

PN- ACC- 213
96965

**The Impact of Electoral Reform at the Local Level in Africa:
The Case of Senegal's 1996 Local Elections***

By

Richard Vengroff, Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Connecticut
u-24 Storrs, CT 06269
Phone 860 486-2615
Fax 860 486-3347
e-mail vengroff@uconnvm.uconn.edu

and

Momar Ndiaye, Director
Institute for Public Service International
University of Connecticut
u-182 Storrs, CT 06269
Phone 860 570-9092
e-mail diaadm07@uconnvm.uconn.edu

*The authors wish to thank the USAID University Linkage Program for funding which made the collection of these data possible.

The Impact of Electoral Reform at the Local Level in Africa:

The Case of Senegal's 1996 Local Elections

INTRODUCTION

Elections do not define democracy but they remain a critical component of the process of democratization, providing the opportunity and basis for both government responsiveness and accountability. While much recent analysis has been devoted to elections, electoral systems and electoral behavior at the national level in Africa (see for example Mozaffar, 1995, 1996; Vengroff, 1994), very little work has been done on local and municipal elections. It is at this subnational level that we can most effectively gauge the viability of political parties, especially opposition parties. Political parties which fail to develop their organizational capacity at the local level may be doomed to failure in their quest for national power. Furthermore, the ability to respond directly to local needs and provide constituent service may depend on the opportunity to hold local office; hence to access/control and to distribute resources, contracts and patronage positions. The local political arena also provides a recruiting and training ground for future national politicians and may be an especially important means of entree into the

political arena for women and ethnic minorities.

Our ability to develop a better understanding of the local electoral process and the impact of local electoral systems is thus, critical to deepening our comprehension of the democratization process in general and of the development of competitive parties, and party systems both locally and nationally. In this paper, the authors examine the local level electoral system and its implications for the party system in one very critical case, the West African country of Senegal.

The Case of Senegal

Although many African nations are engaged in the process of democratization, Senegal is one of a handful generally considered to be making significant progress in the transition to a fully democratic state (African Governance Program, 1994). While it can not be said that democracy has been fully institutionalized in this nation, some very important steps have been taken in that direction (Villalon, 1994; Vengroff and Creevey, 1997). Senegal's approach to democratization, rather than being revolutionary, has built upon a long tradition of carefully crafted plans for incremental change. For this reason, it presents an especially interesting case for analysis and comparison.

On the positive side, the press is free and unfettered, and quite

willing to criticize and attack government policy, the parties and individual leaders. The electronic media have been opened up to private organizations, including international cable TV, radio, and newspapers. Thus, government radio and television stations must now compete for attention with the private sector. Organizational life is very rich and broad based. The tradition of peaceful participation in local, national and even international politics, although not without important exceptions, is well established. The opening of the Government to democratic coalition building (rather than pure cooptation), even with the most serious of opposition leaders,¹ (Vengroff and Creevey, 1997) is a sign of maturity rarely seen in Africa. The military is highly professional and has throughout the history of independent Senegal, not intervened directly in the political arena.

On the negative side, the Senegalese polity has not always been committed to democracy, and occasionally seems to waiver in that regard. Some analysts argue that, under the political hegemony of the "Parti Socialist" (PS), it is at best a "semidemocracy," (Gellar, 1990; Coulon, 1990). Even today some of the fundamental correlates of democratic rule, a broad based participant political culture, a sound economic base, a well educated or at least highly literate population, are weak or simply

missing. The opposition is very fragmented (currently there are more than 20 registered parties), have relatively weak organizations, and have not been fully institutionalized. In the rural areas the electorate is still heavily influenced by a well established system of patron client relationships linked to the "maraboutic" tradition (Villalon, 1995).

ELECTORAL REFORM

In 1991, the so-called period of "cohabitation," a governing coalition (the Diouf government preferred the term "majorité présidentielle élargie" rather than coalition) including the main opposition party, the PDS, produced an important set of political reforms. These include a new electoral code, which provides for a more equitable distribution of seats, representation of all parties at polling stations, a guaranteed secret ballot, a lowered voting age (from 21 to 18), an easier and expanded system of voter registration, guaranteed access to the state media for all parties, and the acceptance of foreign election monitors (Diouf, 1994; Da Costa, 1992). This new system was, in principle, approved and strongly supported by all political parties. Although several retained some doubts about its implementation, the policy itself was considered to be a sound base for free and fair elections.

Senegal has also been, in recent years, a leader in Africa in slowly

decentralizing government services. (Vengroff and Johnston, 1987, 1989). Among the most recent reforms are new electoral codes for the rural communities (communauté rurale or C-R) and municipalities adopted by the National Assembly for the November 1995 elections (postponed until November 1996) which provide for increasing democratization and competition. Changes designed to strengthen the relative autonomy of both municipalities and rural community councils were implemented in 1990 (Sylla, 1991; Vengroff, 1993A) and went even further in 1995 (Ministère de l'Interieur, 1996C). In the 319 rural communities, the councils no longer include members appointed to represent specific organizations such as the cooperatives (this group previously constituted 1/3 of the councilors). All councilors are instead elected by popular vote and universal suffrage. Elective regional councils with legislative (but not executive) authority, were created for the country's ten regions (beginning in 1997), theoretically opening the door to a serious transformation of the existing administrative system (Diouf, 1992; Guéye, 1996).

The latest electoral code (Ministère de L'Interieur, 1996A) established a revised formula for the municipal (communes, communes d'arrondissements, and villes), rural community (communauté rurale or C-R), and newly created regional level (regional councils) elections. In the

past, elections at the municipal and C-R levels were conducted on the basis of party lists with a single area wide multi-member district and a plurality electoral system. This insured that all seats on any given municipal or C-R council would be controlled by a single party, almost always the ruling PS. Most of the opposition therefore chose to boycott the local elections. It was quite clear to them that, due to their organizational and financial resource limitations, and the winner take all electoral formula, their possibilities of gaining seats were almost nil. Their best chances were to channel their efforts in to the relatively few areas where they had strong organizations (Dakar for example for the PDS) and/or concentrated ethnic support (e.g. The Casamance for the AJ), in the hope of capturing a plurality of the voters in the entire municipality or C-R. The new electoral system, virtually assures some representation for a handful of opposition parties in municipal and rural community politics nationwide.

In the 1996 local and municipal elections the newly modified system was employed for the first time. Half of the seats are allocated on the basis of a party list with a relative majority (plurality) in a city or C-R wide multi-member constituency, exactly as had been the case for previous elections (but for all seats). The other half of the seats are

allocated on the basis of proportional representation. For the proportional seats, a simple (Hare) quota is used, that is a quotient is computed by dividing the number of seats into the number of voters. This quotient is then divided into the votes received by each party. Each full quotient obtained by a party results in the allocation of a seat. The remaining seats are assigned to party lists using the system of the strongest remainder. Voting (exclusive voting by list) takes place in a single round with neither transferrable votes nor "panachage"² permitted (both are explicitly excluded in the electoral law - Ministère de L'Interieur, 1996).

The size of both the municipal and C-R councils were significantly increased for the 1996 elections. The total number of councilors to be elected in the municipalities is decided on the basis of population, with a range from 20 in communes with between 1,000 and 2,000 population on up to 90 in those with populations in excess of 600,000. The number of seats for the C-R ranges from 20 for those with populations under 5,000 up to 32 members for C-R with 15,000 or more residents. At the regional level, councils vary from 42 to 62 based on relative population size.³

Did this new electoral system represent a move toward greater democracy? The critical question here is to determine how this system influenced the outcome of the elections: 1) did the remodeled electoral

system result in gains in the number of communes and C-R councils controlled by the opposition?; 2) To what extent did it provide for more effective representation of opposition parties on municipal and rural councils?; 3) How closely does the distribution of seats mirror voter support?; 4) How great a distortion is introduced into the process by the use of a half plurality, half proportional electoral system as opposed to a pure proportional system?; 5) What is the impact of this system on the prospects for the growth, survival, and institutionalization of "serious" (broad based and competitive) opposition parties?; 6) What is the rationale for the government employing such a mixed system? Is it to, through incremental change, insure stability, policy coherence and the emergence of a clear, effective, working majority on each council or are other factors at work here?

THE 1996 ELECTION RESULTS

Although more than a dozen parties put up candidates, only four, the ruling PS, the PDS, the LD, and AJ were serious competitors throughout the country.⁴ The dominance of the PS was hardly affected by the revised electoral system. This party managed to retain control (a majority of seats) on 91 out of 98 municipal councils (93%) and in 298 out of 316 (data are missing on 3 C-R) rural communities (94%). Thus, PS dominance

at the local and municipal level was maintained. Although charges of election irregularities were raised and the opposition has demanded creation of an independent electoral commission for future elections (CENI, Commission électorale nationale indépendante), fraud does not seem to have determined the outcome in very many races. As has historically been the case in Africa, the stronger organizational and financial resources available to the governing party appear to be the major explanatory factors for the outcome of the election (Zolberg, 1965).

The main advance made in the course of these elections, from the perspective of democratization, is the fact that the presence of the opposition has been legitimized and well established, albeit in relatively small numbers, on the councils of almost all of the communes and C-R in the country. The leading opposition party, the PDS, won seats in 90 (92%) of the communes and 257 (81%) of the C-R. The other major national parties, the AJ and LD, won seats in every region of the country including in 63 (64%) and 54 (55%) of the communes, and in 73 (23%) and 94 (30%) C-R, respectively. The PDS actually won control of councils in seven communes and five C-R. Just as significant, however, the PDS now has a core group of elected officials (it elected five or more councilors to almost seven out of ten, 68.4 percent, of the municipal councils and a

quarter, 24.1%, of the rural councils). The smaller LD, won pluralities in only two rural communities, while the more regionally concentrated AJ did so in 11 C-R councils (all in one region). Neither the AJ nor the LD was able to win a plurality of the vote in any of the communes.

TABLES ONE AND TWO ABOUT HERE

The effective number of council parties, calculated using the Laasko-Taagepera index, $N_s = 1/\sum s_i^2$ (Cox, 1997; Mozaffar, 1996) on average is 1.85 for all 414 councils (range 1-3.82). When these data are disaggregated into rural (C-R) and "urban" (commune) councils, we find, as expected, significantly more ($F=74.5$, $p<.0001$) effective parties in the municipal councils (2.22) than in rural councils (1.73) . Overall these findings are quite comparable with those of Mozaffar (1996) for plurality electoral systems in African national parliaments. Surprisingly, in Senegal, the local party system is more competitive than the party system at the national level in Senegal.

The use of a half proportional, half plurality electoral system clearly biased the resulting distribution of seats in favor of the strongest party, the ruling PS. At the municipal level, the PS with 59 percent of the vote garnered 75.5 percent of the council seats. At the C-R level the

figures for the PS are 71.8 and 83.0 percent for votes and seats. The big loser at both levels was the PDS which, although winning 27.8 percent of the vote municipally, garnered only 18.1 percent of the seats. At the C-R level, the PDS, with 19 percent of the vote, captured only 10.6 percent of the seats. The AJ and LD won roughly half of the seats that their vote totals would have justified on the basis of pure proportionality at the communal level, but were much closer to proportionality for the C-R councils. This lower distortion is especially true for the AJ because of the dominant position of its ethnic supporters in one region.

The mean disproportionality index, $\sqrt{[1/2\sum(v_i-s_i)^2]}$ (Gallagher's least squares - see Mozaffar, 1995) for all Senegalese local councils is relatively high, at 14 percent. It is significantly higher ($F=43.5$, $p<.0001$) for the communes (18%) than for the rural councils (13%). This compares with an average of less than ten percent (9.85%) for African legislatures in general (Mozaffar, 1995). It is closer to approximating levels of disproportionality in majority and plurality electoral systems in other African countries (13.3%), rather than proportional systems.

TABLES THREE AND FOUR ABOUT HERE

In many ways, even with some degree of fraud contributing to the

outcome, and in spite of distortions introduced by the electoral system, the opposition made tremendous gains. This is at least partly due to the fact that the effective threshold for the councils is kept relatively low for the proportional seats because of the large district magnitude. Overall, the average threshold ($T = [(50/(m+1)) + (50/2m)]$) (Mozaffar, 1995) for the councils is 4.81. Because of the larger size of the municipal councils, the threshold is significantly lower ($F=247.4$, $p<.0001$) for them (3.76) than for the rural councils (5.13). Furthermore, the lower the effective threshold, the larger the number of effective parties ($r=-.47$, $p<.001$).

Whereas before these elections the opposition parties had their presence pretty much limited to the national level, they now have the basis for further developing their organizations at the local level. There are now almost a thousand (965) elected municipal councilors and 1,302 C-R councilors representing the opposition parties. This is a very important base on which to build their respective party organizations and to prepare for future national and local elections.

THE CHOICE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM

A critical question which needs to be addressed here is why the Senegalese Government chose to adopt the type of mixed electoral system

it did. The answers are rather complex. Foremost seems to be the fact that, consistent with Senegalese experience with mixed (plurality/proportional) national assembly elections, it represents another small step in the democratization process, an important but basically non threatening one. The PS was sure that, as the largest, organizationally strongest party, it would retain control over most councils. The capital, Dakar, a stronghold of the opposition, presented an interesting problem. Feeling potentially threatened by the PDS in Dakar and its suburbs, the government broke the region into 43 "communes d'arrondissement" (local municipal communes), each with its own elected council⁵ (Ministère de L'Interieur, 1996B). The PS's ability to draw the boundaries for the newly created communes, coupled with its organizational superiority, thus insured that they would not be embarrassed by having an opposition council and mayor in the seat of the national government.⁶

Why didn't the PS Government go all the way, making the local elections purely proportional? Even had they done so, the PS would have still won a majority of seats in 72 communes (73%) and been in a good position to rule as head or part of a coalition in many of the others. In the rural councils (C-R) a pure proportional vote would have left the PS with a

majority of seats in 284 councils (90%) and as a possible coalition partner in many others. The costs to the PS for adopting pure proportionality would have been quite limited in terms of the “majority” control of council decisions. The nation’s international image as an emerging democracy would have thereby been significantly enhanced.

The real issues for the PS, as in the past are how to maintain control over elections through patronage and organizational capacity. By increasing the size of all councils, the total number (although not %) of PS elected councilors did not change significantly.⁷ Pure proportionality would have meant that the PS would have lost 696 additional communal council seats and 1,037 in the C-R (see Tables 3 and 4). This would have meant that the associated benefits of formal office holding would have been denied to more than 1,700 local PS faithful, a tremendous loss to the party. Furthermore, given the diverse factions that exist in the PS, which is basically a catch all party, the fight over placement on party lists would have been even more intense.

Defections to the opposition and a further splintering of the PS organizations at the local level would have decreased it’s chances of retaining its near monopoly on power at the national level in the next round of national assembly and presidential elections. In addition, the

opposition organizations would have been strengthened by the election of even greater numbers of their own local officials. Fortified by potential alliances with dissident PS factions, the opposition, might be able to take control of some councils away from the PS, as recently almost occurred in Saint Louis. Once again, the go slow approach is seen by the government as contributing to national stability, while limiting at least the rate of growth of the opposition, an opposition which seems destined to eventually seriously challenge the hegemony of the PS in a national election.

ELECTORAL FAIRNESS AND FRAUD

An important associated issue for consideration is how fair and democratic the actual elections were? The opposition parties have charged the PS with widespread voting fraud and are demanding creation of an independent election commission (CENI). Charges had been made by a number of individuals and parties of bias, of disappearing ballot boxes, and of other means of fraudulently influencing the vote, including creating and registering fictive voters and arbitrarily rejecting legitimate ballots.

Data on several potential indicators of the fairness of the elections were collected and analyzed. One such indicator of the legitimacy of the elections is the turnout. The voter turnout for the rural community

councils was, on average, 46 percent, ranging from a low of 17 percent to a high of 84 percent. In the urban areas the turnout (in the communal elections) was identical, 46 percent on average, with a range of from 24 to 97 percent. When compared with "fair" local elections in other African countries, these figures seem quite respectable (Vengroff, 1993A).

However, the low voter turnout may indicate several things. In addition to low interest and efficacy, it may also be indicative of the fact that the elections were free and relatively fair. In low income nations with relatively poorly educated electorates it is not surprising that turnouts in local elections should be relatively low. When fraud is involved, the effort is usually to inflate the vote by stuffing the ballot box or using fictitious voters. Thus, a relatively low turnout may also be indicative of fairness or at least a low level of fraud in the voting and vote count.

The national figures may mask fraud applied selectively in certain areas only. If voting fraud were widespread, we would expect to have higher turnouts, especially in close races in which victory might otherwise be in doubt. In fact when we look at the correlation between the closeness of the race between the PS and the PDS where these parties are the two leading competitors (90 out of 98 communes and 243 out of 316 C-R) we do not find strong support for this proposition.⁸ In the C-R

councils was, on average, 46 percent, ranging from a low of 17 percent to a high of 84 percent. In the urban areas the turnout (in the communal elections) was identical, 46 percent on average, with a range of from 24 to 97 percent. When compared with "fair" local elections in other African countries, these figures seem quite respectable (Vengroff, 1993A). However, the low voter turnout may indicate several things. In addition to low interest and efficacy, it may also be indicative of the fact that the elections were free and relatively fair. In low income nations with relatively poorly educated electorates it is not surprising that turnouts in local elections should be relatively low. When fraud is involved, the effort is usually to inflate the vote by stuffing the ballot box or using fictitious voters. Thus, a relatively low turnout may also be indicative of fairness or at least a low level of fraud in the voting and vote count.

The national figures may mask fraud applied selectively in certain areas only. If voting fraud were widespread, we would expect to have higher turnouts, especially in close races in which victory might otherwise be in doubt. In fact when we look at the correlation between the closeness of the race between the PS and the PDS where these parties are the two leading competitors (90 out of 98 communes and 243 out of 316 C-R) we do not find strong support for this proposition.⁸ In the C-R

the correlation between turnout and closeness of the race is very weak and negative ($r = -.09$, n.s.). In the communes, the correlation is moderate but still negative ($r = -.35$, $p < .01$), thus indicating that tighter races are associated with lower turnout. In those areas where the PS was unable to mobilize its traditional support base, the opposition was able to make the races closer. Voting fraud on a massive scale does not seem to be indicated by these data.

The rejection of ballots as improperly marked is another tactic frequently employed in some countries as a means of weakening the total votes attributed to the opposition. Data are available on the numbers of null ballots among those cast in each council election. In general the rate of rejection of ballots is quite low, 2.5 percent in the communes and 3.1 percent in the rural communities. Unfortunately we do not have data on individual polling stations so it is not possible to determine the degree to which rejected ballots may have been concentrated in specific areas as opposed to the municipality or rural community as a whole. Thus, it is still possible that the rejection of ballots was used to eliminate votes in polling stations in only those areas that tended to support opposition parties.

The average numbers of ballots nullified is relatively low, but there

is considerable variation in both communes and C-Rs. The numbers of null ballots are rarely of such a magnitude that they could account for the difference between winning and losing parties (for the plurality part of the vote). For our purposes we will examine only those communes or C-R for which the null votes exceed five percent of the total. After looking at the distribution, this figure, although somewhat arbitrary, was chosen to reflect the more extreme cases.

There are 28 C-R (8.8%) in which the five percent threshold for null ballots is exceeded. Out of these there are 13 cases in which the leading opposition party, the PDS officially received less than one percent of the votes. In 16 of the 28, the PDS received not a single seat, even in the proportional allocation. In these same 28 C-R, the ruling PS averaged 83.3% of the vote (median =88.0%) and the PDS averaged only 10% (median = 2.7%). For the other leading opposition parties, the LD and the AJ, the results were equally dismal. Thus, these data are consistent with the thesis that at least in some rural communities, the nullification of ballots cast for opposition parties was employed as a tool to insure a very strong or near unanimous showing for the PS.

The region with the lowest turnout, Diourbel, may be a good example. In this region is located the Department of Mbake which had the

distinction of having the lowest turnout of any department⁹ in the country (31.5%) and the highest rate of null ballots as well (9.6%). The turnout is even lower in those C-R in Mbake than it was in Oussouye (38.3%), the department in the Casamance where a separatist rebellion has been in progress for years and where we would therefore expect a low turnout. These findings may be associated with the fact that the Khalif, based in Touba (within the Department of Mbake), the spiritual leader of one of the most important Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal, the Mourides, broke with the tradition of support for the PS and failed to publicly endorse any party. The result was that turnout was very low in Mbake. The local PS leaders, fearing a tremendous embarrassment if they did not do well or even lost in this symbolically important area may have engaged in systematic efforts to "adjust" the results by every means possible.

An alternative explanation is possible. Those who did vote in Mbake might have, in quite significant numbers, intentionally spoiled their ballots. This would be indicative of a growing alienation from the political process rather than of voting irregularities. Given the sophistication that this would require on the part of voters, the case for this explanation is not compelling.

An examination of the urban areas produces somewhat different

results. In the communes only 5 of the 98 (5.1%) had null ballot rates above 5 percent. However, these were very competitive areas with the PS averaging only 46.2 percent of the vote as compared to 39.9 percent for the PDS. In the communes, we find that the closer the race the larger the percent of rejected ballots ($r=.36$, $p<.001$). Thus, nullification of ballots may also have been used as a tool to help insure PS victories in some hotly contested urban areas.

CONCLUSIONS

Local electoral systems in transitional polities can play a critical role in the growth and development of democratic governance. Hence, the study of these systems, and their impact in African polities, heretofore very limited, is very important. In this study, the impact of electoral system change at the subnational level in an African nation, Senegal, is examined. The nature of the electoral system at the local and municipal levels potentially has a major influence over the institutionalization of party systems and especially opposition parties capable of sustaining themselves and maintaining permanent electoral organizations.

Senegal recently altered the electoral system it employs for the selection of local and municipal councils. For the 1996 elections half of all seats were determined by proportionality and half by plurality using a

party list in a single multimember district. This proved to be a fairly modest step toward democratization. This system, heavily favoring the largest party(ies) clearly introduced distortions between the distribution of voter support and seats on councils, but the differences are fairly modest, and much less than under the old system (winner take all in multimember districts). Although there is some evidence of electoral fraud, it does not appear to have been the determining factor in very many races.

The issue at the local level in the councils can be analyzed in terms of rational choice on the part of both parties and party leaders. The plurality component insures control for the strongest party (the ruling PS) which is guaranteed a strong majority on most councils, a majority capable of selecting a mayor, passing a budget, and deciding on policy. This may also serve to hold this "catch all" party together by maximizing seats for its various factions and allowing for compromises when putting together its lists. For the opposition parties, the proportional part of the vote, held in very large, area wide districts insures access because of the low threshold. It may in fact discourage coalitions among the various small parties, each of which is assured of some representation, and in one case, the AJ, control over several councils in an ethnically distinct region.

The logic for the selection of this system on the part of the ruling PS is, at least when viewed from the perspective of the short run, impeccable: 1) strengthen the appearance of democracy by assuring opposition representation; 2) provide sufficient seats for its (PS) supporters so as to curb the splintering of the party; 3) assure strong majority control over all but a handful of councils and the associated patronage resources; 4) encourage many small opposition parties by having a low threshold for them to elect councilors.

In the long run, the impact may be detrimental to the interests of the PS but positive for democratization. The opposition party organizations may be strengthened at the local level by; 1) their ability to elect councilors (more than 2,500 in the country at this time); 2) develop a cadre of experienced councilors capable of managing local political affairs at a future date and; 3) to increase their ability to compete for higher offices at the regional or national level in future elections.

PARTY	SEATS BY PLURALITY	SEATS BY PROPOR-TIONAL	TOTAL SEATS	# OF COMMUNES IN WHICH SEATS WON	# OF COMMUNES WON BY PLURALITY	# OF COMMUNES WON BY MAJORITY
PS	1,864	1,168	3,032	98	91	72
PDS	143	582	725	90	7	3
AJ	0	119	119	63	0	0
LD	0	76	76	54	0	0
OTHERS	0	62	62	34	0	0
TOTAL	2,007	2,007	4,014	-----	98	75
%	50	50	100	-----	100	76.5

TABLE ONE
COMMUNAL ELECTIONS 1996*

*These totals do not include the four second tier (area wide) councils classified as "Ville" (Dakar, Rufisque, Pikine, Guédiawaye) but do include the 43 councils of the "commune d'arrondissement" of which they are comprised.

TABLE TWO
RURAL COMMUNITY (C-R) ELECTIONS 1996

PARTY	SEATS BY PLURALITY	SEATS BY PROPOR-TIONAL	TOTAL SEATS	# C-R IN WHICH SEATS WON	# C-R WON BY PLURALITY OR MORE	# C-R WON BY MAJORITY
PS	4,250	3,211	7,461	316*	298	284
PDS	76	873	949	257	5	4
AJ	142	189	331	73	11	6
LD	28	155	183	94	2	1
OTHERS	0	68	68	49	0	0
TOTAL	4,496	4,496	8,992	-----	316	295
%	50	50	100	-----	100	93.4

*Data were not available on three of the 319 C-R.

TABLE THREE
SIMULATED ALL PROPORTIONAL ELECTION - COMMUNES

PARTY	AVG. % VOTE	ACTUAL SEATS & % ()	SIMULATED SEATS, ALL PROPORTIONAL	SIMULATED PROPORTIONAL (-) ACTUAL	COMMUNES POTENTIAL LOSS OF CONTROL
PS	59.8	3,032 (75.5)	2,336	-696	- 19
PDS	27.8	725 (18.1)	1,146	+421	- 4
AJ	6.0	119 (3.0)	238	+119	0
LD	4.0	76 (1.9)	154	+78	0
OTHERS	3.2	62 (1.5)	122	+60	0
TOTAL		4,014	4,014		
%	100	100			

*These totals do not include the four second tier (area wide) councils classified as "Ville" (Dakar, Rufisque, Pikine, Guédiawaye) but do include the 43 councils of the "commune d'arrondissement" of which they are comprised.

TABLE FOUR
SIMULATED ALL PROPORTIONAL ELECTION - RURAL COMMUNITIES

PARTY	AVG. % VOTE	ACTUAL SEATS AND % ()	SIMULATED SEATS, ALL PROPORTIONAL	SIMULATED PROPORTIONAL (-) ACTUAL	C-R POTENTIAL CHANGE OF CONTROL
PS	71.8	7,461 (83.0)	6,424	-1,037	- 15
PDS	19.0	949 (10.6)	1,746	+797	- 1
AJ	4.3	331 (3.7)	378	+47	- 5
LD	3.3	183 (2.0)	310	+127	- 1
OTHERS	1.5	68 (0.8)	134	+66	0
TOTAL		8,992	8,992		
%	100	100	100		

References

- African Governance Program (1994) Carter Center of Emory University, *Africa Demos* . 3. 27.
- Coulon, C. (1990) Senegal: The Development and Fragility of a Semidemocracy. In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*. Lynne Rienner. Boulder
- Cox, G. (1997) *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge. New York.
- Da Costa, P. (1992) An End to Cohabitation. *Africa Report*, 37.
- Diouf, A. (1992) Independence Day Address. Dakar. 7 April.
- Diouf, M. (1994) Senegal's Uncertain Democracy: the 1993 Elections. *Africa Demos*. III.
- Fatton, R. (1987) *The Making of a Liberal Democracy* . Lynne Rienner. Boulder.
- Gellar, S. (1990) State Tutelage vs. Self Governance: The Rhetoric and Reality of Decentralization in Senegal. In James Wunch and Dele Olowa, eds. *The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self governance in Africa* . Boulder. Westview.
- Guèye, M. (1996) Les péripéties d'une politique de décentralisation. *Gouvernance Locale*. no. 3 2^e-3^e trimestre. pp. 6-7.
- Ministère de L'Interieur (1996A) *Code Electoral* . République du Sénégal. Dakar.
- Ministère de L'Interieur (1996B) Le Décret de Découpage de Dakar. *Gouvernance Locale*, No. 3 pp. 20-28.
- Ministère de L'Interieur (1996C) *Textes et Lois de la Décentralisation*. République du Sénégal. Dakar.

Mozaffar, S. (1995) The Political Origins and Consequences of Electoral Systems in Africa: A Preliminary Analysis, paper presented at the conference on Comparative Democratic Elections. Cambridge. Kennedy School

Mozaffar, S. (1996) Electoral Systems and Conflict Management in Africa. In Timothy Sisk and Andrew Reynolds, eds., *Elections and Conflict Resolution in Africa*. United States Institute of Peace. Washington, D.C.

Sylla, P. (1991) La Nouvelle Eve Communale. *Le Soleil* January. Pp. 5-6.

Vengroff, R. (1993A) Governance and the Transition to Democracy: Political Parties and the Party System in Mali. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31. pp. 541-62.

Vengroff, R. (1993B) The Transition to Democracy in Senegal: The Role of Decentralization. *In Depth* . 3. pp. 23-52.

Vengroff, R (1994) The Impact of the Electoral System on the Transition to Democracy in Africa: The Case of Mali. *Electoral Studies*, 13. 29-37.

Vengroff, R. and Creevey, L. (1997) Senegal: The Evolution of a Semi Democracy. In John Clark and David Gardinier, eds. *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Westview. Boulder. pp. 204-222.

Vengroff, R. and Johnston, A. (1987) Decentralization and the Implementation of Rural Development in Senegal: The Role of the Rural Councils. *Public Administration and Development*. 7. pp. 273-288.

Vengroff, R. and Johnston, A. (1989) *Decentralization and the Implementation of Rural Development in Senegal: The View from Below*, Mellen. New York.

Villalon, L. (1994) "Democratizing a (Quasi) Democracy: The Senegalese Elections of 1993. *African Affairs*. 93.

Villalon, L. (1995) *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal* . Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

Zolberg, A. (1966) *Creating Political Order*. Chicago; Rand McNally.

FOOTNOTES

1. Abdoulaye Wade and the PDS, the main opposition party, have in 1991 and again in 1995, following bitter election campaigns, successfully negotiated participation in the P.S. Government. Several smaller opposition parties have also joined in these coalitions (e.g. In addition to the PDS, the PIT, LD/MPT, and the PDS/R all hold cabinet posts in the current government).
2. For a discussion and definition of panachage see Gary Cox, 1997, p.43.
3. Elections for the regional councils are also half by proportional representation region wide and half by plurality in each department. Each region has three departments, each of which now constitutes a multimember district.
4. Together these four won 99.3% of rural council seats (with 98.5% of the vote) and 98.4% of municipal council seats (with 95.2% of the total vote). PS=Parti Socialiste, PDS=Parti Démocratique Sénégalais, AJ or AJ/PADS=And-Jéf-Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme, and LD= Ligue Démocratique.
5. This decree divided the Dakar Region as follows: Dakar, 19 communes, Pikine, 16 communes, Guédiawaye, 5 communes, and Rufisque, 3 communes.
6. There are also 4 second tier councils which were created in the Dakar region for the aggregates of Dakar, Pikine, Rufisque, and Guédiawaye. For these entities councils are chosen using the vote

in their respective “commune d’arrondissements.” Half of the seats are allocated on the basis of the proportion of the total vote obtained in the communes using the Party list, Hare system and largest remainder. The other half are allocated to the communes (at least two per commune) and include the mayor and the councilors on the winning plurality list in order. This is designed to produce a strong majority for the PS. In Dakar, for example, 48% of the vote area wide led to over 74% of the seats going to the PS.

7. The increased council sizes and the ending of reserved seats for the cooperatives on the C-R and various economic groups for the communes meant that the total number of elected PS representatives on councils actually increased although their percentage of seats declined.

8. It should be noted that public opinion polling in election campaigns is not allowed in Senegal, so no corroborating evidence is available.

9. The country is divided geographically into thirty administrative departments, three for each of the ten regions.