# *Democracy Audit: Bolivia 2006 Report*


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# Introduction

The Bolivian political scene has changed substantially in the last few years. The election of President Evo Morales by an absolute majority in December, 2005, the election of members to the Constituent Assembly at the beginning of July of this year, and the binding referendum on departamental autonomy – the latter two unthinkable processes until just recently – are visible signs of the transformation of the national political space. One question that naturally arises out of this context is whether or not the broad changes to the political system are accompanied by shifts in citizens' perceptions, expectations, values and attitudes toward the political world. This report presents empirical evidence suggesting that Bolivians' political culture has not been unconnected from the process of change.

This report is part of a series of studies that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University has carried out in Bolivia since 1998 with the financial support of USAID-Bolivia. The study uses surveys that produce indicators of political opinions, attitudes and values which are comparable over time and with those obtained in other Latin American countries where LAPOP works. The survey, whose results we analyze and discuss in this report, was conducted in March, 2006. As can be seen in the first section of this document, the study was based on a representative sample of the national population, carried out in urban and rural areas of the country's nine departments.

The second chapter of this report analyzes the different variations of self-identification that Bolivians have in relation to national politics. Here, we emphasize evidence showing identity to be a social construct, something flexible and susceptible to be transformed over time. The third chapter focuses on the analysis of a particularly important theme in the country: political tolerance. The fourth section presents the results of an examination of a little-explored topic in Bolivian politics and society: social capital. The 2006 elections are the focus of the fifth chapter. Here, we seek to identity the characteristics of voters for the different political parties in 2006, with particular emphasis on the majority who supported the Moviemiento al Socialismo (MAS). The sixth chapter concentrates on certain expectations and perceptions that Bolivians have of the Constituent Assembly. In the last chapter of this report, support for democratic institutions is the object of study; here we highlight the increase in the level of trust that Bolivians have in their political institutions.

This study has two comparative advantages over other investigations of political culture in Bolivia. One the one hand, the data produced here is part of a series begun in 1998, with further rounds of surveys conducted in 2000, 2002, 2004, and now again in 2006. The temporal perspective this series gives us makes it possible to follow the evolution of particular indicators of interest. On the other hand, the survey carried out in Bolivia is similar to surveys that LAPOP has conducted in 16 other countries in the region. This allows us to generate indicators that are comparable between different countries, and which put the results from Bolivia in a more objective perspective.

This report was written by the LAPOP investigation team at Vanderbilt University, in Tennessee, USA. The company Encuesta y Estudios from La Paz, Bolivia was in charge of data collection; with their characteristic seriousness and professionalism, they confronted the the difficult task of conducting the surveys of the thousands of people selected. *Ciudadanía, comunidad de estudios sociales y acción pública* (Citizenship, Community of Social Studies and Public Action), from Cochabamba – LAPOP's academic counterpart in Bolivia – was in charge of publishing this report. *Maestrías para el Desarrollo* (Masters in Development) of the Universidad Católica Boliviana is LAPOP's academic connection in La Paz.

The authors of this report give particular thanks to the more than three thousand Bolivians who offered their time to generate the valuable information analyzed here. We are convinced that it is necessary to have more thorough knowledge of the topics relevant to Bolivian democracy in order to deepen it and make it more beneficial to its citizens. This, we believe, is our contribution. We hope that the information and analysis presented in this report will be useful to academics and scholars of Bolivian politics, to those involved in decision-making at different levels, and to citizens interested in the perceptions and values of their fellow Bolivians.

# I. The 2006 Sample: Design and Characteristics

This report on Bolivian political culture presents the results of the survey conducted in February and March, 2006. It also draws on survey data from previous years in order to make comparative analyses with prior perceptions for those cases where such a comparison is appropriate. Earlier editions of this study included a description of the sample design. That same description is included here, though updated to reflect the 2006 sample, for readers who have not had access to previous reports.

The 2006 sample was carefully designed to closely represent the characteristics of the general population. This means that the sample should have the same proportion of men and women as the Bolivian population; that it should accurately reflect the distribution of the population among urban and rural areas; and that it should reflect the educational, ethnic and cultural diversity of the general population.

A sample design that is representative of the characteristics of the general population significantly reduces the possibility of distortion in the collection and interpretation of the data obtained through public opinion surveys. The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), therefore, lays great emphasis on the design of a sample that represents the characteristics of the populations with which it works. Afterall, respondents' characteristics, such as their level of eductation and gender, can influence some of the attitudes and behaviors that this study analyzes in Bolivia.

The 2006 sample included of a total of 3,013 [1] persons: men and women above 18 years of age; of diverse ethnic identities, different educational levels, and with different occupations; and they were interviewed in urban and rural areas of all departments in the country,.

In order to obtain the most accurate results, interviews for the LAPOP study were conducted in Spanish, Quechua and Aymara, depending on the respondent's area of residence and maternal language. The questionaire which served as the basis of the interviews, therefore, was translated entirely into Quechua and Aymara.

## A Sample Design Representing All Voting-Age Bolivians

A study of democratic values needs to be designed in such a way that it gathers data on the values of all citizens, not only the most active, those who are important political actors, or those who live in the main towns and cities. Undoubtedly, the main advantage that surveys have over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and it is mostly poor and rural voters who go under-respresented in an election. [2]

[1] The total number of non-weighted cases was 3,008, as explained below, but the report works with the weighted cases, which is why we use the figure of 3,013.

[2] This point is discussed at length by Sidney Verba, ex-President of the American Association of Political Science (Verba 1996).

Surprisingly, many studies claiming to represent public opinion are frequently based on samples that systematically under-represent certain sectors of the population. Often, these sample biases are due to cost considerations which vary, in turn, as a function of the wide disperson of the population, or the multilingual nature of the national population making it difficult and expensive to undertake interviews in the all languages spoken in a given country.

Any serious study of democratic values in Bolivia confronts two problems in the design of the sample: 1) a widely dispersed population, and 2) a multilingual population. A comparison with other countries can help put these problems in perspective. Consider Germany, the country in Western Europe with the largest population: 82 million inhabitants in a territory of 357,000 square kilometers. Bolivia, by contrast, has a population of only 9.4 million,[3] dispersed over a vast area of 1.1 million square kilometers.[4] Bolivia is the 29th largest country in the world, but has a population similar to that of the Dominican Republic, a country only four per cent the size of Bolivia. The entire country of Japan, with 125 million inhabitants, could doubtlessly fit into the department of Santa Cruz. In short, Bolivia has a relatively small population living in a vast territory. The complexities that this dispersion creates when designing a sample are exacerbated by the uneven distribution of Bolivia's population. For example, La Paz has a population density of almost 17 inhabitants per square kilometer, while the department of Pando, with an area considerably larger than that of Costa Rica (but with a estimated population of 554,201 in July, 2001) has a density of less than 0.5 inhabitants per square kilometer. The population density of Bolivia as a whole is only eight people per square kilometer, compared to 20 in Brazil and 312 in Belgium.[5]

In a multilingual country, it is important to avoid excluding linguistic minorities in studies that seek to reflect the national reality. Unfortunately, obtaining relevant, up-to-date information on all the languages and where they are spoken has not been easy. We need to know more about the proportion of Bolivians who do not speak Spanish and, therefore, would be unable to respond to questions they were asked in this language. If we use the data from the 2001 *Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda* (National Population and Housing Census, or CNPV), we can see that only 63.5 percent of the population speaks Spanish (see the INE's website: www.ine.gov.bo). But we know this information in incorrect since it does not correspond to the question asked in the 2001 census, which requested respondents to list all the languages they spoke, not just their principal language. The information from the INE's website shows a total of 100 percent, even though the question should give results that surpass 100 percent because many Bolivians speak more than one language. It should be noted that these figures include 20.8 perent of the Bolivian population who speak Quechua and 13.6 percent who speak Aymara.

[3] According to the 2005 projections from the *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas* (National Statistics Institute, or INE). See the INE's web site: www.ine.gov.bo.
[4] The information comes from the World Bank (World Bank 2000 274).
[5] World Bank (Op. Cit. p. 232).

Although many languages are spoken in Bolivia, Spanish is the predominant language. According to the *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas* (National Statistics Institute, or INE), in 1992 only 8.1 percent of the population above the age of six spoke only Quechua and 3.2 percent of the population spoke only Aymara (CNPV 1992). Data from the 2001 *Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda* shows that around 11 percent of the population only speaks a native language, Quechua and Aymara being the predominant ones. To avoid excluding the opinions of these people, it was necessary to prepare questionaires in both languages and include bilingual interviewers on our survey teams. In the 2006 national sample, we obtained the following results in response to our question regarding the language that respondents spoke in the home while growing up.




**Figure I-1. Respondents' Maternal Language, 2006**

This question is useful but it does not tell us whether the respondent, at the time of the interview, understood more than one language (including Spanish) and could have also answered in that other language. In fact, we found that a large proportion of the respondents that spoke a language other than Spanish also understood Spanish. For this reason, only 45 respondents (weighted) were interviewed in Quechua or Aymara

## Department Represention in the National Sample: Stratification

In the design of the sample, it was necessary to consider the size of the population and its distribution in different regions of the country. A study that tries to be representative of the country should be sure to include each and every department, taking into account the wide differences between them in terms of population and area, and that each department has its own social and political character, and that they form part of different regional dynamics. In order to achieve this objective, we decided that the sample should be designed to independently represent each one of Bolivia's nine departments, but ensuring, at the same time, that we would be able to confidently discuss the country as a whole.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the sample design methodology employed in this study using an analogy of winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are nine schools in a school district and that the district has decided to hold a raffle to raise money. Those in charge of running the raffle want to make sure that there is at least one winner from each of the nine schools. If each winning ticket were selected at random, it is possible that one or more schools would be left without a winner. To avoid this, instead of placing all the tickets in one receptacle and randomly drawing nine winning tickets, the tickets from each school would be placed in separate receptacles and one winning ticket would be drawn from each.

In Bolivia, if we want to be sure that citizens from every department are interviewed, we need to divide the sample into nine "receptacles." We call these receptacles the "strata" of the sample. Thus, we have nine separate strata in the Bolivian survey, one for each department. If we did not divide the country into separate strata, it is likely that the majority of those interviewed would be selected from Bolivia's most populous departments (La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba), while only a few interviews would be conducted in the department of Pando, the least populous department. By stratifying the sample, we ensure that interviews will be distributed across all nine departments.

Returning to the raffle analogy, what would happen if we wanted to make sure that there was a winner from each grade level in every school? We would follow the same procedure, using a separate receptacle for each grade level within each school, and drawing a winning ticket from each receptacle. Of course, to achieve this objective we would have to increase the total number of winning raffle tickets. For example, if each school had three grades (10$^{th}$, 11$^{th}$ and 12$^{th}$), then a total of 27 tickets would have to be drawn (3 grades x 9 schools).

In Bolivia, it is important to further subdivide the departments into cities, towns and communities of different sized populations. Once again, if we did not put the names of all the residents of each department in separate receptacles, in a number of departments we would very likely draw most of the names from the largest cities since they account for the bulk of the population. To avoid this situation, it is necessary to stratify each department by different sized populations. To sample Bolivia, it is common to divide the

population into four groups: 1) cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants; 2) cities and towns that have between 2,000 and 20,000 inhabitants; 3) "compact rural" areas with populations between 500 and 1,999 inhabitants; and 4) "dispersed rural" areas with less than 500 inhabitants. We stratified our sample in this way for each department.

Since the sample has been stratified at two levels, first at the department level and then within each department, we have what is called a "multi-stage stratified sample design." The question that now arises is how large should the sample be, and how it should be distributed among the strata. It is common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratam. But this procedure does not work well when there are great differences between the strata in terms of population, as in the Bolivian case. This is because the samples of the least-populous departments would be too small to be able to draw conclusions with any degree of confidence, unless the size of the national sample were rather large. For example, Pando has only 0.6 percent of Bolivia's total population, and if we had a national sample of 3,000 respondents, only about 18 people would be interviewed in Pando.

To overcome this problem, we decided to draw a sample of 300 respondents per department, which means that 95 percent of the time, our sample would be no more than ±5.8 percent away from the true value of each question in the survey. This confidence interval of ±5.8 percent is calculated using standard formulas of sampling error. Thus, in the worst case scenario [6] the survey would fairly accurately represent citizens' views at the department level, erring no more than 5.8 percent (95 percent of the time) from the results we would obtain if we could interview all adults residing in each department. Under more favorable conditions[7], the results could be as accurate as ±3.5 percent at the department level. Since the three most populous departments (La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba) which form part of the so-called "*eje central*" (central axis) are so important politically, we decided to increase the accuracy of the sample in these departments by conducting an additional 100 interviews in each one of them for a total of 400 in each. In these three departments, our "confidence interval" for each sample is no more than ±5.0 percent, or almost one percent more accurate than that for the other departments.

The samples of 300 and 400 respondents per department were designed to provide approximately equal confidence intervals for each one. But once we try to generalize beyond the department level to the country as a whole, it is vitally important to adjust the size of the sample in such a way that it accurately reflects the relative size of the population of each department. For example, referring again to Pando and comparing it with La Paz, it is necessary to reduce the relative weight of Pando in the national sample and increase that of La Paz in order to obtain an overall picture of public opinion in Bolivia. To make such adjustments, once the samples were drawn, we assigned post-hoc weights to them in such a way that each department correctly reflected its contribution to

[6] The worst cases arises when opinion is divided in half, and for a given question, 50 percent of the population expresses one opinion and 50 percent express another.
[7] For example, if the result is a 90-to-10 division in an item.

the total national population. A more detailed discussion of this weighting scheme appears in a later section.

The sample design for all nine departments, with 300 interviews in six departments and 400 interviews in three departments, required a total sample of 3,000 interviews across the country. A sample of this size is accurate to at least a confidence interval of ±1.7 percent. Technically, our sampling error is ±1.7 percent. This means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Bolivia, 95 percent of them would reflect the views of the population with an accuracy of no less than ±1.7 percent. Of course, other factors besides sampling error can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in respondent selection, poor comprehension of the question, etc. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of ±1.7 percent is very good.

The above mentioned estimates regarding the accuracy of the sample could remain as stated if it were possible to carry out what is known as a "simple random sample" for each stratum in the study. Doing this would mean that the sample would be scattered randomly in each of the nine departments. But to do so would imply astronomically high survey costs because of the high cost of travel. In virtually all survey research, costs are lowered by drawing what are known as "cluster samples," that is, groups of people to be interviewed are clustered together in relatively compact areas, such as a block or a row of houses, and various people are interviewed together. Clustering interviews significantly reduces costs, especially in a country like Bolivia where the national population density is very low. Yet, clustering interviews normally increases the confidence interval of the sample, thus reducing its accuracy.

It is not possible to know exactly how much clustering increases the confidence interval because it all depends on the degree of commonality shared by residents of a block or row of houses for a given characteristic. For example, if all residents within a block had similar salaries, the impact of clustering interviews regarding salaries would be greater than the impact of age, which would presumably vary much more than income and would be closer to the national level of variation. Experience suggests that a group-stratified sample design, with a total of 3,000 respondents, would increase to around ±2.0 percent from the ±1.7 percent stated above. For the purposes of this study, we will assume a confidence interval of ±2.0 percent. It should also be noted that we used probability criteria at each stage of the sample selection, down to the household level itself. The individual respondent in each house was selected using quota criteria for both gender and age in order to overcome the common problem of including too many women, or too many young or old people in the sample. This bias at the household level is due to the high probability that, at the moment of the interview, the people mostly likely to be found in the home are women, the very young and the elderly. Sampling by quota at the household level is an economically efficient way to overcome this problem.

The survey itself was efficiently and professionally conducted by Encuestas & Estudios, one of the foremost research survey firms in Bolivia. Founded in 1984, this firm is affiliated with Gallup International. In the last 21 years, Encuestas & Estudios has

carried out more than 1,657 surveys for more than 300 clients. It currently employs 116 people full-time and utilizes 83 part-time interviewers, of whom 40 are bilingual (Quechua or Aymara). The firm implemented the sample design described above and was also responsible for multiple preliminary tests of the survey instruments as well as the translation of these instruments into Quechua and Aymara. Additionally, this firm was responsible for all data-entry.

The actual number of interviews obtained by Encuestas & Estudios in the 2006 national survey was 3,013, or 13 more than the goal of 3,000. In 1998, a total of 2,997 people were interviewed, and in 2000 the sample size was 3,006. In 2004, the total number of interviews conducted was 3,070. This is a remarkably high level of survey completion, and speaks well of the dedication of the interviewers and their supervisors.

In addition, LAPOP places special emphasis on maintaining the comparability between the samples of the different years in which the study has been conducted in Bolivia. In 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006, the interviews were conducted in the same departments and geographic areas of the country, and have maintained the same proportionality of the population in each year.

Age is an important characteristic in determining citizens' attitudes and behaviors with respect not only to democracy but politics in general. Therefore, interviews were conducted with persons of all age groups. In spite of this, as the following figure shows, the average age of the respondents does not vary across the different studies.




**Figure I-2. Respondents' Mean Age, 1998 – 2006**

As indicated above, gender can also be very important in determining political attitudes and behaviors. The LAPOP sample has maintained the same proportion of men and women interviewed for the study in the five surveys conducted so far. Therefore, any variation in attitudes due to gender differences are not the result of higher or lower proportions of men or women interviewed, but are due to changes in the opinions and attitudes of the population at large.




**Figure I-3. Sample Distribution by Gender, 1998 – 2006**

A third important factor in political culture and especially public opinion studies is having a representation of the population by area of residence proportional to the actual distribution of the population. For 2006, the following figure shows the distribution of the sample population by area of residence.




**Figure I-4. Distribution of the 2006 Sample by Area of Residence: Urban – Rural**

The distribution of the population by area of residence has remained constant over the five studies carried out by LAPOP in Bolivia. The variations, although small, reflect the natural increase in the Bolivian population over the past few years, or may be influenced by internal migratory movements, especially from rural to urban areas. These variations, however, do not cause large changes in the distribution of the population.

The topic of sample distribution in terms of ethnic identification, and how representative the sample is of Bolivia's ethnic diversity, will be treated in a separate chapter of this report devoted to identity issues.

# Methodological Notes for the 2006 Report

***Comparison with other countries of the region.*** Almost all the chapters present information, at least in the form of figures and tables, that compares the results of the 2006 Bolivia survey with those from other Latin American countries. With the support of USAID in Washington and from different national missions, LAPOP has been carrying out surveys of this type in different countries of the continent, with the aim of making comparisons that enable a better understanding of the political processes and the evolution of democracy in each individual country and in the region as a whole.[8] The advantage of the project lies in the application of the same questions in surveys executed according to the highest standards of scientific quality in different countries of the region, thereby generating information useful for comparative analysis.

***Confidence intervals.*** Many of the figures based on columns that compare means in this report have a bar in the form of an "I" in the upper portion of the column. This bar refers to confidence interval for that mean; that is, given the sample characteristics and taking into account the respondents' answers to that question, the "true value" may be slightly above or below the calculated mean presented in the column. The larger the sample, and the more concentrated the responses, the smaller the "I" (or the lower the confidence interval) will be. We can thus be more certain that the mean displayed is very close to the "true value" for the population. When we say that the error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, we mean that if 100 identical surveys were conducted at the same time using a similar sample, in 95 out of 100 cases the mean would lie between the upper and lower horizontal bars of the "I."

The practical utility of these error bars, or "I"s at the tops of the columns, is that they enable us to easily verify if the differences between the means of two or more groups represented by the columns are the result of stable statistical patterns or are solely due to chance. If the "I" error bars overlap, we can say that statistically one mean is no different from the other. If they do not overlap, we can assume that the differences between the estimated means correspond to the groups selected for comparison, and that one group is different from the other with respect to the question under consideration.[9]

***Establishing relationships between variables.*** We used different statistical procedures, depending on the nature of the variables, to analyze the information presented in this report. For the most part, the data is connected in multivariate relationships. In order to identify which variables affect given analyses, as well as to select analytical models, we did two things. First, at a theoretical level, we tried to establish which factors the scholarly literature, previous academic studies, or the national context indicated as important for the themes studied. Second, at an empirical level, we

[8] For more information on LAPOP, consult the project's website (http://www.lapopsurveys.org/).

[9] The visual comparison between the bars in an approximation. Each confidence interval produces a group of specific data represented in a bar, and a comparison of two or more bars – two or more groups of data – would require an adjustment to the intervals to take into account the variation of all the bars being compared.

tested the main socio-demographic variables (gender, age, education, wealth, ethnic identity, area of residence, etc.) in successive linear or logistic regression models. These statistical techniques, when appropriately applied, allow us to establish which factors have an independent effect on the factor or variable being analyzed.

The combinations of variables we present in this report are those that we found to be important both theoretically (and conceptually) and in the statistical tests run during the process of data analysis. In some cases, we present figures in which the groups being compared do not show significant differences; we do this in order to demonstrate that the theory or commonsense regarding the hypothesized relationship is mistaken.

## Conclusions

This chapter has described the design of the 2006 sample and some of its characteristics. The size of the sample is large by commonly used standards, which gives us a smaller margin of error than is the norm.

The sample of the Bolivia study not only allows us to analyze the country as a whole, but also provides information to analyze smaller units, such as departments, and inter-regional differences.

The socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the samples used in the five studies conducted in Bolivia maintain constant parameters over the years, but also allow us to control for other kinds of characteristics, such as education and income, which vary incrementally with time.

# II. Bolivians' Identity in Politics*

The identity of Bolivians is a factor that has acquired great importance in national politics in recent years. In this chapter, we present and discuss information regarding some important feelings of collective identity in the country, including the feeling of belonging to the Bolivian nation. After the discussion of identities, we examine related topics, such as discrimination, regionalism and separatist tendencies.

A methodological note regarding the statistical analyses included in this chapter: the relationships between variables shown to be statistically significant were obtained through a series of multivariate statistical analyses that included the specifications of the sample design. The fact that these relationships remain significant after being submitted to multivariate analysis confirms that the relationship does in fact exist, and that it is not the result of another variable affecting the one we use as an explication. Additionally, the use of the complex sample design specifications[1] results in the calculation of robust standard errors, which represent a more rigorous test of statistical reliability than that applied in standard procedures.

## Ethnic Identity

Bolivian ethnic identity lies at the center of important debates.[2] In recent years, scholars and politicians have been debating with particular zeal what percentage of the Bolivian population is made up by indigenous people. Since the "discovery" in the 2001 census that the majority of the Bolivian population feels indigenous, there have been many and varied voices and arguments both supporting and rejecting this "finding."[3]

It is impossible to understand this debate outside of its political context. That the debate has acquired shades of a discursive struggle confirms the political uses of the official recognition of ethnic categories. In an historical moment combining the political activation of ethnic cleavages in the context of a democratic system of government,

* This chapter was writen by Daniel Moreno.

[1] The key characteristics of the sample design for statistical tests are: stratification, more or less homogenous primary sampling units, and weighting to make the data representative of the national population. Regarding the effect of sample design on error levels in statistical tests, see, among others (Kishy Frankel 1974 ; Knott 1991).

[2] Ricardo Calla distinguishes between identitification, as something conscious, and identity, which occurs in the realm of the unconscious (Calla 1993). In this chapter we concentrate only on the conscious realm, and use both terms (identity and identification) to refer to this concept.

[3] See, for example, the incursions by Lavaud y Lestage (2002) or Xavier Albó (2005) into this debate. Molina and Albó's valuable recent work offers a wide discussion of the differing perspectives regarding this issue (Molina B. and Albó 2006).

whether one is part of the majority or part of the minority has important consequences in terms legitimacy and representativeness.

But the debate regarding "who is and who is not" indigenous is in some ways unproductive. The social sciences increasingly favor an at least partial "constructivist" understanding of identity.[4] This point of view maintains that identities should not be considered as static categories but as social constructions that are flexible, fluid and that change over time. Ethnic identity, generally, is not an identity that is maintained throughout a lifetime, but instead depends on the particular and historically determined conditions of the social context in which individuals live. With this in mind, the most interesting questions are not those related to *who is* but rather the conditions that allow certain identities to gain importance.

The *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Bolivia* used the following question in the 2001 *Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda* to establish Bolivians' ethnic identity:

*ETID2. ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas? (leer todas las opciones)*
*Quechua [1] Aymara[2] Guaraní[3] Chiquitano[4] Mojeño[5] Otro nativo[6] ninguno [7] otros (especificar)*

In the 2001 census, around 62 percent of Bolivians identified themselves as part of one of the indigenous or native groups listed.[5] In our sample, using this same question, the percentage is even greater. As Figure II-1 shows below, in 2006 around 71 percent of Bolivians feel that they belong to one of these indigenous groups. This difference could be the result of two things: 1) since the census covers 100 percent of the population (or should), and our data is from a sample with a confidence interval of ±2 percent, the LAPOP figure could be 69 percent, which is closer to that of the census; or 2) indigenous identity in Bolivia has in fact risen in recent years. Given the focus on ethnicity in the national debate, ethnic identity has likely risen in the last few years. This phenomenon is not exclusive to Bolivia; something similar has also occurred in Guatemala (Seligson 2005b; Seligson, et al. 2000).

[4] For a discussion of constructavist approaches to identity in politics see, for example, the work of Chandra (2001) or the more concilitory position of Deborah Yashar (2005).
[5] For an exhaustive analysis of the census data originating from this question, see the work of Molina and Albó (2006), which also includes ethno-linguistic data as part of a Geographic Information System component.




**Figure II-1. Ethnic identification, INE question**

The proportion of people who consider them selves to belong to one of the above mentioned indigenous or native peoples is the same as that obtained in the LAPOP survey two years ago. Seven out of ten Bolivians feel that they belong to some indigenous group when asked using the INE question. But th e census question asks w hether a person "*considers him or herself to belong*" to an indigenous group, which is not necessarily the same as identifying oneself as part of the indigenous ethnic category. In LAPOP, we have traditionally used anoth er question, one tha t works better in cross-country comparative studies, such as the LAPOP surveys. In this question, based on racial self-description, the proportion of people who identify them selves as indigenous or native in Bolivia drops instead to a minority.

*ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originario?*
*Blanca [1] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5] Originaria [6] Otra NS/NR [8]*

The results of this ques tion (Figure II-2) show that the majority of Bolivians, when given the option to identify them selves as "*mestizo*," choose this category. The following figure shows this.




**Figure II-2. Ethnic identification, LAPOP question**

Such large differences between the percentage of people who identify themselves as indigenous when different questions are used was discovered and reported in the last LAPOP Bolivia study (Seligson, Moreno and Schwarz 2005). Two possible preliminary conclusions come to mind regarding this difference. In the first place, Bolivians feel strongly drawn to the names of specific indigenous or native group, generating feelings of identification not possible when asked whether they identity with broader categories like "indigenous." In other words, Bolivians are more willing to identity themselves as an Aymara or Guaraní than to call themselves "indigenous" or "native."

In the second place, it seems clear that when the "*mestizo*" option is available, the large majority of Bolivians feel drawn to it. In the face of other alternatives, most Bolivians feel *mestizo*. Nevertheless, the identification of oneself as "*mestizo*" does not appear to be stable over time. There have been very important changes over the last two years in relation to LAPOP's question of self-defined ethnicity (which includes the *mestizo* category), which seem to be part of a medium-term process of change. The following Figure II-3 shows this trend over time.




**Figure II-3. Percentage of People Who Identify Themselves as White or as Indigenous or Native, by Year**

As can be clearly seen in Figure II-3, since 2000 the percentage of people who identity themselves as "white" has undergone a sustained drop from more than one-quarter of total respondents to a little more than one out of ten. This is exactly the opposite of what has occurred in relation to indigenous or native identity, whose proportion has doubled in a clear and linear manner over the last six years.[6]

If we remember that the sample for each year was designed with very similar characteristics (in Chapter I we show that the demographic characteristics have not

[6] This figure presents the combination of the categories "indigenous" and "native." Until 2002, the question did not include the category "native" as an option offered the respondent. In 2004, we included this category, and the question was asked in exactly the same way in 2006, so it is unlikely that trend registered over time is a product of this small variation in the text of the question.

changed over the years), and if we accept that demographic changes cannot explain this phenomenon in such a short period of time, what we are witnessing in the country is a very clear process of "indigenousization," one that seems correlated with a devaluation of white identity. The other ethnic categories appear to have remained relatively stable over the years, as Table II-1 shows.

**Table II-1. Ethnic identification, by year**

| | | Blanco | Mestizo o cholo | Indigena u originario | Negro | Ninguna Ns/Nr | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1998** | N | 693 | 1870 | 292 | 26 | 96 | **2977** |
| | % | 23.3% | 62.8% | **9.8%** | 0.9% | 3.2% | **100%** |
| **2000** | N | 777 | 1817 | 256 | 38 | 117 | **3005** |
| | % | 25.9% | 60.5% | 8.5% | 1.3% | 3.9% | **100%** |
| **2002** | N | 610 | 1981 | 317 | 23 | 86 | **3017** |
| | % | 20.2% | 65.7% | **10.5%** | 0.8% | 2.9% | **100%** |
| **2004** | N | 597 | 1862 | 480 | 18 | 114 | **3071** |
| | % | 19.4% | 60.6% | **15.6%** | 0.6% | 3.7% | **100%** |
| **2006** | N | 331 | 1953 | 583 | 17 | 129 | **3013** |
| | % | 11.0% | 64.8% | **19.3%** | 0.6% | 4.3% | **100%** |
| **Total** | **N** | **3008** | **9483** | **1928** | **122** | **542** | **15083** |
| | **%** | **19.9%** | **62.9%** | **12.8%** | **0.8%** | **3.6%** | **100%** |

But who are the people who have "changed" their identity? The sample was designed in such a way that individuals consulted one year would not be interviewed in a following study. This means that we cannot know exactly who have "changed" their identity. Nevertheless, given the figures in Table II-1, it is very probable that the change can be explained by the shift of an important group of people who felt "white" into the "*mestizo*" category, and a similar proportion of "*mestizos*" who now feel indigenous or native. This would explains why the *mestizo* category remains relatively stable while the other two fluctuate. "*Mestizo*," then, appears to be a wildcard category of identity in and out of which people move according to the social and political context.

It is precisely the national political context, in very specific moments, that appears to play a determining role regarding Bolivian identity. Unfortunately, we do not have information prior to 1998, but re-examining the direction of change between 1998 and 2000 in Figure II-3 demonstrates the fall in probability that a person would feel "indigenous" and the increase that a Bolivian would feel "white." After 2002, however, the tendency is the opposite: the likelihood of feeling "indigenous" grows while that of feeling "white" shrinks. The turning point seems to be between 2000 and 2002, which coincides with the growing importance of the country's indigenous and popular social movements; the significance of these movements, furthermore, continued to grow increasingly intense through 2006. This means that the LAPOP surveys give us a rather clear picture of the impact of the changes in the national discourse, with the added

advantage that we can put rather precise figures on the magnitude and timing of this impact.

It is possible to imagine an extension of the lines in Figure 3, thinking in terms of cycles of identity transformation over time. In such cycles, individual identities (white and indigenous) gain and lose importance in complementary but opposite directions according to the dynamics of the socio-political context. In this way, we can suppose that until 2000, the tendency was one of movement from "*mestizo*" toward "white" and from "indigenous" toward "*mestizo*." And since 2000, the tendency has been the opposite.

There exists an additional element confirming the flexible character of identity. If ethnicity were a physical (or biological) trait, then we would expect, with small variations related to the rate of masculinity, that the proportion of men and women who feel part of an ethnic group would be relatively equal. The data from the 2006 Bolivia survey indicates the opposite, as Figure II-4 shows.




**Figure II-4. Percentage of People Who Identify Themselves as Indigenous or Native, by Gender**

The percentage of men who identify themselves as indigenous or native is significantly higher than the percentage of women. These differences are not new in the data from Bolivia. Since the first LAPOP survey in 1998, a greater percentage of men than women have identified themselves as indigenous. Figure II-5 shows this relation to be consistent over time.




**Figure II-5. Percentage of People Who Identify Themselves as Indigenous or Native, by Gender and Year**

It is possible that the causes of this gender bias are part of individual differences of political motivation and participation. This gender difference, however, remains even when we control for levels of political satisfaction. Its cause, therefore, remains to be explained by studies that focus directly on the relationship between ethnic identity and gender. In the 1998-2006 database, the probability that women identify themselves as indigenous, in the question asking about racial self-description, is 35 percent lower than that of men; this is after other possible factors are introduced as statistical controls in a binary logistic regression. Table II-2, below, shows these results.

**Table II-2. Results of the Binary Logistic Regression for Self-Identification as Indigenous or Native (LAPOP Question)**

| Variables | Odds Ratio | Std. Err. | z | P>z | 95% IC Sup | 95% IC Inf |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 1.063867 | .1101973 | 0.60 | 0.550 | .8683975 | 1.303336 |
| 2002 | 1.425657 | .1387775 | 3.64 | **0.000** | 1.178031 | 1.725336 |
| 2004 | 3.467781 | .3263385 | 13.21 | **0.000** | 2.88369 | 4.170179 |
| 2006 | 3.891334 | .3598714 | 14.69 | **0.000** | 3.246229 | 4.664637 |
| Educación | .9645317 | .0074026 | -4.71 | **0.000** | .9501314 | .9791503 |
| Ingreso | .8624353 | .0250434 | -5.10 | **0.000** | .8147218 | .9129431 |
| Urbanización | .8958056 | .0619185 | -1.59 | 0.111 | .7823091 | 1.025768 |
| Mujer | .6368956 | .0375543 | -7.65 | **0.000** | .5673845 | .7149227 |
| Edad | .9888699 | .0020813 | -5.32 | **0.000** | .9847989 | .9929576 |
| Riqueza | .8429403 | .0152616 | -9.44 | **0.000** | .8135526 | .8733896 |
| Vestimenta | .6831896 | .058949 | -4.42 | **0.000** | .5768931 | .809072 |
| Lenguaje nativo | 2.660432 | .1761519 | 14.78 | **0.000** | 2.336644 | 3.029087 |
| Oriente | .6944247 | .0555703 | -4.56 | **0.000** | .5936207 | .8123465 |
| Sur | .6884632 | .0477406 | -5.38 | **0.000** | .6009735 | .7886896 |
| **N= 13.495; Pseudo R cuadrada=0,1417** | | | | | | |

The relative probability coeficients presented in the second colum n (odds ratio) show the effect on the p robablity of each of the variab les considered. The probability of identifying onself as indigenous or nativeis, in general terms, 42 percent higher in 2002 than in 1998 (the probability is 1.42 times that of 1998). There is also a strong pos itive effect in 2004 and 2006 (the probability that a person identifies his or herself as indigenous is 2.9 times higher than the probability in 1998). So too does having had one's first language be a native one. Education, w ealth and income have a negative effe ct on the probability of self-identification as indigenous, which is related to the marginal socio-economic conditions of the indigenous population. In other words, the more educated and wealther people are, th e *less* they identity them selves as indigenous. The greater one's age, the use of non-indigenous clothing, living in the country's East or South, and being female, also all reduce the probability that one feels indigenous. How urbanized the area in which one lives has no effect on this proba bility once we statistica lly control for the above-mentioned factors. This is an im portant finding since it cont radicts much of the academic literature (as well as common sense) which holds that indigenous identification is much stronger in rural areas than urban ones. This is not the case in Bolivia, at least when we control for other factors.

## Cultural Identity and Regionalism

The 2006 survey has other techniques of approaching peoples' identity. The questionaire has a number of questions that ask respondents with what intensity they feel a part of their department and certain important "cultures" in Bolivia, like the Quechua or the Aymara.[7] The questions asked (see below) were codified on a scale of 1 to 7, in which 1 indicates nothing and 7 a great deal; we then recodified these questions on a scale of 0 to 100 to facilitate their understanding:

*BOLETID3. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Aymara?*
*BOLETID4. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Quechua?*
*BOLETID5. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Camba?*

Figure II-6 shows the mean intensity of identification with each of these cultures in each department of the country. It is not surprising that the identification with these cultures closely follows what commonsense in Bolivia suggests (that people in Santa Cruz feel more Cambas, or in Cochabamba more Quechua) even though the differences and the groups that comprise them are notably clear. The department of Tarija's low mean in the three variables is noteworthy, although it is not difficult to suppose that if Chapaco culture were included as a question, the feeling of belonging to one of these cultural communities by people from Tarija would be much greater.

[7] The use of this instrument does not imply that it is assumed that there exists a group of more or less stable characteristics that can be called the "Camba culture" or the "Quechua culture." This question is designed to measure the affinity a person feels for what he or she understands as Camba, Quechua or Aymara.




**Figure II-6. Afinity with Camba, Quechua and Aymara Cultures, by Departament**

A similar question was asked in relation to the departments:

*ETID3. ¿En qué medida se siente usted... [paceño, cruceño, cochabambino, orureño, chuqisaqueño, potosino, pandino, tarijeño, beniano]?*

Figure II-7 shows the deparm ental means of this feeling of regional id entity in 2004 and 2006. We want to highlight two elements of this figure. In the first place, and in general terms, this feeling of departmental identity has grown slightly since 2004. In the second place, and contrary to what commonsen se suggests, the feeling of departm ental identity is lower in Santa Cruz than in the re st of the country. This has rem ained constant over the two years in which we in cluded this question in the LAPOP questionaire. The department with the highest feeling of depar mental identity is El Beni, ten points higher than Santa Cruz on a 0 to100 point scale.




**Figure II-7. Intensity of Regional Identity, by Department and Year**

## Sense of Belonging to the National Political Community

For people to accept and legitimize the system of government and the laws of the country in which they live, it is fundamental that they feel a part of the political community of citizens (Norris 1999). Such ties to the political community are a necessary and prior condition to the practice of democracy, and represent an important source of legitimacy, particularly in moments that the system of government is in crisis (Almond y Verba 1970).

To feel part of the region in which one lives, or to feel part of a particular culture like the Quechua, Camba or Aymara, has a positive effect on the feeling of national belonging. The stronger people feel that they are from a department or a cultural group, the greater their feeling of being Bolivian tends to be. [8] Figure II-8 shows this relation, which seems to defy commonsense. Even if the relationship between the feeling of

[8] The question used to measure this feeling of national beloning was: ETID1. ¿En qué medida se siente usted ciudadano boliviano?

regional and national belonging is stronger, th e three cultural identi ties described above have a positive effect on the feeling of nationality.




**Figure II-8. Intensity of Cultural and Regional Identities, by Intensity of National Idenity**

In Bolivia, the feeling of regional and cultural belonging are positively related to the strength of the national political community. The sense of belonging to som ething smaller, like a deparment or particular cultural group, seem s to be generating the conditions for people to feel a part of the na tional community. The correlation between feeling Bolivian and feeling a part of one 's department is strong and statistically significant (r=.427, sig.<.001); the correlation with the feeling of belonging to the Quechua, Aymara and Ca mba cultures shows a positive and s tatistically significant association (r=.122, .052, y .090 respectivamente, todas sig. p< .001).

Since 2004, the LAPOP survey has included three main questions to measure the feeling of belonging to the national political community. The first is the already mentioned question: *how strong is your feeling of being a Bolivian citizen?* The other two refer to feelings of national pride and the belief that members of the national community of citizens are united by certain shared values. The questions, asked initially on a scale of 1 to 7, were recodified on a scale of 0-to -100 to facilitate their presentation. The questions are the following:

*PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los bolivianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?*

*B43. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de ser boliviano?*

Figure II-9, below, shows the national means of the three variables, comparing the 2004 study with the 2006.




**Figure II-9. Intensity of Variables of Belonging to the National Political Community, by Year**

Even if the differences are small and in some cases not significant, there seems to be a general tendency in the country to feel more strongly tied to the nation understood as an *imagined community* (Anderson 1993). The average feeling of Bolivianess is now higher than it was two years ago; the same is true for national pride and the degree to which Bolivians believe they share common values. Is this tendency the same throughout all social groups in the country? Figure II-10, below, suggests that this is not the case.




**Figure II-10. Intensity of the Measures of National Belonging According to Ethnic Self-Identification, by Year**

The average level of national pride among people who feel part of an indigenous group (using the INE question of self-defined ethnicity described at the beginning of this chapter) is now higher than it was two years ago (the differences are statistically significant to the level p.<.05). Meanwhile, those who do not feel a part of a native group have a slightly lower mean, although this difference is not statistically significant. The tendency is the same for all other measures of the strength of the tie to the national political community.

The above appears to us to be a product of President Evo Morales' government. With his massive triumph and his indigenous and popular discourse and policies, Morales has managed to strengthen the tie of many citizens to the nation, especially those who identify themselves as indigenous. The change in government appears to have contributed favorably to the legitimacy of the Bolivian political system. This can be seen in the data of Figure II-11, presented below. It shows that the mean level of support for the political system for each year, differentiating between those who consider themselves indigenous or native and those who do not.[9]




**Figure II-11. Index of Support for the Political System According to Ethnic Self-Identification, by Year**

The above figure shows that in 2000 and 2002, the average support for the political system by people who considered themselves indigenous or native was significantly lower than the average of those who did not feel indigenous. That is, the political system had less legitimacy in the eyes of indigenous or natives. In 2004, the

[9] The index of support for the political system is a measure that combines five elements that refer to the legitimacy that the political system has for people. We thoroughly describe and analyze this index in chapter seven of this report.

difference shrank and became non-significant, although the average for both groups also fell. In 2006, the mean of the two groups is statistically the same, registering the highest levels of the entire LAPOP data series.

In spite of the general tendency in the average feeling of belonging to the Bolivian nation to grow, the country continues to be ranked among those countries where the feeling of national belonging is low, as we reported in LAPOP's previous Bolivian study (Seligson, et al. 2005). Figure II-12, below, compares the means of the variables of national pride and common values with those obtained in nine other Latin American countries in 2004, using similar instruments.




**Figure II-12. Means of Measures of National Belonging, Bolivia in Comparative Perspective**

It can be seen that Bolivia occupies last place in the series comparing the variable of national pride, and the penultimate place in terms of common values, only above Guatemala. On average, Bolivians feel ten points less pride in their nationality than their counterparts in Costa Rica and Panama; and their average level of agreement with the idea of shared values is 15 points below that of Costa Rica. This shows that, even if

Bolivians' feeling of belonging to the national political community has grown, it continues to be one of the lowest in Latin America, and only in terms of the notion of shared values is Guatemala even lower.

Another question, which refers to Bolivians feeling of community, focuses on trust. Trust between citizens is important in terms of constructing social capital which strengthens democracy through civil society (Putnam 2002). Trust is also an important element in terms of constructing the nation as an *imagined community*, in Anderson's (1993) terms. The question used in the LAPOP studies is:

***IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad (barrio) es?***

*Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] NS [8]*

Figure II-13, below, compares the mode[10] (the most frequent response) of this question in Bolivia with that for other countries in the region. It is evident that the levels of trust Bolivians exhibit are among the lowest in the region; the option "little trust" is the answer most frequently given in the country.

[10] The mode is a measure that, when presenting the most frequently chosen answer, is adequate for categorical and ordinal variables.




**Figure II-13. Mode of Interpersonal Trust, Bolivia in Comparative Perspective**

## Discrimination and Identity

In a democratic society it is fundamental that all citizens feel they are treated in a fair manner and do not receive worse treatment than other citizens because of their cultural, economic or political particularities. We included a series of questions in the LAPOP survey focused on possible scenarios in which people might feel discriminated: in school, searching for a job, in government offices, on the street or in a social event. The questions used in the questionaire were:

*¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:*
*DIS1: En la escuela, colegio o universidad*
*DIS2: En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)*
*DIS3: Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio*
*DIS4: En reuniones o eventos sociales*
*DIS5: En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)*
*Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]*

Figure II-14, below, shows the percentage of people who have felt discrimination in each one of the above-mentioned scenarios, differentiating between people whose maternal language is Spanish and those persons who learned to speak in one of the country's indigenous languages.




**Figure II-14. Perception of Discrimination in Five Scenarios, by Maternal Language**

The above figure is elocuent. People whose first language was an indigenous one feel that they have been discriminated against in much higher proportions than those whose maternal language was Spanish. A multivariate, logistic regression analysis confirms that, for three out of the five alternatives (searching for work, government offices, schools), this variable retains its importance indepentently of other considerations like the person's identity, clothing, income, education, and area of residence. Linguistic competence, or the "correct" manner of speaking Spanish, seems to be an important mechanism of social discrimination that goes beyond ethnic and socio-economic differences in Bolivia.

It also seems clear that searching for work is the scene that generates the greatest feeling of discrimination. A little more than one-quarter of all Bolivians feel that they have been discriminated against at some point during the search for employment.

Government offices and schools are two other important scenes of discrimination, with a little less than one-quarter of those interviewed having felt discriminated against in the distribution of public services or in an educational center.

Discrimination does not appear to be constant throughout the country. There are areas in which the probability that a person will be discriminated against, in one of the above-mentioned places or situations, is much higher. Figure II-15, below, shows this.




**Figure II-15. Perception of Discrimination in Five Scenarios, by Region**

The probability that a person will feel they are the victim of discrimination is lower in the deparments of the East (Beni, Pando y Santa Cruz) than in the rest of the country. In most cases, the differences are substantially important and statistically significant. We might suppose that discrimination is less frequent in the East because the social dynamics there are more modern than in the rest of the country and less dependent on clichés and prejudices that are part of a more stratified society and culture like that of the country's West. But it should be recalled that the instrument whose results we present here does not directly measure discrimination but only the perception of discrimination. It is possible, therefore, that the levels of discrimination are really the same throughout the country, but that people do not perceive them in the same manner in different regions. In other words, in the West people are more willing to feel discriminated against than in the East.

In any case, the perception of having been the victim of discrimination has objective effects on Bolivians' political attitudes. The more times people have felt discrimination, and the greater the number of situations in which they have felt it, the less legitimacy they give the political system. This relationship, which remains even after including different statistical controls in a multivariate analysis,[11] is clearly shown by the following Figure II-16.




**Figure II-16. Support for the Political System According to Victimization by Discrimination**

[11] The independent variable in this model is that which results from the sum of the scenes of discrimination in which people have felt themselves to be a victim. This variable has a value of 5 for someone who felt he or she were a victim in all the mentioned scenes, and 0 if the person did not feel victimized an any. These latter cases are the majority, which is why the variable does not have a normal distribution and a linear regression model can not be used. For this reason, we used a *Poisson* statistical model, which models the probability that an event will occur.

## Separatist Tendencies

In recent years, the emergence and discussion of various proposals for regional autonomy has been growing in Bolivia. The main proponents of regional autonomy have been civic organizations from Santa Cruz and Tarija, one the one hand, and organizations representing indigenous groups and intellectuals associated with them, on the other. The next Constituent Assembly will be the scene in which Bolivians debate their ideas and forge agreements on the form and character of such regional autonomy.

Even if the majority of the proposals for regional autonomy contemplate maintaining the unity of the country, there are a few voices promoting its division. In the last two LAPOP surveys in Bolivia, we asked respondents the following:

*NEWTOL7. Suceda lo que suceda, el país debe permanecer unido o… 2) Las diferencias en el país son muy grandes, el país debería dividirse*

Figure II-17, below, shows the percentage of people who, in 2004 and 2006, believe that the country should be divided, differentiating the information by department.




**Figure II-17. Percentage of People Who Support the Division of the Country, by Year and Department**

In general terms, there was a small reduction in the proportion of people who support the idea of dividing the country. In 2004, around six percent of respondents stated they supported this idea, clearly a low percentage. In 2006, this figure fell significantly to 4.6 percent. It is worth stressing that the option to divide the country is clearly a minority one in all deparments of the country. Even in Santa Cruz, the department with the highest percentage in 2006, only one out of 10 residents supported this idea. It is also worth noting, though, the behavior of the data for the department of Oruro where, in the last two years, the percentage of people supporting separatism has tripled.

The new political conditions that have taken hold in the country appear to have weakened these separatist positions even more. Nonetheless, while this is true almost everywhere in the country, in the city of Santa Cruz the tendency is the opposite, as Figure II-18, below, suggests.




**Figure II-18. Percentage of People Who Support the Division of the Country. City of Santa Cruz vs. the Rest of the Country**

The effect of the new political conditions on citizens' attitudes is not the same throughout the country. In the city of Santa Cruz, the percentage of people who believe that the differences within Bolivia are so great that the country should be divided has doubled. If this trend continues, it could generate an especially delicate situation in which one sector of the population leans towards its complete automony, while most of the country is increasingly satisfied with the shape of the country under current conditions as well as the direction the country is changing.

## Conclusions

Identities are flexible and fluid, and should be considered in the context of social and political processes, which is where they are formed and make sense. Such changes in peoples' identity over time, which the LAPOP data has captured in Bolivia, confirms the dynamic character of identity. The growing proportion of the Bolivian population that identifies itself as indigenous or native, and the reduction of the relative importance of the "white" category confirms its strategic character of identity. The fact that men are more likely than women to identify themselves as indigenous or native, in turn, helps showw ethnic self-identification can be a political resource.

In Bolivia, the feeling of belonging to the national political community shows evidence of having increased. This growth is particularly strong among those who identify themselves as part of an indigenous or native group. The moment of political effervescence that Bolivia is experiencing is one of the possible causes of this growth in the sense of nationality. Identifying with a region of a cultural group seems to have a positive effect on the feeling of Bolivianess, contrary to what one might suppose.

Peoples' ethnicity seems to be tied to discrimination in different social spheres. Linguistic capacity appears to be the determining mechanism of discrimination. It turns out that the population whose mother tongue is a native language is much more likely to feel discriminated against than those who initially learned to speak Spanish. Discrimination is felt much more strongly in the country's western departments than the eastern. Feeling discriminated against, in turn, negatively affects the citizens' bonds to the national political community and to the Bolivian political system.

Lastly, even if the proportion of people who believe that the country should be divided has substantially fallen nationwide, the relative importance of this group in the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra has doubled. This reinforces the idea that there is tension between some social sectors from Santa Cruz and the political dynamics of the country led by President Evo Morales. In any case, even in Santa Cruz the proportion of people who support the division of the country is clearly a minority.

# III. Political Tolerance and Authoritarianism

Support for the institutional system can say a great deal about the perspectives of political stability in a democratic state. However, political stability does not necessarily mean there is support for the system. For a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens should not only believe that the regime has legitimacy but should also be tolerant of the political rights of people who disagree with the exisiting form of government (Norris 1999).

Political tolerance is understood as respect for the rights of people expressing other points of view: the participation of people with different interests and ideologies. Tolerance for different cultural values and identities is also of great importance for the political stability of a democracy. With tolerance, people can live together in a national political community despite their differences, both ideological and in terms of identity (Wolff 1965). It is in this way that tolerance becomes one of the fundmental values of democratic socieities. In a recent publication, the LAPOP project thoroughly analyzes the concept of tolerance and the results of a study of it in Bolivia (Moreno y Seligson 2006).

Similarly, there is a theoretical argument that sustains that when people feel threatened and are scared, whether this be for inadequate economic means, crime or other reasons, they tend to have lower levels of tolerance and demonstrate an authoritarian disposition, which manifests itself as support for tradition and homogeneity as well as aversion to diversity (Adorno, et al. 1950 ; Altemeyer 1996 ; Feldman y Stenner 1997 ; Stenner 2005). Feelings of intolerance and the trigger of authoritarian dispositions could have negative consequences for democracy, generating high levels of tension among citizens, which could turn into dynamics of social exclusion and oppression of minorities.

We will begin this chapter comparing the various possible causes of such feelings of intolerance among Bolivians. In the first section of this chapter, we will refer to political tolerance as a dependent variable, that is, as the phenomenon we want to explain using socio-demographic factors such as age, education, gender, income and geographic area. With this aim, we developed a political tolerance index to measure Bolivians' acceptance of the rights of people who constantly criticize and disagree with the country's form of government. Next, we analize the factors that influence political tolerance in Bolivia through various descriptive figures and also through a linear regression model. Finally, we will refer to another type of tolerance, social tolerance, which we will measure in terms of the acceptance of the rights of homosexuals in Bolivia.[1]

[1] The analysis of social tolerance covers different types of social relations between people, but we use tolerance toward homosexuals as a way to approximate the measure of social tolerance because they are generally the least tolerated. That is, we measure social tolerance through an analysis of the most difficult or worst possible case.

The second aim of this chapter is to examine the what generates authoritarian attitudes in Bolivians. We will analyze different expressions of authoritarian attitudes – such as the justification for a hypothetical coup d'etat in the country and the approval of aggressive strategies of political participation like road blocks, the occupation of private property, and protests – as dependent variables, following the same procedure described above. In the analytical model of authoritarian attitudes, we include for the first time in Bolivia an independent variable that measures the propensity to have authoritarian attitudes in order to analyze how this rather subjective dimension influences Bolivians' attitudes. Finally, we will suggest some possible implications that our findings might have for the future of the Bolivian state.

## Political Tolerance

One of the challenges facing the social sciences is how to adequately measure political tolerance. LAPOP uses a general approximation to measure political tolerance, with particular emphasis on the possibility of making comparisons over time and between countries. The series of questions used for this end measure four different aspects or approximations of tolerance, designating those persons who criticize the country's form of government as the group to be tolerated. The responses are measured on a 10-point scale in which 1 indicates that the respondent strongly disapproved of the question and 10 indicates the respondent greatly approved. The questions are:

***D1. Hay personas que solamente hablan mal de los gobiernos bolivianos, no sólo del gobierno actual, sino del sistema de gobierno boliviano. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. el derecho de votar de esas personas?***
***D2. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista?***
***D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que a las personas que sólo hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano les permitan postularse para cargos públicos?***
***D4. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?***

This methodology seems to be most adequate because it does not exclude those who did not select a "less accepted" group as well as does not tie the response to a specific group (Gibson 1992). Its disadvantage is that it only focuses on those who "always speak badly of Bolivia's form of government." A consequence of this is that the people who disagree with the form of government in Bolivia are going to appear as more tolerant than those who support it. Despite these problems, this series of questions has generated good results in the past and for this reason seems to be the most appropriate way to measure political tolerance in the country.

The level of political tolerance among Bolivians has remained relatively stable in the eight years that we have carried out the *Democracy Audit*, as Figure III-1 shows. To gain greater clarity regarding the importance of tolerance, we should note that none of the extremes on the scale is healthy for a democracy. Having less tolerance activates the authoritarian sense in people and thus greater support for a more restrictive system. Likewise, too much tolerance can lead to the acceptance of any kind of system and not watching out for the interests of all citizens. It is for this reason that a democracy needs balanced levels of tolerance to be able to consolidate the democratic system.[2]




**Figure III-1. Evolution of Political Tolerance in Bolivia, 1998-2006**

The aim of this section is to analyze the possible factors that contribute to greater levels of political tolerance. Figure III-2 demonstrates Bolivians' attitude over the years in terms of the questions that comprise our tolerance index.

[2] For a wider discussion on the concept of tolerance, see Mackinnon and Castiglione (2003).




**Figure III-2. Political Tolerance: Support For the Rights of Those Who Criticize the System**

In the previous figure, it can be seen that tolerance levels toward the rights of people who criticize Bolivia's form of government have not drastically changed over the years. In 2006, though, these levels increased in a slight, statistically significant way. It can also be seen that the levels of tolerance toward the rights of people who wish to run for public office and toward those who wish to speak out are significantly less than those of the right to vote and protest. In 2002, the level of tolerance of the right of people to protest was greater than that for other activities. Also, in 2006, a general, statistically significant increase is noted in the levels of tolerance toward peoples' right to vote and protest.

We now turn to analyze the factors that affect Bolivians' political tolerance. Figure III-3 shows us different tolerance levels in terms of respondents' gender.




**Figure III-3. Political Tolerance by Gender**

As we demonstrated in previous studies, men tend to have higher levels of political tolerance than women (Golebiowska 1999). In 2006, the differences in tolerance as a function of gender significantly increased compared to previous years.

In terms of the differences between age groups, Figure III-4 shows that, during 2006, tolerance levels among the elderly tended to fall.[3] This decrease is not necessarily negative. To the contrary, it indicates that the young, who are the future of the democracy, are more tolerant.

[3] To establish the relationship between tolerance and the age of respondents, we excluded the group of people 88 years of age and older, due to the limited number of cases (2).




**Figure III-4. Political Tolerance by Age.**

Controlling for tolerance by urban and rural areas in the country, we noted greater levels of tolerance among Bolivians from rural areas than urban ones; these differences are statistically significant. Figure III-5 indicates that, over time, the tolerance of rural residents has been greater than that of urban ones. Only in 2004 did we note a slight increase in the levels of tolerance of people who inhabit urban areas in contrast to those living in rural ones. These results show us that there are important differences in tolerance between rural and urban areas of the country.




**Figure III-5. Political Tolerance by Urban and Rural Areas**

To conclude this analysis of political tolerance in Bolivia, we designed a linear regression model that includes the above-mentioned socio-demographic variables, as well as our measure of support for the system.[4] Table III-1 shows us which of these factors best explain political tolerance in the country.

[4] LAPOP's index of system support is based on the following items:

**B1**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?

**B2**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene UD. respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?

**B3**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?

**B4**. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente UD. orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?

**B6**. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa UD. que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?

**Table III-1. Factors that Explain Political Tolerance: Results of the Linear Regression**

| | | *B* | *S.E.* | *Beta* | *T* | *Sig.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Educación | .291 | .129 | .060 | 2.246 | *.025* |
| | Educación privada | 4.673 | 1.338 | .086 | 3.494 | *.000* |
| | Apoyo Sistema | .162 | .026 | .139 | 6.192 | *.000* |
| | Blanco | .058 | 1.546 | .001 | .038 | .970 |
| | Indígena | -.020 | 1.360 | .000 | -.015 | .988 |
| | Negro | -5.784 | 7.107 | -.018 | -.814 | .416 |
| | Oriente | 1.575 | 1.166 | .032 | 1.351 | .177 |
| | Sur | -.987 | 1.301 | -.018 | -.758 | .448 |
| | Urbano | -4.438 | 1.168 | -.091 | -3.801 | *.000* |
| | Edad | -.122 | .035 | -.080 | -3.448 | *.001* |
| | Mujer | -3.292 | .963 | -.076 | -3.418 | *.001* |
| | Riqueza | -.163 | .450 | -.010 | -.362 | .718 |
| | Experiencia de discriminación | -.714 | .341 | -.047 | -2.091 | *.037* |
| | Constante | 41.145 | 2.861 | | 14.383 | .000 |
| | **R Cuadrado Adj** | **.051** | | | | |

As can be seen in the results of the linear regression, education (both the level and whether it was private or public) is a positive and statistically significant factor.[5] This provides evidence to support the argument that greater levels of education increases the levels of political tolerance. It can also be seen that private education, as opposed to public, is a positive factor, considerably increasing peoples' level of political tolerance. This finding turns out to be very interesting since, in previous years, LAPOP's data revealed that this relationship between levels of education and political tolerance did not exist or did not behave as academic theories predicted.[6]

Another factor that turned out to be significant is the index of support for the system, indicating that the greater people's support for the Bolivian system of government, the greater their political tolerance toward those who disagree with this system. In terms of geographic variables, it should be noted that the differences between regions are not significant. However, living in an urban area rather than rural one, where tolerance levels tend to be lower, is a significant factor.

Similarly, people who have experienced discrimination (see previous chapter) have lower levels of tolerance. Finally, gender also has an important effect on levels of political tolerance: the regression values indicate that, as established in Figure III-3, men are generally more tolerant than women.

[5] The significant variables are those found in the last column of the table, equal or less than .05.
[6] See the previous *Democracy Audits*, from 1998 to 2004.

## Social Tolerance

In the previous section, we analyzed political tolerance (defined as the acceptance of the political rights of people who disagree with the country's form of government) and the factors that influence it in Bolivia. Now we introduce another form of tolerance, one related to respect for the personal decisions and lifestyle of others. We call this social tolerance. We did not include questions measuring this kind of tolerance in studies prior to 2004, so we will only make comparisons between 2004 and 2006. In these two studies, we included a question that measures peoples' attitudes toward homosexuals and their right to run for public office. In Bolivia, homosexuality has only recently became an issue that can be discussed relatively openly. Since this report primarily measures political attitudes, our question regarding the rights of homosexuals is the following:

***D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?***

When we analyzed political tolerance over time, the mean in 2004 was 41.6 points on a 100-point scale; this rose to 43.7 points on the same scale in 2006. In terms of social tolerance, Figure III-6 shows that the 2004 mean was about 31 points on a 100-point scale and that, similar to the trend of political tolerance, this mean increased to 34.9 points in 2006. These results suggest that Bolivians' level of tolerance generally increased between 2004 and 2006, despite the fact that the mean tolerance level in the social realm remains relatively low.




**Figure III-6. Social Tolerance, 2004 and 2006**

In the previous section, we discovered that the factors that primarily influence political tolerance are gender, area of residence, and education level. Figure III-7 shows us diferenciated levels of social tolerance between men and women. As can be seen, the gender-based differences in political tolerance do not reappear when we measure social tolerance. Women seem to be slightly more tolerant than men in 2004, but in 2006 there is no difference between them.




**Figure III-7. Social Tolerance by Gender, 2004 and 2006**

Education is probably most important factor when it comes to determining peoples' tolerance levels. Previously, we demonstrated that higher levels of education increase political tolerance. Figure III-8 shows that this relationship also holds true for social tolerance. As can be clearly seen, in both years there is a wide difference between the tolerance level of people with higher education and people with little education.




**Figure III-8. Social Tolerance by Level of Education, 2004 and 2006**

Finally, we designed a linear regression model with the same control variables that we used to analyze political tolerance. Table III-2 shows which factors best explain social tolerance. In this model, age (with a negative effect, meaning older people are less tolerant than the young) and any experience of discrimination (which reduces tolerance levels) are the statistically significant variables.

We also see that wealthier people, measured in terms of material goods, are more tolerant. Finally, both the level of education and private education have strong positive effects on levels of social tolerance.

**Table III-2. Factors that Explain Social Tolerance: Results of the Linear Regression**

| | *B* | *S.E.* | *Beta* | *T* | *Sig.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Educación | .739 | .189 | .106 | 3.912 | *.000* |
| Apoyo Sistema | .039 | .038 | .023 | 1.028 | .304 |
| Blanco | -1.635 | 2.238 | -.017 | -.730 | .465 |
| Indígena | -.544 | 1.988 | -.006 | -.274 | .784 |
| Negro | -11.819 | 10.263 | -.026 | -1.152 | .250 |
| Oriente | 1.254 | 1.680 | .018 | .747 | .455 |
| Sur | -3.557 | 1.891 | -.045 | -1.881 | .060 |
| Urbano | -2.552 | 1.700 | -.036 | -1.501 | .134 |
| Edad | -.135 | .051 | -.061 | -2.636 | *.008* |
| Mujer | -.492 | 1.395 | -.007 | -.308 | .758 |
| Riqueza | 1.593 | .652 | .067 | 2.445 | *.015* |
| Educación privada | 4.753 | 1.950 | .060 | 2.437 | *.015* |
| Experiencia de discriminación | -1.121 | .496 | -.052 | -2.259 | *.024* |
| Constante | 27.245 | 4.164 | | 6.543 | .000 |
| **R Cuadrado Adj** | **.043** | | | | |

We can conclude, therefore, that in Bolivia education is the most important factor in creating a culture of political and social tolerance. Thus, when the government invests in education, it is also investing in the consolidation of Bolivian democracy.

## Authoritarian Attitudes

An authoritarian disposition refers to the conformity one feels with tradition and homogeneity, as well as an aversion to diversity (Adorno, et al. 1950 ; Altemeyer 1996). One theoretical argument sustains that the perception of a threat and fear trigger authoritarian attitudes (Stenner 2005). The social sciences still face the challenge of how to adequately measure authoritarian attitudes and dispositions in people. In 2006, LAPOP started to measure authoritarian attitudes in Latin American countries, including several questions with this aim in the questionaire. The answers were measured on a scale of seven points, in which 1 indicates that the respondent was strongly opposed to what was asked in the question, and 7 indicates strong agreement. The questions are:

*AA1. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con esa práctica?*
*AA2. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?*
*AA3. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?*

To faciliate the comprehension of the relationship between authoritarian attitudes and demographic variables such as gender, age, and region, among others, we combined the above questions into a unique index called "authoritarian attitudes." In the same way

that we refer to the relationship between tolerance and the control variables, we refer to the authoritarian disposition and the control variables as a mean on a scale of 0-to-100.

This section studies which Bolivians show a greater propensity to have authoritarian dispositions, and analyzes authoritarian dispositions as an independent variable. All the results related to authoritarian dispositions and attitudes reflect Bolivian reality only in 2006, since no previous study contained a measure for these types of attitudes. Figure III-9 shows the difference in the disposition of having authoritarian attitudes as a function of the gender of the people interviewed.




**Figure III-9. Disposition of Having Authoritarian Attitudes by Gender**

The results indicate that men have a slightly greater disposition of having authoritarian attitudes than women, a difference that is statistically significant. In terms of differences in authoritarian attitudes between different age groups, [7] Figure III-10 shows there is not much variation, except for the group of people between 56 and 88 years of age, in which the propensity to have authoritarian attitudes is greater than among younger

[7] To establish the relationship between tolerance and the age of respondents, we excluded the group of people 88 years of age and older, due to the limited number of cases (2).

people. This result coincides with that of political tolerance. This older age group demonstrates the lowest levels of tolerance as well as a greater disposition to develop authoritarian attitudes.




**Figure III-10. Disposition of Having Authoritarian Attitudes by Age.**

The previous *Democracy Audit* studies indicated the importance of education for democracy. Likewise, after analyzing political and social tolerance in the first part of this chapter, we concluded that education is one of the most important positive factors to strengthen the stability of Bolivian democracy. Figure III-11 shows the differences in authoritarian attitudes between people according to their level of education. It can be seen that authoritarian attitudes decrease as the level of education rises, and that this relation is statistically significant. This finding strengthens the argument that higher levels of education reduce the predisposition of having authoritarian attitudes.




**Figure III-11. Disposition of Having Authoritarian Attitudes by Education Level**

We now turn our attention to the disposition of having authoritarian attitudes by ethnic group. Figure III-12 shows that people who identify themselves as part of indigenous or native and black ethnic groups have a greater disposition of having authoritarian attitudes than *mestizos*. It should be pointed out that the difference between indigenous or native and black ethnic groups is not statistically significant. However, the differences between people who identify themselves as part of *mestizo* and indigenous or native ethnic groups, and between the *mestizo* and black ethnic groups, are statistically significant. Additionally, we see that people who identify themselves as white show less predisposition of having authoritarian attitudes than those who identify themselves as indigenous or natives.




**Figure III-12. Disposition of Having Authoritarian Attitudes by Ethnic Group**

Are there regional differences in the level of authoritarian attitudes? Controlling for authoritarian attitudes by region, we compared the variables that represent the following regions of the country: the West, East and South. Figure III-13 shows that the authoritarian attitudes of people living in the East are significantly greater than residents of other regions. People who live in the West and South reveal less predisposition of exhibiting authoritarian attitudes.




**Figure III-13. Disposition of Having Authoritarian Attitudes by Region of the Country**

Bolivia is a country in which public protests – for example, public demonstrations, strikes, marches, among others – are strategies used by many Bolivians who want to participate in the political process to change those forms of government they ith. These strategies could lead to negotiations with the government, as well as the growth of politics and the recognition of different social actors (Laserna y Villarroel 1999 ; Seligson, et al. 2005).

In this section, we have seen the socio-demographic characteristics of people with authoritarian dispositions. Now we turn our attention to how these attitudes influence the attitudes and behaviors of Bolivians' political participation.

## Authoritarianism in Terms of Political Participation

In this section, we will analyze the levels of authoritarianism that Bolivians reveal on selecting or approving of diverse forms of participation in legally-allowed

demonstrations, electorial campaigns, street blockades, property invasions, among actions.

To simplify the analysis of this issue, we created two scales that measure Bolivians' opinions regarding aggressive political participation (through strikes, blockades, and the occupation of private property) and the justification for a hypothetical coup d'etat. It is important to point out that these scales are used as independent variables and that the scale of "authoritarian attitudes" remains the dependent variable.

Below we will examine the predisposition of Bolivians to approve of aggressive strategies of political participation and to justify a coup d'etat in a variety of circumstances as a function of their predisposition of having authoritarian attitudes. As was done previously, we use a series of questions to measure Bolivians' opinion regarding the justification for a hypothetical coup d'etat. The logic of these questions lies in that a coup d'etat is a clear anti-democratic manifestation that is commonly accompanied by the establishment of an authoritarian regime. The justification of an action of this type is connected to a clear predisposition to consider authoritarianism as an acceptable political tool. The responses are measured simply with two positions: 1, indicating the respondent considers a coup d'etat is justifiable; and 0, when he or she considers that it is not justifiable under any circumstance. The questions are:

*Un golpe de Estado es justificable o no es justificable:*
*JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto?*
*JC10 [JC11]. Frente a mucha delincuencia?*
*JC13 [JC12]. Frente a mucha corrupción?*
*JC11 [JC16]. Frente a mucho desorden social?*
*JC7. Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema izquierda en las elecciones?*
*JC8. Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema derecha en las elecciones?*
*JC17. Si las empresas transnacionales se aprovechan del país?*

The questions to measure Bolivians' opinion on their approval level of aggresive strategies of political participation are:

*Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba*
***E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras?***
***E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados?***
***E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios?***
***E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido?***




**Figure III-14. Disposition to Approve of Aggressive Strategies of Political Participation and to Justify a Coup d'Etat**

Figure III-14 shows that as the predisposition of respondents having authoritarian attitudes increases, their level of approval of aggressive political participation, such as street blockades and the occupation of private property, increases. This relation is not clearly linear but it is much clearer than that established between the predisposition to authoritarianism and the propensity to justify a coup d'etat in different political or economic circumstances. The figure suggests that the disposition to justify a coup d'etat remains relatively constant independently of how the predisposition to authoritarianism varies. From this, we can infer that there is no important relationship between the predisposition to authoritarianism and the attitudes regarding a hypothetical coup d'etat.

To deepen our analysis of authoritarian attitudes in Bolivia, we designed another linear regression model, including socio-demographic variables as well as our measure of support for the system, in order to estimate the predictors of approval of aggressive political participation in 2006. Table III-3 shows which factors influence the approval of aggressive strategies of political participation among Bolivians.[8]

[8] The significant variables are those found in the last column of the table equal or less than .05.

**Table III-3. Factors that Explain the Approval of Aggressive Strategies of Political Participation: Results of the Linear Regression**

| Variables | Coeficientes no estandarizados | | Coeficientes estandarizados | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| Constante | 19.529 | 1.977 | | 9.880 | .000 |
| Mujer | -.671 | .711 | -.018 | -.943 | .346 |
| Edad | -.400 | .122 | -.063 | -3.277 | *.001* |
| Educación | -.676 | .575 | -.026 | -1.176 | .240 |
| Educación privada | -1.756 | 1.023 | -.036 | -1.717 | .086 |
| Blanco | -.916 | 1.112 | -.016 | -.824 | .410 |
| Indígena | 2.541 | .964 | .053 | 2.636 | *.008* |
| Oriente | 5.705 | .840 | .141 | 6.791 | *.000* |
| Sur | .026 | .966 | .001 | .026 | .979 |
| Urbano > 2.000 | -4.890 | .893 | -.121 | -5.474 | *.000* |
| Riqueza | -.607 | .197 | -.077 | -3.085 | *.002* |
| Apoyo al sistema | .053 | .019 | .053 | 2.743 | *.006* |
| Actitudes autoritarias | .131 | .016 | .170 | 8.226 | *.000* |
| Confianza comunidad | -.032 | .012 | -.052 | -2.654 | *.008* |
| N | 2.465 | | | | |
| Rcuadrada ajustada | 0,131 | | | | |

The results signaled in the above table indicate that, as already shown in Figure III-14, as the predisposition to have authoritarian attitudes grows, the predisposition to approve of aggressive strategies of political participation also increases. The results also suggest that young people approve of aggressive strategies of political participation with greater intensity than older people; and that people who live in urban areas tend to disapprove of such strategies more than people who live in rural areas. This result is not surprising considering that it is precisely those people living in large urban areas who suffer the consequences of the aggressive political participation more frequently than people who live in small cities and towns.

The results also indicate that people who live in eastern Bolivia tend to approve of aggressive strategies of participation more than people from other regions of the country. They also show that as the wealth of respondents increases, their approval for aggressive political participation shrinks. And that people who show greater trust in the people of their community tend to disapprove of aggresivity as a form of political participation

## Conclusions

In this chapter, we have seen that, in terms of political tolerance (or respect for the rights of people who disagree with the government), Bolivians have low levels of tolerance compared to citizens of other countries in the Latin American region. In 2006, however, we noted a slight general increase in the levels of tolerance. We also noted a significant increase in social tolerance over the years of the last two studies.

With respect to authoritarian attitudes, the data signals that they have an important effect on specific forms of authoritarianism in the society. The predisposition to authoritarianism certainly affects respondents' willingness to approve of aggressive strategies as an acceptable form of political participation, but does not, for example, affect the tendency to justify a hypothetical coup d'etat.

Finally, we conclude that, in Bolivia, education is the most important factor in the creation of a culture of political and social tolerance, as well as low levels of authoritarian attitudes; and that it also contributes to the consolidation of a stable democratic system.

# IV. Social Capital in Bolivia

In this chapter, we will analyze a primordial element for the existence of democracy and how well it functions. We are referring to social capital. The term "social capital" was popularized in the social sciences with the publication of Robert Putnum's (1993 167) book, "Making Democracy Work." Although an exact definition of the term "social capital" does not exist, Putname descbies it as "the characteristics of social organization, such as trust, norms, and social networks that can provide efficiency in a society." This notion of social capital directly ties citizen participation in civic organizations to improved social well-being.

According to Putnum, when there is active participation in civil society organizations, governments respond more to the population's interests and demands, leading to, therefore, more representative governments that provide better services. In other words, in addition to favoring the rise of democracy, civic participation is said to promote better quality democracies. Putnum also argues that the mechanism which explains this outcome is the greater amount of political activism of people who frequently participate in civic organizations. That is, participation in civil society is expected to translate into greater demands on and supervision of public employees and entities.

Interpersonal trust is a concept intrinsically related to the level of social capital. For Putnum, there is a reciprocal relationship between the level of interpersonal trust and participation in civil society. Individuals with high levels of trust are more willing to associate with others, and in turn, greater social interaction and organization strengthens interpersonal trust, thus producing a virtuous circle between civic participation and interpersonal trust. Because of this relationship, many empirical studies measure social capital through both participation in civic organizations and the level of interpersonal trust in a community.

In this chapter, we will analyze social capital in the Bolivian context. Previous studies have emphasized the characteristics and importance of civic participation in Bolivia (Seligson 1999 ; Seligson 2005a). One of the reasons why social capital is such an outstanding theme in Bolivia is the recent implementation of government iniciatives designed to promote social capital, especially at the local government level. In 1995, the government of President Sánchez de Lozada initiated a process of state decentralization, which included the application of the "*Ley de Participación Popular*" (Law of Popular Participation). This law legally recognized the "*Organizaciones Territoriales de Base*" (Territorial Base Organizations, or OTB), which constitute autonomous channels of popular participation.

This chapter has various objectives. First, we seek to establish how the level of social capital in Bolivia compares with that of other Latin American countries. Second, using samples of national respresentation for the five years available, we examine the evolution of social capital in Bolivia. Third, we want to establish which are the main determinants of social capital in Bolivia, and whether there is a reciprocal relationship

between levels of interpersonal trust and participation in civil society, as Putnum (1993) suggests. Finally, we analyze the consequences of social capital for democracy. Specifically, we examine what kind of civil society organizations promote political participation, whether it be through formal or informal means. We also seek to establish whether or not greater participation in civil society translates into greater support for the Bolivian political system.

## Measuring Social Capital

In this chapter, we will measure social capital through two concepts. The first is related to the frequency with which people state they participate in meetings of different kinds of civic organizations; and the second is related to the respondent's level of interpersonal trust. Below, we present the questions used in the LAPOP survey that allow us to measure these concepts.

| Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste Ud. a sus reuniones una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año o nunca. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Una vez a la semana** | **Una o dos veces al mes** | **Una o dos veces al año** | **Nunca** | **NS/NR** |
| **CP6. Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste…** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** |
| **CP7. Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿ Asiste…** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** |
| **CP8. Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? ¿Asiste….** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** |
| **CP9. Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, campesinos o productores? ¿Asiste…** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** |
| **BOLCP13. Juntas vecinales? ¿Asiste….** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** |
| **BOLCP14. Organización territorial de base (OTB's)? ¿Asiste….** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** |
| **CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? ¿Asiste….** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** |

*IT1.* ***Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad (barrio) es ..?*** *Muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable*

We recodified valid responses to the CP series of questions, as well as item IT1, in order to represent them on a scale of 0-to-100. A value of 0 in the CP series of questions indicates that the person stated that they "never" participated, and a value of

100 that they participated "once a w eek." In the same way, a value of 0 on the scale for item IT1 corresponds to the answer "not trustworthy", and the value of 100 to "very trustworthy."

## Social Capital in Bolivia in Comparative Perspective

The following three figures show how mean Bolivian levels of interpersonal trust and attendence at civic organization meetings compare to those of other Latin Am erican countries where LAPOP has carried out survey s. The samples for the other countries in the Latin American region are representative of the national level and are from 2004. As can be seen in Figur e IV-1, Bolivia has the lowest interpersonal trust average (47 points) among the ten countries we compare. The error bars show that the difference between the means for Bolivia and the other countries is st atistically significant. It is interesting to note that Costa Rica, one of th e oldest and most stable democracies in the region, has the highest level of interp ersonal trust, with a value of ar ound 71 points. In the rest of the countries of the region, however, this value is considerably lower.




**Figure IV-1. Level of Interpersonal Trust: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective**

Does the low level of interpersonal trust in Bolivia translate into less civic participation? Figures IV-2 and IV-3 show participation levels in different civic organizations for Bolivia and other Latin American countries. It can be seen that, despite the low level of trust among Bolivians, on average, they show high levels of participation, including the highest levels in three out of the five organizations we graph.




**Figure IV-2. Participaction in Religious and Parent-Teacher Organizations: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective**

Figure IV-2 shows that Bolivians participate in parent-teacher association meetings more frequently than citizens of the other countries. Bolivia also occupies the third highest place in terms of the frequency of participation in religious organizations.

Figure IV-3 shows participation levels in community improvement committees, in professional, merchant, peasant or producer associations, and in political movements and parties in Bolivia and other Latin American countries. In two out three of these kinds of civic organizations, Bolivia has the highest levels of participation, far above the levels of the other countries. These two kinds of organizations are community improvement committees and professional associations. The analysis of this data provides evidence that sheds doubt on Putnam's theory, at least in terms of its application to Latin America, since we did not find the expected relationship between interpersonal trust and civic participation that Putnam described in the case of Italy or the United States.




**Figure IV-3. Participation in Community Improvement Organizations, Professional Associations, and Political Parties: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective**

Of course, Putnum's theory regarding social capital and its relation to citizen civic and political participation is not the only theory that tries to explain the mechanisms of participation, but it is a respected and accepted theory in the academic world. Therefore, beyond just questioning Putnam's theory in those countries studied by LAPOP, the results of the above analysis challenge our understanding of the social and political dynamics that influence civic and political participation in these countries.

Given this situation, below we analyze the behavior of interpersonal trust in Bolivia between 1998 and 2006. We also wanted to analyze how the levels of civic participation varied during the same period. But we ran into the problem that the variables which allow us to measure civic participation differed in 2006 from the other years. This is because, for the 2006 *Democracy Audit*, we decided to improve the way in which we measured the frequency of civic participation in Bolivia, and these variables changed the format in which we measured respondents' answers. In 2006, we started to measure participation in Bolivia more closely and in the same format in which we measure it in the other Latin American countries studied by LAPOP.

For now, this problem prevents us from studying variations in the levels of civic participation in Bolivia between 1998 and 2006. For this reason too, we cannot graph the relationship between both elements and test Putnam's theory in detail. This task should be undertaken in future studies by collecting extra data on participation in Bolivia.

Figure IV-4, below, shows that the mean level of interpersonal trust, measured as trust in people of the community, has remained constant over the years. The small differences between the bar graphs are minimal since interpersonal trust is measured on a scale of 0-to-100 points; it should also be considered that these differences are not statistically significant, which means that these differences are not real but a product of the sample's structure.




**Figure IV-4. Evolution Interpersonal Trust Levels**

## Determinants of Participation Levels in Civil Society and Interpersonal Trust. Is There a Virtuous Circle?

In this section, we run regression analyses on the data from the 2006 survey in order to establish whether there exists, in Bolivia, a "virtuous circle" between interpersonal trust and civic participation, as Putnum (1993) suggests. We also try to determine which variables affect civic participation and interpersonal trust in Bolivia. To do this, we created two regression models, one in which the index of civic participation is the dependent variable [1] and another in which the dependent variable is the level of interpersonal trust. Brehm y Rahn (1997) carried out a similar analysis using survey data

[1] The index of civic participation for 2006, besides taking into account questions CP6, CP7, CP9, BOLCP13, y BOLCP14, also includes the frequency of participation in political movement or party meetings (CP13).

from the United States, finding that there does exist a reciprocal relationship between interpersonal trust and civic participation, although civic participation had a stronger impact than interpersonal trust.

**Table IV-1. Bolivia 2006: Results of the Linear Regression Estimating the Predictors of Civic Participation**

| Variables | B | Beta | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confianza interpersonal | .037 | .069 | *.002* |
| Educación | .001 | .021 | .482 |
| Desempleado (a) | -.003 | -.008 | .717 |
| Mujer | .001 | .004 | .859 |
| Urbano | -.025 | -.074 | *.005* |
| Conocimiento político | .002 | .012 | .645 |
| Edad | .015 | 1.288 | *.000* |
| Edad al cuadrado | .000 | -1.155 | *.000* |
| Blanco | .000 | .000 | .983 |
| Indigena u orginario | .007 | .018 | .450 |
| Ninguno o Negro | .000 | .000 | .994 |
| Oriente | .009 | .025 | .400 |
| Occidente | .025 | .079 | *.007* |
| Riqueza | -.008 | -.121 | *.000* |
| Constante | -.037 | | .201 |
| R-cuadrado ajustado | .094 | | |
| Número de observaciones | 1943 | | |

In Table IV-1, it can be seen that interpersonal trust exercises a statistically significant positive effect on civic participation (Sig.<0,05). An increase of one point on the interpersonal trust scale is associated with a 3.7 point increase in the participation index. In addition to interpersonal trust, the following characteristics also determine the willingness and frequency with which individuals participate in civic groups: area of residence (urban or rural), the geographic region of residence, age, and the personal socio-economic situation (wealth).

People who live in urban areas show lower levels of participation, as the negative sign for this variable indicates. Also, those who live in the western region of the country tend to participate more than those living in the South. [2] In Table IV-1, the positive sign for the "age" variable, and the negative sign for the "age squared" variable (which can be seen in its standarized coeficient), show that as people age their civic participation tends to fall, although slowly. Additionally, contrary to what the theory predicts, it can be seen that the higher one's socio-economic status, measured by the "wealth" variable, the lower his or her level of civic participation.[3]

[2] We use the southern region as the regional reference category in Tables IV-1 and IV-2.
[3] The "wealth" variable is a measure of the socio-economic status of the person. This variable is calculated by constructing an index that uses the items of the R series of the LAPOP survey, which refer to the ownership of household goods, such as a television, telephone, automobile, etc.

We note how these results, and our analysis in the previous sections of this chapter, contradict Putnam's theory. They show that although the level of interpersonal trust in Bolivia is low, the level of participation is higher than in any of the other Latin American countries. However, when we run the regression analysis only on the 2006 Bolivian data, we see that it behaves according to Putnam's argument, and that higher levels of interpersonal trust imply greater levels of civic participation.

Our data does not offer a clear explanation for this apparent contradiction between the comparative and domestic perspectives. The regression indicates that even if interpersonal trust influences the levels of civic participation, it is not the the only factor that affects it. We can see, looking at the Beta coeficients, that the effect of age on participation levels is greater than the effect of interpersonal trust. These results suggest that Putnam's theory might be valid in the domestic context but that there can be elements that intervene and change the relationship between trust and participation when different countries are compared.

Nonetheless, this reflection is more an hypothesis than an explanation and, as we mentioned above, to more thoroughly explain this dynamic a more extensive analysis, with data that we do not currently have, needs to be undertaken.

**Table IV-2. Bolivia 2006: Results of the Linear Regression Estimating the Predictors of Interpersonal Trust.**

| Variables | B | Beta | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Participación cívica | .113 | .061 | *.008* |
| Nivel de satisfacción con la vida | .190 | .153 | *.000* |
| Víctima de acto delincuencial | -.031 | -.040 | .073 |
| Educación | .001 | .026 | .370 |
| Desempleado (a) | -.027 | -.036 | .104 |
| Mujer | -.068 | -.111 | *.000* |
| Urbano | .007 | .010 | .694 |
| Edad | -.003 | -.140 | .240 |
| Edad al cuadrado | .000 | .149 | .211 |
| Blanco | -.005 | -.005 | .827 |
| Indigena u orginario | -.003 | -.003 | .885 |
| Ninguno o negro | .046 | .029 | .198 |
| Oriente | .090 | .131 | *.000* |
| Occidente | -.009 | -.015 | .623 |
| Riqueza | .015 | .122 | *.000* |
| Constante | .289 | | .000 |
| R-cuadrado ajustado | .099 | | |
| Número de observaciones | 1908 | | |

Continuing with the analysis, Table IV-2 shows that greater civic participation also leads to higher levels of interpersonal trust. This confirms, therefore, the existence of a virtuous circle between these two variables in Bolivia. An increase of one point in the participation index is associated with an average increase of 11.3 points in the level of interpersonal trust on a scale of 0 to 100.

Another important determinant of the level of interpersonal trust is the level of life satisfaction.[4] A higher degree of satisfaction with the life one leads is associated with greater levels of trust in people of the community. By contrast, having been the victim of a crime reduces the level of trust, as does being unemployed. The level of interpersonal trust is also related to gender. Women have a lower average of interpersonal trust than men. In terms of the area of residence and socio-economic status, people who live in the eastern region have more trust than others, as do people with greater wealth.

## Participation in Civil Society and Political Mobilization

In this section, we evaluate whether civic participation is associated with greater poltical mobilization, and what kind of organizations encourage citizens to make more demands on state entities, whether through formal or informal means. Previous studies in Latin American countries have demonstrated that not all forms of participation in civil society lead to political mobilization (Seligson 1999). It is necessary, therefore, to study each civic organization separately instead of using a participation index as we have done in previous sections.

The questions about political participation that we list below are those used in the figures of this section. Our aim is to determine the relationship between civic and political participation in Bolivia. The items and results are from the 2006 survey. Response options were grouped in two categories, where 1 represents "yes" and 0 represents "no."

***A veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolverlos solos. Algunos tratan de resolver tales problemas pidiendo ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. Alguna vez ha pedido ayuda o cooperación***
***CP2.*** *A Algún diputado o senador*
***CP4A.*** *A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad)*

***NP1A.*** *Ahora vamos a hablar de la alcaldía de este municipio. Ha tenido Ud. la oportunidad de asistir a una sesión municipal u otra reunión convocada por la Alcaldía o concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?*

***PROT1.****¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?*

[4] We constructed this variable from item LS3 in the survey, and codified it on a scale of 0 to 1.

The following figure indicates that people who said they asked a deputy or senator for help or assistance show higher participation averages in civic organizations; this hold true for all the organizations or groups we evaluated. However, the difference in the participation average, between those who asked for help and those who did not, is not statistically significant for people who participated in the meetings of religious organizations. This suggests that participation in religious organizations is not strongly tied to petitioning deputies or senators.




**Figure IV-5. Participation in Civic Organizations and Petitions to Deputies or Senators**

Additionally, Figure IV-6 compares the average level of participation in each organization between people who asked for help or cooperation from some local authority and those who did not. The tendency is similar to that illustrated in the previous figure. People with higer levels of participation are more likely to petition municipal authorities, except for those who participate in religious organizations.




**Figure IV-6. Participation in Civic Organizations and Petitions to the Municipality**

When we compare participation in municipal meetings to participation levels in civic organizations (Figure IV-7), the results are similar to previous ones. The only difference is that, as expected, individuals who most frequently participate in *Organizaciones Territoriales de Base* meetings also participate significantly more in municipal meetings. People who participate in municipal meetings show around 16.2 more points in the frequency of OTB participation than those who did not participate in municipal meetings.




**Figure IV-7. Participation in Civic Organizations and Attendence at Municipal Meetings**

Now we turn to analyze the relationship between civic participation and more informal means of political participation, such as demonstrations or political protests. Norris, Walgrave and Von Aelst (2005) point out that participation in public protests becomes a more conventional form of participation when it is accompanied by active participation in civic organizations; in other words, when joining protests does not constitute individuals' only form of participation. This distinction is important because it is believed that protests are less likely to destabilize the political system when protesters also participate in civic organizations. Previous LAPOP studies have noted the high level of Bolivians' participation in public protests within the Latin American context (Seligson, et al. 2005).

Figure IV-8 suggests that, in the Bolivian case, higher levels of civic participation are associated with a greater propensity to participate in protests, as well as other forms of political participation, such as asking a deputy or senator and/or the municipality for help and participating in municipal meetings. Once again, the exception to this tendency is participation in religious organizations, which is associated with less participation in protests, although this relationship is not statistically significant.




**Figure IV-8. Participation in Civic Organizations and Participation in Demonstrations**

## Participation in Civil Society and Support for the Political System

Finally, we use the data from the 2006 survey to examine the relationship between support for the Bolivian political system and participation in civil society. We measure support for the political system in this section with only one item from the LAPOP survey in order to facilitate the analysis. The question was asked using a seven-point scale in which 7 indicates "a great deal" and 1 "none."

***B6.*** *¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?*




**Figure IV-9. Civic Participation and Support For the Political System**

As can be observed in Figure IV-9, there is a positive relationship between the degree of support for the system and the participation average in civil society. It is interesting to note that a relatively low average in the participation index, around 26 points, is associated with the maxium of 100 points in support for the political system, showing the relevance of civic participation or of social capital for national political life.

## Conclusions

In this chapter, we analyzed the level of social capital in Bolivia, measuring it through interpersonal trust and participation in civic organizations. We found that despite the low average level of trust, Bolivia shows relatively high levels of participation in civil society compared to other Latin American countries. We also found that on the individual level, trust and civic participation are closely tied and mutually reinforcing.

The data also suggests, however, that the relationship between trust and participation, although strong and significant in the domestic context, does not necessarily translate with the same effect to the international context. To explain this change, a more detailed study of this relationship in both contexts is needed.

The anlysis of the relationship between social capital and democracy in this chapter suggests that not only is civic participation generally tied to greater political participation, but it is also tied to greater support for the country's political system. Thus the importance of promoting social capital in Bolivia.

# V. Elections in the Political System

Since the restauration of democracy in Bolivia, the presidential elections have been full of surprises. The electoral process itself differs from many other countries since there are really two elections due to the frequently debated "Article 90" of the Bolivian Constitution (Mayorga 2001). In the first, the population casts its vote. In the second, the National Congress selects the winner between the two candidates with the most votes. The second phase only occurs when none of the candidates receive a majority of votes (50% + 1). But in practice, until the recent presidential election of December 18, 2005 in which Evo Morales, candidate of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), won the election with 53 percent of the vote, no candidate had received a majority since democracy was restored in Bolivia.

## Voter Turnout Over the Years

Three presidential elections have passed since the first *Democracy Audit:Bolivia* (Seligson 1999) was written. Table V-1 shows the percentage of people interviewed by the LAPOP survey who stated they voted in the three elections.[1] The first was in 1997, in which the ADN, party of ex –dictator Hugo Bánzer Suárez, obtained largest number of votes. In the 2002 elections, it was Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada who rose to victory at the ballotbox. Finally, in December of 2005, Bolivians elected the reprsentative of the Movimiento al Socialismo, Evo Morales, with an unprecedented majority

**Table V-1. Percentage of Respondents Who Voted in Presidential Elections**

| Año de la Elección | Porcentaje |
|---|---|
| 1997 | 95.2% |
| 2002 | 80.8% |
| 2005 | 90.9% |

Table V-1 shows us that the three presidential elections had different levels of participation on the part of the public. The first thing that should be stressed is that the LAPOP survey does not directly measure electoral participation; the person is asked whether or not he or she voted. Of course, it is possible that some people say they voted when they did not, or that they did not vote when in fact they did. There can be a variety of reasons for this: people can have forgotten whether or not they voted, or who they voted for. Since voting in presidential elections is mandatory, it is also possible that some respondents feared confessing that they had not voted in a presidential election. Such fear

[1] For the 1997 elections, the results presented are an average of the percentages reported in the 1998 and 2000 elections. Likewise, the percentage presented for the 2002 election is the average of the percentages reported in the 2002 and 2004 surveys.

is not only because voting is obligatory but also because of its social desirability; in other words, there is pressure on citizens to fulfill the civic obligation to vote.

In this section, we are going to analyze the reasons behind the different levels of voter turnout in the presidential elections of 1997, 2002 and 2005. Table V-2 shows the results of a logistic regression carried out to estimate the most important predictors of voting in the 1997 presidential elections. To do this, we created a dichotomous variable based on the following question:

***VB297. Votó ud. en las elecciones pasadas (de junio de 1997)?***

To affirmative responses, we assigned a value of 1, and to negative ones a value of 0. The "Sig." column shows that the variables in the model are statistically significant equal to or greater than 05 levels of certainty. As can be seen, the only significant indicator in this case turns out to be age. The results show us that older people tend to vote more than the young.

**Table V-2. Forecasters of Voter Turnout in the 1997 Presidential Elections: Results of the Logistic Regression**

| | B | S.E. | Wald | Df | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mujer | -.262 | .144 | 3.313 | 1 | .069 | .769 |
| Evangélico | .201 | .302 | .443 | 1 | .506 | 1.223 |
| Educación | -.008 | .115 | .005 | 1 | .944 | .992 |
| Edad | .216 | .061 | 12.307 | 1 | ***.000*** | 1.241 |
| Mestizo | .071 | .162 | .190 | 1 | .663 | 1.073 |
| Indígena | -.091 | .281 | .105 | 1 | .746 | .913 |
| Oriente | -.281 | .174 | 2.601 | 1 | .107 | 1.755 |
| Sur | -.001 | .194 | .000 | 1 | .995 | .999 |
| Riqueza en bienes materiales | .034 | .043 | .651 | 1 | .420 | 1.035 |
| Urbano | .043 | .071 | .356 | 1 | .551 | 1.043 |
| Constante | 2.351 | .454 | 26.823 | 1 | .000 | 10.495 |

Figure V-1 presents the results of the logistic regression. It shows that people between the ages of 46 and 88 have higher voting levels than people between the ages of 18 and 45. It is worth stressing that in Bolivia voting is not obligatory for senior citizens, which is why it is surprising that voting levels are highest among the elderly. There is an explanation for this phenomenon, however, which we will discuss shortly.




**Figure V-1. Voting by Age Group**

To analyze voting levels in the presidential elections of 2002, we conducted the same process that we undertook to examine voting levels in the 1997 elections. The following question was asked both in the 2002 and 2004 surveys:

***VBPRS02. Votó ud. en las elecciones presidenciales del 2002?***

We also codified the affirmative responses with a value of 1 and the negative ones with a value of 0. Table V-3 shows which forecasters were significant in this election. In this case, we see that more indicators turned out to be significant. Age is again significant and has a negative sign, which ratifies what we mentioned previously. As we can see in Figure V-1, citizens between the ages of 18 and 25 show comparatively lower voting levels than other age groups. Sub-dividing this age group, we see that 18 year olds had the lowest voting levels. We might suspect, therefore, that the problem of low voting levels among the young is really the effect of voting registration. People who were 18 years old on the date of the election might not have been old enough to be able to register to vote in the months prior to the election. The registration process is rather complicated and requires a good deal of time since it requires a personal visit to the voter-registration

office.[2] Another possible explanation is that respondents who were 18 or 19 years old in 2004, when we carried out our surveys, were not old enough to vote in 2002. Therefore, even if they were valid cases for the survey, two years earlier they did not have the right to vote.

**Table V-3. Forecasters of Voter Turnout in the 2002 Presidential Election: Results of the Logistic Regression**

| | B | S.E. | Wald | df | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mujer | -.300 | .071 | 17.967 | 1 | ***.000*** | .741 |
| Educación | .580 | .061 | 91.769 | 1 | ***.000*** | 1.787 |
| Edad | .802 | .035 | 518.540 | 1 | ***.000*** | 2.231 |
| Mestizo | .219 | .087 | 6.374 | 1 | ***.012*** | 1.245 |
| Indígena | .214 | .121 | 3.148 | 1 | .076 | 1.239 |
| Oriente | .018 | .083 | .046 | 1 | .830 | 1.018 |
| Sur | .112 | .096 | 1.357 | 1 | .244 | 1.119 |
| Riqueza en bienes materiales | .086 | .020 | 18.252 | 1 | ***.000*** | 1.090 |
| Urbano | .011 | .035 | .096 | 1 | .756 | 1.011 |
| Constante | -2.020 | .226 | 79.538 | 1 | .000 | .133 |

Levels of education turned out to be another significant indicator. The data indicates that, in this election, people with higher levels of education voted more than people with low levels. In terms of ethnicity, the regression shows us that people who identify themselves as *mestizos* were more likely to vote than those who consider themselves to be white. Also, in congruity with education levels, the level of wealth in material goods is statistically significant and has a negative sign, thus indicating a greater propensity to vote, at least in this election. Finally, we can see that gender was another significant indicator: men voted more than women. These results are shown in Figure V-2.

[2] The electoral code contains the following provisions:
Article 96.- (OBLIGATORY REGISTRATION). All citizens are obliged to register in the Electoral Census; inscription is only optional for people older than seventy years.
Article 98.- (REGISTRATION NORMS). Registration and re-registration is a personal act. The citizen should do it the notary of his or her electoral district that is closest to his or her residence.
Article 99.- (REGISTRATION NORMS). Electoral notaries, exercising the faculties given them by clause a) of Article 42 of the current Code, will register citizens.
Article 100.- (VALID DOCUMENT AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY). The registration of citizens requires the presentation of an identity document, passport or military service booklet before the electoral notary of one's area of residence, who will testify to this act with his signature and seal.




**Figure V-2. Voting in the 2002 Presidential Election by Gender**

To end this section, we will turn to analyze the results of voting levels in the 2005 election. As in previous years, the survey contained the following question:

***VB02. Votó ud. en las elecciones presidenciales de 2005?***

The same values of 1 for affirmative responses and 0 for negative responses were assigned. We then ran a logistic regression to analyze the results, detailed in Table V-4.

**Table V-4. Forecasters of Voter Turnout in the 2005 Presidential Elections: Results of the Logistic Regression**

| | B | S.E. | Wald | Df | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mujer | -.428 | .146 | 8.663 | 1 | ***.003*** | .652 |
| Evangélico | -.590 | .720 | .670 | 1 | .413 | .555 |
| Educación | .227 | .120 | 3.591 | 1 | .058 | 1.255 |
| Edad | .189 | .058 | 10.432 | 1 | ***.001*** | 1.208 |
| Mestizo | .001 | .196 | .000 | 1 | .997 | 1.001 |
| Indígena | .057 | .243 | .054 | 1 | .816 | 1.058 |
| Oriente | -.635 | .162 | 15.340 | 1 | ***.000*** | .530 |
| Sur | -.362 | .196 | 3.427 | 1 | .064 | .969 |
| Riqueza en bienes materiales | .093 | .041 | 5.267 | 1 | *.022* | 1.098 |
| Urbano | .125 | .071 | 3.102 | 1 | .078 | 1.133 |
| Constante | 1.160 | .444 | 6.835 | 1 | .009 | 3.191 |

The effect of age remains constant: in this election older people also voted more than younger ones. Gender was another significant indicator in this election. As in the 2002 presidential elections, men had higher levels of voter turnout than women. Finally, we can also see that, in terms region, people who lived in the East (Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando) claimed to vote in lower proportions that those living in the the West, as Figure V-3 shows, below.




**Figure V-3. Voting in the 2005 Presidential Election by Geographic Region**

## Voting for Parties and Citizen Characteristics

Now we move beyond the act of voting itself to analyze the characteristics of voters from the various political parties in the 2005 elections, especially those who voted for Evo Morales since he represents the new national majority. To do this, we need to focus on the four parties that received the most votes since the sample size for smaller parties is too small to be able to interpret the results with reasonble certainty. Table V-5 shows the general results. The parties are listed in order of total votes received, according to the survey, from highest to lowest. The four largest, up to the MNR, have 110 or more cases and are, therefore, adequate for analysis. The remaining parties will be excluded from this analysis, since grouping them together is not very useful because of the different programs each of these parties represent.

**Table V-5. Votes per Candidate, 2005 Presidential Election, According to LAPOP survey**

| Partido Político/candidato | Frecuencia | % | % Válido |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAS (Evo Morales) | 996 | 33.1% | 53.3% |
| PODEMOS (Jorge Quiroga) | 462 | 15.3% | 24.7% |
| Nulo/Blanco | 149 | 5.0% | 8% |
| UN (Samuel Doria Medina) | 131 | 4.3% | 7% |
| MNR (Michiaki Nagatani) | 110 | 3.7% | 5.9% |
| MIP (Felipe Quispe "Mallku") | 10 | .3% | .5% |
| FREPAB (Eliseo Rodríguez) | 5 | .2% | .3% |
| NFR (Guido Angulo) | 4 | .1% | .2% |
| USTB (Nestor García) | 2 | .1% | .1% |
| Total | 1868 | 62.0% | 100% |
| No sabe | 443 | 14.7% | |
| No aplica | 701 | 23.4% | |
| Total | 1144 | 38.0% | |
| TOTAL | 3013 | 100.0% | |

In what ways do the voters for the parties that received the most votes in 2005 differ from each other? First, let us take a quick look at gender. As we can see in Figure V-4, it has no impact on voting in 2005, with the exception of null and blank votes, 60 percent of which were cast by women. In many countries, political parties show a much more marked division by gender, but this does not seem to be the case in Bolivia.




**Figure V-4. Voting in the 2005 Elections by Gender.**

In recent years there has been a resurgence of ethnic politics in Latin America, especially in Guatemala, Ecuador and Bolivia. In some cases, this has led to the formation of ethnically-based political parties (Yashar 1996). In Bolivia, this resurgence reached its high point in the election of a self-identified indigenous candidate to the presidency of the Republic. Figure V-5 shows the distribution of votes by people who identify themselves as part of different ethnic groups. The results of the survey show that 27.2 percent, or more than a quarter of the votes for Evo Morales, were cast by people who identify themselves as indigenous or native.

A curious case is that of the candidate for the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, or MNR), Michiaki Nagatani. He received 22 percent of his votes from people who self-identify as natives and another 20 percent from people who consider themselves to be white. It can be seen that the vast majority of votes for all candidates were cast by people who self-identity as *mestizo*. This is not surprising, considering that "*mestizo*" is the most common ethnic identification among those surveyed.

It is also worth emphasizing the fact that all parties have a rather ethnically diverse mix of voters. Even if some parties technically have greater support from some groups rather than others, the four important political forces in the 2005 presidential election had a substantial component of their vote divided among different ethnic identities.




**Figure V-5. Impact of Ethnic Self-Identification on the Vote for President, 2005**

We can also examine the support for political parties by region. The eastern region, and mainly Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the country's richest city, has been fighting for some time to gain greater political and economic autonomy. Figure V-6 shows the clear impact that geographic region has on the vote in Bolivia. While the distribution of the vote was relative equitable in the southern region, it can be seen that Evo Morales' candidacy did not generate much support in the East, since only 12 percent of his vote came from this region. The candidate who obtained the majority of votes in the eastern region was Nagatani of the MNR. This, however, does not mean that the majority of people in this region voted for him. Evo Morales received the vast majority of his votes in the West, while Jorge Quiroga obtained similar percentages in the East and the West. It remains clear, in any case, that geographic region was an important forecaster of the vote in the December, 2005 election.




**Figure V-6. Impact of Geographic Region on the Vote for President, 2005**

Another important variable in the 2005 Bolivian election is that of education. The *Democracy Audit* questionaire used several questions to determine education levels of the people surveyed. One of them allowed us to deduce how many years of formal education a respondent had. On the basis of this quest ion, we constructed Figure V-7, which shows the differences in education between the voters for Evo Morales and the two other candidates who received a sufficiently large number of cases to be able to include them in this analysis.




**Figure V-7. Impact of Education on the Vote for President, 2005**

As can be appreciated in the figure, the average citizen in the LAPOP survey has ten years of formal education. According to the data of the 2006 survey, the citizens coming closest to this average level of education voted for Evo Morales, or cast blank votes. By contrast, people with more years of education leaned more toward Jorge Quiroga or Samuel Doria Medina. Despite the fact that education is a variable that does not turn out to be statistically significant in the multivariate analysis presented futher on, there does exist a significant bivariate relationship between education and the vote, which is why it seems important to us to include this variable the present analysis.

Political ideology is another possible determining factor of the vote. Voters not only difer in demographic, socio-economic, and geographic terms, but there are also important political differences between them. Our survey used a Left-Right scale, which oscilates from a minimum of 1, indicating that the respondent is on the extreme left, to a maximum of 10, indicating that the respondent considers him or herself to be on the extreme right. The question can be seen below:[3]

[3] It is worth emphasizing that the variable we use to measure ideology does not come from given attitudes that can be understood as either of the left or right, but instead from peoples' own self-identification in relation to the axis with left and right at opposite ends. It is clear that this self-identification greatly simplifies ideology, forcing it into only one dimension; many people interviewed had trouble locating

*L1. Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala?*

Figure V-8 shows the ideological distribution of voters. Bolivians' average on this Left-Right scale is 5.25, which shows that their ideo logical self-identification is rather centrist. It can be seen, however, th at there exists a significant differenence between the political ideology of voters for Evo Morales, below the national average, and the voters for Jorge Quiroga (the runner up in the elections) who are located above the m ean and identify themselves more on the right. We can also see that people closer to the extreme right on the scale prefered to vote for the candidate of the MNR. Once again, however, people close to the average decided to vote in blank or annul their vote.

themselves on some point between the ideoogical left and right, confirmed by the fact that in 2006 only two-thirds of the respondents answered this question. Even so, we consider that this variable is a valid, though limited, indicator of the ideological tendencies of the population.




**Figure V-8. Impact of Ideology on the Vote for President, 2005**

Another important factor in the 2005 presidential election was how citizens evaluated the country's economic future. One of the questions of the *Democracy Audit* was designed to measure citizens' perspective of the economic outlook of the country in the year following the survey. The question is the following:

*SOCT3. ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?*

Figure V-9 shows Bolivians' future economic evaluation in relation to electoral choice. For this figure, we recodified the responses on a scale of 0-to-100, where 0 signifies "worse" and 100 "better." As can be seen, voters for Evo Morales, located ten points above the national average, have a more optimistic vision of the Bolivian economy's future than other voters.




**Figure V-9. Future Economic Perception of Voters in the 2005 Presidential Elections**

## Characteristics of Voters for Evo Morales

In the previous sections, we examined the impact that certain variables, such as gender, region, education and ethnic self-identification, had on past presidential elections in Bolivia. In this section, we turn to directly analyze the characteristics of citizens who voted for Evo Morales. The interest in trying to identify the characteristics of voters for President Morales lies in his sweeping victory, and a desire to investigate the socio-demographic characteristics of the citizens who gave the MAS this unusual majority.

To get a better idea of who voted for Evo Morales, we created a dichotomous variable that assigns a value of 1 to all respondents who said they voted for Morales, and a value of 0 to all others. Then we ran a logistic regression, whose results can be seen in Table V-6. The first statistically significant indicator that we can appreciate is that of

ideology. As we showed in Figure V-9, people who identified themselves to be on the left were more likely to vote for Evo Morales than those who identified themselves to be on the right. Age was another statistically significant idicator. We found that older people voted for Morales more than younger people.

**Table V-6. Forecasters of the Vote in Favor of Evo Morales in the 2005 Presidential Elections: Results of the Logistic Regression**

| | B | S.E. | Wald | Df | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Percepción economía actual país | -.143 | .110 | 1.683 | 1 | .194 | .867 |
| Apoyo democracia estable | .-.008 | .004 | 3.121 | 1 | .077 | .992 |
| Autoritarismo | .004 | .003 | 1.438 | 1 | .230 | 1.004 |
| Sofisticación política | -.023 | .058 | .166 | 1 | .683 | .977 |
| Ideología | -.238 | .038 | 39.584 | 1 | ***.000*** | .788 |
| Edad | .117 | .062 | 3.632 | 1 | .057 | 1.125 |
| Educación | .102 | .134 | .573 | 1 | .449 | 1.107 |
| Sexo | -.010 | .160 | .004 | 1 | .950 | .990 |
| Riqueza en bienes materials | -.157 | .042 | 14.262 | 1 | ***.000*** | .855 |
| Urbano | -.163 | .203 | .642 | 1 | .423 | .850 |
| Sur | 1.213 | .236 | 26.386 | 1 | ***.000*** | 3.362 |
| Occidente | 1.907 | .189 | 102.316 | 1 | ***.000*** | 6.736 |
| Mestizo | .757 | .212 | 12.697 | 1 | ***.000*** | 2.131 |
| Indígena | 1.438 | .292 | 24.348 | 1 | ***.000*** | 4.214 |
| Tolerancia | .013 | .004 | 12.414 | 1 | ***.000*** | 1.013 |
| Evangélico | 1.274 | 1.068 | 1.424 | 1 | .233 | 3.575 |
| Percepción corrupción empleados públicos | -.151 | .090 | 2.817 | 1 | .093 | .860 |
| Confianza interpersonal | .004 | .003 | 2.401 | 1 | .121 | .996 |
| Percepción economía país futuro | -.496 | .116 | 18.422 | 1 | ***.000*** | .609 |
| Constante | 1.502 | .810 | 3.440 | 1 | .064 | 4.493 |

Wealth, measured in material goods, is the third significant indicator that the regression shows us. To measure wealth in material goods, we developed a series of questions designed to find out what kind of material goods people have in their homes. These go from basic goods, such as a bathroom inside the house, to the presence of appliances like refrigerators, stoves, and microwave ovens, and finally to luxury items such as automobiles, cellular phones and computers. For each item or question we added one point, and the scale goes from 0 to 16. The results of the logistic regression tells us that people with the highest score, that is people who have the greatest wealth measured in this way, were less likely to vote for Evo Morales than people with lower scores.

In terms of regional variables, the results confirm what we observed earlier. People who live in the western and southern regions of the country were more likely to vote for Evo Morales than those who live in the eastern region. The same occurs with the variables for ethnic self-identification. As we discussed above, people who identify themselves as "*mestizos*" or "indigenous" are more supportive of Morales than people

who consider themselves to be "white." Political tolerance also turns out to be statistically significant. This variable is measured on a scale of 0 to 100; it is derived from a group of questions that measure the political and social tolerance of citizens, as described and analyzed in Chapter III of this report. It is not surprising that people with higher levels of tolerance were more inclined to vote for Evo Morales than people with low levels of tolerance.

The last statistically significant indicator has to do with a question that asked the respondent to predict the economic situation of the country one year from the date of the interview. People who answered this question in a pessimistic manner, that is, those who believe that in January, 2007 the country's economy will be worse off than in 2006, were less inclined to vote for Evo Morales than those people who thought the economy would improve. This could mean that those people who have a pessimistic vision regarding the future of the Bolivian economy consider that Evo Morales is not going to move the country forward in economic terms.

## Bolivians and Elections

In the previous sections, we analyzed the voting level in Bolivia during the last three presidential elections. Then we analyzed the characteristics of the population who participated in the elections of December 18, 2005, and also examined the voters for Evo Morales. In this last section, we will analyze how Bolivians value the people and institutions that participated in the elections. We will also briefly analyze Bolivians' freedom of choice.

By means of the survey carried out in the first months of 2006 in Bolivia, we can state that the elections which took place in December, 2005 were free elections. We can confirm this through a series of questions that we developed for the 2006 survey. The questions are the following:

***VB15A. Puede decirme si en estas elecciones alguien lo presionó para votar por un candidato determinado o para no votar? Sí [1] No [2]***
***VB15B. Puede decirme si en estas elecciones usted recibió algo a cambio para votar por un candidato determinado o no votar? Sí [1] No [2]***

The results are encouraging. Less than seven percent of the people surveyed reported having felt some kind of pressure or having received something in exchange for voting for some party or candidate. Figure V-10 shows which people were more likely to be influenced prior to the elections.




**Figure V-10. Influences on the Vote by Level of Education.**

As we can see, the figure shows that people with a low level of education are more likely to be influenced to vote for a particular party or candidate[4] by antidemocratic mechanisms. The same occurs with people of low income levels, who are easily influenced by candidates who hand out clothing and food in the country's poor neighborhoods and settlements.

Finally, we want to analyze how Bolivians value the components of the electoral process. To do this we developed a series of questions designed to identify how voters ranked a series of factors before going to the voting booth. The responses are measured on a seven-point scale in which 1 means that the element asked about was not important for the respondent and 7 means that it was very important. The series of questions is the following:

[4] Logistic regressions using questions VB15A and VB15B as dependent variables show that both education and income are statistically significant forecasters.

***En el momento de elegir cómo va a votar en las elecciones, en una escala del 1 al 7, donde 7 es muy importante y 1 nada importante, cuánta importancia tienen para usted los siguientes elementos:***
***VB17A. El candidato***
***VB17B. El partido***
***VB17C. El programa de gobierno***

Figure V-11 shows the results. It is important to recalculate how Bolivians ranked these three components. It is also important to point out that the differences between these rankings are statistically significant. As the figure indicates, the platform is the most important when deciding how to vote. This is paradoxical, since more than 40 percent of voters reported not knowing the platform of the party or candidate they were thinking of voting for. Most of the time, however, this is not the fault of the voters but of the candidates who do not make their platform public until a few days before or even after the elections. Another problem is the limited diffusion of these documents have once they have been made public.

An alternative interpretation of these results could be that Bolivians choose who to support in the electoral processes based on an evaluation of the proposals and political orientations of the candidates more than on personalist-types of considerations or on rather rigid party loyalties. To find out which is the most appropriate interpretation for the Bolivian case, we would have to enlarge the study of the electoral selection process in Bolivia and gather new data, which we do not currently have, for such an analysis.

Continuing with the rankings, in second place we find the candidate and in third place, the political party. This latter ranking is not surprising since citizen identification with political parties is rather low in Latin America. This is particularly so in Bolivia where no party has managed to establish a hegemony since the restauration of democracy.

However, starting from the fact that party identification in Latin America is rather weak, one might expect that Bolivians would identify the candidate as the most important element to consider when voting and not necessarily the candidate's platform, which as we recently saw is not known by at least 40 percent of the people interviewed and which can easily change between the electoral period and the moment that a candidate assumes office.




**Figure V-11. Levels of Importance Voters Give Components of the Electoral Process**

To be able to identify which citizens consider a candidate's platform as the most important variable when voting, we developed a logistic regression model, presented below, in which the value that citizens give a candidate's plaform before voting is measured on a scale of 1 to 7.

**Table V-7. Forecasters of Prioritizing the Platform When Voting: Results of the Logistic Regression**

| | B | S.E. | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Votantes de Evo Morales | .248 | .100 | 2.486 | ***.013*** |
| Apoyo democracia estable | .010 | .002 | 4.020 | ***.000*** |
| Autoritarismo | -.003 | .002 | -1.75 | .079 |
| Sofisticación política | .078 | .032 | 2.389 | ***.017*** |
| Ideología | -.029 | .021 | -1.38 | .166 |
| Edad | .044 | .034 | 1.284 | .199 |
| Educación | .292 | .075 | 3.905 | ***.000*** |
| Sexo | .049 | .091 | .536 | .592 |
| Riqueza en bienes materials | .001 | .024 | .048 | .961 |
| Urbano | .072 | .044 | 1.630 | .103 |
| Sur | .014 | .139 | .194 | .917 |
| Occidente | .090 | .110 | .816 | .415 |
| Mestizo | -.242 | .120 | -2.02 | ***.044*** |
| Indígena | -.203 | .161 | -1.25 | .209 |
| Evangélico | -.771 | .664 | -1.16 | .246 |
| Percepción corrupción empleados públicos | -.002 | .002 | -1.01 | .308 |
| Confianza interpersonal | .005 | .001 | 3.362 | .1001 |
| Percepción economía país futuro | .000 | .001 | -.108 | .914 |
| Constante | 4.397 | .364 | 12.07 | **.000** |
| R Cuadrada Ajustada | .065 | | | |

Table V-7 shows the significant indicators in terms of how much voters valued a candidate's platform when voting. The first significant indicator is the vote for Evo Morales. The regression demonstrates that voters for Evo Morales assigned a higher degree of priority to his platform than did people who did not vote for the current Bolivian president. The same occurs with the respondents who show greater support for the Bolivian democratic system. Political sophistication is a third significant indicator. This indicator is measured on the basis of five questions asked in the survey. People with a greater number of correct responses obtained a higher score on our scale, which goes from 1 to 5. The linear regression model shows that as one's political sophistication increases, he or she increasingly values the platform when deciding how to vote. This indicator is closely related to education, which is another of our statistically significant indicators and moves in the same direction, that is, more education leads to more emphasis on the platform. The only negative indicator that turned out to be statistically significant is self-identification as "*mestizo*." The regression shows us that people who identify themselves as *mestizos* value platforms less than those people who self-identify as white. This result is rather paradoxical considering that the majority of Bolivians identified themselves as *mestizos* in this study.

## Conclusions

In this chapter we briefly reviewed what happened in the last three presidential elections in Bolivia, in 1997, 2002 and 2005. In the analysis of the combined data we found a series of demographic, geographic, socio-economic and ideological factors that influenced the political participation of Bolivians over the years.

There exist marked differences separating voters from non-voters, and those who voted for one candidate or for another. We also found that ethnic and regional differences explain the choice of partisan votes, especially in the case of the MAS, the party of the current president, Evo Morales.

Lastly, we undertook a brief analysis in this chapter that allows us to conclude that the vast majority of Bolivians are free to choose their party or candidate, and that people with low education and income levels are more inclined to be influenced by others at the when voting.

# VI. The Constituent Assembly*

In July, 2006, elections will be held to choose representatives to the Constituent Assembly announced back in 2002, and to be convened following the election. The Constituent Assembly has been a topic of discussion between the governing parties and the opposition since its announcement as well the banner of electoral campaigns and social movements.

The present chapter describes Bolivians' perceptions regarding the need to reform the country's constitution; how and on what basis the Constituent Assembly should be formed; and the expectations of what problems the Assambly should addressed, its scope, and in what time frame should it start producing results.

The analysis concentrates on describing Bolivians' opinions, perceptions and expectations, as expressed directly by them, and on describing the characteristics of citizens who show preferences for specific options.

The first part of this chapter analyzes who, among Bolivians, considers it necessary to reform the Constitution and who does not; it also looks at how these preferences have changed over time since President Sánchez de Lozada's administration promised to move forward a process of national deliberation by means of a Constituent Assembly. The second part of this chapter describes the preferences Bolivians have of how representatives to the Constituent Assembly should be elected and how many representatives should make up the Assembly.

## Is It Necessary to Reform the Constituion?

Since 2002, LAPOP's *Democracy Audits* in Bolivia have asked Bolivians if they consider it necessary to reform the country's constitution or whether it would be better to make no reforms (Seligson 2003 ; Seligson, et al. 2005). Bolivians' preferences regarding the question have fluctuated, as can be seen in Figure VII-1, below. The specific question we asked interviewees was:

*BOLCA1. Este año se realizará una Asamblea Constituyente. ¿Cree Ud. que es importante cambiar la Constitución en varios aspectos o cree que debemos dejar la Constitución tal como está?*

* This chapter was written by Vivian Schwarz Blum.




**Figure VI-1. Preference to Change the Constitution Over Time, 2002 – 2006**

As Figure VI-1 clearly shows, the opinion regarding the need to reform the Constition has changed over time. In 2002, 65.6 percent of the people interviewed believed in the necessity of changing the Constitution, while only 34.4 percent of respondents considered that the Constitution should be left as it is.

In 2004, the tendency was the same, but the number of people who considered it necessary to reform the Constitution had increased considerably. In this year, 85.8 percent of those interviewed considered it necessary to reform the Constitution and only 14.2 percent continued to believe that it is better to not reform the Constitution.

The growth registered between 2002 and 2004 in the perception that it is necessary to reform the Constitution can be directly connected to events in the national political scene during this period. The conflicts and violence of Feburary and October, 2003, which led to the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada and the difficult government of President Mesa, which end with his resignation and President Rodríguez's call for early national elections, seem to have increased Bolivians' belief that it is necessary to find a definative solution to the country's problems and that reforming the Constitution would be an appropriate means to this end.

Below, we analyze which Bolivians believe it is necessary to change the Constitution. To do so, we ran a logistic regression analysis to estimate what socio-demographic factors and other political attitudes of people interviewed in 2006 exert an influence on the preference to reform the Constitution or to leave it as it is.

The logistic regression generates estimates with a 95 percent degree of certainty. This means that we can be sure that the estimates are correct in 95 out of 100 cases analyzed. The estimates of the logistic regression of whether or not the Constitution needs reform are presented in Table VI-1, below.

**Table VI-1. Results of the Logistic Regression For Predictors of the Need to Change the Constitution, 2006**

| Variables | B | S.E. | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sexo | -.370 | .173 | *.033* | *.691* |
| Edad | .135 | .068 | *.047* | *1.144* |
| Educación | .098 | .147 | .505 | 1.103 |
| Urbano | -.295 | .235 | .209 | .745 |
| Oriente | -.049 | .209 | .816 | .952 |
| Sur | -.187 | .252 | .458 | .830 |
| Riqueza | -.078 | .045 | .080 | .925 |
| Blanco | -.429 | .227 | *.058* | *.651* |
| Indígena | -.007 | .243 | .978 | .993 |
| Confianza en la comunidad | .003 | .003 | .278 | 1.003 |
| Sofisticación política | .213 | .064 | *.001* | *1.237* |
| Tendencia autoritaria | -.008 | .004 | *.037* | *.992* |
| Participación política agresiva | .004 | .005 | .384 | 1.004 |
| Desempeño presidente | .003 | .005 | .530 | 1.003 |
| Economía nacional | .003 | .005 | .586 | 1.003 |
| Economía nacional futuro | .009 | .002 | *.000* | *1.009* |
| Votó MAS | .625 | .260 | *.016* | *1.868* |
| Votó Podemos | .354 | .240 | .141 | 1.425 |
| Votó nulo | .199 | .347 | .565 | 1.221 |
| Apoyo al sistema | -.012 | .005 | *.012* | *.988* |
| Constante | 1.441 | .709 | .042 | 4.224 |

From the results shown in Table VI-1, we can see that there are many demographic, social and political factors that together determine Bolivians' preference of whether or not to reform the Constitution. According to these results, the probability that men would opt to change the current Constitution is greater than the probability that women would prefer this option. Likewise, as the age of respondents increase, the probability of prefering constitutional reform is substantially greater[1] than among young people.

[1] Column Exp (b) indicates the potential change in the probability of adopting one preference over not adopting it. In this column, we can see the substantial potential impact of a variable over the variable being analyzed.

In terms of ethnic identity, people who consider themselves to be white are less likely to opt to reform the current Constitution than *mestizos*. This relation is statistically significant with a 90 percent (sig. >.1) level of certainty. People who support the political system, and those who have a dispostition to assume authoritarian attitudes in given situtations are less likely to prefer reforming the Constitution than the option of leaving it as it is.

The tendency to assume authoritarian attitudes is understood in this study as an inherent character trait that cannot be explained but instead is latent and becomes manifest in reaction to certain stimuli, in certain contexts (the political, for instance), or in situations that cause fear. Common expressions of this predisposition are resistance to change, inflexability before difference, and the lack of tolerance (Hetherington y Weiler 2005; Stenner 2005). It is important to include this characteristic in the present discussion because the Bolivian political scene is currently undergoing a process of profound change, represented in large part by the formation of the Constituent Assembly, among other elements.

People with higher levels of political sophistication, understood as specific knowledge of domestic and international political issues (Zaller 1992), people optimistic about the near-term national economic outlook, and especially people who voted for the MAS in the 2005 elections all have higher probabilities of favoring constitutional reform rather than leaving it be. This result, for the latter group, is predictable since one of the MAS's electoral campaign proposals was precisely the formation of a Constituent Assembly to discuss the country's problems. It is logical, therefore, that voters for this party would be inclined to reform the Constitution rather than leave it alone.

Figure VI-2, below, shows the difference between men and women, from 2002 to 2006, in terms of the preference to reform the Constitution. This difference is measured on a scale of 0 to 1, in which 0 indicates a preference to leave the Constitution alone, and 1 indicates a preference to reform it.




**Figure VI-2. Preference to Change the Constition, by Gender, 2002 - 2006**

As can be seen in Figure V-2, both women and men prefer to reform the Constitution opposed to the option of not reforming it. Over time, though, men's preference to change the Constitution is consistently stronger than that of women. In 2004, the desire to change the Constitution reached a high point for both men and women; and between 2004 and 2006, this tendency fell only slightly in both sexes.

This means that since 2002, most people interviewed considered it was necessary to reform the Constitution. This preference was stronger in 2004 than in 2006 or 2002. And over time, men have more strongly favored it than women.

Figure VI-3 shows the relationship in 2006 between the preference to reform the Constitution and respondents' ages.




**Figure VI-3. Desire to Change the Constitution by Age, 2006.**

The results shown in Figure VI-3 confirm what we already saw in the results of the regression: that the greater the age of the respondents, the greater the probability that they prefer reforming the Constitution.

Finally, respondents' views regarding the national economic outlook in the near future exert some influence on their preference of whether or not the Constitution should be reformed. While people who believe the economic situation will improve over the next year will are more likely to consider constitutional refom necessary, people who believe that it will deteriorate over the next year are less likely to want such reform, though they too prefer reforming the Constitution to leaving it alone.

Figure VI-4 shows that while the people with the most pessimistic views regarding the economy in 2002 were those most inclined to reform the Constitution, in 2006 they were the most reluctant to reform it. One can only suppose, given this reversal, that the people who view the economic situation pessimistically in 2006 are a different group than those who were pessimistic in 2002. This might stem from the shift in the direction of the country's economic policies since 2002, and the fact that in 2006, the

formulation of economic policy is now in the hands of a different group of people than in 2002.




**Figure VI-4. Preference to Change the Constitution in Terms of the Country's Short-Term Economic Outlook, 2002 - 2006**

In general, the data analyzed in the first section of this chapter indicates that the majority of Bolivians s how a preference to reform the Constitu tion as opposed to the option of leaving it be. Although this tendency varies according to the specific context and socio-demographic characteristic of each respondent, the majority preference remains clear and constant from 2002 to 2006.

The various factors that influence a repondent's preference should be understood as a group of attributes that work togeth er in com bination rather than separately. Therefore, a low level of education, by itse lf, is insufficient to explain a person's rejection of constitutional reform. Instead, to understand that pers on's position, we also need to take into account the interplay of his or her level of political sophistication, ethnic identity, and perception of the national ecoomic outlook.

## Representatives to the Constituent Assembly

Below, we analyze repondents' preferences for how representatives to the Constituent Assembly should be elected, and how many should comprise this institution. To undertake this analysis, we use data only from the 2006 survey. The following analysis, therefore, is a "snapshot" of respondent preferences only for 2006.

We asked the interviewees the following question:

***¿Los candidatos a representantes a la Asamblea Constituyente deberían elegirse a través de……?***
***Partido político*** ***Agrupación ciudadana***
***Comité Cívico*** ***Organización indígena***
***Organización sindical*** ***Circunscripciones territoriales***
***Ninguno*** ***NS/NR***

***¿Qué cantidad de miembros debería tener la Asamblea Constituyente para que puedan hacer un trabajo efectivo y eficiente? Alrededor de:***
***a) 50 b) 100 c) 150 d) 200 NS/NR***

In terms of the organization through which representatives to the Constituent Assembly should be elected, Figure VI-5 shows that 33.8 percent of respondents would prefer that the candidates to the Assembly run for election through citizen groups, while 18.6 percent of respondents would prefer to elect candidates from territorial voting districts, in the same way that single-member district congressional deputies are elected.

An significant piece of information in this section is that 15 percent of respondents do not know how representatives to the Constituent Assembly should be elected, or prefer to not respond to this question. This group of people is two times larger than the group opting for political parties to be the means through which candidates run for election, and more than twice as large as the groups opting for union or indigenous organizations.




**Figure VI-5. Election of Representatives to the Constituent Assembly**

To analyze these results, we ran one logistic regression to determine the characteristics of the people who prefer citizen groups as the way to elect representatives to the Constituent Assembly, and another to identify the characteristics of the people who do not know what would be the best way to elect these representatives or who prefer to not respond to the question.

In Table VI-2, we present the results of the logistic regression for the group of people who consider that representatives to the Constituent Assembly should be elected through citizen groups. The results of the regression indicate that both the indigenous and people who consider themselves to be white are less likely than *mestizos* to opt for citizen groups to be the means to elect representatives to the Assembly.

Similarly, women, people who cast null or blank votes in the 2005 presidential election, and people with greater political sophistication all tend to opt for citizen groups less than men and people who voted for a party in the last election.

**Table VI-2. Results of the Logistic Regression for Predictors of Preference for Citizen Groups**

| Variables | B | S.E. | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sexo | -.238 | .123 | *.053* | *.788* |
| Edad | -.018 | .047 | .704 | .982 |
| Educación | .122 | .104 | .239 | 1.130 |
| Urbano | .704 | .163 | *.000* | *2.021* |
| Oriente | .102 | .152 | .500 | 1.108 |
| Sur | -.142 | .172 | .411 | .868 |
| Riqueza | .058 | .032 | .071 | 1.060 |
| Blanco | -.410 | .183 | *.025* | *.663* |
| Indígena | -.450 | .171 | *.008* | *.638* |
| Confianza en la comunidad | -.002 | .002 | .434 | .998 |
| Sofisticación política | -.148 | .045 | *.001* | *.862* |
| Tendencia autoritaria | -.002 | .003 | .448 | .998 |
| Participación política agresiva | .005 | .003 | .130 | 1.005 |
| Economía nacional | .003 | .003 | .326 | 1.003 |
| Economía nacional futuro | .002 | .002 | .200 | 1.002 |
| Votó MAS | -.213 | .189 | .258 | .808 |
| Votó Podemos | .027 | .189 | .885 | 1.028 |
| Votó nulo | -.923 | .299 | *.002* | *.397* |
| Constante | -.936 | .476 | .049 | .392 |

Citizen groups, however, appear to enjoy greater support in urban areas with more than 2,000 inhabitants. People living in such areas are much more likely to prefer electing representatives to the Constituent Assembly through these groups rather than through other groups or organizations.

In 2006, we also asked interviewees how many members the Constituent Assembly should have to be able to carry out its work efficiently. Figure VI-6 summarizes the preferences expressed by respondents in this respect.




**Figure VI-6. Preferences Regarding the Number of Members in the Constituent Assembly**

As can be seen, 27 percent of respondents consider that Bolivians should elect around 200 representatives to the Constituent Assembly in order for it to be able to work efficiently. Another group, comprised of slightly less than 19.6 percent of respondents, would prefer that the Assembly had around 50 members. A proportion almost equal to 18.9 percent of respondents did not know how to respond to this question.

At first sight, it can be seen that, in relation to the number of people who should represent Bolivians in the Constituent Assembly, opinions are divided relatively equally. The exception to this is the seven percent difference between the first preference (the option for the largest number of representatives) and the second (the option for the least number). We can conclude from this that, given the options presented in the question, respondents either prefer a large Constituent Assembly or a small one rather than the option for one with either 100 or 150 members.

We ran two logistic regression analyses for the two main preferences in this group: a Constituent Assembly with either 200 or 50 members. We include the results of both regressions in an appendix at the end of this chapter.

For both groups, the regressions indicate that the age of respondents is the only socio-demographic factor that influences the preference for how many members the Constituent Assembly should have. While older people have a greater probability of opting for a Constituent Assembly with more members (200), younger people are more likely to opt for one with fewer members (50).

There is a greater chance that people living in the eastern region would prefer a Constituent Assembly with 200 members than one with fewer. There are not, however, statistically significant regional differences in the preference for fewer members in the Assembly.

The differences found in the statistical analysis are determined more by peoples' age than by differences of criteria regarding the Constituent Assmebly. This could be the result of generational difference in the conception of efficiency, since it involves chosing how many members would make the Constituent Assembly function most efficiently. Figure VI-7, below, illustrates this relation; it also shows that, as the age of respondents increases, so too does the possibility that they do not have an opinion on this issue.




**Figure VI-7. Preference for the Number of Members in the Constituent Assembly, by Age**

## The Resolution of Problems Through the Constituent Assembly

In this section of the chapter, we analyze respondents' expectations in terms of the scope and types of problems the Constituent Assembly should try to resolve, and in terms a time frame in which they expect the Assembly, once formed, will start producing results.

Interviewees were asked:

***¿Usted cree que una nueva Constitución Política del Estado proporcionará una solución directa a los problemas del país o que a pesar de la nueva Constitución los problemas continuarán?***

***¿Qué clase de problemas debería solucionar la Asamblea Constituyente?***
*[1] problemas de pobreza y desigualdad en el país*
*[2] problemas de tierra y territorio*
*[3] problemas de estructuración del gobierno y de definición de derechos y deberes ciudadanos*
*[4] problemas de las autonomías regionales*
*[5] todos los problemas del país*
*[6] problemas económicos del país*

***¿Para cuándo cree Ud. que los bolivianos podríamos esperar resultados de la Asamblea Constituyente?***
*[1] en seis meses después de conformada*
*[2] en 1 año después de conformada*
*[3] en 2 años después de conformada*
*[4] en 3 años después de conformada*
*[5] en más de 3 años después de conformada*

In terms of whether or not a new Constitution would resolve the country's problems, Figure VI-8 clearly shows that opinions are divided. While 45.8 percent of respondents believe that even with a new Constitution the country would continue facing the same problems and that this would solve nothing, 44.5 percent of respondents believe exactly the opposite, that a new Constitution would resolve the country's problems. Although the difference between both groups is only 1.3 percent, it is statistically significant with a 95 percent degree of certainty.




**Figure VI-8. Probability that a Constituent Assembly Would Solve the Country's Problems**

Table VI-3 shows the results of a logistic regression applied to the question of whether or not a new constitution would resolve the country's problems. The data indicates that people who live in urban areas with over 2,000 inhabitants are less likely to believe that the Constituent Assembly would be able to resolve the country's problems. The substantial effect of this variable, however, is not especially strong compared to the other variables in this analysis with a significant effect.

**Table VI-3. Logistic Regression For Predictors of the Constituent Assembly Resolving Problems**

| Variables | B | S.E. | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sexo | .069 | .129 | .593 | 1.071 |
| Edad | -.020 | .049 | .688 | .981 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Educación | -.061 | .107 | .572 | .941 |
| Urbano | -.363 | .164 | *.027* | *.696* |
| Oriente | .265 | .160 | *.098* | *1.303* |
| Sur | -.149 | .174 | .391 | .861 |
| Riqueza | -.012 | .034 | .725 | .988 |
| Blanco | .009 | .187 | .960 | 1.009 |
| Indígena | .136 | .175 | .438 | 1.145 |
| Confianza en la comunidad | .005 | .002 | *.028* | *1.005* |
| Sofisticación política | .012 | .045 | .797 | 1.012 |
| Participación política agresiva | .008 | .004 | *.021* | *1.008* |
| Economía nacional | -.006 | .004 | .099 | .994 |
| Economía nacional futuro | .013 | .002 | *.000* | *1.013* |
| Votó MAS | .188 | .203 | .355 | 1.206 |
| Votó Podemos | -.037 | .199 | .854 | .964 |
| Votó nulo | -.160 | .291 | .582 | .852 |
| Desempeño presidente | .006 | .004 | .113 | 1.006 |
| Apoyo al sistema | .005 | .003 | .173 | 1.005 |
| Tendencia autoritaria | .007 | .003 | *.011* | *1.007* |
| Constante | -1.503 | .530 | .005 | .222 |

People with high levels of trust in the community, and people who believe that the economic situtation will improve in the near-term, are more likely to believe that the Assembly would resolve national problems than people who are pessimistic about the economy.

The most interesting result of this analysis is that people with a predisposition to assume authoritarian attitudes, and people who approve of aggressive forms of political participation, have a greater probability of believing that the Constituent Assembly would solve the country's problems. This result is not only statistically significant with a high degree of certainty but is also substantially more important than the other variables analyzed.

Without doubt, these findings deserve to be more thoroughly scrutinized in the future in order to clarify why it is that people with clear authoritarian tendencies show greater trust in the capacity of the Constituent Assembly to resolve problems than less authoritarian people.

As an hypothesis, we might suggest that people who approve of aggressive forms of political participation turn to more radical measures to solve problems and thus see the Constituent Assembly as a definitive solution to the country's problems. Likewise, we might also propose that people with authoritarian predispositions feel more threatened by the current situation of the country and so see the Constituent Assembly as a definitive and final solution to the country's problems. These are only hypotheses, however, and need to be analyzed and tested along with other possible explanations of this position.

The 2006 survey also asked Bolivians what kind of problems they believed the Constituent Assembly should resolve (see Figure VI-9). Most respondents (40.3 percent) responded that they thought the Assembly should resolve all the country's problems. This is a clear indication not only that citizens have clear and great expectations of the Constituent Assembly, but also that there is a predisposition to accept important and far-reaching changes.




**Figure VI-9. Type of Problems that the Constituent Assembly Should Resolve**

Figure VI-9 also clearly shows that respondents' second preference is for the Constituent Assembly to offer solutions to an important problem in the country, poverty and inequality. 23 percent of respondents believe that these are the most important problems the Assembly should discuss and solve, a logical belief in the poorest country in South America, and also one not separate from that of the third largest group of respondents (16 percent) who believe the Assembly should solve the country's economic problems.

All together, about 40 percent of respondents identified the economic problems that generate poverty and inequality in Bolivian society to be the most important

problems they expect the Constituent Assembly will resolve. Other kinds of problems, such as those regarding territory, autonomy, the current structure of the government, recieve little attention compared to the inequality and economic problems.

Table VI-4 shows the results of a logistic regression estimating the indicators of the group expecting the Constituent Assembly to resolve the country's inequality and economic problems.

**Table VI-4. Logistic Regression for Preference Indicators to Resolve Inequality and Economic Problems.**

| Variables | B | S.E. | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sexo | .177 | .126 | .162 | 1.193 |
| Edad | -.005 | .048 | .923 | .995 |
| Educación | -.112 | .105 | .289 | .894 |
| Urbano | .208 | .160 | .194 | 1.231 |
| Oriente | -.313 | .159 | *.048* | *.731* |
| Sur | .088 | .170 | .605 | 1.092 |
| Riqueza | -.075 | .033 | *.023* | *.928* |
| Blanco | .121 | .185 | .515 | 1.128 |
| Indígena | -.115 | .170 | .499 | .892 |
| Confianza en la comunidad | .007 | .002 | *.002* | *1.007* |
| Sofisticación política | -.095 | .045 | *.035* | *.909* |
| Aprobación de participación política agresiva | -.014 | .004 | *.000* | *.986* |
| Economía nacional | -.003 | .003 | .405 | .997 |
| Economía nacional futuro | .001 | .002 | .559 | 1.001 |
| Votó MAS | -.512 | .200 | *.010* | *.599* |
| Votó Podemos | -.132 | .195 | .499 | .877 |
| Votó nulo | .269 | .274 | .327 | 1.308 |
| Desempeño presidente | .005 | .004 | .217 | 1.005 |
| Apoyo al sistema | .002 | .003 | .493 | 1.002 |
| Tendencia autoritaria | .005 | .003 | .091 | 1.005 |
| Constante | -.191 | .518 | .713 | .826 |

The results of this analysis indicate that Bolivians are generally pesimistic about the capacity of the Constituent Assembly to resolve the country's poverty, inequality, and other economic problems. Only those people with high levels of trust in the community show a predisposition to believe that the Assembly can resolve these types of problems.

Instead, the results indicate that people who live in the eastern region of the country, people with high levels of political sophistication and high levels of wealth, voters for the MAS, and people who approve of aggressive forms of political participation all share a rather pessimistic attitude. They show the least chance of believing that the Constituent Assembly will resolve the inequality and economic problems Bolivia faces.

In Table VI-5, we give the results of the logistic regression for the preference that the Assembly should resolve all the country's problems.

**Table VI-5. Logistic Regression for Predictores of Preference that the Constitutional Aseembly Resolve All the Country's Problems**

| Variables | B | S.E. | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sexo | .214 | .126 | *.089* | *1.238* |
| Edad | .013 | .048 | .794 | 1.013 |
| Educación | .010 | .105 | .920 | 1.011 |
| Urbano | -.190 | .159 | .230 | .827 |
| Oriente | .220 | .157 | .161 | 1.246 |
| Sur | -.087 | .170 | .610 | .917 |
| Riqueza | .055 | .033 | *.093* | *1.057* |
| Blanco | -.364 | .191 | *.057* | *.695* |
| Indígena | .103 | .167 | .538 | 1.109 |
| Confianza en la comunidad | -.006 | .002 | *.004* | *.994* |
| Sofisticación política | .077 | .045 | .082 | *1.080* |
| Aprobación de participación política agresiva | .016 | .004 | *.000* | *1.016* |
| Economía nacional | .001 | .003 | .877 | 1.001 |
| Economía nacional futuro | -.002 | .002 | .371 | .998 |
| Votó MAS | .798 | .208 | *.000* | *2.221* |
| Votó Podemos | .379 | .204 | .063 | *1.461* |
| Votó nulo | .364 | .284 | .200 | 1.438 |
| Desempeño presidente | -.003 | .004 | .436 | .997 |
| Apoyo al sistema | .000 | .003 | .934 | 1.000 |
| Tendencia autoritaria | -.004 | .003 | .104 | .996 |
| Constante | -1.093 | .517 | .034 | .335 |

In constrast to the previous case, respondents seem more optimistic regarding the possibility that the Constituent Assembly will have far-reaching results and will be able to solve all the country's problems. In terms of electoral preferences, MAS voters have a greater chance of believing that the Assembly will resolve all the country's problems than voters for both smaller and traditional parties. People who self-identify as white are less likely to believe in this possibility than *mestizos*.

More than an indication of who, among Bolivians, prefers that the Constituent Assembly will operate in one way or another, these results instead suggest the manner in which Bolivians see, expect, think about, and understand the Constituent Assembly: that it will be an institution with an all-encompassing focus that takes "all" the country's problems into account instead of an institution that only focuses on one sector or specific kind of problem.

Finally, respondents stated their expectations as to how much time the Constituent Assembly should take, after being convened, to start producing results.




**Figure VI-10. Expectations that the Constituent Assembly Will Produce Results**

Figure VI-10 shows that respondents expect the Constituent Assembly to start producing results in the short term, that is, in a period between six months (28 percent of those who responded to this question) and one year (36.9 percent of respondents). Only a few respondents suppose the Constituent Assembly will produce results in the medium term. This indicates that, in conjunction with the data analyzed in previous sections of this chapter, we can suppose that Bolivians expect the Assembly to produce important results, and in the near-term.

## Conclusions

In the first section of this chapter, we analyzed Bolivians' opinions and the factors determining them with respect to the need to reform the Constitution through a Constituent Assembly. In the following sections, we analyzed Bolivians' expectations of how the Constituent Assembly should be constituted and function.

In general, the results demonstrate that the large majority of Bolivians agree that they want, expect, and need a change, a reform to the Constitution through an clear

mechanism, an Assembly. The differences that Bolivians have in terms of electoral preferences do not create differences among their expectations of the Constituent Assembly. Independently of who they voted for in the 2005 elections, Bolivians appear to have similar expectations in terms of what the Assembly should do for the country.

The results generally signal that socio-demographic factors, as well as those coming from the social and political sphere, appear to influence the differing expectations Bolivians have. But the clearest message reflected in the data is that the expectations are many, great and urgent.

# Appendix

**Table VI-A1. Logistic Regression for Predictors of the Preference that the Constituent Assmebly Have 200 Members**

| Variables | B | S.E. | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sexo | .090 | .128 | .479 | 1.095 |
| Edad | .139 | .049 | *.004* | *1.150* |
| Educación | -.090 | .105 | .388 | .913 |
| Urbano | -.020 | .160 | .899 | .980 |
| Oriente | .463 | .158 | *.003* | *1.588* |
| Sur | -.064 | .177 | .718 | .938 |
| Riqueza | -.027 | .034 | .433 | .974 |
| Blanco | .035 | .189 | .854 | 1.035 |
| Indígena | .003 | .166 | .987 | 1.003 |
| Confianza en la comunidad | .000 | .002 | .953 | 1.000 |
| Sofisticación política | -.038 | .046 | .400 | .962 |
| Participación política agresiva | .002 | .003 | .599 | 1.002 |
| Economía nacional | -.001 | .003 | .682 | .999 |
| Economía nacional futuro | .002 | .002 | .243 | 1.002 |
| Votó MAS | .120 | .198 | .542 | 1.128 |
| Votó Podemos | -.110 | .202 | .586 | .896 |
| Votó nulo | -.054 | .290 | .854 | .948 |
| Constante | -1.295 | .475 | .006 | .274 |

**Table VI-A2. Logistic Regression for Predictors of the Preference that the Constituent Assmebly Have 50 Members**

| Variables | B | S.E. | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sexo | .205 | .140 | .144 | 1.227 |
| Edad | -.124 | .055 | *.025* | *.883* |
| Educación | .141 | .119 | .236 | 1.151 |
| Urbano | -.006 | .183 | .972 | .994 |
| Oriente | -.149 | .175 | .394 | .862 |
| Sur | -.145 | .195 | .456 | .865 |
| Riqueza | .054 | .037 | .142 | 1.055 |
| Blanco | .181 | .198 | .360 | 1.198 |
| Indígena | -.113 | .199 | .570 | .893 |
| Confianza en la comunidad | -.003 | .002 | .189 | .997 |
| Sofisticación política | .036 | .050 | .470 | 1.037 |
| Participación política agresiva | -.005 | .004 | .224 | .995 |
| Economía nacional | .002 | .004 | .621 | 1.002 |
| Economía nacional futuro | .000 | .002 | .883 | 1.000 |
| Votó MAS | .079 | .225 | .727 | 1.082 |
| Votó Podemos | .231 | .223 | .300 | 1.260 |
| Votó nulo | -.267 | .341 | .433 | .765 |
| Constante | -1.875 | .520 | .000 | .153 |

# VII. Bolivians and Democracy*

In the previous chapters of this report, we have analyzed Bolivians' political preceptions, attitudes and behaviors and how they are influenced by ethnic identification, levels of tolerance, electoral preferences, social capital, and expectations of and preferences for the Constituent Assembly.

In this chapter, we examine Bolivians' attitudes, preferences and behaviors regarding the idea of democracy; some aspects of the practice of democracy in Bolivia; Bolivians' level of support for their political system; the trust they have in this system's political institutions; and their conception of the importance and implementation of the laws and rules within this same system.

Many academic studies have established the benefit of separately considering indiviual attitudes toward democratic principals on different levels of abstraction (Rohrschneider 2006; Rohrschneider y Schmitt-Beck 2002). These attitudes are the product of a combined evaluation of the performance of institutions and government organisms (Dalton 2004) in the short and long-term, of the trust that individuals have in institutions, and their evaluations of political actors (Norris 2006).

This chapter describes in detail the development of these perceptions, attitudes and behaviors from 1998, when LAPOP carried out the first *Democracy Audit* in Bolivia, to 2006, the last year a survey was conducted in the country. This chapter will also compare the similarities and differences of some of these behaviors with those from other Latin American countries where LAPOP has carried out similar public opinion surveys as that conducted in Bolivia.

## Democracy

The first section of this chapter analyzes Bolivians' conceptions and attitudes when faced with postulates that describe an ideal democracy, a working democracy, and controversial situations that are part of a democratic system. To begin, we asked interviewees the following:

*ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?*

This variable was originally measured on a seven-point scale, in which 1 indicates that the respondent strongly disagrees with the question's proposition and 7 indicates

* This chapter was written by Vivian Schwarz Blum.

strong agreement. For better comprehension, we converted the original scale into one with 100 points.




**Figure VII-1. Preference for Democracy as the Best Form of Government. Comparative Perspective, 2004 – 2006**

Figure VII-1 shows the average opinion level that democracy is the best form of government. In the figure, we can see that the tendency to view democracy as the best form of government is clear, though not conclusive, among respondents, since the average only reached 66.2 points on a 100-point scale in 2006, which was slightly better than 2004. This increase between 2004 and 2006 is statistically significant with a 95 percent degree of certainty, and indicates that in 2006 Bolivians were more convinced that democracy is preferable to other forms of government despite the problems it must face.

In the face of this still weak preference for democracy as the best form of government, we looked for complementary information, to that supplied by the question about preferences regarding the idea of a democratic regime, by also asking respondents about their preferences regarding the idea of a leader with democratic behavior. We asked interviewees:

***¿Qué tipo de Presidente de la República prefiere usted más?***
*[1]Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas a través de leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, aunque esto tarde mucho tiempo, o...*
*[2]Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas rápidamente, evitando el Congreso si fuera necesario*




**Figure VII-2. What Kind of President Do You Prefer? Comparative Perspective 2002 – 2006**

In Figure VII-2, we can clearly appreciate that, in contrast to a clear, majority preference for a democractic form of government, Bolivians' responses to the question of what kind of president they preferred have been consistently divided since 2002, the year we first asked this question. Figure VII-2 shows that, in spite of the majority preference for democracy, Bolivians prefer a president who solves the country's problems through quick, anti-democratic means, even by-passing Congress if necessary.

The preference for this kind of president was marked in 2004, and a bit more moderated in 2006. In 2002, however Bolivians' preferences were the opposite; that is, the majority preferred a president who would solve the country's problems following the rules of the game and Bolivia's laws. The change observed between 2002 and 2004 is statistically significant with a 95 percent degree of certainty, which also holds true for the change observed between 2004 and 2006.

These results suggest that due to the political and social instability, the violent events of 2003, the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada, and the period of uncertainty that followed, by 2004 Bolivians prioritized the solution to the uncertainty and problems over democratic procedures (Seligson, et al. 2005). It is worrisome, however, that this preference remains in 2006 (although not so strongly as in 2004), a moment not free from uncertainties but still one that does not suggest that Bolivian democracy is at risk.

As we did for presidential preferences we asked Bolivians whether they preferred the maintenace of order or the protection of civil liberties, two elements sometimes seen in confrontation in the practice of democracy. The question asks:

*¿Qué cree usted que es mejor? Vivir en una sociedad ordenada aunque se limiten algunos derechos y libertades o respetar todos los derechos y libertades, aún si eso causa algo de desorden.*

The resulting data from this questions is only available for the 2000, 2002 and 2006 samples; the question was not included in the 2004 survey. Nonetheless, the results, presented in Figure VII-3, are interesting since they show that preferences fluctuate over time and that these preferences are evenly divided among the Bolivian population.

In general terms, half of the population considers order to be the more important than the protection of civil liberties, while the other half considers civil liberties to be more important than order. The fluctuations over time are slight and could be influenced by the country's political situation during this six year period. The figure clearly shows that the preference in 2002 for order over respect for civil liberties was the opposite of that for 2000 and 2006. This difference between 2002 and the other years is statistically significant, but there is no statistically distinguishable difference between 2000 and 2006. We should, therefore, interpret the tendency to prioritize order over respect for civil liberties in 2002 to be a conjunctural position and is not a preference maintained over time.

Rather than be an uninteresting result, it should be considered that because the data shows both elements to be important in a society and in a democratic regime, it is understandable that the preferences are divided and that this division is not problematic so long as there is no majority tendency to place order above citizens' civil liberties. In 2006, the tendency reversed itself, and Bolivians prioritized the respect for civil liberties above order, like they did in 2000.




**Figure VII-3. Preference for Democratic Society Over Order. Comparative Perspective 2000 – 2006**

Finally, Bolivians were asked how democratic they consider Bolivia to be and whether they are satisfied with the manner in which democracy functions in the country. Both questions measured responses on a four point-scale, ranging from "very democratic" (or "very satisfied") to "not democratic" (or "not satisfied"). The results, presented in Figure VII-4, show the averages registered for both questions transposed to a 100-point scale, in which 1 indicates that Bolivia is not democratic or that the respondent is not satisfied with Bolivian democracy, and 100 indicates that Bolivia is very democratic and that the respondent is very satisfied with Bolivian democracy.




**Figure VII-4. Degree of Democracy and Satisfacion with Democracy, 2004 – 2006**

The results shown in Figure VII-4 reflect that, between 2004 and 2006, both the perception that Bolivia is a democratic country, and the level of satisfaction with the way democracy functions in Bolivia, have increased significantly and in similar amounts. In 2006, respondents believe that Bolivia is more democratic than they did in 2004; and they are also more satisfied, in 2006, with the way democracy is functioning in Bolivia.

## Support for the System

The legitimacy of a regime of government depends on the support from citizens living under it. The analysis of support levels for the Bolivian system has been included in all *Democracy Audits* that LAPOP has carried out in the country since 1998. Traditionally, support for the political system has been low compared to the levels of support for the system in other Latin American countries included in the LAPOP project (Seligson 2003 ; Seligson, et al. 2005).

In this section of the chapter, we present an analysis of the system support in Bolivia between 2000 and 2006, and compare the levels with those for other Latin

American countries. We complement this analysis with a linear regression estimating the predictors of support for the system in 2006.

The instrument LAPOP uses to measure the level of support for the system in a particular country is based on an index of five items that have been studied and established by academics and scholars of democracy to be valid. These items try to capture the general opinion that respondents have of the political system. These items are measured on a seven-point scale, but for better comprehension, we have transformed them into a scale ranging from 0-to-100, in which an average near 0 indicates a low level of support for the system, and an average near 100 indicates a high level of support. The items that make up this index are measured through the following questions:

*B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?*
*B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?*
*B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano está bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?*
*B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?*
*B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?*

Academic scholars of democracy have established that important or significant political events can influence levels of support for the system. Thus, and contrary to what was initially supposed, the level of support for the system can vary considerably over time, even quickly, in response to the changing political context of a country (Seligson 1980 ; Seligson 1983 ; Seligson y Carrión 2002).

With this in mind, it is logical to suppose that the level of support for the system in Bolivia varied between 2000 to 2006, given the juxtaposition of sufficiently dramatic events capable of affecting support for the system over short periods of time: the economically conflictive administration of ex-President Bánzer Suárez, the Water War during his presidency, and his death before the completion of his term of office. In the wake of this administration were the events of Feburary and Octuber, 2003, which culminated in the resignation of ex-President Sánchez de Lozada, the resignation of his successor, ex-President Carlos Mesa, and the call for elections in December, 2005 in which Evo Morales was elected president.

If a crisis of legitimacy so great as the consecutive resignation of not one but two constitutionally-elected presidents suggests that the level of support for the system is relatively low, the election of a new president with 53 percent of the vote should indicate that the level of support for the system has increased in relation to 2004.

Figure VII-5 shows the levels of system support in Bolivia between 1998 and 2006.




**Figure VII-5. Support for the System in Bolivia: Comparative Perspective 1998 – 2006.**

In the previous figure, we see that, true enough, the political events of the last eight years appear to have caused the levels of support for the system in the country to fluctuate. These support levels, though, have maintained a stable range between 44 and 47 points on a 100-point scale. We can also see that the lowest point of support for the system was registered in 2004, right in the middle of a crisis of political legitimacy in the presidency and channels of political representation, such as Congress and the political parties.

A more interesting result, however, is the observation that in 2006 the level of system support not only increased in relation to 2004, but that it also achieved its highest point so far registered by LAPOP in Bolivia, rising above the half-way point on the 100-point scale.

Figure VII-6, below, compares the level of support for the system in Bolivia in 2006 with those registered by LAPOP in other Latin American countries in 2004.




**Figure VII-6. Average Support for the System. Bolivia Compared to Other Latin American Countries**

Compared to other Latin American countries that LAPOP studies, we observe that in 2006, Bolivia rose from its traditional last or second-to-last place, in terms of levels of system support, to seventh out-of-tenth pl ace and above the 2004 survey-averages for Ecuador, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

A linear regression analysis applied to the 2006 sam ple allows us to estim ate the predictors of support for the system in Boli via for this year. The regression's estimate indicates which factors and citizen characteristics influenced an increa se or decrease in the level of support for the system that these citizens revealed.

**Table VII-1. Results of the Linear Regression Estimating Support for the System in 2006**

| Modelo | Coeficientes no estandarizados | | Coeficientes estandarizados | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| Constante | 19.314 | 4.171 | | 4.631 | .000 |
| Sexo | .733 | .991 | .020 | .740 | .459 |
| Grupos de edad | .199 | .380 | .015 | .524 | .600 |
| Educacion rec | .302 | .810 | .012 | .373 | .709 |
| Urbano > 2.000 | -.611 | 1.203 | -.015 | -.508 | .612 |
| Oriente | 2.279 | 1.199 | .056 | 1.901 | .057 |
| Sur | -2.127 | 1.287 | -.044 | -1.653 | .099 |
| Riqueza medida por artefactos en el hogar | .069 | .255 | .009 | .270 | .787 |
| Blanco | -.743 | 1.459 | -.013 | -.509 | .611 |
| Indígena | -.401 | 1.292 | -.008 | -.310 | .756 |
| Sofisticación política | -.071 | .348 | -.006 | -.204 | .838 |
| Desempeño presidente | -.016 | .032 | -.015 | -.517 | .605 |
| Promedio justifica golpe de Estado | .007 | .015 | .011 | .436 | .663 |
| Situación económica nacional | .089 | .026 | .088 | 3.431 | *.001* |
| Confianza comunidad | .066 | .016 | .106 | 4.142 | *.000* |
| Escala tolerancia | .079 | .023 | .090 | 3.494 | *.000* |
| Actitudes autoritarias | .100 | .021 | .131 | 4.747 | *.000* |
| Generalización de la corrupción | -.002 | .017 | -.003 | -.121 | .904 |
| Voto por el MAS | -2.679 | 1.530 | -.073 | -1.751 | .080 |
| Voto Podemos | 3.471 | 1.547 | .084 | 2.244 | *.025* |
| Voto nulo | -.475 | 2.137 | -.007 | -.222 | .824 |
| Desempeño gobierno pobreza | .119 | .030 | .156 | 3.975 | *.000* |
| Desempeño gobierno principios democráticos | .126 | .032 | .156 | 3.937 | *.000* |
| Desempeño gobierno corrupción | .056 | .028 | .075 | 1.988 | *.047* |
| N | 1.358 | | | | |
| Adj. Rsquare | 0,174 | | | | |

The only socio-demographic element that influences the levels of system support is the respondent's region of residence, statistically significant with a 90 percent degree of certainty. According to the regression's estimate, people living in the eastern region of the country (in the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando) tend to show higher levels of support for the system than people living outside this region. Also, people who live in the southern part of the country (in the departments of Chuquisaca, Tarija and

Potosí) tend to show lower levels of support for the system than people who do not live there.

In the following figure, we present the levels of support, disaggregated by geographic region, between 1998 and 2006.




**Figure VII-7. Support for the System by Region: Comparative Perspective 1998 – 2006**

Figure VII-7 shows, in a general way, how the level of support for the system has been consistently higher in the eastern region of the country than in the other two geographic regions used in this analysis. In the figure, we also observe that the western[1] region of the country has consistently shown the lowest levels of support for the system, with the exception of the year 2006 in which its average level of support had risen to the same level as that of the southern region.

Interpersonal trust and political tolerance are among the elements that influence Bolivians' support for the system. In both cases, the data reveals that the greater one's tolerance of different political ideas, and the greater one's trust of people in the

[1] For this analysis, the western region of the country includes the departments of La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba.

community, the higher the level of one's support for the system. Also, a good evaluation of the government's performance in terms of the fight against poverty and corruption, and in the promotion of democratic principals, elevates one's support for the system.

Respondents' electoral preference in the 2005 election also has an effect on the level of support for the system. The data reveals that people who voted for Podemos tend to show greater levels of system support than people who voted for small parties. [2] This result is significant with a 95 percent degree of certainty.

Finally, the analysis of the linear regression indicates that respondents' perception of the national economic situation influences the support they express for the system, and that the more optimistic they are, the greater the support they are willing to give the system, as Figure VII-8 shows below.

[2] Electoral preferences have been divided into four groups in terms of the proportion of votes that they received in the elections. The first group is made up by voters for MAS (the party that recieved the most votes), voters for Podemos (the party with the next to highest number of votes), people who cast null or blank votes (about eight percent of the total), and all other parties (aggregated into one group called "small parties," which includes the voters for the MNR, the UN, and the MIP; together they received less than seven percent of the vote). This last group is taken as a reference category for the linear regression.




**Figure VII-8. Average Support for the System in Terms of the National Economic Outlook**

## Trust in Political Institutions

Political trust is more an attitude than a behavior. It stems from, for example, the evaluation a person makes of an institution's performance in terms the expectations he or she had of the institution. This evaluation can translate into an attitude or into a behavior, but it is not necessarily expressed through an action (Easton 1965 ; Easton 1975).

Trust in political institutions is a central element in the legitimacy of a political regime and influences the level of support the political system receives from its citizens. It is for this reason that, in this chapter, we analyze trust in institutions along with the its influence on support for the system, which we analyzed in the previous section.

Trust, or lack of trust, in institutions can be a justification for citizen action, such as participation in public protests, complicance or non-compliance with national policies, exercising the vote, direct participation in politics, and other similar actions. It is also important in civil society because it encourages the creation of civil institutions, such as unions, committees, associations and even political parties, all of which are

complementary to state institutions and have the potential to increase their effectiveness (Mishler y Rose 1997).

The analysis of the degree to which citizens trust their institutions is also important because these institutions are the permanent structure of a State and of a regime at the same time that they are flexible elements that can be modified and adapted to the needs of the regime.

Academics have extensively discussed the importance of political trust for the political process. Mishler and Rose, for example, argue that "popular trust in political and social institutions is vital for the consolidation of democracy," and furthermore, that "trust is important because it creates 'collective power' allowing the government to make decisions and invest resources without the need to turn to coercion or obtain specific permission from the citizenry for each decision" (Mishler and Rose 1997). Thus, trust has the potential to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the government.

Trust is important for democracy because it forms part of the relationship of representation between elected representatives and the citienry (Mishler y Rose 1997). If citizens do not trust their elected representatives then the latter's decisions will lack legitimacy and will be unable to be implemented. In his model measuring political legitimacy, Weatherford considers political trust to be one of the central components of legitimacy (Weatherford 1992)[3].

We measure the trust that Bolivians have in the institutions of their political system through a series of questions that require the respondents to express the level of trust they have in a particular institution with a number on a scale of 1 to 7: 1 indicating that they have no trust in the institution, and 7 indicating that they trust it a lot. To facilitate the comprehension of the analysis, we transformed the seven point scale into a 0-to-100 point scale, in which an average near 0 indicates little or no trust in an institution and 100 indicates a lot of trust.

In this section, we first analyze the levels of trust, in 2006, in a series of institutions. Some of them will also be selected for further analysis, both over time and in relation to the levels of trust in the same institutions in other Latin American countries.

The institutions will be selected in terms of their importance to the Bolivian political proceses. Among the institutions we consider in this analysis are the National Congress, the Presidency, and the political parties, all traditional channels of political representation. We will also analyze in more detail the trust that Bolivians have in the National Police, as an institution representing the state's authority; Municipal Government, which represents the presence of the State in local spaces and the is motor of policies at the local level; and the National Electoral Court, an institution that has been modernized and has taken on an important role in Bolivian society in recent years. A complementary criteria in selecting these insitutions is the availability of reliable data

[3] For more details on the theoretical discussion of legitimacy in the political process, see Lipset, Seymour M., Political Man: the social bases of politics (1960).

about them; we have data regarding all of them from 1998 to the present from the LAPOP studies. Finally, we will also briefly analyze the trust that Bolivians place in Prefectures around the country both for their important role representing the State at the regional level but also for the increasing importance of these institutions in the process of political decentralization and in the discussions of possible regional autonomy.

This section will present the average levels of trust in the selected institutions and will run a regression analysis to estimate the predictors of trust in some of these institutions for 2006. The regression model we use to analyze trust in institutions has been carefully studied and tested in previous works: in the 2004 *Democracy Audit* in the case of Bolivian institutions, as well as in the studies of institutions in Ecuador and Colombia. The model used in this chapter, though, has been improved in relation to earlier ones in terms of the results it gives.

Below, we list the political institutions that were included in the 2006 analysis of Bolivians' political trust.

**Table VII-2. List of Political Institutions Analyzed**

| Lista de preguntas sobre confianza en las instituciones |
|---|
| *B10A.¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?* |
| *B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?* |
| *B21.¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?* |
| *B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Nacional Electoral?* |
| *B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Fuerzas Armadas?* |
| *B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso?* |
| *B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la policía?* |
| *B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?* |
| *BOLB37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los periodistas?* |
| *B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Presidente?* |
| *B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Municipal?* |
| *B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Prefectura?* |
| *B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los medios de comunicación?* |
| *BOLB22B. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la autoridad originaria?* |
| *BOLB22C. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Comité de Vigilancia municipal?* |
| *B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?* |
| *BOLB23A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ministerio Público o fiscales?* |
| *B17. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en el Defensor del Pueblo?* |
| *BOLB23BNR. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los Tribunales de Justicia?* |
| *BOLB23E. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?* |
| *B44. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en los abogados que trabajan como Defensores Públicos?* |
| *B51. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en las organizaciones no gubernamentales, las ONGs, que trabajan en el país?* |
| *B42. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en los Centros de Conciliación?* |
| *B46. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en que la Delegación Presidencial para la Transparencia y la Integridad Pública está combatiendo la corrupción en Bolivia?* |
| *BOLB53. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los diputados uninominales?* |
| *BOLB54. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los diputados plurinominales?* |

Below, we present Table VII-3 which summarizes the average levels of trust for all institutions between 1998 and 2006.

**Table VII-3. Averages of Trust in All Political Institutions by Year**

| Año | Promedio de confianza en todas las instituciones. Escala 0-100 |
|---|---|
| 1998 | 42,59 |
| 2000 | 42,11 |
| 2002 | 45,96 |
| 2004 | 43,36 |
| 2006 | 50,02 |




**Figure VII-9. Trust in Political Institutions, 2006.**

Figure VII-9 shows the levels of trust earned by Bolivian political institutions in 2006. In the figure, we included a black, vertical line representing the average trust in all institutions included in the analysis. In 2006, th e average trust in all institutions is 50.02 points on a scale of 100, the highest average re gistered since 1998. We also included, in the figure, a dotted blue line representing the average trust in all institutions in 2004, and a dotted green line representing the averages for 2000 and 1998, since they were less than those registered in 2004 and 2002.

In the above figure, it can be seen that political trust is not the same for all institutions. Instead, it depends on the kind of institution. Trust fluctuates in 2006 from a level of 31 points on a 100-point scale for political parties, the Bolivian institutions earning the lowest levels of trust, to a maximum of 67.3 points for the Catholic Church, which consistently receives the highest trust scores among institutions in Bolivia.

In general, trust in institutions increased in Bolivia in 2006, compared to the other years included in this analysis, reaching in this year a level of trust never before achieved in Bolivia. This is what the black line in the figure indicates: it represents the average trust level for all institutions in 2006, which is clearly superior to the general averages in 2004 and 2002.

The distribution of trust in institutions has also changed slightly for some specific institutions. The levels of trust in the National Congress and the presidency have notably improved. That of political parties has also improved compared to 2005, despite being the institutions that Bolivians trust least.

The Office of the Human Rights Omsbudman (*Defensoría del Pueblo*) has fallen slightly, and the Armed Forces more notably so, but both more the product of a redistribution of the structure of trust in institutions than as the result of a specific re-evalution of these institutions. The trust level in single-member district congressional deputies (*diputados uninominales*) slightly exceeds that earned by multi-member district congressional deputies (diputados *plurinominales*), but both groups of representatives are among the institutions earning low levels of trust in Bolivia.

In conclusion, Figure VII-9 shows us that trust in institutions has increased in a significant manner between 2004 and 2006. But even more interesting, if we compare this figure with those from the previous two years, we perceive a different distribution of trust between both years. Institutions that were considered highly trustworthy in 2004 and 2002 now earn lower levels of trust, and in the same way, institutions that did not earn the trust of Bolivians now have recovered it.[4]

Below, we turn to analyze in more detail the levels of trust between 1998 and 2006 earned by the Presidency, National Congress and political parties.

[4] For a detailed comparison of the levels of trust between 2004 and 2006, refer to the chapter on trust in institutions in the 2004 *Democracy Audit*.




**Figure VII-10. Trust in Congress, the Presidency and Political Parties: Comparative Perspective 1998 – 2006**

Figure VII-10 shows the levels of trust earned by the National Congress, political parties, and the Presidency between 1998 and 2006 in detail. In all cases, it can be seen that the levels of trust in 2006 are the highest registered for all three institutions. In the case of the Presidency, we see that trust in this institution has been in clear ascendency since 2000, the year of its lowest level.

Below, we run a linear regression analysis to estimate the predictors of trust in the Presidency in 2006. We are interested in identifying the predictors of trust in the Presidency in the context of President Morales' victory in the December 2005 elections with an historic level of electoral support of over 50 percent.

**Table VII-4. Linear Regression for Trust in the Presidency, 2006.**

| Modelo | Coeficientes No estandarizados | | Coeficientes Estandarizados | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| Constante | 43.241 | 5.564 | | 7.771 | .000 |
| Sexo | 1.730 | 1.335 | .035 | 1.296 | .195 |
| Grupos de edad | .186 | .520 | .010 | .359 | .720 |
| Educacion | -1.085 | 1.108 | -.032 | -.979 | .328 |
| Urbano > 2.000 | -.117 | 1.696 | -.002 | -.069 | .945 |
| Oriente | -4.731 | 1.630 | -.088 | -2.903 | *.004* |
| Sur | -3.037 | 1.825 | -.046 | -1.664 | *.096* |
| Blanco | -1.917 | 1.923 | -.026 | -.997 | .319 |
| Indígena | -2.582 | 1.788 | -.039 | -1.444 | .149 |
| Riqueza medida por artefactos en el hogar | -.741 | .347 | -.070 | -2.132 | *.033* |
| Economía nacional | .101 | .036 | .073 | 2.782 | *.005* |
| Economía nacional futura | .162 | .020 | .223 | 8.240 | *.000* |
| Confianza comunidad | .040 | .022 | .048 | 1.836 | .067 |
| Generalización corrupción | .007 | .023 | .008 | .300 | .764 |
| Sofisticación política | -.648 | .473 | -.041 | -1.370 | .171 |
| Escala tolerancia | .067 | .030 | .058 | 2.241 | *.025* |
| Promedio justifica golpe de Estado | -.041 | .021 | -.051 | -1.959 | *.050* |
| Voto por el MAS | 12.718 | 2.090 | .257 | 6.084 | *.000* |
| Voto Podemos | 1.549 | 2.115 | .028 | .732 | .464 |
| Voto nulo | 3.687 | 3.004 | .037 | 1.227 | .220 |
| Actitudes autoritarias | .045 | .028 | .044 | 1.570 | .117 |
| N | 1.262 | | | | |
| Adj. Rsquared | 0,194 | | | | |

In Table VII-4, we observe that one fact or increasing trust in the Presidency is having voted for the MAS, with a very strong effect. This resu lt is predictable since one can only suppose that the people who voted for the MAS in the 2005 election widely trust their candidate in the exercise of his functions.

An optimistic perception of the national economy, both in the present and the near-future, also increased trust in the Pres idency, as did high levels of tolerance toward those with different politic al ideas from one's own. Likewise, the greater the interpersonal trust – understood as the trus t that respondents have in people of their community – the grea ter the trust in the Pres ident also ten ds to be. These re lations are statistically significant with a high degree of certainty (95 percent).

On the contrary, people who live in the regions of the East and South [5] tend to exhibit lower levels of trust toward the President than people who live in the departments

[5] South sig.> 0.1.

of the West. People who consider that various reasons could justify a coup d'etat tend to trust the President less than people who believe that a coup d'etat is unjustifiable. Finally, personal wealth also affects trust: the greater the level of a respondent's wealth, the less trust he or she has in the Presidency.

The trust that respondents feel that National Congress and political parties have earned is less clear; between 2000 and 2004, the levels of trust in these institutions fluctuated without a clear trend of either rising or falling. These results reflect the difficult situation that both insitutions have had with the Bolivian population during at least the last five years, in which the traditional parties entered in crisis, as did Congress, whose role during the uncertain period following the resignation of ex-Presidente Sánchez de Lozada was sharply criticized by some sectors of the population.

In Table VII-5, we present the results of the linear regression estimating the predictors of trust in Congress in 2006.

**Table VII-5. Linear Regression for Trust in Congress, 2006**

| Modelo | Coeficientes no estandarizados | | Coeficientes Estandarizados | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| Constante | 23.032 | 6.207 | | 3.711 | .000 |
| Sexo | -1.682 | 1.494 | -.032 | -1.126 | .260 |
| Grupos de edad | .075 | .582 | .004 | .129 | .897 |
| Educacion | 2.709 | 1.241 | .077 | 2.183 | *.029* |
| Urbano > 2.000 | .147 | 1.903 | .002 | .077 | .939 |
| Oriente | 4.882 | 1.814 | .087 | 2.691 | *.007* |
| Sur | 2.056 | 2.052 | .030 | 1.002 | .316 |
| Blanco | -2.932 | 2.146 | -.039 | -1.366 | .172 |
| Indígena | -1.735 | 2.008 | -.025 | -.864 | .388 |
| Riqueza medida por artefactos en el hogar | -1.076 | .389 | -.098 | -2.768 | *.006* |
| Economía nacional | .105 | .040 | .074 | 2.616 | *.009* |
| Economía nacional futura | .074 | .022 | .098 | 3.361 | *.001* |
| Confianza comunidad | .078 | .024 | .091 | 3.271 | *.001* |
| Generalización de la corrupción | -.012 | .026 | -.013 | -.446 | .655 |
| Sofisticación política | -1.276 | .531 | -.078 | -2.402 | *.016* |
| Escala tolerancia | .151 | .034 | .126 | 4.506 | *.000* |
| Actitudes autoritarias | .143 | .032 | .134 | 4.479 | *.000* |
| Promedio justifica golpe de Estado | -.009 | .023 | -.011 | -.378 | .706 |
| Voto por el MAS | 3.434 | 2.322 | .067 | 1.479 | .139 |
| Voto Podemos | 6.147 | 2.351 | .107 | 2.615 | *.009* |
| Voto nulo | -1.274 | 3.339 | -.012 | -.382 | .703 |
| N | 1.247 | | | | |
| Adj. Rsquare | .084 | | | | |

We find that people who live in the country's East (in Santa Cruz, Pando and Beni) trust Congress more than people who live in the West. We also find that the greater a respondent's level of wealth, the more this trust shrinks.

An optimistic evaluation of the national economy in the present and near-future also increases the trust in Congress. The same holds true with people who show greater levels of interpersonal trust, greater levels of tolerance toward people with different political idea than their own, and the tendency to assume authoritarian attitudes, such as the resistence to change and inflexibility. In terms of the 2005 electoral preferences, we observe that voters for Podemos tend to trust Congress more than voters for both small and traditional parties.

The most interesting result of this analysis indicates that as educational levels rise (the total number of years of formal schooling), the more trust people have in the National Congress; but that a greater level of political sophistication tends to reduce trust in this same institution. This result highlights a qualitative difference between formal education and the accumulation of specific knowledge about political issues, both domestic and international, not necessarily acquired through the formal educational system but in other contexts, such as the family, the social, and community contexts, as well as through the news media, among others. Political sophistication is a learning process that one acquires individually and already as an adult, or at least at after one has finished formal schooling.

In 2006, Congress registered its best moment in relation to the trust that citizens exhibited in this institution. This high point can also be seen when Congressional trust levels from Bolivia are compared internationally, as the following figure shows.




**Figure VII-11. Trust in Congress. Bolivia Compared to Other Latin American Countries**

Figure VII-11 shows the level of trust that Bolivians report having in Congress in 2006, compared to the trust in Congress exhibited in nine other Latin American countries where LAPOP conducted studies of political behavior in 2004.

Even if Bolivia is a country that traditionally registers very low – if not the lowest – levels of trust in institutions compared to other countries in the Latin American region, in 2006 we see that not only is it not found among those countries with the lowest levels of trust in Congress, but that it surpasses Guatemala, the country that immediately follows it in the comparison, by nine points on the scale. In 2006, the level of trust in Congress in Bolivia was greater than that in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and Ecuador for the year 2004.

Other institutions that deserve a more detailed analysis are the Police, Municipal Government, and the National Electoral Court.




**Figure VII-12. Trust in the Police, Municipal Government and the National Electoral Court: Comparative Perspective 1998 - 2006**

The previous figure summarizes the details of the trust in three different kinds of institutions. Municipal Government has become, in a little more than ten years, the center of political activity at the local level, and is an institution that always receives moderate levels of trust by the population. As with the other insitutions analyzed above, Municipal Government also registers its maximum level of trust in 2006. The same is true with the

National Electoral Court, despite the problems it faced recently because of purges to the electoral census and accusations by President Morales.

The National Police is one of the institutions that Bolivians generally trust least. It is always a part of the group of institutions with the lowest levels of citizen trust. In 2006, the Police did not sufficiently gain the trust of Bolivians to leave this group of least trusted institutions, although it did in this year, along with the other institutions analyzed, achieve its maximum level of trust.

Table VII-6 gives the results of the linear regression estimating the predictors of trust in the police in 2006.

**Table VII-6. Linear Regression for Trust in the Police, 2006**

| Modelo | Coeficientes no estandarizados | | Coeficientes estandarizados | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| Constante | 23.087 | 6.662 | | 3.465 | .001 |
| Sexo | .907 | 1.435 | .017 | .632 | .527 |
| Grupos de edad | -1.021 | .553 | -.052 | -1.847 | .065 |
| Educacion | .570 | 1.188 | .016 | .480 | .632 |
| Urbano > 2.000 | -2.535 | 1.806 | -.042 | -1.403 | .161 |
| Oriente | 6.354 | 1.740 | .107 | 3.651 | *.000* |
| Sur | 3.366 | 1.907 | .048 | 1.765 | .078 |
| Blanco | 3.046 | 2.127 | .037 | 1.432 | .152 |
| Indígena | -5.093 | 1.849 | -.074 | -2.754 | *.006* |
| Riqueza medida por artefactos en el hogar | .060 | .386 | .005 | .156 | .876 |
| Confianza comunidad | .101 | .023 | .113 | 4.409 | *.000* |
| Generalización de la corrupción | -.023 | .025 | -.024 | -.926 | .355 |
| Sofisticación política | -.036 | .509 | -.002 | -.070 | .944 |
| Noticias en la radio | -.608 | .664 | -.024 | -.915 | .361 |
| Noticias en la TV | -.102 | .855 | -.003 | -.119 | .905 |
| Noticias periódicos | -.335 | .884 | -.011 | -.379 | .705 |
| Promedio justifica golpe de Estado | .047 | .022 | .054 | 2.125 | *.034* |
| Escala tolerancia | .136 | .032 | .108 | 4.248 | *.000* |
| Actitudes autoritarias | .062 | .030 | .055 | 2.039 | *.042* |
| Voto por el MAS | 1.560 | 2.186 | .029 | .714 | .476 |
| Voto Podemos | 4.294 | 2.260 | .070 | 1.900 | .058 |
| Voto nulo | -.670 | 3.058 | -.007 | -.219 | .827 |
| N | 1.542 | | | | |
| Adj. Rsquare | .058 | | | | |

The results of the linear regression indicate that older people trust the police less than young people. Similarly, people who identify themselves as indigenous trust this institution less than *mestizos*. Meanwhile, people who trust the members of their

community, and who are tolerant toward people with different political ideas than their own, generally tend to trust the police more. The analysis of respondents' electoral preferences shows that those people who voted for Podemos in the 2005 elections trust the police in larger measure than voters for both small and traditional political parties.

People who believed that, in some cases, a coup d'etat would be justifiable, and people who have a disposition to assume authoritarian attitudes, also trust the police more, probably within a logic recognizing the principal of authority since the National Police is one of the institutions representing the authority of the state.

These results and the low level of the R-squared suggest that, in contrast to the other institutions analyzed in this chapter, the criteria influencing the level of trust that people have in the police are themselves influenced by different factors than those common to institutions such as the Presidency, Congress, and Prefectures, for example. To better analyze the reasons why Bolivians trust the police less, it would be necessary to develop, for fuiture studies, a different model than that applied in this chapter.

Despite this improvement in its level of trust, Bolivia remains the country that least trusts the Police among all Latin American countries studied by LAPOP, as the following figure shows. Bolivia registers lower levels of trust in the Police than in Guatemala, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama, countries with less trust in their Congresses than Bolivia, as we noted earlier.




**Figure VII-13. Trust in the Police. Bolivia Compared to Other Latin American Countries**

Trust in Prefectures is analyzed separately since, between 2004 and 2006, a change was introduced allowing the direct election of Departmental Prefects instead of their appointment by the president. Prefectures have also been, in last two years, the center of a national discussion regarding the possiblity of reorganizing the political-administrative structure of the country to create autonomous regions with Prefectures as the seat of government in such autonomous regions. This discussion has not yet concluded, but the direct election of Departmental Prefects is an intermediate step in the process of the reorganization of the political administration at the regional level.

In terms of how much Bolivians trust Prefectures, in the following figure we see that it has increased in an important way between 2004 and 2006, rising ten points on the trust scale.




**Figure VII-14. Trust in Prefectures 2004 – 2006**

The results of the regression analysis to determine the predictors of trust in Prefectures in 2006 are presented in Table VII-7.

**Table VII-7. Linear Regression For Trust in Prefectures, 2006**

| Modelo | Coeficientes No estandarizados | | Coeficientes Estandarizados | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| Constante | 30.012 | 5.784 | | 5.189 | .000 |
| Sexo | -1.820 | 1.398 | -.038 | -1.302 | .193 |
| Grupos de edad | .618 | .548 | .034 | 1.129 | .259 |
| Educacion | .916 | 1.163 | .028 | .788 | .431 |
| Urbano > 2.000 | -.393 | 1.790 | -.007 | -.219 | .826 |
| Riqueza medida por artefactos en el hogar | .641 | .361 | .063 | 1.774 | .076 |
| Oriente | 6.899 | 1.707 | .133 | 4.041 | *.000* |
| Sur | -.543 | 1.933 | -.008 | -.281 | .779 |
| Blanco | 3.685 | 2.001 | .053 | 1.842 | .066 |
| Indígena | -4.846 | 1.888 | -.075 | -2.567 | *.010* |
| Confianza comunidad | .080 | .023 | .100 | 3.545 | *.000* |
| Generalización de la corrupción | -.052 | .024 | -.061 | -2.143 | *.032* |
| Sofisticación política | -.606 | .495 | -.040 | -1.224 | .221 |
| Noticias en la radio | .058 | .025 | .071 | 2.341 | *.019* |
| Noticias en la TV | .018 | .024 | .025 | .758 | .449 |
| Noticias periódicos | -.002 | .025 | -.003 | -.077 | .939 |
| Promedio justifica golpe de Estado | .035 | .022 | .045 | 1.590 | .112 |
| Escala tolerancia | .151 | .031 | .136 | 4.826 | *.000* |
| Voto por el MAS | 1.123 | 2.177 | .023 | .516 | .606 |
| Voto Podemos | 4.547 | 2.202 | .086 | 2.065 | *.039* |
| Voto nulo | -5.108 | 3.127 | -.054 | -1.633 | .103 |
| Economía nacional | .101 | .038 | .076 | 2.655 | *.008* |
| Economía nacional futura | .032 | .021 | .046 | 1.554 | .121 |
| N | 1.224 | | | | |
| Adj. Rsquare | 0,092 | | | | |

Just as with Congress and the police, people living in the eastern region of the country trust Prefectures more than people living in other regions. Also, people who voted for Podemos in the 2005 elections trust these institutions more than those who supported both small and traditional parties.

In this case, respondents' ethnic identification also has an effect on attitudes toward this institution. While people who identify themselves as indigenous tend to trust Prefectures less than *mestizos*, people who identify themselves as white trust Prefectures more than *mestizos*. This relation is statistically correct in at least 90 percent of the cases analyzed.

As with other insitutions, trust in Prefectures grows in step with increases in interpersonal trust and political tolerance, and as people are more optimistic about the national economic outlook.

Of the institutions analyzed in this section, Prefectures are the only ones affected by the perception that there is corruption in the government offices. The more widespread corruption appears to be among public employees, the less citizens show trust in Prefectures.

In general, we have seen that in almost all institutions, the predictors of trust are the same or at least similar. The case of the police deserves a more thorough study, but all together it can be said that political tolerance and interpersonal trust, along with an optimistic evaluation of the national economic outlook, are important elements that generate trust in political institutions.

A constant in all the cases studied is also a curious piece of information. Contrary to what innumberable studies say about the effects of corruption on democracy and the legitimacy of the system, in Bolivia in 2006, the degree of corruption among public employees, measured as the perception that the respondent has of how widespread corruption is in the civil service, does not seem to have a significant effect on the trust that citizens have in their institutions – with the exception of the case of Prefectures. Even more curious is that this result occurs in the country with one of the highest levels of corruption in the world, according to annually-evaluated information from Transparency International.

Bolivians, however, do not seem to perceive that the degree of corruption in the civil service is very high, alarming or even reprehensible. Comparing the preception of corruption in the civil service with that in other Latin American countries, we find that, as clearly illustrated in Figure VII-15, the generalized perception of corruption in Bolivia is the lowest in the region. It is, therefore, not surpring that corruption is not an element that Bolivians want to take into account at the moment they decide how much to trust their institutions.




**Figure VII-15. Perception of Widespread Corruption. Bolivia Compared to Other Latin American Countries**

## Following the Rules

A central element of the democratic system and in the legitimacy for democracy is respect for the established rules of the game or for what is called the Rule of Law. This concept goes beyond complying with the specific policies established by an administration or for ideologies of right of left. Instead it refers to the rules established as a founding principal for the State to function, and of its relationship to the citizens, and the relationship between citizens (Becker 1999).

The Constitution is the best material expression of the Rule of Law and of the group of rules that regulate the political interactions among citizens, and between them and their representatives, and with authorities.

In 2006, we asked interviewees the following question:

***Por favor dígame con cuál de las siguientes frases está Ud. más de acuerdo:***
*[1] Es importante para el funcionamiento del país que las leyes sean obedecidas siempre*
*[2] Si las leyes se obedecen o no, no tiene importancia*

Figure VII-16, below, shows the proportion of people who responded in one way or the other in the survey.




**Figure VII-16. Importance of Obeying the Law in Bolivia, 2006.**

Figure VII-16 shows that, without doubt, the great majority of respondents (a total of 86.8 percent) consider that it is important to obey the law for the country to work well. This is a clear indicator that respondents feel, in principal, respect for established laws and recognize their importance for the regime to function.

In all regimes, however, the idea of the law is different than the practice of the law and rules. So in order to have a more complete vision of the attitudes of Bolivians toward the law and the rules of the game, we need to find out if the majority of people recognize the importance of the law, whether this translates, in practice, into respect and obedience of the rules, or whether it assumes some other form. With this in mind, we asked interviewees the following question:

***Con cuál de las siguientes frases está Ud. más de acuerdo?***
*[1] Todas las leyes son igual de importantes, por tanto deben ser obedecidas por igual*
*[2] No todas las leyes tienen la misma importancia, por tanto no es necesario obedecer todas las leyes*




**Figure VII-17. Importance of the Law in Bolivia.**

Figure VII-17 shows that the majority of respondents consider that not only is the law important in a democracy, but that all laws are equally important and should, therefore, be equally obeyed. In this case, 25.7 percent of respondents consider that the importance of the law is relative and that not all laws are equally important, for which reason it is not necessary to respect and abide by all laws.

Even if the proportion of respondents who relativize the importance of the law in the system is small in relation to respondents who consider that all laws are important, it should be noted that a change was registered between the first and second question in respondents' attitudes, and that in the second case one-quarter of the population interviewed relativized the importance of obeying all laws.

We see here that support for the idea of following the law can be different than considerations moving the idea closer to practice.

Below, to move the idea of respect for the law closer to practice, we asked the interviewees:

***Hablando de los bolivianos en general y ya no de sus actitudes personales, ¿Cuál de las siguientes frases describe mejor a los bolivianos en general?. Los bolivianos:***
*[1] No quieren cumplir la ley, pero creen que los demás sí deberían*
*[2] Cumplen la ley solamente cuando están de acuerdo con lo que dice*
*[3] Obedecen las reglas sólo cuando los benefician y las desobedecen cuando los perjudican*
*[4] Tratan de cumplir las leyes la mayor parte del tiempo*




**Figure VII-18. Following the Rules 2006.**

The results presented in Figure VII-18 summarize Bolivians' attitudes in relation to following the law in practice. We see that when the question clearly refers to the practice of respect and obedience of the law, the evaluation of Bolivians' political behaviors moves away from the ideal, in which 87 percent of the population considers

that it is important to obey the law, and demonstrates that 38.4 percent of the respondents consider that Bolivians obey the law only when personally beneficial.

Some 26 percent of respondents consider that Bolivians try to obey the law most of the time, and 17 percent that they only obey the law when they agree with it. This means that more than half of the respondents consider that in Bolivia the law is obeyed only under conditions in which one agrees with it or it is personally beneficial.

These results are worrisome in a democratic regime – although not dramatically so – since democracy is maintained on the basis of an agreement that essentially requires following the rules of the game. And if these are only obeyed when personally beneficial or when one agrees with them, then the agreement to live in a democracy becomes uncertain and depends on the will of citizens to obey the agreement.

Another important democratic principal is the respect for majority decisions. Instead of asking respondents about the importance of such respect, we asked them about their attitudes when confronted with majority decisions they did not agree with. The question we asked them was:

***Si una decisión fue tomada por la mayoría en su barrio o comunidad ¿qué es lo que hace Ud.?***
*[1] Aunque no le guste usted la obedece*
*[2] Si no le gusta usted no la obedece*
*[3] Busca la manera de cambiar esa decisión*




**Figure VII-19. Acceptance of the Majority Position 2006**

The results, shown in Figure VII-19, indicate that more than half of the population interviewed is willing to accept the decisions made by the majority even when the decision is not to their liking. Almost one-third of the population interviewed would try to change this decision before accepting it as a majority decision. And only a very small proportion of the population openly admits that if the majority decision were not to their liking, then they would not obey it.

In the context of a democratic regime, these results are encouraging since they indicate that Bolivians are generally willing to follow the rules of the democratic game in instances and situations of decision making. And that if a decision turns out to be unacceptable, they will take action to try and change this decision, a behavior that is not only allowed but is encouraged within the democratic rules, so long as the actions taken are not violent.

Finally, in a democratic regime, it is not only the citizens who are subject to the rules of the game. Their representatives and the representatives of state authority are also subject to these rules. These groups of representatives should comply with the processes established by the law in the fulfillment of their functions and can be held responsible for acts falling outside the boundaries established by the law.

In this respect, we asked respondents:

***Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?***
*[1] Deben respetar las leyes siempre*
*[2] En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley*

The results of this question are presented below in Figure VII-20.




**Figure VII-20. Preception that the Authorities Should Respect the Law**

In the above figure, we see that just as Bolivians have a low predisposition to unconditionally obey the law, they are also willing to accept that authorities do not obey the law in cases when it is "necessary." Even if 55 percent of respondents consider that authorities should always respect the law in the fulfillment of their duties, 41.6 percent of respondents are willing to condone authorities acting on the margin of the law, a truly worrying proportion since more than one-third of the people interviewed do not insist that authorities be held accountable for their actions while fulfilling their duties.

## Conclusions

In this chapter, we analyzed Bolivians' attitudes and perceptions in terms of the idea of democracy and some of the mechanisms through which it is put in practice. We have seen that tolerance and the acceptance of the principals and ideals implicit in a democracy do not translate into the same levels of acceptance and tolerance toward its practice as expressed, for example, in the attitudes of leaders and rulers, in following the rules, or in trust in insitutions.

It does not appear to us, however, that the levels of support for the system or the trust in institutions that Bolivians express are indicators of an unhealthy democracy. Just as the lack of support for the democratic system or high levels of mistrust can indicate a democratic crisis and be an opportunity for the rise of authoritarian regimes, in the same way an excessive amount of trust and support that translates into blind faith and that does not hold rulers accountable could also lead to the same result.

We have seen that the practice of democracy is affected by regional differences, the performance of insitutions, the employees of these institutions and the rulers in the economic, social and political spheres, as well as by the behavior and attitudes of citizens in politics, the society, and in the community.

In an effort of self-evaluation as citizens in this democratic system, we should learn from these results that we still have a long road to travel to move the idea and practice of democracy closer together. Both the problems as well as the solutions reside in the interaction between the state and citizens, are derived from the structure of the system, and the performance of the government and of the citizenry.

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# Appendix: Questionaire in Spanish

*Versión # 24B IRB Approval: 051179*

**BOLIVIA, 2006**

**CUESTIONARIO *1674*: Gobernabilidad**

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**LEER LA CARTA DE CONSENTIMIENTO ANTES DE COMENZAR.**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Ciudad** _____ | **CIUDAD** | |
| **[LOCAL]Localidad**_____ | **LOCAL** | |
| **Bar./UV** _____ | **BAR** | |
| **Mnz.** _____ | **MNZ** | |
| **Viv.** _____ | **VIV** | |
| **DOMINIO [Estrato]:** Público [1] [5]Desarrollo alternativo | **DOMINIO** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **UR.:** Urbano > 20.000 [1] Urbano 2-20 mil [2] Rural compacto [3] Rural disperso, menos 500 [4] | **UR** | |
| **PROV . Provincia** _____ | **PROV** | |
| **MUN. Municipio** _____ | **MUN** | |
| **Distrito electoral** _____ | **DE** | |
| **ZONA. Zona.** _____ | **ZONA** | |
| **UPM** _____ | **UPM** | |
| **DPT. Departamento:** La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4]Chuquisaca [5] Potosí [6]Pando [7] Tarija [8] Beni [9] | **DPT** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Q1. Sexo** *(no pregunte)*: Hombre [1] Mujer [2] | **Q1** | |
| **Q2. Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?** _____ **años** | **Q2** | |

**Día del intento:** Lu [1] Ma [2] Mi [3] Ju [4] Vi [5] Sa [6] Do [7]
**Hora de inicio**: _____:_____ **Fecha** ____/____/ 2006

| *Con qué frecuencia …* | **Todos los días** | **Una o dos veces por semana** | **Rara vez** | **Nunca** | **NS** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **A1**. Escucha noticias por la radio | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | **A1** | |
| **A2**. Mira noticias en la TV. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | **A2** | |
| **A3**. Lee noticias en los periódicos | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | **A3** | |
| **A4i.** Lee noticias vía Internet | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | **A4i** | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***(Mostrar tabla #2)* Ahora vamos a utilizar esta escala que tiene 7 gradas, en la que 1 significa que no confía nada y 7 significa que confía mucho. Por favor indíqueme con un número entre 1 y 7:** | | | | | | | | | | |
| **A1B. [B60] ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las noticias que dan en la radio?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **A1B** | |
| **A2B. [B61] ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las noticias que dan en TV?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **A2B** | |
| **A3B. [B62] ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las noticia por los periódicos?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **A3B** | |

A4 [COA4]**. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema** más grave **que está enfrentando el país? [**NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agua, falta de | 19 | | Inflación, altos precios | 02 |
| Caminos/vías en mal estado | 18 | | Mal gobierno | 15 |
| Conflicto armado | 30 | | Medio ambiente | 10 |
| Corrupción | 13 | | Migración | 16 |
| Crédito, falta de | 09 | | Narcotráfico | 12 |
| Delincuencia, crimen, violencia | 05 | | Pandillas | 14 |
| Derechos humanos, violaciones de | 56 | | Pobreza | 04 |
| Desempleo | 03 | | Los políticos | 59 |
| Desigualdad | 58 | | Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) | 06 |
| Desnutrición | 23 | | Salud, falta de servicio | 22 |
| Desplazamiento forzado | 32 | | Secuestro | 31 |
| Deuda externa | 26 | | Seguridad (falta de) | 27 |
| Discriminación | 25 | | Terrorismo | 33 |
| Drogadicción | 11 | | Tierra para cultivar, falta de | 07 |
| Economía, problemas con, crisis de | 01 | | Vivienda | 55 |
| Educación, falta de, mala calidad | 21 | | Otro_____ | |
| Electricidad, falta de | 24 | | No sabe | 88 |
| Explosión demográfica | 20 | | | |
| Guerra contra terrorismo | 17 | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **A veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolverlos solos. Algunos tratan de resolver tales problemas pidiendo ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. Alguna vez ha pedido ayuda o cooperación** *(lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso)* | | | | | |
| **CP2. A Algún diputado o senador** | Si [1] | No [2] | NS/NR [8] | **CP2** | |
| **CP4A [CP3].** A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad) | Si [1] | No [2] | NS/NR [8] | **CP4A** | |
| **BOLCP3A [CP3A]. A la autoridad originaria o autoridad de la comunidad indígena** | Si [1] | No [2] | NS/NR [8] | **BOLCP3A** | |
| **BOLCP4A [CP4A]. A la prefectura** | Si [1] | No [2] | NS/NR [8] | **BOLCP4A** | |
| **BOLCP4C. A la subalcaldía** | Si [1] | No [2] | NS/NR [8] | **BOLCP4C** | |
| **CP4B. A la policía** | Si [1] | No [2] | NS/NR [8] | **CP4B** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **SOCT1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general la situación económica del país? Diría Ud. que es muy buena, buena, regular, mala o muy mala?**<br>Muy buena [1] Buena [2] Regular [3] Mala [4] Muy mala [5] No sabe [8] | **SOCT1** | |
| **SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?**<br>Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] No sabe [8] | **SOCT2** | |
| **SOCT3. ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?**<br>Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] No sabe [8] | **SOCT3** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría Ud. que es muy buena, buena, regular, mala o muy mala?** Muy buena [1] Buena [2] Regular [3] Mala [4] Muy mala [5] No sabe [8] | **IDIO1** | |
| **IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?** Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] No sabe [8] | **IDIO2** | |
| **IDIO3. Y en los próximos doce meses, ¿Cree Ud. que su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?** Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] No sabe [8] | **IDIO3** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta.** | | |
| **CP5. ¿En el último año ha trabajado o tratado de resolver algún problema de la comunidad o barrio?**<br>Si [1] No [2] =>*CP6* | **CP5** | |
| **CP5A.** *Si responde si CP5 =>* **Ha donado Ud. dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS [8] Inap [9] | **CP5A** | |
| **CP5B**. *Si responde si CP5* **=> Ha dado su propio trabajo o mano de obra en el último año?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS [8] Inap [9] | **CP5B** | |
| **CP5C**. *Si responde si CP5* **=> Ha asistido a reuniones sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora en el último año?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS [8] Inap [9] | **CP5C** | |
| **CP5D**. *Si responde si CP5* **=> Ha tratado de ayudar Ud. a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS [8] Inap [9] | **CP5D** | |

| **Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste Ud. a sus reuniones una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año o nunca.** | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Una vez a la semana** | **Una o dos veces al mes** | **Una o dos veces al año** | **Nunca** | **NS/NR** | | |
| **CP6. Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste…** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** | **CP6** | |
| **CP7. Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿ Asiste…** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** | **CP7** | |
| **CP8. Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? ¿Asiste….** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** | **CP8** | |
| **CP9. Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, campesinos o productores? ¿Asiste…** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** | **CP9** | |
| **BOLCP13 [CP13]. Juntas vecinales? ¿Asiste….** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** | **BOLCP13** | |
| **BOLCP14 [CP14]. Organización territorial de base (OTB's)? ¿Asiste….** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** | **BOLCP14** | |
| **CP13 [CP15]. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? ¿Asiste….** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **8** | **CP13** | |

| **L1. Mostrar tabla #1**: **Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala?** | | | | | | | | | | | **L1** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | [88] | | |
| Izquierda | | | | | | | | | Derecha | NS | | |

**Recoger tabla #1**

| **LS3.** Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? **Diría Ud. que se encuentra 1) muy satisfecho, 2) algo satisfecho, 3) algo insatisfecho o 4) muy insatisfecho?** Muy satisfecho [1] Algo satisfecho [2] Algo insatisfecho [3] Muy insatisfecho [4] NS [8] | **LS3** | |
|---|---|---|

| **IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad (barrio) es ..?** *(lea alternativas)* Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] NS [8] | **IT1** | |
|---|---|---|

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **BOLIT1A [IT1A]: Ahora, hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los aymaras son gente ..?** *(lea alternativas)* Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] NS [8] | **BOLIT1A** | |
| **BOLIT1B [IT1B]: Si seguimos hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los quechuas son gente ..?** *(lea alternativas)* **M**uy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] NS [8] | **BOLIT1B** | |
| **BOLIT1C [IT1C]: ¿Diría Ud. que en general los cambas son gente..?** *(lea alternativas)* Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] NS [8] | **BOLIT1C** | |
| **BOLIT1D [IT1D]: ¿Diría Ud. que en general los blancos en Bolivia son gente….?** *(lea alternativas)* Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] NS [8] | **BOLIT1D** | |
| **BOLIT1E [IT1E]: ¿Diría Ud. que en general los mestizos son gente ..?** *(lea alternativas)* Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] NS [8] | **BOLIT1E** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **BOLIT1F [IT1F]**: **Hablando de distintos grupos de personas, quiénes le parecen más confiables en general?** (*leer todas las opciones menos 6, 7 y 8)*<br>la gente aymara [1] la gente quechua [2] la gente camba [3] la gente blanca [4]<br>la gente mestiza [5] *todos por igual [6]* *ninguno [7]* NS/NR [8] | **BOLIT1F** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:** | | |
| **DIS1: En la escuela, colegio o universidad**<br>Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] Ninguna experiencia [9] | **DIS1** | |
| **DIS2: En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)**<br>Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] Ninguna experiencia [9] | **DIS2** | |
| **DIS3: Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio**<br>Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] Ninguna experiencia [9] | **DIS3** | |
| **DIS4: En reuniones o eventos sociales**<br>Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] Ninguna experiencia [9] | **DIS4** | |
| **DIS5: En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)**<br>Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] Ninguna experiencia [9] | **DIS5** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **VB1. Está usted inscrito para votar?**<br>Sí[1] No [2] *(pasar a VBPRS02)* NS [8] | **VB1** | |
| **VB2 [VBPRS05]. Votó Ud. en las elecciones presidenciales de 2005?**<br>Sí votó [1] ***(siga)*** No votó [2] ***(pasar a VB4)*** NS [8] | **VB2** | |
| **BOLVB3 [VBPTY05] .** *Si votó en las elecciones de 2005=>* **Por cuál partido o candidato votó para presidente?** *(No lea las alternativas) (Pasar a VBPRS02)*<br>FREPAB (Eliceo Rodriguez)[1]<br>MAS (Evo Morales) [2]<br>MIP (Felipe Quispe "Mallku") [3]<br>MNR (Michiaki Nagatani) [4]<br>NFR (Gildo Angulo) [5]<br>Podemos (Jorge Quiroga) [6]<br>UN (Samuel Doria Medina) [7]<br>USTB (Nestor Garcia) [8]<br>Nulo, blanco[98]<br>NS / No recuerda, El voto es secreto[88]<br>INAP (no votó) [99] | **BOLVB3** | |
| ***Si no votó* => VB4**. ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? **[anotar una sola respuesta]**<br>1 Falta de transporte<br>2 Enfermedad<br>3 Falta de interés<br>4 No le gustó ningún candidato<br>5 No cree en el sistema<br>6 Falta de cédula de identidad / falta de documentos<br>7 No se encontró en padrón electoral<br>10 Menor de edad<br>11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado<br>12 Tener que trabajar<br>13 Fue depurado (personas que estaban inscritas para las elecciones del 2004 pero no votaron, no se inscribieron y fueron depurados)<br>Otro_____ (88) NS/NR | **VB4** | |
| **VBPRS02**. **Votó Ud. en las elecciones presidenciales de 2002?**<br>Si [1] *(siga)* Estaba inscrito pero no votó [2] No estaba inscrito[3] Menor de edad[4] NS/NR [8] | **VBPRS02** | |

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|---|---|---|
| **BOLVB3A [VBPTY02] .** *Si votó en las elecciones de 2002=>* **Por cuál partido o candidato votó para presidente?** *(No lea las alternativas)*<br>ADN (Ronald MacLean)[1]<br>MNR (Sanchez de Lozada)[2]<br>MIR (Paz Zamora)[3]<br>Condepa (Valdivia)[4]<br>UCS (Jhonny Fernández)[5]<br>Libertad y Justicia (Costa Obregón) [6]<br>MAS (Evo Morales) [7]<br>MCC (Blattmann)[10]<br>MIP (F.Quispe Mallku) [11]<br>NFR (Reyes Villa)[12]<br>PS (Rolando Morales)[13]<br>Nulo, blanco[88]<br>NS / No recuerda, NR[92]<br>NDR [99] | **BOLVB3A** | |
| **BOLVB8 [VB8]. Cuál cree que puede representar sus intereses mejor, un partido político o una agrupación ciudadana?**<br>Partido político [1] Agrupación ciudadana [2] No sabe cuál es cuál [3]<br>Ninguno[4] NS [8] | **BOLVB8** | |
| **VB15A. Puede decirme si en estas elecciones alguien lo presionó para votar por un candidato determinado o para no votar?**<br>Sí [1] No [2] NS [8] | **VB15A** | |
| **VB15B. Puede decirme si en estas elecciones usted recibió algo a cambio para votar por un candidato determinado o no votar?**<br>Sí [1] No [2] NS [8] | **VB15B** | |

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| ***Mostrar tabla #2.*** **Ahora vamos a trabajar con esta tabla que tiene 7 escalones. En el momento de elegir cómo va a votar en las elecciones, en una escala del 1 al 7,** donde 7 es muy importante y 1 nada importante, **cuánta importancia tienen para usted los siguientes elementos:** | | | | |
| **VB17A. El candidato** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **VB17A** | |
| **VB17B. El partido** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **VB17B** | |
| **VB17C. El programa de gobierno** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **VB17C** | |

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| **VB18. ¿Generalmente conoce Ud. el programa de gobierno del candidato o del partido por el cuál vota en las elecciones?**<br>Sí [1] No [2] NS [8] | **VB18** | |
| **VB19. Cuál cree Ud. que sería la mejor manera de financiar las campañas electorales de los partidos políticos en época de elecciones nacionales y municipales? (*leer alternativas)***<br>Fondos gubernamentales [1] Fondo privados [2] Fondos mixtos (gubernamentales y privados) [3]<br>NS/NR [8] | **VB19** | |
| **PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? *(****leer opciones****)***<br>Frecuentemente [1] De vez en cuando [2] Rara vez [3] Nunca [4] NS/NR [8] | **PP1** | |
| **LEG1. Pensando en los resultados de las elecciones, cuán importante es que el candidato más votado ocupe el cargo que ganó, aunque no sea el candidato de su preferencia? *(****leer opciones)***<br>Muy importante [1] Algo importante [2] Poco importante [3] Nada importante [4] NS [8] | **LEG1** | |

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| **LEG2**. **Cuando un candidato que no es del agrado de uno gana las elecciones qué actitud cree usted que se debe tomar? Elija una de las siguientes opciones.** ***(leer opciones)***<br>Darle la oportunidad de gobernar de todas maneras [1]<br>Impedir que gobierne para que se posesione un candidato mejor [2]<br>Apoyarlo porque así se fortalece la democracia [3]<br>NS [8] | **LEG2** | |
| **ABS5**. **¿Cree que su voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o que sin importar cuál sea su voto, las cosas no van a mejorar?** ***(no leer opciones)***<br>El voto puede mejorar las cosas [1]<br>Las cosas no van a mejorar [2]<br>NS [8] | **ABS5** | |

| **Para que los diputados uninominales conozcan las demandas de la población hay diversos medios. Yo le voy a leer uno a uno y Ud. me va a decir si ha escuchado o no hablar de ese medio.....** *(leer uno a uno)* | **Ha escuchado** | **No ha escuchado** | **NS** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **BOLUNIN3. [UNIN3] Audiencias públicas con el diputado** | 1 | 2 | 8 | **BOLUNIN3** | |
| **BOLUNIN4. [UNIN4] Reuniones de la brigada departamental** | 1 | 2 | 8 | **BOLUNIN4** | |
| **BOLUNIN6. [UNIN6] Foros ciudadanos con diputados** | 1 | 2 | 8 | **BOLUNIN6** | |

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| **BOLUNIN7 [UNIN7]. ¿En el último año, ha escuchado algún programa de radio en el cual las personas llaman por teléfono para hablar con su diputado y éste responde sus preguntas?**<br>Ha escuchado[1] No ha escuchado[2] [8] NS/NR | **BOLUNIN7** | |

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| **BOLREFM1 [REFM1]. Cambiando de tema. ¿Con cuál de estas dos afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo?**<br>**1) Los temas del gas son muy complejos y deberíamos dejar que los resuelva el gobierno o**<br>**2) Podemos entender los temas del gas y debemos participar en las decisiones.**<br>Son muy complejos [1] Debemos participar [2] NS [8] | **BOLREFM1** | |

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| **BOLCA1 [CA1]. Este año se realizará una asamblea constituyente. ¿Cree Ud. que es importante cambiar la Constitución en varios aspectos, o cree que, debemos dejar la Constitución tal como está?**<br>Cambiar la constitución [1] dejarla tal como está [2] NS [8] | **BOLCA1** | |
| **BOLCA2 [CA2]. ¿Los candidatos a representantes a la Asamblea Constituyente deberían elegirse a través de……?***(leer alternativas menos 7 y 8) UNA SOLA RESPUESTA*<br>Partido político [1] Agrupación ciudadana [2] Comité Cívico [3]<br>Organización indígena [4] Organización sindical [5] Circunscripciones territoriales [6]<br>Ninguno [7] NS/NR [8] | **BOLCA2** | |
| **BOLCA3 [CA3]. ¿Qué cantidad de miembros debería tener la Asamblea Constituyente para que puedan hacer un trabajo efectivo y eficiente? Alrededor de: (*leer todos, excepto NS*)**<br>[1] 50<br>[2] 100<br>[3] 150<br>[4] 200<br>[8] NS/NR | **BOLCA3** | |

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| **BOLCA5. Usted cree que una nueva Constitución Política del Estado proporcionará una solución directa a los problemas del país o que a pesar de la nueva Constitución los problemas continuarán?**<br>[1] resolverá los problemas del país<br>[2 ] los problemas continuarán<br>[8 ] NS/NR | **BOLCA5** | |

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| **BOLCA6. ¿Qué clase de problemas debería solucionar la Asamblea Constituyente?[Leer lista]. Elegir una sola alternativa.**<br>[1] problemas de pobreza y desigualdad en el país<br>[2] problemas de tierra y territorio<br>[3] problemas de estructuración del gobierno y de definición de derechos y deberes ciudadanos<br>[4] problemas de las autonomías regionales<br>[5] todos los problemas del país<br>[6] problemas económicos del país<br>[8] NS/NR (no leer) | **BOLCA6** | |
| **BOLCA7. ¿Para cuándo cree Ud. que los bolivianos podríamos esperar resultados de la Asamblea Constituyente? (*leer lista*)**<br>[1] en seis meses después de conformada<br>[2] en 1 año después de conformada<br>[3] en 2 años después de conformada<br>[4] en 3 años después de conformada<br>[5] en más de 3 años después de conformada<br>[8] NS/NR (no leer) | **BOLCA7** | |
| **AD2. De las siguientes frases ¿Cuál es la que mejor refleja su manera de pensar?**<br>En una democracia la minoría debe acatar y hacer lo que la mayoría diga. [1]<br>En una democracia la mayoría manda pero se respetan los derechos de las minorías. [2]<br>NS [8] | **AD2** | |

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| **AD1. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo?**<br>[1] En una democracia es el pueblo el que gobierna<br>[2] En una democracia es el gobierno y los parlamentarios los que gobiernan<br>[3] En una democracia gobierna el pueblo a través de sus representantes<br>[8] NS | **AD1** | |
| **AD3. Si una decisión fue tomada por la mayoría en su barrio o comunidad ¿qué es lo que hace Ud.?**<br>[1] Aunque no le guste usted la obedece<br>[2] Si no le gusta usted no la obedece<br>[3] Busca la manera de cambiar esa decisión<br>[8] NS | **AD3** | |

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| **M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que realiza el Presidente Morales es: muy bueno, bueno, regular, malo o muy malo?**<br>Muy bueno [1] Bueno [2] Regular [3] Malo [4] Muy malo[5] NS/NR [8] | **M1** | |

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| **NP1A [NP1]. Ahora vamos a hablar de la alcaldía de este municipio. Ha tenido Ud. la oportunidad de asistir a una sesión municipal u otra reunión convocada por la Alcaldía o concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] | **NP1A** | |
| **NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o presentado una solicitud a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal de la Alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] | **NP2** | |
| **NP4. ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir el presupuesto o planificar el POA (Plan Operativo Anual) de la municipalidad?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] | **NP4** | |
| **SGL1. Diría Ud. que los servicios que la Alcaldía está dando a la gente son excelentes, buenos, regulares, malos o pésimos?**<br>Excelentes [1] Buenos [2] Regulares [3] Malos [4] Pésimos [5] NS [8] | **SGL1** | |
| **BOLSGL1P [SGL1P]. Diría Ud. que las tareas que realiza la prefectura son excelentes, buenas, regulares, malas o pésimas?**<br>Excelentes [1] Buenas [2] Regulares [3] Malas [4] Pésimas [5] NS [8] | **BOLSGL1P** | |

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| **BOLLGL2M [LGL2M]. ¿En su opinión, se debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la alcaldía, a la prefectura, o algobierno central?**<br>La alcaldía [1] La prefectura [2] El gobierno central [3]<br>*No lea: Ninguno [4] Todos por igual [5] NS/NR [8]* | **BOLLGL2M** | |
| **BOLLGL3M [LGL3M]. Para que el país se desarrolle más, dónde diría que es mejor pagar** | **BOLLGL3M** | |

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| **impuestos:¿a la alcaldía, a la prefectura, o al gobierno central?**<br>La alcaldía [1] La prefectura [2] El gobierno central [3]<br>*No lea: Ninguno [4] Todos por igual [5] NS/NR [8]* | | |

**Pasando a otro tema, algunas personas dicen que se justificaría, bajo ciertas circunstancias, un Golpe de Estado de los militares, es decir cuando los militares toman el poder. En su opinión, un golpe de Estado de los militares se justificaría o no se justificaría** *(lea los incisos y espere la respuesta).*

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto?** | Se justificaría [1] | No se justificaría [2] | NS/NR [8] | **JC1** | |
| **JC10 [JC11]. Frente a mucha delincuencia?** | Se justificaría [1] | No se justificaría [2] | NS/NR [8] | **JC10** | |
| **JC13 [JC12]. Frente a mucha corrupción?** | Se justificaría [1] | No se justificaría [2] | NS/NR [8] | **JC13** | |
| **JC11 [JC16]. Frente a mucho desorden social?** | Se justificaría [1] | No se justificaría [2] | NS/NR [8] | **JC11** | |
| **JC7. Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema izquierda en las elecciones** | Se justificaría [1] | No se justificaría [2] | NS/NR [8] | **JC7** | |
| **JC8. Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema derecha en las elecciones** | Se justificaría [1] | No se justificaría [2] | NS/NR [8] | **JC8** | |
| **JC17. Si las empresas transnacionales se aprovechan del país** | Se justificaría [1] | No se justificaría [2] | NS/NR [8] | **JC17** | |

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| **JC20. Agunas personas dicen que estaríamos mejor sin partidos políticos. Otros dicen que necesitamos los partidos para representar los intereses de la gente. ¿Con cuál esta más de acuerdo?**<br>Sin partidos [1] Con partidos [2] NS/NR [8] | **JC20** | |

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| **AOJ10.**¿Qué cree usted que es mejor? Vivir en una sociedad ordenada aunque se limiten algunos derechos y libertades o respetar todos los derechos y libertades, aún si eso causa algo de desorden.<br>[1] Vivir en una sociedad ordenada<br>[2] Respetar todos los derechos y libertades<br>[8] NS | **AOJ10** | |
| **ACR1. Voy a leerle tres frases. Por favor dígame cuál de estas tres describe mejor su opinión:**<br>[1] La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios.<br>[2] Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas.<br>[3] Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios.<br>[8] NS/NR | **ACR1** | |

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| **AUT10. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo?**<br>[1] Lo que Bolivia más necesita es un Presidente fuerte y decidido que ponga orden con mano dura, o<br>[2] Lo que el país necesita más es un Presidente que sepa dialogar y concertar con todos los sectores de la poblacíon?<br>NS/NR [8] | **AUT10** | |
| **AUT14. Qué tipo de presidente de la República prefiere usted más?**<br>[1]Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas a través de leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, aunque esto tarde mucho tiempo, o...<br>[2]Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas rápidamente, evitando el Congreso si fuera necesario<br>[8] NS/NR | **AUT14** | |

**Ahora** *(entregue tabla # 2)* **vamos a usar esta tabla... Esta tabla contiene una escalera de 7 gradas, cada una indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa nada, hasta 7 que significa mucho. Por ejemplo si yo le pregunto:"hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?", si a Ud. no le gusta nada elegiría el puntaje de 1; si por el contrario, le gusta mucho ver TV me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho, Ud. elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Hagamos la prueba. "hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?" léame el número por favor.** *(ASEGURESE QUE ENTIENDA)* **Usando esta tabla…..**

| | Escala<br>Nada | | | | | | Mucho | NS/ NR | No conoce | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **B1.¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B1** |
| **B2.¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B2** |
| **B3.Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B3** |
| **B4.¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B4** |
| **B6.¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B6** |
| **B10A.¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B10A** |
| **B31 [B31A]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B31** |
| **B21 [B30].¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B21** |
| **B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Nacional Electoral?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B11** |
| **B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Fuerzas Armadas?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B12** |
| **B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B13** |
| **B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la policía?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B18** |
| **B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B20** |
| **BOLB37 [B21]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los periodistas?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **BOLB37** |
| **B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Presidente?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B21A** |
| **B32 [B22]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Municipal?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B32** |
| **B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Prefectura?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B33** |
| **B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los medios de comunicación?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B37** |
| **BOLB22B [B22B]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la autoridad originaria?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | **BOLB22B** |
| **BOLB22C [B22C]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Comité de Vigilancia municipal?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | **BOLB22C** |
| **B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B23** |
| **BOLB23A [B23A]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ministerio Público o fiscales?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | **BOLB23A** |
| **B17 [B23C]. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en el Defensor del Pueblo?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **B17** |
| **BOLB23BNR [B23BNR]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los Tribunales de Justicia?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | **BOLB23B NR** |
| **BOLB23E [B23E]. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | **BOLB23E** |

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| **B44 [B23B]. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en los abogados que trabajan como Defensores Públicos?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | 9 | **B44** | |
| **B51 [B31]. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en las organizaciones no gubernamentales, las ONGs, que trabajan en el país?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | | **B51** | |
| **B42. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en los Centros de Conciliación?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | 9 | **B42** | |
| **B43. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de ser boliviano?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | | **B43** | |
| **B46 [B44]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en que la Delegación Presidencial para la Transparencia y la Integridad Pública está combatiendo la corrupción en Bolivia?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | 9 | **B46** | |
| **BOLB53. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los diputados uninominales?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | 9 | **BOLB53** | |
| **BOLB54. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los diputados plurinominales?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | 9 | **BOLB54** | |

| *(seguir con tabla 2)* | Escala<br>Nada Mucho | NS/NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **N1. En esta misma escala, hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno del Presidente Morales combate la pobreza.** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **N1** | |
| **N3. Hasta qué punto promueve y protege los principios democráticos.** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **N3** | |
| **N9. Hasta qué punto combate la corrupción en el gobierno.** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **N9** | |

| *(seguir con tabla 2)* **Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones?.** | Escala<br>Nada Mucho | NS/NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **ING4** | |
| **PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los bolivianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **PN2** | |

**Recoger tabla #2**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **RL2. Por favor dígame con cuál de las siguientes frases está Ud. más de acuerdo:**<br>[1] Es importante para el funcionamiento del país que las leyes sean obedecidas siempre<br>[2] Si las leyes se obedecen o no, no tiene importancia<br>[8] NS | **RL2** | |
| **RL3. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está Ud. más de acuerdo?**<br>[1] Todas las leyes son igual de importantes, por tanto deben ser obedecidas por igual<br>[2] No todas las leyes tienen la misma importancia, por tanto no es necesario obedecer todas las leyes<br>[8] NS | RL3 | |
| **RL4. Hablando de los bolivianos en general y ya no de sus actitudes personales, ¿Cuál de las siguientes frases describe mejor a los bolivianos en general? (*Elegir una opción*). Los bolivianos:**<br>[1] No quieren cumplir la ley, pero creen que los demás sí deberían<br>[2] Cumplen la ley solamente cuando están de acuerdo con lo que dice<br>[3] Obedecen las reglas sólo cuando los benefician y las desobedecen cuando los perjudican<br>[4] Tratan de cumplir las leyes la mayor parte del tiempo<br>[8]NS | RL4 | |

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|---|---|---|
| **¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Ud. más de acuerdo?** | | |
| **NEWTOL5. Los homosexuales deberían tener el derecho de organizarse y vestirse de la manera que quieran o 2) los homosexuales dan un mal ejemplo a nuestros niños y por lo tanto deberían ser controlados por el gobierno.**<br>Tienen derecho [1] Deben ser controlados [2]<br>NS [8] | **NEWTOL5** | |
| **NEWTOL7. Suceda lo que suceda, el país debe permanecer unido o… 2) Las diferencias en el país son muy grandes, el país debería dividirse**<br>El país debe permanecer unido [1]<br>El país debería dividirse [2] NS [8] | **NEWTOL7** | |
| **NEWTOL8. Sería mejor para el país que exista una sola cultura nacional para todos o... 2) Los pueblos indígenas deberían mantener sus valores, cultura y lenguaje.**<br>Una sola cultura nacional [1]<br>Mantener sus valores [2] NS [8] | **NEWTOL8** | |
| **TOL1. [BTOL1] 1) En la vida política del país deberían participar principalmente las personas con educación o… 2) Todas las personas deberían poder participar en la política del país sin importar su grado de educación.** Las personas con educación [1]<br>Todas las personas [2] NS [8] | **TOL1** | |
| **REP1. ¿Usted se sentiría mejor representado en el gobierno y el parlamento por líderes de su misma procedencia étnica o no importa la procedencia del líder sino su capacidad solamente?**<br>**Líderes de la misma procedencia [1]**<br>**No importa la procedencia [2]**<br>**NS/NR [8]** | **REP1** | |

**Para las siguientes preguntas vamos a usar de nuevo esta tabla que tiene 7 gradas, en la que 1 significa que no está nada de acuerdo y 7 que está muy de acuerdo. Cuando yo le haga una pregunta, por favor contésteme con un número entre 1 y 7.**

| *(Entregar tabla 2)* | Escala<br>Nada Mucho | NS | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **BOLLENG10 [LENG10]. Hasta qué punto está Ud de acuerdo en que las emisoras de radio y televisión incrementen su programación en lenguas originarias.** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **BOLLENG10** | |
| **BOLLENG11 [LENG11]. Hasta qué punto está Ud de acuerdo con que en los colegios se enseñe una lengua originaria.** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **BOLLENG11** | |

**Bolivia es un país muy diverso y por lo tanto cada uno de nosotros puede identificarse con diferentes aspectos de nuestra cultura. Por ejemplo, uno puede identificarse como boliviano y al mismo tiempo también como paceño o como camba. En esta misma escala, en donde 1 significa "nada" y 7 significa "mucho"...**

| *(seguir con tabla 2)* | Escala<br>Nada Mucho | NS/<br>NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ETID1 [BETID1]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted ciudadano boliviano?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **ETID1** | |
| *Encuestador: Para la siguiente pregunta utilice la referencia de acuerdo al departamento donde realiza la encuesta:* | | | | |
| **ETID3 [BETID2]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted**... **[***paceño, cruceño, cochabambino, orureño, chuqisaqueño, potosino, pandino, tarijeño, beniano***]**? | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **ETID3** | |
| **BOLETID3 [BETID3]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Aymara?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **BOLETID3** | |
| **BOLETID4 [BETID4]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Quechua?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **BOLETID4** | |

| *(seguir con tabla 2)* | Escala<br>Nada Mucho | NS/<br>NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **BOLETID5 [BETID5]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Camba?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | **BOLETID5** | |
| **BOLETID6 [BETID6]. Algunos periodistas se refieren a los departamentos de Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Chuquisaca y Tarija como la "región de la Media Luna". ¿Ha oido usted hablar de esta idea?** *Encuestador: si responde NO anote [9] y pase a la siguiente* **¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la "Media Luna"?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | [9]<br><br>8 | **BOLETID6** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **IP1**. ¿**Cuánto interés tiene usted en la política?** ***(leer opciones)***<br>Mucho [1] Algo [2] Poco [3] Nada [4] NS [8] | **IP1** | |
| **IP2**. **¿Cuán a menudo habla usted de política con otras personas?** ***(leer opciones)***<br>Diariamente [1] Algunas veces por semana [2] Algunas veces por mes [3]<br>Rara vez [4] Nunca [5] NS [8] | **IP2** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **PROT1.¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?**<br>Algunas veces [1] casi nunca [2] nunca [3] NS [8] | **PROT1** | |
| **PROT3.¿Ha participado en alguna marcha o protesta en contra del gobierno de Carlos Mesa?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] | **PROT3** | |
| **PROT3A. ¿Participó usted en alguna marcha o protesta en contra del Gobierno del Presidente Rodríguez?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] | **PROT3A** | |
| **PROT4. ¿En el ultimo año, ha participado en alguna marcha o protesta en contra del gobierno municipal?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] | **PROT4** | |
| *(Si dijo "no" de Prot1 a Prot4, NO PREGUNTAR)* **PROT5. Usted cree que valio la pena hacer estas protestas o que no consiguió nada?**<br>Valió la pena [1] no consiguió nada [2] NS/NR [8] Inap [9] | **PROT5** | |

**Ahora vamos a cambiar de tabla.** *(entregue tabla # 3).* **Esta nueva tabla tiene una escalera de 1 a 10 gradas, con el 1 indicando que Ud. desaprueba mucho y el 10 indicando que aprueba mucho. Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Bolivia.** *(Encuestador: No olvide cambiar de escala).*

| | Escalera<br>Desaprueba Aprueba | NS/NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **D1. Hay personas que solamente hablan mal de los gobiernos bolivianos, no sólo del gobierno actual, sino del sistema de gobierno boliviano. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor respóndame con un número** *SONDEE:* **Hasta qué punto?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **D1** | |
| **D2. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **D2** | |
| **D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que a las personas que sólo hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano les permitan postularse para cargos públicos** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **D3** | |

| | Escalera<br>Desaprueba Aprueba | NS/NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **D4. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **D4** | |
| **D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **D5** | |

**Dejemos de lado a las personas que hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. Hablemos ahora de todas las personas en general. Hasta qué punto Ud. aprueba o desaprueba** *(encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #3).*

| | Escala<br>Desaprueba Aprueba | NS/NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **E5** | |
| **E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **E8** | |
| **E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **E11** | |
| **E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de las calles o carreteras?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **E15** | |
| **E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **E14** | |
| **E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **E2** | |
| **E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **E3** | |
| **E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **E16** | |

**Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría:** *(encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #3).*

| | Escala<br>Desaprueba Aprueba | NS/<br>NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **D32 [C3]. ¿Una ley que prohiba las protestas públicas?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **D32** | |
| **D33 [C5]. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político boliviano?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **D33** | |
| **D39 [C6]. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que el gobierno prohiba o limite la propaganda de la oposición?** | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 88 | **D39** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **D46**. Cuando la situación se pone difícil, cuál diría que es la responsabilidad más importante del gobierno: Mantener el orden en la sociedad, o respetar la libertad del individuo<br>Mantener orden [1] respetar la libertad [2] *ambas cosas [3]* (*no leer)* NS [8] | **D46** | |
| **PN4. En general, ¿diría que está satisfecho, muy satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Bolivia?**<br>Muy satisfecho [1] satisfecho [2] insatisfecho [3] muy insatisfecho[4] NS/NR [8] | **PN4.** | |
| **PN5. En su opinión Bolivia es ¿muy democrática, algo democrática, poco democrática, o nada democrática?**<br>**Muy democrática [1] algo democrática[2] poco democrática [3]**<br>**nada democrática [4] NS [8]** | **PN5** | |

**Hablemos de algunas políticas que el gobierno podría adoptar en el tema del gas. Utilizando esta escala entre 1 y 10...**

| *(encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #3).* | Escalera<br>Desaprueba | | | | | | | | | Aprueba | NS | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **BOLREFM32 [REFM32]. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que el gobierno nacionalice las empresas petroleras para que YPFB se haga cargo de todas sus actividades?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 88 | **BOLREFM32** | |
| **BOLREFM33 [REFM33]. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que el gobierno nacionalice el petróleo y el gas, pero contrate a empresas petroleras extranjeras para su transporte y comercialización?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 88 | **BOLREFM33** | |
| **BOLREFM51 [REFM51]. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que las compañías petroleras extranjeras paguen más impuestos sobre su producción?** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 88 | **BOLREFM51** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **BOLREFM35 [REFM35]. ¿En su opinion, quién debería administrar el negocio del gas? *(leer opciones)***<br>[1] Las empresas privadas<br>[2] Empresas mixtas con participación conjunta del Estado y de capital privado<br>[3] Exclusivamente el Estado<br>[8]NS/NR | **BOLREFM35** | |
| **BOLREFM52 [REFM52]. ¿En qué cree usted que se debería invertir principalmente el dinero obtenido por exportaciones de gas? Elegir una alternativa. *(lea las alternativas excepto otros y NS/NR)***<br>Educación [1] Salud [2] Caminos [3] Empleos [4] Lucha contra la corrupción [5] *Otros[6] NS/NR[8]* | **BOLREFM52** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **BOLAOJ1 [AOJ1]. Cambiando de tema ¿Cree Ud. que avisar o denunciar un delito a la policía o autoridad es fácil, difícil o muy difícil?**<br>Fácil [1] difícil [2] muy difícil [3] NS/NR [8] | **BOLAOJ1** | |
| **AOJ9. Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿Cree usted que: se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva para poder entrar a su domicilio o la policía puede entrar a la casa sin necesidad de una orden judicial?**<br>[1] Se debería esperar una orden judicial<br>[2] La policía puede entrar sin una orden judicial<br>[8] NS | **AOJ9** | |
| **AOJ8**. **Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?**<br>[1] Deben respetar las leyes siempre<br>[2] En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley<br>[8] NS | **AOJ8** | |
| **ST1 [AOJ4]. De los trámites que Ud. ha hecho con la policía nacional. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho?**<br>Muy satisfecho [1] algo satisfecho [2] algo insatisfecho [3] muy insatisfecho [4]<br>No hizo trámites [9] NS/NR [8] | **ST1** | |
| **ST2 [AOJ6]. De los trámites que Ud. ha hecho en los juzgados o tribunales de justicia. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho?**<br>Muy satisfecho [1] algo satisfecho [2] algo insatisfecho [3] muy insatisfecho [4]<br>No hizo trámites [9] NS/NR [8] | **ST2** | |
| **VIC1 [AOJ3]. ¿Ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?**<br>Si [1] no [2] NS/NR [8] | **VIC1** | |
| **VIC1A [AOJ3B]. Algún miembro de su familia ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?**<br>Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]<br>*(si dijo "no" a VIC1 y VIC1A pasar a AOJ11)* | **VIC1A** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **AOJ1 [AOJ3A]. Ha denunciado o dio aviso a la policía o PTJ o a la autoridad de la comunidad de este robo o agresión?**<br>Sí denunció [1] No denunció [2] NS/NR [8] Inap (no fue víctima) [9] | **AOJ1** | |
| **AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?**<br>Muy seguro [1] Algo seguro [2] Algo inseguro [3] Muy inseguro [4] NS [8] | **AOJ11** | |
| **AOJ16. Ahora, hablando de sus relaciones familiares , ¿Hasta qué punto teme Ud. violencia por parte de miembros de su propia familia? ¿Diría que tiene mucho, algo, poco o nada de miedo?**<br>[1] Mucho [2] algo [3] poco[4] nada [8] NS/NR | **AOJ16** | |
| **AOJ12**. **Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? (*leer opciones)***<br>**Mucho [1] algo [2] poco [3] nada [4] NS/NR [8]** | **AOJ12** | |
| **DEM2 [AOJ14]. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo?**<br>[1] **A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que un régimen no democrático**<br>[2] **La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno**<br>[3] **En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático** | **DEM2** | |

| **Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...** | **No** | **Sí** | **NS** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **EXC2.**¿Durante el ultimo año, algún agente de policía le pidió una coima? | 0 | 1 | 8 | | **EXC2** | |
| **EXC6.**¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en el último año? | 0 | 1 | 8 | | **EXC6** | |
| **EXC11.**¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año? **[Si dice no marcar 9, si dice "si" preguntar lo siguiente]**<br>Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 | **EXC11** | |
| **EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice "si" preguntar lo siguiente]**<br>En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 | **EXC13** | |
| **EXC14.** *¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?* **[Si dice "no," marcar 9, si dice "si" preguntar lo siguiente]**<br>¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 | **EXC14** | |
| **EXC15.** ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? **[Si dice "no," marcar 9, si dice "si" preguntar lo siguiente]**<br>Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna coima? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 | **EXC15** | |
| **EXC16.** ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año**? [Si dice "no" marcar 9 si dice "si" preguntar lo siguiente]**<br>En la escuela o colegio de sus hijos durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna coima? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 | **EXC16** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta muy generalizada, generalizada, poco generalizada o nada generalizada?**<br>Muy generalizada [1] generalizada [2] poco generalizada [3]<br>nada generalizada [4] NS/NR [8] | **EXC7** | |
| **EXC7B. Y diría que la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos es mayor en el gobierno central, en la prefectura, o en la municipalidad?**<br>Gobierno central [1] Prefectura [2] Municipalidad [3]<br>*No lea: Todos igual* [4] NS/NR [8] | **EXC7B** | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **GI1. ¿Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de los Estados Unidos?** [George Bush] | [0] Incorrecto, NS | [1]Correcto | **GI1** | |
| **GI5 [GI2]. ¿Recuerda cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil?** [Lula da Silva] | [0] Incorrecto, NS | [1]Correcto | **GI5** | |
| **GI3. ¿Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de Argentina?** [Nestor Kirchner] | [0] Incorrecto, NS | [1]Correcto | **GI3** | |
| **GI4. ¿Recuerda cuántos diputados hay en el Congreso?** [130] | [0] Incorrecto, NS | [1]Correcto | **GI4** | |
| **GI6. ¿Sabe usted si se puede ser candidato en las elecciones sin pertenecer a un partido político? ¿Cómo?** [Sí se puede con las agupaciones ciudadanas] | [0] Incorrecto, NS | [1]Correcto | **GI6** | |

| **AA.** Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde 1 significa nada y 7 significa mucho, hasta que punto esta de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones? | Escala Nada | | | | | | Mucho | NS/ NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **AA1**. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo con esa práctica? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **AA1** | |
| **AA2**. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **AA2** | |
| **AA3**. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **AA3** | |
| **AA4**. Cuando los niños de uno se portan mal, se justifica a veces que sus padres les den nalgadas | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **AA4** | |
| **AA5**. Los niños no deben interrumpir a los adultos cuando éstos están hablando | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **AA5** | |
| **AA6.** Muchas religiones enseñan cosas buenas; no hay ninguna que sea realmente mejor que otra. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **AA6** | |
| **DOG1.** A pesar de que en el mundo hay muchos puntos de vista, probablemente sólo una sea la correcta. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **DOG1** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión?** ***(no leer alternativas)***<br>Católica (participante) [1]<br>Cristiana (no católica) [2]<br>Otra no cristiana [3]<br>Evangélica [5]<br>Ninguna [4]<br>Católico (no participante) [6]<br>Otro _____<br>NS/NR [8] | **Q3** | |
| **Q4. ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido a la iglesia (culto o templo) durante el mes pasado?**<br>_____ veces *(88= NS/NR)* | **Q4** | |

**Ahora para terminar, algunas preguntas que nos sirven sólo para fines estadísticos. En su casa Ud. tiene:**

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1 [R1, R2]**. Televisor** | **No….0** | **Uno 1** | **Dos 2** | **Tres 3** | **R1** | |
| R3**. Heladera refrigerador** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | | | **R3** | |
| R4**. Teléfono fijo (no celular)** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | | | **R4** | |
| R4A. **Teléfono celular** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | | | **R4A** | |
| R5**. Automóvil o camión** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | | | **R5** | |
| R6**. Lavarropa** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | | | **R6** | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| R7**. Microondas** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | **R7** | |
| R8**. Motocicleta** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | **R8** | |
| R10. **Energia eléctrica** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | **R10** | |
| R12 [R11]**. Agua potable dentro de la casa** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | **R12** | |
| R14**. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | **R14** | |
| R15. **Computador** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | **R15** | |
| R16 [R14]. **Alcantarillado** | **No….0** | **Sí……1** | **R16** | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **BOLOCUP1 [OCUP1]. ¿En qué trabaja Ud***?. (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)* | | **BOLOCUP1** | |
| **1.- Auto Empleados** | | | |
| Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas grandes o medianas | **1** | | |
| Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas chicas | **2** | | |
| Agricultores dueños o inquilinos de su tierra | **3** | | |
| Ganaderos dueños de su ganado | **4** | | |
| Profesionales independientes | **5** | | |
| **2- Empleados de Tiempo Completo:** | | | |
| Directivos superiores de empresas o negocios | **6** | | |
| Directivos intermedios de empresas o negocios | **7** | | |
| Personal o empleados de Planta | **8** | | |
| Obreros | **9** | | |
| Campesinos empleados en faenas agrícolas | **10** | | |
| Comerciantes y artesanos empleado | **11** | | |
| **3.- Trabajadores de tiempo parcial o sin remuneración** | | | |
| Amas de Casa | **12** | | |
| Estudiantes | **13** | | |
| Jubilados y Rentistas | **14** | | |
| Trabajadores ocasionales | **15** | | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **DESOC1**. *Para todos* => **¿Ha estado desocupado durante el último año?**<br><br>Si [1] No [2] => Pase a ED Estudiante, Ama de casa, Jubilado [9] | **DESOC1** | |
| **DESOC2.** Si responde Si **=>¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo?** _____ semanas NS/NR [8] Inap [9] | **DESOC2** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. aprobó [encierre en un círculo el último año que aprobó el entrevistado(a)].** [*Para los que han tenido alguna **educacíon ténica**, agregar estos años al total. Por ej. si la persona terminó Básico y además hizo dos años de educación técnica, marque el 7]*<br>- Ninguna : 0<br>- Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 **=>** Primaria<br>- Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8 **=>** Primaria<br>- Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12 **=>** Secundaria<br>- Universidad : 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18<br>**-** Pos grado: 18 – 19 -20 -21- 22 -23 -24 | **ED** | |
| **ED2.** *Si tuvo alguna educación* => **Estudió Ud. en escuela o colegio fiscal o particular?**<br>Escuela fiscal [1]<br>Escuela privada [2]<br>Estudió en los dos sistemas [3] | **ED2** | |

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|---|---|---|
| Q10. **¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos** familiares *mensuales* **de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?**<br>*[Mostrar tabla de ingresos ]*<br>Nada [0]<br>Menos de 250 Bs. [1]<br>De 251 a 500 Bs. [2]<br>De 501 a 1000 Bs. [3]<br>De 1001 a 2000 Bs. [4]<br>De 2001 a 5000 Bs. [5]<br>De 5001 a 10.000 Bs. [6]<br>De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs. [7]<br>más de 20.000 [8]<br>NS/NR [88] | **Q10** | |
| **Q11. Cuál es su estado civil?** *(No lea las alternativas)*<br>Soltero [1]<br>Casado [2]<br>Unión libre, concubinato [3]<br>Divorciado [4]<br>Separado [5]<br>Viudo [6]<br>NS/NR [8] | **Q11** | |
| **Q12. Cuántos hijos tiene Ud.? ____ hijos**<br>No tiene hijos [0] | **Q12** | |

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|---|---|---|
| **ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originario?**<br>Blanca [1] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5] Originaria [6] Otra _____<br>NS/NR [8] | **ETID** | |
| **ETIDA. Considera que su padre es o era una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originario?**<br>Blanca [1] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5] originario [6] Otra _____<br>NS/NR [8] | **ETIDA** | |
| **ETIDB. Considera que su madre es o era una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originario?**<br>Blanca [1] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5] originario [6] Otra _____<br>NS/NR [8] | **ETIDB** | |
| **ETID2.** [Census] ¿**Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas?** (leer todas las opciones)<br>Quechua [1] Aymara[2] Guaraní[3] Chiquitano[4] Mojeño[5] Otro nativo[6] ninguno [7]<br>otros _____ (especificar) | **ETID2** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **LENG1. Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa?** *(acepte una alternativa)*<br>Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymara [3] Otro (nativo) [4] _____<br>Otro extranjero [5]_____ NS/NR [8] | **LENG1** | |
| **LENG1A. Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era niño? Cuál?** *(acepte una alternativa)*<br>Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymara [3] Otro (nativo) [4] _____<br>Otro extranjero [5]_____ Ningún otro [7] NS/NR [8] Inap [9] | **LENG1A** | |
| **LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban** ***(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.*)**<br>**Sólo castellano [1] Castellano e idioma nativo [2] Sólo idioma nativo [3]**<br>**Castellano e idioma extranjero [4] NS/NR [8]** | **LENG4** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **MIG2. ¿En qué departamento nació?**<br>La Paz [1]<br>Santa Cruz [2]<br>Cochabamba [3]<br>Oruro [4]<br>Chuquisaca [5]<br>Potosí [6]<br>Pando [7]<br>Tarija [8]<br>Beni [9] | **MIG2** | |
| **MIG3. ¿Nació en la ciudad capital del departamento o en alguna de las provincias?**<br>Ciudad capital [1] Provincia [2] | **MIG3** | |

**GRACIAS, HEMOS TERMINADO**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **LCUEST. Idioma de la entrevista:**<br>Castellano [1]<br>Quechua [2]<br>Aymara [3] | **LCUEST** | |
| **VEST. El entrevistado vestía:**<br>Traje indígena/nativo [1]<br>Traje moderno/occidental[2] | **VEST** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Hora terminada ____:____**<br>**TI. tiempo de duración de la entrevista _____ minutos** | **TI** | |

**YO JURO QUE ESTA ENTREVISTA FUE LLEVADA A CABO CON LA PERSONA SELECCIONADA**

**_____ (firma del encuestador)**

**Firma y código Supervisor _____ Cod. _____ Firma y código Validador _____** Cod. **____**

## *TABLA # 1*

***Izquierda 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Derecha***

# *TABLA # 2*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Mucho** | **7** |
| | **6** |
| | **5** |
| | **4** |
| | **3** |
| | **2** |
| **Nada** | **1** |

# *TABLA “3”*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Aprueba** | **10** |
| | **9** |
| | **8** |
| | **7** |
| | **6** |
| | **5** |
| | **4** |
| | **3** |
| | **2** |
| **Desaprueba** | **1** |

## *TABLA DE INGRESOS*

***0. Nada***
***1. Menos de 250 Bs.***
***2. De 251 a 500 Bs.***
***3. De 501 a 1000 Bs.***
***4. De 1001 a 2000 Bs.***
***5. De 2001 a 5000 Bs.***
***6. De 5000 a 10.000 Bs.***
***7. De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs.***
***8. más de 20.001***