

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

META ANALYSIS

VULNERABILITY, STABILITY, DISPLACEMENT AND REINTEGRATION:

Issues Facing the Peace Process in Aceh, Indonesia

August 2008



IOM • OIM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i	Foreword by Muhammad Nur Djuli, Director of <i>Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh</i>
ii	Foreword by Brigadier General Amiruddin Usman, Head of <i>Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi</i>
iii	Map of Aceh and IOM Project Locations Sites
v	Acknowledgements
vi	List of Abbreviations
vii	Definitions of Key Terms
viii	List of Figures
viii	List of Tables
ix	Executive Summary
xiv	<i>Ringkasan Eksekutif</i>
02	Chapter 1: Introduction
02	Section 1: Aceh Reintegration and Recovery Context
02	Section 2: Assessment Objectives and Rationale
06	Chapter 2: GAM / TNA Ex-Combatants and Ex-Political Prisoners
07	Section 1: GAM / TNA, Towards a Profile of Ex-Combatants and their Support Networks
11	Section 2: Social, Cultural and Political Reintegration



- 13 Section 3: The Recovery of Economic Livelihoods
- 14 Section 4: Information Counseling Referral Services (ICRS), Facilitating Reintegration and Recovery
- 16 Section 5: Key Findings and Recommendations

21 Chapter 3: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Returnees

- 21 Section 1: Who are IDPs and Returnees and is there a Profile or Pattern?
- 23 Section 2: Why People fled and why some of them have Returned
- 24 Section 3: Perceptions on Security, Community Cohesion, and the Peace Process
- 26 Section 4: Economic Recovery of Livelihoods
- 28 Section 5: Gaps in Assistance
- 30 Section 6: Key Findings and Recommendations

33 Chapter 4: Community Stabilization and Recovery

- 33 Section 1: Conflict Impacts, Access Issues and Social Cohesion – Where is it Worst?
- 35 Section 2: Conflict-Carrying Capacities and Social Cohesion
- 39 Section 3: Community Livelihood Recovery
- 41 Section 4: IOM Community Stabilization and Recovery
- 44 Section 5: Recovery Gaps for Vulnerable Conflict-Affected Groups
- 45 Section 6: Key Findings and Recommendations

50 References

52 Endnotes

See Attached CD for: Annex A – Chapter 2 Figures and Tables
 Annex B – Chapter 3 Figures and Tables
 Annex C – Chapter 4 Figures and Tables
 Annex D – Meta-Analysis Database Profiles



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FOREWORD BY

Muhammad Nur Djuli,

Director of *Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh*

This piece of tremendous work produced by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has the possibility to further not only the IOM's and BRA's work toward meeting a common vision, sustainable peace and long-term development in Aceh, but can serve to unite the many partners sharing in this endeavor. Indeed, it comes as no surprise to me that the IOM was capable of compiling this "meta" analysis, as throughout the organization's presence in Aceh, in fact even years before that when I was still dealing with Acehnese refugees abroad, I have been inspired by the IOM's professionalism in realizing its mandated tasks.

However, no matter how well written and analyzed a study such as this is, much like a well researched travel guide, it will only serve as casual reading material unless tangible realization and action follows. As such, the value of this great work, as far as BRA and the process of reintegration in Aceh are concerned, will depend entirely on how well it helps those using it as a guide and how thoroughly these users implement its recommendations. Good implementation will depend on the level of cooperation and coordination between the stakeholders that by necessity should be led by the Aceh Government, particularly BRA. Aceh suffers not from a lack of academic resources but from a paucity of organizations such as the IOM that not only study post-conflict issues, but actually tackle them in the field in cooperation with Government and civil society.

If I may jump ahead to the recommendations of this analysis, those that concern the BRA, I must say that these recommendations include issues from our own "wish list," things that we in BRA need and want to

accomplish. The question remains, are we in BRA capable of performing such tasks? Looking back a little, having been at the helm of BRA for a little less than two years, it is clear to me that we have the moral strength and are building the professional capacity needed. However, a key impediment has been, and I suspect may remain for quite some time, funding; not so much the amount, but rather the imposed methods of payment and spending that make it so difficult to plan any truly logical and strategic implementation.

Being that as it may, we in BRA are fortunate in having good partners such as the IOM that are dedicated to sustaining the peace in Aceh and facilitating Aceh's civilians in overcoming decades of economic, social, and political injustice. I take this opportunity to thank all national and international partners of BRA, both those acknowledged in this publication and those who are not.

We in BRA are looking forward to continuing to build strong and ongoing alliances in helping to realize our common vision of Aceh.

Banda Aceh, 15 August 2008



Mr. Muhammad Nur Djuli,
Ketua Harian BRA

FOREWORD BY

Brigadier General Amiruddin Usman,
Head of *Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi Desk Aceh*

Three years of peace is a testament to the trust, willpower, and commitment of the Government of Indonesia and members of the Free Aceh Movement. During these past three years the people of Aceh along with Government of Indonesia have defined and sustained peace in all its manifestations.

Peace is a constantly moving, intrinsically organic, and ever-changing process. Peace in Aceh has come to mean many things depending upon the vantage point from which looks at it.

To some, peace means access to education, finishing school, applying for a scholarship, or watching one's kids go off safely to school in the morning.

To others, peace means being able to walk several kilometers into the hills in order to cultivate and harvest forest produce such as durians, cocoa, and rambutan.

And whilst the threat of economic and physical violence has ceased, immediate protective measures are necessary if the longer-term investments of the Government and the international community are to sustainably improve social and economic conditions. Therefore, the international community, in close cooperation with the Government of Indonesia, needs to simultaneously pursue a development agenda at the same time as protecting those who are most vulnerable as result of 30 years of conflict in Aceh.

A peace process requires support, dedication, and discipline. The Forum for Communication and Coordination (FKK Desk Aceh) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are two organizations committed to the immense tasks facing post-conflict recovery. Fortunately we are also partners in both practice and principle.

The FKK Desk Aceh was established under decree of the Menkopolhukam or Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs on 21st March 2007. By assisting the Menkopolhukam in monitoring

all conditions relating to the peace process in Aceh, FKK Desk Aceh has enabled a seamless transition from the COSA meeting structure as mediated by the Aceh Monitoring Mission in 2005-2006.


With the support of the Government of Indonesia, the IOM has been highly effective at reintegrating caseloads of former combatants, political prisoners, and vulnerable youth in over 2,000 villages across Aceh; this assists in making the Aceh Peace Process a reality at the grassroots level.

The sheer number of issues and challenges both organizations face from time to time is daunting. In order to effectively reach our objectives of promoting peace and supporting the work of Government agencies such as BRA, strong partnerships within Government and with International Organizations are crucial.

To this end, FKK Desk Aceh sincerely believes that the findings in the Meta-Analysis in relation to ex-combatants, internally-displaced peoples, and the challenges of community stabilization and reintegration should be to carefully studied and debated both by Governments in Indonesia and the International community.

The remarkable quality of all stakeholders' efforts to support the goal of sustainable peace cannot be overstated. Aceh is moving into a critical stage in its post-conflict transition, and we enjoin everyone to read this seminal work and consider how we can continue to support the consolidation of peace in Aceh.

Banda Aceh, 15 August 2008




Brigadier General Amiruddin Usman
Ketua Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi Desk Aceh

MAP OF ACEH AND IOM PROJECT LOCATION SITES



- Post Conflict
- Construction
- Livelihood
- Medical
- Police Reform



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This is a document that literally represents thousands of labor hours undertaken by dozens of peace, humanitarian, and development workers, not to mention many hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries. Their dedication, patience, and quiet achievement represent the *raison d'être* of this report.

The International Organization for Migration's Post-Conflict Reintegration Program in Aceh has been the think-tank for this study and the proving ground in which the idea for the Meta-Analysis first took root and subsequently developed into this report.

The unfailing support of *Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh* (BRA), in particular its Head Muhammad Nur Djuli and key staff Azwar Abubakar, William Ozkaptan, Aguswandi, Yarmen Dinamika, and Dadang Budiana, has been a constant source of motivation in this study.

The enthusiastic support of *Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi Damai Aceh* (FKK), particularly its Head, Brigadier General Amiruddin, and his team comprising Zainal Arifin, Anwar Noer, and Masykur have all been critical for this report.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding and far-seeing impetus for the Meta-Analysis. Amazing people such as Michael Bak, Diah Januarti, Restu Pratiwi, Tom Morris, Kevin McGlothlin, Azza El-Abd, and Robert Cunnane have been stalwart supporters of this study and IOM's post-conflict work in Aceh, something for which IOM is sincerely grateful.

Special thanks also go to IOM's Chief of Mission Steve Cook and his deputy Cecile Riallant, who together have inspired and enabled this study both in a technical and broader sense. Their support, and defence in some cases, has allowed the Meta-Analysis Team the freedom and confidence to develop and refine its inquiries and analyses, no matter how daunting and challenging it has been at times.

Special mention is due to our esteemed colleague Bobby Anderson (IOM), who directly contributed to Chapter 4. His acidulous editing and superlative counsel were both inspiring and thought-provoking.

We would also like to thank the many editors and contributors who have helped us to proof-read, re-write, and in many cases reconsider our findings. These include Paddy Barron (World Bank), Glenn Smith (UNDP), Robert Wrobel (World Bank), Fabrice Boussalem (UNORC), Zulfan M. Tadjoeeddin, and Jesse Grayman (Harvard University).

We appreciate the efforts taken by Sanda Fatharani, Lucy Moore, and Erin McMahon in setting the layout of this report efficiently and creatively.

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The authors of this report are James Bean (LL.B) and Neven Knezevic (PhD).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

• ACMU	Aceh Conflict Monitoring Unit (World Bank)	• ILO	International Labour Organization
• AGTP	Aceh Government Transformation Programme	• INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
• ARF	Aceh Recovery Framework	• INP	Indonesian National Police
• AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission	• IOM	International Organization for Migration
• APRC	<i>Badan Narasumber Damai Aceh</i> – Aceh Peace Resource Center	• JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
• AUSAID	Australian Agency for International Development	• KDP	<i>Kecamatan</i> Development Program translated from <i>Program Pengembangan Kecamatan</i> or PPK
• Bappeda	Regional Development Agency	• KPA	<i>Komite Peralihan Aceh</i> - the Commission for Transition in Aceh. GAM's post-Helsinki civilian political leadership
• Bappenas	National Development Agency	• LoGA	Act of Parliament re Governing Aceh (<i>Undang-Undang No. 11/2006 Tentang Pemerintahan Aceh</i> , or Act No. 11/2006 re Governing Aceh, enacted on 1 August 2006)
• BAPEL	<i>Badan Pelaksana Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh</i> The implementing agency of BRA	• MDF	Multi-Donor Fund
• BPN	The National Land Authority or <i>Badan Pertanahan Nasional</i> .	• MGKD	<i>Makmu Gampong Karena Damai</i> (Village Prosperity Due to Peace), Support to Former GAM Returnee Communities Project
• BRA	<i>Badan Reintegrasi Aceh-Damai</i> (Aceh Peace Reintegration Agency)	• MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
• BRA-KDP	Community-based Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims	• MoU	Often referred to as "Helsinki MoU", this refers to the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement, signed on 15 August 2005
• CBO	Community Based Organization	• MSR	Multi-Stakeholder Review, an assessment of reintegration and post-conflict recovery led by the World Bank in cooperation with donors and international aid agencies.
• CDD	Community Driven Development	• NGO	Non-government Organization
• CEPA	Communities and Education Program in Aceh	• PETA	<i>Pembela Tanah Air</i> or 'Defenders of the Homeland' – an anti-separatist group umbrella association formed after the Helsinki MoU.
• CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	• PNA	Psychosocial Needs Assessment
• CoSPA	Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh	• SPADA	Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas
• CSO	Civil Society Organization	• SPAN	SPAN refers to a census of the population conducted by government agencies in cooperation the United Nations.
• DAI	Development Alternatives Incorporated	• SSPDA	Strengthening Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh – A UNDP project supporting reintegration, recovery and peace- building in Aceh
• DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	• SSR	Security Sector Reform
• DFID	Department for International Development	• SCACP	Support for Conflict-affected Communities Project
• DINSOS	<i>Dinas Sosial</i> (Government Social Agency)	• Tapol/Napol	Amnestied Political Prisoners (<i>Tahanan Politik/ Narapidana Politik</i>)
• Diyat	Financial support given by Gol to eligible conflict victims: compensation payment for surviving family member(s) of conflict victims who died or went missing as a result of the conflict.	• ToT	Training of Trainers
• EC	European Commission	• UNDG	United Nations Development Group
• EU	European Union	• UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
• FGD	Focus Groups Discussion	• UNORC	United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias
• FKK	<i>Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi Desk Aceh</i> the Forum for Communication and Coordination created under decree of MENKOPOLHUKAM or the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security.	• UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
• FORBES	<i>Forum Bersama Pendukung Perdamaian Aceh</i> (Joint Forum for Peace in Aceh), a multi- stakeholder advisory board to advise, assist, monitor, and synchronize the coordinate of reintegration and recovery efforts of BRA and other stakeholders.	• USAID	United States Agency for International Development
• GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> , or the Free Aceh Movement	• WB	World Bank
• GAM/TNA	Armed Wing of GAM		
• Gol	Government of Indonesia		
• HDI	Human Development Indicators		
• IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee		
• ICRS	Information Counselling and Referral Service		
• IDP	Internally Displaced Person		

DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS

Backsliding Pressures – Negative economic, political and social pressures which can cause an individual or group to ‘backslide’ into conflict-related or otherwise predatory activities (e.g. violent criminality, vigilantism, organized group violence with political objectives).

Community Stabilization and Recovery – Community Stabilization projects are flexible interventions, community-driven in nature and with an underlying peace-building methodology; they are linked to a restoration of community trust and repair of social spaces through improvements among vulnerable populations in infrastructure, livelihoods, local civil society support and capacity building. In the context of post-conflict recovery they typically refer to activities that support the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatant groups or other conflict-affected communities that are susceptible to backsliding pressures.

Conflict-Carrying Capacities (CCC) – Capacities amongst individuals or groups to become engaged in new patterns of violent conflict due to personalized forms of violence which they have experienced as a result of violent conflict during the conflict period. CCC appears to be directly related to previous levels of conflict-intensity and weak social cohesion within and between communities.

Conflict Sensitivity – A contextual understanding of the conflict topography unique to a given area and that is used to inform programs and project interventions. It is a term typically used in tandem with the principle of “do no harm” meaning that the actions of actors providing assistance should not cause further damage to a community or society that has been ravaged by conflict (e.g. inadvertently creating new conflict pressures).

Peace-building – Peace-building is a relationship-building process within and between communities in which community members take a direct role in their post-conflict recovery. In many post-conflict contexts the objective of peace-building is to support the restoration of peace and social cohesion amongst communities by enhancing their security, dignity, equitable and sustainable development opportunities, and hope in a safe and prosperous future.

Reinsertion – Is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during their initial demobilization but prior to medium and longer-term reintegration processes. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/ or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

Reintegration – The process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.¹

Social Reintegration – The process by which ex-combatants, groups that have been displaced by conflict, or those that have been heavily affected by conflict, become reintegrated into ‘healthy’ social networks and develop skills to become constructive citizens (i.e. responsible members of society) subject to the rule-of-law.

Livelihood Recovery – A process by which ex-combatants and other conflict-affected peoples learn marketable vocational skills and gain access to sustainable ‘peacetime’ employment/ income opportunities. In the context of DDR this term typically refers to ex-combatant groups but here it is expanded to include a broader class of vulnerable people who have been displaced or whose livelihoods have been negatively impacted by the conflict.

Political Reintegration – The reintegration of ex-combatants into legitimate political processes of the state as equal citizens, which allows them to pursue their goals in a non-violent and democratic setting, thus addressing the political exclusion of groups/ individuals that fought against or did not support the state.

Social Spaces – The meaning and nature of conflict varies for individuals and groups depending on their positions within society during the conflict period and the social space in which violence occurred. Social spaces can mean homes, villages or village clusters, or a broader community. Here the term ‘social spaces’ mainly refers to the realms in which divided communities interact (either positively or negatively), rather than the tangible physical places per se.

Post-conflict – A general classification for a context where violent conflict may have ceased but peace remains fragile.

Spoiler – Certain individuals and groups with economic, political, and/ or social agendas that stand outside the peace process and have a vested interest in its failure (e.g. economic profit through the trade of illicit goods or firearms, prestige, or a desire to prevent accountability for past human rights violations). Spoilers can include ex-combatants and/ or delinquent and vulnerable youth who actively undermine local security and stability and, as a result, act as stressors to the peace process.

LIST OF FIGURES

05	Figure 1	- The Wedge of Vulnerability (1)
06	Figure 2	- The Wedge of Vulnerability (2)
07	Figure 3	- GAM Demographics
08	Figure 4	- Age
14	Figure 5	- Levels of Debt
21	Figure 6	- The Wedge of Vulnerability (3)
24	Figure 7	- Confidence in Helsinki MoU's Success in Bringing Peace to Aceh
25	Figure 8	- Trust in Other Ethnic Groups
27	Figure 9	- Total Income of Less Than IDR 30,000 Per Day
27	Figure 10	- Ownership
28	Figure 11	- Possession of Proof of Ownership
29	Figure 12	- Sources of Assistance
33	Figure 13	- The Wedge of Vulnerability (4)
34	Figure 14	- Proportion of 'Hot-Spots' by District
36	Figure 15	- Conflict-Carrying Capacity Intensity by District
37	Figure 16	- Feeling That Someone Betrayed You by District (%)
38	Figure 17	- Community Participation
39	Figure 18	- Change in Occupation as a Result of Conflict Impacts upon People's Livelihoods
40	Figure 19	- Change in Occupation as a Result of the Tsunami
43	Figure 20	- MGKD Project Peace-Building Impacts

LIST OF TABLES

09	Table 1	- Dissecting Data
10	Table 2	- Ex-Combatants Versus Ex-Political Prisoners: A Rough Profile
22	Table 3	- Indicative Numbers of IDPs and Returnees by Ethnicity
22	Table 4	- IDPs and Returnees – A Snapshot
23	Table 5	- Key Vulnerabilities
44	Table 6	- BRA Assistance to Conflict-Victims
44	Table 7	- Projected Size of Vulnerable Groups

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In a province already distinguished by underdevelopment and 29 years of sustained insecurity, punctuated by high levels of extreme violence, the legacies of conflict in Aceh continue to impact civilians struggling to rebuild their lives. This is particularly true for IDPs, ex-combatants, and those returnees perceived as being members of 'rival' political factions or ethnic groups. One of the most debilitating legacies of violent conflict is the polarization of social relations. Invasive, long-term insecurity contributes to longstanding social distrust. Repairing damaged social spaces, rebuilding bridges of communication between social groups, and promoting participation in political life are essential requirements of successful peace-building and reintegration.²

The challenges for reintegration three years into the Aceh peace process bear heavily upon communities into whom its most vulnerable members reintegrate. Inevitably, these social spaces become submerged in the policy and programming of governments, donors, and implementers alike, yet it is for communities and certain vulnerable groups that governments' design policy and target programming. In 2008, tsunami recovery and the peace process in Aceh are interdependent. Abundant resources have been dedicated to the former, but not nearly enough to the latter. This needs to change if Aceh is to sustain its post-conflict and post-disaster recovery momentum.

Precisely because the Aceh peace process has been so remarkable and because it remains at risk, its success demands fast and oftentimes stop-gap peace-building and reintegration approaches by external actors until local civil society and government can fully support peace and recovery processes without external assistance. Successive governments in Aceh are still reeling from supporting the largest humanitarian response operation in human history following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. At the same time, the Government of Indonesia alongside governments in Aceh are working with civil society to address the legacies of a 29-year war, a war that began in 1976 and officially ended with the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement on 15 August 2005.

Some of the impacts of this deadly conflict include: the crippling of business and industry; the wholesale deterioration of security, law and order; the abandonment of arable land; and most depressing of all, the breakdown, and in some cases total collapse, of communities. These legacies undermine the ability of communities to support the sustainable return of conflict-affected groups such as ex-combatants, IDPs and returnees. Until such time as the technical capacities of government and civil society actors are sufficiently strengthened to support sustainable local peace processes, standard government budgeting and planning processes will not be able to support peace-building efforts on their own. This is the central argument for external actors continuing to play a role in

addressing the gaps in recovery assistance in Aceh.

This report attempts to answer two core questions. Foremost of these is 'Do we have an accurate picture of vulnerabilities and post-conflict programming in Aceh?'. The next question is 'What can donors, international organizations, and other external actors do to address these vulnerabilities and enhance human security in Aceh?'. This report attempts to provide a detailed synopsis of the vulnerabilities experienced by ex-combatants, ex-political prisoners, people affected by displacement issues, and conflict-affected communities. The analyses within this report present findings and recommendations for effectively targeting assistance and preventing a near-to-medium term relapse in conflict within Aceh.

A key assumption underpinning this report is that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) should be enlarged. In practice this means that DDR and community stabilization and broader recovery efforts are holistic means of balancing the social and economic dimensions of peace between conflict actors and conflict victims across Aceh.

THIS REPORT

Preparations for writing this report started not long after the signing of the Helsinki peace agreement in August 2005, with successive IOM managers and their colleagues discussing the prospect of mining the many different datasets in IOM's possession. When in September 2007 IOM finally embarked on this task with generous support from the United States Agency for International Development, a colorful and myriad cache of data and project information presented itself. In total, 28 datasets were available from within IOM and from other partners including the World Bank, Development Alternatives Incorporated, Harvard University, and the United Nations Development Program.

The initial activity was conceptualized as a "meta-analysis", however over the course of the next six months it became increasingly clear that the careful combination and analysis of similar variables was problematic. The Meta Analysis Team took many creative steps to combine similar data collected across 2,000 villages spanning 28 different datasets with the bulk of data being collected and compiled in 2006-2007. This will of course provoke some quarters within the research community to question the analysis, findings and recommendations of this report, but this sort of questioning can only lead to improved targeting and service delivery that ultimately supports the Aceh peace process. At any rate, what this study has uncovered stands on its own and represents useful information for all levels of government, donors, and implementing agencies working in Aceh.

Given IOM's strong involvement in post-conflict police reform in Aceh, it is important to point out that while this report provides

relevant contextual data for existing and future security sector reform programming and research, in no way does this report specifically deal with security sector reform.

The findings of this report will hopefully feed into subsequent research exercises, most notably the upcoming Multi-Stakeholder Review (MSR). It is hoped that this report and subsequent research exercises further promotes a better understanding amongst donors, implementing agencies, and government stakeholders, which in turn will positively reinforce post-conflict recovery in Aceh.

THE APPROACH

The methodology and lines of inquiry for this assessment are, to a significant extent, based on a durable solutions approach adapted to the reintegration and recovery needs of ex-combatants, IDPs and returnees, and conflict-affected communities in Aceh. This adapted approach, tailored to reintegration and recovery challenges in Aceh, is referred throughout this report as ‘Sustainable Recovery for the Wedge of Vulnerability’. Underpinning this concept is that vulnerable groups represent a wedge of vulnerability within Aceh. Furthermore, that this “wedge of vulnerability” demands targeted assistance during early- and medium-term recovery phases in order to support the transition from conflict to sustainable peace and development.

OUR FINDINGS

This report is divided into three broad categories: Free Aceh Movement (GAM/TNA) Ex-Combatants and Ex-Political Prisoners, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees, and Community Stabilization and Recovery. In a context such as Aceh, and given the type of conflict (i.e. guerilla-led insurgency), these groups are obviously not mutually exclusive.

Throughout this report there is a tendency to set out aggregate district-level statistics. These can be misleading given the particular recovery challenges facing discrete conflict-affected communities, particularly those villages in ‘hot-spot’ areas. That said, in an administrative sense for both government and external actors, district level statistics are useful because this is often how programs are set up (i.e. on a provincial, district, or at best, sub-district basis). Moreover, in order to offset perceptions of unfairness at the local level, government will always find itself having to assist an administrative region and not just the ‘hot-spots’ in that region.

Another challenge we encountered was in accurately identifying the sizes of vulnerable groups, whether it was ex-combatants or those falling under BRA’s assistance mandate. Three years into the implementation of the Helsinki peace agreement, this oversight alone speaks volumes of the weaknesses inherent in current monitoring and evaluation systems for conflict-victims, not only

within BRA, but amongst all actors working on post-conflict recovery in Aceh.

Key Findings: Ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners

Decent jobs and livelihoods are critical for reintegration of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners. Equally important is the need to enhance community stability in order to support the reintegration processes of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners. Viewed alongside the findings in relation to Community Stabilization and Recovery (Chapter 4), it becomes clear that social spaces within communities are a first point of recourse for ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners in Aceh. The findings below highlight numerous vulnerabilities in relation to socio-economic reintegration.

Population Sizes and Place of Return

- IOM data points to a total number of 42,000 people claiming some type of GAM/TNA ex-combatant status with an active support network conservatively estimated at 210,000 people. The extent to which these population sizes are based on actual grievances is not clear. It does, however, point to an increasing population of people having difficulties reintegrating. Such persons continue to sap their communities of their ability to stabilize and recover.
- Based upon these estimations some 7% of those who claim GAM/TNA ex-combatant status have received reintegration and recovery assistance. This suggests that significant reintegration and recovery gaps exist in relation to large numbers of ex-combatants that have not been assisted either by the government or by international aid organizations.
- Following the peace agreement some 17% of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners found in IOM’s ICRS client database returned to the same villages they lived in prior to August 2005 but did not return to the same homes. It is not clear what housing arrangements this 17% had upon their return, or whether they now have adequate housing.

Health

- Upon entering IOM’s ICRS program some 38.4% of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners were diagnosed as suffering from psychological problems. A higher proportion of males suffered psychological problems compared to females with the level of psychological problems increasing by age.
- When needing medical assistance a significant proportion of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners appeared to favor informal health assistance through community-based healing mechanisms.

Sources of Assistance

- Women rely upon support mechanisms internal to their communities (e.g. family and friends) more than men. On the other hand, men place greater emphasis upon social hierarchy and livelihood activities, and are more likely to turn to support

mechanisms outside their immediate communities. This demonstrates a pronounced gender dimension to untapped peace-generating capacities in those communities struggling to stabilize and reintegrate.

- Ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners primarily relied upon family members and friends, followed by the international community and community leaders. Rarely was assistance sought from local NGOs or government. This hesitancy and lack of confidence in government and external sources of assistance suggests a critical lack of capacity to manage longer-term reintegration and recovery processes.

Livelihoods and Employment Opportunities

- The relatively high levels of pre-Helsinki MoU employment and livelihood activity amongst ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners does not support arguments that lack of economic opportunity per se originally promoted armed conflict in Aceh. Rather, it was violent conflict that clearly brought a grinding halt to productive livelihoods and employment opportunities, particularly in heavily conflict-affected 'hot spots'.
- Following the peace agreement the bulk of ex-political prisoners and ex-combatants gravitated back into the same types of livelihood activities that they held prior to August 2005 (agricultural or trading livelihoods).
- Fears and perceptions of safety continue to agitate the insecurity amongst critically vulnerable groups, which impedes the economic access of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners.
- Following the peace agreement only 24.8% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners reported owning land, whereas 61.7% reported having indirect access to land through family. Not surprisingly, those with the lowest levels of land ownership were amongst youth and women.
- Only 21.3% of males and females had access to or owned livestock, with the lowest levels of livestock ownership being for older males and females (i.e. access to or ownership over the means of producing agricultural surpluses).
- Only 1.7% of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners had completed some form of technical education prior to August 2005, which undermines their ability to find sustainable livelihoods.

Reintegration: Information Counseling and Referral Services (ICRS)

- Providing information and referral services removes structural barriers that prevent ex-combatant and ex-political prisoners from accessing public services.
- By engaging with clients on a one-on-one basis through consultation, and tailoring business opportunities to individual ex-combatants or ex-political prisoners, the ICRS positively helped create political and social spaces for other peace-building processes to take effect.
- ICRS data does not answer the question whether facilitating individual clients with small-business start-ups was a successful method for providing sustainable livelihoods for ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners.

Whilst it is true that social and political reintegration of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners depends on sustainable livelihood recovery, the reverse is equally true. Sadly, most ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, and their families, have not regained economic independence either through finding jobs or establishing sustainable livelihoods.

Key Findings: Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees

Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) face a host of recovery challenges requiring tailored assistance to meet their specific needs, with returnees more often than not facing greater recovery challenges because of the markedly worse structural economic conditions and lingering security concerns they face inside Aceh.

Both IDPs and returnees continue to experience profound security fears, which impede their return and reintegration. Fear, not ethnicity, is the driving force underpinning mistrust within IDP and returnee groups. Even today, in areas where mistrust and security fears are high, dialogue is not taking place to resolve disputes between divided communities. These conflict-carrying capacities can potentially fuel further conflict. Unfortunately, since the signing of the Helsinki peace agreement little in the way of specialized assistance has been provided to conflict-affected IDPs and returnees. Below are the key findings in relation to the issues faced by IDPs and returnees in 2006-2007:

Patterns of Displacement and Security Concerns

- Fear is the most commonly cited reason people fled their villages of origin. Fear of battles between armed groups is listed by 88.4% of Acehnese, by 87.3% of Gayonese and by 74.6% of Javanese. Fear of serious criminality is listed by 76.3% of Acehnese, by 66.0% of Gayonese, and by 73.9% of Javanese.
- Rumors were the second most frequently reported reasons cited by IDPs and returnees who fled their homes. In many communities, particularly amongst Javanese families, rumors were the first presentation of conflict.
- Voluntary and forced migration patterns show that Javanese IDPs and returnees acted upon their fear of rumored violence, whereas Acehnese IDPs and returnees acted upon actual physical violence that was experienced or witnessed.
- The ethnic groups most displaced by conflict were Acehnese, Javanese and Gayonese, which reflects the identity-based forms of local conflict that took place alongside fighting between GAM/TNA and the GoI.
- Patterns of trust and mistrust, which are fairly consistent for questions on ex-combatant groups, state security institutions and social leaders aligned to different ex-combatant groups, show a tendency for identity-based social cleavages. By way of illustration, less than half of IDPs and returnees feel confident that ex-combatants can successfully reintegrate into society.
- Exact figures for conflict-induced displacement are unavailable. Many conflict-induced IDPs that fled to the coastal areas of Aceh and away from intense local conflict in hinterland regions have since experienced secondary patterns of displacement as a result of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.
- Key factors encouraging people to return to their places of origin include: the opportunity to live amongst family and friends and access to their lands or businesses.
- Key factors encouraging people to resettle in other locations include: continued evidence of political and social insecurity in their places of origin, better employment opportunities and higher levels of psychological security in their current places of refuge or their desired locations, and access to government services.
- Irrespective of their ethnicity 75% of IDPs and returnees report that their homes are not ready for habitation.
- Legal proof of ownership for their homes is still a core concern

for both IDPs and returnees.

Livelihood Recovery

- Poverty and structural economic barriers prove especially difficult for returnees; many returnees have not yet established a productive livelihood base for their agricultural lands or businesses, thus forcing them to find low-paid day-jobs or casual forms of employment to provide for the basic needs of their families. In the absence of external assistance many returnees find themselves drawn into 'poverty traps'.
- Almost half of IDPs (46.7%) do not believe that they can return to their previous occupations if they return to their places of origin.
- Overall, 33.3% of Acehnese IDPs and 58.4% of Acehnese returnees did not have paid employment.
- A high proportion of current IDPs live in poverty or close to poverty: 80.7% of IDPs and 62.9% of returnees earn less than IDR 30,000 per day.

Community Participation

- Irrespective of ethnicity or political affiliation, there is often little confidence expressed by conflict victims in communities (eg. IDPs and returnees) that ex-combatant groups (either GAM or anti-separatist) can successfully reintegrate into society.
- Javanese returnees have encountered difficulties exercising their democratic rights, whilst Javanese IDPs have been politically disenfranchised inside Aceh due to their displaced status.
- IDPs and returnees exhibit strong levels of trust toward traditional leaders and community-based mechanisms, which provide valuable insights as to where the emphasis of future recovery assistance should be directed.
- Communities of origin contain inherent peace-generating capacities. This is demonstrated by the sharp contrast of attitudes and outlooks between IDPs and returnees, with 45.0% and 13.4%, respectively, not confident in the peace agreement.

Assuming that IDPs are more vulnerable than returnees can be a mistake: returnees often come back to damaged homes, dilapidated infrastructure, poor public services, disputes over land ownership, and social dislocation. Despite these findings, one is still tempted to ask who is better off now and therefore who needs more assistance, returnees or IDPs? Patterns of assistance received to date are not able to demonstrate that returnees have better reintegration opportunities and better long-term livelihood prospects compared to IDPs. Nor, for that matter, can the reverse be said to be true. It is a matter of perspective.

Key Findings: Community Stabilization and Recovery

Every district in Aceh is, to a varying degree, conflict-affected with discrete 'hot spots' remaining most socially and economically damaged. In areas of more intense conflict – or 'hot spots' – communities experienced conditions of near lawlessness. This situation has improved dramatically, however enhancing stability and empowering communities goes to the very core of post-conflict recovery in Aceh.

The binary interpretation of Aceh that divides communities into 'tsunami-affected' or 'conflict affected' has led to an extremely visible demarcation between coastal and interior districts. When one considers that 37% more people reported changing their occupations after being affected by conflict than those in tsunami-

affected communities, the line between tsunami-affected versus conflict-affected leads to perceptions of unfairness amongst communities.

Frayed social cohesion and trust are distinct obstacles to community stabilization. If the resulting recovery obstacles are not addressed, community grievances will be shaped by peripheral elites and their followers in an effort to capture political territory and economic resources; spoiler groups can undermine peace-building efforts in Aceh and should be carefully considered.

Conflict-Induced Trauma and Conflict-Carrying Capacities

- Various forms of highly personalized conflict can be used to identify where conflict-carrying capacities have remained highest during the post-conflict period. Personalized forms of violence contribute significantly to psychological damage: feelings of betrayal, humiliation, hostility, suspicion, mistrust, resentment, and the desire for revenge among victims, and witnesses, can further incubate conflict-carrying capacities to the extent that they become backsliding pressures.
- Districts that retain the highest conflict-carrying capacities are Aceh Selatan, Aceh Utara and Bireuen, followed closely by Gayo Lues, Bener Meriah, Aceh Utara and Aceh Tengah.
- Close to one-quarter of respondents in IOM/UNDP IDP and returnee and IOM/Harvard PNA datasets potentially suffer from conflict-induced trauma.
- Social and cultural reconciliation and recovery processes (eg. promoting local arts, *peusijeuk* (traditional cleansing or welcoming ceremonies)) are just as important as reconstruction. Prioritization should reflect those geographical areas that have the highest conflict-carrying capacities.

Community Livelihoods

- Low levels of social cohesion appear in districts that either hosted large GAM-controlled areas or experienced high levels of vertical conflict (eg. Bireuen and Aceh Utara), and in districts that experienced acutely violent identity-based horizontal conflict at the community level (eg. Aceh Tengah and Gayo Lues).
- Conflict-affected communities that have experienced prolonged exposure to conflict have suffered downward economic mobility, thus making it more difficult for them to escape from 'poverty traps'.
- Targeted assistance in the form of community-based self-help is more effective than generic livelihoods projects (eg. giving away agricultural equipment) because the process is the outcome. This approach strengthens community roles and supports sustainable livelihoods within community-led structures.
- Community-led and traditional institutions were found to be fairly resilient mechanisms for community governance, and have played an important role in facilitating community stabilization and recovery.
- Local civil society networks and community-based organizations are perfectly placed to consult with communities and ask them to identify their most vulnerable members, e.g. war widows, orphans, displaced families, returnee families, host families, victims of physical/ mental trauma, and impoverished families.

Access Issues (Markets, Towns, Education, Water, Health)

- Limited access to food; non-food items; markets and towns; health facilities and medical treatment; education and water, are

not separate issues. Nor can these issues be addressed through singular sectoral interventions. Multi-sector approaches are needed that focus on the community as opposed to a specific sector, because it is the community not the road that needs improvement.

- Rather than accessing formal health services, communities rely upon traditional healers who lack the capacity to deal with acute physical injuries, as well as the legacies of conflict-trauma.

Core Recommendations

The core recommendations below provide guidelines on specific interventions to be undertaken by donors, international organizations, and other stakeholders in order to improve the human security of vulnerable conflict-affected individuals, groups, and communities:

GAM/TNA Ex-combatants and Ex-Political Prisoners

- The number of people claiming GAM/TNA ex-combatant status is expanding. The continued necessity of cash payments to such claimants indicates a failure by reintegration implementers and will negatively reinforce a cash-dependency mentality.
- In order to address ex-combatants (i.e. GAM/TNA and anti-separatist) and ex-political prisoner recovery needs, aid actors must identify local community mechanisms through which to deliver assistance, leveraging the innate tendencies of these groups as strengths and promoting social cohesion.
- Provide financial support services to ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners who are married and that have children, thus preventing families from falling into poverty and facilitate the longer-term livelihood recovery of entire households.
- BRA and donors to target assistance to critically vulnerable ex-combatant headed households (e.g. single-headed female households or those dealing with mentally traumatized ex-combatants, orphans, or large households).
- BRA at the provincial and district levels to strengthen community-based reconciliation activities that encourage social cohesion between ex-combatants and receiving communities (e.g. peusijeuk ceremonies or local festivals showcasing indigenous arts and culture). Priority should be given to geographic areas that retain the highest conflict-carrying capacities.
- BRA to work with the provincial government, IOM, and ILO to systematically map an Aceh-wide skills training, jobs, and micro-enterprise referral database by 2009 that can be made operational at the district-BRA level for ex-combatants and vulnerable youth including GAM/TNA and anti-separatist groups.
- Awareness-building and the use of 'safe' community institutions and leaders can bridge the gaps in reintegration and community acceptance of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners as well as facilitate trust-building between different types of ex-combatant groups and government (esp. state security apparatus).
- Donors with strong health credentials in other parts of Indonesia, such as AUSAID, to fund the technical assistance and field mobilization of provincial health programming designed to strengthen the capacities of community-based health services using community health nurses (POSYANDU) and local nurse interns (tenaga bhakti) through a ToT model. The aim is to provide training to first-instance community health nurses and village-based traditional healers to identify and provide 'first-instance' treatment for ex-combatants suffering psychological problems.

IDPs and Returnees

- There is no direct and coordinated support being given to

returnees or IDPs either by government or by the international community. A clearly articulated strategic framework is needed to guide recovery assistance for these groups.

- Government agencies in Aceh, particularly BRA, need to improve access to information concerning upcoming elections for IDPs and returnees, irrespective of ethnicity.
- Identify traditional leadership and social spaces in which people are cooperating and build upon their momentum to strengthen social cohesion (e.g. self-help groups).
- Governments in Aceh should consider developing an employment referral, apprenticeship, and vocational training program for IDP and returnee communities modeled on IOM's new ICRS program. This would be more effective if it was established in tandem with targeted improvements to social and economic infrastructure in order to increase access to markets, towns and public services.
- The Department of Social Services (DinSos) to draft, socialize, revise, and disseminate working guidelines for heads of village to follow in dealing with IDP and returnee issues, and develop reporting mechanisms to authorities if issues cannot be resolved locally.
- Governments in Aceh should take concrete measures to address legal ownership problems of IDPs and returnees over homes, property and businesses.

Communities and Community Stabilization

- If communities are not stabilized, Aceh will experience an emergence of new and violent groups or the expansion in membership of former and allegedly demobilized factions amongst ex-combatant groups.
- Community stabilization programming is a means to reintegrate socially divided post-conflict communities and rebuild healthy social spaces by listening to community demands and focusing on processes rather than tangible outcomes.
- Governments of Aceh that plan to provide village development assistance should carefully consider a village cluster recovery approach that is demand-driven. It is critical that community recovery and development assistance promotes reconciliation and strong consultation within and between communities; IOM's community stabilization mechanisms are useful examples for developing a model, namely the SCACP in the Central Highlands and the MGKD (ie. based on the Kecamatan Development Program).
- BRA should carefully consider decentralizing client or beneficiary selection processes for conflict victims and other vulnerable groups based upon community self-selection and verification only; IOM's new ICRS program is a useful model for this approach.
- The Governor of Aceh to delegate a team to regularly visit and directly consult community leaders on grievance-related issues that could manifest into new conflicts.
- AGTP to work with BRA and donors to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation capacities of relevant reintegration and recovery actors.
- The World Bank to conduct an Aceh-wide assessment of female conflict-victims.
- UNICEF and Aceh authorities to establish community-based orphan care centers in heavily conflict-affected regions of Aceh.

Peace, much like DDR, is organic in nature, not linear; attempting to force a linear process from disarmament to demobilization to reintegration will never work. Moreover, counting weapons and

demobilizing troops is a sterile exercise when done as one-off programs, which unfortunately was the case in Aceh.³ The most culturally-loaded and complex part of the DDR process is the R - reintegration. Sadly, reintegration some three years into Aceh's peace process is still being treated as a cash-for-names exercise. Reintegration is a term almost exclusively used for ex-combatants. This must change because ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups (eg. IDPs and returnees) must be reintegrated into a larger whole; firstly into their communities, and secondly, through their communities, into Aceh and the Indonesian state.

There is no question that there needs to be a strong focus on reintegration, but not at the expense of enhancing the role of government, and supporting peace-generating capacities at all levels of civil society. The conflict-carrying capacities of individuals and communities – feelings of injustice or revenge, or frustration at limited work opportunities – can easily metastasize and presage a relapse into conflict. This study highlights that the Government of Indonesia and governments in Aceh face complex policy choices. At this transitional stage in the peace process, external support needs to be much more targeted. The analyses, findings, and recommendations in this report are meant to provoke a more informed debate on the specific vulnerabilities and gaps in Aceh, and how we can more effectively target post-conflict assistance.

RINGKASAN EKSEKUTIF

Di dalam sebuah propinsi yang telah mengalami keterbelakangan pembangunan dan 29 tahun berada dalam situasi ketidakamanan secara terus menerus, serta ditandai dengan kekerasan ekstrim tingkat tinggi, peninggalan konflik di Aceh terus memberi dampak bagi masyarakat sipil yang sedang berjuang untuk membangun kembali kehidupan mereka. Hal yang demikian sungguh terjadi pada para Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP), mantan pejuang GAM/TNA, dan pengungsi yang kembali ke daerahnya yang dianggap sebagai anggota dari faksi politik atau kelompok etnis yang berseberangan. Salah satu peninggalan yang paling melemahkan dari konflik dengan kekerasan adalah terpolarisasinya hubungan sosial. Ketidakamanan jangka panjang yang terus menerus dapat menghasilkan ketidakpercayaan sosial dalam waktu yang juga lama. Perbaikan ruang sosial yang rusak, membangun kembali jembatan komunikasi antar kelompok sosial, dan mempromosikan partisipasi di dalam kehidupan berpolitik adalah persyaratan pokok untuk mencapai pembangunan perdamaian dan reintegrasi yang berhasil.²

Tantangan reintegrasi selama tiga tahun proses perdamaian di Aceh dengan berat dipikul oleh komunitas dimana anggota masyarakat yang paling rentan berintegrasi. Tak bisa dihindari bahwa ruang sosial ini tidak muncul dalam kebijakan dan program dari pemerintah, lembaga donor, serta badan pelaksana, walaupun pada kenyataannya kebijakan dan program sasaran yang dibuat oleh pemerintah ditujukan kepada komunitas dan kelompok-kelompok rentan tertentu. Di tahun 2008, upaya pemulihan bencana alam tsunami dan proses perdamaian di Aceh saling bergantung satu sama lain. Sumber daya yang melimpah telah dicurahkan pada upaya pemulihan bencana tsunami, akan tetapi tidaklah cukup diberikan kepada upaya proses perdamaian. Hal ini harus berubah apabila Aceh berkeinginan untuk terus melestarikan upaya-upaya pemulihan pasca-konflik dan pembangunan pasca-bencana.

Oleh karena proses perdamaian di Aceh telah merupakan sesuatu yang begitu penting, meskipun proses ini masih mengandung berbagai resiko, maka keberhasilannya memerlukan pembangunan perdamaian yang cepat diselingi dengan pendekatan-pendekatan reintegrasi bersifat stop-gap oleh pelaku-pelaku eksternal sampai pada saat masyarakat sipil setempat dan pemerintah sungguh-sungguh mampu mendukung proses perdamaian dan pemulihan tanpa bantuan dari pihak luar. Pemerintah Daerah di Aceh masih bergulir dengan dukungan dari operasi tanggap kemanusiaan terbesar dalam sejarah umat manusia setelah bencana tsunami dari Samudera Hindia melanda pada tahun 2004. Pada waktu yang sama, Pemerintah Indonesia bersama dengan Pemerintah Daerah di Aceh bahu-membahu dengan masyarakat sipil untuk menghadapi peninggalan dari perang 29 tahun, sebuah perang yang dimulai pada tahun 1976 dan secara resmi diakhiri dengan penandatanganan Nota Kesepahaman Helsinki antara Pemerintah Indonesia dan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka pada tanggal 15 Agustus 2005.

Beberapa dampak dari konflik yang memakan banyak korban ini

diantaranya adalah: lumpuhnya bidang usaha dan industri; situasi keamanan serta law and order yang tidak kondusif; keterlantaran tanah garapan yang subur; dan yang paling memprihatinkan yaitu, terhentinya, dan pada beberapa kasus lumpuhnya masyarakat secara total. Peninggalan masa konflik ini melemahkan kemampuan masyarakat untuk menyokong kembalinya kelompok-kelompok yang terimbas konflik seperti misalnya mantan kombatan GAM/TNA, Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang kembali ke daerahnya. Proses standar penganggaran dan perencanaan pemerintah tidak akan bisa mendukung usaha pembangunan perdamaian secara mandiri jika kapasitas teknis pemerintah dan pelaku-pelaku di masyarakat sipil belum cukup diperkuat untuk mendukung proses perdamaian lokal secara berkelanjutan. Inilah alasan utama mengapa pelaku-pelaku eksternal masih terus berperan dalam menangani masalah-masalah bantuan pemulihan di Aceh.

Laporan ini mencoba untuk menjawab dua pertanyaan inti. Yang paling utama adalah 'Apakah kita mempunyai gambaran akurat mengenai isu kerentanan dan kemajuan program pasca konflik di Aceh?'. Pertanyaan selanjutnya adalah 'Apakah yang bisa dilakukan oleh lembaga donor, organisasi internasional, dan pelaku-pelaku eksternal lainnya untuk menangani masalah kerentanan dan meningkatkan keamanan di Aceh?'. Laporan ini berupaya untuk memberikan ringkasan secara rinci mengenai kerentanan yang dialami oleh mantan kombatan GAM/TNA, mantan Tapol/Napol, orang-orang yang terimbas isu-isu pengungsian, dan masyarakat yang terimbas konflik. Analisa dalam laporan ini menyajikan temuan dan rekomendasi untuk memberikan bantuan secara efektif dan mencegah kambuhnya konflik jangka pendek dan menengah di Aceh.

Asumsi kunci yang mendasari laporan ini adalah bahwa Pelucutan senjata, Demobilisasi dan Reintegrasi (DDR) harus diperbesar. Pada praktiknya hal ini berarti DDR dan stabilitas masyarakat dan upaya pemulihan secara lebih luas merupakan cara menyeimbangkan dimensi sosial dan ekonomi perdamaian antara pelaku konflik dan korban konflik di Aceh.

LAPORAN INI

Persiapan untuk penulisan laporan ini dimulai tidak lama setelah penandatanganan Kesepakatan Damai Helsinki pada bulan Agustus 2005, dimulai dengan beberapa manager IOM yang mengalami pergantian beserta kolega-kolega mereka mendiskusikan prospek penggalan kumpulan data yang berbeda yang dimiliki IOM. Ketika pada bulan September 2007 IOM akhirnya mulai melakukan tugas ini dengan dukungan penuh dari USAID. Sasaran awal ialah membedah kumpulan data serta sumber data yang beraneka warna di beserta informasi proyek agar bisa menyatu dan 'berbicara sendiri'. Secara keseluruhan, 28 kumpulan data telah tersedia. Kumpulan data ini berasal dari IOM dan dari sumber-sumber lainnya

termasuk Bank Dunia, Development Alternatives Incorporated, Universitas Harvard, dan United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

Kegiatan awal menganut konsep "meta-analisis", akan tetapi setelah melewati masa enam bulan, semakin bertambah jelaslah bahwa kombinasi dan analisis secara hati-hati terhadap variabel-variabel yang serupa menjadi bermasalah. Tim Meta Analisis mengambil banyak langkah kreatif untuk menyatukan data serupa yang dikumpulkan dari 2.000 desa yang tersebar dalam 28 kumpulan data yang berbeda, dengan sejumlah besar data yang dikumpulkan dan dikompilasikan antara tahun 2006-2007. Hal ini tentu saja akan menimbulkan beberapa kubu dalam komunitas penelitian yang akan mempertanyakan analisis, temuan dan rekomendasi yang disajikan dalam laporan ini. Akan tetapi, upaya mempertanyakan tersebut dapat mengarah kepada pemberian pelayanan yang lebih baik dan tepat sasaran yang pada akhirnya akan mendukung proses perdamaian di Aceh. Bagaimanapun juga, apa yang telah dikupas melalui penelitian ini berdiri sendiri dan mewakili informasi yang bermanfaat bagi semua tingkat pemerintahan, lembaga donor, serta badan pelaksana program yang bekerja di Aceh.

Dengan peran signifikan yang diambil oleh IOM dalam mendukung reformasi kepolisian di Aceh pasca konflik, perlu ditekankan meskipun laporan ini menyajikan data yang berhubungan dengan reformasi sektor keamanan, yang dapat dimanfaatkan untuk program bantuan dan penelitian baik pada saat ini maupun dimasa depan, laporan ini tidak secara khusus berbicara tentang reformasi sektor keamanan.

Temuan dalam laporan ini diharapkan akan memberi masukan bagi kegiatan penelitian selanjutnya, terutama *Multi-Stakeholder Review (MSR)* yang akan dilakukan dalam waktu dekat. Diharapkan bahwa laporan ini dan kegiatan penelitian selanjutnya lebih jauh akan mempromosikan saling pengertian yang lebih baik diantara lembaga donor, badan pelaksana program, dan pemangku kepentingan di pemerintah, yang akibatnya akan secara positif memperkuat upaya pemulihan pasca konflik di Aceh.

PENDEKATAN

Metodologi dan alur penelitian untuk kegiatan penilaian ini, sampai taraf tertentu, didasarkan pada pendekatan durable solutions yang disesuaikan pada kebutuhan reintegrasi dan pemulihan para mantan kombatan GAM/TNA, Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang kembali ke daerahnya, serta masyarakat yang terimbas konflik di Aceh. Di dalam laporan ini, pendekatan yang disesuaikan dengan tantangan-tantangan reintegrasi dan pemulihan di Aceh ini akan disebut dengan istilah *Sustainable Recovery for the Wedge of Vulnerability*. Yang mendasari konsep ini adalah bahwa kelompok rentan mewakili sebuah celah atau 'wedge' kerentanan di Aceh. Selain itu, celah kerentanan ini

membutuhkan bantuan tepat sasaran selama fase pemulihan awal dan menengah dalam rangka mendukung peralihan dari konflik ke situasi damai dan selanjutnya pembangunan yang berkelanjutan.

TEMUAN KAMI

Laporan ini terbagi atas tiga kategori besar: *Free Aceh Movement (GAM/TNA) Ex-combatants and Ex-Political Prisoners, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees*, dan *Community Stabilization and Recovery* (yaitu Mantan Kombatan (GAM/TNA) dan Mantan Tapol/Napol dari Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan Pengungsi yang kembali ke daerahnya masing-masing, dan Stabilisasi dan Pemulihan Masyarakat). Dalam konteks seperti di Aceh, dan menimbang bentuk konflik yang terjadi (yaitu pemberontakan sistim gerilya), maka kelompok-kelompok diatas jelas-jelas tidak saling terpisah satu sama lain.

Pada keseluruhan laporan ini ada kecenderungan untuk menjelaskan data statistik terkumpul dari tingkat Kabupaten. Hal yang demikian bisa menyesatkan mengingat bahwa tantangan pemulihan tertentu mencakup masyarakat terimbas konflik yang tidak kelihatan, terutama mereka yang berada di desa-desa yang merupakan wilayah konflik dengan intensitas tinggi. Namun demikian, dari segi administratif bagi pemerintah dan pelaku-pelaku eksternal, data statistik tingkat Kabupaten bermanfaat karena data ini sering dipakai sebagai dasar memulai program (yaitu di tingkat Propinsi, Kabupaten, atau yang terbaik adalah, di tingkat Kecamatan). Selain itu, dalam rangka mengimbangi persepsi ketidakadilan di tingkat daerah, pemerintah akan selalu menempatkan diri mereka untuk membantu administrasi daerah dan bukan hanya pada titik-titik rawan di daerah tertentu itu.

Tantangan lain yang kami hadapi adalah ketidakakuratan dalam mengidentifikasi besarnya kelompok rentan, baik mantan kombatan GAM/TNA maupun mereka yang berada dibawah amanah bantuan BRA. Selama tiga tahun masa implementasi Kesepakatan Damai Helsinki, kekeliruan yang demikian turut menyerukan banyaknya kelemahan di dalam sistem pemantauan dan evaluasi bagi korban konflik, tidak hanya yang berada dalam naungan BRA, tetapi juga diantara semua pelaku yang bekerja dalam upaya pemulihan pasca konflik di Aceh.

Temuan Kunci: Mantan Kombatan GAM dan Mantan Tapol/Napol

Pekerjaan dan sumber penghidupan yang layak adalah sangat penting untuk proses reintegrasi para mantan kombatan GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol. Sama pentingnya adalah adanya kebutuhan untuk meningkatkan stabilitas masyarakat dalam rangka mendukung proses reintegrasi para mantan kombatan GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol. Bila dilihat secara berdampingan dengan hasil penelitian yang menyangkut dengan Stabilitas dan Pemulihan Masyarakat (Bab 4), jelaslah bahwa ruang sosial dalam masyarakat merupakan titik pertama bantuan bagi para mantan kombatan

GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol di Aceh. Temuan di bawah ini menyoroti besarnya kerentanan dalam hubungannya dengan reintegrasi sosial ekonomi.

Jumlah Mantan Kombat GAM dan Mantan Tapol/Napol dan Tempat Tujuan untuk Kembalinya Para Pengungsi

- Data IOM menunjukkan bahwa jumlah orang yang mengklaim sejenis status sebagai mantan kombat GAM/TNA sebesar 42.000 orang, sementara support network (yaitu jaringan dukungan) diperkirakan mencapai 210.000 orang. Namun tidaklah jelas sejauh mana kisaran jumlah ini didasarkan pada kondisi sebenarnya. Namun demikian, angka ini menunjukkan peningkatan jumlah orang yang mengalami kesulitan dalam proses reintegrasi. Orang-orang tersebut terus melemahkan kemampuan komunitas mereka untuk menstabilkan dan memulihkan kondisi masyarakat.
- Berdasarkan jumlah kisaran di atas, maka hanya 7% dari mereka yang mengklaim status mantan kombat GAM/TNA telah menerima bantuan reintegrasi dan pemulihan. Hal ini berarti bahwa terdapat masalah yang cukup berarti dalam reintegrasi dan pemulihan sehubungan dengan sejumlah besar mantan kombat GAM/TNA (atau yang mengklaim dirinya adalah mantan kombat GAM/TNA) yang belum dibantu baik oleh pemerintah ataupun oleh organisasi bantuan internasional.
- Setelah tercapainya kesepakatan damai, sekitar 17% dari mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol yang tercatat dalam database klien ICRS IOM belum kembali ke rumah asal mereka pada masa sebelum Agustus 2005 meskipun berada di desa asal. Tidak jelas rumah tinggal seperti apa yang dialami oleh 17% ini, atau apakah mereka rumah tersebut layak huni.

Kesehatan

- Setelah masuk program ICRS IOM, sekitar 38,4% mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol didiagnosa menderita masalah kejiwaan. Jumlah laki-laki yang menderita masalah kejiwaan lebih tinggi dibandingkan perempuan, dengan tingkat masalah kejiwaan semakin meningkat dengan bertambahnya usia.
- Ketika membutuhkan bantuan medis, mantan pejuang GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol dalam jumlah yang signifikan ternyata lebih memilih bantuan kesehatan informal melalui mekanisme penyembuhan berbasis masyarakat.

Sumber-Sumber Bantuan

- Perempuan lebih bergantung pada mekanisme dukungan dari dalam komunitas mereka sendiri (misalnya keluarga dan teman-teman) dibandingkan laki-laki. Sebaliknya, laki-laki lebih menekankan pada hirarki sosial dan kegiatan yang merupakan sumber penghidupan, dan lebih mungkin berpaling pada mekanisme dukungan di luar komunitas mereka. Hal ini menunjukkan adanya suatu dimensi gender yang nyata dalam kapasitas menciptakan perdamaian yang belum tersentuh di dalam masyarakat yang sedang berjuang dalam upaya stabilisasi dan reintegrasi.
- Mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol pertamanya bergantung pada anggota keluarga dan teman-temannya, kemudian diikuti oleh komunitas internasional dan pemimpin masyarakat. Jarang sekali mencari bantuan dari LSM lokal atau pemerintah. Keragu-raguan dan kurangnya rasa percaya pada pemerintah dan sumber-sumber bantuan eksternal menunjukkan adanya masalah genting yaitu kurangnya kapasitas untuk mengelola proses reintegrasi dan pemulihan jangka panjang.

Sumber Penghidupan dan Kesempatan Kerja

- Tingkat yang relatif tinggi sehubungan dengan kesempatan kerja dan kegiatan sumber penghidupan pada masa sebelum MoU Helsinki diantara para mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan Tapol/Napol justru tidak mendukung argumen yang mengatakan bahwa kurangnya kesempatan ekonomi merupakan pemicu konflik bersenjata di Aceh. Sebaliknya, konflik dengan kekerasan lah yang dengan jelas-jelas membawa dampak pada terhentinya kesempatan untuk memperoleh sumber penghidupan dan kesempatan kerja, khususnya pada daerah yang terimbas konflik tingkat tinggi.
- Setelah kesepakatan damai sejumlah besar mantan Tapol/Napol dan mantan kombat GAM/TNA cenderung kembali ke bentuk pekerjaan yang sama seperti sebelum Agustus 2005 (sumber penghidupan dari bidang pertanian dan perdagangan).
- Rasa takut dan persepsi tentang keamanan terus mengganggu rasa ketidakamanan diantara kelompok yang sangat rentan, sehingga menghalangi akses ekonomi para mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan Tapol/Napol.
- Setelah kesepakatan damai, hanya 24,8% mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan Tapol/Napol yang memiliki tanah, sedangkan 61,7% melaporkan bahwa mereka memiliki akses tidak langsung terhadap tanah melalui keluarga mereka. Bukanlah suatu yang mengherankan bahwa mereka yang memiliki tingkat terendah dalam hal kepemilikan tanah diantaranya adalah pemuda dan perempuan.
- Hanya 21,3% laki-laki dan perempuan yang memiliki akses terhadap atau memiliki ternak, sedangkan tingkat kepemilikan ternak terendah adalah laki-laki dan perempuan usia lanjut (misalnya akses atau kepemilikan terhadap alat produksi hasil pertanian).
- Hanya 1,7% mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol yang menyelesaikan bentuk pendidikan kejuruan sebelum Agustus 2005, sehingga melemahkan kemampuan mereka untuk menemukan pekerjaan yang berkelanjutan.

Reintegrasi – Pelayanan Informasi Konsultasi dan Rujukan (ICRS)

- Menyediakan pelayanan informasi dan rujukan menghilangkan penghalang struktural yang menghalangi mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol untuk mengakses layanan-layanan umum.
- Melalui pemberian konsultasi secara personal kepada klien, dan menyesuaikan kesempatan usaha dengan kebutuhan mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol, ICRS secara positif membantu menciptakan ruang sosial dan politik bagi proses pembangunan perdamaian lainnya sehingga memiliki dampak.
- Data ICRS tidak menjawab pertanyaan tentang apakah memfasilitasi klien secara individu tentang bagaimana memulai usaha kecil merupakan metode yang berhasil untuk menyediakan sumber penghidupan yang berkelanjutan bagi mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan Tapol/Napol.

Pendapat yang mengatakan bahwa reintegrasi sosial dan politik para mantan kombat GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol tergantung pada pemulihan sumber-sumber penghidupan yang berkelanjutan adalah benar. Akan tetapi sebaliknya pendapat bahwa pemulihan sumber penghidupan tergantung dari upaya reintegrasi sosial dan politik para mantan pejuang GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol juga sama benarnya. Sayangnya, mayoritas mantan kombat dan mantan Tapol/Napol, beserta keluarga mereka, belum memperoleh kembali kemandirian secara ekonomi

baik melalui perolehan pekerjaan ataupun melalui sumber penghidupan yang berkelanjutan.

Temuan Utama – Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan Pengungsi yang Kembali ke Daerahnya

Para pengungsi yang kembali ke daerahnya dan pengungsi yang berada di daerah pengungsian menghadapi serangkaian tantangan pemulihan sehingga membutuhkan bantuan yang disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan tertentu mereka. Seringkali para pengungsi yang kembali ke daerahnya menghadapi tantangan-tantangan pemulihan yang lebih besar karena kondisi ekonomi struktural yang sangat buruk dan kekhawatiran tentang keamanan secara terus menerus di wilayah Aceh. Baik Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) maupun pengungsi yang telah kembali ke daerahnya terus mengalami perasaan takut dan tidak aman yang amat sangat besar yang menghalangi mereka untuk kembali dan berintegrasi. Rasa takut, dan bukan isu etnis, yang menjadi kekuatan penggerak yang mendasari rasa tidak percaya di dalam kelompok Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang telah kembali ke daerahnya. Bahkan saat ini, di daerah-daerah dimana rasa tidak percaya dan rasa takut akan keamanan tinggi, dialog untuk menyelesaikan perselisihan antara komunitas yang tercerai berai masih amat sangat jarang terjadi. Kapasitas pembawa konflik ini mampu memicu terjadinya konflik selanjutnya. Sayangnya sejak penandatanganan Kesepakatan Damai di Helsinki hanya sedikit bantuan khusus diberikan kepada Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang telah kembali ke daerahnya. Di bawah ini adalah temuan kunci yang berhubungan dengan masalah-masalah yang dihadapi oleh Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang telah kembali ke daerahnya sepanjang tahun 2006-2007:

Pola Pengungsian dan Masalah Keamanan

- Alasan yang paling sering dikemukakan oleh orang-orang yang terpaksa mengungsi dari desanya adalah rasa takut. Ketakutan akan terjadinya kontak senjata antara pihak yang bertikai dirasakan oleh 88,4% orang Aceh, 87,3% orang Gayo dan 74,6% orang Jawa. Rasa takut akan kriminalitas dialami oleh 76,3% orang Aceh, 66,0% orang Gayo, dan 73,9% orang Jawa.
- Maraknya desas-desus merupakan alasan kedua yang paling sering dikemukakan oleh orang-orang yang terpaksa melarikan diri dari desa mereka. Di banyak komunitas, khususnya di keluarga-keluarga Jawa, desas-desus merupakan tanda kemunculan konflik yang utama.
- Pola migrasi secara sukarela dan melalui pemaksaan menunjukkan bahwa pengungsi Jawa mengambil keputusan untuk mengungsi karena rasa takut mereka akan adanya rumor akan terjadinya kekerasan. Sementara pengungsi Aceh mengambil keputusan untuk mengungsi karena alasan kekerasan fisik yang mereka alami ataupun yang mereka saksikan secara langsung.
- Kelompok etnis yang paling terpaksa mengungsi karena konflik adalah orang Aceh, Jawa dan Gayo. Hal ini menunjukkan bentuk-bentuk konflik lokal berbasis identitas yang terjadi berbarengan dengan pertikaian antara GAM/TNA dengan Pemerintah Indonesia.
- Pola kepercayaan dan ketidakpercayaan terhadap lembaga keamanan negara, pemimpin-pemimpin masyarakat yang beraliansi dengan kelompok-kelompok mantan kombatan (baik GAM/TNA maupun kelompok anti-separatis) menunjukkan adanya suatu kecenderungan disintegrasi sosial yang berbasis identitas. Misalnya, kurang dari setengah Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang telah kembali ke daerahnya merasa yakin bahwa mantan kombatan GAM/TNA dapat berintegrasi ke

masyarakat dengan baik.

- Tidak ada angka yang tepat bagi pengungsian yang dipicu konflik. Banyak pengungsi yang melarikan diri ke daerah-daerah pesisir karena alasan konflik yaitu untuk menghindari konflik lokal yang panas di daerah pegunungan kemudian telah mengalami gelombang pengungsian kedua sebagai akibat dari bencana tsunami yang menerjang dari Samudra Hindia di tahun 2004.
- Faktor-faktor utama yang mendorong orang kembali ke tempat asal mereka yaitu: peluang untuk bisa tinggal diantara keluarga dan teman-teman serta akses terhadap tanah atau usaha mereka.
- Faktor-faktor utama yang mendorong orang untuk pindah dan bertempat tinggal di lokasi lain adalah: bukti adanya ketidakamanan sosial dan politik di tempat asal mereka, adanya kesempatan kerja yang lebih baik dan tingkat keamanan psikologis yang lebih tinggi di tempat pengungsian mereka saat ini atau di lokasi-lokasi lain yang mereka pilih, serta akses terhadap pelayanan pemerintah.
- Terlepas dari latar belakang etnis mereka, 75% Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang telah kembali ke daerahnya melaporkan bahwa rumah mereka belum layak huni.
- Bukti sah kepemilikan rumah mereka masih menjadi isu utama bagi pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang telah kembali ke daerahnya.

Pemulihan Sumber Penghidupan

- Kemiskinan dan hambatan ekonomi struktural terbukti sulit khususnya bagi pengungsi yang telah kembali ke daerahnya; Banyak dari mereka yang belum memulai kegiatan sumber penghidupan yang produktif bagi tanah pertanian dan usaha mereka, sehingga situasi ini memaksa mereka untuk mencari pekerjaan dengan upah rendah atau bentuk-bentuk pekerjaan lainnya yang tidak tetap demi memenuhi kebutuhan sehari-hari keluarga mereka. Selain itu dengan tidak adanya bantuan eksternal membuat banyak pengungsi yang telah kembali terseret dalam 'lingkaran kemiskinan'.
- Hampir setengah dari Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (46,7%) tidak percaya bahwa mereka dapat kembali kepada pekerjaan mereka sebelumnya apabila mereka kembali ke tempat asal mereka.
- Keseluruhan 33,3% orang Aceh yang merupakan Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan 58,4% orang Aceh yang telah kembali dari pengungsian mereka tidak memiliki pekerjaan yang memberi penghasilan.
- Sejumlah besar para Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) hidup dalam kemiskinan atau dekat dengan kemiskinan: 80,7% Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan 62,9% pengungsi yang kembali menghasilkan kurang dari Rp. 30.000,- per hari.

Partisipasi Masyarakat

- Terlepas dari afiliasi etnis ataupun politis, korban-korban konflik di masyarakat (misalnya Pengungsi Dalam Negeri dan pengungsi yang telah kembali) sering kali merasa tidak yakin bahwa kelompok mantan pejuang GAM/TNA atau anti-separatis mampu berhasil berintegrasi ke dalam masyarakat.
- Pengungsi suku Jawa yang telah kembali mengalami banyak kesulitan dalam hal melakukan hak-hak demokrasi mereka, sedangkan Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) asal Jawa telah secara politis dipasung di Aceh karena status pengungsian mereka.
- Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang kembali memperlihatkan tingkat kepercayaan yang tinggi kepada pemimpin-pemimpin adat dan mekanisme berbasis masyarakat,

- yang memberikan masukan-masukan yang berharga tentang kemana penekanan bantuan pemulihan di masa yang akan datang harus diarahkan.
- Masyarakat asli memiliki kapasitas lahiriah dalam hal membina perdamaian. Hal ini ditunjukkan oleh perbedaan yang sangat kontras dalam hal sikap dan pandangan diantara pengungsi dan orang yang kembali, dengan angka 45,0% bagi Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan 13,4% bagi pengungsi yang kembali, merasa tidak yakin akan kesepakatan damai.

Anggapan bahwa Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) lebih rentan dari pada pengungsi yang telah kembali adalah keliru: pengungsi yang kembali sering kali balik ke rumah mereka yang rusak, infrastruktur yang bobrok, pelayanan umum yang buruk, perselisihan atas kepemilikan tanah, dan dislokasi sosial lainnya. Meskipun ada temuan yang demikian, orang masih berusaha mempertanyakan keadaan siapakah yang lebih baik sekarang dan oleh karena itu siapa yang lebih membutuhkan bantuan, pengungsi yang kembali atau pengungsi masih berada di daerah pengungsian? Pola bantuan yang diterima sampai saat ini tidak dapat menunjukkan bahwa pengungsi yang kembali memiliki kesempatan reintegrasi lebih baik dan prospek sumber penghidupan jangka panjang yang lebih baik dibandingkan Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP). Tidak demikian juga sebaliknya. Hal ini hanyalah sekedar pandangan.

Temuan Kunci - Stabilisasi Masyarakat dan Pemulihan

Setiap Kabupaten di Aceh, pada tahap yang berbeda-beda, merupakan daerah yang terimbas konflik dimana daerah konflik tingkat tinggi masih merupakan daerah yang paling rusak secara sosial dan ekonomi. Di daerah-daerah yang mengalami intensitas konflik tinggi relatif ke daerah lain - atau disebut sebagai 'titik panas' - masyarakat mengalami kondisi yang hampir tanpa aturan atau penuh pelanggaran hukum dan keamanan. Situasi ini telah membaik secara dramatis, akan tetapi memperkuat stabilitas dan memberdayakan masyarakat menjadi inti dari upaya pemulihan pasca konflik di Aceh.

Penafsiran terhadap masyarakat Aceh yang membagi menjadi dua yaitu 'masyarakat yang terimbas tsunami' atau 'masyarakat yang terimbas konflik' mengakibatkan adanya batas pemisah yang sangat nyata antara kabupaten-kabupaten di pesisir dan kabupaten-kabupaten di daerah yang jauh dari pantai atau terletak lebih ke dalam. Ketika seseorang mengatakan bahwa 37% lebih banyak orang lapor akan perubahan pekerjaannya setelah terimbas konflik dibanding dengan mereka yang hidup dalam masyarakat yang terimbas bencana tsunami, maka garis antara masyarakat terimbas tsunami dan masyarakat terimbas konflik mengarah kepada persepsi ketidakadilan diantara komunitas.

Keutuhan sosial dan kepercayaan yang tegang merupakan hambatan yang tampak jelas bagi stabilisasi masyarakat. Bila hambatan-hambatan dalam upaya pemulihan ini tidak ditangani, ketidakpuasan masyarakat akan dibentuk oleh para elite di sekelilingnya dan pengikut-pengikut mereka dalam upaya untuk memperoleh daerah kekuasaan politik dan sumber daya ekonomi; kelompok-kelompok pengganggu ini dapat melemahkan upaya pembangunan perdamaian di Aceh dan harus ditangani dengan hati-hati.

Trauma yang Disebabkan Konflik dan Kapasitas Pembawa Konflik

- Berbagai-bentuk konflik personal dapat digunakan untuk mengidentifikasi dimana kapasitas pembawa konflik masih dalam taraf yang tinggi selama periode pasca konflik. Bentuk-bentuk kekerasan personal secara signifikan turut menyumbang pada kerusakan psikologis: perasaan dikhianati, dihina, dimusuhi, dicurigai, tidak dipercaya, dibenci, dan keinginan yang kuat untuk balas dendam yang dialami oleh para korban, saksi mata, dapat menghasilkan kapasitas pembawa konflik sampai pada tahap dimana hal ini akan menjadi tekanan yang berbahaya.
- Kabupaten-kabupaten yang masih memiliki kapasitas pembawa konflik tertinggi adalah Aceh Selatan, Aceh Utara dan Bireuen, kemudian diikuti oleh Gayo Lues, Bener Meriah, Aceh Utara dan Aceh Tengah.
- Data Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang kembali ke daerahnya yang dikumpulkan oleh IOM/UNDP dan kumpulan data dari PNA IOM/Harvard, hampir seperempat responden potensial menderita trauma yang disebabkan konflik.
- Rekonsiliasi sosial dan budaya dan proses pemulihan (misalnya mempromosikan kesenian lokal, perayaan peusijeuk) juga sama pentingnya dengan rekonstruksi. Penyusunan prioritas harus mencerminkan semua wilayah geografis yang memiliki kapasitas pembawa konflik paling tinggi.

Sumber Penghidupan Masyarakat

- Rendahnya tingkat kohesi sosial muncul di kabupaten-kabupaten baik yang merupakan tuan rumah dari banyak daerah yang berada dalam kekuasaan GAM ataupun yang mengalami konflik vertikal tingkat tinggi (misalnya Bireuen dan Aceh Utara). Rendahnya tingkat kohesi juga terjadi di kabupaten-kabupaten yang di tingkat komunitasnya mengalami konflik horizontal berbasis identitas yang sangat parah (misalnya Aceh Tengah dan Gayo Lues).
- Masyarakat terimbas konflik yang telah mengalami pengalaman konflik yang berlangsung lama mengalami penurunan mobilitas ekonomi, sehingga hal ini makin membuat mereka lebih sulit untuk lolos dari lingkaran kemiskinan.
- Bantuan tepat sasaran dalam bentuk upaya membantu diri sendiri yang berbasis masyarakat lebih efektif daripada proyek sumber penghidupan yang generik (misalnya memberikan alat pertanian secara cuma-cuma tanpa sistem pengelolaan secara bersama) mengingat proses merupakan hasil yang hendak dicapai. Pendekatan ini memperkuat peran masyarakat dan mendukung sumber penghidupan yang berkelanjutan di dalam struktur yang dipimpin oleh masyarakat.
- Lembaga-lembaga tradisional yang dipimpin oleh masyarakat ternyata merupakan mekanisme yang mudah didukung dalam pemerintahan masyarakat, dan telah berperan penting dalam memfasilitasi stabilisasi dan pemulihan masyarakat.
- Jaringan masyarakat sipil lokal dan organisasi berbasis masyarakat dengan sempurna diposisikan untuk berkonsultasi dengan masyarakat dan meminta kepada mereka untuk mengidentifikasi anggota masyarakat yang paling rentan, misalnya janda perang, anak yatim piatu, keluarga yang mengungsi, keluarga yang kembali dari pengungsian, keluarga yang menampung, korban trauma fisik/mental, dan keluarga yang miskin.

Isu-isu Mengenai Akses (Pasar, Kota, Pendidikan, Air, Kesehatan)

- Terbatasnya akses terhadap: makanan; barang-barang bukan

pangan; pasar dan kota; fasilitas kesehatan dan perawatan medis; pendidikan dan air, bukanlah isu yang terpisah. Isu-isu ini tidak bisa ditangani melalui intervensi sektoral tunggal. Berbeda dengan sektor khusus, pendekatan multi-sektor dibutuhkan dan wajib terfokus pada masyarakat, karena masyarakatlah yang perlu perbaikan dan bukan jalan atau infrastruktur lainnya.

- Daripada mengakses pelayanan-pelayanan kesehatan formal, masyarakat lebih bergantung pada metode penyembuhan tradisional atau alternatif yang sebenarnya sangat kurang memiliki kapasitas dalam menangani penyakit fisik yang akut, serta peninggalan trauma konflik.

Rekomendasi Utama

Rekomendasi utama di bawah ini memberikan arahan intervensi secara spesifik untuk diadopsi oleh lembaga donor, organisasi internasional, dan pemangku kepentingan lainnya dalam rangka meningkatkan keamanan bagi individu, kelompok dan masyarakat terimbas konflik yang dalam kondisi rentan.

Mantan Kombatant GAM/TNA dan Mantan Tapol/Napol

- Jumlah orang yang mengklaim status sebagai mantan kombatant GAM/TNA kelihatannya semakin besar. Kebutuhan akan pemberian uang kepada mereka menunjukkan kegagalan dari pelaksana reintegrasi dan akan secara negatif mendorong mentalitas ketergantungan terhadap uang bantuan.
- Dalam rangka menanggapi kebutuhan mantan kombatant (yaitu GAM/TNA dan para kelompok anti-separatis) dan mantan Tapol/Napol, para pelaku pemberi bantuan harus mengidentifikasi mekanisme masyarakat lokal sebagai jalan untuk memberikan bantuan, memperhatikan kecenderungan bahwa kelompok-kelompok tersebut merupakan kekuatan dalam mempromosikan keutuhan sosial.
- Memberikan pelayanan dukungan finansial kepada mantan kombatant GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol yang sudah menikah dan yang memiliki anak, sehingga mencegah keluarga tersebut jatuh ke dalam kemiskinan dan memfasilitasi pemulihan sumber penghidupan jangka panjang bagi seluruh rumah tangga.
- BRA dan badan donor harus mengarahkan bantuan kepada keluarga mantan kombatant yang sangat rentan (misalnya janda yang menjadi kepala keluarga atau keluarga mantan kombatant yang menghadapi mantan kombatant yang menderita trauma mental, keluarga dengan anak yatim/piatu, serta keluarga dengan jumlah anggota keluarga yang sangat besar).
- BRA di tingkat Propinsi dan tingkat Kabupaten diharapkan meningkatkan kegiatan-kegiatan rekonsiliasi berbasis masyarakat yang mendorong keutuhan sosial antara mantan kombatant GAM/TNA dan masyarakat yang menerimanya kembali (misalkan upacara peusijeuk atau festival daerah yang menampilkan seni dan budaya asli). Prioritas harus diberikan ke wilayah geografis yang memiliki kapasitas pembawa konflik yang tinggi.
- BRA bekerja sama dengan pemerintah Propinsi, IOM, dan ILO untuk secara sistematis memetakan database rujukan berisi pelatihan keterampilan, pekerjaan dan usaha kecil sampai tahun 2009. Database ini diharapkan akan berfungsi di kantor BRA tingkat Kabupaten bagi para mantan kombatant dan pemuda yang rentan akan konflik yaitu GAM/TNA dan para kelompok anti-separatis.
- Upaya membangun kesadaran dan upaya pemanfaatan lembaga dan pemimpin masyarakat yang dianggap 'aman' atau netral

dapat menjembatani celah dalam reintegrasi dan penerimaan masyarakat terhadap mantan kombatant GAM/TNA dan mantan Tapol/Napol, serta memfasilitasi upaya membangun rasa percaya antara bagian-bagian kelompok mantan kombatant yang berbeda dengan pihak pemerintah (khususnya aparat keamanan negara).

- Para lembaga donor dengan latar belakang program kesehatan yang kuat dan berpengalaman di daerah Indonesia lainnya, seperti AusAID, akan mengucurkan dana bagi bantuan teknis dan mobilisasi lapangan bagi program kesehatan di tingkat Propinsi yang didesain untuk memperkuat kapasitas pelayanan kesehatan yang berbasis masyarakat memanfaatkan perawat kesehatan masyarakat (misalnya POSYANDU) dan perawat magang setempat (misalnya Tenaga Bakti) melalui model *Training of Trainers*. Tujuannya adalah untuk memberikan pelatihan kepada perawat kesehatan masyarakat dan dukun tradisional di desa-desa agar mampu mengidentifikasi dan memberikan pertolongan pertama bagi para mantan pejuang yang menderita masalah psikologis/kejiwaan.

Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan Pengungsi yang telah kembali

- Tidak ada dukungan secara langsung dan terkoordinir diberikan kepada pengungsi yang kembali ke daerahnya ataupun kepada Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) baik oleh pemerintah maupun oleh masyarakat internasional. Sebuah kerangka strategis yang jelas dan lugas diperlukan untuk mengarahkan bantuan pemulihan bagi kelompok-kelompok ini.
- Badan perwakilan pemerintah di Aceh, terutama BRA, perlu memperbaiki akses terhadap informasi mengenai pemilihan umum yang akan datang bagi para pengungsi dan mereka yang telah kembali, tanpa melihat asal usul atau kesukuan mereka.
- Mengidentifikasi kepemimpinan tradisional dan ruang sosial di mana warga bisa bekerja sama dan membangun gerakan mereka untuk memperkuat keutuhan sosial (misalnya kelompok yang membantu diri mereka sendiri).
- Pemerintahan di Aceh harus mempertimbangkan untuk mengembangkan sebuah rujukan mengenai lapangan kerja, magang, dan program pelatihan kejuruan bagi masyarakat pengungsi dan mereka yang telah kembali dengan mengadaptasi model yang dilakukan oleh IOM melalui program ICRS yang baru. Pusat rujukan ini akan lebih efektif jika didirikan secara bersama-sama dengan melakukan perbaikan-perbaikan infrastruktur sosial dan ekonomi seperti yang telah ditargetkan, dalam rangka meningkatkan akses terhadap pasar, kota dan pelayanan publik.
- Dinas Sosial (Dinsos) akan menyusun, mensosialisasikan, merevisi, dan menyebarkan petunjuk yang harus diikuti oleh para kepala desa dalam penanganan Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang telah kembali, serta mengembangkan mekanisme pelaporan kepada pihak berwenang jika terdapat isu-isu yang tidak bisa diselesaikan pada tingkat lokal.
- Pemerintahan di Aceh harus mengambil tindakan konkrit untuk menangani masalah-masalah yang dihadapi oleh para Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang telah kembali sehubungan dengan kepemilikan secara hukum atas rumah, tanah dan usaha mereka.

Masyarakat dan Stabilisasi Masyarakat

- Jika masyarakat tidak stabil, Aceh akan mengalami kemunculan kelompok-kelompok kekerasan baru atau meluasnya keanggotaan faksi-faksi lama dan yang sudah tidak aktif diantara kelompok-

- kelompok mantan kombatan GAM/TNA.
- Program stabilisasi masyarakat merupakan alat untuk mengintegrasikan masyarakat pasca konflik yang tercerai berai secara sosial dan untuk membangun kembali ruang sosial yang sehat dengan cara mendengarkan tuntutan masyarakat dan fokus kepada proses daripada hasil akhir.
 - Pemerintah Daerah Aceh yang berencana untuk memberikan bantuan pembangunan desa harus secara berhati-hati mempertimbangkan pendekatan pemulihan kelompok desa yang dikendalikan oleh tuntutan masyarakat desa. Satu hal yang sangat penting yaitu bahwa pemulihan masyarakat dan bantuan pembangunan turut mendorong adanya rekonsiliasi dan konsultasi di dalam dan antar masyarakat; mekanisme stabilisasi masyarakat yang dimiliki oleh IOM yaitu yang dinamakan SCACP yang beroperasi di daerah dataran tinggi dan MGKD (yang didasarkan pada mekanisme Program Pengembangan Kecamatan) merupakan contoh yang berguna dalam pengembangan model bantuan pemerintah.
 - BRA harus mempertimbangkan dengan sungguh-sungguh untuk desentralisasi klien atau proses seleksi penerima manfaat bagi korban konflik dan kelompok-kelompok rentan lainnya yang berdasarkan pada pemilihan dan verifikasi yang dilakukan oleh masyarakat sendiri; program ICRC sebagaimana dijalankan oleh IOM merupakan model yang bermanfaat bagi pendekatan ini.
 - Gubernur Aceh mengutus sebuah tim untuk melakukan kunjungan secara teratur dan secara langsung bermusyawarah dengan pemimpin masyarakat seputar isu yang berkaitan dengan keluhan atau ketidakpuasan yang dapat memunculkan konflik-konflik baru.
 - AGTP bekerja sama dengan BRA dan badan donor untuk memperkuat kapasitas pemantauan dan evaluasi dari para pelaku upaya pemulihan dan reintegrasi yang relevan.
 - Bank Dunia hendak mengadakan penelitian terhadap perempuan korban konflik di seluruh Aceh.
 - UNICEF dan otoritas Aceh mendirikan pusat peduli anak yatim-piatu berbasis masyarakat di dalam daerah-daerah yang terkena dampak konflik yang parah di wilayah Aceh.

Perdamaian, seperti halnya Program Pelucutan Senjata, Demobilisasi dan Reintegrasi (DDR), memiliki sifat dasar yang organik, bukan linier; upaya untuk mendesak proses linier mulai dari pelucutan senjata, ke arah demobilisasi, sampai ke reintegrasi tidak akan pernah berhasil. Selain itu, menghitung jumlah senjata dan mengadakan demobilisasi tentara merupakan tindakan yang steril ketika dikerjakan sebagai kesatuan program, namun sayangnya itulah yang terjadi di Aceh.³ Dari keseluruhan proses DDR yang paling bermuatan budaya dan paling kompleks adalah R – reintegrasi. Sayang sekali, upaya reintegrasi selama tiga tahun di dalam proses perdamaian di Aceh masih diperlakukan sebagai kegiatan pemberian uang tunai. Reintegrasi adalah istilah yang hampir secara eksklusif digunakan untuk para mantan kombatan. Hal yang demikian haruslah berubah karena mantan kombatan GAM/TNA dan kelompok-kelompok rentan lainnya (seperti Pengungsi Dalam Negeri (IDP) dan pengungsi yang kembali) harus direintegrasi kembali ke dalam kesatuan yang lebih luas; pertama-tama kepada masyarakatnya, dan selanjutnya, melalui masyarakat mereka, menuju ke Aceh dan negara Republik Indonesia.

Tak perlu dipertanyakan lagi bahwa perlu adanya fokus yang kokoh dalam reintegrasi, akan tetapi dengan tanpa mengorbankan upaya meningkatkan peran pemerintah, dan upaya mendukung kapasitas membangun perdamaian di semua tingkat masyarakat sipil. Kapasitas memikul konflik baik yang dimiliki individu, maupun masyarakat – yaitu rasa ketidakadilan atau balas dendam, atau rasa frustrasi karena terbatasnya kesempatan kerja – dapat dengan mudah mengacak-acak dan menjelma menjadi keadaan konflik. Penelitian ini menyoroti bahwa Pemerintah Indonesia dan Pemerintah Daerah Aceh menghadapi berbagai pilihan kebijakan yang kompleks. Pada tahap transisi ini di dalam masa proses perdamaian, dukungan eksternal perlu lebih tepat sasaran. Analisis, temuan dan rekomendasi di dalam laporan ini ditujukan untuk membangkitkan diskusi yang lebih informatif tentang kerentanan tertentu dan masalah-masalah di Aceh, dan bagaimana kita dapat lebih efektif memberikan bantuan pasca konflik yang tepat sasaran.



Photo taken by RHM Zafauliah in town of Kutecane during a wedding procession

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1 – THE ACEH REINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY CONTEXT

The signing of the August 2005 Helsinki Peace Agreement (hereafter referred to as the Helsinki MoU) between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) marked a formal end to the longest standing intra-state conflict in Southeast Asia. Since then, a handful of national and international actors, notably the International Organization for Migration (IOM), have worked closely with the GoI and GAM to implement reintegration and recovery components of the peace agreement.

Since August 2005 there have been numerous successes implementing the Helsinki MoU. These include: the disarmament and demobilization of GAM/TNA ex-combatants;⁴ the withdrawal of non-organic police and TNI personnel from the province;⁵ the ratification of a new regional autonomy and decentralization law (Act No. 11/2006 on the Governing of Aceh, hereafter LoGA);⁶ the establishment of Badan Reintegrasi Aceh-Damai (BRA), the principal government body in Aceh with a broad mandate to lead, monitor, evaluate, advise, and support the peace and reintegration processes and the implementation of the Helsinki MoU. Moreover, key figures amongst GAM's political and organizational leadership have entered into government, signifying their transition from "rebel leaders" to government leaders – which brings its own unique set of challenges for building effective systems of provincial and local government.

TRouBLING SIGNS OR EVERYDAY DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES?

Observers sometimes forget that the signing of the Helsinki MoU and subsequent reintegration and recovery processes were only the beginning of longer-term peace-building, which require the sustained and lengthy engagement of all supporting actors. This need can be demonstrated with the history of repeated conflict in Aceh and failed attempts to build sustainable peace in the province,⁷ and current institutional, economic, political or social challenges to building sustainable peace.

Between January 2005 and September 2006, the World Bank's Aceh Conflict Monitoring Unit (ACMU) shows that out of 1,653 conflict records, 114 involved ex-GAM, with 87.7% of these records listed as "vertical conflicts" (i.e. unorganized individual conflicts between GAM members and state institutions such as the Police or TNI).⁸ Of 372 incidents involving weapons, 73 included GAM members or ex-GAM/TNA combatants – and 86.3% of these weapons cases involved the use of firearms.⁹ Not surprisingly, districts with the highest number of conflict incidents were amongst those most heavily conflict-affected.¹⁰ ACMU data also shows that following December 2007 there were several 'spikes' in violent local conflicts, the level of which was not seen since January 2005.¹¹

The BRA also notes several specific problems for reintegration and recovery that include,

- The "hesitancy" of some GAM members in embracing the peace process (i.e. their acceptance of the process is not guaranteed);
- Unresolved "centre-periphery" tensions interfering with the already tenuous success of confidence-building measures undertaken between the GoI and GAM;
- GAM's repeated protests to clauses in the LoGA that, it is alleged, are contrary to the letter and spirit of the MoU; and,
- TNI personnel reportedly taking actions "outside established procedures" (e.g. assaults on civilians).¹²

These challenges, some of which are related to deep-rooted structural factors that underpinned the conflict between the GAM and the GoI (e.g. centre-periphery tensions), sit alongside unfulfilled community expectations of receiving recovery assistance, lingering security concerns related to past conflict actors, and post-August 2005 patterns of violent criminality. Those security concerns are often compounded by identity-based and political cleavages at community-level, especially in fragile flashpoints along North and East coastline of Aceh and amongst ethnically diverse communities in the Central Highlands.¹³ Moreover, these pressures are complicated by new trajectories of social conflict between community members attempting to access humanitarian aid and high community expectations of receiving assistance, which emerged in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.¹⁴

SECTION 2 – ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE

This assessment was undertaken by IOM, with funding support from USAID, to:

- Provide a consolidated picture of individual reintegration;

- Provide a consolidated picture of IOM's community stabilization interventions;
- Identify psycho-social vulnerabilities of conflict-affected communities;
- Identify IDP and returnee vulnerabilities,

and;

- To identify programmatic gaps in order to refocus and improve upon reintegration and recovery assistance delivered by key stakeholders.

The analysis herein is performed principally with respect to data gathered and managed by IOM, especially its Post Conflict and Reintegration Programme in Aceh,¹⁵ and also draws upon data provided by organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Development Alternatives International (DAI) and the World Bank.¹⁶ This report focuses upon conflict-affected groups under BRA's assistance mandate which, based on the Helsinki MoU, include three categories of beneficiaries: ex-combatants; ex-political prisoners and victims of conflict (a broad category ranging from orphans, widows, traumatized people, conflict-affected communities, and IDPs and returnees).¹⁷ The key assessment aims are:

- To inform BRA's future strategic planning on how best to support return and sustainable reintegration processes over the coming years;¹⁸
- To identify post-conflict recovery dynamics, key obstacles and local opportunities to support peaceful reintegration (i.e. local peace-generating capacities), and the determinants of sustainable reintegration and recovery;
- To locate strategic gaps with programmatic responses delivering assistance to conflict-affected groups under BRA's mandate.¹⁹ The focus is on identifying recovery needs that have not been sufficiently addressed, identifying those who have not yet received assistance, identifying potential spoiler groups, and identifying programmatic responses to fill these assistance gaps,²⁰ and;
- To identify the strengths and weaknesses of selected IOM project delivery mechanisms for providing reintegration and recovery assistance, thus providing stakeholders with a better understanding of how to maximize positive impacts of reintegration and recovery interventions. The report then forwards some tentative conclusions in relation to the socio-cultural and economic impacts made by these interventions and then provides recommendations for improving their effectiveness.

It is worth noting that aggregate provincial-level, and even district-level, statistics are regularly used throughout this report, particularly in Chapter 4. This can be misleading vis-à-vis the unique recovery challenges facing discrete conflict-affected communities, especially those in 'hot-spot' areas. That said, the rationale for using aggregate statistics is that both government and external actors do in fact use and need provincial and district level statistics because that is very often how their programs are designed. Government and external implementing agencies will frequently find themselves having to balance assistance across an entire administrative region and not just 'hot-spot' areas, and while targeting of these specific areas is an attractive approach in principle, perceptions of fairness remain a constant concern.

The findings of this report will feed into an upcoming Multi-Stakeholder Review (MSR) being led by the World Bank. The MSR will pick-up the work of this report to identify longer-term trends with ex-combatant reintegration and recovery, identify the forms of assistance received by communities, how varied assistance delivery mechanisms impact upon different elements of peace-building, and further explore where strategic gaps exist with reintegration and recovery efforts.²¹ Importantly, the MSR also aims to promote strategic coherence amongst donors, stakeholders, and government bodies from provincial to district levels while strengthening the capacities of BRA to conduct future monitoring activities and impact assessments.

BRA'S REINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY PLAN – SETTING A STRATEGIC DIRECTION

In mid-2006, BRA appeared uncertain of its overall strategic direction for delivering reintegration and recovery assistance to those falling under its mandate (i.e. the best delivery mechanisms to use), which groups should be targeted in relation

to promoting the peace process (e.g. addressing "spoiler pressures"), and how to make a transition from early recovery to longer-term reintegration and development in a way that would not create assistance dependencies and potentially new conflict pressures. After early confusion with attempts to deliver assistance to conflict-victims, BRA adopted a broad-based community-driven development approach employing the government's *Kecamatan* Development Program (KDP), (a community driven development program implemented by the Department of Home Affairs in cooperation with the World Bank) as a delivery mechanism.²²

Following the Gubernurial *Pilkada* (direct elections for Provincial Governors and District Heads) victory of Irwandi Yusuf (an influential GAM leader during the conflict period), BRA underwent a legislative and organizational overhaul, which led to a new policy direction for BRA.²³ In response to disaffection over the KDP's perceived inability to target assistance to conflict-victims, KDP delivery mechanisms were replaced with an individual (victim-based) approach based on cash compensation and housing assistance (in the form of direct cash grants). Meanwhile, a concerted effort has been made by UNORC to place the activities of BRA under the Peace/Reintegration Cluster of a revamped Aceh Recovery Framework (ARF), an initiative designed to serve as the official strategic recovery framework for the government and stakeholders assisting with reintegration and recovery in Aceh.²⁴

Less important than the details of these policy changes is the fact that they speak to a lack of consensus for the place, and potentially the focus, of reintegration and recovery efforts in relation to post-conflict peace-building.²⁵ It should be remembered that reintegration and recovery form key steps amongst a range of complimentary activities supporting the transition from conflict to sustainable peace and development.²⁶ Here it is argued that reintegration and recovery should

not be confused with other interventions that, for example, seek to address the structural factors which underpinned the conflict between GAM and the Gol (e.g. the macro-economic environment), and over which local communities have limited ability to effect change.²⁷ Instead, reintegration and recovery interventions must focus on realistically achievable objectives for those at local levels who are recovering from violent conflict.

SUSTAINABLE RECOVERY FOR THE WEDGE OF VULNERABILITY²⁸

To coherently assess the vulnerable groups considered herein, this report uses an innovative framework adapted to, and developed for, the Aceh context: Sustainable Recovery for the Wedge of Vulnerability. The populations examined herein suffer from particular types of vulnerabilities specific to the patterns, dynamics, and levels of conflict that they have experienced (i.e. a combination of trauma, lack of support and coping skills, exposure to conflict, resentment, and social or environmental conditioning). These experiences form latent conflict-carrying capacities making them more prone to participating in violence (e.g. political or criminal) or creating instability by fleeing their homes in times of heightened social or political tension. The 'wedge' conceptualizes a myriad of vulnerabilities representing conflict-carrying capacities experienced by communities and individuals. In turn, these vulnerabilities must be the subject of targeted assistance from government and external actors aimed at buttressing the Aceh peace process and preventing a relapse into conflict.

Given policy debates over providing targeted vs. broad-based assistance, it is worth first providing a brief definition of reintegration and how it is applied to recovery processes considered within this assessment. In discussing ex-combatant groups in post-conflict societies, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan defines reintegration as:

A process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a

*country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.*²⁹

This entails transforming the latent conflict-carrying capacities (i.e. pressures or tendencies to engage in different forms of violence or criminality)³⁰ into peace-generating capacities and implies that ex-combatants should adapt to become constructive citizens in society.

Implicit in the definition provided by former UNSG Kofi Annan is that assistance should address the real (rather than the perceived/claimed) needs of conflict-affected communities, to increase their economic capacities to absorb different types of returnees, and to promote post-conflict security by strengthening social cohesion. This view of reintegration introduces a conceptual shift away from economic factors to the social dimensions of reintegration (i.e. reintegration into healthy civil society or facilitating the development of a healthy civil society).³¹ This also involves strengthening local capacities to facilitate the social reintegration or livelihood recovery of other conflict-affected communities.

Reintegration should also be linked to long-term national development planning supported by external actors. This means at some point making a transition from targeted assistance to less targeted processes that will benefit communities more broadly. However, until this transition is achieved the focus ultimately remains on ex-combatant groups and those who are susceptible to back-sliding pressures that can derail a peace process. The problem, however, is how to strategically link early recovery for a range of conflict-affected communities into longer-term sustainable peace-building and development.³²

Sustainable Recovery for Conflict-Affected Communities

This report attempts to bridge the gap between early recovery and later development processes by using the concept of Sustainable Recovery, which aims to find "lasting solutions" for different groups with varied post-conflict vulnerabilities. Since this implies developing tailored interventions, the concept can be applied equally to the different groups falling under the BRA's assistance mandate. This is done so

as to introduce planning mechanisms that will facilitate a transition to "normal" development processes at the local level. Typically used in reference to IDP communities, the different types of solutions (each of which implying different elements and means) can include:

- 1) Return** – the process of going back to one's place of origin/ habitual residence;
- 2) Resettlement** – the process of starting a new life in a place other than the place of origin/ habitual residence; and
- 3) Re-integration** – the re-entry of conflict-affected people into the social, economic, cultural and political fabric of their original community or the community of resettlement.


The latter of the above solutions is also common to ex-combatants and can require long-term assistance and/or protection for particularly vulnerable individuals until they have become reintegrated into "healthy" civil society, whilst at the same time facilitating their livelihood recovery.³³ Moreover, to support sustainable recovery processes, it also requires addressing the vulnerabilities of receiving communities, or those which retain high conflict-carrying capacities as a result of their exposure to violent conflict. Finally, this approach links short- to medium-term reintegration and recovery activities to longer-term development strategies that use participatory, community-based and self-reliance-oriented methodologies.

The Wedge of Vulnerability

The populations examined herein suffer from particular types of vulnerabilities specific to the patterns, dynamics, and levels of conflict that they have experienced (i.e. a combination of trauma, lack of support and coping skills, exposure to conflict, resentment, and social or environmental conditioning). These experiences form latent conflict-carrying capacities making them more prone to participating in violence (e.g. political or criminal) or creating instability by fleeing their homes in times for reasons of fear, rumor, and/or violence. Underpinning this concept of vulnerability is the notion that vulnerable groups need targeted assistance during early- and medium-term recovery phases to support the peace process. Taking a broad view of vulnerability in its active (perpetrator/ conflict actor) and passive (victim/conflict-affected) forms, vulnerable groups can include:

Widow/ers	Persons with psychological trauma	Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees
Orphans	Elderly	Ex-combatants (in both the narrow and the broad sense) ³⁴
Disabled/Physically handicapped	Youth	Ex-combatant Dependants
Women as primary conflict victims	Individuals or communities heavily impoverished by conflict	Conflict-affected Receiving Communities
Children as primary conflict victims	Single-headed households	

Figure 1 : **The Wedge of Vulnerability**
Transition to Sustainable Peace and Development



The Wedge of Vulnerability as outlined above therefore implies that vulnerabilities within communities and amongst individuals must be the subject of targeted assistance from the government and from external actors.

Targeted assistance can include but is not limited to: access to government services, protection, reintegration assistance, livelihood recovery, political representation, and/or compensation for injuries and losses suffered as a result of the conflict. The principal reason is that instigating changes to support local peace-generating capacities during early to medium-term phases of reintegration and recovery will lead to sustainable peace and development.

Methodology

The methodology and lines of inquiry for this assessment are based on a durable solutions approach adapted to the reintegration and recovery needs of ex-combatants, IDPs and returnees, and conflict-affected communities, referred to herein as Sustainable Recovery for the Wedge of Vulnerability (see above).

As a research method, meta-analyses typically use statistical procedures for evaluating a set of related research hypotheses by measuring the impacts of similar independent variables measured on different scales in different studies. The diverse nature of data used for this study (e.g. the different types of questions asked, methods of coding quantitative responses, and diverse data collection aims) has, in most cases, made this kind of

statistical analysis unrealistic. Instead, this work produces a coherent analysis, perhaps better described as a ‘mega-analysis’, which contrasts findings from comparable datasets.³⁵

The first task for the Meta-Analysis Team was to collate available datasets and analyze their respective strengths, weaknesses, and identify how the data could be used to achieve the assessment objectives. Datasets in various formats were transferred into SPSS files, followed by recoding and cleaning of data, whilst other datasets in SPSS format were translated into English and recoded for analysis. Lines of inquiry were developed into a coherent report structure, explored over the next several months and adapted as research questions evolved.

Finally, to overcome assessment weaknesses springing from a lack of qualitative data and in some cases the “dated” nature of available statistical data,³⁶ an external review process was used to ensure that statistical analyses were grounded in the realities of Aceh’s reintegration and recovery processes, and to sharpen the analytical focus of the final report.

Chapter Structure

Chapter 2 focuses on GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, and estimates the size of ex-combatants as a group and their support networks during the conflict period. This chapter identifies particular vulnerabilities faced by some ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners.

A comparison is made between data on ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners collected by IOM’s Information Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS) on the one hand, and the World Bank’s 2006 GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment on the other. An assessment is made of livelihood assistance provided by IOM’s ICRS program in order to identify impacts and lessons learned. A series of recommendations are made based upon chapter findings


Chapter 3 applies to IDPs and returnees, and examines the types of assistance received by IDPs and returnees, where recovery assistance gaps exist, and provides recommendations to fill those gaps.

Chapter 4 identifies conflict impacts on communities, including their livelihoods and levels of psycho-social vulnerability on a geographical basis. IOM community stabilization efforts are then examined with the principal aim of identifying how IOM assistance mechanisms have supported reintegration and recovery activities, how these forms of assistance have impacted upon social spaces, and how they have facilitated livelihood recovery for conflict-affected communities.

Annexes containing complete statistical tables used for this report on a chapter-by-chapter basis are to be found in the accompanying CD ROM. All statistical tables were produced using licensed SPSS Version 15 software.

CHAPTER 2 - GAM / TNA EX-COMBATANTS AND EX-POLITICAL PRISONERS

Figure 2: **The Wedge of Vulnerability**
Transition to Sustainable Peace and Development



Ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners have conflict-related vulnerabilities that can represent serious conflict pressures. As a result, the sustainable reintegration and recovery of GAM/TNA ex-combatants, their support networks, and ex-political prisoners, depends on the availability of realistic opportunities for social reintegration and economic recovery.³⁷ Vulnerabilities may take the form of acute social dislocation, psychological trauma, economic hardships for themselves and their families, and the difficulties of adapting to peacetime changes in the balance of power within and between communities. Moreover, neither ex-combatants nor ex-political prisoners are homogenous categories of conflict-affected people. Both groups, and their sub-groupings, have their own specific demands and needs. If distinctions are not made and tailored assistance is not provided to address the needs of those different groupings, reintegration efforts may do little to facilitate the successful transition of those people into constructive citizens within society and, at worst, may be counter-productive for the peace process.³⁸ The Wedge of Vulnerability these groups represent therefore relates

to their overt and latent conflict-carrying capacities, which make them particularly prone to destabilizing their communities and undermining the broader transition to sustainable peace and development in Aceh.

This chapter examines the reintegration and recovery challenges facing ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners and focuses on four key themes:

1. General lines of inquiry that profile the specific vulnerabilities and recovery needs of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners disaggregated by age, gender, and significant regional variations.
2. It is important to identify the population sizes of GAM/TNA ex-combatants, ex-political prisoners,³⁹ and GAM support networks in order to appreciate the scope of their reintegration and recovery demands and needs. Indicative estimations presented herein suggest that the size of these populations is much larger, and perhaps more complex, than most observers have thus far recognized.

3. Improved access to health, land, life skills training, marketable skills training, realistic job or business opportunities emerge as key areas for donor and government interventions in order to achieve sustainable reintegration and livelihood recovery that will support the Aceh peace process.

4. Information Counseling and Referral Services (ICRS) are the backbone of any reintegration program. Section 5 of this chapter examines how IOM's ICRS program facilitated the reintegration and recovery of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners and what lessons are offered for future activities supporting their reintegration and livelihood recovery.

The bulk of the analysis is based upon IOM's ICRS client database,⁴⁰ with other datasets used where available and appropriate. This chapter concludes with a short gap analysis on the types of assistance provided to GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, as well as the effectiveness of IOM/ICRS program in facilitating the reintegration of these critical conflict-affected populations.

SECTION 1 – GAM/TNA, TOWARDS A PROFILE OF EX-COMBATANTS AND THEIR SUPPORT NETWORKS

Unlike other peace processes such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, or the Congo, the vast majority of GAM/TNA ex-combatants were already living with their families or amongst their communities during the conflict and when the peace agreement was signed. As a result, demobilization often occurred

spontaneously and on a localized level – a process sometimes referred to as “auto-demobilization”. This meant that the textbook-defined process of demobilization, registration, cantonment, and reinsertion did not occur for GAM/TNA ex-combatants and, as a result, the actual number of ex-

combatants is not precisely defined. Nevertheless, the Helsinki MoU refers to GAM committing to “demobilize all of its 3,000 military troops”.⁴¹ Although manifestly problematic in terms of verification, this section estimates the number of people claiming ex-combatant status.




Figure 3 : **GAM Demographics**

- A:** Politico-Military Leadership
- B:** Combatants
- C:** Support Networks

Here GAM populations are divided into demographics A, B and C.⁴² Demographic A refers to GAM’s political leadership and senior command structure, demographic B refers to its gun-carrying combatants and those claiming some type of ‘veteran status’ (namely GAM/TNA), while demographic C refers to support networks that actively provided assistance and protection to combatants.⁴³ Demographic C also refers to those responsible for political indoctrination of communities or new members; those organizing food, munitions, and other supplies or logistical support arrangements, those gathering or relaying intelligence or communications and other related activities – by far the largest category within GAM. This report makes no assertions as to whether political prisoners came from either GAM’s A, B, or C demographics.

GAM/TNA – DEMOGRAPHIC B

Definitions are not agreed upon, nor are strict criteria applied when discussing ex-

combatants in Aceh. Moreover, different figures have been presented by the Gol and GAM before and after the signing of the Helsinki MoU. The nature of the GAM insurgency, which occurred in distinct phases from 1975 until 2005, therefore makes it difficult to answer the question “who at some time wielded a weapon,” which differs conceptually from identifying the number of combatants during the last phase of the GAM insurgency against the Gol (i.e. around the time of the signing of the Helsinki MoU).⁴⁴

Data from IOM/ UNDP/ CIDA MGKD projects shows that there are upwards of 42,000 ex-combatants or those claiming some type of ex-combatant status.⁴⁵ This figure appears high in comparison to comparable settings in the region and probably includes a range of criminal elements or others that have claimed ex-combatant status (i.e. some people claim ex-combatant status to access different types of economic assistance or social entitlements). It is

important to note that this data was collected in 2005-2007 a period in which considerable assistance was being channeled through BRA to ex-combatants. The figure of 42,000 is to be contrasted with the largest official figures offered by KPA, which are significantly lower.

Following the signing of the Helsinki MoU, although officially stating that there are only 3,000 GAM/TNA ex-combatants the KPA indicated in public on several occasions that 15,000 gun-carrying combatants were entitled to assistance, though not clearly outlining the timeframe these individuals carried arms.⁴⁶ It is also noteworthy that recently in early 2008 senior KPA figures remarked, albeit in informal settings, of a figure of ex-combatants as high as 30,000.

There is even greater uncertainty regarding the total size of the ex-political prisoner population. Aside from the 1,924 identified in IOM’s ICRS client-roster, no accurate figures are available.⁴⁷

GAM/TNA SUPPORT NETWORKS – DEMOGRAPHIC C

The overall size of demographic C (i.e. GAM's support network) is estimated based on the assumption that, at the very least, the households of ex-combatants and those claiming veteran status offered support and protection to GAM combatants. As such, the average household size of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-prisoners is used as an indicative measure for the size of GAM's demographic C.

Additional justification for using household size as a proxy indicator for the size of the support network comes from IOM ICRS

database, which shows that after discharge 81.9% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants turned firstly to their families for support. Hence by using the demographic B figure of 42,000, as discussed above, and multiplying it by the average household size (five people) of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-prisoners that participated in IOM ICRS project, the size of demographic C is conservatively estimated at some 210,000 people, or approximately 5% of the total population in Aceh, which actively participated in the insurgency. This is the number of people in Aceh with grievances and conflict experiences linked to their role as conflict actors, rather than victims per se.⁴⁸

AGE AND GENDER

As shown in Figure 3, most GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners are 21 to 30 years old. The second largest age bracket for both is 31 to 41 years old with consistently higher proportions of GAM/TNA ex-combatants. Only above the age bracket of 41 years are there higher proportions of ex-political prisoners. Over half of GAM/TNA ex-combatants below the age of 55 years listed Acehnese as their primary language. The age of ex-combatants in the IOM sample also reinforces the view that various phases of GAM recruitment from 1998 to 2004 targeted disaffected and isolated




Figure 4 : Age

■ GAM / TNA Ex-Combatant
■ Ex-Prisoner

Source: IOM ICRS Client Database (2005 and 2006)

Acehnese youth with weaker job prospects.

Women comprised 27.2% of the GAM/TNA ex-combatants found in IOM's ICRS program and only 1.4% of ICRS clients that were ex-political prisoners. In a number of respects, this apparent 'over-representation' of female ex-combatants in IOM's ex-combatant roster, which did not actually reflect their proportion of participation in the GAM/TNA, was the result of concerted pressure by IOM managers to direct greater levels of assistance to female ex-combatants.

MARRIED WITH CHILDREN – A SOCIAL REINTEGRATION INDICATOR

ICRS client entry surveys show that 54.3% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners were married, 40.6% were single, and 4.8% were widowed. Although the World Bank notes that following the Helsinki MoU ex-combatants were generally keen to get married and, in some cases, this was cited as their

main priority, a comparison with the World Bank's 2006 GAM Reintegration Assessment shows that the proportion of single male ex-combatants remained fairly static over time.⁴⁹

Among individuals found in IOM's ICRS client roster, marriage rates vary significantly by age as well as one's status as GAM/TNA ex-combatant or ex-political prisoner. The majority of those under 30 years of age were single (62.2% and 65.6% respectively), whereas most over 30 years of age were married (69.6% GAM/TNA ex-combatants and 87.1% ex-political prisoners). GAM/TNA ex-combatants were much less likely to be married compared to ex-political prisoners, a finding which is common to that of the World Bank's reintegration assessment.

A key difference between the World Bank sample and IOM's sample shows that ex-political prisoners were more likely to be married across all age brackets. When comparing World Bank 2006 ex-combatant survey data to IOM ex-combatant survey

data, over a period of some six months male ex-combatants made little progress in achieving their stated marriage aspirations. This suggests that status as a combatant, and perhaps the consequences of being directly involved in an insurgency, played a more determinative role in terms of marriage rather than age.⁵⁰ Put another way, marriage is a proxy indicator for the extent to which both ex-combatants, and to a lesser extent ex-political prisoners, are able to successfully reintegrate into society.⁵¹ Marriage trends over a six-month period therefore suggest that, up to the end of 2006, little progress was being made with the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

Limited progress with social reintegration was potentially compounded by the fact that the highest proportion of unmarried persons corresponded to the age brackets – those under 21 years old and between 21 to 30 years old – that are most prone to backsliding pressures that can lead to localized conflict, violent criminality, or a combination of the two.⁵²

COMPARING IOM AND WORLD BANK EX-COMBATANT SAMPLES⁵³

Aggregate figures show that reintegration and recovery challenges were similar

for non-randomly sampled ex-combatants surveyed by IOM upon ICERS client registration beginning May 2006, and ex-combatants that

were randomly sampled by the World Bank several months earlier between December 2005 and February 2006.

Table 1 : **Dissecting Data**

No	World Bank, Ex-combatants and Ex-political prisoners (March 2006)	IOM, Ex-combatants (May 2006), Ex-political prisoners (August 2005)	Significantly Different (99% CI)
01	75% or GAM / TNA ex-combatants are in the 18-35 age bracket	76.2% of GAM / TNA ex-combatants are in the 18-35 age bracket	No
02	Approximately half of GAM / TNA ex-combatants are married	49.1% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants are married	No
03	The average number of children for GAM / TNA ex-combatants is 2.5	The average number of children for GAM / TNA ex-combatants is 2.5	No
04	Place of Return – Highest Pidie & Aceh Timur (13.0% & 17.0% respectively)	Place of Return – Highest Bireuen & Aceh Timur (14.0% & 11.9% respectively)	Yes
05	21.2% of active GAM / TNA ex-combatants indicated they suffered from conflict-related psychological problems	23.9% of GAM / TNA ex-combatants indicated they suffered from psychological problems	No
06	Livelihoods – 30.2% Farmers, 19.6% Traders, 5.4% unemployed	Livelihoods – 38.1% Farmers, 28.5% Traders, 8.8% unemployed	Yes
07	No formal education – 2.5% of GAM / TNA ex-combatants	No formal education – 3.6% of GAM / TNA ex-combatants	No
08	Just over 10% of ex-political prisoners have no formal education	10.3% of ex-political prisoners have no formal education	No
09	Ex-combatants married, 40.0%	Ex-combatants married, 40.6%	No

Sources: World Bank GAM Reintegration Assessment (March 2006) and IOM ICERS Surveys (2005 and 2006)

However, it appears that IOM's ex-combatant sample comprised a much harder core TNA element than did the World Bank's sample, which is evidenced in the higher levels of wounding, higher levels of those without employment prior to the peace agreement and greater numbers of ex-combatants from rural areas found in IOM's dataset.⁵⁴

Differences between IOM and World Bank ex-combatant samples also suggest that the KPA targeted assistance towards younger ex-combatants, a handful of older field-level commanders, and those facing poorer livelihood recovery prospects (i.e. rural residents with low cash incomes). Analyzing IOM's ICERS database and comparing statistical findings against other sources of information adds value to the Aceh peace process by identifying the particular types of vulnerabilities faced by different sub-groups within the GAM/TNA ex-combatant population

since it is these "harder" elements of GAM's former fighting rank-and-file that pose the greatest dangers to the peace process because of their potential to act as spoilers. Tracking noticeable trends over time also provides clues as to what interventions have worked and with which sub-groups. The larger size of IOM's sample also makes it possible to identify specific types of reintegration and recovery challenges, as well as opportunities, on a geographic basis.⁵⁵

EDUCATION – THE SOLUTION OR CREATING HIGH EXPECTATIONS?

Levels of education for ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners can be as equally high and low as with the broader Aceh population (see Chapter 4). However, making comparisons with the broader Aceh population is potentially counter-productive as it deflects attention from tailoring effective reintegration and/or recovery strategies for ex-combatants

and ex-political prisoners. It is commonly accepted that education and training opportunities for ex-combatants is often a determining factor for making a successful transition into the world of work and, by extension, successfully making a transition from an environment of conflict to a context of peace as constructive and productive citizens.⁵⁶

As shown in Table 2 below, some 49% of ex-political prisoners and 34.6% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants have only completed primary school, whilst 7% of both groups have not even completed primary school. Some 10.3% of ex-political prisoners have no formal education.

Only 1.7% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners have completed some type of technical schooling (3.1% of ex-combatants and 0.5% of ex-political prisoners), and only 1.8% have completed university (2.1% of ex-combatants and 1.5% of ex-political prisoners). This is a

very low level of tertiary skills and capacities that undermine ex-combatants' and ex-prisoners' access to economic opportunities (e.g. jobs or small business development).

GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners under 21 years old are significantly more likely to have completed high school than those in other age brackets. GAM/TNA ex-combatants are significantly more likely to have completed high school than ex-prisoners (54.1% and 37.7% respectively). Among young adults (aged 30 and under) GAM/TNA ex-combatants are more educated, with

56.1% completing high school compared to 40.9% of ex-political prisoners. A higher proportion of younger ex-combatants have also completed high school compared to older ex-combatants.

Does this higher exposure to high school level education translate into improved access to economic opportunity, or does it in fact work against reintegration? There is an argument that the higher proportions of youth completing high school results in raised expectations of upward social and economic mobility.⁵⁷ When such expectations are met with limited economic opportunities this can

lead to resentment (i.e. conflict-carrying capacities). The absence of technical skills to supplement or effectively leverage high school education only exacerbates feelings of frustration amongst younger ex-combatants. This vulnerability increases the chances of youth being recruited into newly forming or existing spoiler groups and gangs that can endanger the peace process.⁵⁸ Such groups can include criminal networks or disaffected groups within the ranks of GAM that have been excluded from political power/decision-making, the economic rewards associated with the peace process, or a combination of both.⁵⁹

Table 2 : **Ex-Combatants Versus Ex-Political Prisoners: A Rough Profile**

	Ex-Combatant	Ex-Political Prisoner
Dominant age bracket	21-30 years old	21-30 years old
Average number of indirect beneficiaries	4 people	4 people
Proportion single under 30 years old	62%	66%
Proportion with primary school education only	35%	49%
Proportion with psychological trauma	24%	52%
Support networks and coping methods	Very recent family support patterns that were not significantly disrupted during the conflict.	Prefer to seek assistance from family, but ex-political prisoners are more socially dislocated and more likely than ex-combatants to turn to sources of assistance outside their communities
Debt levels	Very low	High
Favored occupation	Self-employed	A steady job
Desire for skills training and further education	Very high	Moderate (50%)

Source: IOM ICRS Client Database (2005 and 2006)

ACCESS TO HEALTH – CRITICAL FOR SUCCESSFUL REINTEGRATION

*As long as ex-combatants remain traumatized, their productivity and self-esteem, and their commitment to self-help and recovery remain extremely limited and they continue to threaten stability and recovery.*⁶⁰

Health problems are commonly regarded as major obstacles for reintegration and recovery processes. Whilst chronic disease and disabilities can be regarded as obstacles for livelihood recovery, there is increasing recognition amongst policy-makers that psychological trauma amongst ex-combatants can prevent them from becoming functioning members of society due to depression, social withdrawal, hostility or limited capacities to trust other people (i.e. the foundations of conflict-carrying capacities).⁶¹

Psychological Problems

Of some 5,000 respondents to IOM surveys completed in 2005 and 2006 during ICRS client registration processes, 38.4% reported suffering psychological problems, which is interpreted here as indicating the potential presence of psychological trauma as a result of the conflict (51.8% of ex-political prisoners and 23.9% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants). In addition, 31.9% of those below 21 years of age had psychological problems, with steadily increasing proportions across older age brackets.⁶²

However, the highest proportion of people having psychological problems (as well as physical wounding) was female ex-combatants. There is also a striking difference between IOM and World Bank samples in the levels of psychological

problems for men and women, with a much greater proportion of women in IOM's client-roster suffering psychological problems. This difference can be explained by the fact that women in IOM's client roster comprised a much harder core TNA element, which was exposed to more traumatizing events during the conflict period.⁶³ This suggests that female ex-combatants, in addition to experiencing devastating psychological impacts associated with combat, have also encountered social obstacles to their reintegration and recovery springing from traditional social gender inequalities.

Access to Health Services

From 2005 to 2007, 19% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners sought medical assistance through IOM assistance referral mechanisms. Of

these, more ex-political prisoners (35.7%) requested medical assistance than did GAM/TNA ex-combatants (16.6%), and more men (21.3%) requested assistance than did women (10.4%).⁶⁴

Higher proportions of older individuals requested assistance through IOM referral mechanisms (51 to 60 years – 26.8% and over 60 years – 44.4%). This appears to have reflected their poorer health conditions, greater needs and perhaps poorer levels of information about where to receive formal medical assistance.⁶⁵

Even though having many health related problems, a relatively small proportion of

GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners sought formal medical assistance through IOM referral mechanisms (19.0% overall). At first glance this appears to sit at odds with findings in the World Bank's 2006 GAM assessment, which found that 51.2% of ex-combatants were able to access various formal medical services.⁶⁶ At the same time, reasons limiting access to formal health services included insufficient funds, long travel distances, high accommodation costs, and mistrust of formal health providers and a lack of information on where and how to access formal health services. The different proportions of ex-combatants accessing formal health

services springs from the fact that IOM data only recorded referral cases via the ICERS program. World Bank statistics therefore demonstrate that a higher proportion of ex-combatants were seeking medical assistance independent of ICERS project referral mechanisms, or already had information on how to access formal medical services. A key finding here is that, by providing information referral services, IOM's ICERS program fulfilled one of its key mandates by removing a key structural barrier limiting ex-combatant and ex-political prisoner access to formal health services (i.e. a lack of information and knowledge).

SECTION 2 – SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL REINTEGRATION

RETURN (REINSERTION) – THE EASY WAY IN

IOM data shows that 76.7% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners lived in homes that were owned by their parents or other family members (i.e. family homes) and that only 18.0% lived in self-owned homes before the Helsinki MoU. This shows that the GAM/TNA was comprised of mobile combatants/units that regularly rotated in and out of civilian life, or at least regularly visited their families. In turn, the nature of the insurgency and the youth of most ex-combatants meant it was fairly easy for them to re-insert into their home villages after the signing of the Helsinki MoU: they simply returned to 'family homes', which they had visited regularly during their time as active combatants. This also means that the vast majority of ex-combatants had strong family support networks to assist with their initial reinsertion.⁶⁷

Following the Helsinki MoU, 97.9% of those in IOM's sample returned to the same villages they lived in prior to the peace agreement (99.0% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and 96.1% of ex-political prisoners), of which 80.0% returned to the same house or residence (i.e. mostly family homes). The highest proportions of those not returning to their home villages were ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners aged between 26 and 35 years (1.4% and 4.1% respectively). Districts with the highest proportions of ex-combatants not

returning to their home villages were: Aceh Barat, Aceh Tenggara, Bener Meriah and Bireuen.

Only some 18% of ex-combatants did not return to the same homes. This was probably due to the fact that the homes of 20% of ex-combatants were completely destroyed during the conflict period.⁶⁸ Contrasting World Bank and IOM data indicates the magnitude of conflict impacts because it was the homes of entire families that were destroyed, not just those of individual ex-combatants.⁶⁹

Sources of Social Reintegration Assistance and How to Reach Beneficiaries

Patterns on IOM client preferences for sources of reintegration and recovery assistance offer salient clues on which community and government-based mechanisms have the greatest potential for channeling reintegration and recovery assistance to beneficiary populations in a way that will strengthen local peace-generating capacities.

When initially experiencing difficulties with their reintegration (e.g. trauma-related stresses, financial hardships or access to social services) GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners primarily sought assistance from:

- Family members (77.4%),
- Community leaders (45.5%),
- Friends (34.4%),

- International Organizations (24.3%),
- Religious leaders (19.8%),
- Government officials (14.1%), and;
- Local NGOs (10.0%).

Second to families the most common source of assistance was 'community leaders'. However, in most cases these were 'informal community leaders' drawn from parallel local GAM administrative structures at village-level. Seeking assistance from religious leaders did not rank as a high preference for either GAM/TNA ex-combatants or ex-political prisoners. Only as a third option did more GAM/TNA ex-combatants (24.6%) say they would seek assistance from religious leaders compared to ex-political prisoners (12.5%).⁷³ Contrasted against earlier World Bank survey data there was a small increase in those seeking assistance from religious leaders, especially amongst youth male ex-combatants.⁷⁴ This tends to confirm that GAM remained a secular nationalistic movement driven by grievance related issues rather than issues of identity. However, the higher proportion of youth seeking assistance from religious leaders also demonstrates divisions within GAM, and that perhaps identity and religion increasingly played a role in the choices of youth to fight against the Gol.

Viewed alongside the findings in Chapter 4, it becomes clear that social spaces within communities is a first point of recourse

Welcoming Ceremonies or *Peusijeuk*: A Proxy Indicator of Social Reintegration

The vast majority (93.5%) of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political who returned to their villages were well received by village communities. Only 0.9% was received 'badly' or 'very badly', with almost all of these being ex-political prisoners from the districts of Pidie, Langsa, Gayo Lues and Nagan Raya. In Aceh, like many other parts of Indonesia, welcoming ceremonies are a customary convention for acknowledging the return of someone important, or inaugurating a significant village milestone (e.g. the opening of a new road), or formally reconciling the community.

There were 602 cases in which the return of ICRS clients their communities was accompanied by *peusijeuk* ceremonies. *Peusijeuk* ceremonies were overwhelmingly more common for ex-political prisoners than for the 'harder core' GAM/TNA ex-combatants serviced by the ICRS (92.9% and 2.6% respectively). This reflects two dynamics in play at the time. Firstly, ex-political prisoners did in fact return, and therefore the *peusijeuk* was a form of symbolic social reintegration. Secondly, in many cases ex-political prisoners experienced adjustment difficulties where some communities felt that they were traitors or had somehow "failed" GAM's struggle. On the other hand, most ex-combatants neither "returned" to their communities nor were seen as "failing" GAM's struggle, thus symbolic acceptance was unnecessary.

The highest proportions of *peusijeuk* ceremonies were in the districts of Aceh Utara, Bireuen, Aceh Besar, and Lhokseumawe, which corresponds to the higher levels of conflict intensity in these districts and confirms that ex-combatants were already part of their communities (i.e. the bulk of ceremonies were for ex-political prisoners). In the districts of Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah there were roughly equal proportions of *peusijeuk*

ceremonies for ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners. Aceh Tenggara and Gayo Lues were the only districts with higher proportions of *peusijeuk* ceremonies for ex-combatants. On the surface, the Central Highlands looks anomalous, but closer scrutiny reveals that many ex-combatants in this region did permanently leave their communities due to the unique conflict dynamics in this part of Aceh: horizontal conflict exacerbated by the presence of armed anti-separatist groups in predominantly non-ethnic Acehese regions. World Bank data also confirms that ex-combatants returning to their communities in the Central Highlands experienced tensions with receiving communities in which former members of anti-separatist groups were present.⁷⁰

The marked difference in the overall proportions of ex-combatants experiencing *peusijeuk* ceremonies upon their return between IOM and World Bank ex-combatant samples (World Bank's sample 76.7% compared to IOM's sample 2.6%) is a glaring inconsistency.⁷¹ Much speculation may be fielded to explain this difference.⁷² However, this is most likely caused by two competing explanations. Firstly, World Bank surveys did not effectively sample the hardcore fighting element within GAM. Secondly, IOM field staff may have failed to systematically record this data for IOM's 3,140 ex-combatant clients (an unlikely explanation given the extent to which this data was recorded for IOM's ex-political prisoner clients). Nevertheless, allowing for the possibility of data recording errors by IOM field staff would still lead to a massive discrepancy between the IOM and World Bank samples and would not weaken the argument that, for most hardcore ex-combatants, 'symbolic' reintegration into local communities was not necessary.

Source: IOM ICRS Client Database (2005 and 2006)

for vulnerable populations in Aceh, and those that wish to facilitate their successful reintegration into society. Awareness-building and the use of favored community institutions and leader-roles can bridge gaps in reintegration and community acceptance of reintegrated people as well as facilitate trust-building dialogues between different types of ex-combatant

groups with state security forces.⁷⁵

Ex-Political Prisoners More Dislocated and Ex-Combatants in a 'Wait and See' Mode?

ICRS data suggests that ex-political prisoners experienced greater difficulties with their initial social reintegration compared to ex-combatants. For example, 92.5% of GAM/

TNA ex-combatants turned to family members for assistance compared to 63.7% of ex-political prisoners.⁷⁶ Similar difference existed for seeking assistance from community leaders and friends.⁷⁷ Additionally, a higher proportion of ex-political prisoners did not know from whom they should seek assistance if experiencing problems (12.7% compared to 1.4%). Instead, ex-political prisoners appeared somewhat socially dislocated as they were more likely to turn to sources of assistance outside their communities (e.g. the international community, government or local NGOs).

This vulnerability, and the difficulties they sometimes experienced with social reintegration, sprang from the perceptions amongst receiving communities that ex-political prisoners were often spies or simply cowards during the conflict period. This was particularly the case for those prisoners who had been detained in jails inside of Aceh (who were sometimes derogatively referred to as *banci* or *waria*), rather than those who were detained in other Indonesian provinces.⁷⁸

An equally important vulnerability suggested by assistance preferences relates to the politics of the broader peace process. Assistance preferences for harder core ex-combatants could have indicated a reluctance to engage with, and mistrust towards, the entire peace process, and that they were still stuck in a mistrustful 'wait-and-see' mode.⁷⁹

Safety and Security – Indicating Higher Risk Conflict Areas

Following reinsertion into their communities, most ex-political prisoners and GAM/TNA ex-combatants felt 'safe' or 'very safe' (82.0% and 98.9% respectively). However, there are notable variations to the generally high levels of safety and security expressed by ex-political prisoners and ex-combatants upon their initial returns.

Ex-political prisoners generally felt less secure about their safety and security compared to ex-combatants. Some 58.7% of ex-political prisoners felt 'safe' whereas only 8.5% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants felt 'safe', and only 23.3% of ex-political prisoners felt 'very safe' compared to 90.4% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants.⁸⁰

Districts where ex-combatant and ex-political prisoner feelings of insecurity

were highest, and those locations where the levels of IDP and returnee security were also reported highest a year ago, include: Aceh Timur, Aceh Utara, Aceh Tamiang, Aceh Tenggara, Bener Meriah and Langsa. The recent killings of KPA members in Takengon and the subsequent kidnapping of Mukhlis Gayo illustrate how quickly dormant patterns of mistrust underpinning perceptions of security can explode into violent incidents between former rival groups (i.e. conflict-generating capacities realized).

Although no direct correlations are possible, districts where there were lower feelings of safety were those that

experienced higher levels of violent criminality and weapons usage after the signing of the Helsinki MoU. Moreover, up to one year ago those areas also retained high conflict-carrying capacities. These so-called 'conflict-carrying capacities' are further explored in Chapter 4, and are directly related to past patterns of horizontal and vertical conflict and underpin current perceptions of security. As shown in Chapter 3, fears and perceptions of safety continue to agitate the insecurity amongst critically vulnerable groups.

Low Levels of Criminality

The level of criminality, and potential spoilers to the peace process, amongst

ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners found in IOM samples was extremely low. This suggests that assistance through the ICRS prevented backsliding from the peace process. Over the life of the ICRS project, out of some 5,000 ex-political prisoners and GAM/TNA ex-combatants only 11 were arrested or charged by police for criminal offences. The sorts of offences included criminal acts such as the possession of narcotics, public disturbance, extortion and armed robbery. Extremely low rates of arrest were due, at least in part, to built-in ICRS disincentive mechanisms that made receiving assistance conditional upon ICERS clients not becoming involved in criminal activities.

SECTION 3 – THE RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC LIVELIHOODS

PRE-MOU LIVELIHOODS ILLUSTRATE STRUCTURAL FACTORS UNDERPINNING CONFLICT

As shown in Figure 14 Annex A, before the signing of the Helsinki MoU, large proportions of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners were farmers (38.1% and 16.2% respectively), tailors (10.2% mostly women) or traders (around 28%), with the remainder engaged across a range of employment sectors. Few were employed in fields that required professional or technical skills. Compared to the World Bank's 2006 GAM assessment a larger proportion of the IOM's sample were farmers,⁸¹ which suggest that fewer of the 'hardcore' fighters found in the ICERS were drawn from coastal areas or fishermen/fisherwomen.⁸²

Data on pre-MoU employment does not support arguments that lack of economic opportunity per se was the main factor underpinning the decision to take up arms against the Gol. Levels and durations of employment prior to the MoU suggest that most GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners were gainfully employed, with only 8.7% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and 4.7% of ex-political prisoners being unemployed.

The majority of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners were steadily employed in the same job for periods ranging from 2 to 12 years. Only 13.2% held a job for 1 to 2 years and 7.3% held a job for less than 1 year. Generally long

employment durations may be discounted to some extent by the fact most GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners were engaged in low-paid or unskilled work, mostly as farm laborers, and that for the more 'hardcore' GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, violence was a legitimate part of one's livelihood.

Youth (in this case those under 30 years of age) and women across age brackets had the least secure employment prospects prior to the peace agreement. Whilst this could have made it easier for them to be recruited into GAM's fighting rank-and-file, most Acehnese are engaged in low-paid rural agricultural livelihoods, especially in communities with longer exposure to higher intensity conflict (see Chapter 4). Issues of political marginalization, attempts to change power imbalances between Aceh and the central government, the prestige accrued to ex-combatants as a result of participating in the insurgency – these are equally important factors that influenced their choices to fight against the state, the same factors that now impact upon social reintegration and economic recovery processes.⁸³

The relatively high levels of employment and livelihood activity amongst ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners echoes the argument often put to international agencies by ex-combatants and communities that it was not a lack of

livelihood or employment opportunities that originally promoted armed conflict in Aceh. Rather, it was violent conflict that clearly brought a grinding halt to productive livelihoods and employment opportunities, particularly in heavily conflict-affected areas of Aceh. Therefore, sustainable social and political reintegration rather, than sustainable livelihood recovery, may be achievable through enabling mandated government bodies such as BRA, empowering communities and CSOs, and working with ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners to construct social safety nets so that youth have more to gain from peace than they do from violent conflict (e.g. by becoming involved in another insurgency). In turn, the creation of an environment of 'peace' will promote sustainable local economic development.

Debt and its Implications for Families and Livelihood Recovery

As seen in Figure 4 below, 38.7% ex-political prisoners reported having financial debts compared to only 1.4% of ex-combatants. Proportions of debt also increased significantly by older age groups and for those having more children (3-4 children, 5.9%; 5-7 children, 11.5%; 8-10 children, 26.7%, and; 11-14 children, 100%).

The highest proportions of those people having debt were older married ex-political prisoners who had more children. These higher levels of debt were often incurred because of monies or goods

borrowed to sustain families during periods of detention.⁸⁴ At the same time, the higher levels of debt found amongst ex-political prisoners points to the lower levels of wealth found amongst ex-combatants. That is, collateral is typically required in order to borrow money or to incur a debt. Most ex-combatants simply have not been able to offer collateral guarantees because they do not have anything of value against which to borrow. Data therefore does not support claims that ex-combatants

avoided debt by profiting from criminal activities. As noted above, most ex-combatants were unmarried and had no dependent children, which on most cases left them free of financial obligations to care for family whilst away from their villages. On the other hand, almost all ex-combatants with debt tended to be married with children. *The greatest determinant of debt therefore appears to have been, and likely continues to be, marriage and children, and the ability to borrow has depended on ownership of valuable assets.*⁸⁵

As a result, ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners that have families and dependent children face significant challenges for sustainable livelihood recovery. Moreover, these findings suggest that financial support services to ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners who are married with children require ongoing financial support services over the medium-term to prevent families from falling into poverty and to facilitate the longer-term livelihood recovery of entire households.




Figure 5 : **Level of Debt**

■ GAM / TNA Ex-Combatant
■ Ex-Prisoner

Source: IOM ICERS Client Database (2005 and 2006)

SECTION 4 – INFORMATION COUNSELING REFERRAL SERVICES (ICRS), FACILITATING REINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY

Following the signing of the 2005 Helsinki Peace Accord, IOM was requested to work closely with the Indonesian Government and GAM to provide reinsertion and resettlement assistance to 2,000 amnestied political prisoners, and establish a reintegration program for the same 2,000 ex-political prisoners and an additional 3,000 ex-combatants.

IOM's Information, Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS) was established to facilitate the short- to medium-term reintegration and recovery processes of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners.⁸⁶ The rationale underpinning the project methodology was that by using a case-by-case client approach, it allowed for the development of tailored assistance strategies to meet individual reintegration and recovery needs. This was to occur through client counseling referral services, client-driven training programs, and in-kind small

business development. By engaging with clients in this manner (i.e. ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners), the ICERS would also contribute to stabilizing the security environment in Aceh and, thus, create political space for other peace-building processes to take effect.⁸⁷

The ICERS rolled out in two discrete phases: the first beginning in August 2005 for ex-political prisoners, and the second beginning in May 2006 for ex-combatants.⁸⁸ As has been shown in Chapter 4, IOM's early client-based approach was followed by a fairly speedy transition to broader development strategies through IOM community-stabilization programs. Community stabilization programming can be a means to integrate returning populations while improving community infrastructure through a peace-building model that focuses on the principles of strengthening social cohesion and providing quick-impact

'peace dividends': thus building 'linkages' between communities and ex-combatant groups whilst also developing healthy 'social spaces' in socially divided post-conflict communities.

Several significant successes were achieved by the ICERS and have already been identified above. These include the provision of information referral services for clients to access formal health services, and the very low numbers of ICERS ex-combatant clients being arrested by police during the two year span of the project.⁸⁹ These successes should not be underestimated as they addressed structural obstacles to reintegration, whilst at the same time facilitating a secure political and social environment (i.e. buying time and 'social space' for the peace process to evolve). The following sections examine how the ICERS addressed livelihood recovery and training needs of

its clients, and what changes can be inferred with the reintegration and recovery strategies of ex-combatants by comparison to World Bank surveys conducted six months earlier.

ICRS CLIENT DEMANDS VS. FINANCIAL NEEDS

Upon entering IOM's ICRS program in 2005 and 2006 ex-political prisoners and ex-combatants were asked how they planned to meet their financial needs. The majority (58.2%) planned to start self-owned businesses, with a significantly larger proportion of GAM/TNA ex-combatants (66.5%) compared to male ex-political prisoners (50.4%) expressing this preference. The remainder planned to meet their needs by receiving assistance from family members (13.8%), using private funds (4.2%), or by finding employment in established businesses (18.2%). Only a small proportion did not know how to meet their financial needs. The majority of those planning to find employment were ex-political prisoners (both male and female), which might suggest that they were more risk-averse and inclined to seek

out secure employment from established business.⁹⁰

High proportions of ex-combatants seeking to establish businesses were also found by the World Bank's 2006 GAM reintegration assessment, which noted that ex-combatants tended to favor occupations where they have a larger degree of autonomy and decision-making power and who were reluctant to work as employees taking directions from other people.⁹¹ However, the ICRS business preferences of ex-combatants also indicated an unwillingness to trade in the possible upward social and economic mobility that resulted through their participation in violent conflict. As such, IOM livelihood assistance was faced with the challenge of facilitating the reintegration and recovery of 'hardcore' ex-combatants in a manner that would address 'prestige issues' and address livelihood recovery needs.

Recovering Sustainable Livelihoods or Reintegrating into Structural Poverty?

The World Bank's GAM reintegration assessment of March 2006 argues that ex-combatants were gravitating back into

the livelihoods they had prior to the peace agreement.⁹² Forty-four per cent of the livelihood activities supported by the ICRS were for new business start-ups, while 35.4% were to support the development of existing businesses. The main new business preferences for 36.0 % of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and 30.2% of ex-political prisoners were animal fattening and livestock activities (i.e. agricultural livelihoods). The main new business preference for ex-political prisoners was to establish small kiosks (19.1% compared to 13.7% for ex-combatants). Over 20% of ex-political prisoners spread evenly across age groups stated a preference for working in trades such as welding, mechanics or carpentry (more than double the proportion of ex-combatants). For the most part women sought to establish kiosks, become general traders, to get involved in animal husbandry activities, or to become tailors/seamstresses. Less than 1% of IOM's clients expressed a desire to seek government employment, with the greatest proportion of those showing interest in government employment being ex-political prisoners (1.7%) and female ex-combatants (0.8%).⁹³

Access and Ownership: Land vs. Livestock

Access to or ownership of livestock demonstrates that there were major obstacles to livelihood recovery, particularly for those engaged in rural farming or agricultural activities. Only 24.8% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners reported that they owned land. Those with the lowest levels of land ownership were youth, with women exhibiting particular

vulnerabilities with land ownership. IOM data shows that only 21.3% of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners had access to or owned livestock, whereas 38.4% were farmers.

Access to or ownership of livestock ranged from 19% to 24.4% across all age brackets with older men and women reporting the lowest levels of access to or ownership of

livestock. As a result, potentially 15% did not have personal wealth or the means of generating agricultural incomes, thus potentially leaving them stuck as low-income earning farm laborers. That said, high levels of access to land through family or traditional forms of land usage meant that land did not create obstacles for the livelihood recovery of ex-combatants (or ex-political prisoners).

CHALLENGES TO ICRS BUSINESS SUSTAINABILITY

As identified by the World Bank in March 2006, a common problem for the livelihood recovery of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners was a lack of business capital.⁹⁵ To address this need and kick-start small business, the ICRS program provided technical assistance, beneficiary training such as business planning, and a tranche payment system (thus ensuring that funds were used to develop new or existing

small businesses). Each client was provided direct assistance in the form of equipment, training, and other in-kind inputs equivalent to IDR 9 million.

For those clients attempting to find sustainable long-term solutions for their livelihood recovery needs, access to business capital continued to be a major problem. Some 45.5% of clients needed additional funds to keep their businesses operating. This was most pronounced

amongst GAM/TNA ex-combatants under 21 years of age (53.8%) and those aged 21 to 30 years (46.5%). It is worth pointing out that in stable modern societies a minimum of two years of intensive follow-up (i.e. additional support or investment) is needed in order to achieve a 50% success rate in small business start-ups.⁹⁶

The second greatest obstacle for sustainable livelihood recovery was a lack of sufficient business or farming equipment.

There was also a geographic concentration of similar business types, which suggests there was not enough attention given to labor market analysis and market diversification conducted by ICRS caseworkers and clients.⁹⁷ As shown in Annex A, IOM's clients rarely considered strategic business location or land fertility (11.4%) or whether there was nearby business competition (5.5%). Instead, the factor most commonly underpinning business selection was past work experience in a particular livelihood sector (45.2%).

ICRS data also shows that, at the time of their assessment in mid-2007, 54.5% of new businesses established by GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners did not need additional capital and therefore were at the very least holding their own (i.e. some 45.5% of business start-ups needed additional capital and were struggling to generate business profits). At the time of assessment 0.4% of business start-ups clearly reported profits, which given the fact that profitability takes usually longer than six months to attain, this is reasonable. The ICRS, like so many reintegration programs, was limited to an eighteen month project cycle, thus rendering the required intensive follow-up unfeasible. Moreover, business start-ups supported by ICRS did not have the advantage of beginning in "stable modern societies", but instead occurred during an early stage of transition from conflict and, by definition, were unstable environments.

Nevertheless, available data does not prove definitive since surveyed businesses had only been operating for between six and twelve months and might have required more time to begin generating profits. Moreover, while available data cannot establish a firm correlation between the types of businesses selected by region with business profitability, it seems plausible that potential market saturations of similar new business start-ups contributed to low profits generated by new business start-ups.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Skills development included small business training for 76.6% of all GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, as well as animal husbandry training provided to 12.3% of clients. Other types of training delivered to IOM clients included small business development and farming (agricultural) skills. Moreover, 66% reported wanting additional skills training (82.5% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and 50% of ex-political prisoners) to help them meet their livelihood recovery needs.⁹⁸

There are also notable differences in preferences for skills training and further education between the ICRS and World Bank ex-combatant samples. Twice as many ex-combatants in IOM's roster wanted further education (5.5% compared to 2.7%). This was particularly true amongst older the ex-combatants. These differences could be a result of the composition of IOM's ex-combatant sample or the fact that ICRS clients actually received skills training support and started businesses. The opportunities offered by the ICRS and that were not available to other ex-combatants may have resulted in a realization on the part of ICRS clients that they needed more skills in order to effectively manage their businesses.⁹⁹ This also illustrates that over time ex-combatants increasingly viewed education and technical training as a means of addressing their livelihood recovery needs.

However, ICRS training focused narrowly on small business development and, therefore, fell short of building skills needed for ensuring a successful transition to non-violent livelihoods in manner that would build social cohesion.¹⁰⁰ For example, apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs promote life-skills development, personal networking. Nor is data available on the establishment of peer support programs that could have helped clients to build upon opportunities without resorting to violence (e.g. mentoring provided by older ex-combatants to younger ex-

combatants on how to reintegrate and move forward with their lives successfully). Nor did the ICRS conduct research or analysis on local training institutes that could take-up future training activities for ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, or establish a job networking system with local government partners, both of which would have created greater levels of sustainability for fulfilling the project's objectives by building upon local capacities.

Additionally, small but important techniques, such as providing skills training certifications, did not appear to be factored into project planning or implementation. These sorts of tools and techniques could have helped ICRS clients find future jobs, thus promoting sustainable livelihood recovery *as well as* facilitating social reintegration.

TRICKLE DOWN BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES

Although problems appear to have existed with the sustainability of some livelihood recovery projects undertaken by ICRS clients, this must be balanced against the number of indirect beneficiaries that received assistance through the ICRS program. Some 43.1% of ex-combatants and 42.6% of ex-political prisoners reported 3 to 5 indirect beneficiaries, which was the largest overall grouping of indirect beneficiaries at 42.9% of clients reporting 3 to 5 indirect beneficiaries. The second largest grouping of indirect beneficiaries was 1 to 2 people (22.6% of clients), whilst 14.5% of clients reported 6 to 9 indirect beneficiaries. Only 15.4% of ICRS clients reported not having any indirect beneficiaries assisted through the ICRS project.

The numbers of indirect beneficiaries suggests that, for the most part, entire families benefited from IOM assistance, rather than only individual clients. As a result, the ICRS program addressed the recovery needs of ex-combatant and ex-political prisoner families who experienced significant losses during the conflict period.

SECTION 5 – KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The International Labour Organization (ILO) argues that reintegration and recovery

require a minimum of two to three years to be successful and that another three

to five years is needed for a full evaluation of those successes.¹⁰¹ The sections above

suggest that, nearly three years into the Aceh peace process, reintegration and recovery processes for ex-combatants, ex-political prisoners, and their families, have outstripped the timeline suggested by ILO.

At the same time, it appears that most GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, or their families, have not become self-sufficient through establishing or finding sustainable livelihoods. Moreover, the preceding sections highlight numerous vulnerabilities in relation to social reintegration that have not been addressed. The issues identified translate into widespread post-conflict recovery gaps and a need to refocus reintegration and recovery activities so as to consolidate a full transition to sustainable peace and development in Aceh.

POPULATION SIZES AND SUPPORT NETWORKS, MORE ASSISTANCE NEEDED

Key Findings

Using a broader definition of ex-combatants, which includes individuals involved in conflict against the Gol over decades (i.e. including various categories of ‘veteran’), the total number of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and those now claiming some type of ex-combatant status is estimated at 42,000 with an active support network of some 210,000 people.

BRA data records that only some 3,000 ex-combatants have received assistance since the signing of the MoU. This means that some 7.0% of the total number of ex-combatants, or those who claim ex-combatant status, have received reintegration and recovery assistance. Again, it is important to note that at the time the data was gathered BRA was channeling considerable assistance to ex-combatants,

which may at least to some extent explain the relatively high figure of 42,000 people claiming some type of ex-combatant status. Similarly, reintegration and recovery gaps exist in relation to smaller unconfirmed estimates of ex-political prisoners that have not been assisted by either the government or international agencies. While the accuracy of these figures remains suspect, between GMA/TNA ex-combatant, veteran and ex-political prisoner groups, it appears that an entire corpus of people and their families have been neglected.

GAM/TNA ex-combatants are also much less likely to be married than ex-political prisoners, meaning they have fewer social and family care responsibilities. At the same time, older ex-combatants typically have larger families and more children encouraging them to have, or to develop, greater social responsibilities in support of the peace process.

Recommendations

- In light of the large numbers of people claiming ex-combatant status, BRA and donors need to prioritize reintegration assistance by targeting critically vulnerable ex-combatant headed households (e.g. single-headed female households, households dealing with mentally traumatized ex-combatants or

orphaned children, large households).

- BRA to work with donors and local government to establish mentoring networks between older and younger ex-combatants that focus on community leadership, life skills, complimented by skills (esp. trades)

training. This program should be focused on younger ex-combatants between 18-30 years old and led by older married and more mature ex-combatants have developed positions of authority within their communities and learnt life skills that enable them to better reintegrate socially into society.

ACCESS TO HOUSING, SOCIAL COHESION, AND SECURITY AND SAFETY

Key Findings

The vast majority of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners remained in or returned to the same homes they lived in prior to the peace

agreement – mostly family homes. However, some 17% returned to the same villages but did not return to the same homes they lived in prior to the peace agreement. It is not clear what housing arrangements this 17% had upon their return, or whether they now have adequate housing.

GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners perceptions of safety and security also appear lower in districts that now have higher levels of criminality, a known presence of weapons, and are areas that experienced higher levels of conflict intensity during the conflict period.

Recommendations

- BRA’s Housing Task Force to conduct a follow-up assessment to discover what housing arrangements exist for the 17% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners that did not return to the homes and what is the most effective assistance mechanism to address their housing needs (i.e. is it a broad-based community

approach or self-administered direct assistance), and to establish whether this group is actually worse off than non-combatant conflict victims?

- BRA at the Provincial and district levels to strengthen community-based reconciliation activities that encourage

social cohesion between ex-combatants and receiving communities such as peusijeuk ceremonies, promoting local festival showcasing indigenous arts and culture. Prioritization should be made with a focus on those geographical areas that currently have the highest conflict-carrying capacities (see Chapter 4).

COMMUNITY TRUST TOWARDS THE GOI

Key Findings

GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political

prisoners primarily relied upon family members and friends, followed by the international community and community

leaders. Rarely was assistance sought from local NGOs or the Gol. While this demonstrates a lack of confidence

amongst GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners towards the government, it also suggests that the Gol and broader civil society organizations lack the capacity to manage longer-term reintegration and recovery processes in a sustainable manner.

There also exist innate peace-building capacities within community-level social spaces. Women rely upon support mechanisms internal to their communities (e.g. family and friends) more than males. Male ex-combatants and ex-political

prisoners are more likely to turn to support mechanisms outside their immediate communities. The younger ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners rely more upon community leaders, family, friends and religious leaders than do older individuals. On the other hand, older individuals have been more likely to seek assistance from government officials and sources outside their immediate communities. These patterns suggest that ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, depending on sex and age, are both inward

and outward looking.

A negative finding relates to ex-political prisoners who experienced greater difficulties with their initial social reintegration compared to ex-combatants. On the other hand, a positive finding relates to the manner in which IOM's ICRS case management approach facilitated the social reintegration of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners or, at a minimum, discouraged clients from backsliding into criminality and violent behavior.

Recommendations

- In order to effectively meet GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoner recovery needs, reintegration actors must identify local community mechanisms through which to deliver assistance, leveraging the innate tendencies of these groups as strengths and increasing communities' absorptive capacities (see Chapter 4 on community stabilization).
- BRA and donors should focus on ex-political prisoners (including those who were released before the Helsinki MoU) by providing assistance to the dependants of ex-political prisoners.
- BRA to fund local civil society networks at the community level (i.e. not Provincial-level NGOs) in order to identify social reintegration obstacles still facing ex-political prisoners.
- BRA to form ex-combatant and political prisoner 'support groups' outside of current ex-combatant structures, but with the cooperation of KPA.
- BRA to undertake peace education and trust-building workshops for ex-combatants groups including as participants police and military personnel.

PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH – PROMOTING PRODUCTIVITY AND SOCIAL REINTEGRATION

Key Findings

A high proportion of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners experienced psychological trauma and numerous health problems following the Helsinki MoU. Upon entering the IOM's ICRS project some 38.4% of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners

were diagnosed as suffering from psychological problems. A higher proportion of males suffered psychological problems compared to females with the level of psychological problems increasing by age. Chronic disease and wounding are more prevalent amongst ex-political prisoners than they are amongst ex-combatants. Health services are generally poor in Aceh, especially for psycho-social health services.

A significant proportion of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners appeared to favor informal health assistance through community-based healing mechanisms (i.e. only 19% of ex-combatant and ex-political prisoner clients accessed formal medical treatment through the ICRS, whereas some 3,000 received medical referral services through parallel IOM health programming).

Recommendations

- Donors with strong health credentials in other parts of Indonesia such as AusAID to fund the technical assistance and field mobilization of Provincial health programming designed to strengthen the capacities of community-based health services using community health nurses (*POSYANDU*) and local nurse interns (*tenaga bhakti*) through a ToT model. The aim is to provide training to first-instance community health nurses and village-based traditional healers for the identification and treatment of psychological problems afflicting high-risk ex-combatants.

EDUCATION – LEADING TO WAR OR PEACE

Key findings

Levels of education among GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners are generally low with 49% of ex-political

prisoners and 34.6% of ex-combatants having only completed primary school (NB. 7% of all GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners have no formal education). Only 1.7% of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners completed

technical schooling prior to 2005.

GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners under the age of 30 are particularly vulnerable to backsliding pressures. Youth have relatively high

completion rates of high school but very little life skills training¹⁰² or technical training to equip them for a peacetime workforce that will demand productive

and responsible citizens. Higher levels of youth completing high schools combined with weak life-skills training and technical skills can bring high

expectations of peace dividends that, if unmet, will make them vulnerable to organized violence or gang-based criminality.

Recommendations

- Reintegration programs need to consider follow-up support for all ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners through more permanent structures such as government and private business development services, and skills training providers.
- BRA, with IOM's assistance, dedicate staff and resources to work closely

with IOM's new ICRS program for vulnerable and unemployed youth and start working on a scaled-up version to start in 2009. Skills training should be based on labor market analysis and wherever possible focus on providing youth with realistic job opportunities rather than short-term vocational training.

- BRA should work with the Provincial government, IOM, and ILO to systematically map an Aceh-wide skills training, jobs, and micro-enterprise referral database by early 2009 that can be made operational at the district-BRA level for ex-combatants and vulnerable youth including GAM/TNA and anti-separatist groups.

LIVELIHOODS, LAND AND THE MEANS OF PRODUCING SURPLUSES

Key Findings

Statistics do not support arguments that lack of economic opportunity was the main factor underpinning choices of GAM's rank-and-file to take up arms against the Indonesian state. The majority of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners were engaged in long-term income generating activities prior to the Helsinki MoU. However, few held occupations that required technical or professional skills and most were engaged in low income employment.

Following the peace agreement the bulk of ex-political prisoners and ex-combatants have gravitated back into the same types

of livelihood activities that they held prior to the August 2005 peace agreement (agricultural or trading livelihoods). Meanwhile, some 1.4% of ex-combatants and 38.7% of ex-political prisoners had financial debt. The proportion of those with debt increases with age and number of dependents.

Most GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners planned to meet their livelihood needs by:

1. Starting new businesses (58.2%),
2. Relied upon assistance from family members (13.8%),
3. Had access to private funds (4.2%), and
4. Planned to find employment (18.2%).

Ex-political prisoners to a greater extent

planned to find employment in established businesses compared to ex-combatants, who favored self-employment.

Following the peace agreement 45.6% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners had access to farmland and 61.7% had indirect access through family. Only 24.8% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners reported that they owned land. Those with the lowest levels of land ownership were youth, with women exhibiting particular vulnerabilities with land ownership. Only 21.3% of males and females had access to or owned livestock, with the lowest levels of livestock ownership being for older males and females (i.e. access to or ownership of producing agricultural surpluses).

Recommendations

- BRA needs to ensure that donors and external actors prioritize regions using empirical-based selection methods that focus on communities where conflict-carrying capacities are the highest (see Chapter 4). Criteria for prioritizing regions include: high conflict-carrying capacities, high levels of poverty in conflict-affected sub-districts, vertical and horizontal patterns of conflict (present and current), lingering ethnic divisions/rivalries, higher levels of criminality, low levels of assistance received, areas with high numbers of

ex-combatants and history of violent horizontal conflict with political dimensions.

- The European Union (EU) and UN agencies such as UNDP should carefully consider IOM's agricultural assistance models to ex-combatants and vulnerable groups (see Chapter 4) that focuses on sustainable agricultural surpluses with a focus on livestock and the provision of appropriately adapted agricultural equipment (i.e. ex-combatants are organized into self-help groups that

expand into their communities with an enlarged caseload that prioritizes the most vulnerable community members).

- Provide enhanced financial support services to ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners who are married and that have children, thus preventing families from falling into poverty and facilitating the longer-term livelihood recovery of entire households.
- The Gol should move forward with land compensation scheme as outlined in the MoU at Article 3.2.5.

ICRS – LESSONS LEARNED

Key Findings

ICRS data does not conclusively answer the question whether facilitating clients with small-business start-ups was a successful method for meeting the livelihood recovery needs of individual ex-combatants. There was also a potential market saturation of new micro-business start-ups.

Irrespective of training opportunities provided to them, GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners rarely considered issues of business profitability, competitor location, land fertility, or strategically locating their businesses. Understandably the greatest decision underpinning new business start-ups was past experience in a particular field of work. Finally, a lack of business capital proved a major obstacle for longer-term business viability.

Some findings may be made of the ICRS program for GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, as follows:

- Skills training connected to small or micro business development was 'over-emphasized' at the expense of other and skills development needs of ICRS clients. Trainings fell short of cultivating life skills needed for ensuring a successful transition into community life, such as life counseling on changes they could expect in their new roles/status within society, or advice on political and legal issues, or accommodation and support services, their civil and community responsibilities or reconciliation programs.
- An absence of peer support programs to face everyday challenges and build upon opportunities without resorting to

violence.

- Expectation management of clients, i.e. finding a balance between clients' expectations of peace dividends (i.e. a successful small business) and the realities of potential business failure.
- A comprehensive employment referral system was not established that matched reintegration clients with jobs, apprenticeships, and small business opportunities.

It is widely recognized that Information Counseling and Referral is the backbone of any reintegration program.¹⁰³ IOM's ICRS program should aim to work more closely with government mandated agencies such as the BRA, and give equal importance to economic and social reintegration.

Recommendations

- The new ICRS program for vulnerable youth needs to provide a more supportive structure for reintegration of clients through employment referral and better networking with local businesses and civil society.
- The new ICRS program for vulnerable youth should carefully consider geographic concentration of similar business types. More attention should be given to labor market analysis and market diversification in identifying employment opportunities for ICRS clients.
- Referral opportunities for ICRS clients in the new program for vulnerable youth should have a stronger focus on apprenticeships and on-the-job training

which promote life-skills development and social networking.


- Community leaders/peer networks cultivated through IOM's community-stabilization programming are obvious entry points for enhancing social reintegration of vulnerable youth in the new ICRS Program.
- A greater focus on social/recreational/cultural activities to cultivate social skills (e.g. cultural interventions found in IOM's community stabilization programming) should be considered by the new ICRS program for vulnerable youth.
- Indonesian financial institutions should be approached by BRA and the Provincial

Government to provide small enterprise funding to viable micro-businesses willing to work with ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners. Partnership with agencies such as UNDP, IOM, and World Bank to provide facilitation and training to successful applicants receiving funding from national banks would address banks' risk aversion.

- The new ICRS program for vulnerable youth should use its screening and monitoring data to develop a coherent picture of youth employment and opportunities in districts where the project is operating and provide recommendations to BRA on how to more effectively and efficiently target youth unemployment and economic reintegration.

CHAPTER 3 - INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs) AND RETURNEES

Figure 6: **The Wedge of Vulnerability**
Transition to Sustainable Peace and Development



Internally displaced peoples and people who have returned to their places of origin (i.e. ‘returnees’) have critical conflict-related vulnerabilities that can create new conflict pressures. Their vulnerabilities may take the form of traumatic events or experiences that precipitated their initial displacement, the traumas associated with fleeing, the difficulties of reintegrating back into their communities, and in some cases trauma and resentments that developed during their displacement. The resulting latent conflict-carrying capacities among IDPs and returnees make them more prone to fleeing again if confronting politically volatile conditions,¹⁰⁵ or to even destabilizing their communities if their particular recovery needs are not addressed. Therefore their ‘wedge’ within the broader transition to sustainable peace and development in Aceh reflects the notion that they need targeted support from local civil society, the government, and the international community. The predominant

dataset used in this chapter is the IOM/UNDP IDP survey data collected in 2006-2007, which focuses on conflict-related IDPs and returnees, their current socio-economic conditions, and the reintegration and recovery challenges that they have faced since the signing of the Helsinki MoU.¹⁰⁶

This chapter explores current reintegration and recovery challenges facing IDPs and returnees caused by the conflict between GAM and the Gol, and focuses on three key themes:

1. General lines of inquiry that profile these vulnerable groups, the conflict-impacts that they have experienced, their levels of psychosocial trauma and the health conditions they now face, and their challenges with social reintegration, community stabilization and livelihood recovery.
2. Fear, not ethnicity, is a driving force

underpinning mistrust within IDP and returnee communities.

3. IDPs and returnees exhibit strong levels of trust toward traditional leaders and community-based social cohesion mechanisms, which provide valuable insights as to where the emphasis of future recovery assistance should be directed, namely community facilitation and reinforcing existing community-based social cohesion mechanisms and institutions.

The main recommendation for future programming is to facilitate demand-driven community recovery and development interventions that elicit common-interest projects promoting better communication within and between villages and community-based institutions using a cluster-based recovery approach. This strategy promises to be the most effective way of addressing IDP and returnee recovery and reintegration needs.

SECTION 1 – WHO ARE IDPs AND RETURNEES AND IS THERE A PROFILE OR PATTERN?

There are no accurate current figures on the total numbers or concentrations of conflict-affected IDP and returnee populations in Aceh, and even fewer figures for IDPs that remain outside of Aceh. As of 2006, there was an estimated 103,453 conflict-induced IDP households, of these 66,819 had already returned, and 18,905 households were still being hosted inside Aceh and 17,729 being hosted or having shelter outside Aceh. Table 94 at Annex B provides a district-by-district ranking of IDP and returnee concentrations as a proportion of district populations. As shown in Table 3, the ethnic groups most displaced by conflict were Acehnese, Javanese and Gayonese, which reflects the identify-based forms of local conflict that took place alongside fighting between GAM/ TNA and the Gol in districts such as Bener Meriah, Aceh Tengah, Aceh Timur or Aceh Utara.

Patterns of conflict-induced displacement are peculiar to Aceh and have become intertwined with the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Prior to the tsunami most conflict-victims who fled their homes sought refuge in other locations inside Aceh with family, friends, or resettled in coastal

Table 3 : **Indicative Numbers of IDPs and Returnees by Ethnicity**¹⁰⁷

Ethnic Groups	Percent	Total Affected
Aceh	40.9 %	42,312
Gayo	13.1 %	13,552
Jawa	39.9 %	41,278
Batak	1.7 %	1,759
Kluet	1.8 %	1,862
Tamiang	0.3 %	310
Singkil	0.1 %	103
Jame / Padang	1.0 %	1,035
Melayu	0.1 %	103
Madura	0.1 %	103
Sunda	0.5 %	517
Others	0.6 %	621

Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment (Phase 2) (2006); World Bank Village Surveys (2006)

areas, rather than in other Indonesian provinces – with the largest proportion of IDPs being ethnic Acehnese.

A notable exception to the predominant pattern of internal displacement is found with Javanese IDPs. Although Javanese IDPs can be found in districts such as

Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah, more than any other group Javanese fled to locations in other Indonesian provinces such as North Sumatra. Table 94 in Annex B therefore suggests that it is those districts with high IDP rankings and lower returnee rankings that will have the greatest numbers of conflict-related

Table 4 : **IDPs and Returnees – A Snapshot**

	Returnee	IDP
Ethnicity	Predominantly Acehnese	Predominantly Javanese
Household Size	4	4
Usual Occupation	Farmer	Farmer
Current Occupation	Farmer but financially unable to rehabilitate land	Day Laborer
Average Age	38	40
Percentage earning less than IDR30,000 /day	63 %	81 % (50 % earning less than IDR20,000 /day)
Why they fled	39% of returnees experienced violently traumatic events such as being forced to flee as a result of houses or buildings being burnt, being caught in a bombing or being shot at, or having property damaged or seized by other people	Rumored violence towards them, their community, or a nearby community
Who among them are most vulnerable?	Unemployed and Elderly	Elderly
Education levels	30% never attended school or have not completed Primary school	28% never attended school or have not completed Primary school
Why they returned	Reunite with family members.	76% cite safety for themselves and their families and nearly 60% cite better work opportunities.
Confidence in the peace process	High (45%)	Very Low (13%)
Political franchise	High (94% voted in the <i>Pilkada</i> elections)	Low (47% voted in the <i>Pilkada</i> elections)
Threats to their return	Fear of armed groups in their places of origin is a security threat (76%)	Fear of armed groups in their places of origin is a security threat (86%)

Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment (Phase 2) (2006)

returnees in the future. Conversely, current IDPs will choose not to return to their places of origin, but will instead resettle permanently in their current locations of refuge (either in other districts of Aceh or in other Indonesian provinces).

Additionally, whilst exact figures on patterns of conflict-induced displacement

are not available, many conflict-induced IDPs who fled to coastal areas of Aceh (e.g. to Aceh Besar or to Banda Aceh) away from intense localized conflict found at inland regions have experienced secondary patterns of displacement as a result of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Some of these people have attempted returning to the places from which they originally

fled during the conflict period (e.g. Aceh Utara, Pidie and Aceh Tengah).¹⁰⁸ Whilst this partly explains the high concentration of IDPs in places such as Pidie and Aceh Utara following 2005, it also makes it difficult to clearly delineate who is a conflict-induced IDP or returnee as opposed to those who are tsunami-induced IDPs or returnees.¹⁰⁹

SECTION 2 – WHY PEOPLE FLED AND WHY SOME HAVE RETURNED

The reasons people fled their homes demonstrates that perpetrators of violence at the community-level (i.e. by community members) were often found across different villages and that conflict was widespread. However, people’s reasons for fleeing show that the most pronounced conflict pattern at the community-level was between villages (inter-village) rather than within villages (intra-village). The overall result for communities living in areas of higher intensity conflict was a condition of near lawlessness and “survival of the fittest”.¹¹⁰

The forms of violence experienced by IDPs and returnees range from those which were acutely violent to those that amounted to forms of deprivation undermining their overall human security. For example, the most commonly reported conflict experiences relate to various forms of deprivation and include: not having enough food or water (76.8%); being forced to flee because of a dangerous situation (77.2%); not being able to choose a place to stay (72.2%), and; not being able to receive medical assistance (66.3%). As shown in Table 102 at Annex B, IDPs and returnees mostly suffered from various forms of deprivation or indirect violence, but they also suffered from more acutely violent and potentially traumatizing events.¹¹¹ These include: being forced to flee as a result of houses or buildings being burnt, being caught in a bombing or being shot at, or having property damaged or seized by other people. At the same time, around a quarter of all respondents, at some point during the conflict period, were robbed or extorted and/or were physically beaten.

A smaller proportion of respondents experienced highly acute forms of trauma, which in turn may lead to greater conflict-carrying capacities. These include: being

forced to find and bury human corpses, being tortured, having a child kidnapped or lost, being forced to physically torture a member of their own family or a friend, and being raped or being forced to rape someone else.¹¹²

Data on male and female rape also proves somewhat telling about the nature of violence that was perpetrated during the conflict period. These events act as indicators of insidious forms of violence that were used as a psychological weapon to instill terror, fear, and humiliation in rival groups or those perceived to be from rival groups. For example,

- 0.5% of male IDPs report being raped,

whereas 0% of current female IDPs report being raped;

- 1.7% of male returnees and 2.5% of female returnees report that they were raped;
- No IDPs report being forced to rape a family member, whereas 1.4% of male returnees and 3.1% of female returnees report being forced to rape a family member.

As outlined in Table 105 at Annex B, more returnees have been exposed to violently traumatic events than IDPs (38.9% compared to 8.3% for 11 or more traumatic events), with a much higher proportion of males experiencing different forms of violence.¹¹³

Table 5 : **Key Vulnerabilities**

LIVING ALONE = A KEY VULNERABILITY	YOUTH = A KEY VULNERABILITY
<p>A small proportion of IDP and returnee households are comprised of single people (1.4% and 3.5% respectively), with the average household size for both IDPs and returnees containing four people. Those aged 22 to 31 years or 62 years and older live in the smallest households (i.e. one person).</p> <p>The oldest age bracket (62 years or older) is most likely to live alone (10.7% IDPs, 11.8% returnees). There is a roughly equal spread across ethnic groups for the proportion of returnees living alone (3.8% Acehnese, 2.8% Gayonese, and 2.0% Javanese). A slightly higher proportion of Acehnese IDPs (3.0%) live alone compared to Gayonese (1.6%) and Javanese IDPs (1.0%).</p> <p>Combined with other reintegration and recovery challenges that these communities confront (discussed below), older individuals that live alone have the greatest vulnerabilities in relation to their human security. Unlike households containing multiple individuals, these people have fewer support mechanisms to help provide for their needs (economic, security, support or psychological assistance). Approximately 91.7% of those aged 52 to 61 years earn less than 30,000 IDR/day.</p>	<p>The age group reporting the highest experiences of traumatic events is 21 years or under. Among ethnic groups, more Acehnese experienced 11 or more traumatic events (45.5%), while Javanese experienced the least (9.6%).</p> <p>Based upon their exposure to different forms of violence and the legacies of post-conflict trauma, IOM/ UNDP survey data shows that youth (19 to 35 years of age) and male returnees aged 41 and under (particularly ethnic Acehnese) retain the highest conflict-carrying capacities. As discussed in chapter 4 on conflict-carrying capacities at community-level, the psychological legacies of these events and their impact upon social spaces have negative implications for reintegration and recovery and consolidating longer-term peace-building efforts.</p> <p>More than being victims of conflict needing assistance, these age groups among IDPs and returnees bring with them high potentials for generating conflict through the incubation of fear, hatred and bitterness, which can be exacerbated in the absence of targeted recovery assistance. Approximately 80% of youth IDPs earn less than 30,000 IDR/day.</p>
<p>Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment (Phase 2) (2006)</p>	

RUMOR IS THE FIRST PRESENTATION OF CONFLICT

Fear is the most commonly cited reason people fled their villages of origin.¹¹⁴ Fear of battles between armed groups is listed by 88.4% of Acehnese, by 87.3% of Gayonese and by 74.6% of Javanese. Fear of serious criminality is listed by 76.3% of Acehnese, by 66.0% of Gayonese, and by 73.9% of Javanese.

Rumors were the second highest grouping of reasons IDPs and returnees fled their homes. Rumors that there might be violence against people in their village (53.3% IDP, 66.6% Returnee) or that there were attacks against people in their villages or close to their villages (60.3% IDP, 65.4% Returnee) were the two most common rumor-related reasons people fled their villages. Rumor may be said to be first presentation of conflict within and amongst many communities,¹¹⁵ and were clearly a source of fear that were acted upon.

There are notable differences, though minor, in the impacts rumors and violence had upon ethnic groups. Javanese IDPs most list rumors as a reason for fleeing their villages of origin, whereas Acehnese IDPs and returnees most list physical attacks or

witnessing physical attacks as reasons for fleeing their villages. Therefore Javanese acted upon their fear of rumored violence, whereas Acehnese acted upon actual physical violence that was experienced or witnessed.

Since the signing of the Helsinki MoU, fear and perceptions of safety and security have acted as major factors impeding the reintegration and recovery of IDPs that have not yet returned to their villages of origin.¹¹⁶ Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that the most commonly cited reason by IDPs for returning to their villages of origin or for resettling in other locations is safety for themselves and their families.

REASONS FOR RETURN OR RESETTLEMENT

The reason most commonly cited by IDPs for returning to their villages of origin or for resettling in other locations is safety for themselves and their families (75.8%). The main reason for returnees is having family members in their environment (44.5%). For IDPs the second most common reason is better work opportunities (59.9%), whereas for returnees it is having a safe place for themselves and their family members (42.7%). Table 112 at Annex B describes in more detail reasons for return

and resettlement.

Reasons for wanting to return to their villages of origin or to resettle in new locations vary between males and females. More male IDPs list work opportunities (64.9%) as important reasons compared to female IDPs (54.1%) and advice from leaders in society (17.8%) compared to female IDPs (10.0%). On the other hand, female IDPs and returnees more frequently consider important social networks and reintegration into former communities than do male IDPs (i.e. having family members in the environment and only wishing to return to their villages).

These different preferences indicate that men place greater emphasis upon social hierarchy and livelihood activities. On the other hand, women appear to place greater emphasis upon family networks and community relationships, thus giving them a unique peace-generating capacity able to strengthen community bonds. Although Acehnese society is patriarchal, effective entry mechanisms to deliver assistance to women and build upon their abundant peace-generating capacities do exist through established women's groups that are found within villages across Aceh.


SECTION 3 – PERCEPTIONS ON SECURITY, COMMUNITY COHESION, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

CONFIDENCE IN THE HELSINKI MOU

Following the signing of the Helsinki MoU some 63.7% of IDPs and returnees felt 'very confident' or 'confident' that the MoU will bring peace to Aceh. Confidence was highest among Acehnese (78.1%) and Gayonese (79.6%).

However, as shown in Figure 5 there is a sharp contrast between IDPs and returnees, with 45.0% and 13.4% respectively not have confidence in the peace agreement. Those demonstrating the lowest levels of confidence were Javanese and Acehnese IDPs (52.9% and 33.3% respectively). Moreover, a large proportion of current IDPs are unwilling to answer this question, which suggests that they felt less enfranchised than returnees or they simply felt more vulnerable to various forms of reprisal, and were therefore less willing to speculate on the peace agreement.

Figure 7 : **Confidence in Helsinki MoU's Success in Bringing Peace to Aceh**



Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment (Phase 2) (2006)

Security Fears

IDPs and returnees have continued to experience profound security fears, the nature of which bring pause to optimistic appraisals of the peace process. Some 19.4% of IDPs and returnees believe that attacks upon themselves or against their family members continue to be a threat to their security. Only 4.5% of IDPs cite these fears in their current locations compared to 27.8% of returnees who believe attacks still represent a threat to their security.


Among the three main ethnic groups participating in the IOM/ UNDP survey similar security fears exist in relation to torture, extortion, killings and persecution (i.e. similar statistical patterns among different ethnic groups). These fears are not only confined to violence-based threats, and of IDP and returnee views towards extortion (16.8% of IDPs and returnees) and general criminality (20.4% of IDPs and returnees) as a security threats (namely, the levels of fear are roughly the same across ethnic groups).

Security Perceptions towards Ex-combatant Groups

Levels of security for IDPs and returnees (and society more broadly) hinges upon the ability of ex-combatants to reintegrate successfully into society. Security also depends upon the ability of state security institutions (i.e. police and military) to maintain security in a way that accords with and strengthens the rule of law. The IOM/ UNDP IDP Assessment Phase 2 survey asked participants a series of questions regarding trust toward ex-combatant groups and state security institutions. These are used here as perception indicators for levels of IDP and returnee security towards ex-combatant groups.

Approximately 28.4% of IDPs and returnees list the presence of armed groups in their midst as a threat to their security. This threat is more pronounced for returnees (40.2%) than it is for IDPs (9.9%). Amongst IDPs the feeling of threat is highest for Gayonese (29.5%) followed by Acehnese (15.2%). Amongst returnees, feeling threatened by armed groups in their current locations is highest for Acehnese (47.6%) and Javanese (27.5%). Feelings of security are even worse regarding the presence of armed groups in people’s places of origin. Just over 75.5% of returnees and 86.3% of IDPs feel that armed groups in

Figure 8 : **Trust in Other Ethnic Groups**



Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment (Phase 2) (2006)

their places of origin continue to pose threats to their safety and security.¹¹⁷

IDP and returnee trust toward people who support GAM is below 50%. Only 42.8% feel confident that different ex-combatant groups can successfully reintegrate into society (either GAM/TNA ex-combatants or anti-separatist combatants). Lack of confidence is highest amongst Javanese (51.0%) followed by Acehnese (37.7%). The only group expressing a high level of confidence is Gayonese (64.8%). Somewhat predictably the highest levels of mistrust are found among Javanese IDPs and returnees towards leaders of pro-GAM groups (73.4%) and among Acehnese IDPs and returnees towards leaders of anti-separatist groups (47.3%). These patterns of trust and mistrust are the same for IDPs and returnees regardless of whether it refers to their current locations or desired destinations.

Security Perceptions towards the TNI and the Police

As shown in Figure 41 in Annex B, amongst different groups there is significant variation in levels of trust toward the TNI. Some 20.9% of IDPs report not trusting the TNI compared to 50.3% of returnees. Those reporting the highest levels of trust are Javanese (72.2%) followed by Gayonese (62.3%), whereas Acehnese express the lowest trust (30.5%) with similarly low levels of trust towards the police along the same ethnic patterns.¹¹⁸

Community Cohesion and Reintegration

Figure 6 below demonstrates that there are significant social cleavages between IDP and returnee communities, particularly

with respect to Acehnese people’s low levels of trust toward other ethnic groups. Only 41.1% of survey participants trust or strongly trust other ethnic groups, whereas 43.5% do not trust people from other ethnic groups. The level of trust held towards other ethnic groups is lowest among Acehnese (25.8%) and highest among Javanese (53.7%). It is intriguing that the largest ethnic group (i.e. Acehnese) has the lowest level of trust toward other ethnic groups. The social cleavages demonstrated by these patterns of trust represent a potential driver of horizontal conflict at community level, and may be vulnerable to cooption by political elites in the context of other proximate causes of conflict such as flawed elections or competition over natural resources.

Patterns of trust and mistrust, which are fairly consistent for questions on ex-combatant groups, state security institutions and social leaders aligned to different ex-combatant groups, show a tendency for identity-based social cleavages.¹¹⁹ These types of cleavages should be treated as significant obstacles to community stabilization, for reintegration and recovery processes, and for consolidating the broader peace process. However, data demonstrates that fear, rather than ethnicity, is a driving force underpinning patterns of mistrust. In fact, there are a number of points in the examples listed above at which different ethnic groups across IDP and returnee categories exhibit similar levels of mistrust or insecurity in relation to issues perceived as threatening individual safety and security (e.g. extortion, the presence of armed groups, persecution, killing and attacks – see Annex B for full breakdown of statistical patterns).

Traditional Community Leaders

Troubling patterns of trust and mistrust among IDPs and returnees need to be balanced by positive levels of trust toward traditional leaders and community-based social cohesion mechanisms. Prior to fleeing from their places of origin 79.0% of IDPs and returnees reported trusting heads of village (*geuciks/ kepala desa*). A decline of 6.1% in trust of heads of village in villages of origin can be seen in Figure 45 in Annex B.

The lowest levels of trust are found among IDPs that have not yet returned to their villages of origin or resettled in their desired destinations (48.5%). In the context of a protracted intrastate conflict where IDPs and returnees were exposed to different patterns of violent conflict affecting virtually every aspect of their lives, it is surprising that there have not been more pronounced declining levels of trust. Moreover, while levels of trust toward heads of village in villages of origin has fallen, levels of trust in the heads of village in current locations is consistently strong for IDPs (83.8%) and returnees (74.5%), and is similarly strong across the three main ethnic groups participating in the IOM/UNDP IDP surveys (70.6% Acehnese, 84.0% Gayonese and 83.2% Javanese).¹²⁰

Community Participation

For the purpose of this report participation in religious groups is discarded as a potentially false indicator of declining or increasing levels of community participation. For example, as demonstrated in a parallel IOM/UNDP IDP report, religious participation was consistently high before and after the conflict. Therefore, it does not really say much about changes to community

participation or how community interaction was impacted by the conflict.¹²¹

The impact of community participation becomes clearer when analyzing for other types of group activities that show a greater level of change, and because of the voluntary nature of participation in these other social group activities, the results appear more compelling. Whilst the IDP survey considers eight different types of group activities, the three considered herein include social service groups, community self-help (e.g. *gotong-royong*), and government founded groups.¹²²

IDP and returnee levels of participation in community activities (e.g. village meetings) declined during the conflict period or were already low before people fled their places of origin. For example, 25.3% of IDPs and returnees now participate in social service groups (an overall decline of 10.6%), 14.6% participate in government founded groups (an overall decline of 2.8%) and 29.4% participate in community self-help groups (an overall decline of 4.7%). Given obstacles to community stabilization caused by low levels of trust, a finding worth highlighting is that 34.9% of IDPs and returnees note that village meetings are never held to discuss (or resolve) community problems. In other words, in areas where mistrust and security fears are high, dialogue is not taking place to resolve disputes between divided communities, which can potentially fuel further conflict due to a lack of conflict resolution mechanisms at community-level.

At the same time, healthy social spaces do exist in which different ethnic groups are

already cooperating and strengthening healthy societal relationships. Community stabilization efforts should therefore look to identify and support existing community-based mechanisms in order to promote community stabilization and recovery processes to consolidate peace-building.

Political Participation

Overall levels of political participation for IDPs and returnees are fairly high. In their most recent village head elections 66.1% voted (IDP – 58.5%, Returnee – 70.7%), with only Javanese (59.2%) falling below average rates of participation. In the recent 2006 *Pilkada* elections, 78.6% of IDPs and returnees exercised their democratic franchise.

There are however significant variations to levels of participation amongst ethnic groups. A majority of Acehnese and Gayonese voted in the *Pilkada* elections (94.4% and 95.5% respectively), whereas only 58.0% of Javanese did the same. Moreover, the levels of participation for IDPs (47.3%) was much lower than it was for returnees (97.2%), which perhaps explains the lower levels of participation by Javanese. Nevertheless, this indicates that a significant proportion of Javanese returnees did not exercise their political rights and that Javanese IDPs have remained politically disenfranchised because of their displacement status (i.e. they are physically outside the province and as a result are unable or unwilling to participate in Acehnese political processes). Javanese political disenfranchisement appears to be reinforced by the reluctance of many current IDPs to speculate upon whether the peace agreement will be successful (see above).

SECTION 4 – ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF LIVELIHOODS

LIVELIHOODS BEFORE FLEEING VILLAGES OF ORIGIN

Prior to their first instances of flight from their villages of origin, the majority of IDPs (57.4%) and returnees (67.2%) were engaged in farming on self-owned lands or as workers/ fishermen (10.6% IDP, 18.4% Returnee). Few worked as government officials, or in more skilled technical and professional trades.¹²³

CURRENT LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES

Years of conflict have resulted in changes in current occupations and livelihood activities, particularly for those that remain IDPs. The most dramatic change has been decreasing levels of farming/land ownership for IDPs – now 18.0% from 57.4% prior to fleeing their villages of origin.

For returnees there is virtually no change,

currently 67.2% – a decrease of only 0.4%. Over the same time period there has been a 24.6% shift for IDPs into working as farm laborers and fishing, whilst for returnees there has been only a 0.7% shift into work as farm laborers and fishing. Moreover, nearly half (46.7%) of IDPs do not believe they will be able to return to their previous occupations if they return to their villages of origin.


Poverty Levels

Using IDR per day income as an indicator of poverty for IDPs and returnees, Figure 7 suggests that a higher proportion of current IDPs live in poverty. Of those receiving cash income, 49.7% of IDPs and 33.3% of returnees earn below 20,000 IDR/day. Relatively small proportions of IDPs and returnees earn above 40,000 IDR/day (10.5% IDP, 20.2% Returnee).

Approximately 80% of youth IDPs earn less than 30,000 IDR/day, whilst 91.7% of those aged 52 to 61 years earn less than 30,000 IDR/day. Poverty rates for returnees are above 50% for those 21 years or under, 60.4% for those 22 to 31 years of age, and highest for those aged 32 to 41 years (72.1%). Amongst ethnic groups those with the highest proportion of people earning less than 30,000 IDR/day are Javanese IDPs (81.6%) and Acehese returnees (60.1%).

Whilst the data above suggests that Javanese IDPs experience higher levels of poverty, income levels give an incomplete picture of the real levels of poverty experienced by different communities and the hardships faced with rebuilding sustainable livelihoods. For example, returnees in isolated rural communities that were burned out during the conflict must

Figure 9: **Total Income of Less than IDR 30,000 Per Day**



Source: IOM/ UNDP IDP Assessment (Phase 2) (2006)

now rebuild infrastructure, housing, and clear their abandoned fields of overgrown trees and brush so they can restart farming or small business activities. At the same time, returnees must find means of providing for the basic subsistence needs of their families. This can place returnees in a markedly worse economic position from IDPs in North Sumatra who have access to better social services and infrastructure. Even for returnees who receive incomes (as opposed to those who are unemployed or those seeking employment), they must expend funds to access work or government services. As


a result, without savings and only having low-paid employment, many returnees are caught in a vicious circle of poverty, which makes it difficult to restore their farms or businesses to viability.¹²⁶

ACCESS TO LAND AND MEANS OF LIVELIHOODS

Land

Current levels of land ownership and ownership of agricultural resources (means of livelihood production) as shown in Figure 8 below is much stronger for returnees than it is for IDPs. Fewer IDPs (15.7%) own

Figure 10: **Ownership**



Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment (Phase 2) (2006)

farm land, a plantation or fishery compared to returnees (65.5%). Interestingly, land ownership is highest for Javanese returnees (80.8%), followed by Gayonese (63.6%) and Acehese (59.9%).

Of those IDPs and returnees that own agricultural land, 71.5% say that their lands are ready or more than half-ready to be used and 13.1% say that their lands are not ready or not ready at all. More IDPs that own land (77.2%) say that their lands are half-ready or completely ready for use. Land owners reporting the lowest levels or land readiness are Acehese IDPs (28.6%) and Gayonese returnees (31.5%).

Business

As shown in Figure 8 below, 4.9% of IDPs and 6.2% of returnees report owning a shop or small trading business. Only 27.6% of IDPs that owned a shop or small trading business before becoming IDPs still own businesses compared to 67.7% of returnees. Approximately 80% of respondents with businesses report that their businesses are only half-ready or are not ready at all to be used. More than half of IDPs and returnees (85.7%) visited their businesses in the month prior to the IOM/UND IDP survey conducted in mid-2006.

Homes

There is a significant difference in levels of current home ownership between IDPs (45.2%) and returnees (77.4%). Both communities experienced declining levels of ownership during the conflict period (before fleeing 85.1% IDP and 88.8% returnee, current ownership 45.2% IDP and 77.4% Returnee). As shown in Figure 8 below, declining levels of home ownership have been much higher for IDPs (-39.9%) than they have been for returnees (-11.4%).

The average level of decline for returnee

home ownership is -11.4%, with the lowest decline found amongst Gayonese returnees (-9.3%). Acehese and Javanese returnees experienced similar levels of decline (-10.7% and -13.9% respectively). Acehese and Javanese IDPs also experienced similar levels of decline (-40.6% and -41.5% respectively). These similarities indicate that ethnicity has not necessarily been the sole factor underpinning declining levels of home ownership.

A key point worth highlighting therefore is that IDPs, irrespective of their ethnicity, face the highest levels of vulnerability with regards to home ownership.

For all three categories above (land, business and home) the main reasons cited for lack of access include:


- Homes or businesses were burnt or are now ruined;
- There are insufficient tools and equipment to rehabilitate homes/ land/ business;

- Homes/ land/ business have not been maintained or have been neglected;
- Land is difficult to reach; and
- Homes/ lands/ businesses are being used by other people.

Proof of Ownership

Figure 9 below demonstrates that legal proof of ownership is a problem for IDPs and returnees. Some 45.0% of returnees and 30.4% of IDPs do not have any proof of ownership for farming lands, plantations or fisheries. Moreover, 26.7% of returnees and 50.0% of IDPs either do not have or do not know if they have proof of ownership for their small shops or trading businesses. Similarly, 28.8% of IDPs and half of returnees (53.2%) do not have legal proof of ownership for their homes. Interestingly, a relatively high proportion of current IDPs have legal proof of ownership of their homes. Across all of Indonesia, legal ownership recognized by the state continues to come into conflict with native-title claims.¹²⁷

Figure 11 : **Possession of Proof of Ownership**



Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment (Phase 2) (2006)


SECTION 5 – GAPS IN ASSISTANCE

The Helsinki MoU stipulates that IDPs and returnees are entitled to reintegration and recovery assistance from the government. However, in order to meet their daily household subsistence needs IDPs and returnees have primarily relied upon

assistance from family (36.0% IDP, 33.2% Returnee) or provide their food security directly from their own agricultural lands (14.0% IDP, 21.9% Returnee). There is surprisingly little assistance received from the government (5.1% IDP, 1.5% Returnee)

and even less from local self-help groups or international organizations (0.5% IDP, 0.3% Returnee). In other words, available data herein shows that most people have not received any of the assistance to which they have been entitled under the Helsinki MoU.

Figure 12: Sources of Assistance



Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment – Phase 2 (2006)

Only 21.8% of IDPs and 54.5% of returnees have received assistance, with the most common forms being:

- Food distribution (IDP – 12.9%, Returnee – 40.9%)
- Household equipment (IDP – 0.7%, Returnee – 13.9%)
- Cash assistance (IDP – 8.9%, Returnee – 9.0%)

Although IDP survey data shows that psychological trauma as a result of the conflict is potentially very high among IDPs and returnees, none of the assistance provided (as noted by survey participants) includes psycho-social counseling or trauma healing.

Somewhat telling about the different sets of reintegration and recovery challenges facing IDPs and returnees is that 11.5% of returnees and no IDPs have received home-building materials assistance. Unlike returnees who have better access to and tenure over the means of production (e.g. farming lands), more IDPs depend on short-term assistance for their survival and experience greater levels of economic uncertainty (i.e. they cannot provide for their needs in a sustainable manner).

Whether or not patterns of assistance received demonstrates that returnees have better reintegration opportunities

and better long-term livelihood prospects compared to IDPs is a matter of perspective. For example, among returnees greater levels of security over land tenure and home ownership compared to lower levels of such asset security found among current IDPs would suggest that returnees have better long-term prospects for rebuilding their lives – assuming that the peace agreement in Aceh holds.¹²⁸

On the other hand, greater levels of home-building materials and household equipment supplied to returnees might simply indicate the extremely high levels of destruction and theft that they experienced during the conflict period and, as a result, the greater reintegration and recovery challenges that they now face.

Reintegration and Recovery Needs

The IOM/UNDP IDP survey asks a series of questions regarding priority reintegration and recovery needs for IDPs. The most commonly listed priority needs are:

- Job opportunities (53.2%)
- Housing (43.5%)
- Job seeking assistance (32.5%)
- Education (31.2%)
- Security and law (29.8%)

Roughly equal proportions of IDPs and

returnees list the need for security and order and housing as their first priorities. Significant variations emerge with the need for jobs (returnees=16.6%, IDPs=34.5%). A higher proportion of returnees list their first priority as roads (21.8%) compared to IDPs (4.0%). Returnees also place greater priority on water and sanitation (12.5%) than do IDPs (7.8%). Data also shows that recovery and reintegration challenges (or opportunities) are much the same for IDPs and returnees irrespective of ethnicity.

Variations with the need for physical infrastructure point to markedly different sets of reintegration and recovery challenges facing IDP and returnee communities. There are two potentially overlapping sets of challenges identified here. First, there is less need for IDPs to build fixed infrastructure if they will be leaving their current locations of refuge, and instead need livelihood support because they have lost tenure and access to their homes, businesses and farming lands in their village of origin. Second, because of the generally poor levels of infrastructure and access to schools or markets in heavily conflict-affected areas of Aceh (for further detail, refer to Chapter 4), returnees are demanding improved infrastructure so they can begin to rehabilitate their lands, homes and businesses and improve their overall human security.

SECTION 6 – KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Both IDP and returnee communities face a host of recovery challenges requiring tailored assistance to meet their specific needs, with returnees more often than not facing greater recovery challenges because of the markedly worse structural economic conditions and lingering security concerns they face inside Aceh (e.g. infrastructure, access to education, health or markets, and perceived or real security threats springing from criminality and potential spoiler groups to the peace process).

Those who have already returned found devastated local economies, destroyed homes, businesses and lands, and few market opportunities. Whilst poverty and structural economic barriers affect most people in Aceh, these recovery obstacles prove especially difficult for returnees who are also confronted with the legacies of psychological trauma and lingering post-conflict insecurity dilemmas.¹²⁹ Moreover, in many cases returnees have not yet established a productive livelihood base for their agricultural lands or businesses, thus forcing them to find low-paid day-jobs or casual forms of employment to provide for the basic needs of their families. In the absence of external assistance many returnees have simply entered into 'poverty traps'.

There is little special support being given to returnees or IDPs by either the government or by the international community. Moreover, in the absence of a clearly articulated strategic framework to guide recovery assistance for these communities, the little assistance that they do receive is fragmented and limited in both scope and impact.

The findings in this chapter represent a veritable shopping list from which donors and government agencies can select and develop projects to target key vulnerability dynamics and livelihood recovery entitlements of IDPs and returnees. However, the breadth of needs identified does not provide answers on key priority assistance interventions. Of course, the Gol and the authorities of Aceh have the primary responsibility to address what the Helsinki MoU refers to as "civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss due to the conflict",

whereas external actors and non-governmental agencies might consider focusing on livelihoods and other forms of assistance.¹³⁰

REASONS FOR FLEEING VILLAGES OF ORIGIN AND RETURNING/ RESETTLING

Key Findings

Fear emerges as the most commonly cited reason people fled their villages of origin. Javanese IDPs most list rumors as a reason for fleeing their villages of origin. Rumor may be said to be first presentation of conflict within and between communities, and rumors are clearly a source of fear, and are in fact acted upon. Fear and perceptions of safety and security therefore continue to be major factors impeding the reintegration and recovery of IDPs that have not yet returned to their villages of origin. Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that the most common reason given by IDPs for returning to their villages of origin or for resettling in other locations is safety for themselves and their families.

Key factors encouraging people to return to their places of origin include: the opportunity to live amongst family and friends and access to their lands or businesses. Key factors encouraging people to resettle in other locations include: continued evidence of political and social insecurity in 'hot spot' areas (i.e. their places of origin), better employment opportunities and higher levels of psychological security in their current places of refuge or their desired locations, and better social infrastructure and access to government services (e.g. roads, schools, markets, water supply).

In deciding to return or resettle, men place greater emphasis upon social hierarchy and employment opportunities compared to women who place greater emphasis upon family networks and community relationships.

SECURITY

Key Findings

Less than half of IDPs and returnees feel confident that ex-combatants can successfully reintegrate into society. At

the same time, they express little trust in leaders of pro-GAM groups or leaders of local self-defense groups. This is further compounded by low levels of trust towards local state security forces.

The most dominant pattern of conflict was between villages (inter-village) rather than within villages (intra-village). In many cases IDPs and returnees appear to have fled triangular patterns of conflict between GAM combatants and local anti-separatist groups, between GAM/TNA and state security forces, and from violent criminal activity (potentially related to different conflict actors). Those most vulnerable to intimidation in this context were ethnic Javanese, whilst those that experienced the greatest level of physical violence were ethnic Acehnese.

Recommendations

- Provincial government institutes, with the support of BRA, FKK, and local government authorities (viz. *Bupati* and *Camat* levels) conduct joint awareness and socialization campaigns in high-density returnee areas incorporating joint field visits with representatives from IDP groups.
- Development actors undertake community stabilization programming in areas of return (see Chapter 4).

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Key Findings

Overall political participation for IDPs and returnees is unremarkable. Data shows that Javanese IDPs and returnees had low levels of participation in recent Pilkada elections. This suggests that Javanese returnees have encountered difficulties exercising their democratic rights, whilst Javanese IDPs have been politically disenfranchised – at least in relation to their status within Aceh (i.e. are located outside the province).

Recommendations

- Improving access to information concerning upcoming elections for IDPs and returnees, irrespective of ethnicity, should be considered by the authorities of Aceh, in particular BRA.

SOCIAL REINTEGRATION AND COMMUNITY COHESION

Key Findings

Statistical patterns of trust and mistrust between ethnic groups demonstrate significant social cleavages that can act as the basis for new patterns of violent horizontal conflicts. At the same time, data shows a number of points at which ethnic groups exhibit similar levels of mistrust on similar issues that are perceived as threats to people’s safety and security. This suggests that fear rather than ethnicity is a driving force underpinning mistrust between social groups.

Some 34.9% of IDPs and returnees note that village meetings are never held to discuss or resolve problems in their current locations. In other words, dialogue is not taking place between divided communities that have been heavily impacted by the conflict. Although levels of trust in traditional leaders in places of origin have declined, communities still exhibit fairly high levels of trust in traditional community-based governance mechanisms. Trust in traditional leaders and community-based social cohesion mechanisms provide a valuable clue for where the emphases of future programming should be directed – namely community facilitation and

reinforcing existing community-based social cohesion mechanisms and institutions.

An encouraging finding is that the overall levels of community participation in social group activities are fairly high and, in some instances, are also cut across ethnic and political cleavages. There remain healthy social spaces in which communities can work together across ethnic (and perhaps political) lines. These spaces provide clear entry points for the delivery of livelihood recovery assistance using community-based approaches that will further strengthen existing peace-generating capacities.

Recommendations

- Development actors undertake community stabilization programming in areas of return (see Chapter 4). This entails identifying effective traditional leadership and social spaces in which people are already cooperating and build upon their momentum to strengthen social cohesion (e.g. self-help groups). In practice this could mean as follows:
 - › Provision of training, tools and

- equipment for the rehabilitation of homes, property, agricultural lands, and businesses.
- › Improve social and economic infrastructure for increasing access to markets, towns and public services. The KDP approach has proven effective in this regard.
- › The government to develop an apprenticeship training system for IDP

- and returnee communities modeled on IOM’s new ICERS program.
- The Department of Social Services (*DinSos*) to draft, socialize, revise, and disseminate working guidelines for heads of village to follow in dealing with IDP and returnee issues, reporting mechanisms to authorities if issues cannot be resolved.

LIVELIHOODS

Key Findings

Prior to displacement the majority of IDPs and returnees were engaged in farming on self-owned lands or as workers/ fishermen. Few were employed as government officials or in skilled technical and professional trades. The conflict resulted in significant livelihood changes, particularly for IDPs.

Almost half of IDPs (46.7%) do not believe that they can return to their previous occupations if returning to their places of origin. Moreover proof of ownership of the home, business, or farmland remains a critical concern for both IDPs and returnees.

In mid-2006 a large proportion of Acehnesse youth did not have paid employment.

Overall, 33.3% of Acehnesse IDPs and 58.4% of Acehnesse returnees did not have paid employment.

A high proportion of current IDPs live in poverty: 80.7% of IDPs and 62.9% of returnees earn less than 30,000 IDR/day, which places them on the threshold of poverty.

Recommendations

- Access to information and therefore public outreach remains critical in order to bridge the gaps between

fear, mistrust and suspicion and enabling IDPs and returnees to access to real opportunities such

as externally funded livelihoods support or even publicly-funded social services.

HOUSING

Key Findings

IDPs and returnees have experienced significant declines in levels of home ownership, particularly IDPs. As a result, IDPs face greater vulnerabilities in relation

to current home ownership. Three-quarters of IDPs and returnees report that their homes are not ready for habitation. Moreover, legal proof of ownership for their homes is still a core concern. As a result, state mediated land dispute

resolution approaches are unlikely to resolve contested land ownership, particularly for transmigrant Javanese IDPs whose land claims are contested by Acehnesse groups with communal or native title claims.

Recommendations

- The GoI and authorities of Aceh to provide IDPs and returnees with the assistance to which they are entitled under the MoU. If government authorities lack the capacity to do this, then they will need to partner with international agencies and civil society organizations to systematically and strategically address recovery needs.
- Systematic public and private efforts need to be supported to urgently address legal ownership of homes, property and businesses. Socialization campaigns via print, broadcast, and television media should be undertaken prior to thorough land verification and registration processes offered free to citizens.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING (KMSP)

Key Findings

Data for the levels and locations of return or IDP resettlement is at best patchy and sometimes anecdotal. Up-to-date data is

required on the conditions and needs of IDP and returnee communities. There is also a need to improve inter-agency cooperation and for local NGOs or INGOs to begin introducing monitoring systems to identify and assess conflict-related


IDPs and returnees. To this end, donors and aid agencies should work to resolve managerial bottle-necks that have delayed the production of evidence-based findings for different conflict-affected communities.

Recommendations

- Local NGOs, INGOs, BRA, government departments and aid agencies should better coordinate in order to improve the monitoring of IDP and returnee communities. ONE agency should be designated to coordinate this monitoring.
- Donors and international organizations to address managerial bottlenecks that have proven obstructionist for producing evidence-based research findings and that, as a result, have grossly delayed the ability of the government and aid actors to engage with the needs of IDPs and returnees in a coherent and strategic manner.

CHAPTER 4 - COMMUNITY STABILIZATION AND RECOVERY

Figure 13: **The Wedge of Vulnerability**
Transition to Sustainable Peace and Development



This chapter examines conflict impacts, reintegration and recovery challenges; based on available data it identifies where, in Aceh, conflict-carrying capacities have been highest since the signing of the August 2005 Helsinki MoU. This chapter reveals high levels of conflict trauma and markedly low access to health, to education, to markets, and sustainable livelihoods opportunities in more heavily conflict-impacted areas of Aceh. Furthermore, high levels of personalized violence experienced during the conflict period have significantly damaged social spaces where levels of suspicion, mistrust, and feelings of betrayal remain high. This chapter reveals the potential for future conflict due to unaddressed conflict-carrying capacities and

explores how IOM initiatives have sought to replace conflict-carrying capacities with sustainable peace-generating capacities at the community level.

Unaddressed conflict legacies can nurture conflict-carrying capacities, which in turn can be politicized by certain elites and mobilized in the form of organized group violence that serves political as well as economic ends. The segment or 'wedge' within civil society in Aceh most vulnerable to backsliding pressures are conflict victims, which includes but is not limited to vulnerable youth, GAM former support networks, and people who were either traumatized by the conflict or feel excluded from peace dividends received during

early and medium-term recovery phases.

In areas that experienced a higher intensities of violence and conflict, infrastructure development remains woeful, whilst poverty and insecurity remains critically overlooked. If these issues are not addressed, community grievances will be shaped by peripheral elites and their followers in an effort to capture political territory and economic resources. In this event, these spoilers act as stressors to the Aceh peace process.

This chapter concludes with a series of recommendations to facilitate community and government efforts to further stabilize communities and address conflict-carrying capacities.


SECTION 1 – CONFLICT IMPACTS, ACCESS ISSUES AND SOCIAL COHESION – WHERE IS IT WORST?

Every district in Aceh is, to a varying degree, conflict-affected. While certain districts were subject to a higher degree of conflict, with these 'hot spots' remaining the most damaged. Districts with the highest proportions of 'hot-spots' (i.e.

villages or sub-districts that experienced a higher relative intensity of conflict) were Aceh Timur (83.2%), Bireuen (67.0%) and Aceh Utara (45.8%), whilst the remaining districts had lower or significantly lower proportions of 'hot-spots' (e.g. Pidie, Aceh

Selatan, Aceh Tengah or Bener Meriah).¹³¹

There is no clear geographic coherence to the concentration of 'hot-spots' or conflict intensity on a district-by-district basis.¹³²

Figure 14: **Proportion of 'Hot-Spot' by District**¹³⁴

Source: World Bank Village Survey Aceh 2006

Some sub-districts in Aceh Tengah—which would be characterized as low-intensity in a district-by-district measurement—experienced extremely high levels of repetitive violence reminiscent of communal/ identity-based conflicts in West Africa, the Horn of Africa, or the Balkans to name but a few places (e.g. Kute Panang and Celala). Similarly, in Aceh Timur and Bener Meriah, the expulsion of ethnic Javanese in some sub-districts represented some of the worst abuses inflicted during the conflict period.¹³³

It is worth reiterating that many areas that experienced relatively higher intensities of violence and conflict have benefited from international assistance because

they were classified as tsunami-affected. Humanitarian actors entered such areas without any substantial contextual understanding. With alacrity, the link between conflict intensity and ex-combatants engaging in predatory activities quickly emerged, often causing implementers to withdraw because of security concerns. Consequently, these 'difficult' areas remain neglected, and in a way, taken hostage by their spoilers groups and individuals. Many of the areas surveyed by IOM have very little international assistance focusing on the post-conflict context.

PROBLEMATIC ACCESS TO SERVICES AND BASIC NEEDS – LIMITING CAPACITIES FOR

REINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY

The extent of recovery challenges created by limited access issues for conflict-affected communities is illustrated by merged IOM/ UNDP and IOM/ Harvard survey data (IDP/ returnee and PNA studies). Among 'hot spot' residents (see Figure 54 Annex C) surveyed by IOM, UNDP, and Harvard, more than half experience difficulty accessing 'food', 'supplies other than food', and 'suitable housing'.¹³⁵ Community access to such items is lowest in the districts of Gayo Lues,¹³⁶ Bireuen, Aceh Tenggara, Aceh Selatan and Aceh Utara.¹³⁷ Moreover, though Aceh has higher levels of poverty than most other Indonesian provinces, the highest levels of poverty within Aceh are found in areas that

currently have the highest conflict-carrying capacities.¹³⁸

The extent to which conflict has impacted social infrastructure, livelihoods, and government services (all key prerequisites for sustainable reintegration and recovery) can be further identified through IOM project data drawn from the districts of Aceh Tenggara, Aceh Tengah, Bener Meriah and Gayo Lues.¹³⁹ Interestingly, IOM project data bears a striking similarity to data gathered through the more formal survey instruments used in PNA and IDP/returnee studies.

Limited Access to Markets and Towns

The conflict-affected communities surveyed through IOM project mechanisms experience major difficulties accessing towns and markets, which indicates poor infrastructure including roads, bridges, and preventative structures such as culverts, road drainage, or retention walls. These difficulties are greatest in heavily conflict-affected communities in Gayo Lues, Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah. Moreover, long-decayed transportation infrastructure across these and other Central Highlands districts has led to a commonly-held notion of isolation. In turn, this sense of isolation has at times been politicized by community elements seeking to consolidate control over the Central Highlands at the possible expense of Aceh's territorial integrity.

Limited Access to Education

Access to education, and levels of education, are generally low across Aceh. Only 39.2% of respondents surveyed through IOM project mechanisms in Aceh Tenggara, Aceh Tengah, Bener Meriah and Gayo Lues have access to secondary school education. Specific to these districts, secondary school access is lowest in Gayo Lues (76.1%), followed by Aceh Tengah (66.1%) and Aceh Tenggara (52.4%); it is highest in Bener Meriah (49.7%). These rates are among the worst across Aceh and illustrate a significant gap

in access to/provision of services between coastal and interior communities. One issue that it is not within the scope of this analysis to adequately address is that the issue of access to education is not always a physical issue, but a human resources issue. While lack of schools, and distance to schools, is definitely a problem in many areas, lack of teachers, staff, and the ability to pay the salaries of such persons, negatively reinforces poor access.

Limited Access to Water

Access to clean water is one of the greatest problems facing conflict-affected communities. Only 48.5% of villages surveyed by IOM report having access to safe water supplies. Lack of access to clean water is a major hygiene and health problem that directly leads to increased mortality rates from usually preventable diseases such as typhoid, cholera, and dysentery. In Aceh, such diseases are more deadly because of the low quality and quantity of medical staff across the province. Misdiagnoses are common and lead to second and third opinions being sought further from home villages: thus the problem becomes a financial one as well, and leads to decreased production and working hours.

Moreover, lack of access to water creates significant opportunities for the emergence of new conflicts for control over natural resources, which proves an especially difficult challenge to overcome given the history of violent horizontal conflicts at community-level during the conflict period and lingering patterns of social mistrust.

Lack of access to clean water also impacts upon social development. Families spend more of their income on bottled or trucked water, and/or women and children are required to fetch water from sources that are often long distances from their homes. As a result, the longer time needed to transport clean water takes time away from other activities such as recreation or income-generating activities.

Limited Access to Health

More than half (56.0%) of the villages surveyed by IOM reported having inadequate access to health facilities. This figure closely matches the levels of access to health services amongst GAM/TNA ex-combatants as reported by the World Bank in 2006. Lack of professional medical staff in communities, distances to PUSKESMAS and other health facilities, and dilapidated transportation infrastructure all exacerbate the problem. Consequently, the most common health service accessed by communities (60.6% of respondents) is informal, traditional local health providers – namely traditional or religious healers.¹⁴⁰

While physical health access is limited, psychological health access in Aceh is nearly non-existent. In a province with four million people, and only four full-time psychiatrists, this presents an insurmountable challenge for local health service providers. For example, in Aceh Tenggara – a district with a relatively low proportion of high-intensity conflict areas – 69.7% of villages surveyed by IOM list psychological trauma as a 'very important' or 'important' reintegration and recovery issue.

Limited access to food, non-food items, markets and towns, health facilities and treatments, education, and water, are not separate issues nor can they be addressed by a single sectoral intervention. Lack of roads, lack of trained professionals, lack of physical water sources (in the Highlands), and damage to water sources in the lowlands; the binary interpretation of Aceh into 'tsunami-affected' versus 'conflict affected' has led to an extremely visible demarcation between the coast and the interior. This two-dimensional view is impeding community stabilization and reintegration prospects. It also fuels local momentum in support of secessionist agendas in the Central Highlands, where lack of development is fermenting into new conflict.

SECTION 2 – CONFLICT-CARRYING CAPACITIES AND SOCIAL COHESION

Whilst conflict has impacted on the people of Aceh for decades, the type of conflict experiences and the level of associated trauma differ dramatically among individual

villages and between sub-districts and districts. The following sections use merged IOM/Harvard PNA and IOM/UNDP IDP survey data to identify where the legacies

of conflict continue to impede recovery and reintegration.¹⁴¹ While data was collected for 43 trauma variables,¹⁴² this report focuses on those that can be used to identify where

post-Helsinki conflict-carrying capacities are highest.

TRAUMATIC EVENTS RELATED TO THE CONFLICT

The psychological trauma experienced over generations has instilled varying levels of conflict-carrying capacity in communities. In higher conflict intensity rural areas, 27.9% of respondents experienced 10 or more traumatic events, whilst persons surveyed most commonly experienced 4-6 traumatic events (27.9%).¹⁴³ Only 4.9% of respondents experienced no traumatic events. As a result, over one-quarter (27.9%) of those survey respondents who experienced 10 or more traumatic events are vulnerable to long-term conflict-induced trauma.¹⁴⁴ Psychological trauma is potentially highest in Aceh Selatan, Bireun, Aceh Jaya, Aceh

Utara and Aceh Timur.¹⁴⁵

Personalized Violence and Conflict-Carrying Capacities


Conflict-carrying capacity is incubated by a combination of past conflict experiences and ongoing hardships that are attributable to the legacies of conflict (e.g. limited access to health, education or social infrastructure). It is important to remind the reader that the datasets being analyzed in this report are somewhat dated, with the bulk of all datasets being collected in 2006.

Personalized forms of violence can bring with them some of the greatest negative impacts upon social cohesion for conflict-affected communities. In post-conflict environments the legacies of personalized forms of violence, which in Aceh were often carried out across communities and in public as a ‘lesson taught’

or ‘shock therapy’ to civilians and members of rival groups, can incubate latent conflict-carrying capacities amongst conflict victims and communities. Those communities also often face the combined challenges of accepting returning former combatant who may have perpetrated violence against them and others, or accepting returnees against whom they may have perpetrated violence.

In order to identify which districts face greater reintegration and recovery challenges as a result of the psychological impacts of personalized forms of violence, several questions from merged IOM/UNDP IDP surveys and IOM/Harvard PNA surveys were employed. The questions explored: children kidnapped, disappeared, or killed; torture; sexual assault including rape, family members forced to rape one another, and other sexual abuses.¹⁴⁶

Figure 15 : **Conflict-Carrying Capacity Intensity by District**



Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment Phases 2/3 (2006-7); IOM/Harvard Medical School Psychological Needs Assessments Phases 1/2 (2006-7)

Figure 15 above combines the number of personalized conflict incidents experienced to identify where conflict-carrying capacities are highest. Again, Aceh Selatan, Aceh Utara, and Bireuen are among the districts with communities retaining the highest conflict-carrying capacities (40% or more of respondents having directly suffered from personalized forms of violence).¹⁴⁷ There are also interesting differences between IOM's CCC ranking and the World Bank's sub-district conflict intensity ranking system which suggest that a CCC ranking offers more utility in addressing post-conflict recovery needs at the community-level by

identifying where current tension is higher, rather than looking at where conflict was more intense in the past.¹⁴⁸


Social Cohesion/ Trust – Where is it Lowest?

Personalized forms of violence are linked part and parcel to psychological damage: feelings of betrayal, humiliation, hostility, suspicion, mistrust, resentment, and the desire for revenge among victims, and witnesses, can further incubate conflict-carrying capacities to the extent that they are no longer 'latent'. Frayed social cohesion and trust are distinct obstacles to community stabilization. Given findings in Chapter 3 on

dominant patterns of horizontal inter-village conflict, such psychological factors must be considered, and must be used to identify where conflict-carrying capacities remain the greatest.¹⁴⁹

Standalone PNA data in Figure 13 below for 'feelings of betrayal' shows that social cohesion was most frayed in the districts of Bireuen, Aceh Tengah, Gayo Lues, Aceh Utara and Aceh Barat. These districts also ranked highly for people reporting feelings of 'mistrust towards other people', 'feelings of hostility from other people', and 'feeling the need for revenge'.¹⁵⁰

Figure 16: **Feeling that Someone Betrayed You by District (%)**



Source: IOM/Harvard Medical School Psychosocial Needs Assessments Phases 1/2 (2006-7)

Not surprisingly, these districts either hosted large GAM-controlled areas (and thus experienced high levels of vertical conflict between GAM combatants and state security forces) or experienced acutely violent identity-based horizontal conflicts at the community level (e.g. ethnic or political conflict – or a combination of both – as occurred in Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah).

Like infrastructure development assistance, psychological trauma can become a resource to be utilized by local elites with political agendas, economic profit motives, or a combination of both. PNA data therefore suggests that traumatized community members, particularly in more ethnically diverse areas, are vulnerable to becoming co-opted into new forms of identity-based or

violent criminal conflict, or a combination of both. This appears to have been demonstrated by recent (2008) clashes between former GAM combatants and anti-separatist groups in the Central Highlands, which left five people dead and a community leader wounded. In ethnically homogenous locations, differing political allegiances among GAM factions are also leading to new forms

of violent conflict (e.g. in Aceh Utara or Aceh Timur) as these groups seek to capture assets or extort commercial and non-commercial organizations. In some instances there has also been an emergence of new violent groups, particularly among youth, or the expansion in membership of demobilized factions amongst ex-combatant groups. It is therefore no surprise that little confidence is expressed by conflict victims such as IDPs and returnees that ex-combatant groups can successfully reintegrate into society.

Although the sorts of issues outlined above can vary greatly by locality, they often combine to create significant insecurity dilemmas in the minds of many community members, which as a result fuels conflict-carrying capacities at the community-level.¹⁵¹

Horizontal and Vertical Cleavages: Communities, Ex-combatants and State Security Forces

IOM/UNDP Phase 3 IDP Assessment data specific to Bener Meriah and Aceh Timur provides further insight into post-conflict recovery in relation to community trust toward state security institutions, social leaders, and leaders of local GAM and anti-separatist groups. Although these districts have differing conflict and post-conflict dynamics,¹⁵² common trends emerge.

Respondents in Bener Meriah and Aceh Timur have low levels of trust toward state security institutions.¹⁵³ Some 48.7% of respondents trust TNI (Aceh Timur 44.9%, Bener Meriah 52.4%), whilst 48.3% trust the police (Aceh Timur – 43.9%, Bener Meriah – 52.8%). Similar patterns of trust amongst conflict-affected communities are found towards both pro-GAM and anti-separatist groups.

Levels of trust in leaders of both pro-GAM and anti-separatist groups are lower in both districts than trust towards state security institutions. Leaders of pro-GAM groups are trusted by 40.6% of respondents (Aceh Timur 40.4%, Bener Meriah 40.8%), whilst levels of trust toward leaders of anti-separatist groups are 35.1% (Aceh Timur 31.2%, Bener Meriah 38.9%).

Although respondents in both districts report similar levels of distrust, a disparity emerges which appears related to the different ethnic composition of the two districts. Bener Meriah was, and remains, a multiethnic district, comprised of Acehnese, Gayonese, and Javanese. Aceh Timur was multiethnic – minority Javanese and majority Acehnese.

Traditional Governance Institutions

It is encouraging to note that post-MoU levels of trust toward social leaders remained


fairly high in Aceh Timur and Bener Meriah. Following the MoU, trust in current heads of village was 80.1% (Aceh Timur 75.6%, Bener Meriah 84.7%). Similarly, trust in other social leaders remained strong, at about 70% in both districts. As with IDP and returnee groups, data suggests that traditional institutions remain fairly resilient mechanisms for community governance, and are playing an important role in facilitating community stabilization and recovery.

Community Participation

Post-MoU levels of participation in community activities were fairly high in Aceh Timur and Bener Meriah (83.3% participation versus a pre-MoU 69.4%). This shows a promising level of recent community recovery and strengthening of social cohesion.¹⁵⁴

However, as with the levels of IDP participation in community activities discussed in Chapter 3, levels of community participation are based upon individual involvement in different types of community groups (see Figure 14 below). This means that individuals often participate in one or two types of community groups. As a result, although community participation appears to have increased since the signing of the MoU, it is not clear whether the nature of this participation is cross-cutting (i.e. horizontally across different ethnic or political groups).

Figure 17 : **Community Participation**



SECTION 3 – COMMUNITY LIVELIHOOD RECOVERY

Community stabilization related to post-conflict recovery cannot be separated from livelihoods. Economic data from 2007 shows that 26.7% of Acehnese live in poverty; a high figure given provincial reconstruction efforts, and especially in comparison with the Indonesia-wide 16.6% poverty rate.¹⁵⁵

Although provincial-level comparisons demonstrate conflict impacts upon livelihood opportunities in Aceh, they do not sufficiently demonstrate the particularly debilitating impact that conflict has had upon the livelihood opportunities of communities in ‘hot spot’ conflict areas, and how such livelihoods issues have a debilitating effect upon stabilization and reintegration programming. This section explores how conflict has affected livelihood opportunities and then compares those impacts with changes to the livelihood opportunities of tsunami-affected communities.

This presents itself as a significant problem for the analysis of the livelihood activities of tsunami victims, rather than conflict victims. Examining the impact of conflict upon livelihood activities covers a period

spanning generations. On the other hand, tsunami impacts are more recent or short-term with clearly identifiable physical forms of destruction upon infrastructure, business and community livelihoods – thus arguably making recovery somewhat easier. For example, there is a general consensus on required recovery activities (e.g. building homes, providing emergency relief and medical assistance). Therefore, the best that might be achieved is to identify how livelihoods have been impacted by man-made vs. natural disaster and to what extent communities can return to their previous livelihood when recovering from one or the other.


LIVELIHOODS IMPACTS FOR CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES

Pre-Conflict: Before discrete stages of the conflict affected them, major livelihood activities for communities classified as conflict-affected in Aceh Timur and Bener Meriah were ‘farmer’ (an aggregated figure including farm laborers and farm landowners – 65.9%), and ‘fish-farm/ fisheries’ (11.0%). This was followed by ‘unskilled work’ and ‘merchants without staff’ (both at 4.7%), with a combined

5.1% of various skilled occupations (i.e. ‘businessperson with staff’, ‘merchant with staff and driver’).¹⁵⁶ Not surprisingly, these figures closely resemble the livelihood occupations of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners prior to August 2005 MoU (see Chapter 2), which suggests that the economic opportunities available to the general population were similar.¹⁵⁷

Post-Conflict: After experiencing conflict (or becoming conflict-victims), there was a general decline across occupational groupings. The only increase was found in ‘farm worker/ fishermen’ (+3.2%). Declining levels of employment in skilled or ‘profitable’ livelihood activities was seen in ‘farm owner’ (-3.1%), ‘merchants with staff’ (-2.0%) and ‘government officials’ (-0.4%). The only skilled livelihood to show an increase was ‘teachers and lecturers’, which rose by +0.2% in Aceh Timur and by +0.6% in Bener Meriah. Moreover, 68.2% of respondents reported changing their occupations after being affected by conflict (i.e. fleeing their homes for the first time) – a rate of change 36.7% greater than the rate of occupational change found amongst tsunami-affected communities (see below).

Figure 18 : Change in Occupation as Result of Conflict Impacts Upon People’s Livelihoods



Source: IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment (Phase 3) (2007)

TSUNAMI-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES


Before the tsunami, farming was the most common respondent livelihood activity (46.4%). The other most commonly recorded livelihood activities were 'trading' (16.3%) and 'fishing' (12.6%), with only 2% of people in skilled occupations (e.g. 'doctor', 'teacher', 'mechanic', or 'carpenter').

IOM livelihood data for recovery projects

providing assistance to tsunami-affected communities shows that, post-tsunami, 67.3% of people remained in the same occupations. As shown in Figure 16, the greatest changes were 'laborer' (+3.5%), 'other' (+2.3%), 'driver' (+0.4%) and 'carpenter' (+0.2%) – areas of work (with the exception, perhaps, of 'other') that generally support tsunami reconstruction activities; the 'seller's market' which emerged especially in

regard to day-labor (which created disparities between tsunami- and conflict-affected areas: day-labor rates in Lhokseumawe stand at IDR 35,000, compared to a day labor rate of IDR 50-75,000 in Banda Aceh and other areas) netted more profit than other unskilled or semi-skilled trades. Conversely, the greatest declines were in traders (-2.6%), private business (-2.2%), fishermen (-2.0%) and mechanic (-0.3%).

Figure 19: **Change in Occupation as Result of the Tsunami**



Source: IOM/USAID Livelihood Database (2007)

The most significant occupational changes for tsunami-affected communities occurred in Aceh Besar and Aceh Timur. In Aceh Besar, the highest increase occurred in farmer (+8.2%) and worker (+8.2%), whilst the greatest decreases were in trader (-7.6%) and fishermen (-3.2%). Aceh Timur saw a massive decline in fishermen (-23.6%), whilst there was a significant increase in farmer (+10.5%) and a large increase in trader (+5.3%), which obviously suggests that many fishermen in these areas moved into work sectors in support of tsunami-recovery activities (i.e. probably more profitable opportunities arose as suggested by higher day labor

rates above). Banda Aceh had a notable increase in workers (+5.4%), and declines in traders and farmers (-8.3% and -4.5% respectively). Bireuen witnessed only minor changes, with a 3.2% decline in traders, and increases for workers (+1.3%), drivers (+2.3%) and teachers (+0.8%).

Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from the data above. First, there has been upward economic mobility for tsunami-affected communities. This upward economic mobility is likely short-term in nature as it is the product of international tsunami recovery assistance.

Second, once levels of tsunami assistance decline, so too will opportunities for upward economic mobility. Whether or not there will be a negative reversal in economic opportunities (i.e. downward mobility) remains an open question.¹⁵⁸ Finally, although livelihood recovery is difficult for both types of disaster, conflict-affected communities have typically experienced downward economic mobility into less profitable livelihoods, which makes it more difficult for people to move laterally into new economic sectors or livelihoods. More often than not they are stuck in a cycle of conflict-induced poverty (i.e. poverty traps).

SECTION 4 – IOM COMMUNITY STABILIZATION AND RECOVERY

The varied recovery challenges identified above are addressed by the holistic methodologies underpinning community stabilization activities implemented by IOM. IOM has focused much of its energy on community stabilization programming that operates in tandem with more targeted client-based assistance. This combination of targeted and non-targeted assistance recognizes that areas of return may lack 'absorption capacity' for such returnees; it aims to provide communities with visible infrastructure, economic, and social benefits while at the same time providing individual assistance to ex-combatants, ex-political prisoners, and IDPs or returnees. This programming has strengthened the capacities of conflict-affected receiving communities, while also serving to alleviate issues related to community access to services and basic needs through the rehabilitation of damaged community infrastructure.

IOM community stabilization projects have been active in 13 districts, 77 sub-districts and 1,150 villages across Aceh. Two different approaches to community stabilization are implemented as part of IOM's Post-Conflict Recovery Program (PCRP): the USAID-funded Support for Conflict-Affected Communities Project (SCACP), and the CIDA/ UNDP-funded Support to Former GAM Returnee Communities Project (MGKD).¹⁵⁹

MGKD has worked for nearly three years through the Gol Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) mechanisms in 580 conflict-affected villages, and is set to expand into a further 141 over the coming twelve months. However, unlike KDP, which has traditionally focused on rural infrastructure such as roads and agricultural irrigation systems, selected and implemented through a community-driven development approach, the MGKD has a much more diverse array of project possibilities. Such projects (limited to a grant size of IDR 73 million per village), chosen through KDP-facilitated meetings and consultations, have aided in both the reintegration of GAM/TNA ex-combatants into village life, and in rebuilding trust (i.e. social cohesion) in once-divided communities through lengthy consultative mechanisms. Communities assisted by the MGKD select

and prioritize projects based on voting using existing KDP processes.

The SCACP operates in the districts of Aceh Tengah, Bener Meriah, Gayo Lues, and Aceh Tenggara in 408 heavily conflict-affected villages throughout the Central Highlands. The project, now in its second year, is a flexible, multi-thematic peace-building intervention that supports the peace process by facilitating and enabling clearly visible, quick-impact infrastructure, livelihoods, and socio-cultural projects to conflict-affected communities. The facilitation at the village-level of local dialogue and negotiation processes is achieved in partnership with local partner NGOs. The projects that are decided upon by communities constitute process-oriented 'peace dividends' for communities that have seen very little in the way of visible and tangible benefits since the peace agreement was signed.

The SCACP also works through local government, local NGOs, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), radio stations, and SCACP-formed community-based self-help groups, all of which have undergone intensive capacity-building and training since 2006. It is important to note a major difference with the MGKD; while MGKD espouses project selection by voting, SCACP communities prioritize projects using a process of evaluation and scoring facilitated by local NGO partners. The project has further facilitated the entry of well-established Indonesian NGOs into the province. The SCACP also leverages its interventions through joint projects with other implementers including UNDP and DAI.¹⁶⁰

In both SCACP and MGKD, the consultative and facilitating processes are part and parcel of the underlying peace-building and social cohesion methodologies. In conflict-affected communities, while all projects have tangible and visible end-outputs which address both infrastructural and economic issues (both as well relating to access), it is the process that is actually more important than the outcome in regard to restoring trust and rebuilding those democratic and community spaces that were damaged by the conflict. SCACP's cluster approach (whereby

multiple villages must select an infrastructure project that benefits all of them) in particular seeks to restore inter-village trust in restive areas where relations between villages broke down during the conflict and in many cases irrupted into internecine violence.¹⁶¹

Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups Assisted

SCACP has provided assistance to 173,813 beneficiaries affected by conflict, whilst the MGKD has provided assistance to 266,455 individuals through a less targeted assistance approach, for a combined total of 440,268 beneficiaries (or 11% of Aceh's population) in the most heavily-conflict affected areas of the province. Through the SCACP, 156,783 beneficiaries have received community infrastructure assistance including bridges, learning centers, sports grounds and roads, with 899 people directly employed in construction work (including 182 GAM/TNA ex-combatants¹⁶²).

Livelihood projects implemented by SCACP, ranging from fisheries and farming activities to home industries and an innovative community-appropriate technologies pilot project, directly support a further 8,432 persons not benefiting from infrastructure. Meanwhile 30,842 conflict-affected people have directly benefited from socio-cultural activities such as peace concerts, theatrical performances and various trainings – all of which have served to restore or to establish healthy community spaces. Of these beneficiaries from socio-cultural activities, 8,598 have not benefited from either infrastructure or livelihoods activities.¹⁶³ Another aspect of the SCACP as it relates to the opening of social and democratic spaces is community radio journalism programming broadcast throughout the Central Highlands, which reinforce a common identity irrespective of politics or ethnicity.

SCACP villages prioritize the restoration of social spaces as well; community-driven project selection has been highest for socio-cultural activities (65 sub-projects). This is unusual; most CDD approaches result in infrastructure. Under the SCACP, selection of infrastructure projects, focused on social spaces and projects that are in

the common-interest between villages. For instance, children's centers were the most commonly selected project, whilst other projects such as football fields, community centers, schools, and markets also directly enhance community social spaces. The cluster approach, however, does limit infrastructure options (e.g. provision of water for one village) and makes common-interest preferences such as 'socially-themed' activities more likely.

As shown in Table 245 in Annex C, SCACP livelihood activities have also supported the economic recovery of highly vulnerable groups – including widows, the physically handicapped, orphans, IDPs, or those psychologically traumatized as a result of the conflict.¹⁶⁴ The provision of assistance to highly vulnerable groups has occurred through Self-Help Group membership and participation in cooperative activities. This targeted assistance to vulnerable persons, when occurring in tandem with targeted assistance to ex-combatants, makes such assistance within the DDR process more palatable to the community as a whole. Future interventions not necessarily linked to ex-combatant reintegration may wish to class ex-combatants and their families as vulnerable, given the backsliding risk to the community as a whole that some ex-combatants may pose.

Findings from the MGKD project selection shown in Table 246 in Annex C support the SCACP findings above in regard to the project preferences of conflict-affected communities. MGKD communities, working through KDP mechanisms that guarantee flexibility according to immediate, village-level context, select from a variety of projects. Communities have generally selected socio-cultural or infrastructure activities (Infrastructure: 322, Socio-cultural: 438). The most commonly selected infrastructure sub-projects are roads and bridges (74), followed by drainage/irrigation (102). Other infrastructure projects chosen which involve social spaces include community centers, education facilities, health facilities, *meunasah* (*mushollah* or local mosque) and village offices.¹⁶⁵

Data on types of socio-cultural activities selected suggest that community events and group sports activities are prioritized in the post-conflict context by

the communities themselves to bring villages together around common and politically neutral events.

Levels of Community Participation

The broad tools utilized within community stabilization are more than the sum of their parts and should combine to display social impacts not related to the quantifiable physical outputs. To this end, questions found in IOM/UNDP IDP Assessments, comparative levels of community participation between IOM and non-IOM community stabilization program-assisted villages are examined.

IOM/UNDP IDP and returnee survey participants were drawn from villages that received assistance from IOM as well as from villages that did not. The data illustrates the beneficial impact of IOM community stabilization and peace-building projects, which here is measured through levels of community participation since the signing of the 2005 Heksinki MoU through to 2007. Use of the data in this fashion is underpinned by the assumption that, if positive social impact had been made by IOM, an effect size should be noticeable through survey data asking the same participation questions across different villages.

Analysis shows that villages receiving assistance through IOM projects were slightly more likely to participate in community activities (84.4% compared to 81.3% in non-IOM villages). Levels of voting amongst individuals in IOM vs. non-IOM assisted villages also indicate positive peace-building impacts. Voting in the 2006 Pilkada was higher amongst respondents in IOM-assisted villages (96.6% compared to 91.1%). This suggests that these villages were more willing to participate in their own governance and that levels of political participation were generally high across different returnee communities and host communities.

Peace-building Impacts in SCACP

Together with local partners, SCACP monitoring and evaluation mechanisms tracked a number of peace-building indicators. As a direct result of livelihood and infrastructure projects implemented through SCACP, communities reported feeling an improved sense of security (39.0% of infrastructure beneficiary respondents and 37.1% of livelihoods beneficiary respondents). Infrastructure

projects also led to improved levels of child education as a result of the project (29.3%).

A key benefit of livelihood projects reported by beneficiaries was that they have allowed men to go back to the fields for work, as well as to return to their previous livelihoods as a result of increased security conditions (14.5%). In addition, both livelihood and infrastructure projects have allowed communities to reinvigorate economic activities and to improve community belief that there will be a positive and peaceful future (Infrastructure 9.8%; Livelihoods 6.5%).

These activities have addressed two key conditions for successful reintegration and recovery: improving security and facilitating the recovery of sustainable livelihoods. Community stabilization programming, then, has helped to repair the social spaces that were destroyed or damaged by three decades of insecurity and conflict.


Peace-building Impacts in MGKD

Results from recent focus group discussions with 84 MGKD project villages show significantly positive changes over the previous year in levels of trust, social interaction, and freedom of expression. This tends to support SCACP project findings that, as extrapolated from 2007 IOM/UNDP IDP Assessments, IOM assistance has made significant peace-building impacts by strengthening and expanding social spaces in heavily conflict-affected villages. Moreover, recent FGD data demonstrates that the positive impacts made by IOM one year ago are being consolidated on the ground – the hardest goal to achieve, and the most desired project impact.

The biggest change was in Aceh Barat Daya, which saw a + 80.0% increase for those rating their level of trust as 'high' or 'very high'. More broadly, 85.9% of participants indicated that trust is 'high' or 'very high' today compared to only 33.2% of participants one year ago.

Social interaction within villages has also changed positively. Results indicate a fall of 23.7% in those that previously rated social interaction as 'very low'. In addition, 48.9% of the participants changed their rating to 'high' or 'very high', thus increasing the total rating of social interaction as 'high' or 'very high' to 90.1%.

Figure 20 : MGKD Project Peace-Building Impacts



Source: IOM/CIDA MGKD Focus Group Discussions (December 2007)

Of all the peace-building indicators used, freedom of expression, or the ability of a person to express one’s own opinion freely and publicly, witnessed the greatest increase. One year ago, only 27.6% of participants indicated that their freedom of expression was ‘high’ or ‘very high’. Now, 89.1% of participants feel that it is ‘high’ or ‘very high’. At the same time, there has been a 37.5% decrease in the proportion of participants indicating very low freedom of expression (39.3% one year ago and 1.8% today).

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

As with all projects, but particularly those operating in a post-conflict environment, difficulties with project implementation become an almost daily routine. These difficulties are often instructive and offer lessons for improvement. Below is a brief discussion of the key issues that have arisen in IOM community-based reintegration and recovery efforts in Aceh.

Implementation Delays

Issues with contractors/local partners, extensive community/local partner facilitation processes, and logistical difficulties relating to transportation of materials to distant sites on secondary roads, have led to delays with implementation.

Specific technical problems that affected infrastructure projects, including contractor inability to pre-finance the start of a given

project (i.e. available funds in excess of 40% of the contract value would be the minimum necessary to effectively meet project timelines), were a recurring problem. In some cases, contractors bid on projects that they had limited financial or technical capacity to undertake, and attempted to attain financial or technical capacity to implement only after the contract was signed. A perception exists among contractors that IOM and others will somehow pay advances not defined within the contract, rather than the usual practice of only paying for work completed and verified.¹⁶⁶

A further problem relates to the conceptual understanding of a contract; many local contractors failed to understand that it is a legally binding document. *Force Majeure*, a widely misunderstood legal principle has entered the contractor vernacular and is interpreted to mean heavy rainfall, cash-flow problems, holidays, or family issues.

Further, contractors originating from outside the sub-district, or even district, of implementation feel less of a sense of responsibility towards a successful and timely project undertaking. Development actors need to ensure that local contractors are given preference and tenders are only awarded to non-local contractors when the requisite capacity is not available at the local level. In addition, contractors tend to hire non-local daily labor that has no vested interest in the project.

Local labor whose families actually stand to benefit from the intervention undertaken were consistently found to do a more timely and professional job. Lastly, contractors unknown by the local community find themselves open to pressure and threats.

A problem specific to community infrastructure development commonly experienced by agencies working in Aceh relates to predatory, rent-seeking activities and threats levied at contractors by persons claiming past association with ex-combatant groups. This has usually impacted larger, and more attractive, public works projects (as opposed to IOM’s ‘quick impact’ infrastructure) whereby an average of 3% to 8% of a contract is paid, not by the INGO or multilateral, but by the contractor who won the tender. The demanded sum – sometimes referred to as *Pajak Nanggroe* (a GAM levy) – is anticipated by contractors bidding on Aceh projects and is often hidden within the overall budget; problems arise when local extortionists demand more than the contractor has anticipated. To overcome this recurring problem, the SCACP project in the Central Highlands proactively engaged potential extortion actors through government and local BRA/KPA representatives and innovated a tendering process that awarded points to local contractors for utilizing GAM/TNA ex-combatants as workers on the project in question. This led to a dramatic decrease in various forms of ‘rent-seeking’ from IOM projects.

SECTION 5 – RECOVERY GAPS FOR VULNERABLE CONFLICT-AFFECTED GROUPS

If the aim of reintegration and recovery is to facilitate the sustainable reintegration of conflict-affected communities into society in manner that will lead to sustainable peace and development, the lack of accurate data on such groups and conflict victims is troubling on a number of levels. Thus far, the attention of aid agencies, the government and other actors has overwhelmingly focused on tsunami-affected areas. Areas impacted by the tsunami that were also affected by the conflict were not recognized by project implementers who often introduced ‘capturable’ assets (in the form of everything from boats to brick kilns) and created new opportunities for local elites and conflict actors to prey upon beneficiary communities as well as local and international organizations providing assistance to conflict-affected communities.

This has created major gaps in terms of where assistance has been directed, with an insufficient number of conflict-sector donors and assistance providers to meet the pressing needs of communities found in those areas.

A methodological problem also emerges in relation to demographic definitions. There is no clear consensus about the definition, size, importance, and nature of vulnerable groups in Aceh. Vulnerability criteria encompasses, in addition to actual residency in an area mired in relatively higher levels of violence and conflict during the conflict period, youth, unemployed or underemployed, widows, orphans, wounded, those physically disabled or that suffered psychological trauma as a result of the conflict,¹⁶⁷ and those heavily impoverished as a result of conflict.

The nature of summary data available from BRA makes it impossible to identify and track specific gaps by vulnerable groups either in total numbers or based along geographic concentrations. Nevertheless, BRA’s *Pelaksanaan Reintegrasi – Damai Aceh* (2006) progress report, as detailed in Table 6, indicates that 25,672 mentally/physically traumatized conflict victims in 67 Aceh sub-districts have received direct assistance in the form of either *Diyat* (compensation payment for surviving family member(s) of conflict victims who died or went missing as a result of the conflict)

Table 6: **BRA Assistance to Conflict-Victims**

Type of Assistance	Number of Beneficiaries	Amount Provided
<i>Diyat</i> Payments	20,144	IDR 60,342,000,000
Housing Assistance	4,978	IDR 172,603,500,000
Aid for physically handicapped victims	550	IDR 5,500,000,000
Health Services	(7 Hospitals)	IDR 5,000,000,000
Economic Recovery to Conflict Victims	(67 sub-districts)	IDR 215,000,000,000
TOTAL		IDR 458,445,500,000

Source: Pelaksa’an Reintegrasi – Damai Aceh (BRA, 2006)

payments, cash for housing, and other monetary assistance.¹⁶⁸

DIFFICULTIES IN PROJECTING THE SIZE OF VULNERABLE GROUPS

In this report an attempt is made, based upon limited available data, to estimate the size of vulnerable groups in Aceh. The data, or lack thereof, indicate massive reintegration and recovery assistance gaps. Not surprisingly, the largest gaps are for persons potentially suffering from post-conflict trauma, as well as orphans and widows. It is important to note that in determining the causes of deaths in the case of spouses and parents (i.e. widows and orphans), attribution is a constant concern given the massive impact of the tsunami.

In areas that underwent higher intensities of conflict and surveyed through SPAN, 4% of respondents report losing a spouse during the conflict. In the same areas, as surveyed by the World Bank Village Survey (2006), 5% of respondents report losing a parent during the conflict.

The numbers of persons who received serious physical injuries during the conflict, and the number of persons who have suffered from psychological trauma as a result of the conflict, has not been comprehensively measured in any Aceh-wide study.

However, the Phase 2 IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment (2006), and the Phase 1/2 IOM/Harvard Medical School Psychosocial Needs Assessment (2006-7), which focused only upon areas of prolonged violence and higher relative conflict intensity, revealed troubling figures. In the areas surveyed, 8.4% of respondents had potentially debilitating physical injuries from the conflict,¹⁷⁰ while 23.3% of respondents suffered psychological trauma as a result of the conflict.¹⁷¹ Aceh-wide rape statistics do not exist, while district-level statistics are marred by under-reporting that distorts an accurate understanding of rape. Furthermore, data does not exist on single female-headed households, nor is there data for elderly persons ranked according to any type of vulnerability criteria.

Table 7: **Projected Size of Vulnerable Groups**

Total Population: 3,995,546		Projected Vulnerable
Widowed at some stage of the conflict*	4.0%	155,473
Orphaned at some stage of the conflict**	5.0%	184,021
Serious Physical Injury due to conflict (potentially disability)	8.4%	335,625
Psychological Trauma as a result of conflict	23.3%	930,941
Single Female-Headed Households	N/A	N/A
Rape Victims	N/A	N/A
Vulnerable Elderly	N/A	N/A

* Widowed status includes both male and female. SPAN (2006) (via MapFrame).
** World Bank Village Survey Aceh (2006).

SECTION 6 – KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUILDING SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN ACEH

Several key issues continue to impact reintegration and recovery efforts in Aceh. With the exception of strengthening ‘good governance’, many of these can be classified into three categories: the first relates to social cohesion, the second to strengthening community access to government services, and the third to social infrastructure improving livelihood security (e.g. improving access to markets and sustainable local economic development). The following sections outline several key findings made above, and provide recommendations to facilitate successful peace-building, reintegration and recovery processes in Aceh.

ACCESS ISSUES (MARKETS, TOWNS, EDUCATION, WATER, HEALTH)

Key Findings

Whilst the negative relationship between conflict and development appears somewhat obvious, aggregate development statistics presented for

Aceh, particularly when compared to other Indonesian provinces, tends to hide the severity and extent of damage caused to social infrastructure and sustainable livelihoods for conflict-affected communities. As a result, there is often a complete failure by outside actors to appreciate difficult social conditions for communities recovering from the legacies of violent conflict.¹⁷² These communities have low access to basic necessities such as food and water and have limited access to markets or towns, which together impose major obstacles to livelihood opportunities.

Transportation infrastructure has broken down over the course of the conflict and limits access to markets and towns. Whilst levels of education are low throughout Aceh, access to education is particularly low for areas that have experienced protracted violence and conflict. Further recovery obstacles are created by low access to basic services such as health, clean water and

housing. As a result of generally low levels of social development and limited government health service delivery capacities, communities rely upon traditional healers who also lack the capacity to deal with acute physical injuries, as well as legacies of conflict-trauma in individuals. All of the above access issues are intertwined and all reduce productivity and negatively impact livelihoods.

As relating to access and needs, the priority of post-conflict actors should be to bridge the medium-term gap between what a suspicious populace expects and what a new government structure can deliver, while the capacity of the government particular to the sub-district or district-level is strengthened. Ensuring access to services and the meeting of basic needs through such interventions is part and parcel of trust-building mechanisms that allow for civilians to have a vested interest in the legitimacy of the state.

Recommendations

General Access:

- Demand-driven community recovery and development interventions that elicit common-interest projects that promote better communication within and between villages and community-based institutions using a cluster-based recovery approach. The KDP model of infrastructural development is a strong and scalable model for this, and donor funds should be channeled through KDP mechanisms.
- The reallocation of tsunami-earmarked funds in the MDF towards public works projects in the Central Highlands and in hinterland communities along the East, North, and West coasts - namely roads.

Education:

- The creation of cost-recovery mechanisms dedicated to teacher salaries within community livelihoods projects and cooperatives with revolving funds- a tactic IOM’s local partners have

undertaken with some degree of success to pay teacher’s salaries in rural schools.

- MDF provides funds to the Provincial Government for an initiative to pay for the education of aspiring teachers in exchange for two-year postings in rural areas.
- Further livelihoods projects in neglected areas can, if implementation time frames are realistic, co-fund education at the community level.

Water:

- Affirmative prioritization of women’s infrastructure choices and demands will result in the prioritization of potable water service and delivery projects. Women are traditionally responsible for water transport, treatment, and use. They will vote accordingly.
- Disaster mitigation technologies

(culverts, drainage, retention walls, gabions, etc) to be employed in projects and specified in tender documents.

Health:

- Continued emphasis on health and hygiene awareness training should compliment all water and sanitation interventions. Safe handling, storage, and treatment of water for consumption (and, for that matter, food preparation) remains unknown across much of Aceh.
- Training and provision of first aid materials to turn traditional healers into first instance community health service providers based on the POSYANDU system. This training should aim to prioritize psychological trauma cases for targeted assistance in areas that experienced higher intensities of violence and conflict. The nature of the targeted assistance belies a strict definition of what such assistance would constitute.

CONFLICT-INDUCED TRAUMA AND CONFLICT-CARRYING CAPACITIES, KEY OBSTACLES FOR SOCIAL REINTEGRATION

Key Findings

Conflict legacies related to trauma bring with them significant challenges for strengthening and rebuilding of healthy social spaces that deteriorated as a result of the conflict. These challenges have clear implications for peaceful reintegration and recovery processes. When people remain

fearful and mistrusting of other groups, the misuse and manipulation of such resultant insecurity dilemmas by elites can fertilize new conflicts.

Close to one-quarter of respondents in IOM/UNDP IDP and returnee and IOM/Harvard PNA datasets potentially suffer from conflict-induced trauma. Various forms of highly personalized conflict can be used to identify where conflict-carrying

capacities have remained highest during the post-conflict period. Districts that retain the highest conflict-carrying capacities are Aceh Selatan, Aceh Utara and Bireuen, followed closely by Gayo Lues, Bener Meriah, Aceh Utara and Aceh Tengah. Psychosocial indicators drawn from PNA studies also show that conflict-carrying capacities remain high even in districts that were relatively stable during the conflict such as Aceh Tenggara.

Recommendations

For BRA:

- BRA to further develop conflict-carrying capacity indicators to target psychosocial assistance on a geographic basis.
- FORBES meets and reaches collective agreement to decentralize client selection processes for reintegration of ex-combatants, ex-political prisoners, IDPs and returnees, conflict victims, and other vulnerable groups, based upon community self-selection and implementer verification ONLY. No recommendation letters from authorities or conflict actors outside the community in question should be necessary.
- Promotion of common work identities which lessen emphasis on implementing agencies and donor marking, and increases the attribution of achievements to government actors including the Provincial Government, Gol, FKK, and BRA.
- Encourage joint monitoring of BRA staff to implementation agencies.

- Local NGOs utilized as field-level partners in all interventions.

For the Provincial Governor's Office and District Offices in addressing grievances and demands in 'hot-spots':

- The Provincial Governor delegates a specific team to regularly visit and directly consult community leaders on grievance-related issues that could manifest into new conflict, and make recommendations on the cross-cutting improvement of services in heavily conflict-affected regions of Aceh such as Bireuen, Aceh Utara, Aceh Selatan, Bener Meriah, and Aceh Tengah: MDF allocates funds accordingly.
- An integrated media campaign that incorporates a common work identity, and clearly communicates efforts made to address grievances and demand. This common work identity should promote a common theme and identity not affixed to ethnicity or language: an Aceh

'brand' that citizens, over the long-term, may identify with and attribute to government.

For Donors:

- Support a joint BRA-FKK commission to develop anonymous reporting structures to investigate reports of extortion and other abuses undertaken by organized conflict actors. Such a commission would have the ability to make public identifications, recommendations, and censures.
- The greater use of participatory mid- and end-of-project 'learning' evaluations (specific to the project methodology and outcomes)- not compulsorily reported to donors- which allows for the community to self-evaluate the project, make recommendations for the success of similar, future projects, and allow for field implementers to undertake their own learning activities without fear of censure by donors.

LIVELIHOODS

Key Findings

Destructive impacts upon livelihoods and livelihood opportunities are more pronounced for conflict areas than tsunami areas, which have received the brunt of donor assistance over the past several years. Conflict-affected communities that have witnessed prolonged exposure to conflict

have experienced downward economic mobility, making it more difficult for them to escape from the resulting 'poverty traps'.

Targeted assistance in the form of self-help to beneficiaries identified by their communities is more effective than generic livelihoods projects (e.g. a hand tractor for the whole village). The facts is that conflict-

affected communities and their vulnerable members (i.e. ex-combatants, ex-political prisoners, IDPs and returnees, host-families, war widows, orphans, impoverished families and conflict-victims) need short-run gains in order to build momentum behind the Aceh peace process: medium- to long-term "community development" is beyond their current needs.

Recommendations

For implementing organizations and donors

- Local civil society networks and

organizations are perfectly placed to consult communities and ask them to identify their most vulnerable members.

- Emphasize livestock and agriculture project assistance (the predominant livelihoods) undertakings in conflict areas

and target assistance to female clients.

- Create livelihoods projects around the concept of 'self help' that uses group-based support structures and delivers in partnership with local CSOs, with training of self-help groups in budgeting, accounting, and small business management aspects in order to keep track of rotational grants.

- Livelihood approaches should focus on both income diversification and improving market access. Secondary, rather than primary, income enhancement at the family unit level is critical. This would entail an emphasis on home-based industries with a focus on women and older members of the extended family.
- Creative exchanges whereby new livelihoods beneficiaries in conflict

areas undertake facilitated visits to long-term, successful livelihoods projects in tsunami areas.

For the Provincial and District Governments:

- Offer incentives and funding to local and national CSOs to rehabilitate productive agricultural lands in heavily conflict-affected areas that have been neglected or abandoned as a result of the conflict.

IOM COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAMMING FOR REINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY

Key Findings

IOM community-based reintegration and recovery programs have demonstrated that labor intensive schemes rehabilitating market orientated-infrastructure (e.g. roads, bridges, irrigation systems) have a tremendously positive impact in terms

of injecting cash into rural economies (particularly vulnerable groups and those prone to back-sliding pressures) whilst at the same time improving community access to markets, schools and health services. Moreover, through SCACP project mechanisms, communities tend to select projects that facilitate the rehabilitation or creation of healthy community spaces, thus working to build

social cohesion. At the same time, communities have themselves targeted vulnerable groups. The combination of these interventions have worked to facilitate broader reintegration and recovery activities for groups such as ex-combatants, ex-political prisoners, IDPs and returnees, as well as other conflict-victims that fall under BRA's assistance mandate.

Recommendations

- Stop-gap Peace-building by Professionals: Multi-faceted, flexible, and conflict-sensitive community stabilization reintegration models should be adopted by professional organizations planning to enter conflict-affected areas, so as to facilitate a genuine transition to sustainable peace and development by addressing community context-specific reintegration and recovery needs.

- BRA and local governments should dedicate support and funding behind widespread socio-cultural peace-building activities by International, national, and local organizations with experience undertaking such activities.

- Reintegration and community stabilization project implementers such as IOM, CEPA/AUSAID, *Yayasan Bina Swadaya*, *Yayasan Bina Usaha Lingkungan*

and local CSOs to provide structured technical advice to BRA and/or relevant government agencies on the planning and implementation of such activities.

- Reintegration and community stabilization project implementers should establish effective exit strategies by linking projects with government recovery programming at the district-level.

REINTEGRATION RECOVERY GAPS

Key Findings

Difficulties are encountered in accurately identifying the sizes of vulnerable groups falling under BRA's assistance mandate. This, three years after Helsinki, speaks of the weaknesses inherent in current monitoring and evaluation systems for conflict-victims.

Data from areas that experienced higher intensities of violence and conflict as collected by IOM/Harvard reveal extremely troubling numbers, and it is believed by the authors that such percentages as detailed in this report can be replicated in conflict

areas across the province. Those potentially suffering from psychological trauma, physical disabilities, the loss of parents, siblings, and spouses, all as a result of the conflict, must be quantifiably measured. It is likely that the number of persons thus affected dwarfs the number assisted. BRA data only details direct assistance to 550 physically handicapped, 4,978 through housing assistance, and 20,144 through *Diyat* payments. Moreover, although physical infrastructure has been undertaken, there does not appear to have been concurrent investment in human resources (e.g. staff

to operate hospitals).¹⁷³

Those that appear most vulnerable are single-headed households (male but particularly female), female victims of rape or other sexual abuses, and orphans who have not received assistance. In many cases children have received inadequate assistance and levels of care since the signing of the Helsinki MoU. In many cases, children are left to their own survival devices for survival which places them at significant risk of exploitation or becoming future conflict actors (i.e. latent conflict-carrying capacities).

Recommendations

- AGTP to work with BRA and donors to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation capacities of relevant reintegration and recovery actors within BRA and the Provincial Government. The starting point for such capacity development should be the recently created results-based matrix, focusing specifically upon the peace cluster as it relates to reintegration and recovery.
- An Aceh-wide study of female conflict-victims and female ex-combatants, their exposure to gender-based violence, the roles they played during the conflict period, and the coping strategies that they have employed as part of local post-conflict recovery processes. The aim of this study would be to investigate and identify the possible roles they can now play in the peace process, whilst at the same time addressing their specialized needs.
- UNICEF and authorities of Aceh to establish community-based orphan care in heavily conflict-affected regions of Aceh such as Bireuen, Aceh Utara, Aceh Selatan, Bener Meriah, and Aceh Tengah. Children, particularly young adults or older children (15-18yo) have special needs and should receive life skills instruction, emotional counseling, and mentoring within their communities.

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ENDNOTES

- 1 Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005.
- 2 DAC, 'DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation' (Paris: OECD, Development Assistance Committee, 1997), p. 56.
DAC, 'Pedoman DAC tentang Konflik, Perdamaian dan Kerjasama Pembangunan' (Paris: OECD, Development Assistance Committee, 1997), p. 56.
- 3 The number of illegal weapons in circulation and unexploded ordnance in Aceh is not known. Disarmament and other weapons control measures are needed to reduce the levels of violence linked both to crime and ongoing post-conflict tensions, particularly in Aceh Utara, Aceh Timur, and Bireun. According to some sources GAM munitions dumps comprise conventional small anti-personnel mines and grenades up to 150 kilogram improvised explosive devices. These weapons and unexploded ordnance has become hazardous probably due to interaction with the elements, deliberate damage, and/or poor fabrication. Some communities in Aceh Utara, Aceh Timur, and Bireun are discovering unexploded ordnance and to date disposal is referred to TNI. In May-July 2008 the 4th Company Bomb Disposal Unit from Lhoksumawe successfully disposed of hundreds of UXOs (both homemade and manufactured explosives).
Jumlah senjata ilegal masih beredar dan bahan peledak yang tidak meledak di Aceh tidak diketahui jumlahnya. Pelucutan senjata dan tindakan kontrol terhadap senjata lainnya dibutuhkan untuk mengurangi tingkat kekerasan yang menghubungkan aksi kriminalitas dan ketegangan pasca konflik yang terus menerus, khususnya di Aceh Utara, Aceh Timur, dan Bireun. Menurut beberapa sumber sisa amunisi GAM terdiri dari ranjau anti-personal konvensional dan granat seberat 150 kilogram bahan peledak buatan. Senjata dan alat peledak lainnya sudah menjadi sangat berbahaya mungkin karena interaksi dengan elemen-elemen lain, kerusakan yang disengaja, dan/atau buatan sendiri yang berkualitas rendah. Beberapa masyarakat di Aceh Utara, Aceh Timur, dan Bireun menemukan alat peledak yang belum meledak dan sampai saat ini masih ditangani oleh TNI. Pada bulan May-July 2008 Unit Gegana yang ke 4 dari Lhokseumawe berhasil menjinakkan ratusan UXO (baik buatan tangan maupun industri alat peledak).
- 4 There is some speculation regarding the numbers of weapons currently circulating in Aceh (or those that have been hidden) despite disarmament efforts in 2005 and a weapons amnesty in 2007. Nevertheless, the disarmament phase of the peace process overseen by the Aceh Monitoring Mission is widely considered to have been among several successful first steps implementing the Helsinki peace agreement.
- 5 Some confusion exists among Aceh development actors in regard to the definition of 'organic'. Organic forces are those permanently stationed in a given region, while non-organic forces are non-permanent and rotated to different parts of Indonesia in order to supplement organic forces depending on security risks such as insurgency or threat of external attack. The term does not mean 'non-Acehnese.'
- 6 *Undang-Undang No. 11 2006 Tentang Pemerintahan Aceh.*
- 7 These include the *Darul Islam* rebellion beginning in 1952, the emergence of GAM as a nationalistic independence movement in 1975-6, the re-emergence of GAM in 1989, *Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM) period of suppression from 1989 through 1998, and an intensification of conflict and the failure of peace agreements in 1999 and 2003, see Edward Aspinall, *Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation*, prepared for the Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, August 2005), pp. 2-5. Available at: <http://www.berghof-peacesupport.org/aceh.htm>
- 8 World Bank Conflict Monitoring Database, January 2005 to September 2006. The types of conflict range from violent GAM-Gol incidents to vigilantism, inter-community violence, administrative disputes and resource-based conflicts (i.e. access to or control of natural resources and/or assistance from government or international agencies). World Bank ACMU available at www.conflictanddevelopment.org
- 9 Due to changes with data encoding, comparable trends in relation to vertical and horizontal conflict are not available for the period October 2006 to September 2007. However, it is fair to argue that with the rise of social conflicts post-December 2006 these types of conflicts have also increased.
- 10 These included Aceh Timur 113 (6.8%), Aceh Utara 239 (14.4%), Bireun 105 (6.3%), Lhokseumawe 134 (8.1%) and Banda Aceh 270 (16.3%).
- 11 For instance, conflict monitoring between November 2006 and April 2007 recorded 641 conflict incidents in Aceh.
- 12 *Badan Narasumber Damai Aceh, 'Draft, Laporan Rencana Strategis BRA (Renstra BRA)' (Banda Aceh, BRA, October 2007), p. 7.*
- 13 Only recently in February-March 2008 further attacks resumed between former combatants from the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and anti-separatist groups in the Central Highlands resulting in five people killed and one community leader wounded.

- 14 BRA, 'BRA Role and Strategy in Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh – Draft Strategy Paper', January 2008, p. 21.
- 15 Reintegration and recovery data is generally weak across government agencies and international organizations BRA, 'Draft: Laporan Rencana Strategis BRA', p. 7. Notable exceptions are the World Bank, which has invested significant resources into conflict monitoring and analysis; IOM, which (with the support of the World Bank, the EC, Harvard University, CIDA, and UNDP) has pioneered a number of vulnerability assessments including psycho-social conflict analysis (2005), IDP assessments (2004 and 2006), and studies on the needs and aspirations of ex-political prisoners (2005); and UNDP, which has undertaken innovative assessments in relation to both justice sector reform (2006) and civil society development in Aceh (2005).
- 16 Overall 28 datasets have been referred to or directly incorporated into this work, for a full list of datasets used for this analysis as well as their respective strengths and weaknesses see Annex D.
- 17 Article 3.2.5 Helsinki MoU.
- 18 Some of BRA's key objectives in providing assistance to conflict-affected groups have included: 1) Providing assistance to ex-GAM combatants in order to guarantee that they can meet their daily needs during the period of transition, as well as help them secure full-time work; 2) Providing economic and business development assistance to ex-combatants so that they can live independently within society over the long-term; 4) Providing assistance to repair or rebuild the homes of conflict-victims so that they have suitable homes to live in, and in a way that promotes cooperation among different groups in society; 5) Providing housing assistance to former anti-separatist groups' members and others so as to prevent feelings of jealousy, and in a way that builds feelings of trust between groups in society; 6) Providing financial compensation to conflict-victims and education/scholarship assistance to children that were made orphans as a result of the pre-MoU conflict; and 7) Providing reintegration assistance (socio-cultural, religious, political, and education) to people that fled during the pre-MoU conflict period (i.e. IDPs and returnees), BRA, 'Draft: Laporan Rencana Strategis BRA', p. 4.
- 19 In a draft plan circulated in October 2007, BRA implicitly notes several specific types of reintegration and recovery gaps: 1) Groups not satisfied that their needs have been addressed (i.e. insufficient or inappropriate assistance provided for needs); 2) Conflict-victims not receiving assistance (i.e. populations that have not received official assistance); 3) Elements of the Helsinki MoU that have not been implemented; and 4) Members of GAM not agreeing with the spirit of the Helsinki MoU (i.e. potential spoiler groups not engaged in the peace process), BRA, 'Draft: Laporan Rencana Strategis BRA', p. 8.
- 20 For a discussion on the harmonization of post-conflict recovery activities see, Cedric de Coning, 'Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peace-building and Integrated Missions – A Norwegian Perspective', Security in Practice No.5, NUPRI Report, 2007, accessed 11 December 2007 at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/PANA-79SHV9?OpenDocument>
- 21 Limitations to existing BRA monitoring systems have made it impossible for this report to explore strategic harmonization gaps. However, harmonization gaps and their relationship to reintegration and recovery is one of several areas to be examined in the follow-up MSR.
- 22 Lack of clear direction from its inception led to a series of embarrassments for BRA. Notably, a call for conflict victims to provide project proposals led to some 50,000 submissions – ultimately a wasted effort for all those involved as BRA lacked the capacity to process the proposals.
- 23 See Decrees of the Governor of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam numbered 330/213/2006 and 330/145/2007 respectively. Most notably, in the recent legislative overhaul, Forum Bersama Pendukung Perdamaian (FORBES) and the Badan Narasumber Damai (Peace Stakeholders Agency) are responsible for assisting and facilitating coordination, as well monitoring and evaluation, of peace-reintegration implementation activities by national and international actors.
- 24 In its most recent version (January 2008) sectoral clusters under the ARF include: (1) Peace Process/Reintegration; (2) Governance, Rule of Law and Democratic Decentralization; (3) Basic Services; (4) Capacity Building and Asset Management; (5) economic development, and; (6) Infrastructure and Housing. See Badan Reintegrasi Aceh-Damai, BRA Role and Strategy in Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh (Banda Aceh: BRA, January 2008).
- 25 The essence of recent debates revolved around a shift toward "normal" or "sustainable development" and away from targeted reintegration and recovery assistance for conflict-affected communities. Those advocating either approach sometimes failed to appreciate that it is not a matter of "one or the other", but rather combining approaches in a complementary fashion so as to ensure a transition to sustainable reintegration, consolidated peace-building across multiple sectors, and in

- turn, longer-term development. For a further discussion on competing definitions of reintegration and providing targeted assistance over broad-based assistance see, Nilsson (2005), pp. 22-29.
- 26 For further discussion in the context of Aceh see conference paper by James Bean and Steve Cook, 'Peace-Building and On-Going Reintegration Processes in Aceh: A VIEW FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION', Paper prepared for the conference "The Peace Process in Aceh: The Remnants of Violence and the Future of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam", Asia Centre, Harvard University, 24-27 October 2007. The paper is available upon request from IOM's Banda Aceh office.
- 27 One such type of macro-level intervention can be improving the economic investment climate in Aceh, thus addressing structural poverty in Aceh. For an example of a more macro-level "institutional peace-building" approach, see the 2006 UNDP Access to Justice In Aceh Assessment and the current UNDP Justice Project in Aceh, which has as one of its aims to address the deep-rooted structural factors that underpinned the conflict. These were factors over which local communities had virtually no ability to effect change, see UNDP, "Access to Justice in Aceh: Making the Transition to Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh" (UNDP/BAPPENAS: June, 2006), available at: <http://www.undp.or.id/programme/governance/>.
- 28 The concept adapts to Aceh the Durable Solutions Framework, which is typically used in reference to IDP and returnee populations: see UNDG, 'UNDG Guidance Note on Durable Solutions for Displaced Persons (refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees)' (New York: United Nations Development Group [UNDG], 2004); IASC, 'Benchmarks for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons' (New York: Inter-Agency Standing Committee [IASC], March 2007); UNHCR, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern (Geneva: Core Group on Durable Solutions UNHCR, May 2003); 4rs, Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) and Development through Local Integration (DLI) comprise what, among reintegration specialists, is the framework for Durable Solutions. Accessed 3 October 2007 at: <http://www.unhcr.org>
- 29 Secretary-General, Note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005. See also the glossary for the UN 'Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards' (August 2006), which uses the same definition.
- 30 This can include spoiler groups, but conflict-carrying capacities in this context more correctly refers to the psychosocial conflict legacies upon communities, which can fuel further conflict within and between communities, or against the state.
- 31 This is in line with broader trends in other post-conflict environments that look to address the social dimensions of ex-combatant reintegration into the fabric of society, see Nilsson (2005), p. 22.
- 32 This assessment initially attempted to apply Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Indicators to identify key vulnerabilities for conflict-affected people. The nature of available data meant that, in most cases, this was not possible. Nevertheless, using MDG indicators allows for targeted assistance, whilst laying the groundwork for a transition to longer-term sustainable development activities that are linked to national, provincial and district development planning mechanisms. MDG indicators have particular utility for prioritizing assistance to the "most needy" and thus mitigating feelings of envy between aid recipients, see UNDG, 'UNDG Guidance Note on Durable Solutions for Displaced Persons', pp. 6-8. Interestingly, Nur Djuli, the current head of BRA, suggests that BRA has adopted a similar approach by focusing on the short- and medium-term reintegration and recovery needs of conflict victims and ex-combatants. On the other hand, long-term development should be addressed by national and provincial bodies.
- 33 In fact, as it is likely that a large proportion of ex-combatants have resettled in new locations, it is entirely possible that many of the assistance principles for finding lasting solutions for IDP and returnee communities are applicable to ex-combatant groups.
- 34 This reflects a broader definition of "combatant" in-line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (passed unanimously in October 2000) and European Parliament (EP) resolution on Participation of Women in Peaceful Conflict Resolution (passed in November 2000). These resolutions demand a more inclusive definition of combatant to include "those associated and at risk during the conflict, such as cooks, logisticians, spies, and sex partners".
- 35 For a fuller discussion on the method employed and assessment limitations springing from the use of different datasets see Annex D.
- 36 In a number of cases available data for this report was from 2005, 2006 or 2007 and, as such, might not reflect current reintegration and recovery dynamics for those groups considered in this assessment. However, this limitation is balanced by the assumption that many of the more deeply rooted conflict pressures/obstacles in relation to reintegration, recovery, and community stabilization are dynamics which cannot change within one or two years. It is therefore assumed that many of the dynamics and vulnerabilities identified herein remain relevant issues to be addressed for consolidating the transition to sustainable peace and development in Aceh.
- 37 United Nations, Operational Guide to the IDDRS (New York: United Nations, 2006), p. 157.
- 38 Anders Nilsson, Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict Societies (Finland: Sida & Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, May 2005), p. 6.
- 39 While some political prisoners released after the signing of the Helsinki MoU fit the classic stereotype of a political

- prisoner (ideologue, advocate, protest organizer, and so on), the majority did not. Many were field-level GAM combatants. Some were non-ideological criminals who identified themselves as GAM upon arrest, while others were non-ideological criminals recruited into GAM, especially during the recruitment drive that occurred immediately prior to the CoHA collapse. Others were simply B-category GAM rank and file combatants that were captured and detained. Others still were accused, often unjustly, of being GAM or involved in GAM-support activities.
- 40 Samples from the ICRS client database were not randomly selected. The GAM/TNA ex-combatant sample is drawn from a list of clients given to IOM based upon a selection made by the Komisi Peralihan Aceh (KPA, the political agency of GAM established as a result of the Helsinki MoU). Since selection was not random, the obvious question is "how broadly can findings from these samples be generalized?" Considering that the overall ex-combatant population (i.e. gun-carrying fighters) is estimated by KPA to comprise some 15,000 individuals, this assessment balances the non-randomized nature of this sample and its size against the estimated total size of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and argues that findings are fairly representative of those that demobilized in the time surrounding the 2005 peace agreement. A similar argument is used for the ex-political prisoner sample drawn from the IOM client-database, which was also a list of beneficiaries provided to IOM, but from the Gol rather than the KPA.
- 41 Article 4.2 Helsinki MoU.
- 42 This assessment does not explore the myriad and complex internal GAM divisions which are rife within the organization (some of which existed before the August 2005 peace agreement).
- 43 This to some extent also reflects a broader definition of female combatant in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (passed unanimously in October 2000) and European Parliament (EP) resolution on Participation of Women in Peaceful Conflict Resolution (passed in November 2000).
- 44 For example, the World Bank's 2006 GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment does not appear to consider the issue of 'veteran status' or the corresponding implications for reintegration and recovery assistance.
- 45 In practice the real figure of ex-combatants or 'veterans' can be lower considering that many local criminal elements will often claim GAM/TNA ex-combatant status for purposes of extortion or social prestige.
- 46 This figure drawn from KPA is used to estimate for the overall size of GAM's B demographic, often referred to as 'rank and file', and is in sharp contrast to the figures claimed by GAM in the lead-up to the peace agreement. Nevertheless, the real size of this population is potentially close to this figure depending on categorization criteria employed.
- 47 During the course of this assessment one senior KPA official noted that 10,000 ex-political prisoners released before the signing of the peace agreement have not received any recovery assistance. This figure is not, however, verified.
- 48 It must however be noted that, quite possibly, a significant number of those that actively supported the insurgency did so because of various abuses they experienced or feelings of social, economic and political exclusion, which 'pushed' them into militant resistance or supporting militant resistance against the Gol.
- 49 Only 40% were married, World Bank, GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment: Enhancing Peace through Community-level Development Programming (Jakarta: World Bank, March 2006), p. 14.
- 50 The World Bank argues that age instead of status as combatant vs. political prisoner was the key factor explaining higher marriage rates amongst ex-political prisoners compared to GAM/TNA ex-combatants. For a fuller regional breakdown of IOM data see Annex A.
- 51 On the relationship between marriage and strengthening social cohesion for returnee communities affected by conflict see, Sara Pantuliano, Margie Buchanan-Smith and Paul Murphy, 'The long road home: Opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas, Report of Phase 1' (London: Overseas Development Institute, August 2007), Report Commissioned by DFID, p. 60.
- 52 For one example of youth vulnerabilities to mobilization into armed groups during times of violent conflict see Robin Luckham, Ismail Ahmed, Robert Muggah and Sarah White, 'Conflict and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: an assessment of the issues and evidence', IDS Working Paper 128, (England: Institute of Development Studies, 2001), pp. 48-49.
- 53 Using only the GAM/TNA ex-combatants figure the confidence interval (using the standard 95% level) is $\pm 1.59\%$, whereas using the total sample (i.e. both GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners) the confidence interval is $\pm 1.13\%$, both of which are high. However, this assumes a random sample. IOM's sample is further tested by making a direct comparison with several variables to the World Bank GAM Reintegration Assessment conducted in 2006, which used a three-stage sampling technique and, in theory, should be much more representative due to its random selection process. Biases in IOM's sample can thus be detected by identifying statistical variations between variables, which in turn would carry through into other variables. Seven out of nine variables show no significant variations. This demonstrates that findings for ex-combatants drawn from IOM's ICRS database are generally representative of the ex-combatant population.
- 54 On the other hand, significant variations relate to livelihoods and primary places of return, with more ex-combatants in IOM's client-roster comprised of rural farmers and

- unemployed, with the highest proportions returning to Bireuen and Aceh Timur, rather than Pidie and Aceh Timur. There are also variations that appear related to the timeframes of data collection and the composition of IOM's client roster (i.e. harder core TNA ex-combatants).
- 55 These findings can be used by a follow-up multi-stakeholder assessment led by the World Bank to measure changes that will have occurred up to the three-year anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki MoU. For example, as one of its principal objectives, measure the progress that has been made for specific ex-combatant and ex-political prisoner sub-groupings in relation to the analysis conducted herein as well as the World Bank's 2006 GAM Reintegration Assessment.
- 56 United Nations, *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards* (2006), p. 8. This point is further illustrated by the fact that upon entering IOM's ICRS program, GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners voiced a range of long-term aspirations. Secondary preferences for information demonstrated a slightly wider range of reintegration and recovery needs for GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners. Respondents cited access to education opportunities ahead of housing and access to land. Those expressing the highest interest in further education opportunities were ex-political prisoners under 21 years of age.
- 57 See Urdal, Henrik, 'The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000', World Bank Social Development Paper, No. 14, July 2004.
- 58 On spoiler groups see Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, 'The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and Peace-building', Policy Brief, Number 2, 2006 (United Nations University, 2006).
- 59 For example, reports suggest that the recent killing of six people in Atu Lintang, Aceh Tengah on 1 March 2008 was to some extent fuelled by a brawl that irrupted on 29 February 2008 over control of rent-seeking and profiteering opportunities at the Takengon bus terminal (i.e. protection monies paid by local transport operators or control of employment opportunities available at the bus terminal).
- 60 United Nations, *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards* (2006), Module 4.30, p. 23.
- 61 Nilsson (2005), p. 59.
- 62 In IOM's sample, 19.2% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and 35.2% of ex-political prisoners suffered chronic diseases such as lung, heart, or venereal diseases, high blood pressure, muscle, bone or joint problems and malaria (27.5% overall). More men than women suffered a chronic disease (male=29.1%; female=15.9%) and were most prevalent amongst those over 41 years of age (ranging from 36.0% to 50.8%) and amongst ex-political prisoners. The higher prevalence of chronic disease amongst male ex-combatants is most likely due to those that suffered from malaria.
- 63 As a result of their involvement in the conflict 86.0% of ex-political prisoners and 59.5% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants suffered wounds. The level of wounding is markedly higher for ex-combatants found in IOM's sample (59.5%) compared to those in the World Bank's sample (34%). This tends to confirm that those in IOM's ICRS program comprised the harder core fighting elements of the TNA, particularly those over 41 years of age who consistently had over 81% wounding rates.
- 64 See Annex A for full statistical breakdown.
- 65 On a geographic basis requests for medical assistance were highest in the districts of Aceh Tenggara (98.3%); Gayo Lues (96.6%); Langsa (75%); Aceh Utara (58.8%) and Aceh Timur (51.0%). For a full geographic break-down of medical assistance requested in different districts see Annex A.
- 66 World Bank (2006), pp. 51-52.
- 67 The benefits of returning into established social support networks found in families is balanced by the abject poverty many of these families experienced. As a result, families could do little to support the livelihood recovery of ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners that returned. Recent anecdotal evidence also suggests that many of those that initially returned to their family homes have since left as a result of poverty conditions and the inability to support their families. This is due, at least in part, to issues of male social prestige. It is often better for them to seek paid employment in other locations and send support payments to family members in their home villages, rather than to stay in their villages and live shamefully due to an inability to provide for the needs of their dependents or other family members.
- 68 World Bank (2006), p. 47.
- 69 Quantitative data does not indicate whether the destruction of these homes was targeted retribution for combatant participation against state security forces or anti-separatist groups.
- 70 World Bank (2006), p. 24.
- 71 The massive difference between IOM and World Bank data on peusijeuk ceremonies can be explained either by data recording and coding errors on the part of IOM field facilitators, the different timeframe between the two surveys, or the different compositions of the IOM and World Bank ex-combatant samples. Considering the similarities between ranging variables found in the two samples, it seems that the most likely reason is a combination of the timeframe of the different surveys and the differing composition of the two survey samples.
- 72 Firstly the composition of IOM's client roster contained more hardcore fighting elements, which may have refused, or did not feel a need, to go through traditional healing ceremonies, while at the same time communities were afraid to go through such customary processes with ex-combatants. Secondly, ICRS clients were welcomed back into their communities without tension, which hints at the role the Program may play

- in smoothing their transition. Chapter 3's findings on IDP and returnee security concerns offer further detail on community vulnerabilities to rumor.
- 73 This is in contrast to earlier World Bank survey data, which found that there was a small increase in those seeking assistance from religious leaders, especially amongst youth male ex-combatants: World Bank (2006), p. 32.
- 74 World Bank (2006), p. 32.
- 75 United Nations, Operational Guide to the IDDRS (2006), p168; Comfort Lamptey, Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping: Strengthening Strategic Partnerships between United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and Local Civil Society Organizations during Post-Conflict Transitions (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, August 2007), Sabbatical Leave Research Paper submitted by Comfort Lamptey, pp. 7, 13.
- 76 See Figure 11 Annex A entitled "Entry Points For Delivering Assistance By Age Bracket".
- 77 See Annex A for regional and group variations.
- 78 It is reported that a significant number of political prisoners detained in prisons inside Aceh surrendered themselves to state security forces so as to avoid being killed during the escalating violence that followed the collapse of CoHA in 2003. Such prisoners sought to survive the conflict through incarceration, thus allowing them to return to their families and wives following eventual release from prison. This group differed from others who were detained outside Aceh, which the Gol considered greater security threats because of their ability to mobilize people against the state. Such political prisoners still feel fairly high levels of insecurity and, unlike other groups of returnees, local NGO sources claim that such ex-political prisoners rarely frequent from their homes or participate on social group activities because of continuing feelings of personal insecurity and fear of retribution.
- 79 The successes of GAM candidates during *Pilkada* 2006 elections would suggest that greater political voice for some amongst GAM's leadership have addressed political factors that underpinned the conflict between the Gol and the GAM insurgency. However, it remains unclear whether rank-and-file GAM/TNA ex-combatants have achieved meaningful political voice.
- 80 On the district-by-district variations to feelings of safety see Annex A.
- 81 World Bank (2006), p. 41.
- 82 A higher proportion of ex-political prisoners were fishermen. These individuals were arrested because of the support they provided to combatants by shipping weapons or supplies from overseas or by using water routes to transport supplies and personnel to different coastal provinces. In some cases, unsuspecting fishermen was also employed by GAM to ship supplies and personnel, which resulted in their arrests by state security forces.
- 83 Nilsson (2005), pp. 48-51. This can be particularly true in the face of government corruption or 'bad governance' exercised by predatory regimes that, as a result, contribute to the construction of structural economic barriers for sustainable peace and development. In such circumstances, picking up a weapon can be seen as the only means for upward social and economic mobility.
- 84 World Bank (2006), p. 29.
- 85 See Annex A for full statistical breakdown including regional concentrations of debt.
- 86 This differed markedly from early reinsertion assistance packages delivered by IOM, which provided quick cash payments to individuals so as to help them return to their homes or villages. Cash assistance was designed to help with, among other things, the purchase of household equipment or to meet daily expenses until jobs were found or new businesses were started.
- 87 The current phase of the reintegration program, also modeled on the ICRS platform, aims to treat a community-identified class of vulnerable youth at-risk (at risk is inherently a community-defined status, whether unemployed and/or vulnerable to trauma, organized crime, with or without pre-existing conflict skills in some cases) on a case-by-case basis. The individual-oriented approach seeks to tailor a social and economic interest for a potential conflict actor or spoiler.
- 88 Delay with rolling out the ex-combatant phase was due to disagreement within the government and the KPA about the final list of clients to be served by IOM, which was only finalized by May 2006. These programs were preceded by initial reinsertion funding grants to help clients reinsert into their communities. Funds were provided for purchasing essential needs before medium-term reintegration assistance programming began through the ICRS.
- 89 The only caveat with this success is reflected in the many media reports that local police are reluctant to enforce law and order when criminal suspects are GAM or TNA ex-combatants.
- 90 For full geographic breakdown see Annex A.
- 91 World Bank (2006), p. 42.
- 92 World Bank (2006), p. 41. Put differently, they were choosing or had not other options but to reintegrate into the type of livelihoods that before the peace agreement had created structural economic barriers for their upward social and economic mobility.
- 93 For a full breakdown by age, gender, client status and districts see Annex A.
- 94 Following the August 2005 peace agreement, 45.6% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners reported having

- access to farmlands through family ownership and 61.7% reported indirect access to land through forms of traditional/family communal ownership (e.g. extended family at village-level). A further 25.2% lived in a household that directly owned land. Interestingly, these aggregate patterns closely resemble those found amongst ex-combatants surveyed in the World Bank 2006 GAM reintegration assessment (pp. 55-56), with an important variation being that almost 10% fewer ex-combatants in IOM's sample had access to land whilst a higher proportion were farmers (i.e. individuals potentially needing access to land to begin their livelihood recovery).
- 95 World Bank (2006), pp. 41, 42-45. The World Bank also noted a number of design considerations for the provision of capital to ex-combatant groups including technical assistance, monitoring, beneficiary training, tranche payments, and business planning.
- 96 Specht, Irma, 'Jobs for Rebels and Soldiers', in 'Jobs after war- A critical challenge in the peace and reconstruction puzzle' edited by Eugenia Date-Bah, In Focus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction, International Labor Office, Geneva, 2003.
- 97 District-by-district concentrations of new business start-ups demonstrate there was a potential for market saturation. For example, the selection of animal fattening/ livestock/ meat production was high in Aceh Tamiang (46.6%); Aceh Tenggara (46.2%); Langsa (39.7%); Aceh Besar (38.6%); Bireuen (36.2%) and Aceh Timur (31.8%). The selection of kiosks was high in Aceh Singkil (60.0%); Aceh Barat Daya (37%); Banda Aceh (30.0%); Sabang (29.4%); Aceh Selatan (27.6%) and Aceh Barat (26.3%).
- 98 It is to some extent common sense that very short-term vocational training (i.e. in many cases less than one month) is neither enough to support ex-combatants immediate or long-term education needs, especially in terms of the sustainability of their livelihoods. This underscores the importance of follow-up support through more permanent structures such as local government vocational education providers. The absence of an environment of economic expansion, employment growth and governance reform exacerbates the situation.
- 99 Given the fact that 54.3% of GAM/TNA ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners were married, the majority of which had an average of 2.5 children, their immediate needs often prevent them from participating in long-term training. There is no denying that their family obligations, particularly for single-headed households, makes it hard to compensate for their lack of education; they simply do not have the time or the financial means to attend the training courses that could ameliorate their living conditions, see Irma Specht, 'Jobs for Rebels and Soldiers'.
- 100 On incomplete reintegration through livelihood recovery programs see, Jeremy Ginifer, Mike Bourne and Owen Greene, 'Considering armed violence in the post-conflict transition: DDR and small arms and light weapons reduction initiatives', Briefing paper, September 2004 (London: University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 2004), p. 5.
- 101 Berdal, Mats, 'Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars', Adelphi Paper 303 (1996), p. 8. Evaluating the overall success of reintegration and recovery processes should therefore be one of the key assessment objectives of the follow-up multi-stakeholder review to be led by the World Bank.
- 102 Life skills training may include career planning, non-violent conflict resolution skills, family financial management. Vocational or skills training should assiduously try to break down military attitudes amongst ex-combatants, the tendency towards a sense of prestige in using violence as a means of livelihood, but the key to developing appropriate skills is understanding the supply, demand, and competitive advantage characteristics of the labor market context.
- 103 United Nations, Operational Guide to the IDDRS (2006), p.161.
- 104 Areas to explore include: what are sectors suitable for small-medium industrialization? Do these sectors present reintegration and recovery opportunities for males, females, youth and elderly or others? How can the skills of clients be improved and what kind of skills do they need? What supporting infrastructure exists or is needed to allow economic growth to take place (roads, communication, electricity, water irrigation)? What business development services are available locally? Are governments ready to facilitate public/private partnerships?
- 105 It is well-established that floods of IDPs seeking refuge can create new conflicts due to the overstretching of government service capacities in places of refuge, competition over control of finite natural resources to meet the basic needs of receiving communities and IDP communities, or tensions between aid recipient IDP communities with host communities that do not receive humanitarian assistance.
- 106 Conducted mid-2006 the IOM/UNDP IDP Assessment randomly sampled 1,200 IDPs and Returnees across some of the most conflict-affected regions of Aceh. A full disaggregation of survey participants by ethnicity is provided in Annex B. The three main ethnic groups included are: Acehnese (40.9%), Javanese (39.9%) and Gayonese (13.1%) with a fairly even overall gender balance – 52.3% men and 47.7% women.
- 107 This is an indicative figure only with built in biases. The proportions of ethnic groups are drawn from IOM/UNDP 2006 IDP surveys. Because of the random sampling technique employed the ethnic composition of the IOM/UNDP sample should be representative of IDP and returnee communities generally. However, the qualification is that IOM/UNDP surveys focused on several districts, rather than all of Aceh, which most likely results in biases over-representing some ethnic groups

- 108 See, UNDP, *Access to Justice in Aceh* (2006), pp. 145-159.
- 109 Attempting to make such delineations is often misleading because many people have been displaced by both disasters at different times. The problem of clearly identifying conflict vs. natural disaster related IDPs and returnees appears inherent in World Bank attempts to quantify the figures on these populations, or in survey attempts looking to identify conflict impacts and recovery/reintegration challenges for these communities. One of the best attempts is found with IOM/UNDP IDP surveys conducted throughout 2006 and 2007, which has produced a wealth of data on these communities.
- 110 Roughly a quarter of IDPs and returnees experienced extortion and robbery. The problem of lawlessness persists in some regions of Aceh. Anecdotally speaking, police personnel and members of the judiciary are disinclined to enforce the law if criminal suspects are former members of ex-combatant groups.
- 111 While the IOM/Harvard Medical School Psychological Needs Assessment studies psychological trauma as a result of the conflict, the types of violence listed above are highlighted because of the greater conflict-carrying capacities they potentially bring with them. Moreover, these events also point to the existence of higher intensity conflict in sub-districts and districts that have low or medium conflict-intensity rankings as provided by the World Bank Conflict Index for Aceh, see Chapter 4.
- 112 Given the cultural sensitivities with reporting rape or other sexual violations and the survey modality (i.e. interviews were conducted by male facilitators in the presence of family members) the statistics presented here likely under represent the real levels of these occurrences. These figures are taken as an indication of wider and perhaps systematic patterns of sexual violation that occurred during the conflict period.
- 113 See Annex B for a detailed breakdown.
- 114 On the impact that fear has on post-conflict security and reintegration and recovery see, Joshua G. Smith, 'Fighting Fear: Exploring the Dynamic Between Security Concerns and Elite Manipulation in Internal Conflict,' *Peace Conflict and Development*, Issue 8, February 2006
- 115 In point of fact, merely hearing about attacks in other villages or within their own village was the third most commonly evoked rumor causing people to flee their villages.
- 116 For a fuller breakdown of patterns of fear among ethnic groups see Annex B.
- 117 See Figure 40 at Annex B for further details disaggregated by ethnicity.
- 118 See Figure 41 at Annex B for further details disaggregated by ethnicity.
- 119 Such cleavages are prone to violent group organization. This fuels "insecurity dilemmas" based around localized identities (e.g. self-defense or vigilante groups) because, ultimately, communities are scared of other people they regard as outsiders, see Sorpong Peou, 'The Neutralization of Protracted Conflict', in W. A. Knight (ed.), *Adapting the United Nations to a Post-modern Era: Lessons Learned* (Great Britain: Palgrave, 2001), Frances Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development* (Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, UNU/WIDER, 2002) WIDER Annual Lectures 5, Claude Ake, *Why Humanitarian Emergencies Occur: Insights from the Interface of State, Democracy and Civil Society* (Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, UNU/WIDER, 1998), and Graham, K. Brown, *Horizontal Inequalities, Ethnic Separatism and Violent Conflict: The Case of Aceh, Indonesia* (UNDP: Human Development Report Office, 2005) Occasional Paper.
- 120 See Figure 46 at Annex B for further details disaggregated by ethnicity.
- 121 Although there is interesting qualitative data on how the conflict impacted upon individual participation in religious group activities, quantitative data on levels of participation in religious groups is considered something of a false indicator for how the conflict impacted upon participation in social group activities because of the often obligatory nature of participation in such activities.
- 122 See Annex B for full statistical breakdowns.
- 123 See Annex B for a full statistical breakdown.
- 124 22,000 IDR/day is roughly equal to US\$2/day – a commonly accepted income level indicator for living below the poverty line in Indonesia. Non-cash earnings or payments in-kind are not factored into this assessment of current poverty levels for IDPs and returnees.
- 125 In fact, for returnees the age group most reporting that it makes less than 30,000 IDR/day is 62+ years (85.2%). However, for various reasons (e.g. most people within this age group might not be part of the active or job seeking workforce) this potentially skews a real understanding of poverty levels as indicated by income earned per day.
- 126 For further analysis on the impact that conflict has had upon livelihood opportunities see Chapter 4's comparison between conflict vs. tsunami impacts upon economic livelihood activities.
- 127 It is noted that communal or native title is a common law concept, but is probably the best way of quickly describing customary land ownership in Indonesia (under the pluralistic source of law known as *Hukum Adat* or *Adatrecht*), sometimes referred to as known as *Hak Ulayat*. Having a registered certificate of title over land or property is not the definitive test for resolving land ownership disputes, which inundate the civil claims courts across Indonesia. In point of fact it is common for one parcel of land to have more than one allegedly registered certificate of title, notwithstanding

- any other claims stemming from communal or native title.
- 128 Over 300 IDPs participating in the IOM/UNDP IDP Phase 2 survey remain in the North Sumatra province and do not appear inclined to return to Aceh. As noted by IOM researcher Jesse Grayman and a principal author of several studies conducted by IOM, reasons include better access to education, better infrastructure and job opportunities and greater levels of security in metropolitan areas of Medan than was offered in remote and dangerous rural areas of Aceh.
- 129 On 'insecurity dilemmas' and their impact on post-conflict recovery and violent horizontal conflict see, Sorpong Peou (2001), pp. 159-160 and Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, *War, Hunger, and Displacement: An Econometric Investigation into the Sources of Humanitarian Emergencies* (Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, UNU/WIDER, 1997), pp. 40-42.
- 130 For example see Articles 3.2.3 and 3.2.5 (b) in the Helsinki MoU.
- 131 For full district break-downs, see Annex C.
- 132 The ethnography of researcher Jesse Grayman on the Kluet River Valley found in IOM/Harvard Medical School Psychological Needs Assessment (Phase 2) (2007) illustrates clearly these geographic pockets that experienced unspeakable levels of high-intensity violence.
- 133 Many areas of relative high conflict intensity have benefited from international assistance because they were classified as tsunami-affected. Humanitarian actors entered such areas without any substantial contextual understanding. With alacrity, the link between conflict intensity and ex-combatants engaging in predatory activities quickly emerged, often causing implementers to withdraw because of security concerns. Consequently, these 'difficult' areas remain neglected, and in a way, taken hostage by their spoilers groups and individuals. Many of the areas surveyed by IOM have very little international assistance focusing on the post-conflict context.
- 134 World Bank data identifies conflict-intensity by sub-district so as to differentiate between the intensity of localized patterns of violent conflict during the conflict period. The district level aggregation attempted here using World Bank village survey data only identifies in which districts there were a higher proportion of sub-districts that experienced high intensity localized conflict and therefore reinforces World Bank research assumptions (i.e. that conflict intensity depended upon contextual local factors).
- 135 Based upon merged PNA and IDP/returnee datasets.
- 136 Regarding this figure, the reader should bear in mind that the timing of baseline data collection coincided with particularly devastating flash-floods and landslides in Gayo Lues.
- 137 Refer to Annex C Proportion of People Unable to Easily Access Food, Housing and Other Household Supplies by District. The only districts with more than half of the people having access to food were those with small survey sample sizes (Nagan Raya and Aceh Barat Daya), which makes it difficult to reliably state that access to food was higher than for other districts. However, food access appears higher for locations that have better food distribution networks or that are geographically closer to market towns that have direct business links with Medan (e.g. Aceh Selatan and Aceh Tamiang).
- 138 Such areas are typically distant from Banda Aceh and have been bypassed by the bulk of Tsunami recovery assistance.
- 139 See Annex C on Access to Essential Facilities by District. IOM projects in these districts have worked in the most heavily conflict-affected sub-districts of Aceh and in villages that continue to face massive reintegration and recovery challenges in relation to social infrastructure, livelihoods, low levels of social cohesion and lingering conflict pressures.
- 140 Community members will often also turn to traditional healers when experiencing traumatic injuries such as open wounds or compound fractures. In several cases observed by IOM field personnel, this has resulted in the mistreatment of injuries causing gangrene and the amputation of a limb, which otherwise could have been saved with even the most basic appropriate medical treatment.
- 141 IOM/Harvard Medical School Psychological Needs Assessment and IOM/UNDP IDP Assessments data presents a sampling bias towards known high-conflict areas, especially Psychological Needs Assessment data. On the other hand, World Bank village survey did not sample but instead attempted to collect data from every village in Aceh, thus making it more representative by district and variations to levels of conflict-intensity within districts. However, the aim here is to focus on "hotspots" within districts and the level or degree to which these localized "hotspots" were impacted by the conflict.
- 142 Results of all variables are available in Annex C.
- 143 Refer to Figure 55 at Annex C.
- 144 IOM/Harvard Medical School Psychological Needs Assessment studies explore exposure to varieties of traumatic events rather than repeated exposure to a single type of traumatic event. While some survey participants might list exposure to six types of traumatic events, the total experience could be much higher if repeatedly experiencing the same type of event (e.g. rape). Although this introduces some uncertainty about the real number of traumatic events experienced, these studies note that people experiencing 10 or more types of traumatic events are more prone to psychological illness such as depression or post-traumatic stress syndrome. For further explanations on Acehnese cultural understandings of mental illness read IOM/Harvard Medical School Psychological Needs Assessment studies.
- 145 See Annex C for a full breakdown of levels of trauma on a district-by-district basis.

- 146 'Other sexual abuses' was a survey question left undefined for respondent interpretation as a way of allowing victims to list abuses (e.g. for those that might have been raped but that found rape too specific or stigmatizing to report).
- 147 For a full breakdown of findings for victims of these more personalized forms of violence see Annex C.
- 148 It was expected that traumatic events experienced would be high in high-intensity sub-districts. However, in many cases when comparing sub-district conflict intensity as measured by the World Bank to numbers of traumatic events experienced this was not always the case and, in fact, lower intensity sub-districts often had a greater number of traumatic events experienced by survey participants to PNA and IDP/returnee surveys.
- 149 Ideally combining these with other survey questions would be ideal. However, PNA survey questions relating to social trust are not repeated in IOM/UNDP IDP surveys and use different measures for recording survey participant responses, which could not be merged in truly meta-analysis fashion into one overall ranking system.
- 150 See Annex C for full statistical break-downs by district.
- 151 On insecurity dilemmas see Sorpong Peou (2001), Frances Stewart (2002), Claude Ake (1998), and Graham, K. Brown (2005).
- 152 As illustrated earlier, Aceh Timur, a coastal area with a traditional GAM presence, was one of the most heavily conflict-impacted districts from the last insurgent phase. Bener Meriah, a district in the Central Highlands, was a district wracked with inter-ethnic horizontal conflict. Both districts are distinguished by high numbers of ethnic minority IDPs who have yet to return – mostly Javanese.
- 153 This is not a surprising finding given similarly low levels of trust found amongst IDP and returnee communities toward state security institutions discussed in Chapter 3. Trust in current heads of village and other social leaders is generally high among respondents participating in IOM/UNDP IDP Assessments.
- 154 Participation in religious groups has been excluded to gain a better understanding of community participation and current levels of social cohesion. As noted in Chapter 3, this report argues that voluntary participation in secular organizations serves as a better measure for non-obligatory community participation in civil society organizations and, by extension, real levels of social cohesion between different groups.
- 155 World Bank, Aceh Economic Update, April 2008. Poverty in Aceh and other Indonesian provinces remains more marked in rural than urban areas. Given that Aceh's agricultural sector is expanding at twice the rate of the rest of Sumatra, and that 60% of Aceh's population is employed in this sector, the 2007 poverty rate as a whole may be less dependent on tsunami reconstruction and related to sectoral growth (e.g. service industries). Of course, the growth of these service industries may in turn be partly dependent upon tsunami reconstruction activities as well as an improved security situation, both of which allow for small business development.
- 156 See Annex C for full breakdown of pre- and post-tsunami livelihood occupations.
- 157 See Annex C for full breakdowns of occupations prior to the August 2005 Helsinki MoU.
- 158 The World Bank's Aceh Economic Update for April 2008 highlighted Aceh's economy is in decline and has contracted 2.2% between 2006 and 2007. This contraction is underpinned by a reduced supply in oil and gas, and a huge decline in construction activity. This has further underscored the already low levels of labor mobility. That said, potential trade opportunities and new fiscal regulations on the decentralization of funds from Jakarta to Aceh are perhaps among two possible avenues for economic relief that could result in economic growth.
- 159 Also known as *Makmu Gampong Karena Damai Proyek*, or Village Prosperity Due to Peace. Until recently this project was co-funded by UNDP.
- 160 In 2006-2007 Development Alternatives Inc. assisted with the provision of radio and musical equipment for the revival of local news-focused radio. UNDP in 2008 has assisted with the provision of a significant volume of agricultural equipment including hand-tractors, milling machines, and other items in order to improve the yield and efficiency of SCACP self-help groups. The provision of trucks by UNDP as part of this project will enable better access to markets and the emergence of profit centers within local CSOs that operate these trucks. All equipment is provided in conjunction with the participatory planning and training of a collective asset management system that anticipates depreciation.
- 161 It is worth re-iterating that both SCACP and MGKD community stabilization projects operate in the same areas as the 2006-2010 Information, Counseling, and Referral Service (ICRS). ICRS has occurred in two stages; the first reintegrated 1,911 former political prisoners and 3,030 former GAM combatants through targeted and tailored assistance (including but not limited to vocational trainings and non-cash physical inputs), and the second (2008-2010), currently being rolled out, envisions a caseload of 5,000 vulnerable youth who are at risk (at risk is inherently a community-defined status, whether unemployed and/or vulnerable to trauma, organized crime, with or without pre-existing conflict skills in some cases) benefiting from tailored assistance schemes. This is a much more comprehensive approach to DDR than the standard fare; indeed, DDR and community stabilization are optimally two sides of the same coin.
- 162 Project Management requires contractors to hire a certain percentage of daily labor from former GAM ex-combatant groups.

- 163 See Annex C for listing of SCACP project details.
- 164 See Table 243 at Annex C for a full typology breakdown of all vulnerable classes assisted by SCACP livelihood activities.
- 165 Table 244 at Annex C illustrates the flexibility of MGKD community stabilization programming as a whole.
- 166 Other technical problems which impact implementation include work plans that do not take into account public holidays; Friday religious obligations (essentially Friday is a half-day in the field); market days; seasonal obligations of otherwise-available daily labor (tied to harvests), and the yearly Ramadan slow-down whereby work production and employee capacity drops due to the fast – especially regarding physical, outdoor labor. Delays were sometimes also caused by lengthy community facilitation processes; difficulties in choosing the best seed and the use of organic pesticide; the timing of pesticide introduction not correlated with harvest cycles; difficulties finding materials leading to an inadequate supply of organic pesticide; and threats from insects (crickets) and foraging animals (namely pigs uprooting crops). Occasional lack of coordination among community self-help group members and local partners also occurred, and natural elements – in particular, the rainy season, which is effectively a landslide and flood season in the Central Highlands – also led to implementation delays.
- 167 The best work thus far exploring conflict related trauma is found in the IOM/Harvard Psychological Needs Assessment, Phases 1-2 (2006-7). Nevertheless, it appears that little concerted effort has yet to be taken to act upon the findings and recommendations made in those studies to address psycho-social conflict impacts.
- 168 Infrastructure activities, many of which were implemented through BRA-KDP mechanisms and that at one point formed a major component of BRA's assistance, have reached 3,219,105 people (or roughly three-quarters of Aceh's population), are excluded from this analysis.
- 169 Economic recovery activities as implemented by BRA have typically included community-driven development projects through BRA-KDP mechanisms.
- 170 PNA survey questions did not measure the extent of physical injuries. Serious injuries could have included deep gashes or gunshot wounds that now have healed with no lasting physical disabilities.
- 171 Proportions of those potentially suffering from psychological trauma are reached by using merged PNA and IDP survey datasets asking questions on exposure to violent conflict. The proportion of survey respondents with 10 or more traumatic incidents are weighted to population sizes in relation to areas of higher relative conflict intensity sub-districts to reach the overall 23.3%.
- 172 For a discussion on the impact of armed violence on poverty and development see CICS, 'The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty and Development', Full report of the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (England: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford, March 2005).
- 173 Construction of infrastructure without the corresponding investment in human resource development is a common problem with Indonesian development planning. For example, this is also seen in plans to construct court buildings without a corresponding or equal level of investment for training personnel to operate facilities. Infrastructure development is also notoriously prone to various forms of corruption through the allocation of contracts (i.e. nepotism or collusion), pricing of goods and supplies, or substandard constructions that do not meet original construction specifications as a result of contractors seeking to make huge profits by cutting corners on material costs.



Photo taken by RHM Zafarullah in Banda Aceh where families were participating in a public music programme



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