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The Political Culture of Democracy in Haiti and in the Americas

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The Political Culture of Democracy in Haiti and in the Americas, 2012:

Towards Equality of Opportunity

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call "LAPOP Central," first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development

Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Centennial Professor of Political Science, Professor of Sociology
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project,
and
Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science
and Associate Director of LAPOP,
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We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this "reduced core" with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The "Marginalization in the Americas Conference" was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use handheld electronic devices. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we

had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the www.americasbarometer.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the AmericasBarometer *Insights* Report No. 73, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and

requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the "design effect" of the sample.1 Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.[2]

Finally, by December 2012 we will make the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

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[1] The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

[2] All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called "WT" which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT1500" that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Country	Institutions	
	Mexico and Central America	
Costa Rica	Universidad de Costa Rica; CCP; Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible	
El Salvador	FundaUngo	
Guatemala	asies	
Honduras	FOPRIDEH Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras	Hagamos Democracia
Mexico	data Opinión Publica y Mercados	ITAM Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Nicaragua	Red Nicaragüense por la Democracia y el Desarrollo Local	
Panama	CIDEM Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas	

Caribbean		
Belize	B&A Borge y Asociados	
Dominican Republic	Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.	UNIVERSIDAD intec Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo
Guyana	DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS DP	
Haiti	UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL	
Jamaica	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA	
Suriname	ANTON DE KOM UNIVERSITEIT VAN SURINAME	
Trinidad & Tobago	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina	UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA	CIPPEC
Bolivia	Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	EMBAJADA DE SUECIA
Brazil	Universidade de Brasília	CNPq Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Chile	Instituto de Ciencia Política	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Colombia	Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador	FLACSO ECUADOR	UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO / PRIME CONSULTING
Paraguay	CIRD Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Peru	*IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos*	
Uruguay	CIFRA	UM UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Venezuela	CISOR	ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Canada and United States	
Canada	UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL; YORK UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE.; THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY; MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES; PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina

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performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K. Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

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Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

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Nashville, Tennessee
Summer 2012

Executive Summary

Since 2006, the AmericasBarometer has sought to take the pulse of Haitian democracy. Every two years, interviewers have gone out to knock on doors across the country, from the most remote villages to the capital city, Port-au-Prince, seeking to understand Haitian politics and society from the perspective of ordinary citizens. They have asked Haitians what they think about the political system, the democratic regime, the rights of their fellow citizens, and major public policy issues. They have further explored these citizens' experiences related to the earthquake of 2010 and to food insecurity, crime, corruption, and discrimination, as well as their life circumstances and family backgrounds. Ultimately, the goal has been to understand the state of Haiti's democratic system: its strengths and weaknesses, its opportunities, its possible future development. At the same time, this endeavor has involved putting Haiti in context, asking how its democratic strengths and weaknesses compare to those of other governments around the world. This report presents the culmination of the efforts of the fourth round of the AmericasBarometer in Haiti. We focus on results from the 2012 round, conducted in January and February of this year. At the same time, we put those results in perspective by comparing them to results from prior years in Haiti, and from this year in other countries in the region.

This report tackles many key issues. In Part I, we investigate discrimination and equality of opportunity. We first consider the extent to which citizens' economic, social, and political participation is or is not distributed equally across the polity, in particular paying attention to divides by family background, skin color, and gender, but also place of residence and age. We then assess how unequal opportunities and discrimination affect citizens' attachment to the political system and levels of protest participation. In Part II, we go on to consider a series of issues that are core to the AmericasBarometer studies across the hemisphere: crime, corruption, human rights, and support for the rule of law; the legitimacy of political systems; and citizens' attitudes towards and interaction with local government. Finally, in Part III we further explore a group of topics that are of particular concern and interest in Haiti: earthquake recovery, reconstruction, food security, and service delivery; the impact of earthquake recovery and food insecurity on political attitudes; and citizens' dispositions related to organized, competitive electoral politics.

We have many important findings. While a number of points may be worrisome for those concerned about the state of Haitian democracy, others suggest that in some ways Haitian democracy is perhaps surprisingly robust. In the remainder of this summary we provide a brief overview of our findings, highlighting our most important discoveries from the 2012 round.

Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity

It comes as no surprise to long-time observers that, in addition to its very high levels of poverty, Haiti suffers from extraordinarily high levels of inequality, levels that are among the highest in the world. In Chapters One and Two we investigated which citizens are most and least economically and politically advantaged, and we assessed public opinion towards inequality and discrimination. In Chapter Three, we then considered whether inequality and discrimination may be affecting Haitians' democratic attitudes and the legitimacy and stability of the political system.

We discovered that while family background and gender constitute important factors that affect one's economic and political opportunities in Haiti, skin color is less strongly associated with one's fate, though opportunities are certainly not perfectly even across the spectrum of skin color. We also discovered that support for democracy and the political system are affected by some forms of disadvantage, but the effects are not profound. A number of important messages come out of this exploration.

- Haitians overall have fairly high turnout rates, and they are among the most participatory citizens in the Americas when it comes to participation in community groups, local government, and working for political campaigns.

- Family background—in particular, one's mother's level of education—constitutes one of the most important sources of advantage and disadvantage in Haiti. Haitians whose mothers have attended college or university are, on average, likely to attain seven more years of education themselves than are Haitians whose mothers have never been to school. These advantages continue to accrue in other areas: personal income, food security, and many forms of political participation.

- Race – examined throughout this report using an innovative measure of respondents' skin color – also helps to determine economic and political opportunities. The darkest skinned Haitians achieve nearly two fewer years of education than do their lightest skinned counterparts, and skin color also affects levels of food security. At the same time, though, opportunities are quite evenly distributed by race in other ways; skin color has no impact on Haitians' incomes or on any form of political participation. And at the level of public opinion Haitians support equal political and economic opportunities regardless of skin color. Interestingly, Haitians in the middle of the skin color palette tend to be more supportive of the current political system and of democracy in the abstract.

- Gender also affects one's life chances in Haiti. We found some spheres where opportunities and participation are relatively equal: women have attained educational levels that are nearly as high as those of men, and they turn out to vote and take part in community groups at similar (though slightly lower) rates. However, working women continue to be paid less than their male counterparts, and women in general experience greater food insecurity. In addition, Haitian women get involved in electoral politics at half the rate of Haitian men. In terms of public opinion, Haitians are relatively *un*supportive of economic equality for women, or of public policies intended to equalize political opportunities by gender. Women, and in particular women who are homemakers, are less likely to agree that they understand politics, that their opinion matters to politicians, or that democracy is the best form of government.

- Haitians have relatively low levels of support for public policies intended to redress inequality, compared with their counterparts across the Americas. They are also relatively unsupportive and intolerant of the participation of gays and the disabled.

- Citizens who say they have been victimized by discrimination, either in government offices or in public places and work, are *much* more likely to take to the streets in protest, and have somewhat lower levels of support for the political system.

Crime, Insecurity, Corruption, and Human Rights

Chapter Four considered a range of topics related to security, corruption, and human rights. The most salient finding from the chapter is that Haiti is by far the most corrupt country in the Americas, at least using LAPOP's measure of corruption victimization. Haitians are substantially more likely to be asked for bribes than are citizens of any other country in the Americas, and corruption victimization appears to be rising over time. At the same time, when we considered how corrupt citizens across the Americas *perceive* their governments to be, we found Haitians to be in the middle of the pack.

Turning to crime and insecurity, we found that in regional context Haitians have middling levels of insecurity and crime victimization, and that they are satisfied with the police. Trust in the police is very high, relative both to other countries in the region and to trust in other institutions within Haiti. Moreover, we find evidence that trust in the police has jumped dramatically in the past two years.

Crime, corruption, and trust in the police have important effects on democratic legitimacy. Haitians who have experienced crime and corruption have lower levels of system support and are much more likely to agree that authorities can occasionally cross the line in order to catch criminals. By contrast, those who trust the police are much more likely to support the political system in general.

Finally, with respect to human rights, we found widespread support for efforts to end the practice of sending children to work as *restaveks*. Support is somewhat lower, however among wealthy Haitians, those in large cities, and the lightest skinned citizens.

Political Legitimacy and Democratic Attitudes

In Chapter Five we examined political legitimacy. While levels of legitimacy in Haiti vary by the political institutions and actors being evaluated, in general legitimacy in 2012 has rebounded slightly after hitting a trough in 2010. We found that Haitians are highly supportive of democracy in the abstract and of the President, and that they think fairly highly of the Police.

Still, we found some important causes for concern. Support for the political system in general is the third lowest in the Americas, and Haitians also have low opinions of Parliament, the courts, political parties, elections, and the Electoral Commission. Finally, they are quite intolerant of the political liberties and freedom of expression of regime critics. We then found that only 10% of Haitians hold the combination of attitudes most propitious for stable democracy: high political tolerance and high system support. Thus, Haiti has the second lowest level of stable democratic attitudes in the region, and is behind only Honduras. Meanwhile, 40% of Haitians hold the combination of attitudes most likely to put democracy at risk: low political tolerance, combined with low system support.

Local Government

In Chapter Six we examined how citizens interact with and feel about their local governments. Haitians have very high rates of contact with their local governments, and the amount of contact has

risen since 2006. However, they are not very satisfied with this contact. More than three quarters of those who have made requests of their local governments say their requests were not met.

More generally, Haiti rates last in the Americas on satisfaction with and trust in local government. The proportion of Haitians who are *dis*satisfied with local government is six times the share who are satisfied. We also found that most Haitians do not have a clear idea of what their local governments are spending money on, but on balance they tend to think that they do not benefit from those expenditures.

Finally, we found evidence that attitudes towards local government matter not only in their own right, but also because they affect attitudes towards the political system more generally. That is, those who rate local services as "very bad" have levels of system support that are 12 points lower than those who rate local services as "good" or "very good."

Service Delivery, Rebuilding, and the Earthquake's Impact

In Chapter Seven, we assessed service delivery and reconstruction in Haiti, in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. We began with citizens' evaluations. We found that citizens evaluate the performance in rebuilding of international organizations and governments as well as local churches more positively than they evaluated the performance of local and national governments and local organizations. We then examined evaluations of several forms of service delivery: transportation, trash, water, health care, electricity, and potable water. We found that all services were rated somewhere between "bad" and "neither good nor bad," on average. While ratings of transportation had risen since 2010, evaluations of trash, water, and health care had actually declined since 2010.

Continuing to explore service delivery, we found that water service has actually become more sporadic; while 47.2% of those with plumbing had daily access to water in 2010, in 2012 only 35.5% did so. Access to electricity, by contrast, has improved dramatically. Though 46.8% were connected to public electricity in 2010, 60.1% were connected in 2012. In 2012, the average Haitian reports receiving 4.8 hours per day of electricity, up from 3.2 in 2010. Finally, food insecurity remains high; over 40% of Haitians in 2012 reported being food insecure.

Who has best access to services? Residents of IDP camps are actually *more* likely to have access to water on a daily basis, and to have connections to electricity, but they are also more likely to experience food insecurity. We also found that household wealth does not guarantee access to services. Food insecurity is strongly related to wealth, meaning that those in the bottom quintile of wealth experience much more food insecurity than do those in the top quintile. Still, even among the wealthiest fifth of households, 20.2% report food insecurity.

In Chapter Eight, we went on to examine whether and how the earthquake and its aftermath – including food insecurity, damage to homes and municipalities, and life in camps for displaced persons – may have affected citizens' personal and political attitudes.

Though life satisfaction has risen dramatically in Haiti between 2010 and 2012, Haitians remain less satisfied with their lives than are citizens of any other country in the Americas. Food insecurity is strongly related to life satisfaction, lowering scores by 20 points on the 0-100 scale.

Citizens who live in IDP camps and whose homes sustained earthquake damage are also less satisfied with their lives, though the effects are not as dramatic as those found for food insecurity.

We also examined political attitudes. While most Haitians strongly support democracy in the abstract, they also strongly agree with classically populist notions such as limiting the rights of minorities and of opposition parties. Nonetheless, experiences of hardship apparently have little effect on either support for democracy or agreement with populist principles. In fact, food insecurity, life in camps for internally displaced persons, and earthquake damage to homes actually *decrease* adherence to populist ideals. Moreover, these hardships also have limited associations with system support or participation in protests. An important exception, however, is that those who report that the earthquake destroyed their homes are much more likely to have participated in protests.

Party Politics, Ideology, and Voting

In the final chapter of the report, we examined Haitians' ideological dispositions and their party sympathies, as well as their evaluations and levels of support for current politicians. We found that relative to other citizens in the Americas, Haitians locate themselves the furthest to the left on the left-right spectrum. At the same time, Haitians are not particularly engaged with parties. Less than a third told us that they identified with a political party. Moreover, party identification even among those who say they sympathize with a party has been extremely volatile in the past four years. This leads us to suspect that for most Haitians, party identification is determined by loyalty to the personal figures of particular politicians.

Reiterating results from Chapter Five, we found very high levels of support for the President, levels that have jumped dramatically from four years ago. By contrast, support for Parliament and for political parties is relatively low.

Support for the President in general translates into support in the voting booth. When asked whom they would vote for if elections were held this week, only 12% of Haitians tell us that they would vote for any opposition candidate or party, while 43% say they would vote for the incumbent (the remainder says that they do not know, would not vote, or would vote blank). Support for President Martelly is particularly high among those who identify as being on the right; among Repons Peyizan identifiers; among those with the lowest levels of education; and among residents of small cities. By contrast, support for him is lower among those who have been victimized by corruption (though crime does not have an effect), among residents of IDP camps and the biggest cities, and among those who are highly interested in politics.

Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at "0." When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.

Special Note on the Haitian Post-Earthquake Samples

The AmericasBarometer has conducted two waves of surveys in Haiti following the devastating earthquake of January 12, 2010: the 2010 and 2012 rounds. In both rounds, the AmericasBarometer has been particularly concerned with understanding the impact of the quake on Haitians' lives and on the country's democratic system. Thus, the full national sample in 2010 and 2012 has two components: a sample in permanent housing units, following the lines of the AmericasBarometer survey waves conducted in 2006 and 2008; and a smaller sample conducted in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The number of respondents interviewed in each sample component in each wave is described in the following table.

	2010 Wave	2012 Wave
Permanent Housing	1,536	1,512
IDP Camps	216	324
Total	**1,752**	**1,836**

The data collected from the 2006 and 2008 rounds in Haiti were self-weighting, meaning that all cases were assigned the weight of "1." However, data from the 2010 and 2012 rounds must be used with weights, which can be found in the variable "**wt**". To generate these weights, a single value was calculated based on Haiti's 2003 Census for each stratum, and was assigned to all observations within the geographic area, regardless of whether they were in permanent housing or in camps for IDPs.

Please note that to obtain accurate estimates representing the entire country, both the IDP samples and the permanent housing samples must be used, and the data must be weighted.

For more information on the Haitian sample, please see the sample design in the appendix of this report.

Part I:
Equality of Opportunity and Democracy in the Americas

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

With Mariana Rodríguez and Frederico Batista Pereira

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. The life-chances that individuals have are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often conditioned and either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.[3] More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.[4]

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.[5] Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime (Fajnzylber et al. 2002).[6]

Inequality is a not just a social or economic problem, but it is also a fundamentally *political* one, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows

[3] Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

[4] López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

[5] De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank.

[6] Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Loayza, Norman. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

that inequality creates public discontent,[7] fosters political instability and violence,[8] and decreases trust in democracy.[9] LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic "glue" that holds together democratic societies.[10] Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of "perfect" equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime.[11] However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers' educational attainment alone.[12] Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in Haiti and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data

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[7] De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*

[8] Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti, 1996. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," *European Economic Review* 40: 1203-1228; Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency." *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 425-52.

[9] Uslaner, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement." American Politics Research 33: 868-894.

[10] Córdova, Abby B. 2008. "Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies." Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

[11] Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[12] Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the Americas. After assessing objective disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who *perceives* that they have been discriminated against? Moreover, we examine what citizens think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

This section explores previous research on inequality in Haiti and in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure 1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.[13] The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.



Figure 1. Gini Indices by World Regions

[13] See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yithaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.[14] As we can see, levels of inequality are, on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean.



Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure 3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world, by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).[15] The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and at the top percentile of the global income distribution. Inequality in Haiti exceeds that even in Brazil and is the highest in the Americas, at 59.5 (measured in 2001).[16]

[14] The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000.
[15] Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3865.
[16] World Bank Indicators. < http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI> (accessed July 18, 2012).



Source: Milanovic (2006)

Figure 3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution

However, levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.[17] In Figure 4 we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).

Inequality has long been an issue for Haiti. Available data consistently place Haiti among the 10 most unequal countries in the world. As we described above, in 2001 the World Bank reported a Gini coefficient of 59.5, compared to 54.4 for Honduras and 60.1 in Brazil for the same year. Unfortunately, measurement of inequality has been only sporadic in Haiti, and subsequent measures are unavailable for this country. However, while inequalities have been improving in Brazil and Honduras over the past decades, there are no reasons to believe that Haitian inequalities have improved over the same period. On the contrary, the political turmoil that the country endured and the repeated natural disasters it had to suffer have certainly contributed to maintain inequalities at the level observed in 2001.

[17] López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.



Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas

How will inequality continue to evolve over the next decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since the changes in inequality are arguably attributable to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.[18] Given the past and current political and economic difficulties experienced by Haiti, and the ongoing global economic recession, the prospects for improving inequalities in the country are rather limited, at least in the short-run. The enthusiasm with which donor countries have made financial commitments to the reconstruction of the country in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake has not fully been met by concrete actions. Reconstruction efforts have been slow to start and only part of the promised funds has arrived.[19]

Economic inequality goes hand in hand with pronounced social inequalities in the Americas. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).[20] Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which "discounts" each dimension of the HDI based on a country's level of inequality. Figure 5 demonstrates the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute and relative terms, the gap in Latin America and the Caribbean between the average HDI and the

[18] Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
[19] Farmer, Paul. "5 Lessons From Haiti's Disaster." *Foreign Policy*, December 2010; Sontag, Deborah. "Years After Haiti Quake, Safe Housing Is Dream for Multitudes." *The New York Times*, August 15, 2012.
[20] The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index running from 0 to 1, and measuring a country's average achievement in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and income (standard of living). Calculations are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).

average IHDI is the largest in the world. This means that Latin America and the Caribbean lose close to a third of their human development potential due to the region's high levels of inequality.



Figure 5. Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions

Turning to Haiti, we find that this country's HDI is the lowest in the Americas, at .454 in 2011. At the same time, Haiti's 2011 IHDI is much lower, at .271. Figure 6 presents the evolution of the HDI between 1980 and 2011, demonstrating a gradual rise in human development levels. Also, it indicates that the IHDI has risen somewhat between 2010 and 2011, to a much greater extent than the HDI. This rise is perhaps due to earthquake recovery.



Figure 6. HDI and IHDI in Haiti, 1980-2011

Figure 7 presents the overall loss in human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this metric, the region loses 26% of its potential for human development because of persistent inequality. In Haiti, the situation is much more severe; the country is estimated to lose 40.2% of its potential for human development in 2011 due to inequality. Thus, inequality's impact in Haiti is more severe even than in the average country in sub-Saharan Africa. Only four countries in the world are estimated to lose a greater portion of their human development potential to inequality (Namibia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic).



Figure 7. Overall Loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality

Figure 8 allows one to discern differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with advantaged (light green bar) and disadvantaged (dark green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.[21] For example, the graph shows that a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica has a probability of completing sixth grade on time that register at just over 80%, while his/her peer with an advantaged background is only slightly more likely (the probability is close to 90%) to complete sixth grade on time. By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have lowest probabilities of achievement. At the same time, most countries of Central and South America stand out as highly unequal.

[21] Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.



Source: Barros, et al. (2009)

Figure 8. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas

III. Equalities in Economic and Social Opportunities in Haiti: A View from the AmericasBarometer

The previous section provided a bird's eye view of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But who is most affected by inequalities? And what do the citizens of the Americas think about equality and inequality of opportunity in the region? Questions included in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer allow us to assess the extent to which key measures of opportunity such as income and education differ across measures such as one's race, gender, and family background. We also take a detailed look at public opinion: who thinks they have been discriminated against, to what extent citizens perceive inequalities as natural or desirable, and what public policies citizens might endorse to redress inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently

or have different employment opportunities.[22] Such discrimination may occur either because of actual negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of "statistical discrimination," meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, and that women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are especially so.[23] Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labor market discrimination may be lower than often thought in many countries of Latin America.[24]

The first major social divide we examine is that between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, inequality in labor force participation among men and women has become more equal.[25] Moreover, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.[26] Furthermore, a gender gap in educational levels has also shrunk significantly.[27] So, the trend in gender discrimination is certainly positive according to most studies.

Second, we examine divides by racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued unequal economic and social situations, especially in terms of wage differences and employment types/occupations.[28] Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development.[29] Additionally, discrimination by race/ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the Americas.[30]

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[22] For an overview of this literature, see Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

[23] Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. "Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil." Review of Social Economy 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. "Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil." Latin American Perspectives 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. "The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach." *Económica* L (1-2).

[24] Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, and Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. "Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, and Urzúa. 2009b. "An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, and Rajiv Sethi. 2009. "Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan and Máximo Torero. 2009. "Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

[25] Abramo, Laís, and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. "Women's Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America." *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

[26] Hite, Amy Bellone, and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 "Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure." *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

[27] Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. "The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean." SSRN eLibrary (April). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

[28] De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

[29] Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

[30] De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*

Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race/ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data.[31]

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have long been considered the driving forces behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in some other parts of the Americas, trumping the effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited in the previous paragraphs, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas.[32]

We begin our analysis using the AmericasBarometer 2012 by examining what Haitians of different racial, gender, and class-based groups, as well as ones living in rural versus urban areas, told us about their economic and social resources. The AmericasBarometer's 2010 and 2012 questionnaires included many measures of the social groups to which respondents belonged. We assessed respondents' racial and ethnic groups in several ways.[33] Question **ETID** simply asks respondents whether they identify as white, mulatto, mestizo, indigenous, or black. In addition, beginning with the AmericasBarometer 2010, with the support of Professor Ed Telles from Princeton University, we pioneered the use of a color palette.[34] At the end of each interview, interviewers are asked to rate the facial skin color of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) (see Figure 9). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of citizens from varying groups across the region (see, for instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' ongoing sponsorship, we again included the color palette in 2012.[35] While the color palette was not included in Haiti in 2010, it was included in the 2012 survey.

[31] Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[32] See, e.g., Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 73. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).
[33] The full text of all questions is provided in the questionnaire in Appendix C.
[34] Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid.*
[35] In 2012, the skin color palette was used in 24 countries, except the US and Canada. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries, also excluding Haiti.

Figure 9. Skin Color Palette Used in the AmericasBarometer

We also included a number of questions on s ocial and economic resources in the 2012 questionnaire. As in previous years, we included questions on e ducation, family income, and household assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to ownership of flat-screen television sets and vehicles. The latter group of questions, found in the **R series**, is used to create a five-point index of quintiles of household wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country.[36] For the first time in 2012, income was coded in 17 categories, displayed below.

Income Scale used in Questions Q10NEW and Q10G			
(00)	No income	(09)	6381-7200 gourdes
(01)	Less than 800 gourdes	(10)	7201-8400 gourdes
(02)	800-1600 gourdes	(11)	8401-9600 gourdes
(03)	1601-2400 gourdes	(12)	9601-14400 gourdes
(04)	2401-3200 gourdes	(13)	14401-19200 gourdes
(05)	3201-4000 gourdes	(14)	19201-24000 gourdes
(06)	4001-4800 gourdes	(15)	24001 – 28800 gourdes
(07)	4801-5620 gourdes	(16)	More than 28800 gourdes
(08)	5621-6380 gourdes		

[36] This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

We also included a number of new questions on social and economic resources in 2012. For the first time, we also asked those respondents who reported working at the time of the interview about their personal incomes (**Q10G**). For respondents who were married or living with a partner, we sought to tap intra-household inequalities in income earned with question **GEN10**.

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

(1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
(2) You earn less than your spouse;
(3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
(4) You earn more than your spouse;
(5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
(6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
(88) DK (98) DA

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a few questions on family background or class, in addition to the measures of household wealth. Question **ED2** examines family background by asking respondents to report their mother's level of education. In addition, self-identified social class is measured in question **MOV1**, which asks respondents whether they consider themselves to be upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, or lower class.

Finally, we included two new questions on food security developed by our team in Mexico in cooperation with Yale University, but now used in all countries: **FS2** and **FS8**.[37] Taken together, these measures provide an important opportunity to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.						
	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A	
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99	
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99	

[37] Question MOV1 was administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions.

We first assess how gender, race, age, and urban-rural status affect educational status in Haiti, using linear regression analysis.[38] Figure 10 indicates that educational attainment is far from evenly distributed in Haiti. Women, those over age 35, and those with darker skin report lower levels of education, while those who live in urban areas report higher levels of education.



Figure 10. Determinants of Educational Level in Haiti

In Figure 11 and Figure 12 we explore further the relationship between these personal characteristics and education. We find that respondents in rural areas have on average 0.9 fewer years of education than respondents in urban areas, while women have 0.5 fewer years of education than men (see Figure 11). Finally, the same figure indicates that there are dramatic differences in educational levels across age groups. The youngest cohorts have on average about 11 years of education, while in the oldest cohort (those over the age of 65), the average is only 9.

The following figure presents the average years of education for Haitians at different ends of the color spectrum, based on the skin color palette presented above. (Note that because of the low number of respondents at the lightest end of the color spectrum, we have grouped together respondents in categories 1-3.) Again, we find dramatic differences in educational attainment. The lightest skinned

[38] In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical "0" line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning, that we can be 95% confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. For more information on reading and interpreting LAPOP graphs and figures, please refer to page xxxii.

Haitians average over 11 years of education, while their darkest skinned fellow citizens receive fewer than 10 years of education.



Figure 11. Educational Level by Age, Place of Residence, and Sex in Haiti



Figure 12. Educational Level by Skin Color in Haiti

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background affects educational level in Haiti. We did not include our measure of family background, **ED2**, in the multivariate regression model because the question was only asked of half the sample.[39] Limiting analysis to half the sample would reduce inferential power regarding the effects of the other variables. Figure 13, which shows the respondent's years of schooling (y-axis) according to the level of education his/her mother obtained (x-axis), indicates that family background has a very powerful effect on Haitian adults' own personal ability to achieve. Haitians whose mother has never been to school achieve on average only 8.2 years of schooling themselves, while those whose mother has received higher education are themselves likely to achieve the same. In fact, even those whose mother has attended primary school are likely themselves to achieve some secondary education. The effect appears to be slightly stronger for women, but not statistically significantly so.



Figure 13. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Respondent Educational Level in Haiti

[39] In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many new questions were asked of split samples of respondents in order to maximize questionnaire space.

Are the same factors associated with education also associated with income? How do personal incomes vary by age, race, gender, urban-rural residence, and family background in Haiti? In Figure 14 we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of personal income among respondents who told us that they had a job at the time of the interview.[40] We find few statistically significant demographic characteristics associated with income in this figure, in contrast to the models assessing education. We find only that women have somewhat lower levels of personal income than men, while those over the age of 65 have somewhat lower levels of personal income than those 65 or under. In addition, those who receive remittances have higher levels of personal income than those who do not.



Figure 14. Determinants of Personal Income in Haiti, Among Respondents who Work

[40] Income (both Q10NEW, family income, and Q10G, personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, with response categories corresponding to increasing ranges in the income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.

The previous figure suggests that women have lower personal incomes than men in Haiti. As discussed above, in question **GEN10** we asked respondents who were married or who had an unmarried partner about their income versus their spouse's incomes. In Figure 15 we examine differences between men and women in responses to **GEN10**, only among those who also said that they were employed. Indeed, the figure indicates that married, working women are much more likely than married, working men to say that they earn less than their spouses. Similarly, married, working women are much *less* likely than married, working men to say that they earn *more* than their spouses.



Figure 15. Respondent's Versus Spouse's Income in Haiti, Among Respondents who Work

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background affects personal income in Haiti. In Figure 16 we find evidence that there are few differences in personal income between Haitians whose mothers have no education and a primary education. In both cases, respondents report that their personal income averages around 4.6 on the 0-16 scale (see page 12 for the scale categories). Personal incomes are somewhat higher, at 5.7 on the scale, for those whose mothers have a secondary education; and they jump up precipitously to 11.2 for those whose mothers have a higher education. In other words, the returns to having a well-educated mother are tremendous in Haiti.



Figure 16. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Own Income in Haiti, Among Respondents who Work

Arguably the most critical basic resource to which citizens need access is food. We have seen that personal income is not distributed in a perfectly egalitarian fashion across Haiti. Does access to food follow similar patterns? In Figure 17 we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of food insecurity, based on the two questions described above. Questions **FS2** and **FS8** are summed to create an index of food insecurity that runs from 0 to 2, where respondents who report higher values have higher levels of food insecurity.[41] The figure indicates that respondents below 25 years of age and over 65 years of age are the most insecure.[42] Households receiving remittances also report substantially lower food insecurity. At the same time, Haitians with darker skin report food insecurity at significantly higher levels than their lighter skinned fellow citizens. Finally, Haitian women are also more likely to report food insecurity.



Figure 17. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Haiti

In Figure 18 we examine how family background is associated with food insecurity in Haiti. Again, we find that having a well-educated mother pays off substantially, though even those with the best-educated mothers report some level of insecurity. Among Haitians who report that their mothers have never been to school, over half report severe or moderate food insecurity. By contrast, among those whose mothers have higher education, only one-fifth (20.6%) report food insecurity. The graph clearly suggests that food insecurity decreases with the mother's educational level.

[41] In most countries, these were asked of a split sample (that is, of only half of respondents). However, in Haiti they were asked of the entire sample.

[42] Citizens under 25 years of age are the reference category, meaning that the coefficients for all other age categories are estimated in contrast to this age group.



Figure 18. Mother's Educational Attainment and Food Insecurity in Haiti

In the previous figures it has become clear that remittances are an important source of stability in Haitian society, boosting personal incomes and bolstering families against food insecurity. Which Haitians have access to remittances? In Figure 19 we consider this question.[43] We find that those with the darkest skin are 17 percentage points less likely to receive remittances than those with the lightest skin. Even more strikingly, while 88% of those with higher education receive remittances, only 38% of those without any formal education do so. We also find curvilinear patterns with respect to age, such that the groups most likely to receive remittances are young adults (18-25 years of age) and those between the ages of 46 and 65. Gender is not significantly related to receiving remittances, though women have slightly higher rates of reporting receiving remittances. Thus, in general this figure indicates that remittances shore up preexisting advantages accruing to Haitians with more education and to those with lighter skin tones.

[43] Multivariate logistic regression analysis indicates that those with darker skin are much less likely to receive remittances, while those with more education are much more likely to do so. In addition, non-linear and statistically significant patterns exist with respect to age. No significant effects are found for urban-rural residence.



Figure 19. Personal Characteristics and Remittances in Haiti

Who Reports Discrimination?

One way of viewing social and economic discrimination is from the point of view of the purported victim. In 17 countries of the Americas, we included questions tapping whether respondents perceived themselves to have been victims of discrimination. The questions were a slightly modified battery that had first been used in 2008:

Now, changing the subject, and thinking **about your experiences in the past year,** have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?					
	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98	

In Figure 20 we report the percentage of citizens in each country where question **DIS3** was asked who said they had been the victim of discrimination at work or school. We find that the percentage of citizens who say they have been victimized by discrimination varies greatly. Importantly, Haiti has the second highest level of reported discrimination, at 21.6%, and just below Trinidad and Tobago at 23.4%. By contrast, only 3.6% of Venezuelans and 8.0% of Nicaraguans report employment discrimination.



Figure 20. Self-Reported Discrimination at Work or School in the Countries of the Americas

Who reports that they have been the victim of discrimination at work or school? In Figure 21 we use logistic regression analysis to examine determinants of self-reported victimization by discrimination in Haiti. We find that there are few statistically significant determinants of self-reported victimization. We find only that citizens in urban areas are significantly more likely to report discrimination than those in rural areas. Meanwhile, women and those with darker skin report *lower*

levels of discrimination, though the results are not statistically significant.[44] Interestingly, 38.6% of Haitians between 1 and 3 on the skin color palette report discrimination, as compared to only 21.4% of those between 4 and 11. While this difference is not statistically significant because of the very small number of Haitians in the former category, it is quite large. These findings contrast with the other results presented here indicating that women and those with darker skin have lower levels of education and food insecurity. They suggest that perceptions of discrimination are not necessarily strongly related to objectively measured discrimination.[45]



Figure 21. Determinants of Self-Reported Victimization by Discrimination at Work or School in Haiti

Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Inequality

The previous sections have shown that economic and social resources are not distributed equally among Haitians in different groups defined by gender, race, urban/rural status, and family background. They have not told us a great deal about why these inequalities persist, however. In particular, we have not yet assessed the extent to which differences in socioeconomic outcomes might be due in part to discriminatory norms or attitudes. The AmericasBarometer 2012 included several questions that provide a look at how social and economic inequalities are related to general attitudes

[44] Results are similar if skin color is instead recoded as a dichotomous variable (those with light skin versus everyone else), or if we use dichotomous variables for white (or, conversely, black). In no case do racial variables approach statistical significance at any standard level.
[45] Ñopo, et al. 2009. *Ibid.*

regarding the economic roles of men and women, and the economic achievements of different racial groups.

First, we examine norms regarding men's versus women's work. Many studies have suggested that citizens throughout the Americas continue to hold attitudes that imply different roles for men and women in the labor force.[46] In 2012, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following question, on a 7-point scale:

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Figure 22 presents average levels of agreement with this statement across the Americas. In the figure, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, for ease of comparison with other variables. We find great variation in support for this statement across the Americas. Haitians rank third in their levels of agreement, just below Dominicans and the Guyanese. In these three countries, support for giving labor market priority to men is close to the midpoint on the 0-100 scale. In the other countries of the region, by contrast, support for this statement is lower. The lowest levels of agreement are found in the United States, Canada, and Uruguay.

[46] Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented at the *Marginalization in the Americas* Conference, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



Figure 22. Agreement that Men Have Labor Market Priority in the Countries of the Americas

The average levels of agreement with this statement obscure substantial variation among Haitians in their responses. In Figure 23 we examine their responses in further detail, returning to the original 1-7 scale of the question. It turns out that Haitians are evenly split on this issue, with 39% agreeing (reporting 5, 6, or 7), 22% neutral, and 38% disagreeing (reporting 1, 2, or 3).



Figure 23. Agreement and Disagreement that Men Have Labor Market Priority in Haiti

The AmericasBarometer 2012 also asked citizens across the Americas about their perceptions of the reasons for racial and ethnic inequalities. This round, we included the following question in every country of the Americas.[47]

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?		
[Read alternatives, just one answer]		
(1) Because of their culture, or	(2) Because they have been treated unjustly	
(3) **[Do not read]** Another response	(88) DK	(98) DA

[47] This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.

In Figure 24, we present the percentage of respondents across the Americas who agreed that inequality was due to the "culture" of "people with dark skin." In no country did the majority of respondents agree with this statement. Guatemalans are most likely to agree that poverty is due to culture, and Uruguayans are least likely to do so (at 33.3% and 12.4%, respectively). We find that a quarter of Haitians (25.2%) agreed that poverty was due to culture. These levels are statistically indistinguishable from the levels of agreement found in a broad group of other countries, ranging from Costa Rica to Brazil.



Figure 24. Percentage Agreeing that Poverty is Due to "Culture" in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

What, if anything, should the governments of the Americas do about the major social and economic inequalities faced by their citizens? Answering this question fully is beyond the range of this report and providing precise solutions would require, in part, taking positions on important normative and ideological debates that are the purview of citizens and politicians, rather than the authors of this study. Nonetheless, we outline here some common policy proposals, and present public opinion related to those proposals.

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked citizens across the region what they thought the role of the state is in reducing inequality. In question **ROS4**, respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the following statement:

ROS4. The Haitian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Responses to this question provide a first glimpse into the extent to which citizens agree, in the abstract, that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that governments should actively address. In Figure 25 we present the average agreement with this statement in each country in the region. As always, we have recoded responses to run from 0 ("Strongly disagree") to 100 ("Strongly agree."). The figure reveals that levels of support for government efforts to redress inequality are very high in general in the Americas. In 19 countries, in fact, agreement is above 75.0 on the 0-100 scale, and only in the United States does the level of agreement fall below the scale midpoint. While Haiti's level of support for this statement falls below that of all other countries except the United States, Haiti's average score of 65.4 nonetheless indicates that Haitians are on average quite supportive of government efforts to reduce inequality. Moreover, the fact that levels of support for government efforts to reduce inequality are lower than in most other countries may be due to mistrust of government action in general.



Figure 25. Agreement that the State Should Reduce Inequality in the Countries of the Americas

Conditional Cash Transfer and Public Assistance Programs

In the past two decades, many of the region's governments have transformed their social assistance programs, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programs and keeping their

children in school.[48] The most well-known and largest of these programs include *Oportunidades* in Mexico, *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, *Familias en Acción* in Colombia, and the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* in Argentina. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also widely expanded non-conditional social assistance programs. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America are seen as being effective strategies toward assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region. In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, "CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the groups and weight of children, especially among the smallest."[49] However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programs depend, in large part, on how such programs are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policy-makers to develop well-planned and effective programs.[50] These social assistance and CCT programs are widely attributed to help reduce inequality and poverty in some of the region's most historically unequal contexts.

In 2012, we measured levels of receipt of public assistance and CCT programs across the region, using question CCT1NEW.

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Levels of receipt of social assistance and CCTs vary greatly across the region. In Figure 26 we present the percentage of respondents in each country of the region who said that some member of their household received public assistance. Levels of public assistance receipt vary greatly across the Americas. While over half of Bolivians say they receive some form of assistance, only 4.9% of Hondurans do so. Among Haitians, 16.5% report receiving public assistance, a level that is in approximately the middle among the countries of the Americas.

[48] Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. "New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. "Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[49] Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. "Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490.

[50] Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. "Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean." Social Protection Working Paper #0605. The World Bank.



Figure 26. Receipt of Public Assistance in the Countries of the Americas

Given the lack of resources the Haitian State has at its disposal, such findings are not surprising. Even before the 2010 earthquake, the State had difficulty maintaining basic public services as electricity, potable water, and sewage infrastructure.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer provides an opportunity to assess what citizens of the region think about CCT and other public assistance programs. While the survey did not ask directly about *support* for such programs, question **CCT3** did ask about attitudes towards recipients.[51]

[51] This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.

CCT3. Changing the topic…Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

Responses were coded on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents "Strongly disagree" and 7 represents "Strongly agree." Figure 27 presents levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas; responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items.



Figure 27. Belief that Public Assistance Recipients are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas

Levels of agreement that public assistance recipients are lazy vary substantially across the Americas, from a high of 63.7 in Argentina to a low of 28.3 in Guyana. Haitians have relatively low levels of agreement with this statement, scoring only 39.2 on the 0-100 scale, and ranking only above the Guyanese. Thus, Haitians tend predominantly to disagree that public assistance recipients are lazy. This might have to do with the low level of assistance effectively provided by the Haitian government, combined with high popular expectations for their provision.

V. Conclusion

The great differences in the life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitute one of the most important political, social, and economic problems facing the governments of the Americas. While inequality has recently been improving in many countries of the Americas that have historically had the highest levels of inequality, we have seen that important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and where these then place them within their country's social milieu. Haiti stands out even in Latin America, with the highest level of inequality in the region and one of the highest in the world. The UNDP, in fact, estimates that the country loses 40% of its human development potential to inequality.

Which citizens are most disadvantaged within Haiti? To what extent do race, gender, family background, place of residence, and age affect one's life chances? We find that educational opportunities are highly stratified in Haiti, with women, darker-skinned Haitians, and those whose mothers have lower educational attainment achieving fewer years of education than their more advantaged fellow citizens. Similar factors also strongly affect families' levels of food security. Income is less highly stratified than education, though it remains the case that women and those from less advantaged family background earn less.

Turning to public opinion, we find that Haitians tend to agree that men deserve labor market priority, with levels of agreement that are among the highest in the Americas. At the same time, Haitians tend to disagree with statements that are discriminatory against darker-skinned citizens or those who receive public assistance. Finally, Haitians are quite supportive of public policies intended to redress inequality, though levels of support for such policies are lower than those found in any other country but the United States.

To what extent do economic inequalities translate into political inequalities? In the next chapter we consider this question, examining who participates in Haiti and in the Americas, and how these citizens choose to participate.

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.[52] Unfortunately, because the 2010 survey in Haiti was focused on the earthquake's aftermath, skin color was not coded. Nonetheless, results from other countries are instructive.



The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.

[52] The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.

Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.[53] While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.



As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.

[53] The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.[54] The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.

The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values





Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

[54] The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

With Mason Moseley

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to politics, examining how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. Chapter Two is thus divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits significant attention given its pertinence to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that might exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Perhaps beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.[55] An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.[56] Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.[57]

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[55] Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

[56] Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

[57] Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative

Uneven voter turnout certainly has some concerning implications for the representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies. Unfortunately, biased turnout also seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al. (1995), not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting are actually *more* biased against certain groups.[58] For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.[59] Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation exist not only along lines of class or wealth, but also along gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.[60] Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.[61] Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labor.[62] Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women are strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.[63]

Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

[5858] In the US, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." The Journal of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

[59] Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[60] Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation Among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218..

[61] Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1.pp. 156-173.

[62] Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and P olitics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730

[63] Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.[64] In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.[65] Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous *women*, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.[66]

Unequal participation has very real consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day, it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's (2003) cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.[67] In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g. education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more even processes of development.[68]

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.[69] Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by

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[64] Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid*. Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

[65] Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123 -1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[66] Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. Latin American Perspectives, 35(6): 41-62.

[67] Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129–2155

[68] See also Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press.

[69] Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

which participation and representation go hand in hand.[70] Thus, the effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section, we attempt to gauge how unequal political participation actually is in the Americas, using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys. While data from past studies indicate that significant disparities exists in terms of rates of participation across various social groups, we embark on t his analysis with an open mind vis-à-vis participatory inequality in the Americas. Particularly given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic in Latin America and the Caribbean to date, the possibility remains that rates of participation are relatively equal across socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

Turnout

First, we examine inequalities in turnout in Haiti and across the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured using question **VB2**. In parliamentary countries, the question is revised to ask about the most recent general elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of (year of last presidential elections)?
[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]
(1) Voted **[Continue]**
(2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**
(88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**

In Figure 28 we present turnout by gender across the Americas. Two points are clear from this figure. First, there are great inequalities *across* the countries of the Americas in turnout, such that turnout in Honduras is 50.6%, while turnout in Peru is 90.6%. It is important to note that voting is compulsory in a number of countries in the region, while it is voluntary in others. In addition, registration requirements vary across countries. Haitians are required to obtain a national identification card to vote. This may have been a concern not only for young voters, but also for Haitians who had moved or been displaced. Though about 90% of Haitians have *registered* for a national identification card, the process of *receiving* cards may at times be cumbersome. Printing and laminating cards can take at least three months, and recipients often need to make multiple visits to the National Identification Office (ONI) to check whether their cards have arrived. In addition, there were reports of some problems in 2010 and 2011 with verification of local level voter registers.

These institutional differences certainly contribute to part of the cross-national variation in turnout.

[70] Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

Second, compiling data from all twenty-six countries included in the AmericasBarometer surveys, it appears that men and women participate in elections at similar rates—in fact women across the region actually boast very slightly *higher* turnout rates than men. This finding reflects what survey data from the developed world has indicated in recent years: when it comes to electoral participation, women have largely closed the gap with men. Haiti does not entirely follow the pattern found elsewhere; here, women continue to vote at rates slightly, but statistically significantly, lower than do men. In 2012, 74.6% of women reported that they had voted in the most recent national elections, while 80.5% of men did so. This gender difference could also be explained by issues related to registration.



Figure 28. Gender and Turnout in the Countries of the Americas, 2012

We now turn to explore inequalities in turnout in Haiti in greater detail (see Figure 29). Here, we see that turnout rates are highly stratified by one's own education and, to a lesser extent, by parents' educational backgrounds. Among those with higher education, turnout is 88.7%, while among those with no education, turnout is only 60.6%. Similarly but less dramatically, the turnout rate for those whose mothers have some higher education is 13.4 percentage points higher than it is for those whose mothers have never been to school. At the same time, though, household wealth has little to do with the propensity to vote; rates are relatively constant across the wealth distribution. Finally, again we see that women vote at rates lower than men[71].



Figure 29. Sociodemographics and Turnout in Haiti, 2012

Beyond Turnout

Turnout does not tell the whole story. Certainly there are myriad ways that citizens can engage their democratic system besides just voting, and participation in these activities across groups may or may not conform to the patterns observed in turnout. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer surveys include an extensive battery of questions on other political participation besides voting. Among

[71] Note that the one anomalous case in Figure 28 is the United States, where men self-report higher turnout (86.8%) than women (77.6%). There are two anomalies here. First, more women voted in the last U.S. election than men 66% to 62%), and second, there is substantial over-reporting of voting in the survey by about 18%. This over-report percentage is not unusual for recent U.S. presidential elections. See United States Census Bureau, "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports," July, 20, 2009, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html, accessed July 21, 2012, and Allyson L. Holbrook and Jon A. Krosnick, "Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique," February 2009, http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf, accessed July 21, 2012

numerous other topics, these questions inquire about whether and how often citizens contact their representatives, and if they take part in certain community organizations. By looking at how groups might differ in terms of their involvement in these types of political activities, we obtain a more holistic view of whether or not certain sub-sections of society have unequal influence in the political process.

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP has long included a series of questions to gauge whether and how frequently citizens participate in a variety of community groups. In 2012, we also included questions to measure whether a person who says that he or she participates takes a leadership role. The text of the **CP** battery is as follows:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them… (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them… (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them… (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

After each question, respondents who said that they participated at least once or twice a year received a follow-up question (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**

To what extent do citizens across the Americas participate in community groups? In Figure 30 we examine this question. The left side of the figure presents levels of community participation in each country of the Americas. Community participation is calculated as the average response to CP6, CP7, and CP8, and has been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents never participating in any group, and 100 represents participating very frequently in all groups. The right side of the figure presents the percentage of respondents in each country who said they had a leadership role in any community group.

In both figures, it is clear that community participation is exceptionally high in Haiti. The average Haitian scores a 41.6 on the index of community participation, the highest in the Americas, and statistically significantly higher than in every other country but Guatemala. Even more dramatically, 29.8% of Haitians say that they have held some kind of leadership position in a community activity, a rate that is 6.2 percentage points higher than in El Salvador, the next most active country in the region. In fact, in 17 of the 24 countries where the leadership questions were administered, fewer than 10% of respondents said that they had held a leadership role. These very high rates of community participation confirm findings from the AmericasBarometer in previous years that Haitians are extraordinarily participatory, relative to citizens from other countries in the Americas.



Figure 30. Community Participation in the Countries of the Americas

In light of the very high levels of community participation in Haiti, it is valuable to investigate which types of community groups claim the highest rates of participation. In Figure 31 we present average levels of participation in eight different types of community groups and activities. Again, responses on each variable have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents "never" participating, and 100 represents participating "every week." As in most other countries, Haitians report the highest levels of participation in religious organizations. Other relatively prominent forms of community participation include involvement in parents' and in women's groups. By contrast, levels of participation in political groups and in professional, labor, or agricultural organizations are relatively low.

Still, the picture changes to some extent when we compare Haiti to other countries.[72] While Haitians participate at very high rates in religious groups, Haitians' levels of participation in religious group meetings are only the fourth highest in the Americas. Haiti is first or second in the region, however, on every other type of participation. For participation in women's groups (a question that was only asked of women), Haiti's score of 35.2 is more than double that of the next most participatory country, Guatemala (at 14.4). Haiti's very high levels of participation might be partially explained by the weakness of the Haitian State, since citizens have to get involved in their communities to have

[72] The analysis in this paragraph is not shown in figures in the text of the report.

access to service normally provided by the state. It could also be that there is simply a culture of participation at the local level in Haiti.



Figure 31. Types of Community Participation in Haiti

In Figure 32 and Figure 33, we explore the results further within Haiti, presenting the average levels of community participation among Haitians, by demographic group. In Figure 32 we return to the index of community participation presented in Figure 30 above, while Figure 33 presents the percent take a leadership role. Both figures indicate that wealthier households and women participate at slightly higher rates, but the differences are small and not always statistically significant.

At the same time, though, personal education and, to a lesser extent, one's mother's educational background strongly affect one's level of community participation and one's likelihood of taking a leadership role in the community. For those with higher education, the level of community participation is 49.0, while the level is 20 points lower, and 28.8, for those with no education. Likewise, 40.2% of those with some higher education have taken a leadership role in a community group, while only 23.7% of those with no education have done so. In addition, we find that those whose mothers have some higher education score a 46.6 on the community participation index, and 32.7% have taken a leadership role. By contrast, those whose mothers have no education score only a 37.8 on the participation index, and only 17.6% have taken some leadership role.



Figure 32. Sociodemographics and Community Participation in Haiti, 2012



Figure 33. Sociodemographics and Percent Taking a Leadership Role in a Community Group in Haiti

Many citizens also participate in campaign related activities beyond simply voting. To gauge involvement in elections, we asked respondents questions **PP1** and **PP2**.

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]** (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA
PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 34 we examine participation in campaign activities across the Americas. The left side of the figure presents the percentage of citizens who say they have "tried to persuade others" either "frequently" or "occasionally." The right side presents the percentage who said they had worked for a campaign. In contrast to the results for community participation, we find that levels of attempting to persuade others are more moderate in Haiti. While 45.2% of citizens of the United States have tried to persuade someone, just 13.6% of Haitians have done so, a rate that is not statistically distinguishable from levels of participation in a large group of other countries, from Colombia to Honduras. Still, Haiti returns to the top of the ranking in the Americas when we turn to participation in campaign activities. Here, we find that 17.9% of Haitians say that they have worked for a campaign, and that Haiti is tied with Suriname for the top position.



Figure 34. Campaign Participation in the Countries of the Americas

Next, we explore results for Haiti in further depth. In Figure 35 we recode all those who report that they tried to persuade others either frequently or occasionally as having attempted to persuade others. In contrast to community participation, it appears that there are few differences in persuasion between wealthier and less wealthy Haitians, between those with higher and lower levels of education, or between those whose mothers have higher and lower educational status. However, we find an important difference by gender: while 16.6% of men say they have tried to persuade someone, only 10.5% of women do so.



Figure 35. Sociodemographics and Attempts to Persuade Others in Haiti

In Figure 36 we present the percentage of respondents in different groups who said they worked for a candidate or party in the most recent elections. Here, differences by social status (wealth, education, and mother's educational background) are more pronounced than for persuasion, but still not extremely strong and not consistently statistically significant. The strongest relationship is for education: while 25.8% of those with higher education have worked for a campaign, the rates are much lower, at only 11.2%, for those without any education. In addition, we find that gender strongly affects one's likelihood of getting involved in a campaign: 22.2% of men have done campaign work, but only 13.5% of women have.



Figure 36. Sociodemographics and Campaign Work in Haiti

In the preceding analysis, we have found evidence for some participatory inequalities by gender. However, it is quite likely that rates of participation vary by women's positions in the labor market and family.[73] Figure 37 presents rates or levels of participation by gender and, for woman, by family and labor market status. We find that married women without any income of their own from work have lower rates of turnout, and lower levels of participation in community groups, than do other women. By contrast, the two groups of women have similar rates of community leadership, campaign participation, and persuasion.



Figure 37. Gender Roles and Participation in Haiti

These results have not told us much about the association between race and participation in Haiti. In Figure 38 we present the rates or levels of each form of participation across the spectrum of

[73] See, for instance, Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

skin color. Here we find few patterns. It appears that levels of political participation vary very little across the range of skin color in Haiti – welcome news for those concerned with discrimination and inequality in this country.



Figure 38. Skin Color and Participation in Haiti

III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

How much do members of the majority or society as a whole support equal opportunities for minority groups? Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Citizens who think that women's place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, are less likely to tolerate those groups' participation in public life, or to vote for such candidates. In this section, we review the results for a number of questions that seek to quantify the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

Note that responses to these questions are likely subject to what public opinion scholars call "social desirability bias," meaning that citizens will be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes

because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.[74] This means that even respondents who privately harbor discriminatory attitudes may give the "socially desirable," non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions will likely be lower than their actual levels in the population.

Public Opinion towards Women's Leadership

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included three questions tapping attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.[75] The text of these questions is as follows:

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

In Figure 39 we present levels of agreement that "men are better political leaders." As always, responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale, where higher values present greater agreement. Support for this (rather discriminatory) statement is low across the Americas; only in Guyana does the average support for the statement exceed the midpoint on the scale. At the same time, though, Haitians appear to have relatively low opinions of women's leadership capabilities. Levels of agreement with the statement are at 42.1, which puts Haiti in third place across the region.

[74] Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments (see, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, de Jonge, Chad K., Meléndez, Carlos, Osorio, Javier and Nickerson, David W. 2012 Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.)

[75] VB51 and VB52 were administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.



Figure 39. Belief that Men Make Better Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Leadership of Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included one question on attitudes towards people of darker skin in positions of political leadership, **VB53**.[76]

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians. **VB53.** Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? [Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous, "non-whites" in general] (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

In Figure 40 we examine levels of agreement with this statement regarding leaders with dark skin. Again, responses are recoded on a 0 to 100 scale, with 0 representing minimum and 100 representing maximum agreement. Levels of support for this statement are even lower than for the statement regarding women; here, the country with the highest level of agreement is Chile, with a score of only 34.3 on the scale. Furthermore, with a score of only 24.8, Haitians have lower levels of agreement with the statement than do citizens of many other countries in the region.

[76] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.



Figure 40. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of Homosexuals

As in 2010, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included question **D5** on attitudes towards gays running for public office. Responses were coded on a 10 point scale.

> **D5.** And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

In Figure 41, we present average levels of agreement with this statement in each country; responses are again recoded on a 0 to 100 scale, with higher values representing greater agreement. Note that, in contrast to previous figures, here higher values are associated with more tolerant attitudes. This question elicits great variation in responses across the Americas. At the one end, Canada, Uruguay, and the United States are by far the countries that are most tolerant of the political participation of homosexuals. At the other end, Haiti is by far the least tolerant country, with a score of only 8.5 on this scale, and substantially lower than the next country, Jamaica. In Haiti, 63.7% of respondents reported the very lowest level of agreement with the statement, and only 3% reported levels of agreement at 6 or higher on the original scale running from 1 to 10.



Figure 41. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of the Disabled

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question on attitudes towards those who are physically disabled being allowed to run for public office.[77] Again, responses were recorded on a scale running from 1 to 10.

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office? (99) N/A

In Figure 42 we present average agreement with this statement across the Americas, with responses recoded on a 0 to 100 scale. Again we find great variation across the Americas, with the United States, Uruguay, and Canada ranking as the most tolerant countries. And again, Haiti ranks as the country where citizens are the least tolerant of the political participation of the disabled. Still, Haitians are somewhat more tolerant of the participation of the disabled than of homosexuals; the average Haitian scores 36.8 on this variable.

[77] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.



Figure 42. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, for at least some indicators of political engagement, there seem to exist nontrivial discrepancies in rates of participation between men and women and Haitians of different social classes. While these results are certainly troubling, there are reasons to be optimistic about closing this gap, as American democracies have already come a long way in terms of political equality. Moreover, these differences are not present everywhere, which means that there might be lessons we can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review

public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation, based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys.

Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.[78] The general idea is that when more members of marginalized groups see people like them on the ballot and in office, they are thus more motivated to participate in politics than they are where political role models are scarce. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. Unfortunately, however, as described in Special Report Box 5, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included one question, **GEN6**, enabling us to tap support for gender quotas across the Americas.[79] Responses were coded on a 7 point scale.

> **GEN6.** The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

In Figure 43 we find support for gender quotas in the countries of the Americas. As always, responses were recoded on a 0 to 100 scale, with higher values representing greater agreement. In all but two countries where this question was administered, average support for the statement is above the midpoint on the scale; only in Canada and Trinidad and Tobago do the average citizens disagree. Haitians are on average slightly supportive of gender quotas, though with a score of 57.6 Haiti has only the fifth lowest level of agreement with the statement.

[78] Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf.

[79] This question was administered to a split (half) sample of respondents.



Figure 43. Support for Gender Quotas in the Countries of the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.[80] While about half of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly

[80] Lijphardt, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid*.

enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public services.[81] One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in election is less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, would suggest that compulsory voting also does not have the expected effect in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on pa rticipation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.[82]

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.[83] While the relationship between socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,[84] material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

V. Conclusion

Despite reductions in inequality over the past decades, this chapter has revealed that important aspects of political participation remain unequal in the Americas. In Haiti, education and parents' educational background constitute very important markers that affect one's ability and likelihood of getting involved in politics. T his is particularly concerning, since it s uggests that advantages will accrue across generations. When Haitians with higher education participate at higher rates, they may succeed in altering the political game in ways that reinforce their own higher status, thus leading to yet more advantages in future generations.

Furthermore, we find that gender affects participation in some forms of politics. Unlike in other countries in the region, Haitian women vote at somewhat lower rates than men. In addition, though they participate in community groups at similar rates as men, they are less likely to get involved in electoral politics outside the voting booth as well as within it. Haitian women get involved in political campaigns and attempt to persuade their fellow citizens at half the rate of Haitian men.

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[81] Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.
[82] Iversen and Rosenbluth. 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice. 2011, *Ibid.*; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid*.
[83] Uslaner and Brown. 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working paper.
[84] Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Turning to attitudes, we find that Haitians are relatively unsupportive and intolerant of the participation of disadvantaged groups, including women, gays, and the disabled.

Still, there are some positive points in our findings. First, we find that skin color has essentially no relationship to any form of political participation in Haiti. Further, Haitians are apparently quite tolerant of the participation of politicians with darker skin. Second, we find that Haitians overall have quite high levels of some forms of participation, especially participation in community groups and in political campaigns.

Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.[85] In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?

The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

Effects of Gender and Control Variables on Participation and Predicted Community Participation by Gender Roles



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

[85] To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.

Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women's Political Participation

This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

Predicted Probabilities for Men's and Women's Political Participation in Latin America



Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women's group meetings.[86]

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation. The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

[86] The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a ca mpaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women's group meetings, CP20.

Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.

Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.

Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

I. Introduction

As we have seen, economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas are willing to report social and political attitudes that disfavor the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perceptions of their political systems and the democratic regime? Are there further consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.[87] Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.[88] On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect what is often called "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Some citizens have had previous contact with politicians, or their close friends and family members may have done so. These citizens may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences, whether favorable or unfavorable, with specific politicians.[89] If politicians actually treat some groups better than others, citizens who have contact with politicians will draw conclusions from their own experiences, leading to an association between group membership and external efficacy.[90] In addition,

[87] Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

[88] Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[89] Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

[90] For evidence on police officers differentially targeting citizens based on perceived social class, see Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheendar Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 45 (1): 76-97.

citizens with a sense of collective identity – those who perceive that their fate is linked to that of the group– may well base their judgments of political leaders' receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics, more generally.[91]

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.[92] Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders' ineffectiveness. This could lower evaluations of incumbents' performance and what is often called "specific political support": support for the particular people in office.[93] When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing "diffuse support," or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010 found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.[94]

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.[95] However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.[96]

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the

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[91] Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality." *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

[92] Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. New York: Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. "Politics as a Vocation." In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

[93] Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

[94] Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

[95] Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. "Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?" *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

[96] Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America." Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005."The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination," *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.[97] However, discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.[98]

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary (2000), on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.[99] And scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as "important rallying cries" during democratization,[100] and raise "the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action."[101] It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.[102]

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such more general attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

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[97] Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

[98] Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[99] Cleary, Matthew. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid*.

[100] Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women's Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

[101] Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

[102] Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethinicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989.Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

II. Inequality, Efficacy, and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included a number of questions to tap internal and external efficacy, as well as perceptions of representation. Two questions are part of the AmericasBarometer's long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were both coded on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree"). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Not at all") to 7 ("A lot"). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.[103]

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Questions measuring group characteristics and equality of opportunities have been described in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin color, class, household wealth, intra-household inequalities by gender, and self-reported victimization by discrimination in government offices, public places, and employment situations.

We begin by considering the distribution of internal efficacy, **EFF2**, across the countries of the Americas. Internal efficacy varies a considerable amount: from a high of 67.6 in the United States, to a low of 38.8 in Paraguay. With a value of 42.8, Haitians register low levels of internal efficacy. This is particularly interesting, given that Haitians are so extraordinarily participatory, since internal efficacy is typically associated with participation.

[103] This question was administered to a split sample, meaning to half of all respondents in each country.



Figure 44. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas

How do social inequalities and experiences of discrimination affect internal efficacy? In Figure 45 we use linear regression analysis to examine the association between internal efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences. We find that those who say that they have been victimized by discrimination are less likely to think that they understand the most important political issues in their country, though, surprisingly, the relationship only exists for those who say that they have been victimized by discrimination in spheres outside the government. Among other personal traits, skin color and wealth have no relationship to internal efficacy. Those with more education have higher levels of efficacy, while female homemakers register lower levels of efficacy.



Figure 45. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Haiti

In Figure 46 we explore in greater depth how personal characteristics and discrimination are related to citizens' belief in their ability to understand the political system in Haiti. We find that those with higher education have levels of efficacy that are about 19 points higher on the 0-100 scale than those without education. Female homemakers, however, have efficacy about 9 points lower on the scale than do men. Finally, victimization by discrimination leads to about a 6 point drop on the scale. Thus, Haiti's very low levels of internal efficacy might be in part attributed to Haitians' low levels of education.



Figure 46. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in Haiti

Now we turn to examine two variables that reflect citizens' perceptions that the political system represents and listens to them. Variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** are described at the beginning of this section. In Figure 47 we present the distribution of these two variables across the countries of the Americas. We find that support for these two statements is low across the region. In no country of the Americas does external efficacy or the belief that parties listen even reach the midpoint of 50.0 on the 0-100 scale. On both variables, Venezuela is at the top of the ranking, while Costa Rica is located at the bottom. In Haiti, however, average agreement with the two questions varies. Haitians' average score for internal efficacy – that is, agreement that leaders are interested in what people like you think – reaches 45.9. However, on the question of whether political parties listen, Haiti's score is only 30.9. This may suggest that Haitian parties are quite weak as institutions. Alternatively, it might suggest that Haitians respond well to populist messages, believing that parties are bad, but that charismatic leaders care.



Figure 47. External Efficacy and Perceptions of Party Representation in the Countries of the Americas

Which Haitians think that "those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think"? And who agrees with the notion that "political parties represent people like you"? In Figure 48 and Figure 49, we use linear regression analysis to examine the personal characteristics and experiences that lead citizens to report high internal efficacy and strong perceptions of representation. We find few statistically significant determinants of external efficacy, though self-reported experiences of discrimination decrease external efficacy, and education increases it. Turning to the second figure, we find that people who say that they have been discriminated against in public places or at work/school are less likely to agree that political parties care about them, while those with more education are more likely to do so. In contrast to the first figure, we also find that those with darker skin perceive parties as less representative.[104] Most puzzlingly, however, it appears that those who believe that they have been discriminated against in government offices are *more* likely to agree that political parties listen to people like them.

[104] Skin color is statistically significant at p = .051 in the model of party representation.



Figure 48. Determinants of External Efficacy in Haiti



Figure 49. Determinants of Belief that Parties Listen in Haiti

To further understand what factors are associated with these two attitudes, in Figure 50 and Figure 51 we examine how several of the most important variables from the regression analysis are related to internal efficacy and perceptions of party representation. None of the examined variables has a large impact on external efficacy. Education has some relationship to both external efficacy and the belief that parties listen, though the effect is not perfectly linear: those with higher education have levels of both variables that are about 10 points higher than those with only primary education. Women who stay at home are about 5 points lower than women who are not homemakers in external efficacy and the belief that parties listen. And victimization by discrimination outside of government offices leads to about a 6.5 point drop in external efficacy, and a 4.6 point drop in agreement that parties listen. However, effects diverge for discrimination in government offices: this form of victimization apparently leads to about a 5 point decrease in external efficacy, and about a 3 point *rise* in agreement that parties listen. It is not clear what explains this last finding.



Figure 50. Factors Associated with External Efficacy in Haiti



Figure 51. Factors Associated with Belief that Parties Listen in Haiti

In Figure 52 we further consider how skin color is related to external efficacy and to agreement that "parties listen to people like you." The figure shows an interesting non-linear relationship: it appears that values of both variables are highest for Haitians in the middle of the color spectrum, between values 6 and 7 on the color scale. Both the very lightest skinned and the very darkest skinned Haitians are less likely to believe that the political system represents people like them.



Figure 52. Skin Color, External Efficacy, and Belief that Parties Listen in Haiti

III. System Support and Engagement with Democracy

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination may also affect more abstract political attitudes. As discussed above, discrimination could be seen as a failure of the political system, and could lower support for the general political system. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we tap a number of more general political attitudes; the most important of these are support for the political system and support for democracy in the abstract. In Chapter Five we describe in detail how these are measured, as well as the levels of these attitudes across the region and over time within Haiti. In the present section, we consider how personal characteristics and experiences of discrimination shape these attitudes that are so critical for democratic stability.

In Figure 53 we use linear regression analysis to assess what individual traits and reported experiences predict levels of political support in Haiti. Here, we again find puzzling results for self-reported discrimination. Those who say they have been discriminated against in public places or at work/school have lower levels of system support, though the effect is not quite statistically significant (p = .07). More striking, however, is that those who say that the government has discriminated against them report *higher* levels of system support. It is not clear what explains these results, but one possibility is that those who have sought services in government offices are *both* more likely to believe that they have been discriminated against and to have high system support. We find few other significant effects, except that those with darker skin have significantly lower levels of system support.



Figure 53. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Haiti

To assess in greater depth the most important factors determining support for the political system, in Figure 54 we examine the separate relationships between a number of personal traits and experiences and system support. In bivariate analysis, we find that homemaker status and discrimination by non-governmental entities have essentially no relationship to system support. Education has a small relationship to system support, though the difference in system support between those with primary education and those with higher education is just 9 points on the 0-100 scale. And again, surprisingly it appears that those who perceive that they have been the target of discrimination on the part of government have levels of system support that are 8 points *higher* than those who do not perceive that they have been targets of discrimination.



Figure 54. Factors Associated with System Support in Haiti

Turning to skin color, in Figure 55 we again find the curvilinear pattern discussed above: those with highest system support are those in the middle of the color spectrum, at about a 6 on the scale running from 1 to 11. Both the lightest skinned and darkest skinned Haitians are less supportive of their current political system than are their compatriots in the middle of the spectrum; those in the middle of the color spectrum have an average level of system support that is 10 points higher than their darkest skinned compatriots. This is probably related to the fact that, as we found in Chapter One, light skinned individuals are wealthier and more educated, while very dark skin individuals are the poorest and least educated.



Figure 55. Skin Color and System Support in Haiti

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination might also have spillover effects on support for democracy in the abstract. In Figure 56 we use linear regression analysis to assess how the set of personal traits we reported above are associated with the belief that "democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government." We find few statistically significant effects here. While Haitians with more years of education have somewhat higher levels of support for democracy, it appears that women have lower levels of support than do men.



Figure 56. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Haiti

In Figure 57 we continue to examine the variables identified as important in the regression analysis above. We find that Haitians with some higher education have levels of support for democracy 10 points higher than their fellow citizens without any formal education, while women have levels of support that are 3-4 points lower than do men. However, as in the regression analysis it turns out that victimization by self-reported discrimination is unrelated to levels of support for democracy.



Figure 57. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy in Haiti

How is support for democracy related to skin color? In Figure 58 we again find a curvilinear relationship. Haitians with skin colors between 4 and 6 on the color spectrum have substantially higher levels of support for democracy than do either their lightest skinned or darkest skinned compatriots. This time, it is the citizens at the lightest end of the color spectrum who have lowest levels of agreement that "democracy is better than the alternatives." In fact, citizens in the middle of the color spectrum have levels of support for democracy that are more than 15 points higher than do the lightest skinned citizens.



Figure 58. Skin Color and Support for Democracy in Haiti

IV. Protest Participation

Last, as we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, marginalization and discrimination may lead some groups – at least those that are highly politicized – to join social movements and participate in protest politics. Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that in at least some countries throughout the Americas, the act of protesting may be becoming a more "normalized' method of political participation: "individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest."[105] In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked a number of questions related to protest, including most importantly **PROT3**.

[105] Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. "The Normalization of Protest in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to PROT6]**
(88) DK **[Go to PROT6]** (98) DA **[Go to PROT6]**

In Figure 59 we examine the levels of political protest throughout the Americas. Rates of participation in protests vary a great deal, though in no country does the average citizen take to the streets. At the high end, 17.7% of Bolivians report that they have taken part in a protest in the past year. Among Haitians, the level of protest participation is just slightly lower; 16.8% of Haitians report taking part in protests in the past year, a rate that puts Haiti in second place in the region. By contrast, in 21 of the 26 countries studied the participation rate is below 10%. At the bottom end, only 2.3% of Jamaicans report having taken part in a protest in the past year.



Figure 59. Participation in Protests in the Countries of the Americas

Who protests in Haiti? In Figure 60 we now use logistic regression analysis to consider whether and how experiences of marginalization and discrimination affect whether Haitians participate in protest politics. Indeed, we find that self-reported victimization by any form of discrimination increases the likelihood of taking to the streets. Most other personal characteristics do not affect protest participation. However, women are less likely than men to take part in demonstrations, and homemakers are even less likely to do so than other women.



Figure 60. Determinants of Protest Participation in Haiti

Figure 60 also reveals that some other political variables are associated with protest participation. Interestingly, those who voted for Martelly in 2010 are slightly more likely to protest, as far those who take part in community improvement committees and who are more interested in politics.[106] Conversely (and not surprisingly), those who are more satisfied with the national economy are less likely to take to the streets.

In Figure 61 we explore further how protest participation is related to several important variables discovered in the analysis presented in Figure 60. Here, it turns out that in bivariate analysis education appears to have some relationship to protest participation. Levels of protest participation for Haitians without any formal education are a little more than 6 percentage points lower than for Haitians with higher education. Other variables have substantial effects. While almost a quarter (22.4%) of Haitian men report having participated in a protest in the past year, the rate is ten percentage points lower for women who are not homemakers (12.5%), and the rate is halved again for women who are homemakers, at 6%. Self-reported victimization by discrimination is even more

[106] The coefficient for Martelly vote is marginally statistically significant at p = .077.

strongly related to taking to the streets. A third (33.1%) of those who say they have been discriminated against in government offices have protested in the past year, while only 14% of those who have not been discriminated against have done so. Moreover, discrimination outside of government offices also matters; almost a quarter of those who have been the victim of discrimination in public places or at work/school have taken part in a demonstration.



Figure 61. Factors Associated with Protest Participation in Haiti

Given the curvilinear relationships found elsewhere, it is reasonable to investigate whether protest participation also varies across the color spectrum. It turns out that it does, though perhaps not in the way one might expect. Once again, we find a spike in the middle of the color spectrum, among Haitians at about a 6 on the color palette. In fact, Haitians in the middle of the color spectrum have participation rates 10 p ercentage points higher than their darkest skinned compatriots. T his is interesting, since it is precisely the group in the middle of the spectrum that also has the highest level of system support.



Figure 62. Skin Color and Protest Participation in Haiti

V. Conclusion

How does Haiti's structure of unequal opportunities affect politics within the country? In this chapter, we investigate how victimization by discrimination as well as personal characteristics such as gender, education, and skin color shape Haitians' political attitudes and behaviors. Results are mixed. Self-reported victimization by discrimination has some relationship to internal and external efficacy, but little relationship to system support or support for democracy. Nonetheless, those who say they have been victimized by discrimination, either in government offices or in public places and work, are *much* more likely to have taken to the streets in protest in the past year.

We also find that gender affects some political traits. Women, and in particular women who are homemakers, have lower levels of internal and external efficacy, as well as support for democracy. At the same time, however, they also have lower levels of protest participation. Turning to race, we find interesting patterns across the range of our skin color variable. Haitians in the middle of the skin color palette tend to have higher levels of efficacy, system support, and support for democracy. At the same time, they also tend to take to the streets to a greater extent in protest. That is, men and Haitians of medium skin tone apparently feel like the Haitian political system best meets their needs, as measured by efficacy and adherence to the political system and to democracy in the abstract. Nonetheless, they are also most likely to go out to protest.

Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?[107]

The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.



[107] For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support

This box reviews findings from the paper "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America," by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.[108] The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.[109] Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.



[108] The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

[109] The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information

This box reviews findings from the 2012 report "Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results," by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.





The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.[110] As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

[110] This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government."

Part II:
Governance, Political Engagement and Civil Society in the Americas

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, Democracy, and Human Rights

With Mollie Cohen

I. Introduction

High crime rates and persistent public sector corruption are two of the largest challenges facing many countries in the Americas today. Since the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, the study of corruption and implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices have been on the rise.[111] Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, obviously was commonplace under previous authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas; however, given widespread media censorship and the great personal risk for those who chose to report on corruption, it was impossible to determine just how much corruption existed and in what public spheres was it more common.

Studies from the field of economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. There is, then, growing understanding in academia of the corrosive effects that corruption has on economies as well as of the challenges corruption creates for democratic governance, particularly the egalitarian administration of justice.[112]

At the level of public opinion, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and political actors of their country, and these effects hold across the region.[113] However, others show that such opinions do not spill over onto attitudes towards democracy more generally.[114] Some scholars even suggest that corruption can at times simply lead to citizen withdrawal from politics, or even *help* specific

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[111] See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies,* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[112] Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?,* edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

[113] Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

[114] Canache, Damarys, and Michael E Allison. 2005. "Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (3): 91-111.

governments maintain public support.[115] Some have also suggested that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the importance of perceptions of corruption. Two recent studies, both using AmericasBarometer data, have indicated that perceiving higher rates of corruption is linked to lower levels of trust in key state institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.[116] However, having experienced corruption is not particularly strongly linked to high perceptions of corruption, and for that reason LAPOP normally prefers to use both data on actual corruption victimization as well as data on corruption perceptions.

Crime is another serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were estimated at 15.5 per 100,000 citizens by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2011, more than double the global homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000, and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).[117] While South America has been following the worldwide trend downward in homicide, rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been on the upswing.

Given this context of extremely high crime, it is imperative that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and the fear associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to comprehend how crime victimization might affect citizen support for the political system and perhaps even democracy, since it is that system that can be blamed for not delivering citizen security.[118] Moreover, citizens might become less trusting, and potentially less tolerant, of their fellow citizens if they fear or have experienced crime, thus eroding social capital and leading to lower support for civil liberties and liberal institutions. Crime victimization could even lead citizens to seek to emigrate to other countries.[119] Fear of or experience with crime might also lead to decreased support for and faith in certain key political institutions, particularly the police, but also the judiciary.[120]

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[115] Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, and Jorge I Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." Electoral Studies 17 (4): 483-503.

[116] Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research,* (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

[117] Global Study on Homicide. 2011. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html

[118] Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*.

[119] Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 64. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

[120] Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3).

As with corruption, it is unclear whether an individual's perception of crime or actual crime victimization is more important in shaping her attitudes towards the democratic system. Even in places where crime rates are high compared to global figures, the probability that an individual will be murdered or become the victim of a serious crime, fortunately, remains quite low in most countries, even though in some Central American countries the rate is disturbingly high. However, individuals might read about violent crimes in the newspaper, see images on the television, or know people who have become the victims of such crimes. The fear of becoming a victim, which is possible for anyone regardless of past experience with crime, might have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a crime victim.

A third major public problem involves human rights abuses. A 2006 survey in the Port-au-Prince area found rampant crime and systematic human rights abuses.[121] A form of abuse specific to the Haitian context involves the practice of sending children to work as restaveks. This longstanding phenomenon involves very poor, frequently rural families sending young children, especially girls, to the homes of wealthier families, typically ones with kinship ties. Often called a modern form of slavery, life as a restavek may commonly involve substandard living and work conditions, denial of opportunities for education, and physical and sexual abuse. A 2009 survey by the Pan American Development Foundation found that in Port-au-Prince and St. Marc, more than a third of households reported servant children in their homes.[122] International bodies, NGOs, and local foundations such as the Jean Cadet Restavek Foundation have recently increased efforts to prevent families from sending their children to work as restaveks, yet particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 food crisis and the 2010 earthquake, these efforts remain difficult.

This chapter seeks to understand the extent of corruption and crime in the Americas and to clarify how corruption and crime affect democratic attitudes and feelings about the rule of law across the region. It also seeks to understand how Haitians respond to efforts to prevent families sending their children to work as restaveks.

II. Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, which are deployed in the AmericasBarometer surveys. Following initial tests in Nicaragua in 1996[123], these items have been refined and improved. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking such questions as: "Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the

[121] Kolbe, Athena and Hutson, Royce A. 2006. "Human Rights Abuse and Other Criminal Violations in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti: A Random Survey of Households." *The Lancet* 368(9538): 864-873.
[122] Pierre, Yves François, Glenn R. Tucker, and Jean-François Tardieu. 2009. *Lost Childhoods in Haiti: Quantifying Child Trafficking, Restaveks, and Victims of Violence*. Port-au-Prince: Pan American Development Foundation. < http://www.itooamhaiti.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/13583>
[123] Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion. Washington, D.C., Casals and Associates, and Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-up Study. Washington, D.C., Casals and Associates.

exact questions).[124] This series has two particular strengths. First, it allows us to determine in which social settings corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to construct a corruption scale, distinguishing between those who have experienced corruption in only one setting and those who have been victimized in more than one setting. We assume that with corruption, as with crime, multiple victimizations are likely to make a difference.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	**No**	**Yes**	**DK**	**DA**
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

[124] Question **EXC20**, on bribery by military officials, was introduced for the first time in 2012.

Another item that taps perceptions of rather than experiences with corruption is also included in the questionnaire. The question reads as follows:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

We rescale this variable from 0-100, where 0 represents a perception that corruption is very uncommon, and 100 a perception that corruption is very common.

Perception of Corruption

Figure 63 shows that citizens tend to perceive high levels of corruption in the Americas. The highest countries are Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, both with average reported levels of corruption above 80 on the 100-point scale; by far the lowest country is Suriname, where the average perception of corruption is only 38.8 on the scale. With the exception of Suriname, the average perception of corruption in every country of the Americas is above the scale midpoint of 50 on the 100-point scale. Perception of corruption averages 66.4 in Haiti. While this suggests that the average Haitian perceives corruption as relatively common, it actually puts Haiti towards the bottom of the ranking in the countries in the Americas, with levels virtually identical to those found in the United States. Thus, citizens in most other countries perceive even more corruption than do Haitians. It may, of course, be that corruption is so common that Haitians do not even see it.



Figure 63. Perceptions of Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

As with the other indicators throughout this report, we present the changes in perceptions of corruption over time. Figure 64 reports trends in perception of corruption in Haiti for the years in which these data were collected. We find that, with the exception of a dip in 2008, average perception of corruption has remained nearly constant since 2006, in the range of 65-66 points on the 100-point scale. Thus, though perceptions of corruption are not particularly high in Haiti, they are higher in 2012 than in 2008.



Figure 64. Perceptions of Corruption over Time in Haiti

It is important to note that high levels of perceived corruption might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of corruption. It is quite possible that in countries where governments attempt to raise public awareness about corruption, and the media focus on anti-corruption measures, citizen perceptions of corruption will have been heightened while these measures take effect. Thus, in some of the countries against which Haiti is compared, actual victimization might be low even though perceptions of corruption are high. We turn to actual experiences with corruption victimization in the next section.

Corruption Victimization

This section addresses the extent to which citizens in the Americas have been victimized by corruption. To this end, we present the percentage of respondents who report that they have been asked for a bribe in at least one location in the last year.



Figure 65. Percentage Victimized by Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 65 shows wide variation in rates of corruption in different countries across the region. One finding stands out: in contrast to perceived corruption, actual corruption victimization in Haiti is extremely high in the context of the Americas. Two-thirds, or 67.0%, of Haitians report that they have been victimized by corruption in some form in the past year. This level of corruption is dramatically higher even than the next most corrupt countries in the Americas, Bolivia and Ecuador, in both of which a little over 40% of citizens say that they have been victimized by requests for bribes in the past year. At the bottom end of the scale, in six countries of the Americas – Panama, Uruguay, Jamaica, Chile, the United States, and Canada – fewer than one in ten citizens says that he or she has been the target of a request for a bribe in the past year.

Some citizens received requests for a bribe in many locations, while others received requests in one or none. Next, we assess the number of places in which citizens reported being victimized by corruption in Haiti in 2012. This information is presented graphically in Figure 66. We find that 33% percent reports no experience with corruption in the past 12 months, 21.8% percent being victimized in one location, 22.6% percent report two instances, and 22.6% report receiving a request for a bribe in three or more settings.



Figure 66. Number of Instances Victimized by Corruption in Haiti

How have levels of corruption victimization varied in Haiti over time? In Figure 67 we show the percentage of citizens who report any corruption victimization, by year. Another finding jumps out from this figure: not only is the percentage of Haitians who have received a request for a bribe in the past year extremely high when Haiti is compared to other countries in the region, but victimization by corruption is growing over time in the country. In two years, the proportion reporting a request for a bribe jumped up dramatically, from a little over half to two-thirds.



Figure 67. Percentage Victimized by Corruption over Time in Haiti

Where do most requests for bribes occur? Given the very high rates of bribe requests in Haiti, it is important to investigate this topic further. In Figure 68 we present the percentage of respondents reporting bribe requests in each location in 2012. We find that 65% of those with children in public school say that they have been asked for a bribe, and nearly that percentage of those who have used public health services have received a request for a bribe in a public health agency. Among Haitians who have used the court system and who have had dealings in municipal offices in the past year, over half have received bribe requests in those locations. Moreover, nearly half of those who work say they have received a bribe request in the past year. Relatively low percentages, by contrast, say that a government employee or a police officer has asked them for a bribe.



Figure 68. Ways Victimized by Corruption in Haiti

Of course, this analysis does not tell us how likely citizens are to offer bribes in the first place, without being asked. Based on long experience and experimentation with survey design, LAPOP has chosen to ask about *requests* for bribes, rather than offers, since citizens may be reluctant to report whether they have actually paid bribes. By asking this more indirect question, LAPOP seeks to avoid offending the respondent or affecting the rapport between the interviewer and interviewee, and it seeks to minimize the extent to which citizens feel compelled to lie.

Note also that these questions do not address seeking or offering sexual favors in exchange for services. Such exchanges may occur in the public and private sectors, as well as schools and hospitals.

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

In order to paint a clearer picture of corruption victimization, we computed a logistic regression model to identify those socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that were positively and negatively associated with corruption victimization. Figure 69 displays the results of this regression. We find that those who are wealthier and who have higher levels of education are more likely to report that they have received bribe requests, while those with darker skin (and who are less educated and poorer) are less likely to report bribe requests; this group is usually more likely to be victims of bribes as well. This is despite the fact that Haitians who have the mean to pay have a tendency not to use the public school and health system, the two most common places where bribe requests occur.



Figure 69. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Haiti

To better grasp the impact of a given independent variable on the likelihood that an individual has been victimized by corruption, we present bivariate results in Figure 70. It turns out that Haitians with higher education have levels of corruption victimization that are 29 percentage points higher than those with only primary education. Similarly, those in the fourth wealth quintile have levels of corruption victimization that are 20 percentage points higher than those in the lowest wealth quintile. Thus, it is clear that most requests for bribes target those with the means to pay, and who have substantial dealings with the public system.



Figure 70. Demographics and Corruption Victimization in Haiti

We also find that skin color matters; those in the darkest portion of the spectrum have levels of corruption victimization that are 11 poi nts lower than those in the middle of the color spectrum. Finally, rates of corruption victimization appear to vary across geographic areas. Rates of victimization are relatively low in small cities, though the standard errors and confidence intervals are so large that it is hard to know whether results found in this sample generalize to the population at large. By contrast, large cities (other than Port-au-Prince) are the places where requests for bribes appear to be most common.

III. Perceptions of Insecurity and Crime Victimization

The Americas Barometer measures citizens' perception of their safety by asking question **AOJ11**:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very **un**safe?		
(1) Very safe	(2) Somewhat safe	(3) Somewhat unsafe
(4) Very unsafe	(88) DK	(98) DA

Following standard LAPOP practices, responses were recalibrated on a 0-100 scale, where higher values mean greater perceived *insecurity*. Figure 71 shows the results for all the capitals in the survey. Citizen perceptions of insecurity vary greatly across the region, from a high around 54.7 points in Mexico City and Lima, to a low of around 29 points in Kingston. Port-au-Prince's average level of reported insecurity sits at 51.7, which puts it in fifth place in terms of perceived insecurity in the Americas.



Figure 71. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 72 shows how perceived levels of insecurity have changed over time in Haiti, using data from past waves of LAPOP surveys in which respondents were asked the same question. The figure indicates that perceived insecurity declined substantially between 2006 and 2010, from a high over 50 points on the 0-100 scale, to a low of 38 points on the scale. Between 2010 and 2012, perceived insecurity rose about six and a half points, to a level just slightly lower than that found in 2008.



Figure 72. Perceptions of Insecurity over Time in Haiti

In what regions of the country are perceptions of insecurity most severe? In Figure 73 we examine this issue. It turns out that perceived insecurity is the lowest, by far, in the Northern region. In the Southern, Central, and Western regions, perceived insecurity hovers in the mid-40s on the 0-100 scale. Finally, perceived insecurity is the highest in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, at just over the midpoint on the scale.



Figure 73. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Regions of Haiti

Once again, in the same way as we previously discussed for the issue of corruption, it is important to note that high levels of perceived insecurity might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of crime. We turn to a discussion of crime victimization in the next section.

IV. Crime Victimization

How do perceptions of insecurity compare to individuals' experiences with crime? Since 2010, the Americas Barometer has used an updated series of items to measure crime victimization, which reads as follows:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?**[Read options]** (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality (4) In another municipality (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

Figure 74 presents responses from **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR**. Given that the majority of criminal acts occur in urban areas, and especially in national capitals, we opted to present crime victimization data for the 24 national capitals included in the sample (for sampling reasons, the United States and Canada are excluded). The cities with highest levels of reported crime victimization are Quito and Tegucigalpa, where about 36% of respondents said that they personally had been victimized by crime, and over 40% said that someone else in their household had been victimized. At the other end of the spectrum, Belmopan, Kingston and Georgetown appear to be the safest capitals, in that fewer than 13% of respondents say they have been victimized by crime, and fewer than 10% identify any crime victim in their household

It is important to remember, however, that our survey is only administered to adults of voting age or older, making it possible for youth crime victimization that family members do not know about to go underreported. It is also important to remember that responses are individuals' self-reported crime victimizations. In some contexts, certain crimes (particularly those that are perpetrated almost exclusively against particular marginalized groups) might be normalized and thus reported with less frequency than that with which they occur.



Figure 74. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Countries of the Americas

Compared to other cities in the Americas, crime victimization is at moderate levels in Port-au-Prince. The left side of the figure indicates that 22.3% percent of the residents in the capital reported having been a victim of a crime during the twelve months prior to being surveyed. The right side of

the figure indicates that 21.7% reported that *another member of their household* had been victimized by crime.

Figure 75 illustrates where most crime in Haiti occurred, according to respondents who said they had been victimized by crime. Following common wisdom, it appears that most crime occurs close to home: 62% of crime victims said that the most recent crime had occurred in their home, neighborhood, or municipality/section communal, and more than 10% said the crime had actually occurred in their homes.



Figure 75. Location of Most Recent Crime Victimization in Haiti

In which regions of Haiti does most crime take place? Figure 76 illustrates regional patterns in crime. Crime victimization follows geographic patterns that are similar to those for perceptions of insecurity, suggesting that perceptions of insecurity, at the aggregate level, may correspond to actual experiences. The region with lowest crime victimization is the Northern region, while that with the highest victimization is the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. However, while the Southern region was second to last in *perceptions* of insecurity, it is second from the top in actual victimization.



Figure 76. Self-Reported Crime Victimization by Region in Haiti

Finally, it might be of interest to know how experiences with crime have changed over time. Figure 77 illustrates trends in self-reported crime victimization in Haiti between 2006 and 2012. Note, however, that the text of the questions measuring crime victimization changed in 2010. In 2006 and 2008, LAPOP used VIC1, which read: *"Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?"* In 2010 and 2012, this was replaced with VIC1EXT, which provided more detail on the types of crimes that may have occurred. This modification was intended to increase the validity of responses. The change in wording of the crime victimization questions might account for the jump in victimization reported between 2008 and 2010.



Figure 77. Self-Reported Crime Victimization over Time in Haiti

Self-reports of crime victimization have risen dramatically since 2008. While some of this rise may be due to the above mentioned changes in question wording, crime victimization has risen by 6 percentage points even since 2010.

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Crime?

Figure 78 depicts the results of a logistic regression model assessing who is likely to be a victim of crime in Haiti.[125] What is most interesting about Figure 78 is that it does a very poor job of assessing who is likely to be a victim of crime.[126] Those with darker skin color are slightly more likely to report victimization than are those with lighter skin. However, none of the other personal characteristics examined here is associated with crime victimization in a statistically significant manner. In other words, being rich versus poor, male versus female, or from a large city versus a small one have no statistically significant impact on whether one is targeted by crime.

[125] In this and all other regression charts, we standardize all variables. As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.
[126] Skin color is statistically significant at $p = .054$.



Figure 78. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Haiti

V. Trust in and Support for the Police

To what extent do Haitians trust and support the police? The AmericasBarometer has long featured a question asking citizens across the Americas to report on their trust in the police, using a 7 point scale running from "Not at all" to "A lot."

B18. To what extent do you trust the Police (PNH)?

In addition, since 2008, LAPOP has asked a pair of questions specific to Haiti examining evaluations of the police. The two questions, HAIM3 and HAIPOLIS, are listed here:

HAIM3. Speaking in general of the police, would you say that the police are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?
(1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly
(5) Very poorly (88) DK (98)DA

HAIPOLIS. Would you say that the police is enough to provide security in the country or another force is needed in the country? **[Read options]**
(1) Police is enough to provide security
(2) Another force is needed
(88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 79, we examine performance evaluations of the police (question **HAIM3**) in 2012. It turns out that most Haitians – 58% of them, in fact – say that the police are performing neither well nor poorly. Among those with a less neutral opinion, the majority are favorable to the police. That is, 31% of Haitians say that the police are performing well or very well, while only 11% say that the police are performing poorly or very poorly.



Figure 79. Evaluation of the Performance of the Police in Haiti

How have evaluations of the police changed over time? In Figure 80 we assess the evolution of perceptions of police performance since 2008. Evaluations of the performance of the police have changed little since 2008, hovering a little over the midpoint of 50 over the past three waves of the AmericasBarometer. Nonetheless, there has been a small but statistically significant improvement in evaluations of the police, on the order of about 4 points on the 0-100 scale.



Figure 80. Evaluation of the Performance of the Police over Time

Just as important as evaluating the performance of the police positively, citizens need to trust the police. Trust in the police represents a longer standing and more abstract disposition, but one that may be critical for effective rule of law. In Figure 81 we assess how trust in the police has changed over time, since the first AmericasBarometer administration in Haiti. We find a dramatic jump of 8 points on the 0-100 scale between 2010 and 2012. In fact, as we will see in the next chapter, trust in the police is very high in Haiti relative to trust in other institutions, with scores nearly as high as trust in the Catholic church, and nearly double trust in institutions such as the Parliament and elections.



Figure 81. Evaluation of the Performance of the Police over Time

In Figure 82 we present another view of trust in the police in Haiti. On the left side of the figure, we find that in comparative perspective Haitians' levels of trust in the police are quite high in 2012, with Haiti ranking only fourth out of the 26 countries studied. Haitians' levels of trust in the police are similar to those in countries with much higher levels of economic development, such as Canada, the United States, and Chile; and to those found in Nicaragua, where security reforms have been pointed to as a model for Central America.[127] On the right side of the figure, moreover, we find that Haiti's ranking relative to other countries in the region has jumped six places between 2010 and 2012.



Figure 82. Trust in the Police in Haiti in Comparative Perspective, 2010 and 2012

[127] Cruz, José Miguel. 2011. "Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State." *Latin American Politics and Society* 53 (4): 1–33.

In Figure 83 we examine the extent to which Haitians agree that "another force is needed in the country," rather than that "the police is enough to provide security." We find that in both 2008 and 2012 most Haitians agree that "another force is needed." Three-quarters say that another force is needed in 2008, and the percentage is only three points lower in 2012. The high levels of agreement with this statement may be due in part to the fact that a national army is strongly linked with Haitians' sense of national identity. Thus, it may not necessarily indicate that people believe that police are not adequate for security. This may in particular be the case given that Haitians, on balance, trust the police and think they are doing well. Nonetheless, further regression analysis indicates that those who perceive high levels of insecurity are more likely to agree that another force is needed, while Haitians who are more satisfied with the performance of the police and those with higher levels of national pride are *less* likely to agree that another force is needed.[128]



Figure 83. Percent who Believe that Another Force is Needed

[128] Analysis is not shown here but is available upon request.

VI. Support for Efforts to Prevent Child Servitude as Restaveks

As discussed in the introduction, one of the most important abuses of Haitians' human rights is the practice of sending poor children to work as restaveks. In 2012, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey in Haiti included two questions to gauge attitudes towards efforts to prevent families from sending their children to work as restaveks:

RESTAVEK1. Government. Do you think the government should prevent families from sending their child to work as a restavek? (1) Yes (2) No (3) No opinion (88) DK (98) DA
RESTAVEK3. Community Organizations. Do you think your local community organizations should prevent families from sending their child to work as a restavek? (1) Yes (2) No (3) No opinion (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 84 we examine responses to these two questions. We find that the great majority of Haitians say they support efforts to prevent families sending their children to work as restaveks, regardless of whether the efforts are by government or by community organizations. Support for community group efforts, at 87%, are very slightly higher than support for governmental efforts, at 85%. A full 83% of respondents said they supported efforts by *both* community groups and the government.



Figure 84. Support for Government and Community Groups Preventing Child Servitude as Restaveks

Who are the biggest supporters of efforts to prevent restaveks? We develop a single variable measuring whether citizens support efforts by *both* government and community groups. In Figure 85 we assess who supports both types of efforts. We find that attitudes are apparently not affected by whether a family has children at home, by the gender of the respondent, by age, or by wealth. However, darker skinned respondents are more likely to support such efforts, as are respondents with higher educational levels. By contrast, respondents living in larger cities are less likely to support these efforts.



Figure 85. Determinants of Support for Efforts to Prevent Child Servitude as Restaveks

In Figure 86 we examine in greater detail who supports efforts to prevent restaveks. We find that among Haitians in the top two quintiles of household wealth, about 78% support these efforts, while among Haitians in the bottom three quintiles, the percentage supporting these efforts is higher. However, we also find that Haitians with higher education have levels of support for anti-restavek efforts that are 16 percentage points higher than among Haitians with no formal education. Support for these efforts also varies greatly across places. In small and medium-sized cities, between 93 and 95% of respondents support these efforts. However, in large cities only 82% do so, and in Port-au-Prince support drops to 70%. In rural areas, where many sending families live, support is at 88%. Finally, we find great variation across the color spectrum. While those in the middle and dark end of the color spectrum have levels of support around 85%, among the lightest skinned Haitians support is approximately 20 percentage points lower.



Figure 86. Personal Characteristics and Support for Efforts to Prevent Child Servitude as Restaveks

VII. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for the Political System

What are the effects of high rates of crime and corruption victimization, as well as the perceptions of corruption and insecurity, on political legitimacy in Haiti? We now turn to a multivariate linear regression which estimates the impacts victimization and insecurity have on support for the political system. Figure 87 depicts the impacts of trust in the police as well as perceptions of

and experiences with crime and insecurity on system support.[129] Trust in the police is a strong determinant of system support; thus, investments in the police can pay dividends in terms of stability of the political system more broadly. Conversely, we find that perceptions of both corruption and insecurity are negatively associated with support for the political system, and that the impact of corruption perceptions is quite large. However, crime victimization has no relationship to the legitimacy of the political system. Even more surprisingly, victimization by corruption is associated with *higher* levels of system support.



Figure 87. Determinants of System Support in Haiti

Figure 88 delves further into the effects of the independent variables on system support, presenting the bivariate relationships between system support and corruption and crime perceptions and experiences. In bivariate analysis, we find similar patterns to those found in the previous figure. Insecurity and crime appear not to be terribly important for system support. Citizens who perceive greater insecurity have somewhat lower levels of system support, though the relationship appears to be non-linear: those who perceive very high levels of insecurity have relatively high levels of system support, as well. Crime victimization, furthermore, is again unassociated with system support. By contrast, patterns are stronger for corruption. Haitians who perceive very high levels of corruption have levels of system support only at 35 points on the 0-100 scale, while those who perceive very low

[129] System support is calculated as the respondent's mean of responses to five questions: B1 (perception that the courts guarantee a fair trial), B2 (respect for the political institutions of the country), B3 (belief that citizens' basic rights are well-protected in the country), B4 (pride in living under the country's political system), and B6 (belief that one should support the political system of the country). The resulting variable is rescaled to run from 0 to 100. For more information, see Chapter 5.

levels of corruption have system support scores that are 18 points higher. Finally and puzzlingly, being a victim of corruption is associated with a 7 percentage point *increase* in system support. It might be that those who report corruption victimization are those that actually receive a service from the government, and thus they are more satisfied than those who do not gain access to the government.



Figure 88. Crime, Corruption, and System Support in Haiti

VIII. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

This section addresses support for the rule of law in the Americas. The rule of law is often conceptualized as the universal application of the laws of the state, or the supposition that no group has legal impunity.[130] Previous studies by LAPOP found a wide variation of the willingness of citizens in the Americas to accept violations of the rule of law by the police in order to fight criminals. Consistent with the threat hypothesis, those that perceive higher levels of crime and those who are victimized by crime are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.[131] To measure support for the rule of law in the Americas, we use a single item which taps the extent to which the authorities should be bound by the law while pursuing justice.

[130] See, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.
[131] Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?.*AmericasBarometer Insights Series*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
(1) Should always abide by the law
(2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 89 shows the percentage of citizens in 2012 in each country of the Americas who express support for the rule of law, versus those who believe that, at times, the police and other authorities may act with impunity. The highest support for the rule of law is found in Jamaica (75%), and a group of countries including Panama, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, the United States, Belize, Colombia, and Brazil all have levels of support at 70% or higher. Meanwhile, the lowest support is found in Bolivia and Ecuador, which are below 55%. Haiti is found in the middle of the distribution; here, 67% show support for the rule of law.



Figure 89. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 90 we show levels of support for the rule of law over time in Haiti. We find that the percent supporting the rule of law has fluctuated a great deal over the past four survey administrations, rising to a high of 78% in 2008, and falling to a low of 60% in 2010. Interestingly, these fluctuations seem to co-vary with the electoral cycle. In both 2006 and 2010, highly criticized national elections were held in Haiti. During those contests, politicians and public figures have openly questioned the impartiality of the electoral administration. While electoral irregularities are quite different from police actions to catch criminals, it is possible that attitudes towards both result from a similar culture related to the rule of law.



Figure 90. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law over Time in Haiti

Finally, we conclude this section by attempting to clarify the determinants of support for the rule of law in Haiti. Figure 91 represents the results of a logistic regression model used to identify those factors. We find that personal characteristics and ideology have little relationship to support for the rule of law. Also, perception of corruption is unassociated with this trait. However, those who perceive higher levels of insecurity, as well as those who have been the victim of crime or corruption, all are more likely to say that authorities can occasionally cross the line in order to catch criminals.



Figure 91. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Haiti

Figure 92 delves more deeply into some of the more important independent variables in this analysis. Here, we find that victimization by corruption is associated with a 5 percentage point drop in support for the rule of law, while victimization by corruption is associated with an 11 percentage point drop. Meanwhile, only 52% of those who perceive very high levels of insecurity support the rule of law, 17 percentage points lower than among those who perceive very low levels of insecurity. Finally, there appears to be little pattern in the relationship between perception of corruption and support for the rule of law.



Figure 92. Factors Related to Support for the Rule of Law in Haiti

IX. Conclusion

This chapter began by addressing the magnitude of crime, insecurity, and corruption in Haiti, over time and in comparative perspective. We found that while citizens in many other countries in the Americas perceive their governments as being more corrupt than do Haitians, experiences present a very different picture. Haitians are substantially more likely to be asked for bribes than are citizens of any other country in the Americas, and corruption victimization appears to be rising over time (from already very high levels). Bribe requests are most common in schools, public health agencies, and the court system, and wealthier, more educated, and lighter skinned Haitians are more likely to be the target of bribe requests.

Turning to crime and insecurity, we find that in regional context Haitians have moderate levels of insecurity, and that they are in the middle of the regional ranking in terms of crime victimization rates. In keeping with these moderate levels of insecurity, Haitians are moderately satisfied with their police, at the same time that they believe that another force is needed to maintain security in the country. Crime victimization does appear to be rising over time, though part of the rise may be attributable to changes in question wording. We also find that personal characteristics such as social status, skin color, and gender have little to do with whether one is the victim of a crime in Haiti.

The chapter then addresses support for efforts to improve human rights in Haiti by ending the practice of sending children to work as restaveks. We find widespread support for efforts to end this practice, though support is somewhat lower among wealthy Haitians, those in large cities, and the lightest skinned citizens.

Last, we examine how victimization by crime and corruption, as well as perceptions of insecurity and corruption, are related to political attitudes, namely support for the political system and support for the rule of law in Haiti. We find that people who perceive higher corruption, as well as those who have been victims of crime, have lower levels of system support. Moreover, we find that victims of crime and corruption and those who perceive great threat from insecurity, are much more likely to agree that authorities can occasionally cross the line in order to catch criminals.

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,[132] others have shown that citizen attitudes and values play a key role, highlighting legitimacy as key for democratic consolidation.[133] Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions, central to the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.[134]

In LAPOP studies using AmericasBarometer data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Further, "system support" has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.[135] While specific support can be measured by questions addressing the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract object represented by the political system and the political offices themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central for democratic survival.[136] This chapter examines political legitimacy and tolerance across the Americas, seeking to understand what factors explain variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians' proximity to citizens' policy preferences have an important effect on citizens' attitudes about the political system.[137] Institutional variables have also

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[132] Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942 *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial, ; Przeworski Adam. 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense," en Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, y Jose Antonio Cheibub. eds. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P.1991., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press..

[133] Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation.* Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A.2000. "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America". *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. y Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press..

[134] See also Almond, Gabriel Abraham y Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

[135] Easton, David. 1975."A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29.

[136] Booth and Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

[137] Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart Ronald, 1988. "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230. Przeworski Adam et al., 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al., 2008. "Income and Democracy," *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 (May): 808-842; Peter Kotzian, 2011. "Public

been shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, that systems that incorporate features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.[138]

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.[139] In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.[140]

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."[141] Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.[142] Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perceptions of high levels of threat,[143] authoritarian personality,[144] and religion.[145] At the

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support for liberal democracy," *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1): 23 -41. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4: 485-514.

[138138] Anderson, Christopher. 2007., *Losers' consent : elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. y Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

[139] Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties, AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 20. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 2. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 36. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[140] Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings, AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 4: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?, AmericasBarometer Insights, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, AmericasBarometer Insights, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

[141] Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," 5.

[142] Gibson, James L.. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L.2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L.1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 : 819-850; Gibson, James L.1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599.

[143] Marcus George E., W. Russell Neuman, y Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. y Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How*

macro-level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.[146] Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.[147] LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.[148]

Research by Golebiouwska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.[149] It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic consolidation. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. The ways in which tolerance and political legitimacy are expected to affect stable democracy, according to LAPOP previous studies, are summarized in Table 1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Terrorist Threats Affect the Public, 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huddy, Leonie et al..2005 "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 : 593-608; Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, y Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 : 959-978

[144] Altemeyer Bob. 2007. *The Authoritarians*.

[145] Postic, Robert K.2007, *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity* (ProQuest, 2007); Stouffer, Samuel A.1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (John Wiley & Sons Inc,)..

[146] Sidanius, Jim y Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[147] Peffley, Mark y Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257..

[148] Lodola, Germán, and Margarita Corral. 2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[149] Golebiouwska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", Political Behavior, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiouwska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

Table 1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

It is worth noting that this conceptualization has found empirical support. Using 2008 AmericasBarometer data, Booth and Seligson found serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.[150]

II. Support for the Political System

LAPOP's "system support" index is estimated as the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. **B1**. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read*:*** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Following the LAPOP standard, we rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support.

How does support for the political system vary across the Americas? In Figure 93 we present the levels of political support in our study in 2012. Levels of system support are moderate across the Americas, ranging from over 60 points on the 0-100 scale in Canada, Nicaragua, Suriname, and Belize, to a low of 41 points in Honduras. System support in Haiti registers the third lowest in the Americas, at 44.5 points.

[150] Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; see also Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. The Honduran Catharsis. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).



Figure 93. Support for the Political System in the Countries of the Americas

Support for the political system is typically higher on some of the individual dimensions of the index than on others. In Figure 94 we present the levels of agreement in Haiti with each of the five components of system support. We find that responses are by far the lowest on the question of whether citizens' basic rights are respected in Haiti; average agreement with this item only reaches 37.8 on the 100-point scale. By contrast, the question of whether the respondent respects Haiti's political institutions receives the highest level of agreement.



Figure 94. Components of Support for the Political System in Haiti

How has system support evolved over time in Haiti? In Figure 95 we examine system support since 2006, as measured by the AmericasBarometer. We find great fluctuation. After holding relatively stable between 2006 and 2008, system support dropped precipitously in 2010, in the wake of the devastating earthquake. But in 2012 we find some good news: system support has now rebounded to levels somewhat higher even than in 2006.



Figure 95. Support for the Political System over Time in Haiti

III. Political Tolerance

The second component that the Americas Barometer uses to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. This index is composed of the following four items in our questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Haitian form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: ***[Probe: To what degree?]***
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Haitian form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

We calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. As with all LAPOP indexes, we then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance. In Figure 96 we examine tolerance levels

in 2012 across the Americas. The United States registers the highest levels of tolerance, at 73 points on the 0-100 scale, and tolerance is also over 65 points in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Canada. At the other end of the scale, average tolerance is only 37 points in Honduras. With an average tolerance level of 47.0, Haiti is in the bottom third of the regional ranking, but tolerance in this country is higher than in a number of other low-income countries, including Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and El Salvador.



Figure 96. Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 97 we present the levels of agreement with each of the four components of tolerance in Haiti. It appears that Haitians distinguish to a high degree between different types of political participation. Interestingly, Haitians are relatively tolerant of the rights of regime critics to engage in peaceful demonstrations. Tolerance of regime critics' right to vote is also above the midpoint on the 0-100 scale. However, Haitians are relatively intolerant of regime critics' rights to make speeches on TV or to run for public office. On both of these items, average levels of tolerance are around 40 points on the 100-point scale.



Figure 97. Components of Political Tolerance in Haiti

How was political tolerance evolved over time in Haiti? In Figure 98 we display the average levels of political tolerance in Haiti in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2006. We find that levels of tolerance have varied a great deal over time. Tolerance was comparatively quite high in 2006, at 62 points, and then declined substantially by 2010. Tolerance has since rebounded, but it remains quite a bit lower than in 2006, and very slightly lower even than in 2008.



Figure 98. Political Tolerance over Time in Haiti

What affects levels of tolerance in Haiti? In Figure 99 we develop a linear regression model to answer this question. We find that women are less tolerant than men, while darker skinned Haitians and those with higher levels of education are more tolerant than their lighter skinned fellow citizens and those with lower levels of education. Turning to attitudes and experiences, we find that those who are more supportive of democracy are much more tolerant. Interestingly, and contrary to some findings from other research on the relationship between threat and tolerance, those who perceive their neighborhoods to be insecure are more tolerant, while Haitians who are satisfied with their personal family finances are less tolerant.



Figure 99. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Haiti

In Figure 100 we continue to explore the results from Figure 99, showing the variables of greatest theoretical interest and the ones that were most important in the analysis. We find that Haitians with the darkest skin have levels of tolerance that are approximately 10 points higher than Haitians with the lightest skin. Similarly, those with secondary education are approximately 12 points more tolerant on the 0-100 scale than are those without education. While the relationship between insecurity and tolerance is non-linear, those who feel moderately insecure are approximately 8 points more tolerant than those who feel very secure. Finally, those who are most satisfied with their family finances are about 10 points less tolerant than are those who are least satisfied.



Figure 100. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in Haiti

IV. Democratic Stability

As we discussed in the introduction of this chapter, both system support and political tolerance are critical for democratic stability. In Figure 101 we examine the extent to which citizens across the Americas hold this combination of attitudes. We find that only in Canada do more than half of citizens have high levels of both system support and tolerance. Moreover, over 40% of citizens have attitudes promoting democratic stability in Guyana, the United States, and Canada. By contrast, only 7.2% of citizens hold such attitudes in Honduras, the country at the bottom in the regional ranking. At 10.7%, Haiti is second only to Honduras in having the fewest citizens with the combination of attitudes conducive to stable democracy.



Figure 101. Stable Democratic Attitudes in the Countries of the Americas

How has the percentage of Haitians with the combination of attitudes that is most compatible with stable democracy evolved over time? In Figure 102 we present the percent of citizens with high levels of both system support and tolerance since 2006. We find that the percentage with stable democratic attitudes dropped precipitously between 2006 and 2008 (from 24% to 14%), and again from 2008 to 2010, bottoming out at only 4%. By 2012, the percentage had rebounded to a level slightly lower than that found in 2008.



Figure 102. Stable Democratic Attitudes over Time in Haiti

At the same point, Figure 102 also presents the percentage of citizens with each of the other combinations of attitudes: high system support and low tolerance (termed "authoritarian stability"), low system support and high tolerance (termed "unstable democracy"), and low system support and low tolerance (termed "democracy at risk"). Two findings jump out. First, in 2012 the percentage of citizens with attitudes that put democracy at risk is nearly four times greater than the percentage of citizens with attitudes promoting stable democracy. Second, the percentage of citizens with attitudes putting democracy at risk has nonetheless dropped dramatically since 2010, from 62% to 41%, and in 2012 is somewhat lower than that found in 2008. Thus, while the situation in 2012 is worrisome, it is still substantially improved from 2010.

What affects the extent to which citizens in Haiti hold attitudes that produce stable democracy? In Figure 103 we examine this question using logistic regression analysis. This figure reveals little about who holds this combination of attitudes. Women and men, darker skinned and lighter skinned Haitians, the wealthy and the poor, and those with higher and lower educational levels are all equally likely to hold this combination of attitudes. The only statistically significant finding from the figure is that those who perceive high levels of corruption are less likely to hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to democracy.[151]



Figure 103. Determinants of Stable Democratic Attitudes in Haiti

To further explore the determinants of support for the political system, in Figure 104 we examine the bivariate relationships between system support and several variables from the regression analysis. In bivariate analysis, we are better able to uncover some important relationships. We find that 20% of Haitians with higher education hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to stable democracy, while only 5% of those with no formal education do so. Perceptions of corruption also matter. Among those who perceive low or no corruption, 16% percent hold stable democratic attitudes, while only 6% of those perceiving very high corruption do so. Perceptions of insecurity, by contrast, have almost no relationship to stable democratic attitudes. Finally, the economy also matters for democratic stability: 18% of those who are most satisfied with their family finances hold stable democratic attitudes, while only 6% of those who are least satisfied do so.

[151] In addition, perception of the personal economic situation is statistically significant at p = .075.



Figure 104. Factors Associated with Stable Democratic Support in Haiti

V. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in Haiti support major political and social institutions? In the AmericasBarometer's 2012 round, we asked about attitudes towards many specific institutions, in addition to the more general questions about support for the political system. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented "not at all," and 7 represented "a lot," we asked citizens to respond to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the Electoral Commission?
B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament?
B18. To what extent do you trust the Police (PNH)?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
B43. To what extent are you proud of being Haitian?
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

In Figure 105 we examine support for each of these items. As it is usual in the AmericasBarometer report, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. We find that at the

time of the survey, President Martelly commanded quite high levels of trust, at 71 points. Several other entities elicit expressions of trust that are above the midpoint of 50 points: the Catholic and evangelical churches, the Police (as previously discussed in Chapter Four), and the media. By contrast, with the exception of the President all the other political institutions and actors elicit low levels of trust: the justice system and the Supreme Court, political parties, Parliament, elections generally, and the Electoral Commission. The Electoral Commission is the least trusted of all the entities named, followed immediately by trust in elections more generally.



Figure 105. Trust in Institutions in Haiti

How do these results compare with those from prior years in Haiti? In Figure 106 we present results since 2006. Trust in some entities has risen over time, while trust in others has fallen. The biggest gain, by far, is for the President; while in 2010 trust in the President registered 30.4, it had more than doubled two years later. Of course, in the meantime there had been an alternation in the officeholder of the Presidency, from President Préval to President Martelly. Other entities with rising popularity include the Police (as discussed in Chapter Four), the Catholic Church, the media, and political parties. Meanwhile, confidence in Parliament and in the Electoral Commission has declined since 2006.



Figure 106. Trust in Institutions by Year in Haiti

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered a requirement for democratic consolidation. In the AmericasBarometer, we measure support for democracy by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill,[152] and a question inspired by the work of Rose and Miller.[153] The "Churchillian" question again uses a 7 point response scale, this time running from 1 ("Strongly disagree") to 7 ("Strongly agree"):

> **ING4.** Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

In Figure 107 we examine the average levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas. We find that support for democracy is, in general, high; in every country of the region average support for democracy is above the midpoint on the 0-100 scale. The countries

[152] Churchill actually referred to democracy as "the worst form of government except for all the others."
[153] Rose, Richard and William Mishler. 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.

most supportive of democracy are Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina, in all of which support for democracy averages over 80 points. In contrast, by far the country where citizens are most ambivalent about democracy is Honduras, where support for democracy averages 53 points on the scale. In Haiti, democratic support reaches 70 points, placing the country in the middle of the regional ranking. This indicates that the average Haitian feels moderately positive towards democracy as a f orm of government.



Figure 107. Support for Democracy in the Countries of the Americas

How has support for democracy evolved in recent years in Haiti? In Figure 108 we examine changes in support for democracy since 2006. As with other aspects of legitimacy such as system support, we find that support for democracy declined between 2006 and 2010, and that it has since recovered. Support for democracy in Haiti is now at the level found in 2006.



Figure 108. Support for Democracy over Time in Haiti

VII. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined a series of components of political legitimacy in Haiti. Levels of legitimacy in Haiti vary a great deal depending on what political phenomena citizens are asked to evaluate, but in general legitimacy has risen since 2010, after declining between 2006 and 2008, and again between 2008 and 2010. This is good news; it indicates that after the food crisis of 2008 and the devastation of the 2010 earthquake, Haitian political institutions and actors are, to some extent at least, recovering.

In 2012, we found that Haitians are highly supportive of democracy in the abstract, and of the President. They also think fairly highly of the Police. They are relatively unsupportive of other political actors and institutions, however. Support for the political system in general is quite low in Haiti, and is the third lowest in the Americas. Haitians also have low opinions of the remaining two branches of government – Parliament and the courts – as well as of political parties, elections, and the Electoral Commission. Finally, Haitians are quite intolerant of the political liberties of regime critics, though they are surprisingly willing to tolerate regime critics' participation in peaceful demonstrations.

We then put these components of legitimacy together. We assessed to what extent Haitians hold a particular combination of attitudes that has been shown to be particularly conducive to stable democracy: high political tolerance and high system support. The not-so-good news from this chapter is that, despite a rebound since 2010, only 10% of Haitians hold the combination of attitudes most propitious for stable democracy. This rate puts Haiti in second place in the region in terms of least democratic stability, behind only Honduras. Meanwhile, 40% of Haitians hold the combination of attitudes most likely to put democracy at risk: low political tolerance, combined with low system support.

Chapter Six: Local Government

With Frederico Batista Pereira

I. Introduction

In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views about local government and their orientations towards democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies across countries and works in different ways in different political systems. In some places citizens only have contact with local authorities and do not have access to levels above that. Some local authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy, while others have more. Moreover, local governance takes place in more democratic ways in some places than in others. Thus, the extent to which local government is efficient and democratic may shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole.

Decentralization has been taking place to varying degrees among developing countries, and is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.[154] This process happened simultaneously as the "third wave" of democratization took place in the hemisphere.[155] Citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced the strengthening of local governments, but also saw the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views. Some authors argue that local politics has generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.[156] Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.[157] Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.[158]

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[154] Rondinelli, Dennis, Nellis, John, and Cheema, Shabbir. 1983. *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience.* World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.

[155] Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

[156] Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2004. Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

[157] Akain, Nobuo & Sakata, Masayo. 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

[158] Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

However, others argue that local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.[159] Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.[160] Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.[161]

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.[162] Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.[163] Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities.[164] Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.[165] Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.[166] So, if decentralization may contribute to minority

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[159] Bardhan, Pranab.2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

[160] Willis, Eliza, Garman, Christopher, and Haggard, Stephen. 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7-56.

[161] Galiani, Sebastian, Gertler, Paul, and Schargrodsky, Ernesto2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andres.

[162] Hiskey, Jonathan, Seligson, Mitchell. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88.

[163] Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

[164] West, Karleen. 2011. The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. Papers from the AmericasBarometer. Vanderbilt University.

[165] Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[166] Hayek, Friedrich. 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519-530.

representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.[167]

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.[168] Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.[169] West uses the 2010 round of the Americas Barometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.[170] In this chapter we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region.

In the next section of this chapter we will examine to what extent citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*. We compare to what extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through such institutional channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 w ith the ones from previous years (2006, 2008, and 2010). We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, focusing especially on the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizens' participation in local politics. Last, we assess the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments, and we focus on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and system support.

Previous works using the AmericasBarometer surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.[171] Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.[172] In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.[173] Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.[174]

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[167] West, *ibid*; p. 4.
[168] West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "'This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. (2009). "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.
[169] Patterson, Amy. 2002. "The Impact of Senegal's Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.
[170] West, *ibid*.
[171] Montalvo, Daniel. 2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).
[172] Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.
[173] Montalvo, Daniel. 2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).
[174] Montalvo, Daniel. 2010. "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

II. Local Level Participation

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Local Meeting Attendance

In Figure 109 we examine the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who say they have attended a local meeting in the past year. The percentage of citizens participating in this way varies a great deal across the Americas. Strikingly, as with other forms of community participation (see Chapter Two), Haitians are exceptionally participatory. With 21.2% of Haitians reporting that they attended a local government meeting in the past year, Haiti has the highest participation rate in the region. Other relatively participatory countries include the United States and the Dominican Republic. Meanwhile, Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Chile are the least participatory countries, with rates near or below 5%.



Figure 109. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? In Figure 110 we examine levels of local participation since 2006. Interestingly, the rate of attending local meetings has been on the rise since 2006, and experienced a dramatic jump between 2010 and 2012.



Figure 110. Municipal Meeting Participation over Time in Haiti

Where is municipal meeting participation most common? In analysis not shown here, we find that levels of meeting participation are very similar in urban and rural areas, though they are slightly (but not significantly) higher in urban areas. At the same time, meeting attendance is highest in the Central region, and lowest in the Northern region.

Demand-Making on Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine not only who attends meetings, but also who makes requests or demands of their local government. In Figure 111 we analyze question NP2 to present the percentage of citizens in the Americas who have made a request or demand of some person or agency in local government in the past year. Once again, it turns out that Haitians have a much higher rate of this form of participation than do the citizens of any other country in the Americas. Nearly 22% of Haitians report that they have made a demand of local government in the past year, while the next most participatory countries, Uruguay, El Salvador, Peru, and the United States, all have rates around 16%. At the other end of the spectrum, the countries where citizens are least likely to make demands of local government are Panama and Ecuador, where only around 6-7% of citizens have done so in the past year.



Figure 111. Demand Making on Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

How has local demand making evolved over time? In Figure 112 we examine the percentage of citizens making demands since 2006. Here, we find a pattern quite similar to that found for local meeting attendance: demand-making of local government has risen dramatically since 2008, and especially since 2010. This jump could be related to the very high expectations that came with President Martelly's election. It also may be related to the role that municipalities played in responding to those displaced by the earthquake.



Figure 112. Demand Making on Local Government over Time in Haiti

As with meeting attendance, we again find that levels of demand making are very similar in urban and rural areas. Demands on local government are slightly higher in the Central and Metropolitan Port-au-Prince regions, but not significantly so.

Finally, the AmericasBarometer also asked whether citizens' demands and requests were satisfied. Note that this question was only asked of those citizens who first said that they had made a demand or request: in the Haitian case, 395 respondents were asked this question. These responses can provide an important window on the quality of services municipalities provide, at least from citizens' perspectives. In Figure 113 we examine responses to question MUNI10 in Haiti. We find that more than three-quarters of citizens say that the local government did not resolve their demand or request. Given the huge amount of need following the 2010 earthquake, it is understandable that municipal governments may have had difficulty meeting the increased demands.

Examining these responses in different areas of the country, we find that Haitians in rural areas are slightly more likely to say that their demands were satisfied, though the differences are not statistically significant. Differences are much greater across regions, however. Residents in the

Northern region are by far the most likely to say their demands were satisfied, at 37.4%, while residents in the Western region outside of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area are by far the least likely to do so, at 13.8%. In the Northern and Southern regions, as well as in Port-au-Prince, between 16 and 22% of citizens say their demands were met.[175]



Figure 113. Resolution of Demands Made on Local Government in Haiti

Who chooses to make demands of local government? In Figure 114 we develop a logistic regression model to examine a number of factors that may affect local demand-making in Haiti. We find no important personal characteristics associated with making demands on local government. We do find, however, that those with better family economic situations are more likely to make demands. The primary finding, however, is that those who attended local meetings are much more likely to make demands of government, while those with lower trust in government are more likely to make demands. Given that three quarters of those who make demands do not find their request satisfied, it may well be that making demands of local government leads many citizens to trust the local government less.

[175] Analysis is not presented here, but is available upon request.



Figure 114. Determinants of Demand Making on Local Government in Haiti

In Figure 115 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand-making on local government and a number of factors assessed in the logistic regression analysis. Here, some relationships pop out that did not appear in the multivariate analysis. Citizens between the ages of 36 and 45 are most likely to make demands of local government, while women make fewer demands of local government than do men. In addition, it now appears that citizens with moderately positive perceptions of their family finances are most likely to make demands.



Figure 115. Factors Associated with Demand Making on Local Government in Haiti

III. Attitudes towards Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question has appeared in a number of previous surveys.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are…? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, across the region the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer featured three new questions that tapped satisfaction with particular services typically delivered by local governments.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dis**satisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]** (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]** (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

Furthermore, especially in Haiti the AmericasBarometer included a number of other questions. Two items dealt with perceptions of municipal expenditures.

MUNI5A. In your opinion, the majority of expenditures in this municipality are spent on? **[Do not read, accept only a single response]** (1) Street cleanliness (2) Roads, football field, or public works (3) Health, education (4) Corruption (5) Salary (6) Nothing (7) Other (88) DK (98) DA
MUNI7. In your opinion, the projects carried out by the municipality benefit or do not benefit people like you and your family? (1) Yes, they benefit (0) No, they do not benefit (88) DK (98) DA

Three other questions specific to Haiti asked citizens about their three highest priorities for local government action.

Please tell me which should be the highest THREE priorities of the local government in improvement of your community.			
	First answer HAIMUNI8A	**Second answer HAIMUNI8B**	**Third answer HAIMUNI8C**
Education	12	12	12
Neighborhood security	2	2	2
Creating jobs	3	3	3
Roads construction	4	4	4
Potable water	5	5	5
Electricity and energy	6	6	6
Health care	7	7	7
Housing	8	8	8
Environmental	9	9	9
Improving local government's responsiveness to citizens' needs	13	13	13
Other priorities	11	11	11
DK	88	88	88
DR	98	98	98
N/A	99	99	99

Four other questions specific to Haiti asked about how responsibilities should be divided between local and national governments and community groups.

In your opinion, who should have the greatest responsibility for solving the following problems in your community?	**The mayor**	**Your deputy or senator**	**The national government**	**Community groups**	**DK**	**DR**
RCP1. Repairing the roads	1	2	3	4	88	98
RCP2. Controlling crime	1	2	3	4	88	98
RCP3A. Improving Education	1	2	3	4	88	98
RCP4. Solving local disputes	1	2	3	4	88	98

Finally, two other questions measure trust. These two items ask citizens to respond to the following questions using a 7-point scale, where 1 means "not at all" and 7 means "a lot."

B32. To what extent do you trust the municipal government?
HAIB32A. To what extent do you trust the CASEK?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Figure 116 we examine citizens' average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been recoded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. Satisfaction with local services is clustered fairly close to the midpoint in almost all countries of the Americas, suggesting that this is an item on which most citizens in most countries are fairly close to neutral. Responses are most positive in Canada and Argentina, both of which have values close to 59 points on the 0-100 scale. In 23 of the remaining 24 countries in

the Americas, responses are clustered between 42 and 56 points on the scale. The exception is Haiti, which receives a score of 37.6, making Haiti by far the country with the lowest evaluation of local services.



Figure 116. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 117 we further explore the extent to which citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied with local government in Haiti, taking a more in-depth look at responses to the same question. When we examine responses in greater detail, it becomes clear that nearly half of Haitians (45%) are neutral towards the services of their local governments. However, 47% rate local services as bad or very bad and only 8% rate them as good or very good. Thus, the proportion that is unhappy with these services is about six times the size of the proportion that is happy with them.



Figure 117. Evaluation of Local Government Services in Haiti

How has satisfaction with local government services evolved in recent years? In Figure 118 we examine trends in satisfaction since 2006. We find that after a rise between 2006 and 2008, and a small drop between 2008 and 2010, satisfaction with these services has remained essentially unchanged since 2010.



Figure 118. Evaluation of Local Services over Time in Haiti

As before, we find that evaluations of local services are similar across urban and rural areas. However, they are relatively high in the Northern region, at 43.6, and lowest in the Southern region, at 33.8.

Citizens may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction with the state of the roads and schools and the provision of health care across the Americas.[176] To begin, in Figure 119 we examine satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2. As always, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. As with the local services question, this is an item on which most citizens in most countries in the Americas are relatively neutral; almost all countries have mean responses that cluster between 40 and 60 points on the scale. At the top end, Ecuador (61 points) and Panama (59 points) are the countries where citizens are most satisfied. At the bottom end, Jamaica (35 points) and Trinidad and Tobago (40 points) are the countries where they are least satisfied. With a score of 43 points, Haiti is fourth from the bottom in terms of citizens' satisfaction with the state of roads and highways. Further analysis indicates that satisfaction with roads is by far the highest in the Central region, while it is at relatively similar levels in the rest of the country.

[176] We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.



Figure 119. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 120 we turn to satisfaction with public schools, based on question SD3NEW2. Here, citizens are slightly more positive. The countries where citizens are most satisfied with the quality of public schools are Costa Rica (64 points), Ecuador (62 points), Nicaragua (62 points), and Panama (61 points). At 45 points, Haiti turns out to be second from the bottom in terms of citizen satisfaction with schools, after Chile (43 points), and nearly tied with Brazil. Satisfaction with schools is relatively high, and above the scale midpoint, in the Northern (55 points), and Central (50.4 points) regions; by contrast, it hovers between 39 and 43 points in the rest of the country.



Figure 120. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas

Finally, in Figure 121 we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2. Here, citizens are, in general, somewhat less satisfied. At the top end, average responses in Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador, and Nicaragua cluster around 56-57 points on the scale. At the bottom end, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Haiti, and Chile have average responses clustered around 33-37 points on the scale. Thus, Haiti is the third from the bottom in the Americas in terms of citizen satisfaction with public health services. Satisfaction with public health services is by far the highest in the Northern region, at 52 points. By contrast, it hovers between 31 and 38 points in all the other regions of the country.



Figure 121. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas

Perceptions of Municipal Expenditures

What do Haitians think of how their local governments spend their money? We now turn to analyzing responses to two questions asked specifically in Haiti in 2010 and 2012. First, in Figure 122 we assess what Haitians think are the largest items in the municipal budget. Responses are fairly similar in 2010 and 2012. In 2012, about 14% are not sure how to answer, while about a quarter say "nothing," and 10% say "corruption." About 48% name a category of expenditure that constitutes an actual policy area. The greatest share say "street cleanliness," followed by roads, football fields, health, and education.



Figure 122. Perceptions of the Largest Municipal Expenditure, Haiti, 2012

Do citizens believe they and their families benefit from municipal expenditures? In Figure 123 we assess Haitians' perceptions on this issue. In both 2010 and 2012, about 41% of citizens respond that they do benefit. However, in 2012 many fewer citizens are unsure, and more citizens say "no." Thus, in 2012 Haitians are on balance negative. That is, the share of citizens who say that they do *not* benefit is greater than the share of citizens who say that they *do* benefit.



Figure 123. Belief that the Municipality Benefits You and Your Family, Haiti, 2012

Priorities for Local Government

What do Haitians think their local governments *should* be doing? We now turn to responses on a series of questions assessing priorities for local government. First, in Figure 125 we examine responses regarding citizens' number one priorities for the local governments. By far the greatest share of citizens says their local governments should prioritize schools, and the second most commonly chosen item is jobs. Other major priorities mentioned include roads, neighborhood security, and water.



Figure 124. First Priority for Municipal Services, Haiti, 2012

In Figure 125 we present another perspective on citizens' priorities for local government. Here, we present the percentage of Haitians mentioning each item as their first, second, or third priority. Taking this approach, it becomes clear that job creation is actually Haitians' overriding preoccupation; 57% of citizens mention this area as one of their three top priorities. Schools, health care, and roads are other important areas that large shares of citizens mention.



Figure 125. Top Priorities for Local Government, Haiti, 2012

Preferred Jurisdiction for Services

In the AmericasBarometer 2012, we also asked Haitians whom they thought should have responsibility for, or jurisdiction over, a series of services and policy areas. In Figure 126 we examine responses to these four questions. We find that citizens distinguish between services that entities should be responsible for. While most Haitians believe local governments should be responsible for repairing roads, they generally believe that national government should be responsible for crime and education, and that community organizations should be responsible for solving local disputes.



Figure 126. Entity that Should Have Responsibility for Local Issues, Haiti, 2012

Trust in Local Government

In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked citizens throughout the Americas not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted that government. This question may tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 127 we present average levels of trust in local government across the Americas. With a score of 35.3 on the 0-

100 scale, Haiti is by far the country where citizens trust local government the least in the Americas. At the other end of the spectrum, the countries where citizens have the highest trust in government are El Salvador, Chile, and Venezuela.



Figure 127. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

As in previous analyses, we find that trust in local government is similar in urban and rural areas. However, it is relatively quite high in the Northern region, at 48.3, and lowest in the Western region outside of Port-au-Prince, at 30.2 points.

Since 2006, in Haiti we have also asked citizens about the extent to which they trust their CASEK, or communal sections. These are the smallest administrative units of the Haitian government, and should be the most direct links between the state and citizens. We find very low levels of trust in the CASEK, levels below even trust in local government (see Figure 128). After rising to a high of 37 points in 2008, trust in the CASEK has fallen gradually, to 31 points in 2012. Thus, it is clear that Haitians in general do *not* trust their local governments.



Figure 128. Trust in the CASEK in Haiti

IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support

As we argued in the introduction of this chapter, many citizens have little contact with any level of government except for local government. As a result, perceptions of local government may have an important impact on attitudes towards the political system more generally. In Figure 129 we develop a linear regression model to examine whether satisfaction with local services is associated with support for the political system in Haiti, while controlling for many other factors that may affect system support. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for evaluation of local services is seen in the bottom row of the figure. What this means is that Haitians who think more highly of their local services tend to have higher levels of support for the entire political system in their country. In other words, local services matter, not only in themselves but also because they affect how citizens feel about politics in their country more generally.



Figure 129. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant of System Support in Haiti

In Figure 130 we present the bivariate relationship between satisfaction with local services and support for the political system. Here again we see a strong positive relationship between evaluation of local services and system support in Haiti. For those who rate local services as "very bad," the average level of system support in 2012 is only about 38 points on the 0-100 scale. For those who rate local services as "good" or "very good," by contrast, the average level of system support is 49.8 on the scale. The conclusion, once again, is that local services affect citizens' feelings about national politics more generally.



Figure 130. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in Haiti

V. Conclusion

In this chapter we examined how citizens interact with and feel about their local governments. Our findings are mixed. On the one hand, Haitians have very high rates of contact with their local governments, rates that are the highest in the Americas. This is true both for attending public meetings and for making demands of local government. Moreover, the amount of contact has increased a great deal since the first wave of the AmericasBarometer in Haiti in 2006.

On the other hand, though, Haitians are not very satisfied with their local governments. Of those who have made demands of their local governments, more than three quarters say their requests were not met. There is some evidence that those who have made a demand of local government have lower trust in that sphere of government, perhaps because their demands were, on average, not satisfied. Moreover, Haitian citizens in general (whether or not they have made demands of local government) give local government low ratings, regardless of which measure one uses: satisfaction with local services, trust in local government, or trust in the CASEK. Indeed, Haiti rates last in the Americas on satisfaction with and trust in local government. The proportion of Haitians who are *dis*satisfied with local government is six times the share who are satisfied.

Turning to more specific public opinion items, we find that most Haitians do not have a clear idea of what their local governments are spending money on, but that on balance they tend to think that they do not benefit from those expenditures. When asked what they would *like* local government to do, Haitians emphasize jobs and education. Finally, when asked which level of government should handle a variety of issues, Haitians tend to think that local government should handle building roads, while crime and education should be the primary responsibility of national government, and community groups should have responsibility for solving local disputes.

Finally, in the last section of the chapter we find evidence that attitudes towards local government matter not only in their own right, but also because they affect attitudes towards the political system more generally. That is, those who rate local services as “very bad” have levels of system support that are 12 points lower than those who rate local services as “good” or “very good.”

Part III:
Beyond Equality of Opportunity

Chapter Seven: Service Delivery and Rebuilding

I. Introduction

In January 2010, shortly before the AmericasBarometer survey was set to go into the field in Haiti, the country experienced a devastating 7.0 magnitude earthquake. With an estimated three million people affected, including 316,000 casualties and over a million people homeless, the earthquake's human toll was heartrending.[177] At the same time, the earthquake shattered an infrastructure that was already insufficient before the quake. The earthquake also exacerbated food shortages that had long been a concern in Haiti, shortages which had previously led to the 2008 food crisis.

In the 2010 AmericasBarometer report on Haiti, LAPOP described the state of public services, the economy, and food security in the country in the months immediately following the quake.[178] That report outlined the many challenges facing Haiti, including an extraordinarily high rate of unemployment, staggering inequality in access to basic services, and very low levels of life satisfaction. In this chapter, we return to examine conditions two years following the earthquake. We seek to understand how citizens evaluate progress in rebuilding as well as the basic services they receive; how the country has progressed in providing electricity and water to the population; and to what extent food security remains a concern for all Haitians.

Even before the January 2010 quake, public services, infrastructure, and agriculture were in grave states. The road network, the electricity production and distribution facilities, sewage and potable water were all showing major challenges. For example, a 2005 report produced for the Haitian Public Works Ministry had shown that the publicly managed electricity network lost between 46 and 56% of its production annually, compared to an average of 6.5% for OECD countries.[179] Partly as a result of this inefficiency, the report indicated that no more than 12.5% of Haitian households had access to electricity in 2005.

Agriculture had also long been severely underfunded in the country.[180] Despite the fact that over half of the nation's workforce is in the agricultural sector, low technological capacity and limited investment by national governments has led to very low productivity.[181] In recent years, the country

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[177] "Haiti raises quake death toll on anniversary." *CBC News,* January 12, 2011; Margesson, Rhoda and Maureen Taft-Morales. "Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response." Congressional Research Service, February 2, 2010.

[178] Zéphyr, Dominique and Abby Córdova. 2010. *Haiti in Distress: The Impact of the 2010 Earthquake on Citizen Lives and Perceptions*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project.

[179] Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications, Bureau des Mines et de l'Énergie et Électricité d'Haïti. 2005. *Les enjeux et défis de la lutte contre la pauvreté. Stratégie de développement du sous-secteur de l'électricité en Haïti (2006 à 2001)*.

[180] Shamsie, Yasmine. 2012."Haiti's Post-Earthquake Transformation: What of Agriculture and Rural Development?" *Latin American Politics and Society* 54, no. 2 : 133-152.

[181] Dugan, Ianthe Jeanne. 2010. "Quake Has Haiti Relying on Agricultural Roots." *Wall Street Journal*. February 23, 2010. < http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703494404575081744058479892.html>; Klarreich, Kathie. 2008."Food Crisis Renews Haiti's Agony." *Time*, April 9. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1729150,00.html>.

has imported the majority of its food. In the context of the worldwide food crisis involving dramatically escalating food prices across the globe, these longstanding problems came to a head in 2008. Riots across the country culminated in five deaths, an attempted invasion of the National Palace, and the Prime Minister's removal from office.[182] After the 2008 food crisis, national investment in agriculture rebounded, with increasing attention from both the national government and international donors.[183] In the aftermath of the 2010 quake, however, the country experienced renewed food shortages, shortages that were exacerbated by many Haitians' displacement from urban to rural areas.[184] While food aid from international donors provided much needed assistance, observers also pointed out that in the long run food aid might hamper investment in Haitians' own agricultural production capabilities.[185]

Yet another measure of Haiti's weak public service provision capacity has been the presence of numerous non-governmental organizations on the territory, to a point that is has been labeled a "Republic of NGOS" by some.[186] International institutions and foreign governments have likewise taken on an extremely important role. In many areas, NGOs have literally replaced the government in the role they play.

Although the limited capacity of the Haitian State was already an issue in Haiti before the earthquake, the natural disaster that hit the island on January 12, 2010 contributed to worsen the challenges that were already present. On that day, the already limited Haitian State capacity almost completely vanished. Two years have passed since the earthquake. In that period, some reconstruction efforts have materialized, although many commentators still report that very little has been accomplished.

In this chapter we begin by exploring the level of earthquake damage citizens report, as well as the level of damage in their municipalities. We then examine citizens' evaluations of the performance of national, local, and foreign governments and NGOs in rebuilding. We next proceed to assess service delivery in a range of more specific areas: water, electricity, sewage, and food security. Finally, we take a look at what Haitians say they would *like* national government to be doing.

II. Background: Damage from the 2010 Earthquake

We are interested in exploring perceptions of rebuilding, and how the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake affects the services available to citizens. In order to assess this, however, we first need to know the extent of earthquake damage citizens experienced. In 2010 and 2012, the

[182] BBC News, "Food Riots Turn Deadly in Haiti." 5 April 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7331921.stm; Gauthier, Amélie. "Food crisis in Haiti: exposing key problems in the process of stabilization." *FRIDE Comment*: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, April 2008.
[183] Shamsie, *Ibid*.
[184] Dugan, *Ibid*;
[185] Todd, Tony. 2010."Food aid is wrecking Haiti's agriculture sector, says Oxfam." *France 24,* July 10, 2010. < http://www.france24.com/en/20101006-us-food-aid-wrecking-haiti-agriculture-sector-oxfam-report>
[186] United States Institute for Peace. 2010. *Peacebrief*, April 26

AmericasBarometer included a question to measure how citizens perceived the earthquake damage to their homes.

AIDP2. And now, speaking of that residence where you lived on the day when the earthquake struck, how much damage did that place suffer from the earthquake? **[Read options]**
(1) None (2) It was damaged but repairable
(3) It was damaged but is not repairable (4) It was completely destroyed (88) DK (98)DA

In Figure 131 we present the extent of earthquake damage in citizens' homes, according to the Haitians interviewed in 2012. Half of respondents (59%) said that their homes were undamaged, and another 21% said that their homes were damaged but reparable. However, 9% said that their homes were irreparable, and 11% said that their homes were destroyed.



Figure 131. Extent of Earthquake Damage to Respondents' Homes, Haiti 2012

In the analysis that follows, we will average these responses within each municipality to create a measure of the extent of earthquake damage in each local area. Before we do this, though, we examine the extent to which citizens have moved away from the municipalities in which they lived when the earthquake struck, based on the following question.

HAIMIG1. How long have you been living in this municipality?
0. Less than 1 year
_____ Years (88) DK (98) DA

Based on this question, we find that only 4% of the sample has been living in the municipality for two or fewer years; in other words, almost all Haitians are living in the same municipality where

they lived when the earthquake struck. Thus, we average together all responses in each municipality regarding the extent of earthquake damage to homes. We then group municipalities by the level of damage: none, low, moderate, and severe.

In Figure 132 we present the percentage of Haitians living in municipalities with none, low, moderate, or severe damage, based on citizens' reports of the conditions of their homes. We find that 17% are living in municipalities where no one reports any damage, and 37% are living in municipalities where citizens report only low levels of damage. However, 47% are living in municipalities where citizens report either moderate or severe damage.



Figure 132. Extent of Earthquake Damage in Municipality, Haiti 2012

III. Evaluation of Performance in Rebuilding

How is the process of rebuilding going in Haiti? In 2012, the AmericasBarometer in Haiti included a series of questions regarding the performance of a variety of actors in rebuilding.

In the last year, for each person or organization, please tell me whether the performance was very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad
HAIPERF1. National Government. How would you evaluate its performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA
HAIPERF2. Foreign governments. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA
HAIPERF3. Local governments. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA
HAIPERF4A. Local churches. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA
HAIPERF4B. Local NGOs. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA
HAIPERF5. Foreign NGOs. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA

As with most LAPOP variables, we convert responses to each question to a 0-100 scale, where 0 represents "very bad" and 100 represents "Very good." In Figure 133 we present Haitians' average evaluation of the performance of each of the named entities. We find that citizens are most positive about the performance of foreign NGOs and governments, as well as local churches. Scores for each of these are above the midpoint on the 0-100 scale. By contrast, Haitians are relatively dissatisfied with the performance of local NGOs and governments, and of the national government.



Figure 133. Evaluation of Performance in Rebuilding, Haiti 2012

What affects how citizens evaluate the national government's performance in rebuilding? In Figure 134 we examine who rates the national government's performance more or less highly.[187] We find that those with higher levels of education and household wealth, as well as those in larger cities, evaluate the national government's performance more highly. We also find that those who say they identify with the ruling Repons Peyizan party are more positive about the national government's performance, quite possibly because they excuse the current government for any problems prior to Martelly. Last, it turns out that citizens who live in municipalities where there was more earthquake damage think the government is doing more poorly.[188]

[187] The analysis uses a multilevel model with earthquake damage in the municipality at the second level.
[188] The coefficient for earthquake damage in the municipality is marginally statistically significant at p = .053.



Figure 134. Determinants of Evaluations of the National Government's Performance in Restoration, Haiti 2012

IV. Service Delivery

We now turn to more specific forms of service delivery in Haiti. First, we examine how citizens rate a series of important services. In 2010 and 2012, we asked citizens to rate services in six areas, using the following battery of questions.

Now let's talk about some services in Haiti. In general, how would you rate the quality of each of the following services in Haiti? Very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?								
	Very good	**Good**	**Neither good nor bad**	**Bad**	**Very bad**	**DK**	**DA**	
HAIACS1. Transportation system. Would you say that the service is… **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
HAIACS2. Education system. Would you say that the service is… **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
HAIACS3. Primary Health Care. Would you say that the service is... **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
HAIACS4. Electricity. Would you say that the service is... **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	

Now let's talk about some services in Haiti. In general, how would you rate the quality of each of the following services in Haiti? Very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?								
	Very good	**Good**	**Neither good nor bad**	**Bad**	**Very bad**	**DK**	**DA**	
HAIACS5. Drinkable water. Would you say that the service is... **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
HAIACS6. Trash disposal. Would you say that the service is... **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	

In Figure 135 we examine average responses to these six questions. As always, we have converted responses to a scale running from 0 to 100, where a value of 0 represents "very bad," 25 represents "bad," 50 represents "neither good nor bad," 75 represents "good," and 100 represents "very good." As the figure shows, ratings on all six services are between 28 and 45 in 2012, meaning that the average Haitian evaluates these services as somewhere between "bad" and "neither good nor bad." Perceptions of the quality of transportation increased between 2010 and 2012 (the difference is not quite statistically significant, but close), while mean evaluations of education and electricity remained constant across the two years. On the other hand, evaluations of trash, health care, and water services *decreased* from 2010 to 2012. In the case of health care, the decline is quite large.



Figure 135. Evaluations of Services, Haiti 2012

What explains these low ratings, as well as the declines in the ratings of services? How do the ratings relate to citizens experiences? In the sections that follow, we examine in greater depth citizens' experiences in a series of service areas.

Water Service

In 2010 and 2012, we examined access to water using two questions.

PS1. Where does the water used in this house come from? **[Read options]** (1) In house plumbing **[Continue]** (2) Outdoor plumbing but part of the property **[Continue]** (3) Neighbor's plumbing **[Continue]** (4) Public sink or faucet **[Continue]** (5) Well on the property **[Go to PS3]** (6) Well in the neighborhood **[Go to PS3]** (7) Truck, wagon or tanker **[Go to PS3]** (8**)** Water bucket **[Go to PS3]** (9) Rain **[Go to PS3]** (10) Spring, river or stream **[Go to PS3]** (11) Other **[Go to PS3** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to PS3]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to PS3]**
PS2. How often does this household receive water? **[Read options]** (1) Every day (2) Every two days (3) Every three days (4) Once a week (5) Once every two weeks or less (88) Doesn't know (98) DA (99) N/A

In Figure 136 we examine the distribution of household water sources in 2010 and 2012. As we can see, there were few important changes in Haitians' sources for water in this two year period. About 40% in both years receive their water through some form of plumbing. In both years the single most important water source is springs and rivers, which is the primary water source of about a quarter of Haitians.



Figure 136. Household Water Sources, Haiti 2010 and 2012

We can take a closer look at water services with a question about how often the respondent's household receives water. As described above, we also asked just those *individuals with plumbing* how frequently they received water. In Figure 137, we see that the percentage of Haitians with plumbing who receive water "every day" has decreased from 2010 and 2012, from 47.2 percent of those with plumbing reporting receiving water "every day" to 35.4 percent in 2012.



Figure 137. Access to Water on a Daily Basis (Among those with Plumbing), Haiti 2010 and 2012

Who has access to water on a daily basis? In Figure 138 we examine this question. It is important to remember that this figure is based only on those Haitians who have access to some form of plumbing; citizens with plumbing are likely to be different from those without plumbing in a number of important ways. Nonetheless, we are interested in what factors affect whether respondents with plumbing have daily access to water. Interestingly, access to daily water is higher for those living in IDP camps than for those outside of camps. Access to daily water is also higher in medium and large cities other than Port-au-Prince. Also, interestingly, we find that those in the two highest wealth quintiles actually have lower rates of access to daily water than do other Haitians. This is probably due to the fact that most wealthy neighborhoods are located in areas where the public aqueduct does not operate. In those areas, water has to be delivered by truck, a service that is not always reliable.



Figure 138. Characteristics Associated with Access to Water on a Daily Basis, Haiti 2012

Electricity

The 2010 and 2012 AmericasBarometer in Haiti also asked a pair of questions about access to electricity.

PS3. Is this house/apartment connected to the public electric power supply? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Don't Know (98) DA
PS4. Approximately how many hours per day have you been supplied with electricity within the 6 past months?_____ (88) Doesn't know (98) DA (99) N/A

Here, we find more positive outcomes of reconstruction. Figure 139 shows the percentage of individuals who report that their house or apartment is connected to public electricity in 2010 and 2012. As the figure shows, this number increased substantially across the two years, from 46.8 to 60.1%, a difference that is large and statistically significant.



Figure 139. Percent Connected to Public Electricity, Haiti 2010 and 2012

In Figure 140, we examine the number of hours a day that citizens report receiving electricity. Here again we see substantial improvement. In 2012, 52% of Haitians report that they receive four or more hours per day of electricity, whereas in 2010 only 38% did so. Still, the proportion of citizens receiving 17 or more hours per day of electricity remains extremely small, at just 3% of respondents. In 2012, the average Haitian receives 4.8 hours per day of electricity, which is up from 3.2 in 2010.



Figure 140. Hours per Day of Electricity, Haiti 2010 and 2012

Who has access to public electricity? In Figure 141, we examine a few personal characteristics that may be associated with having electric connections. Again, as with water, we find that citizens in IDP camps are actually substantially more likely to report having access to electricity than are others. Nearly all citizens in the capital (more than 9 out of 10) have electric connections, while citizens living in rural areas and small cities have very low rates of access. Finally, household wealth matters to some extent; those in the bottom and second quintile of wealth have much lower rates of access than do their fellow citizens.



Figure 141. Characteristics Associated with Connections to Electricity, Haiti 2010 and 2012

Plumbing and Sewage

In the final set of questions in the AmericasBarometer, the following questions were asked across the entire region, enabling us to assess levels of access to plumbing and sewage.

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No	(1) Yes
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes

In Figure 42, we examine the percent of Haitians with access to indoor plumbing and indoor bathrooms, from 2006 to 2012. We find that the percentage with access to each of these declined steadily from about 30% in 2006 to under 10% in 2010. Since 2010, the percentage with access to each has rebounded slightly, to over 10% in 2012. Nonetheless, access to plumbing and sewage remains limited in Haiti.



Figure 142. Percent with Indoor Plumbing and Bathrooms, Haiti 2006-2012

Food Insecurity

As described in Chapter 1 (see page 12), the AmericasBarometer included a pair of questions regarding food security all across the Americas in 2012. While these questions (FS2 and FS8) were not repeated from 2010, in 2010 a different question on food insecurity was asked just in Haiti.

FOOD0. During the past three months, was there any day when you or any other adult in your home didn't eat for a whole day because there wasn't enough food?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

It is risky to compare FS2 and FS8, the two food security questions asked in 2012, with FOOD0, the food security question from 2010. Any differences in rates of response may well be due to differences in question wording, rather than to real changes in levels of food insecurity. In 2010, respondents were asked about whether they had gone an *entire day without food*, whereas in 2012 they were asked if they had eaten *only one meal per day*. Obviously, the standard used in 2010 reflects a higher degree of food insecurity than the standard used in 2012. Thus, even in the absence of any real change we should expect fewer respondents to answer in the affirmative on the question used in 2010.

In Figure 143, we examine the percentage of respondents reporting food insecurity in 2010 and 2012. In 2010, over a quarter said that they or another adult in their household had gone without food for an entire day at least once in the past three months. In 2012, 36% said that they or someone else had eaten only one meal a day at least once in the past three months, and 42% said they their household had run out of food at least once in the past three months. Again, it is nearly impossible to know whether food insecurity has increased or decreased between 2010 and 2012 based on these questions, given that they measure somewhat different levels of food insecurity. Nonetheless, it is clear that food insecurity has *not* gone away in Haiti, and remains quite high.



Figure 143. Food Insecurity, Haiti 2010 and 2012

Which Haitians are most likely to experience food insecurity? In Figure 144 we consider this question, using the measure of eating only once a day from 2012. We find that citizens living in IDP camps are more likely to face problems related to food security than are those elsewhere. In addition, those in small and large cities outside the capital experience higher levels of food insecurity. Finally, wealth is strongly related to food insecurity. In the bottom quintile of wealth, more than half of citizens have experienced insecurity, while in the top quintile, only 20% have done so. Still, it is

perhaps striking that even a fairly high level of wealth is not a complete antidote against food insecurity in the Haitian context.



Figure 144. Characteristics Associated with Food Insecurity, Haiti 2012

V. Priorities for National Service Delivery

The 2012 AmericasBarometer survey in Haiti not only asked citizens about their opinions and experiences related to public services; it also asked citizens' to describe their priorities for national government in improving their community. This battery of questions is very similar to the battery described in the previous chapter regarding priorities for the local government.

Please tell me which should be the highest THREE priorities of the national government in improvement of your community.			
	First answer HAICOMM1	**Second answer HAICOMM2**	**Third answer HAICOMM3**
Building Schools	12	12	12
Neighborhood security	2	2	2
Creating jobs	3	3	3
Roads construction	4	4	4
Potable water	5	5	5
Electricity and energy	6	6	6
Access to health care	7	7	7
Housing	8	8	8
Environmental	9	9	9
Improving local government's responsiveness to citizens' needs	13	13	13
Other priorities	11	11	11
DK	88	88	88
DR	98	98	98
N/A	99	99	99

In Figure 145 we present responses to the first of these questions, regarding the number one priority for the national government. As the figure shows, individuals on average give greatest priority to schools, followed by jobs. In fact, responses here are very similar to those given to the questions on priorities for local government, suggesting that citizens do not really distinguish between local and national government in this regard.



Figure 145. First Priority for National Government, Haiti 2012

In Figure 146 we present responses to all three questions, examining which issues citizens say are any one of their top three priorities. Taking this perspective, the order of priorities changes slightly. Now, jobs are citizens' most frequently mentioned priority, followed by schools, roads, and health care. Again, these priorities are very similar to those reported for local government. This suggests that these issues represent citizens' overriding concerns, but that they do not much distinguish between levels of government in addressing those concerns.



Figure 146. Priorities for National Government, Haiti 2012

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined service delivery and rebuilding in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. First we considered citizens' evaluations of a number of actors' performance in rebuilding. We found that citizens evaluated the performance of international organizations and governments as well as local churches more positively than they evaluated the performance of local and national governments and local organizations.

We then examined evaluations of six forms of service delivery. We found that all services were rated somewhere between "bad" and "neither good nor bad," on average. While ratings of transportation had risen since 2010, evaluations of trash, water, and health care had actually declined since 2010.

Exploring specific services in greater depth, we found some good news and some not so good news. Water service has actually become more sporadic since 2010; while 47% of those with plumbing had daily access to water in 2010, in 2012 only 35% did so. Access to electricity, by contrast, has improved dramatically since 2010. While 47% were connected to public electricity in 2010, 60% were connected in 2010. In 2012, the average Haitian reports receiving 4.8 hours per day of electricity, up from 3.2 in 2010. Access to plumbing and sewage has also improved since 2010, though the increase is only slight, and access remains quite limited, at just over 10% of respondents. Last, because of changes in question wording it is not clear whether food insecurity has increased or decreased in Haiti since 2010. However, it *is* clear that food insecurity remains high; by some measures, over 40% of Haitians in 2012 reported being food insecure.

Which Haitians receive better or worse services? We found that residents of IDP camps are actually *more* likely to have access to water on a daily basis, and to have connections to electricity, but they are also more likely to experience food insecurity. Residents of medium and large cities other than Port-au-Prince have greatest access to daily water service, while those in Port-au-Prince and in small cities have quite limited access. By contrast, residents of the capital have high levels of access to electricity; more than 9 in 10 people living Port-au-Prince told us that they are connected to public electricity, as opposed to only 4 in 10 in rural areas. Food insecurity is highest in small and large cities outside of Port-au-Prince, but is relatively uniformly distributed across the country.

Interestingly, we also find that household wealth does not guarantee access to services. It turns out that the *poorest* households actually have best access to water. Households in the bottom 20% of the wealth distribution have lower levels of access to electricity, but outside the bottom quintile, the relationship between wealth and electric connections is not very strong. Food insecurity is strongly related to wealth, meaning that those in the bottom quintile of wealth experience much more food insecurity than do those in the top quintile. Still, even in the wealthiest quintile of households, 22% report food insecurity, at least on one measure.

Last, we examined what Haitians identified as their priorities for government services. Here, we find that Haitians are most concerned about having their governments improve schools and jobs.

Chapter Eight: Legitimacy and Life Satisfaction in the Aftermath of the 2010 Earthquake

I. Introduction

The earthquake of 2010 led to massive loss of life as well as the devastation of resources and infrastructure, effects that we in part considered in the previous chapter. Here, we investigate the earthquake's effects in the political sphere. We ask a series of questions. How have the earthquake and its aftermath, as well as the country's high levels of food insecurity, affected the legitimacy of the political system? How have they shaped citizens' adherence to democratic principles? Have they led to higher levels of protest?

Before we consider these political attitudes, however, we begin with a more personal one: life satisfaction, or happiness. This disposition is important in a couple of ways. First, it is a telling indicator of well-being in a country; many now advocate for happiness as a more important indicator of citizens' welfare than more traditional indicators such as gross domestic product.[189] Bhutan, for instance, is famous for adopting "Gross National Happiness" as its goal. Second, life satisfaction may be a component of a "syndrome" of attitudes that is associated with stable democracy.[190] Previous research by LAPOP has found life satisfaction to be quite low in Haiti.[191] This is likely to be in large part a result of Haiti's low levels of economic development and high inequality. Indeed, LAPOP research shows that countries' levels of economic development have a very strong relationship to their citizens' levels of happiness, a finding that may largely explain Haiti's low registered levels.[192] Here, we also investigate the role that the earthquake, life in IDP camps, and the food crisis have played in shaping Haitians' life satisfaction.

At the same time, these humanitarian crises may also have affected citizens' attitudes towards the political system generally. Could citizens blame the political system, or even the entire democratic regime, for the hardships experienced under the watch of democratic governments? While it is plausible that citizens might blame democracy, some prior research gives us hope that citizens may

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[189] Graham, Carol. 2010."The Economics of Happiness." *Washington Post* (January 3, 2010); Graham, Carol. 2009. *Happiness Around the World: The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires*. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

[190] Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. "The Renaissance of Political Culture." *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 : 1203-1230.

[191] Corral, Margarita. 2011 "The Economics of Happiness in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 58, Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).; Zéphyr, Dominique and Abby Córdova. 2010. *Haiti in Distress: The Impact of the 2010 Earthquake on Citizen Lives and Perceptions*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project.

[192] Corral,*ibid*. For further information on the debate over the relationship between economic development and life satisfaction, see Clark, Andrew E, Paul Frijters, and Michael Shields. 2008. "Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles." *Journal of Economic Literature* 46: 95-144; Easterlin, Richard. 1995. "Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?" *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 27: 35-47; Graham, Carol, and Andrew Felton. 2006. "Inequality and Happiness: Insights from Latin America." *Journal of Economic Inequality* (4): 107-122; Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers. 2008. "Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Spring): 1-87.

distinguish between democracy in the abstract and the democratic governments under which they face hard times. Researchers have found that during recent economic crises, Latin American citizens' attitudes towards the democratic system have been remarkably robust.[193] Indeed, an important conclusion from the 2010 round of AmericasBarometer surveys was that the economic crisis had little impact on democratic attitudes throughout the region.[194]

The 2010 earthquake, its aftermath, and food insecurity may have had stronger effects on support for the current political system and on political protest. While citizens may recognize that democracy as an abstract ideal is not to blame for their hardships, they may be less likely to exculpate the government and political system under whose watch the hardships occurred, and which were responsible for responding to those problems. Indeed, the 2008 food crisis in Haiti was associated with widespread protests. More generally, scholars have found that governance problems such as corruption and economic crisis can lower the legitimacy of the political system.[195] Given the strong connection between system support and political protest, these public hardships and associated perceptions of failure of the public sector may also lead citizens to take to the streets.[196]

Exposure to hardship related to the earthquake and food insecurity may also have led some Haitians to embrace populist notions that infringe on the civil liberties of their fellow citizens. Seligson explains that populism includes "a core belief that the institutions of classical liberal democracy, especially legislatures and courts, are anachronistic, inefficient, and inconsistent with the true expression of 'the people's will'….In practice, populism often can mean running roughshod over fundamental democratic guarantees of civil liberties, especially free expression and the right to due process."[197] In times when citizens feel high levels of threat from events beyond their control, they

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[193] Carlin, Ryan E. 2006. "The Socioeconomic Roots of Support for Democracy and the Quality of Democracy in Latin America." *Revista De Ciencia Política* 26 : 48–66; Evans, Geoffrey, and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies." *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4 : 485–514; Graham, Carol, and Sandip Sukhtankar. 2004. "Does Economic Crisis Reduce Support for Markets and Democracy in Latin America? Some Evidence from Surveys of Public Opinion and Well Being." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 36, no. 2: 349–377.

[194] Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University; but see Córdova, Abby B., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. "Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 42, no. 4 : 673-678.

[195] Canache, Damarys, and Michael E Allison. 2005. "Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies." Latin American Politics and Society 47, no. 3 (September 1): 91-111; Graham and Sukhtankar, *Ibid*; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2: 408-433; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction With Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 3: 285-308.

[196] Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Muller, Edward N., Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1982. "Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 2 (1982): 240-264; Smith, Amy Erica. 2009. "Legitimate Grievances: Preferences for Democracy, System Support, and Political Participation in Bolivia." *Latin American Research Review* 44, no. 3: 102-126.

[197] Seligson, Mitchell A. 2007. "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America." *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3: 81-95; see also Schamis, Hector E. 2006. "Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions." *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 4: 20-34; Weyland, Kurt. 2001. "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics." *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 1 (October): 1.

may become impatient for the people in charge to do *something*, and may be more willing to dismiss the niceties of democratic processes.[198] Thus, we test whether exposure to the earthquake and to food insecurity leads citizens to agree with populist statements.

We begin our analysis in this chapter by examining citizens' levels of life satisfaction, and how the earthquake has affected them. We then proceed to assess the 2010 earthquake's impacts on a series of political attitudes, as well as on protest participation. We begin by considering support for democracy, based on the "Churchillian" measure we discuss in Chapter 5, as well as a number of other questions often used to examine support for democracy. We then turn to how personal experience with the earthquake, with food insecurity, and life in IDP camps affects populist attitudes. Finally, we turn to system support and protest.

Our approach in this chapter builds on findings from previous chapters of the report. As we have seen in Chapter Five, Haitians on average tend to distrust their political system and many of the country's political institutions, though trust in the political system may be on the rise, and at the time of the 2012 survey citizens had high levels of confidence in the President. Moreover, in Chapter Two we found that Haitians report very high levels of protest, levels that are second only to those found in Bolivia. Do the earthquake and its aftermath, as well as the food crisis, play a role in these patterns? After first exploring life satisfaction, this is the subject to which we turn.

II. Life Satisfaction

To what extent are Haitians satisfied with their lives? And how has Haitians' life satisfaction changed over time? The AmericasBarometer survey has regularly asked citizens across the Americas how satisfied they are in general with life. The question is worded as follows:

LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... **[Read options]**?		
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Somewhat satisfied	(3) Somewhat dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied	(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't Answer

[198] For examinations of the relationship between threat and democratic dispositions, see Merolla, Jennifer, and Elizabeth Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan Weiler. 2009. *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Laha. 2005. "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3: 593-608; Radnitz, Scott B. 2010."Threat Perceptions and Support for Authoritarianism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Azerbaijan." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Figure 147 shows average values on life satisfaction in Haiti from 2006 to 2012. Again, for the sake of comparison responses are transformed on to a 0-100 scale, where 0 means "very dissatisfied," 33 means "somewhat dissatisfied," 67 means "somewhat satisfied," and 100 means "very satisfied." We see that levels of life satisfaction are by far the highest in 2012. In 2006 and 2008, "happiness" averaged 45 and 42, respectively, on the 0-100 scale. In 2010, following the earthquake, this dipped to an average of 36, a very low value. In 2012, we see that the mean level of citizen life satisfaction has increased to 55, a significant leap.



Figure 147. Life Satisfaction in Haiti, 2006-2012

How does this compare with life satisfaction in other countries of the Americas? In Figure 148, we present levels of life satisfaction throughout the region, based on the 2012 AmericasBarometer. Here we find something striking: despite its very large jump over the past two years, life satisfaction in Haiti remains the lowest in the region. In all but two other countries, life satisfaction is above 67 points, a score which would mean that the average citizen in those countries is at least "somewhat satisfied" with her life.



Figure 148. Life Satisfaction in the Countries of the Americas, 2012

Have the earthquake and its aftermath or the food crisis reduced life satisfaction in Haiti? It seems intuitive that they would have done so. In Figure 149, we examine the relationship between life satisfaction, on the one hand, and food insecurity, earthquake damage, and living in IDP camps, on the other. We find, indeed, that the life satisfaction of those at high levels of food insecurity is, on average, 20 points lower than among those who are food secure.[199] Similarly, we find that those

[199] As described in Chapter One, the index of food insecurity is developed by adding together responses to FS2 and FS8, creating a variable that has three values: food secure, low food insecurity, and high food insecurity.

whose homes sustained irreparable damage or were destroyed by the earthquake have average levels of life satisfaction only in the 40s. By contrast, those whose homes sustained no or only reparable damage have average levels of life satisfaction in the upper 50s on the 0-100 scale. Still, the figure on the bottom left indicates that earthquake damage at the municipal level does not appear to affect Haitians' levels of happiness. Finally, the figure on the bottom right indicates that those living in IDP camps have, on average, levels of life satisfaction that are 7 points lower than those not living in camps.



Figure 149. Life Satisfaction and Earthquake Recovery, Haiti 2012

III. Authoritarianism and Support for Democracy

One of the most important ways the earthquake and its aftermath may have affected politics is by shaping how citizens feel about democracy and authoritarianism in general. In Chapter Five we saw that Haitians, on average, are quite supportive of democracy in the abstract, with an average level of support of 70 on the 0-100 scale. This is one of the dimensions of legitimacy on which Haitians are not at the bottom, but in the middle of the pack in regional perspective. Moreover, support for democracy has remained quite stable in Haiti in recent years. In Chapter Three, we developed a multivariate model to assess the determinants of democracy, and found that Haitians with higher levels of education are more supportive of democracy, while female Haitians are less so. However, we found few other determinants of support for democracy.

In Figure 150 we again assess the characteristics associated with support for democracy in the abstract, based on the "Churchillian" measure discussed in Chapter Five.[200] Once again, we find that those with higher levels of education are more supportive of democracy, while women are less so. We also find that Haitians who are more satisfied with their personal finances and with the national economic situation are *less* satisfied with democracy. T his is surprising, since research in other developing democracies has found that good economic performance builds support for the democratic regime.[201]

Turning to the impact of the earthquake and the food crisis, we find that three of the four variables related to these issues are statistically insignificant.[202] We do find that those who experience food insecurity have lower levels of support for democracy. Still, the fact that the first three variables in the figure are all strongly related to each other may impede our ability to find any of them statistically significant as determinants of support for democracy.



Figure 150. Determinants of Support for Democracy, Haiti 2012

[200] The analysis is based on a linear regression model. Results are essentially identical when a hierarchical model is used, with random effects at the municipal level.
[201] Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
[202] Results are essentially identical when a hierarchical model is used.

In Figure 151 we assess the bivariate relationships between support for democracy and food insecurity, earthquake damage, and living in IDP camps, respectively. In the top left corner, we see that while food insecurity may have a statistically significant relationship with support for democracy, the relationship is quite small. Those with high levels of food insecurity are only 3 points less supportive of democracy on the 0-100 scale than are those who are most food secure. In the top right corner, we see that there is essentially no association between earthquake damage to citizens' own homes and support for democracy. In the bottom left corner, by contrast, we find that those living in municipalities with some earthquake damage are on average 5 points less supportive of democracy than those living in municipalities without earthquake damage. Finally, we see that living in an IDP camp has no impact on support for democracy.

Taken together, the findings here and in Chapters Three and Five reinforce several messages. First, support for democracy in Haiti is fairly high, even when Haiti is considered in the context of other countries with much stronger democratic histories. Second, support for democracy in Haiti is widespread, in that few personal characteristics are strongly associated with this attitude. Third, democratic support is quite robust; it has been affected very little, apparently, by the many negative experiences Haitians' have undergone in recent years.



Figure 151. Earthquake Recovery and Support for Democracy, Haiti 2012

Do these results hold when we examine other measures of support for democracy? The AmericasBarometer has developed a number of other measures of authoritarianism and adherence to democratic principles across the Americas. The wording of three important questions is as follows:

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most: **(1)** For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or **(2)** Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or **(3)** Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. (88) DK (98) DA
DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? (1) Iron fist (2) Everyone's participation (88) DK (98) DA

AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? **[Read the options]** (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (88) DK (98)DA

In Figure 152 we examine Haitians' democratic attitudes on each of these items. We present the percentages saying that "our country needs a government with an iron fist," that "we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected," and that "democracy is preferable to any other form of government." As with the "Churchillian" measure, we find that democratic support has been quite stable and high over time on all three of these items. In 2012, the percentage agreeing that "democracy is always preferable" is close to 80%, while only 10% agree with iron fist rule, and 12% support the notion of having an unelected leader.



Figure 152. Democratic Attitudes, Haiti 2006-2012

How do Haitians' experiences related to the earthquake, recovery, and food insecurity affect these other components of democratic support? In Figure 153 we examine how these are related to the likelihood of agreeing that the country needs a government that rules with an iron fist. Here, it appears that experiences of insecurity may affect democratic attitudes. At the highest levels of food insecurity, support for iron fist rule is substantially and significantly higher than among the most secure; confusingly, however, support for iron fist rule is *lower* at *moderate* levels of food insecurity. In addition, earthquake damage may matter. Those who say their homes were destroyed are 7 percentage points more likely to support iron fist rule than are those who say that their homes sustained no damage. Similarly, those living in municipalities with some damage are also 7 percentage points more likely to support iron fist rule than are those living in municipalities without damage. However, living in IDP camps has no effect on support for iron fist rule.



Figure 153. Food Insecurity, Earthquake Recovery, and Support for Iron Fist Rule, Haiti 2012

In Figure 154 we further examine how food insecurity, earthquake damage, and life in IDP camps are related to the likelihood of agreeing that "we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people." Here, we find little effect from food insecurity. Of those with some earthquake damage to their homes, 14.4% say the country needs an unelected leader, 6 percentage points higher than among those without earthquake damage to their homes (and a statistically significant difference). Respondents living in municipalities with moderate or severe damage have rates of support for unelected leaders that are 9 percentage points higher than for those living in municipalities without damage. Finally, the likelihood of agreeing with the need for an unelected leader is about 4 percentage points higher for Haitians living in IDP camps, though this difference is not statistically significant.



Figure 154. Food Insecurity, Earthquake Recovery, and Support for a Strong Unelected Leader, Haiti 2012

Finally, in Figure 155 we examine whether and how the earthquake and food shortages have affected the likelihood that citizens agree that "democracy is always preferable." Here again, we find that food insecurity and living in IDP camps are both unrelated to democratic support. However, earthquake damage is associated with responses to this item. We find that 73% of those whose homes sustained some damage from the earthquake agree that democracy is always preferable, while 82% of those whose homes were undamaged do; again, this difference is statistically significant. And agreement that democracy is always preferable is also 9 percentage points lower for those living in municipalities that sustained damage.



Figure 155. Food Insecurity, Earthquake Recovery, and Belief that Democracy is Preferable, Haiti 2012

On the whole, then, triangulating across various measures of support for democracy, we find that democratic support is relatively high and stable in Haiti, and that it is unaffected by food insecurity or by living in IDP camps. However, those whose homes sustained earthquake damage or who live in municipalities with earthquake damage do have somewhat lower levels of support for democracy, on some measures but not on others.

IV. Populism

As we discussed in the introduction, in times of crisis citizens may be more likely to endorse populism, and to support populist leaders. Populist leaders may convince citizens who are feeling threatened and under stress that the times warrant dispensing with the niceties of civil liberties and due process. The AmericasBarometer has long utilized a battery of three questions to measure citizens' agreement with populist principles. Respondents are asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the following statement, using a 7-point scale.

Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements **POP101.** It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?
POP107. The people should govern directly **rather than** through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?

In Figure 156 we present responses to these questions in Haiti in 2012 and 2008. As standard in LAPOP analysis, we have transformed responses to a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents strong disagreement and 100 represents strong agreement. We find that in 2012 in Haiti, support for limiting opposition parties and agreement that minority parties are a threat are both near the midpoint of the 0-100 scale, while support for the people governing directly is much lower, around 32 points on the scale. Agreement with the first two items has risen slightly since 2008, while agreement with the third has dropped dramatically in the past four years. It is possible that the very high levels of personal support for President Michel Martelly are driving both the rise in the first two items and the drop in the third.



Figure 156. Populist Attitudes, Haiti 2008 and 2012

Where is Haiti in comparative context? Are these levels of populist attitudes high or low, relative to other countries in the region? In Figure 157 and Figure 158 we present the levels of agreement with populist beliefs across the Americas. The first figure, Figure 159, deals with attitudes towards the rights of minorities and the opposition party. The second figure, Figure 160, deals with another dimension of populism, perception that the people should govern directly.

As we can see in Figure 159, Haiti ranks at the top of the countries in the Americas in willingness to restrict the rights of minorities. Other countries near the top, following Haiti, include El Salvador, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. By contrast, the countries least supportive of these populist statements include Guyana, Uruguay, Argentina, the United States, and Trinidad and Tobago.



Figure 157. Support for Restricting Minority Rights in the Countries of the Americas, 2012

While Haiti ranks very high in populism on one dimension, Figure 160 also indicates that on a second dimension, support for direct popular rule, Haiti is not particularly populist. Here, the country ranks in the bottom third of the countries of the Americas in turns of populist attitudes. Countries near the top on this dimension include some familiar ones, such as El Salvador and Nicaragua, as well as a new one, Suriname. At the bottom, we again find Argentina, Guyana, and Uruguay.



Figure 158. Support for Direct Rule of the People in the Countries of the Americas, 2012

Could the very high levels of populist attitudes in Haiti, at least on one dimension, be due in part to the earthquake and its aftermath, as well as the food crisis? How have these negative events shaped populism in Haiti? In the next three figures, we consider these questions. Figure 159 examines the relationships between the earthquake and recovery and support for limiting opposition parties. Figure 160 examines the relationships between the earthquake and recovery and support for direct rule by the people. Last, Figure 161 examines the relationships between the earthquake and recovery and belief that minorities are a threat.

We find few strong relationships between populism and the earthquake's aftereffects. We find virtually no pattern in the relationships between support for populist statements and earthquake damage, whether to one's own home or to one's city at large. However, where we do find patterns, it appears that those who are most hard hit by the earthquake and who experience greatest food insecurity are actually *less* populist than their fellow citizens. For example, we find that food insecurity has a small but statistically significant *negative* relationship with the first two populist statements, while its relationship with the third is unclear. This means that those who are most food insecure are *less* likely to say that opposition parties should be limited, or that the people should govern directly.

Similarly, we find that those who live in IDP camps have lower levels of agreement with opposition to minorities, and that these relationships are statistically significant. Life in IDP camps leads to a 4 point reduction in agreement that opposition parties should be limited, and a 6 point reduction in agreement that minority voices constitute a threat.



Figure 159. Food Insecurity, Earthquake Recovery, and Support for Limiting Opposition Parties, Haiti 2012



Figure 160. Food Insecurity, Earthquake Recovery, and Support for the People Governing Directly, Haiti 2012



Figure 161. Food Insecurity, Earthquake Recovery, and Belief that the Minority are a Threat, Haiti 2012

Taken as a whole, these findings related to populism suggest a few conclusions. First, adherence to populist beliefs is very high in Haiti in comparative context, especially when it comes to willingness to restrict the rights of minorities, and it may be growing. Second, however, experiences related to the earthquake and its aftermath, as well as to food insecurity, are *not* driving Haitians' adherence to populist attitudes.

V. System Support and Protest

In the final section of this chapter, we consider how the earthquake and recovery, as well as food insecurity, may have affected Haitians' levels of support for the political system and led to protest. Indeed, given the protests that crippled the nation following the food crisis in 2008, it is very reasonable to suspect that there may still be a relationship between food insecurity and protest. In Chapter Five, we found that levels of support for the political system in Haiti are the third lowest in the Americas. And in Chapter Two, we found that rates of protest participation in Haiti are second highest in the Americas. It is reasonable to suspect that the dire events that have preoccupied the country are in part responsible for both phenomena.

In Figure 162, we present a hierarchical linear regression model assessing the factors that determine Haitians' levels of political support. We find that older Haitians and those who perceive their economic situations more favorably have higher levels of support for the political system. However (and unusually), wealth and education have little relationship to support for the political system. Turning to variables in which we are most interested in this chapter, those who are more food insecure are found to have lower levels of system support. In addition, both earthquake damage and living in an IDP camp shape levels of system support.



Figure 162. Determinants of System Support, Haiti 2012

We now turn to bivariate analysis to see whether other relationships appear to be stronger when the variables related to the earthquake and its aftermath are considered individually. Figure 163 indicates that those with high levels of food insecurity have levels of system support that are 7 points lower than those who report being secure with respect to food. Meanwhile, those who say that their homes were destroyed have levels of system support that are 6 points lower than those who say that their homes suffered no damage. However, the bivariate graphs also indicate that earthquake damage at the municipal level, as well as living in an IDP camp, have no important impact on system support.



Figure 163. Food Insecurity, Earthquake Recovery, and System Support, Haiti 2012

Experiences related to the earthquake and to food insecurity may also have led to protest. In Figure 164 we examine the factors that increase the likelihood of participating in a march or demonstration.[203] After controlling for Haitians' perceptions that they have been discriminated against by government (discussed in Chapter Three), we find that the likelihood of participating in protest is unassociated with earthquake damage, food insecurity, or living in IDP camps. However, in other analysis we find that those with earthquake damage to their homes are much more likely to feel discriminated against or unfairly treated. Thus, further analysis indicates that earthquake damage may lead to higher levels of protest by affecting the extent to which citizens think they have been discriminated against.

[203] The model is estimated using logistic regression, and includes all the independent variables from the model of protest participation in Chapter Three. When the model is reestimated using hierarchical logistical regression, results are essentially identical.



Figure 164. Determinants of Protest Participation, Haiti 2012

In Figure 165, we consider the bivariate relationships between our key variables of interest and protest participation. Again we find little relationship between food insecurity and protest, in contrast to what would be suggested by the protests surrounding the food crisis in 2008. However, earthquake damage has a strong relationship to protest participation. Those who say that their homes were destroyed are 8 percentage points more likely to have participated in a protest than those whose homes sustained no damage. Meanwhile, those living in municipalities with very high levels of damage are 7 percentage points more likely to have participated in a protest. Finally, residents of IDP camps are 3 percentage points more likely to have participated in a protest, a difference that is far from statistically significant.



Figure 165. Food Insecurity, Earthquake Recovery, and Protest Participation, Haiti 2012

VI. Conclusion

The earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010 was catastrophic in many ways, leading to great loss of life and to injuries, and destroying homes and infrastructure. More subtly, but nonetheless important, the earthquake and its aftermath – including food insecurity, damage to homes and municipalities, and life in camps for displaced persons – may have affected citizens' personal and political attitudes. Most obviously, these experiences may have substantially lowered levels of life satisfaction. They may also have shaped support for the democratic regime, adherence to populist beliefs, and support for the political system. And finally, they may have boosted protest participation. In this chapter, we have investigated these possible effects.

First we examined life satisfaction. We found that while life satisfaction has risen dramatically in Haiti between 2010 and 2012, Haitians remain less satisfied with their lives than are citizens of any other country in the Americas. As expected, food insecurity has a major effect on life satisfaction, lowering scores by 20 points on the 0-100 scale. Citizens who report earthquake damage their homes or that they live in IDP camps are also less satisfied with their lives, though the effects are not as dramatic as those found for food insecurity.

We then turned to attitudes towards democracy as a form of government. Here, we find that Haitians strongly support democracy in the abstract, and that most experiences of hardship have little effect on these attitudes. However, those with earthquake damage to their homes do have slightly lower levels of democratic support, at least using some survey measures. Nonetheless, these minimal

effects should be welcome news for those seeking to maintain and promote the democratic regime in Haiti.

We then assessed citizens' levels of agreement with populist principles. Here, we found that, relative to citizens of other countries in the region, Haitians are highly populist when it comes to infringing the rights of minorities and of opposition parties. They are much less populist with respect to support for direct rule by citizens. D espite these somewhat worrisome findings, though, we discovered that experiences of hardship – in particular, food insecurity, life in IDP camps, and earthquake damage to homes – actually *decreases* adherence to populist ideals. Again, this is welcome news for those concerned with the bolstering Haitian democracy.

Finally, we examined the earthquake's effect on system support and protest. Those who report that the earthquake destroyed their homes have somewhat lower levels of system support, but much higher levels of protest participation. Life in IDP camps and in municipalities that sustained high levels of earthquake damage, however, does not have much effect on system support and protest. Moreover, we found that food insecurity apparently lowers system support, but does not trigger participation in protests.

In conclusion, it appears that the earthquake and recovery have had a small effect how Haitians feel about abstract political objects, such as the political system and democracy. But what about politicians and political parties? In the next chapter, we turn to the Haitian system of party and electoral competition to examine which ideological tendencies, parties, and politicians Haitians support the most.

Chapter Nine: Voting Behavior, Government, and Party Performance

I. Introduction

How do Haitians interact with organized politics? Which parties do they identify with? Do they identify with the labels "left" and "right"? Which candidates do they support? And what do they think about the performance of the incumbent President, as well as Parliament? Abstract attitudes towards democracy and the political system, on which this report has focused until now, can be critical for the stability of the democratic regime. Nonetheless, Haitians on a daily basis encounter the national political system predominantly through political campaigns and through evaluations of politicians who are in competition with other politicians. In Chapter Two, we found that Haitians have very high rates of participation in political campaigns, relative to their counterparts in other countries. In the current chapter, we investigate whom Haitians support when they work on campaigns or go to the polls.

Haitians have had their share of political turmoil over the course of the past two decades. While politics prove to be generally divisive in Haiti, national elections have been associated with a very tense political climate and broad mass mobilization. The last two electoral cycles are no exception. Both the 2006 and 2010 presidential elections ended with thousands of people taking to the street, protesting against the allegedly fraudulent character of the electoral process. These people were brought to the street by political leaders seemingly attempting to influence the outcome of the election by putting popular pressure on both the institutions of the Haitian state and the international community. In 2006, these protests lead to a loose interpretation of the electoral law about the counting of blank ballots. These were exceptionally considered as valid and "distributed" as votes at a pro-rated basis to each of the candidates, thus allowing the leading candidate, René Préval, to win the first round with more than 50% of the votes. This led to a change in the law to specify that a blank vote is not counted and to include a "none of the above" category on the ballot. In 2010, popular protests forced the electoral institutions to verify the tabulation of the results, leading to the exclusion of the candidate of the incumbent government. In both cases, the international community played a significant role in shaping the institutional response to the protest. What brings Haitians to the street? During these two elections, did Haitians protest in order to defend their convictions and ideologies or were they simply responding to the political parties' mobilization efforts?

In this final chapter, we begin by considering ideology – meaning where citizens place themselves on the left-right spectrum – and party identification. Many citizens around the world do not identify with any party or ideology at all, so we also examine what percentage of Haitians do so. We then turn towards elections. While President Martelly had been in office for less than a year at the time of the survey administration, we are curious about what might be the outcome of future elections. Thus, we investigate what citizens say when asked, "If the next election were held this week, what would you do?" Finally, the chapter considers how citizens evaluate current political actors: the incumbent President, Parliament, and political parties.

II. Ideology and Party Identification

One of the most important items often measured in public opinion studies is ideology, meaning where citizens place themselves on the left-right spectrum. In every wave, the AmericasBarometer has measured citizens' ideological positions using the following question.[204]

L1. Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK 88	DA 98	
Left									**Right**			

Research shows that ideology is an overarching disposition that can help citizens determine their positions on a great range of other issues, such as welfare policy or support for big business.[205] Thus, knowing where Haitians place themselves on the left-right spectrum might help us understand their attitudes on many of the important issues of the day. At the same time, research in the Latin American context also shows that many citizens – particularly those with lower educational levels and interest in politics – do not identify with any position on the left-right spectrum at all.[206] Thus, we seek to understand here both whether citizens identify on the left-right scale, and where they self-identify.

In Figure 166 we examine the percentage of Haitians who tell the interviewer where they belong on the left-right spectrum in each survey wave since 2006. Interestingly, the percentage identifying their own positions has risen steadily and dramatically since 2006; by 2012, more than 9 in every 10 respondents reported their own positions. In fact, in comparative context we find that the percentage of citizens not responding to this question in Haiti, 6.8%, is the lowest among all the countries in the Americas (figure not shown here). Since research indicates that elite politicization and polarization affect the percentage of citizens identifying on the scale, this suggests that Haitian politicians use the labels "left" and "right" to a high degree.[207] Aristide was a very strong political figure who used the vocabulary of left and right.

[204] In the United States and Guyana, we instead used question L1B, which replaces the terms "left" and "right" with "liberal" and "conservative."

[205] Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*. London: Free Press of Glencoe; Knight, Kathleen. 2006. "Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century." *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 4: 619-26; Peffley, Mark, and Jon Hurwitz.1985. "A Hierarchical Model of Attitude Constraint." *American Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 4 : 871-90.

[206] Ames, Barry, and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. "Knowing Left from Right: Ideological Identification in Brazil, 2002-2006." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2, no. 3: 3-38; Zechmeister, Elizabeth, and Margarita Corral. "Individual and Contextual Constraints on Ideological Labels in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* (Forthcoming).

[207] Ames, Barry, and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. "Knowing Left from Right: Ideological Identification in Brazil, 2002-2006." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2, no. 3: 3-38.



Figure 166. Percent who Self-Identify on the Left-Right Scale, 2006-2012

We are also interested in which ideological positions Haitians choose on the left-right spectrum. Figure 167 presents the distribution of Haitians on the scale in 2012, among those who choose to self-identify. It is obvious that Haitians tend to cluster on the left of the spectrum. The single most popular position is a "3" on the 1-10 scale, and positions 2-5 all claim over 10% of the electorate. By contrast, the least popular responses are positions 7-10 on the scale, and position "9" claims the smallest share of respondents, at only 2%.



Figure 167. Position on the Left-Right Scale, 2012

How have Haitians' ideological positions changed over time? Figure 168 shows the average position reported in each wave, among those who chose to identify a position. Recall that, as always, the full scale runs from 1 to 10. We find that Haitians' average position on the scale is unchanged since 2010, at 4.1 on the 1-10 scale. In both 2006 and 2008, by contrast, Haitians had been very close to the scale midpoint of 5.5, at 5.2 in 2006 and 5.4 in 2010. Thus, the average position moved more than one full point to the right between 2008 and 2010.



Figure 168. Average Position on the Left-Right Scale, 2006-2012

How does Haitians' position of 4.1 on the left-right scale compare with that of citizens throughout the region? In Figure 169 we present the average positions on the left-right scale in 2012 in the countries of the Americas. Here once again, we find that Haitians stand out: this time, as the electorate in the Americas that positions itself furthest to the left on the 1-10 scale. The figure reveals that the average citizen in most countries positions herself very close to the scale midpoint of 5.5. Nonetheless, we find that there are 11 countries where citizens position themselves statistically significantly to the right of center: Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Colombia, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Belize, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, and the United States. Similarly, the countries where citizens position themselves statistically significantly to the left of center include not only Haiti, but also Guatemala, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil.



Figure 169. Average Position on the Left-Right Scale in the Countries of the Americas, 2012

In addition to ideology, party identification constitutes another way that many citizens in democracies around the world structure their understandings of politics. Citizens may base not only their vote choices, but also their positions on a great range of other issue positions, on their party identification. That is, research find that citizens who identify with a particular party often learn about the political world through that party's elites. They take cues from those elites regarding not only

which candidates to support, but also which positions they should take on the important issues of the day.[208]

The AmericasBarometer examines party identification using a pair of questions. While VB10 has been asked in each wave since 2006, question VB11 was only asked in 2008, 2010, and 2012.

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to POL1]** (88) DK **[Skip to POL1]** (98) DA **[Skip to POL1]**
VB11. Which political party do you identify with? **[DON'T READ THE LIST]** (2201) Fwon Lespwa (2202) RDNP (2203) Respè (2204) Repons Peyizan (2205) MPH (2206) Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haïtienne (2207) Oganizasyon Pèp Kap Lité (2208) Alyans/Alliance Démocratique (2209) Renmen Ayiti (2210) Ansanm nou Fo (2211) Lavalas (2212) Unité (77) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA

We begin by examining what percentage of Haitians says they identify with any political party, based on the first question. In Figure 170 we show this percentage in each wave since 2006. We find that about 38% claimed a party identification in 2006, and that the percentage declined 10 percentage points by 2010. Since the trough in 2010, party identification has risen slightly again, to 30% in 2012.

[208] Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1964. *The American Voter: An Abridgement*. New York: John Wiley; Carsey, Thomas M., and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2006. "Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2: 464-77; Evans, Geoffrey, and Robert Andersen. 2006. "The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions." *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 01: 194-207.



Figure 170. Percent who Identify with a Party, 2006-2012

Having only 30% of citizens identify with a party may seem quite low, but party identification is notoriously low in many countries of the Americas.[209] Where does Haiti stand relative to other countries in the region in terms of the proportion of citizens that identifies with a party? In Figure 171 we examine party identification across the Americas. It turns out that Haiti's party identification rate of 30% puts it solidly in the middle of the pack, in regional terms. Party identification is found to vary greatly across the countries of the Americas. At the high end, in the Dominican Republic and the United States more than 60% of citizens report a party identification. In only four countries do more than half of citizens say they identify with a party: the two aforementioned, plus Nicaragua and Uruguay. At the other end of the spectrum, there are four countries where fewer than one in five citizens claims to identify with a party: Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Guatemala.

[209] For previous work by LAPOP on this topic, see Batista Pereira, Frederico. 2012. "Why Are There More Partisans in Some Countries than in Others?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 71. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).



Figure 171. Percent who Identify with a Party in the Countries of the Americas, 2012

Which parties do Haitians identify with most strongly? For citizens who said they identified with a party, we asked them to tell us which one. Figure 172 indicates that 71% of respondents identify with the political party Repons Peyizan, the President's party. This is somewhat surprising. Prior to the 2010 presidential election, the party had never had a presidential candidate in the race. Similarly, the party had never won a seat in parliament. There are thus strong reasons to believe that this level of support among the Haitian electorate is closely associated with the personal figure of the Republic's President.



Figure 172. Party Support, 2012

Figure 173, which presents the parties Haitians have identified with since 2008, confirms our suspicion. The level of party support changes along with different governments. In 2008, the vast majority of respondents associated with the political party Fwon Lespwa. This party had been founded by President René Préval in the wake of the 2006 election, in an attempt to dissociate himself from former President Aristide and from the Fanmi Lavalas party that had been associated with President Aristide. In 2010, Fwon Lespwa attracted many politicians and supporters from Fanmi Lavalas, Preval's former party.



Figure 173. Party Support, 2008-2012

In preparation for the 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections, President Préval attempted to reenact the same momentum for change by founding INITE, a political party that was created to resolve divisions within Fwon Lespwa. The strategy proved somewhat successful at the parliamentary level, with 33 candidates elected in the Chamber of Deputies (out of 99 seats) and 5 candidates winning seats in the Senate (out of the eleven at stakes during that election). President Préval was not able to accomplish the same in the presidential race. The INITE candidate was defeated in the highly criticized first round of November 28, 2010.

Scholars who study political parties have highlighted the importance of the "institutionalization" of the party system, meaning that the set of parties competing in a country provides a predictable, stable forum for political competition.[210] Institutionalization is a sign of maturity of the democratic system, and indicates that all the players in the democratic game follow the same rules, which remain relatively stable over time. The fact that party support systematically varies with the presidential figure is a strong sign pointing to the low level of party system institutionalization.

III. Vote Choice

As we have seen, ideology and party identification constitute important dispositions that can help citizens understand the political world and make choices among candidates. We now turn to the heart of the topic: which candidates receive the strongest support from Haitians on election day? The AmericasBarometer uses question VB20 to ask citizens across the Americas whom they would support "if the next [presidential/parliamentary] elections were being held this week." Results of this question need to be interpreted with a couple of caveats in Haiti. First, presidential candidates cannot run for consecutive terms of office, which may have affected respondents' likelihood of choosing the incumbent. Also, since 2008 ballots in Haiti specifically provide the opportunity to choose "no candidate." Nonetheless, responses may be instructive.

VB20. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? **[Read options]**
(1) Wouldn't vote
(2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party
(3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration
(4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote
(88) DK (98) DA

The weakness of the party system is further illustrated by the vote intention pattern presented in Figure 174. Out of the 57% voters that would not cast a ballot for the incumbent, more than half of them would abstain rather then vote for another political formation. As a matter of fact, only 12% of the respondents would vote for one of the opposition parties. This might suggest that voters in 2012 do not respond well to the political offer from opposition parties.

[210] Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.



Figure 174. Support for the Incumbent versus Opposition, 2012

Who says they will vote for the incumbent, versus the opposition? In Figure 175 we develop a logistic regression model examining who supports the incumbent, rather than choosing one of his opponents. Note that the analysis excludes all respondents who said that they did not know, or who said that they would not vote or would vote blank. Thus, the analysis is limited to the 1,013 respondents who chose options 2 or 3 in response to question VB20.[211]

[211] The "N" in the figure is lower because of non-response to a number of questions analyzed here.



Figure 175. Determinants of Support for the Incumbent versus Opposition, 2012 (blank and non-voters excluded)

We first assess how attitudes and dispositions affect the vote. We find, first of all, that Haitians who self-identify on the right are more likely to support President Martelly.[212] In addition, those who identify with the party Repons Peyizan are much more likely to support him. However, as we noted above, we suspect that the very high level of identification with Repons Peyizan is driven by support for the personal figure of the President, rather than the reverse. Surprisingly, respondents' assessments of the effectiveness of the current administration are not important for the vote, and positive evaluations of the national government's performance in rebuilding apparently *lower* the likelihood of supporting the incumbent.[213] We also find that those who are more interested in politics are less likely to say that they would support President Martelly versus the opposition.[214] The fact that Martelly was an anti-system candidate might explain the unexpected results for both political interest and evaluation of the government's performance, since he sought votes among those who were dissatisfied with standard politics.

Turning to experiences, we find that those who have been victimized by corruption are much less likely to support the incumbent. However, crime victimization and food insecurity are unrelated to vote choice. Finally, personal characteristics such as age, education, wealth, and gender are all

[212] The coefficient for "rightist" is statistically significant at p = .054. Those who identify with positions 1-4 on question L1 are coded as "leftist," positions 7-10 are coded as "rightist, and positions 5 and 6 are coded as "centrist." The omitted category includes citizens who do not identify with any position on the left-right scale.
[213] Evaluations of governmental effectiveness are based on the variable EFICGOV, which creates an index averaging responses to questions on the government's effectiveness in combating poverty and corruption, promoting democratic principles, and improving security. Assessments of performance in rebuilding are based on question HAIPERF1.
[214] This question is measured using POL1, which is recoded so that higher values represent greater interest in politics.

statistically insignificant in the model, as are variables related to location, including the size of the city and an indicator for whether the respondent lives in an IDP camp.

In the next four figures, we explore in greater depth how the variables considered in the logistic regression model are individually related to the probability of supporting the current president. Figure 176 assesses the relationship between individual characteristics and voting for the incumbent. We find few statistically significant differences, though the indications of some relationships. First, those in the bottom quintile of wealth are most likely to support the President, and those in the top quintile are seven percentage points less likely to do so than those in the bottom one. More strikingly, those with no formal education are extremely likely to support the President, with rates of support above 90%. However, there is little difference between Haitians with primary, secondary, and higher education in support for the President. The figure also reveals that women are about 5 percentage points more likely to support the incumbent than are men, but the differences are not statistically significant. Finally, the President's strongest support base is among those aged 55-65, while his weakest support comes from those 25 and younger, as well as those over age 65. Again, however, these differences are not statistically significant. On the whole, the figure suggests that support for Martelly comes from every segment of society.



Figure 176. Personal Characteristics and Support for the Incumbent versus Opposition, 2012

Figure 177 examines the relationship between place of residence and vote choice. We find that the President's strongest support comes from small cities, while his weakest support comes from the capital and other large cities. Most of these differences are not statistically significant, however. In addition, Martelly's support appears to be about 8 pe rcentage points lower in IDP camps than elsewhere in the country, but this difference is not statistically significant. What is more, this indicates that Martelly's base of support has shifted since the election, since he was rather electorally successful in Port-au-Prince and in IDP camps.



Figure 177. Place of Residence and Support for the Incumbent versus Opposition, 2012

Next, we assess the relationships between incumbent support, on the one hand, and a series of experiences and attitudes, on t he other. Figure 178 shows essentially no relationship between incumbent support and either food security or crime victimization, confirming what was found in the multivariate analysis presented above. However, those who have been targeted by a request for a bribe have rates of support for President Martelly that are 10 percentage points lower than among those who have not been targeted by bribe requests. Finally, the relationship between political interest and incumbent support is somewhat uneven. S till, it is evident that the highest levels of support for the incumbent come from those who say they are totally uninterested in politics, at 88%; by contrast, only 73% of those who say they are highly interested in politics support Martelly.



Figure 178. Experiences, Attitudes, and Support for the Incumbent versus Opposition, 2012

Last, we examine how support for the current president is associated with ideology, or the position chosen on the left-right spectrum; and with party identification. On the left side of the figure, we find that the highest rates of support for President Martelly are among those in positions 7-10 on the spectrum, and that the very highest rate of support, 87%, is among those furthest to the right. Haitians at the far right support the current president at a rate that is 11 percentage points higher than among those on the far left. On the right side of the figure, we find that Repons Peyizan identifiers are by far the most likely to support the current president, followed by those who say they have no party identification. Supporters of other parties, by contrast, are much less likely to say they would vote for the current president.



Figure 179. Ideology, Party, and Support for the Incumbent versus Opposition, 2012

IV. Evaluations of the President, Congress, and Parties

Our final focus in the chapter involves how citizens rate the job performance of the people currently holding office – the President and Parliament – as well as perceptions of political parties. To examine these issues, we consider responses to four questions. Questions EPP1 and EPP3 involved responding on a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 meaning "not at all" and 7 meaning "a lot."[215]

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Michel Martelly? **[Read the options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA
M2. Now speaking of Parliament, and thinking of members/senators and representatives as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members/senators and representatives of Parliament are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA

EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do Haitian political parties represent their voters well? (99) N/A
EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you? (99) N/A

In Figure 180 we present responses to these four questions in 2008 and 2012. As always, we follow the LAPOP standard of converting responses to a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents being very dissatisfied, and 100 represents being very satisfied. This facilitates comparison of questions that were

[215] Questions EPP1 and EPP3 were administered to a split sample, or to only half of respondents.

initially asked on different scales. We find, first, that satisfaction with the performance of the current president has more than doubled, from 27 points to 59 points, in the past four years. The President is now, by far, the highest rated among these actors. Of course, the officeholder of the Presidency has changed in the past four years; this change is certainly responsible for the rise in satisfaction with the President. Satisfaction with Parliament's performance, by contrast, has dropped slightly, from 37 to 34 points. Finally, Haitians rate parties fairly low; however, we find that agreement with the statement that "parties represent their voters well" has risen substantially and significantly in the past four years.



Figure 180. Satisfaction with the President, Congress, and Parties, 2012

V. Conclusion

For most Haitians, participation in electoral politics constitutes one of the most important ways they interact with the state. In this chapter, we have examined Haitians' ideological dispositions and their party sympathies, as well as their evaluations and levels of support for current politicians. Combined with the analysis presented in Chapter Two, our findings suggest that in some ways,

Haitians are quite engaged with national electoral politics, and have among the most participatory citizens in the Americas when it comes to working for campaigns. In this chapter, we find that Haitians have very high rates of identification with positions on the left-right spectrum. Moreover, relative to other citizens in the Americas, Haitians locate themselves the furthest to the left on this spectrum.

At the same time, Haitians are not particularly engaged with parties. Fewer than a third of citizens told us that they identified with a political party. While this proportion is actually not particularly low when Haiti is compared to other countries in the Americas, we find that party identification even among those citizens who say they sympathize with a party has been extremely volatile in the past four years. This leads us to suspect that party identification is not a deeply rooted, driving disposition even among the 30% who say they identify with a party. Rather, we suspect that for most Haitians who report a party preference, this preference is determined by loyalty to the personal figures of particular politicians.

We also found very high levels of support for the President, levels that have jumped dramatically from four years ago. Only 12% of Haitians tell us that they would vote for any opposition candidate or party if elections were held this week (43% say they would vote for the incumbent; the remainder do not know, would not vote, or would vote blank). By contrast, support for Parliament and for political parties is relatively low.

While Haitians of all stripes support the President at high rates, we find that some citizens are more likely to support the President than others. Support for Martelly is particularly strong among those who identify as being on the right; among Repons Peyizan identifiers; among those with the lowest levels of education; and among residents of small cities. By contrast, support for him is lower among those who have been victimized by corruption (though crime does not have an effect), among residents of IDP camps and the biggest cities, and among those who are highly interested in politics.

Appendices

Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent

Dear Sir/Madam:

You are being asked to participate in a research study. This research involves a survey of public opinion on behalf of Vanderbilt University and carried out by Borge y Asociados. The goal of the study is for us to learn of the opinions of people about different aspects of the local and national situation.

This survey is completely voluntary and it will take 30 to 40 minutes to complete.

You have been randomly selected to participate in this survey in a kind of lottery system. Your answers will be kept confidential. Your address will not be recorded. We will not ask for your name and nobody will ever be able to learn how you responded. You can leave any questions unanswered, and you may stop the interviews at any time.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact us at 3891-4529.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix B. Sample Design

I. Universe, Population, Unit of Observation

Universe: The survey provides national coverage of voting age adults, focusing on the standard five principal regions of the country: Metropolitan region, North, Center, Rest of West, and South. In the past, these have been our strata (ESTRATOPRI) for Haiti and will remain our strata for 2012. The universe is comprised of adults (18 years old and over) living in urban and rural areas in all the 140 municipalities registered in the 2003 census in Haiti[216].

Population: The survey is designed to collect information from a nationally representative sample of the entire voting age adult population. Only non-institutionalized adults are eligible to participate in the survey. Therefore, the sample excludes people in boarding schools, hospitals, police academies, military barracks, and inmates of the country's jails.

Unit of Observation: The study contains topics that refer not only to the individual, but also to other members of the household. Thus, the statistical unit of observation is the household. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, some respondents live in dwellings that could be shared with other households. For this reason, it is more convenient to consider the dwelling as the final unit of analysis. Additionally, the dwelling is an easily identifiable unit in the field, with relative permanence over time, a characteristic that allows it to be considered as the final unit of selection.

II. Sample frame

The sampling frame covers 100% of the eligible population in the surveyed country. This means that every eligible person in the country has an equal and known chance of being included in the survey sample. It also means that no particular ethnic group or geographical areas are excluded from the sampling frame.

In this sample design, as a sampling frame, we used the list of municipalities, localities and census segments, and maps in Haiti from the 2003 by the Institut Haitien de statistiques et d'Informatique (IHSI).

Haiti is divided into 10 departments and sub-divided into about 140 municipalities. Within each municipality, the Institut Haitien de statistiques et d'Informatique established the census segments and within them the constituent dwellings.

According to the 2002 census data, Haiti has a total of 5,639,026 voting-age adults. Forty nine percent of the population was living in urban areas and the remaining 51% live in what is categorized as rural areas. Table 1 shows the distribution of the population 18 years old and over by department, and urban and rural areas.

[216] The next population census will not be conducted until 2012.

Table 1. Distribution of the Population 18 Years old and over by Department, Sex, and Urban and Rural areas.

Departments	Urban	Rural	Total
Artibonite	351908	534967	886875
Centre	65569	284948	350517
Grande-Anse	50225	182493	232718
Nippes	29415	146411	175826
Nord	254735	282613	537348
Nord-Est	84608	102668	187276
Nord-Ouest	93561	258286	351847
Ouest	1715286	498217	2213503
Sud	84031	309495	393526
Sud-Est	45473	264117	309590
Total	2774811	2864215	5639026

III. Sampling Method

The sampling method chosen takes into consideration a series of elements pre-established by LAPOP. The following requirements for the design of the sample were determined by LAPOP Central beforehand:

(a) Obtain representative samples for the following study strata:

Size of the Municipalities

1. Municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants
2. Municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants
3. Municipalities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants

Strata for the first stage

1. Metropolitan region
2. North
3. Center
4. Rest of West
5. South

Strata for the second stage:

1. Urban Area
2. Rural Area

(b) Calculate the sampling errors corresponding to these strata.
(c) Minimize travel time in survey operations.
(d) Optimal allocation that would allow a reasonable set of trade-offs between budget, sample size, and level of precision of the results.
(e) Use the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available.

(f) Expectation of 24 interviews by Primary sampling unit (PSU) or municipality, allowing a multi-level analysis

(g) Final sampling unit of 6 interviews in urban and rural areas

On the basis of these requirements, the method that is used in Haiti corresponds to a **stratified multi-stage cluster sampling.** The sample will be stratified based on three factors:

1) Size of the Municipalities
2) Region: Metropolitan region/North/Center/ Rest of West/South
3) Level of Urbanization: Urban/Rural Areas

The stratified sampling ensures a greater reliability in our sample by reducing the variance of the estimates. Stratification improves the quality of estimates, with the sole condition that the whole sample unit belongs to only one stratum, and the strata in combination cover the total population. Stratification also enables us to ensure the inclusion in the sample of the most important geographic regions in the country and sample dispersion.

The survey design for Haiti follows a multi-stage process as shown in the table 2 below:

1. The first stage, which corresponds to the selection of primary sampling units (PSUs), involves the selection of municipalities within each of the strata defined above with probability proportional to the voting age adult population (PPS) of the country. Each PSU consists of 24 interviews.

Table2: Multi-Stage Stratified Cluster Sampling	
Strata	Size of the Municipalities, Regions, Level of Urbanization,
Primary sampling Unit (PSU)	Municipalities
Secondary sampling Unit (SSU)	Census segments or Enumeration areas
Tertiary Sampling Unit (TSU)	Blocks or Manzanas
Quaternary Unit (EU)	Households
Final Unit	Respondent

2. The second stage of the sample design consists of the selection of census segments or enumeration areas within each PSU using PPS.
3. In the third stage blocks or “manzanas” within the census segments are selected.
4. In the fourth stage, clusters of households are randomly selected within each PSU. A total of 6 interviews are to be carried out in each sampling point in both rural and urban areas. Sampling points represent clusters of interviews, and the clusters are kept relatively small in order not to increase the “design effect” of the sample, but are also designed to reduce transportation costs by allowing some concentration in a given geographic point.
5. Finally, in the fifth stage of the sample design, a quota sample by gender and age is employed for selecting *a single respondent in each household***.** The objective of the quota sample is to ensure that the distribution of individuals by sex and age in the survey matches the country’s official population statistics or those reported by the Census Bureau. Fully random selection

within the household would have required extensive recalls, thus dramatically increasing costs with no assurances that a correct balance by gender and age would be thus achieved[217].

IV. Stratification

Stratification is the process by which the population is divided into subgroups. Sampling is then conducted separately in each subgroup. Stratification allows subgroups of interest to be included in the sample whereas in a non-stratified sample some may have been left out due to the random nature of the selection process. In an extreme case, samples that are not stratified can, by chance, exclude the nation's capital or largest city. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample. It reduces the sampling error. In a stratified sample, the sampling error depends on population variance within strata and not between them.

Since sampling is conducted separately in each stratum, it is desirable and important to ensure that there are a sufficient number of people in each subgroup to allow meaningful analysis.

The Haiti sample is stratified by population size of the municipalities, regions (Metropolitan region/North/Center/ Rest of West/South), level of urbanization (urban, rural). Table 3 displays the distribution of the interviews within each region by size of the municipalities for Haiti. Appendix I shows the distribution of the sample by urban and rural areas. A total of 744 interviews are conducted in the urban areas and 768 in the rural areas. It will be recalled that Haiti has an approximately 50-50 split urban/rural according to the census. Our sample design reflects this split.

Table 3. Distribution of the Sample by Region and Size of the Municipalities

Population	**Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants**	**Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants**	**More than 100 thousand inhabitants**	**Total**
Metropolitan		72,651	1,351,799	1,424,450
Northern	402,979	426,543	246,949	1,076,471
Central	221,861	687,685	327,846	1,237,392
Rest of West	52,682	417,633	318,738	789,053
Southern	566,355	545,305		1,111,660
Total	1,243,877	2,149,817	2,245,332	5,639,026
% of respondents	**Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants**	**Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants**	**More than 100 thousand inhabitants**	**Total**
Metropolitan	0.0%	3.4%	60.2%	25.3%
Northern	32.4%	19.8%	11.0%	19.1%
Central	17.8%	32.0%	14.6%	21.9%
Rest of West	4.2%	19.4%	14.2%	14.0%

[217] The team in Chile uses random selection at the household level because of an exceptional level of what we might term "professional dogmatism" by various researchers and professionals in that country, whose strong and vocal stances against the use of quotas run the danger of reducing the credibility of our work in that country. The Ecuador survey has also used random selection, and we are recommending the use of quotas for 2012.

Southern	45.5%	25.4%	0.0%	19.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Number of interviews	**Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants**	**Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants**	**More than 100 thousand inhabitants**	**Total**
Metropolitan	0	24	360	384
Northern	120	96	72	288
Central	48	192	96	336
Rest of West	24	120	72	216
Southern	144	144	0	288
Total	336	576	600	**1512**

V. Sample Selection

First Stage: Primary Sampling Units.

At the first stage, Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) are selected within each of the four regions (i.e., strata, with allocation proportional to stratum size). The PSU are the country's 140 municipalities that we have classified by size following the LAPOP Central guidelines:

Large: Municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants;
Medium-sized: Municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants;
Small: Municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants.

The municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants are self-selected, which is the same thing as saying that they are selected with probability equal to 1. Small and medium-sized municipalities are selected within each stratum, with probability proportional to the population size (PPS) of the municipality (population 18 years of age or older), on a systematic basis, with a random starting point. Table 4 shows the number of municipalities that were selected in the four large regions in Haiti. A fixed number of 24 interviews are conducted in each municipality except for the 11 large municipalities. How those are selected is explained below.

Table 4. Municipalities Selected by Regions

Number of municipalities in Haiti	**Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants**	**Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants**	**More than 100 thousand inhabitants**	**Total**
Metropolitan	0	1	5	6
Northern	29	11	2	42
Central	12	13	2	27
Rest of West	5	10	2	17
Southern	40	11	0	51
Total	**86**	**46**	**11**	**143**
Number of interviews	**Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants**	**Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants**	**More than 100 thousand inhabitants**	**Total**
Metropolitan	0	24	360	384
Northern	120	96	72	288
Central	48	192	96	336
Rest of West	24	120	72	216

Southern	144	144	0	288
Total	**336**	**576**	**600**	**1512**
Number of selected municipalities	**Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants**	**Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants**	**More than 100 thousand inhabitants**	**Total**
Metropolitan	0	1	5	6
Northern	5	4	2	11
Central	2	8	2	12
Rest of West	1	5	2	8
Southern	6	6	0	12
Total	14	24	**11**	**49**

For the eleven large municipalities, the primary sampling units (PSU) correspond to the next lower sub-divisions in the census. In Haiti, these sub-divisions are defined as "localities" or "areas." Table 5 shows the number of PSUs to be selected in each of the large municipalities.

Table 5. Primary Sampling Units within the Large Municipalities.

Municipality	**Freq.**	**Percent**	**Number of interviews**	**PSUs**
Port-de-Paix	101079	4.6%	36	1
Léogane	107738	4.9%	36	1
la Croix des Bouquets	133564	6.1%	36	1
Saint Marc	140553	6.5%	36	1
Cité Soleil	140730	6.5%	36	1
Cap-Haïtien	145870	6.7%	48	2
Pétion-Ville	182348	8.4%	48	2
Gonaïves	187293	8.6%	48	2
Delmas	222511	10.2%	60	2
Carrefour	261773	12.0%	72	3
Port-au-Prince	555239	25.5%	144	6
Total	***2,178,698***	**100.0%**	**600**	22

In sum, a total of 60 PSUs of 24 interviews each is selected. The PSUs correspond to 14 small municipalities, 24 medium-sized municipalities and 22 PSUs within the three large municipalities.

Second Stage: Selection of Census Segments.

In a second stage of the sample selection process, after stratification by urban and rural, segments or enumeration areas are selected in each PSU with allocation proportional to population size. The census segments are selected with probability proportional to size (PPS) on a systematic basis with a random starting point within each PSU. The number of segments to be selected in each PSU was set taking into account the LAPOP Central requirement of establishing final sampling units of size 6 in both urban areas and rural areas. Table 6 shows the number of segments selected within each stratum. A total of 252 sampling points were selected: 130 in the urban areas and 122 rural ones, distributed across the 54 selected municipalities.

Table 6. Distribution of Sampling Points by Regions and Size of the Municipalities						
	Number of interviews			Number of selected census segments		
Region	**Urban**	**Rural**	**total**	**Urban**	**Rural**	**total**
Metropolitan						
Fewer than 25k inhab.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	24	0	24	4	0	4
More than 100k inhab.	360	0	360	60	0	60
Total Metropolitan	384	0	384	64	0	64
Northern						
Fewer than 25k inhab.	36	84	120	6	14	20
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	24	72	96	4	12	16
More than 100k inhab.	60	12	72	10	2	12
Total Northern	114	174	288	19	29	48
Central						
Fewer than 25k inhab.	12	36	48	2	6	8
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	42	150	192	7	25	32
More than 100k inhab.	60	36	96	10	6	16
Total Central	114	222	336	19	37	56
Rest of West						
Fewer than 25k inhab.	6	18	24	1	3	4
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	42	78	120	7	13	20
More than 100k inhab.	30	42	72	5	7	12
Total Rest of West	78	138	216	13	23	36
Southern						
Fewer than 25k inhab.	24	120	144	4	20	24
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	30	114	144	5	19	24
More than 100k inhab.	0	0	0	0	0	0
TotalSouthern	54	234	288	9	39	48
Total Country	744	768	1512	124	128	252

Third Stage: Selection of Blocks or Manzanas.

In the third stage, blocks or "manzanas" within the census segments are selected. Each country team is expected to obtain the appropriate maps of the selected census segments or enumeration districts from their own census bureaus. Each selected census segment will be divided into three or more manzanas or blocks. One mazana or block will be selected randomly in each census segment. The selected manzana will constitute the sampling point or cluster within the census segment. The interviewer is required to interview 6 persons in each selected manzana/block or cluster.

Fourth Stage: Selection of Households.

This stage of selection begins once interviewers locate the starting point of the block or manzana. Each interviewer will select a number of households in a systematic way. Specifically, interviews should be carried out every three households. In other words, each time an interview is completed, the next interview cannot be carried out in the following two households.

In case of rejection, empty dwelling, or nobody at home, the interviewer selects the adjacent dwelling. In those cases in which the interviewer reaches the end of the manzana without completing the quota of six interviews, he or she can proceed to the next manzana follow the same routine as in the first block.

Fifth Stage: Selection of the Respondents.

A single respondent will be selected in each household, following a quota sampling based on sex and age (as shown in Table 7 below). The quota for each age group and sex was estimated based on the 2002 c ensus. The respondent should be a permanent household member- neither a domestic employee nor a visitor. If there are two or more people of the same sex and age group in the household, the questionnaire should be applied to the person with the next birthday.

Table 7: Quota by Sex and Age Group

Sex/Age group	18- 29	30- 45	45 and over	Total
Male	1	1	1	3
Female	1	1	1	3
Total	2	2	2	6

VI. Oversample of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Because of the important number of people living in camps in the metropolitan area, it was decided to expand the standard sample of 1,500 respondents and interview 324 IDPs in camps (See Table 8 below). A total of 54 IDP camp was selected and 6 interviews were carried out in each IDP camp.

Table 8. Unweighted sample by Stratum and Urban/Rural Areas

Stratum	Total Country	Urban	Rural
Metropolitan Area	384	360	240
Northern	288	114	174
Central	336	114	222
Rest of West	216	78	138
Southern	288	144	144
IDP camps	324	324	0
Total	1,836	1068	768

VII. Confidence Level, and Margins of Error

The confidence levels anticipated for the national sample was 95 percent, with a margin of error of 2.5 percent, assuming a 50/50 proportion in dichotomous variables (in any other proportion, the sampling error is lower). The margins of error for a confidence level of 95 percent assuming a Simple Random Sample (SRS) design are:

Sample Size and Margin of Error (Confidence Level 95%)		
Region	Sample size	Margin of error
Metropolitan Area	384	5.00
Northern	288	5.77
Central	336	5.35
Rest of West	216	6.67
Southern	288	5.77
Areas		
Urban	744	3.59
Rural	768	3.54
Total Country	1, 512	2.52

Since the sample is stratified and clustered (Kish 1995), we have to take into account the complex sample design to accurately estimate the precision of the sample. It is not possible to determine the sampling error a priori. We recommend including the sampling error taking into account the design effect for a set of variables once the survey is completed.

Sample	**Population 18 years and older**			**Percentage**			**Number of interviews**		
Region	**Urban**	**Rural**	**total**	**Urban**	**Rural**	**total**	**Urban**	**Rural**	**total**
Metropolitan									
Fewer than 25k inhab.	-	-	-	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0	0	0
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	72651	0	72,651	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	24	0	24
More than 100k inhab.	1351799	0	1,351,799	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	360	0	360
Total Metropolitan	**1,424,450**	**-**	**1,424,450**	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	384	0	384
Northern									
Fewer than 25k inhab.	112605	290374	402979	27.9%	72.1%	100.0%	36	84	120
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	119955	306588	426543	28.1%	71.9%	100.0%	24	72	96
More than 100k inhab.	200344	46605	246949	81.1%	18.9%	100.0%	60	12	72
Total Northern	**432,904**	**643,567**	**1,076,471**	40.2%	59.8%	100.0%	114	174	288
Central									
Fewer than 25k inhab.	59967	161894	221861	27.0%	73.0%	100.0%	12	36	48

Between 25 and 100k inhab.	146834	540851	687685	21.4%	78.6%	100.0%	42	150	192
More than 100k inhab.	210676	117170	327846	64.3%	35.7%	100.0%	60	36	96
Total Central	**417,477**	**819,915**	**1,237,392**	33.7%	66.3%	100.0%	114	222	336
Rest of West									
Fewer than 25k inhab.	15017	70851	85868	17.5%	82.5%	100.0%	6	18	24
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	162401	288680	451081	36.0%	64.0%	100.0%	42	78	120
More than 100k inhab.	113418	138686	252104	45.0%	55.0%	100.0%	30	42	72
Total Rest of West	**290,836**	**498,217**	**789,053**	36.9%	63.1%	100.0%	78	138	216
Southern									
Fewer than 25k inhab.	90518	475837	566355	16.0%	84.0%	100.0%	24	120	144
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	118626	426679	545305	21.8%	78.2%	100.0%	30	114	144
More than 100k inhab.	0	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0	0	0
Total Southern	**209,144**	**902,516**	**1,111,660**	18.8%	81.2%	100.0%	54	234	288
Total Country	**2,774,811**	**2,864,215**	**5,639,026**	49.2%	50.8%	100.0%	744	768	1512

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Haiti 2012, Version # 9.1.4.0 IRB ***Approval: 110627***

AmericasBarometer: Haiti, 2012

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PAIS. Country:

01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	**22. Haiti**	23. Jamaica
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada
27. Suriname				

22

IDNUM. Questionnaire number **[assigned at the office]** |__|__ |__|__|

ESTRATOPRI:
(2201) Metropolitan Area
(2202) Region 1 (North-Northweat-Northeast)
(2003) Region 2 (Center-Artibonite)
(2204) Region 3 (West)
(2205) Region 4 (South-Southeast-Grand-Anse/Nippes)
|__|__ |__|__|

ESTRATOSEC. Size of the Municipality: (1) Large (more than 100,000) (2) Medium (25,000-100,000) (3) Small (< 25,000) |__|

CORRIDOR. (1) North (2) Port-au-Prince (3) Saint-Marc (4) Other regions |__|

UPM (Primary Sampling Unit)_____ |__|__ |__|

PROV. Department:_____ **22**|__| __|

MUNICIPIO. Commune: _____ **22**|__| __|

HAISEKSYON. Communal Section: _____ |__|__ |

HAISEC. Sector_____ |__|__ |__|

HAISEGMENTO. **Census Segment** _____ |__|__ |__|

CLUSTER. [CLUSTER, Final sampling unit, or sampling point]: _____ |__|__ |
[A cluster must have 6 interviews]

UR. (1) Urban (2) Rural **[Use country's definition]** |__|__ |

TAMANO. Size of place: (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area |__|

IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language: (1) Creole |__|

Start time: _____:_____	**|__|__|__|__|**
FECHA. Date Day: **____** **Month:**_____ Year: 2012	**|__|__|__|__|**
Do you live in this home? **Yes → continue** **No →Thank the respondent and end the interview** **¿Are you a Haitian citizen or permanent resident of Haiti?** **Yes → continue** **No → Thank the respondent and end the interview** **Are you at least 18 years old?** **Yes → continue** **No → Thank the respondent and end the interview**	
NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.	

Q1. **[Note down; do not ask]** Sex: (1) Male (2) Female	

LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... **[Read options]**? (1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES **[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONSHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]** **A4**. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country? **[DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]**	**|___|___|**

Water, lack of	19	Impunity	61
Roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Politicians	59
Corruption	13	Bad government	15
Credit, lack of	09	Environment	10
Crime	05	Migration	16
Human rights, violations of	56	Drug trafficking	12
Unemployment	03	Gangs	14
Inequality	58	Poverty	04
Malnutrition	23	Popular protests (strikes, road blockages, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement of persons	32	Health services, lack of	22
External debt	26	Kidnappings	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack of)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Land to farm, lack of	07
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems of	60
Electricity, lack of	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War against terrorism	17	Taking care of the people hurt by the earthquake	63
Rebuilding the country after the earthquake	62	Other	70
Doesn't know	88	Doesn't answer	98
N/A	99		

SOCT1. How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	
SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was **12 months ago**? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	
IDIO1. How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	
IDIO2. Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.					
In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...? **[Read the options and mark the response]**	**Yes**	**No**	**DK**	**DA**	
CP2. A Deputy or Senator	1	2	88	98	
CP4A. A local public official or local government for example, a mayor, municipal council, or councilman	1	2	88	98	
CP4. Any ministry or minister, state agency or public agency or institution	1	2	88	98	

Now let's talk about your local municipality...	
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**	
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are…? **[Read options]**(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	

In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by this municipality? **[Do not read, accept only a single response, match to one of the codes below]**

	MUNI2A
None **[skip to MUNI5]**	1
Lack of water	2
Roads in poor condition	3
Lack of security, delinquency	4
Lack of street cleanliness	5
Lack of services	6
Economy	7
Lack of funds and assistance	8
Bad government	9
Environment	10
Corruption	11
Displaced people	12
Reconstruction	13
Housing	14
Poor quality education	16
Other_____	77
Other_____	
Other_____	
DK	88
DR	98

MUNI3. How much has the Municipality done to solve this problem? **[Read options]** (1) A lot (2) Something (3) A little (4) Not at all (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

MUNI5A. In your opinion, the majority of expenditures in this municipality are spent on? **[Do not read, accept only a single response]** (1) Street cleanliness (2) Roads, football field, or public works (3) Health, (4) Education (5) Corruption (6) Salary (7) Nothing (8) Other (88) DK (98) DA	
MUNI6. How much confidence do you have that the local/municipal government manages funds well? **[Read the options]** (3) A lot of confidence (2) Some confidence (1) Little confidence (0) None at all (88) DK (98) DA	
MUNI7. In your opinion, the projects carried out by the municipality benefit or do not benefit people like you and your family? (1) Yes, they benefit (0) No, they do not benefit (88) DK (98) DA	

Please tell me which should be the highest THREE priorities of the local government in improvement of your community.			
	First answer HAIMUNI8A	**Second answer HAIMUNI8B**	**Third answer HAIMUNI8C**
Building schools	12	12	12
Neighborhood security	2	2	2
Creating jobs	3	3	3
Roads construction	4	4	4
Potable water	5	5	5
Electricity and renewable energy	6	6	6
Health care	7	7	7
Housing	8	8	8
Environmental Improvements	9	9	9
Improving national government's capacity	13	13	13
Improving local government's capacity	11	11	11
Other priorities	77	77	77
DK	88	88	88
DR	98	98	98
N/A	99	99	99

In your opinion, who should have the greatest responsibility for solving the following problems in your community?	**The mayor**	**Your deputy or senator**	**The national government**	**Community groups**	**DK**	**DR**	
RCP1. Repairing the roads	1	2	3	4	88	98	
RCP2. Controlling crime	1	2	3	4	88	98	
RCP3A. Improving Education	1	2	3	4	88	98	
RCP4. Solving local disputes	1	2	3	4	88	98	

Now let's talk about some services in Haiti								
In general, how would you rate the quality of each of the following services in Haiti? Very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?	**Very good**	**Good**	**Neither good nor bad**	**Bad**	**Very bad**	**DK**	**DA**	
HAIACS1. Transportation system. Would you say that the service is… **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
HAIACS2. Education system. Would you say that the service is… **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
HAIACS3. Public health Care. Would you say that the service is... **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
HAIACS4. Electricity. Would you say that the service is... **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
HAIACS5. Drinkable water. Would you say that the service is... **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
HAIACS6. Trash disposal. Would you say that the service is... **[Read options]**	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	

In the last year, for each person or organization, please tell me whether the performance was very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad	

HAIPERF1. National Government. How would you evaluate its performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
HAIPERF2. Foreign governments. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
HAIPERF3. Local governments. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
HAIPERF4A. Local churches. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
HAIPERF4B. Local NGOs. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
HAIPERF5. Foreign NGOs. How would you evaluate their performance in rebuilding the country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	

Please tell me which should be the highest THREE priorities of the national government in the processus of improving your community.

	First answer HAICOMM1	**Second answer HAICOMM2**	**Third answer HAICOMM3**
Building Schools	12	12	12
Neighborhood security	2	2	2
Creating jobs	3	3	3
Roads construction	4	4	4
Potable water	5	5	5
Electricity and renewable energy	6	6	6
Access to health care	7	7	7
Housing	8	8	8
Environmental Improvements	9	9	9
Improving national government's capacity	13	13	13
Improving local government's capacity	11	11	11
Other priorities	77	77	77
DK	88	88	88
DR	98	98	98
N/A	99	99	99

	Once a week	**Once or twice a month**	**Once or twice a year**	**Never**	**DK**	**DA**	
CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in the last 12 months.	1	2	3	4	88	98	

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a week, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat "once a week," "once or twice a week," "once or twice a year," or "never" to help the interviewee]**										
	Once a week	**Once or twice a month**	**Once or twice a year**	**Never**	**Attend/member**	**Leader/Board member**	**DK**	**DA**	**INAP**	
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4 **[Go to CP7]**			88	98		
CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? **[If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]**					1	2	88	98	99	
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4 **[Go to CP8]**			88	98		
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]**					1	2	88	98	99	
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4 **[Go to CP9]**			88	98		
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]**					1	2	88	98	99	
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4			88	98		
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4			88	98		
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4			88	98	99	
CP21. Meetings of sports or recreation groups?	1	2	3	4			88	98		

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]** (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA	

MIL5. How proud do you feel to be Haitian when you hear the national anthem? **[Read options]** (1) Extremely proud (2) Very proud (3) Somewhat proud (4)Not at all proud or (5) Do you not care? (88) DK (98) DA	

[GIVE CARD A]

L1. Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	**DK 88**	**DA 98**	
Left									**Right**			

[TAKE BACK CARD A]

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to PROT6]** (88) DK**[Go to PROT6]** (98)DA **[Go to PROT6]**	
PROT4. How many times have you participated in a demonstration or protest march in **the last 12 months**? _____ (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A	
PROT7. And, in the last 12 months, have you participated in blocking any street or public space as a form of protest? (1) Yes, participated (2) No, did not participate (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
PROT6. In the **last 12 months** have you signed any petition? (1) Yes, signed (2) No, has not signed (88) DK (98) DA	
PROT8. And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut? (1) Yes, has done (2) No, has not done (88) DK (98) DA	

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the Police Nationale d'Haïti to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a coup by the police be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]**

JC1. When there is high unemployment.	(1) A take-over by the police of the state would be justified	(2) A take-over by the police of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A take-over by the police of the state would be justified	(2) A take-over by the police of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A take-over by the police of the state would be justified	(2) A take-over by the police of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Parliament and govern without Parliament?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC16A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court and govern without the Supreme Court?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]** (88) DK **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]** (98) DA **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]**	
VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? ____ [fill in number] (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
VIC2. Thinking of the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? **[Read the options]** (01) Unarmed robbery, **no** assault or physical threats (02) Unarmed robbery **with** assault or physical threats (03) Armed robbery (04) Assault but not robbery (05) Rape or sexual assault (06) Kidnapping (07) Vandalism (08) Burglary of your home (thieves got into your house while no one was there) (10) Extortion (11) Other (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A (was not a victim)	
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?**[Read options]** (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality/Section communale (4) In another municipality/Section communale (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)	

ARM2. If you could, would you have your own firearm for protection? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	

Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the **last 12 months** ….

	Yes	**No**	**DK**	**DA**	**INAP**	
VIC40. Have you limited the places where you go to shop?	(1)Yes	(0) No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC41. Have you limited the places where you go for recreation?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC43. Have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC44. Out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbors of your community?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC45. In the last twelve months, have you changed your job or work out of fear of crime? **[If does not work mark 99]**	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	(99) INAP	

I am going to read you some things you hear on the street or in the media when people talk about ways to combat crime. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree somewhat, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each one of them. The best way to fight crime…							
	Strongly Agree	**Somewhat Agree**	**Somewhat Disagree**	**Strongly Disagree**	**DK**	**DA**	
VIC101. is to create prevention programs. Do you: **[Read Alternatives]**	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
VIC102. The best way to fight crime is to be tougher on criminals	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
VIC103. The best way to fight crime is to contract private security	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	

Following, I am going to read you a series of situations that you could see at any time. I would like for you to indicate for each one if you would approve, would not approve but would understand, or would neither approve nor understand						
	Would approve	**Would not approve, but would understand**	**Would not approve or understand**	**DK**	**DA**	
VOL207. Suppose that in order to teach a child, a parent hits the child each time he or she disobeys. Would you approve of the parent hitting the child, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL206. Suppose that a man hits his wife because she has been unfaithful with another man. Would you approve of the man hitting his wife, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
	Would approve	**Would not approve, but would understand**	**Would not approve or understand**	**DK**	**DA**	
VOL202. Suppose that a person kills someone who has raped a son or daughter. Would you approve of killing him, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL203. If a person frightens his community and someone kills him, would you approve of killing the person, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL204. If a group of people begin to carry out social cleansing, that is, kill people that some people consider undesirable, would you approve of them killing people considered undesirable, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

VOL205. If the police torture a criminal to get information about a very dangerous organized crime group, would you approve of the police torturing the criminal, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line? (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very **un**safe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA	

AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? **[Read the options]** (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	

AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this community protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think? **[Read options]** (1) Police protect people from crime or (2) Police are involved in crime (3) **[Don't Read]** Neither, or both (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ20. And thinking about your and your family's security, do you feel safer, equally safe, or less safe than five years ago? (1) Safer (2) Equally safe (3) Less safe (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ21.I am going to mention some groups to you, and I would like you to tell me which of them represents the biggest threat to your safety: **[READ ALTERNATIVES, MARK JUST ONE RESPONSE]** (1) Neighbors from your neighborhood or community (2) Gangs (3) The police or military (4) Organized crime and drug traffickers (5) People in your family (6) Common criminals (7) **[DO NOT READ]** Other (8) **[DO NOT READ]** None (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ22. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: **[read options]** (1) Implement preventive measures (2) Increase punishment of criminals (3) **[Don't read]** Both (88) DK (98) DA	

[GIVE CARD B TO THE RESPONDENT]

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly]**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Not at all						**A lot**	**Doesn't know**	**Doesn't Answer**

Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. **B1**. To what extent do you think the courts in Haiti guarantee a fair trial? (**Read*:*** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)	
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Haiti?	
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Haiti?	
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Haiti?	
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Haiti?	
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?	
B11. To what extent do you trust the Electoral Commission?	
B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament?	
B18. To what extent do you trust the Police (PNH)?	
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?	
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church?	
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?	
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?	
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?	
B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?	
HAIB32A. To what extent do you trust the KASEK?	
B43. To what extent are you proud of being Haitian?	
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?	
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?	

Now, using the same ladder, ***[continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]*** **NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT**	**Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA**
N1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?	
N3. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?	
N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?	
N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?	
N15. To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONSHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]** And continuing to use the same card, **NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT**	**Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA 99=N/A**
EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do Haitian political parties represent their voters well? (99) N/A	
EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you? (99) N/A	

Now, using the same ladder, ***[continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]*** **NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT**	**Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA**

MIL3. Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America?	

[Take Back Card B]

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Michel Martelly? **[Read the options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
M2. Now speaking of Congress/Parliament, and thinking of members/senators and representatives as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members/senators and representatives of Congress/Parliament are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA	
HAIM3. Speaking in general of the police, would you say that the police are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98)DA	

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dis**satisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]** (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]** (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	

[GIVE CARD C]

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree." A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

Write a number 1-7, or 88 = Doesn't Know, 98 = Doesn't Answer

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Strongly disagree					**Strongly agree**		**Doesn't know**	**Doesn't answer**

Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements **POP101.** It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?	
POP107. The people should govern directly **rather than** through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?	
POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?	

We are going to continue using the same ladder. Please, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you	

agree or disagree with this statement?	

Write a number 1-7, or 88=DK and 98=DA	
ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7. **(88) DK (98)DA**	
ROS1. The Haitian government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS2. The Haitian government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS3. The Haitian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS4. The Haitian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS6. The Haitian government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[QUESTIONS CCT3 - RAC2A SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]** **CCT3.** Changing the topic…Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A	
GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A	
Now I would like to know how much you are in agreement with some policies I am going to mention. I would like you to respond thinking about what should be done, regardless of whether the policies are being implemented currently. **[Write Down Number 1-7, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A.]**	
GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A	

[Take Back Card C]

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[QUESTIONS W14-PN5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]** **W14A.** And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger? (1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
PN4. And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Haiti? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
PN5. In your opinion, is Haiti very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic? (1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic (4) Not at all democratic (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

[Give the respondent Card D]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 **Doesn't know**	98 **Doesn't Answer**
Strongly disapprove									**Strongly approve**		

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?	
E14. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in Haiti. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Haiti form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: ***[Probe: To what degree?]***	
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Haitian form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?	
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?	
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[QUESTIONS D6-D8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]** **D6.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry? (99) N/A	
D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office? (99) N/A	
D8. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the state/government having the right to prohibit newspapers from publishing news that can be **politically damaging** to it? (99) N/A	

[Take back Card D]

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most: **(1)** For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or **(2)** Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or **(3)** Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. (88) DK (98) DA	
DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? (1) Iron fist (2) Everyone's participation (88) DK (98) DA	

AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? **[Read the options]** (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (88) DK (98)DA	

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	**No**	**Yes**	**DK**	**DA**	
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...						
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC13. Do you work? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98	

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA	
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	88	98	

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA	

Now, changing the subject, and thinking **about your experiences in the past year,** have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?						
	Yes	**No**	**DK**	**DA**	**INAP**	
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98		

VB1. Are you registered to vote? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA	
INF1 [HAIVB1A]. Do you have a national identification card? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	

VB2. Did you vote in the first round of the last **presidential elections** of 2010? **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]** (1) Voted **[Continue]** (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]** (88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**	
VB3. Who did you vote for in the first round of the last presidential elections of 2010? **[DON'T READ THE LIST] [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]** (00) none (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot) (2201) Mirlande Marigat (RDNP) (2202) Michel Joseph Martelly (Repons Peyizan) (2203) Jude Celestin (INITE) (2204) Jean Henry Céant (Renmen Ayiti) (2205) Jacques Edouard Alexis (MPH) (2206) Charles Henry Baker (RESPE) (2207) Jeune Jean Chavannes (ACCRHA) (2208) Yves Cristalin (LAVNI) (2209) Lesly Voltaire (Ansanm Nou Fo) (2210) Josette Bijou (INDEPENDENT) (77) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote)	
VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to POL1]** (88) DK **[Skip to POL1]** (98) DA **[Skip to POL1]**	
VB11. Which political party do you identify with? **[DON'T READ THE LIST]** (2201) Fwon Lespwa (2202) RDNP (2203) Respè	

(2204) Repons Peyizan (2205) MPH (2206) Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haïtienne (2207) Oganizasyon Pèp Kap Lité (2208) Alyans/Alliance Démocratique (2209) Renmen Ayiti (2210) Ansanm nou Fo (2211) Lavalas (2212) Unité (77) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA	

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	

VB20. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? **[Read options]** (1) Wouldn't vote (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote (88) DK (98) DA	

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]** (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA	
PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections of 2010? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA	
VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[QUESTIONS VB51-RAC1CA SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]**	
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians. **VB53.** Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? **[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks "non-whites" in general]** (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this? **[Read alternatives, just one answer]** (1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly (3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES
[QUESTIONS AB1-AB5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]
Changing the subject, and talking about the qualities that children ought to have, I am going to mention various characteristics and I would like you to tell me which one is the most important for a child:

AB1. (1) Independence, or (2) Respect for adults (3) **[Don't read]** Both
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

AB2. (1) Obedience, or (2) Autonomy (3) **[Don't read]** Both
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

AB5. (1) Creativity, or (2) Discipline (3) **[Don't read]** Both
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES
[QUESTIONS SNW1A – SNW1B SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]

SNW1A. Do you personally know an elected official or some person who was a candidate in the most recent national, departmental or local elections?
(1) Yes (2) No **[Go to FOR1]**
(88) DK **[Go to FOR1]** (98) DA **[Go to FOR1]** (99) N/A

SNW1B. And is this position at the local, departmental or national level?
(1) Local (2) Departmental (3) National
(4) Candidates at more than one level (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES
[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (FOR1-FOR8) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8")]

FOR1. Now we are going to talk about your views with respect to some countries. When we talk about "China" in this interview, we are talking about mainland China, the People's Republic of China, and not the island of Taiwan. Which of the following countries has the **most influence** in **the Caribbean**? **[READ CHOICES]**
(1) China (2) Japan
(3) India (4) United States
(5) Brazil (6) Venezuela
(7) Mexico (10) Spain
(11) **[Don't read]** Another country, or (12) **[Don't read]** None **[Go to FOR4]**
(88) **[Don't read]** DK **[Go to FOR4]** (98) **[Do not read]** DA **[Go to FOR4]**
(99) N/A

FOR2. And thinking of **[country mentioned in FOR1]** do you think that its influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?
(1) Very positive (2) Positive
(3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative (4) Negative
(5) Very negative (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence
(88) **[Do not read]** DK (98) **[Do not read]** DA (99) N/A

FOR3. [Ask ONLY if the country mentioned in FOR1 was NOT China]
And thinking of China and the influence it has in **the Caribbean**, do you think that this influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?
(1) Very positive (2) Positive
(3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative (4) Negative
(5) Very negative (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

FOR4. And **within 10 years**, in your opinion, which of the following countries will have most influence in **the Caribbean**?
[Read options]
(1) China (2) Japan
(3) India (4) United States

(5) Brazil (6) Venezuela (7) Mexico (10) Spain (11) **[Don't read]** Another country, or (12) **[Don't read]** None (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
FOR5. In your opinion, which of the following countries ought to be a model for the future development of **our country**? **[Read options]** (1) China (2) Japan (3) India (4) United States (5) Singapore (6) Russia (7) South Korea (10) Brazil (11) Venezuela, or (12) Mexico (13) **[Do not read]** None/We ought to follow our own model (14) **[Do not read]** Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
FOR6. And thinking now **only of our country,** how much influence do you think that China has in **our country? [Read options]** (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) None **[Go to FOR8]** (88) DK **[Go to FOR8]** (98) DA **[Go to FOR8]** (99) N/A	
FOR7. In general, the influence that China has on our country is **[Read alternatives]** (1) Very positive (2) Positive (3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative (4) Negative (5) Very negative (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
FOR8. How much do you agree with the following statement: "Chinese business contributes to the economic development of Haiti? Do you **[Read alternatives]**… (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (FOR9A-FOR9D) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]

According to what you have heard, do Chinese businesses operating in Haiti suffer from any of the following problems? **[Read alternatives.]**

	It is a problem	**It is not a problem**	**No opinion/DK**	**DA**	**N/A**	
FOR9A. Labor relations, such as disputes with workers or unions. Do you think that it is a problem, or that it is not, or do you not have an opinion on the matter?	1	2	88	98	99	
FOR9B. Problems that arise from failure to understand the culture and customs of Haiti	1	2	88	98	99	
FOR9C. Lack of knowledge of the political, legal, and social values and rules in Haiti	1	2	88	98	99	
FOR9D. Lack of communication with the media and residents.	1	2	88	98	99	

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (MIL10A-MIL10E) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust the governments of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion

	Very trust-worthy	Somewhat trust-worthy	Not very trust-worthy	Not at all trust-worthy	DK/No opinion	DA	N/A	
MIL10A. The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10B. That of Russia. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10C. Iran. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10D. Israel. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10E. United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (MIL11A-MIL11E) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]

Now I would like to ask you about the relations in general of our country with other nations around the world. When you think of our country's relationship with **China**, would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?

	Closer	About the same	More distant	DK/No opinion	DA	N/A	
MIL11A. China	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11B. And our country's relationship with Rusia. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11C. And with Iran. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11D. And with Israel. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11E. Finally, with the United States. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	

On a different subject…

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

HAIPOLIS. Would you say that the police is enough to provide security in the country or another force is needed in the country? **[Read options]**
(1) Police is enough to provide security
(2) Another force is needed
(88) DK (98) DA

RESTAVEK1. Government. Do you think the government should prevent families from sending their child to work as a restavek?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

RESTAVEK3. Community Organizations. Do you think your local community organizations should prevent families from sending their child to work as a restavek?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

HAIMIG1. How long have you been living in this municipality?
1. Less than 1 year
_____ Years (88) DK (98) DA

AIDP2. And now, speaking of that residence where you lived on the day when the earthquake struck, how much damage did that place suffer from the earthquake? **[Read options]**
(1) None (2) It was damaged but repairable (3) It was damaged but is not repairable (4) It was completely destroyed (88) DK (98)DA

AIDP4. What is the name of the municipality in which you were living on the day when the earthquake struck? _____ (88) DK (89)DK (99) NA	

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?
_____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

00. None

Primary	**Secondary**	**University**
01 Pre-School	08 Sixième / 7 A.F.	15 University 1
02 Preparatory1 / 1 A.F.	09 Cinquième / 8 A.F.	16 University 2
03 Preparatory 2 / 2 A.F.	10 Quatrième / 9 A.F.	17 University 3
04 Elementary 1 / 3 A.F.	11 Troisième	**18+ University 4 and more**
05 Elementary 2 / 4 A.F.	12 Seconde	
06 Intermediate 1 / 5 A.F.	13 Rhéto	
07 Intermediate 2 / 6 A.F.	14 Philo	
(88) DK	(98) DA	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES
[ED2 AND MOV1 SHOULD ONLY BE ASKED FOR INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]
ED2. And what educational level did your mother complete? **[DO NOT READ OPTIONS]**
(00) None
(01) Primary incomplete
(02) Primary complete
(03) Secondary incomplete
(04) Secondary complete
(05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
(06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
(07) University (bachelor's degree or higher) incomplete
(08) University (bachelor's degree or higher) complete
(88) DK
(98) DA
(99) N/A

MOV1. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the …? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Upper class (2) Upper middle class (3) Middle class
(4) Lower middle class, or (5) Lower class?
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Q2D-Y. On what day, month and year were you born? **[If respondent refuses to say the day and month, ask for only the year, or ask for the age and then calculate the year.]** _____ Day ____ Month (01 = January) _____Year (For Q2D and Q2M: 88 =DK and 98 = DR) (For Q2Y: 8888 = DK and 9888 = DR)	|_|_|Q2D Day |_|_|Q2M Month |_|_|_|_|Q2Y Year

Q3C. What is your religion, if any? **[Do not read options]** **[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]** (1) Catholic (2) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian). (3) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i). (4) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion) (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra). (6) LDS (Mormon). (7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform). (11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God). (12) Jehovah's Witness. (88) DK (98) DA	
Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? **[Read options]** (1) More than once per week (2) Once per week (3) Once a month (4) Once or twice a year (5) Never or almost never (88) DK (98) DA	
Q5B. Please, could you tell me how important is religion in your life? **[Read options]** (1) Very important (2) Rather important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important (88) DK (98) DA	

PS1. Where does the water used in this house come from? **[Read options]** (1) In house plumbing **[Continue]** (2) Outdoor plumbing but part of the property **[Continue]** (3) Neighbor's plumbing **[Continue]** (4) Public sink or faucet **[Continue]** (5) Well on the property **[Go to PS3]** (6) Well in the neighborhood **[Go to PS3]** (7) Truck, wagon or tanker **[Go to PS3]** (8**)** Water bucket **[Go to PS3]** (9) Rain **[Go to PS3]** (10) Spring, river or stream **[Go to PS3]** (11) Other **[Go to PS3** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to PS3]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to PS3]**	

PS2. How often does this household receive water? **[Read options]** (1) Every day (2) Every two days (3) Every three days (4) Once a week (5) Once every two weeks or less (88) Doesn't know (98) DA (99) N/A	
PS3. Is this house/apartment connected to the public electric power supply? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Don't Know (98) DA	
PS4. Approximately how many hours per day have you been supplied with electricity within the3 past months? Hours of electricity per day (00-24)_____ (88) Doesn't know (98) DA (99) N/A	

OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently **[Read options]** (1) Working? **[Continue]** (2) Not working, but have a job? **[Continue]** (3) Actively looking for a job? **[Go to Q10NEW]** (4) A student? **[Go to Q10NEW]** (5) Taking care of the home? **[Go to Q10NEW]** (6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work **[Go to Q10NEW]** (7) Not working and not looking for a job? **[Go to Q10NEW]** (88) DK **[Go to Q10NEW]** (98) DA **[Go to Q10NEW]**	
OCUP1A. In this job are you: **[Read the options]** (1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise? (2) A salaried employee in the private sector? (3) Owner or partner in a business (4) Self-employed (5) Unpaid worker (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

[GIVE CARD F]

Q10NEW. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children? **[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: "Which is the total monthly income in your household?]** (00) No income (01) Less than 800 gourdes (02) 800-1600 gourdes (03) 1601-2400 gourdes (04) 2401-3200 gourdes (05) 3201-4000 gourdes (06) 4001-4800 gourdes (07) 4801-5620 gourdes (08) 5621-6380 gourdes (09) 6381-7200 gourdes (10) 7201-8400 gourdes (11) 8401-9600 gourdes (12) 9601-14400 gourdes (13) 14401-19200 gourdes (14) 19201-24000 gourdes (15) 24001 – 28800 gourdes (16) More than 28800 gourdes (88) DK (98) DA	

[ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING OR IS RETIRED/DISABLED/ON PENSION (VERIFY OCUP4A)] **Q10G.** How much money do you personally earn each month in your work or retirement or pension**? [If the respondent does not understand: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]** (17) No income (18) Less than 800 gourdes (19) 800-1600 gourdes (20) 1601-2400 gourdes (21) 2401-3200 gourdes (22) 3201-4000 gourdes (23) 4001-4800 gourdes (24) 4801-5620 gourdes (25) 5621-6380 gourdes	

(26) 6381-7200 gourdes (27) 7201-8400 gourdes (28) 8401-9600 gourdes (29) 9601-14400 gourdes (30) 14401-19200 gourdes (31) 19201-24000 gourdes (32) 24001 – 28800 gourdes (33) More than 28800 gourdes (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Not working and not retired)	

[TAKE BACK CARD F]

Q10A. Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	
Q14. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	
Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read the options]** (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time (88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA	
Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: **[Read options]** (1) Increased? (2) Remained the same? (3) Decreased? (88) DK (98) DA	

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.					
	No	**Yes**	**DK**	**DA**	
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	

Q11. What is your marital status? **[Read options]** (1) Single **[Go to Q12C]** (2) Married **[CONTINUE]** (3) Common law marriage **[CONTINUE]** (4) Divorced **[Go to Q12C]** (5) Separated **[Go to Q12C]** (6) Widowed **[Go to Q12C]** (88) DK **[Go to Q12C]** (98) DA **[Go to Q12C]**	
GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]** (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all (2) You earn less than your spouse; (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse; (4) You earn more than your spouse; (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing (6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP	
Q12C. How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____ (88) DK (98) DA	
Q12. Do you have children? How many? _____ **(00 = none → Skip to ETID)** (88) DK (98) DA	

Q12B. How many of your children are under 13 years of age and live in this household? _____ **00 = none**, (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP (no children)	
ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race? **[If respondent says Afro-Haitian, mark (4) Black]** (1) White (4) Black (5) Mulatto (7) Other (88) DK (98) DA	

LENG1. What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? **[Mark only one answer] [Do not read the options]** (2201) Creole (2202) French (2203) Spanish (2204) English (2205) Other (88) DK (98) DA	
WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? **[Read options]** (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA	

For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information people have about politics and the country...

GI0. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? **[Read alternatives]:**
(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never
(88) DK (98) DA

	Correct	Incorrect	Don't know	Don't answer	
GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States of America? **[Don't read**: Barack Obama, accept Obama**]**	1	2	88	98	
GI4. How long is the presidential term of office in Haiti? **[Don't read:** 5 years**]**	1	2	88	98	
GI7. How many members does the Chamber of Deputies have? **[NOTE EXACT NUMBER. REPEAT ONLY ONCE IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOESN'T ANSWER]**	Number: _____		8888	9888	

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

R1. Television	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R5. Vehicle/car How many? **[If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]**	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	
R6. Washing machine	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R15. Computer	(0) No **[GO TO R16]**			(1) Yes	
R18. Internet	(0) No	(1) Yes		(99) N/A	
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No			(1) Yes	

R26. Is the house connected to the sewage system?	(0) No	(1) Yes	

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

COLORR. [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent] _____ (97) Could not be classified **[Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]**	**|___|___|**
Time interview ended _____ : _____ **TI.** Duration of interview ***[minutes, see page # 1]*** _____	|__|__|__|
INTID. Interviewer ID number: _____	|__|__|__|
SEXI. Note your own sex: (**1**) **Male** (**2**) **Female**	
COLORI. Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.	**|___|___|**

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.
*Interviewer's signature*_____ *Date* ____ /_____ /_____

Field supervisor's signature _____
Comments: _____
_____
[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who entered the data _____
[Not for PDA use]Signature of the person who verified the data _____

Card A



Card B



Card C



Card D



Card F

(00) No income
(01) Less than 800 gourdes
(02) 800-1600 gourdes
(03) 1601-2400 gourdes
(04) 2401-3200 gourdes
(05) 3201-4000 gourdes
(06) 4001-4800 gourdes
(07) 4801-5620 gourdes
(08) 5621-6380 gourdes
(09) 6381-7200 gourdes
(10) 7201-8400 gourdes
(11) 8401-9600 gourdes
(12) 9601-14400 gourdes
(13) 14401-19200 gourdes
(14) 19201-24000 gourdes
(15) 24001 – 28800 gourdes
(16) More than 28800 gourdes

Color Palette

Appendix D. Tables of Regression Output

Figure 10. Linear regression model of years of education

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Urban	0.079	0.029	0.007
Woman	-0.073	0.015	0.000
Skin Tone	-0.141	0.021	0.000
26-35 years	0.008	0.023	0.730
36-45 years	-0.095	0.025	0.000
46-55 years	-0.170	0.029	0.000
56-65 years	-0.110	0.019	0.000
66+ years	-0.097	0.031	0.002
Constant	0.168	0.028	0.000
Number of observations	1731		
F(8, 103)	21.260		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.111		

Figure 14. Linear regression model of personal income

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Urban	-0.017	0.045	0.709
Woman	-0.116	0.030	0.000
Skin Tone	0.042	0.052	0.422
Receives Remittances	0.164	0.043	0.000
26-35 years	0.051	0.065	0.435
36-45 years	0.024	0.064	0.714
46-55 years	0.009	0.064	0.889
56-65 years	-0.009	0.050	0.863
66+ years	-0.077	0.033	0.022
Constant	-0.081	0.063	0.203
Number of observations	571		
F(9, 92)	8.080		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.053		

Figure 17. Linear regression model of food insecurity

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Urban	0.036	0.037	0.344
Woman	0.066	0.024	0.007
Skin Tone	0.097	0.036	0.007
Receives Remittances	-0.215	0.038	0.000
26-35 years	-0.096	0.036	0.008
36-45 years	-0.105	0.039	0.008
46-55 years	-0.088	0.034	0.012
56-65 years	-0.029	0.029	0.309
66+ years	0.021	0.023	0.373
Constant	0.065	0.044	0.143
Number of observations	1717		
F(9, 102)	11.100		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.068		

Figure 21. Logistic regression model of workplace discrimination

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Urban	0.265	0.098	0.008
Woman	-0.054	0.053	0.306
Skin Tone	-0.113	0.073	0.124
26-35 years	0.136	0.114	0.236
36-45 years	0.137	0.078	0.080
46-55 years	0.054	0.088	0.539
56-65 years	0.022	0.061	0.726
66+ years	0.073	0.068	0.281
Education	-0.117	0.067	0.086
Constant	-1.265	0.105	0.000
Number of observations	1689		
F(9, 102)	2.420		
Prob > F	0.016		

Figure 45. Linear Regression Model of Internal Efficacy

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	0.009	0.029	0.764
Woman	0.006	0.027	0.818
Homemaker	-0.046	0.025	0.062
Age	-0.008	0.026	0.768
Education	0.129	0.033	0.000
Quintile of Wealth	-0.004	0.029	0.896
Political Interest	0.244	0.031	0.000
Skin Tone	-0.032	0.030	0.302
Victim of Discrimination by Government	-0.015	0.037	0.675
Victim of Discrimination Elsewhere	-0.085	0.029	0.004
Constant	0.093	0.040	0.021
Number of observations	1580		
F(10, 101)	15.490		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.094		

Figure 48. Linear Regression Model of External Efficacy

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	0.016	0.038	0.671
Woman	0.019	0.026	0.449
Homemaker	-0.032	0.029	0.273
Age	-0.018	0.029	0.530
Education	0.110	0.033	0.001
Quintile of Wealth	-0.017	0.029	0.567
Political Interest	0.009	0.023	0.698
Skin Tone	-0.016	0.030	0.594
Victim of Discrimination by Government	-0.037	0.040	0.358
Victim of Discrimination Elsewhere	-0.107	0.027	0.000
Constant	0.139	0.052	0.008
Number of observations	1593		
F(10, 101)	4.860		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.033		

Figure 49. Linear Regression Model of Agreement that Parties Listen to People Like You

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	0.011	0.040	0.775
Woman	0.005	0.045	0.918
Homemaker	-0.026	0.033	0.432
Age	-0.014	0.039	0.717
Education	0.133	0.047	0.006
Quintile of Wealth	-0.031	0.049	0.524
Political Interest	0.047	0.040	0.241
Skin Tone	-0.075	0.039	0.061
Victim of Discrimination by Government	0.099	0.045	0.030
Victim of Discrimination Elsewhere	-0.090	0.036	0.015
Constant	0.058	0.052	0.267
Number of observations	758		
F(10, 101)	2.910		
Prob > F	0.003		
R-squared	0.045		

Figure 53. Linear Regression Model of System Support

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	-0.037	0.037	0.316
Woman	0.008	0.023	0.733
Homemaker	0.007	0.024	0.781
Age	0.028	0.025	0.265
Education	0.050	0.039	0.206
Quintile of Wealth	0.017	0.030	0.572
Political Interest	0.108	0.033	0.001
Skin Tone	-0.134	0.026	0.000
Victim of Discrimination by Government	0.163	0.048	0.001
Victim of Discrimination Elsewhere	-0.047	0.025	0.065
Constant	0.288	0.045	0.000
Number of observations	1599		
F(10, 101)	10.840		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.065		

Figure 56. Linear Regression Model of Support for Democracy

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	0.033	0.022	0.138
Woman	-0.070	0.022	0.002
Homemaker	0.021	0.023	0.373
Age	0.005	0.022	0.808
Education	0.077	0.037	0.041
Quintile of Wealth	0.004	0.026	0.887
Political Interest	0.072	0.042	0.087
Skin Tone	-0.009	0.021	0.686
Victim of Discrimination by Government	-0.025	0.031	0.428
Victim of Discrimination Elsewhere	-0.025	0.026	0.344
Constant	0.054	0.032	0.101
Number of observations	1592		
F(10, 101)	3.770		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.029		

Figure 60. Logistic Regression Model of Protest Participation

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	0.078	0.088	0.376
Age	0.027	0.081	0.735
Woman	-0.328	0.087	0.000
Homemaker	-0.184	0.106	0.085
Education	-0.033	0.097	0.731
Quintile of Wealth	0.023	0.086	0.787
Political Interest	0.340	0.077	0.000
Comunity Improvement Committee Participation	0.393	0.088	0.000
Skin Tone	-0.102	0.084	0.229
Perception of the National Economy	-0.151	0.078	0.055
Martelly Vote 2010	0.124	0.070	0.077
Victim of Discrimination by Government	0.295	0.076	0.000
Victim of Discrimination Elsewhere	0.193	0.066	0.004
Constant	-1.749	0.119	0.000
Number of observations	1527		
F(13, 98)	11.810		
Prob > F	0.000		

Figure 69. Logistic Regression Model of Corruption Victimization

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Education	0.238	0.102	0.022
Size of Place of Residence	-0.025	0.068	0.712
Perception Family Economic Situation	-0.024	0.081	0.767
Woman	0.004	0.049	0.935
Quintile of Wealth	0.231	0.076	0.003
Skin Tone	-0.148	0.062	0.019
Constant	0.668	0.075	0.000
Number of observations	1588		
F(6, 105)	4.470		
Prob > F	0.001		

Figure 78. Logistic Regression Model of Crime Victimization

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Education	-0.064	0.094	0.494
Size of Place of Residence	0.085	0.066	0.203
Perception Family Economic Situation	-0.012	0.081	0.888
Woman	-0.052	0.103	0.617
Quintile of Wealth	0.085	0.078	0.277
Skin Tone	0.153	0.076	0.045
Constant	-1.398	0.086	0.000
Number of observations	1587		
F(6, 105)	1.120		
Prob > F	0.353		

Figure 85. Logistic Regression Model of Support for Efforts to End the Practice of Sending Children to Work as Restaveks

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Quintile of Wealth	-0.092	0.102	0.370
Education	0.252	0.088	0.005
Size of Place of Residence	-0.466	0.116	0.000
Skin Tone	0.177	0.075	0.020
Woman	-0.001	0.068	0.988
Age	-0.135	0.078	0.086
Children in the Home	-0.021	0.072	0.772
Constant	1.831	0.154	0.000
Number of observations	1704		
F(7, 104)	6.490		
Prob > F	0.000		

Figure 87. Linear Regression Model of System Support

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Education	0.076	0.031	0.014
Size of Place of Residence	0.003	0.033	0.922
Skin Tone	-0.106	0.023	0.000
Woman	0.019	0.022	0.373
Perception of Insecurity	-0.125	0.031	0.000
Crime Victimization	-0.007	0.020	0.719
Perception of Corruption	-0.336	0.042	0.000
Corruption Victimization	0.150	0.024	0.000
Constant	0.218	0.037	0.000
Number of observations	1569		
F(8, 103)	19.810		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.164		

Figure 91. Logistic Regression Model of Support for the Rule of Law

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Education	0.038	0.074	0.607
Size of Place of Residence	-0.118	0.072	0.101
Skin Tone	-0.005	0.066	0.943
Woman	-0.019	0.074	0.796
Interpersonal Trust	-0.018	0.078	0.821
Ideology (Rightist)	-0.091	0.061	0.142
Corruption Victimization	-0.179	0.069	0.011
Crime Victimization	-0.132	0.059	0.028
Perception of Insecurity	-0.249	0.088	0.006
Perception of Corruption	-0.027	0.078	0.726
Constant	0.803	0.087	0.000
Number of observations	1449		
F(10, 101)	3.830		
Prob > F	0.000		

Figure 99. Linear Regression Model of Political Tolerance

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Perception of the National Economy	-0.035	0.037	0.350
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	-0.122	0.030	0.000
Perception of Insecurity	0.105	0.029	0.000
Crime Victimization	-0.040	0.024	0.100
Frequency of Church Attendance	-0.016	0.034	0.634
Importance of Religion	-0.010	0.043	0.817
Support for Democracy	0.206	0.035	0.000
Education	0.050	0.024	0.036
Quintile of Wealth	-0.013	0.031	0.670
Skin Tone	0.081	0.030	0.008
Woman	-0.041	0.018	0.027
Constant	0.004	0.042	0.925
Number of observations	1523		
F(11, 100)	9.230		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.102		

Figure 103. Logistic Regression Model of Stable Democratic Support

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Crime Victimization	-0.003	0.084	0.976
Perception of Insecurity	-0.065	0.088	0.461
Corruption Victimization	0.046	0.087	0.594
Perception of Corruption	-0.308	0.094	0.001
Perception of the National Economy	0.089	0.123	0.471
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.141	0.079	0.076
Woman	-0.045	0.078	0.569
Quintile of Wealth	-0.001	0.103	0.994
Education	0.139	0.089	0.122
Size of Place of Residence	-0.042	0.125	0.735
Skin Tone	-0.067	0.095	0.481
Constant	-2.164	0.135	0.000
Number of observations	1510		
F(11, 100)	2.520		
Prob > F	0.008		

Figure 114. Logistic Regression Model of Seeking Assistance from Local Government

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Trust in Local Government	-0.206	0.089	0.022
Attended a Local Government Meeting	1.061	0.074	0.000
Perception Family Economic Situation	0.162	0.077	0.038
Education	0.028	0.090	0.758
Woman	-0.103	0.064	0.108
26-35 years	0.041	0.101	0.683
36-45 years	0.171	0.099	0.089
46-55 years	-0.058	0.102	0.572
56-65 years	-0.109	0.083	0.192
66+ years	0.065	0.071	0.359
Skin Tone	0.068	0.082	0.409
Quintile of Wealth	-0.020	0.092	0.828
Size of Place of Residence	0.048	0.070	0.492
Constant	-1.708	0.089	0.000
Number of observations	1529		
F(13, 98)	17.170		
Prob > F	0.000		

Figure 129. Linear Regression Model of System Support

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Satisfaction with Local Services	0.117	0.032	0.000
Crime Victimization	-0.014	0.020	0.504
Perception of Insecurity	-0.103	0.027	0.000
Corruption Victimization	0.152	0.029	0.000
Perception of Corruption	-0.350	0.040	0.000
Approval of President's Job Performance	0.112	0.034	0.001
Political Interest	0.102	0.030	0.001
Perception of the National Economy	-0.053	0.038	0.166
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.164	0.032	0.000
Perception Family Economic Situation	0.010	0.028	0.734
Woman	0.023	0.023	0.317
Quintile of Wealth	-0.042	0.030	0.165
Education	0.034	0.039	0.376
Size of Place of Residence	0.004	0.033	0.909
Skin Tone	-0.080	0.027	0.003
Constant	0.129	0.043	0.004
Number of observations	1303		
F(15, 96)	23.160		
Prob > F	0.000		
R-squared	0.278		

Figure 134. Hierarchical Linear Regression Model of Evaluations of National Government Performance in Rebuilding

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	0.067	0.037	0.069
Quintile of Wealth	0.054	0.026	0.040
Woman	0.019	0.023	0.402
Education	0.125	0.030	0.000
Earthquake damage to home	0.017	0.033	0.614
Repons Peyizan identifier	0.039	0.014	0.004
Earthquake damage in the municipality	-0.104	0.054	0.055
Constant	-0.098	0.052	0.060
LR test vs. linear regression			
Chi-squared (01)	56.400		
Prob >= Chi-Squared	0.000		
Number of observations	1687		
Number of groups	50		
Log restricted-likelihood	-2336.253		
Wald chi2(7)	43.350		
Prob > chi2	0.000		

Figure 150. Hierarchical Linear Regression Model of Support for Democracy

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	0.031	0.030	0.302
Quintile of Wealth	0.011	0.024	0.652
Perception of the National Economy	-0.105	0.023	0.000
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	-0.065	0.023	0.005
Woman	-0.055	0.020	0.006
Education	0.104	0.027	0.000
Age	0.009	0.019	0.658
Food Insecurity	-0.065	0.022	0.003
Earthquake damage to home	0.003	0.030	0.910
Earthquake damage in the municipality	0.033	0.040	0.402
IDP camp	-0.053	0.025	0.036
Constant	0.141	0.037	0.000
LR test vs. linear regression			
Chi-squared (01)	14.310		
Prob >= Chi-Squared	0.000		
Number of observations	1616		
Number of groups	50		
Log restricted-likelihood	-1987.992		
Wald chi2(11)	85.630		
Prob > chi2	0.000		

Figure 162. Hierarchical Linear Regression Model of System Support

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	-0.008	0.034	0.820
Quintile of Wealth	0.006	0.026	0.811
Perception of the National Economy	-0.006	0.025	0.805
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.227	0.025	0.000
Woman	-0.005	0.022	0.815
Education	0.051	0.029	0.074
Age	0.058	0.021	0.005
Food Insecurity	-0.069	0.024	0.004
Earthquake damage to home	-0.033	0.032	0.314
Earthquake damage in the municipality	-0.124	0.047	0.008
IDP camp	0.061	0.027	0.024
Constant	0.141	0.044	0.001
LR test vs. linear regression			
Chi-squared (01)	35.770		
Prob >= Chi-Squared	0.000		
Number of observations	1621		
Number of groups	50		
Log restricted-likelihood	-2107.351		
Wald chi2(11)	156.180		
Prob > chi2	0.000		

Figure 164. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Model of Protest Participation

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	0.032	0.059	0.590
Age	0.030	0.052	0.567
Female	-0.524	0.158	0.001
Homemaker	-0.611	0.364	0.094
Education	0.000	0.025	0.989
Quintile of Wealth	-0.004	0.054	0.942
Political Interest	0.011	0.003	0.000
Community Improvement Committee Participation	0.013	0.002	0.000
Skin Tone	-0.052	0.042	0.217
Perception of the National Economic Situation	-0.007	0.004	0.054
Vote for Martelly 2010	0.142	0.147	0.335
Victim of Dicrimination by Government	0.006	0.002	0.001
Victim of Dicrimination Elsewhere	0.004	0.002	0.021
Food Insecurity	0.001	0.001	0.248
Earthquake Damage to Home	0.114	0.100	0.257
Earthquake Damage in Municipality	-0.008	0.179	0.964
IDP Camp	-0.164	0.235	0.484
Constant	-2.143	0.621	0.001
LR test vs. logistic regression			
Chi-squared (01)	2.170		
Prob >= Chi-Squared	0.070		
Number of observations	1468		
Number of groups	50		
Log likelihood	-629.228		
Wald chi2(17)	122.850		
Prob > chi2	0.000		

Figure 175. Logistic Regression Model of Support for the Incumbent

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t
Size of Place of Residence	-0.013	0.113	0.906
IDP camp	-0.036	0.107	0.736
Quintile of Wealth	0.015	0.123	0.903
Woman	0.040	0.081	0.622
Education	0.119	0.117	0.311
Age	0.063	0.100	0.531
Food Insecurity	-0.075	0.119	0.527
Crime Victimization	-0.091	0.087	0.301
Corruption Victimization	-0.383	0.097	0.000
Perception of National Government Performance in Rebuilding	-0.274	0.115	0.019
Political Interest	-0.370	0.098	0.000
Effectiveness of Current Administration	0.138	0.122	0.260
Repons Peyizan identifier	0.496	0.074	0.000
Leftist	-0.112	0.239	0.641
Rightist	0.395	0.203	0.054
Centrist	-0.081	0.197	0.682
Constant	1.167	0.129	0.000
Number of observations	917		
F(16, 90)	5.920		
Prob > F	0.000		

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life.

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The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United Stated and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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