

BRIEFING NOTES

CONFLICT PREVENTION:

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS AND APPLICATIONS

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The views presented herein are those of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the United States Agency for International Development or the Academy for Educational Development.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to make available a set of materials relating to conflict, crisis, chaos, and complex emergency prevention (C4P) as discussed at the November 4 Mission Directors Conference, which USAID personnel can draw on as they begin the analytic process for developing their strategic planning frameworks or reviewing progress of existing strategic plans. This briefing note is a product of a broader Agency discussion and decision to engage at a policy and programmatic level on prevention. This engagement moves the Agency into the realms and collaborative efforts with others using parts of preventive diplomacy, sustainable development, and economic and political transition paradigms, all of which contribute to address root causes and vulnerabilities of conflict. The following represents a series of theoretical frameworks and applications of how development tools are used as preventive measures by practitioners, but does not attempt to provide analyses—or pros and cons—of application.

The paper outlines, in Section I, Theory, a set of the better-known conceptual frameworks and approaches for prevention. Section II, Applications, presents a brief annotation of activities within the Agency and outside groups that are working on prevention.

After several years of efforts in this area, USAID has been undertaking a number of innovative approaches but has not been able to install systematically the institutional culture and capacity within the Agency to address the various aspects of prevention. The provision of these conceptual approaches and frameworks is one product of a modest proposal to install systematically that culture of prevention and change internal work procedures to improve C4P performance, the core of which is more objective analysis through a conflict prism by our USAID missions and more transparent and candid review of our country strategies.


As part of the decision to improve USAID's internal C4P performance, PPC has been designated as the focal point in the Agency to coordinate those efforts and provide policy guidance and technical assistance. PPC, in cooperation with other Bureaus and outside experts, is tasked with providing missions analytic and technical support to use the frameworks and conceptual approaches as part of their strategic planning and results framework process. Additional information on analytic and applied frameworks to assist missions can be obtained by contacting Bill Renison in PPC (202-712-0986) or Kasey Fink at R&RS (202-661-5856).

I. Theory: Conceptualizing Conflict and Conflict Prevention

Lund, Michael. 1996. *Preventing Violent Conflicts*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.

In *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, Michael Lund explores the concept of preventive diplomacy. He offers a three-part conflict prevention framework, which includes the cycle of conflict, types of interventions, and the subtypes of preventive diplomacy.

Lund defines the cycle of conflict as the evolution of a conflict from stable peace through war and returning to stable peace. He explains the relationship between the intensity and duration of a conflict and then suggests appropriate levels of intervention. Lund's version of the conflict life cycle contains five graduations of amicability or animosity in relationships. In determining the classification of a conflict or potential conflict, the following issues must be considered: awareness of differences, separate identities, political polarization, value of congruence, mutual trust, and hostile behavior. The figure below illustrates Lund's life cycle.



Once a conflict is conceptualized in terms of the conflict cycle, an appropriate intervention can be determined. Lund identifies three types of interventions: peacetime relations, preventive diplomacy, and crisis management. Peacetime diplomacy occurs when all parties of a potential conflict have an interest in maintaining stability. Crisis management, or

dispute resolution, involves efforts to mitigate and manage disputes that have reached a crisis level. When placed on a continuum of interventions, crisis diplomacy and peacetime diplomacy are the two extreme interventions.

The midpoint of this continuum is preventive diplomacy. The primary objective of preventive diplomacy is to reduce the potential for violence in actual or potential conflicts and to contribute

to a durable peace. Lund classifies most preventive interventions as preventive diplomacy. These interventions are most appropriate in regions facing unstable peace or in transition situations where violence has ended but peace building efforts have not been successful at moving the parties to the stable peace category.


Finally, Lund draws a distinction between three types of preventive diplomacy: crisis prevention, preemptive engagement, and preconflict peace building. The table below outlines these interventions and offers guidance as to their appropriate implementation. One type of preventive diplomacy—preconflict peace building—is most relevant to development practitioners.

Table 2-2. Subtypes within Preventive Diplomacy

	Crisis Prevention	Preemptive Engagement	Preconflict Peace Building
Primary Objectives	Block violent acts, reduce tensions	Address specific disputes, channel grievances into negotiations, engage parties	Create channels for dispute resolution, build political institutions, define norms, change attitudes, reduce sources of conflict
Techniques	Economic sanctions, coercive diplomacy, deterrence	Special envoys, mediation, arbitration	Problem-solving workshops, arms control regimes, CEBs, conflict resolution training, human rights standards, collective security
Examples	North Korea negotiations Macedonia peacekeeping	OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Observers	NGOs Balkans Peace project NPT OSCE standards
Intensity of Conflict	Near crisis, low-level violent acts, taking up-of arms, threats, violence probable	Low-level conflict over particular issues, tensions, polarization, violence possible	Coastal peace, diffuse political instability, uncertainty, distrust, animosity, violence possible
Time Frame	Short term	Short to medium term	Short to medium term

Baker, Pauline and John Ausink. 1996. “State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model.” *Parameters U.S. Army War College Quarterly* 26(1): 19-31.

In this article, Baker and Ausink outline a predictive model of ethnic violence and state collapse. This model emphasizes the relationship between the state and society and recognizes the linkage between struggles for power, the state as an institution, and violent conflict. The model informs practitioners through a conceptual framework, longitudinal analysis, ten indicators of state collapse, and an overview of the role of the international community. The illustration below represents the merger of these four objectives.



The framework is divided into five stages that correspond to various aspects of the conflict: root causes, immediate causes, transition, transformation of the state, and outcomes. At stage three, the focus of the model shifts away from the determinants of the conflict to the transition phase, which can occur violently or nonviolently. Based on the level of violence present in stage three, the transformation of the state, in stage four, may be in terms of a violent domination or a democratic process. Baker recognizes that many conflicts spend a period of time between stages three and four, often with varying levels of violence. The framework concludes with a continuum of possible outcomes that range from chaos to constitutionalism. Each of these stages is accompanied by a suggested role for the international community.

Creative Associates International. April 1997. *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners*. Washington: United States Agency for International Development.

The first three sections of this guide present an analytical framework for developing effective strategies for conflict prevention and mitigation. This framework identifies the factors within a society that promote and sustain social peace, thus reducing conflict. The first component of this framework categorizes these determinants as systemic (structural), proximate (enabling), or immediate (triggering).

Systemic causes are those that concern changes in actors' material resources, examples of which might include environmental deterioration, population growth, resource scarcity and competition, and poverty. The implications of systemic determinants on conflict are long term and affect large portions of the population. Proximate determinants of conflict are those that relate to political and institutional incapacities to mediate the effect of systemic determinants on the population. These determinants often include inadequate social, political, and communications processes in the form of government policies, social organization, economic reform programs, liberalization, or militarization. Proximate sources of conflict are more visible than systemic sources. Finally, immediate determinants of conflict are those events and actions that trigger the onset of violence. Examples of immediate determinants include events such as a government crackdown of an oppressed group.

After analyzing these three factors, one must determine whether the potential conflict is internal to a country or if it is a regional concern. The table below illustrates the implementation of this framework and how the determinants overlap. While the authors use ethnicity in their example, this framework for analysis can be used for any source of conflict.

Illustrative Factors Shaping Peaceful and Violent Conflict Outcomes		
Type of Cause	Sources of Conflict	
	Within Country or Region	Extra-Regional
<i>Systemic</i> causes: structural conditions	<i>Ethnic group imbalance:</i> Is the society composed of one majority group and one minority ethnic group, or is it more heterogeneous, with three or more active sizable groups competing for political space through shifting coalitions?	<i>Global and regional isolation:</i> Does the state enjoy political, commercial, and trade relations with neighboring countries and with countries outside the region? Does the state participate in regular meetings and forums or is the state politically or economically isolated?
<i>Proximate</i> causes: Political and institutional factors	<i>Ethnic political parties:</i> Are the most important national parties organized around ethnic groups, or do parties organize around shared nonethnic interests such as political ideologies?	<i>Cross-conflict spillover:</i> Are conflicts crossing borders to increase levels of conflict in neighboring countries or are leaders taking steps to avoid conflict outcomes they observed in nearby regions with similar group conflicts?
<i>Immediate</i> causes: acts and events	<i>Leadership extremism:</i> Do conflicting parties' leaders show moderation in their words and actions and seek bilateral or multilateral negotiations to resolve disputes, or do they engage in demagogic rhetoric, proactive acts, or coercion to achieve their objectives?	<i>Absence of third party engagement:</i> Have third parties become engaged early in a dispute or is the international community standing by to await developments in a local conflict?

Source: Adapted from guide page 2-8:2-10

Creative Associates also devised a set of development tools that are to be used in conflict prevention efforts, which are outlined in the final section of this paper.


United States Institute for Peace (USIP).

John Lederach, in association with USIP, has developed a conceptual framework for analyzing conflict transformation—the process of shaping the outcome of potential and actual conflicts. Conflict transformation can be conceptualized through a series of lenses: personal, relational, structural, and cultural. Each of these lenses refers to an aspect of conflict or potential conflict that should be examined in terms of describing change and intervention. Lederach discusses the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of each lens.

The personal refers to the changes affecting an individual’s emotional, perceptual, and spiritual conditions. The relational addresses changes in the relationship between two parties, including communications and interactive aspects of conflict. Structural refers to the root causes of the conflict—patterns of changes in the social structure. Finally, the cultural dimension addresses changes in cultural patterns as a result of the conflict and the ways in which culture affects how a conflict is managed.

Lederach applies these to a larger framework that encompasses the actors in conflict transformation, the linkage of crisis with long-term outcomes, and a strategy for conflict transformation.

The illustration at the right is Lederach’s comprehensive, integrated conflict transformation strategy. The horizontal axis refers to approaches to conflict transformation that are linked to specific time periods. Crisis intervention is an immediate intervention, usually occurring two to six months before the outbreak of violence. Preparation training is a short range approach that encompasses one to two years. The final two time periods are perhaps the most helpful to development practitioners attempting to integrate conflict prevention into the strategic planning process. The design of



social change is a medium range approach that encompasses five to ten years. Finally the desired outcome or system/relationship approach carries a long-term scope of over 20 years.

The vertical axis of this approach reflects the continuum of issues related to a conflict, from the micro level to system-wide. At the intersection of these axes, Lederach provides questions that one might ask in order to begin applying this framework to the development context: What are the root causes of the crisis? What are the social structures and relationships we desire? How do we get from crisis to desired change? How do we manage the immediate crisis? How do we prevent the crisis from recurring?

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. December 1997. *Preventing Deadly Conflict*. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York.

In *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, the Carnegie Commission identifies the following ten factors that indicate a society's risk for conflict.

1. Weak, corrupt, or collapsed states
2. Acute discrimination against classes of citizens
3. Poorly managed religious, cultural, or ethnic differences
4. Politically active religious communities that promote hostile or divisive messages
5. Political or economic legacies such as colonialism or the Cold War
6. Sudden economic or political shifts
7. Widespread illiteracy, disease, or disability
8. Lack of resources including arable land or water
9. Large weapon stockpiles and ammunition
10. Threatening regional relationships

In order to manage the complex relationships between these factors, an effective conflict prevention strategy must include early reaction to risk areas, a comprehensive approach that addresses all risk factors, and an extended effort to make linkages to and resolve the root causes of the conflict. Conflict prevention strategies may take one of two approaches: operational or structural.

An operational conflict prevention strategy is employed when violence appears imminent. Any intervention at this stage of a conflict must avoid worsening the conflict. The four key elements of an operational strategy include: a lead player, whether an NGO or individual, that can serve as a mobilizer for preventive action; a comprehensive approach that strives to end violence, provide for humanitarian needs, and integrate political and military aspects of the problem; the provision of adequate resources devoted to the prevention effort; and a plan to restore authority to the host country. Tools used in operational strategies include early warning systems, preventive diplomacy, economic instruments, and force.

A structural conflict prevention strategy addresses one of three core structural inadequacies: 1) security, 2) basic economic, social, and cultural needs, or 3) justice. Inadequacies in the security infrastructure may manifest themselves as widespread access to or stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, conventional confrontation between militaries, or internal violence including terrorism, organized crime, insurgency, or repressive states. Structural inadequacies in terms of basic economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian needs include access to health services, education, and opportunities to earn a livelihood. It is in this realm that traditional development efforts have the greatest potential to prevent conflict. Development efforts provide a long-term solution to structural inadequacies when they are incorporated into the state's internal development policy. Finally, inadequacies in the justice sector include human rights, humanitarian law, nonviolent dispute resolution, transitions to democracy, and social justice.

Jenkins, J. Craig and Doug Bond. 1998. "Conflict Carrying Capacity, Political Breakdowns and Reconstruction: A Framework for the Early Warning of Political System Vulnerability." Paper presented at International Studies Association annual meeting, Minneapolis, 18-21 March.

Conflict carrying capacity (CCC) is a quantitative approach to early warning systems. This indicator measures the "ability of states to regulate and resolve intense conflicts and thus weather civil and other challenges through institutionalized mechanisms for arbitration and negotiation, cooperative control, violent repression and electoral processes" and the ability to "re-establish and reconstruct conflict resolution procedures after a breakdown" (Jenkins 1998, 3). In postconflict situations, CCC can also be used to measure changes in the integrity of the system. Jenkins and Bond draw clear distinctions between their concept of CCC and democratization, as nondemocratic states may, in fact, be effective in conflict regulation.

In order to generate the CCC index, the authors offer a formula using information, such as proportions of action that are reported as challenges to the state's monopoly of conflict regulation, extra-institutional actions of the state in response to civil sector challenges, and proportion of forceful or violent action by all parties to the system. The result is an early warning indicator for state-driven crises, civil sector-driven crises, and jointly driven crises.

II. APPLICATIONS

A. *Working within the Agency*

Barton, Rick and Melissa Brown. “USAID’s Current Strategies and Programs for Political Reconstruction.” Washington: USAID.

The Global Center for Democracy and Governance is in the process of developing an extensive strategic framework for democracy and governance programming that will serve as a tool for political analysis. In their paper, Barton and Brown use this tool to analyze political reconstruction in transition societies. A conflict perspective can be applied to their assessment of opportunities and risks in postconflict states. The assessment addresses three primary issues: 1) issues and actors central to the crisis, 2) agreement that ended hostilities, and 3) the transition environment. The first and final of these provide an interesting framework for a potential conflict analysis.

In attempting to identify the issues and actors involved in the conflict, the checklist for postconflict political assessments suggests that the following be considered:

1. The issues that started the conflict (or point toward a potential conflict). Consider: resource distribution, social/ethnic divisions, historical legacies, changes in the political system, and the decision making process.
2. The political actors in the country. Consider: individuals, groups, latent actors, actors’ interests and related political action, resources available to each actor.
3. The type of political institutions that are in place.
4. The political alignments of these actors. Consider: stability and shifting trends in alignments, degree conformation of alignments with social cleavages, forums available for actors to engage in dialogue.
5. Civil society and local government providing space for actors other than the parties of the dispute to operate. Consider: goals of these actors, support from local populations.

This set of issues presents a practical guide on how to start thinking about identifying risks and areas in which to concentrate conflict prevention efforts. Additional questions that might be asked are as follows:

1. What are the likely sources of future conflict?
2. What is the experience of the local population? Consider: perceptions of physical security, their assessment of civilian/military authorities, expectations.
3. How much space is given for civil society to operate?
4. What is happening in the private sector? Consider: constraints, corruption, harassment

5. What are the economic, social, and political issues facing the country? Are they relevant for all classes of citizens?

Although this tool was developed for democracy and governance programming, it has been adapted to post-conflict transition, and is now examined through a conflict prevention prism, the approach offers a valuable contribution to the conceptualization of conflict prevention within the Agency. It also points to the use of such frameworks by the Agency and their ability to be adapted to local conditions.

Wolf, Thomas. 1996. "Coming to Grips with Conflict: A (Mainly Africa-Related) Conceptual Guide." USAID/Kenya. DRAFT.

Wolf's paper, "Coming to Grips with Conflict: A (Mainly Africa-Related) Conceptual Guide," recognizes the complexity of conflict and the difficulties in active conflict prevention. To assist in understanding conflict as a phenomenon, Wolf offers a framework that encompasses understanding the nature of the conflict, the parties/context of the conflict, and the issues and variables present. Wolf illustrates the implementation of this framework by categorizing conflicts typical to Africa.

According to Wolf, understanding the nature of a conflict requires the identification of six key factors: 1) What are the underlying causes? 2) What are the immediate goals of the contestants? 3) What is the identity/number of actual or potential participants? 4) What are the means or instruments at the disposal of combatants? 5) What is the level of intensity or cost to participants, local bystanders, society, and others? 6) What are the results/impact for participants, the physical environment, and the population? As Wolf points out, collecting the necessary data to answer these questions is an enormous task. However, once these key questions are addressed, a clearer understanding of the conflict, or potential conflict, begins to emerge.

The next step in Wolf's conflict framework requires an analysis of the parties and context of the conflict, which may include any of the following: struggle for control of the state leading to possible or actual state destruction; struggle for control of a state that remains intact; conflict in which the state is the primary antagonist attempting to impose its will on society; and, conflict between societal elements with the state as a potential peacemaker. As Wolf notes, any of these conflicts may be the result of competition for resources (real or symbolic) or communal or other divisions without a specific material goal. The duration and degree of organization of the parties involved may vary greatly.


Wolf cites five key determinants of the impact of violent conflict, in terms of political, economic, and social consequences. These determinants include the weapons arsenal available to combatants, the proximity of the conflict to urban centers, the degree of disruption to economic

and agricultural activities, the number of actual and potential combatants involved, and the will of the public authority to engage in conflict prevention.

Although Wolf's framework seeks to provide insight into understanding existing conflicts, it can be applied in conflict prevention efforts, both in terms of early warning and strategy development. By attempting to place potential conflicts into this framework, the nature of the potential conflict and the interests of its actors can be systematically examined and then incorporated into an appropriate conflict prevention strategy.

Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and the RADARS team

GHAI and the RADARS team have designed a framework for conflict analysis that emphasizes GHAI's prevention objective. The emphasis of this model is the relationship between the warning and the response, structural or baseline issues, and intra-national conflicts resulting from access resources and marginalization.



The graphic at the left represents a development-oriented framework for conflict prevention. Derived from various authors, this framework was created by the Agency as one way to internalize conflict prevention. This model demonstrates the relationship between development and conflict prevention. Development-oriented prevention efforts are most appropriate and effective at the bottom tiers of the pyramid.

FORWARD Collaborative Approaches for Resolving Water Issues

FORWARD is a USAID project that strives to promote equitable and sustainable water management strategies, policies, and plans in selected ANE countries (primarily Egypt, West Bank/Gaza, and Jordan) that are facing serious shortages or conflicts over water allocation. One of the projects primary objectives is to strengthen local capacity for problem-solving and dispute resolution over water issues. Mediator training, negotiation workshops, and dispute resolution

process development are integral components of the FORWARD implementation strategy. The success of this initiative has resulted in the expansion of the FORWARD portfolio to include Lebanon, Morocco, and the Asia region of ANE.

B. Issue Specific

Kriesberg, Louis. 1998. *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

In *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*, Louis Kriesberg offers an empirically grounded understanding of conflict prevention and mitigation through constructive conflict and provides a linkage between conflict resolution theory and practice. Kriesberg defines social conflict as occurring “when two or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible interests.” Kriesberg builds on this premise and illustrates that conflict can often be constructive.

Kriesberg emphasizes the uniqueness of each conflict and points to six ways in which conflicts vary: issues, characteristics of actors, relationships of adversaries, context, means of struggle, and the outcome. In addition, Kriesberg offers the conflict funnel as an illustration of his argument that not all relations between actors are potentially conflictual and even fewer result in destructive conduct. Once the conflict is evaluated in terms of Kriesberg’s six aspects, conflict prevention strategies can be investigated.




Figure 1.5 Conflict Funnel

Kriesberg draws a distinction between destructive and constructive conflicts. Destructive conflicts are pursued through severe means that cause harm to large numbers of participants. These conflicts involve coercion and violence that increase as the conflict expands. The issue in contention often relates to the mere survival or existence of one or more of the parties. Destructive conflicts are self-perpetuating, and the outcomes are unilaterally imposed on other actors without regard to their interests.




Figure 1.4 Alternative Sequences of Destructiveness and Constructiveness

On the other hand, constructive conflicts are resolved through persuasive efforts and the offer of benefits, not threats or coercion. Actors recognize the legitimacy of each party to the conflict and are most interested in pursuing a mutually acceptable outcome. Kriesberg recognizes that conflicts seldom fall neatly into one of these categories, insisting that any conflict contains elements of each. The figure to the left illustrates this argument.

Gurr, Ted. 1998. "A Risk Assessment Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion." In *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, edited by John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, 15-26. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Gurr's risk assessment model for ethnopolitical rebellion is an early warning systems model designed to identify high risk areas based on the premise that the likelihood of rebellion by a politically active ethnic group will be the result of three functions: collective incentives, capacity for joint action, and external opportunities. From these concepts, Gurr developed a series of issues to be considered that includes group incentives for initiating collective action, group capacity for sustained collective action, group opportunities for collective action, and conditions that shape regime responses to collective action. As indicated in the table on the next page, Gurr provides indicators for each of these concepts that are explored in detail.

This is not meant to be an exhaustive, static list of indicators but rather a basis that will be revised and supplemented by practitioners. Gurr notes that one factor that is noticeably absent from this framework is the effect of regime policies or international response to ethnic conflict situations, which are certain to play a crucial role.

Gurr uses the Kansas Events Database System (KEDS) to collect the data necessary to conduct his analysis.

1. **Group Incentives for Initiating Collective Action**
 - 1.1 Grievances about active economic, political, and cultural discrimination against the group (ECDISC, POLDISC, CULDISC)
 - 1.2 History of lost political autonomy (AUTLOST)
 - 1.3 History of state repression
2. **Group Capacity for Sustained Collective Action**
 - 2.1 Strength of group identity (CULTID)
 - 2.2 Group mobilization (MOBILZ)
3. **Group Opportunities for Collective Action**
 - 3.1 Recent major changes in the structure of the political regime (INSTAB)
 - 3.2 Support from kindred groups in neighboring countries (KINSUPP)
4. **Conditions that Shape Regime Responses to Collective Action**
 - 4.1 History of elite reliance on coercion
 - 4.2 Duration and strength of democratic experience
 - 4.3 Regime's domestic power and resources

Note: Table 1.3 labels in parentheses refer to the indicators used in the analysis reported below. Other factors are not operationalized in this chapter.

Tishkov, Valery. 1994. "The Nature of Ethnic Conflict." *Social Science* 25 (1): 36-50.

Ethnic conflict is one of the most complex phenomena facing the international community. Social scientists have spent considerable resources attempting to understand the nature of ethnic conflict, presumably to become more efficient at prevention and mediation. Valery Tishkov reviews three approaches to analyzing ethnic conflict that serve as a useful component to conflict prevention frameworks. The approaches reviewed by Tishkov include: sociological, politological, and socio-psychological mechanisms.

The sociological approach to analyzing ethnic conflict revolves around the concept of social stratification. When a correlation appears between social stratification and ethnicity, the likelihood of violent conflict increases. Social stratification in this context can include economic conditions and opportunities, natural resources, health and education services, or rural/urban biases. The manifestation of the correlation between ethnicity and social stratification is often seen in the distribution of government resources and revenues.


The politological approach emphasizes the role of intellectual and political elites in increasing ethnic conflict from perceptions and tensions to violent conflict. The struggle for power, political or otherwise, is the fundamental basis of this approach. Elites use ethnic perceptions to ensure political survival. This approach also examines group dynamics in ethnic conflict in terms of incentives needed for group action.

The socio-psychological mechanism approach to understanding ethnic conflict is built upon behavior psychology. This approach considers the relationship between an individual's sense of danger and the appropriateness of their reaction to various threats.

None of these approaches claim to explain the entire nature of ethnic conflict. However, each approach addresses an aspect of ethnic relations that, when considered together, emerge as a framework for understanding the reality of ethnic conflict.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 1998. *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*. Stockholm: International IDEA.

IDEA has developed a framework for looking at conflict through a democracy and governance perspective. At the basis of this framework is the conflict triangle, illustrated on the right. Each of the elements of this



triangle (situation, attitudes, and behavior) have the potential to create conflict within the system. Situation relates to the objective positions that influence conflict, for example, unequal distributions of political power. Behavior represents the peoples' actions. Are certain groups prone to violence or aggression? Attitudes refers to how parties in a

conflict perceive the situation and each other. According to this model, conflict might erupt at any of these three points. As conflict erupts in the triangle, it quickly spreads to the other areas of the triangle. The points in the triangle then begin to interact, as depicted above left, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of conflict reinforcement.

State Failure Task Force: Phase II Findings

For the past three years, the CIA has headed, in response to a request by the Vice President, an effort to study societal, economic, political, and environmental factors associated with serious internal political crises. Under the state failure study, the following Phase II findings emerged:

- Countries with above world-median levels of infant mortality had three times the risk of failure compared with countries with below-median levels.
- Partial democracies—those with a mix of autocratic and democratic features—have three

times the risk of failure than either full democracies or partial democracies, particularly in countries where quality of life is relatively low.

- Countries with levels of trade openness below the world median had three times the risk of failure than countries with higher levels of trade openness.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the Phase II findings are as follows:

- Partial democracies were 11 times as likely to suffer state failure as were autocracies.
- Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, having a more urban population increases the risk of failure in only poorer states.

In transitions to autocracy and democracy, the task force found that countries whose democratic transitions are likely to succeed have lower infant mortality, greater trade openness, a higher level of urbanization, and some prior elements of democracy.


In the environment and security sector, a model that included deforestation and adjusted for similar levels of vulnerability and capacity found that the greater the loss of forest cover, the greater the increase in infant mortality rate.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival. *Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Briefing Book*. American Association for the Advancement of Science, University of Toronto.

The Project on Environment, Population and Security (EPS) researched the relationship between environmental scarcity migration, population growth, and violent conflict between 1994 and 1996. The focus of these efforts was an analysis of the social consequences of environmental scarcity due to degradation or depletion of resources, increased consumption, and unequal distribution.

EPS found that environmental scarcity results in conflict when interacting with economic, political, and social factors. Environmental scarcity contributes to what are often considered the root causes of a conflict by creating social, ethnic, economic, or political inequalities and tensions. In addition, EPS pointed to environmental scarcity as a source of potential conflict as it “encourages powerful groups to capture valuable resources and encourages marginal groups to migrate to ecologically sensitive areas.” The graphic below illustrates this relationship. Environmental scarcity is intensified by these two processes, and social instability is worsened.

RESOURCE CONFLICT GENERATION



C. Organizations Developing Approaches to Conflict Prevention

International Alert (IA)

International Alert has been active in conflict prevention, mitigation, and transformation for over a decade. Successes and failures together with a merging of theory and practice have emerged as a framework for transforming violent conflict at all stages. The framework consists of five categories on a continuum of action items that range from early warning to a catalyst for action.

The approach cites early warning as the key factor in conflict prevention and provides several examples of appropriate tools and indicators. However, IA recognizes that for conflict prevention efforts to be successful, early warning is not enough. Once a potential or actual conflict situation is identified, it must be linked to an analysis of the situation by academics and experts, which includes extensive field visits.

An action plan is developed after consultations with expert consultants. In implementing this action plan, IA steps in to complement activities undertaken by national, regional, or international actors, as resources permit. The final piece of IA's approach is the catalyst for action which unites national, regional, and international actors in the commitment to and pursuit of peace in the region.¹

¹ International Alert. 1996. *Transforming Violent Conflict. Annual Review 1995*. Hastings: International Alert.

Protocol of the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA)

PANDA is a collaborative effort of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural survival, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS). KEDS/PANDA strives to provide early warning for emerging violent conflict, human rights violations; political, economic, and environmental stability; and humanitarian needs. PANDA members are working with KEDS to expand and refine its automated parsing program of real-time events in order to collect data on the root causes of conflict, aggravating conditions, event reports, and country reports. The data collected relates to a variety of actors—from the individual to organizations—and interactions between actors.²

African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

ACCORD's activities are shaped by the dual approach that they bring to conflict resolution. The first component of this approach is the pursuit of the psychological change that is necessary to create a culture of peaceful dispute resolution. The second element of their approach supports efforts to invoke structural change in systems that empower people with the skills to engage in peaceful dispute settlement. ACCORD has developed a comprehensive peace model that was recognized by the United Nations and is in the process of establishing a Conflict Prevention Centre.

The Centre will provide a physical space for interventions by ACCORD in disputes throughout Africa. In addition to the physical facility, the Centre will have expert conflict resolution personnel available to assist in the resolution process. The Centre will also house the Rapid Response Mechanism—an assessment unit prepared to do extensive analysis of emerging conflicts, deployable within 24 hours.

In 1998, ACCORD launched ACCNET—a complex database of information regarding conflicts in Africa. This information will be made available on the Internet and will thus contribute to early warning efforts on the continent.³

Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER)

FEWER consists of a consortium of intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and academic institutions that provide early warning system data and analysis to policy makers. FEWER's strategic plan focuses on early warning activities in the Caucasus and

² PANDA. From web site: [<http://cfia-db2.fas.harvard.edu>].

³ ACCORD. From web site: [<http://www.accord.org.za>].

Great Lakes and the provision of possible intervention options. As part of the early warning system element of this plan, FEWER has begun two early warning systems projects implemented by the Russian Academy of Sciences/Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (EAWARN project) and the University of Maryland/Centre for Development and Conflict Management (GEDS project). EAWARN provides information and analysis on issues on the North Caucasus, while GEDS serves as the lead on early warning systems for both the Caucasus and the Great Lakes. GEDS monitors international and regional news wires for trends in social, economic, and political developments that place a region at risk for conflict.⁴

International Peace Academy (IPA)

IPA's mission is to promote conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts within and between states. In pursuit of this objective, IPA engages in a variety of activities that include training seminars for senior level officials of NGOs, governments, and humanitarian agencies. IPA training seminars are designed to provide participants with an expanded understanding of the causes of conflicts through the presentation of various approaches to conflict analysis. The conclusion reached by participants is that none of these approaches are mutually exclusive and that conflict is a complex multi-faceted phenomena that must be understood if prevention or mitigation is to be successful.⁵

War-Torn Societies Project (WSP)

The WSP is a joint project of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS). The project began in 1994 to assist in countries in postconflict transition and to identify opportunities to the international community to aid the transition. WSP uses participatory-action research (PAR) at the macro-social and macro-political level as a tool for rebuilding and a mechanism to ensure local ownership and responsibility of the project. The WSP pursues an integrative approach that encompasses research, participatory consultation, strategy design and priority setting, policy formulation and action, various policy responses, and interaction between numerous actors. In addition to research activities, WSP also maintains an extensive database of post-conflict documents that is available at <http://www.unicc.org/unrisd/wsp/db/docs/index.htm>.

⁴ FEWER. April 1998. Forum on Early Warning and Early Response: Current Developments. Memorandum.


⁵ International Peace Academy. 1997. "IPA Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping." IPA Training Seminar.

III. Additional Resources

Anderson, Mary. 1996. *Do No Harm: Local Capacities for Peace through Aid*. Cambridge: Local Capacities for Peace Project.

Anderson presents a variety of concepts and lessons in an analytical framework for assessing Sources of Tension/Dividers/War/Capacities and Connectors/Capacities or Peace in conflict situations. Anderson drew from conversations with donor agency staff in developing this planning tool.

Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict



Local Capacities for Peace Project

Schmeidl, Susanne, and Craig Jenkins. 1998. "Early Warning Indicators of Forced Migration." In *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, edited by John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, 56-69. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Schmeidl and Jenkins offer an early warning model of indicators of forced migration that expands

upon a modified version of Clark's early warning system model. Three of Clark's four categories (root causes, proximate cause, and intervening factors) are used to develop indicators of forced migration.