



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK

PARTICIPANT MANUAL



ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK TRAINING

Day 1

9:00 – 10:15	Welcome and Introductions
10:15 – 11:00	Framework Overview and Assessment Introduction
11:00 – 11:15	<i>Break</i>
11:15 – 12:15	State Stakeholder Assessment
12:15 – 13:15	Lunch
13:15 – 14:00	Non-state Stakeholder Assessment
14:00 – 16:00	Conducting an Electoral Security Assessment: Small Group Exercise
15 min	<i>Break – Small Group Self-regulated, anytime between 14:00 and 16:00</i>
16:00 – 16:45	Conducting an Electoral Security Assessment: Small Group Report
16:45 – 17:00	Closure

Day 2

9:00 -9:15	Welcome and recap
9:15 – 10:00	Electoral Security Planning Discussion
10:00 – 10:15	<i>Break</i>
10:15 – 11:30	Electoral Security Planning: Small Group Exercise
11:30 – 12:30	Lunch
12:30 – 13:45	Designing an Electoral Security Program: Small Group Exercise
13:45 – 14:45	Designing an Electoral Security Program: Small Group Report
14:45 – 15:00	Break
15:00 – 15:45	Electoral Security Programming
15:45 – 16:45	Monitoring and Evaluation
16:45 – 17:00	Closure



Participant Resources (CD)

1. General Electoral Security Resources

1. Electoral Security Framework
2. UNDP Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming
3. From Bullets to Ballots: A Summary of Findings from Six Post-conflict Election Studies
4. Post Conflict Elections and Democratization: An Experience Review
5. Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies
6. State Structure and Electoral Systems in Post-conflict Situations
7. Transition Elections and Political Processes in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations: Lessons Learned
8. Elections and Security: A Roundtable Report Exploring the Impact of Security on Elections

2. Electoral Security Assessment Resources

1. Electoral Security Terms and Definitions Handout
2. Conflict Assessment Framework
3. Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
4. Electoral Systems Matrix
5. Electoral Security Framework Overview and Assessment Introduction Power point slides
6. State Stakeholder Assessment Power point slides
7. Non-state Stakeholder Assessment Power point slides

3. Electoral Security Planning Resources

1. List of websites (organizations referenced in Planning)
2. Compendium of International Standards for Elections
3. Planning Power point slides

4. Electoral Security Programming Resources

1. Managing Assistance in Support of Political and Electoral Processes
2. USAID Political Party Development Assistance
3. USAID Political Party Assistance Policy
4. Programming Power point slides

5. Electoral Security Monitoring and Evaluation Resources

1. Monitoring and Evaluation in Post-conflict Settings
2. Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators
3. Standard Indicators for Governing Justly and Democratically, Director of Foreign Assistance
4. Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: A working Draft for Application Period OECD/DAC
5. Designing for Results
6. Monitoring and Evaluation Power point slides



USAID Electoral Security Framework

USAID's electoral security initiative includes the Electoral Security Framework (a handbook) and a two-day training module on the content of the handbook. The Framework is a comprehensive four step methodology that allows users to assess electoral security threats and design programming to address them.

- 1) **Assessment** – After working through all steps of the assessment (summarized below), you will have the information to identify priority areas of electoral security intervention based on the greatest areas of need and possible impact
- 2) **Planning** -- Examine donor constraints, US Government priorities, local capacity limitations, and other planning elements. At the conclusion of this step, you will refine and modify the areas of intervention identified in step 1.
- 3) **Programming** – Based on steps 1 and 2, you will determine specific areas of programming objectives and associated activities.
- 4) **M&E** – You will provide illustrative M&E plan/indicators for the programming objectives determined in step 3.

Electoral Security Assessment Outline

1. **Contextual Analysis:** What are the electoral conflict risk factors found in the following sectors?
 - Security
 - Political
 - Economic
 - Social
 - State Institutions
 - Election Specific Factors
2. **Historical Conflict factors:** Has there been conflict surrounding past elections? Assess patterns of violence and ascertain the likelihood that these patterns will recur.
 - Targets
 - Perpetrators
 - Locations, timing, intensity of past violence
 - The number of years or number of elections since the “founding” election after a conflict.
3. **Stakeholder Analysis:** Information gathered through the contextual and historical analysis (steps 1 and 2) can be applied to stakeholder analysis to determine potential perpetrators of electoral conflict, their motives, the potential targets for such conflict, and the tactics utilized in conflict.
 - State Stakeholders
 - Non-State Stakeholders

[At the conclusion of the assessment phase, you will have the information to identify priority areas of electoral security intervention based on the greatest areas of need and possible impact.]




FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT INTRODUCTION

The Electoral Security Framework: A Snapshot



Electoral Security Framework Snapshot



ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

The electoral security assessment is conducted using both a desk study and information gathering in the field. The purpose of the assessment is to profile:

- History of electoral violence
- Electoral security contextual analysis
- State and non-state stakeholders

At the conclusion of the assessment phase, you will have the information to identify:

- Priority areas of electoral security intervention
- A preliminary development hypothesis

ELECTORAL SECURITY PLANNING

The planning phase builds on information gathered during the assessment and provides additional filters that help refine priority areas of intervention and the initial development hypothesis. The planning phase takes into consideration:

- Local change agents
- The international community
- Coordination
- USAID interests and constraints

At the conclusion of the planning phase, you will have the information to:

- Refine priority areas of intervention
- Update the development hypothesis
- Develop program objectives
- Consider candidate objective-level indicators

ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAMMING


This phase is used to identify the most appropriate program interventions based on assessment and planning conclusions. While it is not always feasible, the most effective programming strategies combine activities targeting both and non-state stakeholders.

ELECTORAL SECURITY MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The foundation of a strong monitoring and evaluation approach will be established during the course of assessing, planning and programming.

NOTES:

The Framework: A Flexible Tool



Ideal Timing to Begin Assessment – 18 months prior to elections

The Framework is a flexible tool that can be customized as needed to accommodate and diverse planning and programming horizons.

WHEN TO USE THE ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK?

The Framework can be characterized as:

A diagnostic instrument used to profile possible electoral conflict and develop corresponding programs in support of sustainable electoral security.

The Electoral Security Framework is designed primarily for use by USAID/DG officers.

Ideally, the Framework, beginning with the assessment, should be used at least 18 months prior to elections, or in line with the mission planning cycle. The more time the better.

Recognizing that this is not always possible, the Framework can be used at any point in the electoral cycle. However, the closer you get to elections, the less time there is to apply findings to create meaningful electoral security programs.

Always remember to constantly reevaluate and reassess the electoral security environment. Do not get stuck in a “static assessment” trap in which you are surprised by changing circumstances.

When conducting an assessment, the team should be relatively small in order to remain low profile given the sensitivities surrounding elections.

Depending on the size of the team and the scope of stakeholders, the assessment and planning phases will likely take 3 weeks for the desk review and field interviews.

Keep in mind the importance of thoroughly documenting assessment findings, conclusions and recommendations.

If the U.S. Government has a strong working relationship with the host country government, the assessment and planning phases provide an excellent opportunity to engage them early in the process and develop a shared vision for electoral security.

Ideally, a Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) or an Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) should be completed before conducting an electoral security assessment. A CAF / ICAF will identify:

- Drivers of conflict
- Local institutional and social resiliencies / capacity to mitigate conflict
- A clearer understanding of the role that elections may play in exacerbating or mitigating these dynamics as well as other opportunities for conflict mitigation or vulnerabilities that may exacerbate conflict.

NOTES:

STRUCTURAL RISK FACTORS

Important structural variables to take into account when trying to establish the likelihood of conflict surrounding elections include:

Security: Security variables include:

- History of conflict or war
- Any on-going insurgencies or organized crime that has taken on a role in the elections.

Political: Political variables include:

- The type of country (for example, Freedom House ranking)
- Years since founding election

Economic: Economic conditions that may pre-dispose a country to conflict include:

- Low per capita income
- Income inequality
- Low Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Social: Social factors that may create vulnerabilities for electoral violence include:

- Ethnic cleavages and systemic discrimination
- Major demographic changes
- Youth bulge
- Elite threatened by perception of possibly losing power as a result of an election

Effectiveness of State Institutions: Variables include:

- State legitimacy
- State effectiveness

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

History of electoral violence is a strong predictor for future electoral violence. Trends identified from past elections can be projected forward to further inform our electoral security threat profile based on historical precedent.

What were the motives for violence? Typically, motives for violence include a desire to:

- Shape voter turn-out and preference
- Disrupt an electoral process and prevent voting
- Strengthen a bargaining position vis-à-vis inter-party or intra-party coalitions and rivalries
- Change the demography of a constituency by driving out supporter of an opposing political party
- Discipline would be defectors from a winning coalition
- Obtain a power sharing agreement prior to the election

Which individuals or organizations/institutions were responsible for perpetrating violence?

- State and state proxies
- Public servants
- Coalitions of opposition parties
- Political rivals
- Insurgents

- Criminals
- Diaspora
- Neighboring countries
- Economic elites
- Citizens
- Civil society

Who or what was targeted?

- Human targets
- Information targets
- Facility targets
- Events targets

What tactics were employed?

- Intimidation and harassment
- Incitement to violence using media or public venues
- Taking hostages or kidnapping
- Strategic displacement
- Extortion
- Murder
- Violent armed clashes / mobs
- Street protests
- Attacks by armed groups
- Vandalism

What characterized electoral conflict at different stages of the electoral cycle? The electoral cycle includes pre-, during and post- election timeframes.

Where did the incidents occur?

What was the intensity of electoral violence? As illustrated in the matrix below, incidents of electoral violence can be coded and analyzed to identify potential low or high security risk environments and allocate security resources accordingly.

Electoral Incident Coding	
Code Level	Description
0	No reported electoral violence before or after a vote
1	The first level of violence is violent harassment, indicated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspapers being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents
2	The second level of violence is violent repression, as indicated by long term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, and torture
3	The third level is a highly violent campaign, in which there are repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to 20 or more deaths

** Straus, Scott and Charlie Taylor, Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2007, 2009*

NOTES:

ELECTIONS SPECIFIC CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

The next step is exploring contextual variables that may provide further indication of the likelihood of violence specifically linked to the electoral cycle.

Electoral system

- Plurality – Majority
- Proportional representation
- Semi-proportional
- Other

The type of system in use will then determine:

- Electoral formula
- District magnitude
- Vote to seat ratio
- Boundary delimitation

Political party system

Recent electoral reforms

Timing and sequencing of elections

Type of election / electoral stakes

The type of elections and associated electoral stakes (or the office sought and the benefits that accrue from achieving those offices)

Decentralization

NOTES:

STATE STAKEHOLDERS OVERVIEW

The Electoral Security Framework divides state stakeholders in to four main categories:

Regulatory institutions

- Legislature
- The EMB
- Regulatory commissions (such as Media, Land and Boundary, and Anti-corruption)

Security institutions

- International military (if applicable)
- National military
- National police
- Local police

Judicial institutions

- High, supreme, constitutional, and ordinary courts
- Electoral tribunal and special electoral courts
- Transitional justice mechanisms

Public Administration Institutions

- Elected and appointed officials and associated ministries at the national and sub-national levels

Note that not all of these stakeholders will be relevant in all situations. Likewise, there may be additional stakeholders that need to be assessed depending on the context.

The questions identified for each stakeholder group are representative of the information required concerning that stakeholder for the purposes of conducting an electoral security assessment. Some of the questions will be asked directly to stakeholders themselves, while others may need to be posed to a different stakeholder.

It is also useful to validate information about one stakeholder by querying others. These questions are intended to further our understanding of the historical patterns of electoral violence (perpetrators, targets, etc.) and the implications for upcoming elections. Depending on the time and resources available, different approaches may be used for gathering information including key informant interviews, focus groups, community groups (the former is a homogeneous group, the latter heterogeneous), direct observation, and surveys.

In addition to specific questions customized for each stakeholder group, we can use a common set of questions that apply to all stakeholders. First, we can mirror the questions used in our previous analysis of the history of electoral violence. We should use our historical analysis to predict stakeholders' current potential as perpetrators of electoral conflict (and associated motives and tactics) **and/or** their potential as targets/victims of such conflict.

- ✓ Have stakeholder representatives incited or perpetrated conflict in previous elections?
- ✓ Have stakeholders been targeted in recent elections?

Other common questions include:

- ✓ Has the stakeholder received electoral security assistance from the international community?
- ✓ What is the level of structural and behavioral independence of the stakeholder?
- ✓ What role has the stakeholder played in past elections?

Other factors to consider include:

- ✓ Awareness of the relationship among stakeholders, both state and non-state.
- ✓ Stakeholder credibility.

REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS

Legislature

- ✓ What are the key instruments that form the legal architecture?
- ✓ Which legislative committees are responsible for drafting electoral law?
- ✓ What is the threshold required to pass or amend a law?
- ✓ Are electoral reform measures in process? Describe the reforms.
- ✓ Are there aspects of existing legislation that create electoral risks?
- ✓ Are there aspects of the law or institutional resiliencies that mitigate risks?
- ✓ If a peace agreement is being implemented, what are the electoral terms of the agreement?

EMB

- ✓ What is the structure / model of the EMB?
- ✓ How are members appointed and what do they represent?
- ✓ Is there recent information about public opinion of EMB performance?
- ✓ How have recent election observation reports evaluated electoral administration?
- ✓ What role does the EMB play in electoral security administration?
- ✓ What has been the nature of complaints filed against the EMB in past elections?

Other Regulatory Commissions: Media, Land and Boundary, Anti-corruption

- ✓ Media – Has the commission played an effective role in assuring accuracy in broadcast and print content? Equitable access to media time and space for qualified political entities

- ✓ Land and Boundary – Do the constituency boundaries reflect international principles of respecting existing administration units, taking into account geographical features and allowing for representation by communities of interest?
- ✓ Anti-corruption – What is the record of the commission in uncovering corruption in political finance? What penalties have been issued against which parties for infractions?

NOTES:

SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

International Military

- ✓ What is the electoral mandate of the international military force?
- ✓ Outside of this mandate, what additional role will these forces play in election security, logistics, and communications?
- ✓ Is there a “Quick Reaction Force?”
- ✓ How are they coordinating electoral security enforcement with other agencies?

National Military

- ✓ Are security sector reform (SSR) programs planned or underway? If so, what is the likely impact of the SSR on the military?
- ✓ What is the role of the national military in election administration?
- ✓ How is electoral security enforcement coordinated with other agencies?
- ✓ If there is no role for the national military, where will the forces be garrisoned?
- ✓ Do members of the military have the right to vote? If so, when and where do they cast their ballots?
- ✓ Has the military ever performed a coup d’état? If so, when did it occur and what is the potential impact on the current elections?

National Police

- ✓ Is there a national police or constabulary force?
- ✓ If so, how will the police be deployed – mobile, fixed or reserve?

- ✓ What are their rules of engagement for crowd control?
- ✓ How is electoral security enforcement coordinated with other agencies?

Local Police

- ✓ If there are local police, how will they be deployed?
- ✓ Are local police armed?
- ✓ What are their rules of engagement?
- ✓ How is electoral security coordinated with other agencies?
- ✓ Do local police operate detention facilities?
- ✓ Are local police assisted by other official or quasi-official grassroots security entities?

NOTES:

JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

High, Supreme, Constitutional and Ordinary Courts

- ✓ In past elections, have high courts been employed to determine the outcomes of an election or the eligibility of major candidates?
- ✓ If so, which parties brought the complaints to the high court for redress?
- ✓ Have ordinary courts been used to hear electoral complaints of a criminal nature? If so, what has been their experience providing justice?
- ✓ Do ordinary courts have any authority to overturn elections results or call for a new election?

Electoral Tribunal and Special Electoral Courts

- ✓ Is there a special tribunal or court that hears electoral cases?
- ✓ If so, is that tribunal or court separate from the EMB?
- ✓ How is the court appointed and who are its members?
- ✓ What kinds of cases has the tribunal or court heard in recent elections? What were their decisions?

Transitional Justice

- ✓ Were there widespread human rights abuses surrounding recent elections?

- ✓ If so, was there an investigation or any transitional justice undertaken?
- ✓ Were perpetrators of the abuses identified and penalized?
- ✓ Was there any compensation or redress for the victims of these abuses?

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTIONS

Elected and Appointed Officials and Associated Ministries at the National and Sub-national Levels

- ✓ Are positions appointed or elected?
- ✓ Characterize the relationships among ministries at the national-level.
- ✓ What role have ministries played in past elections? What is the relationship between ministries and the political parties?
- ✓ Do civil servants and appointed officials act as extensions of the ruling party during elections rather than non-partisan public servants?
- ✓ Characterize the relationships among different levels of government. To what extent is government decentralized?

NOTES:

NON-STATE STAKEHOLDERS OVERVIEW

The Electoral Security Framework divides non-state stakeholders in to the following categories:

Civil Society

- Civil society organizations

Political Parties

- National and sub-national

Media

- Media organizations

Traditional Leaders

- Tribal
- Religious
- Other community leaders

Non-state Security Enforcement

- Private security firms
- Community-based security enforcement (non-state)

Non-state security Spoilers

- Insurgents
- Criminals

Citizens

- Voters
- Non-voters

Similar to the discussion of state stakeholders, not all of these non-state stakeholders will be relevant in all situations. Likewise, there may be additional stakeholders that need to be assessed depending on the context. Some of the questions will be asked directly to stakeholders themselves, while others may need to be posed to a different stakeholder.

These questions are intended to further our understanding of the historical patterns of electoral violence (perpetrators, targets, etc.) and the implications for upcoming elections. Depending on the time and resources available, different approaches may be used for gathering information including key informant interviews, focus groups, community groups (the former is a homogeneous group, the latter heterogeneous), direct observation, and surveys.

In addition to specific questions customized for each stakeholder group, we can use a common set of questions that apply to all stakeholders. Similar to our approach with state stakeholders, we can begin by mirroring the questions used in our previous analysis of the history of electoral violence. We should use our historical analysis to predict stakeholders' current potential as perpetrators of electoral conflict (and associated motives and tactics) **and/or** their potential as targets/victims of such conflict.

- ✓ Have stakeholder representatives incited or perpetrated conflict in previous elections?
- ✓ Have stakeholders been targeted in recent elections?

Other common questions include:

- ✓ Has the stakeholder received electoral security assistance from the international community?
- ✓ What is the level of structural and behavioral independence of the stakeholder?
- ✓ What role has the stakeholder played in past elections?

Other factors to consider include:

- ✓ Awareness of the relationship among stakeholders, both state and non-state.
- ✓ Stakeholder credibility.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil Society Organizations

- ✓ What is the mission of the CSO?
- ✓ Does the CSO have the capacity to conduct programming on a large scale and accept / manage US Government funds?
- ✓ In which parts of the country does the CSO conduct programs?
- ✓ Is the CSO part of a network or coalition with other likeminded organizations for electoral purposes?
- ✓ What activities are planned surrounding the elections?

POLITICAL PARTIES

Political Parties: National and Sub-national

- ✓ How are political parties registered with the government and what are the eligibility requirements?
- ✓ Does the party have a constitution and statement of principles?
- ✓ Does the party occupy seats in parliament? On the sub-national level?
- ✓ What is the party's position on the type of electoral system in place and the fairness of any delimitation that has been conducted?
- ✓ Does the party have ties to neighboring countries or affiliations with likeminded parties in those countries?
- ✓ ?
- ✓ Has the party signed a code of conduct?
- ✓ How does the party communicate with other parties? Is there a national council of party representatives? If not, would the party participate in one if established?

NOTES:

MEDIA

Media Organizations

- ✓ Is the media private, government operated, or both? How are private media organizations licensed by the government?
- ✓ Does the organization represent or mainly espouse the views of one particular political party?
- ✓ Are media activities and access to media regulated by the same authority or commission? If so, how is government media regulated?
- ✓ What are the regulations on equitable access to broadcasting for political parties?
- ✓ Has the organization ever been accused of disseminating misinformation or provocative rhetoric?
- ✓ Are electoral stakeholders (state and non-state) using new media applications to disseminate information or mobilize supporters?

TRADITIONAL LEADERS

Traditional Leaders: Tribal, Religious, and Other Community Leaders

- ✓ What kinds of traditional leaders (religious, tribal, community, or other identity-based factors) may play a role in the elections?
- ✓ Is there a dominant community? Are communities competitive or fragmented across the country?
- ✓ Where are traditional leaders most influential?
- ✓ Have traditional leaders been subject to manipulation or coercion by the ruling party, elites, or economic interests?
- ✓ Have communities been subject to discrimination or strategic displacement for electoral purposes?

NOTES:

NON-STATE SECURITY ENFORCEMENT

Private Security Firms

- ✓ Is the state a participant in the 2008 Montreux Document?
- ✓ What are the company's security responsibilities and under what contract are these responsibilities described?
- ✓ Have company representatives been injured or killed in an election-related attack?
- ✓ Have company representatives fired rounds in electoral security enforcement? If so, what was the outcome?
- ✓ Does the company adhere to a code of conduct?

NON-STATE SECURITY SPOILERS

Insurgents

- ✓ What is the objective of the insurgency?
- ✓ How long has the insurgency been ongoing? What is the estimated number of insurgents?
- ✓ Is the insurgency particularly strong or weak in certain areas of the country?
- ✓ What is the role of women in the insurgency?
- ✓ Is insurgency leadership centralized around a handful of figures or is management more decentralized?
- ✓ What are the tactics of the insurgency?

Criminals

- ✓ What are the rates of violent crime?
- ✓ What is the estimated number of illegal small arms in the country?
- ✓ Do criminals financially support or intimidate political candidates?
- ✓ Is criminal influence in elections a new phenomena?
- ✓ Are candidates required to publicly report donors?
- ✓ When involved in elections, do criminals work independently on the local level or in larger organized syndicates operating regionally or nationally?
- ✓ How do criminals obtain their funds?

CITIZENS


Voters and Non-voters

- ✓ Do they have confidence in the ability of the government to hold free and fair elections? Why or why not?
- ✓ Do they intend to vote in the upcoming election?
- ✓ Have they voted in past elections?
- ✓ If they are not eligible to vote, why not? Do they intend to participate in elections in other ways?
- ✓ How do they receive news and information about the elections?
- ✓ Are they clear about the role of security forces (police and military) in the upcoming elections?

ELECTORAL SECURITY PLANNING



Planning Approach



LOCAL CHANGE AGENTS

Before we complete our consideration of the local context and actors – most of which was undertaken during the assessment phase, there is one additional element that we need to factor in – local change agents.

There are three characteristics that we can use to identify local change

- Political will
- Absorptive capacity
- Ability to affect positive change

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Now that we have completed our analysis of the domestic electoral security context, it is time to begin factoring in the role and priorities of the international actors.

Role of the International Community


The nature of international involvement in elections is defined by its mandate. Electoral mandates can come from UN resolutions, terms of peace agreements, or invitations from host countries.

Role of International Community in Elections

Intervention	Examples	Description
Electoral Supervision	Namibia and Bosnia and Herzegovina	Through a UN resolution or peace agreement, the international community is requested to supervise an election or referendum. Supervision generally refers to formulating the rules and certifying election outcomes. Supervision without administration is rare.
Electoral Administration	Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo	Through a UN resolution or peace agreement, the international community is requested to administer an election or referendum. Administration differs from supervision in that the former refers to full operational responsibility, whereas the latter refers to full supervisory authority over the process but not necessarily all of the administrative responsibilities.
Electoral Verification	Nicaragua, Angola, El Salvador	Through a UN resolution or peace agreement, the international community is requested to verify an election or referendum. Verification missions do not have any legally binding power, but observe and verify the legitimacy of the electoral process and compliance of electoral authorities with regulations. Verification has now been replaced by certification processes.
Electoral Certification	East Timor, Côte d'Ivoire	Through a UN resolution, peace agreement, or invitation by host country, the UN evaluates the policies and practices of the national election authority, or other aspects of the electoral process as specified in the mandate, to assess compliance with international good practices. Certification has a stronger enforcement posture than verification, but is used relatively infrequently.
Technical Assistance	New democracies (Albania, Iraq, Indonesia, Russia)	Through an invitation from a domestic electoral stakeholder, the international community can be requested to assist sovereign domestic institutions with the conduct of an election or referendum or the adjudication of the results. This is a flexible approach that can offer a wide range of assistance options – training, expertise, provision of commodities, etc.
Electoral Observation	New democracies	International observation missions are composed of neutral parties (multilateral, bilateral or private) that assess aspects of the electoral process against universal standards for democratic elections. International observers are often accompanied by domestic civil society and political party observer initiatives.
Electoral Mediation	Nicaragua, Kenya	An impartial third party employs non-official election dispute resolution mechanisms.

Who is the International Community?

The number of these organizations and their diverse interests and capacities can prove challenging to developing integrated elections planning. However, understanding who is out there and what they are doing is a critical factor for refining the priorities for intervention that emerged from the assessment - both to avoid duplication and to better understand the limitations of the environment.



USAID

- Field mission
- The regional bureau / mission backstops
- DCHA/ DRG (Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance)
- DCHA/ CMM (Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management)
- DCHA/ OTI (Office of Transition Initiatives)
- DCHA / (CMC) Civilian Military Coordination
- Other USAID actors may include FFP (Food for Peace) and/or OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) if there is a humanitarian crisis

Other U.S. Government

- State Department
- Department of Justice
- Department of Defense
- National Security Council and the U.S. Congress

NOTES:

United Nations

- UN Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD)
- UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UN DPKO)
- UN Development Program (UNDP)
- UN Volunteers
- UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)

Regional Inter-governmental Organizations

These organizations often play a constructive role by providing a set of professional standards and common principles for what constitutes free and fair elections. For examples, refer to the *Compendium of International Standards for Elections (on your cd)*.

- African Union (AU)
- Organization of American States (OAS) – Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation
- European Union (EU)
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)– Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
- Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
- Council of Europe
- League of Arab States
- Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Other Governments

Other governments may provide funding and technical expertise either directly or through non-governmental implementers.

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs often implement programs funded by bi-laterals or may have other programs running independently. Some of the more prominent NGOs providing election-related assistance include:

- International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) based in the US

- Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) – conducts programs that directly link conflict prevention and elections assistance www.eisa.org.za
- Electoral Reform International Services (ERIS) based in the UK
- Bureau for Institutional Reform and Democracy (BIRD) based in Germany

Other Organizations

Other organizations that may play a role in electoral security include:

- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
- Election Management Associations (EMAs)

NOTES:

COORDINATION

When assessing the different actors and their respective contributions to electoral security programming, consider how activities are (or are not) being coordinated. Depending on coordination mechanisms already in place, there may be a convening or leadership role for USAID at different levels.

Coordination of key international community actors

Coordination with the military and police

Coordination within the US Government

Coordination with local actors

USAID INTERESTS AND CONSTRAINTS

Interests

- U.S. Government foreign policy
- USAID comparative advantage

- Current programs.
- Need to demonstrate results

Constraints

- Legal Considerations
- Budget and sources of funding
- Mission Capacity

NOTES:

ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAMMING

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAMMING

An integrated approach to electoral security programming strengthens the capacity of both state and non-state stakeholders to address electoral security, activities and programs have the opportunity to be mutually reinforcing by:

- Mobilizing diverse stakeholders
- Creating checks and balances; and
- Increasing both the supply and demand for electoral security.

Electoral security activities undertaken by state stakeholders are legitimized, empowered, and controlled by a legal framework.

Electoral security activities undertaken by non-state stakeholders focus more on values-based approaches to peaceful competition and post-election reconciliation.

Both state and non-state stakeholder activities can also provide opportunities to engage, empower or give voice to traditionally marginalized or under-represented groups such as women, youth, the disabled, and minorities.

The following are illustrative programming approaches that may be taken into consideration depending on assessment and planning findings.

If there is an inadequate legal framework for elections, consider:

- Providing technical assistance to those drafting legislation and regulations
- Supporting constitutional design or reform
- Providing training in legislative and regulatory drafting
- Assessing election system performance to identify and prioritize key issues
- Establishing or strengthening legal advice centers
- Using codes of conduct to encourage constructive engagement of all political actors

If there is inadequate EMB capacity, consider:

- Providing technical assistance and training to:
 - Organize district and precinct commissions
 - Train commission members on key duties
 - Conduct voter registration;
 - Conduct civic education; and
 - Accredite domestic and international election observers.

- Providing material support such as procurement of equipment
- Providing support to strengthen electoral security, including:
 - Coordination of electoral security actors
 - Decentralization of electoral security
 - Establishment of Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs)
 - Assistance with electoral violence incident data collection and analysis

NOTES:

If there a lack of confidence in the impartiality of the EMB, consider:

- Introducing alternative oversight instruments
- Strengthening the ability of other regulatory institutions to support legitimate elections

If there are weak electoral dispute mechanisms, consider:

- Creating a specialized EMB adjudication body (an elections complaint commission) if one does not exist
- Strengthening existing electoral dispute resolution institutions by supporting:
 - Operational planning for processing disputes
 - Training in election law for judges and lawyers
 - Voter education programs about dispute resolution mechanisms
 - Decentralization of adjudication
 - Case management training (processing election complaints quickly and efficiently)
 - Prosecuting perpetrators of violence
 - Redressing victims grievances / appropriate reparations for victims of electoral violence to rectify the impact of election violence
- Supporting EMB crisis management planning

- Strengthening electoral mediation / alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
 - Mobilize or strengthen legal aide organizations
 - Engage respected religious, tribal or other leaders
 - Link in to traditional dispute resolution mechanisms
- Supporting electoral dispute monitoring

If independent monitoring of elections needs to be improved, consider:

- Training domestic elections observers
- Supporting electoral conflict monitoring
- Bringing in international elections observers

If there is a lack of political party professionalism, consider:

- Providing technical assistance and training to address governance of political parties, formulation of issues-based platforms, outreach, or other areas that may be contributing to electoral conflict
- Establishing or strengthening political party councils
- Using political party codes of conduct. In order to enhance enforcement, codes of conduct terms can be mandated in legislation.

If there is a lack of media professionalism, consider:

- Providing technical assistance and training to improve independence and professionalism of the media or other areas that may be contributing to electoral conflict.
- Using media codes of conduct. *The ACE Electoral Knowledge network has developed a model code of conduct for election reporting.*
- Conducting media monitoring

NOTES:

ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPTIONS BY STAKEHOLDER

STATE STAKEHOLDERS: REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS			
Stakeholder	Prevention	Management	Mediation
EMBs	Legal reform Codes of Conduct for EMB officials and staff General technical assistance and capacity building to develop independence and legitimacy Targeted technical assistance to remedy a deficiency that could become conflictive	Development of electoral security administration capacity Media monitoring unit Joint Election Operations Centers Joint Election Security Task Forces Poll worker training on conflict resolution techniques	EMB/political party liaison committees
Other Regulatory Institutions	Legal reform Codes of Conduct for officials and staff General technical assistance and capacity building to develop independence and legitimacy		
STATE STAKEHOLDERS: SECURITY INSTITUTIONS			
Stakeholder	Prevention	Management	Mediation
Police – National and Local	Security Sector Reform Codes of Conduct Election security training programs Rules of engagement training	Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement.	Incident mapping and analysis Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement

Police – International	Codes of Conduct	Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement	Incident mapping and analysis
	Election security training programs	Technical assistance to national forces	Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement
	Rules of engagement	Monitoring national police forces	
Military – National	Security Sector Reform	Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement	Incident mapping and analysis
	Codes of Conduct	Logistics	Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement
	Election security training programs		
Military – International	Rules of engagement training		
	Codes of Conduct	Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement	Incident mapping and analysis
	Electoral security training programs	Monitoring national military forces	Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement
	Rules of engagement training	Logistics	

STATE STAKEHOLDERS: JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

Stakeholder	Prevention	Management	Mediation
EMBs			Technical assistance and capacity building for election dispute resolution
National Judiciary and Ordinary Courts			Technical assistance and capacity building for election dispute resolution Pursuing court cases against offenders
Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanisms			Technical assistance and capacity building for election dispute resolution
Transitional Justice			Pursuing investigations, court cases and other instruments against offenders.

NON-STATE STAKEHOLDERS			
Stakeholder	Prevention	Management	Mediation
Civil Society Organizations	Training in ADR techniques	Legal aid services	Electoral mediation
	Peace committees and educational; initiatives	Medical and psychological assistance	Monitoring electoral conflict
		Diaspora outreach programs	Monitoring electoral dispute resolution
			Monitoring political party code compliance
			Monitoring delimitation
			Media monitoring
			Peace education programming
Political Parties	Codes of Conduct	Political Party Councils	Political Party Councils
	Pre-election peace pacts	Political party resource assistance	EMB/party liaison committees
			Police/party liaison committees
Media Organizations	Codes of Conduct	Agreement on election reporting protocols	Monitoring campaign activities for hate speech and potential conflict
Traditional Leaders	Pre-election mediation and education	Get-Out-The-Vote initiatives	Post-election ADR
Private Security Companies	Codes of Conduct	Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement	Incident mapping and analysis
	Election security training programs		Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement
Community-Based Watch Committees	Election security training programs	Mobile and fixed enforcement	Fixed, mobile and reserve enforcement

MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)



A Quick Refresher: M&E Terminology

Term	Definition
Development Hypothesis	How proposed interventions will effectively address the problem.
Critical Assumptions	Assumptions underpinning the success of the program.
Program Objective	The highest level objective upon which USAID can expect to have a material effect (stated as a result).
Baseline	Status prior to intervention.
Target	Expected status at the end of the intervention.
Indicator	How we measure progress against objectives.
Performance Management Plan	A plan for obtaining systematic feedback on the robustness of the development hypothesis and strengthening it over time.

FOUNDATIONS OF AN M&E PLAN

While M&E may seem daunting, the foundations of a robust M&E approach have been established during the electoral security assessment, planning and programming phases.

Electoral Security Assessment

The assessment, combined with information from the CAF / ICAF helped to identify:

- Conflict dynamics
- Electoral security vulnerabilities and opportunities
- Identification of a problem statement
- Priorities for electoral security interventions (the ideal within the given country context)

Reflecting on the assessment findings, from an M&E perspective, we should:

- Consider the impact of our program on electoral security and on broader conflict dynamics
- Develop an initial development hypothesis and critical assumptions.

- Better understand the availability and quality of data that may be used for baseline data and indicators

Electoral Security Planning

The planning phase provided additional filters for our analysis, allowing further refinement of assessment findings by overlaying additional considerations, such as local change agents, international community presence and programs, and USAID interests and constraints which informed:

- Refined and finalized areas of intervention
- Refined development hypothesis and critical assumptions
- Definition of the USAID program objective(s) and associated indicators at the objective level
- Availability and reliability of data
- Consideration of coordination approaches to engage local and international

Reflecting on the planning findings, from an M&E perspective, also consider other variables that may need to be monitored, even if they fall outside of our control.

Electoral Security Programming

This phase yielded a customized program composed of a set of activities responsive to country context and needs, factoring in other electoral security programming and USAID's interests and constraints as a donor.

As part of the program process, from an M&E perspective, it is critical to:

- Conduct a baseline before programming begins
- Identify performance
- Establish baselines and targets to measure actual performance against desired results.

Continuous M&E

Supporting continuous M&E requires a strong performance management system. This involves putting the pieces developed during the assessment, planning and programming phases together to develop a comprehensive approach for collecting, managing and analyzing data.

NOTES:

M&E IN INSECURE ENVIRONMENTS

There are many challenges that arise when conducting M&E in insecure environments.

Challenges to conducting M&E in insecure environments

- Rapidly changing environment
- Less transparency
- Lack of trust
- Instability
- Lack of reliable and accessible data
- Extreme weakness of host country institutions
- Challenges of attribution and causality
- Physical security of evaluators and informants

Characteristics of M&E in insecure environments

- Prominent political and military considerations:
- Different objectives within the U.S. Government
- Different assumptions about change
- Pressure to demonstrate results quickly
- Multiple actors
- Short time frames
- Lack of a common frame of reference
- Reluctance to share and receive security sensitive information

Good practices for conducting M&E in insecure environments

Note that most of these are M&E best practices even in stable environments

- Address both electoral security and conflict dynamics
- Focus on manageable interests
- Ensure that data for your indicator exists

- Triangulate and build in redundancies
- Use clusters of indicators for a given outcome
- Combine qualitative and quantitative indicators
- Recognize the importance of contextual indicators
- Establish consensus on metrics early
- Use local and international partners
- Incorporate use of new technologies
- Budget for M&E

NOTES:

SELECTING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

USAID uses both standard and custom indicators for reporting purposes.

Standard Indicators

Standard indicators and definitions for the objective “Governing Justly and Democratically”, program area “Political Competition and Consensus Building” can be found on line at www.state.gov/f/indicators/

The majority of standard indicators are output indicators – although some can be used as outcome indicators as well. If you find one that works, no need to create a new one!

These are a few of the standard indicators for elections and political process. There are also standard indicators and definitions for political parties.



Sample Standard Indicators

www.state.gov/f/indicators/

2.3 Political Competition and Consensus Building

- Status as Electoral Democracy, based on Freedom House rating
- Number of consensus building forums (multi-party, civil/security sector, and/or civil /political) held with USG Assistance
- Number of domestic election observers and/or party agents trained with USG assistance
- Number of laws or amendments to ensure credible elections drafted with USG technical assistance
- Number of individuals receiving voter and civic education through USG-assisted programs
- Number of USG-assisted political parties implementing initiatives to increase the number of candidates and/or members who are women, youth and from marginalized groups

Custom Indicators

Standard indicators are complemented by custom indicators selected by each operating unit (mission or bureau). These indicators should be carefully selected and grounded in the reality of the country context, in addition to how the election process supports democratic transition and a lasting resolution to violent conflict.

Custom indicators will likely need to be tailored to specific programs and environments. However, illustrative examples of candidate indicators specific to different aspects of elections may be found in (*on the cd*):

- Transition Elections and Political Processes in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations: Lessons Learned. A Guide for US Government Planners (S/CRS) 2007
- Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, Section on Elections and Political Process, USAID, 1998

Illustrative custom indicators may include:

- Degree of independence of electoral authority

- Adherence to codes of conduct
- Incidence of electoral violence
- Level of voter confidence in electoral authority
- Degree to which vote tabulation and reporting votes is carried out accurately and transparently
- Degree to which assessments by election monitors are acknowledged and received by electoral authority
- Level of acceptance of results by losers
- Degree to which electoral law facilitates multiple political parties in the electoral system
- Degree to which the electoral legislative framework encourages bridging strategies among parties

NOTES:

MEASURING PROGRAM IMPACT ON CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Conflict driver:

Development hypothesis:

Electoral security program objective

Candidate indicators

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN

The purpose of the performance management plan is to continuously assess the validity of our development hypothesis, track progress against objectives and adjust as necessary. It is also a way of “telling our story” to Congress and the American people.

According to the ADS, there is no standard format for a PMP. Each operating unit should select a format that fits their particular needs. However, performance indicators must be included in a PMP (ADS 203.3.3). In addition to performance indicators, a performance management plan should include:

- A definition of the performance indicator, unit of measurement, and brief justification for selecting this indicator
- Baseline and target values for each performance indicator included in the PMP
- Whenever possible, indicators should be disaggregated by sex
- Data source and methods of collection or calculation
- Schedule for data collection
- Description of known data limitations and how they will be addressed
- Description of data quality assessment procedures
- Estimate of costs
- Identify possible evaluation efforts
- Calendar of performance management tasks

Remember to factor in collecting information on results that are supported by other development partners.

NOTES:

Task: Staying in your small groups, take 10 minutes to:

- Select 1 of your electoral security program objectives
- Develop at least 2 objective-level performance indicators
- Develop at least 1 to performance indicator to measure impact on conflict dynamics
- Propose how each indicator will be measured

Be prepared to discuss with the group.

MEASURING PROGRAM IMPACT ON CONFLICT DYNAMICS

CHEAT SHEET



Conflict Driver: A large and rapidly growing portion of the population – particularly youth – are disaffected, disillusioned, and disempowered with few opportunities for legitimate participation in the political arena. As a result, they are increasingly mobilizing in violent protests.

Development Hypothesis: If youth have improved access to legitimate avenues for political participation, then there will be fewer violent protests.

Electoral Security Program Objective: Increase youth access to (and use of) legitimate channels for political participation.



Measuring Program Impact on Conflict Dynamics

Candidate Indicators:

- Percent of youth registered to vote
- Level of increase in youth understanding of voter education messages
- Number of civic education campaigns targeting youth
- Number of youth employed as domestic election observers
- Number of youth participating as party poll watchers
- Number of youth participating in party youth organizations
- Degree of youth representation in civil society election activities
- Number of violent protests involving youth



Capture at a Glance

1520 Capture colonized by Gotchastan

1975 Military coup in Gotchastan unseats monarchy. Gotchastan withdraws from Capture.

Capture announces its independence under the leadership of the country's only political party, the Socialist League for an Independent Capture (SLIC).

Seven days later, neighboring Lynwait invades Capture, killing and displacing thousands of people. The United Nations calls on Lynwait to withdraw from Capture.

Lynwait establishes a provisional government of Capturites sympathetic to Lynwait, the Social League of Passive People (SLOPP).

- SLOPP party members represent the political and social elite of Capture, primarily of Gotchese descent
- They comprise 15% of the population of Capture, but command 90% of the country's wealth.

SLIC members take up arms.

- SLIC refers to its objective of seeing Capture established as a social democracy, but most people, including the leadership of Lynwait, call them communists.
- Rumors abound that SLIC leadership is receiving training and financing from communist countries in the region.
- About 25% of Capturites identify with SLIC and its objectives.

A new armed group emerges, the Front to Return Independent Capture (FRIC).

- FRIC is also seeking an independent Capture, but with the objective of establishing a democracy and free market economy aligned with western countries such as the US and Europe. Approximately 30% of the population identifies with FRIC.

1976 Lynwait launches a brutal "pacification" campaign in response to attacks on SLOPP government targets by SLIC and FRIC.

2007 Following negotiations with the UN, the President of Lynwait calls for a referendum on the status of Capture. The referendum is scheduled for 2009.

2008 United Nations Capture Integrated Mission (UNCAPIM) established by Resolution 1234.

2009 Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) arrives in Capture. UN brokers meeting of top political party and ex-combatant members to establish a commission to foster reconciliation until the referendum is undertaken.

Referendum held on July 12, 2009. 80% of the population voted for independence with a 98.6% turnout. Capturite militias aligned with SLOPP and supported by the Lynwait military launch a large-scale scorched earth campaign of retribution.

Multi-national forces arrive in Capture putting a stop to the violence.

2011 Peace agreement signed.



Votopia at a Glance

1953 – Supremistan colonization of Mysay ends. The new country of Mysay is comprised of two dominant ethnic groups:

The Mysays:

- 40% of the population, consider themselves descendants of the former Supremese colonizers
- Practice Catholicism
- Politically and economically powerful and hold the majority of government positions
- Concentrated in the cities and other urban areas
- Retain ties to the Government of Supremistan and business community

The Votés:

- 60% of the population, descended from original inhabitants of Mysay
- Practice Islam
- Share common religious and ethnic affiliation with the country of Ruffemup to the north
- Politically and economically marginalized, practice mostly subsistence agriculture
- Hold few government positions, aside from serving in the military
- Concentrated in the rural north of the country

1969 – The Votés, led by Mohammed (Mo) Wrights, declare independence from Mysay. A violent one year civil war ensues. Votés are supported by troops from neighboring Ruffemup.

1970 – County of Votopia (in the northern part of Mysay) secured and recognized by the international community. Mo Wrights becomes founding President.

1971 – Mysay recognizes Votopia. USAID/Votopia opens.

1973 - Votopia adopts a new constitution based on the Supremistan model, a First Past the Post electoral system.

First Parliamentary elections held. Mo Wrights party, the Public Leaders Opposition Party (PLOP) runs virtually uncontested and wins a substantial majority.

1976 - The Mysay Alignment Party (MAL) emerges advocating for closer ties, and possibly reunification with Mysay in light of continuously declining economic conditions.

1978 - Parliamentary elections held. PLOP defeats MAL by a narrow margin.

1980 - MAL begins launching attacks on government targets. Sharia Law Acceptance Party (SLAP) formed representing a loose coalition of hard-line Islamic parties.

1983 – Mo Wrights assassinated. Per the constitution, caretaker government is appointed and elections are called for 1984.

1984 – MAL wins elections by a narrow margin.

1989 – Following a coup, PLOP returns to power. PLOP wins elections in **1992**.

1997, 2003, 2009 – subsequent elections with MAL and PLOP both enjoying periods of control over the government. Political environment marred by a series of coups, martial law, caretaker governments, and persistent election-related violence



Electoral Security Framework Training Evaluation

Please rate the value of each session as it relates to advancing your work in electoral security.

<p>Welcome and Introductions</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">1 Unacceptable</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2 Poor</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">3 Average</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">4 Good</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">5 Excellent</p>
<p>Comments:</p>					
<p>Electoral Security Assessment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Context and History of Electoral Conflict • State Stakeholders • Non-state Stakeholders 	<p style="text-align: center;">1 Unacceptable</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2 Poor</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">3 Average</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">4 Good</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">5 Excellent</p>
<p>Comments:</p>					
<p>Electoral Security Assessment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small group exercise • Report 	<p style="text-align: center;">1 Unacceptable</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2 Poor</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">3 Average</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">4 Good</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">5 Excellent</p>
<p>Comments:</p>					
<p>Electoral Security Planning</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning overview • Small group exercise 	<p style="text-align: center;">1 Unacceptable</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2 Poor</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">3 Average</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">4 Good</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">5 Excellent</p>
<p>Comments:</p>					

Electoral Security Programming <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small group exercise • Report out • Programming overview 	1 Unacceptable	2 Poor	3 Average	4 Good	5 Excellent
Comments:					
Monitoring and Evaluation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring and evaluation overview • Small group exercise 	1 Unacceptable	2 Poor	3 Average	4 Good	5 Excellent
Comments:					

Please rate the next questions using the following scale.

(5= Excellent 4 = Good 3 = Average 2 = Poor 1 = Unacceptable)

Please rate the training course methodology (balance of presentation, small group work, exercises, etc.)

Rating: 1 2 3 4 5

Comments

Please rate the course materials (manual, handouts, reference materials, visual aids)?

Rating: 1 2 3 4 5

Comments:

My overall rating of the course is:

Rating: 1 2 3 4 5

Comments:

Which elements of the Electoral Security Training were the most useful for you? Why?

Which elements of the training were less helpful? Why?

Are there additional topics or issues that you would have liked to see addressed during the training? If so, please list them.

How do you anticipate applying the elements of the course to your work?

Other Comments:

Thank you!

