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A BRIEF HISTORY
OF
THE COOPERATIVE EDUCATION PROJECTS
OF
THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN and THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Prepared by
Dr. Christine S. Hugerth
USAID Education Division
for
The Ministry of Education

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ORIGINS

President Truman in his inaugural address of January 20, 1949, described American foreign policy in terms of four major points, or courses of action. Of the fourth, he said: "Point four: We must embark on a bold new program for making available to peace loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life."

In the "Act for International Development" the United States Congress provided legal authority for the "Point Four" program under Title IV of Public Law 535, which was approved by President Truman June 5, 1950. The Act authorized the President to carry out programs of technical cooperation designed to enable the people of developing countries to make better use of their own resources by their own efforts.

Eight months later, on February 7, 1951, the "Point Four General Agreement for Technical Cooperation between the Royal Afghan Government and the Government of the United States of America" was signed. In a later document dated June 30, 1952, it was stated that there would be an interchange of technical knowledge and skills and related activities designed to contribute to the development of the economic resources and productive capacities of Afghanistan.

The American government agency which carries out the programs of technical assistance and cooperation has had several changes of official name over the years and is at present called the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). However, it is still probably best known around the world as the "Point Four" program.

I. THE EARLY YEARS IN AFGHANISTAN (1951 - 1956)

Education and agriculture were the earliest joint projects of the two governments. When looked at in terms of money, the American contribution has been greater only in transportation projects. But the man years of American specialists provided for education development in Afghanistan have been far greater in number than in any other field.

The first "project agreement" in education, signed by the two governments June 27, 1951, was to develop the Afghan Institute of Technology. This project continued under a project agreement in "technical education" effected by

exchange of notes between the two governments on May 26 and June 23, 1952. In May and June, 1952, the Vocational Agriculture Education Project to develop the Vocational Agriculture School in Kabul was begun also.

October 11, 1953, the next joint education project of the two governments was formally initiated. It was called simply Education Project. It gathered together the previous projects and added some new joint activities. The United States would (1) provide teachers of science, technology, vocational agriculture, educational methods, English language and other subjects; (2) continue to assist the Afghan Institute of Technology and the Vocational Agriculture School at Kabul; also the Teacher Training College of Kabul (i.e., the Darul Mo'Allamein, a high school), the only DMA existing at that time.

Although in the first stage of these and subsequent projects the American specialists have done much of the teaching and have even functioned as administrators of schools such as Habibia, A.I.T., and the Faculty of Agriculture, the aim from the beginning was the training in Afghanistan and abroad of Afghans who would be able to staff Afghan schools and educational programs and operate them eventually without foreign assistance. Therefore, the American teacher-advisors and their Afghan associates have been the key elements in all projects undertaken in education by the Royal Government of Afghanistan and the United States Agency for International Development. The first Afghans went abroad for study under the joint education projects in 1954.

It was in 1954 also that the United States government's technical cooperation agency began to provide technical advisors through contracting with American universities. The first contracts were with the University of Wyoming and with Teachers College of Columbia University. Later contracts were made with Southern Illinois University, Indiana University, and a group of eleven engineering schools.

In 1955 the omnibus Education Project continued, and a new project was added. The new project was first called the English Language Institute, but the name was changed before year's end to Institute of Education. As its first name implied, the main function of the new project was training Afghans to teach English, and it was at this time that the American teachers of English at Habibia College (high school), the Afghan Institute of Technology and other schools became part of a project whose aim was to train Afghans to replace them as rapidly as possible as teachers of English.

It is interesting to note that in 1956 two of the joint projects were being carried on in institutions which had been expressly established in connection with these projects. One was the above-mentioned Institute of Education; the other was the Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering, a new division of Kabul University. The Faculty admitted its first group of forty-six students in the freshman class in April, 1956.

1956 saw also the first modest American assistance to Kabul University in the field of University administration. The project consisted of one American advisor and a secretary provided under the contract with Teachers College of Columbia University, plus funds for sending a number of Afghans abroad for study.

II. THE MIDDLE YEARS (1957 - 1961)

The technical cooperation program in existence during the first years continued essentially the same throughout the middle years. American specialists averaged from sixty to seventy persons each year. Training of Afghans abroad increased rapidly in these years. Also, these years saw growing inputs of materials and equipment and the start of substantial construction of necessary buildings to house the new educational programs.

One of the continuing activities was the Institute of Education, which two years after its creation by the Ministry of Education was placed under Kabul University. Its four functions as planned were: (1) teacher training and leadership to all teacher training institutions; (2) in-service improvement of education personnel; (3) education-related research; (4) in a special branch, the training of teachers of English.

During these years the activities of the Afghans and Americans associated with the Institute of Education were chiefly the following: training of primary school teachers centered in the Kabul Teacher Training College (Darul Mo'Allamein); in-service winter and summer workshops for teachers; development of materials needed for modern ways of teaching, especially textbooks for the teaching of English; research and initiation of a testing program; and the continued development of the English Language Program to prepare Afghans to teach English.

It is worthy of note that women teachers were included in the winter training sessions for the first time in 1959, and that the training of women teachers, especially as English teachers, continued to increase greatly. Before the end of this period, Darul Mo'Allameins were established in Kandahar, Jalalabad and Herat.

The second of the continuing joint activities was that in Vocational Education, which centered in two schools: the Afghan Institute of Technology and the Kabul Vocational Agriculture School. Both were high schools. The goal in both cases was to develop the school into a strong institution in its particular field of specialization, with well-equipped laboratories, shops and classrooms; a well trained faculty; and a functional curriculum. Though both the Ministry of Education and the U.S. Agency for International Development invested much in material resources and personnel in the Vocational Agriculture School, it was later moved.

The Afghan Institute of Technology continued to grow strong, and programs were developed in civil, mechanical, electrical and aviation technologies. Building construction technology was added later. The United Nations assisted in the aviation program, and English teachers from the Institute of Education taught all students. During these years the original physical facilities were improved, the curricula developed, the Afghan teaching staff continued to receive training on the job and in study abroad, and job placement of graduates was begun.

Though the Vocational Agriculture high school in Kabul closed, the

technical assistance activity in agriculture education did not cease. In April, 1956, the Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering had started in three classrooms in the Faculty of Science building, moving later to the Surgery Building of the Faculty of Medicine. The first class was graduated in 1959: 9 graduates in agriculture and 4 in engineering. Plans for this Faculty called for training of Afghan professors (the director of the VoAg School later became Dean of this Faculty), developing curricula, and designing and equipping functionally adequate classrooms and laboratories.

With both governments vitally interested in the continuing growth of Kabul University, it soon became apparent that its proper development required that the existing Faculties scattered throughout the city should be brought together on one campus. In 1958, a U.S. team of architects and engineers was brought to Afghanistan to prepare a master plan for the entire University and to determine the nature of the first five buildings. In 1959 the plans were complete for an administration and classroom building, a library, an engineering building, an agriculture building, and an 800-student dormitory. In addition, plans were included for a gymnasium to be provided by the Asia Foundation.

In early 1960, a construction contract was let to the Hochtief Co. The U.S. contribution included the imported commodities needed in construction and the equipment to be installed in the five buildings. Also under this construction project, named Education Facilities, were various improvements to Habibia Lycee (high school), the Kabul Darul Mo'Allamein, the Vocational Agriculture School, the Afghan Institute of Technology, and construction of the first unit of a comprehensive school for the Helmand Valley at Lashkargah. The University buildings were completed in 1964.

The American contribution to the building of Kabul University was about four million U.S. dollars. Costs to be paid in afghanis were 125,262,000 afghanis, of which the Afghan government pledged 72,262,000, the balance of 53,000,000 afghanis provided from "wheat funds." "Wheat funds" was the name given to the afghanis obtained from the Afghan government's sale of American wheat provided as a gift of the American people. It had been agreed between the two governments that these "wheat funds" would be used to help finance joint development projects.

In summary, these years saw the continuation of joint projects in teacher education and vocational education, and the emergence of a growing program of U.S. assistance to Kabul University, which was recognized as the source of most of the high-level leadership for future social and economic development in Afghanistan.

III. THE LATER YEARS (1962 - 1966)

Ten years after the signing of the first General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan concluded that a re-examination of its participation in education activities would be desirable. Consequently it was decided that all projects in their existing form would be terminated on December 31, 1961, and that new projects would be created, based in part on the recommendations of two planning teams which had studied the educational situation

in Afghanistan in 1959, and in part on the fact that the Second Five-Year Plan would begin in March, 1962. It will readily be noted that the five new projects undertaken by the Afghan and American governments, while introducing new elements, continued the main emphases of prior years. These projects were:

1. Kabul University Development. In 1962, the Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering was split into two separate Faculties, each to be assisted in its development by an American university team of specialists under contract to the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Institute of Education of Kabul University, also assisted by a university contract team, continued its work in teacher education in Darul Mo'Allameins and in vacation workshops, the training of teachers of English, and added responsibility for a newly created Faculty of Education in academic year 1962. Two U.S. specialists began the development of the University's central library. U.S. funds were provided to complete equipping of the five new University buildings.

2. Public School Education. For two years four specialists provided under the contract between the U.S. Government and Teachers College of Columbia University worked in the Ministry of Education in the fields of curriculum, educational administration, emergency teacher training, and teacher training for women. The Emergency Teacher Training Program began in 1962. The Ministry of Education established a Community Schools Department during this period. The Community Schools joint activity continued until 1968, when a pilot, or demonstration, school had been established in every one of Afghanistan's twenty-eight provinces.

The idea of a type of school which teaches students to use their knowledge to improve living conditions, and which both leads and depends on its community lit a spark in people over the nation. A number of schools of this type have been set up independently by groups in various parts of the country, using volunteer labor and materials and land contributed by citizens. Another part of this project undertook to prepare and produce textbooks under the Institute of Education. Modest assistance was provided also to the Ministry of Education's Audio-Visual Center in 1962 and 1963.

3. Vocational Education. Under this joint project activity, assistance was continued to the Vocational Agriculture School in Kabul and to the Afghan Institute of Technology. A U.S. specialist was provided in the field of home economics, but this activity was soon discontinued. A fourth year of study was added at the Institute of Technology in order to turn out graduates with the type of competence indicated by the name of the school. Also, under another project, plans were made and funds provided for a new physical setting for the school, which would make it one of the finest facilities of its kind in Asia.

4. Education Facilities. Chiefly concerned with construction of the buildings for Kabul University under the First Five-Year Plan, this project during the Second Plan was used to provide architectural and engineering services and funds for construction of the new Institute of Technology buildings mentioned above.

5. English Language Teaching. Though the teaching of English and the

training of Afghans to teach English had continued for many years under the Institute of Education activities, an emergency enlargement of the U.S. assistance was provided in 1961, mainly through increase in the number of U.S. persons serving as teachers of English in various schools.

With the creation of the Faculty of Education in Kabul University, the program to prepare university-trained teachers of English became a major in this Faculty. The University-wide English Department teaching English as a foreign language to University students from all Faculties, and the In-Service Program to improve teaching and supervision in the lycees continued under the Institute of Education. It should be mentioned that opportunity for Afghan students to study English has been greatly increased by the large number of American Peace Corps Volunteers who teach English throughout the country.

6. The Lycee Project. In 1964, an activity called the Lycee Project was undertaken, whose purpose was to prepare more adequately in math and sciences those lycee students desiring to enter the Faculties of Agriculture and Engineering. This project ended in 1968 after having many lycee teachers participate in its activities designed to improve the teaching of these two subjects.

IV. THE PRESENT PERIOD (1967 and 1968)

The period of the start of the Third Five-Year Plan saw the responsibility for further development of the system of primary teacher education assumed by UNESCO. After fourteen years of American participation, four new Darul Mo'Allameins had been established, personnel had been recruited and given basic training, curricula had been set up, a variety of teaching materials for secondary school level and for demonstration primary schools had been provided or produced, and construction or improvement of buildings had been provided for.

An Emergency Teacher Training Program, designed to relieve the acute shortage of teachers because of the rapidly expanding number of primary and village schools, had been started in 1962. The program involved a modified middle-school program in 29 centers, followed by one year of professional teacher training in the Darul Mo'Allameins. In 1966 the program graduated its first group of 500 primary teachers.

By the time of American withdrawal from primary teacher education, the standard program in the Darul Mo'Allameins had been extended through grade twelve, making it possible for selected graduates to enter Kabul University for farther study.

At present writing (February, 1968) the following joint Afghan-American education projects continue:

1. Faculty of Education, Kabul University. This Faculty is preparing teachers of professional subjects for Darul Mo'Allameins and also other education specialists for leadership positions. It continues the program of training at the University level teachers of English for the schools of the nation. The Faculty also offers a sequence of professional courses for students of other Faculties who plan to enter teaching.

2. Agriculture Education. The development of the Faculty of Agriculture, Kabul University, continues with the objectives of adequate enrollment of well-qualified students, trained Afghan professors, appropriate curricula, and an adequate physical plant including an Experimental Farm.

3. Kabul University Central Library. With completion of the U.S.-financed building in 1964, books from the former individual Faculty libraries were combined. With some 80,000 volumes and 300 subscriptions to scholarly journals, this is the largest library collection in Afghanistan. Major collections have been catalogued. An acquisition program has been established. A trained Afghan library staff is taking over administration of this library.

4. Kabul University Administration Improvement. Begun in 1966, this joint project is building a modern and effective administrative organization in Kabul University. This development includes general administration and policy, administrative aspects of academic affairs, a comprehensive student personnel program, and business administration.

5. Technical Education. This project continues the development of the Afghan Institute of Technology, the secondary-school technical education center; and the Faculty of Engineering, the university-level engineering education center in Kabul University. Completion of the new buildings for the Institute of Technology is expected in summer, 1968.

6. School Design and Construction. With increasing involvement in renovation, replacement or creation of buildings to house cooperative education activities, both the Afghan and American government agencies began to think in the 1950's of developing a Department in the Ministry of Education to design buildings for modern school programs and to supervise the construction of these buildings to the exacting specifications needed for housing groups of students safely. Though American architects and engineers had assisted with various buildings over the years, it was not until the early 1960's, when facing the immediate problem of construction for the Darul Mo'Allameins, that the joint activity to develop a Department of School Design and Construction in the Ministry of Education took shape.

In 1964 the American Mission in Afghanistan provided by a contract with a U.S. firm an architect and an architectural designer to design, engineer and provide field inspection for construction at the Herat, Jalallabad, Kandahar and Kabul Darul Mo'Allameins. Later, construction at the new Mazar-e-Sharif school was added.

Equally important was the proposal to assist in setting construction standards for the 500 schools contemplated under the Third Five-Year Plan. With constant training while on the job and by a unique program of apprenticeship in the large architectural offices of the contracting firm in the U.S., the Afghan personnel will in time be prepared to carry on this Department without foreign help.

7. Curriculum and Textbook Project. Begun in 1966, this joint project of the Ministry of Education and the U.S. technical mission is still in its initial stages. Its objectives are twofold: (1) to establish within the

Ministry of Education a functional entity responsible for continuing curriculum development for the nation's primary schools and to create a modern primary school curriculum; and (2) to create in the Ministry a capability for creation and production of modern primary school textbooks and teachers guides to the effective use of those books, and to prepare the first modern primary textbooks and guides based on the new curriculum.

IN CONCLUSION

In all of the cooperative programs described above, the foremost objectives have been the strengthening of the educational system of the nation, and the education and specialized training of the human beings on whom will depend Afghanistan's full development in the years to come. The investment in people has been the heaviest contribution of both the Afghan and American governments. Materials, equipment and buildings have been provided only as they contribute to producing specialized personnel needed for Afghanistan's social and economic progress.

The accompanying Tables give the interested reader the quantitative information on these joint endeavors.

Feb., 1968

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs form below was sent to AID/Ed by US Embassy for completion)

AID GIVEN TO AFGHANISTAN IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION BY THE Agency for International Development
of the United States of America

1. Teachers & Experts

Number: 663.01 man years

<u>Years</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Tech'l, Voca'l</u>	<u>Higher</u>	<u>Miscellaneous</u>	<u>Est. Value*</u>	<u>Total number of man years</u>
prior to 1336 (1956)		\$391,000	\$401,000		\$792,000	29.33
1336/1340 (1956-1961)	\$1,000	647,000	3,585,000		4,233,000	156.77
1341 (1962)	195,000	388,000	1,019,000		1,602,000	59.33
1342 (1963)	575,000	72,000	1,191,000		1,838,000	68.07
1343 (1964)	251,000	30,000	1,653,000		1,934,000	71.63
1344 (1965)	423,000	81,000	898,000		1,402,000	52.00
1345 (1966)	828,000	280,000	886,000		1,994,000	73.85
1346 (1967)	838,000	270,000	915,000		2,023,000	75.00
1347 (1968) est.	962,000	289,000	829,000		2,080,000	77.03
	<u>\$4,072,000</u>	<u>\$2,448,000</u>	<u>\$11,377,000</u>		<u>\$17,898,000</u>	<u>663.01</u>

* \$27,000 used as estimated average cost per man year.

AID GIVEN TO AFGHANISTAN IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION BY THE Agency for International Development of the
United States of America

2. Fellowships & Scholarships

Number of: 795 man years of study

<u>Years</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Tech'l. Voca'l</u>	<u>Higher</u>	<u>Miscellaneous</u>	<u>Est. Value*</u>	<u>Total number of</u>
prior to 1336 (1956)	0	25	24	0	\$242,000	49
1336/1340 (1956-1961)	0	34	143	1	890,000	178
1341 (1962)	10	12	33	0	273,000	55
1342 (1963)	8	14	27	0	243,000	49
1343 (1964)	29	19	55	0	514,000	103
1344 (1965)	19	23	39	0	405,000	81
1345 (1966)	47	44	15	0	527,000	106
1346 (1967)	31	47	11	0	444,000	89
1347 (1968) est.	32	36	17	0	422,000	85
	<u>176</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>364</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>\$3,960,000</u>	<u>795</u>

* \$5,000 estimated average cost per man year of study.

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AID GIVEN TO AFGHANISTAN IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION BY THE Agency for International Development of the
United States of America

3. Equipment, Construction & Other

Estimated Value: \$10,174,000

<u>Years</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Tech'l, Voca'l</u>	<u>Higher</u>	<u>Miscellaneous</u>	<u>Estimated Value</u>
prior to 1336 (1956)		\$96,000	\$37,000		\$133,000
1336/1340 (1956-1961)	\$17,000	362,000	2,625,000		3,004,000
1341 (1962)	42,000	34,000	860,000		936,000
1342 (1963)	89,000	44,000	578,000		711,000
1343 (1964)	493,000	153,000	715,000		1,361,000
1344 (1965)	98,000	35,000	321,000		454,000
1345 (1966)	285,000	192,000	309,000		786,000
1346 (1967)	75,000	1,064,000	95,000		1,234,000
1347 (1968) est.	63,000	1,457,000	35,000		1,555,000
TOTALS	\$1,162,000	\$3,437,000	\$5,575,000		\$10,174,000

I. OVERVIEW AND RESULTS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN 1949 - 1979

A. Origin of the Program, 1946 - 1959

1. Background on the Economy of Afghanistan

Afghanistan in the 1950s was among the least developed countries in the world. Its economy was based on subsistence agriculture and many nomadic people raised livestock. Internal trade outside the towns was mostly by barter. Communications and transport were rudimentary and goods were largely shipped by pack-animals for there were few roads. Power development was at a beginning stage. In several centers there was a handful of small factory-type complexes to gin cotton and produce soap, leather goods, and seed oils. The principal exports were karakul sheep pelts, cotton, and fruits. Less than 8 percent of the population were estimated to be literate. (See Table 1, Economic Indicators).

2. Afghan Initiative for Helmand Valley Development

The American engagement in assisting with the development of Afghanistan was taken at the initiative of the Government of Afghanistan in signing a \$17 million dollar contract in 1946 with Morrison-Knudsen (M-K), an American construction company, for an ambitious program of irrigation and highway construction in the arid Helmand Valley. M-K was also to train Afghan technicians for maintenance and supply operations. Afghan financial reserves - built-up during World War II - were soon exhausted and U.S. Export Import Bank loans totalling \$39.5 million (in 1949 and 1954) permitted construction to continue.

The project encompassed two major dams, power facilities, diversion dams, an extensive system of irrigation, roads, land reclamation and resettlements. It was a monumental program of development in a watershed draining 40 percent of the Afghan land area and directly affecting 2 to 3 million people, or about a fifth of the entire population. This program, which in some respects was beyond the capabilities of both the Afghan Government and the M-K engineers, was to officially engage U.S. prestige and development assistance for the ensuing two decades.

For Afghanistan's leaders the Helmand valley had been the capital of the Ghaznavid civilization - a 10th century irrigation center - and is today in the heart of the Pashtun lands, the dominant tribal group of the country and origin of the royal family. Thus the project engaged considerable Afghan national pride and widespread support for the restoration of ancient glories.

Reclamation of land and security of irrigation for food ~~food~~

production was a reasonable development priority. The traditional peasant and pastoral economy produced an annual average of 3 million tons of basic food - engaging some 90 percent of the labor of its people - for a bare margin of subsistence. Periodic drought years led to imports of 10 to 17 thousand tons of wheat and flour from the U.S. in 1947, 1953 and 1954.

However, the Helmand project's initial scale and timing was highly unrealistic given the weak institutional capabilities for development and the shortage of Afghans able to handle the management, technical and social problems which ensued.

Morrison-Knudsen performed well in the construction of specific engineering works, but was too ready to accept the risks of shortcuts proposed by the Afghans -- omitting surveys which should have been performed and agreeing to Afghan ancillary services which clearly could not be performed. As a result M-K took on tasks for which it was ill-prepared to handle such as land preparation and reclamation and helping to resettle some thousands of nomads on poorly reclaimed land - functions which M-K could well have declared outside its field of competence.

agreeing to perform ancillary services?

Both the Afghan government and Morrison-Knudsen appear to have assumed that traditional Afghan farmers already on the land would know how to apply appropriate soil and cultivation and irrigation practices in the use of irrigated water. This hopeful assumption proved ill-founded.

on the Valley soils under conditions of ample water supply

Nor was the Export-Import Bank entirely realistic in providing a relatively limited loan for a project of such scope and complexity without a conditional requirement for adequate technical support in agricultural and water management practices. Also unrealistic were the terms of the loan for its amortization over nine years - later extended to 18 years at a rate of 4.5 percent. Comparable projects in more advanced countries would have qualified for amortization periods of up to 40 years, but these were beyond the Ex-Im Bank's authority and its directors believed that American prestige was on the line in terms of providing financial support to M-K.

and the social factors involved in re-settlement.

American prestige was the touchstone which would drive sustained and higher levels of official U.S. funding for the Helmand Valley project over the next two decades. The American Ambassador in Kabul would report in 1958 that failure to do so would result in "chaos and dire consequences" for American political interests in that part of the world.

3. The U.S. Program of Assistance in the 1950s

Under President Truman's Point Four program an agreement was signed in Kabul in early 1951 for a U.S. program of technical

cooperation which averaged about \$1.5 million annually over the five years to 1956. U.S. technical assistance focused on providing advisors in agriculture, vocational and general education and training Afghans in the U.S.

However, beginning in 1956 U.S. development assistance jumped to an average level of over \$28 million annually, largely in response to an emerging economic competition with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The first Soviet aid to Afghanistan was a \$3.5 million loan in 1953 for a number of small construction and industrial projects. This was followed up in 1956 - on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit to Kabul - with a \$100 million line of credit and an apparent Soviet intention to orient the economy and trade of Afghanistan toward the Soviet Union. Facilitating "Soviet economic penetration" - as President Eisenhower termed it - was the closing of the Pakistan border in 1955 for five months to Afghan trade - due to tension over Pashtun tribal areas - and the opportunity provided the Soviet Union to provide alternative trade and transit facilities through its own territory.

In the period 1956-1960 the U.S. accepted the challenge of "competitive co-existence" in Afghanistan and launched a broad scale program of capital and technical assistance totalling \$143 million, focused on Helmand Valley development, transport, education and public administration, and natural resources.

The Helmand Valley project became a central priority of U.S. development assistance with total U.S. commitments reaching a level of \$54 million. American technicians now assumed responsibility for the project and supplemental U.S. funds made up for lagging Afghan commitments. For the first time the staffing needs of the Helmand area project were viewed as an integrated whole which encompassed engineering, land reclamation, agricultural research and extension and assisting with community aspects of the irrigation program. However, the shortage of qualified personnel and administrative problems, for both the Americans and Afghans, would continue to limit realization of the project's economic potential.

In addition to giving the Helmand Valley a boost and assisting broader country-wide efforts at agricultural development, the U.S. initiated a politically significant program of transport assistance in roads, vehicles, and airports - and even allocated funds for the travel of Afghan pilgrims to Mecca (\$250,000)

The regional transit project, estimated at \$26 million, was an effort to strengthen transit and transportation facilities through Pakistan. This included improved transshipment facilities in Karachi, extension of the Pakistan rail-head into

Afghanistan and upgrading the road system to Kandahar and Kabul. At the same time, the U.S. undertook the politically difficult task of improving relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the interest of secure access for Afghan trade to free world markets - an alternative to those through the Soviet Union.

A further \$27 million was allocated for air transportation facilities, including airport construction, two DC-4 aircraft, and training for personnel at all levels of air control, maintenance and operations. The climax was the prestige establishment of Afghanistan's national airline, with the participation of Pan American Airways, and regularly scheduled air links to the outside world.

The third major area of priority U.S. assistance was in education and public administration with funding allocations of about \$10 million. Projects were undertaken in the Afghan Institute of Technology; in vocational training, at the Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering; in teachers' education, the teaching of English and university administration. Additionally the U.S. undertook a project for advising the Afghan Ministries of Finance and Planning.

to improve financial administration in

Planning not the

4. Political and Foreign Policy Context of U.S. Assistance

U.S. political objectives in Afghanistan were first to keep Afghanistan free, and second to bring Afghanistan closer to its free world neighbors, and by so doing to lessen Afghan economic dependence on the Soviet bloc and blunt the force of communist economic and political penetration in Asia.

In order to meet these political objectives for dealing with the Soviet challenge, the economic assistance program was considered the most effective tool available to the United States.

In particular, the U.S. government was concerned with the serious drift of the Afghan economy toward the Soviet Union as a result of the large Soviet credits repayable in commodities and the opening of convenient transit facilities for Afghan trade through the Soviet Union. The massive Soviet program - economically, culturally, diplomatically - was directed to undermining Afghanistan's free-world relationships. The U.S. FY 1958 Congressional Presentation expressed "real apprehension as to the survival of the Afghan state".

By helping Afghanistan maintain its independence and encouraging the democratic development of the country's political and economic institutions, the U.S. hoped to nullify a major objective of Soviet policy, namely the entry of communism into Afghanistan and among the nations of South Asia. This was a direct threat to U.S. foreign policy goals in Pakistan, India

and Asia generally.

The Soviet Union was perceived as seeking to counter free world security efforts centered in the Baghdad Pact. Strategically Afghanistan is an important "salient protruding deep into the Northern Tier of the nations of the Baghdad Pact". As seen by the U.S., it would be a serious blow to U.S. foreign policy interests and to the defenses of the Northern Tier if Afghanistan became closely aligned with the Soviet Union.

The U.S. government concluded that the capacity of Afghanistan to resist Soviet inroads was directly dependent on its economic progress. It was important to expand U.S. influence in fields which have a direct impact on the Afghan population, such as agriculture, and education. Should Afghanistan - through its association with the free world - be unable to achieve the necessary economic progress, then the free world would suffer a defeat which would be recognized throughout Asia.

It was for these reasons that the economic assistance program was seen as strategic to the defense of U.S. foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan and Asia.

B. The U.S. Program in the 1960s - Building Afghan Capacities for Development

1. Afghan Government Plans for Accelerated Development

It was the Government, rather than the private merchants, of Afghanistan that played a dominant role in pressing for large scale public development projects. Afghan leaders saw the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as a golden opportunity to obtain high levels of economic assistance for accelerated modernization of Afghanistan.

The first Afghan Five Year Development Plan, 1956-1961 - essentially a shopping list of projects - involved estimated expenditures of \$280 million, mainly for roads, dams, airports, factories, power stations, and schools. These were largely financed by foreign assistance and carried out by foreign experts from the Soviet Union, West Germany, the United States, and the United Nations. For the second Five Year Plan, 1962-66, the Afghan government projected a three-fold increase in development outlays of over \$800 million and sought major commitments from the U.S. and Soviet Union toward its financing.

American aid policy toward Afghanistan in the early 1960s, under President Kennedy's administration, sought to slow up the pace of U.S. commitments to large projects. Consequently, unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. did not make a large advance financial commitment to the Afghan Second Plan. Rather the approach of

the new U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) was to consider capital assistance for specific, high priority project proposals in terms of Afghan "absorptive capacity" for development. This meant a priority for completing the capital projects already begun in the late 1950s and a redirection of new U.S. assistance commitments to alleviating the Afghan human and financial constraints on development.

U.S. assistance strategy in the 1960s was still geared to the objective of offering Afghanistan an alternative to over reliance upon Soviet bloc aid. However, the USAID program was directed primarily to helping Afghanistan develop its human resources and institutions essential to progressive development and to encouraging the Afghan government to mobilize the country's own resources for development. By providing relatively large-scale technical assistance in education, government management and economic policy and planning, the U.S. sought not only helping Afghanistan improve its vital human and institutional capacities for development but, at the same time, to maximize American influence on these politically important areas of the society.

2. Program Management and Implementation Constraints

a. Personnel and Financial Problems

The initiation of many large scale development projects by both the U.S. and Soviet Union had severely strained Afghan capacities for implementation. It was easy enough for the Afghan Government to look to foreign engineers and construction firms to build turn-key infrastructure projects. However, it was quite difficult to find qualified Afghans to operate the completed facilities. The country faced a critical shortage of trained technical personnel which endangered the utility of much of the capital investments.

There were severe limitations on the capacity of the Afghan Government to mobilize sufficient budgetary resources to cover the local costs of the projects for which foreign exchange costs have been met by external grants and loans. There was a serious question whether the Afghan government could mobilize sufficient internal resources to perform its responsibilities for the local costs of construction and of later operation and maintenance.

The balance of payments also was a matter of concern. There was little immediate prospect of increasing export earnings during a period when there would be increasing need to make payments on past loans - both in terms of commodity payments to the Soviet Union and cash payments to the U.S. Trade with the Soviet Union was increasing and in the early 1960s constituted 40 percent of total Afghan trade.

b. The Impact of Transit Problems on AID Operations

The recurrent difficulties between Afghanistan and Pakistan over Pushtun tribal lands in both countries flared up in 1961, with a resulting breaking off of diplomatic relations and an Afghan closure of the border with Pakistan. This led to a considerable disruption of Afghanistan's relatively sizeable trade to and from the Free World non-communist countries, including almost all U.S. aid. The Soviet position in Afghanistan was strengthened as a result. Trade and transit facilities with the Soviet Union remained open.

The Afghans sought U.S. assistance to create a new transit route through Iran to the Persian Gulf as an alternative to transit through Pakistan. However, there was little interest in financing the construction of 3,600 miles of new roads and the additional port facilities which would be required.

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1,000

Tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the border areas was a serious obstacle to effective U.S. aid operations in Afghanistan. The closing of the border stalled important engineering, construction and other equipment for U.S. financed projects for road construction, improvements in the Helmand Valley and expansion of education facilities. Over 30,000 tons of AID material destined for Afghanistan was stalled en route through Pakistan. In some cases projects were delayed for up to two years as a result, with all the attendant personnel management and cost overruns which that involved.

Several U.N. programs were initially in danger of being disrupted, including the World Health Organization's malarial eradication efforts, but the U.N. was able to ship essential supplies for Afghanistan through the Soviet Union.

It was not until after 1963 when Afghanistan lessened its political agitation over Pashtunistan that problems of transit through Pakistan began to be eased.

2. The U.S. Program in Education.

a. Introduction

The objectives of U.S. education assistance to Afghanistan was to establish basic schooling opportunities for children at primary and secondary school levels, skill training for adolescents and adults, and to provide scientific, technical, administrative and managerial training as needed in support of AID programs in various sectors of the economy.

revise primary school curriculum and prepare textbooks for primary schools, train teachers and improve curriculum at the secondary level, provide

AID also underwrote project-related training, for Afghans both within Afghanistan and through participant training in the U.S.

* revision reflects text of memo for Administrator's review in 1966.

The AID approach in Afghanistan was to regard improvement in education as essential as investment in physical infrastructure. Diffusion of knowledge and new ideas were seen as necessary to instill the abilities and motivations favorable to effective use of capital investment and facilities. It was evident in Afghanistan that with the underinvestment in human capital the rate at which additional physical capital could be productively utilized was limited. Technical, professional and administrative people were needed to make effective use of capital investment.

Although investment in infrastructure capital does indirectly achieve some lessening of economic backwardness, the more decisive means to advance long-term development is through direct investment in people. AID's assisted ^{one to} education program in Afghanistan was the largest of AID's efforts for education in the world. Also the person years of American specialists provided for education development in Afghanistan has been much greater in number than in any other field. From the beginning of the program through 1968, U.S. aid to education was to total ~~663~~ ^{included} 663 person years of U.S. teachers and experts at a cost of about \$30 million. (See table)

b. American Involvement as Teachers and Administrators

In the first stages of American assistance to the Afghan Institute of Technology, the Vocational Agricultural School, the Teacher Training College and subsequent projects, American advisors did much of the teaching and even functioned as administrators. However, the objective was the training of Afghans, both in country and abroad, to staff Afghan schools, and educational programs to operate without foreign advisors.

Most of the U.S. education advisors were provided through contracting with American Universities. The first contracts were with the University of Wyoming and with Teachers College of Columbia University. Later contracts were made with Southern Illinois University, Indiana University, and a ~~group~~ ^{consortium} of eleven engineering schools.

c. Public School Education

Perhaps one of the most interesting "outreach" education projects was that provided in 1962 by specialists from Teachers College of Columbia University working with the Afghan Ministry of Education in the fields of curriculum, administration, emergency teacher training, and teacher training for women. The Ministry established a Community Schools Department and Community Schools as demonstration projects has ~~by 1968~~ been established in every one of Afghanistan's 28 provinces.

This type of community school taught students to use their knowledge to improve living conditions, and participate in community projects had a wide appeal over the nation. A number of schools of this type were set up independently by groups in various parts of the country, using volunteer labor and materials and land contributed by the Afghan people.

The emergency teacher training program was designed to relieve the acute shortage of teachers as a result of the rapidly expanding number of primary and village schools. In 1966 the program graduated its first group of 500 primary teachers.

After 14 years of American assistance to the system of primary teacher education, further development was assumed by the United Nations in 1968. During this period four new teachers' colleges (Darul Mo'Allemeins) had been established, personnel trained, curricula set up, teaching materials developed, and construction and improvement of building provided.

U.S. assistance turned its attention to curriculum and textbook development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The objective was to establish within the Ministry of Education a functional entity responsible for continuing curriculum development for the nation's primary schools and a capability for creation and production of primary school textbooks.

d. Technical Education

The first U.S. assisted education projects were to develop the Afghan Institute of Technology and the Vocational Agricultural School in Kabul. Both were high schools. The U.S. provided teachers of science, technology and agriculture. The goal in both cases was to develop strong institutions in their field of specialization, with well equipped laboratories, shops and classrooms; a well trained faculty; and a functional curriculum.

Programs were developed at the Institute of Technology in civil, mechanical, electrical, aviation and construction technologies. The construction of building and facilities provided was to make the Institute one of the finest of its kind in Asia.

Beginning in 1954
The technical education ~~in agriculture was to be extended to a~~ *program also provided support for development of* Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering at Kabul University. ^{was} In the 1960s the Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering were split into two separate faculties, each assisted by ^a separate team of American university specialists *from different U.S. institutions.*

It admitted its first students in 1956.

A special project during the 1960s was directed to prepare more adequately in math and science those Afghan students desiring to enter the Faculties of Agriculture and Engineering. The effect was to greatly improve the level and teaching of these subjects.

Overall it is estimated that the U.S. provided assistance under technical education projects totalling about \$10 million from the beginning of the program in 1951 through the 1960s - about half in teachers and participant fellowships and half in equipment and construction of facilities. This does not include technical training provided by agricultural and rural development assistance.

e. Higher Education

Among the early U.S. assistance efforts in education was an institute for the teaching of English which was soon broadened into an Institute ^{of} Education. Additional to training Afghans to teach English, the Institute became a center for education-related research and teacher training and leadership for all teacher training institutions and programs. ~~The Afghan Institute of Education was became~~ ^{A Faculty of Education at} Kabul University - being closely modelled on and assisted by Teachers College of the University of Columbia. *was established in 1962 to prepare teachers of professional subjects and to offer a full major in English teaching.* The first American assistance directly to Kabul University was in the field of administration along with a progressively expanded program for training Afghans at American universities. The objective was to build an effective administration at Kabul University, including general administration and policy for academic affairs, a comprehensive student personnel program, and business administration.

The U.S. also provided funds to build and equip five new university buildings which would bring the various faculties of Kabul University into a single campus location. The new construction included an administration and classroom building, a library, an engineering building, an agricultural building and an 800-student dormitory. The American contribution to the construction of Kabul University was about \$4 million.

The construction project, entitled Education Facilities, was extended to improvements for other schools assisted by the U.S. as well as the beginning of a new comprehensive school for the Helmand Valley. As part of this activity, the U.S. assisted in the setting up a Department of School Design and Construction in the Ministry of Education for architectural training of Afghans and the setting of construction standards.

With completion of the U.S. financed university library, assistance also was provided an acquisition program, the cataloguing of the major collections, and training of the Afghan library staff.

f. Conclusion


The major U.S. contribution to education in Afghanistan was at the university level, with a total U.S. contribution of well over \$20 million. In all the education projects the foremost objectives have been the strengthening of the agricultural system, and the education and specialized training as a basis for Afghanistan's future development. While materials, equipment and building were a large part of the assistance, they were provided as a contribution to the education of specialized personnel needed for Afghanistan's future economic progress.

C. Building Institutional Capacities - US Aid in the 1960s

~~Introduction~~

During the 1960s the US assistance program to Afghanistan sought to complete the earlier commitments for large capital projects and to consolidate their benefits by raising the over-all level of performance of Afghanistan in selected economic areas.

Major American advisory and training missions directed toward introducing technological innovation increased efficiency in the fields of education, agriculture, public administration, and private sector development. The objective of US technical assistance was quite ambitious. It was to achieve changes in Afghan institutions and attitudes which would have a permanent social and cultural impact in each of these critically important fields.



~~E. Building Afghan Capacities for Development~~

~~1. 7~~ Education and Training

a. Introduction

The Government of Afghanistan recognized the development of education as of fundamental importance for economic and social progress, and to a large extent looked to the United States to formulate its education program and to help build the institutions to carry it out. In the early 1950s educational opportunities in Afghanistan were largely limited to traditional "mosque schools" taught by mullahs which reached a limited number of students. Perhaps eight percent of the population was able to read and write; and there was virtually no instruction in technical and scientific subjects.

Afghanistan - largely with foreign assistance - was launched on major programs of infrastructure investment in roads, dams, power plants and other construction facilities. It was evident that with such low investment in human capital the rate at which physical infrastructure could be productively utilized would be limited. Technical and administrative people were needed to make effective use of investment in infrastructure.

Of course, infrastructure investment does achieve a measure of economic progress for it is possible to train directly, both on-the-job and in special programs, many of the technicians required to drive trucks and tractors, to engage in construction and to operate and use at least partially the completed facilities. AID underwrote a good deal of project-related training of this type both within Afghanistan and through participant training in the U.S. and other countries.

However, in order to lay the groundwork for long-term development the more decisive means to advance progress is through direct investment in broad education programs and institutions. The U.S. approach in Afghanistan was to regard improvement in education to be at least as essential as investment in physical infrastructure. Additional to the direct training of managers and technicians was the diffusion more broadly throughout the population of literacy and knowledge of new ideas necessary to instill the abilities and motivations favorable to effective use of capital investment and technology and sustained development.

AID's assisted education program in Afghanistan was the largest of its education efforts for any country in the world. Also, with the Afghan program, the numbers of American specialists provided for education development was much greater than in any other field. For example, from the beginning of the program through 1968, U.S. aid to education was to total 663 person years of U.S. teachers and experts at a cost of about \$30 MILLION.

Given this massive involvement of American education assistance - which called forth such a large array of projects and advisors - what can be discerned about the underlying education strategy pursued by the U.S.?

The earliest thrust of the American assistance effort was in technical and vocational education. The objective was to provide technical, administrative and managerial training in support of AID programs in various sectors of the economy, including skill training for adolescents. This thrust was closely paralleled by programs for teacher training and an Institute of Education modeled directly on American educational experience and practice. Efforts along both these paths were projected for the most part at higher and university levels of education, at strengthening the Afghan Ministry of Education, and with a major focus on development of Kabul University.

On this platform for development of higher education, AID was to gradually extend its activities on broader outreach in areas of public education to help Afghanistan establish basic schooling opportunities for children at primary and secondary school levels,

b. American Involvement as Teachers and Administrators

In the first stages of American assistance for an Afghan Institute of Technology, Vocational Agricultural School, Teacher Training College and subsequent projects, American advisors did much of the teaching and even functioned as administrators. The objective was the training of Afghan teachers and administrators, both in country and abroad, to staff these newly established schools and programs.

Most of the U.S. education advisors were provided through contracting with American Universities. The first contracts were with the University of Wyoming and with Teachers College of Columbia University. Later educational advisory teams were fielded by Southern Illinois University, Indiana University, Nebraska University and a group of eleven U.S. engineering schools.

d. Technical Education

As noted above, the first U.S. assisted education projects were to develop the Afghan Institute of Technology and the Vocational Agricultural School in Kabul. Both initially were at the high school level. The goal was to develop strong institutions in their field of specialization, with well equipped laboratories,

shops and classrooms; a well trained faculty; and a functional curriculum.

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The technical education in agriculture was later extended to a Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering at Kabul University. In the 1960s the Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering were split into two separate faculties, each assisted by separate teams of American university specialists.

A special project during the 1960s was directed to prepare more adequately in math and science those Afghan students desiring to enter the Faculties of Agriculture and Engineering.

Overall it is estimated that the U.S. provided assistance under technical education projects totalling about \$10 million from the beginning of the program in 1951 through the 1960s - about half for teachers and participant fellowships and half for equipment and construction of facilities. Additional technical training was provided by agricultural and rural development projects.

e. Higher Education

Among the early U.S. assistance efforts in education was an institute for the teaching of English which was soon broadened into an Institute for Education. The Institute became a center for education-related research and teacher training and leadership for all teacher training institutions and programs. The Afghan Institute of Education was became a faculty of Kabul University - being closely modelled on and assisted by Teachers College of the University of Columbia.

The first American assistance directly to Kabul University was in the field of academic, student and business administration along and a progressively expanded program for training Afghan faculty at American universities.

The U.S. also provided funds to build and equip five new university buildings which would bring the various faculties of Kabul University into a single campus location. The new construction included an administration and classroom building, a library, an engineering building, an agricultural building and

an 800-student dormitory. The American contribution to the construction of Kabul University was about \$4 million.

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With completion of the U.S. financed university library, assistance also was provided an acquisition program, the cataloguing of the major collections, and training of the Afghan library staff.

In the early 1970s the large programs of technical education and faculty development at Kabul University were phased out. In part, this was due to recurrent student unrest which made further progress in the work of American advisors problematical. It also was asserted, at least by some, that it was time for these institutions to "graduate" from U.S. assistance and for a shift of emphasis of U.S. educational efforts in favor of broader coverage and improvement in the instruction of primary and secondary schools throughout the country.

At the same time, it had to be admitted that - despite large past U.S. efforts - the capacity of Kabul University to relate its resources to the development problems of the country remained very limited. Consequently US AID continued its efforts, through a University of Nebraska team of advisors, to focus the capacity of Kabul University to contribute more meaningfully to the country's needs through introduction of curriculum changes, research and consultation services.

c. Public School Education

One of the interesting "outreach" education projects was that provided in 1962 by specialists from Teachers College of Columbia University working with the Afghan Ministry of Education in the fields of curriculum, administration, emergency teacher training, and teacher training for women. The Ministry established a Community Schools Department and Community Schools as demonstration projects has by 1968 been established in every one of Afghanistan's 28 provinces.

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U.S. assistance turned its attention to curriculum and textbook development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The objective was to establish within the Ministry of Education a functional entity responsible for continuing curriculum development and for creation and production of primary school textbooks.

f. Conclusion

The major U.S. contribution to education in Afghanistan was at the university level, with a total U.S. contribution of well over \$70 million. The large scale assistance was directed at meeting Afghanistan's needs for higher level institutions to train Afghan leaders in important managerial and technical areas of future development. While the effect in expanding education throughout the country was relatively limited, central educational institutions were in place for what was hoped would be a later expansion of improved elementary and secondary education throughout the country.

2. Institution Building in Agriculture

a. US Support for National Agricultural Development

While early US technical assistance in agriculture had been largely directed to the Helmand Valley, in the 1960s a national agricultural project extended assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture for the country as a whole. Initially its work was largely focus on the Kabul area. Twenty-two US direct hire advisors staffed projects in research, extension, irrigation, forestry, soil conservation, plant protection, Agricultural machinery and tools and agricultural credit.

The thrust of this activity was to train Afghan personnel and build the institutional capabilities of the Ministry of Agriculture and other facilities. By the mid-1960s agricultural research facilities at Kabul had been expanded, a pilot dairy was operating, and a poultry plant was producing improved chickens and hatching eggs for distribution to farmers.

Work at the Ministry of Agriculture was reorganized and expanded with the help of American technicians to better serve other areas of the country. The USAID Mission assisted in the establishment of six regional agricultural stations, each staffed with an American advisor who designed the programs to be carried out by US trained Afghan researchers. These regional stations were located in the the major areas concerned with irrigated agriculture and were in addition to the US assistance in the Helmand Valley.

On the whole, however, the concentrated efforts at a multidisciplinary approach to national agricultural development failed to demonstrate measurable or permanent improvement in the Ministry of Agriculture and its programs. Although many capable Afghan technicians were trained and potentially useful facilities were in place, a viable institution capable of sustained support for Afghan agriculture was not created. In retrospect, it is clear that the spectrum of technical activities was too broadly ambitious and beyond the managerial and professional capacities of the Ministry.

b. National Drive for Accelerated Wheat Production

In 1967 in response to a US Presidential initiative, a comprehensive American report was produced on Agricultural Development in Afghanistan with Special Emphasis on Wheat. The Afghan Government accepted the report's recommendations to initiate an accelerated campaign to assist Afghan farmers to adapt the new fertilizer and irrigation-responsive high yielding varieties of wheat. The goal was to achieve foodgrain self sufficiency for Afghanistan.

Both the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture and the AID Mission mobilized for the campaign. A new department in the Ministry was given responsibility for the program which combined the functions for research, extension and fertilizer distribution. The USAID Mission increased its agricultural staff to 35 technicians in full support of the Afghan efforts.

With the limited Afghan technical and managerial nararowly focused on this one well defined objective, a large measuræ of success was achieved. The most responsive of the wheat seeds were multiplied at the six Afghan research stations and demonstration plots were placed with some 2,000 farmers using the cultivation practices advised by the Afghan extension service. The results were dramatic and seeing the potential for increased production farmers were anxious to apply the new cultivation practices which combined improved seeds and fertilizer.

Again the Afghan Government would have to mobilize a special effort, but this did not happen until the 1971-72 failure of the rain-fed wheat crop dramatized the need to improved wheat production in irrigated areas. The principal constraints to be overcome were timely availability of credit and and more effective distribution of fertilizer.

Given these well defined objectives and an urgent need for action The Afghan Government, with US Mission assistance, devised a new credit system in which groups of farmers collectively guaranteed the repayment of credit by individual members of their group and a special effort was made to ensure fertilizer deliveries through both private and government channels. This provided both the confidence and means to supply necessary fertilizer to farmers.

Impressed with the results of this emergency effort. the Government proceeded to institutionalize the process by designation of the Agricultural Development Bank to establish a credit system for both suppliers and farmers, and a private stock company was organized with competent staff to regularize the market distribution of fertilizer. USAID backed-up these efforts with loans for fertilizer and continued technical assistance. The combination of available credit to and accessible supplies of fertilizer for farmers increased wheat yields significantly and facilitated a shifting of farm land to alternative crops such as cotton.

Thus USAID's record in assisting the agricultural sector in Afghanistan was mixed. It largely failed to transform the agricultural ministry which remained bound to its traditional mode of political and bureaucratic inertia. Yet when the limited Afghan technical and managerial capacity could be politically mobilized to perform specific prioraity tasks in

an institution setting outside the traditional constraints imposed by a line government ministry, a large measure of success was achieved in improving the productivity of irrigated agriculture in Afghanistan. The operational success of the Afghan Fertilizer Corporation was possible by the objective orientation of its management and staff.

3. Public Administration

The Afghan government service at the end of world war II was little more than an organization for management of the Afghan King's household with minimal national functions related to tax collection and maintaining order and the privileged position of the ruling group. Recruitment and promotion in the service gave recognition to educational attainments within the bounds of overriding and assured loyalty to traditional objectives. This essentially political orientation of the Afghan civil service did not provide a promising institutional basis for reform and modernization of the Afghan economy.

The Afghan ruling group sought accelerated economic development through maximum external assistance - for the construction of dams, roads, public buildings and factories - under the restraining control of the Afghan civil service to ensure minimum social and cultural change in traditional values and institutions. The cold war competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for political influence in Afghanistan yielded high levels of unconditionally provided economic assistance and the Afghan Government in the 1960s extended its supervision of the process through centrally administered development plans and state management of all aid-constructed facilities.

Major and sustained efforts were undertaken by the US Mission over several decades to improve the management and efficiency of government services in Afghanistan, both in key central ministries and sectoral organizations. The results were to prove highly disappointing. Many Afghans were trained and much good advice was offered for administrative improvements without, however, substantially affecting the traditional political concerns of the Afghan civil service for maintaining control with marginal institutional change.

Among the US technical assistance programs in administration were the following:

- improving tax administration, budgeting and fiscal management in the Ministry of Finance,
- contract advisors in the Ministry of Planning for technical services and participant training,
- training and equipment of the civil police,
- assistance for fiscal management and budget operations throughout government ministries from a US encouraged unit for management improvement in the Prime Minister's office,

- inclusion of management instruction for Afghan participants sent abroad for training in technical fields assisted by US AID projects,

- sustained US efforts to improve planning and management in the Helmand Valley,

- initiation of a project to develop a government-wide statistical system and Central Statistical Office,

- initiation of an ambitious demographic studies program as a basis for planning and management decisions regarding population and development matters generally,

- direct management assistance as a key objective of US AID assistance projects in education, agriculture, rural development and basic health services,

- participant training over a period of many years to improve executive management capabilities of key Afghan development agencies, and

- training for legal scholars, jurists and officials of the Ministry of Justice to modernize the legal system and better serve the development needs of the nation.

Despite these varied and sustained US efforts, the Afghan civil service did not become development oriented in its basic orientation. Most of its administrators remained unmotivated - by US standards - and bound by an archaic civil service which resisted change. This is a disappointing appraisal of the results of 25 years of public administration assistance by the United States.

Afghanistan's low level of fiscal efforts in support of its development programs was particularly striking, as proposal after proposal for tax reform remained unimplemented. The government of Afghanistan found it politically convenient to finance and largely implement its development program with foreign aid and foreign technicians.

H. Lessons Learned from the Afghan Development Experience -
Applicability for Future U.S. Assistance.

First, the U.S. assistance program to Afghanistan after 1955 was over-ambitious, both as to scale and timing. In many ways the program was larger than could be effectively administered by either the U.S. or Afghan governments. For both governments it was easy enough to establish project activity and agree on advisors and counterpart field staff, but it was much more difficult to recruit appropriately qualified staff. Better manpower planning on both sides would have indicated a slower pace of project commitment and activity.

Also, U.S. expectations of the time required to achieve effective project results in Afghanistan were generally unrealistic. In particular there was a tendency to terminate technical assistance and institutional development projects far too soon, well before they had been firmly rooted. In almost all cases experience indicated that it would take at least 50 percent longer for effective implementation than the normal AID judgement.

Second, the U.S. generally had too much confidence in the applicability of technical solutions to complex social and economic development problems and of the appropriateness and transferability of U.S. values and experience. This over confidence in U.S. technical expertise, and its universal applicability, meant that too little attention was paid to local circumstances and values in the preparation and execution of aid activities. It would have been helpful to have allowed more time for field testing of project concepts with the local people who would be directly concerned. More time for field review and less intensive Washington or headquarter reviews would be sound future practice.

Unfortunately, U.S. confidence in technical solutions was matched and even exceeded by Afghan expectations that development was a packagable commodity which could be delivered by foreign assistance in the form of turn-key construction projects. Nor were Afghan officials reliable informants in many cases of the cultural attitudes and concerns of the local people who were regarded as the passive objects of development rather than as participants or partners in the process. Ignoring these principles was to prove particularly costly in Helmand Valley resettlement, irrigation and land development schemes.

Third, generally speaking Afghan officials were often not well informed on the culture and attitudes of many of the people in local areas. This is in large part due to the diversity of tribal cultures in the country. However, it is also due to an elitist - or perhaps tribal attitude - which led officials in

central departments to assume they knew what was best and that local people were too uninformed to know their own interests. Effective local administration and project development would need to emphasize changes in these official attitudes.

The fourth lesson that can be drawn from the Afghan development experience is that infrastructure investment in capital project construction was far too often in advance of plans for institutional adaption in the use of the facilities and the training of personnel for their effective operation. An exception was the civil aviation project where training of ground and maintenance personnel was well phased to airport construction and delivery of aircraft. This was a good model but it was not followed in most other U.S. funded construction projects.

Fifth, the U.S. aid program was at an extreme disadvantage in being so directly projected as a government-to-government program in its detailed administration when the Afghan government was so over-centralized, largely ineffective and out of touch with developments in most of the hinterland. A better model to aim for in future relations with Afghan authorities would be to agree on general guidelines which would allow flexibility in US AID channeling of aid through private and local intermediaries who are closer to development needs and implementation problems.

Sixth, the U.S. to be effective in its Afghan programs should develop at least a small number of career officers who speak the local language and are able to select and work closely with a cadre of select Afghan leaders who have, or can develop, an ability for community mobilization in support of local development activities and projects. This would help bridge the cultural and language barrier which was a strong deterrent to program effectiveness in the past.

Seventh, the use of aid for short-term political objectives, in the competition with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, tended to distort sound economic rationale for development and in the process to weaken the longer-term political interests of the the United States. Aid as a tool of diplomacy has its limitations when politically motivated commitments are at much higher levels - and promise more - than can reasonably be delivered in economic returns.

Politically motivated assistance should be clearly identified and realistically programmed as to its purposes and short term benefits. A good example where this was done was the financing of the travel of a given number of Afghans to the Haj and the airlifting of Afghan grapes to markets in India during the closure of the Pakistan border.

However, large capital projects undertaken largely on short-term political grounds are almost certain to promise more than they can deliver in economic benefits and to prove politically counter-productive of U.S. interests.

The eighth lesson is that when major donors vie for influence through competitive aid commitments, weak donor coordination is the likely result and the overall effects are likely to weaken all development activities in the country. The U.S. - Soviet aid competition in Afghanistan in the 1950 and 1960s severely strained Afghan capabilities in domestic resources and available trained manpower.

In retrospect the Soviet may have been somewhat more experienced than U.S. personnel in forcing the allocation of Afghan resources in support of their objectives - perhaps due to their more direct experience, and prior integration, of Central Asian tribal and muslim territories. The emphasis by some U.S. officials on the apparent geographic and functional complementarity of the U.S. and Soviet aid programs missed the mark as to the truly competitive effect in the allocation of scarce Afghan resources. However, in the end it was in the military arena that the U.S. Soviet competition would be decided.

4. Efforts to Enhance the Role of the Private Sector

Despite the severe limitations - by western standards - of government administration, Afghanistan's big push for modernization of its economy beginning in the 1950s was almost entirely in the state sector. Most of the infrastructure investment in large-scale irrigation, roads and school construction was of course in the public sector, but beyond that the public sector was made responsible for the formation and operation of national industries. State control of industrial development was favored by the traditional large landowners who sought to avoid the emergence of a politically strong mercantile middle class.

The government undertook, with foreign assistance, a number of state owned and operated companies that produced textiles, cement, sugar and metal products. Public sector expenditures on industry and mining enjoyed priority call on Afghan resources. Private companies were forced to disinvest in favor of state ownership and, as a result, by 1970 nearly three-quarters of the total capital invested in industry was in government owned factories. The government then controlled all major activities in slaughtering, grain mills, printing, cement, energy production, and mineral extraction, as well as much of the banking, the tourist industry, and certain commodities in trade.

So pervasive was the state in the modern and urban sector of the economy, that middle and higher level schools of the country - largely US-assisted - were almost entirely devoted to providing their graduates to the public sector, and the state for its part was committed to their employment.

Of course, the private sector in the traditional rural economy - comprising agriculture, livestock, local trade and handicrafts - was predominant in that 85 percent of the population was dependent on these activities for their livelihood.

Private investment in the urban areas was primarily in real estate and bazaar trading and banking where they dealt with money lending and foreign exchange transactions. The severe credit and other constraints on private ventures limited them largely to handicraft and small-scale industrial production.

The total national product of Afghanistan in 1976-77 was on the order of Af 115 billion, which translates to a national product of Af 8,200 per capita, or about \$180. Sectoral estimates of the net domestic product and of the number of persons employed are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Net Domestic Product and Persons Employed by Sector
1975-76

	Af billion	% of NDP	No. of Persons Employed ('000)	% of Total
Agriculture and Livestock	53.81	55.4	2492.8	52.9
Handicrafts	7.70	7.9	843.6	17.9
Industry and Mining	3.40	3.5	40.7	0.9
Construction	2.17	2.2	44.7	0.9
Transport and Communications	3.46	3.6	56.6	1.2
Commerce	11.82	12.2	257.3	5.5
Services	8.64	8.9	691.6	14.7
Other	6.09 /a	6.3	282.7 /b	6.0
TOTAL	97.09	100.0	4710.0	100.0

/a Includes housing.

/b Includes unemployed which amounts to 2.7 percent of the total labor force.

Sources: Ministry of Planning, Afghan Demographic Survey (ADS): National Demographic and Family Guidance Survey of the Settled Population of Afghanistan, and Household Estimates.

With the transition from the Daoud government in 1963 Afghanistan entered a period which appeared promising for the evolution of a parliamentary and more liberally democratic government under the monarchy. During the next decade AID was encouraged to extend technical assistance in favor of encouraging private sector development. An AID financed study explored the potential for private investment in some eight product fields and also provided assistance for the drafting of a law to promote foreign and domestic private investment.

The law which was adapted in 1967 provided entrepreneurs with a variety of incentives, including tax and tariff exemptions. An investment advisory service was established and this was followed by establishment of an Investors Association and an Industrial Development Bank. The United Nations, the British Commonwealth Secretariat and US AID worked closely together in providing technical support. Progress was made in training Afghan staff in a variety of service functions.

As a result of government encouragement and the improved climate for investment, one hundred medium sized industrial facilities were established with 86 of them in the Kabul area. A quarter of the capital provided was by foreign investors from nineteen countries. Twenty-eight of the enterprises were clearly export oriented, mainly for leather and raisin processing. The remaining 72 enterprises were for import substitution, including rayon weaving, plastic products and metal fabrication.

It was clearly demonstrated that with the right investment climate and technical services there was a potential for private industrial development in Afghanistan; a potential which however was adversely affected by the uncertainty for private investment which followed Daoud's deposing of the king in 1973 and an intensification of statist policies. All banks were nationalized in 1975-76 and the state gained control of almost all industrial enterprises. The brief opening for more liberal economic and political policies has come to an abrupt end.

Other USAID supported private enterprise projects in Afghanistan were for mineral resources and coal production, the Karabul Institute and village industries development,

5. Progress of Infrastructure Development

a. The US Assisted Infrastructure Program

By the end of the 1960s US economic assistance for the infrastructure development projects - undertaken in the 1950s - were largely completed. This included roads, airports, dams and power plants.

More than 500 miles of paved highway had been constructed, linking the country's major towns and commercial centers and facilitating trade with major countries. The Kabul-Qandahar highway was completed in 1966 with a distance of 300 miles with US assistance of almost \$45 million. The regional highway and rail links south to Pakistan had been completed with US assistance of over \$52 million. The Herat-Islam Qala highway of 77 miles with US assistance of over \$9 million connects the Afghan road system with Irtan, and joins the the north-south Russian built road just north of Herat.

About \$9 million had been provided for motor vehicles transportation, road maintenance equipment, and equipment for improvement and maintenance of secondary roads.

To help develop an airline capable of serving all sections of the country divided by mountains and not always passable by road, the US had helped finance five airports, trained pilots and technicians and provided for the purchase of airplanes and ground equipment with assistance of over \$30 million.


The US had provided for the financing of \$24.5 for the construction of the hydro-electric generating units (33,000 KW) at the Kajakai Dam in the northern Helmand Province, a project which was not completed until 1975. A further \$9.5 million was provided in 1974-75 to finance the construction of transmission lines southward from Kajakai to the settlements of Kandahar, Lashkar Gah and Girishk.

While the construction of the Arghandab and Kajaki dams and the Boghra Canal by the American firm of Morrison-Knudsen, with US Export/Import Bank financing, had been completed as early as 1959, US AID technical assistance had been involved for a decade in helping to improve the irrigation system and develop the land.

There were continuing problems associated with the with drainage and poorly installed farm irrigation canals which resulted in increased salinization of lessening of the fertility of some of the land. AID technicians would be recalled to the Helmand Valley in the early 1970s to help cope with these drainage problems.

Also the Afghan government continued to press AID for further

development of irrigation infrastructure and AID accepted most
reluctantly the financing of \$10.5 million for comprehensive
development of over 31,000 hectares of land in



the Shamalan area. The assistance was provided in 1968 under stringent conditions for relocation and resettlement of Shamalan residents so that the land could be properly resurveyed and leveled for efficient irrigation - conditions on which the Afghan government would have to renege because of the political and cultural difficulties of managing the resettlement provisions. Four years later the project would be abandoned and the loan assistance converted to provision of equipment for the Helmand Valley Authority.

b. High Cost of Infrastructure Development to Afghanistan

While initially it had appeared clever planning by the Afghan government to encourage such large foreign assistance from the US and other donors for major infrastructure development, the government lacked the resources and flexibility to accompany these large projects with the ancilliary rural investments necessary to realize their potential economic benefits. For example, recognizing the central role of agriculture in the economy the government would need to shift its emphasis in the early 1970s from further investment in large infrastructure projects to smaller more productive ancilliary projects to taken full advantage of the newly built irrigation systems and roads.

For a number of reasons, however, the redirection of investment priorities and resources proved almost impossible for the Afghan government. For one thing the government was overcommitted to state enterprises in the industrial sector which were a relatively non-productive drain on its limited resources. Second, the delays in many of the large on-going infrastructure projects had preempted scarce local expertise as well as domestic funds. Further, the US and other donors were reluctant to start new projects given the difficulties they were encountering with existing uncompleted projects. During the 15 years from 1952 to 1972, the period of the first three plans, the Afghan government channeled over 70 percent of available resources for agriculture into the large irrigation projects. This left little for investment in small scale activities which would have increased the productivity of the overall investment in infrastructure.