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TECHNICAL GUIDANCE ON DIASPORAS IN CRISIS SETTINGS

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION..... 1

PART 1. CONTEXT 1

 Diaspora as Context 2

 Resulting Grievance and Resilience..... 3

 Diaspora Influence on Grievance and Resilience in The PO 5

 Identity 5

 Institutional Performance and Social Patterns 9

 Key Actors..... 11

 Trajectories and Triggers..... 12

PART 2. MAPPING POTENTIAL DIASPORA INFLUENCE ON THE CONFLICT CURVE 13

 Economic Contributions 13

 Philanthropic Contributions..... 17

 Human Capital Contributions..... 20

 Policy/Attitudinal Influences 23

PART 3. NEXT STEPS 27

PART 4. SOURCES..... 28

TABLE OF BOXES

Box 1-1. Remittances to Somalia 5

Box 2-1. Diaspora Philanthropy in Conflict-Affected Societies..... 17

Box 2-2. The Helper Mentality Among Returned Diasporans 21

Box 2-3. Diasporans as Political Constituents in the COO 23

Box 2-4. Pan-National Identity Mobilization for Peace 24

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1 Remittance Contributions and the Conflict Curve 14

Figure 2-2. Philanthropic Contributions and the Conflict Curve 18

Figure 2-3. Human Capital Contributions and the Conflict Curve 20

Figure 2-4. Diaspora Policy/Attitudinal Influence and the Conflict Curve 27

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 1-1. Diaspora Characteristics and Implications..... 7

Table 1-2. Diaspora Influence on Institutional Performance: Sample Institutional Assessment . 10

Table 2-1. Potential Remittance Contributions to Peace and Conflict..... 15

Table 2-2. Potential Philanthropic Contributions to Peace and Conflict 19

Table 2-3. Potential Human Capital Contributions to Peace and Conflict 22

Table 2-4. Potential Policy/Attitudinal Influences on Peace and Conflict 25

ACRONYMS

CAF	Conflict Assessment Framework
COO	Country of Origin
COR	Country of Residence
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDG	Millennium Developmental Goal
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PO	Place of Origin

INTRODUCTION

Diasporans are immigrants who maintain a connection, psychological or material, to their place of origin. Since diasporans may identify with a “homeland” that does not correspond to a country, it is sometimes more appropriate to refer to place of origin (PO) as opposed to country of origin (COO). This is particularly so in conflict contexts where state boundaries may be contested. Diasporans may create communities of identity where members reinforce in each other their links to the PO culture and associated values.

Research on the role of diasporas in conflict-affected countries entails pendulum swings and exaggerated categorical assumptions about diasporas’ potential positive or negative impact in such contexts, including reversals of findings.¹ The literature on diasporas’ potential contribution to peace and conflict, and development more generally, is largely bifurcated. Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike tend either to see them as a potential panacea for all ailments or, much more commonly, as inconvenient and obtrusive actors who are meddling or irrelevant at best and peacewreckers or obstacles to stability and development at worst. These findings highlight the importance of taking a critical and nuanced look at both the phenomenon of diaspora engagement in peacebuilding and conflict, and also the research that supports it. In the context of conflict-affected countries particularly, very few studies recognize diasporas for what they are: a key component of the society in conflict (Lubkemann 2011). In these environments, diasporans are at once conflict entrepreneurs, competing interests, and contributors to stability and development (Brinkerhoff 2011).

This technical guidance is intended to assist the analyst in understanding when a particular group or individual might be an asset or a hindrance to conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and ultimately stability and development, as well as what types of interventions and contributions—positive and negative—diasporans may make at different times in the conflict curve. The guidance largely follows the concepts and format of USAID/CMM’s Conflict Assessment Framework.

Part 1 addresses context components: diasporas as an inherently important social actor to consider, resulting grievance and resilience, and their potential relations to key actors. This part ends with a brief discussion of possible resulting triggers and trajectories. Part 2 maps diaspora influence on the conflict curve. It addresses in detail when particular diaspora contributions (economic/remittance, philanthropic, human capital, and policy/attitudinal) will be most relevant and when they are likely to have positive, negative, or a mix of impacts for peace and stability. The specific types of contributions in each category are identified as potential targets of analysis for each stage of the conflict curve.²

PART 1. CONTEXT

Diasporas are a component of the societies experiencing conflict and should be analyzed accordingly. Since, by definition, diasporans are those immigrants who maintain a psychological or material connection to the homeland, not all immigrants are relevant to conflict assessments. Diasporas can be distinguished and deconstructed according to a range of factors, including origin of migration, location and concentration of settlement, interest identities (e.g., political, ethnic, religious), and generations. The latter includes historical waves of migration, generations of settlement, and generational demographics (i.e., age distribution). These features have

¹ Specifically, e.g., Collier’s and Hoeffler’s (2001) well-known statistic that the presence of a large diaspora increases the likelihood of conflict re-emergence sixfold, which was later reversed by Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008).

² These categories and related potential contributions are taken from Brinkerhoff (2011).

implications for diaspora identity, potential mobilization, motivations, and intentions vis-à-vis the PO. They directly inform diasporans' grievance and resilience, as well as their potential impact on other actors' grievance and resilience in the PO.

DIASPORA AS CONTEXT

Origin refers to the causes of out-migration and dispersal from the country of origin (COO). Origins include, for example, forced exile, refugee/asylum due to war or poverty, and more elective origins ranging from oppression to perceived socio-economic opportunities. Origin yields a particular myth, which forms the basis of the diaspora's identity as distinct from the PO and as a partial determinant of the diaspora's motivation to embrace the country of residence (COR) or some of its cultural characteristics. For some, origin is a myth of return and/or reterritorialization; for others, it is the myth of economic prosperity in the COR, and perhaps freedom and democracy. Diaspora origin may inform diasporans' motivation and sense of potential efficacy, that is, their perceived ability to assimilate in the COR and/or influence the PO.

Origins largely (but not exclusively) determine the location of diaspora populations. Many refugees may be located in a near diaspora³—residing in countries contiguous with the national borders of the COO. The near diaspora, for example, is more likely to repatriate following the end of violence, and may also be comprised of “refugee warriors” (Harpviken 2008). The latter may be enabled by humanitarian support structures. Social institutions in the near diaspora also provide the organization support necessary to mobilization. Harpviken (2008) examines why “refugee warriors” may become “returnee warriors” focusing on enabling environment, ideology, and organization (see also Salehyan 2007). He suggests that resettlement into areas not controlled by the state will likely lead to continued engagement in violence as a means to influence power distribution. The “near diaspora” construct suggests its antithesis, the “far diaspora.” These diasporans may be located in countries offering greater opportunities for socio-economic advancement and potential political influence on important international actors who have the capacity to intervene in the conflict-affected COO.

Origins may determine the demographic composition of a diaspora and illuminate religious, ethnic, and political differences both within the diaspora and between the diaspora and its compatriots remaining in the COO. These differences are also reflected in historic waves of migration—for example, the Afghan diasporas of the Russian invasion or the Taliban era—or pre- or post- some major event—such as for the Somali diaspora, the killing of American marines in Mogadishu in 1993. They may also be reflected in geographic locations. The US may attract particular subsets of a diaspora, depending on policy frameworks and perceived opportunities. For example, members of Somalinet, a digital diaspora community, encouraged settlement in the US based on comparative welfare benefits in the UK, Toronto, and Chicago (Brinkerhoff 2006); following the Soviet invasion, the political Afghan elite settled primarily in Germany, while business entrepreneurs settled in the US (Hanifi 2006).

Regarding generation of settlement, the linear model of assimilation (Hansen 1952) is no longer the norm. This model asserted that the third generation of settlement is most likely to champion and potentially mobilize around the PO cultural identity.⁴ Rather than substituting a new COR identity for the PO identity among first generation diasporans, those who have been settled the longest actually may become *more* interested in engaging on behalf of the COO politically or economically (Portes et al. 2002; Guarnizo et al. 2003). These individuals may have acquired

³ Harpviken as quoted in Lyons and Mandaville (2010).

⁴ The first generation is likely to be overwhelming concerned with settlement and economic survival. The second generation is likely to reject all association with the PO in an effort to blend in and “be normal.”

the resources to do so in a meaningful way and may have reached a glass ceiling in terms of contributing and achieving status in the COR.

Segmented assimilation posits that the degree of integration in the COR depends upon the opportunities and social and cultural capital put in place by the previous generation(s) (Portes and Zhou 1993). These opportunities and capital can enable the socio-economic success of subsequent generations or leave them marginalized (i.e., downwardly assimilated), such as in the Salvadoran community in the US, among others (see Rumbaut and Portes 2001). This theory suggests that subsequent generations will lean towards that cultural identity which affords the greatest opportunities in terms of identity resources and quality of life (see Waters 1999). Structuralist approaches to studying violence and terrorism suggest that diasporans who are socio-economically and politically marginalized may become the targets for recruitment into violent (including terrorist) activities (Taylor and Lewis 2004).

Depending on the organization of a diaspora sector and its intention to socialize younger generations into a PO-oriented identity, subsequent generations may develop hybrid identities with more or less pronounced identity constructs from the COR than earlier migration generations. For those intent on sustaining the PO identity in diaspora, anecdotal evidence suggests that some may become more “national” or “ethnic” than their compatriots who remain in the PO, and many groups may intentionally structure a diaspora identity to fit political objectives, whether or not these concur with their compatriots in the COO or historical reality.⁵ Friedman (1994) emphasizes the popularity of traditionalism, whether based on religion or ethnic identity, “since it offers roots and fixed identities to those who cannot abide failure: in a modern context that prizes material success (228).” In other words, for those who are socially, economically, politically, and perhaps psychologically marginalized, traditionalism is a favored means to some comfort.

Chronological age may contribute to the degree of PO identity revisionism (see Sökefeld 2002). Hybridity and “new ethnicities” are more common among youth (Hall 1991), as they are more likely to self-consciously select and assimilate cultural identity artifacts (Vertovec 1997; Vertovec and Rogers 1998). On the other hand, young immigrants, especially in the second generation, do not experience the same unquestioned cultural obligations vis-à-vis the PO and may reject “duties” borne by previous generations to support family, community or even political causes related to the PO.

RESULTING GRIEVANCE AND RESILIENCE

The implications of these diaspora characteristics for grievance and resilience are far from straightforward. While some generalizations can be made about particular groupings, there are always exceptions and alternative perspectives. For example, some argue that conflict-generated diasporas “harbour grievance” much longer than COO residents (Bigombe et al. 2000, 333; see also Lyons 2007); Armenia is, perhaps, the best known example (see, e.g., Shain and Barth 2003). Lyons (2007) argues that diasporas resulting from civil conflict are less likely to support reconciliation. On the other hand, some may experience conflict-fatigue and want simply to move on. When thoughts of the homeland create psychic pain (Friedman 1994), diasporans may be inclined to further embrace their COR-based identity. Because some may not have been directly impacted by the conflict and may have access to alternative information sources, they may change their initial orientations towards the COO conflict (Baser and Swain

⁵ For example, the Armenian diaspora is famous for sustaining an Armenian identity based on victimhood and resisting Armenian rapprochement with Turkey. Some segments of the Hindu diaspora engage in historical revisionism to the point of claiming the Taj Mahal as a Hindu monument (Lal 1999). Sato (2005) recounts how Urfalli Syrian Orthodox Christians practice selective amnesia in their reconstruction of identity in diaspora in order to better situate themselves in Syrian society and changing political contexts.

2008). These alternative information resources include exposure to democratic practices, which may incline them to engage in peace processes (Vorrath 2011). The Irish-American diaspora demonstrates the extent to which interests within a diaspora can be highly varied and even the most intransigent may change over time (Cochrane 2007).

As noted above, marginalization of a diaspora group can create a downward socio-economic trajectory for subsequent generations and may make individuals within that group vulnerable to recruitment into violent activities, some of which may be targeted at the COO. Such marginalization, however, may also prevent these individuals from accessing the means necessary to engage with the COO on their own. Their primary focus may be on survival in the COR.

Structural integration, on the other hand, has significant fortuitous impacts (see Brinkerhoff 2008a). It may provide “psychological coherence” that “enables [diasporans] to deal with the past and envision a common future with other groups both in the host and homeland” (Hall and Kostic 2008). This is the case, for example, among Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Yugoslavs in Sweden (Ibid.). With respect to strong integration into the COR, to summarize:

- Some individuals, particularly in the first generation, may be more likely to engage economically and politically in the homeland since they have the resources, and can be particularly impactful there relative to in the COR.
- Some will be inclined to further integrate and identify with the COR due to psychic pain or conflict fatigue.
- Some will find the psychological coherence to envision a different future for themselves and their COO compatriots and work to further that vision accordingly.
- Some will find their grievances so intense, their perceived identity threats so salient, that they will mobilize as conflict supporters/enablers.

The degree of integration, or alternatively marginalization, then, can enable diaspora contributions to conflict-affected COOs for better or for worse. Other factors are also relevant to diasporans’ motivation to so engage and to the likelihood that they may mobilize. Esman’s early work still holds great relevance. For example, perceptions of threat to identity are likely to enhance solidarity and potential for mobilization (Esman 1986). He later hypothesizes that “defensive’ mobilization in response to a clear and present threat to a group’s established position will produce more rapid and aggressive collective action than offensive’ mobilization to exploit opportunities for uncertain future benefits” (Esman 1994, 30). Mobilization, he implies, is based on an implicit cost-benefit analysis. The higher the cost of a particular agenda to status and security in the COR, the greater the likelihood that the diaspora community will split and/or fail to mobilize (Esman 1986).

Beyond identity expression, diasporans may be more explicitly self-interested. They may mobilize to maintain and acquire power resources. This includes economic, social (social status based on social roles or on complying with socially valued criteria), political (ability to influence the exercise of authority), moral (perceived legitimacy of actions), informational, and physical (i.e., coercion or violence, depending on perceived legitimacy of applied physical force) resources (Uphoff 2005).

Bringing these findings together and incorporating a much broader analysis of other factors, such as psychological empowerment, the likelihood of identity mobilization can be summed up in the following equation (Brinkerhoff 2008a):

$$\text{Mobilization} = \text{Value to be gained (Benefits - Costs)} + \text{Perceived Efficacy}$$

Each of these components is subject to social influence and is a product of individuals' perceptions. Efficacy (perceived ability or belief that objectives are achievable) is a product of opportunity structures as well as issue framing and psychological empowerment.

DIASPORA INFLUENCE ON GRIEVANCE AND RESILIENCE IN THE PO

Diasporans can experience both enhanced grievance and enhanced resilience while living in the COR over time. What is most salient is how these experiences lead them to influence context factors located in the conflict-afflicted COO. The CAF specifies three context components: identity, institutional performance, and social patterns.

IDENTITY

As discussed above, diasporan identity is subjective, contingent, and changing. It is most potentially impactful on grievances and resilience in the PO when it reflects

- A traditionalist perspective on the PO identity, which may reflect a religious, ethnic, or political faction that is party to the conflict. In some cases, this traditionalist perspective may be more fixed and exclusionary than its counterpart in the PO, and it may not reflect historical realities or the identity as it is practiced in the PO. Since diasporans may not be subject to the consequences of the related agendas they advocate or participate in, their cost-benefit analysis may be skewed towards escalating conflict, possibly more so than their compatriots residing in the PO.
- A pan-national, reconciliatory, and/or bridging identity, which may reflect conflict fatigue, rapprochement with other factions living in diaspora, and/or learning emerging from access to alternative information sources and appreciation for and ability to envision futures alternative to those that inspired the conflict.
- A relative hybrid identity, where diasporans are relatively integrated and committed to living in the COR but continue to respond to cultural obligations and family duty in the PO. These perceived obligations and familial duties include sending remittances to individuals and households and possibly engaging in individual or coordinated philanthropic efforts (see Box 1-1). The contributions of these diasporans may inadvertently or intentionally sustain or aggravate local grievances. Inadvertently, for example, recipients may use the resources to support conflict even when this is not the intention of the sender. Depending on the comparative representation of local populations within the diaspora and their places of settlement, remittances can also exacerbate local inequalities along factional lines. On the other hand, such contributions may be essential to enhancing local resilience. They may provide subsistence income during the conflict and the means to develop alternative sources/means of livelihood, laying the foundation for post-conflict economic development, as discussed in Part 2.

Box 1-1. Remittances to Somalia

Studies on economic remittances to Somalia may be illustrative for other conflict and post-conflict countries. Remittances are estimated to support 40 percent of urban household incomes (Kulaksiz and Purdekova 2006), and have supported education investments throughout Somalia's long conflict (Lindley 2006). Remittances have driven the development of financial service mechanisms and communication technologies (Maimbo et al. 2006), and have expanded trade (Nenova and Harford 2004). Waldo (2006) reports that these financial systems are not as informal as may be assumed. Among other things, they enjoy broad trust from diverse groups based, in part, on some degree of transparency.

Analysts can begin to identify the potential for each of these identities and related engagements by examining the historical waves of migration, destinations of settlement and related access to material and lobbying resources, and degree of integration in the COR. Table 1-1 summarizes the factors to consider when assessing a particular diaspora.

Table 1-1. Diaspora Characteristics and Implications

Factor	Implications	Possibilities	Examples
Origin	Myth that provides the framing for relating to the PO	Forced exile	Deep grievance
		Refugee/asylum	Potential grievance or conflict fatigue
		Oppression/discrimination	Potential grievance or embrace of COR
		Perceived socio-economic opportunity	Embrace of COR identity and/or hybrid identity that retains connections to the PO, including desire to contribute
Location of settlement	Influences means to intervene and possible motivations	Near diaspora	Possible refugee warriors or potential recruitment into the conflict
		Far diaspora	Depending on socio-economic opportunities and advancement, may have greater potential political influence, especially on COR government and other international actors
Demographic composition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Suggests potential to mobilize a unified diaspora front ▪ Suggests loyalties to different parties to the conflict 	Identifiable according to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Wave of migration (historic/political circumstances) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Informs preferences for particular outcomes, including mobilization for peace or for conflict ▪ Influences perceptions of the conflict and of the COO more generally (e.g., may be outdated or irrelevant to current situation) ▪ Influences perceptions of likely allies and enemies both in the COO and in the international arena
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implies potential to intervene/contribute in particular ways 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Socio-economic patterns in settlement destinations 	May inform whether a particular location-based diaspora will: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mobilize and engage around political influence or economic contributions ▪ Have the capacity or inclination to mobilize at all ▪ Can suggest factions and rivalries within the broader diaspora and among coalitions linking particular diaspora groupings to particular parties to the conflict

Factor	Implications	Possibilities	Examples
Generation of settlement	Not an automatic determinant of potential interest in PO conflict, but can be suggestive	First generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May be focused on socio-economic survival in immediate term, though still complying with obligations in the PO (e.g., remittances to family members) ▪ With increasing integration and socio-economic status, may engage in collective diaspora efforts vis-à-vis the PO (e.g., philanthropy) ▪ With still increasing integration and significant socio-economic progress, may increasingly engage economically and politically in COO ▪ Some will find the psychological coherence to envision a different future for themselves and their COO compatriots and work to further that vision accordingly
		Second generation	<p>Depending on socialization into the PO cultural identity and related duties:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May continue remittance or philanthropic activities initiated in the first generation ▪ May discontinue these activities and even shy away from identification with the PO culture ▪ May become a latent diaspora, mobilizeable based on trigger events
		Third generation and beyond	As above, with decreasing likelihood of PO engagement
		Downward assimilation	<p>Minimal means for mobilizing on behalf of the PO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May focus on survival in the COR ▪ May be recruitable as combatants or extortionists to support conflict entrepreneurs ▪ Tendency to adopt traditionalist identities
Age distribution	Can influence perceptions of the PO as well as types of engagement	Youth	<p>Possibility of rejection of PO identity as above, or:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Youth may be more likely to practice revisionist cultural practices and historical interpretations ▪ Traditionalist youth may be more inclined to directly (and physically) engage in PO conflict
		Older generation	Likely to continue to comply with perceived cultural obligations and sustain PO cultural identity

INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PATTERNS

Considerations of diaspora-assessed institutional performance and social patterns begin with the CAF. Because diasporas are a segment of conflict societies—just as rural and urban populations, women, and youth—their potential influence and resources should be similarly mapped onto existing governance and class structures (Lubkemann 2011). Assessment targets in this arena begin with the institutional performance findings of the CAF. Diaspora activities related to the functions of these institutions can then be mapped along with their relation to these formal institutions.

Institutional performance is largely internal, but combining it with diaspora impacts social patterns. Two general outcomes are possible at the extreme, with gradations in between:

1. Diaspora philanthropy can become a substitute for a poor-functioning or clientelistic state, creating an alternative social pattern that in the short-run can exacerbate local grievances and in the long-run further threaten the perceived legitimacy of formal institutions. There is also a possibility that local populations become dependent upon diaspora contributions or interventions in these institutional arenas, enhancing diasporans' ability to influence and potentially mobilize grievance or resilience.
2. In well-performing, nascent, or reforming institutions, diasporas can partner with formal institutions—thus increasing their legitimacy and potentially their capacity (i.e., through human capital contributions or technical assistance)—or can challenge or compete with them.

Table 1-2 presents a suggestive assessment framework for diaspora influence on institutional performance. Following an assessment of a particular institution's function and performance, analysts can identify diaspora activities which provide similar functions. Performance assessments include attention to the inclusiveness of the functional provision. The relation of these activities to the institution and its function can then be assessed in terms of competing, substituting, or partnering. Possible results from these combinations are suggested.

Table 1-2. Diaspora Influence on Institutional Performance: Sample Institutional Assessment

Performance	Diaspora Relation to Institution			Possible Results
	Compete	Substitute	Partner	
Good				Could aggravate grievances
				Could aggravate grievances and/or support resilience in the short to intermediate term
				Could support resilience and enhance effectiveness and legitimacy of formal institution
Bad				N/A
				Could support resilience and possibly aggravate grievances if functional support is not inclusive Could jeopardize long-term resilience if it inhibits the emergence of a legitimate formal institution
				Could enhance resilience by building the capacity and legitimacy of the formal institution.

KEY ACTORS

Key actors will turn to like-minded individuals, groups, and organizations for support, and these like-minded individuals or groups may be found in the diaspora. Diasporas are important resources for key actors in terms of helping the latter to access the means necessary to mobilization: operational, capacity, financing, and support networks. Diasporans' ability to provide these means is largely dependent on their locations of residence and, to some extent, the degree of socio-economic success they have been able to achieve (as above). Diasporans may either be collective contributors to the efforts of key actors in the COO or they may be key actors themselves.

In the first instance, whether as individuals or as groups, diasporans can make small contributions of money, material resources, philanthropic projects, or policy/attitudinal influences that cumulatively impact key actors' agendas. In a constructive scenario, these efforts are targeted at supporting resilience, peace and reconciliation, and post-conflict stability and development. In a destructive scenario, these contributions aim to escalate or sustain the conflict until the ultimate agenda is achieved. For example, the Kosovo Liberation Army established an international "Homeland Calling" fund (Adamson 2005, 2006). Horst's (2008) study of Norway-based Somalis revealed that, during the course of a single conflict, money raised from the diaspora could range from \$500,000 at the lowest sub-clan levels, to as high as \$5 million at the clan level.

Such diasporan contributions can be both voluntary (as above) or involuntary. For example, diasporans may be coerced into supporting continuing conflict, as has been documented among the Tamil diaspora in Canada (Human Rights Watch 2006), and the Kurds in Germany (Adamson 2005). By contributing to PO-oriented charities, diasporans may unwittingly support conflict in the homeland.⁶ As a result, some of these charities have been placed on terrorist watch lists, disbanded, and/or had their assets frozen. Disasters may at once inspire diaspora charitable giving as well as provide opportunities for insurgency fundraising. Tamil organizations collecting money for tsunami relief are thought to have used the resources to acquire weapons for the LTTE (Vertovec 2005). Whether resources are intended for constructive or destructive purposes, informal financial transfer systems (e.g., hawala) support the purchase of material goods that are transferred, and these may include weapons. Profits through the system may also support conflict entrepreneurs.

Diasporans may be key actors in their own right and also within conflict profiteering networks. Governments-in-exile are the most obvious examples of key actors in diaspora. There may also be key figures in the diaspora affiliated with relatively less obvious groups, but whose influence could be significant. This might include, for example, wealthy individuals or those who suffer from acute grievance. These are individuals who have both motive and opportunity to advance a particular agenda, positive or negative. They may be preferred intermediaries due to their relative ease of access to international resources, networks, and international trade routes. In particular, they may link conflict entrepreneurs on the ground to networks of willing supporters abroad, e.g., Kosovo. In some cases they may mobilize unwilling support, e.g., through extortion, as above.

Diasporans who maintain media/information sources on the conflict or COO more generally may be key actors. They can use these media tools to portray particular interpretations of the conflict, sometimes in ways that cloak realities and suggest causes resonant with liberal values

⁶ Diaspora business investment can similarly entail mixed motives or unintentional political implications, for example, creating new linkages to other countries, such as Raffic Harriri's investments, which produced a sustained Saudi Arabian economic interest in Lebanon (Koinova remarks).

(Tekwani 2003). As such, the key actors who manage these informational outlets become important mobilizers of public opinion with potential consequences for mobilizing material and policy support for the conflict.

The importance of diasporans, whether key actors or those mobilized to follow others, cannot be gauged in isolation. Adamson and Demetriou (2007) assert that the diaspora phenomenon is a function of both “non-state political entrepreneurs” and state elites, who may use the notion of diaspora to solicit support for political, material, or conflict agendas. In this sense, diasporans become important actors in a “boomerang” effect (Keck and Sikkink 1998), whereby internal actors use diasporans to voice, promote, and engage what cannot be done within the borders of the homeland.

Diasporans may be well-placed to lobby and otherwise influence international actors, for better or for worse. Studies show their influence is most effective when they frame their interests in the language of liberal values (Shain 1999). This may or may not represent their actual intentions. Drawing from the cases of Lebanon and Kosovo, Koinova (2011a) suggests that the rhetoric of liberal values may reflect an instrumentalist agenda on the part of diaspora organizations seeking to reinforce their sovereignty aims vis-à-vis the homeland (see also Shain 1999). As key actors, one need only consider the US’ experience with Ahmad Chalabi to know that diasporans have their own agendas and may be misleading and untrustworthy (see, for example, Roston 2009). Chalabi demonstrates the ingenuity international actors may seek to tap into for socio-economic as well as political objectives. Yet, the advantages of what he had to offer as a diasporan were naively presumed.

TRAJECTORIES AND TRIGGERS

Regarding diaspora as context, trends depend, in part, on the degree of organization within a diaspora and these organizations’ intention to socialize youth into grievances and/or pan-national identities. On the one hand, for example, Armenian youth in diaspora are socialized into a victim-based identity that prolongs grievances. On the other hand, Indicorps is a diaspora volunteer organization that intentionally socializes members into a pan-Indian identity, where volunteers serve in regions other than those of their heritage.

In her analysis of the Armenian, Albanian, and Chechen diasporas, Koinova (2011c) identifies three trigger points in the engagement of diasporas in secessionist movements. The first occurs when local elites formally declare a secessionist movement, triggering diaspora mobilization for support. Subsequently, diasporans may exert “radicalization” influence on the conflict at two junctures: 1) when severe human rights violations occur (e.g., massacres, pogroms, and ethnic cleansing), and 2) when local moderates appear to lose credibility in achieving secession. Much more difficult to identify are the more personal triggers for diaspora engagement, such as when a family member in the COO is killed in the conflict, which prompted, for example, a roofer in New York to fundraise for military equipment to support the conflict in Kosovo (Ibid.).

While Koinova’s analysis specifically examined diaspora engagement to support secessionist movements, diasporans may also mobilize to support peace and reconstruction in response to trigger events. Just as grave human rights violations may radicalize diaspora influence, they may also mobilize diaspora interest, perhaps for the first time in a conflict cycle, inspiring intensive political lobbying for intervention, for example, or for supporting more moderate key actors in the COO. The end of conflict, itself often signaled by the announcement of a peace agreement, may inspire diasporans to mobilize for post-conflict reconstruction. Peace may trigger a reconfiguration of continuing remittance and philanthropic contributions. For example, the Liberian diaspora transitioned subsistence remittances to income-generating initiatives, such as sending in-kind material goods that could be resold in local markets (Lubkemann 2008). The

fall of the Taliban regime inspired a latent diaspora of Afghan-American youth to mobilize for the first time around an Afghan identity and seek to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction (Brinkerhoff 2004).

PART 2. MAPPING POTENTIAL DIASPORA INFLUENCE ON THE CONFLICT CURVE

For better or for worse, diasporans may intervene with direct activities in the PO, or indirect ones targeted to mediating actors, such as country-of-residence (COR) governments and international bodies. The most noticeable and commonly recognized diaspora interventions in the PO include economic remittances, philanthropy, human capital, and political influence, including international advocacy and participation in peace processes. Even when diasporans are not acting out the most explicitly destructive roles as conflict entrepreneurs and sustainers, each of the constructive contributions noted above can have a darker side.

Following is a discussion of each of these contributions. For each type a table is provided indicating the potential positive and negative contributions. These tables, and much of the accompanying text, are reproduced from Brinkerhoff (2011). These are then mapped on the conflict curve. Many of these contributions may be continuous along the conflict curve. The graphs serve to emphasize when and how (positively or negatively) they might be most impactful.

ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS

That remittances are essential to sustaining livelihoods during conflict is well-known. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2009), in 2007, remittances to Liberia equaled its GDP; during Kosovo's civil war (1998-1999), remittances accounted for 45 percent of annual domestic revenues (Demmers 2007). However, remittances' contribution to peacebuilding, reconstruction and post-conflict development requires more research and analysis. Remittances are of great importance due to their ability to "alter the local balance of economic, political, and military power" (Horst 2008, 320). By sustaining livelihoods and basic services during conflict, diaspora remittances may represent a foundation upon which peace and development can be expanded (see Fagen and Bump 2006). Importantly, remittances may be the only factor preventing disarmed and demobilized combatants from re-engaging in violence, especially when jobs may be scarce in the immediate aftermath of conflict (see Lubkemann 2008).

On the other hand, diasporas are more reliable funding sources for insurgencies than states and, unlike states, they do not seek to control insurgencies, only to support them (Byman et al. 2001).⁷ Diaspora resources may at least partially replace the funds previously accessible through Cold War politics (Adamson 2005). In the 74 active insurgencies between 1991 and 2001, Byman and Associates (2001) found refugees to account for 21 percent of outside support, and diasporas (those immigrants who are settled in foreign countries) to account for 19 percent of such assistance. Table 2-1 presents these positive and negative contributions in greater detail and scope.

Mapping these on the conflict curve (Figure 2-1) reveals that remittance contributions, while important to sustaining subsistence during conflict, may also have the most negative consequences immediately preceding and during the peak of conflict. This is the time when

⁷ Notable cases include support to the Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka, Kurdish guerillas in Turkey, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The Irish Republican Army is a well-known demonstration of diasporas' role in sustaining conflict.

support for insurgency may be at its greatest and with the most dire consequences in terms of loss of life. The most positive remittance contributions occur following the peak as conflict de-escalates, and during post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction.

Figure 2-1 Remittance Contributions and the Conflict Curve




Table 2-1. Potential Remittance Contributions to Peace and Conflict

Contribution	Latent	Escalation	Peak	De-escalation	Post-conflict
ECONOMIC REMITTANCES					
Positive					
Significant proportion of GDP, especially during conflict; may outpace official development assistance (ODA) (e.g., Liberia 2007; Kosovo 1998-1999).					
Sustaining livelihoods during conflict and providing a foundation for future economic development (e.g., Somalia).					
May support Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) by supporting alternative income generation (e.g., Liberia).					
Create financial transfer systems for the above, as well as for other external actors from the international community (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia).					
May be transformed from subsistence to investment as the conflict subsides (e.g., Liberia).					
Often a sustained source of support for the long haul of reconstruction and development, when donor commitments wane (e.g., Somalia).					
Negative					
Informal transfer systems can be used to support continuing conflict (e.g., Kosovo).					
Charitable contributions using informal systems may inadvertently support illicit trade, contributing to continued violence (e.g., Afghanistan).					
Informal systems may profit or be created by conflict entrepreneurs (e.g., Tamil rebels or Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka).					
For combatants, they can be more reliable and less controlling of tactics and objectives than state-supported insurgencies (e.g., LTTE, Kurdish guerillas in Turkey, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization).					
May explicitly call for and support factional violence (e.g., Somalia).					
Proportional advantage of influencing the homeland owing to relatively greater access to wealth and opportunity (e.g., Ethiopia,					

former Yugoslavia).			
Diasporans are not subject to the consequences of their financial contributions (e.g., former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka).			
Insurgency groups may target diasporans for manipulation and extortion (e.g., Tamils in Canada, Kurds in Germany).			
Allows fungibility of resources that can be applied to promote or participate in conflict.			

Overall, the remittance contributions of diasporans in conflict-affected countries may be more positive than negative. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008) find that doubling the size of diasporas may reduce the likelihood of conflict renewal from 40 percent to 32.8 percent, and there is a strong relationship between per capita income at the end of conflict and the likelihood of renewed conflict. Together, these findings suggest at least a partial explanation for their findings with respect to diasporas (Brinkerhoff 2011). The very remittances that have heretofore been assumed to support conflict may, in fact, sustain livelihoods in ways that better prepare populations for peace.

PHILANTHROPIC CONTRIBUTIONS

In conflict-affected societies, the motives for diaspora philanthropy may be solely philanthropic, combined with aspirations for peace, or provide a cover for political and conflict objectives (as above). Studies of the Somali diaspora similarly find that many believe humanitarian or development support to their COO is the best or the only way to support lasting peace and stability (Horst 2008, Kleist 2008), including, for example, “productive investments that create a new middle class with clear interests in peace or...focusing on educating the new generation into a different mindset while creating opportunities for them” (Horst 2008, 334).

Especially important in fragile contexts, diaspora philanthropy organizations can act as intermediaries between traditional development actors, and diasporas and local communities—for example, identifying needs and priorities of local communities and communicating those to donor organizations, NGOs, and diasporans to solicit funding and expertise. Also, diaspora organizations may demonstrate innovative programs and approaches that can be replicated and/or used to advocate for traditional actor administrative and programmatic efforts and reforms (Brinkerhoff 2004). Box 2-1 describes diaspora philanthropy efforts in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Liberia.

Box 2-1. Diaspora Philanthropy in Conflict-Affected Societies

Somali women in Mogadishu organized an education and livelihood project for young combatants. The project was financially adopted by diaspora Somalis in Norway. After raising approximately \$10,000 and engaging in significant lobbying to government agencies and NGOs, the Norwegian Government began funding the project (Horst 2008).

Afghans4Tomorrow was a vehicle for members of the Afghan-American diaspora to take leave and vacation time from their jobs in order to go to Afghanistan and make contributions of time, energy, and expertise to the rebuilding effort. A4T was particularly innovative in reducing the costs to labor contributions by framing opportunities for the short term, potentially implemented during vacations from full-time jobs or school in the COR. Among the projects A4T implemented in Afghanistan are Ministry of Finance (MOF) training and staffing support, and support to schools (Brinkerhoff 2004).

In 2004, the Liberian Community Association of Northern California shipped a container worth over \$12,000 in medical supplies and contributed \$30,000 to rehabilitate three hospitals. Over seven years another Liberian diaspora organization supported post-secondary education for more than 2000 refugees in Ghana, providing and administering an annual budget of \$150,000. Smaller, ad hoc, efforts include “Edward” who provided \$800 to rebuild the road and three bridges connecting his home village to Monrovia. He subsequently provided an

additional \$500 for chainsaws and training to start a lumber business (Lubkemann 2008).

Diaspora philanthropy can also be used as a tool to advance political and conflict agendas. Conflict entrepreneurs may combine violent and non-violent tactics as they seek to tap the resources of transnational networks (Adamson 2005), as demonstrated by some transnational charities that ultimately support networks for violence. Examples of mixed tactics include Hamas in Lebanon, and, historically, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Individual diasporans, and potential key actors in conflict settings, may also use philanthropy to enhance their reputations and connections in the COO. This is most notable with respect to diasporans seeking political office. For example, prior to the 2005 Liberian Presidential election, several of the diasporan candidates founded their own nonprofits, including those aimed at supporting orphanages, schools, and training and microenterprise. Table 2-2 presents these positive and negative contributions in greater detail and scope.

Mapping these on the conflict curve (Figure 2-2) reveals that philanthropic contributions are most salient at the beginning and ends of the conflict curve, though the resulting impact on peace and stability is mixed. During latent conflict, such contributions can support resilience but may also highlight or exacerbate local inequalities and grievances. During post-conflict peacebuilding, these contributions may similarly exacerbate these tensions just as they may lay the groundwork for recovery and resilience and the rebuilding of effective institutions (see discussion of institutional performance in Part 1).

Figure 2-2. Philanthropic Contributions and the Conflict Curve





Table 2-2. Potential Philanthropic Contributions to Peace and Conflict

Contribution	Latent	Escalation	Peak	De-escalation	Post-conflict
PHILANTHROPY					
Positive					
Can focus diasporans' support, making it more constructively strategic (e.g., Sudan, Somalia).					
Can become a bridge of reconciliation within diasporas (e.g., Sudan).					
Can reduce dependencies and create new opportunities and hope for PO residents (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia).					
May represent a significant resource for needed humanitarian assistance (e.g., Liberia, Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan).					
Can contribute short and long term knowledge transfer (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan).					
Informal organizations and efforts may be flexible, enabling more people to participate (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia).					
May create important intermediaries between traditional actors, local communities, and diasporas (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia).					
May demonstrate replicable innovation or efforts that can be formalized and extended (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan).					
Negative					
Can provide a cover for political or conflict objectives, and sometimes mislead contributors (e.g., Tamil organizations and tsunami relief, Hamas in Lebanon, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt).					
Can be selective and discriminatory, potentially exacerbating local conflicts (e.g., Somalia).					

HUMAN CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Human capital contributions are largely bifurcated, as illustrated in Figure 2-3, with sometimes extreme negative consequences during conflict-escalation, peak, and the beginning stages of conflict de-escalation. Typically, these periods attract only one type of human capital contribution, the recruitment of combatants. Among the better known examples are the efforts of the Kosovo Liberation Army to recruit from the diaspora (see, for example, Adamson 2006).

Figure 2-3. Human Capital Contributions and the Conflict Curve



Diaspora populations are one of the most fruitful sources for human capital for reconstruction and development. Human capital contributions may take the form of repatriation or shorter-term philanthropic support. Diaspora human capital is often necessary to staff and re-staff government and development programs.⁸ For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the filling of specific government and development positions was solicited from among diasporans with the requisite expertise; similar recruitment occurred in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (see, for example, King and Melvin 1999-2000). Diasporans can combine cultural/language knowledge and local networks with skills, knowledge, and networks from abroad.

While largely positive, diaspora human capital contributions to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction can have negative consequences as well, posing challenges to security and legitimacy. Resulting tensions and resentments can retard reconstruction or, at worst, stimulate continued or re-emerging conflict. A review of post-conflict state building confirms that the repatriation of diasporans can lead to the emergence of a new political elite, which can give rise to new political tensions (Chesterman et al. 2004). For example, the experience of Eastern Europe in drawing from its diaspora to staff key political and governmental positions was short lived as Western diasporans came to be seen as threats to the local political and economic elites (for the Ukraine experience, see King and Melvin 1999/2000). When diasporans aspire to political power and influence these tensions are exacerbated.⁹

⁸ Brinkerhoff (2008b) provides a detailed review and analysis of these programs, as well as related policy recommendations.

⁹ While it is beyond the scope of this technical brief, a broad range of issues related to post-conflict repatriation should be studied, not least of which is conflict over land rights (Lubkemann 2011).

Diasporans' presence alone can reintroduce and/or worsen existing ethnic tension, potentially replicating pre-conflict stratification of skills and class, and consequent opportunity and resources.¹⁰ In rebuilding government, in particular, tradeoffs between expertise and ethnic representation may be necessary to reach sustainable peace agreements. Those who return can introduce new divisions and resentments among those who stayed and endured and those who enjoyed perceived luxuries while others suffered (see, for example, IOM 2005). New inequities may also be introduced through incentive payments for repatriation or temporary skills transfer. Perceived condescension, whether or not it is intended, further exacerbates these tensions, as described in Box 2-2.

Box 2-2. The Helper Mentality Among Returned Diasporans

Returning diasporans (temporary or longer term) may also inspire resentments simply by virtue of a "helper" mentality, and these resentments may be worsened by the diasporans' attitude and behavior. Diasporans' perceived relationship to the COO may inspire hubris, with inaccurate assumptions about local culture and systems. In discussing diaspora knowledge transfer in Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bernard Lututala Mumpasi, rector of Kinshasa University confirms that returnees may be out of touch with the needs and relevance of their expertise to their native country. Furthermore, these returnees may manifest disdain for their local counterparts and systems. Such disdain, whether real or imagined, yields significant resentment on the part of local residents "who, in extremely difficult conditions, make sacrifices... to continue to operate, despite being abandoned by politicians and development actors" (qtd. in Government of Belgium et al. 2006, 231).

Table 2-3 presents these positive and negative contributions in greater detail and scope.

¹⁰ For detailed accounts of these struggles of return and resulting tensions, see Stefansson (2004a, 2004b) and Cornish et al. (1999).

Table 2-3. Potential Human Capital Contributions to Peace and Conflict

Contribution	Latent	Escalation	Peak	De-escalation	Post-conflict
HUMAN CAPITAL					
Positive					
May be essential for reconstruction and development, e.g., for re-staffing government and development programs (e.g., Afghanistan, Armenia, Iraq, Liberia, Palestinian territories, Somalia).					
Brings entrepreneurship, knowledge, skills, and networks (Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia).					
Negative					
Can introduce tensions and resentments that retard reconstruction or stimulate renewed or re-emerging conflict (e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DRC, Liberia).					
May create a new political elite and give rise to new political tensions (e.g., Iraq, Liberia, Ukraine).					
Can replicate pre-conflict stratification of skills, class, opportunities, and resources (e.g., Afghanistan).					
May introduce new tensions between those who stayed and endured and those who <u>l</u> ived comfortably' (e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina).					
<u>H</u> elper' mentality, possible overestimation of COO knowledge, and arrogance may create tensions (e.g., Afghanistan, DRC).					
May be an important source for combatant recruitment (e.g., Kosovo).					

POLICY/ATTITUDINAL INFLUENCES

Sometimes the aim of diaspora identity politics is simply to keep the ethnic identity alive; often this objective combines with more political aims to create and sustain an ethnic homeland. For example, in the 1990s, Kurds in London broadcasted Kurdish language television throughout Europe and into Turkey at a time when Turkey did not permit Kurdish language television. The program featured folk dances and children's programming, and alternative news reporting, including issues of Kurdish human rights (Koslowski 2005).

Diaspora communities may be explicitly maintained and mobilized for the purpose of influencing international public opinion and building political support for human rights and political freedoms and also for particular partisan agendas. Those who reside in relatively open and democratic societies can capitalize on newfound freedoms to do so (Wayland 2004; Koslowski 2005). One of the largest contributions diasporas make to insurgencies is through diplomatic pressures (Byman et al. 2001). Demmers (2007) credits the Croatian diaspora with garnering the support of the international community in their conflict with the Croatian Serbs in the 1990s.

Assessing the potential opportunity or risk of diaspora advocacy efforts can be challenging. Sometimes partisan interests are at play under the guise of inclusive and democratic platforms (see Mohamoud 2005). As interest groups, diaspora nationalist movements can influence COO politics, fostering instability and supporting continuing conflict, as documented, for example, among Sikhs and Hindus in diaspora (Biswas 2004). Even when one subset of a diaspora promotes an extremist agenda in the homeland, another subset may arise to counter it, as Biswas (2010) demonstrates in the case of the US-based Indian diaspora and Hindu nationalism.

Diasporas are important political constituents in homeland political processes, including peace negotiations and post-conflict constitutional processes, as illustrated in Box 2-3. To prevent continued destabilization, relevant diasporans should be included early in the negotiation of peace agreements. While settlements would be more difficult to reach, they might prove longer lasting, especially if accompanied by targeted public relations campaigns in CORs.

Box 2-3. Diasporans as Political Constituents in the COO

Significant efforts were made to include the Afghan diaspora, primarily in Germany and North America, in the drafting of the Afghanistan Constitution in 2002; broad participation from the diaspora also was sought for providing feedback on the draft (Brinkerhoff 2004). Diasporas as interest groups can assist in reconstituting legitimacy for post-conflict governments. Campaigning for the 2005 Liberian elections was probably more intense in the United States than in Liberia itself (see Lubkemann 2006). There are 14 counties in Liberia, yet it is often said that five more exist in the United States (Providence, Philadelphia, DC, Staten Island, and Minneapolis). The diaspora at once financed the presidential campaigns for the 2005 elections and provided many of the candidates, including President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Diaspora campaign contributions can also yield formalized political influence in the homeland. For example, \$4 million in contributions to Franjo Trudjman's campaign earned the Croatian diaspora 12 of the 120 parliamentary seats (Djuric 2003; qtd. in Demmers 2007).

Diasporas also advocate for peace. In diaspora, ethnic groups who share a geographically defined homeland may mobilize around a unified diaspora identity in order to promote peace in their homelands, as illustrated in Box 2-4. On the other hand, diaspora direct participation in

conflict resolution in the homeland can inadvertently lead to disastrous outcomes when potentially “out of touch” diasporans lobby for policies that hinder sustainable peace, e.g., focusing on retribution and blame. If diaspora groups plan to return, their political integration is essential to sustained peace; their inclusion in peace negotiations supports this integration (Vorrath 2011).

Box 2-4. Pan-National Identity Mobilization for Peace

The Sudanese diaspora in Europe organized across ethnic lines for a peace tour to demonstrate that peace across ethnic lines and based on an overarching Sudanese identity is possible. Such efforts create multiple loyalties and mutual dependencies, and these new identities increase the degree of trust across category boundaries. The Somali (Kleist 2008; Horst 2008) and US-based Ethiopian diasporas have also pursued reconciliation within the diaspora, in the latter case with the assistance of a facilitator (see Lyons et al. 2004). In Somalia, in addition to conflict, diaspora remittances support cultural mechanisms specific to conflict resolution, such as the funding of a *shir* (traditional clan assembly), and *diya* payments (compensational payments) deemed necessary for reconciliation (Horst 2008). Members of the Somali diaspora have also created a “virtual *shir* in cyberspace” (<http://www.somalishir.org/>).

Diasporas can make meaningful contributions to peace negotiations (see Zunzer 2004; PILPG 2009). They can assist mediators in locating warring parties (Baser and Swain 2008); they may pressure these groups and leaders to participate in peace negotiations; and they may lobby the governments in their countries of residence to engage in and/or facilitate negotiations, as in the case of Ireland (Cochrane 2007). Diaspora participation can inspire trust and confidence in conflicting groups and international facilitators alike, in part, by providing insights into the conflict and the actors (Hall and Swain 2007). In both Darfur and Nepal, diaspora networks issued joint statements identifying possible options for inclusion in peace agreements; in Burundi and Sudan, diasporas have supported the implementation of peace agreements (PILPG 2009). Diasporans may participate in third-party mediation, albeit not as entirely neutral parties (see, for example, Baser and Swain 2008). This was the case, for example, for Somalia and Afghanistan (Zunzer 2004), and for Ugandans in London (Spear 2006).

Table 2-4 presents these positive and negative contributions in greater detail and scope.


Table 2-4. Potential Policy/Attitudinal Influences on Peace and Conflict

Contribution	Latent	Escalation	Peak	De-escalation	Post-conflict
POLICY/ATTITUDINAL INFLUENCE					
Positive					
May influence international political opinion for the protection of human rights and political freedoms (e.g., Afghanistan, Copts in Egypt, Croatia).					
May "humanize" COR foreign policy (e.g., Egypt, former Yugoslavia).					
Can yield deeper commitments to development assistance and meeting the Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs) (e.g., Armenia).					
Moderate, bridging groups may emerge to counter extremist agendas both in the PO and within the diaspora (e.g., Sudan Civil Society Forum, Somalia).					
Can support the legitimacy of post-conflict governments (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia).					
May promote reconciliation in the diaspora as a demonstration to support reconciliation in the COO (e.g., Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan Civil Society Forum).					
Can fund and organize cultural mechanisms specific to conflict resolution (e.g., Somalia).					
Can support peace negotiations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Locating and communicating with warring parties, connecting them to international mediators ▪ Encouraging them to participate ▪ Supporting implementation ▪ Lobbying COR governments to mediate and support negotiations and implementation ▪ Inspiring trust in the process ▪ Providing insight into the conflict and actors ▪ Suggesting components to peace agreements ▪ Directly mediating among conflicting parties (e.g., Afghanistan, Burundi, Darfur, Nepal, Somalia, Sudan)					

Contribution	Latent	Escalation	Peak	De-escalation	Post-conflict
Negative					
May support partisan agendas that exclude important groups and stakeholders, fomenting continuing tensions and possibly conflict; resulting peace agreements may yield further exclusion, sowing the seeds for conflict in the future (e.g., Sikhs, Hindus).					
The rhetoric of liberal values can be used instrumentally and may mask partisan and exclusive agendas (e.g., Sri Lanka).					
May influence COO politics in ways that sustain divisive agendas (e.g., Hindus and Sikhs).					
Influence may be disproportionate owing to access to wealth and opportunities, potentially skewing political elections with results diasporans are not subject to (e.g., Croatian diaspora).					
May lobby for policies that hinder sustainable peace, sometimes unwittingly (e.g., Kenya, Ethiopia).					
Can lobby based on continued grievance, discouraging actors from engaging in peace negotiations (e.g., Kosovo, Irish diaspora, Tamil diaspora).					

Mapping these on the conflict curve (Figure 2-4) reveals that policy/attitudinal influences are important throughout the conflict curve but have particularly negative potential impacts during latent conflict, and may be most salient during conflict de-escalation and post-conflict peace and reconstruction, when these contributions are as likely to be constructive as destructive for peace processes.

Figure 2-4. Diaspora Policy/Attitudinal Influence and the Conflict Curve



PART 3. NEXT STEPS

The knowledge base to inform policymaking regarding diasporas and peace and conflict is quite limited to date (Brinkerhoff and Riddle 2009). Accounting for and responding to diasporas' potential influence in conflict and peacebuilding necessitates multi-agency and multi-donor approaches, including sharing assessment frameworks and diaspora-specific mapping and analyses, as well as coordinated engagement strategies. More general knowledge and experience sharing should be initiated as soon as possible. As information from applying this technical guidance cumulate, policymakers will have more empirical evidence with which to test and refine these frameworks. With an improved knowledge base, a more specific toolkit can be developed, which can include identification of diaspora-specific theories of change.

Policy responses to diaspora roles in peace and conflict can address a range of functions. Brinkerhoff (2009) addresses five functional categories of policy response to creating an enabling environment for diaspora contributions to development more generally. These include 1) mandating through legal and regulatory frameworks; 2) facilitating, such as through incentivizing desired engagement and behavior, supporting networking among various stakeholder groups, and connecting needs to diaspora contributors; 3) resourcing, either through direct funding or indirectly through loan guarantees and tax benefits; 4) partnering to achieve shared objectives through a rational division of labor based on comparative advantage; and 5) endorsing, or actions that publicize, praise, and encourage individual diasporan and diaspora organization contributions. These functional categories of policy response can equally be applied to the specific context of peace and conflict. With a deeper knowledge and experience base, specific actions in each functional category can be identified for both COO governments and international actor policy responses. Given the potential for negative as well as positive contributions to peace and conflict, these policy frameworks should incorporate not

only when and how to enable diaspora contributions, but also how to prevent or disable them (Lubkemann 2011).

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