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TERRORISM
A
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEM

THE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
SEMINAR

15 SEPTEMBER 1973

CLASSIFIED BY John F. Manopoli
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31, 1978

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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FOREWORD

On Saturday, September 15, 1973, the A. I. D. Office of Public Safety sponsored a one day seminar on the subject of Control of Criminal Violence.

The seminar was designed to update AID/OPS personnel on the nature and extent of the criminal violence, or terrorism, threat to diplomatic representatives and facilities, and to private citizens, both overseas and at home. A further purpose of the seminar was to review what the Office of Public Safety has been doing and could further do through its program of assistance to the police forces of foreign governments to better enable host governments to meet their responsibilities for control of criminal violence or terrorism.

Additionally, it provided a forum for exchange of information between various U. S. government agencies concerned with the control of criminal violence; as well as to emphasize the priority that has to be given to U. S. efforts to control international terrorism.

Officials of other U. S. government agencies participated in this seminar as lecturers and panel members and provided an opportunity for the exchange of information and ideas.

It was generally agreed that the purpose of the seminar was effectively realized. Of particular interest were some of the ideas discussed for Office of Public Safety foreign police assistance assets to be more directly focused on measures to cope with the criminal violence and terrorism problem in certain key technical areas.

It was emphasized that the U. S. Government in addition to its multilateral diplomatic and unilateral efforts to protect U. S. diplomatic representatives and facilities, as well as U. S. commercial interests and private citizens, must also rely on the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies of the host governments for security and protection. Assisting host governments,

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where necessary, to improve their capability to provide protection from terrorism is clearly in the U. S. interest in the humane consideration of the safety of their citizens as well as U. S. citizens stationed or living in their countries.

It was suggested that our Government could further assist selected foreign governments to cope with the terrorism problem in a manner similar to that employed in the U. S. approach to the international aspects of the narcotics problem. This includes assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies through exchange of information and through direct support with training, technical personnel, equipment and funding where needed to enable the recipient government to develop more effective law enforcement capabilities.

A particular aspect of police assistance in the telecommunications area was discussed. This is the value of multi-nation, regional telecommunications capabilities for law enforcement agencies to provide for rapid and reliable information exchange in connection with the threat of, or actual, international-type terrorist operations. The example was cited of the Office of Public Safety providing training, technical assistance and commodity support to the police departments of six Central American countries in their establishment of a regional telecommunications network which has significantly increased narcotics information interchange and cooperation between the participating nations. It was suggested that a further extension of this type of assistance on a selective basis should be explored as a criminal violence control measure.

The following pages present synopses of the seminar presentations and discussions. The contributions of the guest participants were major factors in the successful presentation of ideas and information, and their participation is sincerely appreciated.



Lauren J. Goin

Director

Office of Public Safety

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DISCUSSION OF OPS ROLE

Mr. Lauren J. Goin, Director, Office of Public Safety, A. I. D.

Mr. Goin identified the purpose of the seminar as being to review the phenomenon of criminal violence, or Terrorism, in terms of the problems posed to the U.S. and foreign governments, and what the U. S. Government has been able to do to cope with the problems to date, and may be able to do in the future. A further consideration of the seminar was the role of the A. I. D. Office of Public Safety to assist foreign police forces to meet their own responsibilities in respect to domestic and international Terrorism.

When the Civil Police Assistance program of the United States Government was established in 1955, it was as a result of a policy declaration of the Eisenhower Administration which was articulated in the minutes of the National Security Council meeting, Section 1290, sub-section D, and the program in those years was known as the 1290-D program. One of the objectives of the program, and set forth as one of the purposes for providing assistance to the civil police, was to counter Communist subversion and terror. Seven years later the Johnson Committee recommended to President Kennedy that the objectives of a viable and vigorous Public Safety program should include the countering of subversion and terror.

Criminal violence in the very strictest sense of the words can deal with a number of ordinary types of crimes. But it can also, and we use it in this context, mean the criminal activities involving violence as purposeful acts of terrorism to achieve an unlawful objective which is usually political in nature. Many people have a tendency to think in terms of terrorism as a political activity rather than as a violation of the law and thus a civil police responsibility.

The Office of Public Safety has been working with foreign civil police institutions to a limited extent to develop their capability to control criminal violence and terrorism. I am suspect that we have not used our resources to the extent that we can. I don't

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believe that we have really tackled the institutional development questions in those countries that are threatened by terrorism nearly to the extent that we should or that we could with the resources that we have. There is no other nation that has the capabilities represented in the Office of Public Safety to assist foreign nations' civil police forces, to help them do their job.

The Office of Public Safety is concerned with the indigenous skill development. We take an advisory, counselling role rather than a direct operational role in the process.

First, I would like to identify what the terrorism problem seems to be, in a general and specific way, and then, discuss what are we doing about it, and derive finally from all of that what can we do in addition which would be productive and helpful.

In order for a malcontent to be classified as a Terrorist some action has to be taken by him, and this is usually an action of violence, and thus a violation of the law. Terrorist activities vary considerably in their complexity and sophistication. Normally terrorist groups, if organized for long term activity, begin with a clandestine establishment of a popular base recruited from the population. They develop a logistical system, a training cadre, and assure themselves of information relative to their targets they consider to be the enemy.

These groups often, but not always, have outside support. There are numerous instances of material, financial and even manpower support over the past ten or fifteen years from Cuba, or the Soviet Union, or the People's Republic of China. Often these revolutionaries as they would call themselves, are home-grown versions, with their own ideas of the Socialist state.

Manifestations of Terrorism take various forms. A violent riot--a riot in the street may be a terrorist act if it is a purposefully fomented instrument for a special interest group to impose its will on the balance of a society through intimidation.

Murder of police officers and of government officials, kidnapping of diplomats and of industrial representatives, extortion and

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intimidation, arson, robbery for funds or supplies, and aircraft hijacking, are characteristic actions of terrorist groups. Bombing is a particularly violent act. All of these acts are violation of the law and are thus the responsibility of the police to prevent, to investigate, and to arrest offenders. A significant point I want to make is that the perpetrators of these crimes, may be subversive terrorists, and their subversive group may indeed have a political ideological support of one kind or another, and be recognized as an ideological opponent to the government in power. Nevertheless, these people are violators of the law and if arrested and convicted are placed into jail as violators of the law, not because of their political ideology.

Now, what I have just said we, as law enforcement oriented people, understand, as a statement of fact, I believe. But to some extent the press, and too many people are deluded into representing the convicted law breakers as being incarcerated because of political beliefs. So there is a tremendous communications gap between these two lines of thought in our own and other societies.

In a few minutes we will discuss the Tupamaro organization in Uruguay, but before that I would like Public Safety Advisor Morris Grodsky to talk about letter bombs. Letter bombs have come to the fore in the last couple of years in widely scattered countries as a cruel terrorist device.

I have asked Grodsky to talk for a few minutes on this particular subject to give you some insight into the problem.

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THE PHENOMENA OF THE LETTER BOMB

Mr. Morris Grodsky, OPS International Police Academy

There is currently great interest in acts of criminal violence on an international scale. Foreign police officers with whom I come in contact inevitably have questions concerning letter bombs - just what are they, and what can be done about them.

A little historical background indicates that about a year and a half ago the letter bombs first became a factor of major public concern. There is indication that they were invented in the form in which they exist some time before that, but had not been widely used. However, early in 1972, there was a wave of letter bombs around the world and they seemed to originate, at least their mailing origin, primarily in Europe, including the countries of Austria, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. A second wave which attracted far more attention occurred just about a year ago in September and early October. At least 64 letter bombs were sent out at that time to various parts of the world. An Israeli Agricultural Attache in London was killed by the explosion of one of these devices. A postal employee at a New York City post office was also injured. There is a good possibility that this latter incident did not happen during the routine handling of the mail. It is possible that the explosion occurred while that letter was being opened.

The very nature of the letter bomb is that it will not normally explode while in transit, but is designed to detonate at the time that the letter is opened and the contents removed.

There was a third wave of letter bombs in late October of last year. At this time Israeli security agents disclosed that they intercepted three such letters which had been addressed to President Nixon, Secretary Rogers and Melvin Laird. The letter bombs were also sent to some of the Middle Eastern countries, and two of them, I believe, exploded in Beirut, causing injuries to a number of people.

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That is a brief recent history of the letter bomb. Their use is increasingly widespread, evidencing a spread of the technology if not motivation. Certainly it has come to our attention that such devices have been sent as a minimum to Europe, North and South America, Africa and the Middle East. This is an international terrorist weapon.

The letter bombs which have been sent, generally speaking, were in airmail envelopes and were sent by airmail. There may be exceptions to any of the things that I say, but these are the general facts. The letter bombs are normally mailed from outside the country to which they are addressed. I don't know of any such devices which have been sent domestically, that is, received in the same country from which they originated.

Let us discuss briefly the make-up of a letter bomb. It is difficult for people who may not have too much knowledge of the fabrication of bombs and explosive devices to believe that a deadly explosive charge can be placed in such a small container. But we know that it can be. The explosive materials used are extremely powerful, and particularly the plastic explosives can be compressed so that a small amount can have a devastating effect.

The letters are characteristically slightly more bulky than an ordinary letter. The weight, generally speaking, will vary from about two to five ounces. The letter bomb will be a little heavier than the average letter of the same size. The envelope will have some flexibility around the edges. However in the center there will be a rigid rod. These features should arouse suspicion. Suspected letters should be turned over to someone with knowledge of bombs and explosives.

Now how does the letter bomb work? May I simply note that most, not all, letter bombs work on a mechanical principle, having a spring-loaded rat-trap type of device, held under pressure by a folded sheet of cardboard or heavy paper within the envelope. When that is removed and the cardboard is allowed to open, the pressure device is released and the spring activated to detonate the device. Basically, it is a pressure release mechanism.

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I think that everyone was shocked when the secretary in the British Embassy recently suffered such terrible injuries. In a way this shows the contagious nature of terrorism and criminal violence because the original source of the letter bombs, to my knowledge, is thought to be the Arab terrorists known as the Black September group. However, there is an indication, although I don't think there is proof as yet, that the British Embassy device had its origin more in the Irish situation. It is also thought that the British Embassy device differed from the more common pressure release mechanism earlier discussed. Evidence indicates that this was an electrically activated device; basically simply a circuit held open by an insulator. When the contents of the package were removed, two contacts came together, closing a circuit. When the woman removed the contents of that package, she unfortunately suffered the loss of her hands.

What can be done about the letter bombs? Basically it would be well to educate those people who handle mail and who are in a vulnerable position as to the overall appearance of a letter bomb so that should they recognize such a letter, or think they recognize it, they will put it aside and call someone who can do something about it.

There are devices which have been invented specifically to handle this particular threat. A few days ago a gentlemen representing a company which makes such a device was in our office and he left one of the letter bomb detectors with us. I am not here to promote this detector, but so far as I know it is the only one of its kind on the market so it is not exactly a competitive problem. It is called the LETTERGUARD, and this is the Executive Model. The concerned executive places it on his desk and should any letter come in which gives him cause to be suspicious, he can put the letter through the device and it will give out an audible signal if there is any metallic component inside the letter.

The general concensus has been that up to now it has not been possible to design a letter bomb without some metal component. When that happens this device will no longer be effective, but at the present time it is. It can be calibrated to ignore such things as staples and paper clips, and to react only to that particular

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quantity of metal which must of necessity be in a letter bomb.
Those who are interested may examine the detector at the seminar,
and later at the Office of Public Safety.

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TERRORIST GROUP ORGANIZATION - THE TUPAMAROS OF URUGUAY

Mr. Lauren J. Goin, Director, Office of Public Safety

Mr. Goin described the origin, organization and operation of the Uruguayan terrorist group known as the Tupamaros. The Tupamaros have been primarily involved in urban guerrilla activity centered in the capitol city of Montevideo.

The presentation included the projection of a colored slide series illustrating the organization and activities of the Tupamaros. These slides are maintained on file at the Office of Public Safety and are available for review upon request.

The Tupamaros originated in 1962. The founder of the Tupamaros was Raul Sendic, a law student drop-out and a member of the Socialist Party of Uruguay. After a serious political setback for the Socialist Party of Uruguay in the 1962 elections, Sendic and approximately 20 other members disassociated themselves from the Socialist Party and formed their own group.

One of the first illegal acts Sendic and his group committed was to steal several hundred firearms from a gun club in 1963.

From 1963 to 1966 the Tupamaros committed a few isolated acts of terrorism and numerous robberies. During this period they worked to build a Robin Hood image. As an example, in 1963 the Tupamaros hijacked some food trucks and distributed the food in the poorer sections of Montevideo. Another example of the group's attempt to build an image with which the public could identify was in choosing the name Tupamaro for their organization. The name Tupamaro is short for Tupac Amaro, the name adopted by an Inca decendent who led a major uprising against the Spanish in Peru in 1781. The Peruvian Revolt was crushed; however, the name became synonymous with the call to revolution against oppression. Artigas, the "Father of Uruguayan Independence" and his followers were also known as Tupamaros in the 19th century. From its inception, the Tupamaros organization concentrated their revolutionary

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struggle in the cities ignoring the more traditional rural activities popularized by Castro and Guevara. The terrain in Uruguay is predominately flat and offers little protection for guerrillas unlike Cuba, Bolivia, and other scenes of rural guerrilla success.

The group's choice of targets, and its basically non-violent approach in addition to its successes made it a household word in Uruguay. Magazines and newspapers, including the "Readers Digest," described the membership as "modern Robin Hoods." In early 1969, a local Uruguay newspaper, in conducting an opinion poll of average citizens, reported that 40% of the people surveyed believed the group was well-intentioned.

In mid-1969, the Tupamaros began to change their strategy. A captured MLN document dated mid-1969 discussed the end of the period of non-violence and the beginning of a period of broadened objectives and stressed the need for a "systematic confrontation with the regime." From that period onward, they placed increased emphasis on violence. In early July, six attacks on police were made by the Tupamaros, killing five policemen and seriously wounding one.

In mid-1970 the Tupamaros conducted a surprise raid on the National Training Center in Montevideo and carried off approximately 700 weapons and a large quantity of ammunition. This was largely accomplished by using inside help, and without firing a shot.

The Tupamaros' mystique was damaged by a series of kidnap operations in July and August 1970. In the space of one week, the terrorists kidnapped four hostages, one of whom escaped en route to a hideout. They narrowly missed on three other kidnap attempts. Chief Public Safety Advisor Dan Mitrione and Dias Gomide, a Brazilian counsel, were kidnapped on July 31, and Dr. Claude Fly, an elderly Soils Specialist, was kidnapped on August 7. The objectives of the terrorists were to exchange these hostages for the release of approximately 150 "political prisoners" in custody at the time. The Government of Uruguay stood firm and as a result Dan Mitrione was brutally murdered on August 10. This brutal murder caused the Tupamaros a substantial loss of prestige and public support.

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By the end of 1970, 344 Tupamaros had been arrested and 250 remained in jail. The police successes had a serious impact on the Tupamaros. Their well-organized earlier efforts gave way to operations which appeared to be committed by inexperienced recruits.

On September 15, 1971, the police effected their first successful find of a Tupamaro "People's Prison". This was the first of a trend of government success in the anti-terrorist campaign. Following this, dozens of hideout and support bases were discovered; a large amount of explosives, weapons, and material were recovered, many members of the group were arrested, including leaders who had previously escaped from jail. At this time the operations of the Tupamaros are minimal and primarily defensive in nature. There are over 3,000 members in custody, some 45 have been killed, and many have fled the country.

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THE U. S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Interdepartmental Group on International Terrorism.

Ambassador Hoffacker noted that international acts of terrorism and senseless violence have spread from those involving civil aviation and diplomats to the point where innocent people anywhere may be victimized. This was dramatically underscored by the tragedies at the Munich Olympics, the epidemic of kidnapping in Latin America, and the wanton murder of two U. S. diplomats and a Belgian official in the Sudan.

Every nation has a humanitarian obligation to do all within its power to prevent the spread of terrorist acts. Bilateral cooperation is important but the worldwide nature of the problem also requires action by the community of nations. U. N. Secretary General Waldheim, for one, has taken useful initiatives in this respect.

The U. S. Government has responded vigorously to this serious challenge. Last September President Nixon established a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism to consider, in his words, "the most effective means to prevent terrorism here and abroad." He asked Secretary of State Rogers to chair this Committee, which includes also the Secretaries of the Treasury, Defense, and Transportation, the Attorney General, our Ambassador to the U. N., the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and the President's Assistants on National Security and Domestic Affairs. The President directed this body to coordinate inter-agency activity for the prevention of terrorism and to devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur.

Under the Cabinet Committee, a Working Group was named by the President comprising personally designated senior representatives of the members of the Cabinet Committee. It is this Group which I chair, which meets frequently and which is in daily contact as issues arise and incidents occur.

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We have asked all of our foreign reporting posts, as well as Washington agencies, to give highest priority to terrorist-related intelligence. We ensure that such intelligence is fully coordinated in Washington so that there is the broadest use of this precious resource. A weekly report is prepared summarizing and evaluating the voluminous influx of intelligence from all government agencies.

Abroad, security at our embassies and consulates has been much improved. I have recently testified before a Senate committee in support of a request for \$21 million for personnel and materials to better our overseas security and hopefully reduce the risk which our official personnel suffer throughout the world.

We are mindful that our mandate also covers unofficial Americans. We spend a great deal of time - and are happy to do so - with American businessmen with overseas interests. We share with them security techniques and experiences. Although we may not agree on tactics such as the advisability of paying ransom, it is important that we stick together in tight situations where terrorists, some of whom are more mercenary than ideological, have taken advantage of serious internal security deficiencies to kidnap businessmen for increasingly higher ransom.

Visa, immigration and customs procedures have been tightened. The regulation allowing a foreigner to transit the U. S. without a visa has been suspended except for passengers with immediate onward reservations to a point outside the U. S. This suspension applies to every traveller on a non-discriminatory basis. In the past, approximately 600,000 visitors per year were allowed to spend up to 10 days crossing the U. S. without prior approval or screening. This loophole has been closed.

Last fall Congress approved a public law aimed at increasing protection for some 22,000 foreign officials in the U. S. through the creation of federal criminal offenses for various acts directed at foreign officials and official guests. Under this legislation the FBI has investigative jurisdiction concurrent with that already held by local law enforcement authorities.

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The Federal Government has alerted all post offices and likely targets of letter bomb activity. Of the more than 195 letter bombs known to have been mailed internationally, seven have been intercepted in the U. S. by alert customs and postal employees and citizens.

The anti-hijacking program has been stiffened. One hundred percent screening of passengers and hand luggage has been in effect since January 5. There have been no successful hijacking attempts in the U. S. during the first six months of this year as compared with 14 successful hijackings during the first half of last year.

If in spite of all our efforts, an act of international terrorism should occur, we are prepared to deal with it swiftly and effectively. If the action takes place in the U. S. and is within federal jurisdiction, the FBI is responsible for responding to such an act. All federal departments and agencies have indicated their readiness to assist the FBI in such circumstances. Mechanics for prompt response to requests for equipment and men have been worked out.

Tactics vary in each crisis situation, but one consistent factor should be understood by all parties concerned: the U. S. will not pay ransom to kidnapers. President Nixon made this clear following the murder of our two senior diplomats in Khartoum in March, and I quote him: "The nation that compromises with the terrorists today could well be destroyed by the terrorists tomorrow."

The outlook is not as promising as it might be. There seems to be increased collaboration among terrorist groups of different nationalities. Such groups seem to be moving farther and farther afield, including to North America. There is moreover evidence of new and sizeable financial sources for some terrorist groups not only from ransoms collected but also from governments which, for one reason or another, are sympathetic to the political aspirations of certain terrorist groups.

Accordingly, we must increase our vigilance, our expertise, and our determination in the face of what may be an expanding threat to our personnel and other interests abroad, as well as on the home

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front. In fact, this global epidemic still threatens the very fabric of international order. We have no choice but to defend ourselves and to inspire further international cooperation. President Nixon has laid it on the line with these words: "The use of terror is indefensible. It eliminates in one stroke those safeguards of civilization which mankind has painstakingly erected over the centuries. . . Let us not be disrupted or turned away by those who would loose anarchy upon the world; let us seek no accomodations with savagery, but rather act to eliminate it. "

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THE ROLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY OFFICE

Kenneth W. Knauf, Assistant Director
Domestic and Foreign Security Operations

Mr. Knauf opened his presentation with the observation that he would prefer to emphasize security techniques and hardware, rather than philosophy or theories.

The State Department has had security personnel at overseas locations since 1948, and for the first twenty years there was little concern with the phenomenon of terrorism, the principal responsibility being the frustration of foreign intelligence initiatives to obtain U. S. Government information not overtly available.

In 1968, with the assassination of Ambassador Mein in Guatemala, and the kidnaping of Ambassador Elbrick in Brazil, and with a general rise around the world in incidents and threats to U. S. officials and facilities, the Office of Security was called upon for an increased personnel and installation protection role. Initially it was necessary to improvise such protective items as armored sedans in critical locations from equipment on hand, modified by State Department personnel. The Congress subsequently appropriated adequate funds for both an increase in security personnel and the procurement of security equipment.

Although it is generally agreed among the member nations of the U. N. that the host government has the responsibility and obligation to protect accredited foreign diplomats, for many countries the requirement to do so exceeds the capability. They just don't have the men, equipment, money, and often the know-how to provide that kind of support to each of the many diplomatic representations they host. In such instances, it would be futile to complain, but better to use U. S. resources to the maximum extent feasible.

In some countries the U. S. has provided the host governments both with equipment, such as "follow-on" vehicles, and even with funds to pay for guard personnel.

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By and large, we would prefer that American personnel assigned overseas not be armed. In the first place an insufficiently trained or psychologically prepared individual represents as much or more of a danger to himself and his associates with a firearm than he does to a potential terrorist. Secondly, the ramifications of a U. S. citizen killing or wounding a national of the host country, regardless of the circumstances, can be prejudicial to U. S. interests. Finally there is a strong possibility that weapons in the possession of U. S. personnel initially may eventually wind up in the hands of unauthorized foreign nationals.

In regard to equipment, we have had many problems with transparent armor for window glass, requiring frequent replacement for faulty lamination, loss of visibility and general ineffectiveness. Only very recently have we found what we hope will be a more satisfactory product. We have had problems with closed circuit T. V., and with intrusion alarm systems which have to function equally well in tropical and frigid areas. Repair and maintenance poses problems. High on our list of priorities is reliable, easily operated and maintained explosive detector equipment. What we have seen so far requires highly specialized technicians to operate and maintain. This is not practical for wide-spread, general usage. We employ letter bomb detectors, which are basically refinements of familiar metal detectors developed for mine-sweeping. We find that they are more effectively used in conjunction with small x-ray equipment to further identify metal which they may detect. The x-rays of course are a potential danger to personnel when not properly shielded.

Finally I would like to note that there is no substitute for the availability to the U. S. ambassadors overseas and the people for whose well-being he is responsible, of fully qualified U. S. security personnel to provide security advice and assistance in coordination and liaison with the host government security agencies.

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THE ROLE OF U. S. INTELLIGENCE

Mr. Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Ober stated that his presentation would be limited to avoid duplicating the areas discussed thoroughly by others on the program.

Intelligence for use in meeting the threats posed by terrorists is basically handled as is the development of other information of national interest. The CIA does have personnel assigned to specialize in this particular field. A primary difference in developing, reporting and communicating intelligence concerned with actual or potential terrorist acts is the element of urgency when assassination, hijacking, kidnapping or sabotage may be concerned. This type of intelligence is less for study, analysis and estimates than it is for immediate action.

Since intelligence of a terrorism nature is normally handled for immediate action, there is danger that the source of the information may be compromised. Terrorist groups may have little difficulty in identifying the one responsible for a leak of information. In addition to humane considerations, the loss of carefully developed sources is a serious matter.

The objectives from an intelligence viewpoint are to detect plans in time to prevent the intended action, and to intercept the terrorists on their mission if information becomes available subsequent to launching.

In the case of such groups as the Fedayeen, in addition to their other objectives, they want maximum publicity to keep world attention on their cause. Therefore they resort to the most wanton types of terrorism for the shock value. They have a highly professional leadership and well-educated supporters in all fields.

They also have a dedicated, fairly desperate pool of people from which to compose action teams. A major point is that the Fedayeen have direct support from some governments. It cannot be expected

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that they will ever lack for funds, or arms, or communications, or support from local sympathizers. In practical terms, this means that Fedayeen terrorists can operate across international borders and can acquire locally the money and equipment needed through friendly diplomatic sources. Similarly they can obtain international travel documents with no difficulty.

Thus the interception of a Fedayeen terrorist team is extremely difficult. They don't have to carry arms or explosives, or to travel on questionable documents. They have close international ties with indigenous subversive groups, such as the Red Army of Japan which supplied the Lod Airport assassins.

Penetration of Fedayeen groups for intelligence purposes is difficult and must be many faceted to overcome the professional compartmentation techniques they employ.

Of great importance is liaison and cooperation with host government security agencies, particularly for accurate controls on travel and movement through customs and airport control. Cooperation is needed in the security surveillance of such likely targets as U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel to afford information on observed or suspected situations. Unfortunately, we may not have this input in some areas.

Some thoughts I would like to note. We do follow a general policy of sharing information with friendly foreign governments. This may result in leaks, or the compromise of information. The choice is a difficult one, but we feel that extraordinary risks are justified to assure that the information gets to where it may be most useful.

Another point is that information passed to other agencies may be repeated to other agencies and so garbled that it may eventually be returned as confirming the original information, or as related to a wholly different situation.

To prevent unnecessary and counter-productive action, it is important that intelligence information be back-checked to the extent feasible with considerations of urgency.

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COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS

Mr. John Dimmer
Assistant to the Ambassador, Bonn

Mr. Dimmer had recently returned to the U. S. from a three-year assignment in Bonn where his duties included responsibility for coordinating matters of the American Embassy interest with the German internal security agencies, including the German Federal Police under the Ministry of the Interior.

In this assignment, Mr. Dimmer acted as coordinator for our embassy on matters related to international terrorism which involved or might potentially involve U. S. interests.

Mr. Dimmer was in Germany at the time of the Munich massacre of Israeli olympic athletes by Arab terrorists, and during other international terrorist incidents which took place in Germany. As a result of his observation of the events surrounding the olympic athlete incident, including the futile attempt at their rescue by German security personnel, certain important considerations for dealing with this type of crisis situation were pinpointed. Of high priority is the point previously made by Mr. Ober regarding the requirement for an extensive reliable and rapid system of communications. A part of such a system should be a uniform reporting format used by all concerned internal security elements regardless of organizational and hierarchial positions, i. e., internal conflicts and dissension between elements of a security system can have disastrous results. A uniform reporting format should have a key code word as an identifier that a message concerns terrorism and is for immediate action. Equally important is that every message entering the system should have a serial number to facilitate tracking and further reference.

Great difficulties can arise from anyone in the communications system altering or adding to an original basic report. In that event the central action office may be confused, not knowing if the content is from the original reporter or has been added to along the line. Comment on a basic report should always be separated from the basic report.

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There should be a central action office to which messages regarding terrorism should be directed. Such action information should not be processed by an office responsible for general and routine matters. Prior planning and organization should provide for this, with specific staffing and responsibility assignments.

A consideration of importance to control of acts of terrorism is to have an internal security agency or element aware through study and familiarity with pertinent conditions and factors of the potential for acts of terrorism. This would include being aware of motives, e. g., the bitter Arab-Israeli conflict of interests, and of current opportunities for parties representing either interest in a conflict to take action against the other. This type of information will allow concentration of security resources at the points of prime trouble potential.

Physical security for personnel reasonably vulnerable to terrorist actions is important. For example, the Israeli olympic athletes were quartered in a facility to which access was easy for the terrorists. There were few, if any, security guards assigned. The tragedy might have been avoided by better planning.

A good adage for those of us with responsibility in this field is - Always plan for the worst.

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grown up with an ingrained awareness of the necessity of inter-agency cooperation. However, in many countries where we have served, even when the number of public safety agencies is very few, the tradition of such coordination and cross communication may never have been established or practiced.

Criminal violence takes many forms. Currently we note a tendency toward individual or small group, commando-like actions. In the recent past a common manifestation was in the form of violence committed under the cover of mass confrontations, riots, or demonstrations.

OPS responded to that type of threat with an intensive training effort for foreign police designed to improve their capabilities to control mass violence. In all of this training, OPS strongly promoted the doctrine of "minimum necessary force" and non-lethal control methods.

In 1967 and 1968 many excellent police forces in the United States learned to their embarrassment that the day-to-day routine of police operations within the community did not prepare them for the organized and concentrated attacks against public order which occurred during that period. They learned then that only the development of a total force concept could prepare them to handle large scale rioting and violence within the framework to constitutional government and without the declaration of marshal law. The contingency planning which was subsequently carried out under this total force concept enabled federal, state, and local police forces to coordinate their intelligence, and their personnel and material resources, to effectively head off or control disorders. This same total force concept is being brought to bear upon the critical problems of narcotics control, and more recently upon the suppression of terrorists. Obviously, then, the total force concept does not mean the use of any means to fight terrorism, whether legal or otherwise, but is the means by which a free society directs its resources in resolving the problem of terrorism. The total force concept is the means by which OPS Doctrine is implemented, and is entirely consistent with current U.S. foreign policy statements.

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The Office of Public Safety holds to certain doctrine with regard to terroristic acts and to the counter measure to be taken in the control of such acts.

First, we believe that a criminal act committed under the guise of a political action carried out with an ideological motivation is nevertheless a criminal act. The perpetrator, when arrested should not be designated as a political prisoner, but as a criminal.

We believe that the normally accepted procedures used by police, the use of information sources, good utilization of records, good (and humane) interrogation methods, the use of physical evidence, and generally efficient investigation procedures can be utilized to minimize extremist violence.

We know that one of the principle aims of the terrorist is to drive a wedge between the police and the public. By inciting the police to take repressive and often times extra-legal actions, the violent extremist can produce such an alienation between the police and the public which they serve.

It is, therefore, most important that police, even under most severe provocation, remain disciplined and continue to act within a legal and humanitarian framework carrying out their role as guardians of the public well-being and protectors of the public order.

We do believe wholeheartedly in a doctrine of firmness in dealing with the practitioners of extremist violence. The payment of ransoms, the release of criminals (who may be glorified with the title of political prisoners) will only serve to propagate kidnapping, hijacking, and assassination. This position is consistent with the official policy of the U. S. Government.

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AID/OPS TRAINING

Dr. John A. Lindquist, Chief, Training Division

In this presentation, I would like to describe to you some of the instructional activities and programs undertaken by our Office of Public Safety in response to this growing problem of worldwide criminal violence.

The International Police Academy trains several hundred junior and mid-level officers each year in its General Courses conducted in English, Spanish, and French languages. In addition, approximately 50 high level officers attend the Senior Officer Courses each year.

For the past three years, our courses have included study in such subjects as the following, related to the control of criminal violence:

- Bombs and Bomb Matters
- Airline Security
- Kidnapping and Dignitary Protection
- Dignitary Protection (San Martin)

In addition to adding such relevant subject matter to our courses, IPA has created specific new courses related to criminal violence. One of these, the Technical Investigations Course, has dealt with the police response to the violence of bombs and explosives. Starting in 1969 we have conducted seven 8-week courses in English and Spanish for 140 participants.

In 1971 we created a new 4-week specialization course in Dignitary Protection. This month we will be starting with our fourth group which will bring the total number of students who will have participated to 71.

In addition, some 15 other foreign police officials have been separately programmed for this type of training.

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We have long been aware that the U. S. Public Safety Advisors serving two-year tours of duty at overseas missions tend to lose touch with current U. S. trends and developments in the police profession. Thus, the OPS has for years followed a policy of requiring Advisors who are in the U. S. between tours to participate in two-week orientation programs.

For the past two years this orientation program has included subject matter such as: "Bombs and Bomb Matters", "Kidnapping", "Dignitary Protection", "Airline Security", and "Border Control".

As a result of this emphasis, thus far, 96 of our Public Safety Advisors have had an opportunity to refresh or improve their knowledge with respect to these areas related to international criminal violence.

In respect to the current trends toward increasing international violence, we felt that it would be of value to improve our own depth and capabilities in this area of present concern. To this end we have encouraged and supported efforts of our faculty staff to participate in special courses related to international criminal violence.

In the last four years, faculty members have participated in the following courses:

- Dignitary Protection
- Aviation Security
- Advanced Bomb Technology
- Protection of Public Figures
- Protection of Public Facilities
- The New Left

Subject matter derived from such outside courses have supplemented that knowledge gained by individual study and research to help us in presenting a richer curriculum to our participants.

The Training Division of the Office of Public Safety is fortunate in that it has a much greater forum for the distribution of concepts than the several classes which may be in house at a given time.

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I speak of the International Police Academy Review, a quarterly publication printed in English and Spanish and distributed to more than 4, 500 former participants.

The Review also reflects our preoccupation with these worldwide problems of violence.

In the past five years we have printed such original articles as:

- Security and Evasive Driving
- Police Procedure Against Sniper Attack
- Resources Control in Vietnam
- Protection of Dignitaries
- Police Response to the Bomb Threat

Naturally, we look forward to a continuation and acceleration of such written contributions.

In the past five years as pertinent training films become available from a variety of sources, we have added them to our film library to be used in our IPA presentations and to serve as a resource for overseas training efforts. We have, upon request, loaned films to domestic police for use in training programs.

In line with the increased concern and emphasis in the area of International Criminal Violence, the OPS Training Division has for some time been preparing a new specialization course of four weeks duration. Tentatively designated by the title of "Criminal Violence Control" the new course is scheduled to start on November 5 of this year.

Finally, the Office of Public Safety has continuing liaison with many U. S. law enforcement and associated organizations at all levels from Federal to local. We have similar relations with a great many police agencies of foreign countries. Through liaison and coordination we are able to call upon such agencies when necessary and to in turn provide assistance. This cooperation is reflected in the presence of our guests today, and is a major factor in our training program.

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PANEL SESSION

Following the individual presentations which are included in synopses in this report, a panel of the speakers, with the exception of Ambassador Hoffacker who had a prior commitment, entertained questions from the audience. A few of the representative questions and answers were as follows:

Question to Dr. Lindquist:

In your opinion, will the problem of skyjacking get worse?

Answer:

As indicated by Ambassador Hoffacker, skyjacking seems to be under control in the U. S. as a result of the imposition of protective systems and equipment. In the first six months of this year there was not a single successful case of skyjacking in the U. S. At this time last year there were, I believe, 14 or 15 cases. I don't want to appear over-optimistic. There could be a reversal of this trend, but the indications are that the controls in force in the U. S. may be effective in most instances. I do not believe similar adequate controls are in effect worldwide, and I anticipate that until there are such controls there may be a continuation or worsening of the skyjack situation outside the U. S.

Question to Mr. Knauf:

Over and above the assassination and kidnap attempts against U. S. officials there have been many anti-U. S. demonstrations overseas over the past ten years or so, many of which have resulted in damage to facilities. Could you comment on probable future trends?

Answer:

It is probable that the ending of the U. S. involvement in Indo China may remove some of the real resentment expressed in the types of

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demonstrations you describe. For professional anti-Americans, though, I am sure other pretexts will be used to justify rock-throwing at USIS windows. The frequently voiced accusations of U. S. involvement in Allende's downfall in Chile is a good example. It is also worth considering that some demonstrations against the U. S. may have more of a spirit of student hell-raising than serious political opposition or hatred of the U. S. In general I would estimate that demonstrations, rock-throwing and the like, as well as more seriously intended and carried out propoganda operations will be with us in the foreseeable future.

Question to Mr. Knauf:

Why is it that the State Department Office of Security relies upon short-term, young, relatively inexperienced Marine Guards for security of U. S. installations and personnel overseas, rather than well-trained and experienced professional security personnel?

Answer:

My first answer is that to the extent possible we rely on the host government providing security for our personnel and installations. Originally the use of Marine Guards was largely ceremonial in addition to their internal duties to prevent security violations and compromise of classified material primarily through the carelessness of our own employees. They still function in these capacities although they have acquired additional security responsibilities, partly because we had no acceptable alternatives. However, the Marine Guards are carefully selected and are given special training prior to and during their assignment. I should point out that the Marine Corps is not enthusiastic about the use of Marines for close-in bodyguard details and similar duties. The Corps requires that such use must be preceded by the Ambassador coordinating such use with the host government foreign ministry and receiving a guarantee of diplomatic immunity for the Marines. In summary, I would prefer to have older, fully qualified security officers in the number necessary, but the realities of the situation require a compromise, and the Marines are that compromise.

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Question to Mr. Goin from Mr. Adkins, D/Chief, OPS/TD:

At this time of energy crisis in the U. S. the security of energy supply sources such as the Middle East oil production facilities becomes a paramount interest to the U. S. Two years ago, I participated in a security survey of the ARAMCO facilities as a result of the Saudi Arabia Government requesting the U. S. to provide such technical assistance. OPS has considerable technical expertise in these matters. Would you comment on a possible expanded role for us in this capacity.

Answer:

As you know, over the years the Public Safety programs in the field have trained and advised counterpart police agencies which, in turn, have had an inter-face with the security element of local firms and industries. For example, Brazil law provides for Brazilian police to train civilian security guards of commercial organizations. It is reasonable to suppose that requests to the U. S. Embassy on a Government-to-Government basis would be honored to the extent feasible. However, there are private firms which offer security surveys, training and protection of a commercial basis and there are legal restrictions on U. S. tax-supported elements of Government getting into the commercial arena. I would think that questions pertaining to specific situations should be handled on an individual basis, rather than to make an overall generalization.

Question to Mr. Dimmer:

It seems to me that terrorist acts, particularly those involving outright atrocities to innocent people, are repugnant. Do you think that world opinion may be a factor in diminishing such terrorist acts?

Answer:

It seems to me that much depends on one's definition of a terrorist, i. e., one man's terrorist is another man's patriot. The chances

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are there will always be enough public opinion in favor, particularly on the terrorist's home turf, to counterbalance the unfavorable opinion.

Question to Mr. John N. Gatch, Jr.
(Associate of Ambassador Hoffacker)

Much of what was said here today indicates that the law enforcement agencies of many countries lack the training and general know-how to deal effectively with problems of terrorism, with the consequence that they not only fail to provide adequate security and protection for their own officials and citizens, but they certainly can't do so for the foreign diplomatic community, tourists and commercial representatives. Has consideration been given by the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism to the U. S. Government providing support and assistance for this purpose to law enforcement agencies of other governments which may request such assistance? A parallel to this possibility is the position taken by the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control. To address the international narcotics problem I believe that they have designated some 55 or 60 countries as qualifying for U. S. Assistance to enable them to meet their narcotics law enforcement responsibilities.

Answer:

Although I do not believe that our group has considered the problem from that standpoint yet, it is certainly an excellent suggestion. There is, of course, the question of our mandate, does it run along those lines.

Comment by Mr. Ober:

The U. S. has provided assistance to foreign governments for some years, and I think that the main question is - is this getting down to the police level as much as it should? This is probably the area where the weakness lies. Our security assistance may not reach the local police for bureaucratic reasons.

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Comment by Mr. Dimmer:

In my experience, even when foreign law enforcement agencies received information they did not initiate proper action, so it seems that the problem is one of training, procedures, policies and plans. Further, I think that anything in a broader sense that will help overall integrated communications and evaluations is bound to pay great benefits in terrorism control.

Comment by Mr. Ober:

I welcome this opportunity to be here, and I think it has been very useful to me -- providing a different perspective on the problem we all share. I hope there will be more opportunity for exchange in the future.

Comment by Mr. Knauf:

I am going to use this opportunity to say something last that I should have said first, and that is the very fine cooperation the Office of Security has had from the Office of Public Safety. We have called upon Mr. Goin from the early days of the terrorism problem for officers to help us train people, train local employees, assist with close-in protection, driving, weapons, and the like. This has been much appreciated.

Closing Comment by Mr. Goin:

Thank you Ken, and thanks to all of you for being here and participating today. We may be working in different agencies, different departments and different locations, but by bringing together our initiative, our ingenuity and our intelligence, we can better find solutions to our problems. This is why I suggested that we get together just to talk on this problem of terrorism -- to let each of us know what the others' perspectives are and what they are doing. This may lead us to think how best we can use our resources to meet the problem.

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Several of the thoughts that have been expressed today are well worth pursuing in regard to our resources. Should any of you at any time think of something to make us more effective, please let me know by any means, the telephone or a note, or any way. We will keep our minds open for ways we can work and help others work in control of this problem of terrorism.

Again my appreciation for your cooperation. I hope the session has been as worthwhile for you as it has for me. Thank you very much.

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