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ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK

GUIDE FOR TRAINING FACILITATORS



This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Creative Associates International, Inc.

Electoral Security Framework Training
Overview Agenda

<i>Day 1</i>	<i>Day 2</i>
Morning	Morning
9:00 – 10:15 <i>Session 1: Introductions and Overview</i>	9:00 – 9:15 Welcome, brief recap
10:15 – 11:00 <i>Session 2: Framework Overview and Assessment Introduction</i>	9:15 – 11:00 <i>Session 6: Planning Discussion and Exercise</i>
11:00 – 11:15 Break	11:00 – 11:15 Break
11:15 – 12:00 <i>Session 3: State Stakeholder Assessment</i>	11:15 – 12:30 <i>Session 7: Small Group Exercise: Designing An Electoral Security Program</i>
12:00 – 13:00 Lunch	12:30 – 13:30 Lunch
Afternoon	Afternoon
13:00 – 13:30 <i>Session 4: Non-state Stakeholder Assessment</i>	13:30 – 14:45 <i>Session 7: Small Group Exercise cont'd – Report out and Discussion</i>
13:30 – 15:30 <i>Session 5: Small group exercise – Conducting an Electoral Security Assessment</i>	14:45 – 15:30 <i>Session 8: Programming</i>
15:30 – 15:45 Break (or may come earlier during small group work)	15:30 – 15:45 Break
15:45 – 16:45 <i>Session 5: Small group exercise cont'd – Report out and discussion</i>	15:45 – 16:45 <i>Session 9: M&E</i>
16:45 – 17:00 Wrap up and closure	16:45 – 17:00 <i>Session 10: Conclusions and closure</i>

***Assumes 24 participants*



Preparing for the Electoral Security Framework Training

Before the training begins, there are a few things that need to be completed by members of the training team. The most important are selecting the small groups that will be working together over the course of the training, reviewing the training materials prior to presentation, and making the necessary logistical arrangements.

Selecting Small Groups:

Using the applications submitted by participants, identify small groups that will work together on the case studies. The case studies are a critical part of the “skills building” element of the training, providing participants with the opportunity to apply what they are learning to fictional country scenarios.

As such, participants will learn from the experience of working through the case study, but also from the experiences and perspectives of their fellow group members and the trainers. Using the applications to identify relevant information, try to establish balanced groups, paying particular attention to the following:

- Elections experience
- Years of experience with USAID
- Gender balance
- FSN/expatriate balance

As feasible, also pay attention to whether or not participants appear to have more experience in conflict or post-conflict environments versus more stable state settings.

The Votopia case study represents a steady state environment, but with a long history of violence linked to the electoral cycle. As such, it provides participants with the opportunity to analyze past elections, among other variables, for patterns of electoral conflict.

The Capture case study represents a post-conflict environment with virtually no history of democracy or democratic institutions. Participants grapple with the trade-offs between stabilization and supporting democracy through elections, an inherently competitive process.

The number of small groups is at the discretion of the training team. The training was designed for 24 people broken into four groups of six people - two of these groups work on Capture, the other two on Votopia.

It was envisioned that even though groups were working on the same case study, they would likely come up with different assessment conclusions and prospective programs based on diverse experiences, perceptions, etc. The overall message when comparing the assessment findings or programs of the two groups working on the same case study is - there is no right answer - the appropriate programming mix depends on the context.

However, the training team may decide, for a number of reasons, that four groups is not appropriate for a given training:

- The ideal size for a small group is 5-8 people. A group of fewer than 5 people often loses energy and more than 8 can become unwieldy. So, if there are less than 24 people, fewer groups may be more appropriate.
- If you are training in a mission that is much more similar to one case study than the other, you may only want to use only one and compare across groups. Another alternative is to slightly alter the instructions of the selected case study, giving some groups 18 months to program before elections and others only 10 months (or some other abbreviated time frame.)
- Participants coming in and out of the training can be very distracting, particularly for small group work. It is often detrimental to the group and time consuming to have to “re-explain” and sometimes “re-justify” their work for members coming in and out. If some participants are unable to commit to staying for the full time, consider having them as “observers” for small group work as opposed to full participants. This may also limit the number of individuals available for small group work.

Ultimately, the training is flexible, and the training team can decide how to best use the case studies.

Tips for Reviewing Training Materials:

Prior to beginning, the training team should identify who will take the lead on each element of the training, including introducing group exercises, and playing “traffic cop” for report outs and discussion. Taking the lead does not preclude participation by the other trainer, but clarifies who is responsible for each session, including ensuring slides are loaded on the projector, hand outs are ready for distribution, and other session logistics.

Trainers should review all materials in advance, including viewing slides on the “slide view” to understand how the slides are animated. Trainers are encouraged to customize the slide animation as desired.

Likewise, the facilitator notes often provide more information than the trainer will be able to deliver. Again, trainers are encouraged to customize their presentations, selecting the information that they feel is most relevant and complementing it with their own examples if desired.

Finally, an “energizer” in the form of an elections quiz accompanies the training. The quiz is derived from the ACE Knowledge Network on-line quizzes. Trainers may use this or substitute something else like three truths and a lie or other brief activities to break up presentations.

Logistical Arrangements:

Assuming 24 participants, the room should be set up to host four tables - six people at each table. These tables do not need to represent the same composition as the pre-assigned working groups. It is often better to let people do some work as table groups and other tasks as small working groups as assigned by the case studies.

In advance of the training, place the following at participant seats:

- Participant notebook
- Pens / pencils
- Notepad
- Name tag, table tent (and markers), or both

In addition, make sure that there are adequate breakout rooms for the small group work. These rooms should be easily accessible from the main room. Each room should have a table large enough to accommodate the group and at least one flip chart and markers. The number of break out rooms required will depend on the number of small working groups.

For the main training room:

- At least two flip charts (in addition to those that will be used by the small groups) for facilitator use
- Projector and computer for the slides
- Basket for terms and definitions exercise
- A place for completed evaluation forms
- If you are doing the electoral security quiz or other game, consider some kind of prizes - chocolates or other candy often work well.

In advance of the training, post:

- Ground rules (norms)
- List of acronyms
- Parking lot
- Plus / delta (if using)
- Small group member lists (keep covered until breaking into small groups).

Prior to the training, invite and reconfirm opening remarks from senior managers (this may be an Office Director or Mission Director, depending on the location of the training). If handing out certificates, be sure to have them printed out in advance for signing by the senior manager. If they are available, consider having the senior manager come to close the training, congratulate participants on their work, and hand out certificates at the end of the training.

This training is designed to be dynamic and updated based on trainer experience. To provide comments and feedback on the training, please contact Ms. Tess McEnery at tmcenery@usaid.gov.



Electoral Knowledge Quiz

1. *The complexity of electoral management requires specific institution(s) responsible for electoral activities. Such bodies have a variety of shapes, with a wide range of titles. What is the common name of an authority responsible for organizing elections?*

- a. Electoral Management Body (EMB)
- b. Election Administration Board (EAB)
- c. Electoral Managerial Organization (EMO)

Why: The term 'electoral management body' or EMB has been coined as a name to refer to the body or bodies responsible for electoral management whatever wider institutional framework is in place. Examples of EMBs are Election Commissions, Ministries of Interior, Government departments etc. A country could have several EMBs working at national, regional and/or local level.

2. *Stakeholder confidence is vital to elections. Stakeholders must be convinced that the EMB is not influenced by the governing party and that it is motivated by impartiality; if not, legitimacy might be questioned. Who are stakeholders in elections?*

- a. Political parties and candidates
- b. EMB staff
- c. Voters and prospective voters
- d. Media
- e. All of the above

Why: In the context of the EMB, stakeholders are those individuals and groups that have an interest or stake in the EMB operations. The word 'stake' here means a risk or a benefit which arises from the EMB actions. For example, because of the stake (loosing or winning) which political parties have in an election, they will insist that the EMB manage the polls in an impartial manner.

3. *An EMB is a body which has been founded for the purpose of managing elections, and of direct democracy instruments if those are part of the legal framework. Which of the following are essential (core) functions of an EMB?*

- a. Procurement of electoral materials
- b. Counting of votes
- c. Conducting voter education
- d. All of the above
- e. None of the above

Why: Particularly in emerging democracies, electoral legal frameworks are being designed to cover all electoral process matters relevant to the delivery of free and fair elections and in many countries, the EMB is responsible for a wide range of activities throughout the electoral cycle such as the ones mentioned in this question. Although perhaps important and often carried out by the EMB, procurement and voter education are not considered as essential functions for the conduct of elections.

4. *Delimitation of electoral districts is a fairly recent phenomenon that was initiated some time during the 19th century. What does the term "boundary delimitation" refer to?*
- The process of drawing electoral district boundaries
 - The process of drawing voting areas (also called polling areas, districts or election precincts) for the purposes of assigning voters to polling places
 - The process of demarcating administrative boundaries such as state, country or municipality lines
 - All of the above
 - None of the above

Why: Although the term "boundary delimitation" usually refers to the process of drawing electoral district boundaries, it can also be used to denote the process of drawing voting areas for the purposes of assigning voters to polling places. The term has also been employed to describe the process of demarcating administrative boundaries such as state, county or municipality lines.

5. *Many countries differ in delimitation practices, but there are some generally accepted guiding principles. Which of the following principles should always guide the delimitation process?*
- Equality of voting strength
 - Gerrymandering
 - Non-partisan Delimitation Commissions
 - All of the above
 - None of the above

Why: The principle of equality of voting strength means that electoral district boundaries should be drawn so that districts are relatively equal in population. Equally populous districts allow voters to have an equally weighted vote in the election of representatives. If, for example, a representative is elected from a district that has twice as many voters as another district, voters in the larger district will have half the influence of voters in the smaller district. Electoral districts that vary greatly in population - a condition referred to as "mal-apportionment" - violate a central tenet of democracy, namely, that all voters should be able to cast a vote of equal weight.

6. *There are countless electoral system variations, but essentially they can be divided into 12 main systems. Which is most frequently used to elect the 1st chamber of national legislature?*
- The First Past the Post System (FPTP)
 - The List PR System
 - The Two Round System (TRS)

Why: According to statistics from the ACE Comparative Data section, the FPTP system is the second most common system, while the TRS system is not so often used to elect legislature (however, TRS is more commonly used in direct elections of individual positions (such as presidential elections)).

7. *Much research has been carried out in order to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each and every type of electoral system. According to most experts, which is the best electoral system?*
- The Single Transferable Vote system (STV)
 - It depends on the context
 - The Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system

Why: The "best" electoral system depends on the context - a given electoral system will not necessarily work in the same way in different countries. The consequences of the choice of electoral system depend on factors such as how a society is structured in terms of ideological, religious, ethnic, racial, regional, linguistic or class divisions; whether the country is an established democracy, a transitional democracy or a new democracy; whether there is an established party system, or parties are embryonic or unformed, and how many 'serious' parties there are; and whether a particular party's supporters are geographically concentrated or dispersed over a wide area.

8. *In any election, the EMB should ensure the legitimacy of the processes for which it is responsible. This can be done if election management is founded on basic but fundamental guiding principles. Which are those fundamental guiding principles?*

- a. Independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency and service orientation
- b. Independence, impartiality, integrity and rapid delivery
- c. Impartiality, integrity, transparency, financial stability and cost effectiveness

Why: These principles form the basis of electoral administration and are essential to ensure both the appearance and the actual integrity of the electoral process. The principles are not developed in a vacuum; instead they have emerged in the context of international electoral standards and norms and are guided by national legal frameworks and good practices based on country-specific and global innovations.

9. *The structure of election administration has a significant impact on the credibility and effectiveness of the EMB. There are three common models of electoral management; the independent, governmental and mixed models. Which is the most common model?*

- a. Independent model
- b. Governmental model
- c. Mixed model

Why: According to statistics from the ACE Comparative Data section on Electoral Management, the Independent EMB model is the most frequently used among national EMBs around the world.

10. *Electoral systems translate the votes cast into results – the offices/seats - won by parties/candidates. A number of variables are important determinators in this process. What of the following is NOT considered a key variable of an electoral system?*

- a. Ballot structure
- b. The district magnitude
- c. The number of years for which representatives are elected

Why: Both ballot structure and district magnitude are crucial components of any electoral system. The ballot structure determines how the voter can express his/her preferences at the ballot (voting for a candidate or a party; making a single choice or expressing preferences), while the district magnitude affects the proportionality of the system by determining how many representatives that are elected from a district.

11. *Mixed Model EMBs have dual structures with one part independent of the executive branch (providing oversight or control) and one part located within a state department (organizing the elections). What of the following is true for a Mixed Model EMB?*

- a. Mixed Model EMBs have a variety of structures, internal relationships, and attributes, and it is difficult to codify the essential and possible attributes of Mixed Model EMBs.
- b. The Mixed Model is most commonly used in the UK and former British colonies.
- c. A disadvantage of the Mixed Model is the lack of checks and balances.

Why: The powers, functions and strength of the independent component in relation to the governmental component vary in different examples of this model, and the classification of a particular EMB as a mixed model is sometimes not very clear. In some cases, the independent component is little more than a formalized observation operation, while in other cases, the independent component has a role to supervise and verify the implementation of electoral events by the governmental component and sometimes also to tabulate and transmit results.

12. *A strategic plan helps EMBs to achieve agreed objectives and goals. A strategic plan is a management tool covering operational planning and prioritizing, resource allocation, service standards etc. What time period is normally covered in a strategic plan?*

- a. One specific period in an electoral cycle
- b. One electoral cycle
- c. Several electoral cycles

Why: It is important that the EMB consults with its stakeholders in the development, monitoring, and review of its strategic plan. This promotes stakeholders' awareness and appreciation of the EMB's challenges and strengths, and may boost their confidence in the electoral process in general. It also promotes the EMB's awareness of the expectations and priorities of its stakeholders.

13. *The term "independent EMB" embraces two concepts: structural independence from government and "fearless independence" in that the EMB does not bend to partisan influences. What is true about structural independence and "fearless independence"?*

- a. Fearless independence promotes credible elections
- b. An EMB could be "fearlessly independent" without being structurally independent
- c. An EMB could be structurally independent without being "fearlessly independent"
- d. All of the above
- e. None of the above

Why: It is of crucial importance for a country's electoral process that the EMB managing the elections be seen to be independent of any party and of the sitting government. If the EMB does not have this confidence of independence, the entire electoral process and the election results might be questioned. For natural reasons, an EMB cannot be independent in every aspect; in many cases, the financing of the EMB and the appointment of key personnel is dependent on the legislature, but it is essential that the EMB at the least be structured to protect it from political influences. In many cases, both a culture of independence and the commitment of EMB members to independent decision making are more important than the formal 'structural' independence.

14. *It is good practice for EMBs to establish a code of conduct; rules governing the behavior of EMB members/staff. These need to be consistent with (and complementary to) any legal requirements. What of the following could be included in the code of conduct?*

- a. Commitment to maintaining the integrity of all electoral processes
- b. Avoidance of conflicts of interest
- c. Provision of quality service to voters and other stakeholders
- d. All of the above
- e. None of the above

Why: It is good practice to require all EMB members, staff, and contracted personnel to sign a document indicating their acceptance of and adherence to the EMB's code of conduct as a condition of their appointment. To be effective, the code needs to be backed by appropriate and enforceable sanctions for breaches, and a fair process for determining allegations of breaches.

15. *The Electoral Cycle Approach is a planning/training tool designed to help EMBs and assistance providers to understand the various challenges faced in electoral processes. Which of the following statements is in line with the Electoral Cycle Approach?*

- a. Elections are one-off events rather than continuous
- b. EMBs should focus their efforts at one election at the time in order to not get completely overloaded with work
- c. The period after an election is of relatively low importance and requires little resources from the EMB
- d. All of the above
- e. None of the above

Why: The electoral cycle approach has proved to be a formidable learning tool for electoral officials. It is a key instrument to facilitate understanding of the interdependence of different electoral activities, helping EMB officials to plan and allocate resources for specific activities in a more timely fashion than in the past. In particular, it places an important emphasis on the post-electoral period as a significant moment of institutional growth, and not just as a vacuum between elections.

16. *There are countless electoral system variations, but essentially they can be divided into 12 main systems. Which is most frequently used to elect the 1st chamber of national legislature?*

- a. The First Past the Post System (FPTP)
- b. The List PR System
- c. The Two Round System (TRS)

Why: According to statistics from the ACE Comparative Data section, the FPTP system is the second most common system, while the TRS system is not so often used to elect legislature (however, TRS is more commonly used in direct elections of individual positions (such as presidential elections)).

17. *District magnitude is one of the key components of an electoral system. But what is really meant by the term district magnitude?*

- a. The number of voters in an electoral district
- b. The total population of an electoral district

- c. The number of representatives elected from an electoral district

Why: District magnitude is the number of representatives elected from an electoral district. Some electoral systems (FPTP, AV and TRS) have a district magnitude of one, while all proportional and some plurality/majority systems have a district magnitude above one. Districts magnitude can have crucial effect on the proportionality of any electoral system; the larger the district magnitude the higher the proportionality.

18. *Another electoral system family is the Proportional Representation (PR) family. The most common systems of the PR family are List PR and STV. What is often said to be one of the main advantages of PR systems?*

- a. Little room for establishment of extremist parties
- b. Low risk of "wasted votes"
- c. Works against fragmentation of the party system

Why: PR systems tend to give rise to very few wasted votes. When thresholds are low, almost all votes cast in PR elections go towards electing a candidate of choice. This increases the voters' perception that it is worth making the trip to the polling booth at election time, as they can be more confident that their vote will make a difference to the election outcome, however small.

19. *An electoral system should ensure fair representation of the population. In many countries, women are under-represented in legislature. Of the following strategies, which measure is NOT likely to promote female representation?*

- a. Implementing quotas for political parties on the proportion of female candidates
- b. Reserving seats for women in the legislature
- c. Decreasing the magnitude of electoral districts

Why: A small district magnitude is more likely to decrease the number of elected women as smaller districts encourage parties to put forward fewer candidates who are "the most acceptable"; this is often men.

20. *It is important to ensure strong voter influence in the electoral process, but are there any drawbacks of maximizing voter influence when designing an electoral system?*

- a. No, voter influence should always be maximized
- b. Yes, there could be certain drawbacks

Why: A potential side effect or drawback is a potential fragmentation of the party system; the desire to maximize voter influence should be balanced against the need to encourage coherent and viable political parties. Maximum voter choice on the ballot paper may produce such a fragmented legislature that no one ends up with the result they were hoping for. There is widespread agreement among political scientists that broadly-based, coherent political parties are among the most important factors in promoting effective and sustainable democracy.

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- d. Media
- e. All of the above ←

Why In the context of the EMB, stakeholders are those individuals and groups that have an interest or stake in the EMB operations. The word stake here means a risk or a benefit which arises from the EMB actions. For example, because of the stake (loosing or winning) which political parties have in an election, they will insist that the EMB manage the polls in an impartial manner.

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An EMB is a body which has been founded for the purpose of managing elections, and of direct democracy instruments if those are part of the legal framework. Which of the following are essential (core) functions of an EMB?

- a. Procurement of electoral materials
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- b. Gerrymandering
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Much research has been carried out in order to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each and every type of electoral system. According to most experts, which is the best electoral system?

- a. The Single Transferable Vote system (STV)
- b. It depends on the context ←
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Why: The "best" electoral system depends on the context - a given electoral system will not necessarily work in the same way in different countries. The consequences of the choice of electoral system depend on factors such as how a society is structured in terms of ideological, religious, ethnic, racial, regional, linguistic or class divisions, whether the country is an established democracy, a transitional democracy or a new democracy, whether there is an established party system, or parties are embryonic or unformed, and how many serious parties there are; and whether a particular party's supporters are geographically concentrated or dispersed over a wide area



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- Independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency and service orientation ←
- Independence, impartiality, integrity and rapid delivery
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The structure of election administration has a significant impact on the credibility and effectiveness of the EMB. There are three common models of electoral management: the independent, governmental and mixed models. Which is the most common model?

- a. Independent model ←
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Electoral systems translate the votes cast into results - the offices/seats - won by parties/candidates. A number of variables are important determinators in this process. What of the following is NOT considered a key variable of an electoral system?

- a. Ballot structure
- b. The district magnitude
- c. The number of years for which representatives are elected ←

Why: Both ballot structure and district magnitude are crucial components of any electoral system. The ballot structure determines how the voter can express his/her preferences at the ballot (voting for a candidate or a party, making a single choice or expressing preferences) while the district magnitude affects the proportionality of the system by determining how many representatives that are elected from a district.



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- a Mixed Model EMBs have a variety of structures, internal relationships and attributes and it is difficult to codify the essential and possible attributes of Mixed Model EMBs
- b The Mixed Model is most commonly used in the UK and former British colonies
- c A disadvantage of the Mixed Model is the lack of checks and balances

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It is good practice for EMBs to establish a code of conduct: rules governing the behavior of EMB members/staff. These need to be consistent with (and complementary to) any legal requirements. What of the following could be included in the code of conduct?

- a Commitment to maintaining the integrity of all electoral processes
- b Avoidance of conflicts of interest
- c Provision of quality service to voters and other stakeholders
- d All of the above
- e None of the above

Why: It is good practice to require all EMB members, staff, and contracted personnel to sign a document indicating their acceptance of and adherence to the EMB's code of conduct as a condition of their appointment. To be effective, the code needs to be backed by appropriate and enforceable sanctions for breaches, and a fair process for determining allegations of breaches.

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The Electoral Cycle Approach is a planning/training tool designed to help EMBs and assistance providers to understand the various challenges faced in electoral processes. Which of the following statements is in line with the Electoral Cycle Approach?

- a Elections are one-off events rather than continuous
- b EMBs should focus their efforts at one election at the time in order to not get completely overloaded with work
- c The period after an election is of relatively low importance and requires little resources from the EMB
- d All of the above
- e None of the above

Why: The electoral cycle approach has proved to be a formidable learning tool for electoral officials. It is a key instrument to facilitate understanding of the interdependence of different electoral activities, helping EMB officials to plan and allocate resources for specific activities in a more timely fashion than in the past. In particular, it places an important emphasis on the post-electoral period as a significant moment of institutional growth and not just as a vacuum between elections.

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There are countless electoral system variations, but essentially they can be divided into 12 main systems. Which is most frequently used to elect the 1st chamber of national legislature?

- a The First Past the Post System (FPTP)
- b The List PR System
- c The Two Round System (TRS)

Why: According to statistics from the ACE Comparative Data section, the FPTP system is the second most common system, while the TRS system is not so often used to elect legislature (however, TRS is more commonly used in direct elections of individual positions (such as presidential elections)).



District magnitude is one of the key components of an electoral system. But what is really meant by the term district magnitude?

- a The number of voters in an electoral district
- b The total population of an electoral district
- c The number of representatives elected from an electoral district ←

Why District magnitude is the number of representatives elected from an electoral district. Some electoral systems (FPTP, AV and TRS) have a district magnitude of one, while all proportional and some plurality/majority systems have a district magnitude above one. Districts magnitude can have crucial effect on the proportionality of any electoral system; the larger the district magnitude the higher the proportionality.



Another electoral system family is the Proportional Representation (PR) family. The most common systems of the PR family are List PR and STV. What is often said to be one of the main advantages of PR systems?

- a. Little room for establishment of extremist parties
- b. Low risk of "wasted votes" ←
- c. Works against fragmentation of the party system

Why PR systems tend to give rise to very few wasted votes. When thresholds are low, almost all votes cast in PR elections go towards electing a candidate of choice. This increases the voters' perception that it is worth making the trip to the polling booth at election time, as they can be more confident that their vote will make a difference to the election outcome, however small.



An electoral system should ensure fair representation of the population. In many countries, women are under-represented in legislature. Of the following strategies, which measure is NOT likely to promote female representation?

- a Implementing quotas for political parties on the proportion of female candidates
- b Reserving seats for women in the legislature
- c Decreasing the magnitude of electoral districts ←

Why A small district magnitude is more likely to decrease the number of elected women as smaller districts encourage parties to put forward fewer candidates who are "the most acceptable"; this is often men.



It is important to ensure strong voter influence in the electoral process, but are there any drawbacks of maximizing voter influence when designing an electoral system?

- a No voter influence should always be maximized
- b Yes, there could be certain drawbacks ←

Why A potential side effect or drawback is a potential fragmentation of the party system; the desire to maximize voter influence should be balanced against the need to encourage coherent and viable political parties. Maximum voter choice on the ballot paper may produce such a fragmented legislature that no one ends up with the result they were hoping for. There is widespread agreement among political scientists that broadly-based, coherent political parties are among the most important factors in promoting effective and sustainable democracy.

SECTION 1

Session 1: Introduction and Overview

Duration: 1 hour and 15 minutes

Overview:

During this session, participants will learn about each other and explore electoral security terminology used throughout the Framework and the training. Participants and trainers will have an opportunity to discuss expectations of the course in relation to the actual agenda and learning objectives.

Objectives:

- Introduce participants and trainers
- Create a common understanding of electoral security terminology
- Review the Electoral Security Framework training in light of participant expectations

Materials Needed:

- Flip chart with instructions for exercise written out (see activities below)
- Terms and definitions - for the exercise, these should be cut into pieces - the term separated from its definition - and placed in a bowl or basket
- Electoral Security Terms and Definitions reference sheet for distribution to participants following the exercise
- Flip chart with group norms (ground rules) posted
- Flip chart with parking lot posted

Activities:

1. Senior Manager Opening Remarks (15 minutes)
 - Followed by quick introduction of trainers.
2. Definitions Game (45 minutes)
 - The trainer circulates around the room and each participant draws one slip of paper - they will have either a term or a definition
 - NOTE - this exercise has been designed for 24 people - 12 terms and 12 definitions. If you have fewer / more take out pairs of terms / definitions or add until you have the appropriate number.
 - Participants should look at their term / definition and try to find the person who has the other half
 - Once they have matched the term with its definition, they should take a few minutes to talk as a team. Discussion should focus on experiences working with elections and expectations of the training.
 - One person from each team should read their definition and introduce their partner's experience with elections and expectations for the training. The other team member should then do the same (without reiterating the definition!)
 - Continue until all teams have introduced themselves and their terms / definitions

- Throughout the process, elaborate on terms / definitions as appropriate and time permitting. Answer any questions about terminology
4. Training review (10 min)
- Review the training agenda - taking special care to identify where participant expectations as articulated in the previous exercise may be addressed. This is also an opportunity to point out if some expectations may not be fully met during the course and suggest other resources.
 - Review participant handbook and cd references
 - Explain the “parking lot” - a place for issues that will not be addressed directly by the training but are too important to be lost - someone will be assigned for follow-up
 - Answer any questions about the agenda / objectives
5. Group norms (ground rules) and housekeeping (5 min)
- Group norms may include:
 - Start and end on time
 - Active participation
 - Cell phones off or silenced
 - Everyone teaches everyone learns
 - Respect for other viewpoints
 - Have fun!
 - Others
 - Housekeeping may include:
 - Location of restrooms
 - Computer use during breaks
 - Transportation logistics
 - Meal locations
 - Other

Optional Additions/Variations:

- Consider using plus/delta to gather anonymous participant feedback on an on-going basis. Post two sheets of flip chart paper side by side - one with a large + drawn at the top and another with a large \triangle

Place sticky notes and a pen close by. Explain to participants that when they would like to suggest a change - they can place a sticky note with the suggestion on the delta chart. When they have something that they liked, they can put it on the plus chart. Trainers will review daily.

Handouts:

- List of Electoral Security Terms and Definitions

Participant Resources (CD):

- Electoral Security Terms and Definitions

Electoral Security Terms and Definitions Handout

Term	Definition
Delimitation	The process of drawing electoral district boundaries, sometimes referred to as “districting”.
Election Management Body (EMB)	The institution legally responsible for managing and overseeing all elements necessary for the conduct of elections – from determining who is eligible to vote to conducting balloting, counting votes, and tabulating results.
Election Management Network	The formal network of public agencies and, in some cases, private sector participants undertaking tasks to assist in the conduct of elections. These may include police, Ministry of Education, local governments, and civil society organizations, among others.
Election Observer	One who witnesses and assesses but does not intervene in electoral proceedings.
Electoral Cycle	Elections as a continuous process rather than an isolated event, often divided into pre-electoral, electoral and post-electoral periods
Electoral Justice	The adjudication of civil challenges to the electoral process filed by voters and political contestants. These civil challenges could concern eligibility, disenfranchisement, campaign practices, irregularities, and other disputed outcomes among others
Electoral Security	Protection of electoral stakeholders (e.g. voters, candidates, poll workers, media and observers); electoral information(e.g. vote results, registration data, and campaign materials); electoral facilities (e.g. polling stations and counting centers); and electoral events (e.g. campaign rallies) against death, damage or disruption
Electoral Security System	The legal architecture, state, and non-state institutions that are employed for the protection of electoral stakeholders and assets; and the adjudicative mechanisms to issue penalties for violations.
Electoral Violence	A sub-type of political violence in which actors employ coercion to advance their interests or achieve specific political ends
Legal Framework for Elections	The broad-ranging legislation and regulations that govern the conduct of electoral stakeholders including: responsibilities of the EMB; behavior of candidates; rules and obligations for the media and political parties; and the use of force by security agents.
Parallel Vote Tabulation	Observers record the results from a scientific sample of polling stations. Results are independently tabulated for comparison with the official results of the election authorities
Transitional Justice	A range of approaches – judicial and non-judicial - that states may use to address past human rights violations. This includes a series of actions or policies and their resulting institutions, which may be enacted at a point of political transition from violence and repression to societal stability.



Session 1: Electoral Security Terms and Definitions Exercise

Delimitation	The process of drawing electoral district boundaries, sometimes referred to as “districting”.
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SECTION 2

Session 2: Framework Overview and Assessment Introductions

Duration: 45 minutes

Overview:

This session will provide a brief overview of the Electoral Security Framework followed by an introduction to the Assessment process focused on analyzing environmental factors including electoral context and history.

Objectives:

- Recognize how and when to use the Electoral Security Framework
- Understand how conflict dynamics link to electoral security
- Understand the impact of context and history on electoral conflict

Materials Needed:

- Power point slides for Framework Overview and Assessment Introduction
- Electoral Systems Matrix (handout) when discussing electoral systems

Activities:

1. Framework Overview and Assessment Part 1: History and Context (45 minutes)
 - Power point presentation
 - When discussing the impact of electoral systems, distribute the electoral systems matrix and quickly highlight the four different categories - plurality / majority, proportional representation, semi-proportional representation or mixed, and others
 - Question and answers

Optional Additions/Variations:

Handouts:

- Electoral Systems Matrix

Participant Resources (CD):

- CAF
- ICAF
- Power point slides for Framework Overview and Assessment Introduction
- Electoral Systems Matrix




Facilitator Notes and Slides
Framework Overview and Assessment Introduction

Slide 1: Cover slide

We are ready to begin exploring the Electoral Security Framework. We will start with a review of the framework itself, and the logic behind it. We will then address when, why and how to use the framework.

Slide 2: Electoral Security Framework Snapshot


Before you begin: Ideally, prior to beginning the electoral security assessment, a CAF or ICAF should be undertaken to identify contextual drivers of conflict, mitigating factors and vulnerabilities and opportunities.



You will also want to determine whether relevant data can be gathered from other assessments (these may be from USAID or other parts of the US government, other donors, or local partners – government and civil society).

Other assessments may include:

- DG assessment (characteristics of government institutions and civil society/media)
- Economic growth assessments (indicators of growth and decline, concentration of resources)
- Gender assessments (inclusivity)
- Environmental assessments (resource availability)
- Pre-election gap assessment – may be conducted by the UN or USAID. The assessment is primarily focused on election administration but may contain a security component.



Electoral security framework snapshot: We are going to quickly review the electoral security framework. In the first column are first three phases of the framework: assessment, planning and programming. Each of these phases is designed to build on the findings of the phase that precedes it. In the second column, we see the “products” or “outputs” that the findings should inform. This is what you should be able to identify at the conclusion of each phase. Finally, the last column represents monitoring and evaluation. It is not something that occurs in a sequence with the other phases. Instead, the

foundations for a strong M&E system develop concurrently with the assessment, planning and programming stages. Let's take a closer look at each one.

Electoral security assessment: The electoral security assessment is conducted using both a desk study and information gathering in the field. The purpose of the assessment is to profile:

- History of electoral violence – has there been conflict surrounding past elections?
- Electoral security contextual analysis – are there strong indicators of electoral violence based on lessons learned from elections and conflict?
- State and non-state stakeholders – what are the characteristics of these stakeholders and how do they relate to electoral security?

At the conclusion of the **assessment** phase, you will have the information to identify:

- Priority areas of electoral security intervention – based entirely on the local context, where are the greatest areas of need and possible impact?
- A preliminary development hypothesis – given what we know, what is our assessment of the problem and how do we change that problem. This may also be referred to as a theory of change. How does change happen?

Planning: You will then build on this information during the planning phase. The planning phase provides additional filters through which we continue to refine our priority areas of intervention and development hypothesis by taking into account:

- Local change agents – who has interests aligned with ours and are they willing to work with us / do we have access to them?
- The international community – what is the role of the international community in the broader electoral security context?
- Coordination – are there mechanisms in place for coordinating electoral security programs or do they need to be developed?
- USAID interests and constraints – factoring in USG foreign policy priorities, budget, etc.

At the conclusion of the **planning** phase, you will have the information to:

- Refine priority areas of intervention
- Update your development hypothesis
- Develop program objectives
- Consider candidate objective-level indicators

Programming: Using your findings from the planning phase, you are now ready to begin programming. While it is not always feasible, the most effective programming strategies usually combine activities that engage both state and non-state stakeholders.

- **State stakeholder** activities support electoral security from the standpoint of what is mandated by law – for example, drafting political finance laws, supporting EMB capacity to resolve electoral disputes, etc.
- **Non-state stakeholder** activities refer to those activities that are values-based as opposed to mandated by law. These may include election monitoring, codes of conduct for political parties, etc.

By the end of the programming phase, you should have developed targeted a USAID electoral security program that is responsive to the particular needs of any given country context.

In addition, throughout the process, you will be laying the foundation of a strong **monitoring and evaluation** approach for your electoral security program.

- During the **assessment** phase – you will develop an initial problem statement which will lead to your development hypothesis. You will also identify linkages between electoral security issues and broader conflict dynamics (drivers of conflict, mitigating factors, vulnerabilities and opportunities) as identified in the CAF / ICAF. Finally, you should also get a better sense of the availability and quality of data.
- During the **planning** stage, you refine your development hypothesis, articulate critical assumptions, and develop program objectives and associated candidate indicators and targets.
- Finally, during the programming stage, as activities are identified, you will develop performance standards for these activities, identify your baseline, and create a performance management plan. We will talk about this more when we discuss monitoring and evaluation tomorrow, but it is important to note the role of a performance management plan in continuously assessing your progress against desired results, but, as importantly, testing the validity of your development hypothesis.
- Also note that the CAF / ICAF and the electoral security assessment should be considered “living” documents. In order to remain useful and relevant, they will need to be updated regularly, particularly in rapidly evolving environments. In the event of significant changes, the assessments may need to be repeated.
- Remember the importance of involving partners – both domestic and international in monitoring and evaluation.


Slide 3: The Framework: A Flexible Tool

The Framework can be characterized as a **diagnostic instrument used to profile possible electoral conflict and develop corresponding programs in support of sustainable electoral security.**

It is a flexible tool designed for application in two different kinds of scenarios:

- **Otherwise stable environments where elections may trigger conflict** – these countries may have underlying conflicts but, for the time being, are relatively stable and would not be characterized as conflict or post-conflict environments. Countries that fall into this category may include Bangladesh, Kenya, etc.
- **Elections in conflict or post-conflict environments** – these countries may have ongoing conflict – perhaps in certain regions, or be in a post-conflict phase. It is not uncommon for elections to be included in peace agreements or be used as a means of signaling a return to “normalcy” following a conflict. Countries that fall into this category may include Sudan, Colombia, Afghanistan, etc.


Ideally, the Framework, beginning with the assessment, should be used at least 18 months prior to elections, or in line with the mission planning cycle. The more time, the better. Recognizing that this is not always possible, the Framework can be used at any point in the electoral cycle. However, the closer you get to elections, the less time there is to apply findings to create meaningful electoral security programs.



Always remember to constantly reevaluate and reassess the electoral security environment. Assessment findings and conclusions can change not only in volatile, insecure environments, but also unexpectedly in otherwise stable cases. Do not get stuck in a “static assessment” trap in which you are surprised by changing circumstances -- constantly reevaluate the validity of our development hypothesis, the status of your critical assumptions and the electoral conflict dynamics.

Slide 4: When to Use the Framework

As mentioned, the Framework can be applied at any point in the electoral cycle, even in cases of snap elections. If only limited time is available, the most relevant elements of the assessment and planning sections can be extracted and completed as a desk study. The programming section can then be used to match identified needs with responsive programs. Keep in mind the importance of continuous monitoring and evaluation in rapidly changing environments where programs may need to adapt to frequently changing circumstances.



The framework has been designed primarily for use by USAID/DG officers. The assessment team should be relatively small in order to remain low profile given the sensitivities surrounding elections. Ideally, the team would, at a minimum include an elections specialist, a conflict specialist, and a country expert. The team should combine both local and international expertise. It may be useful to have a “core” assessment team that is then augmented by members that bring specialized expertise and participate on a more intermittent basis. Specialized expertise may include knowledge of government functioning and relationships among state stakeholders; civil society experts; or individuals knowledgeable about insurgent or criminal activities.

Depending on the size of the team and the scope of stakeholders, the full assessment and planning phases will likely take 3 weeks for the desk review and field interviews. It is important to thoroughly document assessment findings, conclusions and recommendations because the team working on the programming may not be the same as the team performing the assessment. Ideally, some of the members will overlap, most likely the DG staff in the mission.

That said, it is understood that many Missions may not have the financial or human resources to staff up a specialized assessment team. In these cases, the assessment team will likely be comprised of a few DG team members or other USAID staff, both FSOs and FSNs, and these few participants will be responsible for subsequent program development, solicitation and program management. The Election Security Framework is meant to be adaptable and flexible, rather than a strict and unyielding process. You should utilize it in the most efficient and effective way to fit your needs.

If the U.S. Government has a strong working relationship with the host country government, the assessment and planning phases provide an excellent opportunity to engage them early in the process and develop a shared vision. Involving host country state and non-state stakeholders in the assessment and planning process as appropriate encourages multi-stakeholder buy-in and should yield findings, conclusions and recommendations that are appropriate to the country context and in line with host country

priorities. Participating in the assessment can also serve as a capacity building activity for local stakeholders as well.

Slide 5: CAF and ICAF

Ideally, a CAF of ICAF should be completed before conducting an electoral security assessment. The CAF/ICAF can be conducted by a team (i.e. from CMM or the interagency) or as a desk assessment at the mission. Note that unlike a CAF, an ICAF is an inter-agency undertaking which is reflected in dual purpose of both identifying conflict dynamics and developing a shared understanding of these dynamics across the USG to inform integrated US policy and planning decisions.

A CAF / ICAF will identify:

- Drivers of conflict
- Local institutional and social resiliencies / capacity to mitigate conflict
- A clearer understanding of the role that elections may play in exacerbating or mitigating these dynamics as well as other opportunities for conflict mitigation or vulnerabilities that may exacerbate conflict.

 USAID <small>FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE</small>	CAF and ICAF
A CAF or ICAF provides an overview of the broader conflict context, including:	
1. Drivers of Conflict	
•Key actors' motives that fuel violence	
•Key actors' means or access to conflict resources	
2. Local resiliencies and capacity for conflict mitigation	
3. Vulnerabilities and Opportunities	

Drivers of conflict: To identify the drivers of conflict, the CAF will assess core grievances

(roots of conflict) that exist in society and identify key actors. In particular, the CAF examines:

- **Motives** or incentives of key actors that fuel violence, actors and groups that may mobilize, and possible location, scope and character of violence.
- **Means or access to conflict resources.** Are those actors or groups with the incentives able to garner financial, organizational, and human resources necessary to mobilize and sustain violent conflict?

Local resiliencies - where does the institutional and social capacity for conflict mitigation reside?

Opportunities for conflict mitigation or **vulnerabilities** that may lead to violence - are there events, such as elections, that may serve to trigger violence or are there other events that may serve to bring diverse groups together.

The more of these conflict dynamics that exist in one situation, the more likely violent conflict is to erupt. The CAF/ICAF will help to identify areas of overlap or convergence within conflict dynamics that are priority areas of vulnerability. This information will provide a broad contextual overview of the political, social, economic and security environment and their relationship with conflict dynamics. Assuming that elections are one of the vulnerabilities identified, the next step is to conduct an electoral security assessment.

Slide 6: Structural Risk Factors

As noted in the last slide, the CAF of ICAF will address many of the structural factors (security, political, economic, social, and effectiveness of state institutions) that contribute to the broader conflict dynamics. However, as of this time, there is not a standardized format for a CAF/ICAF report. The following are important structural variables statistically linked to increased likelihood of conflict that should be taken into account surrounding elections. If they are not addressed in the CAF/ICAF, or a CAF/ICAF is not

conducted in advance of the assessment, the information should be relatively easy to obtain through readily available sources of data and talking to people who are knowledgeable about the country context. Establishing the broader context is the first step in developing an electoral security threat profile.

Security: Security variables include:

- History of conflict or war:
- Any on-going insurgencies or organized crime that has taken on a role in the elections.

In addition to helping assess patterns of conflict in terms of where it has occurred, the motive, perpetrators and victims of conflict, this information will also be useful for identifying potential “hot spots” that may be especially vulnerable to conflict based on historical precedent or current circumstances (insurgents, criminals).


Structural Risk Factors

Important structural variables statistically linked to increased likelihood of conflict:

- **Security**
History of conflict. Presence of insurgency or criminals in politics.
- **Political**
Regime type. Years since founding election.
- **Economic**
Low per capita income. Income inequality. Gross Domestic Product.
- **Social**
Ethnic cleavages. Major demographic shifts. Youth bulge. Threatened elite.
- **State Institutions**
State legitimacy and effectiveness.

Political: Political variables include:

- **The type of country** - Freedom House ranks countries as free, partly free, or not free. USAID categorizes country types as:
 - **New and fragile democracies** – nascent democracies coming out of political transition, more established democracies at risk of backsliding, and better performing democracies seeking to consolidate their progress
 - **Authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states** – closed societies with little potential opportunity for near-term democratic opening and those states with some space for political opposition and access to information but the state maintains authority without real contestation or accountability. These countries tend to be of higher US foreign policy significance than new and fragile democracies.
 - **Crisis and rebuilding societies** - countries characterized by significant instability, vulnerability to conflict or actual conflict, or those undergoing a fragile post-conflict transition. The majority of these countries are US foreign policy priorities because of US national security goals and their potential impact on regional stability.
 - In general, consolidated democracies or autocracies are less likely to experience conflict than those in transition. So, when using the Freedom House rankings, partly free is likely to be the biggest area of concern.
- **Years since founding election** - how many years has it been since the country held a “founding” election beginning the transition from conflict or authoritarian rule to a multi-party democracy?

Economic: We know that poverty and violence are often linked, even if we don’t exactly know how. Economic conditions that may pre-dispose a country to conflict include:

- **Low per capita income** (less than \$2,700) per year – note that regions within a country with a lower per capita income than the others may be more prone to violence
- **Income inequality** can be assessed using the GINI index which ranges from “0” representing absolute equality and “100” representing the furthest range of inequality. A tipping point for vulnerability is a GINI coefficient of 50.0 or above.
- **Low Gross Domestic Product (GDP)** – with a few exceptions (India, Philippines) electoral conflict tends to occur in countries with an annual GDP of less than US\$ 100 billion.

Social: Are there social factors that may create vulnerabilities for electoral violence? These may include:

- Ethnic cleavages and systemic discrimination
- Major demographic changes – immigration, urbanization, or forced displacement
- Youth bulge – unemployed youth susceptible to recruitment
- Elite threatened by perception of possibly losing power as a result of an election

State Institutions: Are state institutions considered legitimate and effective?


- Legitimacy refers to the perception by important segments of society that the government is exercising state power in ways that are reasonably fair and in the interests of the nation as a whole.
- Effectiveness refers to the capability of the government to work with society to assure the provision of order and public goods and services. (*USAID Fragile States Strategy 2005*)

Keep in mind, none of these structural factors alone leads to violent conflict. However, the more of them that are present, the greater the likelihood that violent conflict will emerge. A youth bulge alone does not mean that there will be violent conflict. But, the presence of a youth bulge, combined with low per capita income and weak state institutions is more likely to indicate the possibility of violent conflict than any of these variables in isolation.

Slide 7: History of Electoral Violence

The next step is to then look at past elections for indications of potential conflict. History of electoral violence is a strong predictor for future electoral violence. Trends identified from past elections can be projected forward to further inform our electoral security threat profile based on historical precedent.

- **What were the motives for violence?**
Typically, motives for violence include a desire to:
 - Shape voter turn-out and preference
 - Disrupt an electoral process and prevent voting
 - Strengthen a bargaining position vis-à-vis inter-party or intra-party coalitions and rivalries
 - Change the demography of a constituency by driving out supporter of an opposing political party
 - Discipline would be defectors from a winning coalition
 - Obtain a power sharing agreement prior to the election
- **Which individuals or organizations/institutions were responsible for perpetrating violence?**
Remember, for perpetrators to be effective, they must have leadership, operational capacity, financing and unrestricted operating space. Perpetrators may include:
 - State and state proxies
 - Public servants
 - Coalitions of opposition parties
 - Political rivals



- Insurgents
 - Criminals
 - Diaspora
 - Neighboring countries
 - Economic elites
 - Citizens
 - Civil society
- **Who or what was targeted?** Targets of electoral violence may include:
 - Human targets - voters, public officials, election workers, security forces, candidates, party agents, election observers, media representatives, etc.
 - Information targets – sensitive material (voted and un-voted ballots, voter registration lists, materials that possess “determinative value” for election outcomes)
 - Facility targets (electoral commission headquarters and district offices, registration and polling stations, political party offices, election observer offices, media organizations, residences, hotels frequented by international visitors or observers)
 - Events – (official – voter registration programs, election day activities; and associated events – campaign rallies, debates and political party and coalition meetings)
 - **What tactics were employed?** Tactics are the methods employed to inflict violence and may include:
 - Intimidation and harassment
 - Incitement to violence using media or public venues
 - Taking hostages or kidnapping
 - Strategic displacement
 - Extortion
 - Murder
 - Violent armed clashes / mobs
 - Street protests
 - Attacks by armed groups
 - Vandalism
 - Electoral boycotts
 - Boycotts seek to undermine the legitimacy of elections. A boycott is frequently accompanied by some level of electoral violence
 - Political confrontations
 - These are actions undertaken by parties or candidates to provoke a reaction from their counterparts and their supporters. Campaign rallies may become confrontational if opponents attend and cause disruptions by counter-campaigning or other activities. Debates among candidates may also become confrontational and in some cases attempt to inflame existing societal cleavages, posing an increased risk of polarization and conflict.
 - Dissemination of hate speech and rumors
 - Both traditional (radio, tv, newspapers) and new media (internet, SMS, social networking sites) can be conduits for manipulating and mobilizing citizens.
 - **What characterizes electoral conflict at different stages of the electoral cycle?** – Election related security incidents may pre-date the commencement of the official electoral calendar. As we remember from our definitions this morning, the electoral cycle includes pre-, during and

post- election timeframes. A more detailed breakdown of the electoral cycle, as expressed by the UNDP may include:

- Phase 1 – long run-up to electoral events (18 mo – 3 mo prior)
 - Phase 2 – campaign final lap (3 mo prior to election day)
 - Phase 3 – polling day(s)
 - Phase 4 – between voting and proclamation
 - Phase 5 – post-election outcomes and aftermath
- **Where did the incidents occur?** Based on past patterns and knowledge of the current environment, it may be possible to designate “hot spots” where conflict is more likely to occur. Security assets can then be allocated accordingly. Hot spots can be identified as regions, municipalities, neighborhoods, or polling stations. This information can be used to create a “conflict map” to track patterns of violence.
 - **What was the intensity of electoral violence?** Past intensity of the conflict can be evaluated to determine low or high security risk environments, also a factor in allocating security assets:
 - Low security risk – likely to require limited allocation of security assets
 - High security risk – the EMB will need to work closely with security forces to prevent, manage or mediate anticipated conflict
 - Electoral incidents can be tracked and coded on a scale of 0-3 – zero being no recorded violence and three reflecting a highly violent incident with repeated and coordinated physical attacks leading to 20 or more deaths

Slide 8: Elections Specific Contextual Analysis

Once we have assessed the broader structural risk factors and history of electoral violence, we can expand our electoral security threat profile by exploring contextual variables that may provide further indication of the likelihood of violence specifically linked to the electoral cycle. Similar to the structural risk factors, no one of these variables alone automatically lead to violent conflict surrounding elections. However, areas of overlap where multiple variables converge will help to identify priority areas for electoral security programming. Contextual variables include:

- **Electoral system** –the electoral system, whether established by the constitution, electoral law, or the context of a peace agreement can have implications for fostering or dampening conflict surrounding elections. Some types of electoral systems may encourage divisive behavior while others encourage a more moderating approach. The risk of electoral system-induced conflict will vary depending on the political and social context.



**Elections Specific
Contextual Analysis**

Consider the following contextual variables when developing an electoral security threat profile:

- Electoral system
- Political party system
- Recent electoral reforms
- Timing and sequencing of elections
- Type of elections / electoral stakes
- Decentralization

There are four main categories of electoral systems that can then be divided into sub-categories – each with relative benefits / challenges when used in potentially conflict-prone environments (refer to handout):

- **Plurality – Majority** – generally based on single-member constituencies where an elected official represents a particular geographical unit. Tend to generate fewer political parties and often result in two-party systems. These systems tend to create high stakes winner take all environments, however, they do tend to eliminate the challenges of divided government.
- **Proportional representation** - PR systems aim to reduce the disparity between a party's share of national votes and its share of parliamentary seats. For many new democracies, especially those with deep divisions, inclusion of all significant groups in parliament can be important for democratic consolidation. Outcomes based on consensus building and power sharing usually include PR systems. Disadvantages associated with PR systems giving rise to coalition governments may include party system fragmentation, government instability, and weak linkages between representatives and their geographic electorate
- **Semi-proportional representation** - systems which translate votes cast into seats won in a manner that falls in between the proportionality of PR systems and the majority aspect of plurality-majority systems. Two electoral systems and two different formulae are used at the same time.
- **Other** - these systems do not fit neatly into the other three main families above.

The type of system in use will then determine:

- **Electoral formula** – how votes are added up / aggregated to determine winners
 - **District magnitude** – how many seats are allocated in a particular district. This is important because of the effects on inclusion and exclusion through proportionality of representation. May see – single member districts which return one winner to office or multi-member districts with multiple winners.
 - **Vote to seat ratio** – how many votes are required for a seat in the legislature determines the likelihood that small parties can win representation
 - **Boundary delimitation** – how many districts will there be and how do these districts relate to the spatial distribution of voters
- **Political Party System:** Political parties play a critical role in shaping the tone of elections and accepting the outcomes. The political party system can help reinforce the importance of healthy party competition and reduce incentives for violence through organizational rules, codes of conduct, financial disclosure and internal democracy. Party eligibility requirements can encourage either “bridging” or “bonding” strategies. Parties employ “bridging” strategies when they craft messages and policies designed to have appeal to the broad electorate. They employ “bonding” strategies when the appeal to group identities with the intent of forming voting blocs along ethnic, religious or regional lines. This has the potential for reinforcing existing social cleavages and even creating new ones.
 - **Recent electoral reforms** – while electoral reforms can serve to consolidate democratic institutions and processes, they can also create vulnerabilities for electoral conflict by shifting expectations and the rules of the electoral contest. Delimitation – the process of identifying districts and allocating seats may be perceived as a political power play and spark a backlash. Conversely, electoral reforms that are too limited in scope may lead to disappointment expressed through violence.

Example: An international-led electoral reform effort was conducted in the Solomon Islands, raising expectations of new political dynamics. However, when the subsequent elections returned the incumbent to office, protesters appeared at the Parliament and later set fire to a shopping mall.

Delimitation, the redrawing of boundaries, can be particularly sensitive.

Example: The headline of an article in the Times of India exclaimed “Was delimitation the trigger?” for violence that broke out between the two castes over reserving a constituency by drawing boundaries favoring one of the castes. The violence reached such an intensity that Indian military and paramilitary forces were deployed with “shoot-at-sight” orders to quell the violence.

Example: In Sierra Leone, delimitation was listed as a priority policy for the UN Peacebuilding Commission for the Parliamentary elections (2007) and the Local Council Elections (2008). In both cases, Local Council wardens were engaged to prevent conflicts emerging from boundary disputes.

- **Timing and sequencing of elections** – both the timing and sequencing of elections may introduce elements that can either exacerbate or mitigate electoral conflict.
 - Timing of elections should be considered in light of the broader country context and conflict dynamics. In particular:
 - The extent to which elections have been “demilitarized” may impact electoral conflict. To what extent have DDR programs taken place and been successful? Are there still large contingents of armed combatants active in the country?
 - The status of any post-conflict tribunals. This may have an impact on the ability of candidates to register.
 - Large displaced populations / broad demographic movement – either internally (IDPs) or externally (refugees) residing in a third country. What accommodations will need to be made to establish identity and ensure access to voting in elections?
 - Sequencing of elections may also contribute to electoral conflict. Whether national and local elections should be held simultaneously or sequentially will be contextually dependent.

Example: In India, local elections are held on a rolling basis so that the government can concentrate security assets on one area of the country rather than stretching resources thin. National elections are also staggered over the course of 3-4 weeks to ensure adequate security assets.

- **Type of election / electoral stakes** – the type of elections and associated electoral stakes (or the office sought and the benefits that accrue from achieving those offices) may also contribute to conflict dynamics.
 - **Presidential** elections are often “winner-take-all” high stakes events that may result in conflict between party factions
 - **Parliamentary** elections may yield uneven patterns of electoral conflict reflecting sub-national power struggles
 - **Local** elections may also reflect local political rivalries
 - **Constituent Assembly** elections can be high stakes if the Assembly is tasked with drafting a new constitution

- **Referenda**, by their very nature, create clear winners and losers since they often involve high stakes issues such as territorial status.

Electoral stakes may also be greater than those ascribed by the type of elections. For example, local elections in a highly decentralized system or in cases where significant natural resources or control of types of resources are at stake may escalate the power associated with local office considerably.

Example: Criminal interests in controlling local government in Colombia to secure uninterrupted transport of drugs. In Bangladesh, the party that wins national elections not only gains access to public resources, but also the rents and patronage associated with a broad range of civil society organizations connected to the party. In cases like this, you may also see post election intra-party violence as factions of the winning party compete for resources.

- **Decentralization:** The status of decentralization may also play an important role in public expectations surrounding elections and the resources that can be deployed in support of electoral security. As mentioned previously, under decentralization, the stakes of local elections may be higher with additional responsibilities and resources at the sub-national level that may accompany decentralization. Likewise, control of local security assets, such as police, may be a local level responsibility.

Now that we have established the broader context of our operating environment, it is time to explore key stakeholders and their relationship with electoral security.

Electoral Systems Matrix

(Taken from *International Organization for Migration Enfranchising Displaced Electorates Training and Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies* p. 19-22)

<i>Electoral System</i>	<i>Variations</i>	<i>Comments</i>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Plurality / Majority</u></p> <p>3 plurality systems:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First past the post • Block vote • Party block vote <p>2 majority systems:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative vote • Two-round system <p>Generally based on single-member constituencies where an elected official represents a particular geographical unit. Tend to generate fewer political parties and often result in two-party systems.</p>	<p>First Past the Post (FPTP) <i>(UK, US, India, Canada, and most countries once part of the British Empire)</i></p>	<p>The world's most commonly used system supported primarily on the grounds of simplicity and tendency to produce representatives beholden to defined geographic areas. Contests are held in single-member districts and the winner is the candidate with the most votes, but not necessarily an absolute majority of votes. FPTP creates incentives to build coalitions within the major parties to maximize the attractiveness of party candidates.</p> <p>However, it can result in under-representation, disadvantaging minority parties and leading to a lack of representation of minority groups in government. Some groups may feel excluded from the political process. FPTP systems can also be susceptible to gerrymandering – the drawing of electoral districts to achieve a certain political end.</p>
	<p>Block Vote (BV) <i>(Palestine, Maldives, and other parts of Asia and the Middle East)</i></p>	<p>Application of FPTP in multi-member districts rather than single-member districts. Voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled. The candidates with the most votes win, regardless of the percentage of the vote they actually achieved.</p>
	<p>Party Block Vote (PBV) <i>(Singapore, Mauritius)</i></p>	<p>Operates in multimember districts. Requires voters to choose between party lists of candidates rather than individuals. The party winning the most votes takes all the seats in the district and its entire list of candidates is elected. Even more so than FPTP, PBV can lead to extreme disproportionality between the national vote and the seats awarded to a political party.</p>
	<p>Alternative Vote (AV) <i>(Australia, Fiji, and other parts of South Pacific)</i></p>	<p>Electors rank candidates in a single-member constituency in order of choice marking 1 for their favorite candidate, 2 for their second choice, etc. The system enables voters to express preferences between candidates rather than just their first choice. If no candidate has over 50% of the first preferences, lower order preference votes are transferred until a majority winner emerges. This system aims to prevent a single candidate from winning with anything less than an absolute majority of the vote.</p>
	<p>Two-round System (TRS) <i>(France, Mali, some parts of the former Soviet Union and some former French colonies)</i></p>	<p>Two rounds of voting. The first round is the same as a normal FPTP election. If one candidate receives an absolute majority of the vote, they are elected and there is no second round. If no candidate receives an absolute majority a second round is conducted and the winner declared elected. The system is designed to “weed out” smaller parties so that a runoff election will be held between the two candidates with the largest percentage of the ballots from the first polling.</p>

<p><u>Proportional Representation (PR)</u></p> <p>PR systems seek to ensure that the proportion of seats earned by a political party is directly related to the votes cast for that party. For many new democracies, especially those with deep divisions, inclusion of all significant groups in parliament can be important for democratic consolidation. Outcomes based on consensus building and power sharing usually include PR systems.</p> <p>Criticisms of PR are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gives rise to coalitions governments with disadvantages including party system fragmentation and government instability • Produces weak linkages between representatives and their geographic electorate 	<p>List Proportional Representation (List PR) <i>(South Africa, Finland. Widely used in continental Europe, Latin America, and Southern Africa)</i></p>	<p>The most common type of PR. Most forms of List PR are held in large, multimember districts that maximize proportionality. List PR requires that each party present a list of candidates to the electorate. Voters select a party rather than a candidate and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the national vote. Winning candidates are taken from the lists in order of their respective position.</p> <p>In a <i>closed list</i> system, the winning candidates are taken from the list in the order of their position on the list which is determined by the party prior to the election. In an <i>open or free list</i> system, voters can influence the order of the candidates by marking individual preferences within the party. This system puts more power in the hands of the voter to determine party leadership, but can be complex to administer.</p>
	<p>Single Transferable Vote (STV) <i>(Ireland, Malta)</i></p>	<p>STV uses multimember districts where voters rank candidates in order of preference on the ballot paper in the same manner as AV. Electors can vote for more than one candidate, including candidates from different political parties by indicating first, second, third, etc. choices. Voters rank each of the candidates that appear on the ballot and can have as many votes as there are candidates.</p> <p>After the first-preference votes are tallied, a “quota” of votes is established which a candidate must achieve to be elected. Any candidate who has more first preferences than the quota is immediately elected. If no one has achieved the quota, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated and their second preferences are redistributed among remaining candidates. The surplus votes of elected candidates (those votes above the quota) are redistributed according to the second preferences on the ballot papers until all seats for the constituency are filled.</p> <p>The system is more mathematically complex than others. Given the complexity of the process, counting can take a long time, and demands for recounts can be more common, further delaying the announcement of results.</p>
<p><u>Semi-proportional or Mixed</u></p> <p>Systems which translate votes cast into seats won in a manner that falls in between the proportionality of PR systems and the majority aspect of</p>	<p>Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) <i>(New Zealand, Germany, Bolivia, Italy, Mexico, Venezuela and Hungary)</i></p>	<p>MMP systems attempt to combine List PR and plurality / majority. A proportion of the parliament is elected by plurality-majority methods, usually from single-member districts. The remainder is constituted by PR lists. The PR seats are used to compensate for any disproportionality produced by the district seat results. Single member districts also ensure that voters have some geographical representation.</p>
	<p>Parallel <i>(Japan, Russia, South Korea,</i></p>	<p>Uses both List PR and plurality / majority. Each voter may receive either one ballot paper used to cast a vote both for a candidate and for the candidate’s</p>

<p>plurality-majority systems. Two electoral systems and two different formulae are used at the same time.</p>	<p><i>Thailand, and the Philippines)</i></p>	<p>political party, or two separate ballot papers, one for the plurality / majority seat and one for the PR seats. Unlike MMP, disparities are not compensated for by use of the PR system. Parallel systems have been widely adopted by new democracies in the 1990s.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Other</u></p> <p>These systems do not fit neatly into the other three main families above.</p>	<p>Single Nontransferable Vote (SNVT) <i>(Used today in Jordan, Vanuatu, and Afghanistan)</i></p>	<p>Each elector has one vote but there are several seats in the district to be filled. The candidates with the highest number of votes fill the positions. For example, in a four-member district, a candidate would, on average, need only just over 20% of the vote to be elected.</p> <p>The system can encourage internal party fragmentation as multiple candidates compete for each vote. If too many candidates are nominated, a party risks distributing its votes among them, causing candidates to lose despite an overall high number of votes for the party. Parties must aim to have voters distribute their votes as evenly as possible.</p>
	<p>Limited Vote (LV) <i>(Gibraltar, the Spanish Upper House, and many US local government elections)</i></p>	<p>The LV system is similar to plurality / majority where voters cast ballots for individual candidates. The candidate with the most votes wins. LV is used in multi-member districts, but usually gives voters at least one fewer vote than there are seats to be filled. In Spanish and UK manifestations, the limited vote shares many of the properties of the block vote.</p>



SECTION 3

Session 3: State Stakeholder Analysis

Duration: 45 minutes

Overview:

This session continues the assessment discussion and introduces analysis of State stakeholders.

Objectives:

- Assess the role of key state stakeholders in electoral security

Materials Needed:

- Power point slides for State Stakeholder Assessment

Activities:

1. Quick State Stakeholder Brainstorm (10 minutes)
 - Divide participants into 4 small groups - can be done by table (show first slide for reference):
 - Regulatory Institutions - Legislature, EMB, Regulatory Commissions (i.e. Media, Land and Boundary, Anti-corruption)
 - Security Institutions - International Military, National Military, National and Local Police
 - Judicial Institutions - High, Supreme, Constitutional and Ordinary Courts, Electoral Tribunals and Special Electoral Courts, Transitional Justice
 - Public Administrative Institutions - Government Institutions (Ministries) and the Executive at the national and sub-national levels.
 - Take 10 minutes to brainstorm what you would need to know “from” or “about” these stakeholder groups to conduct an electoral security assessment
2. State Stakeholder Assessment (35 minutes)
 - Power point presentation
 - Before going through each stakeholder group (regulatory, security, judicial and public administrative institutions) ask group for questions they came up with
 - Link questions as feasible to presentation
 - Question and answers

Optional Additions/Variations:

- If time is short, step one (brainstorm) can be eliminated or can be solicited from the large group during the presentation rather than breaking into smaller groups.

Participant Resources (CD):

- Power point slides for State Stakeholder Assessment



Facilitator Notes and Slides
Assessment: State Stakeholders

Slide 1: Cover slide

We are now ready to take a closer look at some of the stakeholders and their relationship with the broader electoral security environment. This morning we will take a look at state stakeholders, and this afternoon move on to non-state stakeholders.

Slide 2: State Stakeholders

Who are important state stakeholders when we are considering electoral security?

For the purposes of our electoral security assessment, we break state stakeholders into four large groups:



- Regulatory institutions. These include:
 - Legislature
 - The EMB
 - Regulatory commissions (such as Media, Land and Boundary, and anti-corruption)
- Security institutions. These include:
 - International military (if applicable)
 - National military
 - National police
 - Local police

The role of security forces and their approach to engagement can also play a role in dampening or encouraging electoral violence. Poorly trained, unequipped security forces that use heavy handed tactics can exacerbate electoral conflict.

Example: In East Timor, during the post election period in 1999, despite a substantial Indonesian military and police presence, local militia were allowed to kill, injure and displace thousands of independence supporters. In other countries, such as Bangladesh, the military is believed to have a “dampening” effect on violence. Their professionalism is attributed by some to frequent participation in UN peace keeping forces.

- Judicial institutions. These include:
 - High, supreme, constitutional and ordinary courts
 - Electoral tribunal and special electoral courts
 - Transitional justice mechanisms

Limited electoral dispute adjudication capacity (whether the EMB, domestic courts, or special elections courts) can play a role in post-election violence. The absence of fair, capable, and transparent electoral adjudication mechanisms may lead people to seek redress for grievances outside



of formal channels by turning to violence. Electoral fraud, or the perception of electoral fraud, may serve as a trigger for violence if electoral dispute adjudication capacity is weak.

- Public administration institutions. These include:
 - Elected and appointed officials and associated ministries at the national and sub-national levels.

The ability and willingness of these institutions to provide security and basic services to citizens will help to identify electoral security strengths, weaknesses, and coordination issues. Key elements to explore include the inter-relationships and power dynamics among different parts of governments and the extent to which election-related activities are politicized.

Let's take a look at each of these stakeholders in turn and get a better sense of the type of information we will need to gather for our electoral security assessment. The following sequence is presented for clarity, but stakeholders may be interviewed in any order depending on context and convenience. All of these stakeholders may not be relevant in all situations. Likewise, there may be additional stakeholders that need to be assessed depending on the context.

The questions identified in the following slides for each stakeholder are representative of the information that you want concerning that stakeholder. Some of the questions will be asked directly to stakeholders themselves, while others may need to be posed to a different stakeholder. It is also useful to validate information about one stakeholder by querying others. Depending on the time and resources available, different approaches may be used for gathering information including key informant interviews, focus groups, community groups (the former is a homogeneous group, the latter heterogeneous), direct observation, and surveys.

The stakeholder assessment questions are also intended to further our understanding of the historical patterns of electoral violence (perpetrators, targets, etc.) and the implications for upcoming elections. As such, in addition to specific questions customized for each stakeholder group, we can use a common set of questions that apply to all stakeholders.

Slide 3: General Stakeholder Analysis Questions

First, we can mirror the questions used in our previous analysis of the history of electoral violence. We should use our historical analysis to predict stakeholders' current potential as perpetrators of electoral conflict (and associated motives and tactics) **and/or** their potential as targets/victims of such conflict.

- **Have stakeholder representatives incited or perpetrated conflict in previous elections?** If so, what was the outcome? Who or what was targeted? Were charges formally adjudicated? What tactics were employed?
- **Have stakeholders been targeted in recent elections?** Who were the perpetrators? What did they do? When and where did the incidents occur? How do perpetrators obtain resources? Are the



General Stakeholder Analysis Questions

- ✓ Have stakeholder representatives incited or perpetrated conflict in previous elections?
- ✓ Have stakeholders been targeted in recent elections?
- ✓ Has the stakeholder received electoral security assistance from the international community?
- ✓ What is the level of structural and behavioral independence of the stakeholder?
- ✓ What role has the stakeholder played in past elections?

In general, also be aware of:

- The relationship among stakeholders, both state and non-state:
- Stakeholder credibility

targets/victims fearful of violence or intimidation looking forward to upcoming elections? Have offices or residences of organization leadership ever been the target of an attack? If so, by whom? Was the attack investigated? What was the outcome?

Other Common questions include:

- **Has the stakeholder received electoral security assistance from the international community?** If so, please describe. What types of assistance have they received? Has this assistance had an impact / have there been changes? Are there unmet needs?
- **What is the level of structural and behavioral independence of the stakeholder?** By structurally independent, we think in terms of legal independence – who do they report to according to the legislation, as well as financial independence – are they financially dependent on other parts of the government or other stakeholders? If so, does the government provide funding in a timely and predictable manner?
- **What role has the stakeholder played in past elections?** As a predictor of future performance, but also to provide insight into the power of each stakeholder vis-à-vis election outcomes and results.

Other factors to consider include:

- **Awareness of the relationship among stakeholders, both state and non-state.** This will provide information about power dynamics and alliances that may have an impact on electoral security.
- **Stakeholder credibility.** Similarly, how the stakeholder is perceived by other stakeholders, including non-state stakeholders such as citizens, provides important insights into perceived credibility and legitimacy. For the purposes of electoral security, perception is particularly important for security forces, the EMB, and judicial institutions. If citizens do not feel that legitimate channels of participation are open to them (elections, election dispute adjudication avenues) they are more likely to go outside of the formal channels to express elections grievances.

Slide 4: Regulatory Institutions: Legislature

What are some of the things we would want to know about the legislative committees to inform our assessment and understand their role in electoral security dynamics?

- **What are the key instruments that form the legal architecture?** Electoral law may be found in the constitution, legislation, regulation and administrative procedure. Electoral law may be consolidated or spread over several pieces of legislation.
- **Which legislative committees are responsible for drafting electoral law?**



**Regulatory Institutions:
Legislature**

- ✓ What are the key instruments that form the legal architecture?
- ✓ Which legislative committees are responsible for drafting electoral law?
- ✓ What is the threshold required to pass or amend a law?
- ✓ Are electoral reform measures in process? Describe the reforms.
- ✓ Are there aspects of existing legislation that create electoral risks?
- ✓ Are there aspects of the law or institutional resiliencies that mitigate risks?
- ✓ If a peace agreement is being implemented, what are the electoral terms of the agreement?

- **What is the threshold required to pass or amend a law?** Does it encourage collaboration or competition between political parties? Do parties not in power feel excluded from decision-making, which may lead them to express grievances outside of formal channels? Do different types of laws have different thresholds?
- **Are electoral reform measures in process? Describe the reforms.** What are the potential impacts of these reforms on different state and non-state stakeholders?
- **Are there aspects of existing legislation that create electoral risks?** This may include elements of existing legislation or gaps in existing legislation – such as lack of political finance law.
- **Are there aspects of the law or institutional resiliencies that mitigate risks?**
- **If a peace agreement is being implemented, what are the electoral terms of the agreement?**

Slide 5: Regulatory Institutions: EMB

There is a strong relationship between real or perceived poor performance of the EMB and electoral violence. An EMB that does not reflect an inclusive membership structure, political balance, and professionalism can seriously damage the credibility of an election. What are some of the things we would want to know about the EMB to inform our electoral security assessment?



Regulatory Institutions:
EMB

- ✓What is the structure / model of the EMB?
- ✓How are members appointed and what do they represent?
- ✓Is there recent information about public opinion of EMB performance?
- ✓How have recent election observation reports evaluated electoral administration?
- ✓What role does the EMB play in electoral security administration?
- ✓What has been the nature of complaints filed against the EMB in past elections?

- **What is the structure/model of the EMB?** Is it government-run, independent, or “mixed.” How is it funded? How is it staffed?
- **How are members appointed and what do they represent?** Who appoints members of the EMB and where are these members drawn from – political parties, judiciary or civil society?
- **Is there recent information about public opinion of EMB performance?** Have recent public opinion polls been conducted to assess how citizens the independence and professionalism of the EMB?
- **How have recent election observation reports evaluated electoral administration?** Thinking both in terms of technical efficiency and democratic quality of electoral administration. Technical efficiency refers to measures of operational competence – did ballots get printed on time? Are they accurate? Democratic quality reflects adherence to international standards – is there truly access to polling stations for all citizens? Has the EMB conducted adequate voter education and outreach?
- **What role does the EMB play in electoral security administration?** In general, the EMB is responsible for facilitating the safe conduct of registration and voting. This is a broad responsibility reflecting many facets of electoral security. For example, if the EMB is responsible for enforcing political party codes of conduct, are they ensuring that parties engage in

appropriate, non-conflictive actions? Has the EMB taken into account security issues as related to the placement of registration and polling centers?

- **What has been the nature of complaints filed against the EMB in past elections?** What types of complaints have been filed? Are there consistent patterns that may identify areas of EMB weakness?

Slide 6: Other Regulatory Commissions: Media, Land and Boundary, Anti-corruption

What are some of the things we would want to know about other regulatory commissions to inform our electoral security assessment? These will likely include media commission, land and boundary commission and perhaps an anti-corruption or public ethics commission.

- **Media** – Has the commission played an effective role in assuring accuracy in broadcast and print content? Equitable access to media time and space for qualified political entities? Is the media commission performing the functions it is supposed to? Are they effectively overseeing broadcast and print content? Are they providing equal access to time and space for qualified political entities?
- **Land and Boundary** – Do the constituency boundaries reflect international principles of respecting existing administration units, taking into account geographical features and allowing for representation by communities of interest? This is a particularly sensitive issue since boundaries can be drawn to aggregate or fragment support for a certain party. Can constituencies be aligned with existing administrative boundaries as opposed to creating new boundaries for the purpose of elections? Islands often form their own district because it is geographically difficult to combine them with other parts of the country. Communities of interest, for example geographically defined ethnic communities should not be cut into many pieces – this will dilute their representation.
- **Anti-corruption** – What is the record of the commission in uncovering corruption in political finance? What penalties have been issued against which parties for infractions? Is the anti-corruption commission operating as it should? Have they had success in uncovering corruption in political finance and what happens when they do? Have any of the political parties been penalized for political finance violations?



Other Regulatory Commissions:
Media, Land and Boundary, Anti-corruption

- ✓ **Media** – Has the commission played an effective role in assuring accuracy in broadcast and print content? Equitable access to media time and space for qualified political entities?
- ✓ **Land and Boundary** – Do the constituency boundaries reflect international principles of respecting existing administration units, taking into account geographical features and allowing for representation by communities of interest?
- ✓ **Anti-corruption** – What is the record of the commission in uncovering corruption in political finance? What penalties have been issued against which parties for infractions?

Slide 7: Security Institutions: International Military

What are some of the things we would want to know about international military forces, perhaps led by the UN or a regional force, to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **What is the electoral mandate of the international military force?** What role do they play in the elections? We will talk more about the mandates of the international community in the context of elections during the planning section tomorrow, but, often, the mandate of international

forces is included in UN resolutions, term of a peace agreement, or an invitation from the host country.

- **Outside of this mandate, what additional role will these forces play in election security, logistics, and communications?** A UN Security Council resolution may authorize use of force for peace keeping but be silent on the role of the UN military in supporting elections. In this event, it is at discretion of the military to contribute to electoral security. For example, they may decide to contribute to logistics, such as using helicopters to transport elections materials.
- **Is there a “Quick Reaction Force?”** A quick reaction force serves as a rapid response mechanism. They may be military, constabulary or local police, depending on the scale and nature of the required response. Civilian emergency service providers such as fire and ambulance workers may also be included. The QRF may also have specialized capabilities such as hostage negotiation, bomb squad, chemical weapons, and snipers.
- **How are they coordinating electoral security enforcement with other agencies?** How are roles and responsibilities divided amongst the agencies? What kind of coordinating mechanism do they use? For example, regular meetings or creation of a Joint Elections Operations Center (JEOC). A JEOC is one approach to strengthen electoral security coordination by integrating civilian, police and military representatives (possibly domestic and international). JEOC structures and functions vary according to the contextual needs, however, they serve as an ongoing management body for coordination, control and communication.

Slide 8: Security Institutions: National Military

What are some of the things we would want to know about national or domestic military forces to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **Are security sector reform (SSR) programs planned or underway? If so, what is the likely impact of the SSR on the military? Do they feel that they have something to gain / lose in the coming elections?**
- **What is the role of the national military in election administration?**

What are their responsibilities before, during and after the elections? What are the demographics of the military in relation to ethnic, religious, or other groups that may play a role in upcoming elections? Is the military predominantly linked with a certain political party?

- **How is electoral security enforcement coordinated with other agencies?** Are they coordinated under the EMB? For example, in India, the EMB has use of all state institutions / means to perform its function during election time, including control of national police.
- **If there is no role for the national military, where will the forces be garrisoned?** Where will the military be on election day? If they don't have a role they should be garrisoned rather than on

 USAID <small>FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE</small>	Security Institutions: National Military
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Are SSR programs planned or underway? If so, what is the likely impact? ✓ What is the role of the national military in election administration? ✓ How is electoral security enforcement coordinated with other agencies? ✓ If there is no role for the national military, where will the forces be garrisoned? ✓ Do members of the military have the right to vote? If so, when and where do they cast their ballots? ✓ Has the military ever performed a coup d'état? If so, when did it occur and what is the potential impact on the current elections? 	

patrol. If you find that they don't have a role and are not garrisoned, there is potential for interference in the election.

- **Do members of the military have the right to vote? If so, when and where do they cast their ballots?** Again, where will they be on election day? This information may also provide insight about the level of control exercised on how the military votes. For example, if the sergeant comes around and takes everyone's ballot and puts it in the ballot box, it is probably not truly a secret ballot. They may be checking to make sure members of the military voted as ordered. It is also important to understand how military votes are reported. Are they integrated with the rest of the general electorate, or announced separately so it is evident how the military voted?
- **Has the military ever performed a coup d'état? If so, when did it occur and what is the potential impact on the current elections?** This provides some indication of how powerful the military is and how their interests are aligned. It also gets to the heart of the role of military in government and the relationship between the two.

Slide 9: Security Institutions: National Police

What are some of the things we would want to know about national police or constabulary forces to inform our electoral security assessment? Sometimes, the national police and the constabulary force are the same thing. In other cases, national police are local police at the national level. Constabulary forces may be a step above the police in training and weaponry, serving as an elite police force.

- **Is there a national police or constabulary force?** These usually report to interior ministry. Not all countries have a national police or constabulary force, but it is important to identify who you should be talking to.
- **If so, how will the police be deployed – mobile, fixed or reserve?** This helps to inform us how forces will be configured on election day. Mobile means that they are out roaming the streets. Fixed means that they are assigned to a particular location. Reserve is like a quick reaction force – flexible and able to deploy as need.
- **What are their rules of engagement for crowd control?** Ideally, these rules of engagement should be derived from a Use of Force policy that specifies in writing when and how much force police are authorized to use in certain situations. Widespread knowledge of rules of engagement is important so that police and the public understand how to engage with each other. What is the gender composition of the police? For example, if voters need to be patted down outside of polling stations, are there enough women to meet the need, or is this likely to create an impediment for women voters?

Example: The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) which is part of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. ICITAP works to strengthen the

**Security Institutions:
National Police**

- ✓ Is there a national police or constabulary force?
- ✓ If so, how will the police be deployed – mobile, fixed or reserve?
- ✓ What are their rules of engagement for crowd control?
- ✓ How is electoral security enforcement coordinated with other agencies?

capacity of host countries to develop policies and procedures and to train police to respect individual rights through peaceful expression and to maintain order when demonstrators break accepted norms.

In Nepal, ICITAP coordinated directly with the election commission and the police to provide security for the 2008 elections. The election commission then supervised police who were deployed to polling sites to provide security. ICITAP also worked with the senior police officer on use of force policies and specific plans dealing with public order. Based on these policies, they then conducted training with the police to prepare for the elections.

- **How is electoral security enforcement coordinated with other agencies?**

Slide 10: Security Institutions: Local Police
What are some of the things we would want to know about local police forces to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **If there are local police, how will they be deployed?** – This will help to identify how security is decentralized. Each local police force may report to their respective local council. If only local police are available, you may need to establish relationships with multiple police departments to coordinate electoral security.



Security Institutions:
Local Police

- ✓ If there are local police, how will they be deployed – mobile, fixed or reserve?
- ✓ Are local police armed?
- ✓ What are their rules of engagement?
- ✓ How is electoral security coordinated with other agencies?
- ✓ Do local police operate detention facilities?
- ✓ Are local police assisted by other official or quasi-official grassroots security entities?

- **Are local police armed?** What kind of power do they really have? Are they going to be effective if a crisis arises?
- **What are their rules of engagement?** Do they have rules of engagement, and if so, how do they engage with citizens. Are citizens aware of these rules of engagement and understand what to expect?
- **How is electoral security coordinated with other agencies?** In addition to agencies, don't forget non-state stakeholders as well, such as election observers, or CSOs that may be tracking incidents of electoral violence.
- **Do local police operate detention facilities?** This question also speaks to the kind of power local police hold and the resources at their disposal to provide electoral security.
- **Are local police assisted by other official or quasi-official grassroots security entities?** There may be additional security infrastructure and resources outside of the local police. In Bangladesh, the ANSARS are village watch committees. They are not armed, but work closely with the local police.

Slide 11: Judicial Institutions: High, Supreme, Constitutional and Ordinary Courts

What are some of the things we would want to know about high courts to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **In past elections, have high courts been employed to determine the outcomes of an election or the eligibility of major candidates?** The answer to this question should provide some indication of how powerful these courts are and their past role in elections.

- **If so, which parties brought the complaints to the high court for redress?** Were sanctions imposed? If so, on who or what institution?

- **Have ordinary courts been used to hear electoral complaints of a criminal nature? If so, what has been their experience providing justice?** Again, this should provide an indication whether the courts are have any power. In the event that special elections courts or tribunals exist, they would address administrative complaints. If there are no special elections courts, all electoral complaints would go through the ordinary courts.

- **Do ordinary courts have any authority to overturn elections results or call for a new election?** How powerful they are and what role have they played in past elections?

Judicial Institutions:
High, Supreme, Constitutional & Ordinary Courts

- ✓ In past elections, have high courts been employed to determine the outcomes of an election or the eligibility of major candidates?
- ✓ If so, which parties brought the complaints to the high court for redress?
- ✓ Have ordinary courts been used to hear electoral complaints of a criminal nature? If so, what has been their experience providing justice?
- ✓ Do ordinary courts have any authority to overturn elections results or call for a new election?

Slide 12: Judicial Institutions: Electoral Tribunal and Special Electoral Courts

What are some of the things we would want to know about electoral tribunals or special electoral courts to inform our electoral security assessment? Tribunal and Special Elections Courts are basically the same but go by different names.

- **Is there a special tribunal or court that hears electoral cases?** – these courts may be domestic, international, or a combination of the two

- **If so, is that tribunal or court separate from the EMB?** Sometimes this function falls to the EMB, other times not based on electoral law that establishes EMB responsibilities.

- **How is the court appointed and who are its members?** You want to discern some measure of judicial independence. Members should be judges or lawyers from smaller courts rather than political appointees. Are court members qualified to fulfill their functions?

Judicial Institutions:
Electoral Tribunal and Special Electoral Courts

- ✓ Is there a special tribunal or court that hears electoral cases?
- ✓ If so, is that tribunal or court separate from the EMB?
- ✓ How is the court appointed and who are its members?
- ✓ What kinds of cases has the tribunal or court heard in recent elections? What were their decisions?

- **What kinds of cases has the tribunal or court heard in recent elections? What were their decisions?** This should provide some indication of the types of grievances surrounding elections and the ability of the tribunal or court to address them and assign penalties as appropriate. Which individuals or institutions have been sanctioned by the courts in the past and what for?

Slide 13: Transitional Justice

What are some of the things we would want to know about transitional justice to inform our electoral security assessment? Transitional justice mechanisms may include: criminal prosecutions; truth commissions; reparations programs; memorialization efforts, and others.

- **Were there widespread human rights abuses surrounding recent elections?**
- **If so, was there an investigation or any transitional justice undertaken?**
Investigations and transitional justice may be led domestically, by the international community, or a combination of both? Where is the process right now? What are the implications for upcoming elections? For example, are candidates currently under investigation? Will it have an impact their ability to register?
- **Were perpetrators of the abuses identified and penalized?** Who were the perpetrators? What was the nature of the human rights abuses (tactics) and where were they perpetrated?
- **Was there any compensation or redress for the victims of these abuses?** Who were the victims.



**Judicial Institutions:
Transitional Justice**

- ✓ Were there widespread human rights abuses surrounding recent elections?
- ✓ If so, was there an investigation or any transitional justice undertaken?
- ✓ Were perpetrators of the abuses identified and penalized?
- ✓ Was there any compensation or redress for the victims of these abuses?

Slide 13: Public Administration Institutions: Elected and Appointed Officials and associated ministries at the national and sub-national levels of government. What are some of the things we would want to know about public administrative institutions to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **Are officials appointed or elected?** If appointed, who are they appointed by and under what terms? This should provide a sense of which officials are beholden to others and which are more independent.
- **Characterize relationships among ministries at the national-level.** Which ministries really hold power and which are beholden to other actors?
- **What role have ministries played in past elections? What is the relationship between ministries and the political parties?** Have certain powerful officials placed pressure on other



**Public Administration Institutions:
Elected and Appointed Officials**

- ✓ Are positions appointed or elected?
- ✓ Characterize the relationships among ministries at the national-level.
- ✓ What role have ministries played in past elections? What is the relationship between ministries and the political parties?
- ✓ Do civil servants and appointed officials act as extensions of the ruling party during elections rather than non-partisan public servants?
- ✓ Characterize the relationships among different levels of government. To what extent is government decentralized?

ministers or staff to vote certain ways or are they associated with any political party? Have ministries with election-related responsibilities performed effectively and efficiently in past elections?

- **Do civil servants and appointed officials act as extensions of the ruling party during elections rather than non-partisan public servants?** Do they interpret their functions in a politicized manner? Do they act with party interests in mind rather than taking a non-partisan approach? Are they expected to belong to a certain political party and vote a certain way? Are there prohibitions on civil servants from advocating for political parties surrounding elections?
- **Characterize the relationships among different levels of government. To what extent is government decentralized?** Are sub-national governments wholly dependent on the national government for resource transfers or do they have some capacity at the sub-national level to raise and allocate funds? If so, do they have security responsibilities at the sub-national level? Are security forces beholden to local-level officials? Note that if government at the sub-national level has some power, the stakes for local office will likely be higher.



SECTION 4

Session 4: Assessment Non-state Stakeholders

Duration: 30 minutes

Overview:

This session continues the assessment discussion and introduces analysis of non-state stakeholders.

Objectives:

- Assess the role of key non-state stakeholders in electoral security.

Materials Needed:

- Power point slides for Non-state Stakeholder Assessment

Activities:

1. Assessment Part 3: Non-state Stakeholders (30 minutes)
 - Power point presentation
 - Before going through each stakeholder group (civil society, political parties, media, traditional leaders, non-state security enforcement, non-state security spoilers, and citizens) solicit possible stakeholder questions from the plenary.
 - Link questions as feasible to presentation
 - Question and answers

Optional Additions/Variations:

Participant Resources (CD):

- Power point slides for Non-state Stakeholder Assessment



Facilitator Notes and Slides
Assessment: Non-state Stakeholders



Slide 1: Cover slide

Now we are going to turn to non-state stakeholders. What kind of non-state stakeholders do you think may be players in electoral security initiatives?

Slide 2: Non-state Stakeholders

Non-state stakeholders include:

- **Civil society** – when we refer to civil society, we are thinking primarily of civil society organizations (CSOs). However, depending on the context, it may be important to include other civil society stakeholders in the assessment. These may include the business community, universities, associations, labor unions, and Diaspora
- **Political parties** – at the national and sub-national levels
- **Media** – both more traditional media stakeholders that play a part in state and non-state TV, radio, print, as well as users of new media applications such as SMS, social networking and internet.
- **Traditional leaders** – these may be tribal, religious or other community leaders. In some countries, traditional leaders may assume a role akin to providing some types of parallel government services and have some level of influence or authority over the actions of certain groups of people
- **Non-state security enforcement** – this group includes any non-government security enforcement mechanisms such as private security firms and community-based security enforcement (non-state).
- **Non-state security Spoilers** – this group represents what we think of as “uncivil society” – insurgents, criminals.



- **Citizens** – Voters and non-voters that may, nonetheless, have an impact on electoral security, for example, youth.

Similar to our discussion of state stakeholders this morning, let's take a look at each of these non-state stakeholders in turn and get a better sense of the type of information we will need to gather for our electoral security assessment. The following sequence is presented for clarity, but stakeholders may be interviewed in any order depending on context and convenience. All of these stakeholders may not be relevant in all situations. Likewise, there may be additional stakeholders that need to be assessed depending on the context.

The questions identified in the following slides for each stakeholder are representative of the information that you want concerning that stakeholder. Some of the questions will be asked directly to stakeholders themselves, while others may need to be posed to a different stakeholder. It is also useful to validate information about one stakeholder by querying others. Depending on the time and resources available, different approaches may be used for gathering information including key informant interviews, focus groups, community groups (the former is a homogeneous group, the latter heterogeneous), direct observation, and surveys.

The stakeholder assessment questions are also intended to further our understanding of the historical patterns of electoral violence (perpetrators, targets, etc.) and the implications for upcoming elections. As such, in addition to specific questions customized for each stakeholder group, we can use a common set of questions that apply to all stakeholders.

Slide 3: General Stakeholder Analysis Questions

Similar to our approach to assessing state stakeholders, we can first mirror the questions used in our previous analysis of the history of electoral violence. We should use our historical analysis to predict stakeholders' current potential as perpetrators of electoral conflict (and associated motives and tactics) **and/or** their potential as targets/victims of such conflict. As a reminder, the questions were:

- **Have stakeholder representatives incited or perpetrated conflict in previous elections?** If so, what was the outcome? Who or what was targeted? Were charges formally adjudicated? What tactics were employed?
- **Have stakeholders been targeted in recent elections?** Who were the perpetrators? What did they do? When and where did the incidents occur? How do perpetrators obtain resources? Are the targets/victims fearful of violence or intimidation looking forward to upcoming elections? Have offices or residences of organization leadership ever been the target of an attack? If so, by whom? Was the attack investigated? What was the outcome?



**General Stakeholder
Analysis Questions**

- ✓ Have stakeholder representatives incited or perpetrated conflict in previous elections?
- ✓ Have stakeholders been targeted in recent elections?
- ✓ Has the stakeholder received electoral security assistance from the international community?
- ✓ What is the level of structural and behavioral independence of the stakeholder?
- ✓ What role has the stakeholder played in past elections?

In general, also be aware of:

- The relationship among stakeholders, both state and non-state;
- Stakeholder credibility

Other questions for non-state stakeholders include:

- **Has the stakeholder received electoral security assistance from the international community?** If so, please describe. What types of assistance have they received? Has this assistance had an impact / have there been changes? Are there unmet needs?
- **What is the level of structural and behavioral independence of the stakeholder?** By structurally independent, we think in terms of legal independence – how are they regulated and licensed according to the legislation, as well as financial independence – are they financially dependent on the government or other stakeholders?
- **What role has the stakeholder played in past elections?** As a predictor of future performance, but also to provide insight into the power of each stakeholder vis-à-vis election outcomes and results.

Other factors to consider include:

- **Awareness of the relationship among stakeholders, both state and non-state.** This will provide information about power dynamics and alliances that may have an impact on electoral security. For example, if all media outlets are controlled by the state, or if police forces report to local commissioners versus the Ministry of Interior.
- **Stakeholder credibility.** Similarly, how the stakeholder is perceived by other stakeholders, including citizens, provides important insights into perceived credibility and legitimacy. For the purposes of electoral security, perception is particularly important. If citizens do not feel that legitimate channels of participation are open to them (elections, election dispute adjudication avenues) they are more likely to go outside of the formal channels to express elections grievances. Likewise, if civil society or the media are perceived as extensions of a certain political party, information disseminated and initiatives undertaken by these groups may not have the intended impact due to lack of credibility.

Slide 4: Civil Society: CSOs

Reflecting back on the questions that we want to ask of all stakeholders, it is important to have a clear understanding of the independence of CSOs. How CSOs are registered and regulated by the government and whether or not they are able to receive financial grants from international organizations will provide important insights to their level of structural independence. Behavioral independence can be assessed by considering past electoral security programming and alliances with political parties. In addition, what are some of the other things we would want to know about CSOs to inform our electoral security assessment?

 USAID <small>FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE</small>	Civil Society: CSOs
<ul style="list-style-type: none">✓What is the mission of the CSO?✓Does the CSO have the capacity to conduct programming on a large scale and accept / manage US Government funds?✓In which parts of the country does the CSO conduct programs?✓Is the CSO part of a network or coalition with other likeminded organizations for electoral purposes?✓What activities are planned surrounding the elections?	

- **What is the mission of the CSO?** What do they do and how is it linked to electoral security?

- **Does the CSO have the capacity to conduct programming on a large scale and accept / manage US Government funds?** Can they be considered a viable partner? Do they have a track record of conducting large scale programs?
- **In which parts of the country does the CSO conduct programs?** Where do they work? Are they deeply tied in to certain communities?
- **Is the CSO part of a network or coalition with other likeminded organizations for electoral purposes?** Networks provide a broader reach than one CSO. The existence of networks also provides insights into the nature of CSO relationships. Are they willing to partner and work together, or do they consider themselves in competition?
- **What activities are planned surrounding the elections?** What do they consider the areas of greatest need?

Slide 5: Political Parties: National and Local
 What are some of the things we would want to know about political parties to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **How are political parties registered with the government and what are the eligibility requirements?**
 - What are the thresholds? Do parties need to be a certain size to register? Are some parties excluded as a result? Are there other eligibility requirements that may lead to systemic exclusion? Are party coalitions permitted? This information should provide an indication of whether there are a few dominant parties or a more politically fragmented landscape.



**Political Parties:
National and Local**

- ✓ How are political parties registered with the government and what are the eligibility requirements?
- ✓ Does the party have a constitution and statement of principles?
- ✓ Does the party occupy seats in parliament? On the sub-national level?
- ✓ What is the party's position on the type of electoral system in place and the fairness of any delimitation that has been conducted?
- ✓ Does the party have ties to neighboring countries or affiliations with likeminded parties in those countries?
- ✓ Has the party signed a code of conduct?
- ✓ How does the party communicate with other parties? Is there a national council of party representatives? If not, would the party participate in one if established?

- **Does the party have a constitution and statement of principles?** If so, there are some structural requirements imposed on the way parties are internally organized and governed. If not then it may be an indication that the political environment is relatively unregulated with few limitations on party behavior.
- **Does the party occupy seats in parliament? On the sub-national level?** How strong is the party and where are they strong?
- **What is the party's position on the type of electoral system in place and the fairness of any delimitation that has been conducted?** Do they feel as though their power is diminished because of the electoral system? Are there perceived grievances that may lead to conflict?

- **Does the party have ties to neighboring countries or affiliations with likeminded parties in those countries?** Are there external influences (ideology, funding, training) on the political parties?
- **Has the party signed a code of conduct?** In some cases, such as Bangladesh, it is mandatory to sign a code of conduct in order to register. If they have signed one, what are the terms of the code of conduct? How is it enforced? If it is not mandatory, which other parties have / have not signed? Do parties encourage or condone inflammatory dialogue and mobilization of unruly party mobs?
- **How does the party communicate with other parties? Is there a national council of party representatives? If not, would the party participate in one if established?** Councils can be established and supervised by the EMB, initiated by political parties, or created by international donors or other interested stakeholders. They provide a formal mechanism to adjudicate differences among parties and a forum for election authorities to meet with all parties at the same time and deliver information in a transparent manner.

Slide 6: Media Organizations

Similar to civil society organizations, it is important to assess the level of independence of the media and how they are perceived by citizens. Are media staff and organizations perceived as professional and unbiased, and how prevalent is “tabloid” journalism. In short, do citizens trust the information that they receive from the media? What are some of the things we would want to know about the media to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **Is the media private, government operated, or both? How are private media organizations licensed by the government?** How much diversity is permitted? Is there exclusion of certain groups or viewpoints? Who is getting air time?
- **Are media activities and access to media regulated by the same authority or commission? If so, how is government media regulated?** What is the mandate of the media commission? Do they only regulate private media leaving government to self-regulate? Are there regulatory biases that favor government over private media?
- **Does the organization represent or mainly espouse the views of one particular political party?** Helps to identify which points of view are being broadcast and may provide insight into power dynamics amongst political parties.
- **What are the regulations on equitable access to broadcasting for political parties?** Do they have equal access or might this serve as a potential grievance?
- **Has the organization ever been accused of disseminating misinformation or provocative rhetoric?** If so, describe the nature of the accusation and whether any sanctions were imposed?

	<h3><u>Media Organizations</u></h3>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Is the media private, government operated, or both? How are private media organizations licensed by the government? ✓ Are media activities and access to media regulated by the same authority or commission? If so, how is government media regulated? ✓ Does the organization represent or mainly espouse the views of one particular political party? ✓ What are the regulations on equitable access to broadcasting for political parties? ✓ Has the organization ever been accused of disseminating misinformation or provocative rhetoric? ✓ Are electoral stakeholders (state and non-state) using new media applications to disseminate information or mobilize supporters? 	

- **Are electoral stakeholders (state and non-state) using new media applications to disseminate information or mobilize supporters?** New media applications may include SMS, social networking sites, websites, etc. Is it effective?

Slide 7: Traditional Leaders: Tribal, Religious, Community

As with other stakeholders, it is important to identify the role that traditional leaders have played in past elections. Leaders may have played a role in education, mediation of electoral disputes, or peacebuilding within and among communities. Conversely, they may have applied their influence to get citizens to vote for a particular candidate. What are some of the things we would want to know about traditional leaders to inform our electoral security assessment?



**Traditional Leaders:
Tribal, Religious, Community**

- ✓ **What kinds of traditional leaders (religious, tribal, community, other identity-based factors) may play a role in the elections?**
- ✓ **Is there a dominant community? Are communities competitive or fragmented across the country?**
- ✓ **Where are traditional leaders most influential?**
- ✓ **Have traditional leaders been subject to manipulation or coercion by the ruling party, elites, or economic interests?**
- ✓ **Have communities been subject to discrimination or strategic displacement for electoral purposes?**

- **What kinds of traditional leaders (religious, tribal, community, or other identity-based factors) may play a role in the elections?** This helps to identify who we should be talking to. What kind of traditional leaders are there and what kind of power do they hold?
- **Is there a dominant community? Are communities competitive or fragmented across the country?** This should be helpful to discern power dynamics, societal divisions, etc.
- **Where are traditional leaders most influential?** Do they have more influence in rural areas or certain regions of the country?
- **Have traditional leaders been subject to manipulation or coercion by the ruling party, elites, or economic interests?** Conversely, have they traditionally been aligned with certain groups or interests?
- **Have communities been subject to discrimination or strategic displacement for electoral purposes?** Strategic displacement is used to diffuse an opposition power base by destroying homes and forcing them to relocate, for example, Sunni neighborhoods that have been displaced in Baghdad.

Slide 8: Non-state Security Enforcement: Private Security Firms

What are some of the things we would want to know about private security firms to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **Is the state a participant in the 2008 Montreux Document?** The Montreux Document reaffirms the obligation on States to ensure that private military and security companies operating in armed conflicts comply with international humanitarian and human rights law. The document also lists some 70 recommendations, derived from good State practice.

- **What are the company's security responsibilities and under what contract are these responsibilities described?** Who are they working for? Are they working for a domestic political party, employed by international organizations, or others? Who is perceived as under threat and why?
- **Have company representatives been injured or killed in an election-related attack?** This may provide indications of the level of violence surrounding elections, and affirms that the people they are protecting are indeed targets.
- **Have company representatives fired rounds in electoral security enforcement? If so, what was the outcome?** This may provide indications of how aggressive the company is. Was the incident justified or were innocent people injured / killed. It may also shed light on how the company is perceived.
- **Does the company adhere to a code of conduct?** Is the code of conduct publicly available? How is it enforced?

Slide 9: Non-state Security Spoilers:

Insurgents

Referring to the questions that we want to know about all stakeholders, the inter-relationships between the insurgency and the state and the insurgency and citizens are particularly important for assessing the likelihood of insurgent involvement around elections and their ability to mobilize resources. What are some of the other things we would want to know about any ongoing insurgencies to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **What is the objective of the insurgency?** What cause are insurgents fighting for? What is their grievance in relation to the status quo? How will elections impact their objectives / grievances?
- **How long has the insurgency been ongoing? What is the estimated number of insurgents?**
- **Is the insurgency particularly strong or weak in certain areas of the country?** This, along with other factors, may help when considering security resource allocation.
- **What is the role of women in the insurgency?** Are women fighting in the insurgency? Are they recruited to accomplish specific tasks that may be used surrounding elections, for example, suicide bombings?
- **Is insurgency leadership centralized around a handful of figures or is management more decentralized?** How is the leadership structured and how do they mobilized members?



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Non-state Security Spoilers:
Insurgents

- ✓ **What is the objective of the insurgency?**
- ✓ **How long has the insurgency been ongoing? What is the estimated number of insurgents?**
- ✓ **Is the insurgency particularly strong or weak in certain areas of the country?**
- ✓ **What is the role of women in the insurgency?**
- ✓ **Is insurgency leadership centralized around a handful of figures or is management more decentralized?**
- ✓ **What are the tactics of the insurgency?**

- **What are the tactics of the insurgency?** As a predictor of the forms of violence that may manifest during the election cycle. For example, car bombings, kidnapping, political assassinations, etc.

Slide 10: Non-state Security Spoilers: Criminals

Similar to insurgents, understanding the inter-relationships among state institutions and criminals will help identify the electoral stakes for criminals, and how they may be involved with elections. What are some of the other things we would want to know about criminal activity to inform our electoral security assessment?

- **What are the rates of violent crime?** If crime statistics are available.
- **What is the estimated number of illegal small arms in the country?** If available.
- **Do criminals financially support or intimidate political candidates?**
- **Is criminal influence in elections a new phenomena?** Or is it pattern that has been historically repeated? Is it linked to certain families?
- **Are candidates required to publicly report donors?**
- **When involved in elections, do criminals work independently on the local level or in larger organized syndicates operating regionally or nationally?**
- **How do criminals obtain their funds?**



**Non-state Security Spoilers:
Criminals**

- ✓ **What are the rates of violent crime?**
- ✓ **What are the estimated number of illegal small arms in the country?**
- ✓ **Do criminals financially support or intimidate political candidates?**
- ✓ **Is criminal influence in elections a new phenomena?**
- ✓ **Are candidates required to publicly report donors?**
- ✓ **When involved in elections, do criminals work independently on the local level or in larger organized syndicates operating regionally or nationally?**
- ✓ **How do criminals obtain their funds?**

Slide 11: Citizens: Voters and Non-voters

When reflecting on the possible role of citizens in electoral security, citizen perception of the government and the electoral process are critically important. Keep in mind that perception may vary from region to region, or even neighborhood to neighborhood depending on myriad variables. What are some of the other things we would want to know about citizens – both voters and non-voters – to inform our electoral security assessment?



Citizens: Voters and Non-voters

- ✓ **Do they have confidence in the ability of the government to hold free and fair elections? Why or why not?**
- ✓ **Do they intend to vote in the upcoming election?**
- ✓ **Have they voted in past elections?**
- ✓ **If they are not eligible to vote, why not? Do they intend to participate in elections in other ways?**
- ✓ **How do they receive news and information about the elections?**
- ✓ **Are they clear about the role of security forces (police and military) in upcoming elections?**

- **Do they have confidence in the ability of the government to hold free and fair elections? Why or why not?** Citizen confidence in the formal system should be disaggregated in many different ways to identify groups of citizens with less confidence in the process. Data may be disaggregated geographically, by gender, by age, by ethnic group, by religious association, urban/rural, socio-economic status, etc. This will help target electoral security programming to areas of greatest need.
- **Do they intend to vote in the upcoming election?** If they are eligible to vote but not intending to, try to understand why. Is it lack of confidence in the system, lack of access to polling stations, or other reasons?
- **Have they voted in past elections?** If so, and they are not planning to vote in this one, what has changed? If not, and they are planning to vote in this one, what changed?
- **If they are not eligible to vote, why not? Do they intend to participate in elections in other ways?** Is it a matter of being too young, or something else? Have they been unable to register? Does it appear that certain groups are being excluded from voting? If unable to vote, do they plan on participating in other ways? This may include rallies, protests, etc. This information should provide some insights as to how non-voters intend to voice grievances or otherwise participate in elections.
- **How do they receive news and information about the elections?** Do citizens primarily look to traditional media outlets, or more informal new media? Have they been reached by voter education or civic education campaigns?
- **Are they clear about the role of security forces (police and military) in the upcoming elections?** Do citizens understand police rules of engagement and how security forces should be interacting with the population before, during and after elections?



Session 5: Small Group Exercise - Conducting an Electoral Security Assessment

Duration: 3 hours and 15 minutes (includes 15 minute break)

Overview:

Participants will conduct an Electoral Security Assessment using fictional case study countries. Results including key findings, linkages with conflict dynamics, proposed development hypothesis and area(s) of intervention will be reported and discussed in plenary.

Objectives:

- Successfully conduct an Electoral Security Assessment of a given country
- Recognize linkages between conflict dynamics and electoral security
- Propose initial areas of program intervention and development hypothesis based on Electoral Security Assessment results

Materials Needed:

- In advance, divide participants into groups (see *Preparing for the Electoral Security Training*)
- Post working groups on flip charts
- Electoral Security Case Study - Capture (handouts)
 - Assessment Task
 - Background Document
- Electoral Security Case Study - Votopia (handouts)
 - Assessment Task
 - Background Document
- Key Points for Facilitators - Electoral Security Case Study Capture
- Key Points for Facilitators - Electoral Case Study Votopia
- Introduction to Capture and Votopia (to be read by trainer to plenary)
- Votopia at a Glance (handout) for Capture teams
- Capture at a Glance (handout) for Votopia teams
- Flip charts and markers for each table group

Activities:

1. Conducting an Electoral Security Assessment (120 min)
 - Introduce exercise and distribute case studies and “At a Glance” documents. Read brief introduction to Capture and Votopia case studies (5 minutes)
 - Participants review the case study and conduct the assessment (105 min)
 - Prepare for report out by recording: (10 min)
 - Conclusions from key assessment findings (organized according to the framework)
 - Proposed initial development hypothesis
 - Proposed priority area(s) of intervention.

Participants should be prepared to explain their choices.

2. Report out to plenary on Electoral Security Assessment Findings (60 min)
 - Each group will report to plenary and address any questions posed by the group or trainers: (15 min / group)
 - Conclusions from key assessment findings (organized according to the framework)
 - Proposed initial development hypothesis
 - Proposed priority area(s) of intervention.
 - During report outs, trainers should ask questions as appropriate of the group.
3. Processing (if time remains - this will depend on how many small groups are reporting out)
 - Trainers will spend the few minutes of the session answering questions and processing the session. Points of interest may include:
 - Highlighting different conclusions that may have arisen between two groups using the same case studies and exploring why.
 - What was the most challenging part of this exercise?
 - Can you envision using a similar approach in the field? Why or why not?
 - What was the most useful / helpful part of this exercise? The least?
 - Conclusions and reflections on the exercise

Optional Additions/Variations:

- If working with more than one group on each case study, make report outs “additive” to avoid repetition. After the first group presents on one country, the second group working on the same country should only add in different conclusions or things that were not mentioned by the first group.
- Processing time can be adjusted according to how long it takes to report out. If participants have a lot of questions about each others’ conclusions, the trainer has the option of using the processing time to allow for less guided discussion among participants. The timing for the report out is based on four groups - but fewer groups reporting out will leave more time for processing.
- If you need extra time, there is 15 minutes built into the end of the day for wrap-up and closure that can be used for this session.

Handouts:

- Electoral Security Case Study - Capture
 - Assessment Task
 - Background Document
- Electoral Security Case Study - Votopia
 - Assessment Task
 - Background Document
- “Votopia at a Glance” for Capture teams
- “Capture at a Glance” for Votopia teams

Participant Resources (CD):

Introduction to Capture and Votopia

We are about to break into our working groups to apply the Framework and conduct an Electoral Security Assessment on two fictional countries: Capture and Votopia. These countries illustrate the different environments in which the Framework can be applied – Capture is an immediate post-conflict country and Votopia is considered a stable country, although it has a long history of violence linked to elections.

You will each be working on one of these case studies. In addition, you have received an “At a Glance” document that provides some basic information on the country you will not be working on so that you will be able to follow the work of the other groups.

As a brief summary of each:

Capture - Following the end of colonization, Capture plunged almost immediately into protracted conflict lasting 30 years. During this time, infrastructure was decimated and thousands killed, injured and displaced. The conflict was ended by a strong UN presence with a mandate to maintain peace and security, coordinate all aid, and assist Capture in moving towards democratic self-governance.

As part of this mandate, the UN brokered a peace agreement among the three main combatant groups including an interim power sharing government and amnesty that remains in effect until elections in 2012. The agreement also incorporates major security sector reform (SSR), including disbanding of the military and police as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts.

The political parties, newly formed from the three major combatant groups, all have a lot to lose with upcoming elections. All provisions of the power-sharing agreement expire when elections are held, so no one party is guaranteed continued representation in government and the party in control determines the future of any transitional justice mechanisms.

The electoral system specified in the peace agreement – *closed list proportional representation* – takes place in large, multi-member districts. Each political party presents a list of candidates already ranked according to party preference. Electors vote for a party, and parties allocate their seats to candidates in order of their position on the list. This electoral system will be a challenge because of disputes over property ownership that have arisen due to large numbers of displaced persons who have resettled and a history of conflict leaving few remaining records (property, identification, etc.).

State institutions and civil society are all nascent and lack the ability to perform even basic functions. There are large numbers of IDPs and refugees who will need to be accommodated in upcoming elections. Indeed, some citizens, including ex-combatants who are generally not welcomed back into communities, despite DDR efforts, are seeking refuge in IDP camps where basic service provision exists and they can receive food, water, and basic health care.

Votopia - Votopia declared independence from the country of Mysay in 1971 as a result of religious and ethnic divides. To this day, the neighboring country of Mysay continues to back the Mysay minority in Votopia. Although Votopia is a stable country, it is subject to violence surrounding elections, in large part due to the nature of the government and political party interactions which encourage winning at any price.

Although elections have been deemed largely free and fair by the international community for many years, they are marred by violence. All parties (which originated around ethnic and religious divides) employ inflammatory actions including boycotts and street violence. Although they deny it, it is well known that the political parties all have associated militia groups funded by Diaspora and neighboring

countries. The Votopian military is largely considered professional, and tends to have a dampening effect on this violence. The police force, on the other hand, is widely regarded as corrupt and poorly trained.

The electoral system is plurality / majority – *First Past the Post (FPTP)*. There are 300 constituencies, with one member of Parliament per constituency. Voters vote for their candidate of choice, and the candidate with the most votes is elected as the Member of Parliament for that constituency. The party with the most Members of Parliament forms the government. Electoral stakes are very high, as this system creates a strong executive Prime Minister elected by the parliamentary majority, resulting in a very powerful leader with few checks and balances on the ruling party.

The fragmented nature of political parties has led to openings for organized crime, centered around opium cultivation, production and trafficking, to enter politics. Within the past year, Votopia has passed sweeping decentralization legislation. Although implementation is still in the early stages, local elections are becoming a very high-stakes undertaking.

The domestic court system in Votopia is largely in shambles and those with power and money are free to do as they please. The CSO community in Votopia is quite sophisticated but highly politicized. Media infrastructure in Votopia is relatively strong, but media in general is not very professionalized and has, at times, incited people to violence.

Capture at a Glance

1520 Capture colonized by Gotchastan

1975 Military coup in Gotchastan unseats monarchy. Gotchastan withdraws from Capture.

Capture announces its independence under the leadership of the country's only political party, the Socialist League for an Independent Capture (SLIC).

Seven days later, neighboring Lynwait invades Capture, killing and displacing thousands of people. The United Nations calls on Lynwait to withdraw from Capture.

Lynwait establishes a provisional government of Capturites sympathetic to Lynwait, the Social League of Passive People (SLOPP).

- SLOPP party members represent the political and social elite of Capture, primarily of Gotchese descent
- They comprise 15% of the population of Capture, but command 90% of the country's wealth.

SLIC members take up arms.

- SLIC refers to its objective of seeing Capture established as a social democracy, but most people, including the leadership of Lynwait, call them communists.
- Rumors abound that SLIC leadership is receiving training and financing from communist countries in the region.
- About 25% of Capturites identify with SLIC and its objectives.

A new armed group emerges, the Front to Return Independent Capture (FRIC).

- FRIC is also seeking an independent Capture, but with the objective of establishing a democracy and free market economy aligned with western countries such as the US and Europe. Approximately 30% of the population identifies with FRIC.

1976 Lynwait launches a brutal "pacification" campaign in response to attacks on SLOPP government targets by SLIC and FRIC.

2005 Following negotiations with the UN, the President of Lynwait calls for a referendum on the status of Capture.

2006 United Nations Capture Integrated Mission (UNCAPIM) established by Resolution 1234.

2007 Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) arrives in Capture. UN brokers meeting of top political party and ex-combatant members to establish a commission to foster reconciliation until the referendum is undertaken.

Referendum held on July 12, 2007. 80% of the population voted for independence with a 98.6% turnout. Capturite militias aligned with SLOPP and supported by the Lynwait military launch a large-scale scorched earth campaign of retribution.

Multi-national forces arrive in Capture putting a stop to the violence.

2008 Peace agreement signed.



Votopia at a Glance

1953 – Supremistan colonization of Mysay ends. The new country of Mysay is comprised of two dominant ethnic groups:

The Mysavs:

- 40% of the population, consider themselves descendants of the former Supremese colonizers
- Practice Catholicism
- Politically and economically powerful and hold the majority of government positions
- Concentrated in the cities and other urban areas
- Retain ties to the Government of Supremistan and business community

The Votés:

- 60% of the population, descended from original inhabitants of Mysay
- Practice Islam
- Share common religious and ethnic affiliation with the country of Ruffemup to the north
- Politically and economically marginalized, practice mostly subsistence agriculture
- Hold few government positions, aside from serving in the military
- Concentrated in the rural north of the country

1969 – The Votés, led by Mohammed (Mo) Wrights, declare independence from Mysay. A violent one year civil war ensues. Votés are supported by troops from neighboring Ruffemup.

1970 – County of Votopia (in the northern part of Mysay) secured and recognized by the international community. Mo Wrights becomes founding President.

1971 – Mysay recognizes Votopia. USAID/Votopia opens.

1973 - Votopia adopts a new constitution based on the Supremistan model, a First Past the Post electoral system.

First Parliamentary elections held. Mo Wrights party, the Public Leaders Opposition Party (PLOP) runs virtually uncontested and wins a substantial majority.

1976 - The Mysay Alignment Party (MAL) emerges advocating for closer ties, and possibly reunification with Mysay in light of continuously declining economic conditions.

1978 - Parliamentary elections held. PLOP defeats MAL by a narrow margin.

1980 - MAL begins launching attacks on government targets. Sharia Law Acceptance Party (SLAP) formed representing a loose coalition of hard-line Islamic parties.

1983 – Mo Wrights assassinated. Per the constitution, caretaker government is appointed and elections are called for 1984.

1984 – MAL wins elections by a narrow margin.

1989 – Following a coup, PLOP returns to power. PLOP wins elections in **1990**.

1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 – subsequent elections with MAL and PLOP both enjoying periods of control over the government. Political environment marred by a series of coups, martial law, caretaker governments, and persistent election-related violence



Welcome to Capture

May 19, 2010

You are a new DG officer at USAID/Capture. Today is your first day of work. You report, early of course, for a briefing from the DG team leader. To your dismay, not only is the team leader already in the office when you arrive, but she explains that she has an important task for you to undertake.

Capture is preparing to hold elections in 2012. Ensuring that elections meet international standards and are undertaken in a secure environment is of paramount importance to the U.S. Government. The US Ambassador to Capture, Ivanna Vote, has directed USAID to launch a program in support of the upcoming UN administered elections. The eyes of the world will be on Capture in 2012!

USAID/Capture recently received the results of an Inter-Agency Conflict Assessment (ICAF), requested by the Mission Director, Mya Lektion. The ICAF team, led by the USAID/DCHA Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management (CMM), just released their final report.

The DG team lead hands you a copy of the ICAF summary findings, which highlight the drivers of conflict, potential mitigating factors, and opportunities and vulnerabilities. She also gives you a brief overview of the recent history of Capture.

She explains that based on experience with the referendum two years ago, citizens of Capture and the international community are anticipating violence surrounding the 2012 election. In light of the innovative, groundbreaking, and highly acclaimed *Electoral Security Assessment Framework* developed by the USAID/W Elections and Political Process (EPP) team, she asks you to conduct an Electoral Security Assessment.

Specifically, she tells you that you have one week to do the following:

1. Review the ICAF findings and Capture background information;
2. Using the Electoral Security Assessment methodology (outline, attached below), conduct an initial desk assessment and note your key findings. Keep in mind the relationship between these findings and the conflict dynamics highlighted in the ICAF (drivers of conflict, mitigating factors, opportunities and vulnerabilities)
 - a. Draw conclusions from your key assessment findings (organized according to the framework)
 - b. Propose an initial development hypothesis
 - c. Propose priority area(s) of intervention.

Next week, you will present items A, B and C to the DG team. Record your information on a flip chart. This will kick off mission planning for the next four years.

Electoral Security Framework Assessment Approach Outline
(some of these bulleted factors may not apply; work selectively)

History of Electoral Violence:

- Motives
- Perpetrators
- Targets
- Tactics
- Links to electoral cycle
- Location of incidents
- Intensity of violence

Elections Specific Contextual Analysis:

- Electoral system
- Political party system
- Recent electoral reforms
- Timing and sequencing of elections
- Type of elections / electoral stakes
- Decentralization

State Stakeholders:

- Regulatory
- Security
- Judicial
- Public Administration

Non-state Stakeholders:

- Civil society
- Political parties
- Media
- Traditional leaders
- Non-state security enforcement
- Non-state security spoilers
- Citizens

Capture Inter-agency Conflict Assessment
Final Report: Summary of Findings
May 2010

The conflict assessment team identified the following **drivers of conflict**:

1. Divisions and rivalries among senior political leaders hamper the ability of the interim government to deliver basic services, demonstrate peace dividends, and form functioning institutions. Many of the elements of a functioning and representative state are still in the early stages of development. They often fail to function properly and are vulnerable to partisanship.
2. Large numbers of IDPs and refugees remain displaced. Given the scarcity of resources, including land, they are not welcome in their original communities since others have since settled on their land.
3. Ex-combatants appear to be having difficulty reintegrating into non-combatant life. Communities are often unwilling to accept them and many ex-combatants and community members are reluctant to surrender arms, feeling that it will leave them vulnerable.
4. Many Capturites disagree with the blanket amnesty provided to all combatant parties. They will likely advocate for transitional justice mechanisms following the first elections.
5. Electoral stakes are extremely high. None of the participants in the current power sharing agreement are guaranteed a role in government. Ex-combatants are having a difficult time transitioning to political parties, and could easily return to violence.

In addition to drivers of conflict, the team identified several potentially **mitigating factors**:

1. Communities have largely maintained traditional dispute resolution mechanisms led by community elders. In IDP camps, elders are working together to mediate inter-community disputes.
2. In the short-term, limited basic needs are being provided by international NGOs with support from a few domestic CSOs. However, in the long run this may become a driver of conflict if the government is unable to fulfill its service provision role.
3. There is strong international community support for the peace agreement
4. Capturites love music and have a rich history of songs that tell complicated stories. These epic songs and other music is passed down orally from generation to generation. Music may provide opportunities to bring people of different party affiliations together in a neutral forum.

Large oil and gas reserves have recently been discovered off the coast of Capture. If used properly, revenues may serve to stimulate the economy, provide employment opportunities, and finance government service provision.

Finally, the team flagged upcoming **opportunities** to mitigate conflict and **vulnerabilities** that may serve to exacerbate conflict dynamics:

1. 2012 Parliamentary elections



Capture Background

History of Capture: Road to Independence

Today's Capture, home to 40 million people, was first colonized in 1520 by Gotchastan. They remained a colony, mostly forgotten as a far flung outpost, for more than 400 years. In 1975, a military coup rocked Gotchastan, unseating the long-standing monarchy. Following the coup, Gotchastan began a rapid divestment of its colonies and overseas territories in order to focus on domestic issues. On August 12, 1975, the small country of Capture announced its independence under the leadership of the country's only political party, the Socialist League for an Independent Capture (SLIC).

Citizens of Capture basked in their new-found independence, for seven days. On August 19, forces from the neighboring country of Lynwait swept into Capture. The invasion was swift and brutal, killing indiscriminately and displacing thousands of people.

Within two weeks, the United Nations Security Council called on Lynwait to withdraw troops from Capture, but to no avail. Lynwait established a provisional government composed of Capturites sympathetic to Lynwait, the Social League of Passive People (SLOPP). Although small in number, SLOPP represented the political and social elite of Capture. Primarily of Gotchese descent, they were accustomed to holding privileged positions in government and business. Representing only 15% of the population, SLOPP members commanded 90% of the country's wealth and were interested in maintaining the status quo at any cost.

The Government of Lynwait defended its actions as a measure to prevent SLIC, which it claimed was communist in nature, from consolidating power. In the wake of communist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, Lynwait's claims were accepted by many in the west, loath to see the emergence of another communist government. The UN never did recognize the occupation by Lynwait.

Almost immediately, SLIC members took up arms. At the same time, a new resistance group, the Front to Return Independent Capture (FRIC) began organizing and launching incursions against the SLOPP government and Lynwait military targets. In response, Lynwait launched a multi-year "pacification" program that eventually killed a million people and displaced significant portions of the population.

During this time, SLIC and FRIC grew in popularity and garnered widespread support. SLIC fought for an independent Capture, established as a social democracy. It was rumored that their leadership received training and funding from communist countries in the region. About 25% of the population of Capture identified with SLIC and its objectives.

FRIC also fought for an independent country, but envisioned Capture as a democracy with a free market economy. They were aligned with, and rumored to be receiving support from, western countries such as the US and Europe. About 30% percent of the population identified with their objectives. Despite the differences in their philosophies, both SLIC and FRIC were fighting for an independent Capture and often worked together in the battle for independence. The unfortunate 30% of Capturites not aligned with SLOPP, SLIC or FRIC were often caught in the cross-fire of attacks or indiscriminate reprisals. As attacks by SLOPP, supported by the Lynwait military, continued to terrorize the citizens of Capture, SLIC and FRIC counter-attacks became more frequent and lethal. Capture descended into a war zone characterized by an ongoing series of attacks and reprisals among the parties.

In a surprising turn of events, after more than 30 years of brutal repression and human rights abuses by the Lynwait military under the guise of SLOPP and reprisals by SLIC and FRIC, in 2005 the President of Lynwait called for a referendum on the status of Capture, following an intensive series of negotiations

with the UN Secretary General. The citizens of Capture had the option of voting for independence or choosing autonomy within Lynwait. In advance of the referendum, an agreement committing to end the violence in Capture was signed by the President of Lynwait, and leaders of SLOPP, SLIC and FRIC.

In preparation for the referendum, the United Nations Capture Integrated Mission (UNCAPIM) was established by Security Council resolution 1234 with a mandate to remain in Capture until elections are held in 2012. According to the terms of the resolution, the Security Council mandated UNCAPIM with the following:

- To provide security and maintain law and order throughout Capture;
- To establish effective administration of Capture by working with the parties to negotiate and administer a peaceful settlement and foundations for self-governance;
- To support capacity building for self-government;
- To ensure coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development assistance.

Two months prior to the referendum, the newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) arrived in Capture. Disturbingly, violence continued to escalate in advance of the referendum, delaying voter registration and campaigning for the popular consultation. With the dream of an independent Capture close to becoming a reality, SLIC and FRIC began to battle over the vision for the newly independent country. The cause that had once bound them as allies was turning them into bitter enemies. During this time, all parties and combatant groups received increases in arms and other support from their international allies – SLOPP supported by Lynwait, SLIC supported by communist governments in the region, and FRIC supported by allies in the west.

In response, the UN brokered a meeting of leadership from SLOPP, SLIC and FRIC and senior representatives from the Lynwait military to establish a commission to foster reconciliation until the referendum was undertaken. Following the referendum, this commission evolved into the Capture Consultative Commission (CCC) composed of five members from each of the three political parties / ex-combatant groups and five members appointed by the UN. Lynwait was no longer represented following the referendum. The CCC was designed to serve as a forum for political and community leaders to advise the UN and discuss policy issues.

With support from the UN and Gotchastan, the referendum was held on July 12, 2007. When the results were announced one week later, 80% of the population voted for independence with a 98.6% turnout.

In response, Capturite militias aligned with SLOPP and a significant, barely disguised Lynwait military contingent launched a large-scale scorched earth campaign of retribution. The pro-independence SLIC and FRIC parties were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the response which had clearly been planned in advance. A number of SLIC and FRIC leaders were taken from their homes and killed along with their families. The UN forces were unable to restrain the violence. Capturites who could not leave for neighboring countries abandoned their homes seeking safety in rural areas and the jungle. The country's infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools was decimated. Nearly 100% of Capture's electrical grid was destroyed.

When rampaging militias threatened to overrun the UN compound in Capture, the Secretary General publicly urged Lynwait to accept offers of assistance from several governments to quell the violence or be held accountable for crimes against humanity reportedly being committed in Capture. One month after the referendum, on August 17, 2007 additional multi-national forces arrived in Capture, finally bringing the violence to an end. The UN launched a large-scale emergency humanitarian relief effort.

In the year after the violence ended, the UN worked closely with the CCC to broker a multi-party peace agreement. The terms of the agreement were signed and made public on December 31, 2008 with implementation designed to begin on New Years' day, 2009. The peace agreement would be monitored and implemented under the auspices of the UN and included commitments from the UN and the international community to provide peacekeeping forces until the year 2012.

Specific terms of the peace agreement included:

- Initiation of a comprehensive security sector reform program that includes a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. Any vestiges of a Capture military or police have been completely disbanded.
- Establishment of an interim government with a power sharing agreement among former combatants including SLOPP, SLIC and FRIC. The power sharing agreement was modeled on the composition of the CCC with representation from each party. The UN is responsible for supporting the power sharing agreement and ensuring that all participants abide by the terms of the agreement. The interim government and all aspects of the power sharing agreement will become void when national elections are held in 2012.
- National elections will be held in 2012 to establish a Parliamentary government. The electoral system is closed-list proportional representation with large multi-member districts. Each political party presents a list of candidates—already ranked according to the party's preference—to the electorate in each multi-member electoral district. Voters vote for a party and have no say as to which specific candidates are elected. Parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote in the electoral district. Parties then allocate their seats to the candidates in order of their position on the lists. Due to a mandatory 30% gender quota system, every third spot on each party's candidate list must be filled by a woman.
- Provision of amnesty conditions for ex-combatants, although it leaves open the possibility of establishing transitional justice mechanisms, once provisions for the interim government expire with the 2012 elections.

Capture Today: State and Non-state Stakeholders

For the most part, in the year since the signing of the peace agreement, little has changed in Capture. The majority of the country's infrastructure remains in shambles and people continue to live in poverty and uncertainty. The interim government of capture is largely hamstrung due to infighting, with each party trying to prove their worth and advance their specific initiatives prior to the upcoming 2012 elections. Since many of the SLIC and FRIC leaders were killed following the referendum, these roles have now been assumed by a relatively inexperienced cadre filling key leadership positions.

Capture has remained somewhat stable, but this relative calm is fragile as evidenced by sporadic clashes. As internally displaced persons and refugees migrate or return to Capture, attempts to return to their communities are often thwarted by other community members who have taken over their homes and land. A similar problem faces ex-combatants involved in the DDR program established under the peace agreement. Communities have suffered enormously at the hands of the different combatant groups, and are often unwilling to welcome them back.

Citizens of Capture are beginning to think about upcoming elections in 2012, and many do not quite know what to expect. Aside from the recent referendum, Capturites have no experience with elections or

democratic institutions in the past 30 years. Given the aftermath of the referendum, many are apprehensive about upcoming elections, and some are even considering leaving the country in the time surrounding elections in anticipation of wide-spread violence.

The following characterizes the status of key state and non-state stakeholders that may need to be taken into consideration when thinking about electoral security.

The electoral system is new and included as part of the peace agreement. At this time, the constitution of Capture dates back to the days of colonialism under Gotchastan. The CCC has approved a Constituent Assembly with members nominated by the different parties to begin drafting a new constitution. Likewise, there is no updated body of electoral law for Capture. The Capture Electoral Commission (CEC) is established as part of the peace agreement. The Commission is comprised of 5 UN representatives, as well as 3 representatives from each political party. Additionally, the CEC Chairman is a UN representative. Structure and responsibilities of the CEC are relatively undefined in the peace agreement, although because of the strong UN presence, most Capturites have confidence in the ability of the CEC to technically administer the 2010 election. Citizens are less confident in the UN's ability to secure the election.

Voter registration continues to pose a challenge for the upcoming election. The registry developed for the referendum needs significant updating. In the violence following the referendum, many more Capturites lost their lives and their homes. Aside from updating the information, many Capturites fleeing violence have no form of identification. The IDP camps are filled with people who have no means of verifying their identity. In addition, as many as one quarter of the population has sought refuge in surrounding countries.

A Land and Boundaries Commission, vested with property adjudication rights in the absence of a functioning judiciary, has been formed but not yet been fully staffed. Given the uncertainty surrounding upcoming elections, many refugees are not returning to Capture. Likewise, IDPs continue to move around the county, often unable to resettle in their original communities. Due to scarce resources, their homes and lands have often been taken over by others, and communities are loathe to welcome additional mouths to feed. UNHCR has established IDP camps in Capture to serve these populations. Indeed, some members living in the communities are even beginning to abandon their houses and migrate into the IDP camps where they know they can get a reliable source of food, clean water, and basic health care. Given significant demographic shifts and little formal documentation of historical land boundaries and ownership, the new Land and Boundaries commission has significant hurdles to overcome.

The UN peacekeeping force in Capture is composed of approximately 10,000 troops from more than a dozen nations. They are complemented by an international civilian police force of 5,000. Together, the peacekeeping force is large enough to maintain stability in large urban centers, but has limited impact in the more rural areas that comprise the majority of Capture.

Nascent SSR efforts are beginning to develop professional domestic military and police forces with the hope that they will collaborate in providing security for the 2012 elections. In addition, the DDR process is moving forward. While there has been some success in getting people to turn in arms for cash, many, particularly those outside of urban areas where UN forces are the strongest, are fearful of giving up their arms which are their only protection. Likewise, the reintegration process has not been terribly successful as communities are reluctant to welcome former combatants home. Many disagree with the amnesty provided to ex-combatants and are unwilling to take in additional members that may require community resources to feed and care for. Although ex-combatants are provided with DDR packages, these soon run

out, and they are often reliant on the community for care. Several have also migrated to the IDP camps where they can receive food and basic services.

Domestic courts are essentially non-existent. Many Capturites continue to rely on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms led by community elders. These dispute resolution mechanisms managed to endure despite the displacement of many communities and their leaders following the departure of Gotchastan. Indeed, the peace making reputation of some of these elders has grown to rather legendary proportions. In some cases, community elders have moved into IDP camps and have managed to work with other elders to establish dispute resolution mechanisms. These elders are even working together to mediate disputes between members of different communities.

With the exception of international NGOs providing basic services, there is no organized civil society in Capture. The international NGOs and the UN have largely taken over basic government functions, and most Capturites turn to them for provision of basic services. As a colony under Gotchastan, Capturite civil society was relatively free to organize. Capture was home to many vibrant civil society leaders and organizations, although most of them left the country or disappeared during the long Lynwait pacification campaign. A few civil society organizations, those with links to the international NGO community, have survived and mostly function to support extension of international NGO services to the community level.

Now part of the interim government and the power sharing agreement, ex-combatant groups are required to evolve into political parties to compete in the 2012 elections. Requirements for political party registration have yet to be defined. None of the parties are guaranteed a role in the new government, and the use of large multi-member districts with closed lists is already beginning to cause internal competition as party members jockey for key positions.

As evidenced by the poor functioning of the interim government, the ex-combatant leaders are having a difficult time making the transition to political parties. In addition, because of the blanket amnesty in place until the next election, many Capturites are suspicious of the party leadership and accusations of human rights abuses are common against all party leaders.

There are no formal media outlets currently functioning in Capture, with the exception of the radio station and newspaper of the interim government. Most Capturites get the majority of their information from word of mouth. Given that the majority of Capturites are illiterate, the newspaper has limited circulation outside of urban areas. However, many Capturites are able to receive radio broadcasts. In addition to broadcasts from the interim government, they receive several stations from neighboring Lynwait.

During the extended conflict that engulfed Capture, there were a handful of local journalists who forged relationships with international media firms. They often served as guides and translators for visiting journalists and often contributed to stories. When the conflict made it too dangerous for international journalists to travel, local journalists provided “inside” coverage from inaccessible areas. In fear of their safety, these local journalists have kept a low profile, however some of them are now coming forward to tell their stories, assuming they will be protected under the UN oversight of the interim government.



Key Points for Facilitators Electoral Security Case Study Capture

The fictional case study of Capture is designed to give participants experience navigating the complexities of immediate post-conflict societies where there are virtually no democratic institutions or practices to build on. It is modeled primarily on East Timor, but also includes aspects drawn from Northern Uganda and Haiti.

Following the end of colonization, Capture is plunged almost immediately into protracted conflict lasting 30 years. During this time, infrastructure is decimated and thousands are killed, injured and displaced.

A strong UN presence is built into the case study to represent internationally supervised and administered elections, versus those overseen by the host country. As such, participants should pay particular attention to beginning to transfer knowledge and skills to the government and citizens of Capture with an eye towards future elections and building the institutions needed to support democratic self-governance.

The UN mandate in Capture includes:

- Providing security and maintaining order;
- Establishing effective administration of Capture;
- Supporting capacity for self government; and
- Ensuring coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development assistance.

To this end, the UN brokers a peace agreement among the three combatant groups – SLOPP, SLIC and FRIC. Terms of the peace agreement include:

- Comprehensive security sector reform including a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program;
- Disbanding of the Capture military and police;
- Implementation of a power sharing agreement (PSA) for an interim government overseen by the UN until elections in 2012
- Establishment of an electoral system that is closed –list proportional representation; and
- Amnesty for ex-combatants until provisions of interim government expire with new elections.

The electoral system – *closed list proportional representation* – takes place in large, multi-member districts. This will be a challenge because of disputes over property ownership that have arisen due to large numbers of displaced persons who have resettled and a history of conflict leaving few remaining records (property, identification, etc.).

Each political party presents a list of candidates already ranked according to party preference. This causes rivalry not only among parties, but now within parties as candidates jockey for positions. Electors vote for a party and have no say as to which candidates are elected because it is closed list. Parties allocate their seats to candidates in order of their position on the list. There is a mandatory 30% gender quota system where every third spot on each list must be filled by a woman. This suggests some targeted programming for women candidates may be in order.

Capture also raises the “trade-offs” associated with dual objectives of minimizing conflict while supporting democracy. The PSA to establish the interim government in Capture has been successful, at least for the time being, in bringing a halt to conflict. However, the broad amnesty that accompanies the PSA is not widely supported by the citizens of capture. This raises broader questions concerning the costs to democracy of ending conflict and how to plan and program around these issues? It should also

encourage participants to consider not only working level program interventions, but higher-level diplomatic interventions as discussed in “Planning.”

When participants begin programming, diplomacy may be employed for the purposes of exploring arrangements that will mitigate the possibility of conflict re-emerging when the PSA ends. Diplomatic interventions may also be useful for amending the amnesty provisions to support legitimacy of nascent political parties among citizens, and to maintain UN presence if necessary following elections, particularly since security outside of urban areas is still a great concern.

The political parties, newly formed from former combatant groups SLOPP, SLIC and FRIC, all have a lot to lose with upcoming elections. In addition, the majority of senior SLIC and FRIC leadership were killed following a referendum on independence, so both parties now have new leadership.

All provisions of the PSA expire when elections are held, so no one party is guaranteed continued representation in government. Likewise, the amnesty provisions of the PSA expire at that time, leaving the incoming government with the ability to determine how to manage transitional justice. The UN, which is supervising and administering elections, will withdraw following the elections in 2012.

State institutions and civil society are all nascent and lack the ability to perform even basic functions. There are large numbers of IDPs and refugees who will need to be accommodated in upcoming elections. Indeed, some citizens, including ex-combatants who are generally not welcomed back into communities, despite DDR efforts, are seeking refuge in IDP camps where basic service provision exists and they can receive food, water, and basic health care.

Large oil and gas reserves have been identified off the coast and, if used properly, revenues could serve to stimulate the economy, provide employment opportunities, and finance government service provision.

Part of the challenge with the Capture case study is sifting through the myriad needs and trying to prioritize which are most important. The answer, of course will also be linked to the working group’s longer term objectives in relation to both security and democracy.

Welcome to Votopia

May 19, 2010

You are a new DG officer at USAID/Votopia. Today is your first day of work. You report, early of course, for a briefing from the DG team leader. To your dismay, not only is the team leader already in the office when you arrive, but she explains that she has an important task for you to undertake.

USAID/Votopia is closing out a program cycle. To begin planning for the upcoming program cycle, the Mission Director requested an Inter-Agency Conflict Assessment (ICAF). The ICAF team came last month and was led by the USAID/DCHA Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management (CMM). The team just released their final report.

The DG team lead hands you a copy of the ICAF summary findings, which highlights the drivers of conflict, potential mitigating factors, and opportunities and vulnerabilities. She also gives you a brief overview of the recent history of Votopia, noting that the country passed sweeping decentralization legislation within the past year, but that implementation is still in the early stages.

She also explains that in the past, elections in Votopia have always been accompanied by violence. In light of the innovative, groundbreaking, and highly acclaimed *Electoral Security Assessment Framework* developed by the USAID/W Elections and Political Processes (EPP) team, she asks you to conduct an Electoral Security Assessment.

Specifically, she tells you that you have one week to do the following:

1. Review the ICAF findings and Votopia background information;
2. Using the Electoral Security Assessment methodology (outline, attached below), conduct an initial desk assessment and note your key findings. Keep in mind the relationship between these findings and the conflict dynamics highlighted in the ICAF (drivers of conflict, mitigating factors, opportunities and vulnerabilities)
 - A. Draw conclusions from your key assessment findings (organized according to the framework)
 - B. Propose an initial development hypothesis
 - C. Propose priority area(s) of intervention.

Next week, you will present items A, B and C to the DG team. Record your information on a flip chart. This will kick off mission planning for the next four years.

Electoral Security Framework Assessment Approach Outline
(some of these bulleted factors may not apply; work selectively)

History of Electoral Violence:

- Motives
- Perpetrators
- Targets
- Tactics
- Links to electoral cycle
- Location of incidents
- Intensity of violence

Elections Specific Contextual Analysis:

- Electoral system
- Political party system
- Recent electoral reforms
- Timing and sequencing of elections
- Type of elections / electoral stakes
- Decentralization

State Stakeholders:

- Regulatory
- Security
- Judicial
- Public Administration

Non-state Stakeholders:

- Civil society
- Political parties
- Media
- Traditional leaders
- Non-state security enforcement
- Non-state security spoilers
- Citizens

Votopia Inter-agency Conflict Assessment (ICAF)
Final Report: Summary of Findings
May 2010

The conflict assessment team identified the following **drivers of conflict**:

1. Political competition and the associated economic rewards to be gained at any price have polarized political parties and caused them to be singularly focused on personality-focused campaign tactics. Parties have no solid platforms or unifying policy statements. Once they win elected office, party members do not know how to govern and are largely unresponsive to their constituents. Most policy decisions result from obscure political horse-trading. As a result, citizens are skeptical about the effective, transparent and accountable functioning of government institutions, and have few avenues for legitimate political representation, particularly, women and youth.
2. Women are becoming increasingly marginalized given the history of gender-based violence and the rise in influence of more extremist Islamist based groups
3. The government is unable to provide basic services to the majority of the population, particularly outside of urban areas.
4. Training and provision of small arms for militia wings of all political parties continues to threaten stability. The Public Leaders Opposition Party (PLOP) and the Sharia Law Acceptance Party (SLAP) receive support from different groups in the neighboring country of Ruffemup, while the Mysay Alignment League (MAL) is supported by neighboring Mysay.
5. Political leaders use their charisma, political influence, and violence to mobilize groups in support of their own political interests.
6. The rise of opium poppy cultivation and associated trafficking activities have increased violent crime in rural areas. There is some evidence that criminals are becoming more closely linked with political parties, exchanging political financing for protection.

In addition to drivers of conflict, the team identified several potentially **mitigating factors**:

1. A professional and well trained military generally serves as a “dampening” force on violence
2. Members of the military are banned from belonging to a political party or voting. As a result, they tend to identify with the military as a professional force rather than any of the political parties.
3. The more women are empowered and secure, the more they will be able to participate in peace building initiatives.
4. Votopians have a strong sense of national pride, and many still remember the sacrifices of the war for independence. Although identities may be fragmented internally, to the external world they identify strongly as Votopians.

The team also noted that decentralization may either mitigate or exacerbate conflict. Local governments are currently weak, lacking both trained human and financial resources. Although the decentralization legislation devolves significant service delivery responsibility to the local level, it is unclear to what extent local governments will have the authority to raise revenues. Also untested is whether or not the central government will deliver complete transfers of funds to the local level in a timely manner.

Finally, the team flagged upcoming **opportunities** to mitigate conflict and **vulnerabilities** that may serve to exacerbate conflict dynamics:

1. Parliamentary and local elections in two years
2. Regional soccer championship coming up in one year– Votopians are huge soccer fans and come together when national pride in the sport is at stake.



Votopia Background

History of Votopia: The Road to Independence

Originally, today's Votopia was part of a larger country, Mysay, a colony of Supremistan until 1953. Votopia declared independence from Mysay in 1969 and formally succeeded in 1970 as a result of religious and ethnic divides.

Today's Votopia is home to 40 million people. However, it is important to understand the history of Mysay in order to understand the succession and creation of the country of Votopia. At the time of Mysay's independence from Supremistan in 1953, 40% of the country's population was predominantly Catholic and 60% were Muslim Votés.

Although a minority, the Mysays, who consider themselves descendants of the Supremistan colonizers, commanded considerable economic and political power at the expense of the Votés who were primarily engaged in subsistence farming in the more rural northern part of the country. Powerful Mysay elites held the majority of government positions and were concentrated around the capital and other major cities. Following independence, they retained ties to the Supremistan government and business community.

The majority of the population, the Votés, who primarily trace their lineage from the original peoples of what is today's Mysay, were disadvantaged both economically and politically. In 1965, under the leadership of a charismatic labor organizer, Mohammed (Mo) Wrights, Votés began to demand economic and political equality. They received support from the neighboring country to the north, Ruffemup, with whom most Votés share a common ethnic and religious identification. As their demands grew louder and more powerful, the government began using security forces to crack down on the Vote citizens of Mysay. Incidents perpetrated by the Mysay security forces were designed to intimidate and often targeted Vote citizens randomly, including women and children. Human rights abuses continued to worsen, including the use of rape as a tactic to inspire fear. The international community, including the Supremese, publicly chastised the Mysay government, threatening to curtail business and political ties.

Initially, Vote rebels and some citizens sought safe haven in Ruffemup and smuggled arms across the border. When the Votés declared independence in 1969 and formed Votopia, civil war erupted in Mysay. Vote members of the Mysay military joined their Votopian brethren in the struggle. In addition, Ruffemup sent troops in support of the Votopian bid for independence. Within one year, they had secured the northern half of Mysay and declared the country of Votopia. During this year, hundreds of thousands of Votopians died at the hands of the better armed Mysay military or fled the country for Ruffemup. The international community recognized the new country of Votopia and began providing humanitarian and development support. USAID /Votopia opened shortly thereafter. Bowing to international pressure, Mysay also recognized Votopia in 1971.

With independence, Mo Wrights, a tremendously popular public figure, became the founding Prime Minister. Within a year, Votopia adopted a constitution and a Parliamentary system of governance based on the Supremestan model, creating a strong executive prime minister elected by the parliamentary majority. Parliamentary systems in which executive branch members are drawn from the parliamentary majority yield very powerful political leaders, especially the Prime Minister, with few checks and balances on the ruling party.

Independent Votopia: Electoral System and History of Elections

The electoral system in Votopia is the simplest form of the plurality/majority system - First Past the Post (FPTP). It is a single member constituency electoral system with more than 300 elected members. This means that Votopia is divided into 300 constituencies. Each voter consistency then has one vote which

they can use for the candidate of their choice. The candidate with the largest number of votes is elected as the Member of Parliament for that constituency. The party which has the greatest number of elected Members of Parliament then forms the government.

The first parliamentary elections were held shortly after the adoption of the new constitution in early 1973. President Wrights' party, the Public Leaders Opposition Party (PLOP), ran virtually uncontested and won a substantial majority based on Mo Wrights' broad based appeal. Prime Minister Wrights announced new government priorities that included reconstruction and development of the highly rural Votopia.

However, after several years as economic conditions continued to deteriorate, public discontent began to increase. In 1976, an opposition group emerged called the Mysay Alignment League (MAL) advocating for a return to closer ties, and possibly even reunification with Mysay. As economic conditions further declined, MAL continued to press their demands. When efforts at dialogue with the Wrights government were rebuffed, MAL developed a small but effective political party militia, trained and armed by Mysay and began launching attacks against Votopian government targets. At the same time, Votopia was experiencing a rise in hard line Islamic groups. Although Islam is the state religion, both PLOP and MAL considered themselves more secular than religious parties. In 1980, newly formed Islamic-based groups formed a loose coalition, the Sharia Law Acceptance Party (SLAP) with the common goal of introducing Sharia law. Although not generally considered violent, some SLAP members began receiving training from radical groups in Ruffemup.

In the face of economic deterioration and mounting civil unrest, Prime Minister Wrights declared martial law in early 1982. He then used his parliamentary majority to pass through a constitutional amendment limiting the power of the judicial and the legislative branches of government and instituted a one party system which all members of Parliament, as well as senior civil officials were obligated to join. Citizens of Votopia were becoming increasingly disenchanted with Prime Minister Wrights. The following year in 1983, Prime Minister Wrights was assassinated by a mid-level Votopian military officer, Pat Free N'Fair. The Officer was shot immediately after the assassination, but friends said Free N'Fair had become disillusioned after reading Alexis de Tocqueville's "Democracy in America". He was convinced that the government under the leadership of Prime Minister Wrights was leading Votopia down a path of "soft despotism" and away from the ideals under which it was founded.

Following the assassination of Prime Minister Wright, per the constitution, the Justice of the Supreme Court was appointed to the position of Chief Advisor of a caretaker government. Elections were called for 1984. Although MAL only won by a slim majority, they gained significant control over Parliament. To forestall an agreement restoring closer relations with Mysay, the PLOP party militia staged a coup in 1989 and returned to power. They then won the 1990 elections. Although elections continue to be held as mandated by the constitution, the political environment in Votopia is marred by successive series of coups orchestrated by the military or party militias (sometimes both together when their interests aligned), long periods of martial law, and management by caretaker governments.

This legacy of violence entwined with elections has hampered efforts to consolidate democracy in Votopia, polarized political parties, and deeply undermined citizen confidence in the impartiality of the electoral administration, even though the most recent Parliamentary elections held in 1995, 2001 and 2007 were considered largely free and fair by the international community. Violence has mostly been directed towards political party members and supporters, but occasionally the small Mysay minority living in Votopia is also targeted.

1995 Elections:

Election day itself was relatively calm. Although international and domestic observers found the elections to be free and fair, MAL accused PLOP (the party in control of the government at the time) of fraud and demanded a new election under a caretaker government. When PLOP did not concede, MAL launched a series of protest strikes resulting in widespread violence and human rights abuses – including the reintroduction of rape as an intimidation tool, similar to the tactics used by the Mysays during the civil war. More than a dozen political leaders were killed and hundreds of citizens injured in clashes between protesters and security forces and clashes among political parties. At the end of the year, MAL staged a parliamentary walk out but then returned in early 1997 under an agreement with PLOP that MAL charges was never implemented.

2001 Elections:

Leading up to the elections, MAL began staging protests and announced that they would boycott. Indeed, they did boycott municipal elections held before the parliamentary elections. Under increasing public pressure and accusations of corruption, the PLOP government stepped down to allow a caretaker government to preside over parliamentary elections. Despite this move, political violence continued to escalate in the six months leading up to the elections. Violence erupted between political parties and even within political parties as candidates sought to secure a nomination from their party. There were also attacks against journalists. The majority of the violence was concentrated in urban areas and carried out in the streets and at campaign rallies using knives and machetes. As a result, the caretaker government had to postpone elections in an attempt to restore security. Eventually, elections were held in 2001 and deemed free and fair by domestic and international observers. The elections returned PLOP to power. MAL rejected the results and once again boycotted parliament. Boycotts of parliament continued periodically through 2005.

In 2005 Votopia was rocked by near-synchronized blasts in 63 of 64 administrative districts targeting mainly government buildings. An extremist Islamic group affiliated with SLAP claimed responsibility for the blasts which sought to press their demand for replacement of the secular system with Sharia courts. Subsequent attacks on courts in several districts killed judges, lawyers and police personnel who were guarding the courts. A resulting government campaign against Islamic extremists led to the arrest of hundreds of senior and mid-level SLAP leaders, five of whom were sentenced to death and executed.

2007 Elections:

According to the Votopian constitution, once the parliamentary session expires, in this case 2006, the president must offer the position of Chief Advisor of the caretaker government to the immediate past Justice of the Supreme Court. However, PLOP opposed this move, arguing that the Justice had belonged to MAL in the past and would sway the election in their favor. Following two days of street protests, the current president assumed the role of Chief Advisor to the caretaker government. MAL announced that they would boycott the elections and planned a series of country-wide strikes. The President then declared a state of emergency, and stepped aside. The position of Chief Advisor was assumed by the former Votopia Bank Governor who announced elections in 2007. At this time, an independent assessment of the voter lists found significant and widespread problems including incorrect names and voters registered in more than one location.

In advance of the 2007 election, the state of emergency was lifted and 50,000 troops were deployed across the country to secure the run-up to voting, the election day, and the period immediately following the elections. More than 100 incidents of election day violence were reported with nearly 500 people injured. The majority of these incidents were attributed to PLOP and MAL supporters as opposed to the police or military. Election day itself was relatively calm, but the violence following elections claimed nearly 30 lives and injured nearly 300. Violence occurred both among and between party leaders and their

supporters. There was also widespread violence on university campuses among student groups affiliated with the political parties. MAL won the parliamentary elections, and post-election clashes occurred among students affiliated with MAL for rents and patronage, for example, jobs with the new government. Many reports indicated that the police did not step in to stop the violence.

Votopia Today: State and Non-state Stakeholders

Votés are now beginning to think forward to the national and local elections to be held simultaneously in 2012. The following characterizes the status of key state and non-state stakeholders that may need to be taken into consideration when thinking about electoral security.

The electoral system is defined in the constitution and supplemented by a body of electoral law. Although the laws provide a framework, key legislation on political financing and other supporting regulations do not exist.

The current Votopia Electoral Commission (VEC) is not considered impartial and professional by the majority of Votés, despite having overseen three elections deemed largely free and fair by the international community. In particular, the VEC has largely failed to arbitrate tensions between the major political parties and has been unsuccessful in managing security around recent elections. However, the recent removal of the VEC Secretariat from the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's office was well received by the public as a signal that election administration will be more independent. The terms of the current VEC executive members expire this year, and new appointees will be announced in the next few months by the MAL government. Of the twelve appointees, six will be nominated by MAL, four by the opposition parties (PLOP and SLAP), and two will be nominated by major civil society groups. The Commission Chairman will then be elected by the executive members.

Votopia also has a newly established Anti-corruption task force independent from the Office of the Prime Minister. The committee was established by the government to appease donor calls for increased government transparency and accountability. Despite this less than auspicious beginning, the head of the commission is well regarded, having formerly served as the Executive Director of a non-partisan NGO attempting to monitor government corruption. The task force is comprised of members from the different political parties and civil society, including the business community. Although well intentioned, the task force has made little progress to date due to divides among the members. They have, however, set forth an ambitious three-year plan that has been widely circulated in the press. They have vowed to cleanse the public administration of corruption and depoliticize the police force. In anticipation of the upcoming election, the task force has offered to work with the new VEC to develop authentic and transparent voter lists with photographs to limit opportunities for identify fraud at the polls.

Votopia has a local police force that is widely regarded as politicized and corrupt. They are poorly trained and not well paid, making bribing police officers to "look the other way" a more attractive option than curtailing illegal or violent behavior. There are no formalized rules of engagement dictating how the police interact with civilians. Police generally carry out the bidding of the local officials who pay their salaries. Although police are deployed to fixed locations on election day, there have been complaints of police intimidation in the past from voters and election monitors.

Unlike the police force, the Votopian military is generally regarded as professional and have been cited as a positive force in past elections, having a "dampening" influence on violence leading up to and post-elections. Members of the military are banned from political party affiliation by law and are not allowed to vote. On election day, they are garrisoned. As a result, unlike most Votés, they identify more with the military than any particular political party. Some speculate that the Army's frequent participation in

United Nations peacekeeping operations has improved their professionalism and given them electoral security expertise that can then be applied domestically.

The domestic court system, both high courts and ordinary courts, is largely neglected and in shambles. This, in combination with a politicized police force, has led to an environment of impunity, where political leaders, citizens and criminals perpetrate crimes that often go unaddressed, especially if the offender has money or political power. Judges are widely regarded as uneducated in the law itself, and inconsistent in their rulings. Courts have limited case management systems and all records are kept in paper form, making them easy to remove or alter. Electoral disputes have traditionally been handled by a special electoral dispute body housed in the VEC, but, like the courts, dispute resolution is typically slow and ineffective. There are few incentives for citizens to use formal systems of dispute resolution, leaving citizens to resort to other forms of “justice”.

Registering a CSO is relatively easy in Votopia, and there is a strong tradition of civil society participation in Votopian politics. The majority of CSOs in Votopia are closely aligned with one of the political parties, even down to the level of student groups on college campuses. When a political party wins control of the government, the aligned CSOs expect the rewards due to them which they often receive in the form of grants or mid-level government positions for CSO leadership which allows them to draw dual income.

Despite their affiliation with political parties, Votopian civil society is generally quite technically and operationally sophisticated. In the past, several organizations have provided domestic monitors and collected information about past incidences of electoral violence. There are some CSOs that remain unaligned with political parties, but because of their small number, they are often overwhelmed by multiple donor initiatives.

Political parties are driven by charismatic leaders and reflect their unique personalities and interests. Candidates seek party endorsements for the benefits that come from holding office and do not hesitate to resort to violence, even within their own parties, to achieve their objectives. Few political parties participate in the electoral process as a result of the somewhat restrictive eligibility requirements. Specifically, in 45 out of 64 administrative districts, a political party must secure the registration of at least 5% of the number of registered voters to certify the party’s participation in elections. There are also exorbitant party registration fees that result in the exclusion of smaller, more independent parties from the political process. However, once registered there are few checks on how parties govern themselves. As a result, parties are hierarchical and tend to exploit citizen fears to inspire loyalty to the party. For example, rumors that land would be expropriated from PLOP party members if MAL came to power during the last elections drove many voters to vote for PLOP for fear of losing their livelihood. To date, MAL has not expropriated significant amounts of PLOP party member land holdings. In addition, although the political parties deny it, it is a well known secret that they each have their own party militias. These party militias receive financial support from Diaspora and neighboring countries.

There have been few changes in party leadership in the last two decades. Women and youth are virtually unrepresented. In addition, the highly fragmented nature of the political parties has left room for criminal groups to enter politics through financing of political party militias and contributions to campaigns in return for freedom to operate unimpeded under the party in power. Indeed, there are even rumors of drug lords successfully running for local office, as they are often better prepared to finance and provide basic services than the government.

There is a relatively good media infrastructure in Votopia, with most citizens getting information through television, radio, and, of course, word of mouth! About one-third of the media is government operated,

another third operated by the opposition parties, and the last third privately owned by entrepreneurial business leaders. It is not difficult to get a license to operate a media station, and many diverse voices are heard throughout Votopia. Unfortunately, the media is generally not professional and has, at times, incited people to violence by reporting faulty information or even information that is intentionally inflammatory. Media representatives, for example journalists from opposition party media, have in the past become targets of violence. Interestingly, new media applications are on the rise, and, completely unregulated. All three major political parties have recently developed websites in anticipation of the upcoming elections.

The traditional leaders with the most influence in Votopia are religious leaders and community elders. Each community has a long history of a small council of elders responsible for the smooth functioning of the community. In larger urban areas this has broken down, but in more rural areas with smaller communities the councils are still strong. The council of community elders is often called upon to resolve community disputes. The councils also provide a “social safety net”, ensuring care for those members of the community unable to care for themselves. Unfortunately, like CSOs, community elders and religious leaders have become closely affiliated with the different political parties. Indeed, there is a history of candidates bargaining with the heads of community elders’ councils to secure endorsements and/or community votes in exchange for some benefit such as appointed office or a “gift” for the community such as a new community center, repaved roads, etc.

Organized crime is a relatively new entrant to the Votopia political landscape, but rapidly gathering strength. During the past 10 years, some farmers, in desperation as the economy continued to decline, turned to cultivation of opium poppies. Given the ideal climate and relatively rural nature of parts of Votopia, this has bred an ideal environment for opium production. Votopia is rapidly becoming a production center for opium consumed in the West. Organized crime is most evident at the local level, closest to the production centers in the rural East of the country. Drug lords often provide financing to local governments and incentives to traditional leaders in return for the ability to continue their operations without interference. In those areas where financing and incentives are not enough, they resort to violence and intimidation of citizens. Recently, a mayor who had not given in to criminal demands and was making an effort to root out criminal elements from the community disappeared. He was found dead three days later – a clear warning to other local level leaders considering resisting organized crime. They are eager to maintain their ability to operate in light of decentralization and the upcoming local elections. Some are rumored to be running for local office.

Key Points for Facilitators Electoral Security Case Study Votopia

The fictional case study of Votopia is designed to give participants experience developing programs, including analyzing patterns from past elections to project forward, in environments that have a history of democratic elections. Although Votopia is a stable country, it is subject to violence surrounding elections, in large part due to the nature of the government and political party interactions which encourage winning at any price. Organized crime surrounding opium cultivation is also beginning to play a role in Votopian politics. Although not overtly stated in the case study, it is evident that there is little real political will in the government to change a system that provides significant rewards to those in power.

Votopia is modeled primarily on Bangladesh, with significant elements drawn from the Elections Security Assessment case study. The case study also includes some elements from the Colombia Electoral Security Assessment.

USAID has been in Votopia since it declared independence from Mysay in 1971 as a result of religious and ethnic divides. Votopia was backed by neighboring country Ruffemup in their bid for independence. To this day, the neighboring country of Mysay continues to back the Mysay minority in Votopia and radical groups in Ruffemup provide training to members of the Islamic-based political party – SLAP.

Within a year of independence, Votopia adopted a constitution and parliamentary system of governance based on the model of the former colonizer, Supremestan. Electoral stakes are very high, as this system creates a strong executive Prime Minister elected by the parliamentary majority, resulting in a very powerful leader with few checks and balances on the ruling party.

The electoral system is plurality / majority – First Past the Post (FPTP). It is a single member constituency electoral system with more than 300 elected members, meaning that Votopia is divided into 300 constituencies. Each voter constituency then has one vote that can be used for the candidate of their choice. The candidate with the most votes is elected as the Member of Parliament for that constituency. The party with the most Members of Parliament forms the government.

Despite the election of a charismatic independence leader as the first Prime Minister, economic conditions in Votopia continue to decline. Eventually, the Prime Minister is assassinated by a Votopian military officer and, per the constitution, the Justice of the Supreme Court is appointed to the position of Chief Advisor of a caretaker government until elections can be held.

Although subsequent elections are deemed largely free and fair by the international community, they are marred by violence targeting political party members and supporters, but also occasionally the Mysay minority living in Votopia. All parties employ inflammatory actions including boycotts and street violence. Although they deny it, it is well known that the political parties all have associated militia groups funded by Diaspora and neighboring countries.

The Votopian military is largely considered professional, and tends to have a dampening effect on violence. The police force, on the other hand, is widely regarded as corrupt and poorly trained.

Although in the past the Votopia Electoral Commission (VEC) has not been considered impartial and professional by citizens, there may be a window of opportunity to change this perception. The VEC Secretariat has recently been removed from the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's office and the term of current VEC executive members expires this year. New appointees will be announced in the coming

months by the MAL government. Of the twelve appointees, six will be nominated by MAL, four by the opposition parties (PLOP and SLAP) and two by major civil society groups. The Commission Chair will then be elected by the executive members.

There may also be a window of opportunity to enhance transparency and accountability surrounding elections by working with the newly formed Anti-corruption task force independent from the Office of the Prime Minister. The task force was established primarily to appease donor calls for increased transparency and accountability. It is unclear how much impact the task force will have. The head of the task force comes from the CSO community and is highly regarded, however, task force members are highly fragmented and have accomplished little, despite setting forth an ambitious three-year plan vowing to clean up public administration and depoliticize the police force.

The domestic court system in Votopia is largely in shambles and those with power and money are free to do as they please.

The CSO community in Votopia is quite sophisticated but highly politicized. The majority of CSOs, even student organizations, are aligned with political parties and share in the rents and patronage when their party wins. Likewise, traditional leaders are closely affiliated with political parties and there is a history of candidates bargaining with community elders councils to secure endorsements or even votes from the community. Media infrastructure in Votopia is relatively strong, but media in general is not very professionalized and has, at times, incited people to violence.

Political parties are driven by charismatic leaders who shape the parties to reflect their personalities and interests. The same individuals have held leadership positions for years, and do not hesitate to use violence, even within their own parties, to achieve their objectives. Women and youth are virtually unrepresented.

Restrictive eligibility requirements mean that few political parties participate in the electoral process and competition is limited. Once a party is registered, there are few checks and balances on how they govern themselves. The fragmented nature of political parties has led to openings for organized crime, centered around opium cultivation, production and trafficking, to enter politics. Organized crime interests have begun financing political party militias and candidates (there is no legislation on political finance at this time) in return for freedom to operate unimpeded under the party in power. Drug lords are rumored to be successfully winning local offices, as they are able to offer more basic services to communities than the government. In areas where financing and other incentives are not enough, they will resort to violence. Within the past year, Votopia has passed sweeping decentralization legislation. Although implementation is still in the early stages, local elections are becoming a very high-stakes undertaking.

SECTION 6

Session 6: Planning Overview and Small Group Exercise

Duration: 1 hour and 45 minutes

Overview:

This session provides an overview of planning considerations followed by a brief case study exercise where participants can apply planning skills to further refine their assessment findings.

Objectives:

- Recognize key actors and their interests in electoral security programming
- Understand the potential impact of international involvement in the electoral environment
- Understand how the interests and constraints of the USG and other actors shape electoral security programming priorities
- Apply planning skills to further refine assessment findings

Materials Needed:

- Power point slides for Planning
- Electoral Security Case Study Capture (handouts)
 - Planning Task
 - E-mail from Mission Director
 - Internal Memo - Annual Donor Coordination Workshop
- Electoral Security Case Study Votopia (handouts)
 - Planning Task
 - E-mail from Mission Director
 - Internal Memo - Annual Donor Coordination Workshop

Activities:

1. Planning (35 minutes)
 - Power point presentation
 - Question and answers
2. Electoral Security Planning Case Study Exercise (60 min)
 - Distribute case study handouts
 - Instruct participants to review additional materials and address the following given the new planning information:
 - Refine priority areas of intervention
 - Refine development hypothesis, if necessary
 - Refine program objectives, if necessary
 - Articulate a few key assumptions (*remember, critical assumptions are variables that are out of your control but that must hold true for the fulfillment of the development hypothesis*)
 - Record key points on flip chart
 - No report out but participants and trainers should be able to review key points on flip charts during break.

- **NOTE:** trainers - following processing when participants are on break quickly review flip charts to make sure no group is wildly off track and they have enough to move into the programming exercise.
3. Process of Case Study exercise Part 2 (10 min)
- Participants will not formally report out but are asked to leave their flip charts available during break so people can circulate and take a look
 - Points for processing this session may include:
 - What are some of the things you found out that had an impact on your programming priorities and development hypothesis? How did you change your priorities / hypothesis in light of this new information?
 - Was there additional information that you felt you still needed?
 - How did you prioritize areas of intervention given diverse interests and constraints of USG and international actors?
 - What was the most challenging part of this exercise?
 - Can you envision using a similar approach in the field? Why or why not?
 - What was the most useful / helpful part of this exercise? The least?
 - Conclusions and reflections on the exercise.

Optional Additions/Variations:

Participants may need the processing time (activity #3) to finish the task. If so, processing the Planning session can be combined with processing of the Programming section (Session 7) by beginning the discussion by asking participants how their ideas changed once they got the additional information (the first bullet in activity #3 above).

Handouts:


- Electoral Security Case Study Capture
 - Planning Task
 - E-mail from Mission Director
 - Internal Memo - Annual Donor Coordination Workshop
- Electoral Security Case Study Votopia
 - Planning Task
 - E-mail from Mission Director
 - Internal Memo - Annual Donor Coordination Workshop

Participant Resources (CD):

- Planning Power point slides
- List of websites (organizations referenced in Planning slides)
- Compendium of International Standards for Elections

Facilitator Notes and Slides: Planning

Slide 1: Cover slide



Slide 2: Planning Approach

- We began by conducting an electoral security assessment. During this process, we identified the broad conflict dynamics, mitigating factors, and vulnerabilities and opportunities. We then undertook an analysis of key state and non-state stakeholders.
- Using this information, we identified priority areas for intervention and formulated an initial development hypothesis. These areas are based purely on an electoral needs assessment within the country context and do not factor in other possible opportunities and constraints. We use this approach to ensure that we are designing programs around electoral security needs as opposed to designing around constraints.
- This brings us to planning. Now that we have identified the areas of greatest need in relation to electoral security, it is important to vet these areas and refine them in light of three key factors:
 - Local change agents – where do local interests and abilities (political will and access to change agents) align with promoting electoral security?
 - The international community – who is there and what are they doing?
 - USAID interests and constraints – how do we as a donor best target our limited resources?
- Once we have addressed these considerations, we should arrive at:
 - Priority areas of intervention (refined in light of planning findings)
 - An updated development hypothesis and corresponding program objectives reflecting the selected areas of intervention and desired outcomes
 - A coordination approach for working with other domestic and international stakeholders, if necessary.


ASSESSMENT	Local Change Agents (Planning)	International Community (Planning)
Priority areas of intervention based on country context and initial development hypothesis		USAID Interests and Constraints (Planning)
PLANNING Refined areas of intervention, updated development hypothesis and program objectives		PLANNING Approach for coordinating with domestic and international stakeholders

Tell participants that a list of web addresses for all organizations referenced in the planning section is in the "Planning" section of their cd.

Slide 3: Local Change Agents

- Before we complete our consideration of the local context and actors – most of which was undertaken during the assessment phase, there is one additional element that we need to factor in – local change agents.

- There are three characteristics that we can use to identify local change agents – political will and access to those individuals / organizations; absorptive capacity; and the ability to affect change. Or, if we think about it another way, when considering an organization or individual, ask:
 - Do they want to do it? And if so, do we have access to them?
 - Can they do it?
 - If they do it, will it mean anything?



- **Political will:** do they want to do it?
 - Which organizations or individual interests are consistent with supporting electoral security?
 - Are they willing to work with international organizations / USAID?
 - If they are willing to work with international organizations / USAID, do we have access to work with them? For example, the Electoral Commission may have an interest in working with USAID, but may be blocked from doing so by the government. In Zimbabwe, there may be individuals in government interested in working with USAID on reform, but access to these individuals is likely to be limited and may endanger their safety.
- In addition to political will, we also need to factor in the **absorptive capacity** of these organizations or individuals: can they do it?
 - Are they receiving significant resources from other international donors to implement election-related programs?
 - If so, do they have the capacity to effectively manage multiple programs? Are they in a position to take on more?
 - If not, do they have the capacity to receive and implement USAID assistance in a manner that is fiscally compliant and can they achieve desired programmatic milestones?
- Finally, in the event that political will and absorptive capacity exist, we need to consider the ability of the organization or individual to **affect positive change**: if they do it – will it mean anything?
 - Are they able to play the political game in a way that can affect the outcome? Are they credible?
 - Do they have resources and organizational capacity to meaningfully affect electoral security?
 - If we decide to work with lower level judges but they continue to receive political pressure to rule on cases a certain way from their superiors, is this the best place to invest our limited resources to affect meaningful change?

Slide 4: Role of the International Community in Elections

Now that we have completed our analysis of the domestic electoral security context, it is time to begin factoring in the role and priorities of the international actors.

To begin with, let's take a few minutes to talk about the role or function of the international community in elections. The characteristics of international involvement in elections will be defined by its mandate. Electoral mandates can come from:

- UN resolutions
- Terms of peace agreements
- Invitations from host countries

Taking into consideration different sources of electoral mandates, what different roles might the international community play during the election cycle? (Note matrix in participant notebooks)

 Role of the International Community in Elections
<p>Possible roles or functions of the international community during the election cycle:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electoral supervision • Electoral administration • Electoral verification • Electoral certification • Technical assistance • International observation • Electoral mediation

- **Elections supervised by the international community** – usually through a UN resolution, or peace agreement. Supervision generally refers to final word in formulating the rules and certifying the outcomes. Often done by the UN (Namibia) but also OSCE (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996). In this scenario internationals may or may not have representation and vote on the EMB. Supervision alone (without administration) is not very frequent
- **Elections administered by the international community** – also through a UN resolution or peace agreement. Administration is distinguished from supervision – the former refers to full operational responsibility (Cambodia 1992, E. Timor 1999, Kosovo) whereas the latter refers to full supervisory authority over the process, but not necessarily the administrative responsibilities (Namibia).
- **Verification of elections** is mandated through a UN resolution. UN verification missions do not have any legally binding power, but observe and verify the legitimacy of the electoral process and compliance of electoral authorities with regulations (Nicaragua, Haiti, Angola, South Africa, Liberia). Verification was conducted mostly in the 1990s but has now been replaced by certification processes adapted to the electoral context.
- The UN has conducted **certification of elections** focused on approving the policy and practices of the national election authority, or other aspects of the electoral process as specified in the mandate (East Timor 1999 and Timor-Leste 2006). Certification brings with it a stronger enforcement posture on the part of the UN than verification. Certification is used relatively infrequently.
- **Technical assistance** may be provided at the request of a domestic electoral stakeholder to assist with the conduct of an election. This is a flexible approach that can offer a wide range of assistance options – training, expertise, provision of commodities, etc. the objectives of providing technical assistance focus on capacity building, compliance with international norms and standards, and support for long-term sustainability and knowledge transfer in anticipation of future elections (Albania, Indonesia, Iraq, Russia)
- **International observation.** These missions are composed of neutral parties (multilateral, bilateral or private) that assess aspects of the electoral process against universal standards for democratic elections. International observers should be complemented by domestic civil society and political party observer initiatives.

- **Electoral mediation.** An impartial third party employs non-official election dispute resolution mechanisms. (Nicaragua, Kenya)

It is important to understand the role of the international community in the context of any given country electoral context. This will provide a foundation for coordination with other international and host country actors, as well as affect the latitude and scope of USAID involvement.

- For example, the international community will likely play a larger role when elections are supervised by the UN, versus scenarios where the international community is providing technical support to the host country government in administering and managing the elections process.

The role of the international community will also have implications for program sustainability and integrating approaches to building local capacity.

- For example, if elections are UN supervised, local capacity building with an eye towards future elections will require additional emphasis than if elections are administered and managed by the host country with international support.

Slide 5: Impact of International Community Involvement

Reflecting on the possible role of the international community in the context of elections, what impact might international involvement have, both intended and unintended?

- **Intended impact:**
 - International presence may limit violence helping to create the security conditions necessary to allow elections / democratization to move forward
 - Help to prevent gross irregularities and widespread fraud – particularly important in environments of high distrust and antagonism
 - Strengthen the legitimacy of nascent democratic groups
- **Possible unintended impact:**
 - Support for political parties may reinforce social divisions – especially if political parties are drawn along ethnic lines or on the basis of other dividers
 - International presence may unintentionally lend legitimacy to uncompetitive elections (Ethiopia)
 - Perception of external manipulation of elections by US or others in the international community
 - Known manifestations of fraud or violence may change form and emerge elsewhere

Impact of International Community Involvement

Possible intended impact of international involvement:


- Limit violence to allow elections / democratization to move forward
- Prevent gross irregularities and widespread fraud
- Strengthen the legitimacy of nascent democratic groups

Possible unintended impact of international involvement:

- Political party support may reinforce social divisions and exacerbate conflicts
- May lend legitimacy to uncompetitive elections
- Perception of external manipulation of elections
- Known manifestations of fraud or violence may simply change form and emerge elsewhere

Slide 6: Planning: Who's Out There?

During the assessment section, we focused on host country actors and capacity. Now let's take a look at the international actors that may be providing different types of assistance throughout the electoral process.



Aside from USAID, it is not unusual to find the following types of organizations engaged in providing electoral support of various kinds:


- Other parts of the US Government, including Departments of Defense and State
- The United Nations
- Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations
- Other governments
- International NGOs
- Other organizations

The number of these organizations and their diverse interests and capacities can prove challenging to developing and coordinating integrated elections planning. However, understanding who is out there and what they are doing is a critical factor for refining the priorities for intervention that emerged from the assessment - both to avoid duplication and to better understand the limitations of the environment.

Slide 7: U.S. Agency for International Development

When developing electoral security programs, there are a number of actors that you will likely encounter, both in DC and the field. Within USAID, who are you likely to be working with on program design and development?


- Field mission
- The regional bureau / mission backstops
- DCHA/ Democracy and Governance
- DCHA/ Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management
- DCHA/ Office of Transition Initiatives
- DCHA / Office of Military Affairs
- DCHA / Office of Civilian Response
- Others? – FFP or OFDA if humanitarian crisis / IDPs



Slide 8: Other U.S. Government

What about other US Government presence that may impact the design of electoral security programming?

- **State Department.** This may include:
 - Embassy - in-country policy guidance
 - Regional bureaus – backstop post and policy development
 - Political and Military Affairs (PM) Bureau - DDR and SSR as related to peacekeeping operations
 - International Organizations (IO) Bureau - US contributions to peacekeeping missions
 - Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) Bureau
 - Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) Bureau – refugee reintegration
 - Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) – interagency coordination and development of interagency strategic plans
 - Public Diplomacy – public information, exchange programs



- International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau - security / justice environment
- **Department of Justice.** This may include:
 - International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) – police training - work with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism
 - Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) – assisting prosecutors and judicial personnel to develop and sustain effective criminal justice institutions.
- **Department of Defense.** Will vary depending on whether or not there are “boots on the ground”. Note that OMA serves as a liaison between USAID and Department of Defense. Actors may include:
 - The Defense Liaison Officer at the Embassy who deals with military to military relationships. The would be the ones most involved in any military to military assistance for elections
 - Combatant Commands (COCOMS)
 - Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
- **Other USG actors** may include:
 - National Security Council (NSC) – represents the highest political and policy level entity of the inter-agency chaired by the President. The NSC is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials.
 - US Congress – can mandate electoral assistance to a particular country and block assistance. Through shifts in priorities, Congress has the power to restructure allocations in order to facilitate or impede electoral assistance

Slide 9: United Nations and Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations

What about parts of the United Nations and regional organizations that may be undertaking electoral programming?

- **United Nations** – note UN movement towards more integrated missions that more directly link security and conflict management, human rights, humanitarian, development and democratization efforts into a common country-level plan and an HQ and on-the-ground set of processes for coordination. See “Note from the Secretary General” Guidance on Integrated Missions, 9 February 2006.
 - UN Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) – part of the Department of Political Affairs - may work directly or through UNDP or peace keeping operations
 - UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UN DPKO) – provides election security and mission management – both international military and civilian police
 - UN Development Program (UNDP) – funds projects - may manage a trust fund

 USAID <small>FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE</small>	United Nations and Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations
<p><u>United Nations:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNEAD – Electoral Assistance Division • UN DPKO – Department of Peace Keeping Operations • UNDP – Development Program • UNV - Volunteers • UNOPS – Office for Project Services 	
<p><u>Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AU – African Union • OAS – Organization of American States • EU - European Union • OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe • SADC - Southern Africa Development Community • COE – Council of Europe • League of Arab States • OIC - Organization of the Islamic Conference • CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States 	

- UN Volunteers – provide international election officers that serve as an international presence at registration sites and polling stations basically overseeing the management of the polls.
- UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) – provides logistical services
- **Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations** – often play a constructive role by providing a set of professional standards and common principles for what constitutes free and fair elections and may address key issues of conflict prevention. For examples, refer to the *Compendium of International Standards for Elections*. A cautionary note – while contextually valuable, in some cases, regional standards may fall short of international standards for free and fair elections.
 - African Union (AU)
 - Organization of American States (OAS) – Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation
 - European Union (EU)
 - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)– Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
 - Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
 - Council of Europe – see evaluation of elections guide. www.venice.coe.int
 - League of Arab States – limited election observation
 - Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) – limited election observation
 - Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – election observation
 - Others not listed include la Francophonie, and the Commonwealth.

Slide 10: Governments, NGOs, and Others

What about other governments, international NGOs and other organizations that you might come across?

- **Other governments** may provide funding and technical expertise either directly or through non-governmental implementers. Governments that have been involved in global elections include:
 - From North America – Canada and Mexico. Elections Canada maintains a large pool of electoral experts available for contracting.
 - South America – Brazil
 - Africa – South Africa
 - Australia – the Australian Elections Commission (usually funded by AusAid) focuses much of their work on the Asia / Pacific region. Developed BRIDGE training www.bridge-project.org with the UN, International IDEA and IFES. BRIDGE is a modularized professional development program designed to build local capacity to undertake electoral processes.
 - Asia – India and Japan
 - And several European countries – Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
- **NGOs** often implement programs funded by bi-laterals or may have other programs running independently. Some of the more prominent NGOs providing election-related assistance include:



USAID **Governments, NGOs, and Others**

Other Governments:

- North America – Canada, Mexico
- South America – Brazil
- Africa – South Africa
- Australia
- Asia – India, Japan
- Europe – Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

NGOs:

- International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)
- Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA)
- Electoral Reform International Services (ERIS)
- Bureau for Institutional Reform and Democracy (BIRD)

Others:

- International IDEA
- Election Management Associations

- International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) based in the US
- Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) – conducts programs that directly link conflict prevention and elections assistance www.eisa.org.za
- Electoral Reform International Services (ERIS) based in the UK
- Bureau for Institutional Reform and Democracy (BIRD) based in Germany
- **Others:**
 - International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) www.idea.int is a 25 member state organization focused on enhancing knowledge and elections administration capacity worldwide
 - Election Management Associations (EMAs) may be national, regional, or international in scope and provide assistance and observers. Some of these bodies meet occasionally as part of the Global Election Official (GEO) Network.

Slide 11: Importance of Coordination

When assessing the different actors and their respective contributions to electoral security programming, consider how activities are (or are not) being coordinated.

Depending on coordination mechanisms already in place, there may be a convening or leadership role for USAID at different levels:



Importance of Coordination

Potential coordination needs and opportunities:

- Coordination of key international community actors
 - Working level
 - Diplomatic level
- Coordination with the military and police
- Coordination within the U.S. Government
- Coordination with local actors

- **Coordination of key international community actors.**
 - In many cases, the UN acts as the lead coordinating body for the international community, but USAID may play a key leadership and coordinating role either bilaterally or as a member of the UN-led core group.
 - In other cases, there may not be a UN presence or the coordination function may be absent.
 - Coordination with other international actors is critical for ensuring unity of message and avoiding duplication of financial and technical assistance
 - Coordination should begin as early as possible so that donors with constraints can earmark funds for areas that they can support.
 - Coordination should be undertaken at two levels:
 - Routine working-level coordination
 - High level diplomatic committee to ensure that important policy issues are discussed and decisions made. This group may help to mediate disputes and broker compromises among political factions.
- **Coordination with the military and police:**
 - Coordination with a U.S.-led coalition, or international peacekeepers (military and civilian police), and national military and police forces. Increasingly this coordination among civilians and military during elections is facilitated by Joint Elections Operations Centers.
 - Coordination is important for mapping a country’s election risk profile, allocating security assets accordingly, and informing civilians (including elections observers) about the mission and rules of engagement of both the military and police.

- **Coordination within the US Government:**
 - US Government coordination will likely involve:
 - Embassy Political Section
 - USAID Democracy Office
 - Public Diplomacy Office
 - Defense Liaison Officer
 - A similar group should be formed in Washington
 - These groups should meet regularly to coordinate and share information on strategy, main activities, responsibilities, timelines, and changing environmental circumstances.


- **Coordination with local actors:**
 - During the assessment (step 1) and from past programming, USAID will have relationships with local actors engaged in the electoral cycle. It is important to bring these actors into the planning process to ensure that proposed activities are relevant and meaningful. Joint planning may also serve as a capacity building activity for local organizations. Remember that national military and police forces may also have a role with local civilian organizations in the context of coordinated electoral security.

Slide 12: USAID Interests and Constraints

In addition to the other factors we have discussed, when planning electoral security programs, USAID will need to consider donor interests and constraints.

Any idea what some of these might be?

- **Interests:**
 - US Government Foreign Policy
 - What are the overall US Government foreign policy objectives in this country? Elections tend to be high profile events that capture the attention of policy makers. It is likely that the Embassy will play a significant role in design and implementation.
 - USAID Comparative Advantage
 - What area(s) is USAID particularly strong in, versus those that are often left to other donors? Where can USAID have a substantive contribution in light of existing or planned electoral security programming?
 - Current Programs
 - Are there opportunities to leverage current mission activities or activities of other donors that would advance USAID's planned program? Are there ongoing initiatives that intersect with electoral security that USAID can build on – for example, the networks and training provided under an existing civil society capacity building program or judicial reform initiatives.
 - Demonstrate Results
 - When undertaking high profile, politically charged activities like electoral support, there is often heightened scrutiny and the need to demonstrate rapid, tangible results.



The need to deliver results may be an issue that should be factored into program planning. If planned interventions will take longer to demonstrate results, it may be useful to include some activities that will yield more immediate outputs or outcomes.

Example: In one African country, the Ambassador wanted international election observers – a high profile activity with immediate results, but very costly. Upon conducting an electoral security assessment, the team concluded that improving electoral security was contingent on strengthening the role of civil society organizations in elections – a much longer-term type of intervention. The team knew that bringing in international observers would take most of the program budget, leaving little else for other activities. So, they proposed a compromise. Rather than international observers, the team suggested using regional observers from the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). This solution ensured quick results, while also strengthening regional capacity to undertake electoral observation missions. There were also sufficient funds remaining to focus on strengthening the capacity of civil society to play a meaningful role in election security, a longer-term, sustainable approach.

- **Constraints:**

- Legal Considerations

- In addition to abiding by statutory language in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 116(e)), there may be additional restrictions on foreign aid or sanctions against certain countries resulting from violations of loan repayment requirements, human rights conventions, nuclear non-proliferation pacts or acts of war
- This does not necessarily preclude assistance, but USAID will need to seek special approval or waivers


- Budget and sources of funding

- The amount of resources (budget) available will have an impact on your planning. What can realistically be done with the amount of money that you have?
- In addition, the source of funding may have implications for program planning. For example, while Development Assistance (DA) funds usually come from USAID, Economic Support Funds (ESF) comes from State – and they may want some involvement in how the money is spent. State’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, as well as the regional bureau may be involved
- In cases where there are urgent and unexpected Election and Political Processes (EPP) needs for which a Mission’s current operating year budget (OYB) cannot sufficiently address, the DCHA/DG Office manages a special EPP Fund.
- The EPP fund is intended to address urgent or unanticipated needs such as snap elections, coups, transitional justice, power sharing arrangements or post-elections violence. Funds are awarded using a competitive process in which applications are required to meet at least two of the following three criteria: the proposed program 1) is unique and innovative, 2) addresses snap elections or other unanticipated needs. and 3) has the ability to have a significant and measurable impact. EPP funds are usually transferred out to the field for use in new or existing mechanisms. The work is mostly in USAID presence countries and the money is not earmarked specifically or solely for crisis response, it can be used to respond to events before they reach the crisis stage.

- Mission Capacity
 - Does the mission have the capacity to take on the activities that you are planning? If it is very management intensive and mission staff is stretched very thin, you may need to consider other options.

Slide 13: Reevaluating Priority Areas

- Analysis of planning variables will likely lead to a reprioritization of areas for USAID intervention.
- At the end of the planning step, you should be able to identify your key areas of intervention, refine your development hypothesis and critical assumptions, and establish a USAID program objective(s). You should also be thinking about associated indicators at the objective level.
- You should have also identified a coordination approach in line with coordination needs and opportunities at different levels.
- You are now ready to move on to Electoral Security Programming





Electoral Security Planning

May 24, 2010

When you arrive at work and open your morning e-mail, you find a message forwarded to you by the DG team lead. The message is from the Mission Director, Mya Lection, providing an update on her recent meeting with Ambassador Ivanna Vote. Attached to the e-mail is a copy of an internal memo providing an overview of international community activities in Capture based on the *Annual Donor Coordination Workshop* hosted by the US Embassy on April 15.

The team lead forwarded the e-mail to you, assuming that the additional information would be helpful as you conduct the Electoral Security Assessment. Indeed, you are now able to:

1. Refine priority areas of intervention
2. Refine your development hypothesis
3. Refine your program objectives; and
4. Articulate a few critical assumptions.

Remember – critical assumptions are variables that are out of your control but that must hold true for the fulfillment of your development hypothesis.

You record your findings (above) on a flip chart to present to the rest of the team. You are now prepared to impress them at Wednesdays planning meeting!



E-mail – High Importance!!!

From: Mya Lection, Mission Director
Date: May 24, 2010
Time: 7:20 am
To: USAID/Office Directors
Subject: New Electoral Security Program
Attachment: Annual International Donor Coordination Workshop Internal Memo

I met yesterday with Ambassador Ivanna Vote to brief her on the status of preparations for our new electoral security program. Ambassador Vote was pleased to hear that we are starting early and is looking forward to reviewing our proposed program. She provided me with an internal memo (attached) summarizing the *Annual International Donor Coordination Workshop* and pointed out the importance of focusing on areas of USAID comparative advantage and not duplicating other donor programs.

As we commence our planning process, Ambassador Vote reiterated the importance of maintaining program flexibility in this rapidly changing political and social environment. She reminds us that the overriding interest of the U.S. Government in Capture is to support creation of new institutions and a society that is prepared for the challenges of statehood.

The Ambassador was clear that the world will be watching the elections in Capture. The extensive CNN coverage of the post-referendum violence and ensuing peace agreement have ensured that Congress and the American people want to know what is being done for the citizens of Capture. Congressional delegations have been coming to Capture to assess progress – even though the ink is barely dry on the peace agreement! In short, our planning had better be sound and produce results that the American people and Congress can be proud of – and the quicker the better!

When I met with the Ambassador, she had just returned from a country team meeting. She emphasized that stability surrounding upcoming elections in Capture is becoming more of a concern. Lack of economic growth opportunities, high illiteracy, very limited basic infrastructure, and a severe shortage of skilled public administration professionals required to strengthen nascent public institutions leave Capture highly vulnerable to conflict.

Looking forward, US assistance will focus on:

- 1) Supporting Capture's transition to full independence by strengthening democratic institutions;
- 2) Supporting on-going stability in capture;
- 3) Increasing opportunities for economic growth and job creation.

In the spirit of partnership with the interim government of Capture, it is important to keep in mind that they are in the process of working with donors to create a National Development Plan (NDP). Although it is far from being finalized, based on initial meetings, the NDP will likely focus on poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth. Key areas of interest include:

- 1) Reconstruction and maintenance of basic infrastructure;
- 2) Revitalization of agriculture which provides livelihood to the majority of the population;
- 3) Private sector growth, macroeconomic stability, job creation to reduce unemployment, and financial institutions with prudent fiscal management;
- 4) Development of an effective administrative and governance structure to serve the peoples' interests;
- 5) Increased citizen participation in governance, oversight institutions and transparency;
- 6) Emphasis on preventive health care and clinical support in underserved areas.

I look forward to discussing upcoming electoral security ideas further during our first planning meeting on Wednesday. Our new DG Officer will be providing findings from a preliminary Electoral Security Assessment. As our planning evolves, we will also begin sharing our program ideas with the Ambassador and others at the monthly country team meetings.

Internal Memo - USAID
Annual Donor Coordination Workshop
April 15, 2010

Representatives of international organizations working in Capture recently gathered for the first annual Donor Coordination Workshop hosted by the U.S. Government. Ambassador Ivanna Voté opened the workshop. The following notes summarize activities currently underway by the international community in Capture.

U.S. Government

Following the signing of the peace agreement in late 2008, the U.S. Government (along with several other diplomatic missions) opened an Embassy in Capture. Since then, we have employed a flexible programming approach to rapidly address the myriad needs of Capture and its citizens. We are in the process of developing an interim country strategy, and our programs continue to evolve to meet rapidly evolving circumstances.

The majority of U.S. Government development-oriented initiatives undertaken today in Capture are led by USAID. Currently, USAID and other U.S. Government programming includes:

Peace and Security – U.S. assistance is primarily provided by the Department of State and Department of Justice / ICITAP with a focus on returning Capture to a peaceful and secure nation through security sector reform and stabilization operations.

- Providing training to security services to support a non-partisan, competent and professional military;
- Supporting and advising police as law enforcement institutions are reconstituted. This will include capacity building and organizational reform, while incorporating crisis management and human rights training. These activities are undertaken in coordination with other donors and UNCAPIM.

Governing Justly and Democratically – USAID is supporting efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and establish the foundations of good governance. Specifically, programs include:

- Supporting the drafting of a new constitution;
- Using small grants to support civil society strengthening, community stabilization, and economic recovery (USAID Office of Transition Initiatives);
- Diversifying and strengthening media outlets to improve delivery of high quality information. This includes expanding the quality and reach of public broadcasting, and improving access of citizens, particularly in rural areas, to reliable information;

Investing in People – The USAID/Health team is focused improving access to basic health services. Specifically, programs include:

- Supporting expansion of cooperatives and health clinics to increase access to basic health services in rural areas;
- Collaborating with NGOs, religious leaders, and faith based organizations to establish outreach, testing, counseling, treatment and care services for populations with HIV/AIDS.

Economic Growth – The USAID/Economic Growth team is focused on revitalizing the local economy and combating the extreme poverty that grips Capture. Nearly two-thirds of the population live below the poverty line. The poor, living mostly in rural areas, rely on subsistence agriculture and have little access to basic infrastructure and services such as clean water,

electricity, education, health care and sanitation. Donor presence and reconstruction programs have provided some boost to the economy, but this cannot be relied on in the long-term. Although oil and gas reserves have been identified off the coast of Capture, some of this water is claimed by Lynwait and negotiations are currently underway. Specific USAID programs include:

- Job creation through reconstruction and improvement of buildings and rehabilitation of small infrastructure;
- Developing land titling and registration policies and laws including studies and assessments of key land issues and technical assistance;
- Creation of rural cooperatives including women representing one-third of total membership. Cooperatives support small farmers efforts to increase production and processing of organic and fair trade certified coffee and establish viable marketing channels for export.

Humanitarian Assistance – USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Office of Food for Peace (FFP) have both been active in Capture since the post-referendum violence. In particular, efforts are focused on IDP camps and promoting basic food security amongst other vulnerable populations including women, children, the elderly and disabled.

International Community

Aside from the work of the U.S. Government, several other multi-lateral organizations and governments are supporting programs in Capture. More than 50 countries and international agencies, including the U.S. Government, provided \$900 million for reconstruction, humanitarian support and development assistance. A significant amount of these funds have been channeled into two trust funds:

- Capture Reconstruction Undertaking for Development (CRUD) is administered by the World Bank for reconstruction projects across sectors including economic management, health, education, community empowerment, agriculture and infrastructure;
- Governance Improvement Funds Trust (GIFT) is administered by UNCAPIM. GIFT pays for the administrative costs of the government, including salaries for government workers such as teachers and health care workers. GIFT also funds democracy and governance projects that develop the capacity of Capturites to guide the future direction of their new country.

All decisions made regarding the trust funds are undertaken in consultation with the interim government.

In addition, other donor activities include:

Peace and Security

- UNDP is working on creating a police training college as part of a broader effort to restructure and reform the Capture police force including vetting and certification of personnel;
- UNCAPIM is supporting the interim government with a sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program for all armed groups, as well as weapons control and public security measures;
- UNCAPIM peace keeping forces continue to assist with the restoration and maintenance of rule of law, public safety and public order through support to the police and re-establishment of the corrections system;
- European Commission is supporting security sector reform efforts and providing senior advisors to assist with the reconstitution of military institutions, including organizational reform and capacity building.

Governing Justly and Democratically

- EC will support the interim government of Capture to organize and conduct out free and fair parliamentary elections in 2012 through the provision of technical, logistical and administrative assistance to the newly formed Capture Election Commission;
- UNCAPIM will continue to report on the human rights situation including the status of returning refugees and internally displaced persons;
- AUSAID/Australia is providing assistance with judicial training, institution building, and promoting of rule of law. This includes training judges and prosecutors, assisting with revisions of the legal code, and supporting the role of the judiciary branch as an independent arm of government;
- AUSAID/Australia is funding a program to facilitate voting in the upcoming elections by refugee populations via commodity support for mobile ballot boxes and support for electoral law provisions allowing special ID and registration considerations for refugees;
- CIDA/Canada is undertaking a civic education and outreach project to encourage citizen involvement in democratic governance;
- DFID/UK is establishing a department of public administration at the University of Capture, located in the capital city;
- UNDP is funding an establishment of an independent radio station and newspaper.

Investing in People

- UNICEF is supporting non-formal education for out of school youth;
- Danida/Denmark is providing shelter and skills to socially vulnerable women and supporting CSOs that provide health services to poor people in urban areas;
- DFID/UK is focused on HIV/AIDs and reproductive health care, hospital management and medical education.
- AUSAID/Australia is working with local organizations to build their capacity to improve literacy among youth and adults;
- World Bank is working to improve the quality of formal education, secondary education and reintegration of child drop-outs into the formal system
- The European Commission through the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) is providing funds for rehabilitation of school water and sanitation systems.

Economic Growth

- CIDA/Canada is providing credit and basic business skills to entrepreneurs;
- The International Labour Organization is advising the interim government on the organization, structure, and staffing required to establish a Division of Labor and Social Services, including assistance setting up the first Employment Service Center.
- DFID/UK is providing technical expertise to coffee growers to improve production and access to export markets.
- AUSAID/Australia is providing technical assistance to assist farmers increase production and quality of crops both for export and domestic consumption. Crops include vanilla, rice, corn, soybean, cassava and sandalwood.

Humanitarian Assistance

- The UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) launched a consolidated appeal resulting in provision of humanitarian emergency response in Capture by the UNHCR, UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNDP and other UN Agencies.

- AUSAID/Australia is providing assistance to meet food and medical needs of displaced populations.

Donor Coordination:

All participants agreed on the usefulness of the annual donor coordination meetings and committed to continue meeting formally annually. Donors will also begin more informal meetings on a monthly basis to exchanging information.

Key Capturite Stakeholders

Participants at the workshop agreed that both state and non-state institutions are weak and need significant support to move the country towards a functioning democracy. Looking forward to the upcoming elections, which all agree may spark a return to violence, priority areas may include working to transition ex-combatant groups into fully functioning political parties; developing the capacity of civil society to play a meaningful role in participatory democracy; and restoring basic functions of government including provision of basic services and security for the citizens of Capture.

Electoral Security Planning

May 24, 2010

When you arrive at work and open your morning e-mail, you find a message forwarded to you by the DG team lead. The message is from the Mission Director, Dee Limit, providing an update on her recent meeting with Ambassador Les D. Ception. Attached to the e-mail is a copy of an internal memo providing an overview of international community activities in Votopia based on the *Annual Donor Coordination Workshop* hosted by the US Embassy on April 15.

The team lead forwarded the e-mail to you, assuming that the additional information would be helpful as you conduct the Electoral Security Assessment. Indeed, you are now able to:

1. Refine priority areas of intervention
2. Refine your development hypothesis
3. Refine your program objectives; and
4. Articulate a few critical assumptions.

Remember – critical assumptions are variables that are out of your control but that must hold true for the fulfillment of your development hypothesis.

You record your findings (above) on a flip chart to present to the rest of the team. You are now prepared to impress them at Wednesdays planning meeting!



E-mail – High Importance!!!

From: Dee Limit, Mission Director
Date: May 24, 2010
Time: 7:20 am
To: USAID/Office Directors
Subject: New Planning Cycle
Attachment: Annual International Donor Coordination Workshop Internal Memo

I met yesterday with Ambassador Les D. Ception to brief him on the status of preparations for our new USAID planning cycle. Ambassador Ception was pleased to hear that we are starting so early and is looking forward to reviewing our draft planning documents. He provided me with an internal memo (attached) summarizing the *Annual International Donor Coordination Workshop* and pointed out the importance of focusing on areas of USAID comparative advantage and not duplicating other activities already underway.

As we commence our planning process, Ambassador Ception reiterated the importance of strategically focusing our limited resources to have the greatest impact in this rapidly evolving policy environment. He reminds us that the overriding interests of the U.S. Government in Votopia are to promote political stability and economic growth.

He has recently come from a country team meeting and emphasized that stability in Votopia is becoming more of a concern. Extreme poverty, a long history of political turbulence, porous borders and sparsely governed regions in remote areas leave this nation vulnerable to extremism. In addition, we are seeing more instances of interference in domestic issues by neighboring countries, coupled with a recent rise in transborder trafficking of illicit drugs. Together, these threaten to destabilize Votopia even further.

Looking forward, US assistance will support a partnership with the Government and citizens of Votopia to strengthen state and non-state institutions in support of fostering a democratic and secure nation. So, as we embark on a new four year planning cycle, be mindful of the following US Government concerns:

- 1) Worsening security conditions caused by a general deterioration in governance, law and order (particularly, recent backsliding on indicators of transparency and corruption);
- 2) Rising political violence, particularly as elections draw nearer;
- 3) Growing apprehensions about religious and political extremism.

In the spirit of partnership with the Government of Votopia, it is important to keep in mind their strategic interests as put forth in the recently updated Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The PRSP serves as a framework for Government of Votopia interaction with the donor community. It includes 7 priority areas:

- 1) employment;
- 2) nutrition;
- 3) maternal health;
- 4) quality education;
- 5) sanitation and safe water;
- 6) criminal justice;
- 7) local governance.

The PRSP also has two themes that cut across all aspects of the strategy: youth and gender. Today, youth comprise 40-50% of the population in Votopia. Many of them have a limited education and are unemployed. The PRSP also acknowledges that poverty reduction is unlikely to occur without the

empowerment of women and promotion of gender equality. Half of Votopian women have experienced at least one incidence of domestic violence in their lives.

Finally, Ambassador Ception lamented the rise of corruption in Votopia. Corruption is so pervasive that it threatens every aspect of Votopian society – political, economic and social. The Ambassador requests that all programs developed by USAID reflect approaches to addressing this pervasive impediment to development.

I look forward to discussing this further during our first planning meeting on Wednesday. Our new DG Officer will be providing findings from a preliminary Electoral Security Assessment. As our planning evolves, we will also begin sharing our program ideas with the Ambassador and others at the monthly country team meetings.

Internal Memo - USAID
Annual Donor Coordination Workshop
April 15, 2010

Representatives of international organizations working in Votopia recently gathered for the third annual Donor Coordination Workshop. The Workshop is an annual event that provides a forum for donors to share information about strategies and programs, and compare lessons learned and best practices gleaned from experience working in Votopia. Hosting the workshop is a rotating responsibility. This year, the US Government hosted, with Ambassador Les D. Ception opening the workshop. The following notes summarize activities currently undertaken by the international community in Votopia and speculate on possible opportunities to deepen collaboration with the government of Votopia.

U.S. Government

The U.S. Government has worked in partnership with the Government of Votopia since independence in 1970. Programs have evolved to accommodate the changing policy environment and the interests of the Government of Votopia and the U.S. Today, the U.S. Government works with multiple government and non-government stakeholders to promote Votopia's integration into the world economy and confront challenges to lasting peace and security.

The majority of development oriented initiatives undertaken today in Votopia are led by USAID. USAID is entering a new planning cycle and several of the current programs are scheduled to close-out in 2011. However, we envision many of them continuing with slight adjustment to reflect current U. S. Government priorities and those of the Government of Votopia as put forth in the recently revised Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP). Currently, USAID and other U.S. Government programming includes:

Peace and Security – U.S. assistance will help to improve capacity, increase awareness and establish strong partnerships to prevent terrorist activity, reject violent extremism, and protect Votopia's borders. Specifically, programs include:

- Enhancing cooperation with the Votopian military to provide training that emphasizes professionalism and civilian control and respects individual human rights;
- Working with the police, military, and civilian counterparts to increase capacity to monitor, detect and prevent potential terrorist activities as well as effectively control borders;
- Strengthening the capacity of local law enforcement and judiciary to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate financial crimes and money laundering.

Governing Justly and Democratically – The USAID/DG team continues work to support Votopia's ongoing transition to a fully functioning democracy by strengthening key democratic practices and institutions. Specifically, programs include:

- Promoting democratic decentralization – identifying roles and responsibilities of local government leaders and provide training to fulfill them;
- Advancing comprehensive anti-corruption reforms – working at the national level with select civil society organizations to build capacity to perform “watchdog” function;
- Providing limited support to democratic political parties – working to provide training on basic leadership skills to all political parties.
- Improving the capacity of parliamentary committees and staff – by providing technical assistance with legislative drafting and training.
- Encouraging civil society development including enhancing roles of key leaders and “voices of moderation” – primarily focused on creating networks and advocacy.

Investing in People – The USAID/Health team is focused on building local capacity to offer basic health services. Specifically, programs include:

- Encouraging voluntary family planning, maternal and child health care, and tuberculosis treatment;
- Combating the spread of HIV/AIDS and support for vulnerable populations;
- Supporting food-for-work and cash-for-work, and alternative income generation activities in seasonally food insecure areas

The USAID/Education team is working on improving the quality of basic education with a focus on early childhood education and improving parental participation in school management and operations.

Economic Growth – The USAID/Economic Growth team continues to struggle with the extreme poverty that continues to affect a large proportion of the population, half of whom survive on less than \$1 a day. Regulatory, institutional and infrastructure deficiencies significantly increase the costs of doing business. Profound lack of accountability, transparency and predictability in government operations frustrates economic growth and poverty reduction efforts. Programs are focused on increasing economic opportunities. Specific programs include:

- Training and skills building with a focus on youth and women;
- Expanding access to affordable electricity – which is prohibitively expensive for many and still unavailable in parts of Votopia – through changes in policy and law;
- Increasing agricultural diversification;
- Improving the Information and Communications (ICT) sector in Votopia. This is a relatively new program that has generated a lot of excitement. ICT has a 20% annual growth rate and is a major potential engine for job creation.

International Community

Aside from the work of the U.S. Government, several other multi-lateral organizations and governments are supporting programs in Votopia. These include:

Peace and Security

- JICA/Japan is providing radio equipment to the police;
- EC is providing peer-to-peer police training
- The Votopian military is participating in a series of NATO exercises to continue building their professionalism and technical knowledge.

Governing Justly and Democratically

- DFID/UK is providing support for financial management reform, public access to justice, and strengthening parliamentary committees in respect to planning and governance;
- SDC/Switzerland is supporting decentralization by promoting civil society participation and building the capacity of local governments to improve service delivery;
- The UN provides extensive technical assistance in the form of expert advice on the drafting of various critical laws, including those on political party financing, electoral dispute resolution;
- World Bank is working to improve public sector transparency with a focus on procurement reform.

Investing in People

- UNICEF is supporting non-formal education for out of school youth;

- Danida/Denmark is providing shelter and skills to socially vulnerable women and supporting CSOs that provide health services to poor people in urban areas;
- DFID/UK is focused on HIV/AIDs and reproductive health care, hospital management and medical education.
- World Bank is working in non-formal education, secondary education and outreach to child drop-outs.

Economic Growth

- CIDA/Canada is working with the government to implement a new policy for SME development and increase access to finance. They are also exploring public-private partnership opportunities;
- DFID/UK is focusing on private sector infrastructure development.
- World Bank is providing technical assistance to the energy sector and exploring private power generation;
- GTZ/Germany is working closely with the Votopia Chamber of Commerce to advocate for more accountable and transparent government and reform of key legislation to improve the investment environment;
- Norway is working on small enterprise development through provision of credit;
- European Commission is focused on improved agricultural diversification and supporting the Government of Votopia to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of seed and fertilizer distribution programs, and agricultural extension services.

Donor Coordination:

All participants agreed on the usefulness of the annual donor coordination meetings and agreed to begin also meeting more informally semi-annually to continue to share information.

Key Votopian Stakeholders

Participants at the workshop agreed that although the government is weak, and in cases unwilling to change, there are opportunities to work with influential individuals willing to move forward with change. One of the most interesting new developments may be the appointment of a new Chief Justice, Judge Putemaway. Many speculate that this is a move by the government to pacify donor concerns, similar to the creation of the Anti-corruption Task Force. Regardless, Judge Putemaway comes to the position as a government outsider and will be interesting to watch. Other institutions worth watching are the new VEC, once it is appointed, and the Anti-corruption Task Force.



SECTION 7

Session 7: Small Group Exercise: Designing An Electoral Security Program

Duration: 2 hours and 30 minutes

(does not include 1 hour lunch break between exercise and report out)

Overview:

Using the information from prior sessions, participants will design an electoral security program for their respective case study countries.

Objectives:

- Identify appropriate electoral security programming options in light of assessment and planning analysis.

Materials Needed:

- Electoral Security Case Study Capture Programming Task (handout)
- Electoral Security Case Study Votopia Programming Task (handout)
- Flip charts and markers for each small group

Activities:

1. Electoral Security Programming Case Study Exercise (75 min)

- Distribute programming task (handout) and review instructions to small groups:
 - In preparation for your team meeting, you draft the following agenda:
 - As a group, select 2-3 program objectives and design corresponding program activities.
 - Divide into small groups - each taking one program objective.
 - Each small group designs a program that will fulfill their respective objective. Note the following:
 - Elections are occurring in a year and a half. You will need to consider programs pre-, during, and post-election day. Not all programs need to, or should, run for the entire planning period (four years). Some programs undertaken in advance of elections may have limited application in the post-election period. Other programs may not begin until the post election period.
 - Identify key activities and their sequencing in relation to other activities.
 - Identify how the program fulfills program objectives and considerations relating to conflict dynamics.
 - Identify areas of intersection with programs being implemented by other international and domestic actors and within USAID as appropriate. Note possible opportunities to leverage these programs.
 - Come back together as a group and compare programs. Identify areas of intersection between programs and eliminate overlap.
 - Record findings, including:
 - Outline of program activities (for each objective) and sequencing

- How will activities fulfill program objectives / development hypothesis - what is the causal logic?
- How do these activities relate to overall conflict dynamics?
- Where do activities intersect with other US Government and international donor programs? How can these be leveraged?

3. Report Out on Case Study exercise Part 3 (60 min)

- Each group will have 15 minutes to present their program activities

4. Processing (15 min)

- Points for processing this session may include:
 - Note divergences / similarities among groups sharing the same case studies and explore how they got to different conclusions.
 - Why did you select these particular program activities? What was the logic?
 - What was the most challenging part of this exercise?
 - Can you envision using a similar approach in the field? Why or why not?
 - What was the most useful / helpful part of this exercise? The least?
 - Conclusions and reflections on the exercise.

Optional Additions/Variations:

- Report out can be time consuming and groups often use more than the 15 minutes allotted to explain their programs. If working with more than two small groups, an alternative approach to having each group formally report out is to conduct a gallery walk.

For a gallery walk, each group posts their program and one person from the group stays behind to answer questions while other members look at the work of other small groups. The person left with the group flip chart should switch every 10 or 15 minutes so that all group members have a chance to look at the work of their peers. When using this format, it is important for the trainers to visit each group and provide feedback on the programs identified. The group can then reconvene for processing. If using a gallery walk, a good way to begin processing is to ask if anyone modified their programs based on peer input.

Handouts:

- Electoral Security Case Study Capture Programming Task
- Electoral Security Case Study Votopia Programming Task

Participant Resources (CD):

Electoral Security Programming

June 1, 2010

You are a rising star at USAID/Capture! The DG team loved your Electoral Security Assessment presentation. Even Mya Lection, the Mission Director, stopped by to thank you. She suggested to the DG Team Lead that using your Electoral Security Assessment as a point of departure, you should take the lead on program design for the upcoming 2012 elections.

You have had several brief meetings with your Electoral Security program design team, but you are now getting ready for your first working meeting. You have set aside several hours to really begin thinking in depth about possible programs that meet the priority needs of Capture, while at the same time factoring in U.S. Government priorities, activities of other actors in the international community, and opportunities to have an impact on electoral security in relation to local actors and USAID comparative advantage.

The team has agreed that you will begin by programming in an environment that is not “resource constrained” and will then refine programs as the Mission gets a better idea of budget and staffing levels for the upcoming years.

In preparation for your team meeting, you draft the following agenda:

1. As a group, select 2-3 program objectives and design corresponding program activities.
2. Divide into small groups – each taking one program objective.
3. Each small group designs a program that will fulfill their respective objective. Note the following:
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 - c. Identify how the program fulfills program objectives and considerations relating to conflict dynamics.
 - d. Identify areas of intersection with programs being implemented by other international and domestic actors and within USAID as appropriate. Note possible opportunities to leverage these programs.
4. Come back together as a group and compare programs. Identify areas of intersection between programs and eliminate overlap.
5. Record findings, including:
 - a. Outline of program activities (for each objective) and sequencing
 - b. How will activities fulfill program objectives / development hypothesis – what is the causal logic?
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Electoral Security Programming

June 1, 2010

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SECTION 8

Session 8: Programming Overview

Duration: 45 minutes

Overview:

Once participants have had an opportunity to design a program, trainers will provide an overview of possible assessment findings and corresponding program options to address these findings.

Objectives:

- Understand the range of programming activities available given different contextual scenarios

Materials Needed:

- Power point slides for Programming

Activities:

1. Programming (45 minutes)

- Power point presentation conducted in interactive dialogue format. During the course of the presentation, trainers should relate specific program activities developed by participants to scenarios discussed in the slides.

Optional Additions/Variations:

Participant Resources (CD):

- Programming Power point slides
- Managing Assistance in Support of Political and Electoral Processes
- USAID Political Party Development Assistance
- USAID Political Party Assistance Policy




Facilitator Notes and Slides: Programming

Slide 1: Cover slide

Now you have had a chance to design a program for your country. Let's take a look at some of the scenarios you encountered, and other scenarios that you may find in your work designing electoral security programs.

Although we will be addressing these scenarios in the context of the assessment framework, keep in mind that activities should not be thought about in isolation. Seek out opportunities to leverage resources across activities (even those that do not fall within USAID or the DG portfolio) as feasible. For example, an EG program working with business associations may provide powerful allies for advancing electoral security in the interests of democratic consolidation.




Slide 2: An Integrated Approach to Electoral Security Programming

While designing your programs, many of you took an integrated approach to electoral security. As appropriate, you included activities that focused on the state stakeholders as well as non-state stakeholders – political parties, civil society, the media, etc.

By strengthening the capacity of both state and non-state stakeholders to address electoral security, activities and programs have the opportunity to be mutually reinforcing by:

- Mobilizing diverse stakeholders
- Creating checks and balances; and
- Increasing both the supply and demand for electoral security.



Electoral security activities undertaken by state stakeholders are legitimized, empowered, and controlled by a legal framework.

Electoral security activities undertaken by non-state stakeholders focus more on values-based approaches to peaceful competition and post-election reconciliation. Unlike state stakeholder activities, non-state stakeholder approaches are undertaken because “it is the right thing to do” rather than – because it is the law.

What were some of the non-state stakeholder “values-based” activities that you identified for your programs in the prior exercise?

Can you think of additional types of activities involving non-state stakeholders?

- Multi-stakeholder forums and consultations to prepare for a public campaign
- Electoral assistance groups whose members volunteer to serve as poll workers or monitors
- Peace campaigns conducted by civil society organizations
- Religious and cultural leaders' forums

- Traditional leaders forums
- Strategic leadership development and training

Both state and non-state stakeholder enforcement initiatives can also provide opportunities to engage, empower or give voice to traditionally marginalized or under-represented groups such as women, youth, the disabled, etc.

The following slides address some of the different scenarios that you may encounter when designing electoral security programs. To the extent possible we will try to address both state and non-state enforcement approaches to electoral security.

Slide 3: Inadequate Legal Framework

Just a reminder, the legal framework for electoral security includes legislation and regulations that govern the responsibilities of the EMB, political behaviors of electoral contestants, representation, obligations for media organizations and the use of force by security agents, as well as assigning penalties and sanctions.

In the event that your programming priority is to address an inadequate legal framework for elections, what options might you consider?

USAID **Inadequate Legal Framework**

If, there is an inadequate electoral legal framework...

Consider.....

- Technical assistance for legislative and regulatory drafting (or assisting with the amendment process)
- Assisting with constitutional design or reform
- Training in legislative and regulatory drafting
- Assessment of election system performance / auditing election laws
- Providing legal information / advice
- Facilitate adoption of "codes of conduct"

Technical assistance – In the event of inadequate legal framework, a common option is to provide technical assistance to those drafting legislation and regulations. In some cases it may be the legislative arm of the government, in others drafting may be the responsibility of the EMB. Legislation and regulations may include:

- Electoral laws/regulations (voter registration, political finance, etc.)
- Political party acts
- Media regulations
- Use of force (police) regulations
- Penalties and enforcement powers.

Returning to the concept of Election Management Networks, assistance may need to be provided to different stakeholders in the network – for example the Ministry of Information, Ministry of Interior, Media Commission or the body responsible for overseeing the media.

Constitutional reform – in some cases, you may have to start at the highest level by supporting constitutional design or reform. Constitutional considerations for elections systems in divided societies may include negotiating pre-elections pacts (minority representation, special representation through quotas, etc.).

Keep in mind the potential of the electoral system in shaping behavior of political parties, candidates and voters. Some argue that pre-election power sharing pacts that determine the fate of the election before ballots are cast can mitigate potentially conflict provoking election outcomes and possibly deter boycotts. However, there are also trade-offs between supporting an end to conflict using power sharing agreements and promoting democracy.

Training – training in legislative and regulatory drafting may be appropriate when there is a newly formed parliament or where a “rubber stamp” body has just been changed into a decision-making body. EMBs may not have experience preparing administrative regulations. Training may also be provided in conjunction with technical assistance.

Assessment – prior to initiating legislative reform, an assessment of election system performance may assist with identifying and prioritizing key issues to be addressed. Given the short lead time characteristic of breakthrough elections, this may be limited to a preliminary assessment identifying areas of greatest need.

Legal information / advice – legal advice centers may be established or strengthened as a means of providing information on legislation governing campaigns and elections, collect information on violations of the law and offer free legal advice to voters and political participants.

Codes of conduct – may be used to encourage constructive engagement of all political actors and attempt to deter violence and/or boycotts by opposition parties. USAID may be in a role to facilitate routine dialogue among political players and between political players and the Electoral Commission. They may also assist with the development and adoption of a code of conduct to establish common “rules of the game” and commitment by all participants to adhere to those rules.

Slide 4: Inadequate EMB Capacity

The capacity of the EMB to perform its responsibilities in an impartial and effective manner is critical for credible elections. There are many areas where EMB capacity may fall short. The EMB may be newly created, or it may have good intentions but lack the capacity to fulfill its duties. In these cases, general capacity building in the form of training and technical assistance can be provided to the EMB.

Technical assistance and training may include supporting EMB capacity to:

- Organize district and precinct commissions
- Train commission members on key duties
- Conduct voter registration;
- Conduct civic education; and
- Accredite domestic and international election observers.

USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE **Inadequate EMB Capacity**

If, the EMB is weak...

Consider.....

- **Technical assistance and training for EMB and other regulatory stakeholders to:**
 - Organize district and precinct commissions
 - Train commission members on key duties
 - Conduct voter registration
 - Conduct civic education
 - Accredite domestic and international election observers
- Providing material support such as equipment procurement

It is also important not to forget other actors in the election management network that may play a role in drafting regulations or be responsible for implementation and enforcement. These may include diverse stakeholders such as Land and Boundary Commissions, Media Commissions, and Anti-corruption commissions just to name a few.

In addition, if the EMB is not adequately or regularly funded by the government, USAID may consider providing material support such as procurement of equipment.

Slide 5: Inadequate EMB Capacity

In principle, EMBs should take the leadership role in electoral security planning and supervision, while taking counsel on tactical issues from security forces providing enforcement.

Elections are civilian organized events and their administration should be “demilitarized” to the extent permissible.

There may be circumstances where the EMB is capable and credible in the performance of routine election responsibilities, but needs additional support with electoral security.

In these cases, support may be provided to the EMB to strengthen electoral security coordination – basically, the integration of civilian, police and militaries (possibly domestic and international).

- A common organizational structure for accomplishing this integration is the Joint Election Operations Center or JEOC;
- JEOC structures and functions vary according to the contextual needs, however, they serve as an ongoing management body for coordination, control and communication;
- An expanded list of potential participants in JEOC activities may include – senior election managers, security forces (national and international military and police), civil emergency and rescue services, political party agents, civil society organizations monitoring the elections, conflict resolution specialists, women’s groups, and traditional leaders.
- The EMB retrains the management lead, but receives advice from the other representatives.

Example: As a part of the Bonn agreement signed by Afghan leaders in December 2001, a Joint Elections Management Body (JEMB) was created with both Afghan and international representation to conduct elections during the transition period. Presidential elections were to be held in 2004 followed by elections for the National Assembly and provincial councils in 2005. The JEMB was primarily responsible for policy and regulations, and was supported by an implementing arm – the JEMB Secretariat.

Although the JEMB had no real resources to secure the elections itself, they invested significant time building relationships with key Afghan and international security networks. In general, domestic security forces were responsible for location security (e.g. specific voting sites) whereas international security forces provided an overall security umbrella and the ability to respond to significant incidents.

Building on a methodology developed for elections in Bosnia and Kosovo, the JEMB Secretariat worked closely with the Afghan military, police, security services and international forces to develop a series of institutions responsible for election security.

Within the Secretariat, two bodies were created that played an instrumental role in coordinating security throughout the elections cycle. The first was a high-level security coordinating group that met on a regular basis and included senior representatives from all of the security institutions involved in the elections – international forces, Afghan military, police and intelligence services. The second was a Joint Elections Operations Center (JEOC) that was part of the JEMB Security Department. The JEOC included more junior representatives from all organizations participating in election security initiatives and functioned like a security operations room for the election administration.

 USAID <small>U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT</small>	Inadequate EMB Capacity
<i>If, the EMB requires assistance with electoral security...</i>	
Consider.....	
• Technical assistance and training for the EMB on electoral security coordination	
➢ Joint Election Operations Centers (JEOC)	
• Support for electoral security decentralization	
• Support for establishing military and civilian rapid response mechanisms	
➢ Quick Reaction Forces (QRF)	
• Assistance with incident data collection and analysis	

Support may also be provided to the EMB to assist with decentralization of electoral security administration. This is critical because the nature and intensity of the threats will vary from location to location. Decentralization of electoral security can be incorporated into or run parallel to the election administration structure.

Example: Returning to the JEMB in Afghanistan leading up to the 2004 and 2005 elections – the JEOC structure – which you will recall served as the security operations room for administration was replicated in eight regional offices and 34 provincial offices throughout the country, forming the backbone of the national electoral security process.

With offices around the country, the JEOC was able to evaluate the security environment and highlight those areas with escalated risk levels. Additional resources could then be allocated accordingly.

In addition, USAID, through an implementing partner, provided 100 unarmed security consultants, many with special forces backgrounds, who were placed throughout the 34 provincial offices to advise on security matters and carry out high-risk elements of the election operations – particularly in areas where UN staff was not allowed for security reasons.

USAID may also provide support to the EMB for establishing rapid response mechanisms, also known as Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) which may be military, constabulary or local police, depending on the scale and nature of the required response.

- QRFs may also have specialized capabilities such as hostage negotiation, bomb squad, chemical weapons, and snipers.
- Civilian elements of QRFs may include emergency service providers such as fire and ambulance workers. In these situations, they may be considered for advance voting so that they will be available in full strength on election day.
- Even election officials may visit certain polling stations or other locations to quell disputes.

Example: For the Kosovo elections in 2000, an Election Response Group comprised of officials from KFOR, UNMIK police and the OSCE was deployed to provide quick resolution of election day disputes.

EMBs may also benefit from assistance with electoral violence incident data collection and analysis.

- Experience has demonstrated the utility of mapping incidents and intensity of electoral violence throughout the electoral cycle as a predictor of future violence and tactics.
- This is linked to the concept that we introduced in the beginning that elections are not a stand-alone event, but part of a bigger cycle that spans not only pre-and post-election day, but also from one election to another.
- Software can be developed to create an Electoral Incidents Database to track and profile electoral conflicts. However, it is important to keep in mind that the database is only as valuable as the accuracy of the information collected and reporting is consistent across periods.

Example: the Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) Program, funded by USAID and implemented by IFES, is an electoral monitoring program that focuses on electoral conflict and violence.

- In addition to mapping incidents, the EVER framework categorizes threats according to the election calendar and seeks to identify the motives for the conflict and violence.

- This information is then used to anticipate threats to future elections and deploy resources accordingly.
- IFES typically partners with domestic civil society organizations in monitoring activities.

Example: Returning once again to Afghanistan, in 2005 the JEMB Secretariat Security Department distributed District Security Questionnaires that included 38 questions focused on demographics of the location, security situation, threats and warnings, security support and logistics. Based on an evaluation of the responses from election security officials, each of the 72 districts received a “threat state” of permissive, semi-permissive, or non-permissive.

Slide 6: Inadequate EMB Capacity

We have spoken about how to programmatically address a weak EMB, but what about in the event that the public and international actors do not have confidence in the credibility (impartiality) of the EMB?

One option is to introduce alternative oversight instruments:

- This may be done in the context of peace agreements



Inadequate EMB Capacity

If, there is a lack of public and international confidence in EMB credibility...

Consider.....

- **Introducing other oversight instruments**
 - created by peace agreements
 - strengthening other regulatory institution
- **Enhancing oversight and reporting capacity of civil society organizations and the media**

Example: in addition to creating a new electoral commission – the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the peace agreement for El Salvador also mandated the creation of a multi-party Board of Vigilance which had oversight responsibility for the TSE and served as a post-conflict confidence building measure for elections.

Another option is to work with existing regulatory institutions such as media commissions, anti-corruption commissions, land and boundary commissions, and political finance regulators to strengthen their ability to support legitimate elections.

If feasible, work with civil society organizations and even the media to enhance their ability to serve as “watchdogs”. Training in responsible oversight is important, but so is the ability to document and communicate findings with the public. Beware though, of placing individuals in danger.

Slide 7: Weak Electoral Dispute Mechanisms

What about in situations where electoral dispute resolution mechanisms are weak? Responsibility for electoral dispute resolution may fall to several organizations including:

- Domestic judicial institutions
- EMB
- Special elections courts (run domestically or internationally)



Weak Electoral Dispute Mechanisms

If, electoral dispute resolution mechanisms are weak...

Consider.....

- **Creating a specialized EMB adjudication body**
- **Strengthening institutions responsible for electoral dispute resolution:**
 - Operational planning
 - Training on election law for judges and lawyers
 - Voter education
 - Decentralization
 - Case management training
 - Prosecuting perpetrators of violence
 - Redressing victims of violence
- **EMB crisis management planning**

In certain cases, where electoral violence is particularly severe, transitional justice mechanisms may also be established (run domestically or internationally) to investigate widespread human rights violations.

Transitional justice generally refers to a range of approaches – judicial and non-judicial - that states may use to address past human rights violations. Transitional justice includes a series of actions or policies and their resulting institutions, which may be enacted at a point of political transition from violence and repression to societal stability.

A number of transitional justice mechanisms may be employed, including:

- **Criminal prosecutions** - judicial investigations of those responsible for human rights violations. Prosecutors frequently emphasize investigations of the "big fish": suspects considered most responsible for massive or systematic crimes.
- **Truth commissions** - commissions of inquiry with the primary purpose of investigating and reporting on key periods of recent past abuse. They are often official state bodies that make recommendations to remedy such abuse and to prevent its recurrence.
- **Reparations programs** - state-sponsored initiatives that help repair the material and moral damages of past abuse. They typically distribute a mix of material and symbolic benefits to victims, benefits which may include financial compensation and official apologies.
- **Gender justice** - these efforts challenge impunity for sexual- and gender-based violence and ensure women's equal access to redress of human rights violations.
- **Security system reforms** - these efforts seek to transform the military, police, judiciary and related state institutions from instruments of repression and corruption into instruments of public service and integrity.
- **Memorialization efforts** - include museums and memorials that preserve public memory of victims and raise moral consciousness about past abuse, in order to build a bulwark against its recurrence

Electoral dispute resolution institutions must be equipped to transparently and independently adjudicate disputes in a timely manner so that grievances don't turn violent. In the event that electoral dispute mechanisms are weak, consider:

- Creation of a specialized EMB adjudication body (an elections complaint commission) if one does not exist.

Opportunities to strengthen existing electoral dispute resolution institutions (EMB elections complaint commissions, domestic courts, or special elections courts) may include:

- Operational planning for processing disputes
- Training in election law for judges and lawyers
- Voter education programs about dispute resolution mechanisms
- Decentralization of adjudication
- Case management training (processing election complaints quickly and efficiently)
- Prosecuting perpetrators of violence
- Redressing victims grievances / appropriate reparations for victims of electoral violence to rectify the impact of election violence.

In the event of a serious or prolonged election dispute, EMBs may need support with crisis management planning. This support may be in the form of technical assistance, training, and even exchanges with other electoral dispute management bodies.

Slide 8: Weak Electoral Dispute Mechanisms

What about non-state stakeholder approaches to addressing electoral disputes? In the event that electoral dispute resolution mechanisms are weak – how can USAID work with non-state stakeholders?

Electoral mediation / alternative dispute resolution mechanisms using an impartial third party to provide electoral dispute resolution services. Examples include:

- Mobilizing and/or strengthening legal aide organizations;
- Engaging respected religious, tribal, or other leaders;
- Linking in to traditional dispute resolution mechanism.

Example: The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (a network of domestic CSOs) holds workshop in rural areas to promote reconciliation and peace dialogue surrounding elections. Traditional leaders are encouraged to participate in the workshops and take conflict management skills back to their respective villages.

Note: The UN Peacebuilding Fund manages the Immediate Response Facility - an emergency fund that can be used under exceptional circumstances to sponsor dialogue and reconciliation projects. Funds from the Immediate Response Facility go to UN organizations, but it may be a useful resource to keep in mind when working with the UN.

Electoral dispute monitoring -another approach is to work with local organizations to conduct electoral dispute monitoring. This involves tracking disputes that are filed with established electoral dispute resolution entities to identify patterns of complaints and resolution.

Example: OSCE has developed an Election Dispute Monitoring System that codes cases both geographically but also by the nature of the complaint, the status of the complaint, legal basis of the complaint, decision and enforcement – among other issues.

Slide 9: Need to Improve Independent Monitoring

In the event that there is a need to improve independent monitoring of elections or pre- and post-election periods, consider:

Training domestic elections observers – working with local organizations to train elections observers is a common approach to increasing transparency and accountability leading up to and on election day.

Electoral conflict monitoring - the same organizations providing domestic observers can also be trained to monitor electoral conflict by tracking incidents based on witness accounts, news accounts, victim accounts, etc. In addition to helping identify possible “hot spots” and areas that may require additional security resources, tracking and recording incidents of electoral violence can also create a body of evidence in the event that domestic or international courts bring election violence cases to trial.

Organizations may also be trained to conduct dispute monitoring, as mentioned in previous slides.



Weak Electoral Dispute Mechanisms

If, electoral dispute resolution mechanisms are weak...

Consider.....

- Electoral mediation / alternative dispute resolution
 - >Legal aide organizations
 - >Respected religious, tribal or other leaders
 - >Linking into traditional dispute resolution mechanisms
- Electoral dispute monitoring



Need to Improve Independent Monitoring

If, there is a need improve independent monitoring...

Consider.....

- Domestic elections observers
- Electoral conflict monitoring
- Electoral dispute monitoring
- International observers

International observers – may also be brought in. Although they will not likely conduct incident reporting, international observers, merely by their presence, tend to have a dampening effect on electoral conflict.

Slide 10: Lack of Political Party Professionalism

In some cases, political parties may lack professionalism or play an inflammatory role in relation to upcoming elections. What are some approaches that you might consider?

Technical assistance and training – provision of technical assistance and training can be used to address improved governance of political parties, formulation of issues-based platforms, outreach, or other areas that may be contributing to electoral conflict.



Lack of Political Party Professionalism

If, political parties play an inflammatory role or lack professionalism ...

Consider.....

- Technical assistance and training
- Political party councils
- Political party codes of conduct

Political party councils – if there is poor communications among political parties or between political parties and the government, one option to improve communication is by creating political party councils. Political party councils can provide a forum for inter-party communication. They may also provide a forum for the government to address all of the political parties at the same time to ensure that information is communicated to the different parties in a consistent and transparent manner. Creation of political party councils may be combined with the use of political party codes of conduct.

Political party codes of conduct – if there is a need to reform political party behavior, consider using a political party code of conduct. While each code should be unique, depending on the need and circumstances, political party codes of conduct often share common features:

- A set of principles (often in the form of a Preamble) that involve recognizing fundamental rights and freedoms as being essential to a fair election
- Guidance who is subject to the code's requirements
- Specific conduct and behaviors (both encouraged and prohibited) for example:
 - Prohibitions may include:
 - Hate speech, defacing campaign posters, disrupting campaign events, intimidating voters, etc.
 - Certain financial receipts and expenditures for political parties (however, to be effective, legally binding political finance enforcement must exist)
 - Encouraged actions may include – engaging women as candidates and party leaders, and encouraging involvement of youth in party activities

In order to enhance enforcement, codes of conduct terms can be mandated in legislation.


Example: In Malawi, the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act tasks the Electoral Commission with the establishment and enforcement of a political party code of conduct. The terms of the code of conduct are legally binding and can be enforced with legal sanctions.

Slide 11: Lack of Media Professionalism

Technical assistance and training – provision of technical assistance and training can be used to improve independence and professionalism of the media or other areas that may be contributing to electoral conflict.

Media codes of conduct – media organizations can be a source of voter education and public information, however, can also serve as a conveyer of hate speech, incendiary rumors and dangerous falsehoods. Similar to political party codes of conduct, media codes can be used to encourage positive behaviors and sanction inflammatory actions.

Example: the Guyana Broadcasting Corporation was accused of inciting violence by airing false reports about voters being turned away at polling stations. Anger over the reports then provoked an attack on the headquarters of the Guyana Elections Commission. In response, in preparing for the next election, the Guyana Press Association announced its commitment to develop a media code of conduct.



The ACE Electoral Knowledge network has developed a model code of conduct for election reporting, including 20 behavioral standards. Expectations of those governed by the code include:

- Objectivity
- Truth
- Responsiveness to voter needs
- Provision of relevant information
- Encouraging free speech
- Promoting democratic values.

Prohibited behaviors include:

- Dissemination of hate speech and incitement
- Refraining from publishing in some circumstances
- Accepting gifts
- Favoring incumbents
- Biased reporting against women

The code also includes obligations to investigate stories, provide equitable coverage of political parties, offer a forum for alternative views, and assist the EMB will disseminating official electoral messages.

Media monitoring – can be used in conjunction with a code of conduct or independently. When used in conjunction with a code of conduct, monitoring can be used for compliance purposes.

Media monitoring can also be used independent of a code of conduct to track media reports for misinformation and inflammatory speech so that remedial responses can be rapidly formulated and disseminated. Monitoring can be conducted by the EMB or by domestic and international observer groups.

Example: returning to the case of Guyana, monitoring of compliance to the media code of conduct was undertaken by the Elections Commission which established a Media Monitoring Unit. The Monitoring Unit analyzed the content of broadcast news for accuracy and impartiality and published regular reports on their findings. Unlike previous elections, there were no incidents reported to have been provoked by the media.

Let's take a look at the chart in your books. It provides different options, by stakeholder group, for activities that may be undertaken to prevent, mitigate and manage conflict.

Slide 12: Remain Flexible

When developing electoral security programs, especially in rapidly changing environments, it is important to remain flexible.

As we will discuss in the next section, in rapidly evolving environments, it is important to be continuously assessing the appropriateness and effectiveness of your programs and the development hypothesis behind those programs and make changes as appropriate to have an impact on electoral security.

It may also be useful to include a crisis modifier in your implementing mechanism. A crisis modifier may take the form of a task description that allows for tapping into additional resources or modify existing projects in the event of a crisis.

The slide features the USAID logo in the top left corner and the title "Remain Flexible" in the top right. The main text reads: "When developing programs in rapidly evolving environments, it is important to remain flexible:". Below this, there are three bullet points: "• Continue to reassess on a regular basis", "• Consider using a crisis modifier", and "• Don't forget linkages to long-term development programming".

Finally, don't forget linkages to longer-term development programs. As we have seen, elections, and even the electoral cycle are not a stand-alone event. Several of the factors contributing to sustained electoral security are multi-year initiatives better suited to long-term programming than shorter-term elections assistance. These include security sector reform, judicial reform, and strengthening of political parties, media, and civil society organizations. However, to be successful, it is important that these longer-term initiatives are undertaken with an eye towards electoral security, even if that is not the primary purpose of the program. When possible, work to embed electoral security elements into longer-term development programs.



SECTION 9

Session 9: Monitoring and Evaluation Overview and Small Group Exercise

Duration: 1 hour

Overview:

This session will provide an overview of ongoing monitoring and evaluation including tips for operating in insecure environments. Participants will reflect on monitoring and evaluating election security programs and the impact of electoral security programs on broader conflict dynamics.

Objectives:

- Recognize the challenges to monitoring and evaluating election security programs in insecure environments
- Understand the links between monitoring and evaluation and assessment and planning, especially as related to conflict dynamics
- Explore strategies and approaches for monitoring and evaluating electoral security programs in insecure environments
- Recognize the importance of a performance management plan in rapidly changing environments

Materials Needed:

- Power point slides for Monitoring and Evaluation
- Flip charts and markers for each working group

Activities:

1. Monitoring and Evaluation (40 min)
 - Power point presentation with a few exercises
 - Questions and answers
2. Small group exercise - Part 4 (10 min)
 - Instruct groups to take 10 minutes to (note the exercise instructions are also in their notebooks):
 - Select 1 of the electoral security program objectives
 - Develop at least 2 objective-level performance indicators
 - Develop at least 1 to performance indicator to measure impact on conflict dynamics
 - Propose how each indicator will be measured
 - Be prepared to discuss with the group.
3. Report out (10 min)
 - Ask groups to volunteer candidate indicators and measurements

Optional Additions/Variations:

- Given the energy level of the group and available timing, the small group exercise may be considered optional.


Participant Resources (CD):

- Monitoring and Evaluation in Post-conflict Settings
- Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators
- Standard Indicators for Governing Justly and Democratically, Director of Foreign Assistance
- Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: A working Draft for Application Period OECD/DAC
- Designing for Results
- Monitoring and Evaluation Power point slides

Facilitator Notes and Slides: Monitoring and Evaluation

Slide 1: Cover slide

Now we are going to talk a bit about continuous monitoring and evaluation (M&E). This portion of the handbook / training, will reflect on the challenges to conducting M&E in insecure environments and strategies for developing approaches that monitor progress against electoral security objectives, but also against broader conflict dynamics as identified during the CAF/ICAF.




Slide 2: A Quick Refresher: M&E Terminology

Before we begin, let's take a few minutes to review a few terms associated with monitoring and evaluation to ensure that we are all talking about the same things.

- **Development hypothesis** – describes how the proposed interventions when implemented successfully, will effectively address the identified problem. It should articulate the causal linkages between recommended activities and the program objective. Per the ADS, the development hypothesis generally refers to plausible linkages rather than statistically accurate relations. In conflict environments, the development hypothesis may also be referred to / linked to the theory of change – what needs to change to reduce conflict.

- *Improved elections administration will enhance legitimacy of electoral process*



Term	Definition
Development Hypothesis	How proposed interventions will effectively address the problem.
Critical Assumptions	Assumptions underpinning the success of the program.
Program Objective	The highest level objective upon which USAID can expect to have a material effect (stated as a result).
Baseline	Status prior to intervention.
Target	Expected status at the end of the intervention.
Indicator	How we measure progress against objectives.
Performance Management Plan	A plan for obtaining systematic feedback on the robustness of the development hypothesis and strengthening it over time.

- **Critical assumptions** – what are the major assumptions underlying the success of your program as related to your development hypothesis? Assumptions revolve around issues that are not under your control. For example:
 - The western region of the country will remain stable enough to allow regular access by program staff
 - You will have access to the Election Commission to provide capacity building assistance.Beware of “killer assumptions”. In the event that your assumption is unlikely to hold true, you may need to rethink your development hypothesis and programming approach.
 - If we assume that the western region will remain stable enough for implementation, yet for four of the past six months, the area has been inaccessible for security reasons, you may need to rethink your approach.
 - If the government will not allow access to the Electoral Commission or the Electoral Commission is unwilling to work with USAID, you may need to find alternative partners to accomplish the same objectives or rethink your approach.


In highly volatile environments, addressing notable contingencies or different scenarios may also be appropriate.

- **Program objective** – the highest level objective upon which USAID can expect to have a material effect (have an impact / influence change). The program objective should be stated as a result. For example:
 - Improved professionalism and transparency of electoral authority to administer and oversee elections
 - Improved capacity of formal and informal institutions to effectively resolve electoral disputes
 - Increased coordination, transparency and accountability of electoral security actors
- **Baseline** - where we are before an intervention. This is a critical point of departure against which we begin measuring movement achieving results
- **Target** – where we want to be at the end of the intervention. What do we want to achieve?
- **Indicator** – how progress is measured against our objective(s). Indicators define the data to be collected and allow us to compare actual versus planned results over time. USAID uses standard (F) indicators as well as custom indicators. In general (although not always) standard indicators tend to be more output oriented whereas customized indicators are more outcome oriented.
- **Performance management plan** – an approach for obtaining systematic feedback on the robustness of the development hypothesis and strengthening it over time by making decisions and taking actions to improve on activities (and the overall program) based on this feedback. Performance management is important not only for managing performance but also for telling our performance story (reporting on it).

Slide 3: Step 4: Continuous M&E

While M&E may seem daunting to many people, in reality, throughout the assessment, planning and programming, we have been laying the foundations for a performance management plan.

- **Assessment:** We began by conducting an electoral security assessment. This assessment, combined with information from the CAF / ICAF provided us with the following:
 - The broad conflict dynamics – incentives, actors, resources (CAF/ICAF)
 - Electoral security vulnerabilities and opportunities
 - Identification of a problem statement
 - Priorities for electoral security interventions (the ideal within the given country context)



Reflecting on the assessment findings, from an M&E perspective, we should:

- Consider the impact of our program not only on electoral security, but also on broader conflict dynamics

- Develop an initial development hypothesis (linked to the problem statement) and key assumptions. How will addressing these issues improve electoral security? What key assumptions must hold true for this to be the case?
 - Better understand the availability and quality of data that may be used for baseline data and indicators
- **Planning:** We then undertook a planning step. This step allowed us to further refine our assessment findings by overlaying additional considerations, such as international community presence and programs, local change agents, and USAID interests and constraints. At the end of the planning step, we had:
 - Refined and finalized areas of intervention
 - Defined the USAID program objective(s) and associated indicators at the objective level
 - Refined development hypothesis and critical assumptions
 - Gathered additional information about availability and reliability of data (i.e. what do other donors have?)
 - Considered a coordination approach / engaging partners – local and international

Reflecting on the planning findings, from an M&E perspective, we should also consider other variables that may need to be monitored, even if they fall outside of our control. Does the success of our activities depend on the success of other programs? For example:

- Does our voter list improvement program depend upon the success of our civil registry reform program?
 - Does the ability to conduct a voters list census depend upon another donor's Household Mapping program that identifies the correct street addresses for all citizens? If so, we will need to track the progress of the Mapping program so that our voters list census workers go to the right addresses.
 - Does the ability to allow citizens to check and confirm their voter registration information require functioning city council offices? If so, is anyone working on building the capacity of local city councils to deal with such requests? If not, do we need to refocus our activities?
- **Programming:** After that, we designed a program composed of a set of activities responsive to country context and needs, factoring in other electoral security programming and our interests and constraints as a donor. The rationale underlying the selection of these activities is articulated in our development hypothesis.

During the course of programming, from an M&E perspective, we:

 - Conducted a baseline before programming begins. This is an opportunity to test our candidate indicators for accuracy and whether or not they can be measured. The baseline data will serve as a point of departure against which we will measure progress against objectives.
 - We identified performance standards - targeted indicators identifying minimum requirements for what our activities hope to achieve (targets are embedded – quality, quantity, timeliness, unlike higher level indicators)
 - Established baselines and targets to measure actual performance against desired results.
 - **Continuous M&E:** Now, we need to think about a performance management system – putting it all together including an approach for collecting data, managing data, analyzing it, and making sure that managers have access to information in a timely manner to make program adjustments as necessary.

Slide 4: Challenges to M&E in Insecure Environments

We are going to return to indicator development and performance management planning in a few minutes. First, since the Electoral Security Framework can be applied in both stable and non-stable environments, let's talk a bit about how M&E design and implementation is different in insecure environments, since this will have implications for our indicators and PMP.

As we know, there are many challenges that arise when conducting monitoring and evaluation in insecure environments versus steady state. Many of these will become evident as you collect information during the Step 1 assessment. Challenges to data collection and analysis include:



Challenges to M&E in Insecure Environments

Data collection and analysis

- Rapidly changing environment
- Less transparency
- Lack of trust
- Instability
- Lack of reliable and accessible data
- Extreme weakness of host country institutions
- Challenges of attribution and causality
- Physical security of evaluators and informants

- **Rapidly changing environment:** The environment is often less stable / rapidly fluctuating, making planning more difficult. Security may be a factor, demographics may shift as people relocate (ie. IDPs), etc. This may have implications for:
 - Your ability to conduct routine data collection
 - Your assumptions about how much progress can be made – it may not be steadily incremental, rather progress of activities may come in spurts depending on level of security and other windows of opportunity.
 - Your key assumptions underpinning your development hypothesis. They may change – repeatedly. Note OTI approach of “rolling assessment”
- **Less transparency:** The environment is often less transparent. What motivates behavior may not be as clear. People may be less willing to be open and honest regarding issues that may be perceived sources of vulnerability – ethnic affiliation, religious affiliation, where they are from, etc. .
- **Lack of trust:** Information gathering may be hindered by a fear of reprisals or distrust of outsiders.
- **Instability:** Lack of security can impede activity implementation and interrupt routine data gathering.
- **Lack of reliable and accessible data:** There may be a dearth of reliable and accessible data, especially following prolonged conflicts. This will impact collection of baseline data as well as formulation of indicators. Sources of information from government agencies, etc. just may not exist. Or, if data does exist, it may be politicized by different parties to the conflict – it may not be widely agreed upon as reliable. Governments or others may try to impede access to sources of information, certain regions of the country or groups of people.
- **Extreme weakness of host country institutions:** Government and civil society organizations are likely to be very weak and will need strengthened capacity to serve as monitoring and evaluation partners.
- **Challenges of attribution and causality:** attribution refers to the causal linkages between expected or observed changes and specific program activities. In environments characterized by lack of transparency, rapid change and multiple actors, attribution and causality can be difficult to determine. There may not always be a direct cause and effect relationship.

- **Physical security of evaluators and informants:** In addition to challenges of inaccessibility posed by insecure environments, the security of evaluators and staff is critical. Evaluators may be vulnerable as outsiders in a community. Likewise, informants may be targeted for speaking or associating with outsiders.

Slide 5: Characteristics of M&E in Insecure Environments

In addition to the challenges of operating in an insecure environment, M&E will be further impacted by the nature of electoral security programs which are often high profile. This is especially true if they are part of a peace agreement or a new constitution and there is significant US foreign policy interest in the country and election outcomes. You will likely encounter many of these factors during step 2 – Planning.

Characteristics of M&E in for election security in post-conflict environments may include:



Characteristics of M&E in Insecure Environments

Increased stakes, scrutiny and number of actors

- **Prominent USG political and military considerations**
- **Different objectives within the USG**
- **Different assumptions about change**
- **Pressure to demonstrate results quickly**
- **Multiple actors**
- **Short time frames**
- **Lack of common frame of reference**

- **Prominent political and military considerations:** Due to the high stakes of elections, political and military considerations are likely to move to the forefront. There will likely be a high level of US political interest in the elections, and there may also be a role for the military in stabilization and/or implementation of a peace agreement. These interests will need to be taken into consideration both at the design phase, but also in terms of aligning monitoring and evaluation with US foreign policy interests as feasible. High level diplomatic and policy related issues may help or hinder the ability of program activities to affect change.
- **Different objectives within the USG:** There may be different objectives, or different hierarchies of objectives within the USG. At times, these objectives may even appear to work at cross purposes, be confused, or conflated (mixed together). For example:
 - Higher level USG objectives may be focused on stabilization, which is not always compatible with promoting democracy and competition that characterizes elections.
 - There may be confusion about the hierarchy amongst objectives – are we here to encourage stabilization first and foremost, or promote democracy?
- **Different assumptions about change:** Diverse actors, within the USG and the international community, may hold different assumptions about change. Some theories of change focus on who needs to change, others on what needs to change, and some on how change should happen. The theory(ies) of change – whether implicit or explicit – will drive program focus and activity selection. Programs may be built on more than one theory of change. Sample theories of change:
 - If we change the awareness, attitudes, behaviors and skills of many individuals, it will create a critical mass able to effectively advocate for peace (individual change)
 - Peace is secured by establishing stable and reliable social institutions guaranteeing democracy, equity, justice and fair allocation of resources (good governance)
 - If we reduce the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants, chances for security and peace are increased (reduction of violence)
 - If we address underlying issues (i.e. injustice, exploitation, threats to identity and security), people’s sense of victimization will reduce the drivers of conflict, opening space for peace (social justice)

- **Pressure to demonstrate results quickly:** Given the high stakes and enhanced scrutiny that often accompanies electoral security programs, there are likely to be pressures to rapidly demonstrate results. This requires that data, as well as clear causal linkages between objectives and activities are sound (accountability). In highly visible scenarios, there may also be pressure for positive outcomes. M&E systems must be designed to make data available quickly to demonstrate results.
- **Multiple actors** – Electoral security programs are often characterized by the presence of a larger than usual number of US and international organizations implementing multiple programs through multiple implementers. Depending on their affiliation, these organizations may have different priorities and objectives, even though they may be all implementing programs relating to electoral security.
- **Short time frames:** For everything from start-up, to program implementation and results cycles. There may also be frequent shifts in strategy and tactics coming from Washington (Congress, NSC) or the Embassy that will have an impact on programming. Election timetables may be driven by a combination of peace agreements, constitutions, and international pressure. Timelines may shift quickly, requiring corresponding flexibility in programming.
- **Lack of a common frame of reference:** In addition to different assumptions about change and different objectives, there will also likely be a lack of common frame of reference concerning more mundane issues that will, nonetheless, have implications for monitoring and evaluation:
 - Lack of consistent place descriptors / names
 - Reluctance to share and receive security sensitive information
 - Absence of agreed upon information sources/integrators

Slide 6: Good Practices for Conducting M&E in Insecure Environments

Given all of these challenges – both the country context and the increased complexity of high visibility events such as elections, let’s talk about good practices for conducting monitoring and evaluation in insecure environments - most of which are M&E best practices even in steady state.

- **Address both electoral security and conflict dynamics:** Monitor progress both against election security results and conflict dynamics. Electoral security indicators will monitor efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the program. Conflict indicators will monitor progress against conflict dynamics. There are two types of indicators for measuring progress in relation to conflict dynamics. The first are “do no harm” indicators. These are used to assess whether or not your activities are resulting in harmful consequences. The second kind of indicators will provide information about whether or not your activities are having a mitigating effect on the overall conflict dynamics. Both types of indicators are important.



Good Practices for Conducting M&E in Insecure Environments

- Address both electoral security and conflict dynamics
- Focus on manageable interests
- Ensure that data for your indicator exists
- Triangulate and build in redundancy
- Use clusters of indicators for a given outcome
- Combine qualitative and quantitative indicators
- Recognize the importance of contextual indicators
- Establish consensus on metrics early
- Use local and international partners
- Incorporate use of new technologies
- Budget for M&E

So, how do we monitor both the progress of our electoral security activities and the possible impact of these activities on conflict dynamics? If we know that a conflict dynamic relates to the youth feeling

disenfranchised and a manifestation of this is causing disruptions around polling stations, an electoral security indicator that may provide information on progress against electoral security programming but also the higher level conflict dynamics may be *number of youth that vote by polling station*.

There may also be circumstances where program activities may have to assume a hierarchy of objectives. For example, some activities may have a positive outcome in relation to promoting democracy but a negative outcome in relationship to conflict. For example:

- Increased competition among political parties during an election may be seen as a positive development outcome linked to democratization. However, increased competition may exacerbate existing conflict dynamics, thereby reducing stability.
 - Conversely, power sharing agreements may have a positive outcome in reducing conflict, but a negative outcome as related to democratization.
- **Focus on manageable interests:** When choosing program objectives and indicators, make sure that they demonstrate the causal effect of the intervention. Remember, manageable interests are things that we can impact through our intervention – the program objective is the highest level expression of this.

Ensure that data for your indicator exists: When considering possible candidate indicators, make sure that the data is reliable and available – the baseline assessment provides an opportunity to test this. Indicators informed by poor quality data will not be useful. Likewise, if the data is not readily available, the cost of collection may outweigh the value of the indicator. Where direct indicators are not available, consider a well thought out proxy.

- **Triangulate and build in redundancies:** Where data availability and quality are questionable, it is important to triangulate, or, integrate various sources of data and methods of data collection to assess the same thing. Also build in redundancies – if people are not likely to share information, ask the same question different ways to compare responses and lean towards oversampling to ensure that groups left out (perhaps due to security concerns) are accounted for in other areas. Collect data from different sources (government, community organizations, sample surveys) and also use multiple methods to collect data – focus groups, direct observation, personal interviews, etc. Multiple sources and methods will help to balance out weaknesses in data.
- **Use clusters of indicators for a given outcome:** Using clusters of indicators will help to capture different time frames and balance differences in perception versus actual performance. Initially, output indicators, rather than outcome indicators provide effective and legitimate monitoring measures during early efforts at stabilization. As the program continues, outcome indicators will become increasingly important.
- **Combine qualitative and quantitative indicators:** In insecure environments, public perception takes on additional importance where formal channels of communication – radio, television, newspapers have likely broken down or have limited distribution. People may, instead, act on perceptions fueled by rumors and fear. It is important to track public perception, but equally important to balance public perception with bigger picture information. Public perception may vary from location to location, and is only part of the story. It is important to measure both perceived and actual change.
- **Recognize the importance of contextual indicators:** Contextual indicators take on additional importance, especially after prolonged conflict. During the conflict, the way things “should” work

has likely broken down, resulting in shifts in power dynamics and even values. Context is likely to have an impact on the progress of interventions and will also impact selection of proxy indicators.

Establish consensus on metrics early: Where possible, work within the USG and other partners to establish consensus on program objectives and metrics. This will help to clarify respective roles and coordination in relation to other USG and international programs. In the event that baseline data is missing, work with partners to establish consensus on baseline data and how it was measured.

- **Use local and international partners:** People are likely to be less suspicious of local partners collecting information, and they may be able to access areas that USAID cannot. Keep in mind however, that local partners may bring their own biases and consider how this may affect M&E efforts. When feasible given security constraints, this can be balanced by using a combination of locals and outsiders. Using local partners will also involve training and capacity building elements. Be sure to clarify risks that they may be taking – i.e. going into less secure areas, working for the USG, etc. When other donors are implementing related programs, there may be opportunities to share data collection responsibilities or use data that they are collecting in the context of their programs.
- **Incorporate use of new technologies:** In highly insecure environments where physical access to sites may not be possible, consider use of technology applications for monitoring and evaluation. For example, aerial photography and GPS coordinates may be used to verify location of polling stations, track population movements, etc. If present, the US military often has the technology and the capacity to support this type of monitoring. Furthermore, the use of picture phones, SMS technology, and web-based technologies can be used in environments where there may be environmental, personnel or security impediments to traditional data collection.
- **Budget for M&E:** This should include not only the development of the performance management plan, data collection, analysis, etc. but also training for local staff engaged in M&E. Similar to working with local partners, be mindful of placing staff at risk. In stable environments are often characterized by high staff turnover. Make sure that building in redundancies extends to M&E staff. Be prepared to train staff early and often!

Slide 7: Sample Standard Indicators

Let's turn to indicators for a few minutes. As we stated before, USAID uses both standard and custom indicators for reporting purposes. Standard indicators and definitions for the objective "Governing Justly and Democratically", program area "Political Competition and Consensus Building" can be found on line at www.state.gov/f/indicators/

The majority of standard indicators are output indicators – although some can be used as outcome indicators as well. If you find one that works, no need to create a new one!

	Sample Standard Indicators www.state.gov/f/indicators/
Element 3.2 – Elections and Political Process:	
➤ Number of domestic / international election observers trained with USG assistance	
➤ Number of election officials trained with USG assistance	
➤ Number of people reached by USG assisted voter education	
➤ Number of laws or amendments to ensure credible elections drafted with USG technical assistance	
➤ Number of election observation tools (quick count, exit polls, pre- and post-election reports, etc.) supported by the USG that are appropriately implemented	
➤ Number of local CSOs strengthened that promote political participation and voter education	


These are a few of the standard indicators for elections and political process. There are also standard indicators and definitions for political parties.

Slide 8: Sample Custom Indicators

Standard indicators are complemented by custom indicators selected by each operating unit (mission or bureau). These indicators should be carefully selected and grounded in the reality of the country context, in addition to how the election process supports democratic transition and a lasting resolution to violent conflict.

Custom indicators will likely need to be tailored to specific programs and environments. However, illustrative examples of candidate indicators specific to different aspects of elections may be found in:

- Transition Elections and Political Processes in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations: Lessons Learned. A Guide for US Government Planners (S/CRS) 2007
- Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, Section on Elections and Political Process, USAID, 1998



Illustrative indicators may include:

- **Degree of independence of electoral authority** – using a scale or qualitative assessment, public perception (behavioral independence), and review statutory status – organizational structure and degree of independence from the government (structural independence)
- **Adherence to codes of conduct** – could be by political parties, candidates, media, security forces, etc. qualitative assessment of content analysis of speeches, media content, etc.
- **Incidence of electoral violence**, disaggregated as appropriate – need a baseline for this one? Last election?
- **Level of voter confidence in electoral authority** – focus groups, surveys – note to include all segments of society to ensure representation
- **Degree to which vote tabulation and reporting votes is carried out accurately and transparently** – based on reports of international and domestic monitors, parallel vote tabulation.
- **Degree to which assessments by election monitors are acknowledged and received by electoral authority** – evaluation of openness and receptivity by a panel of experts / monitors
- **Level of acceptance of results by losers** – content analysis of speeches, actions, media reports -
- **Degree to which electoral law facilitates multiple political parties in the electoral system** – content analysis by experts
- **Degree to which the electoral legislative framework encourages bridging strategies among parties** – content analysis of law by experts.

Slides 9: Measuring Program Impact on Conflict Dynamics

We have talked about the importance of not just monitoring progress against electoral security objectives but also against conflict **dynamics**. Remember, when measuring against conflict dynamics we are looking at “do no harm” indicators and those that tell us whether or not our activities are serving to mitigate conflict dynamics. What exactly do we mean by this?

Let's say that our conflict dynamic is:

- *A large and rapidly growing portion of the population – particularly youth – are disaffected, disillusioned, and disempowered because there are few opportunities for legitimate participation in the political arena.*

Our development hypothesis or theory of change might be something like

- *If citizens, particularly youth, have more legitimate means for political participation, they will be less likely to address grievances outside the formal system.*



Measuring Program Impact on Conflict Dynamics

Conflict Driver: A large and rapidly growing portion of the population – particularly youth – are disaffected, disillusioned, and disempowered because there are few opportunities for legitimate participation in the political arena.

Electoral Security Program Objective: Increase use of legitimate channels for political participation by youth.

Candidate Indicators:

- Percent of youth registered to vote
- Level of increase in youth understanding of voter education messages
- Number of civic education campaigns targeting youth
- Number of youth employed as domestic election observers
- Degree of youth representation in civil society election activities

Following this logic, our program objective might be:

- *Increase use of legitimate channels for political participation by youth*

What are some possible candidate indicators?

- **Percentage of youth who indicate they plan to vote** – demonstrating buy-in and increased use of formal channels to address issues (DHN indicator)
- **Level of increase in youth understanding of voter education messages** – raising awareness among youth of channels and opportunities for participation (impact indicator)
- **Number of civic education campaigns targeting youth** – are CSOs reaching out to youth? (DHN indicator)
- **Number of youth employed as domestic election observers** – deeper engagement of youth in the elections process (impact indicator)
- **Degree of youth representation in civil society election activities** – increasing engagement in election related activities – these may include monitoring, voter education, etc. (impact indicator)
- **Do youth perceive that they have a voice in the political system?** (impact indicator)

Slide 10: What's in a Performance Management Plan?

Now that we have the pieces, we need to put them together into a performance management plan. Remember, the purpose of the performance management plan is to continuously assess the validity of our development hypothesis, track progress against objectives and adjust as necessary. It is also a way of “telling our story” to Congress and the American people.

In insecure environments, a PMP can take on even greater significance. Many of the activities implemented may be somewhat experimental in nature and relatively untested compared to activities undertaken in steady state environments.

In addition, there is not likely to be a large body of lessons learned or best practices easily transferable to the particular context in which you are operating. The PMP becomes an important tool for validating (or not) our development hypothesis and program design.



What's in a Performance Management Plan? (ADS 203.3.3)

- ✓ Performance indicator (including definition, unit of measure, and justification for indicator selection)
- ✓ Baseline and target values
- ✓ Performance indicators should be disaggregated by sex (wherever possible)
- ✓ Data source and method / approach of data collection or calculation
- ✓ Schedule for data collection
- ✓ Known data quality limitations
- ✓ Data quality assessment procedures
- ✓ Cost estimate
- ✓ Identify possible evaluation efforts
- ✓ Calendar of performance management tasks

So, what goes into a PMP? Many of the things we have just been talking about!

- According to the ADS, there is no standard format for a PMP. Each operating unit should select a format that fits your particular needs.
- However, there is one thing that must be included in a PMP (per the ADS) – performance indicators.
- You will also need:
 - **A definition of the performance indicator, unit of measurement, and brief justification** for selecting this indicator;
 - **Baseline and target values** for each performance indicator included in the PMP;
 - Whenever possible, indicators should be **disaggregated by sex**;
 - **Data source and method of collection or calculation.** How will the raw data be collected, compiled, analyzed and reported? Note that that data collection methods should be consistent and comparable over time
 - **Schedule for data collection.** When will the data be collected? Who will be responsible for collection and analysis of raw data?
 - **Description of known data limitations and how they will be addressed.**
 - **Description of data quality assessment procedures.** What are the procedures that will be used to verify and validate measured values of actual performance?
 - **Estimate of costs.** What will collecting, analyzing, and reporting performance data cost and how will it be paid for?
 - **Identify possible evaluation efforts.** Highlight evaluation efforts that may complement performance monitoring efforts and identify circumstances that may require special studies. Don't forget plans to monitor critical assumptions and contextual indicators (ie. GDP) that affect the results framework and plans for evaluating the development hypothesis.
 - **Calendar of performance management tasks.** Performance management tasks may include review of partner reports, conducting portfolio reviews, assessing data quality, revising PMP as necessary, preparing the annual performance report and designing and conducting evaluations as needed.

Keep in mind that you will also want to gather information on results that are supported by other development partners. Back to the example earlier, if the successful implementation of your program is dependent on the timing and effectiveness of another partner's program, you want to make sure that you are keeping an eye on their progress.

Task *(also in participant notebooks at end of M&E section)*

Staying in your small groups, take 10 minutes to:

- Select 1 of your electoral security program objectives
- Develop at least 2 objective-level performance indicators
- Develop at least 1 to performance indicator to measure impact on conflict dynamics
- Propose how each indicator will be measured

Be prepared to discuss with the group.



SECTION 10

Session 10: Conclusions and Closure

Duration: 15 minutes

Overview:

This session concludes the two-day training. Participants should be recognized for their hard work and asked to fill out the evaluation in their binders prior to leaving.

Objectives:

Materials Needed:

- Certificates signed by senior manager (if using)
- Evaluation (in participant notebooks)
- Participant contact list

Activities:

1. Address any outstanding issues in the parking lot or any other loose ends.
2. Congratulate participants on their work and distribute certificates. If possible, have the Mission Director or DG Director / Deputy Director distribute certificates and recognize participants work.
3. Remind participants to fill in their evaluations prior to leaving and distribute participant contact list if not included in participant notebooks.

Optional Additions/Variations:

Participant Resources (CD):



Frequently Asked Questions

How is the Electoral Security Framework different from the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF), Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), or Democracy and Governance Assessment (DG Assessment)?

Unlike these other assessments which occur at a broader level, the Electoral Security Framework provides an integrated approach to conducting a sub-sector analysis and developing corresponding programs that address electoral security priorities. In the event that a CAF or ICAF identified elections as a possible trigger, or a DG Assessment identified elections as a priority area of intervention, it would then be appropriate to use the Electoral Security Framework to identify electoral security vulnerabilities and appropriate responses.

If I don't have 18 months before elections, can I still use the Electoral Security Framework approach?

Yes, the ideal time to use the Electoral Security Framework is 18 months or more prior to elections in order to have time to craft and begin implementing responsive programs. However, recognizing that this is not always possible, the Electoral Security Framework is a very flexible approach that can be used at any point during the electoral cycle to assess areas of greatest need and identify appropriate programs. If time is short, use a knowledgeable group of mission staff (expatriates and FSNs) to conduct a brief desk assessment using the most relevant sections of the Framework assessment and planning materials. Then move on to programming and M&E, although continue to refine and reassess as you are implementing.

