

**The Experience in Ivory Coast
with Decentralized Approaches
to Local Delivery of Primary
Education and Primary
Health Services**

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GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

<i>Académie</i>	<i>Inspection académique</i> , Educational District
<i>Agent de santés</i>	Community Health Worker
<i>Amicale des</i>	
<i>Inspecteurs</i>	National Organization of Primary School <i>Inspecteurs</i>
BCFAO	CFA Franc Zone Bank for West Africa
CAFOP	Primary School Teacher Training College
<i>Caisse de</i>	
<i>pharmacie villageoise</i>	Village-based Community Pharmacy Scheme
CAISSTAB	Cocoa Marketing Stabilization Fund in Ivory Coast
CAP	<i>Certificat d'aptitude pédagogique</i> , certificate of pedagogical aptitude
<i>Capitation</i>	Head Tax
CEAO	Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CEP	<i>Certificat d'études primaires</i> , school leaving certificate
<i>Cercle</i>	<i>sous-prefecture</i>
CHU	<i>Centre Hospitalo-Universitaire</i> , University Teaching Hospital
CIDT	Compagnie ivoirienne des textiles
CIE	Compagnie ivoirienne d'électricité
<i>Commune</i>	Municipality in Ivory Coast
<i>Concours</i>	Competitive Examination to fill a limited number of positions
<i>Conseillers</i>	
<i>pédagogiques</i>	Pedagogical Counselors
CTR	<i>Centre téléphonique rural</i>
DCGTX	<i>Direction et contrôle des grand travaux</i> , Major Public Works Directory and Supervisory Agency
DCL	<i>Direction des collectivités locales</i>
<i>Département</i>	Largest sub-national administrative jurisdiction in the Ivory Coast
<i>Direction des</i>	
<i>Collectivités locales</i>	Administrative Agency within Ministry of Interior responsible for overseeing local government activities
<i>Ecole normale</i>	
<i>supérieure</i>	Teacher Training College for Secondary School Teachers
EECI	Energie électrique de la Côte d'Ivoire
EFF	Extended Fund Facility (IMF Funding Facility)
FCFA	Franc, Communauté francophone d'Afrique (CFA Franc Zone)
FRAR	Regional Development Fund for Infrastructure Creation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GOIC	Government of Ivory Coast
GVC	Groupement Villageois Cooperatif
H2	Hospital with 30-100 beds
IMF	International Monetary Fund
<i>Inspecteur académique</i>	Head of <i>inspection académique</i>
<i>Inspecteur régional</i>	Head of educational region
<i>Inspection académique</i>	Administrative subdivision within educational regions, established by Ministry of Education
<i>Instituteur adjoint</i>	Less highly trained primary school teacher
LGA	Local Government Authority
MA	Medical Assistant
<i>Matronne</i>	Traditional birth attendant
<i>Médecin chef</i>	Chief Medical Officer
<i>Médecins du Monde</i>	Doctors of the World
MSP	<i>Ministère de santé publique et préventive</i> , Public Health Ministry

MV	Midwife
Mutuelle Generale	Health Insurance Plan for Civil Servants
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ONI	Office nationale de télécommunications
Patente	Business Tax
Patrimoine	Local revenue source user-fee collected for use of municipal facilities or equipment
PDCI	Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire
Prefet	Administrative official heading a <i>département</i>
SAL	Structural Adjustment Lending
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SBA	Stand-by Arrangement (IMF Funding Facility)
SG	Secretary-General (PDCI Subprefectural Party Committee Head)
SODECI	Société des eaux de la Côte d'Ivoire
SODEPRA	Société de production animale
SOE	State-owned Enterprise
<i>Sous-préfet</i>	Administrative official heading a <i>sous-préfecture</i>
<i>Sous-préfecture</i>	Second-level sub-national administrative jurisdiction in the Ivory Coast
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
TP	<i>Travaux publics</i>
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VMW	Village Midwife

THE EXPERIENCE IN IVORY COAST
WITH DECENTRALIZED APPROACHES TO LOCAL DELIVERY OF
PRIMARY EDUCATION AND PRIMARY HEALTH SERVICES

I THE SETTING

A Introduction

Chapter I sketches background conditions for the remainder of the report, which focuses on the impact of the Ivoirian economic crisis and structural adjustment lending on institutional and public fiscal arrangements in the primary education and public health sectors. The chapter provides first geographic information about the Ivory Coast, then details evolution of the economic and political situation, reviews the administrative framework, and ends with an overview of the Ivoirian decentralization process.

B Geographic Information

Ivory Coast is one of the relatively rich countries of francophone West Africa with a population of some 12 million people and GNP per capita of about \$800¹. Although in land mass (322,000 km²) it is smaller than many of the Sahelian countries, a much higher proportion of its land is either cropland (11 per cent), permanent pasture (nine per cent) or forest (20 per cent)². Agriculture, in fact, provides both the major share of Ivory Coast's exports (36 per cent of GDP, 52.8 per cent of exports)³ and, until recently, the traditional political base of support for the ruling party, the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI). The major exports are cocoa (30 per cent of total merchandise export value in 1989), coffee (7.6 per cent), and timber (9.5 per cent)⁴.

Cote d'Ivoire is not, however, a backwards agricultural country. Manufacturing and industry account for 42 per cent of GDP⁵. The capital, Abidjan, has been known for years as the "Paris of West Africa". Of the country's population, nearly half (about 46 per cent) live in urban areas, one of the highest proportions of urban dwellers in Africa. Because of the prosperity the Ivory Coast enjoyed until the 1980s, it attracted citizens of the adjacent poor Sahelian countries. Immigrants came both to do the manual jobs despised by Ivoirians and to farm.

¹ World Bank, Social Indicators of Development 1990 x11

² World Bank Sub-Saharan Africa From Crisis to Sustainable Growth Washington D C 1989 pp 221-279 [1987 figures]

³ World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa From Crisis to Sustainable Growth pp 224-248

⁴ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 p 147

⁵ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 pp 224-25

C End of the Ivoirian Economic "Miracle," Fiscal and Political Consequences

1 Economic Crisis and Stop-Gap Measures

The Ivoirian economic miracle ended in the mid-1970s with the government's mismanagement of the revenues from the commodity boom. Until then the country had enjoyed economic growth rates averaging 7.7 per cent per annum between independence in 1960 and 1975.⁶ In Trends in Developing Economies 1990, the World Bank's analysis of macro-economic policy concludes that the government responded to the mid-1970s boom by creating ambitious investment programs, which it funded first through foreign borrowing and then through money creation after the boom ended. This left the country with a large structural fiscal deficit, which rises and falls in line with world commodity prices. With a very open economy, Ivory Coast has changed from exporting 46 per cent of GDP, and importing 37 per cent in 1965 to almost the reverse in 1980—exporting 37 per cent and importing 44 per cent.⁷ As a member of the FCFA franc zone Ivory Coast has no direct control over its exchange rate, and has been hurt by the decreasing competitiveness of its exports as the effective exchange rate became increasingly overvalued. The overvalued rate has reduced the incentives within the economy to invest in new export capacity. An inappropriate regulatory framework and a large number of inefficient, state-owned enterprises also inhibit growth of a competitive private sector.⁸

On the domestic side, the failure of government agencies and state-owned enterprises to pay their bills has recently created a massive problem. The arrears of Ivoirian businesses and farmers totalled about \$2.5 billion by the end of 1989 and constituted a major obstacle to renewed private sector growth. The liquidity of the banking system has been seriously affected by the 1989 drops in commodity prices. Four development banks have failed, this, again, affects the ability of the private sector to respond to opportunities.⁹ From a functioning, growing economic system in the mid-1970s, the Ivoirian economy has slid into near chaos.

2 Recessionary Economics and Politic Liberalization

Political support for the ruling party has diminished in tandem with the economic decline. President Felix Houphouët-Boigny and his Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) have been in power since independence. As did most other African leaders, he used state resources to build patronage networks. Resources were extracted in the form of excessive effective taxation of the agricultural sector, where farmers until the mid-1980s received prices below world market levels for export crops. Since the government and state-owned enterprises are the largest employers, the cuts in real wages that have occurred in recent years has made the party very unpopular with public employees. The government was forced by urban unrest in 1990 to reverse almost immediately civil service pay cuts negotiated with the World Bank and IMF under the Fourth SAP. Instead, the new Prime Minister has begun to implement vigorously an alternative agreed with the World Bank to improve

⁶ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 p. 140

⁷ World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition: From Structural Adjustment to Self-Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C. 1987) I. 2

⁸ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 p. 140

⁹ Africa Confidential 31.19 (9/28/90) 4

revenue collection, concentrating particularly on tax evaders, and to cut costs, particularly of perks and customs evasions ¹⁰

Maneuvering by President Houphouet-Boigny to cope with demands by the political opposition for a multi-party electoral system is the political reason for decentralization changes. Elections in 1980 were the first in which free competition within the one party framework was permitted. Voters in this and subsequent elections, have rejected a large number of incumbents. This electoral change was intended to build support for the President, reduce the pressure for a multi-party system, and take people's minds off the worsening economic situation. The surge of popularity won by these changes encouraged the president to undertake more reforms in advance of the 1985 elections. He reorganized the party to permit the direct election of 235 general secretaries and created new municipalities. The central government provided everything from streets and electricity to schools. The aging president, who refuses to name a successor, permitted an opposition leader, L Gbagbo, to compete against him for the presidency in 1990 elections that produced a large majority for Houphouet-Boigny. Decentralization not only served to address the problem of providing services for rapidly growing urban areas in a time of economic crisis but also opened new electoral opportunities within the framework of a one-party system.

The president has cautiously opened the political arena to new parties. Results of the heavily manipulated October, 1990 presidential elections suggest the president wants an opposition to exist but not to become too strong ¹¹. In January, 1991, the first multi-party elections for municipal offices were held. These elections were scheduled under Phase III of Law 80-1180, the decentralization legislation passed in 1980. Implementation of Law 80-1180 has been proceeding at a measured pace since then. The president's age alone - he is over 90 - is a factor in the uncertainty over the future of politics in Ivory Coast, whether he can keep opposition and protest under control is another. The president has effectively been protected against coups by the French, they may well play a critical role in any transition to democracy. As well as his special relationship with France, the President has always managed external relations adroitly, and the Western donors, on the whole, have supported the structural adjustment efforts even while they complained about the slow pace and frequent backsliding.

D Administrative Arrangements A French Model Africanized

The current Ivoirian system of government replicates French colonial arrangements. The colonial system reached even the lowest levels of Ivoirian society through several administrative tiers, all controlled by the central government. These levels were *cercle*, prefecture, sub-prefecture, canton, and village in descending order of size ¹².

Toward the end of the colonial period, between 1952 and 1955, the French established the communal system, the beginning of a process of decentralization. The French created two types of communes: those that were fully autonomous, having a locally elected mayor and municipal council, and those that were only partially autonomous, with centrally appointed mayors and municipal councils. At the time of independence, the French had created a total of eight communes. Three - the main towns of the colonial government,

¹⁰ Africa Confidential 31 19 (9/29/90) 5

¹¹ Africa Confidential 31 23 (11/23/90) 3

¹² Jennifer Mandel, "The Decentralization Process in Côte d'Ivoire" unpublished ms Indiana University Bloomington IN 1990 p 1

Grand Bassam, Abidjan, and Bouake (Figure 2) - were fully autonomous. The other five were smaller towns in the interior of the country.¹³

At the time of independence, the Government of Ivory Coast (GOIC) returned to a highly centralized system of administration. The eight communes became defunct when funds were not provided for their operation and municipal elections were not held. Regional development and administration were managed through the prefect and sub-prefect.

E Staged Decentralization

The economic crisis and the GOIC's inability to meet the growing demand for urban services occasioned the 1978 move to decentralize. Through this new administration and decision-making system, the central government sought to

- stimulate local economic development with the hope that this would in turn stimulate national economic growth,
- continue the process of "rational" urbanization that had been started in the post-independence economic "boom" period, and
- involve the population more in the daily affairs of the community and in the developmental decision-making processes.¹⁴

The process of communalization began in 1978 with the preparation of a new municipal code. However, it was not implemented until 1980 when it was passed into law and the first municipal elections took place. Under this law communes theoretically enjoy full devolved responsibility for local administration and development. In fact these responsibilities are being transferred progressively through a series of decrees. The decentralized system of government is being implemented in five-year phases. At the beginning of each phase more responsibility is transferred to the communes.

First-phase decentralization occurred from 1980 to 1985. Initially, the GOIC revitalized the eight French-created communes that had become defunct at independence and created 29 new ones for a total of 37. Among these was the City of Abidjan, established as a supra-municipal body to coordinate the activities of the ten municipalities comprising the city's ten districts. These municipalities were established on the basis of their ability to sustain themselves economically and on their sense of community.

Phase two of decentralization, 1985 to 1990, saw the creation of 98 new municipalities for a total of 136. However, these were given power not on the basis of their ability to sustain themselves economically, but through political pressure. Some are very small with populations of 10,000 or less.

The third phase of decentralization commenced in 1990. No new municipalities have been created. However, the government has moved to a multi-party system for the first time. Nine of the communes were won by either a newly created party or an independent candidate. It should be noted that on average only 35% of the eligible voters turned out to vote.¹⁵ In

¹³ Koffi Attahi. Côte d'Ivoire. An Evaluation of Urban Management Reforms. In Richard E. Stren and Rodney R. White, eds. African Cities in Crisis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 114.

¹⁴ Jennifer Mandel. The Decentralization Process in Côte d'Ivoire. unpublished ms. Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, p. 4.

¹⁵ Economist Intelligence Unit. Côte d'Ivoire Country Report. No. 1, 1991. London: Economist Publications Ltd, p. 7.

1988, 48.7% of the population of 10.8 million lived in communal jurisdictions. In that same year, 41.7% of the population lived in commune jurisdictions, the administration defined as "urban" areas. The Ivorian definition of commune includes many that are quite small, with populations of less than 10,000 and whose economies still remain more agricultural than industrial.¹⁶

¹⁶ 1988 Urban Population Figures for the Côte d'Ivoire. USAID/Regional Housing and Urban Development Office, Abidjan, unpublished ms.

II HISTORY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS

A Introduction

Chapter II reviews structural adjustment programs negotiated among the GOIC, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), degree of compliance by the Ivory Coast, and consequences. The first section describes in greater detail the Ivory Coast's descent from a widely respected model of commodity-driven economic development to a seriously indebted country. The next section reviews the Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) agreements. The final section details the extreme difficulties encountered by the Ivory Coast in 1989.

B From Economic Model to Major Debtor Country

The economic crisis that forced the GOIC to turn to the IMF and World Bank for high-conditionality loans originated in the spending spree that began during the coffee and cocoa boom of 1975-1977. When the international prices for coffee and cocoa fell precipitously between 1977 and 1980 and the government had exhausted its sources of commercial loans, it was faced in 1980 with extraordinarily large fiscal and balance of payments deficits, as well as the highest per capita external official debt (\$14.4 billion in 1990, excluding independently contracted state-owned enterprise [SOE] debt) in sub-Saharan Africa.

Until the boom began, Ivory Coast had a reputation as one of the best managed economies in sub-Saharan Africa, with a steady growth rate and consistent balance of payments surpluses. The GOIC budget also showed consistent surpluses, thanks to CAISSTAB, the cocoa marketing fund. It paid farmers about half the world price and used its profits, not segregated as cleanly as intended in the stabilization fund, as a source of funds for the GOIC, particularly for investment in order to diversify the economy. This strategy worked well enough for many years (though not for cocoa farmers), but the huge surpluses that rolled in during the boom years were invested in white elephants: an unsuccessful sugar industry and specialized tertiary education.¹⁷

When cocoa prices dropped, the GOIC failed to devise selling strategies that might have capitalized on the Ivory Coast's position as the largest cocoa producer to minimize its losses.¹⁸ CAISSTAB stabilization reserves quickly ran out, and the new investments failed to produce additional revenue streams. The GOIC borrowed from any willing external sources to maintain its inflated level of spending and to allow consumer goods and food imports to continue at the boom levels to which people had become accustomed. The government also printed money to cover its deficits and allowed government agencies to borrow independently and to build up domestic and external arrears. By 1981 domestic inflation had led to an overvalued exchange rate, increased protection of domestic industry had extinguished growth of manufactured exports, and new manufacturing capacity was dependent upon imports of intermediate inputs. Domestic manufacturing thus offered no way out of the problem of falling export revenues. Having in six years created a set of structural impediments to balance of payments equilibria, the GOIC used up its available credit and then looked for further funds. Its good reputation with the Western donors

¹⁷ World Bank, "The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition: From Structural Adjustment to Self-Sustained Growth." Washington, D.C., 1987, II, 5.

¹⁸ Richard C. Crook, "Politics, the Cocoa Crisis, and Administration in Côte d'Ivoire." Journal of Modern African Studies (1990), 28 (4), 659-660.

probably ensured that, although the IMF and World Bank prescriptions were standard, the strings were a little looser than for other countries. The GOIC did indeed appear to string the donors along.

C Structural Adjustment Lending The Stages

To continue to function the government agreed in 1981 to IMF and World Bank stabilization measures. The GOIC hoped for a rich oil find to bail out the country financially. It has not materialized so far, but the possibility leaves the government perhaps less than wholeheartedly committed to the rigors of structural adjustment under conditions of continuing economic decline. The GOIC has had a continuous series of high-conditionality loans from both the World Bank and the IMF, who have cooperated closely, with the IMF focusing on macro-economic targets and the overall government budget and the World Bank concentrating on structural policies.¹⁹

1 First Sal - 1981

The World Bank program, Ivory Coast's first structural adjustment loan (for \$150 million), took effect in 1981. The structural adjustment loan (SAL) conditions called for three sets of actions from the government:

- public investment was to be cut back severely (from 25 per cent of GDP in 1978 to 16.5 per cent in 1981) and new planning and selection processes were to be developed,
- in the agriculture sector a number of studies and efficiency measures preliminary to actual reforms were to be set in motion,
- a number of other studies - of state-owned enterprises, the industrial sector and the budget (particularly for education) - were to be undertaken.²⁰

From 1981 through 1986 the GOIC's economic performance improved. The fiscal and balance of payments deficits declined because the government achieved greater control of the budget and was aided by higher coffee and cocoa prices, and by the end of the early 1980s drought. When coffee and cocoa prices dropped again in 1987 and 1988, the deficits shot back up (the budget deficit to 11.3 per cent of GDP in 1989, and the balance of payments deficit to 9.7 per cent).²¹

¹⁹ The IMF provided an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1981 and Stand-By Arrangements in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987. The IMF canceled the last SBA in March 1988. A new 17-month SBA for \$224 million was initiated in November 1989. World Bank "Adjustment Lending: A Review of Ten Years of Experience. Country Economics Department Policy and Research Series. Washington, D.C. 1988, p. 77. The World Bank "Program Performance Audit Report. Côte d'Ivoire Second and Third Structural Adjustment Loans, Washington, D.C. 1990, p. 3 reports Ivory Coast received from the IMF a total of \$830 mln during the period 1981-1986.

²⁰ Christiaan Grootaert and Ravi Kanbur. Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty and the Social Dimensions of Structural Adjustment: A Methodology and Proposed Application to Côte d'Ivoire 1985-88. SDA Policy Analysis. Washington, D.C. World Bank 1990, p. 6.

²¹ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 147-148.

2 Second and Third SALs 1983, 1986

The measures contained in the second SAL in 1983 and the third in 1986 (both for \$250 million) produced no fundamental change in the structure of the economy, as its continuing vulnerability to fluctuating international prices for coffee and cocoa showed. The second SAL was more specific than the first. It had five main components:

- public finance management (budget control and rationalization of the investment program),
- rehabilitation of the state-owned enterprise sector and reduction of government subsidies to the sector,
- agricultural policy reform pricing policy changes and institutional strengthening,
- industrial policy (trade measures including an export subsidy scheme),
- urban housing (in response to the very high rate of urbanization and to the high cost to the government of providing civil service housing) ²²

The third SAL called for implementation of specific measures to carry the same sets of reforms further towards a transition to market mechanisms and to more efficient institutions.

3 World Bank Evaluation of GOIC SAL Compliance

The World Bank concluded the GOIC successfully implemented some parts of the SAL agreements but important slippages occurred. Under pressure from the World Bank the worst and most obvious areas of wasteful government spending were eliminated. The capital budget was slashed so heavily that necessary maintenance was under-financed. Agricultural producer price increases were politically palatable and achieved an improvement in the rural-urban terms of trade ²³. The price increases then had to be reduced in 1989 because they no longer reflected the now lower world prices. The price increases did not lead to net increases in agricultural production, instead, the rate of increase in output began to stagnate after rebounding from the drought ²⁴.

Other parts of the SAL packages were not implemented or did not have the desired effect. One of the biggest obstacles to structural adjustment in Ivory Coast is an exchange rate regime (membership in the FCFA franc zone) that rules out devaluation as an instrument. Instead, the government had to reduce real formal sector incomes and subsidize exports to achieve an effect similar to devaluation: discourage imports and encourage exports. Public servants and SOE employees - the largest number of formal sector employees - saw their real incomes fall by 20% between the first and third SALs²⁵ and showed their displeasure through strikes, popular protest and obstructive

²² Christiaan Grootaert and Ravi Kanbur, Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty p 7

²³ Grootaert and Kanbur Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty p 8

²⁴ World Bank Program Performance Audit Report Côte d'Ivoire Second and Third Structural Adjustment Loans - Washington D C 1990 p 16. The 5.5% increase of 1988 dropped to 4.6% in 1989 and again to 4.2% in 1990. World Bank Trends in Developing Economies Washington D C 1990

²⁵ Grootaert and Kanbur "Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty p 8

tactics The set of measures to encourage exports did not work as well as hoped Benefits from pseudo-devaluation did not appear

The government dragged its feet in a number of areas

- reform of the financial sector made little progress, GOIC debt to Ivoirian firms and banks caused a liquidity crisis that resulted in many bank failures and private firm bankruptcies,
- SOE sector reforms were minimal, though that sector represented one-third of employment and one-fourth of value added in the modern sector by the late 1970s During the first two SALs a few SOEs were reorganized, privatized or liquidated, the monitoring system that was supposed to be implemented by the third SAL was not rigorously applied, and the SOE sector continued to be a drain on the government budget,
- frequent reorganizations of ministries reduced the coherence of implementation efforts, and frustrated the major objective of strengthening Ivoirian government institutions' ability to plan and analyze economic policy measures,
- decision-making became increasingly centralized in the Presidency (in the agency DCGTX), which demoralized ministry staff and worsened the quality of policy decisions, because DCGTX did not have the staff or the data to make informed decisions,
- infrastructure was not maintained as a result of cuts in capital spending,
- SAL II provided that program budgeting would be introduced in the education sector This was not done, the World Bank later concluded that, like other vague objectives, it stood less chance of being implemented than did very specific measures

By 1989 it was clear that the economy was in no better shape to weather drops in coffee and cocoa prices than it had been in 1980 In other words, structural adjustments enhancing diversity and flexibility of the economy had not occurred, nor were government institutions stronger and more capable of dealing with external shocks The relationship between the GOIC and the World Bank deteriorated in the late 1980s The World Bank felt Ivoirian bureaucrats had not accepted "ownership" of the structural adjustment program, and that performance by the government had not matched promises made

D 1989 GOIC Reactions to a Devastating Year

1989 was a terrible year In terms of meeting its targets under the SAP the government lost ground Government revenues dropped by three per cent of GDP Domestic arrears - government agencies failing to pay their bills - increased instead of decreasing The government budget deficit estimated actual was 16% of GDP, rather than the target 8% ²⁶ In May the government suspended payments on its external debt to all creditors except the IMF and World Bank Under pressure from the donors the President appointed Alassane Ouattara, previously president of BCEAO (the franc-zone central bank for West Africa), first to be the unofficial finance czar, then to the newly-created post of Prime Minister

²⁶ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies p 141

The Ouattara appointment was key to regaining donor support. In mid-1989 the government agreed to a new economic recovery program (based on sector adjustment loans to agriculture and energy totalling \$250 million). Not surprisingly it was simple and tough. Phase I (to have been completed by December 1990) was to reduce the deficit and arrears, and to implement key structural adjustment measures, Phase II was designed to reduce the effective exchange rate and improve efficiency.²⁷ Prime Minister Ouattara has energetically pursued the new structural adjustment measures, although those suffering the effects include virtually the entire population.

In February, 1990, the government announced, with what Crook calls "almost unbelievable political maladroitness," that civil service and SOE wages would be cut by "up to 40 per cent." This announcement triggered a wave of official trade union strikes, even though the government later announced that only very senior officials would face 40% wage cuts. Amidst confusion, the government decided not to go ahead with the implementation of civil service pay cuts.²⁸

In April the GOIC adopted an alternative approach: the government would increase revenues by overhauling the tax and customs collection systems - both measures likely to hit the wealthy.²⁹ The government was to pay some of its domestic arrears. Cost-cutting measures included the reduction of non-wage current expenditure, a measure likely to affect both education and healthcare delivery. The civil service was to reduce the number of "temporary" employees, and to monitor staffing levels and the wage bill.³⁰

In the medium-term the economic recovery program calls for financial sector reform, SOE monitoring, price liberalization, simplification of the regulatory structure and a review of labor policy.³¹ The education and health budgets are to be internally redistributed in favor of basic and primary services. The sectors targeted for structural reform were agriculture, energy and water and sanitation. In agriculture the shock of cutting producer prices for cocoa and coffee by half was supposed to encourage farmers to switch to other crops.³² For water and sanitation the primary reform was to give operating and maintenance responsibilities to local government.³³ Two working groups were set up to make recommendations to the government on mitigating the short-term negative impacts of SAL measures on the poor and, in the medium term, on increasing participation.³⁴

The main question now is whether the new Prime Minister can effect real change and make it stick. For the moment he seems to have the President's support, as well as the donors'. After thirteen years of avoiding change (ten of them under structural adjustment programs) the government is under pressure from the donors for economic reform and from much of the population for an end

²⁷ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 p 141

²⁸ Richard C. Crook Politics, the Cocoa Crisis and Administration in Côte d'Ivoire Journal of Modern African Studies (1990), 28 (4) 666-67

²⁹ Africa Confidential Côte d'Ivoire Unrest Ahead (1991) 32 8 (April 19) 3 reported in April 1991 that customs receipts are not close to meeting expected levels

³⁰ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 p 141

³¹ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 p 141

³² World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1991 p 143

³³ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 p 141

³⁴ World Bank Trends in Developing Economies 1990 p 143

to austerity Its leaders will need to be politically adroit to satisfy partially both sets of demands

III POLICY AND PROCEDURES FRAMEWORK

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND SERVICE DELIVERY

A Introduction

Chapter III provides a more detailed analysis of public fiscal and administrative institutional arrangements at various governmental levels. The first section details Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)-motivated changes introduced during the 1980s, particularly concerning revision of the national budgetary process, efforts to reduce the public sector wage bill, and other economy measures. The public service areas for which municipal jurisdictions are now responsible are noted in the second section. One source of tension within the municipal government is outlined at the end of the chapter.

B Fiscal Changes Following First Structural Adjustment Program

Under each SAP, the GOIC agreed to certain changes specified in Letters of Intent to the IMF. Policy initiatives to reform the budgetary system and get greater control over public expenditures featured prominently among these changes. Reducing the overall amount devoted to public sector wages constituted another important policy focus. Finally, efforts to economize were announced in related areas.

1 New Budget Law

These policy changes were to be included in the new budget law. This was to be based on the in-depth reorganization of the budgetary system. The new budget system is based on a single annual budget for all government expenditure. To accomplish this the government was to create the Directorate General of the Budget. The responsibility of this office is to draw up a consolidated budget covering all public revenue and expenditure. Decisions concerning allocation of state funds are made at the level of the central government.

2 Public Wage Bill

The Government of Ivory Coast stated in a letter of intent dated June 4, 1990 that it intended to cut the wage bill by four percent in 1990. This was to be accomplished through two means: 1) on-going reconciliation of the payroll file for government employees, including contract workers and agencies staffs and 2) staff reductions. The latter is to be managed by strict enforcement of mandatory retirement age and cutbacks in the number of contract workers and public and private technical assistance. In a related measure, a policy strictly limiting new hiring of public employees was outlined in the Letter of Intent dated October 20, 1989.

Salaries account for 50% of all state revenue expenditures. Half of this is paid out in the form of fringe benefits and allowances. Teachers account for 60% of all salaries ("Cote d'Ivoire Unrest Ahead," Africa Confidential, (April 1991) 32/8).

3 Other Reductions in Public Expenditures

These were to include cutbacks in budget appropriations for operating costs, including government premises, motor pool, equipment, subsidies, transfers and utilities.

C Institutional Changes

1 Post-Independence Administrative Arrangements

Post-independence administrative jurisdictions include the département, sous-prefecture (cercle), the canton, village, and the commune, in descending order of scale and political authority. Prefets supervise sous-prefets, who supervise chiefs of cantons and villages. Communes originally were created only in the major urban centers of the country. In the largest communes the mayor was elected by the council rather than being appointed, as in the smaller communes. Council members were elected, but the councils were very ineffectual bodies consulted only rarely by the mayors. By 1980 rapid urban growth resulted in expansion of number of départements from 4 to 34. In 1985 the number of départements was raised to 49.

2 Economic and Political Crises, and Phased Decentralization as a Solution

Economic crisis caused by falling cocoa and coffee prices in the late seventies as well as high rates of urban growth created demand for urban services the central government could not meet. Also the highly centralized government had grown stagnant and lost mass appeal. The president hoped that the increased need for leaders created by decentralization would provide the much needed new blood for the party. The decentralization program had three objectives:

- involve the population in decision-making more effectively,
- relieve central government of part of the burden of urban development, and
- strengthen urban-rural ties by creating growth poles outside Abidjan.

Law No. 80-1180 promulgated in October 1980 initiated the decentralization process. The process involved creating numerous municipalities, units consisting of urban centers and the surrounding rural area within five to eight kilometers, in three phases:

Phase I (1980-85) based on studies of economic viability, 29 new communes were created for a total of 37,

Phase II (1986-90) 98 new communes were created, bringing the total to 135. Many of these were created in response to local political pressure and still depend on the central government for most of their budgets. Forty-five percent of the Ivoirian population lives in urban areas, but majority of communes are small (20,000 inhabitants or less) and derive most of their resources from rural areas. This phase saw the transfer of more responsibilities.

Phase III (1991-) the October 1990 municipal and national elections were the first multi-party elections. Eventually, number of municipalities is expected to be increased to a total of 350-400.

Provisions of the Municipal Code were progressively implemented through a series of decrees conferring increasing responsibility on municipalities. The *Direction des Collectivités Locales* (DCL) of the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for managing the process of decentralization and for exercising tutelary authority over municipal governments. The DCL can remove elected officials for cause. However, the DCL does not have adequate resources to exercise effective tutelary control. The DCL finds it impossible to cope with municipalities that use ministerial connections to overrule DCL decisions.

denying requests from those jurisdictions. Currently, national administrative officials, i.e., prefects and sub-prefects, are much distrusted by municipal officials and usually play only a limited role in tutelary supervision.

3 Municipal Elective and Appointive Posts

Municipal council members are elected every five years as part of a mayoral slate. The mayor heads the council, which meets at least three times per year. All positions are unpaid. Municipal employees are of three types:

- persons recruited and paid by the central government but posted to the municipality, including the Secretary General, responsible for the day to day management of the commune,
- central government employees seconded to and paid by the municipality, including the municipal receiver, and
- persons recruited and paid by the municipality, the largest group, earning low salaries and having no clear career path.

4 Municipal Responsibilities A Growing List

Communes organize their work into three general areas: local government services, socio-cultural services and manpower, and economic services. Local government services include:

- environment,
- public hygiene and sanitation, and
- water supply.

Socio-cultural services include:

- education,
- public health, and
- welfare work.

Economic services include:

- management of loans for agriculture and livestock farming,
- forestry, hunting, and fishing,
- mineral resources,
- transportation and communication,
- industry and trade,
- arts and crafts, and
- tourism.

Municipalities are formally responsible for eight areas:

- 1 cultural--museums, libraries,
- 2 public health--dispensaries,

- 3 green areas-parks,
- 4 public utilities--water and electric,
- 5 education-preschool and primary schools, housing for teachers,
- 6 public hygiene, including clean animal markets, and
- 7 social-service centers

The Municipal Code lists all these services as communal responsibilities, but even the wealthiest jurisdictions cannot provide them all

The transfer of *les compétences*, or responsibilities, is the means by which the central government delegates authority to the communes (municipalities) Although legislation has already been passed giving communes authorization to manage numerous sectors, actual implementation of this law must take place through the passage of decrees by the Council of Ministers Implementation occurs progressively as each new area of responsibility is transferred by decree

5 Municipal Government Frictions

Conflicts occur between the mayor's chief of staff (*chef du cabinet*), appointed to organize the council's business (supposedly the "political manager"), and the Secretary General, appointed and paid by the central government to organize "administrative management " In fact, the dividing line between politics and administration is fuzzy The chief of staff hides information from the Secretary General, considered an agent of the central government Because their jobs are voluntary, councillors and mayors miss meetings The absence of career paths for local employees means they are often poorly trained and ineffective Almost all formally qualified people working in communes come from the central government Mayors sometimes misuse funds

IV FISCAL AUTHORITY

A Introduction

Chapter IV outlines the municipal^{*} budgetary process within the context of overlapping state administrative institutions and procedures, and then turns to the sources of municipal revenue

B The Budget Process

The mayor prepares the communal budget. The Municipal Code, Article 14, stipulates that he must evaluate municipal receipts and that the budget must be accurate and verifiable. The article prohibits the mayor from creating fictitious receipts. The finance committee of the municipal council reviews the budget and then sends it, with an opinion, to the council. The council votes on the budget chapter by chapter, and then votes on the final draft version. The council can also decide to vote on the budget paragraph by paragraph or section by section instead of chapter by chapter.

After approval by the municipal council the budget goes to the *Direction des Collectivités Locales* (DCL) for review and approval. If any problems with the budget are matters of form, the DCL can either correct them or return the budget to the commune for revision. If the problems involve substance, the commune must revise the budget with advice and assistance of the DCL. The mayor has fifteen days from the time of receipt to get a revised budget to the municipal council. After the revised version has been approved by the municipal council the mayor has three days to return it to the DCL. If the mayor takes too long with this process, the DCL can take itself take corrective measures. The municipal council also has the option of referring the budget back to the DCL for correction.

Once the budget is passed by both the municipal council and the DCL, the mayor is personally responsible for all communal money expenditures and receipts. He must account for everything. If he manages the money badly the central government may sanction him. Below a fixed ceiling the mayor may spend communal money as allocated in the budget. But major projects require approval of the DCL before municipal funds can be committed.

The DCL dictates to the communes the form and character of municipal records, and is required to inspect them annually. The central government cannot impose any expenditures on the communes other than those for which they are directly responsible. They can give a municipality more authority in a particular area, but then must also provide means to meet the additional responsibility. The central government may borrow money from the communes within certain guidelines set by the Council of Ministers.

The central government posts a municipal receiver in every commune. A Treasury employee, the receiver works in and with the commune. While he is accountable to the government, the commune pays his salary. For this reason two or more communes may share the same receiver, but all communes must have one. The municipal receiver is personally accountable for all municipal funds not kept in the Treasury. He may deposit this money in the commune's name, either at a bank or at the Treasury. Three times a year the municipal receiver is required to check his accounts against those of the mayor to be sure they match and once a year the Treasury is supposed to do the same.

C Municipal Revenue

Municipal revenue in Ivory Coast comes from five major sources

- taxes,
- receipts for fees and services,
- revenues from public property,
- investments, grants and other aid, and
- miscellaneous sources

One group of revenues is set and collected by the central government. Another is established and collected by the commune itself.

Communal revenues derive from eight areas. The first is retroceded government taxes, of which there are two types. Both types are established and collected by the central government which then returns all that has been collected to the communes in proportion to their contribution. The first of these is property taxes and the second, the *patente* or business tax. These funds are kept in a common Treasury account, and shared by all the communes and the central government. When a commune incurs an expense the bills are sent to the Treasury to be paid out of its share. The communal share of these taxes is 22%.

The second area of municipal receipts are remunerative. These are user fees or rent paid by inhabitants for various communal services such as market space or use of the communal slaughterhouse.

The third area of revenue is the global grant given by the central government to the communes. This grant accounts for one-and-a-half percent of the total government budget. The money is allocated according to criteria set by the DCL. The amount depends primarily on the size of the commune and the other sources of revenue it has. Other technical and political factors are also considered. Thus, in 1986, the older, larger, more established communes such as Adjamé and Bouaké received only 20% of their total revenue from this source. By contrast, the newer, smaller ones received an average of 67% of their total revenue from the global grant. Some of the smallest receive as much as 80% of their revenue from the central government.

Communes may also receive grants from other sources within and without the country. For example, a wealthy citizen might choose to donate resources for a particular project. A municipality may also receive a grant from a development agency or other non-governmental organization.

Another source is the *patrimoine* which is also a form of remunerative revenue. This is a user-fee for use of communal halls or chairs for occasions such as funerals.

The final source of revenue is miscellaneous taxes on such things as movie theaters, taxis, and advertising posters. These taxes are specific in that each taxable item is clearly stipulated in the law. Communes cannot use this catch-all category of tax to create and establish new taxes not previously defined in the law.

Municipal bonds (loans) are a final source of revenue for communes. However, municipalities have not yet been granted the power to use this source.

All decisions about revenues to be collected by the municipality must be approved by the central government through the Ministry of the Interior. The DCL manages this for the ministry. In addition, much of the revenue is collected by the central government and then retroceded to the municipality. Thus, all decision making processes are top down and all reporting processes are bottom up.

The types of businesses that can be taxed are identified precisely in the code. In comparison with the more urbanized communes, rural communes have few sources of tax revenue. Some communes are able to offer many more services than others. Some have been more creative about finding sources of income. Communes must sometimes undertake illegal activity in order to accomplish what must be done to offer meaningful services.

V DELIVERY OF PRIMARY EDUCATION IN RURAL AREAS

A Introduction

This chapter provides background information about the organization and evolution of formal education in the Ivory Coast. The discussion focuses on the primary education system. The overview section sets the stage for the analysis contained in the remainder of the chapter. It provides a snapshot of the primary education system and then highlights salient problems. In doing so, the analysis draws heavily on a World Bank assessment of the Ivoirian primary education system. The second section provides more detail in terms of historical background, student/teacher/school numbers and institutional arrangements within the education sector.

B Overview

This section offers several initial observations about the Ivoirian formal education system, emphasizing the elitist nature of the system, and the difficulties the primary school system faces in accommodating all school children in that age cohort. It concludes with a list of problems that the Ivoirian system will have to overcome if it is to make a contribution to the future development of local communities and the Ivory Coast as a country.

The Ivoirian education sector is top-heavy. The Ivoirian government has for many years spent heavily on education, but has rather meager results to show for its expenditures. Structural adjustment programs through 1989 did little to change overall policies, although they forced some spending cuts.

Those few Ivoirians who complete their education through the university level have been educated to standards as high as those in the French system. However, this high-quality education co-exists with a primary school system that can accept only 60% of the eligible cohort.³⁵ In spite of a high rate of attrition and repeats, only 15% of those who complete primary school move on to secondary school. The pattern repeats itself at the secondary and tertiary levels, each university graduate (from a three-year degree program) represents eight years of tertiary instruction. The massive investment in education, and the allocation of approximately 40% of the government recurrent budget to education, produces a small cadre of highly educated Ivoirians, while adult literacy levels stagnate at about 30%.³⁶

The education sector is top-heavy in several respects. Tertiary education received about 15% of the recurrent budget for education in 1983, while primary education received about 45%.³⁷ However, more than one million students attended primary school (still only 60% of the cohort), and fewer than 6,000 students attended university.³⁸ Primary school teachers' personnel costs totalled 91% of the recurrent budget for primary education, but Ivoirian teachers' salaries are 25-30% higher than those of civil servants with the same qualifications.³⁹ Their teaching load averages about 27 hours

³⁵World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition 83

³⁶World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition 83

³⁷World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition 80

³⁸World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition 81

³⁹World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition 79

per week, a figure the World Bank considers to be low⁴⁰ Ivoirian teachers have so far strenuously and successfully resisted efforts to cut their salaries (frozen like all civil servants' since 1982) or benefits and to increase their workload. The World Bank characterizes primary teachers' qualifications as high, and the availability of textbooks as good⁴¹. It foresees a problem: the number of qualified primary school teachers is increasing rapidly but, since they are more expensive than teaching auxiliaries, this means a trade-off between a shrinking number of teachers and better qualified teachers in the current austerity conditions when enrollment rates have been stagnant for several years.

This budget austerity is the only apparent effect of structural adjustment programs on primary education, outright cost-cutting measures have affected only the secondary and tertiary sectors. The following issues still remain to be addressed, however, and do affect primary schools:

- high unit costs at all levels,
- need for better planning and management,
- regional and gender imbalances in access to education (in remote rural areas in the north less than 30% have access to primary education and, nationwide 75% of boys are enrolled but only 50% of girls),⁴²
- continued low level of adult literacy,
- slow increase in the number of primary school places compared to the population growth rate,
- need to increase internal efficiency by lowering the dropout rate and limiting repeats,
- need to increase teaching hours per teacher,
- need to educate children more appropriately for the likely opportunities in the job market.⁴³

Not surprisingly, teachers and university students perceive attempts to change the system in a different light than does the World Bank. They do not see that the current system gives them disproportionate benefits, reducing the availability of service for others. They see the cuts in a political light. First, the abrupt withdrawal of teacher housing subsidies in 1983 was perceived as unfair because housing subsidies were not withdrawn from all public servants. Second, the teachers' unions and university students have remained stubbornly independent and vociferous critics of the ruling party, therefore, austerity measures are interpreted as efforts to bring this recalcitrant opposition under the party's thumb. Because of their power to disrupt, their strikes and protest have often won them reversals of austerity measures.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition 78

⁴¹ World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition 78 no year given probably 1983-1986

⁴² World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition 83

⁴³ World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition 82

⁴⁴ Daddieh Cyril Kofie 1988 The Management of Educational Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire Journal of Modern African Studies 26 (4) 639-659

The World Bank recommended as a high priority that the government set policies defining the role of the private sector in education, and issue and implement guidelines and monitoring procedures

C Education in the Ivory Coast

This section provides historical and contemporary details about primary education in the Ivory Coast. It gives both a qualitative and quantitative perspective on the system, and then discusses teacher and education inspector training and career paths, and the role of the education inspector. It concludes with remarks on student performance, which suggest some of the system's strengths and weaknesses.

1 Historical Background

This sub-section gives a sense of the antecedents of the current Ivoirian primary education system. At independence in 1960, Ivory Coast claimed a primary enrollment rate of 46% (24% for females). This figure was relatively high, although the secondary school enrollment ratio was only two per cent (one per cent for females). The pupil-teacher ratio was also quite favorable at 41/1. The literacy rate was estimated at five per cent, extremely low. The difference between officially high enrollment ratios and low rates of literacy (35% in 1980) suggests that a number of problems face primary education: high drop out rates, high rates of grade repetition, particularly in the first three classes,⁴⁵ and a high deviation around the mean of pupil/student ratio (hence, many classrooms have excessive numbers of students). Educational problems endemic to African countries probably face the Ivory Coast also: insufficient training of teachers, lack of equipment and materials and, generally, ineffective pedagogy. Indeed, the reform proposals of 1983 call for less "bookish learning." The ambitious goals contained in that document are unlikely to have been reached however, since considerable re-training of teachers would have been required. Data available at this stage make it impossible to determine whether changes have indeed taken place.

2 Evolution

This sub-section traces the evolution of Ivoirian primary education. It deals first with quantitative measures and then addresses more qualitative aspects of the system.

⁴⁵ In 1966 25% of all primary enrollments were concentrated in the first grade (28% for females) in 1969 that figure had been reduced to 23% (26% for females) in 1974 to 20% (22% for females) in 1984 the rate had been reduced to 19% (21% for females) in 1975 53% of all primary enrollments were in the first three grades in 1980 54% and in 1984, 51%. The very high rates of repeating in grade six (in order to qualify for entrance into secondary education), increases enrollments at the end of the primary school period. In 1980 that rate in grade six was 53% in 1981 56% and in 1982 55%. In all 26% of all primary enrollments were students who were repeating grades. Since 25% of all enrollments are concentrated in grade six (because of grade repeating) it is likely that many students do not go beyond the third grade and thus are not effectively schooled. At the national level rates of school leaving are reported to hover around 2.5% for grade one and two. At grade three the rate increases to 3% (5% in 1982) then increases to 15% in grade five (22% in 1982) and over 50% at grade six (55% in 1982).

Achievement tests may have been administered at one time and their results would be telling. It might be possible to use the Living Standard Survey (1 600 households) which measured literacy and numeracy. While such indicators go up with years of schooling the correlation is not perfect and would therefore reveal the extent to which schooling and illiteracy are associated. Economists point out that such schooling is wasteful because it absorbs resources while producing few if any of the desired outcomes such as literacy. It is likely that this phenomenon (participation in the first three grades only) varies between regions and communities.

Quantitative

Enrollment ratios have continued rising over the years, reflecting a major financial commitment on the part of the government

Table 1 Evolution of Primary School Enrollment ratios

	<u>Total (Years 6-11)</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
1960	46		24
1965	60	80	41
1966	63		44
1967	66		47
1969	72		52
1970	72	80	45
1971	77		56
1972	--		--
1973	--	--	--
1974	65	82	48
1975	65	82	49
1976	68	84	52
1977	70	87	54
1978	74	90	57
1979	76	92	60
1980	77	93	62
1981			
1982	79	93	64
1983	77	91	63
1984	78	92	65

Qualitative

The quality of education is a difficult concept to measure because the term can be defined variously. One element generally associated with quality of educational offerings is funding. Funding includes investments in buildings and facilities as well as recurrent expenses, such as teachers' salaries, supplies, etc. The correlation between funding and quality of educational offerings in industrialized countries (as measured by test results, for example) is rather low, although good schools are never underfunded. In the African context, large classes and insufficiently trained teachers (either because too few are available or because the salaries are too low to attract well-trained persons) are the norm.

In the Ivory Coast, the government's considerable financial commitment to education, and to primary education particularly (spending 50% of the education budget on primary schools is quite unusual) shows up in rather favorable pupil/teacher ratios.

Demographic growth requires an ever increasing education budget. To improve schooling rates where the population is increasing rapidly, the education system will absorb ever increasing proportions of national resources. To these two factors (demography and higher schooling rates) must be added yet another factor, the built-in raises in the salaries of teachers whose income increases with seniority. Further, if new teachers are required to obtain more training before they can be hired than did their predecessors, they will expect increased remuneration. Lastly, in a rapidly expanding system, the costs of training ever increasing numbers of young teachers are considerable. Thus, education represents a costly endeavor, complete with built-in increases (through teacher seniority systems).

It is not surprising that, following the 1981 structural adjustment, enrollment rates decreased. One official report claims that, in 1987, enrollments decreased by 13.2% in the secondary and that the private sector enrollments increased. The period 1980-88 is described in the same report as being characterized by a slowdown in the construction of secondary schools. It is unclear whether a similar policy was followed concerning primary education. The advent of decentralization at that time makes predictions difficult. Rich communities - such as Abidjan - may have taken over the building of schools while poor ones may have been unable to continue what the central state had started.

Table 2

	No schools		No teachers	No students	Ratio	
	Public	Private				
1960		1722	5867	238772	41	31
1965		1806	7478	353745	47	29
1967		1992	8818	407609	46	
1968		2067	9640	427029	44	
1969		2177	10094	464817	46	23
1970		2260	11243	506272	45	22
1971		2281	11433	527615	46	21
1972		2390	12742	566689	44	20
1973		2543	13158	606263	46	20
1974		2700	14403	61369	45	
1975	2470	2904	15358	672707	44	
1976	2758	3195	17044	735511	43	
1977	3130	3591	18704	810244	43	
1978	3531	4003	21640	888728	41	
1979	3919	4419	24441	954190	39	
1980	4297	4807		1024585		
1981	4724	5237		1085124		
1982	4982	5501	31297	1134915	36	
1983	5254	5795	32414	1159824	36	
1984	5450	5976	28561	1179456	37	
1985	5267	5796	33500	1214511	36 a	⁴⁶

⁴⁶ It is more accurate to compute the ratio by dividing the number of students by the number of classrooms (presumably there is one teacher per classroom) Starting in 1975 this series yields the following numbers

	Total	Public	Private
1975	45	45	46
1976	44	43	45
1977	43	42	45
1978	42	41	44
1979	41	41	43
1980	40	40	42
1981	40	40	40
1982	39	40	39
1983	39	39	37
1984	38	38	39
1985	38	38	39

Table 3 Ivory Coast Educational Expenditures

	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Investments</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>GNP</u>	<u>Percent of</u> <u>Gov Exp</u>
1960	4,453,000	1,347,000	4 2	15 1
1964	9,892,850	913,350	4 7	20 9
1965	9,892,850	2,253,918	5 4	20 4
1968	18,685,000	1,580,000	6 4	27 7
1969	17,088,073	2,548,200	5 5	22 8
1970	21,318,402	2,993,000	5 4	24 1
1972	33,653,000	2,175,000	7 5	32 2
1973	34,927,000	4,465,000	7 4	33 9
1974	42,052,000	3,721,000	6 1	29 6
1975	48,125,000	7,803,000	6 6	33 7
1976	66,580,000	9,717,000	5 3	20 1
1977	--	---	--	34 2
1978	120,404,400	30,379,000	7 2	33 1
1979	160,092,300	35,475,900	8 6	39 8 ⁴⁷
1980	----	-----	---	--
1981	147,478,300	24,282,100	7 2	--

3 Organization of Education

This sub-section sketches out organization, at the national level, of the primary education bureaucracy within the larger context of the Education Ministry. It then describes teacher and inspector training and career paths.

Institutional Arrangements

Before 1983, several ministries were responsible for educational matters: the Ministry of Primary Education and of Television Education, the Ministry of National Education (responsible for secondary and higher education) and the Ministry of Technical Education. Each of these ministries had nine regional branches headed by a director. Each director was assisted by an inspector of primary education.

In 1983, two changes took place: in April, primary education was merged with secondary and higher education and, in November, technical education was added, creating a ministry responsible for all educational matters. However, other ministries such as agriculture, defense, health, etc., also have specific educational responsibilities.

The Ministry of Education is headed by a Minister, assisted by a staff (cabinet). The ministry is divided into departments responsible, for example, for scholarships, primary education, statistics and evaluation, teaching personnel, etc. Then each of these services is subdivided into sub-sections. For example, the primary education department is divided into 3 sub-sections: primary schools, school cooperatives and further education of teachers.

Teacher and Inspector Training

Teachers normally acquire their pedagogical skills in teacher training centers. Four Category I centers exist. They recruit students with a total of ten years of primary and secondary schooling. Category I schools provide a

⁴⁷ In 1980 primary education accounted for 49.4% of current educational expenditures; in 1981 49.1% and 50.9% in 1982.

two-year degree program In 1983, enrollment totalled 486 These people typically receive government scholarships while in training

Category II establishments also train secondary school graduates (1,722 in 1983), likewise in a two-year degree program

The third form of training occurs at the Bouake Normal School This institution recruits auxiliary primary school teachers who have passed a competitive examination After two years of training they join the ranks of regular primary school teachers

Primary school inspectors are recruited from among secondary school teachers and are trained at the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, the standard training venue for all secondary school teachers Inspectors are selected as follows a secondary teacher can be appointed to a CAFOP (teacher training college) Secondary school teachers are selected because they are subject specialists (mathematics, history, etc) After studying in a CAFOP for a while, they can prepare for a special examination (*concours*⁴⁸) Successful candidates are then appointed to a position anywhere in the country

In addition, a National Continuing Education Center handles in-service training of primary school inspectors, counsellors, and school principals

Teacher and Inspector Career Patterns

Upon graduating from these schools, teachers are assigned as needed Personal preferences play a limited role in job postings In all likelihood, the grade upon leaving school determines whether the new teacher will get his/her first choice assignment or not Top graduates generally obtain their first choices Teachers who do less well may not get their first (or second or third) choice Pay scale is national with regional and possibly local adjustments Promotions involve advancing up a single salary scale whose monetary value is negotiated between the unions and the Ministry A teacher's salary improves as a function of grades obtained during inspections and reports filed by the school principal In practice, promotions are probably based largely on seniority because inspectors, for lack of transportation, are not often in a position to actually visit the schools

The career ladder for teachers exists but is truncated a primary school teacher may become head of a school and/or *conseiller pédagogique* (teacher supervisor) If s/he wanted to become an inspector, that person would have to become a subject specialist and follow the sequence of career moves outlined above Whenever the subject of advancement came up, primary school teachers complained about this arrangement, particularly about the fact that their very demanding schedule and isolation did not enable them to prepare for the examination to enter the CAFOP Thus in practice the highest position in primary education is not available to teachers

Inspectors play a major role in establishing the curriculum, a number work in the Ministry's pedagogical department They act as a link between local schools and the Ministry, administer the budget (with the help of a civil servant), supervise and assign teachers

⁴⁸ A *concours* is a competitive examination for a limited number of available positions Candidates are selected on the basis of examination results Assuming five positions to be filled, only the five persons with the highest scores are selected Such a system is used in the United States to select foreign service officers for example In the French tradition all civil servants are recruited in this manner and so are all students to the *grandes écoles*

4 Inspector's Role in Organization and Operation of the Ivorian Primary Education System

This sub-section describes the role of the primary education inspector, the direct superior of primary school headmasters, in the administration of the system. Following a sketch of the organizational hierarchy, attention focuses on the personnel, authority and powers available to the inspector, as well as the difficulties he must overcome in carrying out his mandate.

The Ivory Coast is divided into 11 regions for educational purposes, each region is divided into *inspections académiques* of differing sizes, each headed by an academic inspecteur. There are 107 such inspections in the country. Korhogo, for example, is divided into two *inspections académiques*. Koun-Fao has its own, but Kouibly is part of the inspection located in Facobly, a city near Man (Man is also divided into two *inspections académiques*), over one hour away from Kouibly on a poor road. At the head of a region is an *inspecteur régional* who also heads the teachers' college. The *inspecteurs* report to him.

At the national level, all *inspecteurs régionaux* report to the director of primary education, located in the Ministry of Education. Regional inspectors claim that no one reads their reports and so no action is taken on their recommendations. The *inspecteurs académiques* have the same complaint. The overwhelming impression is of a system staffed by competent and rather well-trained individuals, many with high professional ideals, yet saddled with a paralyzing bureaucracy incapable of innovations, including even such as would entail no or very small additional expenses.

Inspector's Staff

The inspector is assisted by a variable number of supervisors who visit schools to supervise and backstop teachers. The inspector also has an administrative staff composed of an administrative secretary, usually a former primary school teacher,⁴⁹ someone who handles all matters relating to exams (also a former teacher), and one or two secretaries. The primary school inspectorate also has a telephone (although schools do not have them), a copier and simple office furniture. The offices visited were not computer equipped. The inspector is supposed to be issued a car (lack of funds for maintenance and repairs means that these cars do not work, so the inspector usually uses his own), and he receives a fuel allowance. Given the state of most rural roads, a four-wheel vehicle would be needed and the gas allowance would have to be several times larger than it is in order for the inspector to be free to cover his district as he should.

Current Difficulties Confronting Educational Administrators

A number of changes have taken place within the last five years. Cars are no longer issued. Gasoline allowances are inadequate (actual figures vary: some claimed an allowance of 28,000 FCFA a month, others 50,000 FCFA a quarter). At 300 FCFA a liter, such an allowance does not enable its recipient to cover much territory. Further, the number of teachers to be supervised has increased, hence the number of supervisory visits per school has decreased. Formerly inspectors supervised 50 teachers, but it is now 65 on average. Some supervise as many as 90 teachers. Since new teachers must

⁴⁹ The recently published report on education recommends altering this policy by removing many teachers from administrative duties in order to assign them to classrooms. While this makes sense it should be noted that having people who understand the teaching world may provide many benefits to the organization. Hospitals are run by doctors, research organizations by researchers and universities by professors precisely because the complex nature of the tasks makes it difficult for managers without the relevant background to be effective administrators.

be inspected in order to be granted tenure, to compensate, experienced teachers are not supervised

In addition, fewer teachers' manuals are available for distribution to teachers. In-service training organized by the inspector and his staff continue to be provided. However, that service is not based on systematic research or evaluation.

One last administrative point should be mentioned. An inspection's geographical boundaries do not necessarily correspond to other administrative demarcations. For example, Kouibly, in the Western part of the country, is part of the inspection located in Facobly, a rather large town over an hour away on a poor road from Kouibly. Necessarily, urban and rural educational problems are different and the mayors of each town have their own priorities.

Inspector's Authority and Power

The inspector is granted considerable powers. He is the most significant education official because he is responsible for ensuring that the curriculum is followed (he may visit any school unannounced). He approves teachers' promotions and transfers and he assigns new teachers posted to the inspection. He manages the budget allocated to his inspection (that budget has declined over the last few years), administers all examinations and keeps basic statistics on teachers and pupils. He may waive the requirement that pupils wear a uniform and he may also waive other requirements, for example, that first graders have a reading book. He supervises newly appointed teachers and he must inspect them before they are granted tenure. He has no authority over the salary scale which is determined through negotiations between the Ministry and the teachers' union. He organizes in-service training in his district. He is also responsible for the supervision of private schools and must give his approval before a community can build a school, the teaching staff of which will be financed by the ministry. The inspector therefore works closely with local leaders, although he receives no training that would prepare him for such duties.

Inspectors have a national organization called the *Amicale des Inspecteurs*. That organization sometimes makes educational recommendations. Inspectors from the same region meet occasionally, but no mention was made of national meetings during interviews.

Inspector's Status Locally

The inspector is a member of the local elite by virtue of his rank, his income and his education. Local authorities need him, for the inspector will make it possible to have a teacher assigned if and when a classroom is built by villagers or by a combination of villagers' and state funding. In assigning teachers allocated to his district, the inspector must weigh many factors, some internal (such as previous exam results in a particular school) and some external (the influence of a mayor). It is unclear how these various forces interact. It is also unclear what role the inspector's ability to interact with local authorities plays in his career progression. The norm is for inspectors to rotate. Therefore, there is relatively little incentive in harnessing local forces. Further, career progression is influenced by decisions made at the national level. Therefore, the inspector cannot totally ignore central state considerations when making decisions. Were mayors able to provide certain amenities (such as textbooks for all children, or attractive classrooms), they could provide incentives the inspector could use to reward meritorious teachers by appointing them to these improved schools (this is a common practice in France where amenities and generous housing allowances - including free utilities - are used to attract teachers in spite of the fact that they are all paid on the same salary scale).

5 Results Student Performance

Primary schooling lasts six years. However, students frequently repeat grades. In 1980, 16% of first graders repeated. This figure rose to 19% in 1981 and 20% in 1982. In 1980, 53% of sixth graders repeated, 56% in 1981 and 55% in 1982. These extraordinarily high rates reflect the very selective entrance examination to secondary schools, given during the sixth grade. Secondary schools' admission rates hover around 15%. Many pupils take the exam more than once to improve their grades, an element in the admission process.

New laws were promulgated in 1983 and 1984, seeking to lengthen schooling to 10 years for everybody. While existing data make it impossible to tell whether these laws have been implemented, the report notes stagnant enrollment rates since 1981. Thus, following the structural adjustment of 1981, a number of financial decisions were made that may have affected enrollment rates, pupil/teacher ratios and other indicators of quality.

Effects of the 1983 and 1986 structural adjustment programs are not clear from available data. However, a slow down in enrollment rate growth was to be expected, since rates were hovering around 75%. To raise that rate would have required increasing admission rates into secondary schools. It is likely that important inter- and intra-regional differences exist, with Abidjan exhibiting the highest participation rates in all forms of schooling.

D Rural Primary Education in the Ivory Coast A Preliminary Assessment

This section starts by recapitulating the growth experienced in the primary system during the decade of the 1980s, and major changes in the way the curriculum is imparted to students and primary education is financed. It then turns to fundamental assumptions underlying the organization of formal education in the Ivory Coast, assesses the advantages and disadvantages of a centralized approach to education, and concludes with a description of the system in 1991.

1 Introduction

The Ivory Coast experienced significant growth in primary education enrollments between 1980 and 1991. In 1980-81, there were 881,000 pupils in public schools and 144,000 in private ones for a total of 1,025,000. In 1989-90, these numbers had increased to 1,246,000 in public schools and 159,000 in private schools or 1,405,000. The increase of 37% for the decade is small given the rapid population growth, 3.5% a year. Thus, enrollment increases merely kept up with population increase.

The enrollment rate is generally believed to be 70% for the country. However, this average figure is too crude to guide educational policies. It hides very large regional, urban/rural, gender and other differences. Further, that figure is not calculated on the basis of an accurate census of the eligible population. Lastly, the schooling rate should be computed on the basis of sixth grade (CM2) enrollments. In many parts of the country, the schooling rate for that cohort is significantly lower, particularly for girls.

The Ivory Coast allocates a high percentage of its general budget to education. In 1975, 6.2% of the GDP was allocated to education, a figure that increased to 6.5% in 1989.⁵⁰ Education expenditures grew from 40% in 1975 to 43% of the total budget in 1989. Primary education received 44% of that

⁵⁰ The World Bank report of 1989 claims a figure of 7.34% of the gross domestic product.

year's education budget (excluding investments), up from 40% in 1980. These figures demonstrate the GOIC's commitment to education.

This high level of expenditure results in part because the country committed to staffing the primary system with fully qualified teachers, i.e., teachers who have finished secondary schooling, undergone two years of teacher training, passed examinations and been certified after evaluation of their classroom work as satisfactory. These teachers receive high salaries: at 156,000 FCFA (roughly \$550) a month, a beginning primary school teacher earns 50% more than a midwife with equivalent educational credentials. Paying teachers at higher rates than similarly qualified civil servants has important financial and organizational consequences, discussed below.

Besides a slower enrollment growth rate than during the previous decade, the period 1980-90 saw two important developments: elimination of free supplies and books for students, and cessation of schooling by television, an expensive and ineffective tool. The televised educational curriculum marked the system in three ways:

- consolidation of an extremely rigid academic time-table, dictated by broadcasting requirements,
- emphasis on rather clear and specific learning objectives, and
- insistence on highly qualified teachers, assumed necessary for a successful television-based curriculum.

2 Background and Fundamental Assumptions about Education

Understanding the French educational system sheds light on the Ivoirian approach. Few systems are as similar to the French system as that of the Ivory Coast. Assumptions made in the one can be found in the other.

These assumptions are what Stanford University Professor John Meyer calls the "charter," i.e., the set of explicit or implicit assumptions that shape the creation of an institution and many of its subsequent developments. Four such assumptions seem particularly salient:

- 1 education is a state responsibility,
- 2 primary education is desirable for all, but secondary education is a privilege, the state should increase access to the first and limit access to the second,
- 3 the state must ensure educational quality, i.e., appropriate curriculum, quality teacher training and standards enforcement,
- 4 education can both help modernize a country and play an important role in the development of a national culture.

State as Education Producer

Assumption one is particularly crucial. It shaped not only the organization responsible for the delivery of education, but also the method of provision. From that assumption follow centralization of educational decision-making and division of the country into educational regions and subordinate bureaucratic units (inspectorates and primary schools, secondary schools, etc.), so that each teacher is hierarchically linked to the Minister of Education.

Ensuring Educational Quality Approaches

The "charter" mentioned above also defines what constitutes education and how it should be delivered. The French definition focuses on mastery of skills and acquisition of certain cultural concepts (heroes, poets), rather than on individual development (a more American notion). Knowledge comes first, the individual will develop once that basic knowledge has been mastered.

Skills mastery is demonstrated through examinations, never administered by the child's teacher, since the latter could not be trusted to be objective. Teachers are tested before they enter the profession. Anyone seeking promotion (to supervisor, for example) must prove competence by passing the appropriate examinations.

Since the program of instruction is considered essential, its implementation is carefully controlled. Teachers must be supervised, to ensure satisfactory performance, and to ensure feedback on performance. Experienced teachers are hired as supervisors and perform both sanctioning and advising functions as they judge appropriate.

Learning is viewed sequentially. Before a student can progress to the next step, he or she must demonstrate satisfactory mastery of the first one. Further, a curriculum represents an inter-related set of skills. The child competent in some skills, but inadequately prepared in another should repeat all subjects in that grade. This practice explains why France reports a primary schooling rate of 103%. The Ivorian high repeat rate represents an extreme, but it reflects systemic insistence that each child show ability to proceed to more complex tasks.

3 Advantages and Costs of Centralized Education Systems

The centralized GOIC expanded primary schooling rapidly as a matter of policy. Standardized teacher training, curricula and administrative procedures facilitated this development. Each school merely replicated the existing organizational blueprint. When too many schools had been built in an inspectorate, a new one was created.

Advantages of Centralization

A centralized system of education can effectively fulfill a number of functions if provided the necessary resources. It can avoid duplication of effort by developing a single teacher training program and a unified curriculum. It can monitor their effectiveness. Since the most complex tasks (curriculum design) are performed at the top, a centralized system can operate at the classroom level with less thoroughly trained teachers. This division of labor permits the centralized system to economize on training costs more than one relying on highly trained professionals. Teachers can be supervised to ensure that they perform well and powerful incentives can be established by creating a national career ladder. Lastly, such a system can post teachers to communities without regard to local resources.

The consequences of centralization will be noted throughout this report. It is probably no accident that, in a standardized subject such as mathematics, children who learn in centralized systems (e.g., the Japanese and French) outperform, on standardized achievement tests, those schooled in decentralization systems (the American among others). If a centralized system manages to develop an effective curriculum, it can foster high levels of learning. But if such a system adopts an ineffective curriculum, then everybody suffers.

Disadvantages of Centralization

The advantages of centralization in education are rarely fully exploited however. For example, few centralized systems carry out systematic pedagogical research, a function that must be centralized. The Ivory Coast is no exception. Centralization is particularly well suited to delivering a highly standardized product (such as mail) with a relatively simple technology. In such circumstances the organization can operate with minimally-trained personnel who accomplish only standardized tasks. But as technology changes (and pedagogy can be thought of as technology), the organization should also change. Yet centralized organizations resist change. In particular, the new technology may require a highly trained staff, while the staff may still have to operate within an organizational structure designed for individuals with little training. In such a case, organizational structure prevents full utilization of staff capabilities. That may be the situation in Ivoirian education: it is designed so that relatively unskilled teachers can provide education as a standardized product (the curriculum). Ivoirian teachers, being highly trained, can develop innovative approaches to teaching, but must labor under the constraints of standardized approaches and regulations characteristic of centralization.

Inappropriate Exploitation of Centralized System's Strengths

The Ivoirian system therefore pays twice: first to develop highly trained teachers (capable of more than they are now required to deliver) and then to develop the standardized curriculum and procedures of a highly centralized educational system. In principle, investing in either one or the other should suffice. *Given the disadvantages of centralization and the considerable investments made in teacher training, the only realistic course for Ivoirian primary education involves devolving authority over many aspects of rural primary education to local provision units. But this possibility exists only because the centralized approach made such high levels of accomplishment, including rapid expansion, possible.*

Designing a fundamental organizational change is always problematic and doing so within the context of scarcity makes such a redesign even harder. Yet this is precisely the dilemma all Ivoirian primary schools face.

Centralization and Local Variation: A Perennial Conflict

Centralized educational systems are ill-equipped to handle local variations because primary schools are uniform units subject to uniform rules specifying what may and must not be done. The issue of language acquisition illustrates the problem. Given their different maternal languages it is unknown whether all Ivoirian first graders are similarly equipped to learn French. Yet the curriculum specifies that four weeks will be devoted to preparing to learn French. In interviews first grade teachers reported that seven weeks, a more appropriate period for preparation, used to be allotted. In reality, setting objectives and allowing the teacher to reach them would probably work more satisfactorily. When asked whether they would like to be able to decide when children were ready to learn to read in French, first grade teachers uniformly supported such a system.

Educators know classes vary from year to year in ability and motivation. But the standardized curriculum does not recognize this variation. Similarly, the curriculum makes no provision for different levels of economic development or regional variations in economic activity (such as agricultural calendars). Most importantly, it prevents teachers from using the experience that would enable them to adapt the school to its environment. The assumption that the school is a creation of the state and that the state stands above all institutions, is responsible for such a view. That view, however, may have outlived its usefulness. It is true that inspectors enjoy significant

latitude in enforcing rules. However, regardless of the supervisory skills of the inspector and of his willingness to foster change, the national curriculum is not designed to handle regional differences.⁵¹

Education requires the cooperation of children and parents as co-producers of learning. It is ironic that a centralized system makes resources available where they otherwise would not be. Many small Ivoirian communities would not have schools, were teachers' salaries not paid by the central state. Yet, centralizing most aspects of the educational enterprise makes it difficult to take into account local problems and opportunities. In areas with high levels of illiteracy and poverty, teachers are not encouraged to make schools into community centers dedicated to literacy of the entire community. Such a failure stems from the fact that goals are centrally determined and maximizing schooling rates and/or literacy are not now officially sanctioned policies. Rather, the goal is to service the children, but children must attend on the state's terms and no negotiations (even implied) are even considered. This characteristic has some dramatic consequences.

Surveys of all CM2 (sixth grade) classes in the study reveal that the proportion of children enrolled in that grade who had never repeated varied between 10% and 33% (only one case). Nationally, if one takes the cohort that enrolled in 1980 and eliminates those who are repeating, 23% of that cohort is in the sixth grade five years later. In other words, the system does not recognize that its curriculum is appropriate for less than 25% of its students, and that the rest require a longer period of time to complete it.

4 Education under Constraints in the Ivory Coast 1991

The Ivoirian Government has taken a number of financial decisions affecting primary education. Teachers' salaries have been frozen at the 1982 level. A beginning teacher receives 156,000 FCFA a month, about 50% more than other civil servants with equivalent educational credentials (midwives, for example). Salaries of other civil servants have likewise been frozen since 1982.

In addition, promotions no longer bring pay raises. A teacher may perform well, but that performance will engender no increase in his income. Moreover, many bonuses and reimbursements formerly provided have been suppressed. Teachers who taught in a community without electricity, running water, a market and health facilities were eligible for a hardship allowance of 10,000 FCFA per month. This allowance is no longer paid. Examinations are always administered by teachers from another area. The travel expenses this policy engenders were formerly reimbursed, but no longer. In addition, teachers have to cover necessary expenses out of their pockets: 2,000 FCFA a month for the cards on which they write their lesson plans (which must be presented to the head of the school every morning), 2,000 FCFA a year for an attendance book and a sum for the books necessary for preparation that varies with the subjects taught.

School construction is now partly funded through local funds or equivalent. The central government's infrastructure matching grants (FRAR) pay for a percentage of the cost of building a school (varying between 40%-50%, depending on economic development and ability to pay in the region). The community raises the rest. Between 1974 and 1987, 2,897 classes were built.

⁵¹ Failure to adapt to local conditions leads to underutilization of local resources. Working within a centralized system makes it difficult to draw upon local resources. In one case only was it reported that the local midwife was asked to come and discuss pregnancy in school. Such a topic exists in the sixth grade curriculum and teachers often feel inadequately trained to discuss it (particularly since the vast majority of them are men). Thus the request reflects an absence of relevant training rather than an attempt at harnessing local resources.

under this arrangement. The community portion can take the form of either labor or cash (or both). Local communities are now responsible for maintenance costs. There is serious doubt whether the necessary budget allocations are being made and whether they can be made, given the prolonged sharp recession and the state of Ivoirian public finances.

In addition to this transfer of responsibility, inspectors and supervisors receive a much lower allocation for fuel. In one inspectorate visited, only one supervisor has a car. The others either travel on mopeds or walk. The inspector usually uses his own car. The fuel allowance is far from adequate to cover the costs. He therefore digs into his own pocket.

Supervisors have also experienced a general increase in the number of teachers they must supervise, from 50 to 65 on the average, but some have as many as 95. While inspections and supervision still occur, the system has probably pushed individuals to their limit. Teachers are unlikely to transfer yet more money from their salaries to finance school operating expenses, particularly since the various financial benefits they used to get have been reallocated to finance additional positions.

E Centralized Curriculum and Local Adaptation

1 Curriculum Rigidity

Visits to schools, extended discussions (many of them extremely lively), with teachers, heads of schools, supervisors and inspectors suggest rural Ivoirian primary education is still working well, largely as a result of centralization which provides highly trained teachers and resources equally shared by all schools. However, Ivoirian teachers, supervisors and inspectors also share one enormous problem that would exist even if the Ivoirian economy were flourishing. Teachers and inspectors are unanimous in criticizing the curriculum. It is so rigid, in terms of the time allotted for specific topics within subjects, and makes so little provision for practice time that teachers simply cannot ensure that students master the prescribed skills.

In a decentralized system, the curriculum would probably have been long since altered by many teachers because it is ill-adapted and because no central authority would have the means to enforce compliance (in England, Her Majesty's Inspectors are advisors - their effectiveness depends on their professional competence, not on their authority as enforcers of centrally-determined policies). In the Ivoirian case, therefore, centralization is becoming counter-productive since it forces teachers to continue teaching in a manner they unanimously consider unsatisfactory. However, centralization forces teachers to comply, to reach certain objectives, to be supervised by heads of schools, to be observed, activities they themselves rate as necessary and useful. Given the many pressures on their resources, teachers would have little incentive to dig in their pockets to perform their duties in a decentralized system. In this sense, therefore, centralization has protected the system's ability to provide the service. The maintenance of the ill-adapted curriculum illustrates the general proposition that centralized systems are often unable to correct their errors or to adapt to new conditions.

2 Teacher Training

The considerable investments in teacher training makes Ivoirian teachers perhaps the most highly trained in Africa. After completing high school and taking an examination, future teachers are sent to a teachers' training college for two years. The first year includes approximately one-third practical training in actual classrooms staffed with carefully selected teachers. The second year includes two-thirds practical training. During

training, future teachers are required to give lessons which are videotaped and then criticized. As was already noted, a young teacher is supervised by the school head when first appointed and he must be observed in the classroom by the inspector before being granted tenure. Teachers submit their class preparations to the head of the school every day. Headmasters report that the press of their duties (they also teach) leads them to pay particular attention to young teachers' preparations and, often, none at all to that of experienced teachers they know to be performing well.

All inspectors and directors (i.e., experienced teachers) report that the training is satisfactory. Younger teachers say that they feel unprepared when starting to teach. However, several of those interviewed said that, with a few more years experience and on-the-job learning, they realize that their training has been quite thorough.

There is little doubt that Ivoirian primary school teachers and those responsible for their supervision are concerned about children's learning. A reading of "*fiches pédagogiques*," i.e., the official report filled out by the supervisor, indicates that these are highly experienced educators with an eye for mistakes (most have 20 years teaching experience). Matters of pedagogy (the transition to French, for example or the teaching of proportions) elicit spontaneous debates.

Financial stringency is affecting the quality of teacher training. The video equipment used in training colleges is not being replaced when it breaks down. Student teachers find it difficult to travel to the school where they are to practice teach because funds are not available. In addition, the teacher training is used to absorb a surplus of high school graduates who might wish to go to university, but who cannot because of lack of space. Teaching is a demanding profession ill-suited as a dumping ground for trainees who, for whatever reason, cannot gain admission to the university.

3 Factors Maintaining Quality

So far, the system is maintaining itself for three reasons: continued relatively wealth, effective positive professional socialization, and adequate residual negative incentives. First, previous investments have created a kind of cushion, for example, teachers' high pay allows them to buy supplies and to underwrite travel costs. Second, Ivoirian teachers have developed a professional ethos a young teacher cannot easily disregard since that ethos is reinforced by organizational rules administered by individuals committed to these rules. When he is assigned to a new school, the young teacher will usually live with another teacher because several months elapse before he receives his first paycheck (after that, payment comes regularly, an unusual circumstance in Africa and a feature of Ivoirian administration teachers appreciate). Furthermore, he will be visited regularly by the director and he will have to submit his preparations to that director every day. Thus, he is under considerable scrutiny.

Organizational control does not take negative forms only. A young teacher will face difficulties (professional and personal - he often does not know the local language and he is often single and far from friends and relatives) and his experienced colleagues are likely to have solutions to these difficulties. This lays the groundwork for professional socialization. It is also worth remembering that directors, supervisors and inspectors are well aware of the incentives at their disposal: they can facilitate a requested transfer or ignore it, they can bend the rules or not. Lastly, if worse comes to worse, they can organize a transfer to a very undesirable location. Thus, the third factor is that the positive and negative sanctions, so far at least, seem to be sufficient to maintain a high level of professional commitment.

In short, the Ivoirian government may have overspent by paying very high salaries, paying for training (free room and board as well as 5,000 FCFA a month allowance) at a level virtually identical to that available teachers in France. These outlays enable the state to continue providing primary education to a constant proportion of young people. Yet considerable strains exist in the system. Shrinking financial resources threaten to erode quality.

F Primary Education System under Strain

This section reviews the threats to quality primary education posed in the contemporary Ivory Coast. Some of these derive from financial strictures. Others reflect the rigidity of a highly centralized system that radically reduces capacity to respond to demand for education more effectively by allowing teachers to tailor the general system to local realities. It then examines the incentives confronting two important classes of actors: parents and teachers as co-producers of primary education.

1 Financial Constraints: Losing the Private School

One part of the system has come under strain for strictly financial reasons. Private schools are encouraged in the Ivory Coast and function under state controls. The state in the past has paid 80% of teachers' salaries. For the state this is financially desirable because private schools rely far more heavily (two-thirds as opposed to one-third) on less highly trained teachers (*instituteurs adjoints*). Private school exams results (administered by inspectors and state teachers) are only modestly inferior to those of state schools. If private schools did not exist, the state would have to pay far more to educate these children or tolerate a lower schooling rate. Inspectors visit private schools in their territories.

However, in 1991, the state failed to pay the subsidy and teachers have not been paid in rural areas. In one of the study sites, the parochial school was closed and in another its future was in considerable doubt. Parents are not paying the fees, officially set at 10,000 FCFA a year in rural areas (20,000 FCFA in urban areas). The one private rural school still in operation in another site had managed to recoup 1,600 FCFA per student for this year and these funds paid for essentials such as chalk. Teachers had received only one month's salary this year. They were in arrears on their rent. Their electricity had been cut off. One reported his wife had left him (spectacularly she came to the classroom, dropped off a baby and told him that she could no longer live without money). In addition to these problems, teachers are not provided with the housing they are normally entitled to. There can be little doubt that rural private schools will close their doors and that these closings will put considerable strain on the state system.

2 Parents' Calculations Concerning Primary Education

Parents, the indirect consumers of primary education, are experiencing significant frustrations. Incomes are decreasing, indeed plummeting in the East. Parents are being asked to make a greater financial contribution than formerly to their children's education. To accommodate the swelling ranks of school age children communities must build schools, hence secure additional revenues. Thus, local taxes will increase also.

Cash Outlays for Primary Education

A parent with seven children (not at all unusual) must spend a considerable amount at the beginning of the school year, at least 100,000 FCFA, assuming no school uniforms are bought. As a result, many children do not have books at the beginning of the year. The case studies reveal the extent of the problem is not nearly as dramatic as teachers' complaints.

suggest All teachers mention it in the start of an interview as a response to the question "Comment ça se passe chez vous?" ("How are things going in your school?") But team visits took place in June By then, only about one-third of the children lacked essential books That one-third of school classes represents the average, but teachers have to use the blackboard a great deal in order to make up for the fact that a significant number of children cannot look up the information in the book In many classrooms, the circulatory system was drawn on the board (same week, same program), an indication that many children would not know what the teacher was talking about unless he took the time to make it available to everybody

When asked why some parents do not send their children to school, most teachers claim that parents cannot afford it Many suggest that parents would send their children if they could afford to buy the necessary materials Some claim that parents are not interested But in fact the decision to send a child to school depends on the interplay between positive and negative incentives

Urban Parents

At one extreme is the city dweller with a cash income Given his level of education, the availability of cash and the impossibility of considering any except modern sector occupations for his children, the urban parent must send his children to school Indeed, that parent will almost surely send his own children, and often those of rural relatives as well These individuals have the means and the positive incentives to send children to school This even extends to rural areas among teachers interviewed, several reported financing former students' studies

Rural Parents

At the other extreme is the rural parent without cash income He has powerful incentives not to send the child to school, particularly when the most salient purpose of schooling - employment in the modern sector - is in sharp decline Since the father knows that the probability of receiving cash from his children later on is decreasing, he might as well not run the risk Furthermore, he may well be unable to afford the books his child requires to attend school The father may even be summoned to the school if the child appears without books Even if the father believes that schooling is desirable or at least not harmful, in this situation he experiences considerable cognitive dissonance (he cannot fulfill the role expectations of a provider) The only solution is to leave the source of the dissonance the school (similarly, in the United States an unemployed divorced father often leaves the state where his children live) This decision also makes available the child's labor for household chores and removes the significant risk of seeing an educated child become a burden because, having been to school, he considers himself educated and refuses to work as a traditional farmer Historically, rural areas have always been the last to achieve heavy schooling rates The Ivory Coast is no exception

Parents' Mixed Strategies Concerning Children's Education

It should also be understood a parent can and does optimize the decision Since he has many children, he can reap the benefits of schooling while minimizing the risks He can send two or three children to school and keep the others at home This strategy keeps open the possibility of cash transfers in future years from the school goes if they eventually obtain posts in the civil service or succeed in business At the same time, he cuts current expenses by not schooling all his children Depending on his evaluation, he can then adapt his purchase of materials to his own circumstances by deciding to buy all the books or few or none It is likely that the parent's decision to allow a child to drop out evolves over time It

is also likely that such a decision does not take account of the child's academic potential. In the early stages of educational development, i.e., when literacy is low, parents cannot evaluate their child's cognitive achievements and they probably decide to withdraw their children from school (or let children make the decision) too early for schooling to be effective. Illiterate parents are also unable to help their children with homework (teachers constantly report that fact).

Thus, in areas with low rates of literacy and increasing economic difficulties, the need to raise significant amounts of cash acts as a powerful disincentive to school attendance. So too does the inability of parents to co-produce formal education, i.e., to assist children with their studies.

In such areas, the curriculum should be adapted so that children have more time to practice French (not spoken at home). In areas with low rates of literacy, a policy that seriously seeks to increase attendance rates would make provision for free books, and possibly free lunches. In one site visited, a school lunch program operates with World Food Program (WFP) food staples. Children pay 25 francs which covers costs of condiments and preparation. But in the East and the North, some children could probably not pay 25 francs for a meal (feeding six children in one family would require 150 FCFA a day).

The disadvantages of a centrally-planned educational policy can be seen from the above observations. Children's labor varies in value, depending on the type of crop. In the West, for example, boys look after cattle and lead the oxen when plowing. Girls fetch water. Local variations in labor demand are so great and changing as to make a national-established school unrealistic. Also, the distance to school and the terrain affect children's ability to attend school. Thus, creating a school-specific policy might be desirable. This implies that school directors will have to work with local parent groups to adapt the curriculum to local needs, family patterns and constraints.

It is likely that a parent's willingness to send children to school will vary with time of year, the child's gender, nature of the education offered, length of the school day⁵² and the cash outlay required.

The cultural distance between the home and school should also be taken into consideration. In rural areas, teachers complain that the time allotted to learning French is too short. Since language is essential to school performance, the failure to learn French may create a powerful incentive for the child who does not learn rapidly to quit school. There are far more such children in rural areas than in urban areas.

Schooling Rates

The team tried to ascertain the effective formal schooling rate. In the North, that rate can be virtually zero where schools have not been built. In areas where schools exist, the officially reported rate hovers around 30% for boys and 15% for girls. However, one further caveat is necessary: this rate is computed on the basis of registered births. High variations in sex-specific official birth rates (50% higher for boys), high variations from year to year and from area to area suggest that many births are never registered. Health workers who operate in remote areas (vaccination programs) report that 50% of all births are never registered. Rural teachers agree that such a figure is realistic. They base their estimates on visits to villages as well

⁵² A recently published report on education suggests that schooling rates can be increased by making part-time education available in those areas where schooling rates are low. This type of experimentation should be closely monitored.

as discussions with children ("How many of your brothers and sisters do not go to school?" is a frequently-asked question) Some teachers plead with village chiefs to send children to school and attendance rates will surge Thus, in rural areas, many children are not enrolled in school and do not appear in official statistics The national average of 70%, therefore, should be taken as a maximum for the reasons just presented and also because, in rural areas, the schooling rate for girls hovers around half that for boys In reality, the schooling rate of the Ivory Coast is lower than reported Given the cumulative nature of education (educated parents want their children to be educated), a policy that makes education costly to the consumer cannot be expected to yield high attendance rates

3 Teachers' Problems and Individual Incentives

Parents face frustration, but so do teachers While they earn good salaries, purchasing power is eroding Given African family and social traditions, they face increased pressure to assist those less fortunate A portion of their salary, as noted, already subsidizes the primary education system (books, supplies, travel expenses, hardship allowances, etc) More importantly, teachers face widely differing working conditions Often, housing is not provided In addition, the rigid curriculum often fails to fit children's learning rates, particularly since some children own all books utilized in a grade, and others none of them It can also be assumed that African children exhibit the same ability distribution as other children In short, the teacher faces a highly complex task and possesses very few tools with which to tackle it He will be far more aware of the limitations within which he must operate than of his creativity, given that the system discourages creativity Committed teachers get support from other teachers (made more likely by centralization), but sanctions can occur if the teacher deviates too far from the curriculum A mechanistic approach to teaching, almost surely inappropriate in rural areas, is likely to be adopted The high repeat rate represents a built-in consequence of the conditions under which teachers must work

4 Conclusions

These observations raise a number of fundamental implications

It is generally acknowledged that 50% of the male population needs to be literate before sustained development can occur More recent European historical evidence suggests that, for true sustainability, 50% of the male population should have the equivalent of six years of education Even if the lower estimate is the correct one (50% literacy), many areas of the Ivory Coast are far from reaching it

Further, women play an essential role in development and their formal education must also reach a certain level Under conditions of abundance, even the inefficient Ivoirian educational system could expect to reach the goal eventually However, the strains the system is experiencing will reduce the already limited efficiency of the system and will reduce the learning on the part of children who attend Further, the proportion of children who attend will be reduced unless dramatic cost-saving measures are adopted In short, the inefficient Ivoirian system of education (both internally and externally) will not create one of the fundamental conditions for sustained economic growth nor will it create the conditions for reduced fertility

Creating an efficient and low-cost system of education therefore represents one of the essential duties of policy-makers if the Ivory Coast is to experience sustained economic and social development The country possesses considerable assets already, far more than most other African countries An improvement of the quality and a reduction of costs are possible The new plan for education takes the view that quality can be

maintained and that, if quality is maintained, schooling rates will subsequently increase. This assessment is correct.

However, centralized systems are difficult to change. Two tasks therefore face Ivoirian educators: what to teach to whom and how to effect changes. Centralization may have outlived its usefulness and a move toward a decentralized management of schools should be considered. It must be remembered that the goal of education is to make learning possible and that administration merely represents a means that makes that learning available to children. Thus, centralization or de-centralization are not the object. What is important is that all children learn as much as possible.

VI DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES IN RURAL AREAS

Ivoirian health care policies focused on curative services, materialized in a network of hospitals. These are concentrated in cities, reflecting the urban bias of the policy. This system employs about 7,000 non-civil service support staff, including gardeners and chauffeurs as well as x-ray technicians and laboratory assistants. While some in this group are considered qualified, but not formally trained, the majority are unskilled. Training of health care workers has also focused on urban-based curative care skills. Employment practices likewise reflect this bias. Hospitals employ 70% of all doctors and about 50% of all nurses and midwives. Apparently all decisions concerning both provision and production of health care are made at the ministry level. The ministry is also responsible for evaluating performance.

The government health care system in Ivory Coast seems never to have provided much service for the bulk of the population, either before or after structural adjustment programs began in 1981. In fact, further evidence of the lack of real change during the 1980s, despite structural adjustment programs, comes from the continuation of skewed health sector policies. Five-year development plans promised to expand access for rural populations to health care, actual spending fell far short of promises. Between 1981 and 1985, although the government had acknowledged the need to improve services in the rural areas significantly, the proportion of annual investment devoted to the health sector averaged less than one per cent.⁵³ From 1981 through 1984 the health sector received on average 6.5% of the total recurrent budget.⁵⁴ In 1984 the two university teaching hospitals received 22% of the entire year's recurrent budget for health, while rural areas containing some 50% of the population received 11%.⁵⁵ Given the focus of the government health care system on urban curative care, the government health service in rural areas seems a minor actor among the array of health services that people actually use.

The World Bank characterized the health care system in 1987 in scathing terms:

- an increasing share of the recurrent budget went to personnel expenses. 75% in 1984, up from 68% in 1981.⁵⁶ Since government policy continued to guarantee employment to Ivoirians who qualified as doctors, this trend was set to continue.
- personnel expenses squeezed out spending on drugs and other necessary inputs. The distribution system for drugs was chaotic, compounding shortages further. Management systems in the Ministry of Health did not allow adequate monitoring of either financial, or epidemiological, or personnel activities.⁵⁷
- the ratio of doctors to nurses and other support staff was too high. Partly for this reason the World Bank estimated that the

⁵³ World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire in Transition: From Structural Adjustment to Self-Sustained Growth. Washington, D.C. 1987. II Table II.2.2 p. 67.

⁵⁴ World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire. II 67.

⁵⁵ World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire. II 71.

⁵⁶ World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire. II 71.

⁵⁷ World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire. II 69.

government service was treating approximately 40% fewer patients than it should

- since the government health service has been so bad for so long, considerable demand for private health care has developed. Some of this demand has been met by government personnel, who spend a large portion of their time on their private practices rather than on their official jobs.⁵⁸ The combination of financial incentives to build private practices coupled with the lack of monitoring allowed doctors to draw full-time government salaries while caring for private patients.
- the Ministry of Health has neither the data nor the appropriately trained staff to plan and monitor effectively. Data collection is wholly inadequate.⁵⁹

The World Bank's 1987 recommendations advised turning the government system on its head. High-cost curative care for high-income urban dwellers (the service the government has traditionally provided) should be transferred to the private sector. The government should switch its efforts to preventive care for the rural populations.⁶⁰ It seems doubtful that such a radical change can be made quickly or efficiently, one would expect bureaucratic foot-dragging at every step. It is also reasonable to question whether the government should entirely abandon what it does, perhaps, know how to do, i.e., urban curative medicine, and whether fees from this health sector should be used to provide incentives and monitoring systems for private sector preventive health care in rural areas.

The results of the skewed health care system are what would be predicted. In spite of its classification as a lower middle income country, Ivory Coast has poorer than average health indicators. The infant mortality rate, although it dropped from about 167 to 121 per 1,000 between 1960 and 1983 (if the data are reliable), was higher in 1983 than the average for lower middle income countries in 1960 (114, which had dropped to 87 per 1,000 by 1983).⁶¹ Life expectancy at birth also lags.

The averages for Ivory Coast camouflage regional differences and poor segments of the population. Access to government services declines from south to north.⁶² Poverty increases going from south to north (35% of the poor live in the eastern forest region, 51% in the savannah region).⁶³ Although national figures for nutrition show adequate amounts of consumption, surveys suggest severe malnutrition problems among children in the north in the months before harvest, and among children of recent immigrants and the urban poor.⁶⁴

⁵⁸World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire II 74

⁵⁹World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire II 69-70

⁶⁰World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire II 75

⁶¹World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire II 64

⁶²World Bank, The Côte d'Ivoire II 67

⁶³Grootaert and Kanbur Policy-Oriented Analysis 1990 Table 2 16)

⁶⁴World Bank The Côte d'Ivoire I 65

The Fourth SAP included measures to reallocate the health recurrent budget to provide more money for drugs and other inputs. It seems fair to conclude that such a reallocation is long overdue. It may well, however, be too early for our fieldwork to detect any change at the level of delivery of government services in rural areas. One would have to conclude then that *the impact of structural adjustment programs in the Ivoirian health sector has been nil to date*.

VII CASE STUDIES

A Introduction

Chapter VII contains three case studies focusing on institutional and public finance arrangements, and provision of primary education and public health services in three small, rural municipalities. Of the three case studies discussed in this report the first, of Koun-Fao, provides the fullest examination of these issues. Analyses of the next two cases, Sirasso and Kouibly, are shorter and concentrate on highlighting differences found in those two jurisdictions compared to Koun-Fao and to each other.

Each case begins with a background section geographic setting, history of settlement and colonization, and current political situation. These materials provide the context concerning nature of local production systems, attributes of the community (size, duration, ethnic composition, traditions of collective action, etc.) The remainder of each case is devoted to discussions of municipal public finance, primary education and public health. Concerning local public finance, an effort is made to reflect the realities of municipal resource mobilization and expenditure, and implications for effective public entrepreneurship (i.e., the ability of elected and appointed local officials to "entrepreneur" solutions to public problems in their jurisdictions). The section on primary education in each case provides quantitative and qualitative information on the character of the educational experience as viewed by major participants (children, parents, teachers, inspectors and administrators) at various points in the process. Those materials provide the reader with a sense of the communal, economic, professional and political incentives that influence the decisions of these different categories of actors. The analysis of health care provision stresses the availability of different kinds of health care, the terms on which different options are available, and highlights the choices that health care consumers and producers make in light of rule-, community- and economically-based incentives.

These snapshots of situations in three widely dispersed rural municipalities are not particularly encouraging, but neither is disaster a foregone conclusion. Instead, the case studies provide critiques of the weak points, strengths and potential opportunities for institutional innovation and improvements in service provision and production. These points are developed further in the conclusions and recommendations presented in Chapter VIII.

B Koun-Fao Case Study

This initial case study provides as much background material as the others, but the discussions of public finance, primary education and public health are more fully developed. The rise and fall of cocoa and coffee production in an area situated in the "old cocoa belt" is described at some length, as are the practical consequences for resource mobilization to finance production of public goods, and co-production of goods such as primary education and health care. Methodologies employed in developing some of the data on public finance and health issues are included in Appendix A at the end of this volume.

1 Introduction Background and Evolution, 1891-1991

Koun-Fao's name reflects its history as the location of a CFAO (Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale) "factory" or purchasing station for cacao and palm nuts during the colonial era. The community counts some 3,000 [?] inhabitants. It is the seat of a commune, created in 1985, which bears the same name. The site lies in east-central Ivory Coast and in the middle of the old cocoa and coffee belt. The local population is composed largely of Agni

and Abron, ethnic subdivisions of the Akan group. In environmental terms the area lies within the region formerly covered by tropical hardwood forests. Most of these have been logged off, first to make room for cash crop plantations and subsequently (1960-1980) to feed the world market for African tropical hardwoods.

In the past, particularly during the cocoa and coffee boom years from the end of World War II to 1980, the town typified the rapidly-evolving Ivorian planter culture. During the inter-war period, cocoa cash-cropping took root in the area, and local peasants rapidly converted themselves to the status of market-oriented plantation farmers. By the 1950s, local planters were moving their produce to market in Chevrolet and GMC trucks.

Geographic Situation and Historical Overview

Physical Situation

Koun-Fao, seat of the commune of the same name, sits astride a two-lane, well-maintained blacktop road connecting the town to Abidjan and the outside world through Abidjan and Port Bouet, some 260 km to the south. North of Koun-Fao the level of development declines precipitously. Beyond Bondoukou, 100 km to the north of Koun-Fao and seat of the colonial-era *cercle*, conditions approximate those of Burkina Faso. The Ghanaian border, some 40 km to the east of Koun-Fao, remains a porous boundary between the Agni/Akan of the town and the larger Akan populations of the Ashanti and other groups in central Ghana. The commune lies halfway between Tanda, seat of Tanda Prefecture, and Agnibilékrou, the next prefecture to the south towards Abidjan. It is 40 km from Koun-Fao to either of these prefectural seats.

Historical Background

Settlement of this Agni, formerly forest community, and the other villages in the commune, dates back to the late 17th Century. Macro-political pressures, in the form of Osei Tutu's rapid military expansion of the Ashanti empire, drove the ancestors of contemporary Koun-Fao people from their homeland to the east in the area of present-day central Ghana. Previously, the Agni had lived in harmony with the Ashanti. When the Ashanti sought to dominate their neighbors after 1680, the Agni, along with the Abron, another Akan group, moved into the Ivory Coast. The Baoule, a third Akan group, were pressured out of Ghana by the Ashanti somewhat later. They were unable to dominate their Agni and Abron relatives, and so moved peacefully through the area to create settlements well west of Koun-Fao out on the savannah, at places such as Yamassoukrou and Baoaké.

Koun-Fao oral history identifies the chief of the first settlers as Youman, an Agni. He is reported to have moved into the village area about 1690. He, as his descendants, were farmers. Some were hunters. Among the village chiefs who followed him were Guissan, Fofiye and Manzan. During the 18th and 19th Centuries the Agni of Koun-Fao also mined gold in the region. Some of the gold was sold to the Ashanti, while some was kept in the village as a status symbol.

French penetration into the area began in the latter half of the 19th Century. Binger, the first Frenchman to explore the area, arrived in Bondoukou, to the north of Koun-Fao, during the late 19th Century. The French conquest began in earnest at the end of the 19th century, with the fall in 1898 at a point along the Libero-Ivorian border of Samory Toure, perhaps the greatest of the West African anti-colonial guerrilla leaders. French armies circumvented forest areas as far as possible. Thus Koun-Fao, like the neighboring communities, was never invaded militarily by colonial forces.

Earlier, the threat of conquest at the hands of Samory Toure led the Agni and Abron to try to negotiate alliances with the English - who had by then moved into the Ashanti region - and the French in Bingerville. In response to Agni pleas the English finally sent a delegation, which prompted the French to move in an army.

Commerce in the area focused on Ashanti during this period. Rubber tapping of native species began before the turn of the century. Local collectors marketed their produce through the Ashanti region to the English. The first customs post was created ten km east of Agnibilekrou, at Sikasso. There the French tried to tax the export of natural rubber.

Cash crops were introduced after 1900. Informants report that a Frenchman named "Keller" introduced cocoa. Coffee culture began about 1920. The Agni continued to collect natural rubber through the end of World War II. In the inter-war period, local people began aggressively developing cocoa plantations. The amounts produced attracted French merchants, and the Compagnie Française d'Afrique Occidentale opened a comptoir at Koun-FAO, probably during the 1930s. The name "Koun" is a deformation of "N'Go", the name of the massive leaves formerly utilized by the Agni for roof thatching, and by the Djoula (the "Soudanais" of French Soudan) traders for wrapping kola nuts for transport. Kola nuts were produced in the region during the 19th Century. They still are, but in much reduced quantity.

The cocoa and coffee African Planters' Union (*Syndicat Agricole Africain*) was founded during 1944, roughly a decade after the first abortive attempts to start a local cooperative movement.⁶⁵ The first efforts began in the early 1930s, and were centered in Abidjan. A representative was posted at Abengourou. He covered the small planters of the Koun-Fao area. In 1940, the war having started, the French Vichy regime forced the black planters to burn their cocoa harvests to prevent them from selling it to the English across the border in the Gold Coast. Coffee culture had not yet become sufficiently important to merit burning the beans. Some local people hid a bit of cocoa, and then later sold it across the Gold Coast border for premium prices. Individuals caught with illegal cocoa stocks in the eastern Ivory Coast were imprisoned at Abengourou, but were released by the French Commandant after short jail terms.

Coffee and cocoa production began booming in 1953. Koubena Moustapha, now the Secretary-General of Koun-Fao section of the dominant Ivoirian party, the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), began planting coffee in 1953. He was not the first, older people had bearing coffee trees well before he did. Money was abundant during this period. Some older, wealthier men had already constructed multi-story houses by the late 1950s. In 1956, coffee output overtook cocoa production in Koun-Fao. In 1959, bush fires broke out, at the end of a long drought, and destroyed many plantations. Moustapha lost 50 Ha in a fire in 1960. That set him back for a number of years. He replanted, but had to wait for four years for the coffee to produce, and for seven years for marketable cocoa. In 1973, local people began to plant hybrid trees which produced more cocoa. Those trees are still producing, and substantially more than the indigenous varieties.

Cocoa trees arrive at peak production after fifteen years, and can continue to produce for fifty years thereafter. Each year the suckers which the trees put out have to be eliminated. Otherwise they take all the sap. The trees also have to be treated to protect them against "capsicum", a form of insect. In 1970, an insect which arrived in the area from Ghana began to

⁶⁵ Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 18.

devastate local plantations by attacking the leaves. They had to be treated as well if the planter wanted to preserve his trees.

The introduced hybrids are still relatively new trees, but they have been much destroyed by wild fires. In 1981, another drought struck the area and bush fires ravaged the plantations. Local farmers normally use fire to clean their fields. A new variety of weedy grass has appeared locally. It retards natural regeneration on fallowed areas, burns very easily and, once fired, can easily flare out of control. The villagers create one-to-two-meter-wide firebreaks around their plantations. They volunteer in case of fire to help their neighbors. Everybody now tries to control the use of fire during the dry season. The state has also attempted to discourage burning, in a bush fire suppression campaign initiated in the late 1980s.

The local hardwood forests, formerly very dense and rich, were high-graded by timber concessionaires who stripped the area during the period 1960-80. To get at prime trees they reportedly moved heavy equipment through local plantations without permission and made no effort to spare coffee or cocoa trees. Once the trees were felled, they took out the prime logs leaving the lopped branches and tops lying about everywhere in the plantations. Then bush fires struck. The "fromagers," a softwood species, were the only trees to survive the fires. Environmental degradation is apparent in the area. Savannah species have recently appeared that previously never grew here.

The price of cocoa was 150 FCFA in the mid-1960s. Gradually it moved up, approaching 400 FCFA in 1975. Afterwards, in 1985, it dropped from 400 to 200 FCFA/kg. Now the effective price to producers is 45 FCFA.

Coffee beans were processed through the initial stages, in artisan operations at production sites, by the planters up to 1980. The locally-grown robusta coffee brought less than cocoa, 150 FCFA/kg. After processing, coffee was sold to buyers who shipped it south to the port and the world market. In the past the blackened ("worthless") coffee beans were kept by the planters, who sold them later to the Djula. A 70-kg bag of coffee beans cost 300 FCFA to shell. After husking, women and children picked out the black beans. The price to sort a 70-kg bag of shelled beans into prime beans and rejects was 100 FCFA. The blackened berries were sold for 50 FCFA/kg, and generally were ground up to be served as coffee in informal sector restaurants.

In 1980, two coffee processing plants were opened in the eastern region, one at Abengourou and the other at Adzopé. Local planters opposed this development for four reasons. First, many had invested in coffee bean shellers and had not yet amortized their machines. Second, with state backing the factories obtained a near monopoly on coffee marketing. They introduced pricing mechanisms that left producers distinctly worse off. Formerly, processed beans ("café vert") were sold for 200 FCFA/kg. It cost planters a total of 400 FCFA to process and sort a 70-kg bag. Assuming that husks and low-grade beans accounted for 30 kg, the value of the 40-kg of marketed processed beans, at 200 FCFA/kg, would be 8,000 FCFA minus 400 processing costs, for a total value of 7,600 FCFA. However, the farmers could sell low-grade beans for local consumption, obtaining perhaps another 500 FCFA (ten kg X 50 FCFA/kg) on that transaction. The total value would be 8,100 FCFA, plus an additional 400 FCFA recaptured by family workers in exchange for processing.

Unhusked beans ("café cerise") are now purchased by the plants for only 100 FCFA/kg. The value of a 70-kg bag of prime unprocessed beans would be 7,000 FCFA. However, factory buyers reject many beans as low-grade, and pay nothing for them though they retain the rejects. Planters lose their capacity to ensure quality control, and thus rarely get a full 7,000 FCFA for a bag. Any profits formerly obtained on reject beans are also foregone under the new

system Finally, planters' families lose the internalized wages from processing

Given the glut of coffee on the market, farmers rarely get a full 100 FCFA/kg even for prime beans They estimate that coffee is now selling at an average price of 45 FCFA/kg The buyers from the marketing board (Caisse de Stabilisation) were reimbursed for the costs of transport

The Prefect of Bondoukou reported to President Houphouet-Boigny some time after 1980 that Koun-Fao planters were refusing to deliver their coffee to the plant In fact local planters simply wanted to have the plant installed at Koun-Fao or at Tanda, rather than at Abengourou, because Koun-Fao production far outweighs that in Abengourou The coffee growers were convoked by Houphouet-Boigny to Yamoussoukro First he dined them, then he showed them his plantations and his own coffee processing plant Then he announced that he had stopped using his own plant because the new ones were more efficient He accused them of refusing to sell coffee to the new plants and indicated such behavior was unacceptable They repeated that they simply wanted factories in their own area

The President then fixed the price at 100 FCFA/kg But in fact, that price is paid only for the best beans The shipments with heavy amounts of low grade ("blackened") beans are bought for 25 FCFA/kg, or buyers are given nothing for them Coffee factory buyers give people nothing for the low-grade beans, but planters assert that factory technicians mix rejected beans with better grades

Despite the prolonged economic downturn, people here continue to maintain their plantations

Koun-Fao farmers have begun planting cotton In 1987-88 cotton was introduced It started off very well, but the CIDT (parastatal cotton production company) lacks credibility with local farmers Production was increasing up to last year, but in 1990 the CIDT took four months to pay for delivered cotton This year, Koun-Fao farmers cut back sharply on cotton production

Political and Administrative Evolution

Koun-Fao, during the late colonial period, was a constituent part of Tanda sub-prefecture In 1967, the town became the seat for the newly created Koun-Fao Subprefecture, while Tanda was elevated to the status of a prefecture The first subprefect arrived the next year Since that period, eight subprefects have been rotated through the jurisdiction Formerly, the subprefect played a wide range of governmental roles in his jurisdiction The larger towns, such as Abengourou, officially had communal status, but mayoral elections were never organized, so the subprefects functioned in those towns as ex officio mayors

From 1980 on, the idea of democratization began to take hold in the Ivory Coast The PDCI allowed individuals to declare themselves candidates for office without the necessity of prior slating by the party Many did, and were elected In Koun-Fao in 1980, a total of four candidates ran, all of whom were natives of the subprefecture All resided in urban centers where they had civil service jobs These local emigres were known by their peasant relatives to be wealthy and to have certain skills While they do not reside in the commune, they do bring intellectual training and strengths to the job

National Deputies

Candidates were proposed from the Koun-Fao subprefecture villages of Korla and Tankesse, and from two villages in an adjacent subprefecture, Kouassi-Datekro. The latter jurisdiction was at the time included in the Koun-Fao electoral district. The Tankesse Koun-Fao candidate won. He was defeated in 1985, but ran again for the post of deputy as a PDCI candidate in 1990 and was re-elected.

In the 1985 elections, the local electoral district was reduced to the sole subprefecture of Koun-Fao. Three candidates ran, one from Korla, one from Tankessé (a different individual, but he won as well) and one from Ameyaokro.

In 1990, two candidates ran, one from the opposition Ivoirian Socialist Party (PSI), from Nguessan-Brindoukro, and the Korla candidate, under the PDCI label. The latter won.

Municipality Creation and Elected Officials

In 1985, the commune was created as one of the wave of 98 communes established in that year. Before that date, Ivoirian communes were found only in the large towns. The subprefects administered the rest of the territory. The communalization argument amounted to the assertion that people are able to govern themselves.

To present one's candidacy for the post of mayor, an individual must be 21 years of age and have no criminal record. A candidate from Koun-Abronso village, just north of Koun-Fao in the commune, won the first municipal election. He was the only candidate, and ran as PDCI. He lived in Abidjan, and was a teacher.

In 1990, there were two candidates. Pierre AKA ran under the PDCI banner. So too did the ex-mayor from Koun-Abronso, who likewise ran as a PDCI candidate. Aka is a financial services administrator, employed at the Financial Services agency within the Treasury Directorate in the Ministry of Economy and Finance. He has worked there for sixteen years. Earlier he was at CEAO in Ouagadougou.

Local Government Opportunities and Problems

According to the current mayor, AKA, Koun-Fao people value the commune jurisdiction for several reasons, of which the following are the most important. Municipal office buildings are nearby, much nearer than Tanda Prefecture, so compliance with government regulations concerning civil status (obtaining birth certificates, marriage licenses, identity cards, etc.) is facilitated. Even though the local Subprefecture existed beforehand, creation of the municipality reduced the number of official transactions per governmental center, probably reducing the time required to complete such operations.

The municipality can also propose to undertake projects, which allows its citizens an entry point to shape the future of their communities as they see fit.

The quality of candidates for public office is a perennial problem. Some see public service as one important aspect of the job, if not the most important one. Others seek office merely to exploit the opportunities for self-enrichment. Embezzlement of public funds is a reportedly a frequent problem.

Local Finances Historical Background

Local participation in financing local health care and primary education has taken the form mainly of investments in infrastructure, beginning as early as 1954. The means by which resources have been mobilized have changed significantly over time. The head tax (*capitation*) was suppressed before independence in the Ivory Coast. Campaigns to mobilize voluntary contributions and cooperative rebates produced the bulk of local resources before 1985. Creation of the municipality in the latter year coincided with the initial phase of the current prolonged recession. The apparent negative impact of creation of the municipality on local willingness to participate in financing local services must be in part a function of the straitened circumstances of the inhabitants. But continued tight central controls over local tax authority to some extent prevents the municipal government from raising resources. A description of the evolution in local finances illustrates these observations.

Mobilizing Resources to Construct Infrastructure Facilities

The process of which infrastructure facilities were provided in the pre-commune days involved a series of steps. The local administrator (Tanda subprefect until 1967, Koun-Fao subprefect from 1968 on) could propose a project. Villages could also take the initiative, requesting that the subprefect include their request for a facility in his budget. If the request was approved, financing and construction were authorized.

Two of the first locally-financed facilities were a primary school and the current municipal building. They constructed in 1954, the latter as a dispensary. It has since been reconverted to administrative use. Both were financed entirely by local contributions, according to Moustapha, the Koun-Fao PDCI Secretary-General.

Before the municipality was established in 1985 the Ivoirian Government created a regional development fund (FRAR) to encourage local participation in financing provision of infrastructure facilities by supplying funds to match local resources. FRAR provided substantial amounts of grant money, in accord with the following procedures. A village in a subprefecture decided to build a school at an estimated cost of 6 million. If the subprefect accepted the project, he put it into the public budget. The forest zone populations, being richer, were expected to contribute forty percent. The FRAR put up the rest of the money.

The money was collected by the village community working through the village chief. During the boom years, there was no problem mobilizing 2.5+ million FCFA. Here the maternity building and the dispensary (c. 1973) were constructed together, entirely by the population of the nearby villages that are now part of the local commune. The idea was presented at a subprefectural council meeting, because local women were going to Tanda to give birth there. The SP and the ex-head of the PDCI convoked the village heads, the women's association representatives and PDCI committee heads.

The money to be raised was divided among the villages, as a function of population size. In the villages, the older men paid 5,000 FCFA, and the younger ones 2,000 FCFA. All could afford the amount. Women did not pay.

Certain individuals - many even - refused to pay. The party tried to convince them to contribute, saying that they would need those facilities if they got sick or their women pregnant. Many still refused, yet were not refused access after the buildings were completed. PDCI Secretary-General Moustapha reports that it was very difficult to collect the money - some people even insulted the collectors. Nonetheless they managed to get it. They deposited it at the Subprefecture.

Once the money was collected, the buildings were constructed in the same year. Everyone was happy with the facilities. The final installations - electricity, etc - were put in during 1985-90. The buildings were completed and inaugurated. The PDCI Secretary-General, in 1980, installed a kitchen, toilets, etc.

The commune can likewise request contributions to deal with such issues. Mayor Aka asks village representatives for suggestions about infrastructure requirements. If they go through the FRAR to get the money, they still have to provide matching funds.

National Matching Funds for Infrastructure Creation

According to the Ivorian government's regional development fund (FRAR) director, the local contribution rates now necessary to obtain FRAR matching grants are

- 50% for educational establishments,
- 30% for production projects, and
- 40% for all other sorts of infrastructure.

The newly-elected mayor, Aka, says the population believes that since the municipality has been created, citizens no longer need to pay anything for local services. Koun-Fao natives who have become civil servants are now picking up a large part of the costs of local public investments. The DCL refuses to allow the communal budget to be used as counterpart funds to finance new investments to get FRAR assistance.

In Koun-Fao FRAR has contributed only to construct two buildings: the midwife's house, and the kindergarten. All the other buildings, including all the schools, classrooms, and six houses for the instructors, were financed entirely by local people.

At the moment, the economic crisis is so bad that the local PDCI Secretary-General asserts that the normal person does not have even 500 FCFA in his/her pocket. Moustapha maintains that if someone has 5,000 FCFA, he is really doing quite well, or has received funds from relatives. The problem is that the plantations have all burned, so that somebody like him, who used to produce fifty tons of cocoa now can produce only 5 tons.

Municipalities have no general authority to tax their populations at present. They have to remain within the authority fixed in law by the Ivorian state. The commune can finance materials for the primary school and school children, e.g., notebooks, if they have the money. But they cannot raise taxes for that purpose at the moment.

Summary

Most Ivorians are caught in a prolonged economic crisis, tied to the steadily weakening market for agricultural exports (especially coffee and cocoa). The direct consequences of this continuing downturn are less money in individual and family pockets, and less money in government coffers at all levels. This experience of relative poverty, all the more unpleasant because it follows three decades of economic expansion and growing personal and public wealth, is forcing Ivorian public and private decision makers to confront the painful dilemma of choosing the lesser of two evils, instead of the far more comfortable and familiar process of choosing the greater of two goods. Nonetheless, nasty choices are now unavoidable.

Ivoirians long maintained that only the best was acceptable in their country because anything less was racist, or implied that they could do without the standard of living to which other peoples have become accustomed. However, if maintained in the context of the current prolonged recession, that argument implies a shrinking percentage of the population will have access to quality services, while the rest will have to make do with little or none. An alternative policy, perhaps rendered acceptable by the current crisis, would focus instead on a judicious lowering of standards designed to preserve public service essentials while cutting out what must be considered frills under contemporary circumstances.

2 Koun-Fao Municipal Finances

Since FY 1987 the fiscal position of the municipality of Koun-Fao has progressively deteriorated, substantially undermining its ability to provide and monitor the supply of public goods to its constituents. Total revenues in nominal terms declined 32% over this three-year period. With the population growing at an estimated rate of 3.3% per year, and inflation running at approximately one per cent per year, the local government's real per capita performance was even worse.

Deteriorating Fiscal Position Causes

The deteriorating fiscal position of Koun-Fao can be traced to two principal factors: (1) the precipitous deterioration in the Ivory Coast's economy, and (2) the macro-economic structural reforms initiated by the central government. The extent to which Koun-Fao and other local government units are susceptible to these exogenous factors, however, is in large part a function of the decentralized fiscal arrangements put in place in the Ivory Coast. In order to more clearly understand the processes which have helped undermine Koun-Fao's fiscal position, this section begins by examining the Koun-Fao fiscal arrangements, and in particular the composition of its revenues and revenue mobilization performance.

Like Kouibly and Sirasso, the two other small municipalities covered in this study, Koun-Fao depends for the majority of its revenues on a lump-sum central grant. Over the FY 1987 through FY 1990 period, central grant resources accounted for approximately 84% of Koun-Fao's total revenues. While this large lump-sum grant contribution from the central government provided the municipality with the greatest possible discretion over its expenditures (i.e., because the funding was not tied to investments in the supply of specific centrally-determined public goods and services), it also magnified the municipality's susceptibility to consequences of central government fiscal policies. *In particular, the municipality's heavy dependence on grants meant that as the central government embarked on SAP-negotiated contractionary fiscal policies, effects of these policies ramified quickly and directly to the local level.*

The close linear relationship between central grants and Koun-Fao's total revenues is clearly depicted in the Koun-Fao tables in Annex 2. It shows the average annual reduction in grant disbursements of 10.32% per year from FY 1987 through FY 1990 was mirrored by a 10.69% decline in Koun-Fao's total revenues. The small discrepancy between the two was due to the slightly worse performance of own-source revenues from locally administered taxes and fees.

Municipal Revenue Mobilization Instruments

Own-source revenues accounted for approximately 13% of Koun-Fao's total revenues from FY 1987 through FY 1990 ⁶⁶ Total receipts from these local instruments fell on average 11.65% per year over the three-year period. While the performance of individual own-source taxes and fees varied substantially (See Tables Annex 2 for a detailed breakdown), the aggregate performance of these local resources was closely tied to the performance of market fees, taxes on small businesses and artisans and fees for administrative services rendered by the municipality. Together these made up close to 90% of total own-source revenues. Closer examination of these three instruments reveals how the deteriorating economic situation and accompanying fall in incomes eroded the fiscal capacity of the municipality.

Of these three primary own-source revenue instruments, receipts from administrative fees and charges fell the most (65% in all) from FY 1987 through FY 1990 in Koun-Fao. By comparison, revenues from taxes on small businesses and artisans fell 30%, while market fee revenues followed a U-shaped pattern falling 17.67% from FY 1987 to FY 1988 and then rebounding by FY 1990 to its FY 1987 nominal level ⁶⁷.

The data do not permit a detailed and precise analysis of the underlying causes of the deterioration in own-source revenue performance in Koun-Fao. Yet several factors can be identified that likely played important roles in this process. First, since all three of these primary own-source revenue instruments are somewhat income elastic, they were no doubt adversely affected by the decline in incomes and economic activity in the municipality. As disposable incomes fell, investment in new economic activities largely dried up, thus reducing the demand for the legal and administrative services offered by the municipality. At the same time, reduced consumer purchasing power likely reduced the demand for goods sold in the market and by small businesses and artisans. As the volume of sales fell, the number of small-scale enterprises forced to shut down probably increased, thus reducing the tax base for market fees and small business taxation.

The second factor contributing to the reduction in own-source revenue yield was the increased temptation to avoid taxes as the level of economic activity fell. Transactions previously carried out in the Koun-Fao market were now more likely consummated in the informal market, beyond the reach of revenue collectors. As disposable incomes fell, barter exchanges no doubt replaced cash-based transactions, further eroding the volume of formal sector economic activity and thus the tax base.

Tactics to Improve Revenue Mobilization

Faced with an eroding tax base, the only recourse available to the municipal authorities in Koun-Fao was either to improve its tax administration (i.e., exert more effort to minimize tax avoidance), or increase its tax rates. Discussions with the municipal authorities in Koun-Fao suggest that they did not believe it was politically feasible (nor equitable) to increase

⁶⁶ Shared taxes (those collected by the central government and shared with the municipality) accounted for the remaining 3% of total municipal revenues.

⁶⁷ Smoothing out the U-shaped pattern reveals that market fee revenues increased 0.06% from FY 1987 through FY 1990.

tax and fee rates. With incomes on the decline, they had concluded that legislating rate increases would be tantamount to political suicide.⁶⁸

While Koun-Fao officials ruled out rate increases to sustain their own-source revenue yield, some evidence suggests they did try to exert a greater tax collection effort. The U-shaped performance of market fee revenues reflects this change in revenue collection effort. As economic conditions worsened in 1987 and 1988, and as municipal elections approached, it was not surprising to find that market fee revenue fell markedly. After the elections, however, the new administration appears to have been able to capitalize on the heightened expectations of its electorate, in order to exert the necessary effort to restore the nominal yield from the market rates to their FY 1987 level.⁶⁹ Similar gains were not apparently possible in the case of the small business and artisans tax.

The only remaining area where Koun-Fao might be able to exert a greater revenue collection effort is in assisting the central government to collect property taxes. Under the existing arrangement, the central government shares 40% of the property tax revenues it collects with the municipalities. By all accounts, however, most of the taxable property base goes untaxed. Only property owners who work for the central government (and not all of them), reportedly pay the tax. In these selective cases, the tax is withheld from the public employees' pay. Since reassessments of property values rarely, if ever, occur in the new districts, even these tax payers pay only a fraction of what they should.

Koun-Fao, like other municipalities, is in a position to assist the central government in collecting the property tax at little added cost to itself. The municipality already collects a fee for surveying land within the municipal boundaries. It thus has a listing of all properties within its jurisdiction along with some notion of the value of these properties. By providing this information to the central tax authorities, the municipality could greatly assist in reducing property tax avoidance. The fact that this type of cooperation has not occurred reflects the lack of communication between the central and municipal authorities. This in turn is no doubt a function of the highly centralized administrative and political institutional structures of the country.

3 Koun-Fao Primary Education

The *inspection académique* is situated in the village of Koun-Fao. The village had 2,631 inhabitants in 1988, the entire commune includes 6,608 people. There are eight schools, but the private Catholic school recently closed. These schools, not including the recently closed one, have 41 classes. In Koun-Fao, the largest class (second grade) has 48 pupils. However in Korla, a nearby village of 1,501 people, the largest class holds 60 pupils. This is considered far too many because, at the end of sixth grade,

⁶⁸ It must be kept in mind that the Ivory Coast had recently undergone municipal elections and that the original municipal administration of Koun-Fao was reportedly voted out in large part because of dissatisfaction with the local government's ability to convert existing tax revenues into an adequate supply of public goods. It is also worth noting that rate increases would have further increased the incentive for tax avoidance and thus on net may not have been a viable strategy for increasing nominal receipts.

⁶⁹ Without a future upturn in economic fortunes it is unlikely that this effort will be sustainable.

students pass the CEP (school-leaving examination) Those who perform particularly well on that examination are admitted to secondary school ⁷⁰

The schooling rate is estimated to hover around 70%, or the national average, for the entire commune Significant variations exist however, depending on degree of urbanization In Koun-Fao, the rate is closer to 80% (with an attendance rate of 98%) while in the small village of Dodoassie, the rate is lower and the drop-out rate is high (seven out of 35 and an attendance rate of 91% as compared to Koun-Fao's 98%) These students return the next year, but eventually such students become too old and drop out completely With a passing rate of 60% for the CEP in 1990, the commune is slightly lower than the national average However, it is above the national average for entry into the secondary (22%) These passing rates into the secondary indicate only the percentage of students eligible to attend and says little about how many in fact go In 1989, passing figures for the CEP (29%) and for entry into the secondary (17%) were significantly lower In Abronzo, where the catholic school recently closed after teachers went without pay for six months, results at the CEP were disastrous only two passed

The inspector has six pedagogical counselors (*conseillers pedagogiques*) working under him, all recruited among teachers Each counselor must supervise about 65 teachers They bring a minimum of 20 years' teaching experience to the classrooms they supervise During an inspection in the first grade, the class was extremely lively and the children involved in learning the number "7," as well as sets Though the teacher's performance appeared highly professional, the counselor made several detailed observations which indicated that he was a highly experienced observer whose comments would help a relatively young teacher improve his already excellent performance

Koun-Fao schools are still in a reasonable state of repair, although little maintenance has taken place recently Some roofs are starting to leak, walls have not been painted in a long time, floors are starting to wear and some desks need repair By African standards, however, the schools in Koun-Fao are reasonable Two classes were in very bad condition in Korria, the walls of one threatening to crumble and its thatched roof (a rare occurrence) leaking very badly

Teachers are well-dressed and speak French extremely well They perceive schooling rates as decreasing They relate the drop to the fact that children see older brothers (sisters are never mentioned) failing to obtain work In addition, attending school represents a significant annual expense (6,500 FCFA in grade one, as much as 30,000 in grade six or \$100) for the family The high cost and the absence of perceived rewards result in low attendance rates, according to teachers who characterize the school as useful only for learning French

In this community, only 10% of the children in grade six have never repeated a grade Teachers firmly believe that illiteracy is growing Many years ago, teachers were involved in literacy campaigns, but such duties are no longer expected of them

Korria has 10 classes divided between two schools Results in Korria are good a 91% passing rate for the CEP and 54% for the secondary, far above the national average The village of Koun Aouzi (population 581) has no school and Koun Abrosso now lacks one It was thought possible that the private school could be re-opened under state auspices or that children could attend school in Koun-Fao, a relatively short distance away

⁷⁰ Secondary schools are located in larger cities Therefore young people must board Estimates of the cost vary between 200 and 300 000 cfa (roughly \$ 1 000) a year a prohibitive cost for most families

Generally, half the children have books, though great variations exist. The fact that a significant number of children do not have all the required books means that the teacher must use the blackboard far more (to draw the blood circulation system, for example). This slows down instruction and reduces the amount of student co-production of learning that can take place (through children teaching themselves by studying their texts independently). In the fourth grade, almost half did not have the French or the math books and 20% lacked a ball point (all children have a slate, but chalk is often provided by the teacher).

Teachers have a number of reasons for wanting to teach well, though local conditions can undermine these motivations. First, many teachers think of themselves as professionals doing an important job. Doing that job well brings satisfaction. Further, in a school, everybody knows who is and who is not a good teacher. Thus peer evaluation can reinforce one's self-conception. The school head supervises teachers, quite closely in the early career stages (the teacher must present his lesson plans at the beginning of each day). In turn, the school head can praise, not praise, or criticize what a teacher does. Lastly, the counselor will do the same thing and, occasionally, the inspector also will. Thus, a teacher who performs well will receive recognition from four categories of persons: his colleagues, his head master, his counselor and his inspector.

Formerly, good performance resulted in promotions. Such promotions have now stopped, at least in the financial sense. However, transfers are still possible and such transfers must be approved by the inspector. Thus, the head of a district has a means at his disposal to reward good performance. Many, if not most, teachers wish to eventually settle in their home area in order to have access to land and to live close to relatives. Thus, transfers represent highly coveted incentives (bribery may occasionally be involved).

Teachers report that, when things go well, parents consider it normal and argue that good results stem from their children's hard work. However, when things go badly, it is always the teacher's fault.

In Koun-Fao, the civil servants' children have the books, live in a home where at least one person speaks French and are encouraged to go to school. Parents come to the school to discuss problems with the teachers. However, in more rural villages, parents are unwilling to come. Such unwillingness sometimes stems from the fact that newly appointed teachers come from a different area and, therefore, do not speak the local language.

In Koun-Fao, one teacher was elected to the municipal council and keeps close tabs on educational issues at the local level. He realizes that the town can do little to improve things (particularly reducing the number of children who lack books). Teachers often use their money to buy chalk and they must purchase the high quality cards on which they write their class preparations (about 2,000 FCFA a month). In addition, they purchase books (the inspector allocates some teachers' manuals, but never all that are needed) and writing materials. In Koun-Fao town teachers live in homes with electricity, but their colleagues in the outlying villages grade papers by the light of kerosene lamps. In Korla, the head of the school runs a generator a few hours a day. Teachers seem to get around on mopeds, none reported having a car. They all live in large households. Their relatively high salaries make it possible for teachers to support their immediate and extended family.

Parental Strategies for Educating Their Children

Parental expenses vary with the grade of the child. The full list of school supplies required by a sixth grade student cost about 30,000 FCFA, the comparable amount for first grade is 13,000 FCFA. In addition, children often lose pens.

Parents seem to use a variety of strategies, and a continuum of such strategies seems to exist. At one extreme is the civil servant (or prosperous businessman) who has a cash income, is educated himself and values education highly. In addition, his children are very unlikely to want to go back to traditional life. The only alternative is therefore to join the educational queue which provides a chance, even if that chance is small, of entering the modern sector. Because such an individual is likely to have fewer children (although one official interviewed had fathered 20 children with two wives) and a wife who might also be employed, that civil servant can ensure that his children receive an education by buying the necessary supplies and the uniform so the child is well groomed (and well-fed). The civil servant parent will discuss educational progress with the teacher. Furthermore, that parent is capable of and may well help the child with homework. The father can also expect to be able to pay the costs of sending his children to secondary school. Thus primary schooling is not a dead-end, particularly for the able student. The parent is modern in every sense of the word and, because modern, committed to education.

At the other extreme is the traditional subsistence farmer. Cash is hardly ever available (and not usually when books must be purchased). For that father, cash costs represent a considerable burden. In addition, incentives to attend school are few. That father almost certainly knows people who have gone to school and are now unemployed, but who are unable or unwilling to assist in agricultural work. If a child goes to school, his or her labor is lost to the family. In addition, parents do not usually like to see their children go to school in tattered clothing. Under these circumstances, disparaging remarks from the teacher about not having books or about inappropriate clothing may lead the father to withdraw his children from school, or at least not to encourage or demand attendance. Further, the cultural distance between the traditional farmer and the school is likely to be extremely high.

Such poor parents may adopt a wide range of strategies. They may buy only some books and, in all likelihood, they will send only some children (more often boys than girls) to school. They may also restrict the length of time children spend in school and many such children may effectively complete at best the third grade. Particularly able children are most likely to be left in school. Success is more likely under these circumstances and the family will then benefit from the knowledge (and possible employment) of that child.

Thus, when discussing the benefits of education in the African context, it is important to remember that education is not a strictly individual good, but rather a family one. This practice may explain why the literature on African education reports a lack of relationship between social class and academic performance, a relationship that is virtually universal in all industrialized countries. This absence of relationship may be due to the fact that only the ablest poor children attend while most richer children attend.⁷¹ It is clear that girls must show considerable ability before they will be allowed to consume scarce family resources.

In short, the dynamics of family decisions are fairly clear at the extremes (poor girls do not attend or, if they do, they almost certainly do not complete the third grade, rich boys always attend). However, the influence of the number of children, their ages, the affluence of other family members, and the academic ability of particular children are less understood.

⁷¹ In Britain there is also a lack of relationship between social class and grades in grammar schools. This unusual finding is probably due to the high academic selectivity of grammar schools: well-off children are more likely to be selected than poor children, but since everybody who is selected is able, social class within the school fails to predict academic performance, which is affected by many other factors: motivation in particular.

One last observation heads of schools and teachers are competent professionals Yet they do not usually see their duties as including active recruitment of children They have incentives to perform well (including self conception) in the classroom, but few incentives to add social duties, such as increasing the attendance rate of girls, for example Nor do inspectors appear to have incentives to promote social goals However, the recently implemented municipal government policies make it necessary for mayors seeking re-election to improve educational opportunities Thus, such mayors may seek to convince - or motivate in other ways - inspectors to extract additional resources from the ministry to benefit the local area Such a move would introduce political considerations into education and would also benefit urban areas because of their population base In turn, powerful politicians could affect the careers of inspectors Thus, an unintended consequence of communalization may make it possible for education to serve social goals that have been ignored in the past While economic circumstances may reduce the demand for education, the process just described may slow the reduction in attendance that would follow on reduced demand

Teachers' Qualifications

In the Ivory Coast, teachers used to be recruited after passing the BEPC, i e , an exam taken after the ninth grade Then, training in a teacher's college followed for two years Teachers were recruited as teaching assistants and then were promoted to full teachers upon satisfactory performance

In 1987, the policy changed Teachers were recruited only after passing the baccalaureate and then enrolled for two years in a CAFOP In such a school, they received free room and board and also a sum of 5,000 FCFA Upon leaving the school, they are assigned to a district as student teachers and, after two years, they are appointed as teachers

According to the Koun-Fao inspector and teachers, all new teachers are assigned to a rural area where working conditions can be harsh, especially for a young, often single man There is no electricity, food is not necessarily available and often the teacher must cultivate a garden to feed himself In addition, he is not likely to know the area, or even the local language, since initial assignments are nationally determined A special hardship allowance paid formerly (10,000 FCFA a month), has been eliminated After some time, usually five years, a teacher can ask for a transfer to a less demanding post In Koun-Fao, out of 396 teachers in the "académie", there were 55 requests for transfer last year

Two consequences follow from this practice urban areas get more experienced teachers However transfers are no longer allowed into Abidjan, even to adhere to the policy of bringing spouses closer together (however, in Kouibly, the sub-prefect's wife, a school teacher, was certain of obtaining a position in Abidjan where her husband had just been transferred) Further, the inspector has at his disposal a significant tool to exert leverage over teachers In some cases, inspectors make take illicit payments to facilitate a transfer (several teachers hinted that such a practice was well-known) If no payment actually takes place, the inspector's benevolence would be recognized (the teacher becomes beholden to the inspector, who can expect "favours" in return, such favours not being necessarily financial)

It is easier to transfer within one's inspection, a little more difficult within the regions and difficult at the national level Large cities no longer accept any transfers, even for bringing spouses closer together

The profession is divided into four classes, each divided (except the second) into three steps Movement from one to the other is based on seniority and performance, as measured by a advisor and the inspector Anyone

who gets three consecutive notes of four (out of 5) is eligible for immediate promotion. However, the regional director often refuses. The official reason is that grading is too generous. While this is probably true (it buys good will from the teachers), a financial reason may also be likely.

Teachers retire at 55 and their pension is based on a complicated formula which takes their highest grade into consideration as well as the number of years they have been employed, the number of children they have had (10% more for each of the first three children⁷²). In certain cases, retirement benefits may exceed pay received when the person was active.

The Inspector and His Staff

The country is divided into educational regions and each region is divided into educational districts (*académies*). At the head of each district is an inspector. This inspector may be a former school teacher who attended a CAFOP as a teacher, then took a special exam and training course. He may also be a secondary school teacher who passed the special exam⁷³. To become an inspector, regardless of the particular route followed to get there, the candidate must pass a *concours*, i.e., an exam which determines who is eligible and how many people will be selected. If there are 10 vacancies for the country, the 10 who score highest on the exam (both written and oral) will be selected and enter the corps of inspectors, i.e., a collection of people who know each other (hence the potential for the diffusion of innovations) and who can be assigned to any duty. Duties however are usually educational (for example, it is common for an inspector to advise governmental commissions on pedagogical issues).

The inspector is the chief education officer in the district and is hierarchically connected to the Minister of Education through the regional director, then to the director of primary education who serves under the Minister of Education. The primary school inspector is responsible for primary schools only. He also supervises the examination, reports enrollments, has a say in the assignment of teachers, determines the leeway teachers will be allowed when enforcing regulations (such as whether children must wear a uniform). He also supervises private schools in his district.

The inspector in Koun-Fao has 392 teachers in his district and he inspected 106 last year. He receives 56,000 FCFA (less than \$200) a quarter for gas (fuel costs about \$3.00 a gallon). However, poor roads mean that his car (the Ministry's does not work) uses a lot of gas. Thus, he cannot regularly visit distant schools. The six advisors who help him face the same difficulty.

The pedagogical advisors are school teachers with at least 12 years of teaching experience, more commonly 20. They formerly supervised 50 teachers,

⁷² This practice also comes from France. However, in France the increase in retirement benefits applies to women only. The logic is that usually, women leave the labor force to look after their children. Since raising children is socially useful, mothers who have lost time should be compensated so that they enjoy the same retirement benefits as women who have not had children. In the Ivory Coast, men receive the benefit even though they are unlikely to have left the labor force to look after their children.

⁷³ Many comments made by virtually all the teachers interviewed suggest that primary school teachers no longer have access to the inspectorate. These positions are monopolized by secondary school teachers who go to a CAFOP (teachers' college) as teachers and then pass the special examination to become inspectors. In short, an avenue of mobility for primary school teachers used to exist but it has been eliminated. Primary school teachers bemoan this reduction in career opportunities. At best now they can become head masters, possibly counselors. When teachers advocate being allowed to specialize (i.e., specialize in the teaching of mathematics, for example) they may well be assuming that such specialization would then enable them to become teachers in the CAFOP and ultimately have access to the inspectorate.

but now, as an economy measure, are responsible for 65 Advisors visit classrooms and observe what teachers do On a special form, they make a few observations concerning the status of the classroom, how the teacher looks (appropriateness of dress and of demeanor toward the children), something about the voice On the next page, an observation of the period is recorded, i e , what actually took place (what the teacher said, what the children did) The page is divided into two, the right half being reserved for comments For example, a teacher was criticized for teaching map reading and not having the children actually read the map The lesson was characterized as too didactic Another teacher was criticized for failing to involve a sufficient number of children in the production of words with certain sounds and using these words in sentences The advisor suggested having the children write such words on their slate so that everybody would carry out the task, practice and everybody's work could be checked (the inspector favors what he calls "active pedagogy " the child must "discover" through practice) The teacher must read these comments and sign off on them

The advisor writes a report for the inspector and this report is then used in deciding on promotion However, promotions are now blocked financially Teachers' salaries have been frozen at the 1982 level ⁷⁴ ⁷⁵ Promotions are frozen also Salaries are clearly paid at the old rate The inspector says that he became inspector after that date and that he is being paid as an inspector, but on the basis of the old salary scale

Teachers

Teachers assert that they are made to operate like manual workers their allocation of classroom hours is rigidly controlled through a centrally established time table, they must adhere strictly to the established curriculum, and adherence is monitored through the teacher's log which the head signs every day They complain that they go from one subject to another without having time to establish whether learning has in fact taken place So, while learning objectives have been clearly established, the extent to which they are reached cannot be measured The schedule leaves little time for practice and for learning assessment

Teachers also complain of having no expertise in specific subjects, such as sports, arts and music They also have no equipment or supplies For example, in music, they tap on different size bottles to familiarize children with sounds

The six teachers interviewed spoke French extremely well They became animated in discussing children and learning They would like to experiment with specialization by subject They must participate in at least two workshops a year This workshop involves preparing a specific lesson and then having that lesson criticized by assembled colleagues ⁷⁶ The inspector reported that a few teachers innovate (the system is designed to discourage innovation), most do the job they are being asked to do and a few are unsatisfactory This is because, for many, going to a teachers' college does not represent a choice, but simply the result of arbitrary decision by the Ministry to send some students to teacher training college rather than to

⁷⁴ Civil servant salary scales reveal that teachers at all levels are paid about 50% more than other civil servants with similar levels of education University professors get a maximum of 800 000 FCFA a month or \$2 700 an extraordinarily high level

⁷⁵ The inspector says that the freeze was put into effect in 1982 rescinded in 1986 then re-instated in 1987 hence the confusion

⁷⁶ This kind of technique has been shown to be very effective not only in improving technical skills but also as a way of sharing knowledge with colleagues and developing collegial relations

university ⁷⁷ Given the absence of alternatives, young people acquiesce and a few turn out to be unsuitable

In primary school, major exams are centrally administered. Teachers make up the exam, a committee selects the questions and these are graded by the teachers from a different district. Children are given practice exams and these are graded by their own teachers who work as a team with a marking schedule specifying the number of points received for each answer ⁷⁸. Results on the exams determine whether a child receives the primary school leaving certificate (*certificat des études primaires/CEP*). The top 20% (17% nationally) are allowed to go into the secondary.

Grade repeating is extremely prevalent (up to 50% before entering the secondary) because children must meet the standards before being allowed to proceed. As noted earlier, there is little room for practice and, therefore, many children do not learn at the officially determined pace and hence must repeat the grade. The drop out rate is high. It would be useful to do a cohort study to ascertain what percentage finishes on time (In France 50% of all children repeat a grade at least once) ⁷⁹. Specialization by subject would enable children to repeat subjects they do not learn, but to proceed in those they do master, thus reducing grade repeating rates and improving system efficiency ⁸⁰.

First graders have to learn French. They use a special booklet designed to teach writing (they make dots, then draw lines, up and down, then circles, eventually the drawings look like letters). In reading, there are 16 reading sessions a week (15 minutes). The children play by memorizing sentences in the form of short skits dealing with situations they know. Formal reading starts later. They use the global method first (whole word recognition), and later the syllabic method (old method of breaking a word into its syllabic components).

⁷⁷ It would be interesting to establish how candidates to the CAFOP are selected. A few probably self-select because they want to become teachers. It is likely that grades on the baccalaureate play an important role also. Parental influence almost surely enters into the picture as well.

⁷⁸ Koun-Fao school teachers were doing such grading during the visit. The grading scheme was on the board and each teacher had a pile of papers. Discussion of several papers with the teachers revealed they were following the scheme closely. Obviously such practice socializes teachers to common achievement norms.

⁷⁹ By taking national statistics one year and following enrollments over six years it is possible to determine the number of students who go through without repeating. That number is 25%. However each cohort includes two types of students: those who have entered the grade in year X and those who are repeating. In those CM2 (grade six) where we asked how many pupils had never repeated the numbers were as low as 10% and never higher than 30% (in the Man region the school in question seemed particularly well-run).

⁸⁰ This would be a variation on mastery learning: a child proceeds to the next level when he/she has mastered the previous one, but each child normally proceeds at his/her own pace in each subject.

Children

Table 4 Koun-Fao Municipality Primary Education System

	1988 pop	Schools	Classes
Dodo Assie	592	1	3
Koria	1,501	2	10 (1 of 4, 1 of 6)
Kougou Abegou	92		
Kouna Abronso	609	privee	5 (6 en 1989-90)
Kouna Houzi	581		
Koun-Fao	2,631	3	17
Gorato	513	1	6
Meme	89		

Commune, 8 ecoles, 41 classes

Absenteeism seems low (2 pupils per class for any given day) The perception is that the drop out rate has increased in the rural areas

The number of children (about 33%) without any supplies has increased Formerly all had supplies About 50% of the children do not have everything they need, e g , the first grade an exercise book in French, in math and a slate (cost 3,000 FCFA) In addition, the child should have a reading book and a pen In the sixth grade, 12,000 FCFA would be required for books, 8,000 FCFA for uniform, 6,000 FCFA for exercise books and about 2,000 FCFA for pens and miscellaneous, or a total of 28,000 FCFA (\$100) a year In some areas, parents assess themselves 5,000 FCFA a year to pay for furniture Given that everybody has more than one child dependent on the salaried head of household, school expenses could easily be 10,000 FCFA a month for a household with primary school children Expenses for secondary school are far greater

Koun-Fao 1 provides an example of primary school enrollment figures, exam and schooling continuation results

Table 5 Koun-Fao Primary School Data

CP2	48	
CE1	38	
CE2	42	
CM1	38	
CM2	39	
Exam Results		
	1989	1990
Took CEP exam	1,789	1,793
Passed	528 (29 3%)	1,077 (60 1%)
Applied for admission to sixth grade	1,817	1,983
Accepted	306 (16 8%)	438 (22 1%)

Private School in Koun Abrosso

Founded in 1956, the private parochial school operates under the supervision of the diocese, which receives a state subsidy. Parents are supposed to pay 8,000 FCFA a year. However, the price has been reduced to 6,000 FCFA this year because parents could not pay. In fact, they did not even pay that, and the diocese has not been paying teachers either. After not being paid for six months, the latter are on strike.

The goal seems to be as follows: the pupils' parents' association has been asking for the last three years to withdraw from diocesan supervision. However, the diocese refuses because of the state subsidy which is based on the number of teachers (apparently the diocese receives the teachers' pay and then disburses it). Parents have asked again for a meeting, without success. If they were allowed to withdraw, then they could turn to the inspector, who then could authorize re-opening the school as a state school. Right now, the earliest this could be done would be in 1993 because teachers would have to be assigned, i.e., the current teachers could not be maintained in their current position.

The ratio of teachers to teaching assistants is the reverse in public and private school, the latter having more teaching assistants who are no longer being recruited in the state system. Although salaries are nationally determined, in practice private school teachers make a bit less. Private school teachers seem to have much less formal training: they receive two months' on-the-job training when hired (after completing the baccalaureate degree). The curriculum is the same, except in reading where the diocese has its own program. Religion is also taught.

Results are now quite poor: out of 30 children, four passed the CEP last year and only two were admitted to the sixth grade. Formerly 12 to 15 passed the CEP and around eight went on to sixth grade. The inspector reported a distinct lowering of competence in writing skills. The economic crisis plays a role in this erosion of school quality: some people are so poor they cannot even buy salt. They have absolutely no cash.

The pupils' parents' association is responsible for providing teachers' housing. The diocese withheld 1,000 a month for maintenance from each teacher's salary. However, that money was used to pay teachers' salaries. Thus, there is no money for repairs. For example, one kitchen is literally falling down, but nothing can be done because the association has no money. They built the buildings, but were told that they were not responsible for maintenance because funds were being withheld. Classrooms are in good condition, only a few desks are broken. No books are to be found in the classroom: they would reportedly be stolen if left there.

More and more children are going to public school in Koun-Fao because it is free. Arrangements seem to have been made between the inspector and the head of the association to transfer the whole system to the state. But the diocese has a legal veto over the transfer. Official pressure cannot be brought to bear on the diocese, which has an incentive to keep the school to continue receiving the subsidy. However, parents are voting with their feet and refusing to pay the fees. Few in any case could pay even if they wanted to. State schools are the only solution.

Visit of Koun-Fao School 1

The following generalities about educational trends were provided by an individual who started working in 1976 as a pedagogical advisor but before that, taught in a Catholic school from 1962-68, and then from 1968-76 in the public sector. He reports an increased drop-out rate. The critical problem he sees is the low level of interest on the part of parents. They assert that

one goes to school to become a civil servant. The government is no longer hiring civil servants. Those who go to school now cannot find jobs in the modern sector. They return to the village, but refuse to work there, so are useless to parents. The advisor thinks parents might change their attitudes if they understood the general utility of education.

The discussion quickly turned to pedagogical problems. In fact, this repeats a pattern while starting with complaints, the discussion turns to real pedagogical issues very quickly. The problem is that teachers do not understand what is expected of them. It is not that they are incapable of doing the work, it is simply that goals are unclear. The advisor also sees the teaching schedule as overloaded, leaving far too little time for necessary repetition. As a result, teachers shortchange some disciplines to favor the major ones: math, French, science.

According to the advisor, four students of a total of 45 have the French reading book. None has all the documents required. Groups of 10 are created so that pupils can work together. While parents tell teachers that a 100 FCFA work booklet is too expensive, they find money for funerals.

The advisor points out that teachers have no outside income besides their salary. Their salary is frozen at the 1982 level and no career progression takes place. Teachers are a little discouraged, but the work gets done. However, teachers used to command more respect than they now do.

The pupils' parents' association members do not come to meetings, particularly when money is involved. Teachers request repairs, of broken desks, etc., but little gets done. However, parents collect money in order to entertain the exam supervisors.

The pedagogical advisor has a quota of 15 visits a month. He used to receive 200-300 liters of fuel a year, but now gets nothing. Thus, visits must be grouped. Often, teachers request a visit, particularly when exam time draws near, to ensure that their students are at the required level.

Teacher in-service training days are organized semi-annually. There used to be an insert in the PDCI's newspaper called "the permanent school" (*l'école permanente*). However, with the advent of multi-partism, this stopped. Teachers complained about having to subscribe to a party newspaper that was not necessarily their own. Nothing replaces "*l'école permanente*"⁸¹

Observation of a first grade class of 39 children revealed a lively learning environment. Children are involved: they talk, they write on their slate, they show the teacher what they have written and the teacher systematically checks everybody's answer immediately and praises (or says not quite). He knows each child by name. When he speaks, he speaks clearly and with gestures to help these first graders, who are still learning French, to understand. Most children have no shoes. All have uniforms. Ten have no science book, five lack a reading book. At the end of the lesson, the children sing.

Then, a math lesson followed (sets and the number 7). This was an animated lesson in which all children were involved (and getting the right answer). The teacher used, as pedagogical aids, cheap or free materials: sticks, bottle caps, stones, chalk and slate. Clearly, this teacher knows

⁸¹ The Party included a strictly pedagogical section in the newspaper. This reflects the fact that everybody was required to subscribe: hence that the newspaper offered a useful vehicle to contact a large number of teachers. However, that a political party should choose to discuss educational issues on a routine basis is worthy of note.

what he is doing and this is good teaching. The kids are having fun (quite a bit of laughter and many smiles) and they are learning.

The pedagogical advisor thought that, while the lesson was very good, a few mistakes occurred. Children drew the set first, then placed sticks inside and some had made the set too small. This might have confused some pupils since the sticks were not clearly included in the set. Second, at the end, the teacher did not have the children apply the number 7 by asking them what in their world might number seven (siblings, for example). Lastly, when the teacher showed how to make that number, he did not specify that the down stroke was to the right of the horizontal one. In fact, some children placed it on the left.

The economic pinch clearly affects the learning environment. Reading books have been eliminated because of the cost. Instead, the teacher writes short sentences on the board. Eleven pupils lack the math exercise book, and seven have no French exercise book. All students have writing notebook.

The next visit was to a CM2 (fourth grade). Of the 41 children, some were quite mature (15 is maximum age). The lesson, dealing with map scales, was quite confusing. Ten students (25%) had no math book, nine lacked the reading text, 16 had no history book, 13 were without the science text, and 11 had no geography text. All have lesson workbooks, daily exercises, written themes and composition. The 14 who have everything are children of civil servants.

The advisor reaffirmed his belief, in this class, that subjects are not mastered because teachers are forced to skim over things. As a result, only 21 of 42 passed the CEP exam, and only 9 of 42 went into sixth grade (secondary school). Nonetheless, these results still exceed the national averages. If programs were less encompassing and if time devoted to individual work were increased, better results would be obtained. However, previous pedagogical innovations were not properly introduced. Future ones should be. The advisor believes that the level of knowledge is dropping. Teachers make grammatical mistakes in the lesson plans they prepare (a capital sin).

4 Koun-Fao Primary Health Care

Health Service Provision and Production Perverse Incentives

Public sector health services in Koun-Fao are provided by two nurses, a midwife and two midwifery assistants from a health center complex consisting of a nine-room, five-bed dispensary and a four-room, ten-bed maternity. Built in the late 1970's with FRAR funding, and expanded in 1990, the health center is intended to serve a population of approximately 8,000.

Despite its apparently modest appearance, the health center has considerable excess capacity. During the team's visit all beds in the dispensary were empty, and monthly reports for the first five months of 1991 revealed that an average of only 360 patients had sought treatment each month. This implies an average daily utilization rate of 12 patients, or 6 patients per nurse per day. Similarly, at the maternity only four of the ten beds were occupied (two by women who had recently delivered and the other two by their mothers who were tending them).

This excess capacity is indicative of several underlying problems that plague the rural health system in Ivory Coast. First, it reflects the highly centralized health planning and management apparatus directed by the MSPP in Abidjan. Centralized systems such as this are notoriously ill-suited to match service production modalities with local needs and preferences. Thus,

it is not surprising to find two nurses posted to a health center that, by all indications, only needs one

Second, the excess capacity is a logical outcome of the local financing arrangements. Because the majority of health system recurrent costs are financed directly by the central government (the MSPP pays the salaries of all health personnel, and previously provided free drugs and other essential medical materials), local authorities do not perceive the true tax price of the health services provided in their jurisdiction. This fiscal illusion creates an incentive for municipal authorities to try to maximize the quantity of services provided or, what is the same, to increase the level of central government expenditure at the local level. The deployment by the MSPP of another nurse, for instance, increases the central subsidy to the municipality, thus generating political benefits even if it fails to generate added health benefits.

Third, the excess capacity reflects the natural bureaucratic imperative for local decision-makers to maximize the effective budget under their control. The mayor and other municipal officials derive their power (and undoubtedly some pecuniary benefits as well) from the level of public sector activity they can generate and sustain in their jurisdiction.⁸²

The incentive municipal authorities have to maximize the quantity of services provided is matched by an equal incentive to upgrade the perceived quality of services. Given the strong curative bias of health services in Ivory Coast, this demand for improved quality is manifest in a call for upgrading dispensaries into rural hospitals and for deploying doctors to the municipal level. In Koun-Fao, the newly elected mayor has committed himself to having the MSPP assign a doctor to the health center. In order to qualify for and then attract a doctor, however, the municipality has had to convert the health center into a rural hospital (hence the recent investment to expand of the health center -- an expansion that has included the addition of four inpatient bedrooms, a doctor's office and bathroom, and a doctor's consultation room), and then construct a doctor's residence (the land has been cleared but funds for construction have yet to be allocated).⁸³

In attempting to attract a doctor to Koun-Fao, the mayor is clearly pursuing his own short-run best interest. Success will demonstrate that he is able, even during a time of increasing austerity, to extract a larger share of centrally controlled resources. In addition, he can ignore for some time the recurrent maintenance costs of the newly expanded health center, and thus derive large and positive net benefits in the short run.⁸⁴

As it turns out, by virtue of his job in the Treasury, where he has been charged with overseeing a recent EEC-financed procurement of drugs, the mayor is also well positioned to ensure a regular flow of drugs to Koun-Fao. While

⁸² This type of bureaucratic or organizational imperative has been noted by Buchanan, Tullock and Niskanen, among other students of Western public finance.

⁸³ It can be argued that this type of fixed cost (and the future recurrent costs it implies) is the price that must be paid to recruit and keep in rural areas highly trained personnel whose expectations are conditioned on working conditions and a life-style found only in large urban areas. Over (1986) argues that the higher recruitment and turnover costs in rural areas coupled with the higher logistics and compliance (supervision and motivation) costs explain in part the urban health sector bias found in many countries.

⁸⁴ The mayor is probably including in his implicit benefit-cost calculus the hoped-for benefits associated with the deployment of more technologically advanced medical equipment at the rural hospital -- equipment that the MSPP does not supply to dispensaries either because they lack technically qualified personnel or because the equipment is useful only for specific procedures and thus requires a larger user population to justify it on economic efficiency grounds.

the government's plan is to sell these drugs to patients, the cost will be below the prices that prevail in the private pharmacy in Koun-Fao, and so their provision will reduce the cost of treatment ⁸⁵

In spite of the incentives local government officials have to maximize the quality of care provided, the evidence from Koun-Fao strongly suggests that the quality of care produced has actually deteriorated This apparently results from a combination of central and local government decisions At the central level, the substantial SAL-induced cutback in health sector expenditures has led to an intra-sectoral reallocation of resources away from expenditures on drugs and other necessary inputs in order to minimize the impact of the cutbacks on employment This reallocation of resources has eroded the quality of health services produced by all cadres of medical personnel, but especially by those with the highest level of training

The decline in the quality of health services follows also from expenditure decisions taken the municipalities In the Koun-Fao case the mayor has had an incentive to invest in the expansion of health services even in the presence of existing excess capacity Such investment expenditures, however, have come at the expense of necessary expenditures on the maintenance and equipping of the existing health center The delivery room in the maternity is inadequately equipped, is filthy, and is in desperate need of repainting Furthermore, no toilet facilities are provided for women or their family members Yet the municipality has spent its limited available resources on building a doctor's office and bathroom for a doctor who has yet to be approved for appointment by the MSPP

The poor quality of maternal and child health services most obviously manifest in the filthy condition of the maternity cannot, however, be fully explained by a lack of central or municipal government resource allocation for maintenance and upkeep It seems in part also to reflect a fundamental disregard on the part of the midwife for the population she serves This disregard is apparent in the way she treats the women who come to the maternity While the reasons for her condescending attitude towards the local population are not clear, it may in part be a function of the type of training she and other midwives receive -- a training that is provided in the hospitals of Abidjan far removed from the type of environment in which rural health personnel are ultimately assigned to work ⁸⁶ Even if the training approach is not responsible for the midwife's attitude, and such behavior is condemned by the MSPP, it is clear that the midwife has little incentive to act any

⁸⁵ The plan calls for charging inpatients a FCFA 2 500 fixed fee that is supposed to cover the cost of all the drugs used for inpatient care Patients seen on an outpatient basis will be able to buy only a one-day quantity of drugs and then will have to buy the remaining quantity prescribed at the private pharmacy See the overview section on health sector financing for a critique of the proposed pricing policy and arguments why it will not generate sufficient revenues to refinance the original quantity of drugs It is worth noting here that the pricing policy creates a clear incentive for patients to seek admission on an inpatient basis Increasing the number of inpatients of course will also tend to confirm a posteriori the wisdom of the mayor's investment strategy

⁸⁶ The irrelevance of the pre-service training appears to have been compounded by the irrelevance of certain in-service training provided A good example of this is the in-service training the nurse received in using Pedojet vaccination guns Rather than being taught about the benefits of immunization and how to promote immunization at the community level the nurse was trained in a technology to which he rarely has access Since vaccination guns are not used by the Expanded Program on Immunization (a community-based alternative to mass vaccination campaigns) there is little likelihood that he will ever use one again

differently since she is never supervised by her superiors, and she is a monopoly supplier of "modern" maternal and child health services ⁸⁷

Health Service Utilization

The excess capacity of the Koun-Fao health facilities is also a function of the low current level of demand for the services supplied. This low level of demand can be explained in part by the poor quality of services offered, and by the very high private costs of consuming the services. Both the quality of care and the private costs of obtaining care have been adversely affected by the precipitous downturn in the local economy beginning in the mid-1980's, and by the simultaneous reduction in public health care subsidies undertaken as part of the GOIC's SAL.

Despite the current predicament, there is little question that the establishment of the health center in Koun-Fao during the boom economic period of the 1970's substantially improved the quality of care available to Koun-Fao's residents. It also reduced the private cost of obtaining care, since all health services were then provided free of charge, and since the establishment of the health center significantly reduced the distance to the nearest health facility.

By the mid-1980's however, the reduction in public subsidy provided to the Koun-Fao health center brought on by the SAL cut-backs in country-wide health sector expenditures began to decrease the quantity of drugs supplied by the MSPP ⁸⁸. Patients thus began sharing some of the drug costs, purchasing those not available at the health center from the private pharmacy. The last shipment of drugs by the MSPP to the Koun-Fao dispensary occurred in March, 1989. Based on 1991 utilization data, it is estimated that this last shipment was sufficient to last three to four months at most. Thus, by July 1989, the residents of Koun-Fao were bearing the full cost of purchasing drugs and other essential medical materials.

The transfer of the financing burden for drugs was shifted onto health care consumers in Koun-Fao at a time when their ability to pay for these services was declining precipitously. Efforts to trace the evolution of estimated current and real incomes for the municipalities of Koun-Fao, Sirasso and Kouibly suggest incomes in Koun-Fao fell by approximately 75% between 1980 and 1990 ⁸⁹.

The extent of the burden incurred by households requiring curative care can be gleaned by the following example. In this case, an elderly (70+ years)

⁸⁷ Lack of supervision has a particularly negative impact on the quality of service provision in a centralized system where health personnel are not trained to take independent decisions. A decentralized system that has trained its personnel to act independently and respond to local needs and conditions is at least in principle less susceptible to the ill-effects of a break-down in supervision.

⁸⁸ The maternity was shielded to an extent from these cutbacks by the continued flow of donor assistance for maternal and child health interventions.

⁸⁹ Data with which to construct a very crude full income estimate were obtained from a non-random sample of three *menages* (household production units consisting of individuals who cultivate together and those who depend directly on their output) in the village of Korla in the municipality of Koun-Fao. Korla elders were asked to identify three representative households: one considered relatively well-to-do, one considered moderately well-to-do, and one considered relatively poor. In each case the household head was asked to list all members actively engaged in any income generating activities in 1980, 1986 and 1990 respectively, and then to estimate their income net of factor costs. In addition, in each case the informant was asked to estimate (1) the value of remittances received in cash or in kind in each of these years, and (2) total income from rental properties. No attempt was made to impute a value of owner-occupied housing nor to impute the value of home production activities.

woman was reported to have been suffering from dizziness. Thinking she might be suffering from malaria, the household began administering Chloroquine tablets they had on hand. When, after two weeks, her condition persisted, the household contacted the local minister who drove her the 4 kilometers to the Koun-Fao dispensary.⁹⁰ The nurse diagnosed her ailment as vertigo and prescribed the following medications:


Table 6 Drug Costs in Koun-Fao

DRUG	COST	CUMULATIVE COST
Complex vitamin	2,440	2,440
Prozapin Chloride	1,505	3,945
Paracetamol	835	4,780
Anti-helminthic ⁹¹	880	5,660

Notes: Prices are in 1991 FCFA.

Since these drugs were not available at the dispensary, and the household did not have the money to pay for them at the pharmacy depot in Koun-Fao, the party hired a taxi for FCFA 200 and returned to their village empty-handed. In order to purchase the drugs they contacted a relative who is a teacher in the village and he purchased the drugs for them.⁹²

Figure 1. Trends in Total Household Incomes



⁹⁰ Time elapsed from the onset of illness until treatment is obtained is often considered a good indicator of ability to pay. In this case, the household chose to wait as long as possible before incurring the high cost of care in the hope presumably that the patient would recover on her own.

⁹¹ An indication of the poor quality of care is that the anti-helminthic drug prescribed is contra-indicated in cases of vertigo. Thus, if the diagnosis was correct, it is likely that the prescribed treatment exacerbated the illness condition.

⁹² Evidence presented later in this case study on private costs and subsidies for curative care suggests that public sector employees and their immediate families have been less seriously affected by the transfer of financing responsibilities for drugs. However, when public sector employees subsidize health care for extended family members (as was the case in this example) the magnitude of the disparity is reduced.

Income estimates from this same village reveal that the mean monthly total household income in 1990 was approximately FCFA 29,725. This suggests the total cost for this one illness episode could have represented as much as twenty percent (20%) of the household's total monthly income¹.

A fuller analysis of the private costs involved in consuming curative care suggest that the total private cost per visit to the Koun-Fao health center may have increased by as much as 300% from 1980 to 1990 -- a time, once again, when incomes are estimated to have fallen by 75%. In addition, these rough estimates suggest that public health sector expenditure cutbacks resulted in a regressive redistribution of the benefits of these expenditures -- i.e., one that increasingly favored the wealthy over the poor. While government employee households (who comprise the majority of individuals in the upper income cohort in rural areas) appear to have been buffered from the increasing private costs of care by their participation in a public health insurance scheme (the *Mutuelle Générale* reimburses them for 70% of the cost of treatment), rural individuals not employed by the government absorbed the price increases in full. Thus, the average consumer of curative care in Koun-Fao from a non-government employee household went from receiving a positive unit subsidy for consumption of curative health care when incomes were relatively high to confronting negative subsidization when incomes were relatively low.

A brief outline of the method used for calculating private costs and subsidies may be helpful at this stage. The private cost per curative care visit (or unit cost) is summarized by the following accounting identity

$$pc = p + drg + oc + dpc - t$$

where *pc* is the unit private cost, *p* is the unit user fee, *drg* is the unit cost of drugs, *oc* is the unit opportunity cost (the time taken to travel to and from the health center, queue and obtain treatment), *dpc* is the unit direct private cost (cost of transport), and *t* is the unit transfer payment received by the individual (e.g., insurance). The unit subsidy is

$$s = rc + cc + t - (p + drg)$$

where *s* is the unit subsidy, *rc* is the unit recurrent cost (paid by government), and *cc* is the unit capital cost (paid by government).

A detailed derivation of the estimates of *pc* and *s* for 1980 and 1990 are presented in Annex 1. In the case of the public subsidy for curative care, an upper and lower range is presented, based on two assumptions about the percentage of illness cases treated at public health care facilities as compared with those treated at home or by a traditional practitioner. The upper cost estimate assumes that only 30% of illness cases are treated at the health center in Koun-Fao, while the lower cost estimate assumes that the percentage is 50%.⁹³ In addition, a distinction is made between government employees (*pcg*) and others (*pc*) since, as noted above, government employees and their families are automatically enrolled in a health insurance scheme.

⁹³ The Adzope health survey (Mort 1991) revealed that 40% of the illness events recorded over the March to May period were treated at a public health facility. The utilization assumptions used above thus provide a 20% range around the Adzope findings.

Table 7 Estimated unit private cost of publicly subsidized curative and patient-related preventive care to consumers from government employee and non-government employee households (in current FCFA)

		Pc =	p +	drg +	oc + dpc -	t
Curative Care						
1980	[1] Pcg	560 =	0	0	190 370	0
	[2] Pc	515 =	0	0	145 370	0
1990	[3] Pcg	1,070 =	0	1,600	190 400	1,120
	[4] Pc	2,055 =	0	1,600	55 400	0
Preventive Care						
1980	[5] Pcg	134 =	0	0	115 19	0
	[6] Pc	106 =	0	0	87 19	0
1990	[7] Pcg	283 =	40	108	115 20	0
	[8] Pc	200 =	40	108	32 20	0

Notes For curative care the unit of analysis is a single out-patient visit to the health center. There are no in-patient visits in Koun-Fao. For preventive care the unit of analysis is a single visit to the maternity. The cost of one in-patient day is assumed to equal four out-patient visits, so an average delivery which, according to the midwife, takes three days is valued at 12 units of preventive care. Legend Pc = Unit private cost, Pcg = Unit private cost to members of government employee household, p = unit user fee, drg = unit drug charge, oc = unit opportunity cost, dpc = unit travel cost, and, t = unit transfer (insurance)

The private cost accounting identities presented in equations [1] to [8] of Table 1, are helpful for analyzing the combined effects of the economic crisis and SAL policies on the market for curative and preventive health care in Ivorian rural areas.

One of the most important insights of this analysis is that most of the increase in the unit private cost of care was caused by the pricing changes introduced under the health sector's program of structural adjustment. By comparing equations [1] and [2] with [3] and [4], it can be seen that government cost recovery efforts (in particular, the decision to transfer responsibility for financing the cost of drugs to consumers), raised the private cost of care for all consumers.

A closer look at Table 7, however, reveals that the unit private cost of care did not increase uniformly for all consumers. According to these estimates, the private costs increased about three times more for patients belonging to uninsured households (households in which nobody worked in the government), than for patients coming from insured households (households with government employees).

When the analysis in this table is combined with the income estimates described earlier, the evidence suggests that the private cost of consuming curative care increased more for poorer households than for wealthier households during the 1980s. Apparently, households including government

employees were not as adversely affected by the economic downturn as households without government employees. Thus, by 1990, the average incomes of government employee households exceeded that of households without government employees, implying that private cost of care increased more for poorer households than for more well-to-do households.

Empirical evidence from Ivory Coast on the demand for curative care shows that the demand for care is more price elastic for lower income consumers than for higher income consumers.⁹⁴ Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that utilization rates among the poor fell more than among the rich even though the poor probably had a greater need for curative care (were sick more often).

The increasing inequity suggested by the foregoing analysis is further supported by an examination of the changing distribution of the public health sector subsidy over the decade of the 1980s. Table 2 presents estimates of the unit public subsidy captured by consumers of curative and patient-related preventive care, in addition to estimates of the unit subsidy to private cost ratio.

When the most generous assumptions about the level of public subsidy captured by curative care consumers in Koun-Fao are employed, the analysis suggests that the pricing policy changes introduced as part of the health sector SAP redistributed the public subsidy away from the poorer, uninsured, non-government employee households towards the wealthier, insured, government employee households. In fact, it is estimated that the unit subsidy captured by the poorest households went from being positive in 1980 to being negative in 1990, while the subsidy captured by the wealthier households remained positive even in 1990. This suggests that one of the indirect effects of structural adjustment in Ivory Coast may be that poorer households are now paying more for care than it costs the government to produce, and are thus subsidizing the consumption of wealthier households who have access to health insurance.

Re-examination of equations [1] through [4] in Table 7 reveals that part of the increase in the private costs of curative care was caused by an increase in the direct private cost of transport to and from the health center.⁹⁵ For non-government employee households these cost increases may have been offset to some extent by a decrease in the opportunity cost of time caused by the precipitous decline in incomes experienced over the decade. Since salaries of government employees were frozen in 1982, the opportunity cost for these households is assumed to have remained constant.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Gertler and Van der Gaag 1989

⁹⁵ As indicated in Annex 1 these estimates are based on reported transportation costs from the village of N Gorato to Koun-Fao. It assumes that the average person hires a taxi and does not walk. While the direct private costs of transport are zero for individuals who walk, this savings is offset by an increase in the opportunity cost of time for the sick person and any attendants that accompany him or her to the health center. Again, the reader is reminded that these are only very crude estimates which may only be indicative of certain underlying trends.

⁹⁶ This analysis of opportunity costs is inadequate, however, in at least one important respect. Because the price of time is derived by multiplying time by an estimated wage, the significant decline in incomes reported from 1980 to 1990 leads to a conclusion that the time costs of obtaining care fell markedly. This is clearly an artifact of the cost-benefit framework -- an artifact that undoubtedly fails to fully validate the disincentive created by time required to consume care.

Table 8 Estimated unit public subsidy and unit private cost to subsidy ratio for curative care consumption by consumers from government employee and non-government employee households

(in Current FCFA)

		s = rc +	cc +	t -	(p+drg)	pc/s
<u>Curative Care (Upper Estimate)</u>						
1980	[9] sg	616 = 600	16	0	0	0 91
	[10] s	616 = 600	16	0	0	0 83
1990	[11] sg	71 = 535	16	1,120	1,600	15 1
	[12] s	-1,049 = 535	16	0	1,600	-1 9
<u>Curative Care (Lower Estimate)</u>						
1980	[13] sg	370 = 360	10	0	0	1 51
	[14] s	370 = 360	10	0	0	1 39
1990	[15] sg	-148 = 322	10	1,120	1,600	-7 2
	[16] s	-1,268 = 322	10	0	1,600	-1 6
<u>Preventive Care</u>						
1980	[17] sg	502 = 470	32	0	0	0 27
	[18] s	502 = 470	32	0	0	0 21
1990	[19] sg	301 = 449	0	0	40+108	0 94
	[20] s	301 = 449	0	0	40+108	0 66

The importance of the time price faced by consumers is particularly evident in the case of preventive care. Equations [5] and [6] reveal that the opportunity cost of time accounted for as much as 85% of the unit cost of consuming preventive care in Koun-Fao in 1980.

A review of the service schedule set up by the midwife in Koun-Fao indicates clearly that the time costs to consumers of preventive care are unnecessarily high. By splitting all health tasks into separate activities, consumers of health care are forced to present themselves at different times for services that could have been more efficiently provided at the same time, or to go to several different people to obtain a group of services that could have been provided by one person. In Koun-Fao, for example, prenatal examinations are scheduled for Mondays and Wednesday, maternal immunization is scheduled for Fridays, child immunizations for town children are scheduled on Tuesdays, and child immunizations for village children are scheduled for Thursdays. Thus, an expectant mother with a child of immunizable age must incur the cost of coming to the clinic on three separate days if she wants to receive prenatal care, be vaccinated herself and have her child vaccinated.

Comparing equations [5] and [6] with [7] and [8] reveals that the unit private cost of using preventive care increased by as much as 110% from 1980

to 1990 -- an increase almost exclusively due to the imposition of user fees and charges for drugs, other essential supplies, and vaccines. When these pecuniary costs are added to the inflated time costs of obtaining preventive care, it is a wonder that anybody uses preventive health services at all.⁹⁷

Impact of Reduced Health Service Utilization on Health Status of Consumers

The end result of the combination of inflated private costs of obtaining care, deteriorating quality, and the precipitous decline in incomes, has been a clear reduction in utilization of these services. The question remains, however, whether this reduction in utilization has negatively affected the health status of the local population.

Empirical evidence from developed and developing countries tends to show that reduced preventive health service utilization ultimately has a negative impact on health status, while the effects of reduced curative care consumption are ambiguous.⁹⁸

Data from Koun-Fao appear to suggest that the declining incomes and reduced ability to consume modern health care have not seriously affected maternal and child health status. This tentative conclusion is derived by examining the recorded birth weights of children delivered at the Koun-Fao maternity.⁹⁹ The data -- summarized in the following graphs -- suggest that the proportion of newborns weighing less than 2,500 grams has decreased mildly between 1989 and 1991, while the mean birth weights for both males and females appear to have remained fairly constant.

While this evidence is heartening, it may be incorrect to conclude that the significant decline in incomes and erosion of the public sector's fiscal capacity has not negatively affected the health status of Koun-Fao's inhabitants. First, a lag should be anticipated between the drop in incomes and reduction in government health expenditures, on the one hand, and change in individuals' health status. By all accounts, households in Koun-Fao prospered greatly during the economic boom of the 1970's and early 1980's. To the extent they accumulated savings, current consumption may well have been maintained at a level far exceeding current income. If this was in fact the case, then the health status of individuals in Koun-Fao may only now begin to deteriorate significantly. Second, the Maternity data are based on a self-selected sample of Koun-Fao's population -- those who chose to deliver their children at the Maternity rather than to deliver at home. Inferences drawn from this sample will be biased to the extent that incomes are correlated not only with birth weights but also with the choice to deliver at the maternity. Since use of the Maternity requires both significant cash and time outlays on the part of the user households, the likelihood of selection bias is increased.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ The continued use of the Koun-Fao maternity may be explained in part by the fact that the midwife has instituted a FCFA 5 000 penalty for women who do not deliver in the maternity but seek to obtain a birth certificate so that the newborn can later be admitted to school. Since this charge is approximately two times the amount a woman would have to pay for four prenatal exams, delivering at the maternity and having her child fully immunized if the woman wants her child to be able to go to school, she might as well pay for all the other services and avoid the fine.

⁹⁸ See for example Abel-Smith (1978).

⁹⁹ Birth weight is a widely accepted indicator of maternal and child health status. The evidence suggests that perinatal mortality is three times greater for children born weighing less than 2 500 grams than for those weighing more. In addition, low birth weights are often associated with maternal malnutrition, short birth intervals, and inadequate prenatal care.

¹⁰⁰ To be exact, if poorer households self-select out of the pool of Maternity users, then the birth weights registered by the midwife will be disproportionately drawn from among children borne to the wealthier and therefore presumably better nourished households. The relationship between incomes and health status will consequently be understated.

Figure 2 Mean Birth Weights





Figure 3 Proportion of Birthweights = 2,500 g



C Sirasso Municipality Case Study

1 Introduction

Sirasso Municipality lies 65 km southwest of Korhogo on a laterite road in the north-central Ivory Coast. Occasional small buttes erupt sharply from the gently rolling terrain, originally covered in orchard bush. Population densities decrease as one leaves the immediate area around Korhogo, the prefectural seat. Densities increase again periodically as one moves through the four or five villages along the rural road to Sirasso. Since this is Senoufo country, each village is more or less surrounded by a dense, old growth, sacred forest. Each forest serves as the site for animist rituals as well as for the initiation rites by which Senoufo men who remain in the community are indoctrinated into the traditions and institutional arrangements of their society.

The Municipality counted 4,461 inhabitants at the last census in 1984. Of those, 3,585 lived in the ten quarters of Sirasso, the municipal seat. The remainder live in three other villages plus two small hamlets. Within the rural municipality, which covers some 200 square km, cultivated fields alternate with large fallow areas being vigorously reclaimed by second growth forest.

The local population is composed primarily of Senoufo, with whom a minority of Malinke traders and weavers have long resided. Some thirty civil servants of various categories (administrators, teachers, health personnel, agricultural parastatal and water and electricity utility employees) round out the population.

Traditionally the Senoufo practiced subsistence agriculture, and associated trades such as weaving and smithing. They also kept small amounts of livestock. Ndama cattle, pigs, sheep and goats (almost all Trypanosomiasis-resistant dwarf varieties) and poultry. At present subsistence crops continue to play an important role in the local production system, but most families now also produce some long-staple, hybrid cotton as a cash crop. Since the great Sahelian drought of 1973-74, Fulbe pastoralists have frequented the region, with a reportedly devastating impact on local agricultural potential.

The Ivorian national government provides a number of services in Sirasso Municipality. These include, in addition to the administrative apparatus associated with the subprefecture based in Sirasso, three primary schools totaling fifteen (15) classes, and a dispensary. The schools employ fifteen instructors. The dispensary is staffed by a midwife, a male nurse, and two Catholic volunteer sisters trained as nurses. A community cultural center rounds out list of nationally-financed social services. Two parastatals, the Compagnie Ivoirienne des Textiles (CIDT) and the Société de Production Animale (SODEPRA), respectively maintain substantial cotton and livestock production support and marketing operations in Sirasso. The Ivorian national water utility, Société des Eaux de la Côte d'Ivoire (SODECI), and the electrical utility, Energie électrique de la Côte d'Ivoire (EECI), provide potable water and electricity within the boundaries of the municipal seat. SODECI accepts maintenance contracts to service hand pumps in the surrounding villages.

Local government in Sirasso dates from 1985, which saw the creation of the municipality by national legislation. However, the transfer of power from traditional Senoufo governance arrangements to a national administrative and political apparatus has been underway since 1963, date at which the Sirasso Subprefecture was created. The subprefecture has served as an electoral district for representation to the national assembly since 1980. 1985 saw the election of the first set of municipal officials (mayor, first and second

deputies and accountant/ treasurer) and creation of a municipal government staff including office and municipal service personnel. These have been reinforced by a general administrator (*secrétaire-général*) and a financial specialist. Municipal own-source revenues are quite limited. The local government depends very heavily on national subsidies for the bulk of its personnel and operating budgets.

The Sirasso municipal case study begins with an overview of the evolution of local government, in the context of overlapping regimes, since pre-colonial times. Next it highlights several problems which appear of critical importance in the local context. Municipal government operations, within the evolving political arrangements, are then described. Against this background the evolution of service activities in the focal areas of primary education and primary health care are described.

2 Historical Background

Senoufo first moved into the Korhogo area around 1,000 A D ¹⁰¹, as one of the very first groups to occupy territories in what is now the Ivory Coast. They originally took most of the northern tier of the country (Odienne in the northwest to Kong in the northeast), then extended their control into southern Mali during the 16th to 18th Centuries. Eventually they were pushed back into the Korhogo region, now the Senoufo heartland, by Mande and Baoule expansions during the 17th - 19th Centuries.

Samory Touré, the last great Manlinke conqueror, signed a peace treaty with the Senoufo after massacring the population of Kanaroba, a Senoufo canton in the Sirasso Subprefecture that had attacked his invading troops.

The three small cantons in what is now Sirasso Subprefecture southwest of Korhogo were associated with Korhogo, the Senoufo capital. Sirasso (eight villages), Kanaroba (eleven villages), Niofoin (eight villages) recognized the traditional Senoufo chief, the Gong, based in Korhogo as a *primus inter pares*. The Sirasso canton chief during the pre-colonial era exerted considerable authority, even though he was himself a peasant who had done stooped hoe farming in his youth. The canton chief also had certain religious duties.

The *tarfolo* are "earth priests". They are descendants of the first founders. The founding families in Sirasso are the Silué, Soro, Yéo, Tuo and Sékongo, each of which has its own *tarfolo*. A *tarfolo* can lend land but not sell it. If one did, he would create eternal tensions in the family.

French Penetration and Colonial Governance System

The French, under the explorer Binger, moved north into Senoufo territory and signed a peace treaty towards the close of the 19th Century. The French initially co-opted the Senoufo traditional structure of governance. They promoted the Gong to the status of provincial chief. This explains the current location of the prefectural seat in Korhogo. The colonialists worked with the traditional chiefs, rather than replacing them. They assigned them certain responsibilities, especially for road maintenance, and required them to mobilize labor for this task.

After the turn of the century, the French colonial regime extracted very substantial labor levies from the Senoufo population. Before World War I Senoufo peasants recruited under the compulsory structure of the *indigénat* (colonial authoritarian governance arrangements applied to all colony

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Atlas de la Côte d'Ivoire 2nd ed (Paris Les éditions jeune Afrique 1983) p 24

residents who did not enjoy the status of citizens) helped construct the railway from Abidjan to Ouagadougou in Upper Volta. Between the wars they were sent to open up the southwestern forest region and supply fuel for the railway. A number of Sirasso men were compelled to participate in these forced labor activities. Senoufo young men during the colonial era were particularly exposed to forced labor levies because the organization of communal governance compelled them to remain in their villages.

Senoufo Communal Organization

Senoufo village-level peasant society was based on a mixed farming production system (subsistence agriculture and stock raising) supported by various craft specialists (potters, sculptors, weavers, smiths, etc.). Village communities were strongly structured by the *poro*, or secret societies into which males aged 25-30 were inducted during a seven-year-long initiation period. The *poro* age grades played, and today continue to play, a major role in governing Senoufo local communities. In the village of Nagbérékaha, the most remote from the municipal seat of Sirasso, young men who remain in the village must be inducted into the *poro* society. Those who refuse to participate reportedly leave the village.

The initiates spend much time in the sacred forest. There they learn Senoufo traditions from their elders. The seven-year-long period of initiation started generally when the individual was between the age of 25 - 30, when youth were expected to begin to think like mature adults. During the old days the initial initiation period lasted three months, now it has been reduced to three days. Some initiates were married, others not. *Poro* initiates could not leave the village for seven years, because each morning they had duties to take care of in the sacred wood. Women could be initiated, but only after menopause. The *poro* society is responsible for helping out older people who lack children or other sources of support with their farming chores so that they produce enough to cover their needs.

In Sirasso Municipality, Catholic missionaries have made some converts, as have Muslim clerics. However, Senoufo converts seem to view these external rites as additive rather than competitive with local animist practices. Catholic men and women frequently participate in polygynist marriages.

Sirasso Traditional Governance System

The Sirasso cantonal jurisdiction contained eight villages, all originally controlled by the Sirasso Canton Chief. He relied on Sirasso quarter heads, his councillors, village headmen and a form of traditional police to govern the villages in his jurisdiction. This system of governance appears to have incorporated considerable division of power and checks and balances.

In the pre-colonial era the canton chief was selected by a nomination and vote procedure. From the available candidates the canton nobility selected and proposed one. Then they, with the chiefs of the eight cantonal villages, elected him to a life term on good behavior. The candidates were, in principle, chosen from the family of the deceased chief. In the villages, the outcome of the succession process is clear in the sense that the successor is known before his father's death. Terms were again for life on good behavior. In some cantons, a village headman may also be canton chief.

Sirasso is divided into two groups: original founders and later arrivals. Each of the two groups now has its own village chief. The headman of the founders' village is based in the Toukporo Quarter.

The last Sirasso canton chief was elected in 1946, and held office until he died in May 1985. One of his sons, a relatively wealthy local leader who made his money in transport activities, retains his traditional status, but has lost weight to the party and administration because the responsibilities of traditional leaders have been reduced to the point of extinction. However, since he has just been elected to two "modern" posts (national deputy and second deputy mayor), he seems likely to continue as a local power.

3 Local Problems

Herder-Farmer Conflicts

The overwhelming collective action problem facing people in Sirasso Municipality, as throughout the northern tier of the Ivory Coast, is the issue of controlling animal damage to field crops. Crop devastation has reportedly reached such a level that some Senoufo farmers in Sirasso Municipality villages can no longer cover their subsistence needs, much less produce a surplus for sale. Accompanying this development is the long-term trend of falling profitability in cotton cash-cropping. Reinforced by cut-backs in national government support for municipal budgets, occasioned by the national government's straitened circumstances, these two problems have led to a recession in the local area. As they form the context for provision of primary health and education services in Sirasso, this section will briefly sketch the main elements of these problems.

Before the great Sahelian drought started in 1973-74, the local cattle population consisted almost entirely of Ndama, a *Trypanosomiasis* resistant dwarf bovine variety. When the drought hit, the most mobile Sahelian herders, notably various Fulbe groups, moved south from Mali and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) into the northern Ivory Coast.

This immigration was sanctioned by an agreement between the governments of the two Sahelian countries and that of the Ivory Coast. The Ivoirian regime established a series of control points where the transhumant herds were initially to be held until they could be vaccinated. Many Fulbe have apparently avoided these controls, probably because their experience with most government officials tends to be negative. The latter often fail to understand the logic and constraints of transhumant pastoralism, and try to impose regulations and practices that, if applied, would undermine the viability of the pastoral production system as herders know it.

The Fulbe who now pasture their animals in Sirasso Subprefecture fall into two groups: those who are permanently resident in the area (though many still send part of their herds during the winter dry season on temporary transhumance to less populated parts of the Ivory Coast), and those who arrive at harvest time to spend the dry season in the area before moving north again with the rains to Sahelian summer pastures.

Resident pastoralists all have a permanent base in the area. Some farm as well as raising livestock. They engage in trade with their Senoufo neighbors. When their animals destroy a local farmer's crops, most stay to negotiate compensation and pay the damages assessed.

Transhumant pastoralists are both more mobile and more predatory. They arrive at harvest time and are accused by local farmers of deliberately putting their animals into ripening crops. They often move their herds at night, reportedly destroying fields as they go. When caught, some become violent. Four people in Nagbérékaha, a Sirasso Municipality village with a 1984 population of 400, have reportedly been seriously wounded when confronting transhumant Fulbe in the act of destroying crops. Many submit to damage arbitration, but then plead for a delay to collect the money by selling an animal or two. Before the stipulated date they move out of the area with

their herds. The farmer is left with no recourse. Since 1989, some 6,000,000 FCFA in assessed crops damages have not been paid in Sirasso Subprefecture.

The local difficulty in confronting this problem derives in part from imperfect understanding of national government regulations governing such incidents. A committee of civil servants has been created in Sirasso to assess damages, but the procedure is time-consuming and probably cumbersome. Farmers are authorized to sequester herd animals found destroying crops and sell them if the herder fails to pay assessed damages, provided they inform subprefecture officials of their action. However, farmers often either fail to organize to confront the accused herder in strength, in which case the latter bluffs his way out of the situation, or they retaliate by shooting herd animals. At that point, violence often erupts and the farmers end up being judged guilty of assault and battery. In Sirasso the search for solutions through collective action has begun, but no strategy has yet been settled. In the meantime, local people report that they often fail to cover their subsistence needs because of crop losses occasioned by Fulbe herds. To cover the shortfall, some borrow against their cotton cash crop earnings to get rice from the local village cooperative (*Groupement villageois coopératif*, GVC).

Falling Cotton Prices

The second major issue is the degradation in producer returns on cotton farming. The Ivoirian state has begun to tax fertilizer inputs as a revenue generation measure. If fertilizers are not applied in precisely the right amounts at the right times, productivity slips. Some farmers reduce inputs, or use some of their allocation (fertilizer amounts financed by the GVC are carefully calculated to be appropriate for the land area the farmer reports he has under cotton) on subsistence crops. Even if fertilizers are used properly, the weather may not cooperate, leading to low yields and producer losses. As producers' incomes diminish, they generally become more risk averse, and the cycle of falling productivity and production accelerates.

Procedures for cotton grading and weighing provide farmers little leverage in cases of dispute. Grading disputes arise when cotton rated high by the producer cooperative is subsequently down-graded by evaluators at the parastatal cotton ginning company. Sometimes cooperative rankings are up-graded, but these attract less attention. Tonnage disputes occur when discrepancies arise between the weight registered by the cooperative and that noted at the gin gate. If the gin scales show a smaller tonnage, farmers suffer a loss of income. Again, the opposite reportedly happens as often, but those events cause no problem.

In part these issues arise because farmers have not played a more direct role in disseminating technical information and in managing the affairs of their producer cooperative. The cotton parastatal, CIDT, is currently seeking, as an efficiency measure, to shift more of the responsibility for extension work and management to farmers in the Sirasso area. This may well improve the overall efficiency of cotton cash-cropping, and provide producers some relief. If it does not however, Sirasso Senoufo are likely to continue reducing their commitment to cotton.

The upshot of these two problems is a reduction in disposable revenue. This operates as a strong disincentive to place children in school, especially since farmers find that sons who do not begin farming very early (normally at seven years of age, just when they would be entering school) rarely agree later to return to the hard labor of stooped hoe agriculture.

4 Sirasso Municipal Governance Arrangements

After independence, the new regime implemented a policy of administrative deconcentration by establishing a number of new subprefectures, many based on (consolidated) old cantonal jurisdictions. In the quadrant southwest of Korhogo, Sirasso Subprefecture was created in 1963, as were Dikodougou, M'Bengue and Sinematiali Subprefectures. The subprefectural units also serve as electoral districts for National Assembly elections. Dikodougou and Guiembé Subprefectures (the latter organized in 1974) share a single deputy, as do M'Bengue and Niafoin, both also established in 1974. Sirasso and Sinematiali Subprefectures have their own deputies.

PDCI, Party Politics and Procedures

Despite the very recent advent of multi-partyism in the Ivory Coast the PDCI continues to play the strong role in Sirasso local politics that it has practically since independence. The organizational model is that of democratic centralism. At the bottom level PDCI village committees are composed of five people: president, treasurer, secretary general and two members. The village headman is also involved, in the sense that he helps the committee carry out its operations.

The PDCI also has subprefectural party committees, each headed by a secretary general (SG). In other regions, the voting is by indirect suffrage, and the balloting is secret now. But in subprefectures of the Korhogo region, PDCI village committee members elect their subprefectural SGs by lining up behind their preferred candidates in public.

There are allegations that the 1990 elections in Sirasso were manipulated by the PDCI. Similar allegations have been made concerning the wider Korhogo region. Nonetheless, *an extraordinary degree of office turnover has occurred in Sirasso since competitive elections were instituted*. These were limited to competition among PDCI candidates in the 1980 and 1985 elections and then including multi-party competition in 1990. Three different deputies, two different mayors and three PDCI SGs have been elected over this period. In other words, local people have voted out elected officials with perfect regularity. The newly elected group of officials in Sirasso - all PDCI candidates - seem to interpret these results as voter intolerance of elected politicians who do not serve their interests for whatever reason. The newly elected say unequivocally that they must serve the interests of the local population while in office if they wish to be re-elected. An account of the Sirasso 1990 elections provides some detail in support of these generalizations.

1990 National Assembly Elections Sirasso

In the 1990 multi-party elections for the National Assembly, four candidates ran, of whom three were PDCI from the start. The fourth ran initially under the opposition FPI label, but switched to PDCI during the campaign when the Sirasso subprefect pressured the candidates to agree among themselves on a winning candidate. He wanted to avoid post-election disputes by orchestrating a unanimous choice. The candidates refused his request, insisting on a normal election. SILUE Moussa, son of the last Sirasso canton chief, won overwhelmingly.

SILUE Moussa began as a bus driver. He bought a minibus with 22 seats in 1980 and drove it until 1987. Now a hired driver operates the bus, which continues to faithfully ply the rough rural road between Sirasso and Korhogo at least three times weekly. He also has a Peugeot pick-up, which he uses for his personal farm affairs, and a 505 Peugeot sedan, which he uses for political work. He appears to live simply but is evidently relatively well-to-do.

Local people collected money for SILUE's campaign, and they pushed him to become candidate for deputy. SILUE's older brother was elected in 1980 the secretary-general (SG) of the formerly single-party, the Parti Democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI). He was replaced in 1985 by another, who was replaced in 1991 by the current SG, OUATTARA Mefolo, the new national deputy's uncle. The deputy is 36 years old. The uncle, who just retired, is about 56. He worked in the national civil engineering service (Travaux Publics) as a roads engineer. The two other PDCI candidates were residents of Kanoroba Canton and both were "commoners". The canton chief there died shortly after independence and, although there were legitimate candidates, the administration declined to replace him as part of policy to eliminate the old chiefly establishment by attrition.

DIGNOGO Idrissa, native of Kanoroba Canton, was the former deputy from Sirasso Subprefecture. He was the deputy and municipal councillor in Sirasso, having moved during the 1985 campaign into a house his father had built in Sirasso. Trained as an instructor, he works as a resident proctor at the Lycée Houphouet boarding facility in Korhogo. In 1990 he ran for the posts of national deputy again and for the mayor's office in Sirasso Municipality. He was defeated for both positions. In the deputy election SILUE received 8,623 votes, and DIGNONO, 499. He was the second of four candidates for the post of deputy. In the municipality SILUE received 800+ votes, whereas DIGNONO got only 59.

DIGNONO reportedly exercised the authority inherent in the post of deputy without much consultation. He did not associate the rest of the civil servants in the subprefecture in his decisions. That strategic failure may have led to his defeat. In any case, many civil servants opposed him.

The voters, according to the newly-elected PDCI SG, knew SILUE Moussa and thought that if he became deputy he would adopt a more inclusive approach. The mayor, the deputy and PDCI SG elected in 1985 were apparently all perceived as having personalized their powers and failed to serve the common good. Those who challenged and replaced them appear committed to a more participatory approach. Interestingly, Sirasso voters selected a slate of candidates who reside in the municipality over one who lived in Korhogo. Whether they had a choice of a mayoral or national deputy candidate who reside in Abidjan was not determined.

Before the elections, the new deputy and PDCI SG organized, on short notice, a meeting of Sirasso Subprefecture natives now working outside the jurisdiction. More than 80 persons attended, which they estimate to be less than half the total number. Sirasso natives in Abidjan held sessions in most of the city's constituent municipalities to discuss candidates and policies. Many are low-level private sector employees who cannot easily travel home on short notice from their jobs. They delegated a member of the session to represent them in Sirasso, and signed their names in support of candidates for specific posts. Start of the day-long meeting had to be delayed for three hours because it conflicted with the poro society obligations of two delegates. Attendance at meetings in the sacred forest took precedence over politicking for contemporary offices.

The newly elected municipal and national political officials plan to schedule semi-annual meetings of this sort in Sirasso, to debate local development options and seek advice from those in civil service posts and the private sector so that they can adequately represent local public opinion. To this end, they have identified Sirasso natives in all major Ivorian cities who will serve as contacts to organize delegations to these semi-annual get-togethers.

FRAR Investments in Sirasso Subprefecture

The GVC are cooperatives put in place by the administration to help the local population. If, to collect the money to get a FRAR matching grant, the GVC agrees to contribute part of its rebate, they can do so. They have done so in several cases in Sirasso.

The GVC Sirasso includes the villages of the commune, plus one other village in the subprefecture. They have always provided support for the FRAR counterparts. The GVC here is at least ten years old. They contributed to obtain FRAR counterpart funds on two occasions. The first occurred in 1984, to finance the dispensary at Daba (village in the subprefecture). The GVC contributed a second time, in 1985, for instructors' houses at Odia, also a village in the subprefecture.

5 Sirasso Municipal Finances

Sirasso was the poorest of the three new municipalities visited in Ivory Coast. Estimates of 1990 household incomes (see Graph X on page 2 of the Koun-Fao health sector assessment), suggest that average household incomes in Sirasso were only three-quarters of those of average households in Koun-Fao and approximately one-tenth of those of average households in Kouibly. This relative impoverishment was reflected in the fact that Sirasso's total revenues were also the lowest of the municipalities examined.

Though the coincidence between average income levels and the level of municipal revenues is not totally unexpected (poorer municipalities have a smaller tax base on which to draw), it does suggest that central government grants are not fulfilling their originally intended redistributive function. According to government statutes, the *partie complémentaire generale* was designed to help equalize the fiscal positions of poor and wealthy municipalities.¹⁰² Had grant performance been consistent with this stated objective, Sirasso would have received a larger *partie complémentaire generale* outlay than Kouibly. As can be seen by comparing Tables XX and YY in Annex ZZ, however, the opposite actually occurred. Despite being considerably poorer than Kouibly, Sirasso actually received smaller *partie complémentaire generale* disbursements in each of the years from FY 1987 through FY 1990.

The failure of central grants to reduce fiscal disparities between poorer and wealthier municipalities was compounded by the cut back in grant outlays undertaken as part of the structural adjustment program in Ivory Coast. Under this arrangement, grants were cut by the same percentage for all municipalities regardless of differences in fiscal position. As a result, the poorest municipalities were actually affected more by the cut backs than those in the strongest fiscal position. The regressive redistributive effects of the grant cut backs can be seen by comparing Table WW and VV in Annex ZZ. The tables show that while grant revenues as a percentage of total municipal revenues decreased in Sirasso (i.e., the municipality had to rely more heavily on own-source revenues), they increased as a share of total revenues in Kouibly.

Perhaps because it was more seriously affected by the cut back in central government grants than Kouibly or Koun-Fao, Sirasso was the only municipality examined where own-source revenues actually grew in nominal terms between FY 1987 and FY 1990. The nominal growth in own-source revenues was due to a fairly strong performance by its two principal non-grant sources of

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Fiscal position is defined as the ratio of fiscal capacity to fiscal need. *Fiscal capacity* denotes the revenues that would be obtained by applying a standard tax rate (uniform across all municipalities) to the tax base in a given jurisdiction. *Fiscal need* is the total cost of providing a uniform standard (quantity and quality) of public services per capita to the populations in a given jurisdiction.

local revenues, the small business and artisan tax and market fees. These two instruments, which together accounted for nearly 70% of total own-source revenues, grew at an average annual rate of approximately 5% from FY 1987 through FY 1990.

The remainder of the growth in own-source revenues was attributable to an increase in bus, taxi and truck parking fees (which accounted for approximately 10% of total own-source revenues), and to an increase in slaughter house fees (which accounted for approximately 6% of total own-source revenues).

Revenues from all the remaining own-source taxes (5 of 12) fell from FY 1987 through FY 1990. The most interesting case was the total loss since FY 1988 in revenues earned from a user surcharge levied on behalf of the municipality by the *Compagnie Ivoirienne d'Electricité (CIE)*, the state-owned electric power company. Local officials reported that since the central government owes the CIE several billion FCFA in arrears, the company has adopted a global strategy of not turning over these tax revenues to local governments. Since revenues from this tax only accounted for 2 percent (2%) of total own-source revenues in FY 1987 and since the CIE maintains Sirasso's street lights free of charge, it is not surprising that the municipality has effectively given up trying to collect it.

Sirasso's increasing reliance on market and slaughter house fees, as well as small business taxes as a means of partially offsetting the 10-32 percent average annual loss in grant revenues experienced from FY 1987 through FY 1990, has no doubt altered the incidence of financing local expenditures on public goods and services. Unfortunately, in the absence of detailed household expenditure data, it is impossible to say definitively whether these changes, brought about in large part as a result of the SAP, have had a neutral, progressive or regressive effect on the local population.

As is argued in the North Tongu District case study for Ghana (cf Vol III, [Ghana country study]), there is good reason to predict that market fees will be disproportionately shifted onto the poor, and thus will be regressive. Taxes on small business are also likely to be shifted forward onto consumers, but whether these consumers are wealthy or poor depends upon the product being sold. If local businesses sell mostly luxuries (goods with an income elasticity greater than unity), then the incidence would most likely be progressive. If they sell mostly necessities, then the opposite would most likely hold.

Were the market for meat products unregulated, it is likely that the incidence of the slaughter house fee would be progressive since the demand for meat is generally income elastic.¹⁰³ Since meat prices are regulated, however, butchers are unable to pass the tax on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Under the circumstances, the tax would appear to be borne by the butchers who undoubtedly would fall in the higher end of the local income distribution. Discussions with local officials in Sirasso, however, indicate that despite the price regulations, butchers can and do shift the burden of the tax onto innumerate consumers by reducing the quantity of meat sold to them at the regulated prices. Given the high rate of innumeracy in Northern Ivory Coast, it is likely that a large proportion of individuals who can afford to pay for meat are innumerate and thus susceptible to being cheated by the butchers. If this is the case, then the incidence of the tax is borne by the wealthy, and thus is progressive.

¹⁰³

See empirical evidence reported in Schwabe (1984), indicating poorer households in developing countries tend to substitute vegetable sources of protein for more expensive meat alternatives.

6 Sirasso Primary Education

The Northern part of the Ivory Coast has the lowest schooling rate in the country. The commune of Sirasso has three schools totaling 15 classes. While in the East, there were 19 places in school for each person in the commune, in the North there are only 11. In Sirasso town, the schooling rate is estimated to be about 70%, possibly 75% or the national average. As will appear below, in parts of the North virtually no children attend. In many others the schooling rate is extremely low. The very large cultural distance between villages that have remained extremely traditional and the formal school creates special problems for teachers. These problems are made the harder by the imposed inflexible curriculum, which prevents these teachers from adapting their instruction to the actual learning potential of the children.

Sirasso has two schools, one being relatively new and located on the outskirts of the town. Sirasso I is an impressive institution that could probably be used in any study of "good schools". The grounds are well kept by the children, flowers have been planted. The pupils' association makes brooms and sells them. The funds are then used for various school projects, such as planting bushes designed to keep animals away from the courtyard. The head is a highly experienced teacher who is assisted by equally experienced colleagues. They report considerable professional interaction involving mutual classroom observation. The tone of the banter between them, their animation when discussing pedagogical problems all lend credence to their claim that this is a "good" school.

Sirasso II, the newer school, is entirely reasonable as far as its physical appearance is concerned. However, the roof of the toilets was stolen recently and so was the teacher's table in one of the classrooms. The absence of teachers' housing near the school means no one is available to provide informal security.¹⁰⁴ Teachers in Sirasso II are younger, but quite enthusiastic. They discussed at great length a number of changes they would like to see occur, particularly the school being allotted a budget they would jointly administer. They give the impression of people who enjoy what they are doing and who work harmoniously together. For example, we discussed the problem of teaching French to first graders. They were unanimous in thinking that, in rural areas, the four weeks allotted to the initial introduction represented too short a period. They also argued that the goal of the four weeks, making a complete simple sentence in French, was too complex a task outside of urban areas. They also reported that parents have to be convinced to send children to school and that, often, children do not come or come only occasionally. They also reported not being able to buy books locally (again, a market failure). They attribute the rigidity of the curriculum to television instruction. Before the introduction of television instruction, teachers were far freer to develop their own program of teaching.

These teachers have an interesting solution to the shortage of classrooms in the North. They argue that the curriculum could be simplified and, then, children would attend for four hours each day. They would teach two classes instead of one. In extremely rural areas, such as the village to be described below, a teacher could therefore cover two grades and three teachers all primary grades. It might also be possible to have two grades in the morning and two in the afternoon if children had enough books and supplies.

¹⁰⁴

The American reader may find it strange that teachers expect to be provided with housing. However, it must be realized that the private market does not make housing available (who would invest when capital is scarce?). Further, providing housing to teachers yields a number of benefits including greater security of the buildings. Thus teachers can be considered to receive what it would cost to guard the buildings. It may well be that what appears to be a generous subsidy in fact saves the state money.

to do some work on their own while the teacher attends to the other grade. Thus, in extremely remote areas, one teacher could probably teach all six grades.

Enrollment data for Sirasso I follows

Table 9 Primary School Enrollment Data Sirasso I

grade 1	27 boys	19 girls	
grade 2	27 boys	24 girls	
grade 3	30 boys	20 girls	
grade 4	29 boys	10 girls	
grade 5	17 boys	10 girls	
grade 6	30 boys	18 girls	[15 (31%) never repeated]

Results on examinations are exactly at the national average

Teachers report that no subsidy from the city is available (the school was built with FRAR funds). They perceive education as available only to those who can afford to buy the books and supplies. At the beginning of the school year, progress is very slow because parents have not been paid for their crop and, therefore, they lack the funds with which to purchase the books.

In Sirasso II, the enrollments are as follows

Table 10 Primary School Enrollment Data Sirasso II

grade 1	21 boys	17 girls	
grade 2	19 boys	13 girls	
grade 3	16 boys	13 girls	
grade 4	12 boys	6 girls	
grade 5	13 boys	7 girls	
grade 6	18 boys	7 girls	[5 (20%) never repeated]

In Sirasso, relatively few children lack books. For example, in fourth grade, only four children did not have the reading book, seven lacked the math book. In fifth grade, only two did not have the reading book and all had the math book. Under these circumstances, sharing becomes possible.

Several interpretations are possible. Only the richest children attend school and, therefore, they can afford to purchase the books sometimes during the school year. This interpretation is made more plausible by the fact that an extremely large proportion of children wear uniforms. The perception of teachers may therefore be accurate: schooling in the north is for the relatively well-off.

It may also be possible, however, that the children who attend school represent a very wide range of economic affluence. However, the difference between affluent and less affluent children would be that, in rich families, a far larger proportion of all the family's children attend school.

In 1988, the commune built a school in Nagberekaha, a small village. There are only two classes, the first and the third grade. Next year, there will be the second and fourth. The school recruits every other year and a third teacher will be needed next year. This year, there are 14 boys and six girls in grade one (eight of whom are repeating the grade) and 16 boys and five girls in third grade. In fact, the schooling rate is very low. A survey was done of all children born in 1983, 1984 and 1985. This yielded 29 children whose parents were asked to come to the school (12 girls among 29

children suggests that the birth of girls is under registered, a figure that is corroborated by a similar survey carried out in the West) Parents were told that they should send their children to school. Out of 29 children, 10 came, of whom three were girls. This figure yields an attendance rate of 33% in very rural areas. Actually, that figure represents a maximum since parents have no reason to register the birth of their children unless they intend to send them to school. The rate for girls represents 25% attendance. It would be reasonable to argue that the effective schooling rate in the northern part of the country hovers around 15% of boys for all children and half that for girls.

Children speak no French at all when they enter school. Attempts at discussions with them indicated that, even in third grade, their knowledge of French was still very limited.

Teachers argue that parents do not understand why children should go to school. However, those who attend are well equipped. In third grade, 15 children have the reading book and 10 the math book. At a cost of 10,000 FCFA, this represents a very large expense most parents have covered.

Teachers note that, in many cases, fields are extremely far from the village. It is unreasonable, therefore, to expect children to attend when parents must work in such fields. Even when parents are interested in sending their children to school, it is not always possible unless a family in the village can act as foster parents. While such a practice is very common in Africa, parents would be expected to provide food or some other compensation. It is often much easier to keep children with all the others and, in addition, to have access to their labor. Even if children were schooled, what would they do with the education given that contacts with the modern sector are extremely limited and can be avoided easily?

7 Sirasso Public Health Services

Health Service Provision and Production

Residents of Sirasso and the outlying villages have only one modern curative health service option as an alternative to traditional care. Curative services are supplied at the government health center in Sirasso which is supported by the Catholic church. In addition to producing curative care services (complicated cases are referred to the hospital in Khorogo), the center also supplies a full range of maternal and child preventive health services. Government staff, including a medical assistant and village midwife, are assisted by two expatriate Catholic sisters (one of whom has formal medical training). For consumers of growth monitoring, nutrition education and supplemental feeding services one other alternative exists at the government run Centre Social in Sirasso.

In principle, overall responsibility for managing and supervising the publicly subsidized health services in Sirasso is vested with the Department of Rural Health in Khorogo which is headed by a chief medical officer, or *Médecin Chef*. An Assistant for Sanitation is responsible for primary health care activities in the region, including primary care, public hygiene, vaccinations, and water supply. The department also operates a treatment facility at the headquarters in Khorogo which is designated as the primary referral point for rural health centers. Cases that cannot be treated effectively at this facility are referred to the large CHR hospital in Khorogo.

In reality, health officials report that the Department of Rural Health currently assumes little responsibility for managing and supervising rural health service production ¹⁰⁵ Recent cut backs in central funding, undertaken as part of Ivory Coast's structural adjustment program, have severely constrained their ability to supervise the network of rural health facilities ¹⁰⁶ Budgets for transportation and fuel have been slashed, effectively eliminating their ability to travel on supervisory visits ¹⁰⁷

The effect of the budget cutbacks have not been all bad, however In an attempt to cut costs, the department recently restructured its immunization delivery mechanisms, opting for vaccination activities to be produced by permanent health staff working in sedentary health facilities rather than relying on the more expensive mobile vaccination approach used previously In addition to cost containment measures, the department of rural health has also conformed with centrally initiated cost-recovery policies These policies allow health facilities to charge service fees for consultations, drugs, laboratory tests, and record keeping

One of the more promising cost-recovery approaches currently under trial in Ivory Coast is a village-based community pharmacy scheme (*la caisse de pharmacie villageoise*) Though the approach has been officially sanctioned by the Ministry of Health (MSPP) as part of the country's primary health care strategy, it receives virtually no government support,¹⁰⁸ and only appears to be working in those instances where non-governmental organizations (NGOs) initiate and support the activity

The following description of this community pharmacy initiative is based on an interview with representatives of the NGO Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World) which is providing technical and financial assistance to a community pharmacy project near Khorogo, as well as on a discussion with the chief medical officer in Man ¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ The health officials also acknowledge that the department gives the least priority to health facilities like those in Sirasso which receive support from non-governmental organizations

¹⁰⁶ The most important cost containment measure has been the freeze on all public sector employee salaries since 1980 Health sector employee salaries are frozen even if they are promoted The salary freeze is reported to have had a particularly negative effect on work incentives for medical assistants who assume most of the responsibility for field supervision

¹⁰⁷ Health authorities noted that funding cuts have prevented them from using the vehicles supplied by UNICEF for supervision purposes This is an interesting example of the spillover effects of structural adjustment on project investments by external donors

¹⁰⁸ The team could not interview the director of the MSPP's Community Health Department to confirm this However the recent World Bank health sector review made no mention of the initiative The three cases observed or about which information was available involved full funding by non-governmental organizations The chief medical officer of Man and the deputy director in Khorogo both indicated they valued the work being done, but gave no real support to the project

¹⁰⁹ The Catholic Sisters at the Sirasso dispensary mentioned that they had trained a number of community health volunteers (*agents de sante*) who lived in the villages around Sirasso The volunteers were trained to provide essential curative care and had received a limited assortment of essential drugs that they sold at unit cost to patients in the village To a lesser extent these community health volunteers also promote improved health practices in their villages

The community pharmacy scheme is a village-based primary health care initiative linked, at least in principle, to the training of traditional birth attendants ¹¹⁰ Originally sanctioned by the MSPP in 1978, the scheme is being implemented selectively throughout Ivory Coast in locations where NGOs will support it

In the Médecins du Monde version of the community pharmacy initiative, the supply of essential drugs is used as an entry point for the promotion of public health measures at the village level. Project members approach community elders and ask them to propose three young villagers (usually women with some education, but not so much that they would be tempted to leave the village) to be trained as community health volunteers. After training the volunteers should be able to diagnose and treat common ailments. They also receive a stock of drugs that they sell in unit quantities to patients. Three volunteers are selected to work together so that the availability of the services does not depend upon the presence of one individual, and so that no one volunteer is overly burdened by the work.

To qualify for these project inputs, the community must demonstrate that it has begun work on protecting the village handpump(s) from pollution, building latrines and setting up a garbage dump. The project provides technical support for these public health activities but no funding. In addition, the community must raise 31,000 FCFA to pay for the initial purchase of drugs for the community pharmacy and must build the pharmacy (estimated cost for doors, windows and shelves is 10,000 FCFA, labor and other materials are donated). Once the pharmacy is built, the money has been raised, and a good faith effort to begin the public health activities has been demonstrated, the project provides a one-week training for the volunteers.

The training is conducted by Médecins du Monde staff with the assistance of the local dispensary nurse. Volunteers are taught basic symptomatology and treatment protocols, and are trained in how to manage and account for the community pharmacy drug supply. The nurse's involvement in the training is important since it is he who later serves as the volunteers' primary supervisor, and sells them drugs ¹¹¹

Drugs are purchased by the project from private pharmacies in Khorogo at the prevailing market price. It is argued that this frees the project from a dependence on drugs imported by the NGO. The drugs are then sold by the tablet at a price set at 150% of cost. The community health volunteers are trained to dispense a pre-designated number of tablets depending on the approximate age of the patient and are provided with a simple book which describes the recommended dosages and the associated total price. The volunteers are allowed to use any profits to maintain their pharmacy ¹¹²

¹¹⁰ The programmatic linkage between the community pharmacy scheme and the training of traditional birth attendants (TBAs) was noted by the chief medical officer in Man. Unfortunately, though linkages are highly desirable, none of the NGOs appeared to be supporting both activities simultaneously. Some villages in Kouibly commune have TBAs but the community pharmacy scheme does not exist there.

¹¹¹ Oddly, it was reported that the nurse does not sell drugs at his dispensary since it is felt that the community would react negatively to a government health worker charging for his services. Accordingly, even though he stores drugs for the community pharmacy scheme and wholesales these to the volunteers, who retail them in their communities, he has no drugs to dispense to his own patients since the government had not supplied drugs for over a year and a half.

¹¹² Médecin du Monde staff expressed concern that volunteers cannot legally be partially remunerated for their effort. They worried that without some pay the workers may gradually reduce the amount of labor they supply and ultimately quit. It is also possible that the volunteers could begin unofficially expropriating the drug sale profits, thus reducing the funds available for maintenance and upkeep of the pharmacy. While voluntarism has many advantages, ignoring its weakness where

D Kouibly Municipality Case Study

1 Introduction

Kouibly, the seat of Kouibly Municipality, lies east-south-east of Man, in the department of the same name in southwestern Ivory Coast. One reaches the village of 4,800 population (1984 census) by a circuitous route from Man, first via a ten-kilometer stretch of blacktop and then along a poorly-maintained laterite track. The total journey of 53 km requires better than an hour's travel. Kouibly Municipality, located in Kouibly Subprefecture and roughly 380 square km in area, contains rich soils and a fair amount of tropical hardwood forest. The local economy is based on the Ivoirian staple cash crops of coffee and cacao, supplemented by substantial sales of food crops such as bananas, rice, taro, manioc, yams and maize. Local boosters describe it as the "bread basket" of the southwestern Ivory Coast. Production from the area is marketed as far away as Yamoussoukro, some 200 km to the east.

Historical Overview

The indigenous population is entirely Wé, a people who moved from north of Man during the 17th and 18th Centuries into the dense tropical forest areas of what is now southwestern Ivory Coast. The Wé were driven south from their original home area by the Malinké expansion during that period.¹¹³ Organized in micro-states comprising at most several villages, they constitute one of some fifteen ethnic groups included within the Krou constellation.¹¹⁴ The Wé claim a warrior tradition, and indeed seem to have been involved in numerous territorial struggles during the 16th through 19th Centuries with the encroaching Malinké, as well as among themselves.

The We people cultivated patches of forest area cleared through slash and burn techniques to subsistence food crops, including tubers and bananas. They also derived a good deal of their diet from hunting and fishing.

The French colonized the area in the late 19th Century and established a permanent presence in the immediate area around 1910. In 1961 the newly independent Government of the Ivory Coast established the subprefecture based in Kouibly. The municipality was created in 1985, along with nearly one hundred others. Kouibly contains a total of eleven villages.

Current Facilities

The municipal government appears staffed by hard-working, competent civil servants. Elected officials are energetic and well-informed, although the three deputies are all retired civil servants or military men and the mayor is within a year of retirement. Some are politically well-connected. The mayor is ambitious for his municipality, a gifted public speaker, somewhat authoritarian and verbally concerned about honoring electoral promises.

National services provided in Kouibly Municipality include numerous primary schools. A private secondary school has failed. The municipality is constructing a general purpose secondary school. A national health service

long-term efforts are concerned may ultimately undermine the community pharmacy effort.

¹¹³ J -N Loucou Histoire in Atlas de la Côte d'Ivoire 2nd ed (Paris Les Editions Jeune Afrique 1983) p 25

¹¹⁴ See S and J -C Arnaud Ethnies in Atlas de la Côte d'Ivoire 2nd ed (Paris Les Editions Jeune Afrique 1983) p 26

doctor, nurses and midwives working in a (poorly-equipped) hospital offer primary health services of various kinds. Traditional healers and midwives also offer primary health services.

Local people run producer cooperatives to market coffee, cacao and food crops in Man. The municipality operates a well-attended weekly market. Several private bus operators provide common carrier services connecting Kouibly with nearby communities as well as with Man and other Ivoirian cities.

Case Study Contents

The Kouibly municipal case study begins with an overview of the evolution of local government, in the context of overlapping regimes, since pre-colonial times. It then highlights several problems which appear of critical importance in the local context. Municipal government operations, within the evolving political arrangements, are described next. Against this background the evolution of service activities in the focal areas of primary education and primary health care are described.

2 Historical Background

Original Settlers

We were the original, and sole, ethnic group in the area that later became Kouibly Subprefecture. The village of Kouibly was founded March 12, 1912. Three pre-colonial era villages, Baibly, Mianbly and Mahanbly, were resettled and consolidated into the single new community. The new village probably numbered about 600-700 inhabitants. The consolidation was carried out on the orders of Lieutenant Laurent, the first French commandant to be stationed in the area.

Subsequently Djoula merchants (Guineans and Maliens as well as Ivoirians from Seguéla, Odienné and Touba) moved in and now occupy a quarter in Kouibly. Malien and Burkinabe Fulbe pastoralists arrived in the area after the French, probably between the two World Wars. Burkinabe migrant workers appeared after World War II. Some remained to establish their own plantations. They now live interspersed with the rest of the population.

Contemporary Production Systems

The local economy has been transformed slowly over the last century from one based on subsistence agriculture, hunting and fishing to one in which tree cash crops are supplemented by market oriented production of foodstuffs. This process has not however eliminated subsistence food production. Local people also derive minor revenues by authorizing logging of tropical hardwoods on their lands.

Coffee and Cocoa Cash-Cropping

In about 1942, coffee was introduced as a cash crop by the colonial agricultural service. Cocoa was introduced after 1970. The independence administration successfully encouraged production after 1960 by a variety of strategies.

Currently villages in the municipality produce about 10,000 tons of cocoa, and between 13,000 and 14,000 tons of coffee. 1980 was a poor rain year and production of these tree crops suffered. However, tree crop production appears relatively constant over the last two decades.

The local economy has slipped into the recession that has afflicted the Ivory Coast generally since the terms of trade for primary agricultural products began weakening in the 1980s. Local planters have however maintained crop production levels.

Bush fires also threaten tree plantation production. Smokers, hunters, and farmers are all responsible for wildfires. Some people, through jealousy, set fire to other people's plantations. More commonly, farmers fire parts of the cane patches in low-lying areas to clear them for agriculture. These sometimes escalate into wild fires which damage surrounding plantations. Farmers who burn residues on their rice parcels to clear them for cultivation likewise occasionally lose control of the fire and it then often burns on into the bush. Such fires also destroy coffee and cocoa plantations. These accidental fires reduce production potential.

In 1988 a Chadian accountant at the multi-purpose center at Trokpadro, seat of the union of the Village Cooperative Groupings (Groupements Villageois Coopératifs [GVCs]), ran off with funds earmarked for purchase of union farmers' agricultural outputs. While the accountant was not an employee of the GVC union, but of the Trokpadro multi-purpose center, farmers who had sold produce to the center never received payment for their last deliveries. Some then refused to sell to the center for several years, but most have again begun to market products there. Those planters who have sold cocoa to the multi-purpose center this year, since the start of the marketing season in March, have still not been paid. The season ends in July.

Other Crops

Rainfed rice is harvested between September and November. Irrigated rice plots produce either one or two harvests, depending on the local water supply. The irrigated rice harvest begins in December and continues into March.

Hevea could produce well here, but is only now being tested at the experimental station at Man. Farmers are also producing pineapples near Man. Oil palm production is not profitable in Kouibly, since there is no processing plant in the local area.

Lumbering

Until this year three logging companies harvested timber in the area. They cut and exported wood to San Pedro on the coast, where the logs were either exported or transformed into wood products for the domestic market. One of the companies worked in the Kouibly Municipality village of Siably.

The lumber companies negotiated with the peasants owners of fields where they wanted to cut wood. According to the third deputy mayor, felling authorizations typically negotiated with peasant farmers for four varieties of prime tropical hardwoods were as follows: iroko, 7 000 FCFA, koto, 4 500 FCFA, acajou, 7 000 FCFA, and boïbeté, 7 000 FCFA. The deputy mayor has sold these species from his own plantation, but other species are cut as well. The loggers do not cause damage to the plantations because they work quite carefully. Most planters want large trees cleared from their land to open it up because coffee and cocoa bushes produce more abundantly when they get more sun.

Each lumber company is required to purchase a license for 600,000 FCFA at the subprefecture. All three paid that amount in 1990 and again in 1991. The company that was cutting in Siably recently stopped lumbering in the area, and the others have stopped logging at sites elsewhere in the subprefecture.

Several woodworking companies in the San Pedro region have shut down recently. They service the Ivoirian market, and the recession-induced fall-off in purchasing power has forced them to close their doors. Hardwood logs may still be exportable, but such raw exports produce little profit.

Municipal Organization

Kouibly Subprefecture was created in 1961, the year after the Ivory Coast achieved independence. Counting the eleven villages in Kouibly Municipality, it contains 52 villages. The subprefectural seat is in Kouibly village. The Municipality was created in 1985. Kouibly municipality villages and their populations are listed below in Table 11.

Table 11 Kouibly Municipality Villages

1	Kouibly	4,768
2	Batiebly	736
3	Troudour	774
4	Gnoahe	466
5	Gbeibly	605
6	Sieibly	900
7	Tobly	229
8	Tacourably	1,453
9	Seably	228
10	Bouebly	391
11	<u>Diebambobly</u>	<u>262</u>
	Total	10,812

The official population in the eleven-village area in 1985 was not adequate to justify creating a municipality, but local people lobbied in Abidjan for municipal status for the area. They worked through Kouibly natives employed as civil servants in Abidjan to promote the cause of Kouibly local government. Since creation however the population has increased to more than 10,000, the minimum amount.

Mr BOUA Kangné Edmond, the elderly second deputy mayor, claims the 1984 census was badly executed and resulted in a severe undercount. He compares that census, executed by outsiders, to those run by the colonial regime, when primary school teachers would undertake the task in their native villages to earn more money during vacation periods. Since they knew the population, they did not miss many people.

3 Local Problems

This section outlines two basic problems confronting the village populations of Kouibly Municipality. Kouibly has an already substantial and growing agricultural production potential. This contrasts sharply with the situations in Koun-Fao and Sirasso Municipalities. In those sites falling production potential (coffee and cacao plantations destroyed in Koun-Fao) or

increasing production costs (rising prices of inputs and livestock damage to crops in Sirasso) now operate as the major obstacles to an economic upturn. In Kouibly, inadequate local roads have prevented people from capitalizing on local production potential. Linked to this potential is the issue of providing appropriate post-primary training facilities within the municipality.

Market Access

Kouibly is the granary of the Department of Man, yet the community does not have a reasonable farm-to-market road tying it into the regional highway network. The distance from Kouibly to Daloa is approximately 150 km. A blacktop link between the two towns would open up a major market.

Failing that, municipal officials and citizens would like to have a better road to Man, preferably blacktop surfaced, to improve their access to outside markets. If the Kouibly road were improved, the number of entrepreneurs coming to the municipality to buy local products could also be expected to increase substantially from an already appreciable level.

Tacourably, the biggest village in the municipality outside of Kouibly, has a substantial under-exploited production potential. Villagers would like to have a bridge constructed over the tributary of the Niehi River that cuts off truck access to their fields south of the village, some of which lie as far away as fifteen (15) km from the village center. The Public Works Ministry (Travaux Publics [TP]) could construct the bridge. In 1988 the Major Public Works Directorate and Supervisory Agency (Direction et Contrôle de Grands Travaux [DCGTX]), the national planning agency in Abidjan, estimated the cost of the bridge at 22 000 000 FCFA. Currently Kouibly Municipality has an engineer from TP in the community working on this issue. If it is not possible to build a bridge, they may have to install a ferry, or work out some other, lower cost solution.

Tacourably people would also like to create a market in their village. Trucks come to the village three times weekly to load food products. Villagers would like to improve marketing conditions. They would need to build infrastructure - stalls and the like. The capacity to market produce locally would materially increase the value of their output by lowering transportation bottlenecks and costs. At present, they have to head-load all their produce into Tacourably from their farms. Then they have to arrange truck transport to Kouibly if they wish to market there.

Post-Primary Training

If municipal officials had more money, they would try to improve local conditions to encourage village youth to stay in the region and engage in agriculture. The national policy of encouraging a return to farming is failing in the local area because Kouibly youth refuse to go back to hoe agriculture. The young insist on having machinery for use in cultivation, otherwise they say, they will simply regress to the level of subsistence farming.

Young people would like to buy hand-led cultivators, but cannot get adequate credit. The cultivators would not be profitable in the immediate village vicinity because the plots are too small. Further away from Kouibly in the cane bottom lands they might be because the areas available there for agriculture are somewhat more extensive.

European social workers in the village are trying to assist young people. But young farmers face the same problem as their elders: market access. They have become discouraged because they cannot sell much of what they produce. They began truck gardening, and some also produce rice on

irrigated plots The rice they produce is mainly consumed locally But the amount of rice produced locally, by both younger and older farmers, saturates the market Local producers market, during the rice harvesting seasons, between 80 and 90 tons weekly Most of that is bought in the local market, some by Djoula women, some by local people, some by traders from Yamoussoukro, etc

4 Kouibly Contemporary Politics

Politics in Kouibly reflect much the same set of concerns and the same evolution as in Koun-Fao and Sirasso Local people who vote appear to apply the same criteria in evaluating politicians' performance If elected officials fail to produce results for the local community, particularly if they fail to take advantage of obvious strategies to obtain assistance, they are unlikely to be re-elected Again, the rate of turn-over is high

This section first analyzes local political strategies, both of elected politicians and PDCI party officials, in the context of flagging national financing capacities It then turns to the level of own-source revenues which Kouibly Municipality government and populations can tap to finance priority activities Infrastructure projects that have been undertaken in Kouibly and two other villages in the municipality are described in the following section

Local Political Strategies

Local politicians, both elected and PDCI officials, face a demanding and volatile environment Those interviewed seemed intensely aware of the need to "produce" for the local community, and nervous about the necessity of convincing their electorates that local self-help must be seen more and more as an indispensable condition for sustainable development in local communities Their nervousness is understandable in the context of the last thirty years during which the central government has played a dominant role in financing local developments throughout the Ivory Coast Local communities have usually had to supply matching funds, but the central share has varied from forty to sixty percent The recession has seriously impaired the ability of both local and national jurisdictions to finance infrastructure facilities

Elected Officials

The three major types of elective offices for which people vote in Kouibly, as in other municipalities, are that of mayor, those of the deputy mayors (two in 1985 and three in 1990) and the post of national assembly deputy

The office of mayor was created along with the municipality in 1985 The first mayor, GUEI François, necessarily ran on the PDCI label because opposition parties were then illegal He is a Kouibly native, and about 50 years old When he first ran he had been seconded, from his position as a sitting magistrate, to the national prison system, so he was allowed to seek and hold office At the time of the second municipal elections he had been recalled to the Ministry of Justice and was thus barred from seeking re-election by ivoirien national rules barring sitting judges from holding elective office He did not contest the election

The current mayor, BOUKPEI Benoit Lamine, was elected municipal councillor in 1985 Born in 1937, 54 years of age, he was elected mayor in 1990 on the PDCI label By his own account, he campaigned on his capacity to bring new infrastructure facilities to Kouibly He grew up in the subprefectural and municipality village of Tobly, 5 km from Kouibly village He is currently a high civil servant in the Tourism Ministry and resides in Abidjan However he makes the 550 km trip to Kouibly at least twice monthly

The first and second deputy mayors were elected in 1985 and re-elected in 1990. KEI Grazaï Denis, First Deputy Mayor, also comes from the subprefectural and municipality village of Tobly. He is an ex-civil service nurse who retired in 1981.

BOUA Kangné Edmond, Second Deputy Mayor, is a native of Trokpadro, a village in the Subprefecture located 32 km from Kouibly. Trokpadro is the first village in the subprefecture as one arrives from Man. BOUA is an ex-civil servant, having worked as a technician in the Ministry of Agriculture. He retired in 1988.

OUYA Emile, Third Deputy Mayor, is also a native of Kouibly, elected councillor in 1985, and then to first term as deputy in 1990, he took office in January 1991. He is an ex-Army captain who retired at the end of 1983.

The national deputy elected in 1980, GUEI Massa, was defeated in 1985, but then re-elected deputy again in 1990. He has run consistently as a PDCI candidate. He is a native of Battiébli, a village in Kouibly Municipality. A medical doctor, he practices in Abidjan.

GUEI's opponent in 1985 and in 1990 was BAH Robert. He likewise ran on the PDCI label. He is a native of Ouaïbli in Kouibly Subprefecture, an ex-student, some 40 years of age, and without employment. In the 1990 elections BAH and GUEI were the only PDCI candidates. One individual ran on the opposition FPI ticket, and came in last.

The national deputies elected from the subprefecture who were not re-elected did not meet the municipal residents' expectations in producing special projects for the community financed with special national budget allocations. If deputies fail to achieve something in their first term, voters in the subprefecture consider it too expensive to give them another chance. They are replaced by people who will be able to lobby the national administration effectively, take part in the annual FRAR meetings, and obtain assistance for communities in the subprefecture.

This propensity of voters to evaluate local and national politicians in terms of their success in "raiding the national treasury" is understandable but not necessarily appropriate in an era of prolonged recession and growing penury. It is understandable because the Ivorian government and the formerly sole legitimate political organization, the PDCI, demonstrated during the first two post-independence decades that the paternalistic party-state was able and willing, as a matter of government policy, to fund an enormous proportion of local development costs. From the early 1970s local communities were called upon increasingly to share some of these costs by providing, e.g., local funds to match FRAR grants allocated by the national government to local communities. Nonetheless, the principle of central government financial responsibility, once established, is not easy to overturn. Rural people continue to believe that money - fiscal relief - is available in Abidjan if they select representatives astute enough to know how to get it.

Dominant central funding of most activities is no longer appropriate. Economic conditions have deteriorated. The national government faces serious budgetary problems. Central officials now clearly recognize that these problems will only be exacerbated if local communities can obtain central support without committing substantial amounts of their own resources as counterpart funds. Indeed, national authorities have introduced a degree of fiscal discipline to the FRAR program by increasing the proportion of local counterpart funds necessary to access national matching grants in precisely the area of highest demand and cost: education.

This strategy has curtailed demand for schools, without flatly refusing to meet it, by increasing the local match to fifty percent (50%) for

educational infrastructure This is particularly true in areas such as Sirasso and Koun-Fao that are hard hit by the current economic crisis Communities now have a strong incentive to reflect whether they can afford the additional classroom or school, and to confront hard choices since primary education is becoming less and less of a free good

Changing Role of the PDCI

The PDCI SG is expected to operate as a development agent in his region To support his operation he has to sell party cards He is supposed to retain twenty-five percent (25%) of proceeds from card sales to finance local activities This is in addition to his monthly salary of \$275 (200 000 FCFA) (the SGs elected in 1990 have not yet been paid however) The remaining seventy-five percent (75%) of card sale totals is to be sent to the national party organization If an SG who lives in Abidjan and cannot be bothered to return to the village to find out about local conditions, inform himself so he can represent the population, and sell cards to support the party organization, the members of the PDCI local committees in a subprefecture are not likely to re-elect him For them it is a question of political efficacy

GUERIA Mian St Louis, currently PDCI Secretary-General, was elected to his first term in 1990 He is 42 years old, a building contractor, and a native of the Kouibly Subprefectural village of Nenadi-Tebao (the Nenadi village occupied by the Tebao We subgroup) He defeated and succeeded SEAGUY Denis, of Kouibly Village, who served a single term as PDCI SG from 1985-90 He was formerly police Adjutant in Abidjan, but retired upon his election as PDCI SG SEAGUY in turn replaced BEBLAI Benoit The latter was elected in 1980 He retired from the civil service as chief adjutant of police A native of Ouaibly in the Subprefecture, he also served only one term, having been defeated in 1985 by SEAGUY Some PDCI SGs are elected to more than one term however

The PDCI spent more on the last campaign than on any previous one, because PDCI politicians had to contest a multi-party competition The former financing mechanisms for electoral campaigns, i e , obligatory annual deductions from the salaries of civil servants and private sector employees, have been suppressed These deductions ranged from 5 000 to 30 000 FCFA, varying as a function of the total salary Peasants were likewise required to purchase party cards each year for 500 FCFA, and to show them to police officials Those who did not have cards were forced to buy one on the spot

The PDCI's financing problems are evidently serious and may well affect the party's capacity to remunerate its employees If this happens, it can be expected to have a long-term impact on the party's ability to dominate politics in the Ivory Coast It is important to note that this is a result of the President's decision, taken under pressure, to permit multi-party elections The decision to reduce the PDCI's privileged position within the political arena by reducing its sources of automatic financing is a logical consequence of the decision authorizing a multi-party regime At present, Ivoirian citizens are at liberty to join any political party they wish, or join none The decision to force the PDCI to compete for financing with other parties was taken and enforced by the party leadership

Limited Own-source Revenues

The lack of adequate secondary school training facilities is linked to the public finance problems which the municipality now confronts The cut-back in national government grants to municipalities (25% reduction in the central grant in 1990, and ten percent in 1991) has seriously impaired municipal capacity to finance local infrastructure projects

Own-source revenues are limited. The Kouibly market meets only once weekly. The municipal government collects 20,000 - 28,000 FCFA per session in market taxes. A daily fee of 200 FCFA is also imposed on all common carriers that use the local bus station. The patente, or business tax imposed on enterprises with gross sales above a threshold amount, is collected in Kouibly by national tax authorities, but the receiver keeps track of the amounts collected.

Productivity of the land tax, also collected by national agents, should increase because the municipality recently revised the local cadastral records to bring them up to date. In addition, title surveys and building permits produce small additional amounts of money. The owner pays for the survey in order to get clear title to the land. Previously, the survey fee was a uniform 7 500 FCFA, but it has been increased recently and made more complex to reflect differences in land values. In the higher class residential quarters property owners are billed 30 000 FCFA for a plot survey, in the more popular quarters, the cost is 20 000 FCFA for the survey. In 1988, many lots were attributed to individuals, only some paid the survey fee. Since Baibly villager residents were displaced from another site to the current one, they received their lots free. But new residents who move into the quarter in the future will have to pay the title survey fee when they build their houses.

Once the title survey is completed, it is sent in to Man along with a completed application including the building plans, other items, and 10 000 FCFA for a building permit. When approved, the application is sent back to the municipality. The mayor signs the authorization, and the construction permit is issued.

In the beginning, from 1963-65, when would-be house builders got their survey receipt, they began construction directly without going through the full permission review procedure. Since 1965, they have generally followed the full procedures.

The population recognizes that the current period is difficult, and that they will have to pay more. This despite the fact that, as in Koun-Fao and Sirasso Municipality villages, local people have already contributed substantial amounts from their GVC rebates to develop local infrastructure facilities. The next section develops this point.

5 Municipal Government Infrastructure Investments

In 1985, the local government constructed a building to house the new municipal services. They built a slaughterhouse (1986), entirely with municipal funds, and constructed a public toilet facility (1987-88), again entirely with municipal funds. It should be noted however that a large proportion of "municipal" funds have been obtained, since the jurisdiction was created, from central government formula grants.

Kouibly Municipal government also helped finance construction of three schools (three classes each) in Bouebly, Seably and at Gnoahe. The schools were built with FRAR matching funds. An instructor's lodging was constructed in Tacourably as well. The municipal building was enclosed in 1988, entirely with municipal government funds.

In some villages, e.g., Seably, the smallest, the local community financed construction of an instructor's house with funds drawn from rebates accorded the village Groupement Villageois Cooperatif (GVC) so that the national education ministry would assign teachers to the new primary school.

Tacourably wants a local bridge constructed, as noted above in Section B 1. Though the bridge interests the village directly, village officials have asked the mayor for help. However, they could work through the local GVC,

using it as a collection mechanism. They would be able to pay off the construction costs at the rate of 200 000/truckload, and still have 1 000 000 FCFA of profit to distribute. If the bridge is built and built well, then they could repay the loan.

They used their GVC rebates in 1975 to finance all costs of six school classrooms. The director's house was built in 1979 with FRAR funds. The instructors' houses were built by the municipality (one house) and four entirely through the GVC rebate funds in 1988 and 1989.

No Tacourably village natives have become practicing architects or engineers. Other villages in the municipality have however kinsmen in these professions. One was drafted to design a renovation of the old subprefectural building when the municipality was created in 1985 and took over the subprefectural offices.

At present Kouibly Municipality has two on-going projects: a general purpose secondary school (CEG) and a rural telephone office. The Kouibly secondary school was begun 1987, but remains unfinished, the municipal budget has just been approved, so they will continue building the structure but will not complete it this year.

The municipality is also constructing a local telephone office, (Centre Téléphonique Rural [CTR]) to tie Kouibly village into the national network operated by the national telephone utility (Office National de Télécommunications [ONT]). The municipality has provided the entire cost, 3 700 000 FCFA. No FRAR counterpart funds have been solicited or made available. ONT will supply the material and finance an occasional visit by ONT personnel. The ONT calculates that this installation will have too few telephone subscribers to be profitable, but they have agreed, under political pressure from Mayor Boukpei, to supply equipment and support.

Financial constraints limit the municipality's capacity to create local infrastructure. The current municipal budget is 32,915,000, of which thirty percent (30%), or 9,875,000 FCFA, is allocated to infrastructure development in Kouibly Municipality.

6 Kouibly Municipality Public Finances

Like the other two new municipalities examined in this study, Kouibly depends for the majority (approximately 90%) of its revenues on the block grant from the central government. As indicated in the case study for the municipality of Sirasso, Kouibly has benefitted more from grant resources than the other two municipalities. It is not clear, however, whether this is in conformity with the statutory grant allocation formula which was designed to (1) provide a lump sum per capita amount to all municipalities enabling them to provide a standard minimum of service delivery, and (2) equalize inter-jurisdictional differences in fiscal positions. Certainly, the actual revenues reported under the different grant components (see Kouibly tables in Annex 2) do not conform with the statutory provisions. If these are ignored, however, and the total grant value is compared with the other two municipalities, it is possible that Kouibly should receive the largest grant disbursement (even though its constituents are the wealthiest), since it is the most populous municipality.

Kouibly is similar to the other two municipalities as well in that it depends primarily on market taxes, fees for administrative services, and parking fees from buses, taxis and trucks for its own-source revenues.

The municipality is unique in two respects. First, it is the only LGA visited that had attempted to implement a rate increase in order to increase its own-source revenue yield. Second, it is the only LGA visited that had

recently carried out a cadastral survey. Because of these two unique factors, Kouibly provides a opportunity to examine the political feasibility of increasing tax rates in Ivoirian rural areas, and permits examination of the potential role of the property tax as a revenue source for the new municipalities.

In FY 1988, the municipality of Kouibly voted to increase the tax charged for property surveys on land and structures (the *frais de bornages*), from FCFA 15,000 to 20,000 for second class properties and from FCFA 25,000 to 30,000 for first class properties. Though the rate increases were primarily intended to apply to new developments, the municipality required all existing property owners seeking either a land title or certification that building construction conformed to municipal building codes to pay the new rate as well. The latter affected property owners in the old, traditional area of Kouibly town who had inherited the land and structures from their parents and ancestors. According to local officials, property owners from this traditional area refused to pay the rate increase, claiming that it represented an added tax on their ancestors. Since the issue had apparently played a role in the defeat of the previous mayor, the current administration had not pursued the delinquent tax payers. In early summer 1991 the issue was still pending.

Though this is only one isolated example of the difficulties inherent in attempting to legislate rate increases in Ivoirian rural municipalities, the fact that no attempts had been made in the other two LGAs visited, suggests local officials understand that rate increases will be very unpopular with their constituents. This observation supports the perception that, despite the recent precipitous fall in living standards, the Ivoirian population had yet to fully abandon the view that the government exists to supply public goods and services and not to tax people.

Despite this apparent local opposition to tax increases, the IRS has begun carrying out cadastral surveys in the new municipalities to provide the data required to begin effectively administering the property tax. Kouibly was the only municipality visited where the cadastral survey had been carried out. The survey revealed 19 properties in Kouibly were liable for the property tax. The annualized assessed rental value of these properties ranged from FCFA 20,000 to 110,000. The estimated total annual property tax revenue was FCFA 212,400, an amount equal to 6.5% of total own-source and shared tax revenues, or 0.6% of the municipality's total revenues in FY 1990.

The foregoing estimates of the property tax yield for Kouibly suggest that the new, relatively underdeveloped, municipalities will not be able to rely on the property tax as a major revenue source. Since this is one of the few tax handles that remains virtually unexploited by the new municipalities, it suggests that the rural LGAs will remain dependent on central grant-in-aid in order to fund their activities.

7 Primary Education in Kouibly Municipality

In Kouibly, there were a total of 1841 pupils (1,083 boys and 758 girls or 41%) taught by 48 teachers or an average of 38 pupils per teacher, a very reasonable number by African standards. Examination results were good, 14% were admitted to secondary school among boys and 10% among girls. With a passing rate of 45%, however, CEP results were significantly lower than the national average. The results for the private school located in Kouibly were the same and the difference between the very rural part of the commune and the town of Kouibly was negligible.

The schools in the city of Kouibly were in poor condition, possibly because they are quite old and have had no maintenance. A Catholic school is located in Kouibly. It has 192 pupils. These teachers have had different

training and recruitment. They are recruited after completing the 9th grade, then undergo a brief period of training and pass a preliminary exam. Then, they are eligible, after satisfactory performance in the classroom, to pass the CAP (*certificat d'aptitudes pedagogiques*), administered by the inspector (in this case in Facobly). The state is responsible for 70% of the teachers' salaries (which are significantly lower than those working in the state sector), that salary being paid to the diocese. However, this year, the state has not paid the diocese and, therefore, teachers have not been paid.

Parents are expected to pay 10,000 FCFA and are also responsible for books and supplies. In urban areas, the fee is 20,000 FCFA. Thus, the income of the school should be 1,920,000. In fact, only 323,000 have been paid by June. Last year, the school received 790,000 for 131 pupils. Thus, this year the average pupil paid 1,682 and last year 6,030.

Teachers report that parents prefer to send their children to public school because the cost of the books is the same, but there is no tuition. It is interesting to note that, even when parents select a private school, they do not pay the fee. It is likely that this school will close because teachers are reporting that their electricity is being cut off and that they cannot live without some income. They would prefer a lower income, but a steady one.

Teachers in the private sector used to be able to transfer to public schools, but such transfers are no longer possible because of the requirement that primary school teachers hold the baccalaureate degree and have attended a CAFOP. It would be interesting to ascertain whether the very significant cost advantage (because of significantly lower salaries) that private schools present yields educational results that are close to those prevailing in public schools. The figures cited above suggest that overall results may not be vastly different, particularly when similar types of schools (in terms of enrollments particularly) are compared.¹¹⁵

Teachers in the West make unusual complaints by African standards: children watch too much TV and do not do homework. They also complain that parents do not back them up, that parents see school as a dumping ground. A high proportion of children do not have books (50% on the average). In the villages, attendance is reported to be about 50% and girls usually drop out after completing third grade.¹¹⁶ Teachers argue that most parents do not want to send their children to school.

Seably, a small village near Kouibly, is supposed to have three classes, but only two function because no housing was found for the teacher and he left after having lived in his classroom with his family for quite some time. One of the current teachers lives in a house vacated by a family so that the teacher would not leave. This school was built by the city.

¹¹⁵ The World Bank has criticized the Ivory Coast for relying on highly trained teachers who are expensive and do not necessarily produce better educational results. Whether an exclusive reliance on less trained teachers would create an organization as capable of change as Ivoirian primary education seems to be is unclear.

¹¹⁶ Even if third grade materials were mastered a child cannot be expected to be literate. Literacy skills attained will quickly erode. Thus if this practice is widespread (and it is in many parts of Africa) the state spends money to educate children but that investment yields no real results except perhaps a more favorable attitude towards education on the part of these people who will then see to it that their children will go to school. Thus such an expenditure could be seen as an investment in future attendance rates. However given the inability of the Ivoirian Government to increase the attendance rate in the future a more effective policy might be to prevent children girls in particular from dropping out.

Teachers in Seably make the usual complaints children cannot buy books and many drop out (there were 45 in first grade at the beginning of the year, now there are 39 and several of them attend infrequently) However, their situation seems no worse than elsewhere For example, in third grade 20% do not have the French book and 41% lack the math book Fifteen percent, however, have nothing at all, a very high percentage

The teachers are pleased with their training and they find their pedagogical advisor (overall there are six for 54 teachers, including those in the private sector) knowledgeable They complain about poor results and argue that, if given a chance, most teachers would leave the profession

The teachers in Seably may have captured the dilemma of Ivoirian primary education When teachers are well trained, they know what they need and, thus, when reasonable working conditions are not forthcoming, they are frustrated and, possibly, ineffective When teachers are poorly trained, they are almost surely ineffective also Thus, an effective educational system requires both well-trained people and sufficient inputs to insure satisfactory results ¹¹⁷ The only solution, therefore, under stringent economic conditions, is to restrict access to primary education so that the system remains viable for those who participate However, given the very high demand for education, most polities have chosen to compromise quality, particularly by reducing educational inputs It is unclear whether greater involvement in educational issues by local authorities and by parents would insure that more inputs would be forthcoming

8 Public Health in Kouibly Municipality

Health Service Provision and Production

Public sector health services in Kouibly are produced at a 45-bed H2 hospital directed by a Chadian medical doctor working under contract to the Government of Ivory Coast The doctor was appointed in 1984 but only took up his duties at the hospital in August, 1986, when construction to upgrade the existing dispensary into a rural hospital was finished

The Kouibly case presents a clear example of the kind of investment that a community in Ivory Coast must undertake in order to upgrade the quality of curative care produced locally As did Koun-Fao, Kouibly had to invest a significant quantity of municipal funds to upgrade its dispensary facilities before a doctor could be enticed to serve there ¹¹⁸

Despite having to make these initial capital outlays, Kouibly municipal government did not have to bear the full cost of producing higher quality care In particular, since the recurrent costs of producing health services are borne by the central government, the municipal government had an incentive to increase the quality and quantity of care so as to maximize the level of subsidy Kouibly received

¹¹⁷ Such inputs would include curricular research as well

¹¹⁸ The Chadian doctor was quick to point out that the community had probably invested less in dispensary upgrading than they would have had to entice an equally qualified Ivoirian doctor to serve in Kouibly As he noted living and working conditions in Chad are so much poorer relative to those in Ivory Coast that it did not take as much to lure him to work in this community Though he considered the physical working conditions at the Kouibly hospital to be adequate he did not feel the town's schools were good enough Because of this he maintained a house in Man where his children lived and went to school In order to see his children the doctor reported that he travelled once a week to Man at his own expense He also noted that if he had an opportunity to transfer (he apparently does not) he would take it

Comparing estimates of the total annual recurrent costs of operating the Kouibly hospital to those presented for the Koun-Fao health center earlier suggests that the municipality of Kouibly succeeded in tripling the level of public sector health subsidy by upgrading its dispensary into a hospital. Table 12, below, summarizes these estimates.

Table 12 Comparing the Estimated Total Annual Recurrent Cost of the Kouibly Rural Hospital with the Estimated Total Annual Recurrent Cost of a Rural Health Center (a)

Expenditure Item	Annual Unit	Cumulative Recurrent Cost
Rural (H2) Hospital		
■ 1 Doctor's pay	3,600,000	3,600,000
■ 4 MAs pay	7,200,000	10,800,000
■ 2 VMWs pay	3,120,000	13,920,000
■ Other staff pay (b)	1,000,000	14,920,000
■ Housing subsidies	1,920,000	16,840,000
■ Drugs & supplies (c)	2,000,000	18,840,000
Rural Health Center		
■ 2 Nurses pay	2,697,000	2,697,000
■ 1 VMW pay	1,409,000	4,106,000
■ 2 MW assist pay	400,000	4,506,000
■ Ambulance drv pay	200,000	4,706,000
■ Housing subsidies	360,000	5,066,000
■ Drugs & supplies	750,000	5,810,000

Notes (a) The estimated health center recurrent costs are the sum of those derived for curative and preventive care at the Koun-Fao health center. See Annex 1. (b) This is an estimate that probably understates the wage bill paid to other staff. (c) Drug expenditures are based on the budgeted allotment provided to the Kouibly hospital under the current EEC drug financing arrangement.

Legend MA = Medical Assistant, VMW = Village Midwife, MW = Midwife

The municipality benefitted from the increased subsidy from 1986 through 1989 when cutbacks in central government outlays resulted in a curtailment in the free drug supply that had previously been provided. As was argued in the overview section, elimination of the central subsidy for drugs had a negative effect on the quality of care produced by all health facilities, but particularly that produced by hospitals.

Because of the curtailment in drug subsidies, the doctor in Kouibly has no drugs, reagents or other essential medical supplies at his disposal. As a result, he has been relegated to offering rudimentary first aid-type services -- services that can be much more efficiently supplied by primary care providers. The unit labor cost alone of a doctor delivering primary care

(ignoring, for example, the amortized unit cost of training), are three times greater than would be required if the same services were provided by a nurse and at least 100 times greater than would be required if provided by a community health worker (*agent de santé* -- assuming s/he were allowed to earn 10% on the price of drugs sold)

The Kouibly case also reveals that the absence of drugs has significantly reduced the return to the capital investment incurred to upgrade the dispensary into an H2 hospital. Unable to supply the necessary drugs and other essential materials for inpatient care (and observing that few patients are willing to pay for the drugs themselves), the doctor shut down the inpatient ward in 1990. In practice, therefore, there is little observable difference in the quality of care provided by this H2 and the dispensary in Koun-Fao. From a cost-effectiveness standpoint it is apparent that in the absence of expenditures on essential complementary inputs, the dispensary (with its 2 nurses and 8 beds) is a more cost effective minimal care provider than the hospital (with its doctor, 4 medical assistants and 35 beds). Still more efficient would be to provide the same care through a network of community health workers.

At the village level, health care consumers have immediate access only to traditional care providers. In Toukorably a very experienced traditional birth attendant (TBA), in practice since 1945, was interviewed. Despite being a traditional practitioner, the TBA had been trained both by the government and by NGOs. In fact, because of her recognized skills, she had left the village for about 10 years to join a TBA training team sponsored by an NGO. Not surprisingly, she also had a very good reputation among local women. Based on this reputation, she has successfully operated a birthing center complex in her village that attracts women from as far away as 45 kilometers. Many women not only come to her for assistance during the birthing process, but also come to her for prenatal care and stay with her for several days after giving birth to receive post natal guidance.

The TBA reported she is capable of handling most deliveries. She has been trained, for instance, in manipulating breach presentations in utero. Only in the case of medical complications does she refer women to the hospital in Kouibly.

An interview revealed that the TBA had a good understanding of sterile technique, and knew about the problems (origins) of neonatal tetanus. In addition, the TBA reported (and the women in the compound confirmed) that she requires all women who want her assistance during birth to go to the hospital for immunizations.

Though she does not charge directly for her services, the women can buy birth certificates from her at a cost of FCFA 500. The money she raises from the sale of birth certificates is reportedly given to the midwives at the hospital in Kouibly so that they can buy alcohol and bandages for the TBA. In addition, it is customary for the woman's family to give the TBA a gift of some food if the new borne child survives.

The TBA noted that the fact that she was not paid directly for her services, and that she had to work very hard, discouraged young women in the community from wanting to work with her to take over when she retired¹¹⁹. Thus, despite the heavy revealed demand for her services, none of the young women saw birth attending as a desirable profession.

¹¹⁹

The TBA also reported that the women were scared of assisting in the birthing process because she said it was known they were at risk of being exposed to dangerous secretions that could debilitate them. Apparently, despite all the training the TBA had received, she still maintained some inaccurate and counter-productive traditional beliefs about the birthing process.

VIII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A Conclusions and Recommendations on Local Public Finance in the Ivory Coast

1 The Effect of Local Public Finance Arrangements on the Provision of Health and Primary Education Services

Before summarizing conclusions about how local public finance arrangements affect provision of health and primary education services, two limitations of this analysis must be underscored

First, the Ivory Coast assessment differs from the other two case studies in this report in that it exclusively focuses on a subset of rural local government authorities (LGA) with official populations of about 10,000 inhabitants¹²⁰. Though these municipalities are believed to be fairly representative of this subset (they are located not only at different points on the development spectrum but also in different rural areas of the country), they undoubtedly differ significantly from larger rural and urban municipalities in terms of the provision of health and primary education services. In particular, small municipalities are unlikely to be able to sustain the range of production technologies employed in the larger municipalities.

Restricting the assessment to a subset of small rural Ivorian municipalities undoubtedly truncates the range of production technologies that might have been observed. A truncation is likely to have occurred because (1) small municipalities are unable to generate sufficient demand to sustain a diverse set of production alternatives, (2) small municipalities are often unable to efficiently use production technologies that benefit from economies of scale, and (3) small municipalities may be unable to finance the capital and recurrent costs of certain technologies because of their more limited tax bases.

Second, the analysis only examines the fiscal position of LGAs in relation to the provision of health and primary education, and does not examine in detail the role played by the central ministries of health and education in financing production of these services at the local level. In one sense this poses a problem because the vast majority of the funding for the local production of health and education services is administered directly by the central line ministries. Thus the analysis is unable to examine in detail the constraints line ministry institutional arrangements place on the provision of these services. In another sense, however, it is less problematic since the investigation focuses primarily on constraints to decentralized provision of these services. *In this case the salient fact is that the production decisions are centralized and that this severely limits the discretion of local governments in providing these services. Having recognized this binding constraint, it is then possible to focus on the added constraints that local government financing arrangements place on the provision of these services.*

Despite the dominant role line ministries play in financing health and education services in Ivory Coast, local government public finance arrangements can still affect provision of these services by (1) constraining local governments' ability to monitor the production of services, (2) reducing their ability to supplement line ministry outlays on non-labor inputs to improve the quality of service delivery, and (3) altering the incentives faced by local, non-government producers of these services. The

¹²⁰

As noted, civil registry statistics are unreliable and may underreport the real population by 30% to 50%.

first two depend upon local government revenue availability, while the third depends upon the types of revenue instruments used and the rates set

Grant Revenues

A review of actual revenue data from Koun-Fao, Sirasso and Kouibly (see Annex 2), indicates that new local government authorities in rural Ivory Coast rely heavily upon central government grants to finance their expenditures ¹²¹ As Table 1 indicates, their actual dependence is substantially higher than local budget data suggested in the past. In fact, contrary to both Minis' (1985) and Attahi's (1989) findings based on assessments of budget data, our analysis reveals that there are no signs of this dependence declining -- a revelation that should not be that surprising given the relatively small populations and limited economic bases of these jurisdictions

The total grant pool for the new municipalities is in principle made up of three parts: (1) *la partie minimal*, theoretically a lump sum per capita designed to ensure that the municipalities can provide a minimal level of services per inhabitant, (2) *la partie complémentaire général*, designed to serve an inter-jurisdictional equalizing function, and (3) *la partie complémentaire spécifique*, a lump sum grant for investment expenditures (equal to 30% of total grant revenues). In practice, grant allocations are not based on a strict population and income formula (see Annex 2). First, the *partie minimal* in the three municipalities is identical though their populations differ. Second, the *partie complémentaire général* is greatest in Kouibly (the municipality with the greatest income base), next largest in Sirasso (the poorest municipality) and smallest in Koun-Fao (a municipality where the income base is by all indications only slightly greater than in Sirasso).

Table 13 Composition of Municipal Revenues FY 1981 - FY 1990

	Grants	Shared-Tax	Own-Source	Total Petites Villes (a)
1981	78%	11%	11%	100%
1982	72%	5%	23%	100%
1983	66%	6%	28%	100%
				New Communes (b)
1986	66%	?	?	100%
				New Small Communes (c)
1987	88%	1%	12%	100%
1988	87%	1%	13%	100%
1989	89%	1%	11%	100%
1990	88%	1%	12%	100%

Notes (a) Source H Minis (1985), based on budgeted revenues for all small municipalities (b) Source Attahi (1989), based on budgeted revenues for all new communes (c) Based on actual revenues for three of the smallest (roughly 10,000 population) communes (Koun-Fao, Sirasso, and Kouibly)

While the central government grant plays a dominant role in municipal public finance, its absolute importance has been decreasing at an average nominal rate of 10% per year from FY 1987 to FY 1990 (- 12.67% in real terms), as a result of the general reduction in government outlays undertaken for structural adjustment purposes. Because grants are being reduced at a uniform

¹²¹

For ease of presentation we will refer only to new municipalities. The reader is reminded that we are actually referring to new municipalities with populations of roughly 10,000 inhabitants.

rate for all municipalities, the indirect effect of structural adjustment is to weaken disproportionately the fiscal position of smaller jurisdictions -- those with characteristically less buoyant revenue sources

The fiscal position of small municipalities is weakened further because they are less able to benefit from productivity gains inherent in larger scale production techniques. Thus, not only is their fiscal position weakened by a disproportionate reduction in revenues, but also by the higher unit costs they must incur to produce given levels of goods and services

In the longer term, if the grant allocations continue to be reduced, the potential for future decentralization of service provision to the municipal level will be seriously undermined. The analysis of local revenue sources which follows suggests strongly that the new municipalities will be unable to finance the delivery of health, education and other services without substantial revenue sharing from the central government level

Own-Source Revenues and Shared Taxes

The probable continued heavy dependence of new municipalities on grant revenues is reinforced by the fact that they have only limited scope to augment significantly the revenue performance of their two principal local non-grant fiscal instruments: (1) shared taxes collected by the central government, of which 45% is reverted to the municipality, and (2) own-source revenues collected by the municipality itself

Looking first at own-source revenues (they account for an average of 89%, 98.5% and 99% of non-grant revenues from FY 1978 to FY 1990 in the municipalities of Koun-Fao, Sirasso and Kouibly, respectively), all indications are that these sources have been fully tapped. Without statutory rate increases for the largest earners, including market taxes, taxes on small commercial enterprises, administrative registry fees, and land survey rates, future real receipts will likely decline in absolute terms. Unfortunately, legislating rate increases in periods of declining incomes is unlikely to be politically palatable.¹²² Since none of these revenues appear to be income elastic (i.e., they will not keep pace with growth in incomes), even an eventual upturn in local economic fortunes will not precipitate a significant growth in own-source revenues

While own-source revenues are likely to decline in real terms, there is reason to be somewhat more optimistic about the potential for increasing receipts from at least one of the two most important shared taxes -- the property tax.¹²³

The property tax is a 5% tax on the rental value of structures and a 0.5% tax on the rental value of land. Revenue yields could be increased and the efficiency of the property tax improved by applying future rate increases to land rather than to structures, since the supply of land is more inelastic than the supply of structures. The revenue yield could also be increased by substantially increasing the base of the property tax. The tax is currently assessed on only a fraction of properties in the municipalities studied. In Koun-Fao, for instance, the municipal authorities estimated that only 30% of

¹²² It is interesting to note in this regard that only one example was found in the three municipalities of legislated changes in statutory rates. Kouibly Municipality increased the rates for land surveys by 50% but the municipality has been unable to enforce collection on properties owned by the original inhabitants of Kouibly

¹²³ The other shared taxes -- the business profits taxes (*patente* and *licence*) -- cannot be expected to serve as major revenue sources given the limited size and scope of business activity in the new rural municipalities

the owners of structures constructed with permanent materials and who worked for the government (i.e., those from whom a property tax deduction could be easily made directly from the monthly salary payment), actually pay any tax at all. And, since the rental values were only assessed once, no account had been taken for improvements made on these properties. Because the municipalities have records of all surveyed properties (recall they collected a rate to survey properties), it is clear that they could easily assist the central government tax authorities to increase the property tax yield by providing those officials with the list of all properties.

The potential for significantly increasing municipal property tax revenues will depend not just on taxing permanent structures but also on taxing the traditional structures in which the majority of inhabitants live. The need to expand the property tax base is made clear by examining the experience in Kouibly where a cadastral survey of permanent structures was undertaken in 1990. The survey registered 19 taxable structures with a total assessed rental value of 785,000 FCFA per month, or 9,420,000 FCFA per year. The total tax on this assessed value is 471,000 FCFA of which 45%, or 211,950 FCFA, will be reverted to the municipality each year. Thus, if the property tax base in Kouibly is not extended to non-permanent structures, own-source revenues will increase by only 5%.¹²⁴

The new municipalities are heavily dependent on central government grants. Given the relatively small population and limited economic base of the new municipalities in the Ivory Coast, it is not surprising that they are heavily dependent on grant revenues from the central government. In the three municipalities visited, Koun-Fao, Sirasso and Kouibly, grant revenues represented on average 84%, 91% and 89% of actual total municipal revenues respectively from FY 1987 to FY 1990.

B Primary Education Sector Summary

1 Recommendations

The first recommendation in the Ivorian case is that AID fund an experiment designed to determine what the benefits of decentralization of education might in fact be. Basically, the program would make several "inspection primaire" independent. Such independence would include the allocation of a modest budget with authority to spend it as the inspector and his advisors saw fit. It would be desirable to select several academies and to vary the amount of the budget made available. Some training of the inspectors (involving self-governance and public entrepreneurship) would take place prior to the beginning of the experiment. It would also be possible to include some pedagogical experimentation in the decentralization project. Such a project should last about three years to yield usable results.

It would also be useful, particularly in the North, to experiment with the creation of girls' schools staffed with women teachers. The schooling rate for girls is particularly low (no higher than 30%, in fact lower than that) and no significant social development can take place without that rate being raised to at least 50% completing the fifth grade.

AID could also fund another type of experimentation involving evaluation. All CAFOP (teachers' colleges) could be invited to submit proposals so that a newsletter could be written (monthly, possibly). This newsletter would provide an opportunity for teachers and inspectors to present

¹²⁴

The DCL is currently developing a simplified cadastral survey for non-permanent structures.

various teaching strategies This would also be a place where successful efforts would be reported

CAFOPs could also be invited to develop in-service training for teachers as well as evaluations of current teaching practices (which textbook is more effective in third grade math, for example) It would also be helpful to ask a team to start thinking about model curricula, particularly more flexible curricula (i e , amenable to adaptation by teachers)

An evaluation section also exists in the Ministry However, this section seems to be totally absorbed by the preparation of basic educational statistics It seems to lack a fully developed evaluation capacity

Another type of experimentation could involve matters of costs Such experimentation should probably take place at the national level One such cost relates to textbooks Would it be possible to produce textbooks more cheaply? Would it be possible to rent textbooks so that the cost of any book would be divided by three, assuming a three year lifespan?

An important cost involves teachers' pay There was a time in the Ivory Coast when teachers were hired as *instituteurs adjoints* With appropriate supervision and training during summers, it might be possible to reintroduce that practice and thereby save on the cost of new teachers Such a measure would also make it possible to weed out unsuitable persons

It would also be desirable to experiment with a new organizational format whereby *conseillers pedagogiques* would be appointed as heads of schools and be responsible for neighboring schools Administrative duties are not very time consuming (would it be possible to computerize record-keeping?) and the conseiller would have much less travelling to do By reducing travelling time, coverage would be increased The only additional cost occasioned by this recommendation involves the evaluation of the changes

Finally, it would be desirable to think about measuring the reliability and validity of the CEP In this, the French experience would be valuable since French and Ivoirian exams are very similar It would also be desirable to develop reliable measures of subject-specific achievements for each grade and to experiment with several types of remediation so that the grade repeating rates could be lowered Such tests might also act as motivators for children

All these measures suggest that the evaluation unit of the Ministry should be allocated an experimentation budget The evaluation unit would become an agent of change Since the CAFOP in Boake has a strong reputation, the feasibility of locating such an evaluation unit in Boake should be determined The possible specialization of different CAFOP (in cost matters, curricular issues, training etc) should also be investigated Such specialization would create several centers of excellence

It is unlikely that the Ivoirian authorities would agree to such changes because they involve the diversion of funds from one function (teaching) to experimentation Yet, the creation of an adaptive and self-correcting system should represent a very high priority for Ivoirian authorities AID could be the agent that demonstrates the usefulness of such a view of education

AID is particularly well-suited to such an enterprise for several reasons The United States is the world leader in matters of educational management and, therefore, AID can draw upon a very large number of highly competent experts Further, AID has considerable experience in making educational technology available to third world countries That experience has been partly systematized in several publications What distinguishes the Ivoirian case is the very high level of teachers' competence Thus, AID's

experience and know-how could easily blend with the receptiveness of motivated and skilled professionals to yield a considerable improvement in the educational achievement of Ivoirian boys and girls

As far as the Ivoirian educational authorities are concerned, a number of actions could be taken. The first would be to identify those teachers and inspectors who perform particularly well and to reward these individuals, at least by according their performance public recognition. The Minister of Education could devote some travel time to such activities. He could, for example, request that military airplanes or helicopters (which must fly training missions anyway) be made available if, on occasion, his duties took him to distant parts of the country.

The system of rotation of *inspecteurs* could be changed so that an inspector would have an incentive to make his unit run smoothly (he would have an easier time after the initial efforts). Allowing an inspector to stay at a single post at least five years could be tried in a few inspectorates.

A region could be designated as an experimental region and teachers given the authority to experiment with teaching techniques. Achievement goals would remain the same, but teachers would be allowed to reach these goals in whatever way they saw fit. Inspectors would act as informed critics, but not as supervisors, except when results turned out to be unsatisfactory. A team from a nearby CAFOP would be assigned to the monitoring of that experiment. It would be desirable that a regional educational conference take place before launching that decentralization effort so that alternative methods of funding could be explored. For example, would parents be willing to pay 500 FCFA per pupil in order for schools to have adequate supplies? Could villages raise some funds if local authorities were made part of the educational process? What methods of co-management would satisfy these local authorities? Would teachers agree to pool some financial resources taken from their salaries if such pooling resulted in much easier working conditions?

On a more radical note, would it possible to reduce the number of teachers, hence effect some cost reduction, in order to make primary education more effective and what criteria of effectiveness would be selected?

The organizational change literature supports the notion that leadership is important. Thus, an individual committed to change should be appointed as regional director. In order for the change to be convincing to others, few additional (if any) resources should be given the experimental region. If the Ministry of Education wanted to receive technical assistance concerning what types of educational techniques are likely to yield improved results (more studying and practice time, for example), the advice of foreign (German, French, American, Canadian) experts could easily be secured through existing channels.

If the schooling rate in the Ivory Coast is to remain stable (it is very unlikely to increase), savings will have to take place. At the current rate of teachers' pay and population increase, primary education will require approximately 1 billion FCFA more a year. Since the economy is still contracting, such funds will not be available. Thus, Ivoirian education officials should make efficiency of delivery a paramount goal (the recently published report on education which preceded a just-granted World Bank loan argued along similar lines). Ivoirian primary education is in far better shape than that of many other African countries as a result of the very considerable investments the country made in the past. That investment must now be protected and be made to yield the fruits it is capable of yielding.

C Health Sector Summary

1 Inefficient Health Service Delivery Mechanisms

The health delivery mechanism managed by the MSPP (Ministry of Health) is a highly centralized and disjointed amalgam of vertically administered programs. At the patient contact level this translates into a lack of ability to modify the mode of service delivery to most appropriately and efficiently meet the needs of the local population. Women, for example, who arrive for maternal and child health services are invariably required to queue in one location for immunization, in another for prenatal examinations, in yet another for treatment. Health workers who have been given responsibility for specific tasks (e.g., nutrition education or immunization, etc.), do not exploit the opportunities for linking with other complementary services. As a result, the costs to consumers in terms of the time they must spend and in terms of their inability to benefit from the synergisms inherent in a coordinated service delivery approach increase significantly.

This lack of local autonomy coupled with the verticality of service delivery not only increases the opportunity costs to the consumer, but also unnecessarily increases the cost of supplying the services (and thus the level of the effective subsidy that must be financed by the MSPP). By reducing the duplication of effort, there is little doubt that a more cost-effective service delivery approach could be instituted -- one that would reduce the recurrent costs of sustaining the existing service delivery system, and simultaneously enhance the opportunities for extending health care to a wider spectrum of the rural population.

2 Curative Bias

Health sector investment in the Ivory Coast has been heavily biased towards the provision of curative care. Though real achievements have been realized with respect to educating the population about the benefits of immunization, it is clear that this effort has been largely financed from external resources and that a very small proportion of public health sector outlays have been directed towards the sustained delivery of these preventive services. Recent estimates for FY 1987 through FY 1989 suggest that as much as 80% of total national outlays on health (MSPP plus non-MSPP) are expended on secondary and tertiary care activities -- curative care delivered at the dispensary and hospital level.

The curative bias is also evident in the lack of support given by the MSPP to promoting the development of primary health care initiatives at the community level. Despite the adoption of a primary health care strategy in 1986 which called for the creation of village health committees, the establishment of village pharmacies (*caisse pharmacie villageoise*), and the training and supplying of traditional birth attendants (*matrones*), the effort has received virtually no support from the public health sector. And yet, there is evidence that with NGO support such primary health care initiatives have been successfully established at the community level in Ivory Coast.

Interviews with traditional birth attendants and pregnant women in a number of villages suggest strongly that where these community-based primary health care strategies have been adopted, they have had a positive effect on community acceptance and utilization of preventive health measures such as maternal and child immunization, hygienic use of water, and improved environmental sanitation.

3 Urban Bias

The health sector infrastructure in Ivory Coast is disproportionately located in the larger urban areas. At the level of the "new" communes (those created since 1985), the investment has been minimal. The three Centres Hospitalo-Universitaire (CHU) located in Abidjan alone employ approximately 20% of all medical personnel in Ivory Coast, 41% of all doctors, pharmacists and dental surgeons, and 16% of all paramedics. By contrast, the 56 H2 hospitals (those with 30 - 100 beds) and 60 dispensaries -- the predominant rural-based curative facility -- employ but 20% of the doctors, pharmacists and dental surgeons, and but 33% of the paramedics.

4 Rapid Degradation in the Quality of Curative Care

Despite a continued commitment to maintaining the proportion of total government outlays expended on health, the substantial reduction in total recurrent public expenditures that has been undertaken as part of the structural adjustment program for Ivory Coast (a reduction of 41.5% from FY 1988 to FY 1991), has induced an important intra-sectoral reallocation of resources away from the financing of drugs and other essential non-labor inputs in an effort to minimize the reduction in employment. Expenditures on drugs and other recurrent medical inputs have fallen by 80% between FY 1987 and FY 1991. This has resulted in an increase in the percentage of recurrent outlays devoted to personnel up from 72.4% of total recurrent MSPP outlays in FY 1987 to 91% in FY 1991.

The absolute and relative reduction in expenditures on essential medical inputs complementary to labor (i.e., those that yield significant gains in labor productivity), has had a very clear and negative impact on the quality of curative care provided. Field visits to secondary and tertiary care facilities in the communes of Kouibly, Koun-Fao and Sirasso, and interviews with health personnel and health consumers indicate that *the sudden cessation in the supply of drugs and other materials in FY 1989 rendered the curative care services virtually ineffectual*. Interviews with consumers indicate that they see little point in seeking treatment at government health facilities except in emergency cases where households will mobilize their resources to purchase the long and expensive list of drugs inevitably prescribed, yet only available at the private pharmacies.

The deterioration in quality of care brought on by this drastic reduction in expenditures on essential medical inputs complementary to labor has no doubt been greatest at the tertiary care facilities manned by doctors and other highly trained medical personnel. The doctor in Kouibly, for example, who does not have access to laboratory analyses, and has no drugs or other dressings at his disposal has been relegated to offering rudimentary first aid-type services -- services that are much more efficiently supplied by primary care providers. The unit labor cost alone of a doctor delivering primary care (ignoring, for example, the amortized unit cost of training), are three times greater than would be required if provided by a nurse and at least 100 times greater than would be required if provided by a community health worker (*agent villageoise* -- assuming they were allowed to earn 10% on the price of drugs they sold).

The Kouibly case also reveals that the absence of drugs has significantly reduced the return to the capital investment incurred to upgrade the dispensary into an H2 hospital. Unable to supply the necessary drugs and other essential materials for inpatient care (and observing that few patients are willing to pay for the drugs themselves), the doctor shut down the inpatient ward in 1990. In practice, therefore, there is little observable difference in the quality of care provided by this H2 and the dispensary in Koun-Fao. From a cost-effectiveness standpoint it is apparent that in the absence of expenditures on essential complementary inputs, the dispensary

(with its two nurses and eight beds) is a more cost effective minimal care provider than the hospital (with its doctor, four nurses and 35 beds) Still more efficient would be to provide the same care through a network of community health workers

5 The Burden of Financing the Purchase of Drugs and Other Essential Medical Inputs Complementary to Labor has been Shifted onto the Consumer

While consumers of curative care have since the early 1980's assumed a progressively larger share of the total cost of purchasing drugs, it is evident that the sudden curtailment in the government supply of free drugs in 1989 once-and-for-all shifted the entire burden of purchasing drugs onto the consumers of curative care

A very limited sampling of households in the three communes of Kouibly, Koun-Fao and Sirasso suggests that the price increase associated with the elimination of this drug subsidy has resulted in a significant reduction in the utilization of curative health services Estimates from these communes for the years 1980, 1986 and 1990 suggest that household outlays on health care fell as much as 75% over the 10-year period in current prices Given the fact that drug prices increased significantly during this period (due both to the elimination of the public subsidy and to price inflation in the private pharmacy sector), these admittedly rough estimates suggest a significant decline in the quantity of drugs purchased

The marked reduction in demand for curative care is undoubtedly also explained by the precipitous decline in household incomes reported between 1980 and 1990 Crude estimates from the three communes suggest that real incomes may have fallen by 20%, 75%, and 60% respectively in Kouibly, Koun-Fao and Sirasso over this 10-year period Evidently the complete transfer of financing responsibility for the supply of drugs and other essential medical inputs onto the consumers of curative care has occurred at the same time as the ability to pay of the average consumer has fallen drastically

A typical example obtained from the commune of Koun-Fao illustrates the extent to which curative health expenditures apparently affect household welfare In this case, an elderly (70 years +) mother-in-law of the head of the household was reported to have been suffering from dizziness Thinking that she might be suffering from Malaria, they began administering some Chloroquine that they had on hand When, after two weeks, her condition persisted, the household contacted the local minister who drove her the 4 kilometers to the Koun-Fao dispensary The nurse diagnosed her ailment as vertigo and prescribed the following medications

Table 14 Koun-Fao Drug Costs

DRUG	COST	CUMULATIVE COST (FCFA)
Complex vitamin	2,440	2,440
Prozapin Chloride	1,505	3,945
Paracetamol	835	4,780
Anti-helminthic ¹²⁵	880	5,660

Since these drugs were not available at the dispensary, and the household did not have the money to pay for them at the pharmacy depot in Koun-Fao, they hired a taxi for FCFA 400 and returned to their village empty

¹²⁵

It is instructive to note that the anti-helminthic drug is contra-indicated in cases of vertigo Thus if the diagnosis was correct it is likely that the prescribed treatment exacerbated the illness condition

handed In order to purchase the drugs they contacted a relative who is a teacher in the village and he purchased the drugs for them ¹²⁶

Interviews with three households in this same village suggest that the mean monthly total income (total earnings, remittances, and income from rental property) in 1990 was approximately FCFA 29,725 This indicates that the total cost for this one illness episode may well have represented 20% of the household's total monthly income¹

The foregoing example not only highlights the substantial equity problems currently confronting the health sector in Ivory Coast¹²⁷, but also suggest that the extent of the financing burden shifted onto the consumers of curative care has undoubtedly been greater than it need have been Three principal factors have contributed to unnecessarily inflating the total cost of curative care to consumer (1) that the MSPP has prohibited the importation of generic drugs which can cost one-third to one-half of brand-name alternatives, (2) that the curative medical personnel in Ivory Coast consistently over-prescribe drugs, and thus unnecessarily raise total expenditures even at current prices, and, (3) that the sudden termination in 1989 of the publicly subsidized drug supply has forced consumers to purchase drugs exclusively from private pharmacies where they are not able to purchase drugs in unit quantities but instead must purchase packages containing quantities far in excess of their immediate needs ¹²⁸ To the extent that the drugs prescribed fall in the "non-essential" category and are thus limited to use in less frequent illness conditions, the wastage rate is increased and consequently so is the total cost to the consumer

While the tendency to over prescribe drugs is undoubtedly partly a function of the lack of laboratory and other diagnostic facilities in most health establishments, there appears little doubt that the problem also emanates from the fact that the Ivory Coast has adopted the characteristically French practice of over-prescribing medication

It is perhaps paradoxical that the transfer of financial burden to the consumer may ultimately engender the conditions necessary to institute a more rational use of drugs Whether this will in fact be the case will most likely depend upon whether consumer preferences are sufficiently intense to change provider behavior In a market where suppliers of medical care determine consumption behavior (and this has certainly been the case in Ivory Coast up to now), any change in the utilization of drugs will require a change in the

¹²⁶ Survey evidence obtained from a cluster sample survey of 150 households carried out between March and May 1991 in the town of Adzope (Molly Mort 1991) confirm the impressions obtained from an unrepresentative sampling of households in the three municipalities visited The data from Adzope reveal that the total average household expenditure on drugs over a two-week period was FCFA 5 235, or FCFA 1 688 per sick household member

¹²⁷ An important implication of the rising private costs of curative care is that it not only erodes household ability to pay for health care it also erodes ability to pay for other basic services such as education Evidence from Koun-Fao suggests that household expenditures on books and other education inputs have been reduced because of a reduction in disposable incomes after expenditures on curative care Since education is also an important input to the production of health the redistribution of household expenditures away from education may have adverse long run consequences for household health status

¹²⁸ In the municipality of Koun-Fao individuals are able to purchase a limited assortment of drugs from merchants who have smuggled them in from neighboring Ghana The merchants sell the drugs in unit quantities but at a substantial profit given a very favorable rate of exchange between the FCFA and the Ghanaian Cedi Consumers are willing to pay the higher cost per tablet because of the savings in total cost they reap when compared with buying packaged drugs from the pharmacy One tablet of Chloroquine from Ghana is reported to sell for FCFA 25 -- 15 FCFA over the cost per tablet at a private pharmacy in Cote d'Ivoire

prescription practices of the medical personnel. A fundamental change in the training curriculum for all medical personnel charged with dispensing medication appears in order.

6 The Evolving Health Sector Pricing Policy is Inefficient

The statutory provisions for cost recovery in the Ivory Coast's public health care institutions dates back to 1960. In 1977 the daily inpatient rates charged for first, second and third class wards were increased to 10,000 FCFA, 6,000 FCFA and 2,000 FCFA respectively. However, effective cost recovery rates (% of total budgeted costs recovered through rates) for the two major CHUs at Cocody and Treichville were only 9.3% and 10.3% in FY 1984 and non-existent in other public health care institutions.

It is interesting in this regard to note that the recently announced revolving drug fund capitalized by an EEC donation of 5 billion FCFA requires (according to the Médecin Chef for Man) a fixed one-time payment per inpatient of 2,500 in order to "cover" the costs of all drugs used in his/her treatment while an inpatient.¹²⁹ Since the 1977 rates are not collected in communal hospitals, it appears that the current provisions represent both a retreat from the level of cost-recovery envisaged in 1977 and from the principle of progressivity (charging individuals of higher incomes more).

More serious from an efficiency standpoint is the informal pricing policy that has emerged over the last decade in all the communes visited. This is the practice of charging for preventive health care services. There is a substantial body of theoretical and empirical support for the view that it is inefficient to charge for preventive care in low income areas or in areas where the demand for preventive care is minimal as a result of a lack of knowledge as to the benefits of these services. Because the demand for these services tends to be highly price elastic among low income and less educated groups, charging for these services creates a strong disincentive for their use. Given the large external benefits associated with the consumption of preventive care, charging for these services results in a large welfare loss to society.

The following is a list of the user charges and other costs incurred by a woman who attended four prenatal clinics, delivered her child at the maternite and had her child vaccinated in Koun-Fao. It is representative of the findings in the other two communes visited, and provides a clear illustration of the costs involved in consuming preventive services.

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There are several reasons why it is believed that the EEC-funded cost-recovery initiative for drugs will soon fail. These include the fact that (1) no provision has been made in the sale price to account for the eroding effects of inflation on the real value of funds available to repurchase drugs (the I INSEE index of pharmaceutical prices indicates an average annual inflation rate of 14.77% from 1980 to 1988). (2) no attempt has been made to follow marginal cost pricing principals which suggest the need to add a variable amount to the purchase price of drugs that captures the logistical costs of drug distribution to more remote areas. (3) no provisions have been made to reimburse hospitals in remote areas for the costs of transporting the revenues to the nearest bank -- something that will be necessary at the minimum twice a month given that the hospitals do not have safes to secure the money. (3) cotton, alcohol and other non-drug items are being supplied free-of-charge and yet the price of the drugs have not been inflated to cover the costs of repurchasing these necessary items and (4) no incentives or supervisory mechanisms have been foreseen to remunerate or prevent the health staff so that they will not dip into the available drugs to meet the needs of their family, thus creating a deficit in the revolving fund.

Table 15 Preventive Care Costs

PREVENTIVE CARE SERVICE	UNIT PRICE	CUMULATIVE COST
Transport to maternité	200/visit	800
Prenatal care user fee	200/visit	1,600
Purchase price of Carnet d'Enfant	500/carnet	2,100
Cost of bandage and alcohol (required)	1,000/woman	3,100
Cost of soap (required)	450/delivery	3,550
Price for BCG (no charge for other vacc)	200/child	3,750

Based on the income data collected for Koun-Fao, these costs represent approximately 10% of the average total monthly income reported for 1990

In addition to these pecuniary costs, the family members of women who deliver at the *maternité* are required to clean the building and its surroundings for the 3 days the mother remains in the *maternité*. Households seeking a birth certificate for children not born in the *maternité* (these are required for school entrance) are charged FCFA 5,000

There can be little doubt that these pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs serve as a significant disincentive for many potential consumers of preventive care

7 Recommendations

(1) At a national level there needs to be a restructuring of expenditure priorities in the MSPP. Much greater emphasis should be placed on funding the extension of the community-based primary health care approach envisaged in 1986 and selectively implemented with NGO support. Once established, the recurrent funds for sustaining these primary care services should come from the existing MSPP budget currently allocated to tertiary care facilities. If based on the existing model of the *caisse de pharmacie villagoise*, the recurrent subsidy should essentially serve to cover the costs of supervision and in-service training.

(2) A comprehensive operational study of the practical issues involved in establishing a viable cost-recovery mechanism that meets both efficiency and equity objectives is required. The study must clearly lay out the individual and institutional incentives associated with alternative financing arrangements and must clearly project the full cost implications of establishing a sustainable health delivery system.

The study should examine the feasibility of a "Bamako Initiative" type of cost-recovery strategy in which provision of maternal and child health services is cross-subsidized from the revenues generated from the sale of drugs. In this regard, the study should recommend appropriate institutional arrangements that reward local effort but at the same time do not penalize lower income regions. Special attention should be given to introducing at least some progressivity into the financing arrangements.

(3) A reformulation of the training curricula for medical personnel appears necessary in order to promote a more rational use of drugs and a greater emphasis on a cohesive delivery of maternal and child health services.

(4) Opportunities for intersectoral linkages need to be exploited. The development of a practical health curriculum for primary school students seems like a logical first step. The opportunities for collaboration between health and veterinary services should be explored, particularly as it relates to the establishment and maintenance of rural-based laboratory and cold-chain facilities.

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ANNEXES

**ANNEX 1: ESTIMATING UNIT PRIVATE COSTS AND UNIT
SUBSIDIES FOR CURATIVE CARE CONSUMPTION
IN KOUN-FAO**

ANNEX 1 ESTIMATING UNIT PRIVATE COSTS AND UNIT
SUBSIDIES FOR CURATIVE CARE CONSUMPTION
IN KOUN-FAO

Curative Care Utilization

Assume there are four illness episodes on average per person per year in Koun-Fao. The Koun-Fao population was estimated at 7,775 in 1988. Thus, the total number of illness episodes per year in Koun-Fao is

$$7,775 * 4 = 31,100$$

Evidence from the Adzope Health Survey (Mort, 1991) revealed that 40% of all illness cases reported were treated at a public health care facility. For the purposes of this rough analysis, two utilization rates are assumed: a high public care utilization rate $31,100 * (.5) = 15,550$ and, a low public care utilization rate $31,100 * (.3) = 9,330$.

Preventive Care Utilization

Females constitute 48.7% of the population of the Ivory Coast. Thus the estimated female population of Koun-Fao is

$$7,775 * .487 = 3,787$$

Fifty percent of all females in Ivory Coast are between the ages of 15 and 49 (those generally accepted as the years within which a woman is fertile). It is assumed that 15% of this age cohort deliver each year at the maternity. Thus the total number of deliveries per year in Koun-Fao is

$$3,787 * .5 * .15 = 284$$

It is assumed that an average of four prenatal examinations are sought per pregnant woman ($284 * 4 = 1,136$) and that the associated out-patient equivalent in-patient days required for deliveries is $284 * 12 = 2,976$. In addition, it is assumed that 50% of the children are fully immunized, implying that the total number of visits for vaccinations is $284 * .5 * 4 = 568$ (BCG is given at birth). Thus, the total out-patient equivalent visits to the maternity is

$$1,136 + 2,976 + 568 = 4,680 \text{ or say, } 4,700$$

These utilization levels will be used below to generate unit (per visit) recurrent and capital costs.

Unit Recurrent and Capital Costs of Curative Care

The annual recurrent cost for curative services in 1980 for the Koun-Fao dispensary was

Nurse (1) salary	1,408,668
Nurse (2) salary	1,288,668
Ambulance driver	200,000
Housing subsidy	
Nurse (1)	180,000
<u>Government drugs</u>	<u>530,400</u> ¹³⁰
Total Recurrent Cost	3,607,736, rounded to 3,700,000

The annual recurrent cost in 1990 is the 1980 total less the cost of drugs and an adjustment for inflation on the housing subsidy. Recall that salaries were frozen in 1982. Thus the 1990 total recurrent cost is estimated to be 3,100,000.

A rough amortization of capital costs associated with expanding the Koun-Fao health center in 1990 is approximately FCFA 150,000 (assuming a 20-year life span). Because data for 1980 were not available (the Koun-Fao municipality was created in 1986), the 1990 value is assumed to have applied in 1980 as well.

Two unit recurrent cost (rc) estimates are derived using the high and low public care utilization levels presented above.

High unit cost estimate (low utilization)

1980 3,700,000/9,330 = FCFA 397
1990 3,100,000/9,330 = FCFA 332

Low unit cost estimate (high utilization)

1980 3,700,000/15,550 = FCFA 238
1990 3,100,000/15,550 = FCFA 200

Two unit capital cost (cc) estimates are derived similarly.

High unit cost estimate (low utilization)

1980 150,000/9,330 = FCFA 16
1990 150,000/9,330 = FCFA 16

Low unit cost estimate (high utilization)

1980 150,000/15,550 = FCFA 10
1990 150,000/15,550 = FCFA 10

¹³⁰

Based on actual cost of last drug shipment received by the Koun-Fao dispensary on 3/29/89

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Unit Recurrent and Capital Costs of Preventive Care

The annual recurrent cost in 1980 for maternal and child (patient-related preventive services) at Koun-Fao maternity was

■ Midwife salary	1,408,668
■ Two midwife assistants	400,000
■ Housing subsidy for midwife	180,000
■ Drugs	100,000
■ Vaccines, needles and <u>syringes</u>	<u>120,000</u>
Total Recurrent Cost	2,208,668, or 2,200,000

In 1990 recurrent costs were the same except that the drugs were no longer supplied. Thus, the total recurrent cost was FCFA 2,100,000

It is assumed that the annualized total capital cost for the maternity was FCFA 150,000 in 1980 and zero in 1990

The unit recurrent cost (rc) is estimated to be

1980	$2,200,000/4,680 =$	FCFA 470
1990	$2,100,000/4,680 =$	FCFA 449

The unit capital cost (cc) is estimated to be

1980	$150,000/4,680 =$	FCFA 32
1990	$0/4,680 =$	FCFA 0

Unit Fees, Unit Drug Costs, Unit Opportunity Cost and Unit Transfer Payment for Curative Care

Unit Fees

Though the government of Ivory Coast adopted in 1977 an official policy of user fees for curative care (See Annex 2), in rural areas this policy has never been implemented. Thus, the unit user fee in all cases is $p = 0$

Unit Drug Costs

In 1980 health centers received free drugs from the PSP. Thus, the unit drug cost for 1980 is $drg = 0$. By 1990, the PSP no longer distributed drugs free, so the full cost was borne by individual consumers. The Adzopé Health Survey (Mort, 1991), based on a sample of 411 individual illness episodes, estimated that the private drug cost per visit was on average FCFA 1,600. In the absence of better data for Koun-Fao, this value has been used for the purposes of these estimates.

Unit Opportunity Costs of Time

The unit opportunity cost has been estimated separately for individuals from government employee households and non-government employee households. Because the public sector salaries were frozen in 1982, the same value has been used for government employee households for 1980 and 1990.

Individuals from government employee households (1980-1990)

Average monthly salary (estimate)	FCFA	110,000
Equivalent hourly wage	FCFA	153/hr

Assuming an average household size of 6, the hourly wage per household member is estimated to be

	FCFA	25/hr
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Assuming on average 1.5 people spend time for each visit (i.e., some people are accompanied), and that average time spent travelling, queuing and being attended to is 5 hours, the unit opportunity cost is

$FCFA\ 25 * (5) * (1.5) =$	FCFA	190
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Individuals from non-government employee households (1980)

Average monthly salary (estimate)	FCFA	83,500
Equivalent hourly wage	FCFA	116/hr

Assuming an average household size of six, the hourly wage per household member is estimated to be

	FCFA	19/hr
--	------	-------

Assuming on average 1.5 people spend time for each visit (i.e., some people are accompanied), and that the average time spent travelling queuing and being attended to is five hours, then the unit opportunity cost is

$FCFA\ 19 * (5) * (1.5) =$	FCFA	145
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Individual from non-government household (1990)

Average monthly salary (estimate)	FCFA	30,000
Equivalent hourly wage	FCFA	41 5/hr
Assuming an average household size of six, the hourly wage per household member is estimated to be	FCFA	7/hr
Assuming on average 1 5 people spend time for each visit (i e , some people are accompanied), and that the average time spent travelling queuing and being attended to is five hours, then the unit opportunity cost is	FCFA 7 * (5) * (1 5) = FCFA	55

Unit Direct Private Cost

The unit direct private cost (expenditures on travel) is based on the reported round trip taxi fare from N'Gorato to Koun-Fao in 1990. The 1980 value has been adjusted by the consumer price index for Ivory Coast. Thus, the dpc for 1980 is FCFA 370 and for 1990 is FCFA 400.

Unit Transfer Payment

The unit transfer payment (government insurance reimbursement) is calculated as 70% of the value of drug expenditures. Since drugs were provided free-of-charge in 1980, the unit transfer, t, is zero in 1980. In 1990, $t = 1,600 * (.7) = 1,120$.

Unit Fee, Unit Drug Costs, Unit Opportunity Cost, Unit Direct Private Cost and Unit Transfer Payment for Preventive Care

Unit Fee

In 1980 no fee was charged for maternal and child health services. Though charges were not sanctioned by the MSPP, in 1990 the midwife in Koun-Fao charged (and still does) FCFA 200 per prenatal care visit. Assuming an average of 4 prenatal exams are obtained per pregnant woman, the total fee is FCFA 800. Thus the unit price of patient-related preventive services (the total fee divided by 20 total visits¹³¹) was

1980	p = 0
1990	p = 40

Unit Drug Costs

In 1980, drugs were supplied free of charge by the MSPP. In 1990 women were required to buy a Carnet d'Enfant (FCFA 500), bandages and alcohol (FCFA 1,000), and soap when they delivered (FCFA 450). In addition, they paid FCFA 200 for the BCG vaccination. Thus the total drug cost per delivery in 1990 was FCFA 2,150. The unit cost of drugs is obtained by dividing this value by 20.

1980	drug = 0
1990	drug = 108

¹³¹ 20 = 4 prenatal visits + 12 out-patient equivalent visits for each delivery + 4 visits for vaccinations

Unit Opportunity Cost of Time

The unit opportunity cost of time is calculated assuming that each visit takes on average 5 hours (travel time, waiting time and consultation time) The same hourly wage estimates are used as were calculated for curative care It is assumed that a total of 92 hours of time is used per delivery (20 hours for four prenatal exams, 52 hours at the maternity for delivery, and 20 hours for four vaccination trips) The unit opportunity cost is thus $92/20 = 4.6$ * prevailing hourly wage To be exact

1980g $4.6 * FCFA 25/hr = 115$
1990g $4.6 * FCFA 25/hr = 115$

1980 $4.6 * FCFA 19/hr = 87$
1990 $4.6 * FCFA 7/hr = 32$

Unit Direct Private Cost

The direct private costs of transport are incurred only at delivery Otherwise, women walk to the health center The same values as calculated for curative care services are used, but they are converted to unit values by dividing by 20

1980 dpc = 19
1990 dpc = 20

Unit Transfer Payment

In the absence of any information to the contrary, it is assumed that no transfer payments (insurance) were made for maternal and child health care Thus, $t = 0$

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**ANNEX 2: PUBLIC FINANCE DATA FOR
KOUN-FAO, SIRASSO, AND KOUIBLY**

Koun-Fao

ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN CURRENT PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUN-FAO

	1987	1988	1989	1990	% GROWTH 87-88
GRANT REVENUES					
Partie Minimal	20 000 000	18 810 000	18,810,000	14 107,000	-5.95%
Partie complementaire general	4 500 000	4,234 000	4,234 000	3,175,500	-6.91%
Partie complementaire special	10 500 000	9 873 500	9,873 500	7,405 125	-5.97%
TOTAL GRANTS	35 000 000	32,917 500	32,917 500	24 687 625	-5.95%
SHARED TAX REVENUES					
Property Tax Structures	121 843	335 639	225 986	151 141	175.47%
Property Tax Land	6 413	17,665	11,894	7 954	175.46%
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	9 619	26,498	11 690	11 932	175.48%
Other	22,445	61,828	41,427	27 843	175.46%
Business Profits Tax Patente	0	489 770	593 716	398,130	
Business Profits Tax Licence	887 730	168 438	73,337	49,208	-81.03%
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	1 048 050	1 099 838	984 050	646,208	4.94%
OWN SOURCE REVENUES					
Small Business and Artisans Tax	1 649 065	1 164 400	1,204,000	1 159 000	-29.39%
Gasoline Pump Tax	45 000	30 000	0	0	-33.33%
Publicity Tax	7 500	15 000	0	9 000	100.00%
Notary Fees	465 000	62,200	64 000	56,500	-82.32%
Charge for Birth Certificates	65 000	326 700	363 600	269 500	402.62%
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	2,032 900	1 846 675	847 745	17 500	-9.18%
Pounds	41 000	121 700	29 800	22,600	196.83%
Property Transfer Tax	0	15 000	140 000	50 000	
Refuse Collection Tax	0	345 811	0	0	
Fees for Kindergarten	0	0	301 000	166 000	
Tax on Cultural Activities	52,700	24 000	2 000	6 000	-54.46%
Theater and Cinema Tax	45 200	17 760	0	0	-60.71%
Cultural Center Tax	13 000	2,000	0	0	-84.62%
Other Receipts for SCPH Services	0	0	0	560 000	
Fee for Admin of Transport & Communications	0	7 500	0	0	
Parking Fees for Buses Taxis and Trucks	0	78 000	117,200	150 800	
Slaughter House Fee					
Market Fees	1 361 600	1 122 410	1 150 330	1,326 000	17.57%
Rent from Assembly Property	29 900	198,240	240,275	197 810	583.01%
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	5 807 865	5 397 396	4,459 950	3 990 710	7.07%
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	41 855 915	39 414 734	38,341 500	29,324,543	5.83%

ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN CURRENT PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUIN-FAO

	% GROWTH 88-89	% GROWTH 89-90	AVG ANNUAL GRW 87-90	CV 87-90	MEAN 87 90	STD 87 90
GRANT REVENUES						
Partie Minimal	0 00%	25 00%	10,32%	12,6	17931750	2281029 4530368
Partie complementaire general	0 00%	25 00%	10,30%	12,6	4035875	508469,31753548
Partie complementaire special	0 00%	25 00%	10 32%	12 6	9413031,25	1187144,8428803
TOTAL GRANTS	0 00%	-25 00%	10 32%	12,6	31380656,25	3958642,955776
SHARED TAX REVENUES						
Property Tax Structures	-32,67%	-33 12%	36 56%	39 6	208652,25	82567,371471348
Property Tax Land	-32,67%	-33 13%	36 55%	39 6	10991 5	4345,6523388325
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	-33,24%	-32 55%	36 56%	39 6	16434 75	6511 0263927817
Other	-33 00%	-32,79%	36 56%	39 6	38385 75	15199 05732891
Business Profits Tax Patente	21,22%	-32,94%	5 86%	60 7	370404	224768,9622857
Business Profits Tax Licence	56 46%	-32,90%	56 80%	117,2	294678,25	345287 76820384
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	12,35 4	-32,97%	13 46%	18 7	939538 5	176149,27702023
OWN SOURCE REVENUES						
Small Business and Artisans Tax	3 40%	3 74%	9 91%	15 9	1294116,25	205684 93391482
Gasoline Pump Tax	100 00%	0 00%	-44 44 4	103 9	18750	19485 57158515
Publicity Tax	100 00%	0 00%	0 00%	67,8	7875	5342,9275682906
Notary Fees	22,14%	11 72%	-38 73%	103,2	169925	172347,22763944
Charge for Birth Certificates	11,29%	-25,89%	129,34%	45 0	256200	115368,25819956
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	54 09%	-37 94%	53 73%	68 4	1186205	811409,20511016
Pounds	75,51 4	24 16%	32,38%	73 9	53775	39760 808279008
Property Transfer Tax	833,33%	-64,29%	384 52%	106 1	51250	54357 037262897
Refuse Collection Tax	100 00%	0 00%	50 00%	173,2	86452,75	149740 55545405
Fees for Kindergarten		-44 85%		108 0	116750	126129 64560324
Tax on Cultural Activities	-91 67%	200 00%	17 96%	94 4	21175	18998 546822207
Theater and Cinema Tax	100 00%	0 00%	-53 57%	117 5	15740	18489 640342635
Cultural Center Tax	100 00%	0 00%	-61 54%	144 1	3750	5402,5456662438
Other Receipts for SCPH Services				173,2	140000	242487 11305964
Fee for Admin of Transport & Communications	100 00%	0 00%	50 00%	173,2	1875	3247 5952641916
Parking Fees for Buses Taxis and Trucks	50,26%	28 67%	28 31%	65 0	86500	56194 928596805
Slaughter House Fee	2,49%	15,27%	0 06%	8 5	1240085	104941,23129161
Market Fees	21,20%	17 67%	188 85%	48 5	166556,25	80762,060506079
Rent from Assembly Property	17,37%	10 52%	11 65%	14 7	4913980,25	723065 03097591
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES						
	2,72%	23 52%	10 69%	12,7	37234173	4740879 8026082
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES						

ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN 1980 PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUN-FAO

	'87	'88	'89	'90	% Change '87-'88
GRANT REVENUES					
Partie Minimal	15,800,000	14,540,130	14,126,310	10,284,003	7.97%
Partie complementaire general	3,555,000	3,272,882	3,179,734	2,314,940	7.94%
Partie complementaire special	8,295,000	7,632,216	7,414,999	5,398,336	7.99%
TOTAL GRANTS	27,650,000	25,445,228	24,721,043	17,997,279	7.97%
SHARED TAX REVENUES					
Property Tax Structures	96,266	259,449	169,715	110,182	169.54%
Property Tax Land	5,066	13,655	8,932	5,798	169.53%
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	7,599	20,483	13,285	8,698	169.55%
Other	17,732	47,793	31,112	20,298	169.54%
Business Profits Tax Patente	0	378,592	445,881	290,237	
Business Profits Tax Licence	701,307	130,203	55,076	35,873	-81.43%
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	827,960	850,175	724,002	471,088	2.68%
OWN SOURCE REVENUES					
Small Business and Artisans Tax	1,302,761	900,081	904,204	844,911	-30.91%
Gasoline Pump Tax	35,550	23,190	0	0	-34.77%
Publicity Tax	5,925	11,595	0	8,561	95.70%
Notary Fees	387,350	63,541	48,064	41,189	-82.70%
Charge for Birth Certificates	51,350	252,539	273,064	196,468	391.80%
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	1,605,991	1,427,480	636,656	12,758	11.12%
Pounds	32,390	94,074	22,380	16,475	190.44%
Property Transfer Tax	0	11,595	105,140	36,450	
Refuse Collection Tax	0	267,312	0	0	
Fees for Kindergarten	0	0	226,051	121,014	
Tax on Cultural Activities	41,633	18,552	1,502	4,374	-55.44%
Theater and Cinema Tax	35,708	13,728	0	0	-61.55%
Cultural Center Tax	10,270	1,546	0	0	-84.95%
Other Receipts for SCPH Services	0	0	0	408,240	
Fee for Admin of Transport & Communications	0	5,798	0	0	
Parking Fees for Buses Taxis and Trucks	0	60,294	88,017	109,933	
Slaughter House Fee	0	0	0	0	
Market Fees	1,075,684	867,623	863,898	966,654	19.34%
Rent from Assembly Property	23,621	153,240	180,447	144,203	548.74%
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	4,588,213	4,172,187	3,349,422	2,909,228	9.07%
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	33,066,173	30,467,589	28,794,467	21,377,592	7.86%

ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN 1980 PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUN-FAO

	% Change '88-'89	% Change '89-'90	Avg Annual Grw 87-90	CV 87-90	Mean 87-90	STD 87-90
GRANT REVENUES						
Partie Minimal	2.85%	-27.20%	12.67%	15.0	13687610.75	2059489.0241846
Partie complementaire general	2.85%	27.20%	12.66%	15.0	3080338.875	463166.08055189
Partie complementaire special	2.85%	27.20%	12.68%	15.0	7185137.53125	1081338.1455416
TOTAL GRANTS	2.85%	27.20%	12.67%	15.0	23953387.15625	3603992.8444239
SHARED TAX REVENUES						
Property Tax Structures	-34.59%	-35.08%	33.29%	40.4	158900.548	64274.419594239
Property Tax Land	34.59%	-35.08%	33.29%	40.5	8363.04375	3382.8690904194
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	35.14%	34.53%	33.29%	40.5	12516.3955	5069.8780878789
Other	-34.90%	34.76%	33.29%	40.5	29233.4545	11833.536370668
Business Profits Tax Patente	17.77%	-34.91%	8.57%	61.0	278677.424	170088.96416813
Business Profits Tax Licence	-57.70%	34.87%	-58.00%	118.8	230614.49825	274030.94333239
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	14.84%	-34.93%	15.70%	20.9	718305.384	150468.9446869
OWN SOURCE REVENUES						
Small Business and Artisans Tax	0.46%	-6.56%	12.34%	18.5	987989.3875	183235.26812118
Gasoline Pump Tax	100.00%	0.00%	-44.92%	104.3	14885	15321.404145835
Publicity Tax	100.00%	0.00%	1.43%	68.3	6020.25	4111.6520630399
Notary Fees	24.36%	14.30%	-40.45%	105.5	130035.775	137252.37689855
Charge for Birth Certificates	8.13%	28.05%	123.96%	44.8	183354.65	86647.726226962
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	55.40%	98.00%	54.84%	69.4	920721.1925	638648.92336723
Pounds	76.21%	-26.38%	29.28%	75.0	41329.825	30978.722156859
Property Transfer Tax	806.77%	-65.33%	370.72%	106.5	38296.25	40777.000468248
Refuse Collection Tax	100.00%	0.00%	50.00%	173.2	66827.97575	115749.44936598
Fees for Kindergarten		-46.47%		108.8	86766.25	94379.435287312
Tax on Cultural Activities	-91.90%	191.21%	14.62%	96.1	16515.25	15873.384506384
Theater and Cinema Tax	100.00%	0.00%	53.85%	118.1	12359.12	14599.152701551
Cultural Center Tax	100.00%	0.00%	-61.65%	144.6	2954	4270.7889200943
Other Receipts for SCPH Services			0.00%	173.2	102060	176773.10542048
Fee for Admin of Transport & Communications	100.00%	0.00%	50.00%	173.2	1449.375	2510.3911392201
Parking Fees for Buses Taxis and Trucks	45.98%	24.90%	35.44%	63.8	64561.1	41216.379818101
Slaughter House Fee						
Market Fees	-0.43%	11.89%	2.63%	9.2	943459.69	86742.808538964
Rent from Assembly Property	17.75%	20.09%	182.14%	48.1	125377.63375	60244.694506217
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	19.72%	13.14%	13.98%	17.6	3754762.6245	661081.2096279
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	5.49%	25.76%	13.04%	15.3	28426455.14475	4344971.6773198

INDIVIDUAL REVENUES AS A PERCENT OF GRAND TOTAL REVENUES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUN-FAO

	'87	'88	'89	'90
GRANT REVENUES				
Partie Minimal	47.78%	47.72%	49.06%	48.11%
Partie complementaire general	10.75%	10.74%	11.04%	10.83%
Partie complementaire special	25.09%	25.05%	25.75%	25.25%
TOTAL GRANTS	83.62%	83.52%	85.85%	84.19%
SHARED TAX REVENUES				
Property Tax Structures	0.23%	0.85%	0.59%	0.52%
Property Tax Land	0.02%	0.04%	0.03%	0.03%
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	0.02%	0.07%	0.05%	0.04%
Other	0.05%	0.16%	0.11%	0.09%
Business Profits Tax Patente	0.00%	1.24%	1.55%	1.35%
Business Profits Tax Licence	2.12%	0.43%	0.19%	0.17%
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	2.50%	2.79%	2.51%	2.20%
OWN SOURCE REVENUES				
Small Business and Artisans Tax	3.94%	2.95%	3.14%	3.95%
Gasoline Pump Tax	0.11%	0.08%	0.00%	0.00%
Publicity Tax	0.02%	0.04%	0.00%	0.03%
Notary Fees	1.11%	0.21%	0.17%	0.19%
Charge for Birth Certificates	0.16%	0.83%	0.95%	0.92%
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	4.88%	4.69%	2.21%	0.06%
Pounds	0.10%	0.31%	0.08%	0.08%
Property Transfer Tax	0.00%	0.04%	0.37%	0.17%
Refuse Collection Tax	0.00%	0.88%	0.00%	0.00%
Fees for Kindergarten	0.00%	0.00%	0.79%	0.57%
Tax on Cultural Activities	0.13%	0.06%	0.01%	0.02%
Theater and Cinema Tax	0.11%	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%
Cultural Center Tax	0.03%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%
Other Receipts for SCPH Services	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.91%
Fee for Admin of Transport & Communications	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%
Parking Fees for Buses Taxis and Trucks	0.00%	0.20%	0.31%	0.51%
Slaughter House Fee	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Market Fees	3.25%	2.85%	3.00%	4.52%
Rent from Assembly Property	0.07%	0.50%	0.63%	0.67%
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	13.88%	13.69%	11.63%	13.61%
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

INDIVIDUAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUN-FAO

	'87	'88	'89	'90
OWN SOURCE REVENUES	28.39%	21.57%	27.00%	29.04%
Small Business and Artisans Tax	0.77%	0.56%	0.00%	0.00%
Gasoline Pump Tax	0.13%	0.28%	0.00%	0.23%
Publicity Tax	8.01%	1.52%	1.43%	1.42%
Notary Fees	1.12%	8.05%	8.15%	8.75%
Charge for Birth Certificates	35.00%	34.21%	19.01%	0.44%
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	0.71%	2.25%	0.67%	0.57%
Pounds	0.00%	0.28%	3.14%	1.25%
Property Transfer Tax	0.00%	6.41%	0.00%	0.00%
Refuse Collection Tax	0.00%	0.00%	6.75%	4.16%
Fees for Kindergarten	0.91%	0.44%	0.04%	0.15%
Tax on Cultural Activities	0.78%	0.33%	0.00%	0.00%
Theater and Cinema Tax	0.22%	0.04%	0.00%	0.00%
Cultural Center Tax	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	14.03%
Other Receipts for SCPH Services	0.00%	0.14%	0.00%	0.00%
Fee for Admin of Transport & Communications	0.00%	1.45%	2.63%	3.78%
Parking Fees for Buses, Taxis and Trucks	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Slaughter House Fee	23.44%	20.80%	25.79%	33.23%
Market Fees	0.51%	3.67%	5.39%	4.96%
Rent from Assembly Property	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES				

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ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN CURRENT PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF SIRRASO

	1987	1988	1989	1990	% CHANGE 87 88
GRANT REVENUES					
Partie Minimal	20 000 000	18 810 000	18 810 000	14 107 500	5.95%
Partie Complementary general	5 900 000	5 548 950	5 548 950	4 161 713	-5.95%
Partie Complementary special	11 100 000	10,439 550	10,439 550	7 829 663	5.95%
TOTAL GRANTS	37 000 000	34 798 500	34 798 500	26,098 875	5.95%
SHARED TAX REVENUES					
Property Tax Structures & Land	153,220	111 027	0	0	27.54%
Other	0	4 500	0	18,000	
Business Profits Tax Patente	0	36 000	0	144,000	
Business Profits Tax Licence	0	0	0	12,000	
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	153,220	151 527	0	174,000	1.10%
OWN SOURCE REVENUES					
Small Business and Artisans Tax	840 000	993 500	1,222,800	696,000	18.27%
Tax on Carts	0	0	3 000	0	
Cherna Tax	11,830	15,470	6 000	5 380	30.77%
Notary Fees	250 000	65 000	33 000	33,500	74.00%
Charge for Birth Certificates	0	307 500	311 500	277,500	
Pounds	0	65 500	58 000	0	
?	59 800	0	0	0	100.00%
Property Transfer Tax	250 000	685 000	300 000	0	174.00%
Parking Fees for Buses, Taxis and Trucks	161 000	253 000	338,200	332,800	57.14%
Market Fees	637 090	853 760	975,460	955,500	1.99%
Slaughter House Fee	74 700	223 500	201 000	167,000	199.20%
Rent from Assembly Property	72,000	96 000	72,000	69,000	33.33%
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	2,556 420	3 558 230	3 520 960	2,736 680	39.19%
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	39 709 640	38 508,257	38 319 460	29 009 555	-3.03%

ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN CURRENT PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF SIRRASO

	% CHANGE 88-89	% CHANGE 89-90	AVG ANNUAL GRW 87-90	CV 87 90	AVG	STD
GRANT REVENUES						
Partie Minimal	0 00%	25 00%	10.32%	12.6	17,931,875	2,260 818
Partie Complementaire general	0 00%	25 00%	10.32%	12.6	5,288,903	686 941
Partie Complementaire special	0 00%	25 00%	10.32%	12.6	9 952 191	1,254 754
TOTAL GRANTS	0 00%	25 00%	10.32%	12.6	33,173,969	4,182,513
SHARED TAX REVENUES						
Property Tax Structures & Land	100 00%	0 00%	-42.51%	102.5	66,062	67 725
Other	100 00%			102.0	7,500	7 649
Business Profits Tax Patente	100 00%			102.0	60,000	61 188
Business Profits Tax Licence		0 00%			3,000	5,196
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	100 00%	0 00%	33.70%	58.2	119,887	69 666
OWN SOURCE REVENUES						
Small Business and Artisans Tax	23 08%	26 73%	4 88%	14.8	988,075	146,227
Tax on Carts		100 00%		100 0	1,500	1 500
Cinema Tax	-61.22%	10.33%	13 59%	43.3	8,670	4 189
Notary Fees	-49.23%	1 52%	-40 57%	94 6	95,375	80,209
Charge for Birth Certificates	1.30%	10 91%	-4 81%	5 1	298,833	15 173
Pounds	11.45 /	100 00%	55 73%	71 1	41 167	29,270
?	0 00%	0 00%	33 33%	173.2	14,950	25 894
Property Transfer Tax	56.20%	100 00%	5.93%	79.4	308,760	245 163
Parking Fees for Buses, Taxis and Trucks	33 68%	1 60%	29 74%	26 6	271,250	72 040
Market Fees	14.25%	2.05%	4 73%	6.7	905,453	60 728
Slaughter House Fee	10 07%	16 92%	57.40%	34 1	166,550	56 716
Rent from Assembly Property	25 00%	-4 17%	1.39%	14 1	77,250	10 894
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	1.05%	22.27%	5.29%	14.6	3 083,073	451,240
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	-0.49%	24 30%	-9.27%	11.8	36,388 728	4,292,457

ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN CURRENT PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF SIRRASO

	% OF
GRANT REVENUES	
Partie Minimal	49.28%
Partie Complementary general	14.54%
Partie Complementary special	27.35%
TOTAL GRANTS	91.17%
SHARED TAX REVENUES	
Property Tax Structures & Land	
Other	0.16%
Business Profits Tax Patente	0.01%
Business Profits Tax Licence	0.33%
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	
OWN SOURCE REVENUES	
Small Business and Artisans Tax	2.72%
Tax on Carts	0.00%
Cinema Tax	0.03%
Notary Fees	0.25%
Charge for Birth Certificates	0.82%
Pounds	0.04%
?	0.85%
Property Transfer Tax	0.75%
Parking Fees for Buses, Taxis and Trucks	2.49%
Market Fees	0.45%
Slaughter House Fee	0.21%
Rent from Assembly Property	
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	100.00%

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ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN CURRENT PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUIBLY

	1987	1988	1989	1990	% CHANGE 87 88
GRANT REVENUES					
Partie Minimal	20 000 000	18,810 000	18 810,000	14 107 500	5 95 4
Partie Complementary general	8,000 000	7,524 000	7 524 000	5 643 000	5 95 4
Partie Complementary special	12,000 000	16,288 000	11,288 000	8 484,500	35 72%
TOTAL GRANTS	40 000 000	42,620 000	37,620 000	28,215 000	6 55 4
SHARED TAX REVENUES					
Property Tax Structures	0	0	0	0	0 00%
Property Tax Land	0	0	0	0	0 00%
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	0	0	0	0	0 00%
Other	0	0	0	0	0 00%
Business Profits Tax Patente	0	31 500	110 438	38,877	
Business Profits Tax Licence	0	0	1 040	1 141	
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	0	31 500	111,478	38 018	
OWN SOURCE REVENUES					
Tax on Professional Establishments	0	0	11,400	0	
Small Business and Artisans Tax	412,080	144 150	518 675	401,900	-65 02%
Tax on Wagons & Carts	20 000	116 000	173 450	138 000	480 00%
Tax on Public Events	0	0	90,250	8 000	
Tax on Cinemas	0	3 300	14,540	6 080	
Tax on Taxes	0	0	7 500	0	
Publicity Tax	0	0	600	0	
Notary Fee	8 000	10 400	21 000	25 800	30 00%
Birth Certificate Charge	1,251,200	606 500	426 500	660 000	-51 53%
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	13 500	9,250	21,250	17,800	-31 48%
Property Transfer Tax	690 000	1 930 000	120 000	0	179 71%
Refuse Collection Tax	172,271	190 068	0	119 758	10 33%
Parking Fees for Buses Trucks and Trucks	593 000	835 300	695 800	484 000	40 86%
Slaughter House Tax	3 800	6 500	45,800	15 900	71 05%
Market Taxes	2,098 150	1 780 600	1 782,150	1,290,350	15 13%
Rent from Assembly Property	19,500	18 000	42 000	24 000	7 69%
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	5 281 501	5 650 068	3 970 915	3 191 588	6 98%
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	45,281 501	48,301 568	41 702 393	31 444 584	6 67%

ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN CURRENT PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUBLY

	/ CHANGE 88-89	% CHANGE 89-90	AVG ANNUAL GRW 87-90	CV 87-90	MEAN 87 90	STD 87 90
GRANT REVENUES						
Partie Minimal	0 00%	-25 00%	10.32%	12.6	17931875	2260818.0039258
Partie Complementary general	0 00%	25 00%	10 32%	12.6	7172750	904327.20157032
Partie Complementary special	-30 70%	-25 00%	-8 66%	23.3	12009125	2800848.9421738
TOTAL GRANTS	11 73%	-25.00%	10 06%	14 6	37113750	5433536.3427054
SHARED TAX REVENUES						
Property Tax Structures	0 00%	0 00%	0 00%		0	0
Property Tax Land	0 00%	0 00%	0 00%		0	0
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	0 00%	0 00%	0 00%		0	0
Other	0 00%	0 00%	0 00%		0	0
Business Profits Tax Patente	250 60%	-66.61%	91.99%	60 4	59605	36011.326449697
Business Profits Tax Licence		9 71%		4 6	1090 5	50.5
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	253 90%	-65.90%	94 00%	60 1	60332	36263.444109277
OWN SOURCE REVENUES						
Tax on Professional Establishments		100 00%		100 0	5700	5700
Small Business and Artisans Tax	269.82%	-22.51%	57.43%	37.3	369201.25	137748.19846619
Tax on Wagons & Carts	49 53%	-20.44%	169 70%	50.8	111862.5	56859 534885348
Tax on Public Events		-91 14%		83.7	49125	41125
Tax on Cinemas	340 81%	-58.32%	141 14%	60 0	7966.666666667	4782.6724282095
Tax on Taxis		100 00%		100 0	3750	3750
Publicity Tax		100.00%		100 0	300	300
Notary Fee	101 92%	22.86%	51 59%	45 1	16300	7349 1496106693
Birth Certificate Charge	29 68%	54 75%	8 62%	42.1	736050	309744 86678555
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	129 73%	16.24%	27 34%	29.2	15450	4511.2359725468
Property Transfer Tax	-93.78%	100 00%	-4 69%	111 6	685000	784607 74257131
Refuse Collection Tax	100 00%	-65.28%	-44 83%	61 6	120523.75	74230 627682834
Parking Fees for Buses Taxis and Trucks	16.70%		2.09%	19 9	652025	129636.34473017
Slaughter House Tax	604 62%	-65.28%	203.46%	92.6	18000	16666 883331925
Market Taxes	0 09%	27 60%	14.21%	16 6	1737812.5	288904.13067097
Rent from Assembly Property	133 33%	-42.86%	27 59%	37 0	25875	9568 0131166298
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	29 72%	19 63%	14 12%	21.9	4523512.5	990343.29105884
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	13.66%	24 60%	10 53%	15.2	41682511.5	6355709.8175696

ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN 1980 PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUBLY

	'87	'88	'89	'90	% Change '87-'88
GRANT REVENUES					
Partie Minimal	15,800 000	14 540 130	14 128,310	10,284,268	7.97%
Partie Complementary general	6 320 000	5,816 052	5 650 524	4 113 747	7.97%
Partie Complementary special	9,480 000	12,589 078	8,475 786	6 170 621	32.80%
TOTAL GRANTS	31 600 000	32,945,260	28,262,620	20 568 735	4.26%
SHARED TAX REVENUES					
Property Tax Structures	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Property Tax Land	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Other	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Business Profits Tax Patente	0	24,350	82,939	26 883	
Business Profits Tax Licence	0	0	781	832	
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	0	24,350	83,720	27 715	
OWN SOURCE REVENUES					
Tax on Professional Establishments	0	0	8 561	0	
Small Business and Artisans Tax	325,543	111 428	389 525	292,985	-65.77%
Tax on Wagons & Carts	15 800	89 688	130,281	100 602	487.52%
Tax on Public Events	0	0	67 778	5,832	
Tax on Cinemas	0	2,551	10 920	4,418	
Tax on Taxes	0	0	5 633	0	
Publicity Tax	0	0	451	0	
Notary Fee	6,320	8 039	15,771	18,808	27.20%
Birth Certificate Charge	988 448	468,625	320 302	481 140	-52.57%
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	10 685	7 150	15 959	12,976	-32.96%
Property Transfer Tax	545 100	1,491 890	90 120	0	173.69%
Refuse Collection Tax	136 094	146 923	0	87,302	7.96%
Parking Fees for Buses Taxis and Trucks	468 470	645 687	522,546	352,836	37.83%
Slaughter House Tax	3 002	5 025	34 396	11 591	67.37%
Market Taxes	1 657 539	1,376 404	1,338 395	940 665	16.96%
Rent from Assembly Property	15,405	13,914	31 542	17,496	-9.88%
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	4 172,386	4,367 503	2,982,157	2,326 652	4.68%
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	35 772,386	37,337 112	31,318 497	22,923,102	4.37%

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ACTUAL MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN 1980 PRICES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUBLY

	% Change 88-89	% Change 89-90	Avg Annual Grw 87-90	CV 87-90	Mean 87-90	STD 87-90
GRANT REVENUES						
Partie Minimal	2.85%	27.20%	12.67%	15 0	13687701.875	2058338.4272954
Partie Complementary general	2.85%	27.20%	12.67%	15 0	5475080 75	823735.37091817
Partie Complementary special	-32.67%	27.20%	-9.02%	25 1	9178871 125	2305650 1277007
TOTAL GRANTS	14.24%	27.20%	12.39%	16 9	28341653.75	4801984 0611113
SHARED TAX REVENUES						
Property Tax Structures	0 00%	0 00%	0 00%		0	0
Property Tax Land	0 00%	0 00%	0 00%		0	0
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	0 00%	0 00%	0 00%		0	0
Other	0 00%	0 00%	0 00%		0	0
Business Profits Tax Patente	240 62%	-67 59%	86 52%	60 5	44723 923666667	27041 88809718
Business Profits Tax Licence		6 50%		3 1	806 4145	25 3745
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	243 83%	-66 90%	88 47%	60.2	45261 533333333	27228 91633902
OWN SOURCE REVENUES						
Tax on Professional Establishments		100 00%		100 0	4280 7	4280 7
Small Business and Artisans Tax	249 58%	-24 78%	53 01%	36.9	279870.29375	103265.40300466
Tax on Wagons & Carts	45.27%	22.77%	163 34 4	50 1	84062.7375	42127 902692061
Tax on Public Events		-91.40%		84.2	36804 875	30972.875
Tax on Cinemas	328 07%	59 54%	134.26%	60.2	5962.726666667	3586 8994700654
Tax on Taxes		100 00%		100 0	2816.25	2816.25
Publicity Tax		100 00%		100 0	225 3	225.3
Notary Fee	96 18%	19.26%	47 55%	42.5	12234 6	5203.4175365811
Birth Certificate Charge	31 68%	50.21%	11 34%	44 8	564678 5	252718 90390189
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	123 19%	18 69%	23 85%	27 6	11687 55	3222.439605912
Property Transfer Tax	-93 96%	100 00%	-6 76%	111.2	531777 5	591574 6272608
Refuse Collection Tax	100 00%		-46 02%	62 6	92579 6945	57977 372018867
Parking Fees for Buses Taxis and Trucks	19 07%	32.48%	-4 57%	21.2	497384 675	105305 519829
Slaughter House Tax	584 56%	-66 90%	195 21%	92.4	13503 35	12473 17537969
Market Taxes	2.76%	-29 72%	16 48%	19.2	1328250 525	255477.31531328
Rent from Assembly Property	126 69%	-44 53%	24 16%	35 8	19589.25	7017.2348320047
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	31 72%	21 98%	16 34%	24.4	3462174.28325	843185 60329852
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	16 12%	26 81 4	12.85%	17 6	31837774 18325	5600556 2024881

INDIVIDUAL REVENUES AS A PERCENT OF GRAND TOTAL REVENUES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUBLY

	'87	'88	'89	'90
GRANT REVENUES				
Partie Minimal	44.17%	38.94%	45.11%	44.86%
Partie Complementary general	17.67%	15.58%	18.04%	17.95%
Partie Complementary special	28.50%	33.72%	27.06%	28.92%
TOTAL GRANTS	88.34%	88.24%	90.21%	89.73%
SHARED TAX REVENUES				
Property Tax Structures	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Property Tax Land	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Property Surtax Incomplete Structures	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Other	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Business Profits Tax Patente	0.00%	0.07%	0.26%	0.12%
Business Profits Tax Licence	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
TOTAL SHARED TAXES	0.00%	0.07%	0.27%	0.12%
OWN SOURCE REVENUES				
Tax on Professional Establishments	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%
Small Business and Artisans Tax	0.91%	0.30%	1.24%	1.25%
Tax on Wagons & Carts	0.04%	0.24%	0.42%	0.44%
Tax on Public Events	0.00%	0.00%	0.22%	0.03%
Tax on Cinemas	0.00%	0.01%	0.03%	0.02%
Tax on Taxes	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%
Publicity Tax	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Notary Fee	0.02%	0.02%	0.05%	0.05%
Birth Certificate Charge	2.76%	1.26%	1.02%	2.10%
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	0.03%	0.02%	0.05%	0.05%
Property Transfer Tax	1.52%	4.00%	0.23%	0.00%
Refuse Collection Tax	0.38%	0.39%	0.00%	0.38%
Parking Fees for Buses, Taxis and Trucks	1.31%	1.73%	1.67%	1.54%
Slaughter House Tax	0.01%	0.01%	0.11%	0.05%
Market Taxes	4.63%	3.69%	4.27%	4.10%
Rent from Assembly Property	0.04%	0.04%	0.10%	0.08%
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	11.66%	11.70%	9.52%	10.15%
GRAND TOTAL REVENUES	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	ERR

INDIVIDUAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES
MUNICIPALITY OF KOUIBLY

	'87	'88	'89	'90
OWN SOURCE REVENUES	0.00%	0.00%	0.29%	0.00%
Tax on Professional Establishments	7.80%	2.55%	13.06%	12.59%
Small Business and Artisans Tax	0.38%	2.05%	4.37%	4.32%
Tax on Wagons & Carts	0.00%	0.00%	2.27%	0.25%
Tax on Public Events	0.00%	0.06%	0.37%	0.19%
Tax on Cinemas	0.00%	0.00%	0.19%	0.00%
Tax on Taxes	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%
Publicity Tax	0.15%	0.18%	0.53%	0.81%
Notary Fee	23.69%	10.73%	10.74%	20.68%
Birth Certificate Charge	0.26%	0.16%	0.54%	0.56%
Charges for Administrative Services Rendered	13.06%	34.16%	3.02%	0.00%
Property Transfer Tax	3.26%	3.36%	0.00%	3.75%
Refuse Collection Tax	11.23%	14.78%	17.52%	15.16%
Parking Fees for Buses, Taxis and Trucks	0.07%	0.12%	1.15%	0.50%
Slaughter House Tax	39.73%	31.51%	44.88%	40.43%
Market Taxes	0.37%	0.32%	1.06%	0.75%
Rent from Assembly Property				
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUES	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%