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**FOOD SECURITY AND DONOR
COLLABORATION ON POLICY
PERFORMANCE**

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFDB	African Development Bank
AID	Agency for International Development
CEC	Commission of European Communities
CG	Consultative Group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GCA	Global Coalition for Africa
GNP	Gross National Product
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IWG	Inter-Agency Working Group
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MFI	Multilateral Financial Institution
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NTA	New Transatlantic Agenda

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OED	Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank)
SADC	Southern Africa Development Conference
SPA	Special Program Assistance for Africa
TA	Technical Assistance
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United National Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNHRC	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USTA	United States Trade Agency
WFP	World Food Program
WTO	World Trade Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The second World Food Summit was held in Rome in November of 1996. At the Summit a broad-based development agenda was adopted keyed to the objective of achieving greater world food security. The United States is now engaged in formulating a special national plan setting forth U.S. strategy and programs for participating in the implementation of the Food Security agenda adopted in Rome.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this Food Security paper is to provide senior decision makers in the U.S. Government, especially the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development with an assessment/evaluation of organizations and mechanisms available for U.S. collaboration and coordination on food security.

THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT

A premise underlying all discussion on coordination, especially collaboration with the developing countries, is the belief that achievement of food security objectives is inextricably linked to the adequacy of their policy environments. The developing country has the primary responsibility for establishing this policy environment, BUT the donors are increasing allocations of aid resources to the good performers--a trend that will be especially relevant to food security programs.

THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

Increased world globalization, the shrinking size and role of the United States' bilateral development assistance, the predominant position of the U.S. in world agriculture, and the continuing dominant role of the U.S. in the world political and economic arenas are all factors influencing the U.S. role in food security.

The Secretary General of OECD underlined the need for coordination in his speech at the Rome Summit stating that " To achieve the goal of food security it is vital that we take a global perspective. Food Security cannot be pursued effectively by countries in isolation. It requires international cooperation and coordination. " In this context, coordination and collaboration among donors and developing countries is essential if the objectives set forth at the World Food Summit in 1996 are to be achieved. Such coordination is especially critical to the achievements of specific U.S. objectives in food security. The U.S. is now a minor donor in areas where food security issues are most critical e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia and budgets are continuing to shrink.

The U S needs full support from the international institutions, especially the UN, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the OECD/DAC Support from the European Union and national governments is also critical both in the northern countries and the developing world International coordination is key to obtaining such support

COHERENCE OF POLICY & STRATEGY WITHIN THE U S IS IMPERATIVE

The first and possibly highest priority objective in any strategy for international coordination on food security is to ensure that the U S itself has developed an agreed "coherent" policy and strategy within the U S Government Without such "coherence" the U S will inevitably begin to speak with different voices in the multitude of international forums engaged in food security matters This process will assuredly undermine the achievement of overall U S objectives by sending mixed and occasionally contradictory signals to other governments A process must be in place to develop and maintain over time such a coherent strategy on food security

THE INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP (IWG)

The IWG was put in place to develop a coherent U S position for the Rome Summit and has continued to successfully provide a forum for inter-agency dialogue on food security The IWG should be continued for an indefinite period and assigned a lead role in the implementation phase of U S food security strategy

AID LEVELS

Official Development Assistance (ODA) levels range close to \$59 billion annually in concessional assistance to developing countries An additional \$9 billion was provided to Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States (NIS) In recent years ODA levels have dropped nearly 14 percent A substantial factor has been the drop in the U S levels The U S is now fourth in absolute terms and last in relative terms as a percentage of GNP The Dutch and Scandinavians contribute 8 to 10 times as much as the U S in relative terms

In the geographic area of key interest in food security, e g sub-Saharan Africa, the U S bilateral program provides an estimated 5 to 6 percent of donor flows This fact underlines the importance of coordination with the other donors who provide the remaining 95 percent

THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE FLOWS

Private flows have grown rapidly in recent years, reaching \$92 billion in 1995 They now dwarf ODA in Asia and Latin America In Africa, however, private flows are negligible and ODA dominates external transfers The lack of private flows to Sub-Saharan Africa will be a major impediment to achieving food security efforts in Africa if the situation is not remedied

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS (NGO)

NGO's now account for a substantial block of concessional assistance flows. The NGO community world-wide contributed \$5.9 billion raised from private sources in 1995. In addition, NGO's administered \$1.5 billion in ODA funds on behalf of aid agencies. The U.S. NGO community contributed \$3.4 billion of this total, a level doubled in real terms since 1982. The level of NGO contributions is comparable to the net contributions of the MDBs and the CEC respectively. The NGO community is the one block of private flows that does concentrate on Africa. The NGO community should accordingly play a prominent role in the US food security strategy.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

There are two geographic areas of particular concern with respect to food security--South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Conditions in Africa present the greatest long-term concern to food security at the present time. Africa has extremely high population growth rates, a comparatively weak agriculture sector, marginal private sector activity and a continuing problem with drought and desertification.

Food security programs must, therefore, give Africa high priority. This should be reflected in the U.S. aid strategy and in the U.S. strategy on coordination of food security.

U.S. RETRENCHMENT -- A CHALLENGE TO U.S. LEADERSHIP

The U.S. is retrenching in a number of key aspects of international cooperation.

1. U.S. levels of development assistance have dropped substantially and may decrease further.
2. The U.S. is in arrears in its obligation to the UN and its agencies.
3. The U.S. is reducing its field representation in its AID program.

In addition, within the U.S. bilateral program, agriculture programs have been reduced and cooperation with the U.S. agriculture sector substantially diminished. The above factors have contributed to a reduction of U.S. influence at both the UN and in international forums such as OECD and DAC where considerable bilateral dialogue takes place. In the developing countries, the reduction of U.S. staffing weakens the historically strong influence of the U.S. with other bilateral donors and with the developing countries themselves. This will be especially critical in Africa where other donors provide the bulk of the resources.

The reduction of U S attention to agriculture issues also weakens the ability of the U S to use its bilateral program to influence agriculture in the developing countries It has also contributed to a loss of support for the AID program per se by the influential agriculture community, including the land grant university segment

AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

The following are some of the key points discussed in the Food Security paper outlining an agenda for improving the effectiveness of U S international coordination around the food security issue

1 The top prerequisite for any successful effort at coordination is to reach and maintain an agreed U S position on food security This requires close inter-agency cooperation The IWG provides an effective forum for this purpose and should be continued indefinitely and assigned the primary role in coordination of the implementation of the U S food security plan

2 U S credibility with other bilateral donors, with the multi-lateral institutions and with the developing countries themselves is a matter of concern in formulating any international coordination strategy The U S must assign a high priority regarding the problems of U S arrears to the UN and U S participation in IDA Continuing decrease in bilateral aid levels must be stemmed Within the U S aid program, increased priority must be assigned to programs in geographical areas critical to achieving U S objectives

3 The USAID program must reestablish agriculture as an important priority area Increased agriculture programs should be part of the dialogue with Congress on increasing aid levels

4 The U S Food Security strategy should clearly recognize the time frame involved in any successful international effort to address food security needs A 20-year time frame is appropriate

The U S must also support the concept that food security can only be achieved in the context of sustained broad-based economic development The Rome Summit recognized this fact in its plan of action The U S should, therefore, embrace the growing consensus that the common themes of the numerous recent World Summits can be combined into a broad-based strategy of sustained economic development

The DAC 21st Century document is such a strategy and is already endorsed by the bilateral donor governments At the 1998 high level DAC meeting, the U S should firmly press for endorsement and incorporation of food security as a primary objective of the 21st century strategy

5 The U S should highlight sub-Saharan Africa as the high priority area for improving food security The U S bilateral aid program should be reexamined in this context The African Food Security Initiative of AID might be broadened and assigned a higher priority as a major U S initiative

Since U S bilateral aid is only 5 to 6 percent of donor flows, the U S must rely on international coordination to influence development in Africa The USAID program should also reexamine the key coordinating role of AID field missions and assess the cost in lost influence by further reductions in field posts

6 While the U S has admittedly undermined its influence in the world's development forums through its arrearages and decreased aid levels, the U S still maintains a position of primacy in the world's political and economic arenas The U S should, therefore, give priority in its coordination strategy to utilization of political-level forums where U S leadership can have a major impact on food security issues The G-8 summits and the U S /EU Summits under the NTA are two such venues Denver was a good start, Birmingham should continue the process

7 The MDBs should be encouraged to take an active role in promoting food security The World Bank, in particular, will take the lead in Africa because of the dominance of the SPA program and the relative weakness of the AFDB ADB and IADB can take a leading role in their respective regions

8 In the near future reorganization and reform at the United Nations and the related issue of eliminating U S arrears will remain obstacles to effective U S use of the UN system Over the 20-year perspective of the food security initiative substantial progress hopefully can be achieved on both issues It is important that we do this because the UN system has certain unique roles in the area of food security Many of the specialized UN agencies play a role in the broad-based agenda that emerged from the World Food Summit It would be well worth the time and effort to develop a specific agency-by-agency set of objectives related to food security for each of the UN specialized agencies First priority should be accorded to discussions with the FAO and UNDP

9 Coordination on policy performance will be a key aspect of the U S effort to tie developing country performance to the achievement of food security objectives The growing trend among donors to concentrate increasingly limited aid resources on good performers will likely accelerate This was emphasized at the recent World Bank annual meeting in Hong Kong U S strategy on coordination should look to the utilization of existing coordinating mechanisms to emphasize the importance of policy performance to food security This is especially important in Africa Existing mechanisms such as the SPA, Club du Sahel SADC, etc , are all examples of regional and sub-regional forums that could be utilized

10 The country level will be one of the central venues of coordination of any effective coordination strategy. The need for "ownership" by the developing countries has been highlighted consistently in ongoing discussions for reforming the aid process. This principle will apply to any food security programs.

The U S might support the objective of enhancing the developing country "ownership" through a variety of steps. First, The U S can strongly support the World Bank initiative of decentralization. Secondly, the U S could encourage greater attention to increasing host country capacity through more effective use of Technical Assistance. Third, the U S might encourage a reexamination of the Consultative Group process to provide the developing countries with a more prominent role in the CGs.

11 The lack of private sector flows to Africa results in a continued imbalance between official and private flows. The result is excessive dependence on donor finance and a continuing shortage of development capital to finance sustained growth in Africa. Unless the private sector becomes more active both domestically and internationally, food security efforts in Africa will be undermined. The U S can take a leadership role in promoting greater private sector development in Africa, possibly building on the recent administration collaboration with Congress on the trade and aid initiative.

12 Finally, during the interviews conducted in preparation of this report there was much discussion about which coordinating mechanism was the best. We would do well to remember that there is a wide variety of coordinating mechanisms available and each of them has its own place and potential as a forum for supporting the U S food security objectives.

Once an agreed upon strategy and action plan is achieved, the various U S government agencies and their components can selectively choose from the menu of coordinating mechanisms available to implement the U S plan. For example, the State Department might take the lead in dealing with Presidential Summits and the EU as a forum for food security issues. AID in turn might take the lead in working with the SPA, DAC, the CGs and Round Tables, and with African regional mechanisms such as the Club du Sahel. Treasury would have a primary interest in dealings with the World Bank and the regional MDBs. The Agriculture Department would have an interest in a variety of mechanisms, including WTO, the OECD, the FAO, discussions with the EU, etc.

In summary, the U S should be working the full range of coordinating mechanisms to implement its food security strategy, and should continue to look to the IWG as an oversight mechanism for assuring that this is done in a "coherent" manner.

1 0 INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this paper is to provide senior decision makers in AID, the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture and throughout the US government with an evaluation of the organizational structures and mechanisms available for collaboration between donors and recipients, linking policy performance of developing countries with donor investment priorities

The linkage between policy environment and greater food security was highlighted in the outcome of the World Food Summit. There is a continuing sense that even with increased assistance levels, food security will not be achieved in the absence of a favorable country-level policy environment. Two key points are paramount here:

1. The primacy of the recipient country's responsibility to formulate development priorities and achieve tangible development progress.

2. Recognition that development assistance is not allocated solely on the basis of need, but also gives preference to countries where the policy environment enhances the prospect of successful development investment.

BACKGROUND

In November of 1996 the nations of the world met in Rome at the World Food Summit, the most recent in a series of United Nations (UN) sponsored world summits addressing issues related to development. Prior summits include the Jomtien Conference on Education in 1990, the New York Conference on Children in 1990, the Rio Conference on the Environment in 1992, the Vienna Summit on Human Rights in 1993, the Cairo Conference on Population in 1994, and the Peking Meeting on Women in 1995.

Each of these summits has produced a detailed plan of action followed by an effort by the international community to implement the plan of action and monitor performance by the signatory countries. While each summit has had a specific focus, they have all been set against a common backdrop of rapid global development and increasing integration of the world's economies. Special attention has been given in all of these summits to the problems of the underdeveloped countries and populations where poverty exists. The common objective of achieving broad based equitable and sustainable development has encompassed most of the specific objectives emanating from the individual summits.

There is a continuing need to consolidate the outcomes of these various world summits into a plan of action which would allow the developed and developing countries to achieve tangible progress on their agreed objectives. There is an equally important need to develop tools for measuring progress and performance towards the summits' objectives. Attention here should be given to both the performance of the donor countries in meeting their commitments and the performance of the developing countries in meeting their responsibilities.

In this context we might note the recent policy report "Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation" prepared by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This report represents the consensus of the donor community on the challenges to development cooperation as we move into the 21st century. It is admittedly a perspective from the donors' viewpoint, but it attempts to consolidate the results of the various world summits into a comprehensive plan of action. The summits themselves had broad participation by the developing countries. Since the document was adopted prior to the last World Food Summit, it does not yet fully address food security. It would be desirable for the United States to encourage the DAC to incorporate the results of the World Food Summit into the 21st Century document.

COHERENCE

When we speak of coordination/cooperation, we generally refer to both the problems of coordination within the donor community and the problem of achieving more effective collaboration between the donors and their developing country partners. In past decades, the focus of development cooperation was primarily on the problems of development assistance and development priorities. The environment for development cooperation has, however, changed markedly in the 50 years since Bretton Woods and the Marshall Plan. Global integration is not only well advanced, but the pace of integration is accelerating. While development assistance dominated resource transfers in the early years, trade and private flows are far more important today, except in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, issues of shared global concerns such as the environment, drugs, international health, migration, etc., are now front and center on the cooperation agenda. Recent financial difficulties in South East Asia, its reverberations in the world's financial markets, and earlier problems in Mexico serve to emphasize the inter-dependence of the world's financial systems and the growing importance of today's advanced developing countries.

In this changing world environment, therefore, it is absolutely essential that the US set as its first priority the objective of achieving a coherent US government policy on food security and a related strategy to achieve specific US objectives. Failure to assure coherence among the various agencies and departments of the US government in support of our food security objectives will risk counter-productive actions and undermine achievement of US objectives.

The first priority, therefore, is to reaffirm the continuing need for inter-agency collaboration here at home. The Inter-agency Working Group (IWG) served this purpose in the preparation for the World Food Summit and in the work underway to finalize the US action plan. In the future, the IWG mechanism will have to maintain a prominent role in monitoring the implementation of the action plan. While the IWG is under the leadership of State, AID and Agriculture, it will need continued participation by other Departments such as Treasury, Commerce and USTA if issues such as trade, investment, and Multi-Development bank (MDB) coordination are to be effectively addressed.

Consultation on food security outside the administration focuses on both the Congress and the private sector. A congressional dialogue has been active since the preparation for the World Summit itself. Congressional consultations continue as the US food security action plan is finalized. Public consultation has been initiated through a series of regional meetings. The use of the internet for broad distribution of the proposed action plan has further strengthened the process. The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will play an important role in achieving food security. Special attention should be given to on going consultations with the NGOs in both the formulation and implementation of the action plan.

The problems of achieving policy coherence are not unique to the United States. Similar challenges face the other donor countries as well. Coherence should, therefore, be part of the international coordination agenda.

2 0 AID LEVELS AND DONOR ORGANIZATIONS

If we are to set forth an effective strategy for coordination, it will help if we highlight the resource base involved and the key organizations responsible for channeling these flows to the developing countries. Some attention must also be given to projected global trends in resource levels and to geographical and sectoral allocation of funds. From this profile we will be better able to identify primary targets within our coordination strategy.

Overall levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA), as monitored by the DAC, have ranged close to \$59 billion annually in recent years. The 1995 level was \$58.9 billion. This level does not include aid flows to Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, which accounted for an additional \$9 billion in 1995. Overall aid flows have been steady in recent years in absolute terms. *However, currency fluctuations have masked an actual decrease in ODA contributions of nearly 14% in recent years. The largest factor in this reduction is the substantial drop in US aid levels. The US has traditionally been the largest donor in absolute terms. The US is now fourth in absolute levels, behind France, Germany and Japan. In relative terms, the US as a percentage of GNP is at the bottom of the DAC member list. The Scandinavians and the Dutch now contribute 8 to 10 times more than the US as a percentage of GNP. The waning US commitment is beginning to have an impact on the US influence in the DAC and elsewhere.*

In overall resource terms the other donors account for \$51.5 billion in annual contributions compared to the US contribution of \$7.4 billion. A primary objective of US coordination efforts, therefore, should be to leverage these other donor resources to support US policy objectives such as food security.

As a footnote here we might also note that DAC estimates that bilateral assistance to the agriculture sector accounted for 12% of the overall bilateral flows in 1993 and 1994. The level was closer to 20% in the 1970s and 1980s. The downward trend in support of agriculture in bilateral programs parallels the drop within the US program. *One objective of the food security action plan might be to increase support to the agriculture sector in USAID programs and throughout bilateral programs of the other DAC members. A return to a 20% level for agriculture in 1995 would have provided an additional \$2.9 billion for agriculture programs.*

Let us now review the primary conduits for channeling ODA to the developing countries. The bulk of ODA flows is still channeled through bilateral aid programs, \$36.1 billion in concessional flows and an additional \$4.4 billion in loans. This \$40.5 billion total is almost 80% of total ODA flows. Thus, coordinating mechanisms that have a particular impact on bilateral aid programs should have a proportionately high impact on affecting the character of resource flows in the context of the food security initiative. For example, G-8 Summits can be highly influential. International bodies such as OECD/DAC, which are basically aimed at bilateral coordination, are particularly important. Individual country bilaterals, e.g. U.S. and Japan, are also good vehicles.

Multilateral flows account for the bulk of the remaining ODA. These in turn are split roughly on an equal basis among contributions to the UN system, the MDBs and the Commission of European Communities (CEC) as follows

United Nations	\$4.2 billion
CEC	5.3 billion
MDBs	
IDA	5.4 billion
Regional Banks	1.3 billion

These figures represent annual disbursements to the Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs) in 1995. Actual net disbursement levels from the MFIs to the developing countries differ slightly in level.

In reviewing the overall distribution of aid flows through the various channels it is clear that bilateral transfers continue to dominate relative to MFI contributions. The UN system and the CEC are both in the ball park with the World Bank in terms of resource transfers. Furthermore, the regional banks are growing rapidly in importance relative to the World Bank, especially in Latin America and Asia.

We might note here a continuing concern about the African Development Bank (AFDB). AFDB is a far weaker institution than its counterparts in Asia and Latin America, thus leaving the World Bank with a proportionately more important role in Africa than in Latin America and Asia.

An additional important aspect of aid flows is the question of geographical allocation. Given the high priority of food security needs in Africa and South Asia, we might ask whether aid flows coincide with these geographical priorities for food security.

The biggest recipient of assistance on a geographical basis is Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa accounts for 37% of ODA flows, but has only 13% of the population of the developing countries. Asia accounts for an additional 30.7% of ODA flows, North Africa and Middle East, 13.3% and Latin America, 12%. Both bilateral and multilateral channels assign first priority to Sub-Saharan Africa which receives 33% of bilateral aid and 44.5% of multilateral aid. US bilateral assistance to Africa is 31% of US aid levels, close to the DAC average. However, in absolute terms the US contribution in 1995 of \$1 billion was only 6% of the combined bilateral/multilateral transfers to Africa.

Africa, therefore, presents an especially important target in any aid coordination strategy. Ninety-four percent of aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa are under the control of other bilateral donors or multilateral institutions. The World Bank plays a relatively stronger role in Africa, but the CEC and the UN system also favor Africa as a recipient. Since Africa has emerged as a primary target area for improving food security, attention should also be given to specialized

regional institutions and mechanisms, such as Special Program Assistance for Africa (SPA), Global Coalition for Africa, and sub-regional mechanisms such as Club du Sahel and the Southern Africa Development Conference (SADC)

The last area of overall aid flows we might explore is sectoral allocation. We have already noted the shift in priority of the agriculture sector. Other areas of concern in the context of food security are technical assistance flows, emergency assistance and food aid, and assistance to the population sector.

Technical Assistance (TA) levels are important for two reasons. (1) At \$14.3 billion in 1995 TA flows constitute nearly 25% of bilateral aid flows and, therefore, represent a large monetary target for review in any reprioritization. Arguably, technical assistance is also one of the areas of aid in greatest need for reform. *The UN, the World Bank, and DAC have assigned a high priority to reviewing technical assistance in recent years (see Annex 5). But, much remains to be done. In addition, improved and better targeted technical assistance is essential to achieving the objective of improving recipient country capacities to manage food security issues, e.g., developing better data systems for monitoring food security at the country level. Such assistance is also crucial to developing the institutional capacity necessary to insure better overall economic performance by the developing country.*

Emergency assistance and food aid are also important claims on aid budgets. Emergency assistance in particular has grown rapidly, especially in response to refugee needs. DAC indicates in its most recent DAC Chairman's Report that these demands may have peaked in 1994 at \$8 to \$10 billion in bilateral, multilateral and military costs. Let us hope so inasmuch as they have represented an increasing drain on otherwise static aid budgets and have placed considerable budgetary strain on the UN system itself.

Population assistance is slightly over 2% of bilateral aid and has shown some slight increase since the World Summit in Cairo. The primary donor to the population sector is the US. Other bilateral donors, with the exception of Norway, have provided little support to this sector. *The population question is prominent in food security strategy and is especially critical in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa's food security problems. The US should assign to the population sector a high priority in the coordination strategy.*

PRIVATE SECTOR FLOWS

In recent years private sector flows have grown very rapidly. They now surpass public sector flows by a substantial margin. In 1995, private sector flows reached a combined level of \$92 billion, the flows have doubled in a few years while ODA remained stagnant. A considerable portion of these flows, i.e., \$53 billion, went into direct investment and a large portion went into bilateral portfolio investment. The rapid increase in private flows is welcome news after the hiatus in the 1980s and the disinvestment in regions such as Latin America. However, the private flows

have gone primarily to Southeast Asia and Latin America. These private flows have helped accelerate growth in these regions and progressively have replaced development assistance. Unfortunately, practically no private flows have taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa, thus contributing to an imbalance between public and private sector transfers. This has resulted in continued African dependency on ODA to finance growth. This problem has been compounded by Africa's inability to marshal adequate domestic resources to finance its development needs. The result is a dilemma for both Africa and donors alike. The continent has inadequate investment resources to sustain high levels of growth and is already excessively dependent on official aid. *Unless greater progress is made in promoting private sector investment, both domestic and foreign, Africa has little hope of acquiring adequate resources to finance higher rates of growth.* The target of achieving food security will inevitably be undermined if adequate growth rates are not met.

THE NGO COMMUNITY

An important portion of the private flows are those attributable to the NGO community. Achievement of food security, especially in Africa, will require close coordination with the NGOs. The breadth and scope of the NGO community is not always appreciated. There are over two thousand NGOs worldwide who are active in assisting the developing countries. In addition there is a large and growing number of indigenous NGOs who are active in both economic development and the political process. There are three characteristics of the NGO community that are of importance in the context of the food security initiative: (1) NGOs are a substantial contributor to concessional aid flows, (2) NGOs have a very strong influence on donor parliaments in both policy and budget and have been assigned a key role in development education by a number of European parliaments, (3) In the field, NGOs have developed great skill and effectiveness in working with local institutions. They have been essential elements in emergency assistance and increasingly have strengthened their long-term development programs. Their ability to work at the local community level and their specialized skills have allowed them to work more effectively than the large donor agencies in decentralized programs.

In the area of aid flows, the magnitude of NGO contributions is also sometimes underestimated. DAC reported overall grants by the NGO community in 1995 of \$5.97 billion, roughly 4% of public and private flows to developing countries. To put this into perspective, the \$5.97 billion level exceeds net disbursements by the CEC of \$4.7 billion, the net disbursement level of the UN system of \$5.8 billion, and the net disbursement level of the International Development Association (IDA) of \$4.9 billion. In addition, the NGO community administers roughly \$1.5 billion in aid flows on behalf of donor governments and aid agencies.

It is clear, therefore, that the NGO community at large is an important partner in pursuit of food strategy objectives. It commands a resource base equivalent to the individual MFIs and has a particularly strong voice in influencing the thinking of both the parliaments and the population at large in the donor countries. *NGOs, moreover, are one part of the private sector that does concentrate its efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa.* We should, therefore, ensure that they are an important component of our strategy for coordination.

3 0 FOCAL POINTS FOR DONOR COORDINATION

The previous profile of overall aid resource flows and major multilateral and bilateral aid channels helps to highlight priority targets for donor coordination. These targets include international forums and agencies, regional institutions, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, country level coordination, and private sector coordination---both profit and non-profit groups.

There are a few key issues to keep in mind as we focus on donor coordination.

(1) We should again emphasize that achieving an agreed coherent US Government strategy on food security is the first basic step in any coordination process. If the US speaks with different voices at different forums, it will surely undermine the effectiveness of the US strategy.

(2) We must recognize that reductions in US budgets for foreign assistance, e.g. the 150 account, is reducing US influence in a number of key forums. As noted previously, US arrears to both the UN system and the IDA replenishment are having an impact on our influence in the UN and at the World Bank. *The reduction in the ODA levels, putting us fourth in overall terms and last in ODA to GNP terms, is continuing to weaken our influence at the DAC and in our bilateral discussions. The retrenchment of the AID field-level presence because of administrative budget problems is also depriving the US of the strong policy voice it once had at the field level in influencing donor agendas and priorities.* In coming years the US will pay a heavy price in lost influence from reducing its field presence.

(3) The reduction of US AID attention to agriculture has also had predictable negative impacts. Decreased US support to AID programs has weakened support in the US agricultural community--especially the US universities. In addition, US cutbacks in agricultural programs may well have had a negative impact on the agricultural programs of other bilateral donors. *If the US cannot sustain a high priority for agricultural programs it will not be able to maintain a leadership position on agriculture and food security within the development community.*

(4) We need to be clear on the time frame we are establishing in our efforts to coordinate food security. The results of the World Food Summit, the prior summits, and the DAC's 21st Century document are all looking at a time frame of at least 20 years. As we analyze the various institutions and forums for enhanced coordination, we should remember that there will inevitably be changes in capacity over that period. Presently weak institutions, such as the AFDB, could be built into a stronger MDB partner as have the Asian (ADB) and the Inter-American Development (IADB) Banks. In fact, strengthening the AFDB should be one of our objectives. On the bilateral front, we should also give sufficient attention to the emerging donors. Over the next 20 years these currently small donors could grow into substantial contributors. They might also have special significance in a regional context, e.g., South Africa.

THE G-8 SUMMIT--DENVER AND BIRMINGHAM

The G-8 Summit presents the most prominent high-level forum for pursuing the US Food Security agenda. The Denver Summit was an excellent first step. In its final communique the Summit addressed a broad agenda for development objectives. It addressed the special problem of Africa development and touched on the issue of food security.

Compared with many earlier G-7 Summits, the Denver session was almost devoid of prior emphasis on international financial issues as well as cold war concerns. The focus on international development and areas of common global concern, such as environment and health, marked a continued shift in focus. In prior years the development community struggled to get such issues on the agenda and in the communique.

The current focus on development and Sub-Saharan Africa make the Denver and Birmingham Summits especially important to food security. Two key action elements are currently underway.

(1) Follow-up on the Denver Summit with periodic exchanges between Development Ministers. The US initiated this process in conjunction with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings in Hong Kong in September.

(2) Targeting the Birmingham Summit to achieve greater focus on food security and sustained attention to the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. Early bilateral discussions with the UK would be helpful, as would discussions in bilateral forum such as US /Japan.

The G-8 mechanism excludes many of the developed European countries. This is a sore point with many of them. However, the Summit does establish a very high level of political commitment by the G-8 members and provides a policy agenda for consideration by non-members.

COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (CEC) AND THE U S /EU SUMMIT

The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the U S /EU Summit process presents an important forum for dialogue on the food security issue with the EU. At the political level, broad and growing EU membership can provide for a broader political dialogue among the Western European countries. Moreover, the EU will inevitably expand eastward to embrace additional member countries. A political dialogue within the EU, therefore, can help bridge the gap between the G-8 membership and the other EU members.

An additional factor is, of course, the EU's prominent role as a major agriculture producer and, next to the U S , the largest food exporter. The EU shares the US's concern with food security. The establishment of the Working Group on Food Security reflects this commitment.

In the development assistance framework, the EU is a major donor in its own right. The annual funding levels of the CEC at \$5.3 billion is on par with the World Bank and the UN.

system. In coming years the CEC might expand to become an even larger donor than the World Bank. The CEC development assistance agenda has a primary focus on the least-developed countries, most prominently those in Sub-Saharan Africa. The CEC geographical focus therefore, parallels the targets of the food security agenda.

The EU has other unique attributes. The EU structure is well suited to consider the issue of coherence and food security. In April of this year, the Dutch submitted a paper on Coherence in their capacity as President of the Informal Development Cooperation Council. Conflict prevention, food security, fisheries and migration were four areas targeted for attention in the paper on Coherence. The following excerpts from the Dutch paper highlight their focus.

"The establishment of the Maastricht Treaty has given the European Union a legal foundation for pursuing consistent economic and external policies that take account of the interests of developing countries. In practice, however, it turns out that there is little systematic weighing of interests, indeed, the procedures for doing so have not been devised. As a result, development cooperation policy amounts to no more than measures to alleviate or offset the negative effects of other European policies."

"In the context of EU policy, coherence is also called for in the area of food security, partly as a result of the international political commitments endorsed at the recent World Food Summit in Rome."

"Given the need to double world food production in a way that is economically, socially and ecologically sustainable, a lack of coherence between the development cooperation, trade and agricultural policies of the EU and its Member States vis-a-vis the position of developing countries means that the latter do not obtain sufficient scope for making optimum use of their potential for achieving food security. It also means, among other things, that they will remain unfairly aid-dependent."

The Dutch initiative provides an entry point for discussing the issue of Coherence and Food Security in the EU.

An additional attribute of the CEC is that it is the only multilateral institution which is a full participating member of the DAC. This allows the European union to speak in the DAC, both through their Community voice and as individual DAC members. If DAC is to eventually take a more active role in the food security follow up, EU/CEC support could be critical.

THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS (MDB'S)

The MDBs will be critical to any successful coordination effort on food security. The World Bank has already assumed the primary role among the MDBs for food security. It has launched a number of programs in the food security area. More importantly the World Bank has long assumed a commanding role across the development agenda. This includes its key responsibility

for focusing on host country policy performance, and the World Bank's shared responsibility with the IMF on structural adjustment programs

In the case of Africa, the World Bank is the dominant MDB because of the relative weakness of the AFDB. The Special Program of Assistance (SPA) mechanism, which is unique to Africa further concentrates responsibility in the hands of the World Bank. The SPA has effectively marshaled resources, helped focus donor priorities, and provided a mechanism for assessing the relative performance of the African countries. This in turn has contributed to the process of favoring good performers. The SPA mechanism is currently being assessed through a major evaluation supervised by the Operation Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank. The evaluation was initiated by the Scandinavians. The results are to be available late in 1997 and will greatly influence the future of the SPA.

At the field level, the World Bank finally seems serious about beginning to redress its traditional headquarters focus and is experimenting with a decentralized structure. The experiment includes establishing 3 regional offices in Africa. These offices will have a strong rural development and agriculture focus. The new decentralized structure will hopefully lead to a stronger and more country-responsive World Bank in the coming years. The process should be further enhanced by the Bank's willingness to invite both bilateral and multilateral donors to participate in the field-level structures. The Bank has already had extensive discussions with IFAD, FAO and UNDP, among others.

Unfortunately the US, which had played a commanding role in coordination at the field level in Africa, is retrenching rapidly and reducing its field presence, both in its bilateral missions and its regional offices. The US might be repeating the same mistake it made in the 1960s when it gutted its African field presence and consequently undermined the effectiveness of its assistance efforts in Africa for well over a decade.

If the US is serious about contributing to more effective donor coordination in Africa, it should reassess its decision to shrink its Africa field staff. The US might reconsider its field structure in the context of the World Bank's decentralization plans, possibly developing some new collaborative approaches for staffing the field, including US personnel detailed to the new World Bank field offices.

While the World Bank is the prime MDB target for coordination, especially in Africa, there is no single point for the US to intervene. The US must engage with the World Bank at all levels, from the broad policy level of the Executive Directors and the Board down to the country-level interface which will emerge from decentralization. A close working relationship at the African regional level and in technical areas such as rural development are also critical. The SPA mechanism and the Consultative Group (CG) meetings provide an opportunity to work both with the World Bank and the other donors.

With the World Bank and with the other MDBs, it is especially important that the Treasury Department is fully on board and kept well informed. It is essential that the US, speaking through the Treasury Department at the Executive Director level is in tune with the AID and State Department personnel who are collaborating with the Bank at the operating level

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS

If we look at the food security issue in Latin America and Asia, the IADB and the ADB assume a far greater importance than the AFDB does in Sub-Saharan Africa. Both the IADB and the ADB have strong lending programs and account for substantial resource transfers. They are engaged programmatically in many of the development areas key to the broad based growth that underpins food security. The IADB, in particular, is also already well represented at the in-country field level with staff offices.

Coordination efforts of food security that are aimed at Latin American and Asia populations at risk should include an active working relationship with their respective regional banks.

COORDINATION AMONG THE MDBs

The US helped to initiate a comprehensive study of the MDBs under the auspices of the Development Committee of the Bank and the Fund. The task force on the MDBs, established by the Development Committee, completed its work in March 1996. The report presented a broad agenda for enhancing cooperation and coordination of the MDBs. One summary statement from that report highlights focal points for coordination.

Coordination among the MDBs should be intensified at three levels

- At the country level by causing recipient countries, with MDB support, to assume primary responsibility for coherence between national and sectoral development strategies and international assistance, inviting donors to aim coordination at sustaining development priorities and enhancing the convergence of their processes and practices, and encouraging in-country coordination beyond the central government to include local government and civil society

- At the level of the MDBs, by promoting the convergence of corporate and operational policies, standards, criteria, processes, and practices, through the initiatives of the heads of the MDBs as a group, actively pursuing opportunities for joint action and documentation in operational activities and consolidating operational research programs, and harmonizing criteria, techniques, and practices for measuring results among evaluation units

- For the MDBs as a group, by making arrangements for the provision of coherent policy guidance by the owners of the MDBs on issues of common concern to them, fostering and reinforcing the complementarity of programs and the convergence of operational policies,

processes, and practices, and monitoring the institutional performance and development impact of the MDBs

The US should encourage an expanded dialogue among the MDBs on the food security issue. The World Bank could assume a leadership role because of its global scope and the work already underway on food security within the Bank. The regional banks could bring to bear their respective regional expertise. A coordinated approach by the MDB community on the food security issue would contribute substantially to the US objectives.

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

In the near future, reorganization and reform at the United Nations and the related issue of eliminating US arrears will remain obstacles to effective US use of the UN system. Over the 20-year perspective of the food security initiative substantial progress hopefully can be achieved on both issues. It is important that we do this because the UN system has certain unique roles in the area of food security which are not easily assumed by other multilateral institutions or the bilateral agencies. For example, in the case of crisis management and related food assistance UN agencies are crucial.

Many of the specialized UN agencies play a role in the broad based agenda that emerged from the World Food Summit, namely UNFPA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, IFAD--they are all important. It would be well worth the time and effort to develop a specific agency-by-agency set of objectives related to food security for each of the UN specialized agencies. The World Bank, for its part, seems to be following such a process as is evidenced by its recent agreement with FAO. The US should think through whether it wants a separate bilateral agenda on food security with the UN agencies and whether it wants to encourage further World Bank linkages.

Priority should be accorded to discussions with the FAO and UNDP. FAO should be engaged because of its obvious key role in food security and because there appear to be many differences of opinion on the appropriate role of the FAO on implementing the food security agenda. The US needs to develop a clear policy on what the FAO's role should be. To date much criticism has been levied on FAO's performance by the US. It might be more productive if instead the US put forth a suggested role for FAO on food security.

The UNDP should be highlighted for a number of reasons, including their maintenance of one of the three data bases on development statistics, along with the World Bank and DAC. The UNDP also has long been charged with a primary role in technical cooperation. As discussed below, technical cooperation should be one of the primary areas of attention in any US food security strategy. Finally, UNDP has long played an important role as a coordinator at the field level, albeit with a spotty record. The UNDP should be actively encouraged to rethink its field-level structure in conjunction with other donors and in light of the World Bank move toward greater decentralization.

OECD/DAC

The OECD and DAC provide one of the major multilateral forums for coordination on food security. The OECD provides the broader forum focusing on a wide range of technical and economic concerns of its member countries. As such, it is theoretically well positioned to focus on an issue like food security in an comprehensive approach incorporating concerns of finance, trade, and agriculture as well as development assistance. The DAC, in turn, specializes on issues relating to aid to the developing countries, but coordinates where appropriate with the other main committees of OECD. The OECD also has recently initiated a major program of outreach to non-member countries, most particularly the advanced developing countries.

The OECD was established following World War II to provide a forum for monitoring economic trends in its member countries. The OECD evolved out of the old Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which in turn was established to administer the Marshall Plan. The addition of non-European members and the expansion of the scope of economic cooperation marked the transition from OEEC to OECD. Today, OECD has 29 member countries, with the recent additions of Korea, Mexico, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The DAC was created at the inception of OECD. The Committee provides a broad forum for discussion of policies and practices related to development assistance. In addition, the Committee maintains a substantial data base on aid flows and provides a comprehensive annual report on the performance of the donor community. DAC also undertakes a peer review of each member country every few years for the purpose of assessing the performance of each member in complying with their commitments at the DAC.

DAC holds an annual High Level meeting with Development Ministers of the member countries to focus on issues of policy-level significance. It is through these High Level meetings that DAC is able to achieve a greater unity in both policy and performance among its members. DAC also holds periodic reviews on special development issues of current concern. It also has established a number of working groups for more detailed coordination on such issues as the Environment, Women in Development, Evaluation, Development Statistics and, recently, Democracy and Governance.

A recent example of the DAC's work at developing policy level agreement among its members is the policy statement "Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation." As mentioned earlier, DAC initiated this policy review as an effort to pull together the outcomes of the various world summits. The resulting policy document provides a consolidated agenda for the bilateral donors to follow in support of the outcomes of the summits. A number of major donors, most notably Japan and the UK, have launched a very active program of follow-up on the document.

The OECD took the initiative 20 years ago to promote the establishment of the Club du Sahel which is now one of the semi-autonomous organizations under the OECD. The Club du Sahel was founded for the purpose of achieving food security in the Sahel. It has made great progress in achieving this objective. This example of the Club illustrates that OECD can act innovatively in responding to a major food security crisis---if OECD members support such an initiative.

As the above discussion illustrates, the OECD provides a broad menu of potential areas for coordination on the subject of food security. The US should maintain an active dialogue with the OECD. The objective here is to engage the various committees of OECD who have key responsibilities in areas such as finance, investment, agriculture, trade and development.

Initial discussions with OECD were initiated in September and included meetings with the Deputy Secretary General, the DAC Chairman, the Director of the Food and Agriculture Committee and members of the DAC Secretariat. At these meetings the OECD personnel were briefed on the USG effort to develop an action plan on food security. It was emphasized that the action plan would give attention to the importance of donor coordination on food security and, therefore, OECD was positioned to play an important role in this coordination process.

The meeting with the Deputy Secretary General affirmed the growing interest within OECD on more effective intra-committee coordination on a growing number of cross cutting issues. The Deputy Secretary General emphasized the rapid growth in OECD's relations with non-member countries. The rapid globalization of the world economy has merged the interest of the DAC and OECD's traditional main line committees. Food security was discussed as one such issue which cut across the Development, Food and Agriculture, Trade, and Investment Committees. The Development Center was also mentioned as a potential forum for future discussions on food security issues. The Development Center has a unique capacity to provide a forum for dialogue between OECD members and non-members, a role it has undertaken frequently in the past.

Discussions with the DAC Chairman and the DAC Secretariat confirmed that DAC's highest priority at the moment was promotion and dissemination of the 21st Century strategy document. The document has strong support among the DAC membership and is beginning to impact on program development in key countries. The DAC discussions confirmed that the 21st Century document did in fact provide a sound foundation for achieving the broad-based development necessary to achieving long-term food security. DAC, however, was non-committal in its willingness to modify its 21st Century document to more specifically include food security as an objective. There appears to be a reluctance to modify an already approved policy document. *The US should nevertheless continue to press for inclusion of a clear statement on food security objectives in the 21st Century Strategy document.* The next opportunity would likely be the AID Administrator's participation in the spring High Level DAC meeting.

Discussions were also held with the Director of the Committee for Food and Agriculture. The Director confirmed continuing interest of his committee with food security issues. He emphasized that his committee had taken the lead role within OECD in preparation for and

participation at both World Food Summits (The OECD Secretary General's speech at the Rome World Food Summit is included in Annex 4. The speech provides an excellent overview of OECD's perspective on Food Security.) The Director also emphasized the importance his committee gave to cooperation between OECD committees on cross-cutting issues such as food security. He was fully familiar with DAC's 21st Century document and saw it as fully supportive to any effort to achieve food security.

Discussion with the Director also highlighted the upcoming OECD meeting of Agriculture Ministers in the spring of 1998. These Ministers meet very infrequently (only twice in the last 15 years). *The 1998 meeting, therefore, presents an important opportunity for discussions among the Ministers on food security. The US should check into the proposed agenda for the spring meeting and discuss possible handling of food security as one of the agenda items. This might be discussed at an IWG meeting in the near future.*

4 0 COORDINATION AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

"Ownership" by the developing country is key to the success of any food security strategy. To achieve this there will need to be greater attention given to country-level coordination. This has two key aspects: (1) coordination at the local level, i.e., within the recipient country, preferably led by the recipient country itself and, (2) coordination at the international level for a specific country program, most notably the CG meetings and the UN Round Tables. To some degree, country-level discussions also take place in broader fora such as the SPA mechanism and the Club du Sahel.

Attention to country-level coordination was inherent in the very early days of development assistance beginning with the Marshall Plan itself. Under the Marshall Plan the European countries assumed primary responsibility for coordinating their development and utilizing Marshall Plan resources. Because of this history, the OECD and its Development Assistance Committee emphasized the preeminence of the host country's role in coordinating development assistance at the outset in 1961. Over the years this principle was reaffirmed, but not always observed in practice. In 1986, when DAC began to codify various principles for development cooperation, the Development Ministers adopted a set of principles for aid coordination which reflected the consensus that had evolved over many years. Key elements of these principles are set forth below to illustrate the focus for coordination.

These principles are as relevant today, particularly so in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa

- Central responsibility for aid coordination lies with each recipient government
- Developing countries need well designed policies and carefully appraised investment and expenditure programs for effective and coordinated use of both their national and external resources
- There is a need for aid agencies to help developing countries strengthen their analytical and management capacity to design and implement effective policies and programs
- There is a need for continuing discipline by both recipients and donors in adhering to carefully appraised and productive investment programs. Such programs will provide a particularly useful basis for aid allocations if they have been the subject of careful review and discussion with donors with the help and advice of the international financial institutions. They are a good basis for aid coordination
- There is a need for close cooperation between recipient governments and the multilateral lead agencies but the processes of consultation and coordination should provide an opportunity for bilateral donors to express their views during the formative stages of policy and program consultations between recipients and the international agencies

- Full and frank exchanges of pertinent information on on-going and planned activities among donors, and between donors and recipients, are essential to the successful coordination and effective use of aid
- There is a need to strengthen aid coordination at the local (i.e. recipient country capital) level, and to establish stronger links between central and local coordination arrangements. Central coordination arrangements should give the lead to local and sectoral coordination, inter alia, by identifying issues to be addressed at the local/sectoral level. Policy dialogue should be an intrinsic element of aid coordination and the local/sectoral level. Recipient governments should be at the center of the process
- Effective participation both in the policy dialogue and in aid programming at the local level will be facilitated by the presence of policy-oriented staff stationed in recipient countries in which individual Members have major aid interest

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY ROLE

The above principles highlight the primacy accorded to the recipient country in the coordination process. As development assistance evolved over the years following the Marshall Plan donors encountered much weaker human and institutional capacities in the developing countries. Increasingly the bilateral and multilateral donors responded by assuming a stronger role in the setting of development priorities and in coordinating donor activities. Not surprisingly, donor priorities began to play a more dominant role in the development planning process. Externally supplied technicians began to fill the human resource gaps in developing country institutions. This further strengthened the influence of the donors in the development process.

In the case of Asia and Latin America, donor influence was less pervasive than in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, as development progressed in many Asian and Latin American economies there was a commensurate growth in institutional capacity and a strengthening of the human resource base. The Asian economies also had greater access to an expanding domestic resource base and eventually to substantial private investment flows. All of these factors have enhanced the Asian and Latin America dominance over their development process.

In Africa the human and institutional capacities have not been adequately strengthened in the years since their independence. In many countries capacities may in fact be diminished---a situation exacerbated by war and civil unrest, but also by the loss of many senior personnel to employment in developed countries and international institutions.

The emergence of the macro-economic stabilization effort in the early 1980s in Africa further strengthened the role of the external donors. This was particularly so in the case of the Bretton Woods institutions with the IMF/World Bank assuming a dominant role. The emerging perception

today is that stabilization programs, whatever their merits, are programs basically imposed by donors upon the developing countries who have little say. A coordinating mechanism such as the SPA program might thus be viewed as a mixed blessing. On the positive side, it has marshaled increased resources for Africa's stabilization efforts, and it has rewarded the better performers by increasing assistance levels. On the negative side, the SPA is a donor body with only token participation by the developing countries.

We face a major challenge in Africa if we are to improve country-level coordination and help countries there gain a stronger role in the formulation and coordination of their development. Strengthening the host country role is a basic requirement if Africa is to achieve and maintain food security. What then are some of the steps that the US might encourage to help strengthen Africa's role? Four come to mind:

(1) The US should support even more strongly the on-going program of capacity building for Africa which aims at strengthening both the human and institutional capacity within African countries. Technical assistance should be increased and/or redirected to meet this objective, but the donors also need to reform their technical assistance practices (see Annex 5).

(2) The US should give strong support to developing in-country information/data base systems keyed to monitoring agriculture and food security. These systems should be "owned" by the host country, meet their perceived information needs, and be sustainable. Sustainability will also mean addressing the recurrent cost issue.

(3) The US should encourage coordination mechanisms that provide the developing countries with a stronger voice. For example, sub-regional organizations like the Club du Sahel, IGAD, SADAC, etc., provide for an open dialogue between the donors and the developing countries. Consultative Group meetings and UN Round Tables could be structured to facilitate a more equal dialogue than now occurs.

(4) In a broad and long-term sense, the US should support steps that will encourage long-term diversification of Africa's development finance sources. At present Africa is overly dependent upon external public sector assistance. The commitments at the World Food Summit to encourage investment and improve trade should receive a top priority in our consultations with other donors.

COUNTRY LEVEL COORDINATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

The primary country level coordinating mechanism is the Consultative Group (CG). The CG mechanism evolved out of the early work in coordinating programs in India, Pakistan and Nigeria in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. The number of CGs expanded steadily through the succeeding three decades. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) established the Round Table mechanism to provide a similar process of coordination for countries which were

too small to be likely candidates for an increasingly loaded CG agenda. Today the CG mechanism and the UN Round Tables together provide coverage for nearly all the developing countries.

The CG mechanism is the stronger of the two and draws extensively on the staff of the World Bank and the IMF. CGs typically involve larger countries and more substantial assistance programs. Round Tables put their focus on smaller countries and have been viewed as a less dynamic process. Nevertheless, the Round Tables have provided an important coordinating mechanism for countries without CG's. The UNDP has thus helped to shoulder the country-level coordination burden with the World Bank.

As currently structured the CG meetings provide a forum for donor review for the development programs and performance of the individual countries. This puts the developing country in the "hot seat". Discussions are usually set against World Bank and IMF assessments and host countries' own presentations. Donors use these sessions to offer support, approval and, when appropriate, criticism of the host country program. This process eventually leads to indication by the donor of financial support to meet the development financing gap.

The process has evolved over many years and is generally a productive forum for exchanging dialogue at the country program level. Periodic CG meetings tend to pull together and crystallize issues that have evolved over the prior few years. These CG sessions have focused effectively on economic performance questions, policy agendas, and increasingly on more political issues such as corruption, human rights and excessive military expenditures.

The question for the Food Security Strategy is how might the CG mechanisms be used to strengthen implementation of the Summit agreement. *The US could further these objectives by insuring that the agenda for discussion at the CG meetings include food security issues where the country context indicates.* In addition, there is an important opportunity to strengthen the role of the host country if the donors and the MFIs would be willing to allow the recipient country a stronger leadership role at the CGs. As now operated, the CGs critique host country performance. *It would be useful to consider putting the recipient country in the chair for a meeting, or even a session of the CG, and allowing the host country an opportunity to chair a review of donor performance and problems with donor coordination as seen through the eyes of the recipient country.* This would, for example, be an excellent venue for dialogue on the problems with technical cooperation and its role in capacity building.

In summary, the CG mechanisms already provide an effective forum for review of host country programs and policy performance. It is clearly possible and desirable to insure that this mechanism addresses specific food security issues, where appropriate, for a given country. However, a broader objective of strengthening the ownership and leadership role of the recipient country could also be achieved if the donors were willing to share the forum more collaboratively with the recipient countries.

SPECIAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICA (SPA)

Donor coordination on African programs has given birth to a unique coordinating mechanism--SPA. This mechanism emerged from the recognition by the donors that continued support for Africa's ongoing structural adjustment programs would require a much more closely coordinated dialogue among donors, an increased concentration of resources in support of these reform programs, and some selectivity in choosing between good and bad performers in the allocation of funds. The SPA mechanism has proven to be a very effective forum for close dialogue and discussion among the donors. Increased financial support for structural reform programs has been achieved. More effective monitoring of relative performance by African countries has also resulted, thereby allowing the donors to more effectively shift support in response to developing country performance.

The SPA mechanism, as noted earlier, is currently the subject of a major evaluation initiated at the request of the Scandinavians and conducted under the supervision of the World Bank's Evaluation office. This evaluation is scheduled to be completed in November of this year. A summary will likely be presented at the December meeting of the SPA in Paris. The evaluation results and the inherent question of the future of SPA is not expected to be a full agenda item for discussion at the December meeting. *Most likely the next SPA meeting in the middle of 1998 will provide an opportunity for a full discussion on the SPA evaluation and SPA's future role.*

Africa is the central focus of food security concerns and the SPA mechanism is one of the dominant coordination instruments in assisting Africa. The future role of SPA will be very important in any food security coordination strategy. *The US review of the SPA evaluation should be undertaken with a specific eye to SPA's future impact on food security. Immediate attention should be directed to the question of how the SPA mechanism is currently having an impact on food security issues.*

At present the primary role of the SPA process is to support the broad objective of food security through the achievement of a more solid and sustained level of economic growth. Structural adjustment programs theoretically promote a higher sustained level of economic growth over time and thereby provide the necessary foundation for broad-based development and long-term food security.

The SPA agriculture programs do not *per se* address specific agenda items that relate to food security such as reform, formulation and support of specific agriculture programs, agri-business activities and population programs. It is questionable whether any future incarnation of SPA is liable to focus on such specific aspects of food security, albeit there is the possibility of sectoral reform programs as a future agenda item.

It is also important to continue to emphasize that the SPA mechanism does not provide for any effective dialogue between the donors and the African countries. SPA is effectively a donors club designed to improve cooperation and collaboration among the donors themselves. If this basic characteristic of SPA is maintained then it must be recognized that coordination between the donors and the Africans will continue to take place through various other mechanisms which have already been mentioned. These include the Consultative Groups, the Round Tables, regional organizations such as the Club du Sahel, SADC, EGAD. The Global Coalition for Africa will continue to be an important forum for specific issues to be discussed at a senior level. Finally, there is in-country coordination and the challenge of strengthening donor recipient coordination at that level.

In summary, it will be important to closely monitor the dialogue and discussions on the future of the SPA mechanism. It would be especially interesting to hear some of the African perspectives on the SPA mechanism. However, there is a question whether SPA will be reconstituted in a form that would provide a more effective donor/recipient dialogue. It is also questionable whether SPA should focus on some of the more specific aspects of agriculture and food security rather than broader based economic reform issues. It is quite likely that SPA will not become a primary forum for donor coordination on food security issues except in the broadest sense that it continues to promote basic economic reform and a higher level of sustained economic growth. If SPA contributes to this objective it will be making a major contribution to food security.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The need for improved information systems has been clearly identified as a priority in achieving food security. The World Food Summit called for the establishment of a follow-up activity to establish a monitoring information system (FIVIMS) to monitor the number of under-nourished people around the world. A much broader scope for expanded information was set forth in AID's efforts to create a Strategic Ag Command Action Plan. This proposal rightfully assigns the highest priority to improving the national information systems at the country level. With limited exceptions most regional and international data systems will have to draw on the national systems for their base data. There are indications that the national systems in Africa, in particular, are becoming inoperable because of lack of funding support. The concern about deterioration of the national systems in Africa, therefore, is a real concern in addressing food security in Africa.

Restoring the national information systems is very much a sub-set of the capacity building objectives discussed elsewhere. Technical assistance is an important component of restoring and upgrading these national systems. However, we face an equally important problem in addressing recurrent costs ramifications of revitalizing any national system. *This is an area where US leadership might help. Encouragement to the other donors to engage in support of recurrent costs in a priority area such as national information systems could be very critical.*

Discussions on supplemental information systems based in a regional or international context are also well covered in the AID work on the Strategic Ag Command. The key issue here, however, is where these various information systems might be housed. Again there is a question of whether the FAO should have the lead role. Locating a home for regional information systems may be less political in dealing with the FAO interface.

Another aspect of the broader information question is who monitors donor performance in the follow-up to the World Food Summit. DAC maintains a fairly sophisticated data base on donor performance. It has not to date been as active in monitoring detailed sector performance as it might. This issue has been discussed in a number of previous Tidewater meetings at the request of UN agencies, especially UNICEF. UNICEF was struggling with the problem of monitoring donor performance on commitments made at the Summit for Children. DAC's response at that time was that it would be prepared to provide a monitoring role if the DAC membership would agree to develop and submit to DAC the required national input. Without such cooperation, DAC had no capacity to monitor. The situation with the food security follow-up will be identical.

There still exists a generic problem of monitoring donor performance against their various commitments at the series of World Summits. *The US might approach DAC to undertake a broad monitoring role, given the excellent work that has been accomplished on the 21st Century document.* The Development Ministers have set forth a recommitment to targets in the 21st Century document. Implicit in their adoption is a commitment to monitor both the accomplishments in the developing countries and the donors' performance in supporting this goal.

5 0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The above review highlights some of the parameters of donor coordination and food security. The following conclusions and recommendations emerge from the review.

1 The top prerequisite for any successful effort at coordination is to reach and maintain an agreed US position on a food security strategy and action plan. There needs to be "coherence" in the US strategy. All of the US agencies and departments must work to an agreed set of objectives. All US representatives engaged in donor coordination should be working from the same script.

The IWG has served this purpose admirably to date both in the run-up to the Food Summit and the work to date on drafting the US action plan. Implementation and monitoring the action plan will require continuation of the IWG, or a similar body, well into the future. Establishing the IWG or a similar coordinating mechanism as a permanent fixture should be given serious consideration.

2 We should recognize that achieving coherence of policy and strategy is an increasingly serious problem in development cooperation for all major donors. Rapid integration of the global economy and the emergence of shared global problems such as environment, migration, food security, drugs, health issues, etc., are all pushing formerly domestic-oriented line ministries into a progressively more active international role. The Agenda of the Denver Summit underlines this fact. Development cooperation and shared global concerns are now at the top of the international political agenda.

The US should take every opportunity to underline the importance of coherence of policies in dealing with the developing countries. Two obvious venues are discussions with the EU in the context of the NTA and the OECD.

In the case of the EU, the recent Dutch initiative on coherence highlights interest in the issue within the EU. On a bilateral level, discussion with the Dutch Development Minister might also be desirable.

In the OECD and DAC, there have been ongoing discussions for over 5 years on the issue of coherence, both at the Council level of OECD and at the Ministerial level meetings of DAC. The US has an opportunity here to focus OECD and DAC on coherence as it relates to food security. Discussions have been initiated with the Deputy Secretary General of OECD and the DAC Chairman as a first step.

Bilateral sessions on the US /Japan Common Agenda also present an opportunity to discuss coherence and food security.

3 US credibility with other bilateral and multilateral donors and with the developing countries themselves is a matter of concern as we focus on international coordination. The paramount political, military and economic influence of the US is, of course, not in question. However, in certain key venues related to development cooperation, US credibility is in question. The UN debate on restructuring and arrears, replenishment of IDA, and the continued decrease in US ODA levels are all undermining US influence. The resulting decrease in financial resources is also having an impact on the effectiveness of both the UN system and IDA and potentially undermining the achievement of US food security objectives.

The Administration must continue to assign a high priority to making progress on the UN and IDA funding problems. The Administration should also begin a serious in-depth review of the long-term implications of dwindling US assistance levels. With recent US economic progress and reduced deficits, other donors look to the US for an improvement on all of these fronts.

4 The US recognized in its early background papers that the World Food Summit would share many common objectives with prior World Summits. A need has emerged, therefore, to consolidate the agreed objectives of the Summits into a coordinated and comprehensive program of development cooperation.

The US should embrace the concept of developing a consensus of a broad-based strategy which could be the primary approach for implementing the combined commitments of the summits. Each summit may have some specific individual issues that need special attention, but the primary underlying objective of all the summits is the achievement of broad-based sustained economic growth.

One such initiative is the DAC's 21st Century document. This strategy document received the approval of the Development Ministers in 1996 at DAC's High Level meeting. Moreover, it is being actively marketed with the international agencies and especially on a bilateral basis by the governments of Japan and the UK. The document, unfortunately, preceded the Rome Summit and would, therefore, benefit from an update to address food security. The US could focus on updating of the DAC document at the next spring's High Level meeting of DAC.

5 The US should give primacy in its coordination strategy to political-level forums where US leadership can have a substantial impact on food security issues. The G-8 Summits and the U S /EU Summits under the NTA are two such venues.

The Denver and Birmingham Summits are both critical and, of course, inter-link. The US strategy for follow-up to the Denver Summit should emphasize food security and the related priority of supporting African development. The AID Administrator convened periodic meetings of Development Ministers, beginning with Hong Kong in September. This dialogue allowed an opportunity for the US to highlight both food security and African development as priorities.

The upcoming Birmingham Summit will provide an opportunity for the US to further its own action plan which will be completed by year end. However, bilateral discussions with the UK should start as early as possible with an eye to insuring that the Birmingham meeting focuses on food security, and that African development is maintained as a major agenda item at Birmingham.

6 The US should highlight the priority of Africa. The Food Summit targeted both Africa and South Asia as priority targets for improving food security. Africa, however, is clearly emerging as the single, most formidable challenge. The US should recognize this publicly and give special emphasis in its coordination strategy to Africa. The Birmingham Summit could be used to reemphasize the serious challenge of food security in Africa. The Summit could underline the leaders' commitment to work with Africa to solve this problem. The Summit could further emphasize the interrelationship between renewed economic growth in Africa and the achievement of food security.

Such a clear statement in the G-8 context would help provide the political impetus necessary to facilitate progress in both bilateral and multilateral discussions on food security.

Within the US Administration the African Food Security initiative of AID could be broadened and given higher visibility as a major US initiative in response to the recommendations at Rome last year.

7 The US should look to the World Bank to take the leadership role within the MDBs. The World Bank has undertaken considerable work in Food Security and approved a new Rural Development Strategy which helps focus Bank activities on food security.

The US should also encourage greater coordination among the MDBs on Food Security. Extensive work of the Development Committee Task Force on MDBs highlighted the need for greater inter-bank coordination. The US might use this recommendation as an entry point to push for a joint MDB review of food security. The World Bank could contribute a global perspective as well as a specific African focus. The ADB and the IADB, in turn, could provide special attention to the South Asian and Latin American aspects to Food Security.

The African Development Bank stands out in the MDB family as a relatively weak institution for a variety of reasons. In any long-term strategy focus on Africa, however, the AFDB should be a priority target for strengthening as an institution. The objective of greater African "ownership" cannot be viewed solely from the perspective of the country level. We must also maintain a regional and African-wide focus. An African Development Bank which is a strong partner to the World Bank and the bilateral donors is essential to achieving full commitment by the continent to the development process. The US should maintain strengthening of the AFDB as a priority objective. The US should also make a special effort to work with the AFDB on key development issues such as Food Security.

8 Donor collaboration on policy performance has been highlighted as an important concern in food security. A review of the various mechanisms for donor coordination indicates there is already considerable attention being given to recipient country performance. Initially the attention was directed primarily to economic performance--especially under structural reform programs. Increasingly, however, broader issues such as corruption, human rights, excessive military expenditures and improving governance have moved on to the agenda.

The SPA mechanism, the CG process and in-country coordination are all important fora for addressing these policy issues. The SPA is already the subject of an extensive assessment and may be further modified. The CG mechanism and the Round Tables would also benefit from change if the donors would increasingly give the host countries a stronger lead role. In-country coordination in turn is in need of much greater attention by donors and recipients alike. Enhanced ownership by the recipient countries and more decentralized management by donors are both necessary. In short, while the SPA, the CG mechanisms and in-country coordination are all currently important to the policy dialogue, there is much that could be done to strengthen the process.

Mechanisms such as the GCA, the Club du Sahel, SADC, and the Special Program for African Ag Research are all complimentary fora for dialogue. These fora are more specialized in character, focusing on regional coordination or special topics. The Club du Sahel, of course, has both a regional focus and a special mandate to achieve food security within the Sahel. It has made remarkable progress in food security in the 20 years since its inception, partially because of the unique collaborative relationship between the Club and the Sahel. The collaborative character of this relationship also provides a vehicle for both continuing policy dialogue on food security issues and an opportunity for donors to render judgment on country performance.

The recent speech by the President of the World Bank at the Bank's annual meeting in Hong Kong further underlined the growing consensus that the donor community will increasingly reward good performance. The President indicated that the donors "must be selective in how we use our resources" and we should "concentrate our assistance on countries with good policies". He referred to recent studies that showed "that in a good policy environment, development assistance improves growth prospects and social conditions, but in a poor policy environment, it can actually retard progress, by reducing the need for change and by creating dependency."

It is clear from the President's statement that the World Bank will likely be taking an even more aggressive stance on rewarding the good performers. It is likely that the rest of the development community is already in step with this position.

9 Country-level coordination remains one of the toughest and the most important venues on Food Security issues. The need for greater "ownership" by the developing countries has been highlighted consistently in on-going discussions on reforming the aid process. The MDB Task Force repeatedly emphasized the "ownership" objective in its final report. Achieving greater host country "ownership" of its development programs is a complex and long-term undertaking,

especially in Africa. First, it means recognition in fact, rather than only in speech, of the host country's primary role. Secondly, it means giving sustained attention to improving the host country capacity to manage its own economic affairs more effectively. Third, it means decentralizing much of the donors' development assistance activities to the field so in-country coordination can be improved.

The US should also provide strong support to the World Bank initiative on decentralization to the field. A stronger field presence by the donor community will help strengthen the role of the host country itself and contribute to greater "ownership" of their development programs. The US should give continued encouragement to the World Bank President as he carries through on decentralization.

Capacity building in Africa requires substantial levels of sustained technical assistance. Continued reform of technical assistance would enhance its impact. Greater emphasis needs to be given to long-term institution objectives and less to short-term project and program needs. Donors need to reinforce the work underway on reexamining technical assistance initiated by DAC at World Bank and UNDP urging. The US might encourage the DAC's technical assistance network to focus on food security and capacity building issues as areas of emphasis.

10 A review of resource flows to Africa highlights the lack of private sector flows. This is in stark contrast to Asia and Latin America. The donor countries and their African partners need to work collaboratively to redress the imbalance between public and private sector flows. The plan of action set forth by the World Food Summit implicitly recognized this with its emphasis on trade and investment. The US should develop a specific action plan to encourage private sector investment, particularly in the area of agribusiness.

The challenge of achieving greater private sector investment in Africa is formidable. Much lip service has been given to the objective, but little tangible progress has been achieved. The US might approach this issue in various ways. The OECD could be approached to undertake a comprehensive review of investment and trade as it relates to Africa. This review should involve Trade and Investment Committees as well as the DAC itself. Within the World Bank, especially the IFC, the US should explore what steps might be taken to enhance greater investment in agriculture and agribusiness. There might also be an opportunity for enlisting the assistance of South Africa in her capacity as an emerging leader on the African scene. South Africa has a sophisticated private sector, substantial foreign investment, on-the-ground familiarity with Africa. South Africa might be in a position to help craft some new strategies for promoting increased private sector development on the continent.

11 The NGO community is a special case. It commands a substantial resource base with net annual transfers on a par with IDA. It has a strong political voice. It plays a key role in development education of the public at large. It is composed of a large diverse community of organization numbering close to two thousand. It is already committed to channeling its resources to African development, and it has developed special expertise in crisis management and food security.

Any strategy for improving coordination on food security issues must provide for a full on-going dialogue with the NGO community. In the first instance, it is critical that the US involve the NGOs as an important partner in both formulating and implementing the US strategy. Secondly, the US should encourage other major donors who have active NGO communities, specifically the Canadians and Europeans, to enlist their respective NGOs on implementation of food security programs. The international NGO community also undertakes an annual assessment of donor activities and publishes an annual report "The Reality of Aid". It would be useful if the next Report were to focus on food security issues.

12. Finally, during the interviews conducted in preparation of this report there was much discussion about which coordinating mechanism was the best, e.g. is the SPA better or more important than the Club du Sahel, etc. We would do well to remember that there is a wide variety of coordinating mechanisms available and each of them has its own place and potential as a forum for supporting the US food security strategy and action plan.

Once an agreed upon strategy and action plan is achieved, the various US government agencies and their components can selectively choose from the menu of coordinating mechanisms available to implement the US plan. For example, the State Department might take the lead in dealing with Presidential Summits and the EU as a forum for food security issues. AID in turn might take the lead in working with the SPA, DAC, the CGs and Round Tables, and with African regional mechanisms such as the Club du Sahel. Treasury would have a primary interest in dealings with the World Bank and the regional MDBs. The Agriculture Department would have an interest in a variety of mechanisms, including WTO, the OECD, the FAO, discussions with the EU, etc.

In summary, the US should be working the full range of coordinating mechanisms to implement its food security strategy, and should continue to look to the IWG as an oversight mechanism for assuring that this is done in a "coherent" manner.

INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

Washington, D.C.

- 1 Priscilla Clapp, Special Representative for Food Security, Dept of State
- 2 John Lewis, Global Bureau, U S A I D
- 3 Tracy Atwood, Global Bureau, U S A I D
- 4 Jonathan Olsson, Global Bureau, U S A I D
- 5 August Shumacher, Under Secretary of Agriculture
- 6 Avram Guroff, National Food Security Coordinator, Dept of Agriculture
- 7 Norman Nicholson, Policy, Planning and Coordination Bureau, U S A I D
- 8 Princeton Lyman, Asst Secy, International Organizations, Dept of State
- 9 Melinda Kimble, Dep Asst Secy, International Organizations, Dept of State
- 10 Julia Taft, President, Inteaction
- 11 Colm Bradford, Chief Economist, U S A I D
- 12 Ted Morse, Special Asst to Administrator, U S A I D
- 13 Rick Nygard, Actg Asst Admin for Management, U S A I D
- 14 David Shear, President, International Management Development Inc
- 15 Alex Shakow, Development Committee, World Bank
- 16 Ambassador Robert Blake, Chairmn, Committee for Agricultural Sustainability
- 17 James Govan, Director of Programs, Africa Bureau, U S A I D
- 18 Carol Peasley, Actg Asst Administrator, Africa Bureau, U S A I D
- 19 Gerry Wolgn, Africa Bureau
- 20 Cameron Leuthy, OMB
- 21 Jerome Sherry, Policy, Planning and Coordination, U S A I D
- 22 Haven North, World Bank consultant, Special Programs for Africa
- 23 Walter Bollinger, Global Bureau, U S A I D
- 24 Edward Schuh, BIFAD Board Member
- 25 Larry Saters, RONCO Inc

Paris, France

- 1 Mr Shigahara, Deputy Secretary General, OECD
- 2 Gerald Viatte, Director, OECD/Food, Agriculture, Fisheries Directorate
- 3 James Michael, Chairman, OECD/DAC
- 4 Roy Stacy, Director, Club du Sahel
- 5 Bernard Wood, Director, OECD/Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD)
- 6 Richard Carey, Deputy Director, OECD/DCD
- 7 Jean-Louis Grolleau, Head, Information Systems, OECD/DCD
- 8 James Dolan, Acting DCM, US Delegation, OECD
- 9 Arthur Fell, OECD/DCD
- 10 Elisabeth Thioleron, OECD/DCD



The Seven Commitments of the World Food Summit Plan of Action

Summary List

- 1. Establish the Enabling Environment for Development**
 - ◆ Prevent and resolve conflicts peacefully
 - ◆ Establish a stable political environment based on democracy and good governance
 - ◆ Promote and respect human rights for all human beings
 - ◆ Coordination and commitment of public, private and joint initiatives
 - ◆ Provide equal opportunity for all
- 2. Reduce Poverty and Facilitate Access to Food**
 - ◆ Assist food insecure households
 - ◆ Ensure a safe and nutritious food supply
 - ◆ Strengthen capacity for self-reliance through basic human needs
- 3. Adopt Sustainable Participatory Development Practices**
 - ◆ Intensify and diversify sustainable food production
 - ◆ Improve irrigation, halt deforestation and desertification
 - ◆ Promote adequate transfer of technologies
 - ◆ Encourage local marketing systems, infrastructure and credit
 - ◆ Implement integrated rural development strategies
- 4. Ensure Trade Policies Conducive to Food Security**
 - ◆ Benefit from opportunities in the international trade framework
 - ◆ Meet food import needs in all countries considering market fluctuations and the most vulnerable developing countries
 - ◆ Support continuation of the Uruguay Round reform process
- 5. Improve Forecasting and Respond to Food Emergencies**
 - ◆ Establish food system preparedness
 - ◆ Identify vulnerable regions and establish prevention and preparedness strategies
 - ◆ Improve management of emergency operations
 - ◆ Ensure transition from relief to development
- 6. Encourage Investment**
 - ◆ Create an environment for optimal public and private investment
 - ◆ Mobilize technical and financial resources to raise investment and provide debt relief
- 7. Implement the Plan of Action**
 - ◆ Draw up national strategies and programs
 - ◆ Improve international and regional cooperation systems
 - ◆ Monitor implementation

SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY
THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Values and interests

As we approach the end of the twentieth century, the time is ripe to reflect on the lessons of development co-operation over the last 50 years and to put forward strategies for the first part of the next century. This report sets forth the collective views on these matters of development ministers, heads of aid agencies and other senior officials responsible for development co-operation, meeting as the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development¹

In the year 2000, four-fifths of the people of the world will be living in the developing countries, most with improving conditions. But the number in absolute poverty and despair will still be growing. Those of us in the industrialised countries have a strong moral imperative to respond to the extreme poverty and human suffering that still afflict more than one billion people. We also have a strong self-interest in fostering increased prosperity in the developing countries. Our solidarity with the people of all countries causes us to seek to expand the community of interests and values needed to manage the problems that respect no borders—from environmental degradation and migration to drugs and epidemic diseases. All people are made less secure by the poverty and misery that exist in the world. Development matters.

The record of the last 50 years, from Marshall Plan aid to the network of development partnerships now evolving, shows that the efforts of

countries and societies to help themselves have been the main ingredients in their success. But the record also shows that development assistance has been an essential complementary factor in many achievements: the green revolution, the fall in birth rates, improved basic infrastructure, a diminished prevalence of disease and dramatically reduced poverty. Properly applied in propitious environments, aid works.

Co-operation within the United Nations, the international financial institutions, the OECD and other global and regional fora has greatly enhanced these efforts and shaped an evolving multilateralism in which all countries hold a vital stake.

We have learned that development assistance will only work where there is a shared commitment of all the partners. We have seen the results in countries which have grown prospered and achieved industrialisation, they no longer depend on aid but stand on their own feet and participate in the global economy. We have seen on the other hand, the countries in which civil conflict and bad governance have set back development for generations. And we have learned that success takes time and sustained international and local effort.

As we look ahead we see an overwhelming case for making that effort. As a crucial part of this undertaking, the international community needs to sustain and increase the volume of official development assistance in order to reverse the growing marginalisation of the poor and achieve progress toward realistic goals of human development. Domestic preoccupations in Member countries should not jeopardise the international development effort at a critical juncture. Today's

¹ This report was adopted at the Thirty-fourth High Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee held on 6-7 May 1996.

investments in development co-operation will yield a very high return over the coming years

We believe that ways must be found to finance multilateral development co-operation that are adequate efficient predictable and sustainable. The full implementation of current agreements to pay arrears and create workable financing systems is an essential part of efforts to ensure that the United Nations and the multilateral development banks avoid severe crisis and continue to play their vital roles

We also recognise that those responsible for public money are accountable for its effective use. We have a duty to state clearly the results we expect and how we think they can be achieved

It is time to select taking account of the many targets discussed and agreed at international fora a limited number of indicators of success by which our efforts can be judged. We are proposing a global development partnership effort through which we can achieve together the following ambitious but realisable goals

Economic well-being

- a reduction by one-half in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015

Social development

- universal primary education in all countries by 2015
- demonstrated progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005,
- a reduction by two-thirds in the mortality rates for infants and children under age 5 and a reduction by three-fourths in maternal mortality all by 2015
- access through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015

Environmental sustainability and regeneration

- the current implementation of national strategies for sustainable development in all countries by 2005 so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental resources are effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015

While expressed in terms of their global impact, these goals must be pursued country by country through individual approaches that reflect local conditions and locally-owned development strategies. Essential to the attainment of these measurable goals are *qualitative factors* in the evolution of more stable safe, participatory and just societies. These include capacity development for effective democratic and accountable governance the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law. We will also continue to address these less easily quantified factors of development progress

Effective international support can make a real difference in achieving these goals. This is far from saying that they can be achieved by aid alone. The most important contributions for development as in the past will be made by the people and governments of the developing countries themselves. But where this effort is forthcoming it needs and deserves strong support from the industrialised countries. We commit ourselves to do the utmost to help

- first by a willingness to make mutual commitments with our development partners supported by adequate resources
- second by improving the co-ordination of assistance in support of locally-owned development strategies, and
- third by a determined effort to achieve coherence between aid policies and other policies which impact on developing countries

These approaches were set out in broad terms in the statement of policy that we adopted in 1995 entitled *Development Partnerships in the New*

*Global Context*² The report that follows builds on this statement and proposes specific new practical measures to achieve the vision of partnership for development

We intend our report to be a contribution to the broad contemporary effort to improve the effectiveness of development co-operation. A rich process of dialogue and decisions is underway—within the OECD, in the Interim and Development Committees of the World Bank and IMF, in the regional development banks, in the G7, and in the United Nations system. This heightened international focus on development co-operation reinforces our conviction that development matters.

The success or failure of poor people and poor countries in making their way in an interdependent world will have a profound influence in shaping the 21st century. We offer our proposals in this report with confidence that international co-operation can be effective in supporting development, and that the results will be well worth the effort they will demand of our societies. The stakes in a stable, sustainable future for this planet and all who will inhabit it are far too high for us to forego that effort.

² The text of the statement is an annex to this report. It is analyzed and discussed in the 1995 DAC report *Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee* (OECD 1996).

SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPEECH TO THE WORLD FOOD SUMMIT

It is a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to address the Summit in my personal capacity as Secretary General of the OECD

The consensus reached in the draft Declaration and Plan of Action is a good omen for future action. Indeed, the elimination of hunger is an achievable goal, but this will depend largely on how we order human affairs, through policies, institutions and people's actions. Thus I would like to offer you some key messages based on the work of the Organisation which I have the honour to lead, and identify briefly the future contribution that my Organisation can make

Key Messages

- Economic growth and development is a vital shared interest for all our countries Poverty lies at the root of food insecurity Sustainable global economic growth is the first foundation for raising incomes and guaranteeing access to food for those who will otherwise be vulnerable
- Economic policies should nurture growth and participation It is essential to ensure a macro-economic environment that is conducive to private initiative and investment. Micro-economic policies need to focus on eliminating structural impediments to growth and employment
- Policies must provide the right incentives for agriculture Through the development of research and the diffusion and adoption of improved techniques, we can meet the growing demand for food while safeguarding the environment. But this dual goal will only be met if policies that distort markets are eliminated. It is vital that we have market-oriented agricultural sectors, responsive to changes in global supply and demand
- Countries should make full use of international markets Trade is a key element for food security as it stimulates economic growth. It permits the efficient transfer of food supplies from surplus to deficit areas. Trade allows countries to become self-reliant, rather than trying to become self-sufficient regardless of cost. To meet food crises, the selective and judicious use of food aid is required. Aid should be used to make up temporary shortfalls, rather than forming a permanent source of supply. It should be provided from local and regional commercial sources, wherever possible, rather than being used to dispose of surplus government stocks

OECD Contribution

The traditional aim of the OECD has been to identify the most effective and efficient mix of policies, at both the macro and micro levels, to achieve economic and social objectives. It is our mission to ensure coherent policies for our own countries, and to help support the capacities and efforts of other countries to achieve coherence as well. Together with effectively functioning markets, this policy coherence is vital for ensuring national and global food security. Thus the OECD seeks to stimulate broad-based economic growth and the expansion of international trade, promote social development, a more efficient public sector and "good governance", and to improve policy positions and responses in the OECD countries.

- The OECD constantly monitors and assesses the impact of agricultural and fisheries policies in OECD countries. Each year, we make a thorough evaluation of the policy developments in OECD countries against the principles of agricultural policy reform which were agreed upon within OECD. The key principle is to improve market orientation through a progressive and concerted reduction of agricultural support and protection. The planned meeting of OECD Ministers for Agriculture (early 1998) will deal with the need for further policy reform at the domestic and international levels.
- We also make 5-year projections for global supply, demand, trade and prices for major agricultural commodities. Our most recent set of projections correctly anticipated the sharp increase in world grain production in response to last season's high prices, and the resulting price reductions.
- The OECD has been reaching out increasingly for policy dialogue and experience-sharing with a wide range of non-member countries. We now have underway a forward-looking study on evolving linkages between the OECD economies and those of non-Member countries. The study covers trade, finance, economic policy, agriculture and environment that are all linked to our agenda here.
- In collaboration with Sahelian countries and their aid donors, the OECD's Club du Sahel drew up a code of conduct for food aid operations in 1990. The Food Aid Charter seeks to maintain food supply at a relatively constant rate while at the same time guarding against potentially adverse effects of food aid on the agriculture of the region. We are drawing on the success of the Charter in achieving these aims to find lessons for application and adaptation to food aid operations in other low-income food deficit countries.
- The members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recently adopted a strategic twenty-year framework for working with partner-countries to achieve concrete goals in people-centred, sustainable development. A central goal is that of reducing by half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing countries by the year 2015. The DAC strategy aims to revitalise the commitment by our countries, and our active partnership with developing countries, to reach the goals agreed upon by the entire international community in all the global conferences. DAC's action-plan for implementation is already well underway, working closely with partner-countries and with other international organisations.

To achieve the goal of food security it is vital that we take a global perspective. Food security cannot be pursued effectively by countries in isolation. It requires international co-operation and co-ordination. The OECD is committed to continuing and extending its efforts in this direction through an integrated policy approach. Our analytical and monitoring work will complement action by others to achieve common global goals. As the OECD-DAC strategy points out we "will need to change how we think and how we operate, in a far more co-ordinated effort than we have known until now".

TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Technical cooperation has been highlighted as one focal point in the coordination strategy for Food Security. The World Bank, UNDP and DAC have worked closely on this issue in recent years. A seminar hosted by DAC in 1994 discussed needed reform in technical cooperation. It also stressed the critical role of technical cooperation in capacity building. The discussions drew on the DAC Principles "New Orientations in Technical Cooperation" as adopted by the Development Ministers at DAC's High Level meeting in 1991. The principles are worth stating here as background for our discussions on food security strategy.

-- Set as strategic objectives of technical cooperation long-term capacity building in developing countries rather than immediate short-term performance improvement

-- Put great emphasis on the central role of developing countries in the planning, design and management of technical cooperation

-- Stress the essential importance for effective technical cooperation of improved planning in the context of coordinated support for sectoral objectives and policies and in particular, use of a program rather than a project-by-project approach

-- Encourage "ownership" i.e. responsibility and control of technical cooperation programs and projects at all stages by the intended beneficiaries through participatory approaches, including local NGO participation

-- Emphasize the key importance for sustainable development and self-reliance of long-term institution building, especially in the areas of policy analysis and development management

-- Take into account the new recognition of private sector needs for technical cooperation

-- Encourage greater use of local expertise and existing structures

-- Define objectives in terms of outcomes to be achieved rather than inputs to be provided

-- Stress the need to pay greater attention to the costs and cost effectiveness of technical cooperation activities

Much of the focus of the DAC seminar in 1994 was directed to problems with the current technical cooperation effort. This was especially a concern in the context of Sub-Saharan



Africa and, to a lesser degree, to the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

Participation at the DAC seminar included all of the MDBs, the IMF, the UN system and the bilateral donors. The key conclusions were that there was a need for reform in both the donor community and in the developing countries themselves. In the donor community, criticism was aimed at the donors' failure to adhere to their own principles and their preoccupation with short-term priorities such as project implementation rather than long-term capacity building. For the host country the criticism was directed primarily on the failure to undertake broad-based public sector reform--especially civil service reform which would create a more favorable environment for capacity building and effective use of technical assistance.

One result of the seminar was to establish a technical cooperation network. This network is managed by a bilateral donor of the DAC. It functions as a task force on technical cooperation reform.

Individual Donor Performance Peer Reviews and Trends

Chart V I Net ODA in 1995
Performance of DAC countries as a percentage of GNP and in terms of volume



A-6

Source OECD, Development Assistance Committee 1996 Report

Aid Performance by DAC Members

Long-term Trends in DAC ODA

	Volume of net ODA (\$ million at 1994 prices and exchange rates)			Share of total DAC (at current prices and exchange rates, per cent)			Two-year averages, net disbursements ODA as per cent GNP		
	1974-75	1984-85	1994-95	1974-75	1984-85	1994-95	1974-75	1984-85	1994-95
Australia	954	1 067	1 120	40	27	19	0.60	0.47	0.35
Austria	245	519	659	0.6	0.8	1.2	0.20	0.33	0.33
Belgium	881	1 059	810	2.7	1.6	1.5	0.55	0.56	0.35
Canada	1 559	2 062	2 146	6.5	5.7	3.7	0.51	0.50	0.40
Denmark	528	976	1 427	1.5	1.6	2.6	0.54	0.83	0.99
Finland	111	327	302	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.17	0.38	0.32
France	3 837	6 625	7 952	10.9	10.8	14.3	0.44	0.62	0.59
Germany	4 579	6 636	6 663	12.8	10.1	12.1	0.39	0.46	0.32
Ireland	21	67	125	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.09	0.23	0.27
Italy	642	2 239	2 129	1.6	3.9	3.7	0.11	0.27	0.21
Japan	5 419	10 592	13 317	9.3	14.3	23.5	0.24	0.31	0.28
Luxembourg		21	58			0.1		0.16	0.38
Netherlands	1 397	2 484	2 653	4.3	4.2	4.9	0.68	0.97	0.79
New Zealand	144	103	109	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.42	0.25	0.23
Norway	361	871	1 112	1.3	2.0	2.0	0.62	1.02	0.95
Portugal			270			0.5		0.05	0.31
Spain		344	1 251		0.5	2.2		0.09	0.26
Sweden	1 125	1 437	1 666	4.0	2.8	3.0	0.74	0.83	0.86
Switzerland	332	705	953	0.7	1.0	1.7	0.16	0.30	0.35
United Kingdom	2 736	2 716	3 094	6.9	5.2	5.4	0.39	0.33	0.29
United States	10 211	12 124	8 557	32.1	31.8	14.6	0.26	0.24	0.12
TOTAL DAC	35 084	53 000	56 373	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.33	0.34	0.28
<i>of which</i>									
EU Members	16 103	25 477	29 059	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.40	0.45	0.40

Table 1

Total Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries

	1987	1988	Current \$ billion 1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995 p	1987	Per cent of total 1989	1995p
I OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (ODF)	56.7	61.4	61.1	69.8	69.7	69.8	70.1	71.6	69.4	66.1	52.7	28.3
1 Official development assistance (ODA) ^a	43.9	47.9	49.0	52.9	58.6	58.9	56.4	60.5	60.1	51.2	42.2	24.7
of which Bilateral disbursements	34.0	36.8	36.6	39.4	42.4	41.4	39.6	41.3	40.6	39.6	31.6	16.0
Multilateral disbursements	9.9	11.1	12.4	13.5	16.2	17.5	16.8	19.2	19.5	11.5	10.7	8.7
2 Other ODF	12.8	13.5	12.1	16.9	11.1	10.9	13.7	11.1	9.3	14.9	10.4	3.6
of which Bilateral disbursements	6.2	7.0	5.3	6.7	4.4	7.4	6.4	7.5	5.0	7.2	4.6	2.0
Multilateral disbursements	6.6	6.5	6.8	10.2	6.7	3.5	7.3	3.6	4.3	7.7	5.9	1.6
II TOTAL EXPORT CREDITS	1.6	2.2	9.4	4.7	1.8	1.3	0.6	9.3	11.0	1.9	8.1	4.3
of which Short term	4.1	2.0	4.8	4.5	0.8	0.5	1.5	0.2	0.8	4.8	4.1	0.3
III PRIVATE FLOWS	30.7	39.1	45.5	51.8	50.8	76.8	86.4	134.1	158.9	35.8	39.2	67.4
1 Direct investment (DAC)	19.4	21.8	26.5	26.4	22.6	27.3	38.6	48.5	53.6	22.6	22.8	23.7
of which to offshore centres	10.9	8.9	6.5	7.1	6.5	9.5	9.5	9.1	9.0	12.7	5.6	3.6
2 International bank lending ^b	7.0	7.8	10.5	15.0	11.0	31.0	9.0	42.6	70.0	8.2	9.1	29.6
of which Short term	5.0	4.0	8.0	7.0	12.0	25.0	7.0	44.0	50.0	5.8	6.9	27.7
3 Total bond lending	1.0	1.6	2.2	0.9	6.5	11.1	29.0	29.0	19.3	1.2	1.9	7.6
4 Other private ^c	1.3	3.7	2.3	4.4	5.3	1.4	4.0	8.0	10.0	1.5	2.0	4.0
5 Grants by non governmental organisations	4.0	4.2	4.0	5.1	5.4	6.0	5.8	6.0	6.0	4.7	3.4	2.4
TOTAL NET RESOURCE FLOWS (I + II + III)	85.8	98.3	116.0	126.3	122.3	147.8	155.9	215.0	239.3 ^d	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Memorandum items</i>												
Total net credits from IMF	4.7	3.9	2.1	2.2	1.0	0.3	0.8	0.5	13.1			
Recorded asset transactions by LDCs net	8.1	19.6	18.2	23.6	47.2	6.9	26.2	20.1				
Interest and dividends paid by LDCs gross	79.1	94.8	100.3	95.4	91.1	92.6	95.4	90.7				
Total official grants	27.2	31.0	32.4	39.4	45.4	44.9	43.4	45.5	46.8			
Total intra LDC flows (ODA) ^d	3.3	2.2	1.6	6.0	2.7	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.6			
At 1994 prices and exchange rates												
Total net resource flows	114.3	121.5	144.8	141.4	132.2	150.8	162.5	215.0	218.5			
Total official development finance	75.5	75.9	76.3	78.1	75.4	71.2	73.1	71.6	63.4			
Total ODA receipts	58.5	59.2	61.2	59.2	63.4	60.1	58.8	60.5	54.9			
Total DAC ODA (bilateral and multilateral)	54.1	58.2	57.1	59.3	61.3	62.1	58.9	59.2	53.6			

a) Excluding forgiveness of non ODA debt for the years 1990 to 1992




b) Excluding bond lending by banks (item III 3) and guaranteed financial credits (included in II)

c) No reporting has been received from DAC Members on portfolio investment

d) Not included in total net resource flows

Financing and External Debt of Developing Countries


Chart III-6 Total developing countries
 Net disbursements \$ billion at 1994 prices and exchange rates



Note 1995 data are provisional

Financing and External Debt of Developing Countries

Chart III 2 Resource flows by category and region
 Net disbursements \$ billion at 1994 prices and exchange rates



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Table 27






Aid by Major Purposes 1994

Commitments

													Per cent of total														
	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	Japan	Luxembourg	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	United Kingdom	United States	TOTAL DAC	Total	CEC	World Bank	UN Agencies	
Social and administrative																											
Infrastructure	345	176	275	171	219	267	331	369	477	69	236	-	216	416	234	353	273	315	150	260	299	273	246	88	307	-	
Education	141	128	116	96	31	38	212	171	173	23	85	-	62	344	25	208	92	66	41	101	47	107	89	38	108	-	
of which Basic education	19	-	02	-	11	14	-	29	00	-	-	-	15	01	-	00	16	36	01	-	-	06	43	04	58	-	
Health and population	74	25	117	43	57	90	28	38	92	21	22	-	37	25	50	20	69	87	27	58	127	49	79	14	104	-	
of which Basic health	45	-	15	02	02	54	-	16	00	10	-	-	07	07	-	00	-	57	-	-	-	05	36	10	47	-	
Planning and public administration	37	05	17	08	46	21	31	28	56	08	08	-	29	23	44	100	15	55	22	68	55	28	63	28	77	-	
Water supply and sanitation	32	05	21	09	22	73	32	75	67	07	95	-	27	05	22	00	02	44	16	24	10	49	15	08	18	-	
Other social Infrastructure/Service	61	11	04	14	63	45	28	58	90	10	25	-	61	19	94	24	96	63	43	08	60	40	-	-	-	-	
Economic infrastructure	228	197	42	136	262	52	61	201	126	93	421	-	62	83	90	76	242	115	13	119	155	212	159	168	156	-	
Transport and communications	196	109	23	75	137	26	31	165	62	04	232	-	25	45	50	66	31	58	08	22	13	109	144	157	139	-	
Energy	30	83	20	18	118	09	22	36	01	80	179	-	16	28	36	09	211	51	05	71	26	78	06	07	06	-	
Other	02	05	-	43	08	17	08	-	63	09	09	-	21	10	04	01	01	06	-	25	115	26	01	02	-	-	
Production	78	66	211	97	148	351	58	105	104	26	125	-	133	145	95	62	218	125	136	132	127	110	295	339	278	-	
Agriculture	66	20	113	36	84	319	51	58	51	16	98	-	125	132	62	12	206	105	105	80	57	75	232	311	201	-	
Industry mining and construction	05	38	48	54	49	32	02	17	38	11	25	-	04	04	33	17	08	17	26	34	04	17	54	16	68	-	
Trade banking tourism	07	08	49	01	15	-	04	14	14	-	02	-	04	08	-	32	03	01	06	18	66	16	10	11	09	-	
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	01	15	00	-	-	-	-	-	-	00	-	02	-	-	-	02	-	-	-	-	-
Multisector	09	10	147	40	98	51	78	14	34	-	48	-	02	46	154	03	05	49	117	-	08	39	65	137	38	-	
Programme assistance	206	08	25	15	03	06	93	24	00	94	44	-	18	127	14	00	-	62	39	119	24	49	175	152	183	-	
Debt relief ^b	08	343	165	04	25	-	307	121	00	560	43	-	64	-	71	99	128	13	409	43	-	115	-	-	-	-	
Food aid	21	04	20	76	-	-	05	19	17	46	04	-	33	04	23	00	08	-	31	45	141	35	57	116	34	-	
Emergency Aid (other than food aid)	48	168	30	169	86	159	03	62	153	65	02	-	51	55	242	17	10	246	84	148	28	45	-	-	-	-	
Administrative expenses	35	11	75	94	81	89	36	35	85	22	44	-	-	84	57	32	68	55	23	60	66	45	-	-	-	-	
Unspecified	23	17	09	199	77	25	27	49	04	24	32	-	420	40	20	358	48	20	-	74	154	77	03	-	04	-	
TOTAL	100	-	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	-										

a) Including students and trainees
b) Including forgiveness of non ODA debt

Chart III 5 **Total DAC ODA to multilateral agencies**
At 1994 prices and exchange rates (\$ million)



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- PN-ABL-930 Azarcon Yolanda and Randolph Barker 1992 *Trends and Determinants of Irrigation Investment in the Philippines* Report No 321

¹Publications with a reference number are available from USAID Publications with no reference number are available from Abt Associates All reports are in English, except those marked Sp (Spanish) and Fr (French)

²APAP's report numbering system designates different types of reports Technical reports begin with the digit one or two, core and collaborative research reports begin with three methods and guidelines reports begin with four, handbook reports begin with five

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