. "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean." *Latin American Politics and Society* 52 (2): 1-35.

life satisfaction, a summary measure of individuals' quality of life, are also increasing throughout the hemisphere.

Yet data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey balance this good news with some cautionary notes. While fears of crime and perceived levels of corruption have fallen, experiences of being targeted to pay a bribe have not shown the same consistent pattern of decrease over time. Levels of crime have been similarly inconsistent: improving in some countries and worsening in others. Moreover, large differences exist with regards to performance across countries, with many countries continuing to experience poor governance or a weak economy. Finally, demographic groups systematically differ in their ability to capture the benefits of the overall positive upward trend. Indeed the impoverished, women, the darker skinned, and those with low levels of education are among the least likely to evaluate the economy positively or to feel safe in their neighborhood.

Some key findings in this chapter are as follows:

- The economy and crime are widely perceived as the most important problems facing countries in the hemisphere. Corruption is less likely to be considered a priority.
- While more people describe the economy in negative terms than in positive terms, levels of optimism about the national economy and respondents' personal finances have increased over time as has household wealth.
- Despite the amount of publicity given to crime in the Americas, reported levels of fear of crime have fallen recently, and reported experiences with crime victimization are lower in 2012 than in 2010. Yet crime rates have dropped less in some regions of the hemisphere than in others.
- While perceptions of overall levels of corruption within the government have decreased over time, the percentage of respondents who reported paying a bribe in the last year is higher in the 2012 surveys than in 2010.
- Life satisfaction is strongly linked to economic outcomes and, more weakly, to fear of crime and exposure to corruption. Thus as respondents report improving economic and security situations, average levels of life satisfaction have increased in the hemisphere.

## II. Evaluations of the Most Important Problems Facing Countries in the Americas

Respondents to the AmericasBarometer surveys are asked "In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country?" In Figure IV.1, we break down the more than 50 general responses that were recorded to this question into 5 general topic areas.[5] For example,

[5] We follow Singer (forthcoming), where this methodology and coding scheme are discussed at more length.

respondents who said the most important problem was "Economy, problems with, crisis of," "Inflation or high prices", "Unemployment", "Poverty" or "Inequality" are classified as saying that the most important problem facing their country was the *Economy*. Other categories of problems include *Crime (and Violence)*[6], *Corruption/Governance*[7], *Social Policy (and Infrastructure)*[8], and *Other*[9] problems that do not fit neatly into these categories.

In interpreting these data, we emphasize that respondents are only allowed to name the single most important problem. So although some issues are not singled out as the most important problem in a country, we should not conclude that they are not concerns or that they do not affect attitudes towards political institutions or democracy. Yet this question provides a general snapshot of what issues are currently considered "problems" and, among those problem areas, which ones are most likely to be considered priorities.

Two issues have dominated public concerns over the past 6 years: the economy and crime, with the economy considered the larger of the two problems. This echoes a global tendency for people to prioritize the national economy as an electoral issue over other aspects of government performance due to its direct impact on citizen welfare and consumption.[10] However, the percentage of respondents who consider the *Economy* the most important problem has dropped from 46 percent in 2008 to 38 percent in 2012. This swing reflects changes in the hemisphere's economic fortunes. Latin America and the Caribbean weathered the recent economic downturn relatively well. From 2008-2011, growth rates in the region averaged 3.3 percent while the average European economy contracted 0.14 percent.[11] These improvements have not gone unnoticed by citizens. As the next section shows, evaluations of national economies in the Americas have improved over time. So while economic issues remain the most important problem facing citizens of the Americas, recent economic gains have created space for concerns about other issues.

The high level of attention to crime in the region is also not surprising. Roughly a third of respondents in the Americas in this period name crime as their country's most pressing problem. And citizens are rightfully concerned. Homicide rates in the Americas are substantially higher than in any other world region except Africa. Specifically, at 15.6 murders per 100,000

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[6] Responses included in this category: crime, popular protests (strikes, road blockades), drug addiction, drug trafficking, gangs, security (lack of), armed conflict, kidnappings, forced displacement of persons, human rights, violations of, violence, impunity, the rule of law.

[7] Responses included in this category: corruption, bad government, politicians

[8] Responses included in this category: credit, lack of; roads in poor condition; water, lack of; population explosion; education, lack of, poor quality; health services, lack of; malnutrition; electricity, lack of; discrimination; housing; transportation, problems of.

[9] Responses included in this category: land to farm, lack of; environment; migration; war against terrorism; external debt; terrorism; earthquake reconstruction; the constitution; and "other" which comprises 3 percent of responses.

[10] Singer, Matthew M. ""Who Says "It's the Economy"? Cross-National and Cross-Individual Variation in the Salience of Economic Performance." *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (March 2011): 284-312.

[11] Based on IMF World Economic Outlook statistics, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx. For a more extensive discussion of the relatively muted effect of the global economic slowdown on Latin America, see Seligson, Mitchell A. and Amy Erica Smith. "The Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Political Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times" (2010). http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2010/2010-comparative-en-revised.pdf

inhabitants, the 2011 homicide rate in the Americas was more than double the global average of 6.9 victims per 100,000 and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).[12]




**Figure IV. 1. The Most Important Problem Facing the Country, by Year**

In the period 2006-2011, we observe significant regional differences, with homicide rates increasing in 5 of the 8 Central American countries and Mexico while they fell throughout South America over the same period of time.[13] Other forms of crime (theft, assault, etc.) are also dropping in the region they remain, again, higher than the global average.[14] Thus, the recent rise in the importance of crime to citizens in the Americas likely reflects the increase of crime in certain regions as well as more robust economic performance, which makes individuals feel freer to identify other issues as the "most important." This interpretation is bolstered by greater prominence of corruption and social policies since 2008: as economic issues become less pressing, respondents are more likely to focus on problems of governance.

These aggregate trends obscure differences across countries. These differences are shown, from one perspective, in the comparative charts that make up Figures IV.2, 3 and 4.

[12] UNDOC, "2011 Global Study on Homicides." http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf
[13] *Ibid*, pages 10-11.
[14] Costa, "Citizen Security in Latin America."




**Figure IV. 2. Percentage Identifying the Economy as the Most Important Problem by Country, 2012**

Our analyses of these data reveal that the economy is the most important problem to a plurality of respondents in 13 countries, many of which are located in the Caribbean or the Western Andes (Belize, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and United States). Crime tops the list in 10 countries, including Mexico, much of Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala), Trinidad & Tobago, Colombia, Venezuela, and the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay). In the latter, data presented later suggest crime victimization has increased over time. Corruption and governance rate as the most important problems in only one country (Honduras). The United States also scores high on this dimension: 15 percent of U.S. respondents identified "bad government" as a problem and "politicians" another 8 percent. Finally, only in Brazil do the most commonly cited problems involve social policy, namely concerns with health services (cited by 21 percent).




**Figure IV. 3. Percentage Identifying Crime as the Most Important Problem by Country, 2012**

In brief, our analyses of the data reveal that individuals' perceptions of the most important issues facing their countries correspond to their personal experiences.[15] Those who think the economy is bad are more likely to see the economy as the most important problem. Similarly, crime as the most important problem for crime victims, and for who think corruption is rampant, corruption. Thus the citizens of the Americas are well aware of the problems facing

[15] The analysis in this paragraph is based on a multinomial logit analysis of responses to the 5-category most important problem codes displayed in Figure IV.1. The results of the analysis are available in Appendix 1 to this Chapter.

their countries and more likely to focus on non-economic problems as region's economies stay afloat in the global economic storm.




**Figure IV. 4. Percentage Identifying Corruption as the Most Important Problem by Country, 2012**

## The Economy

Over 177 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean and roughly 30 percent of the region's residents live in poverty. Of these, 70 million endure extreme poverty in which their nutritional needs go unmet.[16] While dreadful, these poverty rates are at their lowest in 20 years. Indeed, 45 percent of the region lived in poverty in 1999. This major reduction in poverty is due

[16] United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Social Panorama of Latin America* http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/5/45175/P45175.xml&xsl=/dds/tpl-i/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl-i/top-bottom.xslt

not only to the vigorous economic growth noted above,[17] but also, in many instances, to serious investments in social programs.[18] Data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey captures these dual trends. On the one hand, most respondents have a mixed to negative view of economic performance, which corresponds to the high levels of poverty and low levels of development in many countries. On the other hand, growing satisfaction with the current state of the economy suggests citizens of the Americas both recognize economic gains and enjoy at least some of their benefits.

To assess perceptions of the current state of the economy in the Americas, we focus on the following question from the AmericasBarometer Survey:[19]

> **SOCT1**. How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
> (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad

Respondents had mixed views of the economy in 2012. Most respondents said the national economy was neither good nor bad, but negative views of the economy outweighed positive ones (Figure IV.5). Yet these data actually represent an improvement over previous years. Figure IV.6 graphs average (mean) regional scores on this question since 2004. Following standard LAPOP procedure, we rescaled responses to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents the perception that the economy is "very bad" and 100 represents the perception that the economy is "very good." Views of the economy were more optimistic in 2012 than in any other year. In 2004 only 7.5 percent of respondents said the economy was either very good or good and in 2006 that percentage stood at 11 percent. By 2012, that rate had nearly doubled to 21 percent. Conversely, the percentage of respondents who judged the economy as very bad or bad dropped from 57 to 34 over the 2004-2012 period.[20]

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[17] Based on IMF World Economic Outlook statistics, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx

[18] See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/03/picture.htm

[19] The survey actually asks respondents two questions about the state of the national economy. The first (SOCT1) asks respondents to assess the current state of the national economy while the second (SOCT2) asks about the trend over time "Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?" Although comparing these two questions shows some differences in the level and trend of the national economy, responses tend to be correlated at the individual (Pearson's $r$ = 0.41) and at the country level (Pearson's $r$ = 0.69). Thus, to streamline the analysis we present the data on how people evaluate the current state of the national economy (and their personal finances in the subsequent section). The results on how economic performance is associated with democratic attitudes in Chapter 6 are unaffected by the choice of indicator.

[20] In all the trend analyses in this and subsequent chapters, the graphs represent the countries that were included in each wave of the survey. However, the number of countries surveyed has increased from 11 (primarily in Mexico, Central America, and the Andes) to 26 in 2012. Thus as a robustness check we have replicated all analyses with only the countries that were included in all 4 waves to ensure that the trends discussed below are not being primarily driven by changes in the composition of the sample. While most trends are fairly general, any exceptions are noted in the text.




**Figure IV. 5. Evaluations of the National Economy, 2012**




**Figure IV. 6. Evaluations of the National Economy Over Time**

As Figure IV.7 shows, opinions about the economy differ systematically across countries, with some regional patterns.[21] Respondents tend to see the economy more positively in South America than in the Mexico and Central America or the Caribbean. Within North America, the national economy is more commonly seen as good in Canada and bad in the United States.




**Figure IV. 7. Evaluations of the National Economy by Country, 2012**

[21] Following LAPOP practices, responses to these questions have been re-coded on a 100 point scale, with high values representing positive evaluations of the economy.




**Figure IV. 8. Factors Associated with Evaluations of the National Economic Situation**

To understand how economic assessments differ across countries and within them we model evaluations of the national economy using a hierarchical linear model, with the results of this analysis depicted in Figure IV.8.[22] Evaluations of the national economy generally reflect national economic trends: citizens are more optimistic about the economy in countries where GDP grew in 2011 and are less optimistic about the economy where unemployment was high. Inflation does not affect evaluations of economic performance in the hemisphere, a finding consistent with the idea that resolving hyperinflation in much of the region has reduced the salience of inflation as a national concern.[23]

[22] As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.

[23] Singer, Mathew M. 2013. "Economic Voting in an Era of (Non)Crisis: Economic Voting in Latin America 1982-2010. *Comparative Politics* (January).

Evaluations of the national economy also differ across socio-demographics and individuals' personal economic circumstances. Specifically:

- Men have significantly more positive views of the economy than women.
- Wealthy citizens have significantly more positive views of the economy than poor ones.
- Individuals with high levels of education view the national economy far more positively than those with little education.
- Negative attitudes toward the economy are potentially lower among individuals with darker skin, although this pattern is not quite significant at conventional levels.
- Young people tend to have more positive opinions of the economy than do all other age groups.

According to these data, members of groups who have traditionally been marginalized from to the national economy -- such as the poor, the uneducated, and women -- are likely to judge the national economy more harshly.

Citizens in the Americas also tend to see the national economy through a partisan lens. Those who self-identify with the ruling executive's party rate the national economy more positively than opposition partisans; and, the economic ratings given by political independents fall between these two extremes. In other words, individuals evaluate economic outcomes not simply according to strict objective standards, but also in light of their short-term consequences for their party. A similar pattern has been observed in Western Europe and the United States.[24]

Partisan colorings aside, evaluations of the economy do appear capture real differences in economic output and personal economic vulnerabilities. The AmericasBarometer asked the following question to evaluate respondents' personal financial situation: "How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?" While we do not present these data in detail, three findings merit mention. First, evaluations of personal economic circumstances in the Americas are on the same general upward trend as evaluations of the national economy. Second, countries where respondents tend to have more positive views of the national economy tend to have citizens that have more positive views of their personal economic circumstances. Third, evaluations of personal economic situation are slightly more positive than are evaluations of the national economy. For example, 34 percent of respondents judged the national economy either bad or very bad, while only 16 percent of respondents evaluated their own personal economic situation in the same negative terms.

An alternative way of thinking about economic performance is to consider access to various finished capital goods. The AmericasBarometer survey asks whether respondents own a television, refrigerator, telephone (landline or cellular), car, washing machine, microwave oven,

[24] Duch, Raymond M., Harvey D. Palmer, and Christopher J. Anderson. 2000."Heterogeneity in Perceptions of National Economic Conditions." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (4): 635–52; Evans, Geoffrey, and Robert Andersen. 2006. "The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions." *Journal of Politics* 68 (1): 194–207.

motorcycle, or computer, and whether their house has indoor plumbing and an indoor bathroom.[25] From these questions, we generate a scale of household wealth that can range from 0 (owns none of the goods) to 100 (owns all of them).[26]

Since 2006, the upward trend in household wealth (see Figure IV.9) mirrors that of citizen perceptions of the national economy. A hierarchical model, not presented here, finds household wealth is significantly higher among those who live in large cities, are highly educated, and older respondents. Wealth also tends to be lower for women and those with darker skin.[27]




**Figure IV. 9. Wealth Measured by Goods Ownership, by Year**

In summary, perceptions of economic circumstances in the Americas in 2012 are decidedly mixed. Negative opinions outweigh positive ones, although the largest share of respondents describe the economy as neither good nor bad. Positive economic assessments responses have increased over time, as has household wealth. At the same time, large disparities continue to exist across countries as well as within them.

[25] These questions are not asked in the United States or Canada.
[26] We do not use the relative wealth measure used in the rest of this report because we are interested in the absolute level of wealth, even though the relative level may be the more relevant consideration for political attitudes.
[27] See the regression analysis in
Appendix 2 to this Chapter. One advantage of this question is that it is not affected by partisan variables in the same way that more general economic perceptions are.

## Crime

Crime is the second most frequently cited major problem facing countries in the Americas. This section tracks reported rates of crime victimization in the region as well as the degree of security citizens feel in their neighborhoods.

Perceptions of respondent security are measured using the question:

**AOJ11**. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe

Nearly 70 percent of AmericasBarometer respondents report feeling either very or somewhat safe in their neighborhood (see Figure IV.10). Overall levels of insecurity are at their lowest since 2004 (see Figure IV.11).[28] In analyses not shown here, we find that while the percentage of people who feel *very* safe has not changed much over time, the proportion saying that they feel at least *somewhat* safe has increased fairly steadily since 2004.[29] The largest drops in fear of crime occurred in Paraguay, Chile, Panama, Honduras, and Peru,[30] while insecurity levels in Mexico, El Salvador, and Venezuela remained fairly stagnant.




**Figure IV. 10. Levels of Insecurity in the Americas, 2012**

[28] This trend exists in Central America, South America and the Caribbean and thus is not merely a reflection of adding cases over time from regions where insecurity levels are lower.
[29] This is based on analysis not shown here, but available from the authors.
[30] This is based on analysis not shown here, but available from the authors.




**Figure IV. 11. Levels of Insecurity Over Time**




**Figure IV. 12. Feelings of Insecurity by Country, 2012**

The rosy regional trend disguises substantial differences across the countries of the Americas in 2012 (Figure IV.12).[31] Feelings of insecurity are especially high in the Andes (Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) but also in Haiti, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. In the case of Haiti, individuals displaced by the earthquake and living in camps perceive the least security.[32]

[31] Following LAPOP practices, responses to these questions have been recoded on a 100 point scale, with high values representing negative evaluations of the security situation in their neighborhood.
[32] From an analysis not presented here, but available from the authors.




**Figure IV. 13. Feelings of Insecurity by Capitals, 2012**

A surprising pattern of Figure IV.12 is that perceived insecurity tends to be higher in South America than in Central America and Mexico. These data are in line official crime statistics (compiled by the United Nations): whereas homicide rates are substantially higher in Central America, rates of assault, robbery, and sexual assault are higher in South America.[33] But these data mask important differences within countries. For example, while Mexico has the 8th highest insecurity index overall, feelings of insecurity among residents of Mexico City are significantly higher than the country's average and thus Mexico City has the highest level of insecurity of any capital district in the hemisphere for which we have data (Figure IV.13). Fear of crime is also substantially higher in Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, and Asunción than the national average in Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay, respectively.

[33] http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/data.html

Other pockets of high insecurity also exist beyond these capitals. Mexico is a prime example. Our analyses of the data (not shown here) reveal that over 50 percent of respondents in the states of Chihuahua, Mexico, Zacatecas, and Baja California reported feeling either very or somewhat insecure in their neighborhood compared to less than 15 percent of respondents in Oaxaca, Durango, Tlaxcala, or Campeche.[34] This regional variation in Mexico and in other countries serves as a reminder that national-level observations and trends may not always apply with equal force to citizens in all parts of the countries under study.

It is important to note that perceptions of insecurity are not necessarily grounded in experiences with crime. Thus the AmericasBarometer surveys track levels of crime victimization using two questions:

| |
|---|
| **VIC1EXT**. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?[35]<br>(1) Yes (2) No |
| **VIC1HOGAR.** Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?<br>(1) Yes (2) No |

The first question referring to personal crime experience has been asked since 2004 while the household question was introduced in 2010. Just over 17 percent of respondents reported being a victim of a crime in the last year (see Figure IV.14). But by combining these two questions, we generate an index of household victimization that tracks whether the respondent or another person living with them was a crime victim. This index demonstrates that broad impact crime has on lives in the Americas: one in four households experienced a crime last year (Figure IV.15).

[34] The AmericasBarometer survey is representative at the regional level instead of at the state level, so exact estimates of state-level patterns cannot be estimated.

[35] The question wording was changed slightly (expanded to include examples of types of crime) in 2010, and this same wording was used in 2012.




**Figure IV. 14. Individual Crime Victimization Over Time**

Yet these data represent an improvement over 2010, as crime levels fell back to their previously measured level from 2006. The improvement was much larger in the southern cone of South America and in the Caribbean, however, than it was in Mexico, Central America, or the Andes: while crime victimization levels in these countries fell in 2012 relative to 2010 they generally remain above their 2004-2008 levels.[36]

[36] This is based on analysis not shown in the figure, but available from the authors.




**Figure IV. 15. Household Crime Victimization Over Time**

Crime victims were also asked to identify the form that the crime they experienced took. As Figure IV.16 shows, the most common crimes were unarmed robbery (which more often than not did not entail physical violence or confrontation) and armed robbery. Burglary is also common.




**Figure IV. 16. Types of Crimes that are Most Common, 2012**




**Figure IV. 17. Crime Victimization by Country, 2012**




**Figure IV. 18. Crime Victimization by Capitals, 2012**

Cross-national patterns in crime victimization generally match those in perceived levels of insecurity, with the highest levels of reported crime in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru (Figure IV.18).[1] Yet the United States and Canada, the two countries where fear of crime are the lowest in the hemisphere in Figure IV.13, are not the countries with the lowest levels of experienced crime. A similar gap between relatively low levels of fear of crime and relatively high levels of crime victimization exists in Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras, and Paraguay. On the other hand, reported victimization rates are lower than one would expect based on the levels of fear of crime in Haiti, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, El Salvador, and Belize. Just as with perceived insecurity, residents of South American countries were more likely to report being a crime victim than were residents in Central America and Mexico, the Caribbean, or North America.

[1] Levels of perceived insecurity and levels of crime victimization correlate $r = 0.69$ at the country-level.

However, country-level trends do not always reflect the experiences of respondents in capital districts; while crime experiences are generally higher in capital districts than they are in the rest of the country, this gap is especially large in the case of Tegucigalpa, Bogota, Guatemala City, Mexico City, Managua, and Asunción. We suggest that these dynamics may shape how crime is covered in the media these countries and abroad.

While trends in fear of crime and experiences with crime generally coincide across countries, there are different patterns at the individual level. Figure IV.19 presents the results of a regression model analyzing the correlates of fear of crime in the neighborhood and Figure IV.20 estimates the same model for actual crime victimization.[2] Some factors are associated with both – living in a big city makes respondents both feel more insecure and more likely to experience a crime, older respondents both feel generally secure and are less likely to be crime victims. Yet income, wealth, skin color, and gender have differential effects. Women, for example, are less likely to experience crime than men are, but women are much more fearful of crime in their neighborhood. Wealthy individuals, in contrast, feel safer in their neighborhoods but are more likely to be victimized. Education is unrelated to fear of crime but positively related to being targeted. Finally, middle aged individuals report slightly higher levels of insecurity than either the old or the young, but young people are the most likely crime victims in the Americas.




**Figure IV. 19. Factors Associated with Feeling Insecure**

[2] The models are estimated with fixed effects to adjust for clustering at country level and differences across countries. Figure IV.19 is an OLS regression while Figure IV20 and Figure IV.21 are binary logits. Similar patterns obtain if crime victimization is measured at the household level.




**Figure IV. 20. Factors Associated with Being a Crime Victim, 2012**

These differences across groups reflect, at least in part, differences in where crimes occur. Responses to a follow up question about where the crime occurred can be categorized as in one's home, in one's neighborhood, or beyond one's neighborhood. According to the AmericasBarometer, roughly 48 percent of crimes occurred beyond victims' neighborhoods, 23 percent occurred in the neighborhood but outside the home, and 28 percent of crimes occurred inside the home.[3] We model the likelihood of the crime occurring beyond one's home and neighborhood in Figure IV.21.[4] Education and wealth are associated with an increased likelihood of being targeted outside one's neighborhood. Women and the elderly, in contrast, tend to be targeted closer to home. We interpret these findings as follows. The wealthy and well educated cannot protect themselves from being targeted as they move about the city for work or pleasure but they do achieve security (public and/or private) in their neighborhoods and homes. By contrast, individuals with fewer resources and less mobility are more likely to be targeted where they live and, thus, feel less secure in their neighborhoods.

[3] These results are based on analysis not shown in the figures, but available from the authors.
[4] The model estimates a binary logit for whether the victim was targeted at home or in the neighborhood (0) compared to locations further afield (1); country fixed effects are included.




**Figure IV. 21. (Among Crime Victims) Factors Associated with the Crime Occurring in a Location Other than the Victim's Home or Neighborhood**

Another difference with respect to crime across groups is the type of crimes different types of individuals are most likely to experience. In analyses we conducted of the data, we find that, among crime victims, wealthy individuals are less likely to be the victim of a violent crime (assault, armed robbery, or unarmed robbery conducted via the threat of violence).[5] Burglaries are also less common for the wealthy. Thus crimes targeting poor individuals are significantly more likely to involve violence and the violation of the victim's home than are crimes targeting more wealthy individuals, which may generate different forms of insecurity than do the crimes targeting wealthy victims.

## Corruption

Corruption and "poor government" represent the third most frequently cited problem facing countries in the Americas. Studies in economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. Corruption of course also undermines the egalitarian

[5] These results are based on analysis not shown in the figures, but available from the authors.

administration of justice.[6] Some have further suggested that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.[7]

The data from the AmericasBarometer provide two distinct takes on governance trends within the region. Just as economic performance and the security situation have show improvement, data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys suggest perceived levels of corruption is falling. *Yet*, the percentage of individuals who report being targeted for a bribe has followed a different path, increasing in 2012 after a slight drop in 2010.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, and these are deployed in the AmericasBarometer surveys. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking such questions as: "Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions).[8] By asking about the variety of ways in which individuals interact with government, the data provide an extensive snapshot of the forms corruption can take.

[6] Pharr, Susan J. 2000. "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform.* New York: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

[7] Rothstein, Bo, and Eric M. Uslaner. 2005. "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust" *World Politics* 51 (Oct): 41-72; Rothstein, Bo and Daniel Eek. 2009. "Political Corruption and Social Trust: An Experimental Approach" *Rationality and Society* 21 (February): 81-112.

[8] Question **EXC20**, on bribery by military officials, was introduced for the first time in 2012.

| | No | Yes |
|---|---|---|
| Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life... | | |
| **EXC2**. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? | 0 | 1 |
| **EXC6**. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? | 0 | 1 |
| [**DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]**<br>**EXC20**. In the last twelve months, did any **soldier or military officer** ask you for a bribe? | 0 | 1 |
| **EXC11**. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government?<br>If the answer is No → mark 99<br>If it is Yes→ ask the following:<br>In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law? | 0 | 1 |
| **EXC13**. Do you work?<br>If the answer is No → mark 99<br>If it is Yes→ ask the following:<br>In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months? | 0 | 1 |
| **EXC14**. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts?<br>If the answer is No → mark 99<br>If it is Yes→ ask the following:<br>Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months? | 0 | 1 |
| **EXC15**. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months?<br>If the answer is No → mark 99<br>If it is Yes→ ask the following:<br>In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe? | 0 | 1 |
| **EXC16**. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months?<br>If the answer is No → mark 99<br>If it is Yes→ ask the following:<br>Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months? | 0 | 1 |

Across these various potential situations for graft to occur, roughly one in five people report that they had been asked for a bribe in one of these settings in the last year (see Figure IV.22).




**Figure IV. 22. Corruption Victimization, 2012**




**Figure IV. 23. Levels of Corruption Victimization, by Year**




**Figure IV. 24. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2012**

Corruption victimization varies substantially within the hemisphere, with Haiti as a major outlier followed by Bolivia and Ecuador (see Figure IV.24). These three countries are also those that saw the largest increase in corruption victimization relative to the 2010 surveys. Among those that were asked for a bribe, the majority only had to pay a bribe in a single location and 83 percent paid only one or two bribes.[9]

The percentage of respondents who are corruption victims in 2012 (19.5) is lower than in the 2004 and 2006 and on par with 2008 (Figure IV.25). Although corruption victimization levels had fallen in 2008 and in 2010, the uptick in 2012 represents a slight deterioration in governance quality at the citizen level.

[9] These results are based on analysis not shown in the figures, but available from the authors.

Corruption victims have a similar profile to crime victims. As Figure IV.25[10], shows, in particular, those more likely to be victimized by corruption are significantly more likely to be: highly educated, wealthy, urban dwellers, between 26 and 50 years old, and male. Corruption victims thus tend to have frequent dealings with government officials and more resources for those officials to extract. There is no significant difference in corruption targeting across skin colors once country differences are accounted for.




**Figure IV. 25. Factors Associated with Being a Victim of Corruption, 2012**

In addition to tracking personal experiences, the AmericasBarometer survey asked respondents to evaluate the state of corruption in their country:

> **EXC7**. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon?

Responses to EXC7 are re-coded on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the perception that corruption is "very uncommon" and 100 represents the perception that corruption is "very common."

[10] The figure represents a binary logit analysis with country fixed effects.

Public officials in the Americas continue to be widely perceived as corrupt. Over 38 percent of respondents said corruption was very common in their country and nearly 80 percent described corruption as "very common" or "common" (Figure IV.26). Yet this actually represents an improvement over previous years (Figure IV.27). So while actual levels of corruption have remained the same or increased in 2012, levels of perceived corruption have decreased. This owes in part to ever rosier assessments of the economy, i.e. people less likely to see the government as corrupt when they view economy as strong.




**Figure IV. 26. Perceptions of Corruption, 2012**




**Figure IV. 27. Perceptions of Corruption Over Time**




**Figure IV. 28. Perceived Government Corruption by Country, 2012**

There is substantial variation in perceived levels of corruption across countries (Figure IV.28) and, more interestingly, weak correspondence between those results and mean levels of corruption victimization. For example, Haiti, Ecuador, and Bolivia are outliers on corruption victimization but in the middle of the pack on perceived corruption among public officials. The correlation between the two corruption measures is stronger if those three countries are excluded, but still smaller than, say, the perceptions/experiences correlations for the economy and crime.[11] The discrepancy between perceived levels of corruption and reported corruption rates is a common pattern in corruption studies because corruption victimization taps the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while corruption perceptions typically track grand corruption such as national scandals.[12] That is, these two types of questions provide windows

[11] These results are based on analysis not shown in the figures, but available from the authors on request. The binary correlation between average perceptions of the national economy and average perceptions of personal finances across countries is .812, the binary correlation between household crime victimization and perceived insecurity is 0.709, and the correlation between corruption experiences and perceived government corruption is 0.15.

[12] Treisman, Daniel. 2007. "What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption From Ten Years of Cross-

into two different forms of governance failures, both of which can have negative consequences for democracy in the Americas.

Nevertheless, our key observation is that perceptions and experience with corruption in the hemisphere are high but do not exhibit trends as obvious as economic performance. In short, overall perceptions of corruption have declined somewhat, but the declines in bribe extortion through 2010 seem to have reversed by 2012.

## III. Life Satisfaction

A final question relevant to assessing government performance in the Americas is to consider whether people are satisfied with their lives. This has been proposed as a summary measure of human subjective wellbeing and has been validated in a wide variety of contexts.[13] Several recent studies have assessed the effect of economic performance on life satisfaction in the Americas, but very little is known about the broad determinants of life satisfaction in the hemisphere.[14] Studies of other regions or global samples, however, link life satisfaction to economic performance[15] and good governance.[16]

National Empirical Research?" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 10: 211-44.

[13] Easterlin, Richard. 1974. "Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence." In *Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honour of Moses Abramovitz* (eds. David, Paul A. and Reder, Mel W.). New York and London: Academic Press; Pavot, William; Diener, Ed. 1993. "Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale." *Psychological Assessment* 5 (2): 164-172; Diener, Ed. 2000. "Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National Index." *American Psychologist* 55 (1): 34-43. White, Adrian. 2007. "A Global Projection of Subjective Well-being: A Challenge to Positive Psychology?" *Psychtalk* 56, 17-20; Di Tella, Rafael, and Robert MacCulloch. 2005. "Gross National Happiness as an Answer to the Easterlin Paradox." *Journal of Development Economics* 86: 22–42.

[14] Graham, Carol and Pettinato, Stefano. 2001. "Happiness, Markets, and Democracy: Latin America in Comparative Perspective." *Journal of Happiness Studies* 2 (3): 237-68; Graham, Carol and Andrew Felton. 2006. "Inequality and happiness: Insights from Latin America." *Journal of Economic Inequality* 4 (1): 107-122. Also see analyses of this question using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey data by Corral, Margarita. 2010. The Economics of Happiness in the Americas. *Insights Series Report #58*, LAPOP at Vanderbilt University. For a recent study looking at political participation, see Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca and Winters, Matthew S. 2011. "The Link Between Voting and Life Satisfaction in Latin America." *Latin American Politics and Society*. 53 94): 101-56.

[15] Bruno S. Frey, Alois Stutzer. 2001. "Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Human Well-Being." Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

[16] Helliwell, John F., and Haifang Huang. 2008. "How's Your Government? International Evidence Linking Good Government and Well-Being." *British Journal of Political Science* 38: 595–619; Haller, Max, and Markus Hadler. 2006. "How Social Relations and Structures Can Produce Happiness and Unhappiness: An International Comparative Analysis." *Social Indicators Research* 75, 2 (January): 169–216; Tavits, Margit. 2008. "Representation, Corruption, and Subjective Well-Being." *Comparative Political Studies* 41, 12: 1607–30.

The AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents:

**LS3.** To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are...
(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied

The variable is recoded on a 0-100 scale with higher values indicating greater satisfaction. An overwhelming majority of respondents report being satisfied (Figure IV.29). Although life satisfaction in the Americas had declined somewhat between 2004 and 2010, in 2012 it jumped to its highest level since the survey began (Figure IV.30).




**Figure IV. 29. Life Satisfaction, 2012**




**Figure IV. 30. Life Satisfaction Over Time**




**Figure IV. 31. Life Satisfaction by Country, 2012**

Life satisfaction is highest in Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Brazil lowest levels in Haiti, Suriname, and Jamaica (Figure IV.31). Relatively low levels of life satisfaction in two of richest countries in the hemisphere – the United States and Canada – confirm that development and good governance do not automatically translate into life satisfaction as expectations evolve.

Yet previous work on life satisfaction suggests that *at the individual level* it should be strongly correlated with government performance and personal wealth. This expectation is tested via two regression analyses of life satisfaction.[17]The model in Figure IV.32 looks at *perceptions* of the overall situation in the country, using general perceptions of the national economy, crime, and corruption. The one in Figure IV.33 models life satisfaction as a function of the respondent's *personal* economic situation, *personal experience* with being targeted for a bribe, and *personal experience* with crime.




**Figure IV. 32. Policy Outcomes at the National/Neighborhood Level and Life Satisfaction**

[17] The linear regression model includes country-specific random effects.




**Figure IV. 33. Policy Outcomes at the Individual level and Life Satisfaction**

The largest determinants of life satisfaction in the Americas are government performance on the issues of the economy and crime. Individuals who have positive views of the economy are much more likely to be satisfied with their lives than are those who think the economy is bad. Yet changes in a person's personal economic situation generate larger swings in life satisfaction than do a person's evaluations of the national economy. The difference in average life satisfaction between an individual who thinks the national economy is very bad and one who thinks it is very good, for example, is 21 points. In contrast, the difference in life satisfaction between someone who thinks their personal economic situation is very bad and one who thinks it is very good is 36 points. Thus, in spite of the proverbial notion that money cannot buy happiness, a very bad personal economic situation is especially unfavorable to personal happiness.

Crime also affects life satisfaction, although it is not personal experiences that matter as much as perceived dangers. Crime victims are less satisfied than individuals whose household escaped being attacked or otherwise victimized.[18] Yet perceptions of insecurity in the neighborhood have an even stronger negative effect on life satisfaction. Moreover, this effect is nearly equal in magnitude to the effect of wealth and only slightly smaller than the effect of the perceived state of the national economy. Individuals who live in fear of crime are less happy with their lives even if they have not been a victim of a crime recently.

[18] A similar effect is observed if we restrict attention to individuals who were personally victimized.

Corruption's effect on life satisfaction is smaller and less consistent than is the effect of crime or the economy. There is no association between whether or not an individual thinks the government is corrupt and levels of life satisfaction. Corruption victims are less satisfied with their lives, but the marginal effect of being targeted for a bribe is slightly smaller than the effect of being victimized in a crime and substantially smaller than is perceived economic or security situations.

Finally, life satisfaction differs significantly across demographic groups. Income stratification has the largest effect, with wealth positively associated with life satisfaction. The more educated also tend to express greater satisfaction with their lives. The middle-aged are less satisfied than young and elderly people. Urban residents report lower levels of life satisfaction than their rural counterparts. Individuals with darker skin tend to be less satisfied with their lives than are those with lighter colored skin. Church attendance is associated with higher levels of life satisfaction. Having a large family, in contrast, results in lower levels of life satisfaction. On average, there is no difference between men and women in terms of life satisfaction.

In sum, considering that levels of insecurity have fallen and average assessments of the economy have risen in 2012, it is not surprising that levels of life satisfaction have risen in 2012 as well.

## IV. Conclusion

Citizens of the Americas are in widespread agreement that economic performance, crime, and corruption remain serious problems in many of their countries. How citizens perceive governments' performance on these three indicators, but especially the economy, strongly affects their degree of life satisfaction.

Thus, the good news in this chapter is that while confidence in the economy remains mixed and fear of crime and corruption remain high, the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey reports improvements in confidence in the economy, feelings of security, and perceived levels of corruption. As a result, overall levels of life satisfaction are also on the rise. The benefits from these changes have not accrued equally in all countries nor have they reached all groups. Optimism about national trends also do not completely line up with trends in actual crime and corruption victimization. Yet these trends suggest that many leaders and institutions in the Americas may have a reservoir of legitimacy they can build on as they continue to deepen democracy.

## Appendices to the Analysis in this Chapter

1. Appendix 1

To evaluate whether responses to the most important problem question reflect personal experiences and perceptions of the current state of politics in the respondent's country, we model answers to it as a multinomial logit. Citing the economy as the most important problem is the baseline reference category. To control for differences across countries as well as clustering within them, we estimate the model with country fixed effects, which we do not present here to conserve space but are available from the authors directly. As described in the text, respondents who perceive that the economy is strong are significantly less likely to focus on the economy as an important problem and instead focus on social issues or crime. Being a victim of a crime leads individuals to focus on crime and corruption as important issues. Perceptions of corruption at the national level also focus attention on corruption as a problem.

| | Crime | Corruption | Social Policy | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Perceived the Government to be Corrupt | 0.000 | 0.007* | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Number of Times was Asked for a Bribe | 0.010 | 0.040 | 0.046 | -0.027 |
| | (0.025) | (0.035) | (0.041) | (0.052) |
| Evaluation of the Current State of the National Economy | 0.010*** | 0.005*** | 0.012*** | 0.012*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Respondent or Another Member of the Household was a Crime Victim | 0.002*** | 0.002** | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| N Respondents= 19605, standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | |

2. Appendix 2

Above we describe the factors that predict differences across groups in their ownership of material goods. That discussion is based on the regression with country fixed effects presented below in graphical form. Wealth increases with education and age and is higher in urban areas. It is lower among women and among those with darker skin.




Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

**Factors Associated with Household Wealth**

# Chapter Five: Local Government

*Gregory J. Love, Ryan E. Carlin, and Matthew M. Singer*
*With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith*

## I. Introduction

For most citizens, the bulk of their direct contact with the state does not occur at the national or even the regional level but rather at the local municipal level. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect political legitimacy at the national level? In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views of local government.

While the local level of government is often where citizens interact directly with the state, the power of local governments varies substantially within and across the countries of the region. In some places local authorities have significant resources and lawmaking and administrative power, while other local authorities have little political and fiscal autonomy. Moreover, local governments may be more or less democratic. A core premise motivating this chapter is that local government can effectively shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole, a point that is demonstrated in Chapter 6.

The main conclusions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:

- Few citizens directly interact with local government through formal means, such as municipal meetings.
- While few citizens make requests or demands of the local government, even fewer are satisfied with responses to their demands.
- Since 2004, evaluations of local government services are middling, with significant room for improvement.
- Citizens' trust in their local government is strongly influenced by their evaluations of local services.
- Citizen interaction with local government and citizen trust in local governments does not differ between men and women or between people with lighter or darker skin (often indigenous or ethnic minorities), though satisfaction with government services does vary by skin tone.

The rest of the chapter focuses on three main aspects of local government. First we look at how and how often citizens in the Americas interact with their local government. We examine the rate at which citizens attend local government meetings or make demands on their local officials. The section finishes with a focus on the individual factors related to when people make demands. We then turn to citizens' evaluations of local services. The section looks at how citizens in the region view several key areas of local government services (roads, schools, and health care) along with what factors are related to higher evaluations of these services. Finally, we look at trust in local government institutions. Beginning with a look at over time and individual country levels of trust in municipalities, the section concludes with individual linkages to institutional trust. The chapter finishes was a discussion of the patterns of interaction, support, and evaluations of the level of government most proximate to citizens.

Before turning to the tasks identified above, however, we provide a brief discussion of theoretical links among the activities of local government, citizen participation and trust, and democracy.

## Local Government, Participation, Institutional Trust, and Democracy

While decentralization has occurred in many developing countries it is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.[1] It has occurred simultaneously with the "third wave" of democratization in the hemisphere[2] fostering an environment with strengthened local governments alongside widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level. However, there is significant variation in the success of the processes of decentralization and subnational democratization.[3]

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views of its influence on democratic consolidation. Some authors argue increased decentralization has generally created positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities with the greatest need in education, sanitation, and agriculture.[4] Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization in the United States had a positive impact on economic growth.[5] Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds, contrary to conclusions of previous studies, that fiscal

[1] Rondinelli, Dennis, John Nellis, and Shabbir Cheema. 1983. *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.
[2] Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
[3] Benton, Allyson L. 2012. "Bottom-Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico's (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves." *Comparative Politics* 44 (3): 253-271; Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2008. *Radical Democracy in the Andes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[4] Faguet, Jean Paul. 2008. "Decentralization's Effects on Public Investment: Evidence and Policy Lessons from Bolivia and Colombia." *Journal of Development Studies* 44: 1100-1121.
[5] Akain, Nobuo and Masayo Sakata. 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.[6]

However, others argue local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites taking advantage of institutions and frustrating service delivery and development more broadly.[7] Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.[8] Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.[9] Moreover, as Van Cott argues,[10] the success of local democracy often depends on whether the decentralization process was a bottom-driven (as opposed to top-down), the presence of effective mayoral leadership, party cohesiveness, and a supportive civil society.

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, those experiences are often central in shaping their view of democracy. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.[11] Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.[12] According to her, citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values.[13] Moreover, this relationship is especially strong for minorities.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is crucial for representation and democracy. A central question is whether decentralization can improve the representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities. Scholarship on this

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[6] Fisman, Raymond and Roberta Gatti. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

[7] Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

[8] Willis, Eliza, Christopher Garman, and Stephen Haggard. 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7-56.

[9] Galiani, Sebastian, Paul Gertler, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andrés.

[10] Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2008. *Radical Democracy in the Andes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[11] Hiskey, Jonathan, Mitchell A. Seligson. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88.

[12] Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

[13] West, Karleen. 2011. The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. *Papers from the AmericasBarometer*. Vanderbilt University.

topic usually views local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.[14] Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at aggregating and articulating minority preferences, effectively enhancing minority representation.[15] If decentralization contributes to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.[16]

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.[17] Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.[18] West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion or access to local government.[19] In this chapter we seek to develop additional systematic evidence of the relationship between decentralization, minority status, and democracy at the regional level.

In the next section of this chapter we examine the extent to which citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*. We compare the extent to which citizens from different countries participate in local politics through these formal channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, with an emphasis on racial, ethnic, and gender inequality. This is followed by an assessment of the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments and local services. Finally, we examine trust in local government and seek to understand which citizens in the Americas trust their local governments to a greater or lesser extent.

We note that previous work using the AmericasBarometer surveys has examined in detail some of these phenomena, and that research stands as an additional resource for those interested in these topics. For instance, Montalvo shows that the determinants of citizens' demands on municipal governments include not only individual-level factors such education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.[20] Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.[21] In a different study, Montalvo finds crime and corruption victimization are

[14] Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[15] Hayek, Friedrich. 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519-530.
[16] West, *ibid*; p. 4.
[17] West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "'This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. 2009. "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.
[18] Patterson, Amy. 2002. "The Impact of Senegal's Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.
[19] West, *ibid*.
[20] Montalvo, Daniel. 2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10. Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.
[21] Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.[22] Finally, he also shows that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.[23]

## II. Local Level Participation

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

| |
|---|
| Now let's talk about your local municipality... |
| **NP1**. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer |
| **NP2.** Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?<br>(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]**<br>(98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]** |
| **MUNI10**. Did they resolve your issue or request?<br>(1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A |

[22] Montalvo, Daniel. 2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14. Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.
[23] Montalvo, Daniel. 2010. "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35. Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

## Local Meeting Attendance

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? Using all countries, in Figure V.1 we show levels of local participation in the Americas since 2004. The first wave of the surveys was a high-water mark for participation in local government meetings. Since then, the rate of participation has remained fairly steady with about 1 in 10 people taking part in a municipal meeting within the last year. Figure 1, and all the over-time figures presented in the chapter, is similar to one using only the original eleven countries surveyed in 2004 (that is, the results we find in these cross-time analyses are similar regardless of whether we use the sample of all countries surveyed in the AmericasBarometer study over time, or just those original eleven).




**Figure V. 1. Municipal Meeting Participation Over Time**

Figure V.2 displays the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who report having attended a local meeting in the past year. We see wide variation in the rate of citizen participation in municipal meetings across countries. At the high end, in 2012 Haitians were by far the most active in local meetings, likely linked to the recovery and reconstruction of the devastated country (as a result of the massive earthquake in 2010). The low levels of local meeting participation in Chile, another site of a major natural disaster in recent years, are striking and could reflect a far smoother recovery or a rejection (or lack) of municipality-led recovery efforts. Latin America's strongest federal systems (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) rank among the bottom third in terms of local-level participation.




**Figure V. 2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas**

## Demand-Making on Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine not only who attends meetings, but also who makes requests or demands of their local government. How has local demand-making changed over time? In Figure V.3 we examine the percentage of citizens making demands in all countries since 2004. After 2006 there was a marked decline in citizens making demands on local government.




**Figure V. 3. Demand Making on Local Government over Time**

Figure V.4 shows a significant difference in the percentage of citizens in each country who have made a request or demand to a person or agency in local government in the past year. As with local meeting attendance, the rate of demand-making on local governments varies significantly across the region. Once again, Haiti sits atop the comparative chart: one-fifth of Haitian respondents reported making demands to local officials (again, potentially linked to the 2010 earthquake and aftermath). In most of the other countries in the Americas between 10 and 16 percent of respondents claimed to have made a demand on local government, though Ecuador and, especially, Panama registered much lower rates.




**Figure V. 4. Demand Making on Local Government**

The cross-national difference and/or the decline over time in demand making could be caused by either improved service provision, reducing the necessity of making demands, or frustration with the system leading to withdrawal from participation in local government. To begin to assess these two possibilities we turn to the rate at which people felt their demands had been met.

In addition to asking about demand-making, the AmericasBarometer also asked whether citizens' demands and requests were satisfied. Note that this question was only asked of those citizens who first said that they had made a demand or request. These responses can provide an important window into citizens' perspectives on the quality of services provided by their municipalities. In Figure V.5 we examine responses to question MUNI10.[24] A large majority of people who made a

[24] MUNI10 : "Did they resolve your issue or request?"

demand of their local government felt that their request had not been solved. Most citizens who asked something from their local government were unsatisfied with the outcome. For many people in the hemisphere, making demands on the local government would appear to be a potentially slow and wasteful way to effect change in their neighborhoods.




**Figure V. 5. Resolution of Demands Made on Local Government**

To understand who makes demands on local government we look at key individual socio-demographic factors using logistic regression with country fixed effects. Figure V.6 shows that the oldest and youngest citizens, people with higher levels of educational attainment, who live in smaller towns/rural areas, and attend local government meetings are more likely to make demands. Those who view their personal economic situation as being better off are less likely to make demands. Demand-making increases with age until people become elderly, at which point the likelihood of making a demand decreases.




**Figure V. 6. Factors Associated with Demand Making on Local Government**

In Figure V.7 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand-making on local government, on one hand, and place of residence and attending local government meetings, on the other hand. The bar chart on the left in the figure shows that those respondents who reside in rural areas or smaller towns are the most likely to make demands of their local government; residents of the largest cities are the least likely. Thus the level of urbanization appears to be related to citizens' willingness to make demands on local officials, indicating a potential link for social and/or geographic distance between the respondent and local officials and demand-making. Figure V.7 (bar chart on the right) also clearly shows that those who are active in local government, indicated by attending meetings, most likely to make demands of the local government.




**Figure V. 7. Factors Associated with Demand Making on Local Government**

## III. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question has appeared in a number of previous surveys.

**SGL1**. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are…? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad
(5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2012 round featured three new questions designed to tap satisfaction with particular services typically delivered by local governments.

| |
|---|
| **SD2NEW2.** And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?<br>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied<br>(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA |
| **SD3NEW2.** And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]<br>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied<br>(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA |
| **SD6NEW2.** And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]<br>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied<br>(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA |

Finally, the last question, which measures trust, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves of the AmericasBarometer survey. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot.”

| |
|---|
| **B32**. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government? |

## Satisfaction with Local Services

In Figure V.8 we examine citizens’ average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses been re-coded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. With a few exceptions, the average citizen in most countries in the Americas is close to neutral towards local government services, meaning that average scores cluster around the midpoint (50) on the scale. The appearance of Nicaragua and Ecuador at the same level as the U.S. and Canada indicates that while there may be a link between satisfaction with services and national wealth, it is not an ironclad one.




**Figure V. 8. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas**

In Figure V.9 we further explore how citizens evaluate their local government services. Across the Americas as a whole, a near majority sees services as neither good nor bad, with a few percentage points more people having a positive view of services than have a negative view. In general, it appears local government are neither highly effective at providing services nor completely failing citizens in service provision.




**Figure V. 9. Evaluation of Local Government Services**

How have evaluations of local government services evolved in recent years? In Figure V.10, which presents annual average evaluations on a 0-100 scale, we see that since 2004 citizen evaluations of local services has remained relatively constant. Middling rating of services provision seem to have been the norm in the region.




**Figure V. 10. Evaluation of Local Services over Time**

Citizens may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction with roads, schools, and provision of health care across the Americas.[25] Figure V.11 shows satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2 (the wording of which was reported above in the text). Once again, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. Across the region we find moderate levels of satisfaction with road infrastructure. In general there appears to be no pattern among the countries linked to region, development, history of democracy, or size. It does appear, however, that residents in several Caribbean countries have a rather dim view of their road infrastructure.

[25] We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.




**Figure V. 11. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas**

In Figure V.12 we turn to satisfaction with public schools, based on question SD3NEW2. Similar to roads and public health, there are no clear patterns between national wealth and satisfaction with schools. Looking at a few key countries unearths some interesting results. For example, Chile is one of the wealthiest and most stable countries in the region but has the lowest level of satisfaction with education. This low level of satisfaction with schools may be linked with the university student protests that have affected Chile for the past two years. In addition, Chile saw in 2006 a series of protests focused on secondary education. Whether this dissatisfaction is the cause or consequence of the protests, we cannot say.




**Figure V. 12. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas**

Finally, in Figure V.13 we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2. Though most countries fall between 46 and 56, no country scores particularly high and four countries are rated quite poorly: Chile, again, Brazil, and the island nations of Trinidad & Tobago and Haiti. Of the two measures evaluating services that are directly consumed by the population (education and health), Chile's residents evaluate the country's services at a similar level to those of much poorer nations. Brazil, which has recently been referred to as a rising global economic power, also receives significantly lower evaluations than nearly all other countries in the region for health and education services.




**Figure V. 13. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas**

Additionally, as the alignment of countries on the graphs on the previous pages tend to indicate, citizens' evaluations of educational services are more closely correlated with their evaluation of health services ($r$ = .50) than the quality of roads ($r$ = .36). While all three are key indicators of local government performance, it appears that citizens may evaluate hard infrastructure, like roads, differently than the more complex services of the welfare state, such as health care and education.

To examine the individual factors that affect evaluations of local services we use linear regression with country fixed effects. Figure V.14 shows that people from the traditionally more marginalized sectors of society rate their municipality services the lowest. People with dark skin tone, poorer residents, and those with higher levels of perceived insecurity all rate local services lower. For people who view the national economy as strong or who live in major cities, services are viewed as being more satisfactory. Additionally, people who feel that corruption is very common also view their

municipal services are the least satisfactory. This provides evidence of the linkage between government performance and perceived corruption.




**Figure V. 14. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services**

## Trust in Local Government

In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked individuals not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted local government. This question aims to tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 15 we look at trust in local government since 2004. After a highpoint in 2004, trust in local governments has remained steady with people on average reporting neither a lot of trust nor a total lack of trust in their local governments. Despite changes in economic conditions, years of democracy, and decentralization, levels of trust in local governments are essentially static.




**Figure V. 15. Trust in Local Government over Time**

While the average level of trust in local government has remained steady in the region, there are differences across the countries in the hemisphere. Figure V.16 presents average levels of trust in local government across the Americas on a 0-100 scale. Comparing these results to those in Figure V.16 the linkage between trust in local government and satisfaction with local services across countries may be weak. Chilean municipalities, which have low satisfaction with services, enjoy high levels of trust. And in Costa Rica people generally give good marks to services but display below average levels of trust. At the individual level, however, the bivariate relationship is stronger ($r$ = .38).




**Figure V. 16. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas**

Next we look at the factors that shape how much an individual trusts the local government. Using linear regression with country fixed effects, we test to see if interaction with local government and evaluations of local services predict levels of local political trust. Figure V.17 indicates the most important factor shaping citizens' trust in local government is how they perceive the quality of municipal services.




**Figure V. 17. Determinants of Trust in Local Government**

Attending a municipal meeting also exhibits a positive relationship with trust in the local government, but it is a much weaker one than evaluation of services. Overall we see that individuals who interact with their local government and rate the performance of the municipality highly express the highest levels of trust in the institution.

We also see that those who view the national economy in a positive light are more trusting of local government, while people with higher levels of educational attainment and who live in national capitals and major cities are significantly less trusting of their local governments.

Also, as in the determinants of who makes requests or demands of their local government, skin tone is not related to trust in local government. People of darker skin tones, often minorities in the hemisphere (overall), appear to not trust local governments differently than others. However, minorities are often the poorest and least advantaged in society and the effects of education and local and government performance, at both the local and national-levels, clearly suggest more effective government leads to greater trust in the local institutions of the state while, conversely, less effective government is linked to lower levels of trust in those local institutions.

## V. Conclusion

Over the past eight years Latin America has seen relatively constant levels of interaction between citizens and their local governments. There was a highpoint in 2004 for meeting with local officials and making demands on local government; this peak may owe in part to a smaller sample of countries in that survey. But since 2006 we observe no notable shifts in these behaviors across the region. If the number of citizens who interact with their local governments has indeed stabilized, it could either signify that, at the citizen level, the process of decentralization has been completed, or it could mean that recent efforts have not directly engaged more citizens in the process.

Although the trend in citizen participation in local government is flat, significant differences across the countries in the region remain. Haiti has by far the greatest level of participation, with 21% attending a town meeting, while only 4% of Chileans report having attended such a meeting. A similar spread is observed for making demands on local government. Of course, we see a strong link between participating in meetings and making demands upon local government: those who attended meetings were about 32% more likely to make demands or requests of their local government. However, most people who requested something from their local officials did not find their issue or request resolved.

Turning to the performance of local government, most people view municipal services as neither good nor bad. In the region as a whole, there has been no shift in the average assessment of services in the past eight years. In a few countries people give particularly low scores for some services (e.g. Haiti, Brazil, Chile) or high scores (e.g. Costa Rica, Ecuador), but in most countries citizens give the services a middling score of 50 out of 100. In short, perceptions of local government are mediocre: local governments are not generally failing citizens but, at the same time, there is clearly room for improvement.

When we analyze how these measures relate to one another, we see that citizens' levels of trust in local government are significantly associated with how they rate the performance of the government (via services) and whether or not they directly take part in local government meetings. The fact that these evaluations and levels of participation have remained constant, on average, over recent years helps explain the lack of variation in trust in local government since 2004.

Since the local level of government is often the only place where citizens have a direct relationship with the state, it seems reasonable to expect citizens' attitudes toward local government are related to their broader political attitudes. We assess this in the next chapter by investigating how perceptions of local government performance influence support for democratic norms, the legitimacy of political institutions, and political tolerance.

# Chapter Six: Political Legitimacy and Democratic Values

*Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, Matthew M. Singer, Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith*

## I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. Among the main reasons for democracy's success is its ability to generate and maintain legitimacy while permitting its detractors a political voice. This chapter analyzes the depth of political legitimacy and political tolerance in the Americas and the factors that shape the degree to which citizens of the Americas embrace these orientations and values.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture and is key for democratic stability and quality.[1] In LAPOP studies, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. Further, political legitimacy or "system support" has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.[2] While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects represented by the political system and the political institutions themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimensions of support that are central for democratic survival.[3]

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Prominent among the contextual explanations is the idea that certain cultures naturally have higher levels of political legitimacy. Other scholars, however, propose that economic development and politicians' proximity to citizens' policy preferences influence citizens' attitudes about the political system.[4] Institutional

[1] See also Almond Gabriel Abraham, and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Sage Publications, Inc.; Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation.* Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11(2): 5-29; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[2] Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (4): 435-457; Seligson, "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America."

[3] Booth and Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

[4] Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *The American Political Science Review* 82 (4): 1203-1230. Przeworski, Adam, et al. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron, et al. 2008. "Income and Democracy," *American Economic Review* 98 (3): 808-842; Kotzian, Peter. 2011. "Public Support for Liberal Democracy," *International Political Science Review* 32 (1): 23 -41; Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies." *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (4): 485-514.

features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can further bolster system support, especially among election losers.[5]

Individual-level characteristics are also thought to partially determine the degree of legitimacy citizens accord the democratic system. Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.[6] In addition, political system support appears to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.[7]

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."[8] Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy. Among both the mass public and elites, it is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms.[9]

[5] Anderson, Christopher J., et al. 2007. *Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. New York: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 66-81. Carlin, Ryan E. and Matthew M. Singer. 2011. "Support for Polyarchy in the Americas." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(11): 1500-1526.

[6] Corral, Margarita. 2009. *Participation in Meetings of Political Parties*, Insights Series (Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. *Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America*, Insights Series (Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. *Political Parties and Representation in Latin America.*

[7] Montalvo J. Daniel. 2008. *Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings*, AmericasBarometer Insights: (Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. *Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?* AmericasBarometer Insights (Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo 2011. *Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote*, AmericasBarometer Insights (Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[8] Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," 5.

[9] Gibson, James L. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression during the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82 (2): 511-529; Gibson, James L. 2008. "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52: 96-108; Gibson, James L. 1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (3): 819-850; Gibson, James L. 1995. "The Political Freedom of African-Americans: A Contextual Analysis of Racial Attitudes, Political Tolerance, and Individual Liberty," *Political Geography* 14 (6-7): 571-599. In the case of racism, a particular form of intolerance, the results can be a lower sense of freedom of expression within a community and less political freedom for both racial minorities and majorities.

Why are some citizens intolerant? Scholars believe many micro-level factors affect tolerance including perceptions of high levels of threat,[10] authoritarian personality,[11] gender,[12] and religion.[13] Social identity and social dominance theorists view intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.[14] LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. At the macro level, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.[15] External threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance.[16]

In addition to these classic elements of political culture, scholars and practitioners concerned about democratic consolidation have placed increasing emphasis on cementing a strong rule of law in developing countries.[17] Rule of law is thought to bring about a number of benefits, such as economic growth, peace, and potentially democracy.[18] Rampant crime and corruption are thought to undermine citizen support for the rule of law, as are citizens' beliefs about the authorities' willingness and ability to prosecute criminal offenders.[19] Thus support for the rule of law is likely to be weakest in the very places where it is most in jeopardy and incomplete. On the contrary, where large proportions of the citizenry value self-expression over order and conformity, this fosters more "effective," less corrupt democratic institutions.[20] The AmericasBarometer includes measures of interpersonal trust, life

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[10] Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press); Huddy, Leonie, et al. 2005. "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 593-608; Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4): 959-978.

[11] Altemeyer, Bob. 2007. *The Authoritarians* (Bob Altemeyer).

[12] Golebiowska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance." *Political Behavior* 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiouwska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

[13] Postic, Robert K. 2007. *Political Tolerance: The Effects of Religion and Religiosity* (ProQuest); Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955. *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*. John Wiley & Sons Inc.

[14] Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[15] Lodola, Germán and Margarita Corral. 2010. "Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[16] Merolla, Jennifer L. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; Peffly, Mark and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003. "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning." *Political Research Quarterly* 56 (3): 243 -257.

[17] See review in McCubbins, Mathew D., Daniel B. Rodríguez, and Barry R. Weingast. 2010. "The Rule of Law Unplugged." *Emory Law Journal* 59:1455-1494.

[18] Haggard, Stephen, Andrew McIntyre, and Lydia Thiede. 2008. *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 11:205-234; Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 9 (December):1369-1401; Carlin, Ryan E. 2012. "Rule of Law Typologies in Contemporary Societies." *Justice System Journal* 33(2):154-173.

[19] Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "Does Dirty Harry Have the Answer? Citizen Support for the Rule of Law in Central America." *Public Integrity* 13(1); 59-80; José Miguel Cruz. 2008. "Violence and Insecurity as Challenges for Democratic Political Culture in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[20] Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

satisfaction, and political tolerance which we harness to explore this expectation. Lastly, we test whether citizens are more willing to usurp the rule of law, and show rigidity towards suspected criminals, when they perceive the economy to be suffering.

This chapter covers two main sets of themes. First we document the breadth of democratic attitudes in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- Relative levels of trust in political and social institutions are stable, with the Catholic Church and the Army the most trusted, and political parties the least. Yet support for political institutions in the Americas is increasing over time while support for social institutions is dropping.

- Support for rule of law has increased since 2004.

- Since 2004 overall political system support has been stable, but levels on the five components of the system support index have varied. The legitimacy of the courts and the public's belief that rights are protected show steady gains.

- Political tolerance has been stable since 2004; it is highest in the United States, lowest in Honduras.

- Attitudes conducive to stable democracy have been steady over time; they are highest in Canada, lowest in Honduras.

- Support for democracy as the best system has increased somewhat since 2004; it is highest in Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina, and lowest in Honduras.

Second, we consider the factors that lead citizens to have different attitudes toward the political system. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- A strong economy and low levels of insecurity and corruption build support for the political system. Further, effective local government can be expected to raise system support almost as much as positive perceptions of the national economy.

- Political tolerance is reduced among those who think the economy is good, that corruption is relatively rare, and/or who judge local government as performing well. In short, those benefiting from the current system (this also applies to those who supported the winning candidate) are less likely to tolerate dissenting elements within society.

- Citizens who voted for winning candidates in the most recent presidential elections are more supportive of the political system but are less politically tolerant.

- Education and wealth have slight negative effects on system support, but strong positive effects on political tolerance and support for democracy. Compared to middle aged citizens, the youth

and elderly are more supportive of the political system. Women are more likely to support the political system than men.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section I examines the legitimacy of democratic institutions in the Americas with a battery of questions tapping political trust. In Section II, we report on levels of support for the rule of law in the region and analyze its main individual-level correlates. Section III's goal is to explore the attitudes theorized to foster stabilize democracy. Its first two subsections describe levels of (a) Support for the Political System and (b) Political Tolerance from 2004 to 2012 and within the region 2012. Regression analyses probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold these two sets of attitudes. A third subsection derives attitudinal profiles from these two measures in order to gauge (c) Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability at the regional level since 2004 and cross-nationally in 2012. The final empirical section, IV, looks at stated support for "democracy" as the best form of government over time and across the Americas. Section V concludes with our main findings and a discussion of their potential implications.

## I. Legitimacy of Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in the Americas support major political and social institutions? Similar to other rounds of the survey, the AmericasBarometer's 2012 round asked about trust in a number of specific institutions, in addition to the more general questions about support for the political system. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented "not at all," and 7 represented "a lot," citizens responded to the following questions:

| |
|---|
| **B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system? |
| **B11**. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal? |
| **B12**. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? |
| **B13**. To what extent do you trust the National Congress? |
| **B18**. To what extent do you trust the National Police? |
| **B20**. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church? |
| **B20A**. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church? |
| **B21**. To what extent do you trust the political parties? |
| **B21A.** To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister? |
| **B31**. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court? |
| **B37**. To what extent do you trust the mass media? |
| **B47A**. To what extent do you trust elections in this country? |

As per the LAPOP standard, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. Based on the 2012 AmericasBarometer, Figure VI.1 suggests levels of institutional trust can be grouped into four distinct categories. First, on average, citizens of the Americas expressed the greatest levels of trust in the Catholic Church, the armed forces, and the media. It is perhaps worth recognizing that these three institutions, along with the Evangelical Church, are not internally democratic and access to leadership positions within them is not based on contentious politics.




**Figure VI. 1. Trust in Institutions in the Americas, 2012**

The second most trusted set of institutions in the region includes the president, elections, and each country's supreme electoral tribunal. This set is followed by a third group consisting of the Supreme Court, the national police force, and the justice system. Parliament and especially political parties are the least trusted institutions in the Americas.




**Figure VI. 2. Trust in Institutions over Time in the Americas**

In Figure VI.2, present levels of trust in these social and political institutions since 2004. Trust levels in 2012 are fairly consistent with their relative positions over the last several waves of the AmericasBarometer: public trust in the Catholic Church and the armed forces has generally been high while trust in parties and legislatures is generally low. But several dynamics merit mention. Since 2006, trust in both the Catholic Church and the media have been fairly inert whereas confidence in the Armed Forces and the national police have risen. Political parties, and, to a lesser extent, parliaments, presidents, and Supreme Courts have also steadily gained the trust of publics in the Americas in recent years.[21] Thus there is mounting trust in core state political institutions, a phenomenon that lends legitimacy to the region's political systems.

[21] Most of these patterns hold if one analyzes the core group of eleven countries that have been measured since 2004. For those cases, however, institutional trust peaked in 2010 and pulled back slightly in 2012.

Since the legitimacy and quality of representative democracy in the Americas are often in question, levels of trust in parties receive a great deal of media and scholarly attention.[22] On that note, Guyana and Belize are clear outliers with comparatively high levels of trust in parties, at 52.9 and 50.6, respectively.[23] Of the Latin American countries, Venezuela and Uruguay register the highest rates of party trust (43 and 41.8, respectively), and in eight others (Nicaragua, Chile, Mexico, Haiti, Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) trust in parties is statistically greater than in the United States (28.7), the country where parties enjoy the least public trust. Perhaps more importantly, trust in parties has shown a general upward trend over time (Figure VI.2), which bodes well for representative democracy's prospects in the region.

## II. Support for the Rule of Law

This section addresses support for the rule of law, conceptualized as the universal application of the laws of the state, or the supposition that no group has legal impunity.[24] Previous studies by LAPOP have found wide variation in the willingness of citizens in the Americas to accept violations of the rule of law by the police in order to fight criminals. To measure support for the rule of law in the Americas, we use a single item which taps the extent to which the authorities should be bound by the law while pursuing justice.

**AOJ8**. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
(1) Should always abide by the law
(2) Occasionally can cross the line (88 ) DK (98) DA

[22] Boidi, María Fernanda. 2008. "'Throw Them All Out?' Attitudes towards Political Parties in the Americas." in Mitchell A. Seligson (ed.) *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006–07*, pp. 53–72, Nashville, TN; Carlin, Ryan E. Forthcoming. "What's not to Trust? Rubrics of Political Party Trustworthiness in Chile and Argentina." *Party Politics*; Hagopian, Frances. 2005. "Conclusions: Government Performance, Political Representation, and Public Perceptions of Contemporary Democracy in Latin America," in Frances Hagopian and Scott P. Mainwaring (eds) *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, pp. 319–62. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[23] The analysis in this paragraph is based on figures not shown here.
[24] See, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.




**Figure VI. 3. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law over Time in the Americas**

In Figure VI.3 we show levels of support for the rule of law over time in the Americas. Since 2004, it has oscillated in a 10 percentage point band between 66 percent and 56 percent. In 2012, 64.9 percent of respondents expressed support for the rule of law. This marks a significant improvement on our 2010 and 2008 studies. Considering the data from 2006 on, we observe an overall positive trend in citizen support for the rule of law in both the full sample and a sub-sample of countries measured continuously since 2004 (not reported here). Taken together, these results leave us confident in the conclusion that rule of law is gaining support in the Americas.

Figure VI.4 shows the percentage of citizens in 2012 in each country of the Americas who express support for the rule of law, versus those who believe that, at times, the police and other authorities may act with impunity. The highest support for the rule of law is found in Jamaica (74.9 percent), while the lowest support is found in Bolivia (53.3 percent).




**Figure VI. 4. Support for Rule of Law in the Americas, 2012**

Exactly what accounts for the distribution of support for rule of law in the Americas is unclear at first glance. There is no obvious relationship to colonial past. Some former English colonies (Jamaica, United States, Belize) rank in the upper third, while others (Canada, Trinidad and Tobago) rank in the lower third; formerly French Haiti and formerly Dutch Suriname are middle-of-the-pack. History of democracy is not linked with the distribution of support for rule of law in the region in an obvious way. Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Chile, all of which have solid democratic credentials, register middling to low levels of support for rule of law, while Venezuela and Colombia register rather high levels. However, the Andean region is overrepresented at the bottom of the rankings, where Bolivia's low score is followed by that of Ecuador (54.8 percent) and Peru (57.7 percent) at second- and fourth-lowest respectively. While these societies are highly indigenous, other countries with considerable indigenous populations (e.g., Guatemala and Mexico) rank much higher and, in an analysis not reported here, we found that being indigenous is not directly linked to support for the rule of law. For now, then, we cannot explain cross-national differences in the public's willingness to uphold rule of law.

We attempt to clarify the factors that influence public support for the rule of law at the individual level using four sets of factors: trust in the justice system; governance (perceptions of the economy, crime insecurity, and corruption victimization); interpersonal trust; and, life satisfaction. For those interested, the next paragraph grounds expectations for these dimensions in scholarship; for readers who prefer to skip to the results, they are presented in Figure VI.5 and the discussion that follows.

Because our expectations for the predictors of support for the rule of law differ slightly from the predictors of other dimensions of legitimacy, we briefly state them here. Institutionally, a fair and independent judiciary is indispensible to rule of law.[25] But citizens may support going around the judiciary to fight crime if they distrust it or see it as illegitimate.[26] Thus we expect a positive correlation between trust in the justice system and support for the rule of law. Better governance – which we consider in terms of the economy, security, and corruption – should bolster support for rule of law. In fact, past scholarship using AmericasBarometer data has found that those who perceive higher levels of crime and those who are crime victims are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.[27] Additionally, recent studies find personally experiencing corruption and perceiving that corruption is the norm in a particular society erodes citizen support for the rule of law.[28] Citizen support for democratic processes, including the rule of law, may also be higher if the economy is seen as strong. Third and fourth, support for the rule of law is expected to correlate with self-expression values such as interpersonal trust and life satisfaction.[29] In macro-level analyses Inglehart and Welzel[30] find a strong link between such self-expression values and "effective," i.e. uncorrupt, democratic institutions at the macro level. Thus, we may observe an association between self-expression values and support for the rule of law at the micro level.[31]

[25] Ríos-Figueroa, Julio and Jeffrey K. Staton. 2009. "Unpacking the Rule of Law: A Review of Judicial Independence Measures." Paper prepared for Caltech-USC Center for the Study of Law and Politics and the University of Texas Law School Symposium, *The Rule of Law*, March 26-27.

[26] Malone, Mary Fran T.. 2010. "Does Dirty Harry Have the Answer? Citizen Support for the Rule of Law in Central America." *Public Integrity.*

[27] Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *AmericasBaromenter Insights Series*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

[28] Sarsfield, Rodolfo. 2012. "The Bribe Game: Microfoundations of Corruption in Mexico." *Justice System Journal* 33(2):215-234; Blake, Charles H. 2009. "Public Attitudes Toward Corruption." In Charles H. Blake and Stephen D. Morris (eds.), *Corruption and Democracy in Latin America*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press; Bailey, John. 2009. "Corruption and Democratic Governability." In Charles H. Blake and Stephen D. Morris (eds.), *Corruption and Democracy in Latin America*, pp. 60-76. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

[29] It might also correlate with political tolerance, though we do not examine that here.

[30] Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2003. "Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages." *Comparative Politics* 35:61-79; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[31] See, however, a warning on the hazards in assuming that relationships found at the macro level apply at the individual level: Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological Fallacy?" *Comparative Politics* 34:273-292.

To assess the extent to which trust in the judicial system, governance factors, inter-personal trust, and life satisfaction predict support for the rule of law, we develop a logistic regression model with controls for wealth, education, gender, skin tone, age, and city size. Country fixed effects are also controlled for in this model as they are throughout all models in this chapter. The full set of results is available from the authors; for the sake of brevity, we present only the predicted probabilities of supporting the rule of the law according to varying values on our key independent variables.




**Figure VI. 5. Probability of Supporting Rule of Law: Institutional, Governance & Social Values**

The series of graphs in Figure VI.5(a-f) show how the probability of supporting the rule of law changes across the range of these institutional, governance, and social variables (that is, those measures discussed above and noted in the sub-title for each respective graph) while holding all other measures constant.

The results of our analysis of support for the rule of law are as follows. First, a lack of trust in the judiciary is linked to the perception that it is acceptable for the authorities to go around the law to apprehend criminals. As Figure VI.5(a) shows, the probability of supporting the rule of law climbs

from 61 percent for those who do not trust the justice system at all to 70 percent for those who place a great deal of trust in it. This 9-point difference represents the largest effect of all the variables in the model.[32]

Second, the attitudinal underpinnings of rule of law are also predicated on strong governance in the areas of the economy, corruption, and security. As shown in Figure VI.5(b), those who view the national economic situation as very good are about 5 percent more likely to support the rule of law than those who view it as very bad; moreover, as seen in Figure VI.5(c), feeling very safe as compared to very unsafe makes one about 8 percentage points more likely to support the rule of law. Crime victimization (not reported) has an equivalent negative effect. Figure VI.5(d) shows that victims of corruption are 7 points more likely to reject the rule of law than non-victims; perceived corruption (not reported) has no discernible effects.

Finally, self-expression values appear to raise support for the rule of law. Specifically, Figure VI.5(e) displays an 8 percentage point difference in the probability of supporting rule of law between trusting and untrusting citizens. In the same vein, citizens who are very satisfied with their lives have a 7 percentage point greater likelihood of supporting rule of law.[33]

To summarize, citizen support for the rule of law is consistently associated with perceived trustworthiness of the judiciary, government performance (on the economy, crime, and corruption), and self-expression values. While some of these factors matter slightly more than others, all of their effects can be described as moderate and nontrivial. We draw three key implications from this analysis. First, breakdowns – real or perceived – of rule of law in the realms of judicial institutions, crime, and corruption appear to erode support for rule of law among the citizenry. Second and in a related way, negative perceptions of economic performance undermine citizen commitment to rule of law. Citizens who view the state as incapable of delivering justice, clean government, personal security, and economic opportunity support authorities eschewing law promulgated by the state in the name of apprehending criminals. In other words, lack of political legitimacy in key areas of governance can spread to the political system's legal foundations. Taken together the evidence suggests a fragile attitudinal basis for a central tenet of rule of law. Third and finally, correlations previously drawn between self-expression values and uncorrupt or so-called "effective democracy" at the national level are at least partially substantiated at the individual level vis-à-vis support for the rule of law. In this sense, the cultural foundations of rule of law may, to some extent, reflect the processes of modernization.

[32] Employing the more direct measure of faith in the judicial system to deliver justice (aoj12), "If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty?", generates an effect of exactly the same size.

[33] It is notable that these effects are larger than those of gender – women are 4 percent more likely to support rule of law – and wealth – citizens in the first quintile of wealth are 5 percent more willing to uphold the rule of law than citizens in the fifth (predicted probability graphs not shown here). Of course, it is possible that gender and wealth, among other factors, are antecedent to the measures we examine here and thus have both direct and indirect effects on support for the rule of law (the interested reader might return to chapter 4 for an analysis of the factors that predict life satisfaction).

## III. Democratic Stability

Stable democracies need citizens who grant their institutions legitimacy and who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. In other words, system support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic stability or "consolidation." The ways in which tolerance and system support are expected to affect stable democracy, according to previous LAPOP studies, are summarized in Table VI.1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

**Table VI. 1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance**

| | High Tolerance | Low Tolerance |
|---|---|---|
| High System Support | Stable Democracy | Authoritarian Stability |
| Low System Support | Unstable Democracy | Democracy at Risk |

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. Booth and Seligson used the 2008 AmericasBarometer to trace the serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.[34]

Before analyzing this particular combination of attitudes, we first examine these two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

### *III.A. Support for the Political System*

Booth and Seligson (2009) have proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring what we call "system support"- a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the country is organized. We measure it using an index created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

[34] Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; see also Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. The Honduran Catharsis. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

| |
|---|
| I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.<br>**B1**. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read*:*** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.) |
| **B2**. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)? |
| **B3**. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)? |
| **B4**. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)? |
| **B6**. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)? |

Responses to each question were based on a 7 point scale, running from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("a lot"). Following the LAPOP standard, we rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support.




**Figure VI. 6. Elements of System Support Over Time**

In Figure VI.7, we compare levels of the system support index since 2004 and levels of agreement with each of the five components of system support. System support itself (upper left) is fairly static over this period. The slight drop off in 2006 and 2008 was restored by 2010 and 2012. Yet the components themselves are less static. On one hand, we observe a steady rise in a sense that basic rights are protected, agreement that the courts guarantee a fair trial, and pride in the political system. On the other hand, citizens' general respect for the political system's institutions and normative commitment to the political system undulates, at least somewhat, across these surveys. And as the country reports attest, over time variation within countries can be even more pronounced.[35] In sum, while the five dimensions of system support hang together at the individual level and, when summed into an index, are stable over time at the regional level, the legitimacy of individual dimensions of the political system waxes and wanes, albeit within fairly narrow ranges, from wave to wave of the AmericasBarometer.

[35] These basic patterns are present in a sub-sample of countries in which these variables have been measured since 2004. However, as was the case with institutional trust above, 2010 registered the highest degrees of system support across these variables—a pattern not recovered in the full sample reported in Figure VI.6.




**Figure VI. 7. Support for the Political System in the Americas, 2012**

How does support for the political system vary within the Americas? In Figure VI.8, we present the levels of political support in the AmericasBarometer study in 2012. At 53.5 units, the United States is barely above the hemispheric average. Meanwhile countries of major foreign policy importance to the United States – Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Nicaragua – register above-average levels of system legitimacy. The relatively low levels of system support in cases where democratic institutions have recently proved frail – Honduras, Haiti, and Paraguay – suggests system support is a useful bellwether of democratic stability.

## *III.B. Political Tolerance*

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the continuance of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires that people accept the principles of open

democratic competition and are tolerant of their political rivals. Thus the AmericasBarometer measures political tolerance for those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items in our questionnaire:

| |
|---|
| **D1**. There are people who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: |
| **D2**. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number. |
| **D3**. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**? |
| **D4**. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**? |

As with all LAPOP indices, we calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. We then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance.




**Figure VI. 8. Political Tolerance over Time in the Americas**

To explore the evolution of political tolerance in the Americas, Figure VI.9 displays the regional means on political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. The time-lapse picture of political tolerance in the region is virtually static. With the exception of 2004 to 2006, when AmericasBarometer coverage ballooned from 11 to 22 countries, wave-to-wave differences are small. We reached a similar conclusion with respect to system support. If one looks, as we did (but do not show here) at the specific components of the index, the general pattern in Figure VI.10 also holds over time for those constituent elements of political tolerance. But if one observes just the eleven countries for which data exists from 2004, political tolerance seems to have declined every year with the exception of 2010, falling from 53.0 units in 2004 to 47.2 units in 2012. Given this variation within our sample, we encourage policymakers and scholars to consult the country reports for more fine-grained analyses of these dynamics.




**Figure VI. 9. Components of Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2012**

Figure VI.9 presents means levels of agreement with each of the four components of tolerance in the Americas in 2012. As the figure shows, levels of public support for the components of political tolerance differ depending on the particular activity in question. In the Americas, support for dissenters' rights to vote and to engage in peaceful demonstrations is a great deal higher than support for them running for office or delivering a televised speech.




**Figure VI. 10. Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2012**

To get a sense of the distribution of tolerance for political dissent in the region Figure VI.10 presents mean scores on our index by country from the 2012 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in the United States (72.6 units on the 0-100 scale) and lowest in Honduras (36.6 units). Whereas neither support for rule of law nor system support appeared to reflect colonial legacies (see the earlier discussion in this chapter), six of the seven most politically tolerant societies are former British colonies. More generally, there seems to be a relationship between political tolerance and prior experience with liberal democratic institutions. Indeed, each of the top ten polities (i.e., from Chile up) was either a former British colony, in which liberalism anticipated independence in the 1960s and 1970s, or it enjoyed fruitful if, in some cases, truncated periods of political liberalism in what Huntington (1991) identified as the first and second waves of democracy. In this regard, Argentina's

comparatively rocky experience with democracy seems offset by its early guarantee of the secret ballot and expansion to mandatory male suffrage in 1912. To the extent that such experience matters, less lengthy flirtations with political liberalism in Brazil make it a relative overachiever in terms of political tolerance while Costa Rica's long democratic history suggests it slightly underperforms by hovering around the regional average of 54.1 percent.

Of the eight countries scoring below 50 in Figure VI.10 five of them are not only ethnically fractionalized but also ones in which ethnic differences have become politicized: Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. Ethnic differences are further polarized by their association in recent decades with political extremism, violence, and rioting on both sides of the ethnic cleavages. Polarization and violence related to political and socioeconomic divisions are pervasive in three other countries in the bottom third of political tolerance: Honduras, El Salvador, and Haiti. If the cultural roots of democracy are to flourish in these societies, policies aimed at bridging these societal divisions are bound to be crucial.

In the analysis below, we model system support and political tolerance as a function of variety of measures, including socioeconomic and demographic variables, whether the individual voted for the winning candidate in the last national election, and factors related to experiences with local and national governance. These analyses are presented in Figure VI.11 and Figure VI.12, respectively.




**Figure VI. 11. Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2012**

Often in advanced democracies diffuse support for the political system and inherently democratic values are viewed as deep-seated attitudes that are not likely to shift in response to short-run changes in government performance or electoral outcomes. However, the results of a fixed-effects regression analysis predicting system support, reported in Figure VI.11 above, suggest this may not be the case in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean. Rather perceived performances of both the national and local levels of government are crucial predictors of system support.

For example, we see a strong connection between positive assessments of the economy and system support. In addition, people who feel insecure or view corruption as high have much lower system support. System support is also linked to positive evaluations of municipal services and, more modestly, having sought assistance from local government. We also observe that the outcome of the previous presidential election correlates with levels of system support. Individuals who voted for the winner in the election show greater levels of system support than those who either abstained or voted for a losing candidate. The politics of elections and their outcomes are strongly associated with individuals' levels of system support, with election losers in particular ascribing the political system less legitimacy.

These findings lend support to three crucial arguments. First, despite theories that suggest system support is typically a deep-seated orientation, in the Americas it appears to shift with changes in electoral fortunes, the state of the economy, or perceived levels of physical security. Second, while

system support is often viewed as a national-level concept, it appears in part based on the performance of local governments: how citizens view their municipalities shapes how they view their national political system. Thirdly, while socialization seems to account for the differences in system support among the two youngest cohorts and between them and the older cohorts (full analysis not shown), modernization – with education, wealth, and urban residence – appears to affect system support in ways that run contrary to its theoretical predictions.




**Figure VI. 12. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2012**

Turning now to the factors that shape people's level of political tolerance, reported in Figure VI.12, we see a different picture. In contrast with the findings for system support, political tolerance is expected to deteriorate as citizens' evaluations of the national economy and municipal services improve. Perhaps surprisingly, perceived corruption increases political tolerance, suggesting that respondents are willing to tolerate more dissent if the state is corrupt. More discouraging is evidence of a strong negative relationship between tolerance and electoral behavior. Supporters of election "winners" and those who abstained from voting in the last election appear less tolerant of political dissent than are those who voted for election "losers."[36] Finally, the educated, the wealthy, and men are three societal subgroups that exhibit more political tolerance than their counterparts. Education has the

[36] While such results are at odds with the traditional "home team" hypothesis that links winning elections to pro-democratic attitudes, they resonate with findings from Latin America that election losers are particularly tolerant of political dissidents and continue to mobilize in support of their rights while political winners are likely to delegate additional authority to "their" executive (Carlin and Singer 2011).

largest positive effect (per unit change) of any factor, suggesting that as educational attainment increases, so should political tolerance.

These results place democracy's champions in an awkward position. On one hand, citizens for whom democracy "works," i.e., those who voted for the winner, think the economy is humming, think that government is clean, and are satisfied with their local institutions, are in turn less tolerant of individuals who openly criticize the regime and question the value of democracy. On the other hand, these same citizens were shown above to express relatively higher levels of system support, an indication of their support for democratic institutions. Somewhat paradoxically, however, strong democracy requires extending political and civil freedoms even to those who wish to undermine it. Reconciling these two sets of attitudes, then, is a major challenge for the development of the cultural foundations of democracy in the Americas.[37] From a public policy standpoint the task is all the more daunting since citizen perceptions of performance appear to affect democracy's cultural foundations in different, and sometimes, contradictory ways.

## *III.C. Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability*

To identify the attitudes theorized to help stabilize democracy, we combine the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections. Individuals who scored above 50 (the midpoint) on both of the two scales are considered as having a profile of attitudes conducive to stable democracy.

In 2012, 28.7 percent of citizens in the Americas scored high on both system support and political tolerance. The percentage of citizens with both high system and high political tolerance has stayed fairly stable in the region with a low point in 2008 (Figure VI.13). It is nonetheless quite notable that the percentage of citizens with attitudes most conducive to stable democracy consistently hovers between one-quarter and one-third of the population in the Americas.

[37] See Singer, Matthew M. n.d. "Delegating Away Democracy: How Good Representation and Policy Successes Can Undermine Democratic Attitudes." Unpublished working paper, University of Connecticut.




**Figure VI. 13. Stable Democratic Attitudes over Time in the Americas, Full Sample**

The clearest trend we observe is the growth of high system support coupled with low political tolerance – attitudes which could stabilize authoritarianism. Whereas just 22.3 percent of citizens held such values in 2006, that proportion has grown in each successive wave of the AmericasBarometer and now stands at 26.1 percent in 2012. This evidence would suggest there is fertile ground among the publics of the Americas for leaders to install regimes that fall well short of the liberal democratic ideals of highly contested and broadly inclusive political processes.




**Figure VI. 14. Stable Democratic Attitudes over Time in the Americas, Sub-Sample**

**Sub-Sample 2004-2012: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru**

Looking at a subset of countries measured continuously by LAPOP since 2004 (Figure VI.14), we see less stability and more obvious signs of distress. Stable democratic attitudes have dropped sharply since 2010 just as the attitudes that place democracy at risk have risen. Whereas the attitudes favoring authoritarian stability were least common in 2004, they are the most common attitudinal profile today. According to these data, citizen attitudes are not propitious for stable democracy in Central America and the Andes.

In Figure VI.15 we examine the extent to which citizens across the Americas hold this combination of attitudes in 2012. The percentage of citizens with both high system support and high political tolerance displays massive country-to-country variation. Canada boasts the highest percentage of citizens with democracy-stabilizing attitudes with 51.5 percent, though Guyana's wide confidence intervals around its 45.5 percent average make it statistically indistinguishable. Stable democratic attitudes are generally high within the Caribbean, with Haiti being a notable exception. Within Latin America, Uruguay and Chile lead with 42.6 and 34.6 percent, respectively, and their confidence intervals overlap. Strikingly, Honduras still ranks last with 7.2 percent of citizens touting democracy stabilizing attitudes. With 10.7 percent, Haiti rates second lowest.

If these descriptive statistics are any indication of democracy stability, as we believe they are, Latin America does not appear out of the woods with respect to political instability. Only Uruguay and Guyana approach the levels we observe in Canada and the United States; in the rest of the Latin

American countries, just one in every three citizens holds the democratic orientations and values that we expect to buoy democracy in difficult times.

As the country reports discuss, several countries have dramatic over-time trends. Since 2010, the percentage of citizens with democracy-stabilizing attitudes in Costa Rica, the region's most stable democracy in the last six decades, has fallen from 46.6 to 31.5 percent, just above the regional average. Bolivia witnessed a drop of over 7 percentage points (22.8 to 15.6 percent) over the same period. Among bright spots, we observe a nearly a threefold increase in the attitudinal profiles best suited to democracy in Haiti, from a nadir of 3.7 percent, in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. And Ecuador has raised its cultural foundation for democracy 8 percentage points since 2006 (11.9 to 19.8 percent).




**Figure VI. 15. Percent with High System Support and High Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas**

## IV. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered a requirement for democratic consolidation. With the AmericasBarometer, one way we measure support for democracy is by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill,[38] and a question inspired by the work of Rose and Mishler.[39] The "Churchillian" question again uses a 7 point response scale, this time running from 1 ("Strongly disagree") to 7 ("Strongly agree"):

**ING4.** Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Support for democracy has remained fairly stable over the region, with levels of support of democracy as the best system of government in 2012 remaining roughly equal to levels observed in 2010 (Figure VI.16). However, in an analysis not shown here of the continuous 2004-2012 sub-sample of Mexico and the Central American and Andean countries, we find support for democracy fell significantly (but slightly) from 68.7 to 66.3. This is in keeping with the general erosion of democratic legitimacy noted elsewhere in this report.

[38] Churchill actually referred to democracy as "the worst form of government except for all the others."

[39] Rose, Richard and William Mishler 1996. "Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives." *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.




**Figure VI. 16. Support for Democracy in the Americas over Time**

In Figure VI.17 we examine the average levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas. Churchill's pithy conclusion resonates well in the Americas. At least half of respondents in each country agree with him, and three Latin American countries – Uruguay, Argentina, and Venezuela – lay claim to the top spots, registering a full 7 points more support than the United States or Canada (both at 76.3). Keeping with the theme of previous analyses, Honduras has by far the lowest degree of nominal support for democracy.




**Figure VI. 17. Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2012**

We wish to underscore that overall levels of support are far higher for the Churchillian measure than for the orientations and values we expect to bolster democracy—system support and political tolerance. This implies citizens in the Americas are wedded to the abstract notion of democracy, yet they find the legitimacy of their political systems wanting and do not highly value open political competition and participation. This conclusion aligns with research showing citizens can and do hold these diverging values simultaneously.[40] So while the Americas are holding strong with respect to their general acceptance of a democratic system, lower values on system legitimacy and tolerance do not warrant the optimistic conclusion that democracy's cultural foundation is well anchored.

As a final note, the improvements in public evaluations of national government performance documented in Chapter 4 have not generated wholesale increases in democratic support. Whereas support for political institutions, the rule of law, and system support have increased in recent years in tandem with government performance evaluations, political tolerance and endorsement of democracy have not budged. Theoretically, performance should strongly influence attitudes towards specific institutions of the current system but their effects on diffuse attitudes about political norms should be more attenuated. In other words, inherently democratic values, such as political tolerance, and preferences for democracy are not completely delinked from short-run fluctuations in government performance, but are thought to be more generally inculcated via longer-term processes of political development, socialization, and education. An analysis not presented here indeed suggests support for democracy is buffered somewhat from short-term performance downturns or election outcomes.

## VII. Conclusion

The future of democracy in the Americas hinges on its legitimacy. When its local and national institutions are well regarded and trusted, when its core principles are widespread in the populace, and when the system itself is broadly valued for its own sake, democracy is far more stable and effective. But when legitimacy flags, democracy's fate is less certain. Therefore it is important to track the evolution of legitimacy in the Americas, to compare it across countries, and, most crucially, to understand what drives legitimacy among citizens. To these ends, this chapter disassembled legitimacy into its constituent parts and sought to explain them with factors of high policy and theoretical relevance. We placed special emphasis on the role of government performance both at the local and national levels.

In general, our analyses suggest that citizens who perceive their **national** governments as delivering a strong economy, curbing corruption, and providing security are most likely to support the democratic system and hold the sorts of attitudes that make democracy stable. The same is true of citizens who have positive interactions with their **local** governments. These conclusions hold even after controlling for electoral support for the incumbent and a host of socio-demographic factors. The most significant caveats to this pattern are the negative associations between political tolerance – an important element of democratic culture – and several national and local government performance evaluations.[41] But by and large, our analyses underscore the importance of raising levels of governance

[40] Carlin, Ryan E. 2011. "Distrusting Democrats and Political Participation in New Democracies: Lessons from Chile." *Political Research Quarterly* 64(3): 668-687; Schedler, Andreas and Rodolfo Sarsfield. 2007. "Democrats with Adjectives: Linking Direct and Indirect Measures of Democratic Support." *European Journal of Political Research* 46(5):637-659.

[41] This finding potentially reflects the fact that the AmericasBarometer measures political tolerance by asking respondents if they support the rights of political dissidents as opposed to the rights of respondents' least-liked group. See for a review

and economic performance, as well as various international and domestic programs aimed at increasing the capabilities of state institutions tasked with these matters at the national and local levels.

In addition to performance, education plays an intriguing role in understanding legitimacy in the Americas. On one hand, more educated citizens are more likely to hold attitudes that augur in favor of democratic stability, namely political tolerance. On the other hand, education has negligible effects on support for the rule of law and a *negative* influence on system support. What lessons can we glean from a public policy perspective? Perhaps the education systems in the hemisphere have succeeded in instilling values of political tolerance but have thus far failed to inculcate other system-buttressing values. Or perhaps, the educated are the most critical of democratic political systems in the Americas which failed to live up to their billing. Such a conclusion is apropos of the classic chicken-and-egg problem, whereby democratic institutions remain too feeble to garner the public legitimacy they need to thrive.[42] In this sense, the education system may deserve credit, not blame. Indeed citizens who blindly support systems with major and well-known deficiencies would be of little benefit to the region's democracies.

To avoid an overly sanguine reading of the data, we note that the association between government performance at the national and local levels and support for the political system and for democratic institutions can cut both ways. Although we have observed, on average, upward trends in government performance in the Americas, in many countries we have also documented public concern about weak performance in areas of heightened importance to citizens. Evaluations of the economy are improving but remain mixed on average. Corruption victimization and crime victimization have not changed as much as perceptions of the corruption and crime situations have. Finally, while the region as a whole has improved, many countries continue to have weak economies, high levels of crime, and poor governance. If the region's political systems continue to fail in these respects, levels of institutional and system support could tumble. Of course, frustrations with democratic institutions and their performance can either create space for actors to undermine those institutions or propel new modes of participation, such as reform movements,[43] which can improve them while strengthening democracy. Thus long-standing commitments to democratic principles and the norms of open political competition and tolerance are keys to understanding the trajectory of democracy in the region.

---

of this debate see Sullivan , John L. and John E. Transue. 1999. "The Psychological Underpinnings of Democracy: A Selective Review of Research on Political Tolerance, Interpersonal Trust, and Social Capital." *Annual Review of Psychology* 50:625-650.

[42] Samuel P. Huntington. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[43] Norris, Pippa. (ed.). 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. New York: Oxford University Press; Norris, Pippa. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism.* New York: Cambridge University Press. Cain, Bruce E., Russell J. Dalton, and Susan E. Scarrow (eds.). 2003. *Democracy Transformed: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies.* New York: Oxford University Press.

# Appendixes

# Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent

This is the standard informed consent letter, which was modified by research teams within each country.

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

January 2012

Dear Sir/Madam:

You are being asked to participate in a research study. This research involves a survey of public opinion on behalf of Vanderbilt University and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The goal of the study is for us to learn of the opinions of people about different aspects of the local and national situation. The study is being conducted so that we can better understand what people think about their country, although we cannot offer you any specific benefit. We plan to conduct a series of lectures based on the results of what people say. We will never disclose your individual opinion, not even the opinion of the people of this neighborhood. Rather, we will talk about national trends and patterns.

You have been randomly selected to participate in this survey in a kind of lottery system. You will not be paid for your participation, but your participation will not cause you to incur any expenses.

This survey is completely voluntary and it will take 30 to 40 minutes to complete.

Your answers will be kept confidential. Your address will not be recorded. We will not ask for your name and nobody will ever be able to learn how you responded. You can leave any questions unanswered, and you may stop the interviews at any time.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact XXX whose phone number is XXX-XXXX.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Do you wish to participate?

# Appendix B. Questionnaire

*LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2012 Master Core Version # 10.0 IRB* ***Approval: 110627***

| | |
|---|---|
| USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE | ***[LOGO OF LOCAL PARTNER INSTITUTION HERE]*** |

Latin American Public Opinion Project LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina | AmericasBarometer by LAPOP Barómetro de las Américas www.AmericasBarometer.org | VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

AmericasBarometer: Country, 2012

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**PAIS. Country**:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. Mexico | 02. Guatemala | 03. El Salvador | 04. Honduras | 05. Nicaragua |
| 06. Costa Rica | 07. Panama | 08. Colombia | 09. Ecuador | 10. Bolivia |
| 11. Peru | 12. Paraguay | 13. Chile | 14. Uruguay | 15. Brazil |
| 16. Venezuela | 17. Argentina | 21. Dom. Rep. | 22. Haiti | 23. Jamaica |
| 24. Guyana | 25. Trinidad & Tobago | 26. Belize | 40. United States | 41. Canada |
| 27. Suriname | | | | |

|__|__|

**IDNUM.** Questionnaire number **[assigned at the office]** |__|__|__|__|

**ESTRATOPRI:** Insert the names of the strata here |__|__|

**ESTRATOSEC.** Size of the Municipality: (1) Large (more than 100,000) (2) Medium (25,000-100,000) (3) Small (< 25,000) |__|

**UPM (Primary Sampling Unit)**_____ |__|__|__|

**PROV. Province (or department)** :_____ |__|__|

**MUNICIPIO. County** (or municipality): _____ |__|__|

**XXXDISTRITO. District** (or parish, etc.): _____ |__|__|

**XXXSEGMENTO**. **Census Segment** _____ |__|__|__|

**XXXSEC. Sector**_____ |__|__|__|

**CLUSTER. [CLUSTER, Final sampling unit, or sampling point]:** _____
[A cluster must have 6 interviews]

**UR.** (1) Urban (2) Rural **[Use country's definition]**

**TAMANO. Size of place:** (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area

**IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language:** (11) English INSERT OTHER LANGUAGES

**Start time:** _____:_____ |__|__|__|__|

**FECHA. Date Day**: ____ **Month:**_____ Year: 2012 |__|__|__|__|

**Do you live in this home?**
**Yes → continue**
**No →Thank the respondent and end the interview**
**Are you a [country] citizen or permanent resident of [country]?**
**Yes → continue**
**No → Thank the respondent and end the interview**

**Are you at least 18 years old [in Ecuador and Nicaragua: 16 years]?**
**Yes → continue**
**No → Thank the respondent and end the interview**

**NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.**

**Q1**. **[Note down; do not ask]** Sex: (1) Male (2) Female

**LS3.** To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... **[Read options]**?
(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**
**[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONSHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]**

|___|___|

**A4**. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country? **[DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Water, lack of | 19 | Impunity | 61 |
| Roads in poor condition | 18 | Inflation, high prices | 02 |
| Armed conflict | 30 | Politicians | 59 |
| Corruption | 13 | Bad government | 15 |
| Credit, lack of | 09 | Environment | 10 |
| Crime | 05 | Migration | 16 |
| Human rights, violations of | 56 | Drug trafficking | 12 |
| Unemployment | 03 | Gangs | 14 |
| Inequality | 58 | Poverty | 04 |
| Malnutrition | 23 | Popular protests (strikes, road blockages, work stoppages, etc.) | 06 |
| Forced displacement of persons | 32 | Health services, lack of | 22 |
| External debt | 26 | Kidnappings | 31 |
| Discrimination | 25 | Security (lack of) | 27 |
| Drug addiction | 11 | Terrorism | 33 |
| Economy, problems with, crisis of | 01 | Land to farm, lack of | 07 |
| Education, lack of, poor quality | 21 | Transportation, problems of | 60 |
| Electricity, lack of | 24 | Violence | 57 |
| Population explosion | 20 | Housing | 55 |
| War against terrorism | 17 | Other | 70 |
| Doesn't know | 88 | Doesn't answer | 98 |
| N/A | 99 | | |

**SOCT1**. How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

**SOCT2.** Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was **12 months ago**?
(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

**IDIO1.** How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

| | |
|---|---|
| **IDIO2.** Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?<br>(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer | |

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

| In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...? **[Read the options and mark the response]** | **Yes** | **No** | **DK** | **DA** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **CP2.** A member of Congress/Parliament | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | |
| **CP4A.** A local public official or local government for example, a mayor, municipal council, councilman, provincial official, civil governor or governor) | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | |
| **CP4.** Any ministry or minister (federal), state agency or public agency or institution | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | |

| Now let's talk about your local municipality... | |
|---|---|
| **NP1**. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer | |
| **NP2.** Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?<br>(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]**<br>(98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]** | |
| **MUNI10**. Did they resolve your issue or request?<br>(1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **SGL1**. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are…? **[Read options]**(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer | |

| | **Once a week** | **Once or twice a month** | **Once or twice a year** | **Never** | **DK** | **DA** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **CP5**. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in the last 12 months. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | |

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year," or "never" to help the interviewee]**

| | Once a week | Once or twice a month | Once or twice a year | Never | Attend/member | Leader/Board member | DK | DA | INAP | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **CP6**. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 **[Go to CP7]** | | | 88 | 98 | | |
| **CP6L**. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? **[If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]** | | | | | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **CP7**. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 **[Go to CP8]** | | | 88 | 98 | | |
| **CP7L**. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]** | | | | | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **CP8**. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 **[Go to CP9]** | | | 88 | 98 | | |
| **CP8L**. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]** | | | | | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **CP9**. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | | | 88 | 98 | | |
| **CP13**. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | | | 88 | 98 | | |
| **CP20. [Women only]** Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | | | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **CP21.** Meetings of sports or recreation groups? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | | | 88 | 98 | | |

**IT1**. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy
(88) DK (98) DA

**[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]**
**MIL6.** Now, changing the subject, how proud are you of the Armed Forces of [country]? **[Read options]**
(1) Extremely proud (2) Very proud (3) Somewhat proud
(4) Not at all proud or (5) Do you not care? (88) DK (98) DA

**MIL5.** How proud do you feel to be [nationality] when you hear the national anthem? **[Read options]**
(1) Extremely proud (2) Very proud (3) Somewhat proud
(4)Not at all proud or (5) Do you not care? (88) DK (98) DA

**[GIVE CARD A]**

**L1. [Use L1B in United States, Canada, and Guyana]** Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | **DK 88** | **DA 98** | |
| **Left** | | | | | | | | | **Right** | | | |

**[TAKE BACK CARD A]**

**[Give Card A]**

**L1B. [For the United States, Canada, and Guyana]** (Liberal-Conservative Scale) Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from liberal to conservative. One means liberal and 10 means conservative. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of liberals and conservatives. In other words, some people sympathize more with the liberals and others with the conservatives. According to the meaning that the terms "liberals" and "conservatives" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | **DK 88** | **DA 98** | |
| **Liberal** | | | | | | | | | **Conservative** | | | |

**[Take back Card A]**

| | |
|---|---|
| **PROT3.** In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?<br>(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to PROT6]**<br>(88) DK**[Go to PROT6]** (98)DA **[Go to PROT6]** | |
| **PROT4.** How many times have you participated in a demonstration or protest march in **the last 12 months**?<br>_____ (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A | |
| **PROT7.** And, in the last 12 months, have you participated in blocking any street or public space as a form of protest?<br>(1) Yes, participated (2) No, did not participate<br>(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **PROT6.** In the **last 12 months** have you signed any petition?<br>(1) Yes, signed (2) No, has not signed<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |
| **PROT8.** And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut?<br>(1) Yes, has done (2) No, has not done<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]**: **[Customize** for Costa Rica (Fuerza Pública), Panama (Fuerza Pública de Panamá), and Haiti (Police Nationale d'Haïti) ]

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **JC1**. When there is high unemployment. | (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified | (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified | (88) DK | (98) DA | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **JC10**. When there is a lot of crime. | (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified | (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified | (88) DK | (98) DA | |
| **JC13**. When there is a lot of corruption. | (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified | (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified | (88) DK | (98) DA | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **JC15A.** Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress/Parliament? | (1) Yes, it is justified | (2) No, it is not justified | (88) DK | (98) DA | |
| **JC16A.** Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal and govern without the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal? | (1) Yes, it is justified | (2) No, it is not justified | (88) DK | (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **VIC1EXT**. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?<br>(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]** (88) DK **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR ]**<br>(98) DA **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR ]** | |
| **VIC1EXTA.** How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? ____ [fill in number]<br>(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **VIC2**. Thinking of the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? **[Read the options]**<br>(01) Unarmed robbery, **no** assault or physical threats<br>(02) Unarmed robbery **with** assault or physical threats<br>(03) Armed robbery<br>(04) Assault but not robbery<br>(05) Rape or sexual assault<br>(06) Kidnapping<br>(07) Vandalism<br>(08) Burglary of your home (thieves got into your house while no one was there)<br>(10) Extortion<br>(11) Other<br>(88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A (was not a victim) | |
| **VIC2AA.** Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?**[Read options]**<br>(1) In your home<br>(2) In this neighborhood<br>(3) In this municipality/canton<br>(4) In another municipality/canton<br>(5) In another country<br>(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **VIC1HOGAR.** Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone) | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **ARM2.** If you could, would you have your own firearm for protection?<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA | |

Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the **last 12 months** ….

| | Yes | No | DK | DA | INAP | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **VIC40.** Have you limited the places where you go to shop? | (1)Yes | (0) No | (88)DK | (98)DA | | |
| **VIC41**. Have you limited the places where you go for recreation? | (1)Yes | (0)No | (88)DK | (98)DA | | |
| **VIC43.** Have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime? | (1)Yes | (0)No | (88)DK | (98)DA | | |
| **VIC44.**Out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbors of your community? | (1)Yes | (0)No | (88)DK | (98)DA | | |
| **VIC45. In the last twelve months, h**ave you changed your job out of fear of crime? **[If does not work mark 99]** | (1)Yes | (0)No | (88)DK | (98)DA | (99) INAP | |

I am going to read you some things you hear on the street or in the media when people talk about ways to combat crime. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree somewhat, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each one of them. The best way to fight crime…

| | Strongly Agree | Somewhat Agree | Somewhat Disagree | Strongly Disagree | DK | DA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **VIC101**. is to create prevention programs. Do you: **[Read Alternatives]** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (88) | (98) | |
| | **Strongly Agree** | **Somewhat Agree** | **Somewhat Disagree** | **Strongly Disagree** | **DK** | **DA** | |
| **VIC102.** The best way to fight crime is to be tougher on criminals | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (88) | (98) | |
| **VIC103.** The best way to fight crime is to contract private security | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (88) | (98) | |

Following, I am going to read you a series of situations that you could see at any time. I would like for you to indicate for each one if you would approve, would not approve but would understand, or would neither approve nor understand.

| | Would approve | Would not approve, but would understand | Would not approve or understand | DK | DA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **VOL207.** Suppose that in order to teach a child, a parent hits the child each time he or she disobeys. Would you approve of the parent hitting the child, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand? | (3) | (2) | (1) | (88) | (98) | |
| **VOL206.** Suppose that a man hits his wife because she has been unfaithful with another man. Would you approve of the man hitting his wife, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand? | (3) | (2) | (1) | (88) | (98) | |
| **VOL202.** Suppose that a person kills someone who has raped a son or daughter. Would you approve of killing him, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand? | (3) | (2) | (1) | (88) | (98) | |
| **VOL203.** If a person frightens his community and someone kills him, would you approve of killing the person, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand? | (3) | (2) | (1) | (88) | (98) | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **VOL204.** If a group of people begin to carry out social cleansing, that is, kill people that some people consider undesirable, would you approve of them killing people considered undesirable, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand? | (3) | (2) | (1) | (88) | (98) | |
| | **Would approve** | **Would not approve, but would understand** | **Would not approve or understand** | **DK** | **DA** | |
| **VOL205.** If the police torture a criminal to get information about a very dangerous organized crime group, would you approve of the police torturing the criminal, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand? | (3) | (2) | (1) | (88) | (98) | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **AOJ8**. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?<br>(1) Should always abide by the law<br>(2) Occasionally can cross the line (88 ) DK (98) DA | |
| **AOJ11**. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very **un**safe?<br>(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe<br>(4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **AOJ12**. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? **[Read the options]**<br>(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **AOJ17.** To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none?<br>(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **AOJ18.** Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think? **[Read options]**<br>(1) Police protect people from crime or<br>(2) Police are involved in crime<br>(3) **[Don't Read]** Neither, or both<br>(88) DK<br>(98) DA | |
| **AOJ20.** And thinking about your and your family's security, do you feel safer, equally safe, or less safe than five years ago?<br>(1) Safer (2) Equally safe (3) Less safe (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **AOJ21.** I am going to mention some groups to you, and I would like you to tell me which of them represents the biggest threat to your safety: **[READ ALTERNATIVES. MARK JUST ONE RESPONSE]**<br>(1) People from your neighborhood or community<br>(2) Gangs<br>(3) The police or military<br>(4) Organized crime and drug traffickers<br>(5) People in your family<br>(6) Common criminals<br>(7) **[DO NOT READ]** Other<br>(8) **[DO NOT READ]** None<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |
| **AOJ22.** In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: **[read options]**<br>(1) Implement preventive measures<br>(2) Increase punishment of criminals<br>(3) **[Don't read]** Both<br>(88) DK<br>(98) DA | |

**[GIVE CARD B TO THE RESPONDENT]**

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly]**.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 88 | 98 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Not at all** | | | | | | **A lot** | **Doesn't know** | **Doesn't Answer** |

**Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA**

| | |
|---|---|
| I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.<br>**B1**. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read*:*** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.) | |
| **B2**. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)? | |
| **B3**. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)? | |
| **B4**. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)? | |
| **B6**. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)? | |
| **B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system? | |
| **B11**. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal? | |
| **B12**. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? **[Not in Costa Rica or Haiti; ; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]** | |
| **B13**. To what extent do you trust the National Congress? | |
| **B18**. To what extent do you trust the National Police? | |
| **B20**. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church? | |
| **B20A**. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church **[use the most common name in your country]**? | |
| **B21**. To what extent do you trust the political parties? | |
| **B21A.** To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister? | |
| **B31**. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court? | |
| **B32**. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government? | |
| **B43**. To what extent are you proud of being (nationality corresponding to country)? | |
| **B37**. To what extent do you trust the mass media? | |
| **B47A**. To what extent do you trust elections in this country? | |

| | |
|---|---|
| Now, using the same ladder, ***[continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]***<br>**NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT** | **Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA** |
| **N1.** To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty? | |
| **N3***.* To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles? | |
| **N9**. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption? | |
| **N11.** To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety? | |
| **N15.** To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well? | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **ODD QUESTIONNAIRES**<br>**[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]**<br>And continuing to use the same card, | **Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA,** |

| NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT | 99 = N/A |
|---|---|
| **EPP1**. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do [nationality] political parties represent their voters well? (99) N/A | |
| **EPP3**. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you? (99) N/A | |

| Now, using the same ladder, ***[continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]***<br>**NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT** | **Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA** |
|---|---|
| **MIL1**. **[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]**<br>To what extent do you believe that the (nationality) Armed Forces are well trained and organized? | |
| **MIL2. [DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]**<br>To what extent do you think that the Armed Forces in (country) have done a good job when they have helped to deal with natural disasters? | |
| **B3MILX**. **[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]**<br>To what extent do you believe that the [nationality] Armed Forces respect [nationality's] human rights nowadays? | |
| **MIL3.** Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America? | |
| **MIL4. [DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]**<br>To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces of the United States of America ought to work together with the Armed Forces of [country] to improve national security? | |

**[Take Back Card B]**

| | |
|---|---|
| **M1**. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT? **[Read the options]**<br>(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |
| **M2.** Now speaking of Congress/Parliament, and thinking of members/senators and representatives as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members/senators and representatives of Congress/Parliament are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?<br>(1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly<br>(5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **SD2NEW2.** And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dis**satisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?<br>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied<br>(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **SD3NEW2.** And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**<br>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied<br>(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **SD6NEW2.** And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**<br>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied<br>(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA | |

**[GIVE CARD C]**

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree." A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

**Write a number 1-7, or 88 = Doesn't Know, 98 = Doesn't Answer**

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 88 | 98 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Strongly disagree** | | | | | **Strongly agree** | | **Doesn't know** | **Doesn't answer** |

**Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA**

| | |
|---|---|
| Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements<br><br>**POP101.** It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents/prime ministers limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? | |
| **POP107.** The people should govern directly **rather than** through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? | |
| **POP113.** Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? | |

**We are going to continue using the same ladder.** Please, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?

| | |
|---|---|
| **EFF1.** Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? | |
| **EFF2.** You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? | |

| **Write a number 1-7, or 88=DK and 98=DA** | |
|---|---|
| **ING4.** Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? | |
| **DEM23.** Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? | |

| | |
|---|---|
| Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7. **(88) DK (98)DA** | |
| **ROS1**. The (Country) government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? | |
| **ROS2**. The (Country) government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? | |
| **ROS3.** The (Country) government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement? | |
| **ROS4.** The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? | |
| **ROS6.** The (Country) government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? | |
| **[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA, HAITI, OR PANAMA]**<br>**MIL7**. The Armed Forces ought to participate in combatting crime and violence in [country]. How much do you agree or disagree? | |

| **ODD QUESTIONNAIRES** | |
|---|---|
| **[QUESTIONS CCT3-RAC2A SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]**<br>**CCT3.** Changing the topic…Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A | |
| **GEN1.** Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A | |
| Now I would like to know how much you are in agreement with some policies I am going to mention. I would like you to respond thinking about what should be done, regardless of whether the policies are being implemented currently. **[Write Down Number 1-7, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A.]** | |
| **GEN6.** The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A | |
| **RAC2A.** Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A<br>**[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous/native-(country)/First Peoples, "non-whites" in general]** | |

**[Take Back Card C]**

| ODD QUESTIONNAIRES<br>**[QUESTIONS W14-PN5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]** | |
|---|---|
| **W14A.** And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger?<br>(1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **PN4.** And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country?<br>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **PN5.** In your opinion, is country very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?<br>(1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic<br>(4) Not at all democratic (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |

**[Give the respondent Card D]**

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 88 **Doesn't know** | 98 **Doesn't Answer** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Strongly disapprove** | | | | | | | | | **Strongly approve** | | |

| | **1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA** |
|---|---|
| **E5**. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove? | |
| **E8**. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove? | |
| **E11**. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove? | |
| **E15**. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove? | |
| **E14**. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove? | |
| **E3**. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove? | |
| **E16.** Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove? | |

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in country. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.

| | **1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA** |
|---|---|
| **D1**. There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: ***[Probe: To what degree?]*** | |
| **D2**. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number. | |
| **D3**. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**? | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **D4**. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**? | |
| **D5.** And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**? | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **ODD QUESTIONNAIRES**<br>**[QUESTIONS D6-D8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]**<br>**D6.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry? (99) N/A | |
| **ODD QUESTIONNAIRES**<br>**[ASK ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]**<br>**D7.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office? (99) N/A | |
| **D8.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the state/government having the right to prohibit newspapers from publishing news that can be **politically damaging** to it? (99) N/A | |

**[Take back Card D]**

**[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE OPTIONAL FOR EACH COUNTRY]**
I’m going to read you a list of several groups of people. Can you tell me if there are some groups that **you wouldn’t like** to have as neighbors?

| | **Mentions** [Does **not** want as neighbors] | **Does not mention** [**Does not mind** with having as neighbors] | **DK** | **DA** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **DIS35A.** Gays. Would you mind having them as neighbors? | 1 | 0 | 88 | 98 | |
| **DIS35B.** Poor people | 1 | 0 | 88 | 98 | |
| **DIS35C.** People from other countries | 1 | 0 | 88 | 98 | |
| **DIS35D.** Afro-country/blacks | 1 | 0 | 88 | 98 | |
| **DIS35E.** Indigenous/Native (country)/First Peoples | 1 | 0 | 88 | 98 | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **DEM2**. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most:<br>**(1)** For people like me it doesn’t matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or<br>**(2)** Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or<br>**(3)** Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |
| **DEM11**. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?<br>(1) Iron fist (2) Everyone’s participation (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **AUT1**. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? **[Read the options]**<br>(1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected<br>(2) Electoral democracy is the best<br>(88) DK (98)DA | |

| | **N/A Did not try or did not have contact** | **No** | **Yes** | **DK** | **DA** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life... | | | | | | |
| **EXC2**. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? | | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | |
| **EXC6**. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? | | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | |

| | N/A Did not try or did not have contact | No | Yes | DK | DA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]** **EXC20**. In the last twelve months, did any **soldier or military officer** ask you for a bribe? | | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | |
| **EXC11**. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | |
| **EXC13**. Do you work? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | |
| **EXC14**. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | |
| **EXC15**. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | |
| **EXC16**. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | |
| **EXC18.** Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified? | | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **EXC7**. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]** **EXC7MIL**. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption in the **Armed Forces** is **[Read options]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA | |

**[QUESTIONS DIS2-DIS5 ARE OPTIONAL FOR EACH COUNTRY.]**
Now, changing the subject, and thinking **about your experiences in the past year,** have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?

| | Yes | No | DK | DA | INAP | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **DIS2.** In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government] | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **DIS3.** At work or school or when you have looked for work | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **DIS5.** In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place? | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **VB1**. Are you registered to vote? [El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru: Do you have an Identity Card?]<br>(1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA, PANAMÁ, PERÚ, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, AND EL SALVADOR]**<br>**INF1**. Do you have a national identification card?<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **VB2**. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of (year of last presidential elections)? **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]**<br>(1) Voted **[Continue]**<br>(2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**<br>(88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]** | |
| **VB3**. Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2008? **[DON'T READ THE LIST] [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]**<br>(00) none (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot)<br>(X01) INSERT NAMES AND PARTIES<br>(X02)<br>(X03) **Replace X with Country Code**<br>(77) Other<br>(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote) | |
| **VB10.** Do you currently identify with a political party?<br>(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to POL1]** (88) DK **[Skip to POL1]**<br>(98) DA **[Skip to POL1]** | |
| **VB11.** Which political party do you identify with? **[DON'T READ THE LIST]**<br>**(X01) WRITE DOWN THE NAMES OF CURRENT POLITICAL PARTIES**<br>**(X02)**<br>**(X03) Replace X with Country Code**<br>(88) DK (98) DA (99) NA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **POL1.** How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?<br>(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **VB20**. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? **[Read options]**<br>(1) Wouldn't vote<br>(2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party<br>(3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration<br>(4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **PP1**. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**<br>(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **PP2**. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006?<br>(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **VB50.** Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?<br>(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **ODD QUESTIONNAIRES**<br>**[QUESTIONS VB51-AB5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]** | |
| **VB51**. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?<br>(1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same | |

(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**VB52.** If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?
(1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.
**VB53.** Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
**[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous/native-(country)/First Peoples, "non-whites" in general]**
(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**RAC1CA.** According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?
**[Read alternatives, just one answer]**
(1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
(3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Changing the subject, and talking about the qualities that children ought to have, I am going to mention various characteristics and I would like you to tell me which one is the most important for a child:

**AB1.** (1) Independence, or (2) Respect for adults (3) **[Don't read]** Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**AB2.** (1) Obedience, or (2) Autonomy (self-sufficiency, taking care of oneself) (3) **[Don't read]** Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**AB5.** (1) Creativity, or (2) Discipline (3) **[Don't read]** Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**ONLY IN BRAZIL:**
**SOC1-SOC12B SHOULD BE ASKED OF THE ENTIRE BRAZILIAN SAMPLE**

**SOC1.** For every 100 [local currency of country] that a rich person earns and 100 [currency] that a poor person earns, in your opinion, how much should each pay in taxes? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) The rich person should pay 50 [currency], and the poor person 20 [currency].
(2) The rich person should pay 40 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency].
(3) The rich person should pay 30 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency].
(4) **[DO NOT READ]** Another combination
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC2A**. Tell me, please, in which of the following areas the government should invest more money? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)
(3) Housing (4) Retirement
(5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment
(7) Health (8) Security
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC2B**. And in second place? **[READ OPTIONS ONLY IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT REMEMBER THE OPTIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS QUESTION]**
(1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)
(3) Housing (4) Retirement
(5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment
(7) Health (8) Security
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC3**. Now we are going to talk about some of the ways that the government spends money from taxes. We are going to start with education. What do you think about the quality of primary public education in [country]? Is it: **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Good (2) Fair
(3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

| | |
|---|---|
| **SOC4**. In your opinion, to improve the quality of primary and secondary education in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]**<br>(1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on education, or<br>(2) Spend more money on education, even if it has to raise taxes, or<br>(3) Both<br>(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **SOC5**. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on primary and secondary education?<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **SOC6**. In your opinion, to improve the quality of schools, who should decide how to spend the money that goes to schools? **[READ OPTIONS]**<br>(1) Schools (2) Local governments<br>(3) [Regional/state/provincial] governments (4) The central government<br>(5) **[DO NOT READ]** Other(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **SOC7**. Now we are going to talk about health services. What do you think about the quality of public health services in [country]? Is it: **[READ OPTIONS]**<br>(1) Good (2) Fair<br>(3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **SOC8**. In your opinion, to improve the quality of public health services in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]**<br>(1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on health, or<br>(2) Spend more money on health, even if it has to raise taxes, or<br>(3) Both<br>(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **SOC9**. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on public health services?<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **SOC10**. In your opinion, what should the government do to reduce poverty and inequality in [country]? **[DO NOT READ]**<br>(1) Create jobs/improve the economy<br>(2) Promote agrarian reform<br>(3) Improve public education services<br>(4) Offer public assistance to the poor<br>(5) Increase taxes on the rich<br>(6) Improve infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)<br>(9) **[DO NOT READ]** Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **SOC11**. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on [income transfer program specific to the country]?<br>[If there is no specific program, ask about the creation of a program of income transfer]<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |
| **[GIVE THE INTERVIEWEE CARD "E"]**<br>**SOC12A**. On this scale from 1 to10, where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where are [country] politicians located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]** | |
| **SOC12B.** And using the same scale, where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where **would you like** [country] politicians to be located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]**<br>**[TAKE BACK CARD "E"]** | |

**ONLY IN ARGENTINA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, GUATEMALA, MEXICO, PERU, VENEZUELA, URUGUAY, AND THE UNITED STATES:**

**ODD QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (SOC1-SOC12B) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" "9")]**

**SOC1.** For every 100 [local currency of country] that a rich person earns and 100 [currency] that a poor person earns, in your opinion, how much should each pay in taxes? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) The rich person should pay 50 [currency], and the poor person 20 [currency]
(2) The rich person should pay 40 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency]
(3) The rich person should pay 30 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency]
(4) **[DO NOT READ]** Another combination
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC2A**. Tell me, please, in which of the following areas the government should invest more money? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)
(3) Housing (4) Retirement
(5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment
(7) Health (8) Security
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC2B**. And in second place? **[READ OPTIONS ONLY IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT REMEMBER THE OPTIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS QUESTION]**
(1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)
(3) Housing (4) Retirement
(5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment
(7) Health (8) Security
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**ODD QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[ASK ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" "9")]**

**SOC3**. Now we are going to talk about some of the ways that the government spends money from taxes. We are going to start with education. What do you think about the quality of primary public education in [country]? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Good (2) Fair
(3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC4**. In your opinion, to improve the quality of primary and secondary education in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on education, or
(2) Spend more money on education, even if it has to raise taxes, or
(3) Both
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC5**. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on primary and secondary education?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC6**. In your opinion, to improve the quality of schools, who should decide how to spend the money that goes to schools? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Schools (2) Local governments
(3) [Regional/state/provincial] governments (4) The central government
(5) **[DO NOT READ]** Other(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC7**. Now we are going to talk about health services. What do you think about the quality of public health services in [country]? Is it: **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Good (2) Fair
(3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC8**. In your opinion, to improve the quality of public health services in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on health, or
(2) Spend more money on health, even if it has to raise taxes, or
(3) Both

(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC9**. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on public health services?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC10**. In your opinion, what should the government do to reduce poverty and inequality in [country]? **[DO NOT READ]**
(1) Create jobs/improve the economy (2) Promote agrarian reform
(3) Improve public education services (4) Offer public assistance to the poor
(5) Increase taxes on the rich
(6) Improve infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)
(9) **[DO NOT READ]** Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**SOC11**. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on [income transfer program specific to the country]?
[If there is no specific program, ask about the creation of a program of income transfer]
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**[GIVE THE INTERVIEWEE CARD "E"]**
**SOC12A**. On this scale from 1 to10 where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where are [country] politicians located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]**

**SOC12B.** And using the same scale, where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where **would you like** [country] politicians to be located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]**
**[TAKE BACK CARD "E"]**

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**
**[QUESTIONS VB22-MIL11E SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]**
[**VB22 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY IN ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, ECUADOR, PARAGUAY, AND PERU**] **VB22**. How likely is it that you will be penalized by the government if you do not vote in the next national election?
(1) Very likely (2) Somewhat likely (3) Not very likely (4) Unlikely
(88) NS (98) NR (99) N/A

**SNW1A.** Do you personally know an elected official or some person who was a candidate in the most recent national, state/departmental or local elections?
(1) Yes (2) No **[Go to FOR1]**
(88) DK **[Go to FOR1]** (98) DA **[Go to FOR1]** (99) N/A

**SNW1B.** And is this position at the local, state/departmental or national level?
(1) Local (2) State/departmental (3) National
(4) Candidates at more than one level (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**FOR1.** Now we are going to talk about your views with respect to some countries. When we talk about "China" in this interview, we are talking about mainland China, the People's Republic of China, and not the island of Taiwan. Which of the following countries has the **most influence** in **Latin America/the Caribbean**? **[READ CHOICES]**
(1) China (2) Japan
(3) India (4) United States
(5) Brazil (6) Venezuela
(7) Mexico (10) Spain
(11) **[Don't read ]** Another country, or (12) **[Don't read ]** None **[Go to FOR4]**
(88) **[Don't read ]** DK **[Go to FOR4]** (98) **[Do not read]** DA **[Go to FOR4]**
(99) N/A

**FOR2.** And thinking of **[country mentioned in FOR1]** do you think that its influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?
(1) Very positive (2) Positive
(3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative (4) Negative
(5) Very negative (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence
(88) **[Do not read ]** DK (98) **[Do not read]** DA
(99) N/A

**FOR3. [Ask ONLY if the country mentioned in FOR1 was NOT China]**
And thinking of China and the influence it has in **Latin America/the Caribbean**, do you think that this

influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?

(1) Very positive (2) Positive
(3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative (4) Negative
(5) Very negative (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence
(88) DK (98) DA
(99) N/A

**FOR4.** And **within 10 years**, in your opinion, which of the following countries will have most influence in **Latin America/the Caribbean**?
**[Read options]**

(1) China (2) Japan
(3) India (4) United States
(5) Brazil (6) Venezuela
(7) Mexico (10) Spain
(11) **[Don't read ]** Another country, or (12) **[Don't read ]** None
(88) DK (98) DA
(99) N/A

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]**

**FOR5.** In your opinion, which of the following countries ought to be a model for the future development of **our country**? **[Read options]**

(1) China (2) Japan
(3) India (4) United States
(5) Singapore (6) Russia
(7) South Korea (10) **[Exclude in Brazil]** Brazil
(11) **[Exclude in Venezuela]** Venezuela, or (12) **[Exclude in Mexico]** Mexico
(13) **[Do not read]** None/We ought to follow our own model
(14) **[Do not read]** Other (88) DK
(98) DA (99) N/A

**FOR6.** And thinking now **only of our country,** how much influence do you think that China has in **our country? [Read options]**

(1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) None **[Go to FOR8]**
(88) DK **[Go to FOR8]** (98) DA **[Go to FOR8]** (99) N/A

**FOR7.** In general, the influence that China has on our country is **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Very positive (2) Positive
(3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative (4) Negative
(5) Very negative (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence
(88) DK (98) DA
(99) N/A

**FOR8.** How much do you agree with the following statement: "Chinese business contributes to the economic development of [country]? Do you **[Read alternatives]**…

(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (88) DK
(98) DA (99) N/A

According to what you have heard, do Chinese businesses operating in [country] suffer from any of the following problems? **[Read alternatives.]**

| | **It is a problem** | **It is not a problem** | **No opinion/ DK** | **DA** | **N/A** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **FOR9A.** Labor relations, such as disputes with workers or unions. Do you think that it is a problem, or that it is not, or do you not have an opinion on the matter? | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | 99 |
| **FOR9B**. Problems that arise from failure to understand the culture and customs of [country]. | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | 99 |
| **FOR9C.** Lack of knowledge of the political, legal, and social values and | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | 99 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rules in [country]. | | | | | | |
| **FOR9D.** Lack of communication with the media and residents. | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**
**[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]**

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust the governments of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.

| | Very trust-worthy | Somewhat trust-worthy | Not very trust-worthy | Not at all trust-worthy | DK/No opinion | DA | N/A | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **MIL10A.** The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **MIL10B.** That of Russia. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **MIL10C.** Iran. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **MIL10D.** Israel. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **MIL10E.** United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |

Now I would like to ask you about the relations in general of our country with other nations around the world. When you think of our country's relationship with **China**, would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?

| | Closer | About the same | More distant | No opinion | DA | N/A | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **MIL11A.** China. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **MIL11B.** And our country's relationship with Russia. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**
**[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]**

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **MIL11C.** And with Iran. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **MIL11D.** And with Israel. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, | 1 | 2 | 3 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| or do you not have an opinion? | | | | | | | |
| **MIL11E.** Finally, with the United States. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |

On a different subject…

**CCT1NEW.** Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**
**[ASK ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8"), AND ONLY IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, MEXICO, AND PERU]**
**CCT1B**. Now, talking specifically about the Plan de Equidad/el programa Juntos, are you or someone in your house a beneficiary of this program?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**ED**. How many years of schooling have you completed?
_____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

| | **1⁰** | **2⁰** | **3⁰** | **4⁰** | **5⁰** | **6⁰** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| None | 0 | | | | | | |
| Primary | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
| Secondary | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | |
| University | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18+ | |
| Post-secondary, not university | 13 | 14 | 15 | | | | |
| Doesn't know | 88 | | | | | | |
| Doesn't respond | 98 | | | | | | |

**ODD QUESTIONNAIRES**
**[ED2 AND MOV1 SHOULD ONLY BE ASKED FOR INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]**
**ED2.** And what educational level did your mother complete? **[DO NOT READ OPTIONS]**
(00) None
(01) Primary incomplete
(02) Primary complete
(03) Secondary incomplete
(04) Secondary complete
(05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
(06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
(07) University (bachelor's degree or higher) incomplete
(08) University (bachelor's degree or higher) complete
(88) DK
(98) DA
(99) N/A

| | |
|---|---|
| **MOV1**. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the …? **[READ OPTIONS]**<br>(1) Upper class (2) Upper middle class (3) Middle class (4) Lower middle class, or (5) Lower class?<br>(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Q2D-Y**. On what day, month and year were you born? **[If respondent refuses to say the day and month, ask for only the year, or ask for the age and then calculate the year.]**<br>_____ Day ____ Month (01 = January) _____Year<br>(For Q2D and Q2M: 88 =DK and 98 = DR)<br>(For Q2Y: 8888 = DK and 9888 = DR) | \|_\|_\|Q2D<br>Day<br>\|_\|_\|Q2M<br>Month<br>\|_\|_\|_\|_\|Q2Y<br>Year |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Q3C**. What is your religion, if any? **[Do not read options]**<br>**[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]**<br>(1) Catholic<br>(2) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian).<br>(3) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i).<br>(4) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion)<br>(5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra).<br>(6) LDS (Mormon).<br>(7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).<br>(10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform).<br>(11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God).<br>(12) Jehovah's Witness.<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |
| **Q5A.** How often do you attend religious services? **[Read options]**<br>(1) More than once per week (2) Once per week (3) Once a month (4) Once or twice a year (5) Never or almost never (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **Q5B.** Please, could you tell me how important is religion in your life? **[Read options]**<br>(1) Very important (2) Rather important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important (88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]**<br>**MIL8**. Do you or your spouse or partner or one of your children currently serve in the Armed Forces, or have one of you ever served in the Armed Forces?<br>(1) Yes, currently serving (2) Previously served (3) Never served<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **OCUP4A.** How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently **[Read options]**<br>(1) Working? **[Continue]**<br>(2) Not working, but have a job? **[Continue]**<br>(3) Actively looking for a job? **[Go to Q10NEW]**<br>(4) A student? **[Go to Q10NEW]**<br>(5) Taking care of the home? **[Go to Q10NEW]**<br>(6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work **[Go to Q10NEW]**<br>(7) Not working and not looking for a job? **[Go to Q10NEW]**<br>(88) DK **[Go to Q10NEW]** (98) DA **[Go to Q10NEW]** | |
| **OCUP1A.** In this job are you: **[Read the options]**<br>(1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise?<br>(2) A salaried employee in the private sector?<br>(3) Owner or partner in a business<br>(4) Self-employed<br>(5) Unpaid worker<br>(88) DK<br>(98) DA<br>(99) N/A | |

**[GIVE CARD "F"]**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Q10NEW**. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?<br>**[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: "Which is the total monthly income in your household?]**<br>[17 categories based on the currency and distribution of the country]<br>(00) No income<br>(01) Less than $25<br>(02) $26- $50<br>(03) $51-$100<br>(04) $101-$150<br>(05) $151-$200<br>(06) $201-$300<br>(07) $301-$400<br>(08) $401-500<br>(09) $501-$750<br>(10) More than $751<br>(11) xxxx<br>(12) xxxx<br>(13) xxxx<br>(14) xxxx<br>(15) xxxx<br>(16) xxxx<br>(88) DK<br>(98) DA | |
| **[ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING OR IS RETIRED/DISABLED/ON PENSION (VERIFY OCUP4A)]**<br>**Q10G.** How much money do you personally earn each month in your work or retirement or pension**? [If the respondent does not understand: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]**<br>(00) No income<br>(01) Less than $25<br>(02) $26- $50<br>(03) $51-$100<br>(04) $101-$150<br>(05) $151-$200<br>(06) $201-$300<br>(07) $301-$400<br>(08) $401-500<br>(09) $501-$750 | |

| | |
|---|---|
| (10) More than $750<br>(11) xxxx<br>(12) xxxx<br>(13) xxxx<br>(14) xxxx<br>(15) xxxx<br>(16) xxxx<br>(88) DK<br>(98) DA<br>(99) N/A (Not working and not retired) | |

**[TAKE BACK CARD "F"]**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Q10A.** Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad?<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **Q14.** Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?<br>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **Q10D.** The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read the options]**<br>(1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it<br>(2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems<br>(3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched<br>(4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time<br>(88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA | |
| **Q10E.** Over the past two years, has the income of your household: **[Read options]**<br>(1) Increased?<br>(2) Remained the same?<br>(3) Decreased?<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[FS2 AND FS8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]**

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.

| | No | Yes | DK | DA | N/A | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **FS2.** In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food? | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |
| **FS8.** In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day? | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 | 99 | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Q11**. What is your marital status? **[Read options]**<br>(1) Single **[Go to Q12C]** (2) Married **[CONTINUE]**<br>(3) Common law marriage **[CONTINUE]** (4) Divorced **[Go to Q12C]**<br>(5) Separated **[Go to Q12C]** (6) Widowed **[Go to Q12C]**<br>(88) DK **[Go to Q12C]** (98) DA **[Go to Q12C]** | |
| **GEN10**. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**<br><br>(1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;<br>(2) You earn less than your spouse;<br>(3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;<br>(4) You earn more than your spouse;<br>(5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.<br>(6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income<br>(88) DK<br>(98) DA<br>(99) INAP | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Q12C.** How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |
| **Q12**. Do you have children? How many? _____<br>**(00 = none → Skip to ETID)** (88) DK (98) DA | |
| **Q12B.** How many of your children are under 13 years of age and live in this household? _____<br>**00 = none**, (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP (no children) | |
| **ETID.** Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race? **[If respondent says Afro-country, mark (4) Black]**<br>(1) White (2) Mestizo (3) Indigenous (4) Black<br>(5) Mulatto (7) Other (88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **LENG1.** What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? **[Mark only one answer] [Do not read the options]**<br>**[Coding: the 'X' is replaced by the country code as found in variable "PAIS"]**<br>(X01) Spanish (X02) Indigenous language **[NB; list the name of the most common indigenous languages]** (X04) Other (indigenous) (X05) Other foreign<br>(88) DK (98) DA | |
| **[Use only in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru]**<br>**LENG4.** Speaking about the language that your parents knew, your parents speak or spoke: *[Interviewer: if one of the parents spoke only one language and the other two, mark 2.]* **[ Read the options]**<br>(1) Spanish only (2) Spanish and indigenous language (3) Indigenous language only<br>(4) Spanish and foreign language (88) DK (98) DA | |

| | |
|---|---|
| **WWW1.** Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? **[Read options]**<br>(1) Daily<br>(2) A few times a week<br>(3) A few times a month<br>(4) Rarely<br>(5) Never<br>(88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information people have about politics and the country...<br>**GI0.** About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? **[Read alternatives]:**<br>(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never<br>(88) DK (98) DA | | | | | |
| | **Correct** | **Incorrect** | **Don't know** | **Don't answer** | |
| **GI1.** What is the name of the current president of the United States of America? **[Don't read**: Barack Obama, accept Obama**]** | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | |
| **GI4**. How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country? **[Don't read**: insert number of years**]** | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 | |
| **GI7**. How many representatives does the **[lower or only chamber of Congress]** have?<br>**[NOTE EXACT NUMBER. REPEAT ONLY ONCE IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOESN'T ANSWER]** | Number: _____ | | 88 | 98 | |

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **R1**. Television | (0) No | (1) Yes | |
| **R3**. Refrigerator | (0) No | (1) Yes | |
| **R4.** Landline/residential telephone (not cellular) | (0) No | (1) Yes | |
| **R4A**. Cellular telephone | (0) No | (1) Yes | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **R5**. Vehicle/car. How many? **[If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]** | (0) No | (1) One | (2) Two | (3) Three or more | |
| **R6**. Washing machine | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | |
| **R7**. Microwave oven | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | |
| **R8**. Motorcycle | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | |
| **R12**. Indoor plumbing | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | |
| **R14**. Indoor bathroom | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | |
| **R15.** Computer | (0) No **[GO TO R16]** | | | (1) Yes | |
| **R18.** Internet | (0) No | | (1) Yes | (99) N/A | |
| **R16.** Flat panel TV | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | |
| **R26.** Is the house connected to the sewage system? | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | |

*These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.*

| | |
|---|---|
| **COLORR. [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent]** _____<br>(97) Could not be classified **[Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]** | **\|___\|___\|** |
| Time interview ended _____ : _____<br>**TI**. Duration of interview ***[minutes, see page # 1]*** _____ | \|__\|__\|__\| |
| **INTID.** Interviewer ID number: _____ | \|__\|__\|__\| |
| **SEXI. Note your own sex:** (**1**) **Male** (**2**) **Female** | |
| **COLORI. Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.** | **\|___\|___\|** |

*I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.*
*Interviewer's signature_____ Date ____ /_____ /_____*

*Field supervisor's signature _____*
*Comments: _____*
*_____*
*[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who entered the data _____*
*[Not for PDA use]Signature of the person who verified the data _____*

## *Card A (L1)*

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Left** **Right**

## *Card A (L1B)*

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Liberal** **Conservative**

# *Card B*



# *Card C*



## *Card D*



# *Card E*

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Defends the rich** | | | | | | | | | **Defends the poor** |

# *Card F*

(00) No income
(01) Less than $25
(02) $26- $50
(03) $51-$100
(04) $101-$150
(05) $151-$200
(06) $201-$300
(07) $301-$400
(08) $401-500
(09) $501-$750
(10) More than $751
(11) Xxxx
(12) Xxxx
(13) Xxxx
(14) Xxxx
(15) Xxxx
(16) Xxxx

# Color Palette