

FOOD AID TARGETING IN EAST AFRICA

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And
Appendices

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
VOLUME II
COUNTRY REPORTS AND APPENDICES

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1.1. CURRENT TARGETING SYSTEMS

1.1.a. Food aid in Tanzania (background)

As a quick background to country-specific targeting issues, Figure 3 shows the quantities of WFP food aid received by Tanzania over the past ten years for use in development, emergency, and refugee / displaced programs. Assuming that WFP's priorities broadly reflect a government / donor consensus on the type of assistance needed, this graph shows that little food has been used for development programs, and negligible amounts for refugee and displaced assistance: emergency food needs, however, are periodic and highly variable. In contrast to its neighbors (see Figures 5 and 7), this profile reflects a country normally self-sufficient in food production and rarely troubled by major conflict-related relief needs, but vulnerable to the impacts of climatic fluctuations because of poverty, poorly functioning markets, and severely inadequate infrastructure (particularly roads between surplus and deficit areas). This profile of food-aid use is reflected in the policies and institutions involved in targeting decisions.



1.1.b. Policy context

Tanzania is the only one of the three EAC countries which has a specific policy document on disaster management - the Disaster Relief Co-ordination Act of 1990 and the accompanying Regulations of 1991 [refs 36 and 37]. However, the purpose of these documents is limited to “establish[ing] ... a system for the anticipation, co-ordination and control of disastrous situations and the organization of relief from disaster” [title of the Act]. Accordingly, the Act sets up the Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee (TANDREC) with the Disaster Relief Co-ordination Department in the Prime Minister’s Office as its “executive organ” (see section 1.1.c), while the Regulations fill in some procedural details and establish District Disaster Prevention Committees. No specific guidance is given on the use or targeting of food aid (or on any other particular type of relief or disaster).

De facto government policy on food aid targeting, however, appears to have been cumulatively established by directives and (apparently unwritten) guidelines from the PMO through the channels of government structures down to the village level. The study team found a very consistent beneficiary-

level system in place in the areas visited, and in other areas discussed with agencies in Dar es Salaam. This is based on registration of people in “affected areas” under three categories:

1. people with no means to buy food, and *unable to work*;
2. people with no means to buy food, but *able to work*; and
3. people with means to *buy food*.

The intention appears to be to provide group 1 with free food, group 2 with food-for-work, and group 3 with no food aid (or sometimes the opportunity to buy food from government stocks): clearly the underlying principle is that only the destitute and helpless should receive free food aid. However, this apparently logical and simple rule has in fact proved extremely problematic in practice, as discussed in section 1.2., and it is recommended below that the Government of Tanzania should revise these guidelines.

At the time of the study, UNDP support was being provided for the revision and expansion of Tanzania’s disaster management policy (and related institutional capacity), though no draft was yet available of the proposed new policy. A similar project was under way in Uganda (see section 2.1.b.), and in Kenya a draft document on disaster management was under discussion between the Government and UNDP.

1.1.c. Institutional framework: decision-makers and information sources


The key institutions in national-level targeting decisions are represented in Figure 4. On the government side, the formal body responsible for co-ordination of disaster relief is the **Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee (TANDREC)**, chaired by the Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office and composed of representatives appointed by relevant Ministers. The committee is convened by the chairman as and when necessary, and has the formal role of advising the President on the declaration of emergencies.

The secretariat to TANDREC is the **Disaster Relief Co-ordination Department (DRCD)** in the PMO. On paper, this department has core responsibility for the operational management of disaster response, collection of information, and co-ordination of relief implemented by government, international and non-government agencies. In the recent past, however, the DRCD has been institutionally weak and appears to have had little active involvement in relief management. From October 1997 (during a crucial period of needs assessment and relief planning) the effective staff of the Department was reduced to two people. At the time of the study, however, the Department was in a state of transition, with new staff (under a new Director), specialist training and material support provided under the UNDP project mentioned above, and plans to relocate to a more centrally-positioned office. For the future, the Department expects to be a more effective player in disaster management.

During 1997, perhaps the most important role of the DRCD was as the chair and convenor of the **Food Emergency Sub-Committee (FESC)**⁸, formed under the authority of TANDREC to address the specific issues of food aid needs assessment and distribution. This sub-committee included WFP (as secretariat) and all the NGOs authorized to distribute food aid. It seems to have been an important forum for the exchange of information between government, UN and NGO sources, the planning of joint assessment missions, and the formulation of targeting decisions (though it did not have power to actually make such decisions). Formal membership of the Sub-Committee is quite restricted and requires application to the PMO: however, observers can be invited (during 1997, for example, SCF staff and USAID’s Food Aid Monitor attended as observers). The DAC Food Group meetings, co-ordinated by WFP and including FEWS as well as NGOs, were another important forum for the exchange of information and the planning of assessments. **It is RECOMMENDED that in future food emergencies, assuming a similar committee structure exists, both FEWS and the FSD Early Warning Unit should seek invited status at appropriate meetings of the FESC.** This would help to ensure that best use is made of all available information, as early as possible in the decision-making process.

⁸ The name of this committee was sometimes given as “Food Sub-Emergency Committee” or “Emergency Food Sub-Committee”.

Figure 4: Tanzania ~ Key institutions in Stage 1 targeting



Information providers

The Government Early Warning System in Tanzania involves several sections of the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives⁹, the Directorate of Meteorology in the Ministry of Works and Communications, and the Bureau of Statistics in the Planning Commission. The system was first established in 1978, on the recommendation and with the assistance of FAO: its primary focus is on early detection of drought-induced crop failure, and on the aggregate availability of food as estimated

⁹ namely the Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit; the Strategic Grain Reserve; the Statistics Unit; the Marketing Development Bureau; and the Agricultural Inputs and Plant Protection Unit.

by a national balance sheet. Since 1991, when the **Food Security Department (FSD)** of the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives was established by Act of Parliament, the central institution of the early warning system has been the FSD's Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit (CMEWU). The FSD Director is also responsible for the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR, established in 1992), though this is not directly integrated with the department's early warning work. FEWS Tanzania is based in the FSD and is working collaboratively to support and broaden its early warning capacity. The FSD's forecast of the 1997/98 food deficit was an important but controversial element in the national-level targeting decisions, as discussed below.

It should be noted that both the DRCD and the FSD are designed as centralized units, with no staff based outside Dar Es Salaam: the development of capacity at District level will be crucial to their future effectiveness. Decentralization of early warning, needs assessment and disaster management is a common theme among the three East African countries, and was discussed in Chapter 2.

Other important information providers brought into the targeting process by WFP were its own **VAM** office (the only one established in the region at the time of the study), which is developing a village-level data-base on food aid deliveries; and **NGOs** responsible for food aid distribution, who carried out a village ranking exercise which informed WFP's initial distribution plan (see below). WFP also commissioned **SCF-UK** to carry out Food Economy Assessment work, which influenced regional targeting.

FEWS field reports during the relief operation had high credibility and were influential among the international community in raising queries about area targeting, particularly relating to the need to take account of other food crops, livestock and cash crops in assessing the *impact* of grain harvest failures on food security.

In the final analysis, decisions on targeting international food aid were made by WFP at the national level, in consultation with Government, donors and NGOs, using the range of information available (responding initially to the Government appeal which was fairly narrowly based on grain-crop failure forecasts, but then incorporating "coping capacity" information, as available, from the sources mentioned). One feature, which arises clearly from the Tanzania case, is that area targeting was not a one-off process at the planning stage of the relief operation, but was also reviewed and revised in the course of implementation. Decisions on the allocation of the government's own food resources rested with TANDREC, and appear to have been mainly influenced by reports and requests from Regional and District authorities transmitted through the administrative hierarchy to the Prime Minister's Office. These comments are expanded on in the following section.

1.2. TARGETING DURING THE 1997/8 DROUGHT & FLOOD EMERGENCIES

1.2.a. Overview

Table 5 gives a summary of key events relating to national-level targeting decisions during 1997/8. The effects of successive poor harvests in 1995/96, followed by the failure of the October-December *vuli* rains, were already being reported by FEWS in November 1996. In response to Regional reports to the PMO and an FAO/WFP assessment mission, both the government (through SGR) and WFP allocated food supplies for a relatively small-scale relief operation in the drought-affected areas

Table 5: Tanzania ~ Chronology of Key Events

| |
|--|
| Normal RAINFALL periods - unimodal areas (U) Nov- Apr ("main" or "long" rains); bimodal areas (B) Oct-Dec (<i>vuli</i>) and Feb-May (<i>masika</i>) |
| Normal HARVEST periods (major food crops) - unimodal areas (U) Jun-Sep; bimodal areas (B) Jan-Mar (<i>vuli</i>) and Jun-Sep (<i>masika</i>). |

| | U | B | DROUGHT / FLOOD EVENTS | KEY INFORMATION / DECISIONS | FOOD AID OPERATIONS |
|--------|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 96 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> delayed onset of long / main rains in unimodal areas of central & southern Tanzania, following a poor 1995/6 production year in many areas | | |
| Dec 96 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> widespread failure of <i>vuli</i> short rains (Oct-Dec) in bimodal areas | | |
| Jan 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>vuli</i> harvest in bimodal areas of N. Tanzania (20-30% of national annual food production) is forecast to be greatly reduced; livestock & perennial crop production are also affected; cereal prices rise sharply | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> joint assessment mission (GOT/ UN) to drought-affected areas | |
| Feb 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> main rains continue patchy & below-average prolonged unseasonable dry conditions in pastoral & agro-pastoral areas livestock prices fall, cattle mortality rises | | |
| Mar 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> normal peak of long / main rains in unimodal areas - rainfall continues below average in bimodal areas, <i>masika</i> rains start late (end of March / April) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> reports from regions to PMO of drought and impending food shortages FAO/ WFP joint assessment (with GoT & UNDP) estimates 670,000 people in need of relief food due to effects of drought village relief committees formed | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GOT starts relief & commercial releases from Strategic Grain Reserve (10,000 MT maize allocated to worst-affected areas) WFP distributes 500 MT in some of the worst-hit areas |
| Apr 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prospects for the main harvest in 'ugali-bowl' areas of southern highlands are considered good Aggregate food production is forecast to be 15-20% lower than last year's good harvest. food prices fall in most areas due to SGR releases, marketing of farm stocks, and export ban | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoT bans maize exports | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP EMOP 5825 (in response to poor <i>vuli</i> harvest) allocates 10,000 MT for 200,000 people 'worst-affected' by drought, for 4 months |
| May 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Above-average rainfall over northern, northern coast & Lake Victoria Regions; harvest prospects there look good Harvesting starts in central unimodal regions, but season generally ends poorly | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FSD preliminary crop forecast indicates a national production deficit of 523,000 MT for the 1996/97 production year - the biggest shortfall since the 1984 drought | |
| Jun 97 | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (SGR distributions continue) |
| Jul 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> harvesting of <i>masika</i> crops continues | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FAO/ WFP joint assessment (with GoT, UNDP & USAID) warns of "imminent food crisis / famine" in nine drought-hit regions Regions send food aid requests to PMO | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (WFP distributes locally-purchased maize under drought EMOP 5825) |
| Aug 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> main July/ August harvest is judged a failure in some areas food prices drop slightly from July level, but remain 50-100% above 4-year average | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FSD's Food Security Bulletin (released August 15) revises estimate of national cereal deficit to 766,000 MT (excluding SGR stock requirement), and recommends GoT to appeal to donors for approximately 10% of this quantity in food aid FEWS Watch reports need for donor-funded relief operations Prime Minister writes to the Regions urging national mobilization to fight the threat of famine | |
| Sep 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cereal prices are rising across the country | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GOT declares emergency (Sep 15) and appeals to donors for 76,000 MT food to assist 1.4 million people for the coming 3-6 months import tax on maize waived for Sep-Dec period FEWS Trip Report to Dodoma & Singida | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> food aid commitments are made immediately by USA, EU, Germany & Australia, in response to government appeal |
| Oct 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Above-average October rains signal an early start to the <i>vuli</i> season in bimodal regions, and to the main season in several unimodal regions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FEWS Trip Report to Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> further donor pledges for new EMOP from Canada, Finland & UK |
| Nov 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>vuli</i> harvest prospects are good due to adequate & even November rains, and increased area planted planting continues in unimodal areas | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP organizes village targeting exercise by NGOs for EMOP 5889 SCF Food Economy Analysis of Mtwara & Lindi finds cash crop income sufficient to cope with food aid problems - targeting to these regions subsequently revised | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> distributions continue from EMOP 5825 EMOP 5889 approved by Rome Nov 6 |
| Dec 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "wet to very wet" conditions across the country; flooding & waterlogging destroy crops in some <i>vuli</i> areas, hamper planting in <i>masika</i> areas, and disrupt transport | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GOT waiver of maize import tax ends - only a small proportion of the anticipated 700,000 MT has been imported FEWS Trip Report: Mara Mwanza & Shinyanga | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> pledges to new drought EMOP (5889) total 90% of request. Distributions begin December 8, but are disrupted by rain-damaged roads, bridges, & railways |
| Jan 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> unseasonably wet conditions over two-thirds of the country excessive rain damages some crops in both bimodal & unimodal areas, but conditions are variable good <i>vuli</i> harvest reported in Lake Victoria zone | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> only 1,500 MT of EMOP distributed so far, but no reports of serious welfare problems |
| Feb 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> drier-than-normal February benefits harvesting of <i>vuli</i> season crops | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FAO/ WFP joint assessment reports low <i>vuli</i> harvest in Arusha, Kilimanjaro & Tanga | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> market and relief supplies to deficit areas are blocked by flood damage to roads |
| Mar 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> below-average rainfall over whole country food prices decline, due to availability of <i>vuli</i> crops and dry roads for market supplies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FEWS Trip Report to Lindi & Mtwara | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> allocations / area targeting of EMOP 5889 revised: food distributions continue, covering also flood victims identified during monitoring of drought relief |
| Apr 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> good harvest expected in unimodal central regions maize & bean prices declining since January; current prices below nominal 1996/7 prices | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FEWS Trip Report to Mara & Mwanza | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> general EMOP distribution stops at the end of April, with less than half of the originally-planned quantity distributed |
| May 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> normal rainfall distribution over most of the country brings good national harvest prospects market supplies of food are reported to be adequate, and prices fall steadily across the country heavy rain has reduced maize, sorghum & millet harvests, but raised rice, banana, root & tuber production | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FSD provisionally forecasts above-average production for 1997/8, with 261,000 MT exportable cereal surplus | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP proposes quick-action FFW & School-feeding projects in Arusha, Coast, Dodoma, Kilimanjaro & Tanga Regions |

Sources: FEWS Tanzania reports, various interviews and documents

starting in March/April. At this point the Government of Tanzania banned the export of maize. The real emergency, however, developed later in the year when the main July/August harvest failed in many areas due to poor rainfall. FSD's preliminary forecast in May had already estimated the national cereal deficit for the 1996/97 production year at over half a million tons (the worst shortfall since the 1984/5 drought), and in August it released a revised forecast of a staggering 766,000 MT deficit. Already (in July) a joint UN/GoT assessment mission (with FEWS participation) had warned of an "imminent food crisis" [ref 11] in nine Regions, and Regional governments had started to send food aid requests to the PMO. On September 15 the GoT declared an emergency, appealing to donors for 76,000 MT of food aid (10% of the forecast deficit) and waiving the import tax on maize until December. Donor countries immediately pledged food aid in support, and a new WFP Emergency Operation (EMOP 5889) was approved by Rome on November 6. After a planning period including a village targeting exercise (see below), distributions began on December 8 but were, ironically, soon disrupted by heavy rains (the onset of El Niño) which damaged roads, bridges and railways¹⁰. Mainly because of these logistical problems, the total quantity of food distributed during the EMOP was substantially less than planned (at around 30,000 MT). Nevertheless, distributions were stopped at the end of April in response to improving conditions and a good *vuli* harvest. Food aid remaining in hand at the end of free distributions was to be used for post-emergency self-help and school feeding projects [refs 44, 45].

A number of targeting issues arise. Firstly, the types of systematic and analysable information available for national (stage 1) targeting were fairly limited. While it was clear which areas had suffered from poor rainfall and therefore reduced harvests, very limited information was available at decision-making points in Dar Es Salaam about the likely *impacts* of these losses. The focus of the information-providing system was very much on quantifying food-crop production, especially cereals. There was no systematic way to take account of the relative importance of these crops in the diets and economies of different areas, of people's livelihoods and incomes, and generally their ability to "cope" with the effects of poor grain harvests. Decision-makers and information-providers were aware of the importance of these factors, and made efforts to take account of them during the planning and implementation of the relief operation. It is, nevertheless, a critical gap in the national monitoring system that it is not able to place crop forecasts in a broader food security context from the beginning. FSD's Food Security Bulletins do include a frequency count of reported "coping strategies" in food-deficit areas, using a standard list of five activities¹¹ plus a category of "other strategies" for the whole country. However, these are too standardised to be very useful (e.g., pastoralist areas register 100% "engaging in non-agricultural activities"), and cannot be meaningfully interpreted at this level.

The numbers of "affected" people reported and compiled by government channels from the village through Districts and Regions to the PMO were not a reliable planning basis for targeting scarce resources, for reasons illustrated by the example of Arusha below.

A nutrition survey was funded by UNICEF [TFNC, ref 38], but the report was not available in time to influence targeting decisions.

Joint Assessment Missions initiated by the government and UN, with varying participation from other agencies (including FEWS), were important in triggering national-level decisions in this context of large information gaps and uncertainty about the scale of the problem. They verified and prioritized problem areas, put planning figures on the numbers of people and quantities of

¹⁰ The El Niño floods in Tanzania (unlike Kenya) were primarily a short-term logistical problem, temporarily cutting off market access as well as relief distribution. Some crops were certainly lost and cereal production was reduced overall, but other crops (rice, banana, roots and tubers) benefited: thus the food security impacts were mixed, and no large-scale disasters resulted.

¹¹ Selling cash crops, buying food crops, selling livestock, restricting use of food to food only, and engaging in non-agricultural activities. [ref 22]

food, and generated consensus on the action needed. The role of rapid, often inter-agency, assessment missions in influencing Stage 1 food aid targeting emerged as an important cross-country issue, and is discussed in Chapter 2.

In retrospect everyone (including the FSD) agrees that the scale of the predicted food deficit was over-estimated. Updating of the sample frame and other elements of the high-tech crop forecasting system will require funding if accurate production forecasts are to be made in the future (staff capacity is clearly not the problem in this case, as the FSD has a highly-trained expert staff).

More accurate production forecasts – and more importantly a broader-based early warning system able to take account of trade, other food and income sources, and coping capacity at a decentralized level – would have made possible a more accurate estimate of which areas really needed food, and how much. However, such information was not available at the beginning of the emergency and only became available in small pieces as the relief operation progressed. In this situation, the government and international community prepared for the contingency of a major famine (which fortunately did not develop), while distributing relatively small amounts of aid and trying to monitor conditions in the meantime.

During the planning and implementation of the EMOP, considerable attention was paid to targeting. Distribution was delegated to NGOs due to concerns about the poor targeting of earlier relief (under EMOP 5825) which was channeled through the government system. Starting with a


Table 6: Tanzania ~ Regional (stage 1) targeting of WFP drought relief

EMOP 5889, 1997/98 (MT)

| | <i>Preliminary allocation (Nov 97)</i> ¹ | <i>Distribution plan (Dec 97)</i> ² | <i>Revised allocation (Mar 98)</i> ³ | <i>Actual distributions (to Apr 98)</i> ⁴ |
|-----------------------|---|--|---|--|
| Arusha | 16,251 | 3,216 | 3,551 | 2,807 |
| Coast (Pwani) | 3,548 | 912 | 1,453 | 1,194 |
| Dodoma | 6,215 | 15,906 | 20,424 | 8,465 |
| Iringa | 4,727 | 469 | 469 | 200 |
| <i>Kagera</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> |
| <i>Kigoma</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> |
| Kilimanjaro | 1,682 | 663 | 665 | 403 |
| Lindi | 13,119 | 429 | 0 | 0 |
| Mara | 2,846 | 3,689 | 1,343 | 1,285 |
| <i>Mbeya</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> |
| Morogoro | 2,540 | 815 | 978 | 1,023 |
| Mtwara | 5,600 | 335 | 0 | 0 |
| Mwanza | 1,154 | 2,580 | 4,216 | 1,125 |
| <i>Rukwa</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> |
| <i>Ruvuma</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> |
| Shinyanga | 8,217 | 1,122 | 3,779 | 747 |
| Singida | 4,381 | 6,139 | 6,139 | 1,755 |
| Tabora | 3,305 | 3,767 | 2,878 | 961 |
| Tanga | 2,416 | 620 | 1,057 | 349 |
| National total | 76,001 | 40,663 | 46,952 | 20,313* |

Sources: ¹WFP EMOP 5889 Project Document, ref 41;
²WFP EMOP 5889 Distribution Plan, ref 42;
³WFP EMOP 5889 Update Report, March 1998;
⁴WFP EMOP 5889 Monitoring Update, July 1998, ref 46;
* total of NGO reports received, not full total distributed

Map 1: Tanzania ~ Regional targeting of WFP food aid (EMOP 5889, 1997/98)



preliminary area-targeting plan based on government and FAO/WFP assessment mission estimates (see first column of Table 6), WFP organized a rapid village-level targeting exercise by working groups of NGOs and local government in the affected Districts, in November 1997 (before starting distributions). Villages were ranked in three categories (most seriously affected, seriously affected and affected), and then the first rank only were selected for the distribution plan [refs 1, 10, 30, 42]. This exercise, combined with information from FEWS, SCF and others, produced a significantly changed national distribution plan (see second column) with a greater concentration of resources on some Regions (notably Dodoma), and considerably less on others (notably Arusha, Lindi, Mtwara, Shinyanga and Tanga). Distributions began on the basis of this plan, but ironically the drought relief operation was soon severely disrupted by floods and heavy rains which made transport impossible. The second revision of the Regional allocations (third column) therefore partly reflects adjustments for flood relief needs identified during the distributions. In this revision Mtwara and Lindi Regions were omitted following SCF FEA findings that incomes and food access in these areas did not warrant relief distributions [ref 32]: in fact no WFP distributions were made in these areas, although they did receive some government relief. Map 1 shows the area targeting at regional level of this revised plan (March 1998).

WFP also contracted staff from SCF (UK) and Oxfam to assist with the targeting and management of distributions, and to organize training workshops on food security issues, needs assessment methods and distribution (including targeting issues) for staff from local government and NGOs in Dodoma, Singida, Shinyanga and Arusha [refs 29, 31, 35]. This was a very positive initiative, although a great deal more follow-up in training and resources would be needed for local officers to be able to put into practice the principles and procedures discussed.

The **distribution mechanism** for EMOP 5989 was overwhelmingly free distribution, with targeting relying on administrative selection at area and household level. This was decided partly because the scale and apparent urgency of the emergency did not allow adequate planning and management of alternative mechanisms such as FFW (the earlier, smaller-scale relief operation 5825 had successfully channeled some food aid through NGO's with established FFW capacity). Another factor, commonly found in relief operations, was that no funds were available for non-food costs of FFW. WFP introduced both FFW and school feeding as Quick Action Projects *after* the emergency period, for a more limited area and with more planning time.

The definition of the target group had already been decided by government directives as described above and in section 1.2.c. below. However, WFP encouraged distributing NGOs to focus on household rather than individual criteria, to focus on the neediest only (excluding people able to earn or buy food), and to distribute directly to women as household representatives and food managers.

At the beginning of the emergency operation, USAID considered supplying sorghum rather than maize, as a self-targeting element in free distribution (since sorghum is less preferred, lower-value if sold, and less saleable since there is a limited market for it). However, the final decision was to supply maize because it was more easily diverted to other programs (such as refugee operations) if the full quantity of the EMOP appeal was not needed for distribution in Tanzania. This issue of fungibility is a factor which frequently limits the use of commodity choice as a targeting element in relief operations.

Market responses were much less effective in meeting drought-induced food shortages in Tanzania than in Kenya (see Appendix 3). Although the GoT (like its neighbors) waived import duties on maize, domestic prices remained below import parity so that it was not profitable for traders to import. Very little food was therefore brought in commercially. It is disputed how far this can be explained by the effect of non-tariff barriers to trade, how far by lack of effective purchasing power in the worst-hit areas (combined with poor and therefore expensive transport infrastructure), and how far it can be taken as evidence that there were, overall, sufficient stocks of food in the country to fill most of the harvest deficit. Government restrictions on the export of maize may also have distorted price signals and created local shortages in some areas (such as parts of Arusha, discussed below).

1.2.b. Government food aid

The Strategic Grain Reserve (managed by the FSD) buys, stores and sells maize in non-emergency years. In emergencies, it is also drawn on for government relief distributions. Decisions on relief and commercial releases of grain are separate: relief allocations are made by TANDREC with the PMO, in response to Regional reports, while releases of food onto the market are under the management of the Ministry of Agriculture (the FSD at national level, and the Regional / District Agricultural Officers at the depots).

Relief distributions from the SGR were started early (in March 1997), and were targeted through the District administrations and Village Committees. The quantities distributed were quite significant: Table 7 shows that relief allocations from March to July 1997 alone totaled nearly 15,000 MT (about half as much as was later distributed under the WFP EMOP). Unfortunately distribution figures for the whole year were not available (and the proportional allocation to each Region later in the year, when conditions worsened, may not be reflected in these early figures).¹²

¹² Some quantities of maize were later borrowed from the SGR by WFP, which could also lead to double-counting of relief distributions: the overlaps are not clear from the limited data collected here.

**Table 7: Tanzania ~ Regional allocations from the Strategic Grain Reserve
March -July 1997 (MT)**

| <i>Region</i> | <i>Relief food (for free distribution) March-June</i> | <i>Commercial food (for sale) March-July</i> | <i>Total Regional allocation (relief + commercial)</i> |
|---------------|---|--|--|
| ARUSHA | 1,972 | 14 | 1,986 |
| COAST | 931 | 24,739 | 25,670 |
| DODOMA | 700 | 1,155 | 1,855 |
| IRINGA | 107 | 60 | 167 |
| KAGERA | 1,011 | 0 | 1,011 |
| KILIMANJARO | 1,900 | 7,089 | 8,989 |
| LINDI | 1,076 | 1,064 | 2,140 |
| MARA | 1,044 | 2,840 | 3,884 |
| MOROGORO | 321 | 2,591 | 2,912 |
| MWANZA | 1,325 | 0 | 1,325 |
| SHINYANGA | 1,141 | 0 | 1,141 |
| SINGIDA | 800 | 2,070 | 2,870 |
| TABORA | 400 | 1,659 | 2,059 |
| TANGA | 1,951 | 2,713 | 4,664 |
| TOTAL | 14,678 | 45,995 | 60,673 |

Source: FSD (via FEWS Tanzania)

Note: figures for SGR allocations after July 1997 were not available at the time of the study

While relief distributions from SGR stocks were allocated to areas by TANDREC / PMO based on perceived need, the commercial releases in each Region seem to have been determined mainly by local market conditions. Where SGR prices were below market prices, large quantities were sold (for example in the Coast Region during the period shown here). In Shinyanga Region, on the other hand, the Table shows that no commercial releases were taken up between March and July, although in September FEWS reported that this was one of the few places where SGR stocks were still being sold, because the private-sector price was higher at that time than SGR's. Prices are not set nationally, but by each Region or depot. In the time available, the study team was not able to determine the details of how or on what basis this was done: in Arusha (for example) the SGR price was reported to have been significantly below the market level in the latter part of 1997.

In Arusha Region at least (according to the Regional Planning Officer) commercial SGR releases were area-targeted: that is, traders were issued a license to buy government food for delivery and sale to specified needy areas, on presentation of credentials from the relevant District authorities who would then verify that the food had been sold in the right place. It was very difficult to determine how well this worked: comments from villagers suggested that this food may not have reached the most vulnerable areas, and within communities may only have benefited those who would have been able to buy food anyway. (In the areas visited, maize was available on the market throughout the crisis, though at high prices).

The SGR commercial grain releases were the only example of direct market targeting (i.e. manipulating the market supply and price of the staple cereal to influence access to food by target areas or groups) found during the study. FEWS price monitoring shows that such releases did, as expected, cause a drop in food prices and elicit further supplies (from traders' stocks) onto the market in some areas. However, the targeting impact of these operations, and of the local area-

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targeting of sales (as noted in Arusha), was not at all clear. It is therefore **RECOMMENDED that a study be commissioned on the targeting impacts of SGR commercial operations during food shortages** (focusing on the questions of who benefited, at what cost, and to what extent the private sector could have fulfilled the same function if there had been no restrictions on the movement of grain).

1.2.c. Focus area 1: Dodoma Region

Dodoma, in the middle of Tanzania and poorly linked by road to surplus food-production areas (see Map 1), was one of the Regions worst affected by successive poor harvests in 1996/97, and remains vulnerable in 1998/9. The study team's visit here focused on village-level targeting and distribution, and on issues relating to the choice of NGO or government agencies as implementers at this level. Two Districts were visited, Dodoma Rural and Dodoma Urban (the rural area surrounding the town).

Village Relief Committees were formed throughout the country, in accordance with a national directive following the March 1997 assessment of food needs. In the communities visited in Dodoma, these committees had been elected as instructed, including both women and men, but their role and responsibilities were not clear. In particular, their authority in relation to local government (led by Village Executive Officers) and local party leaders was not defined and was inevitably weak in practice. As one committee member in Hombolo (Dodoma Urban District) described their role, it was limited to verifying the identity of people already on the distribution list. It is likely that this varied from place to place, but if the Village Relief Committees are to play a meaningful role in future targeted distributions, **it is RECOMMENDED that the terms of reference for Village Relief Committees be defined, and support provided in pilot vulnerable areas (possibly through NGOs where appropriate) to develop their capacity and authority to make decisions on relief distribution within the community.** While there seems to be widespread support (in the Districts, Regions and capital) for the *idea* of village committees, the reality is unlikely to be very effective without such support.

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In the design of EMOP 5889 (the major WFP drought relief operation for 1997/98) a decision was made to distribute through NGOs rather than local government, due to problems with the targeting of earlier distributions (see Appendices 2 and 3 for similar comments in Uganda and Kenya). In Dodoma, an important sidelight was thrown on this issue by the experience of using two different NGOs in different periods of distribution – one successful (NPA) and one less so in this case (IIRO). Not all NGOs are equally able to manage food aid. Familiarity with the distribution area, and established relationships with government and communities, are often rightly identified as key advantages for NGOs involved in food aid distributions. However, in the Dodoma case, NPA was brought in to manage the relief operation and had no previous presence in the area. The key factors for good targeting in this situation were primarily capacity-related:

- experience with food aid distributions (hence ability to anticipate and plan for difficulties);
- staff capacity (in numbers and skills); and
- material resources (especially transport, to facilitate supervision and monitoring of distributions).

Informants both in local government and villages (including members of village government and committees) stressed the benefits of direct supervision of distributions by NPA staff together with District officials, in order to cross-check the selection of needy beneficiaries (whereas previous distributions had been simply delivered to the village and left for local leaders to distribute unsupervised). A general point arising here is that targeting, whether done by government or other agencies, requires both resources and skills.

The approach to targeting within the villages (stage 3) had already been established, and the local population registered according to the government's three-category guideline (as stated above),

when NPA took over distributions in November 1997. Discussions with villagers and NPA staff detailed two major problems with applying these categories (apart from the important question of who within the village decides which people should be in which group):

- Firstly, the categories had been understood to apply to individuals rather than households, with no account taken of support from family members or even (for group 1) relative wealth. “Unable to work” had been taken to refer mainly to the old and handicapped, and pregnant women. Thus an elderly infirm person living in a relatively well-off household supported by able-bodied family members would be considered eligible for food aid, while an extremely poor family with no income and many children, but with no old or sick family members, would be excluded.
- This issue highlights a disconnect in the concept of ‘vulnerability’ between food aid planners and recipients, which was echoed in discussions in both Uganda and Kenya. The village informants clearly saw the old, sick, orphans and widows as the ‘vulnerable’ members of the community (i.e. individuals who rely on the support of others), while the outsiders see relative household poverty (assets, income, and other resources which enable people to ‘cope’ in difficult times) as central to famine vulnerability. Selecting households by relative wealth within communities is not only difficult and liable to create conflicts, but seems to go against people’s perception of who the beneficiaries ought to be.

Free distribution had been almost the only mechanism used in Dodoma. Although people had been registered in the standard three categories including “able to work”, food-for-work schemes were not available in the area. During the government relief distribution in November 1997, the District Disaster Prevention Committee in Dodoma Rural had allocated some of the food to village schools to keep up attendance (having observed that children were missing school to go and collect wild foods from the bush). NPA commented that the District would have liked to continue this with the later WFP distributions, but that the WFP distribution plan / rules did not allow it.

Dodoma is one of the drought-prone areas identified by WFP for Quick-Action Projects in both School Feeding and Food-for-Work [refs 44 and 45], as *post*-emergency measures. The general issues of using these distribution mechanisms *during* emergencies are discussed in section 2.2.

1.2.d. Focus area 2: Arusha Region

Arusha Region, which borders Kenya in the north, is more complex and varied in terms of food security: it includes relatively rich urban and trading areas as well as widely-varying farming conditions, and pastoralist populations (particularly in Ngorongoro). The importance of disaggregating assessments of people’s economic environment and coping ability in the face of drought or crop failure, at least to District level, is clear in this context.

In Arusha, the study team focused mainly on the government-led process of needs assessment and targeting at Stage 2 (i.e. area targeting within the Region) and the system of information provision from the Region for national decision-makers. As far as the team could tell from discussions in Dar Es Salaam, the system used in Arusha was followed throughout the country: Arusha is discussed here as an example of that system and not as an exception. The section is largely based on very helpful and open discussions with Regional and District officers, who had clearly found the management of food aid problematic and were interested in discussing alternative approaches for the future.

A number of analytical flaws in the needs assessment process are shown in the “Report on Targeting Drought Affected Villages” issued by the Regional Commissioner’s Office following the joint government-NGO village-targeting exercise in November 1997 [ref 1]. Firstly, the overall balance sheet calculations for the Region are made by multiplying the total population of each

District by a ration equivalent to 12 kg maize and 3 kg beans per person per month, and subtracting the 1996/7 local harvest in maize and beans. The implied assumptions are that:

- each District, and the Region overall, needs to be self-sufficient in maize and bean production (no account is taken of income or trade, even between Districts within the Region); and that
- maize and beans comprise the whole of the basic staple diet, disregarding the importance of other foods such as root crops, cooking bananas and livestock products.

In fact the Regional balance sheet, even under these clearly unrealistic assumptions, shows a small surplus in maize production from the 1996/97 harvest, and a deficit in bean production of almost equal size (around 8,500 MT). Yet the Region's relief food request was nearly 33,000 MT. This is because the actual needs assessment was based not on the production / consumption balance (despite the data presented on this), but on the lists of "affected population" collected from each village in each District (following the PMO's nationwide call to mobilize against famine, and the directive on registering people under the three categories). Over-estimation of relief needs is built into this calculation at several points:

- All Districts are included, except for Arusha town itself.
- All three categories of people (including those able to buy food) seem to have been counted in this overall assessment figure, although there was certainly an intention to distinguish between the categories during actual distributions.
- The total number of "affected" people (22% of the Region's population) was then multiplied by a full monthly relief ration of maize and beans (12 kg maize and 2 kg beans), again implicitly assuming no other food sources.
- The period of relief need was estimated at seven months (December to June), compared to WFP's planning period of two months for bimodal and four months for unimodal areas.

Given these calculation methods, it is easy to understand the huge gap between the Region's estimate of food needs and the WFP's planning figures, shown in Table 8.

Further implementation problems with the three-category registration system were raised in Arusha: firstly, it led to the registration of the entire population of listed villages (since everyone falls in one or other of the categories), which in turn raised expectations that everyone would be

Table 8: Arusha Region ~ District (stage 2) targeting of WFP drought relief

| | (MT) | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---|--|--|
| District | Original assessment (Nov 97)¹ | Original Allocation (Dec 97)² | Revised allocation (Mar 98)³ | Actual distributions (Jan-Apr 98)⁴ |
| Arusha (town) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Arumeru | 7,700 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Babati | 2,512 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Hanang | 2,306 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Karatu | 2,709 | 388 | 387 | 96 |
| Kiteto | 1,022 | 146 | 228 | 200 |
| Mbulu | 1,848 | 256 | 264 | 71 |
| Monduli | 6,489 | 894 | 927 | 1,117 |
| Ngorongoro | 6,146 | 881 | 1,094 | 711 |
| Simanjiro | 1,855 | 651 | 651 | 611 |
| Regional total | 32,587 | 3,216 | 3,551 | 2,807 |

Sources: ¹Arusha Regional Commissioner's Office, ref 1

²WFP EMOP distribution plan, ref 42

³WFP EMOP update, March 98

⁴WFP EMOP Monitoring Report, July 98, ref 46

Further implementation problems with the three-category registration system were raised in Arusha: firstly, it led to the registration of the entire population of listed villages (since everyone falls in one or other of the categories), which in turn raised expectations that everyone would be eligible for some sort of assistance. When this did not materialize, District and Regional offices were besieged by local leaders lobbying for the quantities of aid they had been led to expect. Some people in the villages visited clearly suspected that the food must have been diverted somewhere along the line. Village and Ward leaders, meanwhile, were told by District authorities that they would have to cut their beneficiary lists in line with the quantities of aid actually received, but without being given any guidance or support in how to do this. In cases where the District authorities themselves were directly responsible for distribution, their extremely limited transport resources meant that supplies tended to “stick” at the District headquarters. This not only delayed distributions, but led to situations where villages with active and well-informed leaders and enough money to hire a truck would come to collect their own allocations, while more remote and poorer communities were unable to do so, thus distorting the normal priorities in area targeting. Overall, the impression was that the whole operation had been a headache for local government, especially for the District administrators caught in the middle. Many of these problems could be avoided by changing the assessment and registration process, so that realistic *area-targeting is done first* (before registering village populations), and clear information on the actual quantities to be delivered to a given area is provided to leaders and communities before they are asked to prioritize beneficiaries.

In one area visited (Simanjiro), local leaders had interpreted the third registration category (those able to buy food) to mean that they could sell part of the food aid received to raise funds for community work such as school repairs. In practice this had (not surprisingly) led to the better-off benefiting more than the poor from highly subsidized food-aid sales, and to suspicions and conflicts about the actual use of the proceeds. Even if the intended use of funds was entirely honest, this was presumably not the intention of the policy guideline.

As in Dodoma, the registration of people “able to work” was not connected to any actual plan for food-for-work programs, except in some limited areas where NGOs were already operating development programs and were able to organize small-scale FFW (eg TCRS and World Vision).

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Given all these problems, it is **RECOMMENDED that the GoT revise its directives on the registration of food aid beneficiaries, so that local authorities have clear instructions to take account of household rather than individual circumstances, and to identify only those areas and people *unable to cope* with the impacts of drought (or other disasters) rather than listing everyone ‘affected’.**

One further issue in Arusha which does not fall directly under the heading of food aid targeting but which was very important in the management and interpretation of the perceived food crisis, was government restriction of the grain trade. Apparently intended by the central government as a ban on exports across the Kenyan border (to conserve domestic supplies), this led in Arusha to the banning of trade between Districts as the Regional government tried to stop food flowing towards the national border. There is no doubt that this not only distorted price signals, making the situation look worse than it was in some places, but actually caused acute local food shortages in some areas (such as Arumeru) which would otherwise have expected no serious problems.

1.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED TARGETING

Recommendations have already been made above on the participation of FEWS and FSD Early Warning representatives in meetings of the Food Emergency Sub-Committee; the need to study the targeting impacts of SGR commercial operations; the development of TORs for Village Relief Committees; and the revision of government directives on the three-category registration of

drought-affected populations as a basis for beneficiary targeting. Further suggested actions for improved food-aid targeting in Tanzania are discussed below.

Sections 1.1. and 1.2. have highlighted some key gaps and weaknesses in the national-level information available for targeting decisions during 1997/ 1998. At the time of the study, the multilateral Food and Agriculture Sector Working Group (FASWOG) was already considering the scope for improvement of agricultural production statistics, and FAO had commissioned a consultant to assess the data needs for agriculture [Kiregyera 1997, ref. 24]. One relatively inexpensive option under discussion is to fund the transmission of agricultural data from the District agriculture offices, where it tends to get delayed due to lack of resources for communications, to the central Ministry.

Although more timely and accurate production estimates are important for development planning and would be a useful input to Stage 1 targeting, they would not in themselves solve the targeting problem, which to some extent could be described as an *analysis gap* rather than a data gap. An overly-narrow focus on local grain-crop shortfalls (particularly maize and beans), without the framework of a holistic assessment of vulnerability and coping capacity (which would include the relative importance of cereals and other food sources, as well as trade, purchasing power from cash crops or non-agricultural activities, and other economic parameters) was a key factor in the initial over-estimate of the food aid needs in some areas. While WFP and its implementing partners did their best to re-balance the picture with supplementary information, a more systematic analysis of the full food security situation, within the government information system, would provide a more solid basis for Stage 1 targeting in future.

In order to achieve this, some broadening and decentralization of the Early Warning System is needed. By 'broadening', what is meant is that the full context of food security in vulnerable areas must be assessed both in baseline vulnerability analysis and in the selection and interpretation of monitoring indicators. This will require some decentralization, since indicators of overall vulnerability, food security, and coping capacity (unlike quantities of maize production) cannot be standardized to national level. For example, the factors affecting people's ability to cope with the impacts of the 1997 drought were quite different in Coast and Arusha regions, and within Arusha were again quite different between pastoralist and farming areas. Central capacity (in the FSD) to collate and comparatively analyse information on these different economic areas remains crucial (see the experience in Kenya in Appendix 3, and general discussion in Chapter 2), but the collection and initial interpretation must be done at decentralized, ideally District, level.

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To be affordable, it is **RECOMMENDED that decentralization of early warning should focus on selected Districts which are known to be food insecure and vulnerable to the impacts of shocks such as drought, and where possible should build on the training and skills transfer already initiated by some NGOs** (such as the Oxfam / SCF workshops mentioned above). The institutional arrangements for achieving this will need to be developed in-country, but it is suggested that the early warning function remain in the Ministry of Agriculture structures, given the established position of the FSD and the ongoing decentralization of the Ministry. **If funding can be obtained, an Early Warning Officer should be appointed and trained in each selected vulnerable District.**

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At the national level, FEWS is already working jointly with the FSD to integrate a wider range of food security indicators and analysis into the existing Early Warning system. **It is RECOMMENDED that priority continue to be given to FEWS capacity building and collaborative work with FSD to broaden the analytical scope of the Early Warning System at national level.**

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Collaborative work has also been initiated with the wider institutional community under the Food Security Task Force started in February 1998. Under this umbrella, FEWS has been working with SCF-UK, WFP's VAM office and FSD on the potential for joint vulnerability assessment work and

data sharing. It is **RECOMMENDED** that the Task Force would also be an appropriate technical forum for developing an agreed analytical framework and procedures for joint needs assessment missions to at-risk areas in any future food crises. The importance of such a framework as a preparedness measure is discussed in Chapter 2.

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Finally, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the GoT should develop specific policy guidelines for the use and management of food aid, as an important and logical extension of its ongoing UNDP-supported review of disaster preparedness policy in general. This recommendation is also made for Uganda and Kenya (see the chapters following), and could be an item on the agenda for regional discussions within the EAC.

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Once the policy position on food aid and the beneficiary-registration directives have been reviewed, it is **RECOMMENDED** that technical guidelines and training on the management and targeting of food aid be provided to the relevant Regional and District government offices in vulnerable areas. Where appropriate, this too could be done with the collaboration of established NGOs with expertise in these areas. Although the content of the policy and operational guidelines need to be tailored and developed to fit the priorities and circumstances of Tanzania, it is suggested that Ethiopia's experience of the process of defining and disseminating new policy on food aid targeting could provide some useful lessons.

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Given the severe resource constraints on local government, it is **RECOMMENDED** that future food aid distributions coordinated by the WFP and GoT be implemented by experienced NGOs, but with a more formalised requirement to work jointly with District officers wherever possible.

APPENDIX 2. UGANDA COUNTRY REPORT


2.1. CURRENT TARGETING SYSTEMS

2.1.a. Food aid in Uganda (background)

Uganda has not until recently been regarded as a country with food problems, being, as WFP/Uganda puts it, “endowed with some of the best agricultural land in the Great Lakes Region, with favorable climate and ample rainfall” [ref 72]. Food aid (for redistribution to victims of localized food insecurity or man-made emergencies) has mostly been bought in-country from a domestic production surplus, rather than imported. In recent years, however, this profile has been changing. The overall surplus in food availability has been declining (as witnessed by WFP’s falling local procurement figures), and famine vulnerability has been rising (see the FEWS Special Report, ref 54, and WFP’s Country Strategy, ref 74). 1997 brought alarms about drought and flood-related emergencies (in addition to continuing food needs for refugee and conflict-displaced groups), and the first ever FAO/WFP Crop and Food Needs Assessment Mission to Uganda. The accustomed view of Uganda as basically food-secure largely explains the very low priority that has been given to early-warning and related information systems by the Ugandan government, and the weakness or absence of a “relief infrastructure” to facilitate the management of food aid, as discussed below.

Natural shocks (drought and flood) have so far been much less important triggers of food crisis in Uganda than conflict and civil unrest. This is reflected in the program allocation of WFP food aid. As illustrated in Figure 5, the proportion of food aid for refugees and the displaced has far outweighed the categories of other emergency and development aid since 1993.

Figure 5: Uganda ~ WFP food aid by purpose



Because the scope of work for this study focuses on slow-onset (primarily drought-induced) emergencies, and excludes targeting in refugee and displaced camps, the report does not address some issues which are clearly of major concern to decision-makers in Uganda. Several informants in Kampala / Entebbe (WFP, donors and NGOs) commented that targeting food aid to internally displaced persons (IDPs) - mainly in the North and West of the country - was a major and protracted problem, and expressed disappointment that the current study was not working on this. It is therefore **RECOMMENDED**

that consideration be given to funding a separate study on the problems of targeting refugees and the displaced in Uganda. Some provisional questions for such a study would be :

- how to estimate needs, and target assistance, when the numbers of displaced people in a given area are constantly and unpredictably changing;
- when and whether to target IDPs in isolation (with emergency aid) or together with the surrounding population (with development aid);
- in the former case, how to distinguish displaced from resident populations;
- how to selectively target vulnerable groups within camps and resettlement schemes; and
- the targeting success and scope for expansion of innovative schemes such as CRS' food-for-farming projects in Gulu.

2.1.b. Policy context

Uganda has no specific policy document on the use of food aid, though WFP notes that the 1996 National Food Strategy (which was co-ordinated by the Export Policy Analysis Unit and focuses on agriculture-led economic growth) does indicate that:

“the government is generally favorable to well-targeted food assistance in support of a range of relief and rehabilitation initiatives for alleviating poverty. Food aid is to be used to address both the short and long-term needs of refugees, displaced persons and people living in chronically food deficit areas ... where the bulk of food assistance should be targeted. Both ‘immediate emergency and humanitarian aid is to encourage self-sufficiency in the long-term’ through a ‘strategic shift to a new paradigm which links relief and development’.” [WFP Country Strategy p7, ref 74]

However, it appeared to the study team that this approach had not yet been actively integrated with the mandate or operations of government departments directly involved in food aid and disaster management.


The revised *‘Guidelines for Emergency Relief Operations’* issued by the Department of Disaster Management in 1995 deal mainly with the logistics of the department’s own operations. However, they also give instructions on the formation of District Emergency Relief Committees (now renamed District Disaster Management Committees). These committees are made responsible for “identifying needy areas and victims; mobilizing resources for the emergency relief operation; [and] supervision of the distribution”. Registration of beneficiaries is to be “carried out by the local leaders at the grassroot level under the guidance of the Ministry [of Labor] staff in collaboration with the District authority. The idea is to ensure that assistance is served according to the degree of vulnerability of the affected people which can best be identified by the local people themselves” [Ref 50, Appendix C]. No guidance is given on how these difficult responsibilities are to be carried out, nor on how the needy areas and vulnerable people could be defined or identified.

At the time of the study, a UNDP project on *Capacity Building for Disaster Preparedness and Management* (implemented by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare) was nearing its completion date. Its three main aims were “to develop national policy on disaster management, legislation to establish the Disaster Preparedness and Management Commission [as envisaged in the 1995 Constitution], and training in disaster preparedness and management” [UNDP 1997, ref 68]. The policy draft was not yet available, but discussions suggested that no specific guidelines on the use and targeting of food aid were to be included at this point.

2.1.c. Institutional framework: decision-makers and information sources

Key players in food-aid targeting at the national level are shown in Figure 6. The role of the District authorities and local leaders in second and third-stage targeting is discussed below in the context of the focus areas visited.

Figure 6: Uganda ~ Key institutions in Stage 1 targeting



The **Department of Disaster Management (DDM)**, currently in the Prime Minister's Office, was created (as the 'Food Relief Department') in the early 1980s during a major drought-relief operation in Karamoja. In 1995, internal resettlement was added to its mandate and its name ('Department of Emergency Relief and Resettlement'). Recently (1998) the department has been moved from the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare to the Prime Minister's Office, and again renamed as the 'Department of Disaster Management' (though the department's Commissioner commented that its actual operations and capacity do not yet match this expanded title). The Third Deputy Prime Minister has responsibility for disaster management, along with the title of Minister for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees; but at the time of the study it was not yet clear whether a separate ministry was to be created. At District level, responsibility for food aid remains with the Ministry of Labor (see below).

The **National Inter-Sectoral Committee on Disaster Management**, co-ordinated by the DDM and chaired (until 1997) by the Permanent Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare, convenes when needed and forms **ad hoc committees** for specific disasters. The 1997 drought committee, for example, included the Ministries of Agriculture and Health, WFP, FAO, FEWS and relevant NGOs. Agencies convened for these *ad hoc* disaster committees are generally those which participate in joint needs assessment missions.

Information sources for food aid targeting in Uganda are so sparse that it is difficult to talk of "gaps". Official statistics (notably agricultural production and population) are widely agreed to be highly unreliable even by Sub-Saharan African standards, following years of war and disruption. There is no functional early warning system, since the **National Early Warning and Food Information System (NEWFIS)** seems to have disappeared during the recent (1998) reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries.

The NEWFIS was established with assistance from IGAD in 1991, but apparently never operated at full capacity: "NEWFIS has had a low profile since its establishment, probably because of the relatively low demand for early warning information due to the food self-sufficiency notion" [Mwendya 1997a, ref 59]. Donor funding ended in 1995, but no specific funds were allocated by the Government of Uganda to maintain the NEWFIS: its staff struggled on under the Crop Production and Marketing Department, but by 1997 they were only able to report price and rainfall data, in irregular bulletins with limited distribution. NEWFIS staff participated in assessment missions for the 1997 relief operations, but their regular monitoring information (limited as it was) was not mentioned by decision-makers and seems to have had no influence on targeting decisions.

The Co-ordinator of the NEWFIS has commented that it was, from the outset, over-centralized (with staff only at Ministry headquarters and no direct link to the field). He rightly recommends re-focusing future information systems at the District level, in selected food-insecure areas [Mwendya 1997a, ref 59, and study team interview]. From a technical viewpoint it may be added that the design of the NEWFIS was perhaps too focused on detecting drought-related crop failure, and on aggregate national food production, in a country whose worsening food security problems are localized rather than national, and have more complex and chronic causes than rainfall failures.

In the absence of a functioning government early warning system, the DDM relies mainly on reports from the District authorities.

NGOs and other implementing agencies (such as the Red Cross) report on their operational areas and projects, but **FEWS** seems currently to be the only national-level information system referred to by decision-makers in the international / donor community.

2.2. TARGETING DURING THE 1997/8 DROUGHT & FLOOD EMERGENCIES

2.2.a. Overview

Signs of a drought-induced food shortage developing in Eastern Uganda were reported by FEWS as early as November 1996 (see Table 9), following two successive poor farming seasons whose effect was intensified by a longer-term process of increasing vulnerability. Much of the limited local harvest in the East was reportedly traded cross-border to Uganda's drought-hit neighbors, Kenya and Tanzania, where prices were higher: but in January 1997 FEWS reported that this normal direction of trade had been reversed, and maize was moving from Kenya into Eastern Uganda due to increasing food scarcity there.

While it was clear that there was a problem developing, and that the drought was concentrated in the (agricultural) East and (pastoralist) North-East, it was extremely difficult to quantify the food deficit or the need for assistance. Given the weakness of information systems outlined above, it is not surprising that little data or analysis was available on which to base these decisions. As WFP commented in its EMOP proposal, "estimated needs were derived from national, aggregate production data which was found highly inaccurate and which masked variances at the micro, village and household level." [WFP EMOP 5833 Project Document, ref 72].

In this situation, assessment missions became the most important information source for area (Stage 1 and 2) targeting decisions. The first FAO/WFP Crop and Food Needs Assessment Mission to Uganda, conducted in February 1997, estimated that up to 341,000 people in the East and North-East could need food aid due to drought impacts (in addition to continuing conflict-displaced and refugee relief needs). A GoU Inter-ministerial assessment team the following month put the figure at 1.2 million. In April, a joint GoU / WFP/ FAO/ MSF / FEWS assessment mission tried to fill some of the information gaps by assessing factors such as household stocks, coping mechanisms, consumption of seed, self-rationing (reduction in the number of meals), school and clinic attendance, sale of livestock and other assets, and increased social tensions (indicated by a rising crime rate). Their report estimated the population needing food aid at 800,000, and it was for this number of people that the Government appealed for aid on 21 April, at the same time suspending all taxes on the import and local purchase of relief supplies.

WFP responded quickly to the Government appeal with an interim, small-scale relief allocation from the Director's discretionary fund, while planning a full-scale Emergency Operation (EMOP 5833) [ref 72]. Between June and September 1997, a total of approximately 1,300 MT of cereals and pulses (roughly 10% of the quantity originally planned) was distributed under the heading of this EMOP, but the full relief plan was never officially put into operation. By September, the rains (though late) had started, and it was clear that a full-scale food emergency had not materialized. Then in November, the El Niño rains brought flooding and landslides in the East, and different relief needs. Assessing the drought relief operation, WFP commented:

"The target area of ten districts was very large and beneficiaries wide spread. Only 10% of budgeted food was approved thus distribution of the commodities was over-spread to cover more needy people. [Therefore]... except in hospitals where special feeding programmes were implemented as planned, the general feeding was ineffective". [WFP 1998c, ref 77]

Further factors which raised concerns about the local (Stage 2 and 3) targeting of this operation were the weak capacity of local government to manage food aid, and the effects of Local Council elections in late 1997.

Flood impacts in Uganda due to El Niño were very limited in area and impact, as discussed below in the example of Mbale District.

Table 9: Uganda ~ Chronology of Key Events

| |
|---|
| normal RAINFALL periods - 1 st season April- June (North) and March-June (South); 2 nd season Aug-Oct (N) and Aug-Nov (S) |
| normal HARVEST periods (major food crops) - 1 st season Jul-Sep (N) and Jul-Aug (S); 2 nd season Nov-Dec (N & S) |

| | N | S | DROUGHT/FLOOD EVENTS | KEY INFORMATION / DECISIONS | FOOD AID OPERATIONS |
|--------|---|---|---|--|---|
| Nov 96 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FEWS warns of drought and potential food shortage in eastern parts of the country | |
| Dec 96 | | | | | |
| Jan 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2nd-season rains end across the country. Harvesting begins with lower than expected yields in many areas (later estimates suggest national cereal production 30% below normal). Prices of staple foods remain higher than normal for the time of year. Normal trade flow of maize to Kenya is reversed | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoU announces plans to enforce food security laws (household food storage & cultivation of "famine foods" such as cassava) | |
| Feb 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> poor pasture conditions in the North & north-east, & war, continue to erode food security | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FEWS Vulnerability Update reports some eastern districts need monitoring for possible food aid need FAO/WFP fields first ever Crop & Food Needs Assessment Mission to Uganda | |
| Mar 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> below-normal rainfall over the southern half of the country; onset of rains delayed in the north prices of staple foods remain high, with maize nearly double its March 96 nominal price and bean prices at an all-time high rains finally begin in the South during last week of March | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Meteorological Service long-range forecast predicts delayed and shortened rains for the coming season FEWS Vulnerability Update cautions media reports of "famine" are exaggerated, and urges independent corroboration of local / district needs GoU inter-ministerial Technical Team (including NEWFIS) concludes that 1.2 million people in drought-affected districts need food aid, seed and farm tools | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> [WFP 6-month emergency plan for 110,000 conflict-displaced people in the northern districts of Gulu & Kitgum approved] Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare begins delivering small amounts of food aid to drought-hit eastern districts of Kumi & Tororo, in response to local-government requests Food aid logistics hampered by lack of surplus for local purchase, and backlog at Mombasa port |
| Apr 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Meteorological Service now predicts near-normal rains extending through June | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FAO/WFP Mission reports 341,000 drought-affected people in the E & NE. may need food aid till the next harvest (in addition to 150,000 IDPs & refugees) GoU/WFP/FAO/MSF/FEWS joint assessment of drought-affected areas in East and North-East estimates 800,000 people need food aid due to poor 1996 harvest, low stocks and assets, unfavorable terms of trade, & decimation of cassava by mosaic disease GoU appeals to donors for food aid for 800,000 people (21 April) GoU suspends all taxes & levies on imports & local purchases (for relief) of food & seed (until August) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP provides 550 MT of maize meal as immediate help for 92,000 already-malnourished people in drought-hit areas (distributed by district authorities in mid-April) |
| May 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> rainy season established; pasture conditions improve in Karamoja region (Kotido & Moroto Districts) | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP EMOP 5833 planned, to provide food to 612,195 people for 3 months through the Red Cross & churches (due to targeting problems with earlier local-government distributions). GoU agrees to cover food needs of the remaining 188,000 people |
| Jun 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> prolonged dry spell threatens maize yields | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FEWS Watch warns of serious food shortages in Eastern Districts as 5-week dry spell brings third successive poor production season GoU issues second Famine Relief Appeal for the East (June 19) | |
| Jul 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> high prices in Uganda continue to draw commercial maize supplies from Kenya | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU food assessment mission to E & NE Uganda finds people are coping so far, but recommends 3,000 to 5,000 MT food aid for 158,000 drought-affected vulnerable people for Sep-Nov 1997 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoU distributions of maize flour & beans to East & North-East reported to total 895 MT since February |
| Aug 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> poor pastures and unusual pastoralist migration patterns reported in Karamoja region | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> [WFP initiates food aid request for continuing assistance to IDPs (202,000 people in Gulu & Kitgum), including plans for FFW] |
| Sep 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2nd season rains start 1 to 2 months late pasture conditions continue to deteriorate in Karamoja region; migration to dry-season grazing starts one month early | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Department of Meteorology forecasts above-normal rainfall through December due to El Niño | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> [food aid operations continue for IDPs in North & West] WFP report on drought EMOP (5833) concludes rations were over-spread to large numbers of people & were therefore "ineffective" |
| Oct 97 | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU pledges nearly 5,000 MT food aid for drought-hit areas (not implemented) |
| Nov 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> heavy rain in East and West causes flooding, landslides, crop & livestock losses; displacement of people; damage to road & rail links pastoralist areas in Karamoja benefit from early green-up due to unusual rains | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP/UNICEF/UNDP/FEWS/ICRC joint assessment of flood damage in the East GoU appeals to donors for aid to 100,000 flood and landslide victims in Mbale, Tororo, Nebbi and Kabale Districts | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP provides food for a one-off distribution to flood victims in Mbale, Pallisa & Tororo Districts (103.4 MT + 3.5 MT UNICEF biscuits, for 10,000 people for 2 weeks) |
| Dec 97 | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Red Cross distributes WFP food to the flood-displaced in Mbale & Tororo Districts (Dec/Jan) |
| Jan 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> unusually heavy rains continue into early January, diminishing later in the month cereal and pulse yields reduced by excessive rain (through water-logging, mildew, inability to dry harvested grain, etc.) | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> [food aid continues for IDPs, now estimated to total 370,000 people] |
| Feb 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jan/ Feb rainfall still above average, benefiting pastoralists and "traditional food-security crops" (cassava, sweet potato and plantain), but reducing cereal & bean production | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> [numbers of IDPs increase to 400,000; only 40% pledged of 21,000 MT requested by WFP for the displaced; WFP discusses mechanisms for targeting only the most vulnerable with half-rations] |

Sources: FEWS Uganda reports, various documents & interviews

Distribution mechanisms

In the Eastern Districts, all the government and WFP drought-relief food aid was distributed free through local government channels, while WFP flood relief was channelled through the Red Cross (due to concerns raised during the drought operation about the targeting capacity of local government).

The North-East of the country (Karamoja Region, comprising Kotido and Moroto Districts), where school feeding and food-for-work programs are used as both a development / welfare measure and an emergency safety net, was unfortunately inaccessible to the study team due to security restrictions. However, the targeting of these programs (as described during discussions in Kampala, and by WFP and SCF in refs 66, 71, and 76) has three key features which are also relevant to the comparable program in North-East Kenya, and more generally in relation to school-feeding and to chronically food-insecure areas:

1) Long-term targeting of chronically vulnerable areas. As in Kenya, WFP with its implementing partners focuses long-term food aid planning on areas known to be chronically vulnerable. This allows programs to link relief and development, addressing underlying causes while establishing the capacity to respond to periodic crises more effectively, and with alternatives to free distribution:

“The incidence and concentration of both poverty and food insecurity is highest in the north where there is also a very discernible, geographical pattern of food scarcity that allows for cost-effective targeting. To enhance the impact of its projects, WFP will concentrate food distribution in the more chronically food deficit and economically depressed areas of the country, namely, the six northern districts of Arua, Moyo, Gulu, Kitgum, Kotido and Moroto.” [WFP Country Strategy, ref 74]

“Large-scale relief food interventions have been initiated in Karamoja in 1980/81, 1984, 1987, 1990/91, as a result of food insecurity triggered by drought and insecurity. Since 1991, the policy of GoU / WFP has been to avoid free blanket distributions, and instead introduce food into the district through school feeding programmes, FFW and rations to health institutions. These measures would be expanded in scale in case of acute food insecurity” [SCF Risk-mapping Report, ref 66]

This latter point also describes the second feature:

2) Safety-net expansion capacity, i.e. development programs which can serve as a base for expanded assistance in emergencies. In chronically food-insecure areas this allows for quicker and better-managed relief responses than trying to start emergency FFW or other programs from scratch, and can improve targeting capacity. In Karamoja, WFP’s project objectives include a “food security reserve for drought periods – to ensure food security to drought-affected families by (i) distributing food to a larger number of vulnerable groups through the distribution network set up in normal years; and (ii) by mobilizing the people of working age in the communities to carry out famine-relief works in exchange for food” [WFP 1990, ref 71]

3) School feeding as a targeting mechanism (‘School feeding’ in this project includes formal and non-formal education for children, and literacy training for women). A common criticism of school feeding as a targeting mechanism (leaving aside its educational objectives), is that it often fails to reach the most vulnerable children from poor families because they are the least likely to be attending school. In Karamoja, the opposite appears to be true: SCF’s Risk-Mapping report on the area found that, although the percentage of eligible children actually attending school was as low as 10% to 20%,

“Key informants suggested that, despite the fees involved, *poorer children were more likely to be receiving food from school feeding than rich children*, as they were not required for herding and tended to be nearer to urban centres” [ref 66].

This finding contrasts with Kitui in Kenya (see Appendix 3, A3.2.a), but agrees with comments from Garissa (Appendix 3.2.d.), raising the question whether the observation can be generalized to other pastoralist areas.

2.2.b. Government food aid

Unlike its neighbors, the Ugandan Government no longer (since the privatization of the National Produce Marketing Board) maintains a physical grain reserve. Instead, relief food is purchased when needed.

The targeting of government food aid resources at national level is decided in principle by the National Inter-Sectoral Committee on Disaster Management with the DDM, acting mainly on information from the District authorities (CAOs). However, any relief allocation decisions which surpass the very limited budget of the DDM must then be submitted for funding to the Treasury, which frequently provides less assistance than requested [interview with DDM Commissioner]. WFP has estimated that the Relief / Disaster Management Department’s own budget “has since 1993 averaged sufficient to purchase, transport and distribute only 80-90 MT of relief food”, although additional funds from the Treasury have raised the relief budget to as much as sixty times this level (from US\$ 35,000 to US\$ 2.1 million) [WFP Country Strategy p15, ref 74]. For the future, there are plans for a dedicated emergency relief fund under the Treasury.

The study team was not able to determine the total quantity of government relief food provided in 1997, but it appears to have been a much smaller factor than in Tanzania or Kenya. In the Eastern drought-relief operation, the 15% of food needs which the government agreed to cover under EMOP 5883 did not materialize, though small amounts of government-purchased food do seem to have been distributed during the year. In Mbale (see section 2.2.d. below) the District government was able to purchase some food for local distribution to flood victims from its own funds: it is not known if other Districts had done the same.

Within the Districts, government food was targeted in the same way as the WFP-provided drought relief, as described below.

2.2.c. Focus area 1: Kumi and Tororo Districts

Field work in Uganda was undertaken in three of the Eastern Districts worst hit by drought during 1997: two of them (Mbale and Tororo) also received food assistance following the El Niño flooding. The study focus was on drought relief in Kumi and Tororo Districts, and flood relief in Mbale.

As noted above, both government and WFP drought relief was distributed free through local government channels. Commenting on the initial (April 1997) distributions, WFP noted that the limited resources and capacity of the District Disaster Management Committees had caused problems with targeting:

“random samples of the LC [Local Council] beneficiary lists taken by WFP assessment teams confirmed that they represent the most needy”, but “although the identification of beneficiaries was a commendable exercise, there was pressure on district authorities to distribute food equably across several sub-counties instead of concentrating on given areas for maximum nutritional impact” [WFP EMOP 5833 project document, ref 72]

A European Commission assessment team in July also concluded that:

“In the Eastern Districts all food aid from Government and WFP has so far been distributed by the local authorities, with limited success due to improper targeting of the most vulnerable people. The first people who arrived, received the food. The targeting was limited to the level of most affected parishes (entities of 2500 persons). But even some most affected parishes, which are located far from the sub-county office, did not receive any food. This general distribution of limited quantities of food had no nutritional impact.” [EC July 1997, ref 52]

There is no doubt that there were problems especially with the beneficiary (stage 3) targeting, partly due to the extremely small quantities of relief distributed (armed guards were needed at distribution sites to control conflicts over the food), and that lack of resources at the District level caused delays and other problems. Nevertheless, discussions at the District and village level

suggest that there were attempts, and some administrative capacity (though not matched by resources), to target what was received.

In Kumi District, the distribution records in Table 10 show that area selection was carried out at Parish level (with 27 out of 44 parishes receiving food aid), and that relatively larger amounts were directed to worst-affected areas such as Aakum and Aakide. In Tororo, 10 out of 30 Sub-counties were targeted, according to the CAO. The District Disaster Management Committee had taken their targeting responsibilities very seriously, spending many

Table 10: Kumi District ~ sub-District (stage 2) targeting

| SUB-COUNTY | Parish | Affected Population | Government food aid (MT) Feb/ Mar 97 | WFP food aid (MT) June 97 | Total food aid 97 (MT) | = kg per capita |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| KUMI | Agule | 2,367 | - | 2.5 | 2.5 | 1.1 |
| | Omatenga | 2,870 | - | 2.5 | 2.5 | 0.9 |
| | Olupe | 2,199 | - | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.9 |
| ONGINO | Aakide | 2,483 | 5.1 | 6.0 | 11.1 | 4.5 |
| | Aakum | 4,133 | 8.3 | 8.8 | 17.1 | 4.1 |
| | Ongino | 3,958 | - | 6.6 | 6.6 | 1.7 |
| | Oseera | 4,515 | - | 7.3 | 7.3 | 1.6 |
| | Kanapa | 3,066 | - | 4.0 | 4.0 | 1.3 |
| | Kachaboi | 4,556 | - | - | - | - |
| | Tidai (ls) | 654 | - | - | - | - |
| KAPIR | Agirigiroi | 846 | - | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| | Atapar | 2,319 | - | 2.5 | 2.5 | 1.1 |
| | Omiito | 3,986 | 5.1 | 3.5 | 8.6 | 2.2 |
| | Orisai | 1,429 | - | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.3 |
| | Ajesa | 2,799 | - | - | - | - |
| | Akisim | 944 | - | - | - | - |
| | Kapir | 2,935 | - | - | - | - |
| | Kokong | 1,253 | - | - | - | - |
| MUKURA | Morukakise | 2,934 | - | 3.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 |
| | Kaler | 2,814 | - | 2.5 | 2.5 | 0.9 |
| | Okunguro | 4,209 | - | - | - | - |
| NGORA | Agu | 1,786 | - | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.1 |
| | Kobuku | 5,650 | - | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.4 |
| | Odwarat | 2,807 | - | 2.5 | 2.5 | 0.9 |
| | Ngora | 2,487 | - | - | - | - |
| KOBUIIN | Kodike | 883 | - | - | - | - |
| | Akarukei | 1,336 | - | - | - | - |
| | Aciisa | 1,604 | - | 2.5 | 2.5 | 1.6 |
| | Opot | 1,079 | - | - | - | - |
| | Tilling | 1,740 | - | - | - | - |
| KOLIR | Kamatur | 606 | - | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.3 |
| | Momongomeri | 1,774 | - | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.0 |
| | Aminit | 1,944 | - | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 |
| | Apopong | 1,667 | - | - | - | - |
| | Kolir | 2,256 | - | - | - | - |
| | Miroi | 2,050 | - | - | - | - |
| MALERA | Kobaale | 1,138 | - | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.2 |
| | Kabarwa | 2,886 | - | 3.7 | 3.7 | 1.3 |
| | Kotiokot | 1,997 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 5.4 | 2.7 |
| | Koreng | 3,032 | - | 4.0 | 4.0 | 1.3 |
| | Kachoc | 3,909 | - | 3.5 | 3.5 | 0.9 |
| | Kachede | 2,327 | - | 2.5 | 2.5 | 1.1 |
| KIDONGOLE | Koena | 2,928 | - | - | - | - |
| | Kidongole | 3,107 | - | - | - | - |
| Total | | 108,262 | 21.2 | 85.6 | 106.8 | 1.0 |
| Total in targeted parishes | | 71,379 | | | | 1.5 |
| [total district population = 305,000] | | | | | | |

Figures from Kumi District CAO

hours in meetings trying to allocate the very limited quantities of aid at their disposal, with no funding or additional resources for this task. However, the per capita quantities involved were so small that they probably would have had minimal impact no matter how they were targeted.

As Table 10 illustrates, the quantity of food actually distributed to the selected Parishes in Kumi averaged only 1.5 kg (for the whole drought period) for each person listed as “affected”. In reality, the rations beyond the Sub-County level were spread even more thinly than this, so that even smaller quantities reached the beneficiaries.

In the Parishes and villages, Local Council leaders played an important role in deciding who received food, informing people who should go to the Sub-County for the distribution. From the few communities visited by the study team, it seemed that the targeting at this level varied greatly from place to place, and that there had been little capacity for supervision by the District authorities. In Aakum, for example, the Local Council had tried to list the needy as instructed, but complained that this had been impossible to enforce because everyone claimed to be needy. At the distribution itself, women beneficiaries complained that the young and strong had snatched the food, regardless of the lists. A meeting of LC1 (village council) leaders from various parts of Ongino Sub-County agreed that with the first (government) distribution in March they had tried to identify the worst-affected households (using different methods depending on the village leader), but that by the time the WFP food arrived in June/ July the food shortage was more acute and they were forced to give food to everyone “to avoid being beaten”. Consequently people received as little as ½ kg per family.

In both Kumi and Tororo, although no detailed guidelines had been received on selecting beneficiaries, there was general agreement at both the District and community level about who the “vulnerable” groups were who should in principle be prioritized for aid. As in Tanzania (see Appendix 2), the old, disabled, sick, widows and orphans were considered the most helpless. Several villagers commented that this was not fair, as the number of dependents in the household should also be considered.


Overall, the small quantities of food actually distributed make the question of targeting almost academic. From the national level, there were good reasons for not going ahead with a full-scale relief operation – the crisis did not develop as feared. 1997 was certainly a difficult year of belt-tightening for people in these areas, but far from a famine. Better information systems at the beginning of the process might possibly have predicted this. From the District level, however, it seems with hindsight that considerable time, effort and money was wasted on trying to target an ineffectually small distribution (although several informants at the District and village levels independently commented that it had been important for the government to be seen to do something, even if it was a token gesture). The quantity of food received by each beneficiary was so small that, as one villager in Iyolwa Sub-county (Tororo District) put it, it was “like dropping a kilo of sugar in Lake Victoria” to make the lake sweet.

The underlying causes of increasing food insecurity in Eastern Uganda are more to do with civil insecurity, mosaic disease of cassava (the traditional fall-back crop in times of drought or hardship), and recurrent cattle raids than with drought, which in 1997 was merely a shock to an increasingly vulnerable food system in areas previously unused to food shortages. The villagers interviewed in these districts were politely grateful for the food aid, but repeatedly emphasized that their real needs were seeds, mosaic-resistant cassava cuttings, and help with cattle restocking¹³ so that they could again plow the larger areas they used to farm in the past.

In Tororo District, Plan International implemented an emergency school-feeding program using their own resources for local purchase, and basing their targeting of twenty-three primary schools on their previous identification of vulnerable communities and families for a regular program of

¹³ These needs are well-known and are being addressed (subject to limited resources) by government and various other agencies.

Map 2: Uganda ~ Flood impacts in the East



map by FEWS Uganda (Monthly Report January 1998)

child sponsorship. The rationale for using schools was that children were defined as the target group from the beginning, and by feeding them at school Plan could be sure that the food was eaten and not sold. Pre-school-age children from targeted (sponsored) families were also brought to the schools for meals.

2.2.d. Focus area 2: Mbale District

In Mbale, although some drought-relief food had been received earlier in the year, the focus of the study team was on targeting in response to the El Niño floods in November/December. Map 2 shows the flood-affected areas (as well as the

location of the neighboring Eastern Districts). The impacts of flooding in Uganda were in fact smaller than reported at first. A joint WFP / UNICEF / UNDP / FEWS / IFRC assessment in November concluded that "it was an abrupt, medium-intensity disaster that was localised and that affected a low fraction of the community." FEWS reported in December 1997 that 674 houses had been washed away in Mbale, leaving 3,500 people homeless.

The targeting of food aid in this situation was different from drought response in a number of ways. Firstly, the disaster was sudden and short-lived, so that a one-off distribution of food (3kg maize plus 1.5 kg CSB per person) was sufficient to help people over the initial period of dislocation. Secondly, food was only one of several types of assistance needed, and probably not the most urgent in most cases. Shelter, blankets, and utensils for cooking and carrying water were immediate priorities (while in the longer term, at the time of the team's visit, iron roofing sheets for re-building houses were the most hotly-contested aid commodity). Thirdly, the identification of people in need of assistance was much less problematic than in widespread drought. Selection criteria could be clearly and simply stated as households in limited affected areas who had lost homes, crops, stores etc. In the initial period after the floods, the target group tended to gather for shelter in schools and other public buildings, though those who dispersed to stay with neighbors and relatives were somewhat harder to identify.

Flood relief was distributed by the Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS), which had much greater resources for such an operation than the local government and could mobilize volunteers within the affected communities to assess and register the needy and to distribute aid directly to them (without the delays associated with going through each level of the government hierarchy). Nevertheless, Red Cross officials considered that the targeting of the flood relief had been only partly successful, and people in less accessible areas had probably been missed. They also commented that a detailed needs assessment takes time (two to three weeks in this case), while the District authorities had been pressing them to distribute aid immediately without waiting for the assessment report.

2.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED TARGETING

It has already been suggested above that a separate study is needed on the targeting of food aid to refugee and conflict-displaced populations in Uganda. The following discussion focuses on the

relatively smaller and less frequent problem of targeting relief for drought-related and flood-related food crises. In the context of concerns that vulnerability to food crises triggered by such natural shocks is rising, preparedness for future relief needs should include a review of information systems for the detection and assessment of problems; implementation capacity; and specific policy guidelines for government and partner organizations on the use, limitation and targeting of food aid.

17

With regard to information systems, Uganda does not need a national-level EWS: instead, a more decentralized and selective approach is suggested. The study team did not spend enough time in Uganda to make detailed recommendations on feasible institutional or funding arrangements for such an approach, but it is **RECOMMENDED that the viability of establishing an early warning / needs assessment capacity within the government structure of selected vulnerable Districts be explored**. FEWS would be the agency best able to consult and advise on this, and could continue to play its current role of central technical co-ordinator of food security information, in the absence of a counterpart government EWS. Liaison with the DDM at national level will also be important.

18

Given the critical role of assessment missions in determining planning figures for relief needs, it is **RECOMMENDED that FEWS also work with partner agencies to establish a framework and procedure for such assessments in the future, ensuring the best use is made of available baseline data, monitoring information, and prior reports** (see Chapter 2 for general discussion).

19

It is also **RECOMMENDED that institutional links and responsibilities regarding food aid should be clarified between the Department of Disaster Management in the PMO's office, the recently created post of Minister for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, and authorities at the District level** (where relief is still under the Office of Labor and Social Welfare).

20

At the District level, the District Drought Management Committees played a central role in the drought and flood relief operations in Eastern Uganda, but were severely hampered by lack of additional resources for relief management, and did not have clear Terms of Reference for this role. It is therefore **RECOMMENDED that Terms of Reference for the DDMCs be developed (in line with the policy and institutional guidelines once these are specified), and that in any future food aid distributions donors should consider attaching funds for additional expert staff or other management resources as appropriate**.

21

Lastly, it is **RECOMMENDED that the GoU develop policy guidelines on the use and targeting of food aid as a supplement to its general review of disaster preparedness**. As noted in the Tanzania Chapter, this recommendation applies to all three countries and could usefully be discussed at regional level within EAC.

APPENDIX 3. KENYA COUNTRY REPORT


3.1. CURRENT TARGETING SYSTEMS

3.1.a. Food aid in Kenya (background)

Figure 7 reflects Kenya's recurrent food problems during this decade, with development, emergency and refugee/ displaced aid all being significant in crisis periods. The major drought-related crisis of

1992/3 produced a peak of international food aid provision in 1993/4, followed by a bumper harvest and (in 1995) a government ban on maize imports to support prices for domestic producers. In 1995 and 1996 there was very little non-refugee food aid: but the successive rainfall failures of 1996/7 brought a marked increase again in emergency and development food aid for 1997. It should be remembered that this graph (like the corresponding ones for Tanzania and Uganda) shows the allocation of *WFP*. It does not include Government food distributions, which in Kenya are a significant factor (as discussed below).

Figure 7: Kenya ~ WFP food aid by purpose



3.1.b. Policy context

Despite recurrent emergencies, significant expenditure of government resources on relief, and frequent appeals for international disaster aid, the Government of Kenya has no coherent policy on disaster response or preparedness, and no guidelines on the use of food aid. *De facto* government lines on these issues can be inferred from the practice of government food relief distributions (see section 3.2.b.) and the framework of existing institutions (described in section 3.1.c. below), which have been established piecemeal by various laws and administrative circulars. Various Sessional (White) Papers on food security, drought management, social dimensions of development, poverty alleviation etc. are also of general relevance, but the team was unable to find any specific document on procedures or principles for responding to food crises.

A UNDP/ GoK working group on disaster management has been formed and a draft document on the subject has been under discussion since July 1997, but at the time of the study there were no specific plans for a project (such as those in Tanzania and Uganda) to support the development of policy and capacity in this area. The mandate of the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (see section 3.1.c.) for the institutionalization of drought management and early warning within the

government system does, however, include the development of national policy on drought management [ALRMP 1996, ref 84]. It was not clear whether this is intended to include guidelines on the use of food aid.

3.1.c. Institutional framework: decision-makers and information sources

Kenya has a more complex and diverse institutional context for national-level targeting decisions than its neighbors. This is partly because (as represented in Figure 8) there were almost entirely separate decision-making chains for government and international food aid during the drought relief operations. The response to the flood disaster of late 1997/98, however, was much more closely co-ordinated (see section 3.2.a.).

The central government structures for food-aid allocation and disaster-management in general appear somewhat top-heavy, with high-level oversight from the **National Food Security Committee** (chaired by the President or the Minister of State in the Office of the President) and the inter-ministerial **National Disaster Management Co-ordinating Committee** (at Permanent Secretary level), but with weak capacity at technical levels for co-ordination and particularly for information processing. The logistical rapid-response capacity of the government system was greatly strengthened with the formation of a **National Disaster Operations Center (NOC)** under the Office of the President in January 1998. The NOC played an effective role in the relief response to the El Niño floods, and later the Nairobi bomb disaster. However, the NOC is not designed or equipped to fill the continuing gap in the co-ordination of information and response to *slow-onset* disasters (primarily drought). This gap is expected to be filled in the near future by the National Drought Management Secretariat currently being developed under the DPIRP/ ALRMP mandate.


Also in the **Office of the President (OP)**, under the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation (reporting to the Permanent Secretary for Development Co-ordination), is the **National Famine Relief Co-ordinator's Office (NFRC)**. This office is responsible for the procurement of government relief food through the **National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB)**, and delivery to the targeted Districts. The NFRC also acts as liaison with donors on relief matters, and represents the GoK at WFP monthly meetings and other fora.

It was not entirely clear to the study team whether decisions on how much food should be sent to which Districts were actually made in the NFRC's Office, or by the higher-level committees to which he reports. However, these decisions were said to be primarily influenced by reports and requests channeled through the government administrative hierarchy from the Districts to the Office of the President. **District Social Dimensions of Development Committees** (formerly District Relief Committees) are the most important source of such information [interview with the National Famine Relief Co-ordinator]. Political lobbying on behalf of various constituencies also reportedly plays a part, though this is difficult to quantify. The prioritization of Districts during the 1996/7 drought relief operation is discussed further in section 3.2.b.

Where *international* food aid was concerned, the monthly **WFP / GoK / NGO / Donor meetings** organized by WFP (and attended by FEWS) were a key forum for formulating and communicating targeting decisions under the drought relief operation (EMOP 5803). These decisions drew on multiple sources of information, as outlined below.

The UNDP office in Kenya has played an active role in co-ordinating assessments, liaising with the GoK, mobilizing donors, and promoting disaster preparedness.

Figure 8: Kenya ~ Key institutions in Stage 1 targeting



dotted outlines = committees and ad-hoc groupings; ← = main information flows

* FEWS information flows are simplified for the sake of readability. While its main reporting responsibility is to USAID, its bulletins are widely circulated to other decision-makers and counterpart institutions.

Information providers

Compared to Tanzania and Uganda, Kenya is an information-rich country with numerous types and sources of information relevant to food-aid targeting. The major opportunities for improvement here lie not so much with the production of more data as with the accessibility, communication, co-ordination and *use for decision-making* of existing information.

A **National Early Warning System** was set up with IGAD assistance in 1989, on a similar institutional model to those of Tanzania and Uganda - that is, it was designed as an inter-Ministerial network based in the Ministry of Agriculture but drawing information also from the Kenya Meteorology Department, the Central Bureau of Statistics, the National Cereals and Produce Board, the Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing, and the Ministry of Health (Child and Nutrition Information System / CHANIS). However, this EW system was only functional for a short time. It produced one bulletin in 1990 but then ceased because confidentiality clauses were invoked by some of its member departments: its staff has been reduced to a single agricultural officer in the Crop Production Division of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the system has in effect been quietly forgotten. The separate government departments which nominally comprise the early warning system, however, produce information which is regularly analyzed in FEWS reports. This includes agricultural production estimates (Ministry of Agriculture), price data for crops and livestock (Marketing Information Branch, MoA), and rainfall data (KMD).

A much more important institution for the future of food aid targeting and early warning in drought-prone areas – not only in Kenya but as a potential model for other countries¹⁴ – is the decentralized system of early-warning and response planning developed under the **Drought Preparedness, Intervention and Recovery Project (DPIRP)** and now being replicated and expanded under the **Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP)**. The distinctive features of this system (which was first established by the Turkana Drought Contingency Planning Unit in the late 1980s and is currently operating in ten Districts¹⁵) are, briefly:

- It covers *selected* drought-prone areas in depth, rather than aiming for national coverage (which would be prohibitively expensive using this approach).
- The design of the monitoring system (i.e. which data to collect and how to interpret them) is based on a close analysis of local livelihoods, rather than the standard general indicators often collected by centralized national systems. Indicators are selected to pick up changes in the environment, local economy and human welfare.
- Information collection is through regular monthly “ground monitoring” by locally-recruited monitors, at household and community level (using a random sample of households for the former).
- Monthly bulletins classify the local situation, according to a comparison of the indicators with the expected range of fluctuation, at one of four “warning stages”: *normal*, *alert*, *alarm*, or *emergency*. Thus decision-makers can immediately see whether action is needed.
- If the monitoring report appears to warrant a relief needs assessment, the District Steering Group will deploy a local Rapid Assessment Team (RAT) to identify the type and quantity of assistance needed. This recognizes that EW monitoring is designed to give early signals of problem areas, but cannot directly answer the “how much” questions.

¹⁴ In Uganda, for example, the NEWFIS co-ordinator has recommended the TDCPU approach as a model for District-based monitoring in Karamoja [Mwendya 1997a, ref 59]

¹⁵ Turkana, Marsabit / Moyale, Isiolo and Samburu are covered by the DPIRP; Garissa, Mandera, Wajir, Tana River and Baringo by the ALRMP.

- Food aid is not the first response sought by this monitoring system, but a last resort. The primary focus is on District-level response where possible, and on prevention or development measures in preference to relief.

The ALRMP / DPIRP system is inevitably better established in some Districts than others, and is not yet functioning perfectly (bulletins are sometimes delayed and data is not always easily available), but it is very much better than any alternative system available. Its main weakness so far, from the point of view of food-aid targeting, lies not in the quality or relevance of the information collected but in its *use*. At the national level, while the District Bulletins have high credibility among the international community (and are regularly used by FEWS), links to decision-makers within the government system are weak. Although the ALRMP / DPIRP headquarters are, institutionally, within the OP like the NFRC, it is not clear that their information had any influence on Government targeting of Districts during 1997/98. These problems are recognized and are currently being addressed, as part of the institutionalization of EW within the government system, through the planned formation of a National Drought Monitoring Secretariat which will act as an information and co-ordination unit at the central level [interviews with the ALRMP Deputy National Project Co-ordinator and the DPIRP Early Warning Adviser].

At the District level, ALRMP / DPIRP information is used for development project planning through the District Steering Committee formed for this purpose in the Districts covered by the drought-monitoring system. However, it does not appear to be used for the targeting of government relief within the Districts, which is managed separately by the District Social Dimensions of Development Committee. It is therefore **RECOMMENDED that drought monitoring information should be systematically used for government relief targeting at District level (by the DSDDC) as well as for development project planning (by the DSG)**. A first step towards this would be the inclusion of the drought monitoring officer in the Social Dimensions of Development (or Relief) Committee.

22

At the national level, it is also **RECOMMENDED that donor support for the proposed partnership to sustain the DPIRP drought monitoring system could significantly contribute to improved information use in both government and international targeting decisions** [see Halderman 1997, ref 110].

23

WFP Kenya had not yet established its **VAM** office at the time of the study, but during the 1997/8 relief operations it supplemented field reports from its own monitors and implementing partners with two additional information sources. Firstly, two SCF Food Economy assessments (of Kitui and Wajir) helped to inform area-targeting decisions during the latter part of the drought relief operation. Secondly, a short-term Food Security Adviser was brought in to assist with the targeting of the flood relief in mid-1998 (see section 3.2.a.).

NGOs were also an important source of food security information on their operational areas, though this was largely unco-ordinated. Apart from Oxfam's community monitoring in Wajir, which was generally agreed to have influenced the quantity of food aid allocated to the District by DFID and WFP, it did not appear that NGO information had been systematically used for national-level targeting decisions during the drought. Oxfam launched an initiative in February 1997 for NGOs to agree a format to standardize and disseminate their qualitative reporting, but this does not seem to have been put into operation. Information from several NGOs (notably CARE, CRS, GTZ, KFFHC, MSF, and Oxfam) does, however, appear regularly in FEWS bulletins. In mid-1998, during the re-targeting of relief for flood victims, NGOs involved in the distributions were brought together by WFP to work on area targeting, as discussed in the following section.

3.2. TARGETING DURING THE 1997/8 DROUGHT & FLOOD EMERGENCIES

3.2.a. Overview

It will be immediately obvious from Table 11 that the Kenyan drought and flood emergencies in 1996/7 and 1997/8 were longer and more eventful than those in Tanzania and Uganda. Unlike its neighbors, Kenya suffered a second full-scale disaster (warranting a separate international EMOP) with the El Niño floods, probably with greater losses in lives and livelihoods than the preceding drought. Ironically, the normally arid and drought-prone areas were among those worst-affected by the excessive rains.

Table 11: Kenya ~ Chronology of Key Events

| | | | | Normal RAINFALL periods - bimodal areas (Bi) Mar-May (long rains) and Oct-Jan (short rains); Rift Valley (R) Mar-Jun (long rains only); Western (W) Jan- May (long rains only) |
|--------|----|---|---|--|
| | | | | Normal HARVEST periods (major food crops) - bimodal areas July (long rains) and Jan/ Feb (short rains); Rift Valley Aug-Dec; Western July-Sep |
| | Bi | R | W | |
| | | | | DROUGHT / FLOOD EVENTS |
| | | | | KEY INFORMATION / DECISIONS |
| | | | | FOOD AID OPERATIONS |
| Sep 96 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ FEWS Vulnerability Update reports serious food insecurity in Eastern Province due to poor 1996 long-rains harvest (following poor short-rains harvest) ➤ Ministry of Agriculture estimates 1.4 million people in the Province may need food aid ➤ Oxfam reports 30,000 pastoralists in Wajir at risk of destitution |
| Oct 96 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ long-rains harvesting continues in Western Kenya's main maize-growing area, but prices remain high due to expectations of national production shortfall, plus reduced imports from Uganda (where harvests are also poor) ➤ GoK / UNICEF drought assessment mission to the North-East (Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, & Isiolo) recommends supplementary feeding program ➤ FAO / WFP field Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Kenya |
| Nov 96 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ short rains in Eastern Province start late but initially look promising ➤ no rain yet in pastoral districts ➤ FEWS Vulnerability Update warns that a failure of the short rains could bring conditions similar to the major 1992/3 drought in pastoral areas |
| Dec 96 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ short rains underway in agricultural and pastoral areas, but significantly late ➤ harvesting of long-rains crops in breadbasket districts continues ➤ FAO / WFP Crop & Food Supply Assessment report, issued 16 December, estimates 1.6 million people need immediate food aid until February harvest (to be covered largely by GoK relief and WFP School Feeding), and warns that another crop failure in the coming short-rains season could have disastrous effects |
| Jan 97 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ short rains bring some relief to pastoral districts, but are interrupted by a prolonged dry spell in the east ➤ FEWS Vulnerability Update warns of imminent failure of short-rains (main producing) season in Eastern Province – 3rd consecutive failed harvest ➤ Joint Drought Assessment Mission to N.E. Kenya (UNDP/ UNICEF / WFP / UNON / UNDHA/ GoK / USAID) ➤ FAO / GIEWS Special Alert revises FAO/WFP mission findings in the light of short-rains failure, and urges donors to make additional food aid pledges ➤ GoK declares current food crisis a national disaster (Jan 28) |
| Feb 97 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ministry of Agriculture estimates 1996/97 maize production deficit at 761,000 MT (combined structural deficit and current-year harvest shortfalls) ➤ duty on commercial imports of maize removed ➤ UNDMT Mission to Rift Valley, Coast & Eastern Provinces estimates 1.4 million people need assistance |
| Mar 97 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ rainfall in late March signals late onset of critical long rains (which provide up to 80% of national maize production) ➤ WFP Drought EMOP 5803 starts, targeting free food to 205,000 people in pastoral districts (Garissa, Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit & Isiolo) for 6 months (Feb-Jul) ➤ GoK relief now covering 40/63 districts, but impact hampered by blanket (non-targeted) distributions |
| Apr 97 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Upward pressure on food prices continues ➤ heavy rainfall recorded in most parts of the country ➤ GoK relief program expanded to 51/63 districts: total monthly maize allocation 31,410 MT ➤ GoK/ WFP agree to divide geographical responsibility (with government distributions focusing around towns) to avoid overlaps |

| | | | | | |
|--------|--|--|---|---|--|
| May 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > total of 235,000 MT commercial maize imports undertaken, but prices remain high and rising as late harvest is expected, further eroding vulnerable households' access to food > last 3 weeks of May unusually dry and hot, causing crop stress in breadbasket areas and in marginal agricultural areas of Eastern Province | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > UNICEF funds University of Nairobi to carry out nutritional assessments in 10 drought-affected districts | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > GoK & NGO relief distributions in pastoral areas (Wajir, Isiolo & Garissa) hampered by heavy rains making roads impassable > GoK relief distributions peak at around 32,000 MT monthly, to 51 districts |
| Jun 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > rains return in mid-June, breaking 5-week dry spell & improving prospects for fair harvest in main surplus-producing areas. > crop conditions remain unfavorable in the East > most pastoral districts benefit from favorable pasture, browse & water | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > WFP-commissioned SCF-UK FEA assessment of Wajir concludes food aid should continue, at declining rate, until mid-January | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > GoK relief coverage reduced to 43 Districts, following long rains |
| Jul 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Favorable short-term conditions in pastoral districts, but slow economic recovery and high malnutrition | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > duty waiver for imported maize extended up to August 31 > WFP-commissioned SCF-UK FEA assessment of Kitui District finds stopping relief distributions in August would have no adverse impact | |
| Aug 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > maize harvesting starts, with mixed production prospects. Overall fair harvest expected > end of rains signalled by low August rainfall | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > UNICEF/ University of Nairobi study finds significant malnutrition rates, highest in Samburu, Turkana & Kajiado > GoK asks WFP for further relief food assistance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > WFP requests support for 4-month extension of drought EMOP 5803 in five pastoral districts |
| Sep 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > maize price remains on an upward trend despite large imports (375,000 MT during July & August) | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > GoK relief distribution coverage further reduced to 28 districts (total allocation 5,220 MT for September) |
| Oct 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > long-rains maize production estimates revised downwards due to poor rainfall distribution, unusual dry spell in September, and frost in Central Province > terms of trade for pastoralists improve in most pastoral Districts > maize prices fall in most markets > exceptionally heavy rain (associated with El Niño) occurs in most parts of the country during October, especially eastern, northern and coastal areas. Severe flooding reported in northern (normally arid) pastoral areas & along coastal strip | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > WFP EMOP extension approved up to Jan 15, 1998 - total of 6,638 MT cereals required |
| Nov 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > heavy rain continues - highest precipitation in normally arid east & north-east. Tana & Daua Rivers flood, causing loss of life and homes > prices of all food commodities rise dramatically in pastoral areas cut off from road access by floods > long-rains harvesting continues – but heavy rain is expected to cause substantial losses > maize prices fall in surplus areas, but are expected to rise again soon | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Joint Flood Assessment Mission to Tana River & Garissa by GoK / UNDP / WFP / EC / USAID / CARE / Rural Focus Limited. > GoK issues appeal for flood-disaster assistance, for nearly 300,000 people in 9 Districts (Nov 26) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > GoK allocates 14,130MT relief maize for November, for drought-affected Eastern, Rift Valley, Coast & North-eastern Provinces > WFP/ NGOs implementing extended EMOP in pastoral Districts > relief operations in pastoral areas halted by breakdown in road communications |
| Dec 97 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > heavy rain continues, declining after Dec 20 > renewed flooding especially in pastoral districts - livestock diseases increase > Rift Valley harvest nears completion - losses due to high moisture reduce national long rains harvest estimate to 1.83m MT (68% of average) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > USAID Kenya estimates 300,000 people are displaced or adversely affected by rain & floods in northern, eastern & coastal areas > Oxfam warns of anticipated rise in water-borne human diseases | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > WFP Flood EMOP 5969 starts: airlifts of food and drugs for 390,000 people in severely flood-affected pastoral districts of Wajir, Mandera & Tana River begin December 10 (joint GoK / NGO/ WFP). |
| Jan 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > total rainfall in January still well above normal levels, but latter half of month is relatively dry > Garissa & Tana River districts remain largely inaccessible by road, though other pastoral areas are now partially accessible > 450 deaths reported in north & east due to Rift Valley Fever, malaria, typhoid & cholera | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > DPIRP & Oxfam report 40-50% losses of goat & sheep flocks due to flood-related diseases > MoH issues countrywide malaria alert > National Disaster Operations Centre (NOC) becomes operational (21 Jan) > WFP-led flood assessment mission to Tana River, Wajir, Garissa, Mandera, and Isiolo | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > nearly 2,000 MT of cereals, pulses, oil, Unimix & drugs airlifted by end of January to flood-affected Mandera, Wajir, Tana River, Garissa & Isiolo. Total target population 446,000. |
| Feb 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > above-normal rainfall re-commences in early Feb, hampering harvesting & raising risk of crop losses > pasture, browse & water conditions favorable; livestock diseases declining | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > WFP-co-ordinated flood EMOP continues |
| Mar 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > rainfall in mid-March signals a late onset of long-rains season, after an unusually brief dry spell | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > UNICEF/ UNDP flood assessment of 7 worst-affected pastoral Districts finds high malnutrition rates, and exceptionally high livestock losses during Nov-Feb | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > road transport conditions improve - 74% of flood EMOP relief during March transported by road > 2nd phase of flood EMOP starts (5969/01) - target population now 539,600 |
| Apr 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > rainfall distribution continues irregular - planting of long-rains crops continues unusually late, disrupted by unseasonable Dec-Feb rainfall > food prices decline substantially in most markets (except pastoral areas) due to short-rains harvest, destocking by millers, & expected imports | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > total food aid distributed under flood EMOP reaches 13,277 MT; extension to October proposed |
| May 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > May rainfall normal to above normal in most areas (up to 300% of normal in parts of Central Kenya) > flooding along the River Tana forces agro-pastoralists to replant for the third time > maize prices continue to decline | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > MSF/B & DPIRP report exceptionally high child malnutrition in Samburu > GoK issues 2nd appeal for flood emergency assistance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > GoK allocates 270 MT maize to Samburu, but poor targeting of general rations is reported to be reducing the effectiveness of MSF Unimix distribution |
| Jun 98 | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > cumulative precipitation during long-rains period (Mar-Jun) normal to above-normal, but temporal distribution poor | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > WFP needs assessment finds acute food insecurity among pastoralists, signalled by high grain prices, unseasonable livestock sales, low purchasing power, & high child malnutrition. Extension of flood EMOP considered essential to recovery > GoK again waives import duty on maize | |
| Jul 98 | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > WFP short-term Food Security Adviser works with NGOs to review targeting of flood relief (June / July) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > 3rd phase of WFP flood EMOP 5969 approved, targeting 587,480 people up to September 1998 |

Sources: FEWS Kenya reports, various documents and interviews

The drought crisis was seen coming from a long way off. As the Table shows, FEWS was reporting serious concerns about the cumulative impact of repeated rainfall failures in the Eastern and North-Eastern Provinces in September 1996 (and indeed earlier). The Government of Kenya (GoK) had already started distributing relief food from its own resources in July 1996, while Oxfam started distributing food aid in Wajir (with DFID support) in August. Early warning of the potential effects of a further failure of the October-to-January short rains had been given by both FEWS and FAO/ WFP, so that when the rains did in fact fail the response was swift. The GoK declared a national disaster in January 1997, several months earlier than Uganda (April) and Tanzania (September). WFP expanded the area coverage of its School Feeding Programme (to feed an additional 79,000 children in ASAL areas) in the same month, pending approval of an EMOP. UNICEF-funded Supplementary Feeding for children in the North-Eastern Districts had already started. The GoK increased the scale and coverage of its maize distributions from February, and in March WFP's EMOP 5803 came into operation, targeting general rations through NGOs to a planned beneficiary population of 205,000 in the pastoral Districts of Garissa, Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit and Isiolo, and school meals to a total of 270,000 primary and pre-primary children through an expanded School Feeding Programme.

The area targeting of the WFP and UNICEF response was primarily determined by their long-term strategic focus on the chronically food-insecure Districts of the North-Eastern and Eastern Provinces (compare Uganda), combined with information from the multiple sources and assessment missions mentioned above and in Table 11. In April 1997 an agreement was reached with the OP to divide the coverage of Districts where government and international relief overlapped, so that government distributions would focus on areas surrounding the towns and WFP/ NGOs would cover the more remote areas.

The major **distribution mechanisms** during the international drought relief operation were general free distribution and expanded school feeding on behalf of WFP, and supplementary feeding supported by UNICEF. The latter is discussed in the context of Garissa, in section 3.2.d. below.

WFP's general distributions were implemented by partner NGOs within the selected Districts. Standard guidelines were given for beneficiary (stage 3) targeting: "Selection of beneficiaries ... will be made without prejudice to sex, age, race, religion or political affiliation, but *focusing on the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly women and children*. [The NGO] shall work in *close liaison with government* sponsored relief coordination bodies at the district level (i.e. DSDDC, DSG) At the community level, a *committee will be organized* ... to assist in the selection of beneficiaries and to perform the distribution of food. The committee will be comprised of responsible persons (including assured and significant participation by women) elected by the community. Wherever feasible, *food will be distributed directly to women* Opportunities for *Food for Work* schemes should also be fully explored" [WFP-NGO Letter of Agreement for EMOP 5803, main points italicized]. Preference was given to NGOs who were able to distribute through FFW or MCH and to ensure that women were prioritized. However, most of the general (non-school) distributions seem to have been given free due to the scale and time-frame of the emergency needs. By August 1997 WFP reported that the general distribution had in fact reached 443,702 people in the North-Eastern Province (presumably at half-rations compared to the planning figures) [WFP Kenya, Update on EMOP 5803, October 1997].

Expanded School Feeding, on the foundation of a regular developmental programme¹⁶, had been found to be an effective emergency mechanism during the 1992/94 drought. In 1997, the regular School Feeding Program (implemented through the Ministry of Education) was to provide lunches for 350,000 school-children in 17 arid and semi-arid Districts, with the main aim of promoting school attendance and educational achievement. During the first phase of EMOP 5803 (February to August 1997) 452,016 children of primary and pre-primary age were fed under the emergency program at schools in the Eastern (Mbeere, Kitui, Machakos, Marsabit, Makueni and Tharaka

¹⁶ Compare WFP's use of school feeding as a safety-net program in N.E. Uganda (Appendix 1.2.a.)

Nithi), Coast (Taita Taveta) and North-Eastern (Mandera) Provinces [ibid]. The EMOP expansion in September reduced the scale of this operation, targeting the expanded school feeding more narrowly on 151,292 children in drought-affected pockets of Kitui and Makueni for the third term (September to November).

In addition to the demographic targeting effect of school feeding (i.e. ensuring that food aid is received by a nutritionally-vulnerable age group, primary and pre-primary children), WFP Kenya has noted two major advantages of expanded school feeding as an emergency mechanism:

- lower than usual risk of diversion; and
- limited additional planning and preparation inputs (since the institutional arrangements are already in place for the regular program).

Its main weakness as a targeting mechanism, is that it may not reach the poorest and most vulnerable children. The SCF Food Economy Assessment of Kitui in July 1997 found that:

“According to key informants, many of the children of poor households do not go to school or if they do, they drop out early on. The main reason stated is that many parents of Kitui, as with many other areas of Kenya, cannot afford the accompanying costs - uniform, textbooks, and parent/ teacher association fees. ... Key informants reported that the ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’ can generally only afford to send one child to school, thus the SFP only contributed a small percentage of the family food needs. As the ‘middle’ and ‘rich’ can afford to send their children to school, and have smaller families, the contribution of SFP to their household intake is greater”

[SCF (UK) 1997b, ref 131]

This is not universal, however (as shown by the Ugandan example cited in appendix 1.2.a., and the comments of the DEO in Garissa mentioned in section 3.2.d.): it depends on who goes to school in a particular community, and why. SCF’s conclusion from this observation in Kitui was that distribution mechanisms to target the poorest were needed *in addition to* school feeding.

By the time the **El Niño floods** hit, in October 1997, the drought relief operation was entering a process of phasing out, with both GoK and WFP distributions planned to continue at a diminishing rate of coverage until the end of the year. The new disaster was unexpected in its severity and unpredictable in its development (no-one knew when the rain would stop or how bad conditions would get). Many areas were cut off from road access (and therefore from normal market supplies of food) for months. The food security and livelihood impacts were not only in the short-term loss of crops, food stocks, seeds, and so on, but in a protracted health crisis for both people and livestock due to the rise in water-borne diseases and vectors, and the unaccustomed cold and wet conditions in normally arid areas. Livestock losses in some of the pastoralist areas were devastating. The development of the disaster is reflected in WFP’s planning figures for food beneficiaries, which actually grew from 390,000 in the immediate aftermath [EMOP 5969, December 1997] to 539,600 in the first expansion [EMOP 5969/01, March 1998] and then to 587,480 in the third phase [EMOP 5969/02, July 1998].

The flood damage to roads, which hampered the distribution of relief and necessitated air-lifts of food and medicines, also hampered the flow of information for targeting decisions. Many areas were unreachable. The UNICEF/ UNDP Flood Assessment Mission in March, for example, was only able to assess malnutrition among children close to helicopter landing sites.

In this situation, the main targeting question was the quantity of food to be distributed in each affected District: this question was broken down into the arithmetic of *how many people?* multiplied by *what ration rate?*. There was no real disagreement about which Districts needed help in the flood disaster: however, targeting *within* the Districts, and differential ration rates *between* the Districts, were points of contention. Targeting of the neediest within communities was not an issue, partly because action was urgent and beneficiary selection would have been too time-consuming, and partly because vulnerability in this kind of sudden disaster was not necessarily

related to poverty and coping capacity. In communities which were completely cut off from market supplies of food, even the relatively rich could starve. In fact, it appears that communities themselves prioritized the neediest with a larger share of the blanket distribution, at least in some cases [Jaspars 1998a, ref 112, and village informants in Garissa]. Not surprisingly, the distributions at beneficiary level were managed in different ways by different NGOs and communities, so that there was no uniform method.

In June / July, WFP engaged a short-term expert to advise on the targeting of the flood EMOP for the third phase (July to September 1998). After consultations, field assessments and a workshop involving NGO partners, her reports [Jaspars 1998, refs 112, 113, 114, 115 and 116] include the following points:

- the initial area targeting of EMOP 5969 was based largely on where NGO partners were already on the ground distributing drought relief;
- the estimated numbers of beneficiaries were either total District population, or people registered for drought relief, or negotiated figures;
- nutrition surveys (on which area targeting was in theory to be based) were not co-ordinated and used different methodologies (some of which were questionable). There was no national guideline for such surveys (although nutritional status information seems to be frequently used for relief planning in Kenya); and
- the allocation of different ration rates to different Districts was not rational, as food security conditions were unlikely to change at District boundaries.

Jaspars' recommendations for the third phase of EMOP 5969 were to revise the unit of targeting, dividing Districts into livelihood zones (see below) rather than administrative Divisions, and to make blanket distributions to the population of the targeted zones at two different ration rates: 100% for areas with acute food needs and malnutrition, and 50% for areas where the food aid was primarily for recovery.

"Livelihood zones" are similar in concept to the "food economy areas" used in SCF's Food Economy Assessment (FEA) methodology – i.e. they are geographical areas within which people share the same major sources of food and income. Jaspars' approach is more "quick and dirty" than the SCF methodology, as it draws mainly on the existing knowledge of NGOs rather than key-informant field research, and does not include household-level or wealth-group analysis. Its aim is to define coherent economic areas for relief targeting. In practice, the ability of WFP's partner NGOs to map the livelihood zones in their areas was varied. Oxfam was able to do it in some detail for Wajir, mainly because they had a great deal of knowledge of the District and had already done something very similar. CARE (for example) had less confidence in the map produced of livelihood zones in Garissa. Further problems arose with implementation, as it was felt that giving relief to some zones and not to others in the Districts concerned could lead to clan warfare. It would be interesting to know how far the zones were actually used as targeting units.

A useful side-effect of the targeting workshop organized by Jaspars [August 1998, see ref. 115] is that it seems to have raised NGO awareness of the influence that timely and well-directed information can have on the levels of relief resources allocated to different areas.

Market responses were important in the Kenyan drought. Like its East African neighbors, the GoK waived maize import taxes as part of its emergency response (in February 1997, and again in June 1998 after the floods). In contrast to Tanzania, the domestic price was high enough and the liberalized private sector active enough to bring in substantial quantities of grain, which undoubtedly stabilized prices to some extent and greatly mitigated the potential food shortages (thus reducing the need for relief).

3.2.b. Government food aid

The decision-making process for Stage 1 targeting of government food aid (i.e., allocations from the Office of the President at central level to the Districts) has already been outlined in section 3.1.c, where it was noted that government drought relief was targeted separately from international relief, and primarily in response to reports originating from the District authorities. Table 12 shows the outcome of this process in terms of the total quantities allocated to each District over the whole period of the drought relief operation (July 1996 to October 1997)¹⁷. A number of points arise from these records.

Firstly, the quantity of grain redistributed through the government network is substantial. Over the 16-month drought period, the OP authorized the purchase and distribution of more than 200,000 MT of maize. This is equivalent to about 7% of the total national consumption need for maize¹⁸, and roughly eight times the size of the international drought relief operation run by WFP¹⁹. Nevertheless, there is general agreement (including among beneficiaries interviewed in the focus areas visited) that the smaller quantities distributed through NGOs and other agencies had a greater impact, because of better targeting.

In the share-out from national to District level, Table 12 shows that few (if any) Districts were entirely excluded from government relief, but that there was systematic prioritization of Districts in terms of the quantities allocated. In order to make these quantities comparable, the second column shows the percentage of the District population which could have been fed (at the standard ration of 12 kg per month for the whole 16-month period) by the amounts allocated. (Note that this calculation does not imply that the food was actually targeted in that way).

Shaded rows indicate more than 10%, shaded rows plus bold print indicate more than 25%. The highlighted Districts, on the whole, are those which were generally agreed to be badly affected by the drought. Map 3, which shows the monthly allocations for April 1997 (at the peak of government relief distributions) illustrates the relative geographic concentration of government aid in the North and East of the country.

The question remains whether it would have been more economical to redirect or save the smaller (in some cases nominal) quantities allocated for less affected Districts: however, this is a matter for government policy. District-level targeting of the WFP Drought Emergency Operation was much narrower, as shown in the right-hand column of the table. It is a general feature of government targeting systems at all levels that it is much more difficult to exclude some Districts (or Divisions, or villages etc.) from a government distribution which passes through each level of administration than from a non-government distribution which can often be channeled directly (both in physical and management terms) from a central depot to a targeted area or community. These issues are discussed further in Chapter 2.

Within Districts, the distribution and targeting of government relief was the responsibility of the District Social Dimensions of Development Committee (DSDDC, sometimes still called the District Relief Committee), which is a sub-committee of the District Development Committee (DDC) chaired by the District Commissioner. The food was distributed by the District to the Divisions, by the Divisions to the Locations, and among the communities by the Location and Sub-location Chiefs. Informants suggest that at each level there was a tendency to spread the food aid widely

¹⁷ This is not necessarily all drought relief, as the OP also allocates grain for problems such as conflict-displacement or urban destitution [interview with the National Famine Relief Co-ordinator].

¹⁸ Calculated on a 12-month basis, using consumption estimates from the FAO/WFP balance sheet for 1996/7 [ref 102] – government relief allocation for July 96 to June 97 of 186,642 MT divided by 2,654,200 MT total annual food use of maize @ 96kg/capita.

¹⁹ 20,139 MT of maize was requested under the original EMOP 5803 in February 1997, plus a further 6,638 MT for a four-month expansion [5803-01] from September 1997 to January 1998 (final distribution figures not available).

Table 12: Kenya ~ GoK District targeting

| | | Total OP relief allocation Jul 96-Oct 97 (MT) [1] | = enough for % of population [2] | WFP [3] |
|-------------|-------------------|---|----------------------------------|---------|
| NE | Garissa | 9,135 | 30% | G |
| | Mandera | 9,810 | 37% | G S |
| | Wajir | 7,875 | 26% | G |
| EASTERN | Isiolo | 7,056 | 38% | G |
| | Kitui | 15,615 | 15% | S |
| | Machakos | 13,005 | 7% | S |
| | Marsabit | 8,550 | 38% | G S |
| | Meru | 1,503 | 1% | |
| | Makueni | 12,870 | 9% | S |
| | Tharaka Nithi | 6,120 | 9% | S |
| | Nyambene | 4,860 | n/a | |
| | Mwingi | 10,080 | 19% | |
| | Moyale | 4,815 | 52% | G |
| | Mbeere | 5,040 | 17% | S |
| | Embu | 1,413 | 3% | |
| COAST | Kilifi | 5,355 | 5% | |
| | Lamu | 1,845 | 13% | |
| | Taita-Taveta | 4,185 | 9% | S |
| | Kwale | 2,250 | 3% | |
| | Tana River | 9,900 | 27% | |
| | Malindi | 2,250 | 9% | |
| CENTRAL | Kirinyaga | 1,350 | 1% | |
| | Thika | 2,115 | 7% | |
| | Nyeri | 2,655 | 2% | |
| | Murang'a | 1,485 | 1% | |
| | Maragua | 585 | n/a | |
| | Kiambu | 900 | 0% | |
| | Nyandarua | 1,215 | 2% | |
| RIFT VALLEY | Kajiado | 6,120 | 8% | |
| | Laikipia | 4,068 | 7% | |
| | Uasin Gishu | 18 | 0% | |
| | Baringo | 7,110 | 11% | |
| | Samburu | 8,460 | 31% | |
| | Turkana | 8,100 | 18% | |
| | West Pokot | 6,255 | 11% | |
| | Keiyo | 3,600 | 14% | |
| | Koibatek | 1,845 | n/a | |
| | Marakwet | 2,835 | 11% | |
| | Bomet | 4,860 | 6% | |
| | Nakuru | 1,440 | 1% | |
| | Narok | 1,620 | 2% | |
| | Trans-Mara | 1,260 | n/a | |
| Nandi | 270 | n/a | | |
| Kericho | 270 | n/a | | |
| WESTERN | Busia | 810 | 8% | |
| | Teso | 810 | n/a | |
| | Bungoma | 585 | 0% | |
| | Kakamega | 360 | 0% | |
| | Mt Elgon | 315 | n/a | |
| | Vihiga | 360 | 0% | |
| NYANZA | Kisumu | 810 | 0% | |
| | Migori | 810 | 1% | |
| | Suba | 810 | n/a | |
| | Rachuonyo | 450 | n/a | |
| | Siaya | 225 | n/a | |
| | Homa Bay | 225 | n/a | |
| | Nairobi area | 108 | n/a | |
| | TOTAL | 218,646 | | |

(i.e. a reluctance to exclude any areas), though selected Divisions and Locations, like the Districts, were prioritized by receiving larger quantities and / or more frequent distributions.

As far as the study team could establish, all government relief was distributed free (except in some very localized cases where chiefs had reportedly followed NGO examples and unilaterally organized community works using government food aid [Action Aid, Kyuso, Mwingi]). Among some local authorities there is reportedly active hostility to FFW, possibly due to colonial associations.

Within communities, at the beneficiary-selection level (Stage 3), there seems to have been no effective targeting of government relief. FEWS repeatedly warned that blanket distributions were seriously diluting the impact of distributions [FEWS Kenya, Vulnerability Updates]. MSF-France reported that lack of targeting of general rations in Samburu was also undermining the effectiveness of its Supplementary Feeding programme [ref 125]. Field observations by staff of various organizations from different parts of the country echoed the comment of the FAO/WFP assessment mission:

“Better targeting of beneficiaries by the Office of the President would be an immediate improvement in relief assistance. In most of the cases reviewed, it was noted by the Mission that while the criteria for the beneficiaries was well-defined, actual distribution covers every individual in the location receiving the assistance. This meant that those who really needed food aid

Notes on Table 12:

[1] Source – Office of the President, Report on GoK allocation plan: Relief maize to drought affected Districts, 7 October 1997.

[2] total allocation / total district population / 12 kg / 16 months: n/a = population figure not available

[3] Districts targeted under drought EMOP 5803.

G = general distribution, S = expanded school feeding

only received a small percentage of their requirement” [FAO/WFP 1996, ref 102].

Several government officers at different levels, and some village informants, mentioned the assumption that free distributions are self-targeting: that is, whoever turns up at the distribution site when a distribution has been announced is assumed to be in need, because the better-off would be ashamed to come and claim relief. From conversations in the villages it does seem to be true that a small number of higher-status people had voluntarily excluded themselves from claiming relief, but this is clearly not a sufficient targeting mechanism to ensure a worthwhile impact on the really needy.

Another observation confirmed by field observers in many areas was that the quantities (and frequency) of food deliveries received at community level were often very much smaller than the allocations on paper in Nairobi. This is partly accounted for by the practice of paying transport and handling costs out of the maize allocations (as there is no separate provision of funds for this). However, leakage at various levels of the system seems to be more significant than can be accounted for by this alone.

An important point is that blanket distribution at the final point of delivery to beneficiaries (i.e. lack of Stage 3 targeting), while highly visible to field observers, is only a part of the problem. Tighter accountability to prevent leakage, and more ruthless selection of the neediest Districts, Divisions and Locations (i.e. area targeting at Stages 1 and 2) are equally important if the GoK wants to improve the impact of its relief distributions on its food-insecure citizens.

3.2.c. Focus area 1: Mwingi District

Mwingi, in the Eastern Province, is a marginal agricultural area which was highlighted by FEWS in late 1996 and early 1997 as one of the areas severely affected by three consecutive harvest failures. Mwingi was not included in the WFP drought EMOP, but was allocated significant quantities of government relief maize (see Table 12) and was also supported by the GTZ Integrated Food Security Project (IFSP-E) which has been established in the District since 1994. The study team focused on two main issues here: the targeting of community Food-for-Work as a potential alternative to free distributions, and local-government perspectives on the targeting of free relief within the District.

Intra-District targeting of government free relief

District officials explained that government relief food is distributed through Social Dimensions of Development Committees at District, Division and Location levels. Membership of these committees includes the heads of government departments, NGO representatives, churches and politicians. The DSDDC listed six information sources available to them in allocating food aid to Divisions:

1. *Reports from Location Chiefs on the numbers of people needing food;*
2. *Information on rainfall, crop conditions, livestock etc. through the District Agriculture Office from their officers at Location level (the DAO produces a monthly food situation report, including a District food balance sheet);*
3. *Nutritional status information from Location dispensaries, through the District Health Office;*
4. *Reports from NGOs on the areas where they work;*
5. *Politicians requesting food for suffering people in their area; and*
6. *The Drought Monitoring System, which has been established in Mwingi with GTZ support since 1996 (closely modeled on the DPIRP / ALRMP system outlined in section 3.2.a.). The Drought Monitoring System, managed by the District Statistical Officer, also produces monthly reports.*

As at national level, the problem does not appear to be lack of information (at least in this District). During the drought crisis, the DSDDC met monthly and, putting these sources of information

together, reached a consensus on the relative severity of problems in each Division and Location. However, in 1997, since the whole District was hit by drought, every Location received relief food: the worst-hit areas were prioritized by larger shares (compare the national-level allocation to Districts). When the quantity of food received from Nairobi is less than requested, the DSDDC reduces the allocated ration per person rather than reducing the number of people to be covered. At the Location level, the Chief (being the government representative) takes responsibility for allocating the food among the villages. The actual distribution of food is done at Division headquarters, and information is sent out to the relevant areas for people to come and collect it. Apart from the disabled and old, who can deputize the Chief to collect their rations for them, those who do not come to the distribution are assumed not to be needy. Everyone who does come, apparently, receives some food aid. Reportedly it is women who collect the food rations, and who are considered household heads for the purpose of ration distribution.

Discussions in the villages visited confirm that there was systematic prioritization of areas – for example, people in Nzalaani said that other areas in their Division (Kyuso) had received food earlier than them because their harvest was worse, and that household rations were different in different areas (an observation confirmed by Action Aid field staff). However, the quantities received were very small everywhere, by all accounts. One informant commented:

“Last year we didn’t receive any *[government]* relief food – well, it was only 2kg, and only once - can you call that relief?” *[villager in Ukasi Location, Nguni Division]*

Since this comment came from a village with an IFSP-E FFW project, and the DSDDC take account of where GTZ food is going when they allocate free relief, this community would not be expected to receive large quantities of relief. Nevertheless, the impact of such small handouts must have been negligible while the cumulative cost must have been quite high. Concentrating resources on the communities and people least able to cope with the effects of the drought would produce a more effective and efficient targeting outcome.

Even assuming no leakage and perfect accountability, the distribution system within the District seems designed to spread relief as widely as possible: it can hardly be criticised for not selectively targeting only the neediest places and people, since it is not intended to do so, and local government officials have no instructions or incentives from central government to do so. There are a number of capacity and training issues in local government targeting which could be addressed through technical guidelines, capacity building projects in selected food-insecure areas, training, workshops etc. However, without the backing of a targeting policy from Nairobi such local initiatives may have limited success.

Food for Work

Mwingi was the only focus area in the three-country study where the team was able to look closely at targeting in the context of FFW. Key issues were the relative effectiveness of self-targeting in relation to community selection of participants, and the scope for using FFW in place of free distributions.

Food-for-Work is used by GTZ’s IFSP-E in Mwingi as a tool for addressing both acute and chronic food insecurity [Aguko 1998, ref 83]. Food inputs are programmed to support community-based projects according to the general food situation in the area²⁰, so that there is a safety-net aspect to the design of the program. In 1997, the project’s FFW Co-ordinator estimated they had provided about 800 MT in total for about 6,000 households by this means. Discussions with both

²⁰ Since the project started in Mwingi, FFW has been implemented during three food-stress periods: October 1994 to July 1995; August 1996 to March 1997; and April to December 1997 [IFSP-E 1998, Report on the Workshop on FFW Operations, June]

project staff and beneficiaries raised a number of points about targeting which are helpful in considering FFW as a food distribution mechanism:

- **Planning and preparedness** are important: IFSP-E is now inviting communities to submit project proposals at the same time as resources are requested from GTZ, so that “shelf-projects” should be ready when the food arrives. In general, the technical and managerial capacity needed to implement worthwhile projects quickly is one of several limitations on using FFW in emergency situations (see section 2.2.b.).
- FFW in this particular area is regarded as “**women’s work**”, whereas work paid in cash is “men’s work” (this is not true everywhere, but it is fairly common). On the one hand, this helps to ensure that the food aid goes to women: on the other hand, there is a risk of excessively increasing their workload. The IFSP-E Annual Report for 1997 expresses concern about “the social cost of FFW in terms of childcare and women’s health, given the high rates of female participation” [p.56]
- **Seasonal targeting** is crucial. IFSP-E is careful to implement its projects when they do not compete for labor with essential farming activities (i.e. primarily in the dry season, with only part-time work in the farming season). This, too, is a general point important in the planning of emergency FFW (again, see section 2.2.b.).
- **Initial area targeting** - selecting the most vulnerable Sub-locations - is regarded as the most important level of targeting in IFSP-E’s work, and was carried out at the beginning of the project using agricultural and nutritional surveys. Self-help groups from communities elsewhere in the District can also apply for project support for specific activities.
- **Beneficiary / participant selection** for the FFW activities is designed to be done partly through self-targeting and partly through community selection. These strategies are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.

Self-targeting can be achieved through FFW in general by adjusting either or both of two factors: the work requirement (the cost element for participants), and the payment rate (benefit element). In Mwingi, IFSP-E’s experience is that the work requirement has a limited targeting effect: better-off people may not want to do the work, but they sometimes register for participation and then employ poorer people to work on the project for them (so the work is targeted on the poor, but the food is shared with the better-off). This kind of arrangement may be out of tune with the intentions of the project designers, but it seems to arise partly from traditional ways of organizing communal work in this area. According to local values, everyone should participate in community projects (by contributing either labor, or money) if they expect to share in the results. There was some concern among project staff that trying to target FFW participation on the poor only could undermine this ethos of communal work, as well as the local *mwethya* (mutual assistance) organizations which are based on kinship and neighborhoods rather than economic status. It was also noted that in times of food shortage (which is exactly when FFW is most likely to be implemented) the self-targeting effect is weaker, because everyone is looking for employment and food.

Setting self-targeting *payment rates* for FFW is also more difficult in practice than theory suggests. In principle, the value of the food payment should be at or below the minimum wage which the participants could earn elsewhere, in order to encourage people with alternative income opportunities to exclude themselves from FFW and take the better-paid employment on the labor market. IFSP-E’s experience with this reflects two common difficulties. The first is that wage rates as well as employment opportunities in rural food-insecure areas are highly seasonal, and may also vary greatly from year to year depending on general conditions (in times of general food shortage, both are likely to be low). In Mwingi, the casual daily labor rate was estimated by IFSP-E staff to vary between 60 /- and 100 /- per day. A GTZ consultant found that actual wage rates in the more remote areas in June/ July were between 30/- and 60/-, while the FFW ration was estimated to be worth 60/- to 80/- during the same period [GTZ 1998, Evaluation of IFSP-Eastern

Regional Food Assistance]. The FFW payment would thus appear to be quite a good daily rate compared to casual work during most of the year, especially when the extra costs and risks of working outside the village are taken into account. None of the beneficiaries or community leaders interviewed mentioned the payment rate as a factor in deciding whether or not to participate in the projects.

The second problem with setting a self-targeting payment rate in relation to the labor market is that it may be incompatible with nutritional criteria which also enter into the decision: in the IFSP-E's case, the ration was established on the basis of 1,900 KCal per person per day, for a family of six [Aguko, ref 83]. This is a perfectly reasonable basis on which to fix food payments, but it is difficult to simultaneously match the value to the labor market.

Community management and self-reliance are an important part of the overall IFSP-E approach. Therefore, when community projects are implemented with FFW, the final decision on who should participate (as well as other aspects of the project management) rests with the community, through FFW management committees formed to run the projects:

“The decision concerning participant targeting is left as much as possible to the communities (committees), who are expected to hold thorough and transparent discussions with the community members to avoid the exclusion of certain groups and families. The program staff (social and technical) is always represented in these forums” [Aguko, ref 83]

Participatory wealth-ranking has been extensively used by the project to identify vulnerable groups and prioritize project needs. However, the expectation that this would also be used as a basis for community targeting decisions seems to have been realized only to a small extent. The FFW Co-ordinator commented that only recently, after three years of work, have some committees started to make targeting decisions based on the types of criteria identified during wealth-ranking (e.g. excluding someone because their son has a job or their cow recently calved). More often, participation is open to everyone.

Beneficiaries in the villages visited were very positive about the FFW projects, especially as compared to government relief distributions, because the quantities of food received by participating households was enough to make a significant difference in a time of hardship, and because they could see the value of the work and its outcome. However, no-one we talked to supported the idea of selecting only the poor to participate. Development objectives, as well as the values and perceptions of the community, can weigh against the aim of targeting the vulnerable. As one local leader put it,

“If you're going to get the community involved in this kind of project [*building a rock water-catchment*] you can't allocate food only for the poor and weak – you won't get the work done. Anyway, everyone's hungry” [Project Chairman, Mulinde village, Nguni Division]

To sum up the targeting aspects of FFW in this focus area, the most important level of targeting was the selection of beneficiary *communities* (i.e., Stage-2 area targeting using objective survey data for administrative selection). Within the project communities, the self-targeting effect of FFW had not been clear, and it cannot be assumed that it is automatically the poorest who participate in such projects. Community management had been important in deciding on participation by all or most members of the villages involved, and the objective of completing the work could sometimes be in contradiction to the idea of selecting only the poorest.

3.2.d. Focus area 2: Garissa District

Garissa, an arid and mainly pastoralist District in the North-Eastern Province, was hit by both the drought and floods during 1997/98. Garissa town was the head-quarters of the airlift operations at the height of the flood emergency. The main focus of the study in Garissa was targeting by nutritional criteria, particularly of Supplementary Feeding.

Supplementary feeding (SF) distributions of Unimix (a blended food of maize, beans and sugar fortified with vitamins), resourced by UNICEF, were an important part of the relief operation for both drought and flood victims in Garissa.

Supplementary Feeding is a demographic targeting method which selects nutritionally vulnerable age-groups - children under five years old and (usually) pregnant and lactating women – for a special nutritionally balanced and fortified ration. Perhaps the most important point about the targeting of SF is that it can only be effective if the target households also have adequate access to general rations (either through their normal sources or food aid distributions) – as stressed by the definition of SF as “the provision of foods to specific vulnerable groups *in addition to the general ration*, with the aim of preventing or reducing excess mortality” [Jaspars & Young, ref. 152, p.136, italics added]. When general rations are not adequate or are poorly targeted, SF rations are shared among household and community members and the program has no impact on the nutritional status of the target group.

In 1992-95 UNICEF had organized a major blanket SF operation for all women and children under 5 in Garissa: UNICEF’s Resident Program Officer commented that this operation had been difficult to phase out because people had become dependent on it. In any case, in 1997 resources did not allow a similar scale of assistance, so SF was targeted both at area level (selection of areas with the highest prevalence of child malnutrition), and at beneficiary level (each child was screened, and only those below 80% of the reference weight-for-height were fed). Mikono, one of the NGOs implementing this UNICEF / MoH program in Garissa, added that when they identified a malnourished child they also provided Unimix for other children in the household, because a single ration would have been shared among the siblings and thus would have had no impact on the target child. The feeding program was taken to the nomadic communities by mobile health centers, dates and locations of which were announced in advance at public *barazas* (meetings).

Area targeting according to the prevalence of malnutrition (i.e. the percentage of children in an area below a cut-off point of nutritional status) was used for WFP’s general distribution program in Garissa as well as for UNICEF’s SF program. This was somewhat problematic since nutritional survey data from different agencies and different areas was not necessarily available at the same time, and did not necessarily use the same methodology (so that the results were not strictly comparable). For example, Mikono was funded by UNICEF to conduct a nutritional survey of the southern Divisions in June 1998 (during the 2nd phase of flood relief). Based on the results, which showed that 38.9% of children under five were acutely malnourished, WFP proposed to increase rations for the Southern Divisions to 100% and reduce those for the North to 25%. CARE, which was managing food distributions in both northern and southern Divisions, was concerned about the possible effects of such a reduction in aid to the northern areas. They therefore conducted a rapid nutritional survey with MSF-Belgium, which found a global child malnutrition rate of 36% in the northern communities surveyed (not significantly different from the southern rate). However, different methods were used both for sampling and for measuring the children (Mikono used WFH while CARE/ MSF used MUAC). The ration rates for the continuing distributions were eventually fixed at 100% for the Southern Divisions and 50% for the Northern. WFP’s expert adviser on these issues (see section 3.2.a. and refs 112 to 116) commented on the difficulties caused by lack of standardization among the various nutritional assessments used for area prioritization, and this report supports her **RECOMMENDATION that national guidelines be established on standard methodologies to be used for nutritional surveys in the context of relief needs assessments, and if funding allows, a core team of nutritionists should be established**

(possibly among the staff of the Applied Nutrition Program in the University of Nairobi) who could be deployed when needed to provide technical training, familiarization with the new guideline (once agreed), back-up and standardization for NGOs. The development of such guidelines and back-up capacity should be seen as an important disaster preparedness measure. The most appropriate institutions to take this forward would presumably be the Ministry of Health with UNICEF and WFP.

ALRMP monitoring (in all the arid Districts covered by ALRMP / DPIRP) includes a rapid assessment of nutritional status (using MUAC measurement) in its regular monthly monitoring. This identifies areas with worrying nutritional trends which can then be followed up by a more thorough assessment, and was considered very useful by the NGO and UN informants interviewed. Garissa appears to be the District where ALRMP is least well established so far: problems with access to data and late reporting were mentioned by potential users. During the flood crisis, monitoring was unavoidably halted due to the impossibility of reaching the communities. As far as the study team could establish, ALRMP information had not been used either by the government or by WFP / UNICEF and their partners for targeting relief within the District.

For the **general free distributions** by both WFP and government, beneficiary (Stage 3) targeting was left to communities. The District Commissioner commented that local leaders were instructed to give the government food to the needy, but that the clans had their own way of distribution. In WFP / NGO areas it was noted that village committees in the Northern Divisions tended to share food aid equally among everyone, while in the south they gave some food to everyone but with larger shares for the needy. At CARE's Masabubu Distribution Center in Bura Division the Food Distribution Committee (six men and four women chosen by the community) explained that, apart from business people and civil servants who did not claim aid, everyone in the community had received something out of the flood relief food. Larger rations had been given to the old, disabled, orphans and generally those with no-one to care for them. The committee also commented that some people who still had livestock had voluntarily given part of their rations to these vulnerable groups.

In comparing the **flood relief operation** to drought relief, three major points arose from discussions:

- Access and logistics were a huge problem in the flood response, so much so that area targeting in practice depended mainly on accessibility during the acute phase of the crisis. Some areas could not even be reached by air-drop as there was no dry land on which to drop supplies.
- Poverty and coping capacity were of little relevance to people's relief needs, in areas where food stocks and access to markets had been swept away.
- Unlike a drought situation, food was only one of several urgent needs, others being water and sanitation, shelter, and medicines.

Differences between the targeting of flood and drought relief are discussed in general in Chapter 2.

An issue raised both by the District Commissioner and NGO / UN informants is the problem of **commodity choice**. Since the Somali people of Garissa do not normally eat maize (which is the grain most often available as food aid), a large proportion of food aid is sold in exchange for other foods (rice and pasta, which need less fuel and water for cooking, being the preferred staples). As one of the reasons for proposing Cash-for-Work in Garissa in place of food aid, CARE comments:

"During free food distributions or FFW, people sell a proportion of the food to buy other food and necessary items. This food is sold at a much lower price – often less than a fifth of what it cost to get the food to them. CFW omits the need for this wasteful transaction and allows people to purchase what they need. [Also] it is easier and quicker to establish than FFW". *[CARE Kenya 1998, ref 90].*

Targeting aspects of commodity choice in emergency operations are discussed further in Chapter 2, section 2.2.d.

Finally, the District Education Officer was interviewed about the targeting impact of **School Feeding** in Garissa. (The District has a regular School Feeding Program but was not targeted for the expanded program under the drought EMOP). His comments agreed with the findings among pastoralists in Karamoja, Uganda (see Appendix 2.2.a.) – i.e. that school enrolment was low (perhaps 30% of the age-group), but that children from poorer families were at least as likely to be in school as their richer contemporaries.

3.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED TARGETING

In addition to the recommendations made above about strengthening the linkage of drought monitoring information to decision-makers and standardizing nutritional surveys, the following measures are suggested to improve targeting in Kenya.

As noted above, the weak link in Kenya's food security information systems lies in the *use* of data and information rather than their availability. The unevenness and heterogeneity of information from multiple sources (see section 3.1.c.) also makes it difficult to gain an objective comparative overview of relative food aid needs in different parts of the country. During the 1997/8 drought relief, this led to a perception that areas covered by NGOs strong in collecting credible food security information and directing it effectively to decision-makers (particularly Oxfam) received more than a "fair" share of international food aid, i.e. that the Stage 1 targeting was uneven. It is suggested that a constructive way to address this problem is to encourage other NGOs to be similarly pro-active in the use of monitoring information from their own areas when food crises threaten, and to establish a capacity at national level to systematically screen and compare information from different sources so as to provide as objective a ranking of area needs as possible. This role is to some extent played by FEWS, which collates information from all relevant sources. However, it is also **RECOMMENDED that priority be given to establishing the mandate and capacity to screen and compare information from different areas within the proposed Drought Management Secretariat in the government system.** This Secretariat would then be the central screening unit for assessing slow-onset disasters such as drought-related food crises. A similar role for sudden-onset disasters (such as floods) could appropriately be established in the NOC.

25

It is also **RECOMMENDED that the DMS together with counterpart/ partner organizations in the international food security community should develop a national-level 'RAT' (rapid assessment team) capacity** with a similar purpose to that at District level – i.e. to follow up early warning signals from at-risk areas in order to assess and quantify relief or other response needs. An agreed analytical framework and procedure for joint assessment missions co-ordinated in this way could form the basis for a stronger objective comparison of different areas at the planning stage of food aid operations. National RATs could also, when needed, assess areas not covered by the regular DPIRP / ALRMP drought-monitoring system.

26

One specific data gap which hampers assessment of targeting is the lack of comprehensive and accessible records on international food aid distributions under various programs. It is therefore **RECOMMENDED that WFP Kenya (possibly under its new VAM unit), and/or FEWS, establish a data-base system for tracking deliveries of food aid to as small a level of disaggregation as practical, and making such data easily and quickly accessible for analysis.**

27

Targeting food aid to pastoralists is an important issue in all three countries which is outlined in general terms in Chapter 2. In Kenya (and in Tanzania) Oxfam have a policy of starting food aid

distributions to pastoralist communities early in a food crisis, and continuing after market and pasture conditions have improved, with the central aim of enabling beneficiaries to maintain their livestock holdings and avoid forced sales of breeding stock. There is some controversy about the effects of this strategy compared to the alternative of market interventions to purchase livestock early in a crisis, thus supporting purchasing power and facilitating controlled de-stocking (such as has been done under DPIRP). Given the broad terms of reference of this study, it was not possible to go into this issue in depth. It is therefore **RECOMMENDED that a study be funded to compare the targeting and distributional effects of these two alternative approaches to assisting pastoralists during food crises, selecting two or more contrasting areas of Kenya for the comparison.**

28

Finally, it is **RECOMMENDED that the GoK develop a disaster preparedness policy, including principles for the use and targeting of food aid.** This could potentially be done with UNDP support, as in Tanzania and Uganda, and could also be an issue for discussion and exchange of views at regional level within the EAC (Chapter 2.).

29

If such a policy, and the political will for improved targeting of government food aid, is established in Nairobi, then there would be considerable scope for capacity and skills development (training and closer involvement in NGO distributions) at District and Division level in selected food-insecure areas. However, without this political momentum there is little outsiders can do about the overall problems of leakage and weak accountability in the government relief system.

APPENDIX 4: REFERENCES

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APPENDIX 5: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

~ TANZANIA ~

DAR ES SALAAM

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| Prime Minister's Office, Disaster Coordination Unit | Mr Samuel Muro | Director |
| | Mr George Mwakandyali | Principal Planning Officer |
| FSD (Food Security Department, Ministry of Agriculture) | Mr D.A. Kajumulo | Director (FSD & SGR) |
| | Mr Kisange | Head of Crop Monitoring & Early Warning Unit |
| | Mr W. Katunzi | Statistician, CMEWU |
| | Mr O. Ntikha | Statistician, CMEWU |
| | Mr G. Magai | Agricultural Economist, CMEWU |
| | Mr M. Mboya | Agro-meteorologist, CMEWU |
| USAID | Ms Lucretia Taylor | Director |
| | Mr James Dempsey | Deputy Director |
| | Mr Joel Strauss | GHAJ Country Coordinator |
| | Dr Diana Putnam | Project Development Officer |
| FEWS | Dr V. Rutachokozibwa | AFFR, Tanzania |
| CARITAS | Mr Eugene B. Kiliwa | Coordinator (Refugee & Emergency) |
| SCF (UK) | Dr Jose Lopez | Food Economist |
| | Mr Charles Rethman | Distribution & Targeting Planner |
| EU | Mr Ranieri Sabatucci | First Secretary |
| WFP | Ms Irene Lacy | Country Director |
| | Mr Raoul Balleto | VAM Officer |

DODOMA REGION

| | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|--|
| NPA | Mr Pascal Chambiri | Regional Coordinator |
| | Mr Nathaniel Hiza | Deputy Regional Coordinator |
| Regional Government | Mr Isdori Shirima | Regional Commissioner |
| | Mr Mayega | Regional Crop Officer |
| District Government | Mr Emanuel Anyandwile | District Administrative Officer, Dodoma Rural |
| | Mr Robert Kwelloa | Community Development Officer, Dodoma Rural |
| | Mr M.D.E. Mchonvu | District Administrative Secretary, Dodoma Urban |
| | Mr Omari Kimweli | District Agriculture & Livestock Development Officer, Dodoma Urban |

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| Dodoma Rural District | Village leaders & members of relief committee | Ibugule village, Dodoma Rural |
| | Village leaders | Nkhome village, Dodoma Rural |
| Dodoma Urban District | Village leaders & community members | Mkoyo village, Hombolo Ward / Division, Dodoma Urban |

ARUSHA REGION

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|---------------------------------|---|--|
| East African Cooperation | Amb Francis Muthaura | Executive Secretary |
| | Amb Fulgence Kazaura | Deputy Executive Secretary (Projects & Programmes) |
| | Dr Sam Nahamya | Deputy Executive Secretary (Finance & Administration) |
| | Mr Peter Kiguta | Economist |
| Regional Government | Mr J.B.S. Kitambi | Regional Planning Officer |
| | Mr L.L. Ngigwana | Regional Agriculture and Livestock Development Officer |
| District Government | Ms Flora Matemu | Acting District Administrative Secretary, Arumeru District |
| | Mr Musa Mshana | Crops Department, Arumeru District Agriculture Office |
| OXFAM | Mr M. Katakweba | Emergencies Programme Co-ordinator |
| | Mr Roger Yates | Water Programme Coordinator?? |
| TCRS | Mr Herbert Chaimu | Acting Coordinator, Drought Relief Project |
| World Vision | Mr Reuben Shoo | Zonal Manager, Arusha Zone |
| | Mr Faustin Reuben | Food Distribution Supervisor, Simanjiro District |
| | Mr T.S. Mbise | Project Coordinator, Shambarai Area Development Programme |
| Simanjiro District | Members of village government | Mirerani village / town, Simanjiro District |
| | Members of village government & WV development committee; villagers in market | Shambarai village, Simanjiro District |

~ UGANDA ~

KAMPALA / ENTEBBE

| | | |
|--------------|---------------------|--|
| USAID | Mr Ron Stryker | SO1 Team Leader |
| | Ms Melanie Mason | GHAI Coordinator |
| | Mr David Mutazindwa | Information Systems & FEWS Coordinator |

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| FEWS | Mr Rob Rose Mr Andrew Mutengu | RFFR, Uganda & Rwanda AFFR, Uganda |
| WFP | Mr Michael Jones Mr Apollo Lawoko | Deputy Country Director Assistant Programme Coordinator |
| Prime Minister's Office, Department of Disaster Management | Mr Bireke-Kaggwa | Commissioner for Disaster Management |
| Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries And Fisheries | Mr Yiga Leonard Mr Augustine Mwendya Ms Elizabeth Lukonji Mr H. Masembe Kajubi | Deputy Commissioner for Crop Production & Marketing Co-ordinator, NEWFIS Socio-economist, NEWFIS Senior Statistician, Planning (Food Security) |
| Uganda Red Cross Society | Mr Valente Oyukutu Mr Reuben S. Mukasa Kironde | Director of Disaster Preparedness and Relief Programme Manager, Disaster Preparedness |
| ACF | Mr Gareth J.D. Owen | Country Director |
| SCF | Mr Robert Mangham | Deputy Country Director |
| UNDP | Prof Joseph Opio-Odongo | Sustainable Development Advisor |
| Ministry of Labour | Dr David A. Ogaram | Commissioner of Labour (UNDP consultant on Disaster Management Policy) |
| EU | Mr John Crosthwaite | First Counsellor (Economics) |
| Norwegian Refugee Council | Mr Charles Luyonga Ssozi | Project Co-ordinator |
| CRS | Mr Nick Ford | Emergency Co-ordinator |

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| <i>KUMI DISTRICT</i> |
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| District Government | Mr Umar Okodel Ms Rose Ochom Ms Florence Oumo Mr John Ogole | Chairman of Local Council (LC5) / Political Head Chief Administrative Officer District Agriculture Officer Monitoring & Evaluation Officer, Agriculture |
| Ongino Sub-County | Mr Lawrence Akol LC chairmen / members & elders Mr William Acoda Community & Local Council members | Political Mobilizer, Ongino Sub-County Ongino, Akire, Akum, & Kalapa Parishes; Papasaka & Kachilakweng villages Assistant Agricultural Officer, Ongino Sub-County Aakum Parish, Ongino Sub-County Kanapa Parish, Ongino Sub-County |

MBALE DISTRICT

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|----------------------------|---|---|
| District Government | Mr G. W. Wopuwa Mr Bruno Mwayita Mr Charles Durumah Karingan | Acting Chief Administrative Officer Principal Labour Officer, Labour Department Labour Officer, Labour Department |
| URCS | Ms Phoebe Namalwa Mr Davies Mutenyo | Office Secretary Volunteer (Youth) |
| Bududa Sub-County | Community, Red Cross & Development Association Members | Bukino Parish, Bududa Sub-County |

TORORO DISTRICT

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|----------------------------|---|--|
| District Government | Ms Roselyn Luhoni Mr James Kalange | Assistant Chief Administrative Officer Agricultural Officer |
| URCS | Ms Jane Atebat | Desk Volunteer |
| Plan International | Mr Disan Mugumya | Program Unit Manager |
| Kwapa Sub-County | Mr Ocuna Konelius Mr Andrew Obko Community & Local Council Members | Treasurer Assistant Youth Leader Chegen Parish, Kwapa Sub-County |
| Iyolwa Sub-County | Mr James Raymond Owor Community Members | Chairman of Poyem Parish Council (LC2) Auiyo Village, Poyem Parish |

~ KENYA ~**NAIROBI**

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| Office of the President (Department of Relief & Rehabilitation) | Mr F.W. Lekoolool Mr Mahboub M. Maalim Ms Janet Angelei Ms Fatuma S. Abdikadir Ms Helen Bushell | National Co-ordinator / Famine Relief Operations Deputy National Project Co-ordinator, ALRMP Drought Management Officer, ALRMP Community Development Co-ordinator, ALRMP Early Warning Adviser, DPIRP |
| USAID | Mr Larry Meserve Mr Greg Gottlieb | REDSO / FFP USAID Kenya Disaster Relief Co-ordinator |
| FEWS | Ms Michele McNabb Mr Nick Maunder Ms Nancy Mutunga | RFFR, Greater Horn of Africa RFFR, Eastern Africa CFFR, Kenya |
| DFID | Mr Steve Nally | Second Secretary (Development) |

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| WFP | Ms Susanne Jaspars Mr Araya Mr Thomas Ochieng Ms Esther Ouma | Food Security Adviser Adviser (in charge of Development) Head of Emergencies Head of School Feeding Programme |
| UNICEF | Mr Alan Lindquist Dr Jane Muita | Emergency Programme Manager Supplementary Feeding Consultant |
| UNDP | Mr Frederick J. Lyons | Resident Representative |
| Oxfam (UK/I) | Mr Adam Leach Mr Mohamed Elmi | Country Representative Deputy Country Representative |
| CARE | Ms Susanne Niedrum Mr Dan Maxwell | Assistant Country Director Regional Food Security Adviser |
| CRS | Mr Peter Kimeu Ngui Dr Susan L. Hahn | Senior Project Officer (Emergency, Institution Building, Justice & Peace) Director, East Africa Regional Office |
| Action Aid | Mr David Mwaniki Mr Lewis M. Aritho Ms Bertha Kadenyi Amisi | Emergencies Operational Support Officer Programme Support Coordinator Research & Advocacy Officer |
| World Vision | Mr John Masas | Technical Assistant to Operations Director |
| CIAT | Ms Louise Sperling | Senior Scientist, Participatory Research & Gender Analysis |
| SCF / WFP | Mr Adrian (Buzz) Sharp | Food Economy Assessment Unit Manager (Southern Sudan) |

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| <i>MWINGI DISTRICT (EASTERN PROVINCE)</i> |
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| District Government | Mr ole Kakimoni Mr James Kithuku Mr Kimalu Ms Grace Muimi Mr Mwongela Mr Shiundu Mr Kitame Mr Francis M. Koma Mr D. K. Muia | DO1 (District Officer 1) Deputy District Public Health & PHC Co-ordinator District Development Officer Deputy District Development Officer Deputy District Agricultural Officer District Education Officer School Feeding Officer District Statistical Officer (Drought Monitoring) District Forestry Officer |
| GTZ (IFSP-E) | Mr Gϋnter Hemrich Mr Elly Aguko Mr Jackson Muchoki Mr George Karanja Ms Annastasia Mulwa Mr Joseph M. Mbindyo Ms Elizabeth K. Kyalo | Agricultural Programme Co-ordinator Food for Work / Water Sector Co-ordinator Zonal Co-ordinator Community Development Co-ordinator Deputy Community Development Co-ordinator Community Development Worker (Nguni office) Community Development Worker (Nguni office) |
| Action Aid (Kyuso) | Mr Stephen Mwita Mr Chikombe Ms Monica Mutambuki | Programme Manager Monitoring & Documentation Senior Community Development Worker |

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| Catholic Diocese of Kitui | Mr Josphat M. Mulyungi | Development Co-ordinator |
| Kyuso Division | Water Project Chairman, Community Health Worker, Traditional Birth Attendant, Elder | Nzalaani village (Action Aid water project / community FFW) |
| Nguni Division | Mr Masinde Mr Simon M. Kiteme | District Officer for Nguni Division Chief of Nguni Location |
| | Water Project Chairman, community supervisor, committee member / elder, and project beneficiaries | Kanako dam (GTZ water project / community FFW), Mwalali Sub-Location, Ukasi Location |
| | Water Project Chairman | Mulinde rock catchment project, Mwalali Sub-Location, Ukasi Location |

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| <i>GARISSA DISTRICT (NORTH-EASTERN PROVINCE)</i> |
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| District Government | Mr Salim Ali | District Commissioner |
| | Mr Mohamed N. Adhan Mr M.M. Shurie Mr David Waneru Mr Stephen M. Musyoka Mr Habat S. Abdi Mr A.M. Godad | District Agriculture Office District Water Officer District Veterinary Office District Livestock Production Office District Education Officer Deputy District Education Officer (school feeding) |
| CARE | Mr Paul Were Mr Anthony Munyoki | Regional Co-ordinator Logistics Officer |
| Mikono International | Mr Akira Hijikata Mr S.A. Warsame Mr A.D. Jillo | Director Deputy Director Medical Co-ordinator |
| UNICEF | Mr Hussein Golicha | Resident Programme Officer |
| WFP | Mr Joseph Nguku | Field Officer (Garissa and Tana River) |
| N.E. Moslem Welfare Society | Mr Mohamed Hassan Sheikh | Vice Chairman |
| KRCS | Mr Simon Kioi | Project Co-ordinator |
| Bura Division | Assistant Chief, Village food distribution committee members and elders Ms Zara Dere Guni | Mansabubu Distribution Centre CARE Food Monitor |

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| FEWS | Mr Gary Eilerts | RFFR, Southern Africa |
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APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEW CHECKLIST

(for discussions with donors / decision-makers / implementers)

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Definition of targeting used -

Not an evaluation - looking for comparison of recent targeting experience in 3 countries, especially:

* Information use in decision-making (what information, where from, gaps?)

* Actual targeting systems (area-level, household level)

* Possible alternative mechanisms, especially:

* Market targeting

* FFW (self-targeting)

* Use of inferior / poor people's commodities (self-targeting)

* Community targeting at household level

QUESTIONS

1. Overview of this organization's food aid operations in response to the 1997 drought (& later flood)
2. How did your organization make targeting / allocation decisions?
3. How did you define your target group?
4. At what level did your organization actually target? (district, village, household etc.)
5. How did you decide WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN?
6. What information did you use to make these decisions, from what source? What other/additional information would you like to have had?
7. How did you implement the targeting (ie actually ensure the target group was reached)?
8. What delivery mechanisms did you use (eg FFW, free distribution, monetization etc....) & what targeting effects did they have?
9. How successful do you think targeting was during this operation?
 - Did it reach the neediest (humanitarian objectives)?
 - Was it cost effective? (minimum resource use for maximum impact)
 - Did targeting problems have any negative impact on development / economy?
10. Do you have any reports evaluating or commenting on the targeting of the 1997/8 operations?
11. Is there anything about the targeting that you would have done differently, or would like to see done differently in the future? Any recommendations for improvement? Lessons learned that might be relevant for neighbouring countries?

APPENDIX 7: SCOPE OF WORK

DRAFT SCOPE OF WORK For a Comparative Analysis of Food Aid Targeting in East Africa

Background

Food aid is provided by the United States Agency for International Development in emergencies to meet the objective of ensuring that the "critical food needs of targeted groups are met" (Office of Food For Peace- Strategic Objective #1). In East Africa, food aid is regularly distributed to protect the food security of populations who have been identified as being vulnerable by host country governments, the World Food Program, NGOs, FEWS and others. Approaches to assessing vulnerability primarily focus on the identification of areas and/or groups requiring emergency food assistance. Careful analysis and planning is required to translate this and other useful information into the design of interventions, especially targeted interventions which maximize the benefit of food aid interventions while minimizing their cost. Two of the elements which are necessary for "improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations" (Office of Food For Peace- Intermediate Result #1) are the selection of the appropriate commodity for the "target" group and the determination of a highly cost-effective mechanism for the delivery of the food aid required.

Emergency interventions in East Africa appear to have certain underlying characteristics:

First, targeting of emergency food aid at all levels most frequently relies on administrative targeting mechanisms and most emergency food aid is distributed free-of-charge. There has been limited experience with targeting emergency food aid through non-administrative mechanisms such as food-for-work or emergency school feeding programs and even less experience with using other self-targeting mechanisms or market forces.

Second, partially because of the limited scale and large annual variations in food aid programs in East Africa, relatively little investment has been made in the establishment a "relief infrastructure." Emergency situations are handled in an *ad hoc* fashion and little quality data is available to analyze vulnerability or relief needs. The attention of both governments and donors is often diverted when a crisis eases – only to require a refocusing when the next crisis hits in a few years time. The amount of time necessary to re-establish procedures, reconstitute committees and rehire staff often results in delayed responses to crisis situations on the part of governments, international organizations, donors and NGOs. A lack of continuity in data collection and analysis means that the criteria for assessing needs are often haphazard and inconsistent.


It is also worth noting that not only are administrative targeting and the provision of free food among the most expensive types of food aid programs, but the success of these programs is highly dependant upon careful contingency and response planning.

Choice of Countries

Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda engaged in emergency relief in 1997 – first for the drought that continued into the beginning of the year and later for the floods that hit the region in the last quarter. In the case of both crises, the often-heard criticism was repeated: responses were too little, too late, or both. At the national level, significant quantities of food aid were distributed but it is clear that it did not reach many of the most seriously affected areas in adequate quantities to have a significant impact on food insecurity. This underscores the importance of identifying where

preparedness and contingency planning mechanisms are needed to improve the identification of cost-effective targeted interventions when likely emergencies are identified.

Although the quantities of food aid moving into Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are generally smaller than the quantities moving into neighboring countries such as Ethiopia or Mozambique, each country has a significant population of chronically vulnerable people. Food insecurity in East Africa is largely caused by climatic factors, although conflict, poverty and poor physical access are contributing factors.



The World Food Program, the largest provider of food aid in all three countries, has distributed emergency food aid in Kenya in five of the past 10 years, in Tanzania in seven of the past 10 years and in Uganda in nine of the past 10 years. Kenya normally has been the largest recipient in terms of quantities of food. WFP is not the only supplier of food aid – donors and NGOs often distribute food aid outside of the WFP or government umbrella and the governments of all three countries have

purchased food or used national reserves for emergency programs. The total amounts of food aid (for emergency and other programs) has ranged from a low of 100,000 MT in 1996 to a high of nearly 500,000 MT in 1993 (see figure 1).

Although the need to improve food aid targeting exists in virtually every country which distributes food aid, this study will focus on the three East African countries because of the following similarities: 1) emergency food aid in all three countries is a recurrent, but still irregular, need; 2) similar structures are in place to target food aid in all three countries; 3) chronically vulnerable areas are relatively well-demarkated in each country 4) similarly low levels of investment in a “relief infrastructure” exist; 5) similar data problems and analytical systems exist in all three countries; 6) most food aid is targeted administratively and provided free of charge. It is hoped that because of these similarities, lessons learned in one country could be relevant to another country. The three countries already have very strong food security linkages, especially through informal food trade, and climatic disturbances often affect all three countries at the same time. Furthermore, as donors begin to program and stockpile food aid on a regional basis, comparative analyses of food needs and comparable systems for targeting will become necessary. Lastly, the revitalization of East African Cooperation suggests greater opportunities for regional partnerships and sharing of information. It is hoped that the results of this study will be useful outside of East Africa and/or that the results would inform similar studies in other countries.

Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of this study is to produce a set of concrete recommendations on improving the targeting of emergency food aid in Kenya, Tanzania and in order to improve its impact on vulnerable populations, to increase its cost effectiveness and to reduce its negative effects on development.

Related to this general objective are a number of other explicit objectives:

1) identify examples from Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya where food aid has been targeted successfully in emergencies (in terms of cost-effectiveness and beneficiary impact) to areas and groups identified as being highly vulnerable, and describe the elements which make these programs successful. This involves examining these cases in the context of addressing such basic questions as:

- How has demographic targeting been used alone or in conjunction with other forms of targeting (e.g. geographic) and how has this affected overall performance and cost-effectiveness of successful food aid interventions?

- How effectively have these cases involved market-based targeting approaches so as to reduce food aid requirements, strengthen basic food security enhancing structures and improve the targeting efficiency of food aid interventions?

2) identify the current and most significant constraints both within and across the three countries to "improved targeting of food aid to vulnerable populations",

3) recommend where FEWS assistance might be provided to help strengthen contingency and response planning processes and mechanisms at the country level that will lead to "improved targeting of food aid to vulnerable groups"

4) determine where there are critical information gaps which impede the ability of host countries working in conjunction with FEWS, NGOs, the WFP and others to develop cost-effective targeting plans for use under emergency conditions, and

5) provide recommendations to REDSO/FFP and BHR/FFP and AFR/SD/CMR which help them better understand "how the various methodologies in needs assessments might be employed or modified to obtain critical information, such as the identification of the most vulnerable groups, a clearer understanding of coping mechanisms and how this might affect the level and type of food commodities being delivered." (FFP FY 2000 Results Report and Resources Request- p.19).

The study will not focus extensively on household level targeting, due to the limited amount of time available. Instead, the study will focus on improving the area level targeting of food aid, and on examining alternative mechanisms to targeting food aid when emergencies occur. Similarly, the study will focus on the targeting of food aid in response to slow onset emergencies like drought. Targeting in other situations, such as in conflicts or in refugee camps, involves other issues which will be beyond the scope of this study.

It is expected that these recommendations would be useful for all actors involved in food aid delivery and targeting, including national governments, international organizations, donors and NGOs. All recommendations will include next steps for improving targeting in each country.

The study will explore alternatives to the currently dominant practice of administrative targeting of free food. The strengths and weaknesses of each alternative mechanism will be discussed. Minimum data requirements to improve targeting will be outlined. Specific recommendations on how what types of information can better inform targeting–decisions in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda through monitoring or vulnerability assessment work will be included.

Methodology

To meet the objectives, the study will include the following steps:

an examination of the current targeting practices in the three countries;

an evaluation of how well basic information needed in the design of a targeted intervention (i.e. answers to the WHERE, WHO, WHAT, WHEN and HOW questions---see Technical Annex) is integrated within the design of the targeted intervention, as well as how information which monitors the IMPACT of the targeting program upon vulnerable groups is used to adjust the targeting strategy/program when necessary.

an evaluation of how well current targeting practices/mechanisms are meeting humanitarian, efficiency and development objectives;

recommendations to improve the targeting systems in each country, fully cognizant of the limited resources available in the region.

The focus of the study will be on area level targeting rather than community or household level targeting. All mechanisms for targeting will be considered. Information will be gathered in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Kampala/Entebbe on the structures, policies and methodologies used by governments, international organizations, donors and NGOs to identify the areas requiring assistance and to design targeting mechanisms to reach the most vulnerable. Government guidelines and policies on food aid and food aid targeting will be reviewed and evaluated, where available. Efforts will be made to understand who controls decisions on food aid allocations from various sources, including the governments' own stocks. At the national capital level, an appreciation of geographic targeting should be garnered and perceptions of local and household level targeting will be sought. Discussions will be held about alternative targeting methods and about data constraints and requirements.

It will not be possible to complete the second or third steps based solely on information gathered in the national capitals. If detailed sets of household survey data were available, it theoretically could be possible to evaluate targeting effectiveness "remotely", using quantitative methods (such as was done in the recent Ethiopia study by Clay, et al). Because such data are not available in East Africa, qualitative methods will be used to assess the impact and effectiveness of targeting. The experiences and insights of local authorities, operational agencies, communities and individuals will be sought through case studies. The 1997 drought/flood emergencies will be used as a reference year for this evaluation.

Where possible, the case studies will take place in areas identified as the most affected during the 1997 drought/flood emergency. Additional case studies will be undertaken in one or more areas per country where targeting efforts were reportedly most effective. Coverage will include areas where NGOs are active in food aid programs, and areas where no NGO operates. A mix of different targeting mechanisms will be reviewed, if possible (e.g., food-for-work as well as free food). Interviews will be held with local authorities, community leaders and NGOs at the district and divisional level to determine how food aid targeting is done and how effective various actors believe the targeting is at reaching the most needy.

Team Structure

The team will include one international consultant and one local consultant. Host country governments and WFP will be invited to participate as members of each in-country study team. The FEWS regional representative for the Greater Horn of Africa will assist with overall design and support, while FEWS country and regional representatives in the three countries will assist at the national level with information collection, identifying contacts, selection of locations for case studies and transportation when possible.

A debriefing should be held in each country at the conclusion of the Mission representatives from: host country governments with responsibility for food aid, USAIDs, WFP, PVOs and others deemed appropriate by USAID Missions. Linkages with regional bodies such as the East African

Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development should be promoted where appropriate.

Schedule and Deliverables

The study should commence on or before July 1, 1998. Roughly three weeks should be allocated per country, with three weeks reserved for preparation of the final report. It is tentatively planned that the team will visit Tanzania (July 1998), Uganda (July-August 1998) and Kenya (August 1998.)

The team will be responsible for the following deliverables:

Ten hard copies of a draft report, and an electronic copy in Word v7.0. and Word Perfect v5.2. The draft should be submitted to the RFFR/GHA in Nairobi no later than September 11, 1998. Debriefings in each of the three countries based on the draft report, to be completed no later than September 18, 1998.

Ten hard copies of the final report, and an electronic copy in Word v7. and Word Perfect v5.2. The final report should be submitted to the RFFR/GHA in Nairobi, no later than September 30, 1998.

A debriefing will be held in Nairobi o/a September 18.

Possible Follow-on Activities

The team may be requested to participate in a regional debriefing/follow-on meeting after the final report has been circulated. It is likely that many of the recommendations emanating from this study will involve follow-on activities. Some of these activities might be relevant to various actors within USAID (GHA, FFP, Missions, FEWS), governments, international organizations or other donors. It might also be useful to focus on the regional issues identified during the course of the study with a regional audience. Although the need for such follow-on activities can not be pre-judged, a regional meeting might be necessary to discuss the findings and follow-on in more depth. The need and interest for such a follow-on meeting will be assessed during the month of September.

Technical Annex

There is an extensive literature on food targeting which has grown over the last twenty years. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Stanford's Food Policy Research Institute, The World Bank, Michigan State University and other USAID financed research has analyzed a wide range of targeting issues. USAID's interest in targeting has evolved from the research undertaken under the "Consumption Effects of Economic Policy Project" to more recent analysis done by the "Agricultural Policy Analysis Project". In recent literature, targeting has been defined by Jaspars and Young²¹ as "restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who are perceived to be most at risk, in order to maximize the benefit of the intervention whilst minimizing the costs." Sharp²² gives three general reasons for targeting:

Humanitarian reasons: so that the really needy are assisted and the less needy do not benefit unfairly;

Resource and efficiency reasons: so that scarce resources are used in such a way that they have the greatest impact on the problem to be addressed;

²¹ Jaspars, S. and H. Young, 1995, *General Food Distributions in Emergencies: from Nutritional Needs to Political Priorities*, ODI/EuronAid Relief and Rehabilitation Network, Good Practice Review 3, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK

²² Sharp, K., 1997, *Targeting Food Aid in Ethiopia*, Save the Children Fund (UK), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Development reasons: so that dependency and economic disincentive effects...are minimized.

Conceptually, the basic definition of and rationale for targeting is clear. In practice, however, targeting is extraordinarily difficult and perfect targeting systems are virtually impossible to implement, even in countries with well-developed information and delivery systems. Errors of exclusion or inclusion must be accepted, although the goal of any targeting system must be to reduce both. Beyond the basic definition of targeting, there is no universally agreed upon terminology to define more detailed concepts of targeting

From an operational point of view, the questions, which those involved in allocating food aid on an objective basis want to know, are:

- 1) WHERE is vulnerability to drought (flood) the greatest,
- 2) WHO are the groups most vulnerable to this risk,
- 3) WHAT type of (food aid) assistance is needed,
- 4) WHEN is it needed, and
- 5) HOW can it be provided in order to ensure that food insecurity is reduced, development mechanisms are reinforced, and that the intervention is cost-effective.

It is clear that the effectiveness of targeting strategies will improve the greater the extent to which information is available to answer these questions. The conceptual approach should reflect the need to address these basic questions.

Two concepts that provide one organizing structure for addressing these questions are the LEVEL of targeting and the MECHANISM used to target. The LEVEL of targeting primarily relates to the WHERE and the WHO, whereas the MECHANISMS relate to the HOW. Answers to the WHAT and the WHEN also influence targeting design decisions specifically related to the level and mechanisms used to target.

Targeting can occur at many different LEVELS. Donors may target food aid resources to one country over another; governments, donors or NGOs may target food aid to one administrative region over another; local authorities may target food aid to one household over another; and a household may target food to one individual member over another. In general, however, most targeting decisions focus around the middle two levels, commonly known as area targeting or household targeting.

There has been a long-standing debate about whether resources are best spent on improving area level targeting (also known as geographic targeting), or on household targeting. Theoretically, this depends on the homogeneity of the unit. When inequality within areas or communities is less than inequality between areas, greater gains can be made in impact and efficiency by discriminating between areas than between households (Sharp, 1997). A recent study in Ethiopia²³ strongly argued that resources would be best spent on area targeting. That study recommended that "more emphasis should be placed on identifying the most food insecure *weredas* (area targeting) as the first step in the food aid targeting process. Efficient area targeting has a greater likelihood of reaching vulnerable households, and possibly at lower cost, than does household-level targeting." Because the efficiency of area targeting depends on the homogeneity of a region, the smaller the administrative region of analysis, the more likely the inhabitants will be homogeneous.

Many different MECHANISMS can be used to target at various levels, including market targeting, demographic targeting, self-targeting and administrative targeting. In reality, a combination of mechanisms, employed at the same or different levels, often ensures the most successful targeting. A basic consideration is degree of control over the targeting process; namely the degree

²³ Clay, D., Daniel Molla and Debebe Habtewold, 1998, *Food Aid Targeting in Ethiopia: A Study of Household Food Insecurity and Food Aid Distributions*, Working Paper 12, Grain Market Research Project, Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

to which targeting is CONTROLLED (i.e. determined administratively or through other means) or left UNCONTROLLED (i.e., self-targeting) *Administrative targeting* means that someone must select the beneficiaries of a program, ideally using some type of objective criterion. For financial and administrative cost reasons, self-targeting approaches will be less costly than controlled approaches. Markets can be used in either controlled or self-targeting programs. Recent research from East and Southern Africa points out that "market reforms have already helped to reduce and stabilize consumer prices in the region through the development of informal marketing channels for low-cost commodities such as yellow maize and whole maize meal" (Jayne and Jones, 1997, p. 1521) Market based approaches which do not involve subsidies are generally preferred over those which involve subsidies. Other more costly market- based approaches releasing food into the market to bring down prices and subsidizing prices for certain commodities. *Non- market related self-targeting* usually involves using low preference foodstuffs or food-for-work or cash-for-work programs to encourage the participation of the most needy.

Demographic targeting means selecting beneficiaries according to group characteristics such as pregnant and lactating women, malnourished children, female headed households, etc. Demographic targeting is often based on either assumptions about WHO requires targeted assistance, such as in the case of children under the age of five as well as pregnant and lactating mothers. Demographic targeting can also be appropriate when explicit information about the needs of specific vulnerable groups is known. It can also be used in conjunction with geographic targeting when information about high-risk areas is available.