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# Authoritarian Backsliding in the Context of Theories of Political Change

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# Authoritarian Backsliding in the Context of Theories of Political Change

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**ABSTRACT:** This document addresses several theories of political change while considering authoritarian interventions into several societies.

Regional examples of authoritarian interventions in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eurasia and Latin America are included and possible programmatic responses by donor agencies.

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## **AUTHORITARIAN BACKSLIDING IN THE CONTEXT OF THEORIES OF POLITICAL CHANGE**

Authoritarian backsliding has occurred in several countries over the past twenty years. Pinpointing the cause of the backsliding requires careful analysis and comparison especially because single variable causality is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine. Examining the main theoretical schools of thought of political change provides a starting point in determining the dynamics of a backslide. These broader theories, simplistically defined as “sets of systematically related generalizations”<sup>1</sup>, can include the political culture approach, the structure-development and modernization approach, the institutional-state-systems approach, and the transitions-elite bargaining-social movements approach.

### **POLITICAL CULTURE**

The scholars Almond and Verba define political culture as “a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system.”<sup>2</sup> For them, culture comprises the political ideals and operating norms of citizens within a society. Political culture, in fact, combines the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics, dimensions that are the collective history of a political system, and the life histories of the members of the system and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experience.<sup>3</sup>

Almond and Verba go on to differentiate between three types of culture: 1) Parochial, in which citizens live with little interaction with any government or political role within their society. Traditional societies with localized power-structures are parochial; 2) Subject culture in which citizens acknowledge the presence of the authoritarian central government and are reactive only to control while not trying to change or influence it; and 3) Participant culture has citizens reacting and acting *vis-a-vis* the central government while trying to pursue their own self-interests by set rules of participation (often democratically).

Lijphart breaks down culture into an elite (leader) level and a mass (or citizen level). Importantly, he also distinguishes between homogeneous societal culture

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<sup>1</sup> Chilcote, Ronald. 1981. *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm*. New York: Westview. P. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Almond, Gabriel A., Verba, Sidney. 1965. *The Civic Culture*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

and heterogeneous societal culture. Culture may also be a way to dissect a society that itself is comprised of citizens who vary in religious, or ethnic identity or may live in differing locales (rural versus urban), or even have politically and economically competing positions (labor versus business owners).<sup>4</sup>

Ethnicity, according to Avruch, is political culture that is “objectified” by political actors called “ethnic entrepreneurs,” who may capture a unique space or identity shared by some but not all in a society.<sup>5</sup> The shared space is exclusive and those who share ethnicity may reinforce or project that culture via public domains such as festivals, rituals, remembrance days, or marches. Ethnicity (and national identity to some degree) forms from linkages among members “based upon putative ties of kinship, history, language, or religion, the actual content of the cultural bits matters less than their ability to differentiate one group from another.”<sup>6</sup>

Within a society or country, cross-cultural conflict can occur between groups separated by cultural boundaries, and groups can even be further subdivided into subcultures in more complex and differentiated societies. Multicultural societies, in essence, hold individuals who maintain overlapping and multiple group memberships.

In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington takes an inter-cultural perspective in predicting sources of conflict. For him, economic and ideological issues are no longer the driving forces between societies.<sup>7</sup> Instead, culture is the broad manifestation of flashpoints, and what drives the differences between states. Fault lines are the contact points of cultural differences and nation-states are still the aggregates or agents of culture even if other international actors are becoming more visible. Cultures include Western, Latin American, Orthodox, Islamic and Hindu, among others. Culture (represented by history, language, and religion) are so ingrained and long-standing that they will not easily disappear, and will act subtly, if not directly on political behavior and foreign policies.<sup>8</sup>

## **STRUCTURAL/DEVELOPMENT/MODERNIZATION THEORIES**

Structural-development-modernization approaches have many derivatives but the basic concepts revolve around two ideas including: 1) societies evolve economically via a series of stages or steps; and 2) these stages can differ in degrees and patterns of social differentiation across societies.<sup>9</sup> Modernization

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<sup>4</sup> Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press.

<sup>5</sup> Avruch, Kevin. Cross cultural conflict.

<http://www.eolss.net/ebooks/Sample%20Chapters/C14/E1-40-01-01.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Huntington, S. P. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations. *Foreign Affairs* 72(3).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> See “Modernization theory”

theory posits that present day developing societies have yet to achieve the sophisticated economic status that developed societies have. Developing societies will evolve when complex Western technology appears and alters traditional structural and cultural features extant in the developing society.

According to one scholar, the first stage (traditional society) of development is marked by a subsistence economy, agricultural activities, simple commodity barter and very little technology.<sup>10</sup> The second stage is the transition and is a precondition for takeoff due to greater economic specialization and transport of goods across larger territories, increasing wealth and savings, and, importantly, investment.<sup>11</sup> The third stage is the economic takeoff when industry replaces agriculture as the primary employment sector and manufacturing creates a middle class with savings.<sup>12</sup> Critically, new political institutions form that can represent various sectors of society to promote pluralism and democracy. Stages four and five are characterized by greater economic diversification and technology, leading to greater wealth, mass consumption and leisure activities along with the state taking on a larger role in public education and welfare provision.<sup>13</sup> The service sector is now much larger and manufacturing activity relocates outside of the country due to lower wage requirements there.

Industrialization within a developing society not only changes economic production and planning but significantly alters social and political life as well. Changes are more profound because industrializing societies tend to have greater increasing levels of education, urbanization, larger middle classes and greater economic equality and mobility, relatively speaking.<sup>14</sup> These factors tend to increase political mobilization, liberalization and eventually democratization.<sup>15</sup>

Offshoots of the modernization approach include dependency/underdevelopment theory that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Academics such as Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Faletto Enzo<sup>16</sup> emphasized that non-Western societies could not be compared to early European societies during the Industrial Revolution because European countries did not face the geostrategic pressure of self-interested superpower states in the international system that could impact their respective development cycles. In contrast, developing countries in the 20th century had to contend with developed societies, several of which had grown into superpowers, that

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<http://edu.learnsoc.org/Chapters/3%20theories%20of%20sociology/11%20modernization%20theory.htm>

<sup>10</sup> Rostow, W.W. 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Lipset, Seymour. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy. *American Political Science Review* 53(1):69-105.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Faletto Enzo. 1979. *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. . University of California Press.

sometimes interfered with or hindered any natural progress of developing countries.

According to the theory, countries in Latin America, Asia or Africa often stayed in an “underdeveloped” stage and therefore an inferior status. With developing societies, bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin America became puppets and useful to developed economies such as the United States because political order was maintained there while economic surpluses could be derived to the betterment of North American interests, but to the detriment of South American ones.<sup>17</sup>

During the structural/economic changes that transpire during development, human actors become more important than just mere factors of production. In fact, economic growth and industrialization were reliant upon the social forces in a country and not just the actual wealth that is created by them. At the same time, economic and political change cannot be generalized as homogeneous across countries but rather is contingent upon factors that either better promote industrialization and modern political institutions, or hinder them.

Great Britain and the United States were special in that a bourgeois (or middle class) revolution promoted a perfect balance against the central government, promoted commercial agriculture while weakening large landowners, balancing with the large peasant and later industrial classes in the city, and encouraging changes while breaking with past societal practices.<sup>18</sup> Mass movements among social classes became key considerations for governments as average citizens were now more relevant social actors.

Without the larger middle classes, other societies such as France, Germany, Japan and even the Soviet Union, industrialized through a different path, resulting in both different political institutions and types of economies. The French peasantry kept much more political power than did either English or American farmers while more expansive Fascist governments in Germany and Japan co-opted urban and rural workers in an effort to modernize the economy. It is the timing of industrialization in relation to the social structure that is vital during development.

## **INSTITUTIONALIST/ STATE-DRIVEN/SYSTEM THEORIES**

Broadly speaking, institutions are the human-designed constraints that “structure political, economic and social interaction that can consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and

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<sup>17</sup> O'Donnell, Guillermo A.. 1973. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*. University of California Press.

<sup>18</sup> Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.

formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)".<sup>19</sup> Historically, institutions serve to create the more certainty and order that are necessary for economic market viability (i.e. having existing clear transaction and production costs) while extending past behavior with the present and the future. Institutions are incrementally built and often reflect the incentive structure of the economy. They are simply put, the "rules of the game".<sup>20</sup>

Political institutions are vital because they shape and constrain political behavior and decision-making, and even the perceptions and power of elites. Institutions regulate human actors in their political struggles and governance relationships with one another, and these institutions can include party systems and electoral rules, government bureaucracies, parliaments, constitutions, judiciaries and other large institutional complexes making up the "state".<sup>21</sup>

More specialized political institutions are critical to the function of a modern society and usually reflect the history, culture and economic progress of a society. The rules of the game of governance and rule of law vary across state lines and act as a filter for social change and stability. Consociationalism is a method of governance for segmented, heterogeneous (or more pluralistic) societies to share power across the electorate.

Majoritarian/pluralistic societies may be more homogeneous ethnically, religiously or ideologically, and therefore utilize first-past-the post electoral procedures and two-party systems.<sup>22</sup> In contrast, consensus democracies prefer multiparty systems, parliamentarism with oversized (and therefore inclusive) cabinet coalitions, proportional electoral systems, and corporatist (hierarchical) interest group structures.<sup>23</sup>

The state as an institutional actor also acts as a regulator on market/economic growth and behavior. It also competes with private investors in a demiurge role to better utilize local capital.<sup>24</sup> A midwife state actively promotes new industries and might even maintain that industry long-term in a husbandry role.<sup>25</sup> Developmental states such as Japan and Korea created export-led growth success stories but most developing states fall somewhere between the predation model common in Africa and developmental model.<sup>26</sup> Brazil extensively used political rather than meritocratic employment overall but small "pockets of efficiency" encouraged growth even among significant political corruption.<sup>27</sup> India's venerable

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<sup>19</sup> North, Douglas.1991. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(1):97-112.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Bell, Stephen. Institutionalism: Old and New.

<http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.php?pid=UQ:9699&dsID=Institutionalism.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> Lijphart, Arend.1999. *Patterns of democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Evans, Peter.1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

bureaucratic tradition became stifled by the lack of state embeddedness in society and its poor capacity to undertake developmental tasks.

## **TRANSITIONS/ELITE BARGAINING/SOCIAL MOVEMENTS THEORIES**

Another theoretical perspective of political change focuses on the opposing actor of the state in society, that is, the citizen and the citizen aggregated into groups. Citizens and citizen groups comprise social movements that can be collective challenges to political elites, to the state, or to competing groups by citizens with common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, social movements can be a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others.<sup>29</sup>

Social movements can be represented by non-governmental organization, a church, or a civil protest. Movements can be broken down into three components: 1) Campaigns that are more organized and sustained public efforts in making claims with the legal authorities, usually the state; 2) repertoires of contention that include special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering; and 3) citizens' public representation that is measured by worthiness, unity, size and by strength of commitment.<sup>30</sup>

Social actors (citizens, groups, etc.) act and react within the context of a society bound by culture, institutions and to some extent, the level of economic development. When actors mobilize via civil society, social capital or another device, they often utilize political opportunity/processes to make themselves heard. Some societies are more conducive for social movement activities (labor union recruitment in a highly industrialized country), but not all societies are equally so.

Mobilization opportunity can rely on the actual size of the social movement, its organizational funding or resources, or the number of concessions a state gives the movement.<sup>31</sup> These actual opportunities include: more access to political decision-making; any weakness in ruling elites' control; having access to the

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<sup>28</sup> Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

<sup>29</sup> Tilly, Charles. 2004. *Social Movements, 1768–2004*. Boulder, CO. Paradigm Publishers.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Meyer, David S. and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. Conceptualizing Political Opportunity". *Social Forces* 82 (4):1457–92.

See also Douglas McAdam. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press" and Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper. 1999. Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory. *Sociological Forum* 14(1) 27–54.

political elites; and acting versus a weakening state that can no longer suppress societal mobilization.<sup>32</sup>

When political transitions do occur due to the weakness of the state and strength of political opportunities, the likelihood that democracy will emerge is even more remote unless additional conditions are met. In other words, civil society alone cannot guarantee a democracy, Having strong intellectual organizations, neighborhood associations, women's groups, religious groupings and civic associations from all socioeconomic classes such as entrepreneurial groups, trade unions, lawyers and journalists is necessary but not sufficient to complete democratization. Complementing civil society are political society, economic society, rule of law and state institutions that can effectively balance out civil society actors in a harmonious (if not complex) balance. Ordinary citizens not part of a coherently acting social group are also vital in that they are on the street visibly demonstrating for change and making new demands while criticizing the status quo.

The actual political changeover that transpires among political elites can vary with several methods as transition events in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Latin America can attest.<sup>33</sup> Yet, a common element across societies is the existence of political hardliners (or radicals) and moderates, within both the government and the opposition, opposing players who negotiate and bargain for power. Transitional bargaining among political elites historically has resulted in roughly a one third balance between a new-found democracy, democratic consolidation within the existing government, or continuing the status quo authoritarian government.<sup>34</sup>

Additionally, the transition itself can be distinguished by two similar but not identical processes, political liberalization, which implies an easing of repression and extension of civil liberties within an authoritarian regime, and democratization, that refers to a movement toward democracy and a specific move toward a different political regime.<sup>35</sup>

Generally, the four broad theoretical approaches in explaining political change all have some applicability in most historical examples but no one approach can completely explain change in a society. More often, a combination of factors derived from the four theoretical approaches likely promotes any changes.

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1997. Problems of Democratic Transition: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

<sup>34</sup> See Gretchen Casper and Michelle Taylor. 1996. Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from authoritarian rule. University of Pittsburgh Press.

<sup>35</sup> Mainwaring, Scott. 1989. Transitions to democracy and democratic consolidation: Theoretical and comparative issues. Working Paper #130.

The following cases are drawn from five different geographic regions and demonstrate examples of possible explanatory causes of political change. These include Thailand (Southeast Asia), Venezuela (Latin America), Pakistan (South Asia), Madagascar (Sub-Saharan Africa) and Ukraine (Eurasia).

## CASES OF AUTHORITARIAN BACKSLIDING

Asia

### Thailand

The 2006 Thai military coup removed the then-government from power and broke a 15-year period of civilian control, democracy and relative political stability.<sup>36</sup> The cause of the military intervention lies in the political conflict between supporters of two large societal factions, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the People's Power Party (PPP), and the elites associated with each. PAD (or the "yellow shirts") represent the media, social activists, academics, and leaders of worker's unions who all claimed the PPP controlled all political institutions and abused authority, human rights and free press.<sup>37</sup> The populist PPP (or "red shirts") had support, and still does, from the north, Central, and Northeastern regions, and had promoted the populist, social welfare policies of the former Thai Rak Thai (TRT) government. The PPP folded in 2008 with its rank and file forming a new Pheu Thai Party, an organization that currently has significant electoral support.<sup>38</sup> Thaksin Shinawatra, who is the symbolic leader of the red shirts, is banned from Thailand, thus keeping a large part of the electorate from having true political representation.<sup>39</sup>

### THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR BACKSLIDE:

**Structural/Modernization and/or Culture** - Conflict due to economic divisions and sectoral clashes between urban/educated citizens and citizens from other parts of the country.

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<sup>36</sup> See Polity IV Regime trends. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/thi2.htm>

<sup>37</sup> "With Premier at U.N., Thai Military Stages Coup", September 20, 2006 *New York Times*. By Seth Mydans and Thomas Fuller. [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/world/asia/20thailand.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/world/asia/20thailand.html?_r=0)

<sup>38</sup> See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s\\_Power\\_Party\\_\(Thailand\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Power_Party_(Thailand))

<sup>39</sup> "Thailand's politics - Whatever happened to Thaksin?", *Economist*, 12/08/12.

<http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21568000-former-prime-ministers-allies-concede-there-no-easy-way-get-him-home-whatever-happened?zid=306&ah=1b164dbd43b0cb27ba0d4c3b12a5e227>

**Institutional** - Electoral bodies do not represent competing interests well enough to prevent violence on the street, resulting in military intervention.

**Transitions/social movements** - Civil society is vibrant but elite bargaining is ineffective in representing demands of two large factions. A lack of power sharing prevents a truly legitimate government, resulting in conflict.

#### **PROGRAMMATIC APPROACHES:**

- 1) Conflict resolution program to reduce intra-societal divisions between dominant factions.
- 2) Institutional reform to address shortcomings in political representation of all social movements simultaneously.

### Latin America and the Caribbean

#### **Venezuela**

Venezuela was a stable democracy for over forty years after it transitioned from its last military dictatorship in 1958. Its oil exports provided wealth to build a solid infrastructure, education system, a growing middle class and diversifying economy. The center-right, center left, two party system was broad enough to capture most citizens' votes and the country prospered.<sup>40</sup> Unfortunately, at least four distinct authoritarian backslides would result, in large part because of economic troubles. By the late 1980s, the floundering economy worsened, characterized by decreasing oil revenue, rising unemployment, inflation, food prices and debt.<sup>41</sup> The formerly stable two-party system could no longer justify prosperity as an excuse to avoid political reform, and politicians appeared out of touch and/or extremely corrupt.

In 1998, a former army colonel, Hugo Chavez, who led a coup effort against the government, won election in an anti-status quo campaign buttressed by the majority of Venezuelans. Through his Bolivarian Revolution, Chavez installed a new populist constitution and increased spending on social programs to garner support from poor and rural voters. But at the same time, he alienated private businesses, the intelligentsia and many in the middle class. From 2002 (when Chavez was briefly forced out of office by the opposition) onward, he generally

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<sup>40</sup> Library of Congress Country Study: Venezuela.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

found enough backing by the army and his very visible constituents to hold onto office.

In 2010, he bypassed oppositional checks and incorporated his political militia into the military; eliminated the autonomy of the central bank; and won a subsequent referendum to abolish term limits.<sup>42</sup> His 2013 death did not end the Venezuelan dictatorship since he institutionalized what is an autocratic, legacy in the *chavista* state, along with a successor/protege in Nicolás Maduro.

### **THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR BACKSLIDE:**

**Institutional** - Venezuela's pacted<sup>43</sup> democracy from 1958 did not account for new socio-economic actors or social movements that would arise later, and make demands on the state that no longer had adequate resources. Chavez also altered or distorted many of the checks and balances that had facilitated a stable two-party democracy for years

**Structural/Modernization-** Even with a substantial middle class, Venezuela's deteriorating economic conditions in the 1980s/90s exacerbated income inequalities and labor/business cleavages, causing the primary political crisis.

**Transitions/Social movements** - The new labor unions and populist supporters wildly succeeded in promoting Chavez. These sectors represent a unified challenge to a society that did not exist when Venezuela prospered under a two-party democratic system.

### **PROGRAMMATIC APPROACHES:**

- 1) Conflict resolution programs to reduce intra-societal divisions between business and labor factions, rural and urban and other sectors.
- 2) Institutional reform to address shortcomings in political representation of all social movements simultaneously.
- 3) Privatization of oil sector, diversification of economy and public administration reform along with anti/corruption efforts.

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<sup>42</sup> "Showing his true colours", *Economist*, 12/21/10.

<sup>43</sup> For Karl, a pact is a compromise among different political groups that usually leads to corporatist or a consociational democracy, both are collusive multi-party agreements that are determined by the original bargains. See Terry Lynn Karl, 1990. *Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America*.

<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&ved=0CFQQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.chsbs.cmich.edu%2Ffatah%2Fsum%2FKarl.doc&ei=ajHDUaCBINOz4AO-4DYAw&usg=AFQjCNE5AwcT9legheiL4luXq36BQ0N0qw>

## Eastern Europe and Eurasia

### Ukraine

The Republic of Ukraine has a short political history, having formed as a separate nation-state in 1991, after the dissolution of the USSR. Institutionally, the 1992 Ukrainian Constitution designed a multi-party system and civil and political rights for citizens and minorities, but changes in 1996, 2004 and again in 2010, altered those electoral rules.<sup>44, 45</sup>

More recently, Ukrainian institutions have appeared more vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation by political elites, including a judiciary and parliament deemed weak and personalized, and a media too weak to check the overly centralized state.<sup>46, 47</sup> Civil society demonstrated its vitality while protesting corruption electoral fraud in the 2004 Orange Revolution and eventually reversed the presidential election results, giving Viktor Yushchenko victory over Viktor Yanukovich. Yanukovich eventually won office in 2010, an event that was claimed as a step back for true democracy by the opposition candidate Yulia Tymoshenko.<sup>48</sup> The populist demonstrations evident in the Orange Revolution are now a thing of the past with a reintroduction of authoritarian practices, and a reconsolidation of power in the hands of former autocratic elites,<sup>49</sup> occurrences that most thought were unlikely due to the proximity of the European Union and power of accession conditionality.<sup>50</sup>

Ukraine is a group of countries deemed as “competitive authoritarian” in that formal democratic institutions exist but they are usually ineffective because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution came about due to internal variables such civil society and low organizational capacity, but also importantly, external variables such as the influence of Western countries.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Laws of Ukraine. Verkhovna Rada decree No. 2222-IV: About the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine. Passed on 2004-12-08. (Ukrainian)

<sup>45</sup> Update: Return to 1996 Constitution strengthens president, raises legal questions, *Kyiv Post*, 10/1/10)

<sup>46</sup> Kuzio, Taras. 4/24/09. Populism in Ukraine in Comparative European Context.

<sup>47</sup> Lang, Peter. 2005. Ukraine at a Crossroads.

<sup>48</sup> Yulia Tymoshenko’s address to the people of Ukraine, 2/22/10. Yulia Tymoshenko official website.

<sup>49</sup> See Polity IV Regime Trend. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ukr2.htm>

<sup>50</sup> McCrain, Josh. 2011. Salvaging Democracy in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: The European Neighborhood Policy and Ukraine. <http://www.unc.edu/depts/tam/docs/mccrain-fall11.pdf>

<sup>51</sup> Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

## **THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR BACKSLIDE:**

**Institutional** - Ukraine's constitution, branches of government and electoral institutions are solid on paper but are still evolving and are susceptible to abuse by political elites and corruption. Political parties act more as personal vehicles than representing sectors in civil society.

**Transitions/Social movements** - Civil society is vibrant as demonstrated by the Orange Revolution but lacks the capacity or coherence to maintain long-term pressure, and the resulting need for accountability by the government. The media is not powerful or independent enough to act as a monitor on government for civil society.

**Culture** - There is a sociological and political divide between urban/pro-Western/pro-democracy voters and rural/pro-Russian/nationalistic voters, as well as between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians.

## **PROGRAMMATIC APPROACHES:**

- 1) Institutional reform to enhance the institutional capacities of the branches of government particularly the judiciary and civil service, to reduce the impact of personality-based power.
- 2) Enhance the capacities of civil society groups for long-term sustainability and expand the power of the media.
- 3) Conflict resolution programs to reduce intra-societal divisions between rural and urban and Russian and Ukrainian groups.

## **Sub-Saharan Africa**

### **Madagascar**

Like most of Sub-Saharan African states, Madagascar was a European colony until the middle twentieth century (1960).<sup>52</sup> Philibert Tsiranana became Madagascar's first president in 1959, and was the only candidate in the island nation's first two elections, in 1965 and 1972.<sup>53</sup> A popular uprising then forced him out of office and the army stepped in, resulting in consolidated one-man control during the 1970s through the 1980s as Didier Ratsiraka dominated

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<sup>52</sup> CIA World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ma.html>

<sup>53</sup> "Madagascar: Cranking up a new electoral engine". By Annelie Rozeboom, *Africa in Fact* 06/01/13. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201306051887.html>

politics. He did so until 1993 when open presidential and parliamentary elections ended that control.<sup>54</sup> In 2001 and 2006, Ratsiraka returned to face the challenger Marc Ravalomanana and lost both times in a generally open contest. The trend democratically had been steady improvement after 1996 until a rapid decline in 2009,<sup>55</sup> as restrictions on the opposition media led to disorder on the streets and a subsequent presidential surrender of office to the army. The new caretaker government now consists of the former mayor of the capital city Antananarivo Andry Rajoelina who acts as President.<sup>56</sup>

The political instability in Madagascar eventually spilled over into an economy that had been growing long term, as FDI dropped over a four-year period as income per capita in 2013 fell back to its 2001 level. The World Bank estimates that average Madagascans are among the poorest people in the world relatively speaking, with 92 percent of the population earning less than \$2 a day.<sup>57</sup> The upcoming July 24, 2013 election will be critical in steering the country back on course with preparations having been made a year ago with an elections roadmap agreement after three years of extended negotiations led by the Southern African Development Community (SADC).<sup>58</sup>

## **THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS:**

**Institutional** - Madagascar has a long history of very weak electoral and governmental institutions reflected by the lack of voter participation and long tenure that presidents have served. The executive branch dominates the legislative and judicial branches and the military is not professionalized to the point to where it is institutionally objective and remains out of politics. Voters do not seem to have strong political identities due to a lack of economic specialization in society.

**Structural/Modernization-** Madagascar is still relatively rural and underdeveloped and has not evolved to the point of providing the necessary urban professional and industrial/managerial positions that form the backbone of a large middle class needed to stabilize a modern political electorate. Political and social instability are the results.

**Cultural** - The country is ethnically and religiously heterogeneous although those cleavages do not seem to be driving social conflict to the degree in many African countries.

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Polity IV Regime Trend. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/mag2.htm>

<sup>56</sup> "Madagascar: Measuring the Impact of the Political Crisis". World Bank Press Release. 6/5/13. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201306110871.html>

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Rozeboom, 06/01/13..

## PROGRAMMATIC APPROACHES:

- 1) Job training and education to promote diversification and modernization of the economy and to reduce unemployment.
- 2) Civic education in schools to inculcate political identities and the importance of citizenry in a society.
- 3) Security sector professionalization and training for the military to instill the proper roles for the army and police forces during times of economic and social instability.

## South Asia

### Pakistan

Pakistan's governments have alternated between military and civilian rule throughout the country's history, and the democratic period between 1988-1999 started with the election of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister.<sup>59</sup> Her government would be twice dismissed by the president, twice due to corruption charges leveled, and a new PM (Nawaz Sharif), elected by the voters in 1997.<sup>60</sup> In October 1999, PM Sharif ordered the replacement of Chief of Army Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Pervez Musharraf<sup>61</sup>, a move that resulted in the General proclaiming a national state of emergency, a Provisional Constitutional Order, and the arrest of PM Sharif.<sup>62</sup> In 2001, Musharraf became President while remaining Army Chief of Staff and subsequently won a referendum on his presidency, granting him five more years in the job. In 2013, the civilian-led government of Raja Pervez Ashraf had survived five years as a democratically-chosen government. A part of Ashraf's tenure stability is explained by his strong leadership and the army's desire to remain out of leadership, despite the existing obstacles of power outages and food shortages, terror attacks in city centers and increased violence directed at the Shiite minority.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> See Polity IV Regime Trends <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/pak2.htm>

<sup>60</sup> Pakistan: A political timeline. Aljazeera.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2012/01/20121181235768904.html>

<sup>61</sup> "Pakistan Calm After Coup; Leading General Gives No Clue About How He Will Rule". by Dugger, Celia W. *New York Times*. October 14, 1999.

<sup>62</sup> "Pakistan Judges Refuse Oath Demanded by Pakistan's Rulers". *Waycross Journal-Herald*. January 31, 2000.

<sup>63</sup> "Pakistani government makes history: 5 years of political survival" by Nasir Habib and Saeed Ahmed, CNN. March 17, 2013.

<http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/17/world/asia/pakistan-politics>

## **THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS:**

**Structural/Modernization-** Pakistan has a sizable middle class but also suffers from extreme income inequality and a chronic macroeconomic malaise that prevents wealth from spreading to rural areas and to poor urban residents.

**Institutional** - Pakistan has a long history of stable, electoral and governance institutions inherited from its colonial past but corruption is pervasive both at the federal and local levels. Even with democratic principles and practices, societal crises caused by economic and noneconomic factors have often resulted in the army's intervention in politics to maintain order and prevent further instability.

**Cultural** - Pakistan is historically ethnically and religiously heterogeneous and as a result, clashes between Muslims and Hindus and Sikhs ,and between Shiites and Sunnis, are frequent.

## **PROGRAMMATIC APPROACHES:**

- 1) Job training and education to promote diversification and modernization of economy is crucial especially in rural areas in in large cities where unemployment and a lack of skills are high.
- 2) Despite a decades-long existence of strong state organs/institutions left by a colonial power, electoral and governance reform is necessary to address issues of corruption at the local, provincial and central level. Political parties are very weak and don't serve to create stable political identities but rather serve as political elite vehicles of clientelism.
- 3) Conflict resolution programs to reduce intra-societal divisions between ethnic and religious groups and between business and labor factions, rural and urban and other sectors.

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