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

Survey of PHILIPPINE LAW ENFORCEMENT

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Agency for International Development
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20523

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SURVEY

PHILIPPINE LAW ENFORCEMENT

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15 DECEMBER 1966

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

December 15, 1966

Mr. Wesley Haraldson
Director, Operations Mission to the Philippines
Agency for International Development
United States of America
Manila, Philippines

Dear Mr. Haraldson:

Submitted herewith is the Survey of Philippine Law Enforcement which you asked the Washington Office of Public Safety to make after a formal request to you and the Ambassador by His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

In order to assemble the best possible talent for this Survey, Public Safety technicians were brought to the Philippines from Ethiopia, Brazil and Equador, as well as from the Washington Office of Public Safety Headquarters; and the Team included representatives of the U. S. Bureau of Customs and the U. S. Department of Defense. This portion of the report was developed by Mr. Fenelon Richards of the U. S. Bureau of Customs.

The recommendations contained in this report would, if carried out, greatly improve the effectiveness of Law Enforcement in the Philippines. Responsibility for implementation, of course, rests with the Government of the Philippines.

During the course of our short (three months) stay in the Philippines, members of the Team visited 35 of the 57 Provinces, 32 of the 47 Chartered Cities and some 75 Municipalities; the National Headquarters, all four Zone Headquarters, 35 Provincial Headquarters and a considerable number of Company and Detachment establishments of the Philippine Constabulary; the National Headquarters, all ten Regional Headquarters and a number of Sub-Regional Headquarters of the NBI; the National Headquarters and 16 of the 22 Regional Customs Offices. It is believed that the Team was able to identify many of the major peace and order problems in the Philippines and that the recommendations proposed are sound.

We are deeply appreciative of the full cooperation extended to the Team by the AID Mission.

Our stay in the Philippines has been pleasant -- we trust that it will also prove to have been productive.

Yours very truly,

/s/
Frank E. Walton, Chief
Law Enforcement Survey Team



PLACES VISITED BY SURVEY TEAM

INDEX TO PROVINCES

1. Batanes
2. Cagayan
3. Ilocos Norte
4. Ilocos Sur
5. Abra
6. Mountain
7. Isabela
8. Nueva Vizcaya
9. La Union
10. Pangasinan
11. Nueva Ecija
12. Tarlac
13. Zambales
14. Pampanga
15. Bulacan
16. Quezon
17. Rizal
18. Bataan
19. Cavite
20. Laguna
21. Batangas
22. Camarines Norte
23. Camarines Sur
24. Catanduanes
25. Albay
26. Marinduque
27. Mindoro Oriental
28. Mindoro Occidental
29. Romblon
30. Sorsogon
31. Masbate
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48. Misamis Oriental
49. Bukidnon
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51. Lanao del Norte
52. Lanao del Sur
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55. Zamboanga del Sur
56. Sulu



Law Enforcement Code of Ethics

As a Law Enforcement Officer, *my fundamental duty is to serve mankind; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence or disorder; and to respect the Constitutional rights of all men to liberty, equality and justice.*

I will *keep my private life unsullied as an example to all; maintain courageous calm in the face of danger, scorn, or ridicule; develop self-restraint; and be constantly mindful of the welfare of others. Honest in thought and deed in both my personal and official life. I will be exemplary in obeying the laws of the land and the regulations of my department. Whatever I see or hear of a confidential nature or that is confided to me in my official capacity will be kept ever secret unless revelation is necessary in the performance of my duty.*

I will *never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, animosities or friendships to influence my decisions. With no compromise for crime and with relentless prosecution of criminals, I will enforce the law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities.*

I recognize *the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith, and I accept it as a public trust to be held so long as I am true to the ethics of the police service. I will constantly strive to achieve these objectives and ideals, dedicating myself before God to my chosen profession . . . law enforcement.*

Distributed by the NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

A CODE FOR A POLICE OFFICER

I am a Manila Police Officer, a soldier of the law. To me is entrusted the honor of the Force. I must reflect the friendliness and hospitality of the Philippine Islands and at the same time be courteous but firm in the discharge of my duty.

I must serve honestly and faithfully and if need be lay down my life as others have done before me rather than swerve from the path of duty.

It is my duty to obey the law and to enforce it without any consideration of class, color, creed and condition. It is also my duty to be of service to anyone who may be in danger or distress and at all times to so conduct myself that the honor of the Force may be upheld.

CODE OF CONDUCT
MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Manila

CODE OF ETHICS

for

Government Service

ANY PERSON IN THE SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD:

1. Respect and uphold the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

2. Observe the highest standard of morality, integrity, honesty, loyalty and devotion to the public weal.

3. Perform his tasks thoroughly, faithfully, and efficiently.

4. Be physically and mentally fit for public service and live within his income.

5. Expose corrupt practices in the public service without fear or favor.

6. Serve the public courteously, justly and impartially regardless of kinship, friendship, social standing, religious or political differences.

7. Discharge duties promptly without thought of gifts, benefits or any remuneration which may influence the proper performance of official functions.

8. Engage in no business with the Government or with any private party, either directly or indirectly, which will be inconsistent with his position as a public servant.

9. Divulge no confidential information coming to him by the nature of his office or duties.

10. Uphold, respect, and observe these principles, ever conscious that public office is a public trust which he should neither violate, nor should he allow suspicion to arise that such trust has been abused or betrayed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many persons and organizations assisted in and contributed to this study by providing information and data.

Although it is customary to acknowledge, by name, the contributions of such individuals, in this case the list is simply too long for such specific acknowledgement. It would easily exceed a thousand.

The Team's approach was to gather facts, exchange views, solicit ideas, and then distill this information with our own professional background and thus attempt to present practical, meaningful and achievable recommendations.

Almost without exception, the Team was accorded the fullest wholehearted, open cooperation. For this cooperation the Team is exceedingly grateful.

INTRODUCTION

The request for this Survey of Law Enforcement in the Philippines came from President Marcos shortly after he took office. The high priority he gave to it is indicative of the concern with which he viewed the rising tide of criminality in the Philippines.

The Philippines has a history of steadily rising violence, disorder and disturbances commencing with the cessation of hostilities in 1946.

Responsible government officials had declared that lawlessness had grown to such an extent that it was impeding social and economic development. Crimes such as smuggling, tax evasion, and failure to report the true value of imports were depriving the government of revenue which could be utilized for necessary development projects and public services.

The former Chairman of the National Economic Council stated in December 1963 that the severity and amount of crime were discouraging the establishment of industries which could provide needed employment and also reduce the need for imports. In commerce, marketing costs were increased by the payment of protection money to enable delivery and sale of products.

Natural resources are being abused through criminal fishing methods which deplete fishing grounds, and by means of indiscriminate cutting of trees without replanting, thus destroying critically needed watersheds.

Newly inaugurated Philippine President Marcos made improvement of the peace and order situation a top priority item on his agenda. As a result he requested (through the U.S. Embassy) a briefing from the Director of the Office of Public Safety (OPS) on what type of assistance OPS could provide.

On 12 April the Director, OPS, accompanied by the Ambassador and the Director, USAID, called on President Marcos. The Director explained in some detail the method of U.S. operations in civil security assistance and described the type of joint survey which could be conducted. He stated that an "in-depth survey" could be conducted on a nationwide basis by "a team of carefully selected professionals." The study would include police management, operations, facilities, communications, jurisdiction and coordination of police services.

The President said that he had been "searching for three months" for some place to start on a general police and law enforcement effort and that such a study in depth would be an ideal way to start.

The following day the Director, OPS, at the request of President Marcos met with and explained civil security assistance to the Under Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the Mayor and Chief of Police of Manila, the Officer-in-Charge of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). All were enthusiastic about the need for a survey in depth of law enforcement by a U.S. team of professionals.

On 18 March the inter-agency representatives agreed that a comprehensive in-depth survey of the forces engaged in law enforcement was indicated. The scope of the survey is as follows:

1. Assessment of threats to internal security.

2. Review of the legal authority and responsibilities of the various law enforcement agencies.

3. Review of the GOP utilization of its own resources to cope with the internal security problem.

4. Assessment of the capabilities of the various Philippine Law Enforcement Agencies (the PC, the NBI, the local police and the Customs Bureau) to maintain law and order. The assessment would include an examination of their facilities, administration, personnel, training, logistics, and public relations.

The message indicated that the Survey Team would submit a report and recommendations to Washington and the Country Team for review and comment.

The Survey Team Chief arrived in the Philippines on 11 July with other Team members gathered from various countries - e.g., Ethiopia, Equador and Brazil - following. The last Team member arrived on 13 August.

The Survey work was completed by the middle of October.

There are those who contend that the situation in the Philippines has gone beyond the point of no return, that the state of corruption, hoodlumism, and gangsterism is such that it has infected every aspect and element of the Philippine social, political and governmental structure to the point that effective remedies are impossible. To those individuals we can point out that this situation is not unique.

Time and again the city of New York has been rocked by scandal. In the early 1930's Kansas City was so graft-ridden that the police department was largely under the domination of a notorious gangster and gambling boss. The city of Cleveland was similarly plagued, as were the cities of Detroit and Philadelphia. Of 5,000 police officers on the Philadelphia force, 3,000 were replaced within a 6-year period. Almost every American city has been hit by police scandals from which they have risen to new, improved standards of performance.

However, the most noteworthy example is that of the city of Chicago. In 1931 a Chicago police survey pointed out the long standing tradition of political interference in the administration of the police department. Notorious during the 1920's as the headquarters of gangsterism, Chicago was responsible for the development of a whole host of phrases, techniques and reputations based on gangster activities. The subject of movies, plays, articles, stories, and press releases, the Chicago gangster occupied a unique place in American history.

During the 15-year period 1921-1935, a total of 733 gang murders were committed in the city of Chicago area with the peak being reached in 1926 when 76 persons were "rubbed out" gangland style.

In spite of those who said that such action was impossible, the notorious Al Capone was arrested, successfully prosecuted, and convicted in 1931 and sentenced to 11 years in prison.

By 1960 a major police scandal triggered a formal, full-scale, joint effort on the part of the Chicago city administration and the citizens as represented by the Chicago Crime Commission to correct the many ills still existing in the Chicago Police Department. A new superintendent was brought in from outside the department, a top to bottom reorganization was initiated, new disciplinary procedures were established, new techniques inaugurated.

Each year has shown considerable improvement. Total crimes for 1965, after six years' major improvement effort, have been reduced some 20% over the 1960 figure; these in the face of a nationwide rise of some 20% in crime in all offenses for the same period. While the city of Chicago is by no means free of law enforcement problems it may be pointed out that during the six-year period 1960-65 only 54 gangland murders occurred; fewer for the entire six years than for each year during the 1925-30 period.

The tremendous progress made in recent years in strengthening law enforcement in the Chicago community dramatizes what can be accomplished by a joint effort on the part of highly motivated officials given competent technical assistance along with the full support of the community and of the top political and governmental administration. There is no reason to believe that, given the same kind of assistance and support, similar achievements can not be made in improving the serious peace and order situation in the Philippines.

This report is intended to provide guidelines for action in such improvement.

Frank E. Walton

Washington, D.C.
13 February 1967

SUMMARY OF GENERAL FINDINGS

Peace and order in the Philippines is deteriorating at a serious rate.

In all enforcement agencies, Philippine Constabulary, National Bureau of Investigation, the Customs Enforcement Service and the local police, performance is sub-standard, training is inadequate, political interference is common; facilities, budgets and logistical support are deficient; inspection procedures are nonexistent or unsatisfactory, morale is low. Despite such defects, these agencies have numbers of dedicated, capable and highly motivated personnel who are conscientiously endeavoring to improve national and local law enforcement in the face of formidable obstacles.

An overview of national efforts in law enforcement is characterized by the lack of totality of commitment and the continuing tendency to meet exigencies by shoring up or layering over already ineffective practices. Nowhere was this more evident than in the practical impossibility of securing a comprehensive view of national criminality due to the lack of accurate statistical data. Here can be found all the defects of inter-agency enmity, inadequate communications, confusion in reporting requirements and lack of validity in results.

Since WW II, with few exceptions, existing agencies have not been afforded the public and government support required to reach sustained effective performance. These agencies can successfully combat rising criminality, but only if supported to the degree necessary to reach designed effective performance levels.

A gloomy view of law enforcement in the Philippines is amply justified. The most competent of law enforcement agencies is foredoomed to failure if venality and corruption impede the government structures, the judicial processes are unresponsive and the economy cannot sustain essential support.

Philippine law enforcement agencies generally need:

- Major improvement in interagency coordination
- Freedom from political interference at all levels
- Resolute redirection of effort and leadership
- Improved training at all levels
- Increased technical and material assistance
- Improved and adequate facilities and equipment

RECOMMENDATIONS

(Responsibility for implementation included in text)

Sociological

1. Determine the identity and location of homeless children.

2. Provide, support, and adequately supervise institutions for their care.

3. Accelerate school construction and staffing efforts.

4. Staff Juvenile Control Units with personnel qualified by training, experience and temperament.

5. Make greater use of policewomen in Juvenile Control duties.

6. Establish Juvenile Control Units in larger police departments.

7. Make special Juvenile Control training available for regular patrolmen as well as Juvenile Control Unit personnel.

8. Seek participation by the legal community, colleges and social welfare agencies in such special training.

9. Provide adequate space for the Police Juvenile Control Unit for efficiency purposes with due consideration for the young people with whom they are dealing.

10. Provide separate detention facilities for juveniles.

11. Initiate or continue the education of juveniles during their periods of detention.

12. Coordinate police handling of juvenile matters with the Social Welfare Administration and other social agencies.

13. Enlist strong government support in the implementation of the Philippine Youth Welfare Coordination Councils efforts on behalf of juveniles.

14. Appoint a professionally trained and experienced law enforcement officer as consultant in Juvenile Delinquency Control to the Police Commission.

Administration of Justice

15. Provide a professional U.S. team to survey thoroughly and in depth the administration of justice from arrest through sentencing.

16. Provide a professional U.S. team to survey thoroughly and in depth the treatment of offenders in the Philippine detention system.

17. Conduct examinations for municipal judges, city judges, provincial fiscals and city fiscals prior to any selection for these critical positions.

18. Enact legislation allocating a pro-rata share of local filing fees to pay travel and per diem expenses of witnesses in criminal cases.

19. Require a written "Certificate of Readiness to Proceed" on the part of attorneys involved in criminal cases.

20. Encourage the legal profession to emphasize adherence to its established canons of professional ethics.

21. Expand the jurisdiction of municipal judges to include more than one municipality where feasible.

22. Utilize municipal judges made available by this process as fiscals in a corresponding number of municipalities.

23. Designate municipal attorneys as fiscals or special counsels with compensation in whole or part from national funds.

24. Require judges to sit five full days weekly, where warranted by workload, instead of only part time.

25. Relieve chiefs of police of prosecutive duties wherever a municipal fiscal has been appointed.

26. Provide funds for de oficio attorneys.

27. Establish and adhere to national guidelines determining the maximum allowable pre-trial incarceration.

28. Expedite the filling of judicial and fiscal vacancies.

29. Ensure a fair and speedy trial for all offenders through the cooperative efforts of the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the National Police Commission.

Organization and Administration of Law Enforcement

30. Enable the police and the NBI to compete on the personnel market by offering adequate salaries.

31. Establish a close liaison between the Police Commission and the Peace and Order Council.

32. Administratively eliminate PC personnel who for any reason are unacceptable for law enforcement duty.

33. Establish clear lines of PC logistical support within the AFP.

34. Establish a public relations office within the Police Commission to assist the NBI, PC and the local police in this field.

35. Establish a squad of "untouchables" under the office of the President or Police Commission to gather evidence and prosecute successfully the hitherto immune big-time criminals and hoodlums, eliminating the need for special investigative agencies outside the principal law enforcement agencies for this purpose.

36. Revise the present system of instituting and effecting PC control over local police departments.

37. Establish an Inspection and Internal Affairs Division within the Police Commission in order to insure the quality of Police Commission staffing.

38. Conduct a Police Commission study of the necessity for PC inspection of the larger municipalities and chartered cities.

39. Establish a special inspection/enforcement unit under the Police Commission to inspect the larger police forces and ensure compliance with Commission recommendations.

40. Establish a clear, prompt delineation of law enforcement responsibilities and jurisdiction by the Police Commission.

41. Make appropriate representations to secure a suitable portion of reparation funds to provide minimum transportation to municipal police forces and remove politics in distribution of vehicles.

42. Establish guidelines for minumum facilities necessary for law enforcement functions in municipalities.

43. Establish model or ideal police forces in municipalities and chartered cities possessing available funds and properly oriented local governments.

44. Create the office of municipal fiscal or provide more liberal use of special counsels for prosecution in municipalities.

45. Implement Police Commission regional or provincial seminars for municipal and/or city government supervisory personnel on the functions, purpose and needs of local enforcement agencies.

46. Interpret section 9 of the Police Act to require:

    a. Suitable background clearance from the PC, NBI and local agencies to continue duties as a peace officer.

    b. Five years police service immediately preceding the date of the Police Act.

    c. Capability of absorbing a suitable level of training and physical fitness to continue a career as a police officer.

47. Use the existing PC Police Rules and Regulations as an interim Police Manual.

48. Supplement the Manual to include a suitable maximum detective-patrolman ratio and the evolution of these detectives from the ranks of experienced patrolmen.

49. Supplement the Manual to specify a uniform for special protection forces distinct from police and PC.

50. Establish an Office of Legislative Liaison within the Police Commission.

51. Avoid undue haste in organizing, funding, guiding, and programming the Police Commission in its initial functions.

52. Seek legislation banning carrying of concealed firearms by all persons other than members of the Police, Armed Forces and regulated security agencies.

53. Implement an aggressive effort to locate, identify and check all registered firearms and to seize the thousands of loose unregistered and unlicensed firearms in existence throughout the country.

NBI

54. Provide sufficient budgetary support to enable the NBI to carry out its mission.

55. Appoint a permanent Director forthwith.

56. Create the post of Deputy Director.

57. Reorganize the NBI for a streamlined operation.

58. Eliminate the post of Deputy Director of Special Investigation Services and place all operations under an Assistant Director of Investigation Services.

59. Combine Anti-Fraud Action Division (AFAD) and Anti-Graft Economic Division (AGED); reduce personnel and retitle it Anti-Fraud and Graft Section to handle only fraud and graft cases.

60. Reduce Narcotics Division personnel, retitle it a Section to handle only narcotics cases.

61. Reduce Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) personnel, retitle it Domestic Intelligence Section to handle only domestic intelligence type cases.

62. Reduce Interpol Division personnel; retitle it Interpol Unit to handle only cases with international aspects.

63. Eliminate the task force or Special Action Unit.

64. Use resultant manpower savings properly to staff Headquarters Regional Office (HQRO) for 24 hours, seven day a week operation and properly staff Regional and Sub-Regional offices nationwide.

65. Return the Angeles suboffice to control by HQRO and staff it with general investigative personnel.

66. Eliminate Division status for the following and retitle them as Sections under the Crime Lab: Medico Legal, Forensic Chemistry, Questioned Documents and Polygraph.

67. Reduce Ballistics Division to Section under Crime Laboratory Division; transfer Armory and Reloading Section to Training Division.

68. Create an Internal Affairs and Inspection Unit.

69. Remove Legal and Evaluation Division (LED) from under the Deputy Director for Investigative Services and place it under the Assistant Director of Administration.

70. Reduce the Polygraph Division to a Section and transfer the eight surplus operators to investigative duties.

71. Complete the half-finished NBI headquarters building in Manila.

72. Eliminate the K-9 Corps.

73. Eliminate the Marine Section of the NBI.

74. Transfer the Narcotics Rehabilitation activity to a more suitable agency such as the Social Welfare Agency.

Philippine Constabulary

75. Abandon present plans to activate an artillery battalion in the PC.

76. Abandon plans to organize a paratroop battalion in the PC.

77. Develop an organized joint, military/civil program of pacification and civic action for Jolo Island.

78. Redistribute personnel now in excess at higher headquarters to fill units actively engaged in peace and order operations.

79. Detail Provincial Commanders to an assignment for a fixed, stated period and remove only for clearly stated cause resulting in disciplinary action.

80. Stop indiscriminate transfer of PA officers and enlisted men to the PC and vice versa.

81. Establish a career pattern for officers with a normal rotation in assignment.

82. Rotate new officers through all four zones for broad "on-the-job training" exposure.

83. Exert every effort to obtain passage of House Bill 795 in the Sixth Congress in order to further stabilize PC service.

84. Eliminate all but absolutely necessary assignments of PC personnel to civilian offices and officials.

85. Eliminate the practice of temporary utilization of reserve officers in the PC.

86. Minimize political interference in all PC activities.

87. Reorganize the inspection staff into a combination inspection/internal affairs unit.

88. Amplify the Inspector General effort at HPC and zone level.

89. Initiate an internal security and human reliability program over and above existing security procedures for CIS personnel.

90. Devise and display a PC code of ethical conduct.

91. Provide the PC Provincial Commanders with sufficient funds to maintain buildings and equipment.

92. Conduct a major program of disassociation of PC personnel from lawless elements, unsavory persons, sources of wealth and political influence.

93. Develop a planned program to improve the PC image.

94. Prohibit "scrounging", strictly enforce such prohibition and provide adequate logistics support to obviate its further need.

95. Provide the necessary strong command authority, direction and support to Provincial Commanders to enable them to perform effectively, free from political influence.

96. Assign PC officers of neutral political coloration and on a basis of law enforcement capability to problem areas.

Local Police

97. Discontinue the practice of assigning police personnel to bodyguard and escort duty except in the case of authorized government officials.

98. Implement a joint NBI-PC-Police Commission Committee for the purpose of revising present procedures of inspecting local police.

99. Reduce the numbers of police in small communities to a level which can be supported, meanwhile providing for loan from other departments for peak periods of public activity.

100. Devise a method through the Police Commission of compelling municipal governments to conform to recommendations resulting from PC inspections. This should include the withholding of subsidy payments from those who refuse to conform.

101. Establish a joint NBI-PC-Local Police - Police Commission Committee to devise suitable legislation insuring that law enforcement agencies are developed to meet present and future peace and order conditions.

102. Relieve the PC of participation in inspection of local fire departments.

103. Insure joint cooperation by the Police Commission, PC, Justice Department and NBI to establish a MTT for reorienting chartered city governments toward realistic law enforcement support.

Training

104. Return personnel trained in the U.S. in law enforcement to law enforcement positions.

105. Develop a three months basic law enforcement program of instruction.

106. Complete construction of the NBI Police Academy at Tagaytay.

107. Establish regional law enforcement training centers in at least six to eight strategic locations.

108. Obtain classroom space expeditiously by utilizing night hours in courtrooms, college classrooms, schoolrooms if necessary.

109. Utilize the 120 U.S. trained law enforcement officers to the maximum (from the NBI, the PC and local police) in the training program, under the direction of the Police Commission.

110. Utilize the facilities of the Security Training Center for training law enforcement executives in police administration.

111. Expedite selection and construction of the regional training centers on a crash basis.

112. Make every possible effort to program PC and police personnel in joint law enforcement training classes.

113. Meet the immediate need for training by substantially expanding the NBI ambulatory program.

114. Provide facilities to include classrooms, housing, messing and staff for advanced, specialized and supervisory police training.

115. Consider "Command Training" a completely separate requirement with its own location, personnel, staff and training techniques.

116. Allocate 10 million pesos of the 20 million peso initial allotment of the Police Commission for training purposes, with the Philippine Government providing the remainder from other funds.

Criminal Investigation

117. Clarify NBI responsibility by assigning specific jurisdiction to each of the three enforcement agencies: local police, NBI, PC.

118. Require NBI investigative personnel to forward progress reports on a scheduled basis.

119. Eliminate wasteful pairing of agents on routine investigative assignments.

120. Adopt an equitable rotation policy for assignment of NBI personnel.

121. Adopt a practice of monthly staff meetings of the Director and all Division Heads.

122. Transfer the Narcotics Rehabilitation Center to a more suitable agency.

123. Centralize the presently fragmented research and statistics units.

124. Adopt a longevity pay increase plan.

125. Implement an annual in-service school for all NBI personnel.

PC

126. Eliminate the civilian regular agents currently employed by the PC Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).

127. Elevate the Chief CIS to a position where he is responsible to the Chief PC for all PC criminal investigations.

128. Hold an in-service training session for Provincial Commanders to point out the need for liaison with other provincial commanders and the full and complete submission of reports to HPC.

129. Require provincial commands to submit the necessary investigative reports to HPC.

130. Appoint high level liaison officers within the NBI and PC to bridge the gap that now exists between these two agencies.

131. Appoint a "Team Chief" whenever the PC and NBI conduct a joint investigation.

132. Consolidate all CIC and Intelligence & Investigation (I and I) personnel into one unit under the administrative control of Chief CIS and the operational control of the provincial commander.

133. Adopt a uniform system of filing criminal reports in the PC and require the forwarding of progress reports at scheduled intervals.

134. Select CIS personnel on a merit basis and retain them on a basis of quality performance.

135. Institute an 88 hour course on Basic Criminal Investigation for I and I personnel.

136. Revise and expand the present 12 week Criminal Investigation course to provide in depth training in the fingerprint, photography, and related crime scene evidence categories.

137. Require the PC to submit monthly crime statistics to the NBI.

City and Municipal Police

138. Select secret service investigators (detectives) from uniformed personnel ranks.

139. Retain secret service personnel only after a six-month trial period.

140. Investigate crimes thoroughly by probing events leading to the crime, commission of the crime, and actions subsequent to it.

141. Adopt and use the "Report of Investigation" form required by "Police Rules and Regulations."

142. Obtain written, sworn and witnessed statements from all personnel concerned.

General

143. Designate the NBI as the responsible agency for organizing and maintaining records of a nationwide program for the apprehension of fugitives from justice.

144. Turn over to the NBI at least one copy of all fingerprints now in PC and local police files.

145. Require all agencies to complete and file a booking and identification form on every person arrested.

146. Require arresting agency to fingerprint every arrestee on NBI cards. Forward one to NBI Headquarters, retain one copy if desired.

147. Photograph, full face and profile, every arrestee, using identification numbers assigned by the NBI. Retain one photo; forward the other to the NBI. NBI or PC to provide this service for those departments not possessing equipment.

148. Provide a form on the reverse of the warrant of arrest for a complete physical description of the wanted person.

149. Appoint a "court liaison officer" in every police agency to coordinate police-court efforts in solving the backlog warrant problem.

150. Purge warrant files on a monthly schedule.

151. Rescind Justice Department Circular #64 to stop the practice of issuing duplicate warrants. Determine the agency responsible for execution and compel compliance.

152. Provide sufficient warrant and alarm personnel to give 24 hour service seven days a week.

153. Stop the practice of indiscriminate gathering of evidence at crime scenes.

154. Provide a clean, secure, dry evidence locker or room in every police department, PC post and NBI office.

155. Provide a uniform "in and out" log for each evidence storage locker.

156. Provide a uniform evidence tag for use by all Philippine law enforcement agencies.

157. Provide training in crime scene sketching to investigative personnel.

158. Provide each NBI office, each investigative unit of the PC and each larger police department with a basic latent fingerprint kit. PC or NBI to provide this service for smaller departments.

159. Adopt a uniform latent fingerprint card for all police agencies.

160. Provide each office of the NBI, each PC Province HQ, and each larger police department with a camera suitable for criminal investigation purposes. Other police departments to be serviced by the PC or NBI.

161. To the extent possible distribute existing polygraph personnel and equipment to provide service to all law enforcement agencies on a regional basis.

Criminalistics

162. Reduce overstaffing by weeding out unqualified personnel and needless supervisors.

163. Utilize the resultant savings to acquire supplies, equipment and pay better wages to qualified people.

164. Provide qualified scientists to command the laboratories.

165. Establish a merit system for recruitment and promotion.

166. Create a continuous training program to bring modern methods of criminalistics to the Philippines.

167. Relocate the PC laboratory to Cebu to service all agencies in the southern Philippines; utilize the NBI laboratory in Manila to service all agencies (except the MPD) in the north.

Telecommunications

168. Establish a single, integrated countrywide Law Enforcement Communications Service (LECS).

169. Integrate to the extent necessary the communications systems, personnel and equipment of all national, municipal and city law enforcement agencies to accomplish this objective.

170. Establish a control committee under the Police Commission to handle the funding for participating agencies.

171. Transfer specified equipment in the hands of member law enforcement organizations to the LECS.

172. Provide each city and municipal law enforcement organization with a VHF-FM portable transceiver.

173. Provide the PC with VHF-FM portable transceivers compatible with those of the local police.

174. Provide the Customs Service with compatible VHF-FM protable transceivers.

175. Provide the NBI with compatible VHF-FM portable transceivers.

176. Utilize budgetary support from all LECS members until the LECS receives its own budget.

177. Locate LECS facilities in existing law enforcement organizations with adequate space and security.

178. Adopt all formats, instructions and procedures applicable to the LECS.

179. Employ in LECS only personnel with appropriate NBI and PC security clearance.

180. Implement local training as soon as the LECS is established to assure qualified personnel.

NBI

181. Relocate the NBI Communications Center in an area offering adequate space, ventilation and security.

182. Establish an efficient records and message handling capability in conjunction with proposed LECS radio teletype circuits.

183. Acquire a minimum of 50 portable VHF-FM portable transceivers and 25 VHF-FM hand-held transceivers.

184. Provide the NBI with sufficient local funds to purchase locally available telecommunications material and services.

185. Utilize U.S.-trained telecommunications personnel as instructors in training.

186. Procure future telecommunications equipment in concert with the PC, Customs and other users of the LECS.

187. In conjunction with the LECS system, implement a telecommunications management course for NBI, PC, and other law enforcement agency personnel.

PC

188. Utilize a more appropriate message format for transmission of law enforcement information.

189. Provide VHF-FM hand-held two-channel tractical transceivers with one channel for PC-to-municipal circuits, the other for internal PC operations.

190. Allocate VHF-FM portable transceivers to Trafcon vehicles.

191. Store unneeded existing military type communications equipment at the using unit to provide a reserve capability.

192. Conduct LECS management and operations training for PC officers in conjunction with NBI personnel.

Logistics

193. Amend RA 2343 to include a proviso for equitable distribution of tax monies on the basis of law enforcement needs.

194. Establish per capita norms of expenditure for municipal police forces.

195. Establish guidelines providing municipal governments with minimum requirements for local police facilities and the organization of these facilities.

196. Provide the necessary journals, police blotters, and blank forms to the local police and the PC.

197. Distribute reparations vehicles to municipal police forces on the basis of need.

198. Allocate sufficient budgetary support to the NBI to meet its essential needs in construction and mission support.

199. Remove the unpaid volunteer workers from the NBI.

200. Establish a preventive maintenance program in the NBI.

201. Require NBI field offices to submit periodic reports of vehicle conditions.

202. Dispose of all residual "junk" in the NBI supply system.

203. Segregate, inventory and properly store NBI usable on-hand items.

204. Provide a proper NBI supply warehouse and outside storage area.

205. Provide regional reloading equipment to permit reloading of training ammunition in all local police forces.

206. Provide the PC with sufficient funds to permit at least 25% of the budget to be allocated to operations and maintenance.

207. Require strict adherence to established PC procedures in requisitioning logistical support.

208. Redistribute excess general purpose vehicles in the Manila area to PC units in the zone and provinces.

209. Support the PC with adequate, basic police type equipment, on a continuing basis.

210. Analyze Armed Forces Philippines Supply Center (AFPSC) and Military Area Supply Point (MASP) support provided the PC to determine the feasibility of their supporting PC requirements in law enforcement.

211. Disperse MAP-provided aircraft to zone level for greater operational and logistical effectiveness.

212. Provide to PC the necessary boats, of the size and type required in the specific area, to accomplish law enforcement.

Traffic Management

213. Develop public support and acceptance of effective highway and street traffic management.

214. Provide adequate controls forproper selection, training and utilization of traffic enforcement personnel.

215. Increase the annual maintenance rate for roads and streets.

216. Establish cyclical maintenance schedules by area according to types of surface, use, terrain, and climatic conditions.

217. Establish constant maintenance of shoulders adjoining travelways to preserve paved surfaces.

218. Enforce rigid control measures on all cutting and filling of paved surfaces.

219. Prohibit encroachments on the public right of way.

220. Increase new highway and appurtenances construction to meet both present and future requirements.

221. Consider construction of toll roads to amortize construction costs.

222. Provide for signing, channelization, signalization and adequate police coverage of present and future roadways nets.

223. Require the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) to maintain accurate and complete records of all motor vehicle registrations.

224. Require the LTC to make complete registration, suspension and revocation information easily available to law enforcements officers.

225. Provide the LTC with equipment to enable it to comply with its legal requirements.

226. Require the police and the courts to comply with the reporting requirements of RA 4136.

227. Maintain a central LTC office to provide registration and operators license information on a 24 hour, seven day a week basis.

228. Provide the LTC central office with direct teletype connection with the LECS to facilitate dissemination of information to requesting agencies.

229. Improve the quality and thoroughness of motor vehicle inspections.

230. Limit issuance of overweight, overheight vehicle permits and require a performance bond to guarantee payment for damage to roads.

231. Improve the quality of examining and road testing of new drivers.

232. Develop four more sets of drivers examinations for a total of six.

233. Provide equipment for testing visual acuity, depth perception, peripheral vision, and glare reaction of drivers.

234. Improve clinical treatment and re-examination of all problem drivers.

235. Implement a program of re-examination of all drivers at 50 years of age and then at five year intervals.

236. Establish and maintain driving history of every licensed driver.

237. Make greater use of the LTC commissioners authority to revoke or suspend registrations and licenses in order to help deter repeat violations.

238. Distribute a weekly summary of LTC revocations and suspensions to all police agencies for proper enforcement.

239. Enact legislation to require reporting of every accident to the nearest law enforcement agency.

240. Require a complete on-the-scene investigation by law enforcement personnel of every fatal or serious accident.

241. Require submission of the completed accident report in triplicate by the investigating officer(s) within 24 hours of the accident.

242. Require the Police Department to submit one copy of these reports to the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH) and one to the LTC.

243. Require the LTC to enter data from these reports into the files of the concerned drivers.

244. Require the BPH to summarize the information and disseminate it to all concerned agencies and news media.

245. Adopt a standard, color coded traffic accident report form.

246. Require the BPH to establish accident location files to determine construction improvements, and educational and enforcement emphasis.

247. Assign one trained PC traffic officer as a full time liaison officer between BPH and PC Trafcon Headquarters.

248. Provide better traffic facilities with adequate space, office equipment and furniture. Limit access by clients and visitors.

249. Require all law enforcement personnel to obey traffic laws.

250. Require arresting officers to charge offenders with a specific charge so that if found guilty the specific applicable penalty may be imposed.

251. Abolish the motor vehicle patrol officer operation of the LTC.

252. Abolish the transportation inspector force of the Public Service Commission (PSC).

253. Implement an intensive nationwide preventive patrol program on the part of the PC utilizing vehicles, bicycles, or foot patrols according to specific area needs.

254. Require all PC units and personnel to enforce traffic laws and provide the necessary training to accomplish this.

255. Expand the PC Trafcon group in order to establish PC patrol substations along the national and provincial roadway net.

256. Locate these substations to provide 24 hour daily patrol coverage of radii of 100 kilometers each.

257. Eliminate or drastically reduce PC VIP vehicle escorts.

258. Establish special PC "flying squadron" units trained and equipped to provide saturation enforcement in problem areas.

259. Equip all PC patrol vehicles with two-way radios as part of the LECS network.

260. Return to traffic supervisory or training functions all U.S. traffic trained PC officers not presently so assigned.

261. Limit attendance at traffic violators schools to first offenders who have committed only minor violations.

262. Provide adequate visual aids and improve the quality of instruction at traffic violator schools.

263. Alter JP Form 21 and Department of Justice Form 1-A to provide for separate reporting of the number and status of traffic violations each month.

264. Enforce the requirement that all courts report all actions taken in traffic violations monthly to the LTC.

265. Appoint a commission composed of one member each from the Department of Justice, the LTC, provincial fiscals, courts, PC, local police along with two prominent citizens to seek a more expeditious method of handling traffic violations through the courts.

266. Require annual independent audits of disposition of traffic violation cases by the various courts.

267. Provide copies of traffic regulations, national and local, to all motor vehicle operators.

268. Assign specific members of the PC and local police departments to conduct a continuing public information program on traffic safety.

269. Encourage the formation and operation of national, provincial and local groups devoted to building public support for sound official programs of traffic management.

Records and Identification

270. Use one log requiring only an initial and a final entry to process applications in the PC Firearms and Explosives office.

271. Centralize all PC CIS records by adoption of a central complaint follow-up and case numbering system.

272. Reduce PC record storage by utilization of microfilm.

273. Acquire index card guides for proper placement in PC files.

274. Return to Criminal Identification Records and Statistics Division (CIRSD), all its personnel currently assigned to other divisions within the NBI.

275. Acquire 30 standard typewriters and 50 legal size filing cabinets for the CIRSD.

276. Eliminate the present NBI Complaint Action Processing Unit (CAPU) and establish a central unit to process all incoming complaints.

277. Implement an in-depth survey of the Bureau of Prisons Records system by a qualified penologist.

278. Turn over Bureau of Prisons, and Bureau of Immigration fingerprint card collections to the NBI.

279. Expand the NBI CIRSD utilizing qualified personnel from other agencies where possible.

280. Implement an aggressive program to secure full cooperation from all police agencies in submitting fingerprints to the NBI.

281. Grant free Philippine Government franking privileges to all documents concerning this program.

282. Discontinue any publication of national crime statistics by the PC, with this function becoming the sole responsibility of the NBI.

283. Assign to the PC sole responsibility for administration of all records of ownership and possession of firearms, as well as the retention of test bullets.

284. Transfer all NBI active records to the central records repository.

285. Require both the PC and the local police to adopt and use the investigative report forms prescribed in the PC "Police Rules and Regulations."

286. Combine in a single file jacket, information on an individual from both the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Prisons.

287. Eliminate present PC identification forms and substitute revised NBI forms.

288. Utilize one individual jacket for all pertinent information on arrestees from all Philippine law enforcement agencies.

289. Direct all courts and fiscals to forward to the NBI final dispositions along with other special information.

290. Process warrants and subpoenas in the same manner as other complaints which require a case number.

291. Establish a central complaint unit in every local police department or designate a member to be responsible for processing all incoming complaints.

Customs Enforcement

293. Establish an Office of Investigation and Enforcement within the Bureau of Customs.

294. Transfer authority for jurisdiction over enforcement and investigative personnel from collectors to a separate Office of Investigations and Enforcement.

295. Place all enforcement personnel under two classifications: Secret Service Agents and Port Patrol Officers.

296. Reassign Harbor Police and Launch Patrol to Port Patrol Division.

297. Continue assignment of security guards for piers and warehouses under direct supervision of collectors.

298. Create five regions for enforcement and investigation, four regions to correspond to the PC zones, the fifth for the Manila Customs area.

299. Establish the Port of Cebu as a "Pilot Region" for the implementation of regional offices of investigation and enforcement.

300. Staff the Cebu office with a Regional Director and three assistants.

301. Implement the remaining regions six months after the establishment of the Cebu office.

302. Screen all personnel assigned to the Investigation and Enforcement Division and reassign to other divisions anyone found to be unqualified.

303. Retain in this division only such personnel as can qualify for, or already possess, a "Secret" clearance.

304. Assign a Customs Liaison Officer to coordinate enforcement activity in the Manila area with the PC, Navy, NBI and other law enforcement groups.

305. Permit the arresting officer in less serious crimes to take the arrestee directly before the city Magistrate or Justice of the Peace.

306. Authorize the collector to adjudicate a seizure action in cases totaling less than 50 pesos.

307. Photograph and fingerprint all arrestees on NBI forms and forward the photos and prints to the NBI.

308. Discontinue use of the Customs fingerprint card.

309. Record personal history data on each arrestee for inclusion in his file.

310. Return to the Customs those functions recently transferred to the Navy.

311. Eliminate the present Motor Pool Division and contract mechanical repairs out to private garages.

312. Eliminate the assignment of government vehicles for the exclusive use of Division heads in the Manila area.

313. Assign priority to enforcement personnel in the distribution of vehicles.

314. Insure that vehicles are used for official use only.

315. Assign Customs officers to conduct traffic check inspections in cooperation with the PC in an effort to limit transportation of contraband.

316. Amplify public information programs to educate the public on the "evils of smuggling."

317. Implement a campaign against street vendors who openly sell "Blue Seal" cigarettes.

318. Implement a program of inspecting coastwise vessels departing Jolo, Bangao, Zamboanga, Davao, Iloilo, and Gagayan de Oro for contraband.

319. Assign a Liaison Team to determine present under - or over - staffing as well as job qualifications needed for the position being filled.

320. Return to their "mother" units all employees on detail to other offices.

321. Require all personnel holding positions of trust to submit financial statements.

322. Reduce overstaffed offices to meet their needs and transfer superfluous personnel to other agencies.

323. Seek Presidential support to preclude political interference in transfer and promotions.

324. Establish a special panel to handle the backlog of personnel dereliction cases.

325. Issue firm orders concerning the acceptance of gifts and gratuities from subordinates, and customs house brokers and importers.

326. Approve salary increases for all Customs personnel as recommended by the Commissioner of Customs.

327. Confer civil service status on all qualified appointees falling in the category of "confidential employees" of the Customs Police Department and enforcement units in the field.

328. Provide training, making full use of guest lecturers from the NBI, PC and the Police Commission.

329. Instruct all personnel in the use and handling of firearms before issuing them a weapon.

330. Provide U.S. training for Customs investigators.

331. Provide Philippine Navy training for personnel of the Water Patrol Division.

332. Provide two U.S. Customs agents (Customs Agency Service) to assist in organizing an Office of Enforcement and Investigations.

333. Deliver all contraband seized immediately to the Bureau of Customs. If physically impossible, make a constructive seizure and immediately notify the collector.

334. Return authority to Customs for disposing of seized merchandise.

335. Seek legislation enabling assignment of seized property (after forfeiture proceedings) for official government use.

336. Adopt a "chain of custody" procedure for the handling of evidence.

337. Provide proper security for seizures and designate one person as a custodian.

338. Accelerate forfeiture action on seizures.

339. Treat "Blue Seal" cigarette seizures as perishable merchandise and sell them at public auction immediately after seizure.

340. Construct bodegas and warehouses so as to make them varmint proof and free them from moisture and ensure their containing sufficient shelf space for proper storage.

341. Print and distribute maps outlining Customs districts to all PC and Navy units assigned anti-smuggling duties.

342. Print and distribute "Report of Seizure" forms to all government law enforcement agencies enforcing anti-smuggling laws.

343. Budget funds annually for the payment of rewards.

344. Bond and authorize supervisory Customs personnel in the field to pay rewards.

345. Make all payment receipts available to auditors but provide adequate safeguard to protect the identity of the informer.

346. Enlarge air cargo storage at Manila International Airport.

347. Deny access by the public to the baggage inspection area at Manila International Airport.

348. Require Customs personnel at Jolo to perform their duties.

349. Establish liaison with the PC and the Navy by Jolo Customs personnel.

350. Staff the sub-port of Bangao with enforcement personnel.

351. Establish wider separation in mailroom sections in the Customs Mail Division.

352. Partition the storage sections for foreign and domestic mail; into rooms.

353. Provide better lighting facilities in the Customs Mail Division.

354. Remove PC, ASAC and Secret Service agents from the Customs Mail Division.

355. Assign investigative personnel from Customs to "spot check" this Division.

356. Assign undercover personnel to check the Customs Mail Division for anomalies.

357. Supervise more closely the transportation of mail from boat to post office.

358. Retitle the head of the Mail Division to Deputy Director of Customs.

359. Forward foreign parcels destined for the provinces to ports outside Manila for processing and delivery.

360. Strictly enforce a "no smoking" ban in the restricted area where mail is being handled.

361. Provide light observation type aircraft to work in conjunction with naval patrols in anti-smuggling.

362. Equip the airstrips at Tarampitao, Jolo, Puerta Princessa, and Tawi Tawi for night landings and base the planes there.

363. Operate patrols just inside the international boundary, north of Sabah between Balabac, Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago.

364. Operate similar secondary patrols betwen Puerto Princessa and Basilan.

365. Coordinate patrol activities through the Office of Investigation and Enforcement.

366. Provide light, fast vessels equipped with appropriate firearms, spotlights, sirens and radios for PC and Customs patrols.

367. Assign personnel to gather intelligence in areas where smuggling originates.

368. Provide vehicles for use of enforcement personnel in patrol and surveillance of coastal areas.

369. Provide vehicles for collectors at ports for administrative use.

370. Equip enforcement personnel with serviceable sidearms.

371. Equip vehicles and watercraft with radios.

372. Provide a limited number of marked patrol cars for use at South and North Harbor and International Airport.

373. Provide two light aircraft to the Manila Harbor area to operate in conjunction with Navy and Customs patrol boats to combat smuggling.

374. Expand the Customs laboratory to furnish the needed space for a better operation.

375. Provide the recommended supplies and equipment to allow the necessary Bureau of Customs analyses.

376. Prepare and issue a manual and regulations for Customs operations.

377. Prepare and issue a manual and guide on enforcement work to the Secret Service Agents.

378. Prepare and issue a manual and guide covering technical investigations for investigating agents.

379. Assign liaison teams from Manila to periodically "spot check" officers for compliance with Customs policies and regulations.

380. Send an Inspection Team to all collectors districts to make recommendations for improvement of building facilities.

381. Solicit reporting of irregularities from Customs personnel and the public.

382. Provide adequate office space equipment and furniture for better employee performance.

383. Establish a definite policy governing news releases of Customs activities.

384. Reduce the case backlog by utilizing judges of the Courts of First Instance to establish a Customs Court to handle both criminal and administrative cases.

385. Appoint a Secret Service Agent to head the Port of Cebu enforcement program.

386. Screen all Cebu port personnel and select a balanced group to initiate the proposed pilot program.

387. Assign Launch Patrol to conduct surveillance of the Ports of Cebu and Mactan.

388. Effect immediate repairs to the Office of the Collector at Cebu.

389. Authorize the Collector to dispose of outdated files stored there.

390. Repair all three piers at Cebu.

391. Assign a Liaison Officer to coordinate Customs activities with those of the PC at Iloilo.

392. Require the PC and other government agencies to report all seizures to Customs.

393. Initiate prompt action to clear the Iloilo port area in the vicinity of the Customs House of all seized and abandoned vessels.

394. Assess penalties on smuggled articles at Clark Air Base in accord with Section 2505 of Tariff and Customs Code.

395. Implement an audit of collections received by Philippine Customs in Angeles City.

396. Conduct an audit of the records of abandoned merchandise turned over to Customs, Angeles City, by Air Police during the past twelve months.

397. Erect a fence and maintain a 24-hour guard over the Customs Zone at Davao.

398. Establish and staff an office at Cotabato for patrol and surveillance of the extensive coastline.

399. Utilize enforcement personnel properly in Batangas and transfer or reassign surplus personnel.

400. Schedule patrols to effectively cover the 160 miles of Batangas coastline.

401. Provide sufficient boats and vehicles for the Batangas Customs personnel to carry out their mission.

402. Cooperate with the PC in manning traffic checkpoints in Batangas.

403. Assign an enforcement group to the sub port of Basilan, Zamboanga.

404. Implement active patrolling by Task Force Groups (PC Customs) of Zamboanga's coastline.

405. Transfer the Deputy Director at Balabac Palawan to Puerto Princessa, provide him with an assistant, thereby eliminating the necessity for foreign vessels to pick up an inspector at Manila.

406. Assign six enforcement personnel to Balabas and six to Puerto Princessa, Palawan.

407. Provide these units with sufficient watercraft and support equipment for patrol and surveillance work.

408. Provide sufficient watercraft and vehicles to PC units assigned to Palawan and other critical smuggling areas.

"In the beginning was action." Goethe

Patron Saint: "O Lord please give the Filipinos a clean honest government without graft and corruption."

Lord: "No I have already given the Filipinos everything. A clean honest government is something they will have to do for themselves."

Old Filipino Legend
A.R. Roces
Manila Chronicle, 19 August 66

Chapter I

PEACE AND ORDER SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Public Safety Team which conducted the 1964 survey of the Manila Police Department found extreme concern in the Philippines with the extent of lawlessness in the country. Graft, corruption and venality appeared to be embedded in government and law enforcement agencies and had become almost institutionalized in some locales.

Criminality had reached new highs. Murders and gangsterism had increased markedly and criminals were walking the streets of the nation with impunity. A backlog of 9,000 unserved warrants existed, with strong indications of "understandings" between the police and wanted persons. Above all, the spotlight of concern was on the huge volume of smuggling which caused costly losses to the national revenue.

In 1966 the Survey Team found the same concern amplified by two additional years of venality, corruption and law enforcement inefficiency coupled with increased criminal effectiveness. A detailed listing of the public manifestations of corruption and law enforcement inefficiency would absorb more than this report and be overwhelmingly repetitive. The President has emphasized the urgent need for local police reform. Prominent individuals long and eloquently decry the lack of public and private integrity. The Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court has mourned the postponement of justice through delayed counteractions and the use of the court system for other than the purposes of justice.

Concern of this nature is warranted. Revenue losses of millions of pesos continue to have a severe impact on the government income, yet no major smuggler has been convicted. Several hundred local policemen and PC have been charged with every variety of criminal offense during 1966. Seven police and 46 members of the Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) were discharged for anomalies; the PC was charged with fraternization with wealthy hoodlums; a "link" between the AFP and the Huks was revealed.

In September 1966 some areas of the country were in a state of severe disorder and largely beyond the control of "normal" law enforcement. On Jolo island, nine PC companies were barely enough to establish an "armed accomodation" with the inhabitants. The murder of public officials and Huk involvements in criminal activities required additional PC/Philippine Army (PA) forces in the central Luzon area. The police departments of 101 municipalities and cities were under enforced PC control. The number of legal and illegal weapons continued to increase with many worn as public status symbols during daily social and commercial intercourse.

In the judicial field a quarter of a million court cases are reportedly backlogged. Several thousand unserved warrants still gather dust while over 20,000 wanted persons roam the country, reasonably free from apprehension.

Despite evidence of increasing criminality splashed across daily newspaper headlines, the Philippine public has remained generally indifferent to law enforcement problems. There is an ingrained distrust of the law, the judiciary, and the goverment processes in many quarters. At no point during the survey was any attempt made to disabuse the Survey Team members of this negative impression.



Crime situation as represented by one month's headlines, 1964

General Corruption as Reported in the Press 1964

1966 Anomalies Headlines



1966 Crime Headlines

Assessment of localized law enforcement situations in areas accommodating U.S. installations reveals little that is favorable in law enforcement.

Cavite City: Located outside Sangley Naval Air Station, the city is a center for smuggling and the focus of blackmarket activity for US items. The community has outward evidences of peacefulness, with no major crimes being reported during a recent five-month period; however, crimes of violence do occur among underworld elements but are disregarded by the police.

Clark Air Base: There is thievery plaguing the air base and the black-market activities in surrounding communities using US BX and commissary items. These activities were described as "rampant." Thefts from the air base are on a major scale. Their control requires expertly organized and guided efforts with a high degree of support from local law enforcement agencies. The efforts of the PC and the local police have been virtually worthless in controlling the extent of criminality in surrounding communities, particularly in the city of Angeles. This is ascribed to corruption and heavy political influences at all levels. Overall, there is a bleak future for law enforcement success in Central Luzon under existing economic and political conditions, particularly when the burden of large scale involvement in criminal activity was added to the thoroughly discouraging picture. There exists a loss of faith in the reliability of any segment of the PC organization to enforce the law due to lack of support and the influence of politics. However, many individual PC and NBI officers and men are outstanding and beyond corruption, but are nonetheless frustrated in their tasks because of organizational and political difficulties.

Cotobato: This province was reported as being often in the vanguard of reported criminality in terms of numbers of crimes. The existence of armed bands aggravates peace and order. Five such groups are known to be active. Loose firearms abound and their inevitable concomitant killing, is much in evidence. The high rate of lawlessness is identified with the lack of economic opportunities and education and is considered "unsatisfactory" by the PC. Criminality in Cotabato is characterized by a high degree of syndication involving labor unions and political influences.

Ilocos Sur: Identified as one of the "top ten" in criminality, it has a high incidence of grave crimes, e.g. murder and homicide, with the attendant presence of numerous unlicensed and illegal firearms.

Iloilo: Crime is influenced by heavy smuggling, loose firearms and strong political overtones. Racketeering and political favoritism have served to increase the rate of criminality to undesirable levels.

Cavite: This area has a high incidence of syndicated crime, particularly smuggling. The PC reports that syndicated criminality has the protection of government officials and wide participation by many of the local inhabitants. Cattle rustling, gun running, gambling and car stealing are also widespread. Changes in administration through the years have had no effect. The situation is paradoxically described as "normal" by the PC.

Pampanga: Criminality is influenced and aggravated by the existence of the subversive PKP and HMB. Like other Central Luzon provinces, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Bulacan, Pampanga is plagued with loose firearms, cattle rustling, racketeering, car stealing, etc. Counteractions are described as difficult because criminal activity is well organized, well financed and conducted with "prudence."

Intelligent and perceptive Philippine citizens are not blind to the existence of criminality and the ineffectiveness of law enforcement. This is amply clear in the report of the President's Peace and Order Council, established on 9 June 1966. The membership of the council included the Secretaries of Justice and Education, the Solicitor General, the Chief PC and the Director, NBI, among others. Its initial report, dated 12 August 1966, is included in Annex G.

Many of the findings of the Council parallel those of the Survey Team to a large extent. The most common causes of increasing criminality reported by the Council were as follows:

Undue Influence of Politics: This involved police appointments, political protection of criminals and influence of judicial actions, and the use of criminals as bodyguards.

Inadequate Enforcement of Laws: A result of corrupt and inefficient police, prosecutors and judges, a double standard of enforcement, poor training, inadequate facilities, poor management, indifference of the public and lack of police agency coordination.

Inadequate Administration of Justice: Due to court delays, outmoded penalties, indiscriminate bail and pardon procedures.

Police Defects: Excessive numbers of officers, lack of leadership, poor personnel procedures, lack of discipline, police corruption.

Economic, Sociological and Other Causes: These run from low salaries and unemployment, to the effects of communication media, over-population and an inadequate crime reporting system.

The report is considered an excellent summary of existing problems in criminality though necessarily limited by its attempts to cover law enforcement, handling of suspects and criminals, as well as judicial, economic and social areas in a brief document over a relatively short period of time. It was evident to the members of the Survey Team that the Council had a detailed familiarity with the peace and order problem. A large majority of the defects outlined in its report were observed in detail by the Survey Team during the 90 days of its visit.

The NBI Philippine Crime Report for calendar year 1965 shows a total of 194,706 offenses in the Philippines for 1965 - a 10.4 percent rise over 1964.

In the category of "murders", the figure of 8,750 for 1965 represents an 11.9 percent rise over 1964.

The trends over the past four years, according to NBI figures, are as follows:

	1962	1963	1964	1965	% Rise 1962-1965
Total Offenses	141,616	121,331	176,404	194,706	37.4%
Rate per 100,000 population	485.6	400.5	560.1	602	23.9%
Murder	6,069	7,403	7,816	8,750	44.1%
Rater per 100,000	20.8	24.4	24.8	27	33 %

For comparison, the FBI Uniform Crime Reports for 1965 show a total of 9,850 murders in the entire U.S. for 1965 and a rate per 100,000 population of 5.1. Thus the actual number of murders committed by the 32 million people in the Philippines is about as high as that for the 190 million people in the U.S.

The extent of criminality has created widespread public discontent which has not yet crystalized into public reaction. It is discouraging and difficult to marshal public and private support for sustained and comprehensive programs of improvement in the public interest. Any program of useful dimensions in the Philippine environment of today cuts across many lines of jealously guarded special interests and soon encounters walls of resistance. Here they dissolve into ineffectiveness between layers of high-sounding statements of purpose.

At this point, President Marcos and the National Police Commission appear as well defined public rallying points for anti-criminal actions. However, unless public and private support for their efforts is in fact generated, obfuscation by political and other vested interests will render them largely impotent.

The Peace and Order Council could also subside into another category of futility. The Council was formed immediately prior to the passage of the Police Act of 1966. Its authority to a degree overlaps that of the Police Commission. Without disparaging the nature or purpose of the Council, this layering of efforts to counter the same problems becomes in itself a part of the difficulty in initiating corrective actions.

The lamentable conditions in peace and order in the Philippines are not self-generated but represent only a segment of the serious and fundamental problem of conditions in public and private office. Lawlessness, violence and abuses in the Philippines are by-products of corruption, inefficiency and venality in other segments of government and commercial life which provide a congenial climate for their development. Little more can be expected when the local police, with too few exceptions, are dismally trained, poorly budgeted, operationally limited by their inferior equipment and knowledge, and too often strongly influenced by political loyalties. Police pay scales are abyssmal, with the inevitable result of police corruption, abuse, and marked inefficiency. Many of these defects are carried over into the PC, where political influence is a pervading factor, favoritism is in evidence and relations with the public have suffered drastically since WW II through loss of respect and failure to maintain a high-minded police image.

There is a singular compartmentation of efforts in law enforcement which is the result or cause of considerable distrust between agencies at all levels. A clear example is the disregard by the PC of the NBI's charter to centralize the control of fingerprints. By maintaining its own fingerprint repository, with only a fraction of the fingerprints which are maintained by the NBI, the

PC assists in making the NBI files less complete. The failure to openly confront and solve nationwide enforcement problems has created fractionalized efforts, localized approaches and the failure to build any national enforcement infrastructure.

A poignant summation of the burdens of the local law enforcement officer is this succinct quotation from a deputy chief of police:

> "Presently the patrolman is receiving only ₱120.00 a month and with the present high prices of prime commodities, this amount is not enough for the daily subsistence of a policeman with three members in his family. For six year period, there is no uniform being issued to the policemen of this city, as they bought their uniforms from their small salaries. There is no travel expenses ever appropriated, so that there is a great difficulty in solving cases. The Investigation Section handled by one man is totally hardup in investigating cases due to lack of facilities necessary in investigating major offenses. The police could not move fast due to lack of transportation and could not respond immediately to any emergency call especially since we are occupying a wide area."

Although not a description of the poorest local police force visited by the Survey Team, the above comment is an effective summary of the ills which afflict local police departments throughout the Philippines. It expresses the patent misconception of law enforcement in the minds of local governments and shows the results of local government neglect.

Under the outlined circumstances, little in the way of effectiveness can be anticipated from the police force involved. With poor transportation, inadequate communications, no allowances, no uniforms and low pay, it is not surprising that poor police effectiveness exists. It is astonishing that an individual sense of civic responsibility and high sense of duty can so often cause some local police to perform capably despite their material limitations and occasionally overwhelming physical hazards. However, individual efforts and a high sense of duty will not serve to lessen adverse peace and order conditions until a willingness develops to expend a significant portion of the national wealth on training, maintaining and equipping law enforcement agencies.

The Philippines is a developing democracy. Law enforcement suffers directly as a result of budgetary shortfalls and the inability to translate sound plans into reality. Operations and maintenance funds of the PC are extremely limited and make it difficult for that agency to maintain even the status quo, much less show improvements. The same is true of the NBI, which has a severely delayed construction program with little hope of improvements in the current fiscal year. Monies for transporting witnesses to trial and investigation scenes is very limited, as are funds for payments to public defenders of indigent accused. The shortage of funds, with few exceptions, is amplified in the local governments where the police frequently have major problems in securing weapons and ammunition, much less the training and living wage their hazardous "profession" demands.

Any assessment of peace and order in the Philippines must be placed in a proper context. The citing of a multitude of extraordinary deficiencies and statistics can create an unbalanced perspective when viewed in isolation from other significant factors. The difficulties in law enforcement in the Philippines are those which could predictably develop in any nation given the

political, social and economic environments existing since WW II.

Population and economic factors have had major impacts. Since 1948 the population has increased from 19 million to over 32 million and continues to increase at an annual rate of 3.4%, one of the highest rates in the world. At the same time, 1960 census data indicates that more than half of all Philippine households accrued an annual income below $256. The prevailing daily wage approximated fifty cents for agricultural workers. This gains significance when the greater portion of the population is identified as agrarian. Although agrarian, the Philippines cannot feed its present population with its own rice production. Its farming methods produce less than one-third the average rice per hectare that is produced in Japan.

In addition to the population and economic problems, there has been an explosive transition to urbanization for which few preparations have been made. The Greater Manila complex increased in population from 1,366,800 in 1948, to 2,628,000 in 1965. The MPD recently reported a 27% increase in crimes against persons in 1966. Manila is in no measure equipped to combat the problems of law enforcement generated by socio/economic problems attending such a massive increase. Similar conditions prevail in Davao, Cebu City and elsewhere, though on a smaller scale. The growth of the cities has been at the expense of the rural districts. Many of the nation's 28,000 barrios have been stripped of their brightest young people leaving to seek opportunity and the normal gratification of material desires in the cities. The urban-rural transition compounds its effects by adding to the misery of the cities and decreasing the need potential for improvement in the countryside.

Restricted opportunities to advance, an unresponsive economy, a population explosion, low wage scales, depressing living standards in slum and rural areas, unfulfilled desires and wide class differences are classic harbingers of increases in crime and corruption. Partiality in administering the law and the evident powers of influence aggravate law enforcement adversely. Many agencies of the government have been used to serve vested interests and the common man has wryly concluded that the law is not being impartially applied. On the one hand is the highly visible evidence of the elite, the influential and the conspicuous consumers; on the other, the shared misery of frustrated economic and social progress. These conditions of themselves have served to subvert the development of adequate law enforcement.

In the final analysis there will be no real progress in law enforcement until the public and the national leadership insist on impartiality in application of the law. Obviously, law without enforcement is not in fact the law of the land. The clearest demonstration of this truism is the evident disregard for the provisions of Republic Act 3019, the "Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act" which spells out the norms of conduct for public officials entrusted with public office.

It is possible for the law enforcement agencies of the Philippines to develop a high degree of effectiveness. The nation is blessed with a population which is easily trained, responsive to good leadership and which possesses a high order of intelligence. However, even if the law enforcement agencies achieve reasonable efficiency, they will be burdened with the triple problems of budgetary limitations, political influence and an unresponsive judiciary. Without forceful actions in these three significant areas, enforcement improvements will avail little that will be substantive in serving the Philippine public.

". . . a country's greatness is measured by the manner in which it takes care of its dependent groups: children and youth, the handicapped, the poor, the downtrodden, the aged and the infirm. . ."

Imelda Romualdez Marcos

Chapter II

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINALITY

Law enforcement organizations do not develop in a vacuum but are an integral part and reflective of the society in which they exist. Crime, which law enforcement organizations are designed to prevent, detect and counter, reflects disorganization within society. Thus, although the purpose of the Public Safety Survey was not to prepare a sociological treatise on Philippine society and its relationship to crime and law enforcement, the Team considers it necessary to point up some of the factors in Philippine social organization which, based on observations, research, and discussions with interested and concerned Filipinos, appear to have a bearing on both law enforcement and crime.

Philippine society was produced by a series of domestic and foreign influences which are discernable in its present pattern. The Asian people who inhabited the islands at the time of the arrival of the Spanish in the 16th century were of the same ethnic origin as the people on the Asian mainland and neighboring island nations. Their society at that time was generally divided into three classes: nobles, freemen and slaves. Government was based on the "barangay", composed of from 30 to 100 families. The barangays were independent of each other and each had its own ruler, called the rajah. The people obeyed the rajah unquestioningly, served him in time of war, and paid taxes or tribute to him. Usually, the rajah's position was hereditary, but in some instances wisdom and character determined the fitness of a man to become chief. Barangays sometimes cooperated with each other for their common protection and welfare; however, no form of central government had developed prior to the arrival of the Spanish.

The pre-Spanish Filipinos had their own alphabet and wrote with pointed sticks on iron, bark of trees and polished bamboo. Although they had their own literature, little has survived. The first Spanish friars are alleged to have burned all the ancient Filipino manuscripts they could find.

The ancient Filipinos had both oral and written laws. The oral laws were the customs and traditions called "ugali" which were handed down by word of mouth from generation to generation. According to Philippine mythology, these oral laws were first given to Lubuluban, the granddaughter of the first man and woman, which make her the legendary law giver of the ancient Filipinos.

The ancient Filipino laws covered many subjects found in modern jurisprudence. Among these subjects were family relations, inheritance, property rights, adoption and divorce, contracts, partnerships, loans, usury, crimes and their punishment. The law recognized public and private ownership of property. Distinction was made between major (felonies) and minor (misdemeanors) offenses. Classified among serious crimes were insult, murder, larceny, sorcery, arson and rape. Penalties for violation of these laws were death, slavery, incineration and heavy fines. Minor crimes included petty theft, adultery, cheating in business transactions, and perjury. Punishment for these offenses included whipping, exposure to ants, being made to swim continuously for hours, and small fines. An interesting aspect of the ancient laws was the recognition of recidivism (criminal repeater)with the repeater being given a heavier penalty than the first offender.

Two of the ancient Filipino written legal codes have survived. They are the Maragatas Code, believed to have been written about 1250 A.D. and the Kalantiaw Code written in 1433 A.D. These codes remain as evidence of early Filipino recognition of the need to regulate behavior. Two early Chinese writers, Chao Ju-Kua (1209) and Wang Ta-yuan (1349), confirm this early awareness of right and wrong. Both observed that the Filipinos were honest in their commercial transactions and true to their word.

In the modern day Philippine Republic, family relationships dominate social, political and economic life. In the pre-colonial period, the family, too, was the basis of society,with the concept of "family" extended to other members of the barangay but seldom beyond this point. This strong feeling of "family" is believed to have been an important factor in the failure of any form of centralized government to develop during the pre-colonial years.

The foregoing history indicates that law and law enforcement developed naturally among the ancient Filipino people and was not something foreign introduced by early Asian or European traders or the Spanish or Americans. It indicates also that the concept of "family" was strong with the individual looking to the family for support in all his needs, rather than to a government structure.

The importance of family ties among the ancient Filipinos was reinforced by certain Spanish institutions which were readily adopted. The Filipino family is bilateral, including equally all the relatives of both the husband and wife. Family interests and aspirations take precedence over those of the individual, although the family will go to great lengths to protect the individual. Marriage is looked upon as the alliance of two families rather than two individuals with family life centering on the children. Introduction by the Spanish of the social institution of "compadrazgo" or ritual co-parenthood, and its acceptance by the Filipinos, extended the concept of kinship beyond the family into the community. Following the Roman Catholic Church law, parents chose godparents to sponsor the baptism of their children. The Filipinos have extended the practice to include confirmation and marriage. Since Filipino families generally are large, this develops a large number of "compadre" kin, which creates bonds of ritual kinship between the parents, sponsors and children.

An individual finds his principal emotional security within this extended group. Generally the family system emphasizes stability, loyalty and kinship obligations. Custom provides for mutual support among members of the family. If a person is in a position to employ a kinsman or to recommend him for employment, he will do so even though someone outside the kinship group may be better qualified. Carried over into government, this concept brings about nepotism. Extended into law enforcement and criminal activities, this kinship obligation lends itself to political protection of criminals and maladministration of justice. In the field of police administration, the kinship principle results in appointment and promotion of incompetents and less qualified personnel, which dilutes the effectiveness of police organizations. In interviews throughout the country, law enforcement officials told of appointments to their organizations of unqualified personnel who were "compadre" of public officials or of politicians to whom the officials were obligated.

Criminal acts commited by either blood kin or "compadre" of persons of importance in government or business go unpunished, according to a number of sources, while the person without such support is readily penalized. During the period of the Survey, President Marcos recognized this problem when he directed chiefs of police to provide him with lists of names and records of sons of prominent persons who had been involved in criminal activity without undergoing due process of law.

Predominant concern with the family, including kin, is a natural development in primitive societies. Ethical rules are developed as standards for conduct in personal and private relationships. As societies develop and expand, governments come into being and legal rules are developed and enforced by the government in the area of public affairs and public interests. Ideally, they are applied without regard for persons, interests or relationships. In the Western industrialized countries, these legal rules have generally become the dominant standard of human behavior, not only in government relations, but carry over also into personal relationships.

In spite of the growth of the government structures in the Philippines, it appears that the ethical rules which place consideration for family and close friends above all else, still prevail. Legal rules demand that government officials and private citizens must be impersonal in their relationship; ethical rules require that personal considerations receive first importance. The legal rules are directed at the general welfare of the whole community, while the ethical rules stress the interests and advantages of small social groupings, such as the family. Efficient governmental administration of any kind, including police administration, is impossible when personal interests take precedence over what is best for the country as a whole.

A review of publications by Filipino social scientists reveals that they have concentrated considerable research on Philippine social values. They discuss the tendency of the Filipino to identify with his family and friends, referred to in Tagalog as "kami", and to be opposed to all who are not "kami." It is pointed out that while the Japanese occupied the Philippines it was all right to steal from them because they were not "kami", although it is admitted there were other factors involved. The Moslems feel it is all right to steal from Christians because they belong to a different group.

According to the social scientists, when a Filipino goes into government service, he does not realize that his duty as a public servant requires him to serve the nation and that his own eventual welfare can only be served by good government. Instead, the civil servant views his new position from the point of its advantages to him. Thus, the customs agent is willing to accept the Citizen's dishonest declaration without question in return for a bribe, and the citizen feels no guilt at depriving the government of its legitimate revenue since each has benefited. The traffic policeman does not hesitate to accept a bribe and the citizen feels no compunction at offering it because each is serving his own interests.

The strong family system with its authoritarian tradition is alleged to have failed to develop individual initiative and self-discipline. The individual has not learned to trust his own thinking. He must follow the advice of his elders. When such a person goes into government or into business and finds himself in a position of authority, he does not know how to discipline himself to exercise authority properly. He continues to place himself, and his kami first and the government or business suffers.

The preceding brief review of Filipino values and the dominance of private ethical rules over public legal rules gives some insight into present weakened state of law enforcement and the corruption of public officials. It also helps to understand the complaint of law enforcement officials that the public will not cooperate by reporting crimes and giving testimony and how individuals committing crimes can justify their actions, how politicians can interfere with justice and appoint inefficient, unqualified enforcement officers because of their feelings of obligation and loyalty to "kami" who have helped them obtain their office.

The origin of Philippine society in small, self-sufficient groups, and the tendency of the individual to attempt to satisfy his needs within this group rather than to look to government for certain support, is apparent in how Filipino law enforcement officials seek to meet the needs of their organizations, which actually are a part of the government. For example, in older countries, particularly in the West, it is customary for police organizations to be located in public buildings which are built and supported by taxes collected from the general public, commerce and industry. In the Philippines, it is not uncommon for law enforcement organizations to be located in buildings constructed from funds and materials solicited from business and civic groups. Or the law enforcement organization may be without vehicles needed to reach the scene of a crime or to carry out patrol. Officers interviewed by the Survey Team frequently told of borrowing boats, jeeps, and automobiles for this purpose from private citizens. There were some instances where private citizens or civic groups had donated vehicles to the law enforcement agencies. Gasoline was frequently reported as "borrowed" from private business. While immediate needs are met by these solicitations from the private sector, the law enforcement personnel obviously incur obligations which can interfere with the enforcement of the law and the administration of justice in cases where the benefactor might be involved. Provision of adequate facilities, supplies and equipment by the government from regular revenues would provide a better safeguard for impartial law enforcement.

The majority of the Philippine people live in small villages or barrios where nearly everyone is related by natural or ritual kinship. The society is largely agricultural with a small, landowning upper class in the dominant position. Although approximately seventy languages are spoken in the Philippines, 90% of the population speak one or more of the nine principal languages, and 44% speak Tagalog and 39% speak English. In spite of differing local customs, a variety of languages and dialects, and the large dispersed geographic area of the country with its 7,100 islands, the Filipinos have developed cultural unity. Religion and education have played important roles in the development of this cohesion. The Roman Catholic religion was introduced by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century and 93% of the population is Christian at the present time, making the Philippines the only Christian nation in Asia. The Spaniards introduced formal education also, which, although not widely available in Spanish colonial times, did produce a small educated group from which the leaders of independence movements emerged. Widespread public education was initiated by the United States early in the twentieth century. The Filipino people, with rare exception, regard education as the key to personal and family advancement and economic betterment. As a result of widespread public education, the Philippines has a literacy rate of over 70%, with Manila claiming a rate of 90%. Literacy in the more Muslim south is lower, with an estimate of 60% considered somewhat high.

Following World War II, the expansion of education facilities did not keep pace with the increasing population, partly due to the failure of the economy to develop at a rate equivalent to population growth. As a result, it was estimated in 1960 that only a little more than 50% of the school age children were actually in school. Police report that most juvenile crime is committed by out-of-school children. One Chief of Police reported that 75% of the juvenile crime in his city was committed by the 500-700 homeless children who live by their wits in the wharf and market areas. Manila police report a similar problem with out-of-school children.

The manner in which this Chief of Police was attempting to meet the needs of the homeless children in his city was again indicative of the tendency of the Filipino to look to the community rather than the government for solution of problems. He called together a group of civic leaders and solicited their support to establish a home for these children where they could be educated and have an opportunity to develop into law-abiding, self-supporting citizens. In more developed societies, the government provides for such children through government welfare programs, with private charitable groups in a supporting role. The situation appears to be reversed in the Philippines. However, when implemented, the First Lady's Integrated Social Welfare Program will do much to bring government/civic roles into better balance in meeting welfare needs, with resultant improvement in a situation which has encouraged the development of delinquency and criminality.

In relation to these new efforts to establish a home for delinquent children, it is interesting to note that this Police Department, in conjunction with civic organizations, already had one such facility in operation. It was established approximately five years ago and has a capacity between 25 and 30. When visited by one of the Survey Team members, the home had only 11 boys in residence, which was less than half of its capacity. Yet efforts were being made to establish a second home. There is a Tagalog term "Ningas Kugon", which means "burning grass"; it is the hope of the Survey Team that the fanfare to establish the second home for homeless children in this city will not be like "Ningas Kugon," and that the existing home will be supported, used to full capacity, and expanded.

Approximately 57% of the Filipino population is under 20 years of age. As mentioned previously, only slightly more than 50% of school-age children are in school due to lack of facilities and the inability of parents to provide required support, such as clothing and food. Because facilities have not kept pace with population increase, even those children who attend public school can do so only a half rather than a whole day. This results in less education and also provides the child with more free time in which to get into difficulties. Police officials also point out that children in school half days had time to steal items which they felt they needed but which their parents were unable to afford because of limited finances. Implementation of government plans to construct more schools, coupled with initiation of family planning programs, will eventually bring about some solution to the education problem. However, there is the added problem of economic development to provide jobs for all these children when they become adults.

Minority groups are a factor in Philippine society which affect law enforcement. For example, the Muslim Filipinos, commonly referred to as "Moros", constitute a definite peace and order problem in the southern islands. The Moros developed among the non-Christian Filipinos who were converted to Islam by Muslim traders and political leaders from the East Indies in the 15th and 16th centuries. The acceptance of a common religion among these peoples created

a degree of unity which had not existed previously and which was not apparent among the Filipinos of the north until after the arrival of the Spanish. More than 95% of all Muslim Filipinos live in the islands of the Sulu Archipelago and four provinces of Mindanao. Strangely enough, there is no single language understood by all Muslim Filipinos, although the various Moro languages are related to the major Filipino languages.

Moro social customs have remained fairly stable through the centuries. The Moro social patterns include the patriarchial extended family, polygamy, abstention from pork and alcohol and obligatory almsgiving. Differences between Christian and Muslim Filipinos were intensified by Spanish incursions into the south which utilized Christian Filipinos in the main part of the Spanish forces. The Moros realized that these incursions were to prepare the way for Spanish priests who would attempt to convert them. Thus the Moros regarded these Filipinos as both religious and political enemies. Moro raids into the north in reprisal against the Spanish incursions intensified feelings of opposition to the Moros among the Christian Filipinos. The failure of the Filipino government to integrate the Moros into the government complex, and to establish a firm federal government presence in the areas where the Moros reside, has created a situation in which Filipino laws are ignored with the Moros giving primary allegiance to Islam. The Moro tends to identify with other Muslims rather than with the Filipinos. According to PC officials, the Moros feel that the government is not sympathetic to their cause or interested in their welfare, and the Moro's warlike attitude toward the Christian Filipino remains a reality.

In spite of their antipathy toward the Christian Filipinos, the Moros have not developed cohesive political organizations. Factionalism and hostilities among the various "datus" who head the assorted Moro groups have prevented unity. In turn, these hostilities have created disturbances of the peace through tribal rivalries and family feuds. Personal grudges are strong and murder is not uncommon in such situations. During the visit of the Survey Team to Sulu, they were told of a recent Moro murder in which the murderer was known but unapprehended because the PC unit in the area did not feel it had the strength to make the arrest since the Moros tend to protect their own against representatives of the federal government in spite of guilt.

Philippine society remains essentially a two-class society with the upper class numbering approximately 5% of the total population. Class position is determined mainly on land owndership and family prestige. Religion, education and occupation also are factors, but less important. The social system has little vertical mobility in the rural areas, but opportunities for upward movement do exist in urban areas where a small middle class is emerging. The small upper class elite is composed mostly of Catholic Filipinos with noticeable Spanish or Chinese physical characteristics. The upper class emerged from the families of the village chieftains who were able to solidify their positions when the Spanish introduced the private property concept. They became the dominant class in the developing provinces and towns. The offspring of Spanish fathers and Filipino mothers had special status and had access to positions not usually open to ordinary Filipinos. A similar social status developed for persons of mixed Chinese-Filipino descent because of the role the Chinese have played in Filipino economic development.

Although land ownership is an important factor in determining class position, the upper class families do not spend much time on their land holdings, but prefer to live in the cities.

Economics are frequently mentioned as a cause of criminality. P. A. Zapanta in the 17 July, 1966, Sunday Times Magazine, speaks of the "Unemployment Agony",

pointing out that almost everywhere unemployment is a serious problem. The number of job opportunities has not kept pace with the number of job seekers. A 1965 survey reported a total of more than 700,000 persons out of work (216,000 men with families, and 484,000 single persons). Even those with college degrees have difficulty finding jobs. Intensifying this already critical problem is the increased participation of women in the labor force, thus filling jobs which usually would have been filled by men. The prospect for future years is not encouraging.

An example of the extreme lengths to which even highly qualified individuals will go in an attempt to find work may be found in the NBI "Job Trainee" program. As of 6 July, 1966, a total of 202 individuals were performing full-time duties for the NBI without pay in hopes of being nominated for an opening should one arise. Some of these trainees were extremely well-qualified; 48 of them had BS degrees; 17 had degrees in Criminology and others had degrees in Chemistry, Commerce, Business Administration. Three had degrees in Psychology with internship in Clinical Psychology. Some of these employees had been working in this voluntary trainee status for four years.

Shoe shine "boys" are often 18 to 21 years of age, picking up a few coins a day. Apparently there is just no other work for them.

When college graduates are unable to find work and the volume of unemployment reaches today's astronomical proportions, the streets tend to become filled with hungry, disgruntled, idle youths who are "ripe for almost anything". A major tempering factor is the strong Filipino family heritage which tends to take care of the less fortunate ones in the family. However, the appearance of an unusually large number of beggars in the streets is reported to have become a common sight in Pampanga Province. For the first time since the Japanese occupation, women and children are seen scavenging garbage cans in public places.

In view of the economic situation and the overall extreme youth of the nation's people, it is absolutely imperative that a wide-range, well planned program of juvenile delinquency control be developed. This will require a thorough study to identify case factors and the development of plans to attack them on a nationwide basis.

"Too much privilege", said one newspaper editorial, going on to report that a teenager, who was held without bail on a murder charge, had made a side trip on his way to a court appearance to break into the house of a former friend and threaten the latter with a gun. The side trip was made in the custody of three jail guards who were supposed to escort him. Not too long ago, the editorial continued, a Tondo hood serving time in prison was found to have been making unscheduled visits to his old neighborhood for drinking sprees with his cronies.

Josefina D. Constantino, in a column in the Chronicle, commented at some length about the extent to which relativistic ethics has permeated the culture. In another column she speaks of the lack of a sense of values, pointing out that some of the most worthless persons in the Philippines are the people with big names. "Those who wield power--many of them politicians and businessmen; the worst of them are smugglers, manipulators and influence peddlers."

The Filipinos have a term they use for graft by government officials: "Lagay". Lagay is the Filipino version of the Chinese "tong" or "squeeze".

As used in the Philippines, it specifically means "grease money". Anything that requires government action can be expedited by a little lagay. For example, an individual wants to get his drivers' license renewed. The lines are long; the waiting seems endless. He slips a few pesos to the proper individual and gets his renewal promptly.

Dr. Rodolfo R. Varias, in an article entitled, "An Insight into Government Service", told of the use of lagay in a crowded office. "If you want to receive regal treatment, prove that you are a king," his friend told him. The office was filled with people waiting to get their papers processed. After about an hour of observation he found that for a small "fee" his papers could be expedited. He paid, his papers were expedited. He felt like a king but also realized that he had contributed to corruption.

Lagay is a form of extortion, of course. But the system is thriving. Normally lagay is paid for expediting legitimate papers. For illegitimate activity, the cost mounts. For example, a smuggler has a suitcase full of transistor radios he is bringing in from Hong Kong. He places them all on the bottom layer of his bag. On the top layer, which the official has him open, is perhaps a 50 peso bill. If the inspector picks up the bill, there is no problem; the word goes out to "see so and so" because it is known that he will "do business". One customs official was said to be a millionaire in 1964. Investigators were detailed to look into his wealth. However, he fixed the investigators with lagay. As a result, he was found clean.

On the streets, traffic police openly ask traffic offenders for money. Even firemen were reported to have demanded their lagay before they would commence to fight big fires at Binondo and Divisoria.

It is said that at the motor vehicle office literally anyone can have a drivers' license under the lagay system in about 15 minutes. Lagay involves not only government employee-citizen relationships but intra-government employee relationships. Promotions, recommendations, transfers come as the result of lagay. Lagay may include favors as well as money.

Under such a system respect for authority vanishes, crime fluorishes, public service breaks down. Dean Carlos of the University of the Philippines Graduate School of Public Administration says there are three causes: (1) lack of leadership, (2) too much politics, and (3) laxity in law enforcement. He says the lagay system originated with the Spaniards, but that the Filipinos have added their own "refinements." For example, under the Spanish, the red tape was so great that people soon learned to "expedite" papers.

Politicians spend huge sums of money to get elected or to stay in office. Once in, they try to regain their expense outlay through graft. A Filipino social anthropologist believes that lagay is the product of the country's changing social values. The Filipino political and economic sphere, he says, has undergone a revolutionary change. But, sociologically speaking, the Filipino has not learned to extend himself beyond his family and his friends. His sense of responsibility is only at work within his group or his "kami".

The government employee does not realize that his new duty as a public servant binds him to serve the nation, that he falls or rises with the nation, that the nation cannot be hurt without damaging the individual.

A Filipino political scientist of the University of the Philippines has another view on the lagay system. He claims that economic difficulties have given birth to graft and corruption. The people are hungry and they resort to lagay to make both ends meet.

Writing in the Philippines Free Press, Mariano O. Patalinjug speaks of some "25 million Filipinos living in rags, hungry, diseased, in some slum or rural areas denied their dignity as human beings...".

"Criminals of all kinds are on a rampage all over the country", he says. "Once again the Huks in Central Luzon are running circles around the army and the PC, and making complete fools of the brass hats. Convicts who should be in jail roam the streets at will. In the major cities, the ones of those who belong to the powerful establishment are reported to be making a career of robbery, raping and killing, and getting away with it. There is no law. There is no peace. There is no order. Nobody feels safe and secure any more. Life has become precarious and cheap in our country. The wheels of justice grind slowly, much too slowly. And when they do move, they move for the rich and the powerful."

Patalinjug blames leaders with lack of reason, incompetent and misfit government employees, disorganized government offices, no clear delineation of functions, political proteges instead of competent personnel, inadequate budgeting, but overall, the constant intrusion of the politician into every facet of the business of government.

He proposes a complete overhaul of the Philippine bureaucracy from top to bottom, pointing out that "this chaos and this near anarchy must end."

The recently published "Pick's Currency Yearbook", an annual worldwide review of nations' currencies, blames graft and corruption for holding back the Philippine economy. Gigantic bribes, pay-offs, capital flight, under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports and substantial gold transactions were the methods cited by Pick.

CAUSES OF CRIMINALITY IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

Causes	Selected Provinces			Other Provinces In Mindanao
	Sulu	Cotabato	Lanao	
Ignorance/Fanatics	1*	5	2	13
Tribal/Family Feuds	2	2		
Personal Grudge	3	3		3
Warlike Attitude/Feeling Lack of Government Interest	4			
Loose Firearms	5	10	3	5
Presence of Wanted Persons	6	9	4	6
Extreme Poverty	7		5	11
Political Supremacy Among Powerful Clans		1	1	
Land Conflicts		4	6	4
Police Inefficiency		6		8
Political Interference		7		9
Drunkenness/Misunderstanding		8	7	2
Juvenile Delinquents				1
Organized Armed Bands				7
Fiscal/Judge Delays				10
Lack of Protection of Witnesses by Government				12

*No. = Rank Order of Cause in Province

The Survey Team solicited from law enforcement officers their ideas as to the causes of crime. The chart depicts the cited causes for the southern Philippines area. It is hoped that an understanding of the sociological, hereditary, and economic factors involved in criminality will assist in attacking it.

Philippine Cultural Factors

The Family

It has been stated that the Philippine nation is based primarily on the family unit and not on institutions. The Filipinos have a saying, "The faceless ones". Translated to Western thoughts this means that, there is little concern or thought for the ideas, feelings, and concepts of those outside the family circle.

Each of these factors, while not concrete in nature, represent problems that must be faced by advisors implementing any program. The Filipino, because of these factors, tends to be a weak supervisor. He is fearful that he will offend someone in high position, his family, or compadres. He tends to give total agreement to concepts regardless of whether he is in true agreement. While to the Westerner affirmative and negative are concretes, they are not in the Asian frame of reference. Regardless of the recommendations made in the survey, the interpersonal relationships developed between the advisors and their counterparts will be the key factor in the final implementation of specific recommendations.

Juvenile Delinquency In The Philippines

The same limitations noted in records on adult crime apply to those on juveniles. It is difficult to say with certainty that the records available reflect accurately the true extent of the occurrence of juvenile delinquency. A further appreciation of the complexity of determining the true extent of adult and juvenile crime is achieved when one considers the findings of the Manila Social Welfare Bureau in its 1964-65 study of crime and other factors in Manila. This revealed that 55% of the victims of crime did not report to the police. However, based on the statistics available and discussions with police officials, it does not appear to the Survey Team that juvenile delinquency incidence in the Philippines is greater than in similarly developed societies. The Philippine Youth Welfare Coordinating Council (PYWCC) in its study, "A Survey of Youthful Offenses in Cities and Provincial Capitals from January to December, 1961," the latest research on the subject which the Team could locate, reaches a similar conclusion: "It cannot be conclusively stated that the incidence of youthful offenses is low in the absence of population data. However, considering that the total of 18,902 (offenses) comes from 50 communities, the problem does not seem to be so alarming." Regardless of the degree of incidence, efforts must be constantly improved in the areas of prevention, detection, and treatment of juvenile delinquency, which appears to increase in volume and intensity as society develops and urbanizes. The government and society as a whole share with the police the responsibility for dealing with juvenile delinquency; however, the police are dependent upon government and society for the support needed to carry out the police role.

Theft, physical injuries, and robbery are the most prevalent major juvenile crimes reported by the police, who closely relate the theft and robbery to the low economic status of the offender. As indicated earlier, a Chief of Police reports in his city that most of the juvenile crime in that city is committed by the 500-700 homeless children who exist in the market and wharf area. Police also report that out-of-school children (who have homes but whose parents cannot afford to send them

to school or for whom schools are not available) account for another large segment of delinquent activity. The PYWCC in its 1965 study estimates that 500,000 children are denied admission to school each year for lack of facilities. According to police, the fact that many children are in school for only half a day, coupled with the lack of recreation facilities, contributes to opportunities for delinquent behavior. Another group mentioned as a source of delinquent behavior are the children of "important persons" who engage in illegal activities for excitement or other reasons, and who are able to escape punishment because of the use of their family's influence.

Needless to say, the police alone cannot solve the above social and economic problems which are known to contribute to juvenile delinquency. These are problems which must be tackled by the government as a whole in intensified efforts to find solutions. The Philippine Mental Health Association analyzes the problems and recommends remedial actions in its paper, "A Study for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in the Philippines," prepared in 1958, and the follow-up study issued in April, 1965, "A Report Covering the Years 1958-1965 on the Implementation by the Philippine Youth Welfare Coordinating Council of the Recommendations Made in 1958 by the Philippine Mental Health Association Study Group for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in the Pnilippines." The Philippines has excellent, well-trained social scientists and social workers who recognize the problems and know what should be done to solve them. What has been lacking in the past has been strong governmental financial support to implement their recommendations.

The police role in juvenile delinquency is to prevent, detect, and investigate those acts by juvenile offenders which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime punishable by law. To carry out this role, a specialized police unit trained in dealing with juveniles is required in communities large enough to have juvenile problems. The size of the specialized unit depends on the size of the juvenile problem. This specialized unit also needs the support of the patrol bureau which must be trained to recognize juvenile delinquency problems and to know what to do about them.

The Survey Team was impressed with the dedication of the police officers it met who are engaged in juvenile work. All appeared to be trying sincerely to deal with problems which in some cases seemed insoluble. For example, what to do with a young thief who has no parents or home, has never attended school, and has lived by his wits as long as he can remember? In those police departments having specialized juvenile control units, there was an almost universal complaint that not enough police personnel were assigned to meet the need; in some instances, there was the added complaint that personnel assigned to the unit were those who were physically unfit for duty elsewhere and consequently were of limited value to the juvenile bureau; this complaint was encountered in one of the Philippines' largest cities. In most instances, the Team must agree with the departments that the number of personnel assigned to the juvenile bureau did not appear adequate to deal with the problems.

In most instances, police personnel assigned to the juvenile units complained of a lack of specialized training for the work. Almost all said they had read everything they could find on the subject in an effort to meet their recognized needs, and petitioned the Survey Team to provide suitable study materials. In some instances, such as Baguio City, the unit included a social worker trained in the handling of juveniles. In most countries, it has been found that women trained in the social studies and social work are particularly competent both by temperament and training to deal with juvenile offenders. Yet in the Philippines, the Survey Team found few women engaged in

police juvenile work. Those few female members of police departments encountered by the Survey Team were usually engaged in administrative, clerical, or detention activities.

The general lack of suitable office space found in police departments is shared by juvenile units, which in most instances are badly housed. In some instances, juvenile units were housed in multi-purpose areas. When the space was needed for other activities such as training, the juvenile unit had to locate temporary space or suspend those activities normally carried out in the office, such as interviewing offenders and parents. Also, a general lack was noted of separate detention facilities for juvenile offenders. It was common occurrence to see juveniles detained in the same space with hardened adult offenders, sometimes for several months at a time. An example of this practice is recorded in the PYWCC's report of April, 1965, that it "supported the project of the Manila Police Department to remove 600 inmates--some of them first and young offenders awaiting trial--from the City Jail and relocate them in less unsuitable quarters." The dangers of such proximity are obvious.

The Welfareville Institution in Mandaluyong, Rizal, is the only nationally supported corrective institution for children under 16 years of age. It accommodates approximately 400 offenders. Although the condition of corrective institutions is outside the area of responsibility of the Law Enforcement Survey Team, the Team notes that the PYWCC, in its 1965 report, comments on the need for improvements in both the physical plant and the program at Welfareville. At the time of the Manila Police Department Survey in 1964, a member of the Survey Team was impressed with its programs but appalled at the physical state of the institution. For example, at the time a single water faucet was available to serve all 400 inhabitants' needs for water including drinking, washing, laundry, and cleaning of quarters, as well as toilet purposes.

In their operations, the juvenile control units attempt to have unit officers assigned on a regular basis to sections of the city and municipality where delinquent behavior is likely to occur, such as entertainment areas, markets and wharfs, and to the schools to control truancy. The juvenile unit depends upon the regular patrolmen to assist in these potentially dangerous areas and to carry out preventive and detection activities in other areas. The role of the regular patrolman cannot be emphasized too highly in juvenile activities. The regular patrolman on the beat, sensitive to the needs and problems of his area, is in a position to prevent much juvenile delinquency before it occurs. For example, drunkeness is reported to be a fairly frequent juvenile offense in the Philippines. The juvenile unit relies in most instances on the local patrolman to ascertain that neighborhood stores dispensing alcoholic beverages do not sell to juveniles. The juvenile unit can provide the over-all direction of police juvenile delinquency prevention and detection activities and should have the specialized skills to handle difficult cases, but it is the regular patrolman on his beat who can provide the broadest coverage of potential juvenile delinquent behavior.

Following the detection of illegal juvenile activity, the juvenile unit interviews the offender, the parents or guardian, the victim, and attempts to determine a course of action. If sufficient evidence exists, the case is referred to a Prosecutor or Court. As in the case of adult crime, excessive delays in the conduct of court trials are common and it is widely recognized by the police, the PYWCC, and others interested in juvenile welfare that there are too few juvenile courts in the Philippines.

The juvenile control units appear to coordinate their activities quite closely with the schools. There appeared to be less coordination and cooperation

with Social Welfare Bureaus, especially in areas outside Manila. There seems to be little follow-up on juvenile offenders once they are released either by the police, fiscals, courts, or corrective institutions. This lack of follow-up is attributed to lack of personnel.

It can be expected that improvement in the over-all capability of the police to carry out their law enforcement responsibilities will lead also to improved capability in dealing with juvenile delinquents. However, because of the specialized nature of prevention and control of juvenile delinquents and the particular problems existing in the Philippines which contribute to its occurrence, a few general recommendations are in order. These the police cannot be expected to implement alone. For example, government action is needed to determine the identity and location of the homeless children reported by the police who commit a majority of the juvenile crime, and to verify the non-existence of adults legally responsible for their care. Once their homeless status is established, the government should provide and support institutions for their care and education or arrange adequate foster home care. The police can assist the Social Welfare Administration in locating and identifying these children. The government is well aware of the shortage of schools and is taking steps to build and staff additional structures to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of school-age children who are out-of-school and likely candidates for delinquent activity. It is hoped that the government will continue and accelerate its school construction and staffing efforts.

Police executives should give more thought to the staffing of their juvenile control units and those departments without such specialized units should consider the need to establish them. The juvenile control unit should be staffed by the police personnel best qualified by training, experience, and temperament to work with juveniles. Increased use in juvenile work should be made of female police officers trained in social work and the social sciences. It is not suggested that the entire staffs of juvenile control bureaus consist of policewomen; rather there should be a better mix of policewomen and policemen with each contributing their special skills to this important phase of police work. Where policewomen are not available at present, recruitment of qualified women should be included in future personnel planning.

Special juvenile control training should be made available both for the members of the juvenile control units and for the regular patrolmen who assist them and bear the greatest responsibility in preventing and detecting both adult and juvenile crime. Such training could well include contributions from the legal community, the colleges and universities, and social welfare agencies.

Police departments should allocate their juvenile control bureaus adequate office space to carry out their responsibilities with efficiency and dignity and with due consideration for the children with whom they are dealing. Additionally, every effort should be made to provide separate detention facilities so that children will not be housed with adult criminals, and a means should be found to initiate or continue children's education during their periods of detention.

Finally, police should be encouraged, if not directed, to increase coordination of their efforts with juveniles with those of the Social Welfare Administration and other social agencies. The government should give strong support to carrying out those government actions recommended by the Philippine Youth Welfare Coordination Council to prevent juvenile delinquency and should otherwise strongly voice its support for all efforts to reduce juvenile

delinquency. Such government action and support is indeed necessary since the juvenile delinquent of today is the potential criminal of tomorrow.

The Police Commission established under the recently passed Police Law offers a splendid mechanism for the government to give new and strong direction nationwide to juvenile delinquency control. The appointment of a qualified, experienced, well-trained consultant on juvenile delinquency to the Commission would be an excellent beginning. Locating such a person should not be difficult among the many dedicated law enforcement officers and social workers of the Philippines.

"I believe that he who has less in life should have more in law."

Ramon Magsaysay

Chapter III

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

In its survey of law enforcement agencies throughout the Philippines, the Survey Team was exposed to many contacts with the judicial system, prosecutors, and penal officials. These contacts developed certain inescapable conclusions involving law enforcement procedures and were exploited in the interest of completing a well-rounded survey effort. No objective evaluation or overall survey of the Philippine judicial system is intended, since so complex a subject was outside the competence of the Survey Team. The data presented constitutes only a corollary fall out from the survey of law enforcement. Despite incompleteness, they are considered too significant to be omitted. However, the importance of this aspect of law enforcement cannot be overemphasized. Therefore, in order that a proper examination can be made, it is recommended that:

1. A carefully selected team of professionals make a thorough in depth survey of the administration of justice from arrest through sentencing.

2. Another team of professionals survey in depth the treatment of offenders in the Philippine prison system.

Probably the most pernicious and discouraging aspect of law enforcement and the administration of justice was the lack of a clear commitment to the principle of government by law rather than by men, which has been so clearly enunciated by the President Marcos and other government leadership. At the working level, i.e. local prosecutors, courts, attorneys, and enforcement agencies, the law too often appears as an obstacle to circumvented or manipulated and its weaknesses exploited. This disturbing circumstance was commented on by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, Court of First Instance Judge, in handing down a graft conviction against a police chief who attempted to circumvent normal actions by the police, the prosecution, and the judge, "...First the order to the policeman, second the promise of a talk with the fiscal, and finally the assurance that the judge had already been approached. A norm of conduct so rampant in our present official setup that it has grown into such appalling proportions as to undermine the faith of the people in the rule of law." (Manila Times, 24 September 1966, Vol. XXI, Page 2A.)

Too frequently it was apparent to the Survey Team that attorneys abused the judicial system, the prosecution system, and other legal procedures to develop delays, and to secure dismissals after prolonged and multiple postponements. The actions of attorneys were too often compounded and furthered by a lack of firmness on the part of judges in granting postponements and fiscals in acquiescing to reinvestigation. In too few instances was it obvious that both the letter and spirit of the law were being upheld.

It is considered essential here to interject that many able, conscientious and vigorous judges and fiscals were interviewed who were well versed in the law, who clearly opposed the delaying tactics existing in today's courts and who were devoted to insuring impartiality and fairness in applying the law. Many of these were heavily overworked and expended their own funds to supplement their investigative and clerical staff. They were poorly paid in relation to their efforts and acquired experience and engaged in an uphill struggle against the dragging complexities of existing legal processes. Without major assistance at the national level, much of this fine labor will end in futility.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT



Rule 119, Section 2 of the 1964 Rules of Court indicates that in criminal cases the court may, "in its discretion for good cause postpone the trial of the case for such period of time as the ends of justice and the right of the defendent to a speedy trial required."

When queried on the reasons for excessive postponements, many judges indicated that the law could not be prosecuted fairly without considering the "human" side of the law and that "reasonable" request for postponement should be considered. The records of a Clerk of Court indicated in the month of July 1966 that 69 cases placed on the court calendar of which nine were dismissed and 60 granted continuances. The latitude taken under this rule is considerable and is a fruitful breeding ground for additional delays. A case in point is one wherein a municipal judge has permitted the postponement of an estafa (fraud) case for four consecutive years due to repeated pregnancy in the accused on the basis of a doctor's certificate that her pregnancies and subsequent recoveries prevented attendance at any trial. He predicted continued postponements so long as she could bear children and a postponement was requested. When the circumstances of this case were outlined to a municipal judge in another province, he indicated that such postponements should be investigated for validity before being repeatedly granted. He indicated further that a general conclusion was possible to the effect that the accused was in good health by virtue of regular child bearing and could reasonably be made to appear in court in the interest of justice toward the offended party in the case.

The case outlined, with many variations, contains elements typical of many presently being laboriously investigated, prosecuted and tried. Clearly the prolongation of such cases works to the benefit of the accused and tends to discourage the offended parties while increasing their susceptibility to an amicable settlement out of court.

The continued postponements also discourage necessary witnesses. These are frequently persons of limited means who are not provided compensation for their travel or living expenses. Rule 141, Section 11 of the New Rules of Court, dated 1 January 1964, authorizes witnesses to inferior courts one peso a day and ten centavos for each kilometer of travel in going to the place of trial. Witnesses to higher courts are authorized two pesos a day. Even though these are minimal payments by any standards, the monies for their payments have not reached most of the courts visited by the Survey Team. Several judges were firm in their belief that this was a basic underlying cause to court delays and if not solved would increase their stagnation. Many witnesses involved in court actions are poor and live at considerable distances from trial scenes. With no compensation for their efforts, it is difficult for many to recognize the civic necessity for proceeding to the courts when it will cost them their own hard-earned pesos for travel and food and frequently provide only an opportunity to testify against a relative or neighbor. Under these circumstances, witnesses in prolonged cases automatically tend to be difficult to locate and serve.

There is much information to indicate that "amicable" settlements, or settlements out of court, have apparently been extended frequently to include major criminal cases. Repeatedly officials were quite frank in indicating that grave crimes, including homicide and murder, were dealt with in this manner. This repetition was sufficiently frequent to give credence to the existence of this practice. It appeared to have its most obvious use in Sulu, Leyte and Ilocos Sur with occasional mention in other areas.

NUMBER OF PENDING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES AS OF JUNE, 1965 IN CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES

CITIES

	Criminal	Civil
Angeles	723	59
Bacolod	3,324	303
Baguio I	205	29
Baguio II	344	37
Basilan	392	27
Butuan	789	167
Cabanatuan	No Report	
Cagayan de Oro	895	126
Calbayog	133	1
Cavite I	No Report	
Cavite II	No Report	
Cebu I	No Report	
Cebu II	No Report	
Cebu III	324	187
Cebu IV	No Report	
Cotabato	77	58
Caloocan	4,651	0
Dagapan	No Report	
Davao	No Report	
Davao I	No Report	
Davao II	1,161	152
Davao III	1,140	143
Dapitan	No Report	
Dumaguete	No Report	
Gingoog	No Report	
Iligan	Mo Report	
Iloilo	530	
Iloilo II	326	75
Iloilo III	31	3
Lapu-lapu	No Report	
Legaspi II	164	18
Lipa	27	2
Lucena	160	29
Manila I	1,988	224
Manila II	562	211
Manila III	397	327
Manila IV	1,165	935
Manila V	638	290
Manila VI	No Report	
Manila VII	1,141	1,501
Manila VIII	283	383
Marawi	77	43
Ormoc	130	8
Naga I	No Report	
Naga II	No Report	
Ozamis I	No Report	
Ozamis II	111	8
Roxas I	58	7
Roxas II	No Report	
Pasay I	1,504	166
Pasay II	597	188
Quezon	No Report	
Quezon II	No Report	
Quezon III	No Report	
Quezon IV	60	54
San Carlos	No Report	
San Pablo	203	71
Silay	61	57
Tagaytay	No Report	
Tacloban	No Report	
Toledo	No Report	
Trece Martires	No Report	
Zamboanga City	287	7
TOTAL	23,518	6,925

PROVINCES

	Criminal	Civil	No. Municipalities No Report
Abra	321	13	12
Agusan	308	40	11
Aklan	145	13	2
Albay	1,278	132	1
Antique	151	19	5
Bataan	57	44	5
Batanes	0	1	0
Batangas	571	185	1
Bohol	203	25	8
Bukidnon	179	13	2
Bulacan	971	154	8
Cagayan	533	71	3
Cam. Norte	388	50	1
Cam. Sur	567	185	3
Capiz	173	18	5
Catanuanes	66	6	1
Cavite	145	34	4
Cebu	552	72	10
Cotabato	1,261	566	11
Davao	527	92	3
Ilocos Notre	705	151	4
Ilocos Sur	442	94	3
Iloilo	397	132	3
Isabela	364	95	7
Laguna	377	80	8
Lanao del Norte	269	26	3
Lanao del Sur	182	11	16
La Union	313	47	1
Leyte del Norte	932	84	9
Leyte del Sur	52	6	3
Marinduque	47	1	0
Masbate	324	26	3
Mt. Province	202	tu	12
Nueva Ecija	1,rto	723	3
Nueva Viscaya	173	44	1
Occ. Mindoro	45	28	1
Or. Mindoro	219	88	3
Or. Misamis	289	46	5
Or. Misamis	289	46	5
Occ. Negros	836	487	6
Or. Negros	1,550	253	0
Palawan	123	84	4
Pampanga	1,186	88	9
Pangasinan	1,354	87	5
Quezon	1,115	536	13
Rizal	3,041	312	7
Romblon	147	29	5
Samar	1,305	95	16
Sorsogon	328	49	0
Sulu	798	55	9
Surigao	226	52	8
Tarlac	1,688	199	8
Zambales	1,740	118	0
Zam. del Norte	412	51	2
Zam. del Sur	455	84	8
TOTAL	31,795	3,739	282
Cities	23,518	6,035	
Total	55,313	9,774	
TOTAL ALL	65,087		

43% of city courts and 20% of municipalities not reported; estimated actual total: 85,000

In justification for such actions, although never officially or legally condoned, it was reasoned that no other practical procedure was possible in many instances since forcing a witness to testify against the accused would likely serve to generate further animosity and probably another grave crime.

Typically in such cases, the only evidence against the accused consists of statements of witnesses. This is most commonly due to limitations in investigagive techniques which result in the lack of technical or material evidence. As outlined repeatedly by knowledgeable officials and attorneys, the defense and prosecution delay the investigation and the trial as frequently as possible, sometimes for several years. The interim is used to influence witnesses and the aggrieved party by a representative of the accused. With the passage of time, and some form of compensation, those making statements are prevailed upon to indicate that such statements were made in the heat of anger, or are otherwise erroneous, and the aggrieved party agrees to settlement on a variety of terms. If this action is presented to the prosecutor and accepted, no basis for trial exists. The procedure is varied but basically similar if the case reaches trial.

Obviously this system is not officially sanctioned at any level and its existence is officially denied. Many judges were adamant in their condemnation of such actions and did not countenance the existence of the procedure. Several judges indicated that witnesses involved in such actions should be charged with perjury, at the same time admitting that such a procedure was rarely followed.

Many defects of the Philippine judicial system are well established and have been ably commented on by the Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, Justice Roberto Concepcion. The Chief Justice expounds on the significance of the necessary ethical and technical application of law enforcement to achieve suitable conditions of peace and order. He makes specific references to the need for:

a. Minimizing partisan political considerations in appointments to judicial benches.

b. Rendering prompt judicial decisions.

c. Improvement of public prosecution.

d. Adequate compensation for public defenders.

e. Members of the Bar to assist rather than obstruct the courts in dispensing justice.

f. Orientation of Philippine society toward the government and its commands.

Appropriate to the survey of peace and order conditions is his reference to glamorizatinn of racketeers, unscrupulous and violent movie idols, spectacular public performers and others as opposed to the more modest achievements of teachers, artisans, obedient public servants and law-abiding citizens. His comments emphasize that Filipino society, as presently constituted, is an acquisitive society and one where the desire for rapid success too frequently breeds a disregard for the normal legal process, thereby developing its anticipated concomitant, the violence and social disruption attendent in disregarding law.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the Secretary of Justice advocate a series of educational seminars for municipal judges and fiscals for a sharing of experienced outlooks concerning the application and meaning of justice, judicial separation of the bench from political influences and orientation toward necessary adherence to fundamental tenets of ethical conduct.

b. That examinations be conducted for municipal judges, city judges, provincial fiscals and city fiscals prior to any selection for these critical positions.

c. That legislation be considered by the Justice Department allocating a pro rata share of local Filing Fees be allocated to courts for payments of travel and per diem for witnesses summoned to the courts.

d. That the Justice Department consider a court scheduling procedure requiring a written "certificate of readiness to proceed" on the part of the attorneys involved.

e. That the legal profession be encouraged to emphasize adherence to its established canons of professional ethics.

In contacts with municipal judges, the imbalance in judicial workloads between municipalities and municipal prosecution were frequently subjects for discussion. Judges in heavily populated municipalities, e.g. Jolo, Sulu Province, were inundated with cases; many outlying municipal benches were relatively idle. For security reasons many outlying judges resided in the Jolo problacion. There is no provision within the law to permit an equitable sharing of the judicial workload.

A further detriment exists in Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which states, "...municipal judge shall be present at least four hours on each business day in his offices or at the place where his court is held; but he may, after office hours...pursue any other vocation or hold any other office or position."

Municipal Court schedules and Court of First Instance schedules frequently coincide and the latter has priority if attorneys and other persons are involved in court actions occurring in both. With the present established backlog of pending cases, this circumstance, plus the four hour minimum, does not appear to lend itself to reducing the congestion in the courts. To their credit, many municipal judges were observed who did not limit themselves to the four hours of judicial duties in the interest of expediting the flow of cases.

Concerning prosecution, there is no provision in existing law for the position of municipal fiscal and with few exceptions the function of municipal prosecutor is usually handled by the Chief of Police unless a special counsel is provided by the National Government. This prosecution is frequently marked with ineptness due to lack of legal training and the pressure of police duties.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the Secretary of Justice consider legislation along the following guidelines:

a. Expand the jurisdiction of municipal judges to include more than one municipality in those instances where the case load would permit such redesignation.

b. Utilize the municipal judges eliminated by this process as municipal fiscals in a corresponding number of municipalities, these fiscals to have jurisdiction over more than one municipality.

c. Seek the designation of municipal attorneys as municipal fiscals or special counsels with compensation in whole or in part from national funds.

d. Require municipal judges in heavily populated municipalities to sit five full days weekly and increase their salaries to offset corresponding losses from inability to engage in private legal practice.

Adequate defense of the indigent accused and chiefs of police functioning as prosecuting attorneys are weaknesses of existing law enforcement processes. In its many visits the Survey Team did not encounter a single de oficio attorney who had received compensation for public defense, nor was any judge or fiscal able to report a single case of such compensation to their knowledge. Although 217,760 pesos are appropriated for this purpose in Fiscal Year 1966-67, the amount is insignificant in relation to the demand for de oficio services. The saddling of municipal chiefs of police with the duties of municipal prosecutor does not serve the course of justice in most instances. In smaller municipalities his actions serve little more than to point toward the accused. Provincial fiscals indicate many investigations prepared by law enforcement personnel reflect a gross lack of training and of the law. In such instances the fiscal is required to use old or inaccurate information and often can only recommend the ultimate dismissal of the case. In communities with sizable police forces, the chief or police must neglect police management and administration in order to conduct the duties of prosecution.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That municipal fiscals be appointed as outlined earlier in this section.

b. Adequate funds be made available for de oficio attorneys.

c. Chiefs of Police be relieved of the duties of prosecutor wherever a municipal fiscal has been appointed.

Delays in pending cases receive their most dramatic and severe emphasis when some of their results are observed in detention facilities. Survey Team visits to provincial jails involved four such institutions in the provinces of Masbate, Leyte, Cebu and Iloilo. All were overcrowded. The Masbate jail housed 220 prisoners in a building designed to accommodate 70; the Iloilo jail had 64 convicted prisoners awaiting transfer in an extremely small and dismal cell.

Outside the crowded living conditions, the most obviously undesirable conditions were the lengthy periods awaiting trial and the inability to separate categories of prisoners. In the Leyte jail a 12-year-old boy, accused with his father as accessory to a grave crime, has been housed and fed with adult prisoners of all descriptions for the past five months while awaiting trial. In the Iloilo jail one detainee has been awaiting trial for three years, reportedly due to the death and transfers of judges of the Court of First Instance assigned his case.

Of a total of 1,286 prisoners in the four institutions, 755 were detained from a few hours to two or three years, awaiting trial. The Cebu jail had reduced this period to a maximum of two years. In the Masbate jail, two detainees have been awaiting trial for five years for major crimes. One prisoner indicated that he was hoping for an amicable settlement of his case; the other desired to plead guilty to a lesser crime but had encountered legal complications in the process. In these cases it can be assumed that defense attorneys have implemented a series of dilatory tactics and unduly prolonged the course of justice. In both instances the delays serve the purposes of the accused and are tantamount to a denial of prompt justice for the affronted parties. Obviously the lengthy detention period will serve to lessen the resolve of those interested in prosecuting the case, diminish the interest of the witnesses and tend to force compromises outside the court from sheer frustration.

It must also be considered that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code indicates that certain offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment, "shall be credited in the service of their sentences consisting of deprivation of liberty, with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment..."

Germane to this overall problem of administration of justice is the existing shortage of judges and prosecutors and the numbers of cases pending on court dockets. At present there are approximately 90 vacancies reported in the positions of judges and fiscals. President Marcos, in his State of the Nation address in February 1966, reported a total of 81,305 cases pending on court dockets as of July 1965. Compounding this problem is the number of detained prisoners awaiting trial in provincial jails. With 755 in four provincial jails, the national total must be considerable. With these considerations in mind, the absence of judges and prosecutors constitutes a special disservice, particularly to detained persons awaiting the opportunity for a prompt trial and those persons awaiting redress through the outcome of court actions.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the Secretary of Justice consider establishing national guidelines for some systematic method of monitoring the duration of detention without trial to insure that a reasonable maximum is not exceeded, and further, to obviate the manipulation of judicial procedures by insuring reasonable compliance with the established democratic principle of speedy trial.

b. That judge and fiscal vacancies be filled with qualified persons as rapidly as possible to expedite the implementation of the Rule of Law and adherence to the democratic principle of justice to all.

12 year old detained in Masbate Provincial Jail for five months without trial. Charged as accomplice to a major crime with his father.

Teenagers in Masbate Provincial Jail along with hardened criminals and one mental case.

The sequence of excessive postponements, extensive detentions, repeated investigations and exasperating rescheduling of trials, serve to stultify the administration of justice and make the legal process a trying ordeal for both accused and offended parties. These manifold inhibitions, when added to the lack of judges and prosecutors and the already choked movement of court actions, serve to thwart the ends of justice and mock the law. In the Philippines, the Rule of Law has in large part become a nebulous goal obscured by the machinations of those capable of subverting the course of justice to their own ends.

So long as amicable settlements are used for criminal cases, prolonged detention prior to trial permitted, and multiple, repeated postponements granted, there is little room for optimism in achieving an equitable and factual execution of the rule of Law. If in coming years the National Police Commission produces fruitful results in overhauling law enforcement activities, any gains produced will be futile if attorneys, prosecutors and judges continue to hamstring the due process of law.

"For those of us who profess the rule of law, these are trying times indeed. The increasing incidence of crime flouting with insolence and brazenness the forces of peace and order, points with growing alarm to the great number of those who, in disdain or disenchantment, choose the ways of the jungle instead of the paths of right and justice.

"It is time we are reminded that the safety and stability of our society depend on a faithful adherence to the principles of Government and its institutions. For once men have forsaken obedience of the constituted order, destruction of society begins to take place."

Cesar Bengzon
Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

A considerable number of government organizations are involved in law enforcement in the Philippines; several agencies have concurrent original jurisdiction over crime which leads to the inevitable confusion caused by duplicatory authority.

Some agencies are interested in the enforcement of specific laws; others in regulations pertaining to particular activities.

The strong central character of government administration in the Philippines is clearly evident in its system of general law enforcement. At the top is the President who ultimately is responsible for the enforcement of the laws and for the state of peace and order throughout the country. All law enforcement agencies are in effect under his control and supervision.

The President, as the nation's Chief Executive, plays a leading role in general law enforcement. As Commander in Chief he may call on one of the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. If he feels the security of the country so justifies, he may suspend the privilege of habeas corpus. In furtherance of national security he may place all or any part of the country under martial law. The President may deport undesirable aliens considered a threat to the peace and security of the country.

To assist him in the discharge of these duties, the President has advisory bodies such as the National Security Council and the Cabinet, as well as his own Executive Office.

Appointments to the local police are processed through the National Office of Local Governments which also prepares instructions to local police. The Office of Local Governments includes an Assistant on Public Order whose function is to receive and consider peace and order reports from local officials. These reports at times are filed without any, or at most,a perfunctory perusal.

Another unit under the Office of the President is The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) which is engaged in the coordination of all government activities involving national intelligence. NICA prepares intelligence estimates for the President on the peace and order situation at home and abroad. In practice, NICA's activities have been expanded by the President into smuggling control. Since NICA was created as a staff agency to be the focal point of all intelligence and security information and not as an operational agency, the 1955 Government Survey and Reorganization Commission proposed the transfer of NICA's operational activities to the NBI and the Bureau of Immigration.

The largest national general law enforcement agency is the Philippine Constabulary (PC), a 16,000 man segment of the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP). The PC was established in 1901 "for the preservation of peace, law and order in the Philippines." As a national police force organized along military lines, the PC has undergone several reorganizations and has been under the supervision and control of different governmental departments.

THE PHILIPPINE POLICE SYSTEM



In 1936 the PC was abolished when a State Police Force was organized. All municipal, city forces and provincial guard organizations were consolidated to constitute the State Police which was placed under a Commissioner of Public Safety in the Department of Interior.

In 1938 the State Police was abolished and the PC reestablished; however, the reestablished PC was located within the Ministry of Interior. In 1950 when the Department of Interior was abolished, the PC was transferred to the Department of National Defense.

In addition to the PC, other Department of Defense agencies are concerned with the maintenance of peace and order. The Army, Navy and Air Force may be called out by the President in case of emergency or serious public disorder. The intelligence units of these various forces should collect intelligence bearing on the peace and order conditions in the country.

The Navy is expressly charged with the duty of assisting in the enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to navigation, immigration, customs revenue, opium, quarantine, fishing and neutrality in the territorial waters. Thus the Navy is charged with the duty to patrol the territorial waters, inspect fishing and other craft for possible violations and conduct raids where violations of laws exist.

Also at the national level, in 1947 the "Division of Investigation" in the Department of Justice was expanded and enlarged into the "National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI "investigates and detects violations of the law on its own initiative or upon proper request, assists and trains local law enforcement agencies, maintains a central crime laboratory and a central criminal identification records and statistics file for the use of all law enforcement agencies."

Other agencies involved in general law enforcement include the Wage Administration Service, Bureau of Labor, Agriculture Tenancy Commission, Bureau of Posts, Land Transportation Office, Bureau of Immigration, Deportation Board, Anti-Dummy Board, Department of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Health, Bureau of Quarantine, Bureau of Plant Industry, Commission on Ports and Wildlife, Bureau of Forestry, Bureau of Fisheries, Bureau of Mines and Bureau of Lands.

While these national law enforcement agencies operate on a nationwide scale, some local entities also have general law enforcement functions. National and local peace officers have concurrent jurisdiction over the enforcement of general laws, while the latter have original jurisdiction over the enforcement of local ordinances.

Province

The governor, as provincial executive head, is responsible for the execution of the laws by all officers in the province. He is responsible for the efficient operation of the provincial guard and all local police bodies. The PC stationed in the province is required to cooperate with the governor in the maintenance of peace and order and to execute all lawful orders from him. For example, the governor may request the provincial PC commander to direct his subordinates to enforce the ordinances of any municipality in the province.

Should public interest so demand, the governor may, with the approval of the President, place any local police force under PC control.

Municipalities

The largest element of law enforcement officers are the forces totaling some 31,000 in the more than 1400 cities and municipalities (47 chartered cities and 1378 municipalities as of 1 January 1966).

The Mayor is the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality. In that capacity he is responsible for local enforcement of general laws and of certain special regulations. He issues orders regarding police and public safety matters and has full control over the municipal police, including selection of the municipal chief of police.

The municipal police force is composed of a chief and such number of police as determined by the municipal council with the approval of the provincial board. The recently approved Police Act establishes a minimum number of police for municipalities and cities according to class.

Unlike the system in the U.S., the Philippines does not have rural, "unincorporated" areas. All land in the Philippines is within a municipality or a city. Consequently, with their limited manpower and inadequate equipment, the municipal police sometimes find it difficult to maintain direct and frequent contact with all barrios of the municipality.

Each barrio is under the supervision of a barrio captain or lieutenant who is appointed by and responsible to the municipal councilor for his barrio. The barrio captain or lieutenant serves without pay. He is authorized to make arrests and may deputize barrio citizens as "rural policemen" who also serve without pay.

The Chartered Cities

In the chartered city as in the municipality, the mayor has control of the police department with the exception that in the chartered city the chief of police and his deputy are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. However, this will be changed by the recently approved Police Law which authorizes the appointment of chiefs of police of chartered cities by the President only up to January 1968 at which time the appointing authority reverts to the mayor.

Prosecution

When the police deem that evidence of guilt is sufficient to warrant prosecution of an individual in the courts, the case is referred to the provincial or city fiscal whose function is similar to that of a district or city attorney in the U.S.

A provincial fiscal is assigned to each province. Before prosecuting a criminal case in court, he may investigate alleged crimes referred to him. When possible, he also assists the municipal police in preparing their cases. Where municipal fiscals do not exist, the municipal police chief has responsibility to perform the fiscal's function. Since he usually is not an attorney

he sometimes has difficulty in properly preparing and presenting his cases. Where municipalities have a municipal attorney, precedent has been established to designate the municipal attorney concurrently as an assistant provincial fiscal, thus authorizing him to act as municipal fiscal, and relieving the chief of police of this responsibility.

The Judiciary

The Judiciary Act of 1948 sets forth the hierarchy of the courts. At the bottom are the Justice of Peace Courts in the municipalities and the Municipal Courts in the cities. Appeals from these courts go to the Courts of First Instance (CFI) which also try those cases not triable in the lower courts. The next higher court is the Court of Appeals. This court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases not specifically the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the highest tribunal in the land. The Constitution sets forth the organization and powers of the Supreme Court.

The Philippine judicial process is adversary rather than inquisitorial. A person accused of a crime before the court is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise.

Problems in Law Enforcement

Most of the law enforcement agencies are handicapped by improper organization, ineffective administration, deficient equipment and records, and inadequately trained and poorly paid personnel.

These shortcomings, while present in varying degrees in all law enforcement agencies in the Philippines are, with some notable exceptions, most prevalent in the municipalities. One municipality paid its police 15 pesos monthly; others varied, but seldom exceeded 150 pesos.

Lack of training and education also present problems in the PC. On the basis of samplings obtained it appears that less than 50% of the PC enlisted personnel have completed a high school education and that not more than 25% have received adequate training in law enforcement techniques and tactics.

The chartered cities, while in a considerably better position both as to education and training, are still far short of the ideal.

With the exception of a few small municipal police forces, the only law enforcement agency in the Philippines with adequate education and training is the NBI. This agency is patterned after the FBI.

All agents in the NBI hold law or accounting degrees; their selection is highly competitive and rigid. The NBI, however, along with other law enforcement agencies, suffers from an inadequate budget, lack of logistics support and a measure of poor internal administration.

It is common for all law enforcement agencies to publicly "scrounge" for supplies and support from commercial or private interests...or even from other government agencies. This is widely practiced and generally accepted. "Gifts" of automobiles and furniture are usually stenciled with the name of the donor. Several provincial governors advised the Survey Team of their frequent assistance in providing the PC with gasoline, tires, transportation, construction materials and a miscellany of other assistance to conduct day-to-day operations. This practice is clearly the natural outgrowth of poor support.

COMPARATIVE MONTHLY SALARIES
U.S. AND PHILIPPINE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

U.S. $	Pesos	U.S. F.B.I.	Los Angeles P.D.	U.S. Military*	Phil. Constab.*	Manila P.D.	N.B.I.
2500		Director					
2333			Chief				
2165		Asst. Dir.					
2100		Insp.					
1960			Dep. Chief				
1955				Lt. Gen.			
1897		Agent in Chg.					
1752				Maj. Gen.			
1665		Div. Sup.					
1574			Insp.				
1544				Brig. Gen.			
	1480				Brig. Gen.		
1433		Sup.					
1263			Capt.				
1222		Sr. Agent					
	1219				Col.		
1204				Col.			
1085				Lt. Col.			
1071			Lt.				
	1000					Chief	
969				Maj.			
	966					Dep. Chief	
	957				Lt. Col.		
	940						Director
908			Sgt.				
878				Capt.			
873		Agent					
773		Agent I					
771			Ptlmn.				
	755				Maj.		
	736						Dep. Dir.
702				1st Lt.			
	700					Insp. 1/Cl.	
	634						Asst. Dir.
578				2nd Lt.			
	575				Capt.		
	555					Insp. 2/Cl.	
	520						Sup. Agent
	494						Sr. Agent
	477				1st Lt.	Insp. 3/Cl.	
	448						Agent III
	405						Agent II
	400					Sgt.	
	390				2nd Lt.		
	349						Agent I
	291					Ptlmn.	

*Quarters and subsistence allowances included.

It has long been known that citizens receive a high quality of law enforcement service only when they recognize the need and are willing to provide a sufficiently high salary level to attract and retain competent personnel. An examination of Philippine law enforcement salaries discloses some serious shortcomings.

The chart showing U.S. law enforcement salaries at the monthly dollar level was compared with that for Philippine law enforcement agencies at the peso level. Thus, it may be seen that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is one of the highest paid law enforcement officers in the U.S. He is followed closely by the Chief of Police of Los Angeles. These officials receive higher salaries than do full Generals in the U.S. military.

An Inspector in the Los Angeles Police Department and an FBI Division Supervisor both are higher paid than is a Brigadier General in the U.S. military.

A Los Angeles Police Lieutenant is paid about the same as a Lt. Colonel in the U.S. military, while an FBI Agent and a Log Angeles Police Patrolman are paid comparable salaries - both of them considerably higher than a 1st Lieutenant.

Comparing Philippine salaries, it may be seen that the Philippine Brigadier General is paid about the same in pesos as an American Brigadier General receives in dollars. However, this figure is considerably higher than either the Chief of the Manila Police Department (MPD) or the Director of the NBI. Even a PC Lieutenant Colonel receives a higher salary than does the Director of the NBI. It is obvious that law enforcement salaries lag considerably behind those of the military in the Philippines.

RECOMMENDATION

That the positions of Chief, MPD and the Director, NBI be upgraded to a level comparable in status and with equal salary to that of the Chief, PC.

That the positions of Deputy Chief, MPD and Deputy Director, NBI be similarly upgraded to levels equivalent to Colonel in the PC.

Following should be the comparable pay levels, including allowances, for Philippine law enforcement personnel.

	Philippine Constabulary	NBI	Manila Police
1,480	Brig. Gen.	Director	Chief
1,219	Colonel	Dep. Dir.	Dep. Chief
957	Lt. Col.	Asst.Dir.	Insp. 1 Cl.
755	Major	Sup. Agent	Insp. 2 Cl.
575	Captain	Sr. Agent	Insp. 3 Cl.
477	1st Lt.	Agent III	Sergeant
450		Agent II	Corporal
390	2nd Lt.	Agent I	Patrolman

This important basic step must be taken to insure that the police and the NBI have an opportunity to compete on the personnel market for top quality young people as they make their career determinations.

Jurisdiction/Coordination

Lack of coordination and overlapping and duplication of jurisdiction and activities are major problems among law enforcement agencies.

The local police, the PC, and the NBI have original jurisdiction over any crime occurring in a municipality. Frequently all three agencies conduct investigations of the same crime, and often without exchange of views or information. It is not uncommon for the three agencies to produce three different solutions for the same case.

The NBI frequently is called upon to serve warrants for wanted persons who "could not be located" by the local police or by the PC; yet those wanted persons were sometimes in plain view.

Cases which have been marked "closed, no suspects" by the local police and by the PC are frequently reinvestigated by the NBI upon complaint of a victim. The guilty party often is identified, apprehended, prosecuted and convicted.

Another example of the lack of coordination may be seen in the field of criminal records, identification, and statistical information.

The NBI is charged by law with responsibility for assembling and maintaining criminal records and for making the information available to all law enforcement agencies. However, barely 50% of the various agencies submit statistical data.

Little or no coordination appears to have been developed between the NBI and the PC in this field. For example, the PC recently issued a crime reporting directive to all municipalities without any discussion with the NBI. The NBI, on the other hand, developed and distributed a new uniform crime report form without discussion with the PC. Both agencies request reports from the local police, but the formats for these reports have not been jointly developed in order that a single report could be utilized to meet the requirements of both agencies.

The NBI is attempting to develop a National Identity File of fingerprints and has requested all agencies to take and to submit prints to them. However, most of the PC units do not take prints and those which do, do not submit prints to the NBI.

A similar problem exists between the PC and the NBI in the field of police training, regarding trainees and Programs of Instruction (POI). The NBI POI is geared to basic police and law enforcement while the PC POI is oriented more to military subjects.

It is considered imperative that close coordination among law enforcement agencies be developed as a prerequisite to an effective attack on the peace and order situation.

In view of the leverage it has over the local police in the form of subsidy and the membership on the Commission of the Director, NBI, and the Commanding General, PC, it is believed that the newly formed Police Commission is in the best position to effect this coordination.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the Police Commission take cognizance of evidence of lack of coordination and cooperation among the law enforcement agencies, make an aggressive effort to determine the reasons, and attempt to eliminate them.

That close liaison be maintained between the Police Commission and the Peace and Order Council. The latter appears to be a suitable starting point for the development of public support for the law enforcement function.

Jurisdictional duplication presents another serious problem. Efforts of the NBI are often dissipated on unnecessary or inconsequential activities such as serving warrants, or investigating minor cases.

Because of these long recognized difficulties, the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission in 1955 proposed the creation of a National Police Force under the Department of Interior (DOI). The Commission proposed the transfer of both the NBI and the PC to the DOI and their consolidation into a National Police Force.

The Commission further proposed the assignment of primary responsibility for law enforcement and criminal investigation as follows:

a. The police force of each chartered city should have the primary responsibility for all criminal investigation and law enforcement functions within the city limits.

b. The National Police Force should have the primary responsibility for all criminal investigation and law enforcement functions including highway patrol outside the limits of chartered cities.

c. Reciprocal agreements should be developed between the National Police Force and all local police units establishing detailed procedures for mutual cooperation and assistance and providing for technical supervision of local police units by the National Police.

d. All traffic department functions of the Motor Vehicle Office should be transferred to the National Police for areas outside the chartered cities and to the respective police forces of the chartered cities for areas within the city limits.

e. The authority of departmental security units should be delimited to essential needs and those units should be abolished whose responsibilities are not essential to the substantive work of the department or whose functions could be performed by the National Police or the local police.

f. The National Police Force should take over the primary responsibility for criminal investigation and law enforcement in any chartered city or municipality upon the request of the Mayor of a chartered city, by the Governor in the case of a municipality, or at the direction of the President in any case.

The Commission's recommendations progressed little further than the proposal stage although they recognized some of the serious organizational and jurisdictional problems faced by the various law enforcement agencies.

In a 1955 survey of law enforcement in the Philippines, a police consultant from the Institute of Public Administration addressed this problem of duplicating and overlapping jurisdiction and effort among the various law enforcement agencies. After reviewing several proposals, he recommended the separation of the PC from the army, the combination of the PC and NBI and placement of this joint force under either a reactivated Secretary of Interior or the Secretary of National Defense. He pointed out that the military is usually trained as a force while the modern concept of civil police is that of service. He went on to point out that "enforcement of laws by a military force is regimentation repugnant to democratic thinking."

In order to obtain additional views on the matter of duplicatory and overlapping jurisdiction among the various law enforcement agencies, the Survey Team solicited the opinions of the various law enforcement and other government officials whom they interviewed. Without exception, the officials were of the strong belief that there should be a clarification and delineation of authority and responsibility among the concerned agencies.

The most complete answer to the Team's question was prepared by an NBI agent.

The Team is in general concurrence with the NBI agent. Basically the NBI is an investigative and service agency and that their expertise should not be dissipated on minor, time-consuming activities such as investigation of minor cases and service of warrants. Warrants should be served by the local police. Should the local police fail to serve a warrant, it should then become the responsibility of the PC. The NBI should enter the picture only after the failure of the other two agencies.

One NBI region reported the service of 31 warrants on persons on whom the warrants had been served already by another agency or whose cases had already been dismissed - in all cases without notification to the NBI.

It was also reported that on occasion, the local police, because of local politics or local corruption, will refuse to serve a warrant. With lesser frequency, the same thing occurs with PC. This causes the court to direct the NBI to serve it. Such cases should be documented by the PC Provincial commander when the failure is in the local police department and by the NBI where the failure rests in the PC. Factual data on frequency and location should be assembled by the Police Commission in order that proper corrective action can be taken.

The Agent's answer does not take into consideration the fact that the municipalities and sometimes even the cities do not have sufficient manpower to permit the provision of law enforcement service to the outlying areas. The City of Davao, for example, with more than 830 square miles is said to be the largest city in area in the world. It would appear therefore that the PC should assume responsibility for uniformed police patrol of the rural areas of municipalities and of cities where police do not have sufficient manpower to provide service, leaving the police responsible for the central poblacion, the major populated portion of the community. Obviously, the local police should have primary responsibility for any cases within this area, calling on the PC only when additional manpower is required. When a local force requires investigative assistance, it should call on the NBI.

In any event, the delineation of functions of the various law enforcement agencies is one of the major responsibilities of the new Police Commission. In addition to their own experience, the Police Commission will have the advantage of reviewing the thinking of the 1955 Government Commission on Reorganization, and the proposals set forth in this Survey report.

In order to attack the problem of duplicatory and overlapping jurisdiction amongst the various law enforcement agencies, the Survey Team solicited the views of the various law enforcemnt and other government officials whom they interviewed. Without exception, all officials were of the strong belief that there should be a clarification and delineation of authority and responsibility for law enforcement among the agencies.

It was tempting for the Survey Team to propose a sweeping reorganization to obviate jurisdictional problems and ensure coordination and cooperation at the national level. However, given existing conditions, there is no assurance that any major reassignment of law enforcement responsibilities would prove more effective than the present arrangement.

Central to this issue is the national attitude toward enforcement of the laws. Any new organization would be immediately confronted with existing public indifference plus the apparently insurmountable roadblock of legal corruption and judicial ineptitude. It is considered the wisest course at this point to attempt to generate a suitable level of law enforcement from within the existing structure. This can best be accomplished through aggressive and competent actions of the National Police Commission by initiating necessary changes, reforms and attendant legislation.

The newly established Police Commission is charged to study the feasibility of organizing a National Police Agency which "shall be non-military and civilian in character." Considering major changes of this nature at this point could only serve to disrupt existing organizations. A period of trial under the aegis of the Police Commission is considered mandatory before major alterations are attempted.

External Problems

Public officials, particularly law enforcement agencies, are constantly in close touch with the general public and with a multiplicity of pressure groups. Depending upon the climate in which they operate and their own efficiency and sense of security, their actions are influenced to a greater or lesser degree by this close, frequent contact.

Police inefficiency is strengthened or weakened by public approval or disapproval and the resulting support or lack of it in terms of personnel, equipment and operating funds. Support is indicated also in terms of public willingness to participate in the process of law enforcement, such as appearing as witnesses in criminal cases, notifying the police of suspicious individuals or activities and voluntary compliance with the laws and suggestions from the police to inhibit criminal activities. This cooperation of the people is a basic indispensible for any successful police activity.

The fact has been proven in campaigns of all kinds in widespread areas from the prohibition campaign in the U.S. to the anti-terrorist campaign in Malaysia to the anti-Huk campaign of the 1950's and the present operations in Vietnam.

Public support of police activities is earned by demonstration of first-class performance on the part of the law enforcement officer. In order to provide this performance, the policeman, the PC constable and the NBI agent must be carefully selected, properly trained both in professional techniques and in an understanding of his role as a servant of the people. He must be provided the tools with which to work in terms of equipment and supplies. He Must be given organization, administrative, and command support, supervision and direction. Perhaps most importantly, he must be protected from political interference.

Given these premises, the law enforcement agency then has a valid product to sell the public.

Informing the public is in the nature of management reporting to the stockholders. The goals should include: Public Understanding, Public Confidence, Public Support.

In order to achieve these goals, the public relations program must have at least two major emphases - one involves the personal contact between the law enforcement officer and the citizen; the other involves the flow of information between the law enforcement organization and the public. The first seeks a satisfied individual citizen; the second, an informed citzenry.

The public relations program consists of internal and external phases. The former addresses the continual stressing of human relations in every contact with the public. It includes a thorough exploration of the subject, its reasons and its implications. This should be stressed to recruits, at all schools, in regulations and in discussions.

The law enforcement agency has many "publics". Programs should be designed with specific targets in mind. For example, the rural public, the city public, the municipality public, the driving public, businessmen, parents, school children and automobile owners.

Public relations must be generated from within. It is essential that policemen, the PC Constables and NBI agents themselves understand, respect and believe in their department and its work. Outsiders will not if the enforcement officers themselves do not. If the morale of the department is low, this will be obvious in their public contacts. The personal attitude of the individual law enforcement officer is the greatest influence on department public relations.

Following are basic requirements for an employee relations program:

1. Fair selection, assignment, promotion, disciplinary and commendatory procedures. The infusion of "politics" is probably the greatest destroyer of morale.

2. A system of communication within the department, such as a daily or weekly bulletin, and regular staff meetings.

3. Standard operating procedures. These rules and guides should be readily available in the form of a general manual covering two major topics;

a. The responsibilities of the individual officer, including what he is not to do as well as what he is to do and how to do it.

b. The rights of the officer, including opportunities for promotion, vacation, sick leave, disciplinary procedures, retirement, etc.

Operating Methods and the Public

Several aspects of law enforcement operating methods have an important impact on the public and deserve careful attention.

Appearance. The law enforcement officer should not only be efficient, he should look efficient. This impression is created by his being clean and neat at all times, and by his businesslike conduct.

Buildings. The appearance of the law enforcement headquarters, substation and other buildings has a tremendous effect on the attitude of the public. The public reacts unfavorably to ill-smelling, dark, poorly kept and unclean stations.

Handling offenders. In dealing with an offender, the law enforcement officer should be courteous but firm, never allowing himself to lose his temper.

Traffic regulation. More people come into contact with the traffic officer than with any other. Regardless of the efficiency of the rest of the department, if the traffic officer is surly, if he takes advantage of his position to "shake down" violators, the department's reputation is irreparably damaged.

Courtesy. Simple common courtesy as evidenced by "thank you," "you're welcome, " and "please" in personal and telephone contacts have a surprisingly profound effect on the public. Taking advantage of opportunities to assist the public develops good will for the agency.

Public Reporting. In carrying its message to the public, the department should use talks before citizens groups, exhibits, motion pictures, slides, radio, television and printed reports to inform and educate the public about the activities, methods and goals of the law enforcement agency. In giving talks before citizens groups, while the Chief of Police and the Public Relations staff will carry a major part of this load, a Speakers Bureau could be formed and its members scheduled for appearances before schools, civic groups, chambers of commerce, service clubs, etc. Possible topics are unlimited: traffic safety, crime laboratory methods, crime detection, criminal investigation, firearms, judo, etc.

Certain ground rules should be established regarding these appearances:

1. No fee should be charged.

2. The talk should be cleared for policy implications and information contents.

3. While the presentation should be entertaining, it must be designed to elicit a serious response.

Printed Reports. One of the most effective methods of getting the department's story to the public is through its annual report. This is a relatively simple yet effective way to present the department's accomplishments.

The paramount factor in any public relations program is service. Without giving effective service to the citizens, no law enforcement administrator can hope to succeed with a public relations program. Thus a public relations program is, in the final analysis, a program of providing better and more acceptable service.

Many administrators are prevented from doing an effective job by politically minded superiors. It is important that politicians recognize the political benefits to be gained from a good law enforcement department based on sound recruiting, adequate training, fair and honest promotions, sound administration, and material support.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission establish a Public Relations Office to assist the NBI, PC and local police in public relations activities.

Efforts must be made to secure the widest possible dissemination of the favorable aspects of worthwhile law enforcement accomplishments and objectives.

Direction of public relation activities by the Police Commission would tend to eliminate some of the competition for a favorable press which presently takes place among law enforcement agencies as set forth herein.

RECOMMENDATION

Establish a planned program of public relations for all levels of law enforcement.

In the long run, the citizens will get the law enforcement they want. A public relations program will keep them informed and will prompt them to demand improvement.

A constantly recurring theme throughout this entire examination of Philippine law enforcement was that of political interference. Individuals with money or political connections frequently were not arrested despite flagrant offenses. When arrested, they often were released without prosecution. Those prosecuted managed to obtain continuances on the flimsiest of excuses until witnesses eventually failed to appear because they had been "bought off" or terrorized.

Those victims who persisted in pressing charges were cajoled, threatened and offered increasing amounts of money until they, too capitulated and signed statements indicating a desire not to prosecute. In those cases where the court refused to accept such statements because the judges considered the cases so blatant that it should be brought to trial, orders would be issued to bring in the witnesses so that the trial could proceed. However, PC or local police law enforcement officers entrusted with the subpoena service frequently would be "reached". They then would inform the court that the witness could not be located. In such cases the court would have no alternative but dismissal.

With such procedures only a small percentage of persons are ever convicted. Those with sufficient funds, appeal. These appeals can prolong the case for 10 years or more, each year causing memories to fade and witnesses and victims to become more and more susceptible to "negotiation."

Finally, the infinitely small percentage of the original offenders sentenced frequently serve extremely easy terms.

The press reported incidents of disturbances at local night clubs involving criminals supposedly serving sentences in prison. Two hundred prisoners reportedly purchased their freedom.

Obviously, the administration of justice in the Philippines requires a thorough examination. Such examination was beyond the scope of the Law Enforcement Survey.

RECOMMENDATION

That two U.S. Teams examine the two phases of the Administration of Justice: (1) The Judicial Process and (2) The Penal System. (Also included in Chapter III.)

In the meantime, it is imperative that the law enforcement agencies develop a high degree of professional integrity. This can only be done if they are freed of the corruptive influence of political interference.

RECOMMENDATION

That the problem of apparent immunity from prosecution because of money or political influence be attacked by the formation of a squad of "untouchables" under the Office of the President or Police Commission. This squad should be selected on the basis of both professional competence and ability to resist bribery attempts and political interference. Because of the high standards used in NBI selection and their special competence, most members of this squad will no doubt come from the NBI. However, membership should be drawn from any government agency to make up this elite squad.

Their mission should be to gather evidence and to prosecute successfully some of the hitherto immune big time hoodlums, smugglers, gangsters or other offenders to make it clear that no one in the Philippines is above the law. The first of these squads should be established in the Manila area. Others should be set up in Cebu, Cotabato, Iloilo, Cavite, Angeles City and in any other stronghold of corruption. These squads should be provided with full support and given full protection from political interference.

The crime situation in the Philippines is serious and requires drastic and immediate action. The most important factor is to take positive appropriate action. On 25 July a "ranking police official" was quoted in the press as saying that an "all talk, all directives, and all press releases" approach to the peace and order situation is useless without the facilities and the know how.

The Survey Team is most thoroughly in concurrence with the philosophy that it is absolutely necessary to do something, and that "something" should be:

1. Planned intelligently to meet public needs.

2. Planned to utilize and coordinate the best efforts of all agencies.

3. Provided with real political, personnel, and logistical support to make the effort meaningful.

4. Ably directed and controlled by competent professionals with assured freedom from political interference.

5. A sustained effort over an extended period of time.

POLICE ACT OF 1966

Much of the effort of the Survey Team was directed toward observation of those law enforcement difficulties considered in the various police reform legislation proposed since 1959. These efforts culminated on 8 September 1966 in Republic Act 4864, commonly referred to as "The Police Act of 1966."

The Police Act includes provision for formation of a National Police Commission. The staffing, direction and support of this Commission will be the key element in any successful attempt to arrest the adverse course of peace and order in the Philippines. Normally, law enforcement agencies are ultimate arbiters of their own internal and external conduct. However, lack of direction, diffusion of responsibilities and administrative deterioration have made police discipline in the Philippines largely a matter of form rather than substance. The Police Commission provides an excellent opportunity nationwide to realign the responsibilities for law enforcement discipline and to generate a responsive public attitude toward supporting police agencies.

The provisions of the Police Act in relation to its purposes were studied in detail with specific reference to their impact on the existing deterioration in peace and order. The Act itself will not resolve all problems, since it is directed substantially to the workings of law enforcement agencies. A necessary corollary to efficient law enforcement and its public acceptance is a positive public and official attitude toward a Rule of Law. This attitude was not markedly apparent to the Survey Team. Without developing a high level of public confidence and trust in both law enforcement and the efficacy of the law, only a partial solution to the peace and order problem can be anticipated. There is no short term solution to the problem of public attitude, nor is this subject within the terms of reference of the Survey Team.

The purpose of the Police Act is "to achieve and attain a higher degree of efficiency in the organization, administration and operation of local police agencies with the end in view that peace and order may be maintained more effectively and the laws enforced with more impartiality. It is also the object of this Act to place the local police service on a professional level." These are laudable and necessary goals. With these ends in mind, the following comments and recommendations are for consideration by the Police Commission:

A. ENFORCEMENT: Section 23 of the Act states

> "Penal Clause - Any person who, in violation of Act and/or Civil Service rules and regulations, unduly interferes in the performance of the legitimate functions of law enforcement or that of the Board of Investigators, shall be punished with imprisonment..."

This section will predictably be difficult to enforce since the terminology "unduly interferes" provides considerable latitude for interference before it is necessarily interpreted as "undue." For example, to what degree would a municipal mayor be subjected to punishment if he influences the municipal council to withhold funds required for police training, weapons, gasoline, etc.? This is not an uncommon problem. In one large city visited by the Survey Team this situation prevailed, rendering the police force almost stagnant, destroying much of its morale in the process, and leaving the public without effective protection of the law. In several instances observed by Survey Team members, municipal mayors directed the efforts of the smaller municipal police almost completely, using them as a personal armed extension of their offices and giving little thought to their professional police competence or service to the public.

Although Section 4 of the Act authorizes the Commission to "examine and audit on a continuing basis the performance, activities and facilities of all local police agencies, "it is assumed that the day-to-day or periodic inspections of local police forces will continue to be conducted by the Philippine Constabulary and suitable reporting to the Police Commission made of their condition and efficiency. The geographic distribution of the PC and its past association and knowledge of local police forces will represent a considerable asset to the commission. Similarly, the NBI can provide other data on local police agency functions useful in enforcement actions. Over and above these agencies, the Commission will require an enforcement arm for prompt and extensive inspection actions to evaluate, substantiate and assess reported conditions with a view to implementing a stringent system of enforcement and/or correction.

RECOMMENDATION

> That the Police Commission consider among its initial efforts the formation of an inspection and internal affairs division constituted largely from personnel experienced in law enforcement who have received suitable formal training in police administration. This division should serve to establish the tone of Police Commission posture and supervision.
>
> That the Police Commission study the necessity for the PC to inspect police forces of the larger municipalities or chartered cities with suitable peace and order conditions prevailing. The Survey Team could discern little value in such inspections by the PC of larger police forces, e.g. those in the 150-man and over range, since the PC has no authority for enforcement of its recommendations and since PC professional capability for making an inspection of such forces is questionable.

That the Police Commission organize special inspection/enforcement units to inspect these larger police forces and ensure compliance with Police Commission recommendations.

B. JURISDICTION: An apparent conflict in jurisdiction over local police exists in the implementation of Section 4(b), wherein the Commission is empowered to "examine and audit, on a continuing basis, the performance, activities and facilities of all local police agencies throughout the country." The current mission statement of the Philippine Constabulary includes, "Supervision and control over the local police bodies." Additionally, the Commission is empowered to recommend to the President the placing of any local police agency under PC control. This authority is also held by the PC. A further conflict exists in the field of training. Section 4(i) states that the Commission has the duty to "...organize and develop police training programs and to operate police academies." On June 24, 1966, a memorandum from the President indicated that the NBI would "take charge of the training of all local police forces." However, Section 25 of the Police Act specifically repeals R.A. 557 and "executive orders, rules and regulations" inconsistent with the Act.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission form a clear and prompt functional delineation of law enforcement responsibilities and jurisdiction to obviate confusion within local police agencies and the public and to preclude potentially serious conflicts concerning the existence and application of overlapping supervisory and enforcement authority in several legally constituted bodies.

C. MINIMUM STANDARD EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES: Section 4(n) empowers the Commission to "prescribe minimum standard arms, equipment, police uniforms..." The section does not discuss minimum standards in transportation equipment and other facilities which are essential for the conduct of law enforcement and on which guidance is badly needed to achieve some form of standardization. Basic to municipal law enforcement is the capability of local police to respond quickly to reported criminal actions. The Survey Team encountered many instances where local police response to reported crimes was delayed for hours, and even days, due to the necessity to travel considerable distances on foot. This lack of transportation in rural areas distinctly disadvantages local police and permits criminal elements an unnecessary freedom of action. Many local police forces have no conception or at best a poor conception of what facilities should be built, or how organized, and equipped.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Commission include establishment of minimum standards of transportation equipment. This standard should include an irreducible minimum of one method of transportation exclusively available to the local police at all times.

That the Commission make appropriate representation to secure the availability of a suitable portion of reparation funds available to the nation for provisions of reparation goods and services from Japan. This funding should be used to provide minimum transportation to municipal police forces without political considerations.

That the Commission provide guidelines to municipalities concerning the minimum facilities necessary for law enforcement functions.

That the Commission assist in the establishment of model or ideal local police forces in municipalities and chartered cities with available funds and properly oriented local governments, e.g. Makati, Bacolod, Itogon, Lipa City. These should be as numerous as possible, preferably one in each province, and include uniforms, weapons, publications, directives, basic investigative equipment, organization, facilities layout, budget, planning, education, training, administration, technical procedures and personnel management.

D. POLICE CHIEF DUTIES: Municipal chiefs of police are currently required to perform the functions of a municipal prosecutor since municipal fiscals are not provided for this function. There is an obvious imbalance created in this arrangement. In chartered cities with similar law enforcement problems a City Fiscal is provided to perform the duties of prosecutor. In addition to placing the municipal chief of police at a disadvantage, there is a basic incompatibility in this official performing manifold functions in the fields of crime prevention, crime detection, apprehension, investigation, and prosecution. This concept does not serve the public interests in even the best governed municipalities since law enforcement by nature is a full time professional task. Adding time consuming prosecution duties to law enforcement so expands the extent of police duties as to render the Chief of Police largely ineffectual in the supervision and management of his primary functions. Additionally, provincial fiscals, judges and other government officials frequently referred the Survey Team to ill-prepared cases from police chiefs patently unqualified to perform prosecution duties.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission seek legislative action to separate the prosecution function from the duties of the municipal chief of police.

That the Police Commission seek legislative action to create the Office of Municipal Fiscal or more liberal assignment of special counsels for prosecution in municipalities.

E. LAW ENFORCEMENT INDOCTRINATION: The Survey Team in some cities and municipalities encountered several instances of arbitrary and capricious control of police force activities, particularly by mayors. Many mayors possess little or no knowledge of law enforcement and even less knowledge of the training and aptitude required to properly constitute a useful law enforcement agency. In more than one local police force this ignorance of law enforcement resulted in an apparent feud between the chief of police, who was civil service eligible, and the mayor. In similar situations local political interference resulted in the appointment of incompetents and "proteges" of little value in law enforcement. Further, it was clearly evident that many supervisory personnel in local police forces are untrained in the management and administration required for their office. There are exceptions in many communities. Several police forces have able consientious supervisory personnel who maintain high morale, keep their equipment in excellent operating condition and who know and perform law enforcement functions with efficiency. Despite these exceptions a major effort is needed to minimize political influences and inefficient supervision.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission sponsor a series of regional or provincial seminars or short educational courses for municipal and city mayors and other government supervisory personnel on the functions and purpose of local enforcement agencies, the need for adequate financial support and the essential training required.

F. QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT: Section 9 of the Act indicates that

> "Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a provincial, city or municipal police agency, although they have not qualified in a appropriate civil service examination are considered as civil service eligible for the purpose of this act."

This is considered a fundamental weakness in the Police Act and one which will tend to perpetuate existing police weaknesses. If not interpreted with a high degree of definition, it will permit the retention of some peace officers who are of very low intelligence and others who should not be given a protective status due to their mediocre character and/or past associations. Some action is necessary by the Commission to qualify the provision of the Act to ensure that undesirable personnel are not given undeserved protection of tenure and thereby becoming a long term burden to local police supervisors. In some instances, with small police forces, one or two men in this category will effectively cripple any system of advancement. The wording of Section 9 is also open to question in that it fails to indicate if the "five years" is any five years or the immediate five years of service.

RECOMMENDATION

That Section 9 of the Police Act pertaining to retention of police with five years service be interpreted to include:

a. A suitable background clearance from the PC, NBI and local agencies for fitness to continue duties as a peace officer.

b. Five years continuous service immediately preceding the date of the Police Act.

c. Capability of absorbing a suitable level of training, and physical fitness, to continue a career as peace officer.

G. POLICE MANUAL: Section 4(c) of the Act empowers the Commission to

> "prepare a police manual prescribing rules and regulations for the efficient organization, administration and operation of the local police."

The basis for such a document exists in the "Police Rules and Regulations" manual published on March 25, 1964, under the joint guidance and participation of the Civil Service Commission and PC. Several police agencies have adopted, wholly or in part, the provisions of the referenced document. Significant to existing law enforcement problems, the publication contains

a suitable ethics code which is urgently needed by some departments. Additionally, any new publication of this nature might require extensive preparation and funding which would unduly delay implementation of Commission actions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the existing "Police Rules and Regulations" prepared by the Civil Service Commission and Philippine Constabulary be used as an interim police manual.

That the manual revision include a suitable maximum ratio of detectives to patrolmen and the evolution of these detectives from experienced patrolmen.

That the manual revision permit greater flexibility in uniforms and include a requirement that police uniforms bear no marked resemblance to PC or other AFP uniforms. Uniforms of special protection forces should bear no marked resemblance to PC, AFP or police uniforms.

That once determined, laws be enacted which will prohibit wearing of PC or police uniforms by other persons.

H. POLICE COMMISSION STAFFING: Section 5 of the Police Act empowers the Commission to call upon "qualified law enforcement experts in the government service to help in carrying out its functions and responsibilities." Previous versions of this bill would have empowered the Commission to draft such personnel from government agencies. Staffing the Commission will present a difficult problem in view of the size and scope of the Commission's tasks, the inevitable political sensitivity that will be encountered in many areas due to direct confrontation with existing local regimes, and the disruption of the local police administrative and managerial status quo in many instances. These aspects of the Commission's work make it mandatory that specific measures be taken to avoid the Commission staff becoming a haven for those personnel rejected by other government agencies, those psychologically unfit for sensitive and far reaching responsibilities and those with detrimental commercial or political affiliations. These, and other allied characteristics must be carefully weighed, since the Commission will not have an unlimited budget and each member of its staff will be burdened with duties demanding a high degree of dedication, professionalism and an impeccable security background.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission establish a reliability program within its inspection and internal affairs division to ensure that its personnel are in fact professionally qualified and otherwise suited to meet the rigid demands of Police Commission assignment.

I. PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY CONTROL OF LOCAL POLICE: Section 4(f) of the Police Act authorizes the Police Commission after due investigation, to recommend to the President the placing of any local police agency under PC control.

One of the most difficult and certainly one of the most controversial functions is the assumption of control of local police forces at the direction of the President. This control is subjected to wide interpretation by its nature and is often unevenly applied. As of 1 August 1966, the police forces of 101 municipalities and chartered cities were indicated as being under PC "control." In some instances only one officer and a few enlisted men are placed in "control" of a relatively large police force. PC figures indicate that some 490 enlisted men and five officers were "in control" of 92 municipalities, nine cities and one provincial jail - an average of five enlisted men per installation. Obviously, even if these men were trained for this duty, they would not have the capability to "control" these communities.

PC control should not be employed lightly and only after its requirement has been clearly established by long term failure of local police and government authorities to maintain peace and order. PC control and method of implementation do engender strong and adverse local government and police reaction where unsolicited control is implemented to correct purely local deficiencies.

Existing PC directives contain a procedure for local PC commanders to recommend corrective actions and improvements to remove undesirable conditions. Despite this provision, these recommendations are in many instances ignored or compliance is so strictured by political interaction between local government agencies and the police that no corrective actions take place. A requirement exists for some enforcement capability to insure that needed corrective actions are implemented. This is particularly true when the removal of unsavory elements and unacceptable practices by local police force members is recommended. The existence of such elements and practices is not difficult to establish and is generally known to PC or NBI personnel. Correction is usually prevented by local political roadblocks and unenlightened local government officials. Some device is needed to enforce PC recommendations prior to impacting full scale PC control. Such a device will require Presidential and National Police Commission backing to ensure its usefulness and authority.

The basic authority for PC control of local police forces exists in Republic Acts 835 and 838. By authority of these directives, the PC is designated as the single agency through which the President will ensure the organization and discipline of all local police bodies. Control is variously applied in terms of causes and weight of effort, dependent upon the conditions and offenses charged against the police force. Circular #1, Headquarters Philippine Constabulary, dated 7 July 1960, indicates that the basis for implementing control can be any of the following individually or in combination:

- Inefficiency of the entire police force.
- Inability of the police force to preserve peace.
- Loose discipline of the police force.
- Laxity or partiality in the enforcement of the law.
- Official oppression, extortion, misconduct, abuse of authority, or other violation of duty by the police force.
- Disloyalty to constituted authority, or doubtful character of the police superiors or a number of policement to the extent that public safety and order are believed to be in danger.

When outlawry or lawlessness endangering or threatening the peace of the municipality or neighboring municipalities requires the effective employment of the police forces in the city, municipality or anywhere in the province, in coordination with the Constabulary and/or other local police forces.

As outlined in Headquarters Philippine Constabulary Circular #1, Procedure, "The Provincial Commander concerned will immediately take over control of said police force" when a properly coordinated and Presidentially approved order to this effect is received. There are no cushioning provisions to precede this event; its abruptness is the locus for a clear lack of flexibility on the part of both the provincial commander and the affected community. This flexibility is essential in view of the nature of unrequested PC control with its demeaning connotation that the municipal or city government is not able to properly direct its internal affairs. Such is frequently the case. Some communities appear doubly sensitive to this issue since control is directed from the highest centralized government level and is likely to conflict with growing local desires for a greater degree of autonomy.

Unsolicited and routine control of local police forces has certain inherent and undesirable characteristics from the standpoint of both the community and the PC. In practice PC control can endure for years. Some municipal forces in Cavite Province have been under such control since 1954, although the majority of such controls have existed for less than two years with many initiated since the 1965 election. Control is resented by the local police force regardless of its duration or the state of the department's ineffectiveness. It is resented by some local governments since it represents an intrusion into the civil sector by an armed, uniformed force of the central government. In Angeles, Pampanga Province, a community which sorely needs PC control and much police improvement, the local government refused to approrpiate 2400 pesos for police subsistence while undergoing PC training. Appropriating the funds was considered tantamount to approval of PC control. More than likely an obstructing tactic, this attitude is still indicative of local resistance to control procedures.

Frequently PC control places a few PC personnel in direct confrontation with politically sophisticated police and local government elements well versed in the use of influence and political maneuvering. Recently a PC captain was wounded by a member of the Ormoc, Leyte Province police force during an altercation in the police department. This officer was assigned with a detachment of four PC constables to "control" the Ormoc police force of over 100 men. This is a patently hazardous procedure when police are of long tenure and firmly entrenched in their local spheres of influence.

The basic guidance for the local PC commander in imposing PC control is contained in Para 7, c, of Circular 1, HPC, "It shall be the duty of the Provincial Commander to see that the police force thus placed under his charge are properly uniformed, drilled, and disciplined . . ." No authority for disciplinary measures are included with the exception of reporting omissions to the Mayor concerned. The results of this instruction are usually reflected in lengthy on-the-job training and limited operational supervision of local police actions. This procedure constitutes a total emasculation of the control procedure and robs it of any real effectiveness. Police supervisors continue exercising their functions and maintain their arms, albeit under the eye of the PC officer or noncommissioned officer. Control, as such, does not exist in most cases and the term is a misnomer.

The weaknesses of such a procedure are apparent since it does not address the failing which resulted in the imposition of control. The police force itself usually requires a reorientation in the purposes of law and law enforcement, its existence as a service to the public, internal discipline and an overhaul of its investigative, administrative and management procedures. However, much of the real correction is needed within the municipal or city government, which has the real responsibility for police ineffectiveness due to the city government's adverse influence, lack of knowledge of law enforcement functions, poor selection of personnel and withholding of logistical support. The existing system of control only obliquely addresses this latter defect.

An escalating phased system of corrective actions should be considered and some new terminology used in the corrective procedure to obviate the use of the term "control" until it is in fact control. A preliminary system of advising the community of defects, outlining corrective actions necessary, and observing community reaction should prove useful. If this procedure is ineffective, more stringent supervision should be imposed but formal control withheld until preliminary actions prove fruitless. If control is implemented, it would be far more efficient and less time consuming for the police force to be physically removed from office in two or three increments and subjected to mass, accelerated training prior to continuing law enforcement tasks. Smaller police forces might well be removed completely and retrained. In such municipalities the routine police effort could be taken over by the PC. Throughout these actions, it is considered significant that PC control should be reduced to a minimum in terms of time. It must be borne in mind that the factors which encouraged police inefficiency, i.e., corruption, abuse, partiality, etc., also adversely affect PC personnel.

RECOMMENDATION

That a Presidentially approved system for PC control be developed by the Police Commission along the following general lines:

a. Local law enforcement agencies and local governments should be advised in writing by the Commission of local enforcement deficiencies and courses of corrective action recommended. This advice should contain a fixed time phase for implementing corrective actions, e.g., 60-90 days.

b. In the event deficiencies are not corrected, the Police Commission should make an inspection of the community and confirm the situation, giving the community 30 days to make improvements.

c. In the event discrepancies are not corrected within the time period, the PC commander should be authorized by the Commission to impose a period of amicable PC "supervision." This period should be utilized to introduce a team of trained PC/NBI supervisors to conduct supervision and training in an effort to realign defects in conduct, control, and management and possibly preclude the necessity for imposing formal control by encouraging local government corrective actions.

d. If the above effort fails, formal PC control should be imposed by the Commission, provided a sufficient number of trained police administrators are available to make the control meaningful. This control should be control in fact, to be terminated as expeditiously as possible contingent upon the ability to retrain and reorient both the local police force and

the local government. Monthly progress reports should be made to the Police Commission.

e. Authority for discipline of the local police should be vested in the supervising PC officer by the Commission.

f. The Police Commission should insure that controlling forces be specifically trained, oriented, and in sufficient numbers to cope with the problems of the local police being controlled.

Throughout this procedure the Provincial Governor, the Mayor, and the PC zone commander should be kept fully advised by the Police Commission of developments. Once initiated, the procedure should be halted only by correction of deficiencies or by ultimate control. This sequence would provide the opportunity for the local and provincial government to inject their influences and assistance and possibly forestall control. Equally obvious is the necessity for approval at the national level for such a sequence to be effective. The practice of placing municipalities under "control" for political purposes or without warning to the municipal government so that it can correct its deficiencies should be discontinued.

J. TRAINING: Section 4(i) empowers the Police Commission to "organize and develop police training programs and to operate police academies."

At present no national agency is involved in supervising the over-all training of local police agencies. This responsibility was assigned to the NBI by a memorandum from the President on 24 June, 1966.

The national training problem affects the internal requirements of the PC and the NBI plus the training efforts of these agencies in assisting the local police. All three agencies are in transition at this time in regard to their internal and external training efforts. It is imperative that the existing agencies be first raised to an acceptable level of effectiveness, training as well as law enforcement, within existing manpower ceilings prior to any major enlargements and modifications. Drastic internal changes at this phase will serve little purpose except to further disrupt an already disrupted and difficult training effort.

Since there are some 31,000 local police, 16,000 PC and 1,000 NBI, and possibly more forthcoming, the training load presents a formidable undertaking. Delays awaiting construction of facilities should not be countenanced. While this subject is discussed at length in the chapter on training, the following points are considered particularly pertinent to the Commission.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission consider a training program along the following guidelines:

Devise a standard basic police training curriculum to insure uniformity of law enforcement training.

Establish individual courses for specialists, supervisors, and commanders in addition to a standard basic curriculum.

Establish the nationwide student load and regional distribution of prospective students.

Survey existing government agencies and police forces to determine the availability of suitable faculty members for the national training program.

Survey existing government and educational and other facilities with a view toward determining the availability of regional training facilities to meet a dispersed student load.

Establish a quota system of trainees so that all agencies may participate in the training program.

Secure a commitment of travel and subsistence funds to support training actions.

The problems of law enforcement jurisdiction, training authority, and other nationwide law enforcement situations, make it readily apparent that the Police Commission will develop an increasing concern with the national legislative bodies.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission establish an Office of Legislative Liaison.

The peace and order problems in the Philippines are many, and a normal tendency has developed to individual and localized corrective actions which have failed to generate a national cohesion in law enforcement and which have proven to be ineffective. Such actions tend to diffuse the concentration of efforts and achieve little in the way of results. The National Police Commission occupies a position of grave responsibility. In its gathering of resources and achievement of recognition, it will possess growing, but limited capability in terms of skilled manpower and funds. If these are expended too rapidly in combating surface rather than root causes, it may flounder in its beginnings and make little or no progress.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission be organized, manned, funded, guided and programmed without undue haste in its initial functions to enable the development of a soundly conceived, concerted and comprehensive attack on the root causes of adverse peace and order.

Throughout the Philippines, but particularly in large urban areas, members of the Survey Team were impressed by the large numbers of persons in civilian clothing carrying weapons while engaged in routine social or commercial activities in public places. The existence of superfluous and unnecessary weapons in an environment of weak law enforcement, a high incidence of crime, and a marked tendency to take the law into individual hands hazards the safety of the general public.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission support legislation forbidding the carrying without permit of firearms by all persons other than members of the police, armed forces and regulated security agencies performing security functions.

That the entire program of the issuance of firearms permits be thoroughly examined and aired with the end of substantially reducing their number.

"One factor often left out of the analyses in the discussions is the role of law enforcement in socio-economic growth. Yet internal peace and order are as strategic to development as the other factors. . . The successful promotion of a socio-economic program. . .demands as a necessary element the enhancement of the organized capabilities of our law enforcing agencies; namely all those that engage in the prevention of crimes, in the apprehension of criminals and in the detection and investigation of criminal acts and tendencies. . . .

"The other factor behind the incalculable importance of our law enforcing agencies in the process of economic development lies in the obviously adverse effects of crime on economic development itself."

Sixto K. Roxas
Former Chairman, National Economic Council

CHAPTER V *

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI)

The NBI has its origin in the Division of Investigation (DI) of the Department of Justice. Formation of the DI was included in provisions of Commonwealth Act 181, dated 13 November 1936. The concept and implementation of the division are attributed to the late President Manuel L. Quezon, the late Justice Jose Abad Santos and the present Secretary of Justice, Jose Yulo.

With enactment of Commonwealth Act 181, two well qualified law enforcement specialists and investigators were retained by the commonwealth government to organize the division. These were Captain Thomas Dunn of the New York Police Department and Mr. Flaviano Guerrero, the only Filipino member of the FBI at the time. In concept, it was agreed that the DI was to be patterned after the FBI in organization, functions and objectives. In addition to normal investigative functions, it was to be oriented toward providing needed assistance to existing law enforcement organizations.

The DI was actually formed in 1937, with initial emphasis on establishment of its Investigation Section. Considerable public interest was generated by the formation of the agency and more than 3,000 applicants appeared for 48 positions. Qualification standards were held to rigid and high specifications. Only those with law degrees were accepted as applicants and only those capable of completing an exacting physical, mental and security screening were accepted for testing. By the end of 1937, 45 Probationary Agents were appointed at the entrance salary of ₱100 monthly. Seventeen of the original 45 agents are still with the agency and eight are in other government organizations.

DI operations were suspended after the Japanese occupation. Records, equipment and other assets were looted or destroyed by the Japanese. Confidential records were deliberately destroyed by the DI to prevent their falling into Japanese hands. In early 1942, the Chief of the DI and a few agents were released from prison. They reorganized in August 1945.

By 1947, increases in criminality throughout the country gave support for expansion of the DI into a full-fledged bureau. The result was Republic Act 157. Its proponents stated that the strengthened and expanded Bureau of Investigation would undertake serious training of the municipal police forces in modern methods of crime detection and investigation; would expand and improve the Bureau's capability to assist local law enforcement entities in cases beyond their ability and resources; would provide a modern crime laboratory for the mutual benefit of all law enforcement organizations of the Philippines; and would institute an effective system of keeping track of crime and criminals by setting up a central repository of criminal information and records to enable any office in the Philippines to get complete information about the identity and criminal history of any known offender.

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* This chapter contains general background information and sections on organization, administration and personnel. Training, Criminal Investigation, Criminalistics, Records and Identification, Logistics, Telecommunications, and other technical subjects are covered in separate chapters.

"It is the intention" said the bill's proponents "of the proposed law to relieve the Constabulary (then Military Police Command (MPC)) of the duty of ordinary crime detection, investigation and solution and to concentrate this entire function in the new bureau. This will confine the MPC purely to restoration and maintenance of peace and order. The maintenance of peace and order is the province of the Constabulary and this is the reason of its existence. The solution and detection of ordinary crimes is the sphere of non-military organizations such as the proposed Bureau of Investigation."

Certain ambiguities can be recognized in this rationale. Clearly the NBI could not solve and detect all ordinary crimes throughout the nation. This is the basic task of local police forces. The provisions of RA 157 were laudable. However, its passage did not serve to eliminate severe problems in training local police, in establishing a national repository of criminal information or in providing clear cut lines of jurisdiction.

Republic Act 157 was approved on 19 June 1947 and the Bureau of Investigation (by later Executive Order the National Bureau of Investigation) was created.

The DI was the nucleus of the expanded Bureau in accordance with the provisions of RA 157. The act also provided that all supplies, equipment and appropriations of the DI were to be transferred to the NBI. The functions of the NBI under RA 157 include:

(a) To undertake investigations of crime and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines upon its own initiative and as the public interest may require.

(b) To render assistance, wherever properly requested, in the investigation or detection of crimes and other offenses.

(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and other information for the benefit and use of all prosecuting and law enforcement entities of the Philippines, identification records of all persons without criminal convictions, records of identifying marks, characteristics, and ownership or possession of all firearms as well as test bullets fired therefrom.

(d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law enforcement offices and entities of the government as well as the courts that may request its service.

(e) To extend its services whenever properly requested, in the investigation of cases of administrative or civil nature in which the government is interested.

(f) To undertake the instruction and training of a representative number of city and municipal police officers at the request of their respective superiors along effective methods of crime investigation and detection in order to invoke greater efficiency in the discharge of their duties.

(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime laboratory and to conduct research in furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal investigation.

(h) To perform such other related functions as the Secretary of Justice may assign.

In 1960, Republic Act 2678 further expanded and improved the NBI. This Act expanded and reorganized the NBI by increasing its personnel and creating additional divisions and regional offices. The explanatory note along with the Act pointed out that the NBI "has eight specific functions which disclose it is both an investigative and a research and service agency. As an investigative agency it handles investigations of criminal cases and, under certain circumstances, administrative and civil cases, including all forms of graft and corruption. As a service agency, and for the benefit and use of all prosecuting and law enforcement entities of the Philippines, it renders technical services in the field of criminalistics, training services, and records services. As a research agency, and for furtherance of scientific knowledge and criminal investigation, it conducts research in both the laboratory and the legal fields."

The Act went on to point out that the NBI appropriation was considerably limited and that the total number of employees was far below that needed to provide optimum service to the Philippines. Comparison was made between the NBI and the FBI of the U.S., Scotland Yard of Great Britain and the French Surete. The Surete has one agent for every 840 people; Scotland Yard, one agent for every 8,600 people; the FBI, one agent for every 28,500 people; while the NBI had only one agent for every 185,000 people. From a standpoint of area, Scotland Yard has one agent for every seven tenths of a square mile; the Surete, one agent for every 4.2 square miles; the FBI, one agent for every 382 square miles; while the NBI has one agent foe every 939 square miles. Thus, comparatively speaking, among leading national investigative agencies of the world, the NBI covers the largest unit of area in square miles and the largest number of people, per agent:

Agency	No. People per Agent	No. Square Miles per Agent
Surete	840	4.2
Scotland Yard	8,600	.7
FBI	28,500	382.0
NBI	185,000	939.0

A provision of the Act formalized the requirement that only bona fide members of the Philippine Bar or Certified Public Accountants would be eligible for appointment to positions in the Investigation Division of the NBI.

The NBI has expanded to more than 1,000 persons, including agents, crime laboratory technicians, fingerprint specialists, communications technicians and administrative personnel. It functions in 10 regional and 14 sub-offices throughout the nation and has an annual budget exceeding five million pesos. The Bureau has achieved a notable reputation of freedom from corruption and is well regarded by law enforcement agencies both in the Philippines and in other countries. This regard is due chiefly to the quality and integrity of its nucleus of dedicated investigating agents and its general reputation for freedom from unsavory involvement and minimum political influence.

From its inception, efforts have been made to pattern the NBI after its American counterpart, the FBI. In the Philippines the NBI is the only source of reasonably accurate, albeit limited, nationwide information on criminality. For example, the NBI publishes a Law Enforcement magazine patterned after the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. This magazine contains a message from the Director and articles of interests to law enforcement officers all over the country. The December 1965 issue included a brief history of the NBI Police Academy, an article regarding the utilization of statistics in the field of law enforcement, an article by an NBI forensic chemistry officer on the subject of the "Development of the Senses," articles on juvenile delinquency control, review of court cases and a technical article on photo interpretation; an article by a Japanese law enforcement officer on the subject of community attitudes towards crime, as well as one on the subject of the definition and delineation of functions of police agencies.

The April 1966 NBI Bulletin contained a report on the "Third UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders," an article on the recruitment and selection of NBI agents, and one on fingerprinting, as well as a report on a Survey of Crime Prevention Programs of Police Agencies, a technical article on police photography and the usual interpretation of recent court cases. Also included was an article by a PC school instructor on the subject of the PC and the laws on fisheries.

The NBI also issues a crime report each year which is patterned after the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. These reports, which are issued annually, review the incidence of crime, listing them by classification of offenses. Crimes in the Philippines are grouped into nine different types of offenses. The report lists the incidence of crime by month, type, region, and comparison of the preceding year with the current year. Rates of criminality by region are shown on maps of the Philippines. As does the FBI, the NBI also includes a section on police force statistics, listing the number of police by province throughout the country. Also listed are the number of police in each of the chartered cities throughout the Philippines. The police statistics include a listing of the educational attainment of the city and municipal police officers throughout the country, as well as their civil service eligibility.

Finally, the NBI submits an annual report which lists its activities for the year.

In spite of limited budgetary support, the NBI has achieved good results over the past several years. An examination of its records indicates that during the past six years, the NBI has completed investigations on more than 13,000 general investigation-type cases and more than 11,000 special investigations. In the field of technical services such as ballistics, dactyloscopy, forensic chemistry and medico-legal, the NBI has completed more than 15,000 cases since January 1961. However, the reports indicate each year the NBI is falling further and further behind because of its excessive case load. During the past six years the NBI has been assigned more than 9,000 investigative cases which have not been terminated. In other words, although some 24,000 cases have been terminated in the past six years, at the same time nearly 34,000 cases have been assigned to them: As a result their backlog of cases is increasing each year.

NBI Regional Office, Davao (Constructed from Surplus Quonset Hut)



NBI Regional Office, Zamboanga (Constructed from Surplus Quonset Hut)

An examination of the NBI records for Fiscal Year 1966 permits a careful analysis of these problems as well as the specific areas of accomplishments as set forth in the following report issued by the NBI.

NBI Report of Accomplishments - Fiscal Year 1966

Fiscal year 1965-66 was the end of the Macapagal Administration and the beginning of a new one. There was an upsurge of expectation, hope for the better, and general elation. Consequently, greater efforts were exerted in their execution of assignments resulting in better performance and higher morale.

In the investigative field the bureau received 7109 matters for investigation during the fiscal year and it terminated 4320 of them for a 61% completion. In fiscal year 1964-65 the bureau received 7321 requests and finished 4221 of them for only 58% completion.

Aside from the increase of 3% in its efficiency in the investigative field over that of last fiscal year, the bureau broadened its activities into matters that will restore the confidence of the people in the government. The exposure of the Bar Examination anomaly in August, 1965 is a concrete example. With plenty of money at their command, some rich bar examinees paid large sums of money to five employees of the Supreme Court to ensure their prestige and easy sailing into the law profession. With the revelation of this anomaly, the employees were suspended, charged in court and faced bleak futures.

Other examples of service rendered by the NBI to the people in general were the exposing of insurance-for-murder activities of Armingol Hanasan who is now facing the extreme penalty in the New Bilibid Prison; the seizure of big quantities of narcotics in Zamboanga, Pangasinan and other places coupled with the arrests of those engaged in its illegal traffic, pushers, and den maintainers; the quick solution and apprehension of those who tried to silence a provincial weekly editor in Dagupan City for exposing alleged venalities in Pangasinan province.

In the field of technical services the bureau maintained its high efficiency in completion of requests from Courts, fiscals, other government offices, and private parties requesting its assistance in varied matters necessitating technical knowledge and highly specialized equipment.

This fiscal year the bureau received 5452 requests in the technical services category and finished 5207 of them. Last fiscal year they received 4752 requests and terminated 4553 of them. In both fiscal years the rate of terminated matters to the number of requests was 96%.

A side effect of the investigative activities of this bureau is the uncovering of anomalous transactions in various governmental functions, notably tax evasion and theft of government properties. As a result of these investigations the government collected or recovered ₱1,715,530.11 during fiscal year and expects to collect or recover ₱3,486,003.86 more from the exposed tax evaders.

In the field of police improvement the bureau trained 581 police officers in the basic police sciences course during the fiscal year and another 579

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MANILA
PROGRESS REPORT OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND GOING PROJECTS
For the period of *July, 1965 – June, 1966*

	NUMBER OF UNITS			
	Backlog beginning of of the year	Requests received during the year	Accomplished during the year	Pending end of the year
I GENERAL INVESTIGATION	11,174	7,109	4,320	13,963
A. General Investigative cases	6,871	4,162	2,589	8,444
B. Special Investigation cases	4,303	2,947	1,731	5,519
1. Arson cases	114	0	0	114
2. C A P U	0	27	27	0
3. Dom. Intelligence cases	404	743	1,023	124
4. Fraud.cases	2,731	1,461	284	3,908
5. Graft cases	83	316	67	332
6. Interpol cases	971	301	300	972
C. Legal & Evaluation	59	13,948	13,952	55
II TECHNICAL SERVICES				
A. Ballistics cases	127	368	221	274
B. Dactyloscopy cases	9	250	223	36
C. Forensic Chemistry cases	250	2,175	2,138	287
D. Medico-Legal cases	255	2,196	2,004	357
E. Messages sent and received	0	10,326	10,326	0
F. Photographic requests	0	4,843	4,843	0
G. Polygraph cases	0	220	220	0
H. Questioned Documents cases	472	333	401	404
III RECORDS SERVICE				
A. Clearance Certificates issued	0	54,360	47,705	6,655
B. Court cases for indexing	1,413	71,653	72,549	517
C. Fingerprints for processing	24,595	86,531	96,340	14,786
D. Names for record checking	13,053	110,267	93,316	30,004
E. Persons for fingerprinting	0	55,538	55,538	0
IV SPECIMEN FOR EXAMINATION AND/OR ANALYSIS				
A. Chemistry	367	2,749	2,196	920
B. Biology	147	401	386	162
C. Physics	591	101	154	528
D. Toxicology	321	1,490	1,483	328
E. Histo-Pathology	0	4,162	4,162	0
F. Hair Fibers				
G. Hema-Immunology	0	1,799	1,799	0
H. Semenology	0	2,528	2,528	0
I. Clinico-Forensic Microscopy	0	893	893	0
J. Ballistics	3,136	3,620	2,922	3,834
K. Questioned Documents	7,608	4,678	5,872	6,414
TOTAL	12,160	22,421	22,395	12,186

rtc/

FINES SAVINGS AND RECOVERIES
For the Period July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966

Amount actually recovered and collected		₱1,715,530.11
Interpol (HotCar, Estafa)	₱427,828.00	
Anti-Craft (Craft, Tax Evasion)	13,914.00	
NELRO (Robbery)	248.00	
Anti-Fraud (Tax Evasion)	36,717.00	
HQR (Theft)	22,800.00	
EMRO	471.00	
NWLRO (Theft)	450.00	
WMRO (Smuggling, Tax Evasion)	528,715.11	
Narcotics (Prohibited Drugs, Hot Car).	684,387.00	
Amount expected to be recovered or collected		₱3,486,003.86
Interpol (Hot Car)	₱ 44,000.00	
Anti-Graft (Tax Evasion).....	3,394,999.86	
Anti-Fraud (Tax Evasion)	22,500.00	
HQR (Smuggling).....	24,504.00	
Losses prevented		₱846,352.26
Interpol (Swindling, stolen checks, Murder for Insurance, Estafa & Falsification)	776,437.72	
STR (Robbery).....	9,509.84	
NELR (Robbery Insurance).....	3,560.00	
NWLR (Theft)	33,054.50	
CLRO (Estafa, Padding of Payroll, Robbery)	23,790.20	
TOTAL		₱6,047,886.23

SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL SERVICES RENDERED
Fiscal Year 1966

Requesting Party	TECHNICAL SERVICES RENDERED											
	Questionable Documents	Ballistics	Chemistry	Dactyloscopy	Necropsy	Exhumation	Sexual Offenses	Osteology	Pathology	Phy. Injuries	Total	Percent over Total
NBI	126	273	1,577	105	98	27	330	1	4	105	2,645	51.5
Police Agencies .	18	85	365	65	7	7	74			2	623	12.1
Fiscals, Courts Mayors, City Attorneys	106	8	101	21	1,293	7	14			4	1,554	30.2
Armed Forces and Phil. Air Force .	10		0	1	1						12	.2
Other Gov't Offices and Agencies	65		62	17	4	2	1				151	2.9
Private Parties ..	8	2	13	39	10	8	13			3	96	1.9
U.S. and Phil. Naval Force			3	1							4	.1
U.S. Embassy and Consulates			0	0								
Gov't Hospitals and Regional Health Offices ..			54	1							55	1.1
TOTAL ..	333	368	2,175	250	1,413	51	432	1	4	114	5,141	100%

Rear of NBI Headquarters, Manila

policemen studied the science of fingerprinting. Besides the above graduates, the NBI Police Academy also conducted miscellaneous training for 1160 persons from other government agencies.

The NBI report indicates substantial savings and recoveries for FY 1966.

Major recipients of NBI technical service during the year were NBI agents themselves with 51%.

However, substantial technical assistance was provided to fiscals, mayors, city attorneys, and police agencies.

One of the basic functions of the NBI under R.A. 157 is to "conduct research" for the purpose of furthering scientific knowledge in criminal investigation.

In furtherance of this important function, the NBI presently has 36 research projects in various stages of progress, ranging from one not yet commenced due to non-availability of photographic films and chemicals through others from 5%, 8%, 15% to 80%, 90% and 95% complete.

Some of these studies will be extremely valuable to all Philippine law enforcement agencies when they are completed and others will, no doubt, be of interest to criminologists in other parts of the world.

An examination of NBI accomplishments for FY 1966 reveals the extensive amount of work which has been performed by this relatively small organization. With less than 200 agents, 4,320 investigative cases were concluded. However, the 13,963 "pending" cases at year's end give cause for concern. It may be noted that this figure rose by nearly 3,000 during the year.

The recommended reorganization of the NBI will assist in keeping this backlog from growing; however, additional agent personnel will undoubtedly be required.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Cases Terminated by Type/Year

Cases Terminated	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Regional Investigations	1,561	1,584	2,060	2,392	2,749	2,589
Special Investigations	2,427	2,428	2,028	1,953	1,478	1,731
Medico-Legal	1,279	1,616	1,403	1,128	1,761	2,004
Forensic Chemistry	1,026	1,039	1,222	1,622	1,894	2,138
Questioned Documents	338	294	530	267	293	401
Ballistics	54	99	93	104	144	221
Polygraphy	62	59	177	240	202	220
Dactyloscopy	114	215	442	255	259	223
Fingerprints Processed	68,601	170,991	141,614	103,317	81,563	96,380
Name Record Checks	51,901	111,052	108,816	76,086	75,119	93,316
Court Records Indexed	43,682	83,008	66,380	87,084	132,149	72,549
Messages Sent & Rec.	5,630	8,038	9,878	12,114	12,531	10,326
No. NBI Pol. Acd'd Grad.	1,008	1,266	1,520	1,979	2,948	2,098
NBI Personnel	315	484	827	872	912	897
Appropriations (000's)	1,866	2,603	5,626	5,600	5,455	5,605

These figures indicate the tremendous increase in volume which the various sections of the NBI have experienced during the past six years.

Investigations completed have risen from 3,988 in 1961 to 4,320 in 1966, a 10% rise; however, the backlog of uncompleted cases has risen by over 9,000 to 13,963 - an indication of the need for additional NBI agents.

Medico-legal, Forensic Chemistry, Questioned Documents, Polygraphy, Dactyloscopy, and Name Checks have increased by 60%, 80%, 100% up to 300%.

In view of this sustained increase in demands for service and the rising backlog of unclosed investigative cases, every effort should be made to avoid saddling the NBI with work which could better be done by the local police or the PC.

An examination of the NBI budgetary appropriations clearly demonstrates the lack of logistics support provided to the NBI.

NBI APPROPRIATIONS

	No. of Positions	I Personal Services	II Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses	(1) Traveling Expenses	(2) Supplies and Materials	(3) Sundry Expenses	III Equipment Outlay	Total
FY 66-67 (R.A. 4856)	1203	4,531,974	1,084,690	611,700	272,990	200,000	40,000	5,656,664
FY 65-66 (R.A. 4642)	1203	4,092,336	1,172,964	700,000	272,964	200,000	40,000	5,305,300
FY 64-65 (R.A. 4164)	1203	4,242,336	1,172,964	700,000	272,964	200,000	40,000	5,455,300
FY 63-64 (R.A. 3845)	1203	4,207,236	1,313,384	400,000 400,000-B	230,904 82,480-B	200,000	80,000	5,600,620
FY 62-63 (R.A. 3500)	1203	5,057,520*	539,210	342,400	135,740	61,070	30,000	5,626,730
FY 61-62 (R.A. 3100)	551	2,165,128**	438,492	297,122	90,300	51,070		2,603,620
FY 60-61 (R.A. 2700)	551	1,140,329	438,491	287,114 10,000-B	90,300	51,077	37,330	1,616,150
FY 59-60 (R.A. 2300)	310	844,080	444,380	303,000	90,300	51,080	37,330	1,325,790 (Less Savings 5880) 1,319,910
FY 58-59 (R.A. 2080)	304	830,280	509,230	348,000	100,000	61,230	44,000	1,383,510
FY 57-58	296	815,820	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1,368,510
FY 56-57	224	627,540	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	924,090
FY 55-56	224	627,540	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	924,090
FY 54-55	224	627,540	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	925,090
FY 53-54	224	627,540	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	830,895

*Special fund of *3,000,000 and **1,000,000 respectively included for the expansion and reorganization of the NBI pursuant to R.A. 2678.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



FUNCTIONAL CHART

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APPROVED:

SERAFIN P. FAUSTO
OFFICER IN-CHARGE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



The NBI organization is excessively fragmented. Some 26 department heads are presently reporting directly to the Acting Director. This problem is compounded by the fact that one individual, filling a Deputy Director position (for Technical Services) has been assigned to another department of government for some eight years.

Early in 1966, Malacañang requested various departments to submit proposals for reorganization of their respective departments and the elements therein. The Under Secretary of Justice circularized the various offices of the Department of Justice with guidelines for such proposals. The objectives, said the circular, were to promote effective implementation of the laws and efficient administration of public business, to promote economy and to increase efficiency. This was to be accomplished by merger, grouping or consolidation of units, by standardization of salaries, by reduction of unnecessary personnel, and by abolition of unnecessary units. On 18 February 1966, the NBI submitted its proposal for reorganization of the Bureau.

The NBI proposal included an increase in the number of Deputy Directors from two to four. To the Deputy Director for Investigative Services and for Technical Services, were added Deputy Directors for General Administrative Services, and Special Investigations Services. The locations of some of the existing divisions remained the same; others were regrouped. A major change was the proposed moving of the Central Records, Identification and Statistics Division from the Technical Services to the Administrative Services Activity. Following is a detailed analysis of its proposals:

FOUR MAJOR SERVICES

In consonance with the modern concepts of organizations as reflected in the proposed reorganizational chart attached hereto, the Bureau has been divided into four major services: (1) General Investigation Services (2) Special Investigation Services (3) General Administrative Services and (4) General Technical Services. This division into four major services is premised on the principle that similar tasks and functions should be grouped together. Hence, on the investigative aspects of the bureau's service, two groups have been established,the Central Investigation Services and the Special Investigations Services.

I. THE GENERAL INVESTIGATION SERVICES

All general investigation services performed by 13 regional offices together with 20 sub-offices under it are grouped under the Deputy Director for General Investigation Services. This appears to be too heavy a load under the principle of span of control for the Deputy Director. However, the principle is sacrificed for purposes of economy and in order to shorten the span of control of the head of the bureau - the Director.

II. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION SERVICES

This major service is headed also by a Deputy Director who has under his immediate supervision and control, the Domestic Intelligence Division, the Interpol Division, the Anti-Fraud and Action Division, Anti-Graft Division and the Missing Persons Division. Each division is handling specialized type of investigation thereby relieving the general investigations services of cases involving highly technical and specialized nature.

III. THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

Grouped under this major service concerned with administrative matters in the bureau are the Central Identification, Records and Statistics Division, Administrative and Personnel Division, Budget and Finance Division, Logistics and Maintenance Division, Training Division and Accounting Division.

IV. THE GENERAL TECHNICAL SERVICES

The fourth major service includes all units handling highly technical functions - the Forensic Chemistry Division, the Medico-Legal Division, the Questioned Documents Division, the Ballistics Division, Legal Photography and Publication Division, the Electronics and Communications Division, and the Polygraph Division.

STAFFS UNDER THE DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

The Legal and Evaluation Division and the Inspection, Planning and Research Division are made up of staffs working directly under the Director since basically they are performing work of a nature that needs men in the personal confidence of the Director in the implementation of his policies and plans.

The Public Affairs Staff is on detailed service with the bureau from the office of the President where they are centralized by operation of law.

However, an examination of the work in detail reveals that several of the specialized units are being assigned general investigative type activity. In order to retain its expertise and make the work of the Bureau more meaningful, it is believed that these general cases should be assigned to the general investigative activity in the Headquarters Regional Office.

For example, in FY 66 the Anti-Graft Economic Division (AGED) was assigned 1,332 general investigative cases. This represents some 90% of the total work of that division for the year. The Anti-Fraud and Action Division (AFAD) was assigned 63 general investigative type cases, some 15% of its work. Domestic Intelligence and Interpol were assigned 270 and 301 general investigative cases representing some 35% and 95% respectively of the total activities of those two divisions.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
As of February 15, 1966



RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Appoint a Permanent Director as soon as possible to put a stop to office seeking on the part of other contenders in the organization.

2. Create the post of Deputy Director who will act as Director in the event of absence and ensure continuity. The Deputy Director will direct large scale operations, prepare and disseminate procedures, policies, general and special orders, coordinate technical, investigation, and administration services.

3. Eliminate the post of Deputy Director of Special Investigation Services and place all activities under three Assistant Directors: Services, Operations, and Administration.

4. Eliminate AFAD which was formerly a section and made a division in April, 1963.

5. Eliminate AGED which was formerly a section and made a division in April, 1965.

Anti-Fraud and Action Division Fiscal Year 1966

	Cases Received	Cases Terminated
Crime vs. public interest	119	49
Crimes committed by public officials	2	
Crimes vs. person	33	9
Crimes vs. personal liberty and security	12	6
Crimes vs. property	41	7
Naturalization and change of name	78	38
Illegal possession of firearms	1	
Tax evasion	8	2
Service of Warrant and Order of Arrest	1,068	110
Missing persons	2	1
Miscellaneous	97	61
	1,461	284
Personnel 29	- 1,068 Warrants	
	393	

Obviously there are not enough fraud cases to justify specialization in this area of crime.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION STAFF CASE LOAD
FISCAL YEAR 1966



Arrow depicts removal of General Investigations to Headquarters Regional Office. Each Spec. Inv. Section to investigate only the categories shown in blocks with dotted lines.

Anti-Graft and Economic Division Fiscal Year 1966

	Cases Received	Cases Terminated
Crimes against public interest	45	36
Crimes vs. person	1	2
Violation anti-graft law	224	23
Tax evasion	4	0
Missing person	42	0
Personnel 12	316	67

This division averages 26 cases per year for each agent. Neither the number of personnel assigned nor the graft cases handled justify specialization or division status.

6. Create an Anti-Graft and Fraud Section to specialize only in fraud and graft cases limited to:

Crime against public interest (forgery)

Violation of Anti-Graft Law

Crime committed by public officials

The total cases in this category are 613 for all Headquarter's cases during FY 1966. Therefore a maximum of one supervising agent, one assistant who investigates and acts as supervising agent during absence and six agents are recommended. This would average less than two cases per investigator per week which could be carried with ease.

7. Eliminate the Narcotics Division which was formerly a section and made a division in May, 1965 and is composed as follows:

(1) Intelligence and Operations Section

(2) Research - Statistics - Information Section

(3) Civic Action - Liaison Section

(4) Marine and K-9 Section

This division carried the following case load in FY 66:

	Cases Received	Cases Terminated
Crimes relative to opium and prohibited drugs	99	30

Personnel 12

8. Create a Narcotics Section consisting of a senior agent and two investigators to handle only narcotics cases.

9. Eliminate the Domestic Intelligence Division. This Division carried the following case load for FY 1966:

	Cases Received	Cases Terminated
Crimes vs. National Security and laws of the nation	28	145
Crimes against public interest	10	12
Crime vs. property	3	2
Crime vs. personal liberty and security	1	0
Violation of Anti-graft law	2	3
Naturalization and change of name	431	607
Illegal entry	14	18
Illegal possession of firearms	6	0
Tax evasion	5	9
Service of Warrant and Order of Arrest	4	2
Missing person	9	10
Miscellaneous	230	211
Personnel 22	743	1,023

This division has an outstanding clearance rate but its diversification by case types does not justify specialization. This is particularly significant when it is considered that Headquarters Regional Office handles 157 additional cases of naturalization and change of names also.

10. Create a Domestic Intelligence Section to handle the following type cases only:

(1) Crimes vs. National Security and laws of the nation

(2) Naturalization and change of name

(3) Illegal entry

Since the case load carried for FY 66 in these categories totaled 473 plus 157 cases handled by Headquarters Regional Office for a total of 630, a maximum of one supervising agent, one assistant to investigate and act as supervising agent during absence and six agents is recommended.

11. Eliminate the Interpol Division which was formerly a section and made a division in February, 1963.

This Division carried the following case load during FY 66:

	Cases Received	Cases Terminated
Crimes vs. public interest	90	64
Crimes vs. person	7	7
Crimes vs. property	9	12
Crimes vs. chastity	2	2
Naturalization and change of name	1	27
Illegal entry	2	2
Illegal possession of firearms	1	2

FY 66 case load, Interpol Division (Cont'd)	Cases Received	Cases Terminated
Tax evasion	104	88
Service of warrant and order of arrest	5	8
Missing persons	17	13
Miscellaneous	63	74
	301	300

Personnel 25

There is no justification for this division. The only criteria used to channel cases to it is the presence of any international significance. No other specialization by category of crime exists.

12. Create an Interpol Unit with one supervising agent and two investigators to handle only cases with international aspects.

13. Eliminate the Task Force or Special Action Unit formed on September 1, 1966. The sole function of this unit is to provide 24 hour coverage and immediate response on investigations. Personnel total 18.

14. The recommended reorganization would result in the following manpower savings:

	Now	Reorganized
AFAD and AGED	41	8
DID	22	8
Narcotics	12	3
Interpol	25	3
Task Force	18	0
Polygraph	10	2
	128	24

The resultant 104 men should be utilized to (1) properly staff the Headquarters Regional Office for a required 24 hour, 7 day week operation, (2) provide sufficient personnel to open and staff regional offices at Laoag City, Tacloban, and Davao City, (3) provide sufficient personnel to staff the 10 sub-offices which are now non-existent.

15. Remove the Angeles sub-office from under the supervision of AFAD where it has been since January, 1966 and restore it to the supervision of the Headquarters Regional Office.

A review of the NBI personnel assignments reveals that 312 (some 30%) are actually working in locations other than that called for by the organizational plan. In addition 12 of their top level personnel are on detail with other government agencies, Bureau of Investigation, PARGO, Department of Education, etc.

It was reported in Luis Beltran's column in the June 30, 1966 issue of the News that many NBI Agents were "complaining" because they were detailed as drivers and bodyguards of Justice Department officials. The article went on to say that for the first time, many of the NBI agents "realize how drivers feel when they have to wait for hours outside nightclubs and supper clubs as their bosses go in to conduct field operation."

In a number of instances personnel have been detailed from their place of basic assignment, and to make up for the shortage this causes, others are detailed in to the place from which the first persons were detailed out.

The following shows some of the sections which have both loaned and borrowed personnel:

Borrowed		Loaned
24	General Services	13
16	Domestic Intelligence	14
8	Legal Evaluation	2
5	Medico-Legal	5
1	Questioned Documents	1
16	CIRD	63
27	Manila Reg. Office	27
6	Batangas R. O.	7
6	Naga R. O.	6
4	Vigan R. O.	6

Some discontinuities are to be expected in any organization, but the number of displaced NBI agents and other qualified personnel indicate either a poorly designed organization or little internal organizational discipline. The numbers of displaced personnel are excessive and have an adverse effect on overall efficiency.

16. Return to their basic assignment wherever feasible those personnel detailed elsewhere.

17. Eliminate division status for the following and retitle them as sections under the crime laboratory.

(1) Medico-Legal
(2) Forensic Chemistry
(3) Questioned Documents
(4) Polygraph

18. Eliminate Ballistics as a division and place Armory and Reloading Unit under the Training Division; and firearms identification under Criminalistics.

19. Create an Internal Affairs and Inspection Unit to work directly under the Director to process complaints made against NBI personnel, as well as to be alert for and investigate misconduct within the Bureau. This unit will also be responsible for frequent scheduled and unscheduled Headquarters and field inspections of personnel and material in order to keep the Director informed regarding the state of his command.

Neither the current nor the proposed organization calls for an NBI Inspection Unit. This is considered perhaps the major shortcoming of the NBI. It is imperative that the Director have available an Inspection Staff which will keep him constantly informed as to the state of his command. With agents

scattered in some 32 offices and sub-offices over the country, a substantial inspection staff will be required to provide constant review of activities in the headquarters and the field.

20. Remove the Legal and Evaluation Division from under the Deputy Director for Investigative Service and place it under the Assistant Director, Administration.

The Polygraph Section at present has only one operative polygraph and 10 examiners. This division examined only 220 subjects during FY 1966 or approximately 20 cases per man for the entire year. An experienced operator should handle this many cases in a week.

21. Retain two examiners in the Polygraph Division. Reassign the remaining eight to investigative duties until such time as additional polygraph instruments are obtained. This division should be retitled as a section.

As soon as sufficient portable machines are acquired, field polygraph facilities should be installed in the Visayas, Mindanao and Northern Luzon.

22. Transfer the Narcotic Rehabilitation activity to a more appropriate government agency.

Another incompletely thought out and planned NBI activity is the Narcotics Rehabilitation Center which is also housed on the NBI Academy grounds at Tagaytay. This ill-advised institution was started about a year ago without adequate planning or budget support. The Survey Team also visited this center. Here in extremely unsanitary and completely inadequate conditions are housed some 40 to 50 individuals who were said to be narcotic addicts. Included were several juveniles and two women. The group is housed in two quonset huts. The cots on which they sleep are crowded together. The mattresses are dirty; no doctor is in attendance. During the Team visit one inmate had a seizure of some kind. He was carried out, a jeepney was flagged and he was taken somewhere in town for examination.

The treatment of narcotic addiction requires the closest of medical attention to the patient. Such medical service is not available at the Tagaytay Center.

The Philippine Government certainly should be engaged in a narcotic rehabilitation program. Just as certainly, however, such a program should not be under the auspices of the NBI. The Social Welfare Administration, the Department of Health, or the Department of Prisons are more proper locations for such an activity.

This is another example of a program hastily commenced without adequate planning, budget support or clear understanding of what was involved. The NBI personnel involved are being diverted from their primary duties, the facility is installed at the site of the inoperative NBI Police Academy, and funds are scrounged from private civilian organizations.

23 Disband the K-9 Corps.

The NBI is basically an investigative agency. The dissipation of its efforts into other channels is not only unprofessional, it is a scandalous waste of high quality talent. The NBI has become involved in a number of activities which should not be a part of its operation. An excellent case in point is the ill-advised "K-9 Corps."

The K-9 Corps was started a year or so ago with the gift to the NBI of a dog. Eventually nine dogs in various states of age and health were gathered and moved to the NBI police academy site at Tagatay. There have been several versions of the purpose of the K-9 Corps including:

to guard the Police Academy grounds. However, since there is nothing to steal, nothing requires guarding. Also, since they are locked and chained they perform no patrol or guard function.

to train local police in K-9 operations. However, no local police has any such activity at the present.

to be used by NBI agents, on patrol. One dog was to be sent to each NBI region. However, the NBI does no patrolling.

to be trained and used to sniff out narcotics when it is being smuggled in the country. The volume of narcotics presently being smuggled in the country is extremely low. The value of dogs for this purpose has not been sufficiently demonstrated to warrant such an endeavor without considerable investigation.

Members of the Survey Team examined the K-9 Corps at Tagaytay and found the nine dogs in need of medical attention. No veterinary is resident there. Nine individuals are detailed to handle the dogs including three who belong to the Criminal Records and Identification Section. The other six are Job Trainees.

The NBI K-9 Corps obviously was not a well-planned activity. It lacks adequately trained personnel, adequate veterinary services, budget support and any real mission.

The Team found a general tendency for law enforcement organizations to start a new activity or a new program without adequate development of plans. This tendency has produced "instant" solutions to some large problems. These solutions have tended to evaporate on contact with reality, only to give way to freshly imagined approaches which usually founder on the tangible necessities of money, trained people and material equipment along with extended effort. An example of such a plan is that announced as a joint "NBI, Interpol and American Express Company" nationwide campaign designed to "provide maximum security for tourists in the Philippines."

The plan included the establishment and maintenance of a gallery, complete with files of colored photographs of all taxicabs operating in the country, together with the fingerprints and photographs of their drivers. The American Express Company donated $1,000 (₱4,000) toward the cost of establishing such a file. Here again, little thought was given to: the volume of photographs, limitations in local photographic service, photographic storage and files, relations with individuals involved, maintaining currency of photographs and the source of funds for the entire project. The national ramifications of the project are not clear nor the relation with other law enforcement agencies. The most obvious deficiency is inclusion of the NBI in such a program rather than the

local police, the normal contact of tourists in any country. The most charitable comment concerning this "plan" is that it resulted in considerable advertising for the American Express Company which might compensate it for the $1,000 expended.

The most recent such plan is the NBI "Suicide Prevention Center", announced on 27 August 1966. This required a staff of "volunteer physicians, social workers, religious advisers and civic groups", plus 24 hour telephone service to provide "instant" aid. The problems of facilities, vehicles, location, management and operation were left unattacked, and largely unsolved. An organization with manpower spread throughout the community, in constant touch with headquarters, such as the Police Mobile Patrol, would be the logical contact for such service. The experience factor with plans of this nature indicate that it will die a quiet death until revived in some other, equally impractical, form.

From the organization standpoint, the NBI should be streamlined in order to reduce the span of control of the Director, give him a Deputy, and establish a sound functional grouping of units.



RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATION – N.B.I.

In spite of its fragmented organization and its preoccupation with minor activities, the NBI record of accomplishment over the years is good.

At present the NBI is suffering the pains of transition and the necessity for reorientation of some aspects of its organization and function. It is not entirely free from political influences and some of the initial impetus achieved in its formation has languished. Its budget is severely limited and the realization of the full scope of agent functions is not possible with limited vehicles, limited communications and inadequate numbers of agents. As in other law enforcement agencies, it has been overtaken by the rise in criminality and holds a formidable backlog of work which shows every sign of increasing with each passing month.

Despite obvious shortcomings, experience with the NBI indicates its formation was a sound and valid concept, much needed in the post WWII environment to combat rising criminality. Its experience to date makes plain the necessity for clearly outlining its jurisdiction in relation to that of the PC and the local police. In its central position, the NBI will of necessity play a major role in improving the level of local police law enforcement and furthering the efforts of the National Police Commission.

The NBI's logistical requirements have been discussed elsewhere, but certain requirements bear repeating here. Without adequate staffing and budgetary support for personnel, equipment, maintenance and operations, its sound conception and well-trained personnel will come to little. Specifically, they must be provided funds to meet all requirements for establishing a National Records, Identification and Statistics Center, and completion of the NBI headquarters in Manila and the NBI Police Academy at Tagaytay. It is to the credit of the NBI that they have accomplished much with relatively little; it will be to the discredit of the Philippine government if it fails to recognize the pressing needs of the NBI and permits this vital investigative service to become static and unproductive.

"What is happening to the Philippine Constabulary, the National Police Force? What has become of its colorful and impressive traditions? Where are those dedicated constables whose patriotic devotion brought glory to the Corps and the nation?

"Will the PC be again as great as it used to be? This is possible if reforms are instituted to win back the confidence and respect of the citizenry. Only time can tell!"

J. J. Bugarin
Nation
19 September 1966

CHAPTER VI *

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY (PC)

The PC was constituted a national police force by Commonwealth Act No. 343, dated June 23, 1938, and as a major service of the AFP by Section 9, Executive Order Number 389, dated December 23, 1950. The primary mission of the PC is the preservation of peace, law and order throughout the Philippines. This includes full control and direction of all operations against dissidents and lawless elements. The secondary mission of the PC is participation in national defense by exercising home defense responsibilities in rear areas. (Section 825, Revised Administrative Code (RAC) and Section 11 (c), Executive Order 389, S-50).

Since its inception, the service of the PC has alternated among a variety of military, police and civil functions. Its dispersion throughout the island chain makes it the natural government agency to enforce national laws and enforce the peace, particularly in the remote areas, where local police forces are weak or non-existent. In its present constitution and strength, the PC represents the basic internal security force of the Philippines.

Following the end of the Filipino-American conflict at the beginning of this century, military control of the Philippines was relinquished to a civil government. This new government was faced with a severe internal pacification problem due to the operations of armed units of the Filipino Insurgent Army and organized bands of brigands in almost every province. To offset these influences and establish a useful degree of peace and order, an "Insular Police Force" was formed on 18 July 1901. Its name was changed to "The Philippine Constabulary" on 8 August 1901. Following is a brief chronology of significant subsequent changes:

January 1936	- Merged into the Philippine Army (PA) as the Constabulary Div.
October 1936	- Designated State Police Force
June 1938	- Disbanded and inducted into US Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE)
July 1945	- Reconstituted as the Military Police Command of the PA
January 1948	- Reorganized under Department of Interior
April 1950	- Designated as major command under Department of National Defense
August 1956	- Assumed responsibility for all operations against lawless elements

In its first decade the PC was used almost exclusively as a military force to eliminate notorious armed bands. As this need diminished, small patrols took the place of campaigns and expeditions. Constabulary soldiers served as utility men in public works projects, sanitary inspectors, pest control workers, relief workers and teachers, becoming in fact the trail blazers for the government presence in many remote areas. Some officers served in appointments as justices of the peace, health officers and postmasters or census takers. The Constabulary served with distinction throughout these years, accumulating considerable experience and developing a high degree of professionalism which was reflected in the great esteem and high repute it enjoyed with the public. Additionally, the Constabulary acquired the habit of cooperation with civil government authorities and an appreciation and necessary knowledge of the law and civil government procedures.

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* This chapter deals primarily with PC history, organization, administration, inspection, morale and operations. Technical functions, e.g., logistics, training, communications, criminal investigation, records and identification, traffic management and criminalistics are covered in those respective chapters of this report.

The PC mission and operations were transferred to the supervision of the Minister of Interior in 1948. The separation from the Army was not complete since a distinctive provision of the Commonwealth Act maintained the status of PC officer and enlisted men as members of the Army. The President was empowered to transfer any officer or enlisted man from the Army to the PC and vice versa. A single personnel roster was maintained for both services.

Between 1939 and 1941, Constabulary strength was increased from 7,500 officers and men to 15,000. The strength of the PC was drastically reduced in April 1950 and 8,000 personnel reverted to the Army. Operational and administrative control of PC forces in the field were placed in the hands of the Secretary of Defense to be exercised by him through the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces, Philippines (AFP). With this realignment of functions, the PC exercised only purely police functions, while the burden of the antidissident campaign was shifted to the Army. On January 16, 1956, full control and direction of all operations against dissidents and lawless elements was returned to the PC, where it remains today. The strength of the Constabulary now is slightly less than 16,000 officers and men, with an increase of approximately 1,000 programmed for FY 66-67. Additional increases are planned within the next few years to an ultimate strength of approximately 20,000.

PC ties with the PA are lessening, but are still sufficiently in existence to inhibit full-scale development of the PC into identification as a fully professional organization. A recent Republic Act will minimize the transfer of officers between the two services by July of 1967. Transfer of enlisted men will still be possible.

A lack of PC identity has been maintained in the Joint US Military Advisory Group, Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL). Constabulary MAP support is not programmed separately, but is grouped with actions for the PA, largely due to a commonality of items. This combining is carried over into the AFP, where it is manifestly difficult to discern what support is being provided the PC through AFP channels. Carried further, this lack of clarity becomes evident in the regional logistics support at Military Area Supply Points (MASP), which are at present controlled by the PA.

While this arrangement has served to meet needs in past periods, and while it may be based on logically considered military and economic factors, today's acute peace and order problems in the Philippines make diffusion of the PC mission and identity no longer practical. The PC has a pressing need to achieve a professional elite status in controlling adverse peace and order conditions. It is also mandatory that it present a public image warranting the fullest confidence and trust of the Philippine public. PC material requirements are not large, but their availability to the working levels has not been sufficiently reliable to produce continuity of effort and reasonable progress toward elite status and high professionalism.

The problems inherent in PC progress to regain an elite status are familiar and generally of long standing. Some enduring PC deficiencies are:

a. Unwarranted political interference exists in PC law enforcement efforts.
b. Inadequate recruiting is resulting in an aging force.
c. No proper refresher training cycle is being maintained.
d. Outside the Manila area, training efforts are largely limited to on-the-job training.
e. Equipment maintenance is poor and shows no improvement.
f. Personnel assignment policies provide no stability.
g. Follow-up and command supervision are inadequate.
h. Specialty training is inadequate.

Each of these deficiencies was evident to the Survey Team and familiar to JUSMAGPHIL personnel. Through public expressions, and a multitude of individual contacts, it was evident to the Survey Team that the image of the PC has been grievously impaired since WWII and was in need of major refurbishing.

ORGANIZATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL:

Executive Order No. 389, 23 December, 1950, which reorganized the AFP, established the PC as one of the four major services of the Armed Forces: Philippine Army, Navy, Air Force and Constabulary. The reorganization order directed that the Constabulary, as the national police force, be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for the enforcement of law and order.

As one of the four major services of the AFP the PC is under the command and control of GHQ of the AFP. This command is exercised through the PC commander in Camp Crame near Manila, and four PC Zone Commanders located in the four PA Military Areas. Its major units are one reserve Battalion Combat Team, the Presidential Guard Battalion and 146 companies dispersed throughout the 57 provinces of the country. Below the zone level, command and control is normally exercised through PC provincial Commanders who may have one or more company commanders. The companies themselves are usually subdivided into headquarters and detachment elements, dependent on the local terrain and peace and order conditions.

A further reorganization of the Constabulary was directed by PC General Order 12, in July of 1966. It was apparent to the members of the Survey Team that the implementation of this directive was unclear at many echelons of the PC. In general, this order calls for the organization of companies into battalions, the formation of an artillery battalion and the inclusion of mortar and anti-tank elements. The formation of battalions appears to possess merit in providing a more standardized organization and improved logistical support. However, the artillery, mortar and anti-tank elements were considered applicable only to the secondary mission of the PC and detracted from its primary peace and order efforts. This reorganization was discussed with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Munitions. He indicated conformity with the Survey Team's views and that action would be taken to suitably modify the PC approach to reorganization.

The directed reorganization is presently in various stages of completion with three phases of implementation:

Phase I - Deactivation of existing PC Companies and the reconstitution of the new companies and selected PC battalion headquarters in consonnance with the proposed Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Provincial commands continue to operate as in the past to include the administration of PC companies in the province pending constitution and/or activation of the battalion headquarters. Upon activation of the battalion headquarters administration will become the responsibility of the battalion. Provincial commanders will then be responsible for the tactical and operational control of units in the province relative to police and military duties, but under the direct control and supervision of the battalion commander.

Phase II - Inactivation of PC units and activation of PC battalions, PC companies, per approved TOE. Equipment and personnel requirements will be filled as available.

Phase III - Continue with Phase II and the reorganization of Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary (HPC) and Zone Headquarters.

As of 1 September 1966, all PC companies had theoretically reorganized within existing resources and assumed the new unit designation, based on a "pegged" or temporarily fixed strength. Only one battalion, the 32nd PC Battalion, in Iloilo City, had been organized. It was not completely operational. The separate units attached to HPC have been reorganized or are currently undergoing reorganization.

HEADQUARTERS, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

HPC, located at Camp Crame in Quezon City, is composed of a general and special staff along traditional military lines. Separate units attached to HPC are also reflected. The organizational chart depicts the new organization of HPC and separate units as envisioned at this point. The more significant changes over the old organization are:

1. Abolition of several special staff sections, Public Affairs Office, Surgeon General, Dental Surgeon, Chief Signal Officer, and the Chief of Engineers. The commanding officers of the separate units attached to HPC performing these functions will serve as staff advisors to the Chief, PC.

2. Creation of the Support Group. The present Philippine Constabulary Supply and Service Support Battalion (PCSSS Bn) and the Engineer Service Company will be the basic units of this group. The commanding officers of the various technical service units will concurrently by staff advisors to the Chief, PC in their respective fields.

HEADQUARTERS - PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY



3. HPC will centrally control specialized and functional support units attached operationally or in direct support to zones and field units.

4. Troop Information and Education and the Public Relations Office are combined to form the Information Office.

5. The Headquarters Philippine Constabulary Detachment, Replacement Detachment, Band, and Special Services will all be grouped in the HPC and Headquarters Support Group (HSG).

6. Records Branch of the Criminal Investigation Service and Data Processing Unit will form the nucleus of the Central Records Identification Division.

7. The Public Affairs Office, Signal, Medical, Dental, and Chief of Constabulary Engineers are converted from Special Staff sections to operating units with teams to support line units. They remain as principal advisers to Chief, PC and staff on matters pertaining to their fields of interest.

8. The 1st PC Battalion Combat Team is reorganized into the 51st PC Battalion consisting of the following units:

a. Hq & Hq Company

b. Three PC Companies

c. Special Operations Company
   (1) Special Forces Unit
   (2) Police Service Dog Platoon
   (3) Cavalry Platoon

9. A field artillery battalion is planned for activation when the Constabulary reaches a force strength of 20,000.

Separate Units

A brief description of the organization and mission of the separate units which are directly related to the peace and order mission of the Constabulary is provided except for those discussed in sections relating to a specific function.

Tactical Operations Center

The Philippine Constabulary Tactical Operations Center (PC TOC) was established on 28 February 1966, to assist the Chief, PC in the direction control coordination and supervision of all PC operations, with emphasis on anti-smuggling, criminality, traffic control and public information or psychological operations.

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF PCTOC



LEGEND

STAFF COORDINATION OR SUPERVISION

COMMUNICATION LINK FOR COORDINATION OF LIAISON

RELATIONS OF PCTOC TO STAFF ELEMENTS



LEGEND

OVERALL DIRECTION

PRIMARY GENERAL STAFF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF OPNS OF PC TOC

1 PROVIDES C2 AND C3 ELEMENTS

2 REPRESENTED IN PC TOC WHEN REQUIRED BY SITUATION

3 COORDINATION W/STAFF SECTION IS DIRECT BY ELEMENTS OF PC TOC

4 FORMS NUCLEUS OF PC TOC

5 PROVIDES AN ELEMENT IN PC TOC

The functions of the PC TOC are:

To assist the commander in the tactical operations aspect of his exercise of command by providing current information on tactical operations and the tactical support available, expeditiously recommending and issuing implementing instructions.

To direct, control, coordinate and supervise all current PC operations.

To establish liaison with other AFP major services and other government entities to insure cooperation and speedy coordination in the conduct of PC operations.

To prepare and maintain data and statistics on matters pertinent to PC operations.

The PC TOC is a physical groupment of those elements of the general and special staffs concerned with current tactical operations. The operations elements of C2, C3 and PC Anti-smuggling Operations Center constitute the nucleus of the PC TOC. The operations elements of the other general and special staffs

are included in the PC TOC as considered necessary to insure expeditious operational staff reactions, command decisions and implementation of the Chief, PC's decisions.

The internal organization of the elements is flexible and the size of the elements may vary with operational requirements, but the Assistant Chief of Staff, C3 is assigned primary general staff responsibility for supervision of the PC TOC. The ranking C3 element in the C2/C3 operations will normally exercise supervisory responsibility over the PC TOC for the Assistant Chief of Staff, C3. While the C2 and C3 elements are co-located, they are not combined. The administrative elements of C1 and C4 will be called upon to attend to administrative and logistical requirements, as required. The PC TOC is operational 24 hours a day. At night the Constabulary Duty Officer and the general staff duty officers of C2 and C3 operate the TOC along with duty enlisted men.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

The mission of the Public Affairs Office is to assist and advise the Chief of Constabulary in the preservation and maintenance of law and order through the effective use of planned civil relations methods and techniques; public affairs and civic action activities, and public information. Although the Public Affairs Officer remains a special staff officer, he now also becomes the commander of a separate public affairs unit. In the reorganization, the present Zone Public Affairs Offices will be absorbed into the HPC Public Affairs unit and attached to support the Zones. The Commander of the Public Affairs Zone Detachment remains the staff advisor to the Zone Commander. Regular Public Affairs teams will be based at HPC in Camp Crame and assigned throughout the Republic as needed. Special Teams will be formed from administrative personnel in the Public Affairs Office to support field operations when required. Zone detachments will consist of one officer and five enlisted men as follows:

- 1 Detachment Commander
- 1 Assistant Detachment Commander and Operations NCO
- 1 Artist/Draftsman
- 1 Clerk Typist
- 1 Intelligence NCO/Projectionist & Cameraman
- 1 Driver/Mechanic/Powerman

The primary mission of the public affairs teams is to organize rallies and meetings in support of National Objectives, and to coordinate with the various government entities for improvement of social and economic conditions.

Three public affairs/civic action teams are currently engaged in projects. An example of their operations follows.

The public affairs team in Pampanga is engaged in obtaining land for schools, organizing athletic clubs for young children, assisting farmers in controlling cattle diseases, and coordinating the construction of feeder roads. A team was recently sent from Camp Crame to support PC operations against a fanatical armed group which had been terrorizing Bukidnon Province, and had recently ambushed and killed a PC soldier. Following the PC attack on the group the public affairs team moved in to conduct psychological warfare activities, distribute relief goods, and generally improve conditions. A grant of ₱1000 was received from the Social Welfare Administration to assist in the project. A third team is operating at a newly constructed civic action center at Laoag where barrio leaders were to undergo a one-week training course beginning 26 September 1966.

Budgetary support for operations of the Public Affairs Office is separate from the PC Budget. The National Budget Commission obligated ₱600,000 for 11 projects in FY 66-67. An allocation of ₱100,000 was provided for the construction and operation of the civic action center in Laoag.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE



Public Relations Officer

Under the present organizational arrangement, the Public Relations Officer (PRO) is a member of the special staff, Headquarters, PC. The PRO is placed under the functional grouping of the C-3, operations division. Public relations efforts in the PC are prescribed by Department of National Defense Order No. 128, dated 28 January 1964, which established the following objectives:

1. To provide for maximum dissemination of information in accordance with the public's right to know of the role of the PC in its overall mission in the preservation of law and the maintenance of order.

2. To develop public appreciation of the need for support of the Constabulary in manpower, materials and funds to improve its services to the people.

3. To generate public opinion conducive to the formulation of sound and intelligent decisions in the furtherance of the Constabulary's peace and order mission.

The PRO maintains constant liaison and furnishes information to eight metropolitan dailies, six weekly news magazines, six television stations, ten radio stations and 22 provincial newspapers. In addition, liaison is maintained with foreign news agencies such as the Agence-France, Associated Press, United Press International and Reuters.

ORGANIZATION AND MANNING CHART
PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER



ACTUAL STRENGTH

	OS	EM	CIV
1964–66	2.	7	5
1962–63	1	4	18
1960–61	2	7	8

1 – MAJOR, PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER
1 - CAPT, ASST PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER
1 – MSGT, CHIEF CLERK
1 STENOGRAPHER
1 - CLERK I

1 – TSGT, OPERATIONS NCO
* 1 – SSGT, PHOTOGRAPHER AND PHOTO LAB TECH
3 – INFO EDITOR
1 – INFO WRITER
2 – LAB TECH AND PHOTOG
1 – STATISTICAL AIDE
2 – CLERK TYPIST

AUTH PC TD NR 02-H DTD 1 DEC 60

LEGEND * ALSO CHIEF, OPNS BR


OUTLINE MAP
OF THE
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
STRAIT
I PCZ
II PCZ
III PCZ
IV PCZ
Zone Ha

The wide distribution of the PC throughout the nation places it in a position to provide reliable information concerning events of national and international interest.

The Troop Information and Education Office, which is presently a special staff section, will logically be absorbed in the Public Relations Office sometime after 1 October 1966.

Philippine Constabulary Zones

The Republic is divided geographically into four PC Zones to discharge the responsibilities of the Chief, PC in maintaining peace and order. The I PC Zone, with headquarters at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga included Northern Luzon and the Batanes Islands. The remainder of Luzon, together with Palawan, comprises the II PC Zone with headquarters at Camp Vicentelim, Laguna. From Cebu City the III PC Zone controls the Visayas and the IV PC Zone at Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental is composed of Mindanao and Sulu.

The PC Zone Commander exercises administrative and operational control, direction and supervision within the zone over PC Provincial Commands and separate units in carrying out the primary PC mission of maintaining peace and order. The Ordnance and Engineer Staff Sections will be absorbed by the PC Support Group at HPC on reorganization about 1 October 1966, and the Signal Section will become a part of the Signal Service Group with headquarters at HPC.

Provincial Command Headquarters

At present the PC Provincial Command Headquarters are also being reorganized in consonance with the PC battalion concept. Previously there were seven different types of PC Provincial Command Headquarters of varying sizes which were assigned according to the size and population density of the province. The reorganization will standardize the size of the Provincial Command Headquarters with a total of 15 enlisted men. The provincial commander will be the senior company commander stationed in the province or will be an officer from the PC Battalion Headquarters.

PC Unit Organization

As previously stated, the PC units are currently undergoing reorganization into standardized battalion and company units. JUSMAGPHIL has sought standardization of units for several years. Prior to this time, three different types of PC Companies were in existence, ranging in size from one officer and 50 enlisted men to three officers and 75 enlisted men. By the 1st of September 1966, all PC companies had been reorganized into the now standard company of 130 enlisted men and five officers. At least one company will be assigned to each province, and three PC companies will be grouped with a headquarters company to form a battalion.

Although reorganization of all PC companies based on the new TOE has been accomplished, this reorganization is more theoretical than actual. The TOE's 7-15, 7-16, and 7-17, for the PC Battalion, Hq & Hq Company, and PC Company, respectively have not been officially approved by GHQ, AFP, as of the date of this survey. Reorganization was accomplished by consolidation of smaller units into one company with existing personnel and equipment resources, and a " pegged" strength was designated for each newly formed

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY ZONE HEADQUARTERS



Recapitulation.
Officers 44
Enlisted 113
IV PC Zone authorized 1 additional Chaplain and assistant

PROVINCIAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS



1 - Col/Lt Col/Maj, Prov Comdr
1 - Lt Col/Maj/Capt Asst Prov Comdr

1 - MSgt, Intel & Opn NCO
1 - TSgt, Intel NCO
1 - TSgt, Opn NCO
1 - SSgt, Intel Opr
1 - Sgt, Intel Opr

1 - MSgt, Comm Chief
1 - TSgt, Rad Opr/Repair
1 - SSgt, Msg Center & Crypto Clk
2 - Sgt, SWB Opr
1 - Cpl, Wireman

1 - MSgt, Chief Clk
1 - Sgt, FA Clk
1 - Sgt, Gen Clk
1 - Cpl, Clk Typist

() To be assigned from officers of the Bn or Cos

company, based on the personnel strength existing in the provinces. Battalion headquarters and organic units can be organized by the end of this year if PC strength reaches the programmed 17,000 officers and men. The advantages of the reorganization are identified as follows:

1. Standardization of PC units and provincial command headquarters which will facilitate planning and formulation of doctrine equally applicable to all.

2. Reduce the frequency of tailoring task forces to conduct special operations.

3. Provides maximum utilization of personnel and equipment resources within the PC.

4. Lessens the span of control at Zone level.

5. Reduces the number of overhead personnel engaged in administration, logistics, and housekeeping activities.

6. Relieves company commanders of excess of administrative duties and frees this time for concentration on police operations.

7. Facilitates mobilization of PC units to perform war time duties of home defense.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY BATTALION



The following two disadvantages of the reorganization were identified:

1. Creates additional headquarters (battalion) and echelons in the chain of command.

2. Will require displacement of families of personnel moved from a deactivated unit in the consolidation of smaller companies.

While a great deal of thought and planning is evident in the proposed TOE's, the functional organization and equipment reflected in the proposed TOE's are not realistic in view of the primary PC mission to maintain peace and order. For example, the various sections organic to the companies such as training squad, intelligence squad, and investigation squad are designated as mortar, rocket launcher, and anti-tank squad, respectively. These titles are not representative of the primary functions which should be performed. TOE 7-17 is oriented toward the mission of a light infantry company, although everyone is aware that this is not the primary or probable mission. Equipment requirements are not based on the primary law enforcement mission of the PC, but on the secondary role of performing national defense duties in the event of an emergency. The demands for police operations by the PC are paramount at this time and will in all probability continue to be so in the foreseeable future. The possibility of committing the PC in a purely national defense role is rather remote.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Reappraise TOE's 7-15, -16 and -17 to reflect an organization more functionally constituted and with equipment requirements geared to the PC primary mission. Eliminate references to mortar, anti-tank and rocket launcher elements from nomenclatures of standard PC units involved in routine provincial law enforcement activities.

Abandon plans to activate PC artillery and paratroop battalions.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY COMPANY



51st PC Battalion

The 51st PC Battalion, formerly designated as the 1st PC BCT, is a separate unit assigned to HPC, and acts as the PC General Reserve to support PC-wide operations as directed by the Chief, PC.

Organically, the 51st PC Battalion consists of a headquarters & headquarters company, three PC Companies, and a special operations company, with an authorized strength of 49 officers and 600 enlisted men.

The Special Operations Company is unique in the Constabulary. A Special Forces Unit, the 1st Cavalry Platoon, and the 1st Police Security Dog Platoon are grouped under the Headquarters of a company.

This battalion is considered the elite of the PC, and all operational personnel receive Ranger training.

A total of 49 horses and 21 police security dogs are assigned to the Special Operations Company. Current operations of this unit are discussed in the operations section.

PC Operations and Functions

No thorough consideration of the PC can be made without presenting its multiplicity of tasks and the environment in which it discharges its missions. This develops a conclusion that the PC is overcommitted in terms of the scope of its mission and undersupported in terms of logistics and training.

The PC is basically organized along standard military lines and has an essentially military system of command and control. However, its military functions are secondary. Its primary mission is the preservation of public order and enforcement of laws. This is no small task since this mission is accomplished from a widely dispersed posture throughout the 57 provinces of the Philippine island chain.

In general terms, the PC performs law enforcement functions which cannot be handled by local police forces of municipalities or chartered cities. It is also charged with the primary responsibility for suppression of dissident and lawless elements. This combination results in operations ranging from two-man patrols and road checkpoints to battalion efforts against dissidents and company-sized efforts in controlling local police forces.

Over and above its general police duties and mutual law enforcement, in conjunction with the NBI and local police forces, the PC is frequently the primary organization enforcing Special Laws. This derives from expressed legal provisions direction of the President or by deputation. Special law enforcement concerns some functions with strong political and commercial involvements: retail trade, alien registration, land tenancy, immigration, elections, price control, labor, and even weights and measure. The PC fills this role naturally by virtue of its size and ability to function with the power of arrest in all provinces, municipalities and cities.

51st PC Battalion





Many of its difficulties in overall effectiveness and in maintaining an adequate public image stem from participation in special law enforcement. It is questionable that its personnel receive the training necessary to properly perform all such tasks and avoid attendant legal and political pitfalls. It is explicitly clear that the PC, like the NBI and the local police, would perform with greater efficiency if its responsibilities were not diffused into so many areas of interest and if its lines of jurisdiction were better defined. At this point it is apparent that PC requirements for enforcing Special Laws have increased as rapidly as requirements in performing general police duties, without an accompanying increase in training or other support.

Operational Chain of Command

Operations of the Constabulary in the field are centered around the PC Provincial Commander. The Chief, PC issued directives to the PC Zone Commanders, who also issue directives and implementing instructions, but it is the Provincial Commander who is personally responsible for planning, organizing, and executing the PC primary mission to maintain peace and order.

Under the current reorganization, the Provincial Commander will report to a Battalion Commander, who will then report to the Zone Commander. The success or failure of efforts to maintain peace and order in the provinces, however, will still depend upon the personal ability, motivation, and support of the PC Provincial Commander.

The PC Provincial Commanders discharge the responsibilities of the Chief, PC in maintaining order and law enforcement throughout the islands. The Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines requires inspections of local police by the senior inspector of Constabulary in each province, this is the PC Provincial Commander. He is charged to report to the Chief, PC on local police equipment and efficiency and overall conditions of law and order. These inspections and reports are discussed in detail elsewhere in this report.

Local police forces are required to give immediate notice to the provincial governor and the nearest Constabulary facility of any persons threatening the peace of their community, or any robbery or theft by outlaw bands. As senior inspector, the PC Provincial Commander, upon request, is responsible to provide assistance to local police in maintaining or restoring peace and order. In this role, he may assume command and direction of local police operations until peaceful conditions are restored.

The overall concept is sound; however, command and material support provided the Provincial Commander are not realistic. In addition, those commanders with essentially military training are limited in performing what is primarily a law enforcement administrators function.

At least one PC company is assigned to each province, and its headquarters is located near the Provincial Command Headquarters. The provincial commander will direct police operations of the company through the company commander when the on-going reorganization is complete.

The law enforcement mission of the total municipal and city areas is the responsibility of their local police forces. In some instances this is efficiently accomplished. In others, the local police force has only the the capability for policing the urban area with infrequent ventures into barrios and the countryside. As outlined in the chapter on Local Police, this limitation in local police operations usually develops from a combination of factors: lack of transportation, personnel, poor management and inadequate training being predominant. The less effective a local police force becomes in maintaining peace and order, the more time and personnel the PC and the NBI must devote to law enforcement in that locality. With 57 provinces divided into nearly 1,400 municipalities, 47 chartered cities and approximately 29,000 barrios, the scope and complexity of the law enforcement problem can best be described as formidable.

The PC companies divide their personnel into detachments which are located throughout a province and serve as patrol bases. PC patrols normally operate at night and vary in size depending upon the terrain and the threats to the safety of patrol operations. In many areas where barrios are inaccessible by road, PC patrols move on foot over prescribed but varied routes to visit with barrio captains and to perform police services as required. For many of these areas, PC patrols are the only contact between the populace and the government. On patrols that stay out for several days, the PC will spend one or two nights in a barrio or sitio, and then move on to another barrio to repeat the same procedure. If a crime is reported, the patrol obtains the necessary information and takes whatever action is deemed appropriate in attempting to identify the perpetrators. The bulk of PC patrol activity is concentrated in the barrios and along the roadway and coastal areas. The PC has been reasonably successful in denying criminal elements the use of the road network and some portions of the coast.

The PC and NBI normally investigate or take police action only when requested by public officials or municipal police, or when these agencies fail to take action. The attitude of municipal police in many areas frequently reflects irresponsibility in taking effective action to maintain peace and order. These agencies are too often content to let the PC take charge of an investigation or apprehension if they will do so. This attitude is frequently responsible for the development of a "stand-off" between the two agencies: The PC waiting to see if the municipal police will take necessary action; the municipal police waiting to see if the PC will. The problem is compounded because both the PC and the local Police, as well as the NBI, have original jurisdiction. However, primary responsibility rests with the local police.

Operational Communications

The dispersed nature of PC operations places a heavy premium on reliable and effective communications. Existing communications represent a major limitation particularly in rural areas involving detachment and patrol functions. This problem is addressed fully in the Communications Chapter of this report. The organic communications of the PC are tactical in nature and are being improved but do not adequately serve the overall requirements of detailed enforcement activity. This factor is particularly evident when the national lack of telephone and telecommunications service is considered. As previously discussed, PC preventive patrol activity is usually conducted in barrios, sitios and beach areas isolated from any form of communication. These patrols are isolated from a few hours to a few days. They must rely on foot couriers or even passing

vehicles to relay information to the nearest radio post, telephone or telecom location. Reliance on such methods places the PC at a severe disadvantage in responding to the fulfillment of its many tasks and negates much of the operational effort. Conversely, this limitation works to the clear advantage of unlawful elements who are quick to discern such weaknesses.

Such difficulties are compounded by the general absence of radio equipment in most municipal police forces in PC patrol areas and the inability of the PC to conduct any ship-to-shore or ground-to-air communication. In combination, these factors pose a severe limitation and permit at best a hit-or-miss surveillance effort in many areas with haphazard operational response. These shortfalls gain added significance in view of the low order of training and weapons qualifications of many local police forces and their greatly diminished effectiveness during the hours of darkness.

PC Special Operation

The PC conducts special operations against criminal and dissident elements as directed by the President or as intelligence information identifies targets. When the gravity of the situation warrants, special task forces are formed with the Philippine Army or with various other national or local agencies.

The participation of the PC in special operations, plus a multitude of local involvements in inspection activities, has also limited its resources for basic patrol actions. Continuous, regular patrolling is recognized to be the heart of preventive action. The PC commits a major share of its manhours to this task, its traditional and most productive role. Logistical constraints, special operational involvements and personnel deficiencies have acted to limit preventive actions. PC activity observed throughout the country were too often in response to reported criminal activity and other after-the-fact actions rather than preventive actions.

The intensified anti-smuggling campaign currently pursued by the PC, in coordination and cooperation with the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and other national agencies concerned accounts for a sizable portion of PC personnel and equipment resources. Sometimes this campaign has resulted in an impressive number of seizures, arrests and judicial actions, under the direction of a specially appointed Anti-Smuggling Action Committee. However, significant convictions to date have been practically non-existent. The details of this operation are discussed in the Customs section of the survey.

The control of local police forces is a special operation which is covered in a separate section of this report. These operations are substantial. As of 1 August 1966, the police forces of 101 municipalities and chartered cities were indicated as under PC control.

A special operation was conducted during the national elections in 1965, aimed at maintaining a state of calm during this period. PC units were directed to increase the police presence in many potentially explosive areas and achieved reasonable success.

Task Force Barracuda

Task Force Barracuda initiated operations on 9 June 1966 in Cotabato Province. Peace and order conditions in the province had deteriorated to the point that decisive action was necessary to re-establish law and order.

The Task Force was organized with two PC companies and two PA companies under the command of a PA Colonel. The Task Force commander was directed by the IV PC Zone Commander. A Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) team and a Counter-Intelligence Unit (CIU) detachment were attached from HPC. Coordination and cooperation were directed and arranged with the various agencies of the Republic Government concerned such as the Department of Justice, Bureau of Labor, Forestry and Lands, Land Transportation Commission (LTC), NBI, Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Wild Life Commission. The complexity of the problem is reflected in the number of agencies involved. A breakdown of personnel assigned as of 1 September 1966 follows:

	OFF	EM
101st PC Company	1	70
68th PC Company	1	70
A Co., 27th BCT (PA)	2	57
B Co, 27th BCT (PA)	3	43
104th PC Detachment	1	2
CIS Detachment	1	4
CIU Team	1	1
	10	247

Assignments of additional personnel from the Provincial Command Headquarters in Cotabato brought the total PC personnel directly involved to 17 officers and 306 enlisted men.

The area of operations was designated as Southern Cotabato Province with the following mission:

Stop illegal activities and destroy a crime syndicate, known as Octopus, and concurrently enforce law and order with emphasis against smuggling, illegal entry, and subversives in coordination with the Cotabato Provincial Command.

Control of Southern Cotabato by criminal elements had reached such proportions that the basic tasks defined were:

- Settlement of boundary disputes and relocation of boundary monuments by Bureau of Forestry and Lands.
- Investigations and revival of the many previous criminal charges which had been filed and dismissed.
- Neutralization of the Cotabato Security Agency (armed front of the Octopus syndicate.)

- Settlement of labor disputes created by the general unrest and control exerted by Octopus.

After slightly more than one month of operations, the Task Force reported the following results:

- A Total of 68 persons, who violated national laws have been apprehended and two surrendered.

- A total of 64 firearms were confiscated and three others were surrendered.

- 770 vehicles violating the LTC code were apprehended and 172 cases filed against persons concerned.

- Of the nine previously unsolved criminal cases specifically identified for investigation, five have been refiled in court while four were again dismissed.

- Criminal cases uncovered, which had not been previously identified, totaled seven. These cases were properly filed before the court with the cooperation of personnel representing the Department of Justice: three murders, one robbery with murder, one double homicide, one frustrated murder, and one attempted murder.

- The Cotabato Security Guard Agency was dissolved.

- The Bureaus of Forestry and Lands were proceeding with a survey of the disputed boundary, on mutual agreement of the two conflicting parties. The cost of the survey is being partially defrayed by the two parties involved.

In spite of the statistics, Octopus was still active in the area.

Task Force Falcon

Task Force Falcon began operations in the city of Angeles on 7 September 1966, with a monumental task: Destroy all dissident elements in Angeles City and cleanse the city of all forms of crime and lawlessness.

The operation in Angeles City is particularly sensitive since it is located in the heart of Huk territory and also adjoins Clark Air Base. Participation by other government agencies parallels that of Task Force Barracuda; however, the Bureau of Customs plays a larger role.

The task force is basically composed of three officers and 129 enlisted men of the 172nd PC Company. Teams from Zone and HPC of the Criminal Investigation Service, Central Intelligence Unit, Counter-Intelligence Detachment and Public Affairs Office have been added along with a Traffic Control Team and a Police Training Team from the Philippine Constabulary School.

Angeles City had been under PC control since 6 June 1966, with rather limited corrective results. The formation of Task Force Falcon represents an increased effort on the part of the PC to control the situation. A member of the Clark Air Base reported that the PC was heavily involved with the lawless elements of Angeles City, and little progress was apparent.

Task Force Tamaraw (Central Luzon)

Task Force Tamaraw was an anti-dissident operation against the Huks centered in Pampanga Province, but also affecting the land areas and population of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Tarlac. The code name has been discontinued but the operation continues in modified form with a less obvious military emphasis.

Although primarily a PA operation from the standpoint of personnel strength, forces involved are controlled by the newly created I PC Zone Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

Additional personnel assigned to the operation total about 22 officers and 938 enlisted men. The PC and PA units resident in the area bring the total to about 1,560 PA and 500 PC. Much of this operation was in the state of transition during the visit of the Survey Team and several changes in unit alignment were being considered. The operations in the area are necessarily melded with the large scale National Civic Action program being implemented in Central Luzon. No evaluation of the effectiveness of the operation was attempted in view of its changing nature. PC personnel have been accused by the newsmen with unnecessary killings of suspects. In one highly publicized incident, a combined PC/PA operation was ineptly handled and permitted the escape of several suspected Huk murder suspects through a basic neglect to cover the rear exits to a hiding place. However, a later combined operation in December 1966 resulted in the death of the Number Three Huk leader, Ricardo Ignacio, a prime suspect in the murder of three Pampanga city officials.

Cavite Smuggling

The 51st Battalion, formerly the 1st PC BCT and identified as HPC reserve, has been conducting special operations in Cavite Province since 1 March 1966. The primary mission of the battalion is anti-smuggling, but operations are also conducted against illegal fishing, bay piracy, and loose firearms. The Headquarters Company, organic 511th and 512th PC Companies, and the Special Operations Company of this organization are deployed along the coastline of Cavite from the Rizal provincial boundary to Batangas, a distance of 75 to 80 kilometers. Small detachments of three to twelve men are detailed to maintain surveillance and conduct patrols in an effort to curtail or eliminate smuggling activities in what is considered to be the hot bed of this activity on the island of Luzon. The 51st PC Battalion has been specially deputized by the Bureau of Customs and has filed 24 smuggling cases with the Cavite Provincial Fiscal since initiating operations; none of which had been tried at the time of this survey.

The PC reports that illegal landings of smuggled goods have virtually ceased in Cavite since a PC encounter with smugglers on 29 August 1966. Three smugglers were killed and a 1965 "Matador 3" banca powered by a 6 x 6 vehicle motor was seized. PC soldiers pursuing in a slower boat were fortunate that the smugglers ran into a fish trap after opening fire with automatic weapons. This successful encounter has had a tremendous psychological effect on the large number of smugglers residing in and operating from the area. PC officers have been extremely resourceful in maximizing the psychological effects of the action.

A visit to this unit's elements in Cavite revealed a soldierly, hard working unit dispersed along the coast line in anti-smuggling actions. It was conducting the bulk of its mission without the benefit of adequate communications, very poor land and water mobility and little semblance of necessary support from HPC.

Jolo Island

The Island of Jolo, Sulu Province, poses a special problem for the PC in terms of disrupted peace and order. The PC operation on Jolo Island is analyzed in more detail than other operations since its law enforcement problems are peculiar and of long standing, having successfully resisted the efforts of Spaniards, Americans, Japanese and Filipinos. Given existing conditions and current enforcement actions, there is little likelihood that any significant improvement will obtain.

Disorder in Sulu is enduring. Fifty years ago Sulu was noted for its excessive outlawry and was shunned by peaceful travelers. After a rigid campaign effort in 1916, the district chief of the PC was able to report that not a single outlaw was at large; all having been killed or captured or otherwise surrendered for a total of 413 at a cost of 10 PC killed and 12 wounded. Existing conditions show a retrogression to the pre-1914 period. In two weeks of September 1966, 11 persons were killed in six violent incidents by hackings or shootings on Jolo Island. In the same month, the PC killed an outlaw leader and seven followers who had been wanted for an earlier ambush slaying of five PC personnel in May. In many areas the population does not move about at night and the countryside belongs to those engaged in violating the law and their supporters.

Over 8,000 unlicensed firearms represent the greatest single drawback to peace and order on the island.

Jolo Island Firearms

Municipalities	Registered	Unlicensed
Jolo	764	1,238
Indanan	345	650
Luuk	225	1,432
Maimbung	109	600
Panamao	147	1,990
Parang	253	900
Patikul	434	551
Talipao	251	713
TOTAL	2,528	8,074

Note: (1) Unlicensed or "loose" firearms are based on known sightings and reports from informers.
(2) The entire province of Sulu includes a total of 9,512 unlicensed firearms.



These weapons are a prized status symbol and are zealously guarded. They are used for the protection of home and property by the ordinary landholders, by politicians to win respect and maintain influence and by criminals to pursue their illegal activities. A majority of the killings recorded in 1966 were through the use of illegal firearms. The possession of weapons has become so ingrained among the people that it is politically defended by some and has generated violent objections and opposition against all government gun collection efforts. In any of its operations on the island, the PC is rapidly outgunned as the population gathers in mutual support. Usually, ambush attacks against the PC have as their object the acquisition of PC weapons rather than the elimination of the law enforcers.

In addition to the existence of numerous weapons, the significant overall criminal action involves smuggling on a large scale. Smuggling occupies a peculiar status in Jolo, and has wide participation due to historical long term relations with relatives and traders in North Borneo. Those who have engaged in this activity have sometimes accumulated great wealth and political influence. Over the years smuggling has become accepted and the inhabitants have developed a deep seated resentment toward any attempts to halt this activity, which many have come to regard as legitimate "trade."

The psycho-social makeup of the population of Jolo explains many of its attitudes and actions. Many of the Tausogs speak no English or Tagalog and have a tendency to withhold their children from the influence of formal government schools. They seek preservation of their religous and social systems and give their basic loyalties to their families and local leaders rather than any echelon of government. Externally, they appear to present unity in their common indifference to government actions. Internally they are politically factionalized and strongly identified with local personalities.

Tausog internal difficulties revolve around uncertain land titles, long term vendettas for old causes and political rivalries. These differences are seldom submitted to any courts for action due to the lack of any substantial faith in the reliability of government actions. They are usually settled within tribal or family confines, frequently with violence and enduring hatred. Their criminal actions from such violence have resulted in many wanted men who live a hunted existence in the province and continue to contribute to the undesirable state of law and order. These fugitives violently abhor imprisonment, and few have funds for bail procedures. They distrust the law and take every action to maintain their freedom.

In this environment the administration of the law is difficult at best, and at times impossible. Beyond the Jolo municipality the inhabitants appear clearly antagonistic to the Constabulary. The Constabulary personnel generally demonstrate an understandably wary and suspicious attitude when in the countryside.

The situation is greatly compounded by the extremely poor condition of the seven local police forces on the island outside the municipality of Jolo.

Jolo Island Municipal Police Forces

Municipality and Class	Number of Police	Civil Service Eligible	PC or NBI Trained	Population
Jolo-2nd Class	63	4	32	55,770
Indanan-6th Class	18	0	1	25,700
Luuk-6th Class	14	0	0	19,673
Maimbung-6th Class	18	0	0	11,805
Panamao-7th Class	11	0	0	6,879
Parang-5th Class	21	0	0	24,698
Patikul-6th Class	11	0	0	29,897
Talipao-6th Class	15	0	0	20,021

Note: 6th Class Municipalities have a recorded income of ₱30,000. (1962 Reclassification).

As can be seen above, the police are of low competence. In addition, they are politically oriented toward mayors or council members, unequipped and of dubious loyalty and effectiveness. Their pay and morale are low and most policemen supplement their salaries with other income. Police availability is poor and discipline appears to be non-existent. Most of the municipalities have incomes below ₱40,000. Their governments are disinclined to allocate funds to purchase weapons, conduct training or acquire even minimal police facilities and equipment. As a result, records keeping, training and normal administrative functions are largely ignored. In effect, the policing of the island is represented almost completely by the nine assigned PC companies, with a few small exceptions.



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

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A typical Jolo police force exists in the municipality of Patikul. It has a population of approximately 21,000 and an annual income of ₱40,000. The chief of police has a sixth grade education and received ₱140 a month; his 11 patrolmen receive ₱50 each. The patrolmen have no weapons, no uniforms, no training and no civil service eligibility. There is no capability to report, much less investigate, criminal action. The municipality provides no communications or vehicles.

Although the law enforcement needs of this municipal force appear obvious on the surface, their solution has complications. The mayor, a Muslim, was emphatic in indicating that citizens of the municipality were reluctant to pay taxes or participate in the government since they had received no tangible benefits for previous efforts. They considered themselves outside the administration. Some weapons loaned the police force by the PC have become "lost." Additionally, there are strong suspicions by the same members of the local PC that nocturnal actions of the police of Patikul are open to question. This suspicion appears to have reasonable grounds when considered with the fact that the municipality has an estimated 544 unregistered firearms.

The situation in Patikul is not unique. Of the 22 municipalities in Sulu Province, only three are economically 5th class or higher. This indicates an average annual income in the remaining municipalities of 30,000 pesos or less. Excluding the Jolo municipality, there are only six civil service eligible police in the province from a total of 322. Within this total there are no NBI-trained and only 36 PC-trained, 32 of which are in Jolo municipality.

The status of the police forces and the lack of security in the municipalities has resulted in several municipal judges and other local government functionaries taking up residence in the municipality of Jolo. Much of the normal daily business of peace and order goes unsupervised and unaccomplished, or is accomplished on a hit-or-miss basis. Visits to several municipal offices revealed a dearth of activity during week days and even less on the weekend.

Some of the members of the Talipao Police Force

Since the majority of the local police are recruited from local elements, they are ineffective and negative in approaching the problem of wanted persons. In September 1966, approximately 1,945 wanted persons were reported in Sulu Province, with the majority on Jolo Island. There is obvious reluctance on the part of the local police, and the population to identify these persons. They may be relatives or friends, and certainly they are Muslims.

If the local police were to make an apprehension, they could well expect violent reaction from inhabitants or relatives. One local police force reported to the Survey Team that an indentified murder suspect was on the island but could not be apprehended because of the opposition any arresting force would encounter. The PC commander said the PC could not apprehend him for the same reason.

The problem in apprehending wanted persons is further aggravated by the absence of valid descriptions of persons sought. The similarities in physical features of the populace makes clear word descriptions difficult. When the PC seek to capture a wanted person, no one who knows this person will identify him; names are frequently changed upon query by the police or PC. No fingerprints or photographs are available for identification.

PC Company Commander and President of Talipao Barrio Captain's League. The latter is a son of the local Muslim headman.

Up to August of 1966, the PC recorded a total of 78 murders, homicides and parricides in Sulu. Over 50% of these were committed with unlicensed firearms. Solutions to these crimes are difficult since they frequently occur in remote areas, many delays develop in their investigation and little or no technical evidence is available. Ballistics data, fingerprints, photographs, etc., are seldom entered into evidence. The prosecution of many cases rests completely on statements of witnesses. These statements are frequently changed after several trial postponements or in preliminary investigations. Witnesses and the accused are usually poor. The accused cannot afford bail and they frequently threaten additional violence. As a result, more than elsewhere in the Philippines, the practice of "amicable" settlement for major crimes seems to prevail.. The Mayor of Patikul indicated that such settlements were taken for granted. Of 27 such cases which reached the court, 15 were dismissed, nine are still pending and three convictions were recorded.

At the time of the Survey Team visit there were nine understrength companies on the island with 23 officers and 612 men present from an authorized strength of 39 officers and 879 men.

Jolo Island PC Personnel Strength and Engagements
1 January 1966 to 15 August 1966

	Authorized		Assigned		
	Off.	Em.	Off.	Em.	Engagements
Prov. Hq	4	48	4	48	0
81st PC Co.	3	75	2	50	8
82nd	3	75	1	72	3
83rd	3	75	1	41	3
84th	3	75	1	65	3
85th	3	75	2	37	3
86th	3	75	2	44	6
87th	3	75	2	45	3
108th	3	75	1	58	2
111th	3	75	1	41	2
112th	3	75	1	54	3
113th	3	75	3	50	8
MED	1	4	1	5	0
DENT	1	2	1	2	0
TOTAL	39	879	23	612	44

Note: 81st and 108th PC Companies are assigned to areas away from Jolo Island.

Currently these units are attempting to combat the adverse peace and order situation with inadequate communications, a poor road net and a lack of mobility. They possess no reserve personnel. The condition of their vehicles is extremely poor. Added to these problems are poor administration and criminal information. There was a lack of basic statistical data and information concerning wanted persons. Fingerprint files were incomplete or nonexistent. A basic deficiency existed in that no fingerprints of the dead or of apprehended murder suspects were available. The hostility of the rural population adds to local problems of enforcement. This attitude is aggravated by reports of PC mishandling of Muslim prisoners and PC attempts to control the local "thieve's market", a source of livelihood for many inhabitants.

The intransigent nature of the Tausogs, the existence of so many loose firearms, coupled with the general environment of lawlessness, place the PC in a highly unstable situation. Within the province at present, there is recorded a total of 22 outlaw bands with a membership of 258 armed men who participate in murder, ambush, robbery and piracy. The majority of these are located on the island of Jolo and come into frequent contact with the PC. These contacts appear to be increasing. There were 44 such contacts between 1 January and 15 August 1966 as compared with 16 in all of 1965. These bands have the support and sympathy of a large part of the Muslim community. This gives them great freedom of action.

The island has a long history of inability by military organizations to achieve any great permanent success in diminishing the intractability of the population. The present activity of the PC, oriented toward maintaining the status quo appears to be no exception. It may even be losing ground.

At present the PC confines its routine activities largely to preventive vehicle patrols along the existing road net and to daylight operations. Standard PC preventive foot patrols are not attempted. Armed PC sorties into the countrysides to secure suspects, weapons or contraband goods, usually produce quick reaction from the populace and rapid gathering of unfriendly forces when contact with a Muslim appears likely. This invariable reaction severely limits PC freedom of action with its existing personnel and equipment.

The PC on Jolo Island do not concern themselves solely with police actions. Experienced officers are well aware of the value and need for civic action and psychological efforts. They are well-rounded in these subjects from both practical experience and training. However, the present state of undermanning and funding permits only minimal efforts in these areas.

A member of the Survey Team accompanied the Commander of the 83rd PC Company in an initial effort at PC civic action in the barrio of Nha Be, Talipao municipality. The company commander was one of the few unarmed PC personnel observed by the Survey Team. Invited attendance at this initial meeting included members of 36 barrios, the municipal vice mayor, the President of the League of Barrio Captains, one municipal councilor, two teachers and the local headman. All participants except the PC officer were Muslims, and this officer had trained himself to converse in the local dialect. Of interest is the fact that the barrio captain and the municipal police chief were sons of the local headman, reflecting his strong family influence.

It was readily apparent that the barrio itself represented fruitful ground for a civic action approach. There was no well, the single access road was in extremely poor condition and the existing school was far too small and decrepit for its student load. Similar conditions existed throughout the municipality and many could be alleviated with organized actions at a relatively small cost. However, it was similarly clear that such a program would be beneficial only if accepted by the population and the local PC command was adequately manned and funded to see such actions through.

Currently the Sulu PC Command is being reorganized into a battalion organization.. The commander has initiated actions to glean as much civic support for peace and order as possible by establishing Civilian Advisory Committees. He is hampered by the attitude of local politicians, local distrust of government generally, and the lack of funds to adequately pursue a sound civic action/psychological warfare program. His officers are not all experienced. Twenty of his 24 officers are reserve officers requiring bi-annual extensions of service under the provisions of Republic Act of 2334. He has a need for personnel trained to speak the local dialect and Muslim personnel to establish suitable rapport with local groups.

The personnel he does have appear well trained and well motivated. However, they are engaged largely in defensive operations and response to incidents of violence and crime rather than aggressive preventive actions. They are alert and well organized. An unexpected Sunday afternoon visit to the 85th PC Company at Taglibi, Patikul municipality, resulted in an unplanned alert signal which produced 18 armed PC constables within five minutes from their nearby quarters. Despite the alert and aggressive attitude, present manning and equipment places them in a position of weakness rather than strength. In the hostile environment of the island, the absence of reliable local police forces and the general lack of cooperation from the population, the commander is at a disadvantage in pursuing an aggressive program of preventive actions due to his circumscribed freedom of action.

The circumstances outlined in this section are not new to the PC, having been encountered in many areas previously, to a greater or lesser degree. No short term solution to the problems of Jolo Island is possible in view of the depth of cultural, internal, and political involvement.

A comprehensive plan of long term action is needed to establish an environment of peace and order stability. At present there is little hope that successful collection of loose firearms develop or that the local police will appreciably improve. Mutual suspicion and distrust between the population and government agencies must be diminished. The existing holding action is not predicted to achieve these ends.

Since the Survey Team's visit to Jolo the nine companies assigned have been reorganized into the 32nd PC battalion and two separate companies to constitute a reserve strike force. The three operational companies of the batallion are assigned geographic areas of operations; while the two separate companies are used as mobile reserve. This reorganization should benefit peace and order actions, but in itself will not produce significant positive actions since no additional personnel and equipment are allocated.

Jolo, with the balance of the Sulu archipelago, contributes to criminal activity well up into the central Visayas. An increasing number of municipal and barrio attacks from the sea have been attributed to Jolo and the Sulu Island group. With this gain in criminal activity, more long term and comprehensive actions are required to meet this unique situation.

The existing PC units are available as the framework for aggressive preventive patrol action but would require bolstering by a suitable number of PA units to assume the static security role.

To reduce the freedom of action enjoyed by criminal elements within the population, an identification card system for adult residents, similar to that carried on by the police in Vietnam, would be essential. Coupled with it should be a system of identifying each group of dwelling occupants with a suitable photograph similar to the Vietnam family census.

Concurrent with these actions, an intensive search of dwelling and barrio areas will be mandatory to uncover all loose firearms. Since unregistered firearms constitute the major security problem on the island, all firearms permits should be suspended in accordance with Article IV, Section 906 of the Philippine Administrative Code and these firearms collected. Rewards should be offered for weapons surrendered.

Close coordination with the NBI should be maintained because of their particular investigative capabilities.

Consideration should be given to removing all local police, with the possible exception of those in Jolo Municipality, and replacing them with PC personnel for the period of the pacification effort. Based on the present police strength in Jolo, only seven officers and approximately 100 enlisted men would be required for the police effort. PC personnel would have to be carefully selected and trained in police techniques for this purpose. This replacement is considered essential since the police are largely unreliable and would not be an asset in any PC efforts. A system of static control or check points similar to the police resources control program in Vietnam would be necessary throughout the island on a 24 hour basis supplemented with motorized and foot patrols to facilitate police operations and provide mutual security for check points. The communications capability would require a considerable increase to tie-in PC/PA units, security posts, mobile patrols and municipal police stations on a 24-hour basis.

When the effectiveness of law enforcement improves the peace and order conditions, action can be initiated under the Civil Service and National Police Commissions to recruit, train, and replace municipal police. At the same time a PC civic action/psychological warfare program should be commenced to bring home the realization of the fruits of government actions.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Government of the Philippines develop an organized program of pacification and civic action for Jolo Island in the Sulu archipelago along the guidelines discussed above, to include:

1. Raising assigned PC units to full strength, using only experienced officers and men.

2. Providing sufficient communications and mobility to permit necessary freedom of action.

3. Providing PA units in sufficient strength to assume a static security role.

4. Qualifying as many PC and PA Muslims as possible in the local dialects prior to assignment to the island.

5. Initiation, in conjunction with the NBI, of an identification system for individuals and dwellings to work in conjunction with a system of check points and patrols.

6. Provision of funds for intelligence informants and payment for surrender of unregistered weapons.

7. Psychological and information efforts to advise the population, in their own dialect, of the necessity and purpose of cooperation with all government functions.

8. A civic action program designed to reach barrio and sitio level to improve schools, wells, and roads.

9. Rotation of PC personnel after two years of service in Jolo.

10. Additional fuel allotments for PC boats used in anti-smuggling actions.

11. Pre-indoctrination in the purpose of the program, of all military and government personnel involved.

Personnel

Fortunately for the PC, military service in the Philippines is sought after and volunteers are plentiful. Unfortunate for the PC are the lack of sufficient budgetary support and current poor practices of personnel handling. Perhaps the major morale depressant in the PC is the uncertainty of assignment or tenure.

Personnel management in the Constabulary is accomplished in compliance with directives published by GHQ of the AFP. Procedures are similar to those established by the U.S. Army.

The personnel strength of the Constabulary was reported by HPC as 15,723 as of 30 June 1966. The total included 1228 officers and 14,495 enlisted men. Strength of the Constabulary is programmed to reach 17,000 by the end of FY 1967, and a number of recruits are undergoing training at Marawi, Lanao Del Sur. Plans have been formulated to increase the size of the force to 20,000 by the end of the next fiscal year.

The PC lost 23 officers and 317 enlisted men during FY 1966 through normal attrition, and gained only 2 officers and 59 enlisted for the same period:

	ATTRITION			ACCRETION	
	Officers	EM		Officers	EM
Death	1	37	ROTC	2	0
Retirement	22	126	Recruitment	0	59
Separated	0	154			
TOTALS	23	317		2	59

Although the PC had an excess of 23 officers at the end of the fiscal year, HPC and separate units enjoyed an over-strength of 80 officers or approximately 116% of authorized strength. Most of the excess officers are assigned to HPC, while the PC Zones are operating at an overall strength of approximately 92%, or 57 officers short. The shortage in officers does not appear to be too significant in the Zones until assignment at the company level is considered. The IV PC Zone reported a shortage of 430 officers and enlisted personnel on 9 August 1966, as compared to the 303 total shown in the figures of 15 June. The Sulu Provincial Commander reported an authorized strength of 39 officers and 879 enlisted men against an assigned strength of 23 officers and 616 enlisted men - 58.9% of officer strength and approximately 70% of enlisted strength. The highly sensitive and critical peace and order situation in Jolo and throughout the Sulu Archipelago can barely be contained with this posture. The PC tendency to concentrate personnel in excess of authorized strength and needs at higher level headquarters works to the detriment of peace and order operations in the field.

RECOMMENDATION:

Redistribute personnel now in excess of authorized strengths at higher headquarters to fill units actively engaged in peace and order operations.

A policy of systematic rotation of officer personnel throughout the Republic, based on a specified stabilized tour, would enhance the enforcement of law and order. There are many officers who have never served in the IV PC Zone during a full career. Some of these officers have spent the majority of their careers serving in the Manila area. Others are frequently shifted within a zone for long periods of time. This practice is not only demoralizing to the PC officer corps as a whole, but serves to compromise effectiveness. Instances have been cited where an officer assigned to Mindanao or Sulu would never report but would instead seek a politician to intercede in his behalf. If minimum and maximum tour lengths were strictly adhered to, rotation of assignments into less desirable areas would be more palatable to all concerned. If all personnel were rotated uniformly, without interference of political influence, an officer would accept reassignment into any area with the understanding that it was part of his career pattern. A more well-rounded and experienced officer corps could be developed.

RECOMMENDATION:

Establish a career pattern for officers which would ensure a periodic rotation, improve the stability of assignments, and remove political interference from personnel actions.

A career pattern or personnel policy for the assignment of new officers was developed, but it has been difficult to follow. A new 2nd lieutenant is to be assigned to the IV PC Zone for two years and reassigned every two years into one of the other three zones. The ninth year, the officer would then be ready for staff duty at HPC, Zone Headquarters or other staff assignment. This career pattern for new officers is not considered sound since it requires the IV PC Zone to be constantly breaking in new personnel while the other three zones realize the benefits of its efforts.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the on-the-job training of new officers be performed equally by all four zones.

Another aspect of personnel policies which has had a debilitating effect on the morale and efficiency of PC officers has been the policy of transferring between the PA and the PC. This practice retards the professionalization of the PC as a national police force, except when officers transferred from the PA to PC are technically qualified, such as doctors, dentists, logisticians, communication personnel. The following table reflects a PC report on the number of transfers between these two services since 1963.

OFFICERS

	Transfer PA to PC			Transfers PC to PA		
	63-64	64-65	65-66	63-64	64-65	65-66
COL	6	7	10	10	8	10
LTC	5	5	17	9	8	11
MAJ	10	11	14	12	10	12
CPT	18	14	22	15	18	26
LT	14	14	19	22	22	20
Total	53	51	82	68	66	79

An analysis of the service profiles of all PC officers reveals that the average PC officer has 16 years of service; 10 years have been spent in the PA and six in the PC. Thus the PC does not provide a career as a PC officer.

ENLISTED

	Transfers PA to PC			Transfers PC to PA		
	63-64	64-65	65-66	63-64	64-65	65-66
MSgt	1	2	3	2	1	4
FSgt	0	0	1	0	0	1
TSgt	3	2	5	4	0	8
SSgt	6	7	9	6	9	13
Sgt	9	0	16	20	15	45
Cpl	4	5	7	20	30	56
Total	23	16	41	52	60	125

The transfers between the Army and the PC have a considerable impact on professionalism as well as morale. Republic Act 4824, passed by the House and Senate and approved by the President on 18 June 1966, establishes separate officer promotion lists for the PC. Effective June 1967, transfers from the PC promotion lists to any other promotion list, or vice versa, except the PC quota of graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, shall not be permitted.

Strict compliance with the provisions of this act, in conjunction with an improved law enforcement training program for PC officers, will certainly enhance the professionalization of the Constabulary.

Congressman Navarro introduced House Bill Number 795 in the Sixth Congress, First Session. This seeks to prohibit the transfer of any enlisted man or officer between services in the AFP without the consent of the officer or enlisted man. Congressman Navarro points out that"the practice, after every election, especially if there is a change in administration, is to have officers and enlisted men of the PC transferred without jistifiable reason to any other branch of the AFP and vice versa. This pernicious practice demoralizes such officers and enlisted men for they are reassigned to the branch of service where they have no training and experience." It is of course also recognizable that this practice is responsible for diminishing the degree of law enforcement professionalism that can be developed in the Constabulary, and further creates the type of personnel turbulence which adversely affects overall operations.

RECOMMENDATION:

That every effort be made to obtain passage of this House bill number 795 in order further to stabilize PC personnel.

Special Duty

The number of enlisted personnel of the PC on special duty with civil governmental agencies, senators and congressmen is reported to be nearly 300. Aside from politically sensitive reasons, this assignment of personnel is a considerable drain on the personnel resources of the Constabulary. In view of the deteriorating peace and order conditions in the Philippines, this practice is too costly to bear. The majority of personnel assigned are senior NCO's, thereby further reducing the amount of supervisory effort available in units operating in the field. Although the practice of assigning PC personnel to retired government officials and others considered to be VIP's is purportedly to show the gratitude and respect of the Republic, some other way of expressing this respect should be developed. It is plainly not a proper task for the PC. Embarrassing incidents arising from PC association in many of these assignments damage the PC image. In some instances the assigned personnel are relegated to the position of domestic servants, which is in itself demeaning and indicates that they are not really needed for the task originally assigned.

Executive Order 41, dated 2 September 1966, establishes rules and regulations governing the detail or assignment of military personnel to civilian offices and officials. Many of the assignments of PC personnel as described above could be terminated by holding to strict compliance with the provisions of this order.

RECOMMENDATION:

Implement strict control of the assignment of PC personnel to civilian offices and officials, eliminating those which are not considered absolutely necessary.

Republic Act 2334

Republic Act 2334 was enacted by the Fourth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, 19 June 1959, to provide for the rotation of Reserve Officers of the AFP in active military service. The purpose of the act is to make available for service in the event of emergency the maximum number of trained and qualified reserve officers. Since a large number of reserve officers desire to serve on extended active duty, the maximum period of such service has been established by law.

Theoretically, no reserve officer can be called to extended tours of active duty exceeding a total of two years within any period of five consecutive years. Reserve officers on active duty for more than two years on the date this act was approved were to revert to inactive status within three years from date of approval. Excepted were those possessing technical qualifications, skill and competence. The determination of officers in the exceptional category was to be made by a Board of Officers appointed by the Chief of Staff.

The reason for enacting this legislation is sound, however, the limited value of these reserve officers to the Constabulary does not appear to offset the detrimental effects the system develops in the law enforcement mission.

The reserve officer serving a specified period of two years as a Constabulary Officer usually has no law enforcement training or experience. He frequently is placed in a position of furthering his interests to prepare for reversion to civilian life. The wealth and power of criminal elements in the society can strongly influence the actions of an officer who has no interest in the peace and order conditions of the area of assignment beyond his specified period of service. Political pressure brought to bear upon these officers is a powerful weapon in forcing them to cooperate with the more influential elements of the society whose pursuits may be outside the law. From this standpoint, a reserve officer serving in the Constabulary can become detrimental not only to peace and order efforts but to the PC image as a whole.

A number of reserve officers are serving with the Constabulary and are required to obtain an extension of their active duty status every six months or each year. The present system dictates that these officers seek the assistance of politicians and other influential elements in order to ensure their continued active duty. This practice operates to the detriment of peace and order since the officers in this category are loath to antagonize local or national figures who might jeopardize their continued active duty.

Reserve officers were observed performing their duties in an unimpeachable manner, regardless of adverse pressures or political circumstances. In at least one or two instances reassignments of such officers were in the offing due to their strong devotion to duty and high moral principles.

Nevertheless, the feasibility of a reserve program for the Constabulary is doubtful.

The strength of the Constabulary is based on day-to-day operational requirements and anticipated changes in peace and order conditions. The reserve program, on the other hand, is designed only to provide mobilization strength for the secondary mission of national or home defense.

To enhance the professionalization of the PC, as well as the capability to perform the peace and order mission, the GOP should give strong consideration to elimination of the Reserve Program for the Constabulary and shift all responsibility for developing a trained and qualified reserve to the PA. By developing an effective training program at the PC School, officers and enlisted men from the PA Reserve could be selected, as the need arises, to attend training courses for subsequent assignment to the PC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That effective measures be developed to eliminate the practices under the current RA 2334 of utilizing reserve officers in the PC on a temporary basis.

Retirement:

Retirement from the AFP is termed "optional" or "compulsory."

Optional: Upon the completion of at least 20 years of continuous satisfactory active service an officer or enlisted man may at his own request and with the approval of the President, be retired from active service.

Compulsory: Upon completion of at least 30 years of continuous satisfactory active service or upon attaining 60 years of age with a minimum of 15 years continuous service of the officer or enlisted man. An officer is retired from the service in the next higher rank to which, under applicable laws and regulations, he is eligible for promotion. Retirement pay is computed based on the higher rank. As a result of the large number of officers and enlisted men who were serving in the armed forces during World War II, a large number of the Constabulary will be forced to retire within the next three to five years. A tremendous amount of experience will be lost to the PC, but in view of the reservoir of well educated personnel in the population, an overall improvement in quality can be anticipated.

Rank in the Constabulary

The levels and positions of rank in the Constabulary are similar to those of the U.S. Army. The Chief of Constabulary is normally a Brigadier General, but has been as high as Lieutenant General in the past. The Revised Administrative Code, section 829, also points out that the Constabulary, for administrative purposes, shall be deemed to be a Bureau. The Chief of Constabulary shall have all the powers conferred generally on Bureau Chiefs.

The principal General and Special Staff Officers of HPC are Colonels, while Zone Commanders are authorized in the grade of Brigadier General.

Selection Criteria

The criteria for enlistment and reenlistment of enlisted personnel in the Constabulary are contained in GHQ, AFP Circular Number 58, dated 3 January 1959.

All enlistments are in the regular force for a period of three years, except in a national emergency. Any male citizen of the Philippines between 18 and 30 years of age, able bodied, free from disease, of good moral character and habits, of average intelligence, and who possesses the required educational attainment is qualified for enlistment.

Age is not a factor in reenlistment. Except in times of national emergency, individuals at the time of enlistment must have completed the secondary (high school) course of instruction in a school recognized by the government and pass the prescribed classification test. However, a considerable number of the current force does not meet this qualification. The Survey Team was unable to obtain an educational profile of the PC enlisted personnel; however, samples do indicate that less than 50% are high school graduates.

The selection criteria, if followed, is sufficiently high to provide the caliber of individual capable of performing law enforcement duties in the Philippines. The educational qualification has been waived frequently in the past, but since 1962 no waivers have been granted. The majority of enlisted personnel who do not possess a high school education were recruited by the U.S. in World War II and were retained to complete retirement.

Officers are commissioned in the regular force upon graduation from the Philippine Military Academy. Selected reserve officers have been appointed in the regular force based on their performance of duty. Basically the same qualifications are required for an officer as for an enlisted man except that a college degree is a requisite for commissioned grade. There are exceptions to this educational requirement. Graduates of the School for Reserve Commission (SRC) and the ROTC Advanced Course are appointed in the rank of second lieutenant regardless of age.

PC Criminal Investigation Section (CIS)

The Constabulary CIS has peculiar and sensitive requirements to insure the security and reliability of its personnel in view of the nature of its functions and the clear necessity to insure individual reliability. The existing background investigations and security clearances will not provide the Director, CIS, with the detailed insight into individual personal behavior and attitudes to the degree required for weeding out questionable personnel. Many individual and personal problems, e.g. handicapped children, mental illness among dependents, excessive indebtednesses, unexplained increased wealth, internal frictions, etc., can be identified by the Director.

As with the inspection function, a reliability program enables preventive actions prior to individual involvement in irregular practices. A program of this nature cannot be delegated below the Director level if effectiveness is to be achieved. Necessary corrective measures will require expedited action at the director level.

RECOMMENDATION:

That an internal security and human reliability program be initiated for CIS personnel, over and above existing security procedures.

Code of Ethical Conduct

During its many visits of PC units, the Survey Team observed a code of ethical conduct displayed in only two instances.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the PC devise and display a PC Code of Ethical Conduct.

PC Public Image

The PC professional image is not furthered by the condition of its vehicles and many of its buildings in the provinces. Many jeeps are operated with gaping holes in seat covers and various visible parts hung together with wire. Little maintenance has been accomplished on buildings badly in need of such work. The fact that vehicles operate and buildings are made as presentable as possible is a credit to the ingenuity and efforts generated by individual commanders. In too many instances vehicle repair areas give the impression of storage areas for junk due to the poor condition of out-of-commission vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION:

That PC provincial commanders be provided the funds necessary to supplement their efforts in maintaining a suitable physical image through adequate maintenance of buildings and equipment.

Throughout its survey, the Survey Team encountered an oft-expressed desire that the PC recover its pre-WWII image of efficiency, incorruptibility and public service. There is little doubt that the PC image has been publicly tarnished as one views the public press. However, any changes to this situation must be developed primarily from within the PC and through the support it is furnished. Based on its observations, the Survey Team considered key factors in refurbishing the PC image to be: rejuvenation of the PC inspection system, improved training for the law enforcement mission, modifications within CIS, elimination of logistics through "public relations," provision of adequate logistics support, improved publicity, administration of a suitable code of ethical conduct and elimination of adverse political influence. Each is addressed separately in this report.

Historically the PC has been identified as a national agency maintaining internal peace and order by its suppression of lawlessness and opposition to insurgents and dissidents. Its periods of courageous and resolute behavior, frequently in the face of overwhelming odds, is a matter of record and has won the plaudits and esteem of the public. Following WW II, it suffered from identification with partisan politics and today its image is considerably diminished.

The press presents ready disparagement of PC, as well as other law enforcement agencies and is quick to publicize anomalous and irregular behavior even where such actions are largely confined to a minor segment of the organization or are often without foundation. However, in view of current investigations under way in the PC and the charges and counter charges being aired publicly, those instances brought into public view by no means represent the total of such involvement. That corruption exists among PC personnel is clear from the investigations underway outside the PC and those processed through the PC

inspection system. It is equally clear that this corruption and other illegal activities have the willing cooperation and assistance of many unscrupulous individuals in commercial and government agencies at all levels.

For the benefit of both the Constabulary and its individual members, it is essential that detection of potentially irregular or anomalous behavior be accomplished before becoming public knowledge and subjected to the glare of notoriety.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In conjunction with allied recommendations, conduct a major PC program to prohibit improper contacts with lawless elements, unsavory persons, sources of wealth and political influence.

In some areas of PC operations, the population does not necessarily desire relentless police operations to establish peace and order. This is particularly true where anti-smuggling actions are involved and any significant success of the effort will reduce local income. In such circumstances, any efforts of law enforcement officers are unpopular, regardless of justification or legality. In the Cavite area, a PC unit is conducting a campaign to diminish or eliminate smuggling activities. Its relations with the people are poor. In some barrios it is difficult for a PC constable to be provided a drink of water without payment.

The PRO at HPC is responsible for maintaining relations with the press and other media. This office does not receive the whole-hearted support of the entire Constabulary to conduct successful public information activities, or adequate command support to facilitate them. A review of the support provided this section reveals a woefully inadequate budget. For fiscal year 1966-67, the PRO is allotted 8,000 pesos to cover all expenses.

With adequate staff and command support, the PRO, through the Troop Information and Education Program, can encourage each member of the Constabulary in the belief that he is an ambassador of his government, which is judged by his actions as a public servant. A responsible attitude in each man to serve the public as an instrument of good government is prerequisite to restoring the image of the PC.

RECOMMENDATION:

Develop a planned program to improve the PC image.

"Public Relations" Logistics

A major disruption of the PC image is the debilitating and insidious practice of Constabulary "public relations" or "local logistics," pseudonyms used to describe the practice of Constabulary personnel "borrowing" fuel, maintenance services, spare parts, etc., from logging camps, mines and other local commercial concerns. This practice is related primarily to the lack of logistics support for vehicles. Due to its wide prevalence, it cannot be dismissed lightly. It is usually practiced in the interests of mission accomplishment. Without it, many PC vehicles would not be roadworthy and many operational requirements would not be met.

This practice is firmly eliminated by some aggressive provincial commanders and half-heartedly countenanced by others. Obviously such transactions are not officially condoned or recorded, but their existence is widespread and was all too easily established by Survey team members. The majority of individual personnel participating in "public relations" logistics should not be criticized since their actions were usually necessary to accomplish assigned duties.

However, the practice does not serve to improve the PC image since it is imposed on the private sector by an armed and uniformed branch of the national government. It serves to repudiate the atmosphere of public service the PC seeks to engender. At the lower levels it tends to proliferate in a continuing search for gratuitous handouts in the guise of assistance to law enforcement functions. Often it is the easiest method of circumventing vehicle support supply problems.

RECOMMENDATION:

Provide adeqaute logistics support to maintain PC vehicles and implement enforcement actions necessary to preclude PC personnel from entering into any personal arrangements to achieve such support.

Political Impact:

The most pervasive comments recorded by the Survey Team throughout all provinces and PC units visited were those concerning the existence and undesirability of political influence on PC enforcement and personnel actions. No unit was without such comments. Unfailingly, PC personnel addressed the necessity for excluding such influence, at any level, from the conduct of legitimate peace and order missions. This attitude received further and repeated substantiation from numerous judges and fiscals.

The most obviously affected PC personnel positions were those of provincial and company commander. Existing PC policy calls for a normal three year tour in these positions. Many officers in these assignments were certain their tenure would be reckoned in terms of months.

A wholesale change of provincial commanders was effected in early 1966. A tabulation of these changes indicates that only 10 of 57 provinces retained the same commander until 1 October 1966. This change no doubt served to separate many suspected officers from sources of corruption and opportunities for gain; however, it was apparent to the Survey Team that it had been largely counterproductive in terms of disrupted morale and the atmosphere of insecurity it generated in its wake. Additionally, it was certain that repeated subsequent transfers served to place some officers back with old connections and opportunities. In sum, it appeared to contravene the purpose of establishing a stable law enforcement system by introducing a large element of uncertainty and instability. This is clearly a one-sided view which must be placed in perspective. It is apparent that provincial and company commanders are exposed to the influences of corruption, the weaknesses of human failings and the opportunity to use their offices for illegal purposes. They have multiple opportunities for such actions and all too many willing supporters among corrupt or easy going officials and commercial interests. The Survey Team received two informal reports of suspicious involvement which it was in no position to validate. The existence of suspicion appeared to be the cause for at least one transfer. Additionally, criminal and political elements have caused the removal of efficient PC officers by initiating rumors and

defaming their character in the press. Whatever the reasons, these multiple removals and replacements become in themselves a part of the peace and order problem.

Rapid turnovers of commanders seriously disrupt the essential element of command and control. Most deleterious is the unavoidable development of discontinuities in law enforcement. All the manifold limitations in PC personnel and logistics are magnified and new ones developed by unanticipated displacement of commanders and their attendant command guidance. Law enforcement by its nature demands a high degree of continuity; plans and intelligence efforts require command supervision for completion. With severe peace and order problems throughout a wide geographic area, considerable knowledge is demanded of the customs and habits of provincial populations, plus detailed knowledge of peculiarities existing in local police establishments. This is a time consuming effort which cannot be quickly transmitted with any great facility or completeness to a replacement commander. When commanders are transferred to new areas they are confronted with a period of orientation which develops an invariable diminishing of peace and order supervision.

The transfer of PC commanders for reasons other than discipline and meeting peace and order operational requirements should be seriously questioned. Many transfers were described as "political" transfers to the Survey Team. More than one commander indicated that he was moved because he was not personally acceptable to a provincial governor, a congressman or some other government official. Others indicated quite frankly that they were moved when they would not accede to any stretching or violations of the law. Some stated that if a policy of strict law enforcement were followed it was an almost certain route to a transfer in some provinces. The reverse of this attitude was one of some accommodation to the desires of politicians, hoping at the same time to avoid identification as the "governor's man" or the "congressman's man." Overall, PC commanders are called upon to make almost impossible judgments in such matters and encounter a wide opportunity for error.

This situation is one incompatible with professionalism and one which can predictably be the cause of a continued serious eroding of effective law enforcement. It almost certainly will not serve to enhance the future course of peace and order and will breed an undesirable transient nature in the PC command function. Cases were reported where enlisted personnal remained in place because of political interference and the officer requesting his transfer would be removed instead.

The detrimental aspects of political influence in law enforcement are clearly visible in many local police forces which are identified as armed electioneering aids for incumbent mayors and other officials. If PC officers and units are similarly recognized as responsive to partisan political needs and desires of officials, they will tend to degenerate into a like category, continue to lose the respect of the public and their effectiveness as an enforcement agency and a public service.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That PC commanders be permitted a reasonably fixed tenure of command and enforced freedom from any public political alignments by strong command, direction and support.

That the transfer of PC officers and men be separated from political considerations which have no bearing on the necessity for professional conduct of law enforcement.

That the influence of local and national political figures be minimized in the assignment of competent PC officers suitably performing a professional law enforcement task.

That PC officers charged with suspicious or undesirable actions be subjected to expedited investigative and administrative processes with a view toward their ultimate clearance or punishment.

That PC officers in this category not be geographically reassigned until their status is finalized.

Aside from the obvious undesirability of political interference in personnel transfers, it is critically appropriate to consider that many political figures, particularly at the local levels, have little knowledge of law enforcement techniques or the physical hazards of political involvement by PC personnel. Their influences sometimes unwittingly contribute to the peace and order problem by providing PC personnel with their own political coloration

A case in point appears to exist in Ilocos Sur province. The province presently endures a severe peace and order situation with strong political overtone. It has 32 local police forces under PC control for various alleged failures to meet law enforcement requirements. Most of these alleged failures developed during and since the 1965 election which is still being contested in the courts. Within the 32 local police forces, only 21 of 363 police are civil service qualified, indicating a high turnover and the influence of political appointments. One municipality, Narvacan, has been the scene of continued violence and more is predicted by the local company commander. Six members of the Narvacan police force and two PC personnel from the area were reported presently detained in the 1st PC Zone for involvement in an ambush with political implications. On 24 September 1966 the Manila Times published a 1st PC Zone release indicating that a PC sergeant had been killed and a local official wounded in an ambush at Santa Maria, Ilocos Sur, a few kilometers south of Narvacan. At present 39 PC personnel are assigned to control the municipality, which gives clear indications of a tense and uncertain atmosphere.

In this unstable environment, one which calls for maintenance of a non-partisan attitude by the PC, one of the few PC provincial commanders in the grade of Major is in charge. This officer is identified with incumbent politicians, as is the company commander at Narvacan. He was functioning without an assistant provincial commander at the time of the Survey visit, apparently being unable to secure the assignment of a politically acceptable officer for this position. The three understrength companies at his disposal were not considered adequate to meet existing peace and order conditions. The adjacent province, Ilocos Norte, with a less violent peace and order environment, has one full strength PC company commanded by a Lt. Colonel and assisted by a qualified Major. It would appear that the best course would demand the assignment of officers completely disassociated from incumbent officials and their political opposition, plus a heavy strengthening of PC resources in Ilocos Sur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That assignments of PC officers to areas with acknowledged peace and order problems be made with a solution to the law enforcement problem the primary consideration. Officers selected for such assignments should possess a neutral political coloration to avoid identification with opposing or incumbent political factions.

One of the most readily visible political maneuvers which adversely affected the PC was the passage of Republic Act 4705, an act reclassifying the positions and standardizing the salaries of incumbent regular civilian agents of the CIS, HPC. This legislation was originated without the concurrence of the PC or AFP, and was reportedly written by the civilian incumbents of the CIS to solidify their status and pay scales. The civilian element of the CIS is, in large measure, an unnecessary duplication of the ivestigation service available in the NBI. Many of the "investigators" are political proteges who represent a thorn in the side of the CIS attempts to professionalize its service.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the civilian element of the CIS be eliminated and the service professionalized around a nucleus of military investigators subject to military law and command control of the Director, CIS.

Administration and Records:

From the standpoint of law enforcement, PC records and records administration are seriously inadequate and in some cases worthless. Basic data concerning fingerprints, arrests, prosecutions, convictions, wanted persons and similar information are either not available, drastically incomplete or inaccurate. The most cursory of inspections by the Survey Team revealed numerous instances of non-compliance with existing directives and ignorance of such requirements. A wide variation existed between units reported similar information and between the data available from other law enforcement agencies. Little attempt to resolve these differences or assure any correlation had been made. Most significantly, there was little evidence of inspection or command follow-up of these deficiencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the PC administrative, operational and criminal records system be reviewed and revised to insure it will provide basic law enforcement information.

Internal Inspection:

Detection of undesirable trends which can predictably lead to future problems is not difficult in itself; however, correction is impossible without an adequate system of inspection and an internal system to insure the reliability of personnel at all levels. This is particularly necessary in an organization with the wide-ranging authorities of the PC and its constant public involvement. It is essential to bear in mind that PC personnel are no less susceptible to temptation than others. They are exposed to more than the normal opportunities to become involved in crime, and are subjected to the human desires of personal aggrandizement and enrichment. Existing PC inspection checklists are thorough in their attention to matters affecting administrative, logistical, operational

and intelligence efficiency; however, they do not suitably address the problem of irregularities and nonethical conduct.

The PC has real problems in many units concerning relations with the citizenry, the local police forces, local and provincial governments, commercial interests, other government agencies and even other law enforcement functions. The existing inspection system largely ignores these matters, until they have reached the proportions of a complaint or public charge. At this stage the opportunity for preventive action is lost and the PC is faced with a host of unsavory involvements requiring after-the-fact investigations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Amplify the Inspector General effort at HPC and zone level to ensure adequate funds and personnel to identify erroneous PC personnel involvements prior to the necessity for investigations and public exposure.

Specifically charge PC inspectors with the responsibility to discern PC relationships with the citizenry, the local police forces, local and provincial governments, commercial interests and other government agencies.

In essence, an efficient system of protecting PC personnel against themselves is mandatory. Such a system cannot be confined solely to an internal inspection system, but must involve all commanders and supervisors. Paramount in this regard are the existing inspection and investigation systems of the PC: the Inspector General (IG) function and the Criminal Investigation Section (CIS). The former is greatly hampered by its limited size, the lack of flexibility to meet changing requirements and the absence of a separate and assured budget to meet necessary travel expenses. Additionally, most segments of the inspection structure at both HPC and zone level are so burdened with investigations that preventive actions are impossible. The 2nd PC zone inspector reported no routine inspections in one year, while accomplishing 41 investigations. The 1st PC zone indicated no routine inspection in 1964 or 1965. Significantly enough, the IG section at the 1st PC zone has investigated 25 cases concerning zone PC personnel since February 1966. These cases are involved and time consuming since they relate to many local government officials, the public and commercial concerns in addition to the PC officers or enlisted men. Both these situations obtained in areas where PC involvement in enforcement actions is of higher than normal intensity, where political involvement is strong, and the opportunities for irregularities increased.

Inspection efforts within the PC are not sufficiently oriented toward the law enforcement aspects of its primary mission. The most cursory of inspections by the Survey Team members revealed numerous lacks in compliance with existing directives concerning the local police inspections and essential following actions. Little attention is being applied to the content of many reports, their standardization or their distribution. If these factors are not addressed by inspectors with a high competence in law enforcement matters, little improvement can be achieved.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Emphasize inspection orientation toward law enforcement aspects of the PC peace and order mission by personnel qualified in law enforcement matters.

Emphasize the necessity for follow-up actions by inspection personnel and commanders to add validity to the inspection process.

In all fairness, it must be stated that a few PC inspectors have shown a remarkable capacity to take advantage of every transportation opportunity and by dint of hard effort and ingenuity, managed to inspect all assigned units with the desired frequency. There is no doubt that this aggressiveness by such inspectors have served to diminish the number of incidents reflecting adversely upon the Constabulary.

Despite an often negative public attitude, the Survey Team was frequently impressed with the efforts of the PC, particularly at the individual level in field units. It can be stated that the Constabulary has many dedicated and enlightened officers and men who are imbued with a high degree of professionalism, and moral conduct. Personnel contacted were unfailingly military in manner, frank in their discussions and highly cooperative. At the working level, there was a clear sense of mission orientation and a strong will to succeed despite many severe limitations. With enlightened government and public support, plus improved US advisory and logistical assistance, there is reason to anticipate a substantial improvement in the PC conduct of its peace and order mission.

"The need for police reform . . . must necessarily deal with the agency entrusted with law enforcement at the grass roots level—the local police forces."

President Marcos
State-of-the-Union Address
4 February 1966

Chapter VII

LOCAL POLICE

The more than 1,400 local police forces in the Philippines (47 chartered cities and 1,378 municipalities as of 1 January, 1966) range in size from the nearly 3,000-man City of Manila Police Department, down to the 1-man police "departments" of Uyugan and Ivana, Batanes. Effectiveness of the local police departments presents as great a spread as their size. Some departments are adequate and others leave considerable to be desired--while the rest may be found scattered at all levels along the scale between these two standards.

The Team visited 75 chartered city and municipal police forces, coming away with clear evidence that the overriding requirement for basic improvement in law enforcement rests within these forces in conjunction with changes at the national level through the NBI, PC, and the National Police Commission.

Public condemnation of local police forces is manifest. Their image suffers daily from newspaper comments. There is little question of their involvement in the prevailing worsening of the current peace and order situation. At various levels, their participation in criminal and other anomolous actions indicates an absence of restraints from official bodies and clear evidence of ineffectual internal discipline, inadequate training, and ineffective leadership.

Local police are publicly connected with almost every form of illegal behavior, criminal activity, abuse and irregularity. A listing of these actions in all spheres and locations would be unnecessarily tedious. Some examples provide emphasis:

Pampanga:	Five local police reportedly assumed Huk identity.
Mindoro, Occidental:	A local Chief of Police charged with defiance of authority.
Cotabato:	Members of local police charged with robbery-in-band.
Quezon City:	Chief of Police convicted of suppressing evidence. Ten officers linked to crime syndicate with two city prosecutors.
Manila:	Ten police officers accused of shakedown activities.

These and similar conditions are widespread, well established, and publicly commented on by high government officials. Under-secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee, in a speech before a recent graduation class of first-line police supervisors indicated, "When the law is violated by the very public officers primarily called upon by their official duties and their solemn oath to uphold and enforce the law, then our social system has fallen indeed." This was amplified on 22 July, 1966, by the National Peace and Order Council as it called the President's attention to reports of police chiefs, fiscals, and judges ". . . who connive with criminals, accept bribes, and who lack the courage and patriotism to uphold the law and thereby aggravate criminality and lawlessness."

In short, the actions of the local police, in many large communities and small, have served to bring public and official condemnation upon their heads. Suspicion and distrust often accompanies their actions. They are further from winning the confidence and trust of the public than at any time in the past.

The corruption and abuses noted in local police forces, as in other government agencies, are not isolated to those organizations. They are only symptomatic of the widespread corruption, disruptions, deception, and criminal activity evident in other government and private sectors. Agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue are investigated, as are members of the Armed Forces, the Bureau of Customs, the Criminal Investigation Service of the PC, the PC itself, the Land Settlement and Development Corporation and many, many others.

A variety of actions have developed to combat worsening conditions. Church leaders in Baguio City evolved "plans" against excessive criminality; the Mayor of Mandaldan, Pangasinan, ordered the shaving of police mustaches and sideburns for a better police image. The comparatively well supported Makati municipal police announced the acquisition of new vehicles, communications, and Armalite rifles. These actions are at best haphazard and of doubtful value. Most bore short-term results in confronting the long-term problem of detailed law enforcement by well trained and sustained police officers. However, the arousing of public efforts, although narrowly channeled, is a sound indication that the cost of ineffective law enforcement is being realized in some quarters.

It was common and simple to blame the local police for the crime situation. Allegations were frequent and they were illiterate--that they were incompetent--that in every election a complete 100% turnover took place in all the municipalities.

In order to determine some of the facts in this matter, and, hopefully, to point out some solutions, in April, 1965, Civil Service Commissioner Abelardo Subido initiated a survey of the municipalities.

The results of this nine months survey were published in March, 1966, under the title "Special Annual Report on Local Police Personnel Management."

Highlights of that survey report included:

1. Police laws are scattered, conflicting, confusing, and antiquated.
2. No national governmental entity has given full attention and guidance towards the professional growth of the local police service.
3. Only some 30% of the municipal police are civil service eligible.
4. The average policeman is too old for aggressive field leadership.
5. There is no stable national fiscal policy in police training.
6. NEC-AID police training is insufficient.
7. Police buildings and jails are in such decrepit structures that they pose a hazard to health and safety.

Major recommendations of the Civil Service Survey included:

1. A National Police Academy should be established under the NBI of the Police Commission.
2. In-service training of the entire police force from patrolman to Chief should be required.
3. The national government should bear 1/2 the cost of the training expenses of local policemen trained at the established police academy.
4. The NEC-AID police training given should be escalated.
5. The publication of an official organ for local police departments to update their knowledge and skills for better public service should be encouraged and subsidized by the government.

The report pointed out the anomalous situation in which the NBI was given specific responsibility under R.A. 157 for training local police, but the PC with "some legal implications as its enabling authority" for training was being provided with the financial support to do this training "thereby throwing the entire policy out of context."

The report goes on to say that the "training policies and standards of the two national police agencies vary in course content. The stamp of each speciality as a national military police and the other as a national investigating agency are indelibly marked on the subjects of training. As a result, police policies and procedure still suffer from an appreciable degree of lack of uniformity.

The report goes on to say that "8% of the 29,262 local police are graduates of the NBI academy and 23% are PC Police School graduates. The bulk of the PC training has been undertaken by the provincial commands with decidedly inadequate teaching staffs and facilities."

"The NBI, on the other hand, has trained a total of 14,021 government employees from policemen, security guards, or doctors and foreign agents on a variety of 15 or more police courses and could boast an array of competent instructors trained from abroad, practicing and working on the very skills they teach at the Academy."

The Civil Service Study reviewed city and municipal salaries with the following result:

Table of Salaries
(per month FY 1964-1965)

Ranks		Cities		Municipalities	
		Highest	Lowest	Highest	Lowest
Chief of Police		1,330	275	425	50
Deputy Chief		1,160	230	325	150
Police Inspector	I Class	725	260	415	180
	II Class	580	185	260	140
	III Class	480	140	225	130
Police Sergeant		430	130	235	65
Police Corporal		410	125	200	50
Patrolman 1 Class		330	120	175	75
Patrolman		300	105	180	45

The study was considered by the Survey Team to have objectively addressed the local police forces from a civil service viewpoint. However, its orientation precluded any detailed consideration of investigation deficiencies, logistics implications, and the over-all involvement in law enforcement of the national agencies: NBI, PC, and Customs. Many of its findings are addressed in the Police Act of 1966, as well as in the initial report of the Peace and Order Council. Its findings were substantially borne out in visits made by members of the Survey Team.

The report was useful for its delineation of educational, budgetary, and salary factors with certain exceptions. The budgetary percentages from the report appear to be suitable at first glance; however, they are of limited significance unless paired with the city or municipal budgets concerned. In many instances, particularly in municipalities, 100% application of the budget to police activities and support would be inadequate in view of its small total.

Police Budgetary Percentages
FY 1964-1965

Areas	Cities			Municipalities		
	Lowest	Highest	Average	Lowest	Highest	Average
Luzon	12.4	17.2	14.8	7.9	41.2	24.5
Bicol Region & S. Tarlac	17.0	25.0	21.0	11.2	30.0	20.6
Visayas	12.2	26.0	19.1	26.7	28.8	24.8
Mindanao	12.4	20.9	16.6	15.0	26.3	20.7
Averages	13.5	22.3	17.9	13.7	31.6	22.6

Percentage of the Total Police Force as to
Educational Attainment and Civil Service Eligibility
For the Year 1964-1965

Philippines	1965	1964	Increase or Decrease in %
A. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT			
College Graduates	9%	8%	1
Took Some units in College	23%	19%	4
High School Graudates	34%	33%	1
High School Undergraduates	16%	21%	-5
Elementary Graduates	13%	13%	0
Elementary Undergraduates	5%	6%	-1
B. CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY			
Civil Service Patrolman Eligible	36%	34%	2
Other kinds of Eligibility	14%	12%	2
No civil service Eligibility	50%	54%	-4

NBI figures for 1965 show 31,244 city and municipal police throughout the country. Of these 9% are college graduates, 32% have taken some college training, and 66% are high school graduates or better. These figures represent 1%, 5%, and 6% improvement, respectively, over the 1964 figures. 34% have not completed high school. 50% have civil service eligibility of some kind, a 4% improvement over 1964.

Number of Policemen by Population and Province (Population in 000's)
Calendar Year 1965

		Pop.				Pop.	
1.	Abra	(137)	165	30.	Marinduque	(137)	61
2.	Agusan	(324)	449	31.	Masbate	(401)	188
3.	Aklan	(269)	257	32.	Misamis Occidental	(295)	318
4.	Albay	(615)	426	33.	Misamis Oriental	(462)	353
5.	Antique	(284)	200	34.	Mountain Province	(521)	358
6.	Bataan	(174)	100	35.	Negros Occidental	(1589)	1,267
7.	Batanes	(12)	13	36.	Negros Oriental	(713)	379
8.	Batangas	(813)	775	37.	Neuva Ecija	(725)	677
9.	Bohol	(706)	397	38.	Neuva Viscaya	(165)	184
10.	Bukidnon	(235)	128	39.	Occidental Mindoro	(101)	47
11.	Bulacan	(664)	554	40.	Oriental Mindoro	(275)	163
12.	Cagayan	(532)	336	41.	Palawan	(195)	149
13.	Camarines Norte	(225)	70	42.	Pampanga	(738)	736
14.	Camarines Sur	(980)	622	43.	Pangasinan	(1342)	863
15.	Capiz	(376)	415	44.	Quezon	(780)	645
16.	Catanduanes	(187)	95	45.	Rizal	(1746)	3,748
17.	Cavite	(452)	667	46.	Romblon	(157)	92
18.	Cebu	(1586)	2,109	47.	Samar	(1036)	676
19.	Cotabato	(1231)	861	48.	Sorsogon	(415)	214
20.	Davao	(1068)	1,256	49.	Southern Leyte	(250)	132
21.	Ilocos Norte	(342)	185	50.	Sulu	(390)	311
22.	Ilocos Sur	(402)	375	51.	Surigao del Norte	(232)	186
23.	Iloilo	(1153)	1,721	52.	Surigao del Sur	(197)	174
24.	Isabela	(528)	494	53.	Tarlac	(509)	375
25.	Laguna	(564)	375	54.	Zambales	(256)	241
26.	Lanao del Norte	(324)	381	55.	Zamboanga del Norte	(336)	383
27.	Lanao del Sur	(454)	100	56.	Zamboanga del Sur	(893)	1,059
28.	La Union	(350)	235	57.	Manila	(1356)	2,629
29.	Leyte	(1146)	875		Total Number of Police		31,244

Organizations of the various local police departments varied, as might be expected, from the complex establishment of the huge MPD down to the most simple one and two-man municipal departments.

Other than being generally overweighted with plainclothes personnel, the local police departments appeared to be reasonably well organized to carry out their functions.

From the standpoint of administration, supervision, and technical operations, however, most departments were far less than adequate.

Even though facilities were admittedly substandard, with few exceptions maintenance was nonexistent. Facilities were extremely dirty; most of them

were not even swept. It would appear that even with a minimum maintenance budget the floors could be kept swept, the windows washed, and the tables and desks kept cleared of piled debris.

Most departments had little or no concept of the maintenance of adequate departmental and reports records. Blotters were incomplete, uninformative, and usually inaccurate. Reports were so incomplete as to be almost worthless, and, generally speaking, the personnel were not current as to the situation in their communities.

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
CEBU CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT



A graphic case in point occurred in one city where the Survey Team inverviewed the Mayor and Chief of Police. Asked what the major problems were, they said, "The 189 bars and the some 5,164 bar hostesses in the city." The VD rate among these girls was running about 20%, they said, although they required all the girls to get examined every Monday morning.

A team member then asked the Mayor and the Chief of Police how many murders had occurred for the year to date. Neither could answer or even make an estimate. Nor could either guess at the total number of crimes committed, the amount of property loss, or the number of arrests made in the city for any period.

Chartered cities appear to be approaching the Civil Service ideal of basic qualifications. The Zamboanga Police Department, for example: 68% of that department are Civil Service eligibles and more than 30% have had some college training.

The city of Davao Police Department is housed in a completely inadequate building. The department is composed of 401 men, 89% of them high school graduates, 51% with some college training, and 11% of the department are college graduates.

This department was attempting to police the nearly one-half million people living in what was reported to be the largest city in the world in area. They were futilely attempting to accomplish this task, which includes far-flung "unexplored" areas with only a limited number of vehicles and no communications system.

A most serious problem exists in the discrepancy in crime statistics gathered and reported on by the local police with those gathered and reported for the same area by the PC. While this matter will be discussed at some length in the Record Chapter of this report, it may be pointed out here that the IVth PC Zone Crime Report of "All Crimes" showed a total of only 2,255 crimes of all types in the entire IV PC Zone. When the team questioned these figures they were assured that the figures were complete and represented all crimes that had occurred in the entire area. However, the City of Zamboanga report shows a total of 1,901 crimes in the city alone for that period. In the major section of "Crimes Against Persons," the City of Zamboanga reported 540 cases while the IVth PC Zone report shows only a total of 285 crimes of all kinds in the entire province of Zamboanga.

Similarly, the City of Cagayan de Oro reported a total of 146 crimes for the year, while the IVth PC Zone report shows only 67 for the entire province. Finally, the IVth PC Zone report shows 145 crimes for the Province of Davao for the entire year 1965-66, while the Davao city report shows 506 crimes for the month of June alone.

These discrepancies make clear the necessity for standardizing crime reporting.

The 25-man Florida Blanca Police Department was subjected to a surprise inspection by the Survey Team which arrived with only 10 minutes advance notice to the Department. The Team found the entire Department on duty, some of them having been out all night on a case. The Chief of Police is a 14-year veteran of the Department; 17 members have been on the Department more than five years; 11 are Civil Service eligibles; 15 of them have been trained; some of them in as many as three courses of instruction. Three members of the Department (including the Chief) are NBI Academy graduates.

The I PC Zone recommended this Department for consideration for the Department-of-the-Year Award. The PC recommendation said, "In administrative procedures, records filing system, crime reporting and organizational setup, it is undoubtedly the best in the jurisdiction. Because of its rigid campaign against criminality, Florida Blanca has a low rate of crimes within the sector. Its cordial relationships with the public has yet to be equaled by other police forces in the locality."

A similar situation was found by the Survey Team in the municipality of Mandaue, Cebu Province, where an energetic Mayor and a highly capable Chief of Police were running a first-class 36-man police force. Pay was the highest in the Province, according to the Mayor. 27% of the Municipal budget was being allocated to the police force.

The Mayor had made available office space in the Municipal Building for the headquarters of an inter-area police group called "Interpol." The group, composed of law enforcement personnel of the area, met regularly and exchanged professional views.

The city hall was spotless; by far the best maintained public building that the Survey Team saw during the literally hundreds of official visits made all over the Philippines. The Chief, a lawyer, was fully aware of his situation, his problems and his approach to them. He was well organized and well prepared. It was a pleasure to visit such a department.

Mandaue Radio-Patrol Unit

The municipality of Santa Barbara, Iloilo, was another example of what can be accomplished with enthusiastic support of the Mayor. This small police department was operating two radio patrol jeeps on a 24-hour basis. The Mayor had radio or telephone communications to all his barrios, all policemen were equipped with revolvers and were provided with ammunition with which to qualify regularly.

The Mayor had purchased a number of surplus radios and telephone equipment. He had them cannabilized in order to get enough good ones to provide perhaps the best police communications network of any municipality of the country.

Also, in the municipality of Bais, Negros Occidental Province, it was clear why it was selected top municipal Police Department in the country for 1965-66. The Chief, a U.S. IPA graduate, had an excellent department in operation.

Although the Chartered Cities are in need of professional, technical, police advisory services, they are generally in better shape than are the municipalities. The city of Cebu, for example; with an 861-man force, 62% of whom have had some college training, (26% of the force are college graduates). The entire force has been trained in basic police techniques. The Department operates its own training academy; four members of the Department have been trained in the U.S. under

NEC-AID auspices. Yet, according to columnist Wilfredo Beloso in the Philippine Herald, the Department is plagued by the presence of two cliques, each identified with a powerful Cebu politician. With changes in political supremany, the chief changes, thus making the CPD a political football.

"The intrigues generated by the power struggle", said Beloso, "was having a demoralizing effect on the rank and file and police efficiency and discipline inevitably took a nosedive."

Retired Army Colonel Abundio Gultiano was appointed chief in July. In conversations with the Survey Team, he professed to be a political neutral and said he was interested only in getting the job done. A lawyer, his legal training will of course be valuable. He has some competent senior assistants he can call upon if he is able to get his senior staff pulling in unison.

The city of Cebu reported 12,086 crimes for FY 65-66 making it one of the more serious crime areas in the country. Over 1,700 of these were the grave "Part I", "Crimes against the Person" type. A total of 10,769 of these crimes were violations of general laws while the remaining 1,317 were ordinance violations. During the same period Cebu city police arrested a total of 7,892 persons; 5,799 for violations of general laws, and 2,093 for ordinance violations. Were it not for the internal conflicts, this department would be better regarded. It has its own Police Academy with a 12-week basic training course. Seven in-service training programs have been planned for FY '67. An Interpol, composed of law enforcement officers in the area has been formed and the department has a cooperative credit union in operation with 562 members and with assets of ₱144 thousand.

The continual changing of the Chief of Police tends to have a demoralizing effect on a law enforcement organization. Furthermore, it does not permit the professional development of a long-term plan of action.

This is one of the problems with the Manila Police Department which now has its 10th police chief since 1946. The only chief who had any real tenure was Telesforo Tenorio, an FBI Academy graduate who studied police techniques in both the U.S. and Europe. Colonel Tenorio served as Chief of Police from January of 1954 to May, 1962. Other than Tenorio and Quintos who served a total of eight years in two different stretches, the remaining seven chiefs of police have averaged about seven months in office. Current press releases report continual conflict between Mayor Villegas of Manila and Police Chief Papa.

Political conflict appeared to affect a number of communities, particularly the chartered cities.

Local geographic features represent a major factor in law enforcement. The majority of citizens live in small, scattered barrios and sitios, outside the central urban areas of municipalities or chartered cities. A majority of local police forces surveyed were typically unable to pursue any system of comprehensive patrolling throughout rural areas. In these areas, the influence of the law is largely reflected in the person of the Barrio Captain and his unpaid Rural Police. These latter were infrequently appointed in a majority of the municipalities visited by the Survey Team. Where appointed, their visibility was low and their training and capability on the most rudimentary law enforcement level.

Such rural areas are often beyond the control capabilities of police forces, despite their retention of legal jurisdiction for all areas physically within community boundaries. The authorities of the PC are superimposed upon this environment. Routinely functioning in rural areas, they are also automatically involved in any substantial criminal activity outside the immediate jurisdiction of local police: bandit gangs, syndicated criminality, smuggling, illegal immigration and similar activities. In many instances, they possess the sole mobility and communications capability to apprehend criminals who would normally be handled by local police. This situation creates an interaction between the PC and local police, which varies widely throughout the country.

Two cases can be used to reflect this situation: Davao and Baguio. The latter is a relatively small, predominately urban city, wherein all areas can be easily reached by vehicle. The local police are equipped for necessary patrolling actions. In contrast, the Davao City police, with a geographic area exceeding the combined areas of Chicago and Los Angeles in size, and much of this exceedingly rugged, cannot hope to patrol or control its jurisdiction with the communications and transportation available. In these two contrasting environments, the PC expends little effort within Baguio City, but is significantly involved in patrolling the extensive rural areas of Davao. By these examples, it is obvious that application of local law enforcement effort is uneven and questions in jurisdiction over crimes can easily occur.

It is extremely doubtful that any major changes to this situation will develop for some time to come. Considerable study is needed of methods to meet the problem of uneven law enforcement in rural areas by improving local police capabilities, making the rural police a productive entity in law enforcement or amplifying the participation of the PC in specified areas. In terms of popular acceptance, the latter course of action would in all likelihood hold the least appeal in view of existing and developing sentiments for increased local autonomy.

A further detriment to local law enforcement efforts observed was the effect of centralization in government. The direct relationship of many segments of local governments to national agencies in Manila tends to acclimate local officials heavily to direction from the central government and sublimates local initiatives. Many local and provincial appointments with direct effects on law enforcement, e.g., police chiefs, fiscals, judges, and wardens, emanate from the central government. Additionally, local tax structures bear the strong stamp of centralized influences. These conditions serve to strip local enforcement agencies, and their governments, of the capability for significant independent law enforcement action. It was beyond the purview of the Survey Team to conduct detailed exploration into political/government centralization; however, it was hoped that the broad scope of the Police Act of 1966 will enable the Police Commission to recommend and effect more balanced law enforcement in the field.

A common complaint is shortage of personnel; however, it is obvious that existing personnel in the PC, the NBI, and the local police are not presently being effectively utilized. The practice of excessive detail of personnel to headquarters assignments, detail of personnel as bodyguards and escorts and other non-productive assignments, is common in all agencies.

RECOMMENDATION

That the detail of police personnel to bodyguard and escort duty--except for authorized government officials, be discontinued.

Shortage of equipment is another common complaint. At the large gathering of police, PC, fiscals, and judges, the Survey Team was told that, "the only difference between the U.S. and the Philippines is in equipment."

The Team pointed out that there was considerably more difference than merely equipment. A number of examples were cited by which Philippine law enforcement and effectiveness could be improved without additional equipment. Coordination of the three separate law enforcement communication networks presently being utilized was one example. The present failure of the law enforcement agencies to go forward with buildup of the National Identification File at NBI Headquarters was another. Better coordination and calling on the NBI investigational expertise was still another example of possible improvements within existing capabilities.

A major local law enforcement equipment requirement is recognized: a means of communication from the local community to the PC Provincial Headquarters. This need is particularly urgent in those municipalities along the coast which are subject to pirate raids. Effective communications is perhaps the number one need--after basic training and elimination of political interference--of the municipalities. The Survey Team presented a proposal to the PC, the NBI, the Customs Service, and the MPD. It will be discussed at length in the section on communications.

The lack of logistical support which plagues all law enforcement agencies is again most serious in the municipalities. The section on logistics covers this.

"Scrounging" is a common practice among all law enforcement agencies. The city of Zamboanga had two sedans parked in the driveway with signs painted on the side announcing they were "donated" by local business firms. The chairs in the Cebu Police Academy were labeled "Donated by Bombie Aznar"--and "Donated by Jose Gullas."

An image of professional competence cannot be maintained in this fashion. The citizens of a community have a right to expect certain services and protection in the field of law enforcement. They have a right to expect a professional level of competence. On the other hand, the citizens must expect to pay for a professional level of competence. Service should be equal to all. Service founded on what one is able or willing to pay or what one is willing or able to beg cannot possibly provide uniform justice.

The PC is responsible for inspection of the local police forces. However, the frequency and the quality of these inspections leave considerable to be desired.

The entire file of these reports at headquarters PC was turned over to the team for review. It was found that they had not been read. They were incomplete in that many reports had not been turned in and yet no reminder had gone out to the negligent units. No follow-up was made on those cases where shortcomings were pointed out.

The reports themselves were generally stereotyped and rather barren of the information they should provide on the law enforcement status and capability of the agency inspected. It is expected that the Police Commission will establish a meaningful inspection system for the local police.

Cebu Police Department Classroom
("Donation" Labels on Chairs)

Vehicle "Donated" to the Zamboanga Police Department
(It had been inoperative for several months)

MUNICIPAL POLICE

Philippine municipalities are largely rural, frequently economically depressed, and often neglected by the central and provincial governments. Their significance in law enforcement can best be realized by an appreciation of the fact that the 1,378 municipalities are sub-divided into more than 29,000 barrios where a majority of the population of the Philippines resides. With a basically agricultural economy, municipalities have little to offer their citizens in the way of meeting their hopes and rising expectations. As children become educated and develop their talents, they find small reason to remain in the barrios and lose interest in farming. Many leave the countryside for the urban areas since municipal opportunities are few and salaries are low. This serves to stagnate municipal development through its loss of talent, reduce municipal income, and thus arrest the development of law enforcement where it is most needed. Concurrently, it tends to develop increased law enforcement problems in urban areas where too few opportunities exist for those flocking to the cities. Those municipalities blessed with growing economies and adequate incomes find little difficulty in attracting talent to the police force. They can provide a living wage, uniforms, equipment and suitable facilities.

The term "municipality" requires clear understanding when used in a law enforcement context in the Philippines. The Municipality of Makati, Rizal

MUNICIPALITY OF BAY, LAGUNA



LEGEND

THIRD CLASS ROAD .....

ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION — — — — — —

BARRIO BOUNDERY —·—·—·—·—·—·—·—·—

RIVER ═══


RIZAL - BONIFACIO MEMORIAL
HEADQUARTERS
CEBU INTER-POL
MANDAUE CEBU

Province, with a population of 115,000 persons, has a municipal budget of over nine-million pesos. The police force of 276 men is supported with approximately 1.2 million pesos annually. In comparison, the Municipality of Mobo, Masbate, with a population of 12,000, has a municipal income of 53,000 pesos and the police force receives 9,830 pesos annually. Makati is suitably qualified to become a chartered city, but has been unable to do so. Similarly, some chartered cities with low incomes, e.g., Tagaytay, with a population of 12,000 and a 297,000 peso income, have law enforcement structures and problems on a par with municipalities in the middle range. When affluent municipalities are endowed with enlightened

MUNICIPALITIES OF ILOCOS SUR (July 1966)

Nr.	Municipalities	Salaries Chief	Salaries Pat.	Actual Str.	Nr. of Civ. Svc. Elig.	Nr. with Police Trn.
1.	Sinait	130	90	13	2	4
2.	Cabugao	135	85	20	5	9
3.	San Juan	85	60	11	0	3
4.	Magsingal	170	85	12	0	0
5.	St. Domingo*			29	4	14
6.	San Ildefonso*			6	0	0
7.	San Vicente*			7	0	0
8.	Sta Catalina*			7	0	0
9.	Bantay*			11	0	2
10.	Vigan	210	115	59	3	16
11.	Caoayan	90	60	6	1	4
12.	Santa	85	75	11	0	3
13.	Narvacan	110	70	16	0	12
14.	Nagbukel	15	12	7	0	0
15.	Burgos	40	25	7	0	0
16.	Sta Maria	130	70	20	4	4
17.	San Esteban	80	50	5	0	0
18.	Santiago	90	60	7	0	2
19.	Banayoyo	30	30	6	0	0
20.	Lidlidda	20	15	4	0	1
21.	San Emilio	25	20	5	0	0
22.	Candon	200	105	21	1	4
23.	Calimuyod	60	50	5	0	1
24.	Salcedo	70	50	4	0	0
25.	C. del Pilar	20	7	2	0	1
26.	Sigay	15	10	3	0	0
27.	Quirino	40	30	5	0	0
28.	Sta Lucia	105	80	11	0	0
29.	Sta Cruz	130	75	14	0	5
30.	Suyo	40	30	4	0	0
31.	Carvantes	40	30	0	0	4
32.	Tagudin	120	105	11	0	5
33.	Alilem	25	20	3	0	1
34.	Sugpon	15	10	2	0	0
	*Salaries not available			363	21	93

municipal governments, and a minimum of political distraction, the citizens are usually well served with suitable law enforcement. Too often other circumstances exist. In some municipalities the local police are limited in size and able to patrol and police only the urban area.

The Province of Ilocos Sur provides one example of municipal police forces indicating size and representative salaries. This cannot be considered typical since only 7% are reported to have Civil Service eligibility against a nationwide figure of 30%.

To be noted is the fact that of 363 police only 21 have civil service eligibility. The police receiving the highest salaries are in the most populous municipalities immediately along the principal roads and the coast; the poorest paid are generally in the most isolated areas. It is reasonable to conjecture that police enforcement is needed in the hinterlands; however, it must be reasoned also that what law enforcement is accomplished must be accomplished professionally in the interest of avoiding abuses and serving justice. More to the point, this province is not noted for its peacefulness; it has an estimated 1,500 unlicensed firearms and strong political influences. Thirty-two of its local police forces are under PC control, primarily for disturbances during the last election.

The ineffectiveness of the police forces in Ilocos Sur is represented in PC inspection reports which abound with entries indicating: poor logistical support, poor weapons, no training, lack of records, lack of any operational plans or patrolling actions, lack of uniforms and office equipment, and the over-all ocmments on limited operational capability. These defects were substantiated in varying degrees, with a few outstanding exceptions, in a majority of the smaller municipalities visited and many of the larger.

The adjacent province, Abra, has similar statistics from eight of its municipal police forces inspected in July, 1966:

Municipality	No. of Police	Salary of (Pesos) Chief	Patrolman	Civil Service Eligible
Bucay	6	50	40	0
Dolores	8	34	30	0
Lananglilang	10	50	35	2
Manabo	5	45	40	0
Pilar	10	50	35	1
San Isidro	6	40	30	0
San Juan	8	50	40	2
Tayum	8	49	35	1

PC inspection reports reflect deficiencies like those in Ilocos Sur with the addition of low morale.

Cagayan Province in Northern Luzon provides similar data. For a province of over 500,000 persons it has 348 local police and 112 PC personnel. Only 57 of the local police are civil service eligible. This is well below the one policeman per 1,000 personnel established as a criterion in the National Police Act. The province contains 29 municipalities divided into 699 barrios. In addition to its mainland area it contains five offshore islands. The province is predominantly agricultural and much of its terrain is mountainous.

Criminality in Cagayan Province is attributed to a variety of causes: inadequate economy to support a growing population; urbanization by unemployed moving farm areas; alcoholism; loose firearms; political conflicts; land conflicts; moral degeneration; cattle rustling; illegal logging; smuggling; illegal fishing and other vice. PC statistics for Cagayan in FY 1965-66 indicate:

1. One crime committed every 32 hours.
2. Prevalent crimes: murder, homicide, physical injuries.
3. Approximately 80% are crimes against persons due to intoxication.
4. One person killed every 100 hours.
5. Property to the value of 76 pesos lost every 24 hours.
6. A rise in the crime rate during weekends, holidays, and fiestas.

STA. MAGDALENA



The data presented on three provinces illustrate the scope of the task confronting typical local police forces and some measure of the quality of their resources. The task is formidable in terms of the law enforcement assets available, the population to be protected, and the areas covered. Much improvement is needed before any notable successes can be achieved.

The quality and nature of municipal forces to apply to the enforcement task vary widely. It can basically be stated that municipal police forces are in the initial stages of a transition, although the level of transition in most cases is of a very low order at present. Some small community mayors administer their municipalities as a personal fief and show little responsiveness to the electorate, particularly in the field of law enforcement. A few are clearly progressive, responsive to the needs of the public, and appropriately regard law enforcement as a public service.

Municipal politics and inefficiency as they affect the local police appear emphasized on the Island of Jolo, Sulu Province.

The material status of municipalities varies at least as widely as administrative outlooks. Fourteen policemen in Jamihdan, Capiz Province, each receive 45 pesos monthly and all are not equipped with shoes or uniforms. One policeman was armed with a rifle minus a stock. The Bais Municipal Police Force in Negros Oriental, selected as the outstanding municipal police force in the Republic for 1966, presents what can be regarded as the other end of the spectrum. It was also selected as outstanding by the PC Zone for three consecutive years. It has one of the lowest crime rates in the province and has won the respect of the municipal citizenry and its trust in their competence.

The Bais police force is intelligently guided by an attorney who is also a recent graduate of the USAID International Police Academy (IPA). He has the enlightened support of the municipal mayor and municipal council members. The mission and purposes of this police force are suitably stated:

1. To preserve peace and order by enforcement of Penal Laws, Special Laws, and Municipal Ordinances.
2. Prevention of crimes.
3. Control of Juvenile Delinquency
4. Detection and Counteraction on activities affecting local, provincial, and national security.
5. To safeguard lives and property.
6. To protect the constitutional rights of all men to liberty, equality, and justice.
7. To preserve mankind.

BATANGAS POLICE DEPARTMENT



8. To protect the innocent against deception.
9. To protect the weak against oppression or intimidation.
10. The peaceful, as opposed to violence and disorder.

It has at its disposal 34 well-oriented policemen to serve the enforcement needs of 33,000 persons in 41 barrios. These police contain one college graduate, seven undergraduates, 15 high school graduate, two undergraduates, seven elementary graduates and two undergraduates. The Chief of Police is a Captain in the Army Reserve, and more than one-half the force are veterans of WW II and the Philippine Scouts. Their minimum salary begins at 190 pesos monthly and they are provided per diem payments for necessary missions. They were provided a budget of 102,980 pesos for 1965-66, which included insurance, retirement premiums, travel, spare vehicle parts, uniforms, prisoner maintenance, ordnance items and utility payments. Their weapons are varied, but suitable, and their transportation includes: two motorcycles, one jeep, one stationwagon, one outboard motorboat, and two horses for mountain patrols. Most of the police members possess their own bicycles. In addition to the above, the police force has been provided with separate police facilities and a modern jail.

It must be pointed out that this police force is located in a municipality with a sugar central, making it a relatively prosperous community. However, its income is listed only as 750,000 pesos, of which 7-1/2% is allocated to the police budget for operations, maintenance and pay. To be noted is the necessity for the community to vary its equipment to meet its needs and the ability to produce a suitable level of law enforcement with the personnel available. The key to its success is the quality of community and internal leadership which has produced the over-all support of the law enforcement needed.

The existence of strong political loyalties among municipal police is debilitating. One Chief indicated frankly that he had no control over five of his men assigned to duties with the mayor and vice mayor, and that he would readily discharge 50% of the police force as ineffectives if he had that authority. In another municipality it was apparent that the police were loyal followers of the mayor and followed no other instructions.

In another municipality visited, the situation was reversed. The municipality was dissatisfied with its civil service eligible chief of police because of his limited capability and desired to promote a newer policeman into the position. Their problem was the disposition of the incumbent chief, since the municipal government was too small to place him elsewhere.

The strong personal participation of mayors in municipal police work is usually one combining a positive political orientation with a misdirected sense of individual civic responsibility. One mayor in Masbate Province provides an excellent example. The police force had four officers-in-charge in eleven years and had no chief at the time of the visit. The mayor was a strong-minded ex-guerrilla fighter who personally took a hand in pursuing cattle rustlers in the province and all other affairs of the police force. At the time of the visit, all but one member of the police force were out working on roads in preparation for the town fiesta at the mayor's instruction. The mayor's interest in the affairs of law enforcement appeared to be a melding of his aggressive attitude with some combination of paternalism and benevolence; however, it will probably be difficult for the police force to develop an identity separate from the mayor's and reach any great degree of effectiveness.

In police forces of this and similar nature, the caliber of police is difficult to raise. Many local governments have an ignorance of the law and its

designed purposes. They seldom recognize that pistols, uniforms and authority in themselves do not constitute law enforcement and are not substitutes for enforcement actions, training, and supervision. Frequently, they will not provide the funds necessary to support their police in training and the police chiefs are reduced to doing the best they can with what they have. In these smaller police forces, it is difficult to maintain morale in view of the low pay scales and police work is not always a full-time occupation. Frequently, municipal police stations are empty because the police are out fishing, farming or otherwise earning a living. Coupled with poor incentives, low morale, and limitations in equipment, the countervailing drag of administrative inefficiency and political influence in the local government, the police produced often represent a detriment to public safety in terms of irresponsible armed authority. The temptations of corruption are obvious in these circumstances.

SORSOGON



RECOMMENDATION

> That in smaller municipal police forces the Police Commission consider advocating the reduction of police to the numbers which can be best supported by a combination of the municipal funds and national government subsidies. Further, to consider the procedure that additional police be hired or loaned from other communities for peak periods of public activity, i.e., Paydays, Fiestas, Holidays, etc.

Outside the municipal governments, the NBI and the PC have an involvement with municipal police forces. The PC is charged with inspection under the provisions of Chapter 35, Section 834, and Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 343. The Survey Team noted that PC records of such inspections were manifestly incomplete at HPC and were being carried out with uneven regularity in the provinces. In addition, there was no standardization of the information included in the inspection reports. Some inspectors were faithful in executing detailed checklists, others generalized to a large extent. These procedures served to significantly nullify the value of the inspections with the exception of

notifying the local police force of its deficiencies. The basic defeat in the current PC procedures is the absence of any enforcement authority to accompany inspection responsibility. There is no method for the PC to require that pay be raised, equipment furnished, training conducted, or office supplies furnished, etc. Obviously, inspection in itself does not serve to correct these problems. These corrections depend entirely upon the temper of the municipal government, and any pressures the provincial governor desires to expend on such matters. As a consequence, the same defects were noted in report after report for several years. There was no punishment or penalty attached for failure to comply with recommendations with the possible exception of PC censure of the non-complying community.

Although training will be discussed in another section of this report, a comment is suitable in the context of typical municipal attitude toward this subject. In most provinces, the PC organized a variety of local police training courses of from 30 to 60 days duration, usually held at the provincial headquarters location. These required the full-time daily presence of local police personnel and one peso a day to defray the cost of food. In many instances the PC commanders reported that the school attendance was very difficult to originate or maintain, since the one-peso-a-day cost would not be borne by the local governments and they were reluctant to permit absences for so long a period. This attitude has significance as an indication of poor municipal finances and a short-term viewpoint.

Frequently, local police were of low educational qualification and many were political appointees who did not necessarily expect to be in police work after the succeeding election. Some municipalities still subject the local police force to official caprice and short-term political goals. In Ilagan, Isabel Province, all but seven of 26 police were removed after the 1963 election; similarly, in Reina Mercedes, all seven were removed after the 1960 election. It was apparent to the Survey Team that many local police had been rewarded with their positions rather than selected for any merit or potential in law enforcement. They appeared to be creatures of the local mayor or other officials in many cases and of no benefit to the public's interests. Under these less than inspiring circumstances, training was difficult at best, and, at times, impossible.

The practice of post-election "turnover" appears to be diminishing to a large extent with increases in civil service eligibility, and many local governments appear to be developing a reasonable attitude toward the need for enduring law enforcement qualified to meet public needs. These are favorable symptons, but they are not sufficiently prevalent to eliminate corrupt practices in many communities, the "double standard" of enforcement for the influential and the poor, the lack of attention to juvenile problems, a wide lack of standardization of the basic tenets of law enforcement, apathy in local government and indifference in the public.

RECOMMENDATION

That the National Police Commission devise a method of placing some form of penalty on municipal governments which fail to take action on valid recommendations produced by PC inspections. This might well be a system of withholding subsidy payments.

Municipal police forces are organized, administered and inspected under the basic guidance of Republic Acts 2258 through 2276, and 834 through 837. These acts are largely obsolete in terms of meeting today's requirements for law enforcement and do not clearly encompass the present functions of local police forces, the NBI, and the PC. Clarity is required in addressing the training functions between

all three entities; the inspection being discharged by the PC is accomplished without the attendent authority to insist on corrective actions or to impose penalties for failures to do so. Many of the provisions of these acts will conflict with contemplated actions of the Police Commission.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission establish a joint PC/NBI/Police committee or working group for the purpose of reviewing all Republic Acts and other legal implements concerning organization, administration, training, inspection and discipline of local police forces, with the end purpose of devising suitable legislation to insure that these forces are properly developed to meet present and future peace and order conditions.

Republic Act 227 provides for the inspection of municipal fire departments by the PC. In addition to having little competence for this task, the PC has no authority to affect disciplinary or corrective measures other than referring discrepancies to the local of provincial government.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission seek to remove the participation of the PC from the function of inspecting local fire departments, and this requirement be placed in the hands of the Bureau of Public Works and the provincial governors.

The defects noted most commonly by the Survey Team are listed below. (Many of these appear elsewhere in the report but are consolidated here for convenience.)

DEFICIENCIES COMMON TO LOCAL POLICE

- Lack of office supplies: paper, pencils, etc.
- Lack of blank forms
- Lack of office equipment
- Lack of dependable means of transportation
- Poor communications or no communications
- Poor uniforms or no uniforms
- Shabby facilities in poor maintenance
- Little capability to patrol outside the poblacion
- Lack of accurate wanted persons information
- No police blotter or one artificially maintained from an informal, unofficial "journal"
- COP's acting as prosecutors with little knowledge of the law
- Little or no qualification with assigned weapons
- Lack of funds for training and ammunition
- Poor condition of weapons
- Poor housekeeping of facilities
- Low pay scales and attendent low morale
- Strong political influence by mayors or other government officials
- Strong political loyalties of policemen
- Low numbers of civil service eligible personnel
- Low educational qualifications
- Greatly diminished capability during hours of darkness
- Poor records keeping or no records keeping
- Little investigative capability or equipment

- Little understanding of preventive enforcement or identity as a public service
- Small public acceptance
- Poor discipline and low training status
- Limited capability to police rural areas
- Unresponsive municipal governments to police needs
- Inadequate legal reference materials and publications

The deficiencies listed above have usually persisted for a period of several years in varying degrees.

MUNICIPAL POLICE DEFICIENCIES

Following are extracts from PC inspection reports submitted on selected municipal police forces during the calendar year 1966. The extracts selected are those considered typical, of a repetitive nature, and substantiated by Survey Team visits to many other municipal police forces.

SUGPON, Ilocos Sur: Records not maintained, lack of uniforms, lack of equipment, little police training, lack of any operational plans, only one weapon available, poor jail facilities.

ALILEM, Ilocos Sur: No light or water in the jail.

SUYO, Ilocos Sur: No legal publications of any kind, low salaries, no administration, no files.

SANTA MARIA, Ilocos Sur: No bedding in jail, poor information network among police informants.

NAGBUKEL, Ilocos Sur: No police blotter, no administration being conducted, unsanitary jail facilities.

BANGUED, Abra: Police morale low, Pat. salary: 30 pesos.

MANABO, Abra: The mayor controls the actions of the municipal police force, low police morale, low pay.

PILAR, Abra: Mayor controls the actions of the municipal police force, police engage in farming to supplement police income, low morale.

MINALIN, Pampanga: Low morale, poor discipline, inadequately secured jail, police not responsive to corrective recommendations.

APALIT, Pampanga: Low police morale and efficiency, poor equipment, low state of police training.

BATUAN, Masbate: Poor supervision and control by the Chief of Police, poor jail facilities.

ESPERANZA, Masbate: Poor supervision by Chief of Police, poor contacts with barrio captains, no uniforms, inadequate budget.

MILAGROS, Masbate: No police uniforms, unsafe and unsanitary jail facilities, poor initiative in Chief of Police toward training his men.

BALUD, Masbate: Eight Police for population of 14,600, police provide their own uniforms.

SAN FERNANDO, Masbate: Dirty jail with poor food, low salaries for police.

MOBO, Masbate: Chief has no supervision over police since municipal mayor influences all police actions; poor administration, no reference documents, low morale, poor training.

MANDAON, Masbate: No police training, little equipment, no uniforms.

TIWI, Albay: Poor administration, inadequate numbers of police for jurisdiction, no police training.

MALILIPOT, Albay: No bedding in jail, poor discipline, no civil service eligible police.

MANITO, Albay: Low morale, low pay, poor patrolling action, no police training, inadequate firearms, office equipment and clothing.

RAPU-RAPU, Albay: Sub-standard salaries, failure to patrol islands in municipality, no training or lectures, inadequate firearms, office equipment and supplies. Municipal government unresponsive in taking corrective actions for past four years.

LIGAO, Albay: No uniforms, poor discipline, no training and general unsatisfactory attitude.

MAAYON, Capiz: No reference documents, little training, poor administration.

SAPIAN, Capiz: COP does not have full executive control of the police force, low salaries, poor record keeping, no training program.

JORDAN, Iloilo: Inadequate administration and record keeping, inadequate firearms, low salaries.

LAWIGAN, Iloilo: Lack of forms for recording arrests, poor reporting and administration, temporary bamboo jail.

LEON, Iloilo: Poor reporting, two members of the police being tried for murder, inadequate uniforms.

TIGBAUAN, Iloilo: Inadequate numbers of firearms, no patrolling of coastal barrios, poorly equipped jail.

BAROTAC, Iloilo: COP shows poor initiative in administration, training.

CABATUAN, Iloilo: No measures taken to correct defects reported in last inspection, poor jail security and sanitation, inadequate uniforms, poorly cleaned weapons.

CALINOG, Iloilo: Deficiencies reported in last inspection not corrected, poor administration and records keeping.

DINGLO, Iloilo: Poor administration and records keeping, inadequate security of jail and prisoners, no statistical records maintained.

DUENAS, Iloilo: Rusted weapons, lax performance of duties by some policemen, low salaries, poor administration.

MENDEZ, Cavite: Police patrols commonly limited to the urban area only, dirty jail, inadequate police training, police engaged in farming to supplement low salaries.

MAGALLANES, Cavite: Entire force needs training, no office equipment.

ROSARIO, Cavite: No police reference materials, no civil service eligible personnel, poor training.

TALIPAO, Sulu: No semblance of administration or organization, office manned only during market days, discipline below par, no reports, little logistical support, COP has little interest in his job.

PARANG, Sulu: Poor records, no office equipment, no jail.

MAIMBUNG, Sulu: No police blotter, inadequate uniforms and firearms, no local police training, no jail, poor duty attendance by some policemen.

PATA, Sulu: No jail or weapons, no police blotter or records, no office equipment or other logistical support, low salaries.

BONGAO, Sulu: Poor training of police, inadequate logistical support, poor selection of police candidates by the municipal council.

INDANAN, Sulu: Police force needs training in all aspects of law enforcement, poor discipline, no jail.

LUUK, Sulu: No record keeping, poor discipline, salaries not paid on time, little demonstrated initiative or planning, no administration and inadequate logistics support, police chief and patrolmen not in regular attendance at their places of duty.

CHARTERED CITY POLICE

Chartered city police forces more nearly approach reasonable standards in organization and local support. These vary greatly in size and capability dependent upon the economic and political conditions prevailing, in addition to the geography of the city. Some chartered cities are almost completely urbanized, e.g., Baguio; others have a large urban area with considerable adjacent rural and rugged sections. In this latter category is the city of Davao, which has over 800 square miles to police. Other chartered cities are cities in name only, and have all the physical characteristics of municipalities, including both the economy and rural nature. Chartered city police forces vary from that in Manila with almost 3,000 members to Tagaytay, one of the smallest, with 27 policemen.

The table reflects variations in size, support and equipment. Using the police strength specified by the Section 19 of the Police Act of 1966, i.e., one police officer per 1,000 inhabitants, some cities enjoy a 100% coverage in police strength. This is numerically true of the cities of Cotabato, Agusan, and San Pablo. The police strengths indicated in the chart can be misleading, since in many instances, the majority of the police activity is restricted to foot patrols in the urban areas, with only secondary or occasional police activity in the rural sections, largely due to the lack of sufficient vehicles. Most of the cities


DAVAO PROVINCE
DAVAO CITY
DAVAO POBLACION
MUNICIPAL POBLACION (REPRESENTATIVE)
DAVAO PROVINCE
LEGEND
MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES
BARRIOS (VILLAGES)
POBLACION (URBAN AREA)

listed on the chart possess only a few vehicles to service sizable police forces and areas, e.g., Agusan, with 159 police officers and four vehicles. This is a factor seriously inhibiting any rapid response for law enforcement needs. City police budgetary support varies widely: Palayan City allocates approximately 10-1/2% of its income to the police, while Gingoog City uses over 20% for this purpose.

DATA OF CHARTERED CITIES

City	Population	Approximate Income (Pesos)	Police Budget (Pesos)	Number of Police	Number of Vehicles	Number of Weapons
Laoag City	60,000	560,000	130,058.40	73	4	78
Dagupan City	48,185	860,166	92,940.00	55	1	33
Cabanatuan City	88,929	1,900,000	255,655.00	80	4	42
Palayan City	3,981	250,000	26,518.80	17	1	35
Legaspi City	90,000	1,200,000	243,000.40	72	5	63
Lipa City	34,000	1,070,000	149,280.59	65	2	65
San Pablo City	77,215	1,600,000	* –	123	4	87
Cavite City	66,003	206,376,000.65	184,690.01	81	*–	97
Tagaytay City	12,000	297,020	47,073.80	27	1	27
Caloocan City	260,000	6,560,400	818,818.17	268	20	158
Cotabato City	44,820	1,500,000	249,720	90	4	89
Agusan	83,247	2,709,859.75	381,040	159	4	163
Cagayan de Oro	83,679	2,991,365.61	400,000	123	5	145
Dapitan City	32,061	*	63,065	31	1	*
Misamis City	60,000	1,341,900.62	172,608	88	2	86
Gingo-og City	70,000	800,000	170,000	48	3	54
Davao City	223,183	8,680,506	1,512,017	401	25	460
Basilan City	155,712	2,407,509.68	*	140	5	172
Zambo Anga City	132,236	2,606,750.55	873,697	207	7	163

*Data not available.

There is a continuing tendency to seek chartered city status since it creates direct ties with the seat of power and influence in the central government and obviates any control from the provincial governor. However, outside these considerations, continuing fragmentation holds problems. It serves to coalesce political and economic influences into areas of self-sufficiency, thus isolating the less affluent municipalities.

Political influences are at least as clearly apparent in chartered cities as in municipalities and frequently involve national political figures. Usually these influences appear between the chief and the mayor and are the result of divided loyalties among the police force members.

A significant difference between municipal and city police forces is the authority of the President to remove and replace the chief. This, and local political involvements, frequently serve to disrupt the tenor of law enforcement greatly in several cities.

BACOLOD CITY POLICE FORCE

The City of Bacolod is fortunate in securing a well-trained Chief of Police who receives a high degree of cooperation from the city mayor and city council members. The population of 248,000 is contained in 62 square miles and includes 19 barrios outside the urban area of the city. From the annual income of 7,000,000 pesos the 194-man police department receives 1,100,000 pesos.

The police are reasonably well equipped with .38 caliber weapons and are supplied with 23 vehicles. Since June of 1964, its personnel have attended 379 training courses ranging from Basic Police to Police Science. Percentage of cases solved in 1964 was 82.47; this was raised to 90.79 in 1966.

A notable feature of this police force is its administration and management. Although it could be considered "over-organized" and fragmented into sections too small to be effective, it appears to address the basic administrative problems sufficiently well. It has a merit promotional plan and a system of efficiency rating, in addition to a local Police Screening Committee functioning under the office of the city mayor. The directions to this committee establish minimum police qualifications, require medical, psychiatric, and intelligence tests.

With the assistance of the city mayor and council members, the Chief of Police has been successful in establishing a Junior Police organization, a Boys Home for handling juvenile delinquents; a Public Recreation Program primarily for the youth of the city; a Boys Protectory for rehabilitation of youthful offenders; and established a special traffic unit from local motorcycle owners. In addition to these actions, he is directly involved in a local Police Advisory Council and jointly sponsored the initial Seminar Workshop on Barrio Administration beginning in July, 1966, with the City of Bacolod, the Police Advisory Council, and the Association of Barrio Councils. This latter action considered civil defense, rural sociology, criminal law, modern policing, juvenile delinquency, public recreation, community development, barrio financing, criminal evidence, criminal procedure, mechanics of arrest and seizure, public administration and firearms among other topics. No other chartered city Chief of Police observed by the Survey Team had his force so well organized and so capably oriented toward serving the needs of the public. The danger exists that the efforts of the chief will become so diffused that law enforcement will suffer. At the moment, however, this appears to be far less a hazard than neglecting completely the corollary problems of a large city department. The key to the success of this chief, in addition to his training and ability and dedication, was the outstanding rapport he had achieved and maintained with the city council and city mayor. He indicated he had been given a free hand and maximum cooperation without which he would not have accepted the assignment.

Following is the Bacolod annual report of cases handled. It is typical of other cities in many respects. It is not typical in that it reflects a number of unsolved crimes from which can be inferred that statistics are being tabulated in a manner more in keeping with methods recommended in another section of the survey report.



Evening Colors Zamboanga Police Department

ANNUAL REPORT ON CASES HANDLED BY THE BACOLOD POLICE DEPARTMENT
1 JULY 1965 – 30 JUNE 1966

Nature of Crimes	Fiscal Year 1965 - 1966			Monthly Ave. of Cases Handled
	Cases Handled	Cases Solved	Cases Unsolved	
1. Murder	12	11	1	1
Frustrated Murder	17	15	2	1
Attempted Murder	6	6		
2. Homicide	19	18	1	1
Frustrated Homicide	12	11	1	1
Attempted Homicide	15	14	1	1
3. Paricide	1	1		
Frustrated Paricide	3	3		
4. Physical Injuries	984	893	91	82
5. Maltreatment	28	25	3	2
6. Robbery	265	91	174	22
7. Theft	996	541	455	83
8. Estafa (Swindling)	183	158	25	15
9. Threats and Coercion	212	204	8	17
10. Vagrancy and Prostitution	154	154		13
11. Traffic Accidents and Collisions	855	798	57	71
12. Traffic (City Ords.)	504	504		42
13. Malicious Mischief	120	107	13	10
14. Gambling	54	54		4
15. Blue Seal Cigs.	137	136	1	11
16. Rape	11	11		1
17. Attempted Rape	6	6		
18. Lascivious Acts	9	8	1	
19. Abduction	12	12		1
20. Seduction	1	1		
21. Ill. Poss F/Arms, Ammos. and Explosives	45	45		4
22. Deadly Weapon, Concealing	328	328		27
23. Assault	13	13		1
24. Concubinage	1	1		
25. Kidnapping	1	1		
26. Res/Dis to Agents of Persons in Authority	23	23		2
27. City Ordinances	936	936		78
28 Ill. Discharge of F/Arms	13	13		1
29. Alarm and Scandal	219	219		18
30. Slander by Deeds	147	146	1	14
31. Unjust Vexation	161	146	15	13
32. Trespassing	21	19	2	2
33. Passing Fake Bills	9	7	2	
34. Viol. Executive Order No. 319	3	3		
35. Missing Persons	284	236	48	24
36. Lost and Found	256	209	47	21
37. Inducing Minors	6	5	1	
38. Disobedience to Parents	6	5	1	
39. Corrupting Public Official	1	1		
40. Viol. Sec. 52 of the Revised Election Code	2	2		
41. Viol. BIR Law (Weights and Measures)	5	5		
42. Appearances	211	211		18
43. For Record	599	599		50
TOTAL	7,906	6,955	951	
Percentage of Solved Cases for Fiscal Year 1965 - 1966:				87.97

Despite its organization, good leadership, city government support and public cooperation, the Bacolod police force operates under certain limitations. It has:

a. Poor communications
b. No source of intelligence funds or trained intelligence personnel
c. Limited laboratory equipment
d. Inadequate budget and limited personnel.

DUMAGUETE CITY POLICE FORCE
PERSONNEL STRENGTH AND EDUCATIONAL PROFILE

Rank or Designation	Strength		Elementary				High School					College					Elig.	Non-Elig.	Monthly Salary
	Auth	Act	5	6	7	Grad	1	2	3	4	Grad	1	2	3	4	Grad			
Chief.....	1	1														1	1		₱850
Pol Insp 3"(Adm)	1	1										1					1		314
Pol Insp 3"(Plnc)	1	1														1	1		314
Asst. Chief Plnc	1	1										1					1		210
Sergeant	1	1									1						1		215
Sergeants	5	4		1				1			1	1					4		210
Corporals	8	8			2		1				3	2					8		205
Patrolmen 1" Cls	5	5	1			3					1						5		183
Patrolmen.....	48	47																	
a) Regular		29		1	2	2		3	1	1	6	2	1	1	2	7	29		180
b) Temporary....		18	1				1				9	1	2	1		3		18	180
Patrolwoman....	1	1				1											1		180
TOTAL.....	72	70	2	2	4	6	2	4	1	1	21	8	3	2	2	12	52	18	x x

Data on a few other selected city police forces visited by the Survey Team are included. Of the Dumaguete personnel listed, the following training has been received.

a.	Chief	Interpol training	3 months
b.	Chief, One Inspector	NBI	6-month course
c.	34 Patrolmen	NBI	2-week course
d.	10 Patrolmen	PC Training Course	

This police force reported limited investigative capability. Its primary problem in law enforcement was the thefts being caused by a highly transient population.

LEGAZPI CITY POLICE FORCE

Legazpi is a third-class city with an income of 1,400,000 pesos. It has a population of 90,000 and includes 30 barrios. It has 66 police on duty, all of whom are either NBI or PC trained. It has 56 .38 caliber weapons, plus 11 miscellaneous arms. The police pay ranges from a high of 850 pesos monthly for the chief, to 180 for new patrolmen. It numbers 35 high school and seven college graduates among its members. Its comparative crime rate for the past two-year period is as follows:

	64-65	65-66
Killings, one every	2 months and 4 days	one month and 22 days
Estafa, one every	22 days	10 days
Robbery, one every	27 days	11 days
Theft, one every	6 days	4 days

BASILAN CITY POLICE FORCE

This is the only island city in the Philippines and it maintains police jurisdiction for four miles offshore. Of its 2,000,000 peso income, 500,000 is for the police with its 149 members. The city has a population of 160,000 persons.

The chief reports his current problems as: lack of boats, training funds, communications, office equipment, uniforms, photographic equipment, field glasses, and a precinct building.

ILOILO CITY POLICE FORCE

The Iliolo City Police Department functions in a city of 250,000 persons with the following personnel:

DISTRIBUTION

	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2nd Lt	Sgt	Cpl	Det	Pat	Civ	Drs	Total
Office of the Chief	1	2	1		4			1	16			25
Adm. Bureau.....		1		1	5	4	6	1	47		16	81
Det. Bureau		1	1	4	1	4	10	46	10	3		80
Traffic Bureau				1	2	3	5	2	43			56
Patrol Bureau.....			2	1	4	7	22		112			148
Special Services							2		7	8		17
TOTAL	1	4	4	7	16	18	45	50	235	11	16	407

SILAY CITY POLICE FORCE

This force of 68 functions in a city of 60,000 persons. Of its members only 14 are less than high school graduates, and 43 are civil service eligible. All of its members have received training with the PC, NBI. An interesting feature of this force exists in the fact that only 23 members are below the age of 30, and only three appointments were made in 1965, with none since then.

CEBU CITY POLICE FORCE

This force functions in a city of 400,000 persons with an 862-man force. Three hundred and nine of its members have been trained in the NBI or the PC; 229 of its members are listed as having college education. This force has a credit union with assets of 128,000 pesos to which 85% of the force belongs.

QUEZON CITY POLICE FORCE

Rank	Salary Pesos/month	Eligibles	Non-Eligibles
Lt. Colonel	1,000	1	0
Police Inspector 1st Class	500	6	1
Police Inspector 2nd Class	400	20	3
Police Inspector 3rd Class	345	27	2
Police Sergeant	250	52	2
Patrolman	245	659	60
Policewoman	245	5	0
Total Police Force		700	68 = 838
Civilian Employee		26	23 = 49
Grand Total			887

With one of the largest police forces in the Philippines, Quezon City, with an income of approximately 22 million pesos, allocates 2,303,923 pesos to the police force. An interesting item in their budget is 10,000 pesos for the purchase of information. The city is growing rapidly, expanding from 250,000 in 1959 to 575,000 in 1965. A major problem is the existence of over 14,000 former rural inhabitants who occupy land illegally as squatters in 61 areas, and the existence of youthful gangs, a relative rarity in the Philippines.

Common to all city police forces are their limitations in investigative capability, communications, and other equipment, usually directly related to budgetary limitations. They are oriented toward common crimes by ordinary perpetrators. The solution to these is not usually difficult since the accused is frequently readily at hand and known to several witnesses.

Peculiar to chartered city police forces is the problem of large numbers of wanted persons who apparently take refuge in the anonymity possible in urban areas. Davao province indicated it has at least 606 wanted persons; some for as long as ten years. The absence of a national communications network for enforcement agencies and the lack of an adequate national fingerprint repository permits untold numbers of wanted persons to move about with relative freedom. If apprehended, it is usually by accident.

In some police forces, it is frequently a common practice to avoid entering an action in the police blotter until the name of the accused is known. This results in a solution rate approaching 100%, which is less than realistic. Following is a summary of the crime existing in the City of Bago during the months of June and July, 1966. The crimes involved are typical, as are the weapons used.

Like municipal police forces, chartered city police forces are currently in a variety of transitional phases. Most of this transition is still of a relatively low order and is likely to remain so unless major changes occur in city government attitudes and the influence of politics is eliminated or drastically reduced. The few cities with enlightened administrations appear to be at least serving the interests of the people; those wracked by political power struggles and the search for expanding spheres of influence have disreputable police officers, poor relations with the public, and require a major overhaul in city government before the enforcement of the law can become a reality. Once a resolute and enlightened city government is established and is responsive to the needs of its electorate, the correction of police failings and abuses is a comparatively easy task.

CITY OF BAGO

STATISTICAL DATA ON CRIMES FOR THE MONTH OF MAY 1966

Kind of Crime	Weapons Used	Motives of Causes	Status	
			Solved	Unsolved
1. Unjust Vexation	None	Intoxication	Solved	
2. Slight Physical Injuries	"	"	"	
3. Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence	Jitney	Recklessness	"	
4. Slight Physical Injuries	None	Intoxication	"	
5. Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition	Homemade Rev	Personal use	"	
6. HOMICIDE	Knife	Intoxication	"	
7. Slight Physical Injuries	"	"	"	
8. Malicious Mischief	None	Anger	"	
9. Assault Upon An Agent of Person in Authority	Knife	Intoxication	"	
10. Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition	Homemade Rev	Harrassment	"	

STATISTICAL DATA ON CRIMES FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE 1966

1. Alarm and Scandal	None	Intoxication	Solved	
2. Frustrated Homicide	Knife	"	"	
3. THEFT	None	Gain	"	
4. Alarm and Scandal	None	Intoxication	"	
5. Less Serious Physical Injuries	None	Personal grudge	"	
6. Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence	Pass. truck	Recklessness	"	
7. Slight Physical Injuries	None	Harrassment	"	
8. THEFT	"	Gain	"	
9. THEFT	"	"	"	
10. Illegal Possession of Firearms	2 Shotguns	Personal use	"	
11. THEFT	None	Gain	"	
12. Slight Physical Injuries	Piece of Wood	Harrassment	"	
13. Frustrated Homicide	Knife	Intoxication	"	
14. Viol of MO 3, S'63, Adptd by CO 4, S'66	Bolo	"	"	
15. THEFT	None	Gain	"	
16. THEFT	"	"	"	
17. Unjust Vexation	"	Intoxication	"	
18. Frustrated Homicide	Boloes	Personal grudge	"	
19. Frustrated Homicide	Butcher's kn.	Grudge	"	
20. THEFT	None	Gain	"	
21. Theft of Large Cattle	"	"	"	
22. Serious Physical Injuries	"	Misunderstanding	"	
23. THEFT	"	Gain	"	
24. Robbery in an Inhabited Place w/Frust. Homicide	Revolvers	Gain	"	
25. Less Serious Physical Injuries and Mult Sl Phys Inj Thru Reckless Imprudence	Trucks	Recklessness	"	
26. Viol of MO 3 S'63	Knife	Harrassment	"	
27. Slight Physical Injuries	"	"	"	
28. Theft of Large Cattle	None	Gain	"	
29. Acts of Lasciviousness	"	Lewd design	"	
30. Slight Physical Injuries	Stone	Anger	"	
31. Unjust Vexation	None	Harrassment	"	
32. THEFT	"	Gain	"	
33. THEFT	None	Gain	"	
34. Inducing Minor to Abandon Her Home	"	"	"	
35. Unjust Vexation	"	Harrassment	"	

Submitted By:

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Lt Col, Inf (PC) Inac
Officer-In-Charge

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Police Commission, in conjunction with AID, the Justice Department, and the NBI, establish a MTT for the specific purpose of reorienting chartered city governments toward the needs of realistic law enforcement with the complete support of the city governments.

That First and Second Class chartered City Police Forces with 150 or more police be inspected by suitable representatives of the police commission rather than the PC in view of the comparative sophistication of such police forces and the necessity for high level influences to ensure corrective actions.

The obstacles to effective local police operations in the Philippines are those common in other developing nations, with major emphasis on: inadequacies in logistical support, poor local government conception of law enforcement requirements and political interference in the conduct of police functions. The local police in the Philippines do not enjoy a high public status and are not held in any great esteem by the average citizen. Low police salaries encourage the development of corruption and police abuses, which further deteriorates the police public image. Added to this, the inability to secure rapid prosecution through the courts greatly nullifies the effects of law enforcement activities. Without the support of the public, without the wholehearted support of local government and without the enlightened support from the courts, the local police forces exemplify the effects of neglect, misdirection, and inattention.

CITY OF BAGO

STATISTICAL DATA ON CRIMES FOR THE MONTH OF JULY 1966

Kind of Crime	Weapons Used	Motives or Causes	Status	
			Solved	Unsolved
1. Light Threats	Bolo	Anger	Solved	
2. Malicious Mischief	None	Resentment	"	
3. THEFT	None	Gain	"	
4. Accessory to Theft	"	"	"	
5. Qualified Theft	"	"	"	
6. Viol MO 3, S'63, Adptd by CO 4 S'66	Icepick	Personal Use	"	
7. ROBBERY	None	Gain	"	
8. THEFT	"	"	"	
9. THEFT	"	"	"	
10, THEFT	"	"	"	
11. Alarm and Scandal	"	"	"	
12. Accessory To Theft	"	"	"	
13. Qualified Theft	"	"	"	
14. HOMICIDE	Knife	"	"	
15. Less Serious Physical Injuries Thru Reck. Imp.	Stone	Not intentional	"	
16. Less Serious Physical Injuries	Revolver	Personal grudge	"	
17. Res. & Dis. to An Agent of Pers. in Authority	None	Intoxication	"	
18. Unjust Vexation	"	Harrassment	"	
19. Malicious Mischief	"	"	"	
20. Accessory to Theft	"	Gain	"	
21. Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence	Automobile	Recklessness	"	
22. THEFT	None	Gain	"	
23. MALTREATMENT	"	Anger	"	

Submitted By:

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Officer-In-Charge

"Strive for the happiness of your country before your own, making of her the kingdom of reason, of justice and of labor; for her happiness is yours also and that of your family."

A. Mabini

Chapter VIII

TRAINING

Some one hundred and fifty years ago, in a campaign to reorganize the London Metropolitan Police, Sir Robert Peel laid great stress upon the necessity of police training. He recognized the need to establish, so far as possible, definite procedures in police work. He contended that a police force working in a haphazard manner, each man having no definite purpose, meant chaos. As a result of his contention, some system of police training has been established in most British and U.S. police departments.

The need for training is clearly recognized and understood. Just exactly what its dimensions should be - and more important - exactly how to meet this need, are not so universally clear. In the larger police departments in the U.S. police training schools are maintained where the police recruit is given basic training. Smaller departments take advantage of the training provided by the larger departments, and that provided in zone training classes and by the colleges and universities. In addition, the FBI conducts regular residence and zone training classes for selected local police.

Regardless of the location, it is now recognized that the police officer, like a doctor, a lawyer, or any other professional, requires repeated training. He must have vestibule training which will provide him with the basic tools of his profession. These include the history of law enforcement, the laws which he must enforce; the rights of the citizen; the techniques of patrol and observation; utilization of his basic equipment; the techniques of interrogation, report writing, dealing with people, and basic investigation. Most of all he must clearly understand the philosophy of service and the ethics of the law enforcement profession.

The basic training, properly organized and presented by competent instructors, will fit him for his initial job; however, with only this training he can by no means be considered a fully competent professional law enforcement officer. This can only come after additional training, layered with considerable experience.

Additional training will include advanced classes which will assist him in expanding the depth and breadth of his basic knowledge; and specialized training which is specifically geared to give him more complete knowledge of specific phases of his profession such as criminal investigation, scientific investigation, fingerprinting, narcotics, homicide investigation, traffic, vice control or the handling of juvenile delinquency.

In order to transmit information on specific subjects to an entire agency without taking the men from the field - the Roll Call Training Procedure - a technique developed by the Los Angeles Police Department in 1948 is now used extensively throughout the U.S. In 1963 the Public Safety Advisory Staff instituted this program in Viet-Nam. Under this procedure, a 15-minute lesson is taught at the assembly period before policemen go on patrol. At the conclusion of the lesson each police officer is provided with a single page containing the major points of the lesson.

A frequently neglected requirement is that for Supervisory Training. The first line supervisor in a police department, usually a Sergeant, is its backbone. Usually selected from the ranks, he soon finds that the basic, advanced and specialized techniques he learned as a policeman, while valuable to him, have not specifically fitted him to be a supervisor. Therefore, it is imperative that the

techniques of supervision be taught to him both formally and in on-the-job situations. One Public Administration expert has called the first line supervisor the "master and victim of double talk" because he must act as a transmitter for ideas and information from the men in the field to the commanders, and of commands and direction and encouragement from the commanders to those in the field. This individual has perhaps the most difficult and the most important position in the hierarchy of a law enforcement organization. This situation obtains in varying degrees in police departments throughout the world.

Finally we have the Commander. He too, must be trained for his position. Just as one does not learn efficiently to be a basic policeman or a Supervisor by osmosis, neither does one learn to be a Commander in that fashion. While it is said that Commanders are sometimes born, the scales are heavily weighed against this development. It is the responsibility of an organization to see to it that its Commanders are provided with the training they require to permit them to carry out their functions efficiently and effectively.

With these basic principles in mind, an examination of the law enforcement training situation in the Philippines makes it clear that much must be done in this field.

Police training courses in the Philippines are extremely limited. The best is that given by the National Bureau of Investigation.

National Bureau of Investigation Training

When the NBI was created in 1947 one of its stated functions was the training of selected members of local police in investigative techniques.

This provision was also a new concept in law enforcement in the Philippines. It not only recognized the value of training for the police but also laid the foundation for training on a national scale. The establishing Act made it possible to gather law enforcement officers from all over the country and to provide them with police training.

To gather the first NBI training class, all Mayors and Provincial Governors were notified by circular letter from the NBI Director on 15 September 1948 that the "course hopes to fill the long-felt need of professionalizing and standardizing the police career and its methods by providing a supervised enlightened police training that will be uniform throughout the Islands." The circular also stated the following missions of the course:

1. Train police officers in their duties and functions as criminal investigators.

2. Give instructions on progressive investigative techniques and procedures along FBI lines.

3. Prepare officers to be instructors in their home departments upon graduation.

The first session of the Academy was conducted from 15 October to 18 December 1948 with trainees from 10 cities and 15 provinces as well as four from the Customs Service.

As of 15 June 1966, a total of 15,478 individuals had been trained in the more than 20 different types of law enforcement courses offered by the NBI Academy in spite of the limited budgetary and logistical support provided.

The 15,478 trainees included 131 students from other countries: (Laos 79, Indonesia 19, Vietnam nine, Korea nine, Thailand 10, Cambodia two, Japan one, U.S. two observers).

Academy objectives are to:

1. Help improve the Philippine police system by providing a core of trained police officers all over the country, oriented to the modern concepts of police science and administration.

2. Help raise the standards of law enforcement services by continuously conducting police training projects of all types and for all levels throughout the country as a means of improving not only individual performances but those of their respective agencies.

3. Assist local police and other law enforcement agencies by making available to them its facilities, its reserve of experienced instructors, and its other specialized service resources.

4. Provide a medium by which police officers who have received advanced and specialized training abroad can disseminate the knowledge they have acquired.

5. Serve as a means by which cooperation among law enforcement agencies can be achieved through seminars, symposiums and conferences.

6. Serve as a center of continuing research in relevant areas of police improvement, such as training, proposed legislation and similar fields.

7. Help the NBI maintain the high quality of its agents and personnel by providing basic in-service and other types of training to carry out its functions under the law.

The 13th NBI General Session was graduated on 9 August 1963. That class, which brought to 1,037 the total number of General Session Graduates, was composed of the following:

•Philippine Constabulary	6	•Treasury Agents	2
•Philippine Army (Military Police)	2	•Other Government Officials	10
•Philippine Air Force (Air Police)	4	•Private Security Guard	1
•Philippine Navy (Marines)	2	•City and Municipal Police	24
•Province Guard	1	•Prison Guard	1
		Total	53

Ranks included PFC to 1st Lt. (Military) and Patrolman to Chief (Police)

Unfortunately, the August 1963 13th General Session proved to be an unlucky one because it was the last. The NBI Academy facility was destroyed by fire shortly after this session was concluded.

A search had been underway for some time for a new location because the NBI Academy personnel were "squatters" in a borrowed building. In 1963 the Mayor of Tagaytay City had donated a four-hectare plot to the NBI to be used for a National Police Academy. The NBI commenced a drive to raise funds to prepare the land and erect a suitable facility. However, funds were slow in coming. While a pistol range has been constructed and several quonset huts of varying sizes, donated by AID, have been erected, the installation is far from the complete National Police Academy which was envisaged. Additional structures and a considerable amount of

NBI Police Academy, Tagaytay
Range in Foreground

equipment, as well as a budget for operating and maintenance expenses, are urgently required to get this critically needed police training installation into operation.

The destruction of the NBI Academy caused even greater emphasis to be placed on the NBI Ambulatory Police Training Course which was concurrently underway. The existing limited training facilities of the NBI and the PC, who were also providing training to local police, did not have sufficient capacity to meet their training requirements. Many of the municipalities could not affort to send trainees to a course which would require travel and per diem expense. With the assistance of NEC and AID the NBI developed an ambulatory training course for the purpose of providing basic police instruction. NBI provided the instructors and the organizational setup, NEC the funds for operations and AID the technical advice, equipment and some logistical support.

The course, two weeks in length, provides 88 hours of instruction in basic law enforcement and techniques such as: Police Organization, Records, Crowd Control, Police Patrol, Police Ethics, Criminal Investigation, Interrogation, Criminal Law, Scientific Aids, Firearms, and Unarmed Defense.

As of 30 June 1966, 4,660 local law enforcement officers had participated in the 94 sessions of this well-structured course which had been given in 34 provinces. This service is provided to any city or municipality at no cost other than the provision of the classroom facilities and student personal expenses.

Other major courses offered by the NBI Academy: Police Management for Chiefs of Police and other Command and Supervisory Officers (117 graduates to date); Crowd Control and Industrial Security for Urban Areas Police (349 graduates); Fingerprint Identification, 150 hour course to train technicians (4,193 graduates); Records Management, for Police Records Supervisors (152 graduates) as well as miscellaneous special and technical courses such as Questioned Documents Examination (278 graduates), Traffic Supervision (200 graduates), Firearms Training (2,779 graduates), Polygraphy (six graduates), Crime Photography (two graduates), Forensic Ballistics, Forensic Chemistry, Electronics, Ammo reloading and Range Management.

Philippine Constabulary Training

The first PC school was established on 17 February 1905. The school was located in the walled city of Santa Lucia and transferred to Baguio in 1908. By 1918, and until 1936, this school was known as the Philippine Constabulary Academy. In 1936, it was taken over by the newly organized Philippine Army, its name was changed to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA).

Today the Philippine Military Academy curriculum and program of training are modeled after that of the U.S. Military Academy. Graduates are commissioned in the regular army for service in the Philippine Army or Philippine Constabulary.

The present Philippine Constabulary School was established after World War II. It is located at Camp Panopio, approximately one kilometer from HPC. The limited capacity of the facility (maximum of 140 students) makes it woefully inadequate to meet the training requirements of the Philippine Constabulary.

The PC School established following WW II was destroyed by fire in 1964, and the present facility was completed in August 1965. In July 1966, the school was authorized to augment the staff and faculty to 25 officers and 40 enlisted men. The actual strength as of 15 September 1966, was 22 officers and 28 enlisted men.

The school is limited to conducting three classes concurrently in view of the number of available classrooms, a total of 140 students in two or three classes. Two of the classrooms can be joined by removing a partition.

The mission of Philippine Constabulary School is to:

a. Train and prepare PC officers and enlisted men for duties and responsibilities as peace officers and guardians of law and order;

b. Serve as an agency of the Chief of Constabulary in the development of administrative procedures and police techniques with a view of maintaining the prescribed standard of discipline and efficiency and the development of leadership in all ranks;

c. Serve as a principal medium of performance and standardization in the development of concepts, doctrines, policies, and projects in law enforcement;

d. Render assistance to the in-service training of units in the field, particularly through inspections and in the preparation of instructional matters and training aids;

e. Undertake the training of members of other services and local police forces in police techniques and procedures when so directed.

Courses and Student Input

A list of courses taught at the PC School from 1961 through 1966 with the number of students for each is included on the next page.

For the years 1964, 1965, and 1966, there were a total of 740 students in 18 courses. A breakdown from the PC School shows that 209 of these were PC officers, 343 were PC enlisted men and the remainder police, ROTC and other government agencies. Thus, only some 46% of the trainees receiving formal instruction at the PC School were enlisted men.

Philippine Constabulary School, Camp Panopio, Quezon City

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY SCHOOL

COURSES AND STUDENT INPUT
1961-1966

Course	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	Total
PC Officers Basis	74(2)			34	67(3)		175
PC Officers Advanced		31	37	22		45	135
Criminal Investigation	56	59	167(3)	95(2)	131	132(2)	640
Police Admin. & Opers.		32		47(2)1/	16 2/		95
PC Adv. ROTC		47	69	68	24		208
PC Off. Qualification*	67	48	36				151
Traffic Supervision		41					41
Fingerprint Identification	46						46
PC Indoctrination		25					25
Arson Investigation						59(2)	59
T O T A L S	243(5)	242(6)	350(7)	266(7)3/	238(6)4/	236(5)5/	1,575(36)

( ) Course conducted
* PC Enlisted Men with Reserve Commissions
1/ 46 Police and 1 Security Guard
2/ 14 Police, 2 Security Guards
3/ 56 Officers, 85 EM, 50 Police, 68 ROTC, 7 Misc.
4/ 101 Officers, 93 EM, 15 Police, 24 ROTC, 5 Misc.
5/ 57 Officers, 165 EM, 5 Police, 9 Misc.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY SCHOOL



Since its destruction by fire in 1964, the PC school operated in temporary facilities until formal inauguration of the present facility in August 1965. It is apparent that increasing the physical capacity is essential to meet increasing demands.

It is extremely difficult to analyze the programs of instruction of any school in such detail that courses which are purely police or military could be identified. Since the Constabulary is a national organization which must perform multifarious duties in various environments, much of its training would not normally be associated with that for a local police force or a purely investigative agency.

The PC Officer's Basic Course, as revised includes 572 hours of instruction covering 13 weeks.

An examination of the Programs of Instruction of the PC Basic and Advanced Officer Courses does not indicate that these programs as outlined neglect to cover basic or advanced police subjects to develop law enforcement administrators. There is some indication that lack of training support may reduce the effectiveness of these courses, and of course an expansion of physical facilities and the faculty is required to permit a greater student input. As a greater number of PC officers and enlisted men are graduated from the school, more emphasis on the development of refresher-type training and senior officer seminars will be possible, to further enhance the professionalization of the PC as a law enforcement agency.

A better utilization of officers and enlisted personnel trained abroad will contribute to a better training program in the PC. The staff and faculty of the PC school and training positions at Zones should be filled with returnees from such training before other operational assignments are filled. Once assigned to these positions, the officer or enlisted man should be stabilized for a minimum of two years, with three years the objective.

Only 175 PC officers have been graduated from the PC Officer's Basic Course and 135 from the PC Advanced in the past six years. Even though the age and length of service would indicate that the majority of PC officers were trained prior to this time, this is not an impressive number of graduates to perform a mission which demands a high degree of professionalization.

A normal, sound training cycle for a force the size of the PC would put 75 officers through a basic police course, 75 officers through an advanced police course and 1,400 enlisted men through a basic police course each calendar year.

The PC Command Training Objectives for FY 66-67 are stated:

- To improve the effectiveness of the PC in the performance of its primary mission of maintaining peace and order.
- To develop and improve individual skills and specialization necessary in the successful accomplishment of the PC mission.
- To encourage the development of professionalism among PC personnel.

The training program for FY 66-67 emphasizes in-unit training and zone training for the majority of the PC, while the PC School is directed to accomplish the following:

- Conduct one class each of PCOB and PCOA
- Conduct three classes on Narcotics Investigation

- Conduct two classes in Criminal Investigation
- Conduct two classes in Traffic Administration Course
- Conduct two classes in Arson investigation
- Conduct one class in Police Administration and Operations
- ROTC summer course and Traffic Management
- Conduct research work on the improvement of PC training program
- Provide PC-wide training and support to PC units, particularly printed reference materials.
- Prepare publications of Constabulary Manuals.

The additional mission of training security guard personnel of licensed civil security agencies will not permit accomplishment of all of these training objectives.

HPC has as one objective to program training of 30 officers and 100 EM in the Special Forces concept of warfare with Airborne capability along with completion of the civic action course. The 51st PC Battalion, as the PC Reserve, is to schedule Unit Ranger and Special Forces Training, retraining of the organic mounts (horses) and scout dogs, as well as marksmanship and other PC training. Each of the Zones is to program one EM per company for special forces and airborne training in addition to the regularly scheduled training for the Criminal Investigation Service, maintenance services and intelligence training.

PC Zone Training

Some training has been carried on at the various PC zones, but this has been varied and spotty.

Training conducted at company level is usually conducted on Saturday mornings and takes the form of group discussions and local problems.

Recruit Training

Recruit training was initiated at Camp Keithly, Marawi, Lanao del Sur in August 1966, and approximately 400 recruits were scheduled to be trained there that year. An additional 600 recruits are programmed for training at Camp Wilhelm, Lucene City, to complete the planned build up to 17,000 in the PC by 30 June 1967.

PC Training of Local Police

Section 837 of the Revised Administrative Code states among other things that, "It shall be the duty of the Provincial Inspector (PC) to see that the police thus placed in his charge are properly uniformed, drilled and disciplined ..." This section refers specifically only to police forces placed under PC control. However, because of the need of the municipal police forces for training, PC commanders initially implemented a plan to take a representative number of policemen from each to undergo centralized training in the provincial headquarters. This system usually yielded very few graduates because of lack of participation on the part of the municipalities. The majority of municipalities could not afford to pay the subsistence and per diem, much less the uniform, shoes and school needs of policemen slated to attend the training.

The provincial commanders organized PC mobile training teams in an attempt to overcome this defect of the centralized provincial training concept. These teams moved from one municipality to another to conduct training. Several factors have limited the effectiveness of these teams. First, the cadre for these training teams came from the Provincial Command Headquarters or PC units in the province. Operational necessity along with a chronic understrength in provincial units, reduced the frequency that these teams could be made available. Poor attendance caused the feasibility of this training to be questioned when municipalities would not release their policemen from routine duties to attend, or support the training. The general shortage of training funds within the PC further limited this effort.

The training conducted by PC Mobile Training Teams covered four weeks with 44 hours of instruction each week, for a total of 176 hours in police training. detailed records of this training were not available from the PC.

Training Budget

For fiscal year 66-67, the PC was appropriated 656,960 pesos for training. This amount was distributed to three main training efforts:

Training of Regular Components
Training of Reserve Components
Training of Non-PC Components

The Budget Commission ceiling, however actually obligated the following for training:

Regular Components Training	₱ 62,936
Reserve Components Training	30,144
SMPO PX 35	89,120
Non-PC Components	--
Total	₱ 182,000

The above indicates that the PC received approximately 28% of the training budget appropriated by Congress and approved by the President.

Local Police Training

In general, the Survey indicated that the internal training capacity of the local police is limited. Except for a few departments, the bulk of their training comes from outside sources. Training in the local police departments varies from the reasonably adequate basic courses given by the Manila, Cebu and other larger police departments to those in municipalities which provide no training of any kind.

The Cebu Police Department also schedules part-time advanced and refresher training programs for all personnel and specialized training programs, such as Traffic Management and Vehicle Operation and Preventive Maintenance for Traffic Personnel and for Drivers, respectively.

While the larger departments have sufficient manpower and other resources to organize and provide training for their personnel, the same is not always true in the smaller departments.

The 1965 Civil Service Commission Report indicated that 69% of the local police have not been provided recruit training.

BASIC COURSE
MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT

SUBJECTS	Hours
1. Gen. Police Practice & Procedures	45
2. Criminal Law	45
3. City Ordinances	45
4. Traffic Control	45
5. Criminal Procedure	20
6. Criminal Investigation	30
7. Rules & Regulations	30
8. Criminal Evidence	20
9. Criminal Identification	12
10. Legal Medicine & First Aid	20
11. Constitutional Rights & Freedoms	20
12. Public Relations	20
13. Reports, Forms and Records	12
14. Marksmanship & Combat Shooting	12
15. Military Drill & Physical Education	18
16. Scientific Criminology	12
	406

CEBU CITY BASIC COURSE
(12 weeks - 20 hours per week)

SUBJECTS	Hours
1. Police Organization & Administration Subjects	22
2. Police Ethics	6
3. Police Practices & Procedures	46
4. Surveillance & Undercover Operations	6
5. Criminal Law	35
6. City Ordinances	6
7. Criminal Procedure	8
8. Criminal Evidence	6
9. Criminal Investigation	38
10. Police Weapons	14
11. Unarmed Defense	15
12. First Aid	6
13. Miscellaneous (Examinations, Commandant's time, Drill, etc.)	32
	240

On 24 June 1966, in a memo to the Director of the NBI and the Chief of the Constabulary, the President "reiterated" that it was the NBI responsibility to "take charge" of the training of all local police forces.

Priority is to be given to the training of the police forces of the four cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan and the suburban towns of Rizal Province.

The provisions of the Police Act of 1966, which authorizes the National Police Commission to develop police training programs, may modify this instruction.

The directive from the President was an expansion of the NBI role in police training. Under the law creating the NBI, that agency was to "undertake the

MALACANANG
Manila

June 24, 1966

MEMORANDUM to the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and
The Chief of Constabulary

It is hereby reiterated that the National Bureau of Investigation shall take charge of of the training of all local police forces.

The National Bureau of Investigation shall update its training program for local forces and shall insure that the program be a permanent and continuing one.

The National Bureau of Investigation shall give priority to the training of the police forces of the four cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan and the suburban towns of Rizal province.

Effective immediately, the Philippine Constabulary is hereby charged with the duty of training all security guards licensed under security agencies.

The Philippine Constabulary shall see to it that the security guard system in the country is likewise upgraded.

Both the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine Constabulary particularly the Criminal Investigation Service, shall be on a twenty-four hour alert, until further orders. They shall insure that officers and men are on duty any time of the day or night.

The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Chief of Constabulary shall render monthly reports to me on the progress of their activities in this regard.

(SGD.) F. E. MARCOS

A TRUE COPY
OSCS/HPC/ccd
29 Jun 66

instruction and training of a representative number of city and municipal police officers, at the request of their superiors, along effective methods of crime investigation and detection..."

This section of RA 147 has been interpreted rather loosely, primarily because of the tremendous requirement for across-the-board police training by most agencies.

The NBI has trained a total of over 15,000 personnel in the various law enforcement classes it conducts. Not all of these, of course, have been local police. The figures include a substantial number of AFP Security Guards and NBI personnel, as well as local police.

University and College Training

At least four colleges in the Philippines offer courses of instruction leading to a degree in Criminology. These are the University of Visayas, Abad Santos College of Criminology, Philippine College of Criminology and the University of Manila. While it appears that these sourses are well organized and presented by competent instructors, they can only make a fractional contribution to the tremendous volume of law enforcement training which the nearly 50,000 law enforcement personnel in the Philippines require.

Law Enforcement Training in the U.S.

Both USAID and JUSMAGPHIL have provided training in the U.S. for law enforcement personnel, JUSMAGPHIL for the PC and USAID for the NBI and local police.

U.S. Training for PC

Officers and enlisted personnel of the Philippine Constabulary have been programmed for training under the U.S. Military Assistance Training Program (MATP) for a number of years. Training is programmed either in the continental United States, in Hawaii, or at other U.S. installations in the Pacific area.

From a comparison of the amount of training programmed under the MATP for the Constabulary, it appears that the Constabulary has not been receiving school quotas on a proportionate basis with the second largest service, the Philippine Army. For the period between FY 62-66, 136 PC officers and enlisted men received training under the MATP as opposed to 878 for the Philippine Army, or about 12.5%

Furthermore, the training provided for the Constabulary under MATP has not been the police-type training which is sorely needed. The training officer in the C-3 office at PC Headquarters states that only those courses in the U.S. Army Schools catalogue are available to the PC. Civilian schooling in the U.S. in police courses was available up to about two years ago. It was programmed by USAID. For some reason, it was discontinued.

Courses programmed for FY 67 are indicative of the type of training provided the PC.

Number	Course	Duration (Weeks)
1	Civic Action and Psychological Warfare	18
1	Wheel Vehicle Mechanic MOS 631.1	8
1	Command and General Staff College	42
1	Senior Preventive Maintenance Officer Course	16
1	Associate Infantry Officer Advanced Course	20
1	Allied Combat Intelligence	14
1	Senior Foreign Officer Intelligence	11
2	Military Police Officer Career	34
1	Associate Military Police Officer Career	14
1	On-the-Job Training, MP Operations MOS 9110	3
1	Criminal Investigation	8
1	Teletypewriter Equipment Repairman	19
1	Maintenance Management and Property Disposal Ops.	10
1	On-the-Job Training, Quartermaster Organizational and Individual Equipment Maintenance and Repair	8
1	Allied Advanced Intelligence	14
16		

Although not police-type courses, those associated with logistical management, maintenance and repair of equipment, and other technical areas are, of course, necessary for the administration of a national organization the size of the Constabulary. The purely military courses, such as the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, could just as well be obtained in the Armed Forces Philippines Training Center Schools, utilizing this allocation for police or police-related training.

A cursory evaluation of the type of training received under MATP sponsorship for the period from FY 62-66 would seem to indicate that only 25 courses or training programs were related purely to police training in the five-year period. The size of the Constabulary coupled with the duties it performs dictates training requirements in administrative, logistical, and management fields. The training received at the John F. Kennedy School for Special Warfare, for instance, in counter-

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING PROGRAM
Philippine Constabulary Students
FY 62 – 67

FY	USA MILITARY POLICE			CRIME	MILITARY			INTELL	TECHNICAL		OTHER	OTHER	TOTAL
	MPOC	CINCPAC	CI	LAB	TIC	CGSC	JFKSWC	TNG	SOPM	GEN	POLICE	MILITARY	(OFFICERS & EM)
62		2	2				7	3		23	3	4	44
63				1			3	3		16	2	1	26 (24)
64		1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1*	11	3	1	24
65		2			1	3	2	3		9	2		22
66	1	1		1	1	2	3	3	2*	8	1	1	22
Totals	1	6	4	3	3	6	17	13	3*	67	11	7	138 (2)

* Always in addition to another course and not included in total of personnel.

( ) Actual number of participants when different.

A COMPARISON
MATP-SPONSORED SCHOOLING
Philippine Army/Philippine Constabulary
FY 62 – 66

	OFFICERS						ENLISTED MEN						TOTAL OFFICERS AND EM	
	CONUS		OFF SHORE		TOTAL		CONUS		OFF SHORE		TOTAL			
FY	PA	PC	PA	PC	PA	PC	PA	PC	PA	PC	PA	PC	PA	PC
62	59	22	84	15	143	37	19	3	42	4	61	7	204	44
63	87	9	72	3	159	12	44	7	40	5	84	12	243	24
64	84	11	56	6	140	17	33	5	26	2	59	7	199	24
65	53	11	34	3	87	14	31	4	13	4	44	8	131	22
66	27	11	33	5	60	16	28	2	10	4	38	6	98	22
TOTAL	310	64	279	32	589	96	155	21	131	19	286	40	875	136

Source: JUSMAG PHIL

insurgency and psychological warfare operations, better qualifies the participants to perform their peace-and-order mission in the Philippines. The intelligence training develops the basic knowledge which is used to improve police intelligence techniques and operations, and the Command and General Staff College broadens the PC officer's ability to manage personnel and material resources on a large scale.

The training objectives stated in the CINCPAC Military Assistance Plan for the Constabulary are not realistic in view of the basic mission of this organization. Instead of providing training only to potential instructors based on the training capabilities of existing academic institutions, an urgent requirement exists to develop a broad base of PC officers trained in U.S. police administration techniques in order to greatly improve overall daily police operations.

In addition to the courses allocated at the U.S. Army Military Police School and other U.S. Army schools which contribute to the overall administration and management training, Constabulary officers should be programmed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Police Academy, the Southern Police Institute, Treasury Department Schools in Customs and Narcotics, and police courses in colleges and universities in the United States. Police training can be provided through the MATP for the Constabulary as in the past. By cross-service agreement between USAID and DOD, liaison with civil police institutions is maintained for both agencies by USAID.

The PC has received such a small number of allocations for MATP training in the past, particularly in police courses, the base of U.S.-trained officers has been severely weakened through normal attrition. To effectively enhance professionalism in the PC, training under the MATP in the U.S. is needed in the following subjects:

- General Police Administration
- Police Organization and Administration
- Police Records Management
- Police Patrol and Communications
- Traffic Administration, Management, and Accident Investigation
- Criminal Investigation and Identification
- Juvenile Delinquency and Crime Prevention
- Police Science and Criminalistics
- Personnel Management
- Data Processing

U.S. Training for NBI and Local Police

Training for the NBI and the local police has been programmed by USAID Public Safety Division as a part of the Police Advisory activity which has been carried out in the Philippines for several years. All U.S. training arranged under USAID Public Safety has been specifically geared to the law enforcement function. To date a total of 99 NBI and Local Police personnel have received U.S. training in this fashion. In addition, USAID Public Safety has arranged, on a reimbursable basis, Law Enforcement training programs for 38 PC personnel. An additional eight PC personnel have received law enforcement training under the MAP program.

PHILIPPINE LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
TRAINED IN UNITED STATES (FY 57-66)

Major Field	NBI	PC	Local Police	Totals
Police Administration	13/1	16/4	29/2	58/7
Criminal Investigation	7	9/2	1	17/2
Crowd Control	2	--	7	9
FBI Academy	6	--	--	6
Criminalistics	9/1	6/1	--	15/2
Fingerprints	1	--	--	1
Police Photography	1/1	--	--	1/1
Scientific Interrogation	1	--	--	1
Police Weapons/Maintenance/Repair	1	--	--	1
Police Training	4	2/2	--	6/2
Police Records Management	4	2	1	7
Police Telecom Management	4	--	--	4
Internal Revenue Investigation	1	--	--	1
Arson Investigation	2/1	1	--	3/1
Police Electronics Operations	1	--	--	1
Range Operations	1	--	--	1
Juvenile Delinquency Control	1	4/2	1	6/2
Traffic Supervision	--	6	1	7
	59/4	46/11	40/2	145/17
	7%	24%	5%	11%

Legend: 5/ - Number trained
/5 - Number no longer with agency

Thus, the record indicates that a total of 145 Philippine law enforcement personnel were trained in the U.S. during the period 1957-1966. An analysis of these 145 trainees indicates that 17 of them (some 11%) are no longer with their agencies. This problem appears most critical in the PC. Twenty-four per cent of the U.S. trained personnel are no longer with that agency. This compares with less than 7% loss by the NBI and 5% loss by the local police of their U.S. trained personnel. Every effort should be made to regain and to retain in law enforcement assignments these personnel in which so much has been invested.

RECOMMENDATION

- That an effort be made to return (from the Philippine Army or other government agencies) all those personnel who were trained in law enforcement in the U.S., to the agency to which they were assigned at the time they were sent to the U.S. for training.

The courses of instruction in Law Enforcement provided in the U.S. under the U.S. Assistance Program have been very good; however, a considerably increased number of selected Philippine law enforcement officials should be programmed for this instruction.

The International Police Academy (IPA), operated by the Office of Public Safety of AID, Department of State, conducts courses specifically structured to foreign law enforcement requirements.

Academy programs are designed to furnish students with the knowledge to help strengthen the capability of their law enforcement agencies to enforce the law and maintain public order with a minimum use of force, to counter subversion and insurgency and to improve the character and image of the civil law enforcement personnel binding them more closely to their communities.

The curriculum consists primarily of General and Senior Courses. The Senior Course, extending over a 14 week period, is offered in the English language. This course is designed for foreign law enforcement personnel who occupy executive positions with responsibility for establishing policy, staff planning, or who command major operational elements on the national, provincial or municipal level.

The General Course is a 17 week program designed for those occupying supervisory positions in the operational or administrative support elements of a law enforcement organization. This Course is presented in both English and Spanish languages. The final four weeks of the General Course are devoted to specialized training in the participants functional area of activity.

Since its inauguration in 1962 the Academy has trained nearly 3,000 law enforcement officers from 56 countries as widely dispersed as Iceland, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda; Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India and Nepal; Argentina, Chile, Peru and Venezuela; and Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet-Nam.

In addition to Imperial, Federal, National, State, Metropolitan, and City Police officers, trainees have included Constabulary, Military Police, Civil Guard, Gendarmerie, and National Guard personnel as well as representatives of Ministries of Interior, Departments of Public Safety, Directorates and Departments of Investigation, Special Security Corps, Departments of Security and Judicial Departments.

This summary of the Law Enforcement Training situation in the Philippines points up the need for a considerably expanded program. Of primary importance is the provision of basic police training to all law enforcement personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Police Commission, utilizing selected representatives of the NBI the PC and the local police, develop a Program of Instruction for a basic law enforcement course. Three months is considered an adequate training period for such course.

That every effort be made to program, wherever possible, PC and local police personnel in joint law enforcement training classes.

A valuable and important additional benefit to be gained from the provision of joint courses is the increased and improved interagency coordination which would develop as a result of joint participation in the training courses.

In order to provide this training expeditiously, a considerable expansion of police training facilities is required.

Since the destruction of the NBI training facility in the Fall of 1963, that agency has been providing training to local police forces by means of ambulatory training teams. Such measures, while helpful, represent at most only a stop gap. The PC since the destruction of its academy in 1964 has rebuilt but does not have adequate capacity.

It must be recognized that the nearly 50,000 law enforcement personnel (16,000 PC, 31,000 local police, 1,000 NBI) require continuous law enforcement training (basic, advanced, specialized, supervisory and command). In order to meet this tremendous requirement, extensive law enforcement training facilities need to be provided. To train only 50% of this number would require 200 classes of 100 persons each, or 400 classes of 50 persons each.

The first order of business should be complete the presently inoperable NBI Police Academy at Tagaytay. The PC school should be expanded and improved. Concurrently, several other facilities should be developed, centered in the areas where law enforcement personnel are concentrated, e.g., Cebu, Iloilo, Cagayan de Oro, Legaspi, Baguio, etc. Because of the urgency of the need, any available facility should be utilized. One possibility might be the courtroom of the CFI of a city. These rooms might be utilized at night. It is believed that a need exists for a minimum of six to eight permanent police training facilities at various centers of population throughout the country.

RECOMMENDATION

That efforts be made to select, construct, equip and operate six to eight police training centers located strategically throughout the country.

That these centers have a minimum capacity of 100 students each, with housing, messing, range and athletic facilities as well as classrooms, offices and administrative facilities.

That facilities for these centers be made up of NBI, PC and local police personnel selected for their training, their experience and instructional ability.

That the entire law enforcement training program be directed by the Police Commission with constant review, critique, revision and improvement in order to provide the Philippine law enforcement officer with the best possible police training.

While the requirement for basic training is perhaps the most urgent, that for other types of training is hardly less pressing. The need for advanced, specialized, supervisory and command training in law enforcement organizations is constant.

RECOMMENDATION

That, as soon as possible after the commencement of the basic training program, facilities be expanded to provide classrooms, messing, housing and other accommodations for advanced, specialized and supervisory law enforcement personnel.

In order to construct the facilities required, properly equip them, provide the maintenance necessary and finally, to make the training itself available, a substantial expenditure of funds will be required.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission give serious consideration to expenditure for this purpose 50% of the 20 million pesos allocated for police improvement under the 1966 Police Act.

That the Philippine Government provide the necessary funds to complete this critical requirement.

The NBI Academy at Tagaytay and each of the proposed regional training facilities should eventually provide five classrooms (one for 100 students, one for 50 students and three for 25 students), locker rooms, shower room, messing facilities, a dormitory, administration offices, an auditorium/gymnasium, a library, firearms range, a drill and athletic field.

It is estimated that approximately 50,000 square feet of space would be required for each installation. At current construction costs, this should bring the construction cost of each training center to approximately 700,000 pesos. The necessary equipment: chairs, desks, beds, office equipment, lockers, tables, kitchen equipment, library equipment, training aids and ammunition reloading equipment; is estimated at 200,000 with maintenance estimated at 100,000 for a total of one million pesos for each establishment. Thus, the eight regional establishments of the NBI Academy would total about nine million pesos.

Eight basic facilities with 100 student capacity each could, at four classes per year each, train 3,200. Should this capacity be increased to 200 each, 6,400 students could be trained annually. Obviously, this is a long-range problem and requires a long-range attack.

Once the regional centers have been established, the NBI could then revert to its legally authorized role of training "selected" personnel in investigative techniques.

Three major points may be re-emphasized here regarding law enforcement training;

1. The need for police training by the police and the PC is most urgent.

2. The need for police training facilities is critical.

3. The importance of joint NBI, PC, and police participation both in the development of Programs of Instruction and as trainees, cannot be overemphasized in order to foster interagency coordination and cooperation which is now almost nonexistent.

While a line needs to be drawn between the number of personnel who require training and the number who can be spared for training, it must be recognized that an untrained law enforcement officer is not capable of providing satisfactory service to the people.

Finally, in the area of training, a separate facility is required for the training of Chiefs of Police and PC commanders in Police Administration. No facility for the purpose is presently in operation. It is believed that the Security Training Center, which has a capacity for 40 with adequate classroom, housing, and messing facilities, would be highly satisfactory for this purpose. For the past two years this facility has been used to only a limited degree. Its value for its original purpose has tended to decrease with the expansion and acceleration of the Viet-Nam War. With the tremendous in-country training requirement, the continued use of this facility to train a few foreign personnel cannot be justified.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That a separate facility be made available for law enforcement command training.

That such facility have a capacity of 40 students, with classroom, housing, messing and staff facilities for all.

That consideration be given to making the Security Training Center available for this purpose.

That faculty for this institution be selected from qualified NBI, PC and Local Police personnel.

That the Programs of Instruction for this center be developed under the direction of the Police Commission.

That NBI, Police and PC Command personnel be trained in joint classes at this center whenever possible.

Law Enforcement Training in the U.S.

While the development of local law enforcement training facilities and courses is a vital requirement for Philippine law enforcement, considerable additional outside training is still needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the number of Philippine law enforcement officers programmed for U.S. Law Enforcement training be substantially increased.

That a total of approximately 100 Philippine law enforcement personnel be provided U.S. law enforcement training annually for several years.

That these trainees be divided approximately 60 Local Police, 35 PC and five NBI, somewhat comparable to their force level percentages.

"If law enforcement is to succeed, then by all means reassure the conscientious policeman that fidelity to duty will not threaten security of tenure."

Editorial
Daily Mirror, 2 August 1966

Chapter IX

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

INTRODUCTION

The police forces of any country are the most visible representatives of the goverment. Because of this, and because their mission is in a large part restrictive, it is imperative that they exhibit strict impartiality, honesty, and efficiency.

In order to achieve and maintain efficiency, every police agency must possess the ability to prevent crime. Because this task is such a critical factor in the success or failure of the police, it is usually entrusted only to highly qualified personnel. They should be provided with adequate equipment and facilities to:

1. Investigate all crimes when investigation cannot be brought to a successful conclusion by uniformed personnel because of time, complexity, or the need for a high degree of technical skill.

2. Apprehend violators, recover stolen property, and acquire all possible information on crime and criminals for use in combating criminal activity.

A balanced approach to criminal investigation must be dual: concerning both the people and things involved in crime.

The criminal investigator must understand all evidence. He must be able to ascertain the significance of written reports, collect and assess the physical evidence available, and accurately interpret this information.

However careful a criminal may be to avoid being detected, he will inevitably defeat his purpose unless he can control every act at the crime scene. Any contamination, no matter how slight, may result in identification of the criminal and his association with the crime. This then is the thesis of criminal investigation. It evolves from the extremely low probability that the criminal will be successful in concealing his association with the crime.

This section of the survey report is an evaluation of the present performance of personnel assigned to criminal investigation in the various police agencies of the Philippines. It reflects their potential for more efficient operation and includes recommendations to aid in bringing this about.

AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION

The overlapping authority and jurisdiction of the various law enforcement agencies complicates the investigative efforts of all. The primary agencies involved are the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary, and the local police (city and municipal). The NBI employs 214 agents or investigators. There are 306 identified as CIS investigators in the PC, and an unknown number employed in this specific capacity in the 1425 local police forces.

In the absence of more specific guidelines to determine the agency primarily responsible for investigating a particular incident, it is quite

possible for investigation of a crime to be neglected by all agencies unless influential elements are involved. Frequently the NBI, for example, is brought into an investigation already being handled by the local police or the PC. This can happen because the offended party or the next of kin of the victim lacks confidence in the agency handling the investigation, or is dissatisfied with the conclusion reached in the case.

The jurisdiction of the local police is limited to the geographical boundaries of the city or municipality. Primary authority to investigate all criminal activity within these boundaries is inherent in the local police agency. The legislative act or executive order establishing a chartered city may restrict or broaden this primary authority. The PC and the NBI, both national agencies, have authority and jurisdiction throughout the Philippines, which includes all of the territory within the primary authority or jurisdiction of a city or municipality. All land in the Philippines is designated as part of a chartered city or a municipality; although the control exercised over much of this territory by the local police is sometimes limited. The statutory provisions of the Republic do not clearly delineate the basic responsibilities of these primary agencies in relation to each other, nor do they provide sufficient guidelines to permit a clear assignment of primary investigative responsibility for particular crimes.

The ultimate goal must be to bring the local police to a performance level that will enable them to handle investigation of any category of crime against persons or property occurring within their geographical area of responsibility. The preliminary investigation of a crime by local police should be professional and should not be detrimental to subsequent efforts of the PC or NBI. At the same time the capability of the PC must be raised to a level that will enable them to cope effectively with investigation of crime in the rural areas not adequately covered by a local police force.

The difficulties encountered in successfully conducting an investigation of a crime are compounded in almost direct proportion to the amount of time that lapses between the commission of the crime and the conduct of a competent investigation. In the Philippines it is sometimes found that years have elapsed since the crime occurred. Evidence, witnesses and suspects are no longer available. For example, an NBI agent revealed that he had been assigned a case in 1959. The agent stated that the location of the crime was not within the area for which this office is responsible. The agent further explained that travel time to the crime scene as well as the time required to conduct an investigation there would require too long an absence from his office. Consequently, nothing has been done on this assignment even though the request for investigation was made seven years ago.

Another example was found in an NBI regional office where a new investigation was beginning on a case previously investigated in 1957. The conclusion had been reached that death was due to suicide by hanging. The Regional Director revealed that the victim's sister suspected that her brother had been murdered and had sent a letter to the NBI Headquarters requesting another investigation. When the woman made known her intention to ask for a re-investigation, a doctor issued a death certificate dated August 18, 1966, for this death which had occurred nine years earlier!

Suspects, if still available, frequently have successfully withstood interrogation by untrained police officers and are fortified by confidence in their ability to withstand further interrogation. Witnesses, if available, have lost interest as passions have long since dissipated. The investigative reports made

by the original investigating agency are normally of little value since they frequently consist of the "spot report" type required to initially record and notify the PC. This contains only a synopsis of the crime.

The NBI has attempted to limit the types of cases it will handle by establishing the following policy:

1. Complaints received on major offenses already under investigation by another agency are declined. The agency handling the case is requested to furnish information on the status of the case. If they request assistance, it is provided.

2. Complaints received involving violations of "special penal laws" are referred to the Government office charged with the enforcement of the law violated.

3. Complaints received by mail involving civil rights and liabilities are disregarded, until the complainant appears in person. When he does so, he is advised to consult a lawyer, or to take such other remedial action as might be available.

4. Complaints received against police officers for maltreatment, bribery, extortion or any other irregularities in the discharge of official functions are referred to the mayor concerned if the police officers are members of the Manila, the Pasay City, or the Quezon City Police; to the Provincial Commander concerned if the officer is a member of the police forces of other cities and municipalities. If the officer is a member of a national agency, then the complaint is referred to the head of such agency.

5. Complaints received of physical injuries are referred to the police of the municipality or city where the assault was committed after a sworn complaint is obtained from the victim and he is examined by the Medico-Legal Division of the NBI.

6. Complaints received regarding theft, robbery, worthless checks, forgeries, swindling, and threats are not accepted. The complainant is referred to the fiscal or the police department having jurisdiction over the site of the crime.

The first attempt to implement the above policy was made in 1958; another in 1966. These efforts are described as "attempts" because implementation has not been effective in the past, and it will not be in the future until the investigative authority or jurisdiction of the NBI, the PC, and the local police is clearly spelled out by higher authority.

The existing jurisdictional overlap places the Philippine citizen in a position where he must "shop around" for the best bargain available in law enforcement. Some citizens in need of police assistance obtain it easily and rapidly because they are prominent in the community or the nation. Others have contacts with prominent or powerful people who bring pressure to bear on police supervisors to provide the required police service. It is this pressure which causes the involvement of a national level of investigation in local cases.

The citizen who lacks power or influence is often forced to suffer in silence or is reduced to pleading for assistance. For example, while the Survey Team was inspecting an NBI Regional Office, a car arrived driven by a messenger from a doctor. The doctor's home had been burglarized five days earlier.

The burglar(s) had removed the drawer from the dresser. The initial investigation conducted by PC Zone, had resulted in the drawer being covered in an effort to protect any latent fingerprints that might be present until a member of the Zone Headquarters could arrive to examine it. Four days later no one had arrived. The doctor then sent his personal car to request that the NBI send someone to attempt to develop latent fingerprints on the drawer. The doctor offered to transport the examiner to and from the scene.

RECOMMENDATION

> It is recommended that the Police Commission prescribe the specific investigative authority and jurisdiction of each of the primary agencies and their responsibilities in relation to each other--the NBI, the PC, and the local police.

Although these examples cited portray some of the problems encountered by a Philippine citizen victimized by crime, they also point up the need for equipping and training criminal investigation personnel to perform certain basic functions such as dusting and lifting latent prints. The wide dispersal of police agencies, the great distances which must be covered to render police services, and the relative mobility of criminal elements demand this capability.

Since so few police departments take fingerprints, it is quite unlikely that they would be of any value. If a police department does take fingerprints, they are often improperly taken and useless for classification and comparison. Even if prints meet all requisites, seldom are they properly filed locally or forwarded to the central repository.

These same malpractices are found in the processing of clearance certificates (indicating that the holder has no criminal record) in local police departments and PC commands. Fingers are frequently inked on an ordinary stamp pad and applied to a certificate form with the consistency of blotting paper. The prints obtained in this manner are useless for identification or comparison.

The clearance requires the signature and the left and the right thumbprint of the applicant and states as follows:

Clearance Certificate

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that according to the records
of this Headquarters _____
a resident of _____, with
Residence Certificate No. _____
issued in _____ on _____
has no criminal record or pending cases which this
unit has filed against him/her to date.

The only thing accomplished by this procedure in practically all instances is a name check since adequate fingerprint files are not available for comparison at province level nor in the great majority of the local police departments. It was learned during the survey that until January, 1966, the NBI was filing instead of rejecting unclassifiable prints and that the PC also accepted unclassifiable prints. Consequently, almost all crime record checking in the Philippines is done by name only.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI)

Exclusive of Regional Directors and above, there are 214 agents in the National Bureau of Investigation, but only 72 of the 214 are in the regional offices. The Special Investigation Staff at NBI Headquarters contains 142 agents. It would seem indicated at first glance that this might be an inequitable distribution of personnel. The following statistics appear to further support this.

INVESTIGATIONS HANDLED

FISCAL YEAR 1966

Special Investigation Staff	Regional Staff
Total 142 Agents	Total 72 Agents
2920 Investigations	4162 Investigations

INVESTIGATIONS TERMINATED

FISCAL YEAR 1966

Special Investigation Staff	Regional Staff
Total 142 Agents	Total 72 Agents
1704 Terminated	2589 Terminated

It has been recommended in another portion of this Survey Report that the NBI be reorganized. Specific recommendations also have been made regarding the Special Investigation Staff which if implemented would result in manpower saving. It is also recommended that these Special Investigation Staff personnel be better utilized by assigning them to regional offices, where they are badly needed.

It appeared to the Survey Team that the NBI is subjected to a great deal less political influence than are the PC and the local police. This observation was made by highly placed politicians as well as some ordinary Philippine citizens. It is interesting to note that one provincial Governor stated that the favorite political weapon of transfer, used frequently in the PC, is ineffective against NBI agents, who usually are not assigned to their home province. In only one instance observed did the assignment of an NBI Regional Director appear to have been politically influenced.

NBI supervisory personnel are not keeping adequately informed as to the work loads and accomplishments of their agents. Agents indicated that they write progress reports only when a new development occurs in a case. It was also learned that although the regional agents are visited by superiors from time to time, no formal inspection procedure is in effect.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that a strict policy requiring progress reports from investigators at 5, 15, 30, and 45 day intervals be adopted.

It is further recommended that NBI Headquarters compile and disseminate to all offices a monthly report listing cases; totals; pending, solved or terminated; category; peso value of property stolen and recovered; totals of arrests made; and cases from previous months solved or terminated during the reporting period. This report would have additional benefits in that it would tend to develop a healthy spirit of competition between units as well as make all members of the organization more aware of each other's problems.

It is recommended that frequent inspections, both scheduled and unscheduled be conducted of all NBI units by NBI Headquarters for the purpose of ensuring efficiency and uniformity in NBI operations and administration.

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

At the time of the survey, five of the sub-regional offices visited had only one agent assigned. The team was told four other sub-regional offices are staffed with one agent. This is unsafe from the standpoint of physical hazards involved and inefficient in terms of the limited service that can be provided to other agencies and the citizenry.

Travel time to and from investigation sites leaves a one-man sub-regional NBI office without an investigator. Some agents quoted four and five days travel time to reach the furthermost points in their territory by surface travel. They cite instances of travel by bus or car to a point where they finally must resort to walking. One agent stated that he had been marooned away from his office for two weeks by a typhoon. In regard to air travel, many landing fields in the provinces are grass or dirt, and frequently landings cannot be made in rainy weather. Personnel at every office visited in the provinces agreed that because of the foregoing, inoperative vehicles, the lack of travel expenses, and the fact that Manila Headquarters expected them to be near the office if needed, they were forced to devote more attention to nearby crimes than to those occurring any distance away.

There is no question that a lone agent at times is in an extremely hazardous position. The NBI agent should be able to work alone. But on those occasions when resistance on the part of a criminal is anticipated, or when the psychological advantage of two agents might prevent the use of force, assistance should be readily available. It was learned that lone agents sometimes press their civilian office employees into service to accompany them in effecting arrests and attempting to execute warrants, etc. This is improper, since these people have no law enforcement status and training. They could be considered more as liabilities than assets if they kill or are themselves killed or injured.

The opposite situation obtains in Manila where agents frequently work in pairs unnecessarily. Except for unusual situations this is inefficient and wasteful of manpower. Furthermore, some agents in Manila have never been assigned to the provinces, thereby being denied investigative experience of a type that would be beneficial to themselves and the NBI.

RECOMMENDATION

That the NBI require that an agent work alone where suitable but be provided assistance where need exists.

That the NBI adopt a policy of assigning each new agent to the provinces for a period of at least one year before giving him an assignment to the Manila Headquarters.

It is further recommended that a rotation policy be adopted for those agents now in the provinces who desire transfer to Manila.

The Officer-In-Charge of the NBI was questioned regarding some of his current problems. He revealed that a recruiting problem exists and pointed out 154 vacancies have existed for the past four years. Despite recruiting efforts the NBI has been unable to fill these positions. The Officer-In-Charge further stated that he had recently been informed that if he cannot fill these slots he will lose them. The Officer-In-Charge stated that present NBI strength should be increased to two-thousand agents in order to carry out the organization's mission. The Officer-In-Charge evidenced a positive attitude towards the Survey Team in anticipation of overdue changes.

ANTI-FRAUD ACTION DIVISION

The AFAD has a total of 29 agents assigned to the division. Instead of specializing, the AFAD handles a large portion of what would be considered general investigation cases. Murder, homicide, tax evasion, parricide, and serving of warrants of arrest are the cases most frequently handled. A breakdown of AFAD cases for fiscal year including the cases terminated follows.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ANTI-FRAUD ACTION DIVISION
Fiscal Year 1966

	Received	Terminated
Crimes vs. Public Interest	119	49
Crimes Committed by Public Officials	2	0
Crimes vs. Person	33	9
Crime vs. Personal Liberty and Security	12	6
Crime vs. Property	41	7
Naturalization and Change of Name	78	38
Illegal Possession of Firearms	1	0
Tax Evasion	8	2
Service of Warrants	1,068	110
Missing Person	2	1
Miscellaneous	97	61
	1,461	283

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the sub-regional office in San Fernando, Pampanga, be removed from the control of the Anti-Fraud Action Division and placed under the operational control of the headquarters regional office.

It is further recommended that this office be staffed with general investigation personnel to handle general investigative duties. The Special Investigative Staff personnel now in place should be removed if they are not qualified in general investigations.

The Anti-Fraud Action Division was found to contain three sections: Anti Hoodlum; Fraudulent Check; and Special Coordinating.

It was learned that the Special Coordinating section is a pool of six agents supervised by a senior agent whose responsibility is to provide men on request to either of the other two sections. In a Division of this size, the chief should allocate the available manpower with ease. Each of the other two sections is headed by a supervising agent. The Assistant has an assistant who is designated as an executive officer. The Anti-Fraud Action Division has five supervisors directing the activities of fifteen agents who are actually working out of headquarters. This appears to be a waste of manpower. Somewhat similar situations exist in almost all of the Special Investigative Staffs at NBI headquarters.

This interview along with others, indicates a lack of lateral communication between divisions in the NBI headquarters. Each unit appears to be acting as an autonomous entity. Staff meetings are not held. Division heads do not meet to discuss mutual problems, or strive for internal cooperation.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that a program of staff meetings of all Division heads, including the Regional Director of the Headquarters Regional Office, be implemented. The meetings should be presided over by the Director and should be strictly scheduled to take place at monthly intervals. Proper channels for internal communication should be delineated. The Director should point out how cooperation and coordination between units will be achieved.

The interviews conducted at NBI Headquarters revealed that no inspections are conducted. The recommendation already made regarding inspections should apply to all NBI Headquarters units.

ANTI-GRAFT AND ECONOMIC DIVISION (AGED)

This division is headed by an Assistant Director. There are a total of 12 men assigned. This includes the Chief, a supervising agent, and ten agents. Of the ten agents, four are attorneys and six are certified public accountants. A breakdown of AGED cases for fiscal year 1966, including cases terminated, follows:

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ANTI GRAFT AND ECONOMIC DIVISION

Fiscal Year 1966

	Received	Terminated
Crime vs. Public Interest	45	36
Crime vs. Person	1	2
Violation Anti Graft Law	224	23
Tax Evasion	4	0
Missing Persons	42	0
Miscellaneous	0	6
	316	67

AGED has a high proportion of certified public accountants to compare the declared income of a suspect against his income tax return. If the suspect cannot explain discrepancies, a civil action of forfeiture is filed in the Justice Department. The Solicitor General may file an action in an effort to seize the funds owed the government. The Assistant Director stated that much of the activity of his division is directed against politicians with unexplained wealth. He advised that his men experience particular difficulty when investigating members of Congress, who invoke their Congressional immunity. This prevents investigators from obtaining copies of necessary documents.

The Assistant Director stated that present procedures require that a letter requesting a copy of the income tax return be sent to the Secretary of Finance. The Secretary of Finance then forwards the request to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who in turn sends it to the Office of the President. At this point, the letter is returned to AGED asking that the NBI state why they need this information. The Assistant Director must then reveal that the person or persons named is the subject of an NBI investigation. He feels that at this point there is a leak since lawyers, followed by politicians, begin appearing at the AGED office. These attempt to learn what evidence the NBI has and any other information about the case that might be available. As a result of these visits, AGED agents and their families have been subjected to counter investigations by politicians in an evident effort to compromise them. Private agents attempt to check the expenditures of personal funds and have even gone to the schools attended by the children to check tuition costs.

It should be noted that during FY 1966 AGED handled only 228 cases really related to its specialization. This averages 19 cases a year for each of the persons assigned. The fact that a unit which is supposed to investigate graft is also handling missing persons seems indicative of an awareness on the part of supervision that the Special Investigation Divisions do not have enough work to keep their investigators occupied.

NARCOTICS DIVISION

The Chief of the Narcotics Division is also an Assistant Director. Nine agents are assigned to this division. This division was formerly a section and was raised to its present status on March 5, 1965, when the following sections were created:

1. Intelligence and Operations

2. Research, Statistics and Information

3. Civic Action and Liaison

4. Marine and K-9

This division does specialize in that it handled only crimes relative to opium and prohibited drugs during FY 1966. However, only 99 such cases were handled, of which 30 were terminated. This represents only 11 cases per investigator during that year, which makes it appear that the Narcotics Division is overstaffed.

The Narcotics Division operates the NBI Drug Addiction Institute, a treatment and rehabilitation center for drug addicts at Tagaytay City. While a worthy project, the operation of this unit is not consistent with the objectives

of NBI. The NBI has found it necessary to solicit donations and gifts from business groups, civil organizations and even individuals in order to continue its sponsorship of the Institute. This places the agency in a questionable position. Other portions of this report have recommended the disbanding of the K-9 section and the transfer of the narcotic rehabilitation activity to a more appropriate agency.

The presence of a Research, Statistics and Information Section within the individual Divisions is unnecessary. Sound police practice calls for a centralization of such records functions. As opposed to this, the following NBI divisions have their own Research or Statistics Sections:

1. Ballistics
2. Domestic Intelligence
3. Electronics and Communications
4. Forensic Chemistry
5. Logistics
6. Medico Legal
7. Photography and Publication
8. Polygraph
9. Questioned Documents
10. Narcotics

RECOMMENDATION

Eliminate the fragmented research and statistics within the division. Centralize these functions within the CIRSD. Personnel displaced should be utilized to greater advantage within their respective divisions.

INTERPOL

The Interpol Division has 24 agents assigned to three sections:

1. International crime

2. International service and research

3. Counterfeit and forged currency.

This division is primarily responsible for cases with international overtones. However, they frequently handle cases of a general investigative nature.

The Interpol Division was the only unit found in the NBI which, according to its supervisor, does not require additional personnel. This is not difficult to understand when one considers that investigators assigned to Interpol are handling about one case per month.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERPOL CASES RECEIVED AND TERMINATED

Fiscal Year 1966

	Received	Terminated
Crimes vs. Public Interest	90	64
Crimes vs. Person	7	7
Crimes vs. Property	9	12
Crimes vs. Chastity	2	2
Naturalization and Change of Name	1	27
Illegal Entry	2	1
Illegal Possession of Firearms	1	2
Tax Evasion	104	88
Service of Warrants	5	8
Missing Persons	17	13
Miscellaneous	63	74
	301	298

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

This Division, which normally has 19 agents, has had nine of them on another assignment since January. This division, which is charged with the responsibility for special investigations and counterintelligence, is also handling cases of a general investigative nature as indicated by the following table.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION CASES RECEIVED AND TERMINATED

Fiscal Year 1966

	Received	Terminated
Crimes vs. National Security and Laws of the Nation	28	145
Crimes vs. Public Interest	10	12
Crimes vs. Personal Liberty and Security	1	0
Crimes vs. Property	3	2
Violation of Anti-Graft Law	2	3
Naturalization and Change of Name	431	607
Illegal Entry	14	18
Tax Evasion	5	9
Illegal Possession of Firearms	6	0
Service of Warrants	4	2
Missing Persons	9	10
Miscellaneous	230	211
	743	1,019

Some of the general investigation cases listed were handled by the DID because relatives of DID agents were the victims. It was pointed out that this could rob the investigator of his required objectivity. These circumstances serve to point up some of the misconceptions which are prevalent in the Philippines regarding the functions of law enforcement.

SPECIAL ACTION UNIT (TASK FORCE)

This 28-man unit was created to give the NBI a unit capable of handling cases referred by the President or the Department of Justice.

This unit absorbed the Complaints, Action and Processing Unit (CAPU), when it was created. The three CAPU agents assigned process all complaints made to the NBI and filter out any urgent ones for handling by the Task Force.

The Task Force is composed of new agents who have had only two weeks orientation and no substantive training. The group is split into three shifts for 24-hour coverage, seven days a week.

The Task Force tends, as do the other specialized NBI units, to siphon off investigators to fill supervisory positions. It has been recommended in another portion of the report that this unit be eliminated and its personnel transferred to the Headquarters Regional Office which should then begin operating on a 24-hour a day basis.

It has been recommended that AFAD and AGED be combined, designated a section and personnel reduced drastically. The recommendations call for drastic reduction in strength in DID, Narcotics, and INTERPOL, and for strict adherence to the specialization of each section. If the recommendations are carried out, over 100 men will become available for assignment to the General Investigative Staff.

The NBI is top heavy with supervisors. Many of the Chiefs of Divisions bear the title of Assistant Director when they are actually performing the duties of supervising agents. It has been recommended elsewhere in this report that all of the Divisions mentioned be downgraded to Sections and their chiefs retitled accordingly.

It is apparent that title and position, even without salary increases, have been used to reward members of the NBI. At the present time there are 18 Assistant Directors, three Acting Assistant Directors, and 13 Regional Directors. Some of these are not in place. One Regional Director in Manila has never been to his region. The next probability will be reward of the supervising agents in the regional offices, who have been filling in for the Regional Directors, by meaningless titular promotions. Since the NBI has a personnel base too small to accommodate all aspirants, some other means must be utilized to provide incentives.

RECOMMENDATION

That a longevity pay increase plan be adopted for the NBI. The increases of 5% of the base pay should begin with the completion of the third year of service and continue at three year intervals, so long as performance is satisfactory.

The longevity pay increase should not be automatic and should require recommendation of the immediate supervisor and approval of the Director.

RECOMMENDATION

That an in-service school of at least one week duration be conducted as soon as possible for all NBI personnel, and repeated annually. Insofar as possible, one half of the Bureau's members should attend the first session, the remaining 50% should attend the second session.

The Director and members of his immediate staff should annually utilize a portion of the in-service school as a vehicle for disseminating information to all personnel on the accomplishments of the past year, current problems, and future objectives.

HEADQUARTERS REGIONAL OFFICE

Twenty agents are assigned to this unit. Eighteen of these agents are stationed in Headquarters, two are assigned to provincial areas: one in Cabanatuan and one in Puerto Princessa on Palawan.

This division is responsible for handling cases of a general investigative nature as indicated by the following table.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
HEADQUARTERS REGIONAL OFFICE

Fiscal Year 1966

	Received	Terminated
Crimes vs. National Security and Laws of the Nation	14	20
Crimes vs. Fundamental Laws of the State	7	4
Crimes vs. Public Interest	23	13
Crimes vs. Public Morals	2	
Crimes Relative to Opium and Prohibited Drugs	1	
Crimes Committed by Public Officials	28	14
Crimes vs. Person	61	45
Crimes vs. Personal Liberty and Security	17	22
Crimes vs. Property	64	37
Crimes vs. Chastity	4	3
Crimes vs. Civil Status of Persons	4	3
Crimes vs. Honor	1	1
Violation of Anti-Graft Law	3	
Usury	16	9
Naturalization and Change of Name	157	124
Determination of Citizenship	5	7
Illegal Possession of Firearms	7	8
Service of Warrants	1,625	541
Missing Persons	60	48
Miscellaneous	450	449
	2,549	1,348

The Regional Director stated that warrants of arrest are his greatest problem, since it takes from several hours to several days to execute them because of incorrect or sketchy information on the location of the subject. He receives from one hundred to one hundred fifty warrants a week. Because of the large number of warrants, he insists that his agents recheck with the issuing court before attempting to serve them. This recheck often results in learning that the warrant has been lifted or an arrest already has been made.

The Regional Director complained that the volume of warrants is so great because the NBI does make an effort to execute them, unlike some other police agencies. He stated that, if the other police departments would fulfill their responsibility, the NBI would not have to handle warrants.

The use of investigators of an agency on the level of the NBI to execute warrants or handle minor investigations is wasteful. The Regional Director revealed that he has been directed to assign agents in attempts to find missing dogs of prominent persons.

NBI NORTHEASTERN LUZON REGIONAL OFFICE

The Northeastern Luzon regional office at Ilagan is located in a new two-story building built with funds obtained by public subscription. At the time of the survey this building had neither power nor water, and there were no funds to provide any in the foreseeable future. The radio was powered by a generator, but, according to the Regional Director, fuel had to be purchased by the employees. As a result, the radio was operative for short periods of time at four-hour intervals.

The Regional Director reported that one-third of the cases handled by his office were forwarded from Manila Headquarters while the remainder originated within the region. The cases consisted generally of murder, physical injuries, and fraud.

This office, which is responsible for four provinces and four sub-provinces, is staffed by the Regional Director and three agents. He stated that he needs at least ten additional agents to properly carry out his mission. The Regional Director advised that he would assign new agents to the northern and the southern ends of his territory in an effort to combat the problem of time lost in travel to and from crime scenes.

Only one jeep of four assigned is in service. Consequently, as in most NBI offices, getting to and from the crime scene represents a large obstacle to effective law enforcement.

Between January 1, 1966, and August 25, 1966, this regional office opened 464 cases, of which 158 were closed as of August 25, 1966, leaving 306 of these still open.

No local police were trained during 1965 and 1966.

The regional office averaged two cases per month referred to the NBI laboratory by the local police. One hour is required to package the evidence and prepare the cover letter for submission to the laboratory. The Philippine Air Lines transports evidence to Manila free of charge.

NORTHWESTERN LUZON

The Vigan regional office, located in Ilocos Sur Province, is responsible for criminal investigation in two provinces with a total population of 453,251. At the time of the Survey Team's visit on August 22, 1966, there were no investigators present. The Agent-in-charge was in Zamboanga on a court appearance until mid-September. The senior agent had been on detail in the Manila Headquarters since August 11, 1966; another agent had been on detail in Dagupan City since July 19, 1966. The training officer was designated as officer-in-charge pending the return of the Agent-in-Charge. Although extremely competent to discuss the activities of the Vigan office, she is not an agent. The NBI headquarters should not permit this office to remain without coverage by an agent.

This NBI office, located on the second floor of the G. Rivera Memorial Library and Museum Building, W. Vigan, was found to be clean but badly in need of paint. The radio was in operation from 8-12 a.m. and 1-5 p.m., Monday through Friday, and 8-12 a.m. on Saturdays and holidays.

One hundred and nineteen cases had been opened between January 1, 1966, and August 22, 1966. Fifty-four cases had been terminated, leaving this office with a total backlog of 354 cases. The cases most frequently handled are murder, robbery, and illegal possession of firearms. Manila Headquarters refers approximately 70 percent of the cases of this office while 30 percent come from the offices of the Governor and the fiscal or local complainants.

No local police had been trained during 1965 and 1966; yet NBI Headquarters continued to staff this office with a training officer.

Approximately eight cases per month are referred to the NBI laboratory in Manila for examination.

All NBI personnel interviewed at the various NBI offices throughout the Philippines stated that they felt their organization had a reputation for gaining and keeping the confidence of informants and witnesses. They attributed much of their success to the reinvestigation of cases already handled by other law enforcement agencies to this reputation.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SERVICE (CIS), PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

The mission of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the PC is to provide technical advice and assistance on matters pertaining to the prevention, control, investigation, and prosecution of crime.

In accomplishing the stated mission, the Chief, CIS discharges the following functional responsibilities:

a. Advises the Chief of Constabulary on matters pertaining to prevention, control, investigation, and prosecution of crimes.
b. Assists PC Units and other government agencies (on request) in criminal investigations.
c. Investigates and clears designated serious and sensitive criminal cases.
d. Institutes measures against vice, juvenile delinquency and violations of special laws in places where occurrence of such violations is beyond the capability of local PC and local police forces.

Criminal Investigation Service
Philippine Constabulary Headquarters

The function of the CIS, Headquarters Unit is to supervise and assist in criminal investigations conducted by the PC throughout the Philippines. A daily summary (Spot Report) of criminal activity for the prior 24-hour period is furnished to the Chief, CIS, after review and evaluation by the PC Operations Section. This summary is prepared from reports transmitted by radio from the four PC Zone Headquarters. This summary is used as the basis for the assignment of headquarters personnel to the zone or province level to assist in investigations.

The Chief, CIS, has the authority to assign members of his unit at HPC to assist in criminal investigations in the PC Zones, without a request for such assistance. Normally the Headquarters unit of CIS will enter a case only upon request and when the crime involves more than one PC Zone. Similarly, PC Zone CIS personnel assist at Provincial level only when crimes involve movement from one province to another or upon request. At the time of the survey, personnel were being used to assist in investigations in the I, II, and IV PC Zones.

Headquarters CIS personnel are instructed not to become unduly involved in investigations outside their area of normal assignment to the extent that they might be required for court appearances later. An "alert" team is maintained after normal duty hours for expeditious movement to the field.

It was obvious that the Chief, CIS, has neither complete authority over his service, or complete responsibility for its performance. This is a frustrating situation for a highly capable and trained officer who appears to possess the drive and initiative to accomplish a first-class performance.

In the operations of the CIS, the Chief is strictured in his exercise of responsibility. All decisions to provide investigative service from HPC are determined by the PC Tactical Operations Center, TOC, based on their evaluation of the existing situation. When the decision is made to provide assistance, CIS determines the type and quantity to be dispatched. In practice, the Chief, CIS, contacts the PC Zone as soon as he is made aware of a major crime and attempts to determine what is needed in the way of investigative assistance.

Because of the manner in which the system is implemented, the Chief is sometimes 24 hours behind events if he awaits the arrival of the daily summary from the PC TOC. On occasion, the Chief, CIS, first learns of major crimes from the Manila newspapers.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SERVICE
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY HEADQUARTERS



The Chief, CIS, acknowledged that PC fingerprinting procedures were largely wasteful, despite the existence of trained personnel. Too often, fingerprints received are smudged and beyond classification. A serious lack of compliance by provincial commands is experienced in the administrative processing of investigative reports to HPC. According to the Chief, CIS, the only solution to this problem is a directive issued by the Chief, PC.

RECOMMENDATION

That only the Chief, CIS, be responsible for the overall conduct of criminal investigations in the PC. To accomplish this, he must have commensurate authority.

That the Chief, CIS, be removed from a position subordinate to the Operations Branch, and elevated to a position where he is directly responsible to the Chief, PC.

That duplicate spot reports be furnished to Chief, CIS, for "Action" and to the Operations Branch for "Information" immediately upon receipt at HPC.

The Chief of CIS has little or no control over the quality or assignment of investigations outside the CIS unit at HPC. This condition is detrimental to the attainment of a uniformly high quality of investigative effort throughout the PC.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that administrative control over the selection, training, and assignment of CIS personnel throughout the PC be vested in the Chief, CIS.

In implementing this recommendation, it is suggested that administrative procedures be established requiring all applications for assignment or accreditation in the CIS be processed by the Chief of CIS at HPC. A relatively high selection criteria should be established outlining the prerequisites in education, training, intelligence, service and physical characteristics.

Once an applicant meets the prerequisites established and his qualification is approved by the Chief, CIS, the application should be forwarded to the Chief, PC, with a recommendation to accredit the applicant in the CIS. Waivers should be held to the absolute minimum in considering the qualifications of the applicant.

When an applicant is accredited in the CIS, he should be issued the appropriate credentials, and the administrative control of his assignment, initial training, refresher training, and career development in general should become the responsibility of Chief, CIS.

Assignment of CIS personnel throughout the Philippines down to provincial command should be made by Chief, CIS, based on evaluation of crime density or the peculiar needs of an area. These CIS agents conduct investigations under the operational control of the provincial commander or officer responsible for overall law enforcement in the area, but remains under the administrative control of the Chief, CIS.

A severe problem for the CIS is the presence of 92 civilian regular agents who represent a visible manifestation of political influence. These "agents" have little or no qualification to function in this critical section involving crime, vice and intelligence. Few of these agents are considered qualified for their task and many are suspected of graft, corruption and betrayal of investigative information.

This group was successful in drafting and securing the passage of legislation designed to perpetuate their existence and status within the PC. The AFP was unable to prevent this action due to political connections of the agents.

RECOMMENDATION

That the civilian regular agents in the PC be disbanded.

That the vacancies thus created be filled by qualified personnel within the PC.

Investigation Branch

Five officers, nine enlisted men, and 32 civilian regular agents are assigned for duty with the Investigation Branch. The function of this branch is to investigate crimes in the Manila area, and assist in investigations at Zone level at the direction of the Chief, CIS.

The branch suffers from a shortage of travel allotment funds and expenses for agents in the field. A total of 1,000 pesos per month is available for all agents of the CIS. When laboratory technicians are required from the PC Crime Laboratory, these funds are usually expended completely, severely hampering other investigative efforts in the field.

The lack of identification information, photographs, descriptions, fingerprints, etc., is a very serious limitation. Often a suspect who exhibits every characteristic of guilt or involvement in crime, is released for lack of such information at available sources. It is not uncommon to receive a belated request for apprehension for such released persons. Requests to sources for such information usually produce only a name check, which is practically useless in the majority of cases. The practice of using a valid "holding charge", e.g., vagrancy, while a suspect's fingerprints are checked through a central repository, is not utilized.

SUMMARY

INVESTIGATION BRANCH
January 1, 1966 to September 1, 1966

Headquarters Cases		Assistance Cases (PC Units and other agencies)	
Number of cases handled	250	Number of cases handled	659
Number of cases solved	211	Number of cases solved	118
Number of cases pending	39	Number of cases pending	541

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Two officers, seven enlisted and nine civilian agents are assigned to the Intelligence Branch.

The Branch Chief had been in charge only two months following the recent transfers of Criminal Investigation Service personnel due to a sex scandal. The civilian agents are not considered to be qualified investigators and do not fit into the framework of the PC.

It was learned that the bulk of the Branch Chief's work during his assignment to the Intelligence Division had been to confirm or deny reports that smuggled cigarettes had been landed at certain points throughout the country or that certain houses were being used for gambling purposes.

The Captain in charge commented that he lacked sufficient travel funds to operate efficiently in the provinces, and that there was a lack of intelligence reports from the field.

SUMMARY

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, CIS
January 1, 1966 to September 29, 1966

Processing and Approval of New Informants	
Applications received	170
Applications approved	164
Applications pending	6
Record Checks	
Request for record checks received	6009
Request for record checks answered	5586
Number of record checks pending	423

Requests for Verification of Information	
Number of summary of information requests received	358
Number of summary of information requests confirmed/denied	265
Number of summary of information requests pending	93

Central Identification and Records Bureau, HPC

The Survey Team visited this Bureau in an attempt to learn the number of fingerprint cards rejected because of improper inking and rolling on the part of CIS and Intelligence and Investigation personnel throughout the country. The Officer-in-Charge agreed that there were many rejects but stated that they were returned to the point of arrest to be retaken.

A later interview with a female supervisor of fingerprint classification was contradictory. The supervisor insisted that only two cards a month were found to be unclassifiable. In view of the personal observations of members of the Survey Team in PC Provincial and Company Headquarters, it was concluded that this statement is highly questionable.

Upon inspecting the efficiency of a file titled, "Personality and Locator Card File", a card was selected. It listed a name, a sketchy physical description, and the crime as robbery-homicide. The OIC was then asked if the report of investigation could be located with the information. After a lengthy search, only a "spot" report could be found. This report listed only the information on the locator card with the added names of some associates. It was a summary of the daily activity and not a criminal report.

At this point it was revealed that some Provincial Headquarters do not forward the required reports of investigation. It was further stated that other Provincial Headquarters forward them only occasionally. The OIC opened the file to show that one province had forwarded only one report of investigation since the first of the year and that was for a crime that occurred during the month of June. In response to a specific question the OIC replied that he could not determine readily how many Provincial Headquarters were not sending any reports at all because a file folder was placed in the drawer only when a report was received.

The Branch Chief advised that the failure of PC Units to forward fingerprints, and reports of investigation, has long been a problem. He stated that despite efforts on the part of HPC to gain compliance with these requirements, little has been accomplished. The Chief, CIS, apparently does not have the authority to compel the Provincial Commanders to comply.

No quality control of investigations can be exercised if reports of the investigations are not furnished. Needs cannot be properly coordinated in terms of personnel, equipment, and additional leads to be followed. Fragmentary reports of investigations in other provinces or in other local police departments are frequently valuable elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATION

That an in-service training session for Provincial Commanders be held as soon as possible. The overriding theme should emphasize liaison with other Provincial Commands and law enforcement agencies. The need for prompt submission of criminal records, fingerprints, and the necessity for obtaining full and complete information on each report made to headquarters should be thoroughly emphasized.

That the Chief PC, ensure that the Provincial Headquarters submit reports, to both Zone and Headquarters PC on all crimes investigated by their personnel.

Special Operations Branch

The Special Operations Branch, has two officers, 10 enlisted and 21 civilians. It participates in criminal investigations throughout the Phillippines in an assistance capacity in the following categories:

Motor vehicle theft
Anti smuggling
Counterfeit
Illegal logging
Illegal fishing
Falsification of public documents
Fraud

SUMMARY

SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH ACTIVITY
January 1, 1966 to September 1, 1966

Smuggling		Auto Theft		Counterfeiting	
Raids and searches conducted	48	Cases reported	23	Raids/seizures conducted	3
Persons arrested	83	Vehicles recovered	17	Money value of counterfeit confiscated	₱10,000=$2,500
Cartons of "Blue Seal" cigarettes seized	13,267.7	Persons arrested/ involved	34		

VICE CONTROL BRANCH

The Vice Control Branch, consisting of a gambling and a prostitution section, has two officers, 14 enlisted and five civilian agents assigned.

SUMMARY

VICE CONTROL BRANCH ACTIVITY
January 1, 1966 to September 1, 1966

Prostitution		Gambling	
Number of raids conducted	24	Number of raids conducted	41
Number of persons apprehended	253	Number of persons apprehended	700
Number of cases closed	17	Number of cases closed	35
Number of cases pending	7	Number of cases pending	6

ZONE HEADQUARTERS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SERVICE

There are four Zone Headquarters in the Constabulary situated geographically to exercise control over twelve to sixteen provinces each. The CIS at Zone Headquarters is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel or a Major, assisted by a deputy.



Distribution of CIS Personnel by Zone

	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN REGULAR AGENTS	TOTAL
I ZONE	4	26	0	30
II ZONE	5	31	0	36
III ZONE	5	18	0	23
IV ZONE	5	19	0	24
TOTAL	19	94	0	113

INVESTIGATION BRANCH (ZONE)

Although the numbers of personnel assigned to the various Zones differ, the I PC Zone is described as a typical operation. The Investigation Branch, I PC Zone, has 16 personnel assigned as follows:

1 Major	-	Chief Investigation Branch	1 Master Sergeant	-	Action NCO
3 Captains	-	Investigation Team Leaders	1 Technical Sergeant	-	Senior Investigator
			10 Staff Sergeants	-	Investigators

The Branch:

Functions as an immediate investigation arm for, and at the discretion of, the Zone Commander.

Assists subordinate units at the Provincial Headquarters level in the investigation and prosecution of special cases and major investigations.

Maintains liaison with other agencies.

Performs such other tasks as the Zone Commander may direct.

ZONE CIS OPERATIONS

The CIS Investigation Teams in each Zone may be dispatched at any time within the Zone to provide assistance or take over investigations being conducted by Intelligence and Investigation (I & I) personnel at the Provincial Headquarters or in the PC Companies.

The criminal investigation concept in the PC appears to be based on the assumption that I & I personnel at Provincial and Company headquarters, although trained, cannot perform adequately. The accepted solution for the anticipated incapability of I & I personnel is to permit them to handle only routine cases on a day-to-day basis. When a difficult case or major crime is discovered, the I & I personnel are expected to call for the assistance of Zone CIS.

This accepted practice in handling criminal investigations poses several problems which tend to reduce effectiveness. Personnel considered incompetent are permitted to handle the preliminary investigations, which can be the most critical stage. Physical evidence or witnesses vital to a successful investigation may be lost or contaminated by a person lacking technical skill.

Furthermore, Zone commanders or CIS supervisors may be unaware of the complexity of the case from information submitted in the spot report. As a result, the investigator works in isolation until he admits defeat and calls for help. The difficulties encountered in successfully conducting an investigation of a crime are compounded in almost direct proportion to the amount of time that lapses between the commission of the crime and the conduct of a competent investigation. According to some PC officers, a CIS team from Zone can always fall back on the excuse that the initial investigation has been so poorly handled that a solution is impossible.

There were indications that in some instances these Zone CIS teams are led by officers with no investigative training, who are not in CIS by choice. It is

questionable whether Zone CIS personnel are more qualified by virtue of training or equipment to render much in the way of assistance.

If administrative control over the selection, training, and assignment of CIS personnel throughout the PC is vested in the Chief, CIS, and he is responsible for overall control of the quality of criminal investigations, many of these problems will be eliminated or at least alleviated.

PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY



Quality control over criminal investigations can be greatly enhanced by more rigid selection of criminal investigators. In the provinces, some noncommissioned officers were observed who had many years of experience and had also been trained for twelve weeks in the CI course. Many of these men, however, are not high school graduates since this was not a prerequisite when they entered the PC. This was apparent in their manner, vocabulary, and lack of poise in an interview situation.

Although quite capable of performing an investigation in certain environments, many of these NCO's are not capable of coping with all types of persons encountered in investigations. This is significant because influential people do become involved in crimes.

Criminal Investigation Files

The criminal reports files in one provincial headquarters were found classified by perpetrators name only. The reason for this was that this HQ only accepted those cases where the perpetrator was known. If the perpetrator was unknown, the case was assigned to the company for investigation. With this practice, a high HQ solution rate is inevitable.

It was also found that "suspense files" indicated that cases were assigned to a company for investigation for as much as three months without reports of progress to Provincial Headquarters. This permits the subordinate investigators to perform without proper control. Investigators must be given sufficient time

to conduct an investigation but they must also be made to feel that their superiors are interested in the outcome of the case. This is particularly necessary in the PC.

RECOMMENDATION

That a uniform reporting and suspense system be adopted for all PC units. Strict guide lines regarding the forwarding of progress reports on a five, 15, 30, and 45-day interval basis should be disseminated and enforced.

Frequent scheduled and unscheduled inspections by a team of CIS officers and enlisted men selected by the Chief CIS be conducted.

In-Unit Training for Intelligence and Investigation Personnel

Despite the recognized inefficiency of I & I personnel at company level, no provision had been made for providing training for them.

RECOMMENDATION

That the following program of instruction be implemented as soon as possible at the unit level:

Crime scene photography	20 hours
Mug shot photography	10 hours
Fingerprints (dusting, lifting, preserving)	15 hours
Gunpowder tests (parafin casts)	10 hours
Casting and moulding (plaster of paris)	5 hours
Collection, marking, and preservation of evidence	10 hours
Charting and drawing crime scene	8 hours
Two weeks instruction 44 hours each Total	88 HOURS

The PC can no longer afford the practice of specialization in criminal investigation. Too many investigators feel that specialists must be available to perform the routine tasks of photography, evidence collection and lifting of latent prints. As a result, these investigators have only a superficial knowledge of the skills.

The only solution for the wide decentralization found in the PC is to put highly trained, competent investigators into the field to perform the technical requirements.

The PC criminal investigator must be trained and equipped to:

1. Locate, dust, lift and preserve latent fingerprints.
2. Photograph crime scenes, latent fingerprints and arrestees.
3. Properly take rolled fingerprint impressions.
4. Obtain parafin casts of suspects. (The Dermal Nitrate Test, although disdredited in the U. S. because of its inconclusiveness, is highly regarded in the Philippines and is frequently used to elicit confessions.)
5. Obtain plaster of paris and moulage moulds.
6. Sketch a crime scene in detail.
7. Locate, mark and properly preserve evidence at a crime scene.
8. Interview and interrogate all types of witnesses, victims and suspects.

Criminal Investigation Course

The twelve week training course for enlisted men selected for criminal investigation assignments should be revised to devote additional hours to topics in which the survey team found investigators to be weak. It is imperative that each new criminal investigator gain the necessary degree of knowledge of photography, fingerprint lifting and rolling, casting and molding, evidence collection and preservation, charting and drawing of crime scenes, and interviewing and interrogation.

The revision would add 88 classroom hours to the existing course. A few hours have been pared from such topics as firearms identification, document identification, etc., in order to fit the revision. It is recommended that if any additional hours be eliminated that the paring be done on the following subjects:

1. Weapons training
2. Unarmed defense
3. Military justice
4. Military intelligence

RECOMMENDATION

That the following revisions be made in the criminal investigation course of the Philippine Constabulary:

Revised section on criminal investigation techniques

1.	Sources of information	2 hours	
2.	Observations and description	4 hours	
3.	Note taking	2 hours	
4.	Crime scene charting and drawing	10 hours	(increase of 8 hours)
5.	Photography (crime scene, mug shot, latent print)	35 hours	(increase of 34 hours)
6.	Reconstruction of crime	2 hours	
7.	Preservation and handling of evidence	10 hours	(increase of 6 hours)
8.	Interrogation and interview	30 hours	(increase of 10 hours)
9.	Statements, admissions, confessions, and dying declarations	15 hours	(increase of 11 hours)
10.	Report writing	10 hours	
11.	Crime scene search	8 hours	(increase of 2 hours)
12.	Surveillance	10 hours	(increase of 4 hours)
13.	Undercover assignments	2 hours	

Revised section on scientific crime detection

1.	Fingerprints (dusting, lifting, preserving)	20 hours	(increase of 10 hours)
2.	Casts and replica	10 hours	(increase of 6 hours)
3.	Firearms identification	2 hours	(decrease of 1 hour)
4.	Glass fractures	2 hours	
5.	Gunpowder tests	8 hours	(increase of 6 hours)
6.	Hair, fibers, dust, and soil samples	1 hour	(decrease of 1 hour)
7.	Number restoration	1 hour	(decrease of 1 hour)
8.	Poison	1 hour	(decrease of 1 hour)
9.	Blood and other body fluids	1 hour	(decrease of 1 hour)
10.	Document identification	1 hour	(decrease of 1 hour)
11.	Lie detection	2 hours	(decrease of 2 hours)

CITY AND MUNICIPAL POLICE

City Police Departments

The term most frequently applied to the units responsible for criminal investigation in local police departments in the Philippines is the Secret Service (Detectives). In the larger cities, this service is organized in specialized units.

Cebu City

The city of Cebu has 87 men in the Secret Service Division in a total force of 862 men. The city is divided into six precincts with three detectives assigned to each precinct. Uniformed personnel refer to the precinct detectives serious cases and those which may require a lengthy investigation.

Headquarters Secret Service Division expects the investigators at the precinct to handle cases where the perpetrator is known. They are expected to call on headquarters for assistance in difficult cases.

Each shift at Secret Service Headquarters has a three-man homicide team on duty. A three-man intelligence team is also on duty each shift although it is assigned to the Chief's office.

Other units of the Cebu City Secret Service Division are the Theft and Robbery Team, Warrant Subpoena and Missing Person Section, Vice Control and Juvenile Control.

Over 50% of the investigators were appointed directly from civilian life with no prior police experience. The detective commander would prefer that future appointees have prior police experience with higher qualifications than those of a patrolman.

The detective commander has a military background but has attended a course in police administration in 1957 conducted by the Office of Public Safety, AID.

Davao City

Of the 41 men in the Secret Service in Davao City, the Chief of Police considers 80% of them unqualified. According to the Chief, 75% of them were appointed directly from civilian life. He reported a great deal of political pressure on him to make appointments to the police department.

Davao City experiences as many as 150 crimes per month and the clearance rate is only 30%. When the Chief was asked the reason for this, he replied that he attributes it to the poor quality of the detectives. He pointed out that the Chief of the Secret Service has only five years police experience and has never had any training.

Cagayan De Oro City

There are 23 detectives in the Secret Service Division. The Chief of Police pointed out that the Chief of Detectives was appointed to the post directly from a position as civilian clerk in the Mayor's office. The Chief of Police reports that most of his detectives are appointed directly from civilian life with no prior training or experience.

RECOMMENDATION

That Secret Service personnel be selected from the uniformed ranks, on the basis of his desire to become an investigator and his proven ability to investigate crimes. He should undergo a probationary period of evaluation.

That unqualified personnel be eliminated from Secret Service units.

Bago City

Bago is a third class city with a population of 70,601 located in Negros Occidental Province. The officer in charge has a PC background.

The Police Department, although authorized three officers and 87 policemen, has an actual strength of one officer and 49 policemen. The criminal investigations here are handled by two corporals and four patrolmen. The two corporals are NBI trained and the four patrolmen received one month's training from the PC.

This Department recently began to take two sets of rolled fingerprint impressions of each person arrested. One is retained in the Bago City files and the other is forwarded to NBI Headquarters in Manila.

The OIC reported that the only unsolved crime was a murder that had occurred on August 6, 1966. During the interview, he revealed that he personally directed the activities of the six men assigned to criminal investigation and stated that he always visited the scene of any serious crime.

Instead of a report of investigation, the Bago City police make out a "spot report" which is sent to the PC Provincial Headquarters. They keep one copy of this spot report in file and consider it a report of investigation. These spot reports are completely inadequate as reports of investigation since they are nothing more than synopsies of events. With few exceptions, this procedure is being followed by the local police departments throughout the Philippines. One of the purposes of a criminal report is to compel the investigator to perform all the requisites of a thorough investigation in the proper sequence and detail to enhance the probability of a solution.

The fiscals (prosecutors) were questioned about this practice. They reveal that these superficial investigations create very serious problems. Much of the delay in prosecution is due to this unwieldy system.

Investigators usually establish only a prima facie case. Consequently, the fiscals are then forced to see that the necessary investigation is conducted.

RECOMMENDATION

That oral statements always be supported by written statements. The statements should be signed, witnessed, and dated.

Jolo City

Jolo City is a First Class municipality with a population of 28,000. The Acting Chief of Police heads a 67-man police department. The department does not have a special unit responsible for criminal investigation. The Desk Sergeant acts in the capacity of criminal investigator when a serious crime is reported. The Desk Sergeant has had PC training and the Chief is satisfied with his performance since the two murders experienced during the past year were both solved.

After some initial hesitation on the part of the Chief, he said he believed that the two murderers were fingerprinted by the PC. It is interesting to note that a later interview with the PC revealed that they do not send a copy of the fingerprints they take to the NBI anyway. Consequently, these two criminals do not have their fingerprints in the files of the designated national clearing house on crime.

Municipality of Talipao

The municipality of Talipao on the island of Jolo has a 15-member police department headed by an Acting Chief of Police. The department, responsible for a population of 22,000 people, has no special criminal investigators.

An examination of the police blotter revealed that the only police activity listed from July 23, 1966, to August 13, 1966, was one case of assault and battery and three requests by the Mayor for personal escorts for security reasons.

This department was reported by the PC to be manned by illiterates; however, two members of the department were able to read material put before them.

A further check of the police blotter revealed an entry on June 4, 1966, which read as follows:

> "Report received by the office of the Chief of Police from Ajid Simihag residence of Pantave, Talipao, Sulu, that Asibah, Moro of Pantave this municipality, killed on this date, June 4, 1966, more or less 5:00 a.m. because . . ."

The entry had never been completed so it was necessary to question the Chief regarding the circumstances of the crime. It was learned that the victim died of gunshot wounds at the hands of an armed group. The murderers were still at large even though the police knew them and knew where they could be located at any time. When the PC commander was questioned as to why the PC company located across the road did not help, he stated that the PC company was not strong enough to arrest them either.

YEARLY COMPARATIVE CRIME GRAPH



YEAR	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
DENSITY CRIMES/ 100,000	33.1	42.6	37.2	36.5	37.2

LEGEND: GRAVE LESS GRAVE MINOR TOTAL METRO-MANILA NOT INCLUDED

STATISTICS ON WANTED PERSONS – 1966

I PC ZONE		II PC ZONE		III PC ZONE		IV PC ZONE	
Abra	22	Albay	28	Akian	30	Agusan	6
Bataan	41	Batangas	166	Antique	26	Bukidnon	5
Batanas	40	Camarines	50	Bohol	9	Cotabato	159
Bulacan	302	Camarines Sur	39	Capiz	20	Davao	229
Cagayan	25	Catanduenes	13	Cebu	45	Lanao Norte	21
Ilocos Norte	37	Cavite	224	Iloilo	53	Lanao Sur	390
Ilocos Sur	111	Laguna	77	Leyte Norte	51	Misamis Occidental	57
Isabela	163	Marinduque	31	Leyte Sur	22	Misamis Oriental	35
La Union	13	Mindoro Occidental	42	Masbate	6	Sulu	1,946
Mt Province	44	Mindoro Oriental	20	Negros Occidental	73	Surigao Norte	13
Nueva Boiga	125	Palawan	57	Negros Oriental	32	Zamboanga Norte	40
Neuva Vizcaya	62	Quezon	37	Romblon	16	Zamboanga Sur	124
Pampanga	201	Rizal	60	Samar	48	TOTAL	3,035
Pangasinan	142	Sorsogon	15	TOTAL	431		
Tarlac	124	TOTAL	855				
Zambales	148						
TOTAL	1,560						

RECAPITULATION

I PC Zone	1,560
II PC Zone	855
III PC Zone	431
IV PC Zone	3,035
Agg. Total	5,881

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY – CRIME DATA

CRIMES	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	TOTAL
Murder, Homicide and Paracide	679	472	471	250	540	365	285	3,060*
Robbery and Theft	107	52	181	85	264	320	120	1,129
Physical Injuries	91	209	213	250	216	230	180	1,391*
Others	114	188	174	266	239	244	210	1,435
TOTAL	991	921	1,041*	851	1,259	1,159	795	7,010*

CRIME TREND

RECAPITULATION

ZONE	JAN			FEB			MAR			APR			MAY			JUN		
	R	S	A	R	S	A	R	S	A	R	S	A	R	S	A	R	S	A
I PC ZONE	224	172	407	354	286	950	197	175	295	186	128	285	295	150	285	392	203	216
II PC ZONE	224	176	733	359	304	964	226	181	542	222	166	455	195	144	355	286	228	384
III PC ZONE	244	204	389	286	243	587	242	213	388	269	165	266	285	199	233	351	175	287
IV PC ZONE	163	112	1,210	245	183	278	145	90	92	141	87	212	54	174	212	350	169	216
TOTAL	855	664	1,739*	1,244	1,016	2,779	810	659	1,317	818	546	1,218	829	667	1,085	1,379	775	1,103

LEGEND: "R" (Reported)
"S" (Solved)
"A" (Persons Arrested)

* Errors in addition furnished by HPC.

CRIME STATISTICS

PC Statistics

Crime statistics are not being properly collected, assembled, analyzed, or utilized. If proper methods are used, crime statistics are of great value to a law enforcement agency. They are indicators of the efficiency of a police department or any of its subdivisions. They show the number of crimes handled, the number cleared by arrest, the number of arrests made, and the number of cases pending. Statistics can be utilized to deploy personnel for a more equitable distribution of work load for the individual investigator or the group. They point the way to problem areas so that additional personnel can be assigned to cope with unusual crime trends. They are often the basis for obtaining needed increases in personnel or funds to cope with a rising crime rate.

The survey revealed that no uniformity exists throughout the PC in the manner that statistics are compiled for briefing purposes. Repeated attempts were made to learn the total number of crimes handled by the PC as opposed to the local police with almost negative results. The only unit producing such figures was the Third PC Zone headquarters.

Some information and some charts furnished to the Survey Team were found to be in error. The Yearly Comparative Crime Graph shown has an error in the total figure in the 1965 column which should read 11,026 instead of the 12,026 figure shown.

The Crime Data Sheet shown has four errors circled in the totals given. The Crime Trend Sheet shown has an error in number of persons arrested in January. Further, the Crime Trend Sheet cannot be reconciled with the other two sheets. It is interesting to note that the crimes reported for the Third PC Zone as indicated on the Crime Trend Sheet by Constabulary Headquarters total only 1,677 for the first six months of 1966, whereas a detailed breakdown from the Third PC Zone lists 10,790 crimes for a twelve-month period. It can only be concluded that the crime statistics furnished PC Headquarters are unreliable in terms of reflecting the current crime picture in the Philippines.

This disregard for meaningful statistics as a means of assessing the quality of investigative performance is common to both the PC and the local police in the Philippines. The solved rates of 99%, and even 100%, are unrealistic.

Local Police Statistics

Inspection of local police department blotters during the survey revealed that one must do more than accept the entries at face value as is apparently being done by the PC inspecting officers.

The police blotters inspected were found frequently to be lagging two or three days behind the current date. The practice of jotting down complaints in longhand on a separate sheet of paper for later official entry in the blotter was common. This, of course, enables the police department selectively to enter the cleared cases and to ignore the unsolved cases when the blotter is filled out.

Other blotters were found to have a citizen's crime complaint jotted down on a sheet of paper clipped to the blotter sheet.

It was then pointed out that because a permanent entry was not made in ink at the time the complaint was received, and was instead clipped to the blotter sheet, the sheet could be discarded if the crime was not solved.

Another shortcoming of local police blotters was an instance where a murder had occurred and the victim was killed instantly. This fact was discovered by checking the monthly PC report against the police blotter. There was no complaint entered on the blotter sheet for the day of the murder. However, twenty-six hours later when the murderer surrendered, an entry of the crime was made. Many such instances were found, again by checking the monthly report of crimes sent to the PC Provincial Commander by the local chief of police against the sheet on the police blotter.

Some of the monthly reports submitted by the local police to the PC were found to have the number of crimes handled, and the number of crimes, reversed month after month. When this was pointed out to the PC officers accompanying the team, immediate instructions were then issued to effect a correction on subsequent monthly reports.

In order to effectively attack the crime problem, accurate data must be compiled. This can be done by frequent, accurate, standardized submission of crime statistics to a central point for collection, collation, and analysis.

RECOMMENDATION

That the PC adopt the NBI system of uniform crime reporting.

Statistics on crime handled by the PC only should be totaled by the provincial headquarters and forwarded to HPC each month through zone headquarters.

Headquarters PC should extract information required for use of the PC from the report form and then forward the forms to the NBI for inclusion in national totals.

The crime statistics of the local police should be forwarded to the provincial commander who should ensure that no duplication exists with PC reports and forward the local forms through zone to HPC where again they may extract such information as they may require and then forward the forms to NBI headquarters for inclusion with national totals.

It cannot be too strongly recommended that every segment of Philippine law enforcement, regardless of size, participate in reporting crime statistics accurately and promptly.

WANTED PERSONS

One of the most serious and alarming problems facing the Philippines today is the large number of fugitives who are successfully evading arrest. These wanted persons should be a matter of grave concern to all agencies involved in enforcement, adjudication, and correction.

As of 31 August, 1966, these wanted persons totalled 20, 974. For the most part, those represent only those involved in the most grievous crimes. They include murderers and rapists as well as escapees from prisons and mental institutions. This group is scattered throughout the country and its members must be considered dangerous.

A number of obstacles must be overcome if this vast pool of wanted persons is to be dried up. The PC, the NBI, and the local police are all failing to implement positive measures to correct this situation. One outstanding factor is a lack of direction by agency heads. Mutual cooperation between law enforcement agencies is almost non-existent. Agencies tend to limit their apprehension efforts to their own geographical area. The trend of thinking is to consider a fleeing felon as "good riddance" and to be grateful that the problem now is located in some other province or city.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission designate the NBI as the primary agency responsible for directing a nationwide program for the apprehension of fugitives from justice.

The survey team found in many PC Headquarters and local police departments that fingerprints were not being taken of criminals.

RECOMMENDATION

That the NBI be supported as the central repository for fingerprints in the Philippines. Copies of all fingerprints now in the files of the PC and local police should be turned over to the NBI as soon as practicable. In the meantime the following should be implemented immediately:

That every local chief of police in the country be contacted to ascertain his needs in terms of cards, ink, and rollers. The needs for training at least one person to take rolled impressions in each department should be ascertained.

That the needs of the PC in this category be determined.

That the Police Commission develop a program to meet organization training and equipment needs.

In one Provincial Headquarters a request to see the fingerprint files resulted in a fifteen minute search until they were located on a dusty shelf in a cabinet. The prints were simply placed in a folder along with investigative reports and stacked in no specific order in a pile. An examination of the physical description portion of the card revealed, as was generally found elsewhere, that it was only partially completed. The one item most frequently left out was the date of birth. When questioned, the investigators stated that the people did not know their date of birth.

This failure by all police agencies to obtain descriptive material and to take suitable fingerprints and forward them to a central repository is common. Once the prisoner is bonded or escapes custody he has only to change his name and flee to another province to successfully avoid arrest.

In another Provincial PC Headquarters it was pointed out that all but three members of an armed band had been apprehended and incarcerated. The members of the band still at large were listed by name on the large briefing map on the wall. After the briefing the NCO in charge of intelligence was asked to furnish a physical description of the three wanted men. The NCO was unable to provide even the age of the fugitives. After being encouraged to search his files, he simply had to admit that he had no descriptive information on the "most wanted" criminals in the Province. Upon further questioning it

was learned that the home islands of each of the fugitives was known. The NCO revealed that no request had ever been forwarded to the PC or local police there to conduct an investigation in an effort to obtain descriptive material, including photographs, from relatives or friends. Further, no request had been made to the police departments on the home island of the fugitives for any information including fingerprints that just might have been available.

RECOMMENDATION

That a booking and identification form, as required by PC "Police Rules and Regulations", dated March 25, 1964, be completed and filed on every person arrested for a criminal violation.

That all persons arrested for a criminal violation be fingerprinted only on cards furnished by the NBI and the cards forwarded to NBI Headquarters, Manila.

In each interview with police investigators the name or names of the "most wanted" criminals were asked for. When a negative answer was received, it was then the practice to check the police blotter and spot reports to the PC. This examination often revealed that there actually were fugitives wanted by the police. For example, in the Masbate Police Department, an entry was found for August 2, 1966, which read as follows:

"Antonio Gaton Y Ramos was permitted by Patrolman Alfredo Villamor Jr. and Patrolman George Altoregas to go with his father, Victor, to dine at the small store just opposite the Municipal Building. The prisoner Antonio Gaton Y Ramos failed to return."

It was learned that no alarm had been issued for Gaton by the PC. The Chief of Police insisted he notified the PC of the escape by letter. The PC denied that they had ever received the letter. The Chief insisted that he had heard nothing further from the Bureau of Prisons. The possibility of criminal involvement on the part of the patrolmen and the fugitive's father was discussed with the Chief of Police who stated he would look into it. This twice-escaped, convicted murderer, was once again at large.

ROGUES GALLERY

A "Rogues Gallery" frequently found was composed of clippings of photographs of escapees from the Bureau of Prisons printed in a daily newspaper. The law enforcement officers who attempt to make use of this material are to be commended. However, it is regrettable that their support is so poor that they must resort to such methods.

RECOMMENDATION

That all persons taken into custody by the police for any criminal offense, be photographed, fullface, and profile when arrested. An identifying number should appear on the photograph along with the full name, and date. Descriptive data should include pertinent information regarding scars, marks, tatoos and amputations. One print should be forwarded to the NBI, another should be retained by the arresting agency if desired.

On subsequent arrests of a criminal a new photograph for updating purposes should be obtained at five-year intervals.

R.P. Form No. 4

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF ITOGON
MOUNTAIN PROVINCE

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,

-versus-

Accused.

CRIMINAL CASE NO._____

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

WARRANT OF ARREST

TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

GREETING:

You are hereby commanded to arrest _____

who is/are said to be at _____

and who is/are charged before me with the crime of _____

and to bring him/her/them before me as soon as possible to be dealt with according to law.

The bail for his/her/their temporary liberty is hereby fixed at ₱_____ each, which may be furnished by him/her/them either by depositing the amount of the bond in the office of the municipal treasurer of the municipality where the accused is/are arrested, and the receipt therefor forwarded to this Court, or by purchasing the proper money order made payable to the order of this Court and sent to the same Court, or by a personal bail bond for double the amount therein fixed executed by two or more solvent bondsmen who are either freeholders or householders and residents in the Philippines to be determined either by the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the district or by the justice of the peace of the municipality where the accused may be arrested, who are hereby authorized to approve either one of said bonds, and to order the provisional liberty of the accused immediately thereafter, and who shall forward to this Court all the papers of the proceedings.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court this_____day of_____, 19__.

_____
Municipal Judge

- - - - - - - - - - - -

RETURN OF WARRANT OF ARREST

On this date I received this warrant of arrest and it was served by arresting the accused mentioned therein and bringing him/her/them, before the Court to be dealt with according to law, or it was not served because the accused, according to reliable information, is/are at present in _____, Province of_____, and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality. (Cross out either one of the above statements as the case may be.)

_____ _____ _____, 19 ____.
(Municipality) (Province) (Date)

_____
(Warrant Officer)

WARRANTS OF ARREST

The Warrant and Alarm Section, HPC, holds 4,000 outstanding warrants for criminals in the suburbs of Manila alone. These warrants are forwarded to Headquarters from the courts in the Manila area as well as from courts in the Provinces. The written orders of arrest are generally directed to police officers, name the crime, and direct that the accused be brought before the issuing judge to be dealt with according to law. The form provides also for the address of the accused. All of the warrants inspected had only the first and last name of the accused with no middle name or a middle initial listed. The present warrant form is unsuitable, it lacks description of the accused and information to set him apart from others of the same name.

Since a large portion of these warrants are issued at the request of a complaining witness able to name the perpetrator, the witness should also be able to furnish some physical description of the person to be arrested.

RECOMMENDATION

That the warrant form be improved by printing on the back, a form providing for the insertion of a complete physical description, and any other pertinent information that would assist in apprehension, as follows:

Name: first, middle (or initial only if known), and last; address, sex, race, date of birth, birth place, marital status, build, teeth, complexion, height, weight, hair, eyes, marks, deformities, amputations, scars, tatoos, mustache, glasses, occupation; employed by, hobbies, frequents (night clubs, cockfights, etc.), and personal habits (gambler, heavy drinker); associates, clothing worn; direction of flight (may go to, means of travel). Has been arrested at _____ on prior occasions.

That in the event the witness or victim cannot provide the above information, the issuing authority call on the police agency having jurisdiction over the place of the crime to conduct an investigation to obtain the necessary information and make every effort to obtain a recent photograph of the wanted person.

Duplication of Warrants

Warrants are often forwarded to a police department for execution while duplicate copies are sent to the NBI and the PC in the province. Sometimes after an initial failure to execute the warrant in the province and on the basis of new information, additional warrants may be forwarded to other police agencies in a distant province. If at some later time the criminal is apprehended and returned to the court, the issuing authority frequently fails to recall some of the warrants. This practice, along with the great number of warrants outstanding, tends to downgrade to police officers the importance of warrants.

Some courts forward a warrant to a police agency instructing that it be returned within a specified number of days if the wanted person cannot be found. Sometimes this is due to the "Term of prescription" (Statute of Limitations) where the period of time would be 60 days for a light offense. However, when the period of time allowed is six days, this is an effort to prod a reluctant or disinterested police department to action. This practice is resented by the police and is actually self-defeating in that it provides an easier excuse for non-service.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Director of the NBI, the Chief, PC, and all Chiefs of Police appoint qualified members of their organizations to act as liaison officers with the various courts throughout the Philippines.

The efforts of the officers so appointed should be directed at the establishment of a better "working relationship" between the police and the courts. The warrant problem is a mutual one and cooperation in attempting to solve it will result in mutual benefit to both the courts and the police.

Davao City

The Warrant Section Chief of this city stated that he had 300 outstanding city warrants on file plus another 100 on file from other areas. He claimed that some of the warrants were between 20 and 24 years old. When it was pointed out that some of these wanted people might be long dead, he agreed, but stated that he has never purged his files. This man has a five-member team employed full time serving warrants but they are able to execute only between five and seven warrants a week. This warrant team worked daylight hours only. The most likely time to apprehend a subject trying to avoid arrest would be between midnight and six A.M.

Philippine Constabulary

The Warrant and Alarm Section Chief at HPC has a team of four agents assigned to serve warrants but they are able to execute only three or four a week. Some arrests are made of persons who appear in the office to obtain clearances. From this it would appear that a minimal effort at leg work to effect apprehensions is being made by the team. If apprehensions continue at the present rate of three or four per week it will take almost twenty years to eliminate the 4,000 warrants now outstanding. The warrants, however, continue to accumulate at the rate of approximately eleven per day.

During August 16, 1966, and August 22, 1966, a period of seven days, 94 warrants were received by this section. Most of these were merely indexed and filed by the ten clerks employed in the section. This entailed preparation of hand-written cards listing the charge, name of the accused, and the date of issuance. The cards were then placed in a file and the warrants in folders numbered to correspond with the cards and were stored on shelves. An inspection of the warrant room revealed thousands of warrants stored on the shelves. The exact number is unknown because they go back for years. They represent both active and inactive warrants because an executed warrant is not pulled. Instead a notation is made on the warrant card in the file. It was learned that it is not uncommon to attempt to execute a warrant only to find that the person has a receipt from a court to prove that the warrant had previously been served by some other police agency.

The problem of duplication of arrests on warrants is common to the PC and the NBI because warrants are issued in triplicate and forwarded to those two agencies and the city or municipality where the crime took place. This duplication is used to get the warrants into the hands of all three agencies because it is felt that this will enhance the probability of an apprehension. The lines of responsibility are not clearly drawn and since no single agency is assigned to original jurisdiction and held accountable for performance, warrants do not receive proper attention.

Both Active and Inactive Warrants in the Warrant and Alarm Section Philippine Constabulary

Warrant Card File in the Warrant and Alarm Section PC Headquarters

RECOMMENDATION

That warrant files be purged at monthly intervals in every police agency. Purge criteria should be prescribed: term expiration, death of the wanted person, or by inquiries directed to the issuing authority, through the court liaison officer.

National Bureau of Investigation

The warrant problem also exists in the NBI to the extent shown in the following statistics:

Warrants received from October, 1964, to August 31, 1966	14,269
Warrants outstanding from October, 1964, to August 31, 1966	7,473

The courts recalled 6,796 warrants received. This was due in large part to the fact an agency check with the court prior to attempting to serve the warrant revealed that an arrest had already been made or that the warrant had been lifted.

The Chief of the NBI Headquarters' Regional Office stated that warrants of arrest made up the bulk of the work he assigns to his investigators. Out of a total case load of over 2,500 general investigations for fiscal year 1966, 1,625 were warrants of arrest.

It was found that some warrants listed "Manila and suburbs," or a specific location, followed by "or anywhere in the Philippines" as a lead for locating the fugitives. Execution of warrants with such sketchy information is almost hopeless.

The use of NBI investigators in the day-to-day execution of routine warrants of arrest is wasteful since they are trained to perform a much higher level of law enforcement.

RECOMMENDATION

That responsibility for serving warrants be placed as follows:

The city or municipal police in urban areas.

The PC in the rural areas, and where the fugitive has fled, intra-province.

The NBI should be limited to providing technical or actual apprehension assistance upon receiving a formal request from the local police or the PC.

That the PC pay particular attention to the handling of warrants by the local police during their scheduled inspections in order to ensure compliance with proper police standards. This quality control should be directed at any failure on the part of the individual officers or a department.

That a record of warrants be maintained by each agency. The record should list the name, charge, date, and time received, and the officer assigned.

The final disposition, or efforts made to execute, and reasons for failure must be included.

That the warrant sections of the larger Philippine law enforcement agencies be provided sufficient personnel for 24-hour operation. The most likely time to apprehend a subject who is trying to avoid arrest is during night hours.

Judges, fiscals, and clerks of the various courts are required to furnish a copy of the warrant of arrest to the PC, NBI, and the local police at the present time because of Circular Number 64 of the Secretary of Justice, dated September 2, 1964. This was ordered for the purpose of ensuring cooperation from each of the three agencies in the apprehension of criminals but as pointed out earlier, opposite results obtain. Responsibility should be fixed for the service of warrants by a specific level of law enforcement agency.

RECOMMENDATION

That Circular #64, issued from the Office of the Secretary of Justice, and dated September 2, 1964, be rescinded.

That a new circular be issued directing that warrants should be forwarded to the city or municipal police department having jurisdiction over the site of the crime.

EVIDENCE

Collection and Preservation of Evidence

Even the smaller police departments in the Philippines where the designation of personnel as detectives cannot be justified usually had patrolmen assigned to handle criminal investigations, under the direction of the desk sergeant, or the chief of police. However, it was just as common to find that the first man on the scene was responsible for gathering the evidence. This was also found to be true in some PC Posts. This practice is not in accord with good police procedure, for the following reasons:

1. The patrolman or constable is often untrained in the gathering of evidence. Therefore, evidence necessary to the solution of the case can be overlooked, destroyed, or contaminated and lost.

2. The evidence gathered by the patrolman to be turned over later to the investigators responsible for the solution of the case means that it passes through too many additional hands. This complicates the chain-of-custody.

RECOMMENDATION

That the first officer to arrive at the scene of a crime should first attempt to apprehend the perpetrator and failing that, guard the scene and preserve the evidence until the arrival of the responsible investigators.

Evidence Storage

Evidence gathered is often improperly stored until its presence is required in court, but evidence lockers or rooms in the NBI, the PC, and the local police

departments were usually locked and some effort was being made to control access to the keys.

Some departments insisted that all evidence be sent immediately to the fiscal's office to be held for trial. When questioned about the storage place for evidence in unsolved cases, the answer indicated that all cases were solved and as a result of this they had no need for this type locker. When questioned about getting evidence to the office of the fiscal on a Saturday or a Sunday, it was revealed that the evidence was held in the police station until Monday. When pointed out that even in the case of a solved crime it must take a few days from the time the evidence is gathered to the time the perpetrator is apprehended, again it was admitted that this might require evidence to be held at the police station.

An inspection of the evidence storage facilities at each department visited was conducted whenever possible. Evidence was often found to be unmarked. When evidence was marked, it frequently consisted of a paper wrapped around a gun barrel and would contain insufficient information to explain its presence in the evidence room. The information most often missing in the PC and local police departments was the investigating officer's name. In every instance pieces of evidence, marked and unmarked, were selected at random and the investigator was asked to explain why it was being held as evidence. He was then placed in the position of trying to decipher a makeshift tag made of flimsy paper with information that was insufficient in most cases to reach a conclusion.

In the CIS of one PC Zone Headquarters the evidence was in a locked room where supplies were also stored. A submachine gun was tagged. The tag did not have the investigating officer's name or the case name.

At a PC Provincial Headquarters, loose Blue Seal cigarette packages were observed in a large open cardboard box. The investigator related that they had been seized from vendors as contraband and were presumed to be smuggled goods. The cigarettes were all mixed together, yet they represented multiple seizures and should have been stored separately in paper bags, properly marked with all pertinent information.

In one local Police Department a glass front exhibit case was found to house a number of weapons. When a request was made to see the evidence locker or room, this case was pointed out. The case was locked; however, it was in a room where access could easily be gained by anyone seeking to destroy evidence.

In another local Police Department stored evidence, including firearms and bladed weapons, was contained in a locked wooden cabinet just outside a cell which housed four prisoners. The prisoners had been convicted on a charge of robbery for forcing entry into a house where they had stolen a firearm. The chief of police expected these criminals to be sentenced to at least a year in jail for this crime. In view of these circumstances, one could expect the prisoners to be locked in the cell, but they were not. The cell door, which opened on the evidence cabinet, was found to be secured only with a piece of board which was being held in place with a length of rope knotted around it.

The possibility of a jail break with easy access to weapons and the strong probability of death or serious bodily injury to the police officer who happened to be on duty at the time was too great to be ignored. After some persuasion, the prisoners were moved to the very next cell which could be locked.

The majority of law enforcement agencies utilize small wooden cabinets or steel filing cabinets for evidence storage. Others use a supply room where evidence was stored concurrently with supplies. This cannot help but give too many persons access to the evidence and reduce the necessary standard of close custody.

Only a few efforts were found to be directed at maintaining a log or a receipt system for control of deposit and withdrawal of evidence. Where such logs were found, they were not being used.

RECOMMENDATION

That each law enforcement agency have a clean secure room for evidence storage.

That a uniform log be adopted for all departments as follows:

Date _____ Investigating Officer _____

Description of Exhibit _____

Case name or number _____

Out - Date _____ Time _____ Signature _____

In - Date _____ Time _____ Signature _____

Because of the very nature of criminal investigation, the gathering of evidence is hopefully only a prelude to the identification and apprehension of the violator. Once collected, therefore, evidence becomes secondary to the policeman's primary object, the arrest. It is not uncommon to leave important evidence on the investigator's desk or in a drawer unless convenient access is available to a proper storage place.

The evidence problem in the Philippines is complicated by the fact that adequate criminal laboratories are located centrally in Manila. This necessitates particular care in ensuring that specimens of blood and other body fluids found in cloth, paper, or other like material, are completely and quickly air dried prior to storage or shipment to a laboratory. This becomes a problem due to the high humidity in the Philippines. The humidity continues to be a problem in storage since continued dampness is conducive to renewed bacterial action of this type specimen which can negate any possibility of later identification or classification by a laboratory.

RECOMMENDATION

That a portion of the evidence room be set aside for the storage of materials containing dried body fluids or other air dried liquid specimens considered for laboratory examination. This section should be enclosed and small enough that a constantly lighted 100 watt electric bulb will control the humidity. In those police departments and posts without electricity, it is recommended that sufficient quantities of commercially available dessicants be provided to control humidity.

Marking of Evidence

When an investigator is on the witness stand he is always handed the evidence he has collected at the scene of the crime and throughout the investigation. It is at this point, when the prosecutor hands him the evidence, that he must be able to positively identify it. This is not an easy task unless some groundwork has been laid. The best possible means to accomplish this is to mark the exhibit by some identifying characteristic that he will readily recognize. The best rule is to actually mark by scratching the mark on the surface of the object where it will in no way interfere with the evidentiary qualifications but be readily apparent to the eye of the investigator who marked it. Initial(s) inside the mouth of a shall case or on the butt plate of a revolver are common methods. The mark used and the location must be recorded in the investigator's notes to refresh his memory before taking the witness stand. The survey revealed that in the majority of the law enforcement agencies inspected this is not being done.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBIT LABEL General Form No. 1

Offender.....

Offense.....

Complainant .....

In charge of Case .....

Station..... Date .....

RECOMMENDATION

That a uniform evidence tag be adopted for all law enforcement agencies in the Philippines. It should contain the following information:

EXHIBIT LABEL

Case name, or number _____ Police agency _____

Victims name _____ Date found _____

Subject's name _____ Time found _____

Description of evidence _____ Where found _____

Type of case _____ Found by _____

It is further recommended that in the interest of economy consideration be given to having the tags printed by the NBI Printing Section under some mutually acceptable funding agreement.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION EQUIPMENT

The lack of equipment available to Philippine police forces for the task of investigating crime can be described as appalling. Fingerprints are not taken for lack of ink or cards. Photographs of criminals or photographs of crime scenes are not taken for lack of cameras. It they had cameras, there was no film. If they had both cameras and film, they lacked the capability to develop the exposed film.

The majority of police officers questioned try to perform their jobs. The attempts they make at improvising were evident. All departments, from the PC to the local police, were attempting to make use of crime scene sketches as a substitute for the photographs they were unable to take. The sketches observed lacked the detail and exact measurements required to fix each and every article in the crime scene area and in most cases could only be considered as rough drawings rather than detailed sketches. Actually, a sketch should be used to support photographs of the crime scene. In the Philippines, it appears the sketch will be a primary method until adequate cameras and film are obtained.

RECOMMENDATION

That training in crime scene sketching be made available to those responsible for criminal investigation in departments.

Fingerprint Kits

Out of three PC zone headquarters visited, one had been issued a fingerprint kit suitable for lifting latent fingerprints at a crime scene. The other two Zone Headquarters were using kits that were the personal property of the CIS personnel assigned.

Out of 18 city and municipal police departments visited only six had complete or partial fingerprint kits. The Municipality of Mandaue had equipment to take rolled impressions of arrested persons but no equipment for dusting and lifting latent prints. Mandaue calls on Cebu City for assistance when latent fingerprint lifting is necessary in one of their investigations. It was further learned that when Cebu City does not have powder, then Mandaue calls on the NBI for assistance.

Zamboanga City was found to have a camera that was inoperative at the time of the Survey visit. This is a First Class city with a population of 220,000, but they do not have a fingerprint kit. This major city, with all of its attendant crime problems, must call on the NBI or PC to dust and lift latent prints at a crime scene. This for the most part means that assistance is called for only when it is absolutely necessary.

RECOMMENDATION

That each subdivision with the PC responsible for criminal investigation, and each local police department, acquire a fingerprint kit to consist of the following:

- Camel hair brush
- Bottle of black dusting powder
- Bottle of white dusting powder
- Roll of one-inch wide transparent lifting tape
- Supply of latent fingerprint cards

Latent Fingerprint Cards

Because of shortage of fingerprint dusting and listing equipment, there were few latent prints found in the PC and local police files during the survey. Those that were inspected were of good quality. One factor, however, that did stand out was the lack of uniformity found on backing up the transparent lift. Everything from cards to sheets of bond paper was being used. There is a need for a uniform latent fingerprint card for several reasons:

To be of maximum use latent fingerprint cards must be compared against those in a central repository. This usually requires forwarding; therefore, the prints lifted should be affixed to cards for durability.

Forms tend to elicit all of the required information from the donor, and because of the nature of the form, filing and locating are facilitated.

Latent prints to be of utmost value must be available in a central file for later comparison against future suspects in the continuing investigation of the crime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That a uniform, latent fingerprint form card be adopted for all law enforcement agencies in the Philippines, containing the following information:

Latent Fingerprint Card

Case Name or Number	Police Agency
Victim's Name	Date Lifted
Suspect's Name	Time Lifted
Type of Case	Exact Place Lifted From
Lifted By	Lift Witnessed by 1
Photographed Yes No	Lift Witnessed by 2

Instructions . . . . . Tape lifted latent prints across the back of this card.

Distribution of Equipment

Inequities were found in the distribution of criminal investigation equipment in the PC. For example, Headquarters of the 1st PC Zone, when inspected, was found to have cameras, film supplies, and a fingerprint kit, along with other equipment.

Headquarters of the 3rd PC Zone had no film and no fingerprint kit except for the personal kit of one of the CIS personnel.

Headquarters of the 4th PC Zone had cameras, but had no film and no fingerprint kit except for the kit that is the personal property of one of the men assigned.

PC Headquarters of Iloilo Province had a camera and a fingerprint camera, whereas the other PC Provincial Headquarters visited were not equipped with any cameras.

National Bureau of Investigation

The survey of NBI Regional and Sub-offices revealed that in regard to investigative equipment, support was lacking in the area of photographic equipment. The Iloilo office had a camera but it was sent to Manila in November, 1965, for repairs and has not been returned. This office did not have photographic film on hand.

The Ilagan NBI office had a camera but no film. The Baguio office had neither camera nor film. The Laoag office was found to have a camera but a defective lens had rendered it inoperative since July, 1966, and there was no film on hand. The Tacloban office had no film on hand. Generally this was the condition throughout the NBI field offices.

Each of the NBI offices inspected was found to be supplied with a fingerprint kit. Many offices had two kits, the small personal one issued to the agent, plus the large kit issued to the office.

It was found that the large Sirchie Laboratory Kits issued by AID are apparently too sophisticated for the NBI. The hypodermic needles, as well as the tissue builder, fluorescent powder and other such components had been removed from one kit and stored in the drawer of a filing cabinet. In kits where they remained, an inspection showed that they have not been used. The greatest need seems to be for black dusting powder, as all offices had sufficient transparent tape and brushes.

Local Police Photographic Equipment

Out of 20 City and Municipal Police Departments visited, only seven had cameras in good working order. One other had a camera, but at the time of the survey it was inoperative. Of the 12 departments which did not have cameras, two hired commercial photographers for mug shots of arrested persons, and one was using the personal camera of one of its members. Obtaining film did not appear to be the problem in the local police departments that it was found to be in the NBI and the PC.

RECOMMENDATION

That each regional and sub-office of the NBI, each subdivision of the PC responsible for criminal investigation, and each department of local police in the Philippines, acquire a camera suitable for criminal investigation purposes. Adequate film, batteries, and flash bulbs, must also be provided.

That the camera provided be of a bellows type similar to the Speed Graphic (the PC and the NBI have a number of these on hand) since it can, with the proper attachments, function as a mugging camera for full face and profile shots, a crime scene camera, and a fingerprint camera.

Requests for Laboratory Examinations

Out of 20 city and municipal police departments visited, 14 made a regular practice of calling on the NBI for laboratory examinations of evidence in criminal investigations. The examinations most frequently requested are ballistics, and paraffin tests. The local police who use the NBI services do so because it is

free, and because the NBI agents prepare the material for packaging as well as the cover letter. Results are forthcoming in from as little as two weeks in some cases to as long as a month in others. The persons interviewed stated that the time required is not a problem because of the lengthy period before a person comes to trial in the Philippines.

Out of 20 PC posts visited, eight used the laboratory of the NBI as well as the PC laboratory.

Again, one of the determining factors in using the NBI lab was that it did not cost postage or the travel expense of sending a courier to hand-carry the evidence.

The specimens submitted to the PC lab usually took from two to three weeks if forwarded. If hand-carried to Manila and waited for by an investigator, results could be obtained in a day.

Polygraph

In all police departments visited only a minimal use of the polygraph was found. The reason is that polygraph facilities are centralized in Manila and the travel expense to bring the subject to the machine, or the reverse, is too great.

At the present time the NBI has one operative polygraph instrument and ten operators. The PC, on the other hand, has five instruments and three operators.

RECOMMENDATION

That when additional machines are obtained by the NBI and additional operators by the PC, polygraph facilities be located in Northern Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao within the NBI and in each Zone headquarters of the PC.

Coordination and Mutual Assistance in Investigations

The failure of agencies involved in law enforcement to extend and accept mutually profitable investigative assistance is one of the most severe problems of Philippine law enforcement. Improvements in reducing criminality will be minimal until this problem is solved.

NBI Regional Offices and Sub-Regional Offices visited, as thinly spread and understaffed as they are, were found to have never called on a member of the local police or the PC to accompany them on an arrest.

This feeling appears general throughout the NBI. Few of the Regional and Sub-Regional offices contacted had ever called on the PC for assistance although they have conducted investigations jointly with them when they have had to do so. The PC, on the other hand, rarely calls on the NBI except for an occasional laboratory examination. They, too, have conducted investigations with the NBI when they have had to do so. This same feeling is generally true of both agencies in regard to the local police.

A number of fiscals who were interviewed were asked to cite the problems, if any, which resulted from simultaneous NBI/PC investigations. The answers

were surprising. The simultaneous investigations sometimes result in completely different conclusions, one agency stating suspect "A" was the guilty party, and the other agency listing suspect "B" as the culprit. Each agency produces evidence supporting their conclusion. The fiscals commented that this presents an almost insurmountable problem in trying to resolve such an issue, when the guilt or innocence of two suspects is involved. A fiscal also stated that it is not unusual for one side or the other to conceal the fact that they have important evidence, or if they are discovered in the concealment of evidence, to refuse to display it to the other agency.

This schism between the two national police agencies resulted in several recommendations from fiscals that one or the other of the agencies should be disbanded. Actually, each agency has a definite purpose and is needed in the Philippines. The real solution to the immediate problem is for them to work together.

RECOMMENDATION

That overt, positive efforts be made on the part of the Director of the NBI and the Chief PC, to overcome this coordination gap between their respective organizations.

That Chief PC and the Director of the NBI avail themselves of every opportunity to see that their respective personnel mingle professionally and even socially by inviting representative groups to graduations, retirement ceremonies, as participants or instructors in special training courses, and to submit papers for publication in the periodicals of the respective agencies.

That whenever it is necessary for a joint investigation to be conducted by the NBI and the PC that a higher authority (Office of the President or Department of Justice) always appoint a team chief from either agency to supervise and coordinate the activities of all the team members.

That the team chief be instructed to be circumspect in his efforts to give equal credit to both agencies in news releases as well as in reports to higher authority regarding progress.

"He alone possesses true patriotism who strives to do the greatest good for his countrymen. A little good done while in humble office constitutes a title of honor and glory; while a little good done in high office is an indication of negligence or incompetence."

A. Mabini
"Memorial de la Revolution Filipina."

Chapter X

CRIMINALISTICS

INTRODUCTION

Criminalistics is a law enforcement service function that uses the physical sciences to examine criminal things. It should not be confused with criminology which is a social science that deals with criminal people. People commit crimes by means of things. They spill blood, break glass, shoot guns, and leave the marks of their fingers and feet at the scene of their crime.

There are three broad divisions of Criminalistics: Medicine, Science, and Technology. The scientific subjects are usually combined as Forensic Chemistry which includes Chemistry, Biology, and Physics as well as such related fields as Botany, Metallurgy, Geology and Optics. The technological subjects include Firearms Identification (Ballistics), Questioned Document Examination, Fingerprint Examination (Dactyloscopy), and Lie Detection.

In Europe and South America, Legal Medicine is always completely separate from any police department. In the United States and the British Commonwealth, Legal Medicine is done by public officials called coroners or medical examiners. In the Philippines, Legal Medicine is a part of law enforcement and will be included in this study.

Identification of persons by means of the inked impressions of all ten fingers plus their photographs is a function of the Records & Identification Bureau. Only the macro- and micro- photography of physical evidence and the search for hidden fingerprints at the crime scene are a function of Criminalistics. The latter is an element of Dactyloscopy and will be the only aspect of fingerprinting considered in this evaluation.

Criminalistics Facilities in the Philippines - There are three criminalistics facilities in the Philippines which meet the accepted definition of a Crime Laboratory in providing service in both scientific and technological fields. These are the laboratories of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and the Manila Police Department (MPD). Inquiry of responsible criminalists reveals that while some municipalities claim to have "laboratories" these are actually only fingerprint and photographic sections of Identification Bureaus.

Each of the three laboratories has a Medico-Legal Division incorporated into its structure. For the purposes of this report, Legal Medicine will be included in the evaluation.

Location - All three laboratories are located in Metropolitan Manila. The NBI and MDP laboratories are only one block apart: the PC laboratory is eight miles away at PC headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Neither the NBI nor the PC has any regional branch laboratories.

While the Bureau of Customs operates a laboratory at the Port of Manila, this facility is concerned only with the testing of imported goods to determine tariff categories. It refers criminal cases to the NBI laboratory. It will be evaluated by the Customs Advisor.

Legal Authority - The Manila Police Laboratory operates under specific authority of Section 34, Article VII of Republic Act No. 1934 of 1957 which provides that the Chief of Police "...shall cause examination ... by a criminal investigation laboratory established within said department of evidence and telltale marks of crimes".

The NBI Laboratory operates under specific authority of Section 1, Paragraph G, of Republic Act No. 157 of 1947 which provides that the NBI "... shall have the functions ... to establish and maintain an up-to-date crime laboratory and to conduct research in furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal investigation".

The PC has no specific authority to operate a crime laboratory.

Jurisdiction - None of the authorizing Republic Acts spells out the exact jurisdiction of any of the three laboratories. As a consequence, all are free to accept work from any and all persons requesting it. The MPD by necessity confines itself to Manila and its environs but accepts many cases from the Land Transportation Commission regarding stolen vehicles.

Both NBI and PC accept cases from private parties, courts, and other governmental agencies. The NBI does 51% of its work on its own cases, 10% for municipal police departments, and 31% for courts and prosecutors and 3% for private parties, 3% for other government offices and agencies, 2% for armed forces of the Philippines and others. No percentage breakdown is available from the PC.

Background - The Spaniards established a Medico-Legal Institute at the University of the Philippines in 1895. It served both Manila and the provinces. The Americans continued the system until 1937 when the duties were transferred to the Department of Justice. The functions were suspended during the Japanese Occupation. Necessary medico-legal procedures reverted to the University and other criminalistics operations were transferred to the Manila Police Department. After liberation, the U. S. Army Provost Marshal activated its laboratory in the Manila Police Department and staffed it with both American and Filipino technicians. The MPD laboratory served both military and civilian needs, taking cases from as far away as Okinawa.

Following Independence, in 1945, the U. S. Army moved its laboratory to Camp Zama near Tokyo, leaving most of its equipment and the Filipino technicians behind to form the present Criminal Investigation Laboratory of the Manila Police Department.

In 1947, both the PC and the NBI activated crime laboratories in Metropolitan Manila. Besides these agencies, the Department of Health conducts medico-legal investigations as required and performs autopsies in outlying areas. It maintains only the usual pathological and bacteriological laboratories customary to health departments.

Buildings - The NBI crime laboratory occupies part of an old building that also contains NBI administrative offices and the Record Section. The Photographic Section is inconveniently quartered across the street in a new building, while the Questioned Documents Section is quartered in several substandard bamboo huts on the rear of the lot.

The PC laboratory shares one-half of the Criminal Investigation Service building on the grounds of Camp Crame in Quezon City, eight miles from the other two laboratories. A new laboratory building costing $37,000 (₱158,000) is programmed for FY 1967 under the MAP Program.

The MPD laboratory occupies two floors of the Police Service Bureau, a fairly new building adjacent to Police Headquarters and just around the corner from the NBI laboratory. The first floor of the building is occupied by the Identification & Records Bureau. The Medico-Legal Section is located at Police Station 2 in the Santa Cruz district of Manila. It is an old, substandard and inadequate edifice.

Facilities - None of the laboratories was architectually designed for its specific functional purpose. Office and work areas are not arranged for efficient work flow. There is no control of visitors. Modern laboratory design recommends glass panelled observation walls. The new NBI building has such an arrangement but this area is occupied by printing presses.

None of the laboratories is provided with floor drains to facilitate the removal of spilled chemicals. There are insufficient electrical outlets, water pipes and sink drains. There are no fans to remove various vapors, although the NBI does have some fume hoods which are not, however, adequate to eliminate vapors from the large work areas.

Accepted practice calls for at least one, and preferably, two sinks in each work area. These minimums are not met.

Photographic darkrooms all lack adequate ventilation and most lack light trap mazes for easy access.

Furniture & Fixtures - While all three laboratories have some minimal built-in benches, none approaches the accepted requirements of 500 square feet of working space per employee. There are not enough sinks and what sinks do exist are ordinary household items not designed to withstand the corrosive action of chemicals and not deep enough to accommodate large jars and tall flasks. Running hot water is not provided, nor are suction siphons and hose connectors for rubber tubing to provide cooling water to condensers and reflux apparatus.

Both 36-inch standing height and 28-inch seated height benches and tables are needed in any laboratory work area. Many work areas in Philippine laboratories are provided only with ordinary wooden office desks and tables which are not surfaced to resist corrosive chemical action and are not sturdy enough to prevent vibration. This disturbs weighing instruments and interferes with photographic time exposures.

All three laboratories lack adequate overhead illumination. Many rooms have only a single fluorescent tube fixture. There are insufficient electrical outlets to accommodate microscope lamps and other specialized illuminators as well as the many devices that operate on line current. An expensive ultraviolet spectrophotometer in the NBI laboratory is placed in a corner so dark that a flashlight was needed to inspect it.

All three laboratories lack sufficient cupboards and storage cabinets to protect equipment, and as a consequence, hundreds of small and delicate items are cluttered about on table tops exposed to possible damage.

Proper evidence security is evident only in the PC laboratory. Its firearms collection is housed in a double-locked strong room. The MPD, which has the largest collection of firearms, has them piled on benches and table tops for lack of storage space. The NBI collection is housed in glass cases which make a nice display but offer poor security protection.

Only the NBI has fume cabinets with exhaust fans in which noxious chemical and dangerous vapor operations can be performed. In all three laboratories, procedures using caustic acids and poisonous solvents are being done in ill-ventilated rooms with potential hazard of explosions and at grave risks to the health of employees.

Temperature & Humidity Control - The Manila area has an average relative humidity of 78% and an average temperature of 27°C. Ambient conditions for scientific laboratories are standardized worldwide at 25% humidity and 20°C temperature. Philippine laboratories are therefore always too hot and too moist unless control measures are taken.

None of the laboratory work areas, except the NBI Polygraph Division, has air conditioning. Most have only large electric circulating fans which are not satisfactory because they disturb trace evidence such as hairs, fibers, and debris and blow dirt on the instruments and contaminate specimens.

Besides the hot moisturized air, Manila has 108 inches of rainfall per year, often aggrevated by typhoons. Substantial quantities of rainwater penetrate the work areas, saturate the equipment, and produce puddles on the floor.

Chemicals & Biological Materials - None of the laboratories has a sufficient stock of chemicals to meet even basic minimum requirements. Such a minimum list consists of about 200 separate items and costs no more than $800.00 (₱3200), yet is essential to provide an assortment of ingredients to prepare any common testing reagent.

All three laboratories complain that small amounts of needed chemicals are hard to come by since no fixed budgets are provided and money earmarked for supplies generally disappears by transfer to some other account.

Blood-testing serums are expensive and all must be imported. The Institute of Hygiene used to prepare medico-legal testing serum but has discontinued the operation. Only anti-human precipitating serum is available.

Glassware & Porcelain - None of the laboratories has even essential minimums of glassware such as beakers, test tubes, centrifuge tubes, flasks, vials, etc. The most serious deficiency is the almost complete absence of calibrated measuring glassware essential to quantitative work. Pipettes, graduates, cylinders, and volumetric flasks are non-existent. This is a most serious deficiency because it is usually not enough to know that a substance is present -- it is the exact amount found that is significant for legal purposes.

Measuring & Weighing Instruments - NBI laboratory has an adequate supply of instruments provided by the USAID program. This includes colorimeters, spectrographs, spectrophotometers, and analytical balances.

PC has few, if any, modern instruments. It has neither colorimeters nor spectrophotometers and its technicians go to other laboratories (such as NBI) to make most of their analyses.

MPD has only one colorimeter that is a legacy from World War II and is inoperative and non-reparable.

All three laboratories lack calipers and micrometers for precision linear measurement. Both PC and MPD lack accurate analytical balances.

Temperature Instruments - All three laboratories lack constant-temperature regulated ovens, furnaces, incubators, and water baths. None has sufficient refrigerators to store biological specimens, perishable reagents, and serums.

Apparatus & Machinery - All three laboratories lack essential minimum requirements of clamps, supports, racks, tripods, timers, corks, tubing, forceps, scissors, tongs, needles and other apparatus. All are deficient in such machines as blendors, shakers, rotators and stirrers. None has equipment for vacuum or compressed air. Distilled water is prepared by small hand-assembled laboratory stills of low capacity and the operation of these stills within the work areas only intensifies the already existing excessive heat and humidity.

Viewing Instruments - All laboratories have microscopes, but the assortments are not well-balanced. There has been too much emphasis on bullet-comparison microscopes to the exclusion of more versatile stereoscopic binocular and high-power compound models.

The NBI has purchased an elaborate Infra-Red Inverter Microscope Camera of Japanese manufacture, although it is not clear what precise use this instrument has.

Photographic Equipment - All three laboratories have an abundance of photographic equipment, but little of it is specialized equipment for Criminalistics purposes such as micro, close-up, ultra-violet, infra-red, and other special light procedures. In general, there is no special provision for the laboratories; they share the facilities of the general photographic divisions. Only the PC Document Section has set up its own darkroom specifically designed for criminalistics work, and this reflects the personal initiative of one expert and largely contains his own personal photographic equipment.

Teaching & Demonstration Equipment - All laboratories have sufficient amounts of anatomical models, charts, skeletons, and demonstrating boards. All laboratories have excellent displays of unusual evidence in the form of weapons, bones, narcotics paraphernalia, and forged documents suitable for training purposes.

Books & Periodicals - All laboratories lack modern textbooks and current scientific periodicals. Since a modest investment of not more than $600 (₱2400) would be required to provide a basic library, this serious deficiency is difficult to understand.

Maintenance - Maintenance is uniformly poor. While some of this may be attributed to lack of storage space with resultant clutter, in general there is little evidence of any effort at neatness except in the PC laboratory, which shows the influence of military standards. Even the PC laboratory shows poor regard for care of machinery--centrifuges are spattered with dirt and glassware is dusty.

Considering the adverse climate factors, preventive maintenance is vital to the care and preservation of laboratory equipment. An expensive spectrophotometer in one laboratory is so caked with dust that the lamps cannot be seen.

Medico-Legal Facilities - The PC has only a medico-legal officer and one doctor and does most of its autopsies in the field or at various hospitals. It has no equipment to process tissues for microscopic examination but relies

on outside laboratories. The MPD does its work at its own morgue at Precinct 2 and does its own tissue work. While its equipment and facilities are old and in deplorable condition, maintenance and cleanliness are excellent. The NBI has good equipment including automatic tissue processing machines. The NBI Medico-Legal Division performs a number of procedures that are usually classified as Forensic Chemistry such as seminal stains and blood stain testing.

Both NBI and MPD Medico-Legal Divisions do many procedures that are more medical than legal such as blood counts, sputum examinations, pregnancy tests, stool specimens for worms, dental services. MPD data shows 749 cases annually of which only 366 are classified as "crime."

Personnel - Over 200 scientific and technical workers are employed in the three criminalistics laboratories. Sixty per cent are with NBI, 14 per cent with MPD, and 25 per cent are PC.

SPECIALTY	NBI	MPD	PC
Physicians	5	1	1
Medico-Legal Officers	8	2	1
Chemists	16	2	6
Biologists	5	1	0
Physicists	3	1	6
Pharmacists	2	0	1
Firearms Examiners	9	5	5
Document Examiners	20	2	5
Fingerprint Examiners	15	5	7
Polygraph Operators	15	1	3
Photographers	14	7	9
Laboratory Technicians	18	2	1
Laboratory Aides	7	0	0
TOTAL	138	29	44

Salaries - The average salary of a criminalist is ₱4300 (US $1075) per annum with a range of ₱1500 (US $375) to ₱8800 (US $2200) in the NBI and ₱2250 (US $562) to ₱6500 (US $1625) in the MPD. Many criminalists in the MPD have had no promotions in 21 years of service. The PC crime laboratory personnel all hold military ranks ranging from Corporal to Lt. Colonel.

Education and Background - About one-third of Criminalists have college degrees but there is little or no relation between the type of degree and the job performed. Three Firearms Examiners in MPD are a dentist, an attorney, and a criminologist respectively. One Fingerprint Technician is a pharmacist, a photographer holds an engineering degree, and six members of the laboratory staff are attorneys. Although the physicians are doctors of medicine, no criminalist holds a doctorate or masters' degree in Chemistry, Biology, or Physics.

Ten NBI and four PC criminalists have had U. S. participant training. MPD has had none although training is contemplated for FY 1967. Three of the participants had formal courses at the University of California in Berkeley. The others took on-the-job training at selected laboratories throughout the U. S.

There are no generalists with a broad knowledge of the whole field and few if any criminalists have any background in Criminal Investigation, Statistics & Probability, Optics, Metrology, or other fundamental subjects of their craft. Most law schools offer some survey courses in Legal Medicine and Forensic Chemistry. The University of Manila, The University of The Visayas in Cebu and two private colleges: the Philippine College of Criminology and the Abad Santos College of Criminology offer Bachelor and Masters degrees in Criminology, which include some courses in criminalistics.

Four Captains, one Major, and one Lieutenant Colonel (doctor) of the PC head technical sections; except for the doctor, all these officers have military backgrounds as line officers and learned criminalistics through U. S. participant programs. Thirteen of the technical staff are women civilians (chemistry, medico-legal physics).

Appointment - Criminalists must be carefully selected on the basis of educational background and personal integrity since an impeccable record for technical competence and intellectual honesty is essential for acceptance as experts by the courts. In the course of this survey there have been frequent implications that criminalistics candidates have been appointed on the basis of political recommendations without regard to their technical qualifications. If true, this practice is reprehensible and has no place in the appointment of technical specialists.

Career Development - As far as can be determined, there is no program for gradual promotion based on merit up through the ranks. Some members of the MPD staff have been in the rank of patrolman for 21 years. There is one sergeant who is a high school graduate; 11 patrolmen hold Bachelor Degrees, and one is a doctor of Dental Surgery. Two civilian scientists receive the same salary as a clerk and this is lower than the pay of a patrolman.

Training - All criminalists in all three laboratories have learned their craft by work experience. There is no organized program of apprenticeship training for new hires. There is no rotation between the divisions to provide a broad base for career development. There is no planning for replacements due to death, departure, or retirement. The MPD is particularly deficient in this regard. Four of the present staff were trained by U. S. Army Provost Marshal Laboratory Staff in 1945 and are approaching retirement.

Professional Societies - There is no professional Criminalistics society in the Philippines although some workers are corresponding members of American associations. Physicians belong to regular medical associations.

OPERATIONS

Analysis of laboratory workloads is difficult because each facility uses a different classification system and the PC uses a semi-annual rather than fiscal reporting period. MPD lumps Chemistry, Physics, and Biology. PC puts Biology and Chemistry together, but separates Physics. NBI separates Biology and puts it in Legal Medicine, and includes many medical procedures which are

not forensic. Both MPD and NBI include applicant medical examinations and industrial accident cases which are not a part of criminalistics.

For the purpose of this study, an adjusted twelve-month abstract was prepared from FY 65 reports. Only procedures which have to do with the examination of physical evidence were included. Ammunition reloading, blood counts, psychiatric evaluations, extraction of teeth, and routine Wasserman tests were omitted.

In determining work loads, only scientific and technical workers were counted. Clerks, drivers, and laborers were omitted. Only fingerprint technicians involved in the search for and comparison of latent prints were included.

Adjusted Annual Total Cases Received (FY 65)

Division	NBI	MPD	PC	Total
Ballistics	180	1,019	96	1,295
Forensic Chemistry	1,963	546	375	2,884
Dactyloscopy	255	1,405	114	1,774
Questioned Documents	361	20	124	505
Polygraph	202	26	80	308
Legal Medicine	1,891	1,412	557	3,860
TOTAL	4,852	4,428	1,346	10,626

Percentage total cases	46.7	41.8	11.5
Number technicials	138	29	44
Annual case load	35	153	30.5

Source:

NBI Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1965

MPD Annual Report, 1964/1965

PC Accomplishment Report, July 1964 to June 1965

Procedures. Lack of equipment has precluded the use of batch analyses or assembly-line procedures, and many tests that easily lend themselves to multiple operations--blood alcohol and blood stain testing--are being run on a one-by-one basis. Lack of new books and periodical criminalistics literature leaves Filipino criminalists unaware of new developments. The discredited Dermal Nitrate or so-called "paraffin test" for firearms discharge residues is still being used by the NBI and was used in 1,169 cases per year. Both the MPD and the PC have no spectral instruments for qualitative and quantitative color analyses.

There are no Procedure Manuals or other instructions for standardization of methods. Technicians are free to use whatever method suits them. No quality control procedures are evident for such methods as Blood Alcohol and Blood Grouping which are techniques lending themselves to verification. Double checking results by replicate analysis or by another method or by another worker is not evident. This lack of quality and quantity control may be a reason for the large number of contested court cases.

Court Testimony. Philippine criminalists spend a large part of their time in court appearances. MPD experts appear in 1735 cases a year or 39% of their total cases. Nearly all cases are contested and criminalists expect to be examined and cross-examined rigorously on even the simplest case. In addition, if either the judge of defense counsel is dissatisfied with the report, a second expert from a different laboratory is often asked to re-examine the evidence.

Budget. Over 70% of appropriations is delegated to personal services and less than 10% for supplies and equipment. Even the meager amounts alloted for supplies are further depleted to make up defficiencies in other allotments. All laboratories report that Travel and Transportation budgetary item most frequently borrowed. No laboratory has any fixed annual allotment specifically earmarked for laboratory purposes; all must fight other operating divisions for a share of the appropriation. As a consequence, no planning is possible for expendable's and even the meager 2% allowed for overall procurement of equipment is virtually non-existent.

Management. Deficiencies in laboratory management are only a reflection of overall policies of a whole organization. Specifically, Philippine criminalistic facilities suffer from a lack of strong professional leadership. Command of technical units is given to line officers who are unfamiliar with the peculiar problems of specialized activities. A further complication is the excessive fragmentation of scientific operations into a myriad of divisions, branches, sections, bureaus, and offices that results in diffusion of responsibility and control. There are too many chiefs, supervisors and seniors who have rank without authority. In the PC Polygraph Branch, for example, there is a Captain and a Technical Sergeant supervising the work of only one polygraph examiner.

While a high degree of specialization has become a necessity in criminalistics, some degree of versatility is required of all technicians. Although no criminalist can hope to master more than one of the several scientific disciplines, every worker must be at least familiar with the overall principles of evidence evaluation. All laboratories could benefit from a smaller span of control and less compartmentalization of functions.

Evaluation and Recommendations

1. There is no significant difference among the three laboratories in quality of service and skill of technicians. The sincerity and diligence of technicians is commendable considering their low pay, poor equipment, and unsatisfactory working conditions.

2. All three laboratories need firm budgetary allotments for expendable supplies. They should not have to compete for a share of agency-wide funds but should have their own fixed annual budgets to replace consumed chemicals and broken glassware.

3. There is immediate need for an input of about ₱25,000 in each laboratory to provide essential minimums of glassware, chemicals, apparatus, books, and scientific periodicals. A check list with cost estimates is enclosed. No further investment in costly instruments should be made until these minimum requirements are satisfied.

4. Direction of laboratories should be assigned to specialists and not to line officers or lawyers. Superintendent O. W. Wilson, Chief of Chicago Police, and a recognized authority on police administration, says that "Superior officers who lack the necessary technical knowledge are not qualified to supervise and direct the performance of tasks requiring special skills."

Unfortunately, there is a serious shortage of senior scientists capable of assuming direction of a scientific installation. Because the Law enjoys such enormous prestige, there has been little incentive for Filipinos to pursue higher education in science and technology. The emigration of Filipino scientists and technologists to take better paying foreign jobs is a matter of national concern. Higher pay with resulting prestige could remedy this problem.

5. Assignment of technicians has not been based on work load analysis. Present case loads are much too low. The F.B.I. Laboratory in Washington, D.C., performs 1,257,060 examinations annually with a technical staff of 287 persons. This represents a case load of 896 per worker. Only the MPD approaches this figure. In his 1955 Survey of Various Police Agencies in the Philippines, Police Consultant Jeter L. Williamson observed that "Most agencies appear to be overstaffed according to workloads even though every department has requested additional personnel. There is practically no evidence of a department making use of workload studies as a basis for personnel assignments. In fact, the term itself has no meaning for the majority of persons who occupy command positions."

Williamson's comment is still valid after eleven years. U.S. and British experience indicates that one skilled technician should be able to handle up to one case per working day or 200 cases per year. Yet some NBI and PC divisions have a case load of no more than 20 cases per year--scarcely 1 case in two weeks.

The NBI Polygraph Division is an outstanding example of overstaffing. There are eleven polygraph operators housed in an office no larger than a hotel room. Only a single instrument is in regular use which is adequate for 206 cases per year. It is impossible for eleven operators to use one machine. There are two portable instruments for field use, but since there is only one examination room, these cannot be used. It is also not clear why this one-machine operation needs to be dignified as a "division" and commanded by an Assistant Director. It should be reduced to a section, and staffed by two operators and a clerk. There is no justification whatever for "senior", "supervising", or "chief", polygraph operators since there is not that much gradation in the skill required. Both the MPD and the PC have only a single operator. The lone PC operator, however, has both a Captain and a Sergeant to "supervise" him.

6. There are too many supervisors in the NBI and the PC laboratories. Inspection of staffing patterns shows an unusually high number of supervisors. Technical sections are choked with "assistant directors", "chief", "supervisors", "seniors". The job descriptions for all these positions are non-existent or ill-defined. The unjustifiable fragmentation of the NBI into 21 "sections" proliferates an incredible number of supervisors. A work load study in depth is indicated for the purpose of reducing both the NBI and PC staffs to a size proportionate to their case loads. Job descriptions for all technical workers should be prepared and minimum load figures established.

7. Staffing patterns in both NBI and PC are too large for their case loads. Using 200 cases per year as a minimum figure and permitting at least two men for each activity, an estimated staffing patter would be:

Activity	NBI	MPD	PC	Total
Ballistics	2	5	2	9
Forensic Chemistry	10	3	2	15
Dactyloscopy	2	7	9	18
Questioned Documents	2	2	2	6
Polygraph	2	2	2	6
Legal Medicine	10	9	3	22
TOTAL	28	28	20	76
PRESENT STRENGTH	138	29	42	209

This estimate shows that at present the NBI has four times too many people, the PC two, and the MPD has one less technician than it needs. The above estimate assumes further that a supervisor works as well as "supervises", that he receives his extra pay for handling case work as well as supervision.

Such a reduction in force would affect an annual savings of ₱570,000 (US $142,500), a portion of which could be used for supplies and equipment and renovation of buildings. A portion of the savings also could be used to upgrade salaries to a level sufficient to attract and hold high caliber scientists and technologists.

It is realized that in the light of high unemployment in the Philippines, such a drastic reduction in force would be a serious undertaking, but since most of the technicians are educated people with experience in law enforcement, their talents could well be transferred to other law enforcement departments or to investigative assignments within their own agencies. The large number of lawyers would make excellent investigators and could use their legal training in an area where it is more applicable than in a scientific laboratory.

In the PC, a reduction in force could be effected easily by sending line officers back to the line and returning needless Non-Commissioned Officers-in-Charge to field duty. Only military personnel with adequate technical or scientific backgrounds should be retained, and this retention should be permanent. A military officer, per se, is no more qualified as a scientist than an attorney. The present PC Medico-Legal Officer, a physician, would be the logical choice as a Laboratory Director.

8. MPD salaries should be equalized with NBI according to WAPCO standards. There is no difference in skill and responsibility between the work of the two laboratories.

Comparison of Salaries - MPD and NBI

	NBI	MPD
Chief Forensic Chemist	5,112	4,608
Chief Ballistics Examiner	7,992	4,944
Chief Document Examiner	7,992	4,608
Firearms Examiner	3,612	3,408
Document Examiner	4,188	3,408
Forensic Chemist	3,432	2,832

9. Work area environment must be improved by provision of temperature and humidity control. Besides the effect of climate factors on employee morale and efficiency, a more serious consequence is damage to equipment, and effect on test variety. Laboratory instruments designed to work properly under standard conditions are inaccorate or become inoperative. Visual instruments become moisture fogged and permeated by fungus. Precision and accuracy of measuring instruments is destroyed by rust and corrosion. Electronic instruments suffer electrical shorts, volumetric glassware does not measure accurately. Temperature-sensitive analytical methods such as paper chromatography, electrophoresis, and thin-layer chromatography cannot be successfully employed. Photographic developing and printing are adversely affected.

Lack of temperature and humidity control is one of the more serious unfavorable factors affecting Philippine criminalistics. Filipino criminalists are not unaware of it. The NBI Director of Technical Services has been attempting to take corrective actions by setting aside one single room to be climatized in which all delicate apparatus could be placed and critical procedures performed. Lack of funds has prevented implementation.

10. The number of laboratories should be reduced to two--one national and one for the Manila Metropole. As previously reported in the 1964 Survey of the Manila Police Department, the MPD is performing 40% of all criminalistics work in the Philippines and 90% of this work is for its own department. The heavy MPD court load alone justifies the MPD laboratory operation since its technicians are in almost daily attendance at local courts. The MPD justifiably could assume reponsibility for contiguous cities. It has an excellent building with room for expansion, if needed.

The case for the need for the existence of both the NBI laboratory and the PC laboratory is not proved. There is overlapping and duplication at the working laboratory level because there is overlapping and duplication between the two parent agencies. The problem must be resolved on a higher level before any meaningful recommendations can be made at the lower. There are several possible solutions:

a. The PC handles collection, the NBI does the processing. Crime scene searches for the recognition, collection, and preservation of physical evidence are done by the PC and sent to the NBI for processing. This tends to be self defeating, however, in that it would of itself tend to foster overlap of function.

b. Division of responsibility is done by type of case. After a firm jurisdiction has been established, each laboratory does only work on certain types of cases--narcotics, counterfeiting, etc.

c. Division of responsibility is done by function. NBI does Forensic Chemistry, Legal Medicine, Questioned Documents and dactyloscopy. PC does Firearms and Polygraph.

d. NBI runs a central laboratory, PC operates regional branch laboratories. There is no justification for two central laboratories eight miles apart. PC could be better served by splitting its operation.

However, decentralization of the laboratory over such a far flung area as the four zone headquarters could, unless rigidly controlled, result in a progressive deterioration of present PC laboratory effectiveness.

e. NBI operates Manila laboratory for the Northern Philippines--PC transfers to, and operates a laboratory in Cebu for the Southern Philippines.

11. A study of medico-legal departments should be initiated to determine the feasibility of consolidated operations with the National Health Service. In many areas, initial medico-legal investigations have to be done by local health officers or hospital pathologists. Economies might be effected in law enforcement agencies by reducing their medico-legal activities to advisory and training services and the performance of only such specialized functions as the identification of skeletal remains or the histopathological examinations of wounds. Routine investigations would be done by local health officers who had received special training from law enforcement medico-legal officers.

A further inquiry should be directed to the separation of purely medical from medico-legal functions since such activities put manpower and supply drains on criminalistics divisions.

12. Economics in travel expenditures could be effected by charging mileage to the courts and fiscals. Sixteen percent of NBI appropriations are applied to Travel and Transportation. This reduces funds available to Supplies and Equipment to only 9% which is totally inadequate. Rule 130, Section 11, of the Rules of the Courts provides for the payment of mileage and Rule 29, Section 9, further provides that no witness is bound to attend a court more than 50 kilometers from his place of residence. Mileage and per diem could be assessed as Court Costs thus freeing further law enforcement appropriations for needed supplies and equipment.

13. Minimum standards of employment should be established and a training program initiated. All entry to criminalistics positions must be the lowest grade and promotion must be on merit and experience. The academic requirements for admission should be limited to those subjects which are directly related to Criminalistics. This includes Chemistry, Biology, Physics, Metallurgy, or Pharmacy--not Engineering, Dentistry, Business Administration, or the Law. Polygraph Operators should have a degree in Psychology if a degree is regarded as necessary in this activity and should have had actual law enforcement experience.

After selection, the criminalist should be appointed as a Trainee for a period of one year. He should be given a four to six-weeks course in Fundamentals of Criminalistics, which include Identity, Comparison, Statistics and

Probability, Optics, and Metrology. The Trainee then should be rotated through all sections of the laboratory and spend six weeks in each section as an intern. At the end of one year he should be given an examination and a committee of Sections Chiefs should determine his specialty. He then should be given a permanent appointment as a Criminalistics Technician and assigned to work under an experienced Examiner.

From two to four years are needed to train the Technician to become an Examiner qualified to testify as an expert witness in the Courts. At least two years should be the minimum in-grade period required from eligibility for promotion.

Entrance requirements for the Medico-Legal Divisions would be different and should be restricted to Doctors of Medicine, Biochemists, or Medical Technologists. Persons with these requirements should be restricted to employment only in the Medico-Legal Division.

No lateral appointments should be permitted unless the applicant is a direct transfer from another law enforcement agency and meets the minimum requirements of education, training, and experience.

Corrective action to improve Philippine Criminalistics depends upon several major policy changes at the national level. Foremost is removal of politics from appointments to scientific and technical law enforcement positions. Recruitment and promotion must be based solely on skill and ability. Scientists and technologists must be appointed as directors of criminalistics laboratories in place of lawyers and military officers. Adequate funds must be provided to secure new equipment and purchase needed expendable supplies. Rigid entrance requirements and a continuous program of career development based on merit must be implemented. Finally, salaries must be raised to a level that will attract and hold dedicated, competent, and intellectually honest criminalists.

"Short of war, our society is faced with no more serious or more important problem than crime, whether it be measured in economic, social or moral terms. And next to war, criminality in our people offers a greater threat to lives, property, peace of mind, comfort and convenience than any other malady confronting mankind.

"The failure of society to diminish criminality imposes great hardship on everyone. Although it cannot be accurately computed, the cost of crime reaches staggering proportions.

"Economic losses directly attributable to the activities of criminals amount to tremendous sums, but these represent only a part of the total cost of crime. To them must be added the cost of administering criminal justice.

"The Police, the prosecutors, the criminal courts, the probation and parole systems and the penal and correctional institutions are all heavy drains on the public exechequer."

O. W. Wilson,
Police Administration

Chapter XI

COMMUNICATIONS

SUMMARY

Through dedication and improvisation, the communications personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and several other law enforcement organizations have exerted considerable effort to provide essential communications in support of their overall police mission. To a large degree, however, these efforts are being dissipated because of insufficient and antiquated equipment, insufficient personnel, inadequate budget and logistics support and improper operational procedures. Unless these Communications deficiencies are corrected, even the minimal capabilities now held by the law enforcement organizations will be lost with a resultant further decrease in police effectiveness.

In establishing communications requirements for the PC, NBI, Customs, and the other GOP law enforcement organizations, all existing and proposed communications systems were examined to avert possible duplication or parallel systems.

It was discovered that the NBI, PC, and Bureau of Customs, operate separate parallel communications systems which for the most part are providing marginal service with operation limited to certain hours of the day. The independent operation of communications systems by National Law Enforcement organizations has resulted in ineffective, inefficient and misdirected use of communications equipment and a waste of GOP resources.

Many of the 1,378 municipal law enforcement organizations are without means of communications. In emergencies, requests for PC assistance must be transmitted by courier. The timely reception or transmission of police type information concerning criminal activities to or from these agencies is therefore not possible at the present.

Upon identifying these problems, the Survey Team recommended the integration of the NBI, PC and Customs communications facilities and personnel by emphasizing the following:

a. The independent expansion or modernization of existing NBI, PC, and Customs communications facilities would place a requirement on all agencies for additional funds, personnel, buildings, and training. As a result of the GOP austerity program now in effect, these agencies would be unable to meet these requirements.

b. The urgent need for reliable 24-hour-a-day, point-to-point radio communications can be best met through coordination and consolidation of the NBI, PC, and Customs communications facilities and personnel. This consolidation will prevent duplication of equipment, conserve frequencies, centralize communications facilities, reduce building requirements, most effectively utilize personnel, and more economically and efficiently allocate resources. (Standard Operating Instructions for the proposed law enforcement communications service is found at the end of this chapter.

AREAS REQUIRING IMPROVEMENT

A. The Philippine Constabulary

1. To send administrative and security message traffic, the PC presently utilizes the Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) GHQ Long Lines VHF communications system connecting their headquarters in Manila with their four subordinate zone headquarters. This system, although offering both a teletype and voice capability, is operated only 14 hours a day. Continued operation is dependent on several remote relay points. The equipment being utilized by GHQ is tactical by nature and not suitable for fixed installation or for long periods of continuous operation. Numerous outages have resulted in the past. Communication between PC Headquarters and the GHQ Long Lines in Manila are controlled by a combination of overhead and underground telephone lines, which have often been subject to interruptions and interference. Heavy rains and willful destruction of these telephone lines have interrupted service for periods up to several days. To meet this problem, the PC has purchased five Collins Single Sideband (SSB) radio transceivers which permit a needed voice capability to the zones and provides the required emergency back up circuit to the GHQ system.

2. The PC also operates a country-wide HF-AM radio telegraph (CW) network interconnecting their subordinate Zone, Province, Company and Detachments units. The communications equipment utilized in these networks is of World War II vintage. Dating back to 1941, it is beyond any form of practical rehabilitation and prevents the PC from carrying out their law enforcement functions. Faced with the task of providing country-wide communications with this antiquated equipment and not provided sufficient financial assistance, the PC has managed to render more or less acceptable communications service. This is due primarily to the ability of telegraph operators to handle messages expeditiously and the skill of the technicians in the repair of defective equipment.

3. Over 50% of the PC Detachments are without any communications capability. The reamining PC Detachments and many Company Headquarters are required to operate on a time schedule because of the lack of tactical communications equipment suitable for continuous operation.

4. Although the PC is charged with supporting and assisting local law enforcement organizations country-wide, a lateral communications capability between these organizations is non-existent. As a result of this communications void, timely response by the PC to emergency requests from municipal police organizations is not possible. The PC cannot acquire the intelligence information required to counter insurgency, anti-smuggling, or other law enforcement operations and therefore is unable to provide prompt action.

B. The National Bureau of Investigation

1. To support its field operations the NBI operates a country-wide Single Sideband radio telephone network linking the NBI Headquarters in Manila by voice circuit to 20 NBI field offices located in the major cities throughout the country. Because of the lack of sufficient radio operators radio transmission from the NBI field offices is restricted to the 0800 to 1700 period. The NBI headquarters radio station is similarly affected and is manned from 0800 to 2400 hours. Thus, this system does not enable the NBI to fulfill its broad internal security responsibilities.

2. The NBI also operates a UHF-FM network within the greater Manila area for the coordination of anti-smuggling activities with several GOP agencies. This network was an emergency measure brought about by the intensive Presidential drive against smuggling and is more of an expedient than a pre-planned communications system. Because of a shortage of equipment the PC and several other law enforcement organizations have not been included in this network.

3. The NBI presently has in its warehouses $500,000 worth of Japanese communications equipment obtained through War Reparations. When this equipment is installed it will provide for one-way radio transmission of facsimile, teletype and voice from the NBI headquarters in Manila to each of the NBI regional offices. Another 1.2 million dollars worth of Japanese communications equipment to provide the return link is scheduled for delivery in 1967. This communications system, while offering facilities not heretofore available, is far in excess of present NBI requirements. Coupled with the NBI's present lack of communications personnel, this equipment would be utilized at but a small percentage of its rated capacity.

4. The NBI Communications personnel responsible for the design of this system are cognizant of the above and based the system requirement on the anticipated increase in traffic which will result from NBI growth over the next five years as NBI coordination with other law enforcement organizations is extended country-wide.

5. Tactical communications equipment to support NBI field operations is nonexistent.

C. Bureau of Customs

1. To pass administrative messages, the Bureau of Customs operates an HF-AM radio telegraph (CW) network connecting the Customs headquarters in Manila with Customs Collector offices in 12 of 22 major port areas. This system operates less than eight hours a day and provides marginal service at best. A combination of antiquated radio equipment, insufficient personnel and poor operational procedures seriously limits the ability of the Bureau of Customs to support its country-wide operations.

2. Tactical communications equipment to support Customs operations in the port areas and allow the required coordination with other local law enforcement organizations is non-existent.

D. City and Municipal Law Enforcement Organizations

1. Several of the law enforcement organizations in the large cities and municipalities visited were operating token VHF radio patrol car communications systems. The present operational capability of most of these systems is far less than that required to support police operations. The lack of sufficient quantity of proper police type communications equipment, coupled with inadequate and ineffective operational procedures, combine to further reduce police effectiveness.

2. The majority of the municipalities in the Philippines are without any form of communications and, in most instances, where telephone circuits are available, even they are unreliable and are frequently out of service for long periods of time.

COUNTRY-WIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

RECOMMENDATIONS

To equip the law enforcement organizations with the necessary communications capability to carry out their responsibility adequately and effectively it is recommended that a single integrated country-wide law enforcement communications system be established. This system must provide rapid and reliable communications 24 hours a day and connect all law enforcement organizations in the National Government, Chartered Cities and Municipalities. This can be achieved most effectively by integrating the following law enforcement organization's communications systems, equipment and personnel into a single Law Enforcement Communications Service (LECS) which could be established under the Police Commission:

1. National Law Enforcement Organizations

   a. Philippine Constabulary
   b. National Bureau of Investigation
   c. Bureau of Customs
   d. METROPOL
   e. Anti-Smuggling Action Center
   f. Others

2. City Law Enforcement Organizations

3. Municipal Law Enforcement Organizations

A. Commodities

1. Because of the diversity of funding input required through the numerous law enforcement organizations involved, it is recommended that a Control Committee be established under the newly formed Police Commission to assure that future and present procurement is in concert with LECS requirements.

2. The communication equipment presently in the hands of member Law Enforcement organizations should be transferred to the Law Enforcement Communication Service and be utilized in the first year of operation. The initial $500,000 worth of Japanese communications equipment obtained by the NBI through the Reparations Commission should be transferred to the Law Enforcement Communications Service; the additional NBI 1.2 million and PC 2.7 million dollars worth of communications equipment being procured through the Reparations Commission should be selected to augment and complement the Law Enforcement Communications Service.

3. It is recommended that the Municipal and City Police Law enforcement organizations be provided with 1400 VHF-FM portable transceivers. This is required to provide a bare minimum communications capability for the Municipal and City Police law enforcement organizations country-wide.

4. It is recommended that the PC be provided with 750 VHF-FM portable transceivers fully compatible with those recommended for the municipalities. This is required to allow expeditious mutual exchange of information and support as well as to provide sufficient reaction time for the PC to conduct anti-smuggling and other critical law enforcement operations.

5. It is recommended that the Customs Service be provided with 150 VHF-FM portable transceivers. This is required to enable this organization to carry out its everyday law enforcement activities and participate in joint GOP anti-smuggling operations, both on water as well as on land.

6. It is recommended that the NBI be provided with 75 VHF-FM portable transceivers to properly support NBI field operations.

B. Budget

1. Adequate budgetary support should be made available to maintain the Law Enforcement Communications Service. Initially all law enforcement organizations should contribute the required support until such time as the Law Enforcement Communications Service can receive its own centralized budget. The centralized budget for the Law Enforcement Communications Service should include the following: salaries, travel, communications services, contractual, supplies and materials, equipment, etc.

2. Budgetary planning should include sufficient funds to lease local telephone lines and channels on the proposed Bureau of Telecommunications Communication system as required.

C. Facilities

The Law Enforcement Communications Service should be physically located in facilities of one of the existing law enforcement organization where adequate space and security can be made available for equipment and operations personnel. This might be the NBI Regional office in one community, the Police Department of a Provincial Capital city in another, and the PC province HQ in still another.

D. Operations

It is recommended that, in order to achieve uniformity and a consequent improvement in efficiency of communications formats, instructions and procedures applicable to the present communications systems, all GOP law enforcement organizations adopt immediately the Standard Operating Instructions provided herewith. Although this SOI was prepared specially for the LECS system, where it would be most effective, the application of formats contained therein would contribute substantially to improve operations of any law enforcement communications network.

E. Personnel

Personnel for the LECS should be provided by each of the Law Enforcement organizations. Some key positions within the Law Enforcement Communications Service will require permanently assigned, highly qualified officers and senior technicians while other positions may be filled on a rotational basis. Considerable benefit should accrue in terms of exchange of views and improved coordination. Because of the type of internal security messages handled by the Law Enforcement Communications Service, all personnel selected should receive appropriate security clearances by both the PC and NBI.

F. Training

Local training should be implemented as soon as the Law Enforcement Communications Service is established to assure that qualified radio operators and technicians are available.


PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RADIO COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
NBI REGIONAL OFFICE
NBI SUB OFFICE
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE SEA
LUZON
MINDORO
SAMAR
MASBATE
PANAY
CEBU
LEYTE
NEGROS
PALAWAN
BOHOL
SULU SEA
MINDANAO
BUSUAN ISLAND
JOLO GROUP
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
NORTH BORNEO
CELEBES SEA
INDONESIA


PHILIPPINES
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
NETWORK
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
PHILIPPINE
SEA
LUZON
MINDORO
SAMAR
LEYTE
PANAY
CEBU
NEGROS
BOHOL
PALAWAN
SULU SEA
MINDANAO
COTABATO
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
NORTH BORNEO
CELEBES SEA
INDONESIA


PHILIPPINES
CUSTOMS RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
PHILIPPINE
SEA
LUZON
MINDORO
MASBATE
SAMAR
ANAY
LEYTE
CEBU
NEGROS
BOHOL
PALAWAN
SULU SEA
MINDANAO
CUYABATO
BASEAN ISLAND
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
NORTH BORNEO
CELEBES SEA
INDONESIA


PHILIPPINES
CUSTOMS RADIO COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RADIO COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
NBI REGIONAL OFFICE
NBI SUB OFFICE
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE SEA
LUZON
MINDORO
SAMAR
LEYTE
NEGROS
PALAWAN
BOHOL
MINDANAO
SULU SEA
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
NORTH BORNEO
INDONESIA

5. The LECS Network will permit and facilitate rapid and efficient communications between all law enforcement organizations. In the process of communicating information, it will be necessary to follow an established procedure utilizing standard message forms. The purpose of the forms is: uniformity, standardization, brevity, completeness, and to provide the law enforcement organizations with a check sheet of material text and continuity of file.

6. A major contribution toward the provision of proper communications facilities would be the coordination of the efforts of the NBI, PC, Customs, METROPOL and other law enforcement organizations.

7. In order to administer effectively the proposed LECS, a properly proportioned communications staff is essential. Such an organization structure is recommended as shown on LECS proposed organization chart.

8. This proposal was presented in September, 1966, by the Survey Team to the Chiefs of the PC, the NBI, the Customs Service and the MPD, and received their full concurrence.

COUNTRY-WIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK



COUNTRY-WIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATION SERVICE

MEMBERS

- NBI
- PC
- CUSTOMS
- METROPOL
- ASAC
- MUNICIPAL AND CITY POLICE
- OTHER GOP LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

NETWORK CAPABILITIES

1. FACSIMILE
2. RADIO TELETYPE
3. RADIO PHONE
4. RADIO TELEGRAPH



COUNTRY - WIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATION SERVICE PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

A. Mission

The Electronics and Communications Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was established as a staff function under the Deputy Director for Technical Services to perform a dual function.

1. To provide a rapid and secure country-wide police telecommunications system in support of the overall National Bureau of Investigation Mission.

2. To extend qualified advisory assistance and technical support to the NBI Directors and staff, and other governmental agencies.

B. Organization

The Electronics and Communications Division is headed by a Lt. Colonel with a Technical Assistant who is a Major. Both of these officers are detailed to the NBI from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The following communications systems and personnel of the NBI are under the operational control and direction of the Electronics and Communications Division:

1. A country-wide radio service linking all the NBI regional offices and several strategic sub-offices with the NBI Headquarters in Manila.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



2. A (Interpol) radio service linking the NBI Headquarters with other police agencies in Paris and Japan. Future plans include the following stations: Koren, Taipei, Indonesia, Malaysia.

3. A radio service in Manila linking the NBI Headquarters with other governmental security organizations engaged in anti-smuggling activities.

C. Personnel

To provide the above services the Electronics and Communications Division is authorized a total of 57 positions. In September, 1966, only 53 positions were filled. The positions and salary level are as follows:

Position	Civil Service Range	Salary Per Annum
Radio Engineer	44	₱5,256
Audio Visual Tech.	39	3,756
Tel. Traffic Supervisor	38	3,612
Supervisory Radio Tech.	35	3,232
Sr. Radio Tech.	33	2,920
Radio Tech.	31	2,676
Radio Lab Aide	25	2,160
Teletype Operator	25	2,160
Telephone Operator	25	2,160

All technicians are required to have at least two years technical training and must pass a series of IQ and technical tests as well as a personal interview. Radio Engineers are required to have either a College degree or six years of technical experience and to have completed a technical radio school course.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. General

The management and technical competence of the National Bureau of Investigation's telecommunications organization are more advanced than similar organizations in many Southeast Asian countries; however, the communications responsibilities placed upon this organization without proper budgetary support have seriously limited their capability to provide rapid and reliable communications.

B. NBI Country-wide Administrative Radio Network

1. The NBI operates a modest country-wide administrative radio network which provides communications between the NBI Headquarters in Manila and the 20 important provincial cities in which NBI field offices are strategically located. A combination of 23 RCA Mark II and Mark IV 100 watt single sideband

transceivers were provided the NBI from 1958-1964 through the USAID Safety Program. The radio equipment permits voice or telegraph operation on any one of four channels. Many of the radios were not equipped with both an upper and lower sideband; therefore, full operational usage is limited.

The existing NBI country-wide administrative radio network cannot effectively handle the traffic load required by an organization with such broad internal security responsibilities because:

a. The lack of sufficient radio operators at the NBI field radio stations restricts radio transmissions on weekdays from 0800 to 1700 hours and 0800 to 1200 on Saturday. The NBI Headquarters radio station is similarly affected and is manned from 0800 to 2400 hours on weekdays.

b. Sole use of the radio-telephone mode for this network further restricts the amount of messages which can be passed. Although classified messages are few, the NBI uses a voice code to obtain some semblance of secure transmissions and this results in a time-consuming operation.

c. The NBI radio station facilities located on the third floor of the NBI Headquarters Building in Manila do not offer sufficient space or seclusion to permit optimum operations. The close proximity of the radio station to the Forensic Laboratory, coupled with poor ventilation, results in personnel discomfort, thereby contributing to operation degradation.

NBI Radio Station at Manila

2. The NBI has obtained through Japanese War Reparations $500,000 worth of electronic and communications equipment which includes high-powered Single Sideband Transmitters, receivers, intersite UHF multiplex links, automatic switchboard, facsimile, teletype, etc. This equipment would provide the NBI with an additional capability of one-way transmission of facsimile and teletype from Manila to each of the subordinate regional and sub-regional offices. The return link is scheduled for delivery in 1967 from an additional War Reparations allocation. The facsimile equipment would provide the NBI with an extremely valuable tool in their effort to combat crime and would permit the dispatch of criminal pictures, fingerprint cards and other valuable documents over normal telephone lines or radio circuits.

This equipment, however, has been in the warehouse for over six months due to a lack of sufficient budget to permit installation. Within its present budget limitations, the NBI will be unable to provide the required facilities or personnel to permit maximum utilization of this expensive equipment.

PROPOSED NBI COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM



C. Message Forms

Present message forms are arranged in a standard commercial form and are not fully compatible with police operations.

Proper log books are not maintained and the only check on message traffic is the copies of inward and outward messages retained but not properly filed.

Present NBI traffic count shows approximately 1,930 messages dispatched and 2,149 messages received over a 6-month period.

D. UHF-FM Radio Network

1. The NBI has purchased eight UHF-FM Motorola transceivers to satisfy the Manila Police Department survey* recommendation for the establishment of a radio network to link the major police organizations (Metropol) in the Manila Area. By presidential directive, this radio equipment was diverted on a temporary basis to establish an anti-smuggling network. The following organizations are now serviced by the NBI UHF-FM network:

a. NBI Headquarters
b. Customs Service
c. Anti-Smuggling Action Center (ASAC) (Located at AFP Hqs Building)
d. Claims Adjudication Disposal Agency (CADA)
e. Manila Police Department (MPD)
f. National Intelligence Coordination Agency (NICA)

The net control station located at the NBI Headquarters has a two-channel capability; one channel is presently used by the NBI to communicate with its complex at Tagaytay.

2. Nine UHF-FM transceivers are presently on order through USAID and when received will be installed at the PC and adjacent metropolitan area police departments of Quezon, Pasay, Makati, Paranaque, Mandaluyong, Caloocan, Navotas, and San Juan.

E. Command and GOP Facilities

1. Existing commercial and GOP communications facilities are extremely limited and service to most areas is restricted to certain hours of the day. The Bureau of Telecommunications is planning to improve the country-wide communications facilities by the installation of multi-channel Troposcatter and UHF communications equipment in the immediate future.

2. A commercial teletype circuit has been provided the NBI by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLD). This circuit affords printed message service within the Manila area to any law enforcement agency subscribing to the PLD commercial facilities.

3. Commercial messages for law enforcement agencies outside the Manila area are presently sent via wire or radio telegraphy and delays of 24 hours and more are common.

F. Tactical Communications

VHF-FM mobile radio equipment required to support NBI field operations in Manila and other large cities is non-existent.

G. Maintenance and Logistics

All major maintenance is performed at the NBI Headquarters in Manila. The NBI has developed a good maintenance capability and acquired several highly qualified technicians. Although the test equipment on hand was sufficient for normal

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*Survey of the Manila Police Department, dated October, 1964.

Repair facilities NBI on third floor NBI Headquarters

maintenance requirements, several more sophisticated types of test instruments necessary to perform finer calibrations and adjustments to optimize communications equipment are not available.

The NBI has established good control over the expenditure of supplies. Spare parts and equipment are properly stored; however, the lack of a sufficient budget has resulted in stock levels being low and in some cases non-existent.

H. Training

The NBI has sufficient competent radio technicians to maintain its present communications facilities. Several technicians have been trained in the management and administration of police communications operations in the U.S. Five technicians recently were trained in Japan on communications equipment obtained through War Reparations. Several other technicians have attended radio repair courses given by the Bureau of Telecommunications and the Civil Aeronautical Authority.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

RECOMMENDATIONS

Additional new fixed station equipment alone will not increase the efficiency of the NBI country-wide communications system. The basic problem is one of insufficient personnel and budget support. A major step towards an over-all solution of this problem was taken when the NBI agreed to the Survey Team recommendation for the integration of NBI communications facilities and personnel with the PC, Customs and other law enforcement organizations into a single law enforcement communications service.

A. General

Recommendations pertinent to the integration of the NBI and other law enforcement organizations communications facilities are outlined in this report.

B. NBI Headquarters Facilities

The NBI Communications Center should be relocated in an area offering adequate space, ventilation, and security.

C. Message Forms

It is recommended that the NBI establish an efficient records and message handling capability in conjunction with the proposed LECS radio teletype circuits. Standard Operating Instructions have been prepared to assist the NBI in teletype operation and are included in this report.

D. Tactical Communications

It is recommended that the NBI acquire a minimum of 50 VHF-FM portable transceivers and 25 VHF-FM hand-held transceivers to support their local field operations in Manila and other large cities. This equipment should have a two-channel capability with one channel compatible with that used by the local law enforcement agency.

E. Budgetary Support

1. It is recommended that the GOP provide sufficient local funds to allow the purchase of locally-available material and services required to support the NBI communications project.

2. Future telecommunications procurement by NBI should be developed in concert with the PC, Customs and other subscribers to the LECS. Procurement should be based on a continuing study of present and future law enforcement requirements, suitable tests, and engineering evaluation.

F. Training

NBI communications personnel who have successfully finished a telecommunications management course in the United States should be utilized as instructors.

It is therefore recommended that the NBI implement a telecommunications management course for both NBI and Other Law Enforcement Agency personnel in conjunction with the proposed LECS system.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY SIGNAL SERVICE GROUP

A. Mission

The Signal Service Group of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) was established along military lines to provide essential and reliable country-wide communications support to the PC.

B. Organization

1. The Signal Service Group is headed by a Colonel who is also designated as the PC Chief Signal Officer. An assistant group commander with the rank of Lt. Colonel and four majors form the Signal Service Group Staff which exercises operational and technical control over the communications systems and personnel of the PC. The Signal Service Group Headquarters is located in Camp Crame on the outskirts of Manila.

2. A Headquarters Signal Service and Support Battalion is responsible for the operation and maintenance of all communications facilities at Camp Crame. This unit is commanded by a Lt. Colonel who is directly responsible to the Signal Service Group Commander.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



3. One Zone Signal Service and Support Battalion is assigned to each of the following PC Zone Headquarters.

a. I PC Zone at San Fernando, Pampanga
b. II PC Zone at Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna
c. III PC Zone at Cebu
d. IV PC Zone at Cagayan de Oro, Mindanao

The Zone Signal Service and Support Battalion provides communications support for each respective PC Zone Headquarters down to the PC Battalion Headquarters in the provinces. These units are commanded by a Lt. Colonel who is directly responsible to the Signal Service Group Commander at PC Headquarters.

C. Personnel

1. The Signal Service Group is authorized a total of 1,313 positions. In September, 1966, only 944 positions were filled.

Officer	19
Enlisted men	925

2. Recruitment of personnel possessing technical knowledge in electronics or communications was underway at the PC Headquarters to fill these vacant positions.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. General

The PC communications facilities visited were effectively operated within their operating capabilities. Operational areas were neat and well organized but the equipment for the most part was obsolete and in poor condition.

B. PC Headquarters to Zone Radio Network

1. The PC use the Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) GHQ Long Lines communication system as its backbone for communicating from PC Headquarters in Manila to each of its four subordinate zone headquarters. This system employs multi-channel tactical VHF equipment offering both a teletype, telegraph, and voice capability. As a result of the following deficiencies, this system cannot provide the PC with the reliability or service required by an organization having such broad internal security responsibilities:

a. Relay stations operate on a time scheduled basis from 0800 - 1200 and 1400 - 2400. This is due primarily to the expense and transportation problems encountered in supplying fuel for the generators.

b. The failure of one remote relay station can disrupt communications to an entire area serviced by the relay link.

c. A combination of overhead and underground telephone lines connect the PC Headquarters in Manila with the AFP Long Lines Communications Center. These lines have been subject to numerous interruptions and interference in the past.

2. Due to the reliability factor of the AFP Long Lines circuits the PC have been required to establish an independent HF-AM radio telegraph (CW) duplex network to each of their Zone Headquarters. This network utilizes low power World War II type equipment and provides a marginal service at best. Although this network is manned 24 hours a day, HF Communications is dependent upon atmospheric and ionospheric conditions as well as local and external interference.

HF-AM Radio Telegraph Station at PC Headquarters, (Camp Crame)

3. The PC recently acquired through GOP funds five 100 watt HF Single Sideband transceivers (KW-M2) to provide a simplex voice circuit to each of the zone headquarters. Although superior to HF-AM equipment, these low powered Single Sideband transceivers are subject to the same problems concerning atmospheric and ionospheric conditions as well as local and external interferences. In addition, the use of a transceiver restricts the PC to simplex operation thereby limiting the traffic capacity.

C. PC Radio Telegraph (CW) Network

The PC HF-AM radio telegraph (CW) network probably constitutes the country's most extensive radio telegraph communication system. The network extends from Basco in the North to Jolo in the South. The PC communications system does not possess sufficient equipment reliability or handle the traffic load required to properly support the PC in carrying out its primary internal security mission for the following reasons:

1. Existing radio equipment for the most part is of World War II vintage. Some of these radios have been rebuilt two or three times and are subject to frequent breakdowns requiring excessive servicing and parts replacement. Due to the antiquity of these radios, some parts are no longer manufactured.

2. The PC Signal budget has not been sufficient to maintain and/or replace the radio equipment in use.

Zone Receiver and Operations Center at Cagayan de Oro



Zone Transmitter Site at Cagayan de Oro

3. Over 50% of the PC Detachments are without any radio communications equipment. During many anti-smuggling and other law enforcement operations the PC patrols are completely without a communications capability because of the lack of suitable tactical radio communications equipment.

4. Present PC tactical radio equipment requires special batteries which must be imported and are difficult to obtain due to the lack of funds. In addition, numerous batteries are received which cannot be utilized due to limited shelf life and dissipation that occurred in shipment; consequently, 24-hour-a-day communications is not possible at the company and detachment level where communications is restricted to a few hours a day.

5. A lack of proper test equipment and tools prevent the PC technicians from obtaining optimum performance of the existing equipment.

D. Message Forms

The PC in September, 1966, transmitted and received approximately 1,200 messages per month on the Zone-Province circuits. These messages included numerous wanted circulars and other police type information where the standard military format was not fully compatible and contributed to delays and inaccuracies.

E. PC Highway Patrol "TRAFCON"

Throughout the Philippines there are long stretches of highways with few service stations, public telephones or other traveler facilities. Vehicle breakdown, accidents and other emergencies requiring police assistance cannot be serviced for many hours because of the lack of communications. For the most part PC patrol cars responding to calls for assistance are handicapped by the lack of proper two-way radio equipment.

F. PC-City and Municipal Police

Radio communication between the PC and local city and Municipal Police is nonexistent. Commercial telephone is used wherever available. Many of the 1,375 municipalities and 46 cities are without any form of communications and requests for PC assistance must be carried by couriers.

G. Maintenance and Logistics

The PC maintenance accomplishments are very good in spite of the limited amount of test equipment available. Makeshift repairs in absence of spare parts seriously detract from PC communications equipment reliability.

Spare parts and equipment were properly stored. A perpetual inventory was maintained and accurate record of stock issuance and disposal was in use.



PC Repair Facilities at Manila

H. Training

1. The AFP Signal School at Ft. Bonifacio conducts both a basic and advanced Signal Officers Course which is available to PC officers.

2. The PC and AFP jointly conduct Radio Operator (CW) and Radio Mechanic courses at each zone headquarters.

3. Over 60% of the PC Signal Officers have received training in the United States through MAP.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

RECOMMENDATIONS

A major step toward providing the PC with the communications reliability, security and coverage required was taken when the PC agreed to the Survey Team recommendation concerning the integration of PC communications facilities and personnel with that of the NBI, Customs, and other law enforcement organizations to form a single law enforcement communications service.

Future communications equipment procurement by the PC should, therefore, be developed in concert with the NBI, Customs, and other members of the LECS. Procurement should be based on a continuing study of present and future law enforcement requirements, suitable tests and engineering evaluation.

A. General

Recommendations pertinent to the integration of the PC and other law enforcement organizations communications facilities are outlined in the text of this report.

B. PC Headquarters Facilities

To prevent possible interruption in service through existing sole dependence of overhead telephone lines, the PC should be interconnected with the LECS complex via a VHF wideband radio system.

C. Message Forms

It is recommended that the PC utilize a more appropriate message format for the transmission of law enforcement information. Standard law enforcement message format have been prepared to assist the PC in their law enforcement operations and are included in this report.

D. PC-City and Municipal Police

It is recommended that VHF-FM communications equipment be provided the PC. This equipment should be fully compatible with that recommended for municipal police operation to permit timely exchange of police information and enhance anti-smuggling operations. The following quantities of equipment are recommended:

1. 650 VHF-FM portable and 100 VHF-FM hand-held two-channel tactical transceivers with one channel for PC and municipal police circuits. The second channel should be used solely for internal PC operations.

2. 75 of the above VHF-FM portable transceivers should be allocated by PC headquarters for "Trafcon" vehicles. Since a "Trafcon Team" is frequently responsible for an entire province, frequency selection should ensure communications with the PC province headquarters on one channel and the local city and municipal police headquarters on the second channel.

E. PC Tactical Communications

Existing unneeded military type communications equipment should be properly stored at the using unit to provide a reserve capability should the PC, in the event of a National Emergency, change from a law enforcement to a military mission.

F. Training

It is recommended that PC officers receive training in the management and operations of law enforcement communications facilities. This training should be conducted in conjunction with the NBI for the proposed LECS system.


LEGEND:
VHF OR UHF LINKS
HF SINGLE SIDEBAND
MICROWAVE
TROPO
REGIONAL CENTER
LOCAL TELEPHONE EXCHANGE
TOLL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH STATION
REGION 1
REGION 2
REGION 3
REGION 4
REGION 5
LAOAG
VIGAN
BANGUED
TUGUEGARAO
BONTOC
ILAGAN
SAN FERNANDO LU
BAGUIO
BAYOMBONG
MT STO TOMAS
LINGAYEN
DAGUPAN
VILLASIS
TARLAC
CABANATUAN
IBA
DAU RPTR
SAN FERNANDO P
SILING BATA RPTR
MALOLOS
MANILA
CAVITE
STA. CRUZ
MT. GONZALES
MAYABOBO
MENAGAG
MT. BACACAY
PANTO
DAET
LUCENA
BATANGAS
VILLAZAR RPTR
VIRAC
MAMBURAO
CALAPAN
SN JUAN RPTR
LEGASPI
SORSOGON
ROMBLON
SAN JOSE
MASBATE
CALBAYOG
CATBALOGAN
KALIBO
ROXAS
TACLOBAN
ORMOC
SN JOSE BUENAVISTA
ILOILO
BACOLOD
BAYBAY
ABUYOG
MALIC
CEBU
MAASIN
PUERTO PRINCESA
TAGBILARAN
DUMAGUETE
MACASANDIG
CAGAYAN DE OPO
BUREAU OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PROJECT ENGINEERING STAFF
Designed:
Drawn:
Traced:
Checked
Staff Eng
Approved:
Revised.
NATIONWIDE EXPANSION
and
IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

SELECTED SAMPLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
AREA POPULATION, POLICE STRENGTH AND RATIO

AUG 1966

	Population of area	No. of police	Officer Agents	Enlisted Other	Rate per 100,000 pop.	Rate per 1,000
P.C. Zone Level						
ZCIS Zone I	7,435,200	32	5	27	0.4	0.004
ZCIS Zone III	10,000,000	17	4	13	0.2	0.002
ZCIS Zone IV	6,516,000	25	3	22	0.4	0.004
P.C. Provincial Level						
Pampanga	738,700	289	8	281	39.0	0.39
Cebu	1,332,847	188	9	179	14.0	0.14
Cagayan de Oro	600,000	68	2	66	11.0	0.11
P.C. Co. Level						
341 Co.	663,955	54	2	52	8.0	0.08
80 Co.	600,000	68	2	66	11.0	0.11
NBI Regional Off.						
Pampanga (Sub-office AFAD)	669,100	7	3	4	1.0	.01
Cebu	5,000,000	16	5	11	0.3	0.003
Cagayan de Oro	5,000,000	18	10	8	0.4	0.004
Local Police						
Angeles City	100,000	125	14	111	125.0	1.25
San Fernando	80,612	82	12	70	102.0	1.02
Cebu City	350,000	864	70	794	247.0	2.47
Mandaue City	37,000	36	2	34	97.0	0.97
Cagayan de Oro	100,000	123	9	114	123.0	1.23

QUESTIONS ASKED OF SELECTED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

AUG 1966

	Have Blotter or Logbook of Events Reported	Use Complaint Forms	Use Printed Crime Reports	Use Case Number System	Take Fingerprints	Furnish Copy to NBI	Furnish Copy to P.C.	Collect Crime Statistics	Furnish Copy to NBI	Furnish Copy to P.C.
P.C. Zone Level	11/5	5/11	4/12	5/11	15/1	5/11	2/14	16/0	8/8	11/5
ZCIS Zone I	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
ZCIS Zone III	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
ZCIS Zone IV	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
P.C. Provincial Level										
Pampanga	Yes	No	No	No	No	-	-	Yes	No	Yes
Cebu	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Cagayan de Oro	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
P.C. Co. Level										
341 Co.	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
80 Co.	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
NBI Regional Off.										
Pampanga	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Cebu	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Cagayan de Oro	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Local Police										
Angeles City	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
San Fernando	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	At times	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cebu City	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mandaue City	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cagayan de Oro	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

QUESTIONS ASKED OF SELECTED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

AUG 1966

	Have MO file	Pawnshop file	Single Fingerprint System	Use stolen vehicle notice	Use wanted person notice	Have individual jacket based upon fingerprints	Have index card filing system
P.C. Zone Level					10/6		11/5
ZCIS Zone I	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
ZCIS Zone III	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
ZCIS Zone IV	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
P.C. Provincial Level							
Pampanga	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Cebu	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Cagayan de Ore	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
P.C. Co. Level							
341 Co.	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
80 Co.	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
NBI Regional Off.							
Pampanga	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Cebu	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Cagayan de Oro	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Local Police							
Angeles City	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
San Fernando	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Cebu City	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mandaue City	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Cagayan de Oro	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes

The following is a series of examples of police report formats. Sample #1 shows a portion of an accident report. Note the series of checkoff questions in the upper portion of the sample and how the spacing is developed to allow room for complete information.

Sample #1

ROAD

ALIGNMENT (Check One)	SURFACE CONDITION (Check one)	TRAFFIC CONTROL (Check one or more)	KIND OF LOCALITY (Check one to show that the area adjacent to the street or highway within 300 feet was primarily:	WEATHER (Check one)	SURFACE (Check one)
☐ Straight-Level	☐ Dry ☐ Icy	☐ Officer or Watchman	☐ Business or Industrial	☐ Clear	☐ Concrete
☐ Curve-Level	☐ Wet ☐ Muddy	☐ Stop and Go Flashing Light	☐ Residential District	☐ Cloudy	☐ Blacktop
☐ Grade-Straight	☐ Snowy ☐ Oily	☐ Stop Sign or Signal	☐ School, Church or Playground Zone	☐ Fog	☐ Brick
☐ Grade-Curve	**DEFECTS** (Check one or more)	☐ Slow or Warning Sign	☐ Open Country	☐ Mist	☐ Gravel
☐ Hillcrest-Straight	☐ Under Repair	☐ Railroad Gates or Signals	**LIGHT** (Check one)	☐ Raining	☐ Dirt
☐ Hillcrest-Curve	☐ Loose Material	☐ Traffic Lanes Marked	☐ Daylight ☐ Dusk ☐ Dawn	☐ Snowing	
☐ Dip-Straight	☐ Holes, Ruts, Bumps	☐ No Parking Lines	☐ Darkness—street lighted	☐ Sleeting	☐ _____
☐ Dip-Curve	☐ Salt or Low Shoulder	☐ Yield Sign	☐ Darkness—street not lighted	☐ Smoke-Dust	Specify other
	☐ No Defects	☐ One Way Road or Street			
		☐ Railroad Watchman			
		☐ No Traffic Control			

VEHICLES

YOUR VEHICLE – No. 1:

_____ Make — Type (sedan, truck, taxi, bus, etc.) — Year — Was Vehicle Insured? _____ Yes or No — Vehicle License Plate _____ Year — State — Number — I.C.C. Plate No. _____

DRIVER _____ Name — Street or R.F.D. — City and State — Age _____ Sex _____ Race _____ White, negro, etc.

Driver's Occupation _____ Carpenter, clerk, etc. — Driving Experience _____ Years — Driver's License _____ State — Number — ☐ Chauffeur ☐ Operator ☐ Beginner — Speed before accident _____ MPH — Speed Limit _____ MPH

OWNER _____ Name — Street or R.F.D. — City and State — Maximum safe speed _____ Mph

PARTS OF VEHICLE DAMAGED _____

_____ Approximate cost to repair vehicle $ _____

OTHER VEHICLE – No. 2:

_____ Make — Type (sedan, truck, taxi, bus, etc.) — Year — Was Vehicle Insured? _____ Yes or No — Vehicle License Plate _____ Year — State — Number — I.C.C. Plate No. _____

DRIVER _____ Name — Street or R.F.D. — City and State — Age _____ Sex _____ Race _____ White, negro, etc.

Driver's Occupation _____ Carpenter, clerk, etc. — Driving Experience _____ Years — Driver's License _____ State — Number — ☐ Chauffeur ☐ Operator ☐ Beginner — Speed before accident _____ MPH — Speed Limit _____ MPH

OWNER _____ Name — Street or R.F.D. — City and State — Maximum safe speed _____ Mph

PARTS OF VEHICLE DAMAGED _____

_____ Approximate cost to repair vehicle $ _____

for other vehicles use another form

Total vehicles involved _____

Sample of Report Format

Sample #2 is designed as a fill-in-the-blank type report, listing basic demographic information such as Name, Address, Sex, Height, Weight, Date of Birth, Age, etc.

Sample #2

NAME			ADDRESS			TELEPHONE
SEX	RACE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	DATE OF BIRTH	AGE	OPER. LICENSE NO.
OCCUPATION		BUSINESS ADDRESS AND PHONE			MAKE OF VEHICLE	VEHICLE LICENSE NO.
DATE AND TIME OF TEST		LOCATION OF TEST		TYPE OF SURFACE		CONDITION OF SURFACE

Sample of Records Format

Sample #3 is taken from a sobriety investigation. Note that the observations of the officer are simply circled, there is little to write. In reviewing the formats of the crime report, the substance of the information is obviously useful and pertinent to the Philippines. However, the design of some of the reports is weak. We would recommend that the format of each report be carefully examined and adequate space allowed to complete all information.

Sample #3

OBSERVATIONS (circle those applicable)
1. INJURIES OR DISABILITIES: CUTS BRUISES ABRASIONS POSSIBLE FRACTURES MISSING OR ARTIFICIAL MEMBERS
2. ODOR OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE: STRONG MODERATE FAINT ABSENT
3. SPEECH: APPARENTLY NORMAL THICK MUMBLES SLOW LOUD REPEATS INSULTS SARCASTIC
PROFANE (RECORD EXACT WORDS):
4. APPEARANCE OF EYES: APPARENTLY NORMAL BLOODSHOT WATERY
5. APPEARANCE OF FACE: APPARENTLY NORMAL PALE FLUSHED OTHER
6. CLOTHING: (DESCRIBE CLOTHING INCLUDING SHOES)
7. UNUSUAL ACTIONS: NONE FIGHTING CRYING DROOLING DESCRIBE ANY NUISANCES:

Sample #3 (Cont)

TESTS (physical)

1. ABILITY TO WALK AND TURN: SUBJECT TO WALK IN A STRAIGHT LINE FOR A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 20 FEET. AT REQUEST OF OFFICER, SUBJECT TO TURN AROUND AND RETURN TO STARTING POINT.
CIRCLE LETTERS THAT APPLY:

A. DOES SO WITH EASE. B. HESITATES BETWEEN STEPS. C. UNABLE TO WALK IN A STRAIGHT LINE FOR MORE THAN A FEW STEPS. D. REELS FROM ONE SIDE TO THE OTHER. E. SWAYS WHEN PLACING FEET INTO POSITION. F. CONTORTS BODY ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN BALANCE. G. RETAINS BALANCE WHILE TURNING. H. OTHER OBSERVATIONS:

2. ABILITY TO RETAIN BALANCE: SUBJECT TO STAND ON ONE FOOT WITH THE OTHER FOOT RAISED AT LEAST ONE FOOT ABOVE THE SURFACE (DO NOT ALLOW TO BEND KNEE). HANDS AT SIDES AND EYES OPEN.
CIRCLE LETTERS THAT APPLY:

A. RETAINS BALANCE WITH EASE. B. UNABLE TO ASSUME POSITION. C. RAISES AND LOWERS FOOT WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN BALANCE D. RAISES ARMS ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN BALANCE. E. CONTORTS BODY RETAINING BALANCE. F. MOVES FOOT ON WHICH HE IS STANDING ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN BALANCE.

3. ABILITY TO RETAIN BALANCE: SUBJECT TO STAND WITH BOTH FEET TOGETHER, ARMS EXTENDED TO SIDE, HEAD STRAIGHT, EYES CLOSED, POSITION TO BE MAINTAINED 30 SECONDS.
CIRCLE LETTERS THAT APPLY:

A. RETAINS BALANCE WITH EASE B. UNABLE TO ASSUME POSITION. C. SWAYS NOTICEABLY. D. FALLS. E. MOVES FEET WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN BALANCE. F. OTHER OBSERVATIONS:

Sample of Records Format

SUGGESTED FORMAT MODIFICATIONS

There are instances in which words may be eliminated and other spacing shifted to allow adequate writing space. The "Discharge Firearm Report" is an example of the report in need of some redesigning. The following is a listing of suggested charges keyed to the numbered spaces of the report:

Discharge of Firearm Report

2. Date/Time reported.
3. Date/Time of arrival.
5. Unit reporting
7. Not enough space.
12. Not enough space.
13. Not enough space.
14. Serial No. omit "& Frame No.".
16. Not enough space.
21. Not enough space.
22. Not enough space.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The publication "Police Rules and Regulations" published jointly by the PC and Civil Service Commission should be more than a paper exercise. These formats with some possible redesigning should be incorporated as the standard series of crime reports utilized throughout the Republic of the Philippines for PC, NBI, and local police.

"What is lacking are not funds but realistic planning, determination and follow through. This fund scarcity is a dogeared theme that rings sour in a country which squanders millions for lavish junkets and expensive year-long election campaigns."

Editorial
News, 12 September 1966
Comments on need to improve the sewerage/drainage system in greater Manila Area

Chapter XII

LOGISTICS AND BUDGET

One of the most critically apparent deficiencies in Philippine law enforcement is the need for adequate logistical and funding support from the national and local governments. It is axiomatic that the law enforcement a nation or community receives will be in direct proportion to the support provided. This is clearly evident in the Philippines at every level. Logistical and funding support of law enforcement in the NBI, PC, chartered city and municipal police forces is far below the level needed to meet the demands of the existing and developing adverse peace-and-order situation. Logistics and funding support will predictably prove to be the most difficult problem to solve in law enforcement agencies at all levels.

In the Philippines the logistical and funding support for law enforcement has already been far outdistanced by the need. The adverse peace-and-order situation which has developed during the past twenty years to its present state now finds many communities with the worst possible combination of peace-and-order circumstances: a high rate of violence and criminality, an untrained police force of limited effectiveness, a municipal government with little or no knowledge of police management or law enforcement and a local citizenry demanding its deserved government protection. The Police Act of 1966 was designed to meet these ills, but it will require considerable assistance and a large measure of community maturity in confronting a severe set of peace and order problems.

LOGISTICS - MUNICIPAL POLICE

The municipalities of the Philippines possess a most ineffective logistics support which is best described as lamentable. In most municipalities logistics support consists primarily of police salaries, weapons, and an operating location in the municipal buildings. Usually little more could be afforded from the municipal income. Notable exceptions exist: Bais, Negros Oriental; Mandaue, Cebu; Itogon, Mountain Province; and Florida Blanca, Pampanga. These, however, constitute a minority among over 1,400 municipalities. It was clear that the effectiveness of law enforcement in municipalities had a major relation to the amount of logistical support and funding received from the municipal government plus the direction of local politics. Funding and logistical support are not the sole reasons for ineffectiveness since there was much that could be accomplished outside these factors and within the limits of local resources.

A direct contributing influence in municipal funding is the present system of returning tax monies to municipalities from the National Tax Commission. The 1959 Republic Act 2343 provides that municipalities or provinces should receive 30 percent of the tax amounts collected in excess of its total 1959 tax collections, using 1959 as the base year. Locations where industries are based, and/or taxes paid, are the beneficiaries of this system. In practice the wealthy municipalities receive more, and the poor municipalities receive considerably less.

The inequity in this arrangement is readily apparent when the budget for the First Class Municipality of Makati, Rizal Province, is studied as extracted from the FY 66-67 budget presentation for the municipality:

"SECTION 3 - In order to provide adequate safeguard and protection to the residents of Makati, with respect to the maintenance of peace and order, and the drive against criminality, delinquency, and all sorts of law violations, it becomes necessary to create, as it is hereby created, Forty (40) NEW additional positions for Patrolmen in the Police Department at a minimum salary of ₱190.00 each month, or a total of ₱91,200.00 per year. In addition, the set-up and designation in ranks of the officers and patrolmen of the department have been rearranged and/or reorganized, with the end in view to making it more responsive, efficient and effective in the performance of its police duties for the good of the general public. The Officers and Patrolmen affected by this reorganization are hereby given increases in their respective salaries amounting to ₱43,020.00 per year. As it now stands, the Police Department will be getting a lion share of the appropriations in this fiscal year's budget with a grand total of ₱1,509,520.00, detailed as follows:

1.	For Salaries and Wages	₱ 829,840.00
2.	For Sundry Expenses	193,680.00
3.	For purchase of 11 Mobile Units, 1966 Rambler Classic Cards "550"	152,000.00
4.	For purchase of 11 sets of Motorola, Model "MOTRAC" Mobile Radiophone	55,000.00
5.	For purchase of 7 Units of Motorcycles, big and good kind (initial outlay)	50,000.00
6.	For purchase of Firearms and Ammunition ...	30,000.00
7.	For purchase of Office Equipment (New Bldg.)	200,000.00
	TOTAL APPROPRIATION FOR THE POLICE DEPARTMENT	₱ 1,509,520.00

The Police Department will also have a big and beautiful concrete 4-story building now under construction for its permanent offices and headquarters. The building will be completed by October or November this year, 1966, at a cost of over one million pesos."

To place this budget in a proper perspective, it must be recognized that it supports a police force of 276 men policing a community of 115,000. The total income of the municipality (9,025,000 pesos) is higher than that of most chartered cities. Details of the current budget are included below:

V. POLICE DEPARTMENT
(As Newly Reorganized)

Salaries and Wages

1 - Chief of Police @ ₱450.00 mo (RA 4358)	₱ 5,400.00
1 - Deputy Chief of Police @ ₱360.00 mo.	4,320.00
3 - Police Majors @ ₱330.00 ea. mo.	11,880.00

Salaries and Wages (Continued)

6 - Police Captains @ ₱300.00 ea. mo.	₱ 21,600.00	
12 - Police Lieutenants @ ₱270.00 ea. mo.	38,880.00	
37 - Police Sergeants @ ₱220.00 ea. mo.	97,680.00	
24 - Police Corporals @ ₱210.00 ea. mo.	60,480.00	
155 - Patrolmen @ ₱200.00 ea. mo.	372,000.00	
40 - Patrolmen (New) @ ₱190.00 ea. mo.	91,200.00	₱703,440.00

A - Police Department (Civilian Employees)

1 - Technical Assistant @ ₱290.00 mo.	₱ 3,480.00	
1 - Technical Assistant @ ₱270.00 mo.	3,240.00	
6 - Clerks @ ₱190.00 ea. mo.	13,680.00	
1 - Clerk @ ₱180.00 mo.	2,160.00	
1 - Restricted Land Mobile Operator @ ₱200.00 mo.	2,400.00	
2 - Photographer Helpers @ ₱190.00 ea. mo. ..	4,560.00	
1 - Fingerprint Aide @ ₱190.00 mo.	2,280.00	
1 - Fingerprint Aide @ ₱180.00 mo.	2,160.00	
3 - Checkers @ ₱190.00 ea. mo.	6,840.00	
5 - Bindery Helpers @ ₱190.00 ea. mo.	11,400.00	
1 - Driver @ ₱190.00 mo.	2,280.00	
6 - Laborers @ ₱190.00 ea. mo.	13,680.00	
1 - Toolkeeper @ ₱190.00 mo.	2,280.00	₱ 70,440.00

B - Police Department (Motor Pool)

1 - Mechanic @ ₱210.00 mo.	₱ 2,520.00	
3 - Mechanics @ ₱190.00 ea. mo.	6,840.00	
2 - Mechanic Helpers @ ₱190.00 ea. mo.	4,560.00	
1 - Supply Checker @ ₱190.00 mo.	2,280.00	
1 - Field Checker @ ₱190.00 mo.	2,280.00	
15 - Drivers @ ₱190.00 ea. mo.	34,200.00	
1 - Laborer @ ₱190.00 mo.	2,280.00	₱ 54,960.00

Sundry Expenses

Insurance Premium (Life)	₱ 8,000.00	
Insurance Premium (Retirement)	11,500.00	
Traveling Expenses	5,000.00	
Supplies and Materials	50,000.00	
Supplies and Gasoline	70,000.00	
Supplies and Materials (Photo)	6,000.00	
Repair of Equipment	10,000.00	
Repair of Equipment (Jeep)	6,000.00	
Repair of Fixed Property	1,000.00	
Illumination	1,400.00	
Communication (OB Stamps)	500.00	
Communication (PLDT)	1,500.00	
Communication (Prov'l. Tel. Co.)	1,000.00	
Contingent Services	15,280.00	
Clothing Allowances	6,500.00	₱193,680.00

No other budget was found which so completely provided for all police and law enforcement needs on such a scale. The salaries for police officers indicated are those originally established by law as maximums; however, the Police Act of 1966 now indicates only minimum salaries, and these will doubtless be raised considerably in view of the municipality's income.

The other extreme of municipal budgets is that of the municipality of Sugpon, Illocos Sur. Its budget consists largely of the 15 pesos received monthly by its Chief of Police, and 10 pesos to each of its two patrolmen.

Although the above is a comparison of extremes, it was clear to the Survey Team that the affluent Makati municipality could provide complete police support on far less than its existing police budget of 1,500,000 pesos while a few thousand pesos would constitute a major improvement to the police budget of Sugpon and many similar communities. Unless some readjustments are made in consideration of real needs, the existing disparities between local police forces will grow wider.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission consider soliciting assistance for an amendment to RA 2343 to include a proviso for equitable distribution of tax monies on the basis of law enforcement needs.

When dealing with municipalities, it is necessary to bear in mind that wide variations exist in the quality of both the municipal police and the municipal government. Some municipal forces consist of two or three men receiving less than ₱20.00 per month; others are 100-man forces headed by college graduates with a high degree of training and a suitable salary. Some municipal administrations are enlightened and farsighted and permit an orderly system of law enforcement separate from political influence; others have administrations in which council members and the mayor seek to dominate every aspect of local police work. These, and all variations in between, were encountered during the survey.

BUDGETARY SUPPORT

Three basic practices in acquiring budgetary support for municipal police forces are in effect.

a. A budget which provides for salaries, uniforms, maintenance supplies, equipment and the full scale of operational expenses anticipated for the year.

b. A budget which programs only salaries and perhaps uniforms when funds are available. Operating expenses are obtained by submitting a request to the Municipal Council for each proposed expenditure.

c. No budget. The Municipal Treasurer pays salaries and other expenses from a general fund as available.

The first course is the most desirable and exists the least often. Its predominant asset is flexibility for the Chief of Police in establishing priorities within allocated funds to meet operational expenses and provide improvements based on the needs of the community. Too frequently the other budgetary courses are followed. This is frequently due to the limitations in the Chief of Police and his status as an adherent to the mayor or other official. When these circumstances obtain, the community receives untrained, armed and usually irresponsible police who do not serve the interests of the people.

The poor qualifications in some Chiefs of Police affect the entire municipal police force when judgments are needed. In one municipality the chief indicated he needed vehicles to improve his capability to maintain peace and order, in spite of the fact that only two or three of the 27 barrios could be reached by vehicles. Although there were 16 policemen in the municipality, only one weekly foot patrol was operating, and this was in conjunction with the PC. If the PC were not available, the patrols were not attempted.

This represents only a typical example in supervision and management in the municipal police forces. Untrained and politically oriented police chiefs, ignorant of the basic purpose of law enforcement, were inclined to demand vehicles, radios, and more powerful weapons in lieu of applying realism to their problems. Their inability to grasp the realities of the enforcement needs developed unjustifiable requests to the municipal council which were usually ignored, and usually rightly so, in view of the chief's lack of administrative and management ability in using those assets already at hand.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission, in providing standards and funding subsidy to municipal police forces, consider that as a minimum, each municipality possess a fully qualified and salaried chief of police, even to the point of limiting the number of other police officers.

In the municipalities visited the appropriation for police forces represented from approximately 13% to slightly less than 25% of the municipal income. From 90% to 100% of this appropriation was for police pay. The defects of this proportioning are obvious and they seriously stricture the law enforcement operation.

Basic to municipal law enforcement difficulties is the municipal government's lack of knowledge concerning law enforcement requirements. Too many municipalities feel that their responsibilities are met when an armed, uniformed man is placed on the municipal streets. The facilities, equipment, and training required to give substance to law enforcement are too frequently not provided or are grudgingly given. When such an environment exists, the police personnel have a normal tendency to solicit needed items from the local businessmen and civic organizations. The Survey Team has noted many instances of "donated" office equipment and vehicles, many of which are inoperative when received. When police forces are reduced to indigent conditions for basic needs, there is little reason to expect professional competence, high morale, or any significant interest in law enforcement. Under these circumstances the tax monies invested in the local force are achieving no return, or very little return, in the form of a public service.

The budgetary percentages are similar to those discerned by the Civil Service Commission report discussed earlier:

MUNICIPAL POLICE BUDGETARY PERCENTAGES
FY 1964 - 1965

	Lowest	Highest	Average
Luzon	7.9	41.2	24.5
Bicol Region	11.2	30.0	20.6
Visayas	26.7	28.8	24.8
Mindanao	15.0	26.3	20.7
Averages	13.7	31.6	22.6

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission establish recommended per capita norms of expenditure for municipal police forces.

FACILITIES

Few municipalities possessed buildings designed specifically to serve the purpose of law enforcement. The majority of the municipal police forces are housed in portions of the municipal building itself, or nearby annexes. Seldom was adequate space for the administration, training, or storage for the equipment on hand made available. The exceptions found were primarily in those municipalities with the ability to provide funding support. The municipal facilities in Mandaue, Cebu, were in spotless condition and a credit to the local government.

The available facilities were usually adapted to police needs and lacked any standardization. Many municipalities have poor jails or no jails at all. Many lack lights, or running water, necessary security, and sanitary facilities. Functionally, the facilities are organized to fit the space available and not the requirements of police work. Some guidance is required for municipalities in the standardization of police facilities and their use.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission consider the establishment of guidelines to provide municipal governments the minimum requirements for local police facilities and the organization of these facilities.

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

The farther away from Manila a municipal police was located and the lower the municipal income, the greater the lack of supplies and equipment. Commonly, the poorer police forces were not provided paper and forms for necessary reports. Cameras and fingerprint equipment were neglected when film, ink, and forms were not available. Only the most rudimentary of office equipment was avilable in some police offices and this frequently in extremely poor repair.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission establish firm guidelines on the support expected from the municipal government, the PC and the NBI to insure that local police forces are provided necessary journal books, police blotters, blank forms, etc.

The majority of municipal police forces did not have vehicles for patrol use. This is not necessarily a deficiency since much of the terrain does not lend itself to motorized patrols. However, the possession of a minimum of one vehicle in each municipal force would greatly increase the response capability of these forces when criminal actions are reported outside the poblacion at any distance from the police forces but since they have little or no maintenance capabilities, the vehicles will constitute little in the way of a reliable asset unless such facilities are available. Additionally, in many police forces the mayors or chiefs of police usurp the vehicle for personal transportation.

A considerable number of vehicles have been distributed throughout the Philippines as a result of Japanese War Reparations. An equitable distribution

of these vehicles was not in evidence since some municipalities have several while others have none. One provincial governor made it quite plain that this was directly and solely the result of the political orientation of the municipality involved. In some cases the municipal government indicated that they had posted a deposit to cover the cost of transportation of such vehicles but were notified they would not be delivered by a congressmen, governor, or senator of the opposite political affiliation.

The distribution of such reparations assets is uneven. One municipality in Northern Luzon received two reparations jeeps and four fire trucks. One of the jeeps was used primarily by the mayor and the other was reportedly in Manila at the disposal of the Mayor's family, despite the fact that they represented the only transportation available to the police department of 50 men. In the same municipality the fire chief reported that the department had answered five fire calls since the beginning of the year, whereas other municipalities nearby had no fire fighting equipment.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Police Commission make representation to insure that reparations vehicles are distributed to municipal police forces on the basis of need, with the end view of providing the local chief of police a minimum of one means of transportation for this force's exclusive use 24 hours a day.

FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION

Sidearms are available in most municipal police forces on the basis of one per policeman; however, there is a wide variety of types and calibers. All calibers from .22 to .45 were noted. The majority were .38 or .32 caliber. Those inspected were usually well cared for but approximately 20% did not appear safe for firing. The majority of the unsafe weapons were 1943 model Webely .38 revolvers. In addition to sidearms, a few municipal police forces possessed M-1 carbines and 12-gauge riot guns.

Although only very few high velocity shoulder weapons would be considered necessary for a municipal police force under normal peace and order conditions, the threat of armed bands of robbers and a sizeable number of rifles in the hands of the local inhabitants, necessitates a limited supply in some areas. The PC has distributed M-1 carbines on a selective loan basis to some local police and are currently distributing a considerable number of Thompson submachine guns, caliber .45. Practice firing of these latter weapons is restricted since only 20 rounds of ammunition are issued with each weapon.

Only two municipal police forces visited had conducted any training with firearms on a regular basis. Ammunition is expensive at one peso (25¢) per round. In one municipality where practice firing was conducted on a regular basis, the mayor had his own reloading equipment and supplied the ammunition at his own cost; the chief of the other municipal police force was able to take advantage of NBI reloading in Manila at ₱.30 per round. The abysmal state of weapons proficiency among the local police is reflected in the fact that many policemen interviewed were carrying the same seven rounds of ammunition issued to them as long as ten years ago, and a number of them had never fired their weapons.

RECOMMENDATION

(See Recommendation on same item in section on chartered city logistics.)

LOGISTICS - NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NBI logistics are primarily concerned with: the centralized investigative activities at the national level; the centralization of records-keeping and fingerprints; local police training and the maintenance of a nation-wide system of field agents. At present it has 214 agents of an authorized 345. Manning the remaining positions has not yet been approved by the National Budget Commission. Similarly, 120 other positions have not been approved for manning from the NBI total of 1,203 positions. At present the logistics effort support 963 personnel in all categories.

In general, the results of budget efforts leave the NBI leading a hand-to-mouth existence with only its bare essentials being met. Adequate support has not been forthcoming to maintain the equipment and buildings on hand and for essential construction. Many of its vehicles are in poor condition, and several of its sub-offices are shabby and have totally inadequate facilities entirely out of character for a national agency. These factors definitely impinge upon its professional competence not to mention individual and collective morale.

The current approved annual budget is ₱5,600,000 upon which a ₱4,600,000 ceiling was established at the time of this survey. Unless further funds become available, the bureau will operate at a level well below its essential requirements. The programmed expenditures for the year were as follows:

Pay and allowances	₱4,531,000
Travel and per Diem	611,000
Equipment	40,000
Maintenance and Operations	200,000
Supplies	272,000
	₱5,654,000

Travel and per diem consist of the amounts paid to NBI agents in the field at the rate of ₱170.00 monthly and in the Manila at the rate of ₱150.00 monthly. These funds are used for expenses away from the home station, vehicle fuel and minor vehicle maintenance. Without the availability of these funds the field operations rapidly stagnate.

In order to meet its budget ceiling, reductions will be made in areas other than pay and allowances. Maintenance and operations will be diminished initially. A conservative estimate by the NBI Budget Office indicated that maintenance of facilities alone required an additional ₱100,000. Coupled with this is the fact that funds for new construction are a nebulous quantity. It is possible that the NBI will be advised that ₱1,000,000 will be made available in the current year. The bureau has at least ₱7,000,000 in uncompleted and new construction requirements in the Manila area alone.

In sum, the results of budgetary efforts of the NBI have had haphazard results in view of its key role in law enforcement. It was clearly evident to the Survey Team that funds for maintaining vehicles and facilities were sorely needed in addition to the pressing necessity to complete buildings already under construction in the Manila area. (In August, 1966, the NBI received about $500,000 worth of Reparations Communications Equipment. Disposition and utilization of this equipment is discussed in the communications section of this report.)

RECOMMENDATION

To meet its essential needs in construction and mission support in order that it may discharge its assigned responsibilities.

The existing AID program through FY 1968 is currently aimed at the following goals in the NBI:

a. Modernizing the operations of various divisions of the NBI which are still in need of modern operating equipment to permit investigative support to both national and local law enforcement agencies.
b. Building up its training capacity.
c. Completion of the NBI headquarters building.
d. Installation of reparations electronics equipment.
e. Records keeping facilities improvement.
f. Improvement of Training and Inspection Division.
g. Completing and equipping NBI Police Academy.
h. Additional legislative action to centralize laboratory and records services in the NBI.

AID financing in FY 1967 is outlined below. This includes a total of $148,000 for technicians, participant training and commodities. The latter item will specifically address the problem of records equipment and vehicle maintenance.

FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

FY 1967

AID FINANCING ($000)

(1) Summary

Total	Technicians No.	Technicians Cost	Participants No.	Participants Cost	Commodities
149	3	70	12	29	50

(2) Detailed Breakdown by Component

a. Technicians

Position Title	Grade	Estimated Cost	ETA
CHF PUB SFTY ADV	FSR-3	25	On Board
PUB SFTY ADV TNG (PASA)	FCL-4	25	On Board
PUB SFTY ADV (R&I)	FSR-5	20	On Board

b. Participants

No.	Field of Training	Duration	Starting Date	Estimated Cost
NBI:				
2	FBI	16 wks. ea.	Mar. '67	5
2	IPA (Sr. Course)	14 wks. ea.	Mar. '67	4
1	Records Mgmt.	2 mos.	Mar. '67	1
1	Telecom. Mgmt.	10 mos.	Mar. '67	8
LOCAL POLICE:				
6	IPA (Gen. Course)	17 wks. ea.	Nov. '67	11

c. Commodities:

Major Categories	Estimated Cost	Delivery Schedule
R&I Equipment	23	Spring '67
Training Manuals and Books	23	Spring '67
Training Films and Slides	6	Spring '67
Photo Laboratory and Reproduction	3	Spring '67
Armory Training Materials including ammunition components	2	Spring '67
Scientific Crime Laboratory	2	Spring '67
Shop and Maintenance	11	Spring '67

Over a period of time the NBI has acquired functions which detract from its primary task and complicate its logistical efforts. The existence of a small Canine Corps, Narcotics Addicts Section, with an occupational ceramics program are outside the definition of investigative functions and amplify NBI responsibilities to an unnecessary extent into social welfare and rehabilitation. Additionally, the practice of seeking "donations" for construction of field offices and their equipment is commendable in its intent but basically self-defeating in a national investigative agency which must maintain a nonpartisan, impersonal and professional mien.

A strong indication of inadequate budgetary support and poor administration is in the use of unpaid, volunteer workers in many offices of the NBI. These persons are permitted to work on a voluntary basis and achieve an informal seniority when considered for position vacancies for which they are qualified. In the meantime, they gain experience and contribute to the NBI administrative effort. Over 200 of these unpaid workers are presently "employed" in various positions throughout the organization, generally performing administrative tasks, handling fingerprint data or clearance information. Much of their work is laborious, time-consuming and necessary. Without them the work would probably not be accomplished at all. Some have been in this status for as long as four years. These workers contain a great many highly educated persons who will no doubt prove of future value to the NBI.

The existence of this group is considered a long-term detriment to the NBI. These personnel are not professionals, are subject to no disciplinary measures, and have not received a background security clearance. The work they accomplish is "free" but their very presence will make it difficult to justify manning the necessary 240 vacancies. So long as unpaid personnel can be kept at work for long periods of time accomplishing necessary tasks, there is little volition for the Commissioner of the Budget to authorize the manning of vacant positions.

The NBI must be maintained on a highly competent, reliable and professional level. Its internal functions should not be available to any degree to individuals without the "need-to-know." Further, in view of the prevalence of bribery and venality in many government offices, the existence of these workers presents the possibility of a security hazard to the NBI despite the apparently innocuous nature of their work.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the NBI remove unpaid volunteer workers from its staff and seek authorized manning of unmanned positions on the basis of firm workload requirements required to meet the demands of the mission of the NBI and to meet the difficult peace-and-order conditions existing within the nation.

There is little doubt that the NBI owes much of its existence to such individual informal and ancillary efforts in the past. However effective, they now serve to emphasize the impossibility of continuing on such a course if the bureau is to fully achieve its status as an elite investigation unit. This goal must be accomplished in an atmosphere of professional self-sufficiency and competence divorced from outside material assistance and, more importantly, influences. It can only be achieved if there is full national recognition that the functions of the NBI are essential to national peace and order and suitable funding support is provided on a basis permitting intelligent planning of facilities, full-scale conduct of essential operations, economical levels of maintenance and allied logistical support. Any other course will defeat the designed ends of the NBI.

RECOMMENDATION

That the NBI divest itself of all activities and functions which do not clearly contribute to the conduct of its primary mission and the development of its professional competence.

VEHICLES

Vehicle maintenance is a peculiar problem in the NBI. The bureau contains 150 vehicles with 76 of these assigned to the Manila area. A majority of these vehicles are jeeps in excess of five years of age; the balance are jeep station wagons. All vehicles are U.S. excess property or GOP excess property from other government agencies. There is no organized vehicle maintenance and repair program outside the Manila area and a totally inadequate maintenance program in Manila. Field personnel utilize portions of their ₱170.00 monthly allowance for this purpose, calling on the Manila office for larger funds when needed. These are frequently not available. Four personnel in Manila keep a major share of the local vehicles in motion through ingenuity and cannibalization. They have little else with which to work. Of 20 NBI vehicles inspected in the field, 15 were deadlined; twelve of these for more than one year.

RECOMMENDATION

That an organized preventive maintenance program be established in Manila and properly manned and equipped.

That field offices be required to submit periodic reports of vehicle conditions to enable some assessment of vehicle requirements.

WEAPONS

The NBI is suitably equipped with hand weapons. Those inspected were new and in good condition. Ammunition is in short supply for all weapons, but agents possessed an average of two basic loads per hand gun.

WAREHOUSING AND SUPPLY

The Supply Officer, assigned to a division including Budget, General Services, Administrative Services and Accounting, was newly assigned. His working staff consisted of seven overworked personnel. There is a general

attempt in the Supply Office to program certain of the bureau's needs, but most of these are not known with any great degree of certainty due to the absence of adequate records. The supply facility itself is representative of the section's problems. It is housed in a cramped and inadequate building jammed with a variety of new and used parts and equipment ranging from building supplies, communication equipment, tools, vehicle parts and many unidentifiable items. Unfortunately, many items were acquired from surplus sources and indiscriminately dumped onto shelves without any identification or segregation. Some items appear to be aircraft parts.

With his limited personnel assets, the Supply Officer has been unable to comprehensively attack the problem since he is involved in ascertaining his accountability for vehicles, office equipment, and other items spread throughout the organization. In the meantime, newly received items are added to the existing conglomeration.

RECOMMENDATION

That NBI supply personnel segregate, inventory, and properly identify usable items in the NBI supply system and dispose of residual junk.

That the NBI be provided funds for a proper supply warehouse and outside storage area.

That the NBI make a major effort to rid itself of all excess items of equipment not contributing to the NBI mission.

That the NBI make a major effort to conduct a thorough one-time inventory of its assets by location and accountability.

LOGISTICS - CHARTERED CITIES

The 47 Chartered Cities exist as entities separate from provincial government and are tied directly to the central government. In general they are better off economically than most municipalities, but also must provide more government services than a municipality. With this in mind, their logistics and funding support of the local police force can vary widely. In addition to economic factors, the political climate has a direct and sometimes adverse effect on police support provided.

The size and budgets of city police forces vary widely. In addition to these differences, consideration must be given to the geographic nature of the cities which is a factor in considering its logistics. A few are almost completely urbanized, (e.g., Baguio) and all areas can be reached by vehicle quite easily. Others, like Davao, which includes 400,000 persons in an area of 853 square miles, contain huge areas which can be reached only on foot. Another factor influencing city budgets is the 1959 Republic Act 2343 discussed in detail under municipal logistics. Under the provisions of this law, in fiscal year 1964, 70.8 percent of total allotments from excess income tax collections to all cities went to the cities of Manila, Pasay, and Quezon. As with municipalities, the wealthier cities receive the major benefits from national taxing procedures which allot "excesses" on the basis of where the taxes are paid.

City budgets are further influenced by the cities' capability to collect taxes. In Marawi, a Fifth Class City in Mindanao, the local government is apparently incapable of collecting much of the legal tax. The police force

reportedly had not been paid in over six months and had not been issued uniforms for over six years. The city has no investigative equipment or other aids for police operations and the overall effect of this severe lack of support is obviously demoralizing to the individual police officer.

Very few cities have the capability of funds to provide any weapons qualifications training for the police. Of ten cities sampled in the Vasayas and Mindanao, only two had funds to support any weapons training. Basic to this issue is the high cost of ammunition, approximately one peso per round. In the cities conducting such training, they had the use of a reloader in the area which was the property of a gun club. Reloaded ammunition is approximately one-third the cost of commercially purchased rounds.

RECOMMENDATION

That regional reloading equipment be provided in sufficient quantity to permit reloading of training ammunition in all local police forces.

Justification for increases in strength and improvements for the department will enable the police chief to ascertain minimum requirements and program more effective use of resources. Seldom is this planning procedure practiced, results in an inaccurate evaluation of actual requirements to improve police operations.

Supplies are generally provided to city police departments as to municipalities. The amount of supplies received by a police force is directly related to the sincere desire of the Mayor and City Council to provide effective law enforcement. With few exceptions maintenance funds for equipment are not normally provided or programmed, per se. When an item of equipment breaks down, the Chief of Police attempts to obtain funds for repair from the city council. If the funds are not provided, the equipment simply does not get repaired and continues to deteriorate from lack of use. Only in the larger cities is it practical for the police department of the city to operate service facilities for police vehicles and equipment, and smaller departments should not attempt to take on this additional burden.

All of the larger cities were found to have some transportation for use in patrolling although it is not always used for this purpose. An increase in vehicles for almost all city police departments visited would considerably improve their capability to preserve peace and order and would be a practical expenditure. Communications for mobile units are generally not available outside the Manila area and other more densely populated metropolitan areas. An absence of standardization in communications and vehicular equipment complicates the maintenance services that are available. Additional communications equipment in the form of police call boxes and telephones, as well as mobile communications, would contribute the impetus needed to improve police operations in nearly all cities. In most cities it is sometimes extremely difficult to summon police assistance, and oftentimes it is too late in arriving.

There is a serious lack of police investigative equipment in all but a few city police departments. Photographic equipment to prepare ID files and to use in investigations is not available, and when it is, photographic supplies and facilities to process film are not available. Photo labs are not practical in the smaller cities, but the camera equipment would be a definite asset. A polaroid-type camera in smaller cities is probably the most practical for identification purposes. Fingerprint kits for removing latent fingerprints or even taking rolled impressions are not generally available, but should be procured to support the national identification files of the NBI.

Again, as in municipalities, the police forces frequently find it easier to solicit needed office equipment, supplies, and services rather than make futile attempts to influence the city council. Obviously, such actions by armed and uniformed police present a detrimental image and serve to lead police on the path towards requesting increasing handouts from the civil populace.

A typically supported chartered city police force exists in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental Province. This 72-man police force receives a budget of 202,382 pesos annually with 22,382 allocated for operations and maintenance. This latter figure is not adequate for its purpose. The maintenance facilities for vehicles are inadequate and limited laboratory capability requires that any but the most rudimentary laboratory work be dispatched to the NBI in Manila with an attendant two-week delay for results. Following is a resume of existing equipment provided the police force:

a. Firearms: 55 .38 caliber revolvers plus 10 other weapons.

b. Transportation:

(1) 3/4 ton wagon
(2) 1/4 ton jeep
(3) Motorcycle
(4) 4 bicycles

c. Communications:

(1) Telephone to police station and to the chief of police residence
(2) Telephone outlets available for police use:
(a) Public market
(b) Public slaughterhouse
(c) Different terminal offices of shipping companies at the wharf
(d) Movie theaters, (up to midnight)
(e) Other business and residential buildings in case of emergency

d. Department laboratory and investigative facilities:

(1) Photo-laboratory: department has a reflex camera and other photo equipment and materials for taking processing pictures, but inadequate for fingerprint photography.
(2) Latent fingerprint kit, containing powders, lifting tapes, and other materials for developing, lifting, and preserving latent fingerprints.

e. City provides uniform allowances sufficient to furnish each member:

(1) Clothing (one suit for one year)
(2) One pair of leather shoes for one year
(3) Caps
(4) Raincoats

f. The city jail has two cells with enough space to accommodate a total of eighteen prisoners. This department has an additional cell which is under construction, but construction has been temporarily stopped for lack of funds.

The Quezon City Police Force has the following approved budget for the current year:

BUDGET RECAPITULATION - QUEZON CITY POLICE

1.	Police Wages	₱1,708,460.00
2.	Civilian Salaries	129,840.00
3.	Life Insurance	79,441.00
4.	Retirement Insurance	131,800.00
5.	Traveling expenses	7,000.00
6.	Supplies & Materials (Office supplies, gasoline, tires, batteries, water, etc.)	100,000.00
	Photographic supplies	5,000.00
8.	Maintenance of motor pool and other facilities	6,500.00
9.	Rental of Police Precincts	4,380.00
10.	Repair of equipment (vehicles)	30,000.00
11.	Illumination	4,500.00
12.	Communications (rental of telephones, telegrams)	15,000.00
13.	Other Services (Compensation, medical bills for injuries sustained in line of duty, etc.)	10,000.00
14.	Police Training School	17,000.00
15.	Allowance (laundry, motorcycle policemen)	5,000.00
16.	Discretionary fund (purchase of information)	10,000.00
17.	Uniform allowance	38,000.00
	GRAND TOTAL	₱2,303,923.00

The budget total represents slightly over 11 percent of the city income but is adequate to provide the police force approximately 25 percent of the total for operations and maintenance. This may not be sufficient since the force requires some replacement rolling stock and communications equipment. In addition, furnishing of the new police department section of the new city hall will be a major funding problem. To be noted is the 10,000 pesos allocated for discretionary use in the purchase of information. Quezon City, like the municipality of Makati, is a major recipient of tax return benefits under the provisions of Republic Act 2343.

In contrast, the Dumaguete City Police Force has a budget of 202,382 pesos annually for a force of 70 men and a population of 44,000. A total of 180,000 pesos is absorbed in pay and allowances, leaving approximately 12 percent for operations and maintenance. The force has several obsolescent vehicles which require excessive maintenance and should be replaced. The force also lacks a suitable communications system, particularly for contact with outlying barrios during the hours of darkness when the local commercial telephone system is out of operation. The budget does not permit the purchase of ammunition for training with assigned weapons.

The chartered city of Davao has a city income of 6,860,067 pesos and a permanent population of 400,000. Added to this is a transient population approaching 100,000. In addition to the population, it contains a wide-ranging and rugged rural area of over 800 square miles where 150,000 of its population resides. To police this population and area, it has a force of 401 police with an annual budget of 1,097,613 pesos, or 16 percent of the city income. This supplies 18 police vehicles and five motorcycles. The uniformed patrol division possesses eight jeeps for this total, of which four are in good running condition. The motorcycles need replacement, and over-all communications are inadequate. The force is housed in a portion of a municipal building in completely inadequate facilities which hampers both the maintenance of suitable morale and the conduct of operations and training.

In general, the logistics needs in chartered cities are more highly individual than municipalities. Like municipalities, however, the city police budgets depend on the attitude of the city government to a large extent and the existence of various political influences.

Chartered cities have basic common problems.

- Growing populations
- Generally inadequate transportation
- Limited communications equipment
- Poor training and operational facilities
- Inadequate investigative equipment
- Inadequate office equipment and office supplies
- Inability to communicate rapidly with other law enforcement agencies
- Limited maintenance of equipment and facilities
- Obsolete or obsolescent equipment
- Non-standard firearms
- Lack of funds for training and training ammunition
- Limited capability to police rural areas of the city
- Limited knowledge of police needs by the city government

LOGISTICS - PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

INTRODUCTION

Within the terms of reference of this survey, only those aspects of logistical support which have a direct impact on the Constabulary capability to effectively perform the peace-and-order mission have been considered. Logistics in the PC is treated extensively in this report since it represents a major difficulty in PC law enforcement efforts and involves the largest national organization affecting peace and order.

As will be shown, budgetary support for the Constabulary, as the national police force charged with the primary mission of maintaining peace and order, has been woefully inadequate. During times when advances in the society, both criminal and peaceful, require increased support to even maintain the status quo, logistical support for the Constabulary has decreased. Over the past five-year period, when the size of the Constabulary was substantially increasing to provide better police service, operational and logistical funds released were reduced by over 60 percent. In surveying the logistical support to the Constabulary in light of its effect on the peace-and-order capability, consideration was given to: the organization of logistical support, the amount of budgetary support provided, and the results of

the system and support provided as experienced by the using units in the field. The latter included sampling in different areas and under diverse conditions influenced by geographic features, social and economic conditions and a variety of peace-and-order situations.

ORGANIZATION FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

General

PC units at Zone and Province receive their supply and services support either from the PC Supply and Service Support Battalion (PC SSS Bn), the Armed Forces Philippines Supply Center (AFPSC), or Military Area Supply Point (MASP). Detailed organization of the Armed Forces Philippines Supply Center or the Military Area Supply Point is not significant here. The supply and services that the AFPSC and the MASP's are responsible for providing the PC are important and will be discussed.

Armed Forces Philippines Supply Center (AF PSC)

The Armed Forces Philippines Supply Center is organized and equipped to provide supply and maintenance services to supported units (4th and 5th Echelon) of the Philippine Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Constabulary. Specifically, as stated in Standard Operating Procedure #3, AFP, GHQ, dated 6 September, 1966, the responsibilities of the AFPSC are to:

1. Provide direct technical assistance and customer relationship services to units designated under its direct support.

2. Perform disposal functions on excess, obsolete, or unserviceable materials collected by the MASP's through mobile disposal teams or through appropriate instructions. Movement of supplies or equipment from MASP's to AFPSC, if necessary, is a responsibility of AFPSC.

3. Perform inventory control functions on non-republic items over the MASP's insofar as balancing the supply and demand among the MASP's and the direct customers of the AFPSC. The Inventory Control functions exercised by AFPSC feature automatic replenishment of MASP stocks through rendition by the MASP's of Stock Status Report (SSR) together with the prescribed accountable document for items falling short of stock level. AFPSC, in coordination with the Philippine Army, Military Area, Military Area Supply Points, shall prescribe the reporting system necessary to effect responsible stock status reporting and an automatic replenishment procedure.

4. Provide material maintenance beyond capabilities of the MASP's.

The AFPSC is located in the Manila area, and normal distribution of supplies and services is through the Military Area Supply Points or direct to the using unit. Because of the restrictions imposed on transportation modes created by the island characteristic of the Philippines, AFPSC must also rely on organic units of the major services to supply many of the units outside the Manila-Central Luzon area which are not within a reasonable geographic area served by a MASP. This is particularly true with the Constabulary because of the wide dispersal of Constabulary units and detachments throughout the Republic, many of which are in relatively remote areas, accessible only with difficulty. Therefore, the PC SSS Bn must still provide supply distribution and maintenance services to those PC units not served by one of the four MASP's or direct from AFPSC.

Military Area Supply Points (MASP's)

The Philippine Army is responsible for establishing a Military Area Supply Point in each of the four Military Areas, employing the operational structure of the Military Area Support Company. The MASP is to be a functionalized static logistical support complex and a single stock record account. The Philippine Army Supply Accountable Officer provides common items of supply, except Class V (ammunition), and field-level maintenance services to designated AFP units located in realistic geographical access to the MASP. The Supply Accountable Officer will also provide maintenance contact teams and command materials maintenance and readiness inspection service for Philippine Army units and other AFP units in the area as directed. It is assumed that this direction will come from the Philippine Army Military Area Commander.

Direction for the establishment of the MASP is relatively new, as it was established by the AFP GHQ SOP #3, dated 6 September, 1966. Prior to this time, the MASP's operated as sub-depots of the AFPSC and not under the command of the Philippine Army Military Area Commander. PC commanders and supply officers express some doubt concerning the feasibility of such a system to support the PC, particularly since the MASP is under the Philippine Army Military Area Commander and not under the direction of the AFPSC. The PC SSS Bn is anticipating a greater requirement for supply distribution and maintenance services as a result of this reorganization, and a proposed support plan has been drafted for staffing with HPC.

The MASP concept appears sound except for the change in command responsibility from the AFPSC to the Philippine Army Military Area Commander; however, it still will not fully support PC units in the field. The main intent of the MASP concept, as stated in the implementing SOP, is the elimination of existing duplicatory logistics efforts between PA, PC agencies, and the AFPSC. On the other hand, the SOP states that the PC Zone Commander will be provided general supply and field-level maintenance support whenever such support can be provided by the Military Area Commander. The language of the implementing SOP permits the Military Area Commander wide latitude in interpreting the degree and amount of support he is responsible for providing. The SOP points out that pending the result of a study of the organization and operational requirement pertaining to the PC Zone SSS Company and the HPC SSS Bn, PC contact teams in the Military Areas will continue to operate as part of detachments from the PC SSS Bn located at PC Zone.

Philippine Constabulary Supply and Service Support Battalion (PCSSS Bn)

The PC SSS Bn will be absorbed in the PC Support Group along with the PC Signal Support Company and the PC Engineer Company on or about 1 October, 1966. The Zone Supply and Services Support Companies now in existence will also be absorbed by the PC Support Group. The PC Support Group will attach contact teams and support elements in direct support of each Zone, but these detachments will be under the command and receive direction from the PC Support Group.

The Commander of the PC SSS Bn identifies his major problems in the following manner:

1. Shortage of technically trained military and civilian personnel.
2. Shortage of tires, batteries, and tarpaulin covers for all PC vehicles.
3. Shortage of major assemblies (engines) for vehicles.
4. Shortage of travel funds to cover transportation of military personnel and dependents in case of retirement and permanent change of station.
5. Lack of mobility.

6. Limited maintenance and storage space.
7. Non-standardized equipment.
8. Quarters for troops.
9. Inadequate maintenance equipment.

The following recommendations to alleviate these problems were stated:

1. Assignment of sufficient personnel to PC SSS Bn, at least up to pegged strength.
2. Program additional funds for purchase of tires, batteries, and tarpaulin covers.
3. GHQ grant PC priority in issuing major assemblies for vehicles.
4. Program additional travel funds.
5. Representations with higher headquarters for transfer of from 16 to 25 2-1/2 ton trucks from the Quartermaster Transportation Battalion of AFP for partial fill of the PC SSS Bn Transportation Company.
6. Construction of ammunition storage facilities and additional shop space.
7. Construction of a 14,000 square feet of covered storage space.
8. Improvement of rewarehousing and updating stockage list.
9. Construction of Enlisted Men's quarters.



PCSSSBn PERSONNEL STATUS

as of 1 JULY '66

AUTH		PEGGED		ACTUAL	
	EM		EM		EM
25	538	1	233	15	160
			1. REGULAR		16
			2. EMERGENCY		
			3. CASUAL		

PC Supply System

Requisition and Issue Flow

At present, the requisitioning unit submits a request to the Zone SSS Company. The Zone SSS Company either fills the requisition from stock or forwards the request to the MASP. If the item is not available from stock at the MASP, the requisition is forwarded to AFPSC or the Zone SSS Company is authorized to submit directly to the PC SSS Bn. The PC SSS Bn fills the requisition from stock, ships direct to the unit or through the SSS Company at Zone. If the PC SSS Bn must obtain the item from the AFPSC, a direct issue to the requisitioning unit may be arranged.

Following reorganization on or about 1 October, 1966, the PC Support Group will function essentially as the PC SSS Bn has in the past; however, the Zone SSS Company becomes part of the PC Support Group. The using unit will submit a requisition directly to the MASP or to the PC Support Group providing an information copy of the requisition to the Zone 4. When PC reorganization into battalions is complete, the battalions will submit requisitions for organic companies either direct to the MASP or to the PC Support Group. The PC Support Group will deal directly with AFPSC for PC units. There is no priority established distinguishing between units of the major services, and supplies are issued from stock on a first-come, first-served basis. Naturally, those units in closer proximity to the MASP will be in a favored position insofar as receiving critical items is concerned.

AFG GHQ SOP #3, dated 6 September, 1966, states that all four Zone Headquarters and forty-four PC Provincial Commands will be supplied by AFPSC through the four MASP's, but as previously noted "whenever such support can be provided by the Military Area Commander."

This leaves at least twelve PC Provincial Commands that must be supplied and receive maintenance support solely from PC SSS Bn or the Support Group when organized. Since the appropriation for procurement of supplies from the AFPSC



revolving fund is controlled by PC SSS Bn, supplies from this account must be provided by PC SSS Bn. This leaves only MAP equipment and supplies which can be handled solely by the AFPSC and the MASP's for PC units requisitioning direct from them. In any event, there is some reason to doubt the responsiveness of the MASP concept to the requests from PC units since the MASP is under the command of the Philippine Army Military Area Commander instead of remaining a sub-depot of AFPSC. It is logical to assume that the MA Commander will have a tendency to serve Philippine Army units before satisfying the demands of PC units. The MA Commander is responsible for an Army mission in the area. It is not the MA Commander who will suffer if the PC does not discharge its mission effectively but the PC Zone Commander, who has no control over the operation of the MASP.

There are strong indications that PC units in the field have not been receiving their "fair share" of logistics support provided through the AFP for all the major Services. This inference is based on the amount distributed through the system and the current status of PC equipment. Since logistic support is not allocated to the major Services based on their respective missions (with few exceptions), it is almost impossible to make a detailed study of the distribution of this support. It is an area worth exploring in depth if support for PC units does not radically improve. The Constabulary is the only one of the major Services, with the possible exception of the Navy, that as a national organization is fully operational in a peacetime mission. The Navy, although quite small in comparison to the PC, is responsible for patrolling Philippine waters for violation of Republic laws and is actively engaged in anti-smuggling activities. The Constabulary is widely dispersed

over the entire chain of over 7,100 islands stretching over 1,000 miles from Batanes to Tawitawi, is operational 24 hours a day, and is operating over rugged terrain under adverse conditions with equipment that is generally in excess of five years old. The PC dispersal and isolation from supply support sources is a significant limitation. The PA, on the other hand, although engaged in several operations, usually functions in unit strength seldom below the company level. Their operations usually have the assistance of an accompanying support unit or the facilities of a fixed installation.

Since the PC is not equipped with the high cost heavy equipment items as are her sister Services, the peso value of supplies and maintenance support for equipment will not approach that of the other Services. From the standpoint of numbers of spare parts and replacement items and maintenance support in general, the PC should far exceed the requirements of the other Services, based on the peace-and-order mission alone. Since no priority has been established to distinguish between the Services at AFPSC or the MASP's, the PC experiences a considerably higher equipment deadline rate than the other Services. The unit equipment most critical to the mission is general purpose vehicles--jeeps, weapon carriers, 2-1/2-ton trucks. The availability of spare parts and major assemblies for PC general purpose vehicles is extremely critical. The vehicle deadline rate for the four PC Zones, highlights the seriousness of this critical shortage. Many of these vehicles have been deadlined from six months to over a year.

Maintenance Flow

Field maintenance is performed for PC units in the provinces either by the Zone SSS Company or the MASP. Equipment may be evacuated to the PC SSS Bn at Camp Crame if the maintenance service required is beyond the capability of either of these units or PC SSS Bn is more accessible. Field maintenance beyond the capability of PC SSS Bn is evacuated to the AFPSC. Although the Undersecretary of Defense for Munitions has established a priority for maintenance services on PC vehicles, experience in major rebuild for general purpose vehicles has still not been encouraging. In the three-month period preceding 15 September, 1966, a total of twenty-six 2-1/2-ton trucks were turned in to the AFPSC for rebuild, but only nine had been returned.

VEHICLE DEADLINE RATE
PC ZONES
August, 1966

	1/4-Ton			3/4-Ton			2-1/2-Ton		
PC Zone	On Hand	D/L	%	On Hand	D/L	%	On Hand	D/L	%
I	110	4	3.6	58	6	10.3	17	6	35.3
II	102	14	13.7	50	31	62.0	5	3	60.0
III	84	2	2.4	41	3	7.3	19	3	15.8
IV	133	17	12.8	69	24	34.8	18	12	66.7
Average Rate:			8.1			28.6			44.5

Source: PC Zone-4's.

Although it has often been slow, maintenance service has not been a significant determinant in the high deadline rate for PC general purpose vehicles. The availability of spare parts is the most critical factor in relation to deadline experience. In general, the field maintenance required can be readily performed if the parts are made available.

As indicated, maintenance services may be arranged through civilian contract locally by authority of the Zone SSS Company or the PC SSS Bn. A shortage of funds has precluded units from availing themselves of this type service in the past. The comparative analysis of the logistics fund received by IV PC Zone in FY 65 and 66 more clearly identifies the problem. Whereas the funds received for FY 66 almost double those received in FY 65, it must be remembered that this logistics fund is to support over 3,600 PC personnel with over 225 vehicles operating in the largest geographical PC Zone under adverse conditions and a serious peace-and-order situation. Spare parts for vehicles or communications equipment may be purchased out of the 07 account, but the reluctance on the part of Z-4's to do this is understandable in view of the many other necessary items this account must cover.



Supply of Police Equipment

The joint supply system operated by the AFPSC through the MASP's provides only common items used by the major Services. Police equipment and supplies are distributed to PC units by the PC SSS Bn when available. Unfortunately, not much has been made available in the way of specialized police equipment to be distributed to the units.

With few exceptions, even the basic tools of investigation are not available to PC units operating in the field. Cameras for identification records and use at the crime scene have been made available through MAP or Republic funds generally down to Provincial Command level and, in many cases, down to PC company level. Photo laboratory facilities, however, are available in only one PC Zone. Where cameras are in serviceable condition, film--or funds to purchase film--is not available. When the cameras are used, the film must be processed commercially and funds are seldom available for this purpose.

IV PC ZONE

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LOGISTICS FUND RECEIVED FOR

FY 1964-65 and FY 1965-66

OBJECT CLASS	FISCAL YEAR 64-65			
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
02 TVL Expenses	P12,500.00	P 8,000.00	P 3,000.00	P 3,500.00
03 Commo SVCS	3,000.00	500.00	292.00	2,800.00
04 Repair & Maint.				
05 TPN Services	1,000.00	500.00		
06 Other Services	1,000.00	3,800.00	250.00	1,780.00
07 Sups & Mats	8,000.00	11,400.00	8,219.60	5,500.00
20 Capital Outlay				
21 Equipt. Outlay				
TOTAL	P25,500.00	P24,200.00	P11,761.60	P13,580.00
	FISCAL YEAR 65-66			
02 TVL Expenses	P16,000.00	P 4,800.00	P17,000.00	P 5,000.00
03 Commo SVCS	2,000.00	449.00		200.00
04 Repair & Maint.	800.00			
05 TPN Services	3,020.00	1,500.00		
06 Other Services	4,674.00	12,500.00	10,500.00	250.00
07 Sups & Mats	14,488.00	10,000.00	17,233.00	2,000.00
20 Capital Outlay			5,000.00	
21 Equipt. Outlay			3,000.00	
TOTAL	P40,932.00	P29,249.00	P52,733.00	P 7,450.00

TOTAL -- FISCAL YEAR 64-65 = P75,041.60

TOTAL -- FISCAL YEAR 65-66 = P130,414.00

Fingerprint-taking equipment furnished in the past is in poor condition from lack of support. Ink and forms are generally not available to take fingerprints. In the majority of cases, an ordinary ink pad is used and frequently good prints are not obtained. Powder and brushes for lifting fingerprints are generally not available, even at PC Zone level. Since the equipment required is not available for use in the field, identification files are incomplete or not maintained; therefore, this basic investigative technique is not in being. A properly maintained fingerprint file, in coordination with other national and local investigative agencies, could be invaluable in reducing the large number of wanted persons at large.

An appropriation of ₱800,000 was approved for Fiscal Year 1967 for the purchase of fingerprint sets for the PC, but the appropriation as slashed by the Budget Commission eliminated this possibility. It has been almost impossible for the PC to improve their investigative capability with basic crime detection equipment because of inadequate budgetary support. These items are of necessity eliminated from the program in favor of critical supplies required for continued operation of units in the field.

Other Special Equipment

Boats and motors are another critical item considered essential to the PC mission, particularly in view of the intensified anti-smuggling campaign. Property records at HPC indicate that the PC is at 109 percent of authorized outboard motors with bottoms, but the status of this equipment is poor. The outboard motors deadlined for parts or which should be salvaged range from 46.1 percent in II PC Zone to 50 percent in the III PC Zone. Spare parts for outboard motors are extremely difficult to obtain, even when funds are available for this purpose.

The sophisticated equipment used by smugglers, illegal fishermen, and armed bands operating from the sea frustrates PC efforts to apprehend them. In a country with the island characteristic such as the Philippines, the PC must be provided with vessels and motors not only for patrolling against smuggling, illegal fishing, and armed bands, but for transportation to and from inhabited islands which have no law enforcement agencies. In many areas, barrios are only accessible by sea, and in other areas the travel time by water is considerably less than overland.

The size of boat required will vary from one area to another, but the PC has a requirement for light, fast carft in some areas where in others a larger more seaworthy craft is required. Inter-island commercial transport for long distances is normally available and is more practical. HPC, in outlining requirements for watercraft, requested 50-foot boats with inboard motors. An estimated cost of ₱1.6 million was projected for sixteen such craft. A boat this size would appear to be impractical, for PC operations and maintenance costs could be prohibitive on such craft.

Budgetary Support for Logistics

Programming, planning, and plans for implementing logistics support for the Constabulary, at HPC and Zone level, show a thorough understanding of logistical requirements, and personnel continually accomplish the detailed planning and programming necessary to support these requirements. It must indeed be frustrating to be continually forced to implement logistical support plans when less than 10 percent of the minimum amount considered necessary is

made available. The status of maintenance throughout the PC is not a reflection of the training, ability, nor the motivation of these logisticians but a reflection of the drastically inadequate amount of funds received. Logisticians and commanders at all levels have devised some rather ingenious methods to continue operations, but some of these methods serve also to compromise their capability for effective law enforcement.

The Constabulary Budget as approved by Congress and the President appropriated ₱87,527,291 for the fiscal year 1966-67. (Annex DDD). The Budget Commission, however, obligated only ₱69,739,000 for this period based on the actual Republic income projected. Reduction of the PC Budget by over ₱17.7 million might not appear to be severe if it could be spread across the board to all accounts, but after subtracting over ₱63 million for pay and allowances to military and civilian personnel, a comparatively paltry amount of slightly more than ₱6 million remains to provide operational and maintenance funds. Certainly this small amount to cover the operations of a National Police Force spread throughout the Republic from Batanes to Tawitawi can be recognized as totally inadequate. The Under Secretary of Defense for Munitions advised that attempts were being made to remove the 69 million peso ceiling limitation.

The net result is a reduction of 68 percent in the amount appropriated for the repair and maintenance of equipment from ₱3,958,920 to ₱1,660,000 and a reduction of the amount appropriated for the repair and maintenance of facilities of 69 percent from ₱1,382,000 to ₱426,000. Since approximately 74 percent of the appropriated budget was for pay and allowances, which must be paid, this item now constitutes 91 percent of the budget obligated by the Budget Commission. The remainder of the budget covering operating maintenance expenses and equipment outlay must absorb the major portion of the reduction. From 26 percent of the appropriated budget, the supply and logistics portion is reduced to only 9 percent of obligated funds.

If appropriations for maintenance of equipment, buildings, and other facilities are not considered irreducible, then one must accept the resulting deterioration

HPC Gymnasium

of equipment to continue, the more costly maintenance will become in terms of repair, replacement, and operational costs. A picture of the gymnasium at HPC is a good example. Inadequate support of the PC over the past few years has seriously aggravated maintenance problems and operational capability. All general purpose vehicles are from five to six years old. At a time when maintenance costs are steadily increasing, funds have been drastically reduced. For example, in Fiscal Year 1965-66, only ₱2,396,140 was released by the Budget Commission for supply and logistics out of an approved appropriation of ₱5,289,340, a reduction of 55% or ₱2,893,200.

The cost of preventive maintenance is considerably less than the ultimate repair or replacement of equipment and facilities. The importance of preventive maintenance is well recognized by PC officers and men as a sound management practice to obtain the maximum with the minimum. Without adequate resources, effective supply management is impossible. If the Philippine Constabulary is to possess the capability to cope with the peace-and-order situation in the Republic, adequate support must be provided for supply and maintenance of equipment and facilities. The programmed cost is not excessive considering the importance of the mission and the complexities inherent therein. The Government of the Philippines can make a significant commitment to restore and maintain peace and order within the Republic by insuring that a priority is established for allocating support to the Constabulary and that it is sufficiently high that the Budget Commission will trim government activities less important to internal stability. The Republic cannot realistically endure the consequences of failing to provide adequate support to the largest single agency charged with maintaining peace and order throughout the Philippines.

"Public Relations" - Logistics

The inadequacy of budgetary support for the Philippine Constabulary has caused Company Commanders and Provincial Commanders to resort to what is called by them "public relations" in an effort to continue essential police operations. (This is discussed separately under PC Public Image).

Not all support received through "public relations" can be categorized as "bad" even though there are still complications. For example, in one province the governor has taken considerable pains to attempt to procure the necessary spare parts to repair the PC outboard motor so that the PC will have the capability to patrol the extensive coastline to prevent robberies from armed bands operating from boats and to curtail smuggling. In this same area, the city augments the company allocation of gasoline on a regular basis to permit continual PC patrol activity. If such support must be solicited, it is probably best obtained in this manner; however, the PC supervisory role over city and municipal police could be compromised somewhat if conflict arose. All support received should be acquired on an approved legal basis to obviate the influence of politics or personality and protect both the recipient and the donor.

In one rather remote area, the PC company reportedly has not received a POL allocation for over five years. Gasoline and oil to operate PC vehicles are provided by lumber companies or rubber plantations. The donors receive protective services from PC detachments stationed there on a semi-permanent basis. The Company Commander does not actually believe that his position as a law enforcement officer has been compromised since he personally does not directly get involved in receiving the support.

In another area, the PC Company is responsible for an area which includes some thirty-six islands, but has no boat or motor. A need was expressed for frequent patrolling of these islands since there are no government officials residing there nor police. The PC is able to borrow boats from time to time from fishermen, providing the gasoline from their own pockets, to patrol these islands and to conduct specific operations against armed bands or criminal elements. the PC, however, cannot borrow a boat to investigate illegal fishing in the area.

In general, if adequate budgetary support is provided the PC for operations, supply and maintenance, "public relations", with the attendant possibilities of compromise or degrading effects, should diminish drastically.

Internal Supply Management

As mentioned previously, supply consciousness prevails among the officers and enlisted personnel of the Constabulary. The lack of support provided the PC for supplies and maintenance has brought about at least one serious defect in internal supply management.

In order for the joint supply system to be responsive to the requirements for spare parts, requisitions must be formally submitted as prescribed in current supply regulations. The flow of supplies from AFPSC through the MASP's to the using units and the authorized stock level in the MASP's is completely dependent upon the demand developed from experience with equipment in the using units. If spare parts are not obtained through the system, an invalid experience factor is developed and that particular item is not procured and is unavailable for distribution. Valid stock levels which will meet immediate demands cannot be established.

The reason for this practice is understandable in view of past experience in obtaining spare parts, but it must be corrected if the supply system is ever to be responsive to the requirements of using units. In the past the PC Unit Commander or Provincial Commander would make an informal inquiry at the MASP concerning the availability of a specific item. If the item was not on hand and available for issue, the commander did not submit a formal requisition but used whatever means available in the area of "public relations" to get the vehicle or equipment in operation, or even purchased the spare parts out-of-pocket.

Equipment Distribution

An analysis of the distribution of vehicular equipment reveals that units in the field suffer from a concentration at various levels and in certain units. General purpose vehicles are mandatory to successful police operations conducted by units in the field. The 1/4-ton jeep, 3/4-ton weapons carrier, and to some extent the 2-1/2-ton truck are the only available standard vehicles suited to police operations throughout the Republic. As of 31 March, 1966, based on the authorized/allowable number of vehicles by major headquarters (HPC) had 183 percent of the authorized number of 1/4-ton vehicles assigned, and the Presidential Guard Battalion (PGBn) had 195 percent of the authorized number. On the other hand, the PC Zones were all operating with from 71.5 percent (IV PC Zone) to 79.6 percent (III PC Zone) of the number authorized.

Needless to say, this distribution adversely affects PC operations in the field where the requirement for police patrol effort is greatest. Excess vehicles at HPC are used, of course, to transport the large number of staff officers assigned there. This is a normal tendency in any organization, and possibly does not seem significant or unavoidable. The concentration of a large excess of the vehicles authorized the PC at HPC and other units, however, has a more adverse effect on

the transport and patrol capability of field units than is readily apparent. In view of extreme road conditions in the Republic, particularly in III and IV PC Zones, the limited supply and maintenance support available, and the requirement for continuous patrol operations, the distribution of vehicles on hand becomes a critical factor affecting peace-and-order operations. The Under-Secretary of Defense for Munitions is considering action to replace service vehicles in the Manila area with commercial-type vehicles.

Although an increase in vehicles authorized for each company-size unit could significantly enhance police patrol operations, almost every Company Commander interviewed stated that if they just had all authorized vehicles assigned and in operating condition, they would be capable of accomplishing the mission. The requirement for almost continuous operation and the limited maintenance support available result in a high rate of deadline in the field. Many of these vehicles remain deadlined for periods up to and exceeding one year for items ranging from tires and batteries to complete engine assemblies.

The requirements for transportation within HPC and the Presidential Guard Battalion no doubt exceed the amount available, but priority for assignment of 1/4-ton and 3/4-ton vehicles should keep Zone units at full strength. A greater demand should be placed on AFP to provide transportation support for HPC and the Presidential Guard Battalion if required. Also, commercial transportation means are in abundance in the Manila area. According to special provisions of the approved program, only PC Generals, the PC Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff, PC Zone Commanders, and PC Provincial Commanders are authorized to use government-owned motor vehicles, except for official administrative and operational purposes. The authorized number of vehicles for HPC should be adequate to provide required transportation services if this special provision is strictly followed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the PC be provided sufficient funds annually, including the current fiscal year, to permit 25 percent of the budget to be allocated to operations and maintenance.

2. Insure strict adherence to the established system of requisitioning logistical support through the prescribed logistical system to insure that valid consumption data and supply experience factors can be developed.

3. Redistribute excess general purpose vehicles in the Manila area to PC units in the Zone and Provinces.

4. Emphasize support of the police aspects of the PC primary mission through the procurement and distribution of basic police-type equipment on a continuous basis, e.g., fingerprint equipment, photographic equipment, records, forms, flashlights, communications equipment, etc.

5. Analyze the support programmed and provided the PC through the AFPSC and the MASP's for a determination of feasibility to support PC requirements in law enforcement.

6. Insure that MAP- provided aircraft for the PC are dispersed to Zone level to improve logistics and operational capabilities.

"There must be a suitable framework in any society before development can take place. We must have such a framework if we are to make any progress at all—respect for law and order, respect for the rights of the individual."

William S. Gaud, Administrator
Agency for International Development
Department of State

Chapter XIII

TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

The term "Traffic Management" as used here includes (1) all public surface facilities for the traversing and parking of all types of conveyances for the movement of persons and things (except tracked vehicles operating in private rights-of-way); (2) all agencies having responsibilities for ascertaining flow requirements of traffic, planning, approving, funding, constructing and/or maintaining public facilities for such movements; and (3) all agencies responsible for licensing, approving, restricting, stopping, prohibiting or controlling the use of such facilities.

Effective management of traffic, like any other management effort, must be designed to promote and achieve efficient use of available facilities, adequately maintain existing facilities, and provide additional required facilities, and to control their use to provide minimum congestion and delay with maximum safety and rapidity of travel. In a democracy all these objectives must be accomplished with minimum impingement of individual rights and in a manner which preserves human dignity.

The gathering of information, processing, analyses and use of records are important management tools. Such records serve to identify problems, indicate remedial measures, record progress and assess effectiveness of efforts. Additionally, financial accountability records are essential to assure wise and effective use of tax funds. Without such records, it is not possible to accurately measure quality, quantity or direction of efforts.

I. THE IMPACT OF TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

The quality and efficiency of traffic management efforts have a pronounced effect upon the opinions of residents concerning their government and the police which represent that government. Traffic congestion, delays and accidents are manifestations of ineffective management and inadequate facilities and reflect unfavorably upon the government in power. Unfortunately, such public reaction is not limited to traffic matters but carries over to other official efforts and influences public thinking and response concerning the entire field of law enforcement.

Many citizens have their only direct contact with their government through police traffic activities. If the policeman with whom they deal is uncivil or inefficient, if he does not demonstrate adequate training, a knowledge of his assignment and a desire to serve the public, then the police -- and the government -- are not, in the citizen's opinion, doing the job well. He discusses this with his family and friends and soon the police and the government are in disrepute, with a growing body of unfavorable public opinion.

On the other hand, even the driver who is charged with a violation of traffic regulations may become a friend and supporter of the police and the government, <u>if</u> he is convinced that he has been treated fairly, impartially and promptly. He is entitled to expect courteous but firm treatment, to be promptly charged and brought to trial, and to have his case promptly disposed of on the basis of the facts presented without distortion caused by influence of any kind. Delays and unwarranted continuances of traffic cases in the courts are beyond the control of police, but are a source of strong criticism directed against the police as well as the government. Effective traffic enforcement requires prompt adjudication of charges brought with equitable assessment of penalties.

"the generally deplorable state of records keeping ... in most agencies"

It is unreasonable to expect that police forces will ever have sufficient manpower to keep a watchful eye on every user of the streets and roadways; the numbers required would be astronomical and the economic burden unbearable. Instead, the police role in effective traffic management must depend upon creating an active desire on the part of the majority of roadway users to meet their individual responsibilities for safe driving and walking and thus free police to devote major efforts against the small proportion who respond only to rigid and constant enforcement supervision.

Obviously, the achievement of this desirable posture must depend to a large extent on the degree of respect which members of the public have for their police. If a citizen sees continuous evidence of police efficiency, constant

police concern for the rights and dignity of each individual, is convinced that a police case can not be "fixed" by political influence or other methods, and that enforcement actions are directed impartially against all persons regardless of station, wealth or other condition, the citizen thinks of the policeman as a professional man, a responsible official and a friend of the public. When enough policemen have earned enough reactions of this type from enough members of the public, the police force grows in stature to a position of prestige. Then public respect and public support become strong allies in preserving peace, order and public decorum in the community. As the prestige of the police improves, the public's image of the government represented by police also improves.

To achieve and preserve public respect and esteem, a heavy responsibility rests upon each member of a police organization. He must always conduct himself to reflect credit upon himself, to all other wearers of the uniform and to his government; his actions and appearance must be above reproach and his integrity must be unimpeachable. He must constantly remember in all of his activities that the uniform he wears is intended to well and truly represent the majesty of the law and that he is a responsible representative of his government to all persons.

The supervision of traffic and enforcement of traffic regulations must be a part of the responsibility of each member of a police organization. While some specialization in such fields as accident investigation, parking and pedestrian control and fixed traffic posts is desirable, it should never be extended to the point where all traffic responsibilities are assigned solely to a separate traffic group. The uniformed patrolman, whether on foot, a bicycle, motorcycle or in a motor vehicle, should include traffic supervision as a part of his assignment. The primary function of police specialists is to augment and extend the capabilities of the uniformed police patrol force.

Additionally, the primary mission of police is preventive in nature, to so control traffic as to prevent congestion and accidents, to patrol areas to prevent crimes against persons and property, and to preserve public order. Preventive police patrols are the most effective method of carrying out the primary police mission, and are equally effective in preventing crimes and traffic mishaps. Indeed, it is not unusual for the police department which regularly assigns the bulk of its manpower to preventive patrol duties to apprehend automobile thieves and other miscreants much more quickly than by any other method, frequently before the owner of the auto or other property knows that he has been robbed. Additionally, such patrols provide a powerful and constant deterrent against wrongdoing.

Traffic facilities are frequently outside the responsibility of police agencies, but greatly influence the ability of police to adequately supervise traffic flow. It is no more possible to send two thousand vehicles per hour over a one thousand vehicles per hour roadway than it is to send a six inch column of water through a three inch diameter pipe. A four lane highway which is served by a two lane bridge has its capacity limited thereby to two lanes. Ditching obstructions through city streets and rural roadways, deep chuck holes, and inadequate shoulder maintenance all slow the flow of traffic and contribute to accidents.

Traffic ways and structures, including bridges, guard rails, signs and signals, must be adequate for the numbers and types of vehicles and traffic flow patterns. Constantly increasing numbers of vehicles and drivers demand more and better roadways, city streets and parking facilities. Failure to keep pace with traffic requirements will bring additional congestion and accidents and promote dissatisfaction with government.

Experience has demonstrated that highway and street users are willing to pay for improved facilities and a high level of traffic management, usually through gasoline, vehicle and accessory taxes (but will violently object to siphoning off such taxes for other purposes). Provision of needed traffic facilities is sound politically, socially and economically, and adequate traffic facilitation is essential to social and economic progress. As the rising expectations of people are met, and they must be met, larger numbers of motor vehicles and drivers can be expected. More streets, roadways, structures, parking areas and supervision must be provided in time to meet requirements, or chaos will result.

II. ROADS AND STREETS

Situated on many islands, the roadway nets of the Philippines are separated in many places by water distances too great to permit bridging. At other places they require bridges or ferry crossings. This situation adds to both the difficulty and expense of providing adequate roadway facilities.

As of June 30, 1965, total roads and streets numbered 55,778 kilometers and included 11,709 bridges of various types with a total length of 244,004 meters. Information provided by the Bureau of Public Highways lists the totals of various surface types as:

Earth Surface	11,738 Kilometers
Macadam Surface	34,315 Kilometers
Bituminous Surface, low type	5,745 Kilometers
Bituminous Surface, high type	2,465 Kilometers
Concrete Surface	1,462 Kilometers
Miscellaneous Other Surfaces	53 Kilometers
Total	55,778 Kilometers

Construction	Bridges Number	Total Lineal Meters
Coco and Timber	6,892	106,526
Bailey	681	48,214
Masonry	259	3,632
Steel	362	27,745
Concrete	2,514	57,886
Total	11,709	244,004

These totals include National, Provincial, City and Municipal roads and streets. The present system represents a 90% increase over the total of 29,253 kilometers reported for the year 1954. Net totals of 1,012 kilometers were added during Fiscal Year 1963-64, and 466 kilometers during Fiscal Year 1964-65. Four hundred twenty-one bridges, totalling 10,117 lineal meters were constructed or improved during Fiscal Year 1963-64 and 316 structures were completed and 397 improved, totaling 6,646 lineal meters, during Fiscal Year 1964-65.

Maintenance and improvement of the road system and appurtenances is a never-ending task which must be carefully scheduled and promptly executed. Needed maintenance or improvements which are delayed for any purpose rapidly increase the costs of such work. Delayed patching of holes and breaks may soon result in a need for resurfacing. Postponed resurfacing of a deteriorating surface soon results in a need for subbase repairs and resurfacing. Lack of, or inadequate or delayed maintenance is wasteful of government funds, an extravagance which no government can afford in its accounting to the taxpayer.

Expenditures for maintenance of roads and bridges, reported by the Bureau of Public Highways, amounted to ₱55,202,223 during Fiscal Year 1963-64 and ₱93,062,733 during Fiscal Year 1964-65. During the same periods, ₱55,202,223 and ₱62,664,037, respectively, were expended for construction and improvements of roads and bridges. (These expenditures were from the Highway Special Fund and do not include the special purpose funds also controlled by the Bureau.) Such improvements consisted of:

ROADS AND STREETS

	FY 1963-64	FY 1964-65
Re-grading earth roads	1,038 kms.	2,247 kms.
Surfaced with macadam	2,580	
Asphalting	527	1 125
Concrete paving	171	137
Gravel		1,448
TOTALS	4,316 kms.	4,957 kms.

BRIDGES AND STRUCTURES

	FY 1963-64		FY 1964-65			
	Constructed or Improved	Lineal Meters	Constructed	Lineal Meters	Improved	Lineal Meters
Concrete and Steel	112	2,467	78	1,480	53	1,044
Bailey	36	933	14	616	15	592
Timber	190	3,723	50	1,346	23	1,534
Other	83	3,003	176	440	306	999
TOTALS	421	10,117	316	3,876	397	2,769

The 4,957 kilometers or roads and streets on which maintenance or improvement work was completed during the last reported fiscal year constitutes only 8.89% of the system. Hence slightly more than eleven years will be required to complete the maintenance cycle for the entire system. Although cyclical maintenance schedules will vary considerably for different surfaces, terrain, climate conditions and use, this rough method of measuring frequency indicates that the overall maintenance effort must be greatly increased to protect the sizeable investment in the Philippines roads and street network.

Visual inspections of roads and streets in many areas verify the fact that the present level of maintenance is woefully inadequate. Many roadways are in deplorable condition. Cracked or broken paving and large holes are permitting water seepage to damage both base and subbase at numerous locations. Many sections evidence damage by overloaded vehicles. Lack of or inadequate maintenance of shoulders adjoining the traveled roadway leaves variations in the two levels of six inches or more at many places and results in breaking off of roadway edges and constant narrowing of useable surfaces. Utility service cuts along roadways or across them with spoils piled on surfaces for long distances for long periods of time and coconuts piled on rural roads impede travel and cause bottlenecks. Encroachments of small business stands and squatters on the rights-of-way and careless congregations of buses, jeepneys, trucks and pedicabs interfere with normal traffic flow.

"Cracked or broken paving....

and

large holes."

In a number of cities a few wide boulevards with attractive center strip plantings and well-kept park areas offer a beautiful facade for other heavily traveled streets with badly broken paving, holes large and deep enough to wreck a vehicle even at low speeds, gutters filled with stagnant liquids, and refuse piled on the traveled way. Indiscriminating cuts across or along streets for various utilities are left open for long periods of time without adequate warning devices. Spoils and construction materials are frequently piled in the streets and construction enclosures sometimes encroach on travel ways. Most cuts in paving are eventually filled with loose dirt which traffic promptly scatters and apparently those responsible for the cuts are not required to replace paving upon completion of work.

Narrow bridges or an insufficient number of bridges impose limitations on traffic flow, particularly in the areas of larger cities. Many one-way bridges were observed serving two-way or wider roads. Some low-lying roadways and city streets are flooded during heavy rains and require better drainage facilities.

Signing of streets and highways is good in some areas, poor in others and nonexistent in a few places. Traffic flow can be facilitated by installing clear directional signs for highways through cities and municipalities and on some rural roads. Automatic traffic signals are generally poorly timed and few are interconnected.

The national and local governments of the Philippines and the Bureau of Public Highways deserve commendation for their efforts to extend the street and highway system to meet the rapidly developing requirements of traffic. The following table serves to illustrate this progress.

Roadway - Motor Vehicle Ratios

	1954	1965	Change
Total kilometers of roads and streets	29,253	55,778	+ 90.3%
Total registered motor vehicles	116,019	310,132	+166.4%
Average number of motor vehicles per km. of road	3.96	5.39	
Average daily travel per registered motor vehicle	60 km.	48.6 km.	
Average daily kms. of travel per km. of roadway	280 km.	270.5 km.	

Despite an almost doubling of highway and street facilities from 1954 to 1965, the number of motor vehicles using such facilities has increased at a rate nearly twice as great. Wise extension of the roadway system presents complex problems. The rapidly growing needs of metropolitan areas must be met at the same time that new roads into remote areas are opened and additional farm-to-market roads are provided to serve the expanding economic and social requirements of the populace.

Attempts to simplify problems such as the table on roadway-vehicle ratios may be misleading. Registered motor vehicles do not spread evenly over the entire available road system, rather they tend to cluster in and near the cities and population centers. Average miles operated per motor vehicle is a useful general figure, but this average is usually much larger in and around the larger cities and metropolitan areas because of the needs for regular transport of persons and goods.



Inadequate shoulder maintenance and overloaded vehicles result in the breaking-off of pavement edges and constantly narrow useable surfaces.

To illustrate this, the City of Manila and the area comprising the five Provinces surrounding it have 9.49% of the total roads and streets reported. Operating over these facilities are 46.5% of the total registered motor vehicles reported. Consequently, this area has 27.24 motor vehicles per kilometer of roadway in comparison with the 5.39 motor vehicles per kilometer of roadway for the total Philippines.

Roadway – Motor Vehicle Ratio
Manila and Surrounding Five Provinces 1965

Area	Total Kilometers of Roads and Streets	Registered Moter Vehicles
Pampanga Province	1,090.84	(?)
San Fernando City	(?)	6,165
Angeles City	76.39	3,721
Bulacan Province	1,115.34	2,248 (Incomplete)
Rizal Province	949.39	19,967
Manila City	513.60	65,855
Caloocan City	150.43	9,217
Quezon City	499.03	17,184
Pasay City	88.35	9,441
Laguna Province		
Lipa City	151.89	2,244
San Pablo City	120.51	4,087
Cavite Province	485.92	(?)
Cavite City	53.64	4,105
Totals	5,295.33	114,234

(Compiled GEM, from data provided by LTC and BPH. 8-66)

These totals must be further seasoned by the heavy movements of trucks, buses and private cars registered in other areas which travel into, within and out of this area on regular or intermittent schedules thus greatly increasing the average daily number of vehicles used per kilometer of roadway. Official recognition of these influences on requirements is signified by the fact that about 48%, or 26,736.16 kilometers of the present roadway system serves the Luzon Region.

The rapid increase in motor vehicles imposes twin requirements in provision of roadway facilities for their use: (1) improvement of and additions to the existing roadway nets to meet the problems of today, and (2) careful calculation of future needs in time to meet the developing traffic requirements of tomorrow and next year.

Because prior years' roadway requirements have not been met, the accumulated backlog will require funding and construction at the same time that future requirements must be funded and constructed. Costs will, consequently, be high, but fully effective traffic management will not be achieved until these two facets of the problem are overcome.

As the economic levels of Philippine residents improve, more widespread ownership of motor vehicles for both business and pleasure may be anticipated. These new owners, as well as present owners, will want to avail themselves of conveniences offered by their vehicles, including driving for pleasure, business and family purchasing.

Reasonable conveniences for such people will include comfortable driving in regulated traffic without undue delays and the availability of parking areas near

"Many one-way bridges were observed serving two-way or wider roads."

"Signing of streets and highways is good in some areas, poor in others and non-existent in a few areas."

the places in which they wish to transact their business. Areas which can not offer these conveniences will tend to be avoided. Shopping and business facilities will develop in less congested places, usually in suburban areas. Business locations with free flowing traffic and adequate parking facilities, such as Makati, will increase and siphon off the business from central areas to the point where local governments may find important segments of the tax base disappearing. Only the provision of adequate travel and parking accommodations can forestall such trends.

III. VEHICLES

The responsibility for registering all motor vehicles is vested in the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) which is established under the Department of Public Works and Communications by Republic Act 4136, approved June 20, 1964. Broad powers are vested in the Commissioner, including under Sec. 4:

"(2) To compile and arrange all applications, certificates, permits, licenses, and to enter, note and record thereon transfers, notifications, suspensions, revocations, or judgements of conviction rendered by competent courts concerning violations of this Act, with the end in view of preserving and making easily available such documents and records to public officers and private persons properly and legitimately interested therein.

(3) To give public notice of the certificates, permits, licenses and badges issued, suspended or revoked and/or motor vehicles transferred and/or drivers bonded under the provisions of this Act."

The Act seems to make it clearly incumbent upon the Commission to maintain current, complete and accurate records of all transactions connected with the registration of motor vehicles. The Act also empowers others to enforce provisions of the Act under Sec. 4, as follows:

"(7) The Philippine Constabulary and the city and municipal police forces are hereby given the authority and the primary responsibility and duty to prevent violations of this Act, and to carry out the police provisions hereof within respective jurisdictions: Provided That all apprehensions made shall be submitted for final disposition to the Commissioner and his deputies within twenty-four hours from the date of apprehension.

(8) All cases involving violations of this Act shall be endorsed immediately by the apprehending officer to the Land Transportation Commission. Where such violations necessitate immediate action, the same shall be endorsed to the traffic court, city or municipal court for summary investigation, hearing and disposition, but in all such cases, appropriate notices of the apprensions and the dispositions thereof shall be given to the Commissioner of Land Transportation by the law enforcement agency and the court concerned.

Notation of all such dispositions shall be entered in the records, and a copy shall be mailed to the owner and to the driver concerned."

The Act seems to clearly require complete and prompt reporting by all enforcement agencies and the courts of all apprehensions and actions under the provisions of the Act, and specifically requires that all such dispositions be entered in the records.

Nevertheless, motor vehicle registration data available from the LTC is neither accurate, current nor complete. The most recent data available during August, 1966, was for motor vehicle registrations during Calendar Year 1965, giving totals for 91 areas and including estimated totals for 16 of the areas

and totals with notations of "incomplete" for 15 of the remaining areas. Thus one-third of the overall report is of questionable accuracy; the report cannot be considered complete and the data was eight months old, instead of being current.

Complete, accurate and up-to-date motor vehicle registration information is vital to effective traffic management. Such information is frequently necessary to law enforcement personnel to successfully carry on their functions, and should be available to them on a twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week basis. For this reason, continuous manning of a central office with access to registration data (also to driver license and central driver records files) should be maintained and provided with a direct connection to the proposed Law Enforcement Communications Network.

To enable records keeping on a current basis, improved methods of tabulating and recording information should be provided. The present work load requires processing of more than fifteen hundred registrations per working day, and this volume may be expected to increase steadily. This amount of processing and recording, together with similar processing and recording functions assigned to the Commission, is adequate to justify the use of mechanical or electronic tabulating equipment. A system can be designed by suppliers of such equipment to handle the specific requirements of the various operations, including the simultaneous preparation of receipts and records, and suppliers can properly train personnel to operate such equipment.

Electronic equipment was installed in the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH) during May, 1966, and as a temporary expediant it should be ascertained if free machine time is available from these units, including possible nighttime operation. Possible economies might be effected by scheduling other agencies use of the BPH's expensive data processing units with installations of only the less expensive recording units in the various other agencies. This possibility should be explored with suppliers.

Information reported for Calendar Year 1965 shows a total registration of 310,132 motor vehicles of all types. About one-half of this number were trucks and approximately one-tenth were motorcycles.

Motor Vehicles Registered
by Calendar Years

	1962	1963	1964	1965
Cars	100,232	116,088	138,933	150,345
Trucks	89,703	104,241	112,951	122,858
Trailers	4,402	4,902	5,203	6,691
Motorcycles	7,374	10,457	22,079	30,238
Total	201,511	235,688	279,166	310,132
Per Cent Change by Year		+17%	+19%	+11%

An overall increase of all types of registered motor vehicles amounting to 53% from 1962 to 1965 is reported. Percentage increases by type of registered vehicle were calculated for the two year interval between 1963 and 1965 to keep results comparable with available licensed motor vehicle operator totals (since operator data for 1962 could not be obtained).

MOTOR VEHICLES and MOTOR VEHICLES OPERATORS



GEM 8-66 from data by Land Transportation Commission

Percentage Increase from 1963 - 1965

Cars	29%
Trucks	18%
Trailers	36%
Motorcycles	189%
Total	32%

A ready explanation is not available for the pronounced drop in the rate of increase of vehicles registered during the 1964 to 1965 period. Using only the lowered rate of change reported for 1964 - 1965 to project expected annual totals of registered motor vehicles, the following minimums are indicated:

1966	344,246 Registered Motor Vehicles
1967	382,112
1968	423,144
1969	469,689
1970	521,355

Note: The above totals for registered motor vehicles were provided by the Provincial Division of the Land Transportation Commission on August 15, 1966, following a conference with the Commissioner on August 2nd. Data was provided in typed form by Agencies and each copy is marked "certified correct by: Chief, Records and Statistics Sec.," and each was represented as the most recent figures available. The computations and charts covering such items were consequently based upon such data.

On August 30th, a copy of the "Reorganization Report, Land Transportation Commission" bearing the date March, 1966, was received. Data on vehicles and driver's licenses for the years 1956 through 1965 had been specifically requested but was reported as "not available" for most years. Totals listed are higher for the year 1965 than total previously provided.

Slightly more than 20% of the total motor vehicles registered during 1965 were engaged in providing services to the public and were classed as public service vehicles. As such they are operated under Certificates of Public Convenience issued by the Public Service Commission, an agency of the Department of Justice.

Public service vehicles throughout the Republic increased in number by 35% during the period 1964 - 65, a rate slightly in excess of the rate for all vehicles. For the first six months of Calendar Year 1966, a 4.7% increase is reported in the number of public service motor vehicles in operation. Numbers, by type, are shown in the following table on page 15.

It seems clear that at least 200,000 additional vehicles will be operating over the streets and roadways of the Republic by 1970. Since many of these vehicles will be engaged in transporting persons and materials, units may be expected to be operating a greater number of miles per year as economic and social progress programs are implemented.

Registered motor vehicles do not, however, present the total picture. Interspersed among the fast moving passenger vehicles and trucks in cities, municipalities and on rural roads are vast numbers of slow moving pedicycles and horse drawn or carabao drawn conveyances which, with their much lower speeds and slower maneuvering abilities, create interstream conflicts to contribute to

congestion and accidents. Frequent, uncontrolled and careless stopping by passenger hauling jeepneys and buses at any location adds to the traffic confusion.

The poor mechanical condition of many vehicles, continued use of excessively worn tires, abusive acceleration and deceleration, and generally inadequate vehicle maintenance all contribute to frequent breakdowns of vehicles on the road. The proclivity of many drivers to change a tire in the middle of the traveled way or to abandon a disabled vehicle at dangerous locations in the traffic way are practices which infringe on the rights of other users of traffic facilities, reduce roadway capacities and contribute to congestion and accidents. The apparent inability of police forces to prevent such occurence or to force immediate removal of disabled vehicles to less hazardous locations indicates a need for more and better mechanical inspections of vehicle condition and better police organization, training and assignment to accident investigation. (In the metropolitan area of Manila, abandoned disabled vehicles have been observed in the middle of busy intersections for four hours or more before removal or repair in the street).

Numerous private vehicles and taxis were observed operating with red lights showing to the front and with sirens open, items usually reserved for police, fire and other emergency vehicles. The use of such devices, particularly during peak traffic times, adds to the congestion and to the confusion of other drivers.

Many vehicles, particularly taxis, were observed operating with defective headlights or with unsafe steering or tires which were far past safe operating life. Continued operation of unsafe vehicles presents hazards not only to the operator and occupants of such vehicles, but to other users of streets and roads. Numerous police vehicles were observed which were mechanically unsafe, some operating without mufflers and many with tires worn completely smooth and unsafe for operation.

The widespread use in many areas of for-hire passenger vehicles drawn by horse, the two-passenger Calesa and the four-passenger Caretela, apparently fill a need for local, readily available and inexpensive transportation. This is equally true of the various types of Tricycles or Pedicabs, which are bicycles or motorcycles modified with a third wheel and capable of seating one or two passengers. Carabao-drawn carts with two large wheels, Caretons, and a wheelless version, the Careta, are used extensively for transporting materials. According to information received, such vehicles serve a real need in areas where other forms of transportation are not available, but they are found interspersed in rural and urban traffic where they contribute to congestion and hazards.

IV. MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS

Chapter III of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act 4136, approved June 20, 1964, sets forth the application, examination, issuance, use, renewal, restrictions and recording of driver's licenses by the Land Transportation Commission. It further provides for issuance of student driver's permits, for driver bonding in certain cases and for the confiscation, suspension and revocations of driver's licenses. Although the Act does not specifically require the maintenance of a complete and current driver's record file, the mandates for controls and actions clearly make such files necessary to carry out the specified functions.

Information provided by the Land Transportation Commission during August, 1966, includes incomplete reports and estimated totals for each year. For 1964, totals for 10 of the 91 reporting areas were estimated by LTC officials and for 1965,

PUBLIC SERVICE TRANSPORTATION
TOTAL PHILIPPINES

	Type	Number of Operators			Number of M.V. Units		
		Dec. 31 1964	Dec. 31 1965	June 30 1966	Dec. 31 1964	Dec. 31 1965	June 30 1966
PUB and PUJ	- Buses and others, for passengers and freight with fixed routes, termini and schedules	5,862	6,689	7,016	25,458	30,253	31,691
Autocalesa	- For passengers within city or municipal limits, without fixed route, termini or schedule. Limit driver and 5 pass.	4,485	5,429	5,604	10,297	14,835	15,838
Taxi	- For hire by trip or	138	401	403	4,072	7,415	7,490
PU	- Hour, on-call or	435	447	450	921	984	1,012
Garage	- Contract	13	24	26	98	194	249
TH	- Freight truck services	2,603	3,218	3,299	6,075	9,737	10,104
TC	- Cargo only	26	25	25	271	264	264
SB	- School bus for students and facility only	70	79	83	248	339	355
TOTAL		13,632	16,312	16,906	47,440	64,021 + 35%	67,003 +4.7% (6 mo)
TOTAL MANILA (inc. in above)		5,718	6,250	6,363	18,731	23,741 + 27%	24,255 +2.3% (6 mo)

(Compiled GEM - from data provided by the Public Service Commission 8-28-66)

totals for 8 areas were estimated, 43 were noted as incomplete and 2 were noted as "No report." Consequently, the data reported for motor vehicle operators must be considered as approximations and probably on the low side. The errors in these totals will be reflected in any computations or projections.

Driver Licensing

	FY 1963-64	Calendar Year 1964	Calendar Year 1965
Student Permit	78,131	70,614	77,382
Examined	29,310	48,109	39,677
Professional	246,470	303,454	328,872
Non-professional	117,051	139,951	187,431
Government	42	149	309
Totals	363,563	443,554	516,612
Per cent change		+ 22%	+16%

The lower rate of increase in the total number of licensed motor vehicle operators reported for 1964 - 65, compared to the rate of increase between 1963 and 1964 is unexplained. However, if only the lower 1964-65 rate of increase is applied to project the anticipated increase in total drivers for future years, the rapid acceleration of numbers is impressive.

Licensed Motor Vehicle Operator Totals
Projected for Future Years

1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
516,612	599,270	695,153	806,397	935,420	1,049,987

Observations of the performance of many drivers in many widely scattered locations impel questions concerning the thoroughness and effectiveness of the examinations given for a driver's license. Discussions with many drivers make obvious a dearth of information concerning safe driving practices and a lack of knowledge on the part of many persons of what is expected of them as drivers. Sec. 22, Chapter II of Act 4136 provides that:

> "The Commissioner or his deputies shall also acertain that the applicant's sight and hearing are normal, and may in their discretion, require a certificate to that effect, signed by a reputable physician.
>
> An examination or demonstration to show any applicant's ability to operate motor vehicles may also be required in the discretion of the Commissioner or his deputies."

The provisions of Chapter III seem contradictory, for following the seeming discretionary authority to require or not require an examination of an applicant, Sec. 23 ISSUANCE OF DRIVER'S LICENSE, states:

> "If, after such examination, the Commissioner or his deputy believes that the applicant possesses the necessary qualifications and is proficient in the operation of motor vehicles, a license shall be issued to such applicant upon payment -------" (underlining is added)

Examples of some types of records "files" observed.



This section clearly seems to require an examination before the issuance of a driver's license. Administration of examinations and a road test to driver's license applicants and reexamination of drivers with unsatisfactory driving records can do much to remove incompetent operators from the roads and streets, and to keep such drivers from contributing to collisions which may result in death or injury to themselves or to others. LTC reports that all applicants for new driver's licenses are given a complete examination and a road test of 20 to 30 minutes duration.

Casual conversations with many professional and non-professional drivers (without revealing either the purpose, or our identities as members of the Survey Team) developed a wide range of interesting reactions and comments.

One man stated that he had been driving taxis for twenty years, had never been involved in an accident and had never been stopped for a traffic violation. This man's driving was observed for more than twenty kilometers. His competence was excellent and his courtesy to other drivers was outstanding.

One fast driving and reckless taxi driver who claimed to have been driving for five years, said he had received 22 TVR's during 1964 for which he paid one fine of ₱8.50, no TVR's during 1965, and 2 TVR's thus far during 1966, for which he had paid one fine of ₱8.50. He admitted several "minor" accidents.

Other drivers stated that they had received various TVR's for which they attended lectures and then were given back their driver's license. Several drivers volunteered that they had paid "fines of a couple of pesos" directly to the policemen who had stopped them.

Some of the drivers indicated by their discussions that driving is to them a kind of contest or game in which the goal is to ignore all of the rules, but to avoid being caught and penalized.

Without a central repository containing the complete record of all drivers, it is possible for any one of them to commit many infractions and contribute to many collisions without ever being subject to action against his driver's license. Control of the driving privilege requires prompt and complete reporting by the police of all driver involvement in collisions and violations to a central driver record file where the complete record of each driver can be brought together and kept up-to-date. On the basis of such records it is possible to treat problem drivers, those who are violation or collision prone, or those with developing physical defects such as deficient vision or disabling illnesses. The objective is to help the problem driver to overcome his deficiencies or to remove him from the roads by withdrawal of his operating privilege.

Chapter II, Sec. 27 (b) provides for discretionary revocation or suspension of the driving privilege by the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Commission, "Whenever during any twelve-month period a driver shall have been convicted at least three times for the violation of any provision of this Act or of any regulation issued by the Commissioner or any municipal or city ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic not in conflict with any of the provisions of this Act....."

It obviously is not possible to carry out this legal obligation unless there is immediately available a complete and current record of each driver to whom a license has been issued.

Under Chapter V, of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, increased penalties are imposed for certain violations subsequent to the first such violation. Unless all such violations are promptly reported by all police and the information is recorded in a central driver record file, immediately available to all police and courts, it obviously is not possible to comply with these requirements of the law.

"Bulling out" into a crowded intersection without seeming to see vehicles approaching from either the right or the left is commonly practiced and is bound at times to have disasterous consequences. Actually such drivers are imposing upon and depending upon the alertness and capabilities of other drivers to avoid an impending collision, as they steal the right-of-way of these same drivers. The act is equally discourteous and far more dangerous than the intentional crowding in front of a person on foot by another on foot, or the deliberate pushing through a doorway in front of another, acts which are abhorrent to the well-mannered Filipino resident.

V. TRAFFIC COLLISIONS - "ACCIDENTS"

Webster's Dictionary offers a number of definitions for the word "Accident." Included are "an unforeseen or unplanned event" and "an unfortunate event resulting from carelessness, unawareness, ignorance, or unavoidable causes." Certainly no person deliberately plans to have a traffic mishap; they do result from the factors enumerated and sometimes they are unavoidable, but more often they can be prevented.

Roadway collisions and other types of traffic mishaps usually result from a combination of factors which invariably include bad driving practices. Roads and vehicle defects contribute to such incidents, but most of the blame must be

Roadway accidents usually result from a combination of factors, including overloading and insecure loads.

placed on driver error or negligence. It is entirely possible for the competent vehicle operator to compensate for the deficiencies of the roadway and his vehicle by adjusting his driving to existing conditions. Hence the driver can control those factors which are most susceptible to improvement controls and effective management.

The same factors which contribute to congestion also contribute to roadway collisions and such collisions invariably cause additional congestion and delays; both are manifestations of a lack of effective traffic management. Treatment of these contributing factors by improved management and control techniques can be beneficial in preventing congestion, delays and collisions.

When planning solutions to problems, an important first step is to define and evaluate the various factors which comprise the problem, to ascertain its size and complexity, and to analyze the points at which remedial efforts may have the greatest impact and chance for resolution.

Among the data required to use this approach for reducing traffic congestion and collisions is accurate and complete data concerning what is happening on the roads and streets. Detailed information concerning the times and places of "accidents," weather conditons, driver's actions, the conditions of roadways, vehicles and drivers and similar factual information provide some of the guidelines for effective controls. To be more useful, such information should be current and in such form as to afford comparability with previous periods for checking growth and progress.

Unfortunately, complete and accurate data of this type is not available for the Republic of the Philippines at any central location, nor has it been possible to gather it with any degree of accuracy or completeness from the various agencies having responsibilities for traffic management. Indeed, the prevailing practice of permitting settlement of traffic collisions and other infractions "on an amicable basis," precludes complete reporting, for many such cases are never listed in police files. Further the standard practice is not followed of tallying as a traffic fatality any death which occurs within one year from defect accident injuries.

Only a very few (about 20%) of the cities and municipalities visited are keeping traffic accident (and traffic violations) records in any usable form. Most are unable to provide statistics on the number of persons killed or the total number of traffic accidents occurring for any specific year. With such a dearth of recorded information it seems highly probable that totals reported to other agencies, by the cities and municipalities which submit



One police department uses this method for continual tallying of cases filed.

such reports, are "Guesstimates" in many cases. The police chief of one city stated that many traffic accident and/or violation cases are given continuances over long periods of time; that cases not settled in two months are usually "forgotten" which is the fate of about 40% of all cases.

RA 4136 specifically requires reporting of violations of the Act to the Commissioner of Land Transportation within twenty-four hours, and most "accidents" do include driver's violation, but the Law is silent on required reporting of accidents to police or reporting by police to a central office. Regulations requiring such reports could not be found, although reports are submitted by TRAFCON Teams to the Traffic Control Group of the Philippine Constabulary, and by district engineers to the Bureau of Public Highways. A few accidents are reported through LTC agencies to LTC headquarters.

Form TCG C-13, "Traffic Accident Report" is reported as used by TRAFCON Teams for investigating and reporting accidents, and a few such forms were found in local traffic district files, but many were incomplete. Random checks in TRAFCON Headquarters files did not disclose a single case reported on such forms, but cases were instead reported in incomplete narrative form which included accident diagrams. It was explained that the supply of forms is depleted. Narrative reports make exceedingly difficult the task of extracting specific items of information for tabulation and analyses, and this method of reporting is much more subject to omission of vital items than is a standard form.

LTC attempts to summarize accident totals only. The Traffic Control Group prepares a very limited summary of analysis, while the Bureau of Public Highways prepares a complete summary using the Standard Summary Form of the National Safety Council, Inc., as is widely used in the United States. However, the latest summarized accident information available from the BPH is for the Calendar Year 1963, and while the information is valuable for comparisons, it is too antiquated to provide guidance for current programming. BPH advises that accident data is being programmed on the new electronic tabulating equipment installed during May, 1966, that current summaries will be prepared on a regular schedule in the future and will be available for analyses and use by interested agencies.

Available traffic accident totals provided by the various agencies are compared in the table on the following page.

TRAFFIC ACCIDENT TOTALS

Reported by:

Year	Land Transportation Commission			Bureau of Public Highways			Philippine Constabulary Traffic Control Group		
	Accidents	Deaths	Injuries	Accidents	Deaths	Injuries	Accidents	Deaths	Injuries
1959				6,459					
1960	(LTC reports			9,451			12,841	729	7,908
1961	only Fiscal			9,525			11,481	619	7,570
1962	Year)			11,839			14,264	683	8,712
1963				15,140			13,234	822	9,934
1964	2,448	192	1,482	15,589			10,171	636	7,429
1965	798						18,959	720	9,698
*Jan-June 1966							5,345	280	3,843

*Incomplete --

No reports received from: Quezon City - April, 1966
Quezon City - May and June, 1966
Caloocan City - May and June, 1966
Pasay City - May and June, 1966
Rizal Province - January - June, 1966

Information provided by the Traffic Control Group includes totals for the number of pedestrians involved of pedestrians involved in traffic incidents, but does not separate pedestrian deaths and injuries from other deaths and injuries.

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS INVOLVING PEDESTRIANS

Year	Total Traffic Accidents	Involving Pedestrians	Percent Involving Pedestrians
1960	12,841	7,889	61,43%
1961	11,481	3,038	26.46
1962	14,264	3,512	24.62
1963	13,234	2,898	21.89
1964	10,171	2,315	22.76
1965	18,959	3,244	17.11
*Jan-June 1966	5,345	1,322	24.92
6½ Year Total	86,295	24,228	28.08%

*Incomplete --

No Reports received from: Quezon City for April, May or June, 1966
Caloocan City for May and June, 1966
Pasay City for May and June, 1966
Rizel Province for January - June, 1966

The chart, "Motor Vehicle Accidents - Philippines," graphically portrays total accidents, those involving pedestrians, and deaths and injuries as reported. The pronounced fluctuations in these totals, particularly the sharp drop in reported deaths and total accidents for 1964 as compared with 1963 and 1965, is indicative of probable discrepancies and incomplete reporting. Add the fact that many local police departments are known to ommit some accidents from totals reported and others are failing to report, and these totals seem to be somewhat lower than the totals of accidents actually occurring.

Comparing the ratio of reported traffic deaths to injuries and property damage only accidents: 1 death: 12.3 injuries: 19.23 property damage accidents, to ratios from other areas strongly indicates under reporting. Although the basis is not fully comparable and may be influenced by a large number of fatal accidents which result in multiple deaths, ratios reported during many years

MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS - PHILIPPINES



Computed from data provided by P. C. Traffic Control Group - GEM 8-66

RATIOS of M. V. TRAFFIC DEATHS to INJURY and PROPERTY DAMAGE ACCIDENTS

Reported Ratio - 1 Traffic Death: 12.3 Injuries 19.23 Property Damage Accs.

Computed Ratio - 1 " " : 20 " 30 " " "



Computed from data provided by P. C. Traffic Control Group, GEM 9-66

in the United States range from 1 fatal accident: 35 injury accidents: 100 property damage accidents, to 1: 50: 150. Arbitrarily reducing these ratios to 1 accident death: 20 injury accidents: 50 property damage accidents to compute the information shown on the chart "Ratio of M.V. Traffic Deaths to Injury and Property Damage Accidents" offers a further strong indication of the incomplete reporting for all accidents occurring in the Philippines. The variations noted in the pattern of reported injuries and computed injury accidents, when coupled with the sharply reduced total deaths reported for the year 1964 seem most unusual, and also tend to support the premise of a low percentage of complete reporting of accidents.

Utilizing the total traffic accident death figures by year provided by TRAFCON and daily average kilometerage totals provided by the Bureau of Public Highways, it is possible to examine reported traffic death rates. Various standard rates are used for this purpose, but most reliable is deemed to be the number of traffic deaths occurring per hundred million miles of vehicle travel. Reported kilometerages are converted to miles to permit comparison with similar rates reported for other areas.

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT DEATH RATES

Year	Average Daily Kilometerage	Converted to Miles X . 62137	Annual Miles of Travel X 365	Traffic Deaths	M.V. Deaths per 100,000,000 miles
1955	8,189,776	5,088,881			
1956	9,542,199	5,922,236			
1957	9,884,251	6,141,777			
1958	10,156,862	6,311,169			
1959	11,349,650	7,052,332			
1960	11,352,660	7,352,660	2,683,720,900	729	27.164
1961	12,276,999	7,628,558	2,784,423,670	619	22.231
1962	13,027,630	8,094,978	2,954,666,970	683	23.116
1963	13,621,436	8,463,951	3,089.342,115	822	26.607
1964	14,337,061	8,908,613	3,251,643,745	636	19.560
1965	15,089,746*	9,376,315	3,522,354,975	720	20.443

* Average daily kilometerage for 1965 computed by increase of 5¼%, as recorded for the preceding year.

Thus the number of traffic accident deaths reported per hundred million vehicle miles of travel reported has varied from a low of 19.56 to a high of 27.16 during the past six years. For the past twenty years the rate in the United States has been in the vicinity of five deaths per hundred million miles. The reported traffic death rate in the Republic of the Philippines during the past six years is four to five times as great as the rate for the United States.

VI. AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

A number of national and local government agencies have important responsibilities in the management of roadway traffic, with seemingly a considerable overlap in both functions and geographical distribution of forces. Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, approved June 20, 1964, sets forth the obligations of certain agencies for controlling the use of public ways.

AVERAGE DAILY MOTOR VEHICLE KILOMETERAGE - TOTAL PHILIPPINES



GEM 8-66 from data by Bureau of Public Highways

The Philippine Motor Association is a non-governmental membership organization with about 3,500 members at the present time, reported as in operation since 1932, which, in addition to providing certain membership services, includes in its objectives:
encouraging rational motor vehicle legislation;
promoting construction and maintenance of good roads;
promoting cooperation and courtesy among highway users;
advancing accident prevention and safety in motor vehicle operations;
publiching a monthly magazine devoted to accident prevention;
distribution of safe driving information, a driver's Code of Ethics; and
sponsoring an annual School Traffic Poster Contest.

The Land Transportation Commission is empowered to:
inspect, register and administer the registration of all motor vehicles; examine, re-examine and license all motor vehicle operators; hold hearings for the purpose of compelling compliance with the Act; suspend, revoke or cancel registrations or the operating privilege: issue rules and regulations not in conflict with provisions of the Act; record and maintain records concerning vehicle registrations, drivers' licenses, apprehensions for violations and dispositions thereof; and to make sure documents and records easily available to public officers, etc.

The Philippine Constabulary, City Police Forces and Municipal Police Forces are:
given the authority and the primary responsibility and duty to prevent violations of the Act; enjoined to carry out the police provisions of the Act; and are required to submit all apprehensions to the Land Transportation Commissioner and his deputies within twenty-four hours of the apprehension for final disposition.

Traffic Courts, City Courts and Municipal Courts are authorized to:
receive apprehensions where such violations necessitate immediate action; conduct summary investigations, hold hearings and dispose of cases; and are required to give appropriate notices of the apprehensions and the dispositions thereof to the Land Transportation Commissioner.

The Public Service Commission includes in its functions:
ascertaining the need for, and granting, certificates of public convenience; controlling schedules, routing, loadings and charges for all public service vehicles; inspections of public service vehicles for adequacy and safety; testing and sealing of taximeters; and authority to hold hearings, impose fines and to suspend or cancel certificates for failure to comply with requirements.

The Bureau of Public Highways is concerned with:
maintenance and improvement of existing roadway facilities; providing additional required facilities; collecting and analyzing information to ascertain requirements, and to guide design to improve the safety factors, loadings, volumes, and similar features.

The Department of Justice exercises:
administrative supervision over the local courts; stipulates the format for reporting of cases; and requires monthly reports of all cases from Courts of First Instance and all inferior courts, covering the number of cases filed, by types and the disposition of such cases.

The National Bureau of Investigation is only indirectly involved through:
offering technical investigation services to local police departments; assisting in identification and apprehension of wanted persons; and affording investigative training to local police.

In more than half of the installations of agencies visited, the building and office facilities provided were functionally unsuitable and inadequate. In a few cases floors and stairways were unsafe for use, and in many cases maintenance and cleanliness were far from satisfactory. Crowded offices with inefficient arrangements for work flow, makeshift desks, insufficient typewriters, and an almost complete lack of other office machines were the rule. One example in a national agency was an office approximately 12 x 18 feet in area into which were crowded seven substandard desks, occupied by nine employees, and four file cabinets. Papers were piled on tops of file cabinets, one employee was sleeping behind his desk, another was reading the newspapers, and visitors or clients crowded all available free space.

Files are kept on desk tops because filing cabinets are not available.

Employees in many cases seemed to include some who were industrious and applying themselves to work and others who did not seem to have any work to do. Efforts to secure information included discussions with some employees who obviously were not competent for their assignments, as well as many who seemed expert in their work and responsibilities. In many instances employees were handicapped in their operations by large numbers of clients wandering around in work spaces and crowded into corridors and waiting rooms. Important officials often had people waiting in their inneroffices in positions to overhear discussions of an official nature, and interruptions were frequent.

The general status of file and record keeping is exceedingly poor, and requirements for reporting from field areas, even by local offices of official national agencies, are not met. Filing facilities in most offices are not sufficient in number or kind, and filing is primitive, without order and not conducive to efficient use. Regular culling of dead files is rarely practiced. A few examples of introduction and use of laborsaving forms were found, but activities and other reporting is generally in narrative form and is vague, redundant and incomplete.

Many work areas are inadequate and crowded.

Vehicular equipment is not adequate in numbers and is sometimes misassigned. It is generally poorly maintained and frequently deadlined for lack of repair parts. Communications equipment within agencies and between agencies is almost nonexistent. Even telephone service is not available for some field locations and many tactical operations are completely lacking communications. Delayed reports of incidents complicate the problems of the management.

All of these conditions are detrimental to achieving efficient and effective operations. The citizen who is exposed to them is not inspired with confidence in or respect for the government and its representatives. The same conditions make it very difficult for the employee to become inbued with the importance of his assignment, dedicated to attainment of the objectives of the organization, or to develop pride in his work and a sense of accomplishment from his efforts.

Allegations of illegal activities by governmental employees, including police employees are frequent. Newspapers daily charge police and others with criminal actions. Cases were found wherein policemen were under investigation as suspects in crimes or were charged with criminal activities. Some of these cases were of long standing without the charged having been brought to trial to either convict or clear the records.

Despite a reported legal minimum wage of ₱180 per month, a few instances were found beginning policemen at a salary from ₱30 to ₱50 monthly. Certainly communities which offer such substandard wages can expect little in the way of performance, integrity, competence, or layalty from their police.



A few police departments are outstanding in their records functions.

Predominate among the problems discussed by officials at all levels of government, as well as by employees, was political pressures in the assignment of personnel and the execution of missions. One highly placed national official stated that "Political influence selects our appointees, many of whom are 'Pencionados,' who will not work, are insubordinate and often impudent to their supervisors, and we cannot discharge unfit employees." High level supervisors complained of incompetence in lower level supervision and vice versa. Local police chiefs asserted that in some cases their authority for selection and assignment of personnel and direction of activities was usurped by the Mayor. Policemen at all levels expressed frustration and resentment at political interference with police cases and selection and assignments of personnel. At the same time it seems obvious that some policemen are busily engaged in both extra-departmental and intra-departmental political maneuvering.

Traffic management agencies and law enforcement forces cannot afford political favoritism in the selection or assignment of personnel or in their enforcement efforts. Competence, integrity, and impartial application of the law without bias, favoritism or fear or reprisal, are the tools for success.

VII. TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT

In addition to city and municipal police departments, three national agencies employ nationwide enforcement forces.

The Land Transportation Commission

Republic Act 4136 provides, under Article III, Sec. 4,(d)

"(5) The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are hereby authorized to make arrests for violations of the provisions of this Act insofar as motor vehicles are concerned: to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to compel the appearance of motor vehicle operators and drivers and/or other persons or conductors: and to use all reasonable means within their powers to secure enforcement of the provisions of this Act."

"(6) The Commissioner of Land Transportation or his deputies may at any time examine and inspect any motor vehicle to determine whether such motor vehicle is registered, or is unsightly, unsafe, overloaded, improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated because of possible excessive damage to highways, bridges and/or culverts."

It is reported that the uniformed Motor Vehicle Patrol Officers of the LTC are principally concerned with infractions of the registration and driver licensing provisions of the law. LTC Examiners inspect the motor vehicles of applicants for driver's licenses, read a series of questions to the applicant who answers them in written form, (two alternate sets of questions are available) and give road tests to new drivers. Investigators conduct case investigations by reading the available case information and interviewing offending drivers.

Repeated efforts were unsuccessful to obtain annual totals of apprehensions by LTC personnel, the number of cases forwarded to the Public Service Commission, the number of motor vehicle registrations suspended, revoked or cancelled and similar information for driver's license actions except for apprehensions and dispositions for Fiscal Year 1963-64, which included a notation to the effect that reports had not been received from nine agencies. This information was provided during August, 1966 and was still incomplete.

It seems obvious that some of the agencies of LTC are ignoring legal reporting requirements and that discipline within the Commission has not been adequate to enforce compliance.

Equally obvious is the fact that sheer volume, if reported, can not be processed by hand tallying methods in sufficient time to have real value for guiding activities. The use of mechanical or electronic tabulating equipment is imperative if the Commission is to discharge its legal obligations for gathering, processing and making available to others the various items of information needed to successfully manage motor vehicle operations.

The Chief of the Traffic Section did provide the information that the seventeen Motor Vehicle Patrol Officers assigned to the Greater Manila area reported a total of 6,594 apprehensions from January 17, 1966 to September 6, 1966. These figures were maintained by consecutively numbered entries in a bound book and are useful only as a rough measure of work performed.

APPREHENSIONS AND DISPOSITIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1963-64

Reported by the Land Transportation Commission
(Reports not received for 9 agencies)

Apprehensions		Dispositions	
Reckless	1,556	Warning	4,358
Speeking	631	Dropped	1,272
Defective Mechanism	699	Court	248
Other	11,153	Revoked	128
		Miscellaneous	8,425
Total	14,009	Total	14,431

The great number of "Others" under apprehensions apparently are mostly license and registration violations, and the large total for "Miscellaneous" dispositions is unexplained. The very small number sent to Court and the less than oneper cent reported as revoked are indicative of excessive leniency in case dispositions.

Also reported for Fiscal Year 1963-64 were 113,559 inspections of motor vehicles by LTC Inspectors. This amounts to 48% of all registered motor vehicles reported for Calendar Year 1963.

According to the LTC Personnel Officer, total employees of the Commission numbered 1,092 as of September 6, 1966, and included 121 Motor Vehicle Inspectors, 97 Driver Examiners and 93 Motor Vehicle Patrol Officers. Based upon the limited data provided, and assuming that the manpower figures are applicable to prior years, productivity per man may be examined:

97 Driver Examiners examined 87,786 drivers during Calendar Years 1964-65 to average 10.954 examinations per man per week; or about five man-hours were spent for each examination (assuming 5 eight-hour days per work week).

121 Motor Vehicle Inspectors reported 113,559 vehicles inspected during Fiscal Year 1963-64 for an average of 18.048 inspections per man per week; or two hours and 12 minutes average time per inspection (assuming five 8-hour days per work week).

93 Motor Vehicle Patrol Officers reported 14,009 apprehensions during Fiscal Year 1963-64 for an average of 2.958 apprehensions per man per week; or an average of 13 and three-quarters manhours per apprehension (assuming five 8-hour days per work week).

The Philippine Constabulary

Chapter 824 of the Philippine Administrative Code establishes the Philippine Constabulary for the purpose of preserving law and order in the Philippine Islands. Chapter 848 describes the authority of members as peace officers who "are authorized and empowered to prevent and suppress brigandage, unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, and other breaches of the peace and violations of the law. They are empowered to and required to execute any lawful warrant or order of arrest issued against any person or persons for any violation of law, and to make arrests upon reasonable suspicion without warrant for breaches of the peace or other violations of the law."

Total strength of the Constabulary is reported as 15,715 as of June 20, 1966, with plans to increase strength to 17,000 by the end of 1966. At present the Force is organized, distributed and operated along military lines.

Republic Act 4136, Article III, Sec. 4, (d), (7), provides,

> "The Philippine Constabulary and the city and municipal police forces are hereby given the authority and the primary responsibility and duty to prevent violations of this Act, and to carry out the police provisions hereof within their respective jurisdictions:--------"

The working of these laws is very clear; the Constabulary is given the authority and the mandate to prevent violations of the Traffic Code, and to enforce its police provisions. To meet this large obligation, the Traffic Control Group, popularly known as TRAFCON, was organized by Executive Order No. 902 of December 6, 1954. (Act 4136 was approved June 20, 1964). Its present strength is 40 officers and 132 enlisted members, or a total of 172.

DISTRIBUTION OF P.C. TRAFCON TEAMS

	TEAM NUMBER	LOCATION	PROVINCE
I P.C. Zone	1st	Vigan	Ilocos Sur
	2nd	Ilagan	Isabela
	3rd	San Fernando	La Union
	4th	Lingayan	Pangasinan
	5th	Tarlac	Tarlac
	6th	Balanga	Bataan
	7th	San Fernando	Pampanga
	8th	Cabanatuan	Nueva Ecija
	9th	Malolos	Bulacan
II P.C. Zone	5 Special Teams	Quezon City	Rizal (Attached to Headquarters)
	10th	Cavite City	Cavite
	11th	Los Banos	Laguna
	12th	Batangas	Batangas
	13th	Lucena City	Quezon
	14th	Naga City	Camarines Sur
	15th	Legaspe City	Albay
III P.C. Zone	16th	Roxas City	Capiz
	17th	Tacloban City	Leyte
	18th	Iloilo City	Iloilo
	19th	Bacolod City	Negros Occ.
	20th	Dumaguete City	Negros Or.
	21st	Cebu City	Cebu
IV P.C. Zone	22nd	Zamboanga City	Zamboanga
	23rd	Ozamis City	Misamis Occ.
	24th	Cagayan de Oro	Misamis Or.
	25th	Butuan City	Agusan
	26th	Davao City	Davao
	27th	Cotabato	Cotabato

TRAFCON ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL

Officers

Colonel	1	Master Sergeant	4
Lieut. Colonel	1	Technical Sergeant	31
Major	1	Senior Sergeant	35
Captain	36	Sergeant	44
1st Lieut.	1	Corporal	16
	40	Private 1/C	2
			132

Total Personnel: 172 (Aug. 1, 1966)

About 1.1% of the available manpower of the Philippine Constabulary, charged with nationwide enforcement of the traffic laws, is presently assigned to this function. During the past six years more than eighty thousand motor vehicle accidents have been reported, at least 4,209 persons have died and 51,251 others have been injured in such collisions!

27 TRAFCON Teams, consisting of one officer and three or four enlisted members are distributed through the 56 Provinces of the Republic for the purpose of controlling the flow of traffic, preventing violations and for apprehending violators of the Traffic Code. Motor vehicle equipment assigned consists of:

8 Rambler Classic Sedans, 1965
7 Ford Fairlane Sedans, 1962
21 Ford Sedans, 1957
10 Jeeps-Military issue, 1960
7 BMW (German) motorcycles, 1960 - used only in Manila area by Speacial Team.

As of August 1, 1966, motor vehicles were assigned as follows:

Deadlined	1 Rambler, 1965	
	3 Fords, 1957	Total 4
Presidential Escort	1 Rambler, 1965	Total 1
TRAFCON Headquarters	3 Ramblers, 1965	
	1 Ford, 1962	
	3 Fords, 1957	
	3 Jeeps	Total 10
Special Team, Manila area	4 Ramblers, 1965	
	7 Motorcycles	Total 11
		26
		1 Weapons Carrier

Each Traffic Team is assigned one vehicle, except the 19th, which has two. A total of eleven vehicles operating in or near the Manila area are equipped with 2-way radios for communicating with a single base station in TRAFCON Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City.

With 27 teams, each operating as a unit, it is expected that each team will cover two or more provinces. Other Constabulary Forces operating in the provinces do very little in the way of traffic control or enforcement.

Information from the Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1965-66, addressed to the Chief of Constabulary from Headquarters Traffic Control Group and dated July 1, 1966, includes:

Apprehensions -	TCG Special Teams	12,681
	TCG Traffic Teams	36,259
	Other P.C. Units	2,609
	Total	45,045

Licenses forwarded for further disposition to:	
Land Transportation Commission	15,678
Public Service Commission	886
Total	16,564
Total cases filed in Courts	400
Vehicles inspected or caused to be re-inspected for safety and roadworthiness	22,992
Kilometers of travel per team per day	139.5
Average hours worked per day per team	12
Average vehicles inspected per team per month	52.6
Average apprehensions per team per month	92
Average seminars conducted per team per month	3
Average VIP escorts per team per month	2
Total seminars conducted	1,358
Total attendance at seminars	66,810

Present assignments of TCG traffic teams, with one vehicle each, assume that in addition to other duties, the TCG traffic teams will cover 15,922 kilometers of National and 21,363 kilometers of Provincial roadways over which move more than 165,000 motor vehicles to prevent violations of and enforce the provisions of the National Traffic Code. Each team is, therefore, expected to patrol 1,381 kilometers of roadways and to supervise the movements of more than 6,000 motor vehicles, plus the numerous other vehicles and pedestrian traffic, 24 hours each day and seven days each week.

Other equipment provided the traffic teams consists of 10 Kodak Instamatic Cameras. The teams are not equipped with speed measuring devices, fuses, tapes, portable lights or first aid kits. One 5-piece unit of driver reaction and eye-testing equipment, provided by LTC less than 1 year ago, is used for checking TRAFCON drivers at the Headquarters. Equipment is locally constructed and consists of a reaction tester made from a jeep steering, seat and pedals; and units for testing visual accuracy, depth perception, field of vision and glare reaction. All of this equipment was originally donated to the Land Transportation Commission by Norelco, according to information provided.

Financing for the operations of the Traffic Control Group is not provided for by the regular Philippine Constabulary budget. Funding originally was from the Motor Vehicle Office, under the Department of Public Works and Communications. The

M.V. Office has been replaced by the Land Transportation Commission, and TRAFCON operations are presently financed from the special fund from the unappropriated funds of the National Government, according to the Commanding Officer, and are largely generated by LTC revenue. The total amount provided for Fiscal Year 1965-66 was ₱1,200,000, with a small increase to ₱1,224,000 for Fiscal Year 1966-67. These amounts are reported to cover salaries and allowances for personnel with about ₱50,000 each year for equipment requirements.

Advanced traffic training has been provided through U.S. sponsorship for 6 P.C. Officers.

Training Dates	Rank and Name	Present Assignment
8-23-61/8-18-62	Capt. Antonio P. Abaya	28th P.C.; Rizal
8-6-58/7-29-59	Capt. Lamberto R. Armada	C.O. P.C. Co., II Zone
8-3-60/7-31-61	Capt. Felix Bernal	Major - reg. P.C.
8-1-61/ 8-4-62	Capt. Paulino P. Briones	C.O. P.C. Co., Lucena
7-24-59/ 4-8-60	Capt. Venustiano R. Ludena	TRAFCON
7-19-59/1-18-60	Capt. Leonor M. Reyes	Hdq. Co., P.C.

All of these officers served with the Traffic Control Group for a number of years but only one of them is presently so assigned. One was transferred at his request from the position as Operations Officer for TRAFCON to that of Commanding Officer of a regular P.C. Company on August 16, 1966, after six years of traffic assignments. According to information received such requests are made to broaden the officer's experience and to enhance his opportunity for promotion.

The present Commanding Officer of the TRAFCON is a career P.C. officer who has had administration training at the Police College of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at Regina, Canada, from September 25, to December 6, 1960. He assumed command of the Traffic Control Group on September 6, 1965.

Training of TRAFCON personnel and others is reported as conducted on an irregular basis. "Traffic Supervision In-Service Training," a 70 hour course given over a 5 week period was completed once during 1965 and was attended by 18 Philippine Air Force personnel and 42 P.C. personnel. All TRAFCON personnel have completed basic P.C. training, but not all have completed traffic training.

A "Traffic Management Course" of 320 hours of instruction during an 8 week period is offered, but efforts to ascertain the number of persons completing such course during the last five years brought the response that attendance records were destroyed by fire during 1964 and that such records have not yet been reconstructed. Major subjects, times scheduled and references are:

Subject	No. of Hours	References
Highway Transportation	2	NUTI publication
Agencies concerned with traffic	1	Public Acts
Analysis and Statistics	6	NUTI publication
Human Relations	4	NUTI publication
Effective speech and writing	6	Smart's Handbook

Traffic Management Course (Cont'd)

Subject	No. of Hours	References
Traffic Accident Investigation	24	Tr. Acc. Inv. Manual
Traffic Direction and Control	10	Tr. Acct. Inv. Manual
Traffic Law Enforcement	10	(?)
Land Transportation Code and Reg.	10	Public Acts
Public Service Laws and Reg.	10	Public Acts
Rules of Court	16	Rules of Court
Evidence and Procedure	16	Rules of Court
Police Traffic Records System	4	2301 (?)
Police Tactics	14	PSC Syll.
Practical Exercise and Field Report	80	
Commandant's Time	35	
Examination	30	
Total	320 hours	

It is reported that the P.C. provides some traffic training for city and municipal police departments, but a record of the number of courses and the number of police attending by year could not be obtained.

Weekly telegraphic summary reports of activities are submitted by each traffic control team and these are combined at TRAFCON Headquarters into a Monthly Report immediately following the end of each month.

The Public Service Commission

Created as an agency of the Department of Justice by Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act. No. 454, and Republic Acts No. 178, 723, 1270, 2031, 2677 and 3792, the Public Service Commission supervises and controls all public services, including public service motor vehicles. The Commissioner and 5 Associate Commissioners have vested in the broad regulatory and supervisory authority. The Commission had 472 authorized positions, about 350 of which are presently filled, not including "casual employees." Reported as provided for the Agencies nationwide transportation requirements are 3 automobiles and 5 jeeps.

The Transportation Division coordinates land transport schedules, analyses routings in relation to requirements, inspects equipment for compliance with rules for adequacy, cleanliness and safety, and tests and seals taxi meters.

The Complaint, Investigation and Enforcement Office of the Public Service Commission was created in 1962 to supervise and control the field regulatory force. Its functions include investigations of services and rates, assessment and collection of fines assessed under PSC laws and regulations, and conducting

seminars for employees of transportation companies. 140 non-uniformed Transportation Inspectors are assigned to various locations throughout the Republic, with 30 in the greater Manila area. About 30 local police and 14 P.C. officers are deputized to assist in enforcing PSC requirements and it is reported that the Commission is empowered to call upon all law enforcement officers for assistance.

Transportation Inspectors are equipped with 1 passenger automobile and 4 jeeps for the total force, have no organic communications, but use public telephone service where it is available, and are paid from ₱240.00 to ₱280.00 monthly.

The Fiscal Year 1964-65 of the Public Service Commission includes among activities reported:

Vehicles inspected in Commission's premises and issued certificates of road worthiness	1,973
Taxi meters tested and sealed	13,501
Inspections of transportation services	1,972
Apprehensions (includes industrial and other as well as M.V.)	11,720
Complaints filed (included industrial and other as well as M.V.)	7,169
Amount of fines collected (includes industrial and other as well as M.V.)	₱128,039

The report does not separate apprehensions for traffic violations from others, on the basis of total apprehensions for all causes the average apprehensions per man per week was 1.610, or about 84 total apprehensions per man per year. Fines imposed by the Commission may range from ₱10 to ₱200, and amount reported for the year averages slightly more than ₱10 per apprehension.

The Commission has the authority to hold hearings and impose fines and to suspend or cancel certificates of public convenience for failure to comply with requirements. The FY 1964-65 annual report notes on page 19 that:

> "The Commission launched a vigorous and extensive campaign against illegal operators of land transportation public services such as cutting trips, operating outside authorized lines of operation, charging of unauthorized rates, dilapidated equipment, use of false stickers and identification plates, and uncalibrated and unsealed taximeters. Stiff fines against respondent operators are imposed, or in various cases, their operation was suspended after having been found guilty upon prior investigation and due hearing."

The number of suspensions and/or cancellations during the year is not mentioned, nor could this information be obtained. Verbal information was provided to the effect that a total of 8 suspensions and/or cancellations have been effected thus far during the current year of 1966.

City and Municipal Police Departments

Only a few of the city and municipal police departments visited are keeping traffic records in useable form, hence only a sampling of the total apprehensions by year by such departments is available for this study.

Republic Act 4136 gives city and municipal police forces the authority and the primary responsibility and duty to prevent violations of the Act and to carry out

its police provisions within their respective jurisdiction just as it imposes a similar mandate on the Philippine Constabulary for other areas. In some cities and municipalities, police are not meeting their legal obligation for enforcing the law, and many of these departments are failing to fulfill their legal requirements for reporting their enforcement activities.

Comparative information for apprehensions for each of five years was sought, but only one department visited could supply such total for each of the years. The following table was constructed from such information, hence is incomplete, but accurately reflects the reported information.

	APPREHENSIONS REPORTED		
Year	Dep't A	Dep't B	Dep't C
1961		6,482	83,918
1962		6,700	75,803
1963		11,012	89,115
1964	996	11,937	
1965	1,676	15,838	
7 months 1966		18,444	
Number of police assigned to traffice duties	18	110	345
Average Apprehensions per man per week			
1961		1.133	4.678
1962		1.171	4.225
1963		1.226	4.967
1964	1.064	2.087	
1965	1.791	2.769	
7 months 1966		5.580	

More than one hundred and thirty members of the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine Constabulary and various city and municipal police forces have received advanced police training under U.S. sponsorship in the United States. Included in this number have been 3 city and municipal police officers trained in Traffic Administration, 9 in Police Administration and Training, 3 in Records and Identification, 2 in Patrol Operations and 2 in Police Training Techniques, and other specialties.

Most departments have such trained personnel and were observed to be utilizing the individual's increased capabilities to improve operations and to train other members. In a few such cases operations were outstanding among those departments visited.

As of January, 1966, the Republic of the Philippines was reported to have over 1,400 city and municipal police departments with estimated personnel of



Computed GEM - data provided by LTC, PSC and MPD

APPREHENSIONS REPORTED – AVERAGE NUMBER PER MAN PER WEEK

	Land Transp. Comm.-M.V. Ptl. Officers	Pub. Ser. Comm. Trans. Insp.	Philippine Constabulary		City or Mun. Police Departments		
			TRAFCON	Other PC	A	B	C
No. of officers reported	86-1961 93-1966	140	172	15,543	18	110	345
Year							
1961	1.956	NR	3.833	NR	NR	1.133	4.678
1962	NR	NR	4.633	NR	NR	1.171	4.225
1963	NR	NR	4.407	NR	NR	1.226	4.967
1964	(FY64-65)	NR	3.708	NR	1.064	2.087	NR
1965	2.958	1.610	3.907	NR	1.676	2.769	NR
FY 65-66			5.472	0032			
First 7 months, 1966						5.580	

31,693. Estimates of the percentage of this total actually engaged in traffic enforcement activities are not available, but it seems obvious that the present assignments are not sufficient to cope with the problems of traffic. A number of local police department officials reported that if a member of the patrol division observes a traffic accident, congestion or violations, the only action taken is to report this to the traffic division or instruct another person to make a similar report.

Despite the incomplete data available for traffic apprehensions, it is possible to reduce totals by year to a common denominator which will indicate the productivity and hence the effectiveness of various groups.

The apprehension of a traffic law violator is only the beginning step in effective traffic law enforcement. The steps taken following the apprehension to impress the violator with the need for prudent operation of his vehicle affects not only the charged violator, but may serve also as a deterrent to other violation inclined drivers.

The usual practice by all police throughout the Philippines is to issue a TVR, a notice of a traffic violation, which is prenumbered, prepared by the issuing officer in triplicate with one copy for the violator, one to be forwarded through channels, and the third retained in the officer's book. After signing by the violator, this serves as a temporary driver's permit since the offender's license is forwarded to the policeman's headquarters with the copy of the TVR. The violator is required to report to the policeman's headquarters at a specified time. Lectures, reported as varying in length from one to four or five hours, dealing with safe driving and motor vehicle regulations are then given to groups of drivers, after which the license is returned, and the incident is closed.

About 36% of the total apprehensions (45,045) reported by the P.C. Traffic Teams during FY 65-66 resulted in licenses forwarded to the Land Transportation Commission (15,678) and the Public Service Commission (886), while slightly less than 1% of them resulted in cases filed in courts (400).

A number of local governments have passed ordinances with provisions which parallel those of the National Traffic Code, although copies of these were, in most cases, not available. The principal purpose of these local ordinances seems to be to give the local government the capability to impose fines for traffic violations and thus be able to retain the revenues generated. One such community reported that for FY 65-66, 83% of traffic apprehensions resulted in cases filed in court.

Thus, <u>the most prevalent penalty for commission of a motor vehicle traffic</u> violation is imposed attendance at a lecture, following which the violator is discharged, (except in a few communities).

In other areas of the world traffic violator's schools have been used successfully for the purpose of helping <u>first offenders</u> to improve their knowledge of regulations and driving safety. Normally violators are sent to such classes by the courts which delay sentencing the violator and provide for voluntarily attending and successful completion of the course and the accompanying examination, after which the case is closed. Failure to attend, complete or pass the examination can result in a fine or other penalty to close the case. Second or subsequent offenders are not given the alternative of attending the classes, nor are those who commit serious moving traffic infractions. Such classes are conducted by carefully selected and trained instructors and normally consist of

three or four sessions of two hours each with well-planned instruction, educational films and/or photographs and careful examinations.

Certainly the compulsory attendance at lectures imposed on violators by Filipino police are beneficial in improving the driving competency and habits of some drivers. With more than 50% of all violating drivers apprehended released with only this penalty, however, the real value of such apprehensions seems to be reduced to that of a warning. Moreover, Chapter V of Republic Act 4136 specifies precise penalties for certain violations and increased penalties for second and subsequent violations of some sections.

The present incomplete traffic recordskeeping precludes the possibility of police complying with these provisions of the law in some cases and it is entirely possible for a habitual law violator to repeat his violations in adjacent jurisdictions with little likelihood of ever being subjected to the prescribed increased penalties.

The failure of police and courts to fully comply with the reporting requirements of Act 4136 precludes the possibility of the Land Transportation Commissioner complying with his legal requirements to suspend or revoke drivers licenses or vehicle registrations as set forth in the act.

In brief, with a few notable exceptions, traffic law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines is presently conducted in such manner that some legal requirements are ignored by police, courts and officials; many violators are released with inadequate penalties; and the total effort fails to impress the public with the seriousness of the problems or the sincerity of corrective efforts.

Groups in one area opposed enforcement of traffic laws by scattering on the roadway coconut shells with nails protruding through them. Shown are two nails puncturing the tire of a TRAFCON vehicle patrolling the area.

VII. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Traffic law enforcement actions, like other enforcement actions, are only initiated by police, and must be processed by other entities. Philippine laws provide for the processing of certain cases by Fiscals, City or Municipal Court, Courts of First Instance and/or the Land Transportation Commission or the Public Service Commission.

In a city or municipality, a police traffic case may be forwarded to the Fiscal who may conduct his own investigation of the case and may or may not forward it to the court. In most areas a standard practice is to permit opposing parties in a case to reach an "amicable settlement" and many such cases never appear in police or other records. If the case is submitted to the court, opposing attorneys may be granted a long series of continuances, sometimes to the point where witnesses die or move away. Reports were not uncommon of cases filed in courts for as long as two, three or five years without settlement. Several police chiefs reported that if a traffic case is not completed within two months, it becomes "forgotten."

The beneficial impact of traffic law enforcement is reduced as the elapsed time between apprehension and final adjudication of the case is increased.

The Department of Justice of the Republic of the Philippines exercises administrative supervision over all courts through its sixteen Judicial Districts. Appellate jurisdiction through similar channels is a function of the Supreme Court. The authority of the Department of Justice is extended to all city and municipal courts and justices of the peace through the Judicial Districts.

Judges and Fiscals are appointed by the President and, after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serve until the compulsory retirement age of seventy years. Removal from the office is possible through investigation by the Supreme Court, followed by its recommendation for action by the President. Authoritative sources reported that among incumbents are some who were selected on a basis of political support rather than competency, some who were too advanced in age at the time of appointment to develop the essential Judicial attitude and demeanor; and some who are physically or mentally unable to fill the assignment. The same sources reported a recent healthy trend of appointments of younger, well-qualified individuals at an age which permits carefully guided career development in the service.

Under the sixteen Judicial Districts are the Courts of First Instance with 22 branches or salas at the present time. Serving these courts are 183 presently assigned Judges. Ninety City Judges and 1,362 Municipal Judges presently serve the various communities.

Monthly reports of the Court's case activities from all Clerks of Courts, on a prescribed form - D and JI-A, are required by Department of Justice Circular No. 10, of July 9, 1945, and Circular No. 21, of June 14, 1948. Circular No. 3, dated January 20, 1954, requires that all Municipal Judges and Justices of the Peace report the volume of cases and other activities for their respective jurisdictions each month on J.P. Form No. 21, with copies provided each concerned Judge of First Instance and Provincial Fiscal. The required reports group cases into criminal, civil and other categories, but do not provide for a separation for traffic cases from others.

Additional reporting requirements are imposed on the clerks of courts by Section 58 of Republic Act 4136:

> "SEC. 58. DUTY OF CLERKS OF COURT. -
> It is hereby made the duty of clerks of the Court of First Instance, the City Court or Municipal Court trying traffic violation cases to certify to the Commission the result of any case, whether criminal or civilan involving violations of any provisions of this Act or of other laws and ordinances relating to motor vehicles. Said certificate shall specifically contain the name of the driver or owner of the vehicle involved, his address, the number of his license and/or of the certificate of registration of his vehicle, and the date thereof, and the offense of which he was convicted or acquitted."

If this information is being submitted to the Land Transportation Commission, as is legally required, the Commission is not summarizing the data or at least reported that such summarized information was not available from their offices.

Nationwide statistical summaries of cases handled by the Courts were provided by the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice.

ANNUAL CASES CLEARANCES - COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE

	1963	1964	1965
Total cases pending, Dec. 31	80,324	80,112	81,363
Reduction or increase of cases pending at end of year		212	252
Total new cases filed during the year		43,199	45,373
Total cases cleared during the year		43,411	44,122
Average number of cases cleared per Judge per Month		19.7	20.1

Competent authorities advise that the average case clearances for working Judges should be about 30 cases per month. If this average had been achieved for all Judges, 4,471 additional cases could have been cleared during 1964 and 4,368 additional cases have been cleared during the year 1965. Even this accelerated rate of clearance would require about ten years to adjudicate the present backlog of more than 81,000 cases.

Although the number of traffic violation cases included in the present congestion of the Courts can not be estimated, it seems certain that such cases are adding to the problem. The average time required to process most traffic violation cases should be much less than the time required for many types of criminal or other more complicated cases. This premise is strengthened by examination of the information provided by the Clerk's office of the City Court of Manila.

CITY COURT OF MANILA - TRAFFIC CASE CLEARANCES

	1963	1964	1965	(6 months) 1966
Total cases pending as of December 31	1,147	1,363	879	346
Reduction or increase in the number of cases pending at the end of the year		84	484	533
Total new cases filed during the year		155,856	178,741	76,675
Total cases cleared with penalty during yr.		148,719	173,175	76,379
Total cases dismissed without penalty		5,774	4,687	2,748
Total cases cleared during the year		154,493	177,175	76,379
Number of Judges assigned to the Traffic Court		3	3	3
Average number of cases cleared per Judge per month		4,291	4,941	4,243

A number of disparities in the totals for cases pending at the beginning of the year plus total filed during the year, minus total cases closed during the year and cases pending at the end of the year are not explained. These may be demonstrated in the following table:

	1964	1965	(6 months) 1966
Cases pending, beginning of year	1,147	1,363	879
New cases filed during the year	155,856	178,741	76,675
Total cases in Court during the year	157,003	192,404	77,554
Cases closed during the year	154,493	177,862	76,379
Cases remaining at end of the year	2,510	14,542	1,175
Cases reported as pending at end of the year	1,363	879	346
Cases not accountered for in the report	1,137	13,663	929

It can be seen that a total of 15,729 of the 426,861 cases before the Court during the two and one-half year period, or 3.7% of the total are not accounted for by the report. Of the total of 408,734 cases closed by the Court during the two and one-half year period, 13,209, or 3.2% are reported as dismissed and 395,475, or 96.8% are reported as closed with penalty.

Sufficient data from other cities or municipalities for similar examination have not been received.

IX. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND EDUCATION

Various police departments, Traffic Control Teams of the Philippine Constabulary, a few civic organizations and, at least one privately financed organization are attempting to fill the need for better education and information for the users of streets and roadways. The total effort falls far short, however, of the vast need to motor vehicle operators to improve their competence in driving, to recognize and avoid driving hazards, to better know and understand the laws and regulations governing use of vehicles, and of the need for courtesy in driving and for compliance with regulations designed for their safety and convenience. The careless walking habits, including dangerous darting into streams of moving traffic, by pedestrians is indicative of their need for specific instructions and information.

A few of the larger police organizations presently have personnel assigned to the function of preparing educational materials, making safety speeches and maintaining liaison with public media to encourage development and use of safe driving and safe walking propaganda. Traffic Violator's Schools and the required attendance at a safety lecture for the recipients of TVR's are probably making a small impression in the proper direction, but improved benefits from these are possible through better prepared materials, use of training films and illustrations, and better selection of attendees.

"The Driver's Handbook," a 100 page, 4-1/4" x 6-1/4" publication printed in four colors, is an outstanding example of the kind of materials which should be placed in the hands of every driver and every pedestrian in the Republic. The materials for this book were prepared by TRAFCON from various standard sources and reproduction was financed by more than forty business groups, individuals, service clubs, and several of the TRAFCON Teams. It was first printed in 1965, and a second edition was printed in March, 1966, with 12,000 copies distributed to date.

Eight thousand copies of a well-prepared and attractively printed 2-color "code of Ethics" have been prepared and distributed by the Philippine Motor

Association during the past three years. This same material has been reproduced in the Association's monthly magazine; has been reprinted from its magazine in attractive pamphlet form with the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, for distribution to the public; and in various newspapers and other publications. The same Association for the past three years has sponsored a School Traffic Safety Poster Contest, with 1,028 student entries received in time for consideration in the 1965-66 contest.

Other examples can be cited such as the newspaper articles on the Manila Police Department, including one of September 9, 1966, headed "MPD lists 11 safety rules for Pedestrians," and the single fold 5-1/2" x 8-1/2", single color, "Vital Information for Drivers," excerpted from "The Driver's Handbook" and distributed as a joint effort of the Cebu City Police and the Junior Chamber of Commerce of that City.

Some Cities and Municipalities have passed ordinances covering the operations of motor vehicles, but, in most cases, copies of these are not available. Each of these should be reproduced in sufficient numbers to provide a copy to each resident motorist and to others who should know such local regulations. It is unrealistic to expect people to comply with regulations unless they are able to read and study such regulations with reasonable convenience. Such publications need not be elaborately printed; clarity, legibility and a layman's explanation if the language is legalistic, are the primary requisites.

Sporadic safety campaigns or drives are not enough. Required is a constant, well-planned and executed program aimed at specific needs and groups, designed to encourage widespread public participation in traffic improvement and accident reduction efforts. Seasonal themes, emphasis on particular traffic hazards such as "Schools are out," "Drive so your vacation will be accident free," "Check your brakes - check accidents," etc., should be guided at the National level and coordinated at all local levels.

The organization of citizen groups of Safety Councils at all levels should be encouraged. Composed of leading business people and civic leaders, they should function as non-governmental, non-partisan forces for coordinating all interested citizen organizations and groups activities aimed at traffic improvement and reduction of accidents. Each should be privately financed. Business organizations, insurance companies, manufacturers and others have good reason to be interested in protecting their employees, clients and users of products from the injuries and deaths claimed by accidents. Government should consider the benefits possible from making financial contributions to such activities exempt from taxes.

Information concerning the organization, membership and functions of such groups is available from various organizations in the United States, including the National Safety Council, Inc., 425 N. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois; the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 404 Madison Building, Washington, D.C.; the Auto Industries Highway Safety Committee, Inc., 2000 K Street, N.W., Washington D.C.; and others. Sample materials of various types for dissemination to the public are available from the same groups.

The basic objective of these groups is to create, encourage and develop public support for official efforts and for effective traffic management.

SUMMARY - TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

Traffic Management efforts in the Republic of the Philippines at the present time fall far short of meeting existing demands in most areas. Unless more roadways and appurtenances, parking facilities, better controls, and better public education and traffic law enforcement are provided now, the total situation can only be expected to further deteriorate.

There are bright spots, however, in this generally gloomy picture. A few city and municipal police departments, some local courts, and a high percentage of the TRAFCON teams of the Philippine Constabulary are performing intelligently and well despite overwhelming odds. The work accomplishments of the Bureau of Public Highways are noteworthy for plans and quality, but are very inadequate in quantity.

In most places the above average performance observed was traceable to the influence of particular individuals, some reflecting the advantages of advanced training. A good sprinkling of intelligent, industrious and dedicated individuals was met.

Brief evaluations of the principal organizations involved in traffic management must present both discouraging and encouraging factors.

The Land Transportation Commission is generally inept, lacking efficient assignment of personnel, in poorly designed physical facilities and work flow, and is in need of more competent direction. Most present employees are civil service protected; many are political proteges who are not well-qualified, but there are some competent, hard-working people who seem frustrated by inability to meet clear requirements of the operation, through the handicaps of inadequate work space, lack of filing equipment, needed office machines and the quality of direction. Failures of the organization to comply with legal recording, reporting and summarizing, discussed with the members two years ago, have not been remedied to date. Discipline and morale are low.

Abolishment of the Commission's 93 member enforcement force of Motor Vehicle Patrol Officers is recommended. Members averaged 2.958 apprehensions per man per week last year.

The Public Service Commission is charged with issuance of certificates of public convenience and enforcing compliance with public service motor vehicle schedules, rates, routings, etc., among other duties. The Senior Commissioner complained of political selection of worthless employees, who refuse to work, are frequently insubordinate, and whom the Commission cannot discharge. Physical facilities provided are far below acceptable standards.

Abolishment of the Commission's 140 member Transportation Inspector force is recommended. Members averaged 1.610 apprehensions per man per week last year and this total includes an unknown number of non-traffic cases.

The Philippine Constabulary, despite its legal responsibilities as a law enforcement agency, is organized, oriented, trained, distributed, equipped, and operated as a military organization. In and out transfers to and from other military units detract from efficiency, and many key officers of the PC are solely military in their training and concept. Political pressures, within and without the organization, result in frequent transfers of assignment. Morale is surprisingly good and units include some members who seem genuinely interested in and dedicated to good law enforcement efforts.

The PC Traffic Control Group is composed of 172 officers and members, or 1.1% of the total present P.C. strength, with about 50 vehicles including the special headquarters groups). 27 Traffic Teams, composed of 3 or 4 members and one vehicle are expected to cover and police more than 37,000 kilometers of National and Provincial roadways. More than half of the members have completed traffic training and all have completed basic PC training. Teams report average work days of 12 hours, seven days weekly. Interest, teamwork and morale are high. Traffic operations of the PC units are so small as to be negligible.

PC Traffic Teams report 3.907 traffic apprehensions per man per week for last year and 5.472 apprehensions per man per week for the first six months of 1966.

City and Municipal Police traffic operations vary considerably in both quality and quantity, but the few good ones cannot carry the burden for the many poor ones. The concept of systematic police preventive patrols is not generally well understood or practiced, but is being used effectively by a few local police departments.

City and Municipal Courts are suffering from political pressures which intervene in cases, and many are failing to comply with legal reporting requirments.

1. Much effort and funding will be required to correct the traffic ills of the Philippines. Training, legislation and commodities will be needed. Perhaps the greatest and primary requirement is the will to improve, the desire to better those phases of traffic which are contributing to delays, congestion and accidents. This willingness to progress, the effort to achieve advances must be demonstrated by top level officials of the National Government and at all other levels, to lead, induce and direct a similar will on the part of police, drivers, pedestrians and all others. Public communications media have a similar role in building public acceptance of necessary regulations and public support for effective official programs.

2. Roads, streets and roadway structures require at least a tripling of present levels of maintenance, improvements and new construction, to meet backlogged and expected needs.

3. Improved concepts of methods for assessing problems and designing the organizations and programs to meet problems and the use of performance measurement techniques are essential.

4. Better organization, more competent direction and administration, better training and more effective use of manpower is needed.

5. Adequate physical facilities, efficient flow of work, necessary office furniture and equipment must be provided.

6. Improved traffic law enforcement through proper assignments of personnel, filing specific charges for specific traffic law violations, and greatly reducing the use of lectures as the sole penalty for traffic law infractions is essential. Cases should be filed in the courts and the specific penalties provided by law applied to guilty parties; particularly those whose violation has contributed to an accident.

7. Court processing of traffic cases should be improved and speeded, with prompt adjudication of all cases and prompt reporting of dispositions.

8. Improved training facilities for police, better quality of instruction, needed training equipment and aids, and better use of trained personnel should be provided.

9. More motor vehicles and better vehicle maintenance, and a communications network are required in most areas.

10. Compliance with legal reporting requirements, legislation to require reporting of accidents, use of timesaving forms, files and filing equipment, prompt, accurate and complete summaries of reported information, analyses, collations and use of developed information are major requirements.

11. Political influence must be removed from the selection and assignments of personnel of police and other traffic management agencies and political intervention in police and court cases must be stopped if real imrprovement is desired.

12. Public education and information activities must be improved in quality and greatly expanded as a part of an effective traffic management program.

The complete report offers recommendations for improving traffic management; some of which are much more urgent than others. Many can be implemented without large expenditures in a reasonable period of time; others must be considered as long range objectives.

If the host government undertakes an improvement program to facilitate traffic operations and controls, and the U.S. Government decides to offer assistance, the principal and most immediate need is for competent traffic management advisors. Suggested guidelines are:

1. Provision of both local and participant training for police patrol and traffic operations, records management, and motor vehicle and driver's license administration.

2. The large scale funding by GOP required for immediate and long term goals is provided at a rate to make constant improvements possible.

Monetary requirements for effective traffic management are great. The traffic facilities to meet the needs of yesterday, today and tomorrow, must be built concurrently if long range problems are to be met. Large scale training programs in a variety of fields must be undertaken, and greatly expanded public education efforts are necessary. With all of these, improvements will be gradual over a long period of time; overnight miracles should not be expected.

Improvements and greater efficiencies in traffic and other host government operations could make possible the provision of much of the required funding and/or financing.

MPD lists 11 safety rules for pedestrians

(Mirror 9-3-66)

The education division of the MPD Traffic Control Bureau has launched a safety education campaign to cut down motorists and pedestrian hazards by issuing the basic rules for safe street crossing.

The basic rules when followed especially during peak traffic period when more motor vehicles and pedestrians come to Manila will help greatly in avoiding traffic accidents.

The 11 basic rules suggested by the MPD Traffic Control Bureau are:

1. Cross only at intersections whenever possible. Look both ways before starting across and watch out for turning vehicles.
2. When crossing, follow signal lights. Do not start to cross after the light has turned from green to yellow; you might be caught in the middle of the traffic.
3. Do not walk in traffic when you are not feeling well. Call a taxi or ask a friend to take you home.
4. Do not step out into the roadway from between parked vehicles.
5. Avoid getting in and out of a vehicle on the streetside.
6. Wait on the sidewalk, not on the street before crossing at intersection.
7. When there is no sidewalk and you have to walk on the roadway, walk on the left side facing traffic.
8. While crossing the crosswalk always keep right.
9. Wear something white or light at night to help driver see you.
10. Teach children to play far from roadways and driveways.
11. Choose the safest possible route for your children to go to and from school.

MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRAFFIC CONTROL BUREAU

Data on Traffic Enforcement

Total Apprehensions (Issued TVRs)		Total Fatalities (In accidents)	
1964	182,766	1964	113
1965	221,903	1965	115
1966 (6 months)	74,157	1966 (6 months)	52
	478,826		280

Total Accidents:

1964	8,405
1965	6,347
1966 (6 months)	2,951
	17,703

TRAFFIC STATISTICS — MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Data provided by the Traffic Control Bureau

Year	Total Motor Vehicle Accidents	Total Motor Vehicle Deaths	Total Motor Vehicle Apprehensions
1956	8,067	41	105,602
1957	7,987	52	99,942
1958	9,017	55	89,480
1959	8,456	43	91,926
1960	7,875	73	82,277
1961	7,207	82	83,896
1962	8,878	82	75,803
1963	9,665	97	99,115
1964	8,405	113	182,766

MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEY, OCTOBER, 1964

1965	6,347	115	221,903
1966 (6 months)	2,951	52	74,157

REPORT ON TRAFFIC CASES

1. Number of traffic cases pending as of December 31, 1963	1,147
2. Number of traffic cases filed during calendar year 1964	155,856
3. Number of traffic cases disposed of during calendar year 1964	154,493
a. Closed with penalty	148,719
b. Dismissed	5,774
4. Number of traffic cases pending as of December 31, 1964	1,363

****

1. Number of traffic cases pending as of December 31, 1964	1,363
2. Number of traffic cases filed during calendar year 1965	178,741
3. Number of traffic cases disposed of during calendar year 1965	177,862
a. Closed with penalty	173,175
b. Dismissed	4,687
4. Number of pending traffic cases as of December 31, 1965	879

****

REPORT ON TRAFFIC CASES (Continued)

1.	Number of traffic cases pending as of December 31, 1965	879
2.	Number of traffic cases filed during calendar year 1966 ending June 30	76,675
3.	Number of traffic cases disposed of during the first six months of 1966 ending June 30	76,379
	a. Closed with penalty	73,581
	b. Dismissed	2,748
4.	Number of traffic cases pending as of June 30, 1966	346

Prepared by: PABLO MARQUEZ
Asst. Clerk of Court

CITY COURT OF MANILA

Total Traffic Cases

Fiscal Years	Pending at beginning of year	Filed	Dismissed	Guilty w/penalty	Dispositions
1959-60	847	120,321	NA	NA	119,421
1960-61	900	129,282	NA	NA	127,135
1961-62	2,147	132,631	NA	NA	132,464
1962-63	2,033	98,728	NA	NA	93,318
1963-64	1,410	160,595	NA	NA	145,156

MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEY, OCTOBER, 1964

Calendar Year	Pending at beginning of year	Filed	Dismissed	Quilty w/penalty	Total Dispositions
1964	1,147	155,856	5,774	148,719	154,493
1965	1,363	178,741	4,687	173,175	178,741
1966 (6 months)	879	76,675	2,748	73,581	76,379
June 30, 1966	346				

Discrepancies between total cases, cases disposed of and cases pending are not explained.

1964 SURVEY OF THE MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT — STATUS OF TRAFFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Traffic Recommendation Numbered	
146	The Traffic Bureau Chief reported that Mayor's recommended budget included increases for traffic improvements, but Vice-Mayor refused to forward this, until Mayor forced forwarding by a Court decision of recent date. No copy of the budget could be secured.
147	No press visible; many street surfaces are in worse condition than at the time of the report.
148	No noticeable change.
149	No noticeable change.
150	Nothing accomplished to date.
151	Bill H No. 1135 to authorize construction and operation of a monorail system passed the House and Senate on May 19, 1966 and is reportedly signed by the President. Provides privilege and authority for 50 years, provided construction is begun within three years, and operation is begun within five years. Two copies of the Bill are attached as Exhibit No. 1.
152	Nothing accomplished to date.
153	No progress.
154	No progress.
155	No progress reported.
156	No progress reported.
157	City of Manila Ordinance No. 4986, approved, 1964, to regulate traffic and use of streets within the City was upheld by a Supreme Court decision in Villegas vs Marco during July, 1966, wherein the authority of the City supercedes that of the Public Service Commission. See clipping from the "Manila Times" of July 11, 1966, on page 59.
158	The Manila Police Department is reported to have made recommendations which await action by the City Government. Requests for a copy of this series of recommendations were not successful.
159	Recommendations are reported as having been forwarded to the Land Transportation Commission, but there is no evidence of any improvement.

1964 SURVEY OF THE MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT — STATUS OF TRAFFIC RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

Traffic Recommendation Numbered	
160	The Chief of the Traffic Bureau reports that the Traffic Bureau now maintains a driver file as part of operations of the License Division of the City Traffic Court. It was not seen.
161	No review is undertaken, except following complaints received against a specific operator, when his certificate and compliance are reviewed. The Senior Commissioner of the PSC agrees that the recommendation is sound and desirable, but has no plans for an over-all review.
162	The reorganization reported by the Chief of the Traffic Bureau is not evident in the organization chart provided and attached as Exhibit No. 3. Six Divisions continue to report to the Chief, and total manpower is reportedly reduced by 85 since the survey report data was provided.
163	Traffic Bureau Chief reports no new equipment received.
164	No progress to date.
165	The Mayor's Administrative Order No. 17, S-1965, dated March 23, 1965, attached as Exhibit No. 4, directs traffic enforcement by all members of the Manila Police Department, but with restrictions. Efforts to secure statistical breakdowns of the amount of participation were not successful. Total Annual enforcement is shown in Exhibit No. 6.
166	Reported by the Traffic Bureau Chief as established, but an opportunity to inspect the file was not afforded.
167	No progress to date.
168	Only slight progress is evident. An example of the type of newspaper articles prepared is attached as Exhibit No. 5.
169	Records keeping in the City of Manila Traffic Court seems considerably improved for currency. Information requested was provided the following day, compared to many days of efforts required to secure similar totals during the course of the original survey. A copy of the data provided is attached as Exhibit No. 7, with a table comparing the figures for before and after the survey was conducted, as is appended to the Exhibit No. 6 for Manila Police Department Apprehensions.
170	Improvements have not been made in signal systems as recommended and Traffic Bureau Personnel are still assigned to manual direction of traffic.



"Interspersed among the fast moving passenger vehicles and trucks in cities, municipalities and on rural roads are vast numbers of slow moving pedicycles and horse drawn or carabao drawn conveyances which, with their much lower speed and slower maneuvering abilities, create interstream conflicts to contribute to congestion and accidents."

"A cursory look at our peace and order situation will reveal that our real problem is the discriminatory character of law enforcement. The complex and brazen criminality emanates from partiality, and worse, with a crime having been committed, there appears to be further discrimination regarding the treatment of suspects or convicted culprits . . . . . Many a murderer is set loose to kill again, many an innocent victim is hopelessly stymied from his right to justice."

Alfredo R. Roces,
Times, 19 July 1966

Chapter XIV

RECORDS AND IDENTIFICATION

Introduction

The effectiveness of the Records and Identification procedures of a law enforcement agency are directly related to the quality of the service. This phase of the survey will primarily deal with the identification procedures of six major national agencies. They are the Philippine Constabulary, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Commission on Election, New Bilibid Prison, and the Correctional Institution for Women. Each of these agencies maintains fingerprint card files. Several of these agencies were also surveyed for their records keeping procedures. These were the PC, NBI, Bureau of Immigration, New Bilibid Prison and Correctional Institution for Women (CIW). Lastly, the statistical keeping procedures of the PC, NBI, and New Bilibid Prison were examined. This chapter will be divided into three parts:

1. Review of the individual agencies.
2. Comparative analysis of agencies where possible.
3. Recommendations.

The agencies surveyed appear to be highly compartmentalized in that there is little exchange of information between them. Healthy competition is good; however, competition that results in the lack of an exchange of information between law enforcement agencies can spell the defeat of their respective endeavors.

1. REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES

Philippine Constabulary

Office of the Controller -
Electronic Data Processing Unit

The EDP Unit was established 25 October, 1965. It comprises two officers, 12 enlisted men, 30 civilian employees, having a total of 44 personnel.

Currently, the data processing unit is key punching firearms registration information. The EDP unit is made up of 3 branches: Administration, Machine, and Data Processing. The processing branch is now operational.

The EDP branch is totally housed in a new, modern, fully air-conditioned building. They are currently operating 23 key-punching machines with 5 more units on order. In all 28 key-punch operators are now being employed. They are punching at a stated rate of 500 cards per day per operator. It is estimated that it will take eleven months to code and punch the three million firearms registration forms now in file. The standard IBM card is used and they are being punched in the following categories:

1. Personnel card. This is the demographic information of persons who now have gun permits.

2. Gun card. This is a listing of each known firearm in the country.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY - EDP
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION



Keypunch Operators, Selectronic Data Processing Unit, Philippine Constabulary Headquarters

3. Wanted firearms card. This is a listing of all wanted firearms.

Instructions have been developed concerning the transformation from source document to card form. (See sample of a portion of the instructions.) The instructions involve the coding of all source documents and a program of rater reliability. The rater reliability has been established to assure quality control in the coding of each gun permit.

The implementation program calls for the addition of the following equipment:

		Date Due on Board
1.	One Equipment Statistical Tabulating Machine	Sept. 1966
2.	One interpreter	Aug. 1966
3.	One collator	Sept. 1966
4.	One reproducing punch	Sept. 1966
5.	One sorter	Sept. 1966

One machine not ordered is a verifier. A verifier is a necessary unit in the processing of cards, as it rechecks the accuracy of the original punching.

However, only time will determine whether or not the lack of this acquisition will be detrimental to the program. The PC EDP unit is under the command of the controller and is now in the embryonic stage of development

Personnel have been in the building only since July, 1966. Major Ventura, Acting Controller, stated that the current plan of completing the gun permit deck may be modified somewhat in favor of beginning the collection of criminal statistics data from the provincial level. But, since the survey report recommends that the NBI be designated the sole collector of national crime statistics, the plans for the gun permit deck should proceed. Until the administration fully understands the manipulation of data by EDP, they will be somewhat skeptical of its capability, versus the cost factor. The EDP unit is faced with the problem of attempting to develop an ongoing operation while at the same time attempting to cope with a backlog of three million units.

Some codes have been worked out for various aspects of the program and other codes have been received from the Bureau of Census for coding the provinces, municipalities and cities. The latter is a positive sign since standardization of codes within comparable areas is essential.

Future plans now call for a reduction in force from 28 key punch operators to three operators. This will be accomplished after the three million gun permits have been coded and punched. The estimated yearly input of gun permits is approximately 20,000 units. Three key punch operators operating at 500 units per day will be able to punch at a rate in excess of 30,000 cards per month. If substantial increases are made in punching, the number of key operators would have to be revised. It is unfortunate that the current equipment is too limited to take on other work, such as motor vehicle records, etc., in addition to the gun permits.

The person designated Chief of the Machine Room will be the key person in translating administration needs for information into machine language. This person should be a skilled EDP machine operator.

The PC EDP unit has sent six persons to an IBM 35-day machine operators school. IBM Technicians will assist these people, three civilian and three enlisted men, in the development of the machine programming and wiring of principal machine boards to get the program underway.

The ultimate utilization of the firearms deck is unknown at this time. But PC and IBM Technicians are working on this phase. It is anticipated that the IBM card deck will be used primarily for verification of firearms. Each year the PC is required to verify all firearms in the country as well as their registration. The statistical tabulating machine will print out listings by province, city, and municipality and by the type of weapon to be verified. It is also anticipated that listings will be made and forwarded to all provinces on wanted weapons. These proposals, however, are still in the development stage.

For continued support, it is imperative that the administration be shown how EDP can positively benefit from it. If support is not maintained, the expenditures made to date will have been wasted.

Philippine Constabulary Firearms and Explosives Office

There has been an attempt on the part of the Philippine Constabulary to closely supervise the importation and use of firearms within the Philippines.

PROCEDURES IN TRANSFERRING OF DATA FROM GENERAL FILES, PERSONAL AND WANTED FIREARMS CARDS TO WORKSHEETS

Step Nr	Person	Operation	Supplies and/or Equipment
1	Records Clk	Withdraws general file from shelf in File Number sequence.	General File in File Nr Sequence
2	- do -	Puts eighty (80 general file in file number sequence into each of the file boxes aligned along the shorter side of the push cart on the upper and lower docks.	General Files File boxes Pushcart
3	- do -	Brings the pushcart with all file boxes filled to the Personal Carf Files	Filled file boxes Pushcart
4	- do -	Withdraws corresponding Personal Carf for each of the general file contained in the file boxes from the Personal Carf Files.	Personal Cards
5	- do -	Clips Personal Card to General File.	Paper Clips
6	- do -	Accomplishes Control Sheet and places accomplished Control Sheet on top of file box.	Control Sheets Filled File Boxes.

The EDP program has to date received adequate financial support.

Philippine Constabulary

EDP Budget

Approved	Proposed
FY 66 - ₱158,052	FY 68 - ₱299,911 FY 69 - ₱186,731
FY 67 Original ₱426,804	FY 67 Revised ₱475,000

The PC has organized the Firearms and Explosives Office within the Headquarters, P.C. (See table of organization).

Revised Administrative Code Section 888 defines "Mode of making application and acting upon same." And the sections in Article IV define the various aspects and requirements in the sale, registration, and retention of firearms. All persons holding firearms are required to have a firearm permit. Though there is a continuing attempt at curtailing firearms in the country, there are still an estimated 25,000 loose firearms within the Republic. (See Operational Statistics and Functions). The requirements for a firearm permit are based primarily upon:

1. Need for the firearm
2. Assessed property value of the applicant
3. The good character of the applicant

There are ten separate forms required for various types of firearms permits. These range from the standard application PC Form-2 to a Neuro-Psychiatric certificate. (See Requirements for Firearms Applications.)

In all there appears to be some attempt on the part of the PC to make an evaluation as to whether or not the applicant is of good character. This effort, however, is being thwarted by the fact that no national records check is conducted on each applicant. All requests and records checks are made locally and primarily by name. Currently, no fingerprint card is taken of the person applying and, therefore, a person with derogatory information need only to move to a different area, change his name, and re-apply.

Office of the Controller -
<u>Crime Reports and Criminal Statistics</u>

The PC generates two types of crime reports:

1. Daily Spot Reports
2. Monthly Crime Reports

The daily spot report consists of a brief narrative which may list:

a. Provincial case number
b. Victim and/or Accused
c. Location of occurrence
d. Type of offense
e. Brief description
f. Action taken

The daily spot report, however, is limited to major crimes such as murder, homicide, and rape. The daily spot reports are received via radio and are distributed basically as follows: (See Chart on next page)



Crime reports are supposed to be forwarded to PC headquarters monthly. The crime reports are for the most part a brief description of the events that occurred and somewhat more informative than the daily spot reports.

Sample From PC Crime Reporting Instructions of June 14, 1963

CASE NO. 23

1. Offense: Theft
2. Victim: Rosauro Ramirez; 1279 Asuncion St. Imus, Cavite; 28 yrs; male; married; businessman.
3. Suspect or Perpetrator: Unknown
4. Time, Date and Place of Commission of Crime: 17 2100 Mar 63; Malvar Park, Imus, Cavite.
5. Motive: Not applicable
6. Weapon and/or Instrument Used: Jack
7. Agency Handling the Case: Cavite City Police
8. Status of Case: Under Investigation
9. Modus Operandi: Iron grills forced open.
10. a. Kind and amount of property stolen: One (1) TV Set (Philco); one (1) electric fan (Toshiba); Three Thousand Pesos (₱3,000.00) worth of jewelry and other household items.
    b. Amount Recovered: None

Monthly crime investigative reports are supposed to be prepared in four copies at the provincial level. One report should be sent to the P. C. Zone Commander, one copy to CIS, one copy to intelligence, and one copy to central records for filing. The three latter units mentioned are located in P. C. Headquarters.

The figure of only 7,000 crimes was furnished as the total number of crimes reported to the P.C. during FY 65-66. Considering that this amount includes all crimes handled by the local police as well as the P.C. and is to reflect the whole country, it is simply low. It is interesting to note that the NBI totals for only the first five months of 1966 show 50,402 actual offenses and a projected figure of 120,965 offenses for the Philippines.

The total furnished by the P.C. is an estimate based on synopsis-type spot reports because P.C. Provincial Commanders are not forwarding crime reports to Headquarters as required. It was further learned that no breakdown was possible as to the percentage of this total handled by the P.C. and by the local police, nor the percentage solved by either group. However, the P.C. reported that 62% of the 7,000 crimes were solved.

Statistics furnished by P.C. Headquarters regarding crime totals in the Philippines are poor because they do not get the required reports.

ORGANIZATION CHART
FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES OFFICE, HPC



TOTAL STRENGTH

O -	9
EM -	41
CIV -	52
DS CIV -	5
TOTAL -	107

******

The Firearms and Explosives Office of the PC processes approximately 100 to 150 various kinds of permits daily. There are three basic types of permits issued to individuals:

1. Permit to purchase firearms
2. Permit to possess a firearm
3. Permit to carry a firearm

In addition to these permits PC maintains control over the manufacture of ammunition, manufacture of firearms, and firearms dealers. The procedures for registering firearms that have evolved over the years are complicated and indicative of an operation attempting to maintain a close administrative control over what is in reality a very loose procedure. Permits coming into this system must first be logged into one of three logbooks, and are then given a

log number. At this time, two 3 x 5 index cards are made on the request: one index card is attached to the papers for processing; a second index card is kept by the incoming unit. The index card is designed so that the lower part serves as a routing slip. However, it has been admitted by those persons processing that the routing slip is not really used for this purpose, also that they are behind in the typing of the index cards. (See attached). The documents are then, after being logged in again in the License Branch, checked to ascertain whether or not all pertinent papers as required have been furnished. A "permanent code", number is now given. The application is then forwarded to the records section where it is again logged in and record checked by name, and also by serial number of the weapons listed. If information is found in file concerning the weapon or the subject, it is noted on the new application. The records section maintain a number of various files as follows:

1. Pending purchase or issuance file. (Alphabetical index)
2. Processed permits. (Alphabetical index)
3. Firearms permits filed by province and by file number.
4. Surety bonds filed by company and number.
5. Weapons held by gun dealers.
6. Court action on files filed alphabetically.

Once the documents are examined in the Records Section and appropriate notations made, the documents are returned to the Licensing Branch, which evaluates the application and then issues the file number and the permit number. After these numbers have been issued, the gun permit and two index cards are typed. One index card is filed by name and the other is filed by the weapon serial number. After the data has been typed, it is then checked by the Chief of the branch and then by the office chief who places the permits in groups of 35 with a cover letter and forwards them to the Chief PC for signature. The signed applications are then returned to the Administrative Unit who distributes the index cards and data for file and mails the gun permit to the person requesting. Of the gun permits examined that were in the process of being sent to the Chief of the PC for signature none were less than three months old. Some had been in process for five months or more.

The Firearms and Explosives Office is composed of 107 officers, enlisted men and civilians. The current procedure is very complicated and, therefore, the volume output per person is low. Currently, the PC is attempting to establish the good moral character of applicants based only on the local clearances. This method is solely a check of names in file of the various governmental agencies concerned; Chief of Police of the area; the Barrio Captain, City Judge, the Mayor, City Treasurer, etc. Even with this "extensive procedure" there is no real assurance that the person has no criminal history. The methods used within the Firearms and Explosives Office are characteristic of this organization constantly attempting to maintain absolute individual control over each paper at any point in time. This in itself slows the movement of paper through the office. Personnel of this office attempt to maintain tight security; however, citizens continually come in and disrupt the operation to "follow-up papers". During our visit, there were approximately 20 people obviously attempting to follow-up various types of permits. This in itself would disrupt even the best of procedures.

<u>The Firearms and Explosives Office's Relationship to the Electronic Data Processing Unit (EDP)</u>

Under the current program the primary benefits to be derived from the EDP operation for the Firearms and Explosives Office will be that the EDP unit will

provide the Office with listings of firearms for verification. The weapons listed will then be verified at the company level and returned. The firearms records that are no longer outstanding will then be pulled from the active files. The statistical data concerning firearms in the country should also be improved through the use of the EDP program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Applicant Procedures

Currently, there are ten basic requirements for a firearms permit. (See listing). Each of these documents are required in varying degrees for the various types of firearms. It is recommended that the following procedure be utilized when requesting a permit to purchase, possess, or carry a firearm:

1. The application should be completed at the local police department. This application would contain the following data:

a. Full name, aliases or other names if used
b. Address
c. Age
d. Height
e. Weight
f. Date of Birth
g. Color of eyes
h. Color of hair
i. Place of Birth
j. Reason why the firearm is required
k. Kind, make, caliber, serial number of weapon or weapons
l. Caliber and quantity of ammunition required
m. Other data as required by the code

In addition to the completion of this form an NBI Form No. 5 (Revised 1/1/66), Civilian Fingerprint Card, would also be completed. The local police would then be required to forward this card to the NBI which would in turn return a history sheet listing prior information concerning the subject, or a statement indicating that no record exists on the person in the files of the Bureau. These documents plus the local police information concerning the subject should be the basis for the police clearance. As required by Revised Administrative Code when applicable, a City Treasurer's clearance would also be required. These documents would then be forwarded to the mayor or the governor as applicable under Revised Administrative Code Section 888. The governor or the mayor would then make their recommendation concerning the application for firearms permit and forward it to the PC. The various types of clearances now required would be eliminated primarily because a search of the national repository of criminal and non-criminal records would have been made.

Part II: Firearms and Explosives Office

There should be one and only one log or registering of applications for firearms permits. Considerable time and effort is expended and documents tend to log jam at these various logging procedures. All requests received would receive one number. There would be log notations made indicating the name, type of permit required, date received, and the date it was sent to the applicant. Applications would be forwarded to the Licensing Branch for a check to ascertain that all papers required had been forwarded by the mayor or the governor. If all paper had not been forwarded, the application would then be returned to the applicant with a cover letter noting just what papers were omitted. Applications that have been completed properly would then be sent to

the Records Section for a name search and a firearms number search. The pending index card file should be merged with the regular index cards file; in this manner only one search would be required for the subject person, and one search would be required for each firearm. Information on file in the records section would be indicated on a revised action slip. The documents would then be returned to the Licensing Branch, where an evaluation would be made, either approving or disapproving the firearm permit. If approved, the firearm permit would then be typed along with an index card for each gun and index card of the applicant. If disapproved, all documents with a cover letter would then be returned to the applicant via the chief of the office. If approved, the permit would then be forwarded to the Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Officer or his designate who would then sign the permits, thus relieving the PC Commander of this mundane task. The documents would then be forwarded to the incoming log for processing out to the applicant.

RECOMMENDATION #1

It is recommended that only one log be utilized in the Firearms and Explosives Office procedures of processing applicants for firearms permits. It is further recommended that at this one point, the name, type of permit required, and date received be entered upon receipt of the application in the office. The final entry should be the final disposition made of the application.

Part III: Equipment

There are no commercially-made index card files in the Records Branch. There are, however, in excess of 300,000 personal name cards on file. Also, the index cards have no card guides. The cards should be placed in appropriate filing cabinets with filing guides. There are also an equal number of weapon 3 x 5 index card files. The total 3 x 5 cards now on hand would require at least ten filing cabinets of eleven drawers each. Additional filing space of at least five cabinets would be required to allow the files to grow. At one time there was an attempt made to file applicant data in 8 x 11 envelopes; however, there was no logical support and after 4,000 envelopes were used, the program was stopped. It is recommended that the current practice of folding the back-up data be discontinued and that 8 x 11 file envelopes be used to file the applicant records. Consideration should also be given to expanding the open filing system now being employed to handle the 8 x 11 envelopes.

It has been stated that during the past, submission of provincial reports has been sketchy but in the last few months they are almost non-existent. Command personnel have grown more and more to rely on the daily spot reports and less on the monthly crime reports for the simple reason that crime reports are not being forwarded as required. On June 14, 1963, a complete program was prepared describing the PC crime reporting procedures. The PC does not utilize printed crime report forms at this time. A printed crime reporting form was recommended in the 1963 procedures; however, it has never been used. (See form below). There have been new efforts to develop a new crime report. However, as of this date, little progress has been made. The crime reports could be utilized as a primary source document in developing criminal statistics; however, if reports are not consistently forwarded from the provincial level, little analysis is possible.

There is no follow-up system for monthly crime reports. There was an inference made that once the power structure was aware of the problem it could be worked out. It is difficult to understand why the provincial commanders fail to forward reports as prescribed.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

Tag Nr. ...., 196....
Name .....
Address .....
Kind ..... Make .....
Cal. or Ga ..... S. Nr
Ammunition ..... Condit
Holster.....: Belt.....: L. Case.....: L. Co
Wooden Box.....:
Receipt Nr. ..... Acce
From .....

PC Form Nr. 22
22 Aug 55

NAME: Last First MI (Code No)
(Address. City/Prov) (Date Submitted)
(Submitted by) (Dealer)

REMARKS: FEO Action:

Adm Br ..... (Date) Opn Br ..... (Date) Records Br ..... (Date)

(PPFA No) (Lic/SP/CR No) (File No) (Date Issued)

DO NOT DETACH
RETURN THIS CARD TO ADMIN BR FOR PERMANENT FILE

There are no criminal statistics as such being developed by the Statistics and Reports Control Branch. Their main duty is to maintain an up-to-date fact book for the Chief, PC. The book contains such information as population of provinces, pay scales for officers and enlisted personnel, and other basic data that might be required by the Chief, PC.

Criminal Investigation Service - Central Records and Identification Branch

The PC Central Records and Identification Branch is composed of two sections, Central Records Section and Identification Section. There is one Captain in charge of the branch. The branch is staffed as follows:

	Central Records Section			Identification Section		
	Authorized	Assigned	Vacant	Authorized	Assigned	Vacant
Total	0	5	0	0	13	0
Officers	-	-	-	-	-	-
Enlisted	-	-	-	-	4	-
Civilians	-	3	-	-	8	-
Casuals	-	2	-	-	1	-

CRIME REPORT WORKSHEET - GROUP A OFFENSE

1. MONTH REPORTED	2. OFFENSE	3. CASE NO.

4. VICTIM'S/COMPLAINANT's	a. NAME	b. ADDRESS

c. AGE	d. SEX	e. CIVIL STATUS	f. OTHER DESCRIPTION

5. PERPETRATOR'S/SUSPECT'S	a. NAME	b. ADDRESS

c. AGE	d. SEX	e. CIVIL STATUS	f. OCCUPATION (Employed-Unemp)	g. INCOME

h. HIGHEST EDUC. ATTAINMENT	i. OTHER DESCRIPTION

6. TIME	DATE	LOCATION OF OCCURENCE

7. MOTIVE	8. WEAPON USED

9. AGENCY HANDLING CASE	10. STATUS OF CASE

11. MODUS OPERANDI

12. KIND AND AMOUNT OF PROPERTY STOLEN

13. KIND AND NUMBER OF CATTLE STOLEN	NUMBER RECOVERED

14. REMARKS AND OTHERS

PCCIS R/R 8 FORM 4
(14 JUNE 63)

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

Central Records and Identification Branch



*( ) Personnel Assigned

Identification Section

The PC, like other law enforcement agencies within the country, is faced with the task of handling requests for clearances. The following are the types of clearances issued by the Philippine Constabulary.

1. CIS Clearances - CIS clearances are issued to all persons seeking employment with the Department of National Defense which includes Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.

2. PC Clearances - These are issued to all other persons seeking a clearance.

The following is an outline of the procedures of obtaining clearances:

1. The applicant must bring with him the following material:

   a. Letter of request from employer. This letter is a job assurance.

   b. Two passport-size photographs.

   c. Current residence certificate.

2. Forms completed by the applicant:

   a. The applicant completes a personal identification card. This is an 8 x 8 fingerprint card printed by the Bureau of Printing and Engraving.

   b. Handwriting specimen. This is a standard handwriting specimen completed by each applicant.

   c. Blank index cards are thumbprinted.

   d. The clearance certificate.

3. The complete request for a clearance is processed in the following manner:

   a. Name check is made in the name index file; if no name in file,

   b. fingerprints are classified.

   c. Fingerprints are searched by formula in three separate files:

      criminal,
      non-criminal, and
      reconstructed.

Republic of the Philippines
HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SERVICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City

PCCIS1

CERTIFICATION

_____ (Date)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that according to available records on file this Service, there is NO derogatory information and/or remarks against _____ of _____, as of this date.

This certificate is issued to the above-mentioned individual in connection with his/her _____

_____ (Signature)
Res Cert Nr A- _____
Issued on _____ 19____
At _____

FELIZARDO R. TANABE
Colonel, CAV (GSC)
Chief, CIS, HPC

RIGHT INDEX

******

Republic of the Philippines
HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
Camp Crame, Quezon City

PCCIS1

_____ (Date)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that _____ (Last Name) (First Name) (Middle Name) a _____ national, single/married, sex _____, _____ years of age and presently residing at _____ (Place of Birth) _____ (Date of Birth) whose signature, thumb prints and residence certificate number, date and place of issue appears below has NO criminal or derogatory record in this Headquarter's as of this date.

This certificate is valid for the following specific purpose only: _____.

REMARKS:

FOR THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY:

_____ (Signature of Applicant)
Res Cert Nr A- _____
Issued on _____
At _____

(Documentary Stamp)

1. RIGHT THUMB | 2 LEFT THUMB

ID _____
CENTRAL RECORDS SEC _____
WARRANT & ALARM SEC _____
ADM SEC, IB, CIS _____
PCCL _____

NBI _____
FISCAL _____
BU OF PRISONS _____

CIS/AMT/sce/46862/28-7-66

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SERVICE
POLICE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
IDENTIFICATION SECTION

SIGNATURES AND HANDWRITING SPECIMEN

NAME:_____ DATE_____ 19____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

OFFICIAL SIGNATURE:

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

OFFICIAL INITIAL

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

(Lt THUMB Pt)

(Rt THUMB Pt)

Republic of the Philippines
HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
CENTRAL RECORDS SECTION, CIS
Camp Crame, Quezon City

REFERENCE SLIP

PCCISIR _____ (Date)

TO: Adm Officer

C/ID Sec _____ C/PIK _____

C/W&A _____ C/CRS _____

C/IB _____

____ Request record check on the attached list of names.

____ Previous records not available in this Section.

____ Request acknowledge receipt of the attached previous records.

____ Matter pertaining to that Br/Sec.

REMARKS: _____

_____

_____

Vicente S. Tort, OIC, CRS, CIS

Persons seeking a clearance at Philippine Constabulary Headquarters

If no derogatory information is obtained in the search, a reference slip is attached to the request and the applicant then must take his request to five different units within the CIS. These five separate branches will then check their records files to determine whether or not the applicant has derogatory information on file. In the case of the CIS certificates, Chief C.R.S., is authorized to sign the clearance certificate. In the case of PC clearances, the application is then routed to the Counter-Intelligence Unit. The Counter-Intelligence Unit will then require the applicant to furnish the following additional clearances to support his request for a PC clearance:

a. NBI Clearance b. Fiscal Clearance c. Bureau of Prison Clearance

Depending on the nature of the clearance, there may or may not be a background investigation. The PC clearance is then signed by the Chief of the Intelligence Division.

The index card made up by records contains the following information:

1. Name
2. Fingerprint classification
3. Date and Processing of Fingerprints
4. Address
5. Bureau Number. Coded information as follows:
   F - Filipino A - Alien C-1 - Criminal C-2 - Non-criminal

Observations

There is an obvious question to be raised for the collection of a handwriting specimen from each person since fingerprints are a positive means of identification, whereas handwriting comparison requires a human evaluation which is always subject to challenge. There is also an obvious question to be raised as to requiring the applicant to go to five separate branches within the PC compound to secure a clearance.

Fingerprint cards are of light paper stock. Because of the light paper stock, the card will not stand the estimated life expectancy of 75 years of use. There are no fingerprint card guides of significance on file. Guides are at the best 12 to 18 inches apart. There are few index guides in file.

The procedure of checking by name, then by fingerprint classification, is wasteful. The primary and secondary classification should be placed on the fingerprint card before the name is checked by index card file. Currently, the volume is averaging 100 clearances a day. The Identification Section finds itself with the same basic problem as the MPD and NBI in that they spend all their time processing requests for clearances and have little time for the primary responsibility of processing criminal information. PC currently has approximately 230,000 sets of fingerprint cards in file. There was a fire in 1958 which burned the main building in which the majority of all records were destroyed. Approximately 3 million sets of fingerprints were destroyed.

The area utilized for processing applicants for clearances is small and crowded and this in itself reduces output. The fingerprint cards are not all housed in filing cabinets. Some are in open drawers and some in makeshift cabinets. The room is crowded and the operation congested.

The following tables represent the statistical data of the output of the Central Records Branch. Some statistical information does not agree with other information obtained. Please refer also to Records Section statistics:

Fingerprint Cards in File
(posted chart in office)

1959	12,102	1963	81,550
1960	27,200	1964	102,660
1961	44,312	1965	125,707
1962	62,436	June 30, 1966	230,346*

Fingerprint Cards Received from Provincial Co.

	1962	1963	1964	1965
Total	4,134	1,878	1,469	493

Records Check Name Requested

	1962	1963	1964	1965
Total	9,713	17,701	7,192	4,853

Fingerprint Cards in File
Estimated
(furnished by ID personnel)

	1962	1963	1964	1965
Total	62,436	81,550	120,660	125,707
Added during the year	-	19,114	21,110	23,047

Index Cards in File
(Fingerprint Card Indexing)
Estimated

	1962	1963	1964	1965
Total	68,568	88,000	109,631	133,320
Added during the year	-	19,414	21,651	23,660

---

*According to the Chief of the Branch this figure is due to a sudden surge in forwarding by Provincial Headquarters. This could mean that 104,639 persons were arrested in the first six months of 1966, or that contributing agencies purged their files to reach this total.

Records Section

The Records Section is housed in one part of the CIS Building. The building is open and affords poor protection to records and index cards. It will be noted in the photograph that the index cards are housed in open bins. There are no drawer stops in the back. The only thing that keeps the index cards upright is the sheer volume in the bin. There are no index file guides in this file. The chances for filing errors are great. Out-cards are not used when an index card is taken from the file.

The following is the workload of the section as presented by the Chief, CRS:

	1962	1963	1964	1965
Communications received	39,566	35,813	36,869	45,833
Records classified and filed	38,122	36,719	33,173	43,126
Clearance verified	8,440	8,171	9,849	9,760
Records check conducted	16,555	18,597	20,832	14,973
Index cards typed and filed	29,429	24,810	14,348	152,093*
Outgoing communications typed	636	1,932	1,314	3,676
Records borrowed by other Br/Sec	634	561	509	2,092"

*According to the Chief of the Bureau this figure is due to a sudden surge in reporting by Provincial Headquarters. This represents an increase of 137,745 index cards typed and filed over the 1964 total shown.

PC Records Section, Mr. Dimauga, NBI and Capt. Tinio, PC

Currently Central Records maintains primarily inactive files or cases that have been closed. The current procedure is shown by the following diagram.



This procedure appears to be sound, as it provides information to those of primary concern. The following table represents a sample of crime reports received from provincial commanders 1963 - 1965.

The second table represents crime reports received from PC Zones during the period January - June, 1966.

Sample of Monthly Crime Reports by Province Received by PC HQ
1963-1964 First Half 1965

Province	No. Due	No. Received		Percent Received of Number Due
Total	90	24	Average	27%
ABRA	30	4		13%
BATAAN	30	3		10%
BATANES	30	17		56%

Monthly Crime Reports Received by Zone
January - June, 1966

Zone	No. Due	No. Received	Percent Received of Number Due
Total	336	40	12%
Zone I	96	16	16%
Zone II	84	3	4%
Zone III	78	14	17%
Zone IV	78	7	9%

From the chart it is obvious that Provincial Commanders are not furnishing reports as required. In discussing this at both Statistics and Central Records it was admitted that there was little follow-up attempted and those attempted produced no results.

The Central Records Section is not a central records repository in the traditional sense. It is rather a storage facility for records that are no longer of value to operating units. Each Branch of the CIS maintains its own records which are indexed and filed. When the record or document is no longer needed it is then forwarded to Central Records. The index card is not forwarded. This means that the newly received records must again be indexed by Central Records. If additional records are received concerning a case on file, the newly arrived reports are again indexed. This is a duplication of work. Each of the CIS Branches maintains their own records. There is obvious duplication of effort. Basic records equipment is lacking. Currently, the Central Records is six months behind on indexing crime reports received.

RECOMMENDATION #2

It is recommended that all criminal investigation service records be centralized in order that the CIS Central Records may function in reality instead of in name only.

It is further recommended that a central complaint followup, and case number system be adopted and adhered to by this unit.

Central Records should become in reality the central repository of criminal case information. This in itself would increase the cooperation among various units within the CIS. Currently each operational unit, Investigative Branch, Special Operations Branch, Vice Control Branch and Legal Branch (Warrants and Alarm) operate independently. This becomes apparent when a clearance applicant must go to five different branches to complete a clearance, since Records actually maintains only a small part of the records data.

A master index file is essential. This file would contain index cards on all persons coming to the attention of the PC. This indexing, however, must be as complete as possible and the index card should list the following information about each person:

Name _____
(Full, first, middle, last) of all parties

Address _____

Date of Birth _____ Place of Birth _____

Height _____ Weight _____

Color of Hair _____ Color of Eyes _____

Date of Incident _____

Location of Incident _____

There are numerous index cards on file with only a first and last name for identification purposes. Complete information would reduce the time required for records checks. There is an obvious need to consolidate all outstanding criminal records within the CIS in one location. Vice information may be a justifiable exception. However, there should be an index card on file in Central Records for all criminal cases including vice which would lead the investigator to the proper area for final information. Vice cases could be accounted for under a silent case system.

There should be a concept of one primary location for all records. Most index cards on file show only a first and last name. In order to "record check" properly complete information must be obtained and centralized in the PC. No exception should be permitted regarding the index cards; vice reports could be accounted for, however, under a silent case system.

Currently, records are maintained by book. Each book is held together by a paper fastener. This method means that to insert additional records, the book must be taken apart. An open file folder would be recommended. There is inadequate filing cabinet space for filing crime reports. Currently, built-in shelves are being utilized for storage. While this is better than open storage, it makes it difficult to quickly locate records since, for the most part, the records are either filed above or below the normal working height. There is a records removal program for administrative records; however, no program has been established for crime records. A microfilm program should be developed to reduce older crime records, five years or older, to microfilm. A viewer printer would then be utilized for hard copies as needed. Index cards become easily misfiled when there are no index card guides. Index guides should be placed in file at a minimum of every one and one-half inches of index cards filed. As a section increases over two inches, a second index card guide would be inserted to reduce the guide distance.

RECOMMENDATION #3

It is recommended that a program of reducing older records (5 years or more) to microfilm be instituted.

RECOMMENDATION #4

It is recommended that new index card guides be obtained and placed in the master name file at the proper guide distances.

Identification Section

The Identification Section is housed in a single large room in the Bureau. Persons are fingerprinted and cards are processed in this same room. There is no statistical information available concerning the number of persons fingerprinted, output totals, pending totals or volume of cards in file. The chief of the section estimated that an average of 200 persons were fingerprinted a day and the daily output of completed work was estimated at two hundred units a day. It is estimated that there are 100,000 fingerprint cards on file and 200,000 index cards on file as of the end of 1965.

Fingerprints are taken on an 8 x 8 form of adequate quality stock. The completed card is then name checked by examining the alphabetical name file. The section maintains three separate name files: (1) Filipino; (2) Chinese and (3) all others. This division of index cards may require checking in three separate index card files. If no information is found, the fingerprints are classified and searched by fingerprint classification. Again the fingerprint card files are broken into three separate areas: Chinese, Filipino, and all others. This breakdown may also require three separate fingerprint card searches. These breakdowns are unnecessary as all index and fingerprint cards should be consolidated.

There apparently is no definite table of organization within the section. One employee is assigned to fingerprint applicants and four are assigned to file index and fingerprint cards. The Section is composed of 13 regular employees with three non-pay job trainees. All regular employees have been in the service for more than 20 years. There is one LLB degree holder, the rest of the personnel are high school graduates. The Chief of the Section is a Supervising Fingerprint Examiner and all other regular employees are fingerprint examiners with salaries of ₱3,108.00 and ₱2,424.00, respectively.

The current procedures require up to 66% more searching time because it is often necessary to search six different files instead of only two. The individual



Bureau of Immigration Fingerprint Card and Index Card File

capability is an unknown quantity; however, personnel have stated that an examiner could classify between 80-100 sets of fingerprints a day.

Their backlog of work is minimal apparently being approximately 2,000 fingerprint cards for filing. Indexing is said to be up-to-date. The index card contains adequate demographic information and includes a photograph of each subject.

The section is in need of filing equipment for both index and fingerprint cards. There is a desperate need for fingerprint card guides and index card guides. All index cards should be merged into one file as should the fingerprint cards be merged into one file. The merger of the files would reduce filing time and searching time.

Bureau of Immigration Fingerprint Card Storage

Central Records Section

No attempt will be made to analyze the content of the records maintained, only the methodology in storage.

The Records Section is made up of ten regular employees and six job trainees. It receives approximately 120 records for file daily. There is now filed in this section an estimated 500,000 alien files. Storage is by open bin filing. The room is open for ventilation and dust covers all uncovered surfaces.

Three different files are kept on each alien. One file is maintained by Alien Certificate Registration Number. A second file is maintained by alphabetical order and a third file is maintained by a modified Dewey Decimal System.

The Immigration Bureau is responsible for the control of persons entering and leaving the Philippines. The current methodology of processing and storage of information is far more complicated than is necessary. Each person entering the country could be fingerprinted and given a number such as is now done with the ACR number. All papers referring to this person would then be filed under the single number. Only three basic units would be required: (1) Fingerprint cards; (2) Index card; and (3) Individual envelope containing all pertinent data.

Bureau of Immigration Records

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION RECORDS AND STATISTICS DIVISION
JANUARY 6,1966





NBI Manila, Processing Applicants for Clearance

National Bureau of Investigation

The NBI Central Records and Identification Division was surveyed in April, 1964, by USAID, Public Safety. From this survey a series of recommendations were made in reorganizing the division, along the classical lines of an Identification division geared to handle a high volume of fingerprint card processing.

USAID in October, 1965, sent a Records and Identification Advisor to assist in the implementation of the recommendations made by the 1964 survey. From October to December, a series of proposals were made and approved by the director. Memorandum Orders were issued and personnel assigned to the newly created Sections within the new CIRSD. The new sections were:

1. Office of the Chief
2. Records Section
3. Statistical Section
4. Classification Section
5. Master Name Index Section
6. Technical Section
7. Assembly Section
8. Typing Section

Each section, with the exception of the Office of the Chief, is headed by a Section Chief who reports directly to the Assistant Director, CIRSD. The Office of the Chief is a staff function of the Chief of the Division. The NBI, as other law enforcement agencies throughout the Republic of the Philippines, is faced with the problem of processing requests for clearances. In addition, it is charged with the responsibility of acting as the national clearing house for criminal and other information as stated in RA 157. The CIRSD receives approximately 200 requests for clearances a day. They are processed in the same manner as all fingerprint cards coming into the division. The processing is as follows:

Applicant completes application form and fingerprint card releasing slip. The subject is then fingerprinted and photographed. The clearance then is sent to the Statistics Section where it is logged in and time and date stamped. After it is date stamped, it is sent to the fourth floor where the Classification Section partially classifies the fingerprint card utilizing only the primary and secondary classification. From the Classification Section, the card is sent to the Master Name Index Section where it is searched. If a positive identification is made, the fingerprint card is forwarded to Technical Section for fingerprint card search. If no identification is made, the card is sent back to Classification Section. It has been found that this method saves from 30 to 40% of the Classification Section's time in not being required to fully classify all fingerprint cards.

The State of California, Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Identification, has found over the years that as many as 70% of the cards need not be fully classified because of previous cards on file. From the Technical Section, if one or more card is on file, the application is forwarded to an Assembly Section where an NBI number is issued. From the Assembly Section all papers are forwarded to the Typing Section for finalizing. The Typing Section sends the papers to the Quality Control Unit of the Office of the Chief. This unit checks the accuracy of all documents and papers. If everything is in order, clearance is signed by either the Unit Supervisor or the Chief of the Division. Fingerprint cards, criminal and noncriminal, also are processed in basically this same manner. (See Flow Chart.)

Prior to December, 1965, the NBI procedures were complicated and ineffective. All identifications were made by name, fingerprint identification was not utilized. As a result of using name identification, an Interview Unit had been developed. This unit interviewed applicants of similar name to those on file in an effort to determine whether or not they were the same. This became confusing and a backlog of unprocessed clearances developed. The old procedure created a backlog

APPLICANT'S ACTION IN REQUESTING CLEARANCE



PROCESS FLOW CHART: PERSON WITH NO RECORD



PROCESS FLOW CHART: PERSON DENYING CRIMINAL HISTORY



PROCESS FLOW CHART: THE PERSON WITH AN ADMITTED HISTORY IN FILE



of some 50,000 units, both in fingerprint cards to be filed and clearances to be processed. Since December, 1965, this 50,000 unit backlog has been reduced to approximately 15,000 units, as of August 1, 1966. If the current progress can be maintained, the NBI will eventually be in a position to deal effectively with an increased volume of work.

The NBI is receiving fingerprints by mail from contributors throughout the Philippines. The following table represents the criminal and civilian fingerprint cards received from January to July, 1966, exclusive of clearances requested in Manila.

Fingerprint Cards Received
January - July, 1966
NBI

	Total	Criminal Cards	Civilian Cards
January	943	701	242
February	2,308	1,705	603
March	2,039	989	1,050
April	1,051	843	208
May	2,648	723	1,925
June	2,907	2,250	757
July	1,205	783	422

Average Monthly Intake - 1,871

While the NBI has been able to slowly overcome the backlog of work, its productivity is low. The average typist can complete less than 50 units of work a day. Classifiers classify at the rate of 100-125 units a day.

The Plantilla of CIRSD authorizes 217 personnel. Currently, 117 are working in the division, 74 in other divisions, and there are 26 vacancies. Of the vacancies, there are 10 technical positions, 11 clerical, and 4 miscellaneous. The personnel structure of the division has been weakened over the years by reassigning personnel to other divisions or temporarily transferring items to people within other divisions. If the CIRSD is to be the national clearing house, these people must be returned because of the increased volume anticipated.

At the present time the local police departments are furnishing monthly reports to two national agencies with each agency requiring different information. In addition to these requirements, the local police are also submitting "spot reports" on major crimes to the PC.

The local police submit a comparatively simple form ST-1 Revised, to the NBI whereas a somewhat more complex typewritten report is prepared and submitted to the PC. The duplication of time and effort required of the local police departments to report to two agencies is both wasteful and inefficient. The PC and the local police would both derive more benefit if the desired information was obtained by a more "in depth" search of the police department's records and files during the regularly scheduled PC inspections. Currently the inspections being conducted tend to not explore sufficiently in the area of the most important criterion for evaluating the efficiency of any law enforcement agency, the solution of crimes. The local police, however, should continue to submit the required monthly report to the NBI as is specifically recommended in another section of this report.

The Statistics Section has one calculator on which to develop all crime statistics for the Republic of the Philippines. Most of the work done by hand are simple calculations. It is the statistician's feeling that the revised reporting procedures will enable the Statistics Section to provide a greater variety of information nationally. The system will also provide local law enforcement officials information as to the type of crime being committed, by day of commitment and by time of commitment.

Observations

The USAID in the past few years has committed technical, commodity and participant support to the NBI. FY-66 represents the first assistance in the records and identification field. The NBI and other identification agencies surveyed have sufficient personnel to accomplish their current volume of work, if these people were utilized effectively and there was adequate equipment and supplies furnished. Under the old NBI fingerprint identification system, the Technical Section was required to make three separate fingerprint card searches, civilian, criminal, and alien. Currently, the civilian and criminal files are being merged by male and female. The alien fingerprint cards have not been consolidated, primarily because of their deteriorating condition. By utilizing the procedures established in 1965, the Bureau should be able to handle an increase in the volume of fingerprint cards. The Division is now receiving from all sources approximately five to six thousand fingerprint cards a month for processing. This is a small volume compared with the potential capability of this division if the personnel have proper supervision, motivation, and equipment. CIRSD, as other areas of Philippine law enforcement communities, tend to complicate records-keeping procedures. Each section within the CIRSD has a minimum of two people assigned simply to log papers in and out of sections. Even with this check, papers periodically are misplaced. By U.S. standards, production of the division is weak; however, it is felt that this division, if staffed with all the CIRSD personnel now assigned to other divisions and re-equipped with typewriters, could process in excess of 5,000 units per day.

RECOMMENDATION #5

It is recommended that the CIRSD personnel now assigned to other divisions within the NBI be returned.

It is further recommended that this division be re-equipped with 30 standard typewriters for the typing section and an additional 50 legal-size filing cabinets in order to handle the consolidation and the anticipated input.

The following tables represent the input of fingerprint cards in file, fingerprint cards received, clearances requested, and record check by names, made.

NBI
Fingerprint Cards on File
FY 1962-1965

	1962	1963	1964	1965
Cards on File	1,573,979	1,654,446	1,726,707	1,816,605
Received for Processing	164,020	80,467	72,229	89,930
Clearance Requested	37,978	35,147	30,901	31,522
Record Check Names Requested	113,823	106,357	66,414	67,881

NBI Records Procedures

The NBI maintains numerous types of criminal and noncriminal records. These deal with administrative records or in-house records, criminal investigations, and requests for technical and investigative assistance and other records. Under the current procedure, there is no one location receiving all requests for assistance. The CAPU, Complaint Action Processing Unit, receives all walk-in requests. Letters and other requests coming into the NBI P.O. Box 1830, are received by the Administrative Division. Teletyped requests are also received by the Administrative Division. Telephone requests are received and forwarded to the division concerned. The Central Records Section of CIRSD for the most part acts as a repository of inactive case files and administrative records. Mail coming in is either opened by the Administrative Division, dispatched to the appropriate division, or opened by the Officer-In-Charge. Mail is then forwarded as the flow chart describes.

There is no follow-up system concerning requests received and there is no single case number system utilized by all divisions concerned with an individual investigation, rather each technical division maintains its own numbering system for each individual case, and the Investigation Division uses an NBI case number. The investigative units ultimately may request an NBI file number from the Administrative Division; however, there is no prescribed time when this request is made.

During FY 66 the NBI handled 7,109 cases. Utilizing a figure of approximately 200 agents, this represents approximately 35 cases per agent. Since 1961 the caseload of the NBI has been:

Investigative Cases Received and Terminated
FY 1961-1966

	Total Received	Total Terminated	Percentage Terminated
Grand Total	34,229	24,992	73.0%
1961	4,808	3,988	82.9%
1962	4,766	4,012	84.2%
1963	5,260	4,088	77.7%
1964	4,965	4,345	87.5%
1965	7,321	4,227	57.7%
1966	7,109	4,332	60.9%
Cases NOT Terminated		9,237	27.0%

This accounts for 34,229 cases received by the NBI from FY 61 to FY 66. During this same period, the NBI has been able to resolve or terminate 24,992 cases or 73 percent of those cases received. The current records system provides for no method of administratively closing a case. This a procedure by which a case may be removed from the active caseload of an agent pending further developments. The over-all reporting procedure may be described as being loose. The format of the investigation report is open and the individual agent is at liberty to explore a case with few guidelines. This liberty results in a considerable amount of time being required to index a case as the indexer must read or review the complete case to determine the names to be indexed.

NBI CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR PROCESSING INCOMING REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL/INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE



This procedure described may take from several months to several years to complete. Indexing of the case report or a request, if possible, should be done shortly after it has been determined that the NBI will work on the incident.

Court Cases

The NBI through the Department of Justice receives copies of criminal informations and dispositions of court cases. These are indexed, bookbound and filed. The court case information is of considerable value; however, there has been no positive way of connecting a specific person to the data. Recommendations have not been made as yet that would supplement or replace the current procedure. In time, it is anticipated if all persons arrested are fingerprinted, that the informations and dispositions would find their way to the subject's NBI jacket for filing.

Microfilming

The NBI over its years of existence, has collected numerous records such as court case records, investigative reports, and administrative records. At some time in the future, as these records continue to accumulate, some consideration must be given to microfilming. It should be remembered, however, that when the volume reaches a point where microfilming is desirable, that every effort be made to have this done.



NBI Manila, Records, Bookbound style

NBI Office, Pampanga. Note case files being filed in a standard clothing locker.

Questionable Records

Over the years the NBI has acquired from various governmental agencies, records that were no longer of use to that particular agency. Specifically, obsolete drivers licenses have been turned over to the NBI, as have obsolete ICC records and residence certificates. Each of these documents had no value to the agency concerned. Yet, it was the NBI policy that any document collected might be of value someday. Unfortunately, the NBI's records-keeping capacity is nearing its limits. The days are past when records can simply be collected and stored at the NBI. The ICC records have been disposed of with the assistance of the Bureau of Records Management. It is anticipated that obsolete criminal statistics worksheets, obsolete drivers licenses, and residence certificates will also be disposed of, with the assistance of Bureau of Records Management. There is considerable reluctance on the part of NBI personnel to remove the clutter from the records system. It is important that the concept

of having a small amount of accurate information rather than voluminous amounts of inaccurate or ambiguous information be impressed upon the NBI administrative staff.

N.B.I. PROPOSED PROCESSING OF INCOMING REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL/INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE



The NBI should establish a Central Complaint Unit within the Administrative Division. This unit would receive all requests for assistance, through letters, telegrams, radio messages, and those made in person. This unit would receive requests, record them by complaint number, and forward them to the appropriate Deputy Director for action. Deputy Director level in turn would determine whether or not the case warranted further action. If the case warranted further action, a case number would be issued. Each complaint would receive a C-number complaint number and would be filed by this number. Cases would be filed by the usual NBI case number. A tickler file would be used when the preliminary report was due from the investigative or technical division. Preliminary reports should be due within a specified time. Follow-up reports likewise should be due within a specified time and on a routine basis, until termination of the case, clearing the case, or administratively closing it. Once a case has reached the point where no additional information is available, it should be closed administratively. This would keep caseloads from building to astronomical figures as has happened in the past. Furthermore, it would mean that reports would be indexed at their inception rather than at their conclusion, which would then provide greater information to all concerned. Additional names coming to light would be indexed at the time the preliminary and supplementary reports were due.



NBI Manila, Searching fingerprint cards

RECOMMENDATION #6

It is recommended that the present Complaints Action Processing Unit (CAPU) be eliminated and a central complaint unit be established for the purpose of processing ALL incoming requests for NBI assistance, regardless of the source or the means of communication used.

Commission on Election

Introduction

Republic Act 3588 as amended is an act providing for a permanent system of voters. From this act the Commission on Election has been authorized to collect and utilize fingerprint identification as a means of maintaining a permanent record of voters within the Republic of the Philippines.

Location

The National Central File Division, Fingerprint Section, is located in a building currently being renovated from war damages. The building is large and open containing numerous files of the Commission on Election.

Organizational Structure



Commission on Election Name File

Processing Procedures

Processing procedure of this system is basic. The fingerprint card is classified by the Henry System and the classification formula placed in the upper left hand corner. A two-part index card is then typed. The original is filed by alphabetical order, the carbon is filed by classification formula. If a fingerprint card cannot be classified, a mimeographed form is stapled to the file copy and returned to the registrar who requests that the voter return to be re-fingerprinted.

Backlog

The section backlog is 2,600,000-plus units. Currently, those personnel assigned to classifying of fingerprints are issued 50 units a day to classify and process. This is approximately 1,350 units per day.

Problems - Personnel

The section has been operational for only one year. During this time they have been able, with a staff of 25 regular and 18 casuals, 43 persons in



Commission on Election, fingerprint card processing

all, to process 175,000 units. Utilizing an annual work year of 240 days and 50 units per day, a single employee should be able to complete approximately 12,000 units per year. From a view of their FY 66 production, it becomes apparent that the section is not working to their stated capacity. Fifteen people completing 50 units per day should in a year be able to complete more than 80,000 units.

Problem - Equipment

The classifying unit is operating in a poorly lighted area. They do, however, have new fingerprint glasses. There is no commercially made filing equipment for either set of index cards. A steel filing cabinet has been designed and it is hoped eventually that 150 of these units will be procured. However, as of this writing, procurement is only speculative. The cabinets designed will have a capacity of approximately 200,000 cards each. See diagram of index cards and fingerprint filing cards.

Comment

The Commission on Elections system is peculiar to their specific needs. There are six million voters under this system; however, the processing is designed for election procedures and not for identification purposes. If the Fingerprint Section can process at a rate of 200,000 units a year, it will still take 5 years to process one million units and a great deal longer to process the essential six to seven million units. Over-all this system is not applicable to the criminal identification needs of the country.

Commission on Election, fingerprint classification file

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN

Traditionally correctional institutions have maintained records on each person confined. A visitation was made to the Women's Prison to ascertain what type of records were being maintained.

Location of facilities

There is no specific area set aside in the Women's Institution for records, rather the records file is housed with the Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent, and staff, in one open room in the administration building.

Organizational Structure

The records of the institution are maintained by one fingerprint examiner who has been in this position for the past 12 years. She has a college degree and has experience in processing fingerprint cards and other records.

Workload

The Women's Institution receives a modest input of inmates annually:

	1962	1963	1964	1965
Admissions	105	77	85	106

Each inmate confined is fingerprinted three times. Copy No. 1 is maintained by the Institution, No. 2 is forwarded to Men's Institution which houses Central Prison Records, No. 3 is forwarded to the NBI. This latter procedure was begun in 1964.

Processing Procedures

Fingerprint cards maintained by the Women's Institution are classified; however, they are not filed by alphabetical order or by fingerprints, but rather simply maintained in one drawer of the only filing cabinet within the institution. Index cards are made and filed by alphabetical order. The index card file is housed in a box approximately 14 inches long. Approximately 9 inches of the file is made up of inactive index cards, 1 inch is of unused index cards, and the remaining 4 inches are of inmates now in the institution. The inmate count on August 8, 1966, was 187 inmates. The institution's capacity is 250. There is no backlog work at present. Personnel is adequate for the need. There is one filing cabinet that could be utilized for filing fingerprint cards; however, the drawer is not being used for this purpose. It is instead simply a storage place.

Records Keeping Procedures

As inmates depart the prison, their index card and jacket are removed from the active file and placed in an inactive file. If the inmate returns to the institution, both index card and jacket are reactivated.

Each inmate coming into the institution regardless of reason of entry is processed basically the same way. Returning inmates are reassigned their original filing number. The inmate file jacket houses various prison records of the particular inmate and the inmate's jacket is filed by the file number. The inmate is also given a prison number which primarily denotes the length of sentence as to whether or not it is over or under 3 years, 8 months, and 20 days. During the inmate's stay in the prison, she is known by her name and prison number. A carpeta second jacket is also made on each inmate coming into the institution. The carpeta is filed by date of expiration of maximum sentence. This document is utilized primarily as a tickler file so that no inmate is held longer than her legal sentence.

Observations

The filing system appears adequate for the volume. The file jacket contains demographic and court information on the face and assignment data on the back. This eliminates the need for shuffling through a series of documents in an attempt to locate basic data in the jacket. The carpeta, in fact, duplicates the information on file in the jacket; however, it serves the function of warning the institutional administration of sentence expiration. This, of course, could be done by a simple 3 x 5 card file which would eliminate the duplication of the information in the carpeta that is also maintained in the inmate jacket.

NEW BILIBID PRISON

Identification Section

Introduction

The New Bilibid Prison is part of the National Prison System within the Republic of the Philippines. It houses in excess of 7,000 prisoners. Within the New Bilibid Prison is the Fingerprint Section, which contains a collection of fingerprints taken of both civilian and criminal, male and female persons.

Location of Facilities

The Identification Section is located directly off the main corridor leading from outside the prison to the inside security area. This section may be classified as a semi-security section; however, inmates do have access to this area. This factor, by U.S. standards, would be seen as a security hazard; however, it apparently offers no problem in the New Bilibid Prison.

Organizational Structure

The Identification Section is made up of 10 members who have been in the vocation from one to thirty years. Their academic background ranges from High School through College. (See chart). The Section is broken into three units: Clearance Unit, Photography Unit, and Criminal Unit. The Clearance Unit is responsible for processing requests for clearances and processes approximately 50 units a day. The Photography Unit is responsible for photographing inmates or new commitments to prison. The Criminal Unit is responsible for taking the fingerprints and processing new commitments to the prison.

Workload

The Chief of the section states that they process an average of 50 requests for clearance a day. Further, they process approximately 200 inmates (Criminal) per month. Statistical information for this section is lacking. It is estimated at this time that there is on file approximately 41,500 civilian fingerprint and index cards and 224,000 criminal fingerprint card index cards or a total of 265,000 units now in file.

Processing Procedures

Processing procedures of the criminal and civilian fingerprints are standard. An inmate or applicant requesting a clearance is fingerprinted. The name file is first checked to determine whether the name is on file. If no name is on file, the fingerprints are classified, then searched, indexed, and filed. Appropriate notations are made in either case on the clearance or criminal index card. There are three separate fingerprint card systems in the section. The first was a system that was discontinued around 1950. All persons over 40 years of age are searched in this file; however, no additional cards are being entered into this file. The file is similar to a warrant filing cabinet as the drawers are approximately 3" x 8" in width and height. The second fingerprint card system is the criminal system and the third is the civilian system. These two systems also have corresponding index card files. The index cards are typed in duplicate. One copy is forwarded to the documents section along with the inmate jacket. The second copy is filed in either the criminal or civilian index file depending on the type of fingerprint card used. The index card contains name, prison number, file number, and fingerprint classification.

Identification Section
Table of Organization





Men's prison index card filing system. Note need to use lower files to support drawers.

Backlog

The Identification Section is now facing a critical filing problem. As filing space in all cabinets has almost reached capacity, the overflow of fingerprint cards are now being stacked behind the index card file. There are approximately 8,000 civilian fingerprint cards now unfiled. From the discussions there is little hope of additional filing cabinet space.

Problems - Personnel

Aside from the backlog of fingerprint cards to be filed, the section appears to be meeting the daily demands for services. In addition to the standard processing of clearances and commitments to the prison, the identification section is also required to make identifications on all persons leaving the institution temporarily for court or other appearances. They also verify the departure of inmates going out of the institution on parole or direct discharge.

Equipment

If the section is to continue to operate, it obviously must have additional filing cabinet space. The section has the space to add additional filing cabinets and must do so or develop some temporary method of storing fingerprint cards. The section has fingerprint card guides; however, they are in a deteriorating condition. Index card guides are lacking for the most part.

Comment

Again it has been observed that a Section has created work unnecessarily. There should be one index card system and one fingerprint card system. The latter may, if it were necessary, be divided by sex.

Document Section

The Document Section in the New Bilibid Prison houses inmate jackets. These jackets are the same as those utilized by the Women's Prison. The jacket and one index card per jacket is forwarded from the Identification Section to the Document Section. The index cards are filed alphabetically in one of three filing systems: (1) Persons who have died; (2) Released; (3) Active cases, persons now confined. Jackets are filed in three separate systems: (1) Persons who have died; (2) Released; (3) Active - currently in prison. Active jackets are filed by prison number, inactive jackets, died or released, are filed by file number. The file number is a permanent number that is issued and does not change during the lifetime of the inmate while the inmate number may change from commitment to commitment. Prison numbers are issued in 4 series in consecutive order and are followed by the following symbols which mean:

D - Detainer (Case on appeal).
C - Cancel (Sentence from one day to three years, 8 months, 20 days).
SK- Safekeeping (From courts for security reasons).
P - Presedio (Commitment from three years, 8 months, 21 days, or more).

The Bureau of Prison Records has been in operation since 1901. They were not disturbed during either war and there has been no effort to expunge or

Men's prison inmate jackets. Note inactive jackets on top of file.

eliminate obsolete records. The system of filing has grown up over time from apparently a small volume of commitments to one of now in excess of 7,000 per year. The problem of reduction of the volume of records has not been faced, it was stated by personnel of this section that there apparently is no legal objection to the microfilming of many of their records which are no longer in an active status. However, because of budgetary problems this has not been done. The section, typical of most of those surveyed, is in need of proper filing cabinets, both index and legal size. The inmate jackets that are now inactive are placed on top of filing cabinets holding the active jackets. There are a number of questions that could be raised concerning the procedures of handling the inmate jackets; however, as the writer has not had an extensive experience in institutional records management, it would be highly advisable for a person such as a Records Officer III, or Field Representative, Department of Corrections, State of California, to be queried concerning the needs of this system. One obvious question which could be raised is that the inmate jacket, or all information pertaining to this particular individual, is maintained in Central Records and does not accompany the inmate as he is transferred from one prison to the other. It would appear that the correctional staff of the receiving institution does not now receive a great deal of information concerning the incoming inmate. The inmate jacket contains on its face and back a great deal of useful information for the staff working in both custody and treatment areas of the prison system. However, as the jacket is not forwarded with the inmate, it is difficult to understand how custody and treatment can be benefited by the information on file with the prison system.

Statistics Unit

The local Statistics Unit of the prison was not visited; however, in discussions with the Documents Section, they stated that they develop statistics for the over-all prison system. They showed the survey team their statistical report which was typewritten and appeared to be the seventh or eighth carbon copy. This

was their only file copy; however, they did provide the team with a copy of the Insular Prisoner Statistics which is prepared on the inmates confined at Bilibid Prison. This FY 65 statistical report contains exceptionally meaningful statistical data on inmates confined at Bilibid Prison. We were informed, however, that the statistics developed by the Document Section and on a nationwide basis, were not the same as the statistics provided by the Statistics Section. No explanation was made for this. The Bilibid Prison statistical report contains information such as time served by prisoner before release, known prior criminal record, prisoners newly received, type of sentence and length, offenses and area of commitment and other information of criminal statistical interest. This document which was mimeographed presents statistical information that would be useful to a prison administration in projecting population trends, potential length of stay in prison, and other information necessary in budgetary custodial and treatment matters.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Identification

The search for a valid identification medium has been a constantly recurring quest in the history of investigation. At present . . . "the most successful means of identifying a person is that of fingerprint classification, which dates from the beginning of this century."[1]

The identification of individuals based upon fingerprints is based upon the basic principle that no two fingerprints are alike. Several of the national agencies have been collecting fingerprint impressions since the innovation of the system at the beginning of the century. During World War II many law enforcement records were destroyed and along with them fingerprint cards. Bilibid Prison and the Philippine Constabulary were spared, however. Unfortunately, in 1958 the PC fingerprint collection of three million cards was lost in a fire that destroyed the main PC Headquarters.

Fingerprints Currently on File

The following table presents a comparison of fingerprint cards now being maintained by national agencies.

CIW, Correctional Institution for Women is excluded from the table because a copy of all fingerprints are on file at New Bilibid Prison.

The Bureau of Immigration and New Bilibid Prison do not maintain statistical information and the Commission on Election only began their program in FY 65.

It will be noted that the NBI collection represents 73 percent of all fingerprints on file as of FY 65.

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[1] O'Hara, Charles E.: Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, P. 533.

Estimated Number of Fingerprint Cards in File

National Agencies
Republic of the Philippines
FY 1962-1965

	1962		1963		1964		1965	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total on File	1,636,416		1,736,014		1,829,365		2,482,484	100
P.C.	62,436	-	81,550	-	102,660	-	125,707	5.1
N.B.I.	1,573,979	-	1,654,446	-	1,726,705	-	1,816,605	73.2
Bureau of Immigration	- *	-	- *	-	- *	-	100,000	4.0
Comm. of Election	- **	-	- **	-	- **	-	174,672	7.0
New Bilibid Prison	- *	-	- *	-	- *	-	265,500	10.7

* - Data not available
** - Established July 1, 1964

Index Cards on File

The name index card is a method of locating fingerprint cards on file. The index card can be a short cut to the fingerprint file; however, it is of no value

Estimated Number of Index Cards in File

National Agencies
Republic of the Philippines
1962 - 1965

	1962		1963		1964		1965	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Total on File							4,192,992	100.0
P.C.	68,586	-	88,000	-	169,651	-	133,320	3.2
N.B.I.	-	-	2,742,700	-	3,146,775	-	3,520,000	83.9
Bureau of Immigration	- *	-	- *	-	- *	-	200,000	4.8
Comm. of Election	- **	-	- **	-	- **		174,672	4.2
New Bilibid Prison	- *	-	- *	-	- **		165,000	3.9

* - Data not available
** - Established July 1, 1964

if the person being fingerprinted utilized a different name when fingerprinted for the second time. Each of the five national agencies maintains index card files. Each card contains primarily the same basic information. This includes the person's name, basic demographic information, fingerprint classification, and purpose for being fingerprinted.

While that statistical data is limited, it will be seen that the NBI holds 83.9 percent of all index cards on file as of the end of FY 1965.

Requests for Clearance

As has been stated before, numerous national agencies provide clearances to citizens upon request. These are in some part based upon fingerprint identification of the requesting person. The following table represents the estimated daily number of requests for clearances by agency receiving the request.

Estimated Daily Request for Clearance
National Agencies - 1966

	Number	Total
PC Headquarters	100	28.3
NBI Headquarters	200	56.7
Bureau of Immigration	3	.8
Commission on Election	-	-
New Bilibid Prison	50	14.2
Daily Total	353	100.0

Personnel - Production

Personnel or the lack of it is a typical complaint of Chiefs of various identification sections functioning at the national level. The following table will examine the ratio of personnel to work output for the fiscal year 1965.

Rate of Fingerprint Cards Processed
by
Personnel Assigned
FY 65

	PC	NBI	Bureau of Immigration	Commission on Election	New Bilibid Prison
Personnel Assigned	8	117	16	43	10
F/P Cards Received Yearly	8,842	89,930	40,000	174,672	19,000
Ratio per year	1,105	768	2,500	4,064	1,900
Ratio per day (240)	4.6	3.2	10.4	16.9	7.9
Estimated Daily Output of Staff	36.8	374.4	166.4	726.7	79.0

These estimates are based upon questionable statistics received from the various agencies. If the data is relatively accurate, it would indicate that production is quite low.

Each of the various national agencies have technical items, civil service positions. These items range from Fingerprint Aide to Chief Fingerprint Technician. The NBI has the largest number of technical positions of the national agencies. In addition to the 101 positions currently utilized by the CIRSD, there are 59 technical positions assigned to other divisions within the NBI, and 10 positions vacant. In reality, the NBI CIRSD should have 170 technical positions.

An examination was conducted of length of experience by item held. It would normally be expected that the largest number of employees would be at the lowest or entrance level. This however was not the case. The largest is that of the Fingerprint Examiner group, which comprises nearly one half of the total group examined. The median experience of those examined was three years of experience, but less than four. There was found a modest correlation between length of experience and rank.

Productivity of the various technical staff by U.S. standards is low. It has been stated by various identification sections that their daily productivity was from 50 to 200 units of work per day. It has been noted, for example, in the Typing Section of the NBI that it is quite common for one technician to complete from 39 to 40 units per day. Rarely does the production of one person assigned to the Typing Section exceed 50 units per day. The California, Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation has established standards of production. The standard for indexing of fingerprint cards is as follows:

"Average daily production of one typist should be as follows:

"Criminal Index Cards -

Experienced typist (6 months to 1 yr. experience) - 250 cards or more.
Typist's experience (4 to 6 months) - 200 cards.
Typist's experience (2 to 4 months) - 175 cards.
Typist's experience (1 to 2 months) - 125 cards.

Typing of history sheets average daily production should be:

Experience: 1 yr. or more - 100-plus history sheets.
Experience: 6 mo. to 1 yr. - 80 to 100 history sheets.
Experience: 4 to 6 months - 60 to 80 history sheets.
Experience: 2 to 4 months - 40 to 60 history sheets."

The typists of the various fingerprint identification sections are far below this estimated production.

Master Name Index Section records an average production of approximately 150 index cards checked per day. Again utilizing the standard production figures established by the California Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation

we find that the average clerk can process, search approximately 220 index cards per hour. This is again below the production stated by the NBI.

NBI personnel in these figures are simply examples of the productivity of one national agency. Of the national agencies surveyed, the NBI is the only one attempting to maintain productivity control; however, the NBI and other agencies are far more concerned with maintaining logbooks, sorting, arranging and rearranging index cards, fingerprint cards, and backlog, instead of filing them and disposing them.

The following are typical productivity standards established by the State of California for identification procedures. These figures are representative of single processing output:

Fingerprint card searching 30 or more per hour.
Records searches 45 per hour.
Processing of teletype and telephone calls 20 per hour.
Pulling file folder (CII jackets) 180 per hour.

During the past seven months the NBI has significantly improved their production, and it is anticipated that as they gain experience in their newly revised system, their production can reach averages far above what they are now accomplishing. There are, however, two factors facing Philippine agencies that are not being faced by the U.S.; namely, temperature, humidity, and a cultural propensity for complicating procedures. If these factors can be overcome (1) through air-conditioning office facilities, (2) through training, the total current staff should more than be able to handle the current and projected crime increases, in each agency.

Criminal Statistics

The PC for all practical purposes does not maintain national criminal statistics. They are maintaining some statistical data through the use of their daily spot reports. An estimation of offenses reported from provincial commanders to PC Headquarters, Quezon City, during FY 66 is approximately 7,000 cases. The NBI currently received monthly crime reports from approximately 57% of all law enforcement agencies exclusive of PC within the Philippines. The reporting document has been recently modified and it is anticipated that in the next few months a greater percentage of the nation's police departments will be reporting to the NBI.

New Bilibid Prison

The New Bilibid Prison houses a statistical section and document section. Each of these sections are developing separate prison statistics. The New Bilibid Prison statistics for FY 65 are comparable to those developed by many U.S. prison systems. They present meaningful data that would assist the prison administration. The statistics developed by the Document Section concern all prisons with the national prison system. Unfortunately, this report is only typed and the copy shown to the writer could not be read. We were informed that the national statistics were developed differently from those of Bilibid Prison. For purposes of standardization, this is unfortunate since the standardizing of statistics is necessary if data is to be used for comparison purposes.

Records Management

Each of the agencies surveyed maintain a certain aspect of records storage. For practical purposes there is no statistical comparative data available. As stated in the PC Records phase of the survey, PC is receiving only a small percentage of the reports due from the provincial level. The Branches within the PC are maintaining or compartmentalizing their own records, so for practical purposes there is no active Central Records system. The NBI finds itself primarily in the same position in that each of the investigative and technical divisions also maintain their active case files and the central records becomes in reality a repository of inactive documents.

The Bureau of Immigrations

This office compartmentalizes their records. The Bureau of Immigration records are in reality the simplest to maintain in that each document created pertains to a specific person. However, again the records have been compartmentalized and located in various files as stated in Part I.

Commission on Election

The records of the Commission on Election are peculiar to their needs and not designed for a law enforcement agency. They are for the most part broken down in a logical manner as described previously.

Women's Prison

The Women's Prison Maintains less than 200 file folders on inmates at any one time. Their system by its small size presents no significant problem.

Men's Institution

The Men's Institution at Bilibid Prison houses a records file. These records have also been compartmentalized basically the same as those in the other agencies surveyed.

RECOMMENDATION #7

It is recommended that a penologist with extensive prison records experience be provided for a period of ninety days, to survey the present bureau of prisons records problems, and make recommendations for their solution.

While the survey examination of the six agencies within the Republic of the Philippines that maintain fingerprint and other records has been brief, certain obvious recommendations can be and should be made.

RA 157, which created the NBI, directs among other things that the NBI . . . "act as a national clearing house of criminal and other information for the benefit and use of all prosecution and law enforcement entities of the Philippines. Identification records of all persons without criminal convictions, records of identifying marks, characteristics and ownership or possession of all firearms as well as test bullets fired therefrom . . ."

It is apparent from this act that it was the intention of Congress to make the NBI primarily the central clearing house of information for the Republic. As of the end of FY 65, there was an estimated number of 2,882,484 fingerprint cards in possession of the five agencies holding fingerprint records, PC, NBI, Bureau of Immigration, Commission on Election, and New Bilibid Prison. Of these numbers the NBI holds 73.2%. Further, at the end of this same fiscal year there were approximately 4,192,992 index cards on file with these same agencies. Of this number the NBI holds 83.9%. It becomes obvious from these figures that the NBI has the majority of all fingerprint cards on file at the national level. This is exclusive, of course, of fingerprint records held by the military. The PC, Bureau of Immigration, and New Bilibid Prison fingerprint card collections should be consolidated with those of the NBI. The fingerprint collection maintained by the Commission on Election should be excluded from this consolidation because of its highly specialized function and format which is not applicable to standard fingerprint identification methodology.

RECOMMENDATION #8

It is recommended that the fingerprint card collections of the P.C., the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Prisons be consolidated with those of the N.B.I. in order to achieve the objective of a National Clearing House on crime.

It is further recommended that the fingerprint collection of the Bureau of Elections be excluded since it is inapplicable to use for standard fingerprint identification methodology.

Personnel assigned to the various identification sections in Immigrations, Prisons, PC, and personnel holding technical items in various NBI divisions should be transferred to the NBI CIRSD. This would mean that a total of 151 technical positions currently being utilized by these various agencies plus the 59 technical people assigned to other divisions in the NBI, plus the 10 vacant positions, would give a total technical staff of 220 persons to man the national clearing house of fingerprint identification of the national government.

RECOMMENDATION #9

It is recommended that all personnel holding technical items within the identification sections of the P.C., the Bureau of Immigration, and the Bureau of Prisons be transferred to the Central Identification, Records, and Statistics Division of the National Bureau of Investigation.

As has already been recommended, all NBI personnel holding plantilla or technical items of the CIRSD and not now working in this division should be immediately reassigned to the CIRSD. If they are unable to perform the required functions, they should either be trained or removed from the position (item).

Effects of the Act

Central Identification Records and Statistics Division of the NBI would then be able to function as a truly national clearing house. This means there would have to be an end to the compartmentalization of information as is now the practice. It would mean further that law enforcement agencies would be required to work together for a mutual objective, the repression of crime.

What Can the National Agencies Expect from This Consolidation?

Each fingerprint card taken and submitted by a contributing agency would be searched in a truly national repository. Each law enforcement agency would receive in return for their fingerprint card one of the following:

1. A statement that the subject has no other fingerprint card on file.

2. That the subject has additional fingerprint cards on file and a history sheet would be forwarded describing those fingerprint cards now on file. (In the U.S. this would be called the rap sheet or comeback sheet; for the NBI purposes this is called simply a history sheet as it provides a history of both criminal and civilian fingerprint cards on file. See copy.)

The National Bureau of Investigation's identification procedures are designed for large volume input. With 220 technical personnel, with their various ranges of experience, processing the cards, each contributing agency of the national government would benefit.

The NBI should provide each and every law enforcement agency in the country, Local, PC and NBI, with fingerprint cards, NBI Forms 5, 6, 7 (revised 1-1-66). These cards, after completion, are to be returned to the NBI for processing. The NBI would in turn forward to the local agency PC or NBI regional or sub-office a history sheet containing criminal and non-criminal information on the subject based upon fingerprint identification.

RECOMMENDATION #10

It is recommended that the NBI begin at once to furnish a continuing supply of fingerprint cards to every Philippine law enforcement agency. As well as to actively and aggressively enlist their cooperation in the proper and prompt submission of the fingerprint taken of all persons arrested.

It is further recommended that a letter be directed to each agency, fully explaining the need for this program, the requisites for compliance, and the benefits to be derived from cooperating.

RECOMMENDATION #11

It is recommended that because of the heavy volume of mail anticipated, (150,000 to 250,000 cards the first year) coupled with the need for obtaining the voluntary cooperation of the too often extremely poor local police, that the Philippine government extend the privilege of free franking to all documents, concerning this program, forwarded through the mails.

It is further recommended that in order to prevent abuse of the franking privilege that the envelopes used should be of a size (8-1/4" x 8-1/4") suitable for NBI forms number five, six, and seven. The address of the NBI should be printed on the front of the envelope with the further explanation that any alteration will be sufficient cause for non-delivery by the Philippine postal authorities.

Control of the (9-1/2" x 4-1/4") envelope used to return history sheets to the contributing agency must be exercised by the NBI since the nature of their use precludes any possibility of printing addresses.

Criminal Statistics

As has been stated in the past, there are no national crime figures available from the PC. We have been advised that at least one police department in the Rizal Province provides the PC with three copies of the same report furnished to the NBI, as do all cities and municipalities within Rizal Province. However, this information apparently does not reach Camp Crame, PC Headquarters. The NBI, on the other hand, receives statistical data from 57% of all law enforcement agencies, develops this data into meaningful statistics, and presents it.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MANILA

The following is a transcript of the record, as shown in the files of this bureau.

NBI ID Number FPC

PROPERTY OF THE NBI
This report is loaned to you by the NBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

JOSE G. LUKBAN
Acting Director

DATE PRINTED OR RECEIVED	CONTRIBUTOR AND NUMBER	NAME	NATURE OF INFORMATION	REMARKS

* Represents notations unsupported by fingerprints in this bureau.

THIS RECORD FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

RECOMMENDATION #12

It is recommended that the NBI as designated by Republic Act 157 continue as the Sole National Agency to collect nationwide crime statistics.

It is further recommended that the PC discontinue collecting crime statistics on a nationwide basis, and instead contribute its totals on a monthly basis to the NBI as will the local police.

RA 157 also directs that the NBI maintain records on ownership or possession of firearms as well as bullets. The NBI began implementing the section concerning the maintenance of firearms registry of RA 157 on March 9, 1964, and ended the registry in June, 1966. During this period 12,092 weapons were test fired. Two bullets from each weapon were retained by the Bureau. Today, however, the Bureau is no longer processing firearms, nor should it. The PC, from all indications, has been doing a creditable job in this area. In an effort to reduce duplication, this function should be continued by the PC as their new EDP systems is geared for this procedure.

RECOMMENDATION #13

It is recommended that since the PC is particularly qualified, all records on the ownership and possession of firearms, as well as test firing and retention of test bullets, be administered by the Philippine Constabulary.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT - NBI

All national agencies surveyed compartmentalizes and tend to make their records-keeping programs far more complicated and confusing than is desirable.

Currently, the NBI has established a committee to write an operational manual for the NBI. This committee was created on July 1, 1966, and is composed of the Superintendent of the NBI Academy, Chief Records Section, and a USAID Public Safety Advisor. The Committee is working to establish strong administrative guidelines that would include clearly established procedures for the movement of paper within the NBI.

RECOMMENDATION #14

It is recommended that the Central Records Repository of the National Bureau of Investigation becomes so in reality rather than in name only as is now the case. This unit should house active cases and not simply exist as a repository of inactive information.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT - PC

Criminal Investigation Reports

The PC established a crime reporting program on June 14, 1963. However, to date, this program has not been implemented. It is believed that the "spot report" phase of this program should be continued in its present form of providing HPC with daily information on all serious crimes, (Group A). Further, it is believed that to reduce duplication of reporting forms that the PC and the local police should utilize the forms developed in the manual "Police Rules and Regulations", published March 25, 1964.

RECOMMENDATION #15

It is recommended that the Investigative Report Forms as prescribed in "Police Rules and Regulations" be used by both the PC and the local police. It is further recommended that the "spot report" be continued in its present form for providing HPC with daily information on serious crimes.

Each crime investigated would be reported on the appropriate printed crime investigative report. A minimum of five copies of each report would be made with dispersal as follows:

1. Company Level - Two copies
   a. 1 copy for company files
   b. 1 copy to the fiscal
2. One copy - Provincial level
3. One copy - Zone level
4. One copy - HPC

Each level receiving copies of the investigate crime reports should index them. This index card should include at a minimum the name of victim or complainant; address; date offense occurred; type of offense; victim, or complainant's relationship to the offense.

Case Numbers

All Philippine law enforcement agencies should utilize the prefix master number which indicates at a glance the case type or category for filing purposes. Following is the recommended master list.

The company will establish the case number. The case number will be made up in four parts as follows:

6-381-66-5 - This would mean this report was a robbery, from the three-hundred-eighty-first PC company, reported in Calendar year 1966, and was the fifth report of that year.

The provincial headquarters would file the case under this number as would HPC. It will be noted that all crimes reported to a company would be filed together by category. Each year would, in turn, be filed, and lastly, the file would be by the crimes reported during the current year. The provincial headquarters should control the administrative follow-up of all cases.

Statistical Crime Reports

All crimes reported to the PC would be, in turn, reported by them to the NBI on NBI Form ST-1 (Revised), ST-1 (Supplement A), ST-2, and ST-2A.

The PC will report crimes to the NBI in the same manner as all local police agencies report to the NBI. All law enforcement agencies would utilize the standard monthly crime reports. Each local agency would complete two copies of each form a month. One copy would be retained by the agency reporting; one copy would be forwarded to the PC Provincial Commander, who will check it for possible duplication and then forward it through zone and HPC to NBI headquarters in Manila.

This reporting procedure would eliminate the current duplication of effort in reporting to the PC and the NBI. The PC at the provincial level should utilize the crime statistics for administrative control of local police. The NBI at the national level would develop, as recommended previously, the nationwide crime statistics making them always available to the PC. Every effort should be made by the local police, PC, and NBI to eliminate the development of separate forms to accomplish the same task.

PREFIX NUMBER MASTER LIST
for all
PHILIPPINE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

1. Murder
2. Homicide
3. Parricide & Infanticide
4. Physical Injuries
5. Maltreatment
6. Robbery
7. Theft
8. Estafa & Falsification
9. Malicious Mischief
10. Damage to Property
11. Rape
12. Abduction
13. Seduction
14. Lascivious Acts
15. Prostitution
16. Vagrancy
17. Alarm and Scandal
18. Assault/Resistance, to Authority
19. Corruption of Public Official
20. Gambling
21. Slander and Libel
22. Threat and Coercion
23. Trespassing
24. Prohibited Drugs
25. Firearms - Illegal Possession
26. Explosive/Ammo. - Illegal Poss.
27. Deadly Weapon, Concealing
28. Drunk & Disorderly Conduct
29. Smuggling & Other BIR violations
30. All other felonies
31. All other ordinances

Bureau of Immigration

The Bureau of Immigration has a simple task in records management. All records keyed to a specific person identifiable through fingerprints, yet the Bureau has been maintaining three separate files in a records section for each person. In addition, they maintain separate files for all investigative action in another division. We would suggest that a review of this practice be made and that all information pertaining to one specific person be consolidated into one file folder. This file folder would be keyed to the ACR number issued, or if an ACR number is not issued, then it should be keyed to each and every person entering the country. Also, a specific number system should be established that would be used on each fingerprint card taken. This number would be similar to the NBI Identification Number.

Commission on Election

Records procedures appear to be logical in that they are based on the geographical location of the registered voter. We would make no recommendation concerning the management of the Commission on Election.

New Bilibid Prison and Correctional Institution for Women

The confinement institutions have compartmentalized their records similar to the procedure of the Bureau of Immigration. Again, they too have primarily a simple task of maintaining information on each person based on fingerprint identification. We would recommend that all data on the person be housed in one jacket. This jacket would be filed by prison number and be transferred to the institution

holding the inmate and be moved as the inmate is moved to another prison for that Prison's staff use. We would recommend that the inmate be classified by only one number series, as two numbered series tend to complicate the procedure. Further, it is recommended, as stated previously, that a person within either the Federal or California prison system be utilized to assist in the establishment of a records program within the prison system. This person, as stated, should be on the level of a Records Officer III in the California correctional system.

RECOMMENDATION #16

It is recommended that the Bureau of Prisons and the Bureau of Immigration review their records procedures so as to consolidate all data on an individual in one location instead of several.

The one jacket used to house this information should be indexed with the index card filed alphabetically.

POLICE RECORDS MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Sixteen police entities were selected and surveyed as a special sample of the Philippine Law Enforcement Community. The criteria for selection was based upon nearness to the Philippine Constabulary Zone Headquarters. In all three PC Zone Headquarters, 3 provincial PC Headquarters, 2 PC Companies, 3 NBI Regional Offices, and 5 local police departments were visited. (See table of police agencies visited).

POLICE AGENCIES VISITED
August 1966

	PC Zone CIS	PC Province H.Q.	PC Co. Level	NBI Reg. Offices	Local Pol. Dept.
1st day	Zone I	Pampanga	--	Pampanga	Angeles City
2nd day	Zone III	Cebu	341 PC Co.	Cebu	Cebu City
3rd day	Zone IV	Cagayan de Oro	80th PC Co.	Cagayan de Oro	Cagayan de Oro City
TOTAL	3	3	2	3	5

GRAND TOTAL - 16

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

The over-all impression of the records-keeping capabilities of the agencies visited was one of weak, poorly organized systems. Records-keeping capabilities are based upon primarily three principles, the ability to: input data, store data, and the easy output of data. The police agencies surveyed for the most part have a difficult time in drawing data from the records now in file. A series of standard questions were asked each law enforcement agency visited.

In ZCIS, personnel seemed unaware of the operation of the records system. Sergeants, for example, would say one thing and officers would say something else concerning the same records-keeping procedures. One would say fingerprints were taken and another would say fingerprints were not taken.

The NBI, for the most part, maintains the most consistent records system throughout the country. It was found in most cases that there was minimal indexing of crime reports. Of the local police agencies visited only the San Fernando Police Department in Pampanga used printed crime reports. The formats of these reports were taken from the Philippine Constabulary Manual, "Rules and Regulations for Municipal Police." Other than this police department no other law enforcement agency visited, including the PC, used a printed crime reporting system. The NBI does have a limited number of printed forms in use.

The police outside the Manila area tend to simply receive complaints and forward them to the Fiscal for investigation and prosecution. This in itself "solves" crimes. The current criteria for solving a criminal case is as follows:

1. Criminal complaint filed with the Fiscal or the Court.
2. Suspect and victim settle out of court.
3. Complainant is no longer interested in pursuing the complaint.

The basis police procedure followed in criminal actions by the police in the Philippines is as follows:

1. Crime is committed.
2. Victim may go to the police.
3. Police take a statement from victim concerning the occurrence.
4. Complaint is filed with the fiscal or court.
5. Police action completed.
6. Fiscal does actual criminal investigation.



San Fernando Police Department, Pampanga. Case File Folders.

4. Complaint is filed with the fiscal or court.
5. Police action completed.
6. Fiscal does actual criminal investigation.

There appears to be no concept on the part of the police of finding or locating criminal actions on the street and then taking the action. The general practice is to let the victim find the police with the data for prosecution in hand. The police then act as a forwarding agency to the Fiscals.

POLICE MANPOWER

There is a considerable variation in the ratio of police to population in the areas surveyed. The proportion of police to population per hundred thousand ranged from 0.2 per 100,000 of ZCIS personnel in Zone III to 247 officers per 100,000 population in Cebu City. It would be an error to make comparisons or to draw conclusions from this data. The Zone PC of ZCIS varied from 0.2 to 0.4 personnel per hundred thousand population. The provincial level varied from 11 persons per 100,000 population to 39 persons per 100,000 population, and the PC company level varied 8 persons per 100,000 to 11 persons per 100,000. Of particular interest is the fact that the local police range from 97 police officers per 100,000 population to 247 police officers per 100,000 population. To the series of questions asked, such as: Does the police agency "have a blotter or log of events reported?", eleven of the 16 agencies surveyed indicated that they use a log. All local police departments indicated they are using a log. Several departments use a standardized blotter published by the Bureau of Printing. Only 50% of the PC agencies surveyed utilize a blotter or a logbook for processing incoming complaints. Only San Fernando City Police utilize a formal complaint sheet. Most agencies receiving a complaint from a citizen simply "take a statement" about the crime and forward it to the Fiscal. As has been mentioned, the San Fernando City Police has taken the samples from the Rules and Regulations for Municipal Police published by the PC and had them printed for their use. The following is a listing of the printed crime reports used by the San Fernando Police:

1. Police activities report.
2. Robbery/Theft case report.
3. Malicious incidents report.
4. Complaint or crime field report.
5. Death field report.
6. Arrest report.
7. Continuation sheet.
8. Patrol report.
9. Injury report.
10. Traffic Accident report.
11. Prisoners record.
12. Follow-up (progress) report.

Of the agencies surveyed five utilized a system of local case numbers; 15 of the 16 agencies reported that they did take fingerprints; however, only five indicated that they forwarded fingerprints to the NBI, and 2 indicated that they forwarded fingerprint cards to the PC. All agencies indicated that they collected some type of statistics, but again, only 8 indicated that they forwarded statistical data to the NBI and 11 indicated that they sent statistical data to the PC. It will be seen in the table that the PC provides no data to the NBI and that the NBI in turn provides no data to the PC. The local police visited, with the exception of Angeles Police Department, are sending statistical data to both the PC and the NBI. These findings are inconsistent with the national level findings in that only 12% of the statistical data anticipated from the provincial level PC is in fact forwarded to PC Headquarters.

It was found that none of the agencies surveyed maintained:

1. Modus Operandi file.
2. Pawnshop file or file of stolen property filed by serial number.
3. Single fingerprint system.

Ten of the 16 agencies indicated that they did forward information concerning persons wanted to the next lower level of command; however, there is serious doubt that the local police and PC are receiving this data at the working level. When questions as to how a person in the field could inquire whether or not a subject was wanted by PC or local police, the question was oftentimes not answered. Or a comment made, "We just look it up." When pressed as to how they would "look it up", it generally turned out that this would mean going through page after page of ledger books.



Cebu City Police Headquarters. Note that it is located on the second floor, over a market.

There appeared to be little knowledge of the use of basic techniques of records management for field operations, i.e., data concerning wanted persons, stolen vehicles and stolen property, etc. No police agency of those surveyed maintained file folders on an individual subject basis. The Cebu City Police, did, however, utilize the fingerprint card for data concerning the criminal history of the specific subject. The fingerprint card would serve in lieu of the individual jacket. (See copy).

CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT CHART

Name _____ *Classification* _____
(SURNAME) (GIVEN NAME) (MIDDLE NAME)
(PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT PLAINLY)

Aliases _____

Nickname _____ *Reference* _____

No. _____ *Color* _____ *Sex* _____

RIGHT HAND

1. Thumb	2. Index Finger	3. Middle Finger	4. Ring Finger	5. Little Finger
	N-16		N-8	
D-16		D-8		D-4

LEFT HAND

6. Thumb	7. Index Finger	8. Middle Finger	9. Ring Finger	10. Little Finger
N-4		N-2		N-1
	D-2		D-1	

Impression taken by: _____
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING PRINTS)

Date impression taken _____

FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
Left Hand

Note Amputations

LEFT THUMB | RIGHT THUMB

(SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED)

FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
Right Hand

Eleven of the five departments surveyed indicated that they maintained some type of index file. Upon observation, however, it was noted that these files for the most part were extremely small, with the exception of Cebu City, in relationship to the population of the area of responsibility. Index card files, for the most part, were not being kept up-to-date and were being maintained in either small boxes or small files. Two of the three Zone ZCIS did maintain index card file systems. The 1st PC Zone filing system appeared to be relatively adequate; however, for the most part, all files were generally divided or subdivided in a manner that would require from one to four searches for a specific person. The concept of a single master filing system apparently was unknown. Index card files were maintained by Active Cases, Inactive Cases, Persons Wanted, Cases Pending, etc.

CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION DIVISION, CEBU POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY OF CEBU, PHILIPPINES

Record from _____ *Address* _____

Father _____ *Address* _____

Mother _____ *Address* _____

Relatives _____
Address _____

Occupation _____
Residence _____
Place of Birth _____
Nationality _____
Criminal Specialty _____

Age ____ *Date of birth* _____ *Height* _____
Hair _____ *Weight* _____
Eyes _____ *Build* _____
Scars and marks _____

Teeth Identification _____
Reason for prints _____

CRIMINAL HISTORY

NAME	Date Arrested	CHARGE	Date Sentenced	CASE NO.	COURT	DISPOSITION

FUNCTIONAL POLICE RECORDS

The Philippine Constabulary in conjunction with the Civil Service Commission published on March 25, 1964, a pamphlet entitled, "Police Rules and Regulations". In this document, the Chief of PC established "Rules and Regulations for the Government of Municipal Police Forces throughout the Philippines." This document deals with the basic aspects of law enforcement in the Philippines.

Rule 5 presents records and reports. In four pages of text it specifically provides the requirements of police records. Section I states, for example, "Police Records System - The Chief of Police shall maintain an adequate and efficient records system in his forces".

With the exception of the San Fernando Police Department, Pampanga, Rule 5 has not been complied with by either PC or the local police visited. Again, only the San Fernando, Pampanga, Police Department was utilizing these forms. For the most part, the forms are well conceived, but the style of print type used in the printing of the forms should be smaller, thus allowing greater space for typing on the report. Each report, however, provides little or no space in which to identify the police agency reporting. It is recommended that a space at the top of the paper be designated for the name and location of the department reporting. (See samples).

Apparently, the pamphlet, "Police Rules and Regulations", has, for the most part, been a paper exercise. It is obvious a great deal of time and effort has been expended, particularly in the development of the formats for the crime reports. Unfortunately, only a small percentage of the local police have availed themselves of the information provided in this pamphlet.

It is recommended that consideration be given to the utilization of the crime report formats developed in the pamphlet, "Police Rules and Regulations." These crime reports should be printed by the national government on adequate paper stock and furnished to the Philippine Constabulary, National Bureau of Investigation, and local police, at no cost. It is felt that the implementation of standardized, nationwide crime reporting systems would significantly improve the records-keeping capability of the PC, NBI, and local police.

Sample heading #1: Mandaue Police Department
Cebu Province
DISCHARGE OF FIREARM REPORT

Sample heading #2: Mandaue Police Department
Cebu Province
Discharge of Firearm Report

BOOKING INFORMATION

In the past it has been the practice of many law enforcement agencies to maintain booking information in large ledger books. However, in recent years the practice of maintaining booking data in ledgers has slowly been discontinued.

Booking information, just as arrest reports, are now being filed in chronological order by the booking number. Copies of the booking report should be filed as follows:

1. One copy - maintained by jail.
2. One copy to the master records file, filed chronologically, filed with the arrest report.
3. One copy to the subject's identification jacket.

The booking number as well as the case number should be included as part of each arrested person's index card data.

IDENTIFICATION JACKET

Every person arrested by the police department should be photographed and fingerprinted. There is some question among law-enforcement officials as to

SAMPLE 5

Control book used to issue individual jacket numbers

SAMPLE 6



Individual jackets



Cebu City Police Department. Typical ledger books utilized by local police

whether or not every person arrested the first time should be given an individual identification jacket. However, for most departments, it will be more convenient to develop an individual identification jacket on the person at the time of the first arrest.

RECOMMENDATION #18

It is recommended that all Philippine law enforcement agencies establish an individual jacket on each person arrested. This jacket should contain data on the arrestee, such as a copy of the booking information, arrest reports, and other similar information of value to investigators.

At the time of fingerprinting an identification number is issued. This number is the last in the series of file numbers maintained by the police records system. A control book should be utilized for accountability of the numbers. (See diagram).

The subject's individual jacket, fingerprint card, and photograph, all will have the same control number. The subject arrested for all practical purposes can now be known by the control number. This number is also placed on the index card. A copy of the fingerprints should be forwarded to the NBI. Upon receipt by the NBI the Bureau will process and then return to the contributor a history sheet indicating the criminal and non-criminal record of the person based upon fingerprints on file in the Bureau.

FILE DISPOSITION OF CASES

Currently there is a memorandum circular from the Department of Justice to all fiscals and courts requiring them to submit to the NBI copies of information and dispositions of offenses adjudicated by them. The data furnished by the fiscals and the courts is highly informative and commendable; however, from a police point of view, it is impossible to positively identify a defendent by using the information currently being filed at the national level.

This factor alone makes the data furnished for police purposes nearly useless. The final dispositions alone should be forwarded by the fiscals or courts, based on either fingerprint classification of the person or his local police department or NBI number. These simple devices would be used as keys to connect the data in file with the data now being forwarded.

RECOMMENDATION #19

It is recommended that the Department of Justice issue a memorandum to all fiscals and all courts requesting that only the final disposition of cases be sent to the NBI and that the disposition contain one of the following:

1. Set of fingerprints of the defendent, or
2. Local individual, or contributor jacket number, if a fingerprint card has already been sent to the NBI, or
3. NBI identification number if a history sheet has already been returned to the arresting agency.

WARRANTS AND SUBPOENAS

The serving of warrants and subpoenas tends to be a difficult police problem. In the Philippines, it is the general practice to issue the same

warrant or subpoena to the local police, the PC, and the NBI. Hopefully, one of these agencies will make the apprehension or serve the subpoena. It is then the responsibility of the apprehending agency to forward to the court of issuance the completed warrant or subpoena. The court in turn should forward to the other two agencies a recall for the warrant or subpoena in question. On the surface, this procedure appears to be adequate; however, it is not, since large backlogs of warrants exist. To function properly there must be consistent and reliable follow-up if the practice is to succeed on the part of all concerned. In an effort to maintain control of warrants received by police, PC, and NBI, a warrant or subpoena should be treated the same as any other incoming request for police service that requires a case report or number. (See flow chart).

This would mean that the warrant, as any other case report, would go into the tickler or follow-up system and that action would have to be taken at periodic intervals depending upon the requirements of the local agency.

By treating the warrant simply as another case, there will be adequate follow-up which should reduce the number of warrants or subpoenas on file.

RECOMMENDATION #20

It is recommended that warrants and subpoenas be processed in the same manner as any complaint that requires a case report or number, so as to ensure a properly scheduled follow-up procedure.

OPERATIONAL POLICE RECORDS SYSTEM

RECOMMENDATION #21

It is recommended that each of the local police departments establish a central complaint unit, or in the smaller departments designate one member to be responsible for processing all complaints and requests coming to the attention of the agency in order to ensure a proper follow-up.

A police records system is more than simply a process for receiving complaints, writing reports, filing and forgetting them. Complaints to the police may be classified into two basic categories:

1. Complaints handled at the scene of the event that do not require additional action by the police or other agencies.
2. Complaints handled at the scene of the event but requiring additional action on the part of the police and/or other agencies, i.e., fiscal, courts, etc.

It is functionally good police records management to assign a serial number to every event or incident coming to the attention of the police; however, not all incidents will require extensive police service. As the police service improves, the public will develop confidence in the police, and the number of requests for police service will in fact increase. All complaints coming to the police should be given a central complaint number. This means that all complaints must be forwarded or must be processed through one central complaint unit. This unit would issue a complaint number. The complaint number is simply a continuing series of numbers beginning with, for example, C-1 at 12 Midnight, on January 1 of a new year. A complaint sheet then would be filled out on each incident and filed numerically regardless of the offense. No indexing would be accomplished on the complaint sheet alone. The complaint sheet should contain the following data:

1. Nature of the complaint/service.
2. Location of occurrence
3. Name of complainant (as applicable).
4. Address.
5. Telephone number.
6. Date and time complaint received.
7. Unit assigned.
8. Date and time unit dispatched.
9. Date and time assignment completed.
10. Case required? Yes or No.
11. Arrest made? Yes or No.
12. Disposition of Incident - settled by the officer, subject or incident gone on arrival, unfounded, cleared by arrest, exceptionally cleared, not cleared, other, explain.

All incidents coming to the attention of the police which require no additional action on the part of the police are concluded at this point.

The rough complaint sheet, handwritten, is filed in chornological order as a running commentary on the events brought to the attention of the police daily. Those events which are only partially concluded in the field and/or require additional service will be written up on the appropriate crime report as prescribed in the Rules and Regulations for Municipal Police. All events requiring a crime report will also receive case numbers. The case number can be distinguished from the complaint number by using the calendar year following the number, i.e., 11-5783-66. This would mean that the five-thousand, seven-hundred and eighty-third case was a rape, handled by the police agency in calendar year 1966. In addition to the crime report, two smooth copies of the complaint report would be typed by the complaint unit when the case number is issued. One smooth copy of the complaint report would be used as a face sheet of the case report. The second copy would be utilized as a tickler copy for a follow-up system to indicate when the next follow-up report was due for the specific type of case.

All cases can be categorized in the following manner:

1. Actively being investigated.
2. Cleared by arrest or exceptionally.
3. Unfounded.
4. Case closed.

Closing a case should not be confused with clearing a case. A case is closed when it is no longer being investigated and is not assigned to an individual officer. Closing a case is merely an administrative operation and not an investigative accomplishment.

A case is closed and placed in a pending status until additional information is obtained which would warrant it being again actively investigated.

Handling of Offense Reports

The officer investigating the incident requiring a case number will prepare the necessary number of copies of his report depending upon departmental policy. The supervising officer will keep one copy, and then forward the rest to the Records Division. Each department, depending upon its size and number of units or division requiring copies, will establish the number of copies required for each type of crime investigated. The original copy should be approved and signed by the investigating officer and his supervisor. After review by the supervising officer, all copies are forwarded to a Records Division for indexing and distribution. When the Records Division receives the report, the following information should be indexed:

1. All names in the report should be indexed. This should include the complete name, first, middle, and last.
2. Address.
3. Case number.
4. Incident -- Date and Location.
5. Person's relationship to the incident.

The appropriate number of index cards ideally should be made and filed in the following manner:

1. By name of the person on the index card. (Alphabetical file).
2. By the type of crime (victims only).
3. By the location of the crime.
4. Any stolen property should be indexed, whether the property has a serial number or not.
5. All suspects or persons wanted should be indexed.

The Master Name index card file must contain the names of all persons involved in the incident, filed alphabetically. The practice of small index card files for cases pending, cases closed, alien, civilian, criminal, etc., should be discontinued. As this practice requires as many as three or four different searches in an attempt to locate one name in file. One search in the Master Name Index is all that should be required to ascertain whether or not the police department has any information on the subject in question.

Indexing by Types of Crime

The following is an example of the type of indexing that might be utilized by the police agency in indexing crime categories.

1. Death - natural, suicide, accident, traffic, homicide, murder, parricide, other.

In developing a crime index system by type of crimes committed, the primary breakdown will be that of the offense, such as murder, robbery, etc. From there the specific types of murders, robberies, etc., would be grouped together so that the investigator will be able to locate the specific type of category within each offense group.

Location of Crimes Committed

This index is based upon the physical location of occurrence and is filed by the street address of the incident. For example, all offenses occurring on Roxas Boulevard would be filed behind the guide "Roxas Boulevard", beginning with street address number 1 Roxas Boulevard.

Flow Chart of Recommended Crime Records Management



Stolen Property Index

The following formats are samples of stolen property index cards:

Sample 7

ARTICLE	DESIGN OR STYLE	SERIAL OR MOVEMENT NO
WOMEN'S_____ MEN'S_____	SIZE	MONOGRAMS, INITIALS, OR MARKS
MATERIAL COLOR	STONE (NO AND WT.)	SETTING
MAKE OR MAKER'S NAME	CASE NO	
NAME OF COMPLAINANT	TELEPHONE NO	
ADDRESS	DATE	
ENTER ALL LOST AND STOLEN PROPERTY ON THIS FORM	OFFENSE SERIAL NUMBER	

KIND OF WATCH	MATERIAL	WOMEN'S_____ MEN'S_____	NO OF MOVEMENT
KIND OF MOVEMENT			NO OF CASE
MONOGRAMS, INITIALS, INSCRIPTIONS, OR OTHER MARKS			
NAME OF COMPLAINANT		TELEPHONE NO	
ADDRESS		DATE	
ENTER ALL LOST AND STOLEN WATCHES ON THIS FORM		OFFENSE SERIAL NUMBER	

INDEX CARD FOR LOST AND STOLEN WATCHES (3" X 5")

Sample 8



Sample 9



Items with serial numbers can be filed by the last two or three digits of the serial number. (See samples above).

Suspects or Wanted Persons

Suspects or wanted persons are indexed basically the same as all other names appearing on the crime report. The names of the suspects or wanted persons are also filed in the Master Name Index. This eliminates the need for several searches to locate one specific person.

Utilizing this type of records management program of complaint sheets, crime reports, indexing and follow-up system for cases investigated, the police administrator will have an adequate view of the crime problem within his area. Other guides such as spot-pin maps and time studies will also assist in the location of crime problem areas.

Persons Arrested

The arrest and the positive identification of the person arrested are of equal importance. All too often an arrest is made and no attempt is made to learn of the criminal history of that person. An arrest report should be completed for each person arrested. PC Form POL C1-6 provides adequate information. Once this person is brought to the jail or holding area, he should be photographed and fingerprinted. The booking and identification record PC Form POL C1-9 can be modified by excluding from the first page the requirement of taking all ten fingerprint impressions. The right thumb would be sufficient for identification purposes. The standard fingerprint card, NBI Form No. 6 (Revised 1/1/66), should be taken in lieu of the complete fingerprint impressions on the booking slip.

Sufficient copies of the arrest report should be made to allow one copy to be filed with the case report, one copy filed numerically with a copy of the booking slip with all persons arrested, one copy filed in an identification jacket of the person arrested and one copy to the court or fiscal.

FOLLOW-UP SYSTEM

It is essential that the executive head of a law enforcement organization have an administrative control device that will ensure that all cases brought to the attention of the police will receive appropriate action in a reasonable time.

One effective procedure will be found in the use of a follow-up or tickler file system. This file consists of a series of 43 guide cards. Sample 10 presents a typical guide card system. Note that there are 31 cards representing the days of the months and 12 cards representing the months of the year. As a report is received, for example, on January 12, and the departmental regulations require that a supplemental or follow-up investigative report is due not later than January 15, the follow-up slip (complaint sheet) is placed behind the guide for January 16, on which date the following-up officer examines the files to determine whether or not the supplemental or follow-up report had in fact been submitted. In the event the report has yet to be submitted, the follow-up officer would notify the division head responsible for the investigation in order that the matter might receive appropriate action.

If a follow-up slip is to be set ahead for more than a month, it is placed back of the appropriate monthly guide. On the other hand, if it is set ahead for a period less than one month, it will be set b ind the appropriate guide card in the daily section of the follow-up files.

SAMPLE 10

FOLLOW-UP FILE



PC - POLICE RULES AND REGULATIONS

RULE V - RECORDS AND REPORTS

Section 1. Police records system - The chief of police shall maintain an adequate and efficient records system in his force.

Section 2. Organization of records unit - The chief of police shall organize in his force an efficient records unit capable of providing the appropriate services of the line units. The records and identification division (division level) shall be as shown in Fig. 64A. The same may be modified to fit the needs of a small police force by reducing and/or combining the operating units under the three main operating sections, as illustrated.

Section 3. Records of the police force - The records of a police force shall be classified into four general types, namely: (1) complaint; (2) criminal; (3) administrative; and (4) miscellaneous.

a. Complaint records - A complaint record or incident report shall be made on all cases involving a violation of law or ordinance and of calls on which police officers take official action. The chief of police shall require the proper rendition of the following reports for all cases of incidents that call for police action:

(1) Miscellaneous Incident Report (POL FORM C I-1)
(2) Complaint or Crime Field Report (POL FORM C I-2)
(3) Vice Report (POL FORM C III-1)
(4) Missing Persons Case Report (POL FORM C-3)
(5) Injury Report (POL FORM C I-4)
(6) Death Field Report (POL FORM C I-4)
(7) Robbery/Theft Case Report (POL FORM C II-1)
(8) Motor Vehicle Theft Report (POL FORM C II-2)
(9) Traffic Accident Report (POL FORM C-5)
(10) Continuation Sheet (POL FORM C-7)

b. Criminal records - These records shall include all arrest reports and identification records made by the police force. The Chief of Police shall require the proper rendition of arrest reports on all persons arrested. The following criminal records shall be accomplished:

(1) Arrest Report (POL FORM C I-6)
(2) Identification Record (POL FORM C I-7)
(3) Personal Description Sheet (Portriat Parle) (POL FORM C I-8)
(4) Mug Photograph Record
(5) Booking and Identification Record (POL FORM C I-9)
(6) Case Summary Sheet (POL FORM C-8)
(7) Modus Operandi File (POL FORM C I-10)

c. Administrative Records - The chief of police shall maintain the following administrative records in his force:

(1) Correspondence files - These files shall consist of a set of records and copies of communications, such as ribbon copies (originals), carbon copies, copies made by various duplicating or reproducing processes, and related documents, classified and arranged by the subjects to which they pertain. They shall be classified and arranged by subject categories on a subjective functional classification basis, using a standard classification manual prescribed for these files.

(2) Personnel files - These are individual case files of police and civilian personnel employed in the police department.

(3) Property equipment files.

(4) Budget record files.

(5) Reports or materials (not directly related to police work).

d. Miscellaneous record - The chief of police of a municipality shall keep in his force miscellaneous records such as the following:

(1) List of all aliens within the municipality.

(2) List of all firearms holders in the municipality.

(3) Facts about the city or municipality, indicating district, sitios, barrios, all roads, trails, bridges, centers of population, probable trouble spots, and important public utilities.

(4) List of all incumbent municipal and barrio officials and their respective designations.

(5) Copies of all penal ordinances in force in the municipality.

(6) List of all labor organizations, cooperative associations, civic and religious organization, manufacturing plants, and other business installations.

(7) List and description of all army camps and mobilization centers.

(8) Roster of AFP reservists showing current addresses and changes in addresses for active duty training and mobilization contacts.
(9) List of all private security and investigative agencies.
(10) List and addresses of parolees.
(11) Patrol report (POL FORM C-3).
(12) Discharge of firearms report (POL FORM C IV-1)
(13) Such other lists or reports that may be required by the higher authorities.

Section 4. Records follow-up control - The chief of police shall insure the proper follow-up control of all complaints, arrests, and other police matters in an orderly and regular fashion for effective police operations. The follow-up progress report as shown in (POL FORM C-6) shall be used.

Section 5. Monthly and annual police reports. - The chief of police shall render the following reports to the Office of the President:

a. Monthly police activities report (POL FORM C-1) - This report shall be submitted to the Office of the Provincial Governor who shall gather the reports of the municipalities within the province and submit the originals in bunch to the Office of the President not later than the 10th day of the following month. All chiefs of police shall furnish the Constabulary thru the Provincial Commander copies of their reports.

b. Annual police activities report (POL FORM C-1) - This report shall be submitted by following the same procedure in the submission of the monthly police activities report, which should reach offices concerned not later than July 15th of each year.

Section 6. Report of captured and surrendered firearms - The chief of police shall submit promptly to the Chief of Constabulary thru the Provincial Commander a monthly report on captured and surrendered firearms. The chief of police shall turn over on receipt to the nearest Constabulary station for safekeeping and disposition all firearms captured by or surrendered to a member of a police force.

Section 7. Rendition of reports - The chief of police shall render promptly all the reports required of him by the Provincial Commander or proper authority in the municipality or province.

Section 8. Records policy and security discipline. - The chief of police shall observe and strictly implement the following policies and security rules insofar as they pertain to records maintained in his force:

a. Constabulary Officer, NBI Agents, regular police officers and other public officials in the field of criminal justice shall be entitled to use the records of any law enforcement agency for official purposes covered with proper receipts.

b. The relationship between the police and other departments of the government shall be on a formal basis insofar as the use of police records is concerned.

c. The official files of the police department shall be adequately kept and secured from damage by fire, destruction, sabotage, or carelessness. Classified matters shall be separated from the unclassified matters.

d. All official files, documents, records, reports, and information gathered in connection with the apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of criminals shall be regarded as "CONFIDENTIAL." Members and employees of the police force shall not permit the disclosure or use of information contained in confidential records for any purpose other than for the performance of official duties.

e. Erasures in the records of a police force shall be avoided. Changes and corrections shall be made by drawing a red ink line through the words or letters to be corrected and inserted in red ink and correction or change. The initials and police serial number, if any, or badge number of the member making the correction shall also be indicated in red ink, together with the date and time.

f. Police reports and records shall not be moved from a station, precinct, bureau or office, except in conformity with the provisions of law, rules and procedures, or upon the order of the court or any competent authority. Copies of said records, however, may be made by a member when necessary in the performance of police duty.

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Conclusion

Over a period of time it is anticipated that other police record forms will be required. Such forms as unit vehicle dispatch forms, In-Out Patrol Vehicle data, and others, may be needed in the future.

It is anticipated that the requirements of other forms will make themselves known as the system is utilized.

Many law enforcement officials throughout the world assume that record management is basically a simple task. This is an inaccurate assumption. The police administrator cannot effectively administer his agency unless he knows where the agency has been, where it is today, and where it is anticipated that it will go tomorrow. These questions cannot be answered unless there is an effective, dynamic police records program in each law enforcement agency in the Republic of the Philippines.