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I. US objectives in Senegal and the West African Region

A. Contribute to African Successes
B. Build Africans' capability to respond to crisis on the African continent and contribute to peace support and stability operations globally.
C. Protect U.S. interests by contributing to the stability of regions of strategic importance.
- **i) Mineral and other primary resources**
- **ii) Market expansion/trade**
- **iii) Transnational Crime**
  - **(1) Narcotics**
  - **(2) Terrorism**
  - **(3) Criminal Financial Enterprises**
  - **(4) Arms Trafficking**

A. Contribute to African successes.

One of the most important pillars of the Bush administration's Africa policy, is a focus on success stories with the intent of illuminating the rest of the African continent. U.S. policy towards Africa, however, is largely event-driven. The result is that limited resources are more often applied to mitigating one crisis or another, while relatively less is expended bolstering either post-conflict situations or guaranteeing the stability of longer-term success stories.

Senegal perhaps holds the greatest promise on the African continent today. Though poor, Senegal boasts many impressive attributes, including an economic growth rate of 5%-6% for nearly half a decade, one of the lowest HIV/AIDS rates in Africa (1.7%), a steadfastly republican military, a free press and thriving democratic-political culture, vast untapped mineral resources including an estimated 700 million barrels of heavy crude oil, a once thriving tourist industry, and a rapidly burgeoning IT and telecommunications sector. Senegal's comparatively stable environment is increasingly attracting foreign capital, and NGOs and international organizations are relocating their regional headquarters to Dakar from elsewhere in Africa.

B. Build Africans' capability to respond to crisis on the African continent and contribute to peace support and stability operations globally.

The unfortunate reality is that despite it's enormous comparative advantage militarily over the rest of the World, the United States is stretched thin. Combined with a decided domestic political aversion to deploying U.S. troops to hazardous peace support operations, and now limited by the fear of possible International Criminal Court prosecution, the U.S. is unlikely to supply troops to crisis response missions in Africa. Other capable Western nations seem to lean in the same direction as the U.S., increasing the difficulty of identifying lead troop contributors at critical moments. It is therefore evermore important that African nations possess the capability to respond to crisis in their own region.

The United States must therefore look outside its own military to protect its strategic interests on the African continent. The greater the African capacity to maintain stability on the African continent, the less likely it is that the United States will find it necessary to intervene itself.

In general, the African's have proved themselves willing to intervene to save their own, though they often lack the wherewithal to do so. The Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group engaged on the most prominent series of African crisis responses in the early nineties to violence in Liberia and Sierra-Leone, and the South Africans deployed 700 commandos to Burundi in 2001 to protect returning opposition politicians. As of April 2002, African nations were deployed to UN peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Kuwait, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia and East Timor, though often in fairly tiny contingents.

More capable and ready African peacekeeping-capable forces will further bolster the pool of troops available to draw upon when peacekeeping missions are required anywhere in the World, particularly in Africa.

C. Protect U.S. interest by contributing to the stability of regions of strategic importance.

While participation in UN peacekeeping operations generates invaluable experience, revenue, and national prestige for developing nations, peacekeeping *training* introduces a number of stabilizing effects to military institutions that they might not receive by any other means, including presenting or reinforcing subservience to civil authority, fire discipline and human rights, civil affairs skills, and HIV/AIDS awareness.

Stability in Africa is imperative to protecting U.S. national interests on the continent including:

i) Mineral and other primary resources
ii) Market expansion/trade
iii) Transnational Crime
  (1) Narcotics
  (2) Terrorism
  (3) Criminal Financial Enterprises
  (4) Arms Trafficking

i) Mineral and other primary resources

Petroleum

In 2002 approximately 15% of U.S. oil imports came from Africa, predominately from Nigeria and Angola (the 5th and 8th largest exporters of crude oil and petroleum to the United States, respectively). U.S. firms are already moving to capitalize on Senegal's apparently enormous potential:

- In May 1997 the Houston-based Harvest Natural Resources (formerly Benton Oil and Gas) signed a memorandum of understanding with the Senegalese state-owned oil company Société des Pétroles du Senegal (Petrosen) for 45% rights to the onshore Thies block in northern Senegal. An additional agreement for evaluation and exploratory drilling of the adjacent near-offshore acreage guarantees Harvest an 85% share of offshore discovery.
- In May 1998 Harvest Natural Resources signed an oil exploration and production agreement with the joint Senegal/Guinea-Bissau Agence de Gestion et de Cooperation (AGC) to drill the Dome Flore oil field off the coast of the Casamance, estimated at 700 million barrels of heavy crude.
- In October 1999, Houston-based Vanco signed a Production Sharing Agreement with the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Industry, and Petrosen for the Dakar Offshore Profond contract area. This deepwater block covers an area totaling 7.9 million acres from the Gambia to the Mauritania border. The Dakar Offshore Profond license is the largest concession to date in offshore Senegal, and the country's first deepwater award. Vanco is operator of the concession with a 90% interest.

Natural Gas

- In February 1997 Petrosen announced the discovery of natural gas at the Gadiaga well in the Thies (central) block. Harvest signed an MOU with Petrosen to complete the Gadiaga well, estimated to provide 350bcf of gas, construction of a pipeline from Gadiaga to existing gas infrastructure, and additional wells.

ii) Market expansion and trade

(continue…)

II. A history of the conflict

The roots of the Casamance conflict are largely the results of the physical separation of the region by The Gambia from most of Senegal and the consequences of a highly centralized post-colonial state. Geography defined the region's specific interests. More than 60% of the Casamance population is Jola, an ethnic group also present in both The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Although the Casamance is one of Senegal's main food-producing regions, Dakar has neglected it for decades. Land expropriation by both the State and immigrants from northern Senegal since independence has only increased the sense of grievance felt by the people of the Casamance.

The Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (French initials MFDC) claims that initially colonized by Portugal, the Casamance came under French colonial rule in the late 1880's and was administered as a separate colony. Under a 1993 ceasefire agreement, the MFDC political leadership agreed to the appointment of a French expert whose findings released on December 1993 stated that under French rule the Casamance region was considered part of Senegal and never had an autonomous status, thus refuting MFDC's claim.

Founded in 1947, the MFDC did not appear to seek independence but strongly represented the region's interests and was absorbed into the single party state after Senegal became independent in 1960. In the early 1980's, Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor (no relation to the former Senegalese President Leopold Senghor), a Catholic priest, revived the MFDC in a more militant form to demand the independence of the Casamance. By 1982 the organization's armed wing began waging a low-level guerilla war against the central government.

The MFDC's armed wing was formed at a time of a more intensive development of cannabis crops in the Casamance and in the late 1990's, involvement in cannabis trafficking allegedly represented 60% to 70% of the MFDC revenues. Since the 1980's, the rebels have also allegedly been involved in different illicit trafficking, including arms trafficking.

Despite numerous cease-fires and peace initiatives, the low-level conflict continues to plague the region and remains one of Dakar's most important domestic problems. The 20-year insurgency has left the MFDC a fragmented confederation of factions inflicted by internecine squabbling. An aging Father Diamacoune remains the organization's spiritual guide but is now removed from the political leadership.

III. The conflict in context: Senegal and Why the time is right

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IV. Existing US efforts in Senegal

Military Assistance

The United States' regards Senegal as one of its most reliable military partners in Africa, in no small part because of Senegal's active participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian response operations since the 1960s. Consistent with its reputation, Senegal was the only African nation to send a contingent to Desert Storm. Most recently, Senegal deployed an Operation Focus Relief battalion to UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, a contingent to MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a humanitarian response mission to flooding in the northern regions of Senegal. As of April 30, 2002, 553 Senegalese were deployed to a total of seven UN missions, in troop, civilian-police, and unarmed observer capacities, and it has deployed to thirteen UN missions since 1978. The U.S. contributes significantly to Senegal's ability to deploy and operate effectively to

peace support operations through U.S. training and equipment programs, mostly via the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA, formerly the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, or ACRI) bolstered by the one-time Operation Focus Relief (OFR), ongoing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) funds, as well as Excess Defense Articles (EDA) draw down.

U.S. Assistance to Senegal (in thousands $)					
	1999 (actual)	**2000 (actual)**	**2001 (actual)**	**2002 (estimate)**	**2003 (requested)**
DA[1]	17,243	6,400	13,375	13,350	28,380
IMET[2]	846	764	912	850	900
CSD[3]	5,981	6,400	10,366	14,405	0
FMF[4]			800	400	500
PC[5]		2,784	2,735	3,105	3,069
ESF[6]	-	-	-	-	0
EDA[7*]	188	653	736	5,893**	-

[1]Development Assistance
[2]International Military Education Training
[3]Child Survival and Disease Fund
[4]Foreign Military Financing
[5]Peace Corp.
[6]Economic Support Funds
[7]Excess Drawdown Authority
*Total current value at time of delivery.
**2002 figures reflect December 2001 Congressional Notifications.

Non-Military Assistance

Economic Support Funds (ESF) and USAID projects ($24.5 mil FY00, $23.9 mil FY01, $25.5 mil FY02 est.) compose the bulk of U.S. non-military assistance.

V. Program Elements: Bringing the pieces together

Ultimately peace in the Casamance region of Senegal will result only through non-combative means. The U.S. country team continues to impress upon the Senegalese government that a diplomatic solution is essentially the only possibility, a message the Senegalese seem increasingly receptive to. The employment of military civil affairs (CA) capability is the primary tool for underpinning the government's high-level political engagements.

The current state of the conflict is such that engaging the civilian population directly through civil-affairs and public diplomacy will almost certainly serve to heighten Senegal's effectiveness in the Casamance both militarily and diplomatically. The Senegalese military's capacity for such engagement, however, is fledgling, both in terms of strict capabilities, as well as the understanding of how to make the most of those capabilities strategically.

For U.S. contributions to settling the Casamance conflict to be effective, they must simultaneously direct efforts primarily at six elements:

1) **Senegalese military civil-affairs capability.**
2) **Casamance civil-society organizational and political capability.**
3) **Humanitarian de-mining.**
4) **Short- and long-term agricultural development**
5) **Law Enforcement/Gendarme**
6) **High-level diplomatic strategies.**

1) Senegalese military civil-affairs capability.

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2) Casamance civil-society organizational and political capability.

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3) Humanitarian De-mining

Impacts

"Regional agricultural production has decreased dramatically because of landmines. 'The regional service for Agriculture for the Ziguinchor region estimates that the agricultural activities decreased 80% in the southwest region of Casamance, which was the richest zone of the region thanks to the diversity of agricultural activities.' Even if harvested, it remains extremely difficult to ensure transport of the produce as few transporters are willing to risk their lives and vehicles on roads suspected of being mined. Tourism, another key economic activity in Casamance, has suffered from the presence of mines, especially in the Cap-Skiring area, one of the most visited sites in Africa. The most mine-affected area is the region of Niaguis, Southern Casamance bordering Guinea-

Bissau from where mines are reportedly smuggled into Senegal and where the MFDC rebels are still operating. Fifty of the fifty-four mine casualties that occurred in 2000 happened in this region. Most of the mine explosions occurred on roads, and were caused by antivehicle mines." (Landmine Monitor Report 2001)

Need

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4) Short- and long-term agricultural development.

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5) Law Enforcement/Gendarme

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6) High-level diplomatic strategies.

A comprehensive strategy will utilize existing tools as well as additional elements to reinforce the Country Team's message:

- Civil-society training
  - Political organization
  - Civ-Mil relations
- Military training and equipment
    - Civ-Mil and Civ-Pol
      - Civil Affairs train and equip
        - ACRI
        - Direct assistance to new CA Company (BATT?)
          - CMOC/CIMIC training
          - Equipment
          - Program/project funding
        - Support for existing Senegalese CA projects
          - Transport of commodities
          - Agricultural assistance to schools
        - Human rights training
    - De-mining train and equip
      - Mined areas are on the Cap Skirring – Ziguinchor – Kolda road and on the border between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau
      - MFDC-linked cannabis farmers mine around their farmland for protection
      - Livestock bandits lay mines to prevent pursuit
    - IO/PD training and program funding
    - Gendarme Training
- Civilian Development
  - Agribusiness development
    - Agricultural Economic/Trade Analysis (technical issues resolution, trade barriers, market navigation, etc.)
    - Technical Assistance
      - Sustainable Agriculture and Resource Management (SARM)
      - Scientific collaboration and exchange (viruses, soils, genotypes, university linkages, multilateral forums)
    - Physical Infrastructure
      - Roads, Rail, other transport
      - Schools and other educational facilities
    - Technical assistance
      - Education