
THE POLITICS OF SOUTH AFRICA ON ELECTION DAY

April 1994

**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

From April 26 to 28, millions of South Africans will cast their first votes in elections that will establish the popular mandate for a constitutional democracy. After decades of massive civil disobedience, armed struggle, international protests and, more recently, three years of negotiations, South Africans will take a giant step in the dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a new political system. Elections in South Africa, in and of themselves, do not constitute democracy. However, if the results are accepted by the people, these elections will provide an opportunity for addressing the social, political and economic disparities that are the history of this divided society.

The Politics of South Africa on Election Day is published by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in Washington, D.C. and Johannesburg, South Africa. This publication is intended to serve as a context for those who are observing, studying and evaluating the electoral process. We hope that the information contained in this document will contribute to a better understanding of the issues that confront South Africans in their transition to democracy.

NDI is indebted to Padraig O'Malley for his contribution to researching, writing and editing this report. O'Malley, affiliated with the John W. McCormack Institute at the University of Massachusetts in Boston, has provided his services to NDI while writing his own book on the transition in South Africa. His work has been augmented by the contribution of NDI Senior Associate for Election Processes Patrick Merloe and Assistant Counsel for Election Processes Michael Stoddard.

During the six years that NDI has been working in South Africa, the Institute's programs have benefitted from the dedication of many talented individuals. Smydge Perry compiled much of the recent information related to the negotiations, election law and the political parties competing in the elections. Perry handled her research with diligence and proficiency and also contributed to the editing and production of the publication. Over the years, several others contributed to this document through the research and writing of briefing papers. Specifically, we would like to acknowledge the work of Matthew Eldridge, Brian Kelliher, Timothy McCoy, Celena Slade and the late Amy Biehl. The layout, design, production and distribution of the publication was undertaken by Anna Wang and Nomsa Ngakane. Beyond our own original research, we drew from the work of others who have written for the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, the South African Institute of Race Relations, the *Financial Times*, the *Sowetan*, the *Economist* and the *Journal of Democracy*.

NDI is also grateful to the many civic and political experts who volunteered their time to participate in the Institute's training programs in South Africa. These experts were drawn from 22 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America.

The Institute began its program initiatives in South Africa in 1988 at the invitation of the then-exiled director of the ANC's Department of International Affairs, Thabo Mbeki. He requested that NDI begin to work with his and other political organizations to help them prepare for multi-party elections. NDI embarked on a multi-faceted, multi-party program of voter education, political party and civic organization training, legal and administrative guidance, and election studies and observation. The support provided by the National Endowment for Democracy, which made this publication possible, and the U.S. Agency for International Development has been instrumental to our work.

Kenneth D. Wollack
President, National Democratic Institute
April 19, 1994



THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

FOR

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), based in Washington, D.C., conducts nonpartisan political development programs throughout the world. By working with political parties, legislatures, civic organizations and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in new and emerging democracies. Since 1985, NDI has sponsored more than 75 election-related programs in more than 30 countries, including the Southern Africa nations of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia.

In collaboration with the Center for Development Studies at the University of the Western Cape, NDI has carried out an extensive four-year program to help educate millions of South Africa's first-time voters about the modalities and procedures of democratic elections. Throughout the country, in its most remote villages, rural communities and urban locations, staff and trainers have worked with community educators to demystify the election process and minimize intimidation that is rooted in fear of the unknown. The program, dubbed Project Vote, has been enthusiastically accepted by South Africans and supported by the international community.

In a separate program NDI, together with the International Republican Institute and the Joint Center for Economic and Political Studies, has worked with 13 political parties to enhance their organizational capacities to participate in the elections. These parties have never been afforded an opportunity to participate in national elections, and they represent the majority of the previously-disenfranchised South Africans. The Project is designed to support the long-term development of these political parties.

NDI has sponsored visits by South Africans to 20 countries around the world to study election procedures. The Institute has also sponsored three delegations of political leaders and election officials from 10 countries in Africa to observe and study the preparations for elections in South Africa. At the time of the voting there will be a 50-member delegation affiliated with the Independent Election Commission as international observers under the Institute's auspices.

The Institute's program offices are located in Johannesburg and Cape Town and are under the direction of Patricia Keefer, NDI senior associate for political and civic organization. Additional NDI staff members associated with the program include: Anna Wang, project officer for the South Africa Election Support Project; Carl Larkins, program officer for Project Vote; Michael Goldberg, program assistant for Project Vote; Patrick Merloe, senior associate for election processes; Michael Stoddard, assistant counsel for election processes; Maura Donlan, program officer for Southern Africa; Kelly Lamm, program assistant for the South Africa Election Support Project; Paul Rensted, program officer for South Africa; Laura McQuade, grants officer; Eric Payne, South Africa Election Studies Project field representative; Rob Black, logistics coordinator/program assistant for the South Africa Election Studies Project; Theresa Collins, regional assistant; and Celina Slade, Southern Africa intern.

The Politics of South Africa on Election Day

April 1994

On April 27, after several years of on-again, off-again negotiations, South Africans of every color, race and gender will have an opportunity to vote in South Africa's first democratic elections.

It has been a long and arduous process accompanied by horrific levels of violence, especially in Natal and the townships of the Eastern Rand; by shifting political alliances; and by acrimonious disputes between the two major players, who are mutually dependent on each other if a "new" South Africa is to emerge from the ashes of apartheid. South Africans will vote for representatives to a 400-seat assembly that will be an interim government of national unity for five years; assembly members will write a new constitution.

The transition has been a remarkable process as the two main protagonists have sought, and in the end found, common ground. Within the last year a 227-page interim constitution has been written and enacted. The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) gave blacks a significant say in government in the run-up to the elections. A legal framework for elections was codified, and an Independent Election Commission (IEC), an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and an Independent Media Commission (IMC) are in place. In addition, a National Peace Keeping Force (NPKF) has been formed, and international sanctions are a thing of the past.

At the same time, the country is gripped by the most tragic violence, which appears to be extremely difficult to bring under control because the animosities that fuel it are themselves a legacy of apartheid and the political intolerance it incubated in the townships.

The turning point in the negotiating process came on April 10, 1993, when the popular and charismatic Chris Hani -- who was one of the most important leaders in the African National Congress (ANC), the former chief of staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the ANC) and the general secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP) -- was assassinated. The mass anger generated by Hani's death at the hands of a white, right-wing extremist ignited riots, violence and boycotts that signalled to participants in the on-going negotiations process, especially the ANC, that they must project, however symbolically, evidence of significant progress toward transition and elections.

In the Negotiating Forum, ANC Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa pushed through a compromise to provisionally set an election date as a palliative to the restless youth who were increasingly voicing their sense of betrayal and frustration. In exchange, the ANC agreed to the demands of the South African government and of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) that the 26-party Negotiating Forum would draft an interim constitution, which would be the basis of a non-racial, transitional government. The Forum would function until an elected constitutional assembly writes a permanent constitution within two years of the April 1994 elections. Whites, who were taught to see the ANC as the agents of communism and were told to be prepared for a "total onslaught" from its malevolent practitioners on South Africa's borders, are apprehensive at the prospect of change that points to the inevitability of their having to live under black majority rule.

And then there are questions related to the nature of democracy itself: Is majority rule democratic rule? Is black majority rule democratic rule? What kinds of checks and balances are necessary to protect the rights of minorities in a divided society? Is majority rule democratic rule when a white elite controls the economy? Does black political empowerment mean much if it is not accompanied by economic empowerment? The ANC's decision to agree to a five-year government of national unity, in which every party that receives 5 percent or more of the vote will get a place in the cabinet, was made partly to diffuse some of the explosive issues these questions raise.

Moreover, the elections that begin on April 26 and run through April 28 are only the beginning. There are many obstacles to a speedy yet peaceful transition. Among them is the importance of building among the main political entities consensus on the transition to a post-apartheid South Africa. These groups face the repercussions of a rapidly deteriorating economy, widespread political and criminal violence, and the need to mediate differences within their respective organizations. Not only must an agreement be reached among the elites across the broad spectrum of political opinion, but the agreement must also be cogently translated and sold to the fractious South African populous. Furthermore, it must be effectively implemented during the highly-charged transition period to preclude exacerbating violence-inspiring rivalries and turf battles.

THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

The Negotiating Table

During 1993, negotiations under the auspices of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MNF) made progress. The structure of the talks was multi-layered. At the top was the Plenary, *i.e.*, all the political parties and their leaders. There was no permanent chairperson. Rather, the delegates relied on six revolving chairpersons. At the next level, there was a Negotiating Forum consisting of 208 members -- all the members of the Plenary without the leaders. This body confirmed decisions of the next level, the Negotiating Council (52 delegates plus 52 advisors), which comprised two delegates (including one woman) and two advisors from each of the 26 parties. The Negotiating Council met in public four days a week until an agreement was reached. A 10-member Planning Committee met daily *in camera* to develop recommendations, decisions and compromises to be passed on to the Negotiating Council. Technical sub-committees reported directly to the Planning Committee. There were sub-committees on: (1) constitutional matters; (2) fundamental rights in the transition; (3) the Independent Election Commission (IEC); (4) the Independent Media Commission (IMC); (5) the repeal of discriminatory legislation; (6) the Transitional Executive Council (TEC); and (7) violence. Seats on the technical sub-committees were filled overwhelmingly by lawyers and experts who thrashed out some of the thorniest issues, *i.e.*, issues on which the politicians chose to pass.

The negotiations addressed, *inter alia*, such issues as: (1) the powers and functions of the TEC, which would take over functions of government and prepare the way for ensuing national elections; (2) the powers and functions of regional governments in a new constitutional order and whether this issue should be decided in multi-party negotiations or by an elected constitution-writing body (the government and Inkatha preferred the former and the ANC preferred the latter); (3) the nature of a transitional constitution that would set out the powers and functions of an interim government of national unity (selected by the Constitutional Assembly), which would serve as the basis for governance until the Constitutional Assembly drafted a permanent constitution; (4) whether an interim government should govern for five years or longer; (5) the definition of a "government of national unity" as opposed to the definition of "power-sharing;" (6) the composition of electoral and media commissions; (7) the possibility of joint control of the security forces during the transition to ensure free and fair elections; and (8) the future of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei (the TVBC states) and of the KwaZulu region. The parties to the talks showed an unprecedented willingness to rise to the occasion and put their efforts to forge a consensus above issues of partisanship. With April 26 to 28, 1994, selected as the official dates of South Africa's first democratic elections, which would include for the first time the nation's African majority population, a massive effort has been undertaken to quell the violence and educate previously disenfranchised voters to maximize their participation in the process.

Pre-negotiations

Throughout South Africa's modern history the white minority, which makes up less than 13 percent of the country's population, has ruled over a disenfranchised black majority. Since its introduction in 1948 under the leadership of the National Party (NP), the system of apartheid was refined so that fewer than 5 million whites controlled nearly all of the country's material wealth and political power. Despite the existence of domestic anti-apartheid forces, the waging of armed combat by exiled paramilitary forces and pressure from the international community in the form of economic sanctions and boycotts, the South African government continued to maintain the system of *de jure* apartheid until the early 1990s.

Regionally, the implementation of United Nations Resolution 435, which led to the independence of Namibia in 1990, marked a turning point in the politics of Southern Africa. At the global level, revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union -- namely the collapse of communism -- had a direct influence on South Africa. With the fall of communism the South African government's rationale for the "total onslaught" it constantly warned against became irrelevant. Moreover, the evaporation of funds that communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union supplied the ANC during its long years in exile severely diminished the ANC's capacity to sustain its activities. The withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the decline of the Cold War in Africa paved the way for negotiations aimed at ending the military conflicts in Angola and Mozambique.

The dramatic changes in the region and in the world had an important impact on South Africa and provided a window of opportunity for enlightened leadership. Moreover, the South African economy was bleeding, caught in the vise-like grip of a severe economic recession that was exacerbated by internal and external factors such as gold price decline, capital flight, disinvestment and international sanctions. The governing NP was losing the support of both liberal and conservative elements within the white population. The NP also had to face an internal resistance movement, the United Democratic Front (UDF), which had become increasingly more effective. In fact, large parts of the country had become ungovernable; and the government knew that while it could suppress the mass resistance, it could not defeat it.

On the other hand, the ANC found it increasingly difficult to wage its guerrilla war. Forays into South Africa began to taper in the late 1980s. Mozambique, which had assisted the ANC for many years, was plagued by attacks by South Africa. As a result, Mozambique signed an accord with South Africa that prohibited the Mozambican government from providing assistance of any kind to the ANC. In short, it was in the interest of both the ANC and the government to negotiate. The NP government, which came to power in August 1989 under the leadership of State President F.W. de Klerk, concluded that immediate political changes were essential for economic survival. In fact, former State President P.W. Botha and other National Party government ministers had met with ANC leader Nelson Mandela on a number of occasions dating back to 1986.

When in 1989 the ANC adopted the Harare Declaration, which was based on the 40-year-old Freedom Charter, the then-exiled ANC set forth the conditions that would ultimately create a climate for negotiations. The Declaration called for the "unconditional" release from prison

of Mandela and other political prisoners, the legalization of previously banned organizations and the removal of the state of emergency.

In February 1990, de Klerk agreed to legalize the entire spectrum of anti-apartheid forces -- including the ANC, the SACP and the PAC -- and to release Mandela and other political prisoners. In addition, de Klerk committed the government to begin a process for negotiating the repeal of apartheid legislation and the establishment of constitutionally guaranteed, full-rights of citizenship for all South Africans. Shortly thereafter, the government and the ANC reached general agreement on the pre-conditions for beginning informal talks. This consensus was followed in August 1990 by an outbreak of politically motivated violence that continues to this day to destabilize the country and fracture the parties.

Negotiations: CODESA

Despite the government's failure to fully meet the preconditions for talks and despite the continuing violence, 19 political entities agreed to convene the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) on December 20, 1991.

The Conservative Party (CP) and other right-wing forces, maintaining that the 1989 elections did not give the NP the mandate to pursue the course it had chosen, demanded that the NP call new national elections. In a February 1992 by-election in Potchefstroom, the CP won a seat that had been held by the NP since 1948 and was formerly held by the speaker of the parliament. In reaction, de Klerk called for a referendum among white South Africans on whether to proceed with the reform process. Although in principle the ANC opposed the calling of the referendum, it reluctantly urged whites to vote "yes." The CP, after a fractious debate on whether to call for an electoral boycott or to urge a "no" vote, opted for the latter; 68.7 percent of whites voted "yes" on the referendum, and de Klerk claimed an overwhelming mandate for continuing the reform process and negotiating a power-sharing government.

The government, emerging with renewed confidence from its referendum victory, proposed that it would require a majority of 75 percent for the amendment or replacement of the interim constitution and 75 percent for the Bill of Rights. The ANC proposed a two-thirds majority for changes in the constitution and 70 percent for changes in the Bill of Rights. After much negotiation, the ANC and the NP agreed to a 70 percent majority for changes in the constitution and 75 percent for the Bill of Rights. However, the ANC added a rider: it raised the issue of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. The rider suggested that if the Constitutional Assembly was able to achieve as much as a simple majority but less than a 70 percent majority for changes in the constitution, there would be a referendum after six months, with a two-thirds majority being sufficient to approve a new constitution. The government rejected this offer, arguing that the ANC had only to stall for six months and it would be in a position to write a constitution of its own making. The ANC used the government's rejection to argue that everything in the constitutional package had to be agreed to or nothing was agreed. Hence the impasse.

Mass Action

CODESA collapsed as a result of a series of tragic massacres that occurred in May and June, 1992. On June 17, 1992, 40 residents of the Boipatong township were massacred allegedly by Inkatha supporters living in nearby hostels. The attack was reportedly an act of revenge for a similar action that had taken place three weeks earlier when 20 Inkatha supporters were killed by what some witnesses claim were ANC Self Defense Units (SDUs). The Boipatong incident intensified the pressure on Mandela to pull out of negotiations and return to mass action as the means for ending apartheid and bringing down the government -- the "Leipzig Option" employed so successfully to topple communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. On June 21 Mandela announced the ANC's withdrawal from CODESA and issued a series of demands for action by the government to curtail violence.

Mandela also appealed for intervention by the international community. The focus of action moved from CODESA to the streets and into the U.N. Security Council. The ANC said it would not return to the negotiating table until the following demands were met:

- the creation of a democratically elected and sovereign assembly to draw up a post-apartheid democratic constitution;
- the establishment of an interim government of national unity;
- the elimination of state assassination squads, the dismantling of special forces, the prosecution of officers involved in violence, and the cessation of repression in tribal homelands;
- the fencing of migrant-worker hostels seen as focal points of violence, the creation of permanent police patrols, the institution of regular searches for weapons, and the creation of a plan to turn hostels into family homes;
- the banning of dangerous weapons in public;
- the international monitoring of violence;
- the release of all political prisoners; and
- the repeal of all repressive legislation.

Boipatong became another crucial turning point on the road to democracy because it put pressure on de Klerk to agree to a U.N. investigatory mission as stipulated by the July 16, 1992, U.N. Security Council Resolution 765. Special Representative to the Secretary General Cyrus Vance was dispatched to South Africa to try to revive the stalled talks and to secure a multilateral commitment to the curbing of violence.

In the absence of a government response, the ANC's mass action campaign reached its climax in September when more than 20 ANC supporters were gunned down by troops of the

nominally independent homeland of Ciskei while marching on its capital, Bisho. The incident attracted international condemnation of both the ANC's alleged proclivity to provoke violence and the government's overt and clandestine backing of anti-ANC actions. A pall of political apprehension fell over South Africa after Bisho, forcing the major actors to reconsider their strategies and goals. The result was the resumption of bilateral talks between the ANC and the government; the talks were conducted principally between ANC Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa and South African Minister of Constitutional Development Roelf Meyer. As the ANC and the government tried to achieve consensus, they simultaneously conducted talks with allies and adversaries from other parties both in and out of CODESA.

Following months of closed door negotiations, the ANC and the government bridged formidable gaps and were able to present similar proposals for the upcoming transitional period. These proposals were set out in a jointly agreed upon "Record of Understanding." Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) balked at what they saw as the government's capitulation to the ANC/SACP alliance, particularly in matters relating to hostel residents and cultural weapons, which they interpreted as an insult to Zulu traditions.

A significant step occurred when the ANC endorsed a policy proposal, which had its origins in a November 1992 discussion paper written by South African Communist Party Chairman Joe Slovo entitled *Negotiations: A Strategic Perspective*. The outline of the policy position envisaged the majority party ruling as part of an interim government of national unity, *i.e.*, "power sharing" for as much as five years. Under the ANC plan, all political parties receiving more than 5 percent of the vote should be represented in the cabinet in proportion to their respective polling success. Slovo's argument for advancing this arrangement, viewed as pure pragmatism by its proponents, was based on the assumption that the interim constitution would provide a guarantee of continued employment for the existing civil service -- the largest employer in South Africa -- which might be hostile to an incoming ANC government and disrupt the implementation of its policies. Slovo maintained that should the ANC alliance win an outright majority in the first democratic elections, it would find it nearly impossible to make the government function in the interest of those who had elected it if the white power structure, in the form of the NP, were excluded. In short, if the ANC wanted to succeed in government, it would have to co-opt the NP.

Slovo's proposal was sharply criticized by various political factions within the ANC. Pallo Jordan, Chris Hani and Winnie Mandela argued that it represented a departure from the principle of a "transfer of power" to support for the concept of "power sharing." However, the ANC leadership succeeded in securing the support of the National Executive Committee (NEC) for using the proposal as a basis for the January/February 1993 negotiations with the government and other parties.

Negotiations: The Multi-Party Negotiating Forum

The bilateral talks between Ramaphosa and Meyer produced, in addition to the agreements announced on February 12, 1993, a quasi-consensus on the parameters for multi-party talks. Official multi-party talks resumed on April 1, 1993, under the auspices of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MNF). The new forum was much more inclusive than

CODESA, with 26 parties convening at the first formal session. Notable participants, at least at the beginning, included the PAC; the CP and its less militant off-shoot, the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU); as well as the previously excluded traditional leaders. The major hold-outs were the neo-fascist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) on the extreme right and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) at the other end of the political spectrum.

On April 1, 1993, the MNF convened at the World Trade Center outside of Johannesburg to resume negotiations over the rules and structures that were to govern the transitional period. The talks were suspended following the Hanu assassination on April 10 but resumed April 26. The Negotiating Council (the working group of the Negotiating Forum) announced April 27, 1994, as the date for the elections. This scheduling was decided upon with opposition from IFP and the CP, which withdrew from the MNF in July. These two parties, along with the governments of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei and with other right-wing organizations, formed an umbrella organization called the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), which was later expanded and renamed the Freedom Alliance (FA).

The white right demanded a separate Afrikaner-majority state or region in which Afrikaners could enjoy their right to self-determination through different classes of citizenship. These parties also warned of their intention to engage in a sabotage campaign targeting such state facilities as dams, electrical transmitters and railroads.

At the center of the IFP's demands were regional autonomy and genuine federalism in addition to other matters related to the electoral and constitutional process. For example, the IFP took particular exception to the notion of "sufficient consensus" as the mode for decision-making. Sufficient consensus was defined as a consensus that would allow the process to proceed. In reality, sufficient consensus meant the government and the ANC had to be in agreement.

After painstaking deliberations, the Negotiating Forum hammered out an interim constitution and provided for black participation in government, which would effectively level the playing field in the pre-election period. Given the severe divisions within South African society, and the unique nature of the crumbling apartheid state, the transition was described by Steven Friedman as "reluctant" in his article, "South Africa's Reluctant Transition" in the *Journal of Democracy*. Both principals to the negotiations viewed the negotiated transition as a second-best option. Mandela and de Klerk, in their separate ways, came to realize their mutual dependence on each other and hence their unavoidable conclusion that a government of national unity was the only tenable option.

South Africa's whites compose approximately 13 percent of the population but control nearly 98 percent of the country's wealth. Therefore, they are economically indispensable. The ANC, on the other hand, may enjoy a permanent majority in the eventual parliament and possibly a two-thirds constitutional majority in the Constitutional Assembly that will write the next constitution. The two protagonists have sought to accommodate each other. Indeed one observer, Bill Keller of *The New York Times*, described the relationship between Mandela and de Klerk as a "minuet of wary respect."

THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION

On September 7, 1993, the South African Parliament voted to allow black South Africans to participate in the first multi-party national elections. The announcement of the election date was a significant victory for the ANC but, like most victories won in negotiations, it did not come without compromise. In exchange for the announcement, the ANC agreed to the NP demand that the Negotiating Council draft an interim constitution to govern until the Constitutional Assembly wrote the permanent document no more than two years after the April 1994 elections. This was a crucial concession to the NP since it believed it wielded more power in the Negotiating Council than it would in the Constitutional Assembly. Throughout the course of negotiations there were many attempts to change the election date, but the ANC held firm. Meyer and Ramaphosa maintained that once they settled on the date the pressure of time was critical to the resolution of controversial issues.

The constitution approved by Parliament take effect on April 27, 1994. The negotiators at the MNF worked to produce a constitution based on compromises. As stated, the new constitution would be a transitional one. South Africa's final constitution will be written by a constitutional assembly in accordance with the principles and guidelines of the Interim Constitution.

THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) is a multi-racial council that is responsible for overseeing the police, the army, the budget, foreign affairs and the civil service during the transition to a democratically elected system of government. Furthermore, the TEC has representation from each of the parties that participated in the MNF and that agreed to participate in elections on April 27. The TEC was charged with facilitating the transition to democracy by:

- eliminating impediments to legitimate political activity;
- ending intimidation that might affect the transition;
- enabling all political parties to organize and canvass in all areas;
- ensuring the full participation of women in the transition; and
- ensuring that no government or administration uses its powers to promote or prejudice a desired outcome.

In this regard, the TEC, recognizing that many of the 26 parties in the electoral process would be extremely skeptical of the SAP's or the SADF's capacity to behave impartially, set up the National Peace Keeping Force (NPKF). The NPKF is composed of 3,500 members of the SADF, SAP and Umkhonto we Sizwe and includes some homeland police and security forces.

Decisions of the TEC are reached by consensus if possible or, as in most cases, by a 75 percent majority. A 75 percent majority is also needed in its subcouncils on policing, defense and intelligence. A two-thirds majority is needed in other subcouncils, such as regional government, finance, foreign affairs and the status of women.

The TEC may also direct the South African government, governments of homelands and independent states, political parties and organizations not to proceed with the planned legislation or action that the TEC "has reason to believe" would be detrimental to the objectives of the Council. On the other hand, the IEC is chiefly responsible for administering and monitoring the elections and certifying whether the elections are "substantially" free and fair. The IEC is empowered to promulgate and enforce regulations, including codes of conduct for election observers and regulations pertaining to political advertising. Among the IEC's subordinate structures are an Election Administration Directorate, an Election Monitoring Directorate and an Election Adjudication Secretariat. A hierarchy of three levels of judicial structures -- Electoral Tribunals, Electoral Appeal Tribunals and the Special Electoral Court -- will resolve any disputes that result from the election process.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

Parties involved in the negotiations can be divided into two groups: parties that wanted as much as possible of the constitution to be entrenched before the Constitutional Assembly began drawing up the permanent constitution and parties that wanted the Constitutional Assembly to be free to amend the interim constitution in any way it wished.

After much discussion, heated debate, threats of walk-outs and actual walk-outs, the Negotiating Forum agreed that the Constitutional Principles agreed upon would be binding on the Constitutional Assembly and guaranteed by a Constitutional Court.

These principles are:

- (1) The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign state, of a common South African citizenship and of a democratic system of government committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races.
- (2) Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after due consideration to *inter alia* the fundamental rights contained in chapter three of this constitution.
- (3) The Constitution shall prohibit racial, gender and all other forms of discrimination and shall promote racial and gender equality and national unity.
- (4) The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. It shall be binding on all organs of state at all levels of government.
- (5) The legal system shall ensure the equality of all before the law and an equitable legal process. Equality before the law includes laws, programs or activities that have as their object the amelioration of the conditions of the disadvantaged, including those disadvantaged on the grounds of race, color or gender.
- (6) There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.
- (7) The Judiciary shall be properly qualified, independent, and impartial, and shall have the power to safeguard and enforce the Constitution and all fundamental rights.

- (8) There shall be a representative government embracing multi-party democracy, regular elections, universal adult suffrage, a common voters' roll and, in general, proportional representation.
- (9) Provision shall be made for freedom of information so that there can be open and accountable administration at all levels of government.
- (10) Formal legislative procedures shall be adhered to by legislative organs at all levels of government.
- (11) The diversity of language and culture shall be acknowledged and protected, and conditions for their promotion shall be encouraged.
- (12) Collective rights of self determination in forming, joining, and maintaining organs of civil society including linguistic, cultural, and religious associations, shall, on the basis of non-discrimination and free association, be recognized and protected.
- (13) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to indigenous law, like common law, shall be recognized and applied by the courts, subject to the provisions of the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and to legislation dealing specifically therewith.
- (14) Provision shall be made for the participation of minority parties in the legislative process in a manner consistent with democracy.
- (15) Amendments to the Constitution shall require special procedures involving specified majorities.
- (16) Government shall be structured at national, provincial and local levels.
- (17) At each level of government there shall be democratic representation. This principle shall not derogate from the provisions of principle (13).
- (18) The powers, boundaries, and functions of the national government and provincial governments shall be defined in the Constitution. Amendments to the Constitution which alter the powers, boundaries, functions or institutions of provinces shall in addition to any other procedures specified in the Constitution for constitutional amendments, require the approval of a special majority of the legislatures of the provinces, alternatively, if there is such a chamber, a two-thirds majority of a chamber of Parliament composed of provincial representatives, and if the amendment concerns specific provinces only, the approval of the legislatures of such provinces will also be needed. Provisions shall be made for obtaining the views of a provincial legislature concerning all constitutional amendments regarding its powers, boundaries, and functions.

- (19) The powers and functions at the national and provincial levels of government shall include exclusive and concurrent powers as well as the power to perform functions for the other levels of government on an agency or delegation basis.
- (20) Each level of government shall have the appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers and functions that will allow each level to function effectively. The allocation of powers between different levels of government shall be made on a basis which is conducive to financial viability at each level of government and to effective public administration, and which recognizes the need for and promotes national unity and legitimate provincial autonomy and acknowledges cultural diversity.
- (21) The following criteria shall be applied in the allocation of powers to the national government and the provincial governments:
- (1) The level at which decisions can be taken most effectively in respect of the quality and rendering of services, shall be the level responsible and accountable for the quality and the rendering of the services, and such level shall accordingly be empowered by the Constitution to do so.
 - (2) Where it is necessary for the maintenance of essential national standards, for the establishment of minimum standards required for the rendering of services, the maintenance of economic unity, the maintenance of national security or the prevention of unreasonable action by one province which is prejudicial to the interests of another province or the country as a whole, the Constitution shall empower the national government to intervene through legislative or such other steps as may be defined in the Constitution.
 - (3) Where there is necessity to speak with one voice, or to act as a single entity -- in particular in relation to other states -- powers should be allocated to the national government.
 - (4) Where uniformity across the nation is required for a particular function, the legislative power over that function should be allocated predominantly, if not wholly, to the national government.
 - (5) The determination of national economic policies, and the power to promote interprovincial commerce and to protect the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital, and labor, should be allocated to the national government.
 - (6) Provincial governments shall have powers either exclusively or concurrently with the national government, *inter alia*:

- (a) for the purposes of provincial planning and rendering of services; and
 - (b) in respect of aspects of government dealing with specific socio-economic and cultural needs and the general well-being of the inhabitants of the province.
- (7) Where mutual cooperation is essential or desirable or where it is required to guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government service, the powers shall be allocated concurrently to the national government and the provincial governments.
- (8) The Constitution shall specify how powers which are not specifically allocated in the Constitution to the national government or to a provincial government, shall be dealt with as necessary ancillary powers pertaining to the powers and functions allocated either to the national government or provincial governments.
- (22) The national government shall not exercise its powers (either exclusive or concurrent) so as to encroach upon the geographical, functional, or institutional integrity of the provinces.
- (23) In the event of a dispute concerning the legislative powers allocated by the Constitution concurrently to the national government and the provincial governments, which cannot be resolved by a court on a construction of the Constitution, precedence shall be given to the legislative powers of the national government.
- (24) A framework for local government powers, functions, and structures shall be set out in the Constitution. The comprehensive powers, functions, and other features of local government shall be set out in parliamentary statutes or in provincial legislation or in both.
- (25) The national government and provincial governments shall have fiscal powers and functions which will be defined in the Constitution. The framework for local government referred to in Principle (24) shall make provision for appropriate fiscal powers and functions of different categories of local government.
- (26) Each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally so as to ensure that provinces and local governments are able to provide basic services and execute the functions allocated to them.
- (27) A Financial and Fiscal Commission, in which each province shall be represented, shall recommend fiscal and financial allocations to the provincial and local governments from revenue collected nationally, after taking into account the

national interest, economic disparities between the provinces as well as the population and development needs, administrative responsibilities and other legitimate interests of each of the provinces.

- (28) Notwithstanding the provisions of Principle (12), the right of employees and employees to join and form employer organizations and trade unions and to engage in collective bargaining shall be recognized and protected. Provision shall be made that every person shall have the right to fair labor practices.
- (29) The independence and impartiality of a Public Service Commission, a Reserve Bank, an Auditor-General and Public Protector shall be provided for and safeguarded by the Constitution in the interests of the maintenance of effective public finance and administration and a high standard of ethics in the public service.
- (30) There shall be an efficient, non-partisan, career-oriented public service broadly representative for the South African community, functioning on a basis of fairness and which will serve all members of the public in an unbiased and impartial manner, and shall, in the exercise of its powers and in compliance with its duties, loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day in the performance of its administrative functions. The structures and functioning of the public service, as well as the terms and conditions of service of its members, shall be regulated by law. Every member of the public service shall be entitled to a fair pension.
- (31) Every member of the security forces (police, military, and intelligence) and the security forces as a whole, shall be required to perform their functions and exercise their powers in the national interest and shall be prohibited from furthering or prejudicing political party interest.
- (32) The Constitution shall provide that until April 30, 1999 the national executive shall be composed and shall function substantially in the manner provided for in Chapter 6 of the Constitution.
- (33) The Constitution shall provide that, unless Parliament is dissolved on account of its passing a vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet, no election shall be held before April 30, 1999.

THE ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

The Constitution and Parliamentary Structure

The 1993 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Interim Constitution) guarantees universal suffrage. The right to vote may be exercised by citizens and permanent residents who are 18 years of age or older and who are not subject to legal disqualifications, such as being ruled of unsound mind or incarcerated for certain serious offenses. The Interim Constitution also guarantees a secret ballot and the right of citizens to stand for election to public office.

Parliament is to be composed of two houses, the National Assembly (elected directly by the people) and the Senate (elected indirectly by the provincial legislatures). Parliament's term of office is to be five years following the 1994 elections, although Parliament may be dissolved after a vote of no confidence in the cabinet or in the event that a new constitution is not adopted within the requisite time.

Parliament will function as a governing legislature and as a constituent assembly. Both houses sitting jointly will constitute the Constitutional Assembly. The Constitutional Assembly is to pass a new constitution within two years. A vote of at least two-thirds of all members of the Constitutional Assembly will be required to pass the new constitution. If that vote is not obtained within the two-year period but a draft is supported by a smaller majority, the draft can be adopted, under specified conditions, in a referendum by 60 percent approval of the electorate.

The National Assembly will elect one of its members as the President of the Republic. The President will be the head of state and will exercise executive authority. Each party holding at least 80 seats in the National Assembly will be entitled to appoint an Executive Deputy President from among its members in the National Assembly. If no party or only one party holds at least 80 seats, the parties holding the largest and second largest amount of seats will be entitled to designate an Executive Deputy President from among their members of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly will consist of 400 members elected by proportional representation: 200 members from regional lists of candidates submitted by the contesting political parties; and 200 members from national lists submitted by such parties or from regional lists if a party did not submit a national list. The Senate will consist of 90 members with 10 senators selected by each of the nine provincial legislatures.

Provincial legislatures will range in size from 30 to 86 members. Members of these legislatures will be elected by proportional representation from party lists submitted for each province. In addition to electing members of the Senate, these bodies will exercise provincial legislative authority.

The Electoral System

On April 26 to 28 elections will be held for the National Assembly and for the provincial legislatures. The 400 members of the National Assembly will be elected from one ballot, counted according to separate formulas for the 200 members to be elected from the parties' regional lists and for the 200 members to be elected from their national lists. A separate ballot will be cast to elect members of the provincial legislatures.

In addition to the Interim Constitution, South Africa's electoral system includes the Transitional Executive Council Act, the 1993 Electoral Act, the 1994 Electoral Amendment Act, the 1993 Independent Electoral Commission Act, the 1993 Independent Media Commission Act and the 1993 Independent Broadcasting Authority Act. These documents taken together comprise a comprehensive system for governing South Africa's electoral processes.

Election Administration

The elections will be administered by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which comprises 11 South African Commissioners and five non-voting international Commissioners. The IEC is divided into three sections: administration, monitoring and adjudication.

The Election Administration Directorate is responsible for preparing and administering the balloting and counting processes. The Monitoring Directorate is responsible for training and accrediting official IEC "monitors" and "observers" (drawn from domestic and foreign nongovernmental organizations) and for accrediting "international observers" (drawn from intergovernmental organizations, including the U.N., OAU, E.U. and the Commonwealth). It is also responsible for monitoring compliance with the Electoral Act and lodging complaints for adjudication. The Election Adjudication Secretariat is responsible for trying complaints against political parties and persons for violations of the Electoral Act.

Only those political parties that registered as participants in the elections and that submitted candidate lists are permitted to contest the elections. Such parties may receive financial assistance from the State Electoral Fund. If a registered party received a 2 percent rating in an opinion poll accepted by the IEC or if the party submitted the requisite number of signatures of eligible voters, the party qualified for an initial grant from the Fund. Parties that win at least one seat in the National Assembly will receive equal grants from one-half of the remaining monies in the Fund, while the remainder of the Fund will be disbursed to the parties in proportion to the number of votes each received in the National Assembly and in the provincial legislatures.

Political advertising on broadcast media is not permitted, but political parties contesting the elections are included in information programs addressing issues relevant to the elections. The equitable treatment of parties and non-discrimination in news coverage is required under the Independent Media Commission Act and the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act. The Independent Media Commission is empowered to monitor all South African broadcasting services

to ensure equitable treatment of all political parties and to monitor state-financed publications to ensure that they are not used to advance the interests of any political party.

Augmenting these administrative bodies are the political party liaison committees created under the Electoral Act. The Party Liaison National Committee comprises national party election agents from all parties contesting the elections at the national and provincial levels and IEC representatives. The establishment of party liaison committees at the provincial and district levels are contemplated as well, although it is unlikely that liaison committees will function in all districts. Party liaison committees consider administrative matters (such as the number and location of voting and counting stations) and ways to avert infringements of the Electoral Code of Conduct, which is part of the Electoral Act. They also take up violations of the Electoral Code of Conduct in hopes of resolving problems without resorting to formal complaint procedures.

The IEC's Monitoring Directorate independently monitors compliance with the Electoral Code of Conduct and other aspects of the Electoral Act. The Directorate's monitors attend campaign rallies and other events and will be present in the voting and counting stations. Monitors have the power to investigate electoral abuses, may seize evidence and may bring complaints before the IEC's adjudication bodies. Political parties and individuals may also initiate complaints by contacting the Monitoring Directorate. The directorate's investigators follow up such contacts to determine whether a complaint has a substantial basis to be pursued and whether valid complaints should be forwarded for adjudication or mediation or whether they can be resolved informally.

The IEC's Election Adjudication Secretariat is composed of Electoral Tribunals (one for each of the country's 374 magisterial districts), Electoral Appeal Tribunals (sitting at the provincial level and potentially on circuits), and the Special Electoral Court (a circuit court). Complaints with minor penalties, such as warnings and fines, may be brought before Electoral Tribunals; appeals may then go to the Electoral Appeal Tribunals. Matters concerning more serious penalties are brought before the Electoral Appeal Tribunals; sanctions imposed must be approved by the IEC. IEC decisions on sanctions may be reviewed by the Special Electoral Court. Serious electoral offenses, for which imprisonment may be appropriate, are also to be referred for criminal prosecution.

Voting Procedures

Eligible voters who present a "voter's eligibility document" and who have not previously voted in the elections may cast ballots at any voting station in the country. Voter's eligibility documents include: an identity document or temporary identity certificate issued under the 1986 Identity Act or similar law; a temporary voter's card issued under the Electoral Act; a reference book issued under the repealed 1952 Blacks Act; an identification cited under section 13 of the 1950 Population Registration Act; or, at a foreign voting station, a valid passport.

Voters who are unable to visit a voting station and who inform authorities of this situation will be allowed to cast "special votes." On April 26, ballot boxes will be taken to hospitals,

homes for the elderly, and prisons for special voting. Party agents will be allowed to inspect ballot boxes and observe special voting under conditions ensuring a secret ballot.

General voting will take place April 27 to 28 between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. Eligible persons inside a voting station at 7 p.m. will be allowed to vote. Approximately an hour before voting begins, election officials, party voting agents (PVAs), monitors and observers will inspect the ballot boxes, which will then be sealed. The steps in the voting process include:

- a person presents a voter's eligibility document;
- election officials inspect the document to determine the identity of the person, the person's eligibility and that the person has not already voted; PVA's may observe and object to allowing a person to vote if they believe these criteria are not met.
- election officials examine the person's hands to determine whether ink is present, showing that the person has already voted; PVAs may observe and object to the person voting at this step also;
- election officials mark the voter's eligibility document and apply indelible ink to his or her hand to show that the person has voted;
- one election official will tear a ballot for the National Assembly from the ballot book, and another official will place a stamp on the back of the ballot, thus authorizing its use; the ballot is then folded and handed to the voter;
- the voter proceeds to a voting compartment and marks the ballot, then proceeds to the ballot box, displays the official stamp on the back of the ballot to an official and places the ballot into the ballot box;
- the voter then goes to another table where officials tear out and stamp a ballot for the provincial legislature (for the province where the voting station is located) and give it to the voter; and
- the voter proceeds to a second voting compartment, marks the ballot, goes to a second ballot box, displays the official stamp on the back of the ballot, deposits it and leaves the voting station.

When voting ends each day, the slots in the ballot box will be sealed, and election officials will account for all ballot papers. Ballot boxes will be kept in guarded places (*e.g.*, local jails) until they are moved to counting centers. PVAs, monitors and observers will be allowed to watch over ballot boxes in these places and to accompany them to counting centers. New ballot boxes will be used each voting day.

Any objection lodged against a voter by a party agent must be made in writing. After consultation with the PVAs present, election officials will examine the voter's credentials and accept or reject the objection. If the objection is rejected, the voter is allowed to vote in the

normal manner. If the objection is accepted: a) the voter is allowed to vote; b) the ballots are placed into an envelope with a serial number; c) the serial number is placed on the written objection along with a notation of the official's ruling; d) the envelope is placed in a special box for disputed ballots; and e) the objection is placed in a special packet. At the close of voting each day, the special ballot box and the objections are to be sent to the District Electoral Officer. In the presence of the PVAs, monitors and observers, this official will review the objections and determine which ballots are to be discarded and which are to be counted.

Counting Procedures and Announcing Results

Ballot boxes will be transported under guard and with IEC monitors from their secure locations to the approximately 1,200 counting stations on the morning of April 29. PVAs, observers and international observers may follow the transport vehicles.

Before counting begins, the Counting Officer at each station must inspect the seals on the ballot boxes as well as on packets containing statements and other materials from the Presiding Officer at each voting station. The Counting Officer must then verify the statements by comparing them with the number of ballots in the boxes and information in other packets. Simultaneously, all ballots will be inspected to be sure they bear the official stamp validating them. Irregularities between the statements and the ballots must be reported to the Chief Director of the IEC's Administration Directorate (Chief Director).

Once the reconciliation process is completed, ballot boxes will be pulled at random, brought to the various counting tables and their ballots mixed together. This process is intended to make it impossible to know the vote at any particular voting station, thus minimizing the basis for retribution against voters after results are announced.

A ballot will not be counted if: it lacks the official mark, more than one party is marked or it is not possible to determine which party is selected. Any other ballot on which there is a mark or writing showing that the voter clearly indicated his or her choice of party must be counted. A PVA may dispute the acceptance or rejection of any ballot. That ballot is then marked "disputed" (as well as "rejected," if this is also the case). Disputed ballots are kept separately in "accepted" and "rejected" packets and are ruled upon by the Counting Officer. Accepted ballots are counted in favor of the party selected.

Before results at any counting station are unofficially announced and reported to the Provincial Electoral Officer and to the Chief Director, the Counting Officer must report the count to the PVAs and allow them to challenge the tally. PVAs may also bring any alleged irregularities or inaccuracies to the Counting Officer's attention at that time. The allegations must be reported to the Chief Director. If no challenge to the tally is lodged, the Counting Officer will determine whether a recount is required. That decision may be appealed to the IEC.

In addition to these procedures, any party will have the right, within 48 hours of the close of voting, to lodge an objection to any aspect of the elections that is relevant to certification of the results. The IEC is required to investigate any such objection and to rule upon it. The IEC may, upon finding a serious irregularity and upon good cause, order a

deduction of votes from a voting station or even from a particular party or parties responsible for violence, intimidation, fraud or any other irregularity of a material nature.

Unofficial results will be made public at the counting station and at the IEC as they are reported. Not sooner than 48 hours after the close of voting -- and after all alleged irregularities, challenges and objections have been resolved -- the IEC will combine all of the tallies. Seat allocation for each party for the National Assembly will be determined before those for the provincial legislatures. The IEC may then certify the election as "substantially free and fair" and designate, from party lists, the representatives of each registered party for the respective seats.

VIOLENCE

The greatest threat to the prospect of a smooth transition to a democratic South Africa is political violence. South Africa ranks among the most violent countries in the world. Johannesburg has the rather dubious distinction of being the murder capital of the world, with a per capita murder rate that is higher than any other city.

Eighteen thousand people have died as victims of political violence in the last 10 years. The level of violence has escalated since 1990: 3,699 deaths in 1990; 2,706 in 1991; 3,347 in 1992; 3,706 in 1993. The figures for 1994 are even more appalling. According to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 1994 could be the most violent year to date: at least 111 people were killed and 402 injured in election-related violence and intimidation in the last 10 days of March, 1994 and 101 people were killed in KwaZulu/Natal in the first six days after the state of emergency was declared.

In the usual course of things, the ANC would point the finger of blame at the government and Inkatha and talk about a "third force;" Inkatha would blame the ANC; and the government would blame the ANC and Inkatha. But on March 18, 1994, Judge Richard Goldstone released an interim report on criminal violence by elements within the South African Police (SAP), the KwaZulu Police (KZP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The report disclosed that a "third force" did in fact exist, and that its tentacles reached into the highest echelons of the SAP's command. The report named a number of senior officers, including the Deputy Commissioner of the SAP and the head of the Department of Counter Intelligence, as having full knowledge of organized hit squads, train violence, hostel violence and the supply of armaments to Inkatha members.

However, there are numerous other causes of the violence. They include dire economic conditions; the slow pace of change; acts of revenge; and the brutal war over political turf, especially in KwaZulu/Natal. Conditions in KwaZulu/Natal had become so precarious by the end of March 1994 that the TEC and the government were compelled to declare a state of emergency to prevent the region's disintegration into anarchy.

The youth are at the heart of the problem. At least one generation of youth has reached adulthood since the Soweto uprising of 1976 when the government tried to make Afrikaans the medium of instruction in African schools. "Liberation before education" became the rallying cry in 1984. Uneducated, unemployed and perhaps unemployable, the young have known a culture of protest, confrontation, mobilization and resistance in which a different point of view is a wrong point of view and every action, no matter how heinous, could be justified in terms of the liberation movement.

For the young, militancy is part of the culture of resistance. The suspension of the armed struggle appears to many of them to be a capitulation to the government. In the four years since de Klerk rescinded the ban on the ANC and on the SACP and released Mandela, the youth have seen little change. They were told to be tolerant -- a concept that has little meaning

to a generation brought up on the intolerance of the repressive state and that possesses its own intolerance of all who would question its tactics and methods.

The fighting in Natal began in 1985 and launched a war between two factions of Zulus that has claimed at least 10,000 lives since 1987. In 1985 the main protagonists were supporters of Inkatha and supporters of the United Democratic Front (UDF), which later disbanded after the legalization of the ANC. The fighting resulted from rising tensions between the two organizations over dominance of geographical territory and ideological differences. These differences were exacerbated by conditions of poverty, unemployment and homelessness.

In the lush valleys, it is Zulu against Zulu, a struggle for territory and political control - the have-nots murdering the have-nots, the ANC intent on marginalizing Buthelezi, whom it branded a collaborator with the apartheid regime, and Inkatha intent on maintaining its power base.

It has been a bitter war, both sides vociferous in their blame of each other, each seeing every killing strictly in terms of the narrow context of its own righteousness. The ANC claims that the KwaZulu police and the South African police are using Inkatha to destroy the ANC. Inkatha claims the ANC is out to destroy Inkatha just as it tried to destroy the PAC, AZAPO and BCM. It is a zero sum game in which neutrality is the most dangerous position of all. Not to support either side leaves you open to the predations of both.

The violence is also fueled by the desperate socio-economic conditions and the cultural imperative to avenge every killing. Each murder initiates its own cycle of killings. Revenge is a primordial but ever present motive.

But when the violence swept down from Natal to the Transvaal along the Eastern Rand, engulfing the townships of Kagiso, Tokoza, Sebokeng, Katlehong and Soweto, leaving thousands dead, the character of violence changed. It became tribal. On one side Zulu migrant workers and hostel dwellers view the ANC as a Xhosa-dominated movement that is out to destroy all opposition to it and establish a one-party state. On the other side, the ANC sees the violence as being orchestrated by cabals within the security forces and Inkatha to disrupt the ANC from organizing on the ground. Buthelezi is perceived as the enemy of the people, a collaborator who built his power base in KwaZulu in collusion with the apartheid regime. Buthelezi's refusal to negotiate with the government until Mandela was released and the ANC legalized counts for little. In South Africa, opinions don't just harden, they become embedded in concrete.

The accusations are familiar. The ANC insists that the government can stop the violence; the government insists that it cannot. Inkatha insists the violence is tribal, the ANC insists it is not. However, not to acknowledge that there is a strong tribal element the killings in the Transvaal has become increasingly difficult. The reluctance to do so has much to do with the nature of the problem itself. Since the ruling National Party justified its policy of separate development on the grounds that each African tribe constituted a separate nation that had the right to self-determination and an independent homeland, to argue that there are tribal differences insinuates somehow that the government is correct; one becomes, if only by the flavor of one's opinion, an apologist for the regime, and therefore a racist.

The National Peace Accord (NPA) created the Natal Regional Dispute Resolution Committee (RDRC) to monitor unrest in the region. Last year, the RDRC reported that "deficiencies in police investigations and court procedures, an inadequate witness protection system, bureaucratic delays in funding the NPA, and a failure to fully implement its police code of conduct . . . compound the problems [in Natal]."

In fact, these violence-inspiring cultural, economic, and social conditions are often exploited by both organized and rogue elements in the security forces and the political leaders to undermine the opposition and advance their respective causes. Many argue that no party or faction approached the negotiating table with clean hands; all are culpable, but one cannot emphasize enough the role of the South African police.

An agreement was reached on November 25, 1991, securing a good faith agreement between Buthelezi and Mandela to hold a peace summit in the near future. On June 23, 1993, Mandela and Buthelezi met for the first time in more than two years in a church-brokered meeting. The two leaders committed themselves to making joint appearances in areas of endemic rivalry-fed violence -- but the commitment was never kept. They also agreed to the prohibition of weapons at political rallies and to the allowance of free political activity in their respective party's so-called "no-go" areas -- but that commitment too was never kept. The two have only met three times since then -- at the convening of the Multi-Party Negotiation Forum in April 1993, a year later in March 1994 and most recently at the four-party summit with King Zwelithini and President de Klerk. All three meetings have proved to be inconclusive.

Even though the killings have continued, intensifying in Natal and the East Rand, steps have been aggressively pursued to try to stem the violence. The SADF replaced the Internal Stability Units (ISUs), which were accused of initiating violence in the East Rand. The TEC implemented training plans for the National Peace Keeping Force (NPKF) and arrangements were made for international observers from the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Organization of African Unity to be deployed to monitor the elections.

The National Peace Committee, established in 1991 to oversee compliance with the National Peace Accord, has had limited impact. In an effort to enforce the principles of the National Peace Accord, an independent commission, under the leadership of Justice Richard Goldstone, was established to investigate specific incidents of violence, as well as the social and economic conditions that create an atmosphere conducive to violence. The Goldstone Commission, which has been widely praised for its even-handedness and impartiality, has conducted several investigations and issued numerous reports that have contributed to an understanding of the complex nature of political violence in South Africa.

Three landmark reports -- the first published on July 6, 1992, the second on July 23, 1992, and the third on March 17, 1994, illustrate the breadth of the Commission's work. In the first report, which entailed an investigation into the Biopatong massacre, the Commission severely chided the government for failing to heed the warnings and implement the recommendations of its previous reports concerning township violence. In particular, the Commission reiterated its suggestions that the government fence off and police worker hostels and ban the public carrying of cultural weapons, which had been previously exempted from the

1991 ban on dangerous weapons. It was not until September 1993, after the Bisho massacre, that de Klerk agreed to implement these recommendations. In addition, this report labeled the ANC's charge of the government's complicity in the violence "unwise, unfair and dangerous."

The second report examined the SAP's response to Boipatong and township violence generally. This report, authored by Dr. Peter Waddington of the United Kingdom, condemned the "woefully inadequate" response to the SAP to the Biopatong massacre. Although Waddington found the white police force's leadership and organization to be alarmingly unaccountable, the Commission uncovered no evidence to suggest the government's complicity, forcing the ANC subsequently to pull back from its accusation.

In the third report, the Commission alleged that senior police personnel, including the Deputy Commissioner of the SAP, were engaged in "third force" activities, designed to destabilize the country. It is expected to more fully document these findings in the near future.

Responses From The International Community

Prompted by the continuing violence, both the United Nations and the Goldstone Commission called for a drastic change in the command structure of the security forces. They suggested that the forces first be brought under multi-party control, and second, be subjected to international monitoring and sensitivity training. De Klerk refused to acknowledge widespread police misconduct -- although he may be compelled to alter his view in the light of Judge Goldstone's recent findings and on-going investigation -- describing it instead as a series of individual unsanctioned aberrations. Notwithstanding his past reticence, he agreed to allow international monitoring of the violence by the United Nations and other inter-governmental organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Commonwealth.

On July 15, 1992, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 765 out of its concern for the escalating violence in South Africa. The key provisions were: (1) a condemnation of the massacre at Boipatong and its subsequent handing by the SAP; (2) an urging of the South African government to take "immediate measures" to bring an effective end to the ongoing violence and to bring those responsible to justice; (3) an invitation to the Secretary General to appoint a special representative, Cyrus Vance, to meet with the parties, reconvene negotiations and end the violence.

Both the ANC and the government agreed to the presence of an impartial U.N. team to observe demonstrations and township violence. Upon the culmination of Vance's 10-day visit, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council the need for approximately 30 observers to be stationed throughout the country. The OAU, the European Community (EC) and the Commonwealth also stationed observers, bringing the total number to 100.

The observer mission was initially headed by Hisham Omayad, a senior U.N. Secretariat official. The mission drew criticisms of inefficacy, and Omayad was replaced after six months by Angela King. Noting the United Nations' prior experimentation with a civilian police monitoring force, which was successful in Namibia, some argued that such a force could be the

United Nations' most important contribution to peace if international monitoring in South Africa proved ineffective. Before his assassination, Chris Hani had been designing a peace corps intended to combine international and domestic forces to maintain law and order in the context of an election environment. Dispelling widespread fear of violence among the disenfranchised could pave the way for greater voter turnout and enhance confidence in the voting process.

Observers point out that all parties and factions in South Africa are guilty to varying degrees of failing to fully control their constituents and accept responsibility for actions taken in their names. Stability will not be easily achieved by a new government or a new constitution. There will still remain a wide gap between white and black and between the haves and the have-nots. The gap will exist as long as apartheid remains as deeply ingrained in the economy, culture and demography as it is now and as long as blacks are denied meaningful economic rights and equal opportunities. Most disenfranchised South Africans are under the age of 35 and lack the educational opportunities afforded to whites. A study by the International Monetary Fund concludes that 50 percent of blacks are unemployed; most of the other 50 percent are underemployed; and many are fearful, angry, and impatient.

Many experts contend that sincere efforts must be made multilaterally in order to rein in violence and subdue exploitation of fear and political intolerance. Strengthening of the international monitoring of the violence and the justice system and restructuring and retraining of the South African police force -- recommendations of the independent Goldstone Commission -- are essential if the violence is to subside. Rigorous enforcement of the National Peace Accord's principles and code of conduct and more pronounced efforts by the National Peace Committee to mediate and resolve disputes among the various parties would also contribute greatly in this regard.

THE ECONOMY

Caught between the First World and the Third, South Africa teeters on the brink of economic dislocation. The sheer weight of the Third overwhelms the First and drags down South Africa to a level where the country could succumb to slow growth, overpopulation, low investment, and now AIDS.

During the glorious boom days of the 1960s, the economy grew at an average rate of 5 to 8 percent per year. In the bust years of the 1980s the growth rate fell to 1.9 percent annually and then to a meager rate of 1.4 percent per year. Since the population grew at an annual rate of between 2.4 and 2.8 percent, average income per capita fell, and continues to fall, reflecting the inability of economic growth to keep pace with population growth. Per capita income at the end of 1993 is likely to hit its lowest level since 1970. Since 1973, inflation annually has exceeded 10 percent except for 1993.

Production at gold mines -- which used to generate half of South Africa's exports, at least 20 percent of its taxes, and most of white wealth and black employment -- is gradually winding down. The shafts get deeper and the ore gets poorer; in the 1980s output fell by 10 percent. With the price of gold pegged at R933 or thereabouts, 40 percent of South Africa's gold is produced at a loss, and 45 percent of the industry's labor force of 190,000 men work in mines unable to make a profit.

The root cause of the industry's problems is a relentless cost-price squeeze. While the price of gold continues to hold firm, costs have risen inexorably at an inflation rate of about 14 percent per annum. The result: labor has been shed on a vast scale, approximately 40,000 workers lost their jobs in 1990, and a similar number in 1991. In the 1970s the mines also began to run out of skilled whites, cheap labor, energy and ore.

The amount of gold exploration has dwindled to a fraction of what it once was. By 1992, gold production, which had peaked in 1970 at 1000 tons, was down to 614 tons. New mines are not being opened to replace depleted ones. Most of the best prospective sites would require extremely deep excavation that would cost about R3 million to start. The price of gold would have to double before such projects would be viable. Banking sanctions, including the denial of International Monetary Fund funding, have cost South Africa \$3 billion since 1985. In order to meet its foreign debt obligations, South Africa had to run its economy on a cash basis. It had to export more than it imported. But in order to do so, the government had to curtail the rate of economic growth to keep imports under control. Although some estimates put the loss of foreign exchange due to trade sanctions at \$2 billion, the South African government emphatically denies that trade sanctions broke the South African economy. On the contrary, it insists that sanctions encouraged the development of an export culture.

In the late 1980s the government, in an attempt to offset the effects of international sanctions, began a phased program of privatization to sell shares of state corporations and other public enterprises. The ANC compared the government's actions to "selling the family silver

without even consulting the family" and forced the government to retreat from the active pursuit of privatization.

The public sector faces substantial problems of a different kind. From 1962 to 1985, its share of the economy jumped from 22 percent to 38 percent, and by 1989 the government employed more than one-third of all whites. Much of the budget financed the police, the prisons, the military, and the huge bureaucratic apparatus necessary to run the apartheid state, along with a slew of inefficient state-owned industries. This costly system requires the world's highest tax rates.

Moreover, despite the vast sums that were spent to relocate 3.5 million blacks and to subsidize industry in the 10 homelands (all of which were bankrupt by the 1980s), those subsidies consumed 9 percent of South Africa's budget. Unemployment in the homelands has risen to at least 50 percent. Meanwhile, 50 percent of the country's 27 million blacks relocated to townships on the edges of South Africa's cities. In the 1980s the urban population grew at a rate of 7 percent a year and more than 6 million blacks became squatters, which created a housing problem of almost undefinable proportions.

The catalogue of inequalities is exhaustive. South Africa has one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world. Three-quarters of the people receive only 30 percent of the income. Average white incomes are 13 times those of blacks; 60 percent of blacks live below the poverty line; 50 percent of the black labor force cannot find jobs in the formal sector of the economy. Inequality between urban and rural blacks is also very high with up to four-to-one differences in income levels.

Of the 13 percent of surface land that is arable, whites own about 83 percent. Since a third of the 30,000 full-time white farmers account for 75 percent of farm output, the concentration of productive land ownership is even more pronounced.

Inequalities in the distribution of income are reinforced by inequalities in the distribution of social spending. State spending per capita is five times as much for whites as it is for blacks; the per capita state spending for Indians and coloureds comes somewhere in between. White pensions are twice as large as those of blacks and, in the past, white state schools got four times as much per pupil. Whites have four times as much spent on their health care compared to non-homeland blacks and 10 times as much compared to homeland blacks. Various surveys suggest that one-third of black children under 14 years of age are underweight, and half the rural population suffers from malnutrition.

Another statistical overview: the richest 5 percent of the population own 88 percent of all personal wealth. The income received by more than 50 percent of the population is insufficient for families to maintain themselves at a minimal standard of living; 81 percent of households in the homelands, the majority of which are headed by women, are living in dire poverty. More than 30 percent of the working-age population is unemployed; and in 1986 eight million urban Africans lived in half a million "small housing units," with an average density of 16 inhabitants per unit.

Despite these enormous disparities, some blacks were able to better their economic status. In the last 20 years, white living standards have fallen and black employment has risen. The chief beneficiary has been unionized black labor. Between 1976 and 1985, pay inequality between blacks and whites was reduced by roughly half, and by 1989 the gap had shrunk to the point that blacks received 15 percent less than whites for doing the same job. The shift in power toward black trade unions, rapid upward mobility and more skill-intensive production techniques should ensure that black wages will continue to rise. Ironically, South Africa's real economic divide is no longer strictly racial: it is between the haves and have-nots.

The political future of South Africa cannot be divorced from the debate over the country's economic future. Economic factors resulting from international isolation, apartheid's drain on national resources and external forces (such as the decline in the price of gold) played a pivotal role in persuading the National Party that change was inevitable. Economic changes, particularly the redistribution of wealth from the minority to the majority, are also essential components of the anti-apartheid platform. Opinions on the economic future of South Africa vary greatly across the political spectrum, from laissez-faire free enterprise to the total nationalization of the economy. However, it is clear that economic restructuring will be critical to the success of the political transition. There is general agreement that the country must sustain a 5.5 percent per annum growth rate, as opposed to the 1993 low of negative 2 percent, to absorb its work force. In order to maintain a 5.5 percent growth rate between 1990 and the year 2000, some economists have estimated that at least \$10 billion in foreign capital annually, or an inflow of \$100 billion over 10 years would be required -- a target that would be difficult, if not impossible to meet.

Currently, the South African economy could best be described as being in a state of limbo. There are two major policy issues to be addressed:

- can social reform by a post-apartheid government legitimize the economic and political systems and address the aspirations of the poor; and
- can such political and social reform take place without excessive market intervention that undermines investor confidence -- a crucial precondition for economic growth in a mixed economy.

The government published its Normative Economic Model, which emphasized the structural flaws of the economy as the root cause of the past decade of stagnation: persistent double-digit inflation; declining investment and efficiency; increased government spending; and the juxtaposition of rising real wages and falling formal sector employment.

ANC policy-makers realize that in order to break the vicious cycle of a failing economy South Africa must re-establish business confidence and reassure its business community and financial institutions. The ANC's economic policy, as stated in its reconstruction and development program, supports a mixed economy in which cooperative and private ownership co-exist. The ANC pins its hopes for addressing unemployment on heavy investment in new housing construction. The ANC submitted to the Negotiating Forum a draft bill of rights that would guarantee basic economic rights, including the "progressive expansion of a floor of

minimum rights" and the rights of the state to divert resources from richer to poorer areas. But the Forum rejected these provisions. Within the ANC there are capitalists, socialists and communists, and all argue for a different "mix" of the economic basket. However, most agree that a total reorganization of the economy will be necessary. A Swedish-style social democratic economic program, where the government controls a significant percentage of productive resources, has become popular among some ANC economists. These same economists, however, acknowledge the absence of the wealth that sustains the Scandinavian system.

Mandela has issued what critics call conflicting statements on the ANC's economic views, from reassuring future investors that the ANC will pursue an open capitalist economy, to threatening to nationalize key industries such as mining. Mandela is also on record as saying that the state will take away ownership of mineral rights from the mining houses. Cyril Ramphosa told journalists that the ANC would have to reconsider the honoring of foreign debt accumulated by South Africa under the apartheid regime. Such statements made the NP and possible international investors extremely nervous. However, Minister of Finance Derek Keyes and Trevor Manuel, the ANC's chief economist, in appearances before the IMF and the World Bank successfully made the case for the economic and fiscal policies that the government of national unity would pursue. Keyes and Manuel were promised the assistance they sought, much to the relief of the business community.

The difficulty for the ANC leadership will be to respond to the inevitable demands and high expectations surrounding a new government. Trade unions will demand greater say in industrial restructuring, with members likely complaining about the slow pace of black economic advancement or about uneven access to capital. There will be calls for government spending on social service programs such as government housing, job training, and rural/township electrification.

The NP has clearly stated that a free-market economic system in a future South Africa is "non-negotiable." Ironically, it was under an NP government that the South African economy was nationalized. It is well known that most experts believe that apartheid has been the most tremendous drain on the South African economy.

The major actors in South Africa realize the importance of economic recovery and growth. Currently, 25 percent of the country's population of about 40 million controls 70 percent of the country's income, and at least 60 percent of the black population lives below the poverty line. About 7.2 million people live in the nominally independent "homelands" of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei -- technically outside of South Africa. Unemployment, homelessness and poverty of daunting proportions await whatever new government assumes power. The black population is growing at an annual rate of 3 percent. By the year 2010 there will be nearly 60 million people in the country. The NP Finance Minister, Keyes, maintains that in the short run of about four to five years the economy at best will generate a 1 percent increase in employment annually. (The ANC, of course, strongly disagrees.)

Whatever the case, given the endemic unemployment in Third World countries and the chronic unemployment in Western Europe, it will be very difficult on a yearly basis to generate

a sufficient number of jobs to absorb the new entrants to the labor market, not to mention reducing the backlog by the end of the first five-year term of the new government. These facts are sobering for all sides of the economic debate. Discussion on the role of economic organizations and the business community in future negotiations has continued. Although progress toward economic progress has occurred, it has occurred via the National Economic Forum (NEC) and primarily in the industrial sector of the economy. Trade unions and other economic interest groups have always enjoyed a considerable amount of influence over the industrial sector and have had previous experience in negotiations.

With respect to banking, there is a chasm between the formal banking sector and the black community. The symptoms, as in other aspects of South African society, present South Africa as both a First World country with sophisticated banks and automatic teller machines and as a Third World country in which very few blacks have checking accounts or access to consumer credit. The black community represents a huge, untapped growth market for South Africa's banks. Bridging the banking gap offers one more daunting challenge to the South Africa economy.

The Land Issue

With the repeal of the Land Acts and the Group Areas Act, the government acceded to a fundamental demand of the ANC and paved the way for future negotiations on land claims and redistribution. However, these legislative repeals were followed by swift parliamentary actions to codify land ownership and entitlement, and the government commissioned a discussion paper on land reform.

While welcoming the repeal of the laws that were responsible for the forced removal of blacks from 87 percent of South Africa's land, the ANC was not satisfied with the government's proposals. The ANC established a Land Commission to develop a strategy for land reform that rejected the government's proposals and called for the establishment of a National Land Commission. The ANC's constitutional guidelines call for a program of land reform that will: (1) abolish all racial restrictions on ownership and use of land and (2) implement land reform that employs affirmative action to take into account those South Africans who have been the victims of forced removals.

The redistribution of land is an explosive issue, but central to the economic and political debate. Black land entitlement is central to the policies of the PA and AESOP. The expectations of rural blacks, who have been forcibly removed from ancestral land, will be difficult to meet. Rural blacks have already begun to occupy land they believe is theirs. In an early campaign speech in western Transvaal, Mandela announced that all land would be expropriated by the state and made available to black Africans. But rural Afrikaners have begun to arm and organize themselves to resist any attempts to repossess their land. Many argue that the potential for confrontation is great. Thus, the land issue will be one of the most difficult obstacles in a new South Africa.

POLITICAL ACTORS

The legalization of the anti-apartheid forces in February 1990 led to a new set of complex relationships among various political parties, the democratic movement and interest groups in South Africa. Organizations that had operated in exile or that used the established infrastructure of the internal Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) were compelled to accommodate each other. As well, such organizations had to acknowledge political entities that functioned within the apartheid legal framework and formerly jailed political leaders. By the March 11, 1994 final deadline for registration of parties, 29 political organizations had registered, although not all will ultimately contest the elections. The following is a discussion of the major political organizations currently involved in the South African transition.

African National Congress (ANC)

The ANC was founded in 1912 to unify African people in the fight against oppression by the white population that had settled in the region and had formed the Union of South Africa in 1910. From 1912 until 1960, the ANC followed a program of nonviolence and legal resistance. Following the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, in which 67 demonstrators were killed by police, the ANC, initiated a campaign of armed struggle against the government in 1961 and established an external military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), which means "Spear of the Nation." The ANC was banned that same year.

Over the next decade most of the ANC's leaders were imprisoned or forced into exile. Others who remained in the country were banned from political activity. Leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo enjoyed wide appeal among black South Africans. The ANC soon became known as the leading organization in the anti-apartheid movement. In the four years since the ban on the ANC was lifted and Mandela was released from prison, the ANC has emerged as one of the two crucial players in the negotiation process.

Nelson Mandela represents those in the ANC who are committed to the negotiation process. But despite their considerable influence, Mandela and the leadership must occasionally defer to the more militant elements within the ANC and its allied organizations. However the protagonists are characterized, the debate has centered around the strategy for the transfer of power.

At the top of the ANC's leadership structure are Mandela, who was elected executive president in July 1991; Deputy President Walter Sisulu; Thabo Mbeki, who became national chairperson following the death of Oliver Tambo in 1993; and Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa, a former trade union leader. The ANC has 56 elected positions on its 91-member National Executive Committee (NEC), which implements the organization's policies. A 20-member National Working Committee (NWC) selected from the NEC members is responsible for day-to-day decisionmaking. The ANC receives much of its funding from sources outside of South Africa, including private and public funders who have sustained the organization during its many years in exile.

Active within the ranks of the ANC are the ANC Women's League (ANCWL) and the ANC youth, who are represented by the South Africa Youth Congress (SAYCO), the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). The ANCWL has a long history of involvement in the liberation struggle and was at the forefront of pressuring the leadership to pursue a gender-positive policy in the negotiations. The ANCWL was instrumental in drawing up candidate slates for the National Assembly. A third of the candidacy slots were assigned to women, which will likely reflect their similar representation in the future government administration.

The youth are among the most radical influences on ANC policy. Youth organizations have exhibited strong cohesion and have spearheaded some of the most successful mass action campaigns. However, the youth in the townships, often known as "comrades" or "young lions," still identify closely with the armed struggle and are an unpredictable force. They form the corps of the Self Defense Units (SDU's), or Street Committees, which are heavily armed. Often unrestrained cadres operate as vigilante groups terrorizing and protecting residents in the townships.

South African Communist Party (SACP)

Founded in 1921, the SACP has played a special role in the liberation struggle. Until 1985, when the ANC leadership ranks were opened to non-Africans, the Communist Party was the main organizational force for white and Indian participants in the liberation struggle.

The SACP, which was banned in 1950, co-founded the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1961. The MK received education, training and arms from the former Soviet Union and other communist governments. The SACP's leaders, Chairman Joe Slovo and Secretary General Charles Nqakula, are also central figures in the ANC leadership.

The SACP's notorious reputation was, for the most part, the product of the government's relentless warning that a "total communist onslaught" threatened the entire region. Defense against communism was the government's justification for the maintenance of apartheid. This propaganda deeply penetrated the political psychology of the Afrikaners. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the regimes in the Eastern Bloc, the SACP has lost its ideological backing and has been forced to redefine its position.

The SACP held its first party congress since legalization in December 1991 and announced an economic policy based on "democratic socialist order." This new "order" would encompass common ownership of key means of production but would include protection of personal, "non-exploitative" property. In recognition of the new post-Cold War realities, the SACP supports regular, multi-party elections and religious freedom yet faces difficulties with the concerns of some church leaders over the atheistic tradition of communist ideology.

At the 1991 party congress the SACP reaffirmed its faith in Marxism and Leninism. The party acknowledged lessons learned by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, stating that

"it is impossible to sustain and develop socialism in an authoritarian environment." At the conference Chris Hani, chief of staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), resigned from his ANC post to become secretary general of the SACP. Simultaneously, Joe Slovo became SACP chairman.

As noted earlier, the ANC-SACP relationship is considered a key issue in the context of the transition. While the SACP had its own seat in CODESA, in the MNF and in the TEC, it often plays a role within the ANC. The SACP is unlikely to pursue an agenda different from the ANC's and is contesting the elections under the ANC's banner. The SACP has identified 34 of its members on the ANC's list of 200 national parliamentary candidates with 16 of them placed in the top 50 positions.

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

As the umbrella for the ANC-aligned trade unions and in alliance with the ANC and the SACP, COSATU is a powerful political force. COSATU boasts a paid membership of nearly 1.3 million workers within the 14 member unions. Because the trade unions in South Africa were not banned, they developed a nationwide network of urban, industrialized workers. COSATU argued for the inclusion of a workers' charter in a future ANC bill of rights.

Despite COSATU's leading role in shaping ANC policy, particularly on economic matters, the ANC's economic platform calls for a "living wage" as opposed to labor's traditional stance for a "minimum wage." COSATU was instrumental in the establishment of the National Economic Forum (NEF), in which employers, trade unions and government negotiate all national macro-economic issues. COSATU has conducted its own negotiations with the government for labor law revisions and a minimum wage. Before the convening of CODESA, COSATU called for talks involving all parties, economic organizations and trade unions. This call went unheeded. Instead COSATU members were incorporated into the delegations and working groups of the ANC and SACP.

COSATU nominated 20 candidates from the trade union federation that the ANC accepted for its candidate list. However, officers such as former COSATU General Secretary Jay Naidoo had to resign from their union positions in order to run for office. Sam Shilowa, the current general secretary of COSATU, heads the federation's political action drive.

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

Founded in 1975 as a cultural movement by Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, Inkatha constituted itself in 1990 as a political party called the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Buthelezi is the IFP leader. Supporters of Buthelezi and the IFP point to the organization's nonviolent position, its opposition to sanctions, its support of a free-market economy and its pragmatic approach to negotiations. As the chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland in the Natal region, Buthelezi refused to accept the release of Nelson Mandela.

Buthelezi maintains that the IFP represents the Zulu nation of 6 million people. A recent survey conducted in early February 1994 by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy concludes that Inkatha currently has national support of about 5.3 percent of the 22.7 million projected

electorate. Inkatha's support is mainly concentrated in the rural areas of Natal, which are referred to as KwaZulu. The IFP has in the last two years opened its ranks to non-Zulus and has viable political organizations in the Johannesburg-Pretoria area, where it is strong among migrant laborers.

Some observers argue that KwaZulu is, for all practical purposes, a one-party state. Although it is widely acknowledged that intimidation occurs on all sides of black politics in the Natal townships, critics of Inkatha claim that Buthelezi requires all KwaZulu government employees and traditional chiefs to join IFP. Those who refuse are threatened with the loss of position, services or land. Inkatha relies on a network of warlords, many of them quite well-known, to maintain the discipline of the organization in the region.

Inkatha is an important player in the transition. The IFP has deftly sided alternatively with NP and with the CP and non-integrationist homeland leaders to win concessions from the ANC. Chief Buthelezi led the walk-out by a number of parties in the MNF in July 1993.

As the NP reached accommodation with the ANC, the IFP occupied the center ground in advocating a highly decentralized system of federal government. It coalesced with the "independent homeland" administrations of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana and with the more right-wing elements of political opinion. This coalition, the concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), called into question Buthelezi's claims to leadership in the liberation movement. The association weakened the political message of the IFP.

The "Record of Understanding" between the ANC and the government infuriated Buthelezi, who saw the agreement as a calculated attempt to marginalize him. Increasingly, Buthelezi spoke of an ANC/NP alliance working in tandem to ensure that a new government would essentially be an ANC/NP government. In addition, Buthelezi spoke of the ANC as Xhosa-speaking people who would establish a one-party state and destroy the Zulu nation. Buthelezi, an uncle of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini, continued to play the "Zulu card" and called on Zulus to heed his request and come to the aid of the king. In bilaterals with the ANC and the government, Buthelezi's attitudes hardened; when one of his demands was met, it was immediately replaced by another one. Buthelezi's demand for extreme federalism, became a demand for virtual autonomy; his demand for postponing the elections met opposition from virtually every other party. It was not until April 19 that the IFP agreed to take part in the elections.

Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)

The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) was formed in 1959 when an "Africanist" faction left the ANC. Arguing that the continued involvement of non-Africans perpetuated racist ideology and subjugation of Africans, the founders of the PAC identified an Africanist socialist democracy as its goal. Following the Sharpeville Massacre, the PAC was banned under the 1960 Unlawful Organizations Act. In 1990, the ban was rescinded along with bans on other political organizations.

As a liberation organization, the PAC has several wings: a student organization, the Pan Africanist Student Organization (PASO); a women's wing, the African Women's Organization (AWO); a youth wing, the Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU); and an armed wing, Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). While not formally affiliated, it also has a close association with the National Congress of Trade Union (NACTU).

The armed engagements by APLA were allegedly targeted at security personnel and facilities. Until recently, the armed struggle attracted little attention, although the APLA's adherence to the use of violence in the battle for liberation did attract a following of the more militant youth. However, due to substantial in-country and international pressure to cease the armed conflict, the PAC announced a moratorium on the armed struggle on January 15, 1994. The following week, APLA's armed factions announced their concurrence with the policy of the political leadership.

The PAC has long been opposed to negotiations with the South African government. Historically opposed to an internal settlement, the PAC had condemned the ANC's decision to negotiate with the government and refused to participate in the first round of negotiations -- CODESA I and II. The PAC advocated a transfer of power to the majority population. After a series of bi-lateral talks held with the government, the PAC was among the 26 parties that joined the Multi-Party Negotiations Forum (MNF).

At the MNF, the PAC offered a constructive and articulate opposition to the proposals that emerged from the alliance between the government and the ANC. Significantly, the PAC tabled the proposal that committed the South African government to transfer Walvis Bay to Namibia. This PAC initiative boosted the organization's credibility and stature.

The PAC did not take its seat in the TEC until April 19. Previously, the party's leaders had reasoned that by participating in the TEC, the party would implicitly legitimize the authority of the South African Government. The PAC is contesting the elections and will take seats in the Constitutional Assembly and provincial legislatures to have a say in the writing of the new constitution and to provide a voice of opposition.

The PAC draws its strength from the disaffected youth in the townships. Polls indicate that the softest constituency support of the ANC is among the 17-25 age group that overwhelmingly chooses the PAC as its second preference. Consequently, the PAC actively canvasses this group. Its position as the first party listed on the national and provincial ballots may help to advance the PAC's electoral standing. The party is strongest in the Cape and PWV regions. Clarence Makwetu is president of the PAC.

Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO)

Founded in 1979, AZAPO advocates a Marxist Azania (the Africanist term for South Africa) to be achieved by the overthrow of the white colonial establishment. Consequently, AZAPO refuses to enter into negotiations with the current South African government. Of crucial importance to AZAPO is returning land to Azanians. AZAPO has criticized Mandela

for "betraying the solidarity of the oppressed people" through his negotiations with the government. The president of AZAPO is Itumeleng Mosala.

The Azanian People's Organization and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) represent the Africanist school of thought within the liberation movement. These organizations are adamant about a transfer of power to the majority. As the transition moves forward, these groups have become more riven over their respective positions in the negotiating process and in the elections.

The BCM coalesced during the 1970s under the leadership of prominent dissident Steve Biko. Biko's message emphasized black pride and encouraged the psychological liberation of blacks through nonviolent means. Biko's death, while in government custody, prompted an increase in radical streams of Africanist thought as characterized by AZAPO. As an active political movement, BCM has largely been replaced by other organizations. However, Biko's ideas remain an essential component of the philosophy of Africanist organizations.

Historically, the Africanists have emphasized black power and advocated socialist or Marxist economic policies, placing a high priority on the return of land to black Africans. Africanists also reject the principles of the ANC's Freedom Charter. While the BCM espoused a nonviolent philosophy, AZAPO supported armed struggle although it did not have an armed wing.

Neither AZAPO nor the BCM are contesting the elections. AZAPO advocates an electoral boycott and urges people either not to vote or to spoil their ballot.

National Party (NP)

Since 1948 the NP has presided as the ruling party in the all-white South African Parliament and, as such, created and maintained the system of apartheid. NP leaders gradually consolidated a tightly controlled security state supported by an over-employed civil service; the civil service in turn supported the standard of living of the NP's core constituency -- the Afrikaner middle class. The NP has amended the constitution three times since 1948. The third constitution of 1983 created a tricameral parliament that included Indians and coloureds in a second and third house, respectively. The leader of the National Party is South African President F.W. de Klerk.

The leadership of the NP is divided into at least two camps. The older "securocrats" or "hawks" believe in the strong executive-security force relationship of the 1980s and resist change. The "old breed" include Hennis Kriel, the current Minister of Law and Order and a candidate for premier in the Western Cape; former Minister of Defense Magnus Malan; former Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok; and former Defense Minister Gene Louw. The older group is opposed by the generation of negotiators, who advance the notion of power-sharing. One of the more difficult tasks faced by President de Klerk has been the reconciliation of these forces within the government as well as sustaining the ranks of the key negotiators on his team, six of whom have been removed for personal and health reasons.

The "new breed" of NP leaders include such people as Minister for Constitutional Development Roelf Meyer, Minister of Planning Leon Wessels, Minister of Economic Coordination and Public Enterprise Dawie de Villiers and Finance Minister Derek Keyes. The "new" group is the architect of the constitutional framework for a power-sharing government and for guarding the economic restructuring.

The NP lost support from both the left and the right in the period before and immediately after February 1990. There have been defections to the Conservative Party and the reactionary white right wing. However, having moved forward with its reform initiatives, the NP has regained some support from those previously affiliated with the Democratic Party (DP). In 1991, the NP abandoned its white exclusivity and began an active recruitment of other racial groups. While the NP can no longer claim it represents the majority of white Afrikaners, it does boast that it is the largest political party in South Africa (with emphasis on "political party" since the ANC is identified as a liberation movement). The NP recently took steps to recast its image for broader appeal by changing its colors, flag and symbols to ones that its polls suggest are more attractive to African voters. The NP now calls itself the "new" National Party.

The "new" NP recently began to implement a strategy to expand its constituent base by engaging in such activities as organizing branches in townships and conducting motor car speeches in a Western-style campaign. De Klerk, in a move to bolster the NP's image, followed these efforts by appointing Indian and coloured ministers to his cabinet. The candidate lists of the NP are sprinkled with non-whites in the top echelons.

However, the four to six seats the NP is likely to win in the new cabinet are each contested by white males from the "new breed" faction of the party.

Democratic Party (DP)

The DP and its predecessor, the Progressive Federal Party, have long advocated systemic reforms within the white parliament and a federal structure in a new constitution. Former DP leaders, such as Helen Suzman and Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, have been outspoken opponents of apartheid and strong supporters of human rights. The party has engaged actively in the international debate on apartheid and is a member of the executive committee of the liberal International. The leader of the Democratic Party is Zach de Beer.

In addition to its white, liberal backing, the DP also has the support of many pragmatists within the business community who have long recognized that ending apartheid would serve South Africa's future economic interests. The party's opposition to international sanctions has suited these business interests.

President de Klerk's initiatives and the NP's dominant role in the negotiations threaten the future of the DP. Faced with the danger of being marginalized, DP leaders have recently emphasized the importance of the center in finding a common ground. The party played a critical role in CODESA, the MNF and the TEC, in which its advocacy of liberal constitutional principles suited the agenda of compromise. The DP's most significant contribution to the MNF was in connection with the appointment process for the Constitutional Court. The DP succeeded

in deleting a clause from the Interim Constitution that would have allowed the state president to have sole authority in appointments to the Constitutional Court.

The NP has posed more of a serious threat to the political autonomy of the DP than the ANC. Although many DP members are comfortable with the ANC as an ally, the communist influence within the ANC tends to repel potential DP defectors, particularly those in the business community. Five DP members of parliament joined the ANC in April 1992, while others moved in the direction of the IFP.

Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF)/Freedom Front (FF)

A group of retired military and police generals in late 1993 constituted a "Committee of Generals" to stage a political campaign to unify the far-right wing to resist the transition. The Committee, led by Constand Viljoen (current leader of the Freedom Front and former head of the South African Armed Forces), sought to ensure self-determination for Afrikaners in an Afrikaner *volkstaat* (white homeland). The AVF was created in recognition that right-wing leadership was splintered and ineffective and that Afrikaners had a deep respect for military leaders. Other members include Tienie Groenewald, former head of military intelligence; Koos Bischoff, former army chief of operations; and Lothar Neethling, former deputy commissioner of the South African Police.

The Afrikaner Volksfront was an umbrella group consisting of the Herstigte National Party (HNP), the Conservative Party (CP), the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU) and other small right-wing organizations. The delegates agreed to set up armed local security committees, composed of SADF and SAP reservists, to protect farmers and farm workers from attacks. Currently, about 40,000 Afrikaners belong to reserve units called "commandos." Groenewald hinted at the possibility of a military option: "If we cannot reach our aims through negotiation, other forms of action could be considered. These include mass action and ultimately violence."

The generals have boosted the right in terms of both respectability and vision. Afrikaner conservatives have now shifted their focus to self-determination and an Afrikaner *volkstaat*, instead of apartheid and white supremacy. Groenewald's Unity Committee has even mentioned a specific location for the *volkstaat*: a major portion of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, less a few large tracks set aside for "black nations" who wish to exercise their own right of self-determination. Its capital would be Pretoria. Whites would be a majority in the proposed *volkstaat*, which comprises 16 percent of South Africa. (Barely more than the 14 percent Hendrik Verwoerd once allocated to blacks on which to exercise their right to self-determination.)

The neo-fascist Afrikaner Weerstansbeweging (AWB) has greeted the birth of the Volksfront very coolly. This may be an asset to the Volksfront for the bullying tactics of the AWB and its demagogic leader, Eugene TerreBlanche, have been targeted in the past as discrediting the Afrikaner right. The prospect of an alternative to an ANC-dominated government may cause a renewed hemorrhaging of the NP's hawkish right, posing a threat to de Klerk, who has already lost some members of Parliament to the IFP.

When the time came to decide whether to register the Alliance and its component parties for the elections, Viljoen as the alliance's leader filed a slate of 191 candidates on the national list and on eight regional lists.

Conservative Party (CP)/AVU/HNP

The Conservative Party (CP) represents the traditional right of white South African politics. The CP split from the NP in 1982 over the issue of the tricameral parliament and the enfranchisement of "coloureds" and Indians. By 1989, the CP had become the official opposition within the whites-only Parliament. Established and formerly led by Andries Treurnicht, who died in April 1993, the CP has a membership of mostly Afrikaner descent that is concentrated in rural South Africa. The CP has supported the partition of South Africa into separate nations for blacks and whites, with whites maintaining the 87 percent of the land that they currently control. The CP has been prepared to negotiate these boundaries but nothing else.

Following Treurnicht's death, the CP elected hard-liner and deputy leader, Ferdi Hartzenberg, as party leader. Hartzenberg served as education minister in the NP government but left office to follow Treurnicht in 1982 when the NP split over the issue of power-sharing. As education minister, Hartzenberg refused to authorize repairs at black schools involved in education boycotts, forcing many of the schools to close. Moderates in the CP managed to broker a compromise, prevailing in the election of Willie Snyman to the post of deputy party leader. In April 1993 during an address to Parliament by de Klerk concerning the Hanu assassination, Snyman was thrown out of the chamber after dumping a bag of coins in front of de Klerk and accusing him of being a sell-out for dismantling apartheid.

The CP refused to participate in the negotiations at the National Peace Accord and CODESA and has maintained strong opposition to all reform initiatives. The party agreed to participate in the March 1992 referendum, although party leaders maintained that the process was stacked against them. They said that the referendum was about future black domination. However, in the wake of the referendum loss in which the CP advocated a "no" vote, the CP split. Leaders in the party who believed the party should have boycotted the referendum and who advocated a direct negotiating position formed a new party, the Afrikaner Volksparty (AVU). The CP initially joined the MNF but walked out with Inkatha in July 1993. The AVU continued an active membership with the MNF, but it did not enter the TEC nor is it contesting the elections.

Although the CP officially opposes violence, extremist groups under the CP's sphere of political influence, such as the AWB, have increasingly engaged in violent acts. Treurnicht often used the threat of right-wing violence as a bargaining tool, claiming ". . . there's no form of explosive we cannot make." Treurnicht said, "I've told Mr. de Klerk, it isn't me stirring up the people. It's you and your statements and what you envision for South Africa. I have to calm them down." The CP claims that it, not the NP, represents the white population in South Africa and pointed to recent by-elections as proof, but the referendum results have weakened this argument.

To the right of the CP and AVU is the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). A solely Afrikaner party, the HNP advocates white supremacy and a strict separation of races with a rigid homeland policy for "ethnic" groups. The HNP holds no seats in the current Parliament, but is represented on local councils in the Orange Free State and Northwest Transvaal.

Apartheid Political Formations

The 1983 Constitution created three houses of the National Parliament in a so-called reform by which individuals who were racially classified as "Coloured" or "Indian" could vote and obtain representation in a legislative body. The House of Delegates was created for "Indians," and the House of Representatives was constituted for "coloureds." Although the majority of coloureds and Indians did not vote in elections, nevertheless many political parties emerged from the creation of the new legislative houses. The most prominent and viable entities included the Democratic Party (unlike the party of the same name listed above, it is for "Indians"), the Labour Party, the National People's Party and the Solidarity Party. All of these parties were members of the MNF and took their seats in the TEC.

The so-called "homelands" and "independent states" also have generated a number of political formations. The governing bodies in the territories have usually included one-party legislatures -- some of which do not continue to exist, such as in the Transkei and Ciskei -- because of *coups d'états*. Regardless of the current situation, a number of political parties have organized with more traditional ethnic orientations. Some of the more developed include: the African Democratic Movement (ADM), the North West Christian Democratic Party (NWCD), the Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa (DPSA), the Intando Ye Sizwe Party (IYP) and the Inyanza National Movement (INM).

Other Parties

There are 26 parties representing a wide range of issues and constituents contesting the April 26 to 28 elections. Those that were not previously mentioned include: the Rights Party (RP), the South African Women's Party (SAWP), the Sports Organization for Collective Contributions and Equal Rights (SOCCER), the Green Party (TGP), the Keep It Straight and Simple Party (KISS), the United People's Front (UPF), the Wes-Kaap Federaliste Party (WKFP), the Women's Rights Peace Party (WRPP), the Workers International to Rebuild the Fourth International (WI), the Worker's List Party (WLP), the Ximoko Progressive Party (XPP), the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the African Democratic Movement (ADM), the African Moderates Congress Party (AMCP), the African Muslim Party (AMP), the Federal Party (FP), the Islamic Party (IP), the Luso South African Party (LUSAP), the Merit Party (MP) and the Minority Front (MF).

CONCLUSION


In April 1994, the process of transition began to assume a life of its own. First Lebowa found itself in such financial distress that it ceded authority for its financial affairs to South Africa. In Bophuthatswana when some of the police joined other public servants in a strike concerning pension pay-outs, Lucas Mangope was unceremoniously dumped from office and replaced by two TEC-appointed South African administrators. Lucas Mangope's political demise was particularly welcomed by the ANC since the party was prohibited by Mangope from campaigning in Bophuthatswana.

Next in line was Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, who was forced to step down as Ciskei's head of state when militant policemen demanded to have their pensions dispursed before April 27. Again, the TEC appointed two South African administrators to run Ciskei's affairs.

The new South Africa is finally emerging from the darkness of the past into the light of hope.

APPENDICES

SA Regions



Regional Map of South Africa

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Voters and Seats per Province

Province	Voters	National Assembly Seats	Provincial Legislature Seats	Percentage of total voting population
Eastern Cape	2,858,400	26	52	12.8
Eastern Transvaal	1,562,881	14	30	7.0
KwaZulu/Natal	4,513,037	40	80	20.2
North-West	1,913,152	17	34	8.6
Northern Cape	434,930	4	30	1.9
Northern Transvaal	2,275,178	20	40	10.2
Orange Free State	1,625,222	15	30	7.3
Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV)	4,786,980	43	86	21.4
Western Cape	2,369,881	21	42	10.6
TOTAL*	22,339,661	200	424	100.0

Note: 200 of the 424 Provincial Legislature seats are represented in the National Assembly, which will comprise a total of 400 seats. The balance of 224 Provincial Legislature seats remain in the provinces.

Voting Population by Racial Groups

Racial Group	Voting Population	Percentage of Total Voting Population
African	15,921,000	71.3
White	3,740,000	16.7
Coloured	2,033,000	9.1
Asian	645,000	2.9
TOTAL*	22,340,000	100.0

*Total refers to an estimate made on 30 June 1993. The current estimate is 22.71 million.

Sources: Independent Electoral Commission and the Soutan

Voting Population by Province and Racial Group

Province	Total Voting Population	Percentage of Total Voting Population	Percentage of Africans in the province	Percentage of Whites in the province	Percentage of Coloureds in the province	Percentage of Asians in the province
Eastern Cape	2,858,400	12.8	81.5	9.5	8.6	0.4
Eastern Transvaal	1,563,881	7.0	86.6	12.3	0.6	0.5
KwaZulu/Natal	4,513,037	20.2	77.7	9.9	1.4	11.0
North-West	1,913,152	8.6	89.2	9.5	1.1	0.3
Northern Cape	434,930	1.9	31.1	19.4	50.2	0.2
Northern Transvaal	2,275,178	10.2	95.5	4.2	0.2	0.1
Orange Free State	1,625,222	7.3	81.4	15.9	2.6	0.1
Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV)	4,786,980	21.4	62.0	32.4	3.5	2.1
Western Cape	2,369,881	10.6	18.0	27.7	53.2	0.9
TOTAL*	22,339,661	100.0				

*Total refers to an estimate made on 30 June 1993. The current estimate is 22.71 million.

Source: Soutwan



BALLOT PAPER

SAMPLE ONLY

Make your mark next to the party you choose
 Etsa letshwao pela mokgatlo oo o o kgethang
 Yenta lumphawo ecaleni kwelicembu lolikhetsako
 Endla mfungho ethelo ka vandla leni u ri hlalulaka
 Baya letshwao go lebagana le lekoko la gago
 Yenza uphawu lakho eduze nehlangano oyikhethako

Piaas u merk langs die party van u keuse
 Dirra leswao la gago go lebana le phathu yeo o e kgethago
 Kha vha ite luswayo phanda ha dzangano line vha khetha
 Yenza uphawu lwakho ecaleni kweqela elo ulikhethayo
 Dweba uphawu esikhaleni esiseduze kwennlangano oyikhethayo

PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA		PAC		
SPORTS ORGANISATION FOR COLLECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS AND EQUAL RIGHTS		SOCCER		
THE KEEP IT STRAIGHT AND SIMPLE PARTY		KISS		
VRYHEIDSFRONT - FREEDOM FRONT		VF-FF		
WOMEN'S RIGHTS PEACE PARTY		WRPP		
WORKERS' LIST PARTY		WLP		
XIMOKO PROGRESSIVE PARTY		XPP		
AFRICA MUSLIM PARTY		AMP		
AFRICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY		ACDP		
AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT		ADM		
AFRICAN MODERATES CONGRESS PARTY		AMCP		
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS		ANC		
DEMOCRATIC PARTY - DEMOKRATIESE PARTY		DP		
DIKWANKWETLA PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA		DPSA		
FEDERAL PARTY		FP		
LUSO - SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY		LUSAP		
MINORITY FRONT		MF		
NATIONAL PARTY - NASIONALE PARTY		NP		

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