

**United States Foreign Assistance
Oral History Program**

Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection

An Interview with

Madison Broadnax

1998

**Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Arlington, Virginia**

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ASSOCIATION FOR DIPLOMATIC STUDIES AND TRAINING ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, was established in 1986 to enhance the training of foreign affairs personnel and to instill in the public a greater appreciation for our diplomatic history.

The Association's Foreign Affairs Oral History Program was established in 1988 and is housed in the Lauinger Library of Georgetown University and at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, VA. The collection is comprised of oral histories taken from a number of projects, with the unifying factor that all concern the conduct of American foreign affairs and experiences of those employed in the field of diplomacy and consular affairs and their families.

The oral history collection includes interviews done under the auspices of the Foreign Service History Center of George Washington University, which was amalgamated into the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, the Foreign Service Family Project, the Women Ambassadors' Project, the United States Information Agency Alumni Association Project, the Foreign Assistance (AID) Oral History Project, the Senior Officers' Project, the Labor Diplomacy Oral History Project and others.

The aim of the US Foreign Assistance Oral History Program, in particular, is to develop a collection of oral histories of those who have served USAID and predecessor agencies and those who have served in foreign assistance programs of associated organizations such as private firms, private voluntary organizations, and other US government agencies. The Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) of the USAID has made a grant to help finance the preparation of 120 oral histories.

For the most part these interviews are carried out by retired USAID personnel on a volunteer basis, directed by the Oral History Program. The interviews are unclassified, and unless so marked are available for use by researchers. Most of these interviews have been transcribed and then returned to the person interviewed for editing. The transcript is an edited version, and is not a word for word rendition of the cassette tape. The editing usually consists of correcting of names and dates that have been missed during an interview. The individual interviewed may also choose to expand upon topics that may not have been developed in the time allotted for the interview.

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KEY WORDS

MADISON BROADNAX

4-H Program
acre farm demonstration
agriculture
breadbasket for the Middle East
coffee trees
College of Agriculture
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
cotton
credit program
cultural understanding
dairy
Djibouti
dura
Egypt
Food for Peace Program
horticulture
International Research Center
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA)
International Livestock Station
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
irrigation
Korea
Korean Office of Rural Agriculture
livestock
National Agricultural Extension Service
northern Sudan
Peace Corps
peanuts
Point Four Program
poultry
President Johnson
release of terrorists
Research Extension and Education
rice
Rahad Project
Roots and Tubers
satellite village farms
Seoul National University
Seychelles
short and long-term training
Somalia

southern Sudan
Sudan
Title XII
Title XII Officer
tree crops
vegetable research
vegetable crops
viticulture
wheat flour
wheat

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An interview with
Madison Broadnax

Interviewed by W. Haven North
Initial interview date: September 18, 1998

Q: This is September 18, 1998, and the interview is with Madison Broadnax. Madison, give us a thumbnail of your career with Foreign Systems.

Overview of career

BROADNAX: I was in college work when the Agency contacted me about an overseas assignment. They did that because I was serving as a Contact Officer for the State Department and AID for foreign visitors who came to the United States the types of small scale agriculture and child care centers we had in West Virginia. We had a visitor from Nairobi, Kenya, Issac Oquirri. Assistant District Commissioner. He was interested in small scale agriculture and day care centers. They sent him to me. I farmed out a program for him.

This led to my joining AID. My first assignment was to Khartoum, Sudan, as Agriculture Extension Advisor, the Agricultural Branch, and I was there from '58 to '62. After that, I was transferred to Seoul, South Korea and was responsible for six scientists, and counterparts in the USAID Office of Rural Development in Suwon, Korea.

Q: And after Korea?

BROADNAX: After Korea, I was transferred to Washington, D.C., where I was Assistant Director for the Office of Agriculture. I was there three years. Following that, I was asked to go to Sudan as AID Affairs Officer, which I did.

Q: Was that your last assignment?

BROADNAX: No. The relations fell apart, and Dr. Adams asked if I would be interested in the REDSO position, Title XII program, which was something new in AID at that time, in Nairobi. I said yes, and in 1976, I took that assignment. I was there until I retired. I retired in 1979.

Q: Very good. Let's go back to the beginning. Where did you grow up? What kind of education did you have?

Early years and education

BROADNAX: I was born in Swords, Georgia to a family of 17 children and sharecropper parents. At the age of nine, my parents moved from Georgia to Florida, where my father bought his own farm. I went to elementary school there until I was nine and then I got a work-scholarship to go to Fort Valley High and Industrial School, Fort Valley, Georgia. I went there and worked my way through high school. I attended and finished junior college there. From there I went to a Baccalaureate College of West Virginia State with a major in agriculture. After that, I went to graduate school at Michigan State College for a Masters in General Agriculture. On graduation, I was appointed Farm Manager of a 1600 acre farm where I served until my transfer to Agricultural Extension Agent. Shortly after that assignment, I was inducted into the US ATRCORP in 1944 with assignment to Godman Field, Kentucky, which is noted for the Tuskegee Airmen. I was there from 1943 to 1946. In 1946, I returned to West Virginia State College as the Agricultural Extension Agent. I was promoted from that position to Director and Professor of Agriculture. I was there when I became this Contact Officer I was telling you about. All Deans and Directors of Agriculture were designated Contact Officers for both the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development or its predecessor agencies.

Q: Was there anything in those early years that got you thinking about international affairs?

BROADNAX: I always was interested in missionary work. I almost became a minister once, but I didn't. When I was at West Virginia State College and became this Contact Officer, that threw me into contact with the people in AID and the Department of State.

Q: How did you get that position?

BROADNAX: It was an appointment by AID and the Department of State. The purpose was to have a cadre of agricultural experts available to respond to requests from foreign visitors for observational studies. I was a graduate of the college, as I told you. I was in extension work, and the President had two Ph.D's who had flunked in that position. I was appointed and served for 10 years until I accepted the position with AID.

Q: The agricultural faculty?

BROADNAX: Yes. And I was there until I joined AID.

Q: How long were you in that position?

BROADNAX: I was there as Director from '49 until '58.

Q: Anything particular about that time?

BROADNAX: Well, I was always interested in people at all levels of life. When I was in extension work, I traveled all over the State of West Virginia working with small farmers, 4-H

Clubs and gardeners. I've always loved to work with people. And they have responded to me, to what I have to say and what I've tried to teach them. This, I think, was the greatest asset to me in going into the Foreign Service. I easily ingratiate myself with people and I found out that was an asset with the Sudanese, because in the Arab world if you meet them the first time they expect you to remember their name; the next time you see them, they expect you to call them by that name.

Q: What was your technical major or specialization during that time?

BROADNAX: My technical field was agriculture. General agriculture. Extension education. While I was at the Department of Agriculture at West Virginia State College, I took some extension courses in rural sociology. I got enough hours for a major. Then when I went to Cornell, on the AID's sabbatical where I continued my post-graduate studies in Extension Education, Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology.

Q: Let's talk a little bit about how you got those contacts with AID. How come they called you?

BROADNAX: Mainly because the emphasis at the time was on agricultural development, and I was an agriculturist with the type of credential needed at that time. But as I said, we had a contact officer from all of the land grant colleges, black and white, to assist them in programming foreign visitors along the lines of their needs. I was the one from West Virginia State College.

Q: What year was this?

BROADNAX: This was in 1949.

Q: This was well before AID was born then?

BROADNAX: Well, we had Point 4 then. I organized a seminar for our faculty and students based on the Point 4 concept. I invited officials from both Point 4 and the State Department to participate in the seminar, which was very productive from an educational view point. Following this seminar queries relative to my joining the Agency were frequent until I made a positive decision. It went well—very well—and taking the visitors back to the airport, I was asked the question, “Have you ever thought about joining the Foreign Service?” I said, “Not really.” They said, “Well, you're the kind of person we're looking for.”

Q: Where were the students from — the international students?

BROADNAX: At the university, they assigned two foreign visitors to me. One was from Kenya and the other was from Nepal.

Q: They were students or just visitors?

BROADNAX: They were officers. They were officials.

Q: They were just visiting?

BROADNAX: Yes, they were foreign visitors coming to get some information and make some observations that they could take back to their country.

Q: I see.

BROADNAX: This essentially led to my joining the Agency.

Q: Did you know anything about AID or the Foreign Service at that time?

BROADNAX: Only what I read and what Truman said.

Q: Right. So what happened when you indicated your interest?

Joined ICA in Sudan - 1958

BROADNAX: Yes, I did. They kept calling me and one day I got a call. They said, "We've seen your GTR and can you come to Washington for the week-end?" I said, "Yes." And I did. And that's when they got serious. They said, "We have a position in the Sudan. We've been told that you're the person we want right now in that position. We want to talk seriously to you about it, and we want you to think seriously about it." The person who told him this--you knew Bob Kitchen. Kitchen had gone to Sudan and made a reconnaissance survey. He took with him Joe Walker, a fellow from Agriculture, and somebody from the Bureau of Public Roads. Anyway, he assured them that if they could break me loose from the college, I would be the person. He said, "I want to tell you, he's the youngest member on the faculty. He's well liked and he's doing a good job, but he may not want to leave. His wife has to agree with him before he goes." He told them the truth. We didn't have any children, so my wife agreed to it.

Q: Did you have any idea what was involved, or what you were getting into?

BROADNAX: I knew that my position was to go and assist the government of the Sudan in establishing the National Agricultural Extension Service. That's what they wanted me to do. And I had to design it and sell it to the Sudanese, which wasn't much of a problem really. But I had some barriers to overcome. One of the persons I had to deal with was the Dean of the College of Agriculture, whom I'd been told was a card carrying communist in the Sudan.

Q: What year did you go out there?

BROADNAX: 1958. Just before the coup.

Q: At that time it was ICA?

BROADNAX: Right. So I started meeting with the officials in the Sudanese Department of

Agriculture and they gave a reception for me the first week I was there. I met these principals and the Dean of the College of Agriculture. They knew from my background that I was in college work, so he and I had a long conversation at that cocktail party. I asked him if he was familiar with the concepts of agricultural extension--out of school training and... He said "No, I'm not." I said, "Well, that's the program we started through our land grant colleges in the United States, and I'm a product of that system. I'm here to help your government establish a (they requested me to come) national agricultural extension service. The college has always played a key role in this because they train the students that we employ. I'd like to know what you think about doing this through the university." He said, "What are the terms of doing this if I can sell it to my faculty?" I said, "The terms are education and preparing graduates to go out through Sudan and help farmers improve their agriculture. That's the term. You don't owe us anything." He said, "Well, we'd like to talk about this some more." We did from time to time. That year, there was a dearth of trained personnel in Sudan. That year, he had nine graduates from the School of Agriculture. When the government of Sudan staffed their first extension workers, they gave me six of the nine. All college graduates. Also, they had a post-secondary training institute called Shambat Institute, where they trained junior officers beyond high school. We had the exposure to all of those students. I taught a course in extension to the Shambat Institute people. That helped me in two ways: they got to know me and I got to know them, and I got to learn a lot about their culture, how they did things, how the building organization functioned, and how you go through the leaders in those villages to get things done. It worked out very well, so after we had agreed upon staff--Americans--and the localities where they would be working throughout the Sudan, the Ministry of Agriculture decided that they wanted to initiate this program in southern Sudan. I had been to the southern Sudan and I took my camera when I went. In every village I stopped, I took pictures. The next time, when I returned to the southern Sudan, I distributed the pictures to the people, whom I had taken. One of them was Chief Jambo. That was the best thing to introduce me to the people of southern Sudan. I was accepted.

Q: What was the agricultural situation in Sudan at that time, both in terms of the overall agriculture scene and the capacity of the government?

BROADNAX: They had an administrative role that was really tattered. They had an agricultural officer in each province and they were administrators. They had nothing to do with teaching the farmers. If a farmer didn't do what they told him to do, they'd incarcerate him in some fashion.

Q: Were they technically trained?

BROADNAX: They were all graduates of the University of Khartoum.

Q: What was the program like at the University?

BROADNAX: They had a good program. The British had set up a university. They had put good people there to teach. They had some smart Sudanese coming out of that program. I went to south Sudan once with the former British Director of Agriculture Research Station. I learned more

from him than I had learned from anybody, other than Joe Walker. When Joe Walker went there, he came back and gave me all of his notes from his visit out there. But he and I went to the southern Sudan in a place called Yambio, where there was an agriculture research station. They had a Canadian operating that station. He gave me the insides and outs. Just like a professor, you know. It was of great assistance for me to learn about agriculture in the south. When the government asked to introduce the program in the south, it turned out it was the best thing that could ever happen. We initially got an agricultural advisor at a place called Maridi. He was stationed there. He had a senior counterpart assigned there, one of the six people they had assigned to me, and he had three junior agricultural officers from Shambat Institute. There we built offices; we built houses, and we had a horticulture advisor to come on board shortly after that. Due to the shortage of houses, he had to be stationed in Juba, the Capital of the Equatorial Province. I told the Sudanese that we did a lot of one-on-one farm visitations in the United States, but that's too expensive for you. We've got to do it in a mass training manner. One of the best ways we can do it is through demonstration. They said, "Well, we've got plenty land in the south. We'll get a million acre farm demonstration for them." I said, "No, that won't work. Those farmers there have plots. They're small farmers. They can't even imagine themselves owning a million acres of land. Why don't we do 250? We'll grow every type of crop it's possible to cultivate in southern Sudan on that farm." We did that.

Q: How big a farm?

BROADNAX: 250 acres.

Q: That's still big.

BROADNAX: Yes, that was too big, but that's a compromise. We could bring the chiefs in to give them training. Then we had satellite village farms. That's where these junior officers were. They brought people into those satellite village farms. That program went very well until the wrong people got in charge of the government.

Q: How did you find the Sudanese to work with?

BROADNAX: Very easy. Very easy. In fact, I was surprised at the quickness in which they accepted me. Our adversaries had said all kind of things. They said I was a spy. It's a long story. But anyway, they didn't buy it. Everywhere I went in the country, my counterpart was with me. I never went out unilaterally, even with this British Director of Research. We were all together. They found out I was serious. They found out I knew my stuff. They found out I was genuinely interested in helping them.

Q: Was the main project in the south, or did you have projects all over the country?

BROADNAX: That was where the Sudanese wanted to start it because they thought the north was too sophisticated for an extension program. That's what they thought.

Q: What did you think?

BROADNAX: I said they were not. But anyway, I didn't tell them that. The reason why I said this was best place for the extension program to start in the south was because that's where the demonstration farm was going and we had a military general Minister of Agriculture. He made a visit to the south. He visited Maridi Demonstration Farm. The Director of Agriculture was there. Bob Kitchen was there as Mission Director. Joe Walker was there—my Chief. And all of us—my counterparts and all. He said to the Director of Agriculture, “Why can't we have something like this in the north?” The Director of Agriculture said, “Well, we thought this place had the highest priority.” He went on to enumerate. He said, “We've got extension offices set up for the Blue Nile, White Nile, Kordofan, Khartoum, and the Northern provinces.” Which we did. That satisfied the Minister. But he thought that was the greatest thing he had seen. I must admit that my horticultural advisor, who was the advisor to the development of the demonstration farms, did a wonderful job. He had hard-working Sudanese right with him.

Q: Did you have demonstration farms in all the provinces?

BROADNAX: We only had demonstration farms in the southern provinces. In the northern provinces, we used the farms that the government had already established and we improved them. You see, this is what we were up against. Sudan's major product is cotton. They had this two million acre cotton farm in the Gezira where we wanted the extension offices. When we made a reconnaissance survey of the farmers in the Gezira, we found out that some of their practices were not giving them maximum returns. We organized the extension program around food crops. But we had an Extension Information Officer in Khartoum, which was a strategic input at that time. He and his counterpart organized some slides and film and we used them in educational meetings throughout the Extension Service project area. That was the way we got an entrée into that area. In Khartoum Province, where the Shambat Institute was, the program was organized around information. We were bringing farmers into Shambat for field days and show them a variety of vegetable crops and practices. In Elobeid, Kordofan Province, we organized a demonstration in a village about 60 miles from there. We set up demonstration farms there too. We brought in seeds from the United States. USDA backstopped us on selecting seed varieties that they thought would do well, and I must admit we didn't fail on any. We had extension advisers posted in the capital, who taught cultural practices conducive to the region..

Eventually, they requested a Home Extension Agent. I said, “We can get you one, but tell me with whom will she work. We can't bring one unless there is a Sudanese counterpart. So you're going to have to find a Home Economist as her counterpart.” The person we wanted was in education. But they did find somebody who was assigned to be the counterpart to the U.S. Advisor. She coordinated Home Economic programs among the Sudanese women, including 4-H Clubs with girls. The 4-H program was recommended by the Director of Education for Southern Sudan. It was begun in all elementary schools based on the project concept with food as a major.

Q: How did the demonstration farms work? Did they have the impact you had in mind?

BROADNAX: Oh, yes! Yes! Very much so. The demonstration farms revolutionized farming practices and systems throughout the Maridi area. One of the greatest impacts was the change of

crop variety that they were using, to those that we brought in on the demonstration farm. We brought open pollinated seeds so they could save the seeds. They would take these varieties back and try them.

Q: What was a Sudanese farm like in the south?

BROADNAX: Well, in the south they were small. They were primitive. In some places, they were using sticks as implements.

Q: How large a farm did they have?

BROADNAX: Some of them had an acre. Some had more. But an acre was plenty. We improved the crops they were growing — vegetable crops. And eventually, we put in a small tropical tree crops as a cash enterprise, including coffee and pineapple. We put one of those Shambat Extension Officers in charge. At the time that we had to close that program out, we had increased the farmers' income in that locality by five percent, which was a great achievement at that time. We were there long enough to learn how long it took a coffee tree to come into production — it took about three years. When they were able to sell their first crop, that was just like their first Christmas. They really went for it. There was a Lebanese merchant there who grew coffee, and he had his own coffee mill and everything, and that was a ready market for them. It went very well.

Q: Do you have any sense of scale? How many farmers participated in this program in the south?

BROADNAX: No, I don't. Every time we had a field day or a training program, it was well attended by village chiefs and their tribesmen.

Q: The impact was quite widespread?

BROADNAX: Yes. Very widespread. We had two top advisors. They didn't mind working. They didn't mind getting out in the village, teaching the junior agriculture people how they want things done. All the farmers had to do was to see it and they would do it themselves. One of the best thing that happened in the south: we had a Director of Education in the southern provinces. His name was Sir El Khaliffa El Khatum. When we went there and introduced the 4-H Program, he recommended it in a bulletin and put the American 4-H emblem—cloverleaf—on the cover. He sent it out to all of the schools. I'm telling you, shortly after that you could go along and see 4-H Club cloverleaves on different projects. Sir El.Khatim was elected President of Sudan when General Abood was ousted. He did very well. During this time, I was free to visit Army installations, and I met Army officers and everybody. President Numery, who finally became President, was a Colonel in the south when I met him. When I went back to Khartoum as AID Affairs Officer, all of those people had moved up in the various ministries. Of course, this did not have the effect it could have due to lack of objectivity, insight, continuity, and coordination .

Q: Before we get into that period, which was interesting, were there any major problems or issues you had to deal with in expanding this agricultural program?

BROADNAX: Well, I had to sell it because they always say that line of least resistance is the best thing to do, especially if you're not industrious. Many of the agricultural officers were administrators. Some of them were slow to accept the extension program. They saw this as competition to their esteem. The director of agriculture had to put the responsibility on them because they were the chief agricultural officers for the various provinces. So I visited all of them. Finally they came around. Then I had a counterpart who was in school with many of them. He'd gone to the University of Wisconsin and got his doctorate in Agricultural Extension Education. He was my counterpart and he sold it to them. But the program in the south was the thing that put everybody on notice. That it was something they needed, not only in the south, but all over the country.

Q: Throughout the south?

BROADNAX: Yes. Yes.

Q: How were conditions in the south at that time?

BROADNAX: Fine. I mean the Army was there, but they weren't mistreating anybody. They were there because that was one of their commands and that's where they had to serve, you know. The people seeing me were pleased they were going about their business. We were aware that there was a Catholic bishop, who was known to be a rabble rouser. He took offense against some of the things that the northerners were doing, and he let it be known. They got tired of him. They tried to incarcerate him. He escaped. So you had those upheavals there. I couldn't let it bother me, but I was fully aware of it.

Q: What about the competition among the different ethnic groups in the south?

BROADNAX: They were more or less located in different areas. You take the Dinkas in the area of Maridi and Yambio Districts, where this project was initiated. On the east bank, there was another group of tribesmen. There wasn't any conflict with them. In the Bhar El Ghazal Province, they were Dinkas. Dinkas are tall, slim people. Most of them go naked. We didn't have any problem with them. In the Upper Nile Province, the land wasn't too conducive for agriculture, but most people lived on the Nile River where the fish were plentiful. We encouraged that.

Q: Large nomadic livestock herders?

BROADNAX: Oh, yes. On the east bank, livestock was used to buy a wife. They had large herds, and when you got married, you had to give so many heads of cattle for a wife. Ambassador Roundtree and I visited a wedding where this was evidenced. We were invited to the village engagement party. The wife was there and the intended husband and all, and the cattle. It was a wonderful experience. We were fully accepted. We took pictures. No problem. But we knew

there was this undercurrent because there had been a mutiny there during the British rule. A lot of southerners and northerners were killed. A lot of people had never forgotten that. We were aware, but we couldn't let them know that we were aware. I think one of my successes was that I never did get into their politics. I couldn't dare get into it. In spite of what the Russians said about me, and the Egyptians at the time, and the Chinese, the Sudanese didn't buy it.

Q: What did they say about you?

BROADNAX: They told them I was a spy because I remembered faces and things too well. I never did go out by myself. That was one of the things. I told Wadie Habashi, Director of Agriculture, "When I go anyplace, my counterpart has got to go with me. You've got to give permission for him to do that. We can't do it by hanging around offices here in Khartoum." He said, "I'm glad to hear you say that." I said, "Okay."

Q: How did you find traveling throughout that area?

BROADNAX: Found it okay. I had to fly from the north to the south because that's 1200 miles. But we got transportation. We bought vehicles for extension personnel. I want to tell you this. One of the last programs I conducted before I transferred to Korea, was to teach boys and girls elementary agriculture at the Tang school. That's in the Bhar El Ghazal Province. I was there for a week. I had 30 students and a counterpart. We got along very well. We'd organized the class around an acre of land. I had seed varieties of crops that they ate. On a Friday evening, the Sudanese rebel army went in and massacred every northern merchant in that town...sixty-seven

Q: Northern merchants?

BROADNAX: Yes, that's what they did. Like carpetbaggers, they were in charge of all commerce, police, the Sudanese club and the Post and Telegraph — everything of a business nature.

Q: This was the southern army?

BROADNAX: This was the southern army.

Q: Rebel groups.

BROADNAX: Yes. They cut off communication by capturing the Post and Telegraph. They slaughtered every Northern Sudanese merchant, gate guards, and prison guards. I was about two miles away in the rest house and I heard volleys. In the city and about half an hour later I heard one right outside my rest house at the prison. That was a guard at the prison. In about ten minutes, I heard another one. They knocked off that guard and freed all of the prisoners for their army. They went out and harvested peanuts and joined the southern army. That's how they got their food and forces. So the next morning, there were four of us alive in that little town--my counterpart, my cook, my driver, and me. I asked my counterpart what happened? He told me. "You remember when we were out there in the field working with the kids? You saw a man going

up and down the road?" I said, "Yes." He said, "That was their intelligence officer. He wanted to know who you were, why you were here." So what they did, when they decided to massacre the people in the town, they threw a guard around the rest house to make sure nothing would happen to me.

Q: Your counterpart was from southern Sudan?

BROADNAX: Yes. I said, "There's a just God who secured my life then and henceforth." That was my last activity before I left for Korea. But, you know, it's ironic that two weeks before I went there Ambassador Roundtree called me to his office. He said, "Mr. Broadnax, we have a problem. My intelligence people can't travel. They are barred from traveling. You are free to travel all over the country. I want to ask you to report to me any intelligence information." After that massacre, I got back to Khartoum. Well before I got back, they heard about it and they called my wife. The Ambassador called my wife and said, "Mrs. Broadnax, where is Madison?" She said, "He's in the south." He said, "I want you to know he's okay. We had some trouble there, but he's safe. I don't know what you heard, but I want you to know he's okay." When I got back to Khartoum, I reported this and he called in his Chief of Intelligence, CIA and all those people. I debriefed them all on what I knew. I told them they were volleys and they said that was the most important thing I could tell them. If they were volleys, they knew the source.

Q: How did you feel about gathering counterintelligence?

BROADNAX: Well, I felt that I was trusted to do it. I didn't have any skepticism. If there had been some other ambassador, I would have, because I think they would have tried to sacrifice me because I was popular with the Sudanese.

Q: Wasn't there something of a gamble if you became known to the authorities?

BROADNAX: Well, if it had been an established fact, that would have played right into the hands of our adversaries. That's what they were saying all the time. But, as I say, that was the last thing I did before I left Sudan. It was time to go. What made that so interesting, I was in my house one night. My wife and I and some friends had been to a movie. We were sitting there having a drink and a Sudanese knocked on the door--tall, elegant fellow. Had his turban on. He said, "Mr. Broadnax, you don't know me, but I know you. I want to talk to you." I said, "Okay. Come in." He said, "You've got guests. I want to talk to you alone." We sat out on the patio. He said, "I want you to be aware of Mr. Wheeler. Mr. Wheeler's an agent. I work for him. We've had a falling out. But one of my assignments was to track you. I don't work for him any more, but I want you to know."

Q: Mr. Wheeler was with?

BROADNAX: He was with AID in the Program Office.

Q: What was his first name?

BROADNAX: I really don't know. I forgot. You know, that was something I shared with the Chief Officer of Intelligence. I didn't tell my wife and I didn't tell anybody in my own shop. But I was aware of it, and I appreciated it. Shortly after that, I got orders for transfer. I knew it was time to go. And I did.

Q: Let's go back a little bit and review what you thought were your accomplishments over your seven years there.

BROADNAX: I think one of the accomplishments was we trained 83 Sudanese in agriculture. I don't know how many the mission trained in education but in agriculture we trained 83. We sent them to the United States for short and long-term training. They came back and worked in the Ministry of Agriculture until opportunities came for better jobs, salary wise. They wanted to build houses and that sort of thing. Some of them went off to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and places like that. I think that was one of the best things because there's no substitute for knowledge. They were in the system and when the army took over, most of them had enough seniority to retire. They would not work for the army regime. The goodwill towards the Sudanese at that time was very high. I think for my country and for the Sudanese — in fact, my counterpart said when they gave a reception in the garden of the Minister of Agriculture, the Ambassador and all were there, he said, "I have never seen a person come to a country and learn the culture so quickly as Madison Broadnax did." The Minister of Agriculture thanked the U.S. Ambassador, through the United States, for my having been there.

Q: What did you do that made you able to understand the culture compared to what other visitors do?

BROADNAX: One thing, we were required to learn 100 hours of conversational Arabic. I had a counterpart who was in education. He and I used to sit down toe to toe and talk about it. I mean everything that happened to human beings. I said, "When you get married, what do you do? When somebody dies, what do you do?" And that sort of thing. And I said, "As a visitor, somebody dies that I know, and I want to go to the funeral, what do I do?" I became a student of the culture. I had been told that. Indeed, in education myself, I knew it was a must. I told all my advisors the same thing. I said, "Don't just work with your senior advisors. You're going to have people at all levels of the nation including people at the bottom of the ladder; you're going to have people at the middle; and you're going to have people at the top. But you've got to treat all of them equally. The same people you think are insignificant may be the same people who will save your life one day." So that was my attitude all the way through my tenure.

Q: How do you build up the extension service?

BROADNAX: It went very well. It went quicker than I thought. However, I must admit it never achieved the institutional level anticipated because of the instability of the Sudanese Government. The Abood regime was ousted, and Sir El Khatim, former Director of Education in the south was elected President. When I went back, all of the other junior officers, with whom I had worked in the south, were senior officers, many of them ministers. As I said, the U.S. Team at the time did

not take advantage of opportunities available for the U.S. objectives.

Q: Let's go to that time you returned to the Sudan, so we get the continuity of the Sudanese experience. Then we'll deal with Korea separately. What was the occasion that brought you back to Sudan? What year was this?

Returned to Sudan as AID Affairs Officer - 1972

BROADNAX: For several years, the USAID Mission was closed and all AID personnel were reassigned to other missions or AID/W. But in 1972 the political climate changed, and this prompted some discussions relative to resuming a modified AID based on some of the critical needs of the Sudan which complemented U.S. aims and objectives. Out of these discussions, it was agreed that the U.S. would send an economic team to Sudan to explore some priority assistance programs vital to the Sudanese Government at that time.

The economic team was formed, and Edward B. Hogan of PPC was designated team leader. As Deputy Assistant Director for Food and Agriculture of the Technical Assistance Bureau, and with previous Sudanese experience, I was asked to join the team. We came away with a consensus on some Food for Peace efforts and the Rahad Agricultural Diversification project. Accordingly, the team made those recommendations which were approved by AID/W.

Subsequently, I was asked to return to the Sudan as the AID Affairs Officer. I accepted the appointment and returned to Khartoum in 1972. My appointment had the approval of Ambassador Cleo Noel. However, he, together with our Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), were assassinated prior to my return to Khartoum. This placed a lull on our duties, but the decision was made to proceed with the development programs as previously agreed. We had to work with a new country team while doing business in an unusual atmosphere.

Meanwhile, the terrorists were incarcerated and were awaiting trial by the GOS. They were brought to trial, tried and released. Releasing the terrorists without U.S. approval brought a halt to our normal relations. The terrorists were apprehended in Cairo, Egypt by the Sadat regime whose stock accelerated and diplomatic relations were greatly improved.

Q: How did you find returning to Sudan?

BROADNAX: When the Sudanese found out I was on the team, you'd of thought I was the queen of somebody coming in. We had a busy week there, and one of the things the Minister of Agriculture wanted us to do was the project called Rahad. It was a diversified program, not just all cotton. He wanted me to go there and make an assessment of what the possibilities were. In fact, he went with me. That was one of the things we came back and recommended, that we support the Rahad Project and leave the equipment and that sort of thing. We came back and made that recommendation. So then they decided that they wanted to reopen the mission. That's when Sam Adams called me. He said, "I've gotten good reports on your activities when you went back there with the team. I want to know if you'd consider going out as the Aide Affairs Officer." I

told him I thought that would be an honor, but I have to discuss it with my wife. And I did, and she got along well with the Sudanese, so I ended up going back to Sudan as Aide Affairs Officer.

Q: When was this?

BROADNAX: It was in 1972. As I said, all the people I knew at this time as Junior Officers were Ministers and I had an entrée to them.

Q: These were not military personnel at the time?

BROADNAX: Some of them were military. There was Numery. He was a junior officer and he was the President. Two of my former participants were Ministers in the government.

Q: What about our relations with Sudan?

BROADNAX: It was at a standstill and finally down hill. We had a new Ambassador at that time. I was the duty officer, and was ordered to go to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to see if I could get the release of documents for those prisoners. I thought immediately that I was possibly being sacrificed because his political people should have done that. I went. The man on duty was a former Ambassador, Sudanese Ambassador to India, whom I met when I took some Sudanese there to a seminar in 1960. So we were set up there and had coffee and tea. He said, "You're not going no where, are you?" I said, "Not that I know of." He said, "We don't want you to go." I said, "Okay. What about those papers?" He said, "I can't release them." I went back and told my Ambassador that.

Q: They terrorists were in Egypt.

BROADNAX: Yes. We wanted the paper giving the details of the trial and all that. The Foreign Minister didn't release it. We wanted a copy of it, but I couldn't get it.

Q: This was a release of the report of the trial?

BROADNAX: Yes.

Q: Not of the people?

BROADNAX: No. Not of the people. The station chief of the CIA there saw the wisdom of my being there. He even told the Ambassador that he thought at this time a junior officer should have been sent. The Ambassador didn't like it but he told him nevertheless. The program was at a standstill and diminished.

Q: No projects work going on?

BROADNAX: Nothing. Other than we had the Rahad Project. That's what I worked on most of the time I was there. I wrote my backstop a letter. I didn't send him a cable; I wrote him a letter,

and told him that my being in Sudan was too expensive to the government, I wasn't doing anything and that "I recommend that my car and all of my furniture be shipped to Ethiopia for use by the Mission Director." I was transferred to Nairobi.

Q: When did you leave Sudan then?

BROADNAX: I left Sudan in 1975. Came back to the United States. Went up to Michigan State University and gave a Seminar on Title XII.

Q: Let's come to that. Let's go back to the Sudan. You said you had the Rahad Project?

BROADNAX: Yes, Rahad.

Q: Tell us about that project.

BROADNAX: It was one of the large projects— a diversified project with vegetables, peanuts, and wheat. But it needed some equipment.

Q: Irrigation?

BROADNAX: Yes. We brought out a caterpillar expert to draw up the specifications for the type of equipment that we needed at Rahad. We sent out bids on it. Caterpillar didn't get the contract, somebody else got it, but the equipment arrived in Port Sudan and they loaded it on boxcars and shipped it to Rahad. When that boxcar came through Sudan, that mammoth piece of equipment attracted everybody's attention. Of course, we had the big AID emblem on it. You could hear the people who went out to see it, say "mauna"— Arabic for American AID. That was what we had called AID. It went well, but I wasn't there. I wasn't there long enough to see how the project unfolded. We had a Project Commodity Officer who went from Nairobi up there. He reported it was being used okay.

Q: But you don't know what happened to the project?

BROADNAX: I don't.

Q: Before we leave Sudan, it might be interesting if you could give an overview of what you understood to be the agricultural situation in Sudan. It's a big order because it's such a huge place and so contrasting, but how did you find the agriculture of the country?

BROADNAX: I'm glad you asked that because I gave a seminar when I was back there as AID Director in conjunction with USIS on Sudan's potential as a world food supply. And I had their ministers in the various agricultural divisions there as spokesmen. We laid out the possibility of Sudan as the world food supply, especially for Africa with all that vast land they had. All they had to do was organize it and manage it to the fullest potential. They all agreed that this was true.

Q: What was the potential? How do you characterize it?

BROADNAX: They had good land. Plenty of excellent land. They had excellent livestock. We set up a dairy and poultry project there in Khartoum North to demonstrate that they could grow cattle, fatten them, and put them on the market, and have beef. They could grow chickens and could produce eggs, commercially.

Q: What was the main crop?

BROADNAX: Sudan's main food crop was dura, similar to sugar cane. That's what people were eating. That was their main food crop. But through the International Research Center at IRRI (International Rice Research Institute), we brought wheat and rice varieties. We didn't announce what we were driving at, but we were trying to diversify the diets and did somewhat. We got them to agree to put some of their acreage in wheat to take advantage of the water, because the farmers were wasting a lot of water. That went over very well. The Sudanese started eating wheat flour instead of dura. Bread from dura was altogether different. This was one of the topics that we talked about. Then we talked about the south. The south was a prolific agricultural region for many crops. They had the manpower, smart people, and it was just a matter of setting the priorities. They wasted too much money on the army.

Q: I guess it was during your time when the Saudi Arabians and others poured enormous sums into irrigated wheat. Was that something they were starting when you were there?

BROADNAX: They were there. And another thing, the whole north was diversified similar to part of the United States. But when they built the high dam, all that land was inundated. They had to transfer all of those people from that area to a place called Newhalfa, in eastern Sudan, which again had a great potential for growing wheat. We provided a Food for Peace Program for some of the families. They didn't eat all of it. They planted some of the wheat. I went out there on a survey with my counterpart and I saw some of the most beautiful wheatfields growing where these people had planted this wheat on irrigated fields. So the potential was there. And we knew that. And that's what this seminar was all about. It's still there. They've still got good land.

Q: I heard some question whether it was wise to try to irrigate wheat production.

BROADNAX: Well, as I said, in the Gazira, to make maximum use of the water, the water was already there, so it was being wasted. The people from IRRI came up and said yes. It wasn't just something that somebody thought. We brought the scientists from IRRI. They're the ones who said. It's something similar to the same thing in Egypt, too. Egypt wastes a lot of water from the Nile River. Oh, the Sudan is so big! And good land! We built a farm machinery center right in the heart of the dura production section, demonstrating the use of machinery and growing dura, and changing cultural practices. They were wasting land there. I mean, growing land and no intercropping or anything. We taught them that they could maximize their production and double yields if they would use farm production compatible with equipment that we were bringing in. That was another demonstration that proved helpful to them. The Minister and the Director of

Agriculture saw the benefits. But anytime there was an opportunity for multiplying the benefits, there was a military uprising. You can't do anything in a situation like that. But I wouldn't take anything for my experience.

Q: Some people describe Sudan as a potential breadbasket for the Middle East. Is that right?

BROADNAX: Well, that was the theme of this seminar that we put on. They can produce the food, but you've got to have the climate in which to do it. Political climate in which to do it.

Q: What was your understanding of the issues that kept the country so unstable?

BROADNAX: Well, the Arab against the south. Very political. The Arab north against the south. President Abood tried to calm the waters when he was President. He brought in a southerner as Minister of Animal Resource, Mr Francis Deng.

Q: Francis Deng, yes.

BROADNAX: He did a good job. We programmed an observation program in the United States for him and when he got off the plane, some of the people back in Washington said, "Oh, my god, he's a southerner." I thought that was the most asinine thing that could have happened for his observation tour. Also, this prevented him from observing animal production practices adaptable to the Sudan. We had learned through village farming practices and research data from the Yambio Research Station, that the climate in the south was conducive for a variety of farm systems.

Q: Were there any other programs or projects you haven't mentioned that you'd like to make note of?

BROADNAX: Well, as I said, we were there to help them improve agriculture. We did some other good things too. I mean, as far as getting the Sudanese to know Americans and that sort of thing. When the Russians agreed to build the Aswan Dam, and we knew the farmers' land would be inundated with water, I was invited there as an outsider to go to the northern Sudan with seven Sudanese senior officials to make an assessment of the farmers' holdings and evaluate them prior to their being relocated at what they called New Halfa. I did that, and I'll never forget it because two things happened on that trip. Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands was making a state visit, and he found out that there was this delegation there in the hotel, the Athara Hotel. He gave a State dinner for us and invited me to be his guest of honor. That was an honor I'll never forget. The following day, we drove along the Nile making our assessment, and that was the day that John Glenn made his orbit. We stayed at the rest house at the Second Cataract on the Nile River. I was hosted that night. They were singing the praises of the U.S. For this achievement. I got all the adulation and everything from that, and I felt genuinely proud in accepting this recognition for my country.

Q: What about the program? What did you conclude about your survey?

BROADNAX: We did a lot of good. We had a team out there--research people that didn't mind getting their hands dirty, we had farm machinery people who came and worked with the Sudanese hand-in-hand, and from the standpoint of public relations and the inter-cultural relations, we did a lot of good diplomatically. And we did a lot of good agriculturally too. But a lot of the research and a lot of the practices that we ushered in never got to be made maximum use of due to the upheavals. Due to the southern crises, we transferred our personnel from the southern Sudan to New Halfa where the farmers from the Wadi Halfa area had been relocated.

Q: Okay, let's turn to Korea now. When did you go to Korea?

USAID assignment in Korea - 1964

BROADNAX: I went to Korea in 1964.

Q: And you were there until ?

BROADNAX: I was there until 1968. In 1968, I had an AID's sabbatical to Cornell University.

Q: Then you went back ?

BROADNAX: Then I went back — they requested me back. After that — instead of being at Suwon where I was originally, I was Deputy Chief of the Food and Agriculture Division with the responsibility of supervising all the provincial advisors.

Q: Let's talk about the first period you were in Korea.

BROADNAX: My title was Team Leader for Research Extension and Education, and I had six advisors under my supervision. My counterpart was the Administrator of the Office of Rural Development. We were housed in the same office. We traveled together. We organized training programs together. We selected participants for training, all agreed to. Koreans are hard workers.

Q: That was in the Ministry of Agriculture?

BROADNAX: Yes. But in Suwon, not in Seoul.

Q: This was what part of the country?

BROADNAX: Thirty miles south of Seoul. It was a showplace. All of the provinces were under the Korean Office of Rural Agriculture, their agriculture people. And this was the production arm for the Ministry of Agriculture. The Research Station was there and so was the School of Agriculture, and Seoul National University also was there.

Q: What was the agricultural situation, as you found it, in Korea at that time?

BROADNAX: It was rice, rice, rice — their food crop. We had an horticulture advisor who concentrated on diversifying vegetable and viticulture industries. His expertise led to industrializing their viticulture on a par with Japan.

Q: Were the Koreans able to feed themselves?

BROADNAX: Oh yes, yes.

Q: There wasn't a major food crisis?

BROADNAX: No, no famine. None at all.

Q: What was your primary goal?

BROADNAX: Our goal was to put in place an organization capable of running their own show. And as I said, they were hard workers. If you said let's get up at 6:00 and go on a field trip, they were there. It was a pleasure to work with them, as were the Sudanese. The Sudanese — once they got in the office, they would work, but they weren't there too long. They were there from 9:00 AM to 2:00 PM. That was their custom. But the Koreans were a different breed of people. Their work habits were different. We interfaced with the people of the School of Agriculture too, because when they found out that I was a former college administrator, they would call on me to talk to their students. We had a large vegetable garden in the back of my place where we grew vegetables that they didn't know existed because they grew Chinese cabbage for their main delicacy.

Dr. Wang was an Agricultural Economist who studied at the University of Wisconsin. He was in my office once a week. We would exchange ideas on agricultural growth potentials. Here again, he would acquaint me with the culture of the Koreans, which was essential for me. We got along very well. The fine part about it was that they were convinced that the United States was an honest ally; and we were an honest counterpart for them. We utilized IRRI (International Rice Research Institute) a lot for training some of their senior people. We would program some of them to go to IRRI for the latest data on rice production.

Q: In the Philippines?

BROADNAX: In the Philippines, right. That paid off. In fact, we finally got my counterpart on the board for the Philippines. He was on the board until he died. But my first year there, we promoted that training. We emphasized training and research. We had this large administration building as a training facility.

Q: Was there any particular focus to the training?

BROADNAX: We would bring people in from the provinces; they learned about recent research data. They would come in to get the research data. Also how to obtain food production goals for

the current growing season.

Q: These were extension people.

BROADNAX: Yes

Q: They already had an extension system.

BROADNAX: Oh yes, they had one. We had set that up a long time ago. It was operating when I got there.

Q: Was it something the U.S. had helped set up?

BROADNAX: Oh yes, we did it. So these people would come in, the research people would talk to them — their extension people — information people, and they would make slides on the research findings and their application to provincial growing conditions. Then they would take the findings back to the provinces and teach them to farmers. It had a great multiplying effect.

Q: So this was a further development of the extension system?

BROADNAX: Right.

Q: Were there any particular technologies you were trying to promote?

BROADNAX: All of the newer higher yielding strains of rice, which we took from IRRI to increase their production. The strains from IRRI worked well there. They're still working well.

Q: What were some of the main bottlenecks in making the extension program effective?

BROADNAX: The transfer of personnel. You get somebody trained in one position and, if there is a promotion, they went on the promotion system and if he was senior for it, he went for that position. I found that perplexing but understandable at times.

Q: A lot of turnover.

BROADNAX: Right. But within the system.

Q: What about the benefit for the Korean farmer?

BROADNAX: It was wonderful. Let me tell you something. Two things happened to me when I was there at Suwon. We had a Presidential visit. President Johnson made a state visit. And Suwon being the showplace for U.S. VIPs, I had to help with the program.

Q: So it was a major area of U.S. visits.

BROADNAX: That was something we could show off. It was an investment that everybody could see was functioning. I had an interesting experience with President Johnson's expediter. He came and he thought that I could just do this unilaterally. Every day while he was there we were planning the visit. The planner would come down from Seoul and they'd stop in Suwon and pick me up. We'd go down to a place called Anyang Hill. It was a place we had chosen for the President to go. It was right at the top of a farming center. It was in the fall and the Koreans turned out every elementary school to come there to see and hear President Johnson. When President Johnson came, he was programmed to stay there 40 minutes. He stayed an hour and 40 minutes. Dean Rusk kept reminding him that "you are over your time." He said, "We'll just cut out some other part of the program." He got there and he and the Chief of that village got into it and he looked around and as far as he could see were these school kids standing, listening to him talk. It was in October and the rice harvest and everything was a golden yellow. One of the most beautiful scenes you've ever seen. Johnson was impressed. He was very impressed. He asked the chief of the village if he wanted to go for a ride. The Chief of the village thought he asked him if he wanted to go to the United States. So he took the Chief for a ride. The Koreans felt good that they were able to host the President of the United States and that he took time to spend so much time with them. I think that was a big plus for the United States, and the U.S. AID Mission to Korea.

Q: Was the development of that area largely the result of U.S. assistance?

BROADNAX: Yes. Definitely.

Q: Farming assistance, varieties, and all that?

BROADNAX: Yes. Mainly training the Koreans. They're the ones who had to do the job. We provided a research advisor, a horticulture advisor, an education advisor, and an extension advisor.

Q: How large an area were we working in?

BROADNAX: All over the country.

Q: But in the Suwon area, particularly.

BROADNAX: Right. Suwon was the backstop for the production program in the country. It went very well. But as I said, the visit of the President was a big plus for us. Another VIP visit was Secretary of Agriculture Freeman.

Q: Did you meet with President Johnson when he was there?

BROADNAX: Well, the onus was on me. If that program had failed, I'd have been fired. I knew it.

Q: Did you talk to President Johnson?

BROADNAX: I just met him. I shook his hand because the fact is, the CIA man told me not to get too close to the President. I said, "Well, you know, it just so happened that I organized this program." He said, "You heard what I said." I said, "Yes." Anyway, President Johnson felt good over it. He felt good at his reception and everything. And so did Secretary Freeman when he came. Secretary Freeman landed on our helipad where we had cars there and took him right to the conference center. He's a politician, you know. He and Soapy Williams are about the same. The Koreans were impressed with the President and the Secretary of Agriculture — that was a big thing. They went over very well. They enjoyed it, too.

Q: You came back--let's talk about Cornell in a minute--but you came back again in what year? You came back to Korea in what year? Your second round?

Return to Korea in 1969

BROADNAX: The second round, I came back in 1969.

Q: What was your role then?

BROADNAX: I was the Assistant Chief of Agriculture in the Seoul office for field operations, supervising nine provincial advisors.

Q: I was going to ask how big a staff and program did you have?

BROADNAX: We had nine provinces and an advisor in each province.

Q: How big a budget did you operate with; do you remember?

BROADNAX: No, I don't, but it was adequate. We had two good Mission Directors--Joel Bernstein and Henry Costanzo. Costanzo was the one who requested me to come back after Cornell.

Q: Did you have a particular program you were trying to promote while you were in that position?

BROADNAX: Only the increased food production and get the Koreans to use chemical fertilizer instead of the honey buckets. We did that. In the province around Pusan, the Army had a contract to buy food from the Korean farmers. So the horticultural advisor introduced viticulture. We'd build these greenhouses for viticulture that would keep the heat in so he could get growing seasons which confined heat. That went over very well. We got them to use chemical fertilizer. The Army bought all their vegetables as a result of that change.

Q: What were the conditions for farming in Korea? I always had a picture of it being very difficult. A harsh situation.

BROADNAX: Well, they did rice paddy farming and you know the Korean seasons are just like it is the U.S. The farmers were very good. As I said, we saw that some of their seed varieties weren't of the best and that's why we brought them in connection with IRRI, so we could get the best rice strain, and we increased their production.

Q: Apart from rice, what other crops were particularly significant?

BROADNAX: Vegetables. Fruits. We had a vegetable research sub-station. We experimented with different types of fruits and vegetables. I guess the one that was most productive was grapes. I know it was, because it led to the establishment of a winery, with Suntory Japan. That was productive.

Q: Our overall program must have been very, very large. Didn't we dominate the agricultural scene at that time?

BROADNAX: Our programs?

Q: The USAID Program.

BROADNAX: Yes. It was. Joel Bernstein set that up with the Finance Minister when he was there. They requested a U.S. advisor for each department. That was a plus for us. We had a good staff.

Q: These advisors were working with the extension service?

BROADNAX: Extension was the main thrust. All of these people had extension experience. All of them. They were counterparts to the government from each province. There were some political attachments to it.

Q: But the system of agricultural service was essentially patterned after the U.S.? Very much the same?

BROADNAX: Yes. Definitely. Here again, not so much as to the one-on-one, as we used to do in the United States, visiting farms. We did it through demonstrations. Mass training programs. That's why we had this training center at headquarters, and bringing people in.

Q: Farmers and everybody?

BROADNAX: Yes. Farmers and workers. And we would go out with a follow-up program to the provinces, which had their own training set up. The multiplying effect, I thought, was excellent.

Q: You had the university involved in teaching?

BROADNAX: The university played a role in graduating the personnel. The personnel — most of them we got — were university graduates.

Q: They were involved in the extension program?

BROADNAX: No. That was Office of Rural Development. That was the Office of the Minister of Agriculture with that responsibility.

Q: That was the policy of the Korean Government to promote rural development as well as a big emphasis on industry?

BROADNAX: Very positive. President Park Chung Hee was always ahead of his ministers. He was out front. He'd make a speech and we would always say if the Korean agriculture kept up with the President, everything would be okay. He was a good leader. Too bad that they killed him. They would have rice planting, you know, every year. He'd come and take his shoes off and get right out in the paddy and work with them.

Q: Anything else about your Korean experience you want to add?

BROADNAX: As I said, it was a different one from Sudan. But also a positive one. I was enjoying it so much until I got notice that I had been appointed as Deputy for the Office of Agriculture back in Washington, I didn't want to go.

Q: Well, we'll come to that. Let's talk about what you were doing at Cornell in the middle of this Korean time?

BROADNAX: I got a sabbatical. I wasn't a Diplomat-in-Residence, I was a student. I went and took a full load of graduate studies--Economics, Sociology, and Extension Education. And everybody thought I was crazy. I said, "I think I might want to go back to academia one day." So my professor said, "Anytime you want to do it, we'll trade positions." But I was a student. I always did enjoy studying.

Q: A one-year program.

BROADNAX: Yes. One academic year. That was a good experience. I met a lot of good people there. Met a lot of good people from the Rockefeller Foundation. That's how I met Dr. Cliff Wharton. I was there when we had the student uprising. Cornell has never been the same since. I think for the best. At the close of my school year, I got word that I was to serve on an evaluation panel in Washington prior to going back to Korea. I did that.

Q: How did you find serving on that panel? I assume you were covering agricultural themes or more general?

BROADNAX: No. Not only for agriculture. What we had--we had a panel--the Director of

Personnel at the time had some trouble spots. He wanted a panel to review — a lot of people had been selected out — and he wanted a panel to review it and make a recommendation to him. Of the six people we reviewed, we recommended an overturn of five. Only one that we agreed probably ought to be selected out. One was a Mission Director in Jamaica. He'd been in Jamaica, his most recent post. We read all of the reports and everything, and we felt that he, along with several others, were being railroaded.

Q: How did you find the panel system?

BROADNAX: I found it very interesting. I was fortunate. I went out--my appointment was limited when I went to Sudan. Before my tour was over, I had a permanent appointment. I had to evaluate all of the people under me, which wasn't exactly a new experience because I had to do it for college faculty. I knew what to look for when I got on this panel. I could see personal things creeping in, you know. Ralph Gleeson was on the panel and another Engineer who is dead now. Can't think of his name. Anyway, there were three of us. We had complete agreement on what we had done. Fortunately, one of the fellows that was railroading a technician, I ended up evaluating him when I came to AID Washington. He never knew that I had that information.

Q: Do you think it was a fair system?

BROADNAX: Yes, I do. I think it was fair. You know, human elements will get into these things, but you've got to have a panel that can see through that. I served on that panel and I was sent back to Washington to serve on one after that from Korea.

Q: Let's turn to your Nairobi experience. What years were you in Nairobi?

Title XII Officer, USAID/REDSO, Nairobi - 1976-1978

BROADNAX: I was in Nairobi from '76 to '78.

Q: What was your function?

BROADNAX: I was appointed as Title XII Officer.

Q: What's that mean?

BROADNAX: That was, you know, the 1975 Food Program, called Title XII in the legislation. That's how it got its name. That's what I was supposed to go out there and promote and find senior officials in agriculture that could qualify for training under the Title XII concept.

Q: You were assigned to the REDSO, right?

BROADNAX: REDSO, right.

Q: You served a whole region.

BROADNAX: Right. Princeton Lyman's (Chief of the Development Resources Division in the African Bureau) idea was to have a Title XII officer in the REDSO region — one in Abidjan and one in Nairobi. But then, when the politicians heard about it, they took an exception to it. They said they better find something else for me to do because they didn't want me doing that.

Q: Congress?

BROADNAX: No, some of the politicians back in Agriculture. Anyway, that left me pretty much free to do what I wanted to do. Meanwhile, a cable came in suggesting that REDSO respond to a request from the Government of Djibouti to explore some agricultural assistance possibilities. I went to Djibouti.

Q: That's a tough one.

BROADNAX: You talk about tough. It's worse than tough. As soon as I got there and I went over the country, I just told them that it didn't have any possibilities for agriculture.

Q: What kind of a situation?

BROADNAX: It was just dry. No water. But there was a French hydrologist, and I told the Embassy people, "Before I give them my opinion, I want to talk to this French hydrologist." So I went to Bordeaux, France. That's where he was. And we talked. I said, "When are you coming back to Djibouti?" He told me. He came back. So he and I went all over these areas. So I went back and told the Ambassador, "The answer is the same. I think they're wasting their time talking about developing agriculture here. They just don't have the land resources for it." We finally brought out a soil scientist from the Philippines and a hydrologist from the Geological Survey here in Washington. Everybody agreed. So we finally ended up recommending a fisheries project. The last I heard, it was going very well.

Q: But there was no potential for any kind of agricultural reproduction?

BROADNAX: They didn't have any water! No water. That was the thing.

Q: How did the people survive?

BROADNAX: They were living on cattle. Fish and imports. Then, the next time, the Ambassador in Nairobi called and said he'd like me to go to the Seychelles. And I went. There again, there was a minuscule land resource, but they had a research station. They were trying to grow a new crop. But their germ plasm was poor. What I recommended for them was an information communications project. They had a technician in USDA who was very good. She came out. Developed a project for them. The project, so far as I know, went very well.

Q: Why did you select that over other things?

BROADNAX: Because of the diversity of the country. They needed a system whereby they could communicate with the farmers in the areas where there was good land. Then there was an offshore island with good farm potential, but you had to have a boat to get there. That was kind of costly, but with the communication system, we developed a capacity to produce leaflets to send out to the farmers.

Q: Was it a very diverse agriculture?

BROADNAX: What they had was. But it was minuscule.

Q: What was the best opportunity?

BROADNAX: The best opportunity was food crops that were imported at a high price.

Q: Did they just mainly lack information?

BROADNAX: We tried to get the maximum of what they had. That was the purpose of the information. They had a research station, researching root crops — cassava. A former colleague of mine from Korea was at the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) — Ibadan, Nigeria. He attended Michigan State, too, and was a specialist in roots and tubers. I made a request to IITA for Dr. Khan to meet me in the Seychelles to review their research project. As a result of that, he brought in new cassava varieties, and increased the production four fold over what they were getting. That was one of the breakthroughs there. I also took the opportunity to go to Mauritius. I wanted to go there to visit with the people at the College of Agriculture. They had something they called the Extension Program.

Q: What were the conditions in Mauritius?

BROADNAX: Well it was a mix. Everybody was sitting around there in the office with shirts and ties, but I didn't see any activity of anybody doing anything with farmers. They grow a lot of sugar cane and that sort of thing. But they needed a credit program where they could make small loans. We recommended that.

Q: Did they have an extension system?

BROADNAX: They had what they called an extension system. I wasn't impressed with it. But I did meet with the fellow in charge of the credit program. A earnest young man. I went back and recommended some assistance. We had a Contract Officer in REDSO, and I explained it to him and he agreed with it, so we did get some credit assistance out there. The population was a mixture of Chinese, Japanese, Indians. The Ambassador was happy to see us. He said to me, "I assume that Washington knows you are here." I said, "I don't know whether they do or not." He said, "Well, anyway, welcome. We're glad you're here." There were three of us including Helen Soos

and Dr. Billings both were economists out of Vassar and Michigan State respectively. Soos was very good at writing and putting things together, so we wrote our recommendation before we left and gave it to the Ambassador. It was this credit program that I was talking about.

Q: We started a credit program?

BROADNAX: Well, no there was need for some assistance. There was an office in Kenya which provided the funds. I can't think of what it was now. But they got their seed money out of USAID/ Washington. We recommended a small donation from that and they were happy to get it.

Q: But otherwise we were providing technical assistance?

BROADNAX: That was it.

Q: So it was short-term limited.

BROADNAX: Yes.

Q: Other assignments?

BROADNAX: I went to see the Mission Director in Somalia, who had been in Sudan as Assistant Program Officer when Brown was there as the Program Officer. Anyway, he was the Mission Director. He wanted me to come up and review a program — Food for Peace Program that he wanted to get going in Somalia. The Food for Peace Program was to ameliorate hunger in Somalia. I went there for that. Only one trip. That was enough.

Q: Any particular conclusion you reached about the program?

BROADNAX: In Somalia? They had some good people, and we recommended that they come to Washington for a seminar, and they did. The most promising one came, but got back to Somalia and took a program job with the UNDP somewhere in Latin America, I think.

Q: He didn't last very long.

BROADNAX: No.

Q: Great problem.

BROADNAX: Also, I was trying to keep the peace between the Mission Director and REDSO. That was tough. But earlier on I was on TDY in Nairobi for review of the extension teaching syllabi at Edgerton College. During this assignment Mr. Isaac Oquirri, who had visited me in West Virginia, gave a luncheon for my wife and me to meet President and Mrs. Jomo Kenyatta, President of Kenya.

Q: What was the problem between the REDSO and the USAID Mission?

BROADNAX: Well, turf and a misunderstanding of agency goals there. That's what it was. Truth. Here I was the Senior Agricultural Officer, but I was forbidden from working with the Kenyan Senior Ministers of Agriculture. So we had a International Livestock Station there, and I knew the Director. So I spent my time there productively, too.

Q: What were you doing with that?

BROADNAX: Well, more or less liaison. Back when I was in AID/W, my job was to help set up these International Research Stations. And I was familiar with that. So when Golar Butcher (Assistant Administrator, Africa Bureau) came to Nairobi, I told her about my plans for retirement. I told her, "My time is running out." She said, "What?" I said, "My date for retirement is when I'm 64 years old." She said, "When is that?" I said, "I'll be 64 years old February 9, 1979." She said, "What do you want me to do?" I said, "I want TDY back in Washington to finalize my work preparatory to orderly retirement." She called that same night. You gave orders to bring me in. I came in and got everything in order. So on the 31st of January, all of my retirement papers and everything were done. I told everybody goodbye, and they said, "We've got to give you a party." I said, "No, not in your life." They said, "Why?" I said, "Because you tax these secretaries the same amount you tax these high-paying technicians. It's not fair. You're not going to do that on me."

Q: For the party, you mean?

BROADNAX: Yes, Right. I went to the Comptroller. Everything was in order. They said, "You've got a sizeable check coming. You going to come back and get it?" I said, "No, I've got a good mailman. Just put it in the mail." It was for \$10,000. And I walked out.

Q: Didn't you work in the Technical Assistance Bureau at that time?

BROADNAX: That's what I'm talking about. Yes, before I went back to Sudan. That's where I was. I was in AID Washington.

**Work with the USAID Technical Assistance Bureau as
Deputy Director of Agriculture - 1970-1972**

Q: Right. What was that position?

BROADNAX: Deputy Director of Agriculture in the Food and Agriculture Office.

Q: For the whole agency?

BROADNAX: Yes in the Technical Assistance Bureau. Omar J. Kelly was my chief.

Q: What was that job? What were you supposed to be doing?

BROADNAX: I was his assistant. I supervised the technicians.

Q: Any particular programs?

BROADNAX: No. The main thing we were working on was backstopping and making a case for the international research stations.

Q: You were working on those?

BROADNAX: Right. That was my main accomplishment.

Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research

Q: CGIAR Stations.

BROADNAX: Right. We would have seminars and explore development strategies for the regions. So while I was there, the wheat rice stations were operative, e.g. CIAT and IRRI. We planned other stations for livestock in Kenya and Ethiopia, and tropical agriculture in Ibadan, Nigeria and a potato station in Lima, Peru.

Q: How was it decided to add these new institutions? What was the understanding that led to creating more of them?

BROADNAX: Well, we had come to the conclusion that what developing countries needed at that time was new vegetable strains, new germ plasmas, new livestock breeds, new methods of disease control. We had a Title XII committee composed of USAID and Land Grant Colleges with Dr. Cliff Wharton as Chairman. That's how we got those stations set up. I was the delegate to IRRI's 10th anniversary, and I had an audience with the Chinese Reconstruction Office in Taipei. On that same trip, I went back to Korea for a seminar that was going on at the time in food production at ORD. From Nairobi I went to Ethiopia to the livestock center and I went to a UNDP Conference in Ibadan, Nigeria and visited with the people at IITA there. Some field trials were organized by IRRI scientists with farmers in Nigeria and the Cameroons.

Q: How do you rate the significance of these international research institutions?

BROADNAX: Well, they're paying off. The investment is a good one. I do follow up and I get some literature once in a while. They're going good. My Korean cassava scientist has retired from IITA, but he set up a good root and tuber program there. I don't know what is happening in the Seychelles. Under those stations, we had a satellite program, and we had one in the Seychelles. I tried to set up one in the Sudan, but things fell apart. It just didn't work out, for obvious reasons. But we got good feedback from our wheat program in Mexico and the rice program in IRRI.

Q: Were there any major issues you had to deal with while you were in that program?

BROADNAX: No. I was, as I said, my major concern was doing so much paper work back in Washington to get those programs funded. When I visited them, I went to see if our investments were good, and they were. For the most part, we had national scientists running them, which was what we wanted in the first place. I had an occasion in Nigeria to visit some of the farmers where they had field trials with farmers. It was very successful.

Q: Okay. You retired in what year?

BROADNAX: 1979.

Post-retirement assignments - 1979-present

Q: Did you have many assignments after your retirement?

BROADNAX: I had some TDY assignments. I went back to the Seychelles, the Caribbean, Guyana, Egypt, and Yemen. I'll never forget the one in Egypt.

Q: What was that?

BROADNAX: Well, there was a program there that had to do with Extension Mechanization. They had a person in charge on the Egyptian side who was kind of a tough character to deal with. He treated me alright, but on our consulting team we had an Egyptian woman. She was the daughter-in-law of a scientist with whom I had worked in the Arab Agricultural Organization in Khartoum. But she held her own. The program was on track, but I thought the gulf between the Egyptian people there who were in charge of the program and some of his personal animosity against some of our program people were off base. Our program people were right. For instance, we had a request to provide some tools, so we went to the local market and found out the tools were right there on the local market. We felt they shouldn't use U.S. dollars. They could use their own money to buy them.

Q: So you provided some very specific advice on ?

BROADNAX: I just made my recommendations through consultants that the Egyptian government should make a greater effort to procure commodities from local merchants.

Q: Well, any other comments about TDY times?

BROADNAX: I enjoyed those. In Egypt, I assumed I was having some medical problems, and I took care of that as soon as I got home — successfully, too.

Observations on foreign assistance

Q: Let's step back and look at the broader picture. What is your view of the U.S. contribution--and you were very much a part of that--to agriculture development in various parts of the world?

BROADNAX: I think it was essential that the U.S. Government got into agricultural development at the time it did. It was timed during the cold war. It was a time when we needed friends and to influence people. One of the best ways of doing it was communicated through showing our sincerity in helping people to help themselves. To do that, we had to take the initiative which was a plus for us, because people in foreign cultures, when you take the initiative, they may try to work it over, you know, but the idea that you advanced in the first place is the thing that stays with them. That was one of the things that I always kept in the forefront. In all of my dialogues, visitations, and discussions with technicians, counterparts, and governors, because in every province I visited I had to meet the governor. And I got a lot of information too, by doing so. One governor, I remember got to the point where we were on a personal basis. He'd say, "Madison" in talking to me. He was a descendant of the Mardi Sect of the Sudan.

Q: What would you say were some of the universal lessons that over the years you found were appropriate for being effective in working in development?

BROADNAX: Number one is that you have to relate to people, regardless of their station in life. In doing that, I thought it was important to make a case for the United States and how our agricultural program got started, and how we assisted our rural population through agriculture, and their response to it. And that this was not a gift, because in our system, people pay taxes. I said in people paying taxes, this accrued back to them, because the government provides people to work with them. That's a big plus for the United States because the United States invested in people. I told the people in the Sudan, I told the people in Korea, and I told the people in Nairobi that the best thing they could do was to invest in people. When I went on that consultant project in Yemen, I told them that was the biggest asset they had.

Q: What's another?

BROADNAX: When we send people out, they can't be narrow beings. They must have an overall view of this policy. In their own technical way, they can reveal this in their dealings with people. They must be aware of it; they must know it. That's the only way they can take the initiative in doing some of the things we've been successful in doing in the United States. From a UNDP Conference in Ibadan, Nigeria, I visited the USAID Mission in Accra, Ghana where you were the Director and Jim Ford was food and Agriculture Officer. Remember that? I had met a Ghanaian scientist who invited me to visit with him, too, while I was in Accra. I told him I was going to stop by the Mission. He wanted me to come by the Minister of Agriculture to see him, but I don't think while I was there, he had returned to the country. He had been to the United States. He said, "There's one thing I learned in the United States. The United States provides assistance to its farmers. They do it continuously through their research programs in the Land Grant colleges." I said, "That's right. You're exactly right. I wish some of our developing countries would do the same thing to the extent they can." He thought that was the thing to do. I had been to the

Minister of Agriculture Program in Dar Es Salaam and in Edgerton College in Nairobi. I used those two institutions--I said they had been developing and we had sent those people to the United States and those people are back now at home, running those programs. Some of them are ministers of agriculture and technicians, and things like that. I said, "If the United States has done any good in our development program, that's the type of thing we want. We want to work ourselves out of a job, but we want you to do it."

Q: You made a point earlier, several times, about the importance of understanding the local scene. You want to elaborate on that?

BROADNAX: Yes. I'll tell you what made me realize how important it was. I stopped in Libya on my way to Sudan, my mission. They took me out to see a well project. There was this farmer out there with this irrigation demonstration. And he said, "Sayed Mohammad." He thought I was Arab. My advisor told him, "He's not Arab." He wanted me to interpret. I realized then I'd better learn some Arabic as soon as possible. When the Embassy in Nairobi made it mandatory that we take 100 hours of Arabic, it was the best thing for me. When I got a U.S.-trained Ph.D. as a counterpart, we could talk about a lot of these cultural things.

Q: You spoke in Arabic?

BROADNAX: He spoke perfect English. He'd been to the University of Wisconsin, got his Ph.D. He'd gotten his degree in extension education. We had a fellow in horticulture who'd gone to UCLA. The fellow who went to UCLA, my very good friend. He passed away two years ago, he spoke fluent English. We used to talk about the culture, even down to dating. I said, "How do you go about dating?" And one of them, Dr. Ahmed Bedri was single, you know. He said, "The modern Sudanese girl wants to go on dates like you do in the United States but within cultural boundaries of the Sudanese culture. They're not pulling any bones about it." We went to a party one night. Ahmed and his date, and Yousif Abu Sumra, who became one of my good friends, and his date. Both of them were single and respected Arab gentlemen. They said, "Can we go to your house?" My wife said, "Yes." They stayed there till 3:00 o'clock in the morning. These were the kind of things that gave an insight as to the culture and essential for respect and cultural exchange. I made it my business to discuss these things because I didn't want to exceed the social boundaries or pull any boo boos. I was fortunate to have a counterpart who spoke English, who had been to the United States, so we could talk about some of these things on a friendly basis.

Q: What about in the agricultural area? Are there any lessons from your work in trying out agricultural programs in developing countries?

BROADNAX: You've certainly got to make an assessment of what the problems are. You can't do it yourself; the government must make an investment in personnel. If the United States had knowledge worth transferring to a culture, the government has to make people available. If you train people, they will carry the development projects forward after the US technicians have left the country. Therefore, US advisors must have counterparts to work with. You just can't do it on your own.

I'll never forget Jim Beeson, our Ag. Research Advisor who came to us from the USDA Research Service — our Research Advisor in Nairobi. He came out. He worked with the Kosti extension agents on the production of Irish potatoes, which was a novelty. We imported some potatoes and Jim Beeson visited Kosti and taught those junior agricultural officers how to plant Irish potatoes.

He got out there with his hands, which they had never seen before, and the crop turned out to be very good and productive. That's one of the assets of the U.S. agriculture, regardless of how many Ph.D's you have. We don't mind getting our hands dirty in order to teach something. I think that was definitely an asset.

Q: How would you size up your career?

BROADNAX: I was successful. And I say that because, even today, I get correspondence from people with whom I worked. In fact, I owe some correspondence right now to the people in the Sudan, but I'm holding off on that because of the political situation between us and the Sudan at this time. I don't want to put any of their people in jeopardy. The people in Korea were forthcoming. We correspond with them and they remember us. Their agriculture is productive.

Q: How did you find AID as an organization to work for?

BROADNAX: The original Point Four Program — I think Truman had it right. That was the kind of thing that we knew how to do and would do it well. But then we added other development areas to satisfy the politicians, later on we had to add on these other entities--military and so forth and all like that. That kind of diluted it. But I understand why we had to do it. But I think the investment that the United States made was a good one and I go along with some of the new initiatives that we're taking now. It's a different world from '58. We have to remember that.

Q: If some young man or woman who was in the agricultural field came to you, would you recommend to them that they get into international development?

BROADNAX: I would tell them to go for it.

Q: Is there a role in agriculture?

BROADNAX: In agriculture, politically, ambassadorship, everything.

Q: But particularly in agriculture?

BROADNAX: Yes. Yes. Definitely. Sure would. You know, one of the best assets that we have in the field is the Peace Corps. Sorry to say, some of the Ambassadors don't know how to use the personnel to the advantage of the United States. That's an important organization. They were in the Seychelles when I went there, and doing a good job. Not backing off from getting their hands dirty or anything. They were in South Korea and Ethiopia, too doing programs the governments desired and appreciated.

Q: Any last comments?

BROADNAX: Well, my overall assessment is that I had a good career and I came out of it healthy. I didn't get sick, although I did get sick with an abscess in the Sudan, but fortunately the regional surgeon from Ethiopia was there, and he recommended a local surgeon who was highly recommended by the U.S. Board of Surgery. "Instead of shipping you off to Germany," he said, "go on over to the Khartoum hospital and let them do it." And I did. That was the only sickness I had.

Q: Well, I think we've covered a lot of ground.

BROADNAX: I enjoyed it!

Q: It was an excellent interview and I thank you very much.

BROADNAX: You're welcome.