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REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM AND THE NICARAGUA NATIONAL GUARD

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Office of Public Safety
Agency for International Development
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20523

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REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM
AND THE
NICARAGUA NATIONAL GUARD

By
David R. Powell
and
Kenneth B. Youngs

Office of Public Safety
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I. INTRODUCTION

The A.I.D. Office of Public Safety was requested by the U.S. Embassy, Managua, on April 17, 1970, to conduct a survey of the Nicaraguan National Guard and its internal security/law and order capabilities. It was felt that continued U.S. assistance to the National Guard, particularly in the field of civil police administration, was consistent with overall U.S. objectives. The US MilGroup has had a continuing program with the National Guard for many years and recently has focused its efforts on the Guard's civil law enforcement role. It was felt that the Public Safety Program would complement the MilGroup's efforts in the police assistance field.

Between June 10 and June 24, 1970, Mr. David R. Powell, Chief, Latin American Branch and Mr. K. B. Youngs, Special Assistant for Program Development, completed this study and analysis to determine the police capabilities and responsibilities of the National Guard.* The assessment is focused on the National Guard's law enforcement role, its weaknesses, its present and future needs, and recommendations for the implementation of an AID-sponsored Public Safety technical assistance program. Generally, the recommended program is designed to assist the National Guard to maintain law and order and justice within a developing democratic framework. Members of the Survey Team wish to express their wholehearted appreciation for the outstanding support and cooperation provided by the U.S. Embassy, A.I.D. and MilGroup staffs.*

*See Reference "E" for persons contacted.

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II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMARY:

The CASP¹ and other documents of the Country Team (see especially Annex A) as well as other writers on the Nicaraguan scene² report a maturing of the democratic processes emerging in Nicaragua. Such things as free and open opposition, free public media, the politicization of greater portions of the population, increasing opportunities for education and channels of upward social mobility are evidence of this maturing. However, the growing stresses from social, economic, demographic, etc., dynamism are contributing to a socially disorganizing process, largely urban, for which the governmental institutions for law enforcement and criminal justice are unprepared.

The aggravation of this setting by concerted terrorist exploitation, could well reverse the healthy political maturing process, polarize extreme political factionalism and face Nicaragua once again with something like a choice between anarchy and tyranny. The most important governmental institution in the balance of this question seems to be the National Guard, which, although partially functioning in the role of a civilian law enforcement agency, still conceives of itself as an army.

The result of this is the perpetuation in the Guard of individual role concepts that conflict with those expected of policemen in a democratic society, particularly when challenged by social and political conflict. This is manifested by overreactions of the Guard in response to civil disturbances, raids and other police actions in routine as well as emergency situations, a lack of the practice of police patrol which is basic to the concept of crime prevention, a tendency to assume greater authority than the law permits, a tendency to view the machinations of legitimate dissent as "enemy" tactics, and a general lack of sophistication in achieving a cooperative relationship with the urban people at large in the business of catching criminals, keeping order, and performing according to procedures consistent with those of an instrument of the system for the administration of criminal justice.

The single force concept of the Guard and the realities of its political role would make impractical any attempt to separate it into a national police organization and an army. The Guard has come a long way, however, toward separating these functions within the institution. For example, a police academy for non-officer

¹FY 72 Country Analysis and Strategy Paper, U.S. Embassy Managua, 1970, p. 6.

²English, Burt H., *Nicaraguan Election Factbook*, Washington, D.C., Instit. for the Comparative Study of Pol. Systems, 1967.

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personnel has been functioning since 1965 and produced about 200 men who usually work in the police elements of the Guard.

Aside from training provided by the U.S. at the A.I.D. International Police Academy in Washington and Military Police courses in the Canal Zone, the officers of the GN receive little or no civil police training. Although some attempt was made at one time in the past to introduce police subjects into the four-year officer cadet academy, they were later set aside.

The Nicaraguan Government has expressed an understanding of its lack of knowledge in the law enforcement field and the need to institutionalize the police role of the elements of the Guard that have this responsibility. The Managua Police Chief, Colonel Francisco Rodriguez Somoza (The President's cousin) has already taken strong steps to improve the force and cope with occasional problems of corruption and abuse of suspected criminals. It is, therefore, believed that the introduction of a civilian technical assistance program designed to work in concert with the USMILGP in addressing the following weaknesses in the police capabilities of the Guard would contribute to the achievement of U.S. objectives identified in the CASP:

B. CONCLUSIONS:

1. Responsibilities:

Responsibility for law and order functions in the Guard is divided among several nearly autonomous elements. These include all of the Departmental Companies, the 4th Company (Managua Police), the Traffic Section, and the BECATS* elements of the 3rd Company and the 1st Presidential Battalion. Investigative responsibilities are further divided between the police and judicial authorities. There is no central authority to provide direction, guidance, or services except in equipment maintenance, personnel management and training. Responsibility for civil disturbance control is not fixed.

2. Organization and Administration:

In form, the military organization of the Guard General Staff is adequate and grouped by function and purpose after the U.S. military model. The control span in practice is impossibly wide with inadequate delegation of authority, except where assumed as it often is. Traffic is improperly separated from other Managua police elements as are the various elements of BECATS patrol. Line and staff relationships of the Guard are adequate for most service and administrative functions. Command and supervision are further confounded by the typical Hispanic ways of

*Special Brigade Against Assault, Terrorism, and Sabotage.

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personalism, familism and the "patron" and "caudillo" concepts. Unity of command is excellent in the Department Companies but thoroughly confused in Managua.

Work hours in the police elements are reasonable for command, administrative service and investigative functions. The uniformed and patrol service hours are inappropriate and wasteful.

There is little or no systematic inspection.

3. *Personnel Management:*

Police strength per population is reasonable in the Department Companies and rural posts but considerably understrength in the Managua police. Salary and allowances are far too low for non-officer and junior officer personnel but benefits and insurance are good. Discipline is adequate but tends to be more a matter of form than actual control of individual performance. Control of venal practices is lax except for recent improvements in the Managua police.

Tenure is at an unhealthy low of 2% annual turnover for officer and non-officer personnel. There is no compulsory retirement for non-officer personnel which is clearly superannuated.

Recruitment standards and practices for both officer and non-officer personnel are good by Latin American standards.

4. *Training:*

Some police training is now being introduced in the four-year Cadet Officer School. The Police Academy curriculum is much too long, too militarily oriented and otherwise lacks appropriateness and balance. The production capacity of the Police Academy is far below demand. There are too few instructors and a lack of qualified instructors. Instructional methods are rudimentary as are instruction materials and audio-visual facilities and aids.

There is a clear lack of leadership and supervisory training. There is no in-service, roll call, mobile instruction group or correspondence training. Training prerequisites for advancement or other incentives are absent in the police field. Specialist training is absent.

5. *Patrol:*

There is some motor patrol in Managua and foot patrol in some Departmental capitals. Otherwise, the important concept of police patrol and associated public services is absent. Mobile and portable radio communications, beat layouts

based on crime and service need analyses don't exist except in a rudimentary form oriented toward commercial and industrial security. The majority of the "patrol" force is tied up on fixed posts, services for which the shop owner often pays by contract with GN headquarters. The average patrolman is poorly equipped for his job.

6. *Investigation:*

Investigation is usually limited to a preliminary report based on a cursory recording of statements. Follow-up investigation is a responsibility shared with judicial authorities who are equally ill-prepared for the job. Investigators are often used for simple patrol activity in plain clothes. There is much reliance placed on informants. Crime scene search, recovery and use of evidence is extremely rare and there is no criminalistics capability. Courts have no understanding or capability to manage physical evidence. There have been reports of mistreatment in interrogations, although this is not a significant local complaint against the GN.


7. *Records:*

The Fourth Company, commonly known as the Managua police department, does have a modest records center, consisting of several alphabetical files, one of which contains a collection of fingerprints (arranged in alphabetical order). The Records Center is short of trained personnel, proper filing cabinets and supervision. There is no evidence that the National Guard is properly utilizing what records they do have as an effective tool in police operations. Recently, a US Mil Group recommendation for a modest program to develop standardized reports and crime statistics was accepted. There are other isolated records centers in various jails and prisons in rural companies, however, there is no requirement for standardized or centralized reporting of arrested persons, crime reports or criminal statistics. A new criminal case record reporting system has been adopted by the Supreme Court. It is based on a standardized Central American model.

8. *Communications:*

The 1968 joint AID/OPS/USSOUTHCOM study of GN communications is still valid and need not be repeated here. An evaluation of progress on its recommendations should be done (see references). Communications for most of the Guard is good by Latin American standards. The Managua Police, however, lack mobile and portable communications. Most department companies have adequate telephone communications with their posts and Managua but lack mobile and portable units for patrol.

The Guard complex in Managua has adequate telephone and radio communications for administration and most operational needs. It is located in the National Command Center.



The Managua Police has an almost adequate, but rudimentary telephone switchboard and radio dispatch facility and must be commended for self-help efforts in this regard. It lacks reliable and sufficient mobile and portable communications, although MAP procurements in pipeline will fill a good part of this need. Telephone communications with precinct sections are inadequate. Radio contact with other staff and operational GN military and command elements is fair.

9. *Traffic:*

The Directorate of Traffic in Managua is almost an autonomous organization with its officers and men being drawn from other National Guard units. It has the exclusive responsibility for enforcing the national traffic regulations, investigating accidents, licensing drivers and registering vehicles in Managua. In minor accident cases, selected middle grade officers act as referees between the various parties and assist in the arrangement of civil adjustments. Motorcycle and traffic patrol car services are maintained during the day and evening hours and appear to have adequate equipment and resources to carry out this function. Unfortunately, it is physically separate from the Managua Police and is practically autonomous from other police functions, thus creating an overlapping of services and inefficient operation.

10. *Detention:*


Detention facilities and procedures are poor in most respects with the exception of the Model Prison which is excellent.


11. *Buildings:*

Most buildings of the GN police elements are old and decrepit, but well maintained and usually clean. Space utilization is fair to poor although allowance must be made for the hot, humid climate. Although deeply traditional, the fortress-like construction of most cuartels (department companies and Managua police) is expensive and antithetic to proper police image. There is a growing proliferation of precinct stations in Managua that compounds construction, maintenance, and staffing costs that would be better utilized for mobility.

12. *Equipment:*

The police are surprisingly well off in most items of essential equipment and supplies. There is a lack of vehicular mobility in the police elements and some need for improvement of maintenance parts supply, preventive maintenance and inspection. Gasoline and oil availability seems to pose no problem in Managua but is a serious problem in the departmental companies. Mobile maintenance teams under the G4 provide maintenance for equipment in the department companies.





Most supply rooms visited were well organized and maintained. Security is lax for dangerous weapons (examples are fragmentation hand grenades and stowed in open boxes in the various insecure supply rooms at the 4th Section-Managua jail).

Supply records and accountability are fair and modeled after the U.S. military "property book system." Equipment for training, some personal items of police equipment such as handcuffs and flashlights are lacking as well as equipment for investigation, records, and laboratory purposes. There is a superabundance of military weapons and ammunition.

Very little non-lethal riot control equipment was found in the police elements. There were no tear gas masks, shields, riot batons, or electric megaphones and the meager supplies of tear gas ammunitions were hopelessly inadequate and out of date.

13. *Riot Control:*


Civil police riot control capabilities are almost absent. The police elements are neither equipped or trained for the functions. The task is delegated to the wholly military 1st Battalion where one unit of about forty men each is trained in military riot control techniques.

14. *Public Relations:*

The image of the rural GN enlisted man is generally good. He is a powerful man but kept in line by informal social controls. He must get along or be ostracized, a serious problem given his isolation. Most communities can remove an abrasive or irresponsible guard by petition.

The urban image of the police elements is poor to bad as is readily admitted by most Guard officers. Some Guards have an unkempt appearance. Some are reported to extort, take bribes and gratuities, and abuse suspected criminals. The Managua Police Chief has taken strong measures to halt these practices but the pervasive graft at top levels is not conducive to control at lower levels.

Most public relations activities center on the military and civic action aspects of the non-police elements of the Guard. The GN-5 in charge of military justice and public relations holds daily press conferences with the media including the opposition newspaper and radio representatives.



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
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15. Budget:

The national budget has remained relatively consistent at approximate \$95 million for the last four years. The Defense Budget has also been rather consistent at \$10 million during the same period; however, in calendar year 1970, it rose to \$12 million. These defense budget figures do not accurately reflect the true military and police expenditures for the National Guard as it is involved in a number of civil activities such as postal services. One study identified only \$6,500,000 or 6.6 per cent of the budget as truly military and police functions.

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III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GON

On March 31, 1970 Col. Francisco Rodriguez, S., Officer-in-Charge of the Managua Police issued a 13-page report describing the various operations of command and identified major problems. This report is considered to be an outstanding analysis of the local situation.

The report deals with staffing, assignment, and utilization of personnel; identifies high crime areas; analyzes equipment problems; and makes recommendations. A copy of this report is attached as Annex L.


The recommendations of the Rodriguez Report are sound and should be adopted.


1. **RESPONSIBILITIES:** The emerging concept of the GN institution needs to be clearly identified in the minds of its personnel as distinctly dual: civil police and military. The missions of those elements directly concerned with police functions should be more clearly identified as such; specifically the Managua Police (4th Company) and the departmental companies.

Responsibility for all civil police functions in Managua should be centered in the General Staff with a focus of staff responsibility (technical supervision and inspection) over the police functions of the departmental companies, police training given at the Academy or elsewhere, and line supervision of all elements of the Managua Police, traffic, BECATS and centralized services of criminal records and a criminalistic laboratory listed below.

Responsibility for traffic education, engineering, licensing and the investigation of serious traffic accidents should remain the responsibility of a separate division. Intersection control and routine traffic matters performed by uniformed patrolmen should be the responsibility of all patrol members.

First line reaction for civil disturbance control and raids should be fixed in the Managua police using civil police methods. Military elements should be employed only when backup is needed.





2. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION:

The post of the Chief of the Managua Police should be located in the General Staff to assume the above responsibilities and functions. Subordinate elements grouping field operations (patrol, traffic, investigations, juvenile); Services (housekeeping, mess, supply, records, licensing, jail, criminalistics, phone and radio dispatch); and administrative functions should be established. The police academy should remain where it is. All other staff, support and line elements should remain essentially as is.

Work hours for patrol and traffic elements should be revised to keep as many men on the streets as possible. Crime prevention is based on the constant presence of a patrolling policeman on the streets; on foot, on a bicycle, or in a motor vehicle.

Inspection and supervision of men at work in the street or in staff, line or support functions need constant improvement.


The personnel strength of the Managua Police must be increased by at least 800. Ratio of officer per patrolman should be one to ten and NCO, one to four or five.

(a) *Personnel Management:* Compulsory retirement for non-officer personnel and an optional lump sum award of funds (retirement bonus) in lieu of some percentage of pension payments should be considered as a means for increasing turnover of superannuated personnel.

A system of examinations in police as well as military subjects should be established as a base for promotions of police trained personnel. Transfers to purely military duties should be discouraged.

(b) *Training:* A greater portion of the officer cadet curriculum needs to be police oriented. Educational subjects in such subjects as criminal law and procedure, sociology, psychology, political science and public administration would be useful but stress must also be placed on practical police subjects in patrol procedures, investigations, police records and identification, criminalistics, civil disturbance control, juvenile delinquency, vice control, jail administration, traffic, police planning, training and many other law enforcement functions.

The National Police Academy facility needs expansion to handle at least 200 recruits every six months as well as execute roll call and correspondence training in all police units, operate a mobile instruction group to visit the department companies with short practical police courses and hold short in-service training courses and seminars for officer and non-officer personnel with stress on leadership, supervision and modern police techniques.



(c) *Patrol:* Although special needs understandably dictate the need for fixed post assignments of uniformed personnel, the practice should be kept to a minimum. Roving foot, bicycle and motor patrols, with radio communications with headquarters, is the proven crime prevention practice of almost all the free world countries. Sectors for each patrolman should be established by an analysis of crime and public service needs. Numbers of men on patrol should vary during different hours of the day according to similar analysis. A telephone and dispatch center such as that developed by the 4th Company should control all such patrols.

Thirty foot patrols, fifteen bicycle patrols, and eight motor patrols are recommended as a start.

(d) *Investigation:* A complete renovation of investigative procedures taking into account modern techniques of evidence, interrogation *modus operandi*, etc., needs to be worked out in full cooperation with the Judicial Power. Only in rare instances should investigators be used for patrol purposes.

(e) *Communications:* Improvements in light, portable communications for patrol and investigative functions in Managua are needed. Radio, as well as telephone communications linking all physically separated elements of the Managua Police (4th Company) are needed. All vehicles should be radio equipped. Programmed MAP commodity procurements will fill most of this need.

(f) *Detention:* Improvements in booking procedures and identification procedures are needed.

(g) *Buildings:* Precinct stations should be kept to a minimum and as simple as possible. They serve only to provide a source of contact with police for a population that has few telephones and a home base for patrols. They are expensive to build, staff, equip, maintain, and supervise. They are also vulnerable and tend to become overly autonomous.

Radio-equipped trucks are capable of distributing radio-equipped bicycle and foot patrols to all parts of the city at a much lower cost. Small *casetas* may be appropriate in place of precinct stations until telephone communications among the populace are more prevalent.

(h) *Equipment:* Some improvements in the security of dangerous weapons (especially fragmentation hand grenades) should be made. Personal items of police equipment for patrols are needed such as handcuffs, flashlights and so forth. Non-lethal riot control equipment is needed such as tear gas masks, shields, batons, electric megaphones and tear gas ammunitions. Vomiting gas and the electric shock baton are not recommended since experience has shown that the use of such items provokes violent public reactions.

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(i) *Public Relations:* A systematic approach to public relations including a community relations element is needed concentrating on the civil police role and services of the Guard. The theme "Police Service is Civic Action" might be useful.

The uniform and appearance of the average GN officer is excellent by any standards. The same applies to many of the enlisted personnel. Some enlisted persons, however, present a sloppy appearance of dirty, unwashed, unpressed uniforms, shoes and equipment and poor grooming. Since the uniformed man is the most visible representative of government throughout the country his unkempt appearance reflects directly on the government and its leaders, no matter how unfairly. The populace could not be expected to respect either the authority of the man or what he represents.

Moreover, the practice of putting men on duty in public view or involving public contact dressed in battle fatigues and other military field gear with military weapons, must make it seem to any Nicaraguan that his country is under military occupation. Such men should be uniformed in distinctive police dress.

(j) *Non-lethal Civil Disturbance Control:* The GN presently utilizes military methods of civil disturbance control and is known to react to simple police raid situations with heavy weapons and soldiers. The GN needs a capability to be able to respond in a more humane and measured manner. Civil disturbance control capabilities for a provisional unit of 100 Managua police and some similar capabilities in the GN departmental companies are essential.


(k) *Records:* The modest record system in the Fourth Company (Managua Police) should be expanded to a national criminal records center. Other criminal records throughout the Managua area should be transferred to the Fourth Company and centralized. These records would include traffic and some jail records. This new records center should then be combined, or at least located next to the radio and phone central of the Fourth Company. This would improve the flow of information to field personnel and units. Senior enlisted personnel should be trained to classify and file alpha cards (3" x 5"), fingerprints, wanted property, and vehicle files.

All rural companies should be required to forward a copy of all felony crime reports and arrests to the central criminal files.

The MILGP crime report and arrest report project should be continued. However, the MILGP crime statistics project should be modified to agree with the classification and format of the Corte Suprema de Justicia system.

(l) *Traffic:* As noted under Organization and Administration, the Directorate of Traffic in Managua should be under the administrative and operational control of the Senior Police Command Officer in Managua. The license functions should be transferred to the recommended centralized records center.

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B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

Consideration of a police assistance activity sponsored by the United States in Nicaragua must take into account the social, governmental and political aspects of the local system. Is the Government a military/police dictatorship and is President Somoza using police powers to carry out political oppression? Would the image of the United States as a purveyor of democratic ideals and the leader of free peoples be tarnished by association with the Guard in its police functions?³

The Team found the CASP and the Country Team report on the Guard submitted addresses these points. We find it a current, accurate reflection of the overall nature, role and function of the Guard. For this reason, that report is included in the survey at Annex A.

That report and the approved FY 72 CASP lay the foundation for consideration of the above questions.

It is, therefore, recommended that a Public Safety program be established under A.I.D. auspices to assist the Guard carry out the recommendations described in Section III, A, in close concert with the U.S. Military Group. The program's objectives, shared by the MilGroup, would be as follows:

1. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM

The objective of the program is that stated in the approved FY 72 CASP which is to:


"Assist the Guardia Nacional to develop a modern public safety force backed up by competent conventional forces, which can cope both with urban terrorism and the wider spectrum of insurgency; and to seek over the long term to mold the GN into a truly apolitical and professional military force, in the long-range interest of engendering an environment of economic growth and democratic political evolution in Nicaragua."⁴

- (a) Assist by, ". . . concentrating on upgrading the technical proficiency of the Guardia Nacional police units, both in Managua and in the 16 outlying Departments of Nicaragua." Stress would be placed on:

"(1) Encouraging the GON to develop more democratic concepts of responsible and humane police administration."

³In reality, we already are associated with the Guard and its police. The United States Marine Corps created it. The U.S. Military Group is situated in the GN Military Academy and U.S. uniformed officers are frequently seen at local GN offices, ceremonies and social occasions. U.S.-donated equipment to GN police elements prominently display "hands-across-the-sea" symbols and a uniformed U.S. Military Police officer has regularly been advising GN police units for two and a half years.

⁴CASP p. 25.



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- "(2) Providing the Guardia with professional knowledge that will assist in strengthening its capability to enforce the law and to maintain internal security with a minimum use of force."
- "(3) Preparing the Guardia to provide more effective police services, and to counter subversion and insurgency more effectively in its initial stages, . . ."

(b) Specific targets identified are:

- (1) To help the GN, ". . . acquire the minimum essential vehicles and communication equipment needed by the urban and rural police elements."
- (2) To ". . . assist tactical and logistical GN units which provide backup support to police units."
- (3) To augment "personnel, mobility, and command control facilities, . . ."
- (4) To ". . . provide in-country police training programs" including, ". . . self-sufficiency, capability in training common skills."
- (5) To assist, ". . . in developing appropriate professional staff functions. . ."
- (6) To assist in, ". . . establishing central maintenance facilities and maintenance procedures for all Guardia Nacional equipment. . ."
- (7) To, ". . . create a pool of well-qualified instructors. . ."
- (8) To encourage the, ". . . GON to provide the requisite budget and conduct . . . training."

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C. *REQUIRED ACTIVITIES OF THE RECOMMENDED A.I.D.
PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM*

The program should concentrate on the improvement of organization, police planning, patrol, investigations, non-lethal civil disturbance control, training, criminalists, and police records and identification. The activities and resources recommended for each are as follows:

1. *Organization and Police Planning*

To achieve a reorganization of the police elements of the GN according to recommendations made in Section III., A. above and to improve police planning and budgeting.

Resources: The technical advice of a PSA⁵ Generalist, technical materials in Spanish, Executive PS training for four GN officers.

Timing: Two years.

2. *Investigations:*

To improve the investigative capability of the GN Managua Police and appropriate elements of the department companies using the Managua project as a pilot. To develop a unit of thirty qualified officers and NCO investigators in the Managua Police with specialization in homicide, juvenile delinquency control, robbery, kidnapping and others and a team of two similarly qualified men in each departmental company. All aspects will be coordinated with the Judicial power.

Resources: Technical advise of a PSA Generalist assisted by a PSA Training; technical materials in Spanish, participant training in the IPA⁶ for five officers; local courses supported by the GN Police Academy; investigative equipment — \$6,000.

Timing: Three years.

3. *Patrol:*

To establish a system of police patrols in Managua of at least thirty foot patrols, fifteen bicycle patrols, and eight motor patrols according to a systematic analysis of patrol needs and introducing all aspects of true police patrol service, reporting, etc. Patrols should be automobiles, radio-equipped, trained, supervised and otherwise organized for emergency counter-terrorist as well as routine crime

⁵Public Safety Advisor.

⁶International Police Academy.

prevention. A capability for preliminary investigation would be established. This patrol system would be extended to each department by priority according to needs. Police would be uniformed and equipped according to civil police standards.

Resources: PSA Generalist, PSA Training; Participant training 10 officers at IPA (Patrol); Communications, training and personal police items of equipment — \$19,000. Technical materials in Spanish.

Timing: Five years.

4. *Criminalistics:*

To establish a criminalistics laboratory with capability to secure and analyze most forms of physical evidence and to service Managua and all departmental companies with mobile evidence technicians capable of investigating all kinds of crime scenes. Later establish in this unit an explosives handling and disposal capability. (This project is well underway by MilGroup and requires only supplemented resources.)

Resources: PSA Criminalistics. Participant Training, Lab management. Lab equipment \$1,500; Mobile evidence technician teams \$8,500.

Timing: Five years.

5. *Non-Lethal Civil Disturbance Control:*

Develop in the Managua Police a capability to employ a provisional 100 man civil police oriented first-line disturbance and riot control unit. Extend capability to selected departmental companies.

Resources: PSA Training Advisor. Participant training for five officers. Riot control equipment \$9,000.

Timing: Two years.

6. *Police Records and Identification:*

Establish a central police records and identification facility in coordination with Judicial authorities. It would have the capability to establish a uniform crime and traffic reporting system, a criminal history and identification file, complaints files, want files, photo and property files, traffic accident, modus operandi files and a statistical and crime analysis capability. It would be closely coordinated with G-2 (OSN) and service the Managua Police and all departmental companies.

Resources: PSA (Records and Identification) PSA (Generalist) PSA (Training) Participant training six officers, four enlisted men.

Timing: Five years.

7. *Training:*

To improve the civil police training capabilities of the National Police Academy and introduce civil police oriented educational and training materials into the curriculum of the GN Military Academy. To establish a roll-call and correspondence training program based in the Police Academy. It would be capable of providing sixty hours of training per year to all police elements. Establish in the Academy two mobile instruction groups capable of providing two weeks of police training each year to all police elements. Expand the Police Academy to produce two hundred recruits from six months training each year. Improve training quality, appropriateness and methodology. Training would stress support of above activities.

Resources: PSA (Generalist), PSA (Training) Participant Training eight officers (instructor methods), Executive Training six officers. Equipment, expanded facilities and mobile costs - \$20,000.

Timing: Four years.

REQUIRED RESOURCES (U.S.)

	(DOLLARS 000)				
	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75
STAFF (Direct-Hire):					
Chief Public Safety Officer (Generalist)	27.0	28.0	29.0	30.0	31.0
Public Safety Advisor (Training)	22.0	23.0	24.0	—	—
Direct-Hire Sub-total	49.0	51.0	53.0	30.0	31.0
(Temporary)					
Public Safety Advisor (Criminalist)	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Public Safety Advisor (Records and Ident.)	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
TDY Sub-total	4.0	4.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
PARTICIPANT TRAINING:					
International Police Academy					
Investigations (5)	4.0	4.0	2.0	—	—
Patrol (10)	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Records and Ident. (10)	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Training (14)	10.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	—
Lab Management Observation (1)	2.0	—	—	—	—
Participant Sub-total	24.0	16.0	14.0	12.0	8.0
COMMODITIES:					
Vehicles	16.5	—	—	—	—
Communications equipment	2.0	10.0	—	—	—
Riot Control equipment	15.0	—	—	—	—
Training Equipment	2.0	5.0	3.0	2.0	—
Miscellaneous	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	—
Commodity Sub-total	38.5	17.0	5.0	4.0	0
OTHER COSTS:					
	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
GRAND TOTAL	118.5	91.0	77.0	51.0	44.0

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D. RECOMMENDED PROGRAM COORDINATION

The division of responsibilities for assistance to the National Guard should be carefully established before the civilian component is introduced. It must be recognized that the U.S. Military Group does have considerable influence with the GN and must act in the nature of a catalyst to help introduce the civil police concept and advisory function to all levels of the Guardia. This has already been done to a substantial degree by USMILGP Commander, Colonel Trevor W. Swett, Jr., who, with great skill and obviously well-established rapport, has insured that the presence and purpose of the Team was accepted by all GN personnel contacted.

The Public Safety Division should work under the U.S. AID Mission Director as is normal in all countries. The office should be located near the MILGP and perhaps in the Police Academy which is short walking distance from the MILGP and the Managua Police Headquarters.

All aspects of planning and programming should be closely coordinated between the MILGP Commander and the Chief Public Safety Officer (CPSO).

Technical advisory coordination should be at the level of the Chief Public Safety Advisor and the MILGP Commander who should meet frequently to inform one another of contacts and developments with local counterparts related to program activities and objectives.

Public Safety assistance activities will be concentrated on the Managua Police, the departmental companies and appropriate local authorities not associated with the Guardia (such as the Judicial Power), with initial catalytic assistance from the MILGP (continuing where necessary). Public Safety assistance will also involve members of the General and Special Staffs bearing responsibility for support to any aspect of the seven Public Safety objectives. Close coordination with the MILGP MP Advisor will be required on a daily basis. His responsibilities will be as follows:

- a. Perform close liaison with Public Safety Advisors, to include advising in matters requiring military coordination.
- b. Advise the Departmental Companies in all military aspects of their operations; in matters relating to traffic police and confinement facilities; and in catalytic support of technical assistance provided by the Public Safety Advisors in civil police matters.
- c. Advise concerning administration and security of all confinement facilities.
- d. Advise traffic police.

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- e. Advise in supply and maintenance procedures for police equipment.
- f. Advise GN concerning its military (as opposed to civil) police responsibilities.
- g. Advise GN coastal patrol units.
- h. Perform programming of MAP public safety-oriented materiel and training, to include close coordination with AID-provided materiel and training programming.

Overall program coordination issues would of course be the responsibility of the Ambassador or his designee to whom any disagreements between the MILGP and USAID should be submitted for resolution. It is strongly recommended that the CPSC be included in meetings of the Country Team when matters related to the security sector are discussed and its Internal Security Committee.

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IV. THE JUSTICE AND ORDER SITUATION IN NICARAGUA

A. HISTORICAL:

Throughout Nicaragua's early history, the country suffered severe political struggle attended by considerable internecine violence. At the same time, an almost complete reconciliation of the Hispanic and Indian cultures was achieved and there emerged a national identity that found itself faced with a choice between effective self-government, anarchy, or foreign intervention. The Liberal Party, opposed to the Hispanic clergy traditional views of the Conservative Party, emerged with controlling power oriented toward the secularization of the society and established a strong executive form of government supported by the Guard dominated by the Somoza family.

Muder and aggravated assault appear to be the major criminal threat in all parts of the country and are very probably the residual effect of the quasi-politically motivated Capulet-Montague style inter-family carnage that existed for 200 years.

B. CONTEMPORARY:

Since the ascension of the Liberty Party and the achievement of a strong patronistic and moderately social and economically progressive government and also probably thanks to a rural agrarian (60%), illiterate (about 63%), non-politicized population, there has been little politically-motivated disorder since the 1930's. Upheavals of any consequence have been limited to the abortive coup attempts of 1959, 1960 and 1967.⁷

The traditional communist party, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), is quietly Moscow oriented and non-violent. There are about sixty USSR educated students associated with it. The Castro-oriented group, the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) of about forty activists (primarily among the few university students who are not apolitical), is violent. This group has occasionally mounted rural guerrilla campaigns in the northern mountains where the Guard, largely with the cooperation of the local inhabitants, has been capable of effectively opposing them. The FSLN enjoys some popular sympathy, but it may be simply the romantic appeal to the Nicaraguans of an underdog fighting for an ideal, without considering the prospect of a Nicaragua under a dictatorship run by such people.

⁷The bloody 1967 clash between the Guardia and opposition political elements seems to have been the result of the deliberate design of the latter to create violence that would provoke foreign intervention.

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The most dangerous aspect of FSLN operations is increasing urban terror. These include activities such as bank robberies, airplane hijackings and the like. They have shown themselves to be fully capable of the most brutal behavior. In the last three such incidents, FSLN thugs unnecessarily murdered GN personnel that had been overpowered.

There has also been an increase in geometric proportions of common crime⁸ of an increasingly brutal character. Homes and persons have been violated and whole sections of Managua have become a no-man's land at night.

Although comparative statistical material is largely absent, from what has been found, and through interviews with the President of the Supreme Court of Justice and his excellent new statistical system, as well as local police and judicial authorities, fully half of crimes reported involve death or serious bodily harm and crime reported represents only a fraction of crimes occurred. The homicide ratio of 29.4 per 100,000 reported in 1967 was very high by Latin American standards and represented a 12% increase over 1964. A very large proportion of the population regularly go armed.

C. SPECULATIONS ON THE FUTURE

The Nicaraguans seem to have opted for political stability in place of the 200-year period of anarchy and foreign meddling. Only a few elite, however, made this choice. The paternalistic progressive strong executive government has been satisfactory to a docile agrarian folk who think and react according to Hispanic social ways. However, Nicaragua is beginning to join the world.

Urban migration, severe economic recession, a population exploding at the rate of 3.5% per year, the skewing of the population toward youth (47% under 15 years old), a 60% housing deficit in urban areas, slums, increased communication (99 radio stations, over 10,000 kilometers of road, a growth of from 29,000 vehicles in 1965 to over 60,000 in 1970, a 100% increase in airline passenger arrivals in seven years), all of these factors are contributing to a growing problem of crime and disturbance. (See crime statistics, figure 1.)

The results of these stresses on the society (with which we are all familiar) may well be capitalized upon by FSLN extremists using the exceedingly dangerous principles of the urban guerrilla-at-large described by Carlos Marighella in his Mini-manual on Urban Guerrilla Warfare,⁹ and pose a serious threat to the country. The timing might coincide with the expected political tensions of the 1972 elections and President Somoza's decision regarding his succession next year. As stated in the CASP, it is clear that "Nicaraguan security and police organizations are not geared up to combat this sort of activity."¹⁰

⁸Informe de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

⁹Published by the Tri-continental Conference in Havana in 1969.

¹⁰CASP, page 14.

TYPES OF CRIMES JUDGED BY DEPARTMENTS (STATES)
REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA - 1969

Figure - 1.

TYPES OF CRIMES	TOTAL	BOACO	GARAZO	CHINANDEGA	CHONTALES	ESTELI	GRANADA	JINOTEGA	LEON	MADRIZ	MANAGUA	MASAYA	MATAGALPA	NUEVA SEGOVIA	RIO SN. JUAN	RIVAS	ZELAYA
TOTAL	815	26	31	37	80	81	43	91	54	28	80	32	116	48	5	29	34
Peculiar to Public Servants																	
Swindle of Gov't property	3										2					1	
Theft of Gov't property	1										1						
Peculation of Gov't funds	1					1											
Against public health	1										1						
Against public faith (or trust), false testimony, and perjury																	
Counterfeit money	3				3												
Forgery, private documents	3										3						
False testimony	1												1				
Against people																	
Arson & injury attempt	2			2													
Murder	36			5				7	7	2	4		9	1			1
Murder & theft	2												2				
Murder & damage (lesions)	2												2				
Murder & fault	1					1											
Shots & damage	1				1												
Homicide	186	9	4	5	16	23	4	31	15	2	21	2	31	9	1	2	11
Frustrated homicide	5					1		1			1		1				
Homicide & lesions	31	2	1		2	6		4	4	1	5		1	3		2	
Homicide & theft	2										2						
Homicide & burglary	2			1				1									
Homicide & damage	1					1											
Homicide & negligent, reckless	17			4	1	2		3			3		3				1
Homicide & fault	4			2			2										
Homicide & death threatenings	2			2													
Homicide, lesions & theft	1						1										
Theft, homicide & arson (fire)	1																1
Theft, homicide & lesions	1						1										
Homicide attempt	2				1								1				
Shots, firearms	1				1												
Lesions	198	4	10	3	23	27	11	12	6	12	10	16	22	18	1	6	17
Lesions & burglary	2									2							

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TYPES OF CRIMES JUDGED BY DEPARTMENTS (STATES)
REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA - 1969

Figure - 1.

TYPES OF CRIMES	TOTAL	BOACO	GARAZO	CHINANDEGA	CHONTALES	ESTELI	GRANADA	JINOTEGA	LEON	MADRIZ	MANAGUA	MASAYA	MATAGALPA	NUEVA SEGOVIA	RIO SN. JUAN	RIVAS	ZELAYA
Against people (Continued)																	
Lesions & theft	6	4				1						2					
Lesions & faults	2			1		1											
Lesions, imprudent, reckless	2								1			1					
Theft, assault & lesions	5								2		3						
Parenticide	3					1			1					1			
Lesions & death threats	1		1														
Grave injuries	1											1					
Against moral & family																	
Statutory rape	4					1			1		1			1			
Attempted statutory rape	2													2			
Bigamy	2						1					1					
Rape & statutory rape	1													1			
Rape & abduction	5				1						1		1	1	1		
Rape	1													1			
Abduction	1					1											
Abduction, statutory rape, & rape	1										1						
Against property																	
Theft	55		2	3	2		16		5	2	10	2	3	2	2	3	3
Theft & assault	6	4	2														
Theft & damages	1										1						
Theft, attempted	1						1										
Burglary	171	2	8	11	24	13	2	32	8	7	3	5	37	8		11	
Swindle	14				2	2	4				4		2				
Assault	9		3				1		2		3						
Damage	1				1												
Arson	1	1															
Swindle, forgery & others	1						1										
Against human freedoms, inviolability of house & other																	
Inviolability of house - personal rights	1											1					
Against public safety	4																4

SOURCE: Documents Files on Juris. Clerk, Supreme Court of Justice, 1969.

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V. SOME ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON NICARAGUA LAW ENFORCEMENT

A. HISTORICAL INFLUENCES

During the Colonial and early post-colonial period in Nicaragua, armed military forces were dominated by the Spaniards and Creoles were used almost as occupation troops keeping order in a conquered land. They developed the "jefe politico"¹¹ system of governing the people. The "jefe politico" of each community was the personal representative of the President with ample power and authority to enforce laws and adjudicate cases involving minor offenses.

Two political factions, the Conservatives and Liberals, grew up based respectively at Granada and Leon. As disputes between them over power grew in intensity, these political parties developed their own private armies constantly warring with each other and uniting only once in 1857 to drive off the American insurrectionist, William Walker, who took advantage of the situation to intervene in the country's sovereignty.

Nicaragua asked U.S. assistance to maintain order in 1912 which resulted in the Marine occupation until 1925¹² when the National Guard was formed. Initially a bi-partisan force, it was quickly embroiled in renewed factional warfare that was not settled until the early thirties, again under U.S. intervention. The Marines were withdrawn for the last time in 1933, leaving behind a National Guard which soon came under the command of Anastasio Somoza and in the hands of the Liberal Party, a situation that has not changed significantly to the present.

The unitary governmental trappings of the colonial occupation and the association of armed force and police authority with political leaders in or out of power has reinforced the authoritarian nature of Nicaraguan ways.

Although the formal "jefe politico" system still remains, the true authority for law and order rests firmly with the Guard throughout all of Nicaragua. Past schemes for local police forces or functionally separated police jurisdictions have been stillborn.

¹¹The word "politico" translates to either "policy" or "political" so a "jefe politico" may be regarded both a policy chief and a political chief in his jurisdiction.

¹²The writer has met several Americans who still remember U.S. Marine recruiting posters of the late 20's offering a commission as lieutenant in the Nicaraguan National Guard as an inducement to enlistment as a Marine private.

The Guard is both legally and actually Nicaragua's only armed force and as such performs all of the functions of the variety of police institutions ordinarily found under different political systems. Moreover, it has succeeded to the extent that Nicaragua has enjoyed a high degree of stability and a relative absence of the destructive aspects of political conflict.¹³

Educational opportunity is limited; and, even if concerted efforts are made to correct this problem, the population explosion will probably frustrate such efforts.

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS, TEACHERS AND STUDENTS IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS

1967 - 1968

<u>Type of Instruction</u>	<u>Schools</u>	<u>Teachers</u>	<u>Students</u>
Primary	2,314	7,435	250,141
Secondary	111	1,397	26,885
Teaching	25	260	3,292
Business, agricultural and others	22	237	1,072
Vocational	1	44	815
University	2	592	5,144

Source: Banco Central.

B. GEOGRAPHICAL INFLUENCES

Nicaragua is the largest Central American country with 57,100 square miles. It has extensive borders with Honduras, Costa Rica and the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The terrain consists of mountainous areas, coastal plains and numerous zones of timber. As it is located in the tropical latitudes, its many rivers create a continuous obstacle to land transportation. These rivers and the country's two large lakes provide an excellent means of transportation by water.

The country's 26 air fields, 10,000 miles of highway (only one-tenth paved) and numerous ports provide a means of transportation throughout the country. Unfortunately, most of the air fields and 90% of the highways are of dirt. Because

¹³A notable exception was the January 1967 conflict between the Guard and a coalition of opposition factions during an election campaign.

of the tropical rains, this places serious limitations on reliability and timely transportation. The extensive borders and shorelines, particularly on the Atlantic coast, coupled with poor transportation, create serious problems for rural police patrols. The terrain and large expansives of uninhabited areas create an ideal environment for smugglers and other anti-government activities.

C. *POLITICAL INFLUENCES*

In February 1967 General Anastasio Somoza D. was elected President for a five year term. President Somoza has continued the Somoza "dynasty" rule of the country through the instrument of a strong executive power system. Judicial and legislative powers complement the executive rather than serve as a check. While Somoza has a tight control over the country, serves as Director of the National Guard with considerable operational control, and dictates the national budget that is "rubber stamped" by the Congress, there is considerable evidence that he is permitting other political factions to operate. The Conservative Party headed by Fernando Aguero and backed by the "La Prensa" newspaper is continually taking issue with the Executive Branch in a true democratic manner. The Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Communist) was outlawed by the Government in 1945. A small but active pro-Castro group called the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) supports violent terrorist activities and insurgency throughout the country. Currently it has been active primarily in the rural areas. While this group does not have a strong political base, it does enjoy some support from several anti-government groups and occasionally from the general population. (See Justice and Order Situations, Chapter IV.)

D. *ECONOMIC INFLUENCES*

Nicaragua is predominantly an agrarian country, with cotton and coffee as her major export crops. During the early 1960's the country enjoyed a sustained cotton export boom. However, during the last four years this has declined to the point of near economic depression. It is not as serious in rural areas as it is in Managua, Granada, and Leon, the country's major cities.

Although it is difficult to establish a direct cause-effect relationship between economic events and civil disturbance or crime, it is probably true that the growing need to institutionalize Nicaragua's justice system to meet growing threats rising from a host of causative factors will be increasingly hard to pay for in a depressed economic condition.

E. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES

The officer corps of the Guard is, with rare exceptions, middle class. They appear to be able to deal authoritatively with middle and lower class people. The policeman and his NCO are lower class. They have ordinarily learned the basics of reading and writing, but are slow to absorb and practice new and sophisticated police techniques. They can usually cope with other lower class people, but have difficulty with the middle class. They usually depend for respect of their authority on their uniform and the weapons they carry.

This sharp class distinction is reinforced by the observance of military discipline, rules of courtesy, and an established system of military justice. The authoritarian environment is substantially mitigated by respect for individual dignity, whatever a man's class. There is also premium on frank, aggressive self-expression. Often, a policeman is observed to speak his mind in forceful terms to his officer, who listens attentively as long as the man is reasonably courteous.

The family is the most important and cohesive social unit. Consideration for a family member (or possibly close friend) circumvents the duties and requirements of the system for the administration of criminal justice. This also applies to people with money and political influence. Throughout the officer's career he is often away from his family, detached to a remote company, where his hour by hour companionship is largely with his brother officers and his leader, the "Commandante", a relationship that bears a close resemblance to the family structure. Dismissal from the force is probably an exceedingly severe sanction for misbehavior.

The patrón system of personal loyalty, common to much of Latin America, is observed in the Guard and accounts in a large measure for its loyalty to Somoza. Loyalty and obedience to a superior officer often transcends responsiveness to the regulations of the institution. In return, the officer is obliged to grant favors that may involve the violation of regulations. Loyalty to the institution as an abstract is strong, but obedience to the institution as a collection of rules and regulations that aim to govern behavior in a more-or-less uniform manner, is comparatively weak.

Venality, indolence, and fatalism are found in some measure throughout the institution.

The rigid class system may provide part of a sociological explanation for extremism. People have been so locked into the behavioral requirements of their station that to challenge the system must require wholehearted aggressiveness focused on the resistance. Although the people seem to enjoy a great deal of liberty in daily activity, the social boundaries appear to be sharply defined and formidable.

VI. GON ELEMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, JUSTICE AND ORDER

THE NATIONAL GUARD

A. RESPONSIBILITIES:

Law enforcement responsibility rests solely with the National Guard which is established by the Constitution as the country's only armed force. The Guard is also responsible for military defense and military internal security.

1. JURISDICTION:

The Guard has nationwide jurisdiction and all Guard members have powers of arrest either by warrant or, if an offense takes place in the presence of a Guard, he may arrest without warrant. This power extends to all kinds of criminal offenses. In an operational sense, however, the Guard is divided into organizational elements, each with specific area or functional responsibilities as well as several functions of a non-military or police character in conjunction with the Ministries of Government and Finance. Other elements are limited to administration, staff, service or logistical roles (See "Organization" below). The Guard also has international defense cooperation responsibilities based on international defense agreements with the other Central American countries, the United States, as well as the Rio Treaty obligations of the Organization of American States (OAS).

The Guard was originally conceived of as an apolitical force for external and internal defense and Guard members are still constitutionally disenfranchized. In reality, the Guard has been dominated by the Somoza family since 1936. Most Guard members are also members of the Liberal Party but they are proscribed by law from overt political activity. There have been very few instances of any kind reported of Guard intervention in political matters. The President, however, is also the supreme commander of the Guard and actively exercises this authority. Many report that the Guard constitutes the President's most important political power base. It is also reported that most major unit leaders consider themselves accountable to the President, although in practice there is evidence that the indicated chain of command does function to a degree.

The Guard consists of elements divided into military, police, and civilian functions.

The top of the pyramid is the President who fills as well the post of Chief Director of the National Guard. The Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff are found at the next level. The former is responsible for the Special Staff and civilian activities of the GN, and although first in protocol, is in reality second in real authority to the Chief of Staff who is responsible for the General Staff and line activities of the GN. These are organized as shown in Figure 3.

The seventeen departmental companies are called "Internal Security Companies," and are located in each of the department capitols. They have responsibility for law and order and internal security throughout the corresponding department.

They are organized into four or five elements, including:

- (a) A headquarters element called the Company Command providing staff and logistical services such as communications, training, supply, mess, medical and pay. It also usually contains a small three-man Intelligence/Operations unit responsible for intelligence and criminal investigations.
- (b) A Security and Police Platoon of about 40 to 50 men responsible for patrol and fixed post coverage of the department capital city and an interior guard of the headquarters. It also has one or two men assigned to criminal investigation functions. The men wear a distinctive blue uniform and are called police.
- (c) A Patrol Section of about 10-20 men responsible for patrols throughout the department from the Headquarters base. These men wear khaki and are called soldiers of infantry. In reality, they seldom patrol but rather serve as a reserve that stays in the headquarters until called out for an emergency such as a civil disturbance.
- (d) A Platoon of National Guard Posts. These are the men who reside in the small communities of the department as the local authority for law and order.
- (e) In one case, there is a jail platoon responsible for the Model Jail in Managua.

B. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION:

The Guard is organized principally under the Ministry of Defense, but has contingents detailed to the Ministry of Interior (urban and rural police) and the Ministry of Finance (the Treasury police). In reality, these "detailed contingents" remain

solidly under Guard control. The formal organization is shown at figure 2. In reality, functions are divided between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff who are co-equal in rank and authority (See figure 3).

The 1st Presidential Battalion is a composite Battalion located near the Presidential Palace and is a military unit in the true sense of the word. It has an authorized strength of 364 men and is organized in three elements: an infantry company, an armored car company, and an artillery company. Its role is to protect the President and key government installations.

The Engineer Company located near the airport has an authorized strength of 164 men. It has elements for road building and improvement, well drilling, and light construction. Its role is primarily civic action.

The Transportation Company is a truck company that provides the transport to the military elements of the Guard. It has an authorized strength of 69. It also provides heavy trucks in support of the Engineer Company.

The Supply and Maintenance Center located at Xolotlan in Managua is responsible for maintenance of vehicles, communications equipment and arms of a military character. Civilian type equipment is farmed out to private maintenance shops.

The Nicaraguan Air Force located at Las Mercedes Airport in Managua has an authorized strength of 320 men. Aircraft inventory includes:

- 1 T33A
- 5 T33B
- 5 T28A
- 4 B26
- 6 C47
- 8 U (Cessna 180)
- 2 OH-6A
- 1 Cessna 185
- 1 Hughes H 269 Helo

The Fourth Company is in fact the Managua Police Department. It is responsible for maintaining law and order in the capitol city including the suburban areas up to the seventh kilometer. Its functions are described as:

- 1 - To establish a system of security (safety) to protect the life and property of the civilian population.
- 2 - To control the activities of subversive elements, to eliminate bank robberies, assaults on persons and kidnappings.

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- 3 - To prepare tactical plans over dominating terrain.
- 4 - To control individuals.
- 5 - To coordinate with other corps of the National Guard to establish a system of prevention against possible subversive acts of terrorism by extreme elements.
- 6 - To investigate criminal acts. (See Annex G.)

C. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

National Guard personnel are managed by a series of General Orders that make up a "Personnel Manual". This manual is attached as Annex

In brief, it sets out officer and enlisted ranks, requirements for each, and systems and procedures to be followed in personnel matters.

1. STAFFING

The personnel of the National Guard is divided into three groups. The first group performs military duties, the second, police, and internal security services, while the third group staffs and runs civil government type organizations. The staffing of the three groups is as follows:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
<u>TOTAL NATIONAL GUARD</u>	<u>8,641</u>	<u>8,293</u>
Military Organizations	4,028	3,980
Police and internal security organizations	2,586	2,286
Civil type organizations	2,027	2,027

Table A identifies the military organizations, Table B the police and internal security organizations and Table C the civil type organizations. The strength figures were reported on May 28, 1970.

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TABLE - A

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
<u>MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS</u>	<u>4,028</u>	<u>3,980</u>
First Battalion	566	658
General Somoza Battalion	329	189
Third Company	(611)	611
National Guard Headquarters - Managua	(549)	549
General Headquarters, N. G. - Managua	(1,650)	1,650
Air Force of the National Guard	(300)	300
Coast Guard	(23)	23

() No established authorized level.

TABLE - B

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
<u>POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>2,586</u>	<u>2,286</u>
Fourth Company	(416)	420
Fifth Company	(188)	188
Sixth Company	115	107
Seventh Company	107	74
Eighth Company	113	86
Ninth Company	160	119
Tenth Company	127	82
Eleventh Company	104	79

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TABLE - B (CONTINUED)

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Twelfth Company	170	156
Thirteenth Company	156	143
Fourteenth Company	132	135
Fifteenth Company	100	94
Sixteenth Company	124	129
Seventeenth Company	125	114
Eighteenth Company	121	99
Nineteenth Company	135	77
Twentieth Company	136	127
National Guard Headquarters — San Carlos	(57)	57

() No established authorized level.

TABLE - C

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
<u>CIVIL TYPE ORGANIZATIONS</u>	<u>2,027</u>	<u>2,027</u>
Communications	(95)	95
Postal Service	(288)	288
Telegraph Service	(1,017)	1,017
Radio Service	(355)	355
Communication Inspection Service	(132)	132
Aeronautical Service	(102)	102

TABLE - C (CONTINUED)

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Meteorological Service	(38)	38
<p>() No established authorized level.</p>		

Personnel assigned to the Fourth through the Twentieth Companies and the San Carlos Battalion perform primarily police functions. The Fourth covers the Managua area, and the others are assigned to the various political department (states). The personnel of these 18 units are further distributed in small posts to various municipalities and small towns throughout the country. See Table D for Guard personnel distribution.

Table D is a list of the organizations, their locations, authorized and actual strength of the organizations assigned to police and internal security duties.

TABLE - D

**NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF
POLICE TYPE COMPANIES**

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
			Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
MANAGUA POLICE	MANAGUA	(416)	34	2	383	418
"Fourth Company						
Company Headquarters			11	2	190	203
Hospitalized					4	4
1st Police Section			1		9	10
(Precinct)						
2nd Police Section			1		9	10
(Precinct)						
3rd Police Section			1		10	11
(Precinct)						
4th Police Section			2		29	31
(Precinct)						
8th Police Section			1		6	7
(Precinct)						

TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
			Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
9th Police Section (3rd Co. Building)			1	4	5	
10th Police Section (Precinct)			1	8	9	
11th Police Section (Precinct)				7	7	
12th Police Section (Precinct)			1	3	4	
Office of Investigations			4	18	22	
Chief of Traffic (Not under Operational Command of the Fourth Company)			9 ^a	86	95	
Detached Unit			1	1	2	
FIFTH COMPANY	MANAGUA	(188)	10	1	177	188
Company Headquarters			4		52	56
Posts	Tipitapa		1		8	9
	Model Prison		5		45	50
	El Crucero				6	6
	San Francisco del Cernicero				3	3
	Las Maderas				4	4
	San Rafael del Sur			1	4	5
	Mateare				3	3
	Masachapa				4	4
	Ticuantepe				3	3
	Detached to Honduras				11	11
	Sabana Grande				3	3
	Santo Domingo				3	3
	Esquipulas				4	4
	San Benito				4	4
	Las Banderas				3	3

^aDetached from the Third Company.

TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
			Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
	Samaria			2		2
	Mesas de Asicaya			3		3
	Lás Laureles			2		2
	Embajada Americana			5		5
	Plantel de Carreteras Pie.			2		2
	Los Brasiles			3		3
SIXTH COMPANY	JINOTEPE	<u>115</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>107</u>
Company Headquarters			4		73	78
Medics Second Battalion				3		3
Second Battalion Headquarters			2		2	4
Posts	San Marcos		1		4	5
	Diriamba		1		7	8
	Dolores				1	1
	Dulce Nombre de Jesus				1	1
	Sta. Teresa				2	2
	Las Esquinas				2	2
	La Paz de Carazo				1	1
	La Conquista				1	1
	El Rosario				1	1
	Guisquiliapa				1	1
SEVENTH COMPANY	GRANADA	<u>107</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>74</u>
Company Headquarters			5		52	57
Posts	Nandaime		1		3	4
	Malacatoya				1	1
	Hda. La Calera				1	1
	Diriomo				2	2
	Vapor Ometepe				1	1
	El Diria				1	1
	Vapor Gral. Somoza				1	1
	Granada Port Warehouse				1	1

TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
		STRENGTH	Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
	Women's Prison			1		1
	Poneloya			1		1
	Hda. El Diamante			2		2
	Hda. El Picacho			1		1
EIGHTH COMPANY	MASAYA	<u>113</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>86</u>
Company Headquarters			6	1	61	68
Posts	Masatepe		1		3	4
	Niquinohomo				1	1
	La Concepción		1		1	2
	Tisma				1	1
	Nindirí				1	1
	San José Monte Redondo				1	1
	Nandasmó				1	1
	Catarina				2	2
	Los Altos				1	1
	San Juan de la Concepción				1	1
	San Juan de Oriente				1	1
	Cofradía				1	1
	Coyotepe				1	1
NINTH COMPANY	RIVAS	<u>160</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>119</u>
Company Headquarters			6	1	61	70
Medics -- Third Battalion				2		2
Posts	Peñas Blancas				5	5
	San Juan del Sur		1		6	7
	Los Mojones				2	2
	Alta Gracia				2	2
	Noyogalpa				3	3
	La Pimienta				1	1
	Cárdenas				1	1
	Hda. El Nacascolo				1	1

TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL PERSONNEL		
		STRENGTH	Officers	Medics	Enlisted Total
	San Jorge		2		2
	Tola		1		1
	Buenos Aires		2		2
	Belén		1		1
	Las Salinas		1		1
	Potosi		1		1
	Orosi		1		1
	La Aviación		1		1
	Colón		2		2
	Ostional		1		1
	La Virgen		1		1
	Wiscoyoll		1		1
	Ochomogo		2		2
	Ceilan		1		1
	Hda. Nagualapa		1		1
	La Calera		1		1
	Sapoa		1		1
	Hds. Mérida		1		1
	Boca de Sapoa		1		1
	Rabo Lucio		1		1
	Hda. Sta. Ursula		1		1
	Hda. San Fernando		1		1
	El Astillero		1		1
TENTH COMPANY	JUIGALPA	<u>127</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>82</u>
Company Headquarters			3	48	51
Posts	Acoyspa		1	2	3
	Plantel Cara de Mono			1	1
	Santo Domingo		1	2	3
	Muelle de los Bueyes			2	2
	La Libertad			3	3

TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
			Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
	Sto. Tomas			2		2
	Villa Somoza			3		3
	Nueva Guinea IAN			1		1
	Los Millones			1		1
	La Batea			1		1
	Comalapa			1		1
	El Chilamate			1		1
	Muhan			1		1
	La Gateada			1		1
	Cuapa			1		1
	El Coral			1		1
	San Pedro de Lóvago			1		1
	Hda. San Martin			1		1
	El Cacao			1		1
	Presillitas			1		1
	Puerto Diaz			1		1
ELEVENTH COMPANY	BOACO	<u>104</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>79</u>
Company Headquarters			6	1	54	61
Medics - Fourth Battalion				2		2
Posts	Camecapa			3		3
	San José de los Remates			2		2
	Teuetepe			1		1
	Tecolostote			2		2
	Villa Kennedy			1		1
	Sta. Lucia			2		2
	San Lorenzo			1		1
	Tierra Azul			2		2
	Teustepe			1		1
	Boaco Viejo			1		1

TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
			Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
TWELFTH COMPANY	LEON	<u>170</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>146</u>	<u>156</u>
Company Headquarters			5	1	90	96
Fifth Batallion			3		1	4
Posts	Mina del Limón		1		4	5
	El Sauce				4	4
	La Paz Centro				4	4
	El Fortin				2	2
	Nagarote				2	2
	1st Police Section				4	4
	2nd Police Section				4	4
	Quezagonalque				2	2
	Acuapa				2	2
	Malpaisillo				2	2
	La Ceiba				4	4
	El Polvon				1	1
	El Charco				1	1
	Poneloya				1	1
	El Jicaral				1	1
	Telica				1	1
	Las Cristas				2	2
	Hdas. Varias				3	3
	Sta. Rosa del Peñon				2	2
	Momotombo				1	1
	San Jacinto				3	3
	Mina de la India				1	1
	Salinas Grandes				1	1
	Valle de las Zapatas				1	1
	Rio Grande				1	1
	Los Zarsales				1	1

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TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
		STRENGTH	Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
THIRTEENTH COMPANY	CHINANDEGA	<u>156</u>	16	3	124	143
Company Headquarters			11	1	61	73
Medics - Fifth Battalion				2		
Posts	Corinto		1		11	22
	Ingenio San Antonio		1			1
	El Viejo		1		6	7
	Ohchigalpa		1		5	6
	Somotillo				6	6
	Puerto Morazan				1	1
	Etosi		1		5	6
	1st Police Section				3	3
	2nd Police Section				3	3
	3rd Police Section				3	3
	El Realajo				1	1
	Posoltega				3	3
	Tonalá				2	2
	Sto. Tomas				1	1
	Cinco Pinos				1	1
	Villa Nueva				1	1
	Rodeo Grande				1	1
	Palo Grande				1	1
	San Francisco				1	1
	Villa Salvadorita				1	1
	Canalipe				1	1
	San Pedro				1	1
	Rancheria				1	1
	Jiquilillo				1	1
	El Cacao				1	1
	El Nato Grande				1	1
	La Pimienta				1	1

TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
		STRENGTH	Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
FOURTEENTH COMPANY	OCCTAL	<u>132</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>135</u>
Company Headquarters			9		75	84
Sixth Battalion Headquarters			2		1	3
Posts	Santa Maria				3	3
	Quilali				4	4
	Sta. Clara				2	2
	Las Manos				3	3
	Murra				1	1
	Jalapa				1	1
	Apali				1	1
	Wiwili				4	4
	Inteli				2	2
	Ciudad Antigua				1	1
	El Jicaro		1		3	4
	Susucayan				2	2
	Las Pampas				4	4
	El Limon				2	2
	Dipilto				1	1
	Maquehizo				1	1
	Teotecacinto				4	4
	San Albino				1	1
	San Fernando				1	1
	La Limonera				1	1
	El Suyatal				1	1
	Murupuchi				1	1
	San José de Inteli				2	2
	Mozonte				1	1
FIFTEENTH COMPANY	ESTELI	<u>100</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>94</u>
Company Headquarters			7	1	57	65
Posts	San Juan de Limay				7	7

TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
			Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
	Sta. Cruz			1		1
	La Trinidad			4		4
	El Hegadilla			2		2
	Condega			6		6
	Guacuyuca			1		1
	Pueblo Nuevo			6		6
	San Nicolas			2		2
SIXTEENTH COMPANY	SOMOTO	<u>124</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>129</u>
Company Headquarters			4		92	96
Medics - Sixth Battalion				1		1
Posts	Telpaneca				2	2
	Sta. Emilia				3	3
	El Espino				5	5
	Cusmapa				2	2
	Palacaguina				3	3
	Totogalpa				2	2
	Las Sabanas				1	1
	El Tamarindo				2	2
	Yalaguina				1	1
	San Lucas				2	2
	Ducuali				2	2
	Milquilce				2	2
	San Juan Rio Coco				3	3
	Valle Gualiqueme				2	2
SEVENTEENTH COMPANY	MATAGALPA	<u>125</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>114</u>
Company Headquarters			5		62	67
Seventh Battalion Headquarters			2	1	2	5
Seventh Battalion Medics				2		2
Posts	Ciudad Dario				3	3
	Matiguas				5	5

TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
		STRENGTH	Officers	Medicis	Enlisted Total	
	Muy Muy			3	3	
	Sébaco		1	2	3	
	Esquipulas			3	3	
	Caratera			1	1	
	Terrabona			2	2	
	San Ramon			2	2	
	San Dionisio			2	2	
	Puertas Viejas			2	2	
	Sta. Barbara			7	7	
	El Tuma			2	2	
	El Fortin			2	2	
	San Isidro			2	2	
	Rio Boaco			1	1	
EIGHTEENTH COMPANY	JINOTEGA	<u>121</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>99</u>
Company Headquarters			7	1	57	65
Posts	Paso Real del Cua		1		4	5
	El Cacao		1		12	13
	Raiti				1	1
	Asturia				4	4
	La Vigia				1	1
	Yali		1		2	3
	Wamblan				2	2
	Bocay Rio Coco				1	1
	La Concordia				1	1
	San Rafael del Norte		1		1	2
	Kilambe				1	1
NINETEENTH COMPANY	BLUEFIELDS	<u>135</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>77</u>
Company Headquarters			7		34	41
Eighth Battalion Headquarters			1	1	1	3
Posts	El Bluff				4	4

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TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL PERSONNEL			
		STRENGTH	Officers	Medics	Enlisted	Total
	El Rama		1		2	3
	Corn Island		1		2	3
	La Aviación				1	1
	El Recreo				1	1
	La Cruz del Rio Grande				3	3
	Tasbaponie				2	2
	Laguna de Perlas				1	1
	Barra de Punta Gorda				1	1
	Monku Point				1	1
	Macantacas				1	1
	Carawala				1	1
	Cukra Nilli				5	5
	Barra del Rio Grande.				1	1
	La Esperanza				1	1
	Loma del Mico				1	1
	Pescanica				3	3
TWENTIETH COMPANY	CABEZAS	136	11	3	113	127
Company Headquarters			6	1	59	63
Eighth Battalion Medics				2		2
Posts	Siuna		1		6	7
	Bonanza		1		7	8
	Rosita		1		4	5
	Waspan		1		3	4
	San Carlos Rio Coco				3	3
	Alamicamba				2	2
	Cabo Gracias a Dios				2	2
	Prinzapolka				2	2
	Sta. Marta				1	1
	Leimus				2	2
	Sandy Bay				1	1

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TABLE - D (CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATIONS	LOCATIONS	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL PERSONNEL		
		STRENGTH	Officers	Medics	Enlisted Total
	Wawa Bar		2		2
	Slimasia		4		4
	Sta. Isabel		3		3
	La Pinera		1		1
	Los Licos		1	7	8
	Kilometro 43			2	2
	La Esperanza			2	2
Headquarters (Special Services)	SAN CARLOS	(57)	4	53	57
Headquarters Rio San Juan			4	31	35
Posts	San Juan del Norte			2	2
	El Delta			2	2
	Sarapiqui			2	2
	El Castillo			1	1
	Pueblo Nuevo			1	1
	El Almendro			2	2
	Rio Medio Queso			1	1
	Morrito			2	2
	Melchora			2	2
	San Miguelito			2	2
	Valle Guadalupe			2	2
	Palo Palo			1	1
	Boca de Sábalo			1	1
	Campo de Aviación			1	1

The officers and enlisted ranks are similar to those of the United States Army. Ranks and pay are listed in Table E.

TABLE - E

RANKS AND PAY IN THE NATIONAL GUARD

AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL*	RANK	MO. PAY IN CORD	MO. PAY IN U.S.\$**
1	1	Lieutenant General	6,237	891.
-	-	Major General	5,000	714.
3	8	Brigadier General	3,500	500.
38	31	Colonel	1,300	186.
32	21	Lieutenant Colonel	1,250	179.
56	40	Major	1,200	171.
148	134	Captain	1,000	144.
265	201	1st Lieutenant	750	107.
281	289	2nd Lieutenant	650	93.
784	672	Sergeants	450	64.
601	564	Corporal	200	29.
4,103	3,718	Private	150	21.

* Ranks do not add to staffing pattern due to dual positions and civilian employees

** Rate of Exchange is: 7 Cordobas = US \$1.00

2. SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES

In addition to the salaries noted in Table E, that compare favorably with wages received in civilian life, officers and enlisted men receive a number of other benefits, such as housing, medical, retirement, and special pay. It is estimated that

the benefits equal 50 percent to 100 percent of the base pay in Table E. The system is rather informal, rank and personal contacts play a major role in obtaining these benefits. About two-thirds of the officers live in government quarters that are located in several sections of the city of Managua, and in most cases are equal to middle class U.S. homes. Certain assignments draw "position pay". A case in point is the position of instructor in the Military Academy. Regular officers on duty are permitted to receive a second pay for part time duties as instructors even during normal working hours.

While there is no formal system, such assignments form an important part of the pay of most of the officers.

3. *AGE AND TURNOVER*

The National Guard retention rate is very high and has been estimated by qualified sources to be around 2% annually. Approximately one-third of the enlisted men were born about 1910; one-third since 1933, and the remainder since 1942. Employment security, quarters, meals, other benefits and a 5% increase in basic pay on every three year re-enlistment are major factors for the high retention of the enlisted ranks. By inspection it appears that most of the guard enlisted men, assigned to police duties, are over age for operational type police duties.

A similar condition exists in the Officer corp. Officers are not able to find equal or better employment outside of the guard and therefore are content to remain in service. Retirement benefits are insufficient and as a result the officers not only remain in service for 30 years but many of them are starting into their 31st and 32nd year. This is creating a block to younger officers and there is evidence of discontent.

4. *RECRUITMENT*

Military service is obligatory for all male citizens, but needs are met by volunteers. The prestige and upward social mobility offered by a career as a military officer and the lack of other career opportunities have been sufficient to assure a continuing supply of cadets for the national military academy, and enlisted men for the National Guard. Enlisted men usually volunteer for three-year terms, and the pay and living conditions obtained draw recruits primarily from the lower classes.

5. *UNIFORMS*

The basic uniform worn by both officers and enlisted men during normal garrison duty is the cotton khaki shirt and trousers with a variation in the color of necktie and belt: enlisted men, tan; ground officers, black; and air force officers, blue. The field uniform, issued to all troops, is the cotton olive green of standard



OFFICER UNIFORM

UNCLASSIFIED
UNSECRET



ENLISTED MEN UNIFORM

UNCLASSIFIED
UNSECRET

fatigues design worn with helmet, combat boots, and the usual individual equipment. An enlisted man receives four uniforms per year.

Officers frequently substitute tropical worsted for cotton and wear the standard roll collar coat on ceremonial occasions. Generals and field grade officers are authorized gold braid on the visor of the service cap similar to the United States. Some officers wear web pistol belt with holster and 9 mm, 45 calibre, 38 calibre, or 32 calibre side arms. They may purchase a white uniform for more formal wear and a winter blouse and trousers of olive-drab dark green when attending courses in the United States during cold weather.

Rank insignia is placed on the shirt collar, or on shoulder tabs the same color as the uniform. The metal bar insignia signifying company grade rank is used. Rank of field grade and above is denoted by an increasing number of gold stars—one for Major, two for Lt. Col., and three for Colonel. Silver stars, one to five, are for the Generals. On September 30, 1968, the enlisted rank insignia was changed to conform with a chevron design much like that of United States troops, in compliance with a standardization agreement among the five Central American nations.

6. *SERVICE AWARDS & UNIT INSIGNIAS*

Officers are authorized to wear unit shoulder patches on the upper left sleeve of their uniforms upon graduation from the Military Academy. Additional enameled medals are presented after the completion of each five years of service. Special awards include medals for expert sharpshooter and marksman, for degrees of proficiency with firearms. These and other medallions presented by foreign governments are worn over the left breast pocket.

7. *MILITARY JUSTICE*

The Guard has a Manual of Courts Martial for military justice. It establishes and delineates jurisdictional responsibilities, limitations, detailed procedures, and punishments authorized by four military courts: General, Ordinary, Summary and Extraordinary. Capital punishment is authorized for major offenses against the nation (treason, sedition) and crimes against the person (murder, rape). Such a sentence requires a unanimous decision of the court. A sentence of more than 10 years confinement requires a vote by three-fourths of the members; other sentences require a vote by two-thirds. Within its jurisdiction any person may be tried for offenses punishable under Martial Law or any other governmental regulation, when it is considered such trial will strengthen the peace of the Republic.

When officers commit offenses that tend to discredit the good name of the National Guard, they may be ordered before a Court of Honor which consists of 3 to 5 members. Considerably detailed instructions and guidance is provided for

the implementation of this form of justice, however, the punishment usually is dismissal from the service.

During 1969, 400 persons (mostly enlisted) were charged with violation of the Military Code. Eighty percent were for military type offenses, such as absence without leave and sleeping on duty. Fifteen percent were for abuse of authority and the remaining five percent for miscellaneous offenses.

8. PROMOTIONS

There is no formal pattern for officers and as a result political influences play a major role in creating new positions as well as promotions. Among the factors considered for promotion are seniority and performance evaluation reports. There are no written examinations. These procedures apply to both officers and enlisted men.

9. ASSIGNMENTS AND TRANSFERS

The assignment and transfer policy of the National Guard is rather informal. It is possible for a man to spend many years or even a career in the same city or general area of the country. Some key positions for officers are rotated once a year. In most cases these positions have "side benefits" and therefore there is keen competition among the officers. Personal influence and seniority are major factors considered by the Director General (President) in making such assignments.

In most rural areas, a National Guard enlisted man is the sole representative of the civilian government. If members of the community are dissatisfied with the National Guard representative, they may submit a petition asking for his recall. It is reported that the Director General makes every effort to make appropriate adjustments and transfers acceptable to members of the community.

10. REQUIREMENTS TO ENTER THE POLICE SCHOOL

Within the National Guard Military Academy, an officer training institution, there is a police school designed to train enlisted men for a period of one year. Upon graduation, these enlisted men are assigned full time police duties. To enter the police school an applicant must meet all of the following prerequisites:

- (a) a citizen of Nicaragua;
- (b) 17 to 25 years of age;
- (c) have completed at least 4 years of grammar school;
- (d) bachelors preferred;

- (e) have the personal qualities needed to be a policeman;
 - (f) good physical health with a minimum height of 5'7";
 - (g) 3 letters of recommendation from responsible citizens;
 - (h) a letter of recommendation regarding his personal conduct from the police of the district of his residence.
- (a) *Examinations:*

Three examinations are taken by all candidates. It commences with the physical examination given by the Medical Officer of the National Police School in accordance with the regulations of the National Guard. It is followed by the physical aptitude and finally by the intellectual examination.

- (1) Mathematics: addition, subtraction, multiplication and division.
- (2) Grammar: Analysis of the parts of speech.
- (3) History of Nicaragua: First inhabitants, discovery, the Conquistadors, Independence, all of the Presidents of Nicaragua.
- (4) Geography of Nicaragua: Boundaries, expanse, divisions, politics, tourism orientation.
- (5) Science: Human body, zoology, biology and botany.

D. TRAINING:

Training is provided in basically three elements of the GN. The first is the Military Academy founded in 1939 and patterned somewhat after the US Military Academy at West Point. The second is the Police Academy which is an organically a part of the Military Academy. The third is the replacement company of the 3rd Battalion where basic recruit training for soldiers is provided. A separate training program of sorts was also formed at the Model Prison, but not elsewhere.

1. THE MILITARY ACADEMY:

This institution provides a four-year curriculum leading to a high school degree plus the equivalent of about one year of college. The first two years stress basic academic subjects such as mathematics, language, chemistry, biology, geography,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

	Population estimate 1969 (000)	Number of Municipalities	National Guard Strength (Police Units)		Ratio of N.G. (Actual) per 1,000 pop.	Persons Judged 1969	Verdicts Rendered		Crim. case rate per 1,000 persons - 1969
			Auth.	Actual			Not Guilty	Guilty	
TOTALS	<u>1,833</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>2,586</u>	<u>2,285</u>		<u>815</u>	<u>601</u>	<u>214</u>	
Boaco (11th Co.)	82	6	104	80	1.250	26	18	8	3.15
Cazado (6th Co.)	86	8	115	108	.796	31	24	7	2.8
Chinandega (13th Co.)	170	13	156	143	1.188	37	29	8	4.59
Chontales (10th Co.)	92	8	127	84	1.095	80	78	2	1.2
Esteli (15th Co.)	85	5	100	94	.904	81	68	13	1.1
Granada (7th Co.)	85	4	107	71	1.197	43	37	6	2.0
Jinotega (18th Co.)	96	4	121	99	.969	91	49	42	1.1
Leon (12th Co.)	193	11	170	156	1.237	54	35	19	3.6
Madriz (16th Co.)	60	8	124	128	.468	28	25	3	2.1
Managua (4th & 5th Co.)	410	6	(604)	604	.683	80	31	49	5.1
Masaya (8th Co.)	101	9	113	86	1.174	32	29	3	3.1
Matagalpa (17th Co.)	105	10	125	114	.921	116	87	29	.9
Nueva Segovia (14th Co.)	59	11	132	135	.437	48	34	14	1.2
Rio San Juan	20	4	(57)	57	.350	5	5	-	4.0
Rivas (9th Co.)	84	10	160	121	.694	29	24	5	2.9
Zelaya (19th & 20th Co.)	105	6	271	205	.514	34	28	6	1.4

() No established authorized level.

history, economics, sociology and philosophy. The next two years stress military subjects such as arms, tactics, counter-insurgency, and so forth. A final period of six months in subjects related to agriculture and animal husbandry are given largely for civic action purposes.

According to the Chief of Staff, Col. Noguera, the Academy did offer some training in police subjects, but this was discontinued when Col. Noguera left the post of commandment of the Military Academy some years ago. Significantly, the GN has now programmed 335 hours of training in police subjects in the final year of the Academy curriculum. This program will begin in 1971 and will include the following subjects (See entire curriculum at Annex H).

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Criminalistics	50
Fingerprinting	50
Police Records	20
Police Reporting	15
Criminology	30
Penal Law	30
Code of Criminal Instruction	20
Judo (mechanics of defense & arrest)	30
Police Patrol and Watch	20
Constitutional Law	20
Police Regulations	20
Search	15
Firearms practice	15
TOTAL	335

This is the first police oriented training program to be established locally by the GON for their officer cadets and has very probably been the result of the Milgp's urging that emphasis be directed toward preparing the Guard personnel for what is among the most important of their responsibilities and functions.

Even this program, however, represents only a start. The capacity of the GN to effectively carry out the planned program of training is questionable and will require outside help. Moreover, the program will require amplification and balance to more appropriately suit the needs dictated by the Guards actual law enforcement functions.

2. *THE POLICE ACADEMY:*

Established in 1965, the Police Academy is an organic element of the Military Academy and situated on its grounds it provides a one-year course of

training for non-officer recruits who wish to enter the police services of the Guard.

The director of the Police Academy is also the Director of the Military Academy. Effective control of the Police Academy is therefore left to the Sub-director, a man that has twenty-four years of experience in the GN. He is assisted by an administrative staff of one sergeant, one secretary, paymaster, and one supply sergeant. His training staff consists of three Lieutenants of the AID International Police Academy, another of the MP Officers course at Fort Galick in the Canal Zone, and the third of the one year police officer school of the El Salvador National Police. Beyond this, their experience and training in police subjects is limited.

A system of part time instructors is provided for in the budget but it was explained that funds to pay the \$15 per hour honorarium have been exhausted and few such instructors are presently being utilized. The instructors were supposedly drawn from sources outside the GN (such as lawyers) as well as on-duty GN officers. The practice needs renovation and control.

The program offers a one year course for recruits according to the following curriculum:

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

General Course for Police

MILITARY SUBJECT MATTER

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
1. Closed Order Drill	90
2. M1 Rifle - .30 Cal.	40
3. Revolver - .38 Cal.	21
4. Military Courtesy	24
5. Interior Watch	16
6. Military Hygiene and Health	20
7. Code of Military Justice	36
8. Map Reading	28
9. Hand Grenades	10
10. Manual of the Bayonet	10
11. Personal Defense (judo)	90
12. Exploration and Patrol	15
13. Open Order Drill	20
Total Hours	420

1. Director's Time	20
2. Guest Speakers	20
3. Vehicular Maintenance and Driving	90
4. M1 Rifle, Cal. .30 Target practice	32
5. Revolver, Cal. .38 Target practice	32
6. Vacations and unforeseen events	28
Total Hours	222

POLICE AND ACADEMIC SUBJECT MATTER

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
1. Police Baton (use of the emblem of authority)	20
2. Moral and Social Conduct	25
3. Civic Instruction	25
4. Spanish Grammar	40
5. Arithmetic and Geometry	40
6. Geography of Nicaragua	35
7. History of Nicaragua	30
8. Criminal proceedings	15
9. Civil Code	15
10. Penal Code	15
11. Constitutional Law	15
12. Criminal Investigations	50
13. Fingerprinting	30
14. Surveillance	25
15. Police, Immigration and Customs Regulations	20
16. Reporting, Making and classes of	20
17. Police Patrol Techniques	25
18. Handling of persons (prisoners)	15
19. Legal (forensic) Medicine	10
20. Control of Civil Disturbances	30
21. First Aid	15
22. Traffic	20
23. Records (files) making and use of	15
24. Counter-Insurgency	25
25. Drugs and Narcotics	15
Total Hours	590

NOTE: In the subject, Geography of Nicaragua, there is taught the relationship of the Tourism Centers with hotels, bathing resorts, principle rivers, highways to the other departments, hospitals, first aid centers, historic monuments and principle cities.

The physical plant consists of a long stucco-walled, tile-floored single story structure of typical open construction. It provides two offices, a large classroom, an exercise room and a large dormitory with a capacity for about 75 men. Bathroom and mess facilities are separate and, in the case of the latter, shared with the rest of the Military Academy. Range and other facilities exist. General equipment for audio-visual aids and practice ammunition reloading are lacking. Technical materials for the library are in fair supply, but need to be augmented. Lesson plans and materials, and instruction methods and techniques need improvement.

The Police Academy produces about thirty graduates each year. These men almost invariably remain in police work and wear a distinctive uniform of blue cotton. Some are now found in clerical jobs in the GN staff and service elements.

Recruits are selected according to the criterion explained in section above. The current class of fifty are all primary school graduates (sixth grade) and were selected from 256 aspirants. The attrition rate during the year's course is usually about 30% - 40%.¹⁴

3. *THE REPLACEMENT COMPANY:*

The Replacement Company of the 3rd Battalion is the training center for the military recruits of the Guard. Its curriculum for the twenty weeks course is strictly military in orientation (see curriculum at Annex H).

There are no other police in-service, advanced, correspondence or roll-call training programs in the Guard.

It is clear that the Guard recognizes its need for police training and has taken steps to fill this need. Moreover, the Guard also evidently recognizes the need to separate its police from its purely military functions.

E. PATROL

1. MANAGUA POLICE:

The Fourth Company has the primary responsibility for patrol in Managua. Forty-three men are assigned fixed posts throughout the city, and none are assigned to walking beats. The Company has seven Nissan jeeps and six new U.S. jeeps provided by the US MILGROUP, a total of thirteen vehicles. While four of the vehicles have radios, only two are in working order. Efforts are made to have four vehicles on patrol duty, four men to a vehicle. The city is divided into four police

¹⁴The relatively high quality of applicants and the ability of the Guard to be as selective as they are is probably due to the repressed state of the economy and the scarcity of other employment.

patrol zones that cover the downtown area. The men are assigned to work two 6-hour shifts in every 24 hours. As a practical matter only one or two of these vehicles actually are on the street at any one time.

The Fourth Company has 13 Sections that act as posts or precincts. These Sections are distributed throughout the city and are staffed by four to 31 men, with a junior officer in charge. While these Sections do not have organized patrols, per se, their men do move around within the limits of the area assigned to that section.

In addition to the above police-type patrol activities, the city is patrolled by four special vehicles known as BECATS (Special Brigade Against Assault, Terrorism, and Sabotage). A special organization developed five years ago to control major problems. These vehicles have four enlisted men and each group patrols for six hours and then is relieved. One patrol is supported by the Fourth Company (Police), one by the Traffic Department, one by the Third Company (Military), and one by the General Somoza Battalion. These four patrols act as an Immediate Reaction Force to major problems. Each one is assigned a zone to patrol (not the same as the Fourth Company patrols) in the greater Managua area. While these patrols are under the command of their units, they have radio contact with the Fourth Company police communications, and should be considered a valuable asset in maintaining law and order.

The Traffic Police are separate from the Fourth Company and provide their own patrols. Their system is described under the heading "Traffic".

F. INVESTIGATIONS

Within the Fourth Company there is a major, 2 captains, 1 Lieutenant and 24 investigators. While there are no statistics on the number of cases, it is estimated that the Fourth Company receives 10 requests to investigate major crimes a day, and the 13 sections (under the command of the Fourth Company) receive an additional 15 requests. Again, there are no statistics on the classification of crimes, but it is reported that robbery, burglary, assault and homicide are the major crimes. By inspection, it appears that homicide is abnormally high.

Political investigations, and investigations of special interest to the President are handled by the OSN (National Security Office) in the First Battalion. The OSN is staffed by 24 officers and 117 enlisted men.

Major crimes reported to the Sections (Precincts) within Managua are investigated by the officers and enlisted men assigned to the Fourth Company. Minor crimes are handled at the section level by the officer-in-charge, or an enlisted man.

Twenty per cent of the investigators have received some form of advanced training. Part of this training has been provided by the MilGroup in Panama. There is no special procedure for assigning cases, nor is there a formal system of reports and follow-ups. It is more of a "hit-and-miss" system. Within the Fourth Company there are two administrative offices that are also used for interrogations. There is a large room for evidence, with a simple control system. The Fourth Company has a very modest records center, with alpha, fingerprint, and photo file. However, it is so poorly organized and maintained that it is of limited value.

There are no scientific aids to support investigators, however, the US MILGROUP has ordered \$27,000 worth of crime lab and photo equipment to fulfill this need. Several officers are now undergoing training and the project should be in operation within one year.

(a) *Intelligence*

Intelligence in Nicaragua flows in two channels. The unofficial channel is composed of close family friends and employees reporting to the Somoza family. The second network is the Office of National Security (OSN), the only national organization in charge of intelligence and security.

The OSN is staffed entirely by National Guard personnel, numbering over 150 officers and enlisted men selected from the Presidential Guard Battalion. The Chief of the OSN is also head of the non-functioning G-2 Section of the National Guard. He is theoretically responsible to the Minister of Defense, but normally bypasses this and reports directly to the President.

This organization is responsible for the collection, analysis and reporting of domestic and international, civil and military areas of intelligence. Theoretically, their operations are divided into nine sections: Vigilancia (Presidential bodyguard); anti-communist; internal security; investigations and surveillance; supply; records; communications; finance; and transportation.

In practice, much of the OSN efforts are spent within the domestic political arena. Intelligence is recruited from within or from penetrations of subversive organizations, as well as from the foreign community. Foot and vehicular surveillances, wire-tapping and mail inspections are routine activities. Available technical equipment includes polygraph machines, tape recorders, 35 mm and minox cameras.

The primary function in foreign intelligence is monitoring the activities of Nicaraguan exiles and is performed by OSN officers stationed in the Embassies in Mexico, Honduras and Costa Rica. Also, liaison is routinely maintained with foreign security organizations with some degree of success.

G. RECORDS

The National Guard does not have a centralized criminal records system. Nor is there any evidence that they are aware of this law enforcement tool. In the Managua area there are several isolated criminal files with very valuable records that could be centralized.

The Fourth Company in Managua has a 3" x 5" alpha file with approximately 60,000 cards that date back to the early 1940's. Not all cards are criminal, and in many cases there are several cards for one person. These cards, however, contain a considerable amount of valuable information. There are over 6,000 7" x 7" fingerprint cards, some with photos, in a second alpha file. While there are three officers in the Fourth Company that can classify fingerprints, they lack the time to do so. As this is an alpha fingerprint file, the whole system could be converted to the Henry System with very little effort.

There is no formal Crime Report File, although Major Paul Lyon of the U.S. MILGROUP has started a modest program that has been in use for three months. The basic documents are a Daily Report, Arrest Report, and Crime Report.

There is a second criminal file in the Third Section. This section maintains a "county type" jail for commitments up to six months. Again it is a 3" x 5" alpha file with approximately 10,000 cards. Most of the cards have two fingerprints and a photograph.

Criminal records are very poor in the rural companies. A few have ledgers to record complaints received by the Guard. There is no requirement for forward criminal records to Managua.

It is reported that the OSN (National Security Office) has a good intelligence record system with index, photograph and report files. These records, however, are not available to those performing criminal police duties.

H. COMMUNICATIONS:

The entire communications situation of the Guard has been the subject of a recent joint A.I.D. Office of Public Safety/USSOUTHCOM Study dated November 21, 1968. This study should be updated as recommended in Section X of this report.

I. TRAFFIC

Vehicle traffic enforcement in Managua is carried out by an organization known as the Directorate of Traffic. The chain of command for this organization is

directly to the Chief of Staff and Director (the President) of the National Guard. Administratively, the 86 enlisted men assigned to this traffic organization are part of the Fourth Company (Managua police) and the nine officers are dispatched from the Third Company, a receding or a replacement type company. The organization is independent of other National Guard operational units. Table F is its organization chart. It occupies a two-story building with a number of small offices and a small parking lot near the National Stadium. The office space is inadequate and there is considerable crowding, considering the volume of visitors that are dealt with each day. Its physical location is two miles from the Fourth Company.

The principal function of this organization is to control, direct and enforce traffic regulations. A secondary function is to issue drivers' and vehicle licenses. The National Guard has a "Traffic Regulation" that sets forth rules and regulations for the use of the public roads and prescribes fines and penalties for their violation. Downtown Managua has several streets with parking meters and the traffic police have the responsibility to issue citations to violators.


While the principal function is to enforce laws, its men are also authorized to intervene in other police matters, as all members are drawn from the National Guard. As a rule they only intercede in non-traffic matters when there is no representatives of the Fourth Company, and maintain control of the situation until the proper authorities arrive.

The organization has a fleet of twelve motorcycles and eleven sedans. On the date of this report only nine motorcycles and four vehicles are operational and available for duty. The others are in need of repairs that are provided by the centralized National Guard garage. These vehicles are all radio-equipped and are on the same frequency with the vehicles of the Fourth Company. At any one time about half of the vehicles are on patrol, while the other half remains at traffic headquarters to respond to special situations, such as major accidents and escort duties. Traffic enforcement operations are carried out from 6:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight, seven days a week.

The Director of Traffic maintains modest statistics on types and locations of accidents and they report an average of twenty accidents a day. A rather sophisticated pre-printed form is used to record the details of the accidents, including a sketch of the accident scene. Two National Guard Officers review these field reports and in the case of minor property damage or non-injury accidents, make an effort to resolve the civil liabilities to the satisfaction of the parties involved. Major cases of injury accidents are forwarded to trial courts.

In addition to the normal police traffic enforcement functions, the organization also issues drivers' licenses, vehicle licenses, maintains violators records and maintains the necessary backup files. By Latin American standards the filing system

TABLE - F
NATIONAL GUARD TRAFFIC
COMPANY.



UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

and general office procedures appear to be outstanding. The drivers' license file is in alphabetical order and contains a considerable amount of biographic information on each licensed driver. The vehicle registration files are equally as complete and are filed by vehicle license number, registered owner and type of vehicle.

I. TRAFFIC CONDITIONS

The most serious traffic congestion is in the Managua area, a city of 400,000 inhabitants with approximately 20,000 motor vehicles. The streets are narrow and have blind intersections. In the downtown business district, the streets are well paved, graded, and in most cases, have concrete curbs that facilitate the drainage of water. Many intersections are controlled by overhead traffic signals in the center of the street, while others are posted with stop signs.

By inspection, it appears that the lack of community planning and proper traffic engineering is among the leading factors contributing to the congestion and accident rate. It is beyond the scope of this report to analyse the traffic situation in greater detail.

J. DETENTION

The Managua Police Company maintains a small jail (average fifty prisoners) used primarily as a temporary holding facility for persons under investigation by judicial or police authorities. Some prisoners, about 20%, are serving short sentences for infractions of the Police Regulations (See Chapter VII) by the Police Judge whole office and chambers are located in the Police Company.¹⁵

The jail is divided into five sections, but there are no individual cells. Prisoners are segregated among these sections by status (unsentenced prisoners, sentenced by the Police Judge, habitual criminals, and women). There is also a separate tank for GN personnel under punishment for infractions of the Military Code.

The large tanks are devoid of furniture, but clean and airy. Food is served three times a day on a budget of fourteen cents per person (usually beans and rice). Trustee labor is used for janitorial and even clerical work. The staff has had no special training. There are no exercise or recreation programs. Medical treatment, when needed, is provided at a state clinic.

The jail is under the direct supervision of a sergeant. He receives the prisoner with a confinement order that usually consists of the date, time, arresting authority,

¹⁵The Police Judge, a retired GN Colonel, is strictly under the authority of the Ministry of Government completely apart from the GN. Col. Rodriguez, the Managua Police Commandant, complained bitterly about the judge's harsh judgments and venality which he says reflects badly on the police. Rodriguez advised that he is quite trying to have the judge removed from office or at least physically relocated.

name or names of detainees and a one- or two-sentence description of the offense written on a plain piece of paper.

Typical of Latin America, the arrestees names with this basic data are then entered in ledgers, one by sequence and the other alphabetically. Each of the seventeen departmental companies has a similar facility.

The fourth section of the Managua police also maintains a jail with similarly arranged facilities for 300 prisoners who have been sentenced for misdemeanors up to six months. A separate section for juveniles under fourteen is maintained. Disposition of juvenile cases usually consists of locating some private home for them. There are a few state and privately sponsored reformatories, but nothing to meet the increasing demands.

One institution called the "Model Prison" (Carcel Modelo) was developed and jointly financed by state and private funds. It is the country's maximum security facility and is located in Tipitapa. Although under the Ministry of Government, it is staffed mostly by about 50 GN officers and men and is commanded by a GN colonel who has received extensive training in penology in Europe.

This prison, built in 1965 (although not yet complete), is an ultra modern and extremely well conceived correctional institution with a projected capacity of 500 prisoners (male, female and juvenile). Its present inmate population is 102 of which 80% are under long-term sentence for murder. (There are seven under sentence for crimes against the internal security of the state, all of whom are 18 to 25 years of age.)

I. SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT

Five years ago a special enforcement patrol system was inaugurated in Nicaragua to counter subversive activities and major crimes. This program known as the BECATS provides four vehicles patrolling assigned sections of Managua. Each patrol consists of our men, heavily armed, in a radio-equipped vehicle. Their primary mission is against bank robbers, armed assault, terrorists activities and sabotage. Each of the four vehicles is responsible to a different military unit for support and command, and there is very little coordination between various patrols and the Fourth Company (police) and the Director of Traffic. With the operation between the Fourth Company, the Directorate of Traffic and the BECATS, there are virtually three separate and overlapping law enforcement patrols in Managua, a serious waste of manpower and resources.

There are no special enforcement units in Managua or in rural companies to deal with narcotics.

2. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CONTROL

Nicaragua is one of the few countries in the world that has neither a juvenile court system nor a police element specializing in juvenile delinquency prevention and control. Although the law stipulates that juvenile offenders will be treated as civil rather than criminal cases, they more often are not. Some provision has been made by state and private rehabilitation centers and reformatories; however, they are inadequate to meet even the most basic requirements of a rehabilitative program and exist primarily as detention facilities. Most are simply fined and/or reprimanded and set free. No statistics are kept.

In the departmental companies, no formal means of dealing with juvenile offenders was found. The Commanders reported that offending youngsters were simply taken to their fathers who handle matters within the family. The largely rural character of most of Nicaragua makes such a system entirely appropriate, but the substantial growth of the youth population in Managua and attending problems of social disorganization associated with the resulting urbanization, is giving rise to juvenile delinquency problems that demand more systematic solutions.

Therefore, Nicaragua has begun studies that will lead to the establishment of a juvenile court system and the Managua police have appointed one captain to start a special delinquency prevention and control unit. He and four other Government officials recently attended a thirty-four day UNICEF course (sponsored by Uruguay but held in Panama) in juvenile delinquency matters. The officials have returned and have begun a pre-project study under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Government.

The Guard has also attempted to meet part of this need through the establishment of a rudimentary juvenile rehabilitation center in the 4th section in Managua. A small school of about thirty juvenile detainees is managed by a Guard Captain who with great interest and dedication acts as teacher, keeper and father confessor to the youngsters with whom he clearly has excellent rapport.

K. FACILITIES:

The facilities of the Guard range from excellent to poor. Most constructions are of the typical stucco-wall, tile-floor, tin roof style with high ceilings and large hallways needed for air circulation in the hot humid climate. The basic construction is that typical of most police installations throughout Latin America with structures designed as military strong points with a Fort-like appearance and offices arranged either in a "U" or square pattern around the courtyard. Most of the buildings are old but well maintained. Interior guard mounts are posted and there is usually a sentry dressed in military attire posted at the entrances. In one departmental capital, Masaya, concrete fortifications had been built out on the sidewalks

surrounding the front door of the police station. These are unnecessary and present an appearance to the public detrimental to proper police image. Precinct stations, of which there are eight in Managua, fortunately tend to be simple with room and space only for the basic requirements of staffing and for public services. The rent for these facilities runs in excess of \$250 a month each. That combined with the cost of staffing militates strongly against proliferation of precinct station. The cost of maintaining trucks necessary to distribute and collect foot and bicycle patrols as well as other radio patrol mobility is much less expensive, far more versatile and effective than the proliferation of precinct stations, even in a country with telephones available for called for services by the public are as limited as they are in Nicaragua. Facilities for staff service, administrative, logistics, services and the like are quite adequate by most standards.

The Headquarters of the Managua police, however, is among the poorest examples of facilities and early consideration should be given to complete renovation of this facility. Perhaps, the development of a modern police department station, modeled after that of an appropriately sized United States city might be considered at some future time. On the other extreme, the model prison in Tipitapa is an extremely modern building that has obviously been well engineered for its purpose. It is a medium security confinement facility for felony prisoners, male, female and juvenile. The facility is actually far more ample than its present inmate population of just over a hundred. However, it has the capacity to expand the population to at least five hundred inmates in the years to come. Facilities for the one, two, and three-man posts that are deployed throughout the country usually consists of a simple room. Area is partitioned and provides for the sleeping and living quarters, a desk and a telephone, a separate room with a small stone wood burning stove, a crude sink arrangement and a small cell for prisoners. In one such post visited in Tisma, the police post was found contiguous to the office of the mayor and other municipal offices. Although extremely rudimentary these facilities appear to be adequate for their intended function.

L. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES:

Basic equipment of the Guard is adequate in quantity and serviceable for most police related functions. Some equipment is inappropriate, especially in weapons and ammunitions. There is a lack of riot control equipment, training equipment and personal items of police equipment such as flashlights, handcuffs and the like, and items related to the investigative functions of the Guard.

Maintenance for vehicles, arms, radios and other items is the responsibility of the GN-4. Control maintenance facilities are established in Managua and function well. Technical skills are adequate but the shops suffer the common problem of

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the frequent loss of trained men to private industry. There is also a chronic shortage of spare parts, especially for the more sophisticated and military types of hardware. A system of mobile repair teams service vehicles in the interior companies. In general, the US Milgp effort in the maintenance area has been very successful.

Expendables such as paper, fuels and the like usually are in adequate supply in Managua but short in the departmental companies.

Accountability is fixed on the GN-4 who utilizes the US military "company property book" system left by the Military. Inventories are made each six months.

Inventories of basic equipment for the departmental companies, as well as a detailed inventory of the Managua Police, appear at Annex C. It is clear that most basic equipment requirements for the Guard are being met through self-help efforts and programmed MAP equipment deliveries. (See Chapter VIII). It is recommended, however, that jeeps now planned for the radio patrol be changed to compact sedans more appropriate for police use.

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M. SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS:

The enforcement of laws related to the vices: narcotics, prostitution, alcohol, and gambling violations, is not a special function of any element of the Guard. Although there are regulations governing such matters, particularly in the Police Regulations (municipal ordinance type code), these are more honored in the breach than in the observance. The enforcement power is more often used as a means to extort, bribes and gratuities than to control vice.¹⁶

The enforcement of laws related to alcohol taxes is a matter delegated to the Ministry of Finance. Although his budget shows a six hundred man Guard contingent involved in the enforcement of laws related to national fiscal policies, these men in reality make up part the Guard that falls directly under the control of the Chief of staff and the Director General. According to the Minister of Finance, General Gustavo Montiel, he does have a group of about sixty customs agents. Many of these men are retired Guard personnel who are actively engaged in the control of contraband at the frontiers and at ports and do occasionally raid illegal stills manufacturing liquor when requested by a departmental company commander. Most of these men are based in Managua.

Narcotics is not yet a serious problem, but concern over the growth of the use of marijuana and LSD among the youth was expressed by the National Guard Chief of Staff, General Noguera. He reports that most of the marijuana used is not grown in the country but rather imported from Costa Rica. He asked for special help in stemming this problem before it grows to unmanageable proportions. There has as yet been no effort to establish a special narcotics unit.

1. CIVIL DISTURBANCES:

Few of the departments have reported significant civil disturbances except in Grenada and Leon where there are universities. Most disturbances have been related to political activities preceeding an election. In most cases the First Batallion element of about forty soldiers trained in military riot control techniques place themselves strategically out of sight of a potential riot and respond only when the situation becomes unruly. This, however, is extremely rare.

The present Chief of the Managua Police, Col Francisco Rodriguez Somoza, was famed for his successful efforts to prevent such trouble by establishing dialogue with university administrators and student leaders during disturbances of last year in Grenada, where he was the departemental company commander. As chief of the Managua police, he expresses deep concern over the military orientation of the riot control element of the Guard. He reports that they "react like soldiers" which is

¹⁶The Police Regulation, for example, requires that there be as many beds as prostitutes in a house of prostitution. Reportedly, this regulation is rarely enforced.

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wholly inappropriate to the requirements of problems that they face. He rightly fears that they are likely to provoke more violence than to manage violence. He strongly believes that riot control should be a civil police function using civil police techniques utilizing provisional elements of the Managua police as first line civil disturbance control units.

2. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CONTROL:

Aside from the activities reported under "Investigation" above, there is no special juvenile court system. An effort is being made by the Ministry of Government with Guard participation to develop one. There are few reformatories, mostly privately owned and run by religious organizations. But these are limited compared to the growing demand. The fact is that in ten years Nicaragua will have about one and one half million teen-agers, about half the projected population. A glance at the limited number of secondary vocational and university students (See Chapter V above), a cursory examination of the housing and job situation, and the population projections reported in Annex D, and that the population growth is far greater in urban than rural parts of the country, indicates that there will be a large number of youngsters without jobs, without educational opportunity, without housing, and with time on their hands to creative mischief of untold proportions in the very few years to come.

Although the vast majority of these youngsters will be well-behaved people, the time honored maxim that about five per cent of the population can be counted on to be thoroughly criminal in their inclinations gives one some idea of the magnitude of the problem that Nicaragua will soon face. Concerted efforts at best and any effort at all will be essential to managing the enormous problems that Nicaragua will face in juvenile delinquency prevention and control.

N. PUBLIC RELATIONS

For responsibility for public relations is placed under the GN-5 important function involves the administration of the military justice system within the guard. The public relations effort is largely centered on the filing of new briefs to the media on the civic action activities of the guard also once each year there is a dated celebration devoted to the guard during which parades and exhibitions of military aspects of the guard remain. A review is published each year. It largely for the domestic consumption of the members of the guard and is not given a wide spread public distribution.

The GN-5 Col Montaye holds a press conference each morning in which he reports news worthy items involving the guard and the guard activities in general terms to the representatives of all of the public media.

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Although some units have officers designated as public relation officers they function primarily as spokesman to the media, carry out relatively very few active public relations functions.

There is no community relations activity as such and the concept is entirely absent from the guard. The image of the guard is fair to good in rural areas. The team questioned good many Americans in an effort to get not only their impressions but impressions reported to them by various elements of the Nicaraguan society which they have contact, including those of the opposition. Although there is some complaints heard against arrogant or abrasive guards in rural areas they are usually respected as legitimate authority and perform a role associated with that of a sheriff or "Mat Dillon" type of character in the small rural community. The image of the guard in the eyes of the officials interviewed in rural and small town communities is that authority backing up the legal functions that are carried out by the mayors and police chiefs in these same communities.

The image of the guard in the urban setting is regarded as poor to bad. As was readily admitted by guard officers of all rank although ashamed of the corruption the Managua police chief explained that it was so thoroughly institutionalized throughout the guard as follows other parts of the government throughout the society. He was finding it extremely difficult to control. Primary complaint against the guard by elements of legitimate opposition was not the abusive authority nor the meddling in political matters but rather simply the corruption. This is not unusual where policemen who are underpaid and faced with the daily temptation characteristic of the policeman job. A considerable effort however will be needed to improve the image of guard not only through the more efficient and humane performance of the daily tasks and contact with the public but also in their appearance and their attitude toward authority. Ample evidence in the team that resulted from the teams examination of the guards military justice assistance that the article most frequently used in court marshals of guards working in contact with the people, i.e. the police is that related to abusive authority and indeed that part of the article is noted in the military justice manual of the GN-5 had been underlined in ink. Between 50 and 60% of men court martialed under that article had been court martialed for abusive authority, clearly showing not only a recognition on the part of the guard that the need to control but an active effort to control.

O. BUDGET

Several studies have been made in an effort to identify the cost of national defense and internal security of Nicaragua. The following table presents the dollar figures of the national budget and the defense budget for the years 1967 through 1970:

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(\$000)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
NATIONAL BUDGET	\$96,212	\$94,473	\$94,147	\$98,031
DEFENSE BUDGET	\$10,339	\$10,494	\$10,254	\$12,076

The figures shown in the "Defense" budget do not represent true defense costs, as the National Guard provides a number of civil type services, such as civil communications, postal services, and airport services. In an effort to identify the true military and police type activities in the "Defense" budget the attached table, gives a breakdown by component costs.

BUDGET YEAR - CY 1970

<u>Program</u>	<u>DOLLARS (\$000)</u>	
<i>Category</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Total</i>
Central Administration		297
Min of Def Off	62	
General Admin	157	
Supvr of Telecomm	15	
Port Commands	64	
National Defense		6,136
General Hq and Ground Element	4,149	
Air Element	1,422	
Sea Element	46	
Medical Care and Hospitals	519	
Military and Police Training		184
Aeronautical Service		299
Director of Civil Aviation	51	
Admin of Airports	248	
Meteorology Services		137
Catastro and Natural Resources	98	
Hidrometeorology	39	
National Radio		175

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Communications Service		2,318
General Admin	195	
Postal Services	341	
Telegraph & Telephone Services	1,763	
Communications School	20	
Radio Service		448
Running Transfers		769
Expansion of Telephone Net		1,313
TOTAL BUDGET		\$12,076

The budget for the Minister of Defense as indicated above represents approximately 12% of the total national budget. However, of the total MOD budget the following are considered as pure expenditures for national defense and amount to only approximately 6.6%.

Office of the Minister	62	
General Administration	157	
National Defense	6,136	
Military & Police Training	184	
		\$6,539

Table G is annual distribution of operational expenses in dollars.

TABLE - G

(\$000)

<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>\$6,208</u>
Civilian Employees		784
Uniforms and Clothing		516
Arms and Equipment		36
Food for Horses		5
Vehicles and Motor Maintenance		168
Transportation for Troops		84
Maps and Office Supplies		36
Intelligence Service		8
Rents, Repairs and Construction of Buildings		408
Gasoline and Lubricants		108
Electric Lights		45

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Other Costs	984
Food for Personnel	1,416
Prisons and Penitentiaries	84
Medical Supplies and Hospital Maintenance	336
Air Force	936
National Radio and National Guard Radio Systems	156
Coast Guard	36
Welfare	1
National Guard Magazine	1
Director of Traffic	60

TABLE - H

FOURTH COMPANY (POLICE)
MANAGUA

EXPENSES FOR MAY 1970

<u>TOTAL EXPENSES</u>	<u>\$5,076.00</u>
Intelligence	\$ 86.00
Repairs	\$ 850.00
Food (Enlisted Men)	\$2,720.00
Food (Prisoners)	\$1,420.00

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VII. THE COURT SYSTEM

The Court System is patterned primarily after the inherited Continental "inquisitorial" systems of Spain, France, etc., but has undergone some changes, and is now modeled after the Chilean Law of Tribunals of 1850. The characteristic principles of presumption of guilt, written law, written argument, judicial power of inquiry, flexible rules of evidence, the absence of judicial review powers and case law contrast with our own system, but are no less (or more) workable in obtaining justice. There is some effort to use the jury system. Basic rights such as habeas corpus, protection against self-incrimination, appeal, the requirement of search and arrest warrants, protection against double jeopardy and the right to speedy trial are protected. Moreover, illegally obtained evidence is excluded, ex post facto laws may be applied only to the defendant's benefit, and juveniles may only be treated under civil rather than criminal procedures. These and other guarantees make the formal system similar in many respects to our own.

1. THE SUPREME COURT

The courts, like the police, are national in scope and organization. The highest is the Supreme Court of Justice of seven justices elected for five years, by the Congress in plenary session, but from Presidential nominees. They must be between 35 and 70 years old with ten years of law practice. The court itself elects its own president each year. His authority encompasses the entire judicial power through financial, corrective and directive supervision.

2. CIRCUIT COURTS (*Appeal*)

At the next level, there are five appellate courts (Leon, Masaya, Granada, Matagalpa, and Bluefields) and the Superior Labor Court. Each has five or six magistrates with jurisdiction divided between civil and criminal matters. They are elected for four years in the same manner as Supreme Court justices and may be reelected. They must be between 30 and 70 with five years legal practice.

3. DISTRICT COURTS

A district court of several criminal and civil judges appointed for two years by the Supreme Court is found in each of the sixteen departments. They have original jurisdiction in felony cases.

4. LOCAL COURTS

Each municipality (*municipio*) has at least one judge with original jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases and authority to bind over felony cases to the District Courts. They are appointed by the Supreme Court for one year but may succeed themselves indefinitely. Qualifications for District and Local Court judges are substantially less rigorous than those of the higher courts. It is not unusual to find judges without legal training.

In the very small communities of the "*comarcas*" (subdivision of "*municipio*") and "*cantones*" (a subdivision of "*comarca*") are found minor judicial authorities called "*juezes de mesa*" (judges of the table) and "*juezes de canton*" (judges of the Canton.) They are locally appointed by the municipal mayors but rarely exercise authority if a Guard "Commandante" is anywhere near. The people regard the "Commandante" as the true authority and generally tend to take their complaints to him. He has some peace authority by the police code to prescribe minor fines, work on local work projects, house arrest and very short-term confinement.

The President of the Court recognizes the need of his judicial authorities to learn modern concepts of criminology and criminalistics. He believes they should participate in courses provided police elements of the GN.

(a) *The Criminal Law*

The criminal law is embodied in the Penal Code of 1891 based on the Chilean laws. It has recently been revised and the new draft is under consideration of the Congress. The Code is law in all parts of the land although local governments may and do make their own ordinances usually limited to matters related to commerce and trade.

Juvenile offenders are governed apart from the system prescribed for adults. Offenders under 10 are considered incompetent of guilty intent and not responsible for their acts. Between 10 and 16, judgment in the issue of responsibility is made on the merits of each case. Between 16 and 18, responsibility is assumed but treated as a civil matter.

Crimes are divided into three categories in descending order of seriousness:

1. "*Crimen*" — most serious, comparable to felonies, usually including death or injury with malice, treason in time of war, etc.
2. "*Delitos*" — serious misdemeanors and minor felonies.
3. "*Faltas*" — minor misdemeanors.

Punishment corresponds to the gravity of the offense and again fall into three categories:

1. "Penas graves" - (severe punishment) prescribe capital punishment, long prison terms for such crimes as murder, treason (war-time) and "compromising the independence of the state."
2. "Penas Menos Graves" - (less serious punishment).
3. "Penas Leves" - (light punishment) short-term confinement, fine, forced labor, etc.

A rather detailed and complex system of aggravating circumstances is prescribed for consideration of the penalty. There is also a system of sentences graded in five steps for each category of seriousness of offense. Each step is further refined in three degrees of sentence: minimum, medium and maximum.¹⁷

Scale of Sentences in Nicaragua

	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Sentence Medium</i>	<i>Maximum</i>
More Serious (penitentiary expatriation, deprivation of rights, etc.)			
Grade 1	1 year	2 years	3 years
2	4 years	5 years	6 years
3	7 years	8 years	9 years
4	10 years	11 years	12 years
5	13 years	14 years	15 years
Less Serious (prison, exile, confinement, etc.)			
Grade 1	4 months	8 months	1 year
2	16 months	20 months	2 years
3	28 months	32 months	3 years
4	40 months	44 months	4 years
5	52 months	56 months	5 years
Light Sentences (confinement)			
Grade 1	40 days	50 days	2 months
2	70 days	80 days	3 months
3	100 days	110- days	4 months
4	130 days	140 days	5 months
5	160 days	170 days	6 months

¹⁷Codigo Penal de Nicaragua.

Scale of Sentences in Nicaragua (Continued)

	<u>Sentence</u>		
	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Minor Offenses (detection, etc.)			
Grade 1	2 days	4 days	6 days
2	8 days	10 days	12 days
3	14 days	16 days	18 days
4	20 days	22 days	24 days
5	26 days	28 days	30 days

There is also a "Police Regulation"¹⁸ of Nicaragua established in 1880 and most recently revised in 1952. It is comparable to the average U.S. city code of municipal ordinances. It prescribes a host of regulations in such matters as: vagrancy, drunkenness, gambling, weights and measures, carrying of arms, bells, public decency and morals, prostitution, medical quackery, domestic servants, health and sanitation, hotels, public bathrooms, railways, fish and game, country fairs and domestic order. There are many more and the above are offered merely to illustrate the scope of this code.

The penalties prescribed are minor and include public work tasks, fines, seizure of property (usually contraband items), short-term confinement, public and private reprimand.

Although originally the sole jurisdiction of the civil police system of the Ministry of Government (Jefes Politicos, etc.), they now share this responsibility with the urban and rural police of the Guard. (See Chapter V). In most communities, the resident Guard member is considered the first authority.

¹⁸Reglamento de Policia de la Republica de Nicaragua (8th Ed.) 1952.

VIII. PAST A.I.D. PUBLIC SAFETY ASSISTANCE

Most A.I.D. public safety assistance of the past has been limited to training of participants. A list of those sent to the United States for participant training and the courses they attended is attached at Annex C. The cost of this activity is indicated in figure 5.

In 1964, Nicaragua received a radio teletype from the United States at a cost of fifteen thousand dollars for participation in the network provided by A.I.D. to the six countries of Central America and Panama for the purpose of the exchange of information regarding traveling criminals, subversives and the like. This facility still remains in the Office of National Security under the GN-2. It is used for its intended purpose and continues to be well-maintained. No other commodities have been provided.

In 1965 a short survey of contraband control activity was done by an A.I.D. public safety advisor, but the survey was never published. Since 1965 assistance has been provided on a temporary duty basis by the A.I.D. Public Safety Regional Immigration Advisor to the Guardia Nacional Immigrations element. This is the subject of a separate survey and series of progress reports and is not treated here.

Nicaragua has also received TDY assistance in criminal and subversive records for the Office of National Security during the period 1964 to 1968. These records are still in effect and functioning according to the purpose for which designed. The costs of these visits are included in the funds indicated in figure 5.

Essentially, Public Safety assistance has been an increasing focus of the Military Assistance Program which has to a large degree completed its technical assistance efforts in the military internal security/counter insurgency field. Many of the operational capabilities developed for military counter insurgency purposes have been useful in for performance of routine as well as counter subversive law enforcement functions by the guard. This includes the development of certain aspects of the air arm of the Guard as well as the Coast Guard.

Moreover, US military assistance in administration, management, logistics, and maintenance for the Guard staff and logistics elements have also tended to support and strengthen the Public Safety operational elements of the Managua Police Company and the departmental companies. A resumé and description of the past and present military assistance program is as follows:

IX. THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM¹⁹

The following description of the U.S. Military Assistance Program was taken almost verbatim from the excellent briefing provided by the COMUSMILGP, Col. Swett.

The Mission of the MILGP is to provide technical advice and assistance to the National Guard.

Conduct military assistance planning and programming including FMS.

Direct and coordinate U.S. military assistance effort in Nicaragua. Purpose is to:

1. Assist in creating environment which fosters Nicaraguan development and enables Nicaraguans to manage progress.
2. Demonstrate effectiveness of U.S. civilian-military relationships.

MILGP STAFFING

The MILGP has a staff of 18 officers and enlisted men. Within one year, however, it will be reduced to 8 men and redesignated a military mission. During this transition, it will consist of the following:

Chief, U.S. Military Mission (to be retained)
Senior Air Force Advisor (to be retained)
Senior Army Advisor (to be eliminated)
Mission Executive Officer (to be eliminated)
Mission Adjutant (to be retained)
Logistic Advisor (to be retained)
Military Police Advisor (to be retained)
Combat Arms Advisor (to be retained)
Army Supply Advisor (to be retained)
Air Force Supply Advisor (to be retained)
Air Force Maintenance Advisor (to be eliminated)
Administrative Supervisor (to be eliminated)
Crew Chief (to be eliminated)
Army Maintenance Advisor (to be eliminated)

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date- MAR 17 198J

¹⁹MILGP Briefing, June 1970, Managua, Nicaragua.

Service Section Functions:

Provide advice and technical assistance:

1. Public Safety – Municipal, Traffic, and Rural Police Activities.
2. Combat arms as public safety backup.
3. Civic Actions – well digging, road building and improvements, school desk making, "how to" manuals for campesinos, disaster or humanitarian relief activities, etc.
4. Air activities (control of Mediterranean fruit fly).
5. Training-recruit,
6. Logistic improvement.
7. Plans and operations.

Prepare service portions of MAP submission.

Monitor equipment.

TRAINING

MAP training has been provided as follows:

<u>1950-63</u>	<u>1964-69</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2366	1348	209	3923

MAP Expenditures (000 dollars)

	FY63 & prior	FY64	FY65	FY66	FY67	FY68	FY69	FY70
Total	5174	1307	1140	1384	1249	970	1040	951
Training	3029	929	761	598	568	610	675	648
Materials	2145	382	379	789	581	360	369	313

Yet undelivered equipment includes:

1. Six OH-6A helicopters and 3 T-63 engines
2. Call Director system and teletype for
3. Cessna 185 (replacement) and 0470 engine
4. Tools and replacement trucks
5. Crime lab equipment.

Milgroup training that has been provided in public safety subjects are as follows:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
FBI Academy		1
International Police Academy	20	14
Criminal Investigation (Canal Zone)	10	10
MP Officer (Canal Zone)	3	10
MP Enlisted (Canal Zone)	10	15
Criminal Investigation - Ft. Gordon	3	2
Crime Lab Training		
Crime Lab Photo		1
Crime Lab Chemistry		1
Document Examination		1
Fingerprints		1

MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS

FY 69	4 weeks Physical Security Survey	10 students
FY 69	10 weeks Riot and Area Control	30 students
FY 69	5 weeks Criminal Investigation	29 students

The emphasis of MILGP assistance in the security sector has shifted from internal security to public safety assistance. The focus is as follows:

To establish a program of modernizing GN police elements.

To establish a career pattern of training for GN officers and police NCO's.

To extend and improve the GN Police Academy.


To improve capability to prevent, detect and solve crimes with a crime laboratory and improvements of public administrative procedures.

To improve traffic safety.

PAST AID PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING

ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS HISTORY NICARAGUA

(dollars in
thousand)



Note: No Mission Funding in 1969 - only MAP Funding.

Figure - 5.

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X. FUTURE STUDIES REQUIRED

1. *Criminalistics:*

A technical analysis of the plans for the development of a criminalistic laboratory is needed to determine:

- a. The appropriateness of criminalistics facilities and equipment.
- b. The appropriateness of installing the lab in the Managua police or elsewhere.
- c. The role of the Judicial power in the lab program.

2. *Communications:*

A thorough analysis of the telecommunications requirements of the Managua Police and the departmental companies is needed and should be done as a joint updating of the LACE study (OPS and USSOUTHCOM) of November 1968.

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Date- MAR 17 1981

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XI. ANNEXES

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ORIGIN ACTION		
P.R.A.-10		
RM	REP	AF
1		
ARA	LUR	FC
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
L	FDD	AID
		9
	STPH	5/5
	1	10
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USFA	NSA
34	10	3
Pass-5		7/10
		6

DEPARTMENT OF SECRET
AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR
9
C. J. H. H.

TO : Department of State

Department Please Pouch to Amembassy GUATEMALA, Amembassy
SAN SALVADOR, Amembassy TEGUCIGALPA, Amembassy
SAN JOSE, USCINCSO

FROM : Amembassy MANAGUA DATE: SEP 11 1969

SUBJECT : Role of the Military in Latin America: Nicaragua

REF : State 128400, 137474, CA-4404; Nicaragua CASP for
1969; USSOUTHCOM Military Assistance Plan for
FY 1970

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

Introduction. This airgram is submitted in response to the State/Defense request for our information and comment on the role of the military in Latin America. It should be noted that many of the questions raised by Washington agencies (particularly General Kenney's questions in Deptel 137474) appear more relevant to, say, Peru and Panama than to the Nicaraguan scene. Where applicable, however, we have tried to address the points raised and to make clear what the actual position is here in a country where the government--while not a military one--depends heavily on the military for the nation's stability and for its own continuance in office.

Background. The Nicaraguan Constitution and actual practice authorizes only one armed force--the National Guard--with the President as Jefe Supremo. Anastasio Somoza Debayle has acted as the executive of the military ever since his father's death in 1956 (during the 1966-67 presidential campaign he temporarily gave up the title and salary but not the authority). The three

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DATE: Col. W. Watt / POL: PK Johnson: pal 9/9/69
 Content and Classification Approved by: LCH: MRBarnaby
 Clearances: (in draft) POL: J. Stiggs (in draft)

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enclosed charts depict: (a) the President and the national government structure; (b) the President in his role as Jefe Director of the National Guard which illustrates the limited role of the Ministry of Defense; and (c) the National Guard structure (see also IR 2 870 0099 68). More than merely holding the title of Jefe Director, President Somoza holds to himself all significant planning, direction, and supervision duties. He exercises direct personal control over all Guard units, down to and including the internal security companies in outlying departmental capitals. While a general staff exists, it is not truly a planning and coordinating group but rather provides the services necessary to carry on day-to-day housekeeping functions.

The size of the Guard is approximately 6,000, including 550 officers. In equipment the individual Nicaraguan soldier is usually armed with an M-1 Rifle, a pistol, or a U.S. World War II .45 calibre submachine gun (grease gun). There has been no introduction of modern small arms or armored vehicles. There are 7 light tanks and 6 half tracks of World War II vintage, and the Guard has 35 (approximately 30 operational) Staghound T-17A1 armored cars purchased some years ago from Israel. In aircraft the Guard has 5 T-33's jets armed with two .50 calibre machine guns each; one T-33 unarmed trainer; five T-28's; four C-47's, four B-26 light bombers; and various Cessna 180's. Delivery of six MAP-supplied OH-6A helicopters starts September, 1969, but will not be completed until later. The maintenance on these aircraft is average or above by Latin American standards; however, lack of spare parts and combat training limits their potential use. The small airforce (approximately 300 personnel) like the balance of the Guard is directed towards an internal security role.

The majority of the National Guard's 550 officers come from middle and lower middle income families, most of which are probably supporters of the long dominant Liberal Party. Conscription has thus far been unnecessary here. The all-volunteer enlisted corps is largely from campesino backgrounds. Up to 95% are in the 18 to 30 age group at the time of entry, with the balance in the 16 to 18 bracket. About 80% are illiterate upon entry, and about 25% are still completely illiterate upon completion of the five-month basic training course. (Guard training does provide the country with some of its better qualified hospital corpsmen and radio and communications technicians after the men leave the Guard.) Two years ago Guard personnel stationed outside Managua seemed largely composed of obese and aged soldiers, but the training and recruitment program now is producing younger and more adaptable soldiers (see para 5 IR 2 870 0086 68).

The officers receive their primary education at local civilian schools and then secondary training at the Nicaraguan Military Academy. This four-year academy was founded under U.S. sponsorship in 1939. It provides what in effect is the students' last three years of high school; a six-month general agriculture and animal husbandry course; and attendance at the one-year Cadet Course at the USA-RSO Canal Zone school. The Academy also has small police and communications schools for selected enlisted personnel. Although an occasional training course is held here, there is no

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advanced military training in-country nor could the Guard finance such training. A few officers attend courses at the National University and the Central American University, with the majority of the Guard's lawyers and doctors coming from these two schools. Most of the advanced training--technical and professional--is obtained through MAP-sponsored courses at Canal Zone and CONUS schools. A few officers also attend military academies and universities in other Latin American and European Countries, and one a year attends the Inter-American Defense College.

Although inhibited by the preeminence in the Guard during the last eight to nine years of the original or "First Promotion" graduates of the Military Academy, as well as by the initiative-dampening practices of President Somoza, Nicaragua nevertheless has a fairly well-rounded youthful officer group. They are by and large a rugged lot, relatively well inured to discipline and work, and they represent a move into government leadership roles of young men from the middle and the lower middle income groups. The absence of an advanced military school here where officers can focus on purely Nicaraguan problems on both a real and a philosophic level may have two interrelated results: (a) much less impetus to the military to focus on national problems or to assert greater leadership influence in bringing about improvement in the country; and (b) a diminution of the commonly-observed Latin American tendency for military groups to take political initiatives. The innovative technocrat in the military who is conscious of the country's problems really has not yet been developed here.

Current and Future Role in Society. Although small in size, the strength of the military stands out in relation to the weakness of potential insurgent or other opposition elements of the society. The majority of the largely rural population of Nicaragua probably has considerable confidence in the Guardia Nacional and feels reassured by its effectiveness in containing terrorism and maintaining law and order. The Guard, particularly the NCO's and privates, come from this population and remain close to it. Even in the smallest pueblo where a soldier is stationed he is frequently looked to for leadership in an emergency. City dwellers are no doubt less inclined to accept "the policeman is your friend" concept, and some mistrust and fear of the Guard undoubtedly exists in both cities and rural areas. Most political opposition groups in Nicaragua feel antagonistic toward the Guard, but for differing reasons. Those in the minority at the left (Social Christians, independent Liberals, communists) probably view the Guard as at the root of what they see as their problems as the persecuter of the people and a barrier to social, political, and economic justice, which--along with the Somozas' rule--must be overthrown. They also consider U.S. support of the Guard as support of the Somozas, and therefore probably link U.S. Latin America policy with support for what they consider to be "military dictators." The only major opposition party, the Conservative Party, has more ambivalent and complex views about the Guard. On the one hand, like other opposition groups, they see the Guard as a force that has kept the Somozas in power for more than thirty years and when the crunch has come--in elections or civil disturbances such as those of January, 1967--has kept them from taking power.

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But Conservative leaders also recognize the need for a national constabulary force, and if they were able to take power they would want to retain such a force to preserve the nation's stability. (Conservatives could also be expected to try to remodel the Guard, to eliminate its present close connection with the Liberal Party and to make it into either a less partisan or a pro-Conservative force.) Also, the propertied interests among the Conservatives are now, and presumably would remain, desirous of having the Guard take care of any guerrilla or terrorist threats as well as criminal activities which threaten them, their families, and their property. This point is particularly pertinent in the light of repeated armed robberies of banks and other businesses, and the recent kidnapping of a wealthy Chinandega farmer (Embtel 778), crimes which genuinely alarmed wealthier and prominent Nicaraguans of whatever political affiliation.

The Guard has a small but active civic action unit, the Engineer Company, which functions under the G-4 and collaborates to a degree with the Ministry of Public Works. We have seen no evidence of interference or jurisdictional disputes with other governmental agencies. Civic action also does not in any sense post a threat to civilian control since the military has no plan or timetable for social/economic nation building but merely takes orders. The role of civic action has been in the construction of minor penetration roads, wells, and school furniture, and also in the provision of emergency relief supplies. The President usually through well publicized ceremonies makes sure that the civic action projects redound to his benefit and the benefit of the Liberal Party.

The Ministry of Defense also exerts some effect on the economic sphere. It can be somewhat equated to a Ministry of Transportation and Communications; it provides airport management, civil aviation supervision, a meteorological service, port commanders, and supervision of civil radio and TV stations as well as of the national postal and telephone service. The Ministry also owns an exclusive chain of stores through which all ammunition and firearms are sold. The National Guard (not the Ministry of Defense) operates a shoe and boot factory for the servicemen, but the product is also sold commercially through civilian outlets in Central America (this is the second largest shoe factory in Nicaragua). All but four of LANICA Airlines' commercial pilots are Air Force officers on extended leave and quite a few of the local crop-dusters and their mechanics are Air Force moonlighters.

In the future as the population increases in size and social and economic problems become more complex the Guard role will probably remain the same. Elements of the Guard with social consciousness exist; they are likely to continue to depend on President Somoza to define their responsibility. Internal security, including routine constabulary duties, will almost certainly remain their primary mission. Also they can be expected-however willingly or grudgingly is another matter-to support the Somoza dominance of Nicaraguan political life. The existent but undeveloped social awareness of Guard officers might come to the forefront with a change in government. A similar change, however, could also come about once the first two or

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three "Promotions" have been retired and a more equitable distribution of assignments is forced upon the Guard leadership. Under present circumstances low basic pay, in part at least, inhibits such a development; there are only 10 to 12 well paying assignments in the structure and entirely too much of an officer's attention is necessarily focused on financial and political survival. If he and his family are to be successful in their hoped-for move to higher income and social status, he must keep his efforts focused, at least under present circumstances, on "staying right with the boss," i.e. President Somoza.

Role in Political Development. For the last thirty years the Guard has been a force for stability and maintenance of the Somozas in power. However, the present government should by no means be considered a military regime--rather it is an elected civilian government in which the military (1) is dominated by the chief executive and (2) is also responsible to a great extent for the security of that executive. The government also derives support from the coinciding interests of a great majority of the country's businessmen and other elite groups with the Somozas' political and business interests. With the Somozas leading a country which over the long term is moving towards political democracy and a liberalization of attitudes, the Guard has not expressed any independent political attitudes of its own, and must continue to be counted loyal to the Somoza administration and dependent on it. While there are occasional ambitious and articulate individuals among their number, Guard officers probably accept the general proposition that certain areas are properly in civilian hands. There is little if any evidence of a desire to expand their present range of influence and authority. The Guard easily lives and cooperates with the National Liberal Party (most officers are members of the PLN) but mistrusts the Conservatives, who in the past were involved in attempts to overthrow Somoza-led regimes by force. There is a tendency in the rank and file of the Guard to lump the Social Christians, communists, student agitators, and other oppositionists all together as "communists" threatening the nation's internal security. Of late, however, the Chief of the Office of National Security and certain other mature military leaders have acted with moderation and even political skill in dealing with strikes, student demonstrations, and similar incidents.

With regard to the immediate future the Guard will undoubtedly continue to be controlled by President Somoza and will remain in its traditional role as the key to stability in a situation where its traditional role as the key to stability in a situation where slow social change and political liberalization is taking place. Depending on the will of the President; however, the Guard also could function as a repressive agent attempting to slow down or stop this evolutionary change. Barring presently unforeseen developments, the Guard will do President Somoza's bidding with regard to the 1972 presidential elections after the President decides on his course of action. Less foreseeable is what might happen if for any reason Somoza should suddenly lose power. The Guard would certainly play a key role in such a situation, since no political group could take power without at least their tacit support, which it

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probably would give finally to trusted PLN politicians whom they have known for years and feel comfortable with.

In the more distant future slippage in the Guard commitment to democracy and a military take-over could be postulated if a number of presently unlikely developments should take place, such as: a loss of Guard confidence in the Somoza regime; a perceived threat to Guard interests posed by a government of the opposition which after taking office proves hostile to the Guard; growth of a powerful opposition hostile to the Guard which might have a chance to gain power; or growth of a technocrat group within the Guard which is innovative, involved in the social and economic problems of the country, ambitious and convinced that group members can do a much better job of running the country than the civilian politicians.

The Military Establishment and National Security. The primary mission of the National Guard is internal security which includes all public safety responsibilities for the nation. The Guard's anti-subversion capability is modest but it has demonstrated an ability to control small-scale threats to internal security. It is not a conventional military organization and could not contain a well-organized level of insurgency without external assistance. (We believe, however, it can cope with any presently predictable types and levels of rural or urban insurgent activity.) Nicaragua's security is not now threatened by any of its neighbors and probably will not be (although recently President Somoza has been increasingly preoccupied by the future plans of El Salvador in the wake of the war with Honduras). The President may, in the future, devote more attention to planning and organizing to meet an external threat; however, to date the Guard has had no plans for expansion and views fairly realistically its primary internal security mission. Also, Nicaragua has avoided excessive military expenditures and the acquisition of sophisticated military equipment.

During his Presidential campaign President Somoza privately and publicly indicated intentions to begin a program of modernization and improvement of techniques; however, in practice he has been reluctant to make extensive or accelerated changes. Nor has he been willing to delegate authority to others who might wish to improve their operational functions. Moreover, the institutionalized use of a fee system as a major source of supplementary income for Guard officers weakens their individual moral fibre and civil respect but strengthens their ties to the Chief Executive. This militates against any change, including adoption of a compensation system based solely on adequate salaries and inhibits the development of a modern, dedicated, professional force. Also budgetary stringency has worked against augmented spending on salaries for the Guard.

Military Relationships with Other Countries. Prior to the 1958 fall of Perez Jimenez and the death of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, Venezuela asserted an influence through training offered to National Guard officers. Since 1958 Nicaragua has accepted occasional "becas" or school training from various other Latin American countries. While Mexico leads, Guatemala, Brazil, Peru, and Argentina have also been contributors.

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Other than these relations and the Central American-sponsored activities, Nicaraguan military relations with other Latin American countries presently are more or less limited to a minor role on the Inter-American Defense Board and activities sponsored by the United States. Furthermore, Nicaraguan relations with extra-hemispheric powers are minimal and there has been no significant impact.

Within the region Nicaragua has supported CONDECA and regional military activities, including acting as host for regional maneuvers. The Chief of the Office of National Security has adapted his office procedures to benefit from such cooperation (see IR 2870 10768). President Somoza has spoken out strongly in favor of hemispheric defense systems, particularly against the threat from Castro's Cuba; he agreed to the previous regime's contributing an effective infantry company to the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic. The prevailing attitude of the President and other military leaders is that while such cooperation is necessary, it will be effective only in the future and for the present they must provide for their own internal security--looking to the United States for assistance as well as for protection from external threats.

U.S. military assistance to the Guard began with its organization in 1927-32 assisted by the U.S. Marine Corps, and was followed by other U.S. military advisory efforts such as the establishment of the Military Academy in 1939. The presence of the two service missions starting in 1952-53 and the initiation of the Military Assistance Program in 1954 continued the U.S. influence. The Guard turns first to the United States for advice (although not all advice is taken), training, and material. These factors have tended to sustain a pro-U.S. orientation within the Nicaraguan military, as has the continuing commitment of the Somoza family to cooperation with the United States. It is probable that without continued U.S. assistance, the GON would be unable to maintain the proficiency of its security and police forces at the as yet modest level to which they have been brought. However, U.S. training and modernization planning have been limited by several factors: (1) the political inability to change to a system which eliminates the fee system and pays adequate salaries; (2) the reluctance of Guard leaders to adopt more modern techniques (for example in crowd control techniques) in their police/internal security system; and (3) the inability of the average officer and soldier, partly due to his limited educational background, to absorb and utilize the education and training resources available to him.

Identification of Significant Groups and Influential Leaders Within the Military. Defense Attaché reporting on significant groups and influential leaders within the military and their orientation has dealt intensively with this subject. Also the Country Team has identified the most important leaders in its A-70 of April 10, 1969, "Collection of Biographic Information on Potential Leaders," and A-71 of April 10, 1969, "Suggested Changes to the Biographic Handbook." By way of summary, there are different groupings among Guard officers, based mostly on which class or "Promotion" the officers belong to. The "First Promotion" from the Military Academy became the significant military leadership group about eight to nine years ago and its members

have held the majority of the most important (and lucrative) assignments ever since. This has caused grumbling from below and has presented President Somoza with what is probably his most difficult problem in dealing with the military. These senior officers are still in their forties but complete 30 years of service (including Academy time) in February, 1970. They have been loyal over the years, possess many friends within the controlling Liberal Party, and have command experience. Somoza's dilemma is whether the "First Promotion" should be "farmed out" to make room for the succeeding "Promotions" or kept on in an attempt to retain their loyal support and knowhow. Should a decision be made to retire all officers after 30 years the succeeding "Promotions" may discover that there are insufficient lucrative posts to go around in their one year at the top. This developing situation is almost the direct result of continuing the "fee system" of compensation for Guard officers. (For further comments on this situation see IR's 6 870 0005 69, 2 870 0015 69, 6 870 0025 69, and the comments section of IR 6 870 0039 69.)

The impact of the groups and leaders continues to depend on the leeway given them by President Somoza. As has been noted before, the President in fact as well as name is the Jefe Director of the Guard. He keeps his officers on a tight rein and does not encourage them to be innovators. Given this situation the potential future impact of these groups is difficult to estimate if the presently unlikely assumption is made that Somoza's control will slip. Much would depend on which "Promotion" is most influential if and when his control were to slip and what ties individual officers might have at that time with other officers and with influential civilians.

Paramilitary and Quasi-military Groups. There are no real paramilitary forces or police outside the National Guard. There does exist the so-called Guardia Civil, composed of largely campesinos and laborers and led by retired officers or local politicians. They are used occasionally as a government clique at political rallies and similar government functions. They also could be called upon for auxiliary police-type activities if necessary.

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ANNEX B

COMMUNICATIONS

(Excerpt from *Internal Security Forces NICARAGUA Communications Study*, 1968, p. 4-21.)

a. *National Communications Networks.* Generally the National Guard of Nicaragua uses four radio networks, one local teletype (not in operation at this time), a national teletype and telegraph network and a national "telex" network. The Chief of National Radio has complete frequency control of all radio communications in Nicaragua.

(1) *GN Net A Country-Wide (HF/AM/CW)* (See Figure 2). The Net Control Station (NCS) consists of seven CW operating positions in the GN Radio Central connected by landline to a transmitter station located on the outskirts of Managua (Mokoron). Each CW operating position has a CW key, typewriter, Hammarlund communications receiver, and Westrex transmitter with a remote control panel for selecting transmitter frequency by means of a telephone dial. This network is composed of the NCS and twelve stations with seven sub-nets (Figures 3 through 9). The NCS monitors the network 24 hours a day and all stations have a common night frequency. Although this net is intended for military use, the network is used extensively by the public in towns without telephones or telegraph. During a crisis, the National Guard pre-empts the net for official use.

(2) *GN Net B Atlantic Coast Net (HF/SSB/Voice)* (See Figure 10). This network will link the NCC and CFAN by voice circuit to the coastal patrol units and to the internal security companies of the Atlantic Coast. Eight KWM-2A radios have been programmed and funded by MAP for this net. The radios are programmed to be installed in the areas as follows:

- 1 - CFAN
- 1 - 19th Co (Bluefields)
- 1 - 20th Co (Puerto Cabezas)
- 2 - Patrol Boats
- 1 - Emergency Action Unit

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This network is intended to serve the Nicaraguan Coast Guard in coastal patrol activities on the Atlantic Coast, specifically this network will be used for three purposes: Internal security, national disaster relief and search and rescue in conjunction with other existing systems.

(3) *GN Net C Departmental Company VHF Repeater (VHF/FM/Voice)* (Figures 11 through 19).

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(a) This MAP provided network is designed to provide voice communications from the National Command Center (NCC) through a remote controlled base station to the Pacific Coast Departmental Companies and to permit all seventeen Departmental Companies, infantry or armored reconnaissance units, to intercommunicate and to talk to supporting aircraft. It also satisfied the requirement for man-portable and vehicular radios for the police and security units which can interface with the entire net as required.

(b) The previously approved FY 66-68 MAP for Nicaragua contained 26 AN/PRC-10, 2 AN/VRC-10, and 36 AN/ARC-44 radios to provide compatible air/ground and ground/ground communications. Due to the internal security threat posed by the presidential elections on January 1, 1967, and the inability to obtain the programmed radios prior to this date (because of the two-year MAP lead time) these radios were deleted from the MAP and the money used to purchase General Electric VHF/FM radios. Additional radios are programmed for installation if FY 68. Three types of the General Electric (GE) radios are used in this system in the following quantities (Figure 11):

1 21 each, Desk Mate, Base Station, 4 channel.

2 53 each, Mobile/Master, 4 channels (can operate on one and monitor on another channel simultaneously).

3 76 each, Portamobile, 2 channels. The eight channels are designated as follows:

1 Channel E - Air/ground (Figure 12).

2 Channel F - Ground (Figure 13).

3 Channel G - Air (Figure 14).

4 Channel H - Armor (Figure 15).

5 Channel I - Managua Police/Traffic Police (Figure 16).

6 Channel J - Jefe (Common to all Departmental Commanders (Figure 17).

7 Channel K - Security (Figure 18).

8 Channel L - Not Assigned (Figure 19).

(4) *GN Net D Managua Police (VHF/FM/Voice) High Band.*

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(a) The Managua Police Headquarters maintains two-way VHF/FM radio contact with its city mobile patrol vehicles. Radio contact using this same base station on other channels is available for liaison with other Nicaragua military groups. The base station is a new four-channel GE VHF/FM high-band transceiver.

(b) For mobile patrol purposes, the city of Managua is zoned, roughly into four sectors, with one patrol vehicle normally assigned to each sector. Approximately thirteen vehicles are maintained by the Managua Police, but only four are equipped with mobile radios for use in this activity. Other vehicles will require radios to improve radio patrol effectiveness. Radio operating procedures, schedules and message handling and filing techniques for this agency are informal and deserve concentrated action for needed improvements in accordance with established police techniques. There is no radio net or other operational liaison that is adequately developed for exchanging information of mutual interest with the Traffic Police.

(c) The Managua Police radio room has one standard subscriber telephone for citizen call-in. No internal telephone switchboard is utilized within the Managua Police building for routing calls to appropriate divisions or officials for necessary action.

(d) Additional radios are being purchased by the Nicaraguan Government for the Managua Police/Traffic Police units. These radios will be completely compatible with the existing GE equipment and will greatly improve the responsiveness of the Managua Police.

(e) With the proposed establishment of the JOC, through USMILGP assistance, the installation of a direct landline from the JOC to the Office of the Chief of the Managua Police would increase the accessibility to and coordinated action of the police in any problem or emergency situations.

(5) *GN Net D Traffic Police (VHF/FM/Voice) Low Band (Figure 20).*

(a) The Traffic Police Headquarter's radio room located in the National Stadium of Managua contains one local control VHF/FM low-band transceiver radio. Alternately, for additional area coverage, a remote control console is available for wire line control of an alternate base station, on the same frequency, at the Los Nubes radio high site.

(b) Five radio-equipped vehicles are used by the Traffic Police. Other vehicles, used for various purposes, are also available to this agency, but are lacking mobile radio units. Mobile radios for these vehicles compatible with the radios of the Managua Police are recommended to assure better mobile patrol capability. The city is also zoned into four zones by the Traffic Police for purposes of vehicular patrol boundaries.

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(c) Due to equipment age, the radio system of the Traffic Police should eventually be converted from its existing low-band allocation to a high-band VHF/FM system compatible in frequency and equipment type with that presently used by the Managua Police. Considering the low total amount of police personnel, vehicles, and message traffic existing for both groups, considerable standardization of procedures, operational convenience and efficiency can be enhanced through use of common radio network. Closer organizational and functional ties between the Traffic Police and the Managua Police would be operationally beneficial and desirable should future official consideration be given to consolidating these two city security forces.

(d) A special telephone line exists in the Headquarters of the Traffic Police for direct contact with military and other officials. Two subscriber telephone lines are available for routine calls from the general public.

(6) *Customs*

(a) In its main office, the Customs Service operates an old Westrex HF transmitter and receiver for contact with two entry points into Nicaragua at the Inter-American Highway. These entry points are the town of El Espino at the northern end and the town of Penas Blancas at the southern end. The airport Customs Office uses a standard landline telephone for contact with the main Customs Office which is adequate for the type and volume of messages to be forwarded from the airport.

(b) The Customs Offices throughout the country are located in the same general area as the Immigration Offices. For this reason, it would be advantageous for the Customs officials to use, upon agreement with the Immigration Service, the Immigration Service recommended HF/SSB radio network for priority matters.

(c) The Customs Service basically depends on the Army and National Radio Networks for transmittal of its messages, however, there is little traffic sent by the rural Customs Offices to the Central Customs Office.

(7) *Immigration*

(a) The various Immigration Offices are limited to using the Army or National Radio System for telephone or telegraph traffic in contacting the main office. There are no regular reporting schedules for any of the offices. The Immigration Office at the main airport utilizes standard public landline telephone to report information although the line is frequently occupied by other users making it difficult for the main office to quickly contact the airport office on urgent matters.

(b) To advance coordination and prompt information exchange among all Immigration Offices, the establishment of a simple HF/SSB radio system to

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interconnect all offices is recommended. This network is to interconnect each of the nine interior Immigration Stations located in key perimeter towns with Immigration Headquarters in Managua. A base unit of this network should also be located in the JOC for additional coordination with other security elements. To improve contact between the main office and the airport office, a direct telephone circuit between these two points should be installed. This will avoid public usage of this line making it exclusively available for official Immigration matters only.

(c) The Chief of Immigration should be provided with a direct line telephone to the JOC for direct access to command elements.

(d) The direct telephone landline to the main Immigration Office provides city-wide coordination from officials within the JOC; when necessary, while the recommended Immigration radio network serves the special every day needs of the Immigration forces on a country-wide basis.

(8) *Commercial Service*

(a) *National Telegraph Network*. The NCS located in the Communications Palace consists of approximately 30 telegraph operator positions using an open-wire, ground-return, system with stations in La Curva, the Presidential House and stations over most of the country.

(b) *National Teletype (Telex) Network* (Figure 21). The NCS is also located in the Communications Palace with stations at the following locations: Presidential House, GN Radio Central, Security Presidential Net, Campo de Marte, Leon, Chinandega, Corinto, San Juan Del Sur.

(c) *GN Net T (Teletype-local)* (Figure 22). This net is not operational at this time. Equipment is being repaired and will be reinstalled. This is a 60 wpm local land-line teletype network with NCS and switchboard located at the Presidential House, GN-1, Communications Palace, GN Radio, Managua Police, Campo de Marte, and La Curva.

(9) *Tactical Communications*

(a) GN patrols sent out to the rural areas from Managua are equipped with AN/GRC-87 radio and enter Net A, the HF/CW network. The previous short-range mobile tactical radios and air/ground radios did not meet the command and control requirements; however, the GE FM radio system just recently installed should fulfill this command and control requirement for most of the interior regions of Nicaragua. A light weight single sideband (SSB) portable radio may still be required for long-range patrols.

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(b) SSB radios programmed under MAP FY 67 and FY 68 will provide a voice radio link to the East Coast and a voice link from the NCC/JOC to COPECODECA.

(c) The new GE FM radio system will provide the GN great flexibility within the Managua metropolitan area if properly distributed to key civil disturbance units and tactically employed (see Section II, paragraph 3a(3) GN Net C, VHF/FM/Voice, also see Figures 11 through 19).

b. *International Nets*

(1) *Permanent Commission of the Central American Defense Council (COPECODECA)*

(a) This organization was established in June 1964 to provide regional defense and collective security for the participating states. The communications system for this organization is SIMCATEL (Military System of Central American Telecommunications). This is at present an HF/SSB radio network.

(b) At present, COPECODECA is receiving communication services for the member countries via two systems. The first is over COPECODECA's SIMCATEL network. This net provides voice and CW service for high precedence traffic for the COPECODECA delegates. Hard copy teletype service through Central America is provided to COPECODECA over the Central American International Security Telecommunications Network (SECAT).

(c) This service is provided to COPECODECA as a courtesy by the Central American public security officials. A proposal is before CONDECA for joint use of the SECAT system with public safety and military forces by providing extended circuits from each national communications center to the JOCs and COPECODECA Headquarters in Guatemala City. The SECAT system can easily absorb this extra traffic load as it is now operating at less than 10% of its capacity.

(d) With the use of operation code and authentication systems, the SIMCATEL voice, CW network backed up by TTY circuits over SECAT should handle the CONDECA international communications requirements for the foreseeable future.

(2) *Central American Regional Microwave System (COMTELCA)* (Figure 23). This is a commercial system to interconnect Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica by means of a 950 channel microwave system. The first phase, costing 2.5 million dollars is planned to be financed at the beginning of 1968. The final system is estimated to cost 11 million dollars to interconnect 60 channels into Mexico and the United States, Panama and the submarine cable to the US. The final configuration will depend on the location of proposed satellite

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ground stations. A modern commercial telephone system could satisfy many future communication requirements of the GN.

(3) *SECAT CAP-Security Telecommunications Network* (Figure 24).

(a) In response to a formal request in the early part of 1964 by the various Ministers of Security and Government for Central America and Panama, a high frequency security radio network has been developed and installed to facilitate the exchange of all types of police and security information among the Central American Republics and Panama. This network, which interconnects all CAP countries using identical radio equipment, was provided on a grant basis by AID Public Safety for control and operation by the top-level government security agency within each country. This network provides hard copy teletype service throughout Central America to COPECODECA.

(b) The Nicaragua station is in the National Security Communications Center which is directly controlled and operated by technical personnel concerned with presidential communications activities. The station is well organized in its operation and message handling procedures. Maintenance and logistic practices are of a high caliber. The operators attending to the station operation are alert and highly skilled in their specialized duties.

(c) All internal security groups (police, intelligence, military, customs, immigration, etc.) are freely allowed to participate in official information exchange with like security groups in other CAP countries through their respective CAP Security Telecommunications Stations.

(d) Communications consist of information on movements and activities of subversives and criminals coordinated among these security groups along with a standardized identification records system. Messages are promptly delivered to the designated agency for action. A detailed log is kept of all incoming/outgoing traffic. Standard message forms are used for message traffic over the network.

c. *Observations.*

(1) There is a need to plan and to coordinate, among the various government agencies, the modernization and expansion of all governmental communication systems. Toward this end, a high level governmental communication committee should be established with representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy, and key officials from the national telecommunications organizations and the National Guard. This committee would have the following prime functions:

(a) Review existing government communication systems for possible elimination, modernization, or expansion.

(b) Advise the President and the Legislature on the feasibility of communication projects and on the priority for government spending relating to these projects.

(2) The National Guard suffers from a rapid turnover of radio technician personnel. Several factors contribute to this turnover:

- (a) Low salaries.
- (b) Lack of career opportunity.
- (c) Insufficient equipment for training.

With higher salaries, with a better career pattern, and with more equipment for training there is a possibility that some valuable technicians could be induced to remain in the government service.

(3) The modernization of maintenance management procedures is required in the National Guard communications maintenance center in order to derive maximum benefits from limited in-country resources. There are numerous small tactical radios apparently in good condition when placed in storage years ago that had never been used due to lack of batteries. The old Mark II radios, that were replaced by the new General Electric radios, were stored with no apparent plan for their use. The lack of a usage factor being applied to all spare parts resulted in an over stockage on some items and a lack of other items required for maintenance.

(4) There is a variety of communication equipment serving no useful purpose permanently stored in warehouses of the National Guard. Some of this stored equipment could be released for student use in the National Guard Signal School where there is a need for training equipment.

(5) When the President of Nicaragua travels to remote areas of the country, he is often out of range of his VHF/FM radio base station in Managua. The responsiveness of the National Telegraph (CW) systems for presidential requirements outside the Managua area is questionable. It would be advisable to extend the coverage of the President's VHF/FM net with additional high point repeaters or perhaps to investigate the feasibility of using SSB equipment for presidential visits outside the capital area.

(6) The Managua Police and the Traffic Police segments of the National Guard have jurisdiction in the Managua area only. These groups each use their own small VHF/FM base-to-mobile, two-way radio network controlled from their respective headquarters. An expansion of this network to incorporate both groups under the same frequency arrangement would be desirable to improve coordination and effectiveness in serving the needs of the metropolitan area.

(7) The Immigration Service has no communications network of its own. It relies on the communication facilities of the ground forces of the National Guard and the National Radio Service but they do not provide adequately for rapid, convenient, transmission of information on Immigration matters. Better security against the unlawful entry and exit of undesirable persons and contraband on a country-wide land/seaport basis could be obtained with a responsive Immigration radio network (preferably HF/SSB).

(8) The Customs Service has an HF radio circuit from its headquarters building to the northern and southern border towns of the Inter-American Highway. Other Customs areas within the country depend on the existing National Guard and National Radio Service systems when information is to be relayed. The Customs Offices throughout the country are located in the same general areas as the Immigration Offices. If the Immigration Service were to establish a responsive radio network, it would be advantageous for the Customs officials to arrange a cooperative scheme for their transmission of high priority messages over the Immigration Service communications system.

(9) A large room in the Casa Presidencial is partially constructed and air-conditioned for establishment of a National Command Center (NCC/JOC) (Figure 25). Radios and some teletype from existing resources will be installed in one section of this room to support the NCC. Additional teletype, telephones, phone-patch equipment, main frame and switchboard have been funded under MAP and is presently being definitized by the USMILGP preparatory to purchasing. Such landline equipment should be interconnected to all major command centers from the National Command Center. The CFAN net control station at Las Mercedes has been designated as the alternate NCC/JOC (Figure 26). Good progress has been made in establishing a Joint Operation Center. The project should be given top priority above all other communications projects. Once established, the NCC/JOC should be exercised periodically in order to formulate and to refine operational procedures and to determine the capabilities and limitations of the supporting communication systems.

(10) The net organization of the MAP furnished GE VHF/FM radio system. (Net C) appears to be adequate with the exception of Channel F (ground) which may have too many users for one channel. This can only be determined by usage. Since the net has not functioned under a full scale exercise it is premature to judge the overall effectiveness or efficiency of the system. Joint exercises should be held as often as possible.

(11) The radio relay site at Las Nubes is immediately adjacent to the highway. Although a guard is on duty 24 hours a day, this vital radio relay is vulnerable from the highway.

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d. *Recommendations.*

(1) That a committee at the national level be established to advise the President on all significant communications matters, assign priorities to new projects, and coordinate planning and budgets for projects among all government agencies. This communications committee should be composed of representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy, National Telecommunications, and the National Guard. This committee should be provided with an adequate staff, on a full time basis, to collect information and reports on all existing and projected communications. This staff would make this information available to the committee and through the committee to the President if required.

(2) That signal maintenance be centralized under the GN-4 for maintenance control, materiel control and quality control functions for maintenance of communications equipment. An officer should be appointed as Chief of Maintenance. The maintenance control, materiel control and quality control functions should be thoroughly investigated and meaningful procedures instituted. Specific areas where effective management could be initiated are provided in Annex A.

(3) That a career program be initiated throughout the entire National Guard for communications technicians. This program should have pay benefits equal to civilian hire for individuals with the same comparable grade of technical qualifications. The grade structure of military (National Guard) should be identical to the other national divisions (Telecommunications, Police, National Radio and TV, etc.) to provide for an easy means of interchange of personnel when required.

(4) That joint exercises by all organizations operating in the VHF/FM radio system should be carried out to determine the adequacy of the net organizations. After each exercise, a critique should be held with representatives of FAN, CFAN, NCC/JOC, Managua Police, CofS, Somoza Bn, and the Presidential Bn to iron out discrepancies in operating procedures and recommend rearrangement of channel users to prevent traffic overloading of any one channel.

(5) That a study be undertaken to determine the required additional fencing and lighting to deter unauthorized access to the radio relay site at Las Nubes and provide some protection for antennas. The gate should be locked at all times and access provided by special pass or verbal authorization by phone from the NCC/JOC or chief signal officer.

(6) That the telecommunications required for the NCC/JOC be installed by a local supplier to insure compatibility of equipment, easy access to spare parts supply, and maintenance advice. On-the-job training of maintenance personnel should be included as part of the installation contract. An NCC/JOC operations plan should be prepared and recommended to the Chief Director of the National Guard and on approval briefings arranged for all personnel concerned. Standing operations

instructions should include message handling and the requirement for daily communication checks.

e. *Coast Guard Elements*

(1) *Mission.* Nicaragua does not have a Navy as such. The coastal patrol crafts are manned by the Guardia Nacional (GN) with a total of approximately 20 men whose primary duty is coastal surveillance, prevention of smuggling and prevention of infractions of fishing regulations in national waters.

(2) *Organization.* There are at present a total of four patrol craft assigned as coastal patrol craft. Two of the patrol crafts are assigned to the Atlantic Coastal Unit and two to the Pacific Coastal Unit. The boats are:

(a) Atlantic Coast Unit

- 1 One 85-foot Sewart type patrol craft.
- 2 One 75-foot utility patrol craft (not operational).

(b) Pacific Coast Unit

- 1 One 65-foot utility patrol craft. **DECLASSIFIED**
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- 2 One 40-foot utility patrol craft. **CPLF AID/OPA**

(3) *Communications*

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(a) There are approximately eleven coastal surveillance stations with a communication net which operates into Control Centers at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on a frequency of 5.6 MHz. Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields net with Radio National (CFAN) (Figure 27).

(b) The 85-foot patrol craft has one KWM-2A transceiver installed and has one scheduled daily communication contact with CFAN in Managua on 13.720 MHz. The 85-foot boat cannot communicate with any of the coastal stations because of the KWM-2A operating limitations in the band of 5.0 to 6.5 MHz. The coastal surveillance stations, Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields operate on a frequency of 5.6 MHz. The 40-foot and the 65-foot utility boats have TCS-12 transceivers installed. The effective range of the equipment is limited and at the present time the 40-foot boat is reported to have a communication range of approximately 10 miles operating in the CW mode. The 75-foot boat has no communication equipment installed.

(4) *Recommendations*

(a) That one KWM-2A be installed in the 40-foot utility boat, one at Puerto Cabezas, and one at Bluefields. This will provide an alternate channel to

CFAN for the 40-foot boat and permit the 85-foot Sewart Patrol craft to communicate with the coastal surveillance stations through Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields and also continue the communication schedule with CFAN. Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields will have an alternate high frequency circuit capability into CFAN (Figure 28).

(b) That KWM-2A equipment be installed in the 65-foot and 75-foot patrol craft.

(c) That Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas maintain a continuous guard on the patrol craft communication frequency whenever a patrol craft is in operation either on the Atlantic or Pacific side.

f. *Air Force Element*

(1) *Mission.* The mission of the Nicaraguan Air Force (FAN) is to participate in actions to maintain internal order primarily through its roles as the GN air support element, to furnish crews or transportation for government officials, perform reconnaissance flights, provide vehicles for and actively participate in search and rescue operations, and to provide general airlift for troops and cargo. The FAN possesses the capability to perform aerial public address missions.

(2) *General Comment by MILGP.* Limited numbers of aircraft, maintenance facilities, maintenance personnel and an impossible situation concerning provision of aviation fuel in areas other than Las Mercedes would preclude a fixed operation at any base other than Las Mercedes. An LF homing beacon is now installed and operable at Bluefields, a VOR is in operation at Puerto Cabezas and an LF beacon is scheduled for installation at Waspan. There are no other fields in the country other than Las Mercedes which could even be considered as a base for deploying aircraft for forward area operations. Bluefields and Waspan could be eliminated from this category completely because of a lack of parking space for aircraft. Establishment of a satisfactory maintenance capability at any base other than Las Mercedes is considered impossible with the limited equipment available to the FAN. To provide maintenance it is necessary to use this equipment in a consolidated location where electrical power and ground support equipment are available. With a fixed base operation at Las Mercedes a very limited capability for maintenance and communication support would be available at any other landing area with resources now available to the GON. This would include LANICA airlines as well as FAN support. The resources of the GN: aircraft vehicles, weapons, fuel, supplies, are concentrated in the Managua area. If this area is evacuated or destroyed then the means of the FAN to counter attack or to lend support to the GON are lost without assistance from outside the country.

(3) *Organization*

(a) The President is the supreme commander. Control of the operational elements is exercised by the Director, GN through the Commander,

FAN. The President has the capability to communicate directly with any aircraft of contingent.

(b) The FAN is organized into a single squadron type organization with three flights (B-26 & C-47, T-33 & T-28, Cessnas and Helicopters) and the usual staff and support elements.

(c) Staff sections and shops are concentrated in hangars and buildings at the Las Mercedes International Airport complex.

(d) Approximately 245 personnel support 37 pilots and the following aircraft:

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Armament</u>
6	T-33	2 - .50 MG (Nose) (not all)
6	T-28	2 - .50 MG (wg Pods) (not all) (Rocket Rails) (Not all)
4	B-26	4-6 - .5 MG (Nose) (not all)
8	Cessna 180	Wing Rocket Rails
1	Helicopter, 2 place	1 - PA Fuselage-door mount

(e) Of approximately 22 airfields in Nicaragua, 14 are open to civil aviation. The rest are either privately owned or unusable. Las Mercedes, recently modernized to 8600 feet to accommodate jets, is the base for the FAN and the site for the Comandancia FAN (CFAN) Net Control Station. Puerto Cabezas, with 5800 foot runway, can accommodate C-54s. Bluefields, Bonanza, Cor Islands, Sierra and Wespan handle C-46 flights of Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua (LANICA), which is staffed with FAN personnel.

(4) *Personnel.* There are approximately 300 personnel assigned to the Air Force Element. There are 37 pilots and 245 support personnel on active service. Other means (usually pilots) are on detached service with LANICA, crop dusting and similar activities.

(5) *Communications*

(a) *Observations*

1 FAN air-air and air-ground communications are the responsibility of the FAN Communications Maintenance Officer. Three qualified technicians and two apprentice helpers maintain all FAN communications equipment, air and ground, in addition to maintaining all FAN airborne navigational equipment.

2 FAN communications capabilities are versatile. In addition to administrative telephone, the Managua-Las Mercedes area is linked via VHF/FM radio. High-frequency and ground return CW, VHF monitor receive, and TTY are terminated in the FAN operations center at Las Mercedes. The CW operator capably operates a "bug" (High speed CW sending device) and transcribes directly to typewritten hard copy. Aircraft are equipped with broadcast band directional or low-frequency beacon receivers in addition to VHF/AM, VHF/FM and auto-tune multi-channel HF/AM.

3 *Sistema Inter-Americana de Telecomunicaciones de Fuerzas Aereas* (SITFA) provides an HF/SSB link with Washington and other American Air Forces. Primary net control is at Albrook AFB, Canal Zone. This system is primarily used to pass voice traffic pertaining to aircraft movement, SAR, NOTAMS, and weather. Equipment presently in use is the SSB Collins KWM-2A with 1000 watts PEP linear amplifier. Antennas in use are two doublets cut for 13 and 20 MHz (primary and alternate), both oriented NW/SE for Central and South American coverage. Antennas now in use will be replaced/augmented in FY-68 with a tower mounted rotatable beam.

4 Air-ground capability is provided by General Electric VHF/FM aircraft installed transceivers. Cessna 180, T-33, C-47, and B-26 aircraft presently are VHF/FM equipped or are being configured to accept the VHF/FM units.

5 The border surveillance and reconnaissance mission of the FAN is supported by an apparently observant and dedicated rural populace which can be loosely compared to a "ground observer corps." As instructed, these unorganized "observers" report aircraft movement by type, color, direction, number of engines, altitude, time, and location. The information is passed or presented to the nearest official for forwarding to FAN operations at Las Mercedes.

6 FAN Comm-Nav shops are centralized and well equipped with basic test equipment such as tube testers, vacuum tube volt meters, signal generators and multimeters. Pneumatic tubing has been routed to each shop working area to provide for use of compressed air in cleaning and drying equipment. Mock-ups are well placed and connected in such a way as to provide maximum versatility and benefit to the technician. Access to a common DC power supply (0-50V, 0-50A) is provided each shop through outlets at each work bench.

7 Corrosion control of in-place (i.e., within the aircraft) FAN communications components and wiring is not in evidence. However, removable chassis appear to be receiving adequate in-shop attention.

(b) *Areas for Improvement*

1 Exercising of the in-place VHF/FM equipment vehicles and aircraft and units of the FAN and other GN units should immediately follow the

preliminary drafting of operational procedures. The exercises should be performed so that area for procedural improvement will become readily apparent. Training in radio discipline and operator maintenance of equipment should be stressed.

2 In-station logs should be established and standardized throughout.

3 The austere maintenance manning has prohibited and will continue to prohibit full use of FAN aircraft and FAN communication resources.

4 The excellent beginning in establishing and developing the potential of the FAN avionics centralized maintenance shop will not be realized without increased manning and further training of those personnel already assigned. The technician training programs available in the Canal Zone and at Keesler AFB, Mississippi, can best be exploited only if the capability of the *Academia Militar* communications maintenance course is enriched by the furnishing of actual equipment to the academy for use in training and development of the trainees' practical skills and hand craftsmanship.

(c) *Recommendations*

1 That immediate action be taken to periodically conduct exercises with air-ground radios to improve and establish radio operations procedures.

2 That communications maintenance capabilities be integrated into consolidated second and third echelon maintenance shops under a single officer-manager.

3 That full consideration be given to the alternate NCC/JOCs internal configuration to insure its surrounding structure affords the protection against dust and shock needed for sensitive communications equipment.

4 That a program be established for training ground officers in forward air guide techniques and FAN ground support operations. The training of "forward flyaway team" could be held in conjunction with this program.

5 That the best elevation location be determined for automatic or voice relay of communications during tactical operations. This is of primary importance to operations dependent on VHF communications.

6 That a plan be drawn up for recurring communications operations training exercises.

7 That specific procedures be established for changing frequencies and nets, to include the establishment of net control and alternate net control stations.

8 That the VHF/FM maintenance capability be diversified in such a manner to allow for timely maintenance especially during deployments, tactical exercises, or operations.

9 That USMILGP's advice be obtained on pre-training of personnel for out-of-country training eligibility and qualification. Training in the areas of communications maintenance, maintenance logistics management, and coordinated communications operations should specifically be reviewed.

10 That the GN followup on technical training required for the direct maintenance support of its aircraft communications and navigational equipment. Conclusions drawn from past exercise reports can be affected by the present austere avionics maintenance manning. Successful avionics maintenance during sustained operations requires that the present manning be increased from its present size to at least seven fully qualified technicians. The number of apprentice helpers should also be increased.

11 That the FAN incorporate its resources at Las Mercedes to provide full operational and maintenance support of the operating and future alternate NCC/JOC to be located at the airfield.

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ANNEX C

A.I.D. PUBLIC SAFETY PARTICIPANTS TRAINED 1964-1969

IA-GC* #8 (August 17 - December 4, 1964)

Segundo G. CALONJE G., Major, Commander 16th Co, Somoto
Rodolfo MARTINEZ J., Captain, Director, National Police Academy

IA-GC #16 (August 30 - December 17, 1965)

Orlando GUERRERO M., Captain, Gen Hq Gen
Guadalupe PINEDA G., Captain, XO Las Mercedes Com.

EGC** #16 (August 21 - November 17, 1967)

Fulgencio LARGAESPADA B., 1LT, Traffic Police, Managua
Jairo SANCHEZ R., 1LT, Commander Diriamba

IA-GC #36 (June 10 - September 6, 1968)

Sergio CALDERON M., 1LT, Security Office
Juan I. GONZALEZ M., 1LT, Invest Off, 8th Co, Masaya IPA fingerprint trg.
Franklyn MONTENEGRO A., 1LT, 1st Armored Bn, GN-P Pres Batt.

EGC #21 (August 26 - November 22, 1968)

Rigoberto S. UGARTE G., 1LT, Instructor, Natl Pol Academy - also in photo
trg in N.Y.

EGC #22 (October 7, 1968 - January 10, 1969)

M. Orlando HISLOP, 1LT, Office of National Security
To FBI Acad.

IA-GC #38 (October 7, 1968 - January 19, 1969)

Jose A. BUSTOS C., 1LT, Replacement Company
Marco A. CASTILLO M., 2LT, 16th Co, Somoto
Victor M. FLORES G., 2LT, ONS, 1st Armored Bn
J. Napoleon GARCIA G., 1LT, 12 Co, León
Florencio O. PEREIRA M., 1LT, 7th Co, Granada

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*Inter American General Course.

**English General Course.

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IA-GC #39 (November 4, 1968 - February 7, 1969)

Jaime AVELLAN P., 1LT, 7th Co, Granada
Adolfo CASCO P., 1LT, 5th Co, Managua
Adolfo R. CUARDA P., 2LT, Managua Police
Ronald E. SAMPSON O., 2LT, Leon
Luis F. VALLECILLO S., 1LT, Instructor, Nic Mil Academy

IA-GC #40 (December 30, 1968 - March 28, 1969)

Manuel de Jesús BERRIOS P., 1LT, 13th Co, Chinandega
Samuel J. CANIZALES L., 2LT, Replacement Co.
Francisco FAJARDO, Captain, 5th Company, Managua
René A. FLORES C., 2LT, Replacement Co.
José GADEA L., 1LT, Pilot, FAN
Alfonso URBINA M., Captain, XO, Replacement Co.

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**LIST OF DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY OFFICERS,
THEIR POSITION AND COURSES ATTENDED**

5TH CO. — MANAGUA

CPT Edmundo Meneses C. - Commander
Irr Warfare Orient Crse ('68) USARSA

CPT Alberto Gutierrez F. - Carcel Modelo
Gen Supply Off Crse ('60) USARSA

1LT Armando Alonso U. - Responsible Agent
N/A

1LT Juan R. Bermudez R. - Carcel Modelo
Cadet Crse ('61 '62) USARSA
Jungle Warfare ('64) USARSA

1LT Adolfo Casco P. (Exec. Officer) - Carcel
Modelo
Tactics ('54) USARSA
IPA Crse ('68-69) CONUS
Criminal Investigation Crse, NMA ('69)

1LT Eduardo Montalvan S. - Carcel Modelo
Arms and Tactics Inf ('58) USARSA
Military Police Off Crse ('66) USARSA
Jungle Opns ('68) USARSA
Public Safety (NMA) ('69)
COIN Crse (NMA)

1LT Harry Pineda G. - Commander Tipitapa
MP Crse ('63) USARSA
Cadet Crse USARSA

2LT Armando Perez O. - Carcel Modelo
N/A

2LT Pedro Guillen G. - Carcel Modelo
N/A

CPT Francisco E. Fajardo M.
Inf Wpn and Tactics Crse ('58) USARSA
Jungle Opns, ('62) USARSA
MP Off Crse ('65) USARSA
IPA Crse ('68) CONUS

1LT Elmer A. Espinal M. - Carcel Modelo
Cadet Crse ('61) USARSA
Basic Boat Off Ind (SCIATT) ('67)
Criminal Invest Crse (NMA) ('69)

1LT Sergio R. Estrada M.
N/A

*6TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY —
JINOTEPE*

LTC Jorge A. Robleto - Commander
C and R Bn Staff ('58) USARSA

CPT Sebastian Lopez T. (Exec Officer)
Inf Wpns and Tacts ('59) USARSA
Information Officer ('61) USARSA
IPA #41, CONUS ('70)

CPT Jorge A. Pavon G. - Jinotepe
Tactics ('51) USARSA

1LT Jairo Sanchez M - Commander Diriamba
Traffic Crse ('67) CONUS

2LT Francisco R. Palacios E. - Commander San
Marcos
N/A

*7TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY —
GRANADA*

COL José María Espinoza - Commander
Inf Wpns and Tactics ('55) USARSA
C and S Crse ('63) USARSA

MAJ Edmundo Rocha T. - GH Staff GH-3
Personnel Mgmt Crse ('68)

1LT Jaime Avellan P. - Adjutant
Mil Pol Off Crse ('66) USARSA
IPA Crse ('69) CONUS

MAJ Carlos O. Gutiérrez (Executive Officer)
Inf Wpns and Tactics ('56) USARSA
COIN Opns Crse ('62) USARSA

1LT Florencio Pereira M.
Cadet Crse ('62) USARSA
IPA Crse ('68) CONUS

1LT Juan J. Romero B. - Supply Officer
Police Safety Crse NMA ('69)
Criminal Invest Crse NMA ('69)

CPT Edmundo Miranda M. - Medical Officer
N/A

2LT Oscar F. Arcia - Separate Service
Cadet Crse ('65) USARSA
Basic Boat Off Indoctrination SCLATT
Mil Police Off Crse USARSA ('70)

2LT Roger A. Gomez S. - Separate Service
Cadet Crse ('67) USARSA
Jungle Opns Crse ('67) USARSA
Inf Mortar Platoon Crse ('69) CONUS
Airborne Crse ('69) CONUS
Special Forces Off Crse ('69) CONUS
Ranger Crse ('69) CONUS

2LT Juan M. García A.
N/A

2LT Pedro Picado M.
N/A

*8TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
MASAYA*

COL Samuel Cárcamo - Commander
Wheel Vehicle Mech ('55) USARSA
Regt'l and Bn Staff Crse ('61) USARSA
COIN Orient ('64) USARSA

MAJ Enrique Jimenez R. - Medical Officer
N/A

1LT Juan I. Gonzalez M. - Investigation Officer
Supply Crse ('58) USARSA
IPA Crse #36 ('68) CONUS
Fingerprint Crse ('70) CONUS

1LT Noel Vanegas P.
Fire Direction ('56) USARSA
COIN ('62) USARSA
English Language Crse ('68) CONUS
Crim Investigation and Physical Sety
('68) CONUS
Crime Lab Questioned Doc. ('70)
El Salvador & CONUS

CPT Levy H. Sanchez B. - Exec Off. Chief
of Police
Engineering ('50)
General Staff War School, Italy ('69)

2LT José A. Espinoza C. - Supply Officer
Cadet Crse ('62) USARSA
Basic Airborne ('64) USARSA
Jump Master/Pth Fdr ('65) USARSA
Public Safety NMA ('69)
Crim Investigation Crse ('69) NMA

2LT José A. Martinez G. - Separate Service (AM)
Cadet Crse ('67) USARSA
Jungle Opns ('67) USARSA

2LT Federico Narvaez L. - Company Officer
Cadet Crse ('68) USARSA
Mil Police Off Crse (O-9) USARSA ('70)

2LT Victor M. Velasquez - Commander La
Concepción
N/A

*9TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
RIVAS*

COL Guillermo Quintana - Commander
Command and Gen Staff Crse ('65) CONUS

MAJ Dionisio Prado. - Exec Off and Chief of
Police
Mil Intel ('62) USARSA
Info Off Crse ('61) USARSA
Off Medical Orient ('65) USARSA

CPT Rafael Urtecho S. - Departmental Medical
Officer
N/A

1LT Guillermo Acevedo C. - Company Officer
N/A

1LT Alejandro Espinoza P.
Inf Wpns and Tactics ('56) USARSA

2LT Carlos Garcia M. - Commander - San Juan
del Sur
N/A

2LT José M. Aragon J. - Departmental Supply
Officer
N/A

*10TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
JUIGALPA*

LTC José Fanor Cruz - Commander
Comd Rgtl and Bn Staff ('62) USARSA
Med Orient ('63) USARSA
Orient Tour ('66) CONUS

CPT Adan Barillas H. - Medical Officer
N/A

- 1LT Carlos Aguirre S. - Commander - Acoyapa
N/A
- 1LT Pedro J. Pavon T. - Departmental Supply
Officer
Public Safety ('69) NMA
Crimm Investigation ('69) NMA
- 2LT Juan A. Galeano R. - Departmental Officer
Gen Supply ('62) USARSA
Mil Intel Off Crse ('69) USARSA
Mil Police Crse USARSA
COIN Crse USARSA
IPA Crse CONUS
- 2LT José S. Urroz M. - Company Officer
Cadet Crse ('65) USARSA
Police Records Mgmt Crse ('70) CONUS
- 2LT Nicolas Tejado G.
N/A
- 11TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY —
BOACO*
- MAJ José Ramon Silva R. - Commander
Jungle Opns Crse ('60) USARSA
SOPM Crse ('64) USARSA
Orient Tour Crse ('66) CONUS
- CPT Ruben Valladares C. - Medical Officer
N/A
- 2LT Domingo N. Alonso R. - Company
Officer
Cadet Crse ('68) USARSA
Off Gen Supply Crse ('70) USARSA
- 2LT Ronald A. Sandoval S. - Chief of Police
Cadet Crse ('66) USARSA
Jungle Operation ('66) USARSA
Criminal Investigation ('68) CONUS
Physical Scty ('68) CONUS
Crime Lab Photo Crse ('70) CONUS
- CPT José A. Jimenez M.
Field Artillery Crse USARSA
Technical and Tactics, Chile
MPCI Off Crse, ('69) USARSA
- CPT Ramiro González M. - Exec Off Responsi-
ble Agent
Tactics ('51)
CDT ('56)
Ammo Sup & Storage Off ('60)
- CPT Ramiro González M. (Cont'd)
Counterinsurgency ('62)
Inf Off Crse ('64)
Inform Off Crse USARSA ('66)
Mil Police Off Crse ('70)
- 2LT Ramon E. Talavera B. - Boaco
Gen Supply For Off ('62) USARSA
Mil Police ('65) USARSA
Mil Intel Crse ('67) USARSA
- 2LT Medardo Marin C. - Dep Supply Officer
N/A
- 12TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY —
LEON*
- COL Adrian Gross - Commander
COIN Orient ('62) USARSA
Sn Off Prev Maint ('63) USARSA
Com and Staff Crse ('65) USARSA
Counter-Guerrilla Opn ('61) CONUS
- MAJ Orlando Lanzas M. - XO
Weapons and Tactics ('61) USARSA
Med Orient Crse ('63) USARSA
Sn Off Prev Mainte ('64) USARSA
- CPT Jose E. Calderon V. - Departmental Adj. Off
Int. Weapons and Tactics ('58) USARSA
COIN Orient ('63) USARSA
Critique Halcon Vista IV ('69) USARSA
Mil Police Off Crse. (O-9) USARSA
- CPT Rosendo Cerda - Medical Officer
N/A
- 1LT Ernesto J. Abaunza - Company Officer
Cadet Course ('62) USARSA
Mil Police Off Crse. ('66)
Mil Intel Off Crse ('68) USARSA
Crim Invest Crse.
Counter in Surgency Crse.
- 1LT Napoleon Garcia G.
Communication Crse. ('64) USARSA
IPA Crse ('69) CONUS
- 1LT Jose A. Varela S. - Chief of Police
IPA Crse ('70) CONUS
- 2LT Jose T. Sequeira Ba. - Commander Mina El
Limon
N/A

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2LT Cipriano Torres Ch.
N/A

1LT Jose F. Manzano R. - Supply Off.
Engineering ('52) USARSA
Mil Intel ('63) USARSA
MP Crse USARSA
Arms and Tactics
Motor Maintenance Crse
Public Safety Crse (NMA) ('69)
Criminal Invest Crse (NMA) ('69)

1LT Jose Ruiz
Commo Off Crse ('59) USARSA
Jungle Opns Crse ('61) USARSA
Criminal Invest Crse ('67) (NMA)
Off Gen Supply Crse ('68) USARSA
Mil Intel Off Crse ('69) USARSA

*13TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
CHINANDEGA*

LTC Cesar N. Suazo - Commander
Com and Rgtl and Bn Staff ('62) USARSA
Orient Tour ('65) CONUS
Inter-Am Defense Col ('67) CONUS

MAJ Gustavo Duarte
Inf Wpns and Tactics ('56) USARSA
COIN Opns ('62) USARSA
Mil Intel ('64) USARSA

CPT Alfredo Juarez N. - Commander Corinto
Tactics ('51) USARSA
Military Intel Crse ('62) USARSA

CPT Agenor Perez M. - Medical Officer
N/A

1LT Manuel Berrior P.
Cadet Crse USARSA
Jungle Warfare Crse ('63) USARSA
IPA Crse ('69) CONUS

1LT Benito Gaitan L.
N/A

1LT Miguel A. Perez G. - Commander -
Chichigalpa
Tactics ('54) USARSA

1LT Gilberto Quintanilla - Chinandega
Field Grd Off Crse ('54)
Jungle Opns ('61) USARSA

2LT Manuel Alvarado L. - Service
N/A

2LT Felix C. Balladares
N/A

2LT Francisco J. Arana G. - Insecticides Inspector
Cadet Crse ('66) USARSA
Jungle Operations ('66) USARSA
Inf Weapons Crse
Inf Tactics

2LT Gilberto Calderon Q. - Commander - El Viejo
N/A

2LT Fernando A. Guido G. - Investigating Officer
Cadet Crse ('64) USARSA
Irreg Warfare Opns ('68) USARSA
Criminal Investigation Crse ('69) CONUS
Physical Security Crse ('69) CONUS
Jungle Opns Crse ('65) USARSA
Ballistics (FY71)

1LT Moises Salomon G. - Chief of Police
Mil Police Crse USARSA
Gen Crse of Tactics and Arms USARSA
Criminal Investigation Crse ('69) CONUS
Physical Security Crse. ('69) CONUS
English Language Crse

*14TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
OCOTAL*

LTC Francisco DeFranco - Commander
Sr Prev Maint ('62) USARSA
Comd and Staff Crse ('63) USARSA
Off Med Orient ('65) USARSA
Orient Tour ('66) CONUS
COIN Orient ('66) USARSA

1LT Horacio Arce B. - Commander's Adjutant
N/A

1LT Samuel Jiron V. - Adjutant Officer
Tactics ('54) USARSA

1LT Jose L. Mendieta L. - Departmental Supply
Off
Cadet Crse ('62) USARSA
Jungle Opns ('63) USARSA
Public Safety (NMA) ('69)

2LT Hircio Cajina R. - Company Officer
Cadet Crse ('68) USARSA
Mil Police Off Crse ('70) :USARSA

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2LT Pio Perez - Commander El Jicaró
N/A

2LT Roger A. Vega M.
Cadet Crse ('65) USARSA
Mil Pol CI Off Crse ('69) USARSA

2LT Octavio Andrade V. - Transportation Off
N/A

2LT Juan J. Schiebel
Cadet Course ('68) USARSA

*15TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
ESTELI*

LTC Ricardo Lopez P. - Commander
Comd and Staff Crse ('63) USARSA
SOPM ('64)
Sr Off Preventive Maint Crse ('64) USARSA
Inter Am Defense College ('70) CONUS

MAJ Felix B. Campos R. - XO
Fire Direction ('56) USARSA
Comd and Plan Crse ('62) USARSA
Jungle Opns ('60) USARSA

CPT Fermin Meneses - Exec. Off and Chief of
Police
Jungle Opns Crse ('60) USARSA
COIN Opns Crse ('62) USARSA

CPT Pablo Rivas A. - Medical Officer
N/A

1LT Julio C. Padilla - Service
Mil Intel ('62) USARSA
Mil Police Off Crse ('70) USARSA

2LT Humberto Garcia G. - Gen Supply Officer
N/A

2LT Carlos Hernandez - Mess Officer
Cadet Crse ('64) USARSA
Mil Intel Off Crse ('68) USARSA
Public Safety (NMA) ('69)
Crim Investigation (NMA) ('69)

2LT Porfirio Mercado R. - Company Officer
Gen Supply Off ('62) USARSA
Public Safety (NMA) ('69)
Cadet Crse.
Crim Invest (NMA) ('69)
Jungle Opns Crse USARSA
Mil Police Crse USARSA

*16TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
SOMOTO*

MAJ Segundo Calonje - Commander
Inf Wpns and Tactics ('60) USARSA
Comd and Rgtl Bn Staff ('62) CONUS
Pol Executive Tng ('69) CONUS
IPA Crs ('64) CONUS

MAJ Salomon Saenz G. - Exec. Officer
N/A

1LT Sergio Cifuentes Z.
Engineering ('52) USARSA
COIN Opns ('65) USARSA
Mil Intel Off ('68) USARSA
Mil Police Off Crse ('70) USARSA

2LT Jose J. Castillo B.
Cadet Crse ('63) USARSA
Jungle Opns ('68) USARSA
Mil Pol CI Off ('69) USARSA

2LT Marcos A. Castillo - Service
Cadet Crse ('65) USARSA
IPA Crse ('69) CONUS

*17TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
MATAGALPA*

COL Jose Gustavo Guillen - Commander
Inf Wpns and Tactics ('55) USARSA
Veh Maint USARSA
Jungle Warfare USARSA
Assoc Int Adv Off ('57) CONUS
Mil Orient Tour ('61) CONUS
M & G Staff Crse ('64) CONUS
Sr Off Prev Maint ('64) CONUS

LTC Augusto Flores Lovo - Medical Officer
N/A

MAJ Manuel Savedra - Exec. Off.
Int Wpns and Tactics ('56) USARSA

MAJ Gustavo A. Duarte
Inf Wpns and Tactics ('56) USARSA
COIN Opns ('62) USARSA
Mil Intel ('64) USARSA

1LT Francisco Ortiz G. - Chief of Traffic
N/A

2LT Fernando Beteta T. - Comdr. - Sebaco
N/A

2LT Daniel A. Moreno M. - Company Officer
N/A

2LT Oscar Porras M. - Adjutant
Cadet Crse ('66) USARSA
Jungle Opns ('66)
Junge Opns ('68)
Public Safety ('69) (NMA)

2LT Ruben A. Vasquez - Gen Supply Off
N/A

2LT Luis A. Zapata P. - Chief of Police
N/A

2LT Orlando Pomares M.
Cadet Crse ('68) USARSA

2LT Buenabentura Rodriguez - Commander - El
Cacao
N/A

2LT Nahom Zeledon - Service
Cadet Crse ('68) USARSA
Off Gen Supply Crse ('70) USARSA

2LT Felipe Marin
N/A

*18TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
JINOTECA*

*19TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY -
BLUEFIELDS*

MAJ Gonzalo Evertz - Commander - Mess Off
Cadet Crse USARSA
Wpns and Tactics ('60) USARSA
Mil Intel ('60) USARSA
COIN Orient ('62) USARSA
Orient Tour ('66) CONUS
Orient Tour ('67) USARSA
Critique Halcon Vista IV ('69) USARSA
Pol Executive Tng ('69) CONUS

MAJ Jose M. Moncada - Exec. Off
Ord Off Adv Crse ('62) CONUS

CPT Jose H. Suarez A. - Medical Officer
N/A

1LT Juan S. Tiffer M. - Commander - Yali
Cadet Crse ('62) USARSA
Mil Police CI Off ('69) USARSA

1LT Jorge Jarquin S.
Commo Off Crse ('65) USARSA

2LT German Bermudez - Commander San
Rafael del Norte
Cadet Crse ('63) USARSA
Jungle Opns Crse ('69) USARSA
Criminal Invest Crse ('69) (NAM)

2LT Juan Alcibiades Espinal C. - Gen Supply
Off
Cadet Crse ('64) USARSA
Irreg Warfare Opns ('67) USARSA

2LT Mario Gurra P.
Cadet Crse USARSA
MP Off Crse ('70) USARSA

LTC Enrique Alegria - Departmental Commander
Counter- Resistance Opr ('61)

CPT Guillermo Flores O. - XO
COIN Orient ('63) USARSA
COIN Operation ('64) USARSA
Mil Police Of Crse
Cadet Crse
Weapons Crse - Ft. Gulick
Off Gen Supply ('66) USARSA
Jungle Opns ('60) USARSA
IPA Crse ('70) CONUS

CPT Oscar Mayorga S. - Medical Officer
N/A

CPT Adolfo Solis B. - Resp. Agnt and Adj.
Tactics ('51) USARSA
Cadet Crse
Operations and Maintenance ('65) USARSA
Inf Off Crse ('65) USARSA

CPT Rene Zelaya P. - Commander El Rama
Tactics ('51) USARSA
Cadet Crse (USARCARIB)
Junge Opns ('62) USARSA

1LT Ronald Corea - Commander El Bluff
Cadet Crse ('62) USARSA

2LT Emilio Obregon L. - Chief of police
N/A

2LT Manuel Sacasa B. - Service
Cadet Crse ('66) USARSA
English Language - Instructor - Lackland AFB,
Texas
Jungle Operations ('66) USARSA

2LT Alonso Blanco - Gen Supply Off
N/A

2LT Juan J. Deras - Chief Radio Repair &
Circuit
Radio Repair Crse ('69) USARSA
Commo Off Crse ('68) USARSA

2LT Francisco Espinoza
N/A

*20TH DEPARTMENTAL COMPANY —
PUERTO CABEZAS*

MAJ Felix B. Campos
Fire Direction Crse ('56) USARSA
Command & Unit Staff ('62) USARSA
Jungle Opns ('60) USARSA

CPT Noel Herrera G. - Medical Officer
N/A

1LT Jose R. Alegria S. - Commander Licus
Public Safety Crse ('69) NMA

1LT Edgar Altamirano - Commander Waspan
Armament Crse ('52) USARSA
Motor & Vehicles
Mil Police Off ('66) USARSA

CPT Ariel Arguello V.
Inf Wpns & Tactics ('59) USARSA

1LT Dionisio Morales B. - Commander Siuna
N/A

1LT Maximiliano Perez - Service
N/A

2LT Juan J. Bermudez - Resp. Agent
Gen. Supply Off Crse ('62) USARSA
Jungle Operation ('64) USARSA
Mil Police Off Crse ('66) USARSA

2LT Ramon M. Morales N. - Gen Supply Off
Cadet Crse ('65) USARSA
Mil Police CI Off Crse ('69) USARSA

2LT Horacio Rochas U. - Commander Bonanza
N/A

2LT Carlos Rodriguez - National Radio
MP Officer Crse ('63) USARSA

2LT Luis Zeledon R.
N/A

C.G. (SAN CARLOS)

LTC Alvaro Valle S.
Cmd, Rgtl & Bn Staff ('62) USARSA
Off Med Orient ('65) USARSA

1LT Andres Chavarria C. - Chief of Police
N/A

2LT Aquiles Cifuentes P. - Company Officer
Cadet Crse ('67) USARSA
Jungle Operations ('67) USARSA
Cadet Exchange - CONUS ('66)
Public Safety (NMA) ('69)
Criminal Invest (NMA) ('69)
Mil Police Off Crse (O-9) USARSA

2LT Fausto Reyes O. - Supply Off
N/A

C.G. (GMP) CORINTO

CPT Pablo E. Reyes N. - Commander
Engineering ('52) USARSA

CPT Jose G. Caceres - Exec. Officer
Engineering ('52) USARSA
Operation and Maintenance ('65) USARSA

2LT Antonio Castellon E. - Service
N/A

C.G. EL BLUFF

LTC Juan R. Brenes L.
Maint Coast Guard - Guatemala
Coast Defense - Panama
Comd and Staff Crse ('66)

1LT Isidoro Sandino - Service
Nval Crse, Italy ('58)
Maint and Opns Off
Small Boars, Canal ZONE ('64)
OJT AF Boat tng ('67)

MANAGUA POLICE

COL Francisco Rodriguez S.
Mil Intel Orient Tour ('64) CONUS

COL Luis Ocon U. Police Judge
N/A

LTC Hector Gonzalez O. - Commander - Carcel Modelo Comm and Staff Crse ('64) Orient Tour CONUS ('65)	2LT Vandon H. Byers I. - Commander 2nd. Police Section Cadet Crse ('65) USARSA Mil Police Off Crse ('67) USARSA Ranger Crse ('68) CONUS Criminal Invest Crse & Physical Security CONUS Criminal Lab Questioned Documents ('70) CONUS
MAJ Carlos O. Gutierrez G. - Service Inf Wpns and Tac ('56) COIN Opns Crse ('62)	2LT Edgar Hernandez F. - Carcel Modelo Cadet Crse ('63) USARSA Crim Invest Crse ('68) ('69) CONUS Physical Security ('69) CONUS
CPT Ulises Carrillo Engre Off ('58) USARSA Engr Off Carrer ('61) CONUS Mil Intel ('61) USARSA Mil Civic Action Plan Crse and Seminar ('66) USARSA Sv Off Prev Maint ('62) USARSA	2LT Adolfo R. Cuadra - Investigation Office Cadet Crse ('61) USARSA COIN Operations ('67) USARSA IPA Finger print Crse ('68) CONUS IPA Crse ('69) CONUS
CPT Gonzalo Martinez G. Tactics ('51) USARSA Mil Police ('65) USARSA Info Officer ('68) USARSA	2LT Luis A. Delgado - Public Safety (NMA) ('69) Military Police & Criminal Investigation Off Crse, USARSA
CPT Alesio Gutierrez V. - Commander 4th Police Section Inf Wpns ('61) USARSA Inf Tactics ('61) USARSA	2LT Alberto Garcia C. - Separate Service Military Police for EM ('61) USARSA Military Police for Off ('68) USARSA Police Safety (NMA) ('69) Irr Warfare Opns ('69) USARSA
CPT Nicolas Valle Salinas - Investigation Officer Tactics ('51) USARSA Mil Intel ('60) USARSA	2LT Ricardo Guerreto - Serv. Police Cadet Crse ('68) USARSA Mil Police Crse USARSA
CPT Pablo E. Zamora - Commander 3rd. Police Section Tactics ('51) USARSA	2LT Domingo Alvarez A. N/A
CPT Fernando Cedeno - Medical Officer N/A	2LT Jose Guevara M. - 4th Police Section N/A
1LT Salvador Morales Engineering ('52) USARSA Jungle Opns ('62) USARSA Mil Police Off Crse ('66) USARSA Gen Supply Off ('61) USARSA	2LT Donald Rodriguez Ch. - Invet Section School in Criminology in Peru ('69)
1LT Miguel Ruiz S. - Commander 10th Police Section Criminal Investigation Crse (NMA) ('69)	2LT Jose B. Marion C. N/A
1LT Donald Salas B. - Supply Officer N/A	2LT Benedicto Sanchez N/A
1LT Juan Lee Wong F. - Criminal Invest Office Mil Pol Off Orient Crse, CONUS ('61) Criminal Invest Crse, CONUS ('61) National Police School - Peru Inf Wpns and Tactics Crse USARSA	2LT Domingo Gutierrez Cadet Crse ('61) USARSA Comm Off Crse ('61) USARSA Mil Police Crse ('65) USARSA CI Training (NMA)

TRAFFIC

COL Jose E. Carcamo G. - Chief Traffic Department
 Mil Police ('56) USARSA
 Assoct Qtrmaster Off Career ('60) CONUS
 Sr. Prev Maint ('62) USARSA
 Medical Orient ('63) USARSA
 Com & Gen Staff ('58) USARSA

MAJ Jesus Howay
 N/A

LTC Inocente Otto Mojica - Asst Chief Traffic Department
 Field Arty Off Orient, ('62) CONUS
 Orient Obs Crse - Artillery Crse in Venezuela

CPT Sebastian Flores - Traffic Department
 Cadet Crse USARSA
 Weapons and Tactics ('57) USARSA
 Gen Supply Off Crse ('61) USARSA
 Irr Warfare Orient ('68) USARSA
 IPA Crse ('70) CONUS

CPT Roger Sandino - Separate Service
 Inf Wpns ('69) USARSA
 COIN Orient Crse ('65) USARSA
 Exercise NICARAO, CZ ('67) USARSA

1LT Oscar Lopez - Traffic Department
 Engineer Off Crse ('66) USARSA
 Bomb Diaster and Disp (OJT) ('63)

1LT Jose Lagos - Traffic Department
 Inf Wpns and Tact. ('56) USARSA

1LT Jose Torres L. - Traffic Department
 Information Off ('60) USARSA
 Cadet Crse ('61-62) USARSA
 Gen Supply Off Crse ('64) USARSA
 Gen Supply Off Crse ('64) USARSA
 SP Nuclear War ('68) USARSA

1LT Alberto Jarquin - Taffic Department
 Engineering USARSA
 Cadet Crse USARSA
 Jungle Operations ('69) USARSA
 Inf Officer ('66) USARSA
 COIN Opns USARSA
 Tac off for Cadets ('68) USARSA
 IPA Crs ('70) CONUS (Traffic Specialization)

2LT Leonidas Guadamuz - Supply Officer
 N/A

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date- MAR 17 198j

ANNEX D

NICARAGUA POPULATION PROJECTIONS — BY AGE GROUPS

Age Group	1970		1975		1980	
	No. in thousands	%	No. in thousands	%	No. in thousands	%
TOTAL	2,021	100	2,373	100	2,818	100
UNDER 15 Years	952	47.1	1,094	46.1	1,298	46.0
15 — 24	380	18.8	480	20.2	569	20.2
25 — 34	250	12.4	290	12.2	361	12.8
35 — 44	188	9.3	209	8.8	235	8.3
14 & OVER	251	12.4	300	12.7	355	12.7
WOMEN-15-44	404		483		575	

ON 7, 2004
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ANNEX E

KEY NICARAGUAN OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED BY OPS TEAM

General Anastasio Somoza D.	President
Dr. Felipe Rodriguez-Serrano	President of the Supreme Court
Dr. Mariano Beritrigo	Executive Officer (Masaya Unit)
	Minister of Government
General Julio C. Morales M.	Minister of Defense
General Gustavo Montiel	Minister of Finance
General Guillermo Noguera Z.	Chief of Staff, GN
Colonel Ernesto Rugama	Commander, Military Academy
Colonel Elias Carcamo	Chief of Traffic
Colonel Francisco Rodriguez S.	Commander, Managua Police
Colonel Roger Bermudez	GN-4
Colonel Segundo Montoya	GN-5
Colonel Samuel Carcamo	Commander, GN Masaya Unit
Colonel Roger Jerez	GN-1
Colonel Juan R. Brenes	Commander, Guardia Marina (Atlantico)
LTC Inocente Mojica	Executive Officer, Traffic
Major Alberto Luna	Chief, Radio Nacional y GN
Major Efraim Lopez	Officer in Charge National Command Center
Captain Nicolas Valle Salinas	Investigation Officer
Captain Juan Lee Wong	Investigation Officer
Captain Levy H. Sanchez B.	Investigation Officer

KEY U.S. OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED BY OPS TEAM

Mr. Malcolm R. Barnebey	Deputy Chief of Mission
Mr. Robert T. Shaw	Political Attache
Lt. Col. William A. Watt	Defense Attache
Mr. George G. Breig	Administrative Officer, JAS
Mr. Ragnar L. Arnesen	Mission Director, USAID
Mr. Charles B. Johnson	Assistant Director, USAID
Mr. Allen Goldstein	Program Officer, USAID
Mr. James W. Procopis	Assistant Program Officer, USAID
Mrs. Connie A. Montealegre	Training Officer, USAID

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KEY MILGROUP OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED BY OPS TEAM

Col. Trevor Swett Jr.
Lt. Col. Leitt J. Corbridge
Major Paul Lyon

COMUSMILGP
USMILGP
USMILGP

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ANNEX F

M/S NOT RECEIVED

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ANNEX G

NATIONAL GUARD'S PERSONNEL REGULATIONS MANUAL

- 1.- General Orders Nos. 12,13,21,36,75,76,78,1927's Series; 1,16,57,72,106,114, 136,148,166,1928's Series; 29,33,38,54,57,64,104,117,133,134,1929's Series; 8,13,49,54,63,1930's Series,6,16,1931's Series, and any other order, or part of orders which may conflict with this Order, shall be considered revoked.
- 2.- The following regulations governing the administration of the National Guard of Nicaragua are prescribed for the information and guidance of the corresponding personnel.

CHAPTER I

General Instructions

SECTION I / Date- MAR 17 1981

OFFICERS

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- 1-1.- (a) The Officers serving on the force should familiarize themselves with the details of its Administration and discharge all duties related with it as it is prescribed by the Officer in charge.

OFFICIAL ORDERS

- 1-2.- All General Orders emanating from or belonging to the Supply Department, Paymaster, Medical Director or any other officer to whom they proper concern, shall be duly prepared by this Officer and then published after been approved by the Chief Director of the National Guard, accompanied with the signature of the Chief of Staff. Copies for distribution shall be inscribed with the "OFFICIAL" signature of the Officer in charge of the Department or Section from which that order originates. Should an order proceed or belong to that Section, its copies for distribution shall bear the signature of the Adjutant (NG-1).-

- (b) General Orders shall contain information and Instructions for all the commissioned Officers of the National Guard of Nicaragua.-

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(c) General Orders shall be distributed to every commissioned Officer.-

(d) Special Orders shall contain information and instruction necessary only for certain Commissioned Officers of the National Guard, but not for all.-

(e) Special Orders shall be published in the same manner as General Orders, however, they will not require the signature of the Chief of Staff before publication.- It shall be enough to send a copy to the Chief of Staff before or at the time it is being published.

(f) All Special Orders shall bear the signature of the Adjutant (NG-1).-

(g) Special Orders shall be distributed only to Commissioned Officers and Commissioned Officers concerned with such Orders.

(h) Bulletins shall contain information which is not included properly in General Orders or Instruction Letters the Chief of the National Guard wishes to present to all National Guard units.-

(i) Such bulletins shall be prepared by a designated Commissioned Officer, and will be published in the same manner as the General Orders, after been approved by the Chief Director and bearing the signature of the Chief of Staff.- Copies for distribution shall bear the "OFFICIAL" signature of the Commissioned Officer designated to prepare them.-

(j) Instructions Letters shall contain information or instructions particularly only for certain group of Commissioned Officers, and for certain subject matters such as confidential information and instruction for the Intelligence Section.-

(k) In any case, an Instruction Letter shall substitute General of Special Orders.- Instructions which are of a permanent nature belong properly to General Orders and not to the Instruction Letters.-

(l) Letters of Instruction shall be published in the same manner as General Orders, after approval by the National Guard Chief, and bearing the signature of the Chief of Staff.- Copies for distribution shall bear the "OFFICIAL" signature of the commissioned officer in command of the section originating the Orders or that to which they belong.-

PUBLICATIONS

1-3.- *Publications which should be in possession of every Commissioned Officer:*
The following books and Orders shall be issued by the National Guard, and are to be found in possession of every line Commissioned Officers as indicated:

UNCLASSIFIED
UNSECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

TRAINING REGULATIONS, PUBLISHED BY THE MILITARY ACADEMY.-
RECORDS OF THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD (GENERAL ORDERS)
NICARAGUAN CONSTITUTION.-
POLICE AND TREASURY LAW CODES.-
WAR COUNCILS AND INVESTIGATION BOARDS (RECORDS).

PHOTOGRAPHS AND FINGERPRINT IMPRESSIONS

1-4.- Every Commissioned Officer will provide his photograph to be filed in his Official Record at the General Headquarters of the National Guard, together with his fingerprints taken in the usual way.

CITATION LETTERS

1-5.- (a) Such Letters shall be extended solely for the performance of exceptional services beyond those required and expected from excellent Commissioned Officers, of high principles, and merits. Only the Chief Director of the National Guard shall issue Citation Letters.-

(b) Subordinate Commissioned Officers wishing to recommend others, officially presenting appropriate recommendations to the Chief Director of the National Guard,

1-6.- (a) National Guard Commissioned Officers who had served for more than twelve months in such a rank shall be granted a leave of thirty days, if requested, and if his services could be dispensed.

(b) Under no condition such leave shall be given pro-rata.-

(c) It is expected that Commissioned Officers requesting leave will do so only after completing at least (12) months of full service.-

(d) Leave requests shall be made through a letter, in which the address of the place where the leave is to be spent shall be included.

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS VISITING MANAGUA

1-7.- (a) Whenever a National Guard Commissioned Officer stationed outside the Capital City of Managua visits this city, he shall report personally to the Chief of Staff at the early office hours following his arrival, or by phone if he is not able to remain in the city during the early office hours.

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(b) At the Officer of the Day Section, General Headquarters, an Information Book on visits is carried, and Commissioned Officers stationed outside Managua shall sign on said Book for Visitors on their arrival, including the appropriate information, according to the required data.-

COMMISSIONS

1-8.- Whenever a Commissioned Officer of the National Guard receives an Commission as Officer of the Nicaraguan Army, he shall report by letter to the Chief Director of National Guard indicating:

- (a) The date of the Commission.
- (b) The date in which it was received.
- (c) Rank indicated on it.

SECTION II

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

1-9.- Rank.- Ranks for National Guard Enlisted Personnel shall be constituted as follows:

Master Sergeants	Corporals
First Sergeants	Buglers
Sergeant; Drum Major	Drummers
Supply Sergeant	Private
Sergeants	Apprentice Musicians

1-10.- Hair Cutting.- Enlisted personnel, at all times shall maintain its hair well trimmed and carefully combed.- They may have their hair cut to the roots on the nape of the neck and the sides, but it shall be groomed to give the uniforme appearance, and must not be longer than 3 inches on top of the head neither on the forehead nor on the nape of the neck.-

1-11.- Supply Sergeants.- The Supply Officer shall assign some supply Sergeants from other services, in accordance with the Command. They shall be registered in the Supply Office and will carry out their duties under the guidance of that office. For better performance, they will be assigned services according to the needs of the Supply Organization.

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(b) Notwithstanding, these services should be subject to changing once in a while, in order to familiarize the Supply Sergeants with all the services pertaining to their rank.- Only in cases of emergency, they shall be required to perform other services outside of their qualifications.-

NATIONAL GUARD'S BAND

1-12.- The Band of the National Guard is constituted as follows:

- 1 Band Director, with the rank of Captain.
- 1 Sub-Director, with the rank of Lieutenant.
- 14 First Class Musicians
- 13 Second Class Musicians.
- 21 Third Class Musicians.

ENLISTED PERSONNEL'S LEAVE

1-13.- (a) The National Guard shall grant its Enlisted Personnel one week leave for every six months service; fifteen days for one year service. Such leaves shall be granted by Battalion Commanders and the Department Chiefs.- Both, individually, shall maintain rosters of Enlisted men deserving such leave, and the individual's records so that the personnel will not be seriously depleted by too many men on leave.

(b) It is considered preferable that such leaves be granted once a year, for a fifteen day period.-

(c) In Service Records Book, page No. 23, appropriate information shall be entered concerning the individual Enlisted man's leave for future reference.

(d) A copy of the authorized leave shall be remitted to National Guard General Headquarters, in each instance.

THE CLOSEST RELATIVE

1-14.- Whenever an Enlisted man is seriously wounded or suffering a dangerous disease, special efforts shall be made in order to find the patient's closest relative and acquaint him with his condition.-

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CPLF AID/JPA
MAR 17 1981

date:
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HOLIDAYS TO BE OBSERVED BY THE NATIONAL GUARD OF NICARAGUA

I-15.- The following holidays are observed by the National Guard:

January 1st	New Year's Day
May 27th	Army Day
July 4th	U.S.A. Independence Day
September 14th	Battle of Saint Jacinto's Anniversary
September 15th	Nicaraguan Independence Day
October 12th	Anniversary of America's Discovery
December 25th	Christmas Day

Note: There are other holidays which are also observed by the National Guard, but not listed above because preceding dispositions to issuing the present Manual.-

I-16.- The following allocution shall be read to all members of the National Guard on September 15, every year:

1.- Today, September 15, is the Anniversary of the Independence of Nicaragua.- Our forefathers proclaimed our country in that great event as a free Republic amongst the other nations of the World.- It is now upon you the youth of Nicaragua, upon the military men of the Republic, that the people should place its trust for our independence, and our freedom from oppression and disorder. It is an achievement gained through the efforts of the National Guard in maintaining a solid base for peace and order, justice and fairness.- In battle and on the field, so that we may develop and constitute a nation stronger and happier.-

2.- The National Guard has reached its 43rd year of existence, during this time it has written a glorious page in History, about which our country should be proud of.- In the services performed by the Police throughout the country's cities, you Law Enforcement Officers, have maintained peace and order with equanimity for all.- On the field and in combat, you have shown yourselves as excellent soldiers.- In each and all the encounters with the enemy you behaved with valor and gallantry.-

3.- Let us all persevere in this conduct, let us continue maintaining this high mark of distinction which we gained by our own efforts; let us pave the way for a greater and happier Nicaragua; let us proceed writing on the Pages of History our prowess, while we behave always with dignity, mindfull of the responsibilities and the confidence our Country has trusted upon us all....

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CHAPTER II

ADMISSION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN THE MILITARY ACADEMY OF NICARAGUA

2-1.- Recommendations for admission of Enlisted men in the Military Academy of Nicaragua shall be submitted through the Battalion Commanders, Departmental Chiefs and Company Commanders. Such Officers are authorized to recommend, through regular channels, any meritorious enlisted man for admission at the Military Academy of Nicaragua. To carry out such a recommendation the Officer, willing to do so, shall follow these instructions:-

(a) That the enlisted man should be between 18 and 22 years of age.-

(b) That the applicant shall be mentally, physically, and morally sound.- The physical condition will be determined through a Medical Examination and other tests, as to defects of a physical nature.- Mental conditions shall be evaluated on the basis of evidence and reports from the schools he attended, and by observation of his mental capacity, adaptability, interest in the service, etc. As to moral qualifications, they will be based on evidence obtained from those individuals who have certain knowledge of the Aspirant's moral development from the age of 10 to 20, and from personal observation and official information.- His associations with friends, and relatives; his speech and manners, behavior and attitudes, the amusements he prefers, etc., should be carefully checked and specifically noted.- His attitude regarding discipline and his will to obey orders, regulations, laws, should be conscientiously presented and reported.-

2-2.- The Chief Director shall be responsible of screening all recommendations received at General Headquarters, in accordance with the prospective candidate's military history. The selection will be also the responsibility of the Chief Director.-

2-3.- Any Officer after nominating an enlisted man as a candidate for the Military Academy, may, for the sake of special reason, withdraw his nominations, any time before the candidate is transferred to the Military Academy.-

2-4.- If possible, when remitting the candidate's recommendation, his political affiliation should be included.

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SECTION II

ENLISTED MEN

THEIR ENLISTMENT EXTENSIONS

2-5.- (a) How and when is to be made.- The extension of any man's enlistment may be made by writing, on his own free will. It may be extended for a year, or two or three complete periods from the expiration date of his existing contract.- His expressed decision to extend his enlistment must be made at least thirty days (30) prior the expiration of his contract. Any man, serving an extended enlistment for less than three years, may be able to prolong it for one more year and further, before its expiration; the extensions, however, should not exceed three full years from the initial contract's expiration date.- No one shall be allowed to obtain Enlistment extensions should the retention of his services become undesirable any time before the extension is in force.- A Commanding Officer shall cancel the extension should the unbecoming behavior of the individual concerned warrant it. Should any enlisted man be dismissed for bad conduct his enlistment extension shall be cancelled.-

(b) Remission.- Should an enlistment extension be recalled, it shall be remitted immediately to National Guard's General Headquarters.- A certified copy of the remittal shall be sent to the National Guard's Paymaster.

(c) Service Records Book.- Recording of service extensions shall be made in red ink on the Service Records Book of the guard, above the signature of the Commanding Officer, and at the bottom of Page No. 1, and also in the list below the last qualifications in Pages 4 and 9. Similar annotations shall be made for any subsequent extension, noting also that fact that it is the second or third extension. In the same Records Book, the information about enlistment extension requested by the personnel shall be continuously recorded on the service folios related to enlistment prorogations. Additional pages shall be inserted whenever it is required.-

(d) Physical Examination.- Enlisted men who wish to apply for extension of his enlistment shall submit to a physical examination as it is required for re-enlistment, in conformity with the physician's certificate to conclude "The Enlistment Extension Agreement".-

(e) Who can extended it. Commanding Officers are authorized to accept enlistment extensions from guards, who in their opinion are deservedly worthy of being retained in the service, and could be recommended for enlistment.-

(f) When is the extension made.- As a general practice a request for enlistment extension shall not be granted while it has not been carried out to

termination, or the original contract is about to terminate, this in order to determine more satisfactorily whether it is desirable to retain a particular guard.

RECRUITS

2-6.- For general services.- No person below the age of eighteen (18) shall enlist in the National Guard without his parents consent.- The prospective guard shall be nicaraguan citizen. A careful selection of his physical qualification and appearance shall be made.

Should an applicant be found specially needed, but is wanting of other good qualities besides the physical, if any defect does appear within a reasonable to the physician's attention, it shall be reported to the Medical Director, with the recommendation that said applicant be excused from service, and explaining the reasons why he is being excused.

Applicants should read and write.- Only in exceptional cases an applicant will be accepted with such a handicap. Particular attention should be given to the fact that the applicant is endowed with special knowledge or useful abilities. These cases, however, should be previously approved by the Chief Director of the National Guard.

Should it become known that some applicants are being under the patronage of politicians, the former shall not be accepted.

Applicants of notorious bad background shall not be accepted.

Applicants shall be accepted for general service, and assigned wherever their services are required. Enlistment is for a period of three (3) years.-

2-7.- Re-enlistment.- National Guard enlisted men who wish to continue serving at the expiration of their contract may do so by requesting previous authorization from Headquarters. For such a purpose, an appropriate application should be made for each individual case, including detailed information on his service records about his qualifications, as well as his failures and punishments. The applicant should be sent at least fifteen days before the Service Record Book is to be closed.

2-8.- Apprentice Musicians.- Applicants willing to learn to play the drum and the bugle and having proven musical abilities shall enlist for a period of three years. The age requirement shall be from fifteen (15) to eighteen (18). The consent of their parents or tutors shall be required. A physical examination shall be made of each individual, in order to determine that his incisors are in good condition.-

Battalion Commanders, Departmental Chiefs and Commanding Officers in separate Organizations are authorized to accept young men for the music school, keeping in mind that only those in the above mentioned conditions shall be accepted. Applicants for enlistment as apprentice musicians shall be transferred to General Headquarters in order to take the required oath. They should bring the necessary Medical Examination Report and in duplicate the document of the parents or tutors consent, whose signatures should be affixed on it, or at least one by all means. The following sample should be used for such a purpose:

(I) (We) John Doe (father) and Mary Doe, (Mother) state by our own free will that we consent the enlistment of (my)(our) son whose name is; in the National Guard of Nicaragua as a drum and bugle apprentice, for a period of three (3) years, unless he may be disqualified for inefficiency or dismissed by special order from the Chief Director. We also certify that our son was born on (date) in(place)

Signature Signature

Signed before me and taken the lawful Oath, today

During the parents or tutors interview, emphasis should be given upon the fact that their son is to benefit from the musical training he will receive, long after his enlistment is over and he left the National Guard, and all this without any expenses incurred from his family or himself.

2-9.- National Guard's Corporal-Instructors Battallion Commanders, and Department Commanders should endeavour to enlist competent men to act as Corporal Instructors in the Guard, one for Departamental Seats or other Barracks as assigned by the Chief Director.- These Instructors shall be given the rank of corporal, and will receive also rations commutation and the cost of clothing they receive, should they chose not to have their meals in the Barracks.- They shall not be required to wear a uniform.- Their enlistment shall be for a period of one (1) year, but they could terminate it, at their discretion giving notice of it to the Battalion Commander or the Departamental, if in charge, fifteen days (15) before the expiration of his enlistment.

ENLISTED MEN'S RECORDS PREPARATION

2-10.- The following records shall be immediately prepared upon the enlistment of an Applicant:

The original enlistment contract (only the original to be remitted to National Guard's General Headquarters).-

Beneficiary's Record (in duplicate) one for the National Guard's General Headquarters, the other for the Service Record Book of the Applicants Service Record Book.-

Identification Card (Model N.G.D.A.) which once prepared shall be sent to National Guard's General Headquarters.-

Photographs (in duplicate) one shall be attached to the Identification Card, the other, Service Records Book. The photos should be the size known as "Passport". The Commander or the Officer in charge of the enlistment procedures shall verify the photos present the face of the individual with clarity and definition.-

Health Record Book, shall be the responsibility of the Medical Officer

Fingerprinting.- Instructions follow:

A fingerprint card (Form GN-1-11) shall be used in order to make the identification of every man enlisting or re-enlisting in the National Guard of Nicaragua. At the proper time it shall be remitted together with the enlistment contracts to the National Guard's General Headquarters.- The fingerprint card will serve for recording the following individual identification:

(a) Fingerprints of right and left hand fingers rolled one by one in proper order, in the appropriate space designed on the card.

(b) Clear fingerprints of right hand fingers held together and pressed at the same time on the space at the right corner of the card. Thumb finger is included separately, on its own space.

(c) Clear fingerprints of the left hand fingers, excluding the thumb, held together and pressed at the same time on the space at the left corner of the card. Thumb finger print is included separately, on its own space.

(d) The right index finger should be rolled on the reverse side of the card.

(e) All other required data should be recorded at the reverse side, including the signature.

One 3x5" card shall be used for each man enlisting in the National Guard. This card will contain the following information:

- (a) Name of the man (on the left upper part)
- (b) Number (on the right upper part)
- (c) Right thumb-print (on the lower left side)

All cards, small or large, before submittal to General Headquarters is made, shall be examined by the Officer in charge of the duty, in order to correct any mistakes incurred. Fingerprints cards shall not be sent to General Headquarters unless they prove to be 100% correct.

DESERTERS AND A.W.O.L.s

2-11.- Excepting arrest by civil authorities, serious illness or injuries that may prevent a man from returning to his barracks, any absence or leave taken without authorization for a period of ten (10) days over the time granted is to be considered desertion by the National Guard.-

(b) When a man is prevented from returning to his Quarters due to one of the above mentioned causes, it becomes his duty to report his situation to the Commanding Officer of his unit, or at the nearest barracks of the "National Guard, as a last resource.-

(c) Reporting the deserter or absentee Guard's surrender or arrest shall be made to the General Headquarters, indicating the date and the time of the man's return or capture.-

(d) Rewards given for the capture or arrest of the deserter shall be granted by the Chief Director, from time to time.

ENLISTMENT OF PRIVATE PERSONS IN THE MILITARY ACADEMY

2-12.- Private persons who may be accepted to enter in the Military Academy must enlist as cadets at the National Guard.- Their pay as well as other grants received as cadets, shall be those specially stipulated by the Regulations of the Nicaraguan Military Academy.-

Applicants who wish to enter in the Military Academy shall send their applications to the Military Academy Director at the time the Announcement is published in the newspapers every year. The Academy shall forward them to the General Director of the National Guard for final approval.-

Battalion Commanders and Department Chiefs will provide all applicants with a questionnaire in the jurisdiction where they reside.- The questionnaires shall contain primarily the following information:

- a) Age (between 18 and 22)
- b) Civil Status (should be unmarried)
- c) School attendance (minimum of 2 years of high school)
- d) Occupation
- 3) Health conditions
- f) Parents' names
- g) Police issued certificate of behaviour

Required information a,b,c and g, must be supported by corresponding Official documents.-

The applicants must submit to a rigorous mental and physical examination grounds, should they be accepted.-

The Military Academy course of studies which cadets must take, is of four years duration. Upon graduation the cadets may enter in the National Guard as Officers.- Young men, citizens of foreign countries, may enter the Military Academy should they be granted honorary scholarship by His Excellency the President of the Republic, or as grantee with the approval of the President.

SCHOOLING FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL AT THE NATIONAL GUARD

2-13.- (a) Elementary education for enlisted personnel in need of it shall be established for their benefit. Regular classes shall be taught daily during practicable hours, according to the military demands which should be given preference over other activities.- Classes will be taught until such a deficiency is overcome.-

(b) Battalion Commanders and Departmental Chiefs shall secure the enlistment of competent men in order to serve as teachers, on (1) in Departmental Seats or in other barracks, as assigned by the Chief Director. Teachers shall be enlisted with the sole purpose of teaching.-

(c) In garrisons with less than twenty men, classes will be taught by an Officers or non-commission officers and other selected personnel in accordance with their teaching aptitudes.-

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(d) Classes will be under the supervision of the Commanding Officer to insure the efficient progress made by the Guard-Students. The Commanding Officer shall test periodically the reading and writing ability of the student and the rate of his advancement, which will be recorded in the Guard's Service Records Book.-

2-14.- (a) The National Guard established its Music School in order to teach music and produce competent drummers and buglers for its service. The School functions in Managua under the direction and supervision of the National Guard's Music School Director.

(b) Applicants who wish to enlist in this school must submit to an apprenticeship during two years, before they are able to collect a salary as buglers or drummers.- Exceptionally talented apprentices may earn a full salary before the two years term, by special authorization of the Chief Director and recommendation of the Music Director.- Besides learning to play the drum and the bugle, the student may learn also another instrument.-

(c) Music apprentices' salary as an other subsidy; for clothing, lodging, subsistence, etc. are provided for by the National Guard's budget which provides also for all enlisted personnel of the National Guard.-

(d) Music apprentices' corps is limited to forty (40).-

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CHAPTER III

SECTION 1

PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS

3-1.- (a) All National Guard promotions shall be granted by the Chief Director according to recommendations submitted to his knowledge by the Battalion Commanders, Departmental Commanders or Company Commanders, through their Departmental Commanders, according to existing openings.-

(b) All National Guard promotion certificates shall be regular and permanent.-

(c) All recommendations made will give preference to the lowest rank. Due consideration shall be given the officer with the longest service record.- When making a recommendation for promoting an officer, the Commanding Officer shall consider the man's character, with particular attention to his leadership ability, his record, personal appearance, and military bearing.-

(d) Before making any promotion recommendations for any rank, the Commanding Officer shall ascertain that the candidate has complied with all the requirements prescribed for that rank, and so, in a satisfactory manner.- For such an object, he shall attach to his recommendation a certificate stating that the candidate has the qualifications necessary for promotion, according to the regulations in force.- and also an extract from his Service Records Book showing the percentage of his marks and record of his faults.-

(e) Corporals.- Guards recommended for promotion to corporal's rank shall be tested in the following subjects:

- 1.- Reading.- Skill in intelligent reading and explaining service publications, as Training Regulations.-
- 2.- Writing.- Writing skill; reading and writing a clear and legible report.-
- 3.- Arithmetic.- Addition, subtraction, multiplication and division skills.
4. Practice.-
 - a) Training with and without weapons
 - b) First Aid
 - c) Personal hygiene
 - d) Internal Service guard

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- e) Markmanship
- f) Platoon and Squad rifle exercises
- g) Rifle Platoon, Section and Squad commands
- h) Rifle Squad combat principles
- i) Police Regulations

(f) Sergeants.- Guards recommended for Sergeants' promotion rank shall be qualified for all service requirements necessary in the promotion to Corporal's rank, and also for the performance of the following subjects:

- 1.- Accounting and administration of small military posts
- 2.- Preparation of blank forms, morning reports, personnel rosters, etc.
- 3.- Map reading
- 4.- Automatic weapons
5. Patrol and Exploration
6. Section and Platoon combat principles.

(g) Supply Sergeants.- Guards recommended for Supply Sergeants' promotion in rank shall have taken courses in arithmetic, official letter writing, type-writing, spelling, accounting, and the preparation of all forms pertaining to the management of supplies.

(h) First Sergeants.- As general practice, sergeants are promoted to First Sergeants' rank by being screened from the Sergeant's roster. Their promotion does not require an examination. The first prerequisite in the capacity of a first sergeant should be his military leadership.- He should be in fact as well as in name a First Sergeant, able to maintain discipline, conduct military exercises or instruction, and command his organization well, on the field as in the barracks. His competence as the head of an office should be of importance, though secondary to his military leadership.- The candidate's records should show clearly his aptitudes for this rank.-

(i) Master Sergeants.- As general practice, they shall be appointed through selection from the First Sergeants rosters. Such a promotion shall not require examinations.- The applicant shall have had a varied and lengthy service record, excellent conduct, mature in age, and the ability to perform all office functions and military service, as required from a Master Sergeant.- The applicant shall have personal ability to command, military bearing, and all the qualifications of a soldier, which should make him the most conspicuous image of the organization he represents.-

(j) Enlisted men shall be appointed again to their respective rank, should their re-enlistment take place, on the day (excepting Sunday or holidays) after he is discharged in the post or within the Organization where it took place.-

(k) Each organization shall maintain its school open, in order to provide the guards recommended for promotion with the necessary instruction.- Study time shall be that the student guard requires to obtain the grade he is seeking.-

(l) Corporal complements to be assigned to organizations requiring their services shall be designated and announced by the Chief Director.-

(m) Department Commanders or another Superior Command may demote NCOs or another person of lower rank serving under his Command, for incompetence, previous authorization of the Chief Director, based on detailed information submitted regarding the case.-

(n) Whenever an enlisted man is demoted according to regulations, the Departmental Commander or a Superior Command shall address a letter to the demoted man informing him that he has been demoted for incompetence, and advising the rank to which he was demoted, and the rank he lost.-

(o) The Department Commander or the Superior Commander shall furnish the Chief Director, the Paymaster and the Supply Office with copies of each demotion issued; requesting that appropriate annotations be made on the Service Record Book of the man concerned.

PRIVATE PERSONS ARE NOT TO IMPART ORDERS TO ENLISTED MEN

3-2.- (a) Enlisted personnel shall not be subjected to obey order from private persons or civil personnel.-

(b) Civil employees shall not allow themselves the privilege of Ordering enlisted personnel.-

SECOND SECTION

INFORMATION ON DECEASED PERSONS

3-3.- (a) Should Commissioned Officer or an enlisted man serving with the National Guard die, the following procedures shall be observed:

1.- Notify immediately the National Guard's Headquarters reporting the exact time and the cause of death.- The National Guard's Headquarters will in turn notify the nearest relative, requesting the disposition of the mortal remains.-

2.- Should the corpse not be claimed by the nearest relative or it cannot be moved for burial, within the twenty four hours following

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death, it shall be buried in the cemetery of the community where he died. In which event the following dispositions shall be complied with:

- (a) A tag of strong material with all possible identification information regarding the dead man shall be tied to his right wrist.
 - (b) At the right corner of the grave, beside the head-rest, a sealed bottle containing the name, rank, age, and date of his death, cause of death, date of burial, name of the organization he served, company's number, and the name and address of his nearest relative. All this information shall be written in ink, if possible, on the best kind of paper available. The paper shall be well compressed, sealed and wrapped tight with a cover of thick paper as protection.
 - (c) Photographs of the grave should be taken wherever possible, and shall be remitted to the National Guard's Headquarters.
 - (d) A plan showing the exact location of the grave, with immovable markings staked in the ground, indicating the distance from the markings to the grave, shall be submitted to the National Guard's Headquarters without delay.
- 3.- Together with the above information, further details should be reported to National Guard's Headquarters about the dispositions carried out regarding the dead man's remains, as well as any other information and details which may be considered pertinent.

THIRD SECTION

DISCHARGES

3-4.- The discharges given enlisted personnel of the National Guard are classified as follows:

Class I.- HONORABLE DISCHARGE

- (a) At enlistment or extension termination.
- (b) Upon the receipt of a Medical Inspection report stating the enlisted man inability in the line of service.
- (c) Upon receipt of a Medical Inspection report of inability not incurred in the line of service, and not due to bad conduct.
- (d) At the request of the family dependent on the guard, when hardships continues after enlistment.

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- (e) At the request of the family and for the convenience of the guard.
- (f) When accepting appointment as Commissioned Officer.
- (g) For the convenience of the guard.
- (h) For the convenience of the Government.
- (i) For unfitness not reflecting bad behaviour or character.

Class 2.- UNDESIRABLE DISCHARGE

- (a) Desertion.
- (b) Habits and character traits at variance.
- (c) Fraudulent enlistment or extension.
- (d) Sentence imposed by Civil Authorities.
- (e) Other causes of serious nature.

Class 3.- BAD CONDUCT DISCHARGE

- (a) Complying with sentences passed by Ordinary or General Court Martial.

Class 4.- DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE

- (a) Complying with General Court Martial sentences.

DISCHARGE CERTIFICATES TO BE USED

3.5.- When preparing discharge certificates for enlisted personnel corresponding to Class 1, the white certificate shall be used for that purpose.- Discharge Certificates for Bad Conduct, Undesirable and Dishonorable shall be made in yellow Certificate.

DELIVERY OF DISCHARGE CERTIFICATES

3-6.- Discharge Certificates and the final payment check shall be delivered invariably by a Commissioned Officer, who, when doing so, must, in each case, record the amount being paid the discharged guard.-

**NO TRANSFERENCE OF PAYMENTS SHALL BE MADE
AFTER CLOSING ACCOUNTS**

3-7.- In order to prevent confusion and delays at the closing of final payments, no transference shall be allowed or authorized.

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SERVICE RECORDS BOOK SUBMITTAL

3-8.- At the termination of a guard's service, due to discharge, his Service Records Book shall be classified as indicated below, and submitted by Official channels to National Guard Headquarters.- The discharged man's Service Records Book, should his discharge be due to Enlistment expiration, shall be sent to the Nicaraguan National Guard's Headquarters, no less than fifteen days before enlistment expiration.

FORFEITURE OF UNIFORM DUE TO BAD CONDUCT DISCHARGE

3-9.- Should a guard be discharged for other causes rather than honorable, he shall forfeit all rights to uniform, clothing articles, and equipment issued to him. The officer in charge of the Supply Stores shall provide the guard with a suit of civilian clothes. This suit shall be made of the cheapest material to be found, it will consist of a shirt, trousers and a hat.-

FINAL ACCOUNTING

3-10.- (a) Company Commanders shall close the accounts of all guards being discharged and will forward them to the National Guard's General Headquarters in Managua, no less than fifteen days before the enlistment expiration date, so that the National Guard Paymaster may be able to prepare and return the final accounts.- Hereafter, when complying with a sentence, at the time of his discharge from the National Guard, the guard shall be credited with the amount of TWENTY FIVE CORDOBAS (C\$.25.00) in lieu of any other sum owed to him.- Hereafter, guards tried by Court Martial and sentenced to serve time in confinement, before discharge from the National Guard for Undesirable or Dishonorable Conduct, shall suffer imprisonment in the Battalion or Department where they belong.-

(b) The Paymaster shall prepare the Final Payment Account, obtaining the necessary information on clothing issued to the individual guard by the Officer in charge of the National Guard's Clothing Stores Supply. This account, together with the check should be forwarded to the Officer who has been assigned with the final procedures of the man's discharge. That day, he shall deliver all accounts, and the check into the hands of the individual.-

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(c) Accounts pertaining to guards sentenced to CONFINEMENT as explained in paragraph 3-10, (a) shall be dealt with as follows:

- 1.- Accounts will be closed on National Guard Form P-1006, Final Account Voucher, together with National Guard Form DA-1553, Clothing Account voucher, following the same procedures applied to in the closing of deserters and deceased man's accounts.
- 2.- Accounts pertaining to guards sentenced to CONFINEMENT, as explained above, shall be concluded in the Company where the accounts may be closed on the day prior to the date on which the convening Authority approved the sentence.
- 3.- When the guard is to be released from CONFINEMENT, as explained above, his Company commander will advise the Paymaster the date of his discharge, upon which information the latter shall prepare Form GN-P-100, "Final Accounting voucher", and shall remit it together with the last payment check for delivery to the guard by his Commanding Officer.

CHAPTER FOUR

4-1.- Service Record Book.- Hereafter, from this date on, whenever a guard is transferred from a battalion, detachment, department or unit, administrative or other, his Service Record Book, in all cases, is transferred with him. All Service Record Books shall be closed on the date the Guard has been transferred.-

4-2.- A letter of transmittal, indicating the date and the transference authority, together with a list of the transferred men shall accompany the Service Record Book in all cases.- Copy of these letters shall be remitted to the Chief Director.-

4-3.- The Service Record Book of every guard being transferred shall be forwarded directly to the Battalion Commander, or Departmental Commander of the Organization where he has been assigned, according to the Transference Order.-

4-4.- Inspection prior to Transference.- Prior to any service transfer, the Battalion or Company Commander shall inspect the uniform, clothing and equipment of every man being transferred. Any missing article shall be issued to every man transferred to insure that all of them will be fully equipped to start their service.-

4-5.- Telegraph Notification of Arrival.- When transferring a group of five men from a Detachment to another organization, the latter shall be given advance notice of the transfer, indicating the number of men arriving and the time.-

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCIPLINE

5-1.- Regulations: Punishment for offenses committed by National Guard personnel shall be imposed according with the articles prescribed for the Government and Discipline of the National Guard of Nicaragua.-

5-2.- Officers under arrest: Should a Command Officer place under arrest another Officer to be tried by a Court Martial, this event shall be reported to the Paymaster, indicating the nature of charges pressed against the suspect.-

5-3.- Definite Desertion: Absence without authorized leave, with the manifest intention not to return shall be considered desertion, consequently when the intention to desert is manifest, the deserter's account shall be closed immediately, without waiting for the termination of the established ten days.-

5-4.- (a) In order to make available the evidence required by the Court Martial trial of men charged with desertion, and to use it to establish their guilt or their innocence, when the deserter's Service Record Book is closed, the Commanding Officer shall make signed annotations regarding the circumstances which contributed to the desertion.-

What disposition was made of personal effects, particularly of the uniform
Secret arrangements
Obtaining civilian clothing
Statements
Desire to leave the service
Getting travel tickets for a different locality
Fleeing arrest
Whether or not he left valuable effects
Having committed an offense and afraid to be punished for it
Date, time, and place where he deserted.

(b) Remarks such as "Not Known" or "Unknown" shall not be inserted on the Service Records Book until all reasonable efforts have been made to ascertain the probable cause.

5-5.- Report on Deserters: Whenever a Deserter or Absentee surrenders at a Post or Barracks, a telegraph message shall be remitted to the Chief Director reporting the date, time, and circumstances of his surrender or capture.

5-6.- Deserters shall be listed on the roster of an organization designed by the Chief Director.-

5-7.- Company, Battalion, and Departmental Commanders may recommend undesirable Discharge for the deserters who came back, and whose ineptitude bars them from continuing in the National Guard's service.-

CHAPTER SIX

DECORATIONS

6-1.- Enlisted personnel of the National Guard, entitled to such a distinction, are given authorization to wear on the field shirt sleeve the following braids and stripes:

(a) Citation braids.- Shall be worn by enlisted men whose conduct merited citation in General Orders. One for every citation.-

(b) Encounter braids.- Shall be worn by enlisted men who participated in one encounter with enemy forces. One for every encounter.-

(c) Wound braid.- Shall be worn by enlisted guards wounded in combat with the enemy. One for each wound received.

(d) Service Stripes.- Shall be worn by all enlisted men who re-enlisted. One stripe for the first enlistment terminated, without taking into consideration the additional stripes for every three-year re-enlistment.-

Braids and stripes will be made from white cloth, according with the sample kept at the Offices of General Supply Stores, National Guard Headquarters, Managua. This material is provided to each Organization for distribution among the men.-

Braids and stripes shall have the same size as the designs affixed on Uniform Regulation, and shall be placed on the sleeve as indicated, with one exception: A space of half an inch shall separate the citation braids from the rank insignia in both sleeves.-

The National Guard has adopted a badge for the classification of markmanship in the ranks of enlisted men. One badge for those who attained sharpshooter's qualification, the other for rifleman.-

The badge shall be worn sewn on the Khaki shirt, above the fold of the left pocket, with the lower edge of the badge half an inch above the upper edge of the pocket's fold.-

The National Guard's General Headquarters is designing a badge for expert shooters.- The adopted design shall be announced later.

Commanding Officers shall authorize immediately all enlisted men under their command the use of the above mentioned decorations, according with the specified classifications.-

6-2.- Service bars.- Another badge has been created to honor the years of service a guard has given the National Guard. It consists of a gilt silver bar lined with a silk ribbon strip three inches long and three eights of an inch wide, with the colors of the national flag between the colors yellow and red, plus another color which indicates the guard's length of military service. This badge shall be called SERVICE BAR, and National Guard Officers, and enlisted men, as well as Regular Army personnel shall wear it, according to the following manner:

(a) Officers and Enlisted men who served in the Army for a consecutive period of twelve (12) years, are authorized to wear the Bar with the blue distinctive inwardly.-

(b) Officers and Enlisted men who served in the Army for a consecutive period of eighteen (18) years, are authorized to wear the same BAR, with the red distinctive inwardly.-

The National Guard Officers and non-commissioned Officers shall wear the corresponding BAR only when wearing the uniform jacket, and the privates on the upper left pocket of the shirt, during field service.-

Service Bars mentioned in this Order shall be provided by the Officer in charge of the National Guard Supply Stores (See General Order No. 43-1939 and Annex No. 1-1944).-

CHAPTER SEVENTH

7-1.- National Guard Commissioned Officers shall have the opportunity, through regular channels, to address requests to the Chief Director, regarding their preferred choice of service and barracks before the probable date of transfer from one to another unit.-

7-2.- Enlisted personnel who served for a period of a year in one of the Republic's Departments shall make use of the prerogative to address, through regular channels, a request to the Chief Director, requesting their transfer from one post to any other Organization in the Republic, and explaining the reasons supporting their request. It is advisable to request places where the men had not served before. Three organizations should be mentioned specifically.-

CHAPTER EIGHT

CORRESPONDENCE

8-1.- All correspondence related to Commissioned Officers assignments, transfers, Orders' requests or their revocation; leave extension for more than thirty days' requests, etc. shall be made through regular channels, whenever addressed to the Chief Director.-

8-2.- Full Names.- For the avoidance of errors, confusion or delays, etc, in the transmission of mail, all official communications mentioning names of officers or Enlisted personnel, in every instance, shall include the name and surname, in full, the serial number assigned to the guard, excepting the second name which could be in initial form.-

8-3.- A code of five numbers shall be used in each Official telegraph, radiogram, etc.- The first two numbers shall indicate the time of day, from 1 to 24, beginning

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at 01:00 hours.- The third number, a ten minute interval between the hours from 1 to 5.- The fourth and fifth numbers will indicate the day of the month.- For instance: 08515 signifies that the telegram was signed at 08:50 a.m. on the fifteen of the month.- Another example: 17016.- means that the telegram was signed at 5:00 p.m. on the 16.- To indicate the month, the first three initials of its name shall be added, together with the last two numerals of the year. For example: 07223 Oct-65; means that the correct date of the telegram is 07:20 of the 23th day of October, 1965.-

Whenever a radiogram or telegram is sent, a copy of it shall be placed in the Files Record, and a second copy shall be sent through the mail the following day, as confirmation.- In all telegrams and radiograms the word period shall be used instead of apart (or paragraph).

8-4.- Address and telephone number belonging to Commissioned Officers living in Managua.- All Commanded Officers attached to the National Guard, as those attached to Managua or on a visit to the City, shall report immediately after arrival their place of residence, telephone number and any other information that may facilitate an emergency call.- Officers returning to service in Managua, after a tour of duty elsewhere shall also report their local residence.- Officers who move to another place of residence, and/or change their telephone number shall inform immediately, by letter the National Guard Headquarters.-

8-5.- Enlisted personnel Serial Numbers.- The National Guard's Headquarters maintains a list of Serial Numbers corresponding to all Enlisted men in the Organization.

8-6.- Personnel Report.- Departmental Commanders and Company Commanders in Managua shall submit Morning Reports, annotating clearly on them the number of General Headquarters Change Sheet, which should serve as basis for their reports.- Battalion Commanders shall forward daily a Change Sheet showing the strength of their forces.-

Every Saturday morning, Departmental Commanders shall make their weekly report on distribution for the Battalion Commanders, who in turn shall forward it by telegraph to the National Guard's Headquarters, Managua.- Garrisons shall arrange that distribution separately and in the same telegraphic text, in the following manner: Officers names in Alphabetical order and enlisted men, similarly, but including their numbers in totals, indicating the strength of forces under their command, and date of Change Sheet, which supports the Report.

Change Sheets.- Battalion Commanders shall submit Change Sheets whenever any change takes places. Change Sheets shall show all transfers (made in and out the Battalion), promotions, demotions, deaths and desertions, leaves and permissions, etc.- On the lower part of the Change Sheet the strength of forces shall be listed showing the total numbers of Officers, Enlisted men in the various Departments,

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Companies within the Battalion, and the grand total of the Battalion strength, annotating the Change Sheet number given by General Headquarters, which supports the Report.-

Rosters.- The National Guard payroll is a combined roster and a muster list, copies of which shall be forwarded monthly to General Headquarters by every Organization.- The list shall include the military history of Officers and Enlisted personnel of the Organization during the time period indicated in the payroll.- (See General Order No. 28-1930 - Paymaster Manual).-

Commissioned Officers Efficiency Report.- Superior Officers shall submit an Efficiency Report on every Officer under their command, on September 30 and March 31, every year, and whenever the Officer changes his Service assignment, which consequently changes also his Superior Officer in charge of making his reports.-

The Officers in charge of making these reports are the following: All Staff Officers in their Departments, Battalion Commanders, Departmental Commanders and Organization Commanders which are not within a Battalion or a Department.- The Officers' Reports shall be forwarded to the Chief Director, in whose office they shall be maintained confidentially.- Efficiency Reports shall not be used in detriment of special reports remitted to the Chief Director whenever the circumstances demand it.-

8-7.- Written Orders and Instruction for Enlisted Personnel.- All written Orders, instructions, leave papers, travel orders, etc. issued to Enlisted personnel shall be written in the Spanish language.- Such Orders and Instructions for Enlisted personnel shall be clearly detailed, in order to avoid faulty interpretation or misunderstandings from such personnel.- Leave papers shall contain the name and surname of the individual Guard, rank and Serial Number of the recipient, time and date of his departure, time and day his leave terminates, and place and office where he is to report upon return.- Travel Orders shall specify the places he shall go through, and the Office where he will report his arrival.- Disposition of prisoners, equipment and receipts to be obtained, etc. shall be clearly detailed.- Service and leave papers, as travel Orders, shall be explained carefully to whom is to receive them. He shall be asked also whether he understands the explanation well before he is allowed to go on leave or start his trip.-

8-8.- Communications with Government Functionaries.- Members of the National Guard shall not maintain direct correspondence with the President or another functionary of the Executive Branch of the Nicaraguan Government, such as the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of the Treasury, etc., or with the Chief Director, regarding official business or of any other nature related to his position as member of the National Guard.-

Any National Guard member who wishes to write to the President or any other of the functionaries mentioned before, shall be able to do so, whenever this communications will be forwarded through General Headquarters, via its immediate Officer so that they shall be remitted to the President or any of the functionaries already mentioned.- The members of the National Guard shall be cautioned that under no circumstance they shall address or remit **DIRECTLY** any communication to the President or any functionary.-

NOTE: The dispositions contained in the previous paragraph are suspended as long as the General Order No. 33-1940 is not abolished by the Chief Director.

8-9.- **Commissioned Officers Financial Statement.-** Whenever a Commissioned Officer of the National Guard is to be transferred from a Battalion or Department to another, or for a tour of duty, he shall prepare a declaration of his debts and send it to the Battalion, the Departmental Commander or the Chief Director, before transfer takes place. All Command Officer's Indebtedness delcarations shall be remitted to General Headquarters where they shall be filed with the Service Record Book of the Officer concerned.

The following form shall be used when making the Declaration:

_____	_____	
(Quarters)	(Date)	
<p>Upon being transferred from Quarters. . . or from (The National Guard) on this date I delcare the following unsettled debts. (Should you be free from debts, state it so.)</p>		
To	Amounts	Payment arrangement
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

I certify that the above declaration is true and correct, and that I shall make payment of my debts as indicated above.-

Name, Rank, and Serial Number

Battalion and Departmental Commanders shall be responsible of the presentation of the Indebtedness Certifications of each Officer being transferred from his Battalion or Department. It is required that every National Guard Officer should pay his legal and just debts, voluntarily, preventing thus the embarrassing experience of being called to attention by the Chief Directors' Office.- Failure to

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carry out dutifully the payment arrangement made shall bring discredit and loss of reputation to the Officer in the eyes of the people with whom he lives and works. Nothing is more detrimental to the Officer's future and career than to yield to the habit of indebtedness.

8-10.- Miscellaneous.-

(a) No Command Officer or Enlisted man of the National Guard shall accept gifts or gratuities from person or persons who directly or indirectly seek advantages or favours resulting from presents or gratuities.- This should be particularly applicable to Police Officers, Officers in charge of prisoners, messhalls or purchasing Officers.

(b) Whenever a National Guard Command Officer is provided with copies of communications addressed to Authorities of the Government of Managua by a Political Chief, a Police Director, Arms' Commander or any other functionary regarding any irregularity concerning the National Guard, all information related to the case shall be immediately sought after and remitted to the Chief Director.-

(c) Whenever a Guard happens to shoot a citizen while carrying out his duties, should such duties be other than a combat with bandits, eyewitnesses' written testifications should be taken, and submitted to the Chief Director, for the General Headquarters files. If possible the sentence passed by the Police or Crime Judge shall be obtained together with authorized reports and copies for the General Headquarters records.-

(d) National Guard Commissioned Officers shall not write articles for publication nor grant interviews to the Nicaraguan press.- Information to the Press shall be given by the General Headquarters in Managua, and only by the Officer in charge of that activity. In Battalions and Departments outside Managua, the Officer in Command shall be authorized to provide information to the Press regarding events which details would not obstruct in any way the work of the National Guard.- This information shall be limited.- The use of this authorization shall be restricted instead of enlarged, and shall constitute a courtesy toward the Press.- Generalities and forthcoming intentions shall be avoided.-

*BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GUARD OF NICARAGUA,
DIVISION GENERAL ANASTACIO SOMOZA, G, NATIONAL GUARD.*

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ANNEX H

EQUIPMENT SURVEY

The following is a partial inventory of military and police type equipment assigned to the rural police companies. In addition MAP provided equipment is identified, as well as MAP equipment to be provided in FY 70, 71 and 72. Rural companies 4, 5, 11, 15, 18 and 19 are not included as the USMILGROUP inventories have not been completed to date.

6th Company, JINOTEPA

1.- *On hand - local*

- 4 9mm Madsen MG (Pistol)
- 3 S&W 3S Cal 6" Barrel
- 3 9mm Browning
- 29 33 Cal 4" Barrel
- 1 38 Cal Ruby
- 1 38 Cal S&W Air-weight
- 79 Rifles Cal .39 M1
- 64 Enfields
- 7 Carbines
- 6 Thompson's 45
- 36 Baynotes Enfields
- 75 Bayonets M1
- 1 Radio, GE, Deskmate, w/accessories, 4 Channels, Model DM76LFS
- 2 Tripode Machine-guns Cal .30 M2
- 4 Automatic Rifles Cal .30 M1918A2, Brng
- 1 1 T Truck, M601
- 2 1/2 T Trucks, M603
- 1 Trlr, Cargo, 1/4T, M100
- 10 Protective Masks M9A1
- 1 Tool Kit, General Mechanic
- 2 Radios, GE, Portamobile, w/accessories, 2 Channels, Model UN36LCS

2.- *MAP Equipment*

- 1 Trk Cgo 1T M601
- 2 1/4T Jeeps
- 1 1/4T Trlr Cgo
- 10 M9A1 Protective Mask

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- 1 Desk-mate Radio
- 2 Portamobile Radios

3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*

¼T Vehicles

- 1 - FY71

PRC 77 Radio Set

- 1 - FY71
- 1 - FY 72

7th Company, GRANADA

1.- *On hand - local*

- 54 Enfields
- 83 Rifle Cal .30 M1
- 83 Bayonet M1
- 1 Radio, GE, Deskmate, 2/accessories, 4 Channels, Model DM76LFS
- 2 Automatic Rifles, Cal .30, M1918A2, Brng
- 2 Trucks, ¼ Ton, M603
- 1 Trailer, Cargo, ¼ Ton, M100
- 1 Tool Kit, Gen Mech
- 2 Radio, GE, Portamobile, w/accessories, 2 Channels, Model UN36LCS
- 9 Pistols Browning 9 mm
- 3 Pistols S&W .38
- 5 SubMG 9 mm Madsen
- 5 Carbine M-1

2.- *MAP Equipment*

- 2 ¼ T Jeeps
- 1 ¼ Trlr Cgo
- 1 Desk-mate Radio
- 2 Portamobile Radios

3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*

¼ T Vehicles

- 4 - FY70

Radio Set Portamobile

- 3 - FY70
- 1 - FY72

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8th Company, MASAYA

1. *On hand - local*

- 10 Pistols, 9mm Browning
- 84 Rifles Cal .30 M1
- 81 Bayonets M1
- 1 Radio, GE, Deskmate, 2/accessories, 4 Channels, Model DM76LFS
- 1 Tripod Machine-gun, Cal .30 M2
- 1 Machine-gun, Cal .30, M1919A1, Brng
- 6 Automatic Rifles, Cal .30, M1918A2, Brng
- 1 1T Truck, M601
- 1 ¼T Truck, M603
- 1 Trlr, Cargo ¼T, M100
- 2 Radios, GE, Portamobile, w/accessories, 2 Channels, Model UN36LCS
- 2 Thompson 45 Cal SMG
- 4 9mm SMG
- 119 Enfields

2.- *MAP Equipment*

- 1 Trk Cgo 1T M601
- 1 ¼T Jeep
- 1 ¼T Trlr Cgo
- 1 Desk-mate Radio
- 2 Portamobile Radios

3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*

- ¼ T Vehicles
- 2 - FY71
- PRC 77 Radio Set
- 1 - FY71

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9th Company, RIVAS

1.- *On hand - local*

- 167 Rifle Cal .30 M1
- 76 Bayonet M1
- 1 Radio, GE, Deskmate, w/accessories, 4 Channels, Model DM76LFS
- 3 Tripod Machineguns, Cal .30 M2
- 3 Machineguns, Cal .30, Brng
- 6 Automatic Rifles, Cal .30, M1918A2, Brng
- 2 Trucks, ¼ Ton, M603
- 2 Trailers, Cargo, ¼ Ton, M100
- 2 Radios, GE, Portamobile, w/accessories, 2 Channels, Model UN36LCS
- 1 Revolver Cal .38 SW Barrel 2"

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- 10 Revolver Cal .38 SW Barrel 4"
- 5 Revolver Cal .38 Ruby Ext
- 24 Rifles Enfls Cal .30 M2
- 1 Revolver Cal 38 Canadian
- 6 Pistols Cal 9 mm Browning
- 1 Pistol Cal 9 mm SW
- 1 Pistol Cal 45 Aut
- 6 Pistols 9 mm Madson

2.- *MAP Equipment*

- 2 ¼ T Jeeps
- 2 ¼ T Trlr Cgo
- 1 Desk-mate Radio
- 2 Portamobile Radios

3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*

- Radio Set Portamobile
- 1 - FY70

12th Company, LEON

1.- *On hand - local*

- 5 Pistols 9 mm SWO
- 15 Pistols 9 mm Browning
- 183 Rifles Cal .30 M1
- 126 Bayonets M1
- 1 Radio, GE, Deskmate, w/accessory, 4 Channels, Model DM76LFS
- 3 Bipode Machinegun, Cal .30 M2
- 3 Machinegun, Cal .30, M1919A4 Brng
- 9 Automatic Rifles, Cal .30, M1918A2, Brng
- 3 Trucks, ¼ Ton, M603
- 1 Truck Commercial Flat-bed
- 1 Nissan Patrol Station-wagon
- 2 Trailers, Cargo, ¼ Ton, M100
- 37 Protective Masks M9A1
- 1 Tool Kit, Gen Mech
- 2 Radio, GE, Portamobile, w/accessory, 2 Channels, Model UN36LCS
- 2 60 mm Mortars
- 13 Thompson 45 Cal Smg

2.- *MAP Equipment*

- 3 ¼ T Jeeps
- 2 ¼ T Trlr Cgo
- 1 Desk-mate Radio

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- 2 Portamobile Radios
- 37 M9A1 Protective Masks
- 1 1 T Trk

Note: 1 Jeep, dead-lined 10 Sep 69 (Faulty brake system) vehicle being repaired at Campo de Marte.

3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*

✓ ¼ T Vehicles

- 4 - FY70
- 1 - FY71

Radio Set Portamobile (PRC77)

- 6 - FY70
- 2 - FY71

RC 292

- 4 - FY70

13th Company, CHINEMDEGO

1.- *On hand - local*

- 18 Pistols
- 151 Rifle Cal .30 M1
- 102 Bayonet M1
- 1 Radio, GE, Deskmate, w/accessories, 4 Channels, Model DM76LFS
- 1 Tripode Machinegun, Cal .30 M2
- 1 Machinegun Cal .30, M1917A1, Brng
- 14 Automatic Rifles, Cal .30, M1918A2, Brng
- 3 Trucks, ¼ Ton, M603
- 2 Trailers, Cargo, ¼ Ton, M100
- 18 Protective Masks M9A1
- 1 Tool Kit, Gen Mech
- 2 Radio, GE, Portamobile, w/accessories, 2 Channels, Model UN36LCS
- 1 60 mm Mortars

2.- *MAP Equipment*

- 3 ¼ T Jeeps
- 2 ¼ Trlr Cgo
- 1 Desk-mate Radio
- 2 Portamobile Radios
- 18 M9A1 Protective Masks

Note: 1 Jeep dead-lined 26 Aug 69 (accident repairs) vehicle being repaired at Campo de Marte.

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3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*

¼ T vehicles
5 - FY70

Radio Set Portamobile

5 - FY70
1 - FY72

14th Company, OCOTAL

1.- *On hand - local*

7 Pistols Browning
2 Pistols S&W
1 Pistol Standard
146 Rifle Cal .30 M1
155 Bayonet M1
1 Radio, GE, Deskmate, w/accessoires, 4 Channels, Model DM76LFS
4 Tripod Machine-gun, Cal .30 M2
4 Machine-guns .30, M1919A1, Brng
7 Automatic Rifles, Cal .30, M1918A2, Brng
1 Truck, 1 Tone, M601
3 Truck, ¼ Ton, M603
2 Trailers, Cargo, ¼ Ton, M100
2 Radio, GE, Portamobile, w/accessories, 2 Channels, Model UN36LCS
6 Thompson 45 Cal Sub-MG
2 Sub-MG 9 mm Madson
1 45 Cal Grease gun

2.- *MAP Equipment*

3 ¼ T Jeeps
2 ¼ T Trlr Cgo
1 Desk-mate Radio
2 Portamobile Radios

3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*

¼ T Vehicles
1 - FY70
1 - FY71

Radio Set Portamobile

1 - FY70
2 - FY71

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16th Company, SOMOTO

1.- *On hand - local*

- 6 Pistols Browning 9 mm
- 1 Pistol S&W 9 mm
- 2 Pistols Standard 9 mm
- 1 Pistol Cal .45
- 111 Bayonet M1
- 1 Radio, GE, Deskmate, w/accessories, 4 Channels, Model DM76LFS
- 3 Tripod Machine-gun, Cal .30 M2
- 3 Automatic Rifle, Cal .30, M1918A2, Brng
- 2 Trucks, ¼ Ton, M603
- 2 Trailers, Cargo, ¼ Ton, M100
- 2 Radio, GE, Portamobile, w/accessories, 2 Channels, Model UN36LCS
- 3 Thompson 45 Cal Sub-MG

2.- *MAP Equipment*

- 2 ¼ T Jeeps
- 2 ¼ T Trlr Cgo
- 1 Desk-mate Radio
- 2 Portamobile Radios

3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*

- ¼ T Vehicles
 - 1 - FY71
- Radio Set Portamobile
 - 1 - FY71

17th Company, MATAGALPA

1.- *On hand - local*

- 1 Pistol .45
- 8 Revolvers .38
- 6 Pistols Madson 9 mm
- 2 Submachine guns .45
- 3 Pistols Star 9 mm
- 12 Pistols Browning 9 mm
- 2 Pistols Smith and Western
- 106 Rifles Cal .30 M1
- 102 Bayonets M1
- 1 Radio, GE, Desk-mate, w/accessories, 4 Channels
- 6 Automatic Rifles Cal .30 M1918A2 Brng
- 3 Trucks, ¼ Ton M603
- 2 Trailers, Cargo, ¼ Ton M100

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- 20 Protective Masks M9A1
- 1 Tool Kit, General Mechanic
- 2 Radios, GE, Portamobile, w/accessories, 2 Channels, Model UN36LCS
- 169 Rifles Enfield
- 2 Machineguns (water-cool) BMG .30 Cal
- 1 Machinegun (air-cool) Cal .30
- 5 Thompson Submachine-guns
- 25 Bayonets Enfield
- 1 Carbine
- 1 Carbine bayonet

- 2.- *MAP Equipment*
 - 3 ¼ T Jeeps
 - 2 ¼ T Trlr Cgo
 - 20 M9A1 Protective Mask
 - 1 Desk-mate Radio
 - 2 Portamobile Radios

- 3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*
 - ¼ T Vehicles
 - 5 - FY70
 - Radio Set Portamobile
 - 5 - FY70
 - 1 - FY72

20th Company, PUERTO CABEZAS

- 1.- *On hand - local*
 - 88 Bayonets M1
 - 4 Mount Tripod
 - 4 MG Cal 30 Browning
 - 122 Rifle M1
 - 1 Trk 1 Ton
 - 1 Trk ¼ Ton
 - 1 Trlr ¼ Ton
 - 1 Deskmate
 - 1 Auto Maint Kit
 - 1 MG Cal 50
 - 1 Radio Set Collins KWM2A

- 2.- *MAP Equipment*
 - 1 ¼ T Jeep
 - 1 ¼ T Trlr Cgo

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- 1 Desk-mate Radio
- 1 Collins KWM2A

3.- *Equipment to be Programmed in MAP*

¼ T Vehicle

1 - FY72

Radio Set Portamobile

2 - FY71

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ANNEX I

TERMS OF REFERENCES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 059

PAGE 01 STATE 081113

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INFO OCT-01 /041 R

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APPROVED BY: BYRON ENGLE DIRECTOR OPS
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 081113

AIDAC

SUBJECT: PUBLIC SAFETY SURVEY OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL POLICE

REFERENCE: STATE 072179

1. THE SURVEY TEAM WILL CONSIST OF DAVID R. POWELL, FSR-3 CHIEF LATIN AMERICA BRANCH, OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY, TEAM LEADER, AND KENNETH YOUNGS, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO DIRECTOR, OPS.

2. OBJECTIVE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY WILL BE TO DETERMINE THE POLICE CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL, TO ASSESS THEIR PRESENT AND FUTURE NEEDS, TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS APPROPRIATE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF US

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TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE GON SECURITY FORCES'S CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY:

3. COURSE OF ACTION. THE STUDY WILL EMBRACE A REVIEW OF THE CT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY. AN ANALYSIS WILL BE MADE OF THE SECURITY FORCES'S CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTIONS RELATED TO ADMINISTRATION, ORGANIZATION, BUDGET, PERSONNEL STRENGTH AND SYSTEM, DEPLOYMENT, OPERATIONS, TRAINING, COMMUNICATIONS, MOBILITY AND MAINTENANCE. THE SURVEY WILL ALSO CONSIDER THE ROLE OF A PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM AS IT WILL RELATE TO OVER-ALL US OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN NICARAGUA.

USAID WILL BE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE, AS REQUIRED, TRANSPORTATION, BOTH INTER-AND INTRA-CITY, OFFICE ACCOMMODATIONS AND SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE.

4. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY. THE SURVEY TEAM WILL PROVIDE AN ORAL BRIEFING TO THE CT REGARDING THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. A WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR CT COMMENTS. INFORMATION AS TO THE TEAM'S FINDINGS WILL NOT BE TRANSMITTED TO THE GON PRIOR TO WASHINGTON APPROVAL.

5. USAID DIRECTOR ARNESON CONCURS FOREGOING. ADVISE FUNDING SYMBOLS.

RICHARDSON

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ANNEX J

**THE FOUR YEAR CURRICULUM OF THE
NICARAGUA MILITARY ACADEMY**

**Camp Mars
Managua, Nicaragua¹**

Diversified Course

<i>SUBJECT</i>	First Year <i>(Hours weekly)</i>	Second Year	Total
Mathematics	4	4	8
Spanish Language	4	4	8
Foreign Language	4	4	8
Physical	4	4	8
General Chemistry	6		6
General Biology		6	6
Geography of Nicaragua	3		3
History of Nicaragua		3	3
Economy		3	3
Sociology	3		3
Philosophy	2	2	4
Total Hours	30	30	60

/s/ illegible
SULVIO MAYORGA C.
Captain (Eng) NG.
Offical Administrative Assistant

CABC/SMC/xcf.

NOTE: The plan for the Bachelor's degree consists of five years: three (3) years basic and two (2) years diversified courses. The three years of basic studies are taken before entering the Military Academy and the two years of diversified courses are taken in this Center to obtain the degree of Bachelor of Sciences and Letters.

¹Memo to COMUSMILGP from the Nicaragua Military Academy dated February 6, 1970.

FIRST COURSE

TACTICS

<i>SUBJECT</i>	<i>HOURS</i>
Map Reading	40
Individual Training of the Soldier	25
Procedure of Leading Troops	10
Squad of Infantrymen	30
Patrolling	10
Bayonet Practice	20
Review of Tactics	56
Orientation - Counter-insurgency	56
Tactical Exercises	112
Counter-insurgency exercises	112
Close Order Drill	312

ARMS

North-American .30 cal M1 Rifle	20
Practice Rifle Aiming and Sighting	25
Carbine cal .30 M1	15
Pistol cal 9mm	10
Pistol cal .45	8
Automatic pistol M-3 cal .45	10

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 CPLF AID/GPA
 [Date- MAR 17 1981]

ASSOCIATED CLASSES

Military Courtesy	20
Interior Regulations A.M.N.	20
Interior Guard Duty	15
First Aid	10

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SECOND COURSE

TACTICS

Map Reading	20
Platoon Drill	50
Review of Tactics	56

<i>SUBJECT</i>	<i>HOURS</i>
Orientation - Counter-insurgency	56
Tactical Exercises	112
Counter-insurgency exercises	112
 Closed Order Drill	 312

ARMS

Hand and Rifle Grenades	15
Automatic Rifle - BAR	15
Thompson Sub-Machinegun	12
Browning cal .30 machinegun	20
Mortar - 60 mm	35
Rocket - 3.5 inch	12
Rifle Aiming and Sighting	25

ASSOCIATED CLASSES

Military Laws	10
Military History	30
Aptitude for Command	30
Saber Practice	7
Military Sanitation	10
Military Administration	10
Bayonet Practice	10

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THIRD COURSE

<i>SUBJECT</i>	<i>HOURS</i>
Map Reading	20
Tactics of Company	40
Military Intelligence	15
Review of Tactics	56
Orientation - Counter-insurgency	112
Counter-insurgency exercise	112
Staff Functions	14
Organization of a Battalion	14
 Close Order Drill	 312

ARMS

<i>SUBJECT</i>	<i>HOURS</i>
Machinegun .50 cal	12
Mortar cal 81mm	40
Rifle S/R cal 57mm	12
Rifle Aiming and Sighting	25
Orientation of Artillery	28
Orientation of Armored Units	28

ASSOCIATED CALSSES

Military Pedagogy	30
Military Administration	10
Military Laws	10
Military History	20
Communications	10
Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare	10
Observer Aerial Reconnoitering	10

BASIC COURSE FOR POLICE

Criminalistics	50
Fingerprinting	50
Police Records and Files	20
Police Reporting	15
Criminology	30
Penal Laws	30
Code of Criminal Instructions	20
Judo	30
Police Patrol and Surviellance	20
Constitutional Law	20
Police Regulations	20
Searches	15
Target Practice with 9mm pistol and Madsen machinegun	15

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RECAPITULATION

First and Second Courses

One month of vacation per year
Fifteen (15) days of review of tactics
Fifteen (15) days of Counter-insurgency Orientation
Fifteen (15) days of Exercises (Tactics and Counter-insurgency)
Fifteen (15) days of Closed order and Interior Guard Drill (practical)
Nine months of regular calsses: 36 hours per month = 324 hours
For the III Course (Class): Hours given to classes = 311
For the IV Course (Class): Hours given to classes = 290
The Close Order Drill one (1) hour more training is given daily to the recently
joined members making a total of 312 hours

Third Course

Equal time for the first five items listed above
Three (3) months of the Basic Police Course
Six (6) Months of regular classes: 112 hours monthly = 672 hours
Hours of class work = 348
Free hours for civil classes = 300
Close Order Drill time equal to the other classes

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**GENERAL PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION
FOR THE REPLACEMENT COMPANY OF THE THIRD BN**

The basic preparation of the Infantry Soldier consists of sixteen weeks.

INFORMATION OF COMMAND AND INDOCTRINATION

<i>NUMBER</i>	<i>SUBJECT</i>	<i>HOURS</i>
1.	Information about Command	2
2.	History of the Armed Forces	2
3.	Military Courtesy, Moral and Social Conduct	30
4.	Code of Military Jurisprudence	10
5.	Police Laws and Procedures	10
6.	Civic Instruction and the Constitution of the Republic	10
7.	Lectures and classwork: Arithmetic and Grammar, History and Geography of Nicaragua	200
	Total Hours	264

GENERAL MILITARY SUBJECTS

8.	Close Order Drill	120
9.	Inspections and Ceremonies	36
10.	Physical Exercise	60
11.	Bayonet Practice	20
12.	Interior Guard Duty	20
13.	Hygiene, Sanitation, and First Aid	16
14.	Sports	40
	Total Hours	312

TRAINING IN THE USE OF ARMS

15.	Training in Aiming and Sighting	74
16.	Garand Rifle cal .30 M1	25
17.	Browning Automatic Rifle cal .30 M-1918-A-2	30
18.	Pistol - Sub machinegun - M-3 cal .45	9
19.	Pistol - Sub machinegun - Madsen cal 9mm	9
20.	Livinia Machinegun cal .30 M-1919-A-4	25
21.	Hand Grenades MK-2 (fragmentation), Chemical grenades and rifle grenades	12
22.	Grenade Launchers, 40mm, and types of grenades	9
23.	Pistols	2

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<i>NUMBER</i>	<i>SUBJECT</i>	<i>HOURS</i>
23.	Revolvers	2
25.	Target Practice with all arms (El Mango Ranch)	100
	Total Hours	297

TACTICAL TRAINING

26.	Course in Hand to Hand Combat	5
27.	Course of Infiltration	4
28.	Marches and Bivouacking	20
29.	Individual Tactics Training	20
30.	Use of the Compass	10
31.	Practical Exercise on use of Compass	2
32.	Map Reading: Introduction	2
33.	Map Reading: Military Symbols	2
34.	Map Reading: Locations	3
35.	Map Reading: Scale and Distance	6
36.	Map Reading: Direction	3
37.	Map Reading: Orientation	3
	Total Hours	80

SPECIAL FOUR WEEKS COURSE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

FIRST WEEK

1.	Introduction and Concept of Counter-Insurgency	2
2.	Training in Counter-insurgency	2
3.	Organization of guerrilla Forces	2
4.	Transmissions	1
5.	Organization of Anti-guerrilla forces	3
6.	Intelligence and Counter-intelligence in Counter-insurgency operations	2
7.	Combat Formations	3
8.	Concepts of Civic Action	5
9.	Theory of Communism	3
	Total Hours	23

SECOND WEEK

10.	Terrestrial Navigation - day	13
11.	Terrestrial Navigation - night	13

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NUMBER	SUBJECT	HOURS
12.	Patrol: Introduction	3
13.	Patrol: Planning	3
14.	Patrol: Conducting	3
15.	Provisioning and Evacuation	2
16.	Isolation of guerrilla forces and control of villages	3
17.	Establishment of a Base (of operations)	2
18.	Destruction	3
19.	Reconstruction	2
20.	Ambushes and Raids	3
21.	Technique of aerial provisioning (airlift and drop)	3
22.	Immediate Action	2
	Total Hours	55

THIRD WEEK

23.	Operations against a guerrilla base	2
24.	Knots and ropes	2
25.	Traps-Snares-booby traps	3
26.	Technique of crossing rivers (Las Banderas River)	10
27.	Mountain climbing	10
	Total Hours	27

FOURTH WEEK

28.	Practical Exercise in conducting an Ambush	9
29.	Practical Exercise in Establishing a Base	4
30.	Investigation areas	6
31.	Establishment of a Base	4
32.	Combat Patrols and Raids	10
33.	Night Fighting	11
34.	An Approach March, Establishment of Base and Supplies by air (airdrop)	5
35.	Night Ambush	5
36.	Recognition and fixing Base	6
37.	Destruction of Guerrillas	4
38.	Evacuation and Escape - Responsibility of the Captures Soldier	13
	Total Hours	77

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MISCELLEANOUS

<i>NUMBER</i>	<i>SUBJECT</i>	<i>HOURS</i>
1.	Examination	8
2.	Period for handling Administrative Affairs	20
3.	Graduation	2
	Total Hours	30
TOTAL HOURS OF INSTRUCTION OF THE COURSE		1,165

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ANNEX K

EQUIPMENT OF THE MANAGUA POLICE

FIREARMS		AMMUNITION	
Enfield Cal 30	55	Cal. 30 M2	40 126
M-1	398		
Carbine, M-1	25	Cal. 30 Carbine	1 502
BAR	6	Cal. 45	5 549
MG 30 heavy	4		
Thompson 45	9	9 mm.	4 151
Madsen	13	9 mm. practice	10
M-13 45	10		
MK II grenade	42	.38 spec.	7,167
T gas grenade	238		
SW 38	202	.38 short	124
Canadian 38	3	.38 Winchester	73
9 mm Browning pistol	13		
9 mm Star pistol	4		
45 Automatic (Army)	1		
37 mm gas carbine	2		
38 Revol. Ruby	75	Wood batons (short)	40
Pistol S & W 9 mm	2		
38 Revolver	1		

RIOT CONTROL

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[date- MAR 17 198]

ANNEX L

RODRIGUEZ REPORT - MANAGUA POLICE

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE MANAGUA POLICE,
NATIONAL GUARD OF NICARAGUA

Managua, ND

"El Hormiguero"

Nicaragua

31 March 1970

APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION OF THE URBAN POLICE OF MANAGUA

MAP: Plan of the city of Managua, 1:8000 scale

Date: June 1967

1. MISSION: To maintain LAW AND ORDER

a. To establish a system of security to protect the life and the property of the civilian population;

b. To control the activities of the subversive elements, in order to eliminate assaults of banks and persons and to eliminate kidnappings;

c. Tactical planning of prevailing matters;

d. Control of individuals;

e. To coordinate with other forces of the Armed Institution, in order to establish a preventive system against possible subversive acts of terrorism by the extremist elements;

2. THE SITUATION AND CONSIDERATION

a. PERSONNEL: The Urban Police of Managua, presently consists of a strength of 398 men distributed in the following manner:

(1) ORGANIZATION	PLACE	STRENGTH
General Headquarters	Hormiguero	13 Officers 155 Enlisted

1st Precinct	C. Rosario Dist.	1 Officer 13 Enlisted
2nd Precinct	Montoya District	— Officer 7 Enlisted
3rd Precinct	Gancho Cam. Dist.	1 Officer 8 Enlisted
4th Precinct	Aviation District	2 Officers 29 Enlisted
5th Precinct	Santo Domingo Dist.	(Not under police control)
6th Precinct	-----	(None)
7th Precinct	Sch. of Arts. Dist.	(Not under police control)
8th Precinct	Altagracia Dist.	— Officer 9 Enlisted
9th Precinct	Capitania District	3 Enlisted
	Note: This Precinct has a force of one officer and various NG enlisted men who belong to the NG 3rd Company.	
10th Precinct	Mons. Lezcano Dist.	1 Officer 8 Enlisted
11th Precinct	Central Market Dist.	— Officer 6 Enlisted
12th Precinct	Rene Schick Dist.	1 Officer 6 Enlisted
13th Precinct	Occidental Dist.	1 Officer 7 Enlisted
Traffic Dept.		130 Enlisted

(2) A chart of the total distribution of the personnel assigned to this General Headquarters is attached (Annex 1).

(3) As one can appreciate, the following Precincts are not under the direct control of the Central Office of the Police:

- (a) 5th Police Precinct
- (b) 7th Police Precinct
- (c) 9th Police Precinct

(4) According to the analysis of the attached chart, one arrives at the conclusion that the number of available men in this General Headquarters remains reduced at 29 enlisted who have to fulfill the following functions:

- (a) To guard banks
- (b) To guard civilian and military prisoners
- (c) To guard the transfer of money to different parts of the country
- (d) To carry out orders coming from civil authorities, such as, seizures, arrests, threats, etc.
- (e) Patrol of all public events that are held at the stadiums, gymnasiums, plazas, theaters, etc.

(5) According to studies carried out by persons specialized in police patrol, it has been established that in order to bring about efficient patrol in a civilian population, at least one policeman is required for each 361 inhabitants (See Annex 2 chart of the Police Model for Developing Countries). Our present ratio of police to civilian population is 1 to 4000, taking into account the 29 men of the Police Headquarters, plus the 100 men distributed in the different Precincts. From this, it is deduced that the patrol measures might be 12% effective at the present, leaving a deficit of 88% and, as a consequence, accompanying this the rapid increase of robberies, assaults, crimes and disrespect towards the Authorities.

b. TACTICAL SITUATION:

The population of Managua consists of approximately 300,000 habitants in an area of 30 sq. Km. Embraced in this whole sector are nine police precincts located in actual houses that are leased by the National Guard and that present no defensive function in case of attacks; at the same time they are situated in places that, due to the growth of the population, do not correspond to the problem centers of the area.

It is noted that the 11th Precinct is well located to carry out only its police mission. In the northeast part of the city, the patrol ends at the 4th Police Precinct boundary and from there extends for 7 Km, leaving the districts of Santa Clara, Santa Rosa, Waspan and Meneses without patrol.

(1) In the southeast part of the city is located the 13th Police Precinct, which is situated in the Periferico Market building and which does not have the necessary capacity to cover the patrol of districts Blandon, Ducali, Eden, Santa Barbara, Meneses, Santa Julia and the colonies Salvadorita, Maestro Gabriel, Bello Horizonte and the 14th of September. The creation of a new police precinct is of urgent necessity.

(2) The 12th Police Precinct, situated in the southeast section of the city and in the neighborhoods of the Schick division, has as their mission the covering of four divisions, the La Fuente district, the same district that is being formed with the displacement of the underprivileged people from the Lago area.

(3) In the south part of the city is found the Centro-america Colony district, that which is void of any police patrol, the same situation as with all the colonies adjacent to this sector.

(4) In the southwest of the city is found the 8th Precinct, located in the Altagracia district and has as its patrol function, the following districts: San Judas, Loma Linda, San Isidro, Pochocuape and the Torres-Molina group, where in the last 8 months a new district of low social and economic level has been located and makes up the major number of the underprivileged from the Costa del Lago area in Managua.

(5) As one can appreciate, this great area is populated with great number of people of limited economic and social resources, hence bringing with them the greater frequency of problem to the police. This Precinct, located in Altagracia and lacking in personnel and mobility, can not make effective patrol nor continue this in the surrounding district which is called San Judas and which extends 5 Kms from the previously mentioned Precinct. It can be mentioned that these districts for lack of police patrol justly loan themselves to the easy housing of many delinquents, reason for which the creation of a new police precinct is of high necessity.

(6) The 2nd Police Precinct, located in the Montoya district, dispatches its patrol over the districts of Boer, the stadium, Las Palmas and Bolonia. This Precinct has equal difficulty in regards to reduced personnel and to its location.

(7) The 10th Police Precinct, located in the northeast part of the city in the Mosenor Lezcano district, was created to establish police patrol in the said sector, but presently new groups and colonies have been established, such as, Morazan Colony, the Linda Vista division and others. Therefore, the moving of this Precinct is necessary toward a place more to the west, looking for the problem center of the previously indicated districts.

(8) The 1st Police Precinct, that which is the oldest, is found situated in the sector of the Cristo del Rosario district and its patrol is suppose to embrace the districts of Acahualinca, Frixione, Santa Ana, Punta Caliente and all the settlers located in the Costa del Lago area from the School of Art to the Matadero Modelo. It ought to be noted that, due to the size of the sector that it encompasses, the police efficiency is minimal, for already it also greatly lacks personnel and mobility.

(9) In the north sector of the city, we have the 7th and 9th Police Precincts, respectively, and as already mentioned before are not under the control of this Command. It can be said of them that they are found too close to each other and do not perform any effective police function, not knowing if by chance they have some special function that might not be related with police matters.

(10) The 5th Police Precinct, located in the district of Santo Domingo, is not in the control of the police and therefore their functions are unknown. Still, its location is desirable to maintain the patrol in the surrounding districts of the sector.

c. THE SITUATION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION:

This organization depends on a radio-transmission service, composed of the following elements:

(1) Base unit located at the Police Headquarters (One)

Transmission power:	80 Watts
Maximum range:	300 Kms
Make:	GE

(2) Mobile units installed in Nissan jeeps (Four)

Transmission power:	80 Watts
Maximum range:	80 kms
Make:	GE

(3) Presently two of these mobile units are found in a bad state and are in the process of repair in the radio shop of NG Camp Marte.

(4) The mobile units that are installed in 2 Nissan jeeps do not offer the necessary efficiency to establish a control over the motorized patrol exercising vigilance in the city. For this reason, it is urgent to install transmitters of two bands in all the vehicles that patrol the city and in this manner one can alert them with urgency in case of necessity.

(5) The Police Precincts of the city inter-communicate with Headquarters through automatic telephones, with the exception of the 12th and 13th Precincts who do not have them and communicate through public telephones.

(6) Presently the following equipment is available to transport prisoners and to patrol in general:

Kayser Willy jeep	6 (New)
Nissan patrol jeep	7 (Used)
Mercedes Benz cars	1 (Chief)

(7) The Nissan patrol jeeps are found in bad working condition, two of them being presently in for repairs.

(8) Distribution:

- Kayser Willy jeeps: Destined for motorized patrol during the 24 hours of the day (4)
- In the charge of the Investigation Office (1)
- At the order of the Commander (1)
- Nissan patrol jeeps (BEGATS patrol) (2)
- In the charge of Prevention Office (1)
- In the charge of the Investigation Office (1)
- Messenger and Prisoner Transport (1)
- In repair (2)

(9) As one can observe, all the vehicles are totally centralized, which makes the dispatching of men to the different Police Precincts difficult. The same Precincts do not have any vehicles assigned to their charge in order to patrol their extensive sector. Furthermore, they lack radio transmission in order to communicate directly with the mobile patrols.

3. ANALYSIS

From the observation and study of the attached chart, one deduces that, of the 398 NG enlisted men, the personnel remains reduced at 29 enlisted men belonging to this Organization and unable to fulfill all the obligations corresponding to this Police Precinct. Of these 29 enlisted men, which the Police Headquarters has available, there exist 7 NG non-coms among them, of which 5 are guards each day in the following forms:

- (1) One Sergeant of the Guard
- (2) Four NG non-coms, as chiefs of patrol, in the Motorized Patrol section. This service lasts 24 hours and the day to day relief remains incomplete.

Of the 22 remaining enlisted personnel, 8 are used for motorized patrol, leaving a difference of 14, who are distributed in the following manner:

- Two NG enlisted men, corporal of the guard
- Two NG enlisted men, at Post Nr. 1
- Two NG enlisted men, at the National Theater Ruben Dario

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This leaves a balance of 8 NG enlisted men to fulfill the different missions enumerated in the sub-paragraph "4" of paragraph "a".

(1) General Headquarters of the Police maintains 42 fixed posts (see the attached list in Annex 3), ordered by the Higher Authority who has no effective control over their armament nor their personal conduct. The posts also do not pass inspection in their Headquarters and do not receive any military instruction. It is also noted here that they receive no salary collected through the General Paymaster's Office of the National Guard and do not bring any benefit to this Organization.

(2) In the present situation, the distribution of the Police Precincts in the Managua area, with respect to their location and assigned personnel, is not consistent, bringing as a consequence a deficiency in police patrol. It serves as an example the great realization that the 8th and 13th Police Precincts have to cover a great perimeter of patrol and are where the majority of delinquents in this city are housed.

(3) The 8th Precinct area of which was spoken in the sub-paragraph "4" and "5" of paragraph "a", urgently requires the creation of a new precinct. If this were to be carried out, it would be located in the Loma Linda district, the object being to give elasticity towards their police functions.

(4) The creation of a new precinct is also necessary in the 13th Police Precinct area mentioned in subparagraph "1" of paragraph "b". The same would be located in the Santa Rosa district.

(5) The creation of a new Police Precinct would also be necessary at the height of Kilometer 6 or 7 of the North highway.

(6) The Precincts mentioned in subparagraph "9" and "10" of paragraph "b" are not under the control of the Police and its location is not functional for the dispatchment of an efficient vigilance. Therefore, it is recommended that the 7th Precinct increase the personnel by 8 men, so that it might exercise vigilance in all the area that the 9th Precinct embraces and that this be abolished and be installed in a more appropriate place, which could be the Loma Linda district. With reference to paragraph "10", the Precinct is located in a building of the Government and in a site more appropriate to establish a sub-headquarters and the laboratories for analysis, with a force sufficient to control the central and north part of the city.

(7) With reference to the transportation situation, it can be said that a deficiency exists, principally at the Police Precincts, in that they are dependent on mobility and from this can provide effective patrol, at the same time fulfill the orders emanated from the Central Headquarters of the Police for greater

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cooperation between both units. Moreover, the Urban Police of Managua lacks vehicles for transportation of civilian prisoners which are constantly in movement from one place to another and for the search of the common drunks, vagrants, marijuana users, and prostitutes that daily walk the streets of Managua, giving it a reviling aspect to the city. This mission is carried out at various times with stake trucks that are borrowed at Camp Marte and that do not provide the security necessary for such operation, as well as attract great quantity of onlookers.

(8) The present communications by radio provide no effectiveness, inasmuch as the installed apparatuses in the four vehicles are found in bad condition and do not facilitate the control due the patrols. In order to be able to alert them in case their service is required, it is of great necessity to install in each vehicle a radio transmitter-receiver - like so, to count on the most important of an army, the Communication.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. CONCLUSIONS: It is a notoriously simple view to see that the Urban Police of Managua lacks sufficient personnel to bring about and execute their functions that the mission assigns them.

(1) That the National Police School does not prepare the contingent necessary to cover the needs of the Police Headquarters.

(2) That the increasing of personnel in this Headquarters would bring problems of housing for them.

(3) The limited personnel that are on the force lack vehicular equipment and necessary transmitters to fulfill the mission.

(4) That this personnel lacks the necessary instruction to develop themselves with effectiveness in relation to their police activities.

(5) That the distribution and nomenclature of the Precincts is not functional.

(6) That the buildings that the Police Precincts presently occupy do not loan themselves to the minimum of guarantees.

(7) That the areas the Precincts cover are too extensive for their capacity.

(8) That the Department of Criminal Investigation consists of very few personnel, plus available material to work in the said Department.

(9) That a site is necessary to locate the laboratory.

b. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Since the present ratio of Police to civilian population is 1 to 4000, it is recommended the increase of at least 500 men, who ought to be selected by age, good behavior and intellectual capacity of the Organizations of Managua.

(2) That the National Police School establish two graduations per year - 50 police graduates each 6 months or 100 per year.

(3) That the Officers coming from foreign schools and with police knowledge deliver their knowledge to the new graduates of the National Police School, with the only aim that this personnel leaves more technically trained.

(4) That the graduates from the National Police School pass directly to service at the Police Headquarters.

(5) That the 42 fixed posts belonging to this Organization pass to direct service.

(6) That the policemen be equipped with revolvers or pistols, clubs, handcuffs, and tear gas.

(7) That attending to the needs of progress and evolution of all police institution, this Command orders a special training for its personnel, without neglect of basic obligations, in order that this police be better prepared and act in a more efficient form.

(8) That those enlisted personnel that are older than 50 years or those younger that have physical disabilities be relieved from this Command.

(9) That six transmitter-receiver apparatuses, if not found in the country, be urgently ordered to install in the new vehicles that patrol the city.

(10) That the principles accorded in the BECATS organization become effective or continued again.

(11) That 10 vehicles for patrol and two more with 12-people capacity for transporting civilian prisoners be requested of the Superiors.

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(12) That those Precincts be eliminated that are not under the direct control of the Police Headquarters or that they be passed onto this force for their better functioning.

(13) That new Police Precincts be established in the districts of Loma Linda and Santa Rosa, for the reasons mentioned before.

(14) To construct a pavilion for the housing of the enlisted personnel.

(15) That the problem of housing be solved, in part upon the increasing of the number of enlisted personnel in the precincts that exist and in the probable creation of them.

Francisco Rodriguez S.
Colonel of (Inf) NG
Commander of the Police of Managua

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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE MANAGUA POLICE,
NATIONAL GUARD OF NICARAGUA**

Managua, ND

"El Hormiguero"

Nicaragua

April 1970

	Present	Out/Country	Absent	Mil. Hosp.	Restriction	Confinement	Under Inves.	AWOL	At Precincts	Spec. Assign.	Total
National Guard Officers	6	1							8	1	16
Line Service	26			2		1					29
Special Service	34										34
Fixed Posts	42										42
Chauffers	20										20
1st Police Precinct	13										13
2nd Police Precinct	8										8
3rd Police Precinct	8										8
4th Police Precinct	29										29
8th Police Precinct	9										9
9th Police Precinct	3										3
10th Police Precinct	8										8
11th Police Precinct	6										6
12th Police Precinct	4										4
13th Police Precinct	7										7
Total	223	1		2		1			8	1	236
Investigation Department											
(1) NG Officers	5	1									6
(2) NG Enlisted Men	28										28
Traffic Department											
(1) NG Officers											
(2) NG Enlisted Men	128										128
Grand Total	384	2		2		1			8	1	398

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE MANAGUA POLICE,
NATIONAL GUARD OF NICARAGUA

Managua, ND

"El Hormiguero"

Nicaragua

April 1970

GENERAL LIST OF NG POLICE IN FIXED POSTS:

Communications Palace	(8)	NG EM's
Justice Palace	(3)	NG EM's
"El Retiro" Hospital	(5)	NG EM's
Bank of London	(3)	NG EM's
Distilling Center	(1)	NG EM
Tax Administration	(1)	NG EM
National Company of Insurance	(1)	NG EM
Bank of America "El Carmen"	(2)	NG EM's
Bank of America "Centro-America"	(1)	NG EM
Institution of Highways	(1)	NG EM
Garage of the IAN	(1)	NG EM
Cologate-Palmolive Company	(2)	NG EM's
Bank "Caley Dagnall"	(1)	NG EM
Julio Martinez	(1)	NG EM
Pasteurier "La Salud"	(1)	NG EM
Bank of "La Vivienda" (INVI)	(1)	NG EM
INCEI	(1)	NG EM
Supermarket "Criolla #2"	(2)	NG EM's
Garage of the Health Center	(1)	NG EM
Public Market	(1)	NG EM
Social Security Hospital	(3)	NG EM's
Home of Col. Ocon	(1)	NG EM
Total Enlisted NG . .		(42)

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