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**TUNIS-CARTHAGE
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND PASSENGER TERMINAL
SECURITY REPORT
TUNISIA**

JULY 1972

**OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

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by

MITCHELL A. MABARDY, AID/OPS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I <u>SCOPE OF STUDY</u>	1
II <u>CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</u>	2
A. CIVIL AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY SECURITY PLANNING	2
B. SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES	3
C. SECURITY DETECTION DEVICES AND PROCEDURES	3
III <u>SUMMARY BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE AIRPORT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC</u>	5
A. AIRPORT AND TERMINAL	5
B. TRAFFIC AND TOURISTS	5
IV <u>SCOPE OF AIRPORT SECURITY AND APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES</u>	7
A. CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY AND COMPATIBILITY OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS	7
1. General	7
2. Vulnerability of Civil Air Transportation Industry	8
3. Security Plans Compatible with Facilitation of Operations.	8
B. SECURITY PLANNING	9
1. National Responsibility	9
2. Security Committees	10
3. Airport Security Officer	11
4. Security Responsibilities of Air Carriers and Airport Operations	12

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	<u>Page</u>
5. Processing and Protection of Passengers, Crew and Baggage	13
6. Airport Passenger Terminal Use of Magnetometer to Prevent Aircraft Hijacking	15
7. Security Search Aircraft, Accompanied and Unaccompanied Baggage and Cargo and Facilities	17

ANNEX NO. 1

Security Processing, Protection of Passengers, Crew and Baggage.	1A
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ANNEX NO. 2

Security Search Aircraft, Baggage, Cargo and Facilities	4A
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I. SCOPE OF STUDY

The initial terms of reference for the study addressed the Government of Tunisia's (GOT) request in which they sought advice on metal detection types of security equipment. The equipment is to be installed in the new passenger terminal building, scheduled to open for passenger use about August 1, 1972. The study as initially proposed was to provide for an analysis of requirements in the field of metal detection devices including the latest technical information and cost data. The purchase of the equipment will in all probability be accomplished within the frame work of the present AID airport loan number 664-H-043.

In responding to the GOT request for the study, AID/W made the advisory services of Mitchell A. Mabardy, Office of Public Safety (OPS), Washington, D.C. available to the USAID Mission, Tunisia.

Based on early consultations between the AID/OPS advisor, the USAID Director and other senior officers of the U.S. Mission in Tunisia, it was agreed that study and advice limited to security detection devices exclusively would not be in the best interests of all concerned. There was general agreement that the study effort should, in addition to covering the matter of detection devices and procedures applicable to passengers, encompass in brief summary form the basic and principal elements of airport security programs and plans.

In view of the enlarged framework of reference, the study or any portion may within the discretion of the United States Mission Tunisia be made available to the GOT. It is recognized that the GOT has already developed some plans for overall airport security.

In preparing this report the writer gratefully acknowledges assistance received from the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Appreciation is expressed for FAA documents and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) document 8973 (restricted), "Security Manual for the Prevention of Unlawful Acts Against Civil Aviation" from which material is used to supplement this report in Annexes One and Two.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSA. CIVIL AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY SECURITY PLANNING1. Conclusion

The civil air transportation industry is vulnerable to determined criminals, hijackers and saboteurs who will seek out any vulnerability in the airport security system in order to carry out their attack. It is essential that appropriate measures be taken to effectively assure the safety of people and property. It is necessary that airport terminal passenger security be considered along with all aspects of airport security as a whole to avoid actions which result in fallacious planning. All aspects of airport security must be given appropriate consideration, including the relationship of each to the whole, in formulation of security plans.

To provide adequate plans for passenger and baggage security alone, without sufficient security attention and treatment of the remainder of airport activities results in a state of insecurity.

2. Recommendation

Whereas a security system is being practiced at the Tunis-Carthage International Airport, action to refine and upgrade the existing system and plan should include only those measures which are appropriate to satisfy the needs of the situation. In this regard the ICAO Security Manual document 8973 (restricted) along with this report should serve as guides.

Measures taken to produce a new plan should provide a complete and coordinated security action plan which takes into consideration all elements of the airport including passengers, baggage, cargo, aircraft, warehouses, aircraft maintenance facilities and all shops, all activities located on and which take place on the flying and operational side of the airport, all employees, all vehicles and materials entering the flying and operational side of the airport, concessionaires, etc.

The plan should be well balanced between the movement of passengers and the performance of essential airport operations. Security should be relative and not aimed at absolute protection since absolute security is excessively expensive and virtually unachievable at most airports.

B. SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Conclusion

The reported level of aircraft commercial movements in Tunisia is significant and is projected to more than double by 1980. Information received indicates a much heavier burden will be placed on the existing and planned expanded airport facilities each year and tourism should continue to grow in its importance to the national economy. Security of the Tunisian commercial aviation industry will continue to take on increased importance and it appears appropriate that responsibilities and tasks are properly identified and assigned.

2. Recommendation

It appears appropriate that formal action is timely for the Government of Tunisia to review its assignment of responsibility for the security of the aviation industry. This includes the formal organization and designation of a National Civil Aviation Security Committee, Airport Security Committees and Airport Security Officers. This committee under the Office of Airports Tunisia may require additional expert advisory assistance to prepare and implement detailed airport security plans.

C. SECURITY DETECTION DEVICES AND PROCEDURES

1. Conclusion

With the application of appropriate security measures throughout the entire airport the passenger terminal becomes the single most important location at which security measures may be applied to prevent hijackers from boarding an airplane.

The employment of various items of security equipment such as magnetometers, procedures for screening passengers, visual examination of hand carry-on baggage, body pat-down of passengers and systems for the matching of passengers to hold baggage should be applied to assist in the detection of hijackers.

The airport security action plan which covers the passenger terminal should be designed to establish responsibilities and assign tasks to selected persons who work in the terminal. This includes: airport manager; airport security officer; airline staff and ticket agents; airline employees at the boarding gates; customs, immigrations, police, health and post office officials; concessionaires; and, other as appropriate. The plan should seek to achieve a coordinated effort.

2. Recommendation

The report mentions a number of manufacturers who are producing magnetometers which, because of adaptability and versatility as described in the report, are suitable to the passenger security requirements at the Tunis-Carthage International Airport passenger terminal. Among the manufacturers' products mentioned are the Infinetics Incorporated, Model 3 LM walk-through magnetometer and the handheld MK-7 detector which are examples of what appear to be ideally suited items for the Tunis-Carthage International Airport. The walk-through magnetometer and the handheld detector are suited for use in various modes and combinations at the passenger terminal.

Based on the passenger traffic loads it is recommended that at this time, only two walk-through magnetometers and four handheld detectors be purchased and employed as described in the report.

Approximate cost:

Two Magnetometers of the 3 LM model	\$ 4,200
Four Handheld Detectors MK-7	600
Batteries for Handheld Detectors and shipping costs	1,200
	<u>\$ 6,000</u>

Magnetometers and handheld detectors at the Tunis-Carthage Airport should be employed along with plans, procedures, systems and personnel as suggested in this report, and in ICAO document 8973 (restricted) title: "Security Manual for the Prevention of Unlawful Acts Against Civil Aviation."

III. SUMMARY BACKGROUND INFORMATION, THE AIRPORT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC

A. AIRPORT AND TERMINAL

1. The Tunis-Carthage International Airport is located about 10 kilometers northeast of Tunis and encompasses an area of approximately 5,000 acres. The airport currently has two runways, one is 2,220 meters and the other 3,200 meters in length. The longer runway of the two is capable of handling aircraft as large as the Boeing 747. Along with construction of the new passenger terminal building, a portion of the perimeter fence in close proximity to the terminal is also being erected. This portion of fencing is a concrete slab wall about 6 feet high, it was learned that the balance of the perimeter fencing will consist mainly of a strand or mesh wire cattle type barrier. There is a fire fighting facility located on the airport proper consisting of several new pieces of mobile equipment including an ambulance.
2. The new passenger terminal is an attractive structure. It is organized into various areas and activities which are compatible with one another. The terminal provides space for police, customs, immigration, public health, passenger circulation and holding areas, baggage areas as well as the various ticketing and service activities. The layout of the terminal lends itself to the design of various channeling routes and holding areas for security processing of passengers.

B. TRAFFIC AND TOURISTS

1. Existing studies in country reflect that passenger traffic will increase substantially between now and 1980. Accordingly, plans are being formulated for a phased expansion of all facilities of the new terminal to accommodate the increase.

2. Forecasts^{1/}

The forecast of passenger traffic from 1972 through 1980, arrivals plus departures, plus transit counted once in '000 is:

I n t e r n a t i o n a l

<u>Base Year</u>	<u>Scheduled</u>	<u>Charter</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Domestic</u>	<u>Grand Total</u>
1972	666.0	481.0	1,147.0	51.0	1,198.0
1974	865.0	763.0	1,628.0	68.0	1,696.0
1976	1,124.0	1,212.0	2,336.0	89.0	2,425.0
1980	1,768.0	2,866.0	4,634.0	141.0	4,775.0

The forecast of peak hour passengers is:

1972	640	560	1,200	40	1,240
1974	790	850	1,640	60	1,700
1976	980	1,280	2,260	70	2,330
1980	1,390	2,730	4,120	100	4,220

The forecast of freight traffic in tons uplift and discharge:

1972	-	-	5,710	130	5,840
1974	-	-	6,910	160	7,070
1976	-	-	8,360	195	8,555
1980	-	-	12,290	285	12,575

The forecast of commercial aircraft movements:

1972	11,560	6,210	17,770	1,240	19,010
1974	13,750	8,610	22,360	1,660	24,020
1976	16,360	11,950	28,310	2,170	30,480
1980	21,590	21,570	43,160	3,440	46,600

3. In addition to Tunis Air, the following international airlines serve the Tunis-Carthage airport: Air France, Alitalia, Lufthansa, K.L.M., Swissair, S.A.S., Sabena, British Caledonian, Air Algerie, Royal Maroc, Saudi Arabian Airlines, Libyan Arab Airlines, Aeroflot, Maler, J.A.T., Balkan and C.S.A.

^{1/} Source: O.P.A.T. Spass Associates Analysis Tunis Carthage Airport Terminal Data Feasibility Study, Bovay Engineers, Inc.

4. Tourists visiting Tunisia constitute a significant element in the economy of the country and in 1970 provided 33.2 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings.^{1/} Tourism is highly important to the economic well-being of Tunisia. It is given preferential treatment and is projected to greatly increase over the coming years. It is estimated that in 1972 of the total 1,470,000 arrivals on international flights, 481,000 will be tourists on charter flights, with an additional number coming in on scheduled flights. The number of incoming tourists on charter flights is projected to gradually increase each year, so that by 1980 it will amount to about 2,866,000, as contrasted to 1,768,000 incoming passengers on scheduled international flights and 141,000 on domestic flights.
5. From a security point of view it would appear that the task is narrowed down mainly to scheduled and domestic travelers and flights. In all probability the average run-of-the-mill hijacker or saboteur will find tourist charter flights inconvenient for his purpose. Nevertheless some degree of security alertness aimed at charter flights is essential. In the case of a politically motivated hijacker or saboteur, inconvenience is not a matter of serious consideration and charter tourist flights may offer a certain amount of attractiveness in view of their importance to the national economy.

IV. SCOPE OF AIRPORT SECURITY AND APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES

A. CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY AND COMPATIBILITY OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS

1. General

The civil aviation industry security problems including the appropriate initiatives for establishing a reasonable level of airport security are different in each situation, and in this regard the Tunis-Carthage International Airport is no exception. The writer is fully aware that authorities in the Government of

^{1/} "Tourism in Tunisia" American Embassy, Tunis 3/12/71.

Tunisia have established certain airport security systems and are practicing certain airport security procedures. The report covers some airport security concepts and procedures which would apply in Tunisia. The degree of application would be that which is deemed appropriate within the judgment of responsible authority. The writer has kept expressions on concepts and procedures in succinct and brief summary form, except for guidance for security screening of passengers and security checks of aircraft, baggage (accompanied and unaccompanied), cargo, and facilities which is covered in more detail including annexes one and two.

The writer received information that the Government of Tunisia is a member of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The 1971 Tunisian representative is reported as Mr. A. El Hicheri. The writer recommends that for civil aviation planning this report, with annexes, be used by the Government of Tunisia in conjunction with the French language version of ICAO document 8973 (restricted), title: "Security Manual For The Prevention of Unlawful Acts Against Aviation." Copies of ICAO document 8973 are reported to be in the hands of appropriate civil aviation authority in Tunisia. Additional copies are available from ICAO.

2. Vulnerability of Civil Air Transportation Industry

The civil air transportation industry is vulnerable to various acts of sabotage, attempted threats of sabotage, unlawful seizure of aircraft, and other forms of attack including hijacking and malicious damage to flying and ground equipment. It is essential that the industry be capable of coping with these problems. Primarily, this involves the safety of personnel with the protection of property as a secondary consideration.

3. Security Plans Compatible with Facilitation of Operations

- a. It can be readily appreciated that an effective response to the threats to the air transportation industry is a complete, coordinated and exercised security action plan.

- b. The coordination of the staff activities and efforts of major governmental agencies for carrying out civil aviation security programs, and the organization and development of airport security plans and systems is a time consuming undertaking which requires the use of professional security experts. It is difficult to accurately estimate how long it would take to achieve the appropriate coordination; planning, training of personnel and an adequate operational system in Tunisia. For example, after about two years time, a number of the larger countries concerned with civil aviation security are still working out technical aspects of their systems.
- c. In developing security plans, care must be exercised to achieve a reasonable balance between the application of security measures, and the movement of passengers and the conduct of essential airport operational activities. The civil air transportation industry being such as it is, security should be based on relative, rather than absolute protection, as the cost of security normally increases in proportion to the protection provided. Since absolute protection is virtually unachievable for most airports, security measures and procedures will represent a compromise of values. Measures should be flexible and related to the threat which will vary in degree from time-to-time.

B. SECURITY PLANNING

1. National Responsibility

In Tunisia, the State should assume the responsibility for security policy and planning with the Office of Airports Tunisia placed in charge. Close coordination should be established among the various governmental organizations concerned, such as the Office of Airports Tunisia, Police, Customs, Immigrations, Post Office, Airport Administration, and others as appropriate. Responsibility at the State level and at the Airport level must be clearly stated and assigned.

2. Security Committees

At the State level a National Civil Aviation Security Committee should be designated and at the Airport level an Airport Security Committee designated. Persons designated to serve on committees perform the task as an additional duty to their regular responsibilities. Briefly, the National Committee should be made up of representatives from the activities mentioned in paragraph 1 above, and should be responsible for formulation of broad policy, coordination of international civil air security matters and review of airport security plans. The Airport Security Committee should be composed of counterparts of representatives on the National Committee as well as airport industry, business and airline managers. The Airport Security Committee should:

- ... review security program implementation and plan for the performance of surveys and inspections;
- ... identify airport vulnerability and security priorities;
- ... review the airport security plan;
- ... coordinate airport security activities;
- ... carry out decisions of the National Committee;
- ... review and update security controls for the circulation of passengers and the public, and baggage and cargo handling;
- ... review and update security procedures for processing incoming and outgoing passengers;
- ... review and update security controls for airport industry and other activities which take place on the flying side of the airport.

Care must be exercised to facilitate the smooth and efficient flow of passengers and assure that procedures are not harsh, irritating or embarrassing to the passengers. The Airport Security Committee should receive from the airport security officer and recommend to the National Civil Aviation Security Committee for its approval, airport physical safeguard requirements such as detection and surveillance devices, alarm systems, security fencing and lighting, fire fighting equipment, and other specialized security equipment.

3. Airport Security Officer

The designation of an Airport Security Officer is most essential to the success of an airport security program and the implementation of necessary security actions. The Airport Security Officer should discharge his tasks and responsibilities under the supervision and direction of the Airport Manager. The following are some of the responsibilities of the Airport Security Officer:

- ... writing the plans for the overall airport security systems;
- ... performing surveys and inspections;
- ... coordinating with and advising commercial air carriers and all of the various airport operators in their security roles;
- ... establishing personnel and motor vehicle identification systems;
- ... coordinating fire, rescue and emergency guard activities;
- ... maintaining records, reports and disseminating information;
- ... maintaining liaison with major nearby police and military organizations;
- ... encouraging security awareness and vigilance;

... reviewing systems, physical safeguards, equipment, procedures and implementation of security operations; and, upgrading security procedures and systems.

4. Security Responsibilities of Air Carriers and Airport Operators

- a. It is unrealistic and economically unacceptable to expect to achieve a reasonable level of security through use of police, customs personnel and airport guards alone. All activities and operators located in the terminal and points beyond the terminal in the flying operations portion of the airport should be charged with full security responsibilities in their areas of operations. Personnel who work in the flying operations portion of the airport can do much good in the reporting of and prevention of access by suspicious and unauthorized persons.
- b. The assignment of responsibility to each of the various activities and organizations at the airport is indispensable to the overall security effort and responsibilities must be fully accepted and implemented. All personnel who are employed by the various activities in the airport as a whole including the terminal must comprehend and carry out their individual security duties in their particular areas or there will be no security.
- c. In the terminal, the role of concessionaires will be limited probably to the reporting of suspicious persons and abandoned or suspicious packages, but if their role can be increased, it should.
- d. Ticket counter clerks and baggage clerks have a far more important role to play which is described in the following paragraphs.

5. Processing and Protection of Passengers, Crew and Baggage

a. In some civil aviation operations, whenever there is an increased security threat and greater security measures are required, the practice is:

- (1) Each ticket counter clerk is indoctrinated in advance in standard procedures concerning a number of checks in the form of questions and observations which are applied to passengers purchasing tickets. The questions are part of the normal ticketing procedure and do not arouse suspicion. A suspected hijacker or saboteur is given a coded ticket and identified on the passenger manifest. At the airline terminal boarding gate the suspect is subjected to a magnetometer check and body pat down, and a visual examination of his hand carry-on baggage. He is required to produce identification documentation, additionally, if necessary, reference may be made to intelligence files and wanted lists. His hold baggage is held out and he is requested to open same for examination.
- (2) Visually inspect all hand carry-on baggage of all passengers and air crew using several airline employees to expedite the process.
- (3) Pass all passengers and sealed packages through a magnetometer gate, (a metal detection device).
- (4) Conduct a physical body pat down of all or selected passengers as deemed appropriate. Make certain that baggage and passengers are matched. Each of the carriers has developed a number of methods for matching passengers to baggage using certain checks and double checks. For example at the boarding gate baggage stubs are checked against a record noted along each name on the passenger manifest. If necessary, passengers and baggage may be matched along side the airplane.

- (5) Regarding security of hold baggage, it is the practice to have all such baggage personally passed to the ticket clerk by the passenger or it is definitely not accepted, additionally, the clerk may ask if the passenger personally packed the baggage or observed what was being placed in the baggage.
- b. All of the above described procedures are exercised by personnel employed by the airline carrier with law enforcement personnel standing by the background in case criminal proceedings are justified. It is recommended that in Tunisia airline employees be used as described above and law enforcement agents remain in the background prepared to exercise their authority as appropriate.
- c. During periods in which there is no security threat, it is the general practice of airlines to screen all passengers at the ticket counter using a profile check system. About one out of each 10 passengers is routinely subjected to close examination. Some hand carry-on baggage is given a direct visual examination. Passengers at random may be passed through the magnetometer gate. As appropriate, hold baggage may be matched against passengers by comparing baggage tickets against notations on the passenger manifest.
- d. Airline employees, airplane crews and law enforcement personnel are given a security briefing each time they report for duty.
- e. Because of the significance of this aspect (passenger and baggage security) of airport security in the study being conducted by the writer, detailed procedure contained in Annex One is provided for guidance and use as appropriate in Tunisian airport security operations.

6. AIRPORT PASSENGER TERMINAL USE OF MAGNETOMETERS TO PREVENT AIRCRAFT HIGHJACKING

a. Passenger Terminal Relationship To Airport Security

As a general rule, the passenger terminal is the single most important location at which certain security measures and procedures may be applied to prevent a hijacker from boarding an airplane. Security at the passenger terminal is only one of the elements in the overall security plan for the entire airport. Security practices at the passenger terminal may be conducted realistically and with a confident feeling only when appropriate security measures are being practiced in the entire airport complex in order to protect against the hijacker having access to the aircraft from points outside the passenger terminal.

b. Magnetic Field Detection Devices

A magnetometer whether it be a walk through device or a hand held instrument which is passed in close proximity to the body of a person or a packaged item is essentially a magnetic field detector. Objects made of iron and steel have the same characteristics as permanent magnets and put out a magnetic signal. The earth also has a magnetic field. In describing the manner in which a magnetometer works, it may be simply stated that the earth's magnetic field is compared to a radio transmitter, a gun carried concealed on a person being searched acts like a radio antenna, and the magnetometer with its signal system amounts to a radio receiver.

c. Magnetometers

Magnetometers are gaining in wide-spread use in industry and airport security operations. These instruments are produced with a wide price range which is related to the built-in versatility and capability of the item. Prices range from about one thousand dollars to several thousand dollars.

Magnetometer requirements for the Tunis-Carthage International Airport Passenger Terminal should take into consideration such matters as local electric power, minimum installation and instrument adjustment, instrument mobility and versatility compatibility with the airport terminal job requirements and economy. In this regard the Infinetics, Solco Engineering, Rens Manufacturing Co., Schonstedt Instrument Co., and a number of others are producing suitable instruments.

Cost of the walk-through magnetometer suited for the Tunis-Carthage Airport needs should be about \$2,500, possibly slightly less as the Infinetics Model 3 LM which appears to be ideally suited meets such a price estimate. Portable hand held detectors run about \$150 each.

d. Tunis-Carthage International Passenger Terminal and Detection Devices

The new passenger terminal building at the Tunis-Carthage International Airport being predominantly a stone and cement structure has certain qualities which favor the use of magnetometers for passenger security checks.

The traffic pattern during the initial operation phases lends itself to the use of two Infinetics magnetometers Model 3 LM, and four Model MK 7 hand held short portable hand detectors or similar devices in capability.

Two Magnetometers	\$4,200
Four Hand Detectors	600
Batteries for Hand Detectors and shipping costs	1,200
	<u>\$6,000</u>

The two magnetometers should possibly be employed at the ground level of the two staircases to be used for boarding located at each end of the terminal building.

They should be used in a "Gate Plan" style for check of passengers of a given flight. This point is selected as it is closest to the aircraft and the most removed from other activities of the passenger terminal.

An "Airport Plan" style of passenger checks would call for location of one or more magnetometers in the vicinity of the concourse and passenger holding areas. This then would permit one walk-through magnetometer to service passengers for a number of boarding gates. At the Tunis-Carthage International Airport Passenger Terminal, one magnetometer could be used in a "airport plan" style and the other in a "Gate Plan" style. The "Airport Plan" has its disadvantages as it may prove difficult to control passengers after they have been processed. This problem may be controlled through improved channeling of passengers and the use of barriers and guards.

Hand held detectors may be used in conjunction with walk-through magnetometers or independently.

7. Security Search Aircraft, Accompanied and Unaccompanied Baggage and Cargo and Facilities.

In view of past history, bomb X-ray and fluoroscopic equipment does not appear justified for use in Tunisia at this time. Additionally, such devices are expensive and have not, through extended usage established any record for practical applicability. In the event of a bomb threat the search procedures as contained in Annex Two are proposed for use as appropriate in airport security programs.

ANNEX NO. 1

1A

Processing, Protection of Passengers, Crew and Baggage

Screening procedures and detecting devices should be utilized to detect the presence of weapons on a passenger's person or in his hand baggage. When special detection equipment is not available, suspected passengers and their hand baggage should be searched in accordance with the applicable national laws.

All passengers should be required personally to identify themselves by production of identity documents at the gate position and at any other time deemed appropriate by security officers, so as to establish the identity of the passenger and to verify that the name on the ticket corresponds with that on the identity document. Crew members should also be required to identify themselves.

Passengers and crew members should be required to personally identify their baggage before it is loaded on the aircraft; any unidentified baggage should be removed and checked. Crew members should also check the contents of their baggage to ensure that no explosives have been surreptitiously placed in them. Experience has shown that passengers may carry baggage which does not belong to them or which they may not have packed themselves personally and maintained under their supervision until arrival at the check-in counter. These arrangements will therefore not preclude the necessity to effect physical search or inspection/screening by security devices of baggage prior to its being loaded on to the aircraft. Local circumstances and conditions will dictate the action required.

Security inspection/screening of passengers and their hand baggage should occur at as late a stage as possible, before boarding the aircraft. This may properly be done in the air-side waiting area, preferably at the gate or door leading to the aircraft. Where passenger buildings are constructed with piers and "forward waiting rooms", inspection/screening of passengers and their hand baggage may be done on entering these areas if they are isolated from the public.

When required, passengers and their baggage may be inspected/screened by many methods including physical search by trained personnel. For the rapid processing of large numbers of passengers, inspection/screening should be carried out on a systems basis which may include the use of electronic metal detection devices to identify those individuals and their baggage which require detailed inspection or search. These procedures will be implemented only when greater security is required. However, prior arrangements should be made so that the equipment, facilities and staff are immediately available.

Operators should develop procedures which ensure that normally only baggage of passengers actually travelling on a flight and previously security cleared unaccompanied baggage is loaded on aircraft. This will entail the necessity for correlating the number of passengers who check baggage at the counter with the number of passengers boarding the aircraft.

Responsibility for the carrying out of selective inspection/screening of passengers and their baggage should be agreed upon through and coordinated by the Airport Security Committee.

In all cases, privacy should be assured when physical search is to be carried out. If special rooms are not available, portable screens may be used for this purpose.

When a specific threat exists, consideration should be given to temporarily suspending the check-in of baggage at any point other than the airport check-in counter.

When greater security is required, it is particularly important that the number of passengers on an aircraft coincides with the number of boarding passes issued. This check must ensure that:

- (1) All passengers in transit on the same flight who leave the aircraft reboard it;
- (2) Only originating and transfer passengers board the aircraft;
- (3) Passengers terminating their journey at that stop do not reboard the aircraft. A careful count should be made of all passengers on board the aircraft. This count should also be checked against a pre-boarding count.

Special precautions should be taken to control transfer and transit passengers and baggage, which should include surveillance of transit areas (arrival/departure halls) and baggage storage and sorting areas.

In some circumstances, all passengers may be required to leave the aircraft, all hand baggage and personal effects removed, and the aircraft interior searched. If special circumstances require that some transit passengers remain on board during the search of the aircraft, they should be required to identify their hand baggage and personal effects which should be searched. The baggage of any missing passenger should be removed and searched before the flight proceeds.

There should be inspection/screening of all items such as flight document bags, catering supplies, duty-free purchases, etc., placed on board aircraft.

There should be adequate supervision of catering supplies in order to prevent poisoning, and the surreptitious introduction into an aircraft of fire-arms, a sabotage device or other item, which may jeopardize the safety of the aircraft.

Special procedures should be instituted to prevent tampering with passenger baggage between the point of check-in and loading on the aircraft.

There should be close surveillance of passengers and baggage moving between aircraft and terminal buildings and also of the movement of inter-line baggage. Security escort should be provided where necessary, especially for groups of passengers requiring special attention.

Special measures should be taken to prevent unlawful interference with passengers and to deal with such a situation, preferably before it occurs.

ANNEX NO. 2

Search Aircraft, Baggage, Cargo and Facilities

- a. General. The key to search procedures in a good bomb incident plan is a policy of continuing good housekeeping throughout the facility. Everything used in the area should have a designated place. Even personal objects such as lunch boxes, briefcases, etc., must be stored in specific locations. These locations must not be established near critical equipment. With good housekeeping habits it will be easy for supervisors or search teams to quickly spot anything "foreign" to the area. This, after all, is the best way to locate a homemade bomb. In addition to good housekeeping, the next most important phase of the search procedures is the selection of the search teams. It is a common fallacy to think that a bomb disposal technician or a policeman is best qualified to conduct a bomb search because they know what to look for. On the contrary, since these "Outsiders" probably don't know what does belong in the area they are not the best qualified. Supervisors and others in responsible positions who have continual access and are thus familiar with an area are the best personnel to assign to the search team.
- b. Aircraft.
- (1) Place suspect aircraft in the designated isolated area at least 100 yards from other aircraft, personnel, and facilities.
 - (2) Search team should be composed of aviation technical personnel who are familiar with the aircraft involved.
 - (3) Luggage and cargo should be removed from the aircraft and held in a safe area away from personnel and the aircraft.
 - (4) With all aircraft equipment shut off and the aircraft doors closed, the search crew should stand still inside the aircraft for a few seconds with their eyes closed to attempt to detect any mechanical timer noise within the aircraft.

- (5) If no mechanical timer can be detected, the aircraft must be systematically searched for any item that does not belong in the aircraft. Search should begin at floor level in areas accessible to the public and continue through less suspect sections of the aircraft.
 - (6) If a suspected item is located, it should not be touched and the emergency control officer should be notified immediately so that qualified bomb disposal support may be requested.
 - (7) Search personnel should take no further action except to evacuate the area around the aircraft to a minimum radius of 100 yards and request fire fighting support to stand by in the event of an explosion and fire prior to the time the bomb disposal personnel declare the device safe.
 - (8) After the device is declared safe the search procedures should be completed, as applicable, to insure that no secondary device exists.
 - (9) In the event of an explosion, procedures to provide first aid to injured personnel should be taken first, followed by established damage control procedures. After the effects of the explosion are under control, the search procedure should continue, as applicable, to insure that no secondary explosive device exists.
 - (10) As each subdivision (compartment, etc.) of the aircraft is searched, it should be conspicuously marked with tape or chalk to avoid duplication of effort.
- c. Accompanied Baggage. Search procedures for individual pieces of luggage is a tedious, time-consuming process. This is particularly true of the large, passenger-carrying, turbine-powered aircraft where the excessive delay can have an economic impact. The only solution currently available, other than individual item search, as cited below, is to match baggage with passengers boarded. In this way, only accompanied baggage is permitted on board. This process can reduce reloading time considerably. Of course, this procedure assumes that no passenger will intentionally board an aircraft with a live bomb set to explode during the flight. The low incidence of suicidal bombers or murders via explosions in aircraft substantiates the validity of

this assumption but the risk must be considered when this method is employed. In the event individual baggage is to be searched, the following procedures are suggested:

- (1) Accompanied baggage should be stored separate from unaccompanied baggage and passengers until claimed by each individual owner.
- (2) Passengers will be individually matched with their baggage and then will proceed to the search area. Other personnel awaiting search must be kept at a safe distance from the search area and the baggage storage area.
- (3) Upon discovery of a suspicious item, the baggage should be left as found and the surrounding area evacuated to at least 100 yards.
- (4) The owner of the suspect baggage or any passenger refusing the search of his baggage should be referred to the supporting law enforcement officer.
- (5) The emergency control officer should be notified immediately so that the alerted bomb disposal support can be requested.
- (6) No further action should be taken by search personnel or passengers until the device is declared safe by qualified bomb disposal personnel.
- (7) After the device is declared safe, the search procedure should continue since there is always the possibility of a secondary explosive device being planted to cause additional casualties or damage.
- (8) In the event of an explosion, procedures for providing first aid to injured persons should be initiated followed by established damage control procedures. After the effects of the explosion are under control, the search procedure should be completed to insure that no secondary device exists.

- (9) As each item of baggage is declared safe, it should be marked and sealed by the use of tape to preclude duplication of search effort and opening by the passenger prior to boarding the cleared aircraft.

d. Unaccompanied Baggage and Cargo

- (1) Unaccompanied baggage and cargo should be stored separate from all other baggage and personnel.
- (2) The origin and destination of each item should be checked to determine the validity of the shipment.
- (3) All items that cannot be verified as valid should be segregated from the valid shipments which may be released. Shipments that cannot be verified and are suspect should be placed in a revetted area or pit 100 yards away from other activities and shipment delayed at least twenty-four to forty-eight hours for possible activation of a clock work time delay device. Remember, it is possible for any suspect item to be rigged to explode when it is opened. Only trained bomb disposal experts should attempt to dismantle or neutralize a bomb. Prior arrangements should be agreed upon for use of trained military or police personnel.
- (4) If a suspect bomb is located, it should not be moved or disturbed in any way. An area within a 100 yard minimum radius of the device should be evacuated and fire fighting support should stand by in the event of an explosion and fire prior to the time the bomb disposal personnel declare the device safe.
- (5) After the device is declared safe, the search procedures should be completed as applicable to insure that no secondary explosive device exists.
- (6) If an explosion occurs, procedures to provide first aid to injured personnel should be taken followed by established damage control procedures.

LEADERS OFFICIAL USE

8A

- (7) All unnecessary utilities, such as gas and water, not required to facilitate the search, should be turned off to reduce damage in the event of an explosion.
- (8) In the event a suspected device is located, it should not be touched or disturbed in any way. The central control point should be notified immediately, and the previously alerted bomb disposal support requested. Pending safing of the device by bomb disposal personnel, an area within at least 100 yards minimum radius of the device should be evacuated and fire fighting support should stand by to effect damage control procedures in the event of an explosion.
- (9) After the device is declared safe by the bomb disposal personnel, the search procedures should be completed to insure no secondary device exists.
- (10) In the event an explosion occurs, procedures for first aid to all injured persons should be taken, followed by established damage control procedures.
- (11) After the effects of the explosion are under control, the search procedures should be resumed, as applicable, to insure that no secondary device exists.
- (12) If no secondary device is located, normal operations may be resumed. In the event a second device is located, the above procedures apply.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFY after 22 Aug. 76

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