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**Using Media-Based Programs to
Communicate DG/Conflict Management Messages
In Nigeria: Effectiveness and Impacts**

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LIST OF ACRONYMNS

AWAC	Anambra State Women Awareness Committee
CDJ	Center for Democratic Journalism
CEDPA	Center for Development and Population Activities
DG	Democracy and governance
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
FOMWAN	Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
ICRC	Instances Communications Resources Center
FIDA	International Federation of Women Lawyers
IHRLG	International Human Rights Law Group
JMA	Jam'iyyar Matan Arewa
JHU/CCP	John Hopkins University/Center for Communication Programs
JDPC	Justice, Development and Peace Commission
LARAG	Law Reform Advocacy Group (Oyo State)
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives/USAID
NAWOJ	National Association of Women Journalists
NCWS	National Council of Women's Societies
NEPA	National Electric Power Authority
NMMC	National Mass Media Campaign (JHU)
NUJ	National Union of Journalists
NJ	Network for Justice
NBA	Nigerian Bar Association
NTA	Nigerian Television Authority
NAN	News Agency of Nigeria
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
PAC	Project Advisory Committee
PIC	Project Implementation Committee
WIM	Women in Media
WLDCN	Women, Law and Development Centre of Nigeria
WNGOCG	Women NGO Coalition Group
WODEF	Women's Optimum Development Foundation
WPE	Women's Political Empowerment

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between 1997 and 2002, USAID/Nigeria funded grants through John Hopkins University/Center for Communication Programs (JHU/CCP) to several Nigerian NGOs, with the intent of using media-based programming as a means of achieving certain Democracy and Governance (DG) objectives. From 1999 to 2001, OTI/Nigeria supported media-based activities intended to resolve or mediate conflict, as well as raise awareness about corruption and means of combating it.

This evaluation serves several purposes:

- It provides an inventory of the kinds of media-based interventions undertaken.
- It analyzes the effectiveness of these interventions in communicating specific DG and conflict mediation messages and highlights strategic considerations.
- It assesses the impact of these interventions vis-à-vis DG objectives (such as longer-term civil society development) and conflict management objectives.
- It considers factors that influenced the communication of messages and DG and conflict impact.
- It presents lessons learned from both the OTI and JHU programs, as well as recommendations for designing and implementing future media-based interventions.
- It offers suggestions for the development of indicators appropriate for assessing civil society results achieved through communications-based programming.

It is important to note that this evaluation focused primarily on the JHU media interventions; the review of OTI activities was intended as a means of deriving further lessons learned about such programming.

Program Overview

A. JHU:

Since its inception, the JHU program has maintained these objectives:

1. Educating women about democratic participation;
2. Empowering women to participate in politics at the local, state and national levels;
3. Educating women about their fundamental human rights;
4. Facilitating and motivating advocacy on key reform issues;
5. Enhancing civil society's participation in governance and public debate.

The program has gone through four distinct phases. Programming changes during this period reflected, first and foremost, easing restrictions on conducting explicit pro-democracy activities and JHU's ability to conduct and facilitate more joint activities. The changes also reflected a natural evolution in immediate objectives, strategies, activities, geographic diversity and selecting sub-grantees, particular NGOs. In all four phases, however, media-based interventions, as noted below, formed the core of the program. The National Association of Women Journalists (NAWOJ) played a pivotal role, increasing its own capacity to improve and expand coverage of women's issues in the media, making women more visible in the media, assisting other NGOs in accessing the media and helping establish networks among grantees and other NGOs.

During Phase I (March 1997 to February 1998), activities were designed to provide education and sensitization about women's political empowerment (WPE) and related issues, augment the capacity of NAWOJ chapters and members themselves to cover these issues, increase the visibility of women leaders and politicians in the media and build the capacity of other sub-grantees to advocate for WPE.

Under Phase II (March 1998 to February 1999), activities were designed to help create structures for internal democracy and build institutional capacity of sub-grantees. NAWOJ activities promoted more extensive coverage of women leaders and politicians, women's issues and DG activities (such as advocacy visits or meetings with local government officials) in the media, and also continued sensitization workshops for its members, as well as other journalists and editors.

Under Phase III (June 1999 to May 2000), JHU maintained its emphasis on extending the visibility of women in the media, as participants in TV and radio talk shows, for example, and the coverage of WPE issues, coalition building, facilitating dialogue between constituents and elected officials, conducting advocacy campaigns, sensitizing and training journalists, as well as teaching youth and students about democracy.

Phase IV (2000 -2001) constituted a sea change in programming, as the transition to democracy allowed for a shift in program strategy. JHU refashioned the program so that it was more strategic, more national in scope, and directly addressed the issue of increasing civil society participation in governance. A new national mass media campaign, "Democracy Begins with Me," highlighted successful attempts by communities to organize around local issues and bring their concerns before elected representatives and effect change. The campaign itself was designed by an advertising agency and coordinated with the activities of other grantees, namely NAWOJ, the Women, Law and Development Centre (WLDCN) and the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) and their partners.

The principal, though not only, vehicles for achieving these objectives were various types of media-based interventions. These used communication techniques to expand the knowledge base, raise awareness, prompt attitudinal changes and perhaps elicit changes in behavior. The specific messages communicated responded to the particular configuration of the structural (often economic) and institutional, as well as social, cultural and religious barriers to women's participation in politics. Women were rarely visible in politics – whether in political parties, as candidates for office, as representatives of constituencies or in leadership positions.

The messages communicated also responded to a political environment generally characterized by absence: of good governance, of accountability, of strong oversight mechanisms, of inclusion. Corruption and perceptions of politics as the province of the political class or characterized by cronyism have contributed to political apathy among Nigerians. The government had exercised tight control over both print and broadcast media, particularly under military rule, and implicit and explicit forms of censorship still continued under the new regime.

B. OTI:

The OTI program, from 1999 till 2001, also used media-based interventions, in *quick* response to specific (and sometimes more immediate) challenges of the transition period. As a result, OTI's programmatic emphasis may shift over time (as well as its reliance on media strategies). In Nigeria, OTI addressed the changing nature of civil and military relations, the need for police reform, the prevalence of corruption and the pervasive ethnic, religious, economic and geographic conflicts that have plagued the country. Additionally, it confronted the often biased and incendiary media reporting that can trigger conflict, rather than facilitate the peaceful, informed and balanced exchange of ideas and debate.

It is important to keep in mind the clear distinctions between USAID democracy and governance programs, particularly as regards attention to capacity building, and OTI programs. As OTI provides small grants to Nigerian NGOs to execute specific activities, completion of a piece of work rather than longer-term capacity building has been stressed.

Various Approaches to Media Use and Media Interventions

The JHU and OTI programs were often innovative in their approaches to media use and interventions. *Generally speaking, this paper looks at two categories of interventions, broadly defined.* The first includes media interventions and campaigns to achieve changes in attitudes or behavior, or to motivate new behaviors. It also covers activities to improve media attentiveness to and coverage of democracy and governance initiatives, women's political empowerment and conflict. The second category includes diverse activities to train political actors and civil society organizations, in particular, in the use of media and media strategy development. *For the JHU program in particular, the latter was a form of increasing the capacity of CSOs and effectiveness of advocacy.* While there is some overlap, these categories are useful in reflecting and transmitting the broad vision of how media based-interventions could facilitate the achievement of different DG and Conflict Management objectives.

Category One:

1. Using media for mass mobilization.
2. Using media for short-term mobilization, such as voter registration.
3. Using media to create awareness of specific WPE issues, human rights or other DG and related topics.
4. Sensitizing and training journalists, editors and media organization directors.
5. Creating ways and means to increase the general coverage of WPE and other issues of importance to women in the media.
6. Developing ways and means to extend and make standard the presence of women in broadcast media.
7. Assisting NGOs to develop own media tools or Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials.
8. Using media to establish dialogue between elected officials and their constituents.

Category Two:

1. Using media for public relations (media events).
2. Assisting NGOs and coalitions to develop their own media strategies or using and accessing media as part of their own advocacy campaigns.
3. Training women politicians and activists on media use.
4. Strengthening professional organizations for women in media and journalism.

Conflict Management:

More specifically, it is important to stress that OTI used media to reach its conflict management objectives in four ways:

1. General sensitization. In states and localities where the situation was tense, though had not resulted in violent conflict, OTI organized campaigns to improve that climate and reduce tensions. This kind of approach allowed for several weeks of lead time.
2. Responses to hot-spots. OTI responded to both on-going or sudden violent conflict, or its immediate aftermath, with calls for tolerance and peaceful resolution of disputes. The lead time for these interventions was usually only a day or two.
3. Improving conflict reporting. OTI workshops for journalists and editors educated them as to the possibly incendiary effects of their reporting and more helpful approaches to reporting conflicts.
4. Publicity. OTI funding allowed for activity, publicity and media coverage of interventions.

For both JHU and OTI, program activities made use of a broad spectrum of media, both broadcast and print, as well as alternative means of communication. Generally, the choice of medium was governed by such factors as the target audience, nature of message and availability of resources. Interventions relied on radio, predominantly, as well as TV, often as radio and TV talk shows, panel discussion, radio and TV dramas, advertisements and public service announcements. As for print, the more popular media were billboards, posters and handbills and newspapers. Alternative media and communications supported included town meetings, community theater, and information, education and communication (IEC) materials, traveling video presentations and press kits.

Strategic considerations for media-based programming

During interviews with Nigerian media experts, professionals and critics, the team was repeatedly advised about the importance of considering certain issues during the media strategy planning process. While they were raised in the Nigerian context, they are clearly salient issues in professional and academic debates on mass communications. A select few are noted here:

1. Choosing to specify, a priori, the kinds of media activities to be included in a media strategy, or allowing strategists (whether in NGOs or advertising agencies) more freedom in creation and selection of activities. Choosing “stand-alone” interventions or using mixed media campaigns.
2. Deciding between “top-down” (instructional) approaches and “bottom-up” approaches, with a view to increasing recognition and reception by target audiences.
3. Choosing to address difficult issues – such as conflict – directly or indirectly.
4. Using language effectively, especially when translating messages.
5. Responding to culture (and knowing your audience).
6. Recognizing and acknowledging trade-offs between extending via reach through use of government-owned (and perhaps less credible) outlets and the need to maintain credibility.

Analyzing Impacts

There are certain caveats when measuring the impact of media-based interventions. It can be difficult to prove causality between a media intervention and actual change, to the extent that it can be discerned at all, in attitude and behavior. In addition, measuring impact is further constrained because evidence is hard to come by in most cases; little evaluation and monitoring have been done.

Nevertheless, after conducting the evaluation, the team was able to identify these impacts.

Select DG Impacts, by category:

Category One:

1. Communication strategies were effective in encouraging new behaviors and specific forms of political participation in governance.
2. There was evidence of some increasing acceptance in the Muslim North of women’s right to represent constituencies. In a few cases, women have been appointed to higher-level state positions. However, informants stressed that there continues to be less tolerance for women in leadership positions.

3. The presence (or absence) of women in the media and the extent of coverage of “women’s issues” have become the subject of debate within the media community.
4. Citizens gained experience engaging local elected officials.

Category Two:

1. Over the course of the program, grantees and sub-grantees demonstrated an increasing sophistication in the use of media.
2. NGOs better understand the critical of networking and coalition building, and the essential role of media in increasing the effectiveness of both.
3. Advances were made in passing key legislation to protect the rights of women, overturning deleterious legislation and protecting women from harmful traditional practices.

Conflict Management Impacts:

It is important to reiterate the difficulties in linking changes in attitude and behavior, or institutional reforms, to specific media interventions. In terms of the OTI program, this was all the more difficult because there were very few in-depth evaluations of activities. Based on those available, the team cautiously derived a few hypotheses about impact.

1. Multi-media campaigns promoting tolerance and co-existence have the potential to educate audiences about the need to end conflict.
2. Campaigns have the potential to increase “cordiality” between groups.
3. Peace campaigns that combine training with media interventions can lead to the establishment of structures intended for the resolution of conflict. (Maintaining these structures over the long-term may require other forms of assistance or support not part of the OTI mandate.)
4. Media interventions that solicit government support for the project can be effective as a means of teaching conflict resolution and mobilizing audiences.

Lessons learned about communicating messages

The evaluation also addresses at length a number of specific lessons learned from JHU and OTI programming in Nigeria. Again, these would be relevant elsewhere, but proved particularly significant for the design and implementation of activities in Nigeria. Some of the lessons addressed include the following:

1. The success of media-based interventions depends on the institutional capacity of the implementing organization or grantee. Lack of attention to capacity building, as with any civil society program, can constrain message communication and impair its effectiveness.
2. Strategies that use media-based interventions as a means of mass mobilization or short-term mobilization must establish and fund mechanisms for coordinating and directing response.
3. Reinforcement of messages – through use of different media or multi-media campaigns – is necessary for effective communication. Effective communication requires strategic and informed use of language.

4. Media intervention is a **necessary** condition in any campaign to promote awareness, impart education and promote change. But it is not a **sufficient** condition. Where there are structural or institutional barriers to change, for example, media intervention alone cannot lead to significant change. Expectations should be modified according.
5. Designing activities without sufficient attention to culture can create antipathy toward a message or idea, rather than sympathy.
6. Media interventions often cost more money than anticipated.

Recommendations for future media-based programming in DG and Conflict Management

Drawing from its findings on critical strategy concerns, program impact and lessons learned about activity design and implementation, the team formulated a set of recommendations for future programs. Key recommendations appear in the beginning and middle of the list, though not in order of importance. Recommendations for specific types of programming are clustered toward the end.

- *Instead of yearly funding, USAID should consider a longer-term strategy to insure program stability and consistency of focus.* Additionally, the yearly funding cycle made it difficult to maintain and sustain institution-building efforts.
- *USAID should dedicate more attention (and resources) to institutional capacity building. Institutional capacity building initiatives should be incorporated into communications-based program strategies.* The stronger the grantee or sub-grantee, the better the implementation and coordination of media and other activities.
- *Grantees and sub-grantees should be given broad guidelines that allow them greater room for creativity and innovation – in terms of strategy development and the design of individual interventions or activities – without compromising USAID’s own strategic objectives and standards, and cognizant of political sensitivities.*
- *As much as possible, interventions should take a multi-media approach, or be conducted in combination with other activities. Rarely should they be used alone.* In the first instance, mixed media campaigns are a better way of guaranteeing that the messages to be communicated are understood and reinforced. In the second, media activities combined with other types of activities – such as advocacy, training workshops and public fora – increase chances for, or augment, impact.
- *Media-based interventions and communication strategies must receive sufficient funding to meet costs. Where resources are limited, strategies should be limited accordingly.* The lack of funds at times prohibited completion of a program or limited implementation of activities.
- *Media intervention should be designed and executed by professionals who understand the religious and cultural sensibilities of the area and will not be seen as “outsiders” imposing a different set of values.*
- *In environments characterized by violent conflict, by ethnic or religious tensions, care should be taken that interventions do not have an incendiary impact.*
- *Using language effectively is the key to effective communication. USAID should ensure that all media-based activities use language appropriate to the target audience.*

- *Media campaigns run the risk of setting off a revolution of rising expectations. Unfulfilled, the expectations breed frustration that could undermine future campaigns.*
- *Given that much of Nigeria's youth has had minimal experience with or understanding of democracy and its practice, more media interventions should be focused on youth. Innovative democracy education, whether done through schools, communities or the mass media, could have significant impact.*
- *Greater effort should be made to evaluate activities and generate feedback. Creative approaches to evaluation should be sought.*
- *Media interventions –such as, mass media campaigns or broadcast programs – intended to change attitudes, perceptions and behaviors should incorporate dynamic characters that undergo similar transformations. (These demonstrate behaviors that can be modeled by the audience)*

I. INTRODUCTION

Between 1997 and 2002, USAID/Nigeria funded grants through John Hopkins University Population Communication Services (JHU) to several Nigerian NGOs, with the intent of using media-based programming as a means of achieving certain Democracy and Governance (DG) objectives. From 1999 to 2001, OTI/Nigeria supported media-based activities intended to resolve or mediate conflict, as well as raise awareness about corruption and means of combating it.

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- It assesses the impact of these interventions vis-à-vis DG objectives (such as longer-term civil society development) and conflict management objectives.
- It considers factors that influenced the communication of messages and DG and conflict impact.
- It presents lessons learned from both the OTI and JHU programs, as well as recommendations for designing and implementing future media-based interventions.
- It offers suggestions for the development of indicators appropriate for assessing civil society results achieved through communications-based programming.

It is important to note that this evaluation focused primarily on the JHU media interventions; the review of OTI media interventions was intended to cull further lessons learned about such programming. This exercise was not an evaluation of any of these projects in particular or their management by OTI grantees, JHU and other grantees or sub-grantees. Indeed, the projects highlighted here were chosen primarily because of the light they shed on a variety of media interventions, as well as other criteria, such as diversity of strategies, coverage of both major and minor interventions, geographic or zonal diversity, and inclusion of principal DG or conflict management objectives.

Also of note, the evaluation team defined media as vehicles designed to communicate a message, whether intended for a mass audience or smaller audience. This supported USAID's and OTI's broad approach to media-based programming, which allowed for the adoption of a diverse set of media-based programs.

Finally, this was not an assessment of the entire media sector in Nigeria, in anticipation of future USAID activities in support of policy reform or the like. The team did speak with Nigerian media experts – in print and broadcast media – to understand the context of USAID and OTI interventions. This report does present information outlining the basic dimensions of media in Nigeria (such as the organization of radio or TV outlets, print media and control over resources, for example) since this informs our analyses of program effectiveness in communicating DG messages.

Methodology

Preparatory work for this evaluation was conducted in Washington, DC, and Baltimore, MD, from July 22-26, 2002. Fieldwork in Nigeria began on July 18, 2002 and concluded on August 13, 2002. Chom Bagu, of USAID/Nigeria, participated in the fieldwork. We analyzed program and project documents, independent evaluations, ephemera and reports filed by grantees and sub-grantees. We conducted detailed interviews, took advantage of opportunities to convene informal focus groups and met with Nigerian media executives and professionals. The annex contains the extensive question set and outlines the in-country work plan.

II. DG AND TRANSITION OBJECTIVES AND CHALLENGES

Section IV highlights the types of media-based programming and interventions that JHU and OTI adopted. This section outlines how program objectives and challenges specific to the transition, democratization and reform in Nigeria determined the focus and content of the messages communicated.

A. JHU

Since its inception in 1997 during military rule and then reconfiguration at the time of the transition to democratic civilian rule in 1999, the JHU DG program has had several objectives:

1. Educating women about democratic participation;
2. Empowering women to participate in politics at the local, state and national levels;
3. Educating women about their fundamental human rights;
4. Facilitating and motivating advocacy on key reform issues;
5. Enhancing civil society's participation in governance and public debate.

Throughout, the program continued its function of providing necessary information and education, with the intent of creating awareness, providing assistance for better and more effective advocacy, and motivating women's participation in the political process, whether in individual communities and states, or nationally.

The principal, though not only, vehicles for achieving these objectives were various types of media-based interventions. These used communication techniques to expand the knowledge base, raise awareness, prompt attitudinal changes and perhaps elicit changes in behavior. The specific messages communicated responded to the particular configuration of the structural (often economic) and institutional, as well as social, cultural and religious barriers to women's participation in politics. Women were rarely visible in politics – whether in political parties, as candidates for office, as representatives of constituencies or in leadership positions.

The messages communicated also responded to a political environment generally characterized by absence: of good governance, of accountability, of strong oversight mechanisms, of inclusion. Corruption and perceptions of politics as the province of the political class or characterized by cronyism have contributed to political apathy among Nigerians. The government had exercised tight control over both print and broadcast media, particularly under military rule, and implicit and explicit forms of censorship still continued under the new regime.

B. OTI

The OTI program, from 1999 till 2001, also used media-based interventions, in *quick* response to specific (and sometimes more immediate) challenges of the transition period. As a result, OTI's programmatic emphasis may shift over time (as well as its reliance on media strategies). In Nigeria, OTI addressed the changing nature of civil and military relations, the need for police reform, the prevalence of corruption and the pervasive ethnic, religious, economic and geographic conflicts that have plagued the country. Additionally, it confronted the often biased and incendiary media reporting that can trigger conflict, rather than facilitate the peaceful, informed and balanced exchange of ideas and debate.

It is important to keep in mind the clear distinctions between USAID democracy and governance programs, particularly as regards attention to capacity building, and OTI programs. As OTI provides small grants to Nigerian NGOs to execute specific activities, completion of a piece of work rather than longer-term capacity building has been stressed.

III. THE MEDIA IN NIGERIA

A. Overview and Evolution

Before modern news media were established in Nigeria, markets, masquerades and village announcers served as major sources of news and information. Held every five days in various locations, the market brought together buyers and sellers from outlying villages who exchanged news and gossip and political intelligence. During festive occasions, masquerades, imbued in the popular imagination with the spirit of the ancestors, performed the editorial function of exposing scandals, and publicly condemning anti-social behavior and corruption, regardless of the status of the perpetrator. Striking a gong to secure attention, the village announcer, a personal emissary of the king, went from street corner to street corner, usually in the evenings when every resident would have retired home, to deliver important information to the community (Ugboajah, 1980).

Today, these institutions function marginally, only as adjuncts of the mass media. The first newspaper in Nigeria was established in Abeokuta, capital of present-day Ogun State, by the Anglican missionary, the Rev. Henry Townsend in 1859. The newspaper collapsed in 1867, a casualty of a local uprising that led to the sacking of the Anglican mission and the destruction of the printing press. Other newspapers sprang up in Lagos and other cities in the south of Nigeria. Some 51 newspapers were set up in Nigeria between 1880 and 1937 when Nnamdi Azikiwe founded the *West African Pilot* in Lagos. "Zik," as Azikiwe was called by his teeming admirers, had studied political science, anthropology and journalism in the United States, and had served as editor of the *Morning Post* in Accra, in the neighboring Gold Coast.

The *Pilot* became an instant commercial success, rivaling the *Daily Times*, which had been founded by British expatriate and Nigerian commercial interests in 1926. When the first countrywide political party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) was founded in 1947 with Azikiwe as its general secretary, the *Pilot* became its publicity organ and the voice of Nigerian nationalism.

All of them, except 15 provincial weeklies, were based in Lagos and were privately owned (Omu, 1978). The first newspaper north of the Niger, *The Citizen*, was published in 1939 and appeared fortnightly. It was not until 1949 that the North had its first daily newspaper, the Kano-based *Comet* (Agbaje, 1992).

During the colonial era, Nigerian newspapers played a crucial role in fostering national pride and mobilizing the public for self-government and independence. After independence, they became instruments for political recruitment, elite mobilization and for winning and retaining political power at local, state and federal levels.

"Nigerian journalism," according to Elliott and Golding (1974), "was created by anti-colonial protest, baptized in the waters of nationalist propaganda and matured in party politics."

Whereas the colonial press was privately owned, the post-colonial press has experienced strong government presence. The Eastern Nigeria Government set the pace with the establishment of the *Eastern Nigeria Outlook* in 1956. In Western Nigeria, the Action Group Government entered into a publishing agreement with The Thompson Newspaper Group in London to produce the *Daily Express*. In 1961, the Federal Government established the *Morning Post* to publicize its activities (Agbaje, 1992).

Five years later, the Northern Nigerian Government transformed *The Nigerian Citizen* into a daily newspaper, the *New Nigerian*. The newspaper served as publicity organ for the government as well as the ruling party, the Northern Peoples Congress, and generally articulated the interests of the North (Daura, 1971).

While its contemporaries were in decline or had ceased publication, the *Daily Times*, maintaining its commercial orientation and formal neutrality in politics, thrived from the early 1960s through the late

1970s, it was the most widely circulated newspaper in Nigeria. Its Sunday edition enjoyed a circulation of more than 500,000 copies. But its affiliation with the *Mirror* group in Britain rendered it politically suspect. Such an influential newspaper, its critics said, should be owned and controlled by Nigerians, not by foreign interests (Jose, 1987).

In 1976, the Federal Government acquired 60 percent of the *Daily Times* stock, and hence editorial control. It also took over complete control of the *New Nigerian*. Most of Nigeria's 36 states used to own and control a newspaper. Some, like *The Herald* (Kwara), *The Voice* (Benue) and *The Sketch* (Oyo, Osun and Ondo) have ceased publication altogether; those still operating, such as *The Tide* (Rivers), *The Chronicle* (Cross River), *The Pioneer* (Akwa Ibom) and *The Observer* (Edo), are under funded and have limited circulation. Because they have been employed again and again as organs of government propaganda and as weapons against those perceived to be opponents of the government, they enjoy little credibility and carry little influence (Yusuf, 1992, Haruna, 1996).

As government-sponsored newspapers were collapsing, the private press began to grow and to thrive. *The Punch*, which went into circulation as a weekly in 1975 became a daily in 1978 and now ranks as one of the most successful Nigerian newspapers. The 1980s witnessed the entry of more privately owned newspapers into the market – *The Guardian*, *The Vanguard*, *The Champion*, *The Democrat*, *The Reporter* and *Sunray*. The last three were short-lived. New titles established during the past four years include *This Day*, *The Comet*, *The National Interest* and *Daily Trust*.

The newspaper press is concentrated in the Southwest, the area of the country that was first exposed to and was most receptive to Western influences, and constitutes the economic hub of the country. Together, the newspapers based in this area are often referred to rather pejoratively as the "Lagos-Ibadan Axis" of the Nigerian press, or less censoriously, but still disapprovingly, as the Lagos-Ibadan press. Such disapproval is especially strong in predominantly Muslim Northern Nigeria, where the newspaper press is far less successful and the southern press is regarded as brash, permissive and anti-Islam (Haruna, pp. 66-67).

Most Nigerian newspapers and magazines are published in English, the language of the educated elite. A few weeklies and periodicals are published in Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, Nigeria's major languages. But the range and quality of information they provide do not compare to that offered by the English language press. For the most part, they dwell on the bizarre and the sensational. An outstanding exception is *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo*, a Hausa-language newspaper published three times a week. It is a serious and highly respected newspaper, numbering among its editorial staff holders of graduate degrees, something out of the ordinary.

According to industry sources, the combined circulation of more than 15 daily newspapers published in Nigeria is less than one million. For weeklies, the combined circulation is estimated at 1.5 million. These figures are a reflection partly of the cost of a newspaper relative to disposable income. Even among the elite with much larger disposable incomes, buying a newspaper everyday is no longer obligatory. Many now buy newspapers only on the days they carry supplements or special sections on subjects that interest them, such as property, oil and gas, technology and education.

The low circulation figures, however, do not reflect the actual readership. It is estimated that at least five persons read one copy of a Nigerian newspaper. The total readership is small relative to Nigeria's estimated population of 120 million. But the readership constitutes, in the main, the attentive audience for public affairs and wields a much greater influence in policy-making than its size would suggest. Also indicative of their prestige, 10 Nigerian newspapers are now available for a global audience through the Internet.

Radio came to Nigeria during World War II when the BBC began relaying its Empire Service to Nigeria. This venture became the Nigerian Broadcasting Service in 1957 and ultimately the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria. (Obazele, 1996). Until the early 1990s, radio was controlled exclusively by both the federal and state governments. Today, private radio stations are thriving in some of Nigeria's major cities.

Radio is by far the largest medium of communication in Nigeria. It reaches vast audiences with programming in Nigerian languages or the Pidgin English widely spoken in most parts of Nigeria. In the most far-flung villages and grazing lands of Northern Nigeria, artisans and farmers and cattle breeders can be seen with their transistor radios tuned to Hausa programs of the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Deutsche Welle and Radio Beijing.

Television began in Nigeria in 1959 as a government monopoly (Maduka, 1989). Like radio, it is now open to private initiatives. In the past seven years, many privately owned television stations have sprung up in Nigeria's major cities. In Nigeria's rural areas, few people own television sets. Television viewing is therefore often a communal experience that also provides a platform for debate and discussion on program content and the issues raised.

Lagos alone has six private television stations; Ibadan, Benin, Enugu and Port Harcourt, among other Nigerian cities, have one or more private television stations.

Still, the broadcast media in Nigeria, for the most part, operates under government control. The federal government owns and controls the national television and radio networks, and state governments own and control radio and television stations that reach across state boundaries to other states. Because they often ignore or suppress news and information that editors and programmers think will displease the government, the radio and television networks are often regarded with distrust. The World Service of the BBC continues to serve as a prime source of news and information for Nigerians even on local issues.

Often discounted in an inventory or analysis of the Nigerian news media is the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN). Established in 1978 at the height of the debate on a new world information and communication order, it is the country's largest news organization. It has more than 80 correspondents covering the state capitals as well as major cities, and has earned a reputation for comprehensive news coverage and sober, accurate reporting. On Nigeria's rural areas and smaller towns, it is probably the leading provider of news and features for the print and electronic media.

NAN is technically under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Information, but its bulletins do not reach the public directly. Its clients are news organizations, which decide what to pick up from the bulletin and how to present the information. Consequently, the government does not perceive NAN as a threat and rarely interferes in its editorial operations (Maida, 1996).

NAN's correspondents based in London, New York, Abidjan and Johannesburg are instructed to report the news from a distinctly Nigerian perspective. Through its news exchange agreements with other news agencies, NAN disseminates Nigerian news to international audiences.

With the availability of modestly priced video cameras and ancillary equipment, home videos have become quite popular in Nigeria. Produced by professionals and amateurs alike, they depict aspects of Nigerian life and culture and call attention to social vices. Many of them are subsequently broadcast on television.

Since the colonial era, traveling theaters have been an important medium of communication in Nigeria. Troupes, made up of members of an extended family or friends from a community, travel far and wide to stage plays with overt or covert political messages. Traveling theaters are less common today, but drama remains a potent medium for communicating messages to identified audiences. Through radio and television, drama reaches huge, dispersed audiences.

B. Reaching The Audience: Using Media Effectively In Nigeria

The media are necessary tools for reaching large, dispersed audiences with informational, educational and communication programming. But the choice of medium is governed by such factors as the target audience, nature of message and availability of resources.

1. Using Broadcast Media

Radio

Given these factors radio seems to be the medium with greatest reach for communicating DG and conflict resolution messages in Nigeria, in just about any language. Transcending the barriers of literacy, radio programs are accessible in the remotest parts of Nigeria. Thanks to battery-operated sets, listeners can tune in to their favorite programs without having to worry about the notoriously undependable municipal electricity supply.

TV

The television network in Nigeria is almost as extensive as the radio network, in terms of outlets. Viewers all over the country can watch the same program at the same time and undergo the same communication experience. It can therefore serve as a vital tool for mobilizing the entire nation or large sections of the population. Because it is a visual medium, it can be used to teach skills. Television viewing in Nigeria is for the most part a family or communal activity. The programs being shown are often discussed and debated in family or communal settings. Such discussions usually increase the salience of the issues or messages being communicated.

But access to television production is expensive. Groups seeking to use television to advance their goals usually lack the technical expertise to produce quality material. The television outlets with the widest reach are government-controlled. Their funding comes principally from the government. They usually will not transmit information or programs that might displease the authorities.

More often than not, the problem is self-censorship, rather than government censorship. In August 2002, the House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding that President Olusegun Obasanjo resign within two weeks or face impeachment. The resolution was widely reported and dominated the print media, including government-controlled newspapers, for weeks. But the national television network, probably through self-censorship rather than through government dictates, reported neither the resolution nor the national debate that it triggered. This suppression was a reminder that, even in a democratic setting, some official media organizations are yet to shed the habits of the military era. And it raised, anew, questions about the credibility and trustworthiness of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) as a vehicle for imparting information and promoting change.

Private television stations are licensed by the state. So, even where a private station is inclined to be more adventurous in its programming, a threat to review its license may just be enough to keep it on its best behavior. Such threats are few and far between, but they always lurk in the minds of operators and programmers.

Radio and TV Talk shows

Media managers have identified talk shows as a potent medium for communicating DG and conflict resolution messages. To be effective, however, the shows must be a judicious blend of entertainment and information. In the words of one media executive, Nigerians are "tired of being lectured."

When audience members can call in, the effectiveness of talk shows is enhanced. In the recent past, only those who have telephones – a minority even among the elite – could call in. But with the technological

revolution that has made wireless phones more available and more affordable to ordinary Nigerians, many more listeners are calling in, and the range of opinions and views expressed is a truer reflection of society.

Panel Discussions

Panel discussions can provide for a greater diversity of viewpoints than talk shows if panelists are selected carefully to represent contending viewpoints. If not conducted skillfully by a moderator, a panel discussion can degenerate into a contest for debating points. And even when handled properly, panel discussions rarely resolve the issues at hand. But they often yield information, insights and perspectives otherwise unknown to listeners.

Radio Drama

Radio drama can also serve as an effective vehicle for delivering DG and conflict resolution messages. Drama series are effective when they maintain an overall theme, to which each episode adheres, and strike a good balance between edification and entertainment. The language needs to be accessible to ordinary listeners, and the plots should reflect their experiences.

Jingles (Advertisements or Public Service Announcements)

Jingles have been a prominent feature on radio since Radio Nigeria began its commercial service in the early 1960s. They are inexpensive to produce. Designed to win and hold the listener's attention, the best of them contain memorable punch lines. They are especially useful in urging listeners to take some desired action. An effective jingle requires a great deal of creativity.

TV Drama

Televised drama, which combines sight and sound and color, has even greater potential than radio for communicating messages. As with radio drama, it has proven effective when maintaining an overall theme to which each episode adheres. It is important, however, that the real message not be lost in the "glamour and sophistication" that often characterize television. While TV dramas are expensive to produce, leveraging resources with government or private sector funds has proven possible.

Home Videos

Home videos are a cheaper alternative to television drama, and have grown very popular in Nigeria. But according to media experts, they tend to perpetuate stereotypes. Typically, they portray women as witches, prostitutes and evildoers, rarely as leaders, professionals and role models. Consequently, they may not be suitable as vehicles for interventions designed to promote female participation in politics or end practices harmful to women.

2. Using Print Media

Billboards

Billboards placed strategically along highways also can help disseminate messages, especially to motorists and travelers. An appropriate and striking graphic design is key to effectiveness. It should be clean and uncluttered, using few words. Otherwise, the message may be lost. Placement is also important; billboards need to be high enough so that they are not easily defaced. Since the message is only communicated for the life of the billboard, it is essential that billboards be reinforced by the use of other media.

Posters and Handbills

Posters and handbills also have been employed in disseminating messages. While they have potential, more often than not, greater effort is invested in producing them, rather than in distributing them to the target audiences. They often end up being used by food vendors as wrapping material.

Newspapers

As vehicles for communicating messages, the print media combine strong advantages with significant flaws. They are permanent and can be called up again and again. Society sets greater store by the written

word than by the spoken word. It is mainly through the print media that the policy dialogue is conducted; hence the attentive audience cannot ignore them. They supply feedback that enriches policy dialogue. They can be used for elite mobilization, or to call the attention of the elite to issues of general concern.

However, they serve principally as a medium through which the elite talk to the elite about issues that concern the elite. And they serve those who have a significant degree of literacy in English and the disposable income to subscribe regularly to newspapers and magazines.

Millions of Nigerians not literate in English have literacy in many of the three major Nigerian languages – Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. But they are not, for the most part, served by the print media. No Nigerian language newspaper is published daily. *Gaskiya*, the best-known indigenous language newspaper, is published in Hausa only three times a week. It is a sober, serious and respected newspaper, circulated widely in Northern Nigeria and in British and American universities offering courses in Hausa.

Yoruba language newspapers, on the other hand, tend to dwell, much like American supermarket tabloids, on the bizarre, the spurious and the sensational. Igbo language newspapers are rare. This may be in part because, unlike Yoruba and Hausa, Igbo lacks a widely accepted orthography, a point made eloquently by the novelist Chinua Achebe while presenting the Odenigbo Lecture for 1999. Most of the available Igbo material consists of periodicals.

Even at their best, however, Nigerian language newspapers lack the influence and prestige of the English language newspapers. They are caught in a vicious cycle. They attract little advertising and are therefore not self-sustaining. Because they are not self-sustaining, they are considered a drain on scarce resources and undeserving of new investment.

In Nigeria, considerable prestige is attached to English literacy. In many Nigerian homes, children are taught early to speak English. In the better private and public schools, English is the medium of instruction. As soon as Nigerians acquire proficiency in English, they cease to read the indigenous language print media, or treat them only as curiosities or sources of amusement.

3. Using Alternative Means of Communication

The mass media are the most efficient vehicles for reaching large, dispersed, heterogeneous audiences. But smaller audiences can be reached just as effectively by other means, including:

Town Meetings

Town meetings also serve as a means or conduit of communication. They facilitate interactions and conversations between policy-makers and the public and can help promote accountability. NAWOJ reported using them effectively. But they need to be conducted with skill, lest they become open confrontations.

Community Theater

Community theater is another vehicle that can be used to deliver messages. The drama need not be staged in large halls; instead, it is taken literally to the audience – in motor parks, markets, churches, mosques and city centers. Staging requires few props or costumes and only a small cast; therefore, it is relatively inexpensive.

To be effective, however, it must draw on what one expert called “the mind-set” of the people. It should provide light-hearted entertainment even as it seeks to deliver a message, and should avoid caricatures. Participation of members of the community enhances the potential of community theater.

Video on Wheels

Where video cannot be transmitted to television audiences because of cost, or where the goal is to reach smaller audiences, video on wheels can be used effectively to communicate DG and conflict resolution messages. The “cinema van” travels from one selected town or village to another and shows the video on a large screen.

This practice was common during the colonial days and in the years following independence. The visits of the cinema van were few and far between, but each one was a memorable event that attracted huge audiences. If each screening is followed by discussions involving the sponsors of the video and members of the community, the material is less likely to be regarded purely as entertainment and much more likely to serve as a vehicle for communicating DG and conflict resolution messages.

Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Materials

USAID interventions can adapt, and have adapted, some marketing tools, such as distribution of “point-of-sale” materials, such as T-shirts, caps, badges, folders, pens and pencils, jotters, paperweights, calendars, coasters and other memorabilia. These serve to remind people of the specific intervention and its message. They can be expensive to produce.

Press Kits

Where the goal is to empower the media to do a better job of reporting about a particular issue or on particular institution, a press kit is a worthy investment. The kit must be a comprehensive resource, detailing reporting techniques, strategies and rules of the game, together with useful references. The core material will always be valid, but since institutions and personnel change, it will be necessary to update the kit from time to time.

IV. PROGRAMMATIC APPROACHES AND MEDIA-BASED INTERVENTIONS

This section presents an overview of JHU and OTI programs and activities. It then reviews specific approaches to media-use and details media-based interventions. *The examples cited are illustrative of activities conducted by both JHU and OTI.* They are not meant to comprise an exhaustive list, nor are they indicative of impact.

A. Program Development and History

JHU

The DG program was an extension of an existing JHU/ Center for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA) health project, which worked with women's NGOs and not-for profit organizations. The project was initially designed to work within restrictions of USAID programming in Nigeria under military rule. These involved several prohibitions, such as not working with government or parastatals, not using the mass media, and only addressing humanitarian assistance or child survival problems. Thus, the JHU/CEDPA project maintained a low profile and avoided activities that could be deemed as pro-democracy or antagonistic to the government.

The DG program, begun in 1997, had four distinct phases. Programming changes during this period reflected, first and foremost, easing restrictions on conducting explicit pro-democracy activities and JHU's ability to conduct and facilitate more joint activities. It also reflected a natural evolution in immediate objectives, strategies, activities, geographic diversity and selecting sub-grantees. In all four phases, however, media-based interventions, as noted below, formed the core of the program. The National Association of Women Journalists (NAWOJ) played a pivotal role, increasing its own capacity to improve and expand coverage of women's issues in the media, making women more visible in the media, assisting other NGOs in accessing the media and helping establish networks among grantees and other NGOs.

During Phase I (March 1997 to February 1998), JHU worked with sixteen Nigerian NGOs and groups (representing female lawyers, journalists, religious organizations and market women groups, among others) in nine states. Activities in Phase I were designed to provide education and sensitization about women's political empowerment (WPE) and related issues, augment the capacity of NAWOJ chapters and members themselves to cover these issues, increase the visibility of women leaders and politicians in the media and build the capacity of other sub-grantees to advocate for WPE.

Under Phase II (March 1998 to February 1999), JHU worked with eighteen Nigerian NGOs in 15 states, on activities designed to help create structures for internal democracy and build institutional capacity of sub-grantees. NAWOJ activities promoted more extensive coverage of women leaders and politicians, women's issues and DG activities (such as advocacy visits or meetings with local government officials) in the media, and also continued sensitization workshops for its members, as well as other journalists and editors.

Under Phase III (June 1999 to May 2000), JHU worked with 20 Nigerian NGOs in eighteen states. It maintained its emphasis on extending the visibility of women in the media, as participants in TV and radio talk shows, for example, and the coverage of WPE issues, coalition building, facilitating dialogue between constituents and elected officials, conducting advocacy cover, sensitizing and training journalists, as well as teaching youth and students about democracy.

Phase IV (2000 -2001) constituted a sea change, as the transition to democracy allowed for a shift in program strategy. Rather than working with a large number of sub-grantees, JHU worked with four major sub-grantees, refashioned the program so that it was more strategic, more national in scope, and directly addressed the issue of increasing civil society participation in governance. A new national mass media

campaign, "Democracy Begins with Me," highlighted successful attempts by communities to organize around local issues and bring their concerns before elected representatives and effect change. The campaign itself was designed by an advertising agency and coordinated with the activities of other grantees, namely NAWOJ, the Women, Law and Development Centre (WLDCN) and the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) and their partners.

Between January and June 2002, USAID funded a bridge program, in anticipation of upcoming elections. The program focused specifically on encouraging Nigerians from all walks of life to vote.

OTI

OTI's program, begun in 1999, sought to support the transition from a military regime to democratic governance. Generally, media interventions have sought to encourage national reconciliation through activities aimed at calming "hot-spots" and outbreaks of violence, demonstrating means of conflict resolution, possibilities for dialogue and coexistence, and sensitizing journalists about the use of incendiary reporting. Interventions also sought to demonstrate that corruption, particularly at the office, could be managed or at least resisted.

A typology of OTI's media-based approaches specific to conflict management is provided below, along with some examples, based on the program documents available to the team.

[As noted in introduction, OTI was not the primary focus of this exercise. The evaluation team was instructed to rely as much as possible on existing OTI documents and reports to inform its review. They had access to a disparate group of documents - differing in type, scope, and quality - on the following OTI activities: The Borno State Conflict Resolution Campaign; the Center for Law Enforcement Education radio drama ; the Center for Democratic Journalism training workshops; media campaigns on tolerance in peaceful co-existence in the North West; WODEF's Tightrope TV program; the Kebbi Youth Council/ Video on Wheels "Rural Enlightenment Road Show"; The People's Parliament Radio Conflict Talk shop for Kano; the Kwara State Peace Campaign; the International Press Center, Lagos, and Independent Journalism Center, Lagos; Ben Tomoloju's campaign on tolerance and peaceful co-existence (for the Ikeja Abattoir); and NUJ's workshop on political reporting in Katsina State. The team also had the opportunity to conduct interviews with CLEE, the producer of Tightrope, IPC, Media Knight Communications, and Ben Tomologu. The team has used these sources as judiciously as possible.]

B. Specific Media-based Interventions

Generally speaking, this paper looks at two categories of interventions, broadly defined.

The first includes media interventions and campaigns to achieve changes in attitudes or behavior, or to motivate new behaviors. It also covers activities to improve media attentiveness to and coverage of democracy and governance initiatives, women's political empowerment and conflict.

The second category includes diverse activities to train political actors and civil society organizations, in particular, in the use of media and media strategy development. For the JHU program in particular, the latter was a form of increasing the capacity of CSOs and effectiveness of advocacy. While there is some overlap, these categories are useful in reflecting and transmitting the broad vision of how media based-interventions could facilitate the achievement of different DG and Conflict Management objectives.

Category One:

1. Using media for mass mobilization

JHU's National Mass Media Campaign (NMMC), "Democracy Begins with Me," was intended to mobilize communities and individuals to participate in governance. It relied on the distribution of posters, TV and radio spots, all developed by PREX, an advertising agency. The campaign demonstrated how community groups in Enugu, Kano and Rivers States were able to organize themselves, in order to resolve local issues or problems, such as power outages and low currents, poor roads and lack of adequate health care. This had required petitioning local leaders and state representatives, as well as presenting issues at public hearings. The posters, radio and TV spots directed the public to take similar actions and to turn to counseling centers established by WLDCN Lagos, NAWOJ Enugu, Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) Oyo and the Network for Justice Kano, for assistance in tackling problems or issues.

The PREX campaign was to be reinforced by NAWOJ TV and radio programming. Additionally, NAWOJ and its state chapters organized a testimonial contest. State chapters requested communities or individuals to submit stories similar to those portrayed in the PREX campaign. Awards were given for the best testimonials at the state level, and these were then sent to National NAWOJ, as entries in a national competition.

2. Using media for short term mobilization

JHU has used media to mobilize Nigerians, especially women, to participate in the electoral process. The Network for Justice (NJ) Kano has used radio spots as a form of voter education, explaining the process and purpose of voter registration. JHU Kano also conducted a voter education and registration campaign, reinforcing, as well, the idea that a secret ballot allows women to vote as individuals, rather than according to the dictates of family, and that women have the right to make their own decisions.

3. Using media to create awareness of specific WPE issues, human rights or other DG and related topics.

JHU and its sub-grantees relied on a variety of interventions. The most prevalent were use of radio or TV talk shows or discussion shows, some more interactive than others. When possible and resources were available, JHU sub-grantees and OTI used TV and radio drama.

One prominent example is OTI's "Tightrope" television drama series, which was shown on the NTA network. Its first season was dedicated to raising awareness about corruption, particularly in the workplace. The various episodes presented scenarios that allowed viewers to examine different aspects of corruption, ethical dilemmas and their resolution. Its main protagonist was a professional woman, so it served also to highlight the particular pressures and difficulties faced by women in the workplace.

Additionally, sub-grantees such as NAWOJ and NUJ wrote and distributed many articles and feature stories on these issues in newspapers throughout the country.

Below are a few examples of media interventions:

- To counter negative stereotypes about women in politics, NAWOJ chapters used "Women of Caliber" boxes in newspapers as a way of creating more positive images of women. Family talk shows on TV and radio showcased prominent women politicians or political aspirants, along with their families. These shows were intended to demonstrate that women politicians were not social deviants, deserted by family members.

- FIDA chapters conducted “Me and My Rights” radio spots to encourage women to defend their rights against harmful traditional practices.
- Instances Communications Resources (ICRC), FIDA Abia and the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN) produced songs on democracy and women’s rights. ICRC’s songs were distributed to university students in Bauchi; FIDA’s were intended for use at women’s rights rallies and FOMWAN’s were a part of its efforts to develop specific IEC materials for a Muslim audience.
- ICRC also developed a three-phased alternative media/theater program as a means of educating youth – students in a secondary school, nursing school and university – on issues of good governance and democracy in Bauchi state. An introductory workshop was followed by the performance of two plays, one on gender roles and the other on good leadership. In the last phase, ICRC conducted a drama competition, asking students to write plays that addressed local problems and democracy issues.

NAWOJ Lagos used public lectures with prominent women to address WPE issues – especially the need for affirmative action for Nigerian women.

4. Sensitizing and training journalists, editors, and media organization directors

NAWOJ state chapters, the Center for Democratic Journalism (CDJ) and NUJ Katsina conducted numerous sensitization workshops for both male and female editors, journalists and media organization executives. These focused on reporting on general democracy and governance issues, such as accountability, especially on WPE issues. Katsina State training, for example, had a specific focus on political reporting, particularly in a sector marked by censorship and bias.

OTI grantees (Institute of World Affairs and IPC) also provided Internet training for journalists, as well as set up centers to provide Internet to members of the NUJ.

5. Creating ways and means to increase the general coverage of WPE and other issues of importance to women in the media

Certainly, many of the interventions mentioned here, by their nature, increased coverage of these issues. In some cases, however, sub-grantees like NAWOJ chapters and NUJ made specific overtures to media professionals.

NAWOJ Bauchi, for example, asked for media support in producing gender-sensitive stories with a focus on political rights during a sensitization workshop.

NAWOJ Nassarawa solicited general project support from the media and also requested publication of articles on organizations promoting women’s rights.

6. Developing ways and means to extend and make standard the presence of women in broadcast media.

One emphasis of the program was to increase the visibility of women – whether politicians, activists or professionals – on TV and radio programming. Producers were encouraged to invite women to participate in discussions of serious issues, as opposed to lighter topics, which has been the custom.

NAWOJ Lagos, for example, established itself, informally, as a speaker's bureau that was able to refer specific discussants for radio and TV programming. They were able to use their own media affiliations to do this.

7. Assisting NGOs to develop media tools or IEC materials

Whether as stipulated by the contract or later, as specific components of evolving communications strategies, many grantees and sub-grantees produced IEC materials. Some IEC materials were primary components of the media strategy. For example, posters were a primary component of NAWOJ Lagos' campaign to encourage the election of more women. In the NMMC, posters also were a primary means of communication. In other cases, posters simply played a supporting role, along with hosts of stickers, T-shirts, folders and handbills. Other IEC materials – such as training manuals and press kits – were essential to the activities.

8. Using media to establish dialogue between elected officials and their constituents.

Many JHU sub-grantees organized public fora with state and local officials, as a means of encouraging responsiveness and accountability from elected officials. Radio and TV talk shows also served as venues for discussion and dialog.

The ICRC also used exercises in its workshops – such as role-playing in impromptu sketches or dramas – that allowed participants to confront local government officials and chiefs about local issues. Participants felt safe “hiding” behind fiction.

Category Two:

1. Using media for public relations (media events)

A number of JHU sub-grantees, particularly some NAWOJ and FIDA state chapters, became quite adept at creating one-off media events, whether press conferences or specific advocacy visits, publicizing them and persuading journalists and reporters to attend.

In some cases, these chapters could rely on their own members with senior positions in media organizations to secure press attention. In others, this was not possible. Often these served the dual purpose of raising the profile of the organizations, as well as publicizing the work they were doing.

2. Assisting NGOs to develop their own media strategies or using and accessing media as part of their own advocacy campaigns.

JHU project agreements, such as that for the Justice, Development and Peace Commission (JDPC), often stipulated that sub-grantees must network “with DG partners in project locations, especially the NUJ and NAWOJ groups, particularly to assist in the media promotion” of their activities.

NAWOJ chapters, such as those in Kano, Kaduna, Nassarawa, Bauchi, Enugu and Rivers were to and often did form a Women NGO Coalition Group (WNGOCG) with NGO members, journalists and NAWOJ members to help develop activities and assist with advocacy and media strategies.

FIDA Oyo developed an advocacy strategy for its legal reform initiatives. Media use was a large component of this strategy, with FIDA making advocacy visits to various media houses (Galaxy Television, the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State and the Nigerian Television Authority). Similarly, it conducted press conferences and arranged for members FIDA (and the Law Reform Advocacy Group (LARAG) coalition) to participate in TV programs, to sensitize the public about this issue.

The Network for Justice Kano also developed its own media strategies and media campaigns, in support of advocacy and other activities. NJ had experience with this, previously developing a mixed-media campaign strategy to warn of the health risks of the food additive Mono-Sodium Glutamate (MSG).

3. Training women politicians and activists on media use.

National NAWOJ, after an orientation and training by JHU, trained women politicians on how to appear on television programs, how to write press releases, organize rallies and how to organize press conferences.

Anambra State Women Awareness Committee (AWAC) created a distance learning/training radio program for women leaders – covering advocacy, responsibilities, accountability and transparency.

4. Strengthening professional organizations for women in media and journalism

JHU designed specific capacity-building activities for NAWOJ, especially in Phases I and II. These were intended to support the organization at both the national and state levels. Clearly, NAWOJ's ability to assist other NGOs was predicated on developing its own capabilities and skills.

Using media for conflict management:

More specifically, it is important to stress that OTI used media interventions to realize its conflict management objectives in four ways:

1. General sensitization. In states and localities where the situation was tense, though had not resulted in violent conflict, OTI organized campaigns to improve that climate and reduce tensions. These kinds of approach allowed for several weeks of lead time. For example:

The Kebbi State Youth Council Video on Wheels presented videos on conflict prevention and resolution in rural communities. Each presentation was followed by discussion facilitated by a conflict resolution specialist.

The media campaign on tolerance and peaceful co-existence in North West Nigeria (Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara States) combined radio and TV spots with radio religious documentaries.

The Kwara peace campaign, the first phase of larger initiative, used an integrated media strategy to prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict.

OTI sponsored a 13-program radio talk-show, "The People's Parliament: A radio conflict talk shop (sic) for Kano."

A second season of the TV drama "Tightrope," drafted with the assistance of a conflict resolution specialist, used its office setting to explore issues related to conflict.

2. Responses to hot-spots. OTI responded to both on-going or sudden violent conflict, and its immediate aftermath, with calls for tolerance and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The lead time for these interventions was usually only a day or two.

To mediate outbreaks of violence, such as the Abattoir Crisis in Lagos and in Jos, OTI sponsored radio and TV spot campaigns. In the aftermath of violence in Kaduna, OTI sponsored a media campaign that included radio and TV spots, posters, stickers, newsletters and a talk show.

3. Improving conflict reporting. CDJ's workshops for journalists and editors educated them as to the possibly incendiary effects of their reporting - whether biased articles or gruesome photos - and less deleterious approaches to reporting conflicts. OTI trained journalists on the use of the Internet as a means of research, on skilled political reporting, and on resisting censorship and bias, to the extent possible.

4. Publicity. OTI funding allowed for activity, publicity and media coverage of interventions.

V. MEDIA INTERVENTION PROGRAMMING: FINDINGS REGARDING STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

During interviews with Nigerian media experts, professionals and critics, the team was repeatedly advised about the importance of considering certain issues during the media strategy planning process. While they were raised in the Nigerian context, they are clearly salient issues in professional and academic debates on mass communications.

Overview

If there is one point about which communication scholars are unanimous, it is that the media are *necessary* tools in any campaign designed to spread enlightenment and bring about social change. No campaign designed to create awareness, whether of a service, issue or opportunity, generate interest or move the audience to desire and ultimately take action can go far without the skillful use of the media. The media can help concentrate public attention on democracy and good governance and make people see them as desirable; they can help create an atmosphere in which meaningful change can occur. The media can help kindle aspirations and widen horizons, creating a platform for policy dialogue. They can help spread knowledge and teach skills. They can confer status. In these and other ways, the media can help advance social, economic and political development.

The media interventions examined in this report were predicated on the tacit belief that the media are indispensable tools for achieving broad social and political objectives. We concur in this belief, but note that it is important to use media cautiously. The media are not neutral tools. They are part and parcel of a political economy, constrained by all kinds of interests and allegiances.

When media are not controlled by government, they are owned and controlled not by entirely altruistic forces, but by persons or institutions pursuing certain goals or beholden to certain interests. Their primary goal may be to advance a particular interest group or defend a particular religion or faith. They may choose to avoid anything that could jeopardize their chances of winning government contracts in the future.

Nor is the mind of the audience member a *tabula rasa* on which the media programmer can inscribe just about anything. Previous knowledge, education, deeply-held beliefs, culture, membership in close-knit groups, level of self-esteem, nature of message, credibility of source and the medium, as well as other variables, influence how media messages are received, perceived and retained.

How did some of these factors impinge on media intervention messages?

Select Topics:

1. Specifying, a priori, the kinds of media activities to be included in a media strategy or allowing strategists (whether in NGOs or advertising agencies) more freedom in creation and selection of activities.

The media interventions examined in our survey seemed to have been undertaken primarily with an eye to getting the message out. The governing philosophy behind a good number of media interventions seemed to be: "We have a message to communicate for a particular end. Design the message, and then disseminate it using the medium with the widest reach." JHU already had determined the small universe of activities.

There was less concern and little opportunity for devising more creative strategies that may have had a greater potential for lasting impact.

Actual media strategy preparation through pre-testing was infrequent, though good pre-testing always enhances design and impact. For the National Mass Media Campaign, PREX decided to use a "social marketing" approach and the material had been tested by JHU (Lagos) on "a small but representative

sample.” However, pre-testing seems not to have tracked “with the realities on the ground,” as remarked by the PREX team, nor to have anticipated the controversies that trailed the production.

2. Deciding between “top-down” (instructional) approaches and “bottom-up” approaches, with a view to increasing recognition and reception by target audiences.

Two broad strategies have emerged, in Nigeria as elsewhere, for the design of media interventions and their messages. One is the “top-down” approach, in which a source, far removed from and having little in common with the audience, passes down information or instruction, supposedly for the benefit of the audience. The second is the “bottom-up” approach, in which “everyday people” are depicted voicing their own ideas or opinions, participating in public debate. The one is elite-directed; the other is people-directed. One is based on the assumption that the authorities know best; the other is based on the view that people are best placed to articulate their own problems and priorities.

Criticism of the television mini-series “Tightrope” illustrates the contentious debate that these opposing approaches have engendered. The series, designed to dramatize issues of conflict and corruption, was by all accounts a technical success. The protagonist was a well-known actress. Members of the supporting cast, including her real husband, were also well-known dramatists. According to some media analysts, the show should be faulted because it took a “top-down” approach. They argue that it did not reflect the experiences of the urban poor and so found little resonance or empathy with the average Nigerian. They emphasize that the office environment depicted in the series was not familiar to the majority of Nigerians, and so the show did not always highlight the kinds of problems encountered by most Nigerians. Clearly, the producers felt otherwise. They countered that the show provided all Nigerians a chance to consider very common ethical dilemmas and their resolution – whatever the venue. They also saw value in the show’s positive and realistic depiction of a woman in a position of power. Additionally, they argued that the program did bring in other Nigerians from other walks of life, particularly as the show evolved.

Some of the radio spots aimed at resolving the conflict over the Ikeja abattoir also took a top-down approach. Listeners would have found it hard to make a connection between the organizations identified as offering the message – Ben Tomolaju’s drama company and USAID – and the conflict. Instead, both most likely came across as well-meaning organizations preaching from a comfortable distance, not representative of the men and women caught in the vortex of conflict in Ikeja.

3. Choosing to address issues directly or indirectly.

It is not easy to know which approach is more effective: addressing a difficult topic head on or more obliquely. This is particularly true with respect to more contentious issues or messages communicated during periods of crisis. Direct messages may address a problem or issue head-on, but may also increase controversy or perhaps have an incendiary effect. Indirect messages may be more palatable and safer, but may be less effective in getting the point across.

Conflict resolution radio spots are illustrative of the choices involved. Given the tense atmosphere, some subtlety is surely indicated. More “indirect” radio spots have emphasized unity, in general terms, or encouraged working for a more prosperous Nigeria and brighter future, purposely avoided mentioning conflict. OTI and the producers involved were concerned that more “direct” radio spots could incite further violence, rather than stem it.

However, without connection to a particular conflict, or any specific conflict-resolution messages, audiences were left to draw their own conclusions. The more reflective listeners would have linked the message with the conflict. But this might have been lost entirely on others. For this group of listeners, the message would probably have been more effective if linked directly to the communal conflict.

Indeed, the “indirect” approach was employed in a radio campaign designed to help resolve the violent, ethnic conflict resulting from the struggle for control of the abattoir in Ikeja, Lagos. Though broadcast in English, Yoruba, Hausa , Igbo and Pidgin English at the height of the conflict, the message made no direct reference to the conflict. Instead, it was a general appeal for calm and stability. The burden of relating the message to the on-going conflict was placed on the listener.

4. Choosing “stand-alone” messages or using mixed media campaigns.

The grantees, sub-grantees and the media professionals interviewed were unanimous in their assessment that media interventions are more effective if they are reinforced by other activities. “Stand-alone” activities simply do not have the same reach as mixed media campaigns. They can also “miss” segments of the targeted audience, and may fail to raise consciousness or promote change. They work best when integrated with other media interventions or activities.

5. Integrating DG messages with communication about other topics or not.

Again, there is some contention about whether or not DG messages should be communicated in their “pure form” or if they should be linked to messages about other issues or topics. On one hand, the DG message could get lost in the mix; on the other hand, another topic may catch the attention of a targeted audience.

For example, this issue was particularly relevant in Northern Nigeria, where the Jam’iyyar Matan Arewa and the Coalition of Women’s NGOs in Kano used the same media interventions to transmit messages and information about women’s health, harmful traditional practices and the need for women’s empowerment.

6. Using language effectively.

Although there is agreement that language is critical to communication, there is always debate on appropriate tone, wording, translation and usage. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, in Nigeria, language is fraught with social, economic, and political overtones and undertones. Negotiating these waters is difficult.

The radio spots, on file at Ben Tomolaju’s studio in Lagos, produced for the Ikeja abattoir crises, offer a good example of some of the difficulties involved. The English version was rather formal. Three Nigerian members of the team reported that the Yoruba and Hausa versions were more idiomatic and more nuanced. The pidgin English version got a bit closer to the heart of the matter. All the spots sought to address the same issue and to convey the same broad message. In reality, however, those who heard the message in different languages got messages with slightly different shades of meaning, depending on the skill of the translator and the adaptability of the language in question.

7. Responding to Culture.

“Know your audience” is a fundamental law of communication. This means knowing the culture, the “design for living” embodied in a people’s language, laws, religion, arts and crafts and traditions. Knowledge of the culture breaks down barriers. Without such knowledge, the communicator cannot empathize with the audience or win its trust.

This was the experience of PREX, contracted by JHU, to work on the National Mass Media Campaign. PREX learned this lesson to its cost when it tried to do a docu-commercial on the efforts of the people of Yakasai, Kano State, to engage the government and press for the construction of a health center for the community.

From the outset, the Yakasai community regarded the Lagos crew with suspicion and distrust. Members saw it as a symbol of the Lagos-Ibadan press, contemptuous of tradition and anti-Islam. For its part, the

crew, lacking knowledge of the culture, seemed unaware of this unease and its causes. The result was predictable. The community rejected the first docu-commercial, saying that it was inconsistent with their culture. The crew flew back to location for a second attempt. The community rejected the result again. It was the third shoot that finally won the community's approval.

The delays and cost overruns and the controversies would have been averted, or would have occurred on a much smaller scale, if the PREX creative team had not assumed that what works in Lagos would also work in Yakasai.

8. Ascertaining the credibility of any media outlet or organization, prior to using it as part of the media strategy.

Clearly, if the target audience considers a particular outlet to lack credibility, it may either ignore it, or give little credence to the material presented.

From colonial times to the present, government-controlled media have been used to suppress and pervert the news, to wage political warfare, to proclaim false election results, to threaten the public and generally to stultify the populace.

For example, during the 1964 General Strike, the Federal Government newspaper, the *Morning Post*, reported incorrectly that workers in Port Harcourt had returned to their jobs. Irate workers attacked its premises in Lagos. State-controlled radio put out false election results in Western Nigeria in 1965, turning winners into losers and losers into winners. Angry subscribers returned the wired boxes through which radio programs were relayed, and the company providing the service collapsed.

During the crisis that followed the annulment of the 1993 presidential election and throughout the regime of President Sani Abacha, millions of viewers stopped watching the news and public affairs programs of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) because NTA had been reduced to a government propaganda outfit. This was especially the case in south-western Nigeria. The federal government-owned *Daily Times* and *New Nigerian* lost so much readership and influence that today they are no longer numbered among Nigeria's major newspapers. The broadcasting studios of Abia Radio have been bombed twice in the last three years by unidentified persons widely believed to be agents of the opposition.

Because of these and other experiences, information from official sources may be received with great skepticism, especially in times of crisis. When large sections of the public simply stop listening to the official radio, watching the official television and reading the official newspapers, any campaign conducted in these media, however well meaning, may not even reach the target audience. As noted in the development support communication literature, if the media are perceived to lack credibility, they cannot be used to promote development and change.

9. Ascertaining the actual independence of a media outlet or organization, prior to including it in the media strategy.

Privately owned media may be just as susceptible to control and manipulation as the official media. Moreover, since they maintain their licenses at the government's pleasure, they may be wary of carrying content that could displease the authorities. They may also demonstrate their own editorial biases.

10. Recognizing and acknowledging trade-offs between extending reach through use of government-owned (and perhaps less credible) outlets and the need to maintain credibility.

Some of the private broadcast outlets set up over the last seven years have established some reputation for credibility and independence. But most of them reach only a single metropolitan area. The regional stations

and official networks reach much larger audiences but generally lack the credibility and independence that could make them effective agents of mobilization.

VI. ANALYSES OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT-MANAGEMENT IMPACTS

Both JHU and OTI programs took a multifaceted approach to the communication of their numerous DG or conflict resolution and mediation messages. Understanding the impact of these programs requires a similar approach, an analysis that considers both the emphasis on the process and means of communication, as well as its agents and actual program objectives.

Several critical questions emerge:

- Has JHU prompted awareness of DG, WPE and human rights issues?
- Have activities produced hypothesized changes in attitude or behavior?
- Have activities resulted in civil society organizations better able to use media? Particularly as part of advocacy campaigns?
- Have activities increased networking among NGOs, both among the grantees and sub-grantees, as well as within the larger NGO universe?
- Have these connections facilitated advocacy?
- Have communications or media strategies, as linked to advocacy, produced reforms?
- Have OTI programs facilitated conflict management? Have they facilitated a better understanding of the bases for peaceful co-existence?

From this extensive review of documents and interviews, we have been able to draw some conclusions about the impact of the media-based interventions and address the questions above. Of course, given the number and diversity of grantees during the four phases of the JHU program, in particular, it is not possible to declare that these conclusions hold true for every NGO or group funded. Nevertheless, the analysis here is based on evidence that reveals either strong trends among several NGOs or particularly strong cases.

A caveat on answering these questions and measuring impact: One of the recurrent issues in media research is how to measure the impact of a given piece of communication. A complete analysis of all causal relationships is of course out of the question; it cannot legitimately be claimed, even in tightly controlled laboratory situations, that it was a communication intervention and nothing else that produced a certain outcome. And even when it is acknowledged that many other factors were at work, it is almost impossible to determine the precise impact of the communication intervention. Objective measurement is almost impossible. The people whose behavior or experience we seek to measure never stay the same. They learn, grow and change. In addition, the short time between some of these activities and the evaluation also limited possibilities for discerning impacts. This difficulty was compounded by the fact that some of these interventions were short-lived or only intermittent.

Specific DG Impacts, by Category

Category One:

1. Communication strategies were effective in encouraging new behaviors and specific forms of political participation in governance.

The National Mass Media Campaign (NMMC)

The National Mass Media Campaign was emblematic of this. The strategy – providing examples of how individuals and communities can participate in governance and then directing them to organizations ready to provide assistance – worked. Audience response to the spotlight on communities resolving local problems through engagement with local and state government can be captured by looking at the types of calls received by the counseling centers. From February-May 2002, 53 percent of the callers to centers operated by WLDCN Lagos, NAWOJ Enugu, FIDA Oyo and FOMWAN Niger discussed community problems with the types of services – infrastructure, roadwork, electricity supply, community health and water supply, for example – highlighted in the NMMC. Seventy-two percent of the callers received their source or information from media (62 percent from radio and 10 percent from TV). WLDCN had not been asked to set up monitors at the beginning of the campaign, and so was not able to document the numbers of callers. In Kano, NJ also received a large numbers of callers, however difficulties with the conception and implementation caused a delay in the project.

Still, adequate counseling was the lynchpin of this campaign. Counselors were responsible for taking down the nature of the complaint, giving advice or sometimes outlining a set of actions to be taken. This required detailed information about setting up community groups, approaching local or state governments or NEPA (the utility company) and conducting advocacy campaigns. Thus, the media component proved an effective source of motivation or encouragement, as well as information. Actual participation in governance (and follow-up) is linked more directly to the NGOs' counseling centers ability to respond to and direct callers.

2. Citizens gained experience engaging (local) elected officials.

Clearly, the JHU program used alternative forms of media to assist Nigerians in raising demands, asking questions and even confronting local government chairmen and other officials. The various Local Government Fora or People's Fora, often organized through NAWOJ chapters, gave Nigerians a chance to make their voices heard and communicate with local leaders. Given Nigeria's checkered political history, these fora provided Nigerians with their first experience of democracy. The community dramas facilitated by ICRC offered another type of approach to communication. Role-playing designed as a method of educating communities about the practice of democracy actually permitted participants – in character – to confront local leaders or chiefs forcefully, though indirectly.

3. There was evidence of some increasing acceptance in the Muslim North of women's right to represent constituencies. And, in a few cases, women have been appointed to higher-level state positions. Nevertheless, informants stressed that there continues to be considerable opposition to women in leadership positions.

In northern Nigeria, particularly in Kano, JHU and its grantees used a communication and media strategy, in combination with select and cautious advocacy, to advance the notion that women have the right to participate in politics. This has meant relying on media campaigns that communicate the messages non-confrontationally, that frame women's participation as beneficial to the community and are indigenous, that is, not an imposition of Western ideas. Working with the Emir of Kano and more supportive Muslim clerics, these NGOs have stressed the idea that women's participation is not forbidden by the Koran, much less Islamic political history. Similarly, they have worked with local governments to see that more women are elected to sit on local councils. In this way, they are making very gradual progress in increasing acceptance or tolerance of women as political actors. Indeed, informants from several women's NGOs organizations in Kano explained that there was greater acceptance of a woman's right to represent a constituency. While Kano has seen the appointment of women to offices such as state commissioner, our informants noted that promoting women in leadership positions was still seen as a usurpation of men's authority and so more difficult to accept.

4. The presence (or absence) of women in the media and the extent of coverage of "women's issues" have become subjects of debate within the media community.

There were clear differences of opinion among media professionals about whether or not the JHU program had effected some changes in the coverage of issues or the visibility of women in that sector.

(Clearly, JHU grantees and sub-grantees have made considerable and extensive use of both print and broadcast media through their projects, advocacy campaigns and other program activities. This is detailed in the rest of the evaluation.)

There are several factors at play, several takes on the issue. JHU and NAWOJ have placed a premium on sensitization of media professionals, about the need to cover particular issues, to report on activities of women's organizations and female politicians. After all of these efforts have been concluded, are there notable, recognizable differences in the coverage of issues or in the visibility of women? If so, is this progress sustainable?

For some, the answer is generally negative. They acknowledge certain lip service to increasing coverage, but note that the Nigerian print media have not changed all that much, if at all. For others, the answer is more positive. Female journalists have benefited from the sensitization training. "Women's pages" (on fashion or cooking, for example) are no longer the alpha and omega of "reporting" on women. There are more serious articles about issues of concern to women. Women continue to have a presence in media organizations. Indeed, NAWOJ Lagos benefited from the senior status of a number of its members. Perhaps it is a question of interpretation, the bases of comparison, or expectations.

Certainly, JHU programming has helped to strengthen the presence (and frequency) of women on serious TV or radio programs. Indeed, the goal line has been pushed back a bit. The new question is how to get beyond "tokenism."

For the media experts on the evaluation team, the fact that these issues are now central, rather than tangential, to debate about the quality of Nigeria media is strong evidence of significant change.

Category Two:

1. Over the course of the program, grantees and sub-grantees demonstrated an increasing sophistication in the use of media. Evidence of this is the evolution in media strategizing and planning undertaken by the NGOs, especially those that had received funding in two or more phases. For example, NAWOJ Kano and NAWOJ Lagos developed broad media strategies that relied on the use of different media (such as radio programs, placement of features in newspapers, and panel discussions) to communicate and reinforce WPE messages, such as acceptance and legitimization of women politicians, mitigation of stereotypical images of women, and women's rights and ability to participate in the discussion of serious political, social and development topics.

The FIDA chapters in Oyo and Abia developed practices that gained them media attention to specific issues, such as law reform, need for women's legal aid and violence against women. They adopted strategies that combined on-going efforts with one-off events. Some NGOs, and this is particularly true of the WLDCN and its partners, such as NJ, assigned staff to develop media campaigns and established structures necessary for implementation.

Similarly, particularly telling were grantees and sub-grantees that either articulated or had developed specific communication and media strategies for which they had yet to get funding. The point is not that NGOs, in a constrained resource environment, complained of a lack of resources. The point is that media-savvy NGOs, such as Women in Media (WIM, created by former members of NAWOJ Kano), NAWOJ Lagos, NJ and Women's Optimum Development Foundation (WODEF) gained experience designing media strategies, better understood the real cost of these components, the trade-offs and the specific limitations imposed by limited resources.

2. NGOs better understand the criticality of networking and coalition building, and the essential role of media in increasing the effectiveness of both.

A good example of this is the creation in Oyo State of the Law Reform Advocacy Group (LARAG) by members of FIDA and representatives from the Nigerian Bar Association, NAWOJ, NUJ, the judiciary, academics and other NGOs. LARAG works to identify and advocate the reform of laws discriminatory to women. In particular, LARAG activities focused on inheritance rights for widows and creating procedures and structures that would allow for the speedy disposition of estate matters. As part of this, the organization has worked to implement procedures for the immediate dispersal of estate funding to meet financial needs of widows and children in the interim period. NAWOJ played a critical role in assisting LARAG to access media and thus increase its profile, as well as draw attention to the issues at stake.

NAWOJ chapters, such as those in Kano, Kaduna, Nassarawa, Bauchi and Enugu, took on the task of forming a Women's NGO Coalition Group (WNGOCCG) with other NGOs and journalists. NAWOJ members helped develop media strategies and assist with advocacy. In Kano, members of the WNGOCCG received training from NAWOJ and assistance in integrating access to media in advocacy. In Rivers State, the WNGOCCG engaged in joint activities, such as a radio talk show, creation of radio spots and People's Forum, as well as advocacy. The coalition's advocacy campaign focused on implementation of a Women's Rights Agenda and pressed its case with the House Committee on Women's Affairs in the Rivers State House of Assembly.

JHU also mandated that grantees create a Project Implementation Committee and a Project Advisory Committee. Additionally, a Networking Committee was to establish linkages and attend events or meetings hosted by other DG partners and report back to the Project Implementation Committee (PIC) or Project Advisory Committee (PAC), with the specific purpose of learning, reporting and making recommendations. Several of the grantees were thorough in establishing these bodies, in networking, sharing lessons on media use and strategy. As part of its fieldwork, the evaluation team was able to attend a WLDCN Workshop for Experience Sharing attended by a good number of the JHU grantees, sub-

grantees and non-JHU partners. Participants used the event to discuss the development of their media strategies, lessons learned and how they used media to strengthen the networking encouraged by JHU.

JHU grantees also participated in joint activities and networks organized by previous grantees and other organizations. During Phase I, JHU provided funding to the Jam'iyar Matan Arewa (JMA, begun 1963), the oldest and perhaps premier organization dedicated to women's issues in Kano State and Muslim Northern Nigeria. JMA has had the support of the Emir of Kano and has branches in all 44 of Kano's local government areas. It used the JHU funds as a mechanism for outreach to rural women, sensitization and development of WPE jingles and programming. After Phase I ended, JMA continued to work for women's political participation, creating a Women's Political Platform to work with other NGOs, reinforce coordination of activities at the local level and strengthen its advocacy efforts. Although JHU no longer funded the JMA, JHU Kano continued to work with its leadership and participate in coalition activities.

JMA used radio programming that focused on health, AIDS, women's political participation and early marriage as a means to educate and also to publicize JMA as a source of information, resources and referral. For example, JMA held a contest with prizes for the audience, every three episodes, testing the listeners' ability to answer specific questions about the material presented. JMA also had established a trust fund so that those soliciting assistance with political participation could receive support for campaigning or soliciting votes.

3. The program facilitated improved legal representation and counsel for women.

Critical legal services were provided by WLDCN and FIDA through counseling centers and legal aid clinics. FIDA Abia, for example, was able to establish clinic days during which it interviewed potential clients or complainants and made decisions about future actions. When possible, involved parties were invited for arbitration. When the nature of the complaint required legal representation in court, FIDA professionals assisted clients with the procedure.

FIDA's media strategy was a critical element of these efforts. FIDA actively (and successfully) sought to "publicize" these services and encourage women to seek assistance in several ways, through radio spots, billboards, discussions with traditional leaders and visits to villages.

(Funding is problematic, though FIDA Abia and its clinics have proven somewhat sustainable, in the interim, with contributions from its membership).

4. Advances were made in passing key legislation to protect the rights of women, overturning deleterious legislation, and protecting women from harmful traditional practices.

WLDCN, NJ, FIDA state chapters and NAWOJ state chapters, throughout Nigeria, in Enugu, Abia, Oyo, Bauchi, Kano and Abuja, among others, have been active in identifying gender-biased or deleterious legislation, policies or practices and working to see these reformed, overturned or curtailed. Working with other NGOs in Nigeria, such as the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRIG) and the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), each group has worked locally on issues of national concern, such as counteracting customary law, assisting the representation of women, the administration of estates and inheritance rights of women, and the protection of women's and children's rights. In Enugu, the "Prohibition of Infringement of Fundamental Rights of Widows and Widowers" bill, sponsored by the Minority Leader of the Enugu State House of Assembly and primary focus of advocacy by NAWOJ and its partners, was passed into law in March 2001.

5. Through its media strategies and activities, NAWOJ established linkages to other women's NGOs.

These linkages, while not connected to any chapter's particular sustainability, have increased its standing and presence as a professional organization. For example, in Rivers State, NAWOJ established networks and linkages with NGOs such as the National Council of Women's Societies (NCWS), WIN, FIDA, Women's Mobilization of Nigeria, the Women Empowerment Group and Women in Politics, among others.

Specific Conflict Management Impacts

It may be that the caveats about measuring impact – with respect to causality between a media intervention and actual change, to the extent that it can be discerned at all, in attitude and behavior – are of particular significance when considering the impacts of conflict management programs.

In addition, measuring impact is further constrained because evidence is hard to come by in most cases; so little evaluation and monitoring has been done.

Even where target groups were tested as to awareness of conflict resolution interventions in general, a good number did not associate any particular intervention or message with OTI. (This might prompt further investigation of OTI's approach to the use of publicity.) This makes it difficult to discern whether or not a specific intervention reached its target audience at all, much less had impact.

Evaluating impact is often difficult to do, given strongly held expectations and anticipated results.

Should we expect media interventions to dampen the outbreaks of violence? What constitute reasonable expectations for the use of jingles or posters during the Abattoir Crisis in Lagos, the Jos riots or the conflict in Nassarawa?

Similarly, what expectations do we have for media interventions attempting to change long-held and ingrained perceptions of the "other," embedded in multi-reinforcing and sometimes indistinguishable political, social, economic, ethnic divisions and tensions? How can hypotheses about impact be tested? For example, in the case of the peaceful co-existence campaign in the Northwest, it was simply not possible to assess impact of the short program.

What is the consequence when expectations cannot be met? The executive director of the Center for Law Enforcement Educations, responsible for OTI's civil-military relations radio drama, "Forward March," noted that he and his staff had been frustrated when their expectations about "social re-engineering" were not met.

Keeping in mind these very salient points, the evaluation team cautiously derived a few hypotheses about the potential impact of media interventions. It is important to emphasize that these hypotheses are based on the review of existing OTI project evaluations and interviews with grantees and implementers.

1. Multi-media campaigns promoting tolerance and co-existence have the potential to educate audiences about the need to end conflict. OTI was able to conduct pre- and post- intervention surveys about its multi-media campaign in Borno State. Respondents rated panel discussions on radio and TV, followed by billboards, as particularly useful in this effort. Of those respondents who were aware of the panel discussions, 50 percent understood the message as telling people to live in peace, stop or avoid conflict, and see themselves as citizens of one state. It is telling that only 8 percent understood the message as the need for tolerance.

In Kano, the 13-program radio talk show, "The People's Parliament: A Radio Conflict Talk shop," and radio spots were well received by a test audience, as a means of conflict reduction. Indeed, this was evidenced by the wealth of unsolicited responses from its English-speaking viewers.

2. Campaigns have the potential to increase "cordiality" between groups. In Borno State, where the emphasis was on improving relations between the executive and other "stakeholders," there were improvements in cordiality. For example, cordiality between youth and the executive improved from 22 percent to 42 percent; as for the executive and general public, the score rose from 21 percent to 40 percent. At the same time, the intervention allowed the general public and specific stakeholders to better identify those issues causing conflict. Interestingly, the factors often included lack of social services, lack of infrastructure, high levels of unemployment or low pay. Not surprisingly, the federal and state governments were expected to play a leading role in resolving conflict, followed by religious/ethnic leaders. Potentially, it may be easier to address the service provision or policy issues that generate conflict rather than those rooted in ethnic and other divisions. Respondents who thought that current relations between the executive and stakeholders had taken a turn for the worse identified as reasons such factors as lack of peace and the failure of government to rectify problems with social services.

3. Peace campaigns that combine training with media interventions can lead to the establishment of structures intended for the resolution of conflict. In Kwara State, OTI's program joined a media-based peace campaign with training workshops aimed at various stakeholders and target groups. This involved the establishment of different fora for the resolution of ethnic, religious or communal disagreements. (This does not presuppose the maintenance of these structures over time. Indeed, that might necessitate longer-term programs which are not part of OTI's mandate.)

4. Media interventions that solicit government support for the project can be effective as a means of teaching conflict resolution and mobilizing audiences. The Kebbi State Youth Council/Video on Wheels program visited dozens of communities. It presented a video on conflict resolution, followed by discussion. Participants often numbered upwards of 200 or 250 people. Generally, local government officials were informed of the plans, attended the programs and were involved in discussions that ensued. In most of the communities visited, the presentation led to the formation of local peace committees, with the support of local government, village heads or chieftains. The Kebbi Youth Council is itself a quasi-governmental entity.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMUNICATING MESSAGES AND THEIR DG AND CONFLICT IMPACTS

1. *The success of media-based interventions depends on the institutional capacity of the implementing organization or grantee. Lack of attention to capacity building, as with any civil society program, can constrain message communication and impair its effectiveness.*

NAWOJ was a relatively new organization when first funded by JHU. JHU worked with NAWOJ chapters to build their capacity, particularly in the early phases of the program. At the end, however, a small number of individual chapters, animated by the leaders who had paid less attention to creating functioning organizations, lacked the financial and managerial systems or structures necessary for sustainability. NAWOJ is primarily a membership organization, and without these structures and the discipline they can impose, NAWOJ chapters have been more vulnerable to fracture. If a lack of resources prohibits significant attention to institution building, working with stronger, better established, or proven organizations, like FIDA or the WLDCN, is a better guarantor of success.

2. *Strategies that use media-based interventions as a means of mass mobilization or short-term mobilization must establish and fund mechanisms for coordinating and directing response.*

Despite significant response to the NMMC, the WLDCN and its partners did not have the institutional capacity to handle requests for assistance and counseling. It prevented them from taking on promising opportunities in support of community organizations eager to engage government.

3. *Reinforcement of messages – through use of different media or multi-media campaigns – is necessary for effective communication.*

Stand-alone interventions (such using radio spots for conflict mitigation) probably had less chance of impact. Interventions that used a variety of media to support or draw attention to a focal intervention were more successful in communicating messages.

4. *Strategy is everything.*

Media-interventions integrated with other kinds of activities – such as advocacy campaigns, sensitization workshops, or coalition-building, for example – not only created more opportunities for message communication, but also contributed to and heightened the impact of the individual interventions. Indeed, certain astute JHU grantees and sub-grantees understood this when developing their own media strategies, advocacy campaigns or one-off activities. It was also particularly true of OTI peace campaigns in Borno State and in Kwara, and its rural-outreach activities, such as the Kebbi Video Road show.

5. *Media intervention is a necessary condition in any campaign to promote awareness, impart education and promote change, but it is not a sufficient condition. Where there are structural or institutional barriers to change, for example, media intervention alone cannot lead to significant change.*

We see this phenomenon at work in the north where, despite a spirited campaign to empower women, religion and tradition operate in such a way as to discourage women from aspiring to leadership positions. For media intervention to succeed, these structural and institutional barriers will have to be removed or reformed, as happened in Enugu, where NAWOJ and a coalition of NGOs successfully moved the legislature to enact laws empowering women.

6. *Relatively longer-running programs and continuing series can be very effective in communicating messages and raising awareness of issues. They were better able to maintain both levels of interest in the issue and mobilization.*

Some of the momentum generated by media interventions is probably lost when, for any number of reasons, the campaign is not sustained. This was particularly problematic (and unavoidable) for both JHU and OTI, given annual program cycles. There could be no guarantees that a program begun one year would be continued the following year.

7. *More evaluation and feedback would have enhanced the effectiveness of interventions. (This feedback would have been essential to the design of follow-on activities.)*

Follow-up media monitoring, mechanisms for feedback and evaluation were not often built into project design. As a result, many important questions were left unanswered. To what end did participants use the information gleaned from the training sessions and the sensitization workshops? Did editors or media-organization executives oversee changes or increases in coverage of women's issues? Did journalists incorporate their training in reporting?

Given that this was a communication program, it was surprising to see how few attempts were made at monitoring reception of messages among target audiences or ascertaining their value(s).

Where this did occur, with the ICRC's theater and drama interventions for schools in Bauchi State, the grantee could discern which DG messages were best understood, which were rejected outright and which media were most appropriate for communication.

Similarly, the project evaluator for the Kebbe Video Road show noted that, ideally, videos should have been distributed to the local governments they visited. In this way, reach would have increased dramatically. Given that both personal ownership of VCRs and the number of "community-viewing centers" are on the rise, such video distribution may indeed be a valuable means of communication.

8. *Project cycles and resource constraints naturally limited follow-on activities. Nevertheless, where these occurred, the interventions were tailored or fine-tuned, increasing chances for more effective communication and impact.*

The "Tightrope" series is a good case in point. The producers funded evaluations of the first season's corruption programming. The information provided – about technical issues, characters, plot, messages and situations – were critical during the preparation of the second season, as producers attempted to retool the format to fit the demands of conflict "education." It also made them aware of criticisms – about class and status of Nigerians portrayed – as they developed new episodes.

9. *Interventions that included interactive components or exercises were better able to communicate messages and ascertain responses.*

The more inventive and participatory the activity the better. Radio and TV phone in-shows, radio dramas followed by discussions, video presentations followed by discussions, public fora for debate and community theater productions, for example, allowed people to respond or react to the ideas communicated. In many cases, it allowed Nigerians with little experience in expressing their own ideas to engage other members of their community, raise questions, confront leaders, and ask for and receive information and advice.

10. *Designing media activities requires prudence and forethought.*

In environments characterized by violent conflict, by ethnic or religious tensions, or by hostility to the imposition of “outside” values, media interventions can do more harm than good. There is always a worst-case scenario.

Designing activities without sufficient attention to culture can create antipathy toward a message or idea, rather than sympathy. This can mean, as in northern and other Muslim areas of Nigeria, crafting messages and designing materials that are not hostile or alien to the culture, either implicitly or explicitly.

It is more important that inputs or material – IEC materials, posters, radio and TV spots and scripts – be appropriate on site, rather than conforming to any externally mandated philosophy. As noted elsewhere in more detail, the PREX materials used by the NMMC were not appropriate for the audience. Clearly, ideas transmitted first from JHU Baltimore, through JHU Lagos, to PREX in Lagos, then to JHU Kano caused frustration and concern on down the line, especially when these were shared with JHU partners in the north. This was apparent to the evaluation team during its meetings with all of the parties. What was especially clear was that PREX felt beholden to and constrained by JHU Baltimore, but was less sensitive to cultural concerns and gender issues. The PREX team understood opposition to its materials in the north mainly as problems with logistics and a pre-test that had provided incorrect information.

Similarly, it is also important to recognize that limited or small-scale media interventions may be preferential to a full-scale media intervention.

11. *Effective communication requires strategic and informed use of language.*

In several cases and for a number of reasons (often technical problems or resource constraints) communication was impaired by TV and radio spots that had not been translated and could not reach critical audiences. When translation did take place, it was often done “word by word” rather than being reconceived in light of unique linguistic or other traditions.

12. *While the evaluation found fewer problems with infrastructure and access than anticipated, some do persist.*

Grantees and sub-grantees had to work with sub-standard studios or faced problems with the electrical supply in rural areas. More seriously, interventions designed to train journalists on Internet use encountered significant problems with the ISPs available in Nigeria. Some of the centers established for this purpose were either unable to conduct activities or suffered declines in attendance and use.

Most JHU and OTI partners understood the particular medium best able to reach its target audience (for example, radio in the north), and this probably reduced access issues. This does not mean, however, that they would not have liked to rely on other types of media. Media experts and partners also understood that facilities like “community viewing centers” were making TV and video programming more accessible to Nigerians.

13. *Media interventions often cost more money than anticipated.*

This was a recurrent theme. For example, NAWOJ Lagos expressed the view that there was a real disconnect between the amount of money allocated for the several interventions contracted with JHU and their actual cost. NAWOJ chapters found that they had to pay for radio and TV time, or for inclusion of articles in papers, something not anticipated. Cost overruns or escalations, due at times to technical problems, were also an issue. Grantees and sub-grantees learned a lot about the cost of media interventions in Nigeria. Clearly, this kind of feedback must be sought and new media-based programs designed and funded accordingly.

Generating sufficient revenue proved a real problem for the Internet Centers. The IT Center in Port-Harcourt has evolved into an operation providing services to businesses. The goal of journalistic empowerment seems to have been supplanted by the commercial imperative of generating funds for the NUJ. However, the funds seem to have been invested wisely. The Center has added five to the original three computers it has and plans to acquire two more in the near future. The IT Center in Lagos, one of the more successful, maintains its focus on improving the quality of journalism by charging users and participants in its activities a nominal fee.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE MEDIA-BASED PROGRAMMING IN DG AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The evaluation team found that formulating recommendations for future programs was a straightforward exercise. However, placing them in rank order of importance was difficult, in part because most of the recommendations addressed critical strategic concerns or lessons learned about activity design and implementation in Nigeria.

Key recommendations appear at the beginning and middle of the list, though not in order of importance. Recommendations for specific types of programming are clustered toward the end.

- ♦ *Instead of yearly funding, USAID should consider a longer-term strategy to insure program stability and consistency of focus.* JHU cited the yearly funding cycle as a major constraint on its ability to think long-term, to take a more strategic approach to the DG program, and to develop and rework specific activities. Additionally, the yearly funding cycle made it difficult to maintain and sustain institution-building efforts.
- ♦ *USAID should dedicate more attention (and resources) to institutional capacity building.* These initiatives should be incorporated into communications-based program strategies. The stronger the grantee or sub-grantee, the better the implementation and coordination of media and other activities.
- ♦ *Grantees and sub-grantees should be given broad guidelines that allow them greater room for creativity and innovation – in terms of strategy development and the design of individual interventions or activities – without compromising USAID’s own strategic objectives and standards, and cognizant of political sensitivities.* There should be a distinction between USAID oversight of media interventions and a priori decisions about strategy and activities.
- ♦ *As much as possible, media interventions should be used as part of mixed-media campaigns or in combination with other activities.* Rarely should they be used alone. In the first instance, mixed media campaigns are a better way of guaranteeing that the messages to be communicated are understood and reinforced. In the second, media activities combined with other types of activities – such as advocacy, training workshops and public fora – increase chances for, or augment, impact.
- ♦ *Media-based interventions and communication strategies must receive sufficient funding to meet costs.* Where resources are limited, strategies should be limited accordingly. JHU and its sub-grantees found that most of their activities were more expensive than anticipated. As a result, lack of funds prohibited completion of a program or limited implementation of activities.
- ♦ *Media intervention should be designed and executed by professionals who understand the religious and cultural sensibilities of the area and will not be seen as “outsiders” imposing a different set of values.* Designing activities without sufficient attention to culture can create antipathy toward a message or idea, rather than sympathy. Special attention needs to be paid to interventions in northern, primarily Muslim, Nigeria.
- ♦ *In environments characterized by violent conflict, by ethnic or religious tensions, care should be taken that interventions do not have an incendiary impact.*
- ♦ *Using language effectively is the key to effective communication.* USAID should ensure that all media-based activities use language appropriate to the target audience. Translations, carefully done, should increase reach. Programs like “Tightrope,” syndicated or translated into major Nigerian languages, could reach much larger audiences and have greater impact. Similarly, given the response of the English-viewers to the People’s Parliament Radio Talk show in Kano, translations into Hausa would also be worth the effort, as originally intended.
- ♦ *Media campaigns run the risk of setting off a revolution of rising expectations.* Unfulfilled, the expectations breed frustration that could undermine future campaigns. Care should therefore be taken to ensure (a) that campaigns do not give rise to a tide of expectations, and (b) that expectations generated have a reasonable chance of being met.
- ♦ *Given that much of Nigeria’s youth has had minimal experience with or understanding of democracy and its practice, more media interventions should be focused on youth.* Innovative democracy

education, whether done through schools, communities or the mass media, could have significant impact.

- ♦ *To the extent possible, media interventions should be interactive.* Radio and TV phone-in-shows, radio dramas followed by discussions, video presentations followed by discussions, public fora for debate and community theater productions, for example, allow people to respond or react to the ideas communicated.
- ♦ *For significant impact, drama series should have an overall theme, and each episode should contribute to the development of that theme.* The series should use actors with whom the audience can relate and strike a good balance between edification and entertainment. Scripting is crucial. The language should be accessible to the ordinary listener, and the drama should center on and reflect the experiences of ordinary listeners.
- ♦ *Activity should address the more salacious aspects of the media business.* Sensational stories of conflict sell newspapers. Sober and responsible reporting of conflict does not. Prizes for judicious reporting of conflict could reward the better newspapers and also significantly enhance the efficacy of media intervention messages aimed at conflict resolution.
- ♦ *Greater effort should be made to evaluate activities and generate feedback. Creative means of evaluation should be sought.* Anniversaries of significant projects or accomplishments provide opportunities for re-visiting and keeping them in the public focus.
- ♦ *Media interventions –such as, mass media campaigns or broadcast programs – intended to change attitudes, perceptions and behaviors should incorporate dynamic characters that undergo similar transformations.* (These demonstrate behaviors that can be modeled by the audience)

ANNEX A. PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Abia

Echerenwa, Victoria
Treasurer, FIDA, Abia State

Abuja

Atte, Jimmy
Executive Director, Nigerian Television Authority HQ (Network News)

Ejembi-Emden, Jennifer
General Manager, Nigerian Television Authority
Abuja Federal Capital Territory

Evwierhoma, Mabel, Ph.D.
Lecturer in Theater Arts, University of Abuja
Independent Drama Producer

Ibrahim, Hauwa, Attorney-at-Law
Dianisotti's Chambers
Legal Activist, UNDP Consultant on Widowhood Practices and Children
Leading attorney for Muslim women facing death penalty under Sharia for having children out of wedlock.

Kande, Daniel
Former National President, NAWOJ

Kawu, Ishaq Modibbo
Editor, Trust Newspapers

Unom, Sam
Assistant Governance Adviser, Department for International Development (DFID)
British High Commission

Yusuf, Kabir
Publisher, Editor-in-Chief, Trust Newspapers

Kaduna

Bilkisu Yusuf
Journalist and Editor, Citizens Magazine

Kano

Ahmad, Rakiya Sani
Journalist and Vice President of the Centre for Democratic Journalism

Baba Yaro, Hadiza
JHU

Bala, Abdullahi

Coordinator, Network for Justice

BEN Umar, Halima
JHU

Musa, Aisha
Assistant Coordinator, Network for Justice Programme, Director Media

Sule, Aisha
Former Executive Member, NAWOJ

Yakassai, Ummi Tanko
Jam'iyar Matan Arewa (JMA)

Lagos

Akande, Jadesola
Professor and Executive Director, Women Law and Development Center

Arogundade, Lanre
Coordinator, International Press Centre (IPC)

Awosika, Keziah, Ph.D.,
Director, WLDC

Chidi, Yerisoibiba, Ph.D.
Senior Program Officer (DG), JHU

Chukwura, Innocent
Director, Center for Law Enforcement

Ebisemiju, Bankole
Media Knight Communications (peace campaign)

Kawu, Auwalu A.
Programme Officer, JHU

Kusemiju, Bola
Country Representative, JHU

Ojo, Dapo
JHU Account, PREX Advertising

Ojo, Jaiye
Chief Executive Officer, PREX Advertising

Okon, Effiong
Creative Director, PREX Advertising

Oloyede, Bimbo
Broadcaster and Independent Television Producer
Producer of "*Tightrope*"

Momodu, Raheemat
Journalist, Former Chairperson NAWOJ

Shomefun Bisi
Chair, Public Awareness and Sensitization Committee
FIDA, Oyo State

Tomolaju, Ben
Independent Drama Producer
Producer of Radio Jingles on Ikeja Abattoir conflict

Port Harcourt

Chinda, Uche
President, NAWOJ, Rivers State

Chukwudi, Nelson
Financial Secretary, NUJ Rivers State Council

Zaria

Jenkeri Akwori (Ph. D) – (Dramatist) Lecturer Dept of Theatre Arts, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

ANNEX B. BUILDING AN EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

In preparation for its brief with the USAID/Nigeria DG team on July 30, 2002, the evaluation team drew up a draft "Evaluation Framework" for use in defining and prioritizing objectives, reviewing general questions and lines of inquiry, and selecting specific projects activities for review and evaluation.

The highly collaborative process of designing and working through the framework produced agreement on objectives, priorities, questions and the evaluation agenda. It also marked the beginning of an evaluation process enriched by intellectual exchange, friendship, respect, and hard work.

A. Evaluation Objectives

1. Review media activities and interventions and strategies, as applied in USAID and OTI programs. Provide an inventory of media-interventions and typology of interventions.
2. Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of media-based activities, as tools for achieving results in civil society and conflict management.
3. Consider opportunities and examine options for media-based programming and/or strategies.
4. Indicator Development – Offer suggestions for indicators that measure progress towards civil society results, but also reflect the use of media-based programming.

The participants agreed that Objectives 1, 2, and 3, would take priority, given possible time or other constraints. However, the team leader would prepare a discussion of indicator design to be included in the paper.

B. General Questions and Lines of Inquiry for Selection

The participants agreed that the questions below would guide and provide focus for the evaluative effort. The questions reflect USAID/Nigeria's Scope of Work, as well as initial discussions held by team members with JHU Baltimore and OTI/Washington, and the initial review of JHU and OTI project documents. They were not intended as or compromised an interview protocol. These questions are not organized in terms of importance or relevance, rather, they constitute a first take on the numerous issues and concerns the mission and team hoped to address through the evaluation.

1. To what extent were media-based interventions and programs effective, at the national, state or local levels?
2. Was there complementarity among components? A unifying vision?
 - a. in one campaign?
 - b. among media activities by different sub-grantees and organizations?
 - c. among related activities at the national, state or local levels?
3. To what extent was there a governing communications strategy for the program? What were its objectives? Specific components? (For example: IEC, print media, IT, broadcast media, talk shows, drama, workshops, and community-based media.)
4. Did this communications strategy guide the choice of activities?
5. Did the activities chosen indeed communicate DG messages?

6. Did this strategy guide the choice or selection of sub-grantees? If not, what was the basis for selection?
7. To what extent was there a fit between sub-grantee/implementing partner and project or activity? Consequence?
8. What constraints did the evolution of the program/program history place on the selection of sub-grantees or specific activities? What were the consequences? Were sub-grantees able to design and implement creative projects or activities within these constraints?
9. Were activities feasible, given limits on media-based programming due to poor or limited telecom infrastructure?
10. Were activities appropriate, given varying levels of literacy or variety of local languages and culture?
11. Were activities or materials adapted accordingly? To what effect?
12. Generally, were materials or content appropriate for communication of the specific DG message? How was content determined?
13. How did execution of specific media activities build the capacity of sub-grantees managing the activities?
14. How did participation in specific events, fora, or activities subsequently enable capacity building in participant NGOs?
15. How did specific activities impact the Nigerian media?

For example, coverage of DG activities? Coverage of women in politics? Coverage of issues of importance to women?

Increased presence of women journalists in print and broadcast media?

16. How did specific activities impact the degrees of professionalism among journalists? The formal or informal organization of women journalists? The capacity for advocacy?
17. Were non-media NGOs able to integrate exposure to or training about media as part of their advocacy efforts or initiatives?
18. How did principal sub-grantees (NAWOJ, for example) attempt to build linkages about other sub-grantees? Activity participants? With what results?
19. What mechanisms were used for feedback? How was feedback incorporated into future or further activities?
20. Technical and operational questions, as they develop.
21. Who were the beneficiaries of the programs?
22. Did programs reach targeted audiences?

23. Have interventions produced changes in behavior? What are people doing differently as a result of exposure?
24. Have the programs affected the internal democracy of NGOs?
25. What particular oversight issues arose?
26. How did the interventions link to or connect with local or personal issues?

C. Possible Criteria for Selection of Projects for Evaluation

Participants discussed selection of particular projects to cover during the evaluation, given constraints on time and resources. The following criteria were chosen to guide the process, to study as representative a mix of interventions as possible.

1. Phase or period of project
2. Duration of project
3. Major and minor JHU and OTI media-based interventions
4. Range of media
5. Mix of media interventions
6. Wide zonal and geographic balance

Participants also considered choices based on tentative travel scheduled to Lagos, Port Harcourt, Kano, Kaduna, and Zaria, addition to the time in Abuja.

C. Methods to be used:

1. Documentation review and analysis – project and program documents, evaluations, ephemera.
2. Interviews with key informants – project managers, beneficiaries, participants, media experts.
3. Informal focus groups, when possible

ANNEX C. CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING INDICATORS FOR COMMUNICATIONS-BASED DG PROGRAMS

General Comments

The challenge here is to create indicators that capture or bridge both the communications orientation and, indeed, basis of program interventions and the DG objectives they serve.

Just parsing the intermediate result, “increased knowledgeable participation in civil society in public deliberations and oversight of government,” helps us distinguish these two elements. On the one hand, the IR speaks to increasing knowledge as well as public deliberation, facilitated or accomplished through media-based interventions. On the other hand, the IR speaks to civil society participation and oversight of government phenomena not necessarily addressed through media-based interventions in other perhaps more “typical” civil society programs.

The indicators chosen by JHU Nigeria in Phase IV were indeed comprehensive and covered many of the “civil society” bases. These include indicators on advocacy, civil education, NGO capacity and sustainability and internal democracy.

As for the communications aspects of the program and the IR, the JHU Lagos evaluations specialist explained that JHU relied on what they characterized as typical “communications” indicators and anticipated outcomes. These focus on how an intervention and the message communicated either increase understanding or knowledge and perhaps trigger some kind of action or behavior change. These were captured in JHU indicators three and four, to determine if exposure to the education campaign had or had not increased knowledge and inspired specific actions. The same is true for indicator 14, which looks at actions taken (going for counseling) after exposure to the National Mass Media Campaign.

Two concerns come to mind. First, given the pre-transition focus of the JHU program on women and health, it is to be expected that JHU would choose more archetypal communications indicators that connect the nature of messages relayed – about family planning and about the need for immunization – to knowledge and behavior change objectives. In the case of an immunization campaign, objectives may be raising awareness about how immunization prevents disease and increasing the number of children receiving immunizations from clinics.

The question is not whether behavior change indicators are appropriate for a DG program, but rather, what phenomenon or matters are left out of the calculation. The achievement of DG results is often predicated upon complex changes, for example, in adopting new practices, reconfiguring certain processes, institutional reforms or the creation of new institutions. A DG indicator that does not capture these changes may miss the focus or substance of a DG program.

Second, the JHU indicators are, of course, very appropriate for civil society results and the program’s work on advocacy. They are used widely for programs with typical civil society or civic education program components. However, civil society measures do not necessarily provide clues that they have been adapted for a DG program that relies predominantly on media-based and communications-based interventions.

Alternative approaches

Before thinking about new types of indicators, it is important to reiterate some specific objectives of JHU’s DG program and its media-based interventions. A few examples are illustrative:

1. Building advocacy coalitions that make use of media strategies.
2. Strengthening CSO or NGO capacity and ability to develop and implement media strategies.

3. Using the media to either raise the prominence or quality of the debate on women's participation in politics.
4. Facilitating women's participation in politics, whether through training of women politicians in media use or using media to gain public acceptance for women's participation.
5. Increasing the coverage of women's issues and visibility of women in the media.

The challenge, then, is to devise indicators that let us know whether we are making progress in any of these objectives. Clearly, these program objectives, which fit squarely and neatly under the IR, "Increased knowledgeable participation in civil society in public deliberations and oversight of government," are multifaceted. How to best capture these facets?

Recently, as with indicators on internal democracy or advocacy, there has been an increasing tendency to use alternative indicators, such as indices or milestones. Indices are not purely quantitative measures; instead, they are one kind of indicator that allows you to quantify essentially qualitative information about changes, whether in processes, institutions or practices.

Qualitative indicators, which measure change over time against specific, pre-determined criteria, also allow for methodologically-sound and strict assessments of changes in processes, institutions, practices, and the like – presented in narrative form. There is no quantification.

Alternative indicators are well suited for adaptation by programs that use media-interventions to achieve civil society and other DG results.

Examples

The new Handbook on Qualitative Indicators contains a few civil society indicators that could be readily adapted for use by missions with IRs similar to that of USAID/Nigeria and programs with media-based interventions. Each indicator outlines very specific criteria and elements to be used for assessment as part of the performance measurement and results monitoring process. They are intended to provide useful information for program management.

It is important to remember that all of the indicators in the new Handbook are conceived very broadly, to accommodate a range of programming and stated results. They often include criteria or elements that address media; these could be sharpened, extended, or given more prominence

Indeed, adaptation of these qualitative indicators, as with the design of any indicator, requires a narrowing of focus, the selection and modification of assessment criteria, and establishing data collections system, among other things

The indicators presented here were selected first and foremost because of their relevance to and fit with some of the specific objectives of JHU's DG program and its media-based interventions. They are also in the new Indicators Handbook and so have been vetted by experts and developed with input from DG staff in Washington and in the field.

Example Number One

Indicator: "Quality of and accessibility to public debate"

This indicator assesses quality and access against four criteria, with specific elements outlined below. The criteria and elements are not presented sequentially or according to significance. Although this indicator tracks debate on one issue, it could easily be modified to compare debate on two or more issues.

- A. Inclusiveness
- B. Access to information
- C. Availability and quality of policy analysis
- D. Diversity of arenas for discourse

A. Inclusiveness

1. Expanded number of NGOs conduct advocacy on this issue
2. Formation (or broadening) of issue specific coalitions or networks
3. Diversity of actors in debate:
 - a. Women's organizations, minority organizations, labor unions and professional associations (also as part of coalition or network)
 - b. Government actors – especially from relevant ministries/agencies
 - c. Political parties, opposition parties
 - d. Private sector actors – firms, foundations
 - e. Academics
 - f. Religious groups

Questions for consideration: Which are new entrants? In what capacity are they active? Have there been changes in major or minor actors?

B. Access to information – diversity in the channels for dissemination of information

1. The Internet serves as an arena for discussion and a source of information
 - a. Number of dedicated web-sites or web-pages
 - b. Web-site affiliation (government, NGO, private sector) and/or sponsorship clearly identified.
 - c. Access to web sites. Are there restrictions or fees?
 - d. Frequency of use?
2. Establishment or expansion of national and/or local government information centers or libraries (executive, parliamentary, legislative)
 - a. Reliability of material and data available
 - b. Public (NGOs, citizens, private sector) access – required fees, permission
 - c. Prohibition on use of material
3. Establishment or expansion of Statistics Offices or Archives
 - a. Reliability of material and data available
 - b. Public (NGOs, citizens, private sector) access – required fees, permission
 - c. Prohibition on use of material
4. Media
 - a. Number/type of non-governmental sources of news/information/opinion
 - b. Number/type of government-controlled media-outlets
 - c. Restriction on public access to non-governmental media outlets (radio, press, TV)

C. Quality and Availability of Policy Analysis

1. Reliability and productivity of key non-governmental public policy institutes/ think tanks working on this issue.
 - a. Affiliation, if any. Connections to university, professional association, labor union, CSO or private sector actor/institution?
 - b. How open is think tank about funding sources? Sponsorship?
 - c. Qualifications of analysts contributing issue briefs.

- d. Diversity of products: working papers, issue briefs, training materials newsletters with recent actions/activities
 - e. Distribution? Primary audience? What channels does the think tank use to disseminate information?
2. Reliability and productivity of key government and government-sponsored policy think tanks working on this issue
- a. Funding source? Directorship?
 - b. Qualifications of analysts contributing issue briefs
 - c. Diversity of products: working papers, issue briefs, training materials newsletters with recent actions/activities
 - d. Distribution? Primary audience? What channels does the think tank use to disseminate information?

D. Arenas for Discourse

1. Increased diversity in arenas for discourse
- a. Training workshops (sponsored by government, by international NGOs, by local NGOs or by donors, think tanks or universities).
 - b. Legislative hearings
 - c. Seminars/roundtables (sponsored by government, by international NGOs, by local NGOs, by donors, by think tanks or universities)
 - d. International or national conferences (sponsored by government, by international NGO, by local NGO, by donors or universities)
 - e. Joint commissions
 - f. Coalitions/formal networks
 - g. Peak federations
 - h. Web pages and web sites devoted to issue
 - i. Media fora, “call in shows,” for example
2. Expansion of debate
- a. Geographic
 - b. Institutional
3. Diffusion
- a. Establishment of (follow-on) working groups.
 - b. Mechanisms for outreach to citizens

Comments on Application

This indicator tracks debate on one issue, but could easily be modified to facilitate a comparison of debates on two or more issues. The missions – in consultation with stakeholders, partners or experts – will refine and narrow the indicator and select, reject or expand criteria as necessary.

For example, a mission with a program such as JHU’s may want to alter the elements under Criteria B – “Access to information – diversity in the channels for dissemination of information.” Depending on the political environment, it may want to jettison elements on government statistics’ office or libraries and expand the media elements.

Once these initial revisions are done, there should be a baseline assessment against the chosen criteria. This assessment should identify any criteria or elements critical or salient with respect to debate on a particular issue, and those elements potentially sensitive to change during the strategy period. It could also make suggestions for any modifications in the indicator.

Targets could be set on a yearly basis, given the possibility of registering change against certain criteria or elements, for example, increased productivity of think tanks or less restrictive access to government data. For other criteria or elements, change may be more gradual and targets might be set at the middle and last year of the strategy.

Example Number Two

Indicator: “NGO/CSO Functional Capacity”

This indicator looks at “the extent to which NGOs have developed or improved functions.” This indicator, as it appears in the new Handbook, can be used to assess NGO or CSO capacity in four broad functional areas. These are: Advocacy, External Relations, Management and Activity Execution. The elements under each functional area are illustrative lists of the tasks to be undertaken and would serve as the basis for assessment.

This indicator can serve two purposes. First, it allows for a qualitative assessment of a smaller number of targeted NGOs or CSOs. Second, it can be the basis for an index that assesses a larger set.

While all four functional areas are included here, it is clear from this evaluation that the External Relations and Activity Execution functional areas may be the most relevant for JHU or a similar program. These highlight coalition-building, networking and media strategies all are central to the JHU program.

Four Functional Areas

I. Advocacy

- a. NGO board/directorate recognizes and understands key advocacy techniques.
- b. NGO can articulate goals of an advocacy campaign.
(For example, provide general information on issue, influence policy debate, educate the public or a particular constituency, and provide technical expertise to policy-makers/decision-makers.)
- c. NGO develops (preliminary) advocacy strategy.
(For example, incorporates techniques learned from seminars and selects and crafts strategy to address audience – decision-makers/public/constituency)
- d. NGO develops advocacy campaign budget and identifies potential sources of funding.
(Are resources adequate for budget?)
- e. NGO collects information necessary for campaign.
(Collects and analyzes data as input for campaign strategy, requests public input on issue, seeks information on issue, conducts policy analyses, develops materials for dissemination or as appropriate)
- f. NGO identifies other NGOs for joint advocacy or joint activities during the campaign.

II. External Relations

- a. NGO establishes longer-term relationships with other NGOs.
- b. NGO joins or participates in an existing NGO network.

- c. NGO participates in/joins a formal coalition or NGO is a member of an umbrella organization.
- d. NGO and coalition partners involved in joint activities.
(For example, organizing working groups, conferences, advocacy initiatives)
- e. NGO engages decision-makers: in legislature, in legislative committees, in government offices.
(For example, provides technical expertise, disseminates research, designates liaison, initiates regular meetings)
- f. NGO continues to identify and engage new constituencies.
(For example, it initiates and pursues contacts with organized interests – business or labor – and with more geographically dispersed communities)

III. Management

- a. NGO develops a human resource management plan.
(For example, to include staffing and hiring plans, job descriptions, personnel policies/manuals, training programs)
- b. NGO develops plan to recruit and train volunteers.
(For example, coordination and management of volunteers, job descriptions, staffing plans, training programs)
- c. NGO initiates formal strategic planning process.
(For example assesses organizational capacity and development needs, articulates long-term goals for organization, establishes processes for feedback from members, etc.)
- d. NGO improves financial management systems.
(For example, accounting, budgeting, internal/external auditing, strategic financial planning, fundraising, submits grant proposals, preparation of financial statements, etc.)

IV. Activity Execution (in support of any activity – civic education, domestic monitoring, legal literacy, advocacy, etc.)

- a. NGOs establish procedures or encourage broad participation in its efforts.
(For example, includes women, minorities, indigenous populations and communities outside the capital.)
- b. NGO works with media or develops media relations campaign to assist in its efforts.
- c. NGOs establish outreach or public education programs.
- d. NGO establishes mechanisms or procedures for monitoring issues, policy implementation and political environment.
- e. NGO develops information collection and dissemination systems.
(For example, reports regularly on activities, creates an information office, creates resource center or library, sets of computer databases, etc.)

Comments on Application

Prior to undertaking a baseline assessment, the mission – in consultation with stakeholders, partners or experts – would adapt this indicator, narrow its focus and decide which functional areas to assess and which tasks to include in each area.

The baseline assessment should identify any elements critical or salient with respect to each functional area, and those elements potentially sensitive to change during the strategy period. It could also make suggestions for any modifications in the indicator. Are there additional actions that need to be included? Should some be jettisoned? The final version should incorporate any revisions made prior to or directly after the baseline assessment.

Targets could be set on a yearly basis, given the possibility of registering change against certain criteria or elements. For other criteria or elements, change may be more gradual, and targets might be set at the middle and last year of the strategy.

Example Number Three

Indicator: "The extent to which sustainable coalitions emerge and develop new structures and/or organizational capacities"

Given JHU's emphasis on NAWOJ, as both the conduit of its media assistance and focal point for initial NGO coalition building, this indicator could also be relevant. Again, it already contains elements that address media and these may need to be expanded or reconfigured as part of the indicator adaptation and revision process.

Sustainable coalitions are defined here as one form of collaboration. The members recognize that they can achieve desired ends over time by working together – by sharing skills and technical expertise, by pooling resources, by solving common problems – rather than working individually. To get a handle on the development of sustainable coalitions, this indicator poses questions about initial formation and organizing principles, institutional sustainability, resource sustainability, program sustainability and legitimacy.

This indicator is formatted as a questionnaire. Each question is followed by actions, functions or capacities the assessment should address. These are not listed sequentially or in order of significance.

Questions

1. To what extent have the actors involved entered the initial stage of coalition formation – identifying shared interests and potential members or relying on a "convener" to foster participation?
 - a. Interest and Membership Identification
 - i. Identification of common interest /Redefinition of currently shared interests/concerns
 - ii. Identification of possible coalition members/extend membership beyond core group
 - iii. Small group with common interest, more limited in scope, or larger group concerned with broader problems or sectoral reform
 - iv. Initiate some joint activity (discussions, workshops, and seminars) to facilitate both identification of potential coalition members and various approaches to particular issues or problems.
 - b. Role of convener – when applicable
 - i. Foster participation

- ii. Use legitimacy (formal or informal, due to expertise, credibility or position) to begin the process of coalition building
 - iii. Identify possible participants
 - iv. Frame issue or orientation to problem
2. To what extent has the coalition developed elements of institutional sustainability?
- a. Coordination and decision-making body
 - i. Facilitates communication, information-sharing, organizes participation in advocacy activities
 - ii. Responsible for decisions about fundraising and resource use
 - iii. Decisions about staffing – paid professional or volunteers
 - iv. Decisions about recruitment and acceptance of new coalition members
 - v. Works to establish central and/or regional offices
 - b. The Division of Labor/Responsibilities
 - i. Initial assessment of the coalition – mechanisms for communication, inter-organizational skills, resources, capacity to carry out functions (advocacy, analysis, planning)
 - ii. Initial assessment of individual coalition members – resources, technical expertise, structure, capacity to carry out functions
 - iii. Decisions about allocation of responsibilities within the coalition: participation in decision-making mechanism; participation in communication mechanisms; provision of technical expertise; provision of skills/advocacy training for other coalition members, coordination of relations with other CSOs, private sector and with government actors; planning and executing advocacy campaigns or producing policy analysis, for example.
 - iv. Job descriptions
 - c. Rules of the Game/organizing principles
 - i. Determination about flexibility: tolerance for members' decision-making autonomy within the coalition – support for particular activities or acceptance of particular decision
 - ii. Establishment of By-laws/Constitution
 - membership – requirements, fees
 - democratic internal structures
 - determination of decision-making committee members
 - iii. Conflict Resolution – procedures for resolving conflicts over allocation of resources or for accommodating diverse interests/organizational norms
3. To what extent has the coalition acted to secure resource sustainability?
- a. Creating a strategic plan: determining resource needs and requirements.
 - b. Formulating plans and mechanisms for fundraising, both nationally and internationally – donor community
 - c. Development and implementation of financial management and budgeting systems
4. To what extent has the coalition adopted procedures to secure program sustainability?
- a. Periodic re-evaluation of mission and identification of short-term, medium term or long-term goals
 - b. Monitoring the political environment to identify both changes in approach to issues and opportunities for advocacy or intermediation.
 - c. Develop members' skill set and technical expertise
 - d. Public relations and media

5. To what extent is the coalition viewed as legitimate?
 - a. By base constituency of member CSOs/NGOs
 - b. By other CSOs and private sector actors
 - c. By government – based on recognition by donors, participation in international fora, provision of useful information and technical expertise, ability to articulate and present interests of concerned actors.

Comments on Application

The mission – in consultation with stakeholders, NGOs representations and experts – would determine the coalitions for assessment, as well as the specific criteria and elements. In the case of JHU, the assessment might include coalitions of women’s NGOs convened by NAWOJ in select states. It may also look at the LARAG coalition that FIDA and NAWOJ participated in.

This indicator would require a baseline assessment of each coalition. It should also identify any critical issues or aspects of coalition-building particular to each case and those potentially sensitive to change during the strategy period. It should make suggestions for any modifications to the indicator – addition or substitution of questions and related actions, functions or capacities.

In some instances, targets could be set on a yearly basis, given the possibility of registering change. For example, in a year, a coalition could begin the process of creating a set of by-laws: putting together an early draft, receiving commentary, revising and submitting a draft for confirmation. However, where it is anticipated by the baseline assessment that some changes or movement will be more gradual, targets might be set at the middle and last year of the strategy. It is also possible that in the first year or two of the strategy, these coalitions work toward identifying mission and recruiting members; other elements of institution building may be postponed till after this initial stage. Trend lines would have to be identified accordingly.

ANNEX D. REFERENCES

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