



EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE DESIGN SUPPORT (EWARDS)

JOS CONFLICT ASSESSMENT



MAY 2010

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The team also benefited from the willingness of multiple actors to meet and discuss with us the conflict in Jos. The list of interviewees may be found in Appendix A. We thank the interviewees for their candor and insights. It should be noted that many interviewees, given the recent violence and still high levels of tension, requested anonymity. We have accommodated those requests.

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Cover photos: Top left: Bukola Akosile, Program Officer, West African Network for Peacebuilding Nigeria. Top right: Chris Kwaja, Jos native and Research Associate, Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies. Bottom row: Conflict-ridden areas of Jos, Nigeria. All photos courtesy of Jos Conflict Assessment Team, EWARDS.

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DISCLAIMER

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ACRONYMS

AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magheb
CECOMPS	Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies
CEPAN	Center for Peace Advancement in Nigeria
CEPSERD	Center for Peacebuilding and Socio-Economic Resources Development
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDWARDS	Early Warning and Response Design Support
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
LGA	Local Government Authority
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WACA	West African Conflict Assessment

FOREWORD

The outbreak of violence of March 7, 2010 reminded the world yet again of the tragic consequences of human conflict. For Jos, this violence, coupled with the bloody events of January 17, 2010, reflects an alarming and accelerating cycle of violence on the Jos Plateau in the twenty-first century.

This conflict report is the first of several assessments envisaged for West Africa under the auspices of Early Warning and Response Design Support (EWARDSD)—a two-year project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/West Africa and USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation in Washington, DC. The project aims to strengthen conflict early warning and build response capacity for more effective prevention and mitigation of conflict in the sub-region. As leaders in this enterprise, Early Warning Department of the Economic Community of West African States and its key civil society partners West Africa Network for Peacebuilding and the West African Civil Society Forum are EWARDSD beneficiaries and partners.

This assessment was conducted to analyze current and preceding conflict factors surrounding Jos, and the process has provided the team with important experiences that will guide future assessments and concise analysis for potential responses. In light of this effort, the EWARDSD team was able to refine an assessment framework, field test it, and distill important lessons and best practices for the future.

The reader will find elements of assessment design and methods in this report that may be of interest to conflict professionals. The report mainly covers conflict-specific findings and recommendations regarding Jos for an audience with this interest. The team trusts that both elements will contribute to a better understanding of conflict on the Plateau.

Many organizations deserving of thanks have been mentioned in the Acknowledgements area. Additional thanks go to Dr. Amy Pate and Dr. Joseph Hewitt of the University of Maryland who led the assessment framework design from the outset and proved to be able trainers in the field assessment.

Robert J. Groelsema

ARD/EWARDSD Chief of Party

Accra, Ghana

March 11, 2010

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The West African Conflict Assessment (WACA) framework was developed in collaboration with multiple West African partners. It was designed as tool for assessing the causes of conflict and for identifying response needs under the Early Warning and Response Design Support program (EWARDS) funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In December 2009, EWARDS stakeholders selected Jos, Nigeria, to be the location for the pilot assessment and field test of the WACA framework. A field assessment was then conducted between January 25 and February 8, 2010. The assessment process included six steps:

1. Mapping Context
2. Mapping Actors
3. Mapping Conflict Drivers and Mitigators
4. Mapping Turning Points
5. Building Scenarios
6. Assessing Response

The methodology employed for the Jos assessment is a combination of review of secondary source material, interviews, and review of primary source documentation. The assessment team consisted of two field teams, one based in Abuja and one based in Jos, that conducted field interviews between January 31 and February 4, 2010.

Jos is the capital of Plateau State, known as the “Home of Peace and Tourism” in Nigeria. However, tensions between ethnic groups in Jos, and especially between Jasawa (primarily ethnic Hausa) and Berom ethnic groups, have periodically erupted into violence, with incidents becoming more frequent since the 1990s. In January 2010, riots erupted and retaliatory attacks took place in March 2010.

The assessment team found that the ethnic and indigene-settler cleavages were the most critical to understanding conflict dynamics in Jos. The primary conflict actors are the Jasawa and the ethnic Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere. Contestation over indigeneship and competition for the resources provided to local government authorities (LGAs) undermine systems for conflict management in Jos, while fueling grievances and providing incentives for the violent continuation of conflict. Exacerbating the conflict further is a lack of opportunity, outside indigeneship, and control of LGA resources for economic advancement and security. Additionally, a growing culture of impunity challenges attempts to reign in violence.

Responses undertaken must try to bring the various communities together to dialogue constructively to address the “tit-for-tat” nature of reprisals, and to break the cycle of violence. The conflict in Jos is rooted in certain structural characteristics of the Nigerian state—structural characteristics that have also led to conflict in multiple other locales. In particular, disputes over indigeneship and control of LGA resources underlie much of the conflict in Jos.

Our recommendations are as follows:

SHORT-TERM

General

- The Nigerian government must arrest and prosecute perpetrators of violence. Furthermore, the ability of local communities in Jos to monitor and participate in the legal process should be strengthened. Regular reporting on progress in this area will undermine the current culture of impunity.
- The Nigerian government should invite a neutral arbiter to participate in arbitration of the conflict, with a particular role to play in any panels of inquiry. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union should both be considered.

Programmatic

- Civil society organizations, with donor support, should develop and deliver programs that provide civic education and opportunities for constructive engagement, especially targeting youth in Jos.
- Civil society actors, with support from donors, should help local communities stay apprised of progress in the prosecution of alleged perpetrators (for example, through the regular dissemination of reports), and provide support for victims to be involved in the legal process (for example, through the provision of transportation to legal hearings).

MEDIUM-TERM

General

- The Plateau State and Jos LGAs, working in coordination with the federal police and civil society organizations, should support and strengthen mechanisms for the detection and transmission of early warning signals to the appropriate authorities. While some attempts have been made at this, they have thus far been lacking. Communication to the public on how to report early warning signals should be strengthened, for example, through regular publishing in local press and on local radio of an early warning “hotline” number. Regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and the African Union, and international donors should provide funding and expertise to support these efforts.
- The Plateau State and Jos LGAs, working in coordination with the federal police and civil society organizations, should establish mechanisms that trigger coordinated response to early warning signals. For example, by building the relationship between the police and civil society (especially through various peace communities or peace clubs), law enforcement could provide increased security measures when early warning signals are received and civil society actors could engage in activities targeted to defuse the situation.
- International donors should support research and planning for the engagement of radical elements of opposing communities in community reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Programmatic

- Civil society actors, with support and coordination from ECOWAS and donors, should conduct a study of best practices for working with radical elements of conflicts and involving them in community reconciliation processes.

LONG-TERM

General

- Federal arbitration of issues of indigeneship and citizenship are necessary. A national process of dialogue on these issues, and implementation of policies resulting from that dialogue is needed. The delineation of indigeneship in current federal law and regulations is murky.
- The way in which LGAs are funded should be reconsidered. As long as control of LGA structures results in disproportionate economic benefits, violent conflict remains a possibility.
- The Nigerian federal, Plateau State, and Jos LGAs should set up structures for the long-term reintegration of internally displaced persons within Jos. These structures should include not only economic assistance, but also psychological counseling for victims of violence. International donors should support these efforts through funding and expertise.
- Interreligious peace committees should be established in communities that currently do not have them. Civil society organizations and donors should identify existing interreligious peace committees in other communities that may be enabled to take this role. Furthermore, existing peace committees should be empowered to establish interethnic peace committees in Jos. Linkages between the various committees should be supported, for example, through the funding of liaison positions by the donor community, in order to share best practices and assist with early warning.

Programmatic

- Donors should consider funding a series of town halls, forums, or other dialogues on indigeneship, to be coordinated by civil society organizations.
- Donors should consider funding increased civic education, for example, to strengthen citizens' understanding of the relationship between taxation and accountability.

I.0 INTRODUCTION

I.1 OVERVIEW OF WEST AFRICAN CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

The West African Conflict Assessment (WACA) framework was designed to be used by governmental and nongovernmental actors to evaluate a wide variety of conflicts in the West African context, as well as potential responses to those conflicts. The framework, developed in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and civil society actors, lays out a process by which various contributors to both conflict and peace may be analyzed. Both of these contributors are categorized as root causes, proximate causes, or accelerators/decelerators.

The assessment process consists of six steps:

1. Mapping Context
2. Mapping Actors
3. Mapping Conflict Drivers and Mitigators
4. Mapping Turning Points
5. Building Scenarios
6. Assessing Response


These steps relate to each other and to root causes, proximate causes, and accelerators/decelerators as shown in Figure 1.1.

I.2 SELECTION OF JOS AS PILOT

In December 2009, Early Warning and Response Design Support (EWARD) stakeholders selected Jos, Nigeria, to be the location for its pilot WACA. A secondary literature review on conflicts in Jos and the Plateau State helped establish the general social, economic, and political parameters of these conflicts, as well as a number of well-positioned local partners to assist with the pilot assessment. Although Jos had not experienced a major outbreak of violence since November 2008, a review of the secondary literature indicated that the underlying issues leading to the 2008 and previous episodes of violence had not been addressed, and tensions remained high. Conflict in Jos was seen as having a high probability of recurrence, but also high potential for actionable responses.

Violence again erupted in Jos on January 17 that resulted in approximately 500 deaths and thousands displaced from their homes. While the timing of this outbreak of violence momentarily jeopardized the activity, it further reinforced the feeling that an assessment of conflict dynamics in Jos was needed urgently. Indeed the March 7, 2010 reprisals, which occurred during the drafting of this report, confirmed the need for decisive action.

Figure I: WACA Framework



I.3 METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed for the Jos assessment is a combination of review of secondary source material, interviews, and review of primary source documentation. Written primary and secondary sources were used to establish the background to the conflict in Jos, as well as social, economic, and political parameters of the conflict. These sources were also instrumental in building the history of the conflict in Jos. Interviews in the field were utilized to gauge the opinions and perceptions of key stakeholders about the causes of the conflict, previous responses to the conflict, and the potential for future responses. Fieldwork took place between January 31 and February 4, 2010.

I.4 TEAM MEMBERS

The assessment team consisted of two field teams, one based in Abuja and one based in Jos. Team members based in Abuja included:

- Dr. Amy Pate (Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland)
- Dr. Robert Groelsema (EWARDIS)
- Mr. Aidan Sabie Naah (EWARDIS)
- Mr. Ayokunle Fagbemi (Center for Peacebuilding and Socio-Economic Resources Development)
- Ms. Bukola Ademola-Adelehin (West Africa Network for Peacebuilding-Nigeria)
- Mr. Gima Forje (West African Civil Society Forum)

Team members based in Jos included:

- Mrs. Lantana Abdullahi (Center for Peace Advancement in Nigeria)
- Mr. Best Nanfwang (Center for Peace Advancement in Nigeria)
- Mr. Chris Kwaja (Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies)
- Mr. Kop'ep Dabugat (Center for Peacebuilding and Socio-Economic Resources Development)
- Mrs. Aisha Musa (Kanewa Advancement Forum)
- Ms. Florence Ihome (ECOWAS)
- Mr. Ebenezer Asiedu (ECOWAS)

2.0 BACKGROUND TO JOS CONFLICT

Outlining the background to a conflict setting is necessary to set the stage for a conflict assessment. A basic understanding of the trajectory of the conflict helps contextualize and frame information gathered from various sources. Therefore, a brief outline of the Jos conflict is provided here.

Jos is the capital of Plateau State, known as the “Home of Peace and Tourism” in Nigeria. However, tensions between ethnic groups in Jos have periodically erupted into violence, with incidents taking place more frequently since the 1990s (see text box). The typical pattern of violence has been between Jasawa (a term used to self-identify Hausa and sometimes Fulani and other northern groups with a long history in Jos)¹ and Berom-Anaguta-Afizere. Jasawa, Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere all consider themselves to be indigenes of Jos, and at different times in history have been granted indigene certificates in Jos. Berom and Anaguta have consistently been granted indigene certificates; Afizere have generally been granted indigene certificates (there have been incidents of their denial [Ostien 2009]); and Jasawa were granted indigene certificates under early administrations in Jos North Local Government Authority (LGA), but this has not been the case in recent years. Currently, most official organs, including the Plateau State government and most of the various official panels of inquiry, view Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere as the groups with indigene status in Jos (Plateau Resolves 2004; Plateau State of Nigeria 25 March 2009; Plateau State of Nigeria 9 April 2009).

Jos is a city built by colonialism. British development of the mining sector led to the growth of the city on peripheral lands at the boundary of Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere territories. Large numbers of Hausa and Fulani were brought into the region to work the mines. Large numbers of Yoruba and Igbo also moved

CHRONOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN JOS, PLATEAU STATE

1945: Jasawa-Igbo riots over control of local markets

1966: Igbo massacre by Jasawa and Berom

1994: Riots between Jasawa and Berom-Anaguta-Afizere after a Jasawa is named chairman of Jos North LGA

1997: Communal clashes between Berom and Jasawa in Gero in Jos South LGA over access to land

2001: Riots between Jasawa and Berom-Anaguta-Afizere after a Jasawa is appointed coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Program for Jos North LGA. Conflict escalates to general Muslim-Christian violence.

November 2008: Riots between Jasawa and Berom-Anaguta-Afizere after contested election results. Conflict escalates into general Muslim-Christian violence.

January 2010: Riots between Jasawa and Berom-Anaguta-Afizere after property dispute

March 2010: Fulani herdsmen attack Berom villages in retaliation for losses in January 2010 violence.

¹ The term “Jasawa” is contested within Jos. Jasawa is generally a term of self-identification used primarily by ethnic Hausa, but also by Fulani, to designate that they are Hausa (or Hausa Fulani) with a history rooted in Jos (Adetula 2005; Milligan 2010). Advocates for Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere interests tend to deny that Jasawa is a legitimate identity category, and claim that Jasawa are Hausa. The politics of terminology in this context are important to note. The denial of the term “Jasawa” is one means of denying that ethnic Hausa are rooted in or have rights to Jos. Identification of oneself as Jasawa is a semantic means of laying claim to rootedness in and rights to Jos. In deference to the right to self-identification (an emerging right within international law) and in recognition of the social construction of ethnic identity, the team has used Jasawa as a term to identify ethnic Hausa in Jos.

into the city, some arriving with missionaries and others coming for clerical work and commercial opportunities. Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere people were largely absent from the Jos township in its early years, even though the community was built on collectively held land of these groups. Throughout their African colonies, the British depended on systems of indirect rule, and Jos was no exception. Between 1902 and 1947, the British appointed 12 Jasawa traditional rulers (Sarkin Jos). The institutionalization of the Berom paramount chief, the Gbong Gwom, was a post-World War II creation of the British (Blench et al 2006). The status of traditional leaders continues to be an issue of contention between the various groups in Jos.

3.0 ASSESSING CONFLICT IN JOS, NIGERIA

3.1 MAPPING CONTEXT

The first step in the conflict assessment process is mapping key contextual factors. Contextual factors are generally root causes of conflict. While they do not directly or inevitably result in conflict or the eruption of violence, contextual factors make societies more or less resilient when faced with conflict or when violence does erupt.

Several contextual factors were consistently identified by informants and also in the secondary sources accessed by the assessment team. These include issues of indigeneity and settlership, the creation and proliferation of LGAs, and the lack of state and local authority control over police forces. Other contextual issues mentioned, although with less frequency, included the colonial history of Jos (and especially the history of indirect rule and creation of traditional leadership structures in Jos), the high level of ethnic heterogeneity but segregated settlement patterns, and a youth bulge coupled with high levels of youth unemployment.

Importantly, the media has tended to focus on the significance of the religious division of Jos into Muslim and Christian populations, an emphasis that seems to have influenced the thinking of other actors outside Jos. However, based on the information provided by respondents in Jos, religious divides appear secondary to the factors mentioned above.

The contextual factors listed above can be divided into four categories: political, security, economic, and social.

3.1.1 Political Factors

The most frequently mentioned characteristic of the political context is the tiered system of rights in Nigeria. Indigenes are given an expanded set of rights in their specific locales, and all citizens of Nigeria are given a general set of citizenship rights—regardless of status as indigene or settler. This duality has been referred to as the “pathology” of Nigerian citizenship (Ostien 2009: 3). Conflict arises in the ambiguity of indigeneship.

The term “indigene” appears in the 1999 Constitution in regards to the appointment of federal ministers. Section 147.3 states, “Any appointment under subsection (2) of this section by the President shall be in conformity with the provisions of section 14(3) of this Constitution: provided that in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of such State” (Federal Government of Nigeria 1999). The constitution, however, does not define the term “indigene.” The definition of that term has been provided primarily by the Federal Character Commission, the purpose of which is to ensure the equitable distribution of resources and political power in keeping with the federal principle of the Nigerian state. The Federal Character Commission defines an indigene as follows:

“10. (1) An indigene of a Local Government means a person

- i. Either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents was or is an indigene of the local Government concerned; or
- ii. Who is accepted as an indigene by the Local Government:

Provided that no person shall lay claim on more than one Local Government” (Federal Character Commission 2005).

Neither of these two criteria clearly defines who is and is not an indigene. While there is clearly a distinction between indigeneity and citizenship, the mechanisms and instruments that give them expression are unclear and open to manipulation. The boundaries of local governments have changed repeatedly over various Nigerian administrations, and documentation of who is indigene of what locality is often lacking and/or contested. The second provision raises the likelihood of contestation for control of LGAs. Some Jos North LGA administrations have issued indigene certificates to Hausa-Fulani, in addition to Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere. Others have refused to issue indigene certificates to Hausa-Fulani. Rulings by various commissions of inquiry in the past on who is and is not an indigene of Jos have failed to resolve this issue.

A second contextual factor is the presence and the method of LGA creation. LGAs are directly funded by the federal government, and their control is a lucrative business (Last 2007; Suberu 2001). LGAs have proliferated over the years as groups vie for greater access to political power and economic resources, growing from 301 in 1976, to 589 in 1991, to 774 in 1999. However, the rationale for creating new LGAs has not always been systematic; in many cases, new LGAs have been created as a symptom of political patronage. One scholar notes, “If the imbroglia over local government reorganizations convey a lesson for Nigeria, it is that the pressures for new localities in the country are bound to remain insatiable and intractable as long as they are linked to communal struggles for access to an expanded share of central resources, opportunities and representation rather than to the quest for local self-governance and self-reliance” (Suberu 2001: 108).

3.1.2 Security Factors

Within the security arena, informants frequently mentioned problems with the centralization of the police and security forces. While the governor is considered the chief security officer within any state, police within states answer to the central government in Abuja. There are no guarantees that state or local political leaders receive the full security reports that are given to national police officials. Furthermore, the chain of command is such that state and local leaders must channel their security requests through national police officials in Abuja, sometimes making timely response to the outbreak of violence problematic.

3.1.3 Economic Factors

High levels of unemployment and underemployment, particularly of youth, were frequently mentioned as important contextual factors by respondents in Jos and Abuja. While figures for Jos or Plateau State were not available, youth employment in Nigeria as a whole is between 60 and 70 percent (World Bank 2009).

Additionally, despite a lack of economic opportunities in Jos, individuals continue to move there from other locales in Plateau State and from nearby states. Migration to Jos has several sources: draw of educational opportunities in Jos, the degradation of agricultural land in Plateau State (Adia and Rabi n.d.; Blench and Dendo 2003), better economic opportunities (relative to other areas of Plateau State), and security concerns growing from conflict in rural areas (see, e.g., Blench and Dendo 2003 for a discussion on how changing agricultural patterns in Plateau State lead to conflict-related displacement and movement to urban areas). Additionally, since the implementation of shari’a law in some northern states, Jos has also seen an influx of Christians and moderate Muslims. The increase in population creates greater economic pressures and competition between different groups in Jos.

3.1.4 Social Factors

The high level of ethnic heterogeneity within Jos and Plateau State was identified as a key factor in social context. Additionally, lines of ethnic identity frequently coincide with religious affiliations and political allegiances in Jos. Jasawa and Yoruba tend to be Muslims and in recent years have supported the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP). Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta are more likely to be Christian and lend their support the People's Democratic Party (PDP). This is not to say that all settlers are Muslim, as some are Christian, or that all indigenes are Christian, as there are Muslim indigenes. However, the presence of reinforcing (as opposed to cross-cutting) cleavages is important to recognize for conflict management. Further intensifying the nature of these cleavages is the segregated settlement pattern of Jos. One informant noted that the government over the years has missed opportunities to encourage mixed settlement patterns. Recurrent violence in recent years has also reinforced segregated settlement patterns.

One dynamic that should be noted is how ethnic relations in Jos and Plateau State relate to the perceptions of ethnic balance in Nigeria as a whole. The Hausa-Fulani aggregate, while a minority in Jos, is the single largest ethnic grouping in Nigeria (although by no means a majority). The Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere, on the other hand, live almost exclusively in Plateau State and are an extremely small percentage of Nigeria's population (even though the Berom are the largest single group in Jos and its environs). Anaguta and Afizere, while significantly smaller groups than the Berom, still constitute majorities in certain areas of Jos and surrounding areas. While population figures for Nigeria are highly controversial, the difference in the relative sizes of the groups in Jos and in Nigeria as a whole should be noted.

3.1.5 Contextual Factors – Conclusion

Overall, the assessment team found that the nature of indigeneship and the politics of LGAs were the most important contextual factors that act as root causes of conflict in Jos. Economic decline, population growth, and the reinforcement of social cleavages also increase pressures on systems of conflict management. However, these pressures would be more manageable in the absence of contestation over indigeneship and competition over LGA resources.

3.2 MAPPING ACTORS

The next state of the conflict assessment process is the identification of key actors in the Jos setting. Multiple actors are involved in or impacted by conflict in Jos. At the core are *conflict actors*—those who are directly involved. The grievances, resources, and incentives of these actors drive cycles of conflict. *Intervening actors* impact the conflict indirectly, primarily through their interactions with the conflict actors. *Vulnerable communities* are impacted by conflict, but generally are not directly engaged in conflict behavior. However, if vulnerable communities are neglected, there is potential for conflict to spread and escalation in the future.

3.2.1 Conflict Actors

Informants and secondary sources identify the primary conflict actors in Jos as Jasawa on one side and ethnic Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere on the other. While not all members of the Jasawa, Berom, Anaguta, or Afizere communities are involved in violence, respondents typically used the collectives as the actors identified. The “foot soldiers” involved in violence are typically youth (teenagers and adults under 40 years of age) from these ethnic affinity groups. However, the perception is that political and community leaders from these groups are instigators of conflict, even if they do not directly engage in violence. While other actors (e.g., Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba) are periodically pulled into the conflict, most informants indicated that if the conflict among the primary actors could be managed successfully, Jos could once again experience peace.

As explained by informants and other sources, the primary grievances of the Jasawa, motivating recourse to violence, are the following:

- Loss of political power;
- Loss of traditional authority structures;
- Denial of indigene status; and
- Denial of Jasawa identity, as distinct from other forms of Hausa identity.

The primary grievances motivating recourse to violence of Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere² are explained as the following:

- Insistence by Jasawa that they are indigenes of Jos;
- Creation of Jos North LGA (perceived as central state favoritism towards Jasawa); and
- Perceived lack of respect by Jasawa of Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere traditions and culture.

Both sides perceive discriminatory treatment at the hands of the other, in both the political and the economic realm.

The incentives for conflict were viewed as greater than the incentives for peace, regardless of the person being interviewed. This may, in part, be due to the occurrence of mass violence in the week prior to conducting field interviews. However, given that perpetrators of violence are rarely prosecuted, and since the spoils of conflict can be considerable, it is understandable why “big men” may be tempted to favor disorder. The high stakes associated with control of local political structures and traditional institutions constitute a zero-sum dynamic.

3.2.3 Intervening Actors

Informants identified multiple interveners in Jos: governmental actors at the local (Jos and environs), Plateau State and central Nigerian levels; and local, national, and international non-state actors. In addition to interveners identified by respondents, assessment team members identified multiple foreign state actors (including USAID) that were intervening in Jos in some capacity. Government authorities at the local, state, and federal levels were consistently viewed as the intervening actors with the most impact on conflict dynamics.

At the level of government, informants noted that in many instances, the local, state, and national authorities have not been coordinated in their responses to conflict in Jos. In some instances, they were in active competition with each other, exacerbating the conflict. The most frequently cited example of this dynamic was the establishment of rival panels of inquiry by Nigerian President Yar’Adua and Plateau State Governor Jang following the 2008 violence.

Conversely, while involvement by civil society organizations (CSOs) was seen as helpful and necessary, it was considered insufficient to address the underlying causes of conflict. Furthermore, responses by CSOs were viewed, even by representatives of those organizations, as ad hoc and uncoordinated. Jos and Abuja CSO representatives also cited lack of consistent donor support for their efforts as a key challenge to their efficacy.

² Respondents from communities other than the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere generally grouped these three under the single label of “indigene.” Named grievances of representatives of the Berom and Anaguta were remarkably similar. It should be noted that disputes between Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere do occur; however, they typically do not result in violence. Disputes between these groups are instead resolved through consultation of traditional leaders or through the legal system.

One respondent in Abuja also noted that CSOs tended to most actively work with those who were already committed to peaceful coexistence instead of those individuals more likely to promote or engage in violence.

The media—both Nigerian and international—were criticized for the coverage of violence in Jos. In Abuja, several representatives of indigene interests claimed that the international media exaggerated the extent of the crisis, inflated casualty counts, and was biased toward Jasawa/Muslim viewpoints. In Jos, local Nigerian news outlets came under tougher criticism than the international media. These were perceived as making inflammatory statements during the first days of the crisis and of having an anti-Muslim bias.

In interviews with some officials in Abuja, allegations of al Qaeda involvement in the January 2010 riots surfaced. However, the assessment team in Jos found no evidence (or accusations) supporting this allegation. These claims do, however, speak to the high levels of mistrust present. It should be noted that following the riots, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) made public offers of support (including for training and weapons) to Muslims in Jos. AQIM has already made inroads in two other ECOWAS states—Mali and Niger. In March 2010, a Jos man was sentenced to a nine-month jail sentence after he admitted to sewing fake military uniforms and to being a member of Boko Haram and the “Al Qaeda Islamic Association.”³ The possibility of future al Qaeda penetration in Jos should not be entirely discounted.

3.2.4 Vulnerable Communities

Within the WACA framework, three distinct categories of vulnerable communities were identified: victims of conflict, recruitment communities, and spillover communities.

1. **Victims of conflict.** Individuals interviewed stated that almost every community in Jos and its environs could be considered to be vulnerable. However, informants consistently identified individuals displaced by violence, especially women and children, as particularly in need of support. Representatives of CSOs in Abuja and Jos noted that while immediate humanitarian assistance was given to internally displaced persons (IDPs), no sustained assistance to help them rebuild their lives in Jos was available. In particular, informants noted the lack of counseling for victims of violence as problematic.
2. **Recruitment communities.** Youth are seen as the community that is primarily vulnerable to recruitment into violence. Eyewitnesses to recent violence (e.g., in January 2010 and/or November 2008) noted that the majority of fighters engaging in violence were under 40, and many were in their teens or 20s. Groups working in Jos noted that youth were particularly susceptible to manipulation by elites, in part due to a lack of opportunities for more constructive activities. Specifically, high unemployment and lack of educational access contribute to youth vulnerability.
3. **Spillover communities.** Informants noted that conflict has a high probability of spreading to other communities in Plateau State, particularly those close to Jos, as has happened in the past. Furthermore, as Jos has high levels of ethnic heterogeneity, informants noted that conflict could spread to other states where ethnic kin of Jos groups also co-mingle. This has occurred in the past, when after the 2004 violence in nearby Yelwa, there were retaliatory attacks in Kano. Furthermore, while the assessment team was in Abuja, rumors were heard of retaliatory attacks being planned in the capital, although none occurred.

Additionally, Jos itself has the potential to be a spillover community when conflicts erupt in other parts of Nigeria. Recent incidents of violence in Jos have not been reactions to violence elsewhere in the

³ The al Qaeda Islamic Organization was reportedly formed by the aforementioned resident of Jos with nine other Plateau State residents after consultations with Islamic fundamentalists in Bauchi state (Abdulsalami, 12 March 2010). It appears that this organization can best be described as an “aspirational” organization—one that admires and emulates the network headed by Osama bin Laden, but that lacks any direct links to al Qaeda central or affiliates, such as AQIM.

country. However, assessment team members and informants remain convinced that Jos has the potential to be a spillover community, especially if the religious dimension of the conflict continues to be stressed by the media and other actors.

3.3 MAPPING DRIVERS AND MITIGATORS

The next stage in the conflict assessment process is mapping conflict drivers and mitigators. Conflict drivers and mitigators are proximate causes of conflict and peace. They influence conflict dynamics through changing the grievance, resources, or incentives of key conflict actors. The drivers and mitigators identified by the assessment team are presented in this section.

3.3.1 Drivers

Informants identified numerous drivers of conflict in Jos in the political, security, economic, and social realms.

Political Drivers. The primary political drivers of conflict mentioned were the dynamics of LGA politics in Jos and issues concerning the various panels of inquiry set up after violent outbreaks. The behavior of politicians from other states was also mentioned at times as a conflict driver.

Jos town is divided into three LGAs: Jos North, Jos South, and Jos East. Jos North is the most politically contentious LGA; this is where most of the Hausa and Fulani live (in addition to other groups). Both in Abuja and Jos, informants representing Berom, Anaguta, or Afizere interests (as well as the interests of other communities granted indigene status in other areas of Plateau State) pinpointed the creation of Jos North in 1991 as a driver of conflict, as its creation is viewed as favoring Hausa and Fulani interests. The first caretaker chairmen of Jos North were Hausa. The first local elections in Jos in 2008 resulted in violence after irregularities in the vote counting occurred and the results for Jos North were disputed.

Respondents also noted several issues concerning the various panels of inquiry. The composition of such panels was criticized by some respondents for including individuals that had encouraged or had benefited in some way from conflict. Team members also heard criticism that panel members, who had no incentive to tackle difficult issues underlying the conflict, had used their involvement to increase their personal status and to gain access to resources. The operation of some panels was seen as not being transparent or not being neutral in dealings with all communities in Jos. Multiple informants, but especially those representing indigene or Christian interests, bemoaned the fact that white papers arising from government panels had not been widely circulated nor the policies recommended implemented. However, at least one representative of the Muslim community in Jos noted that the reason for non-implementation was that the proposed policies would not, in fact, promote peaceful coexistence. Finally, the example of competing panels set up after the 2008 violence illustrates fully the difficulties posed by the panels. Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta refused to participate in the presidential commission, viewing it as biased against them, but did participate in the state-level panel. Jasawa, on the other hand, refused to participate in the state-level panel (also seeing it as biased), but did participate in the presidential commission.

A third political driver mentioned was the behavior of other state governments whose indigenes live in Jos and its environs. Informants cited the example of the Bauchi State Assembly resolution that instructs individuals with Plateau State indigene certificates to leave the state. It is feared that if such actions were carried out, Hausa in Jos with real or alleged ties to Bauchi State (in which Hausa are the largest ethnic group) could be targeted with violence in retaliation.

Security Drivers. The primary security-related conflict driver cited was the failure of the government to arrest and prosecute perpetrators of violence. The lack of consequences for engaging in violence perpetuates a culture of impunity. While the government has made large number of arrests after recent occurrences of violence (in 2008 and 2010), many of those arrested were transferred to Abuja. Local respondents in Jos also

complained that once suspects were transferred to Abuja, they were unable to follow the legal process. Following the 2008 violence, most of those arrested were released without facing trial, according to respondents. Furthermore, those few perpetrators who were prosecuted were “foot soldiers” in the conflict rather than the “big men” or “shadow people” seen as primarily responsible.

Several informants in Jos mentioned that problems with different security forces inflamed the conflict. A representative of Berom interests said that while the police were efficient in dealing with the crisis, the army did not act impartially. However, a representative of the Jasawa community had the opposite complaint—that the police acted with bias whereas the army was more impartial in its actions. This reflects a general trend in Jos, where representatives of Berom, Anaguta, or Afizere communities have more confidence in state-level actors and representatives of Jasawa have more confidence in federal actors.

Economic Drivers. Economic drivers mentioned to the team included high unemployment (especially among youth) and competition over scarce resources (especially those linked to the holding of political office or traditional leadership positions). Other contested resources in Jos city include control of markets and particular economic sectors (which are viewed as the purview of specific groups). In areas surrounding Jos city, there is tension and sometimes violent conflict between Fulani herders and Berom farmers over access to land and rivers. These tensions have been viewed as remote causes of conflict in Jos city (Plateau State of Nigeria 9 April 2009). Additionally, the failure to reintegrate quickly IDPs back into the economic life of Jos was viewed as a driver of conflict.

Unemployment and underemployment across ethnic groups were identified time and again as an important economic driver of conflict in Jos. Tin mining, the industry that originally brought many migrants to Jos, has almost collapsed, even though deposits of the mineral remain and the price of tin has increased radically in the past decade. Reasons for the continued decline include the deterioration of infrastructure such as railroads for moving the tin from Jos to ports for export and the instability created by continued recurrence of violent conflict (Owen 2008). No other industry has risen up to take the place of tin mining. Furthermore, the tourism industry, another vital sector, has also virtually collapsed due to recurrent conflicts.

The collapse of tin mining and tourism has accentuated the importance of political power for economic well-being. LGAs derive the majority of their income from federal subsidies (primarily from oil revenue). The ability to control an LGA is seen as an opportunity for economic advancement through the control of LGA budgets (and through the ability to loot public coffers, Milligan 2010). While competition over LGA resources pre-dates the decline of other economic sectors, the shrinking of other pathways to economic well-being raises the stakes of LGA competition and increases pressures on institutional means of conflict mitigation.

Social Drivers. Informants identified multiple social drivers of conflict. These include segregated settlement patterns within Jos, the use of religious-based rhetoric and appeals to build alliances (resulting in the spread of conflict), the widespread use of cell phones (especially text messages) to spread rumor and coordinate actions, and conflict over the rights to traditional leadership positions.

3.3.2 Mitigators

Respondents were unable to identify many mitigators of the conflict. This may be due to the recent outbreak of violence that was foremost in many informants’ minds. The most commonly cited mitigator, however, was interreligious dialogue. Interreligious dialogue at the elite level (between religious leaders) was viewed as helpful; however, interreligious dialogue at the community level was seen as even more important. Informants noted that the presence of interreligious peace committees in several Jos communities was credited with preventing the spread of riots to those neighborhoods.

A second mitigator in Jos has been the willingness of some groups to use formal and informal means of nonviolent conflict resolution and the ability of institutions to arbitrate in these disputes. In particular,

conflicts among the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere groups have typically been resolved through either negotiation among traditional elites or through litigation.

3.3.3 Drivers and Mitigators – Conclusion

The assessment team found that in Jos, conflict drivers outweigh conflict mitigators, helping to explain recurrent violence and instability in Jos. The most significant drivers identified were the dynamics of LGA politics and a growing culture of impunity within Jos.

3.4 MAPPING TURNING POINTS

The next stage of the conflict assessment process was to map turning points. Turning points are discrete events that significantly alter the trajectory of the conflict.

3.4.1 Past Turning Points

The primary turning points within the history of the Jos conflict identified by primary and secondary sources were political in nature, especially political competition and appointments within Jos North LGA. The riots of 1994 were sparked by disputes over the appointment of a Jasawa to the Caretaker Management Committee of Jos North Local Government Council. The appointment of another Jasawa to the Jos North National Poverty Elimination Program sparked riots in 2001. Disputed election results for Jos North fuelled outbreaks in 2008.

3.4.2 Potential Turning Points

Many respondents, especially in Jos, thought that the January 2010 violence could potentially be a turning point that could cause conflict actors to “step back from the brink.” The massacre of Berom villages by Fulani herders in March 2010 undermines this interpretation of the January 2010 violence. However, respondents also acknowledged that for long-term settlement, underlying causes of conflict would have to be addressed and better managed.

Respondents also noted that elections will continue to be a potential trigger for violence, as long as political office remains a primary means of self and group enrichment. One assessment team member noted that upcoming state and national elections scheduled for 2011 are already causing concern among the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community in Jos.

3.5 BUILDING SCENARIOS

The final stage of the conflict assessment process, prior to considering response options, is to build scenarios. As such, this step in the process serves as a bridge between mapping the conflict and mapping potential responses. Assessment team members built three scenarios based on their analysis of information gathered through fieldwork and secondary sources. The three scenarios—violence de-escalates, status quo remains, and violence escalates—represent three potential futures for Jos.

3.5.1 Violence De-escalates

Achieving a de-escalation of violence depends on both federal and local action. At the federal level, active dialogue and negotiation on the definition and privileges accorded to indigeneship is required. In particular, it is necessary to address the political manipulation of indigeneship. A second federal-level issue is the structure and financing of LGAs. The level of federal subsidization of LGAs makes competition for their control fierce. Furthermore, since the leadership of LGAs is not dependent on local sources of financing, political

elites have no incentives to respond to local constituents and local constituents have little incentive to hold those elites accountable. These two actions would have ramifications not only for violent conflict in Jos, but also in multiple other locales across Nigeria.

The two federal-level initiatives described above are both long-term endeavors and are unlikely to ameliorate conflict in Jos in the short-term. They may, in fact, inflame conflict in the near future, although they are probably necessary for long-term conflict reduction. In the short-term, however, team members identified several key components for conflict mitigation. CSOs should seek to strengthen interreligious dialogue and to expand such community-based efforts to dialogue along the lines of ethnic and indigene/settler cleavages. Importantly, a desire to progress from interreligious peace committees to similar structures to bring together leaders across political, ethnic, and other divides was expressed. Furthermore, the peace committees that currently exist in Jos are largely unlinked. Building bridges between peace committees in different parts of the city could assist in the development of best practices and also serve as means for early warning. Additionally, at the local level, active efforts to engage youth in constructive activities, including job training and entrepreneurial activities, would increase their ability to resist manipulation by elites. Economic development in general is important to decrease pressures on local institutions and to lessen the importance of control of LGA resources. Finally, local-level initiatives are needed to lessen the distrust of security personnel (and security personnel distrust of different communities).

3.5.2 Status Quo

The status quo scenario was identified as being the most likely path of conflict in Jos and its environs, primarily due to a lack of political will on the part of elites. The current constitutional crisis at the federal level renders unlikely (at least until new presidential elections in 2011) federal action on the indigeneship issue or LGA structures and financing. Furthermore, team members thought it unlikely that the NGO community will receive sufficient resources and be able to overcome communication difficulties in order to be successful at increased efforts in conflict mitigation. At the same time, assessment team members did not see factors leading to violence escalations, including the elevation of the religious cleavage as primary or the entry into the conflict of outside actors linked to al Qaeda, as likely. The middle case scenario is exemplified by a continuation of the talk-fight pattern that has become the norm in Jos. In this scenario, Jos would experience periods of relative peace punctuated by recurrent crises. While in this case, the government may respond reactively to outbreaks of violence, responses to underlying causes of conflict remains ad hoc and primarily in the hands of civil society.

While the status quo scenario was found to be the most likely, team members did not believe that it could be sustained indefinitely. In the long-term, team members believed that the violence in Jos would either escalate or de-escalate, depending on federal and local responses to root causes of the conflict.

3.5.3 Violence Escalates

A final scenario developed was the escalation and spread of conflict, both to other communities in Plateau State and to other areas of Nigeria. Further escalation of violence in Jos, and the elevation of the religious cleavage, has the potential to ignite conflict across the country. With each new eruption of violence in Jos, the rhetoric has become more extreme. Additionally, after the January 2010 crisis, new dynamics were seen that could spread conflict to other locales. Actions by officials of other states (such as the evacuation of their indigenes or the threatened expulsion of Plateau State indigenes from their states) could result in the geographic diffusion of conflict actors and violence creating a domino effect. Officials in Abuja expressed fear that Jos would become an epicenter of violence, from which violence will spread throughout the country and attract the involvement of outside actors linked to al Qaeda. Some even expressed concern that Jos would serve as a base for launching attacks against Abuja.

3.6 MAPPING RESPONSE OPTIONS

Informants identified multiple options for response by government actors and CSOs operating at the local, state, national, and international levels. Furthermore, responses in the political, security, economic, and social realms were all viewed as possible and necessary. A common theme, regardless of the option being discussed, was the need for *sustained response*. Informants recognized that sustained response requires high levels of political commitment and financial resources. They felt that these prerequisites for sustained (and, they argued, effective) response have been lacking in the past. In informant interviews, team members noted that the desire to place responsibility on outside actors (outside Jos, outside Plateau State, outside Nigeria) was a common theme. In order to mount sustained and effective response, political elites must resist the temptation to place primary responsibility for the conflict on actors outside their spheres of influence. Doubtless, there are multiple dynamics at work in Jos. However, at the local, state, and federal levels, there are actions that can be taken to address the conflict. Doing so requires that political elites at each level take responsibility for response instead of engaging in buck-passing.

3.6.1 Political Response Options

Respondents identified federal arbitration of indigeneship and citizenship (including clearly defining the former as well as delineating the rights and responsibilities of each) as a vital response, for managing not only the conflict in Jos but in the country as a whole. Some respondents suggested that indigeneship was in conflict with full democratization of Nigeria; however, other respondents argued that indigeneship was integral to Nigerian political life and could not be legislated away.

Respondents also suggested the reorganization of LGAs based on transparent and democratic criteria. Again, as competition for LGA resources fuels conflicts in localities other than Jos, informants viewed this action as addressing causes of conflict throughout Nigeria. It should be noted that, as LGAs have proliferated in recent years, it is much more difficult to dismantle or reorganize them.

A third political response directly involves civil society actors. Respondents noted that actors in the Jos conflict, especially youth, lacked a working knowledge of Nigerian political structures and rules. Informants suggested that civic education should be used as a means of increasing knowledge of the rights and obligations of Nigerian citizenship, including education on legal, nonviolent means for the redress of grievances.

A panel of inquiry into the January 2010 riots has already been established. Respondents were, in general, not optimistic as to the outcome of this panel. They recommended, however, that open hearings be held, that all sides be allowed to present their cases, and that any findings of the panel be made public. The dissemination of reports from previous panels of inquiry could also serve as a starting point for dialogue between opposing communities. However, strong feelings that panels have been biased against one group or another make general implementation of their findings unwise.

Finally, respondents in Jos stated a desire for intervention by ECOWAS. Local, state, and central government officials are viewed as biased, but ECOWAS is seen as a potentially neutral broker that could bring the sides of the conflict together. However, ECOWAS is generally barred from intervening in localized conflicts, unless specifically invited by the central government. The appeal of ECOWAS seemed to be its status as a neutral arbiter; therefore, other neutral arbiters should be considered as well. While long-term changes in political structures cannot be instituted through neutral arbitration, their value was seen in helping conflict actors and communities in Jos air their grievances and move toward reconciliation. The identification and involvement of a neutral arbiter is also one way to overcome the problem of “dueling” federal and state-level panels of inquiry.

3.6.2 Security Response Options

The security response option most commonly cited by respondents was the decentralization of police. While recognizing that the police were originally centralized to further professionalization and to prevent bias, most respondents indicated that centralization compromised rapid and effective response to crisis situations. However, decentralization of security forces also raises the possibility that the indigene-settler issue driving political conflict would be reproduced in the security forces. This would exacerbate rather than ameliorate conflict in Jos. Therefore, decentralization of police (by necessity, a long-term project) should probably move in lock-step with action on indigeneship.

Informants also repeatedly noted that the government needs to arrest and prosecute perpetrators of violence. However, informants wanted to ensure that this process was fair and transparent. Many noted that once the legal action against alleged perpetrators moved to Abuja, local communities lost the ability to monitor (or, in the case of victims, participate in) the process. Some informants feared the prosecution of scapegoats instead of the real perpetrators of violence. Others expressed the opinion that the “big men” behind the violence needed to be prosecuted in addition to the “foot soldiers.”

Finally, interviewees wanted better mechanisms in place for responding to early warning signals. Many informants indicated that they observed behaviors and/or rhetoric signaling an increase in tensions and an increased likelihood of violence prior to the January 2010 riots. However, none could identify mechanisms for reporting those signals other than calling police. While security forces did increase activity in December 2009 due to early warnings, they did not sustain this level of support. Increased security force activity cannot be the only response to early warning; while it can prevent, in the short-term, the outbreak of violence, other activities also need to take place to defuse the situation. Furthermore, given the generally high level of tension in the city, respondents were not confident in how significant the early warning signals they observed were at the time of observation. While activities have occurred (such as the USAID-funded Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation Project) to build capacity for processing early warning signals and building responses, local capacity on this score still appears to be quite low (USAID 2009).

3.6.3 Economic Response Options

Economic response options typically relate to increasing economic opportunity in Jos and addressing problems of chronic unemployment, especially among youth. Specific options mentioned included job training centers and loans for micro-enterprises. Increased economic opportunities were seen as important for two reasons: specific opportunities for youth could increase resistance to religious, cultural, and/or political manipulation leading to violence; and general opportunities could decrease the importance of control of LGA resources, and help to lower the stakes of LGA competition and the likelihood of violence.

A second issue regarding economic responses was frequently brought up by informants. Several respondents noted that humanitarian assistance following periods of violence was not evenly distributed among the communities affected. While the distribution of humanitarian assistance is viewed as necessary, fairness in the distribution was seen as crucial to its success. Unfair distribution of humanitarian aid was viewed as reinforcing animosities that drive conflict in Jos.

3.6.4 Social Response Options

Informants identified CSOs as those best equipped to implement social response options. The need for increased dialogue and interaction between actors on opposing sides of the conflict is vital. Respondents saw the value of interreligious peace committees; however, as actors in Jos see the conflict as largely ethnic in nature, they also recommended interethnic peace committees. While CSOs sponsor a number of single events promoting peace, informants wanted more long-term and coordinated effort in this area. Some informants also wanted to see government initiatives to encourage desegregation of settlement patterns in Jos.

Finally, informants remain concerned about the status of IDPs in the Jos conflict. They recommended sustained support for IDP reintegration, including psychological counseling for victims of violence.

4.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The assessment process revealed several significant findings. First, it should be noted that the view from Abuja at times differs significantly from that in Jos. In Abuja, informants that represent indigene and/or Christian interests frequently highlighted religion as the problematic cleavage in Jos. However, in Jos, almost uniformly the conflict was viewed as ethnically based between the Jasawa and the Berom/Anugata/Afizere groups. Although informants in Jos recognized that religion was used as a means of mobilization and as a way to target victims of violence, it was felt that if the ethnic conflict (especially the indigene-settler conflict) could be successfully managed, religious differences would diminish in importance or cease to be an issue. The assessment team found that the ethnic and indigene-settler cleavages were the most critical in understanding conflict dynamics in Jos.

Second, informants in Jos uniformly expressed a desire for peaceful coexistence. However, comments also revealed a high level of mistrust of other communities. Responses undertaken must try to bring the various communities together to dialogue constructively to address the “tit-for-tat” nature of reprisals, and to break the cycle of violence. The sometimes adversarial nature of panels of inquiry and uneven distribution of humanitarian aid are examples of previous response strategies that have driven communities further apart. The absence of post-conflict trauma programs could be missed opportunities to facilitate the healing.

Finally, the assessment highlighted how the conflict in Jos is rooted in certain structural characteristics of the Nigerian state—structural characteristics that have also led to conflict in multiple other locales. In particular, the disputes over indigeneship and control of LGA resources underlie much of the conflict in Jos. These structural roots of the conflict have also been highlighted in other assessments of the Jos conflict (Milligan 2010; Ostien 2009).

Recommendations are divided into short-, medium-, and long-term recommendations. Recommendations include general policy prescriptions as well as more specific programmatic options. Due to the short time spent in the field and the preliminary nature of the exercise, all recommendations should be viewed as preliminary and suggestive rather than final and definitive.

Our recommendations are as follows:

SHORT-TERM

General

- The Nigerian government must arrest and prosecute perpetrators of violence. Furthermore, the ability of local communities in Jos to monitor and participate in the legal process should be strengthened. Regular reporting on progress in this area will undermine the current culture of impunity.
- The Nigerian government should invite a neutral arbiter to participate in arbitration of the conflict, with a particular role to play in any panels of inquiry. ECOWAS and the African Union should both be considered.

Programmatic

- CSOs, with donor support, should develop and deliver programs that provide civic education and opportunities for constructive engagement, especially targeting youth in Jos.
- Civil society actors, with support from donors, should help local communities stay apprised of progress in the prosecution of alleged perpetrators (for example, through the regular dissemination of reports), and provide support for victims to be involved in the legal process (for example, through the provision of transportation to legal hearings).

MEDIUM-TERM

General

General

- The Plateau State and Jos LGAs, working in coordination with the federal police and civil society organizations, should support and strengthen mechanisms for the detection and transmission of early warning signals to the appropriate authorities. While some attempts have been made at this, they have thus far been lacking. Communication to the public on how to report early warning signals should be strengthened, for example, through regular publishing in local press and on local radio of an early warning “hotline” number. Regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and the African Union, and international donors should provide funding and expertise to support these efforts.
- The Plateau State and Jos LGAs, working in coordination with the federal police and civil society organizations, should establish mechanisms that trigger coordinated response to early warning signals. For example, by building the relationship between the police and civil society (especially through various peace communities or peace clubs), law enforcement could provide increased security measures when early warning signals are received and civil society actors could engage in activities targeted to defuse the situation.
- International donors should support research and planning for the engagement of radical elements of opposing communities in community reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Programmatic

- Civil society actors, with support and coordination from ECOWAS and donors, should conduct a study of best practices for working with radical elements of conflicts and involving them in community reconciliation processes.

LONG-TERM

General

- Federal arbitration of issues of indigeneship and citizenship are necessary. A national process of dialogue on these issues, and implementation of policies resulting from that dialogue is needed. The delineation of indigeneship in current federal law and regulations is murky.
- The way in which LGAs are funded should be reconsidered. As long as control of LGA structures results in disproportionate economic benefits, violent conflict remains a possibility.
- The Nigerian federal, Plateau State, and Jos LGAs should set up structures for the long-term reintegration of internally displaced persons within Jos. These structures should include not only economic assistance, but also psychological counseling for victims of violence. International donors should support these efforts through funding and expertise.

- Interreligious peace committees should be established in communities that currently do not have them. Civil society organizations and donors should identify existing interreligious peace committees in other communities that may be enabled to take this role. Furthermore, existing peace committees should be empowered to establish interethnic peace committees in Jos. Linkages between the various committees should be supported, for example, through the funding of liaison positions by the donor community, in order to share best practices and assist with early warning.

Programmatic

- Donors should consider funding a series of town halls, forums, or other dialogues on indigeneship, to be coordinated by civil society organizations.
- Donors should consider funding increased civic education, for example, to strengthen citizens' understanding of the relationship between taxation and accountability.

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

IN ABUJA

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Representative of Christian Association of Nigeria, Youth Wing

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Representatives of the Yoruba Community
Representatives of Anugata Community
Representatives of Berom Youth Movement
Representatives of Jama’atu Izalatul Bidi’a Wa Ikamatus Sunnah (JIBWIS)
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