

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
UNCLASSIFIED

**ASSESSMENT
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU
(CIB)
JAMAICAN CONSTABULARY**

JUNE 1972

**OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

DECLASSIFY after 18 Aug. 76

UNCLASSIFIED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

**ASSESSMENT
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU
(CIB)
JAMAICAN CONSTABULARY**

JUNE 1972

by

ROBERT H. JACKSON, EA/OPS

DECLASSIFY after 18 Aug. 76

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CONTENTS

PREFACE	PAGE 2
PROBLEMS AND RESOURCES	PAGE 3
RECORDS	PAGE 5
INFORMATION GATHERING	PAGE 9
OPERATIONAL CAPACITY	PAGE 16
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	PAGE 17

ANNEXES

- A. FIELD INTERROGATION FORM
- B. FILE CARD CIB FILES
- C. JAMAICAN CID ORGANIZATION CHART
- D. JAMAICAN CID FORM NO. 4

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PREFACE

This report was written to respond to the needs, resources, organizational structure, and personnel of a particular police force. In many instances it does not reflect ideal solutions, but rather those which at this point in time are felt to have the greatest chance of success for the short term. For example, to be of maximum effectiveness an intelligence unit should report directly to the Commissioner of Police; or no lower than his deputy with no layers of supervision between. However, as presently constituted the Assistant Commissioner of Police CID in Jamaica appears to be the highest level where both the policy and decision making process coincides with the operational resources. Even this level will in all probability meet with resistance as being too high in the organization. This is mentioned because of the assignment of a sergeant, albeit soon to be inspector, as head of the CIB with no operational force under his control. It is to be hoped that as the intelligence function becomes truly operational its sensitivity and value as a management tool will be recognized and dictate adjustments in the organizational structure.

Other areas of departure from recognized standards will be noted, and it must be kept in mind that the urgency of making the CIB operational and realities of the situation dictate making the best of the existing climate; this with the hope that steady progress towards the ideal will continue.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS AND RESOURCES

1. The country of Jamaica comprises some 4,400 sq. miles with a population of approximately two million persons. The capital city of Kingston and surrounding metropolitan area contains an estimated population of 850,000 accounting for almost 50% of Jamaica's total populations.
2. The Jamaica Constabulary is a national force of 3,040 officers and men. 293 of these are attached to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Country-wide, there are six geographic "area" subdivisions which are further divided into 161 police divisions, police stations, and police posts. CID personnel are assigned to area and division headquarters, and occasionally, to the police station level. These personnel are operationally under the command of the local area or Division Uniformed Commander, and administratively under command of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, CID. Additionally, there is a 20-man Flying Squad and a Fraud-Squad attached to CID Headquarters in Kingston which also provides the supportive functions of: Criminal Records, Forensic Lab, Photographic Section, Statistical Unit, and Questioned Documents under a separate Technical Division. Criminal intelligence has been placed under this Technical Division. No specific operational role was envisioned for this three-man unit when created. It would presumably function as a repository of information and disseminate this information to appropriate elements within the police as necessary.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3. In addition to the regular police, there is a police auxiliary of approximately 1,000 persons. This unit is authorized to perform a wide spectrum of police duties as needed. There is also a Special Branch which is charged with internal security.

4. Statistics were not available on the percentage of serious crime in the Kingston corporate area as compared to the remainder of Jamaica, but according to local police officials it exceeds the percentage of population in Kingston by a considerable margin. There has been a growing public and Governmental concern over the increase in armed robbery, shooting incidents, burglaries and other crimes of violence within Jamaica and particularly within the Kingston corporate area. Many of these crimes are committed by loosely-organized gangs.

5. To combat this more effectively, a Criminal Intelligence Bureau was proposed by the Jamaica Constabulary. In November of 1971 the bureau was formed and staffed with one sergeant, one policeman, and one policewoman. Since that time, activity of the bureau has consisted mainly of searching the criminal records files for subjects considered to be of potential interest and extracting this information and creating from it a criminal intelligence file. Since the information is already filed in the Criminal Records Office a duplication exists. Unless or until additional information is provided from external sources these files would serve no practical purpose, except in providing a point of departure for the development of further information on individuals selected as likely prospects for further attention, and if the widely-held thesis is correct that the serious crimes are committed mainly

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

by a relatively few individuals. This then is a brief outline of the setting, problems, and resources.

RECORDS

The heart of any intelligence effort lies within the effectiveness of the files. They must supply to the end-user a source of accurate, complete, and timely information. It must furnish information upon which administrative decisions can be based, and also provide information which will develop suspects and eventually lead to arrests. Normal police work can be characterized as action by reaction i.e., a crime occurs and a complaint is made to the police who enter the case after the event. Intelligence ideally would involve the police prior to the crime by providing information of places, events, and persons most likely to produce crimes. Intelligence in a sense attempts to predict the future so that the probable outcome of events may be prevented or altered to the advantage of the police. This information must be: 1) collected, 2) collated, 3) evaluated, 4) filed for instant retrieval, and 5) disseminated.

The files then are crucial to the success of the entire effort. They should be simple, but complete, and cross-referenced to the extent of making retrieval possible from not only a subject's name; but also from aliases, nicknames, girl friends, associates, places frequented, and by crime if appropriate, thereby providing a more complete picture of a subject.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CIB) presently has one 3"x6" card-file filing cabinet with an estimated capacity of 10,000 cards, and six legal-size standard filing cabinets.

Recommendations:

A. That the 3"x6" card files be set up alphabetically by name and cross-referenced to aliases, nicknames, girl friends, associates, places frequented, and by crime. This card should be keyed to the CIB files and also to the criminal records files.

B. That the legal size file cabinets be exchanged for 6"x8" or other size card files to constitute the main CIB files. These cards would contain appropriate identification material on the face and the reverse would be used for one-line incident reports i.e., "subject now working at Ace Construction Co.," etc. One legal-size filing cabinet should be retained for those card files that become too bulky to be contained on the standard card system. It is anticipated that this will occur in only a minimal number of instances. A suggested format for the card files has been left with the CIB.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Because intelligence files are apt to contain raw unevaluated information which to a great extent may be factual, although it may not be supported; and some data will consist of mere suspicion, rumor, heresay, conjecture, etc., it is important then that access to the files be on a "need-to-know" basis. Only those directly concerned as administrators or the action elements should be permitted access to these files. This is important to avoid compromising active cases and to prevent embarrassment to innocent subjects on file, or police personnel who would otherwise be suspect if "leaks developed".

Recommendations:

- A. That the Assistant Commissioner of CID designate by written authorization those persons who will be permitted access to the files and that this number be kept to an absolute minimum.
- B. That all requests for information be channeled through the office in charge of the CIB and that he or his designee do the actual searching of the files so as to maintain control and preserve the integrity of the files.

This is not to suggest that the files become to restricted as to inhibit their usefulness, but only that precautions be taken to ensure that information be provided only to those persons who have a demonstrated need of it.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

To properly utilize information it must be analyzed, evaluated, and correlated with other existing information and placed into a useable form within the files or prepared for dissemination to the proper action force. The person or persons performing the analysis should have a broad range of general knowledge, a retentive memory, consuming curiosity, and a broad background in police activities. He should also be flexible, innovative, and able to make objective and perceptive judgements from often incomplete information. The present officer in charge of CIB would appear to meet these qualifications and has an enthusiastic approach to the challenges of making the CIB a useful tool of the police.

Recommendation:

That the bulk of his time be spent in screening and evaluating such information as is received by the CIB.

A certain amount of information will be incomplete as it reaches the analyst in minor instances, such as: lack of verification of employment, lack of address, make of auto, etc. The officer in charge of CIB should, in addition to his duties as analyst, develop and maintain a broad range of sources of information that do not require operational activities as with the more common type of informant. These should be developed within the legal framework of the country and existing policies of the department.

Sources of information would include schools, banks, loan institutions, utilities, companies, unions, Motor Vehicle Registration Bureaus,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Bureau of Vital Statistics, Credit Bureaus Customs records, etc. All private and governmental agencies which might provide information should be developed. These sources of information and any pertinent information concerning the contact i.e., days off, rank in the organization, "reluctantly gives information", etc., should be filed separately and access to them confined to the officer in charge of CIB and possibly the Assistant Commissioner CID. Any requests for information would be referred to the officer in charge who would make contact with the source and relay the information to the interested officer while at the same time, enter information developed into the files.

These would be his informants, although it is preferable to think of them as sources of information, nevertheless, all discretion applied to informants in general will also apply to these sources even though in some cases they may be governmental employees or leading business people. These sources should be contacted by one person only, and they should be reassured that the information will be kept confidential. The files have been covered first inasmuch as this constitutes the foundation of the intelligence effort.

INFORMATION GATHERING

The physical act of acquiring information takes an infinite variety of forms limited only, by the imagination and resourcefulness of the person assigned the task. The overwhelming proportion, however, will come from overt sources rather than from clandestine operations. The most readily available sources are within the police force itself.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The constable knows his particular beat better than anyone and is sensitive to the movements of people within it and in the performance of his duty has made dozens of acquaintances. He is the recipient of a constant stream of information from persons within his area and his own personal observations.

All uniformed and plain clothes personnel are in possession of varying amounts of important information that needs only to be evaluated and placed in a useable form. This vast reservoir of intelligence then should be one of the first targets of an embryo intelligence organization. By expanding the information collecting capacity of the three members of the CIB to the resources of a 3,000-man force and further expanding to include data from their sources and informants makes the job less formidable.

This force, however, is only of value if it is properly instructed and motivated. It is customary in police work that official written documents contain only information which has been developed as a result of a criminal complaint and which is kept primarily for the purpose of criminal prosecution and can be used in court. Opinion, rumor, conjecture, heresay and the like have little merit in the normal conduct of police business, but this is not the case in intelligence where seeming unimportant bits of information when combined with others may provide the key to a much broader problem. The members of the force must clearly understand the importance of their contribution, but that they are not acting in a covert sense and are to report such information as comes to them during the normal course of their duties. Little

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

notice is taken of the average uniformed man by the public, even in the high crime areas. This is because he is usually a fixture in the area and is expected to be there and no significance is attached to his presence. During routine patrol little attention is drawn to him. For these reasons and the fact that he is a trained observer, he can be an effective source of information.

Reporting by him of this information may be stimulated by making such reports informal in nature. Excessive formality will tend to dry up the source by placing burdensome procedures on the officer. He also needs to be convinced of the importance of such information.

Recommendations:

- A. That all uniformed members be given a short block of instruction on the intelligence function during basic training and at all in-service courses. This should consist of no more than an overview with emphasis on the role of the uniformed man.
- B. That reporting procedures for the uniformed branch be simple and informal. Handwritten on a piece of notebook paper and containing the reporting officers name and station would be adequate. This is ensure that valuable information is not neglected because of cumbersome reporting procedures. This information should be channeled as direct and speedily as possible to the CIB. The

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

station commander would be the most likely person to receive it and then directly from him to the CIB for evaluation.

In addition to providing the above type of information, the uniformed patrol in making routine inquiries of suspicious persons during their tour of duty are required to note in their notebook the names of persons and circumstances surrounding each incident. The information then remains in the officer notebook until such time as he refers to it for any reason.

Recommendations:

A. That all officers be provided with simple mimeographed forms of approximately 3"x6" with space for subjects name, description, address, date, and time of contact, location, vehicle description, reason for contact and officers name and station. (Sample left with CIB.)

Further, that these forms be completed for each incident during a tour of duty and turned in to the station commander at the end of each shift and promptly relayed to the CIB.

B. That the CIB examine these forms and extract any pertinent information daily and then file them chronologically for a period of not more than 30 days and then destroy. Thirty days

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

in most cases should give sufficient time to ensure that all practical use of the information is exhausted. This is not to say that in some specific instances it might not be desirable to retain it longer.

C. That the CIB staff make every effort in the initial stages to spend some time at each police subdivision explaining to the commanders and their subordinates the value of police intelligence as a tool for focusing the resources of the police on the criminal problem. This will entail a certain amount of salesmanship to properly generate an information flow.

The CID investigator also has the potential for furnishing top quality intelligence through his contacts, informants, and as a result of criminal investigations he performs. He should be encouraged to relay this information through the station commander to the CIB. An investigator's informants and sources of information are the tools of his trade, and he may be reluctant to provide intelligence if he believes it is an attempt to take over his informants. He must be reassured convincingly that the interest lies only in the information and not in the identity of the informant. As with the uniformed men the CIB staff initially will spend a great deal of time discussing personally with the CID officers the function of the CIB and selling

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

the concept to them. All CID in-service courses should also include a brief intelligence overview as a regular part of the curricula.

It can be assumed that the working officers, both uniformed and plain clothes, have a good idea of who in their areas are most likely to be committing the serious crimes. Often they do not have sufficient evidence to make arrests. In many cases several officers will have fragmentary information on the same subjects, but due to lack of clear cut evidence have never communicated this information, nor has any official record been made of it.

Recommendations:

- A. That to provide a nucleus of subjects for CIB attention each police subdivision within the Kingston corporate area be requested to submit the names and any other information they have on those persons in their areas suspected of criminal activities of a serious nature.
- B. That if the volume of information in the Kingston corporate area does not exceed the capacity of the CIB to process it that this same system be expanded to include the remainder of the country.

This would occur after operations in the Kingston area had survived the initial growing pains and adjusted from experience to a more or less routine mode. Officers from the outlying stations would not be excluded from the training blocks, nor would solid intelligence be refused by

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CIB from stations other than in the Kingston area. Only that active solicitation would be deferred until the operation in Kingston is fully operational.

The CIB staff would by personal contact secure this list of subjects and after correlation and evaluation; it would serve as the basis for the active file. Periodic updating will be necessary to keep it current and ensure that time and effort are not wasted on unproductive subjects.

When a suspect is arrested and brought to the station in Jamaica a Form 4 is filled out. Form 4 is a comprehensive one page, both front and back, profile of the suspect. It includes a great deal of useful information concerning family, associates, place of employment, etc. If the suspect is not held by the police or is acquitted during a trial, this form is then destroyed. It could not be ascertained if this was required by law or was merely departmental policy.

Recommendation:

That if this destruction is carried out under departmental policy that the policy be examined and if no strong reasons exist for continuing it; that these forms be retained and forwarded to the CIB for extraction of any pertinent information.

Criminal records and fingerprint files are maintained in Jamaica only on those persons who have been convicted of a criminal offense rendering these files useful only to a limited degree in development of intelligence information.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

To be fully effective, an intelligence unit must have an operational capacity in addition to its filing system. Although the information gathered from members of the police themselves, as previously discussed, is vital, it leaves a gap that must be filled. Numerous instances will occur when the information on hand will need to be supported and reinforced to be useful, or where entirely new information is being developed and rapid followup is essential. For this, the CIB needs an operational arm. To be effective, intelligence activities should be the sole function of the operational unit not merely as a part of other duties. The operational unit should not make arrests or testify in court except under very special circumstances when compelling reasons would make it necessary. The role of this unit would be to develop information to the point that regular CID units could step in and with slight further investigation make the arrest and prepare the case for prosecution. Working hours for this unit should be irregular conforming to the habits of their targets and the prevailing criminal patterns of the area. This unit should be provided with sufficient transport and communications equipment to effectively fulfill its mission. Vehicles used should not be identifiable as police equipment, nor should they be in any way conspicuous.

If equipment is not available meeting this criteria, thought might be given to officers using their own personal vehicles on a mileage reimbursable basis. Use of motorcycles, bicycles, and commercial vehicles should not be overlooked. Innovation and imagination should

characterize this units operations. Most policemen look like policemen whether in or out of uniform. This is a matter of carriage, gait, dress, and the many undefinable actions and traits built into the career policemen over a period of time and which normally are highly desirable, but not for officers working intelligence. Men selected for this unit should have the ability not to look like policemen in dress, manner, or action. This may take as much or more self discipline than first gaining the appearance of a policemen.

Recommendation:

That one section of the Flying Squad (six men) be designated as member of the CIB to act as the operational arm in conducting surveillance and investigations supplemental to the other means of information gathering.

This group would be subordinate to the officer in charge of CIB. Adjustments in rank structure may be required to accomplish this in accordance with accepted standards of organization. It would be expected that this group would work closely with the remainder of the Flying Squad who in most cases would complete the investigations and make the arrests themselves or in cooperation with field CID men.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

An intelligence unit is unique in that it is both an operational as well as a support functions; however, it is usually preferable to

place it with the operational functions.

Recommendation:

That the CIB be moved from the Technical Division and placed directly under the Assistant Commissioner CID. To be of maximum value as an administrative and operational tool, the CIB must have the benefit of executive guidance and direction and access to the policy and decision making level without additional layers of supervision between them.

The Special Branch and CIB will frequently unearth information which will be of interest to the other or of mutual interest.

Recommendation:

That clear channels between them be opened at an appropriate level for the exchange of information. A meeting at regularly scheduled intervals might be suggested.

It cannot be overemphasized that police resources are chronically in short supply, and maximum utilization of those available are vital to the success of any undertaking.

In the many discussions with both uniformed and CID personnel, it was apparent that the proposed theory of the CIB would be accepted as

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

fulfilling a need and if properly presented would generate enthusiastic support. For example, a lecture giving an overview of the intelligence function to a class of sergeants was well received and resulted in several sergeants asking the officer in charge of CIB how they could apply for assignment to the unit. A high degree of interest, however, will only be sustained if the CIB is able to show a degree of success. Only through the cooperation of the entire force will this success be possible.

As a prophet of the future, the CIB should not concentrate on the present criminal problems to the exclusion of those that lie on the horizon. As the information flow becomes operational, it will give clear indications of future trends and these should be seized upon to chart new courses of action before they become serious. Narcotics trafficking, for example, gives clear evidence that it is growing more rapidly than enforcement techniques applied to combat it. To be informed and prepared rather than surprised is of primary importance.

Recommendation:

That at monthly intervals a meeting at executive level be held to assess the present and future trends of serious crime with the view of directing the intelligence effort into the most productive areas and those of primary concern.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The danger lies in the intelligence function becoming routine and comfortable after a period of time and losing its forward motion. The meetings would serve to guard against the CIB stagnating and thus becoming ineffective by periodically asking itself: (1) where are we and (2) where do we want to go.

FIELD INTERROGATION CARD

NAME	ADDRESS
DESCRIPTION	
DATE & TIME OF CONTACT	PLACE OF CONTACT
DESCRIPTION OF VEHICLE	LICENSE NO.
REASON FOR CONTACT	
COMMENT	
STATION ASSIGNED	
OFFICER	

Any additional information could be noted on the back of the form. These forms could be mimeographed on standard bond paper and then cut to size and made into pads that each patrol officer could carry with his officers notebook. The size depicted here is 3"x5", but any convenient size would do.

This form is meant to be illustrative only and experience may dictate deletions or additions of material.

GIB FILE CARD

FILE NO. 001

G.R.O. NO. 002

NAME					ALIAS
DOB	HT.	WT.	EYES		HAIR
DISTINGUISHING MARKS, SCARS, TATTOOS, ETC.					NATIONALITY
LAST KNOWN ADDRESS			LIVING WITH		
OCCUPATION			LAST KNOWN PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT		
VEHICLE OWNED					
ASSOCIATES					
RELATIVES					
HANGOUTS					
SUSPECTED OF					
DATE OF PRIOR ARRESTS	CHARGE		PLACE		RESULT
COMMENTS (MODUS OPERANDI, ETC.)					

A picture if available would be attached in an envelope to this card so that it could be removed and used by officers in the field for identification purposes if necessary.

The back of the card would contain one line incident and contact reports. This card is meant to be illustrative only and changes in form and content

page 2

would be anticipated. These cards would constitute the main CIB file.

It is understood that locally procured 6"x8" card filing cabinets are available and for this reason this size has been suggested.

JAMAICA CONSTABULARY

To

Date

THE RECORDS AND IDENTIFICATION BRANCH,
P.O. BOX 462
KINGSTON.

In every case of conviction for any felony or indictable misdemeanour this Form must be completed in respect of each person and forwarded to the above address without delay.

PARTICULARS OF PRESENT CONVICTION

Sentence
Court Date
Offence
Where offence committed
Name of person arresting.

DESCRIPTION OF PERSON

(1) Name, Aliases or Nicknames.

C.R.O. No. (if known) [See (3)]

Address
Place and date of birth
Height: ft. in. Occupation: Build:
Complexion: Face:
Hair: Hair on face:
Head: Forehead:
Eyebrows: Eyes:
Nose: Mouth:
Lips: Teeth:
Chin: Ears:
Hands: Voice:
Marks:
Dress:
Unusual features and Deformities:


(2) Peculiarities of gait, etc., Speech or Figure, Known Habits or Weaknesses, and any other information.

Names and addresses of relatives, giving relationship.

(3) Number of previous convictions (if known). Where C.R.O. number unknown give date of last conviction.

(OVER)

CHAIN OF COMMAND C.I.D.



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFY after 18 Aug. 76.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNCLASSIFIED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



DECLASSIFY after 18 Aug. 76

UNCLASSIFIED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE