



ENHANCING RESILIENCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

SYNTHESIS OF AN EVIDENCE BASED WORKSHOP

Derek Headey and Adam Kennedy

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Dear Partners,

In 2011, the Horn of Africa faced the worst drought in 60 years, leading to emergency food insecurity levels in Kenya and Ethiopia and famine in Somalia. At the height of the drought, more than 13 million people across the region required humanitarian assistance, and more than 700,000 refugees fled Somalia.

At the same time, many communities showed resilience in the face of these harsh conditions, demonstrating effective coping strategies that reduced the economic impact of the drought and enabled them to maintain a sufficient degree of food security, health, and well-being.

It is in this context that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) hosted a workshop titled, "Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa: An Evidence Based Workshop on Strategies for Success." The workshop, held December 13–14, 2011, at the Madison Hotel in Washington, DC, was co-hosted by USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, Bureau for Food Security, Bureau for Africa, and Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. It was facilitated by USAID's Office of Food for Peace-funded TOPS program, as well as the International Food Policy Research Institute.

Providing a platform for learning, the workshop identified successful strategies, enabling conditions, and policies for strengthening resilience, as well as approaches that have been less successful. The workshop was principally designed to initiate a dialogue among donors, private voluntary organizations, researchers and academics, and the private sector on evidence-based strategies for enhancing resilience in the Horn of Africa. The dialogue centered on several key issues:

- What is meant by resilience and resilience programming?
- What are successful strategies and enabling conditions that can help build resilience, and what lessons can be learned from previous efforts?
- What value does resilience programming have in mitigating the effects of shocks, speeding recovery from them, and building "pathways out of poverty"?
- What are the linkages between resilience and economic growth?

More than 180 participants with diverse backgrounds and disciplines, including agriculture, livestock, nutrition, conflict, gender, governance, economics, and health, participated in the workshop. The format consisted of formal presentations and more informal roundtable and plenary discussions to maximize participation and draw from the group's broad base of knowledge. All material from the workshop, including videos and Power Points of the plenaries, are available at the workshop: <http://agrilinks.kdid.org/library/enhancing-resilience-horn-africa-evidence-based-workshop-strategies-success-agenda>.

This workshop is part of our Agency's larger effort to help countries and communities withstand increasingly frequent and severe environmental shocks. USAID recently launched a planning process to more effectively link our humanitarian assistance and development programs to enhance resilience in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. In addition, we are supporting a newly established consortium of research institutions, international organizations, and nongovernmental partners to provide analytical support for country and regional level programming, including the development of the common program framework for ending drought emergencies in the Horn of Africa.

In support of the resilience agenda for the Horn of Africa, USAID, together with the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and a number of other development partners, co-hosted a Joint Ministerial and High-Level Development Partners Meeting on Drought Resilience in the Horn of Africa. The meeting took place on April 4, 2012, in Nairobi, Kenya, and demonstrated commitment to country-led, regional level programming on ending drought emergencies in the Horn of Africa. It resulted in the formation of a new partnership—the Global Alliance for Action for Drought Resilience and Growth—to strengthen coordination within the development community, spur economic growth, build new partnerships with the private sector, and reduce food insecurity. The role of the alliance will be finalized with development partners over the coming months.

Across USAID, we are examining our policies and operations to see how we can more effectively build resilience, a key Agency priority. It is our hope that these workshop proceedings, which combine research findings with discussion points from the December workshop sessions, will contribute to the growing body of evidence on strategies for enhancing resilience in the Horn of Africa and help to focus collective efforts on the resilience agenda. We look forward to continuing to work with our partners and finding new ways to collaborate.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Rajiv Shah". The signature is stylized and cursive.

Rajiv Shah

INTRODUCTION

The Horn of Africa is acutely vulnerable to food security crises that arise from complex causes, including swift shocks from the vagaries of climate—particularly exposure to drought and flooding—and slower-moving stresses like the complex nexus of rapid population growth, land fragmentation, natural resource degradation, and conflict. The 2010–2011 crisis in the region emphasized the shortcomings, as well as some of the strengths, of international and national relief efforts—namely that while they have saved lives, and increasingly livelihoods, they have not sufficiently increased the capacity of the region to withstand future shocks and stresses. In short, they have not done enough to enhance resilience to the point where the region can avert crises similar to the one it endured in 2010–2011.

For a region like the Horn of Africa, resilience has profound implications for development programming. As US Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Rajiv Shah said, “For too long we have segregated humanitarian support and activities and development activities.... We haven’t seen the beauty of the possibilities that exist when we think of these things as a more integrated whole.”¹ In that sense, resilience—in both concept and action—can bridge the two traditionally distinct domains of humanitarian assistance and development support programs.

But how exactly should we define resilience, and what does this concept imply for programming, capacity strengthening, institution building, and development strategies as a whole? Is resilience already an important (if implicit) dimension of these efforts, or do we need to rethink and redesign the way our efforts are conceived and implemented? Based on previous and ongoing substantive efforts to build resilience, what types of interventions work or don’t work—and where is the evidence to show for it?

These questions and issues that arise in the programming of our work together with our development partners in the Horn of Africa are the subject matter of much of the dialogue that took place at the “Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa” workshop hosted by USAID in December 2011. The purpose of this set of proceedings is thus to present the key messages from the workshop and communicate evidence-based strategies that were highlighted to inform future programming of humanitarian and development assistance efforts. The goal is to bridge the two in a way that maximizes the impact of development partners’ efforts and enhances resilience to lift millions out of poverty, food, and social insecurity in the Horn of Africa.

LIVELIHOODS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: CONTEXT

The arid and semi-arid lowlands (ASALs) of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia are geographically, linguistically, and economically very distinct from the highland areas of these countries. While the highland economies are largely dominated by settled crop production and nonfarm industries, the lowlands are heavily dominated by urban dwellers (10–20 percent of the total ASALs population), pastoralism (mobile livestock rearing), and secondary livelihoods, such as collection of natural products for consumption and sale (including firewood, charcoal, and gum-resin) and dryland crop production (both irrigated and rainfed). The dominance of pastoralism is a direct result of interseasonal and interannual

variation in rainfall and abundant land resources, which require and historically have allowed households to move livestock herds in response to differences in grazing and water resources that exist over space and time. Although exact numbers are unavailable, it is estimated that approximately 40 million people live in these areas, with perhaps half of them loosely amenable to being described as “pastoralists” (Headey, Seyoum Taffesse, and You 2012).

Although the Horn of Africa is full of different types of people and distinct economies, the climate and its related risks, particularly acute vulnerability to drought, are shared across the region. Moreover, while the peoples of the re-

gion have longstanding traditional coping mechanisms—including the mobility of pastoralism and traditional family and clan support systems—there is considerable evidence that these techniques are breaking down. Mobility, in particular, is now thought to be much more restricted than in earlier times due to the complex combination of population growth; fragmentation of grazing lands caused by cropland expansion, pest invasion, and land grabs; and local, regional, and international conflict (Flintan 2011). Such stresses and shocks initiate a vicious cycle of insecurity: traditional social protection systems erode, making it harder for households to recover from shocks, which now occur more frequently and


1. For a summary of Administrator Rajiv Shah’s presentation, see page 13. See the full presentation here: <http://agrilinks.kdid.org/library/usaaid-resilience-workshop-keynote-address>.

leave households further exposed to subsequent shocks (Devereux 2006). It is within this environment that millions of people have become continuously dependent on humanitarian assistance for food and financial aid, and refugee situations in Kenya and Ethiopia that were originally designed as temporary mitigating strategies have been prolonged for years. This is certainly unsustainable and new thinking and actions on how to make these communities resilient and ultimately prosperous is urgently needed.

Conflict, poor governance, and the related breakdown in traditional coping mechanisms also characterize the ASALs in the Horn of Africa. These challenges largely explain the apparently increased vulnerability of ASAL populations to drought and also the regional pattern of drought impacts. Data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) show that the number of people adversely affected by drought has been increasing over time (Headey, Seyoum Taffesse, and You 2012) (Figure 2). Other research shows that conflict and poor governance are associated with the severity of the 2011–12 humanitarian crisis across the region, with famine declared mainly in the most conflict-affected areas of southern Somalia (Maystadt et al. 2011). So, while climate change cannot yet be declared—or discounted as—a contributing factor to the famine and food scarcity in the Horn of Africa, it is well established that the region’s vulnerability to major shocks is by no means caused solely by climate-related influences.

Inadequate governance is just as problematic to building resilience as conflict—a conclusion drawn from major studies of the successes and failures of interventions in this region (for example, McPeak et al. 2011 and Little et al.

FIGURE I. Estimated food insecurity at the height of the Horn of Africa famine




Source: DFID 2011.

2010).² First, large-scale physical and social infrastructure have been neglected in the region; policies and investments that would benefit the livestock sector—the primary sector in the region—have also been lacking. Education and health outcomes in ASAL regions, for example, are far below those of highland regions in these East African countries and deplorably so in an absolute sense (for example, often less than 20 percent of adults can read). Governments in the region have also emphasized sedentarization of mobile communities, without

due understanding of the importance of mobility for livestock rearing and trade in the region. Second, where at-scale interventions have taken place, they have at best a modest track record of efficacy, sustainability, and poverty reduction. In the past, efforts to promote ranch-style livestock systems did not yield the broad-based pro-poor economic impacts needed to widely enhance resilience among the poorer pastoralists (McPeak et al. 2011). More recently, a number of efforts to promote commercialization through value-chain approaches have begun, and while a select few, particularly livestock traders, have benefited from-

2. See the discussion notes from the workshop’s session on governance on pages 22-23.

FIGURE 2. Number of people adversely affected by droughts in the Horn of Africa, 1970–2010



Source: Headey, Seyoum Taffesse, and You (2012); estimates from EM-DAT 2011.

Notes: These estimates of the total number of people affected are only very approximate. See Headey, Seyoum Taffesse, and You (2012) for more details.

such programs, they tend not to be the most vulnerable and poor (Barrett 2004, Hashi and Mohammed 2010). Most programs thus far have also operated at a relatively small scale.

Finally, while there have been many effective interventions in the region, most have lacked scale or simply have not been sustained. As noted in the workshop, many development programs have been relatively short-lived (usually up to five years), which limits the scope of potential impact and may actually induce outcomes opposite than the ones intended. Too often governments and development partners demand rapid results and graduation of beneficiaries from assistance programs in a relatively short time, but enhancing resilience appears to require sustained intervention and substantial commitments from all stakeholders involved.³

3. For a summary of Karen Brooks's presentation, see page 16. See the full presentation here: <http://agrilinks.kdid.org/library/usaid-resilience-workshop-plenary-presentation-moving-forward-horn>.

For the most part, the limited impact of these efforts—and sometimes the lack of any efforts—has stemmed from misconceptions about pastoralism by federal and international policymakers and the marginalization of ASAL communities from often distant policymakers. That marginalization has also contributed to increased insecurity and the breakdown of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Governance issues are therefore a deeper cause of many of the problems in the region.

Despite these problems, there are still some positive developments in the region. Pastoralists often emphasize that although they are certainly vulnerable to drought, the economic opportunities of the livestock sector create significant wealth—wealth that could be better protected (for example, through increased mobility and better access to markets).⁴ Moreover, high interna-

4. For a summary of Jeremy Konyndyk's presentation, see page 14. See the full presentation here: <http://agrilinks.kdid.org/library/usaid-resilience-workshop-lessons-from-mercy-corps>.

tional meat prices and substantial export demand in the Middle East and within the region itself mean that livestock is a high potential sector for many (but not all) people in the Horn of Africa. Likewise there are opportunities for diversification (for example, using irrigation and better water harvesting methods and engaging in various nonfarm livelihoods) and an increasing demand for education, which would seem a necessary condition for successful economic transformation in the region (Headey, Seyoum Taffesse, and You 2012).

RESILIENCE 101: DEFINING AND FRAMING RESILIENCE

In a keynote presentation delivered at the beginning of the workshop, John Hoddinott, deputy director of IFPRI's Poverty, Health, and Nutrition Division, explained both the concept of resilience

and the practice of building it.⁵ He said that the term “resilience” originally referred to “the ability...to [both] withstand severe conditions and jump back.” The term has increasingly gained traction in various twentieth-century sciences, especially ecology (“a resilient ecosystem can withstand shocks and rebuilding itself”), psychology (“coping with stress and adversity”), and, of course, in the fields of development and disaster risk management (DRM). Development and DRM specialists emphasize many dimensions of resilience, including social and collective action (reciprocity, trust, and social norms), economic capital (income and savings), human capital (education, health, and skills), and political capital (long-term investments, government capacity, DRM structures and plans, preparedness, and responsiveness). Some definitions emphasize resilience as a process (a dynamic phenomenon) rather than a state; some see it at different levels, namely those of individuals, households, institutions, communities, ecosystems, and governments.

Building Resilience through the Productive Safety Net Programme

From 1993 to 2004, Ethiopia relied heavily on emergency assistance to avert mass starvation. Although successful to some degree, this practice did not prevent asset depletion or integrate well with ongoing economic development activities that might reduce the threat of future famine. The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was created to change this by providing recipients with a predictable source of household income either via cash trans-

fers, food transfers, or paid labor within a public works program. This program works in combination with the Household Asset Building Program (HABP), which links people in the PSNP with the agriculture extension service that disseminates technological packages and on-farm technical advice. By building institutions to plan and manage public works, integrating public works into *woreda* development plans and early warning systems, and working with communities to determine beneficiaries, the PSNP builds resilience into government structures and strengthens capacity for better governance.⁶ The PSNP is also building resilience into the natural resource base by focusing on tree planting, rehabilitation of stream beds and gullies, and terracing to prevent erosion.

The impacts of the PSNP can also be seen at the household level. Households that received five years of support from the PSNP public works programs have seen an improvement in food security of approximately one month per year. In the drought-prone areas where people have experienced two or more droughts in the past five years, the food security has improved by 0.93 months per year compared to those who did not participate

“You are dealing with very poor households in poor communities, experiencing frequent drought. Yet, despite that, the program is improving food security and asset holding. In other words, we begin to see that this program is improving resilience.”

— John Hoddinott, IFPRI

in the program for five years. The same households experienced an improvement in livestock holdings of 0.39 tropical livestock units (TLU) compared to those not participating in the program (Berhane et al. 2011; Coll-Black et al. forthcoming).

The impacts of including the HABP with the PSNP are even more pronounced. The months of food insecurity decrease by an additional half a month per year, and households accumulate an additional 0.6 TLU more than they accumulated through the PSNP on its own (1 TLU under PNP+HABP compared to 0.4 TLU with PSNP alone). The HABP’s additional impacts are thought to be the result of the program providing households with (1) a safety net (in the form of cash or food transfers) during times of shock, (2) working capital through public works programs, and (3) technical expertise.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RESILIENCE

Various speakers and discussants at the workshop deliberated on the implications of a resilience paradigm, which would involve redesigning development strategies in the Horn of Africa, bridging the gaps among traditionally distinct development and DRM activities, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and operations.⁷ John Hoddinott began by emphasizing that while much of what USAID and others already do fits within the resilience paradigm, the false

and discredited “relief and development” dichotomy still persists in USAID and other institutions. A range of speakers also emphasized that since resilience is a process—rather than a state to be achieved within a set timeframe—achieving it

5. For a summary of John Hoddinott’s presentation, see page 11. See the full presentation here: <http://agrilinks.kdid.org/library/usaids-resilience-workshop-plenary-presentation-resilience-101>.

6. A *woreda* is a division of local government similar to a county.

7. See additional discussion on page 17.

depends on demonstrable long-term commitments.⁸ In practice this means longer timeframes (for example, a minimum of five years but optimally between ten and twenty), less obsession with graduation, and no more “going it alone”—more specifically, building stronger partnerships with regional governments and other international bodies.

While there was broader agreement on the value of explicitly moving toward a resilience paradigm, there was little consensus on what this meant in practice. USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah and various assistant administrators emphasized the importance of internally reorganizing the way the Agency does business by developing more efficient procurement systems and flexible funding streams, improving the linkages and synergies between relief and development, and sustaining donor commitment in the long term.

Given the complexity of quantifying resilience outcomes and processes, M&E will also be critical, and attention should be given to addressing the significant challenges to conducting it in isolated and highly mobile communities. But how should resilience be measured? Workshop participants discussed whether there should be multiple indicators with perhaps one or two primary ones to capture overall achievements. For example, some speakers emphasized decreased dependence on food aid as an overall target while others noted the advantages of more objective indicators, such as nutrition outcomes, which could indicate performance in both acute and chronic undernutrition and food insecurity. There was a general consensus, however, that the multiple domains of resilience—economic, political, social, ecological,

individual, community, and various levels of government—necessitate multiple indicators of both the quantitative and qualitative variety.

EXPLORING THE EVIDENCE BASE IN FIVE DOMAINS

In addition to the more generic discussions of the organizational and operational implications of a resilience paradigm, much of the workshop focused on exploring the evidence base of resilience building within the domains of economic development; natural resource management; health and nutrition; social development; and governance, institutions, and conflict. These deliberations involved a mix of presentations, small-group discussions, open floor plenary speeches, information-sharing across the various domains, and stocktaking of key lessons.⁹

I. Economic Growth and Transformation

Economic growth and transformation would seem to be a necessary if insufficient condition for lifting ASAL people out of poverty, increasing their capacity to withstand and “bounce back” from shocks, and decreasing their vulnerability to those shocks from the outset. Transformation entails both movements of people and resources out of traditional agriculture and herding, but also a modernization of those traditional sectors and their accompanying technologies, physical capital formation, and increased human capital. Existing transformation paradigms have largely ignored the role of resilience, however, which is a goal in and of itself, but also an instrumental factor for asset accumulation—as the literature on poverty traps indicates (Barrett and

McPeak 2006; Barrett, Carter, and Ikegami 2008). In the ASAL context, there is some evidence that much of the region’s transformation to date involves people falling out of pastoralism into low-return and highly unsustainable activities, such as firewood/charcoal collection (Devereux 2006). Thus, a push-pull paradigm may be the best approach, with some actions designed to pull the poor into new activities that have lower, less-risky entry points and some designed to push them to take more risks by building up their technical capacity. The Household Asset Building Program (HABP) in Ethiopia is an example of a multifaceted push-pull approach. It involves training and extension to cover skill and managerial development of poor households, rural savings and credit cooperatives, and microfinance institutions on the finance side; traders and farmers on the input-technology side; improved storage, processing, and quality control on the marketing side; and strengthening management capacity on the government side. But there is also evidence suggesting limited absorptive capacity of irrigation and urbanization, as compared to the substantial economic potential of the livestock sector and its downstream value chain activities (Headey, Seyoum Taffesse, and You 2012).

In addition to strong export growth in livestock (in Ethiopia), there have also been successful emergency destocking interventions (Aklilu and Wekesa 2002; Catley, Aklilu, Admassu, and Demeke 2007), high returns to animal health services and improved market access (Nin-Pratt, Bonnet, Jabbar, Ehui, and Haan, 2004), and viable prospects for formalizing informal trade and increasing government revenue (Negassa et al. forthcoming). In short, these make the case for a balanced development strategy, something that has largely been missing in much of the region. There is

8. See presentations here: <http://agrilinks.kdid.org/library/enhancing-resilience-horn-africa-evidenced-based-workshop-strategies-success-summary>.

9. See breakout session discussion summaries beginning on page 17.

also wide acknowledgement of the interactions with other resilience domains, particularly the sustainability of the natural resource base for livestock and crop-based farming (and the implication for livelihood diversification), the role of education and health investments in economic development, and the critical role of governance and conflict resolution in the region.

There was further discussion of other possible interventions in the region, including index-based livestock insurance (currently in a trial phase in Kenya), education investments, and training and extension programs. While there was no consensus on the potential of each of these interventions, there was general agreement on the need for more innovative experimentation and learning in these settings, balanced with caution in the face of often excessive enthusiasm.

2. Natural Resource Management

Depletion and degradation of the natural resource base is a major cause of deteriorating livelihoods in the arid and semi-arid lands of the Horn of Africa, so natural resource management is an important foundation upon which to build resilience in the region. The prevalence of natural resource degradation is mainly due to unsustainable and unregulated production activities that decrease the provision of ecosystem services and thereby increase the vulnerability of people's livelihoods. Due to underdeveloped management practices, weak and unenforced property rights institutions, and common property resource governance, greater competition for resources has led to increasing incidences of violent conflict. In some cases conflict over resource ownership and

use has led to displacement of populations to other areas, further exacerbating resource-related conflict. In cases where displacement has not taken place, conflict arises from unequal access to resources by competing groups.

“For too long we have segregated humanitarian support and activities and development activities... We haven't seen the beauty of the possibilities that exist when we think of these things as a more integrated whole.”

— Rajiv Shah, Administrator, USAID

Degradation of natural resources due to overuse has led to diminished productive agricultural and livestock areas, nutrient depletion of soil, soil erosion, and declining quality of rangelands and watersheds. With the decline in input quality has come a subsequent decline in yields and overall productivity. The combined effects of unregulated resource competition and degradation have created hazardous conditions that will likely get worse without effective interventions.

Strategies and programs must improve resource-use rights (including land rights and grazing rights for pastoralists), protect and bolster existing resources that are threatened by degradation (through, for example, conservation agriculture), and promote improved management strategies for existing resources (such as rainwater harvesting or commercial destocking). Other successful initiatives to protect natural resources have included early warning systems (although these have been plagued by poor response time), long-term education, community-based conservation and management programs, grazing associations, and community gardens for pastoralist “drop-outs.” Examples of natural resource management (NRM) interventions

from other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, including the Sahel; were noted at the workshop, however, there was a general consensus that much is yet to be learned regarding how these interventions would be applicable in the particular arid and

semi-arid environments of the Horn of Africa.

Generally NRM has been shown to work best when integrated within multi-sectoral approaches—combining economic development, improved farming practices, clear incentives, and increased awareness and behavioral change. In addition, community ownership was identified as critical particularly because of the often high labor efforts and costs involved in such projects.

Still, many knowledge gaps in NRM that need to be filled by research remain, particularly with regards to the contentious issue of whether human and livestock populations exceed the carrying capacity of land and water resources. Many ASAL populations (both human and livestock) are estimated to have more than doubled in size in recent decades. They are continuing to grow despite significant constraints on natural resources and mobility.

3. Health and Nutrition

Surveys of pastoralist community development priorities regularly uncover that improved health and nutrition outcomes top the list (McPeak et al. 2011; Devereux 2006). This is not surprising insofar as health outcomes and services in ASAL

regions are far below those in highland regions in these countries while health-related shocks rapidly diminish household assets as the assets are instead used to smooth out consumption changes, thereby magnifying the incidence of acute nutrition and health problems (Hoddinott 2006). There is also growing evidence that malnutrition early in childhood and during gestation lowers cognitive development, achievement in school, and future earning potential; even temporary shocks to nutritional status in early childhood can have lasting irreversible consequences (Behrman, Alderman, and Hoddinott 2004; Black et al. 2008).

The determinants of health and nutrition outcomes in ASAL regions are particularly complex and multifaceted, so improving them will require interventions on multiple fronts, including agriculture, livestock and livelihood programs, water management, hygiene and sanitation, and disaster risk management. These interventions, when accompanied by other investments in communication strategies that promote positive behavior within the local context, have been shown to improve nutrition outcomes (Berti, Krusevec, and FitzGerald 2004; Faber, Jogessar, and Benadé 2001; Ruel 2001). However, there is a need for more ex post impact evaluations of behavioral change communication methods to determine how to improve programmatic successes. Strategies that, by design, include preventative methods as opposed to reactive methods have also been more effective both in cost and impact (Ruel and Menon 2003).

4. Social Dimension

Disintegrating social networks have resulted in an erosion of traditional coping

mechanisms, rising ethnic strife, and a concurrent breakdown in the structure of acknowledged means of resolving conflicts and deriving sustainable resolutions. While faced with uncertainty and mounting stress on the structure of societal relationships, individuals have become increasingly fatalistic and lack a broader, optimistic vision of the future. Survey results on attitudes indicate that low aspirations are widespread and characterize individuals as becoming more risk averse when dealing with issues pertaining to the future (Bernard, Dercon, and Seyoum Taffesse 2011). Research has shown that being discouraged about positive outcomes in the future has led many to forgo investing in long-term well-being and instead to focus on immediate survival (Bernard et al. 2011).

Discriminatory attitudes toward women were also noted as having resulted in systemic undervaluing of women's role in

“This year there was a crisis comparable to 2002–2003 in Ethiopia, and there [were] 4.6 million beneficiaries.... That's a lot less than the 14.6 million that [had to be] covered in 2002–2003.... We can definitely say that PSNP reversed the trend to destitution across the areas it was working in.”

— John Graham, USAID/Ethiopia

agriculture and other income-generating activities and women's exclusion from access to resources and absence from positions of importance in political structures of varying complexity. While there are many constraints on social resilience in the region, it was pointed out that traditional coping mechanisms must be recognized and strengthened. The need to impart new mindsets, skills, and facilitation mechanisms was also identified. Moreover, public safety nets such as the Productive Safety Net Programme are important because they

have tremendous benefits to society that outweigh the social costs associated with such programs.

Other interventions that were mentioned as being effective include mental health and psychosocial support services in Dadaab, which involved case management sessions, community-based psychosocial activities, life skills training, savings and loans groups, support in setting up self-help groups and revitalization of traditional resources, training in problem solving, community health and nutrition programs, strengthening social networks, peacemaking, value chain development, and natural resource management. To boost social resilience, there is a need to address the immediate stressors or causes of trauma; identify positive and hopeful role models; establish opportunities for future empowerment; build social networks and institutions to help cope with challenges; and maintain links

with services, markets, and economic opportunities. Some of the hindrances to social resilience pointed out at the workshop include insufficient attention to psychosocial stressors and trauma, political instability, unresolved conflict, isolation, and dissolution of social networks.

5. Governance, Institutions, and Building Peace

Governance and institutions in the Horn of Africa were described as a fundamental centerpiece to enhancing resilience but significant challenges were acknowl-

edged, including the lack of coordination and ability to enforce policies of various *de jure* institutions. There was recognition that several levels of governance exist (community, subnational, national, and regional) and that these need to be in harmony while maintaining national sovereignty to effectively enhance resilience of the whole region. Two important levels on which positive changes have recently begun are the country level—through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework—and the regional level, where governance institutions under the African Union’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are coming together with development partners to facilitate trade and investments in the ASALs. These institutions have allowed for a country-led approach that can also be matched with the regional development agenda. A summit held in Nairobi in September 2011 signified the level of political commitment that has arisen to buttress the regional institutions to facilitate trade, investments, and security at the regional level. The involvement of the African Union and national governments at this heightened level has set the stage for concrete action to follow. Of particular concern were the continuing security challenges in Somalia, which remain despite several governments within the region attempting to address them.

At the subnational levels the primary source of local conflict was said to pertain to livestock raids and disputes over grazing and water-use rights along livestock trading routes, which are in essence a coping mechanism for livestock losses, particularly during drought when pastoralists have to traverse extensive areas to feed their livestock and conduct trade. Hence, approaches that seek to

address both causes and consequences of conflict with peace-building efforts (namely, dialogue and dispute-resolution training) and tools (including economic development, natural resource management practices, and youth interventions) were said to have had the most success. One speaker highlighted the important role of nongovernmental organizations

“The workshop reinforced that we have a critical moment of alignment: heads of state, regional institutions, UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector have all converged in their understanding that resilience is critical as we seek to reduce suffering and increase the ability of families to survive the inevitable shocks of drought, floods, and other natural disasters. We have the tools to address the challenges ahead, but it is clear that none of us can succeed alone.”

and presented a hybrid model of peace-building tools that incorporated dispute-resolution training that links customary conflict resolution methods with support for reconciliation processes, thereby leading to localized peace agreements at the community and subnational levels. The need to couple these tools with economic opportunities was stressed, since much of the localized conflict arises from competition for economic opportunities and access to resources.

MOVING THE AGENDA FORWARD

The workshop culminated in several deliberations on how best to move the resilience agenda forward in the region. There was real consensus that resilience programming had value added, particularly if it resulted in long-term strategies that were process oriented and capable of bridging the divide between development and relief. Among operations and implementation partners, there

was also some consensus on what kinds of steps could make resilience programming an effective reality. First, it was argued that there might be real value in a common framework to help guide both the design and implementation. Conceptually, this could entail refining the type of framework that the UK Department for International Development has already

— Nancy Lindborg, USAID

developed to include additional emphasis on different levels and domains in which resilience operates.¹⁰ Operationally it may mean something similar to the “crisis modifier” approach used in the Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative in Ethiopia. This approach allowed relief resources to be programmed through a standup development mechanism in a way that assured complementarity of relief and development programming. The latter was particularly viewed as useful in establishing that development and relief activities should never undermine each other.

A common framework will also need a significantly more rigorous monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system, comprised of greater efforts to collect indicators and to establish impact through more rigorous research and evaluation. While there was no consensus as to what an ideal summary indicator of resilience is—or whether such an indicator is needed—there were many productive

10. See Andrew Preston’s presentation summary on pages 15–16.

ideas on which indicators suited which resilience domains. In health and nutrition, M&E systems are highly developed, for example, and largely consist of well-established physical indicators. In governance and conflict there is a greater need for qualitative indicators, and where possible the development of more objective quantitative indicators (such as “number of violent conflicts”). In natural resource management, indicators of technology uptake, conflict incidences, aerial data, and geographic information systems data are all relevant. Economic development is perhaps the most challenging domain, given the difficulties of systematically surveying mobile and dispersed populations and of quantifying livestock, their most important asset.

Beyond M&E, there is clearly a broader need to strengthen and expand the evidence base for policymaking in the Horn of Africa, where some of the most fundamental questions remain unanswered.

1. What has actually been happening in the region in terms of economic growth, poverty, and asset ownership (particularly herd sizes)?
2. To what extent are human and animal population growth straining the carrying capacity of the region’s natural resource base?
3. To what extent should resources be devoted to pastoralism versus other sectors?
4. How should development strategies vary across different regions, given the heterogeneity of peoples

and places in the Horn?

5. To what extent do cultural and behavioral factors constrain investment, entrepreneurship, and cooperation in the region?

“Donors have different priorities, expertise, and resources; creating a consensus around a specific agenda is not only straightforward but the PSNP has shown that it is possible and can be effective.”

— Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, IFPRI

In truth, we have quite incomplete answers to all of these questions and many others. So, how can operations in the region receive better support from research institutions, such as the CGIAR Consortium, land grant universities in the United States, and educational institutions in Africa? Indeed, while there are already efforts underway to provide short term assistance on this front, USAID and other development partners also need to develop research capacity and demand in the long run. Research should also help improve program learning.

Some workshop participants felt that there was too much emphasis on success stories and not enough on failures, which can also be instructive. Similarly, a better understanding of the adaptations that occur in moving from strategy and program design to program implementation will provide opportunities to learn and identify examples of adaptive responses. However, it was also stressed that many impact assessments and evaluations lead to evidence that is not always translated into program design or implementation guidance. Indeed, one activity for the near future is to engage the research

community in drafting technical papers summarizing the long-term research already carried out in the Horn of Africa on the effectiveness of various approaches.

Finally, there was a consensus that

greater effectiveness entails tackling the problem at scale, working more closely with national governments and development partners, being there for the long haul, and developing both greater flexibility in funding streams and more efficient procurement mechanisms. In her blog post about the workshop, Nancy Lindborg, assistant administrator of USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, noted that, “The workshop reinforced that we have a critical moment of alignment: heads of state, regional institutions, UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector have all converged in their understanding that resilience is critical as we seek to reduce suffering and increase the ability of families to survive the inevitable shocks of drought, floods and other natural disasters. We have the tools to address the challenges ahead, but it is clear that none of us can succeed alone.” The next step is to make working together a reality.

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PLENARY SESSION NOTES

Resilience 101

John Hoddinott, Senior Research Fellow, IFPRI

Resilience has traditionally been understood in two different ways. In one sense, “resiliency,” as adopted from the ecological literature, is about tolerating disturbance without collapse. In psychology, however, resilience is portrayed in a slightly more nuanced way and is defined as somebody’s ability to bounce back from shock or stress. In the psychological sense, resiliency is therefore a process and not an outcome.

There are a number of commonalities that can be found in the various definitions of resilience that can guide the way we understand it. First, resiliency can be seen at different levels and in different domains such as the individual, household, or the ecosystem. People should also be able to adapt to adverse events or shocks without permanent consequences. We must also remember that resiliency is not just about economics and requires the development of government institutions, building appropriate social structures, maintaining a natural resource base, and developing human capital (health, nutrition, education). Finally, initiatives that build resilience involve reducing the likelihood and severity of adverse events, enhancing the magnitude and speed of the response to cope with shocks, and diminishing the impacts of adverse events.

The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is an example of building resilience at scale. From 1993–2004, Ethiopia relied heavily on emergency assistance to avert mass starvation and although successful to some degree, this did not prevent asset depletion or integrate well with ongoing economic development activities that might reduce the threat

of future famine. The PSNP was created to change this by providing recipients with predictable cash transfers, food transfers, or paid labor within a public works program to generate regular income. This program is complemented by the Household Asset Building Program (HABP). The HABP ensures that people in the PSNP receive technological packages and on-farm technical advice through an agriculture extension service. Also, the PSNP builds resilience into government structures and improves governance capacity by constructing institutions to plan and manage public works, integrating public works into *woreda* development plans and early warning systems, and working with communities to determine beneficiaries. The PSNP also builds resilience into the natural resource base through an emphasis on planting trees, rehabilitating stream beds and gullies, and terracing to prevent erosion.

Drawing on the experiences of PSNP, USAID could improve its resiliency programming by beginning to better integrate relief programming with development initiatives. Additionally, building resilience is a process and as such it requires long-term commitment especially given that the impacts of many resilience programs are not seen until five or more years after the program began. Without that long-term commitment, expecting mutual commitment from partners is unrealistic. USAID must also continue to work in partnership with other donors and governments given the magnitude of these programs and the size of the investment.

We have a strong evidence base available for a number of programs designed to strengthen resilience. This provides important insights into what works and what does not work both strategi-

cally and programmatically. This session highlighted three programs that have achieved results.

Arid and Marginal Lands Recovery Consortium (ARC) Program in Kenya

Shep Owen, Regional Director, Food for the Hungry

The Arid and Marginal Lands Recovery Consortium (ARC) program in Kenya decided that with the right investments there was the potential for positive change in the pastoralist areas. This project strove to increase agricultural productivity, to protect and diversify household asset bases, and to strengthen livelihood options to increase household purchasing power. By making strategic investments in creating livestock markets, the project ensured that sales of US\$185,000 in 2005 (the first year of the program) quadrupled to reach US\$850,000 annually. In addition, sales have been surprisingly buoyant during the latest drought. Likewise, market prices for livestock have gone up due to key contributions from the program to improving community veterinary services, raising the quality of animals, regularization of market days, and transparent market information. The activity of the market indicates that with the right investments, such as market creation and other services, pastoralists are willing to sell animals.

The program has provided a positive learning opportunity. The engagement with the private sector was essential in providing credit and stable demand from buyers to maximize market opportunities. The accessibility of the market is also important, and the construction of a main road by the Kenyan government may have made a significant contribution to the success of the project. With

capacity in the region low, the long-term engagement of the program with community workers, the private sector, and pastoralists also was essential to improving the provision and usage of technical services such as veterinary care, savings and loans programs, and business operation. There is, however, still a need for better monitoring and evaluation of the project, switching the focus from inputs and outputs to outcomes and impact. Achieving this will require a harmonization across donors and more flexibility.

Disaster Risk Reduction/ Hyogo Framework

Harlan Hale, Principal Regional Advisor for Southern Africa, Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID

The USAID Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance implements a disaster risk reduction program to target disaster-prone areas. It is focused on reducing losses rather than increasing incomes, in alignment with the UN's International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Hyogo Framework. The Southern Africa Regional disaster risk reduction program comprises multiple components, all of which cater to the southern African environment. The first of these focuses on conservation agriculture, a practice in which soil tillage is reduced, causing residues to remain on the soil surface. This creates mulch that reduces weeds and groundcover that reduces moisture losses. The program also emphasizes small-scale water harvesting and irrigation to extend the growing season, regulate variable rainfall, and allow for diversification outside of rainy seasons. Through this work smallholders are seeing an additional three to four months of productivity during the dry season and no longer need to focus as much effort on charcoal and brick

making, which significantly degrade the environment when practiced on a large-scale. Given the additional productivity, farmers are becoming more food secure and are able to dedicate more money to school fees and diversify into other assets such as livestock or businesses.

Through crop diversification, another component of the program, families have increased the diversity of their plots, which now include more drought-tolerant varieties and leguminous species that improve soil fertility and help to increase protein intake and diversify diets. The challenges that the communities now face have shifted from food scarcity to post-harvest losses, the development of value chains for legumes and horticulture crops, and the lack of business skills. These challenges are important and will be addressed with additional support.

“We’ve concluded that pastoralism is a viable livelihood and that with the right investments in the area, the arid and marginal lands of Kenya can not only begin to overcome the trend of perpetual decline, but they can grow and contribute significantly to national growth.”

— Shep Owen, Food for the Hungry

Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative in Ethiopia

Abdifatah Ismail, Somali Regional State President Advisor on Humanitarian and Development, Government of Ethiopia

The 1999–2000 drought in the Somali region of Ethiopia showed the need for a large-scale initiative to improve the rate at which food and nutrition assistance was provided in times of need. When drought again came in 2002–2003, the humanitarian response rate had improved because of intragovernmental coordination, but there was still a significant loss of animals—the main livelihood of the population. The Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative (PLI) was created to make a strong

link between emergency response and development, on the principle that emergencies should not undermine long-term progress. The Initiative has chosen to focus on saving livelihoods by maintaining the asset base of pastoralists and reducing chronic dependence on humanitarian assistance.

There have been several components that have contributed to the program's success. First, the program is strongly linked to early warning systems. This allows the initiative to respond faster to shocks and trigger livestock destocking programs and the provision of emergency water and fodder provision. The very successful destocking program—the first of its kind in Ethiopia—began in 2006 and in that year alone was responsible for the purchase of 100,000 animals. Fostering linkages between the highlands

and the lowlands has also improved market linkages and the commercial off-take of animals. The program has also found that cereal banks are an effective tool to stabilize grain prices and that by working with pastoralist communities it is possible to establish grazing reserves.

The PLI has also partnered with Tufts University to implement a system of monitoring and evaluation, which has led to the creation of a best practices guide adopted by the Ethiopian government. In addition, rigorous academic impact evaluation has shown that the PLI has been a very effective use of resources in the region, with a benefit–cost ratio of 44 to 1.

Keynote Address

Dr. Rajiv Shah, Administrator, USAID

The best way for the development community to demonstrate what has been learned from past crises is through our actions and responses to the present crisis in the coming months and years. This crisis—the worst in a long time, affecting more than 13 million people—is a manifestation of weak and abusive governance in Somalia, drought, and low-performing agriculture in the region. This has led to acute hunger, loss of livestock and assets, and displacement not only in Somalia but in other countries in the region.

The US government has been able to mount a significant humanitarian response, which accounts for more than 50 percent of the global total. Some of that response has come in the form of improved and fortified foods targeted especially toward women and children. This food aid response has helped to reduce malnutrition rates over the last five months, in some places to pre-famine levels. We have also seen a response in Al-Shabab-controlled areas, which many thought, given the challenges, was not possible. This has been in large part because of local partners.

The resiliency agenda must include other types of interventions that make use of modern technology. We have seen the success and uptake of index-based livestock insurance provided by the private sector that relies on independent verification through satellite imagery to trigger payout. We have also seen how low-cost, high-yield public health interventions can be equally, if not more, effective at preventing fatalities in times of crisis. The US Feed the Future Initiative has tried to build on this, providing not only emergency assistance but also, together with FAO, providing productive agricultural technologies. For far too long we have segregated these two approach-

es and not realized the potential synergies of these two things as an integrated whole.

The US government is committed to using its resources to make sure that we demonstrate that we have learned a lot as we recover from the crisis in the Horn of Africa. We intend to invest resources, planning efforts, and our intellectual leadership in building a resilience strategy that is robust, that is country-owned, that connects to and is a part of our Feed the Future program and agricultural development strategies country by country, and that really does represent the best integrated thinking of all parties and all partners.

The Nairobi Strategy: Enhanced Partnership to Eradicate Drought Emergencies

H.E. Elkanah Odembo, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Washington, DC

During a regional meeting in September 2011 to discuss the current drought, several heads of state admitted that they have not made sufficient investments in the semiarid and pastoralist communities in the Horn of Africa. There was also wide acknowledgement that there is a need for long-term programming. Within a matter of weeks Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Djibouti had developed medium- and long-term plans to begin to address the longstanding crisis in the region.

This meeting was followed by another in Djibouti three months later to reaffirm development commitments and outline program strategies. During this meeting, heads of state agreed to support the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Climate Prediction and Applications Center (ICPAC), invest in better water management and harvesting practices, improve ecosystem management

to build resilience in natural systems, and integrate the Drought Risk Reduction framework and climate change adaptation into development planning and resource allocation frameworks.

DEVELOPING A COMMON AGENDA FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE: LESSONS IDENTIFIED FROM RECENT EFFORTS AND GAPS REMAINING

Consensus Building and the Productive Safety Net Programme

John Graham, Senior Policy Advisor, USAID/Ethiopia

The formulation and development of many of Ethiopia's food security programs has often come on the heels of a crisis. The 2002–2003 drought affected nearly 14.6 million people in Ethiopia and was the impetus for the formation of the PSNP and the PLI. Similar programs were started in the productive highland areas in 2008 to improve productivity and combat food price inflation during the food crisis. With the latest crisis in the Horn, there is now the opportunity to create platforms for disaster risk reduction.

The experience of working to develop the PSNP offers many lessons that can now be applied elsewhere. First, analysis formed an integral part of the formulation of the project and that preparation helped to consolidate viewpoints and create a common agenda. Second, for development partners and donors, supporting the PSNP meant a combination of direct budget support and grants to implementation partners. Direct budget support provided the Ethiopian government with ownership of the project while direct funding to implementing partners allowed development partners like USAID

flexibility in their partner funding.

The results of the project can be seen at scale. Whereas in 2002–2003 the program supported nearly 14.8 million individuals, with the latest crisis there were only 4.6 million beneficiaries. Without the PSNP these individuals would have been given food aid but it would have been disorganized and late and there would have been a deterioration of livelihoods. With the PSNP in place, as has been shown by Berhane et al. (2011), we can see that people actually have accumulated assets even in the face of crisis.

While the PSNP did not accomplish everything, we can definitely say that PSNP reversed the trend to destitution across the areas it was working in. That's a huge number of households. The PSNP was a huge step forward.

The Links between Resilience, Conflict, and Food Security

Jeremy Konyndyk, Policy and Advocacy Director, Mercy Corps

The second presentation by Jeremy Konyndyk addressed the nexus between conflict and food security and its impact on resilience. The presentation outlined these linkages and how they manifest themselves in the Horn of Africa while also addressing how this issue could be more fully addressed through changes to the focus of policies and programs.

Frequently in the development paradigm, conflict is seen as an exogenous factor and not necessarily something that we can address. When households fear conflict or violence, seasonal migration and herd splitting become difficult, as does accessing markets for destocking or purchasing nonfarm goods.

Mercy Corp's approach is a hybrid

of peace-building tools such as dispute resolution training, linking customary conflict resolution forums with formal institutions, and supporting reconciliation processes that lead to localized peace agreements. These are linked with development tools, which often address the root causes of conflict such as the lack of economic opportunities or natural resource scarcity.

While the outcomes presented are preliminary, communities thus far have

“Resilience implies that transitory adverse events should not have permanent consequences, and that agents can adapt to adverse events.”

— John Hoddinott, IFPRI

reported that, because of the peace process, elders are better able to negotiate shared access to scarce grazing resources and that pastoralists are able to enjoy greater freedom of movement and fewer conflict-related obstacles when accessing pasture and water. Likewise, families are better able to access markets, which increases their trade opportunities compared to those of the control groups that were not targeted by the program. This has provided them with greater economic opportunities and alternative coping strategies in times of crisis.

Some Lessons from Ethiopia's PSNP

Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, Research Fellow, IFPRI

The Productive Safety Net Programme has provided an example of how emergency aid and programs to enhance resilience and promote development can be included in a large-scale program. It has also provided an example of how a program can work at scale, covering nearly 8 million people and 300 *woredas*, with the right mixture of commitment and coordi-

nation by government and development partners.

There are several principles which contributed to the success of the PSNP. Coordination between the nine development partners and the various ministries of government was essential in creating agreement on the framework of the PSNP and a common agenda. By working together in partnership, the Ethiopian government was able to internalize the PSNP and assume ownership. This fur-

ther contributed to the integration of the PSNP within the broader food security agenda and the national development plan.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were also a part of the initial design and mutual understanding of the PSNP. With government support, the M&E framework was able to integrate the expertise and capacity of the national statistical agency and external evaluators. The learning opportunity that came out of interim evaluations also allowed the PSNP to adjust the program to better target those in need.


PATHWAYS OUT OF POVERTY: EXPLORING THE LINKAGES BETWEEN RESILIENCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

The Value Chain Model

Steve McCarthy, Senior Technical Director, Enterprise Development, ACDI/VOCA

Economic growth can be achieved by the growth of industries and the private sector but economic growth alone is insufficient for reducing poverty unless the poor

FIGURE 3. UK Department for International Development Resilience Framework



Source: DFID 2011.

are linked to growth opportunities. Poor households tend to be more isolated from the mainstream economy and as a consequence do not have the ability to maximize productivity of their land and labor. They often lack non-physical assets such as social relationships, skills, and education, which can be important to participating in new economic opportunities.

We therefore need push strategies that help vulnerable households to participate in value chains through capacity building to take advantage of opportunities and to improve household ability to take more risks. Households and private sector firms must remove key constraints and take advantage of opportunities to upgrade strategies that use small, low-risk steps. On the other hand, pull strategies targeted toward the poor strengthen value chains to create opportunities for vulnerable households. They do so by strengthening competitiveness and focusing on local markets that have less stringent product requirements. By doing so, they create less risky entry points and lower barriers to entry.

The Ethiopian Household Asset Build-

ing Program (HABP) is part of a broader strategy by the Ethiopian government to incrementally graduate large numbers of its citizens out of poverty. This program selects value chains based on livelihood clusters and develops household business plans at the same time it builds the institutional capacity of financial service providers for sustained delivery of multiple financial products. The program also builds linkages between suppliers and users of inputs and technologies and improves storage, processing, and quality control for increased value addition to the implementation of business plans.

DFID's New Resilience Agenda

Andrew Preston, Counsellor Development, Foreign and Security Policy Group, British Embassy, Washington, DC

DFID's disaster resilience agenda has evolved from work on disaster risk reduction (DRR) in 2006, which committed 10 percent of humanitarian spending to post-disaster programs meant to "build back better" and incorporate DRR into mainstream country strategies by 2015.

The Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR), or Lord Ashdown Review, was launched soon afterward to make recommendations on how the UK government can respond to emergencies and improve responses to humanitarian crises; certain core messages emerged. The UK must better anticipate crises by using a combination of science and on-the-ground experience. This should be complemented by spurring innovation to bring new techniques and technologies to bear on humanitarian challenges and working with nations and communities to make them more resilient to disaster.

The DFID resilience framework consists of the following elements (see Figure 3):

1. Context: Resilience should always be clearly contextualized, allowing a coherent answer to the question: resilience of what?
2. Disturbance: Understand whether the disturbance is a shock or an ongoing stress to determine the answer to the question: resilience to what?
 - Shocks are sudden events that impact the vulnerability of the system

and its components.

- Stresses are long-term trends that undermine the potential of a given system or process and increase the vulnerability of actors within it.
3. Capacity to deal with disturbance:
 - Exposure to risk is an assessment of the magnitude and frequency of shocks or the degree of stress.
 - Sensitivity is the degree to which a system will be affected by, or respond to, a given shock or stress. This can vary considerably for different actors within a system.
 4. Reaction to disturbance: The adaptive capacities of actors—individuals, communities, regions, governments, organizations, or institutions—are determined by their ability to adjust to a disturbance, moderate potential damage, take advantage of opportunities, and cope with the consequences of a transformation.

The Graduation Model

Alexia Latortue, Deputy CEO, CGAP, World Bank

CGAP is currently working on advancing financial access for the world's poor. However, financial services are not always enough to move households out of poverty and micro-finance around the world generally tends to reach those that are just below, at, or just above the poverty line while not reaching the poorest of the poor.

CGAP's model is based on BRAC, a nonprofit organization in Bangladesh, which brought together the social-safety-nets aspect of social protection with the idea of linking the very poor to markets and financial services. Taking this approach, CGAP has tried to help people graduate out of poverty and safety nets by providing them with assets, income, and food security.

Currently, CGAP's pilot program operates in Tigray, Ethiopia, and tries to build on the PSNP by using a five-step program to achieve graduation. First, the program targets the poorest beneficiaries through participatory wealth ranking and household surveys. Second, the program provides consumption support on the premise that being food insecure causes significant stresses that prevent the poorest from planning for the future and taking advantage of opportunities. Stabilizing consumption allows people to begin to think about their aspirations and plan for the future. Third, the program makes saving mandatory, putting households in a better position to buffer against shocks. Fourth, by working with partners, CGAP does a value-chain analysis to determine what mixture of short-term and long-term assets has the most potential to diversify incomes. Finally, the program works directly with households on a case-by-case basis to mentor, set up graduation goals, and provide complimentary training.

CGAP has also implemented a thorough monitoring and evaluation strategy that documents program implementation, monitors participant progress, and measures outcomes and causality with both qualitative and quantitative impact assessments. While results from Ethiopia are not available due to the newness of the program, evidence from India has shown that there have been positive outcomes in terms of consumption of nutritious foods and dietary diversity.

Moving Forward in the Horn

Karen Brooks, Africa Region Agricultural Programs Manager, World Bank

The World Bank's experiences in the Horn of Africa have been primarily through its work with the Kenya Arid Lands Resource Management Program. This program

has been operating for 20 years and has components that develop and monitor early warning systems, generate alternative livelihood options, provide a contingency fund to destock during times of drought, initiate capacity building, and promote conflict resolution. The World Bank strongly feels that the long-term commitment of this program is in part responsible for its successes and has been essential in order to develop and sustain resiliency in the region.

There have been many indicators that the program has had success in building resilience. The number of people needing food aid has decreased by half between the 2001–02 and 2008–09 droughts, as seen in a recent evaluation of intervention and control groups. The response time to shocks has also been cut in half in part because of the success of early warning systems. Child nutrition indicators have not shown as much improvement, but it was clear that during drought those most at risk for acute malnutrition were positively impacted by the program.

There are also many lessons that have been learned from this program. First, natural resource management should be part of any long-term resilience or drought-management program. Likewise, conflict resolution should be a component of strategies in the region and can be an effective tool for enhancing development programs. Projects can also benefit from a strong system of monitoring and evaluation that should be developed during the program-design phase in order to ensure accountability and transparency. Finally, because the development agenda and environment is complex, we cannot monitor every single issue and relationship. As such, the systems of monitoring and measurement must not be overly complex, and the results must be easily accessible.

BREAKOUT SESSION NOTES

On the first day of the workshop, participants were invited to participate in one of five breakout sessions. These sessions provided an opportunity for participants to bring their various experiences into the discussion so as to identify and understand (1) context-specific vulnerabilities and the most effective responses, (2) how to build on traditional coping capacities and indigenous knowledge, (3) the inter-related nature of this area of vulnerability with other areas, and (4) key cross-cutting issues, among others. Each session opened with introductory presentations on the topic by a member of the private voluntary organization (PVO) community and a member of the academic community in order to frame the conversation that followed in small group discussions around a set of key questions and cross-cutting issues. Workshop participants mixed with members of other breakout groups to identify commonalities and differences across sectors regarding vulnerabilities and resilience.

DAY 1: BREAKOUT SESSIONS BY SECTOR

Natural Resources

Presenters: Jesse T. Njoka, Center for Sustainable Drylands, University of Nairobi, and Paul Macek, Senior Director, Food Security and Livelihoods Team, World Vision

Session I

1. How have vulnerabilities in natural resources manifested themselves in the Horn of Africa?

The discussion began by cataloging the vulnerabilities that relate to natural resources (and straddle other sectors) as they exist in regions of the Horn of Africa.

Two critical vulnerabilities were identified: heightened pressure on limited resources and degradation of the existing resources.

A rise in demographic pressures has increased demand for land and potentially pushed natural resources beyond their carrying capacities. Underdeveloped management practices, property rights regimes, and common property resource governance have led to increased resource competition and violent conflict. Populations have been displaced because of conflict over resource ownership, which serves to aggravate resource-related conflict further. Where people are not displaced, conflict still occurs as a result of unequal use of resources by competing groups.

Overuse has degraded natural resources, thereby reducing productive agricultural and livestock areas, eroding soil and depleting soil nutrients, and diminishing the quality of rangelands and watersheds. With declining quality of inputs into the production process, yields have subsequently declined. Resource competition and degradation have fostered hazardous conditions that will probably worsen without effective interventions.

2. Which resilience-building strategies and programs have been successful?

Which ones have not? To what degree have the successful ones built on traditional coping capacities, assets, or other practices?

Successful strategies and programs identified by discussants improved resource-use rights (including land rights or pastoralists' grazing rights), bolstered existing resources threatened by degradation (by methods including conservation agriculture, watersheds, and sand dams in rivers), and found better management strategies for existing resources (for example, commercial destocking, rainwater harvesting,

and integration of ecosystem science into development activities). Other successful initiatives have been early warning systems (although these are plagued by poor response time), a focus on long-term education, community-based conservation and management, grazing associations, and development of community gardens for pastoralist "drop-outs."

Strategies and programs that have thus far been unsuccessful have compounded the problem instead of providing innovative and simple solutions. An example was the fish-processing-plant program that was implemented in Lake Turkana in Kenya. The local population was both unfamiliar with fishing and processing fish products and unmotivated to pursue these activities. This example speaks to the necessity of developing need-based, contextual solutions using valuable cultural inputs from the community.

3. Which factors or enabling conditions have helped build resilience and which ones have hindered it or even destroyed previously successful resilience efforts?

Building natural-resource-based resilience has benefitted from risk spreading, agricultural diversification, functional and transparent markets (including insurance), land rights reform, and community level buy-ins. Factors such as risk aversion, government capture of gains, and lack of consensus in project development have hindered—and, in some cases, negated—resilience-building efforts. Although discussants were able to identify crucial factors that either help or hinder resilience-building efforts, the dialogue did not delve into the determinants of those factors or the possible channels through which they worked.

Agricultural diversification that includes adopting drought-resistant crops (and moving away from maize), tree

planting, and climate-smart agricultural practices has produced beneficial results. Community buy-ins are a strong determinant of success in resilience-building efforts. These buy-ins communicate an expressed agreement with the project objectives and goals as well as tacit understanding of its beneficial effects in the long run.

4. What are the key elements of a strategy designed to address vulnerability in natural resources?

The key elements identified were community-based resource management, regenerative projects, improving access and rights to resources (especially land), and long-term financing. Community-based resource management systems, supported by local government involvement and community buy-in, can be instrumental in identifying the causes of degradation in a local context because such systems take into account trends and behaviors among local users. This identification can enable a bottom-up approach that uses customary networks to build capacity within communities to enable change in use behavior. Regenerative or rehabilitative projects developed within this framework have the potential to create sustainable agricultural techniques that improve production.

A lack of secure access, use, or ownership rights to resources is a significant obstacle to governing or managing natural resources and thus to building resilience. In the opinion of the discussants, this is a defining element of any strategy that addresses vulnerability in natural resources. In addition to assuring access to resources, developing clear mechanisms for adjudicating disputes is critical to a robust resource rights regime.

5. How can we measure success in resilience programming?

The discussions on measuring success produced both immediate and long-term metrics. In the more immediate time horizon, it is important to set goals that are achievable. An example put forth was the goal of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Southern Africa program. This goal—to endure one drought season without external assistance—could be used as a foundation for future sustainable practices. With the long term in mind, resilience programs can be categorized as successes either if groups or committees (for example, water user, savings, or microfinance groups) formed during the program’s duration exist and function after its conclusion or if new groups or committees organically form based on area needs.

Other indicators that can be used to determine success in resilience programming are community ownership of projects/programs (which allows for a decrease in dependence on donor funding or other assistance over time), gender equity in access to resources, and reduced degradation or signs of regeneration. Another important measure of success would be a reduction in conflict or contests over use of resources, and, in cases where conflict arises, a fair resolution using proper adjudication mechanisms (although this is rather difficult to measure quantitatively).

Session II

6. Consider the role that each of the following cross-cutting issues—gender, conflict, and climate change—plays in influencing risks or vulnerabilities related to natural resources. How might strategies and programs designed to address each of these cross-cutting issues impact vulnerabilities in natural resources?

Interventions addressing gender issues will need to focus primarily on reforming

differential access rules under customary practice. Access, use, and ownership rules are quite restrictive for women, effectively excluding them from making decisions regarding production on land, as well as the rental, sale, or use as collateral of parcels of land. Implementing programs that reform these rules will be very difficult, but innovative solutions that empower women with greater gender-specific production opportunities do not place an excessive burden on resources. Such a burden would lead to further degradation or future conflict.

The discussants felt that while programs designed to mitigate conflict will have obvious positive impacts as far as reducing natural resource vulnerabilities (including greater cooperation in use or access to resources), there are some potential drawbacks to consider. Some participants suggested that greater land tenure and security will decrease movement of pastoralists and potentially increase natural resource degradation. Complementary land-management practices must be developed to prevent both overburdening and future degradation.

Climate change is perhaps the most challenging issue to address when designing strategies to reduce vulnerabilities related to natural resources. Discussants argued that interventions targeted at mitigating climate change are often the same interventions that would be recommended for managing natural resources. However, the long-term impacts of climate change on those practices (for example, using irrigation to build resilience without considering the long-term impacts of precipitation on these water resources) would need to be seriously considered.

7. What role do the other four areas of vulnerability play in natural resources? What are those vulnerabilities?

The relationship between economic systems and rules of governance has a significant impact on the use and management of natural resources. Changing patterns of economic opportunities—for example, trends in privatization and resettlement—could have unpredictable impacts on natural resources. Discussants felt that it is imperative to implement projects to ameliorate worsening conditions of high-risk resources and safeguard potential high-value resources that might be at risk. In the immediate future it is crucial that economic systems adapt to pastoralism by building resilience in pastoral ecosystems while creating opportunities for pastoralists to find more sustainable means of income generation. Some suggested that steps be taken to formalize the movement of commodities and labor across international borders in the Horn of Africa.

Governance rules regarding land use and natural resources are influenced, to a large degree, not only by economic priorities, but also by custom. At the aggregated level, this leads to excessive centralized decisionmaking that can disrupt local governance structures; at the disaggregated level, informal and customary institutions often conflict with formal policy on tenure and access. The lack of checks and balances in governance has resulted in widespread corruption at local levels. This has the effect of reducing equity, as well as incentives for people to support local projects and initiatives aimed at building resiliency. Although tackling corruption is important, it is also a highly differentiated and difficult problem.

To avoid repeating arguments from the previous discussion question, the groups did not separately discuss the relationship between vulnerabilities in social factors and those in natural resources. In discussing the role of strategies addressing gender and natural

resources, however, participants were able to capture the most important social factor-related issues: gender inequity in resource access, erosion of practices and habits that have organically evolved, and inadequate investments in education for the long term.

Social Factors

Presenters: *Carla Koppell, Senior Coordinator for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, USAID, and Mara Russell, Practice Manager for Food Security and Livelihoods, Land O'Lakes*

Session I

1. How have vulnerabilities in social factors manifested themselves in the Horn of Africa?

The discussion began by informally cataloging the vulnerabilities related to social factors that exist in regions of the Horn of Africa. Out of this dialogue, a few critical vulnerabilities surfaced: gender disparity, disintegrating social networks, ethnic strife, and absence of effective social safety nets. (The first two topics received the bulk of the attention.)

Discriminatory attitudes have led to women's roles in agriculture and other income-generating activities being systematically undervalued. Such attitudes have also caused women to be denied resource access and to be absent from important positions in political structures of varying complexity. As a result of women's secondary status, gender-specific issues are often overlooked at times of crises and their economic potential is not put to best use when the male head-of-household is away.

Disintegrating social networks have resulted in sparse distribution of effective mutual support and cooperative groups, erosion of traditional coping mechanisms, and an increase in distrust within communities. The growing distrust

is evidenced by rising ethnic strife and a concurrent breakdown in the structure of acknowledged conflict resolutions. Uncertainty and increased stress on societal relationships' structure has made people more fatalistic and undermined a broader, optimistic view of the future. Surveys conducted on attitudes indicate that low aspirations are widespread and characterize individuals as becoming more risk averse when considering issues that might arise in the future. Discussants felt that being discouraged about positive outcomes in the future has led many people to forgo investing in their long-term well-being and to focus instead on immediate survival.

2. Which resilience-building strategies and programs have been successful? Which ones have not? To what degree have the successful ones built on traditional coping capacities, assets, or other practices?

Programs designed to emphasize strengthening social protection and creating fertile ground for participation by members of the community to engage in broad dialogue were common subjects discussed by participants. Network strengthening or intensification strategies that have been successful were motivated by social protection following traumas or crises where the links between individuals and communities allowed both to cope emotionally with the recent stress.

An unsuccessful strategy that was brought up during discussion dealt with repatriation programs or programs that included cash transfers to refugees. A cash stimulus inadvertently led to a black market for relief items, thus undermining the relief efforts' attempts to reach refugees consistently. Monetary assistance also plays a role in corrupting natural supply chains (characterized as individuals or groups that would voluntarily sup-

ply others with assistance) by bypassing existing social networks. Discussants failed, due to unspecified constraints, to capture how strategies and programs improved or built upon pre-existing coping capacities or assets, but they did raise for future exploration such issues as the effectiveness of existing social networks and how future interventions can bolster existing frameworks. An effective strategy should augment positive traditional mechanisms that have evolved over time, but it should also ameliorate any negative consequences from these mechanisms, which, in developing countries, tend to discriminate against or isolate marginalized or vulnerable groups within that society.

3. Which factors or enabling conditions have helped build resilience and which ones have hindered it or even destroyed previously successful resilience efforts?

While the discussion of conditions or factors that have either enabled or hindered resilience efforts was lively and engaging, the participants missed the opportunity to discuss region-specific or community-specific conditions that have helped interventions. An important takeaway from the discussion was that enabling conditions—those that build resilience and generate social cohesion—consist of psychosocial support within networks, positive role models, and responsive leadership. Factors that have hindered successful efforts have been just the opposite and have included rigid political responses and policies, restricted migration, and weak collective action.

More generally, discussants emphasized the importance of further longitudinal analysis of the interconnected nature of resilience building within communities and their cultural spaces, especially as it relates to women's issues (for example, gender-based violence, early marriages,

and female genital cutting).

4. What are the key elements of a strategy designed to address vulnerability in social factors?

Discussants expressed strong support for development strategies that integrate resilience as a core element and are preventative rather than for strategies that do not include resilience and are reactive to crises. However, vulnerabilities manifest themselves in different ways and thus any resilience strategy must be nuanced. Therefore, capacity-building efforts that use local organizations and networks coupled with participation by community leaders and members should be at the core of any strategy. Within the community, likeminded individuals should be linked and organized around specific challenges and vulnerabilities to encourage collective action while community leaders must be nurtured.

5. How can we measure success in resilience programming?

Discussants felt that success in resilience programming is probably best measured by using a before-and-after evaluation—meaning a baseline survey would be conducted before the program begins and a follow-up survey after it concludes. Some participants also expressed concern about the way success is often defined in resilience efforts. In social structures, it can be measured by either a decline in violent incidents (particularly incidents of gender-based violence) or an increase in employment, school enrollment, children's nutritional conditions, or access to resources by marginalized populations. Some measurement indexes mentioned were the Lubben Social Network Scale and the Berkman-Syme Social Network Index.

Session II

6. Consider the role that each of the following cross-cutting issues—gender, conflict, and climate change—plays in influencing risks or vulnerabilities related to social factors. How might strategies and programs designed to address each of these cross-cutting issues impact vulnerabilities in social factors?

Interventions addressing gender issues commonly are designed to address women's empowerment, access, and agency. The positive results of such programs are quite easy to identify: improved access to resources, strengthened sources of income generation, and better social integration, among others. Negative results are rather minimal and mostly involve the reaction of the society's male members. For example, excluding men from certain programs, designing interventions that lack a male presence, or, more simply, not educating men on the importance of empowering women might lead to programs being interpreted as external intrusions into domestic affairs. This could cause empowerment efforts to backfire and instead further damage women's prospects in their communities.

The positive outcomes of addressing conflict stem from a core objective: mitigation. Strategies or programs designed to address conflict mitigation can take the form of both "soft" programs (for example, dialogue and participatory approaches) and "hard" programs (including non-local tribunals), with the former likely to have a sustained effect. The sensitivity in presenting why the sharing of resources or strengthening collective action is imperative in resilience building is difficult to convey and is often lost in translation from policy or academic theories to application in the field.

Climate change is perhaps the trickiest of subjects to approach through in-

terventions. Repeating cycles of drought and famine suggest the need to implement programs to strengthen farming and livestock practices, build productive safety nets and emergency stocks, and create community networks across the region. Climate change in the future will only worsen existing vulnerabilities within society as competition for resources increases. Thus holistic management practices should be the focal point of future strategies.

7. What role do the other four areas of vulnerability play in social factors? What are those vulnerabilities?

The discussion on this topic was largely informal and consisted of a general conversation on “non-social” issues and did not cover any concrete vulnerabilities in other areas. Economic vulnerabilities were mentioned, however, and specifically as they relate to women. Underdiversified sources of income, sensitivity to weather shocks, and women’s restricted access to economic opportunities have a direct link to social issues related to women. A lack of economic opportunities or sustainable employment generation can result in worsening of social cohesion, levels of conflict, and marginalization of women. Governance vulnerabilities resulting from dysfunctional institutions might yield power to the people being governed. Return to such pre-state conditions can disintegrate into violent or unstable solutions (for example, “strong-man rule,” wherein the majority ethnic groups oppress the minority groups). The discussion, due to time limits, was unable to cover the impacts of vulnerabilities in natural resources or health and nutrition on social issues.

Health and Nutrition

Presenters: Dan Gilligan, Senior Research Fellow, IFPRI, and Kristi Ladd, Techni-

cal Director of Nutrition, Food Security, ACDI/VOCA

Session I

1. How have vulnerabilities in health and nutrition manifested themselves in the Horn of Africa?

Three key issues were discussed: the use of data and responses to early warning systems, education, and women’s empowerment. Other vulnerabilities discussed in less detail included indicators for disease patterns, healthcare infrastructure, extension services, and macroeconomic factors, such as food prices and trade.

A key vulnerability that was discussed is the absence of timely and high-quality information about local conditions and trends that is available to pastoralists. The absence of this information generally leads to a shrinking set of spatial and temporal options prior to and during a crisis. Concerns have been raised that while an early warning system designed to monitor and analyze conditions does exist in the Horn of Africa, inaction and negligence at the core (federal and local governments) due to a combination of unwanted political risks and underestimation of the impact of drought inhibits response and dissemination of information to pastoral households. An alternate concern is how to effectively reach pastoralists to share information since they are largely a mobile community. Failure to respond effectively to early warning systems has led to the health of affected populations worsening, an outcome that could have been lessened in magnitude by a proper response.

Another vulnerability which many feel needs to be addressed in the long run is deficient or missing translation of educational programs into improved behavior. Leading back to the previous point, it is imperative to better understand the psychology at the individual and societal

level of pastoralists. A better profile of behavior would inform the various characteristics of future interventions in such communities. A similar approach would be beneficial in addressing behavioral changes in nutritional and hygiene practices as well as broader health prospects. Rigorous country-specific and community-specific studies are needed to develop a typology of specific behaviors and identify social, political, and religious constraints to changing those behaviors.

The discussion reflected the well-known application of social choice theory towards gender inequality in bringing up ways to improve women’s agency. Similar to other developing countries, understanding gender roles in the context of the community and the family is still poorly understood. The role of women’s empowerment, educational attainment, and ability to affect decisions that influence intrahousehold allocation of resources (that is, income, savings, reproduction) in the Horn of Africa must be better understood in order to affect health and nutrition outcomes.

2. Which resilience-building strategies and programs have been successful? Which ones have not? To what degree have the successful ones built on traditional coping capacities, assets, or other practices?

Strategies that have succeeded in building resilience have generally included various modes of targeting. Many targeting programs have been designed to empower women through education, microfinancing, and income generation. The relative importance of educating men on the importance of women having significant input in household decisions was also discussed.

In addition, strategies have been shown to be more effective in cost and impact when they are designed to

include preventative methods instead of reactive ones. One example would be the age-based preventive targeting of food assistance and behavioral change to reduce childhood undernutrition in Haiti carried out by Marie Ruel at IFPRI.

Behavior change communication (BCC) is an instructional process by which individuals and communities develop communication strategies to encourage positive behavior within local contexts. It was suggested that targeting formative research on identifying behaviors and constraints will be key. However, there is a dearth of ex post evaluation of BCC methods, and such studies in the future would help further improve techniques.

Other strategies that have been successful are integration of codependent programs, risk insurance, health system strengthening, and workers' health programs (see the examples of Pakistan and Ethiopia).

3. Which factors or enabling conditions have helped build resilience and which ones have hindered it or even destroyed previously successful resilience efforts?

Enabling factors that have helped build resilience mostly include capacity building within governments and women's groups, effective outreach mechanisms (such as clean water promotion) and extension services, and civil society strengthening (for example, improved access to health-care within communities).

Factors brought up by discussants as having inhibited or hindered resilience efforts include lack of public services on the ground, restrictive migration policies, infrastructure failures, and the broader confusion at the institutional level on the best strategy to pursue.

4. What are the key elements of a strategy designed to address vulnerability in health and nutrition?

The resulting consensus from the discussants reflected an integrated, holistic strategy developed for the long term which combines elements from previously successful programs and new innovations.

Broader investments in health, education, consensus building and participatory forums within communities, and natural resource management are needed. More generally, resilience building should be central to all development and humanitarian interventions.

There is also the need to develop health service delivery systems (for example, immunizations, emergency care, reproductive services, and special nutrition products) complemented by robust logistics that function efficiently during non-crisis periods and withstand pressures of crises.

Apart from the components of the strategy, discussants felt that the inherent design of the overall strategy should be highly contextualized to the local conditions (preferably including communal ownership and participation), and that it should contain feedback mechanisms that enable prioritizing actions as well as funding based on immediate needs.

5. How can we measure success in resilience programming?

Measuring success in programming, especially in this region, is a challenge. The key conclusion the discussants reached was that assessing successful interventions requires that programming be better integrated with research and academic institutions. Baseline and endline surveys to measure intervention-specific indicators are crucial in understanding what works. Because the sustainability of interventions is a concern, surveys and monitoring must be of adequate duration to capture long-term changes. This has not been done in the past, with many programs instead focusing on results within a very limited

time horizon.

Furthermore, there is a need to use more rigorous methodology that incorporates randomized control trials, where possible. While quantitative data collection agencies in the region remain weak and capacity building is necessary, projects still can do more to invest in proper evaluation that provides more conclusive results.

Governance and Institutions

Presenters: Girma Kassa, Conflict Management Advisor, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Ethiopia, and Hussein Halane, Senior Advisor, Global Humanitarian Accountability, Save the Children

Session I

1. How have vulnerabilities in governance manifested themselves in the Horn of Africa?

The key vulnerabilities in governance that emerged from this discussion were the informal status of customary institutions and the weak capacity of local governments in implementing and sustaining projects. The informal status of customary institutions undermines the validity of their initiatives and rules set for access, management, and adjudication. Often they act as a parallel set of rules, creating further confusion. A lack of decentralized decisionmaking or inclusion of traditional leaders in the decisionmaking process prevents them from generating robust social protection mechanisms that would allow people to equilibrate their livelihoods following a crisis.

Weak capacity in terms of organization, accountability, and resources prevents institutions from implementing legitimate strategies or programs due to an uncertain time horizon in terms of

human and financial resources. Additionally, the weak capacity of institutions prevents them from responding in a timely manner to early warning systems.

2. Which resilience-building strategies and programs have been successful? Which ones have not? To what degree have the successful ones built on traditional coping capacities, assets, or other practices?

Strategies and programs that have succeeded in addressing vulnerabilities in governance and building resilience have focused on long-run investments and engaging communities in a participatory manner. Investments in agricultural technologies and inputs (such as fertilizer, improved seeds, and drought-resistant crops) and large-scale investments in reserves of water and food have been fruitful. Those that have been unsuccessful have lacked a broader, more regional, focus on resilience building. Since the effects of crisis often cross borders with ease, planning for negative spillover from neighboring countries will serve to build a more rounded approach to building resilience.

3. Which factors or enabling conditions have helped build resilience and which ones have hindered it or even destroyed previously successful resilience efforts?

A fatal error in building resilience has been investment in crisis management and rehabilitation alone without investment in either preventative or long-term developmental measures. Discrimination against women or other minority groups have compounded difficulties in building resilience as it leaves out high-risk populations.

4. What are the key elements of a strategy designed to address vulnerability in governance?

Key elements of a strategy to address vulnerabilities in governance must include a multidisciplinary approach that integrates solutions into the framework of all relevant government institutions and bolsters government ownership at various levels, with clear designation of roles in management and implementation.

5. How can we measure success in resilience programming?

Measuring success in programs developed for building resilience in governance can benefit from regular reviews of a number of different indicators. First, and perhaps most importantly, reviewing the government's revenue collection apparatus and programmatic spending trends is essential to understand progress on resilience initiatives. Second, monitoring participation in local governments (especially by women) provides a useful indicator of decentralization and shifting gender roles. Finally, studying long-term usage behavior and adoption of improved technologies in agriculture, changing costs and provision of service delivery, and indicators of child nutrition and household income measures is also useful for measuring resilience.

Session II

6. Consider the role that each of the following cross-cutting issues—gender, conflict, and climate change—plays in influencing risks or vulnerabilities related to governance. How might strategies and programs designed to address each of these cross-cutting issues impact vulnerabilities in governance?

Interventions addressing gender issues will generally have a positive impact in reducing vulnerabilities in governance, but as brought up during the social factors sessions, it is important to involve men as part of the initiatives or there could be a negative backlash due to exclusion of traditional decisionmakers. Governance

will benefit by making structural changes that allow women to become part of the decisionmaking process as well as developing differentiated programs that address specific coping needs for women during crisis.

Strategies designed to tackle the impact of climate change might include provisions regarding governance that reform current regulations on migration, allowing affected populations to move during times of crisis. However, movement of large groups needs to be done in a sensitive manner so as not to fuel further conflict. Other strategies that address creating structured rules that monitor land and natural resource usage more closely, develop better response mechanisms to early warning systems, and increase public spending on infrastructure will have both short- and long-term positive effects.

7. What role do the other four areas of vulnerability play in governance? What are those vulnerabilities?

Vulnerabilities in all other sectors play a strong negative role in governance. Even under strong governance, situations of crisis and general structural vulnerabilities in related sectors are difficult to respond to and require significant dedication of resources. Interventions aimed at improving other sectors invariably should contain components that go towards improving governance.

Economics

Presenters: Derek Headey, Research Fellow, IFPRI, and Penny Anderson, Director of Food Security, Mercy Corps

Session I

1. How have vulnerabilities in economics manifested themselves in the Horn of Africa?

The group felt that the occurrence of

repeated prolonged drought has led to a degradation of the natural resource base, making pastoralism no longer a viable livelihood for everyone. There has also been greater stress on the limited amount of water, causing conflicts of user rights and competition among pastoralists and sedentary farmers. This has caused a number of pastoral drop-outs and increased urban migration. Given this, the participants agreed that more must be done to understand the extent of the land degradation and the carrying capacity and that currently there is not enough information available in this area.

Others felt that pastoralists have been vulnerable to government land policy that limits privately held land and restricts migration that has traditionally been a means of coping with climate-related shocks. Given that no one person or group can lay claim to the land, it currently is suffering from a “tragedy of the commons.” Some felt that providing ownership will motivate people to invest in their land to maintain its productivity, as well as reduce conflict over usage rights.

Finally, participants felt that there were missing markets and that this has made pastoralists vulnerable. Some cited evidence that as pastoralists become more commercial they are more likely to sell livestock, especially as conditions worsen. However, there is also evidence from the USAID-funded Improving Pastoral Risk Management on East African Rangelands project (PARIMA) that the best means of recovering from a drought is to maintain as large a herd as possible to guarantee some breeding stock following drought to replenish herd sizes during favorable times. This would indicate that there are missing markets for not only destocking (during times of drought) but also for restocking.

2. Which resilience-building strategies and programs have been successful? Which ones have not? To what degree have the successful ones built on traditional coping capacities, assets, or other practices?

Some participants stressed that we still do not have enough knowledge or data to really know what traditional programs have and have not worked. This issue in itself can become a vulnerability, and we therefore need new and more complete impact evaluations and differential analysis that more finely disaggregates households based on livelihoods and incomes to better understand what has worked and for whom.

We have also traditionally focused on strategies that have been based on preserving pastoralism, but with population growth we realistically need to begin to provide an exit for some pastoralists for whom this livelihood is just not productive. Some cited improving (mobile) education as being a key strategy to facilitate the movement of people out of pastoralism and into non-agriculture based livelihoods.

For those who wish to remain in pastoralism, the government could do more to help this sector. Some participants suggested government-initiated insurance (or public-private partnership) as being one piece of the solution but evidence is still needed. However, because insurance is very context specific it needs to be suited to the specificities of pastoralist needs.

3. Which factors or enabling conditions have helped build resilience and which ones have hindered it or even destroyed previously successful resilience efforts?

The participants suggested that in the past programs often have been developed in response to an immediate crisis. As such, the funding response has been

generally targeted for short-term aid and thus largely neglected development programs in the region. It was suggested that development partners should make a longer-term commitment to helping the region and that funding streams should have a longer time horizon given that making real change and impact may take several years. Likewise, it was suggested that there needs to be a marriage between short-term humanitarian aid and development efforts.

4. What are the key elements of a strategy designed to address vulnerability in economics?

One of the key successes of the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia was that it was able to provide a basic level of household protection and prevent the erosion of household assets, allowing households to shift their focuses away from meeting immediate needs. By removing these constraints the poor are better able to take advantage of opportunities in small, low-risk steps. The economics group felt that there is a need for strategies that help to push households to participate in value chains through education and capacity building, allowing them to take advantage of opportunities and to improve their ability to take on more risks. On the other hand, there is also a need for pull strategies that strengthen value chains to create opportunities for vulnerable households by improving competitiveness. By doing so, they create less risky entry points and lower barriers to entry.

5. How can we measure success in resilience programming?

There was some discussion that much of the data and evidence that we use now is based on correlations but does not specifically explore cause-and-effect relationships. The most effective way to understand the relationships between

program actions and outcomes is through independent impact assessments that provide a strong causal relationship.

Baseline data throughout the region has also been lacking, making analysis difficult. Establishing baseline surveys is particularly difficult in remote areas, among mobile populations, and in conflict zones. While survey data is ideal, it is also costly and requires long-term commitments. Given these challenges it may be worthwhile to consider and fund alternative means of performing assessments, such as remote sensing based on satellite imagery, or GIS, or both.

Other participants suggested these indicators as potential benchmarks for measuring resilience:

- Anthropomorphic measures
- Number of people participating in safety nets
- Household expenditures
- Measurements of variability in income
- Maintenance of assets

6. Consider the role that each of the following cross-cutting issues—gender and conflict—plays in influencing risks or vulnerabilities related to economics. How might strategies and programs designed to address each of these cross-cutting issues impact vulnerabilities in economics?

Gender: Within pastoralist households most decisions are made by men while women are limited in their right to own and control household assets. As such, women have traditionally not been able to participate in economic activities. Still, evidence from elsewhere has shown that if women are given greater opportunity to make household decisions and control wealth, they are more likely to invest in education, health, and nutrition. It was therefore suggested that programs focus on giving women greater economic op-

portunities.

Conflict: Many participants felt that the drought and population growth have exacerbated conflict by increasing the competition for limited resources. In areas of conflict, market systems have broken down, further increasing the vulnerability of communities to shocks. There is some evidence that where communities have worked on conflict programming there is better resource sharing and communities were better able to develop strategies to migrate. The strategies that have been the most successful are those that take into account traditional institutions and merge them with formal institutions. Greater transparency in decisionmaking may also help to prevent conflict in the future.

DAY 2: MIXED GROUP BREAKOUT SESSIONS

Strategies and Policies to Build Resilience

How were the cross-cutting themes of gender, conflict, and climate change differentially addressed by each group?

There was a general consensus that the cross-cutting themes overlapped and could not be thought of alone, so that impact in any one area can have a significant impact in other areas.

- Climate change can lead to changes in the natural environment and ultimately to a scarcity of productive resources. This in turn can then fuel conflict as groups compete for access to a limited resource base. That competition for resources will ultimately have gender implications as women's user rights are acknowledged or denied based on customary gender roles, particularly in pastoralist communities.
- Conflict can also cause migration,

as we currently see between Somalia and Kenya, leading to concentrations of displaced people who ultimately will compete for natural resources.

Ultimately, the groups felt that the best means of addressing conflict and climate change were to build on existing practices and safety nets within communities. Given that community groups (for savings, health, or women, among others) are the first to react to shocks, ex ante programming should do more to empower and strengthen them so that they are better prepared in times of crisis. Many participants also felt that through the presence of social networks and customary practices of wealth distribution and social protection, some of those affected by the current crisis have been able to maintain or restock assets more quickly. The groups also provided examples whereby customary governance institutions of respected elders or groups of elders were the most effective at solving conflicts, particularly those related to access to resources. In the face of growing incidences of environmental shocks due to climate change, these institutions should play a greater role in local governance.

However, many participants also expressed concern that supporting customary institutions may reinforce biases that promote gender inequality. In their view, customary gender roles place much of the control of productive assets in the hands of men, limiting women's ability to control household decisionmaking. Deferring to local institutions is unlikely to change this. Similarly, traditional male roles in pastoralist areas have centered on the movement and provisions of family herds, lowering the emphasis on education for boys and lowering enrollment in schools. Many felt that lower education levels made young boys and

men more susceptible to recruitment by militant groups.

Most participants agreed that establishing and developing women's groups and networks can lead to an increase in the status of women in society and may have a broader impact across the community as a whole. Several discussants cited numerous examples of how women's empowerment translated into higher enrollment in schools, greater household savings, and improved nutrition indicators for children.

The programming context in the Horn of Africa is rife with intractable obstacles. What other adaptive strategies, not yet cited, could be applied to minimize these obstacles?

The discussion groups felt that engagement had to take place at both the local level and with central governments. Some felt that the central governments in the Horn need to take the lead in creating a policy framework, critical institutions, and an enabling environment in order to successfully implement resilience programming. One group felt that the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) process provided new opportunities for development partners and governments to interact to develop investment plans and policies that would provide a framework to build resilience while making sure that such policies were country-owned and country-specific.

Participants cited strategic investments in education such as mobile schools as being crucial to support the livelihood and lifestyle of pastoralists, allowing them to receive education while migrating. Evidence was also cited whereby those with an education were better able to adapt to non-agricultural employment in urban areas. Given the recent trends in urbanization in the

Horn, education therefore gives those that choose to drop out of pastoralism a greater chance of a secure livelihood.

Discussion group members of all sectors felt that a substantial evidence base is still lacking and that even basic statistics of pastoralist household and livestock numbers are absent, making informed political decisions difficult. Others stated that understanding the scale and impact of the current crisis and drought is nearly impossible and understanding differential impacts among various livelihood groups (including pastoralists and agro-pastoralists) is problematic. Moving forward many advocated placing greater emphasis on the regular collection of statistics, because without this information it will be difficult to advocate for political change with regards to arid and semi-arid lands and pastoralist groups.

Similarly, the evaluation of the PSNP was really the only large-scale program that group members could cite as a rigorous evaluation of a safety-net program in the region. As we move forward some were concerned that without adequate information, given the scale of these projects, mistakes could be very costly. And, even though the rates generally are not favorable in sparsely populated areas, we still have much to learn about the benefit-cost ratios of investments in pastoral regions. One of the things that the PSNP evaluation has taught us is that a sequential process with key interventions can oftentimes improve outcomes and success rates. Creating partnerships with the academic community for research and improved M&E will be critical as we move forward to inform resilience programming.

In areas of conflict or those that are particularly neglected by the central government, many advocated that working at the community level was the best pos-

sible way to effect measurable change. Some discussion group members shared experiences whereby community care groups and women's groups were able to have a broad impact on maintaining stability in the face of conflict. Likewise, informal groups and social networks have traditionally provided financial and care support during times of crisis. Strengthening these existing groups is a better approach than creating new ones.

Finally, some suggested that leveraging technologies such as mobile telephones may play a critical role in resilience programming to overcome the obstacles of isolation. Some cited examples of how mobile telephones have gone a long way to better connect communities, providing not only a social networking opportunity but also a means to improve rural market linkages. Other cited examples from other countries where telephones can be used to improve mobile banking and transfer money.

What institutional, organizational, and other enablers and barriers exist that facilitate or hinder integrated programs that would address vulnerabilities in multiple spheres?

The current crisis in the Horn of Africa calls for an integrated development approach but within development partners and country governments alike there has been a lack of coordination. Even within an agency like USAID, there is often no uniformity of how to respond to crises in different countries. In addition, many participants felt that USAID policies and approaches do not allow for much flexibility in resilience programming. Therefore there is a need for better advanced planning to promote vertical and horizontal integration. There is also need for coordination of response—both active responses and financial ones—among the donors

together with the local governments.

Participants also indicated that a common framework for resiliency is still lacking. Given this, linking and coordinating different sectors of government to create integrated programs is difficult. Likewise, common measures of resilience have not been agreed on nor have we decided what constitutes a good resilience indicator. Resilience is a complicated, multi-level objective, so there should be multiple indicators starting at the household level. So, while a single indicator may not accurately reflect broader resilience thinking in an integrated framework, we must develop some easily quantifiable measures that we can agree on and these indicators and the assessment of them must be dynamic rather than static.

In Ethiopia and Kenya there has also been government bias against pastoralist areas hindering development efforts. In Kenya, given the large influx of displaced people coming from Somalia, most money has been directed toward dealing with immediate food security needs rather than making investments to foster long-term growth. The Kenyan Equalization fund, which directs 0.5 percent of total government revenues to the most marginalized areas, was cited as a good example of a remedy for this past neglect. In Ethiopia there has been long-running neglect of the pastoralist areas with most groups vastly underserved in education, health, and extension services. Likewise, government policies restricting the use of Somali currency and stricter regula-

tion of cross-border trade have forced most trade and marketing to become informal and limited development efforts to formalize livestock marketing. Shifting attitudes within government towards the needs of ASALs may greatly contribute to improving resilience programming.

What policies could facilitate efforts to strengthen resiliency in multiple spheres?

In order to design policies that engage and strengthen resiliency in multiple spheres, participants felt that within the program design phase there must be a strategic coordination piece. This commitment to engaging multiple disciplines and ministries will ensure that the design and implementation of resiliency efforts are multisectoral. The planning phase within the CAADP framework was cited as providing a positive example to encourage cross-sector collaboration. Similarly, stronger joint planning will also further integrate humanitarian and development spending, something that the PSNP has demonstrated to be effective in resiliency programming. These joint planning cells should also include the PVO community, given that their action at the community level with small groups is often successful at integrating multiple sectors such as security, health and nutrition, and gender. In their experience, objectives within these small cells tend to be met at a high rate and could feed into integrated programming at other levels.

Overall, the group thinks that custom-

ary institutions are the most important for addressing problems, and the aid community must be careful not to break down these mechanisms. However, if these institutions are to be supported they must first be validated by the groups that they represent and serve.

Participants found that, given both the lack of physical infrastructure and the low level of human capacity in the region, there were a number of policies that could be enacted that would have a cross-cutting impact. First, there is a need for more investment in physical infrastructure such as roads, telecommunication systems, health systems, and schools. Roads and telecommunications will help facilitate the participation in markets that is desperately lacking while schools will enable greater income diversification into nonagricultural sources.

Second, given the size and importance of the livestock sector in the ASALs there is also the need for pro-pastoralist land policies which support rather than hinder the mobility of pastoralist communities. These, along with facilities to trade and market livestock products, will help formalize pastoralist livelihoods. Similarly, water management policies (including the use of rivers and borehole development) have been neglected and tribally administered. Ratifying and formalizing these agreements will not only reduce conflict in the region but facilitate greater mobility during times of crisis.



ENHANCING RESILIENCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

AN EVIDENCE BASED WORKSHOP ON STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS

13–14 DECEMBER 2011 | WASHINGTON, DC

Jointly hosted by the US Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Bureau for Food Security, and Bureau for Africa in partnership with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the USAID/Office of Food for Peace-Funded TOPS Program in support of the Feed the Future Initiative.

OBJECTIVES

- Foster a common understanding of what is meant by resilience and resilience programming.
- Identify successful strategies and enabling conditions to build resilience and lessons learned from less successful strategies.
- Demonstrate the value of resilience programming in mitigating the effect of shocks and recovery from them, and its potential role in any “pathway out of poverty.”
- Identify the linkages between resilience and economic growth.

AGENDA

Day 1: December 13, 2011

8:00–8:30 | Registration and continental breakfast

8:30–8:45 | Welcome Remarks by USAID

Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID

8:45–9:00 | Welcome Remarks by IFPRI

Paul Dorosh, Director, Development Strategy and Governance Division, IFPRI

9:00–10:00 | Plenary Presentation: Resilience 101

John Hoddinott, Senior Research Fellow, IFPRI

Chair: *Beth Dunford, Director of Country Strategy and Implementation, Bureau for Food Security, USAID*

10:00–10:15 | Break

10:15–11:45 | Plenary Panel Discussion

The Evidence Base: What Do We Know about What Works and What Doesn’t?

Chair: *Dina Esposito, Director, Office of Food for Peace, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID*
Arid and Marginal Lands Recovery Consortium (ARC) program in Kenya

Shep Owen, Regional Director, Food for the Hungry

Disaster Risk Reduction / Hyogo Framework

Harlan Hale, Principal Regional Advisor for Southern Africa, Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID

Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative in Ethiopia

Abdifatah Ismail, Somali Regional State President Advisor on Humanitarian and Development, Government of Ethiopia

11:45–12:15 | Keynote Address

Dr. Rajiv Shah, Administrator, USAID

Chair: *Dina Esposito, Director, Office of Food for Peace, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID*

12:15–12:30 | The Nairobi Strategy: Enhanced Partnership to Eradicate Drought Emergencies

H. E. Elkanah Odembo, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Washington, DC

Chair: *Susan Fine, Director, Office of East African Affairs, Bureau for Africa, USAID*

12:30–1:30 | Lunch

1:30–2:45 | Breakout Session 1: Identifying and Understanding Context-Specific Vulnerabilities and the Most Effective Responses

Economics

- *Derek Headey, Research Fellow, IFPRI*
- *Penny Anderson, Director of Food Security, Mercy Corps*

Governance and Institutions

- *Girma Kassa, Conflict Management Advisor, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Ethiopia*
- *Hussein Halane, Senior Advisor, Global Humanitarian Accountability, Save the Children*

Health and Nutrition

- *Dan Gilligan, Senior Research Fellow, IFPRI*
- *Kristi Ladd, Technical Director of Nutrition, Food Security, ACDI/VOCA*

Natural Resources

- *Jesse T. Njoka, Center for Sustainable Drylands, University of Nairobi*
- *Paul Macek, Senior Director, Food Security and Livelihoods Team, World Vision*

Social Factors

- *Carla Koppell, Senior Coordinator for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, USAID*
- *Mara Russell, Practice Manager for Food Security and Livelihoods, Land O'Lakes*

Presenters representing the research community and the field implementing community will each deliver a short 10-minute framing presentation on vulnerability in this area, followed by a 20-minute Q&A session. The questions to be addressed by each presenter will include:

1. How have vulnerabilities in this area (economics, governance, health and nutrition, natural resources, or social factors) manifested themselves in the Horn of Africa?
2. Which resilience-building strategies and programs have been successful? Which ones have not? To what degree have the successful ones built on traditional coping capacities, assets, or other practices?
3. Which factors or enabling conditions have helped build resilience and which ones have hindered it or even destroyed previously successful resilience efforts?
4. What are the key elements of a strategy designed to address this area of vulnerability?
5. How can we measure success in resilience programming?

2:45–3:30 | Small group discussion

Each small group table will discuss the five key questions in more depth, building on the concepts presented in the framing presentations and raised in the Q&A.

3:30–3:45 | Break

3:45–4:30 | Breakout Session 1 (continued)

Participants continue small group discussions in chosen “area of vulnerability,” addressing the following questions:

6. Consider the role that each of the following cross-cutting is-

—gender, conflict, and climate change—plays in influencing risks or vulnerabilities related to the area being discussed. How might strategies and programs designed to address each of these cross-cutting issues impact vulnerabilities in that area? This might include (1) how strategies designed to address each of these cross-cutting issues may impact vulnerabilities in your chosen area and (2) how programs designed to strengthen resilience may help to minimize or inadvertently increase their negative impacts.

7. What role do the other four areas of vulnerability play in the area being discussed? What are those vulnerabilities?

4:30–5:15 | Plenary Discussion of Breakout Session 1

Facilitator: Tim Frankenberger, President, TANGO International

5:15–5:30 | Closing Remarks

Raja Jandhyala, Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Africa, USAID

Day 2: December 14, 2011

8:30–8:45 | Welcome Remarks

Susan Reichle, Assistant to the Administrator for the Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning, USAID

8:45–9:15 | Day One Summary

Tim Frankenberger, President, TANGO International

9:15–10:45 | Plenary Panel Discussion: Developing a Common Agenda for Building Resilience: Lessons Identified from Recent Efforts and Gaps Remaining

Chair: Neil Levine, Director of Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID

Consensus Building for the Ethiopia New Coalition for Food Security and How that Led to the Safety Net Program

John Graham, Senior Policy Advisor, USAID/Ethiopia

The Links between Resilience, Conflict, and Food Security

Jeremy Konyndyk, Policy and Advocacy Director, Mercy Corps

Some Lessons from Ethiopia's PSNP

Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, Research Fellow, IFPRI

10:45–11:00 | Plenary Remarks: Strategies and Policies to Build Resilience

Tim Frankenberger, President, TANGO International

11:00–11:15 | Break

11:15–12:45 | Breakout Session 2: Strategies and Policies to Build Resilience

Participants will move into small groups including one representative from each separate vulnerability group from the previous day. Small group discussion will address the following questions:

- How were the cross-cutting themes of gender, conflict, and climate change differentially addressed by each group?
- The programming context in the Horn of Africa is rife with

intractable obstacles. What other adaptive strategies not yet cited could be applied to minimize these obstacles?

- What institutional, organizational, and other enablers and barriers exist that facilitate or hinder integrated programs that would address vulnerabilities in multiple spheres?
- What policies could facilitate efforts to strengthen resiliency in multiple spheres?

12:45–2:00 | Lunch

2:00–2:30 | Plenary Discussion of Breakout Session 2

Facilitator: Tim Frankenberger, President, TANGO International

2:30–4:00 | Plenary Panel Discussion: Pathways Out of Poverty: Exploring the Linkages between Resilience and Economic Growth

Chair: Paul Dorosh, Director of the Development Strategy and Governance Division, IFPRI

The value chain model

Steve McCarthy, Senior Technical Director, Enterprise Development, ACDI/VOCA

The graduation model

Alexia Latortue, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), World Bank

DFID's new resilience agenda

Andrew Preston, Counsellor Development, Foreign and Security Policy Group, British Embassy, Washington, DC

4:00–4:15 | Break

4:15–4:45 | Plenary Presentation: Moving Forward in the Horn

Karen Brooks, Africa Region Agricultural Programs Manager, World Bank

Chair: Michael Curtis, Director of Office of Sustainable Development, USAID/Bureau for Africa

4:45–5:30 | Plenary Discussion: Synthesis of Key Lessons Learned and Next Steps

Paul Dorosh, Director, Development Strategy and Governance Division, IFPRI


After a 15-minute synthesis of both days, participants will have 15 minutes to discuss recommended next steps with their tables. Each table will present recommendations to the plenary.

5:30 | Closing Remarks

Paul Weisenfeld, Assistant to the Administrator for the Bureau for Food Security, USAID

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