



Knowledge
Attitudes
Practices
Survey on the
Sri Lankan Peace Process

FOR THE SAKE OF A
JUST AND LASTING PEACE

Final **R**eport
Social **I**ndicator - **C**entre for **P**olicy **A**lternatives

2003



Academy for Educational Development

This report was prepared with technical and financial support provided by the Academy for Educational Development with financing from the United States Government through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under Associate Award Cooperative Agreement Number 386-A-00-03-00012-00 for the "Sri Lanka Peace Support Project". The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development.



Foreword

Ultimately, the durability of any peace process and the agreements made through it crucially depends on public support and legitimacy. This in turn is a product of the knowledge, attitudes and perceptions people have of the process and agreements made. Hence the survey by Social Indicator (SI) the Survey Unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) a public policy centre focusing on peace and governance through programmes of research and advocacy.

This Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS) of the peace process was made possible by the financial assistance of the Academy for Educational Development (AED) and the technical support of William Mishler, Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, US and Steven Finkel, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, US, which CPA-SI gratefully acknowledges. Their collaboration with us has greatly enhanced our capacity building and deepened our understanding of the challenges posed by this crucial dimension of the peace process. It has also augmented our continuing survey programme on public attitudes towards peace and a political settlement, the Peace Confidence Index (PCI), now in its 16th wave as the longest uninterrupted survey on peace in Sri Lanka. Congratulations to Pradeep and the SI team, whose energy, enthusiasm, commitment and expertise have made the KAPS survey a distinctive

and invaluable tool for peace building in Sri Lanka.

CPA -SI sincerely hope that the results of the KAPS survey will inform decision making and advocacy efforts with regard to a political settlement and peace in Sri Lanka. We see the value of the KAPS survey as being a channel through which the hopes and fears of the public will be filtered into Track One level decision making and thereby provide the information necessary for an inclusive peace. Likewise, we see the KAPS survey as a catalyst for more targeted advocacy and intervention at the level of civil society, to ensure greater understanding and subscription to the overarching objective of a negotiated political and constitutional settlement.

The KAPS survey is a part of our contribution in fulfillment of CPA -SI's mandate of advancing democratic peace and governance in Sri Lanka. We hope it will be the public good, we intend it to be, of value and utility to all those who share our mandate.

Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu

Executive Director

Centre for Policy Alternatives



Acknowledgements

This report was prepared by Mr. Pradeep Peiris and his team at Social Indicator, with technical support and inputs from Dr. William Mishler, University of Arizona; Dr. Stephen Finkel, University of Virginia; Dr. Jeff Galati, Wellesley College, US; Ms. Gwendolyn G. Bevis, Program Associate, AED/Washington; and Mr. Kim J. DeRidder, Chief of Party, AED/Sri Lanka.

Additional guidance for KAP survey design and questionnaire for this project was provided by the KAPS Steering Committee, which includes: Dr. P. Saravanamuttu, CPA; Mr. Ketheshwaran Loganathan, CPA; Dr. Jehan Perera, National Peace Council and Dr. Selvy Thiruchandran, WERC.

Further support, suggestions, and input during the survey process was provided by the KAPS Advisory Committee, which comprise of: Ms. Anberiya Haniffa, MWRAF; Dr John Gooneratne, SCOPP; Mr. Dev Annand Ramaiah, UNDP; Mr. S. Balakrishnan, NPC; Mr. Andres Wiederkehr, Helvetas; Mr. Phil Esmonde, Oxfam GB; Mr. Joe William, CIDA; Mr. Shiral Lakthilaka, Ministry of Constitutional Affairs; Mr. Rukshan Fernando, SEDEC; Mr. Kingsley Rodrigo, PAFFREL.

Kim De Ridder
Chief of Party
Academy for Educational Development



Contents

Executive Summary 7

Preface 9

Introduction 10

For the Sake of Peace 12

A. Support for Peace Proposals 13

B. Protesting Unfair Peace Proposals 15

C. Peace Agreement Activists and Opponents 16

D. Ethnicity, Region and Political Parties 18

Beyond Ethnicity 20

A. Demographics: 21

B. Ethnic Interaction and Identity: 22

C. Tolerance and Democratic Values 24

D. Political and Civic Engagement 26

E. Support for Government Institutions and Performance 29

F. Perceived Benefits of Peace 31

Within Ethnicity 34

A. Explaining Attitudes Toward Peace: The Sinhala 33

B. Explaining Attitudes Toward Peace: Tamils 38

C. Explaining Attitudes Toward Peace: Up-Country Tamils 40

D. Explaining Attitudes Toward Peace: Muslims 43

Communicating for Peace 44

Summary and Recommendations 48

APPENDIX A: Survey Methods and Questionnaire 54

APPENDIX B: Focus Group Report 57

NOTES 79

APPENDIX C: The Survey Instrument



Executive Summary

To understand the nature, extent, and underlying dynamics of public support for the peace negotiations in Sri Lanka, the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS) interviewed a nationwide probability sample of 2,980 citizens in June 2003. The survey focused on public support for a variety of specific proposals⁴ that might be included in a final agreement "for the sake of peace" (including federalism, guaranteed minority representation in Parliament, and decommissioning of Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) heavy weapons). It also focused on the willingness of citizens to protest a final agreement that they considered unfair. This report summarizes the analyses of these data, supplemented by the results of a series of Focus Groups Discussions across the country designed to augment the survey results. Among the highlights of the report:

- Sri Lankans are divided about the peace process. They are divided about how far they are willing to compromise for the sake of peace, and they are divided regarding their readiness to protest a peace agreement they consider to be unfair.

- Most Sri Lankans are willing to make at least some changes in the status quo for the sake of peace, and a substantial minority is willing to make multiple changes. Proposals⁴ to strengthen minority rights receive the broadest support, including a proposal to guarantee proportional representation for minorities in parliament. Opinions are divided on federalism, but there is little support for asymmetric federalism, amnesty, or a ro-

tating presidency.

- When confronted with specific trade-offs in the peace process, Sri Lankans are remarkably accepting. For example, while Sri Lankans are divided on removing High Security Zones and the decommissioning of LTTE heavy weapons, a majority accepts both proposals⁴ when they are tied together.

- Overall two-thirds of Sri Lankans either embrace multiple proposals for peace or indicate they are willing to accept (i.e., unwilling to protest) a final agreement even if they do not think that it is fair.

- Ethnic differences in attitudes toward the peace process loom predictably large. The great majority of Sinhala respondents opposes most peace proposals⁴ while the great majority of Tamils, Up-Country Tamils and Muslims support the majority of peace proposals.

- The Sinhala majority, however, is far from monolithic. A substantial minority supports multiple peace proposals. A majority of those opposed to most proposals are relatively apathetic and are not prepared to protest a final peace agreement even if they consider it unfair.

- The Tamil, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim minority communities have relatively modest demands. While they strongly favor a federal solution, they largely reject asymmetric federalism, a rotating presidency, and amnesty.

- The strongest opposition to the peace proposals is concentrated not in the

South but in the North Central and North West regions bordering LTTE-controlled territory.

□ Opposition to the peace proposals is strongest in the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), but even here, there is surprising diversity and strong pockets of support.

□ Government concerns about "selling" a peace agreement to United National Party (UNP) supporters appear exaggerated. Three quarters of party members either support multiple peace proposals or say they will not protest an agreement that includes them.

□ Support for multiple peace proposals increases decreases with age and income.

□ Support is greatest among those with the most and least contact with other ethnic groups. Substantial ethnic integration facilitates peace, but a little bit of contact is a dangerous thing.

□ Those most interested in politics and those most aware of and knowledgeable about the peace process are substantially more supportive of multiple proposals.

□ Support for multiple peace agreements increases with public confidence in the Prime Minister and Parliament, but decreases with public support for the President.

□ The great majority of citizens expect that a peace agreement will pay important dividends. Those who do are much more likely to support multiple peace proposals.

□ Sri Lankans, and especially the Sinhala, think that economic benefits are the most likely result of peace. However, those who think that peace will bring a reduction in violence, greater personal security and increased

individual freedoms are much more likely to support multiple proposals for the sake of peace.

□ Sri Lankans rely on television for most of their news, but those who rely more on radio for their news are better informed and more likely to support multiple peace proposals.

□ There are good reasons for optimism about the demand for peace and the willingness of the public in Sri Lanka to embrace a just and lasting peace agreement. There is much that can be done both in the short and long run to increase demands for peace and to mitigate opposition to a final peace agreement.



Preface

Opinion surveys are instruments of empowerment. They provide the means by which the silent majority of the public can express opinions on the issues affecting them, thereby informing government and influencing public policy debates. Social Indicator (SI), the polling unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), introduced the Peace Confidence Index (PCI), an Island-wide bi-monthly survey, in order to capture the changes over time in public perception of the peace process. Begun in May 2001, PCI has become a credible index for parties who support as well as oppose the current peace process. Importantly, PCI methodology is sensitive to current political developments assessing both national and ethnic perspectives on the peace process.

While the PCI provides an excellent barometer of overall patterns and trends in public support for the peace process, it is limited in the information it can provide with regard to WHO supports and opposes the peace process, both in general and with respect to specific proposals that have been advanced or might be advanced in the negotiations. It also is limited in explaining WHY different groups support or oppose different peace initiatives. In order to build on the PCI and develop an instrument that will provide more detailed information on the backgrounds, attitudes, and behavior of peace proponents and opponents, SI has undertaken Sri Lanka's first ever Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS) on the peace process, with the support of the Academy for Educational Development (AED) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition to

providing a deeper, richer understanding of the peace process in Sri Lanka, a principal purpose of KAPS is to build the capacity of both government and civil society organizations and institutions to understand and better meet the interests, needs and concerns of the public with regard to the current peace process.

The idea underlying KAPS is to go beyond the ethnic and partisan divisions in Sri Lanka to identify and understand in a more subtle and nuanced way the most ardent supporters of peace and the most likely opponents. While newspaper reports and the conventional wisdom typically treat parties and ethnic groups as politically homogeneous, there often is considerable diversity of opinion within such groups.

For example, while the official position of an opposition party may be to oppose the peace process, it is possible, even likely, that there are substantial numbers of individuals and significant subgroups within the party who support the peace process and are willing to embrace as least some changes in the political status quo if they would contribute to a just and lasting peace. By identifying these individuals and understanding their motivations it may be possible for the government to design a package of peace proposals that can draw much broader political support both inside and outside the party. It also may be possible for governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to use this information to develop communication campaigns that target specific audiences and provide education about the peace process that focuses on different groups' specific interests and concerns.

Opinion surveys are instruments of empowerment. They provide the means by which the silent majority of the public can express their opinions on the issues affecting them, thereby informing government and influencing public policy debates.



Introduction

Additionally, since difficult compromises are inevitable, the achievement of a just and lasting peace will require the concerted efforts of the government, the LTTE, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders in the process to explain and defend to their supporters both the fairness of the negotiation process and the necessity of the compromises made to achieve an agreement.

The citizens of Sri Lanka long for a just and lasting peace. Having endured two decades of civil war while suffering 65,000 casualties, massive economic disruption, and untold heartache, Sri Lankans today overwhelmingly embrace the current ceasefire and express an abiding desire to see a permanent peace agreement negotiated between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Hope, however, although a vital resource, is not sufficient in itself to produce a settlement of this enduring conflict. Despite an overwhelming desire for peace, Sri Lankans express many different and often conflicting opinions regarding the specific elements that should be included in a final agreement. Almost inevitably, the achievement of a permanent peace agreement will require difficult negotiations and potentially painful compromises from all parties on a number of issues involving both fundamental principles as well as administrative detail. This requires that those at the negotiating table avoid easy stereotypes and understand in some depth the attitudes of citizens on all sides of the conflict, what the different groups hope to achieve in a final peace agreement and, especially, what they are willing to sacrifice to achieve those aspirations. It also requires that negotiators understand what compromises citizens are willing to accept in the interest of peace and, just as importantly, what fundamental beliefs they are willing to fight to protect.

Additionally, since difficult compromises are inevitable, the achievement of a just and lasting peace will require the concerted efforts of the government, the LTTE, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders in the process to explain and defend to their supporters both the fairness of the negotiation process and the necessity of the compromises made to achieve an agreement. This requires that stakeholders understand both the underlying values and concerns of their supporters and how best to frame the compromises in the final peace agreement in order to secure the widest possible public support.

In order to better understand Sri Lankan attitudes about the peace process, Social Indicator, a non-partisan survey research center associated with the Centre for Policy Alternatives in Colombo, undertook a nationwide survey of the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAPS) of Sri Lanka citizens with respect to the peace process. The survey was supported in part by a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with technical assistance provided by the Academy for Educational Development (AED). The KAP survey, which complements and extends the longer running Peace Confidence Index (PCI)¹, was administered in June 2003.

The KAP survey interviewed a total of 2,980 individuals, face to face, in all government-controlled areas of the country. Minority ethnic group members were systematically over-sampled,

and interviews were conducted with 494 Tamil, 439 Up-Country Tamil and 472 Muslims. The resulting sample was subsequently weighted to achieve a national probability sample that also insured the availability of sufficient numbers of ethnic minorities to allow meaningful subgroup analyses. Although restrictions on the administration of the survey prevented the conduct of any interviews in areas controlled by the LTTE, analysis of Tamil attitudes toward the peace process in diverse areas of the country show no significant differences among Tamils living in different areas. Appendix A provides additional details on the survey methodology. Appendix C provides an English version of the survey instrument.

To complement the KAP survey, Social Indicator conducted a series of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) at selected locations across the country to clarify a variety of issues that were raised during initial analyses of the KAPS results and to probe several issues in more depth. Specifically, SI conducted FGDs in the areas of Colombo, Galle, Talawakelle, Amparai, Batticaloa, Pollonnaruwa and Jaffna, covering the Sinhala, Tamil, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim communities. The selected areas were those where preliminary analysis of the survey showed the most interesting, unexpected, or controversial results. Participants for these groups were selected from the KAP survey respondent list using a quota system to ensure the representation of men and women from different age categories. All FGDs were ethnically homogeneous and were moderated by a person from the same ethnic community. Dictaphones were used with the approval of participants to supplement the notes taken during each session. Appendix B provides a complete report of the Focus Group results.

This report summarizes the results of the KAP survey as augmented by the Focus Group results. The report is not encyclopedic; the survey is far too large and rich to be covered fully in 80 pages. Instead, the report focuses on those aspects of the survey that most directly

address public opinion about the peace process and the prospects for negotiating a just and lasting peace. The report begins by summarizing the attitudes of Sri Lankan citizens towards the peace process and especially towards various proposals that might provide a basis for a negotiated peace settlement. Particular attention focuses on the concessions citizens are willing to make in the interest of peace and also on their willingness to protest a settlement they consider to be unjust or unfair. The report proceeds to build a Peace Process Typology, distinguishing between citizens who are willing and unwilling to consider changes in the political status quo in order to achieve a peace agreement, while also distinguishing between those willing and unwilling to protest an unfair agreement. The typology is then used to explore the dynamics of the peace process by examining the ethnic, territorial, and partisan similarities and differences across the four peace types.

Given that ethnic differences loom large in explaining outlooks on peace in Sri Lanka, a second section of the report looks "Beyond Ethnicity," exploring other social and attitudinal factors that help account for different attitudes toward peace. A third section, "Within Ethnicity," goes further, exploring the dynamics that account for differences within each of the major ethnic groups that explain attitudes towards peace. A fourth section briefly discusses the media usage of different sectors of the Sri Lankan population in order to assist those who would like to communicate with particular segments of the country's population. A final section provides a summary and recommendations.



For the Sake of Peace

War is about victory and loss. Compromise, by contrast, is the essence of negotiation. Twenty years of civil war in Sri Lanka has produced far more losses than victories and arguably has left all parties worse off than the period before hostilities began. Negotiation offers opportunities to achieve a solution that will produce net benefits to all segments of society and to the country as a whole.

Compromise in the context of a civil war requires the willingness of

the majority to consider changes to the political status quo that will accommodate at least some of the most pressing needs of the minority that is challenging that status quo as unfair and unjust. It also requires that the minority be willing to compromise at least some of its demands in order to accommodate the most pressing needs of the majority. Indeed, the current peace process began in Sri Lanka with agreement on both sides to accept a cease fire and with the concession by the LTTE to explore a settlement to the conflict within a united Sri Lanka.

Table 1
Sri Lankan Opinions on Specific Peace Proposals⁴

Peace Proposal	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	%	%	%	%	%
The powers of regional governments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be decreased.	20.2	23.5	11.6	23.6	21.0
The powers of some regional governments may need to be increased more than others.	8.7	9.4	14.0	31.4	36.5
The rights of local minority groups should be protected even if the majority in the area does not agree.	32.4	44.9	10.6	6.7	5.4
There should be a rotating Presidency, where the President for one term will be someone from one ethnic group, and the next term by someone from a different ethnic group.	13.8	10.2	11.0	15.4	49.5
Each ethnic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the Parliament.	23.6	38.2	12.4	13.1	12.7
There should be a general amnesty for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission.	7.8	17.6	11.4	15.8	47.3

A. Support for Peace Proposals

To ascertain the extent of public support for changes in the political status quo that might meet at least some of the LTTE demands for greater autonomy, the KAP survey included a battery of questions that asked citizens whether, "for the sake of peace," they would be willing to accept a wide variety of proposals for changes in the political status quo. Some of these proposals, such as the adoption of a federal system, have been explicitly discussed in Sri Lanka and are included in some form either in the proposals by the government, the LTTE, or both. Other proposals, such as amnesty and reconciliation, while not currently "on the table" in the Sri Lankan negotiations, have been successfully used in other conflicts (South Africa, Northern Ireland) and offer insights into how far the different groups in Sri Lanka may be willing to go for the sake of peace.

Table 1 reports the percentages of citizens who Strongly Agree, Agree, are undecided (i.e., Neither Agree nor Disagree), Disagree, or Strongly Disagree with six proposals of varying specificity including:

- * The powers of regional governments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be decreased.
- * The powers of some regional governments may need to be increased more than others.
- * The rights of local minority groups should be protected even if the majority in the area does not agree.
- * There should be a rotating Presidency, where the President for one term will be someone from one ethnic group, and the next term someone from a different ethnic group.
- * Each ethnic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the Parliament.

* There should be a general amnesty (that is, freedom from criminal prosecution) for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission.

More than three quarters of Sri Lankans (77%) agree on the most general proposal that (unspecified) guarantees should be provided to protect minorities in an area even if the majority did not agree. More remarkably, only 12% disagree. Of course, this question could be interpreted by Tamils and Up-Country Tamils as protecting them from the overall Sinhala majority in Sri Lanka and could be interpreted by Muslims as offering them protections from a Tamil majority that might control a local region or province in a federal system. Thus, it is a very weak measure of the willingness to compromise.

A substantial majority of citizens also say that, for the sake of peace, they are willing to accept some form of proportional representation based on ethnicity in Sri Lanka's national Parliament. When asked, 62% of respondents agree with the statement that "each ethnic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the Parliament," while only 26% disagree and 12% are undecided. While such a proposal, if implemented, would guarantee minority representation in the Parliament, it also would largely insure that the Sinhala majority would retain a substantial majority of the seats in Parliament, albeit likely divided among several competing Sinhala political parties.

In contrast to the broad consensus on minority rights and representation, opinions are more divided on the fundamental question of decentralizing power to regional governments (see Table 1). Whereas 44% of respondents agree that "the powers of regional governments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be decreased," an equal percentage disagrees, and 21% do so strongly. Opposition to

a decentralized or federal structure is even stronger when combined with the suggestion that some regional governments would be granted greater autonomy than others. Only 18% agreed with the idea known as "asymmetric federalism," whereas 68% oppose the idea, including 37% who are strongly opposed.

There also is only a limited willingness among Sri Lankans to support either a Presidency that rotates among members of different ethnic groups or a general amnesty for war violence. Only 24% of respondents embrace having a "President for one term...from one ethnic group, and the next term...from a different ethnic group." About the same percentage endorses "freedom from criminal prosecution for people who may have committed violence during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission." In both cases the percentage opposing the change in the status quo is substantially larger.

Two other issues that have been discussed in the context of Sri Lankan peace negotiations are the evacuation of High Security Zones (HSZ) and the decommissioning of LTTE weapons, especially their heavy weapons. Typically, LTTE supporters favor evacuation of HSZs while government supporters favor the decommission-


ing of LTTE weapons. While these two proposals are not necessarily linked to one another in negotiations, it is instructive to consider the tradeoff between them as an indication of the willingness to compromise. Evacuating HSZs and decommissioning LTTE weapons are both highly contentious issues that provide a stern test of the willingness of citizens to consider difficult tradeoffs.

Before asking about support for these proposals, the KAP survey asked whether respondents had heard of High Security Zones. In fact, more than a third of Sri Lankans say they have not. Of the 61% who have heard of HSZs, the great majority thinks they are important for national security and should be maintained indefinitely (see Figure 1). This compares to 29% who think that they should be evacuated after conclusion of a final peace treaty. Only 4% think they should be evacuated now, before the negotiations begin, and an equal percentage think that they should be evacuated "in the course of the peace negotiations."

To test Sri Lankans' receptivity to compromise, we asked these same citizens whether LTTE heavy weapons should be placed under control of an international commission in exchange for the evacuation of HSZs. Overall, 30% of those who have heard of HSZs explicitly embrace a compromise in which LTTE weapons are decommissioned "at the same time the government is forced to evacuate the HSZs." More than twice as many citizens (66%) argue, however, that the LTTE should decommission now, without an immediate quid pro quo, while 4% oppose decommissioning under any circumstances (see Figure 1).

The spirit of compromise, however, is somewhat broader than this suggests. Of the 66% of citizens who insist that the LTTE decommission now, 28% would support the evacuation of HSZs after a final peace agreement is signed, and another 2% would be willing to support evacuation of the HSZs sometime

Figure 1- Sri Lankan Opinion on De-commissioning and HSZs



while negotiations were in progress. Overall, 47% of respondents are 'hardliners,' insisting on the evacuation of HSZs or the immediate decommissioning of the LTTE without any concessions in return. A slim majority of citizens, however, are willing to countenance some form of tradeoff involving HSZs and decommissioning depending on the timing.

Although many citizens who support one of the peace proposals also tend to support one or more additional proposals, there nevertheless is substantial variation in support for different proposals. Many respondents who support federalism oppose asymmetric federalism, and many who support amnesty and reconciliation oppose a rotating presidency. Figure 2 reports the percentage of Sri Lankans who favor none, one or more than one of the six proposals.

Overall, 17% of Sri Lankans reject all six peace proposals compared to more than 35% who embrace at least half of the six. 23% of citizens embrace at least one proposal while another quarter embraces two proposals. While Sri Lankans clearly have yet to forge anything resembling a consensus on what, specifically, they are willing to do for peace, it is equally clear that virtually everyone is willing to do something and a great many are willing to do quite a lot. Many also are willing to countenance hard compromises at least under some conditions. At minimum this is a first and necessary condition for serious bargaining.

B. Protesting Unfair Peace Proposals

In addition to understanding Sri Lankans' willingness to compromise on issues related to the peace negotiations, it is equally important to understand the extent to which they are willing to fight for what they think is right and fair. The question is not simply whether they would revert to armed conflict to abort a peace agreement that they do not support, but more broadly whether they would actively protest such an agreement.

To understand the extent to which individuals are prepared to protest a peace agreement they perceive to be unfair, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with two additional statements:

- * "If there is a peace agreement in Sri Lanka that I think is unfair, I will participate in a protest against it;" and

- * "If there is a peace agreement in Sri Lanka that I think is unfair, I will join an organization that is opposed to it."

As Figure 3 illustrates, a slight majority of respondents indicate that they would mobilize against an agreement that they perceived to be unfair. Overall, 58% of Sri Lankans "Strongly Agree" or

Figure 2 - Sri Lankan Support for Multiple Peace Proposals





Figure 3 - Sri Lankan Protest Potential of an Unfair Agreement



"Agree" that they would participate in a protest against an unfair agreement, while only 29% indicate that they would not. A slightly smaller number of citizens (51%) also say they would join an organization opposing an agreement that they considered unfair, which compares to only 33% of citizens who say they would do nothing and simply live with whatever agreement results.

Taken together, these results indicate that, although there is a strong desire among the people of Sri Lanka for an end to the civil war, significant divisions remain regarding the details of a final peace agreement. Moreover, a clear majority of Sri Lankans is prepared to protest any agreement they consider to be unfair.

C. Peace Agreement Activists and Opponents

To understand the dynamics underlying Sri Lankan attitudes toward the peace process, a peace process typology was constructed based on the combination of respondents' support for various peace proposals and their willingness to protest a peace agreement that they consider unfair. The

combination of support for various peace proposals and the willingness to protest an unjust agreement can help identify those individuals and groups most likely to fight for and against changes in the status quo that negotiators might consider for the sake of peace.

In creating the typology, peace process supporters are identified as those citizens who support at least two of the five most specific peace proposals that were presented broadly to all citizens. These included the questions on federalism, asymmetric federalism, amnesty, a rotating presidency and proportional ethnic representation. They exclude the generic question about protecting the rights of ethnic minorities and the questions about decommissioning and HSZs, since these questions were not asked of the entire sample. Peace process opponents, in contrast, are those supporting only one of the five proposals or none at all. Similarly, peace process activists are identified as any citizens who indicated a willingness to protest an unfair peace proposal either individually or as part of a group. Peace process passives are those who say they are not likely to protest an unfair agreement. By comparing active and passive citizens with supporters and opponents of the peace proposals, four distinct categories are produced as indicated in Table 2.

categories are produced as indicated in Table 2.

Peace process opponents, in contrast, are those supporting only one of the five proposals or none at all. Similarly, peace process activists are identified as any citizens who indicated a willingness to protest an unfair peace proposal either individually or as part of a group. Peace process passives are those who say they are not likely to protest an unfair agreement. By comparing active and passive citizens with supporters and opponents of the peace proposals, four distinct categories are produced as indicated in

Table 2
Constructing the Peace Typology

Protest Potential		Number of Peace Proposals Accepted							
		Low			High				
		0	1	2	3	4	5		
Low	1	Passive Opponent			Passive Supporter			Passive	
	2								
	3								
High	4	Activist Supporter						Active	
	5								
				Peace Opponent			Peace Supporter		

Activist Opponents=Low on Support for Peace Proposals, High on Protest Potential
Passive Opponent=Low on Support for Peace Proposals, Low on Protest Potential
Passive Supporter=High on Support for Peace Proposals, Low on Protest Potential
Activist Supporter=High on Support for Peace Proposals, High on Protest Potential

Table 2.

Activist Supporters of a peace agreement are those who favor at least two of the five peace proposals discussed above and who indicate a willingness to protest an unfair agreement. As observed in Figure 4, Activist Supporters constitute slightly more than one quarter (27%) of the Sri Lankan public. Importantly, the average member of this group supports only three of the five proposals. While they favor changes in the status quo as part of the peace process and are willing to protest an agreement they perceive as unfair, the changes they support are limited in number and tend to be the more moderate changes

(i.e., federalism and proportional ethnic representation rather than a rotating presidency or asymmetric federalism).

Activist Opponents of the peace agreement are the polar opposites of the Activist Supporters. These are citizens who oppose nearly all of the peace proposals and indicate a willingness to protest an unfair agreement. Almost as many as the Activist Supporters, Activist Opponents constitute 25% of all Sri Lankan citizens. Members of this group take a rather hard line toward the peace process, supporting almost none of the proposals in the index, and indicating a clear willingness to protest any agreement that they perceive as inequitable.

Passive Supporters of a peace agreement also favor at least two peace proposals but are not willing to protest an unfair agreement either individually or collectively. Overall this is the smallest of the four groups with only 21% of citizens. The average Passive Supporter also supports only three of five proposals, typically the more moderate ones.

Passive Opponents of the peace agreement complete the typology and are equal in number to Activist Supporters with 28% of citizens. Members of this group support none or at most one of the peace proposals but express little willingness to protest a peace agreement they consider unfair. Although the average member of this group does not support any of the five proposals, their apparent willingness to accept almost any result without protest suggests that they are unlikely to be major obstacles to peace.

The relatively equal distribution of citizens across the four peace types confirms that there is substantial disagreement among Sri Lankans regarding the peace process. Citizens are divided regarding how far they are willing to compromise for the sake of peace and how ready they are to fight against a peace agreement that they consider to be unfair. At the same time, however, these results provide ample reason for optimism about the prospects for public acceptance of a compromise peace agreement. Most citizens in Sri Lanka are willing to make at least some concessions for peace, and a substantial minority is willing to make substantial compromises. Moreover, among the majority of citizens who oppose most peace proposals, a very large minority do not feel strongly enough about the matter to protest a peace agreement that goes further than they would prefer. Only a minority of citizens, about 25% overall, oppose most peace proposals and are willing to protest an agreement that goes too far. Nearly three-quarters of Sri Lankans support multiple proposals or are willing to

Figure 4 - Sri Lankan Peace Types





Figure 5 - Sri Lankan Peace Types by Ethnicity



accept them without protest. At minimum, this provides peace negotiators significant space for maneuver and compromise.

D. Ethnicity, Region and Political Parties

Analysis of the differences in support for the peace process logically begins with ethnicity. Ethnic divisions have divided Sri Lankan society for centuries and provided the primary impetus for the decades-long civil war. It is not surprising in this context that Sri Lanka's principal ethnic groups hold fundamentally different perspectives on the peace process. Among Sri Lanka's ethnic minorities, for example, there is near universal support for the peace proposals, with 96% of Tamils, 89% of Up-Country Tamils and 90% of Muslims expressing support for two or more of the five proposals (see Figure 5). Moreover, those who support the peace proposals in these communities have strong feelings about the process and express a clear willingness to protest any agreement they do not think is fair. In all, 67% of Tamils and of Up-Country Tamils and 64% of Muslims are Activist Supporters of the peace process proposals. Most of the rest are Passive Supporters, who may not actively protest an unfair agreement, but certainly add to the moral force in support of the proposals in the peace index. Predictably, there is much less


support within the Sinhala community for any of the proposals advanced for the sake of peace. A substantial majority (64%) of Sinhala opposes virtually all of the peace proposals, and a majority of the opponents are prepared to protest any agreement considered unfair. The more interesting and surprising finding, however, is the considerable diversity within the Sinhala community. More than a third of all Sinhala support a majority of the five peace proposals and about half of the supporters are prepared to protest an unfair agreement. As a result only 32% of all Sinhala are Activist Opponents of the peace proposals. The rest either support the peace process or are Passive Opponents (37%), whose opposition cannot easily be mobilized against a final agreement.

Given the uneven distribution of ethnic groups across different regions of Sri Lanka, reactions to the peace process are likely to vary in different parts of the country as well. In this regard, the conventional wisdom holds that opposition to a peace agreement is concentrated in traditional Sinhala strongholds, especially toward the southern end of the island. While the evidence from the KAP survey in Figure 6 confirms the existence of substantial geographical differences in support for peace, it calls into question the assumption that opposition to concessions in the interest of peace is concentrated in the south.

While there clearly are substantial numbers of Activist Opponents in the south, Activist Opponents are even more heavily concentrated in the North-Central and North-West regions.

There also is significant opposition in the Western province, although not to the extent that is present in the North-Central province.

Figure 6- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Provinces



When combined with Passive Opponents, almost three fourths of respondents in the North Central province are opposed to the current set of proposals. There also is significant opposition in the Western province, although

not to the extent that is present in the North-Central province. In the other areas of the country that have a Sinhala majority, active opposition to the peace proposals is substantial but not significantly greater than in the country as a whole².

Predictably, Activist Supporters of the peace proposals are heavily concentrated in the Northern and, to a lesser extent, in the Eastern provinces. Fully 66% of the population in the north and 50% in the east favor the peace proposals and are prepared to protest an unfair agreement. In the north, there is virtually no opposition to the peace proposals; those few who are not Activist Supporters are Passive Supporters. In the east, about one third of the population (32%) are opposed to the proposals, but less than half of these are prepared to mobilize against an unfair agreement.

Given that the search for a resolution to ethnic conflict has played such an important role in the political life of the country and has been a principal issue dividing government and opposition for many years up to the present day, it is instructive to consider the different outlooks on the peace process of citizens who identify themselves with one of the principal parties³.

Predictably, Activist Supporters of the peace proposals dominate the minority parties representing Tamil, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim interests. As illustrated in Figure 7, virtually everyone who identifies with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) favors the majority of the five proposals and most of these


are prepared to protest an agreement considered to be unfair. Support for the peace proposals also is extremely high among respondents identifying with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the great majority of whom feel sufficiently strongly about this issue to be ready to mobilize against an unfair agreement.

Opposition to the peace proposals is highest among those identifying with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Almost half of JVP identifiers and nearly 40% of the SLFP identifiers are Activist Opponents. Nevertheless, there is surprising diversity in these parties including even the JVP, whose reputation is as a staunch opponent of any concessions on peace. In fact, there is a sizable constituency for the peace proposals within both the JVP and SLFP. About one quarter of those identifying with these two parties are Activist Supporters of the peace proposals and about 15% are Passive Supporters. When combined with the more than 20% of party members who opposed the peace agreements but are disinclined to protest, it appears that the potential constituency in opposition to a peace agreement is much less than the conventional wisdom holds. Similarly, government worries about the difficulty of "selling" a peace agreement to their own supporters appear from the survey data to be exaggerated.

Among people who identify with the United National Party (UNP), a slight majority actually favors most of the peace proposals, and Activist Supporters form the largest group with 31% of the total. Although there also is a substantial group

(25%) of Activist Opponents within the UNP, the fact that 75% of the government's supporters either favor a peace agreement or are unlikely to protest an agreement means that the government enjoys far more latitude to maneuver in the search for peace than its public statements and behavior to date seem to indicate.

Figure 7- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Partisanship





Beyond Ethnicity

The strength and persistence of ethnic cleavages in Sri Lanka are undeniable. There is no doubting that ethnic divisions dominate all others nationwide or that partisan political differences further divide the Sinhala majority. Nevertheless, the results reported above provide some surprising evidence that contradicts prevailing stereotypes both about the size and rigidity of ethnic, territorial and partisan differences in attitudes toward peace, and about the willingness of different groups to consider changes in the political status quo for the sake of peace. Thus, to understand the prospects for negotiating a just and lasting peace, it is necessary to go beyond ethnicity and consider, more generally, who supports and opposes a

Table 4
Demographic Characteristics of Sri Lankan Peace Types

Characteristic	Activist	Passive	Passive	Activist	Support	Oppose
	Supporter	Supporter	Opponent	Opponent		
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Gender						
Male	28.3	18.7	24.5	28.5	47.0	53.0
Female	25.0	22.3	30.6	22.1	47.3	52.7
Age						
15 - 25 yrs.	37.4	19.8	21.4	21.4	57.2	42.8
26 - 35 yrs.	27.0	20.4	23.9	28.7	47.4	52.6
36 - 45 yrs.	24.7	21.3	30.0	24.1	46.0	54.0
46 - 55 yrs.	21.4	19.3	36.1	23.3	40.6	59.4
56 and above	18.1	23.6	30.2	28.1	41.7	58.3
Education						
Cannot read & write	26.1	26.1	26.1	21.7	52.2	47.8
Literate but no formal education	30.9	20.0	27.3	21.8	50.9	49.1
Up to grade 5	27.4	29.8	27.4	15.5	57.1	42.9
Grade 6-9	27.0	22.0	24.3	26.7	49.0	51.0
Up to O/L	23.7	15.4	31.4	29.5	39.1	60.9
O/L	24.9	19.8	30.4	24.9	44.7	55.3
Up to A/L	28.0	22.4	26.7	23.0	50.3	49.7
A/L	28.7	19.3	25.9	26.2	48.0	52.0
Vocationally trained	37.5	12.5	50.0	0.0	50.0	50.0
Technically trained	20.0	40.0	20.0	20.0	60.0	40.0
Professional	14.3	28.6	57.1	0.0	42.9	57.1
Undergraduate	30.0	30.0	10.0	30.0	60.0	40.0
Graduate & above	31.0	11.9	28.6	28.6	42.9	57.1
Income						
Rs. 1,000 or less	34.4	26.4	22.1	17.2	60.7	39.3
Rs. 1,001 - 4,000	29.0	23.8	22.1	25.1	52.7	47.3
Rs. 4,001 - 7,000	22.9	17.1	30.9	29.1	40.0	60.0
Rs. 7,001 - 10,000	22.1	14.2	33.5	30.2	36.3	63.7
Rs. 10,000 or more	24.4	18.5	33.9	23.2	42.9	57.1
Residence						
Rural	26.8	19.3	28.3	25.6	46.1	53.9
Urban	24.8	30.0	24.0	21.2	54.8	45.2

compromise settlement. Several broad sets of explanations or hypotheses are considered:

A. Support for peace is a function of demographic factors including gender, age, education, and urban/rural residence.

B. Support for peace is a function of the intensity of an individual's ethnic identity and of the extent of his or her contact with other ethnic groups.

C. Support for peace is a function of an individual's political values, including attitudes toward democracy.

D. Support for peace is a function of the extent of an individual's engagement in politics and civil society, including the peace process.

E. Support for peace is a function of support for the Government, including trust in government institutions and assessments of its political and economic performance.

F. Support for peace is a function of the benefits expected from peace.

A. Demographics

The search for explanations, beyond ethnicity, of differences in attitudes towards the peace process begins with demographic differences (see Table 3). Differences in age, sex, education, income and urban v. rural residence frequently expose individuals to different life experiences that can influence values and behavior in important ways, either by reinforcing or diminishing the socializing effects of ethnicity.

Contrary to some expectations that women are more committed to peace than men, Sri Lankan men and women express almost identical support for the various proposals advanced for the sake of peace. Overall 47% of both women and men support two or more of the peace proposals. Where men and women

differ, however, is with regard to men's greater willingness to protest a peace agreement with which they do not agree: 57% of men compared to only 47% of women are potential protesters. Thus, men are more likely to be both Activist Opponents and Activist Supporters of peace, while women are more likely to be Passive Opponents and Supporters.

There is greater evidence that age influences attitudes toward peace. Whereas 57% of Sri Lankans under the age of 26 years support multiple peace proposals, this figure falls significantly to 47% for 26-35 year olds, 46% for 36-45 year olds, and 41% for 46-55 year olds before leveling off in later years. Conversely, younger citizens are significantly more likely to protest against a peace proposal they consider unfair. As a result, 15-25 year olds are almost twice as likely as those over 45 years old (37% vs. 21%) to be Peace Activists, while older citizens are much more likely to be Passive Opponents.

Education's effects on peace attitudes are more muted. Consistent with the finding that younger citizens are more prepared to protest for a peace agreement that is fair, those with greater educational qualifications also express greater protest potential. Differences in support for peace do not vary systematically with education level, however.

To the extent that negotiating an end to the civil war requires significant changes in the political status quo, it is not surprising that those who benefit most from the status quo are among the most determined not to make concessions. Consistent with this view, there is a strong but negative relationship between income and support for the peace proposals. Overall, those earning more are much less likely to support peace and much more likely to indicate a willingness to protest an agreement considered unfair. For example, among those earning less than Rs1000 per month, 34% are Activist Supporters of the peace proposals while only 17% are Activist Opponents. The percentage of supporters

Contrary to some expectations that women are more committed to peace than men, Sri Lankan men and women express almost identical support for the various proposals advanced for the sake of peace.

declines and the percentage of opponents rises steadily up to the income level Rs 7-10,000. At that level only 22% are Activist Supporters whereas 30% are Activist Opponents of the peace proposals. Interestingly, this pattern does not hold among the very wealthiest, those earning more than Rs10,000 per month. Among this relatively small group of individuals, Activist Supporters (24%) and Opponents (23%) are in rough balance.

Finally, the evidence also indicates that the minority of citizens who live in the largest cities in Sri Lanka are substantially more sympathetic towards the peace proposals than those living in more rural areas. Thus, 54% of rural residents oppose all but one of the peace proposals compared to only 45% of urban residents. Surprisingly, rural residents are slightly more willing to protest in support of their views which means that significantly more are Activist Opponents of peace.

B. Ethnic Interaction and Identity

There are conflicting ideas about the relationship between ethnic interaction and ethnic conflict. One per-


spective argues that greater interaction among different ethnic groups reduces stereotypes, increases understanding and empathy, and reduces ethnic tensions and conflict. Another perspective argues exactly the reverse: that higher levels of ethnic interaction create more opportunities for conflict, increase friction, and reinforce mutual fears simply by virtue of the proximity of the other group.

To assess the impact of ethnic identification on peace attitudes, respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following three statements:

- * Whatever happens to my ethnic group in Sri Lanka will affect my life.
- * My children should only marry a member of the same ethnic group.
- * People often treat me differently because of my ethnicity.

An index was constructed from the results, dividing Sri Lankans into three equal categories based on the strength of their ethnic identities. Overall, those who most strongly embrace their ethnic identity are most supportive of the peace proposals but they also are the most likely to protest a peace agreement considered unfair (see Figure 8). Thus,

Figure 8- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Ethnic Identity



33% of the strongest ethnic identifiers are Activist Supporters compared to only 20% of the weakest identifiers. This relationship is asymmetric, however. Among peace proposal opponents there is no relationship between ethnic identity and the propensity to protest.

Respondents also were asked about their experiences with various types of discrimination based on ethnicity, religion and political party affiliation. Interestingly, only 7% of Sri Lankans say they have ever been treated unfairly in education, employment or in dealing with the police because of ethnicity. This compares with 3% who say they have been treated unfairly because of religion but 21% who report unfair treatment based on party allegiance. These figures are a bit misleading, however, because they disguise the fact that only 2% of Sinhala respondents report unfair treatment compared to approximately 30% of Tamils and Up-Country Tamils and 20% of Muslims. Of those reporting unfair treatment by ethnicity, however, the overwhelming percentage (88%) supports the peace proposals, and 57% are Activist Supporters. Among those reporting unfair treatment for any reason, 51% support the peace proposals and 34% are Activist Supporters (see Figure 9).

To measure ethnic interaction, two questions were asked:


- How often do you come into contact with people from other ethnic groups: daily, weekly, monthly, yearly or never?

- About how many of your friends are members of other ethnic groups: many, some, few, none?

Overall, about 40% of Sri Lankans report that they do not have any friends among other ethnic groups. This compares to 16% who say they have many, and 13% who say they have some. Similarly, about 30% of citizens say they never have contact with members of other ethnic groups, while 39% say they have daily contact. Again, an index was created measuring the extent of such interactions.

The relationship between ethnic interactions and attitudes toward peace is complex. The evidence presented in Figure 10 confirms that those citizens with the strongest and friendliest interactions are far and away the most strongly supportive of peace, as 62% of this group support peace and 39% are Activist Supporters. As interaction decreases, the percentage of peace supporters and of activist peace supporters drops precipitously. Among those with moderate interactions, about 44% to 51% support peace and well over half are activists. But among

Figure 9- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Unfair Treatment for Any Reason



those with only occasional interactions, only 36% support peace and only 19% are Activist Supporters compared to 64% who oppose the peace proposals and 40% who are Activist Opponents. Importantly, however, those who report no interactions with other ethnic groups at all are relatively open to making compromises for peace: 48% support the peace proposals, and only 36% of supporters or opponents care sufficiently to protest an unfair peace agreement. On balance, it appears that a lot of interaction increases the willingness to

compromise for peace across ethnic groups, but a little bit of contact is worse than none at all.

C. Tolerance and Democratic Values

The evidence that democratic nations rarely go to war against one another has led to a widespread belief that democratic values and principles are inimical to war, whether international or civil. Although there is solid support for democratic government among the

Figure 10- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Ethnic Interaction





Figure 11- Sri Lankan Support for Democracy



Sinhala public, support for some of the fundamental principles underlying democracy is more tenuous. Regarding democracy per se, 44% of citizens say democracy is always the best form of government and another 28% say it is not perfect but is better than any other system. Another 28% are not quite so sure, and say that sometimes a strong leader must replace democracy. Nevertheless, there is little evidence in Sri Lanka that attitudes toward democracy have much bearing on overall support for peace. Those who think democracy is always best are not significantly different from other citizens in their support for the peace proposals or in their willingness to protest.

Regarding more specific democratic values, 85% agree that the media in Sri Lanka should be completely free to criticize the government as they wish, while only 8% disagree (see Table 3). In contrast, 61% believe that "people should

not have to obey laws which they consider unjust," and 88% say that "it is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive." Again, however, there is not evidence that these values bear upon support for peace or the willingness to protest.

Political Tolerance in Sri Lanka is moderately high. More people agree than disagree (44% vs. 39%) that society should tolerate political views that are fundamentally different from mainstream opinion. Similarly, more agree that a person who wants to do away with elections and let the military run the country should be allowed to make a speech in their community (47% vs. 41%). Yet the results are somewhat mixed given that these questions do not make reference to any specific group, but pertain to groups in the abstract. When references are more specific, support for free speech declines considerably. Only 28% say that a person "who believes that [my] ethnic group is inferior ... should be allowed to

Political tolerance in Sri Lanka is moderately high.

Table 4
Sri Lankan Opinions on Indicators of Political Tolerance

	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
	%	%	%
The media in Sri Lanka should be completely free to criticize the government as they wish.	85.6	7.0	7.4
People should not have to obey laws which they consider unjust	61.2	12.2	26.6
It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive.	87.5	5.3	7.2
Society shouldn't have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different from the country as a whole	43.8	17.3	38.9
A person who wants to do away with elections and let the military run the country should not be allowed to make a speech in your community.	47.1	11.6	41.3
Someone who believes that your ethnic group is inferior to all others should be allowed to organize a peaceful demonstration in your community in order to express their point of view.	28.3	10.7	51.0
A person who opposes all forms of religion should not be allowed to make a speech in your community	50.7	9.9	39.4

organize a peaceful demonstration..”

In addition, 51% believe that "a person who opposes all forms of religion should not be allowed to make a speech in the community." Interestingly, however, higher levels of tolerance are not associated with greater support for the peace agreements. The relationship is weak, but indicates that less tolerant people are slightly more favorable towards peace. However, as might be expected, more tolerant attitudes are associated with greater passivity and a willingness to accept even an unfair peace agreement without protest.

D. Political and Civic Engagement


Democracy works best when there is a relatively high level of democratic citizenship, including substantial levels of political interest, knowledge and participation. Political engagement not only is important for insuring that the democratic process works well, but also has numerous benefits for the individual citizen. Higher levels of participation increase individuals' political tolerance, reduce their propensity for political violence, and contribute to a stronger sense of commitment and belonging to the

political system, all of which should contribute to support for domestic peace.

While students of democracy have long appreciated the importance of political engagement, attention recently has focused more broadly on civic engagement. Citizens who are more active in a whole range of social institutions including religious organizations, unions, professional associations, and fraternal organizations typically acquire higher levels of social capital. This contributes to greater social trust and a greater willingness to cooperate with others, both of which are important assets in negotiating peace.

Regarding levels of political involvement, only about 10% of Sri Lankans say they have a great deal of interest in politics, although about half say they have at least some interest. By comparison, about 25% say they have very little interest in politics and another quarter say none at all (see Figure 12). Importantly, as is evident in Figure 13, support for peace is strongly related to level of political interest. Nearly 60% of citizens with the most political interest are peace supporters, including more than 40% who are Activist Supporters. In contrast, among those with the least interest in politics, approximately 60% oppose the peace proposals, and nearly 25% are Activist Opponents.

Figure 12- Sri Lankan Interest in Politics



The pattern is not repeated for political participation, however. Overall, about 85% of all respondents claim that they voted in the last national elections, a figure substantially higher than the actual rate. Of those who voted, however, only 45% are peace supporters. Similarly when other political activities are considered (including discussing politics, working for a party or political campaign, contacting an elected official, or partici-

pating in a neighborhood group), those who are more active in politics, overall, are modestly more likely to oppose the peace proposals. Importantly, however, those more likely to participate in politics are much more likely to be activists and to protest a peace agreement they consider unfair. Indeed, fully two-thirds of the most politically active citizens are prepared to protest an unfair peace agreement compared to only 37% of the least

Figure 13- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Political Interest





Figure 14- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Political Participation



active citizens (see Figure 14).

A very similar pattern can be observed with regard to political knowledge, which appears to be relatively high in Sri Lanka. Indeed, when asked to identify the number of seats in parliament, the largest party in parliament and the term-length for members of parliament, fully one-third of all citizens answer at least two of the questions correctly, and more than three quarters answer at least one of them correctly. Predictably, those with higher levels of political knowledge are much more likely to be political activists: 58% of those who answer two or more of the questions correctly are prepared to protest an unfair peace agreement, compared to only 38% of those who cannot answer any of the questions. Importantly, however, there is little or no

relationship between general political knowledge and support for the peace proposals.

In contrast, Sri Lankans say they are much less informed about the peace process, and this appears to matter a great deal. When asked how informed they felt about the peace process, only 5% said that they were very informed, 60% said they were somewhat informed, and fully a third said they were not informed (see Figure 15). Of the tiny minority who are very informed, more than two-thirds support multiple peace proposals and more than 50% are Activist Supporters. Among those having no knowledge about the peace negotiations, 64% oppose virtually all of the proposals (see Figure 16). Knowledge about the peace process is among the strongest predictors in the survey of Sri Lankans' attitudes toward peace.

Figure 15- Sri Lankan Knowledge of the Peace Process





Figure 16 - Sri Lankan Peace Types by Knowledge of the Peace Process



While political engagement has important effects on peace attitudes, the effects of civic engagement are more muted. For example, most Sri Lankans report that they belong to at least one civic group and a third belong to multiple groups. While group membership appears to have predictable effects on political activism, it does not appear to influence support for peace. Those belonging to multiple groups are much more likely to be willing to protest an unfair peace agreement, but they are about equally divided in their support and opposition to multiple peace proposals.

With regard to social trust, about a quarter of Sri Lankans indicate that they think most citizens can be trusted to treat you fairly, although three fourths say that you have to be very careful when dealing with most Sri Lankans. Given that social trust is so low, it is probably reassuring for the peace process that social trust does not appear to be significantly related to support for the peace proposals. Predictably, those most trusting of others are significantly more likely to accept a peace agreement, even if it is not fair, and are significantly less likely to resort to protest.

E. Support for Government Institutions and Performance

Negotiations for peace in Sri Lanka are not occurring in a vacuum. Citizens have had a lifetime of experience with the principal institutions of Sri Lanka's political system and have had abundant opportunities to assess the performance of those institutions, not only with respect to the peace process but also more generally in handling other political, economic and social issues. Of course, government decisions almost inevitably produce winners and losers, causing some citizens to have greater confidence and trust in government than others. Given the government's policy of supporting peace negotiations with the LTTE, and its role as chief negotiator, it is quite reasonable to expect that citizens' attitudes toward government will color their perceptions of the peace process and their willingness to trust the government to negotiate in good faith on their behalf.


To measure trust in political institutions and actors, the KAP survey asked respondents their level of confidence in a variety of actors and institutions including the President, Prime Minister, Parliament, the courts, and the Army. Overall, 56% of citizens indicate

that they had "some" or "a lot" of confidence in the Prime Minister, compared to less than 29% who said "not much" or "none." Trust in the President is nearly as high with 52% expressing confidence compared to 31% percent who express little or no confidence. The lowest trust was in Parliament, which is trusted by 30% but distrusted by twice as many. The Army enjoyed the greatest confidence at 73% compared to 52% expressing confidence in the courts (see Figure 17).

Of those expressing confidence in the Prime Minister, 57% support the peace proposals and 33% are Activist Supporters. In contrast, only 35% of those with little or no confidence in the PM support multiple peace proposals. Predictably, those trusting the President are less likely to support the peace proposals (47%). Those trusting Parliament are the most likely to favor peace (60%), however, while those trusting the army are the least supportive of peace (45%).

Given the increasingly open conflict between the President and Prime Minister, it is interesting that as of June 2003, 56% of citizens said that they had equal levels of trust in both leaders. Of the remainder, 24% expressed greater trust in the Prime Minister and 20% in the President. Indicative of the tensions

Figure 17- Sri Lankan Trust in Political Institutions



between the two top leaders in Sri Lanka, fully two-thirds of those citizens expressing greater trust in the Prime Minister support multiple peace proposals including nearly 40% who are Activist Supporters. Conversely, among those more trusting of the President, 61% oppose the peace proposals and 30% are Activist Opponents. Among those who were neutral in June between the President and Prime Minister, 41% favored peace, half of whom were Activist Supporters, and 59% were opposed to peace, including 28% who were Activists.

To obtain a better sense of what people liked or did not like about the government, the KAP survey asked them to evaluate the performance of the government in:

- * Improving the economy
- * Handling crime
- * Dealing with conflict between ethnic groups
- * Advancing the peace process


Predictably, public attitudes toward the performance of government are mixed and vary by area (see Figure 18).

Opinions on the government's

handling of the economy are divided, with 38% saying the government has done a good or excellent job and 45% saying a poor or very poor job. Assessments of government performance on crime were much worse, with those judging the performance as bad outweighing those saying it was good by 56% to 28%. People are less certain how to evaluate the government on ethnic group relations. Nearly a quarter say they don't know. The rest say the government has performed well by a margin of 42% to 34%. Interestingly, public assessments of the government's performance are highest on the issue of peace, where 65% of citizens say the government has done a good or excellent job compared to fewer than 20% who think it has performed poorly.

Among those who think the government has done a good job on peace, 53% support multiple peace proposals whereas 47% do not. This means that the government receives almost as much approval from peace opponents as peace supporters and suggests that its policy of "pursuing peace but slowly" has had some political success. Leaving aside the question of the government's performance on peace and examining the other areas, those who rate the government's performance as good are much more likely to support peace by a margin of 60% vs. 40%. Only 30% of those

Figure 18- Sri Lankan Evaluations of Government Performance



rating the government's overall performance as poor support the peace proposals.

E. Perceived Benefits of Peace

While it is inevitable that the peace negotiations concentrate on the compromises or concessions one is willing to make for peace, many recognize that the conclusion of a just and lasting peace will have important benefits both for them-

selves and for the country as a whole. Rationally, those who perceive greater dividends resulting from the conclusion of a peace treaty should be more likely to accept the compromises needed to achieve peace.

The KAPS study asked respondents a series of questions about the nature and extent to which a just and lasting peace would produce dividends including:

- * In your opinion will a final peace settlement have a lot of benefits for Sri Lanka, some benefits, not very many

Figure 19- Sri Lankan Opinions on the Benefits of Peace





Figure 20- Sri Lankan Opinions on who will Benefit Most from Peace



benefits, no benefits at all?

* Please rank the following benefits: economic stability, personal security, violence-free society, increased individual freedoms.

* Who do you think will benefit most from a final peace settlement - Sinhala, Tamil, Up-Country Tamil, Muslim, those affected by war, politicians, everyone equally?

There is virtual consensus in Sri Lanka that peace will bring manifold benefits. As shown in Figure 19, close to a majority of citizens (43%) say that a lasting peace will bring a lot of benefits to Sri Lanka and another 40% say it will bring at least some benefits. Only 10% say that peace will bring very few benefits, and even fewer say it will have no benefits at all.

Predictably, those who think a peace agreement will produce the most dividends are most supportive of the peace proposals: 55% of those who say peace will bring lots of dividends support the peace proposals and 31% are Activist Supporters. Those who think there will be fewer dividends also tend to think that others will receive most of those benefits. As a result, only 47% support peace, although 27% are Activist Supporters. Among those who expect few if


any benefits, fewer than 40% support peace.

When asked who will benefit most from a final peace settlement, a majority of citizens (51%) say that everyone will benefit equally. In comparison, only 19% say the Tamils will benefit most, 16% say those affected by the war, and 8% say the majority Sinhalese will enjoy the greatest benefits (see Figure 20). Those who think everyone will benefit equally are most supportive of the peace proposals: 55% say they support multiple proposals and 30% are Activist Supporters. Conversely, majorities of those thinking the benefits of peace will go mostly to a single group tend to oppose the peace proposals and frequently are Activist Opponents (see Figure 21).

When asked to rank the benefits that will result from peace, economic benefits tend to be mentioned first (37%) followed by freedom from violence (35%).

Only 17% cite personal security first and only 14% say individual freedoms. Interestingly, however, the least anticipated benefits are the ones most valued by citizens. For example, 62% of those ranking personal security as the highest benefit are supporters of the peace process. So are 54% of those who rank increased freedoms as the most important dividend or peace. Of those who

Figure 21- Sri Lankan Opinions on who will Benefit Most from Peace



think that a reduction in violence will be the principal peace dividend, 52% favor the peace proposals. But among the largest group who think the principal benefits of peace will be economic, only 44 percent support the peace proposals.

Although there are predictable differences in peace attitudes across all categories of explanations, it is apparent from summary Table 5 that four sets of

explanations provide particular purchase on the issue. These include the nature of ethnic attitudes and interactions, levels of political engagement, attitudes toward government institutions and policy performance, and the nature and extent of the peace dividends that Sri Lankans expect to result if and when a final peace agreement is implemented.

Table 5
Summary of Social and Political Differences Among Sri Lankans with Different Outlooks on the Peace Process.

EXPLANATION Principle Factors	Activist Supporters	Passive Supporters	Passive Opponents	Activist Opponents
DEMOGRAPHICS				
Women/Men	Both equally	Women	Women	Men
Age	Youngest	Younger	Oldest	Older
Income-Rs	Lower	Lowest	Highest	Higher
Urban-Rural	More Urban	Most Urban	Rural	Rural
ETHNICITY				
Strength of Id Interaction Grievance	Highest Highest Highest	Lowest Lower Lower	Lower Lowest Lowest	Higher Higher Higher
DEMOCRACY				
Always Best	Higher	Lowest	Higher	Lower
Tolerance	Lower	Highest	Higher	Lower
Free Media	Lower	Lower	Higher	Highest
Different Views	Lower	Higher	Lowest	Highest
ENGAGEMENT				
Political Interest	Highest	Lower	Lowest	Higher
Voted	Lowest	Higher	Highest	Higher
Pol Participation	Higher	Lowest	Lowest	Highest
Pol Knowledge	Higher	Lower	Lowest	Highest
Peace Knowledge	Highest	Lower	Lowest	Higher
Group Members	Higher	Lowest	Lower	Higher
Social Trust	Lower	Higher	Highest	Lowest
GOVT. PERFORM				
Trust President	Lowest	Lower	Higher	Highest
Trust PM	Highest	Higher	Lower	Lowest
Trust Parliament	Higher	Highest	Lower	Lowest
Trust Army	Lowest	Lower	Higher	Highest
Perform Peace	Higher	Highest	Lower	Lowest
Perform Other	Highest	Higher	Lower	Lowest
PEACE DIVIDENDS				
Many Dividends	Highest	Higher	Lowest	Lowest
Everyone Benefits	Higher	Highest	Lowest	Lower
Economic Benefits	Lowest	Lower	Highest	Higher
Personal Security	Higher	Average	Average	Average
Violence Benefits	Lower	Higher	Lower	Higher

Bold Print Indicates strongest, most discriminating explanations.



Within Ethnicity

Not only are the Sinhala far and away the largest and most powerful group, politically, socially and economically, but they also are the most diverse in their attitudes toward peace.

While an appreciation of the attitudes and values that divide and distinguish Sri Lanka's several ethnic communities is important for understanding their different perspective on the peace process, it also is important to understand the differences that exist within the several ethnic groups. This is especially the case with the Sinhala community. Not only are the Sinhala far and away the largest and most powerful group, politically, socially and economically, but they also are the most diverse in their attitudes toward peace. Unlike the Tamil, Up-Country Tamil, and Muslim communities, where there is virtual unanimity in the support of the peace process and where differences exist mainly in their willingness to protest an unfair agreement, the Sinhala community holds widely disparate ideas not only on whether to protest an unfair agreement, but also more fundamentally on the willingness to embrace compromises that are necessary for the sake of a lasting peace (see Figure 5). Ultimately, a peace agreement will be reached only if the government of the day is convinced that it enjoys sufficient support among its constituents to allow it to remain politically viable despite making significant concessions to the Tamils and others for the sake of peace.

A. Explaining Attitudes toward Peace: The Sinhalese

As noted previously, a significant majority (64%) of the Sinhala com-

munity disapproves of virtually all of the possible peace proposals about which they were asked. Nevertheless, slightly more than a third (36%) are willing to break ranks with the rest of their community and express support for multiple proposals if that is required for peace. When combined with the 34% who are Passive Opponents and who are unlikely to be mobilized in opposition to a peace agreement, this suggests that the government has considerable latitude to pursue compromises in its negotiations for peace. Moreover, to the extent that the government or others can expand support for compromise within the community or at least reduce the 30% of Sinhala who are prepared to protest an unjust peace agreement, the government's opportunities to negotiate a fair and lasting peace will increase proportionately.

To simplify the analysis within ethnic groups, multivariate analyses are used. Although they do not provide as much detail as the bivariate analyses reported above in discussing nationwide patterns, they do provide a more concise summary and one whose broad patterns are easier to grasp and appreciate.

Table 6 presents the results of a multivariate analysis (Multinomial Logit) of Sinhala peace attitudes, summarizing the impact of region, partisanship, demographic differences, ethnic identity and contact, political values, political engagement, government support, and expected peace benefits. The analysis indicates, in effect, the independent impact that each of the included

variables has on peace attitudes while controlling for (i.e., holding constant) the effects of all the other variables. For example, the first set of rows in Table 6 shows the impact that different provinces have on the peace attitudes of Sinhala citizens when holding all other variables constant. For each province, the numbers, or "coefficients" in the first column indicate the likelihood of being a Passive Opponent rather an Activist Opponent; the coefficients in the second column

indicate the likelihood of being a Passive Supporter rather than an Activist Opponent; and the third column indicates the likelihood of being an Activist Supporter rather than an Activist Opponent. Numbers in boldface are statistically significant; the others are not. Thus being a resident of the Eastern and Western provinces and Uva significantly predisposes Sinhala citizens to be Active Opponents of the peace proposals rather than passive opponents. Conversely, Eastern and

Table 6
Multivariate Logit Analysis of Sinhalese Peace Attitudes

Independent Variable	Activist Opponent vs. Passive Opponent	Activist Opponent vs. Passive Supporter	Activist Opponent vs. Activist Supporter
Province			
Eastern	1.136	-1.075	-1.747
Western	0.498	-0.536	-0.150
Sabaragamuwa	-0.116	0.448	-0.297
UVA	0.483	-0.158	-0.528
Southern	0.038	0.569	-0.343
North-Western	0.231	-0.537	-0.322
North-Central	-0.334	-1.572	-0.541
Partisanship			
JVP	-0.675	-0.244	0.370
UNP	-0.211	-0.452	0.363
SLFP	-0.704	-0.191	0.448
Demographics			
Sex (female)	0.096	0.192	0.048
Age	0.141	0.147	-0.215
Residence (urban)	-0.274	0.641	-0.489
Ethnic Identity & Contact			
Ethnic identity	-0.136	-0.274	0.156
Experienced discrimination	-0.182	0.440	0.331
Ethnic interaction (low)	-0.003	-0.118	-0.471
Ethnic interaction (high)	-0.280	-0.130	0.150
Political Values			
Democracy is best	0.464	-0.327	-0.207
Democracy should be replaced	0.008	-0.133	0.114
Political Engagement			
Political interest	-0.266	-0.005	0.152
Political knowledge	0.227	-0.096	0.022
Voted in 2001	0.426	-0.219	0.635
Electoral participation	-0.159	-0.015	0.103
Civic involvement	-0.111	-0.133	0.230
Government support			
Trust in political institutions	-0.216	-0.089	0.068
Approve of government's performance	-0.043	-0.317	-0.017
Expected benefits from peace			
Peace will have a lot of benefits	-0.159	0.156	0.081
Constant	-1.336	-1.072	-0.251

Bold entries indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant

Despite these general tendencies, however, age is the only demographic variable that has a statistically significant effect on peace attitudes when other factors are controlled for.

Western province residents are significantly less likely to be Activist Opponents as compared to Passive supporters. Finally, Eastern but not Western province Sinhala are significantly less likely to be Activist Opponents and more likely to be Activist supporters. On the whole, these multivariate coefficients confirm the importance of regional differences within the Sinhala community.

On the whole, these multivariate coefficients confirm the importance of regional differences within the Sinhala community. In every region of the country, a majority of Sinhala opposes the majority of the peace proposals presented to them, but the opposition is much more intense in the Eastern and North-Central provinces. Greater opposition to the peace proposals also can be observed in the Western province and Uva. The character of this opposition manifests itself differently in the North-Central province, an area that borders territory controlled by the LTTE. Compared to other provinces, the Sinhalese in the North Central province are much more prepared to mobilize against a final agreement that they perceive as unfair. Although there is no region of the country where a majority of Sinhalese supports the peace proposals, there is significantly greater support (less opposition) among those living in the central, southern, and Sabaragamuwa province.

What makes these geographic differences more interesting and somewhat puzzling is that they appear even after other factors are taken into account. Thus, while demographic characteristics, political engagement, political attitudes, and feelings about other ethnic groups all play a role, they do not fully account for the intense opposition that is observed in the North-Central province.

The second set of rows in Table 6 summarizes partisan differences among the Sinhala community and

indicates that when we take other factors into account, identification with one of the three major political parties still has an independent effect on Sinhala attitudes toward the peace process. Predictably, Sinhala who most identify with the governing UNP are most supportive and least opposed to the peace proposals; only 36% are Activist Opponents of peace. The JVP has the most Activist Opponents (47%), while the SLFP has the least (28%). At the same time, peace supporters make up 42% of the UNP, 40% of the SLFP and 31% of the JVP. When other factors are controlled for, identifiers with the UNP are more likely to be Activist Supporters than Activist Opponents, but also less likely to be Passive Supporters. Identifiers with the SLFP and the JVP are much less likely to be Passive Opponents than Activist Opponents. SLFP identifiers, however, also are the most likely of any group to be Activist Supporters. Taken together, this indicates that peace attitudes and protest potential are partly a function of partisan attachments. Moreover, while political attitudes and values, evaluations of government performance, levels of political engagement, and ethnic attitudes and interactions help to explain the intense opposition of the JVP, they cannot fully explain why UNP and SLFP identifiers are more likely to be Activist Supporters for peace.

There are few demographic differences among the Sinhala community related to their support for peace. Activist Opponents of the peace proposals earn slightly higher incomes. Activist Supporters tend to be younger, earn less than the typical Sinhala and are more likely to be students or employed in business. The distinguishing feature of Passive Supporters and Passive Opponents is that women comprise the majority of both groups while men dominate the activist groups. Despite these general tendencies, however, age is the only demographic variable that has a statistically significant effect on peace attitudes when other factors are controlled for.

Within the Sinhala community,

those who feel the strongest sense of ethnic identity are the most likely to protest a peace agreement that they consider unfair. More interesting, however, is that strong ethnic identifiers are significantly more likely to be Activist Supporters than Activist Opponents. Sinhala who feel the least sense of ethnic identity, though, are the least likely to protest and are more likely to be Passive Supporters and Passive Opponents. The same general pattern is evident when it comes to Sinhala experiences with various types of societal discrimination or unfair treatment based on ethnicity, religion, and political party attachment. Unlike what was observed in the analysis of all Sri Lankans, however, there is no clear and independent relationship among the Sinhala between the extent of interaction with other ethnic groups and support for the peace process.

The Sinhala are no less committed to democracy in principle than other Sri Lankans. The largest percentage (40%) agrees that democracy is always the best form of government and the majority of the rest say that while democracy has problems it is better than any other system of government. The multivariate analysis indicates, however, that there is only a weak relationship between Sinhala attitudes toward democracy and attitudes toward peace.

While the Sinhala majority appears to hold firmly to the democratic principle of majority rule, they do not appear as committed to the corollary principle of minority rights. To the contrary, the Sinhala community appears ambivalent about tolerating disparate voices. On the one hand, 86% of Sinhala respondents support a free press, but on the other hand, 40% say that society should not have to put up with political views that are out of touch with the country as a whole. Almost 90% also say it is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they become disruptive. Further, while 50% of Sinhala would allow a person to make a speech in their community advocating suspension of elections and military rule,

67% would not allow a demonstration in their community by someone who disparages Sinhala as an ethnic group. Nevertheless, the tenuous support that most Sinhala have for many core democratic principles is only weakly associated with their attitudes toward the peace negotiations.

The multivariate analysis does indicate that those Sinhala who are normally more active in politics also are more willing to protest an unfair peace agreement, although they are equally likely to be Activist Opponents and Activist Supporters of the peace proposals. Conversely, those who are less engaged are less likely to protest an unfair agreement. Passive Opponents predictably express little confidence in their ability to influence politics and have little knowledge about or interest in politics. They also belong to few politically connected groups, and are very unlikely to have voted in the last national elections or to participate in electoral politics more generally. Passive Supporters have very similar profiles. In contrast, Activist Supporters and Opponents both demonstrate greater knowledge of and interest in politics, belong to a number of political organizations, and are very likely to have participated in electoral politics. Supporters are even more likely than Opponents to be politically engaged, although the differences are small.

Nationwide in Sri Lanka, both the President and Prime Minister enjoy substantial public confidence, but the Prime Minister is somewhat more trusted overall. Among the Sinhala majority, in particular, the President enjoys greater trust, although the margin is quite small. Among Sinhala respondents, 55% express confidence in the President compared to only 26% who say they do not trust her. By comparison, 49% trust the Prime Minister and 33% do not. On balance, 23% express greater confidence in the President, 16% prefer the Prime Minister, and 61% have equal confidence in both. Among those who discriminate between the two leaders there are big differences in attitudes toward peace.

While the Sinhala majority appears to hold firmly to the democratic principle of majority rule, they do not appear as committed to the corollary principle of minority rights.

Although a substantial majority of Sinhala opposes virtually all of the peace proposals about which they were asked, most say that they favor peace and most expect a final peace agreement to produce tangible benefits.

Among the President's supporters, 68% oppose virtually all of the peace proposals and more than 40% are Activist Opponents. Among those favoring the Prime Minister, 45% favor multiple peace proposals and about 20% are Activist Supporters. Presidential supporters also have significantly higher trust in the army and significantly lower trust in Parliament and in the courts than do supporters of the Prime Minister.

While supporters of the Prime Minister and of Parliament generally give the government higher marks than do the President's supporters with regard to the government's performance in handling the economy, crime, the peace negotiations, etc., in absolute terms Sinhala respondents give the government very poor performance ratings. Only a third of respondents say the government has done a good job managing the economy and less than a quarter say they have done a good job with crime. In contrast, nearly two thirds say the government has done a good job in the peace process. Those who think the government has handled the peace process well are relatively more in favor of peace than those critical of the government performance. But even among those who rate the government excellent in these regard, 59% say they oppose peace and more than a quarter are Activists Opponents. Among those who believe that the government has performed poorly, more than 90% oppose the peace proposals and more than 40% are Activist Opponents.

More generally, there are relatively weak relationships between Sinhala peace attitudes and their approval of the government's performance. Those Sinhala who believe that the government has performed well in addressing the most important issues facing the country (i.e., the peace process, the economy, crime, ethnic conflict, and human rights violations) are somewhat less likely to be Passive Supporters. Similarly, with

regard to trust in political institutions (i.e., the president, prime minister, Parliament, etc.), those Sinhala who are less confident in their country's political institutions are significantly more likely to be Passive Opponents of the peace process.

Although a substantial majority of Sinhala opposes virtually all of the peace proposals about which they were asked, most say that they favor peace and most expect a final peace agreement to produce tangible benefits. In fact 40% of Sinhala respondents say they expect that peace will produce a lot of positive benefits, while another 39% say it will produce at least some benefits. Interestingly, the Sinhala are no different from other Sri Lankans with regard to the expected beneficiaries of peace. A majority of Sinhala respondents say that they expect all of the people of Sri Lanka to benefit equally. Fewer than 20% say that most of the benefits will go to those affected most by the war, while an equal percentage say that the Tamils will benefit most. Only 8% think the Sinhala community will benefit most, but this is higher than any other ethnic group except the Tamils. Regardless of who they think will benefit from peace, a majority of Sinhala still opposes most of the peace proposals. Those who think everyone will benefit equally register the least opposition. While the multivariate results provide some evidence that those who are more optimistic about the benefits of peace also are most supportive of the peace, the differences are generally small and not statistically significant.

When they are asked to rank the specific benefits that peace would produce, Sinhala respondents strongly focus on economic benefits. Second on their list is a reduction in violence, third is personal security and last is increased freedom. In fact 43% rank economic benefits first, and another 34% rank them second. Unfortunately, those appreciating the economic benefits of peace are the least willing to support changes in the status quo for peace. While far fewer in number, those who rank personal security or an end to violence more highly also are more likely to support

the peace proposals.

B. Explaining Attitudes toward Peace: Tamils

While the Sinhala community is substantially divided in their support for the peace proposals as well as whether to protest an agreement they consider un-

fair, there is virtual unanimity in the Tamil community regarding the peace process. All but a minuscule number of Tamils support multiple proposals for peace. Differences within the Tamil community focus mainly on whether to protest an unfair agreement.

To help identify who within the Tamil community are more likely to protest a peace agreement and in order

Independent Variable	Passive Supporter vs. Activist Supporter
Province	
Eastern	0.544
Western	-0.708
North-Western	21.296
Partisanship	
TULF	0.069
UNP	-0.710
Demographics	
Sex (female)	-0.086
Age	0.039
Residence (urban)	0.328
Ethnic Identity & Contact	
Ethnic Identity	0.377
Experienced discrimination	0.568
Ethnic interaction (low)	0.374
Ethnic interaction (high)	0.384
Political Values	
Democracy is best	-0.805
Democracy should be replaced	-0.666
Political Engagement	
Political interest	0.364
Political knowledge	-0.179
Voted in 2001	-0.209
Electoral participation	0.048
Civic involvement	0.029
Government support	
Trust in political institutions	0.131
Approve of government's performance	-0.220
Expected benefits from peace	
Peace will have a lot of benefits	0.140
Constant	-0.118

Bold entries indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant.

Tamils who have more interest in politics are more likely to be Activist Supporters, while those who have less interest are more likely to be Passive Supporters of peace.

to better understand their reasons, a multivariate model was constructed in the same way as for the Sinhala community except focusing on the differences between Activist and Passive Supporters of peace. The results, reported in Table 7, show that the willingness of Tamils to protest an unfair peace agreement is fairly simple to explain. Attitudes toward protest depend principally on a few key factors. It is not surprising for example, that those who identify with the TULF are the most likely to be Activist Supporters of the peace proposals. They not only support most of the proposals presented to them but indicate a willingness to protest if the resulting peace agreement is not perceived as fair. A substantial number of Tamils also identify with the governing UNP. While also supporting multiple peace proposals, they are a bit more modest in their demands. Importantly, they also are much less willing to protest a peace agreement that contains too many concessions, so the typical Tamil UNP member is a Passive Supporter of peace.

Since the Tamil community is concentrated primarily in the Northern and Eastern provinces, it is not surprising that geographic differences have little or no relationship to Tamils' predispositions to protest. Neither is there any indication that demographic differences have much impact on protest potential. Although younger, better-educated Tamils tend to be slightly more activist overall, the differences are small and not statistically significant³.

Similar to what was observed for the Sinhala, the largest influence on Tamil attitudes toward peace is ethnicity. Tamils who have the strongest sense of ethnic identity and who report having experienced the most discrimination and unfair treatment are the most likely to be Activist Supporters. In contrast, those who least identify as Tamils and have experienced the least discrimination are also the least willing to protest a peace

agreement that they consider unfair.

The level of support for democracy also has a strong effect on peace attitudes among Tamils, but the relationship is not linear. Tamils who are the most committed to democracy and those who are the least committed are, together, the least likely Tamils to be Activist Supporters of the peace proposals.

In contrast, those with a moderate commitment to democracy (i.e., who believe that democracy has problems but is better than any other system of government), are the most willing to protest an unfair agreement. A possible explanation of this is that those most supportive of democracy also are most willing to accept as legitimate the results of a negotiated settlement that is approved by Parliament. Those least supportive of democracy, in contrast, are inclined to accept a peace agreement not because it is legitimate, but simply because they are more politically apathetic.

Among the remaining three sets of explanatory variables, attitudes toward the government and the expected benefits from peace have no effect on whether or not a Tamil is willing to protest an unfair agreement. Again, this is mostly because there is very little disagreement among Tamils with regard to such matters. Tamils overwhelmingly say that peace will bring important dividends. They are much more likely to trust the Prime Minister over the President, and they are ambivalent about the performance of the government (although this varies as between the two political parties).

Most of the political engagement variables also have minimal effects on peace attitudes. The one exception is political interest. Tamils who have more interest in politics are more likely to be Activist Supporters, while those who have less interest are more likely to be Passive Supporters of peace..

C. Explaining Attitudes toward Peace: Up-Country Tamils

Up-Country Tamils exhibit overwhelming support for the peace process.

As observed for the Tamil community, the main area of disagreement among Up-Country Tamils concerns their willingness to protest an unfair agreement (see Figure 5). A distinguishing feature between the two Tamil groups, however, is that Up-Country Tamils are somewhat

more likely to be Passive Supporters of peace whereas Tamils are more likely to be Activist Supporters.

Table 8 reports a multivariate analysis of peace attitudes to help explain the variation in peace attitudes among the Up-Country Tamils. The first set of rows

Table 8
Multivariate Logit Analysis of Up-Country Tamil Peace Attitudes

Independent Variable	Passive Supporter vs. Activist Supporter
Province	
Sabaragamuwa	1.001
UVA	-0.114
Partisanship	
CWC	0.333
UNP	1.044
Demographics	
Sex (female)	-0.026
Age	-0.021
Residence (urban)	0.493
Ethnic Identity & Contact	
Ethnic Identity	0.395
Experienced discrimination	-0.077
Ethnic interaction (low)	-0.886
Ethnic interaction (high)	0.062
Political Values	
Democracy is best	-0.191
Democracy should be replaced	-0.231
Political Engagement	
Political interest	0.322
Political knowledge	0.271
Voted in 2001	0.775
Electoral participation	0.117
Civic involvement	-0.230
Government support	
Trust in political institutions	0.009
Approve of government's performance	-0.284
Expected benefits from peace	
Peace will have a lot of benefits	-0.305
Constant	-0.830

Bold entries indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant.

in the table indicates that a willingness to protest an unfair agreement varies significantly by geography. Up-Country Tamils who live in Sabaragamuwa are significantly more likely to be Activist Supporters than their counterparts who live in either the Central province or Uva.

The second set of rows indicates

that partisanship also influences peace attitudes: Up-Country Tamils who feel close to the governing United National Party are much more likely to be Activist Supporters than those who feel close to the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC). The effect of party attachment is much stronger than the effect of geography and ranks as the most impor-

Table 9
Multivariate Logit Analysis of Muslim Peace Attitudes

Independent Variable	Passive Supporter vs. Activist Supporter
Province	
Eastern	-0.823
Western	-2.934
Sabaragamuwa	0.378
North-Western	-1.388
North-Central	-0.651
Partisanship	
SLFP	0.130
UNP	-0.229
SLMC	0.550
Demographics	
Sex (female)	0.151
Age	0.107
Residence (urban)	0.714
Ethnic Identity & Contact	
Ethnic Identity	0.069
Experienced discrimination	-0.684
Ethnic interaction (low)	0.343
Ethnic interaction (high)	0.081
Political Values	
Democracy is best	0.089
Democracy should be replaced	-0.297
Political Engagement	
Political interest	0.297
Political knowledge	0.280
Voted in 2001	0.463
Electoral participation	0.464
Civic involvement	0.045
Government support	
Trust in political institutions	0.170
Approve of government's performance	-0.114
Expected benefits from peace	
Peace will have a lot of benefits	-0.101
Constant	0.144

Bold entries indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant.

tant explanatory variable in the multivariate model. A second important explanatory variable for Up-Country Tamils is ethnic identity. Similar to what we observed within the Sinhala and Tamil communities, Up-Country Tamils who have the strongest sense of ethnic identity are the most willing to protest an unfair agreement. Those who have a weaker sense of ethnic identity are less likely to protest an unfair agreement and are more likely to be Passive Supporters of peace. None of the demographic variables have much impact among Up-Country Tamils, although younger, better-educated and relatively wealthier members of the community are modestly more likely to be activists. None of the other ethnic identity or interaction variables have any appreciable effect on peace attitudes among Up-Country Tamils when controlling for all other variables. Nor do support for democratic values, support for the government, or expected peace benefits.

There is some evidence, however, to support the expectation that peace attitudes are a function of political engagement. Up-Country Tamils who voted in the 2001 national elections and who have more interest in politics are more likely to be Activist Supporters than those who failed to vote and those who have less interest in politics.

D. Explaining Attitudes toward Peace: Muslims

Muslims also overwhelmingly favor a majority of the peace proposals. As with the Tamils and Up-Country Tamils, the main disagreement among the Muslim community concerns their willingness to protest an unfair agreement. Overall, Muslims are somewhat more like the Up-Country Tamils and less like the Tamils in that they tend to be Passive Supporters of the peace process and somewhat less likely to protest an agreement they consider unfair. To help explain the differences within the Muslim community, a final multivariate model was estimated (see Table 9). Interestingly, the results of the analysis suggest that differences within the Muslim community have far more important effects on their attitudes

toward peace than observed among either the Tamil or Up-Country Tamil communities. This is indicated very simply by the large number of explanatory variables that are statistically significant in the model. Beginning with geographic differences, Muslims who live in the Western and North-Western provinces are much more likely to be Passive Supporters and less likely to be Activist Supporters than Muslims living elsewhere in Sri Lanka. In part, this is because those living in the west and northwest identify less strongly as Muslims. Those who live in the Central and Sabaragamuwa provinces are the most likely to be Activist Supporters, closely followed by those living in the Eastern and North-Central provinces. Also in contrast to other ethnic communities, Muslims' attitudes toward peace are not appreciably influenced by their identity with the Muslim community. Indeed, those who report having experienced discrimination are less likely to be peace activists and more likely to be passive. The latter may well reflect a difference among Muslims in the source of discrimination. Tamils and Up-Country Tamils overwhelmingly identify as ethnic minorities fearful of discrimination from Sri Lanka's ethnic majority, the Sinhala. For many Muslims, however, discrimination is as likely to result from interaction with the Tamil community, which is a minority nation-wide but constitutes the local majority in areas of the North and East.

Politically, Muslims who belong to the SLMC are more likely to be activists than those who support the governing UNP. The latter are equally supportive of the peace proposals but are less willing to protest an unfair peace.

None of the demographic variables distinguish among Muslim attitudes toward peace. Nor do attitudes toward democracy, government performance, or expected peace benefits. Political engagement, however, has very strong effects. For Muslims, prior participation in electoral politics increases significantly their willingness to protest an unfair agreement. In addition, Muslims who are more knowledgeable and more interested in politics are more likely to be Activist Supporters of multiple peace proposals. Muslims who rarely participate in electoral politics, have less knowledge about government and politics, and have less interest in politics, in contrast, are more likely to be Passive Supporters.

Beginning with geographic differences, Muslims who live in the Western and North-Western provinces are much more likely to be Passive Supporters and less likely to be Activist Supporters than Muslims living elsewhere in Sri Lanka.



Communicating for Peace

This report clearly demonstrates the diversity of Sri Lankan orientations toward the peace process and the complex set of attitudes and beliefs that underlie and support those different attitudes. The report also reinforces the importance of ethnic divisions in the peace process and of geography in the ethnic equation. In order to facilitate the peace negotiations, it is important that the government and other interested parties make concerted efforts to communicate with these diverse ethnic and geographic communities and to do so in highly targeted and focused ways.

The approach used in the North in an effort to moderate the demands of Activist Supporters of peace must be very different from the appeals used in the South to build support for peace among Passive Opponents or to dampen the intensity of Activist

Opponents.


The delivery of targeted messages, however, presupposes an understanding of which media different individuals use to obtain their political information and which specific newspapers or radio stations they consider the best, most reliable sources of information. With this in mind, the KAP survey asked respondents a series of questions about their sources of information, both general and specific:

* Generally speaking, through which medium do you get most of your information, newspaper, television, radio, meetings, word of mouth?

* How often would you say you pay attention to news on the radio [read about politics in the newspaper / pay attention to news on the television]? Daily, a few times a week, rarely, never?

* Please indicate the two media [newspaper, or radio / television stations] you listen to/read/watch most.

Figure 22- Sri Lankan Sources for Political News



Sri Lankans in overwhelming proportions say that television is their principle source of news. Overall 57% get their news from television followed by 18% from newspaper, 18% from radio and less than 10% from other sources (see Figure 22). Unfortunately, as is evident in figure 23, those relying primarily on television for news are the least likely to support the peace proposals: 58% of primary television viewers oppose the peace proposals and 27% are Activist Opponents.

In contrast, among those relying on

radio for most of their news, 53% are peace supporters including 32% Activist Supporters.

Those relying primarily on newspapers are similarly inclined: 55% favor peace and 33% are Activist Supporters.

Of course, most citizens likely rely on multiple sources. When asked how frequently they listen to radio, watch television or read papers, 55% say they listen to radio at least a few times a week,

45% read a newspaper at least a few times a week, and more than 75% watch television at least a few times a week.

As illustrated in Figure 24, the radio audience in Sri Lanka is spread widely among many stations. This of course is to be expected given radio's frequently limited range. Only four stations capture as much as 10% of the island's total audience. The largest audience is enjoyed by radio station SBLC, Sirasa FM, Shiri FM and Shakthi FM. Predictably, Table

Figure 23- Sri Lankan Peace Types by News Sources





Figure 24- Most Popular Radio Stations in Sri Lanka for Political News



Tamil is listened to by about 20% of Tamils in the Northern province.

Up-Country Tamils get most of their radio news from Suriyan FM and Shakthi FM, with SLBC in third place. Suriyan FM is most popular in the Central province and Sabaragamuwa, while Shakthi FM is about equally popular in Uva.

Finally, the Muslim community in Sri Lanka gets their radio news primarily from Shakthi FM and secondarily from SLBC. The SLBC is strong principally in the Western province, while Shakthi FM dominates among the Muslim community elsewhere.

While newspapers are the principal source of news to a minority of citizens, research in other countries indicates that newspapers often provide more in depth news and also are relied upon more by opinion leaders. For the Sinhala community, the newspaper of choice is overwhelmingly Lankadeepa, which claims the attention of nearly one third of all citizens. Divaina claims an additional 15% of readers, with the rest spread out among many other papers, none claiming more than about 5% of the readership. Lankadeepa is especially prevalent in the Western, Sabaragamuwa, and Uva provinces, where it claims 40% or more of all Sinhala. Divaina is strongest in Sabaragamuwa, but even there it is in distant second place.

Among Tamils, the leading pa-

per is Virakesari, especially in the Eastern province. In the Northern province it is overwhelmingly Udayan. Up-Country Tamils read Virakesa primarily, while the Muslim community reads Thinakaran (28%) and Virakesari (20%). Thinakaran is especially popular among Muslims in the North Western and Eastern provinces, whereas Virakesari is most popular among Muslims in the Western province.

Although television is the most popular news medium in Sri Lanka, it is also the medium that is most difficult to target to a specific audience. For example, among the Sinhala community, more than half of all citizens obtain most of their news from Rupavahini, with about 15% each attending primarily to Swarnavahini, ITN and Sirasa TV. Moreover, Rupavahini is most popular among the Sinhala in all parts of the country, albeit by different margins. Swarnavahini is a close second in the Southern and Central provinces; Sirasa TV is relatively strong in the Central province as well. ITN is strongest in Sabaragamuwa.

For Tamils, Shakthi TV dominates especially in the Eastern and Western provinces. Rupavahini is in second place among the Tamils, but dominates in the Northern province. Among Up-Country Tamils and Muslims, Shakthi TV dominates, followed by Rupavahini.

While newspapers are the principal source of news to a minority of citizens, research in other countries indicates that newspapers often provide more in depth news and also are relied upon more by opinion leaders.



Summary and Recommendations

The achievement of a just and lasting peace agreement ending Sri Lanka's long and costly civil war depends, inevitably, on the law of supply and demand. A peace agreement depends, importantly, on the proposals supplied by the government and Tamil leadership, among others, but it also depends importantly, if more subtly, on the demand for peace among diverse sectors of Sri Lankan society. Countries are governed by political elites who are driven by different personal and political agendas, but in democratic regimes, public opinion both constrains and impels the actions of political leaders and the decisions they make.

While Sri Lanka's political elite have a somewhat disappointing record with regard to the 'supply' of creative ideas for peace, the demands for peace from the Sri Lankan public have been both strong and sustained. The results from the Peace Confidence Index over the past two years and now from the KAP survey clearly demonstrate that the great majority of citizens want peace, a majority believes that everyone in Sri Lanka will benefit equally from peace, and most are willing to countenance at least some changes in the political status quo for the sake of achieving a just and lasting end to the years of war and devastation.

Nevertheless, the KAP survey clearly demonstrates that many citizens are predisposed to accept only modest changes for the sake of peace, and a substantial minority feels strongly enough in this regard to be

willing to protest any peace agreement that goes beyond what they consider to be fair and just. In contrast, while a substantial minority of citizens does support extensive changes for the sake of peace, many of these individuals are relatively apathetic about the issue and are not prepared to protest a peace agreement that they consider unfair.

Importantly, the distribution of attitudes toward peace varies substantially and predictably across Sri Lanka's major ethnic communities. Accordingly, Tamils and Up-Country Tamils are most enthusiastic about negotiating peace. They embrace a peace agreement first and foremost to end the violence and secondarily to increase personal security and increase individual freedoms. While they naturally prefer to obtain as many concessions as they can from a peace agreement, there is a remarkable degree of moderation and constraint in the demands that they articulate. While strong majorities favor federalism and guaranteed minority representation in the Sri Lanka Parliament, Tamils are about equally divided on the desirability of amnesty and reconciliation. A substantial majority of Tamils does favor a rotating Presidency, but there is substantial disagreement within the Tamil community about the need for asymmetric federalism. Importantly as well, Tamils indicate a clear willingness to compromise on the issues of High Security Zones and LTTE decommissioning. While Tamils would prefer to see the rapid evacuation of HSZs and more gradual decommissioning, a substantial number are willing to negotiate an agreement where the two occur

simultaneously in some interrelated way.

The LTTE leadership already has indicated a willingness to forgo their initial demand for an independent Tamil state, and the evidence from the KAPS study suggests that Tamils generally hold to a relatively moderate set of demands for peace. At the same time, Tamils and Up-Country Tamils are unwilling to accept "peace at any price." The majority of Tamils express a willingness to protest any peace agreement that is not considered fair.

The Muslim community in Sri Lanka is almost as solidly in favor of a peace agreement as the Tamils and for very similar reasons. They also embrace federalism, a rotating Presidency and the guaranteed representation of ethnic minorities in Parliament, albeit usually by smaller majorities. Muslims are somewhat more ambivalent about asymmetric federalism and amnesty, although they support both on balance, and they appear predisposed to accept a compromise on the decommissioning and evacuation of HSZs. While Muslims indicate a willingness to compromise for peace, they are every bit as willing as the Tamils to protest an agreement that is not considered fair.

Sinhala attitudes towards the peace process are much more complex. It is clear, however, that the Sinhala community does not pose the monolithic obstacle to peace that some observers claim. Indeed, a small majority of Sinhala supports the guaranteed representation of ethnic minorities in Parliament and more than one third support a federal structure. There is no support within the Sinhala community for amnesty, a rotating Presidency or asymmetric federalism. More than one third are supportive, however, of an eventual evacuation of HSZs, and about an equal minority is willing to tie the decommissioning of the LTTE to the evacuation of HSZs.

More generally, while about 30% of Sinhala are opposed to virtually all of the peace proposals and are willing to protest them, the vast majority of Sinhala either support multiple peace proposals

or at least are willing to accept (i.e. unwilling to protest) an agreement containing multiple changes in the status quo for the sake of peace.

To an impartial observer without a direct stake in the conflict, the KAPS data suggests the existence of substantial public support in Sri Lanka across all ethnic communities for a "lowest common denominator" peace agreement that includes a federal structure treating all sections of the country equally, a guarantee of equitable representation in the national Parliament for all ethnic groups, and the phased evacuation of High Security Zones tied closely to the decommissioning of LTTE heavy weapons. Although the data do not address the issue, it also is reasonable to speculate that additional provisions guaranteeing political rights and the representation of ethnic minorities within each of the resulting federal units would enhance public acceptance or at least reduce public opposition to such a proposal.

While public acceptance of such an outcome is far from certain, there is much that can be done by the government, by the LTTE, and by other interested parties to facilitate a solution based broadly on these principles. The actions to be taken come in two classes: a) actions designed to increase public support for a peace treaty in the short term, and b) actions designed to promote greater understanding and empathy among the diverse communities within Sri Lanka in the longer term.

The most immediate issue confronting Sri Lanka is the achievement of a just and lasting peace, bringing a certain end to the long and costly civil war, ending political violence, increasing personal security and individual freedom, ensuring the survival and expansion of democracy, and providing an environment conducive to long term economic investment in all areas of the country. Although the KAP survey provides good reasons for optimism about the prospects for peace on the demand side, there is no certainty that such an agreement will be supplied by Sri Lanka's elites, nor is the demand for such an agreement sufficiently strong as to compel self-in-

interested elites to respond to the public will. While it appears that there is a peace agreement in prospect that is at least minimally acceptable to a majority of Sri Lankans from all ethnic communities, there is sufficient ambivalence, if not outright opposition, to such an agreement, especially in the Sinhala community, to give comfort and cover to political elites who are not eager to alter the political status quo. There also are sufficient ambitions in the Tamil and Muslim communities for an agreement that goes beyond what is minimally acceptable to give pause to Tamil leaders who might be willing to compromise.

Information from the KAP survey suggests that there are a number of short-run actions that interested parties in Sri Lanka can take to move public opinion in ways even more conducive to peace. First, the available evidence suggests that most Sri Lankans, by their own admission, are not very informed about the peace negotiations. Only 4% of citizens describe themselves as informed, including less than 3% of Sinhala respondents. While about half of all citizens claim they are somewhat informed, the very high level of respondents who have never heard of High Security Zones suggests that those self-perception may be a bit self-deceptive. The evidence shows, however, that those most informed about the process are the most likely to be peace supporters and especially to be Activist Supporters. Greater knowledge and awareness of the peace process is good in and of itself; in the absence of knowledge, half-truths and stereotypes prevail. Importantly, however, greater knowledge and awareness of the peace process also appears likely to increase public support for the process and to reduce the level of protest focused on any eventual agreement.

In addition to improving knowledge about the peace process in general, the dissemination of more information about specific proposals

on the table would go a long way to reassure skeptics. For example, although the KAPS data do not show it directly, the KAPS process produced abundant evidence that many citizens equate federalism with the break up of Sri Lanka. They do not comprehend the idea of decentralized powers within a unified state and have been exposed to little information on how that might work. Many citizens also fail to appreciate that there are many kinds and degrees of federalism. The specific powers that are devolved to local governments can vary widely among different federal systems, as can the ability of the central government to veto local policies. In some federal systems, local governments can opt out of central government programs, while in others they cannot. And the taxing and revenue sharing powers of central and local government come in almost limitless varieties. While, currently, Sri Lankans are divided on the question of federalism, this is likely due, in part, to their different understandings of what federalism is and how it works. No doubt Sri Lanka's minority communities overestimate the local powers that federalism would provide, just as the Sinhala majority overestimates the loss of central control that federalism would entail. Greater knowledge of the many varieties of federalism would create both a more reasonable basis for discussion of the issue and a greater understanding of the manifold opportunities to find a compromise version of federalism that is minimally acceptable to a substantial majority.

The KAPS data suggest that the principle of "moderation through greater mutual understanding" would also apply to issues such as amnesty and reconciliation, where all sides seem to think that amnesty would benefit mostly the "bad folks on the other side" and not those fellow ethnics who may have committed crimes or violated the civil rights of others during the course of the civil war. Similarly, greater understanding of the specific quid pro quo associated with a peace proposal could enhance its appeal. Citizens who otherwise are op-

posed to dismantling High Security Zones may develop a more open-minded position on the question when it is linked explicitly to the decommissioning of LTTE heavy weapons. Just as citizens are more willing to embrace a tax hike if they are told the specific benefits that will be paid for by the added revenues, they are likely to be more accepting of the "medicine" of peace when they understand that benefits of peace they desire can only be achieved by making important concessions to others. In short, the benefits that result from any concessions made in a peace agreement must be as visible as the concessions themselves.

Although the great majority of Sri Lankans think that a just and lasting peace will produce important dividends, for many citizens the principal benefits they associate with peace are economic in nature. The evidence indicates, however, that those perceiving only economic benefits are much less likely to accept compromises for peace than those who think peace will bring an end to violence, promote personal security, or increase individual freedoms. With the ceasefire almost two years old, many citizens, especially in the Sinhala community, appear to have lapsed into a false sense of security. They appear to take the quiescence of the status quo for granted. In this context, there is much to recommend a public education campaign focused on the very real risk of renewed violence, threats to personal security, and limits on civil and political liberties that would result if the peace negotiations were to collapse in stalemate. Indeed, the President's recent suspension of parliament and temporary declaration of emergency powers provides a very clear warning that the ceasefire is fragile and renewed conflict a very real possibility.

More generally, it is important that the citizens of Sri Lanka's different ethnic communities develop a better understanding of the peace attitudes of other ethnic groups. It would be terrific, of course, if greater understanding resulted in greater empathy. But even if this does not occur, greater understanding may

help to reduce suspicions and fear. Individuals are much more likely to be willing to compromise and make concessions in an atmosphere where they perceive that others are willing to do the same. It can only be helpful for Sri Lanka's ethnic minorities to understand how many Sinhala support guarantees of ethnic representation in Parliament and even federalism. And it would be equally helpful for the Sinhala majority to understand the limited nature of the Tamil demands and their willingness to compromise on central issues.

In the short run, then, there is much to recommend a public awareness campaign highlighting the issues on the table at the peace negotiations, explaining the positions of the disparate sides, underscoring the concessions the "other" sides are willing to make or already have made for the sake of a peace agreement, and conveying the specific benefits that are attached to specific compromises that different sides might make. Such a campaign would go a long way toward convincing a majority of the Sinhala community to embrace a federal solution and to reduce the willingness of those who are not convinced to protest the results of the negotiations. The strategy also should help the minority communities better to understand what is possible and what is likely beyond their reach in a negotiated settlement. Both results would create added pressures on Sri Lanka's elites to be more receptive to genuine peace negotiations, knowing that they have broad support from a broad cross section of the country and from a majority within each of the ethnic communities. Greater public understanding of the peace process and of the positions of the different communities would also reduce opportunities for Sri Lankan elites to engage in demagoguery in the peace process, using ignorance to encourage fear, and fear to generate support for an anti-peace agenda.

In the longer term, the KAPS data offer good reasons for cautious optimism. One bit of encouraging information is the evidence that younger citizens in all eth-

nic communities are more supportive of peace and more inclined to take an activist role in support of a fair agreement. Sri Lankans with higher educational qualifications are generally more supportive of peace as well. As younger and more educationally qualified citizens mature and begin to assume leadership roles in society, the hope is that they will hold on to and bring with them into power the greater tolerance and understanding that they currently express. Increasing urbanization and greater and more diverse media exposure also ought gradually to erode ethnic hostilities in the long run.

Current trends aside, however, the amelioration of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka requires greater and more genuine integration of the country's several ethnic communities into a multi-ethnic Sri Lanka. This is cliché, to be sure, but its truth is not diminished by its being obvious. The KAP survey shows clearly that a little bit of ethnic interaction is a dangerous thing, promoting suspicion and fear and creating jealousy and resentment. The KAPS data make just as clear, however, that more regular and sustained interactions among members of different ethnic groups reduce fears, promote understanding, and facilitate a wide range of interactions, from friendships and social interactions to business partnerships, and even to marriage.

In promoting greater integration, language plays a critical role. The KAPS data demonstrate that those who speak English in addition to their principal language are much more likely to hold positive attitudes toward other ethnic groups. Those who speak another indigenous language are even more likely to have a positive outlook.

The creation of a genuinely bilingual society would, in the long run, do much to reduce the level of ethnic conflict and distrust. But creating

such a society will take decades if not generations. In the meantime, government policies liberalizing and encouraging the use of multiple languages in government, business, and civil society could begin the process of ethnic integration. The creation of media with genuinely national coverage, broadcast simultaneously in all important ethnic languages, and free from a dominant political orientation could provide an important catalyst to the creation of a pan-ethnic or national culture. The broadcast of multi-ethnic programming, exposing citizens in all areas to the lives and values, hopes and concerns of citizens of all groups, could promote understanding and tolerance, especially in more rural and remote areas where day-to-day opportunities for ethnic interactions are limited.

Establishing peace and forging a united Sri Lanka would also be greatly facilitated by the combination of greater economic development and greater equity in the distribution of economic goods across society. There is no question but that severe differences in economic development and wealth contribute to Sri Lanka's ethnic tensions. Two decades of conflict in Sri Lanka have exacerbated these problems, depressing foreign investment, stifling economic development, and further increasing the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have nots.'

Increased economic development is a prime benefit that many citizens associate with the negotiation of a just and lasting peace. But many citizens discount the promise of economic gains, fearing that most of the benefits of development will be realized by others and result in few direct benefits to themselves or their region of the country. It is important that citizens be convinced not only that peace will bring prosperity, but that it will bring a significant measure of that new prosperity to them and to people like them. This holds as well for any reconstruction aid that is promised from abroad in support of the peace process. The plans for the distribution of

this aid must be developed transparently, and the benefits of this aid must be widely distributed, in a way that is perceived as being fair, especially in those areas that are war ravaged and relatively disadvantaged.

This is not to suggest that ethnic differences in Sri Lanka need to be blurred or that ethnic cultures should be suppressed. This not only would be undesirable, but it probably is impossible to achieve and likely would be counter-productive in any case. It is to say, however, that it is important for Sri Lankans of all ethnic identities to develop an overarching, Sri Lankan identity that is separate from, but that complements and augments their ethnic identity.

Horrific though it has been, the civil war has created within Sri Lanka the conditions necessary for restructuring society in order not only to end two decades of violence and misery, but also to begin healing centuries of ethnic conflict, intolerance, and discrimination. The immediate issue on the table is the negotiation of a just and lasting peace, but the

broader issue, in the background, is the forging of a unified Sri Lankan society, proud of its ethnic diversity but committed to social justice, political equality and economic prosperity for all. The KAP survey indicates that there is consensus in Sri Lanka on the desirability of peace and a remarkable willingness, across most segments of society, to accept reasonable compromises for the sake of peace.

More can and should be done in the short run to nourish and strengthen the public's commitment to peace and its willingness to compromise. In the longer term, the creation of genuinely national institutions and a strong sense of national identification are important for reducing the political consequences of enduring ethnic divisions.

The KAPS report demonstrates, on balance, that there are good reasons for optimism regarding the demand in Sri Lanka for a just and lasting peace. Whether elites can be persuaded to supply the peace agreement that Sri Lanka's citizens clearly demand remains an open question.



APPENDIX A: Survey Methods and Questionnaire

Sampling Procedures

This study was carried out using a lengthy, structured questionnaire administered through face-to-face interviews of amongst a nation-wide sample of 2,980 respondents. The sample includes respondents from all 21 districts, excluding only those areas in Amparai, Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Jaffna which currently are not under government control. To compensate for these omissions, the areas under government control -- Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee -- were over-sampled, thus ensuring their proportionate representation in the sample.

The sampling procedures began at the district level, with 100 initial interviews allocated in each district in accordance with each ethnic group's proportion of the district population. We then over-sampled Tamil, Up-Country Tamil, and Muslim respondents within districts in order to obtain interviews with 400-500 individuals from each ethnic group. This was done so that we could provide more detailed and robust information about each minority ethnic group's attitudes, opinions, and behaviors than would be possible with samples of smaller size. The final unweighted sample consists of 1575 ethnic Sinhala, 494 Tamil, 439 Up-Country Tamil, and 472 Muslim respondents. Because the over-sampling factor for each of the minority ethnic

groups was identical for all districts, each ethnic sub-sample may be treated as a random sample of the particular ethnic group's population in Sri Lanka as a whole. When the results are presented for the overall sample, the data are weighted to reflect: 1) the true ethnic population within each district; and 2) the overall size of the district's population. In this way the overall weighted sample provides an accurate representation of nation-wide opinions, as well as an accurate reflection of the opinions of each Sri Lankan ethnic group.

Field Work

Interviews were obtained within each district by first determining the number of desired respondents from each ethnic group, following the procedures described in the previous paragraph. GNs were then selected at random within the district, with the goal of obtaining four interviews per GN. The number of required GNs per district was therefore the number of desired interviews divided by four. Within each GN, interviewers followed a random-walk procedure, beginning at a selected landmark such as a school or a hospital, and interviewing every second household. At the household level, the Kish sampling procedure was followed in order to ensure that every individual in that household would be given an equal opportunity to be selected to the survey.

A total of 71 experienced field enumerators from all three communities were deployed for the data collection and care was taken to send an enumerator of

the same ethnic community as the respondent. Of the fieldwork, 10% was back-checked in addition to accompanied visits and spot-checks in order to maintain the quality of the data collection. The weighted nation-wide results are subject to a margin of error of +/- 2.1%. When considering the ethnic sub-groups separately, the margin of error is +/- 2.5% for the Sinhala sub-sample, +/- 4.4% for the Tamil sub-sample, +/- 4.7% for the Up-Country Tamil sub-sample, and +/- 4.5% for the Muslim sub-sample.

Various civil society groups and the Government Peace Secretariat were consulted in the designing of the questionnaire. Prof. William Mishler of the University of Arizona and Prof. Steven Finkel of the University of Virginia provided technical assistance throughout the study. Professor Jeff Gulati of Wellesley College provided additional assistance in data analysis and construction of the final report.

Sampling Tamils

Constructing a sample of Sri Lankan Tamils was complicated by the fact that a significant segment of the Tamil population lives in territory controlled by the LTTE. In previous efforts to administer the Peace Confidence Index nationwide, Social Indicator was approached by LTTE officials who requested the opportunity to "review" the survey prior to its administration in LTTE-controlled territory. Social Indicator has consistently declined to do so,

choosing instead to avoid LTTE-controlled areas because of concerns for protecting the quality and integrity of the PCI, both real and perceived.

In addition to concerns about maintaining the quality and integrity of the survey, another reason the KAP survey was not conducted in LTTE areas was that SI conducted the survey with a grant from AED which was operating, in turn, under a cooperative agreement with USAID. U.S. Government policy prohibits knowing contacts between its employees, including contractors, and members of the LTTE. Thus, even if SI had been willing to negotiate with the LTTE for access to their territory, the terms of the KAPS contract prevented this.

Obviously, SI would have preferred to have sampled in LTTE controlled territory, but this was simply not possible. To compensate for its inability to do so, SI over-sampled Tamils in government-controlled areas including Jaffna which, until recently, was under LTTE control and still has a substantial LTTE presence. Table A-1 compares Tamil attitudes toward the peace process across the several districts in which substantial numbers of Tamil interviews were conducted. As is apparent from these data, Tamil attitudes are remarkable homogenous nationwide. Overall about two-thirds of Tamils are Activist Supporters and virtually all of the remainder are Passive Supporters. For the largest districts these percentages vary only trivially from a low of 66% in Jaffna to a high of 69% in Trincomalee. Puttalam has the highest percentage of Activist

Table A-1
Tamil Peace Types by District

Peace Type	District					
	Colombo (n=25) %	Puttalam (n=14) %	Jaffna (n=193) %	Ampara (n=57) %	Batticaloa (n=129) %	Trincomalee (n=65) %
Activist Opponent	4.0	0.0	0.5	3.5	3.9	3.1
Passive Opponent	4.0	7.1	1.0	1.8	0.8	3.1
Passive Supporter	48.0	7.1	32.6	24.6	27.1	24.6
Activist Supporter	44.0	85.7	65.8	70.2	68.2	69.2

Supporters at 86% and Colombo has the smallest percentage at 44%, but these percentages are based on a very small number of interviews and are highly volatile. Importantly, the data indicate that there are no statistically significant differences in the peace typology across these six districts.

Table A-2 repeats the analysis but examines differences across provinces rather than districts. The results are virtually identical; the differences across provinces are very small and not statistically significant. Finally, Table A-3 examines differences in attitudes toward peace between urban and rural Tamils. Once again, the differences are negligible. No matter where

in Sri Lanka they live, North, East or West, in urban settings or in rural areas, Tamil attitudes toward the peace process are virtually indistinguishable.

Of course, it is always possible that analyses of interviews conducted in LTTE-controlled areas might reveal some modest differences relative to Tamils elsewhere, but this is unlikely given the evidence at hand. Indeed, any evidence that Tamil attitudes in LTTE areas were different from Tamils elsewhere would most likely raise suspicions about the integrity of the interview procedure used in LTTE areas. All of the available evidence suggests that the Tamil sample in the KAPS data provides a fair and accurate representation of Tamil attitudes toward peace.

Table A-2
Tamil Peace Types by Province

Peace Type	Province			
	Western	North West	Northern	Eastern
	(n=25) %	(n=14) %	(n=193) %	(n=251) %
Activist Opponent	4.0	0.0	0.5	3.6
Passive Opponent	4.0	7.1	1.0	1.6
Passive Supporter	48.0	7.1	32.6	25.9
Activist Supporter	44.0	85.7	65.8	68.9

Table A-3
Tamil Peace Types by Urban Vs. Rural

Peace Type	Rural	Urban
	(n=406) %	(n=77) %
Activist Opponent	2.0	3.9
Passive Opponent	1.2	3.9
Passive Supporter	29.3	28.6
Activist Supporter	67.5	63.6



APPENDIX B: Focus Group Report

Contents

Background and Methodology 58

Economy and Peace 59

Information on Peace 61

Peace Dividends 63

Peace and Ethnic Conflicts 67

Compromises 65

Foreign Involvement 69

Proposals 72

Protest Potential 77



Background and Methodology

Social Indicator (SI), the polling unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) conducted the first ever Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS) on the Sri Lankan Peace Process in order to understand the needs, interests and concerns of the public with regard to the current peace process. This study was strengthened by SI's bi-monthly Peace Confidence Index (PCI) Survey and provides in-depth information to the Government and the Civil Society Organizations to help strengthen their strategies and sustain the peace process. The preliminary analysis of the KAPS study revealed new and interesting findings and instances that these findings challenged conventional wisdom. Therefore, as was planned from the beginning of the survey, SI conducted a series of FGDs across the country to understand the Grey areas of knowledge and to clarify some of the

issues that were raised during the 'Top-Line Results' presentations.

SI conducted eight FGDs in the areas of Colombo, Galle, Thalavakalle, Amparai, Batticaloa, Pollonnaruwa and Jaffna covering the Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and Up-Country Tamil communities. The selected areas were those that showed controversial results in the preliminary analysis of the survey. Participants for these groups were selected using the KAP survey respondent list and during the selection process quotas were set in order to capture men and women from different age categories. However, all the groups were ethnically homogeneous and were moderated by a person who belonged to the same ethnic community. Further, Dictaphones were used with the approval of participants, and the persons who assisted the moderator took down their observations. The FGD protocol was developed with assistance from US technical consultants and was used as a guide for the moderator.



Economy and Peace

Participants from the North Central province were of the opinion that the current economic situation is difficult for all alike. People employed in the government sector are particularly dissatisfied with their economic status, as they feel that what they earn is insufficient to support a family. All participants firmly believed that the peace process has in no way contributed to the development of the economy and that there has been no significant change in the economic situation compared to last year. However there was also a belief that there is a certain change in the economy with regard to the goods coming from the North and East as farming has improved in those areas. *"Goods such as Bombay Onions and Red onions are coming to the market from the North and East because people in those areas now have the freedom to engage in farming."*

Southern provincial participants had various views about the current economic situation. Some were not satisfied with their economic conditions, while others were not sure what to say. One person stated, *"If you take on a personal level there are people who are doing well and people who are finding it difficult to make ends meet, but when you take it generally as a society, I don't think we are doing well."* However, most of them believed that the economic situation was the same when compared to a year ago since the signing of the cease-fire agreement (CFA), while others believed that the condition has worsened. Most of the participants seemed to want to know what had happened to the money

that was saved from the defense expenditure as a result of the cease-fire. They were baffled as to how the peace process could cost the country more than the war. *"The government is saying that the war cost them about Rs. 2.8 billion. So even if you leave aside Rs. 1 billion for the peace process, where is the rest of the Rs. 1.8 billion?"* Most participants were under the impression that this was due to the savings from the defense expenditures being spent on foreign monitoring missions and various other parties involved in the peace process.

Some participants believed that the peace process and the economic conditions of the country were interconnected. Nevertheless, many were puzzled as to how the economy has not shown any signs of recovery as a result of the peace process.

A common sentiment among all Western province participants was that the current economy is such, that no matter how much the earnings, it is not enough to cover the expenditures. None of the participants felt that there had been any improvement in the economic conditions since the signing of the CFA. One participant summed up their strong beliefs when he stated *"The war has stopped in the North, but we have not experienced a reduction in cost of living."* The fact that unemployment is on the rise was seen as another contributing factor to the sluggish economy. When asked if they thought the economy has improved during the past year, almost all participants agreed that the economic conditions have improved for about 10%

of the population. *"There are so many chances for the rich people in this country to make money. For the poor man, the economy is like falling off the frying pan and into the fire."*

Participants of the Northern province had varying opinions about the current economic situation in the country. Only a handful of people were at least somewhat satisfied with their conditions. Some participants stated that their economic conditions have improved greatly as a result of the recovering transport facilities. *"Since the transport has become easier and what is produced here can be sent to the other area, the farmers here are enjoying the benefits of it."* On the other hand, some participants were displeased that the foreign goods flooding the market made it difficult for them to sell their own produce, which are priced at a higher level than the imported goods. Even though there were participants who stated

that they had a low or a moderate economy level, overall the participants were satisfied with their personal economic conditions saying that they somehow manage to balance their income and expenditures.

In contrast to the participants from the Northern province, the people in the Central province were all equally dissatisfied with their current economic conditions. They all confirmed that their income was insufficient to meet their expenses. The rising level of prices of commodities and the fact that a considerable amount of their income has to be spent on educating their children were cited as some of the reasons for their economic hardships. Except for one participant who was experiencing a better economic situation compared to a year ago, all the other participants confirmed that their conditions have deteriorated when compared to a year ago.



Information on Peace

Most of the respondents from the North Central province said that they closely followed the news regarding the peace process. Newspapers, Television and Radio were the commonly used media of information on the current peace process. People living close to the border villages said that they get information directly from the LTTE cadres, as they are freely moving about in their areas. Even though many people received information through different media, not all of them believed what they saw or heard. Some of them were genuinely interested in getting to know the details of the peace process and some just followed it on and off. Those committed people watched political programs like 'Kinihira' and 'Deshapalana Sathiya' in the hope of getting to know further details. People who had felt the impact of war were more committed to finding out further details and followed the peace process closely. There was a certain group of people who saw no difference between peace and war. They paid attention to information on the peace process only when a serious event took place as they were more concerned about their economic hardships.

When asked if the respondent's neighbors and friends were also well informed about the current peace process, some said that there were people who were more informed than them, while a majority said that people known to them didn't pay much attention to this type of information.

All the Southern province respondents emphasized that as people

following Buddhism they valued peace very much. Therefore, all of them followed the peace process keenly.

Though they all highly valued peace they were cautious about what was shown on TV and printed on the newspapers. People who had contacts with army personnel said that they believed more what they heard from the security forces in the conflict areas than what they gathered from the media.

Television, radio and newspapers were the commonly used media by Western province participants, to obtain information on the peace process. Most of the participants watched political programs on TV and some even discussed these matters at home with their family members. The accuracy of the information was something that a lot of participants were worried about. Somehow many believed that false information would not be broadcast via the Television as the viewers got to see it with their own eyes. Those who were not so attentive to news about the peace process said that their personal problems overshadowed their interest in the national issues.

Eastern province respondents paid more attention to news on the peace process than the participants from other provinces. They were particularly interested about the happenings in the country and actively read newspapers and watched television news to get more information.

One significant difference was that most of the Tamil respondents from the Eastern province listened to the BBC

news on the radio. Most participants also read a newspaper published by the LTTE, which is circulated only in the Eastern and Northern province. A majority believed what was being broadcast over the media most of the time. However at times they saw a disparity between the local news and the BBC news.

Muslim participants from the Eastern province were also particularly interested in news on the political and current affairs of the country. They too listened to the BBC news but did not believe all the information they received, as they felt that most of the news was reported under political influence. Some of them thought that the media was responsible for many problems between the ethnicities. *"Media has created problems among the Muslim and Tamil politicians by misinterpreting speeches made by them."*

The newspaper and radio were the commonly used media by Northern province participants, as many did not rely on TV. People who occasionally watched TV mostly watched Indian channels like

Durdharshan. Many were interested about the political situation of the country and some focused their attention on the interim administration issue. All of them admitted that certain news items were exaggerated unnecessarily and could not be completely believed.

Just like Northern province participants, the Central province participants too obtained most of their information through the radio and newspapers. Many relied on the BBC news and some said that they obtained information from other people when travelling in the bus. They thought that the information received through all means was not completely reliable, therefore discussed it among one another and got it verified.

The elder participants said that, compared to the earlier generations, people nowadays were more aware of happenings around them and due to their inquisitive nature and analytical minds did not believe everything that was presented to them through different media.



Peace Dividends

All of the participants in the North Central province expected there to be some sort of benefits as an outcome of a final peace settlement. 'Freedom' was the most commonly expected benefit while several people also expected some development in the country. Many eagerly looked forward to the freedom of movement from one place to another without any fear. Most participants stated that a final peace settlement should result in economic and social development as well as putting an end to conflicts among ethnicities. One participant also expected the underworld and other criminal activities to decrease with a final peace settlement. When asked whom they thought would benefit the most out of a successful peace settlement all the participants stated that everyone would benefit equally. *"As fellow countrymen, ethnic problems, party problems are irrelevant. Everyone, as Sri Lankans should get the benefits equally."*

The main benefit expected by the Southern province participants was the reduction in war-related deaths and destruction. Some participants were convinced that if the money spent on the war was spent on developing the economy it would contribute to a reduction in the cost of living.

Keeping in line with the opinions of the participants of other provinces, the Western province participants also expect economic development as a result of a final peace settlement. In addition they expect an increase in job opportunities and looked forward to an improvement in the

education system. One participant pointed out that a lasting peace would enable all Sri Lankans to enjoy the natural resources of the country equally, without limiting the use to only the residents of that area or to a more powerful minority. Another participant was of the view that, regardless of whether there is peace or not, there exists a need for proper management to develop the country and for the citizens to benefit. However, in the event that a final peace settlement does bring about benefits, all the participants wanted the benefits to be distributed equally amongst all Sri Lankans.

According to some Tamil participants from the Eastern province, they had not gained any benefits during the past one and a half years of the ceasefire agreement (CFA), while some participants stated that they have had more trouble since the signing of the CFA. Almost all agreed that apart from the freedom to move about and not fearing for their lives anymore, they have not experienced any personal benefits so far. One person had a more optimistic impression, saying that the field of business has improved and that there were more employment opportunities now. *"Earlier, when you went to a Muslim village for odd jobs, you feared whether you would be able to return safely because there were people who never returned or returned after being assaulted."*

Muslim participants from the Eastern province also voiced similar opinions to that of Tamil participants from the Eastern province. They too believed that

the most visible benefit from the signing of the CFA was the liberty to travel places without having to get down at every checkpoint and produce the identity cards. One participant said that he had experienced trouble because he lives at the Samanthurai boundary and the Tamil people who come to that area for harvesting rob them of their bicycles and motor cycles. Another voiced out his dissatisfaction: *"We are able to cultivate lands, which we were unable to cultivate earlier. But we are not sure whether we can harvest or not. Outwardly it appears as we are living freely. But actually we live under control."*

Participants from the Northern province appeared to be the group that believed that they had benefited the most from the signing of the CFA. They said that transportation had become easier and as a result the availability of goods in the market was high. Since the barricades have been removed and the identity cards are not checked anymore, the participants said that they were now saving a lot of time. A student participant summed up the benefits they have had, when she stated: *"Earlier a lot of time was wasted at checkpoints. Now we can save that time and use it for our studies. Earlier the fear of shells was always there but now we can learn in a calm and quiet set up."*

Apart from the common developments the respondents had seen in the area they also believed that business is flourishing. *"The peace talks and the Cease-fire has resulted in the foreign aid influx and this has facilitated the development process. Earlier the development was restricted to all other areas in the country except the north and east."* *"Peaceful background is there and our lives have become calm and quiet. We have suffered under the Indian army and the Sri Lankan army. But now we don't have that problem."*

"Now all the roads are open and we can go anywhere. Earlier there wasn't such a situation. If somebody fell ill and couldn't find the medicine, even though such facilities were available here they were not in a position to come here and take medicine. Now they can."

In line with the responses of participants from other provinces, the removal of checkpoints, the ability to move around without producing identity cards, being able to travel to any part of the country and not worrying about a sudden imposition of a curfew, were typical advantages pointed out by participants from the Central province. *"I had to face many difficulties due to these checkpoints. For instance, earlier the police used to question Tamil people when they went to a shop outside their own area, asking why they couldn't buy the goods from the shops in their own area. And when we were taking something to Colombo or bringing something from Colombo we had to face much hassle because the police wanted to open all the parcels and check everything."*

Many believed that the peace process is beneficial to any race or ethnic group. They thought that due to the increasing foreign investments that job opportunities are also on the rise. The fact that tourists are not restricted from coming into the Island was seen by many as contributing to the increase in their income. Another respondent said that before the signing of the CFA, they were compelled to dress in a way that didn't show they were Tamil, when going to religious places like Katharagama. But now they can go wearing their normal, traditional clothes and come back safely. *"Earlier we had to obtain a Police report if we wanted to stay even one night in Colombo. If we did not have a police report, sometimes we were taken into custody, just so that the police personnel can get us to bribe them with some money. There are no such problems now."* Another thought that the clear division that existed among the three groups, Sinhala, Up-Country Tamil and Jaffna Tamil was now less because they are free to travel to any area and converse with anyone freely.



Compromises

Most of the North Central province participants were willing to make compromises in order to achieve a lasting peace, but with certain reservations. They had differing views on what the compromises should be. However all participants agreed that whatever the compromises, they should be made as a nation, not individually. A majority of the participants thought the biggest compromise would be the economic hardships they would have to face in order to ensure the success of the peace process. One participant categorically stated, *"Yes, definitely there has to be some sort of a sacrifice, but without giving the land. That means without separating the country we are ready to sacrifice anything"*, while another said that if the war begins again, a sacrifice would have to be made in that every person above the age of 18 years would have to join the army.

The Western province participants were a little skeptical about the whole peace process and some even believed that the LTTE would not agree to a lasting peace settlement. One participant firmly believed that they were making compromises even at present and that they should not make any more compromises. Most of the participants agreed that Sinhala people were not so passionate about their ethnicity and that they would make any compromise as long as it resulted in personal benefits.

As opposed to the views of Western province participants, all Southern province participants believed that there were many compromises to be made in order to achieve lasting peace.

As a basic compromise, one participant stated that Sinhala people would have to stop looking down at Tamil people and expecting Tamil people to do all the unpleasant labor intense work. Another stated that there has to be an attitudinal change from both sides, while another participant agreed that both Sinhala and Tamil people would have to compromise something for peace. He believed it would be the Sinhala people compromising more, in terms of the land in the North, the National Anthem and Flag, the legal system and the police services.

All Tamil participants from the Eastern province were willing to compromise what they believed was fair if the outcome would be beneficial. In addition they stated that they would support any decisions or actions taken by their representatives if they thought the actions of the representatives were justifiable. One participant maintained that the principal concern should be to conduct the peace process peacefully and justifiably, not concentrate on what should be compromised. Another individual stated that at the moment what could be compromised was for the President and the Prime Minister to get together.

In contrast with all the other respondents, some of the Muslim respondents from the Eastern province opposed the idea of making compromises to achieve a lasting peace. One participant vehemently objected to making any sacrifices as he felt that the difficulties they were presently facing was

due to having already made compromises.

Apart from this absolute disagreement, there were respondents who were willing to make compromises with certain conditions.

“If a situation arises where all races have to give in, never mind we too can give in. On the contrary if only the Muslims have to give in, then it cannot be done.”

“Rights can neither be given in nor sacrificed.”

“Without affecting the basic principles such as self respect, self determination and the motherland, we can give in. For instance we can give in when it comes to income. The process of giving in must come in from all sections.”

Moreover, the Muslim respondents from the Eastern province were not satisfied with the current peace process because Muslims were not involved in the peace talks. They wanted all three communities to be included in the peace process in order to achieve a proper and lasting solution.



Peace and Ethnic Conflicts

North Central province participants were aware of conflicts between different ethnic groups and referred to examples such as the incident in Mawanella. Apart from what was reported by the media, they did not have access to further information. Respondents said that some of the conflicts between different ethnic groups were 'not actions out of love for the ethnicity, but actions out of a desire to create a situation and watch what would happen.'

Nobody thought that conflicts between the Sinhala and Tamil people in their area had worsened after the signing of the cease-fire agreement (CFA). Nevertheless they had heard of minor incidents among different ethnic groups in other areas.

Apart from incidents in Muttur and Mawanella, Southern province respondents were not aware of any other incidents among different ethnic groups and they did not think that there had been any noteworthy incidents since the signing of the CFA.

As opposed to Southern province participants, Western province participants were well informed about incidents between different ethnic groups. They related incidents in Puttalam, Maligawaththa, Ampara, Valachchenai, Muttur, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ambalangoda. More than just a conflict between different ethnic groups, they saw these incidents as politically motivated incidents. Even though the CFA was in action some did not see a reduction in violence, while others thought violence between

ethnicities had reduced as a result of the CFA. Some believed that the CFA had contributed to an increase in various disruptive activities by Muslim people. Some were particularly disturbed by the killings of the Army Intelligence by the LTTE. Participants said that they have heard of certain incidents in the North where the LTTE had violated the CFA, but they believed that the Sri Lankan Army could not take any action, as the Prime Minister didn't allow it.

A greater number of Tamil participants from the Eastern province saw an increase in confrontations between different ethnic groups since the signing of the CFA. Many said the primary reason for this increase in violence between the Muslim and Tamil people was related to paddy fields. According to them all these problems started when they began cultivating the land after the signing of the CFA. People from these two ethnicities had issues about farming when the minority people in the area also engaged in farming along with the majority in that particular area. *"The Tamil people who are in areas where the majority is Muslim, are being assaulted and the Muslims invade the land."*

Some stated that at times the parties who created certain conflicts made individual problems between the two ethnic groups to look like community problems. Another participant provided a different insight to the issues: *"The ethnic animosity is now high because the Muslims think that they will be cornered at the Peace talks and*

because of that they are also asking for a separate unit.”

Participants said that, if Muslim representatives were involved in the peace talks and if both Muslim and Tamil people understood each other and strove to live in harmony, such issues would be resolved.

Asked if they thought there was a relationship between the peace process and the conflicts among communities, one Muslim participant from the Eastern province said that even though there were three communities in the country only two communities had been involved in the peace talks. According to him, the third party (Muslims) being sidelined from the peace process would only create a conflict situation similar to what existed before, as already 40 Muslim people have disappeared since the signing of the CFA.

Many Northern province participants said that the main reason for conflicts among ethnic groups was political activities. They said that they had heard of incidents in Muttur, Mannar and Mulaithivu, which they said were caused by self-seeking corrupt individuals. According to the respondents, these violent activities were carried out by corrupt individuals, in order to spoil the peace process, as they stand to gain many benefits through a situation of war. Another respondent said: *“It can even*

be a personal dispute. For instance a dispute between two individuals belonging to two ethnic communities can advance into a conflict between the two ethnic groups.”

A majority of the Central province participants were unable to recall any incidents of violence between ethnic groups after the signing of the CFA. Some had heard about incidents in Watawala, Bindunuwewa and Maskeliya and were also aware of incidents in Valachchenai and Muttur between the Tamil and Muslim communities, but did not know much detail.

Overall however, compared to the participants from other provinces, the participants from the Central province were unaware of the happenings in the country as most of them had not heard of many incidents that had occurred since the signing of the CFA. Central province respondents had the same opinion as the Northern province respondents when they said that many of the conflicts were created by politicians to sabotage the peace process. People had different perspectives about the incidents between ethnic groups. Some thought that there has been an increase in violence since the signing of the CFA while others believed that these incidents have been occurring even before the CFA but due to the problems in the North and East they had gone unnoticed. On the other hand some respondents said that they live peacefully now.



Foreign Involvement

All respondents across the six provinces considered Norway to be the country that was most involved in the Sri Lankan peace process. People from different provinces gave different reasons when asked what sort of a role they thought Norway played in the Sri Lankan peace process.

Of the North Central participants, many saw Norway simply as an intermediary between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, while some said that they had heard rumors that Norway was trying to sell arms to the LTTE. Yet another group was particularly unhappy with the way issues are being handled by Norway, saying that if the three ethnicities got together they could have done better than getting foreigners involved.

USA was also considered a country that was actively involved in the Sri Lankan peace process, and the general feeling was that USA got involved only because they themselves felt the impact of terrorism through the 9/11 attacks. Many considered this as a reason why the USA extended their ban on the LTTE. Another respondent said that there is a rumor that Minister Milinda Moragoda and the US president were having a close personal relationship and it was because of this that USA is so closely involved in the peace process. In addition there were respondents who believed that USA wants to establish its dominance the world over and obtain control over the Trincomalee harbor, which is considered important in terms of security and economic activities.

Japan was thought of as being the country that provides Sri Lanka with aid and the reason for their assistance was believed to be because of the cordial relations that former President J. R. Jayawardena had with Japan.

Norway's involvement in the peace process was not looked upon favorably by the Southern province participants as they all thought that Norway was protecting the LTTE. The misperception was that both the LTTE leader and the Norwegian head of state were Catholic and that Norway was biased accordingly. Some also believe that Norway is operating with the hidden agenda of converting non-Catholic people to Catholics. Apart from Norway and USA, Thailand, India, Denmark, Canada and Ireland were other countries that are believed to be involved in the peace process.

USA was thought to be involved in the peace process for their own benefit, i.e., to sell their weapons and to control other countries. Some said that getting involved in the Sri Lankan peace process was USA's way of establishing their command over the Asian region, as they were aware of the increasing power and importance of India and China in the region.

A Southern province participant had a very interesting perspective on Japan's involvement saying that it was a tactic of Sri Lankan politicians to appeal to the Buddhist people of Sri Lanka by showing them that there was a Buddhist

country involved in the peace process other than the Catholic Norwegians.

According to Western province participants, Japan, Thailand, Canada, India, France, USA, Sweden, UK and Switzerland are the countries that are involved in the Sri Lankan peace process. Many respondents believed that Norway's involvement in the peace process was suspicious, and that they couldn't be trusted. They also believed that the Norwegians were afraid of the LTTE. As with the other respondents the Western province respondents also saw Japan's involvement as a positive one, stating that they helped develop the country's economy. Thailand was also rated positively for providing a venue to hold the peace talks. USA's involvement came across negatively as here too, people believed that USA was just trying to establish their command over the Asian region. They were said to be operating with the ulterior motive of curtailing India's dominant position in the Asian region, as India is considered to be the most powerful country in the region closely followed by China.

Foreign involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process was perceived to be beneficial by many Tamil respondents from the Eastern province. *"This is a small country and when we find it difficult to take a decision it is good if other countries extend their help"*

"I think we can have a speedy peace with the intervention of foreign countries."

"With the intervention of foreign countries the internal conflict and the problems hidden by the authorities were brought to light and if a decision is taken with the assistance of all countries there will be peace definitely."

Some others supported the foreign involvement as many foreign institutions had helped in constructing houses, providing employment opportunities and

giving loans for self-employment. While foreign intervention was considered good by many, some said that, as there were signs of invasion from countries like America, it would be better to involve them only in certain matters and not in all aspects of the peace process.

Muslim residents in the Eastern province were also aware of the involvement of countries like Japan, USA and India and some said that Iraq and Italy were also involved. Norway's involvement was seen as both positive and negative. There were some who believed that Norway was involved to bring about a final peace settlement as well as to develop the economic situation in the country. In contrast other respondents believed that Norway has a hidden agenda and is operating according to USA's wishes. Many participants agreed when one participant expressed his views on USA's involvement with the LTTE: *"Now Muslims are arrested and killed. American war ships are also coming frequently. America wants to suppress Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda group. In the mean time LTTE is trying to inform the USA that Sri Lankan Muslims also have connection with the Al Qaeda group. Therefore we can't trust Norway and America."* For this reason they wanted countries that the Muslim people could trust, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore and Iraq, to be involved in the Sri Lankan peace process.

One respondent in the Northern province believed that Norway would do their role as intermediaries in the Sri Lankan peace process impartially. Other participants however, viewed Norway's involvement in the peace process entirely as a way of gaining benefits for themselves. The respondents believed that Norway was saving Sri Lanka from being divided in order to market their goods here. They also believed that Norway was seeking an advantageous point in Naval activities as the country is situated in an advantageous position in the Indian Ocean, and also to gain a good reputation by successfully reaching a

final peace settlement. USA, India, Japan and Canada were the other countries that were said to be involved in the Sri Lankan peace process.

Yet another group of respondents saw USA's involvement as being detrimental: "*Purpose of America is creating some problem in any country.*" "*Sometimes America may be intending to use Sri Lanka as a base for its battle against some Muslim countries.*"

The respondents also emphasized that the reason for America's involvement was due to the rapid development of India and China. They believed that America was searching for a center of control to block India's and China's development. India's involvement was said to be because of the Sri Lankan refugees in India as well as of the goods India could market when the transport facilities improve between the two countries.

Japan's reason for getting involved too, was seen as a tactic to market their goods in this country.

Though the Northern province respondents believed that the problems could not be resolved without a suitable

mediator, they believed that these countries should not try to unnecessarily establish themselves in this country, but withdraw when the peace process is established and a solution is reached.

Central province participants rated Norway's involvement quite favorably. They complemented Norway's efforts in rescuing the peace process when it was shaky a few months ago. The signing of the peace agreement was solely credited to Norwegian intervention.

The European countries were thought to be interested in the peace process because the refugees from Sri Lanka living in their countries could be sent back if a final peace settlement is reached. Japan's reasons for involvement was once again believed to be the gaining of a platform to market their goods, while India's involvement was due to the refugee problem becoming considerably troublesome for them. American's sincerity was challenged by many and some shared the opinion that they just wanted to strengthen their security system.



Proposals

This chapter explores the attitudes of the public with regard to six different proposals for a final peace settlement.

1. The powers of the regional governments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be decreased.

The general consensus among the participants in the North Central province was that the powers of regional governments should be increased with the central government having sole control over the security forces, the police, the judicial system and the finances. The participants also agreed that, apart from the four mentioned areas, all other powers should be divided amongst the provincial governments. This division of power, they believed, would be beneficial to the minorities in those areas. They were in favor of having a system similar to that in Canada, where the central government takes all the important decisions. However, they were against the regional governments having more power than the central government. One participant emphasized his opposition to such a proposal: *"By devolving the power, regional governments will have more power than the central government and different nationals will have all the power they want. If power is given to areas where there are more Tamil people, it'll be the same as giving them a separate state."*

Two respondents from the Southern province were in favor of the proposal, saying that it would provide the regional governments with the power to do what is necessary. The majority nevertheless agreed to it as long as it would not harm the Sinhala ethnicity and their religion and would not bring about a divided Sri Lanka. One individual, however, was not sure what to make of the proposal and another was against it.

Many Western province participants were skeptical about the proposal saying that it would not work. *"I don't approve of this concept of giving more power to the provincial governments. The parliament of Sri Lanka should keep all the power. Power like education, health, police should be kept here."*

Some people thought such a proposal would be beneficial, as it would enable them to directly approach the regional government with their problems without having to wait till the tasks were performed by the central government. They also believed that it would bring about competition between the regional governments, which would ensure that the public receives better quality services. At the same time they also expected adverse effects from this such as favoritism. While one person thought all provinces should be vested with equal power, another said: *"The power should be divided by properly understanding the requirements of the provinces and the people."*

All the Tamil respondents from the Eastern province agreed to the proposal without any conditions, stating

that the central government looks after the majority and not the minority, which causes communal problems, and that if the regional governments are given more power that would eliminate discrimination and a lot of other problems. All the Muslim participants from the Eastern province agreed to the proposal as well, as they expect it to bring about many benefits for them. They looked forward to the fact that it would allow them to solve their problems in that province itself. One participant said: *"This provincial council must be divided into two or a separate unit should be given to Muslims. Security and laws must exist in this unit."*

The entire group from the Northern province was in favor of the proposal because they believed that their demands would be easily accommodated, and that since the local government institutions would be empowered they could obtain whatever they wanted. *"What we want is power. Northern and Eastern provinces should be amalgamated while the Tamil-speaking people in those areas are to be given more power. Under those conditions foreign aid can be obtained directly by us."*

The Central province participants anticipated many benefits to arise as a result of such a proposal. When regional governments receive power, the respondents expected the institutions to properly fulfill the needs of the people in that respective region and appropriately utilize the funds allocated to them. One participant, though, disagreed with the proposal: *"Without giving all the power to the regional governments, some of the powers are to be retained with the central government, for instance defense. In the decision making process some decision should be taken at the level of the regional government while some other important decisions are to be taken by the central government. That is the way to ensure a peaceful and smooth running of the affairs of the country."*

2. The powers of some regional governments may need to be increased more than others.

The proposal to increase the powers of some regional governments more than others was rejected by all North Central province participants as they claimed that it would be discriminating. They wanted all powers to be divided equally among all regions.

While some respondents from the Southern province thought it would be of no harm to give certain regions more power, some thought it would create a further divide in the country.

Education was a major concern of the Western province respondents as they thought it should be uniform regardless of the region and the ethnicity. One person suggested distributing power according to the natural resources of the particular geographical area. Another contributed: *"Power should be divided on a basis of need. If a decision is to be taken with regard to land, then the central government should have the total authority. It's fair to divide power based on regional needs but not the power relating to major issues."*

In the case of such a proposal actually functioning, the Northern province participants wanted the North and the East to be vested with more powers. They established that as they were the people who suffered the most from the conflicts, they had to be given more power. They wanted the provinces with more problems to be given more power. *"Since the North and East has more problems, more powers have to be given to them. Under the present circumstances it is reasonable even if the North and East provinces are to be given devolved powers and the rest of the regions are to be kept under the central government. This can create political problems, but the community that governs (the majority) does not have problems and those communities who are governed (the minority) are the ones who have problems."*

Central province participants anticipated problems through such a proposal as they thought it could lead to a situation where more financial

assistance is given to some regions and a lesser amount to other regions. In addition they also believed that the regions having more power would try to dominate the regions with less power. One participant wanted a strong administration, limited to the upcountry, to be established; similar to what the LTTE is demanding for the North and East.

A majority of the Eastern province respondents said that even the most insignificant powers should be shared equally. Echoing the sentiments of the Northern province participants, some of the Tamil respondents wanted the North East province to be given more powers. *"Sinhala are the majority in the central government, therefore more powers should be provided to the Tamil who are in the North East."*

With some obviously contrasting statements, all the Muslim respondents from the Eastern province stated that all regions should somehow be provided with equal powers, even though they wanted the regional powers to be increased.

3. THE RIGHTS OF LOCAL MINORITY GROUPS SHOULD BE PROTECTED EVEN IF THE MAJORITY IN THE AREA DOES NOT AGREE.

Regardless of the age, gender, ethnicity, regions, etc., all participants from the North Central, Southern, Western, Eastern and Northern provinces, except those participants from the Central province, agreed that the rights of the local minority groups should be protected even if the majority of the area disagree. Some insisted that belonging to a minority group did not mean that you didn't have rights and that the majority/minority divide should be discarded.

It is assumed that the reason all respondents agreed to this proposal as they accepted it as a general proposition instead of grasping the deeper meaning of the proposal.

4. There should be a rotating presidency, where the president for one term will be someone from one ethnic group, and the next term be someone from a different ethnic group.

None of the North Central participants accepted the proposal to have a rotating Presidency. However, a majority specified that the President would have to be elected through a public mandate, regardless of the ethnicity. Some participants, however, maintained that the President would have to be Sinhala as Sri Lanka is a Sinhala country. They eluded the possibility of a President from another ethnicity being appointed through a public mandate, as a majority of the population is Sinhala.

The Southern province respondents were amused at the proposal as they thought that the proposal itself would promote ethnic conflicts. They also stated that the President should be elected through a public mandate and that if Mr. Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, was elected as President, as long as that is what the majority wants, then it should be accepted. Further, another respondent added: *"Ethnicity does not matter as long as the person respects the cultures and the religions of our country."* One participant thought that such a system would be acceptable in a situation of a Non-Executive Presidency, but not with an Executive Presidency.

"This is a Sinhala Buddhist country. If we want to protect the religion and the philosophy, this country has to have a Buddhist person as the leader. It should be ruled by a person who is a Buddhist follower and a Sinhala. This is the only Sinhala country in the whole world." Apart from the passionate resistance to a rotating Presidency by one Western province participant, the others looked at the proposal doubtfully as they thought it encourages racial discrimination. As long as a person who is elected as President can develop the country and introduce a sense of nationalism and fairness, some

respondents were willing to compromise on the President's ethnicity.

Tamil people from the Eastern province had different opinions about this matter. They believed that such a proposal could cause problems, i.e., the elected President would support their own community and that could contribute to ethnic conflicts. Some people fully supported the proposal and yet some others, though they supported it, doubted whether the majority would accept a minority President.

Some Muslim respondents from the Eastern province were excited by the idea of having a Muslim President, while others did not think it was such a good idea. Those who disagreed said that, if a President was elected based on ethnicity, then that President will always favor people belonging to the same ethnicity when allocating foreign aid and funds. The participants came up with an alternate proposal of having a vice president from a minority community.

All participants from the Northern province favored the proposal, stating that it would give all communities an equal chance and allow the problems and grievances of each community to be dealt with by each successive President.

Almost all participants of the Central province agreed to this proposal and they accepted it as a proper solution to the injustices committed against a particular ethnic community by a President belonging to another ethnic community. One participant disagreed because he believed that a President belonging to a minority community would create a lot of problems and so the Presidency of the country should be held only by somebody belonging to the majority community.

5. Each ethnic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the parliament.

When asked if they would agree to a proposal where each ethnic group would be given the right to elect a certain number of members to the parliament, the common understanding among the Southern province respondents was that

it would not be such a success. They believed that the MPs should be elected by a majority mandate and, as the existing system allows the representation of all ethnicities, it should be left as it is. *"Then the public doesn't have to elect MPs to the parliament. The President or the relevant authorities could appoint certain people to fill the allocated number of seats in Parliament,"* was another participant's response.

The Western province and Northern province participants all stated that the existing parliamentary system fulfills the needs of all ethnicities.

The Tamil and Muslim people from the Eastern province, along with the Central province participants, agreed that if such a proposal was implemented, it would be beneficial for them. They disclosed that if members were elected to Parliament based on a ratio of the population of different communities, it would ensure sufficient representation in the parliament to get their work done. They expected the MPs who represent a particular community to be trusted with the task of looking into the problems affecting their community and providing adequate solutions.

6. There should be a general amnesty (that is, freedom from criminal prosecution) for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission.

"Whoever that person is, he is not responsible for the incidents individually. He does it on behalf of the organization. Therefore he should be forgiven."

"During the time of the war, all three ethnicities have committed violence. Therefore all of them should be forgiven."
"Sometimes this type of thing happens due to mistakes by the parties involved and in some other cases they do such things purposely. Since this has happened during wartime they can be forgiven."

These were the common sentiments expressed by the participants from the North Central, Western, Southern and Northern provinces when

asked if they thought there should be a general amnesty for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission.

However, there were people who were willing to forgive on the condition that those who have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war should confess and admit their mistakes and assure that this type of violence would not take place in the future.

Asked if the people around them would also be willing to forgive such parties, the participants stated that it is a common phenomenon that at least two out of ten would disagree for any given thing.

In contrast, many participants of the Eastern (Batticaloa and Ampara) and Central provinces thought such offenders should not be pardoned. They believed that even if

those people were forgiven they would repeat the same mistakes and continually ask for forgiveness. *"If we punish them now, they will realize it later."* Some considered these people's behavior not worthy of pardoning, while others thought that they should be asked to pay compensation for the damages they have caused. *"Although such people can be pardoned, who is going to do justice to the people who were killed by them? I think they should not be pardoned even though they may not be committing such offences in the future, since the lives of the victims cannot be valued."*

The general agreement however was to hand over some sort of a punishment to the offenders. One Muslim participant from the Eastern province summed up the views of many when he said, *"Under the pretext of war, many injustices such as firing at Mosques and attacking civilians have happened. Can we forgive the action of firing at unarmed civilians engaged in prayers at the mosque? It cannot be forgiven."*



Protest Potential

A majority of North Central province participants said that they would join an organization only if that organization was not having any political affiliations. One participant stated that the decision to join such an organization or participate in a protest depends on which political party the individual supports. *"If you voted the current government into power, you might just keep quiet even if you don't like the peace process."*

Southern province participants said that they would do what the majority does, in such a situation. One respondent stated: *"The Prime Minister had said that whatever the decision, it will have to be passed in parliament. If it will be voted against, then what is the point in us going and joining an organization."*

Some of the Western province respondents stated that they would definitely participate in a protest or join an organization, while the majority were worried about the consequences of taking part in such an activity. They were mostly worried about the safety of their family members and were willing to take part in a protest together with other people, but not individually.

Tamil participants from the Eastern province thought their protests would not have any impacts, as they were a minority. The participants also believed that their representatives would know when an unfair process was taking place and that if the representatives showed their dissatisfaction, they, the participants, would support the representatives. Some respondents

replied that if they felt their family problems were bigger than the issues at hand they would refrain from participating in such activities, while others said whatever the magnitude of the personal problem they would participate. Some felt that as the LTTE sacrificed their lives for them, they, the LTTE, required unlimited support from the civilians.

Muslim participants from the Eastern province voiced their passionate opinions, when they said that they were willing to go in even for a war against an unfair peace agreement if their protests were ignored. Regardless of their gender, all participants were prepared to take up arms and they also stated that their houses and families would be secondary issues if a war were ahead of them. *"I will do whatever possible for the community and engage myself in the war. I will not pay attention or attend to my family's needs."*

When asked if all the Muslim people around them thought in the same manner, one participant replied on behalf of all, saying, *"Any problem that comes to me is a problem common to all. Hence all will have to cooperate."*

The general agreement among respondents from the North province was that if they got a chance to use the vote against an unfair peace settlement they would do so, failing which, they would campaign against it. They said they would not hesitate to participate in a protest as long as a majority was behind them. When asked if they had taken part in any protests before, some said that they had taken part in strikes at work and in "Pongu Thamil" (where the theme was 'one land one people').

As long as the grounds for protesting was considered reasonable, the Central province respondents said that they wouldn't mind participating in such an activity. However, they said that they would have to think twice about the outcomes and were worried about their families. A female respondent said that she would not join a protest as she has small children to look after. Some of the respondents had already taken part in various protest activities. They all agreed that in the event of a final peace agreement having an adverse impact on Upcountry people, they would make the public representatives and the general public aware of it and then peacefully protest against such a solution, before it is finalized.



Notes

1. The PCI, which has been administered bi-monthly by SI since 2001, provides trend line data on public support for the peace process, while the KAP survey allows for a more in-depth understanding of the political and social dynamics that underlie the trends.

2. The analysis of political parties is complicated by the fact that only 55% of respondents volunteer a party affiliation when asked; 45% say they do not identify with a party. Overall, party identifiers are slightly more likely to be activists but are no more or less likely to support multiple peace proposals than respondents who do not report a party affiliation.

3. It is important to note that the small size of the Tamil community relative to the Sinhala makes it much more difficult to find statistically significant differences among the Tamils. The same applies in equal measure to U.P. country Tamils and Muslims.

4. Refers to the proposals explained in Table I on Page 12.

**OPINION POLL JUNE 2003
CONDUCTED BY SOCIAL INDICATOR
105, FIFTH LANE, COLOMBO 03, TP: 370473**

SERIAL NO:

HOUSEHOLD NO:

INTERVIEWER:

NAME OF INTERVIEWER:

I here by certify that all information provided here is true and accurate and has been obtained from the respondent as instructed.

Signature of Interviewer

INTERVIEWER: ALL STATEMENTS IN BOLD LETTERING ARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU AND SHOULD NOT BE READ OUT TO THE RESPONDENT.

Good morning /afternoon/ evening. My name is _____ and I represent Social Indicator, a research organisation that conducts independent research on social issues. We are currently conducting a study to gather public perceptions and attitudes on various socio-economic issues. We would appreciate it if you could spend some of your valuable time to answer a few questions on this issue.

I hereby assure you that your views expressed will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

SUPERVISOR:

NAME OF SUPERVISOR:

DATE OF BACK-CHECKING:

STATUS: 1. VALID
 2. INVALID
 3. SUSPICIOUS

IF **INVALID**, STATE REASONS:

IF **SUSPICIOUS**, STATE REASONS:

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

KISH GRID

A. Can you please tell me the number of people living in this household who are between the **ages of 18 to 65 years**?

USE THE KISH GRID TO SELECT YOUR RESPONDENT

TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE	HOUSEHOLD NO									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1
3	3	3	2	2	1	1	3	3	1	2
4	4	1	3	4	3	1	2	2	1	2
5	1	1	5	3	2	2	4	5	4	1
6	6	4	1	5	4	1	2	6	3	5
7	5	2	3	1	7	7	3	2	6	4
8	2	5	4	1	1	3	5	4	8	7
9	3	4	6	7	5	8	1	9	2	5
10	7	10	8	3	2	4	1	6	1	5

• **MARK THE NUMBER OF THE CHOSEN PERSON ON THE GRID**

a. Can I speak to _____ (the person chosen through the Kish grid) please?

1. Yes

2. No –

i. Respondent is not willing to give interview **(MOVE TO NEXT HOUSEHOLD)**

ii. Respondent is not available

IF THE CHOSEN RESPONDENT IS NOT AVAILABLE SET AN APPOINTMENT TO CONDUCT THE INTERVIEW LATER.

1. I would like to begin by asking you what you think are the most important issues facing Sri Lanka today. Please rank the following issues from most to least important.
(PLEASE ROTATE)

ISSUES	RANK
a. The Economy	
b. Crime	
c. Conflict between different ethnic groups	
d. The peace process in Sri Lanka	
e. Violation of Human Rights (e.g. Torture & disappearance)	
f. Others (<i>specify</i>)	

I. General Discontents

A. POLICY DISCONTENT

2. I'd like to ask you some questions about conditions in the country that people often talk about. For each condition, please tell me whether you think that the condition has: (1) improved, (2) is about the same, or (3) is worse today than it was a year ago:

Conditions	Improved 1	About the same 2	Worse 3	Don't know/ No response 9
a. The Economy	1	2	3	9
b. Crime	1	2	3	9
c. Conflict between different ethnic groups	1	2	3	9
d. The peace process in Sri Lanka	1	2	3	9
e. Violation of Human Rights (e.g. Torture & disappearance)	1	2	3	9

B. DISCONTENT WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

3. Now, for a few of the conditions that I just mentioned, I'd like you to rate the overall performance of the government in dealing with it. If the number "1" indicates a "excellent" performance, and the number "5" indicates an "very poor" performance how would you rate the government's performance in:

Conditions	Excellent 1	Good 2	Neither good nor poor 3	Poor 4	Very poor 5	Don't know/ No response 9
a. Improving the Economy?	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. In combating crime?	1	2	3	4	5	9

c. In dealing with conflicts between ethnic groups?	1	2	3	4	5	9
d. In furthering the peace process in Sri Lanka?	1	2	3	4	5	9
e. Prosecuting violators of human rights?	1	2	3	4	5	9

C. PERSONAL SITUATION AND ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS

Now, I would like to get your opinion on some economic situations.

Conditions	Much better	Somewhat better	About the same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't know/ No response
	1	2	3	4	5	9
4. About your personal economic situation? What would you say your personal economic situation is compared to a year ago?	1	2	3	4	5	9
5. And how about the economic power of your ethnic group? What would you say that the economic power of your ethnic group compared to a year ago?	1	2	3	4	5	9
6. Now thinking about the future, what do you expect the economy of Sri Lanka to become in the next twelve months?	1	2	3	4	5	9

II. Political Institutions And The Political Process

7. Please tell me generally whether you have a lot, a little, or no confidence in the following institutions in Sri Lanka.

Institutions	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Neither confident nor not confident	Not much confidence	No confidence	Don't know/ No response
	1	2	3	4	5	9
a. Your local governments (MC/UC/PS/ Provincial Council)	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. The national government	1	2	3	4	5	9
c. The President	1	2	3	4	5	9
d. The Prime Minister	1	2	3	4	5	9
e. Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	9
f. The mass media	1	2	3	4	5	9
g. Religious institutes	1	2	3	4	5	9
h. Community-Based or Non-Governmental Organizations	1	2	3	4	5	9
i. Courts and legal system	1	2	3	4	5	9
j. Police	1	2	3	4	5	9
k. Army	1	2	3	4	5	9
l. Trade unions	1	2	3	4	5	9
m. Politicians	1	2	3	4	5	9

8. Sometimes democracy has problems. When this happens, some people say that democracy is always best. Others say that democracy is not perfect but it is better than any other system, while others say that sometimes democracy must be replaced by a strong leader. What do you think?

1. Democracy is always best
2. Democracy is not perfect but it is better than any other system
3. Sometimes democracy must be replaced by a strong leader
4. Don't know/No response

9. Please think about corruption in politics, that is where people in government illegally use public resources/property for their own benefit, or take bribes. How many politicians in Sri Lanka do you think are corrupt?

1. All politicians
2. Many but not all
3. Only a few
4. No politicians
5. Don't know/No response

III. Tolerance And Democratic Values

10. Some people say that the media in Sri Lanka should be completely free to criticize the government as they wish. Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement?

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Somewhat disagree
5. Strongly disagree
6. Don't know/No response

11. Some people say that society shouldn't have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different from the country as a whole. Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement?

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Somewhat disagree
5. Strongly disagree
6. Don't know/No response

12. There are many different opinions about women's participation in the political system. Generally speaking, do you think that women should participate more or less in politics than they do now, or should they participate about the same as they do now?

1. Should participate more than they do now
2. Should participate less than they do now
3. Should participate about the same as they do now
4. Don't know/No response

13. Some people say that most Sri Lankans can be trusted to treat you fairly, while others say that you have to be very careful when dealing with most Sri Lankans. Please tell me your own view on this?

1. Most people can be trusted
2. Have to be very careful with them
3. Don't know/No response

14. I am going to read out the following statements. Please tell me whether you agree with those statements or not?

Statements	Strongly agree 1	Somewhat agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Somewhat disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5	Don't know/ No response 9
a. A person who wants to do away with elections and let the military run the country should not be allowed to make a speech in your community.	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. Someone who believes that your ethnic group is inferior to all others should be allowed to organize a peaceful demonstration in your community in order to express their point of view.	1	2	3	4	5	9
c. A person who opposes all forms of religion should not be allowed to make a speech in your community.	1	2	3	4	5	9

15. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:

Statements	Strongly agree 1	Somewhat agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Somewhat disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5	Don't know/ No response 9
a. Some people think it is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive	1	2	3	4	5	9

b. People should not have to obey laws which they consider unjust	1	2	3	4	5	9
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

IV. Individual And Group Efficacy In Politics

Now I'd like your opinion on some more general issues. I'm going to read a list of statements, and I'd like you to please tell me the extent to which you agree or disagree with each one.

Statements	Strongly agree 1	Somewhat agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Somewhat disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5	Don't know/ No response 9
16. I feel well prepared for participating in political life	1	2	3	4	5	9
17. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	1	2	3	4	5	9
18. People like me have no say in what the government does.	1	2	3	4	5	9
19. If I complained to a local government official, he or she would pay attention to my concerns	1	2	3	4	5	9

V. Willingness To Engage In Participation

20. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements

Statements	Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5	Don't know/ No response 9
a. The only way to influence what happens in this country is to break the law sometimes	1	2	3	4	5	9

81

b. When one group uses its power to put down another group, sometimes violence is unavoidable	1	2	3	4	5	9
c. If there is a peace agreement in Sri Lanka that I think is unfair, I will participate in a protest against it.	1	2	3	4	5	9
d. If there is a peace agreement in Sri Lanka that I think is unfair, I will join an organization that is opposed to it.	1	2	3	4	5	9

VI. Group Memberships

21. Now I am going to read through a list of groups, and I would like you to tell me whether you currently are a member of each group or not.

Groups	Member	
	Yes	No
a. Religious organization	1	2
b. A sports or recreation group	1	2
c. A labor union	1	2
d. A women's group	1	2
e. A community or neighborhood group	1	2
f. A business or professional association	1	2

VII. Political Knowledge

22. Do you know how long the term of office is for members of parliament. that is, after he is elected, how many years does he stay in office before the next election?

23. Which political party has the most number of seats in the parliament?

24. How many seats are there in parliament?

1. 196
2. 200
3. 215
4. 225
5. 250
6. Don't know/No response

VIII. Political Participation

25. Did you vote in the 2001 national elections?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Wasn't eligible
4. Don't know/No response

26. I am going to read a list of other kinds of political activities besides voting. Please tell me whether you have done it more than once, done it once, or never done each activity in the past five years. Have you in the past five years? ASK FOR EACH. READ OUT:

Activities	Done it more than once 1	Done it once 2	Never done 3	Don't know/ No response 9
a. Discussed political issues with friends, family or co-workers	1	2	3	9
b. Worked for a candidate or party in an election campaign	1	2	3	9
c. Participated in a neighborhood or community group	1	2	3	9
d. Contacted an elected official to ask for a favor or raise an issue	1	2	3	9
e. Taken part in a protest march or demonstration on some national or local issue	1	2	3	9

IX. Political Interest, Media Exposure, Partisanship

27. Would you say you have a great deal of interest, some interest, or very little interest in politics?

1. A great deal of interest
2. Some interest
3. Very little interest
4. No interest at all
5. Don't know/No response

28. Generally speaking through which medium do you get most of your information about politics?

1. Newspaper
2. Television
3. Political meeting
4. College/ University
5. Word of mouth
6. Radio
7. Others (Specify) _____

29. How often would you say you pay attention to news on the radio?

1. Daily
2. A few times a week
3. Rarely
4. Never

If answer for Q29 is 3 or 4 GO TO Q31

30. Please indicate two radio stations you listen to most often for news?

Radio Stations	Rank	
	A Most popular (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)	B. Second most popular (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
SLBC	01	01
E FM	02	02
Sun FM	03	03
Yes FM	04	04
TNL	05	05
Classic FM	06	06
Gold FM	07	07
Lite	08	08
Sirasa FM	09	09
Hiru FM	10	10
Shri FM	11	11
Raja FM	12	12
Lakhadha FM	13	13
Shakthi FM	14	14
Suriyan FM	15	15
Shah FM	16	16
BBC Sinhala	17	17
BBC Tamil	18	18
Others (Specify)	19	19

31. How often would you say you read about politics in newspapers?

1. Daily
2. A few times a week
3. Rarely
4. Never

If answer for Q31 is 3 or 4 GO TO Q33

32. Please indicate two newspapers you read most regularly for news?

Newspapers	Rank	
	A. Most frequently read (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)	B. Second most frequently read (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
Lankadeepa	01	01
Lakbima	02	02
Divaina	03	03
Dinamina	04	04
Irida Lakbima	05	05
Irida Divaina	06	06
Irida Lankadeepa	07	07
Silumina	08	08
Ravaya	09	09
Lakjana	10	10
Lakmina	11	11
Dinakara	12	12
Nijabima	13	13
Lanka	14	14
Thinakaran	15	15
Virakesari	16	16
Thinakkural	17	17
Sudar Oli	18	18
Varamanjari	19	19
Sunday Virakesari	20	20
Sunday Thinakkural	21	21
Sunday Sudar Oli	22	22
Daily News	23	23
Daily Mirror	24	24
The Island	25	25
Sunday Observer	26	26
Sunday Times	27	27
Sunday Island	28	28
Sunday Leader	29	29
North East Herald	30	30
Others (Specify)	31	31

33. How often would you say you pay attention to news about politics on television?

1. Daily
2. A few times a week
3. Rarely
4. Never

If answer for Q33 is 3 or 4 GO TO Q35

34. Please indicate two television stations you watch most often for news?

Television Stations	Rank	
	A. Most popular channel (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)	B. Second most popular channel (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
Rupavahini	01	01
ITN	02	02
TNL	03	03
Sirasa TV	04	04
Swarnavahini	05	05
MTV	06	06
ETV	07	07
Dynavision	08	08
Shakthi TV	09	09
Others (<i>Specify</i>)	10	10

X. Views On Specific Peace Proposals

35. Would you say you are very informed, somewhat informed, or not informed about the various proposals that are being talked about in regards to the current peace negotiations between the government and the LTTE?

1. Very informed
2. Somewhat informed
3. Not informed
4. Don't know/No response

36. For the sake of a peace agreement, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following proposals.

Proposals	Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5	Don't know/ No response 9
a. The powers of regional governments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be decreased.	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. The powers of some regional governments may need to be increased more than others.	1	2	3	4	5	9

37. For the sake of a peace agreement, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following proposals.

Proposals	Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5	Don't know/ No response 9
a. The rights of local minority groups should be protected even if the majority in the area do not agree	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. There should be a rotating Presidency, where the President for one term will be someone from one ethnic group, and the next term by someone from a different ethnic group	1	2	3	4	5	9
c. Each ethnic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	9
d. There should be a general amnesty (that is, freedom from criminal prosecution) for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission	1	2	3	4	5	9

If answer for Q37d is 1 or 2, then GO TO Q38, otherwise GO TO Q39.

38. Who specifically should receive amnesty? **(SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)**

1. Only LTTE
2. Only Security forces
3. Anyone under orders but not leaders
4. Everyone including leaders
5. No one
6. Don't know/No response

XI. Peace Dividends

39. Some people think there will be positive benefits for Sri Lanka as a result of a final peace settlement. Others disagree and think that there will be few if any benefits. What do you think? In your opinion will a final peace settlement have a lot of benefits, some benefits, very few or no benefits at all for Sri Lanka.

1. A lot of benefits for Sri Lanka
2. Some benefits for Sri Lanka
3. Very few benefits for Sri Lanka
4. No benefits at all
5. Don't know/No response

If answer for Q39 is 4 or 5, then GO TO Q42, otherwise GO TO Q40.

40. Please rank the following benefits that you think will result from a final peace settlement?

BENEFITS	RANK
a. Economic stability	
b. Personal security	
c. Violence free society	
d. Increased individual freedoms	
e. Others (<i>Specify</i>)	

41. Who in Sri Lanka do you think will benefit most from a final peace settlement?

1. Sinhala
2. Tamil
3. Up-country Tamil
4. Muslim
5. Those affected by the war
6. Politicians
7. Everyone equally
8. Others (*Specify*) _____

XII. Foreign Aid

42. As a result of the peace process Sri Lanka receives donations and foreign aid to rebuild the country. In your opinion who should administer this foreign aid?

1. Central government
2. Local/ regional government
3. LTTE
4. Donor organizations
5. Committee comprising of Government and LTTE members
6. Don't know/No response
7. Others (*Specify*) _____

43. Which part of the country do you think should receive the funds?

1. South
2. North-East
3. Whole country
4. Areas most affected by the war
5. Most underdeveloped areas in general
6. Don't know/No response
7. Others (*Specify*) _____

XIII. High Security Zones (HSZs)

44. Have you heard of High Security Zones (HSZs)?

1. Yes
2. No (**GO TO Q47**)

45. What is your opinion of HSZs, where government forces occupy civilian property?

1. Important for national security and should be maintained
2. Should be evacuated only after final peace settlement
3. Should be evacuated in the course of the peace talks
4. Should be evacuated now

XIV. De-commissioning

46. When do you think that the LTTE's heavy weapons should be placed under the control of an international commission in exchange for the evacuation of HSZs?

1. Now
2. At the same time the government forces evacuate the HSZs
3. Should never give up its weapons
4. Don't know/No response

XV. International Involvement

47. Which of the following countries are most and least involved in the peace process in Sri Lanka?

Countries	Countries	
	A. Most involved (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)	B. Least involved (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
Norway	1	1
Japan	2	2
USA	3	3
India	4	4
Thailand	5	5
South Africa	6	6
Germany	7	7
Other (<i>Specify</i>)	8	8
Don't know/No response	9	9

95

If answer for A is 9, then GO TO Q50.

48. In your opinion please state your level of satisfaction with the role played by the most involved country?

1. Strongly satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Dissatisfied
4. Strongly dissatisfied
5. Don't know/No response

49. People have different opinions on foreign involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process. Some people say it is an infringement in the independence of the country. Others say it can play a useful role but shouldn't go too far, while others say their involvement has been mostly positive for the peace process. In your opinion which of the following best describes foreign involvement?

1. Infringement in the independence of the country
2. Can play a useful role but shouldn't go too far
3. Their involvement has been mostly positive for the peace process
4. Don't know/No response

XVI. Peace Process

50. I am going to read out a list of issues. Please rank the first five most important issue that should be looked into at the peace talks? **(PLEASE ROTATE)**

Issues	Rank
a. Ceasefire agreement enforcement/ adherence	
b. Human Rights	
c. High Security Zones	
d. Reconciliation and Rehabilitation	
e. Foreign Aid	
f. Interim Administration	
g. Federal Structure	
h. Disarmament	

XVII. Ethnic Identity And Ethnic Relations

51. We'd like to ask you some questions now about different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. We know this can sometimes be a difficult subject, so just let us know if you'd prefer to skip any of the questions. Again, all of your answers will be strictly confidential.

Which of the follow groups in Sri Lanka best describes you?


1. Sinhala
2. Tamil
3. Up-country Tamil
4. Muslim
5. Others (*Specify*) _____

52. I am now going to read you a list of statements. For each of the statements, please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, uncertain, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree.


Statements	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Uncertain	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know/ No response
	1	2	3	4	5	9
a. People often treat me differently because of my ethnicity	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. Whatever happens to my ethnic group in Sri Lanka, will affect my life	1	2	3	4	5	9
c. My children should only marry a member from the same ethnic community	1	2	3	4	5	9

53. Now I'm going to ask about each of the major ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, and I'd like to know generally whether you have a good or bad opinion of them. Please use the scale, where 1 means excellent and 5 means very bad.


a. Sinhala




b. Tamil



c. Up-country Tamil



d. Muslim



54. How often you tend to come into contact with people from other ethnic groups?

1. Daily
2. Once a week or more
3. Once a month or more
4. Once a year or more
5. Rarely/Never

55. About how many of your friends are members of other ethnic groups?

1. Many
2. Some
3. Very few
4. None
5. Don't know/ No response

56. Now thinking about yourself and your family, have you or members of your family ever been unfairly treated because of your ethnic, political party or religious background in any of the following areas?

Areas	A. Ethnicity		B. Party		C. Religion	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
a. Education	1	2	1	2	1	2
b. Employment	1	2	1	2	1	2
c. Dealing with the Police	1	2	1	2	1	2

57. Is there a political party in Sri Lanka which you feel close to?

1. Yes
2. No **[GO TO Q61]**
3. No response **[GO TO Q61]**

58. If yes, which party is that?

1. Bumiputhra Party (BP)
2. CWC
3. EPDP
4. EPRLF
5. JVP
6. LSSP
7. MEP
8. Nava Vamanshika Peramuna (NVP)
9. PLOTE
10. Sihala Urumaya
11. SLFP
12. SLMC
13. TELO
14. TULF
15. UNP
16. Other (*Specify*) _____

59. Is there any **other political party** that has ideas close to yours?

1. Yes
2. No **[GO TO Q61]**
3. No response **[GO TO Q61]**

60. If yes, which party is that?

1. Bumiputhra Party (BP)
2. CWC
3. EPDP
4. EPRLF
5. JVP
6. LSSP
7. MEP
8. Nava Vamanshika Peramuna (NVP)
9. PLOTE
10. Sihala Urumaya
11. SLFP
12. SLMC
13. TELO
14. TULF
15. UNP
16. Other (*Specify*) _____

67. Could you please tell me your educational qualifications? **(SINGLE CODE ONLY)**

1. Cannot read and write	8. Advanced Level
2. Literate but no formal education	9. Vocationally trained
3. Up to grade 5	10. Technically trained
4. Grade 6-9	11. Professional
5. Up to O' Level	12. Undergraduate
6. O' Level	13. Graduate and above
7. Up to Advanced Level	

68. When does caste matter in your life? **[Multiple Answers Possible]**

1. In marriage
2. Making friends
3. At work
4. In your neighborhood
5. When voting for a candidate
6. It doesn't matter at all

69. Religion:

- | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| 1. Buddhism | 2. Hinduism | 3. Islam |
| 4. Roman Catholicism | 5. Christianity (Non-RC) | 6. Other _____ |

70. How often do you attend religious services?

1. Regularly
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

1. RESPONDENT'S NAME:		
2. ADDRESS:		3. TEL NO:
4. PROVINCE	5. DISTRICT:	
6. 1. Rural 2. Urban		
7. DATE:	8. START TIME:	9. END TIME:

Thank you very much for your time.

Social Indicator (SI) is an independent social research organisation, which conducts polls on socio-economic and political issues.

Operating under the Board of Directors of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), SI was established in September 1999, and filled a longstanding vacuum for a permanent, professional and independent polling facility in Sri Lanka on social and political issues.

Polling is an instrument of empowerment, a means by which the silent majority of the public can express their opinions on issues affecting them. Our mission is to conduct surveys on key social issues, thereby providing a means through which public opinion can influence the public policy debate.



Published by:

Social Indicator
Centre for Policy Alternatives
105, 5th Lane,
Colombo 3,
Sri Lanka.

Tel: +9411 2370472

Fax: +9411 2370475

Email: cpapoll@diamond.lanka.net

Web: <http://www.cpalanka.org>