

AN-ACP-825

Hurricane Mitch Emergency Response Program  
Rapid Assessment of Participating *Municipios*

*Submitted by:* CARE-International in Honduras  
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# CARE-Honduras Hurricane Mitch Emergency Response Program

## Rapid Assessment Conclusions and Recommendations

### *1. Economic Importance of Small Producers*

In virtually all of the *municipios* investigated, the key economic role of small producers was highlighted. Such producers, providing from six to 12 jobs to laborers, represent the most significant source of employment in most zones. Most of these producers are engaged either in the production of basic grains or coffee.

The plight of these producers is difficult at this time. The large agroindustries have either been able to take steps to restore their production, or have at least partial compensation packages available for their workers. Small and medium producers cannot offer such facilities. At this point, small and medium producers have carried out the rehabilitation that is within their reach; in other words, without access to new capital, they will not be able to do the heavier clearing and rehabilitation that is necessary to bring more land back into production.

These small and medium producers, along with others who might be classified as middle class, represent the segments of the population least served by current rehabilitation programs. First, the majority of FFW programs concentrate on repairing public goods such as roads and bridges. While there is no denying that rehabilitation of such infrastructure is necessary for stimulating production by this sector, it is not a direct response to the fundamental recovery requirements of these people; simply put, these producers do not have sufficient resources to rehabilitate their lands. Thus, while the agroindustries are readily able to restore their productive capacity, the smaller producers have adopted a strategy of rehabilitating the minimum parcels necessary for their own subsistence. At the same time, because of their relative degree of wealth, these segments of the population are not normally considered prospective participants for FFW activities.

If the process of small- and medium-holder recovery is not encouraged, the situation of day workers and laborers, already the least advantaged segment of the population, could become more precarious.

### Recommendations

- Small producers need access to fresh sources of credit to rehabilitate their lands. Such credit should be accompanied by technical assistance to determine which lands are recoverable, and to promote sustainable agriculture techniques. This would not only enable recuperation of productive lands, but also contribute to prevention of future disasters.
- Targeted public works activities, especially in dredging of rivers and restoration of restraining structures, is essential. It is clear that some land will need to be sacrificed, but that there are opportunities to recover large extensions as well.
- Interventions such provision of seeds, tools, and wire for fencing are valuable short-term measures to assist small producers.

### *2. Requirements for Livestock Rehabilitation*

From region to region, the crops cultivated differ; what is constant nationwide is the presence of cattle. Cattle are a significant income source, and are the rural "bank account" for many. Although death of animals in the

storm was not uniform in all regions, there have been some common impacts, principally destruction of pastureland.

#### Recommendations

- Credit is required for the restoration of pastureland. Credit could also be considered for rebuilding herds which have been reduced either by death of animals or crisis sale.
- Technical assistance and veterinary services support might be considered as well.
- Interventions such as wire for fencing are valuable short-term measures to assist cattle producers.

### *3. Reactivation of Commerce*

In general, purchasing power has been reduced due to interruption of income flows coming from agricultural production and salaried labor. There is the additional observation that food assistance is having a stabilizing effect on the prices of basic commodities.

#### Recommendation

- In order to stimulate commerce and promote play of market forces, a judicious mix of FFW and cash-for-work (CFW) could be considered. Two days of CFW and three days of FFW, for example, might improve market conditions and still provide needed basic grains.

### *4. Productive Infrastructure Needs*

There are two major areas of infrastructural rehabilitation that are most urgent. First, reconstruction of restraining structures on riverbanks and dredging of rivers are essential for the recovery of agricultural land in many areas. Second, roads and bridges require substantial repair and reconstruction. These interventions are probably the most influential for reactivating agricultural production.

#### Recommendations

- As part of the technical assistance in assessing the prospects for land reclamation, recommendations as to riverbank repair might be offered. A targeted program of riverbank rehabilitation could be considered.
- An aggressive road/bridge reconstruction program could be considered. Such activity should be undertaken in coordination with agencies such as FHIS and SOPTRAVI.

### *5. Shelter*

Housing loss is widespread. In some places, reconstruction is possible on the same sites, while in others, relocation of entire communities is necessary.

#### Recommendations

- A complete evaluation of all prospective housing projects is necessary, in order to distinguish areas in which reconstruction is possible from those where resettlement is the only alternative.

- In those areas in which reconstruction is possible, a municipal housing fund might be established. Such resources could be managed by municipal authorities in coordination with CARE.
- Where relocation is necessary, coordination efforts to identify appropriate lands is recommended.
- In all cases, active advocacy needs to accompany housing programs, in order to establish standards – preferably at the regional level – for the operation of such initiatives.

## 6. Environmental Mitigation

Hurricane Mitch highlighted – and in many cases exacerbated – the degraded environmental conditions of many regions, especially watersheds. Without repair of these watersheds, risk of future disasters is multiplied and long-term productive potential reduced.

### Recommendations

- Urgent interventions in strategically important watersheds, such as the area surrounding El Cajón, should be identified for implementation in the short-term.
- Short-term interventions should be part of an overall watershed management plan to be developed in the short-term.

## 7. Psychological Aspects of the Crisis

For many – especially the small producers whose economic importance was noted above – the feelings of powerlessness are profound. These are people who are accustomed to having some ability to control their own destinies. They have experience with the formal banking sector, and have been employers of significant numbers of people; to now be in the situation of not having the means to advance in their recovery is psychologically debilitating.

### Recommendation

- All interventions should be accompanied by counseling.

## 8. Implementation Approaches

In Olancho and Atlántida, the sentiment of respondents is that FFW programming should continue for an additional one to two years, while in the south/central part of the country, the next harvest seems to be the appropriate date for ending FFW activities. At first glance, this seems counterintuitive, as Olancho and Atlántida are generally considered among the better off regions of the country. A closer examination of the situation provides possible explanations. First, although damage from Mitch is severe in the southern region, there is a large NGO presence supporting both long- and short-term interventions. In fact, CARE has taken advantage of that fact by establishing partnership relations with a variety of organizations, especially in Choluteca. In Atlántida and especially in Olancho, there are relatively few organizations working either in emergency or development programming. It is therefore possible that respondents from these departments feel that their recovery efforts will be slow due to the limited availability of support. Second, there are parts of the north coast that are still in crisis, as post-Mitch flooding forced many people from their homes as late as January 1999. These people might well be feeling extreme levels of vulnerability, which combined with the high level of damage they have suffered, leads them to request FFW assistance for longer than might be anticipated.

### Recommendations

- In Choluteca, Valle, and Cortés, maximum effort should be made to work via partners. CARE might take a leading role in creating municipal plans that integrate the resources and capabilities of all actors to ensure coherence in activities.
- In Olancho and Atlántida, more emphasis might be placed on direct intervention, as the opportunities for partnering are limited.

## A. Background

The present rapid assessment is a joint initiative of CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the World Food Program (WFP), and USAID. The first three agencies mentioned manage nearly all of the food assistance that has come to Honduras in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, while USAID is the largest donor of emergency food commodities.

Relief food distribution activities began immediately after the disaster, with large numbers of displaced persons receiving rations in temporary shelters and in affected communities. During the month of November 1998, the shelter population declined as people returned to clean and rehabilitate their homes and communities. This return to communities led local authorities and the people themselves to direct the relief food commodities toward food-for-work programming designed to foster rehabilitation. In response to this trend, CARE proposed a four-month program (1 December 1998 – 31 March 1999) based almost exclusively on FFW, although provision was left for relief feeding as necessary in order to save lives and alleviate Mitch-related suffering. The emphasis was placed on responding to damage and dislocation caused by Mitch, as opposed to confronting the issues of chronic poverty facing the majority of Hondurans.

Since early to mid-January 1999, the primary intervention strategy has been FFW. CARE is operating in nearly 900 communities in 67 *municipios* in 10 departments. The following chart shows the breakdown of the types of projects being undertaken.

**FFW Activities by Department and Category of Activity**

Departments	General Community Rehabilitation	Road Access	Agricultural Rehabilitation	Housing Rehabilitation	Water/Sanitation	TOTAL
Atlántida	47	32	11	0	51	141
Choluteca	196	169	145	139	162	811
Comayagua	51	86	19	29	61	246
Cortés	195	227	54	26	56	558
Copán	Activities being identified for inclusion during the month of March					
Fco. Morazán D.C.	79	0	1	2	2	84
La Paz	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Olancho	169	64	10	5	20	268
Santa Bárbara	110	118	83	28	49	388
Valle	108	108	108	108	108	540
Yoro	28	112	49	3	63	255
	<b>983</b>	<b>916</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>572</b>	<b>3,291</b>

At this time, CARE, CRS, WFP, and USAID have resolved to evaluate the extent to which food-supported programming has responded to the needs of participants, and to assess the appropriateness of additional food assistance. The exercise whose results are reported herein is designed to respond to the following questions:

- Is there a need for continued food aid?
- If so, where?
- For whom?
- For how long?
- For what purpose?

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## **B. Methodology**

### **1. Content**

In order to answer these questions, the four agencies identified various areas of investigation that were considered crucial for determining the food security status of the population served by emergency activities. The areas of inquiry included the following:

- Income (traditional sources, access to capital)
- Food Prices
- Purchasing Power
- Food (Agriculture/Animal) Production and Reserves
- Condition of Productive Infrastructure
- Survival Strategies

Inasmuch as the assessment was designed to offer guidance on future emergency programming as well, it was decided to investigate the (1) extent to which the current FFW activities are responding to the needs of the communities; (2) presence and interventions of other agencies; and (3) perceived additional recovery requirements of communities.

See Annex I for the interview guide. In order to facilitate implementation of the data collection exercise and analysis of the results, CARE reformulated the guide into a questionnaire format. A sample of this questionnaire is found in Annex II.

### **2. Sampling Strategy**

A key informant group interview methodology was selected for this assessment. Each of the implementing agencies agreed to collect information in 20 *municipios* served by emergency programming. Initially, there was discussion of forming interinstitutional survey teams, but in the end, each agency carried out the assessment in *municipios* participating in its own emergency program.

As noted above, CARE is working in 67 *municipios* with emergency programming. In order to determine where to collect data, CARE applied the following screening process:

- *Exclusion of Principal Cities:* The agencies agreed that both the rapid assessment instrument and the chosen methodology for data collection were best suited to rural and small urban settings. Thus, the major urban centers of Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, Choluteca, El Progreso, and La Lima were not included in the analysis. It is important to note that the rural areas of the *municipios* of Choluteca, La Lima and El Progreso were investigated.
- *Reduction of Projected Coverage:* In order to assist in dimensioning any further emergency programming, CARE field staff were asked to review the *municipios* currently being served according to the following criteria:
  - Presence of other agencies engaged in similar activities
  - Degree to which further programming would be necessary to respond to important Mitch-related damage
  - Extent to which limiting factors, such as municipal government/community commitment and difficulties in coordinating with other agencies, would impede future programming
  - Ability to conclude agreed upon programming by 31 March 1999

Food

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This process resulted in a prioritized list of candidate *municipios* for additional emergency food-supported program activity.

See Annex III for the guide prepared for this exercise.

Once this screening of *municipios* was completed, field staff were asked to categorize the *municipios* relative to the extent of damage to productive infrastructure, such as roads, water systems, irrigation systems, agricultural land, and housing. From there, the *municipios* were divided by degree of development, using the UNDP Human Development Index calculations for Honduras. Those *municipios* with an HDI score greater than or equal to 0.500 were considered better off, while those with an index below that level were classified as worse off.

The names of the *municipios* were entered into the matrix presented below, and staff was asked to select a number of *municipios* to be investigated from each category. It should be noted that in the case of CARE, the 20 *municipios* subject to assessment were divided among the regions of emergency activity as follows:

Choluteca	4 <i>municipios</i>
Olancho	4 <i>municipios</i>
Comayagua	2 <i>municipios</i>
Valle	2 <i>municipios</i>
North Coast	8 <i>municipios</i>

In fact, due to the diversity of livelihood systems in CARE's operating areas, field staff determined to carry out the rapid assessment in 23 *municipios*, in order to ensure the broadest base of information possible. These *municipios* are noted in boldface in the matrix.

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Better off (HDI >= 0.500)	Worse off (HDI < 0.500)
<p><i>with wfp</i> El Progreso, Yoro</p> <p><i>wfp</i> La Lima, Cortés</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Puerto Cortés, Cortés</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Esparta, Atlántida</p> <p><i>wfp</i> El Triunfo, Choluteca</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Namasigüe, Choluteca</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Marcovia, Choluteca</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Choluteca, Choluteca ✓</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Sta. Ana de Yusguare, Choluteca</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Ojos de Agua, Comayagua</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Catacamas, Olancho</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Juticalpa, Olancho</p> <p><i>wfp</i> San Lorenzo, Valle</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Nacaome, Valle</p> <p><i>wfp</i> El Negrito, Yoro</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Omoa, Cortés</p> <p><i>wfp</i> La Ceiba, Atlántida</p> <p><i>wfp</i> El Porvenir, Atlántida</p> <p><i>wfp</i> La Masica, Atlántida</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Arizona, Atlántida</p> <p><i>wfp</i> San Francisco, Atlántida</p> <p><i>wfp</i> San Francisco de la Paz, Olancho</p>	<p>Concepción Sur, Sta. Bárbara — <i>wfp</i></p> <p>Jutiapa, Atlántida — <i>wfp</i></p> <p>El Corpus, Choluteca — <i>ok</i></p> <p>San Jerónimo, Comayagua — <i>ok</i></p> <p>Guayape, Olancho — <i>ok</i></p> <p>Nueva Frontera, Sta. Bárbara — <i>ok</i></p> <p>San Pedro Zacapa, Sta. Bárbara — <i>wfp</i></p> <p>Victoria, Yoro — <i>ok</i></p>
<p><i>wfp</i> Villanueva, Cortés</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Manto, Olancho</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Gualaco, Olancho</p> <p><i>wfp</i> San Esteban, Olancho</p> <p><i>wfp</i> San Francisco de Becerra, Olancho</p> <p><i>wfp</i> San Manuel, Cortés</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Choloma, Cortés</p> <p><i>wfp</i> Sta. Bárbara, Sta. Bárbara</p>	<p>Azacualpa, Sta. Bárbara — <i>ok</i></p> <p>San José de Colinas, Sta. Bárbara — <i>wfp</i></p> <p>Jano, Olancho — <i>CARE   CES</i></p> <p>Guata, Olancho — <i>CARE   CES</i></p>

On the basis of the *municipios* selected, field staff identified key informants, those individuals most able to present the reality of the *municipio* in question. The goal was to convene a group representing a cross-section of the population of the *municipio*. Also included were members of the municipal government, as well as representatives of significant economic sectors or industries.

The group interviews were conducted between 10-20 March 1999.

### C. Results

Conscious of the diversity of the country, and in accord with the national impetus toward decentralized decision-making, CARE-Honduras adopted a regional management structure starting in July 1998. With this organizational approach, CARE divided the country into three major geographic regions. In each region, programmatic initiatives are the responsibility of a Regional Director and the staff of the region's projects.

Regular meetings of the Regional Directors, who report to the Country Director, ensure coherence of programming nationwide.

For the Mitch response, CARE has activities in each of its geographic regions:

South/West Region: Comayagua, Valle, La Paz  
 South/Central Region: Choluteca, Olancho, Tegucigalpa  
 North Region: Santa Bárbara, Cortés, Yoro, Atlántida

Although the Mitch response is national in scope, the particularities of each region make it difficult to reach all-encompassing conclusions. Thus, the results of the rapid assessment are reported by region. These results reflect the unedited answers provided by group interview respondents.

**1. South/West Region**

*Municipios* investigated: San Lorenzo, Valle; Nacaome, Valle; Ojos de Agua, Comayagua; San Jerónimo, Comayagua

**a. Principal Income Sources**

Activity	Where?	Approximate Population Engaged Pre-Mitch	Estimated Losses	Time Required to Reactivate	Observations
Corn	San Lorenzo, Nacaome, San Jerónimo, Ojos de Agua	80-90 percent	50 percent	During 1999, with work required into 2000 to fully rehabilitate	Smallholder hillside agriculture. In Comayagua, production on flatlands.
Rice	San Jerónimo	60 percent	70 percent	During 1999, with work required into 2000 to fully rehabilitate	Smallholder hillside agriculture. In Comayagua, production on flatlands.
Beans	a. San Jerónimo b. Ojos de Agua	a. 60 percent b. 20 percent	a. 70 percent b. 30 percent	During 1999, with work required into 2000 to fully rehabilitate	Smallholder hillside agriculture. In Comayagua, production on flatlands.
Sorghum	San Lorenzo, Nacaome	80-90 percent	50 percent	During 1999	Smallholder hillside agriculture
Coffee	San Jerónimo, Ojos de Agua	80+ percent	50 percent	During 1999, for those who lost only the last harvest; longer-term for those (20 percent) whose farms were destroyed	
Melons	San Lorenzo	N/A	Limited	During 1999	Controlled by large companies with relatively good capacity for recovery
Watermelons	San Lorenzo	10 percent	70 percent	During 1999	Smallholder production

Livestock (cattle)	a. Nacaome b. San Jerónimo, Ojos de Agua	a. N/A b. 20 percent	a. Heavy b. Moderate	During 2000 and beyond, due to the need to redevelop pasture land	Many animals died in the storm in Valle, and there is insufficient pastureland for those that survived in general
Fishing	San Lorenzo	8-10 percent	75 percent	During 2000, if there is access to credit	Contamination of beds caused by Mitch run-off
Salt Production	San Lorenzo, Nacaome	10 percent	30-50 percent	During 2000, if there is access to credit	
Shrimp Production	San Lorenzo, Nacaome	20 percent	70 percent	During 2000, if there is access to credit	
Commerce	Nacaome	10 percent	50 percent	According to recovery in productive sectors	Lack of purchasing power

*b. Sale of Capital Goods*

In general, there has been a significant sell-off of cattle, in response both to the decline in pastureland and the need for cash from this traditional rural "bank account." In many cases, crisis sales have been required to finance payments on bank loans.

*BAD*

In San Jerónimo, there has not been significant sale of assets to date, but the process is expected to accelerate in April and May, as producers attempt to finance planting.

There has also been sale of homes and lands, especially in San Lorenzo

*c. Price of Staple Foods*

Commodity	Availability	Behavior of Prices Post-Mitch	Level of Consumer Demand	Observations
Corn	Abundant (San Jerónimo) Normal (San Lorenzo) Scarce (Nacaome, Ojos de Agua)	Stable (Comayagua) Higher (Valle)	Reduced to Normal	In San Jerónimo, basic grains are from outside the <i>municipio</i> . Food assistance has had a stabilizing effect on prices; without assistance, market prices would be higher still
Beans	Abundant (San Jerónimo) Normal (San Lorenzo) Scarce (Nacaome, Ojos de Agua)	Stable (Comayagua) Higher (Valle)	Reduced to Normal	In San Jerónimo, basic grains are from outside the <i>municipio</i> . Food assistance has had a stabilizing effect on prices; without assistance, market prices would be higher still

Rice	Abundant (San Jerónimo) Normal (San Lorenzo, Ojos de Agua) Scarce (Nacaome)	Stable (San Jerónimo) Higher (Valle, Ojos de Agua)	Reduced to Normal	Food assistance has had a stabilizing effect on prices; without assistance, market prices would be higher still
Lard	Normal	Higher	Normal (Nacaome, San Jerónimo) Reduced (San Lorenzo, Ojos de Agua)	Food assistance has had a stabilizing effect on prices; without assistance, market prices would be higher still
Sugar	Normal	Higher	Normal	
Coffee	Abundant (Comayagua) Normal (Valle)	Higher	Normal	

It is interesting to note that the price of vegetables such as tomatoes and peppers has declined. A possible explanation is that in the aftermath of Mitch, many producers put their sand-covered fields into production of these crops. The resulting saturation of the market has turned this compensation strategy into a losing proposition.

*d. Purchasing Power*

The generalized nature of the destruction caused by Mitch affected the purchasing power of all segments of the population. Of special importance in this area is the relationship between the loss of small and medium holder productive capacity and decline in employment opportunities for salaried workers/laborers. Agroindustry is a significant employer, and the larger companies have either been able to take steps to restore their production, or have at least partial compensation packages available for their workers. Small and medium producers also provide numerous jobs, but they cannot offer such facilities. Until now, the combination of FFW programming and limited day labor opportunities in clean-up activities has enabled workers to maintain their prior living standards, although there are reports of lower salaries being offered for day labor (Ojos de Agua). At this point, small and medium producers have carried out the rehabilitation that is within their reach; in other words, without access to new capital, they will not be able to do the heavier clearing and rehabilitation that is necessary to bring more land back into production. If the process of small- and medium-holder recovery is not encouraged, the plight of day workers, already the least advantaged segment of the population, could become more precarious.

These small and medium producers, along with others who might be classified as middle class, represent the segments of the population least served by rehabilitation programs. First, the majority of FFW programs concentrate on repairing public goods such as roads and bridges. While there is no denying that rehabilitation of such infrastructure is necessary for stimulating production by this sector, it is not a direct response to the fundamental recovery requirements of these people; simply put, these producers do not have sufficient resources to rehabilitate their lands. Thus, while the agroindustries are readily able to restore their productive capacity, the smaller producers have adopted a strategy of rehabilitating the minimum parcels necessary for their own subsistence. At the same time, because of their relative degree of wealth, these segments of the population are not normally considered prospective participants for FFW activities.

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*e. Agricultural Reserves and Production*

In all cases, the reserves of the staple crops - corn, beans, rice, sorghum - are at below normal levels, and in no *municipio* do they exceed 1-3 months. In addition, much of what is currently stored was harvested in crisis conditions. The result is that its quality is poor, and there are significant losses due to moisture-related conditions.

With regard to production prospects, there is less cultivable land available for the upcoming planting season. At the same time, with an injection of credit, opportunities to rent land would exist. Tools and agricultural inputs are available in the market, but limited purchasing power makes them relatively inaccessible. Seeds will have to be purchased, as the loss of much of the previous harvest to Mitch has necessitated that people consume that part of the crop that would normally be held as seed.

*f. Animal Production*

In Valle, many animals were lost in the storm, including cattle, pigs, goats, and fowl. This was not the case in Comayagua, where losses were less pronounced.

The common element for reactivating animal production is restoration of pastureland, which in most cases will require credit.

*g. Damage to Productive Infrastructure*

In both departments investigated, destruction of productive infrastructure was extensive. The most commonly mentioned problem is the loss of all fencing that delimited fields. Tertiary roads were also badly damaged, as were wells, water systems, and irrigation systems.

The loss of agricultural land is considered the most significant toll, with the related concern of the damage to riverbanks and retaining structures.

The damages to infrastructure are a threat to production, commerce, and health. The presence of large quantities of debris in the rivers is particularly worrisome for the upcoming rainy season, as the propensity for flooding is enhanced.

*h. Survival Strategies*

*i. Food Consumption*

In general, food consumption patterns have changed somewhat. Meat and chicken have almost entirely disappeared from the diet. Basic grains consumption has been maintained, thanks in part to the food assistance programming.

Informants also report consuming smaller than normal quantities of food. In some cases, the number of meals per day has been reduced, but this is not a universal situation.

*ii. Displacement of Population/Migration*

While Mitch forced many people from their homes, most have returned to try to rehabilitate them, some continuing to live in high-risk zones. A number of communities are being relocated in their entirety.

In those cases where there is migration, it is generally temporary in nature. In the case of Comayagua, the destination of most migrants, who come from the adolescent population, is the north coast. However, informants report increases in permanent migration to the United States, especially from Valle.

*i. Emergency/Development Programs*

Organization	Where?	Interventions	Observations
Plan International	San Jerónimo, Ojos de Agua	Housing, latrines, bridges, schools	Long-term programming
<i>Ayuda en Acción</i>	Ojos de Agua	School construction	Long-term programming
CARITAS	San Jerónimo	Housing construction and repair	
FHIS	San Jerónimo	Water systems, school repair	
FINCA	Ojos de Agua	Community banks	Long-term programming
<i>Fondo Cafetero</i>	Ojos de Agua	Bridge, road repair	
Save the Children	San Lorenzo, Nacaome	Child sponsorship, community medical funds, school construction, emergency housing construction	Emergency housing activities are done in partnership with CARE
World Food Program	San Lorenzo	Food distribution to vulnerable groups	
Red Cross	San Lorenzo, Nacaome	Food, medicine, clothing, tools	Short-term donations
World Vision	Nacaome	Food, medicine	Short-term donations
<i>Paz y Desarrollo</i>	Nacaome	Food, medicine	Short-term donations
FUNDEMUN	Nacaome	Food, medicine	Short-term donations
Catholic Church	Nacaome	Food, medicine	Short-term donations
FUHRIL	Nacaome	Food, medicine	Short-term donations

*j. Other Damage Not Being Covered by Existing Programs*

Type of Damage	Where?	Required Response	Timeframe
Rivers diverted	Nacaome, San Jerónimo	Dredging, reconstruction of retaining structures	Short-term
Bridges out; roads damaged	Nacaome, San Jerónimo	Repair/construction	Short-term
Water systems damaged	San Lorenzo	Repair; Save the Children?	Medium-term
Housing lost	Nacaome, Ojos de Agua	Construction of new settlements	Medium-term
Agricultural land degraded	San Jerónimo	Clearing, fencing lands	Short-term
Environment damaged	Ojos de Agua	Reforestation	Medium-term
Self-worth Lost	Ojos de Agua	Counseling	Short-term
Malaria, dengue control	Ojos de Agua		Short-term

> Long-term

*k. Response to FFW Programming*

There was general satisfaction expressed with the implementation of the FFW program. The activities were seen to be relevant to the problems at hand, CARE's institutional presence was valued, and the consolidation of relationships among CARE, municipal governments, and communities was considered a strength of the program.

On the negative side, there was a sentiment expressed that the food assistance might be affecting commerce, as all recognize that the aid is influencing market prices. Some also suggested that the food should be distributed based on the size of individual families, as opposed to a standard ration.

*l. Recommendations for Future Programming*

- FFW programming should be continued through the next harvest, in other words September 1999. There are small segments of the population in San Jerónimo that might require assistance through November/December.
- Consider adding cash or materials support.
- Broaden access to credit.
- Overall recovery programming should have a two-year horizon.

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2. South/Central Region

Municipios investigated: Catacamas, Olancho; Juticalpa, Olancho; Guayape, Olancho; Manto, Olancho; El Triunfo, Choluteca; Namasigüe, Choluteca; Marcovia, Choluteca; El Corpus, Choluteca; Choluteca, Choluteca; Santa Ana de Yusguare, Choluteca

a. Principal Income Sources

Activity	Where?	Approximate Population Engaged Pre-Mitch	Estimated Losses	Time Required to Reactivate	Observations
Corn	a. Catacamas, Juticalpa b. Manto, Guayape c. Choluteca, Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo d. El Corpus e. Marcovia	a. 35-40 percent b. 95 percent c. 15-30 percent d. 80 percent e. < 5 percent	a. 50-75 percent b. 50 percent c. 30-50 percent d. 75 percent e. No change	a. During 1999 b. During 1999 c. During 2000 d. During 2000 e. During 2000	Smallholder hillside agriculture
Beans	a. Catacamas, Juticalpa b. Manto, Guayape c. Choluteca, Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo d. El Corpus e. Marcovia	a. 35-40 percent b. 95 percent c. 15-30 percent d. 80 percent e. < 5 percent	a. 50-75 percent b. 50 percent c. 30-50 percent d. 75 percent e. No change	a. During 1999 b. During 1999 c. During 2000 d. During 2000 e. During 2000	
Sorghum	a. Choluteca, Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo b. El Corpus c. Marcovia	a. 15-30 percent b. 80 percent c. < 5 percent	a. 30-50 percent b. 75 percent c. No change	a. During 2000 b. During 2000 c. During 2000	Smallholder hillside agriculture
Melons	Marcovia, Choluteca	40 percent	15 percent	During 1999	Controlled by large companies with relatively good capacity for recovery
Livestock (cattle)	a. Manto b. Juticalpa, Catacamas c. Santa Ana, El Corpus	a. 5 percent b. 20-25 percent c. 10 percent	a. Slight b. 50 percent c. 20 percent	During 2000, due to the need to redevelop pasture land	Insufficient pastureland for those that survived the storm
Coffee	Catacamas, Juticalpa, Manto	20-30 percent	50-100 percent	Between 2000 and 2001	
Fishing	Marcovia	10 percent	50 percent	During 1999	
Shrimp Production	Marcovia	10 percent	50 percent	During 2000	
Commerce	a. Choluteca b. Juticalpa, Catacamas, Santa Ana, Marcovia, Namasigüe, El Corpus, El Triunfo	a. 30 percent b. 5-10 percent	a. 50 percent b. 50 percent	According to recovery in productive sectors	Lack of purchasing power

*b. Sale of Capital Goods*

In general, there has been a significant sell-off of animals of all kinds.

There has also been sale of homes and lands in nearly all *municipios* in this region.

In El Triunfo, there has been crisis sale of grains at depressed prices.

*c. Price of Staple Foods*

Commodity	Availability	Behavior of Prices Post-Mitch	Level of Consumer Demand	Observations
Corn	Normal (Choluteca, Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Marcovia)	Stable	Low to normal	Lack of purchasing power accounts for lower demand; price stability due to government intervention and food assistance
	Scarce (Guayape, Catacamas, Juticalpa, Manto)	Stable to rising		Price rises due to hoarding
Beans	Normal (Choluteca, Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Marcovia)	Stable	Low to normal	Lack of purchasing power accounts for lower demand; price stability due to government intervention and food assistance
	Scarce (Guayape, Catacamas, Juticalpa, Manto)	Stable to rising		Price rises due to hoarding
Rice	Normal (Choluteca, Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Marcovia)	Stable	Low to normal	Lack of purchasing power accounts for lower demand; price stability due to government intervention and food assistance
	Scarce (Guayape, Catacamas, Juticalpa, Manto)	Stable to rising		Price rises due to hoarding
Lard	Normal (Choluteca, Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Marcovia, Manto, Guayape)	Higher (Marcovia, Choluteca, Guayape, Catacamas, Juticalpa, Manto)	Low to normal (Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Marcovia, Manto, Catacamas)	
	Scarce (Juticalpa, Catacamas)	Stable (Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus)		

Sugar	Normal (Choluteca, Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Marcovia, Guayape)  Scarce (Juticalpa, Catacamas, Manto)	Stable to rising	Low to normal (Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Marcovia, Manto, Catacamas)  High (Guayape, Juticalpa, Choluteca)	
Coffee	Normal (Choluteca, Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Marcovia, Guayape, Manto)  Scarce (Juticalpa, Catacamas)	Stable to rising	Low to normal (Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Marcovia, Manto, Catacamas)  High (Guayape, Juticalpa, Choluteca)	

*d. Purchasing Power*

As in the case of the South/West Region, the segments of the population most affected by Mitch were the small and medium producers. Laborers were also heavily affected, except in Choluteca and Marcovia where the recuperative powers of the melon industry have enabled many workers to return to work.

*e. Agricultural Reserves and Production*

In all cases, the reserves of the staple crops - corn, beans, rice, sorghum - are at below normal levels, and are at less than one month in all *municipios* except Juticalpa and Manto. Virtually without exception, respondents reported that without food aid, they would be vulnerable to food insecurity.

With regard to production prospects, there is less cultivable land available for the upcoming planting season. Tools, seeds and agricultural inputs are available in the market, but limited purchasing power makes them relatively inaccessible.

*f. Animal Production*

In all *municipios*, animal losses were reported, with Juticalpa, Namasigüe, Marcovia, and El Triunfo being most heavily affected.

The reactivation of animal production is almost entirely dependent on access to credit, which is necessary for fencing properties, rehabilitating pastureland, and purchasing medicine and other feed.

*g. Damage to Productive Infrastructure*

Roads and bridges were identified as the most significantly damaged productive infrastructure, followed by irrigation systems (Choluteca, Santa Ana, El Triunfo, Namasigüe), water systems (Choluteca, Guayape, Manto), and drainage systems (Marcovia, Guayape, Catacamas).

As in the South/West Region, respondents identified the loss of fencing as a significant obstacle to restoring production.

*h. Survival Strategies*

*i. Food Consumption*

In general, food consumption patterns have changed, with nearly all respondents reporting reduction in both quantities and number of meals consumed. In El Corpus and Santa Ana, respondents identified food assistance as being key to their ability to maintain customary consumption patterns.

*ii. Displacement of Population/Migration*

In both Olancho and Choluteca, there has been significant migration due to Mitch. Ironically, one of the destination points of migrants mentioned by respondents in Choluteca is Olancho.

Most migration is considered temporary, although there are communities that were abandoned altogether in both the departments investigated.

*i. Emergency/Development Programs*

Organization	Where?	Interventions	Observations
Plan International	Santa Ana, Marcovia	Emergency housing construction	Emergency housing activities are done in partnership with CARE in Marcovia
World Food Program	Choluteca, Santa Ana, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Namasigüe, Marcovia, Juticalpa	FFW and food distribution to vulnerable groups	
Red Cross	Juticalpa, Catacamas, Choluteca	Food, medicine, clothing, tools	Short-term donations
World Vision	Choluteca	FFW	Done in Collaboration with CARE
OXFAM	Marcovia	Emergency housing construction	
Save the Children	Santa Ana	Emergency housing construction	
COHDEFOR	Santa Ana, Namasigüe, El Corpus, Catacamas	FFW	Food commodities donated by WFP
<i>Proyecto Guayape</i>	Juticalpa	Construction materials	
Catholic Church	Choluteca, Namasigüe	Food, medicine	Short-term donations
CARITAS	Santa Ana, Choluteca	Food, medicine	Short-term donations

j. Other Damage Not Being Covered by Existing Programs

?

Type of Damage	Where?	Required Response	Timeframe
Rivers diverted	Santa Ana, Marcovia	Dredging, reconstruction of retaining structures	Short-term
Bridges out	Santa Ana, El Corpus	Repair/construction	Short-term
Water systems damaged	Santa Ana, Choluteca, El Corpus, El Triunfo, Marcovia, Namasigüe	Repair and reconstruction	Short-term
Housing lost	Manto, Guayape, Catacamas, El Corpus	Provision of building materials	Short-term
Self-worth lost	Choluteca, Namasigüe, El Triunfo	Psychological counseling	Short-term
Drainage/sanitation destroyed	Choluteca, Namasigüe, El Triunfo, El Corpus, Juticalpa	Reconstruction of latrines, drainage canals	Short-term
Roads destroyed	Santa Ana, El Corpus, Manto, Catacamas	Repair/reconstruction	Short-term
Agricultural land degraded	Santa Ana, Marcovia, El Corpus, Guayape	Provision of machinery to remove debris, rehabilitation of land	Short- to medium-term
		Relocation	Long-term
Watersheds damaged	Choluteca, El Corpus	Reforestation	Short- to medium-term

k. Response to FFW Programming

In virtually all *municipios*, the respondents appreciated the activities of the FFW program. Especially in Choluteca department, where there are a large number of organizations present, the seriousness and orderliness of CARE's work was singled out.

On the negative side, there was a sentiment expressed that the food assistance might be affecting commerce, as all recognize that the aid is influencing market prices. In addition, in Namasigüe, the respondents discussed the paternalistic environment that the FFW programs can create. At the same time, there was generalized criticism that the ration provided in FFW programs is too small. In Olancho, there was concern about the length of the workday being too long. Of particular interest was the sentiment in Manto that the FFW projects undertaken to date do not respond to the true needs of the communities. This may reflect a weakness in communication between the municipal government and the communities as to the priorities for rehabilitation.

l. Recommendations for Future Programming

- In Choluteca, Santa Ana, El Triunfo, El Corpus, and Namasigüe, FFW programming should be continued through the next harvest, in other words August/September 1999.
- In Marcovia, FFW programming should be continued through the end of 1999.
- In Olancho, FFW programming should be continued for at least two more years.

Don't know →

↑ is consistent with negative pattern.

### 3. North Region

Municipios investigated: Concepción Sur, Santa Bárbara; San José de Colinas, Santa Bárbara; Azacualpa, Santa Bárbara; Jutiapa, Atlántida; Esparta, Atlántida; El Progreso, Yoro; La Lima, Cortés; Villanueva, Cortés; Puerto Cortés, Cortés

#### a. Principal Income Sources

Activity	Where?	Approximate Population Engaged Pre-Mitch	Estimated Losses	Time Required to Reactivate	Observations
Corn	Azacualpa, Concepción Sur, Villanueva, Jutiapa, Esparta,	70-80 percent	50 percent	During 1999	Smallholder agriculture
Beans	Azacualpa, Concepción Sur, Villanueva, Jutiapa, Esparta,	70-80 percent	50 percent	During 1999	Smallholder agriculture
Plantain/Palm/Cacao	Puerto Cortés	60 percent	Significant	During 2000, with credit	
Coffee	Azacualpa, San José de Colinas, Concepción Sur	80-90 percent	50 percent	Long-term (2-5 years)	
Woven Crafts	Concepción Sur	60 percent	50 percent	During 2000	
Maquila	a. Villanueva b. La Lima, El Progreso	a. 80 percent b. 20-30 percent	Slight	During 1999	
Livestock (cattle)	a. San José, Concepción Sur, Puerto Cortés, Villanueva, Jutiapa b. Esparta	a. 10-30 percent  b. 60 percent	Moderate	During 2000, due to the need to redevelop pasture land	
Tela Railroad Co. (transnational)	a. El Progreso b. La Lima	a. 30 percent b. 80+ percent	80 percent	During 2000	
Commerce	a. Concepción Sur, Esparta b. La Lima c. Puerto Cortés, Villanueva d. El Progreso	a. 30 percent b. 25 percent c. 10 percent d. 40 percent	a. 15 percent b. 40 percent c. Slight d. 50 percent	According to recovery in productive sectors	Lack of purchasing power, destruction of stores

b. Sale of Capital Goods

In general, there has been a significant sell-off of animals of all kinds. In addition, respondents in virtually all of the *municipios* investigated reported sale of capital goods such as homes and land. The high rate of sale of such goods suggests that major decapitalization is taking place throughout the region.

c. Price of Staple Foods

Commodity	Availability	Behavior of Prices Post-Mitch	Level of Consumer Demand	Observations
Corn	Normal (Azacualpa, San José, La Lima, Villanueva)  Scarce (Concepción Sur, Jutiapa, Esparta, Puerto Cortés)	Normal to higher	Normal to high (Azacualpa, San José, La Lima, Villanueva, Concepción Sur, Puerto Cortés)  Low (Jutiapa, Esparta)	Food assistance has had a stabilizing effect on prices; without assistance, market prices would be higher still
Beans	Normal (Azacualpa, San José, La Lima, Villanueva)  Scarce (Concepción Sur, Jutiapa, Esparta, Puerto Cortés)	Normal to higher	Normal to high (Azacualpa, San José, La Lima, Villanueva, Concepción Sur, Puerto Cortés)  Low (Jutiapa, Esparta)	Food assistance has had a stabilizing effect on prices; without assistance, market prices would be higher still
Rice	Normal	Normal to higher	Normal	Food assistance has had a stabilizing effect on prices.
Lard	Normal	Normal to higher	Normal to reduced	Food assistance has had a stabilizing effect on prices.
Sugar	Normal	Normal to higher	Normal	
Coffee	Normal	Normal to higher	Normal	

d. Purchasing Power

In Santa Bárbara, the segments of the population most affected by Mitch were the small and medium producers, with the associated impacts on laborers.

In the rest of the region, the destruction was more generalized. Loss of purchasing power, therefore, affects a broader segment of the population.

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*e. Agricultural Reserves and Production*

In all cases, the reserves of the staple crops - corn, beans, rice - are at below normal levels, and in no *municipio* do they exceed 1-3 months. As a large proportion of the population in the region depends on non-food crop production either as small producers or salaried employees, the majority do not have any reserves. In La Lima, for example, there are no reserves of staple commodities, and the Tela Railroad Company has extended the lay-off of personnel for four more months.

With regard to production prospects, there is less cultivable land available for the upcoming planting season. An exception is Concepción Sur, where part of the lands normally devoted to coffee production are planted with staple crops. In the north coast, the continued flooding post-Mitch has left soils destroyed and degraded.

Tools, seeds, and agricultural inputs are available in the market, but limited purchasing power makes them relatively inaccessible.

*f. Animal Production*

In Santa Bárbara, animal losses were moderate, while in the rest of the region, losses were moderate to high. The common element for reactivating animal production is restoration of pastureland, which in most cases will require credit.

In Concepción Sur, some 35 fishponds were destroyed. These will require relocation and restocking.

*g. Damage to Productive Infrastructure*

In Santa Bárbara, the most commonly mentioned problem is the destruction of roads and bridges, followed by water systems. In Concepción Sur, an irrigation system serving 50 families was also destroyed. In the rest of the region, the observations were similar. However, there was particular emphasis placed on the reconstruction of retaining structures on riverbanks; respondents in La Lima, Puerto Cortés, and Esparta said that without such works, attempting to reactivate agriculture would fail.

*h. Survival Strategies*

*i. Food Consumption*

In general, food consumption patterns have changed somewhat. Meat and chicken have almost entirely disappeared from the diet. Basic grains consumption has been maintained, thanks in part to the food assistance programming.

Informants also report consuming smaller than normal quantities of food. In some cases, the number of meals per day has been reduced, but this is not a universal situation.

*iii. Displacement of Population/Migration*

Displacement of the population has been extensive. In Concepción Sur, instability of the land has forced the relocation of several communities. In El Progreso, high levels of permanent migration have also been reported. Throughout the region, there has been both temporary and permanent migration

i. *Emergency/Development Programs*

Organization	Where?	Interventions	Observations
<i>Comisión Cristiana de Desarrollo</i>	San José	Emergency housing construction	Long-term programming also
World Food Program	San José, Jutiapa, Esparta, Puerto Cortés, Villanueva	FFW	
CARITAS	Puerto Cortés	Housing construction	Short-term
Mennonite Church	Puerto Cortés	Housing construction	Short-term
ASONOG	Puerto Cortés	Housing construction	One year program
Episcopal Church	a. Villanueva b. Puerto Cortés	a. Medicine b. Agriculture	Short-term
OCDIH	Villanueva	Emergency housing construction, water, agriculture	Short-term
<i>Amigos de los Niños</i>	El Progreso	Support to families	Long-term programming
<i>Pro-Lote</i>	El Progreso	Financing for land purchase	
ASIDE	El Progreso	Sanitation, credit	One year program
ODEF	La Lima El Progreso	Women's credit	Long-term programming
FINCA	La Lima	Credit	Long-term programming
PRIHMUR	La Lima El Progreso	Credit Housing construction	Long-term programming
Red Cross	San José, Villanueva	Food, medicine	Short-term donations
OFRANEH	Esparta	Food, clothing	Short-term donations
<i>Fundación Cuero y Salado</i>	Esparta	Environment	Long-term programming
Doctors Without Borders	Jutiapa	Water systems	Short-term
FHIS	Jutiapa, Esparta	Schools, water systems	
Plan International	a. San José b. Azacualpa c. Concepción Sur	a. Housing b. Housing, water, roads c. Health/education	Long-term programming
World Neighbors	Concepción Sur	Adult education	Long-term programming
<i>Educados</i>	Concepción Sur	Adult education	Long-term programming
Evangelical Mission	Concepción Sur	Housing	Long-term programming
<i>Proyecto de Reconstrucción Rural</i>	Concepción Sur	Housing, health	Housing done in collaboration with CARE
<i>Cosecha</i>	Azacualpa	Environment, watershed protection	
PROSAR	Azacualpa	Water/sanitation, watershed protection	
<i>Bolsa Samaritana</i>	Azacualpa, Villanueva	Emergency housing construction	In Villanueva, partnership with CARE
Catholic Church	San José, Jutiapa	Housing	
Christian Children's Fund	Concepción Sur	Education	

*j. Other Damage Not Being Covered by Existing Programs*

(?)

Type of Damage	Where?	Required Response	Timeframe
Agricultural lands damaged	a. Esparta b. Puerto Cortés	a. Fencing b. Inputs, tools for plantain cultivation; rehabilitation of pastureland	Short-term
Watersheds damaged	Jutiapa, El Progreso	Reforestation	Medium- to long-term
Self-worth lost	Esparta, Jutiapa, Villanueva	Psychological counseling	Short-term
Roads destroyed	Azacualpa, La Lima	Construction/reconstruction	Medium-term
Rivers diverted	La Lima, Jutiapa, Puerto Cortés	Dredging, reconstruction of retaining structures	Short-term
Bridges out	Azacualpa, Esparta	Repair/construction	Short-term
Water systems damaged	Azacualpa, Jutiapa	Repair of systems; provision of materials	Short-term
Housing lost	Azacualpa, La Lima, Esparta, Jutiapa, El Progreso	Reconstruction	Short-term
Schools damaged	Azacualpa, Concepción Sur, Esparta, Puerto Cortés	Reconstruction	Short- to medium-term
Sanitation/drainage	Azacualpa, El Progreso	Construction of latrines, drainage systems, control of water-related sickness	Short-term

*k. Response to FFW Programming*

In general, the FFW program was considered appropriate to respond to the needs of communities. In several cases, respondents noted that the FFW activities had united communities and allowed new leaders to emerge. In Villanueva and Puerto Cortés, the interviewees recommended that municipal rehabilitation programs be developed to ensure the most efficient use of resources.

On the negative side, there was a sentiment expressed that the food assistance might be affecting commerce. At the same time, many considered the present ration too small.

*l. Recommendations for Future Programming*

- In San José de Colinas, FFW programming should be continued through the next harvest, in other words August 1999.
- In Azacualpa and Puerto Cortés, FFW programming should be continued through the end of 1999, in order to support people through what is expected to be below average harvests.

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- In Esparta, Jutiapa, Villanueva, and El Progreso, FFW programming should be continued for an additional 1-2 years, in order to restore lost productive capacity.
  - In Concepción Sur, a large proportion of the population is being relocated, which suggests that they will need FFW support in that transition (1-2 years).
  - In La Lima, the commercial and small producer sectors would benefit from a credit program, because at this time, banks are not prepared to lend to residents of La Lima. For workers of the Tela Railroad Company, vulnerability will decline with the reactivation of the company's productive capacity. This process is expected to take 1-2 years.

## Area de Investigación: Ingreso

### *1. Fuentes de Ingreso*

- (a) Cuáles son las fuentes tradicionales de ingreso en la región, tanto para hombres como mujeres?
- (b) Cómo ha afectado el Huracán Mitch estas fuentes tradicionales, tanto en términos de cantidad (número de empleos disponibles, por ejemplo) y calidad (salario que se está ofreciendo actualmente)?
- (c) En qué momento estarán disponibles estas fuentes de nuevo?

### *2. Venta de Bienes de Capital*

- (a) Debido a los problemas ocasionados por el huracán, está la gente vendiendo sus activos productivos para poder disponer de efectivo para comprar alimentos?
- (b) Cuáles son los activos que se venden?

### *3. Precio de Alimentos*

- (a) Hay alimentos disponibles en los mercados? Si no, qué hace falta?
- (b) A partir del huracán, los precios de alimentos de primera necesidad han subido, se han mantenido, o han bajado? (Tratar de identificar los productos y el comportamiento del precio de cada uno.)
- (c) A partir del huracán, la gente tiene suficiente dinero para comprar alimentos a los precios de mercado?

*(Fuentes de Información: Gobiernos municipales, dueños de pulperías y tiendas, vendedores callejeros o de mercado, cooperativas de productores, transportistas locales, autoridades religiosas, personal de salud)*

## Area de Investigación: Producción:

### *1. Producción de granos básicos*

- (a) Cómo ha afectado el huracán la producción de granos básicos, incluyendo el impacto sobre cantidades que se venden?
- (b) Cuándo regresará la producción a sus niveles normales?
- (c) Qué se necesita para que la producción regrese a sus niveles normales?

### *2. Producción y utilización de cultivos no tradicionales*

- (a) Cómo afectó el huracán la producción de cultivos no tradicionales sobre los cuales los agricultores dependen para suplementar sus ingresos?
- (b) Para cuándo se espera que la producción de cultivos no tradicionales regrese a sus niveles normales?

### *3. Infraestructura de agricultura y transporte*

- (a) Cuál es el grado de los daños ocasionados por el huracán (camino, sistemas de riego, zanjas, etc.)?
- (b) Cuándo se espera que los agricultores logren producir a niveles normales?
- (c) Qué será el impacto en la próxima cosecha? Cuándo se espera la próxima cosecha?

#### *4. Producción pecuaria*

- (a) Se sufrieron pérdidas de animales debido al huracán? Cuáles?
- (b) A partir del huracán, se ha cambiado la importancia de la producción pecuaria con respecto a su contribución a la seguridad alimentaria?
- (c) Después del desastre, existe capacidad para cuidar los animales adecuadamente? (por ejemplo, enfermedades como resultado del huracán las cuales la gente no puede combatir, falta de alimentación, tierras sin cercar, etc.)
- (d) Cuándo se recuperarán las pérdidas de animales?
- (e) Cómo afectará la seguridad alimentaria la pérdida de animales?

#### *5. Disponibilidad de semillas y herramientas*

- (a) Se perdieron muchas semillas y herramientas debido al huracán?
- (b) Si hubo pérdida, cómo afectará la capacidad de producción de los agricultores?
- (c) Hay disponibilidad fácil de semillas y herramientas para los agricultores?

*(Fuentes de Información: Gobiernos municipales, extensionistas agrícolas, vendedores de granos básicos, cooperativas de productores)*

### **Area de Investigación: Estrategias de Supervivencia**

#### *1. Cambios en hábitos de alimentación*

- (a) Después del huracán, la población está consumiendo diferentes cantidades y variedades de alimentos?
- (b) Después del huracán, la población está complementando su dieta más con alimentos silvestres?

## *2. Desalojamiento de población/migración*

- (a) Ha habido desalojamiento o migración importante a partir del huracán?
- (b) Es una migración temporal, o permanente?

## *3. Disponibilidad de alimentos*

- (a) La gente todavía dispone de alimento de la cosecha anterior?
- (b) La cantidad disponible actualmente es similar, más, o menos de las cantidades que normalmente se tendrían en esta época del año?
- (c) Hasta cuándo alcanzará este alimento?

## *4. Programas de emergencia o desarrollo*

- (a) Existen programas en la zona además de las actividades de CARE/CRS/PMA para apoyar las comunidades?
- (b) Hasta cuándo operarán estos programas?
- (c) Los programas de APT (alimentos por trabajo) están respondiendo a las necesidades de la población? Hay grupos que se hicieron más vulnerables debido al huracán que los programas no está apoyando?
- (d) Hay otros daños ocasionados por el huracán que deben de ser tratados por los programas existentes?
- (e) Cuáles son las intervenciones?
- (f) Por cuánto tiempo deben de continuar los programas?
- (g) Los programas actuales están utilizando una metodología (APT) adecuada? Si no, que más debe hacer los programas?

APOYO EMERGENCIA HURACAN "MITCH"

GUIA ENTREVISTA
EVALUACION PROCESO DE EMERGENCIA HACIA LA RECONSTRUCCION

RESPONSABLES: [lines]

MUNICIPIO: [line] DEPARTAMENTO: [line]

NOMBRE PERSONAS ENTREVISTADAS

REPRESENTAN A:

[lines for names of interviewees]

[lines for representation]

FECHA DE ENTREVISTA: [line]

DURACION: [line]

INSTRUCCIONES GENERALES:

La presente guía de entrevista deberá aplicarse a grupos representativos del Municipio (Alcaldía, grupos campesinos, productores independientes, comerciantes, representantes religiosos, etc.) los cuales deben ser informantes claves, tanto del estrato que representan como del municipio; se sugiere un grupo no mayor a diez personas. Para facilitar el ejercicio tener una persona que conduzca la entrevista y otra que anote las conclusiones del grupo entrevistado en cada una de las respuestas.







# CAPACIDAD DE COMPRA

En su municipio, después del huracán MITCH ¿Quiénes fueron los más afectados en relación a disminuir la capacidad de compra?

CATEGORIA	PROPORCION EN QUE FUERON AFECTADOS			CAUSA DEL PORQUE DISMINUYO LA CAPACIDAD					
	MUY POCOS	POCOS	LA MAYORÍA	PERDIO EMPLEO	PERDIO CULTIVO	PERDIO TERRENOS	PERDIO OTROS BIENES	PERDIO TODO	OTROS
Asalariado/Jornal									
Pequeño Productor									
Mediano Productor									
Gran Productor									
Comerciante									
Personas Trabajo Cuenta Propia									

Pequeño Productor: Menos 5 Ha.

Mediano Productor: De 6 a 20 Has.

Gran Productor: Mayor a 20 Has.

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## ESTRATEGIAS DE SOBREVIVENCIA

### CAMBIOS EN PATRONES ALIMENTARIOS PRODUCTO DE MITCH

a) Despues del MITCH las personas consumen el mismo tipo de alimento en relación a su dieta normal?

- 1 = Si
- 2 = No

b) Los afectados han disminuido las cantidades de alimento por tiempo de alimentación?

- 1 = Si
- 2 = No

c) Los afectados han disminuido los tiempos de alimentación?

- 1 = Si
- 2 = No

### 2) DESALOJAMIENTO DE POBLACION/MIGRACION

a) Considera usted que a raiz del MITCH la población dentro de la cobertura geográfica de su municipio se vio obligada a abandonar/salir de sus hogares?

- 1= Si
- 2= No

En caso afirmativo identificar:

Nombre Comunidad	En que Proporción %	Tipo de Migración	
		Temporal	Permanente

**PROGRAMAS DE EMERGENCIA O DESARROLLO**

a) Que instituciones trabajan en el municipio y tipo de programa:

Instituciones	Tipo de Intervención	Asocio con CARE (SI/NO)	Duración Programa Proyecto (tiempo)	Según Municipio ¿Cuál debería ser la duración de la intervención?	Responde intervención a necesidades de población	
					Si	No

b) Liste otros daños ocasionados por MITCH a los cuales no se les ha dado respuesta por las instituciones?

Tipo de daño	Intervención/Respuesta	Tiempo para la Respuesta		
		Corto Plazo	Mediano P.	Largo Plazo

c) Si existen programas de alimento por trabajo en su municipio, ¿Según la opinión de la población, utilizan éstos programas/proyectos una metodología adecuada en su ejecución ?

	Si	No
*Los tipos de proyectos van de acuerdo al problema		
* Ración es la adecuada (tipos y cantidades de productos)		
* El proceso de selección de beneficiarios es el adecuado		
* Jornada de trabajo es la apropiada		
*Causa interferencia en la economía local		
* El apoyo logístico es el adecuado		
* Apoya/fortalece la organización comunitaria		
* La supervisión/apoyo extensionista es constante		
* Existe el apoyo municipal		
* Existen condiciones minimas de almacenamiento		
* Ha existido promoción/participacion del proyecto		
* Otros: Especifique		

d) Considerando el análisis que hemos hecho de la situación del municipio después del MITCH: ¿Hasta cuando creen ustedes debe continuarse (MES/AÑO) con la ayuda alimentaria? ¿Por qué?

## **CRITERIOS A CONSIDERAR PARA EL PLAN POST-EMERGENCIA**

### **PROGRAMACION TITULO II Y NO TITULO II**

#### ***PASO 1***

- 1.1** \* Revisar información por municipio al 100% de las comunidades participantes para estandarizar criterios de focalización:
- a. Presencia de otras instituciones que apoyen obras de reconstrucción.
  - b. Propuestas de proyectos que no sean orientadas a rehabilitar daños ocasionados por Mitch.
  - c. Condiciones que limiten posibilidades de trabajo exitoso en rehabilitación (modalidades de trabajo, tipos de intervención, oferta de servicios de otras instituciones)
  - d. Finalización de proyectos acordados al 31 de marzo de 1999.
- \* Municipios/comunidades que presenten estas condiciones serán canceladas para una continuación después del 31 de marzo de 1999.
- 1.2** Aspecto a considerar para programar nuevas actividades de abril/agosto-99.
- a. Donde haya mayor daño/necesidad en: vivienda, infraestructura de servicios (agua, carreteras), infraestructura productiva (empleo).
  - b. Que no exista presencia de otras instituciones con una oferta de servicios similar a la programada por CARE.

- c. Presencia de otras organizaciones con las que se pueda establecer trabajo en asocio para complementar intervenciones.
- d. Que se demuestre potencial de desarrollo/oportunidades de generación de empleo.
- e. Que existan condiciones para demostrar un impacto significativo (manejo cuenca El Cajón, empleo agrícola, micro crédito, reasentamiento humano, otros)
- f. Que las autoridades municipales/comunidades estén dispuestas a asumir compromisos/asignar recursos para la continuación/inicio de trabajo conjunto con CARE.

## ***PASO 2***

Definir criterios de egreso de participantes en la asistencia alimentaria según estrato social. Estos egresados podrían ser elegibles a otras intervenciones como: micro crédito, asistencia técnica, fondo de vivienda, remuneración por trabajo social, efectivo por trabajo.