



EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE DESIGN SUPPORT (EWARDS)

PEACE AND CONFLICT IN WEST AFRICA:
ASSESSING STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY IN THE REGION,
REPORT No. 2



JANUARY 2011

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The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government

CONTENTS

- ACRONYMS III**
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I**
- 1.0 INTRODUCTION..... 3**
- 2.0 THE PACWA APPROACH TO STRUCTURAL EARLY WARNING 5**
- 3.0 MAIN FINDINGS..... 9**
- 4.0 TRENDS IN RISK..... 13**
- 5.0 ANALYSES OF FUTURE SCENARIOS 15**
 - 5.1 DEMOCRATIZATION 15
 - 5.2 DEMOCRATIZATION SETBACK 16
 - 5.3 STRENGTHENED GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 17
 - 5.4 SGE AND DEMOCRATIZATION COMBINED 17
- 6.0 CONCLUSIONS..... 19**
- COUNTRY PROFILES 21**

ACRONYMS

CIDCM	Center for International Development and Conflict Management
COP	Chief of Party
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDWARDS	Early Warning and Response Design Support
EWD	Early Warning Department
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NNC	National Network Coordinator
PACWA	Peace and Conflict in West Africa Report
SGE	Strengthened Government Effectiveness
UMD	University of Maryland
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/WA	USAID West Africa
WACA	West African Conflict Assessment
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peace Building
WARN	Warning and Response Network

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Peace and Conflict in West Africa, Number 2, is the second such report produced under the auspices of the Early Warning and Response Design Support (EWARDS) project, funded by the West Africa Mission of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID/WA). The report provides a country-by-country assessment of the structural vulnerability to armed conflict and instability within member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Structural vulnerability considers the political, social, economic, and security conditions in a given country that affect risk for armed conflict and instability.

The report represents a concerted effort among EWARDS partners—the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), ECOWAS Early Warning Department (EWD), the University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management (UMD/CIDCM), and Tetra Tech ARD to contextualize data so that risk scores become more meaningful. Admittedly, structural characteristics of countries are for the most part slow changing and outside the public eye. They may also generate risk scores that seem out of step with current events. Nevertheless, when combined with day-to-day happenings, structural features tell a more complete story about a country’s susceptibility to armed conflict and instability.

As with *Report Number 1*, we offer a narrative that summarizes broad findings from individual country assessments, followed by country profile sheets with graphs that illustrate scenarios, trends, and patterns. *Peace and Conflict in West Africa, Number 2* reports the following findings:

- Overall, the findings reconfirm the high concentration of at-risk states in the sub-region. Eleven of the 15 states (73 percent) qualify for moderate, high, or highest risk. Across the globe, only 37 percent of all states qualify in these categories, a statistic that helps to highlight the disproportionate number of such states in West Africa.
- There are now four countries that qualify in the highest risk category according to the Peace and Conflict in West Africa (PACWA) approach for assessing risk. They are Mali, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Nigeria. All four had been classified in the highest risk category in the previous report—an indication that there has been little change in their structural conditions.
- Eight countries in the West African sub-region qualify as partial democracies. Historically, partial democracies are significantly more likely to experience future conflict or instability than other types of governments (fully consolidated democracies or autocracies). Thus, while the transition to democracy is an encouraging development, transition periods are associated with higher risks of conflict.
- Niger, which had been classified in the highest risk category in the previous PACWA report, was at the time of this writing ranked in the some risk category because it no longer qualified as a partial democracy. The risk score might rise dramatically if events unfolding in Niger permit it to regain its status as a partial democracy.
- Analyses of five-year trends in risk across the sub-region show that Guinea Bissau’s level of risk has increased more than any other country.
- Liberia’s risk score has decreased more than any other country. In 2005, its score was 20.6 (highest risk category). Its most recent score is 13.8. If structural conditions continue to improve at their current pace, Liberia could qualify for moderate risk status in the next year or two.
- Future scenarios indicate that successful democratic consolidation across the region’s partial democracies could reduce risk scores drastically in Nigeria, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone, leading to reclassifications (moderate risk for Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone, and some risk for Nigeria).
- Hypothetical scenarios also show that if infant mortality rates declined and if economic openness improved, Mali would experience a 6.3 point reduction in risk; Nigeria, 5.9 points; Sierra Leone, 5.6 points; Benin, 5.4 points; and Guinea-Bissau, 4.9 points.

I.0 INTRODUCTION

This report, *Peace and Conflict in West Africa* (Number 2), provides a country-by-country assessment of the structural vulnerability to armed conflict and instability within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The report was developed in close collaboration with the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding as part of the Early Warning and Response Design Support (EWARD) project, funded by USAID/West Africa.

WANEP personnel were directly involved in data collection, analyses, and drafting of country profile sheets for this report. The team included Murtala Touray (WANEP Conflict Early Warning Coordinator), Francis Dominic Mendy (Zone 1 Coordinator), Yéri Alice Kambiré (Zone 2 Coordinator), Constant Gnacadja (Zone 4 Coordinator), Edwige Dede Mensah (Program Officer), and Kwesi Enhill (IT Officer). In addition, Aidan Sabie Naah (Program Officer, EWARD) participated fully in the collaboration to produce the report. Chukwuemeka B. Eze, WANEP's Program Director, also participated in the workshop and contributed many valuable insights and suggestions for improvement. EWARD would like to commend all members of this team for their contributions to the final product.

The report is meant to be a resource for individuals working in the area of conflict early warning and response in West Africa. The goal of the report is to provide information about the structural vulnerability of the 15 ECOWAS member states to the potential for armed conflict or major episodes of political instability.

Overall, the report can be useful to analysts and decision makers by:

- Permitting a triangulation of conflict early-warning data generated by the ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and the Warning and Response Network (WARN) of the West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP).
- Accounting for multiple layers of data leading to better insights and more robust projections about conflict risk and resilience in West Africa.
- Providing graphical representations of data and analyses that permit rapid assessments.
- Serving as a source of background information for other reports generated by conflict early warning specialists.
- Identifying structural factors and thematic areas for further research.

2.0 THE PACWA APPROACH TO STRUCTURAL EARLY WARNING

The core element of the PACWA approach is a risk score that estimates the future likelihood of significant armed violence. By “significant” we mean major episodes of political instability, not minor outbreaks of unrest such as street demonstrations or isolated killings. The score is computed using essentially the same methodology in *Peace and Conflict 2010*, a biennial publication of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland.¹

The definition for a major conflict or instability event is based on the work of the Political Instability Task Force. That definition, which has guided the Task Force’s compilation of state failure events covering the period 1955–2006, encompasses a wide variety of event types. These include revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides or politicides. The onset of these episodes marks the beginning of an instability event, and signals the disruption of government capacity to deliver core services and to exercise meaningful authority.

Empirical studies using 60 years of historical data show that instability can emerge from a combination of six factors in four domains—*political, economic, societal, and security*. The most important factor in the political domain is the consistency of governmental institutions, especially in democratizing countries. A second key factor in the political realm is whether a country qualifies as a partial democracy. In the economic domain, it is openness to international trade: the more interdependent the economy, the less likelihood of instability. In the societal domain, the infant mortality rate serves as a barometer of socio-economic well-being. Finally, in the security domain, two factors predominate: the extent to which a country is militarized, and the existence of armed conflict in neighboring countries.² Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of these indicators.

Importantly, *regime consistency* refers to both autocratic and democratic regimes. Historical evidence indicates that regimes with inconsistent institutions are more likely to experience political instability. Indeed, among states with low regime consistency, partial democracies are particularly prone to instability and conflict (see Table 1). The conclusion to this report discusses how response strategies can be crafted to address the challenges presented by partial democracies.

¹ Readers can access the report at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc>.

² Readers may wonder why other variables such as literacy rates were not included in the model to account for the social well-being of a country. Data for literacy are notoriously sparse, with many countries in West Africa having valid observations for only one or two years across 1995-2009 (in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators). In fact, data for infant mortality, compared to many other robust indicators of social well-being, provide excellent coverage across space and time. Infant mortality serves as a useful proxy for multiple dimensions of social well-being (see summary in Table 1).

Table I – Input Indicators for the PACWA Approach

Input Indicator	Domain	Description
Regime or Institutional Consistency	Political	Regime (or institutional) consistency refers to the extent to which the institutions comprising a country’s political system are uniformly and consistently autocratic or democratic. Political institutions with a mix of democratic and autocratic features are inconsistent, a common attribute of polities in transition. Regimes with inconsistent institutions are more likely to experience political instability. Data for the regime consistency indicator come from the Polity Project.
Partial Democracy	Political	Analyses of historical data demonstrate that countries in which democratic institutions are only partially developed are especially prone to instability and conflict. PACWA defines partial democracies as states in which the election of the head of state is driven by democratic mechanisms, but where political competition is factional, parochial, and ethnic-based. Data used to identify partial democracies come from the Polity Project.
Economic Openness	Economic	The PACWA model accounts for the impact of economic openness, which is the extent to which a country’s economy is integrated with the global economy. Countries that are more tightly connected to global markets have been found to experience less instability. Data for the economic openness score have been obtained from the World Bank’s <i>World Development Indicators Database</i> .
Infant Mortality Rates	Economic and Societal	The PACWA model examines the impact of infant mortality rates, an indicator that serves as a proxy for a country’s overall economic development, its level of advancement in social welfare policy, and its capacity to deliver core services to the population. The indicator taps both the economic and social domains of a country. Data for infant mortality rates come from the World Bank’s <i>World Development Indicators</i> .
Militarization	Security	To account for the security domain, the PACWA model focuses on a country’s level of militarization. Militarization has been measured as the number of active members of the official armed forces per 100,000 persons. Instability is most likely in countries where opportunities for armed conflict are greatest. Extensive militarization in a country typically implies that a large portion of the society’s population has military skill and training, and weapons are more widely available throughout the country. Data for militarization come from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Neighborhood Security	Security	The likelihood of political instability in a state increases substantially when a neighboring state is experiencing armed conflict. This risk is especially acute when ethnic or other communal groups span borders. The PACWA report uses data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program to track active conflict in West Africa.

To obtain country risk scores, the PACWA report utilizes a statistical model based on global data for 162 countries over a 50-year period (1950-2003). Notably, the six factors above do not have equal influence on the risk of instability. To “train” the model on their relative influence, we use statistical regression to calculate the extent to which the indicators are empirically associated with the future onset of major episodes of conflict or instability.

Once the model has been trained, the relative weights of each indicator can be used to calculate the risk score for a particular country in a given year. By inputting a country’s data values for the six core indicators in any

given year, the model produces an estimated probability for a major instability or conflict event in the following three-year period. The probability value is presented in the form of a risk score.

The risk score is the ratio of a country's estimated probability of instability or conflict over the average probability for all Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. For example, Guinea Bissau's score of 20 means that the chance of a major episode of instability or conflict in Guinea Bissau is approximately 20 times greater than the average OECD country.

Countries with risk scores greater than 18 are considered highest risk. Countries with scores between 12 and 18 are high risk. Scores between 7 and 12 are moderate risk, and scores between 4 and 7 equate to some risk. Finally, a country with a score below 4 qualifies as low risk.

The PACWA report presents structural early warning analyses of each country in a *country profile sheet*. Each country profile features graphical presentations of more than 200 pieces of data, along with concise interpretations for quick review. Each country profile contains a graph showing the estimated risk for instability or conflict for each year from 1995 to 2009. This 14-year period is sufficiently long to capture historical developments with a bearing on contemporary events.

It is important to note that a risk score from any particular year reflects the risk of a major instability event occurring in the following three-year period. For example, a risk score for 1998 is based on country data from that year, but reflects the risk of instability or conflict from 1999–2001.

Since the risk scores are statistical estimates, the score reflects a degree of uncertainty. Hence, the graph indicates a confidence range. Statistically speaking, the actual risk for a given country is a 95 percent probability within this range.

3.0 MAIN FINDINGS

Table 2 presents the most recent risk scores for the 15 ECOWAS states. Four countries—Mali, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Nigeria—show little or no structural change since the December 2009 PACWA report, and qualify as highest risk. Historically, countries in this category experience major conflict or political instability 22 times more often than countries in the low risk category.

Table 2 – Future Risk of Instability or Conflict, ECOWAS States (2010-2012)

Risk Category	Country	Risk Score	Confidence Range	
			Low	High
<i>Highest Risk</i> (18 or more)	Mali	22.6	14.3	34.8
	Sierra Leone	20.6	12.5	30.9
	Guinea-Bissau	19.7	11.0	31.6
	Nigeria	19.4	11.7	28.6
<i>High Risk</i> (12-18)	Benin	13.8	9.3	19.9
	Liberia	13.8	6.7	24.4
	Burkina Faso	12.2	8.2	18.4
<i>Moderate Risk</i> (7-12)	Senegal	10.0	6.2	14.9
	Guinea	9.6	5.7	15.6
	Côte d'Ivoire	8.4	4.8	13.4
	Ghana	7.1	3.8	11.4
<i>Some Risk</i> (4-7)	Niger	6.3	3.5	10.9
	Togo	6.0	3.5	9.5
<i>Low Risk</i> (4 or lower)	The Gambia	3.0	1.7	4.9
	Cape Verde	1.4	0.7	2.5

As in the previous PACWA report, three countries—Benin, Liberia, and Burkina Faso—qualify as high risk. While the risk of future conflict or instability is significant in these countries, the risks are qualitatively lower than in the highest risk category. Historically, countries in the high risk category experience conflict or instability about ten times more often than low risk countries.

Moderate risk countries are about eight times more likely to experience instability or conflict than low risk countries. As in the previous PACWA report, there are four countries in this category: Senegal, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana. Recent events in both Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire may cause some readers to wonder why the risk scores for either country are not higher (see text box on Guinea below). For Côte d'Ivoire, uneven performance on the input indicators contributes to its moderate risk classification. While low regime consistency exerts upward pressure on its risk score, extremely high

IN FOCUS: NIGER

Niger illustrates how ephemeral risk classifications can be. In the last PACWA report, Niger was classified as a partial democracy and qualified for the highest risk category. Shortly after release of the report, a military coup ousted President Mamadou Tandja, ushering in a period of more autocratic rule, which lowered Niger's score to 6.3. Given recent developments in early 2011, the risk estimate for Niger could return to its previous level (see Figure 1 taken from Niger's country profile sheet found at the end of this report). Such volatility in transitions requires focused attention as the risks of instability and conflict can increase quickly and dramatically within short time spans. It should be noted that in situations like that in Niger, rapid changes in estimated risk scores due to the reclassification of the type of political system, probably exaggerate the change of true underlying risks. The implementation of full autocratic controls in a country experiencing a sudden shift toward autocracy take longer to establish themselves, meaning that the extent of real institutional change could lag behind what the risk score purports to reflect.

levels of economic openness lower its risk score. Finally, while it is true that the countries in the moderate category represent a third-tier in terms of estimated risk, the term moderate risk should not be taken to mean average or normal risk. The dangers of future conflict or instability remain serious in these countries. The structural conditions in these societies are associated historically with appreciable levels of armed conflict, which means that policymakers should sustain attention to conflict early warning and response in countries classified in this category.

Since the last report, Ghana's risk score has declined the most (from 10.1 previously to 7.1 now). Its current score places the country on the threshold between the moderate and some risk categories. Ghana's status as a partial democracy exerts significant upward pressure on its score. The Polity Project assesses the nature of political competition in Ghana as largely factional, which is a driving factor for Ghana's sustained classification as a partial democracy. The transition to full democracy requires an evolution in democratic competition such that political groups and parties are no longer defined largely by ethnic identification and single-issue political agendas. It is worth noting that compared to other partial democracies, Ghana's performance on the other input indicators is extremely good. Of the 23 partial democracies on the African continent, Ghana's risk score is second lowest behind only Gabon (2.3).³

Two countries qualify in the some risk category: Niger and Togo. Niger has been discussed at length above. Togo's relatively low risk score is an artifact of characteristics of its governing institutions, which are largely autocratic. Although it has staged elections in the past, most recently in March 2010, the elections have been marred by allegations of fraud. Like Niger, Togo's risk score will increase dramatically if open democratic competition takes hold in the country.

The Gambia and Cape Verde are the only countries in the sub-region qualifying for low risk. Cape Verde is a consolidated democracy with excellent performance levels on all other input indicators. The Gambia is a consolidated autocracy with strong autocratic features, trending toward repression. Indeed, The Gambia illustrates why countries with low risk are not always places where peace prevails. Low risk scores do not imply the absence of significant grievances, nor do they imply that political freedoms, human security, and economic well-being are enjoyed by all segments of society. Rather, low risk scores imply only that the structural features of a country are aligned to minimize the risk of major instability in the near future (see text box below).

IN FOCUS: GUINEA

The most recent risk score for Guinea is 9.6. That score qualifies Guinea for the moderate risk category. Given the tumultuous recent events in Guinea, some observers may wonder why the risk score is not higher. While it is true that Guinea's score is not the highest in the sub-region, it would be incorrect to interpret the score as meaning there is average or normal risk of future violence. Countries in the moderate category experience serious armed violence with great regularity in historical data and, in Guinea's case, the risk score will increase sharply in the near future if democratization takes hold.

The moderate risk grouping comprises the third tier of countries in terms of the relative risk of future conflict or instability, but Guinea's score still reflects a significant and appreciable danger for a major future outbreak of violence. Historically, countries with moderate risk experience major conflict eight times more often than countries estimated with low risk. Moreover, Guinea has experienced a major episode of conflict in its recent past (from September 2000 to March 2001) when spillover effects from neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia led to clashes between rebels and Guinean forces.

Guinea's performance on any of the risk factors tracked by the PACWA report is mostly poor and, at best, average. Guinea's score for economic openness is average among all African countries. The infant mortality rate in Guinea (90 deaths per 1,000 live births) places the country in the middle of the rankings for the 15 ECOWAS states, but places Guinea in the bottom 10th percentile among all countries globally. Guinea's low regime consistency score produces significant upward pressure on its risk score, but it is important to note that as of this writing, Guinea did not qualify as a partial democracy. If, in the period ahead, there is more open political competition Guinea will usher in a period when investment in conflict prevention efforts should be strengthened, not reduced. Open political competition, especially to the extent that political party allegiances seem to fall] along ethnic lines, will carry the potential for more serious outbreaks of violence and instability.

³ Given democratic consolidation in Ghana, political observers might consider the Polity Project ranking debatable.

IN FOCUS: THE GAMBIA

This issue of the PACWA report estimates the risk score for The Gambia as 3.0, the second lowest risk score in the sub-region. Many people from civil society, as well as the policy community, will react with surprise and some skepticism to that estimate. A criticism of this finding may suggest that since the level of frustration and grievance held by societal groups is likely to be very high in the Gambia, it should be expected that the estimate for risk for future instability and conflict should be high as well.

While this logic is sound, the global evidence from the last 60 years does not support the general prediction that instability is more frequent in autocracies like The Gambia. In fact, major episodes of conflict and instability are relatively rare in autocracies—just as rare as is in consolidated democracies. Empirical analyses conducted across all countries over the past six decades indicates that partial democracies are far more prone to instability and conflict than any other type of government.

A deeper examination of the circumstances in autocracies yields a partial explanation of why they experience major outbreaks of conflict or instability so rarely. Autocracies engage in a range of actions that make mobilizing for conflict extremely difficult for government opponents. Expressions of political opposition are often prohibited by law and punished with imprisonment. The government often controls the media, making it difficult for opposition groups to communicate their dissent with the government to a wider audience. Autocratic regimes often enact repressive policies against potential opposition groups to maintain an advantage in resources that makes successful mobilization against the government nearly impossible. In the end, while grievances against the government may be extreme in autocracies, the capacity and resources to mobilize effectively to challenge the government are often absent for the groups suffering the worst repression.

Many of these observations hold for The Gambia. Since President Yahya Jammeh seized power in 1994, The Gambia has witnessed a steady strengthening of autocratic practices. Despite holding three relatively free and fair presidential elections since then, other policies enacted by the government significantly limit the extent of political participation.* The government strictly curtails civil liberties and freedom of the press. According to Reporters Without Borders, there is an "absolute intolerance of any form of criticism." According to the report, journalists that publish material critical of the government face death threats, surveillance, and arbitrary arrest. Political opponents to the current government often charge that elections are conducted in a climate of intimidation, which prevents open and fair competition among candidates.**

These patterns give The Gambia a profile that closely resembles a multitude of historical autocracies that maintained relative stability through repressive rule. Recall that the PACWA risk scores are computed using information from historical data to inform how to weigh current structural attributes of countries. Accordingly, the risk score for The Gambia is relatively low as long as the country remains strongly autocratic.

If more open political competition is allowed to take hold in The Gambia, it is likely that the country's status will change to a partial democracy. In that case, as the scenario analysis indicates on The Gambia's country profile that appears later in this report, its risk score would rise sharply to a level that would qualify the country for the highest risk category. That sudden rise in risk illustrates the significant downward pressure that the Gambia's current autocratic status exerts on the risk score. Despite very poor performance on other indicators, its autocratic status serves to mitigate risk.

Conflict early warning analysts and early response planners for The Gambia should be attentive to changes in the country that serve to loosen restrictions on the ability of the opposition to mobilize more effectively. If democratic reforms are implemented (e.g., reforms that remove restrictions on the press) that enable opposition groups to more effectively compete with the dominant political party, then new stresses will be introduced into state-society relations in The Gambia that have much greater potential to lead to violent outbreaks.

* See U.S. Department of State (2010) "Background Note: The Gambia." Accessed at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eilbgn/5459.htm>

** BBC (2010) "The Gambia Country Profile." Accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1032156.stm

To conclude, it can be insightful to compare patterns of risk in West Africa with global patterns. Overall, the 15 countries covered in this report exhibit a level of risk that is dramatically higher than overall global averages. In the most recent global analyses performed by researchers at the University of Maryland, 15 countries worldwide qualified for the highest risk category. Four of those are in West Africa.⁴ While approximately three-quarters of

The median risk score in the sub-region is approximately 10.0, which is approximately three times higher than the global median (3.3).

West African countries qualify at least at the moderate risk level, globally only 37 percent of all countries qualify at that level or higher. These comparisons help highlight how acute the challenges are. While elevated risk across West Africa has been the norm, these patterns go against the grain internationally—a distinction that underlines the urgency for continued focus on conflict early-warning and response in the sub-region.

⁴ Niger was classified for 'highest risk' in the global analyses previously conducted at Maryland, but that analysis was performed before the more recent changes in Niger. The others in the 'highest risk' category were Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Zambia, Somalia, Mozambique, and the Central African Republic.

4.0 TRENDS IN RISK

Typically, structural early-warning indicators change slowly over time. From year to year, the risk score for any particular country is unlikely to change drastically. The outbreak of a neighborhood conflict or a significant change in regime characteristics (as in the case of Niger) can have a significant effect on the risk score, but these types of changes do not occur frequently. Analyses of longer-term trends in structural early warning can be more informative than annual changes because they can show meaningful shifts in structural circumstances, indicating whether a country is moving in a positive direction or not.

Table 3 presents the amount of change in risk score for the 15 ECOWAS countries. The countries with the largest increases in risk are at the top of the list and the countries with the largest decreases are at the bottom. Even with the longer five-year period, it can be seen that the level of risk for most countries has not changed significantly. However, changes in three countries do suggest significant shifts in structural characteristics that relate to the risks of future conflict: Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger. In each of these cases, the change in risk score has led to a new classification in a different risk category.


Table 3 – Five-Year Change in Risk of Instability or Conflict, ECOWAS States (2010-2012)

Country	2004 Score	2009 Score	5-Year Change
Guinea-Bissau	13.8	19.7	5.9*
Senegal	9.8	10.0	0.2
Burkina Faso	12.1	12.2	0.1
The Gambia	2.9	3.0	0.1
Mali	22.7	22.6	-0.1
Cape Verde	1.7	1.4	-0.3
Nigeria	20.0	19.4	-0.6
Côte d'Ivoire	9.2	8.4	-0.8
Ghana	8.4	7.1	-1.3
Togo	7.5	6.0	-1.5
Guinea	11.6	9.6	-2.0
Benin	16.8	13.8	-3.0
Sierra Leone	24.9	20.6	-4.3
Liberia	20.6	13.8	-6.8*
Niger	23.3	6.3	-17.0*

** The 5-year change resulted in a different risk classification for the country.*


Over the past five years, the only country in West Africa that has seen a significant rise in risk score is Guinea-Bissau. After experiencing three consecutive years of declines in risk in 2002, 2003, and 2004, Guinea Bissau's risk score dropped from the highest risk category to the high risk group. But, in 2005, the score rose dramatically when former President Vieira was re-elected. Reforms implemented at that time resulted in the country regaining its status as a partial democracy, which typically ushers in a period of heightened risk. Since that time, Guinea Bissau's risk score has remained relatively stable in the highest risk category (see Figure 2 - The black circles in the graph indicate each annual risk estimate. The gray bars indicate the confidence range surrounding each estimate).

Figure 2 – Guinea Bissau Risk Scores, 1995–2009



Aside from Niger, Liberia is the only other country in the sub-region that has exhibited a significant decrease in risk over the past five years (see Figure 3). Over the course of its post-conflict recovery, Liberia’s risk score has improved from 20.6 in 2005 to its current score of 13.8. That improvement has resulted in a change in risk category from highest to high. Improvements in regime consistency (a reflection of progress toward democratic consolidation) and economic openness are the most significant contributors to the lower risk score. To be clear, Liberia still qualifies as a partial democracy, which serves to push the score upward. However, its separate regime consistency score climbed from a score of 1 in 2003, to 9 in 2004, to 25 in 2005, and then to 36 in 2006. Those scores reflect the gradual consolidation of democratic institutions that have taken hold in the country in its post-conflict recovery. If the pace of improvement continues into the future, Liberia’s risk score will fall into the moderate risk category within the next year or two.

Figure 3 – Liberia Risk Scores, 1995–2009



The relative stability of risk scores for many countries in the sub-region is cause for concern. As noted earlier, West Africa possesses an atypical concentration of states in the high and highest risk categories. The absence of evidence, as reflected in PACWA’s input indicators, of improving structural conditions is sobering. Unchanging levels of high risk in the face of multiple efforts by civil society organizations, donor agencies, and other international organizations to improve resiliency and reduce structural vulnerability in these societies suggests just how steep the challenges really are.

5.0 ANALYSES OF FUTURE SCENARIOS

Each country profile in the PACWA report presents four scenarios: a democratization scenario, a democratization setback scenario, a strengthened government effectiveness scenario, and a combined democratization/strengthened government effectiveness scenario. Each analysis is based on a set of assumptions about how a country's input indicators will change over the next four years depending on the details of the scenario. For example, in the democratization scenario, we assume that the country experiences a gradual strengthening of democratic governance, leading to higher regime consistency and a stronger democracy score from the Polity Project. In the strengthened government effectiveness scenario, it is assumed the country makes steady progress in the area of social-economic policies. The Appendix contains a full description of the methodology guiding the scenario analyses.

The results of the scenario analyses also help highlight an important feature of the PACWA structural early-warning approach. When countries achieve the same level of improvement on a particular input indicator, the level of change in the risk scores across countries can be, and usually is, different. The PACWA approach is based on a nonlinear connection between input indicators and risk. For countries performing very badly on particular indicators, a small improvement can reduce risk dramatically. For countries performing very well on an input indicator, improvements (even very large ones) yield very small reductions in risk. Thus, the scenarios offer a tool for assessing the extent to which a change that is fixed in terms of its size has varying effects across the countries in West Africa. A brief summary of the results for each of the four scenarios is presented below.

5.1 DEMOCRATIZATION

The democratization scenario posits a modest progression toward greater democratic consolidation. The impact on a country's estimated risk for future conflict depends on where the country's current position is in its democratic transition. For partial democracies, the scenario culminates in nearly complete democratic consolidation and a corresponding drop in risk. For autocracies, the scenario leaves the country in the middle of democratic transition—a partial democracy with heightened risk for instability. The results of this scenario analysis, therefore, involve a set of countries (current partial democracies) that are predicted to have drastically reduced risk scores and a different set of countries (current autocracies) with dramatically heightened risk scores. In fact, the three countries with the largest increases in risk under the most recent democratization scenario analyses are Niger (increase of risk by 20.4 to a score of 26.7), The Gambia (increase of risk by 13.1 to a score of 16.1), and Togo (increase of risk by 5.4 to a score of 11.4).

The results of the analyses for these three autocratic governments indicate that the risks for conflict and instability will increase to dangerous levels during a period of future democratization. Policymakers should strategize and plan for how early responses might be crafted to address the tensions and stresses that will manifest themselves when (or if) more open political competition arises in these three countries. Figure 4 shows the corresponding graphs for the three countries. Although all three countries would experience heightened risk if they were to transition through a period of partial democracy, the levels of risk would differ because of varied performance levels on other indicators.

Figure 4 – Future Democratization and Risk, Comparing Scenarios for The Gambia, Niger, and Togo





Figure 5 presents data for the four largest declines in risk in the democratization scenario. Each of the countries depicted in the figure are currently partial democracies. In this scenario, Nigeria’s score declines by 13.0 to a new score of 6.4. Mali’s score declines by 12.8 to a new score of 9.8. Guinea-Bissau’s score declines by 12.0 to a new score of 7.7. Sierra Leone’s risk score would drop by 11.6 to a new score of 9.0. The four largest declines in risk correspond to the four countries currently classified for highest risk. In each case, significant gains in democratization would lead to a reclassification for each country in the moderate risk category (for Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone). Nigeria would actually drop all the way to the some risk category.

Figure 5 – Future Democratization and Risk, Comparing Scenarios for Guinea Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone



5.2 DEMOCRATIZATION SETBACK

The democratization setback scenario is essentially the opposite of the democratization scenario, and features backsliding toward autocratic tendencies. Partial democracies become autocracies in this scenario with a decline in risk of instability, while consolidated democracies become partial democracies with a much higher risk of instability. Thus, in this scenario, the countries that can be expected to see the biggest increases in risk are the countries currently classified as consolidated democracies. In the case of West Africa, Cape Verde’s risk would increase modestly to a new risk score of 4.2. Even as a partial democracy, Cape Verde’s risk score would be relatively low because its performance levels on the other indicators is quite strong.

West Africa's partial democracies experience dramatic declines in their respective risk scores in the democratization setback scenario. The risk scores for Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone would drop by at least five points. However, as with Niger, which reverted to more autocratic features in 2009, the lower scores obtained in this scenario should be interpreted cautiously. States can abruptly reverse course and shift into higher risk levels. Hence, policymakers should view developments cautiously as the experience may be of short duration.

5.3 STRENGTHENED GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS

In the strengthened government effectiveness (SGE) scenario, the largest reductions in risk correspond to the countries that are currently performing most poorly on the two indicators that improve over the scenario period: infant mortality rates and economic openness. The countries that improve the most in this scenario are Mali (6.3 point reduction in risk), Nigeria (5.9 points), Sierra Leone (5.6 points), Benin (5.4 points), and Guinea-Bissau (4.9 points).

The level of improvement posited under the SGE scenario is relatively modest. Over the scenario period, each country reduces its infant mortality rate by approximately 30 deaths per 1,000 live births. In the case of Mali, for example, this improvement would result in its infant mortality rate dropping from its current value of 102 to 72, which is comparable to the rate in Benin (75). For economic openness, the ratio of total trade to GDP increases by approximately 25 percentage points over the scenario period. In the case of Sierra Leone, its current score for economic openness (approximately 45) would increase to 70 over the scenario period, which is comparable to Guinea's current economic openness score.

The noteworthy feature of the SGE scenario is that the policy goals represented by the details of the scenario are not impossibly difficult to attain. Already, there are countries in the region that have attained levels of performance similar to what other countries are posited to achieve through the scenario. Just as notable, the reductions in risk that would correspond to these modest improvements are large enough to make a qualitative difference in the risk classification for the state.

5.4 SGE AND DEMOCRATIZATION COMBINED

Progress toward democratization and SGE combines multiple factors that have contrasting effects on risk. For example, while a transition to partial democracy entails a significant increase in risk, the risk can be tempered by simultaneous improvements in aspects of government effectiveness.

The risk for conflict and instability is highest for Niger in this scenario, increasing by 10.1 over the scenario period. However, recall that in the democratization scenario, Niger's risk score increases by 20.4 points. Improvements in government effectiveness can cut the risks of future conflict or instability in half when Niger transitions through a period of partial democracy. A similar result was obtained for The Gambia. When improvements in government effectiveness are combined with democratization, its risk score increases by only 7.4 points compared to the 13.1 points that results when democratization occurs without any improvement in government effectiveness. Put another way, The Gambia would be estimated to be a high risk country during a future period of democratization. If democratization were coupled with simultaneous improvements in government effectiveness, The Gambia's risk score would be limited to the moderate risk category.

When the democratization scenario involves a transition from partial democracy to full, consolidated democracy, risk scores decline considerably. When those changes are combined with strengthened government effectiveness, the risk scores decline even further. For example, Nigeria's score falls by 13 points in the democratization scenario (to approximately 6.4). With improvements in government effectiveness, that score falls even further to 4.3, placing Nigeria on the threshold of the low risk category.

The five countries with the largest reductions in the combined democratization and SGE scenario are Mali (reduction of 16.1 points), Nigeria (reduction of 15.1 points), Guinea-Bissau (reduction of 14.5 points), Sierra Leone (reduction of 14.3 points), and Benin (reduction of 10.6 points).

6.0 CONCLUSIONS

We close by offering further comment on one of the recurring themes among the findings presented in this report: the elevated risk levels associated with partial democracies. Of the 15 countries covered in this report, eight qualify as partial democracies according to data obtained from the Polity Project. Those eight countries are Benin, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Among these eight countries, the risk scores can diverge widely. For example, Mali's score is more than double Ghana's score. The differences can be attributed to how countries perform on the other input indicators. On indicators like economic openness, infant mortality, and regime consistency, Ghana is performing relatively well. In comparison, on the same indicators, Mali performs comparatively worse. While partial democracies are, on the whole, associated with higher levels of risk, those risks can be mitigated significantly when countries make improvements in other areas while they progress through their respective democratic transitions.

For the purposes of crafting effective response strategies for partial democracies, planners should focus on the aspects of partial democracies that are thought to drive those risks. The defining feature of partial democracy, for the purposes of this report, is that political competition is defined by factionalism. The main political groups are defined by single-issue agendas or by ethnic identities. Accordingly, political competition can often be divisive because political outcomes are often zero-sum. That is, victory by one group is viewed as winner-take-all, with little room for compromise. Competition of this nature can produce outcomes in which the losers may feel the only way to advance is to use violence. In such instances, early response planning should focus on broadening the agenda of political groups with attempts to identify common ground between political groups for compromise.

More importantly, electoral processes should be designed with a commitment to transparency so that both winners and losers accept outcomes as legitimate. Mechanisms should be constructed to give political groups a sense that political competition is fair and open. In the absence of those mechanisms, political losers in one election may become discouraged about the prospects of realizing group goals through politics and may be drawn to resorting to violence. This is by no means a complete listing of response options for partial democracies. However, the discussion is meant to emphasize the particular importance of these types of programs in the context of partial democracies.

Finally, in the case of Niger, the report illustrates how volatile risk scores for partial democracies can be. A democratic setback that leads to more autocratic institutions can reduce a country's risk score significantly. The first PACWA report published in December 2009 assigned a risk score of 23.0 to Niger. In the current report, Niger's score has fallen to 6.3, but that score could rise dramatically again depending on political developments in Niger in 2011. The lesson is that structural characteristics of West African countries need to be triangulated with dynamic, events-based data such as that generated by ECOWARN and WARN since situations in these countries can change quickly, and the risk of future conflict or instability can rise and fall precipitously depending on the ebb and flow of democratic reforms and authoritarian rule.

The *Peace and Conflict in West Africa* report series has clear value for both analysts and policymakers. For the analyst, the report can facilitate more robust country risk assessments because it allows analysts to triangulate events-based data against the context of structural risk data. For the policymaker, the report serves as valuable background. With concise presentations of data, the report gives policymakers comparable snapshots across the 15 ECOWAS countries, providing detail about the factors in each country that influence the relative risk of conflict. In sum, the report is one tool among many available to conflict early warning analysts and early response planners.

COUNTRY PROFILES

Country profiles appear on the following pages in alphabetical order.

BENIN

Benin's risk score has remained stable from 1995 to 2000 and declined slightly from 2001 to 2009. This slight change in Benin's risk score is a demonstration of the improvement of its regime consistency.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18

Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7

Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – The regime consistency in Benin was 36 from 1995 to 2005 and increased to 49 from 2006 to 2009, partly the result of Benin conducting a peaceful election in 2006.

Partial Democracy – Although Benin's regime consistency is well above the EWOAS average, it remains a partial democracy, which exerts upward pressure on its risk score.

Economic Openness – Benin's score for economic openness declined gradually over the period 1995 to 2006 and then increased somewhat during the 2007-2009 period, leading to somewhat lower risk scores during that latter period.

Neighborhood Conflict – Benin has not experienced any neighborhood conflict from 1995 to 2009.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


The democratization scenario for Benin (a partial democracy) shows its risk score declining from its current value (13.8) to approximately 5 by the year 2013, a change that would place Benin in the 'some risk' category. In this scenario, Benin's reduction in risk is the sixth highest in the region.

In the Democratization Setback scenario, Benin's risk score climbs steadily as its regime consistency score drops. Then, after transitioning to autocratic rule, the risk score drops dramatically.


In the Strengthened Government Effectiveness (SGE) scenario, Benin's reduction in risk (-5.4) is the fourth highest in the region.

In the combined SGE and democratization scenario, Benin risk score declines from 13.8 to approximately 3.0, a change that would place Benin in the 'low risk' category.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009



Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?



Democratization	Strengthened Gov't Effectiveness (SGE)
Democratization Setback	SGE and Democratization

BURKINA FASO

Burkina Faso's current risk score is 12.2, placing it in the 'high risk' category, but near the threshold for the 'moderate' category. Its risk score remained largely unchanged from 1995-2000, but increased significantly in 2001 when its regime consistency score dropped completely to zero.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – Since 2000, Burkina Faso's regime consistency has been zero, indicating a regime that does not yet exhibit strong tendencies toward democratization.

Partial Democracy – Burkina Faso does not qualify as a partial democracy.

Economic Openness – Levels of economic openness are relatively low compared to the ECOWAS average. The low levels exert upward pressure on Burkina Faso's risk score.

Neighborhood Conflict – There have been no active armed conflicts (with battle fatalities exceeding 1,000) in Burkina Faso's bordering countries during the period 1995-2009.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


In the Democratization scenario, Burkina Faso's risk score increases as it passes through a period of partial democracy. Then, upon full democratic consolidation, its risk score is projected to decline to approximately 9.0

In the Democratization Setback scenario, Burkina Faso would become a more consolidated autocracy with a much lower risk score.


In the Strengthened Government Effectiveness (SGE) scenario, Burkina Faso's risk score would improve to 7.6, which represents an average level of improvement across the ECOWAS countries for this scenario.

In the combined SGE and Democratization scenario, Burkina Faso's risk score would decline to 5.8 after an initial period of elevated scores reflecting a period qualifying as a partial democracy.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009




Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?



Democratization	Strengthened Gov't Effectiveness (SGE)
Democratization Setback	SGE and Democratization

CAPE VERDE

Cape Verde is a bastion of stability in ECOWAS with the lowest risk score (1.4). Its risk score has been consistently low since 1995, qualifying the country for 'low risk' for more than 15 years.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – Regime consistency for Cape Verde has consistently been at the maximum.

Partial Democracy – Cape Verde qualifies as a full, consolidated democracy.

Economic Openness – Cape Verde's current economic openness is score is 81. From 2002 and 2003 it reached into the upper 90's, but the more recent decline has had no measurable impact on its risk of future conflict.


Neighborhood Conflict – Being a string of islands Cape Verde has no neighborhood conflict.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


Since Cape Verde's risk score is already quite low, none of the scenarios featuring greater improvements in its situation would lead to appreciable further declines in risk.

In the democratization setback scenario, Cape Verde's risk score climbs slightly as its regime consistency declines. However, due to strong performance in other indicator areas, the impact on the risk score is limited.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009



Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?



Democratization	Strengthened Gov't Effectiveness (SGE)
Democratization Setback	SGE and Democratization

COTE D'IVOIRE

Côte d'Ivoire's current risk has not varied significantly over the last four years. The current score is 8.4, which places the country in the 'moderate risk' category.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – Before 1999, Côte d'Ivoire was classified as a consolidated autocracy. As such, the estimated risk for instability was quite low. In 1999, Côte d'Ivoire experienced a coup d'état led by General Gueye. However, when a democratic transition began in 1999, the risk score for the country increased dramatically in 2000 and 2001 while the country was classified as a partial democracy. Subsequent to the armed violence that began in 2002, Côte d'Ivoire was no longer classified as a partial democracy, which caused risk scores to decline somewhat.

Partial Democracy – Cote d'Ivoire has been classified as partial democracy only in the years 2000 and 2001.

Economic Openness – Côte d'Ivoire's economic openness is one of the highest in the region, which helps to reduce the risk score of the country. The peak was obtained in 2005 and 2006.

Neighborhood Conflict – Côte d'Ivoire has been affected by only one neighborhood conflict, which was in Liberia from 2000 to 2003. The country's risk score declined noticeably at the conclusion of that war.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


In the democratization scenario, Côte d'Ivoire's risk score would increase dramatically as it transitions through a period of partial democratic rule. After full democratic consolidation at the end of the scenario period, its score would drop to 6.4, placing the country in the 'some risk' category.

In the democratization setback scenario, Côte d'Ivoire would revert to more autocratic institutions, which would serve to lower risk score.


In the SGE scenario, the country's score improves only modestly, a reflection of the relatively good performance on infant mortality and economic openness that Côte d'Ivoire has already established.

In the combined SGE and democratization scenario, Côte d'Ivoire's risk score would decline to 4.0, placing the country in the 'low risk' category.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009




Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?



Democratization	Strengthened Gov't Effectiveness (SGE)
Democratization Setback	SGE and Democratization

GHANA

Risk scores for Ghana have placed it in the moderate risk category. Ghana has had four successful elections, resulting in peaceful transfer of political power from one political party to the other on two occasions. Despite this trend the country still qualifies as a partial democracy. The risk score of the country is still fairly high.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency — Ghana's regime consistency remains fairly stable at a score of 64 since 2004. This is, however, above the ECOWAS average as well as the average for the African continent.

Partial Democracy — Although Ghana has set a good political trend by holding peaceful, free and fair elections the country is rightly classified as a partial democracy. By the coding procedure of the Polity Project, Ghana has not attained the status of a full democracy because political participation in the country is characterized by factional, parochial interest and ethnic-based groupings that are advancing narrow agendas.

Economic Openness — Ghana's overall risk score has been greatly influenced downwards due to its relatively opened economy. Compared to countries across Africa and within ECOWAS Ghana has a high economic openness rating.

Neighborhood Conflict — Although Côte d'Ivoire had a civil war during the period under review, only violent conflicts that exceed 1000 battle-related fatalities qualify as neighborhood conflicts.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


In Ghana's democratization scenario, the country's risk score would decline significantly to 2.7 by the end of the scenario period. A full democratic transition for Ghana would lead to its placement in the 'low risk' category, joining Cape Verde as the only other country in this category for the region.

In the democratization setback scenario, Ghana's risk climbs steadily, reflecting a loss in regime consistency that would occur. The risk score drops at the end of the period when, according to this scenario, Ghana would revert to autocratic rule.


In the strengthened government effectiveness scenario, Ghana makes modest gains in reducing risk with its score declining by nearly 4 points. The relatively small improvement is a reflection of the comparably high performance levels that Ghana has already achieved on these indicators.

The combined SGE and democratization scenario shows that Ghana's risk score would decline to 1.2, a level comparable to many European democracies, if democratic consolidation were combined with modest improvements in government effectiveness.


Risk Scores, 1995-2008



Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?



Democratization	Strengthened Gov't Effectiveness (SGE)
Democratization Setback	SGE and Democratization

GUINEA BISSAU

For most of the last decade and a half, Guinea Bissau's risk for conflict and instability has hovered in the 'highest' and 'high' categories. There were brief periods in 1998, 1999, and 2004 with slightly lower scores. Those were years in which the country did not qualify as a partial democracy.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – Frequent periods of political instability in Guinea Bissau have affected regime consistency scores in Guinea Bissau. Since 2005, regime consistency scores have been somewhat higher than in past periods, which has helped to reduce risk scores slightly.

Partial Democracy – Guinea Bissau currently qualifies as a partial democracy, which exerts upward pressure on its risk score.

Economic Openness – The economic openness score for Guinea Bissau is significantly above the ECOWAS average.

Neighborhood Conflict – Armed conflict in Senegal in 2000, 2001 and 2003 raised the risk scores in those years.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


The democratization scenario for Guinea Bissau leads to a dramatically lower risk score—the result of transitioning from partial democratic rule to more consolidated governing institutions.

In the democratic setback scenario, risk scores for the country would gradually increase as regime consistency scores decline. Then, at the end of the scenario period, the country would qualify as an autocracy, which would serve to reduce the risk score dramatically.


In the SGE scenario, Guinea Bissau's level of risk would drop by nearly 5 points, the fifth largest decline among all ECOWAS countries in this scenario.

The combined SGE and democratization scenario produces a 14.5 point decline in Guinea Bissau's risk score, which would place the country in the 'some risk' category.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009




Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?



GUINEA

The country is in transition, at the pre-democratization stage. Though the risk score of the country has been moderate recently, the risk score could increase as the country transitions to partial democracy when competitive politics could heighten the risk factors and vulnerability of the country.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – The regime consistency score in Guinea has been zero over the years. With the advent of a democratically elected government, its regime consistency score may increase, which will help to limit future risk.

Partial Democracy – The country does not yet qualify as a partial democracy.

Economic Openness – Since 1995, the economic openness score for the country has been below average for ECOWAS and the African continent. However, there was a sharp increase in 2006 before dipping again to below average in the succeeding years.

Neighborhood Conflict – Since the end of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as the significant reduction of fatalities in the Casamance conflict in Senegal, Guinea is not threatened by any neighborhood conflict.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


Guinea is at the verge of making the transition from military to democratic rule. In the democratization scenario, the country's risk score increases from 10 to approximately 20 as the country shifts to partial democracy status.

In the democratization setback scenario, risk scores for Guinea would decrease significantly as the country trends toward more autocratic rule.

In the SGE scenario, Guinea achieves an average level of improvement for West Africa (a decline in risk of 3.3 points).

In the combined scenario for democratization and SGE, Guinea's risk score would drop to 4.9 by the end of the scenario period after an initial period of heightened risk during its democratic transition. The results of this scenario show that the level of risk during the democratic transition would be significantly less if improvements in government effectiveness occurred simultaneously.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009



Regime Consistency




Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?

SIE	SIE	SIE	SIE GNB	SIE GNB	SIE SEN LBR	SEN LBR	LBR	SEN LBR											
1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009					



LIBERIA

Liberia continues to record a decline in its risk score since the end of the civil war when the risk score in 1998 was as high as 38. The current risk score of 13.8 has been fairly stable for the past three years.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – The regime consistency of Liberia has increased since the end of the civil war. The elections of 2005 have further improved the country's regime consistency rating.

Partial Democracy – Liberia continues to qualify as a partial democracy since 1997, which contributes to higher levels of risk.

Economic Openness – Liberia's score on economic openness is well above the average score for both African countries and ECOWAS states, a reflection of post-war assistance programs received by the country.

Neighborhood Conflict – The armed conflict that occurred in Sierra Leone during Liberia's own civil war contributed to the high risk scores for Liberia before 2002.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


In Liberia's democratization scenario, the country's risk score would decline significantly as fully consolidated democratic practices take hold. Its risk score at the end of the scenario period would be 5.1 (some risk).

In the democratization setback scenario, Liberia would shift to more autocratic features, which would result in a sharp decline in risk by the end of the scenario period.


In the SGE scenario, Liberia's risk score would decline by an average amount for West Africa (-3.4).

In the combined democratization and SGE scenario, Liberia's risk score would drop to 3.6 by the end of the scenario period, resulting in reclassification as a low risk country.


Risk Scores, 1995-2008



Regime Consistency




Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?

SIE	SIE	SIE	SIE	SIE	SIE												
1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009			



MALI

Since 1995, Mali's risk score has been one of the highest in the sub-region. This is largely the result of its classification as a partial democracy and sustained armed conflict in neighboring states. Mali's very high infant mortality rate (the third worst in West Africa) also contributes to higher risk scores, a reflection of the relatively poor socio-economic conditions in the country and government's relative ineffectiveness in addressing them.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – Mali's regime constituency score is significantly higher than the ECOWAS average.

Partial Democracy – Mali qualifies as a partial democracy, which contributes significantly to its high risk score.

Economic Openness – From 1995 to 2007, the Economic openness score has been near or above the ECOWAS average, but since 2008 it has dropped somewhat

Neighborhood Conflict – Mali's risk score has been influenced by the two neighboring conflicts in Algeria and Senegal.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS

The democratization scenario shows that a successful transition to full, consolidated democracy in Mali would lead to a significant decline in its risk score.


According to the scenario, Mali's new risk score would be 9.8 at the end of the scenario period. That score is still fairly high, a reflection of how much upward pressure other indicators would continue to exert on the score if they did not improve at the same time.

In the democratization setback scenario, Mali's regime consistency score would gradually decline (leading to slight increases in risk) and then would shift to autocratic rule, producing a sudden drop in risk.


Under the strengthened government effectiveness scenario, Mali's risk score would improve by an amount greater than any other West African country. Its score would drop by more than 6 points.

In the combined democratization and SGE scenario, Mali's risk score would decline to 6.6, placing the country in the 'some risk' category.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009



Regime Consistency




Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?

Year	ALG	ALG	ALG	ALG	ALG	ALG SEN	ALG SEN	ALG	ALG SEN	ALG	ALG	ALG	ALG	ALG	ALG
1995															
1996															
1997															
1998															
1999															
2000															
2001															
2002															
2003															
2004															
2005															
2006															
2007															
2008															
2009															



NIGER

The experience of Niger illustrates how risk scores can change dramatically when a country shifts between autocratic rule and partial democracy. After transitioning to partial democracy in 1999, Niger's high risk scores declined steadily until 2008. Then, with the recent coup and shifts toward more autocratic practices, the risk score dropped to a level consistent for autocracies. With an expected return to democratic rule, the risk can be expected to return to high levels in the near future.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – Niger's regime consistency score is currently relatively low. In past years, the score was higher, which helped to limit risk scores somewhat.

Partial Democracy – After qualifying as a partial democracy from 1999 to 2008, Niger does not qualify in the most recent data.

Economic Openness – Niger's economic openness scores are below average for the sub-region, a reflection of the fact that Niger does not export many products.

Neighborhood Conflict – Ongoing conflict in Algeria and Chad has contributed to higher risk scores for Niger.


FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS

In the democratization scenario, Niger transitions from its current status (autocracy) to a partial democracy. Then, over the remainder of the scenario period, its risk score declines as its regime consistency improves.


In the democratization setback scenario, there is very little change to Niger's score because the country already qualifies as an autocracy.

In the SGE scenario, Niger makes very small improvements in risk. In this scenario analysis, improvements in government effectiveness tend to have less impact in autocracies than in partial or full democracies. The combined democratization and SGE scenario helps to illustrate this. The slope of the drop-off in risk due to improved government effectiveness is much sharper when improvements occur while Niger democratizes.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009



Regime Consistency




Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?

ALG	ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG	ALG	ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG	CHA ALG
1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	



NIGERIA

Since 1997, Nigeria's risk score has remained at the 'highest risk' level. The transition from more autocratic institutions in the late 1990's to partially democratic institutions is the main contributor to the higher level of risk.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – Nigeria has relatively low regime consistency, which helps to elevate its risk score.

Partial Democracy – Nigeria has qualified as a partial democracy since 1999.

Economic Openness – Although Nigeria's economic openness scores were above average for West Africa in earlier years, more recently it has dipped to average levels.

Neighborhood Conflict – There are no qualifying neighborhood conflicts for Nigeria.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


In the democratization scenario, Nigeria would transition from partial democracy to a fully consolidated democracy. The result would be a decline in its risk score to approximately 6.4.

Under the democratization setback scenario, Nigeria's regime consistency score will decrease gradually, leading to a slight increase in risk. Then, after shifting to more autocratic tendencies, its risk score would drop to 10.4.


Under the strengthened government effective scenario, Nigeria's risk score declines from 19.4 to 13.5, the second largest reduction for all West African countries in this scenario.

In the combined SGE and democratization scenario, Nigeria achieves a very large reduction in risk (dropping from 19.4 today to 4.3). At the end of the scenario period, Nigeria's risk score would place it at the threshold for the 'low risk' category.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009



Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?



Democratization	Strengthened Gov't Effectiveness (SGE)
Democratization Setback	SGE and Democratization

SENEGAL

In Senegal, there are moderate risks for instability. Between 1998 and 1999 Guinea Bissau was involved in an active conflict, which served to increase scores somewhat for those years.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – Senegal’s regime consistency is far above the ECOWAS average, which helps to limit its overall risk score.

Partial Democracy – Senegal qualifies as a partial democracy.

Economic Openness – The economic openness score for Senegal is slightly above ECOWAS average.

Neighborhood Conflict – None of Senegal’s neighbors are currently involved in armed conflict.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


In the democratization scenario, Senegal successfully transitions from a partial democracy to a fully, consolidated democracy. That change would lead to a reduced risk score of 4.1, placing Senegal near the threshold for ‘low risk’.

In the democratization setback scenario, Senegal’s governing institutions would gradually lose their level of consistency, becoming increasingly mixed between democratic and autocratic features. That change would lead to a gradual increase in risk until a full transition to autocracy occurs, which would result in a new risk score of 6.7.


In the SGE scenario, Senegal would experience a modest improvement in risk as a result of improvements in the input indicators for this scenario. Its score would drop by nearly 5 points to approximately 4.9.

When the SGE scenario is combined with democratization, Senegal’s risk score drops even further (by almost 8 points) to a risk of just 1.9.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009



Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
GB															
GB															

Scenario	Year	Projection	Baseline
Democratization	2009	10	10
	2010	10	10
	2011	5	10
	2012	5	10
	2013	5	10
Strengthened Gov't Effectiveness (SGE)	2009	10	10
	2010	8	10
	2011	7	10
	2012	6	10
	2013	5	10
Democratization Setback	2009	10	10
	2010	10	10
	2011	12	10
	2012	13	10
	2013	8	10
SGE and Democratization	2009	10	10
	2010	8	10
	2011	5	10
	2012	5	10
	2013	2	10

SIERRA LEONE

The risk of instability or conflict was higher in Sierra Leone at the start of 2002 when the country qualified as partial democracy. Its risk score has dropped to moderate level over the years.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – The country’s regime consistency score is extremely low and has remained consistent over the years

Partial Democracy – The country qualifies as a partial democracy.

Economic Openness – The economic openness score was higher in 2006 than the average score in ECOWAS and Africa. It dropped below the average in 2007 and picked up to the average level in 2008 and 2009.

Neighborhood Conflict – Since the end of the conflict in Liberia, there have not been any significant armed conflicts in neighboring countries.

FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS


In the democratization scenario, Sierra Leone would transition to a fully consolidated democracy. The result would be a dramatically lower risk score (8.7), placing the country in the ‘moderate risk’ category.

The democratization setback scenario shows that if Sierra Leone were to shift toward autocratic rule, there would be a gradual increase in its risk scores as its institutions lost consistency and became more mixed. Once the country became more fully autocratic, according to the scenario, its risk score would drop considerably.

The SGE scenario shows a fairly large improvement in the risk score. Sierra Leone’s reduction in risk in this scenario is the third highest among West African countries (a reduction of 5.6 points).

When combined with democratization, strengthened government effectiveness reduces the risk of future conflict even further. In the combined SGE and democratization scenario, Sierra Leone’s risk score declines to 6.4.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009



Regime Consistency




Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	LBR	LBR	LBR	LBR	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Neighborhood Conflict	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



THE GAMBIA

Risk scores for The Gambia have been low over the 15 year period 1995-2009. Such characteristics as the absence of an independent judiciary, parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability play a significant role in the risk scores.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater
High Risk - 12-18

Moderate Risk - 7-12
Some Risk - 4-7

Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – The Gambia’s regime consistency score is relatively high, indicating a high degree of autocratic consolidation.

Partial Democracy – The Gambia does not meet the criteria for a partial democracy.

Economic Openness – Compared to the sub-region average, the economic openness score for the Gambia is relatively high. This further reduces risk scores for the country.

Neighborhood Conflict – The resurgence of armed conflict in Cassamance (Southern Senegal) in 2000, 2001 and 2003 increased risk slightly.


FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS

In the democratization scenario, The Gambia’s risk score increases as it transitions to partial democracy, a period in which risks in the country would be sufficiently high to classify the country in the ‘high risk’ category.


The democratization setback scenario shows little change in risk for The Gambia because the country is already quite autocratic.

In the SGE scenario, The Gambia makes little improvement in risk. In this scenario analysis, improvements in government effectiveness tend to have less impact in autocracies than in partial or full democracies. In the combined democratization and SGE scenario, the slope of the drop-off in risk due to improved government effectiveness is discernible after the year 2011.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009




Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?



TOGO

Risk scores for Togo have been fairly consistent across the 1995-2009 period. The current risk score of 6.0 places the country in the "some risk" category. The relatively low risk score can be attributed to strong economic openness and the absence of neighborhood conflict. In addition, Togo does not qualify as a partial democracy. Should it democratize to that level, its risks would increase.

Risk Score Key

● - Risk Score ■ - confidence range

Risk Score Categories

Highest Risk - 18 or greater High Risk - 12-18
 Moderate Risk - 7-12 Some Risk - 4-7
 Low Risk - 4 or lower

INDICATORS

Regime Consistency – Togo’s current regime consistency is 16, which is below the ECOWAS average.

Partial Democracy – Togo does not qualify as a partial democracy.

Economic Openness – Togo has a high economic openness score compared to other nations in the sub region and the continent at large. This high score exerts downward pressure on its overall risk score.

Neighborhood Conflict – None of Togo’s neighbours were involved in an armed conflict within the 1995 – 2009 period.


FUTURE SCENARIO ANALYSIS

The democratization scenario for Togo entails a significant increase in its risk estimate. Under this scenario, Togo would qualify as a partial democracy in 2010, raising its risk to 15.0 (high risk). After three years of improved regime consistency, Togo’s would maintain this score and show only a very marginal dip in their risk score.


In the democratization setback scenario, Togo would revert to autocratic rule, increasing its risk to "moderate risk" as regime consistency diminishes and then lowering its risk score to 5 (some risk) by year three when fully autocratic institutions take hold.

Under the strengthened government effectiveness scenario, Togo’s risk score would decline over a short-term allowing for a reclassification of the country to the "low risk" category. In the combined SGE and democratization scenario, improved government effectiveness would help to limit the surge in risk associated with a transition to partial democracy.


Risk Scores, 1995-2009



Regime Consistency



Economic Openness



Neighborhood Conflict?



Democratization	Strengthened Gov't Effectiveness (SGE)
Democratization Setback	SGE and Democratization

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