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SETTING THE AGENDA



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ALLISON M. GARLAND,
MEJGAN MASSOUMI
and BLAIR A. RUBLE

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Allison M. Garland, Mejgan Massoumi and Blair A. Ruble

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I. INTRODUCTION

Allison M. Garland, Mejgan Massoumi
and Blair A. Ruble

THE URBAN CHALLENGE

This year, for the first time in history, the majority of the world's people will live in cities. According to the United Nations, the global urban population will grow from 3.3 billion people in 2008 to almost 5 billion by the year 2030 (UNFPA 2007, 1). This urban expansion is not a phenomenon of wealthy countries. Almost all of the growth will occur in unplanned and underserved city slums in parts of the world that are least able to cope with added demands. The pace of urbanization far exceeds the rate at which basic infrastructure and services can be provided, and the consequences for the urban poor have been dire. Failure to prepare for this unprecedented and inevitable urban explosion carries serious implications for global security and environmental sustainability.

Over the past two years, the Wilson Center's Comparative Urban Studies Project (CUSP) organized a seminar series to bring these trends to the attention of international decision makers. With the support of the Urban Programs Team of the Office of Poverty Reduction in the Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade at the US Agency for International Development, CUSP commissioned research to examine the multidimensional problem of urban poverty, identifying innovative approaches to urban health, water, sanitation, crime, youth, migration, planning, land markets, and housing. The seminar series brought together scholars, policymakers, and local community leaders to discuss strategies for incorporating urban priorities into the global development agenda.

THE URBAN FACE OF POVERTY

One billion people—one-third of the world's urban population—currently live in slums (UN-HABITAT 2006). In cities across the globe, hundreds of millions of people exist in desperate poverty without access to adequate shelter, clean water, and basic sanitation. Overcrowding and environmental degradation make the urban poor particularly vulnerable to the spread of dis-

ease. Insecurity permeates all aspects of life for slum dwellers. Without land title or tenure, they face the constant threat of eviction. Crime and violence are concentrated in city slums, disproportionately affecting the urban poor. Most slum dwellers depend upon precarious employment in the informal sector, characterized by low pay and poor working conditions. Illegal settlements are often located on hazardous land in the urban periphery. Perhaps most alienated in city slums are growing youth populations whose unmet needs for space, education, health, and jobs can lead to social problems, further undermining security in urban areas.

Marginalized from life and opportunity in the formal city, the urban poor are in many ways invisible to their governments. They live in irregular settlements where there are no schools or health clinics, and transportation to jobs is inadequate and costly. They are forced to pay considerably more to private vendors for services and infrastructure that are not provided by the government. Statistics often mask the severity of conditions for the urban poor. While demographic indicators for quality of life of urban dwellers can be higher than for their rural counterparts, disaggregated data reveals differences within levels of access to services and stark inequalities, for example in child malnutrition and mortality rates. Highly visible disparities, spatial segregation, and exclusion create the breeding grounds for social tensions, crime and violence.

Global poverty has become an urban phenomenon. In the year 2002, 746 million people in urban areas were living on less than $2.00 a day (Ravallion 2007, 16). The absolute number of urban poor has increased in the last fifteen to twenty years at a rate faster than in rural areas. Rapid urban growth has made Asia home to the largest share of the world's slum dwellers (Halfani 2007). But nowhere is the threat of urbanizing poverty more grave than in Africa, which has the fastest rate of urban growth and the highest incidence of slums in the world. In her contribution to this volume, Vanessa Watson writes that rapid urbanization in Africa has been decoupled from economic development. In the last fifteen years the number of slum dwellers has almost doubled in sub-Saharan Africa, where 72% of the urban population lives in slums (UN-HABITAT 2006, 11).

POLICY RESPONSES BASED ON URBAN REALITIES

Urban poverty and slum growth are local problems, but their nature and scale demand a global response. The chapters in this volume universally equate slum growth with policy failure. Market forces alone cannot resolve the chal-

lenges of urbanization. In fact, old approaches to urban development and unregulated private sector activity have exacerbated urban disparities.

Rather than planning for urban growth and working to provide land, infrastructure, and services for the poor, misguided policies have focused on slowing the process of urbanization and unsuccessfully trying to stem the tide of rural-to-urban migration. At least two million slum dwellers are forcibly evicted from their homes each year to make way for infrastructure projects and private development (UN-HABITAT 2007). In a UN survey of government leaders from developing countries, only 14% were satisfied with the urban–rural mix of their populations. "Most of those who were unsatisfied bemoaned the increasing urbanization taking place in their countries. About 73% of respondent governments had policies to slow down urbanization, whereas only 3% had policies to accelerate the process" (Bloom and Khanna 2007, 13). Anti-urban and anti-poor policies are based on a misunderstanding of the demographic roots of urban growth, 60% of which is a result of natural increase, not migration. "Policies that aim to slow urban growth should shift their attention to the positive factors that affect fertility decline—social development, investments in health and education, the empowerment of women, and better access to reproductive health services" (UNFPA 2007, 13). Existing migration policies are shaped by fear and the absence of adequate information and institutional capacity, writes Loren Landau in this book. Combating poverty requires a policy framework based on a better understanding of the relationship between migration and urbanization, linking together urban and rural development policies.

Another trend in urbanization that has been neglected is growth in small- and medium-sized cities. While megacities receive a great deal of attention, more than half of the world's urban population currently lives in cities of less than five hundred thousand people. Smaller cities are expected to absorb half of urban population growth between 2005 and 2015, yet their capacity to manage this process with services and policies is weak (UNFPA 2007, 9). National governments and the development community must respond with planning and investment that will help smaller cities to manage growth at the local level.

Integrated Approaches and Appropriate Goals

The contributing authors to this book call for a better understanding of the complex relationship between cities, growth, and poverty to give policymakers the tools needed to address urban challenges in a comprehensive way.

Approaches to urban development are too often fragmented and sectoral. Successful urban development requires an integrated approach based on solid analytical work that encompasses infrastructure, housing, social programs, health, education, the physical environment, income generation, microfinance, credit, safety nets, and inclusion (Freire 2007).

Urban development is a long-term process, and time is an extremely important factor in assessing the impact of policy and assistance. This is often at odds with project-based goals and donor funding cycles. Several of the chapters in this volume express skepticism about the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) that most directly affects the urban poor: target 11, goal 7, to have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least one hundred million slum dwellers (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals). Considered within the context of projections that the world's total slum population will reach 1.4 billion by the year 2020 (UN-HABITAT 2006), this MDG is not only imprecise in its objective but also limited in its target, reaching only a small fraction of the world's slum dwellers.

Local Knowledge, Capacity Building, and Exchange

The authors agree that research built upon local knowledge is necessary to improve our understanding of the causes and characteristics of urban poverty. Solutions generated by local community groups and academics in cooperation with municipal authorities and the private sector are better equipped to target needs and produce results. Arif Hasan's chapter about the Orangi Pilot Project's Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI) in Karachi, Pakistan, details how training offered to citizen groups, NGOs, and young people gives low-income communities the skills to finance, build, and manage their own infrastructure projects at a cost much lower than government-developed systems. Such capacity building has changed the relationship between the urban poor and their local government. Best practice on the ground, based on local initiative, can be translated into best policy by "looking both ways"—down toward the community and NGOs and also up to national-level ministries and international donor agencies (Harpham 2005).

Participants in the CUSP seminar series also see a key role here for the private sector. Many point to the often-unrealized contribution that public-private partnerships can make to local economic development. Donors and national and local governments must find ways to create an environment that engages the private sector and encourages investment.

Research and exchange devoted to successful local initiatives, including community-driven approaches such as the OPP-RTI and public-private partnerships, offer models of urban development that are appropriate for cities of the South. In his chapter on urban assistance, Richard Stren writes about the importance of South–South networks and the benefits of a comparative approach to policy formulation.

Inclusion and Governance

The chapter authors also reach consensus that inclusion is not only a condition upon which economic and political stability rests but it is also a means to effectively combat urban poverty. Slum dwellers have been denied civic engagement and have no effective means to protect themselves, to make demands for goods and services, or to force accountability of those who represent them (Halfani 2007; UN-HABITAT 2006). Vulnerability and insecurity have weakened the links between citizens and their city. Including all stakeholders—especially the urban poor—can make a vast difference in the effectiveness of urban planning and management. Good governance does more than provide needed services and infrastructure to city dwellers. Effective urban governance can be used as a powerful tool to deal with urban growth, poverty, and inequality by allowing for popular participation in decision making, creating connections between civil society and the government, and ultimately fostering the articulation of a common vision for the city (Garland, Massoumi, Ruble, and Tulchin 2007).

HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF URBAN GROWTH

The chapters in this volume describe the challenges that accompany rapid urban growth, but they also point to opportunities found in the urban transformation. Cities have always attracted investment, wealth, and people in a process that has been amplified by globalization. The success of nations increasingly hinges upon the efficiency of their urban areas. Cities today generate from 55% of GNP in low-income countries to 85% of GNP in high-income countries (UN-HABITAT 2006, 46). As cities have engaged directly with the global economy, the gap has widened between those who benefit from international competition and those who are left behind. Increasingly, cities are places where prosperity and poverty exist side-by-side, yet urban centers of political energy and social interaction can be powerful instruments of change. The challenge to policymakers is to provide opportunities for the urban poor to access material and political resources that allow them to benefit from booming urban economies.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME

Section II. Urban trends and challenges

The chapters in this volume draw upon research and activity in the field to offer policy prescriptions that incorporate urban priorities into the development agenda. This section of the volume is devoted to aspects of urban growth that demand new approaches to policy: migration, youth populations, and security.

Loren Landau examines how migration has shaped the socioeconomic and political composition of cities by highlighting four areas that deserve critical attention: social services and accommodation, economic investment, human security, and the creation of common and accountable institutions. Increasingly mobile urban populations that do not see their city of residence as home require institutional and economic incentives that build common rules of engagement and a sense of a shared future among all city residents. Such policies must at once recognize the limits of localized responses while engaging local actors in national, regional, and global deliberations.

In addition to the pressures of migration, the youth bulge, particularly in slum areas, carries potentially negative consequences for urban areas if ignored. It has been estimated that as many as 60% of all urban dwellers will be under the age of eighteen by the year 2030 (Ruble, Tulchin, and Varat 2003, 1). Finding a place for youth is the subject of the chapter by Karen Valentin, Anne Line Dalsgaard, and Karen Tranberg Hansen. The authors draw from their research on youth and citizenship in three rapidly growing cities—Recife, Hanoi, and Lusaka—to illustrate how youth have restricted access to urban space, limiting their rights and citizenship. The authors argue that localized forms of knowledge can play an invaluable part in policy and planning.

In the path to adulthood, marginalized youth populations face limited options beyond crime, drugs, and gangs, giving rise to violence as one of the most serious problems facing the word's cities today. Diane Davis offers an analytical framework for assessing the violence-insecurity nexus by examining the ways that cities and citizens have responded to and changed as a result of crime and violence. Drawing from her work in Mexico City, Davis analyzes recent urban transformations to explore the consequences of insecurity, generating new and hopeful ways of thinking about urban policy and crime reduction.

Section III. Sectoral innovation and community-led solutions

Most of the research presented at the CUSP seminar series on urban poverty focuses on infrastructure and service delivery, which in many ways represent

the essence of what a city is and how it works or not. Investment in infrastructure is a crucial component of any effort to plan for urban growth. The urban poor have responded to the failure of state and local government with innovation. The challenge to policymakers is to build upon and scale up these success stories, incorporating into the agenda-setting process those who suffer most from the lack of access to services.

Looking at water and sanitation, Gordon McGranahan emphasizes the importance of local organization within deprived neighborhoods to engage collectively with public authorities and utilities. Successful measures led by residents and their organizations have combined self-help with constructive engagement. McGranahan reflects upon misleading statistics being used to monitor progress towards international water and sanitation goals. Good information, developed locally and used to drive local action, can make an enormous difference.

Although this approach might seem to devolve government responsibility to the communities, in practice it has changed the way governments operate, writes McGranahan citing the success of the OPP-RTI. It has made it more difficult for governments to accept loan-based megaprojects that create large debts and rarely reach deprived settlements and it has made it easier for governments to complement the efforts of the urban poor to solve their own problems, concludes McGranahan. Detailing an international model of success, Arif Hasan describes how the OPP-RTI used local resources and developed local expertise to create partnerships with government, directing government resources to support the sanitation program. CBOs, NGOs, activists, and educated young people share responsibility for infrastructure in their settlements with the state rather than just lobbying for it, explains Hasan.

Examining housing for the urban poor, Diana Mitlin reviews past and current initiatives to provide adequate shelter. When formal programs "map" themselves onto informal shelter strategies, underlying tensions emerge, influencing future generations of interventions. Mitlin identifies and analyzes new directions in housing policy that are helping programs reach some of the lowest income urban citizens.

Any approach to housing must be part of a broader set of public policies that address insecurity of tenure, argues Edesio Fernandes. "Informal development has become the rule of access to urban land and housing," carrying serious environmental, political, economic, cultural, and legal implications for cities and their residents, warns Fernandes. Policymakers and public administrators

need to integrate regularization programs with other land, urban, housing, and fiscal policies, to involve all sectors and stakeholders in the process.

Victor Barbiero describes the urban setting as a crucible in which various elements of ecology and environment collide and interact to form new cultural, social, epidemiological, economic, and organizational processes. Within this urban crucible, slum populations in particular suffer from infectious diseases as well as chronic and noncommunicable illnesses resulting from environmental and social conditions. The donor community must acknowledge the health challenges and opportunities that accompany urban growth, says Barbiero, calling for a vision of urban development that is anchored in better health, but transcends health to include other sectors such as infrastructure, governance, and housing.

Section IV. Looking to the future: New approaches to urban development and assistance

The final section of this volume looks forward, outlining trends and innovations in urban development policies and programming. Old systems of top-down, master planning have been used as tools by political and economic elites to reinforce social and spatial exclusion and entrenched inequalities, writes Vanessa Watson. Models and experts from the North have little understanding of the dynamics of rapid urbanization, poverty, environmental damage, and informality. Watson describes new directions in urban planning that address growth through pro-poor and inclusive policies and include a wide range of stakeholders in decision making.

The final chapter of the volume by Richard Stren traces several factors that have contributed to the decline in urban assistance. Stren offers important insight about urban development gained from past approaches. Urban assistance is still needed, he argues, recommending four basic objectives for future programming: support research and local problem solving, support South–South networks, continue to focus on pro-poor policies, and act as responsible local stakeholders.

CONCLUSION

Just as the world's population is becoming urban, we are seeing a serious decline in urban assistance. Even when donors have been working in cities, it has not been enough. Successful policies must encompass the complexity of urban areas, viewing cities as more than the sum of their parts and

responding to the multifaceted problem of urban poverty with a holistic approach. Policymakers and academics alike agree that we need the intellectual tools to deal with the challenges of urbanization. There is a serious absence of reliable data on urban populations, growth, and development, especially sound scholarship that draws upon local knowledge to inform policy. As the chapters in this volume attest, we must begin to view cities and their residents as part of the solution, not the problem.

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II. URBAN TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

Shaping Urban Futures: Reflections on Human Mobility and Poverty in Africa's Globalizing Cities

Loren B. Landau

INTRODUCTION

Human mobility is transforming Africa's urban centers. Although visible and widely politicized, we know little about how urbanization and international migration—a potent form of "globalization from below" (Portes 1997)—are affecting cities' socioeconomic and political composition. And while there are undeniable links between migration, development, and poverty, the causal relationships remain ill-defined and contested (Samers 2002). There is a growing literature on migration and development, but a panel of experts assembled in Geneva found much of it of limited relevance, frequently misleading and contradictory, containing simplistic global models, and of little real use to policy makers. Indeed, they were "unanimous in their negative assessment of the quality of the debate, variously qualified as 'fragmented,' 'sickly,' 'confusing and confused,' 'unimpressive,' 'repetitive' and 'ahistorical'" (GCIM 2005a, 3). This chapter seeks to enrich the discussion by moving beyond immediate economic measures of poverty. In doing so it highlights four areas that deserve additional, critical attention: social services and accommodation; economic investment; human security; and the creation of common and accountable institutions. It first argues that existing policy responses—shaped by fear and the absence of adequate information and institutional capacity—are heightening health and security risks, infrastructure degeneration, corruption, and poverty. It concludes that combating poverty requires policy frameworks to consider increasingly mobile urban populations that do not see their city of residence as their home. This means developing institutional and economic incentives that build common rules of engagement and a sense of a shared future among all city residents. Such policies must at once recognize the limits of localized responses while engaging local actors in national, regional, and global deliberations.

EVALUATING MIGRATION AND POVERTY IN AFRICAN CITIES

Efforts to reach consensus on the relationships between human mobility and deprivation are stymied by both the lack of sound data and debate on the meanings of migration, urbanization, poverty, and development. A priori, migration and urbanization appear relatively easy to delineate. Doing so, however, immediately demands that we determine what counts as migration, something easier said than done. Depending on the issue or analyst, migration includes everything from moves within a community, to shifts from peri-urban townships to wealthy suburbs, or relocations half-way across the world. It is equally difficult to determine when the migration process itself begins and ends, especially given the degree to which people may see themselves in a kind of permanent transit. With all of this confusion, where do we measure the effects of complex multistage journeys on poverty—in the sending community, along the way, or at the final destination? Until there are consistent means of coding and tracking the diversity of migration types—including both international and domestic movements—it will be impossible to determine the effects of migration on poverty (see Skeldon 2005).

Beyond the general problems of measuring migration, classifying urbanization raises the seemingly farcical question of "What is a city"? White's (1996, 160) argument, that at a certain point about 40% of urban growth was due to a combination of rural-urban migration and the reclassification of rural locations into urban sites, highlights the importance of defining boundaries. These are two very different processes and there is a need to consistently determine cities' boundaries if we are to speak authoritatively about the dynamics within them. However, even in the European context—where standard data collection and monitoring techniques are far more developed—there are still widespread debates about how to "read" and "monitor" the city (Healey 2002). Defining a city too narrowly risks ignoring its position in regional or global processes, while too broad a definition may risk precision and focus (see Brenner and Kiel 2006; Taylor 2003, 6; and Robinson 2002, 15).

Given this chapter's broad focus, I speak of urbanization ecumenically as movements from environments characterized by lower population densities and the potential for natural resource-based industries to contexts of higher population densities with economies based on industrial production, petty trade, or service provision. Recognizing that these processes are not necessarily geographically bounded means that the analysis also places "the urban" within vast circuits of "border-crossing material and symbolic exchanges" (Landolt 2005,

56). For present purposes, I define migrants as people perceiving themselves as outsiders due to their mobility or who are considered as such by host populations, governments, or development organizations. This includes domestic and international migrants as well as those who move frequently within urban settings. Due to my background and the particular challenges facing non-nationals, international migration occupies much of the following discussion.

Measuring poverty is an equally critical and no less challenging endeavor. Given the diversity of African cities, there can be no absolute or quantifiable definition. Many Tanzanians or Malians would, for example, likely consider those living in South Africa's "poverty pockets" (Cross et al. 2005) as relatively well-off given their access to health, education, water, and transport. Recognizing the difficulty of defining quantifiable measures of poverty, I work from a position that fighting poverty means resisting social fragmentation and marginalization, promoting health and security, promoting accountable institutions and, most importantly, promoting a sense of a shared future. In this model, informed by Sen (1999; 1981), Putnam (2000; 1993), Evans (2002), and DFID (1999), investment in a common future not only facilitates trade, but also facilitates effective planning and promotes political accountability. In today's cities, planning is less about developing future scenarios and concrete means of implementing them than about "trying to hold together long enough to develop a collective imagination" (Healey 2002, 1788–89). People who do not feel linked to their space of residence are unlikely to make financial or social investments there. This means that poverty reduction demands formal and informal mechanisms that facilitate interactions among and service provision to all city residents (Gauteng 2005, 16; see also Adebayo 2002, 351). As Borja (1996, 260–61) notes:

> The participatory process is more important than the definition of the contents of the plan, since the validity of the proposed goals and actions will depend on participation. The final product of a strategic plan is not a law or a government program, but rather it is a political contract between public institution and civil society.

Working from these definitions, I will begin by exploring what we know about the relationship between migration and poverty. In places this veers towards speculation as what we know is vastly overshadowed by what we do not.

WHAT (LITTLE) WE KNOW ABOUT MIGRATION AND POVERTY IN AFRICAN CITIES

The data on migration and urbanization in Africa are far from complete and often overlook important sociopolitical factors. That most urbanization is a result of domestic or "irregular" international migration (i.e., undocumented and uncounted) means it is effectively invisible to government statisticians' offices and planners. Although many regions face paucities of reliable migration data, information on African migration is almost always inconsistently collected, irregularly available, and highly politicized (see Samers 2002; Crush and Williams 2001; Zlotnick 1998; Crisp 1999). For these reasons, key variables such as ethnicity are often excluded from censuses to avoid exacerbating communal conflicts. In South Africa, where statistics are probably as good as they get on the continent, official estimates for the number of nonnationals in the country range from the approximately 300,000 found in the 2001 National Census to 5.1 million *illegal* immigrants reported (and later retracted) by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) (see Hart 1996). More recently, politicians have begun citing numbers as high as 10 million. Estimating domestic migration is equally if not more difficult as people do not cross borders or need to register following a move. More localized studies are able to provide better estimates of individual cities or neighborhoods, but these are spatially limited and must be regularly repeated if they are to capture mobility dynamics (see Kok and Collinson 2006; Maphosa 2004; Jacobsen and Landau 2003). Although I will not discuss the reasons here, it is similarly difficult to get accurate and comparative data on poverty because the indicators are invalid, data collection is irregular or incomplete, or collected information is not systematically shared. Due to these and other obstacles, it is almost impossible to make anything other than generalized claims about the *potential* relationship between mobility and urban poverty.

Despite data and conceptualization problems, it is nevertheless possible to offer a broad outline of migration and urbanization in Africa. One of the things we know for sure is that Africans are an increasingly mobile and urbanizing population. Africans outside the continent have attracted considerable attention from politicians and the media, as have the remittances they send home (see World Bank 2006; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). However, the most significant movements take place within the continent. Indeed, the greatest numbers of people remain within their countries of citizenship while increasing numbers shift from rural to urban areas or from city to city (House

of Commons 2004; Bekker 2003; Herbst 2000). Together with the related HIV/AIDS pandemic, urbanization is now among the most important dynamics shaping Africa's socioeconomic and political realities (see the table).

Comparative Levels and Rates of Urbanization

Region	Level of Urbanization % (2000)	Urban Population (thousands) (2000)	Annual Growth Expected % (2000–2015)
World	47.0	2,845,049	2.0
Africa	37.9	297,139	3.5
Asia	36.7	1,351,806	2.4
Latin America	75.3	390,868	1.7
Oceania	70.2	21,338	1.2
North America	77.2	239,049	1.0
Europe	74.8	544,848	0.3

Source: UNCHS (2001, 271–73)

No city in Africa has yet to claim a spot among the world's twenty largest cities, but estimates of accelerating urban growth mean that cities will become far more important to the African political economy in coming years (Zlotnick 2005).

Understanding the nature of African migration and urbanization is perhaps more important than pinning down the number of people on the move. Critically, migration is increasingly becoming a state of existence for many, with people constantly moving or preparing to do so. As with cities elsewhere, African urban centers are fast becoming spaces of flows, with people maintaining an ever-expanding array of localized and translocal commitments and loyalties (Landolt 2005, Castells 2000; Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Blanc 1994; Portes 1997). Although the newly urbanized Latin Americans described by Perlman (2005, 13) see their countries' primary cities as ultimate destinations, many Africans continue to see cities as sites of temporary residence or as transit points en route to elsewhere in Africa, Europe, and North America (Simone 2004; Landau 2005b). Even within cities, people move frequently to find better housing, to be closer to work, or to fulfill (or escape) social obligations (Mbembe 2004). It is also worth noting that the majority of African migrants are men, often young and single. There are, however, a growing number of women moving to the cities: not only as companions to partners or elders, but on their own

(Kihato 2005; Raimundo 2006). Even so, the number of young, single, and childless people in the cities—including youth and children themselves—appears to be growing faster than other population groups. In attempting to predict future movements, we must also remember that while most movements into African cities are motivated by economic reasons, disproportionately high numbers of Africans move due to conflict and persecution. In some instances, these are movements from cities to cities, although increasingly people are leaving refugee camps where they have been "warehoused" for years in search of economic opportunity and dignity in cities (see Human Rights Watch 2005; Jacobsen 2004). This further contributes to cities' demographic and political heterogeneity and variations in socioeconomic status, and creates an expanding diversity of expectations and aspirations among urban residents.

Accelerating urbanization means that ever larger numbers of people are moving into cities that were not built for a substantial indigenous population. Rather than sites of residence, most African cities were conceived and constructed to serve as nodes of extraction and homes to a small, colonial elite. Indeed, until recently, few African cities could boast a significant "native" population or distinct urban culture. Even people who have grown up in cities often consider themselves as "from" somewhere and retain primary loyalties to their village or ancestral home (Englund 2002). The functions of African cities have become more domesticated in the postcolonial era, but few have the institutional capacity or physical infrastructure needed for their current residents. In many instances city leaders do not even know the number or nature of those residents. It is, therefore, often inappropriate to speak about social integration of migrants and immigrants. Rather, these are cities of strangers and social cohesion means finding commonality among both newcomers and long-term residents.

If existing data and localized accounts afford a broad characterization of migration and urbanization in Africa, they tell us little about the relationship between human mobility and poverty (GCIM 2005a). Unsurprisingly, this has not prevented scholars, politicians, and the press from asserting strong relationships between the two. Adebayo, for example, argues that the "high concentration of migrants moving away from poor conditions in rural areas and townships has put unprecedented pressure on the cities' resources and infrastructure, straining them almost to breaking point" (2002, 352; see also Hanley, Ruble, and Tulchin 2005, 3; Landolt 2005; Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, 8).

The UNCHS (2001, 15) adds yet another dimension in warning that urbanization may also have serious, largely negative, environmental implica-

tions. These and other negative assessments also appear regularly in political discourse, a result of government officials who capitalize on antimigrant sentiment or the fear of being swamped by peasants and refugees. Tanzania is so bold as to report that the "common hazards in Tanzania include epidemics, pest infestation, droughts, flood, major transport and industrial accidents, *refugees* and fires" (Tanzania 2005, 31; emphasis added). Indeed, Malthusian projections about population growth and economic/environmental disaster are almost ubiquitous in the literature on migration and urbanization in developing countries (see White 1996).

Although the literature is dominated by warnings about migration's negative developmental effects, a panel of experts assembled in the mid-1990s by the National Academy of Sciences found that there are generally beneficial effects of urbanization in the process of development (National Research Council 1996; also Livi-Bacci 1994). White (1996, 167) is even more measured (and inconclusive) in arguing that, "urbanization in contemporary countries is mostly neutral, bringing with it some benefits and some costs" (see also UNFPA 2005). Similarly, Usher (2005, 3) finds that "migration can be either the cause or the effect of poverty. Likewise, poverty might be reduced or amplified by migration. The inter-linkages are as complex as the individual migrants' situations."

Despite this diversity of perspectives, three points of agreement appear throughout the literature on migration and poverty. First, that the two processes are linked through a relationship of mutual causality. Second, that there are not enough data available—and not the appropriate kinds of information—to make concrete statements about the causal relationships between the two. Moreover, even if the required data were available, the cases are so varied that there is little chance of gleaning anything but the most superficial generalizations. Third, and most important for present purposes, public responses to migration and urbanization—including the absence of a conscious coordinated response—have tended to exacerbate mobility's negative effects on all of the Millennium Development Goals (Usher 2005). The remainder of this chapter highlights four areas of intersection where migration can affect poverty. In doing so, it draws particular attention to the social and political consequences of migration that are often ignored or downplayed in more economistic analyses. Given the paucity of data, these should not be viewed as conclusions, but rather as a challenge and provocation for further deliberations and research.

ISSUES AND EMERGING CONCERNS OF MIGRATION AND URBAN POVERTY

Investment, Employment, and Economic Development

A great deal of the academic and policy literature on migration and poverty centers on the short-term impact of mobility on labor costs, skills, and job creation. Reflecting the sentiments of anti-immigration advocates in Europe, Australia, and North America, African leaders regularly offer a zero-sum assessment of this relationship: every job filled by an immigrant is one less job for a citizen. (Conversely, every skilled employee who leaves the country is one less doctor, teacher, or engineer; as if everyone can find suitable jobs if they stay put.) In the words of South Africa's former minister of home affairs, "free movement spells disaster for our country" and would undermine the post-apartheid reconstruction and development program (Buthelezi 1997). Many city leaders also paint urbanization of their own citizens in the same terms, decrying the floods of peasants and the damage they do to antipoverty initiatives.

Urbanization may lead to heightened competition, but it can also lead to job creation. Viewed globally, for example, studies of "immigrant-native job competition have generally found only modest substitution effects, except in certain highly focused settings" (Friedberg and Hunt 1995; also Borjas 1995). Hunter and Skinner (2003) argue that new businesses emerge in settlement areas with people drawing on transnational links to bring in new products and capital.[1] Research in inner-city Johannesburg also found international migrants were more likely to hire South Africans than South Africans themselves despite widespread xenophobia and other sociolegal obstacles that prevent foreigners from accessing credit, banking services, or formal employment (Landau and Jacobsen 2004). As with many aspects of migration, the overall impacts are likely to vary depending on the social, economic, and political context; the host populations' skills and resources; and the availability of transport, communication, and financial institutions.

Although central in current political debates, job creation/substitution is only one of migration's economic effects. With the World Bank's (2006) heightened interest, migrant remittances are now drawing increased attention as a potential benefit of out-migration. Research suggests that in Latin America and elsewhere, remittances have now surpassed foreign investment as a source of hard currency and may soon rival exports as a source of national revenue (see

1. See also Landolt's (2005, 61) similar assessment for Latin America.

World Bank 2006; Landolt 2005, 61; House of Commons 2004, 3). Movements of highly skilled Africans and others have certainly provided key human resources for European countries, but remittances do not necessarily solve the problems of migrants or their families (see Cornelius, Espenshade, and Salehyan 2001; Funkhauser 1992; IRIN 2006). In some instances, remitted funds simply allow for survival, not long-term poverty reduction. Moreover, it is often relatively prosperous families that can afford to send migrants to cities. There is an even more pronounced selection bias for those leaving their countries of citizenship or moving into cities outside the African continent. Remittances, therefore, risk heightening economic polarization by channeling resources to the relatively wealthy. This may create jobs, but is unlikely to provide the schools, water and sanitation systems, other social services, or improved infrastructure needed to combat generalized poverty.

When viewed from within the cities that are most likely to send international migrants, there are also considerable social and economic costs: lost productivity and skills and absent parents and other leadership figures. Such people may be underemployed in their countries of origin, but they nevertheless represent a key resource in fighting poverty: more doctors does not automatically translate into better health care, but the absence of more than 30% of doctors from Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, and Uganda and upwards of 50% from Ghana undermines the possibility of an effective health service (WHO 2004, 31; Skeldon 2005, 22). There may be replacement others from elsewhere in the continent or rural areas, but as long as there are regional scarcities, such movements will only transfer poverty elsewhere.

Of course, African cities are not only sites of departure, but also serve as destinations for international and domestic migrants seeking protection and prosperity. Here, too, the issue of remittances appears as both a resource and a liability in addressing poverty. Resource transfers from newly urbanized populations may help combat poverty in rural areas by keeping children in school, promoting small-scale investment, or enabling people to access social services. Viewed from within the city, the magnitude of these remittances, and the social value attached to them, are obstacles to poverty alleviation. Because material transfers are often tied to emotional investments and translocal investment strategies, they are a further indication that many migrants do not to see themselves as a permanent part of the cities in which they live. At the very least, such transfers mean they have limited resources for investing in their communities of primary residence. Rather, they strive for usufruct

rights that allow them to use the city without the responsibility of ownership and belonging. As discussed in later sections, the lack of financial and psychological investment in sites of residence have potentially significant political consequences that affect urban planning for poverty reduction.

Health, Education, and Accommodation[2]

An urban population's skills, education, and physical health are critical capital for improving individual and collective welfare. Not only are healthier and better skilled people more economically productive and more likely to generate tax revenues, they are better able to innovate and dedicate energies to social reproduction. Moreover, a better educated and healthier population is less likely to need social assistance or seek costly emergency services, allowing both public and private resources to be dedicated elsewhere. Accommodation is both a productive resource in its own right and critical to promoting health, education, and human security. However, while migration is often posited to spread infectious diseases and heighten pressure on schools and accommodation, we understand little about the intersections of migration and access to basic social services. For present purposes, I wish to (superficially) raise three concerns affecting migrants' ability to access needed services and accommodation: economic and linguistic exclusion, sociolegal discrimination, and institutions designed for stable populations.

Migrants, especially "irregular" international migrants, are physically within cities but often remain socially, economically, or legally excluded from access to education and public health services such as medical care, water, and sanitation. Some of the obstacles are linked to the relatively poor or undeserved areas in which they live, but there are also other factors tied specifically to their outsider status. Probably the most obvious factors are technical ones: the inability to pay service fees—often higher for those without citizenship or documentation—and language. The latter is particularly damaging in preventing effective communication between migrants and service providers. This may result in the a priori dismissal of a claim to service or harmful misdiagnoses. In terms of education, international migrants may also be considerably older than the mean age for their skill level, a justification for

2. I am grateful to Gayatri Singh, coordinator of the migration, health, and governance initiative at the University of the Witwatersrand, for her comments on this section of the chapter.

many teachers to limit access. The inability or unwillingness of officials to distinguish among different classes of migrants also means that even legally recognized and documented migrants and refugees are denied services or charged inappropriate fees. Although poor citizens face significant obstacles in accessing education and health services, "locals" are often able to call on social networks to sponsor children or pay for emergency care. Moreover, long-term citizen residents are unlikely to face the widespread xenophobia that prevents international migrants and others from unfamiliar groups from accessing social services.

The fact that most bureaucratic systems are designed for a stable citizenry also prevents migrants and their families from receiving appropriate health and education services. To be effective, education and (especially) health services need to retain accurate records on those whom they serve, and both schooling and treatment are often far less effective when regularly disrupted. Apart from the ethical concerns of making medical or education records widely available, few African countries have the telecommunications infrastructure to allow people to access services at multiple sites. In terms of health, this makes it difficult to provide regular treatment and monitoring or to ensure that emergency treatment does not include harmful medicines. Many people may, moreover, simply be refused access to schools or clinics if facility staff cannot call up records of those seeking service.

In addition to concerns over health and education, there are at least three issues worth flagging regarding access to accommodation. The first relates to the widespread claim that migrants increase the demand for housing (see Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, 8). Although this may reflect a generalized pattern, it assumes everyone is seeking the same sort of accommodation. What may be more significant is that migrants often generate a fragmented housing market as they attempt to access fundamentally different forms of accommodation than more stable populations or use existing housing stock in different ways. As long as housing plans remain oriented towards single family, permanent residents, they may effectively exclude people whose housing requirements are more flexible and more affordable. Indeed, they may only foster severe overcrowding and insecurity in flats that are sublet to multiple families or individuals. Again, this is not a problem linked to migration per se, but is due to a housing market and housing schemes that misunderstand how people use and access accommodation. In some areas there is an effort to provide single residency occupancy facilities, but these are rare in African cities.

There are also potentially significant long-term consequences of excluding migrants from education, health services, and accommodation. Most obviously, migrants' inability to access health care raises the specter of public health crises. Although medical staff may discriminate between citizens and non-nationals, infectious agents are less discerning. As long as people continue to share urban space—often living in close proximity—those unable to access treatment become a danger to all those around them. Apart from the short-term losses to health and productivity, the inability of a health system to address the needs of migrant populations runs the risk of creating particularly virulent infectious viruses and bacteria. International movements or shifts from rural to urban areas (or vice versa) often represent a move in or out of areas where one can access antiretroviral (ARV) treatment. When ARVs are only provided in urban settings where people live for ten months of the year, migrants may simply go off treatment for the two months when they are "home." Given the dedication to regularity that current ARV regimes require, such movements may put migrants' health in jeopardy. More importantly, suspended ARV treatment runs the risk of leaving new and untreatable strands of the virus in patients' bloodstreams. As they continue with their lives elsewhere, they may become a danger to those they encounter.

Although the effects of education are often less immediately visible, it too is critical in fighting poverty (see Annan 1999, 4). Amidst the transformations of Africa's urban centers, education serves a dual role. The first is to provide children and youth with the technical and analytical training they need to compete in and contribute to a specialized, skills-based economy. Obstacles to any group acquiring those skills will, consequently, project existing inequalities into future generations and limit the country's ability to adapt to new economic opportunities. Education also serves a second, but no less critical role: forging communities from strangers. Through the sustained interactions within the classroom, diverse groups learn common sets of rules, how to exercise civil rights, and mutual respect. Exclusion from education can create a subset of the population without the knowledge or skills to interact productively within the city. As discussed later, forging a sense of mutual recognition is not only an end in itself, but is critical for creating public space and accountable public institutions.

The inability to access housing also has significant consequences for fighting poverty. First, a well-housed population is likely to be a healthier and

more productive population. This is especially true in environments where residences are not only sites of social reproduction, but are key resources in economic production: petty industry, restaurants, shops, and offices. For students, adequate space also allows opportunities for studying; a rare luxury for those in overcrowded and poorly lit rooms. Well-housed people are also better able to protect themselves and their belongings from the predations of criminals and corrupt police. As the following section suggests, insecurity is one of the key obstacles to fighting poverty in African cities.

Human Security

The global discourse linking migration and security is reflected in public responses to immigration across the African continent (see Landau 2005a; Faist 2004). Although many host populations fault newcomers for increases in criminality and insecurity, there is little evidence of a direct causal link between migration and crime. Without denying some migrants' involvement in petty theft, internet scams, human trafficking, and other crimes, there is little evidence that they are disproportionately prone to criminal actively (see, for example, Landau 2003). This does not, however, stop police officers and vigilantes from targeting immigrants and recently urbanized citizens. However, instead of improving safety, such initiatives often heighten insecurity and economic marginalization. In Johannesburg, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, and Accra, the police have made unsubstantiated public statements linking foreigners to crime. In Durban, the police targeted West Africans for drug dealing and then, based on their arrest statistics, spuriously announced that West Africans were almost solely responsible for drugs reaching the city. One must also be wary of the nature of charges against foreigners: much of what is considered illegal would not be if people had legal channels through which to immigrate and work. Without papers, however, everything from walking on the street to selling tomatoes is illegal and subject to police action. Moreover, many foreigners report becoming involved in illegal trades—drugs and prostitution, for example—because they have been effectively barred entry into other professions or require the protection gangsters can provide. In many instances, the police are implicated in these emerging business sectors.

Apart from their potential role as criminals, there are several reasons why migrants become the targets of crime. The first is that they often trade and live in relatively insecure environments: someone selling on the street is a far

easier target than someone working in a factory or office block. Similarly, a person sharing a flat with ten strangers is far more vulnerable to crime than someone living with close family members or surrounded by familiar and friendly neighbors. The second reason is linked to their inability to access formal financial services. Not only does this limit the possibility of getting credit, but difficulties in saving also mean that migrants (especially undocumented migrants) are more likely to carry cash on their person or store it in their place of residence. Such practices do not go unnoticed by petty criminals and police who may turn foreigners into "mobile ATMs."[3] In the words of an Eritrean respondent in Johannesburg, "as foreign students we are not required to pay taxes to the government. But when we walk down these streets, we pay." Whether these "levies" end up in the pockets of police, moneylenders, or petty criminals, they undermine the rule of law in areas with significant migrant populations. The final cause of foreigners being so frequently targeted is that without documentation they are effectively unable to access the criminal justice system. An undocumented migrant who is robbed by either a criminal or a law enforcement agent is far less likely to report this to the police. For those looking to make a quick buck, migrants—especially nonnationals—are a safe bet.

Apart from the reasons outlined above, foreigners' position as the convenient scapegoat indirectly serves to undermine efforts to improve urban security. The widespread obsession with targeting foreigners—who are no more likely to be criminals than others—only distracts police from where they are needed (Palmary, Rauch, and Simpson 2003). Rather than promoting entry into trading markets, the arrest of people involved in petty trade, small business, or simply living in illegal buildings may present the appearance of law enforcement and boost arrest statistics, but it negatively affects the livelihoods of those arrested and their dependents. Moreover, targeting foreigners for noncriminal activity only drives trade further underground and increases the likelihood that migrants will be drawn into irregular, illegal, or dangerous economic activities. Arbitrary policing and targeting those who may have no effective redress through the legal system can also intensify residents' short-term planning horizons. Rather than making long-term investments in accommodation, training, and business, those who are insecure may keep their resources close to them so that they can leave at a moment's notice.

3. Private communication with Johannesburg police officer (7 May 2004).

Community and Political Accountability

To ensure that cities are places of security and prosperity for all who live there, residents must interact in ways that help to define a common destiny and help build the capacity—whether within government or nongovernmental/social organizations—to achieve common goals (see Healey 2002, 1788–89). Given African cities' ethnic, class, religious, and political heterogeneity, the possibility of sustained fragmentation is greater than it is almost anywhere else in the world. The challenges are ever more acute as people become increasingly mobile. In many instances, residents do not stay put long enough to develop, articulate, and respond to some form of collective imagination and aspiration (see Bridge and Watson 2000, 253; Amin and Graham 1997). Such mobility, coupled with fear of heightening heterogeneity, is generating cities that are increasingly divided: cities of walls (Caldeira 1996) or fragments (Balbo 1993); archipelagos of enclaves (Hajer and Reijndorp 2001, 53), and "territories of urban relegation" (Wacquant 1996.) Amidst cities' competing and overlapping networks, fighting poverty means overcoming these divisions in ways that span these divisions.

Legally, socially, or economically marginalized migrant communities only create additional obstacles to achieving a common objective. This is already visible in migrants' widespread sense of permanent dislocation fostered by the violence, abuse, and discrimination they experience in new residential communities. Rather than striving to integrate, foreigners instead cling to their outsider status, make conscious efforts to avoid close personal relationships with those around them, and spend their time planning their move elsewhere (Landau 2006; Amisi and Ballard 2005; Araia 2005; Mang'ana 2004). Indeed, more than three-quarters of respondents in the Wits-Tufts survey (76%) felt it important for migrants to retain a distinct culture and identity during their stay in the country; only 40% of the non-South African respondents predicted being in South Africa in two years. These numbers may be elevated by Johannesburg's place in the circuits of global mobility, but reports from other cities suggest such self-marginalization is not unique (see Malauene 2004; Simone 2004). Critically, journeys home or onwards often remain practically elusive for reasons of money, safety, or social status. This leaves large numbers of non-nationals effectively marooned in the city, but not wishing to take root in it.

When viewed from the objective of building inclusive cities and accountable public institutions that respond to all city residents, migrants' sense of

isolation and transience is deeply problematic. First, it may limit their interest in investing in the cities in which they live. People preparing for onward journeys will not dedicate themselves to acquiring fixed assets and may maximize immediate profits at the expense of long-term planning. Those who do not feel welcome are also less likely to respect the rules and institutions dedicated to governing the cities they inhabit. This may become visible in efforts to dodge tax regulations, avoid census takers, or subvert regulatory agencies they feel are more likely to prey on them than to promote their interests. Those who feel excluded are also unlikely to join in participatory planning exercises or elections, even when they are legally entitled to do so. This prevents planners from seeing or hearing from these often subterranean communities. Without their voice, they have little choice but to learn of these populations through the media or rumor. Policies based on such accounts are unlikely to address city residents' priorities and needs; rather, they will respond to stereotypes and elite interests. Ignoring a significant minority in policy-making will, however, ensure that even these interests are poorly served. The continued failure of these policies to serve any interests will only harm public institutions' efficacy and legitimacy.

Antiforeigner scapegoating has a second, more insidious effect on realizing accountable and responsive public institutions. In the words of one immigrant in Johannesburg:

> Rumours . . . are continuously spread by everyone that foreigners are responsible for whatever is wrong. It is like, "Thank you, foreigners, that you are here, now we can blame you for everything." South Africans do not look at their own—they just ignore their own problems and pretend that foreigners cause all their problems.[4]

Although such attitudes are not universal, they appear in cities across the continent in responses to Somalis in Nairobi, Congolese in Dar es Salaam, or Nigerians in Maputo and Accra. Removing foreigners from cities is not only ethically unacceptable, it is practically impossible. Even if successful, it would not solve acute social challenges. But the willingness to accept that foreigners are responsible for children not finding places in school, for continued inse-

4. Quoted in Beal, Crankshaw, and Parnell (2002, 124).

curity and unemployment, or for declining quality of health services distracts people from the fundamental structural and institutional issues behind these pressing social concerns. Migrants do not cause most urban problems, but their presence can offer a convenient scapegoat that prevents citizens from holding public institutions responsible for shortcomings and failings.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY FORMULATION

Given the magnitude of mobility into and through Africa's cities, effective urban poverty reduction strategies must consider the real and potential effects of migration as both cause and consequence. Although migration often challenges institutions and planners accustomed to stable populations, migration's effects on poverty are not inherently negative or positive. As with any challenge, denying its significance helps ensure negative outcomes. To quote one of Johannesburg's councilors, "as much as we might not want them here, we cannot simply wish these people away. We must find ways to reach out to them."[5] By way of summary, I offer a number of generalized suggestions on the nature of deliberations towards these ends.

The only way of concretely identifying those factors that maximize the benefits of migration for poverty alleviation will come through further research. To develop evidence-based policies—policies more likely to be effective than their predecessors—there is a need for much more evidence (House of Commons 2004, 15; also UNFPA 2005). As Robinson (2002, 144) notes, "appreciating a city's distinctness as a place, as well as its role in wider networks, are both crucial to imagining and planning for potential city futures." Yet we know very little about migration and urbanization in Africa (GCIM 2005; Cross et al. 2005, 24). We must not only collect more information, but more holistic data that will reveal the multiple intersections among mobility, poverty, and social marginalization. But to improve our evidence base on migration and poverty, there is a need for a careful conceptualization of migration and poverty and further research into each.

Clearly, we must no longer see human mobility as exceptional, but as an enduring dynamic of today's globalizing cities (Bauman 2000; Sassen 1988).

5. Personal communication, 13 July 2005. The Johannesburg metropolitan government has slowly begun to consider migrants as a vulnerable group although it is unclear whether efforts will be made to include migrants in local decision-making priorities.

When speaking of migration, however, we must not assume it is primarily a South-North phenomenon or a series of one-off events. Policies need to be shaped by an understanding of migration's multiple facets including temporary, circular, and seasonal movements within and between developing countries, as well as from South to North (House of Commons 2004, 17). Whenever possible, these must be disaggregated and their effects on poverty carefully parsed. Even within specific spaces, it is important to reflect on the diversity of experiences and explain divergent outcomes. Measures of poverty must also be carefully considered in ways that move beyond individual-level attributes and strategies to include the presence of a shared purpose/trajectory, accountable institutions, and government capacity. These are all primary resources in countering poverty, and anything that fosters fragmentation or prevents the creation of common objectives and rules of engagement should be seen as an obstacle to poverty alleviation.

In line with the multilevel analysis called for above, there is a need to understand the reactions of host populations that result in discrimination, exclusion, or lack of opportunities. Accepting that migration does not happen in a vacuum, our analytical lens should include "host" populations and other categories of migrants. It should also include a critical focus on policy frameworks at the local, national, and regional level. Along with documenting laws and institutions, these should include detailed analyses of how policies are translated into practice and their effects on the behavior of and relationships among employers, host populations, and migrants (see UNFPA 2005, 9). As indicated above, many of the policies designed to control or prevent migration do little to halt or even slow migration and urbanization. Instead, they generate responses that do little to alleviate poverty (see Landau 2005a, b). Building common and accountable institutions also means considering the institutional frameworks that facilitate or prevent newcomers and noncitizens from participating in the planning process. Continuing to exclude any group may have "devastating consequences for many people in the city, especially the poorest in terms of service provision, equality of access and redistribution" (Robinson 2002, 162).

In addition to the proactive suggestion above, there are a number of pitfalls that may hinder effectively responding to migration in ways that counter poverty. First, although I argue in favor of incorporating migrants into planning processes, we cannot assume that they and others seek a closer relationship among citizens, migrants, and state institutions. Social and legal

exclusion can facilitate informal trade and other forms of social interactions while avoiding the obligations that come from denser social networks. For these and other reasons, people may actively resist even the most well-meaning efforts to include them in planning exercises. Given their exposure to Africa's corrupt and predatory state institutions and agents, one can hardly fault them for being so evasive.

There is also a need to consider local governments' complex roles in responding to migration and reducing urban poverty. On one hand, efforts to maximize the benefits of migration will not be successful when local governments ignore the social dynamics occurring within their cities. However, effective advocacy and action vis-à-vis migration may mean challenging national immigration and migration policies if they promote poverty and marginalization. Elsewhere in the world, subnational administrations have begun issuing identity documents, translating legislation and polices into appropriate languages, and reaching out to communities that national governments deem illegal. But taking on this advocacy role represents a significant break from the centralized ethos and party structures that still dominate many African polities.

Although local and national governments can play an important role in shaping and implementing migration-oriented policies, we must also be cognizant of the severe limits they face in addressing migration and urban poverty. These limitations take several forms. First, the growing informality of many African cities means that that much of what takes place within them already exists outside direct government influence or control. Moreover, there are often powerfully institutionalized interests that will resist the expansion of government activity into new areas. Second, as indicated above, national governments often make policies that shape urban economies, but without consulting them. The structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s, for example, dealt a severe blow to many rural economies and stimulated urbanization on a large scale. Cuts to social service programs and government agencies made at the national level have also encouraged the out-migration of skilled labor from the cities while leaving many local governments without the human resources needed to learn about, manage, and assist the urban populations for which they are responsible (see Gilbert et al. 1996). Indeed, as the Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM) notes (2005b, 3): "There is a need for capacity-building in African states, enabling them to collect better migration data and to formulate and implement more

effective migration policies." Since the effects of migration are most pronounced in urban areas, this is where assistance is most needed. Last, and most fundamentally, the continued marginalization of most African countries in global trade and policy-making limits the ability of cities to accumulate the financial and human resources needed to tackle poverty.

Those interested in fighting urban poverty must reconsider models of urban planning and governance in ways that account for human mobility. This means rethinking what we mean by urban community to include people who do not—and will not—see their city of residence as their home. This means that local and national governments, together with donors, international organizations, and scholars, must find new ways of building a sense of a shared future among all urban residents. Promoting such emotional investments—to be followed by physical and financial inputs—in Africa's cities is an acute challenge, but essential if migration is to coincide with or promote poverty reduction.

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Finding a Place for Youth: Urban Space and Citizenship in Lusaka, Recife, and Hanoi[1]

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What do changing demographic conditions mean for transitions to adulthood and young people's attainment of citizenship in specific urban contexts? Constituting almost half of the current global population under the age of twenty-five, young people today comprise a major part of the urban populations of the rapidly growing cities in the developing world. Judging by demographic projections, the total number of youth worldwide is expected to increase from 1.2 billion to 1.8 billion within the next generation (UN-HABITAT 2005). In 2000, 47% of the world's total population was urban. According to recent projections, the world's urban population will reach 60% by 2030. These observations hide striking shifts in the age composition of urban populations. The combination of growing youth and urban populations demands our attention for demographic reasons that have cultural, socioeconomic, and political consequences, both from a societal point of view and from the perspective of young people themselves.

This chapter examines young people's access to space in Lusaka in Zambia, Recife in Brazil, and Hanoi in Vietnam, and the meanings and consequences of this access and its restrictions. Drawing on anthropological research, we discuss how young people's appropriation of specific places is part of wider processes of social in- and exclusion that accompany their gradual acquisition of rights and responsibilities. In each ethnographic example the vulnerable position of young people is a result of, among many other things, their difficulties in gaining access to urban space because of poverty, social stigma, and planned restrictions that contribute to reinforce the liminal status of youth as a social category. We conclude by briefly discussing the applicability of anthropological knowledge to policy and planning in relation to youth in developing countries.

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1. The paper is based on individual presentations by the three authors at the seminar "Youth and the City: Comparative Perspectives on Urban Space, Class, and Gender," hosted by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on 27 April 2006. We are grateful to Director Blair A. Ruble for inviting us and to Professor Pamela Reynolds, John Hopkins University, for constructive comments.

The chapter draws on observations from a collaborative research project, "Youth and the City: Skills, Knowledge, and Social Reproduction," conducted between 2001 and 2005 (Hansen et al. 2008).[2] The aim of this four-year project was to examine urban youth as both a structural and an experiential category, historically constructed and shaped by local and global forces in the three urban settings. The methodological framework of the project integrated in-depth anthropological research in each city with three topically oriented, cross-cutting studies within the areas of human geography, education studies, and media studies. The project was designed with cross-class and cross-regional comparisons in mind. This was reflected in the research methodology that in all three cities took as its point of departure the activities, views, and aspirations of young people between the ages of twelve and twenty-five, whom we sampled using a brief household survey in residential areas of different socioeconomic status. The combination of implicit, in-built comparison inherent in any kind of social science and the explicit comparative framework of the project has invited us to critically assess the epistemological value of a comparative approach (see Fox and Gingrich 2002; Moore 2005).

We discuss here the contributions of a comparative approach to anthropology's engagement with policy (see Peacock 2002). We begin with a general examination of the relationship among youth, citizenship, and urban space and move on to a presentation of Lusaka, Recife, and Hanoi in order to provide a contextual framework for our ethnographic examples. We then discuss the cross-cultural variations in the concept of youth as they appear in the three cities. The empirical cases that follow from each locality illustrate, first, how access to urban space depends on the economic, political, and social resources available to young people. Second, the examples highlight how urban planning, as outcomes of transformations in the political economy and structural conditions of society, influences young people's access to and use of the city.

YOUTH, CITIZENSHIP, AND URBAN SPACE

Urban space constitutes much more than a neutral background against which youth life, like any other kind of social life, unfolds. In effect, urban space is actively implicated in creating context-dependent meanings, constituting phys-

2. This interdisciplinary project was funded by the Council for Development Research of Danida, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and conducted in close collaboration with our colleagues Kate Gough, Ulla Ambrosius Madsen, and Norbert Wildermuth.

ical, social, and moral frames that condition young people's opportunities and restrictions. This is not a new insight, yet it is important to remember when discussing urban planning in relation to young people's needs and desires.

A focus on the relationship between transitions to adulthood and the attainment of citizenship in specific urban contexts draws our attention to the interplay of spatial organization, generational position, and power relations. Questions about citizenship, thus, offer a fertile ground for exploring the relationship between urban youth and processes of social in- and exclusion. Citizenship provides a productive frame for conceptualizing young people's move into adulthood and membership in adult society. A life-course approach to citizenship allows us to recognize how rights and obligations are acquired and changed during the life course in relation to social structures of inequality (Jones and Wallace 1992, 144–45). Such a perspective underscores the fact that legal rights and responsibilities are often age-specific. What is more, it acknowledges the socially constructed character of youth and adulthood and the negotiated dimension of life-course transitions. It also sheds light on the fact that rights and obligations are not distributed on the basis of age-based criteria only; but their acquisition also depends upon available resources. In this perspective, the conception of the term "citizenship" has changed from a narrow focus on legal status and entitlements to a more inclusive notion of citizenship as a normative ideal built around the notion of societal membership (Hall, Coffee, and Williamson 1999, 502–4). This is understood not only in political terms, but also as belonging, independence, responsibility, participation, and shared identity, including the ability to exercise formally bestowed rights and responsibilities (ibid.). From the perspective of youth, citizenship implies much more than obtaining a set of legal rights acquired at a certain age. It also entails the right to, among others, work, housing, sexuality, and social networks that young people need if they are to reach social adulthood.

Linking the notion of citizenship to cities, James Holston and Arjun Appadurai have noted the changing conceptions of the term. They argue that citizenship includes not only the right to participate in politics but also in a wider set of civil, socioeconomic, and cultural processes in the city (1999, 14). This, we may add, includes young people's rights to mark and (re)define urban territories in accordance with their own needs and desires. Rights to the city are conceived as aspects of social relatedness rather than as properties of individuals (ibid., 11), which means that they are never fixed, but flexible and contestable. When viewed from this perspective, cities are special sites for

formation of their citizens (Holston and Appadurai 1999). As administrative centers and seats of national power, cities—and capitals in particular—are stages for politics of a different sort than their rural hinterland. They also represent the localization of global forces in intense and highly visible ways and tend to absorb transnational flows relatively quickly (ibid.).

Urban place and placements are central to the conceptualization of citizenship and link youth and the city as analytical constructs. Transitions to adulthood, the acquisition of full citizenship, and the identity work inherent in these processes cannot be separated from the physical locality in which they occur (Hall et al. 1999, 502). When studying urban youth, this implies that we take seriously the city as a scene of action for young people (see Diouf 1999), asking what cities, as concrete physical locations and dense articulations of intersecting national and global forces, mean for the acquisition of citizenship, that is, for young people's entitlement to specific places and social placements in urban public space. As the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan (1974) has observed, the word "place" has a double meaning: it means both place as social position and place as physical location. These two meanings are interrelated, as placements in and on concrete physical locations to a wide extent are determined by placements in social hierarchies (Olwig and Gulløv 2003). By implication, young people's access to and control over space is closely related to their social position as youth with access to some places and not to others. This entails processes of sociospatial inclusion and exclusion, which tend to take place routinely without people noticing it (Sibley 1995, xiv).

LUSAKA, RECIFE, AND HANOI

Our discussion about urban youth and citizenship is anchored in a comparative framework that sheds light on urban youth life as it unfolds in different corners of the world. It allows us to compare historical contexts, structural conditions, and processes of agency that contribute to the shaping of culturally specific notions of youth and youth life. It also helps us to elucidate some common conditions for growing up urban around the globe and to identify shared traits of youth as a specific phase in the life course. As the anthropologist James Peacock (2002) has noted, the comparative method is particularly well-suited to produce such knowledge, because it opens up for shifting perspectives and systematic analysis of how global patterns develop. Besides, the ethnographic approach employed in our project is specifically useful for the elucidation of routine actions and their consequences. Through inter-

views with young people in the three cities and our participation in parts of their everyday life we have gained insight into the experiential dimension of city life and young people's hopes and worries in relation to the future.

Although they have different urban histories, Recife, Hanoi, and Lusaka resemble each other in that their major growth has been recent; they all have colonial pasts; and they are important administrative centers. Recife is the capital of the state of Pernambuco, one of the poorest regions of Brazil, while Hanoi and Lusaka are national capitals. Socioeconomically and culturally heterogeneous, they are characterized by vast inequalities of income and diverse combinations of ethnic/racial/religious distinctions. There is residential segregation in socioeconomic terms; in Recife this tends to conceal racial divisions, while they are masked somewhat by ideas about race in Lusaka. In Hanoi, socioeconomic differences have increased following economic liberalization, known as *doi moi*, in the 1980s, yet they are not as visible as in the two other cities. As regional or national hubs, all three cities are undergoing rapid growth, driven by a combination of natural urban population increase and rural-urban migration. Not linked to industrialization, their recent rapid urban growth is a result of a global political conjuncture: the debt crisis of the late 1970s, the IMF-led economic restructuring of the 1980s, and the market liberalization of the 1990s (Davis 2004, 9).

Young people in Vietnam have life expectancies of an average of sixty-nine and in Brazil of sixty-eight years of age, but Zambia, with just thirty-three years' life expectancy at birth, offers poor long-term perspectives for young people (UNICEF 2005). Brazil and Vietnam are on the United Nations Development Programme's list of "medium human development countries," whereas Zambia is near the bottom of the list of "low human development countries." All three countries share the experience of economic restructuring—Vietnam only since 1986—most recently the poverty reduction programs set into motion by the neoliberal development agenda of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and donor countries and international agencies that subscribe to the Bank's development priorities. Due in large measure to the development agendas pursued by their governments since the 1970s, many of the young people we have come to know through this work, even those who are rich, are growing up in the context of pressures placed on the educational system from grade school through university, and the lack of formal employment in many sectors of the economy. Against such backdrops, it is not surprising that governments encounter

challenges to satisfy the needs of their growing urban youth populations, and that everywhere, local and global identities are crucially at stake as young people negotiate urban space for the future.

THE MEANING OF YOUTH: TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD

Associated with increasing independence and responsibilities as well as with shifting legal, economic, social, and, often, marital status, youth is an inherently transitional social category. Our findings from all three cities show that transitions from childhood to adulthood are nowhere coherent and synchronous and do not progress in strictly ordered sequences. Moreover, transitions from one position in society to another are often imbued with normative ideas of what constitutes proper youth and proper adulthood, and along with these, ideas about the proper sociospatial location of young and adult people.

In Lusaka, youth was broadly defined chronologically as the age group between twelve or fifteen and thirty-five years. But what youth means is a cultural issue. Many parents distinguish youth from children by maturity, which they define both socially and sexually. In their view, maturity starts earlier for young women than for young men. Young women and men refer to sexual activity when distinguishing between childhood and youth. Young people and adults generally agree that the chief meaning of youth is dependency, or being "kept," as it is referred to in Zambia, which means depending on others for food, shelter, and clothing. This is certainly how some young secondary school students in grade twelve put it in essays they wrote about being a young person in Lusaka. A seventeen-year-old woman wrote in 2001: "Being a young person in Lusaka today means no freedom; even when it is given to you, it is given in such a way that reminds you of your limitations. You are reminded that you are becoming an adult and are supposed to act responsibly yet [you] get treated as a child. It seems that you never have time to live your own life."

In Recife, young people and parents from all groups defined *juventude* (youth) as an age category, from around fifteen or eighteen to twenty-five years of age. The lower and upper limits were not always precise and changed from person to person, yet they were close to the chronological definitions employed by international organizations such as UNESCO and WHO. Implemented in 2005, the Brazilian National Youth Policy defines the age limits as from fifteen to twenty-five. When we asked young people and their parents more specifically about what it means to be *jovem* (young), it became clear that youth is not just a matter of age—the term *juventude* was repeated-

ly used to identify a specific set of attitudes and behavior. A playful, open, and unworried attitude towards life seemed to be a crucial attribute for a person to be classified as *jovem*. But while *responsabilidade* (responsibility) is related to adulthood, *juventude* in itself is also seen as a step towards responsibility in terms of education, work, and establishing a family.

The Vietnamese term for "youth," *thanh nien*, originally designated only young men, but today it encompasses both genders (Marr 1996, 3). A related concept, *vi thanh nien*, is occasionally translated as "adolescent," referring to the "younger youth." Seeking to come closer to an understanding of the meaning of youth in Hanoi, we asked the young people to define *thanh nien* in terms of age and to describe the responsibilities, duties, and rights associated with this particular period of life. They generally agreed that "youth" begins somewhere between fifteen and eighteen and ends around the age of thirty or thirty-five. In terms of age this came very close to what the Communist Party's youth branch used to define its members, but a more complex picture emerged when they had to describe it in qualitative terms. They explained it as a period characterized by increasing responsibilities in terms of preparing oneself for a professional career, getting married, supporting one's parents financially, observing the law, and, as citizens, contributing to the development of the nation.

In all three cities, youth was defined as a period of acquiring responsibility, partly informed by politically defined criteria, partly by culturally dominant norms. At the same time the transition in question was nowhere just a change in social position but also involved a physical change of environment. Setting up an individual household, moving in with the family-in-law, getting a new job, changing from school to higher education or a vocational training center all imply a movement from one physical location to another. Hence, movement in space is a crucial element in the normative construction of the transition to adulthood.

DIFFERENCES IN ACCESS TO URBAN SPACE

Despite a certain consensus about the definition of youth, the young people we met lived their lives in very different ways, even within the same residential areas. Access to schooling and health care varied, and while access to the global sphere of the Internet was a natural part of some lives, it was totally absent from others. But what was maybe most striking in our research were the differences in access to the city in which our informants lived. A city is not just a geographi-

cal phenomenon, a patch of ground covered with buildings; on the experiential level it is divided into known and unknown areas, segregated by fear, social discrimination, and strong senses of belonging. In the following we show how young people experience their spatial in- or exclusion in the city. Each example is formed by the particular circumstances of the specific ethnographic study, and they are therefore kaleidoscopic rather than directly comparative.

In different ways the following cases illustrate the complex relationship between the categories of youth and space in the three settings. They exemplify how youth are allowed or denied access to urban spaces depending upon structural conditions, social norms, and available resources. In other words, they show how socioeconomic and political hierarchies relate to practices of spatial in- and exclusion and how they are interpreted by young people themselves. In Lusaka, we look at young people's expectations of their chances in life and the way the history of the city plan, especially the term "compound," form part of their experiences. In Recife, we deal with marginalized young men's access to the city and suggest that life in the periphery (i.e., the poorer areas of the city) is stigmatizing and therefore reproduced through, among other things, the denial of poor young men's access to income-earning activities. In Hanoi, we focus on a particular segment of modern youth and describe how ideas about the "right kind of youth" are both inscribed in the urban space and transgressed by new practices and competing youth ideals. For the purpose of clarity in presentation, we may simplify what should rather be seen as complex processes.

Experiences of Youth in Lusaka: Getting Stuck, Getting By, and Getting On

The cultural terms for adulthood in Zambia, in the view of both youth and parents, revolve around independence from others, responsibility towards others, and the ability to take care of a household. But attaining social adulthood is difficult, for schools do not provide education for all, and even secondary school and university graduates face difficulties in obtaining formal jobs. The housing situation is abysmal except for the rich. Young people out of school, in informal or insecure formal jobs if they are at all working, cannot afford to rent rooms or houses and they do not have the wherewithal to marry.

Lusaka's layout and built environment still bear the imprints of colonial urban planning with the exception that today income, not race, differentiates residential areas and the kinds of service provision and infrastructure their residents enjoy. Government-built low-income housing areas and squatter settlements

continue to be called "compounds" and middle- income residential areas to be referred to as "townships." Both terms derive from the colonial urban control apparatus that invoked race to segregate housing, labor, health, and domestic arrangements. Back then, "compound" referred to the racially segregated housing institution tied to employment of a labor force that was considered to be temporary and male. In postcolonial Zambia, compounds differ from townships mainly in the material sense of their deterioration, which is evident in the poor quality of buildings, dilapidated infrastructure, and absence of services and amenities. Many urban residents refer to the former white residential areas as *mayadi* (the yards, meaning gardens, i.e. *yadi* with the plural Nyajna language prefix *ma*), a term that today connotes high-income residential areas in general and is no longer associated with race.

The way young people experience and use Lusaka as a space may open up, or curtail, economic and social opportunities. The following discussion draws on our household survey in three different residential areas, interviews and conversations, and participant observation in all manner of activities to sketch different dominant narratives that frame young people's experiences of where they find themselves in class and space terms. Young people experience life in Lusaka in spatial terms, in relation to "where they are," meaning in the compounds or the yards, in distinctions that construe space in economic and social terms that invoke both consumption/life-style issues and social relations. From what they told us we identified three different scenarios of transition experienced by the young people that in shorthand terms may be called *getting stuck*, *getting by*, and *getting on*.

Getting stuck is what young people easily become in the compounds both in their own view and the view of other Lusaka residents who find themselves in better circumstances. Young people in the compound live in crowded households with few means of income; the majority of youth surveyed did not complete their secondary schooling. Many were emphatic about wanting to leave the compounds, which they described as overcrowded, dirty, and disease-ridden. They saw life in the compound as governed by unemployment and hunger. When describing the corollaries of these circumstances, they referred to drinking, drugs, prostitution, theft, and gangs. Some of them worked hard devising efforts to get away, yet felt trapped in the compounds. Many blamed their lack of job prospects on their limited education. With more training, some thought that their life might be better, though few had the means to pay school fees. On the job front, many young men found occa-

sional casual jobs largely in construction, and some young women as nannies. Both young men and women entertained desires about conducting "business," that is, small-scale trade in the compound's markets, along streets, or in front of homes. For this they need start-up capital; they often do not have access to this nor, as we shall discuss later, do they have access to places in town where they can sell their products. Young women with little education and few job skills find themselves handicapped on both the job and the marriage market because young men look for partners who can contribute economically to future livelihoods. To fulfil their consumption needs and desires, young women may get caught up in transactional sex on a trajectory that easily traps them in the compound.

The young people in the township, a middle-income area, felt that they were just *getting by*. Many had completed secondary school, and they were now particularly busy taking courses to acquire qualifications and new skills in the hope of avoiding the kind of marginalization many young people from the compounds experience. Having parents/guardians who know that education alone will not secure the transition to adulthood, these young people navigate their way through a range of courses, occasional jobs, and stints of self-employment, struggling not to "slide down" so as not to "get stuck in the compound." Several unmarried young women with children extend "youth" well into their twenties trying to acquire job skills and find responsible partners. Young men on their part court young women with education and job qualifications. Balancing the options of sliding down or moving up put these young people on a very risky trajectory of getting by.

Young people from high-income residential areas constitute the tiny segment of Lusaka's huge youth population who see themselves as *getting on*. Because they have educational opportunities and financial support, they are better able than the majority of young people to take advantage of the capital's resources. Most of these young people have completed university or tertiary training either in Zambia or abroad. They have networks and contacts by means of which they craft work options, for example in business, media, and culture industries; they also have the means, because of well-placed parents/guardians, to advance their careers by additional training that may allow them to take advantage of new occupational opportunities, for example, in computer-based information technology. They go through many relationships before the transition to cohabitation or marriage. Enabled by the family/household resource base, the trajectory of getting on is increasingly individualized.

In Lusaka young people's experiences of where they are in terms of resources and chances in life are framed by and large by space. The connotations of race and poverty or wealth that through history have been linked to certain parts of the city are today still active, both as real conditions and imagined horizons towards which young people orient themselves and their expectations.

Being the Wrong Kind of Youth: "Dangerous" Young Men in Recife

Being young in the wrong places or being young in the wrong way is both a subjective experience and a fact with tangible consequences when access to urban space is negotiated. Young women attending karaoke bars in Hanoi or enjoying a drink in an upscale hotel in Lusaka may feel awkward and isolated due to discriminating gender stereotypes. In less affluent circumstances, feeling awkward is accompanied by different experiences of structural and physical exclusion. In Recife, young men from low-income areas search for a place in public space in two senses of the term "place." First, they find themselves caught in the generational hierarchy, between childhood and adulthood, with few chances of getting a proper job or a relevant education and, hence, a position as responsible adults. Second, they often find themselves without place in the public space of the city. These two aspects of emplacement interact and reinforce the negative consequences of each other.

Recife is one of the cities in Brazil with the highest number of deaths due to firearms among young men between age fifteen and twenty-four, the majority of whom are poor. Most people in low-income areas know a young man who has been killed, and mothers generally worry when their sons are old enough to do as they wish but not tied to a regular life by work, study, or other obligations. Being in bad company, with nothing to do except hang around in the street, and having no responsibilities towards family, school, or job is perceived as a perilous cocktail leading to crime, drug use, and, ultimately, prison or death. The risk perceived by low-income youth and their families is complemented by the (mainly middle class) social imaginary of the dangerous poor, black, young male living on the outskirts of the city. Newspapers and TV reports frequently show killed persons, most often young black men; and the image of "problematic youth" figures in state and civil society interventions in cultural and educational programs, and in police and justice actions. However, the danger ascribed to young men from low-income areas is not only associated with youth as a difficult passage but is also

closely related to their marginal position in the Brazilian economy. Most young men from low-income areas feel responsible for their own life and the survival of their families, but they do not have the means to act accordingly.

In their own neighborhoods they are easily recognized; here they have their families and friends, their fame as football players, and their girlfriends. But standards of respectability are set far away from the poorer neighborhoods, interfering with and at times disrupting the comfort and recognition provided by personal networks. When looking at the affluent residential areas, youth from low-income areas see the periphery—the center of *their* world—as an empty space in which they experience the lack of all kinds of services and commodities. In a focus group we conducted in a low-income area, a young woman expressed what the whole group seemed to feel about their own place: "We have to leave. This place has nothing; not an area for leisure, not a club for youth, not a plaza, not even a small square." When they leave their neighborhoods and enter the public space of the city, however, they are not welcome. They are stigmatized, avoided, or directly excluded. The color of their skin, their body gestures, clothes, and language tell of their low-income status. Recognized as coming from the poorer areas of the city they provoke immediate suspicion. They are routinely stopped in the street by police, better-off people may cross the road in order not to walk near them, and car drivers are likely to close their windows when waiting for a red light if they are around.

Being stigmatized in public space is a hindrance to several activities, some of which could be income bringing. One of our informants, Fil, once decided with a few friends to sell some paintings they had made in order to improve their miserable economic situation. But as he told us:

> We do not go out in the street to sell [paintings] anymore, because when we do, something always happens. People think that we are thieves, because of our way of being, and they keep being aggressive towards us. Once, Juninho, Klaiton, and I went to the beach to sell some paintings, but it did not work well, because we are from this place . . . the police stopped us, because we are poor, and where we went is a place only for rich people. The policeman [pointed] a revolver like this at us and asked "What are you selling?" And I answered "It is a painting, it is *artesanato.*" He thought we were selling drugs. He looked, he sniffed, and asked "Are you

> armed?" and continued "You cannot stay here, you have to leave." He was very ignorant. We were trying to earn our money honestly, and he just treated us as if we were stealing. We just had to lower [our heads] and leave, and he even took our money for the bus.

When they entered what in principle should be a public space, namely the beach, Fil and his friends were suspect just because they were poor.

In Recife, being poor generally means living with only little food and clothing in a society that everywhere celebrates consumption; it means having access to only public schools with few chances to enter university; and it means few (if any) personal contacts with influence and resources. But it also means a social stigma that, as we have shown above, may prevent young people from creating alternatives ways to adulthood.

Morally Legitimate Places and Sociopolitical Activities in Hanoi

In the very different context of Hanoi, we also found that some young people were considered to be "more properly" young than others. The age definition of youth that people generally made use of corresponds more or less with the age limits set for membership in the Youth Union (fifteen to twenty-eight years) and the Youth Federation (fifteen to thirty-five years),[3] but few young people explicitly acknowledged this. It was striking that one young woman in a focus group discussion about the life course suggested an alternative concept for this period, namely that of *doan vien* (union member), specifically referring to Youth Union membership. This slippage from one conceptual category to another appeared to be a general notion of Youth Union members as being more "young" in a normative sense than other persons of the same age group.

As the "future of the nation," young people in Vietnam are considered central actors in the nation-building process. Their role in this process must be analyzed in the context of rapid transition from a state-controlled planned economy to a socialist market economy, characterized by economic growth and technological progress, but also by increasing social and economic inequalities and a political monopoly vested in the Communist Party. The

3. The Youth Federation is an umbrella organization of which the Youth Union is a core member. Whereas the latter is explicitly defined as a sociopolitical organization, the former is conceived of as a social organization that is not as strict in terms of membership.

rationale behind the Youth Union is, as it is for state-organized youth associations in other authoritarian, centralized societies, to provide "meaningful" and politically correct leisure for young people. Youth Union activities privilege community development and social work, physical exercise and competitive games, and participation in national celebrations. Such activities not only occupy members' spare time, but are also expected to keep them away from what are considered dangerous places and activities in the city by establishing new, morally legitimate places for them.

Young people's engagement in community development is a key element in the work and legitimacy of the Youth Union. It aims to involve young men and women in organized programs of street- and canal-cleaning, whitewashing walls that have been illegally painted with graffiti, and planting trees. Youth Union members also contribute to the maintenance of local security. These goals are expressed in the collaborative volunteer programs established between Youth Union branches in wards and universities, encouraging students to contribute to community development in both rural and urban areas. Emphasizing social responsibility and solidarity, such programs are driven by a concern to engage young people in activities aimed at distracting them from the temptations of the so-called social evils, meaning forms of supposedly immoral behavior such as drug use, prostitution, and gambling. The programs make it possible to control the social environment of the ward and, if necessary, reorient young people who have gotten on the "wrong" track—for example, spoiled young men from better-off families who have fallen into drug use; poor kids who roam the streets without control; or young women who are accused of prostituting themselves behind the facades of the many karaoke bars. The Youth Union offers young people "meaningful" leisure, that is, a set of formally organized and politically informed social activities. Doing so, it aims to turn young people into socially responsible persons and active participants in urban community development and other collective events.

As an integral part of the Communist Party, the Youth Union also provides a basis for the current one-party system to reproduce itself by recruiting new party members and by fostering future citizens who are loyal to the existing political system. However, maintaining the power of the party is a challenge in a society that is undergoing such profound transformations. The difficulty in recruiting new members is evidence of the Youth Union's declining legitimacy in the eyes of the young themselves. It is an open question whether this has to do with ideology or the kinds of activities the union

offers. Although most of the young people in this study were dedicated Youth Union members who acknowledged the advantages of membership, some complained that the kinds of activities it offered could not attract "modern" youth. Judging from the huge number of young people in the streets, cafés, karaoke bars, shopping centers, and discos, it is clear that Hanoi offers young people a wide range of opportunities for consumption and leisure that may challenge the centrality of the Youth Union in their everyday lives. Yet membership in the Youth Union and participation in consumer-oriented leisure activities are not mutually exclusive. This is especially the case for young people from better-off families with the purchasing power to position themselves in the cultural space of the emergent, consuming middle class, who certainly know how to seek out the upscale cafés around Hoan Kiem Lake yet still remain loyal to the Youth Union.

In Hanoi, norms and values of the "right" kind of youth are manifested in the Youth Union and the role it plays in placing young people socially and physically. But these norms and values are contested by new trends and aspirations among youth. As long as young people manage to combine Youth Union membership and consumption, the two domains may reinforce each other, excluding those who can neither be members nor consumers—that is, those at the bottom of society.

Access to urban space is access to citizenship; however, as we have now seen in Lusaka, Recife, and Hanoi, access is not just something one takes, but also something that is allocated to one according to economic conditions, implicit or explicit moral standards, and political control. Some young people are considered dangerous or "stuck" while others are considered to be "proper" and in transition. It is our impression that city plans are generally made for the latter category of youth.

YOUTH, URBAN PLANNING, AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Urban planning is the result of officially formulated policy frameworks aimed at reconfiguring social space. Still, people appropriate and respond to policy initiatives in unpredictable ways that may question or even work counter to politically defined goals. Although planning may result in specific physical transformations of the built environment, it may also have unintended consequences for social organization and human use of urban space. What is more, sociospatial transformations are not always the result of planning but

may take place unexpectedly as a consequence of changes in the structural conditions of society.

Constituting a significant proportion of urban populations, young people belong to all segments of urban society. They therefore relate to and depend on the city in very different ways. For many young people from middle- and upper-class backgrounds, the city represents more or less privatized spaces for housing, education, leisure, and consumption, whereas young people from low-income areas depend on public spaces for work and housing in their everyday struggle for survival. Consequently, changes in structural conditions will have different effects on different youth groups depending upon their life situation. The following example from Hanoi illustrates how changes in the political economy may initiate sociospatial reconfigurations, which can lead to, or reinforce, social exclusion.

The spatial structure of Hanoi has been transformed considerably as a consequence of the economic liberalization in the late 1980s, when central planning was replaced by a market economy (Quang and Kammeier 2002). Changing conceptualizations of the divide between public and private space have resulted in revitalization and commercialization of public spaces, and thus in changing conditions for economic activity, consumption, and leisure activities that take place on streets, pavements, and plazas (see Drummond 2000). This is, as Lisa Drummond has also noted, particularly visible in the leisure spaces used for recreational activities that have become subject to increasing commercialization and consequently restricted access based on financial criteria (2000, 2388). Although not exclusively targeting the youth, many such consumer-oriented leisure spaces attract young people, but are beyond the reach of many of those coming from low-income areas.

The area around Hoan Kiem Lake, located in the central part of Hanoi, exemplifies how urban space becomes socially divided and partly restricted due to increasing privatization. The lake is surrounded by a small park, encircled by wide pavements that are used by elders doing tai chi or young people playing sports. Young couples use the benches facing the lake for intimate encounters while other urbanites stroll around the lake. The open-air café located at the southern end is a popular spot for tourists and young well-dressed Vietnamese, enjoying a break from shopping or work. The café occupies a space materially demarcated from its surroundings by only half a meter of low stone wall. Yet, everyone knows the boundaries, which separate the affluent youth, who can afford to pay two dollars for a cup of coffee, from the shoe-shine boys who flock

around the lake area to make a meager income for survival. Although public space has become accessible for a variety of activities that were not allowed previously, this access is simultaneously conditioned by economic ability.

Whereas changes in the political economy indirectly contribute to reconfigure urban social space, urban planning is explicitly implemented with the aim of transforming the city in ways that target distinct segments of the population. A large proportion of Lusaka's poor population, including many young people, make a living from informal trade in markets and on streets. Neoliberal investment policy has targeted several existing markets for upgrading at the same time as the city council intermittently clears streets of vendors. In the process, access to informal vending space is restricted, pushing vendors to the urban periphery where there are fewer economic opportunities. The result is that in today's reconfigured urban space in Lusaka, young people are finding even less access than their parents' generation enjoyed.

Some urban planning is specifically intended to meet young people's demands and needs, and to assign them places of their own in the otherwise adult-centered city planning. However, despite all good intentions such initiatives are not necessarily received by the young people in accordance with the expectations of planners. This was the case in one of the neighborhoods in which we worked in Recife, where a park was established in 2004 in order to meet, among others, young people's need for public spaces. The long-awaited park turned out to be a disappointment. Because the municipality gave priority to security when planning it, the park was open, without shade, and with only a few benches; in short, very uncomfortable and unwelcoming, without cosy spots and shady corners where young people could find privacy. Attaching negative expectations to its users, the planners of the park reconfirmed the stereotype of low-income youth as dangerous rather than providing them with a place for unplanned encounters, strolling, gazing, and enjoying life that they wanted. Even well-intended plans like this particular instance may imply a desire to restrict youth and control their actions. As a form of policy-making, planning is neither politically nor morally neutral, but a practice of power that can serve to objectify and universalize certain ideas (Shore and Wright 1997, 10).

If we acknowledge that transitions to adulthood and the acquisition of citizenship take place in close relation to the physical locality in which they occur (Hall et al. 1999, 502), and that transitions to adulthood include the acquisition of civic rights and responsibilities, it is important to remember that rights are frustrating and perhaps even have a negative effect if there is no place for the

young to live the life they feel they are entitled to or if the place they expected to have access to turns out to be a restricted area, only suited to "proper" actions. In the case of young people, and especially the poor, the place aspired for is both a social position as responsible, economically self-sustaining citizens and a place in the geographical sense, where this citizenship can be acted out. Such a place needs to enable young people both to act as individuals and to assume social responsibility. If citizenship is to be substantive, planners must take into account this interrelationship between social and physical place. Urban planning must not only recognize that young people's social placement is intersected by class, race, ethnicity, and gender but also that it is a normative construction shaped by ideas of what constitutes "proper" youth and adulthood. In effect, acknowledging the variety of young people's positions and their desire to define their own place may constitute a first step toward a more inclusive urban planning approach.

We conclude by asking what anthropology can offer urban planning and policy in relation to the specific interests of the young in developing countries. This inevitably entails questions about the applicability and relevance of anthropological knowledge in general. One of our research goals was to contribute to the disciplinary, that is, the anthropological understanding of the lives of young people. We also intended to make explicit some of the cultural assumptions and social structures that constitute young people's lives and the political attempts to control and perhaps improve them. The concerns of children and youth in urban development have been dealt with by several other scholars (e.g., Baraldi 2003; Bartlett et al. 1999; Chawla and Malone 2003; Gallagher 2004; Hart 1997) from a rights-based approach and with the explicit aim of including children and youth in urban planning and policy-making. The emphasis of these works is on participatory action research and the development of indicators of urban quality (Chawla and Malone 2003). Unlike these scholars, we have not sought to conduct action research by actively engaging young people as advocates for urban change. Neither have we sought to contribute directly to policy by proposing problem-solving advice. Rather, we believe that the chief value of anthropology lies in the production of localized forms of knowledge, particularly well-suited to provide contextualized and subjective accounts, that is, to bring to the fore young people's own experiences and interpretations of the social and material world they inhabit, including the way in which, through discursive and social practice, they respond to urban planning. With this approach, we have offered insights into the perspectives and actions of the young actors who are targets for policies and planning.

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Urban Violence, Quality of Life, and the Future of Latin American Cities: The Dismal Record So Far and the Search for New Analytical Frameworks to Sustain the Bias Towards Hope[1]

Diane Davis

THE STRUCTURAL ROOTS OF THE VIOLENCE–INSECURITY NEXUS: IS THERE A WAY OUT?

The depressing fact of growing violence across major cities of Latin America is hardly news to scholars and practitioners in the region.[2] In recent years, the number of reports and publications devoted to violence or insecurity and their impact on urban quality of life has grown exponentially. Most of this work falls into three categories: those that examine the social, political, and economic origins of the rising violence and insecurity; those that examine the ways that violence and insecurity derive from or interact with other key livability challenges facing residents of Latin American cities, namely unemployment, income inequality, drug abuse, and poverty; and those that diagnose or evaluate possible policy or programmatic solutions to these problems.

My own work tends to fall into the first category. I have traced growing problems of urban violence and insecurity in Latin American cities to a variety of structural forces and conditions linked to processes of contested state formation, the rise of authoritarianism followed by a limited democratic transition, late industrialization, and the combined impact of these processes on the power of the police and the predominance of informality in the urban economy.[3] Although my methodological approach differs

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2. For a good overview of this problem, as seen from a variety of disciplinary vantage points, see Rotker (2002). For a review essay on the theme, and a treatment of some of the most innovative ways that scholars are now examining violence in Latin America, see Davis (2006a).

3. For more on the police roots of violence and crime, see Davis (2006a); for more on the relationship between political development and violence, see Davis and Alvarado (1999); for more on the relationship between economic development (both industrialization and informality) and growing rates of violence and crime, see Davis (2007).

widely from the second and third category of studies, what unites most of us is pessimism if not outright despair about the near intolerable conditions for large swaths of the urban population in Latin American cities. Even those whose scholarship is directed at remedying these conditions are considerably humbled by the task at hand, given the interrelationships between violence, insecurity, un- and underemployment, and deteriorating quality of urban life, all of which cannot be easily reversed with conventional policy tools (Moser 2004).

This is not to say that efforts at reform have been entirely absent, or that scholars and policy makers in Latin America have not devoted considerable energy to formulating and/or implementing reform policies to reverse the problems of crime and insecurity. Recent work has highlighted the importance of concerted efforts at police and judicial reform (Ungar 2002), as well as the importance of relying on financial or legal support from multilateral agencies and international human rights NGOs fighting impunity and insecurity. Equally popular have been writings that call for reforms or policy changes to accelerate the arrest capacities or crime-fighting activities of federal agents and local police—pursuit of the so-called *mano dura* approach, if you will. And finally, the crafting and advocacy of community-level programs that build local capacities to hold police and governments responsible (in community policing for example), that educate citizens about their rights and responsibilities, and that offer new forms of citizen monitoring of criminal behavior have also garnered widespread policy attention and support in recent years (Moser 2004; Arias and Rodrigues 2006).

But even with all these efforts, on-the-ground success has remained elusive, especially as measured by degrees of public confidence in the police and the latter's capacities to reduce violence and guarantee public security, let alone reverse crime rates. Crime, insecurity, and police impunity in the major cities of Latin America—most notably Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Mexico City—remain at unprecedented levels, standing as among the most serious problems facing the continent's urban citizenry.[4]

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4. In fact, almost every major Latin American country now identifies problems with police, although in Mexico the police are considered notoriously corrupt. A 2002 Gallup study shows that just 18% of Mexican citizens trusted the police. In the same poll, which ranked a variety of Latin American countries, Mexican police are not only the least trusted institution in their home country, but also one of the least trusted police forces in all Latin America (Gallup Argentina 2002). For more on citizen views of Mexican police, see Transparencia Mexicana (2003).

Part of the problem owes to structural constraints, including the fact that a corrupt police force and a weak judicial system are interrelated problems that together undermine the rule of law, further fueling the likelihood of violence and insecurity. When one factors into this equation the globalization of illegal trade activities (in guns, drugs, etc.) that foster or sustain new forms of criminality, and a neoliberal environment in which income inequality is on the rise and poverty continues unabated, the deck seems almost completely stacked against tangible progress. It should also be remembered that police or juridical reform and effective crime fighting generally entail concerted, labor-intensive actions that involve bureaucratic restructuring, individual retraining, new forms of recruiting, and daily (not to mention costly) vigilance to assess the robustness and permanence of these programs and institutional modifications (Ungar 2002).[5]

Given all these constraints, even in those few situations where high-profile reform efforts have been universally recognized as relatively successful in eliminating the sources of violence and insecurity, they generally have had a short shelf life. In El Salvador, for example, which is considered a model case of police reform because it was actively coordinated and overseen by the UN and a bevy of international NGOs all working toward the same aims, initial gains pretty much disappeared within three years of completion (Call 2003, 828–29), with insecurity and impunity returning to prereform levels. As a result, it is tempting to conclude that the content and sweep of policy changes intended to reverse the violence–insecurity nexus are more important in symbolic than in substantive terms, mainly because their chief effect has been to give citizens a sense that efforts are being made, while serious progress remains elusive.

RETHINKING THE VIOLENCE–INSECURITY NEXUS THROUGH THE LENS OF URBAN TRANSFORMATION

Given this sorry state of affairs, what is to be done other than throwing in the

5. Such conclusions are consistent with findings offered by Mark Ungar (2002), who also claims that the benefits of police reform have been few and far between, despite concerted efforts to the contrary. In his examination of police and public officials in democratic Argentina and Venezuela, Ungar makes a convincing case that state-led efforts to reform the institutions of policing often end up giving police more (and not less) power, in no small part because the main strategies used by democratic governments to reform police usually entail embedding them within the institutions of the state in new ways, under civilian oversight, where they are affected by budget crises and a weak judiciary. The limited resources available to overseers, and the constraints on harsh action associated with a relatively powerless judiciary, end up contributing to further abuses of power by police, who are now more deeply embedded in the newly democratic state, thereby compromising even those gains.

towel? How might scholars of violence in Latin American cities help produce the basis for real as opposed to symbolic optimism about progress and change, despite or perhaps even because of the debilitating problems of rising insecurity? In the service of answering these questions, I offer an alternative analytical framework for assessing and potentially remedying the violence–insecurity nexus in Latin American cities, one that entails a focus on the ways that cities are changing as a result of this nexus. I work under the assumption that studying violence and insecurity through the lens of documented urban transformations engendered by these trends might serve as the starting point for generating novel policy ideas and/or renewed hope for bettering the future of Latin American cities. Specifically, rather than focusing directly on the structural causes of rising crime and violence, or on the institutional conditions of the state, economy, or administration of justice systems that mitigate against measurable gains in fighting crime and reducing insecurity, I turn my attention to effects, and evaluate which urban transformations or policy actions have reduced the problems of crime and violence, how and why.

This strategy serves as the analytical equivalent of a magician's sleight of hand to some degree: it redirects scholarly attention away from crime and violence per se, and toward the ways that citizens, business firms, and the cities themselves have actually responded to these threats. By jumping analytical tracks, so to speak, I try to lay the foundation for hope. Rather than miring the analysis in a study of the corrupt and self-sustaining vicious cycle of violence and impunity in which exit appears nearly impossible, and in which government policy makers are routinely thwarted, our attention is turned to other aspects of urban life and livelihood that are changing in the context of growing crime and violence, perhaps even for the better. To do so is not to deny the existence of these terrible problems, but to recognize that cities and their citizens can and have shown resilience and pragmatism, both of which can help create positive urban change in ways that may cultivate more scope for optimism and new opportunities for productive policy action—if not directly in the area of insecurity, then perhaps in other significant dimensions of urban life that can help compensate for or diminish the magnitude of these problems.

To accomplish these conceptual aims, I have developed a three-fold framework to assess recent urban changes in violent and crime-ridden Latin American cities. First, I assess the *character* of recent urban transformations: whether there have been positive or negative developments, both with respect to the security situation and the overall quality of urban life. The point of measuring the overall gains (or losses) is not merely to get a more

balanced and accurate picture of the myriad changes associated with the violence–insecurity nexus. It also allows an assessment of whether measurable progress has been made—and conversely, whether there is still more work to do. By distinguishing among positive and negative urban developments of recent years, a policy framework can be offered for identifying which urban transformations might be deepened or developed (as opposed to reversed or remedied) with additional public measures or institutional support.

Second, I consider the *permanence and sustainability* of recent changes, that is, whether the urban transformations inspired by the violence–insecurity nexus in Latin American cities can be considered temporary—that is, ephemeral or conjunctural responses to current insecurity challenges—as opposed to well-entrenched, because they are a consequence of larger social and economic changes. To be sure, distinguishing between these two categories of change can be difficult, especially without knowledge of the *longue durée*, and given the fact that future policy actions might modify changes that in the present seem to be permanent, or vice versa (i.e., reinforce or institutionalize long-term transformations that may appear temporary). To make this assessment calls for judgment and interpretation, not merely facts. However, the mere exercise of trying to distinguish between ephemeral and lasting changes in crime-ridden Latin American cities is valuable because it underscores the importance of cultivating a deeper appreciation of the institutions, actors, larger socioeconomic conditions, and processes involved in transforming the urban landscape, as well as the likelihood that they will continue, as opposed to being reversed or thwarted.

Third and perhaps most important, I analyze recent urban transformations along several distinct dimensions of urban life, rather than trying to assess the city as a whole. Specifically, I develop a four-fold focus on the *physical*, *economic*, *social*, and *political* aspects of life in Latin American cities, and how greater insecurity and violence affect them. All four of these domains have shown change, but in different ways for different reasons. By analyzing and disaggregating urban changes through this sectoral lens, we can widen our understanding of the impacts of violence to include changes that are not frequently studied in the violence literature. We can also assess in which domains most progress has been made, and in which domains quality-of-life conditions are deteriorating most. Again, the hope is that this knowledge will be helpful in targeting policies and arenas for further action, even as it allows us to see which aspects of urban life have been most egregiously transformed by the violence–insecurity nexus.

Before beginning, a few words about methods and evidence are in order. The chapter draws on data, ethnographic materials, primary and secondary documents, and personal interviews collected through my own long-term studies of crime, violence, and urban development in Mexico City. Although Mexico City may have its own historical peculiarities, it does share with many other major cities of Latin America the terrible problems of crime and insecurity. With the possible exception of changes in urban politics and governance strategies, which still remain affected by the administrative and political legacies associated with decades of one-party rule and tensions between the capital city and the federal executive in Mexico, the chapter proceeds under the assumption that some general insights can be drawn from more focused examination of a single city, and that the conclusions reached will be relevant to policy makers in other Latin American cities.

The chapter starts by examining transformations in the urban social infrastructure, offering an overview of the social consequences of the violence–insecurity nexus for residents of Mexico City. It then looks at the three other domains of urban life (physical, economic, political) in turn; each examination begins with negative and then moves to positive developments. After examining all four sectors, the next section takes a step back and offers overall assessments of the aggregate picture presented in the narrative, both with respect to the positive and negative character of urban transformations in the city as a whole, as well as with respect to their permanent or ephemeral nature. This exercise leads to a final section on policy recommendations, building on the understanding of where the recent violence/insecurity-led urban transformations have been most positive. The final section considers whether further advances can be made in reinforcing positive changes (and reversing negative ones), even without clear progress on crime and insecurity, and concludes by discussing several promising avenues for further innovation and action, especially those that might indirectly feed back on the violence–insecurity nexus in unexpected but positive ways.

URBAN SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIOLENCE–INSECURITY NEXUS

Among those who study the urban social consequences of the rising rates of violence and insecurity in Latin America, there seems to be overwhelming consensus that the picture is extremely negative. Several of the most harmful and socially destructive changes in Latin American cities that have sparked most discussion and concern are the acceleration of a climate of fear, both in

terms of physical and psychological well-being (Rotker 2002), the increasing turn to violence as a means for routine problem solving—whether at the level of the family, the neighborhood, or across the city as a whole (Moser 2004), and an attendant reduction in the quality of public life, neighborliness, and community cooperation (Concha-Eastman 2002). According to one scholar of the subject, "violence generates changes in social behavior [and the] production and erosion of social capital," which in turn makes it more difficult to sustain cooperation and collaboration within families, communities, and at other levels of society (ibid., 49; see also Ratinoff 1996).

Although these changes are often considered to be individual responses to pervasive violence and crime in Latin American cities, one must not forget that other mediating institutions and practices play a role in exacerbating fear among individuals and thus in cultivating an urban social climate in which violence may become relatively "normalized" for all citizens. Two sets of actors and institutions are key here: the media and the police. Recent studies have shown that media attention to violence and crime, although grounded in real statistical evidence, can accelerate the perceptions of fear, thereby driving the vicious cycle of insecurity and social withdrawal (Martín-Barbero 2002). This dynamic owes much to the logic of media production and consumption (i.e., the types of stories selected for presentation; their framing as news, which drives sensationalism; the inability of consumers to differentiate the ordinary from the sensational; etc.). Moreover, the routine reporting of crime-related occurrences in newspapers and on television can give the sense that such actions are the norm, which may help foment a habitual recourse to violence in all domains of social life.

Police also play a mediating role in producing a climate of fear and in privileging the use of force as the single most legitimate means for remedying the problems of criminality, thereby "normalizing" violence as a response to violence (de la Barreda Solórzano 2007). To a great degree, police involvement in criminal activities, either in collusion or in crime fighting, is as much the effect as the cause of further violence and insecurity, and this is true for both the public and private police. On the public side, the problems of crime have accelerated so rapidly that police and citizens alike have begun advocating for greater arrest powers, tougher crime-fighting laws, and reduced restrictions on police discretion. In Mexico, upon the advice of Rudolph Giuliani, a form of "zero tolerance" was recently adopted leading to the criminalization of a wide variety of behaviors long associated with urban street life, including the activities of "squeegee men" who cleaned car windshields at stop signs, and the

street-selling of petty traders and vendors in certain key locations of the city (Davis forthcoming). Although such restrictive measures might create a greater sense of security among potential victims, especially those of the middle and upper classes, they also increase a sense of insecurity among certain more politically disenfranchised citizens (mainly low income) who now are identified as likely criminal suspects when they seek to earn a living, and those whose life may be more socially precarious (Koonings and Kruijt 2007).

Still, with a long history of corruption and impunity among the police, even those citizens who are not likely to be socially confused with criminals may find themselves at the end of an extortion chain in which police (sometimes in collusion with criminals) hit them up for bribes, further fueling the overall sense of insecurity (Bergman 2007). In such conditions, many turn to private police; but the proliferation of private police has not reversed the problems of crime or reduced feelings of insecurity. In my own interviews with citizens in Mexico, many complained that while they felt compelled to employ private police because of the general problems of insecurity and accelerating crime, they knew that private police were often involved in criminal activities as well. Some even argued that private police were a magnet for more crime, because they "advertised" to the public both the resources and prosperity of their employers, thus making themselves more likely targets for crime. This is a bit of a paradox, or seems so when one considers that citizens and businesses began to absorb the servicing and protection duties that had long been the legitimate charge of "public" police precisely because the "official" forces were unable to stop the rise in crime.

The explosion in the number of private police firms was so great in Mexico City that in 1994 authorities created the Dirección de Registro de Servicios Privados de Seguridad—the Private Security Services Registration Department—which counted a total of 2,122 "registered" private security firms within the Federal District in that year alone.[6] Officials subsequently acknowledged that there were many more "pirate" companies that failed to register and thus remained beyond government scrutiny; but among those who did register, more than half (1,123) were subsequently closed down because of irregularities

6. The economic liberalization and commercial opening of the country further contributed to the proliferation of private security forces, mainly because it allowed foreign companies to offer security services. Highly lucrative profits and a relatively low investment were some of the benefits of this business. Citizens, for their part, were eager to hire their own police, because this seemed to be one of the few ways to establish some accountability between them and the police.

in their functioning—no permits for use of firearms, lack of registration of firm personnel, and so on.[7] By 2002, private security firms operating in the capital employed approximately 22,500 private security guards.

To be sure, citizens cannot be faulted for turning to the private sector to solve problems that government or local police have proved incapable of tackling. Yet the decision to bypass public police in favor of private security forces has its clear negatives, or downside, in social terms. For one thing, it has inadvertently let some of the city's corrupt police off the hook, thereby diminishing the public's demands for citizen oversight. This often translates into less accountability and less social engagement between citizens and governing officials. For another, there is the question of to whom private police are accountable, and what this means for social equity, justice, and the rule of law more generally. When individuals start bearing arms as a condition of their employment in private security services, and residents or their "employees" start to carry guns for protection from criminals and police alike, violent "resolutions" to questions of public insecurity become the norm, thereby fueling the vicious circle of insecurity.

Private police, moreover, do not seem to be any more accountable than public police. In addition to reducing public police accountability, the deteriorating rule of law has fueled an environment of impunity and abuse of power even within the private police. In 2002, when statistics were first compiled, Mexico City governing officials saw more than a four-fold rise (from 5 to 22) in monthly complaints against private police between May and November of that year. The fact that private police frequently are comprised of ex-military or ex-police may account for some of the "transfer" in impunity and frequent human rights abuses to the ranks of private police.[8] Whatever the reason, rule of law is the first casualty. A recent survey of citizen practices found that 45% of Mexican citizens believed neither citizens nor authorities respected the law (Transparencia Mexicana 2003). This has been evidenced in a few cases in Mexico City of lynchings, which themselves reflected the emergence of vigilante attitudes among citizens (*El Universal* 2004).

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7. Data on private police drawn from interviews and documentation provided by the Secretaría de Seguridad Pública (Police Chief) in Mexico City during summer 2002.
8. Statistics from the registration office suggested that one-third of the personnel (30%) in private security forces came from the military and police ranks. In personal interviews with several representatives from private security firms, the numbers were closer to 50%. Interview with Adriana Robles Zapata, Coordinadora para la Capacitación de Empresas, Sociedad Mexicana de Seguridad, SA (SOMECSA).

This picture is depressing. But there are also some clear positives in the social arena of Latin American cities, especially if we look for collective and not merely individual responses to violence and insecurity. For one, growing concern about the deteriorating conditions has fostered new forms of citizen participation and new incentives for social mobilization. With support from global and/or local NGOs, citizens are developing new ways to work together at the level of the community, ranging from "mapping" local delinquency and crime patterns to new forms of interaction with police. Although the idea of community policing is not new, it is coming to Latin American cities with great fanfare, and many of these programs offer new ways for citizens to know intimately how local police departments work. Police corruption and crime remain a problem, and many citizens involved in community policing initiatives still complain about lack of police responsiveness and accountability, but new doors for greater understanding are opening.

On the social mobilization front, we also are starting to see collective action among wide swaths of the urban population. In Mexico two years ago, the civil society organization called México Unido Contra la Delincuencia was successful in organizing a march of over two hundred and fifty thousand people from all classes and locations in the city to protest the growing crime situation and repudiate local authorities for not making greater progress. It has been a long time since an issue of Latin American urbanism has united such a broad range of citizens behind a common front. In the postdemocratic environment in Mexico and other recently "transitioned" Latin American countries, cynicism is on the rise as citizens find that formal democracy does not make a major difference with respect to many of the quotidian problems of urban and national life. Most democratic governments' strong commitment to economic liberalization, which increases inequality and limits employment prospects for many (in some ways, driving delinquency and criminal activity), has also fueled questions about what alternative paths might be taken that could better the situation and prevent a return of the failures of the past. With little room for alternatives on the political and economic front, citizens have withdrawn from much of the activism that prevailed in the heady days of protest against authoritarian governments. Crime, as a social issue, has awakened this spirit, and laid a partial foundation for a re-energized citizenry.

As noted earlier, what is most positive about this trend is not merely the collective claim making or the resurgence of an active citizenry. What remains key to the issue of crime and insecurity is that new social alliances are being forged behind this issue, because it permeates all of urban society, often to

the point of bringing middle classes together with the rich and poor in a single coalition around similar complaints. This type of alliance is good for the strengthening of democracy, because it holds the potential to unify diverse classes around a common aim, and thereby avoids the risks of class polarization that frequently eat away at the foundation of democracy. It also can form the basis for a new social project in an era of social and political transition, by uniting citizens around issues that are less divisive and polarizing than those associated with the ideologies and models of politics that dominated in earlier eras. This means that, at minimum, elected officials and political leaders are now being forced to move beyond old ways of doing politics, whether it be clientelism or state-centrism or a myopic preoccupation with economic development, and compelled to find programs, languages, ideas, and alliances that will address some of the strongly articulated concerns about insecurity advanced by the urban citizenry.

URBAN SPATIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIOLENCE–INSECURITY NEXUS

On the physical spatial front, violence and insecurity have transformed Latin American cities in a variety of visible ways. From the point of view of classical urbanism, most of these changes are considered to be negative if not out-and-out horrifying. The list of questionable physical transformations seen as a response to unprecedented levels of crime ranges from the rise of gated communities and other guarded urban and suburban enclaves, where citizens fortress themselves in order to keep out the forces of crime, to the increased use of cars and other private modes of transport (owing to the high rates of robbery and rape on public transport), to the reduced availability and use of public space (Valenzuela Aguilera 2007). Stated simply, citizens have become so fearful of crime that they are changing where and how they live, travel, and interact with their fellow citizens. In Mexico City, there is considerable fear and anxiety associated with being in public spaces (Jiménez Ornelas 2005, 124; de la Barrea 2007). These sentiments are reflected in recent surveys, which show that 39% of Mexico City's residents (and 20% nationally) are fearful of public spaces; a startling 77% will not go out at night, and 48% consistently avoid public transport (Jiménez Ornelas 2005, 124–26).

The combined impact of these fears and avoidances has reduced the scope for face-to-face interaction—whether in streets, parks, or buses. It also has reinforced the privatization and atomization of urban social life in ways that depart from the past, when a vibrant urban physical environment and

culture characterized life and livelihood in most Latin American cities. In prior epochs, central plazas, parks, and downtown streets served as the lifeblood of public communication and interaction, contributing in a modest way to what Jürgen Habermas has called the "public sphere." In Mexico City, some of the most public and open spaces were in downtown areas, where Habermas's notion of public life and public opinion (the latter evidenced through parades, protests, and marches on Constitution Plaza, also known by its Indian name, Zócalo) often achieved their most powerful incarnation.[9] But over the years, the most public of places and experiences, the historic center, has been transformed by rising crime. Downtown areas now host some of the city's most dangerous streets, where informality and illegality collide to create a "no man's land" where citizens fear to tread. As a result, the "public" character of downtown and other key areas of the city have become ever more circumscribed as fewer and fewer people stroll its streets (Valenzuela Aguilera 2007).

One can also see the negative effects of fear and violence on the spatial form and character of the city through the lens of environmental unsustainability. With citizens turning to private cars and gated suburban developments as escape hatches, metropolitan sprawl continues; there is increased demand for new suburban infrastructure, thus more consumption of green spaces, and an upward trend in overall pollution levels. In Mexico City, the expansion of the city to the far reaches of the valley of Mexico has also had negative impacts on water supply and hiked the demand for other basic services like sewerage and electricity. The turn to private automobile use in these transformations is not trivial, especially by women and the middle classes, who are among the most fearful of using public transportation. Whatever the origins, the upshot is a fragmented, sprawled, and environmentally challenged urban agglomeration that, while potentially safer for individual residents, leaves much to be desired in terms of urban sustainability.

Nonetheless, all is not lost on the spatio-physical front. Perhaps one of the most interesting positive consequences of the dystopian urbanism that hovers over many crime-ridden cities of Latin America is the newfound support for urban renewal, jump-started by massive public and private sector commitment to reviving the built environment of the city, especially old areas of downtown

9. The use of the word "centro" to describe this particular physical location in itself speaks to its collective social symbolism and the centrality of downtown, something which further attests to its importance in the public thought and popular public discourse even as it also reflects a history of colonial and postcolonial planning schemes.

long dominated by informal and illegal activities. Many of the recent urban renewal projects in major cities of Latin America have been undertaken with an eye to property development pure and simple, especially given the desire to achieve global city status that now prevails among so many boosters in Latin American cities. But much of the political and fiscal support for urban redevelopment owes directly to the perception and reality that crime is most likely to occur in dilapidated areas, and thus one way to fight crime is to restore and beautify ugly areas. This was part and parcel of the "broken windows" strategy used in New York, and many Latin American cities, including Mexico City, have jumped on the bandwagon (Davis forthcoming).

The recent program to "rescue" or redevelop downtown Mexico City, with support from purveyors of iconic architecture and one of the world's richest men, Carlos Slim, is a case in point (Davis 2006a). Mexico City's problems with growing crime, delinquency, and violence began to accelerate dramatically in the mid-1990s. Between 1990 and 1996, reported rates of robbery, property damage, fraud, and extortion more than doubled from 1,059.0 to 2,434.3 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants (Fundación Mexicana 1997, 16). In this same time period, the percentage of robberies involving violence increased from 38.5% to 55.5% (ibid., 17). By the late-1990s and early 2000, citizens who used to buy goods in the historic center and stroll through the downtown plazas and boulevards surrounding the government offices, museums, and national cathedral were increasingly fearful of venturing downtown.[10] This held true not only for middle-class residents; as time passed, even the city's poor found that they too were afraid to go into these areas because of the high levels of violence and the total absence of a rule of law. And with few customers going downtown, even the informal vendors, who had long relished the dilapidated areas because they could sell their goods in peace and without threat of eviction, supported efforts for change.

In response, a coalition of private and public actors joined together to invest huge sums of money in the development of downtown. Today, a scant six years after the formal announcement of the "rescue," Mexico City's historical center has experienced a major cultural revival, with new investments in hotels, restaurants, museums, public buildings, parks, and housing. The mixed land use, the historical revival of colonial buildings and monuments, and the vibrant cultural life that now spills into cafes, streets, and entertainment venues have

10. For a comprehensive survey of citizen attitudes about crime and its impact on views of the city and urban life, see ICESI (2005).

generated kudos from professional urbanists and residents alike. Others have gone so far as to suggest that these urban transformations, by reinvigorating land use and reviving public spaces, have helped reduce downtown crime rates and the unwillingness to venture into the streets.

Granted, some of the latter improvements are the result of the deployment of a special police force that has been mounted in order to protect the new downtown developments and give the public a sense of security. Their efforts also have been aided by innovations in high-tech surveillance, including video cameras posted in key streets and public buildings with direct hook-up to a police monitoring center. But the point here is that the policy and technical innovations that help deal with problems of crime-related violence and insecurity most likely would not have garnered public or private investment and support if the larger issue of crime and the commitment to urban renewal had not both been on the table. Accordingly, the gains in reducing crime and increasing security must be attributed not merely to new policing and surveillance programs that target criminals per se, but also to the larger project of revitalizing public space and land use, and the beneficial effects that accrue from these combined efforts.

URBAN ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIOLENCE–INSECURITY NEXUS

One recent line of research in the study of crime-ridden cities is the impact of violence and insecurity on the local economy, especially private sector investment. Although systematic data are hard to find, the general view is that crime and insecurity do have a dampening effect on certain sectors of the economy. The most obvious is the possible impact on investor confidence. Both domestic and foreign firms become anxious about the potentially negative impacts of high crime and violence on their activities, ranging from material losses associated with robbery and assault, to higher costs for security personnel to protect physical and human capital, to the threat of catastrophic loss associated with the kidnapping of executives. In Mexico, the latter problem has reached epidemic proportions, with many criminal gangs devoted entirely to kidnapping. In such an environment, foreign investors are likely to think twice about moving firm activities or headquarters to Mexico, or at least to the most crime-ridden cities. This has meant that potential investment revenues, and conceivably new areas of economic growth, may have been lost because of the larger environment of insecurity.

But private sector firms are not the only ones facing possible loss of revenues. Crime and violence have grown in an environment of informality and illegality in which black markets tend to flourish. This not only poses a potential obstacle to investors in the formal economy, who will avoid investing in commercial, manufacturing, or trade activities that are provided at much lower costs in the informal sector; it also means that the public sector will miss out on tax revenues from those formal firms. To the extent that more funds in the public coffers help pay for crime-fighting measures, the loss of revenues associated with the rise of illegality and informality may push a vicious cycle in which formal investors withdraw and crime increases.

To be sure, all informal sector activities are not illegal or criminal, and thus the relationship between crime and informality is neither automatic nor direct. But many of those who work in the informal sector prefer the dilapidated and inaccessible back alleys and streets where their clandestine activities can remain hidden from view, and where police often fear to tread. As a result, informal sector workers frequently oppose urban renewal plans promoted by real estate developers, thereby finding themselves in conflict with public and private sector actors when it comes to desired changes in the character of the built environment. Sometimes these tensions erupt into violence over control of space and the capacity of police or public officials to enter (Davis 2006b). And even when violence is avoided, the existence of informality and illegality in Latin American cities has been linked to rising crime rates, as well as to limited public sector revenues, with these various problems intertwining in ways that limit the scope for fighting crime and reversing the environment of insecurity.

However, even though violence and insecurity may serve as disincentives for investment in manufacturing, commerce, or other traditional sectors of the Latin American urban economy, they also are producing new avenues of servicing, employment, and product development. Specifically, the negative security environment in Latin America has helped jump-start the development of the private security industry, which relies on new technologies and human capital to service a burgeoning clientele. As noted above, the exponential proliferation of private security firms in Mexico City starting in 1994 took many observers by surprise; but since then it has translated into enormous growth, not just for global firms involved in high-end security services for wealthy or corporate clientele, but also for local firms that work for neighborhood organizations, small business associations, and other more modest consumers. Security guards or other low-skilled security services are a growing source of employment, espe-

cially for unskilled and minimally educated workers whose prospects of employment have declined as economic globalization has changed the character and traditional industrial options for low-wage employment in Mexico.

Likewise, consumer and business acquisition of new technologies that offer surveillance or protection is also on the rise, with many innovations being incorporated into cars, houses, and street "furniture" in ways that drive the production and consumption of security services. These new technologies, product innovations, and services are fueling local employment and economic growth in ways that bring positive gains to the local economy. The potential downside, of course, is that the growth of the security industry feeds itself to a great degree, with the proliferation of firms offering security services and technologies driving the perception that crime and violence are out of control. Even so, the economic domain is one area where the balance sheet may be stacked toward the positive.

URBAN POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIOLENCE-INSECURITY NEXUS

The final sector to assess is the political, a domain to which surprisingly little attention has been paid. How have the violence- and insecurity-led transformations in Latin American cities affected local and possibly even national politics? If we defined politics from the point of view of civil society, we would highlight the emergence of new forms of collective organization that empower citizens to engage with the state about solving security issues, a trend already noted above. But has the crime and security situation affected politics "from above," not just from below? Has it impacted the activities and orientations of political parties and elected officials? In Mexico it surely has, but not always in positive ways. One of the most visible consequences of the growing problem of insecurity is the acceleration of internecine political conflict between the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) over which is the most effective party in rooting out crime and impunity. Likewise, the fact that crime and insecurity conditions tend to transcend formal territorial jurisdictions has brought new intrastate political conflicts and tensions, which either map with partisan tensions (when different parties control different jurisdictions) or exacerbate policy-making tensions within the same party. Both situations bring organizational stalemate and/or conflict, which in turn limit the capacity for successful reform and the implementation of effective crime-fighting programs (Davis 2006a).

Evidence of all this is clear from a closer look at partisan infighting and political conflict over crime fighting in Mexico City over the last decade. In 1997, three years into the city's unparalleled upsurge of crime and violence, the newly elected PRD government of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas sought to assert greater control over Mexico City police, seeing them as a key to impunity and crime fighting. But political conditions and institutional goals on the national level did not follow suit, because a different party (PRI) maintained its monopoly on the national executive. The PRI then used its reservoir of institutional capacities to undermine police reform efforts in the capital, leading to partisan conflict.[11] And even when the PRI lost on the federal level, and yet a third party (PAN) came into power nationally, political conflict continued, coming to a head in a particularly high-profile case of vigilantism, in which federal police were lynched by a group of citizens in late 2004 (*El Universal* 2004). In the official outcry over the event, it became clear that one of the reasons the federal policemen had lost their lives at the hands of the crowd was that the local riot police, who answered to Mexico City (and not federal) authorities, had not intervened actively to save the attacked officers.

The conflict between these different police forces was in many ways a conflict between the PRD and PAN, which controlled the local and federal police, respectively. But it also fueled more political controversy and stalemate, even as it increased the use of violence. Shortly thereafter, different cadres of police started pointing fingers at each other, creating even less public trust in the system of policing while also exposing vertical cracks in the principal coercive organizations of the state. The sustained bureaucratic infighting and intraorganizational distrust within and between different police cadres and the different arms of the newly decentralized democratic state motivated hundreds of federal security police to take to the streets to protest against their own commanders as well as those of the Mexico City riot police (*New York Times*, November 26, 2004).

An overheated electoral climate, fueled by the strengthening of competitive party politics, also contributed to the deteriorating political situation. In response to the lynching, Mexico's two most important elected politicians,

11. These resources included a system of federal police forces—still tied to the (PRI-dominated) national executive—with a history of intervening in Mexico City affairs; a military bureaucracy still answering to the PRI and also increasingly worried about what would be exposed in terms of federal armed forces' complicity and impunity if Mexico City police were purged; and considerable federal control of local finances—in the form of a budgetary veto on Mexico City expenditures. Also, the constitution set clear limits on the autonomy of the mayor to name his/her own police chief, with any appointee having to be jointly supported by the president and approved by the national congress.

President Vicente Fox and Mexico City Mayor Manuel López Obrador, turned this troubling event into a pre-presidential electoral dogfight. Rather than uniting forces in the common search for a policy solution to the problems of police conflict and citizen vigilantism, these bitter rivals—from two competing political parties, controlling the two most significant levels of governance in the nation, and locked in a treacherous struggle for the hearts and minds of Mexico City's residents and the national electorate more generally—sought to use the situation to humiliate each other sufficiently so as to score points with the electorate, as they had done with many other high-profile incidents of violence, police corruption, and impunity (*CNI en Linea*, December 7, 2004; *CNI en Linea*, December 8, 2004). For his part, President Fox used the lynching as a pretext for forcing the resignation of Mexico City's very popular police chief, Marcelo Ebrard, a key ally of Fox's main political rival, Mayor López Obrador. In response, López Obrador retaliated by charging Fox with playing dirty politics, even as he set out on his own independent search for a new round of police reforms and alternative security policies to show that he, as mayor, was better able to gain control of the situation than the president (*CNI en Linea*, December 7, 2004).

The political picture, in short, was far from positive, partly due to the high stakes: whomever could claim to be the most efficient in addressing crime and insecurity had a good shot at winning the hearts and votes of the citizenry. Still, the conflictive situation only served to further foment citizen cynicism toward political institutions and parties, leading to a delegitimization of the state and competitive party politics and more political anxiety. Such developments by no means signal complete political chaos, of course, even though they may diminish the quality of political deliberation. But one needs an engaged and participatory citizenry willing to demand effective political action by state actors in order to keep democracy vibrant, and with continued political infighting, citizens are further alienated from formal politics. The situation in Mexico is not that hopeful. To some extent, this is a vicious circle: without citizens organized and struggling for government accountability and transparency in crime fighting and policing, elected officials will merely muddle along and not go the extra mile to attack the security problems, continuing instead to let themselves be hamstrung by their own party rivalries and the sheer magnitude of the organizational reform at hand. Yet, in the absence of concrete gains in rooting out police corruption, and limited accountability on the part of the state, either local or national, citizens become further alienated from the government, driving them to alternative

means—ranging from the privatization of policing to vigilantism—to address security problems, all of which have been discussed above.

In light of these developments, it is hard to be optimistic about a way forward with crime fighting and guaranteeing security, at least in a way that strengthens rather than undermines competitive party politics. Even so, there are also recent signs of hope on the horizon in Mexico City, the locale that has suffered so greatly from these problems. The current administration of Mayor Marcelo Ebrard has built on prior efforts at police reform, many of them imposed under his watch as police chief during the prior administration, to break the stranglehold of corruption and introduce new means of making police more accountable. He has done so by creating new programs and political alliances that wreak havoc on old hierarchies of political power in long-standing governance and police institutions, while also linking together previously antagonistic state and civil society actors in a common project of reducing crime.

Specifically, a few months after coming to office, Mayor Ebrard established and empowered a brand new political authority in Mexico City (named the Autoridad del Centro Histórico) charged to deal with problems of policing, crime, and urban quality of life in a highly circumscribed but critical and economically vibrant area of downtown near the historic center of the city. The targeted area, which is home to a burgeoning informal sector and activities linked to illegal trade in contraband, guns, drugs, and clandestinely imported manufactured products, is known to be a center for crime and has a long history of police corruption. This area is also the setting of recent real estate efforts to "rescue" downtown and its built environmental heritage so as to increase property values, upgrade the commercial clientele, bring tourist and other affluent populations downtown, and minimize crime by offering new sources of income and employment to local residents.

As such, the newly empowered Autoridad del Centro Histórico has been given the task of managing and coordinating all activities that occur within this circumscribed area, from policing to street cleaning to granting construction permits to monitoring air quality to regulating transport to accommodating cultural tourism (Ruiz Healy 2007). The Autoridad supplants all prior institutional hierarchies and established levels of governance, and does so for an area long overwhelmed by crime and police corruption. The police in this newly targeted area are expected to support all anticrime policies established by the Autoridad, and there is a special police force and command structure for doing so. The same form of regulation and reform in lines of accountability also

accrues to other public services offered in this area, which in the past were coordinated sectorally and at the level of the city (i.e., the Distrito Federal) or possibly even the federal government, but not at this subterritorial level. Finally, the coordination and regulation of these public activities is undertaken in conjunction with private sector developers and NGO activists who are driving new investment and cultural or social projects in the area.

So far, this experiment has been moderately successful in eliminating old institutional practices in urban public service delivery, and in bettering the conditions of public security in this highly troubled area. In the past year, citizens have come back to the historic center to shop, eat, and live in ever greater numbers, and the general sense is that crime in the area has stopped accelerating. But more important, this experiment has offered a new model for enhancing police accountability, vis-à-vis citizens and authorities, as well as local businesses, leading to a less corrupt police force and greater confidence in the local police. Much of this owes to the fact that a special police force designated only for the historic center has special institutional oversight of this circumscribed territory, as well as the fact many of these specially designated police personnel have personal ties to the mayor. This not only insures them higher salaries and special privileges, which help mitigate against the temptation to corruption; it also means they are politically tied to a political team that wants this experiment to succeed.

ASSESSING THE OVERALL PICTURE: GAINS AND LOSSES IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERMS

Through this narrative analysis of sectoral transformations in crime-ridden Mexico City over the past decade, we can observe both gains and losses in terms of urban quality of life—understood in social, physical, economic, and political terms. It would be difficult to say whether the overall urban balance is positive or negative. There have been some clearly beneficial changes in land use, urban redevelopment, employment, social mobilization, and economic growth, but these changes have not eliminated social anxiety: they are still accompanied by political dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement, and they have unfolded in an environment where the growth of the "security–industrial complex" has brought more individuals into a world of criminality while further reinforcing a public sense of fear and insecurity rather than eliminating it.

In terms of whether these changes will have short- versus long-term impacts on the Latin American city, the jury is still out, partly because immediate changes in one sector can produce longer-term changes in another, some of

which may exacerbate rather than eliminate insecurity and crime. This is clear with a focus, first, on the rise of private security forces, a phenomenon related both to citizen dissatisfaction with public police and the growth of the security industry as a source of employment and technological innovation.

With a growing market for the production and consumption of security-related goods, the future of these activities is practically assured. In fact, private security services appear to be making a long-term mark on Latin American cities because they are bringing new corporate investors, new technologies, and new patterns of employment into an environment where other options are limited. This also means that the private security industry is unlikely to disappear on its own, even if crime and insecurity conditions were to improve automatically. And to the extent that the proliferation of these activities can reinforce citizen fears by their very presence, and thus help cultivate an environment of insecurity, their persistence—although good for the economy and unemployment—may have unanticipated but long-term negative consequences on the urban experience and quality of life. In order to balance the gains and losses, both short and long term, policy makers need to pay more attention to the security industry and its present and future role in Latin American cities. At present, the trend suggests problems ahead, and a call for policy makers to think more carefully about regulating, monitoring, and taxing private security services in ways that may help mitigate the negative externalities associated with this sector.

A second complex area that warrants further temporal assessment is in the domain of spatial or physical changes in the city. On the upside, efforts at urban renovation and the revitalization of previously crime-ridden areas have been successful in the short term, at least in bringing citizens and public life back to areas that were abandoned. The short-term impact on city form, including sprawl, which accelerated as a result of population movement away from these abandoned and other problematic public spaces (and modes of transport), is less clear, although one could imagine that the revitalization of old downtown areas in crime-heavy Latin American cities might offer new residential alternatives to diminish the trend toward suburbanization. However, in the longer term, these revitalization programs may produce their own set of problems and priorities. One reason for this is that such programs count on strategies for "securing" these newly revitalized public spaces, either through more attentive policing or other surveillance methods. Yet as noted earlier, these mediating actors and technologies may in fact be eliminating public space as much as reclaiming it. This paradoxical dynamic is clear from

a closer look at the larger spatial and developmental context in which revitalization plans generally emerge.

Because few public or private investors have the resources to totally transform more than a few buildings or streets at a time, partial efforts are necessary, which in turn means that heavy policing or surveillance strategies to protect a few redeveloped pockets of space will also be scattered and targeted. This means that persons or activities in properties or areas outside the redeveloped parcels will most likely be subject to excess policing, surveillance, and, most probably, social exclusion if not extreme insecurity (both relative and actual), owing to the spillover effects in contiguous areas of keeping criminals outside of a few protected areas. On the citywide level then, and despite some gains in a few circumscribed areas downtown, insecurity is by no means eliminated. Sometimes, in fact, it merely crops up in a new location, where a different set of residents will suffer. This further means that even those citizens living in privileged properties with heavy security may continue to feel imprisoned by their own fear, which often prevents them from venturing into public spaces on their own, or at least without some form of private security, primarily because citywide crime has not been eliminated. In contrast, those who do venture freely (if that is the word) on city streets, through urban parks, or in other public spaces are more likely to be low-income people, who cannot afford the luxuries of private security and automotive services and who rely on public transportation.

The longer-term result of this dynamic may be a more diminished or at least narrowed or segmented public sphere, in the sense that in the city's overall high-crime environment, those public spaces that are used are also less likely to host class and income diversity. One might even go so far as to say that with targeted urban redevelopment, a city is more likely to host two "publics" in its domain: one comprised of those citizens who use streets and other public locales (even though problems of crime and insecurity put them at risk when they go public, thereby limiting their freedom of movement); and another of citizens who move through a semiprivatized urban world accompanied by surveillance cameras, security personnel, and private armored cars, all of which allow them free movement in public space to a degree, but keep them physically or technologically separated from other publics.

All this will unfold, moreover, in a city that still suffers from violence and insecurity, thereby suggesting that more policy attention be paid to the larger social and spatial consequences of successful urban redevelopment projects. Can the positive gains associated with urban renewal programs be scaled to

the city as a whole? Will security conditions be improved if redevelopment only remains partial? What are the limits, in short, of targeted urban redevelopment when most of a city remains poor, dilapidated, and socially excluded from these areas?

As regards social exclusion/inclusion, a third arena in which more thinking about long- and short-term gains and losses would be valuable is precisely the new social conditions of Latin American cities. As noted above, one positive development in response to growing violence and insecurity is the emergence of new forms of collective claim making and a general citizen consciousness that brings new forms of unity and a common social project. But these developments also have their limits, especially in the long run, owing to the fact that citizens who use the route of social mobilization rather than the formal political process show themselves to be disenfranchised if not cynical about the possibilities for fundamental reform. To be sure, with many grassroots groups taking to heart the problems of police corruption and public insecurity, and seeking alternative solutions and community practices at the neighborhood level, there is evidence that citizens are both building on and reinforcing the democratic practices and advances that resulted from many years of struggle against authoritarianism. Over the last several years, the Mexico City government has supported citizen security meetings at the level of the delegation, with the goal of bringing residents and police together in democratic dialogue about how to best guarantee public security. Yet the results have been highly circumscribed and perhaps more ornamental and symbolic than substantive, for obvious reasons.

Citizens do not speak frankly about police corruption and criminal impunity in their neighborhood when those very same police are sitting across the table, armed with their note pads and badges (identifying citizens by face, address, etc.), and known to be involved in crime as much as fighting it. Thus, a certain degree of success in crime fighting and a veritable police reform must already be in place before citizen participation can make a serious difference. More important, given the limits to individual and even neighborhood action, among those social organizations making most headway in tackling crime and police corruption are those operating on a citywide basis, something which guarantees a larger scale and scope for action and organization. Yet this means that smaller, community-based organizations —the bread-and-butter of most civil society activism and the scale upon which accountability and democratic governance can be greatest—are relatively insignificant in tackling the problem. Instead, the most high-profile

organizations that operate on this scale tend to work in collaboration with private sector businesses.

In Mexico, one such high-profile organization funded by the private sector, the Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Insecuridad (ICESI), has developed a massive public relations campaign about police corruption, and its efforts have included publishing the names of police officials known to be involved in illegal activities. Organizations like ICESI have considerable clout because of their connections with wealthier elites in society, and a great deal of legitimacy because they are independent from the institutions of government that all too often continue to be implicated in police corruption or the failure to stem its tide. But these types of organizations also have a narrowly defined view of the problem of insecurity, why it occurs, how best to solve it, and to whom they, as a citizen organization, should be accountable. Indeed, those linked to business chambers of commerce and other private sector organizations often care mainly about problems like crime and police corruption because they create an environment in which economic gains are put in jeopardy, either by creating location disincentives for private investors, or by driving away potential consumers.

Within this framing, concerns about justice and human rights are sidelined, while the techniques these organizations favor are more consistent with an authoritarian, eliminate-the-problem-no-matter-what-it-takes ethos. This includes pushing for harsher legislative penalties against criminals and greater powers of arrest for police, many of whom still have questionable allegiances and little sympathy for protecting citizen rights.[12] As grassroot support grows for such hard-line measures, political parties jump on the bandwagon and the sky seems to be the limit, as evidenced by recent efforts in Mexico to install the death penalty. In a move further suggesting that authoritarian tendencies are alive despite the country's newfound democracy, high-level administrators

12. This is not to say that all civil society organizations involved in the fight against police corruption have appropriated the businessman's agenda of stopping crime at all costs. There are a number of grassroots organizations in Mexico that take a human rights approach to the problem. But preliminary evidence suggests that those organizations committed to human rights seem to be declining in number, compared to the more "anti-crime fighting" NGOs and citizen organizations, several of which are now working with some police departments in the Mexico City area to up the ante in terms of restrictions of individual liberties. Significantly, most newfound citizen activism for hard-line measures against crime suspects is openly encouraged by the police, who have a vested interest in blaming criminals for the current situation—thereby diverting attention from their own unaccountability and corruption.

are increasingly following the lead set by citizens and local police. The current administration of President Felipe Calderón has empowered the military to work in the arena of crime fighting, giving them unparalleled powers to use military weapons and techniques to confront crime and insecurity, no matter the human rights consequences. The situation has gotten so tense in Mexico that several police have, themselves, filed petitions with the national human rights commission about military violations of their own rights.

Other political parties have also stepped into the fray, but not as arbiters or protectors of rights so much as purveyors of ever-harder-line tactics. In the politically polarized environment where each of three parties has more or less equal electoral support, differentiating themselves politically in terms of which is harder on crime seems to be the last salvo launched in a tight electoral field in which all parties are desperate to guarantee their political future. These trends suggest the need for greater policy attention to human rights violations and to social inequities or exclusions reinforced through the positive development of business and civil society involvement in crime fighting. They also suggest a critical rethinking of the increasingly militarized context in which the war on crime is being fought. Although there may be short-term gains in buttressing arrest rates and making headway against organized crime and other major players by using military personnel and tactics, the long-term trade-offs in empowering the armed forces, in criminalizing low social status individuals and activities, in minimizing human rights abuses, and in reinforcing a political regime built on the dedicated use of violence, even when directed against criminals, suggest more social conflict and political tension will mark the future.

BUILDING A NEW INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENABLING PROGRESS ON THE VIOLENCE-INSECURITY NEXUS

Precisely because the longer-term prospects on the social, economic, spatial, and even political fronts continue to remain mixed, it is easy to get excited about clear progress, and especially about those few innovations that do seem to have produced some positive effects while also laying the groundwork for longer-term gains. Along these lines, let us return to the institutional reforms introduced by Mexico City Mayor Ebrard, and analyze their dynamics with an eye to the larger policy progress and lessons they embody.

As noted earlier, the gains in fighting crime and creating an environment of greater security in Mexico City's most troubled downtown areas owed not just to the urban redevelopment efforts introduced by public and private sec-

tor actors, or to the mayor's personal capacities to reduce corruption among the city police. Both were significant, to be sure; but the program's short-term successes also owed to the organizational innovations in local governance introduced by the mayor, which brought new forms of politics capable of transcending old patron–client practices by offering new vertical connections as much as horizontal ones. This organizational innovation centered around the establishment of an entirely a new type of authority, the Autoridad del Centro Histórico, which bounded a territorial entity for policy action that allowed for new forms of coordination and self-reinforcing commitments to reducing crime from among a variety of stakeholders.

It would be logical to analyze this experiment's successes through the lens of some of the other innovations noted earlier in the paper, not just personal and political control of the police by the mayor, but also the installation of surveillance cameras that have been used to monitor criminal activity. Even so, it is the use of technology by governing officials against their own corrupt employees (i.e., monitoring the police for bad behavior), and not just as a way to protect citizens, that qualifies as one of the innovations that helped establish this program's success. Some of the program's success also owes to the fact that the new head of the Autoridad, Alejandra Moreno Toscana, is a respected scholar and historian with a long resume of accomplishments in the city, whose loyalty to the mayor is unquestioned, who has strong personal relations with the private sector, and who has few partisan or personal political ambitions herself (*Milenio* 2006).[13] She has legitimacy and authority because she is not a typical "political operative."

Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to say that institutional volition, personal commitment, social capital, or private sector connections *alone* are the main source of the program's success, although they clearly have laid a strong foundation for positive action. Rather, what is more important about

13. Moreno Toscana was one of Mayor Ebrard's university professors, and their ties go back several decades. Both worked together in the administration of Mayor Manuel Camacho (1988–94), who governed Mexico City for the PRI. Moreno Toscana does not have as long a history in the PRD as Ebrard and many of his appointed cabinet members. As a prior head of the National Archives, and Secretary of Social Development in the city under different political regimes of the PRI, as new head of the Autoridad she has considerable credibility and great alliance-making potential both in the political sphere and with private sector developers involved in the rescue of the historic city center. She served as a board member of an organization headed by Carlos Slim, a key developer of downtown and Mexico's richest man, and has long advocated the use of history and culture to renovate the historic center.

this experiment, analytically speaking, is the ways that the new lines of authority generated by the establishment of the Autoridad—which also were reinforced by the network of loyalties within and between a small but focused group of *public and private actors*—have cross-cut old corrupt institutions and lines of decision making so as to diminish the individual and institutional influences of the past, including those built on patronage politics. Freed from old power structures, the Autoridad is now in a position to promote and strengthen anticrime and security priorities on the basis of new networks, new loyalties, and a new territoriality.

The Autoridad's capacities in this regard are true not just related to controlling and monitoring the police, which have been effectively wrenched out of the old, still-corrupt structures of policing. It relates to other services. For decades, decisions about police and other downtown services necessary to better the area were made at the level of the city as a whole (and in the authoritarian period, at the level of the nation), creating large "mafias" of citywide service providers and patronage networks of loyalty and employment that made institutional reform difficult to implement because of the expansive urban domain and the large flows of resources involved. Because these service contracts were generally made at the level of the city in its entirety, they were not tailored to the problems and concerns of neighborhoods or more localized areas. With such a large scale for urban policy provision and decision making, and so many powerful networks and bureaucratic influences involved, accountability was difficult and power became entrenched.

In the current experiment, in contrast, decisions are made for a territorial unit smaller than the city, but larger than the neighborhood, and in such a way as to bypass old patronage power networks (and long-standing political jurisdictions) reinforced through decades of authoritarian rule. In this environment, there is scope for the growth of new horizontal connections of reciprocity. And, it is not just that the Autoridad operates in a "new" political world where policy making does not coincide with old, entrenched authorities (because the authority's jurisdiction doesn't match any single politico-territorial unit). To the extent that this new authority also has the power to coordinate *among* urban servicing sectors (security, transport, zoning, etc.) for this new more manageable jurisdiction, it is further able to break old vertical structures of patronage and decision making linked to formal politics or bureaucratic authority that kept at bay reform and accountability vis-à-vis citizens.

That these new bonds of reciprocity engage both public and private sector actors—including government officials, local residents, NGOs, private

developers, the police, and other service and culture providers—in a common project to create security, reduce crime, and physically transform a key but manageable territorial location in the city also is important to the success of the experiment. This has meant that old vertical hierarchies of patronage and politics that developed within the formal political sphere have been partly demobilized, at least with respect to servicing decisions about this central part of the city. They have been replaced by new horizontal networks of reciprocity linking the public sector (or political domain) with the private sector (or market domain), all of which help keep city officials from falling into the cracks of those old alliances and relations. This new situation allows authorities and a variety of interested parties to engage in new forms of dialogue and reciprocity, making more likely the implementation of reform efforts to promote the shared objectives of transforming this specific part of the city.

In many ways, this new arrangement provides the ultimate accountability: a horizontal set of networks and reciprocities established among a wide range of divergent institutional and political actors who are all concerned with a particular, well-circumscribed space. Because police—and even government officials—are merely one of the many "horizontal" actors in this experiment, they are no more significant than the others, and thus are unable to impose their own constraints on reform. Put another way, the police and old-time patronage leaders are less capable of demanding impunity or political favors, and more compelled to act accountably, even if it is just with respect to the other key actors in their horizontal decision-making networks.

To be sure, such an experiment has its limits, in terms of the breadth and extent of overall accountability as well as how much real or lasting impact any gains in the historic center of Mexico City will have on the problems of police corruption, crime, and insecurity in the metropolitan area as a whole. After all, to a certain degree this experiment could be seen as a glorified version of a business improvement district (BID), a program that has been widely criticized in the United States and elsewhere for its protection of the private sector and the social and class exclusivity that often results. Thus, we must ask whether this new Autoridad and its horizontal network of partners, including the police, are really more accountable to the local residents; or are they merely responding to their business investment partners and their urban redevelopment concerns? Moreover, how big an impact can changes in just one small area of the city have on the larger problem of lack of police accountability in the overall system of policing, which remains massive and fragmented?

These are tough questions that need further attention and policy. On the one hand this program is clearly no magic bullet for change, but on the other, the symbolic, economic, and political importance of the historic center also mean that any successes in this area may actually have a demonstration effect for the public and for the city as a whole. Even more significantly, because of the history of this area and the important actors and institutions involved, ranging from the police to the private sector, these small-scale changes may produce a ripple effect in citywide political networks, hierarchies, and jurisdictions that held dominion in the past. Maybe challenging power structures and creating new room for maneuver within these old structures and institutions, while also providing a physical space for creating new relationships and reciprocities in which police are merely another "interest" group, is enough to lead to the delegitimization of old corrupt practices and to increased overall urban accountability when it comes to crime and insecurity. Although changes in conditions of crime and insecurity may not be immediate, they might be slow and steady enough to reinvigorate a sense of hope and optimism about reversing impunity and jump-starting its eventual demise in a city where such sentiments have been in short supply. And a symbolic victory is better than a defeat, with any positive gain an improvement in a system where conditions have only worsened over time.

So, where should policy makers concerned with crime, insecurity, and urban quality of life look for guidance? First, they need to pay closer attention to urban scale and the spatial interconnectedness of divergent developments, especially within certain key areas of the city, as well as to think about the most appropriate territorial scale for policy action. To do this challenges the principal point of entry used by policy makers and practitioners in Latin American cities, which is either the city as a whole (if it is a single political jurisdiction), the metropolitan area (if the city spills beyond its political borders), or the community/neighborhood. The latter has been the starting point for considerable policy action, particularly in the decentralized world of Latin American urbanism. But maybe the most policy success can come from bypassing long-standing or traditional territorial units, and creating new ones that are not just manageable but also spatially distinct.

Second, policy makers must pay more attention to the sector-specific trade-offs that might result from crime-fighting efforts. Gains in one arena—as with growth in the security industry, new innovations in technology, or success in urban redevelopment—may lead to losses, or to new and unanticipated problems, in another sector. This in turn means that policy makers

must start thinking about the integration or coordination of a variety of policies that work in tandem with each other, maximizing the interaction between economic growth, spatial transformation, social inclusion, and physical security in ways that will be self-sustaining and generative of overall progress. Thinking about the physical scale and context for these new interrelationships will be an important part of the task, too. Of course, what exactly that scale or menu of integrated policies will be will have to be tailored to the history and politics of a given place. Experiments that work in one locale may not in another. But the point is to learn from some of the few success stories that have brought some clear progress, as with the new authority for downtown Mexico City, and then determine what it would take to expand, scale-up, or transfer the fundamental insights to other Latin American urban contexts.

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III. SECTORAL INNOVATION

Improving Water and Sanitation Services in Deprived Urban Neighborhoods: Avoiding Global Distractions and Pursuing Local Priorities

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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

For the donor community, one of the attractions of focusing on improving water provision is that it addresses a critical constituent of poverty in a tangible way. It is widely agreed that contaminated or insufficient water is a major source of death and disease, particularly among infants and children (Cairncross and Valdmanis 2006). It is difficult to deny that every family deserves access to sufficient safe water to meet its basic needs. Even without the help of the ubiquitous photos of children drinking clear water from newly installed taps, it is easy to imagine how water provision can transform people's lives. Moreover, even in low-income settlements, urban residents are often willing to pay for better water services, reducing the need for subsidies, which are typically easier for governments to agree upon in principle than to finance in practice.

Sanitation has similar attractions, and is an obvious complement to water provision, though sanitary improvements are typically both less photogenic and harder to finance. From a health perspective, water, sanitation, and hygiene behavior are so closely interrelated that their health burdens are far more easily estimated together than independently, but all three can be important (Cairncross and Valdmanis 2006). On the other hand, providing more water, without also altering local hygiene behavior and sanitary facilities, can actually be counterproductive—as when, for example, the additional water results in overflowing aqua privies or pit latrines. Although water services receive the most attention, most experts believe that inadequate sanitation is the more pervasive problem, and that water, sanitation, and hygiene behavior need to be considered together.

Although there is almost universal agreement on the need to act, there is little international agreement on how to act to improve water and sanitation services, even in urban neighborhoods. A clear majority once favored public

utilities, bringing ever-more-distant water resources to cities, and connecting all residents to affordable piped water and sewerage networks. Now proponents of public provision are set against proponents of more private provision or self-help. Advocates of subsidies are set against advocates of full cost recovery through user fees. Adherents of supply-side water investment are set against adherents of demand-side water management. Backers of ecological sanitation are set against backers of water-borne sanitation. What is particularly disturbing about these disagreements is that they are debated in the international arena, as if they could be resolved at that scale, when such decisions ought to be made locally, preferably in political arenas where the intended beneficiaries have an influence.

The disagreements clearly reflect the fault lines of a great deal of international debate outside of the water sector: they center on public versus private control, and environmental versus developmental goals. They also clearly relate to vested interests within the water sector, both economic (e.g., private companies versus public sector workers) and disciplinary (e.g., engineers versus ecologists). What is less clear is whether they are especially relevant to the interests of water- and sanitation-deprived urban populations. Is more (or less) private sector participation inherently more likely to result in improved services in deprived communities? What about more (or less) water resource management?

This chapter argues that the very attempt to identify internationally the best institutional means for extending water and sanitation services to the urban poor is misguided. It contributes to the fads that sweep through the development arena, and diverts international attention, and indirectly support, from locally driven initiatives. Since the internationally favored approaches reflect international political trends, rather than changing experiences in the practicalities of urban water and sanitation provision, it should come as no surprise that their impacts are ambiguous at best. Thus, the decline of the Soviet Union and its centrally planned economies helped to fuel the promotion of private water and sanitation provisioning in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Alternatively, the international environmental movement helped to draw international attention, if not funding, to a global water crisis implying a need to prioritize water resource management. The call to move from words to action, understandable in an international arena where rhetoric far outpaces practice, can reinforce a tendency to make specific claims about what ought to be done locally, partly to avoid the awkward admission that "it depends" (on, among other things, the local context).

When the governments of the world signed up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), these goals provided poverty-related targets that did not prescribe the approaches to be used. Included was the target of halving the share of the population without access to sustainable drinking water supplies by 2015. An analogous target for basic sanitation was added soon after. However, the international character and stewardship of the MDGs still focused inordinate attention on developing internationally comparable indicators, attracting international finance, and finding the right institutional form to promote internationally.

The *World Development Report 2004* (World Bank 2003) focused on making services work for poor people, and emphasized the importance of ensuring that these poor people have influence over the service provision. The two routes of influence were taken to be direct influence over the provider (by, e.g., payments) and indirect influence via the government (by, e.g., elections). These two routes evoke (private) market mechanisms on the one hand and (public) political mechanisms on the other, and in this sense the framework is still very much rooted in the international public–private debates. The framework can, however, provide the basis for a more wide-ranging consideration of the local means through which deprived residents can secure better water and sanitation provision, and the obstacles preventing them from doing so.

Deprived urban households are usually at a disadvantage when it comes to either markets or plans, and either private or public providers. They typically lack both economic and political assets. This is not just a matter of economic inequality and a lack of electoral democracy. The most effective means for them to gain influence may involve not market mechanisms and/or party politics, but local organization and participatory democracy. Indeed, there are certain common characteristics of water and sanitation deficiencies that can make local organization and direct involvement in planning processes especially critical.

Inadequate water and sanitation both create spatially localized public "bads" that are at once too large in scale for individual households to deal with, and too small in scale to threaten the urban public at large. Thus, for example, the health burdens that accompany bad water and sanitation, and which once threatened whole cities and regions with epidemics (of, e.g., cholera), are now largely endemic to deprived neighborhoods. Within those neighborhoods it remains difficult to protect oneself and one's family. One household's bad sanitation creates a health risk for the neighbors. Having clean water is of little avail if your children drink contaminated water at their

friends' homes. Shared child care or even children playing together can easily spread water- and sanitation-related diseases. Thus, some sort of collective response is required. The residents of wealthier parts of the city are no longer at much risk, however, and as such the local governments rarely face much pressure to respond.

Futhermore, many urban planning systems actively undermine the economic and political influence of residents who lack adequate water and sanitation. Thus, a large share of urban residents without access to basic water and sanitation facilities lives in what are termed informal settlements. These settlements may have been developed without the landowner's permission, in areas zoned nonresidential, or in ways that contravene other regulations. Public utilities are often prohibited or discouraged from providing infrastructure for such settlements, and the same is likely to apply to privately operated utilities, as indicated by an international water company's own guide to water provision in "areas with limited financial resources" (Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 1998). If the residents believe they may be evicted, they will be even less willing to invest in improvements than the public nature of the benefits alone would imply (unless they expect such investments to reduce the risk of eviction, in which case they may be highly motivated to invest).

Political processes that give the residents of deprived neighborhoods some influence over local government expenditures, such as participatory budgeting, provide a route intermediate to the short and long routes identified in the *World Development Report*. Indeed, sanitation was one of the key priorities driven by the low-income neighborhoods of Porto Alegre early on in its development of participatory budgeting. However, even participatory democracy does not inherently benefit the residents of deprived neighborhoods. Thus, the introduction to a recent review of participatory governance argued that more powerful and better-resourced groups are likely to prevail if there is no countervailing power favoring weaker groups (Fung and Wright 2003).

All this points to the importance of local organization within the deprived neighborhoods, and the ability of local groups to respond to the collective challenges inherent in water and sanitation improvement and to engage collectively and constructively in local political processes. It is, however, very difficult to generalize about what specific actions are most likely to result in water and sanitation improvements in deprived urban areas: there is simply too much diversity—physically, politically, and institutionally.

AVOIDING GLOBAL DIVERSIONS

Water, sanitation and the Millennium Development Goals: Admirable aims, faulty frameworks, and silly statistics

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been used to help guide a great many development agencies. Although there are admirable and positive aspects of the MDGs, they also reflect the contradictions in the global development discourse in general and the international water sector in particular. The most obvious contradiction is that the admirable aims outlined in the MDGs are very much at odds with the actions of the world's nation–states, which clearly do not prioritize meeting the needs of the world's poorest. To the extent that meetings of the world's governments divide into meetings stating good intentions and meetings involving serious negotiations, the MDGs are clearly the outcome of the former. Of more concern here, the location of water and sanitation targets within the framework of the MDGs, and the search for internationally comparable indicators of success, reflect the contradictions between the conventions of internationally driven development assistance and the need for local action driven by local interests, including those of the deprived groups themselves.

There are eight MDGs, including the goals of eradicating extreme poverty and reducing child mortality, and all of the goals are intended to guide efforts to meet the needs of the world's poorest. The seventh goal of environmental sustainability is important largely to ensure that efforts to meet the other goals are not undermined by environmental degradation and depletion. There is something almost perverse, however, about having two of the three targets listed under the MDG of environmental sustainability be:

- To halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation

- To improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020

Achieving these targets will contribute nothing to environmental sustainability, although it will contribute to eradicating extreme poverty and reducing child mortality. Environmental sustainability is not threatened by people lacking water and sanitation, or living in degrading conditions in slums. Indeed, environmental sustainability is far more threatened by people overconsuming water, using waterborne sanitation, and living in luxurious neigh-

borhoods. The incorrect positioning of these targets reflects a more general tendency in the policy literature on environment and development to conflate the environmental burdens of affluence and poverty (though the more common mistake is to blame the burdens of affluence on the poor).

Other contradictions are evident in the changes the water target went through between the adoption of the Millennium Declaration by the United Nations General Assembly and the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals within the international donor community. The original target did not mention sanitation or sustainability, but was simply to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people "who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water" (United Nations General Assembly 2000). The term "sustainable" was presumably added in an (unsuccessful) attempt to justify placing the target under the goal of environmental sustainability. The initial neglect of sanitation probably reflects the fact that politicians and bureaucrats tend to focus unduly on drinking water, and assume incorrectly but understandably that contaminated drinking water is the predominant cause of water-borne diseases (when, in fact, virtually all "water-borne" diseases can also be spread as the result of bad sanitation, insufficient water for washing, and unhygienic behavior). Two years later, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, a companion target for basic sanitation was adopted, and the two are now often combined as one MDG target (UN Millennium Project Task Force on Water and Sanitation 2005). However, there is continued neglect of water for personal uses other than drinking, and of other hygiene deficiencies that can contribute to water-borne diseases.[1]

A further contradiction is that, although access to safe water and basic sanitation are attractive targets because they are perceived to be well-defined and easy to monitor, at the international level they are neither. Attempts to monitor progress towards the water and sanitation targets are fraught with difficulty. Prior to the MDGs, monitoring access to water and sanitation relied on notoriously unreliable government estimates. A serious attempt has now been made to bring empirical evidence to bear. For the *Global Water Supply and*

1. The reason for the focus on water (with sanitation as an add-on), rather than on the complex of environmental hazards that threaten people's health and well-being in so many deprived settlements, lies not so much in the nature of the problem as in the anticipated solution. Piped water and sewerage systems can, at least in principle, be implemented and controlled centrally, using standardized technology. Alternative approaches, adapted to local conditions, may be more cost effective, but are harder to advocate and monitor internationally.

Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report (WHO and UNICEF 2000; hereafter *Assessment 2000 Report*), this involved providing governments with statistics on water and sanitation from household surveys (e.g., the demographic and health surveys undertaken by Macro International). Unfortunately, such internationally available statistics do not provide the basis for estimating population shares with and without access to safe water and sanitation. Indeed, the *Assessment 2000 Report* referred to the indicators in terms of "reasonable" access to "improved" water and sanitation, noting that "access to water and sanitation, as reported below, does not imply that the level of service or quality of water is 'adequate' or 'safe.'" (WHO and UNICEF, 2000, 78). Furthermore, the report clearly states that many countries have not had such surveys recently—and even fewer countries have such surveys sufficiently regularly to monitor progress towards achieving the target by 2015.

Not only do such statistics systematically underestimate the population without reasonable access to adequate water and sanitation, but the extent of this underestimation almost certainly varies systematically between countries and between urban and rural areas. The latter can be seen as part of a wider tendency to underestimate urban poverty (Satterthwaite 2003), arising in part from the failure to consider the costs and burdens specific to urban living. Thus, for example, the criterion for reasonable access to a water source is that one does not have to travel more than a kilometer to collect the water, while for sanitation a simple pit latrine is defined as "improved" sanitation. Although one might defend such criteria in rural areas, they are not at all appropriate to densely settled urban areas (McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2006a). If residents of a dense urban slum have to travel a kilometer to collect water, then either the queues will be exceedingly long or the prices exceedingly high. Similarly, sharing a simple pit latrine is hardly adequate in rural areas, but it is clearly inadequate in a crowded urban slum. If, as UN-HABITAT estimates, about a billion urban dwellers—roughly one in four—live in slums, this is potentially a major source of bias. These and other considerations suggest that the official urban coverage estimates in the *Assessment 2000 Report* seriously overestimated coverage, at least in urban areas.

Table 1 compares the estimates of the population without "improved" provision for water supplies and sanitation from the *Assessment 2000 Report* with estimates of the population without "adequate" provision, based on an ad hoc review of local water and sanitation studies. The differences are striking, as is the level of uncertainty in the indicative estimates, which are not

even available on a national basis. The statistics in the left-hand columns are on the indicators to be used to monitor progress towards the water and sanitation targets, but it seems possible, perhaps even likely, that they underestimated the scale of the urban problem several fold (and perhaps the rural problem as well). Some of the individual country figures also suggest gross underestimation. Thus, for example, as described below, the shares without improved sanitation in urban areas of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda were initially estimated at less than 5% in 2000, although their cities are known to have severe sanitation problems.

Table 1. Misleading Statistics I: Estimates of the number of urban dwellers lacking provision for water and sanitation in 2000 based on who has "improved" provision and who has "adequate" provision

Region	Number and proportion of urban dwellers without "improved" provision for:		Indicative estimates for the number and proportion of urban dwellers without "adequate" provision for:	
	Water	Sanitation	Water	Sanitation
Africa	44 million (15%)	46 million (16%)	100–150 million (35–50%)	150–180 million (50–60%)
Asia	98 million (7%)	297 million (22%)	500–700 million (35–50%)	600–800 million (45–60%)
Latin America	29 million (7%)	51 million (13%)	80–120 million (20–30%)	100–150 million (25–40%)

Source: Taken from UN-HABITAT (2003). The statistics on "improved" provision are based on WHO and UNICEF (2000). Latin America included the Caribbean.

It is difficult to see how either set of statistics could be used to monitor progress towards the water and sanitation targets. The figures presented in the interim report on progress towards the MDG targets reflect predictable problems related to the inherent difficulty of the task, and then a few more besides (Inter-Agency and Expert Group on MDG Indicators 2007; WHO and UNICEF 2004). The Millennium Declaration was made in 2000; it made no mention of 1990, but set a range of targets that involved halving the share of

population living in undesirable conditions, such as without safe drinking water (United Nations General Assembly 2000). The *Assessment 2000 Report* quite understandably took 2000 to be the base year against which the population share should be halved. But by the time the interim assessment was published in 2004, the base year had been moved back to 1990 (WHO and UNICEF 2004). This has been maintained for the 2007 report on the MDGs (Inter-Agency and Expert Group on MDG Indicators 2007).

The interested observer is left with the task not only of monitoring progress towards the target, but of monitoring changes in the target. Even the underlying statistics have changed, some quite radically. As illustrated in Table 2, for example, the very low estimates for urban population without improved sanitation in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania were drastically revised upwards by the time of the interim assessment published in 2004. Indeed, for Africa as a whole the estimated shares of urban households without improved sanitation would appear to have more than doubled. This appears to be largely the result of assuming that only a proportion of poorly defined categories of latrines were "improved." Further revisions are evident in the report published in 2006.

Table 2. Misleading Statistics II: Comparing urban percentages without improved sanitation in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda across the 2000, 2004, and 2006 Assessment Reports

	2000 Assessment Report		2004 Assessment Report		2006 Assessment Report	
	1990	2000	1990	2002	1990	2004
Kenya	6	4	51	44	52	54
Tanzania	3	2	49	46	48	47
Uganda	4	4	46	47	46	46
All Africa	15	16	37	37	39	38

Sources: WHO and UNICEF (2000, 2004, 2006).

Although some of the changes that have been introduced in the official water and monitoring statistics may provide more accurate results, they are still far from reliable. Indeed, to claim an acceptable degree of reliability, the household surveys upon which the estimates are based would have to be far

more widely and regularly applied, and far more detailed. Even then it is doubtful whether international comparability could be achieved, given the enormous diversity of water and sanitation technologies and service qualities.

Perhaps more important, it is not clear that the statistics have had much effect one way or the other on progress towards the water and sanitation targets. Indeed, it is likely that no more than a handful of people who were not actually involved in the MDG process have even noticed the ten-year shift in base year, or the fact that in Africa changes in estimation procedures have created more than twofold changes in the estimated urban population shares without access to improved sanitation for any given year (while almost no changes have been detected over time). If the international statistics on improved water and sanitation really had helped to guide international funding initiatives, one would have expected a substantial shift in funding in response to the changes illustrated in Table 2. Not only was there no evidence of such a response, but the monitoring reports do not draw attention to the changes. Indeed, the statistics are presented in such a way as to make it very difficult to understand the methodological shifts between the reports.

Whether there are a few hundred million urban dwellers in the world without adequate water and sanitation, or whether there are well over a billion, there is clearly a lot to be done. The search for comparable indicators with which to monitor progress towards an internationally defined target has been a diversion, at best. It is important to monitor whether international development assistance is indeed supporting local efforts to improve water and sanitation, but the serious question is whether the funds are being well spent and deserve to be increased, not whether the target is likely to be met. International targets have a number of disadvantages. For example, they tend to favor internationally driven top-down planning (e.g., water initiatives designed and supervised by international agencies), devalue improvements that are not up to the targeted standard (e.g., improvements in the prices or services provided by itinerant water vendors, who by the adopted definition cannot deliver "improved" supplies), and favor standardized solutions.

The sort of information and indicators that are useful to drive local action do not have to be internationally comparable, and are more likely to be relevant if they are developed locally and are in the hands of the people who have a real vested interest in improving local water and sanitation supplies. Local governments, utilities, and organizations striving to improve local water and sanitation provision clearly need to know the existing state of affairs in consider-

able spatial detail. As described in the chapter by Arif Hasan on the Orangi Pilot Project – Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI), good information in the right hands can make an enormous difference. By documenting local technologies and geographies, OPP-RTI was able to resist costly infrastructure projects that would displace the investments local people had already made in improving their sanitary conditions. Instead they worked to improve upon this local investment and link it up to publicly provided infrastructure. Far from prioritizing international comparability, OPP-RTI's information collection was carefully tailored to the local physical and political context.

What the water and sanitation targets have achieved to at least some degree, however, has been to focus international attention on the needs of deprived settlements. During the 1990s, the two most visibly promoted approaches to address water and sanitation deficiencies were water resource management and private sector participation. These were intended to address very real deficiencies in many water and sanitation systems, including growing water resource scarcity and poor service delivery on the part of public utilities. Both proved to be difficult to implement, and increasing private sector participation was very controversial. Unfortunately, as described in the following subsections, neither water resource management nor private sector participation can convincingly claim to address the water and sanitation deficiencies in most deprived communities, even in urban settlements.

The misleading global water crisis – or why statistics show people in water-stressed countries having better access to water

There are many disturbing symptoms of a water resource crisis of growing proportions, but the inadequate access to water and sanitation in low-income urban and rural settlements is not among them. This is now accepted in most serious accounts of both water resource scarcity (Rijsberman 2006) and household water and sanitation problems (UNDP 2006). The medium- to large-scale water resource problems and the widespread household- and community-scale access problems are being driven by different processes, and require different remedies.

At least since the 1990s, however, there has been a misleading crisis narrative, which in its starkest form presents a world running out of water, and those without adequate water and sanitation as the first victims. Estimates of the population in water-stressed regions have often been presented alongside estimates of the population without improved water and sanitation, as if the

Figure 1. National share of households with access to improved water sources by GDP per capita and presence or absence of water stress



Source: The estimates are based on data drawn from the Data Compendium of the United Nations Environmental Programme *Global Environment Outlook 3*. London: UNEP and Earthscan, 2002.

two are closely correlated (see Hinrichsen, Robey, and Upadhyay 1998, reported on in *Science* 281, no. 5384, p. 1795). The lead paragraph on British Broadcasting Corporation's web page on the World Water Crisis summarizes this crisis narrative succinctly: "The world's supply of fresh water is running out. Already one person in five has no access to safe drinking water."[2] Taken individually, each of these statements is only somewhat inaccurate, but taken together they are highly misleading: those identified as being without access to safe drinking water are not those already facing water resource stress.

The statistics being used to monitor progress towards the water and sanitation targets actually suggest that water coverage is higher in countries with less than 1,700 square meters of renewable freshwater resources per capita—the cut-off conventionally used to identify water stress. As illustrated in Figure 1, this does

2. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/world/2000/world_water_crisis. Accessed on August 28, 2007.

not seem to be just because the more water-stressed countries are wealthier. A similar relationship applies to urban dwellers, and has been verified in more detailed statistical analysis (McGranahan 2002; UN-HABITAT 2003).

It is hard to reconcile such statistics with the claim that water stress is a major factor currently preventing people from gaining access to adequate water and sanitation, although the statistics are not sound enough to conclude that water stress is actually associated with better water and sanitation provision. Perhaps the most obvious explanation is that in water-stressed conditions people have a greater incentive to adopt "improved" technologies. A lack of alternatives, even for washing water, could be expected to lead to more people connecting to the piped water system. If water resource problems caused interruption in piped water supplies, the statistics would not detect this, particularly if the supplies were still generally available at least half the time (WHO and UNICEF 2000, 78). Perhaps more important, if those without an improved supply suffer more as the result of water stress, this will not be detected. This measurement problem can be seen on a small scale in a city like Jakarta, where the groundwater in the northern areas near the coast is saline. The water statistics have long made the northern areas look good, as the connection rates are far higher, although a careful look at the quality and cost of provision in the 1990s revealed that, especially for poor households, water was far more of a problem for residents in the northern areas (Surjadi et al. 1994).

In the previous subsection, it was argued that locally relevant statistics were more important to the urban poor than internationally comparable statistics, and something similar holds for water resources. Even more than other groups, deprived urban dwellers depend on the quality of local water resources. Jakarta is just one of many low-income urban areas where the groundwater is considered nonpotable, and yet a large share of the population nevertheless depends upon it. In a recent review of small private water operators in Accra, Khartoum, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam, in all but Nairobi operators are described distributing ground water from urban or peri-urban wells to low-income households not connected to the piped water network (McGranahan et al. 2006). In terms of the global water resource crisis, such urban groundwater is negligible. Even in terms of urban water resources, such groundwater is likely to be neglected, particularly if it is considered impotable. Integrated water resource management, along with utility planning, often simply neglects the local water resources on which urban poor groups are particularly dependent.

The public–private debates – hotly contested decisions that make little difference to water and sanitation provision in deprived areas

If the international promotion of water resource management has been linked to a misleading narrative about a global water crisis, the international promotion of private sector participation in water provision has been linked to an equally misleading narrative of public sector crisis. The basic message was that public utilities are underfunded, inefficient, overstaffed, unresponsive to their customers, easily manipulated by politicians to serve short-term political ends, and, in low-income settings, often end up providing subsidized services to the relatively well-to-do while the poorest residents go without. Private sector participation, its proponents claimed, would bring finance, efficiency, and attention to the demands of customers rather than politicians (Segerfeldt 2005). Increased private sector participation was heavily promoted by the World Bank and various other international development agencies (Finger and Allouche 2002; Haughton 2002).

But the targets are as unlikely to be met by more private sector participation as by more water resource management. There have been private utility operators and public–private partnerships in the water sector for centuries, and there is little in this history to suggest that more private sector involvement can ensure that water, let alone sanitation services, reach the poor (Budds and McGranahan 2003). The few large multinationals that dominated the market during the 1990s provided little basis for competitive bidding, and were not easily managed by public agencies that had had trouble managing their public utilities. These large multinationals showed more interest in working in large cities with significant middle classes, than in the economically depressed towns and villages where most of those without adequate access to water and sanitation actually live. As critics have pointed out, private operators did not bring in the private sector finance anticipated by proponents (Hall and Lobina 2006). In any case, many of the obstacles that prevent public utilities from delivering adequate services to deprived areas, such as tenure problems, corruption, and a weak regulatory environment, can equally well undermine the success of private operators (McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2006b). It is perhaps not surprising that empirical studies have not generally found private sector participation to have much effect on efficiency (Braadbaart 2002), let alone coverage (Clarke, Kosec, and Wallsten 2004; Kirkpatrick, Parker, and Zhang 2006).

Increasing private sector participation, also known as privatization although it almost never involved transferring the water and sanitation networks to private ownership, was extremely controversial, however. If proponents oversold the private sector as a panacea, detractors overcriticized it as a pariah. Critics not only pointed to the dangers of monopoly pricing and the lack of private incentive to provide public goods, but some presented privatization as "corporate theft of the world's water," often linking it back to the global water crisis (Barlow and Clarke 2003). In many countries, popular opinion turned against privatization, and in some the result was demonstrations and political unrest (Finnegan 2002).

Although the full-on push for privatization has eased off, in many countries the water sector is still undergoing internationally supported reforms, and many of these reforms involve shifts towards commercial principles, and a regulatory environment that is more open to private sector participation. Moreover, while the multinational water companies may be less active in pursuing concessions, other contracts and other private enterprises are increasing in importance. In parts of Asia, for example, local and regional companies are reportedly becoming more important, and companies run by members of the Chinese diaspora in Asia seem to be securing a growing number of contracts for water and sanitation in mainland China (McGranahan and Owen 2006). Moreover, it is noteworthy that the World Bank's web site on Urban Water Supply and Sanitation still states that "where public delivery fails, the World Bank Group supports private entry" (World Bank 2007), ignoring the fact that public failure is a poor recipe for private success.

A large part of the privatization controversy stemmed from the fact that powerful institutions like the World Bank were promoting it internationally,[3] and multinational companies were winning the contracts. It is one thing for a country or city to go through its own political debate and decide independently, and perhaps even democratically, to give a concession or management contract to a private company. It is quite another for the political pressure to come from international finance institutions that are certainly not democratic, and that are widely held to have vested interests in the sector. Also, as described above in relation to the MDGs and water resource management, the international arena is not the

3. The World Bank also funded or undertook a significant share of high quality but suspiciously favorable research on privatization, and it is indicative that high quality but critical research later came from studies funded by public sector unions.

appropriate scale at which to decide how to improve water provision locally, and trying to make decisions at this level can be very destructive.

In the section on monitoring water and sanitation improvement in deprived areas, it was argued that the most important information needed to drive improvement was not internationally comparable indicators designed to monitor progress towards international goals, but local information designed to support local action. Similarly, in relation to water resources it was argued that the most important resources were not those that figure prominently in the global water resource crisis, but the local water resources upon which deprived urban households actually depend. In relation to private sector participation an analogous claim can be made: for deprived urban households the most important private water sellers are not the multinationals, but the small water enterprises that sell water in so many neighborhoods not connected to the piped water network. Their very existence may well signal a failure of the public utility, but suppressing them can make matters worse, while making their task easier might make water provision easier (Kjellén and McGranahan 2006; McGranahan et al. 2006).

RESPONDING TO THE LOCAL PRIORITIES OF DEPRIVED COMMUNITIES

There are three principal routes through which the interests of deprived communities can become more influential. First, existing regulations that discriminate against these communities can be changed. This is a serious challenge, particularly when officials are searching for ways of curbing rural–urban migration and see upgrading low-income settlements as attracting more migrants. Second, relations between urban poor and formal water and sanitation providers can be improved. This may involve creating more responsive providers or local authorities, and better organized and informed communities. Finally, more effort can be made to enhance the contributions of informal providers and local groundwater resources, which deprived urban residents often already depend upon.

Creating urban planning systems and regulations more favorable to deprived residents and their organizations

International discussions often proceed as if all parties have an interest in improving service provision in deprived settlements. This is not true either internationally or locally. There are often disputes about whether people

should even be allowed to stay in these settlements. A large share of urban residents in many low- and middle-income countries live in "informal" settlements that in one way or the other do not conform to official regulations. The residents may be considered squatters, the land may be zoned nonresidential, or the homes may flout building codes. Other groups may want to occupy or develop the land. Utilities are not always allowed, let alone required, to provide services to these areas.

Even well-intentioned planners find it is difficult to develop acceptable regulations and standards in support of the unacceptably poor. The homes that the poorest groups can afford are likely to be built to standards and in locations that are widely considered uninhabitable. Planners and legislators that promulgate standards and plans allowing such habitations can expect to be criticized for consigning people to live in slums. Even in popular debate, high standards can be presented as a means of improving housing for the poor. Moreover, if there is an epidemic of water- and sanitation-related disease, it is far easier to blame loose regulations for being insufficiently stringent than tight regulations for being unrealistically high. But if the regulations, standards, and land-use zoning make formal housing unaffordable for poor groups, informal settlements are likely to emerge, at least in the absence of draconian evictions. Under such conditions, the urban poor can easily end up outside the law, and in a far weaker position when it comes to engaging with local authorities or demanding their rights as citizens.

Equally important, politics can actively undermine any good intentions planners have towards the urban poor. If there is concern about excessive rural–urban migration, or prejudice against migrants, the politics of urban poverty can easily turn sour. A large and growing share of officials in low-income countries believe that their urban areas are growing too rapidly (United Nations 2004). Informal settlements of urban poor are often perceived to be migrant settlements, even when most of the inhabitants are long-standing residents (Tacoli, McGranahan, and Satterthwaite 2007). Assisting informal settlements to upgrade is likely to be seen as attracting more migrants, whether or not this is actually the case. In many cities there is a strong body of elite opinion against accepting and planning for continued migration, although as expressed in the latest annual report of the United Nations Population Fund, most attempts to prevent migration are "futile, counter-productive and, above all, wrong, a violation of people's rights" (UNFPA 2007, 3).

Residents will be less willing to invest in improving water and sanitation provision if they expect to be evicted. Similarly, providers will not be willing to invest in water and sanitation infrastructure in settlements at risk of eviction, particularly if the providers rely on income from selling water or sanitation services, or if providing such services is illegal. On the other hand, if illegal connections are made, officials may be loath to disconnect them, or may see them as an opportunity to collect illicit payments. Itinerant vendors, who do not need much infrastructure, may cart water in, and deliver it door to door, though they too may be considered illegal (Kjellén and McGranahan 2006). Residents may work together, and develop ingenious measures to resolve their water sanitation problems. However, efforts by local residents to organize themselves may be perceived as a threat, both by local authorities (particularly if they are planning evictions) and by local gangs and leaders. In some cities, complex webs of illicit relations develop, brokering power and, in some cases creating conflicts that spill over into neighboring parts of the city. It can easily seem, to both insiders and outsiders, that while things are clearly not functioning well, any serious attempt to change them is likely to make matters worse.

There is, in short, enormous diversity in the character and extent of informal settlements, and no clear definition even of what an informal settlement is. Yet the sorts of planning problems that arise in these settlements are central to the challenge of improving water and sanitation provision. Such problems cannot be addressed within the water and sanitation sector, narrowly defined. It is probably no coincidence that some of the most innovative and successful approaches to improving sanitary provision, including the OPP-RTI described in this volume, have been led by groups originating outside the water and sanitation sector.

Coming from outside of the sector, water and sanitation improvement can be an important component of broader attempts to improve conditions and develop representative organizations in informal settlements. Water and sanitation not only meet critical needs, but can help residents gain legitimacy for their settlements. Thus, when communities are trying to gain legitimacy and security, residents have been found to be especially keen on investing in access to water and sanitation (Katui-Katua and McGranahan 2002; Schusterman et al. 2002). Changes within the water sector that support such upgrading, by making it easier for informal settlements to negotiate water and sanitation improvements, can be especially efficacious.

In developing standards and regulations that favor deprived residents, it is critical that relevant authorities and politicians are responding to requests from the residents and their organizations. It is one thing for government officials to evoke the interests of the urban poor as they arbitrarily decide to lower the standards required for housing, water, and sanitation, and quite another for them to respond to legitimate demands from within the deprived areas. The context is also critical. In an urban settlement where water and sanitation provision meets the prevailing standards for 80% of the population, enforcing these standards may be the best means of bringing up the remaining 20%. Where only 20% meet prevailing standards, enforcing these standards is more likely to interfere with attempts to improve conditions in the most deprived areas. Unfortunately, the temptation to negotiate standards informally can easily reinforce clientelist politics, again making it difficult for deprived groups to engage effectively in the broader political arena.

Getting deprived residents more influence over formal water and sanitation providers

Even with more favorable urban planning and regulations, bad relations with local authorities and formal water and sanitation providers can prevent services from reaching deprived neighborhoods. Some efforts to use development assistance to overcome the resulting failures actually make matters worse. Donors have promoted participatory processes, but participation does not give residents more influence in negotiations with more powerful groups and organizations unless it is accompanied by some countervailing power. In some cases, participatory processes may have made matters worse by providing the illusion of open engagement, when critical decisions—such as whether the project should be continued—are being made behind closed doors far away (Katui-Katua and McGranahan 2002). Alternatively, supporting NGOs to provide parallel delivery systems can reduce the need for good relations between deprived communities and their governments, but only so long as this external support is forthcoming. Perhaps it is for these reasons that the more successful measures to give residents more influence through increased participation have involved clear links to financial decision making (e.g., through participatory budgeting), while the more successful measures led by residents and their organizations have combined self-help with constructive engagement with public authorities and utilities.

Before even considering how relations can be improved, it is important to recognize the nature of the challenge. There is widespread agreement that utilities need to be more "demand responsive." Unfortunately, where residents have little purchasing power or political clout, utilities have little incentive to respond to the demands of the unserved, particularly if meeting these local demands would undermine their financial or bureaucratic position. It is also difficult to get conventional utilities to respond to the demands of the very poor, because many of those demands are likely to require significant departures from what the utilities view as their standard operating procedures. The attraction of fully networked and capital-intensive water and sewerage systems has never been that they are technically the most cost-effective means of improving water and sanitation. It is that the responsibility for their extension and improvement can, for the most part, be put in the hands of a centralized organization. Utility procedures are conventionally built around a model that views the prototypical domestic customer as an individual household living in a planned settlement and receiving full services. In societies that can afford it, the centralized model makes it simpler to demand universal coverage through, for example, electoral politics. Unfortunately, where large parts of the population remain unserved, calls for universal coverage can become counterproductive. To exaggerate somewhat, if nothing but household connections to piped networks are considered acceptable, then utilities will be under no pressure to assist those off the network. At the very least, the many special activities required to improve services in deprived informal settlements are likely to be treated as sidelines that may be necessary, but ought not to be.

Extending services to unplanned areas is more likely to involve providing public standpipes and lifeline connections, dealing with transient populations, distinguishing between people who are unable to pay and those who are able but unwilling to pay, and negotiating with groups of low-income residents. Compared to a planned settlement, buildings are more likely to have to be moved or adapted to make way for the pipes. There may be issues surrounding violence, nonpayment, illegal connections, vendors, and multihousehold connections. More affordable improvements typically require far more involvement on the part of users. Much depends on the local situation. If, for example, residents believe that by acquiring water and sanitation services they will also acquire formal recognition and tenure, they may well be more cooperative than the residents of formal settlements. Generally, however, extending services to unplanned areas is likely to be more difficult as well as different from extending services in planned areas.

For utilities facing difficulties running what they consider to be their core business—serving "conventional" customers with piped water and sewer connection—working in deprived communities is likely to be a daunting challenge. At the best of times, special pressures are likely to be required. Such pressures can come from various quarters, and need not be via the two conventional routes—demands on the part of users and commands on the part of the state (World Bank 2003). In practice, pressures often arise in a somewhat arbitrary fashion (Connors 2005). They can, however, be brought to bear through the collective action of organizations of the urban poor, either working on their own initiative or through processes set up by the government.

Again, the sanitation program of the OPP-RTI provides an excellent example of how organized communities, supported by professionals, can bring pressure to bear on public utilities, even as they work towards solving their own problems. The approach OPP-RTI developed was built around an external/internal distinction, with lanes of households taking responsibility for the sanitation and drains within the lane, and the government taking responsibility for trunk sewers and treatment plants. Although this approach might seem to devolve government responsibilities to the communities, in practice it has not only spurred action on the government side, but has changed the government's ways of working. On the one hand, it has made it more difficult for the government to accept loan-based megaprojects that invariably create large debts and rarely reach deprived settlements. Second, it has made it far easier for the government to complement the efforts of the urban poor to solve their own problems.

Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI), and the federations of the urban poor it represents, demonstrates similar principles (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2004; Satterthwaite, McGranahan, and Mitlin 2005). A key focus of these federations and their supporting NGOs is on achieving more secure and better-serviced homes and neighborhoods. As with OPP-RTI, the federations use self-help not as an alternative to public provisioning, but as a lever for securing more and better public assistance. Thus, while their savings groups and self-help activities have value in and of themselves, their full potential comes when they increase the capacity of local groups to negotiate with the agencies whose cooperation is needed to achieve any major improvements. Water and sanitation can be an important part of the process, not just because people need water and sanitation, but because it can be very difficult to gain legitimacy in the eyes of government agencies, or even the residents themselves,

without minimal water and sanitation. Thus, urban poor federations and women's cooperatives in India have, with the support of the NGO SPARC, collaborated with local authorities to provide hundreds of toilet blocks in Mumbai and Pune. This has not only helped meet critical needs, but has demonstrated the capacities of organizations of the urban poor, and changed their relations to local authorities (Burra, Patel, and Kerr 2003).

Participatory budgeting can also provide a means through which deprived communities influence urban policy, and indirectly water and sanitation providers. Whereas OPP-RTI and SDI provide examples of strategies of community organizations that can bring constructive pressure to bear on local authorities and formal water and sanitation providers, participatory budgeting is an example of a local authority strategy that creates opportunities for community organizations. In Porto Alegre, a pioneer in participatory budgeting, neighborhood associations started demanding a direct input into city budgeting in 1985, and over the years the city devised a process whereby about 15% of the municipal budget is allocated through a series of public meetings, designed in such a way as to give even groups in favelas (informal settlements) a significant influence over expenditures. It is notable that in Porto Alegre's first ten years of participatory budgeting, the share of households with water connections increased from 75% to 98%, and sewerage coverage increased from 46% to 98% (Baiocchi 2003), with sewerage, land regularization, and street paving at the top of the agenda at the start (Menegat 2002). Participatory budgeting still remains the exception, but the practice has spread to hundreds of other municipalities in Brazil, elsewhere in Latin America, and even in Europe. Although participatory budgeting takes many different forms (Cabannes 2004), it can clearly provide deprived groups with more influence over water and sanitation delivery, without just relying on either electoral democracy or direct influence over utilities.

A rights-based approach can also, at least in principle, give civil society groups a better basis for putting pressure on national governments and local authorities to prioritize water and sanitation provision in deprived settlements. South Africa provides the best example of a country that has not only accepted residents' legal right to water, but also implemented regulations designed to support this right. Thus, a right to "sufficient" water was included in the South African Constitution. When it became clear that many people could not afford sufficient water, this right was used as justification for pushing through a policy that South Africans should receive a minimum supply of water, currently set at six thousand liters per household, for free. Although there have been com-

plaints about its implementation, about the limit of six thousand liters, and about how the quantity controls have helped to commodify water, deprived communities have been able to use the rights debate to negotiate water supply improvements (Loftus 2005).

The scope for replicating these comparatively successful strategies is limited, again partly as the result of regional and international variability. What works depends on existing coverage, resource availability, the extent and forms of corruption and clientelism, settlement size and income, and a host of other factors. The South African government was in a better position than most sub-Saharan governments to respond to demands from deprived communities for free basic water supplies. Participatory budgeting is an important innovation, but is not feasible and effective everywhere. Although the federations of slum/shack dwellers linked to SDI have adopted somewhat similar strategies in countries of Asia, Africa, and most recently Latin America, they cannot claim to have found the universal solution in their particular combination of community organization, NGO support, and engagement with government. Indeed, one of the lessons that stands out is the importance of building on successful local initiatives, and designing measures that suit the local physical, economic, and political situations, rather than trying to decide what works in international forums or institutions.

Improving informal water and sanitation provision

As described above, only a small share of the people without access to the water network or to basic sanitation facilities typically benefit from upstream water management or changes in the role of the private sector in utility operations. Many, on the other hand, are affected by the changing quality and quantity of the local groundwater resources, and the operations of small private water vendors and sanitation workers. Since these water sources and providers are typically considered unacceptable by definition, it can be difficult for governments to work to improve their quality or reliability. In a recent study of small water enterprises in Accra (Ghana), Khartoum (Sudan), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), and Nairobi (Kenya), it was found that the governments were becoming more accepting of the role of both vendors and, in all but perhaps Nairobi, groundwater (McGranahan et al. 2006). On the other hand, comparatively little was understood about the quality and quantity of the groundwater resources, and whether increased use would deplete the local aquifers. Similarly, relations between the vendors and local public authorities and utilities were improving, but still not very constructive.

A review of possible measures to improve water and sanitation provision from informal providers or urban groundwater supplies is beyond the scope of this paper. It is worth reiterating, however, that neither the water resource measures nor the private sector participation promoted internationally has engaged with these issues, despite their clear importance to deprived urban residents. Moreover, the local barriers to action are similar to some of the barriers described above in relation to creating regulations and planning systems more favorable to the urban poor. High standards can easily mean that the government cannot engage with small water enterprises or groundwater supplies without either threatening to close down the supplies or ignoring practices that are not officially allowed. Moreover, there is only a fine line between benevolent neglect and pernicious negligence, when it comes to allowing the use of urban groundwater and sales by itinerant vendors with minimal equipment and no formal hygiene controls.

CONCLUSIONS

Improving water and sanitation provision in deprived urban and rural communities deserves to be an international priority. The Millennium Development Goals should be used to focus on those without adequate provision, and ensure that support does indeed reach those in need.

It is important not to be diverted by international debates over the relative severity of rural and urban deficiencies, the relative merits of markets and plans, or the scale of emerging water resource crises. While the statistics being used to monitor progress towards the international water and sanitation targets are seriously misleading, getting information that can drive local action is far more important than searching for internationally comparable statistics on access to water and sanitation. The international promotion of private sector participation has probably caused considerable damage, but this is because such institutional decisions should not be made internationally or under the influence of international agencies or corporations. It is not because of any inherent defect in private utility operators. Alternatively, even if fears of a global water resource crisis are justified, local deficiencies in water provision to poor urban dwellers are unlikely to be addressed by internationally promoted water resource management.

In many settings, the solution to urban water and sanitation deficiencies lies outside the water sector, narrowly defined. Urban authorities may feel that there is little point in improving "slums," as this will just attract more migrants,

and they may even prohibit formal water and sanitation provision on the grounds that the settlements are not legitimate. Such anti-urbanization policies cannot be addressed within the water sector. On the other hand, there are circumstances in which better water and sanitation provision can help to resolve underlying land issues and improve relations between urban poor groups and local authorities. Much depends on local politics and economics.

Some of the most successful improvements in water and sanitation provision have involved deprived residents securing more power over the formal provisioning system, either through participatory budgeting processes or through organizations of the urban poor negotiating constructively with local authorities. Such approaches are quite different, however, from the sorts of participatory projects international donors can easily design, or the sorts of community organizations that conventional NGOs set up to run their projects.

If neither public utilities nor private operators can easily provide the solution to water and sanitation deficiencies, neither can self-help or participatory approaches. But in any case, the real challenge is not to design approaches that can be applied in diverse situations around the world, but to find the means to support approaches that have been adapted to local conditions, and are already yielding improvements, even if they are not providing the sort of water and sanitation services people everywhere deserve.

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The Sanitation Program of the Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training Institute, Karachi, Pakistan

Arif Hasan

CONTEXT

The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi consists of a number of institutions. One of these is the Research and Training Institute (RTI), which works with low-income communities and government programs on sanitation, housing, education, and participatory research and its extension and incorporation into policy frameworks. This chapter deals exclusively with the OPP-RTI low-cost sanitation program.

Pakistan

Pakistan requires three hundred and fifty thousand new housing units per year for its urban areas, of which the formal sector is able to supply only one hundred and twenty thousand units annually. The demand-supply gap is accommodated in *katchi abadis* (squatter settlements on government land) or through the informal subdivision of agricultural land (ISAL) on the periphery of cities and towns. An estimated nine million people live in katchi abadis in the urban areas of Pakistan and another fifteen million in ISALs. Both types of settlements start out without services, but over a fifteen- to twenty-year period they manage to acquire water, electricity, gas, and some sort of social infrastructure. However, sewage invariably flows into cesspools or into the natural drainage system. The physical and social infrastructure that is acquired is through ad-hoc arrangements made by the residents themselves or small, unconnected projects implemented by local government councillors for their constituencies as "gifts" and political patronage.

Karachi

Karachi, the country's largest city (population thirteen million), has an annual housing demand of 80,000 units. In the last five years the formal sector has been able to provide 26,700 units annually. The gap has resulted in katchi

abadis whose population is now over six million. Between 1992 and 2003, 25,438 housing units were demolished as a result of megaprojects and to satisfy the land hunger of a strong politician-bureaucrat-developer nexus. Almost all the evictees moved to new katchi abadis far from the city center.

Since 1973, the government has been operating the Katchi Abadi Improvement and Regularisation Programme funded with loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Through this program people pay for land and development and acquire a ninety-nine-year lease. The program has improved and regularized only 1.5% of katchi abadis per year. This means that it would take seventy-five years to regularize the existing katchi abadis. Thus the program has not been a success. The reasons for the poor performance of the program are that there has been no proper community participation in it and, as such, cost recovery through lease charges has been poor; there is a lack of capacity in government institutions to involve communities and develop innovative engineering and community participation procedures; the process of acquiring a lease is complicated; and since people have de facto security of tenure, they are not motivated to transform that into de jure tenure. The program has also increased Pakistan's foreign debt, which is difficult to repay (for details, see Hasan 2001).

There is no program for the improvement of ISALs, although their conditions (except for security of tenure) are no different from those of the katchi abadis.

Orangi Town

After the local body devolution plan of 2001, Karachi was declared a city district and divided into eighteen towns. Each town was divided into Union Councils (UC). There are 178 UCs in Karachi. The district, towns, and UCs all have elected *nazims* (mayors) who have decision-making powers over and above the bureaucracy.

Orangi, one of the towns of Karachi, has a population of 1.2 million living in over one hundred thousand houses built informally; 85% of its population lives in an agglomeration of katchi abadis.

The Problem

Developing infrastructure in low-income settlements in a conventional manner is expensive, and the Pakistan government has been taking loans from international financial institutions (IFIs) for this purpose. However, the scale

of the problem is so enormous that not even a fraction of the requirement can be tackled through loans. In addition, loans come with conditionalities, foreign consultants, and, often, international bidding for implementation. All this can increase costs by more than 300% as compared to ordinary government projects. In addition, local governments do not have the financial and/or technical means to effectively carry out the subsequent operation and maintenance of the systems.

It was clear to OPP-RTI from the beginning that foreign loans could not solve the sanitation problem. It was necessary, rather, to raise local resources and develop local expertise. Part of this could come from the community, provided the cost of construction could be reduced by eliminating contractors, modifying engineering standards, and mobilizing communities to finance and manage the construction of an underground sanitation system.

To do this, four barriers had to be removed: (1) the physiological barrier—communities had to be convinced that not only the houses but also the streets and neighborhood belonged to them; (2) the social barrier—communities had to come together and organize to build their sanitation systems; (3) the economic barrier—costs had to be reduced to make the proposed systems affordable to communities; and (4) the technical barrier—communities had to be provided with tools, maps, estimates and technical supervision, and affordable alternative technologies.

It was assumed that organized communities supported by professionals and the OPP-RTI would be able to develop partnerships with government and direct available government resources to support the sanitation program.

The Orangi Pilot Project: Origins and Objectives

The OPP was established in 1980 to understand the problems in Orangi and their causes; through action research to develop solutions that people could manage, finance, and build; to provide people with technical guidance and managerial support to implement the solutions; and, in the process, to overcome constraints that governments face in regularizing and improving the katchi abadis.

In 1998, the OPP was upgraded into three autonomous institutions: the OPP-RTI, dealing with sanitation, housing, education, research, and training; the Orangi Charitable Trust (OCT), dealing with microcredit; and the Karachi Health and Social Development Association (KHASDA), dealing with health and gender issues.

OPP-RTI LOW-COST SANITATION PROGRAM

The Internal–External Concept

The OPP-RTI divides the project of sanitation into "internal" and "external" development. Internal development consists of sanitary latrines in the house, underground sewers in the lane, and neighborhood collector sewers. External development consists of trunk sewers and treatment plants.

Results in Orangi and in 284 other locations in Pakistan have demonstrated that communities can finance, manage, and build internal development if they are organized and are provided with technical support and managerial guidance. Local governments can support the process by building external development provided they accept the internal–external concept and train their staff in OPP-RTI methodology and in working with communities. Technical assistance from the OPP-RTI has consisted of providing communities with plans, estimates of labor and material, tools, training for carrying out the work, and supervision of work. OPP-RTI's research has developed new standards, techniques, and tools of construction that are compatible with both the affordability of poor communities and the concept of community involvement in construction.

In Orangi 96,994 houses have built their neighborhood sanitation systems by investing Rs 94.29 million (US$1.57 million). Local government for the same work would have invested Rs 603.6 million (US$10.06 million). All sewage discharges into the natural drainage system as it does in over 80% of Karachi. The ratio of OPP-RTI investment versus people's investment is 1:18.2 (Hasan 2001).

The Process

The lane was chosen as the unit of organization since a typical lane in Orangi contains between twenty and fifty houses. It was thus small enough to be cohesive and, since everyone in the lane knew each other well, there were no problems of mistrust.

Meetings were held in the lanes and people were told that if they formed a lane organization and elected, selected, or nominated a lane manager or team they could then apply to the OPP-RTI for assistance. Once a lane applied for assistance, the OPP-RTI sent its team to survey the lane and a map and estimates for its development were prepared and handed over to the lane manager or team. The money was then collected from the residents and the work was organized with OPP-RTI technical supervision and managerial guidance. The

OPP-RTI did not handle the money of the lane organizations and confederations; the lane managers/committees managed the funds and kept accounts.

Initially, the only lanes that could participate were those near a natural drainage channel into which they would discharge. Later, lanes that were far away from the drainage system became involved. Collector sewers were required for them to dispose into the natural drains. This led to the creation of a confederation of lanes that financed and built collector sewers. In certain wards, where the confederation of lanes was strong, this effort was funded by grants provided to elected councillors by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC). Maps of the ward, identifying where the collector sewers were required and their costs in terms of labor and materials, were prepared by the OPP-RTI and handed over to the lane organizations and the elected councillors and became a subject of discussion and debate in the community.

The OPP-RTI realized that the natural drains into which the sewage was being disposed could eventually be converted into box trunks with treatment plants where they met natural water bodies.

SCALING-UP THE OPP-RTI SANITATION PROGRAM

Through Local Government

The OPP-RTI sanitation program has been scaled up in two ways:

- The OPP-RTI-supported community sanitation disposes into the natural drainage system of Orangi. Local government is now converting these natural drains into box trunks designed by the OPP-RTI and supervised by community activists trained at the OPP-RTI.

- The Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA), a provincial government organization empowered to develop and regularize katchi abadis, was the first to adopt the OPP-RTI concept of internal and external sanitation. By adopting the OPP-RTI methodology, communities became organized and contributed to development as a result of which a more equitable relationship was established between them and SKAA. Previously, SKAA functioned entirely on IFI funding but it is now solvent and requires no external financing. OPP-RTI was SKAA's consultant and was responsible for training its staff in community mobilization and in making the internal–external concept workable.

Through Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs)

The scaling-up of the program through NGOs and CBOs has led to the creation of partnerships between them and local governments. The OPP-RTI strategy for supporting NGOs and CBOs wanting to replicate its program evolved over time and after many failures. The process consists of:

- CBO/NGO or community activists contact the OPP-RTI for support
- OPP-RTI invites them for orientation at the OPP-RTI office in Karachi or directs them to one of its partners
- After orientation CBO/NGO or community activists convince their community to adopt the program
- They create a team composed of a community organizer and a technical person who are trained at the OPP-RTI and/or on site in their settlements through visits by the OPP-RTI staff
- The training offered is in surveying, mapping, estimating, construction supervision, documentation, and accounting. Training does not have a specific period, but continues throughout the life of the project
- OPP-RTI arranges financial support for the team and related expenses through WaterAid or from its own funds; initially, this support is about Rs 200,000 (US$3,500) per year
- Invariably the CBO/NGO or community activists come into contact with local government departments as its work expands
- Local government representatives are then invited to the OPP-RTI for orientation
- If they are convinced they send their staff for training
- New settlements contact the CBO/NGO or community activists for help in replicating the program when they see how conditions have changed in their neighboring settlements

Outside of Orangi, 46,821 houses in eleven Pakistan towns at 284 locations have built their internal sanitation at a cost of Rs 88.15 million (US$1.46 million). The replication projects have been able to mobilize Rs 146 million (US$2.43 million) from local government funds for building external development and sewage disposal systems not only for their settlement but for large areas of the town and/or city. In two replication projects water supply systems have also been laid on an internal–external basis. In three small towns the replication project has become a consultant to the government for water supply, sanitation, and road paving projects all being built on the internal–external concept. The OPP-RTI partner CBOs and NGOs have learned how to make maps (some use computers and some also use satellite images and GIS) and develop extension literature. Their activists are constantly negotiating with local, provincial, and federal government representatives and agencies (OPP-RTI 2006). (See Box – 1 for reasons for successes and failures of these community projects outside of Karachi.)

A community development network (CDN) has been established linking up all the partner organizations. They meet every quarter at a different replication project and present and discuss developments that have taken place in their program. Local government officials of the area are also invited to the CDN meetings and site visits are arranged. Some partners are stronger in community participation and others in technical matters. They contact each other directly for support and often plan joint negotiations with government agencies (OPP-RTI 2006).

YOUTH TRAINING PROGRAMME (YTP)

Origins and Findings

One of the most important initiatives of the OPP-RTI has been mapping the Karachi katchi abadis. The findings of this documentation have changed perceptions regarding katchi abadis in government, NGOs, the media, and community circles and have had a number of important spin-offs.

In 1991, the OPP office shifted from Orangi to neighboring Qasba. The OPP management felt that since it was located in Qasba it should extend its program there. As a first step it was decided to document the Qasba settlements. In 1992–93, local high school students and school-educated young people were recruited to work on the documentation. The young men were given a small daily stipend and were trained by pairing them with the OPP technical team, with whom they worked in the office and in the field. Maps of Qasba were acquired from the local government and updated. Support of Rs 140,000

BOX – 1: OPP REPLICATION PROJECTS: REASONS FOR FAILURES AND SUCCESSES

Reasons for the failure of NGOs and CBOs to replicate the OPP-RTI program:

1. Failure to develop a technical-cum-motivation team
2. Acceptance of large sums of donor money for expansion. In all cases where this has happened, the NGO/CBO has not been able to deliver because it does not have the capacity or the capability to expand its work accordingly. Accepting large sums of money has also led to financial mismanagement and in one case to the cancellation of funding
3. Lane development is subsidized. OPP-RTI believes in component sharing. Where cost sharing takes place, there are invariably disputes, higher costs, and less empowerment of communities
4. Lack of patience resulting in expanding too fast
5. Failure to keep in touch with the OPP-RTI and seek its advice
6. Failure to share accounts of the NGO/CBO with the community. This makes the community feel that the NGO/CBO is making money from foreigners or government agencies
7. Lack of cooperation from government agencies and officials. This has been due to a number of reasons—their officials and/or engineers did not receive orientation and/or training at the OPP-RTI or there were constant transfers of personnel in the relevant government departments. In certain cases there was political opposition to the OPP methodology, which was seen as a threat to contractors and engineering departments of local and provincial governments

Reasons for success:

1. The development of a technical-cum-social organization team with staff members from the community
2. An activist or leader who can establish an informal working relationship with local government functionaries and politicians that can subsequently be formalized
3. The availability of a map of the area or the expertise in preparing such a map
4. Patience to wait and consolidate rather than expand the programme
5. Availability of funds for staff and administration and credit for developing long collector sewers where disposal points are not available
6. Coordination with OPP-RTI for advice, training, and documentation
7. Regular weekly minuted meetings to review progress, take stock, assign responsibilities, and identify weaknesses and the process of overcoming them
8. Transparency in account keeping and the involvement of local people on the board of the NGO
9. Cooperation from government officials and/or politicians. Support for the OPP methodology has come from public-spirited politicians and government officials, many of whom received orientation at the OPP-RTI or attended public administration courses where the OPP was discussed (Hasan and Alimuddin 2002)

(US$2,330) for documenting ten katchi abadis was provided by SELAVIP. However, a total of fifty katchi abadis were documented as a result of this support and in the process a number of young men from these settlements became associated with the OPP-RTI programs. (Two of them independently promoted the sanitation program in their settlement and later established a school, which has become a major Qasba institution. Its work is described in Box – 2.)

The documentation of the Qasba katchi abadis consisted of identifying existing infrastructure, schools, clinics, sewage disposal points, *thallas* (building component manufacturing yards), the slope of the land, the number of houses, and the approximate investment made by people and government in infrastructure development. This documentation showed the OPP-RTI management that even people outside of Orangi and without OPP-RTI's support had made major investments in attempts to improve the physical and social environment of their settlements.

After the documentation of these fifty katchi abadis, the OPP-RTI felt that there was a need to document the katchi abadis all over the city. This would also establish contacts with community activists, NGOs and CBOs outside of Orangi and give a larger base to OPP-RTI's community and advocacy work. In addition, it would train people in informal settlements to help in the replication of these programs.

As a result of this work, a Youth Training Program was initiated in 1994. The students at the program are matric and/or intermediate (10 to 12 grade at high school) graduates and most of them are also studying in schools and colleges. Training is provided for sanitation and the main focus is on surveying, drafting, documentation, levelling, designing, and estimating. Training is also offered to community activists, for whom the focus is on estimation, construction, on-site supervision, and community mobilization. Training has also been provided in housing so as to produce para-architects; this has consisted of surveying, designing, estimating, construction technology, and on-site supervision.

The students are taught through theory and by mapping and documenting katchi abadis. Initially, they went into the field with an OPP-RTI technical staff member. However, over time the older students started to guide the new ones. Teams now consist of one senior and one junior member. They go out and document physical and social infrastructure in the katchi abadis and identify the slope of the land. They have also documented Karachi's *nalas* (natural drains into which sewage discharges), including the slopes, widths, encroachments on them, and major sewage and storm water inlets into them.

BOX – 2: PEOPLE'S INITIATIVES IN ISLAMIA COLONY

Abdul Waheed Khan was a student when he was identified in 1993 as someone who could help in the documentation of the Qasba settlements. For this he worked with the OPP-RTI on documenting his own settlement of Islamia Colony. In the process he came to understand the social and technical methodology of the OPP-RTI's low-cost sanitation program. He motivated his neighborhood to adopt the OPP-RTI model and as a result nearly 95% of his area has been paved, sewage lines laid, and there has been great improvement in its appearance. The main sewer was laid by SKAA through finances generated from the area as lease charges. Waheed and other activists of the area supervised the laying of the sewer and also facilitated the lease process in coordination with SKAA. The society that Waheed and other area residents formed for development purposes believes that its greatest achievement is the setting up of a school in their area.

The school was set up by Waheed and two friends, Syed Lateef and Faqir Muhammad, in Waheed's own house, with a loan of Rs 1,300 (US$22) from the OPP-RTI. At first there were no students, so the founders asked the children of their extended families to come to the school, and they did. This resulted in other children starting to attend the school, and the number rose to forty-five. Soon the space for the school became insufficient and new premises had to be located. This was a costly matter and Waheed had to raise the fees charged by the school to ensure that they could have appropriate accommodation for the new students. To his surprise, rather than reducing enrolment, the rise in the school fee increased it considerably.

The school is run by the Bright Educational Society, which was established in October 1996. In its early years, OPP-RTI helped this society with advice, and when it required land for a school, the OPP-RTI played a pivotal role and requested SKAA to provide it. The acquisition of a plot by the society created numerous problems. The land developers in the area asked Waheed to divide the plot into small lots in partnership with them and sell them. When he refused they told the community that Waheed had no intention of building a school but was going to sell the land. This turned a number of persons against him. However, when this did not deter him and his partners from their objective, the land developers, who were influential persons in the area, had Waheed arrested and took over the plot. The matter was settled in Waheed's favor with the intervention of the Deputy Commissioner, but after construction started, Waheed was arrested again as the police wanted a share of the construction cost. Again, the local administration, through OPP-RTI lobbying, had to intervene to get him released. Construction was finally carried out under police protection.

The school now consists of a large building with nine classrooms, a library, a computer room, and offices. It has been built with the help of donations from the community and philanthropists and from loans. It has 450 students and 24 teachers. There are now eighty Orangi schools associated with the Bright School Education Society, which provides services such as teacher's training and dealing with government and NGO resource organizations. With the help of the Aga Khan University it has initiated a master trainers program for training teachers in Orangi; so far over four hundred have been trained.

Source: OPP-RTI reports and interviews with Bright Educational Society officers.

Initially, whoever applied for training to the YTP was given a three-month probation period during which he was given a daily stipend, not a regular salary. As a result of this policy, there was a high drop-out rate. Now the Technical Training Resource Centre (TTRC), set up by graduates of the YTP, runs a twenty-six-day training program for applicants and those who are successful become students at the YTP. The training for housing has also been taken over by the TTRC (for details of the TTRC and its courses, see Box – 3).

Fifty percent of the trainees are full time and receive a salary of between Rs 2,200 to Rs 2,500 (US$37 to 42) per month. The other 50% are part time because they are either studying or working. They start work after 2:00 pm and are paid Rs 1,750 (US$29) per month. Almost all of those who are studying say that they have been able to continue their education because of the income that is provided to them by working with the OPP-RTI.

So far the OPP-RTI, through the YTP, has completed the documentation of sanitation, water supply, clinics, schools, and thallas in 334 katchi abadis, which constitute just over 60% of the total katchi abadi population. This documentation has been digitized and the results, along with detailed maps of one hundred katchi abadis, have been published. The documentation of an additional one hundred katchi abadis is in press. OPP-RTI technical staff members, who had some knowledge of computer graphics programs, were encouraged to use this knowledge for digitizing the data; in the process they have become proficient in computer graphics and digitization. As a result, a computerized mapping unit is now functioning and two trained persons from the YTP are part of the unit. (The format of the documentation is given in Box – 4.)

The documentation of the nalas has been presented in two different ways. For the first, an A to Z guide of Karachi published by the Survey of Pakistan, a federal government agency, was acquired and all the pages pasted together to form a map on a scale of 1 cm = 100 meters. Karachi's natural drainage system and sewage trunks are marked on this map, which covers an entire wall in an OPP-RTI classroom. So far documentation of 102 nalas measuring 931,708 running feet has been completed; a detailed catchment area survey of forty-three nalas has also been completed. The map shows a clear picture of Karachi's sewage disposal system and as more information comes in, it is added. For the other, digitized maps on a smaller scale showing the same details have also been prepared. This is the only detailed documentation of Karachi's drainage system that exists along with statistics.

BOX – 3: TTRC AND ITS COURSES

YTP was started by the OPP-RTI in 1994. Towards the end of 1995, a twenty-one-year-old young man, Mohammad Sirajuddin, joined it. He completed the ninety-day housing course on theory and practical and on-the-job training in surveying, designing, estimating, and site supervision. After completion of the course he stayed on with the OPP-RTI to polish his skills. In mid-1997 Sirajuddin encouraged a diploma engineer, Shahid Malik, to join the OPP-RTI as a trainee. Upon the completion of Sirajuddin's training, the OPP-RTI advised the two to set up a consultancy in Orangi for architectural design and surveying so as to serve low-income communities and in the process earn a living as well. In late 1997, they set up SS Consultants, which operated from the OPP-RTI offices.

In the beginning clients were not willing to pay for the services of SS Consultants. They expected free service as was being provided by the OPP-RTI housing program. However, slowly they started receiving requests to design houses, mosques, shops, and schools and started receiving fees as well. At the same time Sirajuddin started to train young Orangi residents to assist in his work. In May 2000, he set up his office in a rented room in Ghaziabad, the Orangi settlement in which he lives. SS Consultants provides services to a variety of clients including NGOs such as the URC, Faran Education Society, Bright Educational Society, Reformers and the OPP-RTI for settlement surveys; design of schools, shops, mosques, and homes; and estimates and supervision of construction.

In 1999, Sirajuddin enrolled in a diploma course at a polytechnic school. There he realized that students studying with him would be unable to do practical work once they graduated. He felt that they needed a practical training course. To create such a course, he linked up with Ashraf Sagar who had also been trained at the OPP-RTI and had set up a consultancy unit called A-I Surveyors in 1998. A-I Surveyors has completed the survey of six settlements independently for community organizations to help them in the regularization process.

The two young men set about organizing a training course. It was decided that it would be of three-month duration and include drafting, quantity surveying, level and plan-table survey, and construction, supervision, and estimation. The fee for the course was set at Rs 1,500 (US$25). Abdul Hakeem, one of Sirajuddin's teachers, agreed to take the course, and OPP-RTI provided guidance when required. So far twelve courses have been held and fifty-six students have been trained.

TTRC has been requested by the OPP-RTI to conduct a twenty-six-day training course on mapping and documentation surveys for students wishing to work with the YTP. Students who are successful in the course then receive training at the OPP-RTI through the YTP. So far TTRC has conducted nineteen such training courses in which fifty-nine students have participated.

The TTRC has received an endowment of Rs 500,000 (US$8,340) from Homeless International, a UK-based charity. An additional Rs 220,000 (US$3,660) has been provided by Homeless International for replicating the TTRC by setting up the Housing Resource Centre. The TTRC has also been acting as a technical advisor to UC-6 in Orangi.

Source: OPP-RTI literature and interview with Muhammad Sirajuddin.

BOX – 4: KATCHI ABADI DOCUMENTATION FORMAT

1. Overall Statistics of Surveyed Katchi Abadis
   - Abstract
   - Analysis
   - Detailed Statistics
   - Sewage lines
   - Water supply lines
   - Clinics, schools, and *thallas*

2. Photographs

3. Location
   - Map of Karachi showing location of katchi abadis
   - List of katchi abadis surveyed

4. Individual Katchi Abadi Information and Maps
   - Map showing location in Karachi
   - Map showing the immediate neighborhood of the katchi abadi
   - Statistics on internal and external development
     - People's efforts (sewage and water)
     - Government's efforts (sewage and water)
     - Number of government and private schools, clinics, and *thallas*
   - Maps (separate for each item) showing:
     - People- and government-laid sewage lines and their direction and disposal points
     - People- and government-laid water lines and their direction and source
     - Private and government built clinics, schools, *thallas,* and mosques

The survey of the 334 katchi abadis shows the extent of people's work. There are 224,299 houses in 19,463 lanes in the surveyed settlements. Sixty-two percent of these lanes have sewage disposal facilities and 50% have water lines, both laid on a self-help basis. Approximately Rs 334.48 million (US$5.6 million) have been invested by the people in this work. Government investment has also been made for sanitation and water supply but most of their work is on main sewers, drains, and water mains. The survey results show that the internal–external concept of the OPP-RTI has been followed in an unplanned way by the government and the communities. Furthermore, 1,041 clinics and 773 schools have been set up by entrepreneurs and/or charities in these settlements, as compared to 12 government clinics and 143 government schools (Rahman 2004).

Repercussions and Important Developments

Setting up the YTP and the mapping process had a number of important repercussions on policy issues related to infrastructure and katchi abadi

upgrading, planning concepts in local government, and community managed development work.

- Documenting the katchi abadis showed people's involvement and investment in development in clear terms. As a result, planning agencies and local governments have realized the need to support this work rather than duplicate it or simply go out and build schools (often without teachers), clinics (often without paramedics), and water and sanitation systems that are often not properly designed, maintained, and operated.

- Persons in the communities were trained in skills and knowledge that communities require to establish a more equitable relationship with government agencies, improve their settlements, and build local institutions.

- The documentation laid the basis for questioning government and IFI planning policies and development projects and for promoting viable alternatives that were based on a sound knowledge of ground realities that government agencies and their foreign consultants often do not have.

- As a result of the documentation, OPP-RTI's concepts were reinforced by statistics and maps at an all-Karachi level and not just limited to Orangi. This has increased OPP-RTI's standing and credibility to the extent that its advice is now sought at the national, provincial, and city level in matters related to sewage and katchi abadi upgrading.

Work with SKAA

In 1994, SKAA decided to follow the OPP-RTI proposed methodology for upgrading katchi abadis. This consisted of documenting and integrating infrastructure funded by the community and the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) into an overall plan for each katchi abadi. It was also decided that SKAA would only build external development and leave internal development to communities. Financing and contracting of external development is arranged by SKAA either by conventional contracting or through departmental work.[1]

1. In departmental work a people's committee of the neighborhood where the project is to be implemented is formed to manage and construct the project; the OPP-RTI becomes its advisor; and the local government funds and designs the project with OPP-RTI and community involvement.

OPP-RTI's work as consultant to SKAA has consisted of:

- Documenting existing sanitation and water supply in the settlements and identifying external sanitation and water supply projects. Community activists assist the OPP-RTI and SKAA teams in both these activities

- Reviewing detailed designs and estimates by SKAA engineers

- Obtaining approval of the project by community members before finalization

- Supervising and monitoring work by SKAA engineers and community activists

- On completion, testing the infrastructure and, if approved by the community, issuing a "no objection" certificate with the community before final payment to the contractors.

The most important aspect of this entire work is the documentation of the katchi abadis leading to the identification of external development and an overall plan that integrates existing informally built infrastructure. This entire work has been done by the YTP under OPP-RTI supervision. As a result, SKAA, which was completely dependent on ADB funding, has become solvent and now has considerable surplus funds derived through lease charges from the communities it has partnered with (SKAA 2004).

OPP-RTI Alternatives for the Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan

The documentation of the katchi abadis by the YTP showed clearly that the OPP-RTI concept of internal sanitation being built by communities and external sanitation being built by the government was valid and workable. In addition, SKAA's work on these principles, supported by the OPP-RTI, has also been very successful. However, the Karachi Water and Sewage Board's (KWSB) Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan (GKSP), which tries to provide both internal and external development and take the sewage to its treatment plants, has been unsuccessful and its investments, provided through international loans, have not even begun to be recovered, putting considerable strain on the economy of the city and the province. KWSB owes Rs 42 billion (US$700 million) to the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

OPP-RTI mapping established the reasons for the failure. The GKSP ignores the existing reality that sewerage systems are already in place and are discharging into the natural nalas of the city. Documentation of much of this work is not available and, even if it were accepted that it exists, it is considered "substandard" by IFI consultants. The GKSP tries to take sewage to the three treatment plants it has built by constructing trunks along the main roads. In the process, however, it does not pick up the existing sewerage systems that discharge into the nalas and so the trunks remain dry and the treatment plants function at no more than 25% of their capacity (OPP-RTI 1999). To link up Karachi's existing infrastructure with the treatment plants and the KWSB trunks, the sewerage infrastructure of entire neighborhoods would have to be dug up and re-laid. This is simply not possible. To support its view, the OPP-RTI made a case study of the ADB-financed Baldia Project in which the KWSB methodology was followed; only 1,744 houses out of 25,000 could connect to the system. The old system of discharging into the natural nala of Baldia continues to function. As such, more than Rs 400 million (US$6.7 million) spent on the project have been wasted (OPP-RTI 1999). These facts have been brought to light by the OPP-RTI documentation of katchi abadis through the YTP.

After studying its documentation the OPP-RTI proposed that the existing sewerage systems, laid formally or informally, should be documented and accepted; that the natural nalas of Karachi should be converted into box trunks; and that treatment plants should be placed at locations where they meet the sea or other natural water bodies (see OPP-RTI 1999). Research also showed that in 1998–99, the KMC subsidy to the KWSB was Rs 329 million (US$5.5 million). With these finances 35 kilometers of nalas could have been converted into box trunks and in six years all of Karachi's 200 kilometers of nalas could be developed except for the Lyari and Malir Rivers and the Korangi Creek (funds for treatment plants would be in addition to these costs).[2]

On the basis of its proposals for Karachi, the OPP-RTI also offered alternatives for the planned Korangi Waste Water Management Project (KWWMP), which was being financed by a US$70 million loan from the ADB and counterpart funds of US$30 million from the Sindh government.

2 The KWSB planners and engineers objected to this proposal because they felt that sewage and rain water flowing together was against good engineering practice. However, through its contacts with academics, the OPP-RTI found that this practice has been followed in Japan.

Korangi is an extensive industrial-*cum*-low-income residential area of Karachi. The OPP-RTI proposal to the KWWMP was simply to accept the present community- and KMC-built sewerage system and convert the nalas, which act as its disposal, into box trunks and place a treatment plant at the end of it just before the point where the sewage enters the Korangi Creek. This would bring down the cost of the project to within what the Sindh government was ready to invest in it and would make the ADB loan unnecessary. The documentation of the existing Korangi infrastructure was done by the OPP-RTI through the YTP and with the help of community activists.

After 1997, the OPP-RTI made a series of presentations of its initial proposals before the KWSB, government of Sindh departments, the Planning Commission in Islamabad, the governor of Sindh, and the ADB. As a result of these presentations, in April 1999 the governor of Sindh decided to cancel the ADB loan of US$70 million for the KWWMP. It was also decided that the project would be built through local resources and with local expertise. A committee was formed by the governor to develop a revised conceptual plan for the project which would also incorporate the observations, objections and recommendations of the government agencies to the initial OPP-RTI proposal. The committee, after developing new terms of reference, requested the OPP-RTI to prepare such a plan, which it did in March 2000. The cost of the project according to the OPP-RTI plan worked out to US$15.18 million.

Meanwhile, the KWWMP generated much discussion and debate in the press and among NGOs and CBOs. A meeting of these, which included several Korangi CBOs, was held at the Urban Resource Centre (URC), a Karachi NGO. It was decided to make efforts to get the initial low-cost alternative plan implemented. In December 1999, they also sent a petition to the ADB Inspection Committee, which was signed by hundreds of Korangi residents, upholding the rejection of the loan and requesting an independent review of the project. In June 2000, fifty-nine NGOs and CBOs (including OPP-RTI) came together on a common agenda for the city's water and sanitation plans and proposals and produced a position paper. (This paper is reproduced in Box – 5.) The paper has been sent to the president of Pakistan, concerned provincial and federal ministers and departments, the governor of Sindh, external support agencies and their embassies, international agencies, and local and international universities. The group has now been formalized as the Water and Sanitation Network and is based at the URC (details are given in Box – 6.)

BOX – 5: CITIZEN'S POSITION PAPER ON WATER AND SANITATION POLICY FOR KARACHI

On June 28, 2000, a meeting was arranged between Government of Sindh and various Karachi NGOs, CBOs and citizens on the issue of water supply and sanitation for the city. The workshop was organised by the Government of Sindh: Local Government; PHED; Rural Development & Katchi Abadis Department in collaboration with World Bank and was facilitated by World Bank consultants. The NGOs, CBOs and citizens handed over a paper and walked out of the meeting for the following reasons:

- The government of Sindh and KWSB were not represented at this meeting by decision makers. Additionally, Chief Secretary, Department of Planning and Development, Government of Sindh, was supposed to chair the meeting. The citizens felt that their dialogue had to be with their government representatives and not with the Bank officials.

- The NGOs and citizens had informed the organisers that they had reservations regarding the manner in which the workshop was being conducted in which individuals were making comments on behalf of various interest groups. The NGOs and citizens had requested a panel discussion on the subject. However, the organisers did not change the format of the workshop.

- When community members objected to the fact that the decision makers were not there, the facilitators asked them to stay quiet and behave in a civilised manner.

However, there is a background to this conflict. In the water and sanitation sector, the KWSB has borrowed over Rs 46 billion (US$ 766 million) for development purposes since 1983. It has not even begun to service the loan. As a result, this servicing is done by deducting Sindh government revenues at source, thus, increasingly depriving the province of funds for development. In addition, none of the projects carried out through these loans has been successful, except the sewage disposal project in Orangi, based on the OPP-RTI model. This fact has been confirmed by the Asian Development Bank (PAA; PAK) 19076-Project Performance Audit Report on the Karachi Urban Development Project (Loan 793-PAK[SF]) in Pakistan, December 1999.

OPP-RTI has developed low cost realistic solutions to the problems of sewage disposal in Karachi. However, these have been rejected by the KWSB, without seriously considering them or even visiting the OPP-RTI sites to see how they work. It is important to note that these very solutions have been applied to similar situations in Japan, Switzerland and other first world countries. These solutions do not require large foreign loans for implementation.

The citizens and NGOs are extremely concerned about his state of affairs and are adamant it should not continue. They insist that a review of KWSB's and the international loan giving agencies' role in this disaster should take place. However, this is something the international agencies are not even willing to consider.

There are a number of changes that the NGOs, CBOs and citizens feel are required to make the loan giving process more transparent and to make it cost effective. These are:

- Projects identified for a loan should be part of a larger program and not isolated ad hoc interventions as they are today.

- Foreign consultants receive over 20% of the loan amount as fees and overheads (in some cases more). They should not be employed since highly qualified local experts are available and can work at a fraction of the cost.

- International tendering, which is part of the loan conditionalties, raises the cost of implementation by anything between 200 to 300% of the local costs. This should be done away with and local contractors be employed for implementation.

- Recovery of loans should be guaranteed from the benefits produced by the project itself rather than from other sources.

- A steering committee of interest groups should review the project at the conceptual stage through public hearings, as to the social, physical and economic viability and need before a request for a loan is made.

- And, above everything else, the loan should be taken if it is impossible to mobilise local resources for the project.

The Government of Sindh and Pakistan must protect the interests of the people of the province and country, and should dictate loan taking procedures and conditionalties in the larger interest of the people of Pakistan. It has to be realised that the debt trap is the biggest cause of poverty in this country and the only way out of it is to live within our means and rely upon the ingenuity and frugality of our people who have managed to survive in an extremely hostile economic environment which has been forced upon us by self-seeking governments and the ruthless international market.

Sr. No.	Name	Organisation	Signature

Source: Urban Resource Centre, Karachi.

BOX – 6: WATER AND SANITATION NETWORK

There has been growing interest among citizen's groups in Karachi in the issue of water and sanitation. This is because of the poor state of these services and also because of forums organized on the subject by the URC. The process of opposing the ADB's KWWMP and promoting the OPP-RTI alternative has been another reason for this interest. As a result, twenty-three groups including OPP-RTI formed a network on water and sanitation and named it People's Voice. Many other groups support the network as and when needed.

The network has strongly advocated using local resources, as opposed to foreign loans, and building on what exists rather than making investments in insensitive megaprojects. The network has also presented citizen's concerns and detailed comments on the World Bank Pakistan Country Assistance Strategy Paper. Presentations of the network's concerns have been made periodically to the media and city and town *nazims* along with the OPP-RTI alternatives for sewage disposal for the city.

More recently, the network has taken up the issue of the proposed ADB-funded Common Effluent Treatment Plant (CETP) for Karachi. The experts associated with the network have discovered a number of financial, technical, and operational problems with the ADB proposal and have raised these issues with the ADB. Members of the All Pakistan Textile Manufacturer's Association (who only came to know of the proposed plant through the network) have also expressed concerns. The network's effort now is to present viable alternatives and initiate public hearings on the CETP and other ADB-funded projects in the pipeline.

People's Voice is also involved in issues related to solid waste disposal and transport in addition to sewage and water. Because of forums, television programs, and meetings with government agencies and local government representatives, government plans for sewage disposal, water supply, and transport have been influenced.

Source: OPP-RTI and Urban Resource Centre quarterly reports.

The debate generated by the OPP-RTI's alternatives to the GKSP led to the Governor's Task Force on Municipal Services requesting the OPP-RTI to undertake a study on institutional issues related to the sewerage sector. A report "Sewage, Drainage and Treatment Plants: Responsibilities, Finances, Issues and Policy Changes Needed" was prepared (its conclusions are given in Box – 7). This study is of considerable importance. It has formed the basis of a debate within government circles and is responsible for the conversion of nalas into box trunks, which has become an ongoing activity in Karachi towns.

Development of Orangi Nalas into Box Trunks

As a result of OPP-RTI's presentations of its documentation of katchi abadis and the alternative proposals to the KWSB's GKSP, the governor of Sindh gave a directive in March 1999: "KMC should develop and upgrade main nalas/drains as sewage and rain water drainage channels, for which budget would be allocated annually." As a result of this directive, the KMC started work to convert tertiary nalas into box trunks on the basis of OPP-RTI surveys and designs. Since devolution in 2001, the city government has continued with this process. The OPP-RTI has developed designs and estimates for seventeen tertiary and one main nala in Orangi based on its surveys. The total length of these nalas is 33.7 kilometers. So far eight branch nalas have been converted into box trunks serving 2,705 lanes. Work on three more branch nalas is in progress and these collectively serve 1,503 lanes. Tenders for two additional nalas have been floated.

Work with City Government on Nalas in Karachi as a Whole

In June 2004, engineers from the Works and Services Department of the Karachi city government requested OPP-RTI support for the conversion of nalas into box trunks and for upgrading existing drains in Karachi. OPP-RTI and the city engineers are members of the focus groups formed for this work. Through mutual consultations nalas for upgrading are identified and OPP-RTI support consists of providing survey maps, designs, and estimates. To date, documentation of about twenty-five nalas has been provided to the city engineers.

The city government's Taimeer-e-Karachi Programme has allocated Rs 2.02 billion (US$36.66 million) for the development of nalas. Rs 669 million (US$11.15 million) has been allocated for fourteen projects identified and designed by the OPP-RTI (OPP-RTI 2006). This development has been made possible because the OPP-RTI has documented 102 natural nalas with a total length of 931,708 running feet.

Preparation of the UC Handbooks and Their Spin-Offs

After devolution in 2001, thirteen UCs were created in Orangi Town. Each UC has a population of between 50,000 and 100,000. The UCs have no technical capacity or capability, nor do they have proper maps for planning, implementation, and operation and maintenance of development work. Therefore, the OPP-RTI decided to prepare handbooks for the nazims of each UC. The books contain:

BOX – 7: SEWAGE, DRAINAGE AND TREATMENT PLANTS – RESPONSIBILITIES, FINANCES, ISSUES, AND POLICY CHANGES NEEDED

Study conclusions are:

- At present KWSB is servicing an area of only about 20% in Karachi. Servicing means maintenance and renovation of existing systems. In these areas most sewage is diverted to storm drains and natural nalas.

- KWSB's role in sewage disposal system development has been negligible. The only known development project undertaken by KWSB has been upgrading Treatment Plant (TP)-I, TP-II, construction of Baldia sewerage project, Lyari trunks, and TP-III, which are all components of the KWSB's Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan. The functioning of these projects, costing about Rs 42 billion (US$700 million) in foreign loans, is questionable as already shown in the cases of TP-I and II and Baldia project. In the remaining 80% of Karachi's area, not serviced by KWSB, development has been undertaken by KDA, other development authorities, the Cantonment Board, the KMC, co-operative housing societies, builders, and the people themselves.

- Natural nalas and storm drains serve as disposal channels for 90% of the sewage generated in Karachi. In the areas under KWSB jurisdiction (20% of Karachi's area), nalas and drains are also being used for sewage disposal. In the remaining 80% of the Karachi area (including katchi abadis) not under KWSB jurisdiction, the sewage disposal points are the storm drains and natural nalas.

- Neither KWSB nor KMC (now the city and town governments) accept responsibility for maintenance/development of these natural nalas and storm drains. The result is the consequent overflows and breakdowns of the sewerage system all over the city. The KWSB managing director and Foreign Projects Office rejects this reality and persists in imposing a master plan (the Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan), which has no relation to the existing system in place. KMC's opinion is that these storm drains and natural nalas are sewage disposal channels. Therefore, it is KWSB's responsibility to maintain them.

- The KMC and KWSB's sewerage wing (responsible for operation and maintenance) are responsive to accepting the ground reality. KMC has already allocated budgets for nala/drain trunk development as per the governor of Sindh's directive of March 3, 1999. The KWSB sewerage wing accepts the ground reality but is helpless due to the KWSB policy.

- For financing the sewerage wing, KWSB is dependent on KMC subsidy. For sewerage maintenance and repair KWSB's revenues (1998-99) were Rs 120 million (US$2 million; 50% share in conservancy charge), while its expenditure budget was Rs 483.4 million (US$8 million). The deficit, covered by subsidy from KMC of Rs 275 million (US$4.6 million), handles establishment, maintenance, and repair costs.

- KWSB sewerage wing budget for maintenance and repair is mostly wasted, which means that the KMC subsidy is wasted. KWSB persists on revitalizing a collapsed system, while at the same time it negates the functional drain/nala disposal system. It spends huge sums on renovating and maintaining lane sewers, secondary sewers, and trunks while the actual disposal is neglected.

- KWSB's dependence on foreign loans for development projects is disastrous for the institution. Presently KWSB has a loan liability of Rs 42 billion (US$700 million), which it has not been able to service.

- Inability of KWSB to service the loans has a negative implication for the budget of the Sindh government and its allied organizations. The KMC's (now the city government) budget allocation due from the Sindh government has been deducted at the source on account of KWSB loans and their servicing.

- Responsibility needs to be redefined. KMC is the viable organization to take responsibility for sewage disposal in Karachi. KMC (now the city and town governments) is responsive to accepting the ground reality as specified in the governor of Sindh's directive of March 3, 1999. KMC is financially viable. It has the technical and administrative capacity to take the responsibility for developing and maintaining sewage disposal systems. The maintenance and repair wing at KWSB can function under KMC (now the city and town governments). KWSB is better suited to function as a water board.

For the above suggestions to be implemented, no changes are needed in the Sindh Local Government Ordinance (SLGO). However, a government directive is needed as per a SLGO clause, which states that "KMC [is] to take up any other role assigned by government."

For KWSB to be converted into a water board the KWSB Act needs to be amended.

Source: OPP-RTI, *84th Quarterly Progress Report*

- Maps of the entire UC and of individual settlements within each UC

- Documentation of existing social and physical infrastructure related to sewage disposal, water supply, health, education, parks and playgrounds, and solid waste disposal

- Identification of development needs on the basis of the documentation and the role of the community and governments in planning and delivering this development

A number of UCs have used this documentation effectively. Development in those that have not has been ineffective, inappropriate, and substandard leading to a considerable misuse and waste of public money. UC-6, a model UC, has used the plan book for:

- Developing external sewerage and water supply, which has included repairing water mains and desilting blocked sewers. The location of the leakages and blockages was identified by OPP-RTI surveys

- Helping the nazim and area activists to organize the pick up of solid waste from the main bins. The UC plan book, with a map showing the disposal points, has helped in this work. People are responsible for disposal of solid waste from the house and lane into the main neighborhood bin, which a government van picks up. Four thousand houses and 450 shops are organized to do this work and they pay the sanitary workers employed for this purpose Rs 20 to Rs 30 per month per shop or per house

- Where people have laid lane sewers on a self-help basis, the nazim finances paving the lane

- Developing tree plantation and electrification on the internal–external model

- Mapping, which has been done by the YTP and the UC has been assisted by the TTRC in its development planning and implementation work.

Requests from UCs and towns from all over Karachi have been received for the preparation of similar documentation and advisory support. This is being provided to UCs in eleven out of eighteen towns of Karachi. These towns are now in the process of converting their nalas into box trunks. However, the process of building treatment plants at the end of the nalas has not yet begun, although the OPP-RTI is in the process of researching low-cost options.

Formulation of National Sanitation Policy

In August 2005, the federal government asked the OPP-RTI chairman to prepare a sanitation policy for Pakistan. After a number of provincial-level workshops, a background paper and policy have been prepared that promote the OPP-RTI component-sharing model based on the internal–external concept. A stakeholder workshop endorsed the policy document and the federal cabinet approved it in December 2006.

Funding Mechanisms

OPP-RTI was funded initially by Infaq Foundation, a Pakistani charity. Together they decided that there would be no targets but that the program would be an exploration into finding alternatives to the existing development paradigm for the katchi abadis. This funding has been used for administrative purposes, research, documentation, training, and extension but not for development. The funds for internal development have been generated by the community and organized at the lane level.

Plans and estimates for external infrastructure were developed by the OPP-RTI and/or its NGO/CBO partners in the replication projects. With these the NGOs and CBOs have negotiated with local governments to fund external development. In cases where disposal points are not available, a revolving fund has been provided to partner with NGOs to develop link trunks between the settlements and the existing government sewerage systems. Each lane pays a proportional cost back to the revolving fund when it connects to the link trunks. In one case where this has been successfully done, funds of Rs 500,000 (US$8,333) were provided by WaterAid. This small fund has helped 8,722 houses in Faisalabad to link their self-built neighborhood sanitation systems to the existing government trunk sewers. Recovery has been 87.47% and the fund continues to revolve.

By providing plans, designs, and estimates for external development, the OPP-RTI and its partners have been able to mobilize government resources

that would previously have been spent on internal development. This has been a major achievement.

Impact

The OPP-RTI programs have had an impact on Orangi, on the OPP-RTI replication areas, on civil society and NGOs, on government projects and policies, on donors and donor-funded programs, and on academia.

Because of the sanitation programs in Orangi, "the availability of cleaner and extended space in front of houses had a significant social and recreational impact as well. New and relatively safer play areas for children emerged. Women were able to move around more freely and be visited by friends and relatives leading some to comment that it had improved marriage prospects for young women" (Zaidi 2001). These findings are similar to those of other surveys in which residents have also said that as a result of the work they have done in the lanes, the value of their properties has increased by up to 30%; they have been motivated to get a lease; and they have become aware that they can look after their neighborhood themselves and plant trees and "come together" (Hasan n.d.). They also realize that the new CBOs and NGOs that have been created by lane activists are different from the previous ones. They are a part of these CBOs and NGOs because the leadership has been born out of collective work.

According to surveys, infant mortality in those parts of Orangi that acquired a sanitation system in 1983 fell from 130 per 1,000 live births in 1982 to 37 per 1,000 in 1991. Most observers and official sources agree that the most important factor in this was the construction of underground sewers (Hasan n.d.). Residents interviewed said that they spent much less on curative health than they did previously. Some estimated an average saving of Rs 500 (US$8.33) per month, which is 10% of the average earnings in Orangi. Others also mentioned that since their health was better, they did not miss work and lose wages.

The most important impact of the OPP-RTI programs in Orangi has been the development of CBOs, NGOs, activists, and educated young people who have become involved in the improvement of their settlements and have developed skills for collective negotiations with government on the basis of sharing development with the state (financing, building, and maintaining) rather than just lobbying for it. This has led to contacts with government agencies and resource organizations and has put pressure on the elected UCs. The Orangi UCs now have maps of their areas, prepared by the OPP-RTI, and details of existing infrastructure (both social and physical) and can plan

scientifically on this basis. They also have active citizen's organizations that can monitor and support the work of the UCs. A strong desire has emerged to turn Orangi into a "planned area" so that the more affluent and educated persons do not leave.

In the replication areas, the sanitation program has produced the same results as in Orangi itself. For instance in Faisalabad, Dr. Naseer Muhammad, a local medical practitioner, said that as a result of the sanitation improvements, doctors are losing money: "They will have to shift to settlements where water and sanitation do not exist, or they will become broke and homeless." Dr. Naseer further reported that water- and sanitation-related diseases have fallen by over 60% in the neighborhoods where his patients come from (Alimuddin, Hasan, and Sadiq 2001). There are other spin-offs as well. Nazir Ahmed Watto, president of the Anjuman Samaji Behbood in Faisalabad, was made a member of the local government's District Development Committee for Faisalabad because of his work in the city; as a result he was able to change a number of development projects for the city from tertiary to secondary level. The OPP-RTI has been working with the Conservation and Rehabilitation Centre (CRC), an NGO run by architects, in Uch since December 1998. The CRC has now become a consultant on development work to the Uch local government. A similar status is in the offing for two other replication projects. An activist in yet another replication project (Anjuman Falah-o-Behbood, Rawalpindi), has become an elected councillor and in that capacity is promoting the OPP-RTI internal–external model for the whole *tehsil* or subdistrict. In almost all replication areas where sanitation has been built, the local organizations are either engaged in tree plantation and solid waste management, or are considering it.

The OPP-RTI's research on Orangi and other informal settlements in Pakistan, and the promotion of its models, has led to a change of perceptions regarding katchi abadis. It has made them "respectable." The residents of informal settlements are no longer seen as poor, illiterate, helpless, and a burden on society or as criminals for that matter. The reasons for the establishment of katchi abadis and the processes involved in them have also been understood. This understanding has led to a number of innovative approaches to housing, including the incremental housing schemes of the city governments of Hyderabad and Karachi in association with Sahiban, a Pakistani NGO. Many philanthropists and Pakistani donor NGOs have also changed their approach from "charity" to supporting participatory development.

Resource organizations and NGOs have also been able to identify reliable community organizations with whom they can work. There is a downside to this as well; as a result of all this, Orangi has become the beneficiary of much attention, which other Karachi informal settlements have not.

Donor agencies have also adopted the OPP-RTI models. The World Bank's Strategic Sanitation Approach (SSA) is borrowed from the OPP-RTI's sanitation program. UNICEF's work with the OPP-RTI in Sukkur and the World Bank-SDC's work in Hyderabad both promoted the OPP-RTI model. The Department for International Development (DFID)-funded Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project (FAUP), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme of the Sindh Pilot Project are also based on the OPP-RTI model. In all of these programs the OPP-RTI has acted as a consultant and/or trainer, except for the DFID-funded FAUP. In addition, the proposed ADB-funded Sindh Rural Development Programme and the Punjab Urban Basic Services Programme have proposed adopting the OPP-RTI methodology (as did the now discontinued UNDP PLUS program).

Academic organizations have also been affected by the OPP-RTI work. Many have linked their programs with work in Orangi. The first of such organizations was the Department of Architecture and Planning at Dawood College (most of the people working on physical development-related community work in Pakistan are graduates of this institution [Ahmed 1998]). The National Institute of Public Administration, where government bureaucrats are trained, has also made the OPP-RTI development model a part of its coursework and named the director of OPP-RTI a member of its board. This has made a number of bureaucrats supportive of the OPP-RTI model.

Lessons Learned

- Government has sufficient funds for external development through contractors but not for both external and internal development through the contracting system.

- The absence of documentation of existing government, community, and/or NGO-built infrastructure makes it impossible for this infrastructure to be integrated into government plans for sanitation. As a result, there is much duplication, wastage of investments made by NGO/communities, and government schemes that are never fully realized.

- Poor communities living in katchi abadis in Pakistan can invest up to Rs 2,000 in financing an underground sewage system. Even very poor families are able to collect this sum in a period of four to six months.

- The cost of community-financed and -managed internal infrastructure is about 25% of the cost of government-developed sewerage systems.

- Poor communities incrementally invest in improving their living conditions provided they have de facto or de jure security of tenure. They also invest to establish de facto tenure security. Much of this investment is badly implemented due to an absence of sound technical advice. This investment is also not recognized by the state and since it is not documented either, it is not integrated into official plans. If it is documented, and it is large in scale, it becomes difficult to ignore.

- Development does not take place with funds alone. It takes place through the development of skills, self-reliance, and dignity. The three are closely interlinked and follow each other in that order. They make relationships within community, and of communities with government agencies, more equitable. This change in relationships brings about changes in government planning procedures and ultimately in policies.

- "Capacity and capability" of government institutions can never be utilized successfully without pressure from organized and knowledgeable groups at the grass roots. Such groups can only be created by activists who have to be identified, trained, and supported financially. Formally trained professionals and technicians are not an alternative to such activists. The formation of such groups forces transparency in the functioning of government agencies.

- One of the major reasons for disasters in government planning is that ideal plans are made and finances are then sought for them. Often these finances do not materialize. Things would be different if planning were done on the basis of a realistic assessment of funds that are available, and if an optimum relationship could be arrived at between resources (financial, technical, and other), standards, and demands, and if planning could recognize and accommodate the fact that all three are dynamic and can change over time.

- Community organizations exist all over Pakistan. However, their main function is to lobby government agencies and politicians for development. This development is often handed out as patronage and without proper planning and implementation. It is often substandard and inadequate, and, more often than not, does not materialize. People have lost hope in the lobbying process and are looking for alternatives.

- A map of the settlement or the small town in which replication is to take place is an essential prerequisite to planning. The process of preparing a map and identifying existing infrastructure and problems is in itself a motivational exercise. The map changes perceptions about what is required for the settlement or city and relates that to ground realities. It has been observed that government agencies often do not have such plans or the expertise to prepare them and as such their planning perceptions and assumptions are inaccurate.

- In smaller towns, municipal authorities have access to sufficient funds for external development if the OPP-RTI model is accepted. Local government agencies also have basic engineering expertise and this can be further enhanced by training at the OPP-RTI. A partnership between people and government agencies, as has been demonstrated on a large scale, is possible in these towns. In larger cities where sophisticated engineer-dominated specialized agencies exist, such a partnership is not possible to begin with. However, as sanitation work in a settlement expands, contact between the NGO/CBO carrying out the work and the government agency in charge of water and sewerage becomes inevitable. If the replication project is large enough and successful enough, this contact develops into a dialogue and subsequently into mutual understanding, if not collaboration.

- The creation of surveying, levelling, mapping, and documentation and planning skills within a community leads to a more equitable relationship between government agencies and CBOs. People who acquire these skills move on to create institutions around them and this in turn leads to development within the settlement. These institutions become a gathering place for people and activists and a space for dialogue.

- In Karachi, where a large number of replication initiatives have been consolidated, CBOs have gone on to do other things and have taken control

of their neighborhoods and settlements. If they are put in contact with each other, they learn from each other and expand their work. If a network of these CBOs is created, and supported by city-level NGOs, academics, and concerned citizens, it can become a major force in determining policy directions, especially if it can put across its views on the basis of scientific research and planning alternatives. This process is taking place in Karachi in a big way but for it to become irreversible policy it has to be nurtured.

- Once the work of CBOs consolidates they realize that many of their problems are related to larger city planning issues. However, understanding these city planning issues and participation in promoting pro-poor solutions to them can only become possible if there is an active NGO in the city that carries out research on these issues, promotes alternatives, and involves CBO activists in it. Karachi is lucky that the Urban Resource Centre performs this role for the city and is in constant dialogue with the technical departments of the city government. A similar center has been set up in Lahore and more are in the offing.

- Government officials and agencies respond positively if research findings and development alternatives are supported by large-scale on-site work and large-scale public involvement, even though they may have serious reservations regarding the alternatives. Where powerful contractors, consultants, and the interests of international loan agencies exist, the reservation regarding the alternatives can turn into active opposition, as in the case of the ADB-funded KWWMP in Karachi.

- The informal sector is an important player in the delivery of services and financial and technical support to poor communities. This sector operates on a very large scale. Government and donor programs cannot replace this sector except at the project level. However, they can support this sector through research and extension of technical advice, credit, and managerial training. If this is accompanied by increasing the awareness of communities regarding what should be their relationship with the informal sector, then a more equitable relationship between communities and the sector can be achieved. This is what the OPP-RTI programs have succeeded in doing in Orangi and in the replication projects.

- Through its work with other NGOs, the OPP-RTI has learned that large funds for small NGOs can result in destroying those NGOs since they may not have the capacity to utilize those funds properly and also because the availability of such large funds is seldom reliable. Once they have stopped, the NGO can no longer function and its activists and staff have to search for other livelihood. In addition, there are always donor agencies and large NGOs searching for smaller grassroot NGOs and CBOs that can promote their programs. In OPP-RTI's experience these smaller NGOs often become implementers of the programs of the donor rather than developing and sustaining their own programs.

- It can also be easily seen that government functionaries who are associated initially with the development of innovative projects have considerable loyalty to them. However, their replacements can be indifferent, if not openly hostile, to such initiatives.

- The manner in which government agencies function is deeply rooted in well-established routines and procedures. Similarly, conventionally educated engineers are often not interested in innovative work. Thus, although the functioning of normal government development work is not disrupted by transfers of officials, that of unconventional work certainly can be.

The OPP-RTI has also worked closely with international agencies and donors and has reached a number of conclusions regarding this association:

- Donors have their own agendas, which consist of quantifiable targets and large-scale spending. This approach makes it difficult for them to support for any length of time a process of exploration and gestation. And without such a process, innovation and its institutionalization is difficult, if not impossible. In addition, most donor concepts are based on inaccurate assumptions. It is simply assumed that government departments can fulfil the roles that donor projects assign to them if training is imparted to them or they are ordered by their higher-ups to perform. The fact that capability and capacity, given the organizational culture of state institutions, cannot be enhanced without the establishment of a process of accountability and transparency is often overlooked. Donors also manage to impose their own culture on government agencies. This culture consists of impressive seminars and publicity and, in some cases a

show of affluence. This not only alienates katchi abadi residents, but also makes the project appear "non-serious" to project staff, since seminars, workshops, and news are seen as an end in themselves.

- The monitoring of donor-funded projects is usually carried out by people who have little to do with the implementation of the project and its day-to-day affairs. The result is that this monitoring is no more than policing and creates a conflict between the project and the monitors who are more interested in finding out what is "wrong" rather than sympathetically understanding issues and guiding the project actors.

- Donors have an important role to play. They can positively influence policy and they can provide much-needed funds for experimentation. However, to play this role effectively, they must have a good idea of processes in low-income settlements, rather than merely the conditions, and the assumptions regarding government agencies and interagency relations should not be based on incorrect information or assessment.

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New Directions in Housing Policy

Diana Mitlin

INTRODUCTION

Four years ago, the publication of the *Global Report on Human Settlements 2003* (UN-HABITAT 2003) highlighted both the present and anticipated scale of shelter inadequacies and suggested that one in every three people in the world would live in "slums" within thirty years. It further estimated that 940 million people—almost one-sixth of the world's population—already live in squalid, unhealthy areas, mostly without water, sanitation, public services, or legal security. The significance given to these problems is indicated by the inclusion of shelter, through "slum" settlements, in the Millennium Development Goals and the aspiration to "Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020" (Goal 7; http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). In addition, the importance of the lack of access to basic services for health and well-being has resulted in specific goals with respect to water and sanitation.

Lying behind such aggregate assessments and generalized objectives is an appalling state of affairs. Shelter deficiencies are numerous, with the most significant being insecurity of tenure, inadequate provision of basic services (notably water and sanitation), and excessive residential densities. Insecurity of tenure is widespread as there is insufficient land for urban growth to take place within the legal framework. In the search for plots, available land may be squatted; and/or land that is not zoned for residential development, typically agricultural land, may be subdivided into residential plots. These informally developed areas are not provided with public services. Families may organize access to water either through investment in water pipes (often illegally tapping main pipes), digging wells, and/or through purchase from informal vendors. Sanitation services are often very limited and it is rare to have provision for sewerage. High densities are a particular problem in central city areas where the locational advantage encourages low-income individuals and families to come in the hope of finding work. In these circumstances, residency may be insecure, or residents may rent rooms in subdivided existing buildings; again, service provision is likely to be inadequate as the number of people accessing these services significantly exceeds the number for which they were originally planned.

In this context, the options for legal accommodation are limited. Even the lowest-cost options exceed the affordability of a considerable proportion of the lowest-income households. Hence there is the widespread use of incremental housing strategies that make shelter more affordable by spreading the costs over a number of years. For higher-income households, some form of legal land purchase may come first, with further investments being made in shelter and services as incomes increase and assets accumulate. For lower-income families, the first investment may be a very basic shelter made from wood or scrap materials on a piece of land with uncertain security of tenure. As security increases, additional investments are made. Infrastructure may be installed once connections to public networks have been negotiated. Over time, the shack will be transformed into a more robust dwelling, with rooms added and flooring and roofing improved with the use of permanent materials. Incremental development is more affordable because the considerable investment required for adequate shelter can be made in small steps as finance becomes available, and without having to pay the interest costs associated with large loans. Investments frequently do not comply with building regulations because of the high costs of compliance. Financial investment is only one component of the household strategy for shelter acquisition, and the collective action of residents helps to achieve tenure security and also secure state investment in infrastructure improvements and connections to bulk services.

The urban poor's uncertain legal status (for multiple reasons) in terms of land occupation and construction means that they live with the risk of eviction. As well as the many large-scale evictions, there are small evictions that take place on a daily basis in the towns and cities of the global South. The relationships between building rules and standards and the bigger issues of city planning and development are highlighted by events in Zimbabwe in 2005 and other smaller eviction programs (COHRE 2006; Tibaijuka 2005).[1] For many, the illegality associated with incremental housing development simply reinforces their status as second-class urban citizens. Illegality compounds the problems of informal shelter, increasing vulnerability as a result of eviction threats and giving rise to bribes and coercive payments. Lack of legal tenure is the ostensible reason for governments not providing, or underproviding, services, but this further exacerbates the problems faced by those with low incomes. Illegality creates the feeling of being "other" and secondary, a feel-

1. For examples from Karachi see http://www.urc.org.pk

ing reinforced by the stigma of living in certain neighborhoods and their association with crime (Lall, Suri, and Deichmann 2006; Henry-Lee 2005). The eviction of residents from low-income settlements occurs within a discourse that emphasizes formality as a necessary condition for urban "citizenship." The problem of low income (one dimension of poverty) is compounded by social exclusion based on residency in a particular neighborhood and accommodation in a particular type of dwelling.

The scale of such problems is immense. Looking first at Asia, in Bhopal, 31% of the population, or four hundred and eighty thousand people, are living in low-income settlements (Lall, Suri, and Deichmann 2006, 1028); in Pakistan, about one-third of the country's entire population live in *katchi abadis* (informal settlements on state land) and slum areas (Naqvi 2007); and in Thailand, there are some fifty-five hundred low-income urban communities, with 8.25 million residents (out of a total urban population of 19.3 million) living in poor quality housing often with insecure tenure (Boonyabancha 2005). Turning to Africa, three-quarters of Angola's urban population live in informal peri-urban *musseque* settlements, and more than 80% of these residents have no clear legal title to the land that they occupy (Cain 2007). In Lilongwe (capital of Malawi), 34% of people live in squatter areas, 44% in traditional housing areas (sites and service schemes with poor conditions), and the rest in conventional planned housing areas. Only about 20% of the people live in the latter, yet they occupy nearly 80% of the land (Manda 2007). In 2002, Dar es Salaam had a population of 2.5 million (United Republic of Tanzania 2003), 70% of which were living in informal settlements. And in Latin America, in Brazil, where more than 80% of the population is considered urban, approximately 40.5% of Brazilian urban residents live in inadequate and/or insecure housing (16 million families) (Rodrigues and Rolnik 2007).[2] It is difficult to draw clear conclusions with respect to the increasing or decreasing scale of the problem. On the positive side, there are indications that incomes increase in some contexts and, hence, that affordability issues are

2. The UN definition of a precarious settlement is one characterized by inadequate conditions of housing and/or basic services. A precarious settlement in Brazil is frequently not recognized/considered by public government as an integral part of the city. Five components reflect the conditions that characterize precarious settlements: insecure residential status, inadequate access to drinking water, inadequate access to sanitation and infrastructure in general, low structural quality of domiciles, and excessive density. In a precarious settlement, domiciles should suffer from at least one of these five conditions.

reduced for at least some families. There have also been attempts to increase affordability by reducing housing and housing finance costs. In some cases, this has been associated with the state (as elaborated below); in other cases, it has emerged from private sector enterprises seeking commercial advantage and profit-making opportunities. On the negative side, despite positive economic growth in some contexts, significant poverty remains. In many cities, there is substantial ongoing population growth (both from natural increase and in-migration), with increasing pressure on available shelter and declining opportunities. Such population growth within the larger cities has resulted in low-cost residential opportunities being increasingly located far from the city center and income-earning opportunities. Therefore, for given income levels, shelter opportunities, particularly in the larger centers, are more expensive and less favorable. A further factor making life difficult for the poor, particularly in the more rapidly growing economies in Asia, has been speculative investment in land, particularly in inner-city areas, and hence evictions, sometimes with resettlement in distant locations.

Shelter has long been an area in which governments have been prepared to invest, in part due to perceived political benefits. As illustrated in the recent *Global Report on Human Settlements 2005* (UN-HABITAT 2005), there have been many significant interventions in this sector by the state. Although inadequacies in state practices are the cause of many shelter problems, governments do respond with specific program initiatives, and this chapter will discuss trends within such initiatives. It first summarizes progress within some of the new and long-standing strategies that governments have used to address shelter needs. It then moves on to some of the embedded and often implicit policy directions within and beyond such programs, and the discussion highlights the underlying tensions in realizing shelter improvements. These tensions are pushing programs in a particular direction, putting pressure on them to shift where they are a poor match for people's own housing efforts, and hence where failures are evident. There follows a look at how the lowest-income groups are becoming more central to program design; how standards are being reassessed; how money is being used as a means of inclusion rather than a mechanism for exclusion; how housing interventions are recognizing the importance of collective rather than individual approaches; and finally, how there is greater awareness of the public implications of private sector provision and involvement. The discussion suggests that these "reversals" of what has been accepted common practice

are underlying and consistent embedded directions or tendencies, which suggest points of weakness in past strategies and which are worthy of greater recognition in considering future policy direction.

GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS

Before considering the current generation of housing programs, it is useful to review previous efforts and examine the pressures for change within earlier attempts to address housing need. It is widely acknowledged that governments have made numerous although generally ineffectual efforts to assist the urban poor to secure adequate shelter. Different strategies have been used but few have had any large-scale impact. Prior to the 1990s, particular emphasis was placed on both direct state provision and on encouraging mortgage lending.

Whether as finance or housing providers, the performance of state-owned housing institutions in the South has been widely criticized (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989; UN-HABITAT 2005). State agencies have failed to support the expansion of mortgage lending in some countries, and in others this has proved a costly strategy. Country studies show that in Ghana, Malawi, and Zambia, mortgage finance remains very small, and this also appears to be true in other sub-Saharan African countries (Karley 2002; Mulenga 2003; Manda 2007). In higher-income countries, such as Thailand and Mexico, the state has had more extensive involvement in supporting mortgage finance; however, in both these countries, this has involved the state in providing finance to cover the costs of nonpayment of loans (Connolly 2004; Kritayanava 2002). Support to enable households to access mortgage finance has been limited and/or expensive. One recent analysis of the performance of such financial institutions concluded that mortgage lending in the South has not emerged as a financially viable housing finance strategy for the poor; it is suggested that "housing banks created with the help of donor agencies over the past thirty years have gone bankrupt or moribund, evolved into full-fledged commercial banks (such as Capital Bank in Haiti), or become real-estate focused banks with very few poor clients (the Housing Bank of Jordan)" (Daphnis 2004, 2). One particular problem is poor repayment of housing loans, illustrated below in the case of the Philippines:

> The old approach used funds of the pension funds, that is, the Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Home Development Mutual Fund for financing [the] government's major housing program, the

> Unified Home Lending Programme (UHLP). . . . [T]he developers or private housing contractors originated the housing loans from eligible borrowers and then submitted the mortgage papers to the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) for take out. The pension funds were the source of funds. . . . This strategy led to the bankruptcy of the government's housing programme in view of the inability to collect loan repayments from borrowers who were granted housing through the origination done by private developers. (Llanto 2007, 3)

Efforts to address housing needs through direct construction have been associated with further problems. There are exceptions, such as Singapore, where the government has undertaken an extensive construction program and where 96% of the population live in home-ownership apartments financed by state-managed mortgages (Chin Beng 2002). However, a more common story is one of government promises to improve the housing situation, followed by a struggle to find effective policies. For example, in Nigeria, between 1971 and 1995, the government actually built only 76,370 dwellings, 13% of the units they intended to build (Ogu and Ogbuozobe 2001, 477). A similar problem was encountered at the National Housing Corporation in Kenya, whose production was also well below need at only a few thousand units a year. In Tanzania, even the provision of plots proved to be beyond state agencies' capabilities. Between 1995 and 2001, there were 243,473 applications for plots to the Ministry of Lands and Dar es Salaam City Council. However, only 8,029 plots were surveyed and made available by the relevant state agencies (Anyamba and Nordahl 2005, 27). In other cases, attempts were more successful although still of limited effectiveness; for example in India, since its inception in 1970, the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) has supported the construction of 14.4 million dwelling units, of which 95% have been allocated to low-income and otherwise disadvantaged households. However, the scale is inadequate given the size of India's population (and repayments have been poor, particularly in recent years, thus reducing the viability of the lending institutions). This lack of scale is a familiar experience. In the Philippines, the government-led shelter program provides on average only about one hundred and twenty thousand "units of housing assistance," and unmet housing demand as of the year 2000 was about 2.4 million units (Llanto 2007, 1). Many housing program were

only ever intended for limited groups of workers; government agencies offered directly built complete public housing units to these workers, often at a considerable price discount, with loans that were never repaid (Ogu and Ogbuozobe 2001, 477; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, 107–11; Alder and Mutero 2007).

What is of particular note is that, even when some success has been achieved, little consideration has been given to those with the lowest incomes. In El Salvador, between 1965 and 1978, Financiera Nacional de la Vivienda financed 26,600 complete housing units in fully serviced developments at a unit price of US$ 20,000, which could be afforded by only the 30% of those with the highest incomes (Stein 2007). In Zimbabwe, nine out of ten low-income home seekers on the housing waiting list in Harare in 1996 had a monthly income of less than Z$ 900 (approximately US $100), which would only qualify them to buy a plot in the Kuwadzana 5 low-income housing project that was being developed at the time (Kamete 2000, 249–51). A recent analysis of Pakistan highlights the long-standing and continuing lack of affordability of current government options because of the overall costs, the time lags involved in development, and the bureaucracy attached to applications (Siddiqui 2005, 4).

Government strategies have, in general, represented a significant transfer of public funds to the few who have received dwellings, but have done little for the many who have not been able to access these programs. What is of particular note is that government programs have reemphasized a vision of shelter as a complete modern unit, although this is unaffordable to most. The ubiquitous nature of this vision has reinforced a regulatory and legal framework that has defined the most common shelter strategy, that of incremental development, as illegal. Official responses have recognized, through support for site and service programs, the inadequacy of the state's strategy of supporting only completed housing units. The site and service programs were an attempt to address the supply constraint on legal land titles and, it was hoped, would enable urban dwellers to more speedily secure adequate shelter. However, although some have been effective, there has been a lack of supply, the locations have not always been well selected, beneficiaries are often not the target group, and buildings are often in contravention of the regulatory processes; such programs are not being widely used at present (see Alder and Mutero 2007, 4, for an example of their decline in Kenya). The lack of capacity to provide access to serviced legal land was illustrated for Tanzania above, and it is this lack of capacity that lies behind the ubiquitous spread of incremental development on informal plots.

NEW STATE STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS HOUSING NEED

During the 1980s, the role of the state was reconceptualized. Both as a result of economic problems in some Southern countries, and under pressure from international development assistance agencies, structural adjustment programs were widely adopted. This shift was promoted in part by the fact that the kinds of problems faced by housing agencies were being widely replicated within other state agencies. Whatever the reasoning, stabilization and structural adjustment programs sought economic stability and the restructuring of economies to promote long-term growth. The immediate consequences were restricted levels of state investment, as governments reduced their budget deficits, and the closure of some state housing and housing finance institutions.

As significant was the reconceptualization of housing policies towards those with a stronger market-led allocation process and away from supply-side provision (i.e., constructing houses). The emphasis within state policies shifted to being "enabling" and demand responsive—with the state seeking to support low-income households' strategies for improving their own housing. In the Latin American context, this was first realized through attempts to improve the workings of the private construction sector, encouraging the provision of low-income housing and reducing the cost of such provision. The Inter-American Development Bank summarizes the implications of this ideological shift for housing policy thus:

> Under the enabling approach, the key task for the public sector is to create the conditions that improve the performance of the private sector. This is possible through the elimination of unnecessary regulations and the government's direct production and financing of low-cost houses, as well as the improvement of the land titling and registration regime, the elimination of obstacles for executing guarantees and the removal of rental regulations. Success in implementing this approach does not depend solely on housing policies and related reforms, rather it depends on macroeconomic stability, essential to the reduction of interest rate and term mismatch risk and the availability of long-term financing in local currency (if possible). (IDB 2006, 5 and 6)

It is perhaps surprising that despite this generalized shift away from state intervention, shelter programs continued to receive government financial support in at least some contexts. In Chile, one analysis suggests that the continued willingness of government to finance housing was related to its need for political popularity (Gilbert 2002a). In this case, an authoritarian state sought to secure an element of popular support by addressing housing aspirations. A similar phenomenon was also observed in Peru during the 1970s (Castells 1983). However, the interest in housing goes well beyond authoritarian states. More recently, the newly democratic government in South Africa prioritized housing investment in 1995, with the announcement of a capital subsidy program that has now reached just under two million allocations (Baumann 2007). Housing investment has remained a significant commitment by the state despite a significant shift away from redistributive policies in general (Peet 2002). The recent downturn in the scale of new subsidy-financed housing in South Africa reflects constraints in the construction sector rather than a declining interest in housing investment on the part of the state. There are other new extensive programs in India, Thailand, Mexico, and Brazil (Satyanarayana 2007; Boonyabancha 2005; World Bank 2004; Rodrigues and Rolnick 2007). Even after many years of neoliberal policies, it was noted that "it appears that countries . . . in Latin America allocate from one to five per cent of government budgets for housing subsidies" (Mayo 1999, 40).

The continuing popularity of support for housing emphasizes its significance in terms of electoral politics. However, despite widespread support for housing investment, there have been very mixed feelings about incremental development. As Porio, Crisol, Magno, Cid, and Paul (2004, 60) explain in the context of the Philippines: "the CMP[3] has also failed to obtain the support of government officials, including heads of housing agencies, because of the perception that it legitimizes the existence of squatters and degraded neighborhoods in urban areas. . . . At the heart of this issue are the different perspectives informing what constitutes a valid housing solution." These attitudes help to explain why, despite the efforts of authorities to undertake "slum" upgrading programs and to invest in encouraging home ownership among those rich enough to afford "complete" homes, there are many large-scale and small evictions taking place in towns and cities on a daily basis (COHRE 2006). There is a reluctance to support incremental development

3. The Community Mortgage Program offers low-cost loan finance to communities facing eviction.

because it is seen as less good than complete "modern" housing, and there is a reluctance to accept incrementally developed neighborhoods as legitimate.

The tensions inherent in this situation, the desire of the state to respond to citizens' needs for shelter, the broader pro-market context and its emphasis on demand responsiveness, and the reluctance to accept incremental development have all resulted in a number of specific program outcomes. The following subsections describe five types of programs, all of which are very much in evidence within the portfolios of state and development agencies. These programs, which are all attempts to improve access to shelter, differ in strategy and with respect to the target groups.

Down-marketing mortgage finance

A significant trend that is emerging in both Latin America and Asia is the effort to enable lower-income groups to secure mortgage financing, thus expanding the market for commercial housing finance and increasing formal home ownership. In some cases, such as Thailand, this trend has been within state institutions; however, in the context of present macroeconomic policies, more significance is being placed on encouraging private sector institutions. There has been notable success in some Asian countries (Watanabe 1998), exemplified by Indonesia and India. In Indonesia, the housing finance market grew at an annual rate of more than 20% between 1993 and 1996 (Seki and Watanabe 1998, 118–19). In India, since the late 1990s, the market has expanded rapidly and has grown at a compounded annual rate of 32.1% between 1999 and 2005, with several nonbanking financial companies also providing loans. The outstanding portfolio of retail housing finance for commercial banks alone stood at US$ 42.3 billion as of March 2006 (Satyanarayana 2007). States have been proactive in making market conditions more favorable; for example, in the Philippines, as elsewhere, the government has sought to support private commercial mortgage lending through creating a secondary mortgage market.[4] Llanto (2007, 4) elaborates on the reasoning:

> there is an intention to integrate low-cost housing (for the employed low-income households) and socialized housing (for the informal sector) into the mainstream credit markets.

4. The Philippine government intends to move away from interest rate subsidies to capital subsidies for the poor (Llanto 2007, 3).

> This came about as government planners realized that there is no way that government would be able to finance all the requirements in the housing sector, especially given the huge losses under the formula lending approach and the inappropriate incentives that misdirected housing subsidies could create.[5]

This approach is self-evidently close to the broader emphasis on neoliberal economic and political policies.

These attempts to improve the functioning of the mortgage market are oriented primarily towards those with formal sector employment who are able to afford complete housing units. For a number of reasons, including higher real incomes, a more efficient financial sector, and affordable construction techniques, more people can afford to make use of mortgage finance. Generally, there does appear to be more money for housing finance in most regions of the world, with the notable exception of sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). Although there have been initiatives in this region (e.g., Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria), they remain small in scale and relatively insignificant; in Kenya, for example, it is estimated that in 2004, the banks and mortgage institutions only offered nine thousand loans (UN-HABITAT 2005). However even in Asia and Latin America limited efforts have been made to reach the informal sector, such as in Mexico (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2004, 35), and the inability of lenders to deduct repayments directly from salaries appears to be a significant deterrent to expanding lending to those informally employed. As shown by experiences in Peru, even the capacity to offer legal land title as collateral is not sufficient to encourage the spread of mortgage finance to households whose incomes are not derived from within the formal employment sector (Calderón 2004). This constraint is similar to that in Europe, where mortgage lenders will not approve loans unless they can verify income (Stephens 2004). This reluctance to lend to those without formal employment may help to explain the slow spread in some countries. For example, in South Africa, only 5% of the target market for mortgage companies has been reached in recent years, despite continued pressure from the government to extend the reach of mortgage lending (Baumann 2007, 4).

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5. Secondary market support has taken place in other countries in the global South as discussed in UN-HABITAT (2005).

Capital grants to access mortgage finance

The shift to demand responsiveness and market mechanisms has resulted in a reorientation of state support for housing away from direct provision and towards capital grants for low-income households (which promote demand in the housing market). Capital grants are offered to low-income households to increase the affordability of completed homes and, in some cases, to help them access housing loans. Many of these households cannot afford to purchase a completed house without a subsidy, although they may have formal salaries and be able to afford to contribute significantly to shelter improvements. The commercial housing loan component has become less significant in some cases, as the problems of affordability and default have become more evident. As a result, there has been greater effort to put more emphasis on sweat-equity components for the lowest-income households (UN-HABITAT 2005).

This approach, associated particularly with Chile and Costa Rica, and later adopted by other countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and Panama, involves the restructuring of traditional relations between the state, the private sector, and the community with respect to housing (IDB 2006). Some 20% of Inter-American Development Bank lending for housing has been allocated to supporting these programs, which is indicative of their significance (ibid., 9) and the popularity of this subsidy system continues to grow; for example, the Philippine government is interested in introducing this approach (Llanto 2007). In South Africa, there were early attempts to replicate this model with the Cape Town Housing Company in the late 1990s. More recently, the restructuring of the housing subsidy has aligned the government's approach more closely with this model, with a savings requirement that is structured as a sweat-equity component for the lowest-income households (Baumann 2007).

These capital grants are conceptualized with a number of distinct characteristics. They target the lowest-income households through entitlements based upon household income. They are seen as encouraging the integration of those in need of shelter within conventional financial markets, hence the emphasis on savings as a requirement for program entry. And, in taking up loans from the commercial sector, they are seen as a means of increasing the familiarity of both lender and borrower with each other, leading to financial market expansion and credit opportunities. As experience with these programs has grown, a number of problems have become apparent. In relation

to the target group, it can be difficult for the lowest-income households to participate due to the need to accumulate savings. In relation to the building process, the scale of increased demand (through capital subsidies) has an impact on the nature of supply. Private construction companies have provided directly for this market, but quality has been a problem (due to the division between financial provider and client) (Cummings and DiPasquale 1997; Jiron and Fadda 2003; Tomlinson 2002; Gilbert 2004). Moreover, there has been a tendency, reported in both Chile and South Africa, for contractors to maximize construction income and minimize land costs, resulting in remote locations and potentially high public costs to provide basic services (Cummings and DiPasquale 1997; Jiron and Fadda 2003; Tomlinson 2002; Gilbert 2004; Rodriguez and Sugranyes 2007).

Shelter microfinance

The third strategy, which is currently attracting considerable interest, is that of shelter microfinance. The significance of microfinance was widely recognized even before Mohammed Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work with the Grameen Bank. The use of microfinance loans for housing investment has developed more slowly than loans for enterprise development, in part due to the larger loan size. Lenders have also been deterred by a concern that housing investments are not productive and hence will not generate an income to assist with loan repayments. However, experience has demonstrated that small-scale lending for housing finance can be successful; in part this learning has resulted from enterprise loans being diverted into housing. In some cases, loans for housing investments have directly improved incomes by providing rental accommodation or by financing investment for home-based enterprises. As a consequence of these experiences, microfinance for shelter has emerged as a new strategy during the last five years, although experimentation among both traditional microfinance agencies and NGOs has been going on for a significantly longer period. Many leading microfinance agencies in Latin America have been drawn into housing microfinance, and these include Banco Sol in Bolivia, Banco Solidario in Ecuador, Mibanco in Peru, Banco Ademi in the Dominican Republic, Calpia in Honduras, and Genesis Empresarial in Guatemala (Ferguson 2003, 26–27). One study identifies 57% of Latin American microfinance agencies as offering housing loans (Escobar n.d., 21). Similar trends are evident in Asia, with the Grameen Bank having had a housing loan program for many years.

There has been some interest in investing in similar programs in Africa, although economic conditions there are less favorable.[6]

Shelter microfinance supports the incremental development process for households with reasonably secure land tenure. Most housing loans are between US$ 500 and US$ 5,000, repayable over one to eight years (CGAP 2004). Loans are generally taken to build additional rooms, to replace traditional building materials with concrete blocks and tiles, to otherwise improve roofs and floors, and to add kitchens and toilets. Lending for land purchase is very rare because of the high costs and other problems with individualized solutions to tenure and infrastructure needs; and also because some degree of land security is generally a prerequisite for such loans. Lending for service development is rare because it requires a collective loan.

The contribution of shelter microfinance to addressing housing needs is limited by the focus on those who are able to afford microfinance investments and who have reasonably secure tenure. However, its value remains significant, as it speeds up the improvement process thus enabling the consolidation of housing assets. In many cases, microfinance agencies provide loans on a commercial basis, demonstrating the potential for expanding financial services in this area. There are an increasing number of formal financial institutions interested in lending for shelter; for example, the Colombian Banco Davivienda (Forero 2004, 41) and ICICI in India (Satyanarayana 2007).

Neighborhood upgrading and the provision of serviced sites

The upgrading of existing low-income settlements that have insecure tenure and inadequate services is a well-established strategy for shelter improvements, and interest appears to be growing. For example, IDB has recently signalled interest in increasing support for neighborhood upgrading (Green and Rojas, forthcoming). Recent evidence of its growth in popularity is indicated in country reviews that identify emerging programs in the Philippines and Malawi and established programs in Central America (Llanto 2007; Manda 2007; Stein 2007). The momentum behind these programs is partly linked to the greater emphasis on land regularization that has emerged from de Soto's analysis, although it should be recognized that the accuracy of this analysis has been questioned and many programs predate this interest (Gilbert 2002b; Bromley 2004).

6. See Alder and Mutero (2007) for a discussion on Kenya, and *Environment and Urbanization* 19, no. 1 (forthcoming).

Neighborhood upgrading requires building a relationship between low-income communities and the state. The state has to engage with low-income communities through issues related to both the legalization of land tenure and the regularization of plots, so that they comply with regulations and other legislation. The provision of subsidies (for infrastructure improvements and, sometimes, other investments) also requires involvement with the state to establish beneficiary rights and entitlements. The growth of participatory planning mechanisms has helped to consolidate positive relationships between the residents of low-income settlements and their local government. Neighborhood upgrading programs offer secure tenure, which encourages residents to upgrade their housing with greater confidence that they cannot be removed. Basic services are provided with the expectation that residents will be able to cover the costs of service delivery and that health standards will improve when water use increases and sanitation is provided. Programs have now become linked with microfinance for shelter to enable higher-income households to improve their dwellings at the same time as their neighborhoods are being upgraded.

One of the greatest advantages of such an approach is the minimal disruption to livelihoods and existing shelter investments. However, some of the most vulnerable settlements may not be entitled to support because it is not possible to upgrade them *in situ*, and relocation is required. Settlements with very high densities may also be difficult to upgrade in an inclusive fashion, and some relocation is likely to be required in order that all the residents are accommodated at legal densities without the expense of medium-rise buildings. The service charges from upgrading may be significant and may result in some of the lowest-income residents leaving the area or in mounting service debts.

Community investment funds[7]

Community investment funds provide access to subsidized loans to assist with land acquisition and investment in basic services. Community funds have emerged from the activities of a range of civil society and state agencies. The premise of such programs is that effective housing interventions require more than the transfer of a capital asset; rather, the process needs to be one that draws on residents' own skills and capacities to consolidate the neighborhood's physical and social dimensions. Community funds are finan-

7. The description of this program type draws on some of the background papers I prepared for the *Global Report on Human Settlements 2005* (UN-HABITAT 2005).

cial mechanisms that enable collective investment in shelter improvement and they may support activities such as land purchase, land preparation, infrastructure installation, service provision, and housing construction, extension, and improvement. Their most distinguishing characteristic is the way in which funding is perceived. Community funds use savings and loans activities to trigger a development process—not simply to increase the access of the poor to financial markets. Through savings and loans activities they strengthen the social bonds between community members (building social capital), so that loans can be repaid and existing finance within the community can be used more effectively. The mechanism also enables other development objectives to be secured through a strong local organization able to negotiate with state authorities.

The growth of community funds has both paralleled and diverged from that of shelter microfinance. Both approaches offer small loans to residents in low-income communities and share many techniques and methods. However, in general, microfinance initiatives seek to promote financial market integration and secure the benefits that can flow from borrowing. In contrast, most community funds are concerned with promoting inclusive and equitable access to tenure security and basic services (IIED 2004). Lending for tenure security and basic services generally draws these agencies and the communities they work with into some engagement with local authorities. Improvements have to fit within the laws, rules, and regulations that govern construction and land development, and some negotiation often takes place. An important and common characteristic of community funds is that some subsidy is provided—financed either through state funds or international development assistance. Although much of the innovation for community funds has been developed within the NGO sector, there has been consistent and growing interest from government programs (Mitlin 2003; UN-HABITAT 2005).

Relatively little attention has been given to this approach; however it has been a state program option for more than twenty-five years. Programs that seek to support community-driven urban development almost universally work with residents' own investment capacity, which is then augmented through some mix of subsidy and loan finance.

DIRECTIONS AND TENDENCIES WITHIN NEW PROGRAMS

Although these programs are very different in terms of their target beneficiaries, objectives, and methods, they share some commonalities in their approaches.

These emerge from common experiences and/or contextual factors that influence the direction of programs. In part, they exist as a result of underlying tensions, as formal state and development agency programs seek to support and hence "map" themselves onto the predominantly informal shelter strategies of low-income families. As formal interventions—with their multiple and diverse objectives—seek to work with the momentum of families' own shelter strategies, there is a mismatch of strategies and consequently tensions arise. These tensions may emerge from the program design or may simply reflect a failure to respond quickly to changing opportunities and constraints in the broader political and economic framework within which low-income and otherwise disadvantaged urban dwellers secure their livelihoods and basic needs.

These commonalities are important because they help to elaborate trends that are embedded within programs, influencing their future direction. They are also important because they represent ideas and experiences that have a life beyond the program itself and that may be concerned with meeting shelter needs or broader development objectives. These programs do not exist in isolation, but are very active and, sometimes, integrated components in broader urban development processes. They are often large-scale state expenditure programs and/or innovative strategies that have received considerable attention from development assistance agencies. The commonalities are also important because the experiences generated by the program approaches summarized above will catalyze experiences that will, in turn, provide the foundations for future generations of interventions to address the need for shelter improvements.

The subsections below all discuss underlying directions and tendencies that seem to be influencing programs to be more, rather than less, pro-poor. However, as suggested below, they are not unidirectional and there are often tensions that push them back towards a more formalized response to shelter needs. There are also other directions and tendencies that may be more or less positive in addressing shelter needs, such as trends in incomes and macroeconomic stability. The five below have been selected due to their emerging significance in housing program and policy.

Money as a means of inclusion

> [I]f we want to get everybody on board, we need a collective financial system which links everyone, no matter how poor they are, so that the whole community goes ahead as a group.

> Collective finance provides the mechanism to join people from all the different economic levels within the community, and can address the economic needs of all those members. A communal financial system can act as a buffer between the outside financial system (which is very stiff and accessible only to the better-off), and the internal, people-owned financial system (which is highly flexible, informal, communal, and constantly making adjustments to accommodate the crises which are part of poverty). (Boonyabancha 2007, 2)

Money is typically a means of exclusion for the lowest-income households. It is the mechanism through which individuals and households are excluded from participating in a range of activities within capitalist economies, and this inability of low-income households to participate in financial processes limits other opportunities. In the area of shelter, low incomes mean that households cannot afford to live in formal settlements and thereby avoid the stigma associated with informal neighborhoods.

Several of these new programs seek to use finance as a means of inclusion, particularly the programming strategies of capital subsidies and community investment funds. In the case of some community funds, money is the mechanism around which residents organize. For example, the role of money within the *Baan Makong* program in Thailand is described above by Somsook Boonyabancha, the director of the program. In this case, savings is a means of drawing together members of the community so that they can develop collaborative relationships. Once communities come together, they can address some of the disadvantages they face, notably the high cost of individual shelter solutions and the need for state support. Organization around savings takes money, which is so often a means of exclusion, and makes it into something that holds communities together and enables them to negotiate with the state from a position of strength.

Finance is also a means of inclusion, albeit in a less powerful form, within capital housing subsidy programs. In this case, capital grants provide a means for low-income households to purchase housing that they would otherwise not be able to afford. The intention is that the state will provide an injection of assets that will provide improved access to shelter and catalyze a change in shelter opportunities. In this case, finance is not the means to negotiate for the transformation of relationships (as in the case with the savings groups referred

to above), rather it is a means to purchase entry into market opportunities previously reserved for those with higher incomes. Without access to these capital grants, conventional housing solutions are unaffordable; but with them, low-income households can acquire improved shelter—which in some cases is within developments that are not associated with the stigma sometimes attached to low-income settlements. However, in other cases, the capital subsidy has been used to produce housing that is of poor quality (see below), reflecting the continued inability of the private sector to address the needs of low-income residents.

The centrality of the poor

There has been a shift, in terms of both social welfare and market-based programming, to make the poor more central in the delivery of services. As argued above, in past decades, the state has seen its role as a provider of houses. In the context of great need and with high unit costs, the scale and intensity of demand has meant that such opportunities were always taken up, even if they did not work that well for the households in question. In most cases, the lowest-income households were not even allowed access to these benefits. Program resources were secured on the agenda of assisting the poor, but in practice the poor were marginal to the process in every sense. There has been a significant shift towards a recognition that the poor have to be central to solutions that work for them. This shift has a number of dimensions, including more widespread recognition of the value of shelter strategies used by low-income citizens; more considered strategies to secure participation; and a recognition of the need to focus on the lowest-income residents if inclusion is to be achieved.[8] In the last decade, there has been a greater emphasis on participation, with an associated emphasis on community consultation in project design and management.[9] It is widely recognized that such participation arises from mixed motives; for the state, citizen involvement offers the potential for cost sharing, in addition to more effective programming.

Greater recognition of what people can afford to pay, and the value in supporting them to remain in their current locations, lies behind several of the programming strategies outlined above. The willingness to support upgrading

8. See the discussion in the two final chapters of Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2004).
9. See, for example, Abbott (1996), Douglass and Friedmann (1998), and Hamdi (2004). For a broader discussion of related issues see Hickey and Mohan (2004).

emerges through interventions such as the Community Mortgage Programme in the Philippines, which helps squatters at risk of eviction to secure tenure (Porio et al. 2004). The importance of engaging grassroots organizations through a participatory process is exemplified by neighborhood improvement and housing programs in Central America (Stein and Castillo 2005). In addition, the growth in shelter microfinance supports households to invest where they are located and to make the improvements that they wish without recourse to a bigger government plan for upgrading.

It has been recognized that many development programs, whatever their intention, have failed to reach the lowest-income residents (see the discussions in Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2004). Participatory mechanisms may favor higher-income groups, which are able to use institutional opportunities to greater effect. This has led to some programs developing specific strategies to draw in the lowest-income and most disadvantaged groups. One of the more considered strategies has been the practice of daily savings, developed within Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI), which supports many community investment funds. Daily savings is used within the savings schemes to encourage those with very low incomes to put aside what they can, often only a few cents, and this grows because of the frequency of activity (SDI 2006). Daily savings is unattractive to those with higher incomes, who may be paid monthly and who may choose to prioritize other activities. Savings schemes federate to enable the views and perspectives of the lowest-income residents to have political representation.

Although greater inclusion of the lowest-income families should be recognized, the limitations should also be acknowledged. Inclusion in more formal shelter results in service charges and taxes, and the lowest-income households may have to struggle to pay these costs (Mitlin and Muller 2007).

Progressive and not exclusionary standards

The intentions that lie behind building standards are often well meaning; however, as outlined above, the process itself has had mixed results. The frequency and nature of rules and regulations within the building process means that these have to be reconsidered if low-income households are to be able to afford legal shelter. The pressure to reform standards has come from both professionals and organized neighborhood associations within low-income settlements.

As low-income households unite in associations and gain in strength, they are better able to negotiate with the state. In the late 1990s, grassroots organizations

working within the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia convinced the municipality of Windhoek that they should reform standards to enable new migrants to the city to afford shelter improvements (Mitlin and Muller 2004). The chosen strategy allows families to buy group plots with communal services. The critical nature of this regulatory change is demonstrated by the fact that many of the lowest-income households choose to use their savings (rather than loan finance) to improve services, as they are nervous of the risks involved in borrowing for shelter improvements (Muller and Mitlin 2007). The low costs associated with incremental development make this possible. More recently, a sister federation in Malawi succeeded in addressing regulatory constraints, this time when it built using mud blocks despite rules to the contrary (Manda 2007).

The issue of regulatory reforms is not new and has been a consistent theme in many shelter-related papers, articles, and books published to date (see, for example, Yahya et al. 2001). Programs that have sought to provide an appropriate upgrading framework for low-income settlements have been willing to revise regulations, such as the community-determined standards within the Million Houses Programme in Sri Lanka. There have since been further measures in a number of countries, such as the special zones of social interest in Brazil that have sought to reduce the scale of illegality faced by residents living in low-income informal neighborhoods. As highlighted recently, the Brazilian experience has not been wholly positive and there are concerns that spatial inequalities have now been legalized (Bundy 2007). What becomes critical is that the upgrading be an ongoing process, securing further local improvements and a more integrated city.

Collectivity…rather than individualism

How can the needs of the lowest-income and most vulnerable citizens best be addressed? A particular theme in program design is the choice between collective and individual development options. Although there are a number of distinct aspects to this collective/individual dichotomy in shelter development, in practice most of the differentiation within programs is related to the ownership of land and the organization of groups benefiting from state programs. Beyond these specific areas, collective financing mechanisms are widely used by the small numbers who manage to acquire access, either through housing cooperatives or through other types of savings schemes.

Affordability issues as well as a recognition of the importance of collective management of infrastructure and neighborhood planning generally result in

collective land purchase; plots may then be subdivided or may remain collectively owned. Dwelling units are generally individually owned under some legal agreement, with rights of transfer and sale. In the Philippines, the Community Mortgage Program is notable for its emphasis on providing land security to groups facing eviction; it is widely acknowledged to be the state program that reaches the poorest, has the lowest unit costs, and higher collection rates (Llanto 2007; Porio et al. 2004). In Thailand, India, South Africa, and Chile, collective options now form part of the state package of support provided to low-income citizens in need of shelter improvements. The interest of state programs in the collective approach reflects the value of having a local organization that is active in the management of finance and the acquisition of land and services. In addition to cost advantages, collective approaches offer opportunities to reduce individual risks and improve the available options through negotiation. In India, cross-subsidies between higher-income residential units and low-income groups have helped to secure affordable housing improvements (see, for example, the work of DAWN in Orissa). In Thailand, some communities have constructed a welfare house for the elderly or those in need of special assistance (Boonyabancha 2007). Collective development significantly reduces unit costs in infrastructure installation and housing development.

However, in the present context and despite the advantages, there is continual pressure to individualize collective housing options in the belief that the advantages associated with individualization outweigh the costs. In many cases, this is evidenced as a difference of interests, wherein higher-income residents are content to repay individual loans without having to address collective needs, while the lower-income groups, which require the additional flexibility and support of a group process, are unable to maintain the collective process although it is in their interest.

The limitations of private investment – from private profit to public poverty

The final commonality is perhaps the least well established, but it remains distinct and deserves to be highlighted. The last two decades have emphasized the potential contribution of private finance to address shelter needs. This has been particularly strong in terms of the promotion of investment in public utilities. However, more recently, the importance of private finance being placed within an effective regulatory framework has become much more widely recognized, as have the public costs associated with unregulated pri-

vate finance (von Weizsäcker, Young, and Finger 2005). This clearly has significant implications, particularly in cases where the private sector is being promoted due to a lack of public sector capacity.

Reflecting first on the costs of private investment in housing programs, there is a notable similarity between the Chilean and the South African experiences (Mitlin 2007). In both countries, private sector construction companies have tended to build poor quality housing units located on the periphery of urban centers where land is relatively cheap. A similar problem has emerged from studies in El Salvador of the production of small, complete, low-cost units by private developers, catalyzed by a capital subsidy (Fortín-Magaña 2003). The public costs in terms of the social implications of spatial isolation and, in some cases, measures to alleviate such isolation are borne by the state, or by the low-income citizens if public investment is not forthcoming. In the case of infrastructure, there appears to be a growing recognition of the real limitations of private sector investment. The anticipated efficiency gains have not been secured (Cook and Uchida forthcoming; von Weizsäcker et al. 2005). In addition, and perhaps unlike the case for housing construction, in the case of water utilities the anticipated profits have also not been reached (*Economist* 2004). As a result, private companies such as Thames Water have moved away from direct investment in water utilities in the global South because they now perceive them to be high risk. At the same time, there is increasing interest in subsidy provision, in part due to the perceived inability of private companies to improve access to water services in the way that was intended when private sector involvement was first promoted (Komives et al. 2005). In some cases, efforts have shifted towards greater citizen accountability. But it is equally recognized that such strategies may fail to address the needs of the poorest citizens, who are the least likely to participate in these efforts in part because they have many demands on their time. There is renewed interest in public provision, both through support for local government programs and through support for collectivities of low-income groups.

However, it should be emphasized that, for the most part, this issue remains unresolved—in part because there may be self-interested pressures from the private sector. There is some awareness that the solution does not necessarily lie in either the public or the private sector; several authors have acknowledged that the answer is more likely to lie with a combination of agencies acting within an appropriate governance structure.

CONCLUSION

Shelter remains a priority area for those concerned with addressing urban poverty. The scale of housing need is not disputed and the consequences of poor housing and inadequate access to basic services are widely recognized. At the same time, housing remains on the political agenda of many governments that are anxious to be seen to be doing something to address shelter needs. However, for many decades and despite state efforts, programs have been generally ineffectual in addressing housing need at the required scale. Rather, they have assisted small numbers of people with relatively expensive housing solutions.

A number of new approaches are now evident within the portfolio of housing programs being offered, while other programs represent more well-established strategies. The previous discussion showed how some governments are seeking to address housing need through encouraging measures to improve the affordability of mortgage finance. Conventional strategies to provide housing finance have been boosted (in some countries) by capital subsidies to help ensure affordability. Savings, subsidies, and loans have combined to enable the purchase of completed dwellings. However, in other towns and cities, incremental housing strategies predominate and the direction of programs has been to work within these constraints. Microfinance for shelter has grown very substantially in the last five years and many microfinance agencies have introduced, or are thinking about introducing, housing loan opportunities. Neighborhood upgrading programs for inadequately serviced and often run-down areas are being introduced. Community investment funds are providing new opportunities for collective organizations of low-income residents to address their housing needs with greater access to capital. In some contexts, affordable new neighborhoods are being developed, perhaps with a basic complete core unit and possibilities for further construction.

Also, as argued above, systemic failures have been analyzed by program designers and by critical development analysts. It has been widely recognized that housing interventions have failed to adequately reflect the strategies of low-income residents and their willingness to invest in shelter improvements, producing housing solutions that are ineffective. The failures of state housing policies have also been widely documented and discussed. In this context, a number of underlying directions within programs have been identified. Arguably, each direction or tendency reflects the struggle of government programs to be effective in securing a progressive transformation of

opportunities within the field of shelter. This list does not pretend to be complete but reflects some of the major issues that I have observed. Although it can be argued that there is some progress, there are also limitations and constraints. As a closing thought, there needs to be greater recognition of the need to address shortcomings in housing policy and programming. Paucity of income should no longer be a reason to exclude families from safe and secure housing; the lowest-income groups should no longer be ignored and marginalized; the effects of standards in creating illegality and compounding exclusion need to be addressed; collective decision making and implementation need to be developed to address shelter components that cannot effectively be realized individually; and the public nature of urban space within towns and cities has to be respected. The present generation of housing programs are tackling these issues and/or living with the consequences of failure. As suggested above, some limited progress is being achieved. To meet the housing needs of the twenty-first century, greater efforts need to be made.

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Urban Land Regularization Programs: State of Knowledge

Edesio Fernandes

INTRODUCTION

The gigantic scale of the phenomenon of informal urban land development has been repeatedly confirmed by recent data from all sorts of sources (see Davis 2006). However, the structural nature of the process is still to be fully recognized by policy makers and public administrators at all levels. This chapter aims to present some of the main findings resulting from international research and academic literature on the matter of urban land regularization—not a rosy picture—in an effort to contribute to improving future policies and programs.

The process of informal access to urban land and housing is by no means new; in fact, there are cities with informal settlements that were constituted over a hundred years ago and that still have not been regularized. In Latin America, where some 75% of the people live in urban areas, at least 25% of that urban population live in informal settlements. The process is clearly getting worse at the global level, especially in the current context of rapid urbanization in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Whereas in the past informal land development used to take place mostly in large cities, more recent processes have also been verified in middle-size and small cities. New processes, as well as new variations of old processes, are occurring both in public and private areas.[1]

The serious social, environmental, political, economic, cultural, and legal implications of this growing phenomenon have already been widely discussed, but the centrality of the issue has not yet been properly recognized by governments, international development agencies, and financial institutions. More than ever before, informal development has become the rule of access to urban land and housing, and no longer the exception. It is not a mere symptom of a territorial and socioeconomic development model, or a dysfunctional, isolated aspect of it, but rather has increasingly become the development model itself. Successfully confronting this phenomenon through

1. For an account of life in informal settlements in four countries—Brazil, Kenya, Turkey, and India—see Neuwirth (2005); for an analysis of the South African and Brazilian experiences, see Huchzermeyer and Karam (2006).

both preventive and curative policies and programs is one of the main challenges for policy makers globally, in order to democratize the conditions of access to serviced land in urban areas.

The process of informal access to urban land and housing results from a combination of still little understood reasons, and is itself one of the underlying bases for many other serious problems.[2] Of the main causes, which range from global, macroeconomic factors to local variables, five deserve special mention, namely: the lack of formal options resulting from the nature of land, urban, housing, and fiscal policies; the exclusionary dynamics of formal land markets that do not cater to the urban poor; the long-standing political manipulation of the people living in informal settlements through renewed clientelistic practices; the elitist and technocratic planning systems put in place by local administrations, which fail to take into account both the socioeconomic realities determining the conditions of access to urban land and housing, and the capacity of local administrations to act to implement urban legislation;[3] and last, but not least, the obsolete nature of the legal and judicial systems prevailing in many developing and transitional countries. The importance of the global and macroeconomic factors should not be underestimated, but the fact is that a great deal can be done at the national and especially at the local levels, specifically regarding the formulation of inclusive land and urban policies—and it remains to be done.

Although from an immediatist perspective such informal processes do offer concrete housing alternatives to the urban poor, it is fundamental to stress that, from a broader, more articulated perspective, the combined effects of the phenomenon have been fundamentally harmful to cities produced in such a way, to the overall urban population, and even to the residents in informal settlements themselves, and as such it should not be condoned nor left unquestioned. Above all, despite a commonly held belief assuming otherwise, urban informality is not a cheap option, in that it generates expensive, fragmented cities; requires highly costly regularization programs; and results in increasingly high land prices and services for the people living in informal settlements. In the last analysis, all parties lose (see Fernandes and Smolka 2004).

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2. For an historical analysis of the processes that produced informal development in Brazil, India, and South Africa, see Durand-Lasserve and Royston (2002).
3. For a critical analysis of how planning policies have been responsible for the process of informal land development in India, see Verma (2002).

It should also be mentioned that, especially in the context of countries where the urbanization process has already been consolidated, informal land development has involved not only the urban poor, but also other, more privileged social segments. Moreover, in these countries, the rates of informal development growth have been higher than the rates of poverty growth, thus indicating that there are other significant factors at play, beyond the traditional recourse to poverty growth as the sole cause of informality. In some cases, a true "informal development industry" has been identified, as several agents have indeed financially benefited from the phenomenon.

INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES

Given the lack of acknowledgement of the phenomenon and its implications, most of the institutional responses so far have proved wanting, and there seems to be a growing, dangerous tolerance of the process of informal urban land development. In fact, institutional responses at all levels have not been adequate, generally having fundamental problems of scale and content. Important as they are, UN-HABITAT campaigns and the Millennium Development Goals, as well as existing national, regional, and/or local programs, have been only small drops of change in the vast ocean of informal land development. On the whole, governmental policies and programs have tended to be isolated, fragmented, sectoral, marginal, and seriously underfunded.

In this context, in which adequate responses are urgently necessary, policy makers and public administrators need not, and can no longer afford to, keep reinventing the wheel. Instead, they should learn from the experiences accumulated over about forty years of regularization programs, which already provide enough elements at least to indicate what should *not* be done. In particular, African, Asian, and transitional countries should look closely at Latin America, where the process of urban development has been consolidating for a while. However, even within the same financial institutions and development agencies, there is no organized know-how about dealing with the phenomenon and contradictory responses are often given. All such institutions and agencies need to take stock so as not to keep repeating the same mistakes.

Perhaps the main problem affecting the vast majority of regularization programs is that they have failed to directly confront the nature and causes of the phenomenon and, as a result, they have often generated further distortions in urban land and property markets. Such programs have not intervened in the land structure in a significant way, especially in that they have borne

little relation to other public policies concerning vacant land, underutilized properties, and public land. The programs have not been properly reconciled with the broader set of public land, urban, housing, and fiscal policies, and they have failed to reverse the long-standing, unequal spatial concentration of equipment and services. As such, these policies and programs have failed to break the vicious circle that has long produced informal land development and have failed to reconcile their declared objectives with the necessary processes, mechanisms, resources, and instruments. Very often, they have been the object of political manipulation.

After decades of public investment through regularization programs, there are no adequate assessments of their efficacy, because there are no clear indicators to be observed for that purpose. In any case, there are many elements indicating that there has been a significant waste of limited resources, and that the beneficiaries of the programs have not always been the urban poor living in regularized informal settlements. Among the many inevitable lessons that can be learned, it should be stressed that regularization programs necessarily take time, are complex—jumping stages not being an option—and are intrinsically costly. Indeed, it is easier and cheaper to prevent the process of informal land development from happening. It can also be said with certainty that, given the diversity of the existing situations, there are no automatic, magic, simplistic, or one-size-fits-all answers or solutions.

Given the scale of the problem, not to regularize informal settlements is no longer a valid policy. Moreover, given the lack of proper governmental action over the years, new international and national laws and judicial decisions have consistently affirmed that traditional discretionary policies are not sufficient: there has been an increasing recognition that the communities living in informal settlements have a right to have them regularized, often against the will of the public authorities. Land regularization has become a fundamental element of the widely recognized social right to adequate housing, and in a growing number of judicial cases eviction orders have been conditioned on the offer, by the public authorities or even by private landowners, of acceptable housing alternatives.

LESSONS FROM POLICY MAKERS

The question then is *how* to regularize. As a principle, the conceptual format and institutional design of regularization programs should reflect the answers given by policy makers to three fundamental, interrelated questions, namely: why

should informal settlements be regularized? what is regularization? and what are the objectives of the regularization programs? In this process, policy makers should take into account the need to reconcile the *scale* of intervention with the proposed technical *criteria*, the existing institutional *capacity* for action, the available financial *resources*, and the nature of the *rights* to be recognized to the occupiers.

When discussing why they need to formulate regularization programs, policy makers should determine the terms for the distribution of rights and responsibilities, onuses and obligations among all stakeholders, including the residents, who should participate in all stages of the process. A crucial aspect concerns the responsibility for financing the regularization programs; mechanisms such as planning gains, microcredit instruments, and others should be considered.

Regarding the conceptual definition of what regularization is, there is internationally a dispute of paradigms: whereas some programs have only proposed the upgrading of the informal areas, others have focused merely on the legalization of the areas and individual plots. Ideally, regularization programs should combine several dimensions so as to guarantee the sustainability of the public intervention: physical upgrading; legalization; socioeconomic programs aiming at generating income and jobs; and cultural programs to overcome the stigma strongly attached to the residents and to the informal areas.

When discussing the objectives of the programs, policy makers have commonly referred to the promotion of security of tenure and sociospatial integration as if they were the same thing, or as if one objective would necessarily and automatically follow the other. As many examples in several countries have clearly demonstrated, the recognition of individual security of tenure, if considered in isolation, can lead to the so-called "expulsion by the market" (or by other forces, such as speculators and drug dealers) and thus contribute to aggravating the conditions of sociospatial segregation; by the same token, it is possible to promote sociospatial integration without distributing titles. The challenge then is to conceive a legal-political formula that reconciles individual interests and rights with public interests and obligations, according to which individual security can be assured while at the same time affirming the collective interests to keep the communities in the upgraded and legalized areas; this would guarantee that the main beneficiaries of the public intervention will indeed be the urban poor.

THE MATTER OF LEGALIZATION

In this context, the question of the legalization of informal settlements becomes even more relevant—and complex. Legalization programs are certainly important,

but not for the reasons usually given. The existence of titles is not a requirement for the occupiers to invest in their informal houses and businesses; several studies have clearly shown that the existence of a solid perception of security, resulting from a sociopolitical pact in force, is sufficient for that purpose. Neither is there automatic access to credit resulting from legalization programs, as banks usually do not lend to the poor and do not accept their new titles as collateral; in fact, there are many official programs recognizing access to credit to buy building materials even without titles. Above all, it should be stressed that, although they have certainly improved the residents' living conditions, regularization programs have had no structural impact on social poverty. However, legalization programs are very important to provide protection against forced eviction; minimize civil law conflicts; promote some degree of economic realization of rights as well as of sociopolitical stability; allow for increased taxation; clarify legal (land) regimes and facilitate investments; and so on.[4]

Once again, the question then is *how* to legalize. Policy makers should take into account the three abovementioned questions ("why/what is/what for"), and think not only of the individual interests of the residents in informal settlements, but also of the general interests of the broader urban population. In this larger context, there is a wide range of legal-political options to be considered, individual freehold being one. Individual/collective freehold/leasehold, permits/licences/authorizations, social rental, and so forth—there are many possible choices, which of course will depend on the consideration of the existing realities in each given situation.[5] This is not to say that there is a "continuum of rights," as some rights are not intrinsically better than others—they are the best options only in a given context—and there is no automatic, incremental process leading from a more precarious form of occupation to a freehold title. Moreover, there are urban planning tools to be considered: the Brazilian experience demarcating Special Zones of Social Interest corresponding to areas occupied by the informal settlements has proved to be effective in terms of keeping land and property values low, thus making it possible for the original communities to stay on the legalized land.

Policy makers should not forget that the role and obligation of the state, as recognized in international documents and national laws, is to provide adequate social housing. This is by no means the same as recognizing ownership

4. For a critical analysis of Hernando de Soto's ideas, see Fernandes (2002).
5. For a comparative study involving several different legal-political solutions, see Payne (2002).

titles, let alone individual titles; in fact, especially as regards settlements on public land, individual ownership may not always be the best option. Moreover, given the scale of the phenomenon of informal land development, there is no way it can be tackled only through the attribution of individual ownership titles, and collective legal solutions need to be considered.

CONCLUSION

The main lesson for policy makers and public administrators is that there is an urgent need for integrated and articulated responses, with regularization programs being fully and directly reconciled with other land, urban, housing, and fiscal policies. Traditional bottlenecks need to be overcome, primarily those concerning the need for proper information and cadastres; the lack of institutional capacity to act, especially at the local level; the difficulties with anachronistic registration systems; and the many problems created by the conservative judiciary. Another recurrent issue refers to the "day after," in that in most cases there has been no proper follow-up of the existing programs, nor a continued state presence in the regularized areas.

The ultimate lesson is that the formation of broad and solid sociopolitical pacts is necessary so as to guarantee the success of future regularization programs. Given the scope and gravity of the phenomenon, solutions can be left neither to the market forces alone, nor to the state alone. Proper responses will require national, truly public policies, in which all sectors and stakeholders should be involved, with renewed, but qualified, support from international development agencies and financial institutions. Permanent intergovernmental articulation is fundamental, as is the partnership among the private, community, and voluntary sectors.

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Urban Health: An Inevitable International Imperative

Victor K. Barbiero

INTRODUCTION

The Renaissance in Europe and the industrial revolution in the United States both increased urban and peri-urban growth and influenced global economies and geopolitical power structures. Yet, urbanization enjoys only moderate traction in the global development arena, even though in 2008, over 50% of the world's population will live in urban or peri-urban areas (UNFPA 2007); and of those three-plus billion people, about 50% will be living in urban slums.

Urbanization entails a collision of forces that results in a new environment and requires a fresh look at development assistance in general, particularly in the health sector. This meeting of natural and manmade forces will shape the urban landscape of the future, creating an "urban crucible" that can facilitate or impede both general and health-specific development efforts. Defining the elements of urbanization, and its economic, social, political, demographic, environmental, epidemiologic, and biologic determinants, will enable planners to address better the formidable issues that will affect the success of developing nations throughout the twenty-first century.

WORLD POPULATION GROWTH

Almost all of the population growth worldwide will occur in developing regions (Figure 1). In fact, 97% of the increase in world population will come from developing countries. For example, even in the face of HIV/AIDS, Africa's population will triple before it starts to decline. In the mid-nineteenth century, world population growth was slow; births basically replaced deaths. With the advent of industrialization and advances in medicine and public health, death rates began to decline and more people survived to have children of their own. The widening gap between birth and death rates fueled population growth worldwide to an estimated 6.55 billion today (US Census Bureau 2006), and an expected 10 billion in the next century.

Most of the growth in developing countries will be in urban and/or peri-urban centers. Within those areas, much of the growth will be in urban

slums. Movement to the cities will become increasingly routine, as industrialization spreads and opportunities for skilled and unskilled labor increase. Pull from the urban areas and push from the rural areas is inevitable and will create a set of issues that will affect the health and welfare of billions of people. Objective recognition of urban momentum, preparation for its consequences, and learning from some of the "best practices" today will help nations, municipalities, communities, and families to better manage urban population growth and mitigate its adverse impacts.

Figure 1. World Population, 1750–2100 (in millions)



Source: http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/soc101y/brym/powerpoint/LEC14population.ppt

TRANSITIONS

The Demographic Transition

The demographic transition characteristically has four stages (Figure 2). Stage one presents high birth and death rates, which provide for slow, stable growth. Stage two witnesses declining death rates with continuing high birth rates and accelerated population growth. Stage three forecasts declining birth and death rates with continued increasing population growth. Stage four arrives with low death rates with fluctuating birth rates and a stable population. Africa, for instance, is in the second stage and moving toward stage three. There are profound development implications of this transition. First, the demographic momentum implies continued births by more parents, even though fertility may decline; there will simply be more people having babies.

Second, age structures will begin to change, and more Africans will be in older segments of the population. Health care issues will likewise change and a greater need will emerge for chronic disease management.

Given the high rates of urban growth, planners, politicians, and public health experts have much to consider. Sound management of the demographic transition will require an in-depth assessment of future health (and other) costs for a growing and aging population. Over the next twenty-five years, governments, donors, and nongovernmental actors will have to find an effective and operational balance between the infectious disease burdens of the poor and the growing proportion of noncommunicable diseases affecting older populations, rich and poor, in both rural and urban areas. Leaders must consider practical policies and programs to stabilize population and cope with the inevitable repercussions of the demographic transition.

Figure 2. The Demographic Transition



Source: http://www.globalchange.umich.edu/globalchange2/current/lectures/human_pop/human_pop.html

The Epidemiologic Transition

Akin to the demographic transition, the epidemiologic transition is progressing in the developed and developing world alike. Simply defined, the epi-

demiologic transition is a shift from infectious diseases to chronic, noncommunicable diseases as the major causes of morbidity and mortality. In 1971, A. R. Omran (1971) eloquently defined three phases of the epidemiologic transition: the "age of pestilence and famine," the "age of receding pandemics," and the "age of degenerative and manmade diseases." Worldwide, chronic diseases cause about 60% of all deaths (Figure 3). The less developed and middle-income countries thus face a double burden because both infectious and chronic diseases will continue to cause significant mortality and morbidity; over the next twenty-five to fifty years this will overburden unprepared health systems. Nations in the North and South must collectively recognize this impending public health quagmire and begin new efforts to mitigate the adverse health impacts associated with the epidemiologic transition. Clearly the governments of the less developed countries cannot, and should not, bear the burden alone. A new paradigm of public-private partnership is in order. The two sectors should further define specific roles of government, nongovernmental/nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in the delivery of care and true partnerships should be nurtured and enabled.

Figure 3. Global Chronic Disease Profile



Source: WHO, 2005

The Nutrition Transition

In October 2004, the BBC reported:

> Obesity rates are escalating everywhere. More than 300 million adults worldwide are overweight and most of them are suffering from weight-related illnesses like diabetes, heart disease and sleeping disorders. . . . The developed and developing world will not be able to cope with treating people with diseases linked to obesity. (Lichtarowicz 2004)

The demographic and epidemiologic transitions are pre- or at least co-factors in the nutrition transition (and links to the urban transition are also clear; see below). The twentieth century witnessed large shifts in dietary behavior, physical activity, food consumption, and the types of foods available. The consumption of saturated fats, sugar, and processed foods characterized the nutrition transition in wealthier countries; an increase in the body mass index of populations and consequent increases in overweight and obesity followed. Some countries, such as the United States, now have more than 30% of the adult population overweight (CDC 2007). Worldwide trends indicate that less developed countries are experiencing growing proportions of overweight and obesity as well. Higher rates of overweight are observed there in the upper socioeconomic tiers, but increasingly poorer populations are also at risk; the prevalence of overweight in children has increased in Brazil, China, and Zambia (Popkin and Gordon-Larsen 2004). The association of overweight and obesity with chronic disorders such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease is clear, and the urban environment is the nexus of these trends in developing countries, particularly among wealthier populations. Low- and middle-income countries present a direct relationship between socioeconomic status, overweight, and obesity. In some respects, rising affluence and industrialization in poor countries promotes poor nutrition. Once again, the urban environment is the springboard. Thus, planners must strive to address the nutrition transition in the twenty-first century and appropriately balance investments in under- and overnutrition in the future.

THE URBAN TRANSITION

Urban Growth

As noted above, about 50% of the world's population will live in urban and peri-urban areas by 2008 (Figure 4). By 2020, over 60% of the world will be

urbanized, with over 30% of the population living in cities with more than one million residents (Figure 5). Characteristically, urban environments grow at higher rates than rural areas due to migration plus natural rates of increase. On average, urban growth is about 4%–5% worldwide; this implies a doubling time of about fourteen to seventeen years. Much of this growth will be in slum populations, which comprise 40%–60% of urban environs worldwide. Tens of millions of the undeserved will populate these slums. From the sprawling barrios of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, to the informal housing of Kibera in Nairobi, to the shadow city of Dharvi in the heart of Mumbai, to the industrial meccas of China and the glistening towers of Kuala Lampur and New York City—the momentum is irresistible.

By 2030, the populations of Nairobi, Johannesburg, and Abidjan could exceed ten million, and seventy-seven African cities could have populations greater than one million (Mosha 2001). The greatest growth in urban centers will be in Asia and Africa; from Shanghai to Lagos, the writing is on the wall (Figure 6). Furthermore, urban sprawl and the emergence of urban agglomerates must be considered (Figure 7). For example, the population within the city limit of Lagos today is 8.9 million; by 2015, greater Lagos could have a population of 23.2 million people. Given the projected urban doubling time, greater Lagos could have more than 46 million by 2040, with Dhaka, Karachi, and Jakarta not far behind.

The Urban Crucible and Health Challenges

The urban setting is a crucible in many respects, as various elements of ecology and environment collide and interact to form new cultural, social, epidemiological, economic, and organizational processes (Figures 7 and 8). Diarrheal and respiratory diseases, vaccine-preventable diseases, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and vector-borne diseases will continue to persist and spread in urban areas worldwide. In addition, noncommunicable illnesses, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease, as well as illnesses resulting from environmental and social conditions, such as indoor air pollution, obesity, injuries, and gun violence, will also increase in all urban environments and across all economic quintiles.

The data are clear: urban agglomerates will grow rapidly, and almost all of that growth will be in low- and middle-income countries. In urban areas, slum populations will increase both naturally and by immigration. These populations will continue to suffer from infectious diseases and undernutrition,

Figure 4. The Urban Transition



Source: UNFPA 2007

Figure 5. World Population and Urban Growth, 1950–2020



Source: http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/soc101y/brym/powerpoint/LEC14population.ppt

Figure 6. Top 11 Urban Populations - City Limits -

City	Population
Shanghai	14.6
Mumbai	12.7
Karachi	11.6
Buenos Aires	11.6
Delhi	10.9
Manila	10.5
Moscow	10.4
Seoul	10.4
São Paulo	10.2
Istanbul	9.8
Lagos	8.9

Figure 7. Selected Agglomerate Doubling Times From 2015

Bombay: 26.1 million; 2.4% - 2X = 29.2 yrs
Lagos: 23.2 million; 3.6% - 2X = 19.4 yrs
Dhaka: 21.1 million; 3.6% - 2X = 19.4 yrs
Karachi: 19.2 million; 3.2%- 2X = 21.9 yrs
Jakarta: 17.3 million; 3.0% - 2X = 23.3 yrs
Calcutta: 17.3 million; 1.9%- 2X = 36.8 yrs

Source: United Nations (1999); Bloem, Moench-Pfanner, and Panagides (2003)

as well as illnesses resulting from water shortages and inadequate sanitation. The urban environment will also contribute to infectious disease syndemicity. Syndemicity implies a synergistic effect of linked health problems that not only contributes to increased disease burdens, but also gives rise to a new set of challenges. These challenges may relate to drug resistance, such as extremely-drug-resistant tuberculosis resulting from the interface of HIV and TB, or more severe respiratory disease due to the combined effect of indoor air pollution and pneumococcal disease. In both these cases, as well as others, the urban crucible will contribute to the breadth of syndemic effects and compound disease burdens worldwide.

Urban social structures are also changing. The urban environment often magnifies poverty, disparity, and desperation and causes stress on families and psychosocial health in general. Mental health issues will likely expand in the future and become more evident. Out-of-school youth may give rise to a

generation of ill-educated and potentially violent adults. Gangs are beginning to replace families in larger South American cities, promoting expanded levels of gun, gender, and household violence. Behavioral norms are changing, for the worse in many respects.

Presently, noncommunicable diseases cause about 44% of the disease burden in low- and middle-income countries; by 2030, that proportion will increase to 54% (WHO 2005). There are a number of myths associated with chronic disease epidemiology and transmission: chronic diseases are not only diseases of the affluent and elderly; economic growth alone will not improve health conditions; and infectious disease models do not apply to chronic disease. The poor suffer from cancer, obstructive pulmonary disease, stroke, and cardiovascular disease as well as the rich. Overnutrition and its consequences burden the poor in developed countries and the wealthy in developing countries. We must evolve new and innovative approaches to address chronic disease burdens in the urban environment and to ensure equity and effect regardless of socioeconomic status. The poor in urban slums will suffer most, and their growing demographic will put hundreds of millions at risk and test the resilience of fragile political and service delivery systems.

Figure 8. The Urban Crucible



Source: Barbiero 2006

Urban Health Opportunities

The Urban Advantage

The urban crucible presents new challenges to be sure, but also potentially new solutions. Physical proximity of services to large numbers of the undeserved could facilitate service delivery by public and nongovernmental institutions. Resources, both public and private, already exist in the urban environment and enjoy political recognition and leverage. Mass media (print, radio, and television) have wide reach in urban centers. The wireless revolution and the ubiquity of cell phones may enhance communication and support for information regarding health campaigns, health days, and health risks. Urban environments also may have cohorts and social groups that are early adopters of change. Perhaps most important, urban environs have a middle class and formal sector that support commerce, promote stability, and anticipate change for the better. University students, teachers, merchants, and other members of a burgeoning middle class want positive change and will promote laws and policies that benefit themselves as well as lower-income populations. Access by the poor to public services is characteristically lower than access by the rich; therefore municipalities should consider pro-poor policies that maximize basic preventive and curative care for undeserved populations. Access, information, health incentives, media messages, informal sector health provider mobilization, civil society engagement, and corporate support of community services (beyond their own workforce) should be encouraged. Pro-poor policies must target equitable access to and quality of services for the lower economic quintiles of the urban population.

Public-Private Partnerships

Quasi-accessible public and private referral networks also already exist. Strengthening these primary and secondary service delivery sites through innovative public-private sector programming, such as franchising secondary and tertiary facilities to expand referral care and chronic disease management, tiered pricing schemes for medicines and medical equipment via insurance and/or health maintenance organizations, might be considered. Local and international pharmaceutical companies might provide drug subsidies for branded drugs, increase the production and distribution of generics for the urban poor, and invest in primary and secondary facility-based services. The public sector might consider expanding fees for services that are traditionally free, such as immunizations and family planning targeting populations in urban centers with more

expendable income. Municipalities could consider policies to guarantee that fees generated at specific facilities be retained by those facilities. Municipalities might also provide in-kind and/or cash incentives for care providers and promote improved and sustained services through increased annual budgets and expenditures for recurrent costs. However, lower economic quintiles of urban populations will require special consideration.

Programmatic Economies of Scale in the Urban Environment

Figure 9 portrays a Venn diagram that illustrates significant economies of scale for programming in the urban environment. The very nature of the urban crucible argues for this model. The approach anchors common support elements within major programming investment areas. For purposes of illustration, we use HIV/AIDS, malaria, and maternal and child health/reproductive health/family planning (MCH/RH/FP). This approach can maintain direct and attributable results from each funding stream, but allow cost sharing in a "wrap-around" manner to cross-cut interventions that would serve the urban environment as well as broader programming investments. Common support elements include: health management information systems (HMIS); monitoring and evaluation (M&E), surveillance (Surv); mass media (e.g., radio)/IEC; infrastructure; logistics and supply chain management (SCM); public-private partnerships (PPP); management/administrative skill building; and policy dialogue. The approach clearly embraces the concept that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. For urbanization, this could be a welcome model because it would enable funds to be channeled to urban environments, yet support major health development areas. This model could be modified to include chronic disease prevention and management as well as to target urban slum populations.

CALLS TO ACTION

Acknowledge the transition

The development community must fully acknowledge urban momentum and the urban health imperative. There are points of no return regarding the urban transition and leaders worldwide need to address the plight of the urban poor. Public health professions have to consider infectious and chronic disease interventions as part of the urban crucible. The double, triple, and quadruple burden (infectious, chronic, nutritional, injury/trauma) that urban dwellers will face in the future must be better understood.

Figure 9. Urban Portfolio Program Integration



Legend: VCT = voluntary counseling and testing; OVC = orphans and vulnerable children; HRD = human resource development; HMIS = health management information systems; M&E = monitoring and evaluation; Surv = surveillance; IEC = information, education, communication; SCM = supply chain management; PPP = public-private partnerships; Mgt = management; EPI/DDC/ARI/Nut/MH = expanded program for immunization/diarrheal disease control/acute respiratory infection/nutrition/maternal health; ITNs = insecticide treated nets; IPT = intermittent therapy.

Source: Barbiero 2007

Build a global strategy

A new global strategy for urban health is in order. WHO, the World Bank, the United Nations, other multilateral donors, and key bilateral donors should formulate priorities for urban health interventions and identify seminal lessons learned from existing programs and projects. The strategy should account for regional variations, but identify consistencies of the challenge and vulnerable populations. The strategy could build upon the UNFPA (2007) *State of the World Population 2007* report. Expanded attention to and investment in urban health will save millions of lives in the future.

Lessons from the field

There are a number of lessons from the field that should be explored further and evaluated relative to their replication/application potential; for example, the role of multilateral drug companies in the control of neglected tropical diseases. BRAC (Building Resources Across Communities; formerly known as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) in health, the Grameen Bank in microfinancing (health), and the Public Health Foundation of India (Harvard University 2006) all promote public-private partnerships to address urban and rural health issues.

Linkage of major programs / economies of scale

Links should be forged with major health programs—such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), and others dealing with maternal and child health/reproductive health/family planning, TB, and infectious diseases—to increase their impact. There are cross-cutting issues, such as communication, laboratory support, referral care, and NGO/private sector engagement, that can be maximized in the urban environment.

Mainstream urban health

The realities regarding urbanization relate to the "face of poverty." While pro-rich policies are issued from Washington to Mumbai, the poor suffer constantly, and the urban poor suffer the most. Urbanization and urban health should be mainstreamed on the development agenda of all multi- and bilateral organizations to recognize the urban imperative and maximize the opportunities therein.

Expand public-private partnerships

An active nurturing of practical, public-private partnerships is in order. Addressing urban health requires robust and honest policy dialogue among the public and private stakeholders. Governments, donors, civil society, and not-for-profit and for-profit institutions need to define a common ground in the urban environment. Collectively each must develop medium- and long-term plans to serve vulnerable urban populations in an effective and sustainable manner.

Implement "demonstration" projects

Host governments and donors should design and implement "urban demonstration programs" in selected countries with appropriate resources and considerable support (i.e., up to ~$10M/yr/program). The programs should focus on specific vulnerabilities such as maternal and child health, the epidemiological transition, and salient policy priorities such as budget, equitable access, quality, and cost recovery. These programs should help enunciate an urban development "vision" that is anchored in better health, but transcends health to other sectors such as housing, governance, and infrastructure.

SUMMARY

The messages are exceedingly clear. Urbanization is inevitable and the demographic, epidemiological, and nutritional transitions are already underway. Billions of people will be negatively affected in the twenty-first century unless action is taken now. Urban population growth routinely exceeds rural growth in most countries and the majority of urban growth will be in slum and disadvantaged populations. Growth in small and medium-sized cities will outpace megalopolises, with growth rates higher than 3% and doubling times less than twenty-five years. If not addressed, multiple disease burdens will plague the poor and fuel disparity, discontent, and instability.

In order to meet future needs, the urban imperative and the window of opportunity associated with the epidemiologic transition must be recognized. Ominously, that window is rapidly closing. The world can ill-afford complacency, indecision, or neglect regarding urbanization and urban health. Development professionals, and particularly public health professionals, must embrace the vision of improved urban health before it is too late.

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IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: NEW APPROACHES TO URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE

Urban Planning and Twenty-First Century Cities: Can It Meet the Challenge?[1]

Vanessa Watson

INTRODUCTION

The joint meeting of the World Planners Congress and the UN-HABITAT World Urban Forum, in Vancouver in June 2006, signified a major shift in global thinking about the future of cities. There were two important aspects to this shift. The first was a recognition that by 2007, for the first time in history, the majority of the world's population will live in cities, and in future years most of all new global population growth will be in cities in the "developing" world. The second important insight was that the rate and scale of this growth, coupled with impending issues such as climate change and resource depletion, posed massively serious problems in the cities of the global South, and required specific intervention if large-scale urban disaster was to be avoided. In a somewhat unexpected shift away from prevailing assumptions that either "the market" or "local communities" would ultimately provide corrective mechanisms in problematic cities, UN-HABITAT identified urban planning as the primary mechanism through which these major issues of urban development will have to be addressed. In effect, UN-HABITAT was suggesting that urban planning should be fundamentally reviewed to see if it was able to play a role in addressing issues in rapidly growing and poor cities. UN-HABITAT Executive Director Anna Tibaijuka (2006) called on planning practitioners to develop a different approach that is pro-poor and inclusive, and that places the creation of livelihoods at the center of planning efforts.

1. This chapter is based on work commissioned by UN-HABITAT in 2006–2007, as an input to the 2009 UN global report on the future of planning.

The reasons why systems of urban planning have been less than adequate in addressing issues in the cities of the global South are complex and cannot always be blamed on planning itself. Yet the fact remains that in most of these regions the planning systems in place have been either inherited from previous colonial governments or have been adopted from northern contexts to suit particular local political and ideological ends. In many cases these planning systems and approaches have remained unchanged over a long period of time, even though the contexts in which they operate have changed significantly. Of equal concern is the fact that most ideas about planning continue to originate in the global North and, while assuming a high degree of universality, are in fact responses to the often rather particular conditions of advanced capitalism and Western liberalism. The assumptions about the context of planning underlying these approaches frequently do not hold either in their area of origin or in other parts of the world.

The aim of this chapter is to show the significant gap that has emerged between the kinds of issues currently confronting cities and the nature of the planning systems in use in many parts of the world. I will argue that far from being a tool through which equitable and sustainable cities can be achieved, planning has more commonly been used as a means of social and spatial exclusion and the entrenching of inequities. The particular approach to planning still surprisingly prevalent is that of old-style master planning, involving systems of "top-down" land use regulation and control. When twinned, as it has been, with an approach to the built environment termed "urban modernism," then the outcome has been cities that operate largely in favor of a small but economically and politically dominant elite. At the same time, master planning has been used, particularly in the global South, to selectively control or exclude a vast and rapidly growing urban population of slum dwellers.

This chapter will also examine shifts that have occurred in some parts of the world to new forms of urban planning, to explore the possibility that these emerging forms might meet the challenge posed by UN-HABITAT. I will argue that these largely process-focussed approaches may go a long way towards addressing the technocratic and bureaucratic problems of master planning, but as long as they fail to address the outcomes of these processes and fail to challenge the inappropriateness of urban modernist forms, then their impact might be minimal.

The chapter will first review the changing urban context within which urban planning will have to operate. It will then discuss the strange persistence

of master planning and the nature of the impact it has had on these current urban conditions. The next part of the chapter examines some of the newer planning approaches and assesses their likely usefulness. The conclusion will give an indication of the qualities that new approaches to planning must have if they are to play any role in the emerging urban landscape.

THE NEW URBAN CONTEXT FOR PLANNING: HUMAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The 2003 UN report, *The Challenge of Slums* (UN-HABITAT 2003), as well as the World Urban Forum of 2006, played an important role in drawing attention to what has been termed a global demographic transition. While the period 1950–75 saw population growth more or less evenly divided between the urban and rural areas of the world, since then the balance has tipped dramatically in favor of urban growth. In 2007, for the first time in history, the majority of the world's population will live in cities, and in the years to come 90% of all new global population growth will be in cities. Significantly, however, the bulk of this growth will be taking place in the global South and East. Currently 82% of the world's population lives in these regions and by 2050 this figure will have risen to 87%. A rapidly growing proportion of this population will be urban: in 1950 less than 20% of the population of poor countries lived in cities and towns, but by 2030 this will have risen to 60% (National Research Council 2003).

This transition is presenting urban management and planning with issues that have never been faced before. Urban growth will be rapid, less so in Latin America, which is already highly urbanized, but very much so in Africa and Asia, which are currently less urbanized. Further, certain cities will attain sizes that have not been experienced before: new megacities of over eight million and hypercities of over twenty million are predicted. The bulk of new urban growth, however, is predicted to occur in smaller settlements[2] of one hundred thousand to two hundred and fifty thousand, which have absorbed much of the rural labor force made redundant by post-1979 market reforms (Davis 2004) and continuing adverse terms of world trade in the agricultural sector. Although megacities present management problems of their own, it is the smaller cities that suffer particularly from a lack of planning and services to deal with growth.

2. This is not the case everywhere. Beauchemin and Bocquier (2004) show that secondary towns in West Africa are hardly growing as people migrate to larger settlements.

Compounding all of the above, this rapid urban growth is taking place in those parts of the world least able to cope: in terms of the ability of governments to provide urban infrastructure, in terms of the ability of urban residents to pay for such services, and in terms of coping with natural disasters. It is these parts of the world where the highest levels of poverty and unemployment are to be found. The inevitable result has been the rapid growth of urban "slums," referring to physically and environmentally unacceptable living conditions in informal settlements and in usually older inner-city and residential areas. The 2003 UN-HABITAT report claimed that 32% of the world's urban population (924 million people in 2001) currently lives in slums on extremely low incomes, and are directly affected by both environmental disasters and social crises. The fact that some of the most densely settled poorer parts of the world are also in coastal zones and will thus be subject to rise in sea level with climate change adds a further dimension to this.

The issue of urbanizing poverty is particularly severe in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, given that the bulk of urbanization is taking place under different global economic conditions than those that prevailed in Latin America and even in much of Asia. Here urbanization is occurring for the most part in the absence of industrialization and under much lower rates of economic growth: in effect urbanization has been decoupled from economic development. Urban growth rates are also more rapid here than elsewhere (1990–2000: Africa, 4.1%; Asia, 3.3%; Latin America, 2.3%; Roberts, 2006). But they are due primarily to natural increase rather than rural-urban migration: 75% of urban growth is from this source, compared to 50% in Asia in the 1980s (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004). The inevitable consequences have been that urban poverty and unemployment are extreme, living conditions are particularly bad, and survival is supported predominantly by the informal sector, which tends in many parts to be survivalist rather than entrepreneurial.

Within towns and cities, sociospatial change seems to have taken place primarily in the direction of the fragmentation, separation, and specialization of functions and uses, with labor market polarization (and hence income inequality) reflected in major differences between wealthier and poorer areas. Marcuse (2006) contrasts up-market gentrified and suburban areas with tenement zones, ethnic enclaves, and ghettos; and areas built for the advanced service and production sector and luxury retail and entertainment with older areas of declining industry, sweatshops, and informal businesses. Although much of this represents the playing out of "market forces" in cities, and the logic of real estate and land

speculation, it is also a response to local policies that have attempted to position cities globally and attract new investment. "Competitive city" approaches to urban policy aim to attract global investment, tourists, and a residential elite through up-market property developments, waterfronts, convention centers, and the commodification of culture and heritage (Kipfer and Keil 2002). However, such policies have also had to suppress and contain the fallout from profit-driven development: surveillance of public spaces, policing and crime-prevention efforts, immigration control, and problems of social and spatial exclusion. Work by Caldiera (2000) in Brazil shows how fear has increased urban fragmentation as middle- and upper-income households segregate themselves into "gated" and high-security residential complexes.

In many poorer cities, spatial forms are largely driven by the efforts of low-income households to secure land that is affordable and in a reasonable location. This process is leading to entirely new urban (*ruralopolitan*) forms as the countryside itself begins to urbanize, as in vast stretches of rural India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, China, Indonesia, Egypt, Rwanda, and many other poorer countries (see Qadeer 2004). As well, large cities spread out and incorporate nearby towns leading to continuous belts of settlement (such as the shantytown corridor from Abidjan to Ibadan, containing seventy million people and making up the urban agglomeration of Lagos [Davis 2004]), and as the poor seek a foothold in the areas primarily on the urban edge. It is these sprawling urban peripheries, almost entirely unserviced and unregulated, that make up the bulk of what is termed slum settlement, and it is in these areas that the most urban growth is taking place. These kinds of areas are impossibly costly to plan and service in the conventional way, given the form of settlement, and even if that capacity did exist, few could afford to pay for such services. In fact the attractiveness of these kinds of locations for poor households is that they can avoid the costs associated with formal and regulated systems of urban land and service delivery. Because of this, however, it is in these areas that environmental issues are particularly critical, both in terms of the natural hazards to which these settlements are exposed and the environmental damage that they cause.

These processes of urbanization and sociospatial change have been shaped by global forces that have had an impact on urban development everywhere. However, such change can never be attributed only to wider structural forces, since these forces articulate in various ways with local histories, cultures, and environmental contexts, resulting in highly differentiated patterns of urban development and change across the globe.

New economic processes have had a major impact on urban labor markets, which show a growing polarization of occupational and income structures (and hence growing income inequality) caused by growth in producer services and decline in manufacturing. Urban labor markets are also increasingly heterogeneous and volatile, and urban residents are disproportionately affected by international economic crises (National Research Council 2003, 7). The growth of informality, discussed above, has been one important outcome of these economic and policy processes. The concept is by no means new, yet there are strong indications that its nature has changed and its scale has increased over the last few decades. Researchers point to new processes of polarization within the informal economy, with informal entrepreneurs moving into sectors abandoned by the public and formal private sectors, but many as well swelling the ranks of "survivalist" activities.

In the realm of government, formal urban planning systems are typically located within the public sector with local government usually the most responsible tier. Within the last three or so decades, and closely linked to processes of globalization, there have been significant transformations in local government in many parts of the world, making them very different settings from those within which planning was originally conceived.

Since the late 1990s "good governance" has become the mantra for development in the South. These shifts have had profound implications for urban planning, which has often been cast as a relic of the old welfare-state model (in fact the emergence of planning can be closely linked to a Keynesian approach to development, which was state-led and strongly reinforced in Europe by the requirements of postwar reconstruction), and as an obstacle to economic development and market freedom. In a context in which the power of governments to direct urban development has diminished with the retreat of Keynesian economics, and in which the new central actors in urban development are real estate investors and developers, whose activities are often linked to economic boosterism, planning has found itself to be unpopular and marginalized. It has also found itself at the heart of contradictory pressures on local government to promote urban economic competitiveness on the one hand, while on the other dealing with the fallout from globalization in the form of growing social exclusion, poverty, unemployment, and rapid population growth, often in a context of unfunded mandates and severe local government capacity constraints (Beall 2002).

Generally urban planning is highly reliant on the existence of stable, effective, and accountable local government, as well as a strong civil society, in order to play a positive role. Significant parts of the global South simply do not have this (Devas 2001). Certainly the notion of a stable and homogeneous civil society with a common worldview, able to debate planning alternatives and reach sustained consensus, has been challenged more generally (Watson 2006) and particularly in the context of sub-Saharan Africa (Watson 2002).

In cities in both the global North and South, societal divisions have been increasing, partly as a result of international migration streams and the growth of ethnic minority groups in cities, and partly because of growing income and employment inequalities that have intersected with ethnicity and identity in various ways (Yiftachel 1998). From a wide-ranging review of the literature on social movements in developing countries, Walton (1998) argues that despite the growth of social movements and moves to democratization, participation is still mediated more typically by patron–client relations rather than by popular activism. Researchers also point to the extent to which urban crime and violence have brought about a decline in social cohesion and an increase in conflict and insecurity (National Research Council 2003). Growth in violent crime, often supported by increasingly organized and well-networked drug and arms syndicates and fueled by growing poverty and inequality, have eroded the possibilities of building social capital in poorer communities. Conducting participatory planning in situations such as these can be extremely difficult.

Hence towns and cities are now faced with a range of urban sociospatial and environmental issues and trends that are relatively new in the sense that most have only emerged in the last twenty to thirty years. Future urban planning, particularly but not only in the global South, will be taking place in a context of severe inequality and poverty, high levels of informal economic activity, fractured civil societies, and weakened local governments, and in the face of severe environmental threats. However, in many parts of the world, urban planning systems have changed little over the past several decades. The next section turns to this issue.

The emergence and persistence of "master" planning

Modern town planning emerged in Europe and North America in the latter part of the nineteenth century largely in response to the appearance of rapidly growing, chaotic, and polluted cities in the industrializing world. Its later adoption as a state function, however, can be attributed to the rise of the modern interven-

tive state and Keynesian economics. Urban "visions" put forward by particular individuals (the "founding fathers" of planning) in the UK, Europe, and the United States in this early period were to shape the objectives and forms of planning, which in turn showed remarkable resilience throughout the twentieth century. Although there have been some shifts in approaches to planning in its regions of origin, in many other parts of the world imported planning approaches and systems have remained static or have changed very slowly. So while it has always been possible to question the appropriateness of "developed world" planning in countries of the global South, there is now often an extreme disjuncture between persisting traditional planning approaches and the very different and rapidly changing nature of cities and towns in these parts of the world.

Taylor (1998) identifies a number of essential components of planning in the early years. The first was that it was seen as an exercise in the physical layout and design of human settlements and hence, although it responded to social, economic, or political matters, it was not seen as the task of planning to intervene in these matters. Planning was therefore seen as a technical activity to be carried out by trained experts without the involvement of politicians or communities. The second characteristic was that it necessarily involved the production of master plans, blueprint plans,[3] or layout plans, showing a detailed view of the built form of a city once it attained its ideal end-state. The third characteristic was that such planning was viewed as a normative task, that is, it should be driven by a particular set of values that described the ideal living environment and which, it was held (by planners), reflected the "public good." Broadly, however, values tended to be quite specific to the time and place in which they were formulated. For example, early British town planning was strongly influenced by radical and utopian socialism of the time and a nostalgic longing for the village life of medieval England. One of the most influential planning forms of the time, Ebenezer Howard's Garden City, represented an attempt to recreate this village life through bringing "green" back into towns made up of winding roads and separate cottage residences, and through controlling the size and growth of the town. The objectives here were twofold: social—the preservation of a traditional way of life that was essentially antiurban; and aesthetic—bringing the beauty of the countryside into the towns (Taylor 1998).

3. The term "blueprint" is borrowed from architecture and refers to the final and fully detailed design that an architect would produce for a building.

The close partner to the master plan was the development control system or zoning scheme. If the master plan was the "creative" and forward-looking vision of the city, then the zoning scheme was the primary legal tool through which it would be implemented. The concept of land use zoning originated in Germany and was adopted with great enthusiasm across the United States and Europe in the early part of the twentieth century. It usually carried with it a particular view of urban form (in keeping with the visions of the early planners) and was enthusiastically adopted by middle and commercial classes who were able to use it as a way of maintaining property prices and preventing the invasion of "less desirable," lower-income residents, ethnic minorities, and tradespeople. At the time it was noted that the supposed "public good" objective of planning had been turned into a tool by the wealthy to protect their property values and exclude the poor.

In considering the wider impact of planning's development in Europe and the United States, the form of plans (detailed, static master plans or comprehensive plans), their method of production (technocratic, top-down), and their legal tools (primarily zoning) comprise one part of the picture. Particularly important as well were the physical/spatial urban forms that these plans carried with them, and the ideal of a "good city" that they represented. Clearly apparent in these urban forms are the (often intertwined) visions of the "founding fathers" of planning, and the normative values that inspired them: aesthetics (order, harmony, formality, and symmetry), efficiency (functional specialization of areas and movement, and free flow of traffic), and modernization (slum removal, vertical building, connectivity, open space). Together these processes and forms were to shape towns and cities throughout the world during the twentieth century.

The ideas and practices were spread in a number of different ways. Ward (2002) offers a typology of the transfer of planning ideas, along dimensions of authoritarianism, contestation, and consensus (in short: imposition); and synthesis, selection, and uncritical reception (borrowing). He argues that the nature of the power relationship between exporting and importing country is a major determining factor, with colonialism and conquest giving rise to imposition of foreign planning systems, while a more equal relationship between countries sees planning ideas transported through other means: travelling planning consultants, politicians, or other influential people, or scholarly articles and books. This process of diffusion was never smooth or simple: the ideas themselves were often varied and contested, and they articulated in different ways with the contexts into which they were imported.

A central argument here will be that in many parts of the world planning systems are in place that have been imposed or borrowed from elsewhere and in some cases these "foreign" ideas have not changed significantly since the time they were imported. Planning systems and urban forms are inevitably based on particular assumptions about the time and place for which they were designed, but these assumptions often do not hold in other parts of the world and thus these systems and ideas are often inappropriate (and now often dated, too) in the context into which they have been transplanted. Frequently, as well, these imported ideas have been drawn on for reasons of political, ethnic, or racial domination and exclusion rather than in the interests of good planning.

Colonialism was a very direct vehicle for diffusing planning systems, particularly in those parts of the world under colonial rule when planning was ascendant. In these contexts planning of urban settlements was frequently bound up with the "modernizing and civilizing" mission of colonial authorities, and also with the control of urbanization processes and of the urbanizing population. On the African continent this diffusion occurred mainly through British, German, French, and Portuguese influence, using their home-grown instruments of master planning, zoning, building regulations, and the urban models of the time—garden cities, neighborhood units, and Radburn Layouts, and later urban modernism. Most colonial and later postcolonial governments also initiated a process of the commodification of land within the liberal tradition of private property rights, with the state maintaining control over the full exercise of these rights, including aspects falling under planning and zoning ordinances.

Planning therefore was, and still is, used as a tool of social segregation and exclusion. It reached a highly sophisticated form in South Africa where planning tools became the central mechanism for the apartheid government, post-1948, to achieve racially segregated cities. Israel/Palestine is another case where planning had been used to achieve Jewish ethnic domination over the Arab minority, through new Jewish settlement building, Arab land expropriation, and the selective use of planning permissions (see Yiftachel 1998). Many African countries still have planning legislation based on British or European planning laws from the 1930s or 1940s, and which has been revised only marginally. Postcolonial governments tended to reinforce and entrench colonial spatial plans and land management tools, sometimes in even more rigid form than colonial governments (Njoh 2003). Enforcing freehold title for land and doing away with indigenous and communal forms of tenure was a necessary basis for state land

management, but also a source of state revenue and often a political tool to reward supporters. Frequently postcolonial political elites who promoted these tenure reforms were strongly supported in this by former colonial governments, foreign experts, and international policy agencies: in 1950 the UN passed a resolution on land reform contending that informal and customary land tenures inhibited economic growth. In Cameroon, for example, 1974 legislation required people to apply for a land certificate for private land ownership. The procedures were complex and expensive and seldom took less than seven years to complete. Few people applied, yet in 1989 the certificate became the only recognized proof of land ownership and all other customary or informal rights to land were nullified (Njoh 2003).

Notably, the most common criticism of master plans is that they bear so little relation to the reality of rapidly growing and poor cities, or are grounded in legislation that is so outdated that they are not implemented or are ignored (see Arimah and Adeagbo 2000). However, as long as the provisions are in place, they can be (and often are) selectively mobilized to achieve particular sectoral or political interests, or to influence the land use and development of some parts of cities in ways that may be exclusionary. Their persistence may also block broader public debate or action on the need for new and more appropriate planning systems. For these reasons a sound critique needs to be developed. There are three aspects of persistent master planning of relevance here: the urban form of modernism that it tends to promote; the regulatory tools of land use zoning; and the institutional processes through which master plans are produced.

Urban modernism as an ideal urban form

It is not inevitable that master planning should be used to impose the modernist city ideal (as the Eastern Bloc countries demonstrated with "socialist realism," as many European cities have demonstrated with compact, low-rise urbanist forms, and as towns planned in the "new urbanism" style now show), but there has been a strong tendency for this to occur, and in Chinese cities it is happening currently. However, in many parts of the world the ideas of the early modernist Le Corbusier and his followers have been associated with being modern, with development, and with "catching up with the West" and have thus been attractive to governments and elites who wish to be viewed in this way. The aggressive promotion of these forms by developers, consultants, and international agencies has also played a role.

In brief, urban modernism involves all or some of the following:

- The prioritization of the aesthetic appearance of cities: modern cities are spacious, uncluttered, efficient, ordered, green, offer grand views (particularly of state and civic buildings), clean, and do not contain poor people or informal activities.

- High-rise buildings with low plot coverage and large setbacks, releasing large amounts of open "green" space between them, following the "superblock" concept.

- The dominance of free-flowing vehicular movement routes (rather than rail), the organization of traffic into a hierarchy of routes, and the separation of pedestrian routes from vehicle routes. High rates of car ownership are assumed.

- Routes, particularly higher order ones, are wide with large road reserves and setbacks (for future expansion), have limited intersections with lower order routes and limited or no access to functions located along them.

- The separation of land use functions (using zoning) into areas for residence, community facility, commerce, retail, and industry. Shopping occurs in malls surrounded by parking. It is assumed that people travel from home to work, shops, and so on, by car.

- The spatial organization of these different functional areas into separate "cells," taking access off higher-order movement routes, and often surrounded by "buffers" of open green space.

- Different residential densities for different income groups, often organized into "neighborhood units"; for wealthier families, low densities, usually organized as one house per plot, provided with full infrastructural services.

The most obvious problem with urban modernism is that it completely fails to accommodate the way of life of the majority of inhabitants in rapidly growing and largely poor and informal cities, and thus directly contributes to social and spatial marginalization. One kind of response, as in Brasília and

Chandigarh, has been that an informal city has been excluded from the formal city, and has simply grown up beside and beyond it. In other cities the informal has occupied the formal city: informal vendors operate from the sidewalks and medians of grand boulevards, and informal shelters occupy the green open spaces between tower blocks; in Dar es Salaam the main road reserves have been turned into huge linear markets, and in Lagos the freeways carry informal retailers, pedestrians, buses, and so on.

Both these kinds of "occupation" are problematic. In many cities, modernization projects involved the demolition of mixed-use, older, historic areas that were well suited to the accommodation of a largely poor and relatively immobile population. These projects displaced small shopkeepers and working-class households, usually to unfavorable peripheral locations, but as importantly, they represented a permanent reallocation of highly accessible and desirable urban land to large-scale, formal manufacturers and government. Where attempts to reoccupy these desirable areas by informal traders and settlers has occurred, their presence is sometimes tolerated, sometimes dependent on complex systems of bribes and corrupt deals, and sometimes met with official force and eviction. This hardly provides a good business environment for small entrepreneurs.

But other aspects of urban modernist planning similarly reinforce spatial and social exclusion and inequality. Thus cities planned on the assumption that the majority of residents will travel by car become highly unequal. Those who have a car have high levels of mobility and accessibility, while those who do not—the majority in cities of the South—often find themselves trapped in peripheral settlements, unable to access public facilities and work opportunities. The modernist city is usually spread out due to low-built density developments and green buffers or wedges. Low-income households that have been displaced to cheaper land on the urban periphery thus find themselves having to pay high transportation costs if they want to travel to public facilities or economic opportunities. The separation of land uses into zoned monofunctional areas further generates large volumes of movement (as people must move from one to the other to meet daily needs), and, if residential zoning is enforced, this leads to major economic disadvantages for poorer people who commonly use their dwelling as an economic unit as well. Monofunctional zoning never did reflect or accommodate the realities of urban life anywhere in the world, and still does not.

The separation of income groups (in many cities through plot size, or density, zoning) is also a major drawback for poorer groups. Those who survive on income from the informal sector (by far the majority in cities of the South) find themselves trapped in bounded areas with low buying power. It is precisely access to wealthier people that they need to make businesses viable. Income separation also exacerbates levels of crime in poor areas. One study on cities in Brazil (Rolnick 1999) found that spatial segregation was the most significant factor of all the variables that accounted for the homicide rate in black urban areas. High crime rates lock poorer areas into a downward spiral of low property values and limited private sector investment, and hence greater poverty and deprivation.

Zoning ordinances and building regulations

Zoning contains simultaneously an urban welfare ideal and restrictive conditions with hierarchical principles that establish inter- and intraclass (and sometimes racial and ethnic) differences. It therefore includes some and excludes others. The application of zoning schemes and land use regulations to residential areas under master planning has required people to comply with particular forms of land tenure, building regulations, building forms, and construction materials, usually embodying European building technologies and imported materials (the kinds of materials used for informal dwellings being prohibited), and requirements for setbacks, minimum plot sizes, coverage, on-site parking, and so on. In many colonial cities zoning ordinances were imported verbatim from the colonizing power with little subsequent change.

Complying with these requirements imposes significant costs and is usually complex and time consuming. Njoh (2003, 143) describes how the process of applying for a building permit in the town of Kumba in Cameroon (used as a typical example) involves five different government departments and a list of documents including a site plan, block plan, surveyor's report, town planning permission, and proof of land ownership. The application process rarely takes less than a year to complete. In a study of nine cities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Devas (2001) found that most had planning and building standards that were unsuited to the poor.

The objectives of regulations relating to safety and health and ensuring access (important for fire and ambulance services at least), are supportable. However, 72% of the population of Kumba survives on income from the informal sector (Njoh 2003), which is precarious and unpredictable. The pos-

sibility that people living in such circumstances could comply with a zoning ordinance designed for relatively wealthy European towns is extremely unlikely. Two outcomes are possible here. One is that the system is strongly enforced and people who cannot afford to comply with the zoning requirements are excluded to areas where they can evade detection—which would usually be an illegal informal settlement, probably in the peri-urban areas. Alternatively the municipality may not have the capacity to enforce the ordinance, in which case it will be ignored as simply unachievable. A common pattern in many cities is that there are core areas of economic and governmental significance that are protected and regulated and the rest are not.

In terms of the first alternative, inappropriate and "first world" zoning ordinances are instrumental in creating informal settlements and peri-urban sprawl, which have highly negative impacts on the people who have to live in such conditions, on city functioning, and on the environment. In effect people have to step outside the law in order to secure land and shelter, due to the elitist nature of urban land laws (Fernandes 2003). It could be argued, therefore, that city governments themselves are producing social and spatial exclusion as a result of the inappropriate laws and regulations they adopt.

In the second alternative, where the capacity for enforcement in regulated areas does not exist, there may as well be no controls at all, which puts such areas on the same footing as illegal informal settlements, again with potentially negative social, health, and environmental impacts. In such circumstances the poor and vulnerable, particularly women, have no recourse at all to the law and are open to exploitation and abuse. A more likely scenario, however, is one of partial enforcement, which in turn opens the door to bribes and corruption in various forms (Devas 2001), a process that inevitably favors those with resources. If urban regulations were supportive rather than exclusive, more achievable by poor people, and developed in consultation with communities, it might also be easier to achieve compliance and hence basic health and safety levels, and the social protection of the vulnerable.

There may be other reasons for nonenforcement, however. Yiftachel and Yakobi (2003, 217–8) argue that in ethnocratic states:

> a common planning response is allowing, condoning and even facilitating urban informality. Whole communities are thus left out of the planning process, or overlooked by the content of urban policies. Typically, such populations are

> mentioned as "a problem," but their undocumented, unlawful or even fugitive existence allows most authorities to ignore them as having full "planning rights" to the city. In other words, policy makers define urban informality as a method of indirectly containing the "ungovernable." The tactic is avoidance and distant containment; but the result is the condemnation of large communities to unserviced, deprived and stigmatized urban fringes. Here lies a main feature of the urban informality as a planning strategy: it allows the urban elites to represent urban government as open, civil and democratic, while at the same time, denying urban residents and workers basic rights and services.

Planning legislation and master planning have been used (opportunistically) time and again across the globe as a justification for evictions and land grabs. The recent COHRE report (2006, 59) documents 4.2 million people affected by forced evictions and land grabs between 2003 and 2006. In China it is estimated that 3.7 million people have been evicted in the last decade to make way for new cities, including four hundred thousand in Beijing to make way for the 2008 Olympics. Most frequently the argument used is that shelters or occupations of buildings are illegal in terms of planning and land law and therefore people can be forcibly removed. As frequently, the real motive lies elsewhere in objectives of political, ethnic, racial, or class domination and control.

The form of the plan and the planning process

A characteristic of master plans is that they are usually drawn up by experts, as end-state blueprint plans, and without consultation with communities. In cities in the global South, it is not uncommon that architects of master plans are either consultants who are based in the North, or who have been trained in the North. Many have little understanding of the dynamics of poverty and urbanization in cities in the South, or alternatively adhere to the older modernist belief that these cities will soon catch up economically with the North. Consultation processes could, of course, potentially allow such foreign experts to gain an understanding of what it means to be a poor urban dweller in the twenty-first century. But many such experts believe little is to be gained from consultation processes and that they know best. Hirt (2005), for exam-

ple, describes how, in Bulgaria, consultation with other professionals on master plans is viewed as an adequate substitute for civic participation. The result is usually that such Northern experts generalize an understanding of values, lifestyles, priorities, and so on from their own part of the world to the rest—they imagine formally employed, car-owning, nuclear families living in formal houses with full services, in cities that are growing relatively slowly and have strong and well-resourced local governments—when the reality in southern cities is entirely different.

A further problem with physical master plans prepared by outside experts is that neither the plan nor the process of implementing it is embedded in the local institutional culture. More recent work on plan preparation (by authors such as Patsy Healey) now understands plan preparation and implementation as institutional learning processes that need to involve not only government "town and regional planners" but a range of other professionals, departments, and actors in government, as well as other civil society-based stakeholders. Institutional arrangements need to shape themselves around the plan and its implementation, achieving at the same time the building of capacity in government and society, and this cannot occur when the plan is drawn up by an outside expert who delivers a finished product and then departs. Thus UN-HABITAT recognizes that in the context of the shift to "governance": "Consensus is no longer given by virtue of legitimacy granted to the state's actions but must be socially constructed. This requires alliances, coalitions and compromises" (UN-HABITAT 2001, 61–62).

NEW DIRECTIONS IN URBAN PLANNING

Although it has persisted in many parts of the world, in some regions, particularly in advanced capitalist countries, the key assumptions of master planning have been questioned. It has been accused of being outdated, inappropriate, and, above all, ineffective in cities experiencing economic and demographic growth and change and the pressures of globalization. It has also been argued that master planning is no longer compatible with the changing role of local governments as the latter shift to include a wider range of stakeholders in decision making and to see their role as facilitative and promotive rather than simply as conduits for state-led intervention. The new "urban management" approach to city development (which, in the global South, was driven largely by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and UN agencies) was sharply contrasted with urban planning, which was regarded as being control-

oriented and state-dominated, and hence a relic of "old-style government." The new forms of forward spatial planning that were put forward from the 1960s onwards in the North were variously termed structure plans, strategic plans, or growth management plans (particularly in the United States). Strategic planning has also been adopted in a number of countries in Latin American, South Africa, and Australia.

Along with a shift in the form of spatial plans in this part of the world has gone a shift in the physical urban forms that have been promoted. Many of these forms are linked to the new imperative of the global positioning of cities: waterfronts, conference centers, office and commercial districts, heritage districts, hypermalls, and entertainment centers. Other forms represent more of a reaction to earlier urban developments, which are viewed as environmentally unsustainable, inconvenient, and monotonous. Hence the promotion of the more sustainable "compact city" (public-transport based, higher density, mixed use, contained by an urban edge [Jenks and Burgess 2000]), smart growth, and "new urbanism" (residential developments emphasizing design and streetscape, liveability and walkability, compactness and community [Grant 2006]).

Strategic spatial planning

Strategic spatial planning emerged in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s[4] partly as a response to an earlier disillusionment with master planning, but also due to a realization that the 1980s project-based approach to urban development, in the absence of a broader and longer-term spatial framework, was equally problematic (Albrechts 2001; Healey, Khakee, Motte, and Needham 1997). To date, strategic spatial planning has been more prominent in the planning literature than in practice (master planning persists in many parts of Europe) but it appears to be enjoying growing support. It meets the requirements of cities in this part of the world for a form of planning that is responsive to strong civil society (including business) demands for involvement in government and planning (the governance issue); can coordinate and integrate economic, infrastructural, and social policies on space in the interests of a city's global economic positioning; can take a strong stand on resource protection and environmental issues, as well as on heritage and "quality of place" issues; and is implementation focussed.

4. Although it has a much longer pedigree in planning history (see Albrechts 2001).

The strategic spatial planning system contains a "forward," long range, spatial plan that consists of frameworks and principles and broad and conceptual spatial ideas, rather than detailed spatial design (although it may set the framework for detailed local plans and projects). The plan does not address every part of a city—being strategic means focussing on only those aspects or areas that are important to overall plan objectives. Albrechts (2001) frames these general planning goals, in Western Europe, as sustainable development and spatial quality. The spatial plan is linked to a planning scheme or ordinance specifying land uses and development norms to indicate restrictions that apply to development rights. Decisions on changes in land use must be guided by the plan. The spatial plan also provides guidance for urban projects (state or partnership led), which in the context of Europe are often "brownfield" urban regeneration projects and/or infrastructural (particularly transport or communications) projects. Significantly, though, strategic spatial planning is a process: it does not carry with it a predetermined urban form or set of values. It could just as easily deliver gated communities, suburbia, or new urbanism, depending on the local groups involved in the implementation process.

Both Healey et al. (1997) and Albrechts (2001) argue that strategic spatial planning has a crucial institutional dimension. The actual process of formulating the plan is as important as the plan itself. It is an active force that needs to bring about changed mindsets of those participating, as well as the development of new institutional structures and arrangements, within and between levels of governance, to carry the plan. Coordination and integration of policy ideas of line-function departments is essential here (because planning is not just about the functional use of land) and the plan itself cannot achieve this coordination: new institutional relationships must evolve to do this. The plan must therefore be institutionally embedded and must act to build social capital in governance structures. This is far removed from the idea of a foreign consultant delivering a plan document and then returning home.

As a process, strategic spatial planning addresses many of the problems of old-style master planning, although much will depend on the actual ethics and values the plan promotes (whether or not it promotes and enforces sustainable, inclusive cities), the extent to which the long-term vision is shared by all (and not simply dominant groups or individuals), and the extent to which a stable and enduring consensus on the plan can be achieved. Guiding urban development is a long-term process and there is little chance of success if the plan is changed with each new election. In practice, strategic spatial

planning in Europe may be seen as an ideal but it is not easy to put into practice, and there have been criticisms that in many cities economic positioning is taking precedence over addressing issues of sociospatial exclusion. There have been criticisms, as well, of planning through shared governance arrangements: Bulkleley and Kern (2006) argue that it weakens government's ability to implement local climate protection policies and Swyngedouw (2005) that it allows business interests to have undue influence on urban development.

Western European strategic spatial planning has emerged in a particular context characterized by strong, well-resourced and capacitated governments (together with the EU and its policy and funding directives) with a strong tax base, in stable social democracies, where control through land use management systems (of all urban and rural land) is still a central element in the planning system, made possible through state control over how development rights are used. Cities are growing slowly, and while poverty and inequality are increasing, the majority are well-off and can meet their own basic urban needs. It would be problematic, therefore, to imagine that the planning problems of the cities of the South could be solved simply by importing European strategic spatial planning.

Nonetheless, a number of Latin American countries have adopted strategic spatial planning, with many attempts seemingly "borrowed" from the European experience through the involvement of the city of Barcelona, the Institute for Housing and Urban Development in Rotterdam, and other think tanks. Steinberg (2005) notes the danger that a strategic planning process adopted by a city administration is often dropped when a new political party or mayor comes into power, because to continue it might be seen as giving credibility to a political opposition. The fact that a plan can be dropped, however, also suggests that neither business nor civil society sees it as sufficiently valuable to demand its continuation. The Bolivian approach, of introducing a national law (Law of the Municipalities 1999) requiring all municipalities to draw up an urban plan based on the strategic participatory method, is one way of dealing with this, but does not prevent the content of the plan from changing with administrations.

Steinberg (2005) concludes that success depends on political will, participation, technical capacity, and the institutionalization of plan management. The social and political processes of debating and agreeing on a plan are as important as the plan itself. The very different approach required by strategic planning inevitably encounters opposition: from politicians and officials who use closed processes of decision making and budgeting to insert their own projects and further their own political interests, and from planners who may

be reluctant to abandon their comfortable role as "grand classical planners" and become more communicators and facilitators.

European strategic spatial planning: the Barcelona model

This particular approach to strategic spatial planning has claimed significant success in the context of Barcelona (Spain), but Borja and Castells (1997) argue that it could be a more general remedy for urban restructuring, particularly in Latin America. In Barcelona (Marshall 2000) it is seen as an architect-led urban design approach, coordinated by politicians and delivering compact urbanism as a city form. Projects are informed by extensive research of broader city dynamics. Marshall (2000) sees the strategic plan as largely corporate planning around economic development goals (the global positioning of Barcelona) with certain social and environmental goals attached. Local projects are driven by more pragmatic and market-related needs.

Borja and Castells (1997) argue for a closer connection between strategic plans (which replace master plans) and large-scale, multifunctional urban projects. Their concern for the institutional work of strategic planning thus links more closely with the ideas of Healey, but neither, argues Marshall (2000), deals with the problem of elite capture of these processes. This is almost inevitable under a prevailing neoliberal ideology in Europe and very likely in cities of the South with their more unequal and volatile political processes. The linking of these plans and projects to a strong progressive politics, according to Marshall, is the only way to counter this danger.

The UN Urban Management Programme

Regarded as one of the largest global urban programs, the UN Urban Management Programme (UMP) was started in 1986 by the Urban Development Unit of the World Bank in partnership with UNCHS and funded by UNDP. It functioned as a tripartite collaboration between UN-HABITAT, UNDP, and the World Bank. The Programme has been involved in 120 cities in fifty-seven countries, with the overall mission of promoting socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements and adequate shelter for all, and the objective of reducing urban poverty and social exclusion. The Cities Alliance organization also emerged from this grouping.[5] In

5. Local Agenda 21 processes, which emerged from the 1992 Earth Summit Agreements, followed a similar direction to the UMP, and were later linked to the UN-HABITAT urban agenda (Allen and You 2002).

2006 UN-HABITAT disengaged from the program and transferred the work to local anchor institutions (UN-HABITAT 2005).

In common with other recent and innovative ideas in planning, and particularly with the "urban management" approach, the UMP attempted to shift the concept of planning and development to the whole of local government rather than having it belong to one department. It attempted to promote participatory processes in local government decision making (the city consultation), to encourage strategic thinking in planning, and to tie local government plans to implementation through action plans and budgets. The more recent concept of the City Development Strategy (CDS), promoted particularly by Cities Alliance, encourages local governments to produce intersectoral and long-range visions and plans for cities. One of the longest and deepest involvements of the UMP has been with Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, but the final plan emerging from this process has still not been approved.

Comments on the success rate of this program have been mixed. Although some argue that it has made a major difference in terms of how local governments see their role, and the role of planning, others have been more critical. One of the originators of the program (Michael Cohen, former chief of the Urban Development Division of the World Bank) concluded that it had not had a major impact on the process of urbanization in developing countries (UN-HABITAT 2005, 5). Coordinator of the program, Dinesh Mehta, noted that the city consultations had aimed to change the way local government did business, but this did not always happen. Ambitious plans often had no investment follow-up to make sure that they happened (ibid., 6) and the weakness of municipal finance systems, a prerequisite for implementation, has been a major stumbling block.

Werna (1995) notes that persistent urban problems should not be seen as due to the failure of the UMP, but rather due to the ongoing globalization of the economy, which has weakened nation-states and increased income inequalities and poverty. Decentralization in this context has placed a major burden on local government without the necessary powers and finance, and this makes urban management very difficult. Also pointing to broader obstacles, Rakodi (2003) draws attention to the problematic assumption that liberal democracies can work in all parts of the South, and that expectations of what local governments will do may be misplaced. Few local governments, she argues, are prepared to actually take steps to achieve equity and inclusiveness. Linked to this is the likelihood that stakeholders in UMP processes will promote their own specific and imme-

diate interests, with less concern for longer-term or city-scale issues and, particularly, less tangible issues such as climate change.

But more basic problems were evident, certainly in the Tanzanian case. The UMP appeared to be successfully changing one part of the planning system—"forward" planning—but left untouched the regulatory tools (the land use management system)—that form an important part of plan implementation. The inherited land regulation systems were therefore able to continue to entrench the inequalities that were inherent in them. In effect the UMP was setting up a parallel planning system, requiring developers first to apply to the local stakeholder committee for application approval in terms of the strategic plan, and then to submit it to the usual development control department (Halla 2002). Although the real power lies with those administering the land regulations, there appears to be little advantage to developers to follow both processes, and little chance of a strategic plan being implemented. As Nnkya (2006) notes, there was no clear evidence to suggest that the Dar es Salaam UMP process had been fully institutionalized.

Integrated development planning

Strongly influenced by both the UMP approach and strategic planning is integrated development planning (IDP), which has formed the basis of post-apartheid South Africa's local government experiment (Parnell and Pieterse 2002). It aims to introduce a form of urban management and planning in municipalities that is intended to integrate the actions of line-function departments and the different spheres of government,[6] including spatial planning, and link these to budgeting and implementation. The IDP is a medium-term municipal plan linked to a five-year political cycle, although aspects of the plan, including the vision (sometimes in the form of a CDS) and the spatial development framework, have a longer-term horizon. The IDP manager's office in each municipality is charged with the task of needs assessment, vision development, and aligning the plans and projects of each line-function department to the vision. One product of the IDP is the spatial development framework (SDF), which has the weaker role of spatially coordinating these sectoral plans, as in the UK, rather than spatial goals feeding into these other plans (Vigar and Healey 1999). Spatially "harmonized" projects are then supposed to direct the budget.

6. South Africa has three autonomous "spheres" rather than "tiers" of government.

So far (six years into the South African experiment) there are modest successes (Harrison, Todes, and Watson 2008) but still many problems. Local government line-function departments, including planning departments, still operate in isolation from each other with the IDP attempting to integrate the products of these functions but not their processes. Integration is therefore not yet institutionally embedded. The capital budget in many places is still shaped by the relative power of these departments and by the politicians of the day, rather than by the norms of sustainability and equity. There are very few linkages between the SDFs and the land use management systems—in many places the latter date from apartheid days while the SDFs are new. There is therefore a disjuncture between the zoning ordinances, many of which promote urban modernism and social exclusion, and the SDFs, which try to promote a different urban form, but lack the tools to do so. Participation has come to be seen as "professional participation"—involving different departments and levels of government rather than citizens and stakeholders. In many cities this takes very limited forms of participation, such as presenting the results of the IDP for public comment.

Issue-specific approaches to urban planning

Some of the more interesting new approaches to urban planning have emerged from concerns about specific issues in cities, and these may have wider application.

There is a growing concern among those involved in southern cities about the particularly difficult issue of planning in the peri-urban areas. The bulk of rapid urban growth is taking place in these areas, as poor urban dwellers look for a foothold in the cities and towns where land is more easily available, where they can escape the costs and threats of urban land regulations, and where there is a possibility of combining urban and rural livelihoods. The peri-urban interface is therefore highly mixed in terms of uses and also highly dynamic and unstable. These are also the areas that are most difficult to plan and service (due to jurisdictional problems, mixed-tenure systems, and the scattered and fragmented nature of settlement) and where the cost-recovery approach to public- or formal private-sector infrastructure provision cannot work. Often these areas exist in an administrative vacuum, outside of municipal boundaries. At the same time these are areas where threats to, and by, the natural environment are greatest. Although they present some of the most intractable problems for urban planning, most planning systems operate with an urban-rural dichotomy that entirely ignores areas such as these.

Allen (2003) argues that it is not possible to extrapolate the planning approaches and tools applied in either urban or rural areas to the peri-urban interface: they require different planning approaches specific to these conditions. Drawing on research by the Development Planning Unit of University College London, she advocates a combination of methods usually associated with urban, rural, and regional planning. Allen calls for a strategic environmental planning and management approach, working incrementally from subregional to community levels to manage their articulation at different stages of the process. At the community level, other work (Kyessi 2005) has shown the value of an incremental approach to service provision using community-based and informal service providers, managed by local committees, with technical advice from city administrations. Research focussing on alternative land delivery systems is also of particular importance in interface areas.

A second specific concern has to do with planning for environmental risks and hazards. Pelling's (2005) report to UN-HABITAT shows that urban growth is accompanied by an increased incidence of natural disasters and risks, with the poor urban populations most vulnerable. Too often, disasters are managed as exceptional events, seen as happening outside of the mainstream concerns of urban planning. This has led to a responsive mode of disaster management relying on humanitarian aid, with the consequence that disaster risk continues to rise in cities around the world.

Pelling argues that the urban planning system is a central tool for dealing with hazards and risks, but this is not yet widely recognized. He suggests that there are three interrelated areas where urban planning policy and practice can contribute to the reduction of losses to disaster: identifying risk, risk reduction, and disaster response and recovery. Identification of risk involves hazard, vulnerability, and risk mapping as a component of everyday urban planning, and is already taking place in many cities. It is immediately useful for land-use planning, construction, insurance, and housing and land markets. The land-use management system and building codes are an essential part of risk reduction, but need to include the poor and the informal in developing and managing them. Effective disaster emergency response and recovery rest on good predisaster planning and anticipation of risks in the reconstruction phase.

In effect, many of the new approaches to planning discussed in this chapter, which see planning as integrated, implementable, inclusive, community based, and responsive to context (particularly a preparedness to work with

informality), would also be good planning for disaster and risk management. There are contradictions, however: disaster and risk management planning call for a *strengthening* of the control aspects of land regulation (building codes, use zoning, land protection), from which the poor in southern cities work hard to escape and which local governments usually fail to enforce. Finding a way to bring these two imperatives together is still an unresolved issue.

A third issue has been how to use urban planning in postconflict and transitional situations. These situations are often instructive as old systems may need to be swept away and new approaches can be tested. Significantly, however, postconflict situations often have much in common with prevailing conditions in many southern cities, particularly peri-urban and semi-urban areas, where there is no clear authority and no established public functions or systems. Planning principles in postconflict situations might, therefore, have wider applicability.

From the 1960s to the 1980s the standard approach to relief in war-torn and postconflict/disaster areas was a linear one: relief – reconstruction – development (Van Horen 2002). More recent positions argue for linking relief to development (USAID) and introducing development-oriented emergency aid (the German Agency for Technical Cooperation - GTZ). The UN-HABITAT (2006) urban *trialogues* approach looks to spatial planning to help reintegrate displaced communities back into cities. In Somalia this implied three levels of action: a spatial structure plan, strategic projects, and enabling conditions for development. The role of the spatial structure plan was to provide an integrative framework so that shorter-term actions could contribute to longer-term goals of development. Strategic projects happened immediately, in parallel with the longer-term plan, to make a visible difference on the ground and to provide a way of integrating sectoral aid and actions. Enabling conditions required assistance to local government, infrastructure delivery, and reviewing the legal framework to ensure rights for the poor.

The issue of land rights is a crucial one in these situations, as this may have been a core reason for conflict and there are often competing or overlapping claims to land postconflict. Augustinus and Barry (2004) argue that the establishment of a land management system is urgent, as it can help create social and economic stability, forestall land grabs, deal with returning displaced persons, and help restore the functions of government. But they point out that the conventional (technical) approach to establishing this system and the form of land rights delivered are both highly problematic. In a postconflict situa-

tion the cadastral system needs to be put in place usually in advance of national land and planning policy and urban plans (which take much longer to develop), although these systems should provide the broader goals that inform the cadastral system.

It is therefore important, argue Augustinus and Barry (2004), that the process of defining the cadastre is designed to cope with a highly fluid and changing situation as well as one where claims to land are largely informal. This means that the first step is to adjudicate local land claims through community-based processes. Then, instead of moving directly to a (Torrens) title system, a deeds system is retained, as the deed is an affirmation of land rights but does not constitute them, as does a title. This approach could have wider relevance.

CONCLUSION

The context within which urban planning operates today is very different from what it was when planning emerged as a profession and function of government during the last century. Yet in a surprising number of countries planning systems have changed little from these early models. This is cause for serious concern, given the unprecedented nature and scale of the problems that are facing human settlements across the globe. There is now widespread recognition of the intractable problems of poverty, inequality, and environmental damage that are facing cities (particularly, but not only, southern cities) on a scale not experienced before, and in a context where the capacity to deal with these issues, either by government or civil society, is weak.

But while "old style" master planning was subject to a growing critique in parts of the global North, with arguments that it should be replaced with more flexible and inclusive structure, strategic, and growth-management planning, master planning has persisted to a remarkable degree in many parts of the world. And even where the nature of these forward plans has changed, the basic principles of the regulatory planning system tend to remain. What needs to be recognized is that planning systems can be a "two-edged sword" that can potentially be used to achieve good, but can just as easily be used in ways that are regressive and oppressive: to promote vested interests and political, class, racial, or ethnic domination. In less democratic and less politically stable countries, in particular, master planning has proved to be useful tool for political and economic elites to gain power and profit, and if necessary to deal with opponents through the intermittent enforcement of restrictive planning laws.

It is perhaps for these reasons that a review of innovative planning systems across the globe shows positive experiments with forward planning systems (strategic plans, IDPs, UPMs, etc.) that are collaborative, flexible, integrative, action oriented, and so on, but far less with reform of land rights and regulatory systems. For the most part therefore, the "right to the city" remains an elusive ideal for most poor urban dwellers, with their largely informal means of survival and shelter falling afoul of land use zoning, building regulations, minimum plot sizes, tenure requirements, and so on. These regulations have rendered large proportions of city populations "illegal," when in fact this population now represents the norm rather than the exception. The growth of the peri-urban areas, now one of the most critical issues facing city management in the global South, is to a large degree an attempt to escape these constraints and costs. In addition to these problems, experiments with new forms of forward planning have been largely process focussed, leaving open the resultant urban form to express the interests of developers, foreign investors, or stronger middle-class lobbies, rather than goals of social justice and environmental sustainability. Thus new variants of urban modernism continue to dominate urban landscapes, excluding the poor and the informal.

This chapter argues that the nature of a country's urban land law is the most critical aspect of the urban planning system. As forward plans of various kinds are sidelined by new administrations or fashions, and as participatory agreements run into conflict, it is urban land law that inevitably persists and is the slowest and hardest to change, usually because it allocates rights (to more powerful groups in society or to the state) that are long lasting and strongly defended. Fernandes (2003) has argued that the promotion of urban change in fact depends on comprehensive reform of the legal order affecting the regulation of property rights and the overall process of urban land development, policy making, and management. Yet least attention has been paid to this aspect of urban planning in the various reforms and innovations discussed above.

New ideas regarding urban land law and alternative tenure forms are still experimental. Given the fact that 25% to 70% of the urban population in cities of the South live in irregular settlements (Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002), and that the delivery and administration of formally titled land (requiring a full cadastre and registration system and the technical requirements of mapping, surveying, registration and conveyancing), is well beyond the capacity of many local governments, there has been a call for alternative

approaches to land regularization and tenure. Although there is consensus that urban tenure security is vital, research is beginning to show the value of working with informal arrangements (see Rakodi 2002) that are actually operating, even if not perfectly, and have wider social support.[7] Research in this area (Rakodi and Leduka 2003, 4) will "attempt to afford nonstatutory law and custom, as well as the social relations between various actors in informal land delivery systems, equal status with state law and organisation, and . . . focus on the predominant contemporary processes of land delivery."

A key tension complicates this problem, however. On the one hand, there are strong arguments for more open, inclusive, flexible planning systems that work with informality rather than trying to eradicate it, and on the other hand, a push for stronger controls and state-led development processes, in response to the threats of climate change, environmental hazards, and the spiralling crises of poverty, crime, and disease in many urban environments in the global South. It would be a mistake to believe that land use management cannot be done in poorer and informal areas as this would leave poorer communities without an important tool for the improvement of their areas. The issue is rather what form such management should take and where the locus of authority for it should lie.

An important caveat to this, however, is that innovative planning systems cannot, on their own, succeed in addressing the major urban issues discussed here. There are three aspects to this. First, good planning cannot occur in the absence of good government and a reasonably functioning economy. Devas (2001) argues that there are three essentials for sound planning: a political system in which the poor can make their voice heard; a city government with some capacity to deliver; and an appropriate regulatory framework. Second, addressing social and spatial exclusion in urban areas cannot be dealt with by spatial planning and land laws alone. Equally or more important are infrastructure and service delivery, and the capital and operating funding models that underpin these. Achieving "inclusive cities" actually means universal access to some form of basic urban services, but this is far more of a challenge than is usually recognized (see Parnell 2007 on the South African experience). Third, positive urban planning can be far more effective in the context of a national constitution containing basic principles of social and environmental justice, and

7. This of course counters the "de Soto thesis" that titling will solve problems of poverty—a position that is increasingly discredited (see *Economist*, August 24, 2006).

an acknowledgement of the importance of rights to access urban opportunities—that is, spatial justice. It is important that an agreed set of norms that should inform all planning is recognized and enshrined in law. It also needs to be recognized that doing this is only a starting point, and that these norms will have to be backed up in local regulatory and governmental practices.

Finally, it is important to recognize that there are no universal models or "rule books" to define a good planning system. In fact many past problems in planning systems can be attributed to the imposition of foreign models, usually from the global North, on other contexts with very different sociocultural and spatial traditions (see Mabogunge 2004). It is essential for the practice of planning to become institutionally embedded for it to be taken seriously, and imposed systems are unlikely to be able to do this. This holds as well for the nature of urban reform that is produced through the planning system. There also needs to be recognition that many of the crises that are currently facing urban settlements are of a nature and scale that have not been experienced before. The peri-urban interface, densifying rural areas, cities that are largely informal, and issues of environmental hazard and climate change, along with unprecedented poverty and inequality and weak governments, are only now being properly understood. Ways to address these issues are being dealt with experimentally in some parts of the world, but there are no ready-made solutions that can be applied.

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International Assistance for Cities in Developing Countries: Do We Still Need It?

Richard Stren

In the fall of 2006, I had a rare opportunity. I attended a closed meeting of the major partners making up the Cities Alliance, and was able to listen to their discussion—among themselves—of the question: What can we do to enhance agency support for urban assistance in our countries and programs? At this meeting were most of the bilateral partners of the Cities Alliance (such as USAID, SIDA, CIDA, GTZ, DFID), as well as the World Bank, UN-HABITAT, and a number of the Cities Alliance country members such as Nigeria and Brazil. Overall, the discussion was very spirited, going on for about three hours.

Although this is not the place to summarize the long discussion, I took two major points from the meeting. First, in most Western countries (but not all, witness the continued support in most of the Nordic countries), there is a declining level of public support for overseas assistance, as well as a decline in the support that individual assistance agencies are devoting to what is traditionally known as "urban development." Second, the main reason for this apparent decline in funding could be summarized as too much competition from other, often more popular, development themes. Urban development, as it was traditionally packaged, did not muster enough interest in most development agencies to attract funding when issues such as HIV/AIDS, post-conflict reconstruction, the conflict in Darfur, support for growing numbers of refugees, the tsunami in 2005, various floods and hurricanes, the plight of Africa, the problems of women and children in poverty, and many others were clamoring for support—often with the help of very high-profile celebrities and events planned around these celebrities. The meeting was told that even in the World Bank, urban assistance had declined, although there was about to be a reorganization that might reinvigorate this sector.

In addition to the reasons offered in this "insiders" discussion, there are other possible explanations behind the apparent decline in urban assistance over the last decade. In the next section we will consider several of them,

before looking more positively at the factors that ought to support, or even enhance, urban lending in the immediate future.

THE APPARENT DECLINE IN URBAN ASSISTANCE: SOME EXPLANATORY FACTORS

Declining Political Support in the West. One of the more intriguing factors may very well be political. In the elections of 2000 and 2004 in the United States, for example, support for the president's party came largely (but not entirely) from the suburbs, and from the so-called "red states" in the interior. Many of the most ethnically diverse parts of the country—cities in the so-called "blue states" such as California, Oregon, and Washington, and the states of the northeast and Great Lakes area—voted against the president, while states with smaller and less diverse urban populations (with the notable exceptions of Florida and Texas) voted for the president's party. This pattern is far from perfect as a characterization, but it does help to illustrate the point that social support for US overseas assistance, which is channeled through the administratively-controlled USAID, was likely to be different after 2000 than it was before. Similarly, in Canada, the most recent election (in 2006) showed the winning party (the Conservatives) failing to gain a single parliamentary seat in any of the three largest and most socially diverse cities in the country—Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. As in the United States, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is controlled by an executive accountable to the country's leader—in this case a president, responsible to the minister of international cooperation who is, in turn, selected by the prime minister. Although this pattern of political support for the dominant party in Canada does not ensure that urban issues will be extinguished from CIDA's agenda, it does not appear that an urban program currently features in its assistance portfolio.

Anti-Urban Bias. For many years the argument has been put forward that investments in development in poor countries (or overseas assistance in general) has suffered from urban bias. As Michael Lipton (1976) argued many years ago—mostly on the basis of data from South Asia—project expenditures have tended to privilege urban areas even if the likely rate of return of these investments would be higher in rural areas. As more of the rural poor move to the cities, however, and we observe an "urbanization of poverty," this earlier argument seems less and less valid, especially given the kinds of structural adjustment effects that took place during the 1980s, when food prices

became much higher for urban populations and secure urban employment became very scarce (Becker, Hamer, and Morrison 1994). Nevertheless, we can still find expression of the old idea that, because there is more wealth in urban areas (there is also a great deal of poverty), development assistance should concentrate on rural development and agriculture. This argument continues to attract supporters in many northern development agencies in spite of its obsolescence.

What do we know about urban poverty? Systematic and reliable estimates are hard to come by, particularly when we wish to make cross-national comparisons. In Table B.10 of the most recent *Global Report on Human Settlements* (UN-HABITAT 2007, 374–75), figures on rural and urban poverty are given for selected countries for which acceptable data is available. Of the twenty countries in Africa and sixteen in Asia for which estimates are given, three in each group show that the proportion of population in the cities that is poor (by national standards) exceeds that in the rural areas. These figures would seem to reinforce the urban bias argument, except for the fact that, as cities grow, more and more of their populations in terms of absolute numbers are poor. Some relatively recent work by the World Bank shows clearly that poverty is urbanizing in Latin America and the Caribbean. Table 1, which compares urban with rural poverty in that region, shows a steady increase in the aggregate number of urban poor, including the urban population in the "extreme poverty" category. By contrast, the estimated aggregate number of rural poor has ceased to rise after 1995, and as of 2000 the aggregate number of rural people in "extreme poverty" did not increase in comparison with 1995.

Moreover, since cities are much more productive economically than rural areas in general, support for urban assistance that can lift their poor populations out of a dysfunctional condition of life must be encouraged.

Table 1. The Urbanizing of Poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean (in millions)

	Total Poverty		*Extreme Poverty*	
Year	**Urban**	**Rural**	**Urban**	**Rural**
1986	71	65	26	32
1995	102	79	38	47
1998	102	76	39	46
2000	113	76	46	46

Source: Fay and Laderchi (2005, 20).

What about the proportions of urban populations that are poor? Again, solid statistics are few and far between. But the UN-HABITAT table cited above shows that, for example, 52% of the urban population of Niger was "poor" by national poverty standards in 1993; that 46% of the Zambian urban population was poor by similar criteria in 1996; and that for India, Bolivia, and Honduras—to pick some countries virtually at random—the level of recorded urban poverty was 32.4% in 1994, 53.8% in 1997, and 56.0% in 1992, respectively (UN-HABITAT 2007, 374–75). Another list of urban poverty estimates has more recent figures for many of these countries. Zambia shows 56% urban poverty in 1998 (an increase), India 24.7% in 2000 (a decrease), Bolivia 52% in 1999 (a decrease), and Honduras 41% in 1998 (a decrease) (Kessides 2005, 74–75). An even more recent study of Niger showed that the proportion of truly poor (by local standards) in Niamey, the capital city, stood at 42%, while in the third and sixth largest towns (Maradi and Dosso), the combined figure was 47%—an apparent decrease since the 1993 figures (personal communication to author, 2007). Even though some countries showed a decline in the percentage of the urban population in poverty, the very figures—in most cases over 40%—still indicate the need for international attention.

If we can hypothesize weak support structures for overseas urban assistance in some developed countries, we can also observe a preponderance of what we might call "anti-urban bias" in many developing countries. This tendency is not universally visible, but in Africa in recent years, most national elections for parliaments or national assemblies have produced voting results that have pitted the largest (and usually capital) cities against the party or coalition that eventually won. The most extreme example of this is Zimbabwe, where, beginning in the year 2000, the government party, ZANU-PF, began losing elections in the capital city, Harare. In June 2000, all Harare's constituencies supported the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in parliamentary elections. Then, in March 2002, Harare's electorate voted the ruling party out of office at the local government level, defeating the party in all but one local ward. Following a number of conflicts between the minister of local government, public works and national housing, and the executive mayor of Harare, the government sacked the mayor in 2004, appointing a commission to run the city (Kamete 2006). Finally, in the 2005 general elections, the government lost not only Harare but all major urban constituencies by an embarrassing margin. One of the consequences of the disconnect

between the national government and the people in the capital city (a disconnect that was mirrored in the voting patterns in the second largest city, Bulawayo) seems to have been the decision of the Zimbabwe government to move massively against informal sector housing and trading in a military-style "Operation Restore Order" that eventually resulted in the displacement of at least 700,000 people in 2005 (UN-HABITAT 2005).

This pattern of greater support for opposition parties in the major cities was reflective of similar tendencies elsewhere in Africa. Urban areas have often been seen as sources of disloyal opposition to regimes that are used to the traditional vote control systems they have been able to operate in more socially and economically homogeneous rural areas. That this system has roots going back to the colonial period has been very effectively demonstrated by Mahmood Mamdani (1996). Mamdani's brilliant account shows how, during the colonial period, rural populations were governed through decentralized, traditional structures while urban areas (which often contained many expatriates) were governed and adjudicated with rules including rights and legal institutions more similar to European patterns. The rural and urban spheres, he argues, were treated differentially. After independence, these patterns were slow to change, since the ascendant political groups in each country had built their winning coalitions on the basis of largely rural-based, traditional patron-client structures of support. Although African countries that were only 14.7% urban in 1950 had grown to 38.3% urban in 2005 (heading for 50.7% urban in 2030; United Nations 2005, 10), their electoral systems have been much slower to change than their demographic (rural/urban) dynamics.

The slow pace of representation of urban interests in national governments and governing coalitions in the developing world is another partial explanation of the weakness in support for urban assistance. Current assistance policies—in both bilateral and multilateral agencies—rely rather considerably on agreements with local counterparts. Support for urban assistance, at the end of the day, must be forthcoming from senior bureaucrats and political leaders in recipient countries. To the extent governments in recipient countries do not see the benefit in urban assistance packages—in comparison to the benefits from other assistance offers—this will diminish the enthusiasm for offering urban assistance in the first place.

Weaker Support in Donor Agencies. At the same time, there are many competing interests in the donor agencies themselves. In the World Bank, for example, many groups compete to promote their approaches, since support

in the form of large projects will enhance the integrity of their group and their professional point of view. One of the key reflections of where support is available is the theme of each year's World Development Report (WDR). The 2008 WDR, which was released in October 2007, has as its title, *Agriculture for Development*. The launching of this document undoubtedly strengthened the position of the rural development group in the Bank when a press release from the office of the Bank's president noted that "growth originating in agriculture is four times more effective at raising the incomes of the extreme poor than growth in other sectors" (World Bank 2007b, 5). In this particular WDR, all eleven chapters deal in one way or another with agricultural development (World Bank 2007a). By contrast, in the last WDR in which urban development was a prominent feature – the 1999/2000 report entitled *Entering the 21st Century*—only two of eight chapters ("Dynamic Cities as Engines of Growth" and "Making Cities Livable") dealt specifically with urban issues (World Bank 2000). These symbolic markers are important because of the considerable effort the Bank puts into producing the yearly WDRs, and because of the current leadership role of the Bank among all other multilateral and bilateral agencies in the West. By far the largest of the development assistance agencies with approximately 12,500 full-time staff, the World Bank's professional ranks include between 200 and 225 individuals who consider themselves part of what is called the "urban family" (personal communication to author, 2006). Over the last decade or so, the Bank has been lending over $2 billion per year in combined urban development, urban water, and urban transport projects (World Bank 2000, 122–23; personal communications). Fortunately for the "urban family" (which some insiders see as "on the decline"), the WDR for 2009 has been designated as "Spatial Disparities and Development Policy." Three major chapters (out of ten) have been set aside for urban issues, but this is unlikely to dispel the impression that "urban" is declining on the Bank's agenda.

Many New Claims for Development Assistance. A fourth important factor that must be considered in this litany of possible explanations for a decline in official urban assistance is the increasing number—some might say "cacophony"—of new claims for assistance budgets. These claims—when they are presented in a "human rights" format—assert a normative superiority over previous, more sectoral approaches to development, such as the need for better roads, schools, clinics, and water distribution systems (Uvin 2002). For example, the claim that assistance agencies ought to focus their mission

on the alleviation of climate change, the worldwide scourge of HIV/AIDS, famines, child labor, or violence against women somehow advance propositions that reflect a high moral imperative because they are issues virtually involving life or death for millions of extremely vulnerable people. And most of the potential targets of this assistance live in the very poorest countries. Promoting a traditional urban development approach (which may involve, for example, the very important objectives of slum upgrading, capacity building for newly democratized municipal governments, support for participatory planning initiatives, and assisting the establishment of improved local financial tools) lacks a powerful moral edge. International NGOs, many of them with high-profile celebrities willing to speak on their platforms, also campaign for emerging issues. This dilemma has also affected UN agencies, but in a negative way. A former UNICEF planner argues that development organizations—such as UNICEF—that have adopted a human-rights based approach (called "human-rights based approach to programming" or HRBAP) have had great difficulties in allocating resources. Since the HRBAP argues that all human rights are equally important, and therefore that prioritization of rights is not possible, prioritization and allocation of scarce resources became extremely difficult for many organizations, especially those which were committed to "results-based management" (Munro, forthcoming). The clash of traditional urban development approaches with human-rights claims (such as the right to the city, the right to housing, and the right to land) has fragmented the message of urban development and weakened the ability of agencies to offer assistance.

In addition to claims for assistance in response to human rights justifications, many of these emerging and very weighty issues are reinforced by the current list of Millennium Development Goals (the MDGs). All major assistance agencies have at least been formally committed to the MDGs since they were declared, like the Ten Commandments, by the Secretary General of the United Nations in the millennium year. In the complex statement of eight goals and eighteen targets, urban development receives only one mention: target 11 "to have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers," within goal 7, "Ensure environmental sustainability." Although the connection between improving the lives of slum dwellers and ensuring environmental sustainability is relatively well understood by many urban specialists and those with environmental backgrounds, it is not so obvious to the outside world.

Emphasizing the goal of improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020 appears tangible, but at the same time, very distant and even imprecise. What and how much is required for "improvement," for example? And, given the massive size of the world's slum population—estimated quite carefully by UN-HABITAT to be 924 million in 2001 (UN-HABITAT 2003, 14)—how substantial is the overall effect of simply "improving" the lives of 100 million slum dwellers, if not even removing that number of slums in absolute numbers? We may express even more skepticism over the goal established in 2000 when it was pointed out, again by UN-HABITAT, that by 2005 there were 998 million slum dwellers in the world, and that if current trends were to continue, there will be 1.4 billion by the year 2020 (UN-HABITAT 2006). However aggregated and inaccurate these figures may be, they are consistently collected by the same agencies and show trends in the wrong direction in relation to the Millennium Development Goals.

Is Urban Development Still an "Idea in Good Currency"? Many years ago, Donald Schön defined "an idea in good currency" as an idea that was "powerful for the formation of public policy," an idea, presumably, at the center of policy debate and even political conflict. Among the characteristics of these ideas are, however, that "they change over time; they obey a law of limited numbers; and they lag behind changing events, sometimes in dramatic ways" (Schön 1971, 123–24). It may not take long, if ideas do not relate to changing events, for new ideas to drive out old. Since the notion of urban development began in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the excitement over the work of John Turner and the establishment of UNCHS (now UN-HABITAT) as a United Nations organ to help the urban poor, many other ideas have vied for entry at the top of the international policy agenda.

New ideas have arrived. New approaches to the "urban" or new alternatives to urban development have, in one way or another, either bypassed older notions of urban development, or have restated them in a different fashion. This may be partly a matter of language, partly a matter of a whole "paradigm change." "Sustainable development" is perhaps one of these new approaches; perhaps "good governance" is another. Both incorporate elements of urban, or local, development, but both relate to a wider set of concepts ("environmentalism" or "democratization") that are currently more appealing to Western publics. Although "slum" or "squatter" improvement/eradication have a certain cachet and appeal to certain groups, they

have difficulty competing in a conceptual universe that is underpinned by notions of absolute rights, personal liberties, and environmental crisis. This is not a comment on the validity or importance of the goal of improving cities in the developing world; this objective is still valid after many years. But ideas change; old projects and programmatic approaches (no matter how successful) are regularly avoided by career assistance officers because they need to identify with new, more current initiatives in order to establish their bona fides, so that competing approaches and perspectives eventually emerge.

Why one idea supplants another is a mysterious process, but "an idea whose time has come" under the right conditions, can replace old ideas at the top of the political agenda (Kingdon 1995). Just as easily, however, ideas can be negatively "framed" in such a way that they lose favor among voting publics (or competing ideas gain favor), even though the problems they represent have not been solved or even in any way reduced. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, for example, the challenge of the cities held a privileged position on the American political agenda. After that, while the plight of the cities did not change, the issue was pushed off the agenda amidst partisan rancor and the defining of urban issues as essentially "local" problems (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, ch. 7). In the policy literature in the social sciences, arriving on the political agenda is an important key to achieving the major objectives of any policy. But political competition requires new ideas. Issues, just like equities in the stock market, do not hold their position indefinitely.

A BRIEF RETROSPECTIVE

In spite of its current stagnation and even decline, international development assistance for urban problems has enjoyed some real successes in the past. These historical successes should not be forgotten, even as we focus on the future. The following discussion will list some of the highlights of the overseas assistance experience, but it is by no means comprehensive.

Perhaps the first, and most important insight about urban development in the global South came through a Western architect, John Turner, although his observations were based on experiences and discussions with Peruvian colleagues. Turner's insight was that poor people living in so-called "slums" were in fact building for their own needs much more effectively than the government and public agencies that were clearing the slums and constructing large, centrally controlled public housing estates (Turner 1976). Turner's perspective, which had first been expressed in the late 1960s, along with the

analysis of the value of the "informal sector" developed by Keith Hart (1973) and by the ILO (1972), resulted in an approach to housing for the poor that stressed self-help building and the value of the small-scale local economy. This was epitomized by the "sites and services" model of housing development, whereby—at least in principle—local governments would lay out plots, community services, and infrastructure for low-income people, and they in turn would construct their own houses and develop their own local economies. Instead of being "marginal" to urban society, the poor were central to its proper functioning (Perlman 1976).

A second insight, which was promoted and pursued in the 1980s and 1990s, was that assistance should focus on the development of national policies which, in turn, would be applied appropriately at local levels according to the context (Buckley and Kalarickal 2006). This period represents the re-emergence of the local in urban development. These national policies—sometimes brought together in the "urban management" approach to the improvement of local services (Davey 1996)—included improving urban public finance, and improving the delivery of local services. Both were absolutely central requirements for local governments that were struggling with problems of limited local funding sources and weak human resource capacities. The 1980s and 1990s also saw the emergence of movements of democratization and decentralization, which in turn focused more attention on the institutionalization of city governments and on their ability to plan for their citizens. Support by the major assistance agencies (such as DFID, USAID, SIDA, and others) for capacity building at the local level helped thousands of local governments to establish themselves during this transitional period. Although neither democratization nor decentralization were normally promoted or initiated by overseas agencies in the first instance (these movements were largely local, based on political and civil society considerations), assistance agencies and foundations were often quick to support locally elected mayors and local government associations once they were established, and when they asked for help.

A third, and final insight that we must mention here is that urban assistance—when it is appropriate and requested by recipient countries—needs to be offered in a collaborative manner involving cooperation among all major donors. There are two important reasons for this: the first is that urban development is a multisectoral effort that requires many different actors to work together; and the second is that overlap and concurrency among donors is

counterproductive both for the recipients (who are tasked with the huge transaction costs of managing many projects with different time scales and operational parameters), and for the donors (who do not need to "reinvent the wheel" if other donors have already found the best way to deal with an issue). An important beginning of collaborative assistance in the urban field was the establishment of the Urban Management Programme (UMP) in 1986. It was largely a collective effort of UNCHS (later called UN-HABITAT), the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with much of the funding supplied by UNDP. (The UMP ceased to exist as a unified, worldwide program in 2006.) Although the OECD (2003) guidelines for donors to harmonize their assistance operations in individual countries and regions are probably honored more in the breach than the observance, the existence of the UMP and the establishment in 1999 of the Cities Alliance were major steps forward. The Cities Alliance is a broad coalition of ten of the major donor countries, the World Bank, and UN-HABITAT (as founder members), the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme, the European Union and (as of 2007) Brazil, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Chile, and the Philippines, as well as the organizations Metropolis and United Cities and Local Governments (http://www.citiesalliance.org/members/members.html). The work of the Cities Alliance represents the first time—albeit on a modest scale—that all the major urban assistance agencies have worked together on agreed projects in a wide variety of countries.

WHY URBAN ASSISTANCE IS STILL NEEDED

Notwithstanding all the changes in development approaches we have just discussed, I would conclude that overseas assistance to cities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is still justified. There are two important reasons for this conclusion. The first has to do with the economic benefits of urbanization in poor countries; and the second has to do with the benefits that can accrue from a networked approach to urban development.

Urbanization and Economic Development. As Mila Freire and Mario Polèse (2003, 5) have convincingly argued, the "evidence of a positive link between cities (urban areas) and economic development is overwhelming." There is some debate over the direction of this link (that is, whether cities affect development, vice versa, or both), but in any case cities are a part of the nation, so that even if the influence flows from national development

to cities, helping cities will also support national development. And support for cities is usually support for the most productive sectors in the nation. This is the argument, originally made in the 1980s by Jane Jacobs (1984) among others, that urban economies are the "motors of development" of our modern economies. In the United States, a detailed study has shown that 361 metropolitan area economies are responsible for 86% of the total GDP of the whole country. If it were a country, the metropolitan region of New York would have the tenth largest economy in the world (US Conference of Mayors 2007, 12). Using different figures based on similar calculations, we can compare the GDP of selected major world cities with the GDP of the countries in which they are located. The results are shown in Table 2 below. The figures show clearly that the proportion of the country's GDP generated by these major cities is well in excess of the proportion of the country's population that they represent. Comparing column (3) with (6) we see that, while New York City is 6.2% of the population of the United States, its economy represents 9% of the country's GDP. This represents a positive, or disproportionate economic contribution of 45%, giving a "location quotient" (Isserman 1977) of 1.45. Similarly, for Mexico City, São Paulo, Shanghai, and Mumbai the corresponding location quotients are 2.27, 2.86, 5.45, and 9.41, respectively. In proportion to their populations—which are already very large—these urban areas make an important contribution to the economies of their respective countries.

Table 2. Comparisons of Major World Cities' GDP with Country GDP, 2005

City	(1) City Population (millions)	(2) Country Population (millions)	(3) City/ Cntry (%)	(4) City GDP ($Billions)	(5) Country GDP ($Billions)	(6) City GDP/ Country GDP (%)
New York	18.7	298	6.2	1133	12,417	9
Mexico City	19.4	107	18.1	315	768	41
São Paulo	18.3	186	9.8	225	796	28
Shanghai	14.5	1,323	1.1	139	2,234	6
Mumbai	18.2	1,103	1.7	126	805	16

Source: United Nations (2006); World Bank (2006); City Mayors, http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/richest-cities-2005.html; World Bank, *World Development Indicators Database,* http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf

A more extensive table, which uses a different data set that includes twenty-one cities and national urban systems in developing and transitional countries, was prepared by Freire and Polèse. The results are based on somewhat older data than that in Table 2 above, but the indicators are similar. Ratios of the GNP of the cities to the percentage of the national population they represent are all considerably higher than 1:1. As the authors conclude, "there is something in the very nature of urban agglomerations that contributes positively to higher incomes" (Freire and Polèse 2003, 6). It follows that any support (through overseas investment, technical assistance, or training) that helps these cities will also lead eventually to collective benefits for the recipient nation. And the poorest countries, whose planning and technical capacities are the lowest, generally need outside support the most. The poorest countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are almost always the countries with the lowest levels of urbanization and the fastest rates of urban growth (Cohen 2004).

Networked Development. The well-known sociologist Manuel Castells has argued that we are living in a globalizing, information age, for which "dominant functions and processes . . . are increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture" (Castells 1996, 469). Whether we are talking about "global cities" at the very apex of the international financial and political system (Sassen 2001); "world cities" as leading nodes in the economic hierarchy, spread throughout the world's major regions (Friedmann 1995); or just "ordinary cities" (Robinson 2006), all can benefit from better information about what other cities are doing to solve similar problems and meet similar challenges. Cities—whether rich or poor—are connected by membership in both national networks of local authorities and international networks and organizations.

A recent reflection on the importance that networks have assumed in international urban assistance is by Akin Mabogunje, writing about the Urban Management Programme (UMP). Mabogunje, one of Africa's premier geographers, and a member of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States, was a key adviser to the UMP during the 1990s when it opened regional offices in Abidjan, Cairo, Bangkok, and Quito. His observations about the success of this initiative are worth quoting at some length:

> I believe there can be no better testimony to the legacy of the Programme than first, the existence in each region today of a very active constituency of stakeholders in the urban management field comprising the regional networks of institutions, experts and practitioners, informed academics, consultancy firms, non-governmental organizations and city managers. Second, the existence of these networks has meant vast improvement in the database, knowledge, and expertise available for dealing with problems of urbanization in individual countries and regions. But thirdly and most importantly, the existence of these networks has enabled the new international effort at urban development known as the Cities Alliance to take off effectively without much concern with issues of capacity building. (Mabogunje 2005, 4)

Larger and more far-reaching networks have also been formed by local governments around the world. Recently, the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the World Federation of United Towns and Cities (UTO), which had been in operation since 1913 and 1957, respectively, combined into the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), with headquarters in Barcelona. After it was launched in Paris in 2004, the UCLG adopted the Bilbao Declaration, according to which the organization committed itself to "promote decentralised cooperation programmes between cities, local and regional authorities and their associations throughout the world to help bridge the digital divide" (http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/upload/template/templatedocs/Bilbao_declaration_English_FINAL.doc). According to its web page, the UCLG represents over one thousand cities across ninety-five countries directly, as well as 112 local government associations around the world. The UCLG sits as an associate member of the Cities Alliance and regularly attends meetings of the Governing Council of UN-HABITAT. In March 2006, the World Bank, acting through Cities Alliance, signed two grant agreements with UCLG. Both the existence and the level of activity of UCLG demonstrate the importance to cities around the world to stay in touch with each other, and to maintain good relations with major international funding agencies.

"Decentralized cooperation," or city-to-city development, is a rapidly growing sector on the international scene. Almost every major Western country has been supporting this expanding field for the last decade. A good

example is France, where the organization Cités Unies France was created, in 1975, out of the World Federation of Twin Cities, which itself was started in 1957. With a well-organized structure, a very informative web page (http://www.cites-unies-france.org/html/home/index.html), and a wide range of planned activities, Cités Unies France has a membership of five hundred local authorities at all levels of the French decentralized structure, and a network of some two thousand cities in France and in developing countries that are regularly connected with each other. Both France and the European Union provide overseas funding for city-to-city collaboration. In the case of France, funding comes both from the local authorities themselves—some of which are very wealthy—as well as from the overseas agencies of the government. An important policy statement by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled "Governance Strategy for French Development Assistance" indicates the importance of working with local authorities on overseas projects. The document points to "decentralized cooperation" as an example of working with "new partners," and to the "dynamic created by the Decentralized Cooperation Programme . . . to develop exchanges with local governments . . . through the various representative bodies in existence" (France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, 19).

In France, Cités Unies is very proactive. When local authorities show interest in working with overseas local partners, Cités Unies France helps them with information pertaining to the country in which they are proposing to work, case studies of other partnerships, and information on training and capacity-building "tools" they have developed. It also maintains regular contacts with major French government agencies and overseas NGOs that would be germane to the overseas projects they are contemplating. On the recipient side, there is often a well-oiled NGO, supported by French and European Union funding, or funding from the active local governments from the North working in a particular country. In Niger, for example, ANIYA is the local NGO that helps coordinate decentralized cooperation programs with France. In May 2007, ANIYA claimed there were twenty French local governments (including both communes and regional governments) connecting through functioning programs with thirty-four Nigerien communes. ANIYA's work—financially supported by the Nigerien government, the French communal assembly of Faucigny-Glières, the participating communes in Niger, and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs—began in earnest in 2001, just as Niger was developing its new program of decentralization. There are regular meet-

ings in Niger and France. A brochure on their web site, which shows a group of French and Nigerien mayors, claims that "[t]ogether we are engaging in an innovative global initiative, a network of solidarity with the goal of gaining a mastery of our local development" (http://www.france-niger.com). The two themes that are stressed on the site are the help received (both in terms of training and financial support) by local authorities, and the new relations Nigeriens are able to cultivate with the outside world. This is especially important for a country that is so vulnerable to periodic droughts and food shortages. According to the most recent World Bank statistics, Niger is one of the poorest countries in the World (World Bank 2007a, 354–45).

WHAT CAN URBAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS DO?

There is no doubt that urban assistance programs are still needed, even though many bilateral assistance programs, and even the World Bank, have reduced their support to this sector. Cities are extremely productive islands in a sea of what are often very dysfunctional or stagnant economies, but they are increasingly finding their way to connect with the larger global economy. Rather than state the obvious about the growing importance of cities, and the very great problems they represent and require help to overcome, I would suggest that program directors consider four basic objectives.

Support research and local problem solving. Until now, implied models of urban development for cities in the North are derived from the North (Robinson 2006). Cities should be clean, orderly, and efficient; and infrastructure and services should be supplied to all groups and neighborhoods on the basis of decisions made by publicly elected local authorities. Taxes, wherever possible, should be collected (or at least remitted) locally, and fees for some services (such as water, electricity, and sewerage) should be applied to households receiving the services. Because this model of urban development is essentially based on the experience of the North, research on alternative forms or perspectives would seem redundant. Most northern-based assistance agencies do not encourage or support research to a significant degree.

But for southern cities, research—particularly by local scholars and scientists—serves at least two major purposes. First, it solidifies local knowledge about cities and indirectly enhances informed local discussions of important issues. It is especially necessary that research done by local scholars and/or consultants can be accessed locally. Creating histories and narratives of issues and questions involved in local urban development is an

important vehicle for valuing the city and supporting public commitment to the urban reality. A country such as Brazil, where local research and writing about cities has been an important factor in public discussion for many years, has been successful in nurturing a civic culture in many of its larger cities. Partly as a result, Brazil has seen an impressive number of urban innovations such as the urban social movements that contributed to the end of the military regime; the participatory budget model; and the Statute of the City and its product, the Ministry of Cities. The second reason for supporting research is that it brings more information to decision-makers at the local level who are often constrained by their lack of systematic data on local problems. This information becomes the patrimony of cities, and of the scholars and research institutes who become part of local policy networks. Since cities in the South are growing so much more quickly than cities in the North, new information and methods of collecting it are particularly welcome; thus support from the North and from more experienced researchers can be extremely valuable.

Support South-South networks. Almost all countries have associations of local authorities. These associations bring local experience to bear on cities, and newly elected officials experiencing challenges of many kinds. There are usually training courses for new councilors and mayors, regular meetings at which national political leaders explain government policy, and opportunities to explore various ideas and learn about what others are doing. These associations are extremely important and should be a focus of budgetary support from overseas.

With more support for local research into many aspects of past and current urban development, and with burgeoning associations of cities and their elected officials, cities will need to reach out to other cities to better understand possible futures and scenarios to deal with their most challenging problems. In the social science study of policy, a strong argument can be made (Rose 2005) that any local policy idea or initiative can best be developed and refined if the comparative method is used. Comparison means learning as much as possible about how a potential policy actually works in a complex situation; but when a new policy is being contemplated, examples of what might or might not work in practice can only be learned by visiting other countries and learning from their experience. Nearby or culturally similar countries are the best environment for this kind of policy learning. Donors can assist this process by supporting visiting groups from one country to

another, and they can support regular meetings (such as Africities, which is held every two years in some African city) where initial contacts are made and potential exchange of information can be initiated. A good example of a well-functioning southern network is the Shack/Slum Dwellers' International (SDI), which was formed by six national federations of slum dwellers in 1996 as a network through which they could learn from each other and collaborate to make their work more effective. As the process developed, "city governments and some national governments have become interested in supporting these community-driven approaches, recognizing their potential contribution to poverty reduction and urban development" (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2007, 489–90). By 2006 the network of federations had grown from six to fifteen, with a small staff in South Africa for coordination, and regular (mainly bilateral) meetings between federations (ibid., 492). Support has come from a number of northern donor agencies.

Supporting these South-South networks not only steers local officials and policy makers away from the more traditional circuits of visiting, say, London, Paris, or Barcelona—where the model of urban development may be questionable in terms of the real potential in a poor third world city or town—but also encourages and implicitly underpins the idea that what works locally is often the most appropriate approach.

Continue to focus on pro-poor policies. Much of what overseas assistance agencies are doing is both admirable and important. Among the most important policy thrusts in recent years has been the promotion of so-called "pro-poor" policies in southern countries. A key message from a comparative study of ten cities in the South is that "the well-being of the urban poor can be improved by access to economic opportunities, supporting social networks, and greater access to assets (notably land), infrastructure and services" (Devas et al. 2002, 3). It is important for outside agencies to continue to promote policies that can help the poor, since—as we already know from many studies of urban politics in the North—local regimes, even when they are democratically elected on a regular basis, can easily get shunted onto a development path that privileges wealth, large-scale development, and big business. In the process, their policies and programs can marginalize the very large segment of the population that is poor and often getting even poorer. But support from the outside for policies and projects that can help the poor must be nuanced, based on very solid information about local societies, collaborative with local stakeholders, consistent and reliable.

Act as responsible local stakeholders. If, as many overseas agencies argue, local development needs to be transparent, accountable, and free of any suggestion of corruption (see Tannerfeldt and Ljung 2006), external assistance must also be transparent, accountable in some reasonable fashion to local stakeholders, sustainable over time, and open to reasonable discussion. External agencies have become, themselves, very powerful local stakeholders in an important process of political and economic change. They should consider this role seriously, particularly in countries (such as Bangladesh, Niger, Kenya, Uganda, Philippines, Guatemala, among others) where the actions—combined or otherwise—of the external assistance community can have a major impact on local development. Among other things, this responsible role means that donors should stick with local programs until there is general agreement that they should be discontinued; and they should work closely as a group so that, as much as possible, their messages and the reporting requirements for their projects are "harmonized" on the ground, following the recommendations of the OECD declaration.

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Her ongoing research comprises a collaborative, interdisciplinary, multi-site, multi-year project, Youth and the City: Skills, Knowledge, and Social Reproduction (funded in Denmark) which was conducted in three rapidly growing cities: Recife in Brazil, Hanoi in Vietnam, and Lusaka in Zambia between 2001 and 2005. She has published several short papers from this work. She is working with her colleagues on a book with comparative and interdisciplinary scope on urban youth, entitled, Urban Lives/Global Exposures: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Urban Youth in Recife, Hanoi, and Lusaka.

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