

MANAGING TRANSITIONAL ANARCHIES: RWANDA, BURUNDI AND SOUTH AFRICA

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Against the backdrop of Africa's troubled transitions to democracy Rwanda and South Africa stand at opposite ends of a spectrum of success and failure that ranges from the apocalyptic to the nearly miraculous. At one extreme South Africa, the site of what has been described as "one of the most extraordinary political transformations of the twentieth century", where the people "have defied the logic of their past, and broken all the rules of social theory, to forge a powerful spirit of unity from a shattered nation" (1). At the other end of the scale, Rwanda, a synonym for abyssal violence -- a name that will go down in history as the epitome of an African Holocaust. Burundi, though spared the agonies of Rwanda, does not fare much better on the scale of failed transitions. Here a remarkably successful transition was abruptly brought to a halt by an attempted military take-over, setting off an explosion of ethnic violence on a scale consonant with the country's reputation as a leading candidate for the title of genocidal state. (2)

Few could have anticipated such dramatically divergent destinies. One only needs to recall the misgivings expressed by informed observers of the South African scene on the eve of the transition, and the decidedly upbeat prognosis offered by at least one seasoned analyst about the future of Rwanda and Burundi. Three weeks before the latter's "exemplary transition" was nipped in the bud by the army, and five months before Rwanda captured the headlines as the site of the most horrifying genocide of the end of the century, Professor Jean-Pierre Chrétien paid a vibrant tribute to the emergence in each state of "a new political culture which has nothing in common with the mentalities of the 1960s", and concluded that "in Kigali as in Bujumbura a culture of human rights is gradually replacing the discriminations based on blood rights". (3)

Rather than to take Professor Chrétien to task for his less than impressive forecast -- an exercise no less futile than what Raymond Aron called "the infallibility of retrospective prediction" -- our aim in this paper is to try to explain the contrasting trajectories of Rwanda, Burundi and South Africa, and see what lessons can be learned from a comparative assessment of their performance in coping with the challenge of democratization.

The argument, in a nutshell, is that structural factors, social and economic -- whether "enabling", as in South Africa, or "disabling",

as in Rwanda and Burundi -- are not enough to explain success or failure. Significant as they are in facilitating or hampering political outcomes, and in shaping the reconstruction of ethnic or racial selves, the really critical variables have to do with (a) the nature of the transition bargain, (b) the quality of leadership skills, (c) the character of opposition movements, and (d) the attitude of the armed forces. Difficult though it is to properly measure the relative significance of each of the above, in all three cases the role of the army in assisting or obstructing political reform emerges as the decisive element in the transitional equation.

In drawing comparative lessons from the cases at hand heavy emphasis has been placed on domestic forces at the expense of international actors. Neglect of this dimension is not meant to depreciate its significance: the brevity of our concluding thoughts on the subject has been dictated by considerations of space; there is simply no room in this already lengthy exercise for a more extensive pondering of the international parameters of democratic transitions.

The point of this discussion, in any event, is not to celebrate the primacy of "voluntarism" as an alternative to structural explanations, but to show that structural constraints, no matter how limiting, do not rule out the element of choice involved in democratization.

Caveats

On the eve of their transitions all three states could be described as "ranked" societies, in that they shared a vertical pattern of stratification in which the politically dominant group also controlled access to wealth, education and status; all three opted for a transitional formula that brought incumbents and opponents to the negotiating table -- what Huntington calls "transplacement" (4); while Rwanda and Burundi are tragic examples of aborted transitions, South Africa's success is all the more remarkable given the similarity of structural conditions noted above.

While each of these propositions is basically correct, they all cry out for further qualifications. For one thing, there is an obvious difference between the "ruling minority" pattern exhibited by Burundi and South Africa, on the one hand, and the "ruling majority situation" characteristic of post-independence Rwanda. If there is any structural parallel between Rwanda and the apartheid state it must be found in the type of minority rule exemplified by associated with the Tutsi monarchy before it fell under the blows of Hutu "rebels" (1959-60), causing thousands of Tutsi to seek asylum in neighbouring countries. Their revenge came in 1994, when their sons, now turned "refugee-warriors", successfully fought

their way back into the country under the banner of the Tutsi-dominated Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR). By a prank of history the restoration of minority rule under FPR auspices brings Rwanda back to where it stood before the 1959/60 revolution -- on the brink of yet another cycle of ethnic violence.

Unlike Rwanda, and for reasons that lie beyond the scope of this discussion, Burundi was spared the trauma of ethnic conflict long enough to accede to independence (1962) as a constitutional monarchy under a mixed Hutu-Tutsi government. Not until 1965 did the ripple effects of the Rwanda revolution trigger a sequence of events that led to the overthrow of the monarchy by the army and the capture of the state by Tutsi elements. Although the position of hegemony held by Tutsi in Burundi and whites in South Africa invites comparison, that one happens to be a racial and the other an ethnic minority is a fact of no small significance. Not only because of the greater social distance engendered by race differences, but because racial oligarchies are supposedly more resistant to democratic changes.

Only in South Africa did the transition process involve a genuine transplacement, in the form of a sustained dialogue between the two key players, the Nationalist Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC). In Rwanda, what few contacts occurred between the ruling party, the Mouvement National pour la Revolution et le Developpement (MNRD), and the FPR, failed to go beyond a pro forma agreement on a transitional arrangement; the Arusha accords, it will be recalled, never really got off the ground (5), in part because the decisions made by the parties represented at Arusha were never fully endorsed by the rank and file, and only reluctantly by the leadership. In Burundi transplacement took the form of joint decisions between Hutu and Tutsi elements handpicked by President Pierre Buyoya, but left out key opposition parties, i.e. the Front Democratique du Burundi (Frodebu) and the Parti de la Liberation du Peuple Hutu (Palipehutu). Burundi thus stands half-way between transplacement and "transformation", when "the elites in power take the lead in bringing about democracy". In short, only in South Africa were the conditions met for a genuine negotiation with the principal opposition party.

Finally, it is important to note that terms like "success" and "failure" greatly oversimplify the dynamics of transitional processes, and thus obscure the specificity of the cases at hand. Far more appropriate for analytic purposes are the distinctions drawn by Michael Bratton, in which "fragile", "flawed", "blocked" transitions are seen to correspond to distinctive patterns, as does a fourth category, "transitions precluded by conflict". (6) On the basis of this typology South Africa clearly belongs to the first and Rwanda to the last of these transitional patterns, with Burundi standing as a prime example of a "flawed transition", i.e. one in which "an election is held and a new government is formed, but the regime of governance changes minimally", (7) the losers refusing to

accept the verdict of the polls.

Useful as it is for analytic purposes, Bratton's typology leaves room for further distinctions. There is indeed a great deal more to the case of Rwanda than a "transition precluded by conflict": what has emerged from the belly of the genocidal beast is a society maimed beyond recognition. Although states like Chad, Angola, Liberia, Ethiopia, and Rwanda all fit into that category, the scale and savagery of the killings in Rwanda, resulting in a million deaths, along with its devastating domestic and regional implications, make it qualitatively different from, say, Chad or Ethiopia.

By the same token, although Benin, Madagascar, the Congo and South Africa can all be described as "fragile democracies", given its resource base, level of institutional development and regime characteristics, South Africa's "fragility" seems like rock-like solidity compared to the Congo, Benin or Cape Verde. Because of its historic legacy of "stateness" and political competitiveness, so strikingly at odds with the patrimonial syndrome encountered in virtually every other state in the continent, there are compelling reasons to agree with the view set forth by Bratton and Van de Walle that even though "consolidated democracy in South Africa (cannot be said to be) easy, imminent or preordained... it is more likely than in those African neopatrimonial regimes where political competition has been outlawed. (8)

Finally, it is important to stress that the cases of Rwanda and Burundi cannot be dealt with independently of each other. Ethnic strife in Rwanda has had a profound impact on the destinies of Burundi, and vice versa. Just as the Hutu-led revolution in Rwanda has contributed directly to the sharpening of ethnic polarities in Burundi, the assassination of Burundi's first popularly elected president (a Hutu) at the hands of the all-Tutsi army, on October 21, 1994, provides the indispensable backdrop for an understanding to the Rwanda genocide.

Clearly, efforts to generalize about the "why" and "how" of democratic transitions, about types and processes, outcomes and liabilities, are singularly complicated by the contextual specificity of African state systems. Nowhere is this obstacle more daunting than when trying to compare the record of performance in states as different from each other on almost every social and economic indicator as South Africa, on the one hand, and Rwanda and Burundi on the other.

Contextual Parameters

There are indeed reasons to wonder whether comparison makes sense when the units of analysis are as strikingly different from each other in terms of size, population density and level of economic and social development as the Lilliputian polities of Rwanda and

Burundi, on the one hand, and South Africa on the other. Consider, for example, the demographic and spatial dimensions: with a territory roughly 50 times the size of Rwanda (26,000 sq.km.) or Burundi (28,000 sq.km.), South Africa claims a population of 39.5 million, as against 7.5 million in Rwanda (before the genocide) and 6 million in Burundi. The latter two have the highest rate of population density anywhere in Africa, a factor that has sharpened significantly the edge of conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. One need not be an impenitent Malthusian to realize that neither state can sustain the current rate of population pressure on the land without recourse to further violent "readjustments".

The macroeconomic picture reveals equally striking discrepancies in terms of production, volume of exports, investment and savings. All of which underscores the extreme poverty of Rwanda and Burundi -- with GDP per capita of \$ 290.00 and \$ 231.00, respectively, as against \$ 2,650 for South Africa -- and South Africa's wealth as one of the world's 25 biggest economies. With a GDP of \$ 120 bn, according to the 1994 UN Human Development Report, South Africa ranks sixtieth in terms of per capita income, and 93rd in terms of human development (9); on both counts Rwanda and Burundi are at the bottom of the heap. There is no equivalent in either state for South Africa's buoyant industrial sector, long nurtured through vigorous import substitution policies. Patterns of employment show that only 30 per cent of the population of South Africa is engaged in agriculture as against 98 per cent in Rwanda and Burundi. The preeminence of mining and manufacturing in the South African economy translates into a sizeable African middle-class, for which there are no equivalents in either Rwanda and Burundi.

The implications go beyond Barrington Moore's classic argument that middle classes are the indispensable ingredient of successful democratization. (10) The first point to note is the presence in the African population of a substantial number of "stakeholders" in South Africa's capitalist economy, a fact that gave added credibility (the collapse of the Soviet system also helped) to F.W de Klerk's trade-off: acceptance of a privatization-cum-market economy whose benefits would be shared by whites and blacks in return for full political participation by Africans. Because both whites and blacks have a stake in the economy a compromise on the economic front could be negotiated as part of a larger package proposal on the distribution of power. Such a quid pro quo is hardly conceivable in states like Rwanda or Burundi, where access to the economy tends to be seen in the same zero-sum game perspective as access to power.

Predictably, the texture of the civil society in South Africa is far more supportive of democracy than that of Rwanda and Burundi. Despite notable exceptions, the South African social landscape incorporates a range of associational groupings -- Churches, trade-unions, cooperatives, civic associations, human rights groups, grass-roots organizations, etc. -- whose goals and memberships

transcend the boundaries of any particular ethnic or racial community. As such they provide critically important vehicles for aggregating and channelling social demands across the board. According to a study of community-based organizations in the Western Cape an important aspect of the emergent civil society is the proliferation of "productive linkages between the state/formal bureaucratic activities and the interests and aspirations of the civil society." (11) If so, nothing is more typical of the civil societies of Rwanda and Burundi than the extreme weakness of such cross-cutting linkages. What has emerged instead are associations dominated by ethnic or ethno-regional particularisms, and more often than not thoroughly unsupportive of democratic orientations.

Although the foregoing makes clear the existence in South Africa of a set of comparatively auspicious conditions for a smooth transition, the race factor, on the other hand, that most potent catalyst of primordial identities, introduces liabilities nowhere to be encountered in Rwanda or Burundi.

The Transformation of Ethnic/Racial Cleavages

"Love uncertainty and you will be democratic". Przeworski's trenchant formulation (12) illuminates the critical issue involved in ranked societies faced with the prospects of democracy; where the introduction of the vote on a per capita basis threatens to shift power away from ruling minorities, their enthusiasm for democracy is bound to be diluted by the virtual certainty of their replacement in office by representatives of the masses.

On the face of the evidence one might have anticipated greater resistance to democracy on the part of South African whites than from the ruling elites of Rwanda and Burundi. For if all three states are (or were) hierarchically structured societies, only in South Africa was the once politically dominant minority juridically, culturally and racially distinct from the African majority. History, language, and institutionalized discrimination conspired to mark them off from each other in ways unknown in Rwanda and Burundi.

Unlike South Africa, neither state is artifact of Western imperialism. As has repeatedly been emphasized, Hutu and Tutsi speak the same language -- Kirundi in Burundi, Kinyarwanda in Rwanda -- share the same customs and lived in relative harmony side by side with each other for centuries before the advent of colonial rule. Contrary to the image projected by the media, the patterns of exclusion brought to light during and after independence cannot be reduced to "deep-seated, ancestral enmities". Although precolonial Rwanda was unquestionably more rigidly stratified than Burundi, and hence more vulnerable to a Hutu-led revolution, the key to an understanding of their contrasting political fortunes -- with Rwanda acceding to independence (1962) as a Hutu-dominated republic, and Burundi as a constitutional monarchy under an

ethnically mixed government -- lies in the uneven rhythms at which processes of ethnic mobilization were set in motion in the years immediately preceding independence. A detailed discussion of this critical phase in their history would take us too far afield (13); suffice it to note that in both instances it is the interplay between ethnic realities and their subjective reconstruction (or manipulation) by political entrepreneurs that lies at the root of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict.

This last point requires further elaboration: to treat race and ethnicity as "givens" can only lead to confusion and misinterpretation; only by ridding ourselves of this essentialist view of primordial identities can we begin to appreciate the fundamental changes that have shaped the contours of collective "selves". None of the societies under consideration can be treated as simply bi-polar. Just as in Rwanda and Burundi Hutu are separated from Hutu by regional and clan affiliations, so also for Tutsi. In South Africa likewise, Afrikaans-speaking whites are culturally distinct from English-speaking whites, and both in turn differ from Coloreds in terms of cultural, occupational and residential ties. Cultural pluralism is even more pronounced among Africans. Whatever differences mark off Zulu from Xhosa, Ndebele from Venda, Tswana from Qwaqwa, and so forth, have been powerfully reinforced by the "separate development" policies that followed the coming to power of the Nationalist Party (NP) in 1948. Not only are ethnic maps in all three cases far more diversified than might appear at first sight, but the processes of ethnic/racial restructuring arising from changes in their environments are more open-ended than might be assumed from an essentialist perspective. (14)

This is where intergroup violence takes on special significance as a variable. All three societies can fairly be described as among the most violent societies in the continent, yet the consequences have been markedly different in South Africa from what can be observed in Rwanda and Burundi. In South Africa violence has been more political than ethnic. It has involved principally black Africans, pitting Zulu supporters of Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) against ANC militants (both Zulu and non-Zulu), and far less frequently blacks against whites. (15) In Rwanda and Burundi, by contrast, violence has consistently involved Hutu against Tutsi, inexorably pushing their societies towards polarization, while prompting social actors to redefine their collective self-images in manichean terms.

The phenomenon is nowhere more tragically evident than in the case of Rwanda. Aside from the fact that ethnic conflict has been a recurrent theme of its history ever since the 1959-60 Hutu revolution, as shown by the killings of Tutsi by Hutu in 1963 and 1973, the October 1990 invasion by the Tutsi-dominated FPR resurrected the dynamic of ethnic confrontation on an unprecedented scale, causing untold casualties among innocent Tutsi civilians.

Never at a loss for metaphors of demonization, the media consistently sought to portray all Tutsi as members of a "feudal", alien minority hell bent upon reimposing their domination on the Hutu masses. With radio Mille Collines goading Hutu to kill Tutsi, the movement towards ethnic polarization gained an irresistible momentum. What few inter-ethnic parties had come into being since 1991 -- such as the Parti Liberal (PL), the Parti Social Democrate and the Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MRD) -- saw their leadership fracture along ethnic lines. From all evidence, the Arusha compromise was already on the ropes when the shooting down of the presidential plane triggered the genocidal killings of Tutsi civilians.

The record of ethnic strife in Burundi tells a somewhat similar tale, but with a different denouement. The 1972 genocide of Hutu civilians by the all-Tutsi army, following an aborted Hutu-instigated uprising, was the cataclysmic event behind the reconstruction of group identities, i.e. the dehumanization of Tutsi by Hutu and the denial of Hutu identity by Tutsi. To the some 100,000 Hutu killed in cold blood in 1972, another 15,000 were added in August 1988 in the wake of a Hutu-led insurrection in the northern provinces of Ntega and Marangara. Ironically, although the conflict provided the catalytic element behind Burundi's transition to democracy, the result was a further hardening of ethnic lines. Remarkably, another major outburst of ethnic violence in November/October 1991 failed to bring the democratization process to a halt, and by 1993 incumbents and opponents made a valiant effort to describe their respective parties -- the Union pour le Progres National (Uprona), and the Front Democratique du Burundi (Frodebu) -- as sharing a non-ethnic vision of the future Burundi polity, even though the first was predominantly Tutsi and the other predominantly Hutu.

The emergent pattern in South African context points in the opposite direction. Ever since the collapse of apartheid there has been a continuous questioning of racial stereotypes. Even though their residual hold on the consciousness of extremists cannot be discounted, the significance of the phenomenon, made manifest in the new themes in South African art and literature (16), cannot be overemphasized. By confronting the "out there" of race and ethnicity, with their subjective visions of what a future democratic South Africa should look like, many are the social actors, white and black, who take seriously the task of "deconstructing" the either-or options of a white-ruled or black-ruled South Africa.

Having said that, in none of cases under examination was the outcome of democratization foreordained by their past histories, class structure, ethnic make-up or economic resource-base. Crucial as these factors may be in restricting or enlarging the range of choices available to social actors, in the last analysis their choices -- or non-choices -- is what made a difference.

Transition Bargains

In their work on SOUTH AFRICA'S OPTIONS, written in 1979, Van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh prophesied that sooner or later "when the costs of maintaining white domination increase to an unacceptably high point, most whites will want to, or could be persuaded to, move away from it". After referring to the "optimum forum" that a multiparty convention would provide, they go on to note: "Obviously there will be wide differences... The object of negotiations is precisely to try and bridge differences by bargaining, compromise and trade-offs".(17)

Perception of costs are inevitably linked to an awareness of conflict. What sets in motion the wheels of democratization, one perceptive observer noted, is not "trust and tolerance", but "very uncivic behavior, such as warfare and internal social conflict".(18) Very "uncivic" indeed was the behavior of the FPR guerillas shooting their way into Rwanda on October 1st, 1990, of Hutu peasants in Burundi killing their neighbours and Tutsi troops shooting at Hutu in August 1988, of ANC black youth in the townships "necklacing" suspected traitors to the cause... But if the dynamics of transitions are inseparable from the conflict situations from which they arise, the structuring of conflict impinged very differently on the process of democratization in Rwanda -- where the conflict took the form of a military invasion massively supported by Uganda -- from what can be observed in Burundi or South Africa.

While all three states ended up endorsing a power-sharing formula as a way of accomodating conflicting claims, the really critical issues -- how much power was shared with whom, at what level, and for how long -- were dealt with very differently.

Seen in this light the transition bargain in Rwanda emerges retrospectively as a recipe for disaster: not only were the negotiations conducted under tremendous external pressure, but, partly for this reason, the concessions made to the FPR were seen by Hutu hard-liners as a sell-out imposed by outsiders. For the Tutsi "rebels" to end up claiming as many seats in the transitional government as the ruling MNRD, as well as half of the field grade officers and above, was viewed by extremists in the so-called "mouvance presidentielle" as a surrender to blackmail. Many indeed wondered whether the Arusha accords of August 4, 1993, would have been signed in the absence of repeated nudging from the OAU, Tanzania, France, the United States and Belgium. If there were any doubts about the intense disagreements within the MNRD about the wisdom of letting the FPR fox into the henhouse these were quickly dissipated by the outbreaks of Hutu-instigated violence that both preceded and followed the accords. Violence thus became self-generating: rather than providing a framework for a peaceful settlement, the Arusha accords became the focus of growing

resentment between Hutu and Tutsi, causing even moderate parties like the Parti Social Democrate (PSD) and the Parti Liberal (PL) to virtually disintegrate amidst ethnic quarrels.

In South Africa the path of negotiations was not forced upon the government by outside pressure, but freely chosen by the parties concerned; it did not involve off-and-on talks in a neighbouring state, but four years of sustained bargaining in Pretoria, during which, according to the Secretary General of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, "a lot of ideas matured in our heads and hearts"; more importantly, the key opposition partner in the negotiations was not an armed faction but a century-old political movement headed by a charismatic leader, mellowed by a 28-year sojourn on Robben Island. Nor was the incumbent president the product of an ethno-regionally inspired military coup.(19) The September 1992 Record of Understanding between F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela made clear that they saw themselves as the key players. Their success in marginalizing radical opposition movements, including Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Afrikaner Volksfront (AV), is in obvious contrast to what happened in Rwanda, where marginalization affected, first and foremost, the moderates, while giving pride of place to the extremists, i.e. the FPR and the MNRD. Furthermore, while de Klerk remained obdurate on refusing to integrate Umkhonto we Sizwe (the armed wing of the ANC) within the South African Defence Force (SADF), Habyalimana had no other choice but to knuckle under to the demands of the FPR.

Not the least of the achievements of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which included representatives of 20 of the 26 delegations participating in the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF), was to reach a consensus on a power-sharing formula, and work out a compromise between the ANC's long-standing commitment to a unitary state and the insistent demands for regional autonomy set forth by IFP and VP. Provision was made for a consociational system that would allow all parties winning at least 20 per cent of the vote in the provinces to claim a share of executive power for five years after the multiracial elections of April 1994.(20) Agreement on a flexible federal formula, and a special constitutional/monarchical status for Natal, went a long way towards meeting the demands of both the government and the IFP/VP "regionalists".(21) And by retreating from its previous insistence on widespread nationalization, the ANC gained increasing credibility as a "valid interlocutor".

Looking at the options facing South Africa in 1991, Donald Horowitz concluded: "The choice is between zero-sum, high conflict contests along ethnic and racial lines... and open-textured, fluid, low-conflict contests, mainly along racial and ethnic lines but with an admixture of intergroup cooperation" (22). If Rwanda clearly shows the danger of the first option, South Africa stands as a prime example of the benefits to be gained from the second. But what of Burundi? Compared to Rwanda, the lines of conflict were certainly

more fluid, and a fair measure of inter-group cooperation presided over the decisions reached by the Constitutional Commission, and before that by the National Commission in Charge of Studying the Question of National Unity. The government appointed by President Buyoya in the wake of the 1988 massacre included as many Hutu as Tutsi, including a Hutu Prime Minister, and ethnic parity was also the rule in the appointment of these commissions.

As in South Africa the Burundi transition, extending over a five-year period (1988-1993), introduced a climate of tolerance and openness totally unknown during the previous 23 years of dictatorship, culminating with an electoral campaign relatively free of ethnic references.(23) "Exemplary" is how international observers described the transition. The process of consolidation could have been equally impressive, however, if the military, long the guarantor of Tutsi ethnocracy, had been willing to give democracy a chance. On this dimension as on many others the case of Burundi departs dramatically from that of South Africa.

Leadership Patterns

The ultimate test of leadership is the capacity to create a political will where none would otherwise materialize. In transitions to democracy leadership skills make a critical difference because the outcome of the process is so heavily dependent on the ability of incumbents and opponents alike to forge a common consensus on basic issues affecting the fate of the parties concerned. Whether the national community remains united or flies apart depends on the choices made by a handful of leaders.

Here the contrast between South Africa, on the one hand, and Rwanda and Burundi on the other, could not be more glaring. There is simply no equivalent in either state, or anywhere else in the continent, for the sustained dialogue and compromises achieved through the complex personal chemistry between Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk -- the first a larger-than-life figure, the embodiment of African hopes in the townships and beyond, the other the standard-bearer of liberal reforms, the Afrikaner with a human face. Complementary enemies, to be sure, yet willing to jettison the ballast when the circumstances required, they deserve all the credit bestowed upon them by the media for "making it happen".

If, as Ian Shapiro suggests, "transplacements occur only when reformers are stronger than standpatters in government and moderates are stronger than extremists in the opposition", (24) it is easy to see why the Mandela/De Klerk tandem contributed decisively to the success of the operation: only F.W. de Klerk could have swung the standpatters around on the side of reform, as he did in April 1992 when he received two thirds of the vote in support of constitutional negotiations; only Mandela had the charisma, and the guts, to resist the pressure of township extremists within the ANC.

"We are starting a new era of hope, of reconciliation, of nation-building". (25) Mandela's words, during the April 1994 election, articulate a message that was seldom heard in Rwanda or Burundi in the ranks of the opposition, much less among incumbents. Compared to Mandela, Rwanda's president, the late Juvenal Habyalimana, comes across as extraordinarily indecisive, lacking in vision, and very much the captive of his extremist, northern-based entourage -- the so-called akazu ("little house" in Kinyarwanda). Where Mandela insisted on speaking for "all South Africans", Habyalimana spoke only for the Hutu, or, more precisely for the northern Hutu; where Mandela showed commitment to a negotiated solution, Habyalimana had to be driven kicking and screaming to the negotiating table; where Mandela was able to reassure his opponents, Habyalimana did just the opposite. Unlike what happened in South Africa, the reformers in the government never had a chance, while the extremists in the opposition never ceased to gain influence -- hardly a recipe for a successful transplacement.

In Burundi the incumbent President, Pierre Buyoya (Tutsi), and the leading opposition figure and Frodebu President, the late Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu), were genuinely committed to giving democracy a chance, which for both meant keeping the extremists at bay and looking for the middle ground. This they were able to accomplish only up to a point. While both tried to keep the lid on extremists within their respective parties, the Uprona and the Frodebu, neither could prevent the more radical elements within the Palipehutu from engaging in acts of violence against government officials. All Buyoya could do was to unleash the army against anyone suspected of Palipehutiste sympathies. With the banning of Palipehutu candidates from the 1993 presidential and legislative elections many of the more radical voices within the party joined the Frodebu. By contagion, as it were, the radicalisation of the Frodebu led to a similar phenomenon within the Uprona. Thus, beginning in 1989, under Buyoya's leadership, Tutsi reformers in the government played a major role in pushing the country in the direction of democratization, but in so doing they opened up a window of opportunity for extremists at both ends of the ethnic spectrum to derail the transition. That they were not able to do so before the elections is as much a tribute to Buyoya's willingness to stay the course as it is a reflection of Ndadaye's distaste for ethnic demagoguery.

Opposition Movements

The failure of negotiations, or the reluctance of the government to negotiate, creates propensities for violence, and once violence is unleashed on a substantial scale the odds are that it will scuttle the transition process. This is what happened in Rwanda, with horrifying consequences.

All three states have been confronted at one time or another with armed oppositions: Umkhonto we Sizwe -- the armed wing of the ANC -

- in South Africa, Ubumwe in Burundi, and the FPR -- also known as Inkontanyi -- in Rwanda. By 1992 the first had agreed to end the armed struggle as part of a broader agreement between Mandela and de Klerk; the second, never more than a shadowy "groupuscule", had virtually ceased to exist; the third, however, is now in power in Kigali.

State-capturing insurgencies are not uncommon in Africa, yet the nature of the state they try to capture differs from one case to the next, and so does the identity, aspirations and organizational skills of the insurgents. In part the success of the FPR stemmed from its ability to capitalize upon the many "dysfunctions" afflicting the Rwanda state -- ranging from corruption, narcotics operations and political assassinations to ethno-regional favoritism in the army and the bureaucracy. But these alone would never have sufficed to ensure a FPR victory. Two factors played a key role in transforming the Tutsi refugee-warriors into a formidable force: (a) the massive support, in terms of arms, ammunition, equipment and cash, they received from Uganda, and (b) the inability of the Habyalimana government to prevent the killings of Tutsi civilians by Hutu death squads: the result has been to draw a growing number of young Tutsi into the ranks of the FPR (a phenomenon perhaps best described as "involvement by victimization"). From approximately 4,000 men at the time of the October 1st 1990 invasion the FPR claimed some 20,000 combatants when it seized Kigali in July 1994.

Though intended to bring violence under control, the Arusha accords, as noted earlier, had the opposite effect. The critical issue hinged around the incorporation of FPR elements into the Rwandan armed forces. In contrast with what happened in South Africa, where de Klerk strenuously resisted ANC demands that Umkhonto we Sizwe be incorporated into the South African Defence Forces (SADF), and by so doing was able to retain much of his credibility within and outside the military (26), the Arusha accords provided for a basic restructuring of the Rwandan army. Out of a total of 19,000 men 40 per cent of the troops and 50 per cent of the officer corps would consist of FPR men. As noted earlier, though formally endorsed by the delegates to Arusha this concession proved totally unacceptable to the extremists of the ruling MNRD, the Interhamwe militias and key elements of the Presidential Guard, who then proceeded to engage in random killings of Tutsi civilians in hopes of blocking the transition. They succeeded beyond all expectations.

As is now painfully evident, the shooting down of Habyalimana's plane on April 6, 1994, was the cataclysmic event that triggered the genocide of Tutsi civilians throughout the country, and the physical liquidation of all moderate Hutu politicians in the capital city. Although considerable doubts remain as to who shot the missiles that brought the plane down, the crash must be seen not so much as the cause of the massacre as a symptom of more

fundamental forces leading inexorably towards confrontation.(27) Once the negotiation process had been "highjacked" by Hutu extremists within and outside the government, the "middle ground" opposition parties quickly collapsed as a rallying point for compromise.

How to develop incentives to reward moderation and sanction extremism is the key question raised by transitions to democracy everywhere; as the case of Rwanda sadly demonstrates neither is conceivable where the logic of violence supersedes the exigencies of compromise -- and where the military becomes a party to the conflict.

The Role of the Military

Whether as a guarantee of national security (South Africa), a continuing source of instability (Burundi), or a key participant in the massacre of civilians (Rwanda), in each state the military has emerged as a decisive element in the political equation.

Are the differences in the performance of their respective armed forces simply reducible to the classic distinction between praetorian and professional armies, the former characteristically predisposed to intervene in politics, the latter viewing its role as subordinate to civilian authority? The answer is not nearly as clear as one might think.

At the risk of oversimplification, we would argue that in each state the military showed considerable propensities to intervene in civilian politics; if the SADF refrained from doing so during the transition to multiparty democracy this is because of a widely shared consensus among high-ranking officers that the costs of a military intervention would far exceed its chances of success. From the ANC perspective, however, this rational choice option was far from evident, especially in view of the well-established "interventionist" reputation of specific units -- the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Reconnaissance Commandos (Recces)-- and the historic vulnerability of the SADF to Afrikaner interests. One of de Klerk's shrewdest moves was to show enough distaste for the SADF's praetorian propensities to strengthen his credibility with the ANC, while at the same time leaving enough room for doubts about his capacity to keep the lid on SADF to induce Mandela to agree to the terms of the transition bargain.

It is important to note that throughout the 1980s, during the so-call "total onslaught" era, the SADF emerged as a key participant in policy-making. The principle of civilian oversight was frequently called into question by praetorian elements, later said to constitute a "third force". The involvement of the SADF in covert operations has been convincingly established by the report of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry Regarding Public Violence

and Intimidation, in turn prompting de Klerk to fire 23 top-ranking officers in December 1992.(28) Nonetheless, many hard-line praetorians evaded the purge, a move which, in retrospect, may have been a blessing in disguise. As Herbert Howe shrewdly observed, "retaining politically hard-line officers and structures paradoxically may have aided, rather than lessened, de Klerk's bargaining power. He needed support for his reform across the political/racial spectrum, and his unwillingness to purge and/or integrate the SADF with Umkhonto helped win the crucial referendum of whites in March 1992". And he goes on to note: "The government's retention of hard-line officers in the SADF helped (or forced) the ANC leadership to sell several inevitable compromises to its members and supporters, who were told not to underestimate the regime's known counter-revolutionary capabilities, and that these required ANC flexibility". (29) While ANC flexibility on security and political issues was a powerful inducement for the SADF not to intervene, by the same token it made the political costs of intervention impossible to sustain.

Why was the Burundi army (or segments thereof), unlike its South African counterpart, unable to anticipate the cost of a military intervention? When one reflects on the catastrophic consequences of the October 21, 1993 coup -- 50,000 dead, one million displaced, 300,000 refugees, the virtual decapitation of the Frodebu party and the paralysis of the state -- the question takes on added pertinence. Part of the reason lies in the force of historical precedent. Military coups in Burundi have occurred in 1965, 1976 and 1983, and each time at very little cost for the army. The last two were bloodless coups, resulting in the replacement of one military clique by another. Even though the situation in 1993 was radically different in that it involved the overthrow of a popularly elected, Hutu-led government, the coup-makers probably did not anticipate the scale of the social explosion set off by their action, or their immediate condemnation by international public opinion. Also, because of its ethno-regional profile (approximately 95 per cent of the officers and troops are Tutsi-Hima from the Bururi province) the Burundi army has always tended to see itself as a corporate entity different from the rest of the Tutsi population (the so-called Tutsi-Banyaraguru). (30) Furthermore, its frequent involvement in the repression of Hutu protest movements, including the 1988 uprising, was hardly conducive to a conciliatory stance on Hutu demands. The threats posed to its corporate interests by the coming to power of a Hutu-led government only increased the army's predisposition to intervene, as did the massive layoffs of Tutsi civil servants dictated by the exigencies of patronage for Frodebu stalwarts.

In Rwanda the role of the military must be seen in the context of the bitter civil strife touched off by the October 1990 invasion. The participation of the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) in the war against the FPR went hand in hand with its growing political involvement, culminating with the orgy of political assassinations

by the Presidential Guard in the days immediately following the shooting down of the presidential plane.

In a sense the RAF never ceased to involve themselves in the politics of the country. The July 5, 1973 coup that brought Habyalimana to power was designed to shift power away from Hutu elements from the south -- many of whom formed the spearhead of the 1959 revolution -- to northerners. And to make sure that power would remain in their hands the coup-makers did not hesitate to have an estimated 40 key politicians from the previous regime murdered while in detention at the Ruhengeri jail, all of them from the south, and all of them with impressive credentials as "revolutionnaires de la premiere heure". There are few parallels in history for such a thorough-going purge of revolutionary elites by a military counter-elite.

From a north-south axis ethno-regional tensions then shifted to the north, pitting those civilian/military elites who came from the Bushiru region (Bashiru), Habyalimana's homeland, against those who claimed the Bugoyi as their region of origin (Bagoyi). By 1980 all Bagoyi personalities of any standing had been relegated to the sidelines. Some ended up in jail, others in flight, others under virtual house arrest. Not until January 1991, following a daring FPR raid on the Ruhengeri jail, was the leading figure of the Bagoyi "clan", Theoneste Lizinde, set free, only to declare himself among the staunchest supporters of the FPR, along with another well-known Mugoyi, and currently President of the FPR, Alexis Kanyarengwe.

The 1990 invasion brought radical changes in the size and composition of the RAF, and a growing convergence of interests between the Presidential Guard (PG) and the presidential "household" (*akazu*). From a total of 7,000 men in 1989, the RAF claimed a total of 30,000 in 1994, while the PG numbered approximately 6,000. (31) While many of the new recruits came from the south/central region, promotions and citations for gallantry remained the monopoly of northerners. North-south tensions erupted into a series of mutinies on June 4, 1991, in the Ruhengeri, Biumba and Kanombe camps. As the FAR increased in size, its ethnic profile altered, thus paving the way for continuing ethno-regional tensions within the army.

Meanwhile, after encountering stiff resistance in the weeks following the invasion, the FPR shifted its strategy from conventional warfare to guerilla tactics. The quest of the *inkontanyi* for safe sanctuaries among the civilian Tutsi population led to a similar change of tactics on the part of hard-liners in the government. Increasingly, innocent Tutsi civilians became the target of vicious attacks by Hutu militias (*Interhamwe*), often assisted by PG elements. It is worth noting in this connection that, beginning in early 1992, the PG became heavily involved in the recruitment and training *Interhamwe* militias. By late 1993 an

estimated 50,000 militias had received military and political training in the Mutara camps.(32) By then the PG had become so thoroughly politicized, regionalized, and indeed "clanicized" that it could best be described as a military extension of Habyalimana's household, a kind of neo-patrimonial inner circle held together by regional and kinship ties.

It is easy to see, in these conditions, why the PG emerged as a key participant in the massacre of moderate Hutu politicians and Tutsi civilians, why the tensions between the PG and the regular army erupted into bitter confrontations in the wake of the air crash, and why the strongest opposition to the Arusha accords came from the upper ranks of the PG. What remains unclear is what role, if any, the PG may have played in bringing down Habyalimana's plane. If their motives for getting rid of Habyalimana are reasonably straightforward in view of his grudging commitment to Arusha, whether they felt that it was worth the sacrifice of their recognized "patron" and benefactor, Colonel Elie Sagatwa, is not nearly as clear.

In all three cases the behavior of the military can be described as "path dependent" in that it bore a strong relationship to historical precedent. Yet in each case history has shaped attitudes very differently. The allegiance of the SADF to civilian authorities, as Herbert Howe points out, is traceable to the 1912 Union Defence Act; (33) as the CODESA talks got under way, some 80 years later, the force of historical precedent gave added weight to the emergent "pacifist" streak in Afrikaner public opinion, whose growing opposition to a military take-over found a receptive echo within the SADF.

No such concern for compromise entered the minds of the coup-makers in Burundi, only a corporate commitment to their ethno-regional interests. Assuming that history would repeat itself, little did they realize that in striking against a popularly elected government representing the Hutu majority they would cast themselves in the role of a pyromaniac fireman, unable to douse the flames they had ignited. Much the same sort of ethno-regional loyalties can be seen in the behavior of the PG in Rwanda, but with a strong neo-patrimonial flavor; this has meant a much higher degree of military penetration of the Rwanda polity than was the case in Burundi after 1988. Whereas in Burundi President Buyoya was able to distance himself from the military long enough to engineer a successful transition, in Rwanda Habyalimana remained throughout the captive -- and possibly the victim -- of a civilian/military oligarchy determined to hang on to its privileges, even if it meant the scuttling of Arusha.

External Pressures

By way of a conclusion, brief reference must be made to the impact of external powers on the range of choices available to domestic

actors. As shown by the radically different implications of the US involvement in South Africa and France in Rwanda, outside leverage can either facilitate compromise or raise the expectations of the stand-patters to the point where any such compromise becomes much more problematic.

There can be little doubt that in pressing for full black participation in the political and economic spheres, the US has played a critically important role in facilitation the transition from apartheid to democratic rule in South Africa. There has been, on the one hand, "a package of diplomatic, economic, educational and military initiatives intended to strengthen both the front line states and the African opposition within South Africa"; in addition, notes Donald Rothchild, "this hard track has been interlinked with the second (or soft) track of diplomacy and mediation". (34) On both counts the result has been to enhance the prospects for a negotiated settlement as the only realistic alternative to protracted racial strife. That the efforts undertaken by the US to help negotiate a compromise should have gone hand in hand with similar efforts by the Soviet Union significantly increased their chances of success.

France's involvement in Rwanda carried entirely different implications. As in the case of the US in South Africa, France followed a two-track diplomacy: a "hard track", involving massive military and financial assistance to the incumbents, and a "soft track", where diplomacy and mediation were seen as a key priority. The pursuit of the first never ceased to compromise the success of the other. By substantially strengthening the military capabilities of the regime against its internal and external foes, France's "hard track" diplomacy created major disincentives for the Habyalimana clique to make concessions to the opposition; and when after endless rounds of talks and mounting international pressure Habyalimana finally agreed to meet the demands of the FPR, recourse to wholesale political assassinations (35) continued to be seen by a great many Hutu hard-liners as the most sensible strategy to prevent a sell-out to the "enemies of Rwanda".

By turning a deaf ear to persistent and massive human rights violations France contributed to give the Habyalimana regime a degree of credibility that proved totally illusory and thus created false expectations about its commitment to democracy. By preaching harmony and reconciliation at Arusha, while at the same time arming and training MNRD death squads and militias, France's "two-track" diplomacy emerges in retrospect as singularly counterproductive. No attempt to explain the failure of Arusha and the ensuing blood bath can afford to ignore France's ominous contribution: no amount of retrospective guilt can mitigate its place in history as the chief villain in the Rwanda apocalypse.

In his Commencement Address at American University Law School, USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood correctly emphasized the danger

of overly deterministic explanations of the Rwanda genocide: "It was not inevitable", he said. "It did not have to happen. It was not a predictable outcome of years of hatred. It was not fate... Events in Rwanda, as in the Holocaust, as in every other abject failure in humankind's history, demonstrate that chaos does not just happen... that the forces of history are not an irresistible tide". He goes on: "Robert Kaplan may portray Rwanda as the future of Africa, but how then does one explain South Africa, where a unified and peaceful nation is emerging from three hundred years of institutional racism?" (36)

In trying to provide a tentative answer to this question, we can only reiterate the point made at the beginning of this discussion: structural factors, whether traceable to historical, social or environmental forces, cannot be left out of the accounting; yet neither can they be seen as the sole determinant of political outcomes. They can limit the range of options; they cannot eliminate them altogether. Substantive and procedural choices are the irreducible common denominator of every transitional bargain; leadership skills in turn influence the choice of options, in the same way that these in turn help shape the attitudes of the armed forces and the opposition; and the same is true of course of the area of latitude available to international actors. Although their options are not exercised in a vacuum, "it is what individuals choose to do", to use the Administrator's lapidary phrasing, that ultimately matters. Searching for effective policies to ease transitions to democracy, and assure its consolidation, demands a great deal more than the refutation of structural determinism; the real challenge lies in making appropriate choices to help circumvent obstacles to democracy.

Footnotes

1. Patti Waldmeir and Michael Holman, "A Powerful Spirit of Unity", FINANCIAL TIMES, July 18, 1994, p. I.

2. In coldly statistical terms, compared to the loss of an estimated one million lives that has accompanied Rwanda's descent into hell -- via genocide, battle field casualties, cholera, dysentery, famine and sheer human exhaustion -- Burundi's hemorrhage -- 50,000 dead evenly distributed between Hutu and Tutsi -- seems almost inconsequential; yet it is worth remembering that the 1972 bloodbath in Burundi took the lives of an estimated 100,000 Hutu people, some say 200,000. For a detailed account, see R. Lemarchand, BURUNDI; ETHNICIDE AS DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1994).

For the benefit of the uninitiated reader, the following facts are worth noting. Unlike most other African states, Rwanda and Burundi were multi-ethnic archaic kingdoms, first colonized by Germany and then entrusted to Belgium as Mandates under the League of Nations and UN Trust Territories after World War II. They both became independent in 1962, Rwanda as a Hutu-dominated Republic, Burundi as a constitutional monarchy. Although they share a very similar ethnic map -- with the Tutsi pastoralists said to represent approximately 14 per cent of the total population, the Hutu agriculturalists 80 per cent, and the Pygmoid Twa 1 per cent -- only in Rwanda was Tutsi overrule highly institutionalized. Burundi society was characterized by greater complexity and fluidity, with power gravitating in the hands of a princely oligarchy (the so-called ganwa) whose identity was separate from that of either Hutu or Tutsi. Which helps explain why Burundi acceded to independence as yet untouched by the revolutionary upheaval (1959-61) that brought the Hutu of Rwanda to power. For further details, see R. Lemarchand, *RWANDA AND BURUNDI* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970).

3. Jean-Pierre Chretien, "Tournant historique au Burundi et au Rwanda", *MARCHES TROPICAUX*, October 1st, 1993, pp. 2420-2422. For a more somber view of the future of South Africa on the eve of the April 1994 elections, see Breyten Breytenbach, "Dog's Bone", *THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS*, May 26, 1994, in which the author refers to "the bloody mess of our transitional phase and the contradictions and discordances erupting like pus ever more violently day by day..." (p.4). In more subdued language, Donald L. Horowitz, in *A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), expressed similar misgivings, referring to "the long-shot character of the democratic gamble in South Africa" (p. 263). For a remarkably prescient -- and optimistic -- view of the South African transition, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa", *WORLD POLITICS*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (July 1994), pp. 454-489. To quote: "although political transition in South Africa may be protracted and punctuated by violence, it may well ultimately occur by negotiation. And the long-term prospect for democratic consolidation may be better there than in other parts of contemporary Africa" (p. 487).

4. Samuel Huntington, *THE THIRD WAVE; DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 114.

5. For an excellent discussion of the Arusha accords, see Filip Reyntjens, *l'AFRIQUE DES GRANDS LACS; RWANDA, BURUNDI, 1988-1994* (Paris: Karthala, 1994), pp. 248-256.

6. Michael Bratton, *POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN AFRICA IN THE 1990S: ADVANCES AND SETBACKS*, Michigan State University Working Paper No. 2 (East Lansing: May 1993), p. 16 ff.

7. Ibid.

8. Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa", op. cit., fn. 90, p. 488. A convincing case can be made for viewing the apartheid state as an etat de droit, though clearly upholding le droit du plus fort; constitutionalism, after all, does not rule out social injustice. In South Africa the racial discriminations written into the apartheid state were sanctioned by an extraordinarily elaborate legal system, rather than left up to the whim of a patrimonial figure (as was the case of Liberia during the Americo-Liberian hegemony).

9. For more statistical information, see the special section on South Africa in FINANCIAL TIMES, July 18, 1994, esp. p. III.

10. Barrington Moore, Jr., THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

11. Foundation for Contemporary Research, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT; A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY BASED ORGANISATIONS IN WESTERN CAPE (Capetown: E.A. Pieterse & A.M. Simone editors, 1994), p. 46.

12. Adam Przeworski,

13. See R. Lemarchand, RWANDA AND BURUNDI, op. cit.

14. See Leroy Vail ed., THE CREATION OF TRIBALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).

15. Black on black violence, involving essentially Inkatha militants against partisans of the ANC, reached its peak in 1992: in Natal alone human rights monitors recorded 1,147 people killed during the first ten months of 1992. See THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, p. A6.

16. See, for example, Brown and Bruno van Dyk ed., EXCHANGES, SOUTH AFRICAN WRITING IN TRANSITION (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1991); Kiersten Holst Petersen and Anna Rutherford eds., ON SHIFTING SANDS: NEW ART AND LITERATURE FROM SOUTH AFRICA (Portsmouth: Heineman, 1992).

17. Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh, SOUTH AFRICA'S OPTIONS (Capetown: 1979), quoted in Tom Lodge, "Democracy Through Personal Chemistry", SOUTHERN AFRICAN REVIEW OF BOOKS, Vol. 4, No. 6, Issue 22 (September-October 1992), p.3.

18. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", in Dankwart Rustow and Kenneth Erikson eds., COMPARATIVE POLITICAL DYNAMICS; GLOBAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 168.

19. It is worth remembering that Habyalimana came to power in 1973 as a result of a northern Hutu-instigated military coup designed to shift power away from the southerners, suspected of accumulating more than their fair shares of the national wealth. Also, the deposed President, Gregoire Kayibanda, was thought to be too "soft" on the Tutsi. On this and other aspects of the 1973 coup, see Filip Reyntjens, *POUVOIR ET DROIT AU RWANDA* (Tervueren: Musee Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 1985).

20. For an excellent analysis of the 1994 elections and what lies ahead, see the series of articles in *AFRICA REPORT*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (July-August 1994), pp. 13-45.

21. According to *THE WEEKLY MAIL* (May 20, 1994), as a last minute concession to win Natal's participation in the elections FW de Klerk ceded control over more than a third of Kwazulu/Natal's land to Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini, amounting to roughly three million hectares...

22. Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

23. See Reyntjens, 1994, *op. cit.*; Lemarchand 1994, *op. cit.*

24. Ian Shapiro, "Democratic Innovation: South Africa in Comparative Context", *WORLD POLITICS*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (October 1993), p. 138-9

25. Quoted in *TIME MAGAZINE*, May 9 1994, p. 17.

26. See Herbert M. Howe's outstanding analysis, "The South African Defence Force and Political Reform", *THE JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (March 1994), p. 46.

27. Rene Lemarchand, "The Apocalypse in Rwanda" *THE CULTURAL SURVIVAL QUARTERLY* (forthcoming).

28. See Howe, "The South African Defence Force and Political Reform", *op. cit.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. For further details, see R. Lemarchand, "Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice", *op. cit.*

31. The close connection between the PG and the *akazu* clique are excellently described by C. Braeckman and A. Guillaume, in "La poudriere rwandaise", *Le SOIR* (Bruxelles), June 1st, p. 8.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Howe, *op. cit.*

34. Donald Rothchild, "Regional Peace-Making in Africa: The Role of

the Great Powers as Facilitators", in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild eds., AFRICA IN WORDS POLITICS (Boulder, Westview Press: 1991), p. 299.

35. For chilling account of the extent and modalities of the manipulation of political violence by the Habyalimana regime, see Association Rwandaise pour la Defense des Droits de la Personne et des Libertes Publiques (ADL), RAPPORT SUR LES DROITS DE L'HOMME AU RWANDA: SEPTEMBRE 1991-SEPTEMBRE 1992 (Kigali: December 1992).

36. Brian Atwood, "Commencement Address to American University Law School", memo. USAID/General Notice, May 27, 1994, p. 4.
