

PN-ACC-133

96701

# **Delegate Briefing Book**

**Election Observation Mission**

**Russia's Parliamentary Elections**

**December 17, 1995**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Tab 1 Travel Information  
Schedule
- Tab 2 Election Day Facts  
Mission Statement  
Program Summary
- Tab 3 Guide to Being an Election Observer  
Media Relations During Russian Election  
Media Fact Sheets  
Sample Questions and Answers
- Tab 4 Memo on the Electoral Environment of the 1995 Parliamentary Elections  
1995 Parliamentary Election Law  
Comparison of Russian Election Laws
- Tab 5 IRI 1993 Election Report -- Executive Summary and Recommendations  
IRI Recommendations Addressed under Parliamentary Election Law
- Tab 6 Memo on Parties and Coalitions  
Electoral Associations Running on the Party List Ballot
- Tab 7 Memo on Russian Parliament and Politics
- Tab 8 Memo on the Economy  
Memo on the Media
- Tab 9 Excerpts from the IFES July 1995 Public Opinion Survey in Russia  
Map of Russia
- Tab 10 Russia's Campaign Trail, Where Rocking the Vote Takes on New Meaning  
Roll Call 11/30/95  
Russians are Fed Up With Politics Washington Times 10/3/95  
Younger Russians: Open to Change, Bored by Vote Washington Post 11/2/95  
To Russian Democrats: Don't Unite New York Times 9/14/95  
Market Reformer Cites Inconsistency for Shortcomings Washington Times 11/28/95  
Russia's Political Miracle: A Red Comeback New York Times 11/8/95  
Once Upon a Ruble, Ah, Life Was Grand Washington Post 11/12/95  
Ailing Czar, Fragile State New York Times 10/29/95  
The Structure of Parliament New York Times 11/24/95  
More Russians Work Harder, Boost Income, Enter Middle Class  
Wall Street Journal 6/7/95  
Capitalism Exposes the Poverty Gap Financial Times 4/10/95  
Images of Lawlessness Twist Russian Reality New York Times 6/7/95  
Russia How to Do Business in Sixty Countries



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
E-Mail: iri@iri.org

### IMPORTANT TRAVEL INFORMATION

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the International Republican Institute's Russian Parliamentary Election Observation mission. The following information should make your trip more enjoyable.

**IRI In-Country Staff:** Dave Merkel is IRI's Resident Program Director in Moscow. The IRI-Moscow address and phone numbers are:

Starosadskii Pereulok 7, Apt. 2  
Moscow, Russia 101000  
011-7-095-956-9510 (tel)  
6373636@mcimail.com (e-mail)

**Medications, additional conveniences:** You should bring pain reliever, stomach remedies (Kaopectate or Immodium A-D, for example), cold/flu medicine, or any other medications you think you may need -- most of these items are hard to find in Russia; converter for hair dryer or electric razor; extra pair of glasses, if necessary; small umbrella; camera with complete supply of film and batteries; non-perishable snack items for trips to the regions (granola bars or cheese and cracker snack packs, for example).

**Clothes:** Include business attire for the briefings on Wednesday and Saturday. Coat and tie or skirts are fine. For election day, bring casual warm clothes, with many layers, as you will spend the majority of the day outside visiting polling places. You can expect severe winter conditions. Bring layers, a heavy coat, weather-proof boots, a hat and gloves. Bring a towel and slippers for your staying in the regions.

**What not to bring:** Don't bring bottled water, unless you want it on the plane; we will purchase that for you in Moscow. Don't bring cigarettes or jeans to trade; these items are readily available now and the "black market" no longer exists.

**Money:** Dollars can easily be converted in exchange houses near the hotel; the exchange rate has been steady at about 4500 rubles to the dollar. Don't bring travellers checks because they are difficult to cash. Don't bring large amounts of cash -- about \$200-\$300 should be sufficient. The total amount you decide to bring depends on what you plan to buy for souvenirs. Because Russian currency exchanges and businesses do not accept bills that are worn, torn or written on, bring as many new or clean bills as possible. Also, bring small denominations.

**Moscow Hotel arrangements:** While in Moscow, you will be staying at the Marco Polo Palace Hotel. The telephone number is 011-7-095-956-3152 and fax number is 011-7-095-956-3151.

**Making phone calls:** You should know that calling the United States from the Moscow hotel is expensive and can be difficult and calling from the regions may be impossible. The hotel in Moscow charges up to \$10.00/minute. One suggestion is to bring an AT&T calling card. There is a local access number for Moscow that puts you in touch via satellite with an American operator. At \$3.00-\$4.00/minute, this is considerably cheaper. The access number is 155-5042.

If someone in the United States needs to contact you, calls may be directed to Eric Jowett at IRI in Washington. He will relay any message to IRI staff in Moscow, who will be able to reach you. Eric can be reached at IRI at (202)408-9450 or at home after business hours at (703)528-7082.

**Expenses:** This mission is funded by the U.S. Government through the Agency for International Development (AID). IRI will pay for the cost of your hotel, meals taken with the group, coach class airfare and transportation while in Russia. Due to government regulations, IRI cannot pay for expenses such as alcohol, phone calls, laundry and mini-bar. The hotel will request your personal credit card upon check-in for such expenses.

**Miscellaneous:** Please mark your luggage clearly with your name and address. We will be traveling as a group and need to be able to easily identify your bags.

**Free Advice:** You will be in Russia during a period of historic change. Our schedule should run smoothly in Moscow, but be prepared for unexpected experiences and even delays in the regions. Travel within Russia can be unpredictable, and the logistics of deploying 25 persons to far-away destinations during the Russian winter is particularly challenging. In addition to bringing this briefing book, we ask that you come to Russia with an ample supply of patience, understanding and good humor. It will ensure that you will have a rich and rewarding experience.

**International  
Republican Institute**

**IRI**

Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
E-Mail: iri@iri.org

**ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION  
RUSSIA'S DECEMBER 17, 1995 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS**

**SCHEDULE**

**Monday, December 11**

p.m. Delegates depart United States

**Tuesday, December 12**

5:30 p.m. Delegates arrive Moscow  
Check-in Marco Polo Palace Hotel

8:00 p.m. Official Welcome Dinner with U.S. Embassy Officials

**Wednesday, December 13**

9:00 a.m. Briefings  
5:00 p.m. Central Election Commission  
U.S. Embassy  
Political parties representatives  
Media representatives

**Thursday, December 14**

a.m./p.m. Departures for deployment cities throughout the day

**Friday, December 15**

a.m./p.m. Arrival in deployment cities

5

**Saturday, December 16**

a.m./p.m.

**Briefings**

Local election officials  
Political parties representatives  
Candidates  
Media representatives

**Sunday, December 17**

8:00 a.m.

Open a polling station and visit as many polling sites as possible throughout the day.

10 p.m.

Observe vote tabulation

midnight

Report findings to IRI Moscow office via fax or phone

**Monday, December 18**

a.m./p.m.

Depart for Moscow

1:00 p.m.

Moscow Press Conference to release preliminary statement

7:00 p.m.

Mandatory working dinner for delegates returning to Moscow on Monday

**Tuesday, December 19**

a.m.

Depart Moscow (Delegates who returned to Moscow on Monday)

a.m./p.m.

Arrive Moscow (Remaining delegates)

7:00 p.m.

Mandatory working dinner for delegates returning to Moscow on Tuesday

**Wednesday, December 20**

a.m.

Depart Moscow



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

## ELECTION DAY FACTS

Voters will elect 450 members of the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly. Half of the 450 seats will be elected in single mandate constituencies, similar to U.S. Congressional Districts. The other 225 seats will be elected by party list; those parties winning 5 percent or more of the vote will receive seats proportional to the number of votes won. Deputies are running for four-year terms. The first class of deputies elected in 1993 served two-year terms. The upper house of the parliament, the Federation Council, is not being elected this year.

- What voters will vote for on two separate ballots:
  - A candidate for the single mandate constituency
  - A party list or slate of candidates
- Other election-related information
  - To qualify on the party list ballot, candidates had to be nominated by parties; parties had to gather 200,000 signatures with no more than 7 percent coming from any one region; 43 parties qualified
  - Candidates for single mandate seats had to gather signatures from 1 percent of the district, about 5,000 signatures
  - Complaint process provided
  - Parties and candidates guaranteed equal treatment and access to the mass media
  - Election law allows use of privately raised funds within limits
  - No campaigning on election day; media advertisements not allowed after December 15
  - Voting eligibility at age 18
  - Polls open from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m.

- What election laws and procedures will apply:
  - A law passed by the Parliament and signed by the president in June 1995 governing elections to the State Duma
  - A law on the guarantees of electoral rights of the Russian citizens
  - A Central Election Commission (CEC) resolution governing domestic and foreign observers, the role of the media, and representatives of electoral blocs and candidates
  - Election is administered at the national level by the CEC in Moscow
  - Subject (regional), district and territorial election commissions supervise the elections in conjunction with the CEC at the regional and local level



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
E-Mail: iri@iri.org

**Mission Statement  
IRI Election Observation Mission  
1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections**

The International Republican Institute (IRI) is sending a 25-member mission to observe the December 17, 1995 State Duma (lower house) parliamentary elections in Russia. The purpose of the mission is to evaluate the electoral process and implementation of a new State Duma election law, identify strengths and weaknesses of the system, and make recommendations for improvement. These elections will play a significant role in the continued development of a stable democracy in Russia and in U.S. decisions on assistance to promote democracy.

IRI delegates will be deployed to 10 cities in which the Institute conducts programs: Arkhangelsk, Moscow, Murmansk, Novosibirsk, Perm, Rostov-na-Donu, Volgograd, Voronezh, St. Petersburg, and Tomsk. The deployment cities are IRI's core regional cities where training and consultations with party activists, elected officials, women and youth groups have been carried out over the past two years.

IRI has worked in Russia since 1991, assisting a variety of pro-reform political parties and elected officials in democracy-building activities. The Institute also sponsored monitoring missions to Russia's April 25, 1993 referendum and December 12, 1993 parliamentary elections. The report following the referendum detailed weaknesses in the technical aspects of the voting process. Its recommendations were published in *Izvestiya* and later were introduced on the floor of the parliament by pro-democratic members. The recommendations of the December 12, 1993 parliamentary election team proved a useful tool to Russia's parliament and election commission in revamping the new State Duma election law. Alexander Ivanchenko, Vice Chairman of the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC), in a March 29, 1995 meeting on Capitol Hill, commented that, "The report provided by IRI's international observer delegation served as the road map for the CEC in making improvements to the election law." Eighteen of the 20 recommendations relevant to an election law were addressed in the new State Duma election law. IRI has conducted more than 45 election observations around the globe.

**BACKGROUND**

Following the 1993 parliamentary elections, Russia's political and electoral process moved into a phase of development in which a new Central Election Commission was formed, new electoral laws debated and passed, and some of the 1993 political movements becoming full-fledged political parties, albeit in the formative stages. The new State Duma election law was

signed June 21, 1995 by President Boris Yeltsin, and candidates and parties began campaign preparations during the summer. Many political parties are running candidates in a majority of the single seat districts as well as presenting party list candidates. In addition, despite internal disagreements over issues such as the Chechen war and parliamentary votes of no confidence, President Yeltsin's Administration and the parliament have tested each other without resorting to violence and attempts to overthrow the government. They have demonstrated a willingness to compromise. Even with these positive signs, a variety of factors will bring international scrutiny to bear on the December 17 elections.

First, these elections are only the second post-Soviet parliamentary elections and the first under the new election law. The 1993 elections were pulled together hastily and the existing election law was less than perfect. The implementation of the law had problems due to its ambiguity; some of the regional election commission staffs lacked proper training and knowledge of the election law. While the new law substantially addresses many of IRI's 1993 recommendations, one goal of the 1995 delegation will be to monitor the new law, not only for its strengths and weaknesses, but its effective implementation. Knowledge of the election law, proper training on voting and counting procedures, and timely transmission of election guidelines from the Central Election Commission to regional and local election officials are crucial to the new election law's implementation.

Second, Russia's Central Election Commission and a number of State Duma deputies and IRI political party contacts have spoken of the importance of IRI's past election observation missions and have requested that IRI conduct an observation mission for the December parliamentary elections.

Third, questions still remain by the electorate, especially among political activists, about the government's ability to conduct elections free of fraud and abuse. The emergence of a pro-government party earlier this year, with candidates currently within the government, raised concerns in the minds of some of possible conflict of interest or vote manipulation that the 1995 delegation can address. Specifically, many of IRI's contacts in the regions have expressed concerns about ballot security and potential fraud. The 1995 election observation delegation will provide an objective perspective and boost voter confidence in the integrity of the process.

Fourth, the parliamentary elections will lay the ground work for the presidential election scheduled for June 16, 1996. With no clear successor to President Yeltsin, who may or may not run again, the outcome of the parliamentary elections will have ramifications for pro-reform parties and candidates preparing for the presidential campaign. Complaints of widespread problems in the parliamentary elections could undermine the public's confidence in the presidential contest.

Finally, the legislature of the past two years has been a transitional one. The Constitution provides that the first class of deputies in the State Duma serve only two years; thereafter, all deputies in the lower house will serve four years. The parliament elected in December 1995 will set the tone for Russian public policy into the 21st century.

## METHODOLOGY

IRI does not make simple findings as to whether an election can be categorized as free and fair. The observers' goal will be to catalogue implemented improvements made in Russia's election law since December 1993 and to recommend further refinements to the law and the process.

The mandate of the observers is to observe the process, not to interject themselves in the process, even if they feel it is somehow being compromised. Observers will be permitted to question election officials, but not to suggest any immediate modifications in their behavior that could be construed as interference. IRI will request the Russian government to provide observers unlimited access to all levels of election administration to ensure a genuinely transparent view of the process. Members of the delegation will make their observations, identifying both strengths and weaknesses of the system, under two broad categories: electoral environment and election administration.

### Electoral Environment

Delegation members will be responsible for observing the state of the electoral environment, the specific conditions of the campaign period that may affect voting on election day. Electoral environment includes political party and candidate campaign activities, the role and impact of other civic organizations, the extent of attempts by government officials to control aspects of the pre-election season, the role of the media, and major issues motivating public debate.

The electoral environment also consists of factors that affect the parties' competitiveness. What is the state of the political "playing field" on which competing parties attempt to deliver their message to voters? Do they have access to scarce campaign resources? Is the local broadcast media providing parties with allotted time as provided in the law? What is the bias of media reporting on the campaigns? Are the local election commissions providing the political parties and candidates with information they need?

These are special concerns in a country such as Russia that has yet to shift fully from command to market economic structures. Local officials still retain control of major sectors of economic and social life. Government officials, factory directors, farm collective managers and former communist party apparatchiks whose livelihood is tied to preserving the status quo rather than working for change can make it difficult for parties and candidates to campaign effectively. Another concern is accessibility and coverage of the media, still largely controlled by the state.

It is important to note that the members of the December 12, 1993 parliamentary delegation made suggestions for the institutional development of political parties, a free and independent media, and a legislative branch that would serve as a genuine partner in governance. The long-term development of civil and political institutions that support and sustain democracy

is critical to any country's transition. This is a crucial area for the 1995 delegation team to observe.

Observers also must determine the level of voter understanding regarding ballot procedures and the voter's familiarity with parties, candidates, and their policy positions if the election outcome is to be meaningful. Democratic elections are undermined when voter ignorance, misunderstanding, or fear can be manipulated to generate support for a particular candidate or party. The December elections will be especially interesting regarding this aspect: in 1993, 13 parties presented party lists: in 1995, 42 parties are fielding lists of candidates, thus increasing the complexity of this election.

Finally, observers should consider the larger historical and political contexts in which the parliamentary election is taking place. The particular stage of Russia's democratic evolution, combined with its political culture -- its traditions and beliefs -- must be appraised and applied to specific observations. What may be regarded as undemocratic in one country could possibly be viewed as a significant advancement in another, given past practices and pace of reform.

### **Electoral Administration**

The equitable and consistent administration of the voting process is necessary to ensuring a legitimate outcome. Observers will evaluate activities that are crucial to effective election administration: recruitment and training of polling station workers, the production and distribution of ballots, the legibility of ballot papers, availability of voting booths and ballot boxes, and most important, the tabulation and tracking of ballots and reporting the results. This evaluation extends to an examination of the election law to determine whether it contains clear guidelines and procedures or if vague and ambiguous language remain that would allow wide administrative discretion and, consequently, inconsistent application of the law.

Observers will examine the process with a critical eye toward opportunity or motive to commit ballot fraud and abuse. Observers will perform random checks against fraudulent voting practices while providing a disincentive against such practices by their presence. The willful tampering or destruction of ballots, the manipulation of voting results, or use of ineligible or multiple voters are all issues to which observers must pay close scrutiny. In addition, coercion, intimidation, and bribery of voters is another method of ballot fraud to explore.

It should be noted that IRI observers to the April 25, 1993 referendum found little evidence of fraud or intimidation. Observers did note that the production, distribution, and security of ballots was lax, and various regions of the country differed in their methods of tabulation. The delegation concluded these weaknesses could be exploited easily when the stakes of elections are higher and if there is a greater incentive to cheat. The IRI observers to the December 12, 1993 election found that many traditions in Russia's electoral system that came from the old Soviet-style elections had positive benefits when reapplied to democratic elections; for example, the invitation to vote, universal registration, and the efficiency and dedication of polling station personnel. The 1993 delegation, however, found other components of the system

that held potential for abuse, such as the portable ballot box, an under-appreciation of the secret ballot, and ill-defined elements of the election law.

## **OBSERVER PROCEDURES**

The delegation will arrive in Moscow December 12. On December 13, the delegation will meet with election officials, party leaders, media representatives, and U.S. officials, receive city assignments, and begin departing for deployment cities on December 14.

Observers will divide into teams to travel to the deployment cities accompanied by an IRI staff member, where they will hold a second round of meetings with local election officials, party leaders, and others. The purpose of the meetings will be to assist observers in gaining an understanding of the political context of elections, receive first-hand information regarding the conduct of the campaign period, and pose questions to local authorities responsible for election administration.

Each observation team will be accompanied by an IRI staff member who is responsible for all logistics (such as ruble transactions, interpreters, and meals and hotel rooms). The IRI staff will serve as a recorder during the meetings. Observers will be provided with a notebook that will include a copy of the new election law, guidelines and tips for observation, sample exit poll questions for voters, standardized forms for recording information on individual polling stations, and a section asking observers to record their larger impressions and conclusions regarding both positive and negative features of the election.

On election day, observers will begin visiting polling stations early in the morning to monitor procedures on opening ballot packages, sealing ballot boxes, and other administrative preparations before the polls officially open. Once polls have opened, observers will attempt to cover a diverse geographic cross-section, traveling to both rural and urban areas of their respective region. Team members will record the presence and behavior of partisan poll watcher and media observers, the quality of the poll workers and their knowledge and compliance of the election law and relevant guidelines, the secrecy of the vote, adherence to proper voting procedures, police or military presence at the polls, and any impermissible campaigning.

Observers will remain in their deployment regions until the counting is completed that night. To the extent possible, the observers will track the protocols: following the delivery of results to the district election commissions and observing their input into the state automated system; noting whether the protocols were made available upon request to party and media monitors and international observers; and providing results to IRI's Moscow office to later verify the national CEC count matches that of the observed regions.

Each of the teams will be asked to identify the positive and negative features of the elections in their assigned region, and provide evidence to substantiate those findings. Observers

will be asked to identify those features that could be considered pervasive versus those that were isolated events.

The teams will reconvene in Moscow the following day (where travel is possible--where not, observations will be transmitted by phone or fax), and will share further observations with the delegation leaders who will issue a preliminary statement. The preliminary statement will form the foundation of an in-depth report drafted by IRI staff. All delegation members will be debriefed before their departure to the U.S. The final report will expand on the preliminary statement, incorporating the delegation's final conclusions and recommendations, and will be issued by IRI by February 15, 1996. The report will be distributed to all participants, relevant Russian party and government officials, U.S. congressional and government officials, the media, and U.S. and Russian research and academic institutions.

*December 1995*



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
E-Mail: iri@iri.org

---

## RUSSIA

---

<b>Program Grantee/Grantee Source:</b>	<b>IRI/AID</b>
<b>Program Grant Dates:</b>	<b>8/94 - 6/97</b>
<b>IRI Country Programs Since:</b>	<b>1991</b>

---

Since the failed anti-Gorbachev coup of August 1991, Russia's attempts to convert to representative democracy and establish a market economy have engendered a series of crises. President Boris Yeltsin's public appeal soared after he courageously opposed the coup attempt against the Gorbachev government and formed a new government consisting almost entirely of radical reformers. After implementing unpopular economic and domestic policies, his popularity plummeted. Though Yeltsin won the April 1993 constitutional referendum, the Parliament, sensing its diminishing influence, attempted to assert its authority by throwing further obstacles in reform's path, including approving an inflation-fueling budget and blocking sales of state-owned properties. Russia's political crisis came to a head with Yeltsin's September 1993 decree disbanding the legislature and calling for new parliamentary elections, which led to the October armed conflict between Yeltsin and his opposition in the parliament.

The December 1993 parliamentary elections were a critical turning point for Russia's nascent democracy, particularly for political parties. Campaign demands accelerated the development of Russia's young and fragile democratic political coalitions and spurred the growth of national political networks. The growth was further prompted by a provision in the electoral law that one-half of the 450-seat lower house be elected by national party lists. Parties need five percent of the vote to be represented in the new parliament; the threshold sparked tenuous coalition building among political groupings with similar agendas.

In September 1991, one month after the failed anti-Gorbachev coup, IRI launched its first training effort in the Soviet Union with a conference in Moscow on Building the Foundations of Political Pluralism. As the Soviet Union fell, IRI embarked on a program of political development at the grassroots level in 15 cities across Russia. IRI began working primarily with the Democratic Russia Movement, a pro-reform coalition consisting of approximately 30 parties and civic organizations. Training missions covered party organization, voter outreach, and political communications. In the summer of 1993, to foster increased involvement of women in an emerging and competitive political process, IRI initiated a "Women in Politics" program.

IRI's operations are centered in field offices opened in Moscow and St. Petersburg in 1992 and 1994, respectively. These offices have enabled the Institute to provide frequent follow-up consultations for trainees. IRI's efforts have also included material assistance in the

form of typewriters, computers, fax machines and other scarce supplies in an economy making the painful transition to a free market system.

In addition, IRI's April 1993 referendum observation mission led to a report detailing balloting process improvements needed to prevent fraud by those opposed to the country's democratic transition. The monitoring team's recommendations were published in *Izvestiya*, and introduced on the floor of the parliament by pro-democratic members; as the Washington Times has noted "the American influence on democratic elections has grown so much that most of the suggestions from a 21-member Republican team monitoring the April 23 referendum in Russia were taken to heart in arranging the December elections."

By December 1993, 1,300 people in 15 cities had participated in 31 IRI seminars and numerous one-on-one consultations. In the December legislative elections, 20 IRI trainees ran for 62 open national parliamentary seats; 12 won. Forty-five trainees sought local office in the regional elections that have been taking place since January 1994, and at least 800 IRI-trainees worked on campaigns as managers, press secretaries and volunteers, most for the first time.

IRI's December 1993 election observation mission evaluated improvements in the electoral process and made recommendations for further refinements in the election code. The Vice Chairman of Russia's Central Election Commission (CEC) has stated that "the report provided by IRI's [December 1993] observer delegation served as a roadmap for the CEC in making improvements to the election law" for 1995 parliamentary and 1996 Presidential election. Of the 20 IRI election law recommendations in the report, 12 were implemented in their entirety, and another six in part, in the new law passed by the Duma in March 1995.

The war in Chechnya demonstrates a continuing penchant for centralized control, and a willingness to use force to quell perceived threats to the Russian state. It also demonstrates the willingness of nascent democratic parties and other institutions to act against central dictates. With parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1995 and presidential elections in 1996, the next two years will be critical in the development of Russia's democratic institutions.

In 1995, in addition to increasing the tempo of training for Russia's political parties and women, IRI has initiated programs for traditionally apathetic younger voters, and for local elected officials. IRI's efforts are focussed in five regional areas based around St. Petersburg, Perm, Rostov-na-Donu, Voronezh and Novosibirsk. Training and consultations in these regions has been conducted monthly, with interspersed smaller sessions to enhance effectiveness. Finally, to enhance issues-oriented party identities and cohesion, IRI conducted training and consultative sessions in Moscow for members of the Duma.



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

## GUIDE TO BEING AN ELECTION OBSERVER

- Observe the election process, do not interfere with it. Do not attempt to correct any problems you see. Note inconsistencies or problems for IRI's post-election statement and report.
- Become familiar with the Russian election law.
- Become familiar with the electoral environment in your deployment city.
- Be sure to be at the opening and the closing of a polling station (not necessarily the same one, although that is a useful tactic).
- Take good notes of all you observe for later reference. You will visit so many polling sites that you will not be able to keep them straight without notes. Record the total number polling stations you visit.
- Direct questions to the polling commission director. If he/she is not available, talk to the assistant director.
- Talk to other domestic or international observers you meet at polling stations to learn what they have seen during the voting process.
- Talk to voters to find out what they think about the ballots and the elections in general.
- If there are other international observers in your deployment city, talk to them about their findings. As much as possible try to coordinate your polling station visits with them so there is minimal overlap. Try to meet with them after the elections to compare notes.
- As much as possible, keep your route on election day a secret and don't follow a predictable pattern. If people know what polling stations you are going to visit, it is unlikely you'll find any problems at those sites.
- If barred from a polling station, show your observer credentials and indicate that you have the right to observe the elections. Don't force your way in, however. Note for the record that you were barred from the station, by whom, and the polling station number.
- Attempt to visit a military polling station and talk to some voters in the military. Ask voters if they received any instruction from their commanders on how to vote or if they

were forced to vote. How the military votes this year will be especially noteworthy given the large numbers of military candidates running. All polling stations are supposed to be open to observers, but past IRI observers have been barred from some military stations. Again, if barred from the polling site, make a note of the station.

- If you arrive at a polling station when a mobile ballot box is being taken to a voter, follow along. Observers are allowed to watch the voting process with the mobile ballot box. However, do not ride with polling station workers; ride separately in your own van.
- Inquire about early voting; how many voted and how were they records and ballots maintained and secured.
- Arrive at your final polling station about 15 minutes before the polls close to watch the closing and tabulation process. **BE SURE TO GET A COPY OF THE PROTOCOL, THE TALLY SHEET, WHEN THE COUNTING IS COMPLETE.** A copy is supposed to be provided to observers. If not, copy down the results. **FOLLOW THE POLLING STATION WORKERS TO THE TERRITORIAL ELECTION COMMISSION TO WATCH THE RECORDING OF THE RESULTS AT THE TERRITORIAL LEVEL.** Do not ride with election commissioners; ride separately in your own van.



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

## **MEDIA RELATIONS DURING RUSSIAN ELECTION**

Media attention to the Russian election activities is expected to be high, and the quality of the IRI delegation will undoubtedly attract attention. Therefore, it is important that the delegation is a consistent and informed source of information.

The primary authorized spokesmen for the delegation in Moscow will be Senator McCain, and he will conduct the Monday press conference accompanied by other available delegates. Others in the delegation may be called on for one-on-one interviews and/or comments by the press, especially when they are in the regions.

As part of your Saturday schedule in the deployment cities with election commissions, party leaders, etc., you will likely meet with news media to assess what voting information, civic education, and access for candidates to media time they have provided. In past observer missions, the media have sometimes tried to turn these meetings into a press conference of the foreign observers. You should resist this and simply provide the media information about your mission by giving them copies of our news releases, which your IRI staff person will have.

Below are a few tips that may help the delegation to speak with one voice. The "DOs and DON'Ts" apply to Russian, American and international press.

### **DO:**

**Remember that you speak for the IRI delegation, not as an individual.**

**Assume that anything you say, anywhere, at any time is On The Record and can be reported.**

**Allow press to follow you as you go about your observer duties.**

**State that you'll have to wait until all delegates report in to know how the election is going; then a preliminary statement of findings will be issued with a final report to follow from Washington.**

**Always note that we are here merely to observe, not interfere or intervene.**

**Be willing to defer to others in the delegation.**

**DON'T:**

**Respond to questions about whether the election is "free and fair".**

(An isolated incident of misconduct, fraud, or irregularity may prove to be unrepresentative of the entire process.)

**Comment on "how election is going" during the day.**

(Quotes on election day can be used in stories that are filed early and may prove to be unrepresentative of the entire process at later times and from other regions.)

**Speculate or be drawn into predictions on anything.**

(Beware of any "If" or "When" formulations, i.e., "If reformers win, will ....." or "When the Parliament convenes, will ....."

**Guess if you are unsure of a factual answer.**

(There is nothing wrong, and much to be desired, by answering, "I'm sorry, I just don't know" or "I really just don't have anything for you on that.")

**Reveal the location where you will observe the vote count; tell them you will be happy to call them from the site when you get there.**

## **MEDIA FACT SHEET**

### **ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TO RUSSIA**

- Sponsored by the International Republican Institute (IRI)
- Non-partisan delegation of 25, funded by USAID grant
- Delegation led by US Senator and IRI Chairman John McCain
- Teams will deploy to 10 cities throughout Russia
- What observation missions do to assess pre-election environment:
  - Meet with national and local election officials and party leaders regarding candidate media access, civic education, voting procedures
  - Assess voter understanding regarding ballot procedures
  - Assess voter familiarity with parties, candidates and policy positions
  - Observe distribution of ballots; security of ballot boxes
- What observation missions do on election day:
  - Assess availability of voting booths and ballot boxes; secrecy of voting
  - Observe training and performance of polling place workers
  - Observe procedures for counting ballots and delivering to final tabulation centers
  - Discuss with voters attitudes and expectations regarding election results
  - Observe election without interfering
- Why observation missions are important:
  - Provide outside, independent view of proceedings
  - Analyze the adequacy of election laws; shortcomings in implementing laws
  - Issue preliminary findings the day after election; prepare post-election report with final conclusions and recommendations for Russian and U.S. audiences

## SAMPLE PRESS Q & A's

**Q. What is the International Republican Institute, and why is it going to observe the Russian elections?**

A. The International Republican Institute -- IRI as it's known -- is a non-profit organization that conducts democracy work worldwide. IRI began its work 10 years ago and now is active in 32 countries running a wide range of programs that promote democracy. It also has conducted more than 45 election observation missions around the globe.

**Q. How many observers are going and who are they?**

A. Our delegation of 25 is bi-partisan -- we have Republicans and Democrats -- and is led by U.S. Senator John McCain. The delegation is a mix of men and women who are elected officials, election law experts, Russian scholars and others with knowledge and expertise in Russian affairs and elections.

**Q. Why are you observing the Russian elections?**

A. First, Russia's Central Election Commission, and a number of State Duma deputies and IRI political party contacts have spoken of the importance of IRI's past election observation missions and have requested that IRI conduct an observation mission for the 1995 parliamentary elections.

Second, the December elections are only the second post-Soviet parliamentary elections and the first under the new election law. While the new law substantially addresses many of IRI's 1993 observer recommendations, it should be monitored for strengths and weaknesses and effective implementation. Knowledge of the election law itself, proper training on voting and counting procedures, and timely transmission of election guidelines from the Central Election Commission to regional and local election officials are crucial to the new election law's implementation.

Third, questions still remain by some of the electorate, especially among political activists, about the government's ability to conduct elections free of fraud and abuse. Specifically, some of IRI's contacts in the regions have expressed concerns about ballot security and potential fraud. An international delegation would provide an objective perspective on the election and boost voter confidence in the integrity of the process.

Finally, the parliamentary elections will lay the ground work for the presidential election in June 1996. The outcome of the parliamentary elections will have ramifications for pro-reform parties and candidates preparing for the presidential campaign. Complaints of widespread problems in the parliamentary elections could undermine the public's confidence in the presidential contest.

**Q. What do you do in advance of election day?**

- A. We meet and talk with as many people as possible about all aspects of the election. We visit with members of the Central Election Commission, political party leaders, press, political scientists, public opinion pollsters, and, of course, voters themselves.

**Q. Where are you going inside Russia?**

- A. IRI observers will visit 10 cities in the Ural Mountain range, Siberia, southwestern Russia and the Arctic region.

**Q. How were the cities selected?**

- A. These are cities where IRI has conducted programs for the past four years. IRI has conducted a variety of party building, campaign training, communications and polling training seminars, as well as seminars targeted at women and youth political activists. The cities are geographically diverse, have a varied economic base, some are Communist strongholds, and some have made great progress in building democratic institutions.

**Q. What do you look for as observers?**

- A. We look at a whole host of things in two broad categories -- the electoral environment and the election administration -- the actual way the election is carried out.

On environment, we look at the role of political parties, the impact of trade unions and other civic organizations, the extent of government control and the role of and access to the media.

We look at whether the voters understand the ballot procedures, and if the voters are familiar with the candidates and the parties.

We also look at the election within the historical and political context of the country, with its unique traditions and beliefs. What is regarded as undemocratic in our country could be viewed as a significant advancement in another.

On election administration, we look at the ballot production and distribution, availability of voting booths and ballot boxes, the training of poll watchers and counting procedures. We watch for intimidation, coercion and bribery of voters and other forms of vote fraud.

**Q. What do you do, for example, if you see evidence of fraud? Do you attempt to stop it?**

- A. Observers do just that -- they observe. We aren't going to direct, interfere or disrupt the election in any way.



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

## **Electoral Environment of the 1995 Russia Parliamentary Elections**

Prepared by the International Republican Institute

### **Introduction**

On December 17, 1995, Russia will hold its second competitive elections for the State Duma, the lower house of Parliament. Since the elections held two years ago, Russia has made progress in developing the institutions vital to a democracy, but still does not have a fully developed electoral system, especially a political party system. The outcome of this election will have far-reaching implications. Because this class of deputies will serve a four-year term (the first class was transitional and served only two years), it will define Russian public policy into the 21st century. This contest will also set the stage for a more significant election, the presidential election in June 1996.

The atmosphere of this year's election is far different from those held in 1993. The December 1993 parliamentary elections were held only two months after President Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of People's Deputies, the federal legislature, with the storming of the Russian White House. The election law was issued by presidential decree and was imperfect. Parties had almost no time to prepare, and few new parties were able to collect the signatures necessary to be placed on the ballot. Contrary to expectations, pro-reform parties performed poorly. Together they received only 112 of 450 seats. The surprise victor was the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who won the votes of the disenchanted electorate which suffered under economic reforms.

Although democrats may not perform any better in the 1995 elections, this contest will take place after a sustained period of relative cooperation between the president and the parliament. An improved election law was passed. Even the most heated disputes of the past two years, like those over Chechnya and the election law, were resolved democratically. At one point last summer, the parliament passed a no-confidence vote against the president because of his handling of the Chechnya conflict. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin challenged the legislature to take a second vote. If deputies voted against Yeltsin a second time, he would have to choose between firing his cabinet or disbanding the parliament. Knowing Yeltsin would choose the latter course of action, the parliament did not pass the second no-confidence vote. As a concession to the parliament, Yeltsin did fire a couple of cabinet ministers.

### **1995 Elections**

Up for grabs in the 1995 elections are 450 seats for the State Duma, the lower house and more powerful body of the Russian Federal Assembly. The Federation Council, the upper

house, will be made up of the heads of the executives and legislatures from Russia's 89 regions. The governors of the regions will be elected by December 1996. The Federation Council has a relatively minor role in the legislative process, although they can create some stumbling blocks for the State Duma.

Of the 450 State Duma seats being contested, 225 will be filled by candidates from single mandate districts, similar to U.S. congressional districts. More than 2,600 candidates will run for the single-seat constituencies, an average of 12 per district, although some districts will have as many as 20 candidates. In order to qualify, candidates had to collect signatures from 1 percent of their district, about 5,000 signatures. At least one-third of the candidates are running as independents. The remaining are either affiliated with coalitions on the party list ballot or are with other minor political associations.

The other half of the State Duma seats will be filled by candidates running on a national party list ballot. All electoral blocs winning more than 5 percent of the vote will receive seats proportional to the number of votes won. All ideologies and interests will be represented on the party list ballot, from nationalist and communist to reformist. Some of the coalitions represent special interests such as the Coalition for the Defense of Pensioners and Veterans, Beer Lovers' Party and the Party for Protecting the Disabled.

The election law prescribes how the lists are to be constructed. The maximum number of names is 270 and the first 12 names are to be from the national party leadership; the remaining 258 names must represent specific regions and no region can make up more than 30 percent of the list. Candidates may run both on a party list ballot and in a single mandate district, a tactic used by most party leaders to improve their chances of getting into parliament. In order for parties to be placed on the ballot, parties had to gather 200,000 signatures, with no more than 7 percent coming from any one region, by October 22. Sixty-nine electoral blocs were authorized by the Central Election Commission (CEC) to gather signatures and 43 will be on the ballot, more than a threefold increase over the 1993 elections in which 13 parties were registered.

The 225 party list seats will be distributed among those parties and blocs that reach the 5 percent threshold. The first 12 seats a party wins go to the 12 national candidates on its list. Remaining seats won will be awarded to the regions according to the turnout for the bloc in that region. If a party wins less than 12 seats, the number of seats won will be awarded to the national candidates in the order they appear on the list. Any candidate listed on a party list who won a single mandate seat will not be counted against the bloc's party list seats. Many analysts believe that given the number of parties competing in the elections, only six or seven will reach the 5 percent threshold.

Voters will receive two ballots when they enter the polling station, one for the single mandate seat, the other for the national party lists. Originally the CEC wanted to design the party ballot to list the name of each party, the top three national candidates and the candidates from a particular region. That proved to be unfeasible with the large numbers of parties.

Instead, the ballot will likely be printed on a newspaper-size sheet of paper and will list only the top three national candidates. The order of the ballot was decided by lottery. Because there are so many parties, those listed high on the ballot will potentially get votes from undecided voters or from those who are confused by the ballot. Number one on the list is the Women of Russia bloc, a centrist organization; most of the major pro-reform parties are between positions 15-25.

Several problems arose during the election registration process. Creative entrepreneurs exploited the signature collection process by collecting pages of signatures and selling them to candidates and parties. Many of the signatures were legitimate, but others were from dead or non-existent people. Parties and candidates accused each other of fraud during the signature collection process, but generally only candidates in single mandate districts were disqualified for such violations. Almost every electoral bloc that turned in signatures by the deadline was approved by the CEC. The CEC initially rejected two blocs, the popular pro-reform Yabloko and the nationalist Derzhava, for technical violations. Communists and pro-reform parties alike objected to the banning of Yabloko, accusing the CEC of manipulating the elections. Russia's Democratic Choice threatened to boycott the elections if Yabloko could not participate, saying the elections would be a sham. The Supreme Court reversed the CEC's decision a week later. As a result of the court's decision, the CEC allowed almost every other party that turned in signatures to be placed on the ballot, technical violations notwithstanding.

### **Election Issues**

Because interest in politics in Russia is low and a majority of voters don't believe the parliament can improve their lives, most political observers believe voter turnout in the December elections will be below 50 percent. Surprisingly, a public opinion poll conducted by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) in summer 1995 indicates that as many as 75 percent of voters will vote in the State Duma elections. The poll showed that senior citizens will likely turnout in high numbers while younger voters (18-30) are expected to be minimally represented at the polls. This presents problems for pro-reformers who generally perform poorly among seniors and well among young people.

In the early 1990s, Russian elections were a clear cut battle between good and evil, reformers and communists. At that time, pro-reform activists had only one goal -- defeat communists -- and voters lined up to support them. Now that politicians must deal with the social and economic problems faced by the country, the lines between good and evil have become blurred. Reform-oriented parties are irreconcilably divided over issues of personality, not substance. After years of double-digit inflation, rising unemployment and a loss of many social services, much of the electorate thinks that reform and democracy are dirty words.

Across the country, the biggest issue of concern is the economy. Undoubtedly, Russia has made progress in converting its economy, a difficult and slow task considering the country is 11 time zones wide and previously produced almost no consumer goods, only unwanted heavy industrial goods. Consumer goods are now available, although most are foreign produced, inflation is coming down, and foreign companies are investing in Russia. Even with the

progress, about two-thirds of Russians are barely making ends meet or living in poverty. Those who have been hurt the most are older people who have seen their support from the state almost completely disappear. Even Russians who have done well are frustrated to watch their country, once a superpower in education, research and military capabilities, slip behind industrialized countries once in its sphere of influence.

Those parties and candidates who are positioned to benefit the most from the mood of the electorate are the communist and nationalist blocs, especially the Communist Party of Russia, the Agrarian Party and the Congress of Russian Communities. (See memo on political parties and coalitions for more details on these blocs.) Each of these blocs advocates to a certain extent policies that would restore Russia to its former greatness by voluntarily reviving the Soviet Union, guaranteeing a job for every person, subsidizing goods and recreating a centralized economy. Such a system would bring back shortages and long lines, but for those voters who have not been able to purchase the foreign goods that have flooded the country, this is not an issue.

Among pro-reform parties only Yabloko is expected to do relatively well. Yabloko is led by economist Grigori Yavlinsky, who, with a 10-15 percent approval rating, is among the most popular politicians in Russia today. Yavlinsky has the advantage of not being affiliated with the Yeltsin administration or with any of the current economic policies. In this election, Yavlinsky refused to cooperate with the other major pro-reform blocs, Russia's Democratic Choice (RDC), led by economist Yegor Gaidar, and Our Home is Russia, led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. None of these coalitions has crafted a strong message that will connect with the electorate. Given the lack of cooperation and defined messages, pro-reform parties appear to be making the same mistakes they did in 1993. In one positive sign, however, pro-reformers at the regional level are coordinating candidates in single mandate districts so they are not running against one another.

A new type of candidate has emerged in these elections -- military commanders. At least 120 military leaders are running in single mandate seats across the country. The Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has quietly encouraged military leaders to seek office in an effort to bring pro-military deputies in the State Duma. The military has suffered greatly since the fall of Communism. In the Soviet era, the military had prestige and almost unlimited funds. Now its budgets have been slashed, its weapon industry is being dismantled and it was humiliated in the Chechnya conflict. Grachev hopes that military candidates will appeal to the millions of Russians who are veterans or work in defense-related industries.

Media analysts point to recent losses for reformers in several local elections as an indication that they will suffer in the December elections. In Volgograd in southwest Russia, the communists swept most of the city duma seats. In Yeltsin's home republic of Sverdlovsk, the Our Home is Russia candidate for governor lost to the renegade former governor and Yeltsin opponent, Eduard Rossel. While not good news for reformers, the results of these elections should not be over-dramatized because reformers were not expected to succeed in these contests.

Analysts predict only six to seven parties will reach the 5 percent threshold: Communist Party of Russia, Congress of Russian Communities, Liberal Democratic Party, Women of Russia, Our Home is Russia, Yabloko and Russia's Democratic Choice. Some speculate the Communist Party will win as much as 25 percent of the vote. The Congress of Russian Communities and Yabloko are expected to win 8-15 percent each. Our Home is Russia, the Agrarian Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, Women of Russia and RDC are expected to win between 5-10 percent of the vote each.

### **Election Administration**

The parliamentary elections are administered at the national level by the Central Election Commission. In addition to overseeing the elections, the CEC is responsible for allocating funds for the election process, arbitrating complaints appealed from the lower commissions and registering parties and electoral coalitions on the national ballot. Next in authority below the CEC are the election commissions of the 89 administrative subjects (often called regions, comparable to states) of the Russian Federation. The subject election commissions are responsible for coordinating activities within their region, printing ballots, arbitrating complaints and acting as a liaison between the CEC and the lower commissions.

Next are the district election commissions, formed along the boundaries of the single mandate constituencies. District election commissions coordinate election activities within the district, approve the text that will appear on the single mandate ballots, publish the results of the single mandate contests and forward the results of the national party list ballots to the CEC. Below the district election commissions are the territorial commissions, which are cities or counties. The territorial commissions train poll workers, arbitrate complaints, deliver ballots to the polling stations and generally coordinate activities among the polling stations. The polling station commissions organize and update voter lists, prepare and oversee the voting process and tabulate and report the election results.

### **Election Law**

The election law that governed the 1993 parliamentary elections was issued by presidential decree two months before the election and did not address all the issues that would arise in the election. Following those elections, the IRI observation delegation issued a number of recommendations on the election law that were partly or substantially adopted into the new law. The Vice Chairman of the Central Election Commission commented that IRI's report "served as the road map for the CEC in making improvements to the election law." A separate memo outlines IRI's recommendations and how they were adopted into the current law.

The current parliamentary election law was signed by the president in June 1995 after great debate between the two bodies of the Federal Assembly and the president. The debate reached such proportions that it appeared for a while that no law would be passed and the president would again issue a law by decree. The issues disputed were: the ratio of single mandate seats to party list seats, the percentage turnout required to validate the elections, the

one-round elections in single mandate constituencies and the provision requiring civil servants or mass media employees to take a leave of absence if they sought office.

The biggest stumbling block was the ratio of party list to single mandate seats. Both the president and the Federation Council, which generally supports the president, wanted to decrease the number of party list seats because the current one-to-one ratio brought into the parliament too many opposition parties. Yeltsin established the party list seats in 1993 to favor Russia's Choice, which was widely thought to be the most popular coalition. Russia's Choice unexpectedly performed poorly on the national ballot (winning 40 seats), but did well in the single mandate seats (winning 26 seats). A complete surprise, the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) won the most party list seats (59), but won only 5 single mandate seats. Recognizing that pro-reform parties have not gained in popularity since the last elections, Yeltsin wanted to decrease the number of party list seats to 150 and increase the single mandate seats to 300.

The president lost that battle, but won a concession that only the first 12 seats on the party lists could be representatives of the national party (generally based in Moscow), and the remaining 258 candidates must represent specific regions. No region could represent more than 30 percent of all names on the list. Even though Yeltsin appears to have more support in St. Petersburg and Moscow he hopes that by increasing the role of the regions, he will build more support for the government throughout the country. On other issues, Yeltsin was able to remove the provision requiring a leave of absence for civil servants and media employees running for office (this helps Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, leader of the Our Home is Russia bloc). The required turnout remained at 25 percent because Yeltsin agreed that to raise it to 50 percent, given the voter apathy, risked invalidating the elections. Finally, Yeltsin also agreed that holding two rounds of voting in the single mandate districts to force run-offs would be difficult to do at this time.

There was a move to alter the election law. Smaller parties wanted to drop the 5 percent threshold because with so many parties vying for votes, only a few will obtain 5 percent. A member of the Constitutional Court did say that legal questions might be raised if more than 50 percent of voters cast their ballot for coalitions that do not get into parliament, creating a situation where half of the seats represent less than a majority of the country. Despite that concern, the Constitutional Court has refused to hear the case. Legal problems aside, a parliament operating under such a scenario does not have a strong mandate. This issue will likely continue beyond the elections.

The following is a quick-reference list of election law highlights and information:

*Campaigning:* Candidates can begin campaigning as soon as their candidacy or party list is registered by the Central Election Commission. The party or candidate can campaign until midnight the night before the elections. No campaigning is allowed on election day. Campaign literature posted outside polling stations before election day will remain.

**Advertising:** Paid and free media advertising (newspaper, radio and television) will run from November 15 to December 15. Each party will receive 30 minutes free air time on state radio and television. Parties and candidates can buy air time on radio and television, but the length cannot exceed 30 minutes. Parties and candidates have the right to at least one free advertisement in a state newspaper or magazine. Parties and candidates are not limited to the number of ads in newspapers they can purchase. Media selling airtime or newspaper space to one candidate must provide the same terms to other candidates. The CEC allocated by lottery the scheduling of television and radio space.

**Voter lists:** All eligible citizens (those over 18, not serving in prison or deemed incapacitated by a court) are allowed to vote. Polling stations post a list of voters' names and addresses living in that jurisdiction no less than 30 days prior to the election. At this time, voters can indicate omissions or other corrections to the polling station commission, which must be reviewed within 24 hours. Voters at hospitals, rest homes, health sanitoriums or other temporary stay residences will be entered on a list by the director at the institution. Students in dormitories will be entered on a list at the dormitory. Voters outside the Russian Federation for an extended period will be entered on a list at the polling station established in that country (generally an Embassy or Consulate). Voters who have moved to the polling station district after the publishing of the voter list can be placed on the list on election day by presenting appropriate identification.

**Polling station hours:** Polls will be open from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. Anyone at the polling site premises at 10 p.m. will be allowed to vote.

**Early voting:** Russia does not have mail-in absentee balloting. Voters who are not able to vote on election day can vote at the territorial commission four to 15 days before the election or at the polling station one to three days before the election.

**Mobile ballot box:** Voters who are unable to go to the polling station because of "health or other good reasons" may request in writing that a ballot box be brought to their home. Several polling station commission members bring a small ballot box to the voter's house, the voter signs the registration form and receives a ballot. A record is made of the fact that the voter voted outside of the polling station premises. Ballots from mobile ballot boxes are counted separately during tabulation.

**Spoiled ballots:** Voters who have marked their ballot incorrectly may receive a new ballot from a polling station commissioner. The spoiled ballot is invalidated and a notation is made that a second ballot was provided by the voter's name on the voter list.

**Tabulation:** The order of the tabulation process is specified by the election law. First, the number of unused ballots are counted and invalidated. Second, the integrity of the ballot box seals are checked. Third, ballots in the mobile ballot boxes are counted. If the number exceeds the number of ballots requested, the entire box is invalidated. Fourth, the ballots in the main ballot boxes are emptied. Fifth, all invalid ballots -- ballots where it is impossible to determine the voter's will -- are separated out. If there is any question about the validity of a ballot, the

polling station commission will vote. Sixth, all ballots are counted and all results are entered on the "protocol," the official record. One copy of the protocol is sent immediately to the territorial election commission. (IRI observers will follow the protocol to this point.) A second copy is kept by the secretary of the polling station commission until the end of its work, along with the sealed voting ballots, a list of commission members, domestic and international observers and representatives of the mass media. A third copy is provided to observers, candidates, mass media and representatives of the polling station commission. Results are supposed to travel up through the various election commissions (polling, territorial, district, subject, central) as soon as each receives all the data from the subordinate commissions.

*Observers:* The Central Election Commission issued a resolution regarding the status and rights of international election observers. Foreign observers are to be accredited by the Central Election Commission. The resolution states that international observers are allowed to be present on election day at polling stations; watch the tabulation of the voting results; issue opinion on the conduct of the voting; and, meet with parties and candidates. International observers can have their accreditation revoked "in the case of violation of the federal legislation or generally accepted principles and norms of international laws."

*Complaint/appeal process:* The nature of the complaint determines where the complaint is to be directed. For example, the district commission registers single mandate candidates. If a nominee believes the commission unfairly invalidated his/her candidacy, the candidate can appeal to the subject election commission. Appeals continue up the chain of commissions. Complaints about decisions by the CEC are appealed to the Supreme Court.

*Campaign financing:* The Central Election Commission will give each party 80 million rubles (\$17,777) and each candidate 400,000 rubles (\$89). Beyond that, parties and candidates must raise their own campaign funds. They may receive money from a candidate's own funds, the electoral bloc or party, individuals and legal entities. Candidates and blocs may not receive funds from foreign states, organizations or citizens; people without Russian citizenship; charitable organizations; military units and organizations; and, local and state government enterprises and organizations.

Maximum contributions to a single mandate seat campaign are the following: from the candidate's personal funds, 43.7 million rubles (\$9,711); from the electoral bloc or party, 65.5 million rubles (\$14,555); and, from individuals and legal entities, 874,000 rubles (\$195). The maximum expenditures for a single mandate candidate are (\$97,111). Maximum contributions to a party or electoral bloc are the following: from the bloc's own means, 4.37 billion rubles (\$971,000); from individuals, 1.3 million rubles (\$291); and, from legal entities, 87.4 million, (\$19,422). The maximum expenditures for an electoral bloc or party are 10.9 billion rubles (\$2.43 million). Political analysts estimate that an average race will cost candidates between \$250,000-\$300,000.

All campaign funds must be kept in a temporary account at the Russian Federation Savings Bank or branches. The CEC requires parties and candidates report expenditures during the election

process, but that may not be strictly enforced. It is expected that parties will underreport many of their expenditures to stay within the spending restrictions.

### **Media Coverage/Airtime**

As noted above, all parties will receive 30 minutes of free airtime on state-owned or partially state-owned radio and television stations. From November 15 to December 15, television and radio stations will offer on weekdays 90 minutes of free airtime dedicated to the parties between 7 a.m. to 10 a.m. and 30 minutes between 6 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.

The CEC drew lots to determine in what order parties would appear on television. Channel 1, Public Russian Television (ORT), will conduct debates rather than allowing the parties to give a 30-minute speech. Leading the debates on ORT will be the Ivan Rybkin bloc, the Economic Freedom Party, Yabloko and Derzhava. Taking the last slots on December 15 on ORT will be the Communists & Working Russia-For the Soviet Union bloc, the Association of Russia's Lawyers, the 89 regional bloc, and the Independents' bloc. The Russia TV company (Channel 2) will allow parties to use the time as they choose and will begin with Russia's Democratic Choice, the Economic Freedom Party and the Beer Lovers' Party. It will end with the Inter-Ethnic Union, Power to the People and Our Home is Russia.

Rossiskaya Gazeta, the official newspaper of the government, published the rates it would charge parties and candidates for advertising. A full-page ad will cost 80 million rubles (\$17,777); a half-page ad will cost 42.1 million rubles (\$9,355); a third-page ad will cost 33.8 million rubles (\$7,511); and a quarter-page ad will cost 22.7 million rubles (\$5,044). Television advertisements can cost up to \$20,000 per spot during prime time. A typical national television advertisement in the United States can cost between \$75,000-\$100,000.

*December 1995*

**FEDERAL LAW  
ON ELECTIONS OF DEPUTIES OF THE STATE DUMA  
OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY  
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Passed by the State Duma on 9 June 1995  
Approved by the Federation Council 15 June 1995  
Signed by the President 21 June 1995

**CHAPTER I. GENERAL**

**ARTICLE 1. Basic Principles of Participation of Citizens of the Russian Federation in the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation**

Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as deputies of the State Duma, shall be elected by citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of the universal, equal and direct electoral right by way of secret ballot. Participation of a citizen of the Russian Federation in elections is voluntary.

**ARTICLE 2. Legislation on Elections of deputies of the State Duma**

Legislation on elections of deputies of the State Duma is constituted by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation", this Federal Law and other federal laws.

**ARTICLE 3. Electoral Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation**

A citizen of the Russian Federation, who has reached the age of 18 years on the day of election, is entitled to elect deputies of the State Duma.

A citizen of the Russian Federation, who has reached the age of 21 years on the day of election, is entitled to be elected deputy of the State Duma.

A citizen of the Russian Federation, who resides or stays outside the Russian Federation during the period of preparation and conduct of election, has all the electoral rights in elections of deputies of the State Duma.

A citizen of the Russian Federation found incapable by a court of law or imprisoned under a decision of a court of law has no right to vote or to be elected.

**ARTICLE 4. Setting of Elections of Deputies of the State Duma**

In compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, elections of deputies of the State Duma of new convocation shall be set by the President of the Russian Federation. The first Sunday after the expiration of the constitutional term, for which the State Duma of the previous convocation was elected, shall be the day of elections. The term from the day of setting the election and the day of the election shall be no less than four months.

In the event the President of the Russian Federation should fail to set elections of deputies of the State Duma within the term set forth by Paragraph 1 of this Article, the date of elections of deputies of the State Duma shall be announced by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation on first Sunday of a month, which follows the month in which State Duma stops its authority.

In the event of dissolution of the State Duma in cases and under the procedure stipulated by the constitution of the Russian Federation, the

President of the Russian Federation shall simultaneously set elections of deputies of the State Duma of the new convocation. In this case the last Sunday before expiration of three months after the day of dissolution of the State Duma shall be the day of election, terms of electoral actions set forth herein being reduced by one quarter.

In the event the President of the Russian Federation should fail to set elections of deputies of the State Duma of the new convocation after the dissolution of the State Duma, the day of elections of deputies of the State Duma shall be announced by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation.

**ARTICLE 5. Election to the State Duma**

In compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the State Duma consists of 450 deputies:

225 deputies of the State Duma are elected in single-mandate (one district - one deputy) electoral districts on the basis of the standard quota of voters' representation in single-mandate electoral districts, except for electoral districts established in subjects of the Russian Federation where the number of voters is less than the standard quota of voters' representation in a single-mandate electoral district, which is defined by way of division of the total number of voters in the Russian Federation by 225 single-mandate electoral districts;

225 deputies of the State Duma are elected in the federal electoral district in proportion to the number of votes given for federal lists of candidates for deputy nominated by electoral associations or electoral blocs.

**ARTICLE 6. The Right to Nominate Candidates for Deputy**

The right to nominate candidates for deputy belongs to the voters and electoral associations or electoral blocs.

**ARTICLE 7. Preparation and Conduct of Elections by Election Committees**

Election committees shall be entrusted with the preparation and conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma and control over adherence to electoral rights of citizens.

During the preparation and conduct of elections, election committees shall be independent of the bodies of state power and local government within the scope of their powers set forth by federal laws.

Decisions of election committees adopted within the scope of their powers shall be binding upon state bodies, bodies of local government, state enterprises, institutions and organizations, as well as for officials thereof.

**ARTICLE 8. The Right to Pre-Election Campaign**

The State shall provide citizens of the Russian Federation and public associations with free conduct of pre-election campaigns in compliance herewith.

Citizens of the Russian Federation, public associations may in any form allowed by the law legally perform activities encouraging the voters

to vote for or against one or another candidate or federal candidates list of an electoral association or electoral bloc.

Equal conditions of access to state mass media shall be guaranteed to candidates for deputies, electoral associations and electoral blocs.

#### ARTICLE 9. Financing of Elections of Deputies of the State Duma

Financing of measures related to preparation of elections of deputies of the State Duma shall be performed at the expense of federal budget funds.

Candidates for deputy, electoral associations, electoral blocs shall create their own election funds for financing pre-election campaign.

#### ARTICLE 10. Publicity in Preparation and Conduct of Elections of Deputies of the State Duma

Preparation and conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma shall be performed openly and publicly.

All decisions of election committees, bodies of state power and bodies of local government related to preparation and conduct of elections shall be subject to publication.

### CHAPTER II. ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND POLLING STATIONS

#### ARTICLE 11. Establishment of Electoral Districts

In order to conduct elections of deputies of the State Duma, 225 single-mandate electoral districts shall be established, which must comply with the following requirements:

- 1) equal number of voters in electoral districts within one subject of the Russian Federation with a permissible mutual deviation of no more than 10 per cent, and no more than 15 per cent in regions with difficult of access and remote regions;
- 2) an electoral district shall constitute a single territory; establishment of an electoral district of non-adjacent territories is not allowed.

One electoral district shall be established on the territory of a subject of the Russian Federation with a number of voters lower than the standard quota of representation.

Electoral districts shall be established by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation on the basis of the data provided by bodies of executive power of subjects of the Russian Federation indicating the number of voters residing on territories of respective subjects of the Russian Federation. The scheme of electoral districts shall be approved by a federal law subject to promulgation no later than 110 days prior to the day of elections.

In the event of dissolution of the State Duma or in the event of failure to approve the electoral district scheme within the term stipulated by Paragraph 3 of this Article, elections of deputies of the State Duma of the new convocation shall be conducted in the electoral districts of which scheme was approved during the election of the State Duma of previous convocation.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation must officially publish the list of single-mandate electoral districts no later than 108 days prior to the day of elections.

#### ARTICLE 12. Establishment of Polling Stations

Polling stations shall be established to provide voting and calculation of votes at elections of deputies of the State Duma.

Polling stations shall be established by the head of the local administration with coordination of a respective district election committee no later than 60 days prior to the day of elections with due regard to local and other conditions for the purpose of creation of maximum conveniences for voters.

Polling stations shall be established with regard to the following requirements:

- 1) no more than 3000 voters per polling station;
- 2) following the borders of administrative and territorial division in the subject of the Russian Federation;
- 3) inadmissibility of crossing of polling station borders by electoral district borders.

In sanatoriums, spas, rest homes, hospitals, other stationary medical institutions and other places of temporary stay of voters, in regions difficult of access or remote regions, on navigating vessels and at polar stations, polling stations may be established within the term specified in Paragraph 2 hereof, and no later than 5 days prior to the day of election in exclusive cases. Such polling stations shall be attached to the electoral districts on the basis of their location or the place of vessel's registration.

Militarymen shall vote at common polling stations. By way of exception, establishment of polling stations in military units located in detached regions far from settlements is allowed. In such cases polling stations shall be established by commanders of military units on the decision of a respective district election committee. Access to the voting premises must be granted to all members of the election committee, observers, candidates and their attorneys if they produce a relevant document.

Polling stations for citizens of the Russian Federation staying on the territory of a foreign state shall be established by heads of diplomatic missions and consular offices of the Russian Federation on the territory of their country of stay.

The issue of attachment of polling stations established outside the territory of the Russian Federation to a single-mandate electoral district shall be resolved in compliance with Paragraph 3, Article 11 hereof. The number of voters in a district to which polling stations established outside the territory of Russian Federation are attached shall be less than the standard quota of representation. The number of voters at polling stations established outside the territory of the Russian Federation shall not exceed 10 per cent of the number of voters residing on the territory of the single-mandate electoral district to which these polling stations have been attached.

Polling station lists indicating borders thereof, and addresses and telephone numbers of polling station election committees shall be published in the local press no later than 40 days prior to the day of election.

### CHAPTER III. LISTS OF VOTERS

#### ARTICLE 13. The List of Voters and Procedure of Compilation thereof

The list of voters shall be compiled by the polling station election committee on the basis of information provided by the head of local administration in a standard form. The head of local administration shall from time to time revise lists of registered voters as of January 1 and July 1 annually. The head of local administration shall forward data of voters to the election committee no later than 40 days prior to the day of election.

The list of voters shall be compiled in alphabetical or other order (on the basis of

settlements, streets, houses, or addresses of voters). The list shall indicate last names, first names, second names, year of birth (day and month of birth additionally for the age of 18 years) and address of permanent residence of voters.

The list of military voters staying in the military unit, their family members and other voters, if they reside in the region where the military unit is located, shall be compiled on the basis of data provided by commander of the military unit within the term stipulated by Paragraph 1 herein.

Militarymen residing outside military units shall be put on the lists of voters at the place of residence on common grounds.

Lists of voters staying on the day of election in sanatoriums, spas, rest homes, hospitals, other stationary medical institutions and other places of temporary stay of voters shall be compiled on the basis of data provided by chiefs of the said institutions.

The list of voters of a polling station established either on a vessel navigating on the day of elections or at a polar station shall be compiled on the basis of data provided by the captain of the vessel or the chief of the polar station.

The list of voters of a polling station established outside the territory of the Russian Federation shall be compiled on the basis of data provided either by the head of a respective diplomatic mission, consular office of the Russian Federation, or by commander of the military unit located outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

The list of voters shall be made in duplicate according to the form approved by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation and shall be signed by the chairman and secretary of the polling station election committee. One copy of the list of voters shall be left at the polling station election committee at the second copy being handed over to the respective territorial election committee no later than 16 days prior to the day of elections.

#### ARTICLE 14. Procedure of Entering Citizens on the Lists of Voters

All citizens of the Russian Federation, who possess the active electoral right in accordance with Article 3 of this Federal Law, shall be entered on the list of voters.

The grounds for entering of a citizen on the list of voters at a certain polling station shall be the fact of his/her residing on the territory of this polling station established in accordance with the federal law that determines the rights of citizens of the Russian Federation to freedom of movement, choice of place of stay and place of residence on the territory of the Russian Federation.

A voter may be entered on the list of voters at one polling station only.

Voters staying on the day of election in sanatoriums, spas, rest homes, hospitals, other stationary medical institutions and other places of temporary stay of voters shall be entered on the list of voters of the place of their stay.

Students and post-graduate students of the day form of study residing in dormitories shall be entered on the list of voters at the place of the dormitory location.

Citizens of the Russian Federation residing outside the territory of the Russian Federation or staying on long-term business-trips abroad, provided that they hold an external passport of citizen of the Russian Federation, shall be entered on the list of voters of the polling station established outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

Citizens of the Russian Federation arriving in foreign states under private invitations, on

service, business and tourist trips, shall be additionally entered on the list of voters provided that they apply to the polling station election committee and hold an external passport of citizen of the Russian Federation.

Voters who have settled on the territory of the polling station after the list of voters had been submitted for general familiarization, as well as voters for any other reason not entered on the list of voters shall be additionally entered by the polling station election committee on the list of voters on the basis of documents of identification and documents confirming the place of residence on the territory of this polling station.

#### ARTICLE 15. Familiarization of Voters with the Lists of Voters

Lists of voters shall be submitted for general familiarization no later than 30 days prior to the day of election.

Each citizen shall be entitled to file a complaint with the polling station election committee for the failure to put him/her on the list of voters, as well as of any other mistake or inaccuracy in the list of voters.

The polling station election committee must review the complaint (application) and revise the mistake or inaccuracy, or give a written answer to the applicant indicating the reason for denying the application within 24 hours. Decisions of the election committee may be appealed in a higher election committee or in court, which are required to adjudicate the complaint (application) within three days, or immediately if the complaint is filed, three days prior to the election or on the day of election. In the event of a decision in favor of the applicant, the polling station election committee shall immediately make the necessary corrections in the list of voters.

Introduction of amendments into list of voters after the beginning of the calculation of votes is not allowed.

### CHAPTER IV. ELECTION COMMITTEES

#### ARTICLE 16. The System of Election Committees

Preparation and conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma shall be arranged by election committees:

- 1) the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation;
- 2) election committees of the subjects of the Russian Federation;
- 3) district election committees;
- 4) territorial (rayon, city and other) election committees;
- 5) polling station election committees.

#### ARTICLE 17. The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation formed in compliance with the Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation" shall lead the activities of election committees that provide preparation and conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma.

Electoral associations and electoral blocs which have registered a federal list of candidates for deputy in the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation are entitled to appoint one member to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation with the right of deliberative vote.

ARTICLE 18. Procedure of Formation of the Election Committee of a subject of the Russian Federation

According to the Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation", the election committee of a subject of the Russian Federation shall be formed by the legislative (representative) and executive bodies of state power of the subject of the Russian Federation with due regard to suggestions of public organizations, elective bodies of local government, meetings of voters at places of work, service, studying and residence.

The election committee of a subject of the Russian Federation shall consist of 10 to 14 members, no less than half of the members of the election committee being appointed by the legislative (representative) body of state power of a subject of the Russian Federation.

Chairman, vice-chairman and secretary of the election committee of a subject of the Russian Federation shall be elected by secret ballot at the first session from the members of the election committee and, as a rule, must have a higher legal education.

The election committees of subjects of the Russian Federation shall be formed no later than 30 days after this Federal Law has entered into force.

Electoral associations and electoral blocs which have registered a federal list of candidates in the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation are entitled to appoint one member to the election committee with the right of deliberative vote to each election committee of subjects of the Russian Federation.

ARTICLE 19. Procedure of Formation of District Election Committees

District election committees shall be formed in each single-mandate electoral district.

District election committee shall be formed by the legislative (representative) and executive bodies of state power of the subject of the Russian Federation no later than 92 days prior to the day of election in the number of 8 to 14 members. Half of the members of the district election committee shall be appointed by legislative (representative) body of state power of the subject of the Russian Federation, the other half being appointed by the executive body of state power of the subject of the Russian Federation.

In nomination of candidatures for the district election committee, the legislative (representative) and executive bodies of state power of the subject of the Russian Federation shall take into consideration suggestions of elective bodies of local government, public associations, meetings of voters at places of work, service, studying and residence.

Chairman, vice-Chairman and secretary of the district election committee of a subject of the Russian Federation shall be elected by secret ballot at the first session from the members of the district election committee. Chairman of the district election committee, as a rule, must have higher legal education.

In the event that legislative (representative) and executive bodies of state power of the subject of the Russian Federation should fail to appoint members of the district election committee within the term stipulated in Paragraph 2 herein, the district election committee shall be formed by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation.

Electoral associations, electoral blocs which have registered a federal list of candidates in the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation are entitled to appoint one member of the election committee with the right of deliberative vote to each district election committee. A candidate for deputy is entitled to

appoint one member of the election committee with the right of deliberative vote to the district election committee of the single-mandate electoral district where this candidate is registered.

If the subject of the Russian Federation has only one single-mandate electoral district, forming of a district election committee is not necessary. In this case the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation may entrust the election committee of this subject of the Russian Federation with powers of the district election committee.

ARTICLE 20. Procedure of Formation of Territorial (Rayon, City and other) Election Committees

Territorial (rayon, city and other) election committees shall be formed no later than 60 days prior to the day of election in the number of 5 to 9 members. Members of the territorial election committee shall be appointed by the elective body of local government. Chairman, vice-chairman and secretary of the territorial election committee shall be elected by secret ballot at the first session from the members of the territorial election committee. On the decision of district election committee coordinated with the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, several territorial election committees shall be formed within one administrative territorial unit with a large number of voters.

When nominating candidatures for the territorial election committee, elective bodies of local government shall take into consideration suggestions of public associations, meetings of voters at places of work, service, studying and residence.

In the event that the elective body of local government should fail to appoint members of a territorial election committee within the term stipulated by Paragraph 1 herein, or there is no elective body of local government on this territory, the territorial election committee shall be formed by the district election committee.

Electoral associations, electoral blocs which have registered a federal list of candidates in the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation are entitled to appoint one member of the election committee with the right of deliberative vote to each territorial election committee. A candidate for deputy is entitled to appoint one member of the election committee with the right of deliberative vote to each territorial election committee of the single-mandate electoral district where this candidate is registered.

ARTICLE 21. Procedure of Formation of Polling Station Election Committees

Polling station election committees shall be formed by elective bodies of local government no later than 44 days prior to the day of election in the number of 5 to 10 members.

When nominating candidatures for the polling station election committee, elective bodies of local government shall take into consideration suggestions of public associations, meetings of voters at places of work, service, studying and residence. Chairman, vice-chairman and secretary of the polling station election committee shall be elected by secret ballot at the first session from the members of the polling station election committee.

In the event that the elective body of local government should fail to appoint members of a polling station election committee within the term stipulated by Paragraph 1 herein, or there is no elective body of local government on this territory, the polling station election committee shall be formed by a respective territorial or district election committees.

Members of the polling station election committee at a polling station established either at a polar station or on a navigating vessel shall be appointed by the chief of the polar station or the captain of the vessel within the term stipulated by Paragraph 1 herein, or no later than five days prior to the day of election in exceptional cases.

Members of the polling station election committee at a polling station established outside the territory of the Russian Federation shall be appointed by head of a respective diplomatic mission or consular office of the Russian Federation, or by commander of the military unit located outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

Electoral associations, electoral blocs which have registered a federal list of candidates in the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation are entitled to appoint one member of the election committee with the right of deliberative vote to each polling station election committee. A candidate for deputy is entitled to appoint one member of the election committee with the right of deliberative vote to each polling station election committee of the single-mandate electoral district where this candidate is registered. On the day of election a candidate for deputy, electoral association, electoral bloc are entitled to appoint one observer, who shall have the right to stay in the voting premises from the beginning of voting to the end of processing of documents on election results and receive certified copies thereof, to respective polling station election committees.

#### ARTICLE 22. Status of an Election Committee Member

Members of the election committee with the right of deciding vote are entitled to be present at all sessions of the committee.

Election committees may not include candidates for deputy, their attorneys, spouses and close relatives of the candidates, as well as persons directly subordinate to them.

A member of an election committee, having the right both to deciding and deliberative vote has the following rights:

- 1) to be informed of meetings of a respective election committee in advance;
- 2) to speak at the meetings of the election committee, make suggestions on the issues within the scope of competence of a respective election committee, and demand voting on them;
- 3) to ask other participants to the session questions according to the agenda and receive reasonable answers to them;
- 4) to familiarize himself/herself with any documents and materials of the respective and subordinate election committees and receive certified copies thereof.

When the election committee takes a decision, members of the election committee with the right of deliberative vote shall not take part in the voting.

Members of the election committee with the right of deciding vote may be relieved of the duties of a member of election committee before expiration of the term of his/her powers on the decision of the body, which had appointed the member, in the following cases:

- 1) submission by a member of the election committee of a written application for resignation;
- 2) loss of citizenship of the Russian Federation by the member of the election committee;

- 3) entry of an indictment in respect of the member of the election committee into legal force;
- 4) recognition by the decision of the court of law, which has entered into force, of the member of the election committee incapable, restricted in capability, missing or dead.

The payment for work of members of the election committee with the right of deciding vote relieved of main work for the period of preparation and conduct of the election shall be effected at the expense of funds allocated for conduct of the election. Within the term of their powers they may not be dismissed from the job or transferred to another job without their consent on the initiative of the administration (employer).

During the period of conduct of the election members of the election committee with the right of deciding vote may not be prosecuted or subject to measures of administrative punishment imposed by the court without consent of a respective public prosecutor.

Power of members of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, election committees of subjects of the Russian Federation and district election committees with the right of deliberative vote related to preparation and conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma shall continue till the end of registration of candidates at the time of elections of deputies of the State Duma of the next convocation provided that the electoral association, electoral bloc or candidate, who had appointed them, received deputy's mandates. Powers of other members of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, election committees of subjects of the Russian Federation and district election committees with the right of deliberative vote shall expire in 30 days after the publication of common results of the election. The term of powers of members of territorial and polling station election committees with the right of deliberative vote shall simultaneously expire with the term of powers of these election committees.

#### ARTICLE 23. Powers of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation

During preparation and conduct of the election, within the scope of its powers set forth by federal laws, the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall:

- 1) guide the activities of election committees in elections of deputies of the State Duma;
- 2) exercise control over adherence to the legitimacy in the preparation and conduct of the election and provide uniform application of this Federal Law;
- 3) make suggestions on assigning voters, including militarymen staying outside the territory of the Russian Federation, to single-mandate electoral districts on the territory of the Russian Federation on the basis of data provided by respective ministries and departments of the Russian Federation;
- 4) issue instructions and other normative acts on the questions of application of this Federal Law binding upon all election committees performing preparation and conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma;
- 5) register electoral blocs;
- 6) register federal lists of candidates and lists of candidates nominated in single-mandate electoral districts by electoral associations or electoral blocs;
- 7) register attorneys of electoral associations and electoral blocs;

- 8) provide for equal legal conditions in the pre-election activities for all electoral associations, electoral blocs which have registered federal lists of candidates, and for all candidates registered in single-mandate electoral districts;
- 9) issue certificates of a standard form to candidates registered with federal electoral districts and attorneys of electoral associations and electoral blocs;
- 10) hear information of ministries and departments, and other bodies of executive power and bodies of local government on the issues related to preparation and conduct of elections;
- 11) set the form of ballots, list of voters and other electoral documents;
- 12) approve the text of the ballot in Russian for voting in federal electoral districts;
- 13) approve seals of election committees and the order of shipment and storage of electoral documents;
- 14) distribute funds allocated from the federal budget for financial support of the preparation and conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma, support of the activities of election committees for the term of their powers, control over targeted use of the said funds;
- 15) control over provision of election committees with premises, transport, communication and consider other issues of material and technical support of the election;
- 16) adjudicate complaints (applications) about decisions and actions of subordinate election committees and adopt reasonable decisions thereon;
- 17) establish a uniform procedure of processing of the results of voting and defining the results of elections of deputies of the State Duma;
- 18) define persons elected deputies of the State Duma in a federal electoral district and issue certificates of election to them;
- 19) establish the general results of the elections of deputies of the State Duma in the Russian Federation and publish them in the press, and provide for transfer of documents related to preparation and conduct of the election to archives;
- 20) compile lists of persons elected deputies of the State Duma and transfer these lists and necessary documents to the State Duma;
- 21) organize elections of deputies of the State Duma to replace the withdrawn deputies and repeated elections of deputies of the State Duma;
- 22) realize other powers in compliance with this the Federal Law and the Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation".

Decisions of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation adopted within the scope of its powers shall be binding upon all state bodies, bodies of local government, public associations, state enterprises, agencies and organizations, as well as their officials.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall publish its own official gazette.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall be a legal entity and act on a permanent basis.

**ARTICLE 24. Powers of the Election Committee of a Subject of the Russian Federation**

The election committee of a subject of the Russian Federation shall:

- 1) coordinate activities of election committees of the subject of the Russian Federation;
- 2) provide for interaction of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation with bodies of state power in the subject of the Russian Federation;
- 3) exercise control over legitimacy of conduct of the election on the territory of the subject of the Russian Federation;
- 4) provide for printing of voting ballots in the federal electoral district and single-mandate electoral districts established on the territory of the respective subject of the Russian Federation and distribution thereof to district election committees;
- 5) distribute among district election committees monetary resources allocated for preparation and conduct of the election, and exercise control over targeted use of these resources on the territory of a subject of the Russian Federation;
- 6) establish a uniform numeration of the polling stations on the territory of the subject of the Russian Federation;
- 7) adjudicate complaints (applications) about decisions and actions of other election committees in this subject of the Russian Federation and adopt reasonable decisions thereon;
- 8) realize all other powers on behalf of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation.

The term of powers of the election committee of a subject of the Russian Federation shall be four years.

Election committees of subjects of the Russian Federation shall be legal entities and act on a permanent basis.

**ARTICLE 25. Powers of the District Election Committee**

The district election committee shall:

- 1) exercise control over fulfillment of this Federal Law on territories of electoral districts;
- 2) coordinate the activities of territorial election committees and polling station election committees, adjudicate complaints (applications) about decisions and actions of these committees and adopt reasonable decisions on the said complaints (applications);
- 3) register candidates for deputy and their attorneys, issue certificates of a standard form to them;
- 4) provide for equal legal conditions of pre-election activities for all candidates for deputy;
- 5) dispose of monetary resources allocated for preparation and conduct of the election in the electoral district, distribute part of these resources among territorial election committees, exercise control over targeted use thereof on the territory of the electoral district;
- 6) approve the text of the voting ballot for voting in the single-mandate electoral district;
- 7) provide supplies of territorial election committees with voting ballots in the federal and single-mandate electoral district;
- 8) estimate and publish the results of voting and election in the single-mandate electoral districts and forward data of the results of voting in the federal electoral district on the respective territory to the

- Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation;
- 9) control over provision of territorial election committees and polling station election committees with premises, transport, communication and considers other issues of material and technical support of the election;
  - 10) organize elections of deputies of the State Duma to replace the withdrawn deputies and repeated elections of deputies of the State Duma;
  - 11) realize other powers in compliance with this Federal Law.

District election committees shall act until the expiration of the term of powers of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation.

**ARTICLE 26. Powers of the Territorial (Rayon, City and other) Election Committee**

The territorial (rayon, city and other) election committee shall:

- 1) exercise control over the preparation and conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma on the respective territory, inform the population of addresses and telephone numbers of the polling station election committees;
- 2) coordinate the work of polling station election committees on the relevant territory, adjudicate complaints (applications) about decisions and actions of these election committees and adopt reasonable decisions on the said complaints (applications);
- 3) dispose of monetary resources allocated for preparation and conduct of the election, distribute them among polling station election committees;
- 4) provide for equal legal conditions of pre-election activities for all candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs along with the district election committee;
- 5) organize delivery of voting ballots and other documents to the polling station election committees;
- 6) render organizational and technical assistance to polling station election committees in the conduct of voting at the polling stations;
- 7) organize voting ahead of time in the premises of the territorial election committee;
- 8) estimate the results of voting on the respective territory, give them to the mass media and hand over protocols of voting results to the district election committee;
- 9) provide for transfer of documents related to preparation and conduct of the election to an archive or higher election committee;
- 10) realize other powers in compliance with this Federal Law.

The term of powers of the territorial election committee shall expire after the official publication of the common election results, including the results of elections in the respective electoral district.

**ARTICLE 27. Powers of the Polling Station Election Committee**

The polling station election committee shall:

- 1) notify the population of the address and the telephone number of the polling station election committee, its working

- hours, as well as the day and the place of voting;
- 2) compile lists of voters at the polling station;
- 3) familiarize voters with lists of voters, adjudicate complaints about mistakes and incorrectness in the list of voters and solve the issue of introduction of relevant corrections thereto;
- 4) provide for preparation of voting premises, ballot-boxes and other equipment;
- 5) control over adherence to the regulations on placing of pre-election propaganda materials on the territory of the polling station;
- 6) organize voting at the station on the day of the election, as well as voting ahead of time;
- 7) arrange calculation of the votes, estimate the results of voting in the polling station;
- 8) adjudicate complaints (applications) regarding violations of this Federal Law and adopt reasonable decisions thereon;
- 9) realize other powers in compliance with this Federal Law.

The term of powers of the polling station election committee shall expire after the official publication of common election results including the results of elections in the respective electoral district.

**ARTICLE 28. Publicity in the Activities of Election Committees**

Election committees shall conduct their activities publicly and openly. Candidates for deputy and their attorneys, authorized representatives of electoral associations, electoral blocs and representatives of mass media are entitled to be present at the sessions of election committees.

Election committees shall advise citizens of the results of registration of candidates, their biographic data and voting results of each candidate, electoral association or electoral bloc.

Decisions of election committees shall be published in the press and handed over to other mass media.

**ARTICLE 29. Organization of Election Committees' Activities**

The activities of election committees shall be performed on a collegial basis. A session of the election committee shall be deemed competent provided that the majority of committee members with the right to vote is present at the session. A session of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall be deemed competent provided that no less than two-thirds of the members of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation with the right to vote is present at the session.

In the event of adopting a decision by election committees which have in their composition an even number of committee members with the right to vote, in case of an equal number of votes "Yea" and "Nay", the vote of the chairman of the election committee shall be deciding.

Decisions of election committees adopted within the scope of their powers shall be binding upon all bodies of state power and bodies of local government, as well as for subordinate election committees.

Decisions of election committees on the election of the chairman, vice-chairman and secretary of the election committee, on registration of candidates, on cancellation of registration of candidates, on the issues of financial support for preparation and conduct of the election, on estimation of voting results, on

declaration of elections null and void shall be adopted at the sessions of election committees by the majority of votes of the total number of committee members with the right to vote. Decisions of election committees on other issues shall be adopted by the majority of votes of the number of members of the election committee with the right to vote present at the session.

Decisions of the election committee shall be signed by the chairman and the secretary of the election committee.

Members of the election committee who do not agree with the decision adopted by the election committee are entitled to express in writing their opinion of which the chairman of the election committee must advise a higher election committee no later than within three days, or immediately, if the opinion is expressed three days prior to the day of election or on the day of election.

A decision of the election committee, which is in conflict with federal laws or is adopted by the election committee which exceeded its authority, shall be subject to cancellation by a higher election committee or by the court of law.

Sessions of the election committee shall be convened and held by the chairman or, on his/her behalf, by the vice-chairman of the election committee. Sessions shall also be held on demand of no less than one-third of the election committee members with the right of deciding vote.

Representatives of concerned parties are entitled to be present at the sessions of election committees during adjudication of complaints (applications).

The chairman, the vice-chairman and the secretary of the election committee acting on a permanent basis, may be permanent employees of the election committee. So may be other committee members with the right to vote provided that there is a decision of a respective election committee. Payment of labor of the members of the election committee with the right to vote shall be effected within the limits of budgetary funds allocated to the election committee in the order and in amounts determined by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation.

Election committees acting on a permanent basis shall have their staff, structure and employees of which shall be established by the election committees within the limits of budgetary funds allocated thereto. Other election committees may form temporary staff for the period of preparation and conduct of elections, structure and employees of which shall be determined by respective election committees within the limits of budgetary funds allocated thereto.

#### ARTICLE 30. Assistance to the Activities of Election Committees

State authorities, bodies of local government, public associations, enterprises, agencies and organizations, as well as their officials must render assistance to election committees in realization of their powers, including granting of necessary premises, transport, means of communication, technical equipment, as well as give information and materials, respond to requests of election committees within a term of five days, or immediately, if such requests are made five days prior to the day of election or on the day of election.

#### ARTICLE 31. Appeal of Decisions and Actions of Election Committees

Decisions and actions (inaction) of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation and its officials may be appealed to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.

Decisions and actions (inaction) of election committees and their officials may be appealed to a higher election committee or in the court of law. Preliminary appeal to higher election committees shall not be a mandatory condition for an appeal to the court of law.

Complaints (applications) received by the court shall be adjudicated by the court within the terms envisaged herein.

Decisions on complaints (applications) received by a higher election committee in the course of election shall be made within a term of five days from the day of receipt of the complaint (application) by the committee, or immediately if such complaint (application) is received five days prior to the day of election or on the day of election. In case the facts contained in complaints (applications) should require additional review, decisions on them shall be adopted no later than within ten days.

A higher election committee is entitled to adopt an independent decision on the subject of the complaint (application) thus canceling the decision of the subordinate committee.

Courts and bodies of the prosecutor's office must organize their work (including holidays) so as to provide timely adjudication of complaints (applications).

### CHAPTER V. ELECTORAL ASSOCIATIONS

#### ARTICLE 32. Definition of the Electoral Association

An electoral association is an all-Russian public association established in the order stipulated by federal laws, whose charter provides for participation in elections to bodies of state power through nomination of candidates and is registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation no later than six months prior to announcement of the day of election.

Electoral blocs created for the period of the conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma also possess the rights of an electoral association.

#### ARTICLE 33. Electoral Blocs

Electoral blocs may be established by no less than two public associations which are electoral associations in compliance with Paragraph 1, Article 32 of this Federal Law.

In the event that a public association is part of an electoral bloc, it may not appear during the period of the conduct of the election as an independent electoral association or join another electoral bloc.

Decisions on joining an electoral bloc shall be adopted at the congress (conference) of the public association.

Electoral blocs shall be registered by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation. The registration shall be executed no later than within five days after submission to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation of minutes of the congresses (conferences) of the public associations with decisions on joining an electoral bloc and joint decision of public associations on the establishing of an electoral bloc signed by authorized representatives of such associations.

#### ARTICLE 34. Authorized Representatives of Electoral Associations and Electoral Blocs

Electoral associations and electoral blocs shall appoint representatives authorized to represent the electoral associations and electoral blocs in compliance with this Federal Law on all issues related to participation of such electoral associations and electoral blocs in elections of deputies of the State Duma, including financial issues.

ARTICLE 35. Participation of Electoral Associations and Electoral Blocs in Election of Deputies of the State Duma

Electoral associations and electoral blocs shall take part in elections of deputies of the State Duma on equal grounds in the order established by this Federal Law.

#### CHAPTER VI. NOMINATION AND REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES FOR DEPUTY

ARTICLE 36. Nomination of Candidates for Deputy by an Electoral Association, an Electoral Bloc in Single-Mandate Electoral Districts

Candidates for deputy in single-mandate electoral districts shall be nominated at the congress (conference) of an electoral association, with an indication of the electoral district in which each candidate will be nominated. Electoral associations and electoral blocs are entitled to nominate no more than one candidate in one electoral district.

The decision on nomination of candidates shall be adopted by secret ballot.

Electoral associations and electoral blocs are entitled to nominate persons who are not members of public associations, which are part of these electoral associations or electoral blocs.

ARTICLE 37. Nomination of the Federal List of Candidates by Electoral Associations, Electoral Blocs

The federal list of candidates for deputy of the State Duma for voting at elections in the federal electoral district shall be nominated by the electoral association or electoral bloc at the congress (conference) of the electoral association.

The decision on nomination of a federal list of candidates shall be adopted by secret ballot.

Electoral associations and electoral blocs are entitled to nominate persons who are not members of public associations, which are part of these electoral associations or electoral blocs, for the federal list of candidates.

The composition of the federal list of candidates and the procedure of placing candidates thereon shall be determined by electoral associations and electoral blocs. When determining the order of placing candidates on the list, the electoral association or electoral bloc may split it partly or in full into regional groups of candidates (by the subjects of Russian Federation or groups of subjects of Russian Federation), in the meantime part of the list, which includes candidates who do not belong to regional groups, may not include more than 12 candidates. At the same time, they must indicate which subjects of the Russian Federation or groups of subjects of the Russian Federation correspond to each of the specified regional groups of candidates. A candidate may not be included into two or more such groups and may not be mentioned on the federal list more than once. After the federal list has been submitted to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, its composition and order of placing of candidates thereon may not be changed, except for the changes caused by the withdrawal of candidates.

The federal list may include candidates for deputy of the State Duma nominated by the same electoral association or electoral bloc in single-mandate electoral districts.

The total number of candidates nominated by an electoral association or electoral bloc on the federal list may not exceed 270 persons.

ARTICLE 38. Submission of Lists of Candidates and Documents of Electoral Associations and Electoral Blocs to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation

The federal list of candidates and the list of candidates nominated by an electoral association or electoral bloc in single-mandate electoral districts are to be submitted by an authorized representative of the electoral association or electoral bloc to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation. These lists should indicate last name, first name, second name, date of birth, place of work, office held (occupation) and place of residence of each candidate. The lists should be accompanied by a copy of the certificate of registration of the electoral association by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, its registered charter, minutes with decision of the congress (conference) of the electoral association where candidates were nominated, as well as the power of attorney of the electoral association.

Authorized representatives of an electoral bloc shall submit to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, along with lists of candidates, minutes of congresses (conferences) of public associations with decisions on joining the electoral bloc and a joint decision of these public associations on creation of an electoral bloc signed by authorized representatives of these public associations.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall consider the documents submitted within a term of three days and issue certified copies of lists of candidates or reasonable decision on refusal to issue such copies to the authorized representative of an electoral association or electoral bloc.

The refusal to accept documents and issue copies of lists of candidates may be appealed in the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation which is required to adjudicate the complaint no later than within 3 days.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall publish lists of candidates submitted thereto in mass media and its official gazette.

ARTICLE 39. Collection of Signatures in Support of Candidates Nominated by an Electoral Association or Electoral Bloc

An electoral association or electoral bloc which has nominated candidates in single-mandate electoral districts shall carry out collection of voters' signatures in a respective single-mandate electoral district in support of each candidate in a number of no less than one per cent of the total number of voters in this electoral district.

An electoral association or electoral bloc which has nominated a federal list of candidates, must collect no less than 200 thousand voters' signatures in his/her support, no more than seven per cent of the required total number of signatures falling on one subject of the Russian Federation.

Signatures collected in support of a candidate nominated by an electoral association or electoral bloc in a single-mandate electoral district and registered by constituency electoral commission, shall be included by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation in the number of signatures in support of the federal list of candidates nominated by the same electoral association or electoral bloc.

An electoral association or electoral bloc is entitled to start collection of signatures from the day of the issue of certified copies of candidates' lists by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation. Collection of signatures before receipt of certified copies of candidates'

lists by an electoral association or electoral bloc is not allowed.

Collection of signatures shall be carried out at places of work (including work collectives), service, study or residence, during the pre-electoral campaign as well as at other places where campaigning or carrying out the signatures is not prohibited by law. Forcing and bribing of voters in any form on the part of a person collecting signatures is not allowed.

Signature sheets shall be printed in the form set forth in Appendices No. 1 and 2 hereto.

In the process of collection of signatures in support of a federal list of candidates, each signature sheet should indicate last name, first name, second name, date of birth, place of work, office held (occupation) and place of residence of the first three candidates who are at the head of the federal part of the list, as well as the three candidates who are at the head of the respective regional part of the list, if the list is split into regional groups of candidates. The person collecting signatures in support of a federal list must produce the federal list of voters certified by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation on demand of the voter. Each signature sheet should indicate the name of the subject of the Russian Federation where signatures were collected.

If signatures are collected in support of a candidate nominated by an electoral association or electoral bloc in a single mandate electoral district, the signature sheet should indicate name of the electoral association or election bloc nominating the candidate and affiliation of the candidate to the respective electoral association or election bloc besides the said data.

Voters are entitled to put their signatures in support of candidates (lists of candidates) of different electoral associations or election blocs but only one time in support of one candidate (list of candidates). In this case the voter shall specify his/her last name, first name, second name, date of birth (day and month additionally for the age of eighteen years), address of permanent residence, series and number of the passport or document substituting it, and the day of placing the signature.

The signature sheet shall be confirmed by a person collecting the signatures who must indicate his/her last name, first name and second name, permanent residence, series and number of the passport or an identity card substituting it, and by an authorized representative of the electoral association or electoral bloc nominating the candidate.

In the event elections of deputies of the State Duma are conducted ahead of time, the number of voters' signatures to be collected in compliance with Paragraph 2 hereof by an electoral association or electoral bloc nominating the federal list of candidates shall be reduced by one half.

#### ARTICLE 40. Direct Nomination of Candidate by the Voters

The right to nominate his/her candidature for participation in the elections of deputies of the State Duma in a single-mandate electoral district belongs to every citizen of the Russian Federation who possesses the active electoral right and has reached the age of 21 years on the day of election.

The right to nominate a candidate in a single-mandate electoral district also belongs to voters at the place of work, service, studying or residence in the territory of this electoral district.

Initiators of signature collection in favor of the nomination of a candidate in a single-mandate electoral district shall notify in writing the respective electoral district committee of their initiative. The notification must indicate last

name, first name, second name, date of birth, place of work, office held (occupation) and place of residence of the candidate.

#### ARTICLE 41. Collection of Signatures in Support of the Candidate Directly Nominated by the Voters

Collection of signatures in support of a candidate directly nominated by the voters shall start on the day of official publication of the list of single-mandate electoral districts by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation.

The signatures of no less than one per cent of the total number of voters in the electoral district must be collected in support of a candidate's nomination. In the event the election of deputies is held ahead of time, this number of voters shall be reduced by one half. Signatures may be collected only among voters of the electoral district where the candidate is nominated. Collection of signatures shall be conducted at places of work (including personnel), service, studying and residence, forcing and bribing of voters in any form on the part of the person collecting signatures is not allowed.

Signature sheets shall be printed according to the form specified in Appendix No. 3 hereto. Each signature list shall indicate last name, first name, second name, date of birth, place of work, office held, occupation, place of residence of the candidate and the name of the electoral district in which he/she is nominated.

When signing the signature sheet, the voter shall indicate his/her last name, first name, second name, date of birth (day and month additionally for the age of eighteen years), address of permanent residence, series and number of the passport or identity card substituting it, and the date of placing the signature.

The signature sheet shall be confirmed by a person collecting the signatures who must indicate his/her last name, first name and second name, permanent residence, series and number of the passport or a document substituting it, and by the candidate for deputy.

#### ARTICLE 42. Registration of Candidates for Deputy

For registration of federal lists of candidates, authorized representatives of electoral associations and electoral blocs shall present to the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation no later than 55 days prior to the day of election, signature sheets in support of the federal list of candidates and data of each candidate of the federal list indicating his/her last name, first name, second name, date of birth, place of work, office held (occupation) and place of residence. At the same time, applications of candidates of their consent to be nominated by the federal list, submitted by an electoral association or electoral bloc shall be presented to the Central Election Committee.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, within ten days from the day of receipt of documents, shall determine whether the procedure of nominating the federal list of candidates meets the requirements of this Federal Law and make a decision on registration of the federal list of candidates or a reasonable decision of refusal to register.

For registration of a candidate, nominated directly by the voters of a single-mandate constituency, as well as a candidate nominated by an electoral association or electoral bloc in a single-mandate constituency, or authorized representative of the electoral association or electoral bloc, shall present to the district election committee, no later than 55 days prior to the day of election, the signature sheets with voters' signatures supporting nomination of a candidate. In the meantime, data of the candidate indicating his/her last name, first name,

second name, date of birth, place of work, office held (occupation), place of residence, as well as the application of the candidate stating his consent to be nominated in this electoral district and the decision of an electoral association or electoral bloc on the nomination of this candidate in this electoral district shall be presented to the district election committee.

Signature sheets shall be submitted to the election committees bound and numbered, with the signature sheets in support of the federal list of candidates being bound separately by the subjects of the Russian Federation where voters' signatures were collected. When receiving signature sheets, the election committee shall certify each signature sheet with the seal of the election committee and then issue a written confirmation of the receipt of signature sheets indicating the date and time of receipt thereof to the authorized representative or the candidate.

The district election committee shall determine whether the procedure of a candidate's nomination is in compliance with the requirements of this Federal Law and make a decision on the registration of the candidate or a reasonable decision on the refusal to register within five days from the day of receipt of the documents.

Authorized representatives of concerned electoral associations and electoral blocs, as well as candidates nominated in single-mandate electoral districts are entitled to be present at the determination of correctness of signature sheets and other documents by election committees.

If doubts about the accuracy of the data contained in the signature sheets, or in the trustworthiness of voters' signatures should occur, the district election committee shall organize a proper review of the signature sheets.

Registration of the same person in more than one federal list of candidates or more than one list of candidates nominated by an electoral association or electoral bloc for election in single-mandate electoral districts, as well as in more than one single-mandate electoral district, is not allowed.

A candidate registered in a single-mandate electoral district as a candidate directly nominated by the voters may not be registered in the same district as a candidate of an electoral association or electoral bloc.

The same person may be registered as a candidate in the federal list of candidates and at the same time in one of single-mandate electoral districts.

Decision of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation on registration of the federal list of candidates or on the refusal to register may be appealed in the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and the decision of a district election committee on registration of the candidate or on the refusal to register may be appealed in the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation or in the Supreme Court of the republic which is part of the Russian Federation, court of the kray, court of the oblast, court of a city of federal importance, court of the autonomous oblast, court of the autonomous district. The complaint shall be adjudicated within three days.

A certificate of registration indicating the date and time thereof shall be issued to each registered candidate. Registered lists of candidates and data of registered candidates shall be handed over to the mass media within 48 hours after the registration. The district election committee shall place the information on registered candidates their data listed in Paragraph 3, Article 40 hereof, on stands in the premises of the election committee no later than 15 days prior to the day of election.

In the event only one candidate is registered or no candidate is registered in a single-mandate

electoral district, as well as if no federal list of candidates is registered or only one such list is registered in the federal electoral district within the terms stipulated by this Article, election in such electoral district shall be postponed by the decision of a respective district election committee for a term of 60 days for additional nomination of candidates or federal lists of candidates and undertaking of further electoral measures.

If less than two candidates should remain in a single-mandate electoral district on the day of election, election in this electoral district shall be postponed by the decision of a respective district election committee for a term of 100 days for further nomination of candidates and undertaking of further electoral measures.

## CHAPTER VII. STATUS OF CANDIDATES FOR DEPUTY

### ARTICLE 43. Equality of Candidates for Deputy

All registered candidates for deputy shall have equal rights and bear equal duties.

### ARTICLE 44. Rights and Duties of Candidates for Deputy

After the registration, a candidate for deputy shall not be entitled to take advantage of his official standing in order to be elected.

After the registration, upon presentation of a personal statement, the candidate for deputy shall be relieved of his/her work, military service and military assemblies from the day of registration to the day of official publication of common election results. Within this period, a respective election committee shall pay candidates for deputy a monetary reimbursement in an amount, which shall not exceed 10 minimum salaries envisaged by the federal law on the day of setting of the election at the expense of funds allowed for preparation and conduct of the election.

A candidate for deputy may not be dismissed from the job on the initiative of the administration (employer), transferred without his/her consent to another work or office, including work in other area, as well as sent on a business-trip, enrolled for military service or military assemblies from the day of registration to the day of official publication of the common election results. The time of participation of the candidate for deputy in the election shall be included into the length of service in the field of qualification where he/she had worked till the day of registration.

From the day of registration to the day of official publication of common election results, candidates for deputy nominated in a single-mandate electoral district shall be entitled to use any means of public transportation free of charge on the territory of a respective electoral district, except for taxis and charter trips. In the cities where there are several electoral districts, the candidate may use the public transportation of the city free of charge on the whole territory of the city, except for taxis and charter trips.

In case the candidate has a permanent residence outside the single-mandate electoral district where he is nominated, the candidate, within the said period, shall be entitled to three free round trips by railway, water or automobile transport, except for taxis and charter trips, or to one free round trip by air transport to the electoral district and back. Payment of such trips shall be effected at the expense of funds of a respective district election committee.

A candidate for deputy put on the registered federal list of candidates shall have the right to make one round trip within the territory of the Russian Federation by any means of intercity transport, except for taxis and charter trips. In addition, a candidate included in a regional group of candidates (if the relevant federal list is divided

into such groups) shall be entitled to free use of any means of public transportation, except for taxis and charter trips, within the territory of a respective subject of the Russian Federation. Payment of such trips shall be effected by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation at the expense of funds allocated for the preparation and conduct of the election.

A candidate is entitled to withdraw his/her candidacy no later than three days prior to the day of the election. An electoral association or electoral bloc may recall any registered candidate by the decision of an authorized body, except for those in whose support voters' signatures have been collected in single-mandate electoral districts no later than three days prior to the day of the election. If a candidacy is withdrawn without compelling circumstances, the respective election committee may attribute a respective part of expenditures borne, including funds allocated by the election committee to the candidate or the electoral association, electoral bloc for the pre-election campaign, to the candidate or the electoral association or electoral bloc.

A candidate for deputy registered in a single-mandate electoral district may have up to 10 attorneys, who shall be subject to registration by the same election committee. An electoral association or electoral bloc, which has registered a federal list of candidates, may appoint up to 500 attorneys, who shall be subject to registration by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation. Attorneys shall receive certificates from respective election committees and shall perform campaign and other activities that facilitate the election of the candidate. Administration (employer) must give attorneys an unpaid leave at their request for the term set forth in Paragraph 2 herein. Candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs, which have appointed attorneys, are entitled to recall them at any time notifying the respective election committee that will invalidate certificates issued to these attorneys.

After the registration, a candidate for deputy may not be prosecuted, arrested or subject to administrative punishment imposed by the court without the consent of the Procurator General of the Russian Federation. When giving such consent, Procurator General of the Russian Federation shall immediately notify the election committee which has registered the candidate, thereof.

#### CHAPTER VIII. PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN

##### ARTICLE 45. Pre-Election Campaign and Terms thereof

Citizens of the Russian Federation, candidates for deputy of the State Duma, electoral associations and electoral blocs are entitled to conduct pre-election campaigning freely.

The following entities are not allowed to conduct pre-election campaigns or spread any pre-election propaganda materials:

- 1) federal bodies of state power, bodies of state power in subjects of the Russian Federation, bodies of local government, as well as their officials in the process of fulfilling of their official duties;
- 2) military units, military institutions and organizations;
- 3) charitable organizations and religious associations;
- 4) members of election committees with the right of deciding vote.

The pre-election campaign shall start on the day of registration of candidates and shall end at 12 p.m. local time prior to the day preceding the day of election. Any pre-election campaigning is

prohibited on the day of election and the preceding day. Propaganda printed materials previously placed outside the premises of the election committees shall remain in place.

Pre-election campaigning may be conducted:

- 1) through the mass media;
- 2) by means of arranging public pre-election events (pre-election assemblies and meetings with voters, public pre-election debates and discussions, gatherings, marches, demonstrations and other pre-election events);
- 3) by means of issuing and/or distributing printed, audiovisual and other propaganda materials.

Conduct of pre-election campaigning involving the free or preferential giving of goods, rendering of services (except for information services), securities, as well as payment of money is prohibited.

Journalists, officials of boards of editors of mass media are not allowed to conduct information television and radio programs, take part in elucidation of elections through these mass media, if the said officials are candidates for deputy of the State Duma or their attorneys.

##### ARTICLE 46. Misuse of the Right to Pre-Election Campaign

Misuse of freedom of mass information is not allowed in the conduct of pre-election campaigning. Pre-election programs, pre-election propaganda materials and speeches at assemblies and meetings in the mass media must not contain appeals to violent change of the principles of the constitutional system and breach of integrity of the Russian Federation. Proclamation or propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or lingual superiority, issue and distribution of information and materials advocating social, racial, national or religious hatred are prohibited.

Candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs and their authorized representatives are not entitled to hand over money, presents or other material values to voters other than for the fulfillment of pre-election organization work (being on duty at polling stations, collection of signatures and so on), arrange preferential sale of goods, free giving of any goods except of printed, including illustrative, materials, as well as badges specially made for the election campaign. In conducting the pre-election campaign, candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs and their authorized representatives are not entitled to influence the voters through promises to hand over money, securities and other material values to them.

Election committees shall exercise control over adherence to the established order of conducting the pre-election campaign. Once informed of unlawful speeches or the distribution of unlawful propaganda materials, they shall undertake measures to prevent these activities and shall be entitled to apply to respective bodies with a request for prevention of unlawful campaign activities, as well as to the court of law with a request to cancel the decision on registration of a candidate or federal list of candidates. The said requests shall be considered by the court within a term of three days, or immediately if the requests are made three days prior to the day of election.

##### ARTICLE 47. Pre-Election Campaigning through Mass Media

Candidates for deputies, electoral associations and electoral blocs are entitled to broadcasting time on the channels of state TV and radio companies which perform television and radio broadcasts on the territory of a respective electoral district on equal grounds (free of

change, equal amount of broadcasting time granted, same time of broadcasting and other conditions).

Instruction on the procedure of granting of broadcasting time to candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs on the channels of state TV and radio companies shall be published by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation with participation of state bodies that provide adherence to constitutional rights and freedoms in the field of mass media, suggestions of candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs being duly considered.

For the purpose of conducting the pre-election campaign, electoral associations and electoral blocs, which have registered federal lists of candidates are entitled to use state TV and radio companies.

Candidates for deputy are entitled to use regional state TV and radio companies to conduct their pre-election campaigns.

Officials of boards of editors of periodicals, among founders (co-founders) of which there are state or municipal bodies, state enterprises, agencies or organizations, or which are financed partly or in full at the expense of funds of respective budget (federal budget, budget of subject of the Russian Federation), must provide equal opportunities of publishing pre-election propaganda materials for all candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs.

The procedure of publishing pre-election propaganda materials in periodicals specified in Paragraph 5 herein shall be established by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation with participation of state bodies providing for adherence to constitutional rights and freedoms in the field of mass media.

Pre-election campaigning through mass media shall be conducted in the form of public pre-election debates, "round tables", press-conferences, interviews, presentations, political advertising and other forms not prohibited by the law. Electoral associations, electoral blocs and candidates for deputy are entitled to independently determine the form and nature of the pre-election campaigning.

It is prohibited to interrupt television and radio programs containing pre-election campaigning with advertising of goods, works and services.

Information TV and radio programs shall give information on the conduct of the pre-election campaign by candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs in a separate bloc only, as a rule in the beginning of the said programs without any comments. These information blocs shall not be paid by candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs and initiative voters' groups.

Journalists, officials of boards of editors of mass media, officials and creative workers of state TV and radio companies are not allowed to take part in elucidation of the election through the mass media, including TV and radio programs (broadcasts), if said persons are candidates or attorneys of candidates.

TV and radio programs containing pre-election campaigning shall be broadcast and simultaneously recorded on video and audio tape that shall be stored within six months from the day of broadcasting of the said programs.

#### ARTICLE 48. Pre-Election Campaigning in Periodicals

Periodicals established by bodies of legislative (representative), executive, judiciary power, as well as by bodies of local government exclusively for publication of their official messages and materials, normative and other acts, are not entitled to publish pre-election campaign materials of candidates for deputy, electoral associations or electoral blocs.

A periodical, among founders (co-founders) of which there are state or municipal bodies, state enterprises, agencies or organizations, or which is financed partly or in full at the expense of funds of respective budget (federal budget, budget of subject of the Russian Federation), and which has granted a candidate for deputy, an electoral association or electoral bloc area on the page, is not entitled to refuse to grant a place on the page to other candidate for deputy, electoral association or electoral bloc (regional electoral association) under the same conditions, and must do it in the nearest issues.

#### ARTICLE 49. Conditions of Conducting Pre-Election Assemblies, Meetings with Voters

State bodies and bodies of local government shall render assistance to candidates for deputy, electoral associations, electoral blocs in organizing and conducting pre-election assemblies, meetings of candidates for deputy and attorneys with voters.

Applications for allocation of premises for conduct of such assemblies and meetings shall be considered by competent state bodies and bodies of local government within a term of five days from the day of submission thereof, and shall be settled in the order established by the district election committee.

At the request of the election committee, premises which are suitable for conduct of public events and are owned by the state or municipal authorities, state enterprises, agencies and organizations, shall be granted for use for the time determined by the election committee free of charge for meetings of candidates for deputy and their attorneys with the voters. Election committees must provide equal opportunities for all candidates and electoral associations, electoral blocs.

Buildings and edifices included into the State Register of Highly Valuable Memorials of the Cultural Heritage of the Nations of the Russian Federation may not be granted for these purposes.

#### ARTICLE 50. Spread of Printed Propaganda Materials

Electoral associations, candidates for deputy are entitled to freely issue posters, leaflets and other printed propaganda materials.

Printed propaganda materials shall contain information on organizations and persons responsible for issue thereof.

Spreading of anonymous printed propaganda materials is prohibited.

Printed propaganda materials may be placed in any premises, on any building or edifice, or any other object on consent of the proprietor or owner of the said objects.

It is prohibited to place printed propaganda materials on monuments, obelisks, buildings, edifices of historic, cultural or architectural value, as well as in the premises of the election committee and in the voting premises.

Local administrations must allocate special places for hanging or sticking of printed propaganda materials no later than 20 days prior to the day of election. Such places should be suitable for visiting by voters, and there should be no less than one such place within the territory of each polling station. Candidates registered in respective single-mandate electoral associations and electoral blocs, which have registered a federal list of candidates with the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, shall be granted equal area for hanging or posting printed campaign materials.

Informed of the spread of anonymous or counterfeit printed campaign materials, the election committee shall undertake measures to prevent these activities, and shall be entitled to

45

apply to respective bodies with request to prevent unlawful pre-election campaigning.

Election funds may be formed from the following monetary resources:

#### CHAPTER IX. ELECTION FINANCING

##### ARTICLE 51. Financial Support of Preparation and Conduct of the Election

Expenditures of election committees related to preparation and conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma, as well as provision of activities of election committees during the term of their powers shall be made at the expense of federal budget funds. Respective expenditures shall be envisaged in a separate entry in the federal budget.

Funds for conduct of elections of deputies of the State Duma envisaged by the federal budget shall be transferred for disposal of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation within ten days from the day of setting of the election and shall be distributed thereby among the election committees of subject of the Russian Federation.

In the event elections of deputies of the State Duma are conducted ahead of time, these expenditures shall be paid at the expense of credits of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation covered at the expense of the federal budget funds. In case budgetary funds are not timely transferred to the account of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation is entitled to apply to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation for credits, and if the latter should refuse to allow a credit, the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation is entitled to apply to commercial banks for a credit on a competitive basis for financing the preparation and conduct of the election. These credits, including interest charged, shall be covered at the expense of the federal budget funds no later than three months after the day of election. The financing of special and new elections of deputies of the State Duma is done similarly in case monetary resources initially allocated for conduct of the election are exhausted.

The order of transfer of monetary resources to election committees shall be jointly established by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

Chairmen of election committees shall dispose of monetary resources and shall be responsible for compliance of financial documents with the decisions of election committees on financial issues. Unexpended budget funds shall remain in special accounts of the election committees after the end of the election for use for the purposes envisaged by Paragraph 1 herein.

##### ARTICLE 52. Election Funds of a Candidate for Deputy, Electoral Association and Electoral Bloc

Candidates for deputy and electoral associations and electoral blocs shall form their own election funds for financing the pre-election campaign. Election funds shall be placed in special temporary accounts in divisions of the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation. The right to dispose of the money of the election fund for said purposes shall belong to the candidate, electoral association or electoral bloc which formed this fund.

Divisions of the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation shall open special temporary accounts for candidates and electoral associations and electoral blocs which have registered a federal list of candidates, on the basis of a written message from the respective election committee for forming of election funds. No income shall be added to and paid from the said accounts.

- 1) funds allocated to a candidate, electoral association or electoral bloc for the pre-election campaign by a respective election committee;
- 2) a candidate's own funds, which may not exceed 1000 minimum salaries as set forth by the federal law on the day of the election;
- 3) funds allocated to the candidate by the electoral association or electoral bloc that has nominated him/her, which may not exceed 1500 minimum salaries as set forth by the federal law on the day of election;
- 4) own funds of the electoral association, electoral bloc, which may not exceed 100 thousand minimum salaries as set forth by the federal law on the day of election;
- 5) voluntary donations of natural persons and legal entities.

The amount of donations of a natural person to the election fund of a candidate for deputy may not exceed 20 minimum salaries as set forth by the federal law on the day of election, and 30 minimum salaries to the fund of an electoral association or election bloc. The amount of donation of a legal entity to the election fund of a candidate for deputy or the election fund of an electoral association or electoral bloc may not exceed correspondingly 200 and 2000 minimum salaries as set forth by the federal law on the day of election.

The maximum amount of candidate's expenditures from an election fund may not exceed 10 thousand minimum salaries set forth by the federal law on the day of election.

The maximum amount of expenditures of an electoral association or electoral bloc from an election fund may not exceed 250 minimum salaries as set forth by the federal law on the day of election.

Donations to an election fund from the following entities are not allowed:

- 1) foreign states, organizations and citizens;
- 2) persons without citizenship;
- 3) Russian legal entities with foreign investments, if the share of the foreign capital in their registered capital exceeds 30 percent;
- 4) international organizations, international public movements;
- 5) bodies of local government, state and municipal enterprises, agencies and organizations;
- 6) military units, military institutions and organizations;
- 7) charitable organizations and religious associations.

Banks shall render information on crediting of funds into special temporary accounts of candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs to respective election committees within a term of three days from the day of crediting thereof.

If the credited voluntary donations have been transferred to the election funds of candidates or the elections funds of electoral associations, electoral blocs by natural persons or legal entities who are not entitled to make such donations, or in amounts exceeding those stipulated herein, the candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs must return these donations correspondingly in full or the part exceeding the permissible amount of the donations, to the donators with an indication of the reason for the

return. Anonymous donations shall be transferred to the revenues of the State.

Candidates, electoral blocs and electoral associations are not allowed to use other monetary resources for conducting the pre-election campaign except for the resources received by them in their election funds.

Banks shall render information on spending of monetary resources in special temporary accounts of candidates, electoral association and electoral blocs to the respective election committee upon written request thereof.

If a candidate, electoral association or electoral bloc use other monetary resources for conducting the pre-election campaign except for resources transferred to the election funds, the respective election committee is entitled to apply to the court with a request to cancel the decision on registration of the candidate or the federal list of candidates. The said request shall be considered by the court within five days, or immediately if such a request is made five days prior to the day of the election.

All financial transactions from special temporary accounts of candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs for their election funds shall be terminated on the day of the election. On the basis of a respective solicitation of a candidate, electoral association or electoral bloc, the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation and the district election committee may extend the term of completing financial transactions for payment of expenditures made before the day of election.

#### ARTICLE 53. Procedure of Accounting of Funds and Financial Reports

The procedure of accounting of the receipt and expenditure of budgetary funds allocated for the preparation and conduct of election, money of election funds of candidates for deputy and election funds of electoral associations and electoral blocs shall be determined by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation in compliance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Forms of financial reports of election committees on the receipt and expenditure of funds allocated for the preparation and conduct of the election, and financial reports of candidates for deputy, electoral associations and electoral blocs shall be established by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation in compliance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Candidates for deputy shall submit a financial report to the district election committee no later than 30 days after publication of election results. Electoral associations, electoral blocs shall submit financial reports to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation within the same term. Copies of said financial reports shall be handed over by respective election committees to mass media.

Polling station election committees and territorial election committees shall submit financial reports to higher election committees no later than 10 and 20 days from the day of publication of election results, respectively.

District election committees shall submit financial reports to election committees of the subjects of the Russian Federation no later than 45 days from the day of publication of election results.

Election committees of the subjects of the Russian Federation shall submit summary financial reports to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation no later than 60 days from the day of official publication of the common election results.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall submit the financial report on spending of federal budget funds to the Houses

of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation no later than three months from the day of official publication of the common election results. The said financial report must be published by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation in its official gazette and handed over to mass media no later than one month from the day of presentation thereof to the Houses of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

#### ARTICLE 54. Unexpended Monetary Resources of the Election Funds

No later than 30 days after the day of election, candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs shall return unexpended election funds to the respective election committee in the amount proportional to the amount of monetary resources allocated to them by respective election committees. After expiration of this term, on the instruction of a respective election committee, unexpended budgetary resources shall be unconditionally transferred by divisions of the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation to the account of the election committee.

After the election, with the permission of respective election committees, the remainder of monetary resources in accounts of candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs shall be transferred into current accounts of organizations and persons who had made the donations into the election funds in proportion to their contributions.

#### ARTICLE 55. Auditing Service

The auditing service attached to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation for providing experts of state bodies of the Russian Federation shall be established in order to exercise control over targeted use of funds allocated to election committees for the preparation and conduct of the election, as well as control over sources, correctness of accounting of the election funds and spending thereof by candidates to deputy, electoral associations and electoral blocs.

### CHAPTER X. VOTING AND CALCULATION OF ELECTION RESULTS

#### ARTICLE 56. Voting Premises

Voting premises shall be freely allocated by the head of a respective local administration to the polling station election committee for disposal.

The voting premises must have a hall, in which cabins or specially equipped places for voting by secret ballot will be placed, or rooms suitable for voting by secret ballot. Cabins, specially equipped places or rooms for voting by secret ballot shall be outfitted with tables and writing accessories. Use of pencils for these purposes is not allowed.

In the voting premises or immediately in front of it, the polling station election committee shall install a stand, on which samples of completed voting ballots and information materials on all electoral associations, electoral blocs taking part in the election in the federal electoral district and on all candidates nominated by them in the federal electoral district, as well as all candidates taking part in the election in a single-mandate electoral district, are placed. Information materials on candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs, as well as their pre-election platforms, shall not contain propaganda appeals. Samples of completed voting ballots, placed on the stand, shall not contain names of electoral associations and electoral blocs taking part in the election in the federal electoral district, or names of candidates taking part in a single-mandate electoral district.

#### ARTICLE 57. Voting Ballots

Each voter shall receive two ballots of different form approved by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation for election of deputies of the State Duma. The form and the text of the ballot in the Russian language of the federal electoral district shall be approved by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation no later than 28 days prior to the day of election. The text of the ballot of a single-mandate electoral district shall be approved by the district election committee. The text of the ballot must be placed on one side of the ballot only.

The ballot of the federal electoral district shall contain the names and emblems, if there are any, of electoral associations and electoral blocs who have nominated registered federal lists of candidates for deputy in the order determined by the lot, indicating the names of public associations which are part of these electoral associations and electoral blocs. The lot shall be arranged by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation with participation of authorized representatives of electoral associations and electoral blocs no later than 36 days prior to the day of election. The number received by an electoral association or electoral bloc as a result of the lot shall be retained until the end of the election. Last names, first names and second names of the first three candidates from the federal lists of candidates nominated by an electoral association or electoral bloc shall be placed under the name of this electoral association or electoral bloc. If an electoral association or electoral bloc split their federal lists of candidates into regional groups during the registration, last names, first names and second names of the first three candidates, who are assigned to a respective regional group of candidates in the said list, shall be included in the voting ballot. If the federal list, which has been split into regional groups during the registration, does not contain candidates assigned to any of the regional groups, the voting ballot should indicate only last names, first names, second names of candidates of the respective regional group.

An blank box shall be placed to the right of the name of each electoral association or electoral bloc. The entry "none of all federal lists of candidates" with a blank box to the right thereof shall be placed in the end of list of electoral associations and electoral blocs.

The ballot of the single-mandate electoral district shall contain last names, first names, second names of all registered candidates in this electoral district in the alphabetical order, and their data set forth by Paragraph 4, Article 41 of this Federal Law. In case the candidate is nominated by an electoral association or electoral bloc, names of these electoral associations and electoral blocs, as well as candidate's affiliation to a political party or other public association, which is part of the electoral association or electoral bloc, if there is such affiliation. If a candidate is nominated directly by the voters, his political affiliation shall be indicated only of candidate's own accord. A blank box shall be placed to the right of the data of each candidate. The line "none of the candidates" with a blank box to the right of it shall be placed at the end of the list with names of candidates.

Each voting ballot shall contain instructions on how it is to be completed.

Ballots shall be printed in Russian. On the decision of the election committee of a subject of the Russian Federation, ballots in republics, which are part of the Russian Federation, shall be printed in Russian and in the state language of the respective republic, and, in cases of necessity, in the languages of nations of the Russian Federation on territories of their compact living. If ballots for a polling station are printed in two

or more languages, the text in these languages shall be placed on each ballot. The text of the ballot shall be approved by the election committee of a subject of the Russian Federation.

Ballots for voting in the federal electoral district shall be printed on the instruction of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation no later than 20 days prior to the day of election. Ballots for voting in single-mandate electoral districts shall be printed within the same time on the instruction of respective election committees of subjects of the Russian Federation. Territorial election committees shall receive ballots from the district election committees no later than 16 days prior to the day of election. Polling station election committees shall receive ballots from territorial election committees no later than four days prior to the day of election. In each electoral district, the number of voting ballots handed over to the polling station election committee may not exceed the number of voters on the lists of voters of the polling station by more than 0.5 per cent. Signatures of two members of the polling station election committee, which are to be certified with the seal of the election committee, shall be placed in the upper right corner of the voting ballot. Ballots not certified by the polling station election committee are deemed ballots of a non-standard form and shall not count in the calculation of votes.

In case of withdrawal of some candidates no earlier than 15 days prior to the day of election or the voiding federal lists of candidates of some electoral associations and electoral blocs, territorial election committees and polling station election committees shall cross out the data of respective candidates or electoral associations, electoral blocs on ballots on the instruction of district election committees.

#### ARTICLE 58. Voting Procedure

Voting on the day of the election shall take place from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. local time.

Polling station election committees must notify the voters of the time and place of voting no later than 20 days prior to the day of conduct thereof through mass media or otherwise.

An election committee of the polling station established on navigating vessels, military units, at polar stations, in remote regions and regions difficult of access may declare the voting completed ahead of time set forth by Paragraph 1 herein, if all the voters on the list of voters have voted.

A voter who will be absent from his place of residence on the day of election for certain reasons, may vote earlier by filling in the ballots at the premises of the territorial (15 - 4 days prior to the day of election) election committee or polling station election committee (no earlier than three days prior to the day of election), the secrecy of the ballot shall not be infringed. If a voter should vote at the premises of the territorial election committee, the signatures of two members of the territorial election committee certified with the seal of the territorial election committee shall be placed on the reverse side of the ballot given to the voter. The voter shall enclose the completed voting ballots in an envelope, seal the envelope and hand it over to the member of territorial election committee or polling station election committee on duty. The signatures of two members of the territorial election committee or polling station election committee correspondingly, which are to be certified by the seal of the respective election committee, shall be put on the place of sealing of the envelope. Territorial election committee shall hand over the list of voters who have voted and enveloped with their voting ballots to a respective polling station election committee no later than three days prior to the day of election.

In case of voting early at the premises of the territorial election committee, the secretary of the polling station election committee, on the territory of which the voter resides, shall make the record "ahead of time" in the relevant line of the list of voters (on receipt by the polling station election committee of a sealed envelope with ballots from the territorial election committee) and sign it.

District election committees are entitled to permit early voting, but no earlier than 15 day prior to the day of election, on the vessels which will be navigating on the day of election, as well as at polar stations and other remote regions or regions of difficult access.

At 8 a.m. on the day of election, the chairman of the polling station election committee shall declare the polling station open and produce empty ballot-boxes to the members of the election committee, voters and observers present. After this the ballot-boxes shall be sealed. Then the chairman of the polling station election committee shall produce envelopes left by the voters who had voted early, the integrity of each envelope, the presence of certifying signatures and seal, as well as correspondence of the number of envelopes to the number of corresponding marks on the list of voters being checked. After this envelopes shall be opened and ballots extracted therefrom shall be put in the ballot box. In case more than two ballots should be extracted from the envelope, all ballots extracted from the envelope shall be voided, whereof a special statement shall be written. After this the chairman of the polling station election committee shall invite the voters to commence to vote.

When receiving the ballots, the voter shall indicate the series and number of his/her passport or an identity card substituting for it in the list of voters. On consent of the voter, or at his/her request, the series and number of the produced passport or identity card substituting for it may be entered into the list of voters by a member of the polling station election committee. The voter shall check the correctness of the record and sign it.

In case a voter is not able to sign for receipt of ballots by himself/herself, he/she is entitled to the assistance of another person, except for the members of the polling station election committee, observers, attorneys of the candidates, electoral associations or electoral blocs. The person who has rendered assistance to the voter, shall sign in the list of voters in the column "Signature of Voter for Receipt of Voting Ballots" indicating his name.

Each voter shall vote personally. Voting for other persons is not allowed. Ballots are filled in the cabin, specially equipped place or a room for voting by secret ballot, where the presence of anybody, except for the voter, is not allowed. A voter who is not able to fill in the ballot by himself/herself, is entitled to invite any person except for a member of the election committee, observers, attorneys of candidates, electoral associations or electoral blocs to the cabin, specially equipped place or room for voting by secret ballot. The name of this person shall be indicated in the list of voters next to the signature of voter for receipt of ballots.

On the ballot of the federal electoral district, voters shall place any sign in the blank box to the right of the name of the electoral association or electoral bloc whose federal list of candidates they vote for, or in the box placed to the right of the entry "None of the all federal lists of candidates". In the voting ballot of a single-mandate electoral district, voters shall place any sign in the blank box to the right of the name of the candidate he votes for, or in the box placed to the right of the entry "None of the candidates".

Voters shall cast completed ballots into the ballot box. The ballot box must be in sight of the

members of the polling station election committee and the observers.

The polling station election committee shall provide all voters with an opportunity to take part in the voting, including voters who can not come to the voting premises due to health or other good reasons. For these purposes, the polling station election committee shall have a necessary number of mobile ballot-boxes determined by a decision of the district election committee. An application for the possibility of voting outside the voting premises must be confirmed by the voter in writing on the arrival of members of the polling station election committee to him/her. The application shall contain the same data of the voter as in the list of voters. On receipt of ballots, the voter shall make a mark about it in his/her application and sign. Members of the polling station election committee, traveling to the applicants, shall sign for the receipt of ballots in an amount corresponding to the number of applications. The number of voters' applications, as well as the number of used and returned ballots shall be marked in a separate statement. At the same time, a record of the fact that the voter voted outside the voting premises shall be made in the list of voters. Observers are entitled to be present at voting outside the voting premises. After the return of members of the polling station election committee to the voting premises, the portable ballot-box shall not be open until the beginning of the votes calculation. Arrangement and conduct of voting outside the voting premises must preclude the opportunity of violation of the citizen's electoral rights, as well as an opportunity of breach of secret voting or distortion of the voter's will.

The chairman of the polling station election committee shall monitor order in the voting premises. His orders are binding upon all those present in the voting premises. In case the chairman of the polling station election committee is absent, he shall be substituted by the vice-chairman of the polling station election committee, and in the event of his absence he shall be substituted by the secretary or other member of the polling station election committee authorized thereby.

In case the voter feels that he has made a mistake in completing the ballot, he is entitled to apply to the member of election committee who has issued the ballot with a request to issue a new ballot for him, in lieu of the spoiled one by making a respective record in the list of voters in front of the name of the respective voter. The spoiled ballot shall be rendered void whereof a statement is made.

Observers representing candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, attorneys of candidates, foreign (international) observers, as well as representatives of mass media are entitled to be present at the polling stations during the voting, calculation of the votes and drafting of protocols of the results of the voting by polling station election committees.

#### ARTICLE 59. Calculation of the Votes at Polling Stations

On expiration of the time allocated for voting, the chairman of the polling station election committee shall announce that only the voters who are already at the voting premises may receive ballots and vote.

Before opening the ballot boxes, members of the election committee shall count and render void unused ballots in the presence of observers representing candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, and foreign (international) observers if they are staying in the voting premises. The number of these ballots shall be declared and entered into the protocol of the voting results whereafter the chairman of the polling station election committee shall check the

integrity of seals and leads on the ballot-boxes, to make sure that they are not damaged and open them. Ballot boxes shall be opened by turns — first mobile ballot boxes and then stationary ballot-boxes.

Ballots that were in mobile ballot-boxes, shall be counted first. Their number should not exceed the number of written applications of voters for conduct of the voting outside the voting premises.

In case more voting ballots than the said applications should be found in the mobile ballot box, all ballots that were in the mobile ballot-box shall be declared null and void by decision of the polling station election committee.

This fact, with an indication of the names of members of the polling station election committee who provided voting outside the voting premises, shall be reflected in a statement which is attached to the protocol on the voting results.

In the process of calculation of the votes cast in the federal electoral district and single-mandate electoral districts, all ballots of non-standard form, that is those not made officially or not certified by the election committee, and invalid voting ballots shall be separated. Invalid ballots are those ballots, from which it is impossible to determine the voter's will. In particular, such bulletins, where any sign has been placed in more than one box or has been placed in none of them. If doubt should arise, the polling station election committee shall resolve the question by way of voting. When adopting a decision on recognition of a ballot as invalid, the election committee shall indicate on the reverse side thereof the reasons of invalidity. This record shall be certified with signatures of no less than three members of the polling station election committee. Invalid voting ballots shall be separated from other ballots.

The votes shall be counted directly by the members of the polling station election committee without a break until the receipt of the voting results, of which all members of the polling station election committee, as well as observers including foreign (international) observers shall be notified.

The polling station election committee shall draw up protocols on the voting results in single-mandate electoral districts and federal electoral districts.

The following data shall be included in each of the said protocols:

- 1) number of voters on the list of voters, including voters additionally entered on the list;
- 2) number of ballots received by the election committee;
- 3) number of ballots issued to the voters at the polling station on the day of election;
- 4) number of ballots issued to the voters who had voted early;
- 5) number of ballots issued to the voters who voted outside the voting premises;
- 6) number of ballots declared void;
- 7) number of ballots contained in the stationary ballot-boxes (except for the ballots of non-standard form);
- 8) number of ballots contained in mobile ballot-boxes (except for the ballots of non-standard form);
- 9) number of valid ballots;
- 10) number of invalid ballots (including a separate line for the number of voting ballots containing no marks in any of the items).

In addition to these data, the following data shall be entered into Protocol No. 1 of the voting results in single-mandate electoral districts:

- 1) last names, first names, second names of candidates, and, in the event of their coincidence, other data of the candidates included in the voting ballot;
- 2) number of votes cast for each candidate;
- 3) number of votes cast against all the candidates.

The following data shall also be entered into Protocol No. 2 of the voting results in the federal electoral district:

- 1) names of electoral associations and election blocs which have nominated federal lists of candidates;
- 2) number of votes cast for each federal list of candidates;
- 3) number of votes cast against all federal lists of candidates.

The said protocols shall be made in triplicate in presence of all members of the polling station election committee, observers, attorneys of candidates, electoral associations and electoral blocs and signed by all members of the polling station election committee. Any member of the polling station election committee who does not agree with the protocols in full or with certain provisions thereof is entitled to attach his/her dissenting opinions to the protocols whereof appropriate records shall be made in the protocols.

Complaints (applications) about violation of this Federal Law received by the polling station election committee on the day of election, as well as decisions of the polling station election committee made thereon shall be attached to the first copy of the protocol. Certified copies of complaints (applications) and decisions of the polling station election committee shall be attached to the second copy of the protocol.

Completion of protocols on the voting results with a pencil and introduction of any corrections whatsoever therein is not allowed. In case mistakes, discrepancies in the protocols of the polling station election committee are revealed, as well as doubts about the accuracy of the protocols, a higher election committee is entitled to adopt a decision on the repeated calculation of votes by the respective polling station election committee. Repeated calculation of votes shall be done by the polling station election committee in the presence of members(s) of the higher election committee.

Once signed, the first copies of the protocols of the polling station election committee shall be immediately forwarded to a respective territorial election committee.

Second copies of protocols along with sealed voting ballots, with lists of members of the polling station election committee observers of candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, foreign (international) observers and representatives of mass media who were present at the calculation of votes cast shall be filed and kept by the secretary of the polling station election committee until the end of its work.

Third copies of protocols shall be given for familiarization to attorneys of candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, observers, members of the polling station election committee and representatives of mass media.

Voting documents, including ballots, shall be handed over to respective territorial election committees no later than 10 days after the official announcement of the results of the election in the single-mandate electoral district.

**ARTICLE 60. Calculation of the Voting Results by Territorial Election Committees**

The territorial election committee shall calculate the voting results on the respective territory on the basis of protocols of the voting results submitted by polling station election committee by way of adding of the data contained therein, no later than three days after the day of election. The adding of data contained in the protocols of polling station election committees shall be performed directly by the members of the territorial election committee.

Based on the results of the voting, the territorial election committee shall draw up protocols, in which data of the number of polling station election committees on the respective territory, number of protocols of polling station election committees, on the basis of which protocols of the voting results are drafted, shall be entered, as well as the summary data on the items of protocols of polling station election committees set forth by Paragraphs nine through eleven, Article 59, of this Federal Law.

Protocols of the territorial election committees shall be made in triplicate and signed by all members of the election committee present. The summary table of the voting results on the respective territory, which includes complete data of the protocols of all polling station election committees, shall be attached to the protocols. Any member of the territorial election committee who does not agree with the protocols in full or with certain provisions thereof is entitled to attach his/her dissenting opinions to the protocols whereof appropriate records shall be made in the protocols.

Complaints (applications) about violations of this Federal Law received by the territorial election committee, as well as decisions of the election committee made thereon shall be attached to the first copies of the protocols. Certified copies of complaints (applications) and decisions of the territorial election committee shall be attached to the second copy of the protocol.

Once signed, the first copies of the protocols of the territorial election committee along with the protocols of the polling station election committees and the summary table shall be immediately forwarded to the respective district election committee.

The second copies of the protocols along with the summary table and lists of members of the territorial election committee, observers of candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, foreign (international) observers, representatives of mass media, who were present at the calculation of the voting results and drafting of the protocols, which shall be filed and kept by the secretary of the territorial election committee until the completion of its work.

The third copies of protocols and the summary table shall be given for familiarization to attorneys of candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, observers, members of the territorial election committee and representatives of mass media.

**ARTICLE 61. Calculation of the Election Results in the Single-Mandate Electoral District and Assessment of the Voting in the Federal Electoral District**

The district election committee shall estimate the results of voting in single-mandate electoral districts and assess the result of voting in federal electoral districts on the respective territory on the basis of protocols of the voting results submitted by territorial election committees by way of adding of the data contained therein no later than seven days after the day of election. The adding of data contained in the protocols of territorial election committees shall be performed directly by the members of the district election committee.

The candidate who has received the greatest number of votes of the voters who had taken part in the voting, shall be recognized elected deputy in a single-mandate electoral district. If candidates receive an equal number of votes, the candidate who was registered earlier shall be deemed elected.

The district election committee shall declare the election in the single-mandate electoral district null and void, if violations of this Federal Law committed during the conduct thereof do not allow to reliably estimate the results of the will of voters and if the election has been rendered void by the district election committee at more than one third of the polling stations.

The district election committee shall declare the election in the single-mandate electoral district as one that has not taken place, if less than 25 per cent of the registered voters took part in the election.

The number of voters who took part in the election shall be estimated by the number of voters' signatures for receipt of ballots in the lists of voters.

On the basis of protocols of respective territorial election committees, the district election committee shall draw up Protocol No. 1 of the voting results in the single-mandate electoral district wherein the following data shall be included:

- 1) number of territorial election committees in the district;
- 2) number of protocols of the territorial election committees on basis of which this protocol has been drawn up;
- 3) number of voters in the single-mandate electoral district put on the list of voters;
- 4) number of ballots issued to polling station election committees;
- 5) number of ballots issued to the voters at the polling station on the day of election;
- 6) number of ballots issued to the voters who had voted ahead of time;
- 7) number of ballots issued to the voters who voted outside the voting premises;
- 8) number of ballots declared void;
- 9) number of ballots contained in the stationary ballot-boxes (except for the ballots of non-standard form);
- 10) number of ballots contained in mobile ballot-boxes (except for the ballots of non-standard form);
- 11) total number of valid ballots;
- 12) total number of invalid ballots (including a separate line for the number of voting ballots containing no marks in any of the items);
- 13) last names, first names and second names of candidates on the voting ballot and number of votes cast for each of them;
- 14) number of votes cast against all the candidates;
- 15) last name, first name and second name of the elected candidate.

On the basis of Protocols No. 2 of the territorial election committees, the district election committee shall draw up Protocol No. 2 of the results of voting in the federal electoral district, wherein the data set forth in Article 59 hereof shall be included.

Protocols of the district election committee shall be made in triplicate and signed by all members of the election committee present. A summary table of the voting results in a single-mandate electoral district which includes complete data of the protocols of the territorial election committees shall be attached to the protocols. Any member of the district election committee who does not agree with the

protocols in full or with certain provisions thereof is entitled to attach his/her dissenting opinions to the protocols whereof appropriate records shall be made in the protocols. The first copies of each protocol and the summary table shall be immediately forwarded to the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, the second copies of the said protocols and the summary table is filed and kept by the secretary of the district election committee.

Complaints (applications) about violations of this Federal Law received by the district election committee, as well as decisions of the election committee made thereon shall be attached to the first copies of the protocols. Certified copies of the complaints (applications) and decisions of the district election committee shall be attached to the second copies of the protocols.

Second copies of the protocols and the summary table and the lists of the members of the constituency electoral commission with the right of deliberative vote, observers from candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, foreign (international) observers, mass media representatives, attended the process of tabulating and compiling the protocol, are kept by the secretary of constituency electoral commission until the end of its work.

The third copies of the protocols and summary table shall be given for familiarization to attorneys of candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, observers, members of the polling station election committee with the right of deliberative vote and representatives of mass media.

In the event that mistakes, discrepancies in the protocols of the district election committee and other violations are revealed, as well as doubts about the accuracy of the protocol of the voting results in the federal electoral district, the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation is entitled to adopt a decision on the repeated calculation of votes by the respective district election committee. Repeated calculation of votes shall be done by the district election committee in the presence of member(s) of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation.

Ballots shall be kept no less than one year, protocols of the voting and election results shall be kept no less than one year after the day of setting of the date of new elections, other document of the election committees being kept no less than six months.

#### ARTICLE 62. Calculation of the Election Result in the Federal Electoral District

On the basis of Protocols No. 2 submitted by the district election committees, the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall calculate the votes cast in the federal electoral district by way of adding of the data contained in the Protocols. The adding of the data contained in the protocols submitted by the district election committees shall be done directly by the members of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation.

Electoral associations and electoral blocs, whose lists of candidates have received less than five per cent of votes of the voters who took part in the election, shall be excluded from the distribution of deputy's mandates in the federal electoral district.

The number of voters who took part in the voting shall be estimated by the number of ballots of the standard-form found in the ballot-boxes.

Each electoral association or electoral bloc, whose list of candidates has received no less than five per cent of votes of the voters who took part in the voting, shall receive deputy's mandates, the number of which is determined according to the method envisaged in Article 70 hereof.

In the event the list of candidates of the electoral association or electoral bloc was split into regional groups, deputy's mandates received by the electoral association or electoral bloc shall first of all be assigned to the candidates not included into any of the regional groups. The rest of deputy's mandates shall be assigned to candidates of regional groups, each of these groups receiving the remaining deputy's mandates in proportion to the number of votes cast for the federal list of candidates in the respective subject of the Russian Federation or group of subject of the Russian Federation. This number of deputy's mandates shall also be estimated according to the method envisaged in Article 70 hereof.

Distribution of the deputy's mandates among the candidates of the federal list of the electoral association or electoral bloc shall be performed in compliance with the order of appearance of the candidates in this list, the said order being established during the registration of the federal list with the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation.

Deputies elected to the State Duma in single-mandate electoral districts shall be excluded from each federal list of candidates. In this case the deputy's mandates shall be assigned to the candidates of the same federal list in compliance with the order of their appearance on this list or the corresponding regional group.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall draw up a protocol of distribution of the deputy's mandates in the federal electoral district among electoral associations, electoral blocs, wherein the following data shall be included:

- 1) number of protocols of district election committees, on basis of which this protocol has been produced;
- 2) number of voters in the Russian Federation put on the lists of voters;
- 3) number of ballots issued to the polling station election committees;
- 4) number of ballots issued to the voters at the polling stations on the day of election;
- 5) number of ballots issued to the voters who had voted ahead of time;
- 6) number of ballots issued to the voters who voted outside the voting premises;
- 7) number of ballots declared void;
- 8) number of ballots contained in the stationary ballot-boxes (except for the ballots of non-standard form);
- 9) number of ballots contained in portable ballot-boxes (except for the ballots of non-standard form);
- 10) total number of valid ballots;
- 11) total number of invalid voting ballots (including a separate line for the number of voting ballots containing no marks in any of the items);
- 12) names of electoral associations and electoral blocs, which have registered federal lists of candidates, and number of votes cast for each federal list of candidates;
- 13) number of votes cast against all the federal lists of candidates;
- 14) names of electoral associations and electoral blocs allowed deputy's mandates;
- 15) last names, first names and second names of the elected deputies of each federal list of candidates.

A summary table of the voting results in the federal electoral district which includes complete data of Protocols No. 2 of district election committees, as well as complaints (applications) about violation of this Federal Law received by

the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, and decisions of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation made thereon shall be attached to the protocol.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall declare the election in the federal electoral district as one that has not taken place if less than 25 per cent of the voters on the lists of voters has taken part in the election.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall declare that all deputy's mandates in the federal electoral district have remained undistributed if all electoral associations and electoral blocs are excluded from the distribution of the deputy's mandates in accordance with Paragraph 2 herein.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall render the election in the federal electoral district void, if violations of this Federal Law committed during the voting and assessment of the election results do not allow to reliably calculate the results of the will of voters.

In the event the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation has declared the election in the federal electoral district as one that has not taken place or rendered them void, or if none of the electoral associations or none of the electoral blocs have been allowed deputy's mandates, the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall set a repeated election in the federal electoral district. The terms of electoral actions set forth by this Federal Law may not be reduced by the Committee by more than one third.

#### ARTICLE 63. Calculation of the Common Election Results

On the basis of the protocol of the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation of distribution of deputy's mandates among electoral associations and electoral blocs in a federal electoral district and on the basis of protocols of district election committees of elections of deputies of the State Duma, no later than three weeks after the day of elections the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall estimate common election results.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall declare the election in a single-mandate electoral district null and void, if violations of this Federal Law committed during the conduct thereof do not allow to reliably calculate the results of the will of voters.

In single-mandate electoral districts, election which is declared one that has not taken place or rendered void, the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall set a repeated election. Terms of election activities, envisaged by this Federal Law may be reduced by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation no more than by one third. In this event the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation may give an instruction on forming district, territorial and polling station election committees with a new staff.

#### ARTICLE 64. Registration of Elected Deputies of the State Duma

After signing the protocol of the election results a respective election committee shall notify the candidate elected deputy of the State Duma. In compliance with requirements of this Federal Law, the candidate elected deputy of the State Duma within a terms of three days must inform in writing the respective election committee of declining all responsibilities incompatible with the status of a deputy of the State Duma.

In the event the deputy elected in the process of distribution of mandates according to federal lists of electoral associations, electoral blocs within a term of three days does not fulfill the

requirement of declining responsibilities incompatible with the status of a deputy of the State Duma, his/her deputy's mandate shall be transferred by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation to the candidate of the same federal list according to his position on this list or in corresponding regional group.

After official publication of common election results the respective election committee shall register the elected deputy of the State Duma and issue for him a certificate of election provided he/she fulfills the requirement set forth in Paragraph 1 herein.

#### ARTICLE 65. Publication of the Voting Results and the Results of Elections of Deputies of the State Duma

Results of voting at each polling station, result of elections at an electoral district in the amount contained in protocols of the respective election committees, must be presented for familiarization to any voter or observer, as well as representatives of mass media.

District election committee shall publish in the local press data of Protocols No. 1 and No. 2 of all territorial and polling station election committees of the respective single-mandate electoral district no later than one month after the day of election.

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall publish in mass media the common election results, including data of Protocols No. 1 and No. 2 of all district election committees no later than one month after the day of election.

No later than three months after the day of election the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall publish in its gazette information of the voting results, including complete data of protocols of all election committees, except for those of polling station committees, as well as data of deputies elected, envisaged by Paragraph 1, Article 40 of this Federal Law.

#### ARTICLE 66. Use of the Automated Information System

In the event of using automated information systems the election committee shall form a group of members of the election committee and members of the election committee to exercise control over using of the automated information system. All members of the election committee have the right to familiarize themselves with any information input into the automated information system and output of it.

From the moment of the beginning of voting to the moment of signing of the protocol by the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation, the automated information system shall be used exclusively for supervising the process and results of voting by means of transmission of data from lower election committees to higher election committees.

During this period transmission of any data from information centers of the higher election committees to information centers of the lower election committees is prohibited, except for the information receipt confirmation signals.

Data of the process and results of election received by means of the automated information system shall be preliminary information of no legal importance.

The text of the computer printout containing data input into the automated information systems must be attached to the protocol of the election committee filed and kept by the secretary of the election committee. The authenticity of the computer printout shall be certified with signatures of members of the automated information system operation control group and the person responsible for information input.

CHAPTER XI. FILLING OF THE VACANT DEPUTY'S MANDATES

ARTICLE 67. Filling of the Vacant Mandate of Deputy Elected by a Federal List

In case a deputy elected in the process of distribution of deputy's mandates according to federal lists of candidates of electoral associations or electoral blocs withdraws ahead of time, on the decision of the State Duma, his/her mandate shall be transferred to the next candidate of the same federal list.

If the list of an electoral association had been split into regional groups and a deputy of any regional group withdrew, the mandate shall be transferred to the subsequent candidate belonging to the same regional group of this federal list. If there are no candidates left in the respective regional group, the mandate shall be transferred to the regional group of the same federal list that has received the largest number of votes and has candidates, who have not received the status of a deputy.

In case there are no candidates left on the federal list of candidates, the mandate shall remain vacant until the next elections of deputies of the State Duma.

ARTICLE 68. Filling of the Mandate of Deputy Elected in a Single-Mandate Electoral District

In case of early cessation of powers of the deputy elected in a single-mandate electoral district, the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation within a month from the day of vacant mandate's becoming available, shall set additional elections of a deputy of the State Duma at the respective single-mandate electoral district. If less than a year remains till the expiration of powers of the State Duma, the additional elections shall not be set and conducted.

Nomination of candidates in a single-mandate electoral district, their registration and other election activities are carried out in conformity with this Federal Law.

CHAPTER XII. RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF CITIZENS' ELECTORAL RIGHTS

ARTICLE 69. Responsibility of Violations of Citizens' Electoral Right

Persons, who by means of bribery, deception, violence or threat of use thereof, falsification of electoral documents, deliberately calculate votes incorrectly or otherwise prevent the free exercise of his/her electoral rights by a citizen of the Russian Federation or work of election committees or members of election committees, or persons deliberately spreading false information of the candidates or otherwise acting for the purpose of discrediting honor and dignity of candidates, as well as persons preventing legal activities of candidates' attorneys, observers, including foreign (international) observers, or the conduct of a pre-election campaigning, shall bear administrative and criminal responsibility.

CHAPTER XIII. METHOD OF PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF DEPUTY'S MANDATES

ARTICLE 70. Method of Proportional Distribution of Deputy's Mandates

The Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation shall calculate the sum total of voters' votes cast in the federal electoral district for federal lists of candidates of electoral associations and electoral blocs that have collected five or more per cent of the votes of voters, who took part in the voting. This sum of votes shall be divided by 225 - the number of deputy's

mandates, distributed within the federal electoral district. The obtained result shall be the first electoral quotient.

After this, the number of votes collected by each federal list of candidates taking part in distribution of deputy's mandates shall be divided by the first electoral quotient. The integer part of the number obtained as a result of division shall be the number of deputy's mandates to be received by the respective federal list of candidates.

If after operations made in conformity with Paragraph 2 of this Article, undistributed mandates remain, a second distribution shall be made. Each of those federal lists of candidates, which have the largest fractional part (remainder) of the number obtained as a result of division in conformity with Paragraph 2 of this Article, shall receive one of the undistributed mandates. In case fractional parts are equal, preference shall be given to that federal list of candidates, which has collected more votes. In case number of votes is equal, preference shall be given to the federal list of candidates registered earlier.

If the federal list is split into regional groups, then distribution of mandates within the federal list is performed - among these groups and candidates not included in any group (provided there are such candidates). At the first stage of this distribution number of candidates, not included in any of the regional groups and not elected in single-mandate electoral districts, is determined. In the first place the mandates are transferred to the said candidates.

Mandates left undistributed within the federal list of candidates shall be distributed within the list among regional groups. Calculations are performed according to the same method. If there is lack of candidates in one or more regional groups, the remaining undistributed mandates shall be distributed among other regional groups according to the same rules.

In the process of distribution of mandates within the federal list the electoral quotient may fail to coincide with the first electoral quotient, obtained in conformity with Paragraph 1 of this Article.

CHAPTER XIV. CONCLUSIVE AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 71. Electoral Associations Taking Part in the Elections of Deputies of the State Duma of the Second Convocation

According to this Federal Law, all-Russian public associations, established in the order set forth by the Law of the USSR "On Public Associations", charters of which provide for participation in elections to federal bodies of the state power and are registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation no later than six months prior to the day of election, are entitled to take part in elections of deputies of the State Duma of the second convocation.

ARTICLE 72. Entry of this Federal Law into Effect

This Federal Law shall enter into effect on the day of its official publication.

SP




**International Foundation for Electoral Systems**  
**Международный Фонд Избирательных Систем**

1101 15th Street, N.W. \*Third Floor\* Washington D.C. 20005 (202) 828-8507 Fax (202) 452-0804  
 121009 МОСКВА, М. Каковинский пер., д. 2/6, кв. 11, тел. (095) 232-3829, факс (095) 241-2366


**COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN ELECTION LAWS**

	DUMA ELECTION LAW	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW	BASIC GUARANTEES LAW
Overview/Status	24/11/94 Duma passes 1st reading; 15/3/95 Duma passes 2nd reading; 24/3/95 Duma passes 3rd reading; 12/4/95 Federation Council (FC) vetoes; 21/4/95 Duma passes with minor revisions; 4/5/95 FC vetoes again; 11/5/95 Duma overrides FC veto; 23/5/95 President vetoes - conciliatory committee (CC) set up; 9/6/95 Duma passes CC version; 14/6/95 FC rejects again; 15/6/95 FC passes law; 21/6/95 President signs law.	16/12/94 Duma passes 1st reading; 15/3/95 Duma passes 2nd reading; 24/3/95 Duma passes 3rd reading; 12/4/95 Federation Council (FC) vetoes; 4/5/95 FC approves law; 17/5/95 President signs law.	26/10/94 Duma passes law; 15/11/94 Federation Council (FC) passes law; 6/12/94 President signs law.
Term of Office	4 years (Constitution, Art. 96)	4 years (Constitution, Art. 81)	N/A
Election Timing; How Called	Election called by President at least 4 mos. prior to expiration of term (3 mos. in case of Duma dissolution.) (Art. 4)	Election called by Fed. Council at least 4 mos. prior to expiration of term (3 mos. in case President "ceases fulfillment of powers.") (Art. 4)	N/A
How Elected	450 deputies - 225 elected in single mandate districts (SMD); 225 elected in proportion to number of votes cast for federal lists of candidates of electoral assocs/blocs. (Art. 5)	Direct vote of people. (Art. 1)	N/A
Franchise Requirements & Priviledges	Citizens 18+ years; special provisions for military, temporary residents, out of country citizens, voters residing in rest homes, hospitals, sanatoriums, spas, etc. (Arts. 3,12) DISQUALIFIED: citizens declared incompetent by court or imprisoned. (Art. 3)	Citizens 18+ years; special provisions for military, temporary residents, out of country citizens, voters residing in rest homes, hospitals, sanatoriums, spas, etc. (Arts. 3, 24) DISQUALIFIED: citizens declared incompetent by court or imprisoned. (Art. 3)	Citizens 18+ years of age. DISQUALIFIED: citizens declared incompetent by court or imprisoned. (Art. 4)
Districting Authority	Determined by CEC. Dists. must be approved by law NLT 110 days before election; CEC publishes list of dists. NLT 108 days before election. (Art. 11)	N/A	Specifies electoral district rules for local governments and local elections (i.e. non-federal level). (Art. 9)



### COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN ELECTION LAWS


	DUMA ELECTION LAW	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW	BASIC GUARANTEES LAW
Districing Principles	Single mandate districts (SMD): contiguous territories; pop. deviation no more than 10% (15% in remote areas); at least 1 SMD in each Subject. (Art. 11)	Single federal election district encompassing entire territory of R.F. (Art. 5)	Contiguous territory; pop. deviation no more than 10% (15% in remote areas and up to 30% in areas of indigenous small nations). (Art. 9)
Election Commission Hierarchy; Central Election Comm. (CEC); Subject Election Comm. (SEC); District Election Comm. (DEC); Territorial Elec. Comm. (TEC); Precinct Election Comm. (PEC)	<u>5 Levels:</u> CEC, permanent body; SEC, permanent body, 4 yr. term; DEC, one for each of 225 single mandate dists, formed NLT 92 days before election; TEC formed NLT 60 days before election; & PEC, formed NLT 44 days before election. (Arts. 16-28)	<u>4 Levels:</u> CEC, permanent body; SEC, permanent body, 4 yr. term; TEC, formed NLT 60 days before election; & PEC, formed NLT 44 days before election. (Art. 10-18)	<u>5 Levels:</u> CEC; SEC; DEC; TEC; & PEC; procedure for formation specified in federal laws. (Arts. 11-13)
Formation of Electoral Associations & Blocs	Elec. assocs. must be registered with Ministry of Justice NLT 6 mos. prior to announcement date of election; elec. blocs formed by 2 or more elec. assocs. and must register with CEC within 5 days of submitting the resolution forming the elec. bloc. (Arts. 32, 33)	Elec. assocs. must be registered with Ministry of Justice NLT 6 mos. prior to announcement date of election; elec. blocs formed by 2 or more elec. assocs. and must register with CEC within 5 days of forming. (Arts. 28, 29)	Elec. assocs. must be registered with Ministry of Justice NLT 6 mos. prior to announcement date of election; elec. blocs formed by 2 or more elec. assocs. ; elec. blocs must register with relevant elec. comm. (Art. 2, 18)
Period of Election Campaign; Restrictions	Begins on day of registration of candidates and ends at 12 p.m. local time on the day preceding the election; no opinion polls or forecasts published within 5 days of election and on election day; no anonymous campaign materials; no posting of campaign materials on monuments, historical buildings or inside the voting premises. After registration, a candidate may not take advantage of his/her official standing in order to be elected. (Arts. 44, 45, 50)	Begins on day of registration of candidates and ends at 12 p.m. local time on the day preceding the election; no opinion polls or forecasts published within 5 days of election; no anonymous campaign materials; no posting of campaign materials on monuments, historical buildings or inside the voting premises. After registration, candidates holding government office must take leave of absence during campaign. (Arts. 37, 38, 43)	Begins on day of registration of candidates and ends one day prior to election day; no opinion polls or forecasts published within 5 days of election; upon registration, candidates holding government offices or employed by mass media must take leave of absence during campaign. (Art.22, 26)



**COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN ELECTION LAWS**

	DUMA ELECTION LAW	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW	BASIC GUARANTEES LAW
Eligibility for Nomination	Citizens 21+ years old. DISQUALIFIED: Citizens declared incompetent by a court or imprisoned. (Art. 3)	Citizens 35+ years old; at least 10 yrs. residing in territory of R.F. DISQUALIFIED: Citizens declared incompetent by a court or imprisoned. (Art. 3)	Specifies min. ages for candidates for local gov't legislative and exec. bodies. (Art. 4)
Nomination Requirements	Candidates may be nominated by elec. assocs/blocs or directly by citizens; candidates MAY NOT run in more than one single mandate district (SMD); candidates MAY run in both a SMD and on an electoral assoc/bloc's federal list. (Arts. 6, 39, 42)	Candidates nominated by elec. assocs/blocs, or directly by citizens. (Art. 6)	Candidates may be nominated by elec. assocs/blocs or directly by citizens. (Art. 18, 19)
Signature Requirements	<p><u>Electoral Assoc/Bloc:</u> Min. of 200,000 sigs. with no more than 7% from one Subject of R.F.; sig. sheets must state name of Subject of R.F. where sigs. collected; elec. assoc/bloc may begin collecting sigs. upon receipt of certified copy of candidate list; sigs. due to CEC NLT 55 days prior to election; CEC then determines registration status of fed. list candidates within 10 days of submission of sigs.</p> <p><u>Single-Mandate District (SMD):</u> Min. of 1% of voters in the district; candidates affiliated with an elec. assoc/bloc may begin collecting sigs. upon receipt of certified copy of cand. list; indep. cand. may begin collecting sigs. on day of official publication of list of single mandate districts; sig. lists due to District Elec. Comm. (DEC) NLT 55 days prior to election; DEC then determines registration status of candidates within 5 days of submission of sigs. (Arts. 39, 41,42)</p>	Min. of 1,000,000 sigs. with no more than 7% from one Subject of the R.F. ; sig. sheets bound separately by Subjects of the R.F. ; sig. collection begins upon receipt of registration certificate; sigs. due to CEC NLT 60 days before election; CEC determines registration status of candidates within 50 days of election. (Art. 34, 35)	Signature requirements shall be established by specific federal laws. The maximum number of sigs. required may not exceed 2% of registered voters. (Arts. 18 & 19)


52



**COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN ELECTION LAWS**

	DUMA ELECTION LAW	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW	BASIC GUARANTEES LAW
Other Requirements for Electoral Assocs/Blocs with Candidates on Federal List	Federal candidate list nominated at elec. assoc/bloc congress by secret ballot & submitted to CEC; CEC issues or refuses to issue certified copy of list of candidates within 3 days of receipt; no more than 12 candidates on list who do not belong to regional groups (maximum 270 candidates allowable on list); list may be split into regional groups of candidates; all candidate names & their position order on list must be disclosed to CEC; info re 3 fed. list candidates and 3 regional list candidates (if applicable) shall be included on sig. sheets. (Arts. 37, 38, 39)	N/A	N/A
Rights of Candidates, Electoral Assocs/Blocs during Campaign	Elec. comm. reimburses cand. an amount not to exceed 10 times min. mo. wages (as of 27/7/95 min. mo. wage was 55,000 roubles); candidates cannot be prosecuted; mass media must provide equal conditions to all candidates for campaign statements; CEC establishes procedures for granting air time. A candidate may withdraw no later than 3 days prior to election day. * (Arts. 44, 47, 48)	CEC reimburses candidates an amount equal to candidate's avg. mo. income but not to exceed 20 times min. mo. wages (as of 27/7/95 min. mo. wages was 55,000 roubles); mass media must provide equal conditions to all candidates for campaign statements; candidates cannot be prosecuted; CEC establishes procedures for granting air time. A candidate may withdraw at any time before election day. * (Art. 37, 40)	The appropriate level of elec. comm. shall reimburse candidates in amounts established by specific laws; candidates cannot be prosecuted; mass media must provide equal conditions to all candidates for campaign statements; CEC establishes procedures for granting air time. Any candidate may withdraw at any time before the election. * (Arts. 20, 22, 24)

51  
8



**COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN ELECTION LAWS**

	DUMA ELECTION LAW	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW	BASIC GUARANTEES LAW
Financial Limits & Disclosure	Max. expenditure per candidate not to exceed 10,000 times min. mo. wages (as of 27/7/95 min. mo. wage was 55,000 roubles); max. expenditure per electoral assoc/bloc not to exceed 250,000 min. mo. wages; donations not allowed from foreign countries, non-citizens, international orgs., local gov'ts, state & city agencies, military units, charitable or religious orgs.; candidates for deputy submit financial reports to Dist. Elec. Comm., Elec. assocs/blocs to CEC. - Deadline: NLT 30 days after publication of election returns. (Arts. 52, 53)	Max. expenditure per candidate not to exceed 250,000 times min. mo. wages; donations not allowed from foreign countries, non-citizens, international orgs., local gov'ts, state and city agencies, military units, charitable or religious orgs.; candidates and electoral assocs/blocs submit financial reports to CEC NLT 30 days after publication of election returns. (Arts. 45, 46)	Maximum expenditure per candidate to be specified in individual federal laws; donations not allowed from foreign countries, non-citizens, international orgs., local gov'ts and religious orgs. Relevant level of elec. comm. must make periodic reports prior to election day re the amounts & sources of funds based on info submitted by elec. assocs/blocs & cand; cand. & elec. assocs/blocs submit fin. report to relevant elec. comm. NLT 30 days after election. (Art. 28)
Complaint Adjudication	Complaints may be taken to next higher level of Elec. Comm. or to a court; complaints re CEC action/inaction may be filed with Supreme Court which must act on complaint within 5-10 days of receipt or immediately if filed within 5 days of election. (Art. 31)	Complaints may be taken to next higher level of Elec. Comm. or to a court; complaints re CEC action/inaction may be filed with Supreme Court which must act on complaint within 5-10 days of receipt or immediately if filed within 5 days of election. (Art. 23)	Complaints may be taken to next higher level of Elec. Comm. or to a court; complaints re elec. comm.'s action/inaction may be filed with Supreme Court which must act within 5-10 days or immediately if filed on election day. (Art. 16)

59



### COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN ELECTION LAWS

	DUMA ELECTION LAW	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW	BASIC GUARANTEES LAW
Administrative Voting Procedures	<p><u>Single-Mandate Dist. (SMD)</u> candidates listed on ballot in alphabetical order with their elec. assoc/bloc affiliation (if applicable);</p> <p><u>Federal list</u> candidates order on ballot determined by lot; Pct. Elec. Comm. notices time/place of election NLT 20 days prior to election; voters mark ballot FOR candidate/list of choice or for "none of above"; absentee voting permitted; vote counting occurs at precincts after polls close; vote protocols (results) submitted to next higher election commission; ballot retention period 1 yr., documents kept at least 6 mos., protocols (results) kept 1 yr. after day setting date of new elections. * (Arts. 57 ,58, 59, 61)</p>	<p>Candidates listed on ballot in alphabetical order with their elec. assoc/bloc affiliation (if applicable); Pct. Elec. Comm. notices time/place of election NLT 20 days prior to election; voters mark ballot FOR candidate of choice or for "none of above"; absentee voting permitted; vote counting occurs at precincts after polls close; vote protocols (results) submitted to next higher elec. commission; election documents kept at least 6 mos, protocols (results) kept until next election date is set. *(Arts. 50, 51, 52, 54)</p>	<p>Pct. elec. comm. notices time/place of election NLT 20 days prior to election; voters mark ballot FOR candidate/list of choice or for "none of above"; absentee voting permitted; vote counting occurs at precincts after polls close; vote protocols (results) submitted to next higher elec. comm.; election documents kept for time established by fed. laws; ballots must be preserved for min. 1 yr. , protocols for min. 1 yr. after next elec date is set. * (Arts. 6, 30, 31, 32)</p>
Election Observers	<p>Observers representing candidates, elec. assoc/blocs, candidates' attorneys, representatives of media, and foreign observers may be present at polls during voting, calculation of votes and drafting of protocols (election results); 3rd copies of protocols made available to observers, members of elec. commissions with deliberative vote, &amp; media representatives at all Pct. Elec. Comm (PEC), Territorial Elec. Comm. (TEC), Dist. Elec. Comm. (DEC), &amp; Subject Elec. Comm. (SEC). (Arts. 58 - 61)</p>	<p>Observers representing candidates, elec. assoc/blocs, candidates' attorneys, reps of media &amp; foreign observers may be present at polls during voting, calculation of votes and drafting of protocols (election results); 3rd copies of protocols made available to observers, members of elec. commissions with deliberative vote, &amp; media reps at all Pct. Elec. Comm (PEC); Territorial Elec. Comm. (TEC); &amp; Subj. Elec. Comm . (SEC). (Arts. 52 - 54)</p>	<p>Observers sent by elec. assoc. or by cand and foreign observers may be present at polling stations; observers entitled to copy of protocol (elec. results) at pct. or dist. level; elec. comms. of all levels shall share info. re voting returns and election outcomes in the presence of observers representing candidates, elec. assoc. and foreign observers.; observer may be removed from premises if s/he attempts to violate the secrecy of the ballot or attempts to influence a voter. (Arts. 14, 30, 31, 32)</p>



## COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN ELECTION LAWS

	DUMA ELECTION LAW	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW	BASIC GUARANTEES LAW
ELECTION RESULTS: release & availability of information in protocols of Precinct Election Commissions (PECs); Territorial Election Commissions (TECs); District Election Commissions (DECs); Subject Election Commissions (SECs); and Central Election Commission (CEC)	Any voter, observer, or media representative may examine protocols at the PEC or DEC level; DEC's must publish protocols of TECs & PECs pertaining to single mandate districts NLT 1 mo. after elec; CEC must publish in its bulletin all voting results except for PECs NLT 3 mos. after election day. (Art 65)	Any voter, observer, or media rep. may examine protocols at the PEC, TEC or SEC; TEC must publish its protocol NLT 5 days after election day & the PECs protocols within their TEC NLT 15 days after election day; CEC must publish in mass media protocols of SECs NLT 1 mo. after elec. day; CEC must publish in its bulletin all voting results, except for PECs, NLT 3 mos. after election day. (Art. 58)	Any voter, candidate observer or media rep. may examine voting returns of each elec. pct; the complete data included in the protocols of all levels of elec. comms. except PECs, shall be made public within 3 mos. after election. (Art. 33)
Declaring the Winner	<b>Single Mandate Dist.(SMD):</b> candidate who receives most votes (plurality) is elected; if a winning candidate ran for both a SMD & on fed. list, s/he takes SMD seat; <b>Federal List:</b> elec. assoc/bloc must win min. 5% of votes cast for distribution of deputy mandates. If list was split, mandates assigned first to non-regional candidates and then to regional candidates in proportion to number of votes cast for the federal list in that Subject(s) of R.F. (Arts. 61, 62, 70)	Candidate who receives more than one half of votes is elected. If no majority, a run-off is held between top two candidates; runoff election to occur no later than 15 days after the estimation of the results of first election. (Art. 55)	N/A
Voter Turnout Threshold	Minimum 25% voter turnout requirement (based on the # of voters signing for ballots) or election invalid. (Art. 61)	Minimum 50% voter turnout requirement (based on the # of voters signing for ballots) or election invalid. (Art. 55)	N/A
Filling Vacancies	<b>Single-Mandate Dist. (SMD):</b> New election called except if less than one year of term remains, then position stays vacant until next election. <b>Federal List:</b> Mandate transferred to next candidate on fed. list; if no candidates remain, mandate stays vacant until next election. (Art. 67, 68)	If president ceases to exercise powers due to resignation, health or impeachment, duties are temporarily filled by Chairman of Government (Prime Minister). Constitution, Art. 92	N/A

FEDERATION COUNCIL: 5/7/95 Duma passes law to elect future members of the Federation Council (FC); 27/7/95 FC supports Duma law to elect future members of their upper chamber by a razor-thin one vote margin (90 of 178 members voting in favor); 11/8/95 President vetoes law; 12/8/95 Duma fails to override presidential veto. Yeltsin favors forming upper chamber via appointees, who are the head of the executive and legislative branches of each of the 89 Subjects of the Russian Federation. No further legislative action or presidential decree had been issued on this matter as of September 1, 1995 when this election law grid was published.

\* CONTRADICTIONS ARE FOUND BETWEEN PROVISIONS OF "BASIC GUARANTEES LAW" AND "DUMA AND/OR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW(S)".



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

**INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE  
RUSSIA ELECTION OBSERVATION REPORT  
DECEMBER 1993**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The International Republican Institute (IRI) sponsored a 24 member delegation to observe the parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum in Russia on December 12, 1993. Under the leadership of IRI Chairman, U.S. Senator John McCain, the delegates evaluated the electoral process, identified the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and made recommendations for future elections. As a matter of policy, IRI does not make simple findings as to whether an election can be categorized as free and fair.

IRI's observation mission to Russia's April 1993 referendum led to a report detailing weaknesses in technical aspects of the voting process. That observer team's recommendations were published in *Izvestiya* and later introduced on the floor of the parliament by its pro-democratic members.<sup>1</sup> A number of improvements suggested by IRI monitors following the April referendum mission had been adopted by December, including clearer guidelines on validation of ballots and procedures for replacing spoiled ballots by local election officials; increased security for mobile ballot boxes; revisions in the absentee voting system; and provisions for an orderly process of accrediting domestic and international observers. These changes demonstrated a willingness to reexamine the process and make modifications where weaknesses were found.

The 25 recommendations contained in this report will be forwarded to the appropriate Russian and American officials in a constructive effort to help Russia improve the process in anticipation of the next step, local elections tentatively scheduled for March 1994. There are many traditions in the current system that, although their origins lie in the old Soviet-style elections, have positive benefits when reapplied to democratic elections; for example, the invitation to vote, universal registration, and the efficiency and dedication of polling station personnel. IRI observers, however, found other components of the electoral process that hold the potential for abuse, such as the portable ballot box, an under-appreciation of the secret ballot, and ill-defined elements of the election law. In addition to specific recommendations for improving the electoral process, this report also contains suggestions for the institutional development of political parties, a free and independent media, and a legislative branch that can serve as a genuine partner in governance. The long-term development of civil and political

institutions that support and sustain a democracy will be critical to Russia's transition.

## II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The IRI delegation found the December 12 elections to be a significant, positive step forward in Russia's democratic transition that affirmed a commitment to the democratic process. The competitive nature of the campaigns waged by the parties, the interest displayed by Russian voters in the election process, the media access afforded differing points of view, the efforts of election administrators to add uniformity to the process, and the creation of a new constitutional order -- all signaled a momentous departure from past Soviet practices and habits.

The IRI observers applauded the Russian people for their peaceful and serious conduct in a potentially volatile campaign period. The Russian people also deserve recognition for their endorsement of a post-communist constitutional order providing a clear division of power and establishing institutional relationships. In the face of the hardship and pain found in any economic transition, the Russian people chose a democratic framework to move them beyond the paralyzing effects of the recent power struggle.

IRI observers found the campaign environment to be diverse and dynamic. The IRI delegation commended Russia's 13 political parties for their success, given a brief campaign period, in obtaining the required signatures to compete in the elections, and in recruiting and fielding candidates. The short campaign period, however, led to the issuance of an incomplete election law, the hurried appointment of a Central Election Commission (CEC), and a rush to create new political parties. Additional steps must be taken in the two-year transitional period ahead to secure the positive benefits of the election, minimize the negative consequences, and build durable democratic institutions.

### Election Law

**Issue:** Russia's new parliamentarians revising the election law or writing new laws ought to bear in mind that their counterparts in other countries, with the benefit of deeper democratic traditions and the accumulated experience of competitive elections, still seek and find ways to refine the process. Whether by applying innovative technologies, meeting new procedural challenges, or relearning old lessons, the development of electoral systems is a never-ending process.

Although the current election law contains serious shortcomings, it is nevertheless a significant step forward in encouraging the development of democratic institutions. The short period of preparation for the December 12 elections led to a hastily assembled and inadequate set of election regulations. Many directives from the CEC were, in effect, new laws rather than interpretations of existing law. While this timetable obviously was dictated by the unique set of circumstances surrounding the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, future elections will provide the opportunity for greater advanced planning.

Furthermore, the CEC's maneuvering on the issue of turnout had little effect in the final

analysis except to erode its own credibility. It was reminiscent of past practices in which authorities manipulated the rules to achieve a pre-determined outcome. If Russians are to have faith in their new political institutions, the process must be fully defined and respected by those institutions.

**Recommendation 1:** All aspects of the electoral process should be clearly defined by law in advance of the campaign period, rather than on an ad hoc basis throughout the process. The new parliament should revise and consolidate the current election law to provide a more consistent framework for future elections. The process of reexamination and amendment should be continued with successive elections.

**Recommendation 2:** Results of individual polling stations should be published locally, or otherwise made available for public consumption and dissemination, by the constituency election commissions.

**Recommendation 3:** Sample ballots posted at polling stations for the purposes of voter education should be unmarked. There also should be a greater uniformity of civic education materials at polling stations.

**Recommendation 4:** There should be a uniform method of marking ballots to minimize voter confusion and make a clear distinction between old and new methods.

**Recommendation 5:** A well-defined process of appeal should be developed and clearly defined so that aggrieved parties may readily have a method of recourse.

**Recommendation 6:** Procedures should be put in place to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot for voters utilizing the portable ballot box.

## Election Administration

**Issue:** IRI observers saw a genuine effort made by national, regional, and local election officials to guarantee a fair process. Particularly impressive was their detailed knowledge of the election procedures. IRI observers found that the majority of election officials at the regional and local level had worked in previous elections.

**Recommendation 7:** Effort should be made to recruit new people into the process of election administration. Better training programs are needed for new poll workers who lack experience and to educate experienced workers on departures from past practices.

**Issue:** The accreditation of pollwatchers was limited to representatives of political parties, thereby excluding a large pool of prospective pollwatchers from civic organizations.

**Recommendation 8:** Civic organizations should be allowed to sponsor domestic pollwatchers.

**Issue:** Civic education was compromised because of the shortness of the campaign period. In addition, the CEC and constituency commissions should not be the only institutions that play a role in civic education.

**Recommendation 9:** Other civil institutions such as unions, newspapers, political parties, universities and schools also have an interest in providing civic education and should be encouraged to do so.

**Issue:** The partial and incomplete release of results by the CEC implied an orchestrated and selective release of results, thereby fueling suspicion of vote tampering. Such suspicions were not immediately disproved because many of the activities of the CEC were not open to the public, the press, or observers.

**Recommendation 10:** The CEC should establish a well-defined and well-publicized process for reporting results based upon a realistic timetable given the level of technology. The CEC also should provide access to domestic and international observers in the aggregation of results as they are reported from the constituencies.

**Recommendation 11:** The CEC should become a permanent and fully accountable body, with pre-defined terms and conditions of office. Every effort should be taken to ensure that the CEC is independent and free from political influence.

**Issue:** Eligible voters were counted at the end of the process. When the CEC released the number of eligible voters after the December elections, the figure was approximately one million less than the eligible voters in the April 1993 referendum, further fueling speculation about vote tampering.

**Recommendation 12:** Local governments are responsible for updating the voter registries before the election. Those numbers should be forwarded to the CEC before the election, not after, to provide a nationwide total of eligible voters upon which to base voter turnout before voting begins.

**Issue:** IRI observers were troubled by the potential influence of military officers in military voting. IRI observers also concluded that many members of the military were disenfranchised from elections in their place of official residence because there was no method of absentee balloting.

**Recommendation 13:** Members of the military should vote at civilian polling stations whenever possible. The system of military voting when no civilian stations are available must be reevaluated and a new system devised, whether at civilian administered stations on military installations, absentee voting, or early voting. Military officers should be removed from civic education and all other aspects of the voting process to avoid concerns regarding influence, and political parties and candidates should be provided greater access to military personnel.

**Recommendation 14:** Russian election authorities should continue to explore and develop other methods of absentee voting to allow persons in the military, students, or other individuals away from their district of official residence for a prolonged period an opportunity to vote on regional and local ballots.

## Political Party System

**Issue:** The presence of plurality on Russia's political landscape is no longer questionable. What remains questionable is the degree to which democratic institutions capable of adjudicating societal interests can consolidate and overcome the legacy of past practices. Democratic institutions cannot be created simply by legislation, presidential decree, or a single election. Democratic institutions gain strength as they organize over time, broaden their public acceptance, learn from practical experience, and adapt to changing circumstances. Russia's transition, therefore, is tied not only to democratic elections, but also to the long-term development and strengthening of institutions necessary to support and sustain a democracy. The continued and active role of political parties in governance and in future elections will be critical components of that process. While the elections were a vital catalyst for party development, many of those gains can be squandered in the post-election period if parties fail to make the organizational transition to governance. Given the level of voter turnout in December, it will be particularly important that members of various parties in the new Duma demonstrate they are capable of working together to solve Russia's problems.

**Recommendation 15:** Parties should form institutional structures in the Duma, hold regular meetings, form leadership offices, recruit staff with technical expertise, establish caucuses, and coordinate with extra-parliamentary party structures.

**Issue:** Russian democracy is coming to life in the age of television. Methods of mass communication allow candidates to appeal directly to the voter, and thereby bypass much of the need for party structures. Party institutions, however, have many important functions in Russian society at this stage of political development.

**Recommendation 16:** Parties must focus on building structures at the regional and local levels to help develop party platforms, recruit candidates, and mobilize popular support.

**Issue:** Parties devoted most of their effort to candidate registration and the campaign period that followed, neglecting the fact that political parties have an important role to play on election day. While effective legal mechanisms guaranteeing an equitable political process may be provided by an election law, it is the competitive nature of a multi-party system that brings those mechanisms to life. Abuses go unchallenged when one party begins to dominate political life.

**Recommendation 17:** Political parties should recruit and train domestic pollwatchers to monitor the process, provide a disincentive for abuse, and conduct a parallel vote count to provide an external basis for judging the validity of the official count.

**Issue:** Many political parties found it difficult to generate interest and recruit members without clearly defined election dates. Parties lacked an organizational impetus when elections seemed a distant and uncertain event. With the scheduling of elections for December 12, parties were faced with the opposite extreme: approximately 30 days to register their candidates and 30 days to campaign.

**Recommendation 18:** Provide an adequate campaign period with sufficient advanced notice to allow parties an opportunity to make organizational preparations before the start of the campaign period.

**Issue:** IRI observers found the emergence of a multi-party system within two years of the collapse of the Communist's single-party monopoly to be a truly remarkable development. Particularly notable was the identification of many voters with a specific party and the striking diversity of the parties. The provision for a proportional ballot was an important measure in encouraging the development of a multi-party system. The minimum requirement of two candidates on the single mandate ballot and three candidates on the double mandate ballot similarly were important provisions that ensured competition on the ballot. These benefits, however, were mitigated by the absence of party identification on the single and double mandate ballots. Voters unfamiliar with the candidates but wanting to support a specific party were unable to do so. In addition, deputies not elected under a party label may feel less compulsion to maintain party loyalty after the election, making it more difficult for parties to provide discipline and play an effective role in governance.

**Recommendation 19:** The party affiliation of all candidates should be indicated on all ballots. If a candidate has no official party affiliation, his or her status as an independent should be noted.

**Issue:** The funding of parties became an issue in the campaign period and thereby detracted from the debate of larger issues because there was no mechanism to evaluate accusations of illegal financing.

**Recommendation 20:** A campaign financial disclosure law that reveals amounts, sources, and recipients of campaign funds should be passed by the new legislature, with periodic reporting deadlines during the campaign period and stiff sanctions for non-compliance.

**Issue:** IRI observers were struck by the noticeable absence of young voters. Political parties have a vital interest in recruiting and developing the next generation of leaders that will help their organizations become durable institutions over the long term. Young people usually are the members of society most open to new ideas, and often the most enthusiastic participants of political life, because they have more at stake in the future.

**Recommendation 21:** Political parties should make a concerted effort to recruit young people to provide them an avenue to shape their own future while developing the next generation of political leaders. Parties, for example, should include a youth program in their platforms, develop organizational components specifically for young people, and include young people among their candidates.

### *Print and Broadcast Media*

**Issue:** IRI observers noted the broad spectrum of political interests participating in the vigorous campaign debate. Observers believed that political parties enjoyed equal access to unpaid television and radio, adequate access to paid advertising, and that media restrictions or cases of censorship ultimately had little impact on the public's access to information. IRI observers noted, however, that several news outlets representing views opposed to the government were closed during the initial stage of the campaign, and temporarily operated under government-imposed editorial restrictions regarding the proposed constitution.

**Recommendation 22:** The creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations that provide an objective yet critical source of information are vital institutions in the development of a free society. National and local government authorities, therefore, should resist the temptation to assert media control and, whenever possible, play a positive role in moving media institutions toward greater freedom and independence. As a first step, the new Parliament should redefine the relationship between the government and the media in a manner that allows freedom of the press.

## Government Role

**Issue:** Boris Yeltsin embarked upon a campaign to consolidate his power with the issuance of Presidential Decree no. 1400 on September 23, 1993, which disbanded the parliament. Although some of Yeltsin's actions in September and October could be considered undemocratic, the end result of those actions was to break his monopoly on power and create a legislative body with a new degree of democratic legitimacy.

Under the new constitution, Ministers must resign from their positions upon election to the State Duma. A two-year exception to this rule is provided for Ministers in the new constitution's transitional section. This provision, however, still allows for potential conflict of interest regarding the conduct of ministers in the campaign period. IRI observers heard widespread criticism regarding the unfair advantage many ministers enjoyed by virtue of their office, especially as it pertained to access to television.

**Recommendation 23:** The new Russian constitution prohibits a minister from serving in the State Duma. IRI observers believe consideration should be given to extending that prohibition to the campaign period. Ministers running as candidates to the State Duma should consider taking a leave of absence, or resigning from their post, upon registration as a candidate to avoid the potential for conflict of interest or the misuse of state resources.

**Issue:** In addition, conflict of interest issues are likely to arise in future elections regarding officials who misuse the advantages and privileges of incumbency to win re-election, unless there is a legally proscribed process for regulating their activity.

**Recommendation 24:** The new parliament should pass a law specifying the allowable activities of elected and appointed officials seeking elected office. In addition, the range of allowable political activities for government officials who support specific candidates or parties should be defined by law.

**Issue:** Many parties identified the "Mafia" as a source of campaign influence for their opponents. It was often unclear whether those identified as such were true organized crime figures or simply new capitalists who had made a lot of money. In a society where the ownership of private property was prohibited for over 70 years, the latter is perhaps understandable, but Russia now needs to define what it truly means by the "Mafia" - those genuinely involved in organized crime.

**Recommendation 25:**

A law akin to the *Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization* act (RICO) in the United States, coupled with a high-level investigative and prosecutive office within the Russian government to concentrate on organized crime, could aid a great deal in bringing the true "Mafia" to justice. In addition, a politically insulated criminal justice system, improved compensation for law enforcement officials, and a strengthened legal framework, providing prosecutors with the necessary tools, would aid Russia's fight against crime and encourage popular faith in the system.

1. IRI observers to the April 25 referendum in Russia found no evidence of systematic fraud or intimidation. The observers, however, did note that the production, distribution, and security of ballots was lax; and the various regions of Russia differed in their methods of tabulation. The IRI delegation further concluded that these weaknesses could be exploited easily when the stakes of elections were higher and if there were a greater incentive to cheat.



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

**IRI RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED BY THE  
RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAWS**

The following summary describes the status of IRI Election Recommendations relative to the Parliamentary and Presidential Election Laws passed in spring 1995 by the Russian State Duma, the lower house of parliament, and signed into law by President Yeltsin. After each IRI recommendation, its status is noted in *italics*.

Mr. Alexander Ivanchenko, Vice Chairman of Russian Central Election Commission, commented on March 29, 1995, in a meeting on Capitol Hill, that "The report provided by IRI's international observer delegation served as the road map for the CEC in making improvements to the election law."

**IRI Recommendations:**

- #1: All aspects of the electoral process should be clearly defined by law in advance of the campaign period...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*
- #2: Results of individual polling stations should be published locally, or otherwise made available for public consumption and dissemination, by the constituency election commissions...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #3: Sample ballots posted at polling stations for the purposes of voter education should be unmarked...  
*Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #4: There should be a uniform method of marking ballots to minimize voter confusion...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #5: There should be a well-defined process of appeal so that aggrieved parties may readily have a method of recourse...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*

- #6:** Procedures should be put in place to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot for voters utilizing the portable ballot box...  
*Substantially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*
- #7:** Effort should be made to recruit new people into the process of election administration; better training programs are needed for new poll workers who lack experience and to educate experienced workers on departures from past practices...  
*Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*
- #8:** Civic organizations should be allowed to sponsor domestic pollwatchers...  
*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (law does permit observers by election associations and blocs, representatives of candidates, international observers, and the mass media)*
- #9:** Civil institutions such as unions, newspapers, political parties, universities and schools should be encouraged to provide civic education...  
*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (but encouraged by CEC Vice Chairman in meeting on Hill)*
- #10:** The CEC should establish a well-defined and well-publicized process for reporting results; the CEC should provide access to domestic and international observers the aggregation of results as they are reported from the constituencies...  
*Substantially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #11:** The CEC should become a permanent and fully accountable body, with pre-defined terms and conditions of office...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #12:** Local governments should forward updated voter registries to the CEC before the election, not after, to provide a nationwide total of eligible voters upon which to base voter turnout before voting begins...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #13:** Members of the military should vote at civilian polling stations whenever possible...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Substantially addressed in Presidential Election Law*
- #14:** Russian election authorities should develop other methods of absentee voting to allow individuals away from their district of official residence for a prolonged period an opportunity to vote on regional and local ballots...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law (although questions remain about the efficacy of the methods prescribed)*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*

**#15:** Parties should form institutional structures in the Duma, hold regular meetings, form leadership offices, recruit staff with technical expertise, establish caucuses, and coordinate with extra-parliamentary party structures...

*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*

**#16:** Parties must focus on building structures at the regional and local levels to help develop party platforms, recruit candidates, and mobilize popular support...

*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*

**#17:** Political parties should recruit and train domestic pollwatchers...

*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*

**#18:** Provide an adequate campaign period with sufficient advanced notice to allow parties an opportunity to make organizational preparations before the start of the campaign period...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*

**#19:** The party affiliation of all candidates should be indicated on all ballots. If a candidate has no official party affiliation, his or her status as an independent should be noted...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*

**#20:** A campaign financial disclosure law that reveals amounts, sources, and recipients of campaign funds should be enacted, with periodic reporting deadlines during the campaign period...

*Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law (notably, there is no mention of reporting requirements during the campaign, only after)*

**#21:** Political parties should make a concerted effort to recruit young people to provide them an avenue to shape their own future while developing the next generation of political leaders...

*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*

**#22:** To promote and encourage the creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations that provide an objective yet critical source of information, national and local government authorities should resist the temptation to assert media control and, whenever possible, play a positive role in moving media institutions toward greater freedom and independence...

*Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*

**#23:** Consideration should be given to extending the prohibition on government ministers serving in the State Duma to the campaign period...to avoid the potential for conflict of interest or the misuse of state resources...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*

**#24:** The new parliament should pass a law specifying the allowable activities of elected and appointed officials seeking elected office. In addition, the range of allowable political activities for government officials who support specific candidates or parties should be defined by law...

*Substantially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*

**#25:** A law akin to the U.S. *Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization* act (RICO), coupled with a high-level investigative and prosecutive office within the Russian government to concentrate on organized crime, could aid a great deal in bringing the "Mafia" to justice. In addition, a politically insulated criminal justice system, improved compensation for law enforcement officials, and a strengthened legal framework, providing prosecutors with the necessary tools, would aid Russia's fight against crime and encourage popular faith in the system...

*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*

*December 1995*



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

**Background Memo on Political Parties and Coalitions in Russia**  
Prepared by the International Republican Institute

On December 17, 1995 some 5,000 candidates and 43 parties will vie for 450 seats in Russia's State Duma (lower house of parliament) 1995 elections. The number of parties has increased considerably over the 1993 parliamentary elections when 13 parties qualified for the national party list ballot. The political coalitions represent a wide spectrum of interests including reformist, centrist, communist and nationalist movements.

In order to be placed on the ballot, parties had to collect 200,000 signatures with no more than 7 percent of the signatures coming from any one region. Parties who win 5 percent of the vote or more will divide up the 225 party list seats proportionally. Many of those listed on the party ballot will also seek election in a single mandate district. It is estimated that an average of 12 candidates will run for each of the 225 single mandate seats.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) initially denied two blocs, the pro-reform party Yabloko and the nationalist party Derzhava, a place on the party ballot because of technical violations. Other pro-reform parties, the Communist Party, the media and observers, protested the decision saying it was politically motivated. Russia's Democratic Choice threatened to boycott the elections, saying the decision put democratic elections in jeopardy. The Supreme Court overturned the decision within a week.

Most of what exists in the way of political organizations in Russia are movements and coalitions. Several hundred political parties and coalitions exist in Russia, the exact number changes constantly. Russian political activists have had difficulties creating parties because the word "party" conjures up negative images of the Communist Party. Political activists see democracy as freedom from the party structure and have focused instead on forming loose coalitions among like-minded groups. Most political movements in Russia revolve around personality, not ideology. Parties and coalitions divide and regroup frequently over disputes among key leaders. Few parties or coalitions have established strong regional networks. Those that have regional organizations generally do not have good communication and coordination between the regional and national levels. Regional organizations will often ignore decisions made at the national level.

One of the two major reform blocs in this year's elections, Russia's Democratic Choice, tried to form an alliance with the other key reform bloc, Yabloko earlier in the year. Yabloko refused to consider any kind of alliance. Both groups support free market reforms (although

they disagree over the exact approach to economic reform), private property ownership and improved crime prevention. Despite similarities in their basic philosophy, the two won't join forces because their leaders, former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and economist Grigori Yavlinsky refuse to surrender to the other their authority and status as the leader of reform in Russia. The overall number of reform candidates is not expected to change drastically from the 1993 elections, in which they won 112 or 25 percent of the seats.

For purposes of this memo, IRI will classify the parties using four main categories. Reformist parties are those that generally support market reforms, privatization of businesses and services, an end to most government subsidies of consumer goods and private property ownership. Centrist parties usually support some market reforms and privatization, though at a slower pace. In addition, most centrist parties advocate a stronger role for the government in maintaining social services, like health care and child care. Communist political organizations generally support strong, centralized control of the economy, laws and other regulations; government control of the productions of goods, services and the agriculture industry; and, government price controls. Nationalist groups advocate policies that discriminate against non-Russian citizens and support the restoration of the former Soviet Union.

The following is a summary of the major blocs and coalitions participating in the 1995 December Parliamentary elections.

*Russia's Democratic Choice -- United Democrats*

Affiliation: Reformist

Performance in 1993 elections: 40 party list seats; 26 single mandate seats

Leader: Yegor Gaidar

In two years, Russia's Democratic Choice (RDC) has transformed from the coalition that won the most seats overall in the 1993 parliamentary elections into a party that may just cross the 5 percent threshold on the party list ballot in December. RDC is led by economist Yegor Gaidar, former prime minister and architect of President Boris Yeltsin's controversial "shock therapy" economic program.

During the December 1993 elections, Russia's Choice (the RDC predecessor) was a coalition of reformers who advocated the most radical economic changes. It was known as Yeltsin's unofficial party even though Yeltsin refused to publicly endorse it. (Yeltsin thought he should stay above the political contest.) Even though the coalition won more seats than any other party or movement (66 seats or 15 percent), its victory was seen as a failure because it was expected to obtain a majority. Russia's Choice, and Gaidar specifically, were blamed for the country's economic problems and the financial hardships faced by a majority of Russians. And, in a country where charisma is an essential ingredient for a successful politician, Gaidar appeared arrogant, removed and insensitive to the country's economic pains. Gaidar used his free TV time allotted to all parties to explain that under his reform policies things will get worse

before they get better. The party was unable to develop a message that connected with the electorate and justified the necessity for tough economic reforms. RDC's party membership in the Duma has dropped to 54 deputies, down from an all-time high of 96 deputies (some deputies joined after the 1993 elections).

In an effort to regroup, Gaidar decided to take Russia's Choice into the next stage of development and in June 1994, created a formal party, named Russia's Democratic Choice. The party set out to create an extensive regional network, holding regional party congresses throughout the country. One of RDC's first tasks was an ambitious campaign to recruit members. Potential members were screened to ensure that all supported the RDC philosophy - a procedure criticized for its similarity to the process used by the Communist Party to filter members in the Soviet days. The party now claims a membership between 300,000 to 400,000 members. A segment of Russia's Choice never joined the Russia's Democratic Choice party and has recently renamed itself Bloc 89 (for the 89 regions of Russia), so as to avoid confusion among voters between the two political organizations.

Despite intensive efforts to recreate its image and build a cohesive pro-reform party throughout Russia, RDC's popularity has plummeted to a point where it may win only a small representation in the Duma via the party list ballot. Several factors contributed to the party's decline. First, RDC has tried to create its image around the persona of Gaidar, viewed by many Russians as personally responsible for the economic "shock therapy" reforms that have lowered their living standard. Second, RDC gave up its status as the "party of power" and went into opposition over the Chechnya invasion. The title "party of power" went to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin when he created the Our Home is Russia bloc. Third, RDC suffered financially because of its anti-Chechnya stance. The party's position on Chechnya cost RDC the support of its wealthiest benefactor, Oleg Boiko, president of National Credit Bank and OLBI investment company. As a result, the party has undertaken a poorly received fundraising effort soliciting contributions from government and private organizations of up to 500 million rubles (\$110,000).

Early in 1995, Gaidar sought to bring together pro-reform forces under one bloc. His main rival, Grigori Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko bloc, refused to form an alliance. Later, Gaidar rejected the idea of joining Our Home is Russia because of ideological disagreements with its leader, Chernomyrdin, over the Chechnya invasion. However, RDC leaders did leave the door open for cooperation among its regional leaders with Our Home is Russia, which is occurring in such areas as St. Petersburg, Murmansk and Rostov. RDC is also cooperating with Yabloko in these and other regions.

Gaidar did manage to create a coalition of several small, mostly insignificant pro-reform movements under the name "Russia's Democratic Choice -- United Democrats." The bloc includes the Peasant's Party, the Party of Social Democracy, Women for Solidarity and Soldiers for Democracy. Gaidar's inability to bring together any prominent parties further underscores his weakening position. Because of the popularity of many of the RDC single mandate candidates, the party is expected to win a number of single constituency seats. Ironically,

despite RDC's low nationwide approval rating, its success in the single mandate seats could help it maintain its position as the largest pro-reform bloc, if it also wins party lists seats.

### *Yabloko*

Affiliation: Reformist

Performance in 1993 elections: 20 party list seats; 7 single mandate seats

Leader: Grigori Yavlinsky

Yabloko is this year's leading pro-reform bloc and is led by economist Grigori Yavlinsky. The party's name is an acronym for its founders: Yavlinsky; former federal corruption investigator Yuri Boldyrev; and, former Ambassador to the United States Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the State Duma International Relations Committee. Started as the main alternative to Russia's Choice in the 1993 elections, Yabloko has greatly outpaced its rival (now called Russia's Democratic Choice) in this election. Yavlinsky refuses to join forces with RDC because he blames its leader, Yegor Gaidar, former prime minister and architect of Yeltsin's economic policies, for the country's economic problems. Yavlinsky further justifies his refusal to cooperate with RDC by saying that democratic parties will garner a larger portion of the vote if voters have more parties to choose from. Yavlinsky is planning a bid for the presidency in 1996.

With a public opinion poll rating of around 10 percent, Yavlinsky is among the most popular politicians in Russia and will likely be a major contender in the 1996 presidential elections. Yavlinsky stands out among reformers as a consistent opponent to Yeltsin and as an outsider having never served in the Yeltsin administration (although he was an adviser to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev). Yavlinsky supports a more moderate approach to reform and opposes the voucher privatization program, which Gaidar helped to create. He claims to be a spokesman for regional interests although the vast majority of his bloc members in parliament are from Moscow. Yabloko claims to have 4,000 members throughout the regions and an additional 16 chapters in Moscow with an unspecified membership.

Yabloko has been more unified relative to other democratic coalitions. Over the past two years, only six of 33 State Duma deputies defected from the bloc. In comparison, RDC's all-time high representation dropped from 96 to 54. Notably, however, one of Yabloko's founders, Yuri Boldyrev, left the Yabloko leadership in September 1995 saying the bloc was not opposing the Yeltsin administration forcefully enough. In June, the bloc supported the first no-confidence vote against the president over the Chechnya debacle, but refused to go so far as to support the second no-confidence vote. Boldyrev remains a member of the party. Yabloko's major disadvantage in the election is its lack of regional organization and funding. Despite Yavlinsky's popularity, he has not been successful in building a strong grassroots party structure.

In his address to the bloc's second congress in September, Yavlinsky declared the bloc's slogan to be "Dignity, Order, Justice." He said these words stand for "private property, freedom of political views, protection against crime and protecting the weak against the strong."

Yavlinsky wants to bring those who have been left behind by economic reforms -- teachers, engineers, researchers, skilled labor and peasants -- into the middle class.

Yabloko almost did not appear on the national party list ballot when the Central Election Commission ruled that Yabloko made some technical mistakes in its registration. Some thought the move to be politically motivated because of the bloc's popularity, although that was never proved. The Communists and Our Home is Russia coalition criticized the CEC's decision, and Russia's Democratic Choice threatened to boycott the elections because of it. A week later it was overturned by the Supreme Court. The CEC delay gave Yabloko a lot of free media, but has cost the party donations at a critical time. Funders who were holding onto contributions during the dispute, have still not come through with money.

Even though Yabloko has more support in public opinion polls than any other reform party, its lack of organization in the regions and funding will likely hurt the party considerably. Yabloko is not placing any emphasis on winning its single mandate seats. All party funds are going to the national party's campaign. Ironically, Yabloko may place behind RDC even though it is considerably more popular.

### *Forward, Russia!*

Affiliation: Reformist  
Performance in 1993 elections: n/a  
Leader: Boris Fyodorov

Forward, Russia! was created in February 1995 by former Yeltsin official Boris Fyodorov. Fyodorov served as Finance Minister from 1992-1994 and helped Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar formulate the shock-therapy economic policy that became so unpopular, although he is not blamed for economic problems like Gaidar. Fyodorov quit Yeltsin's cabinet in early 1994 frustrated, with the democrats' poor showing in the 1993 parliamentary elections. He made several attempts to form movements that would address voters' concerns while continuing market reforms before creating Forward, Russia!

Forward, Russia's! agenda is market-reform oriented with a nationalist twist. One of the party's long-term goals is the voluntary reunification of the former Soviet republics. Forward, Russia! seeks a unified, strengthened Russia, a uniform status of the territories of Russia (including Chechnya -- Fyodorov was one of few democrats to initially support military intervention there), stronger efforts to combat crime and corruption, a raise in living standards, solutions to the housing shortages, reduction in the tax burden and an end to inflation. It is unclear whether Fyodorov's mixed messages will attract voters across ideological boundaries or whether voters will be suspicious of his attempt at mass appeal.

In April 1995, Fyodorov advocated forming one democratic coalition among all reform movements. When that failed, he attempted to form an alliance with Yabloko and Russia's

Democratic Choice. None of the three leaders could come to agreement and each is running separately. One of Russia's most prominent female politicians, Duma Deputy Irina Khakamada, left Forward, Russia! early in 1995 after a number of disputes with Fyodorov and established her own bloc, Common Cause. Aside from the philosophical differences, Khakamada also complained of Fyodorov's public chauvinistic outbursts toward her.

Forward, Russia! appears to be well-funded, with its financial backing coming from young entrepreneurs with whom Fyodorov established early ties. As part of his campaign strategy, Fyodorov created a "Contract with Russia" modeled on the Republican Party's "Contract with America," which he studied extensively. Fyodorov is a charismatic speaker and has spent the past year traveling across the country meeting with voters. Knowing that voters were turned off by the economic jargon of the reformers in the 1993 elections, Fyodorov's message emphasizes language that will appeal to the average voter. Forward, Russia! has undertaken a negative campaign aimed at the Communists, nationalists and Our Home is Russia in an attempt to single itself out from other parties.

Despite Fyodorov's travels around the country, he has been unable to establish a strong regional base. This fact, combined with the party's mixed campaign message, make it unlikely that Forward, Russia! will cross the 5 percent threshold.

#### *Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES)*

Affiliation: Reformist

Performance in 1993 elections: 18 party list seats; 1 single mandate seat

Leader: Sergei Shakrai

The Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) was established by Minister of Nationalities Sergei Shakrai in October 1993. The party crossed the 5 percent threshold in the 1993 elections, but may suffer in the 1995 elections from an inability to distinguish itself from other pro-reform parties. Shakrai has tried to stake out a delicate position of being pro-Yeltsin, but anti-government. Because of his loyalty to Yeltsin, he helped form Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's bloc, Our Home is Russia, but left in September when Chernomyrdin did not place him high enough on the party list ballot. Shakrai took most of the PRES membership with him when he left.

As the Minister of Nationalities handling the regional ethnic problems that arise, Shakrai has tried to capitalize on his relationship with regional leaders to build support for his party. In 1993, he successfully built a coalition among regional administration leaders. Since then, however, Shakrai has been unable to turn that support into a solid regional grassroots network.

PRES's agenda stresses a federalist policy that provides equal rights to all territories of Russia and a clearer definition of power between regional and federal governments. PRES supported having only single mandate seats in the parliament, eliminating all party list seats.

In addition, the party supports land reform, a market economy, improved protection of human rights and a strong foreign policy.

PRES's delay in deciding to run as an independent party because of its falling out with Our Home is Russia, and its inability to distinguish itself from other pro-reform parties could cost it representation in the Duma on the party list.

### *Christian Democratic Union*

Affiliation: Reformist

Performance in 1993 elections: did not run party list; 1 single mandate seat

Leader: Vitali Savitsky

The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is a small, structured reformist party based in St. Petersburg. The party is led by one of its two State Duma deputy Vitali Savitsky. The party draws its ideology from the Christian Democratic International, which is conservative, though not based on a religious ideology. The party's major objective is the "moral and cultural revival of Russia," according to Savitsky. Its platform advocates a "socially oriented, market-based economy."

In the 1993 elections, the CDU was not able to gather enough signatures to be placed on the national party list ballot. Savitsky won his single mandate seat in 1993 by running a grassroots campaign with a strong voter contact strategy (which he learned in IRI seminars) that appealed to many voters. In the 1995 elections, party leaders chose to run independently rather than join another pro-reform coalition even though some leaders had developed good relations with Russia's Democratic Choice.

The CDU has created youth and women's organizations in St. Petersburg and several other regional cities, but has been unable to build a strong regional network as it intended. Polls show the majority of voters are not familiar with the CDU or its platform. The party is trying to appeal to members of the Russian Orthodox church.

### *Common Cause*

Affiliation: Reformist

Performance in 1993 elections: n/a

Leader: Irina Khakamada

Common Cause was formed just before the 1995 elections by the popular female politician, Duma Deputy Irina Khakamada. She had been a part of Forward, Russia!, but left in early 1995 because of differences with its founder, Boris Fyodorov. The bloc's three top

candidates on the party list ballot are all popular figures: Khakamada, actor Rolan Bykov and astronaut Vladimir Dzhanibekov.

The group hopes to attract women and young voters with an agenda that focuses on social issues, including combating discrimination against women and recognizing homemaking and child care as occupations. Under Common Cause's program, the government would compensate women for their household work. The bloc generally supports the government's current economic reform policies.

The bloc will try to use the popularity of its leaders to attract voters, but it is not expected to pass the 5 percent threshold. Popular as Khakamada may be in Moscow and St. Petersburg, she isn't well known enough in the regions to carry Common Cause into the parliament. She is, however, expected to win her race for a single mandate seat.

### *Our Home is Russia*

Affiliation: Centrist

Performance in 1993 elections: n/a

Leader: Viktor Chernomyrdin

In April 1995, Yeltsin decided to construct a two-party system by creating two powerful electoral blocs -- one center-right and one center-left -- that would bring together coalitions of like-minded parties and dominate the 1995 Parliamentary elections. In creating these parties under his direction, Yeltsin hoped to diminish the strength of extremist opponents among the national and communist parties. Our Home is Russia, led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, is the center-right party; Rybkin's bloc, led by State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin is the center-left party.

Chernomyrdin officially founded the bloc in May and has had greater success than Rybkin in establishing his coalition. Although Chernomyrdin has not gained support from all cabinet ministers as he initially promised, he has assembled a team of high-ranking government officials and powerful business and industrial groups. The major blocs that comprise Our Home is Russia in the State Duma are Stability, Rossiya and some former members of Russia's Democratic Choice. Administrative leaders throughout the regions have jumped onto the party's bandwagon, some observers suspect because the regions want to curry favor with the government. As the former chairman of Gazprom, the state gas corporation, the prime minister has also had little trouble gaining financial backing from the country's oil and gas industry.

Despite his success at gaining support of national and regional government leaders, Chernomyrdin failed to bring other major reform parties into the coalition. Yabloko, led by economist Grigori Yavlinsky, has long been opposed to Yeltsin's and Chernomyrdin's economic policies and refused to consider an alliance with Our Home is Russia. Yegor Gaidar's Russia's Democratic Choice, once considered the president's party, had a falling out with Yeltsin over

the war in Chechnya, and as a result rejected joining forces with the prime minister's party. Sergei Shakrai, head of the reformist Party of Unity and Accord (PRES), joined the Our Home is Russia and left in August because he wasn't given a top position on the national party list ballot. Notably, despite the lack of national party leadership support for Our Home is Russia bloc, many regional leaders from these parties will cooperate with Our Home is Russia in the upcoming elections. Regional RDC leaders in St. Petersburg, Rostov and Murmansk have coordinated candidates in the single mandate races with Our Home is Russia to ensure that strong candidates will not run against each other.

The platform of Our Home is Russia is deliberately ambiguous in an effort to draw in broad support. In fact, Chernomyrdin rejected the label "center-right," preferring to have his bloc known as a "broad center coalition." The bloc's unofficial motto is stability and order, promising a slower forward movement of reforms. At its founding congress in May 1995, coalition members adopted a platform to please everybody, promising among other things: more foreign investment and protection of Russian manufacturers; continued agrarian reforms and regulation of land ownership. At the party's second congress in September, Chernomyrdin outlined the bloc's three main objectives: "First, to stimulate national capital accumulation as the basis for economic growth. Second, to expand cooperation between the government and national entrepreneurs. Third, to establish a socially-oriented economic system based on market principles."

Western observers' expectations of Our Home is Russia in the December elections has dropped considerably since its formation. In a special election for governor in September in the industrialist region of Sverdlovsk, the incumbent, from Our Home is Russia, was soundly defeated by Eduard Rossel, an anti-Moscow candidate and former governor who had been fired by Yeltsin the year before. Rossel led a drive to create an independent Urals Republic. Although the race was seen by some as a bellwether for the parliamentary elections, other insiders said Yeltsin "gave" the election to Rossel in exchange for his agreeing to drop his quest for a Urals Republic. There are signs that Yeltsin is distancing himself from Our Home is Russia partly because of the bloc's drop in popularity. The president has been publicly critical of Chernomyrdin and the bloc.

Labeled the "party of power" by opponents and supporters alike, Our Home is Russia is viewed by many as the party of the old Soviet *nomenklatura*. Some opponents believe the coalition was formed only to help its leaders retain their power. Even Chernomyrdin predicts Our Home will take fourth place, with 12-15 percent of the vote, behind the Communists, Yabloko and the Liberal Democratic Party. The bloc is expected to do well in single mandate races, which may help it create one of the largest factions in parliament.

## *Women of Russia*

Affiliation: Centrist

Performance in 1993 elections: 21 party list seats; 2 single mandate seats

Leaders: Yekaterina Lakhova and Alevtina Fedulova

Women of Russia was founded in October 1993 to address issues affecting women. It is a coalition of three women's organizations: the Association of Women Entrepreneurs, the Union of Navy Women and the Union of Russia's Women (the latter two are former communist organizations). In the 1993 elections, Women of Russia won more than 8 percent of the vote, a surprise to many political observers who questioned whether the bloc would clear the 5 percent threshold. The original goal of the bloc was to increase the presence of women in politics. In 1993, they single-handedly raised the number of women in Russia's lower chamber to 13.5 percent, up from 5.4 percent in the Congress of People's Deputies.

A centrist bloc, Women of Russia's agenda focuses on social issues, advocating more government involvement and financial support in health care, child care and education. Many initially thought the bloc was a communist affiliate, given that two of its three founding member organizations were former communist groups. Although it does often vote with the Agrarian and Communist parties, Women of Russia does not take a hard opposition line to the government. The party's leaders have refused offers to join other coalitions fearing that adequate attention would not be given to women's issues. In addition, they believed their candidates would be placed far down on other parties' candidate lists, preventing many women from being elected to the Duma.

The bloc's appeal among women is mixed with the bloc's major support coming from educated, but economically disadvantaged women. Those who oppose the bloc disapprove of its labeling some issues as women's issues and propagating certain gender stereotypes. The movement has gained a reputation for its moderate, but sometimes contradictory, positions in Parliament. For example, in February it voted for the government's anti-inflationary budget and at the same time supported a measure to increase the minimum wage. The Communist Party is actively campaigning against Women of Russia in order to win back the women vote, on which it relies heavily.

Despite the fact that Women of Russia inherited the infrastructure from two communist organizations with strong presence in the regions, it has failed to create a powerful regional network. Women of Russia was among the first eight to register its party on the national ballot and is expected to clear the 5 percent threshold. The bloc has no estimate of members or regional branches.

## *Rybkin's Bloc*

Affiliation: Centrist

Performance in 1993 elections: n/a

Leader: Ivan Rybkin

Rybkin's bloc, named after its founder, Ivan Rybkin, speaker of the State Duma, was unofficially created in April 1995 at the same time as Our Home is Russia, a pro-government coalition led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Both electoral coalitions were formed at the direction of President Boris Yeltsin, who hoped two strong center-left and center-right parties would help foster a two-party system. Chernomyrdin's organization came together much more easily than did Rybkin's, which wasn't officially launched until August.

The problem in forming Rybkin's bloc lay in the premise of its creation. Yeltsin recognized that if he attempted to create one pro-reform coalition among existing pro-reform parties, it would be an easy target for opposition groups. So, in addition to a pro-reform coalition, Yeltsin decided to create an opposition group among forces that were somewhat cooperative with his government. This would prevent the creation of a powerful extremist movement. Yeltsin was successful in establishing the pro-government group, Our Home is Russia. However, the so-called opposition bloc led by Rybkin was viewed by many opposition groups as also being pro-government because it was formed with Yeltsin's blessing.

Although generally on good terms now, Rybkin and Yeltsin have had a stormy relationship. While serving in the Supreme Soviet in the early 1990s, Rybkin led forces opposed to Yeltsin. In the State Duma, after being elected speaker of the new parliament by a coalition of communist, socialist and nationalist parties, Rybkin received high marks for his cooperation with the government and pro-reform parties. Ironically, before agreeing to create Yeltsin's opposition party, Rybkin actually had a stronger base than Chernomyrdin because his cooperative style allowed him to patch together an alliance of smaller socialist parties. But after Yeltsin's announcement that Rybkin would form a bloc, Rybkin's natural allies either refused outright to join the bloc, or joined and later quit. Even the Agrarian Party, of which Rybkin was a member, would not join because it didn't believe its interests would be adequately represented. Rybkin tried to stem the damage in the fall with press conferences denouncing the government, but it was too little too late for most opposition groups.

Despite Rybkin's difficulties in assembling his bloc, he managed to build a coalition of 50 parties and associations (including agrarian, union, industrialist and entrepreneurial groups), that was among the first eight groups to be registered by the Central Election Commission on the party list ballot. The bloc's platform is based on five principles: social justice, law, order, creation and realism. Beyond espousing rhetoric to help low-income people hurt by economic reforms, the bloc has not staked out positions on most issues. It is questionable whether Rybkin's bloc will cross the 5 percent threshold required to enter the Duma via the party list ballot.

### *Workers' Self-Government Party*

Affiliation: Centrist  
Performance in 1993 elections: n/a  
Leader: Svyastoslav Fyodorov

The Workers Self-Organization Party is worthy of note because of its charismatic founder, eye surgeon Svyastoslav Fyodorov (not to be confused with the economist, Boris Fyodorov, leader of Forward, Russia!). Labeled the Ross Perot of Russia's 1995 elections, Svyastoslav Fyodorov is a self-made millionaire who advocates giving ownership of every enterprise to its workers, which he says would increase productivity and better protect workers rights. He bases his philosophy on the success of his own eye surgery practice.

Fyodorov's party supports only limited economic reform as he also advocates fixing prices, salaries and pensions. In addition, he would prohibit the export of Russia's raw materials, instead having them sold to producers at artificially low prices. Although it is unlikely the party will cross the 5 percent threshold on the party list ballot, it is polling at a consistent 3-4 percent support. This could be a surprise victor on the national party list. Fyodorov will probably win a single mandate seat.

### *Communist Party of the Russian Federation*

Affiliation: Communist  
Performance in 1993 elections: 32 party list seats; 5 single mandate seats  
Leader: Gennadi Zyuganov

Russian President Boris Yeltsin banned the Communist Party in late 1991 after the August 1991 coup attempt against former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1992, Russia's Constitutional Court partially overturned Yeltsin's decision, allowing for the revival of what has become one of the largest and best organized parties in Russia.

The rebirth of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) was slow at first because many communists found homes among communist offshoots movements like the Agrarian bloc. The KPRF held its founding congress in February 1993, establishing as its leader Gennadi Zyuganov, the former ideology chief of the Russian Communist Party under the Soviet regime. The party claims to have 500,000 members and 20,000 regional organizations.

Reports suggest that the KPRF is undergoing an internal revolution between younger communists, who want to moderate the party's image, and hard-line old-timers who are resisting change. While not as reformed as the new communist parties of Eastern Europe, the KPRF has changed its position on certain issues since its existence under Soviet rule. Unlike other more radical communist organizations in Russia, like the Russian Communist Workers' Party, the KPRF does support private ownership of some businesses, indicating that only energy,

agriculture, transportation, communications and strategically important industries should be state controlled. The KPRF has also distanced itself from nationalistic policies and advocates a peaceful transition to power. Zyuganov has discreetly tried to distance the party from its old image: a New York Times journalist has noted that Zyuganov never uses the word "communist" in his speeches.

The KPRF is still unquestionably communist, however. At its third national congress in January 1995, the KPRF adopted a platform that opposes the private ownership of land and natural resources, supports the reversal of the privatization of certain industries, advocates a return to a state-regulated economy, calls for the adoption of a new Russian Constitution (that presumably would increase the Parliament's power at the expense of the Executive branch) and supports the restoration of the Soviet Union on a voluntary basis.

Support for the party has grown since the 1993 elections, according to a recent public opinion poll. In 1993, the Communists won 12.4 percent of the vote; in April 1995, 25 percent of voters said they supported the Communist Party. Communist Party backers are also strongly loyal to the party: the same poll shows that 93 percent of those who voted Communist in 1993 intend to do so again. In contrast, only 54 percent of those who supported the pro-reform Russia's Democratic Choice said they would vote for it again. The KPRF has the greatest support among pensioners, teachers and other workers, who receive among the lowest benefits and salaries. Support for the party is growing across the country because as crime increases and economic instability remains, more people find comfort in the promises of the Communist party to turn back the country's economic and social policies to those of the more stable Soviet era.

The Communist Party has one of the strongest regional networks, having inherited the existing structure from the Soviet Communist party. It is anticipated that the party will make the strongest showing of any of the parties on the national ballot. Given its well-organized apparatus, it is not a surprise that the KPRF was the first to turn in the required 200,000 signatures to be placed on the national party list ballot for the 1995 Parliamentary elections. The local party organizations are extremely effective at mobilizing voters. Candidates will run a grassroots, door-to-door campaign, with almost no advertising. Given its solid base, the party does not need to spend money on ads.

The Communists performed exceptionally well this year in two local elections in Volgograd and Vladimir. Both elections are seen as an indication that the Communist Party is on a comeback. It should be noted, however, that the Communists never truly lost control in either of these regions.

The KPRF has the strongest collection of single mandate candidates and is expected to win the most party list seats. Analysts predict the KPRF will win 20-25 percent of the vote.

## *Agrarian Party of Russia*

Affiliation: Communist

Performance in 1993 elections: 21 party list seats; 12 single mandate seats

Leader: Mikhail Lapshin

A close relative to the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) is a powerful political party and legislative lobby that has the support of much of rural Russia. The APR is an election bloc that includes the Agrarian Union and the Agro-Industrial Trade Union. The bloc claims to have a membership of 250,000 and more than 4,000 regional organizations.

Over the past five years, there have been several attempts to reform the agriculture industry. In 1990, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies adopted a law that allowed farmers to leave the *kolkhozi* with a share of land and equipment, but individuals often did not receive enough quality land to run a viable farm. A 1992 presidential decree released all state farms from central control, forcing farmers to find their own markets and handle their own accounting. About 90 percent of farms, however, remain collectives, housing 30 million people. Since 1993, agriculture subsidies have been substantially decreased, but the APR has been successful at preventing a complete end to the subsidies.

Unlike most Russian parties, the APR has a defined constituency and a focused agenda. The driving force behind the APR is the managers of the collective farms (*kolkhozi*), who still control almost 90 percent of Russian farmland. These farm managers want to stop market reforms in the agriculture sector in order to prevent the loss of their jobs, power and perks. Farm workers also generally support the APR, most likely because their bosses tell them to do so. Farm managers control everything in their employees' lives from their salaries to the housing they receive, so "convincing" farm workers to vote for the party is an easy task. With agriculture production falling and food prices rising -- more due to lack of real reform, than too much reform -- the APR has also been able to persuade other Russians that agriculture should be state-controlled.

APR's goal is to reverse market reforms. The party's platform opposes the sale and private ownership of farmland and the privatization of agricultural industries, and supports an increase in government agricultural subsidies. In addition to its agrarian agenda, the APR supports many of the tenets of the Communist Party, including restoring the Soviet Union and recreating a strong centralized government. Unlike the Communist Party, however, the APR has supported Yeltsin in some major policy issues. The APR did not support the no-confidence vote this summer reprimanding Yeltsin and his administration for the handling of the hostage situation by Chechen rebels.

The leader of the APR is Mikhail Lapshin, a former Communist party official. Another powerful member until recently was Ivan Rybkin, speaker of the State Duma, the lower house of Parliament. During this election, Rybkin broke away from the APR to form his own electoral bloc, named after himself, which the APR chose not to join.

During the 1993 elections, the APR won 55 seats in the state Duma. Like the Communist party, the APR has a strong organizational network that can effectively turn out voters. The Agrarians and the Communists together are expected to take about one-third of the seats in the 1995 parliamentary elections.

### *Congress of Russian Communities*

Affiliation: Nationalist

Performance in 1993 elections: n/a

Leaders: Yuri Skokov and General Alexander Lebed

Founded in March 1993 by a coalition of Russian organizations to defend the interests of Russians living in former Soviet republics, the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) has only recently become a strong contender in Russian politics. The surge in popularity can be attributed to the movement's new leading nationalist figure, General Alexander Lebed, former commander of the 14th Army in Moldova.

General Lebed consistently ranks as one of the most popular politicians in Russia, edging out the pro-reform leader Grigori Yavlinsky, chairman of the Yabloko bloc. The 44-year-old former military commander possesses the qualities of a strong, authoritarian leader that Russians traditionally support. Lebed is charismatic and speaks about issues the average person can relate to rather than abstract economic policies, in contrast to some pro-reform politicians. His two main issues are restoring the dignity of Russia and cracking down on crime. He is expected to run for president in 1996 and be a leading contender, with a possible coalition between KRO and the KPRF. Lebed rose to the prominent position in Moldova after he held back the army during the 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. He gained national prominence in early 1995 with his public criticisms of Yeltsin's military move against Chechnya. After intensive media speculation that he might enter the political arena, Lebed resigned from the army in May. Lebed is considered a strong contender for the presidential elections in June 1996.

The KRO's original focus was providing support to Russian entrepreneurs in the former Soviet republics. Although more moderate than the LDPR, the KRO is considered a nationalist party because of its strong pro-Russian policies and calls to return to the past. The movement has no representation in the State Duma. It did not field candidates in 1993 because it was unable to collect enough signatures to be listed on the ballot. In April 1995, the KRO elected its chairman Yuri Skokov, a professional politician and former Yeltsin ally during the 1991 coup. Skokov has since become an opponent of Yeltsin and his economic policies. One of Skokov's main tasks has been to establish a strong network in the regions. He has systematically and effectively gone into regions where potential support is high and built a solid network through existing organizations.

Another prominent addition to the movement in recent months is State Duma deputy Sergei Glazyev, former chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia and chairman of the Duma

Committee on Economic Policy. Glazyev served in Yeltsin's administration in 1992-93 as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations. He is considered an economic centrist -- he supports market reforms, but at a slower pace and with a more social democratic bent.

With Lebed's charisma and a relatively strong grassroots organization, the movement is expected to do well in the Parliamentary elections. KRO perhaps has the greatest financial resources for the campaign, some speculate as much as \$8 million. The coalition's advertisements have been professional and pointed at cleaning up corruption in Russia. KRO is expected to do well on the party list, but few of its single mandate candidates are expected to win because the coalition was not able to recruit quality people.

### *Liberal Democratic Party of Russia*

Affiliation: Nationalist

Performance in 1993 elections: 59 party list seats; 5 single mandate seats

Leader: Vladimir Zhirinovksy

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) is best known for its outspoken, bomb-throwing, nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Zhirinovsky took the country by surprise in the 1993 December Parliamentary elections when his party came out from obscurity in the final hours of the elections and won the most seats on the party list ballot and the second most seats overall in the State Duma. Western pundits thought Zhirinovsky won the anti-government vote from those protesting the country's economic policies. Yeltsin, in an attempt to take votes away from the communists, aired a documentary on Zhirinovsky, the day before the elections in 1993. That program, which had an anti-government message, helped sway undecided voters to Zhirinovsky. Zhirinovsky also waged a successful, western-style campaign targeting messages at various segments of society. Most of his promises were absurd and went unfulfilled like lowering prices on vodka, restoring the Russian empire to its borders under the Tsarist regime (which includes Finland), reclaiming Alaska and finding a husband for every woman in Russia.

The party was founded by Zhirinovsky in December 1989 as the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (LDPSS). It was the first officially registered alternative party to the Communist Party. The LDPR claims to have 170,000 members and branches in all 89 regions and republics of Russia. Zhirinovsky did establish a relatively active regional network for the December 1993 elections, which he has managed to maintain generally despite his decrease in popularity. The LDPR was among the first parties to make a targeted appeal to youth, even establishing youth auxiliary groups in early 1994. The party publishes two newspapers, *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovsky's Truth) and *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovsky's Falcon), which the LDPR claims have a combined circulation of 500,000.

Zhirinovsky's xenophobic, chauvinistic and anti-Semitic rhetoric frightened western leaders, who feared he would be a serious contender for the Russian presidency in 1996. He ran for president in 1991 against Boris Yeltsin and, despite his relative obscurity and extreme

views, he won almost 8 percent of the vote. After the 1993 Parliamentary elections, however, his popularity plummeted as many of his antics made him look like a buffoon. Zhirinovskiy's first *fisticuffs* with another deputy in the cafeteria line in January 1994 marked what became characteristic behavior on his part. Most recently he physically attacked a deputy who is a defrocked priest and punched a female deputy who came to her colleague's rescue. Zhirinovskiy later said the woman enjoyed the brawl because she had an excuse to touch him. In addition to numerous episodes like these, Zhirinovskiy's dictatorial leadership style within his party has caused a number of deputies to abandon the LDPR; the number of Duma members in the LDPR dropped from 64 deputies to 54.

A recent public opinion poll by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VCIOM) shows that Zhirinovskiy's support has dwindled from 23 percent in the 1993 elections to 11 percent. The LDPR may be losing some voters simply because it is no longer the only "patriotic" party on the political scene. Most likely, however, is that disgruntled voters, who were wooed by Zhirinovskiy's charisma and promises for a stable Russia in 1993, have been turned off by his actions and empty promises. These voters will likely find a home with Communists or centrist parties advocating stability and pared-back reforms.

Despite the LDPR's drop in support, it was still among the first parties to be registered on the national party ballot. The party's platform continues to emphasize strong centralized control and pro-Russian policies. Zhirinovskiy wants to forbid citizens from the Caucasus from entering Russia (Russians often associate them with the mafia), suspend civil rights of all citizens to control crime, restore the borders of the former Soviet Union and return the Russian military to parts of Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

The LDPR is well-funded and is trying to portray itself as "one of the people" through its paid ads. Depending on the success of the media campaign, the party could get 5-10 percent of the party list seats. Because of the poor quality of single mandate candidates, LDPR will likely not win many more single seats than it did in 1993.

### *Derzhava*

Affiliation: Nationalist  
Performance in 1993 elections: n/a  
Leader: Aleksandr Rutskoi

Derzhava, which means power in Russian, is led by Aleksandr Rutskoi, former vice president and leader of the October 1993 parliamentary revolt against Yeltsin. He was jailed for several months for his actions before being granted amnesty by the State Duma in early 1994. Rutskoi founded Derzhava in April 1995 and claims to have a membership of more than one million and 62 regional branches.

Although Rutskoi is now one of Yeltsin's most ardent opponents, five years ago he was a Yeltsin ally. In the 1991 presidential elections, Yeltsin asked Rutskoi to be his running mate. Their relationship deteriorated shortly after the election because of disagreements over Yeltsin's "shock therapy" economic policy. After months of political maneuvers between Yeltsin and the Parliament, led by Rutskoi, in October 1993, the Supreme Soviet declared Rutskoi to be the acting president. Yeltsin responded by dissolving the parliament and ordered the shelling of the parliamentary building.

After the Duma granted Rutskoi amnesty for his actions in the uprising, Rutskoi went back into politics, claiming that he was still vice president of Russia. He was elected chairman of the Russian Social Democratic People's Party (RSDNP) and at the same time began to organize Derzhava. His efforts split the RSDNP; some members joined Derzhava and others left for the Social Democratic Union. Derzhava's major competition in the election will be the Communists and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, although there will be at least 15 parties with similar agendas.

Even though Rutskoi blames the communists and the 1917 revolution for Russia's economic ills, he wants to restore much of what existed under the former Soviet Union. Derzhava's platform calls for forcibly restoring the territory of the Soviet Union and replacing the ethnic territories within Russia with non-racially divided provinces. The movement's economic policies dismiss any form of capitalism and oppose the sale or private ownership of land.

With Rutskoi's appeal to the increasing number of discontented voters, Derzhava will likely pass the 5 percent threshold, although the increased competition among similar parties may limit Derzhava to just 5 percent.

*December 1995*

## ELECTORAL ASSOCIATIONS RUNNING ON THE PARTY LIST BALLOT

### Blocs by category and top three candidates

NOTE: You may hear different labels for these parties from different sources, but these are the most common classifications for the electoral associations running in the December elections.

#### REFORMIST

##### **Russia's Democratic Choice - United Democrats**

1. Gaidar Yegor Timurovich, State Duma deputy, Chairman of the bloc
2. Kovalev Sergei Adamovich, State Duma deputy
3. Shukshina Lidia Nikolayevna, Actress

##### **Yabloko**

1. Yavlinsky Grigori Alexayevich, State Duma deputy, Chairman of the bloc
2. Lukin Vladimir Petrovich, State Duma deputy
3. Yarygina Tatyana Vladimirovna, State Duma deputy

##### **Party of Russian Unity and Accord**

1. Shakhrai Sergei Mikhailovich, State Duma deputy, Vice Prime Minister, Chairman of the Party
2. Bykov Valeri Alexeivich, General Director of Pharmacology Research Institute
3. Ivankov Vladimir Ivanovich, General Director of Siberian Accord Association

##### **"Panfilova-Gurov-Lysenko" (Republican Party of Russian Federation)**

1. Panfilova Ella Alexandrovna, State Duma deputy
2. Gurov Alexander Ivanovich, Vice President of Infrom-Service company
3. Lysenko Vladimir Nikolayevich, State Duma deputy

##### **'Forward, Russia!'**

1. Fyodorov Boris Grigoryevich, State Duma deputy, Chairman of the Party
2. Denisenko Bella Anatolyevna, State Duma deputy and chairwoman of the Duma Health Care Committee
3. Vladislavlev Alexandr Pavlovich, First Vice-President of Russia's Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs

##### **Christian-Democratic Union-Christians of Russia**

1. Savitski Vitali Viktorovich, chairman of the party, State Duma deputy
2. Ivanova Tatyana Borisovna, Women Alliance Association, president
3. Kisilev Alexander Nikolayevich, First Secretary

### **Common Cause Electoral Bloc**

1. Khakamada Irina Mutsumovna, State Duma deputy, Leader
2. Bykov Rolan Anatolyevich, Actor, Film producer
3. Dzhanibekov Vladimir Alexandrovich, astronaut

### **Economic Freedom Party**

1. Borovoi Konstantin Natanovich, Chairman of the party
2. Nekrasov Leonid Vasilyevich, State Duma deputy
3. Shpigel Leonid Teodorovich

### **Beer Lovers Party**

1. Kalachev Konstantin Eduardovich, General Secretary
2. Shestakov Dmitri Yuryevich, Chairman
3. Palchevski Andrei Ivanovich, Campaign Manager

## **CENTRIST**

### **'Our House - Russia' Electoral Association**

1. Chernomyrdin Viktor Stepanovich, Prime Minister
2. Mikhalkov Nikita Sergeivich, film producer ('Burned by the Sun')
3. Rokhlin Lev Yakovlevich, 8th Army Corps stationed in Volgograd

### **Women of Russia Electoral Association**

1. Fedulova Alevtina Vasilyevna, Deputy Speaker of the State Duma
2. Lakhova Yekaterina Filippovna, State Duma deputy
3. Klimantova Galina Ivanovna, State Duma deputy

### **Ivan Rybkin Bloc**

1. Rybkin Ivan Petrovich, Speaker of the State Duma
2. Petrov Yuri Vladimirovich, leader of the Realists' Union and Chairman of the State Investment Corporation
3. Chilingarov Arthur Nikolayevich, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma

### **'Duma 96' Civic and Political Movement**

1. Burenin Vladimir Arsenyevich, President of 'Business-Education' Association, Rector of the Commercial School of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Chairman of the movement
2. Simonov Mikhail Petrovich, General Designer Sukhoi Aeronautical Engineering Company
3. Kondratyev Georgi Grigoriyevich, three star general, Ministry of Emergency Situations

### **Party of Workers' Self-Government**

1. Fedorov Svyatoslav Nikolayevich, eye surgeon
2. Kazannink Alexei Ivanovich, Omsk State University Professor
3. Porokhovshchikov Alexander Shalvovich, Pushkin Drama Theater Actor

### **‘Stable Russia’ Civic and Political Movement**

1. Petrov Oleg Vadimovich, Movement’s Executive Committee Chairman
2. Bystritskaya Elina Avramovna, Actress
3. Gorlov Alexander Viktorovich, General Director of Servicemen Association

### **Social Democrats Electoral Bloc**

1. Popov Gavril Kharitonovich, former Mayor of Moscow, Chairman of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms
2. Lipitski Vasili Semenovich, State Duma deputy, Co-chairman of electoral bloc
3. Bogomolov Oleg Timofeyevich, State Duma deputy

### **Transformation of Fatherland Electoral Bloc**

1. Rossel Eduard Ergartovich, Sverdlovsk Oblast Governor
2. Yakimov Viktor Vasilyevich, Deputy in Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma
3. Salye Marina Yevgeniyevna, Chairwoman of the Free Democratic Party

### **Ecological Party of Russia (Cedar)**

1. Panfilov Anatoli Alexeivich, Chairman of the movement
2. Yakubovich Leonid, Host of the Russian version of TV show ‘Wheel of Fortune’
3. Tarasov Artem Mikhailovich, State Duma deputy

### **“Interethnic Union” Electoral Bloc**

1. Mikitayev Abdulakh Kasbulatovich, Presidential Commission on Citizenship, Chairman of the bloc
2. Gareyev Makhmut Akhmetovich, Military Inspector
3. Zaytsev Alexander Nikolayevich, State Duma deputy

### **Trade Unions and Industrialists - Labor Union**

1. Shcherbakov Vladimir Ivanovich, Chairman of Russian United Industrial Party
2. Shmakov Mikhail Viktorovich, Chairman of Federation of Independent Trade Unions
3. Volski Arkadi Ivanovich, President of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs

## **NATIONALIST**

### **Liberal Democratic Party of Russia**

1. Zhirinovski Vladimir Volfovich, State Duma deputy, Chairman of the party
2. Abeltsev Sergei Nikolayevich, State Duma deputy
3. Vengerovski Alexander Dmitriyevich, State Duma deputy, Deputy Chairman of the party

### **“Power to the People” Electoral Coalition**

1. Ryzhkov Nikolai Ivanovich, President of Eurasia International Association, former Prime Minister of the USSR
2. Baburin Sergei Nikolayevich, State Duma deputy, Chairman of Russia’s All-People’s Union
3. Shuvalova Helena Anatolyevna, Chairwoman of All-Russia Mothers’ Movement “For Social Justice”

### **Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc**

1. Govorukhin Stanislav Sergeivich, State Duma deputy, film producer
2. Rumyantsev Oleg Germanovich, President of Constitutional Reforms Foundation
3. Aksutchits Viktor Vladimirovich, Chairman of Russia’s Christian-Democratic Movement

### **“For the Motherland!” Electoral Bloc**

1. Polevanov Vladimir Pavlovich, Chairman of “New Russia” movement
2. Podkolzin Yevgeni Nikolayevich, Russia’s Airborne Troops Commander
3. Baltin Eduard Dmitriyevich, Black Sea Fleet Commander

### **National Republican Party of Russia**

1. Lysenko Nikolai Nikolayevich, State Duma deputy, Chairman of the party
2. Pavlov Nikoali Alexandrovich, Political Secretary (party position)
3. Ovchinnikov Konstantin Nikolayevich, Central Coordination Committee Chairman

### **Russian Nationwide Movement**

1. Bazhenov Alexander Vasilyevich, businessman, Co-chairman of the movement
2. Moshnyakov Valeri Vladimirovich, Co-chairman of the movement
3. Platonov Vladimir Konstantinovich, Moscow Local Chairman

### **“Derzhava” Social and Patriotic Movement**

1. Rutskoi Alexander Vladimirovich, former Vice-President of Russia, Chairman of movement
2. Kobelev Viktor Vasilyevich, State Duma deputy, Deputy Chairman of the movement
3. Dushenkov Konstantin Yuryevich, Chairman of the Orthodox Church Brotherhood Union, press-secretary of St Petersburg Archbishop Ioan

### **‘Congress of Russian Communities’ Civic and Political Movement**

1. Skokov Yuri Vladimirovich, Chairman of the movement
2. Lebed Alexander Ivanovich, Deputy Chairman of the movement
3. Glazyev Sergei Yuriyevich, Chairman of the Duma Committee on Economic Politics

### **“My Fatherland” Electoral Association**

1. Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich, Chief Military Expert of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2. Shatalin Stanislav Sergeivich, International Foundation of Economic and Social Reforms “Reform”
3. Kobzon Iosif Davidovich, singer, businessman

### **Electoral Bloc 'Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov'**

1. Tikhonov Alexander Anatoliyevich, General Director of 'InterUral' company, Chairman of the bloc
2. Tupolev Alexei Andreyevich, General Designer of Tupolev Aeronautical Engineering Company
3. Tikhonov Viktor Vasilyevich, Army Hockey Team Senior Coach

### **COMMUNIST**

#### **Communist Party of the Russian Federation**

1. Zuganov Gennadi Andreyevich, State Duma deputy, Chairman of the party
2. Goryacheva Svetlana Petrovna, Deputy Attorney General of Vladivostok City
3. Tyleyev Aman-geldy Moldagazyevich, Speaker of Kemerovo Legislative Assembly, Federation Council member

#### **Agrarian Party of Russia**

1. Lapshin Mikhail Ivanovich, State Duma deputy, Chairman of the party
2. Nazarchuk Alexander Grigoryevich, Minister of Agriculture
3. Starodubtsev Vasili Alexandrovich, Federation Council member

#### **Coalition for the Protection of Pensioners and Veterans**

1. Davitashvili Yevgeniya Yuvashevna, "healer"
2. Volkov Andrei Romanovich, State Duma deputy
3. Pankratov-Cherni Alexander Vasilyevich, actor

#### **"Communists - Working Russia - For the Soviet Union"**

1. Tulkin Viktor Arkadyevich, Russian Communist Workers Party, First Secretary of the bloc
2. Kruchkov Anatoli Viktorovich, Russian Communist Party, Chairman of the bloc
3. Anpilov Viktor Ivanovich, Working Russia Movement, Chairman of the bloc

### **POLITICAL ORIENTATION NOT ESTABLISHED**

#### **All-Russia Moslem Civic Movement 'Nur' ('Light')**

1. Yakhin Khalit Akhmetovich, Chairman of the movement
2. Yarulin Vafa Seitbattalovich, Deputy Chairman of the movement
3. Shagidulin Anver Gallyamovich, State Duma consultant

#### **Lawyers Association of Russia**

1. Malayev Alexei Nikiforovich, President of Association
2. Mirzoyev Gasan Borisovich, President of Guild of Russian Lawyers
3. Fedoseyev Anatoli Mikhailovich, Federation Council member, Constitutional Law and Legal Issues Committee, Deputy Chairman of Association

**Independents Bloc**

(only regional candidates)

**“89” (89 regions of Russia)**

(only regional candidates)

**“People’s Union” Party**

1. Lukyanov Vladimir Nikolayevich, Chairman of the party
2. Galagan Dmitri Andreyevich, Chairman of the Executive Committee
3. Mironov Genadi Anatolyevich, Secretary of the party

**Threshold Generation Electoral Bloc**

1. Solonnikov Dmitri Vladimirovich, Director of St Petersburg Children and Youth Center
2. Pilepeshin Nikolai Anatolyevich, Youth Housing Compound, Chairman
3. Bariyev Marat Mansurovich, Tatarstan State Committee on Children and Youth Affairs, Chairman

**Electoral Bloc including Party for Protecting the Disabled and other parties**

1. Dikul Valentin Ivanovich, President of Medical Rehabilitation Center
2. Voyevodin Vadim Alexeyevich
3. Koltunov Yan Ivanovich

**Public Utilities Workers Union Electoral Association**

1. Chernyshev Leonid Nikolayevich, President of the Union
2. Surov Petr Sergeivich, Director of Construction Department
3. Avdeyev Valeri Valentinovich, Director of Ministry of Construction Utilities Department

**Federal-Democratic Movement of Russia Electoral Association**

1. Novikov Oleg Ivanovich, Chairman of Moscow Anti-Trust Department
2. Kalugin Oleg Danilovich, Consultant for Information Service Agency
3. Kazakova Rima Fedorovna, poet



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

## **Background on the Russian Parliament and Russian Politics**

Prepared by the International Republican Institute

### **Introduction**

In June 1991, Boris Yeltsin won election to the Russian presidency, providing a serious challenge to Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin's courageous stand against the coup attempt on Gorbachev in August 1991 helped the new Russian president consolidate support in the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and enhance his authority. Later in October 1991, Yeltsin appointed himself prime minister and formed a government consisting almost entirely of radical reformers. By the end of 1991, Gorbachev officially left the political scene and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Russia became an independent state, and Yeltsin became the foremost powerful leader in this part of the world, as the former Soviet Union transitioned into 15 separate countries.

Yeltsin's presidency has been rife with controversy and challenges. His deputy prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, launched an ambitious economic program of "shock therapy," lifting price controls and permitting floating exchange rates. These policies stirred so much controversy that Yeltsin was forced to ask for Gaidar's resignation. Yeltsin's political problems also included: a struggle over political ideology and the character of post-Soviet government; an institutional clash between the executive and the legislative branches of government; and the personal rivalry between himself and his chief opponents, Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice President Alexander Rutskoi.

By early 1993, Yeltsin appeared to have negotiated a power sharing arrangement with the Supreme Soviet that included a commitment to hold a constitutional referendum in April, asking whether Russia should be a parliamentary or presidential system. Yeltsin won strong support in the April 25 referendum and proceeded with his plans to adopt a new constitution.

Sensing it was losing influence in the summer of 1993, the Parliament attempted to reassert its authority. It approved a budget two and a half times larger than Yeltsin's budget. It voted to transfer the authority of the State Property Committee, which had been aggressively selling state-owned industries, to the more protective government ministries. It blocked the adoption of legislation on private ownership of land, and sought to further curb executive powers and assert control over the media. It proclaimed Ukraine's Crimean city Sevastopol a Russian city, worsening relations with Ukraine and causing alarm in other republics of the former Soviet Union.

The political crisis came to a head with Yeltsin's September 21, 1993 decree disbanding the legislature and calling for parliamentary elections in December. During October 3-4, political confrontation erupted in armed conflict between Yeltsin and his opposition in Parliament. By October 4, army units loyal to Yeltsin subdued the opposition and captured the insurgent leaders, chief among them, Khasbulatov and Rutskoi. Plans for the parliamentary elections were then put into motion with election day set for December 12, 1993.

#### **I. December 1993 Duma Elections**

The October events were a critical turning point for Russia's nascent democracy. With elections only two months away, the campaign demands of national parliamentary elections accelerated the development of Russia's young and fragile democratic political coalitions and spurred the building of national political networks. By early November, the Central Election Commission (CEC) determined that 13 of the 21 parties and coalitions that had submitted valid signature petitions and would be allowed to participate in the elections. Of the 13 parties, only one, Russia's Choice, fully supported the government's economic reforms, while the remainder embraced various reform and anti-reform positions.

Of the eight parties that broke the five percent threshold requirement to take seats in the Parliament, only three were considered pro-reform. Although Yegor Gaidar's Russia's Choice won the largest single bloc of votes, it performed more poorly than anticipated. Russia's Choice won only 66 seats in the 450-seat State Duma. Even the combined total of 112 seats won by all the reform-minded parties and coalitions was not nearly enough to control the 450-seat body. The weak showing of the reformers has been attributed in part to voter dissatisfaction with a decreasing standard of living and their concern for what continued reforms would bring.

During the campaign, the pro-democratic forces, lacking clearly defined ideologies or platforms to maintain discipline and attract new supporters, were further weakened by personality driven politics. As a result, the four principal democratic movements divided the diminished "reform vote" among themselves, further accentuating the strong performances by the anti-reformers. Additionally, the pro-reformers pursued a Moscow based campaign strategy that dictated policies to the regions rather than listening to the concerns of local party leaders to build support for a popular program. The Moscow circle was accused of elitism and as being out of touch with the challenges in the everyday lives of Russians.

Significantly, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won 64 seats by promising to recreate the Soviet Union and return it to the days of economic stability and international influence. While the LDP cannot control the legislature by itself, the 145 seats with the combined forces of the LDP (64 seats), the Communists (48 seats), and the closely aligned Agrarian Party (33 seats), easily surpass the reformers' 112 seats.

The shifting of coalitions among the respective reform, centrist, and anti-reform camps has important implications for such issues as committee chairmanships and the posts of speaker and chamber heads, which are central to setting the legislative agenda. Since December 1993,

a number of deputies from across the political spectrum have defected from their factions, joined other factions or formed new coalitions. Among the new coalitions are the December 12 Union, a moderate coalition made up of disaffected deputies from other pro-reform parties; New Regional Policy, a coalition of deputies from regions with oil and gas interests; Stability, a coalition of deputies from several pro-reform movements, who were upset when their parties broke away from Yeltsin during the Chechnya crisis; and, Rossiya, a group that was initially part of Stability, but broke away soon after its formation over certain policy differences. (see Table I for State Duma election results)

## **II. The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation**

The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, or the parliament, consists of 628 representatives; 450 deputies make up the State Duma, the lower chamber, and 178 members compose the Federation Council, the upper chamber. The State Duma is the more powerful of the two bodies and, like the U.S. House of Representatives, it meets year-round. The Russian Constitution establishes that the first class of deputies would be transitional and would serve only two years. Starting with the December 1995 elections, members will serve four-year terms.

Half of the Duma members are elected from single mandate constituencies. The remaining members are elected from national party lists, a feature in the election law intended to foster a party system. Seats are awarded proportionally with parties required to receive at least 5 percent of the vote in order to have representation in the Duma. In the 1993 elections, eight of 13 parties or political movements won seats on the proportional lists. In all, pro-reform parties won less than one-third of the 450 seats. The Duma is headed by Speaker Ivan Rybkin, a member of the Agrarian bloc, which is closely aligned with the Communist Party. Despite his Communist leanings, Rybkin has generally proven to be a moderate and fair, though sometimes weak, leader. He has organized his own party list named the Ivan Rybkin bloc, which is not expected to do well in the December elections (see party memo).

Unlike the State Duma, the Federation Council meets only periodically and for no more than three days at a time. It is less powerful than the Duma and its main function is approving legislation passed by the lower chamber. The Federation Council is made up of two representatives from each of the country's 89 administrative entities, which include regions, republics, krais and two federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg). Most members of the Federation Council are also regional legislative and executive branch representatives. The Council is led by Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeiko, a staunch Yeltsin supporter. In general, the Council is pro-reform and usually favors Yeltsin's positions on most issues.

In the December 1993 elections, only 22 regions in Russia elected their Federation Council representatives; the remaining members were appointed by the President. The Parliament is currently debating whether to require Federal Council deputies be elected. Many in the Duma are supporting legislation that requires elections for the upper chamber, believing it would create a greater separation of power between the legislative and executive branches. Yeltsin wants each region to appoint their representatives, providing regions a greater voice in

national affairs. He also argues that creating mandatory elections for the upper house members is unconstitutional.

### **III. Constitution of the Russian Federation**

The Russian Constitution was adopted by a nationwide referendum held during the December 1993 parliamentary elections. The Constitution gives substantial powers to the executive at the expense of the Parliament. The President has nearly veto-proof power. The Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of both chambers to overturn a veto, a nearly impossible task given the number and diversity of parties in the Parliament. Another Constitutional check on the Parliament is a provision that requires government studies before the Parliament can consider legislation that would alter the state budget, taxes or other financial matters. Further, two articles provide broad grounds for the president to dissolve the State Duma if it repeatedly withholds its consent to the president's nominee for prime minister or expresses no confidence in the government. The Constitution also allows the president to appoint his cabinet without legislative advice and consent.

### **IV. Parliamentary and Presidential Relations**

Yeltsin's relationship with the new Parliament has been considerably better than it was with the Congress of People's Deputies, which he disbanded in September 1993. The two branches have been able to approve several major pieces of legislation, including a new election law and two budgets, within the bounds of parliamentary debate. And, while on several occasions relations have broken down, all disputes have been resolved peacefully, despite fears to the contrary.

The issue that has most strained relations has been the invasion of Chechnya. Yeltsin lost the support of his traditional allies, namely Russia's Choice, in his effort to reign in the breakaway republic. He managed to gain approval to attack Chechnya's capital city, Grozny in December 1994, only with support from the Liberal Democratic Party, led by ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and PRES, a pro-government group advocating moderate reform led by Sergei Shakrai. The invasion not only brought to the surface issues of regional-federal relations and human rights, but it generated questions about the effectiveness and control of the military and presidential authoritarianism. It also severely strained the federal budget. The Chechnya crisis sparked a showdown between Yeltsin and the State Duma in July 1995, when the Duma passed a no-confidence vote in the government after a disastrous attempt to rescue hostages held by Chechen rebels caused scores of casualties. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin dared the Duma to pass a second no-confidence vote, which if passed, would have forced Yeltsin to either fire his cabinet or disband the parliament. Knowing Yeltsin would disband Parliament, prompting early elections, Parliament failed to pass the second vote. Yeltsin did, however, dismiss some members of his cabinet in an effort to appease the Parliament.

**Table I: 1993 State Duma Election Results**

Party	Proportional Vote	Party List Seats	Single-Seat Ballot	Total Seats
Russia's Choice	15.38%	40	26	66
Liberal Democratic Party	22.79%	59	5	64
Communist Party of the Russian Federation	12.35%	32	16	48
The Agrarian Party of Russia	7.9%	21	12	33
Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc	7.83%	20	7	27
Women of Russia Party	8.10%	21	2	23
Party of Russian Unity and Accord	6.76%	18	1	19
Democratic Party of Russia	5.50%	14	1	15
Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms	4.06%	0	4	4
Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress	1.92%	0	3	3
New Names/Future of Russia Bloc	1.25%	0	0	0
The Constructive Ecological Movement	0.75%	0	0	0
Dignity and Charity Bloc	0.70%	0	2	2
Other Parties	NA	0	13	13
Independents	NA	0	127	127
Total		225	219	444

*December 1995*

104



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

## International Republican Institute

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

### **Background Memo on Economic Issues in Russia** Prepared by the International Republican Institute

December 1995 marks four years since Russia began its painful transition to a market economy under President Boris Yeltsin's economic program. The policies have caused inflation to rise to 1,000 percent annually in 1993, unemployment to reach 15 percent in some regions, and social services once provided by the government to disappear. Despite these setbacks, there has been definite progress in transforming the economy. About 80 percent of state owned enterprises have been privatized, inflation fell to 100 percent annually in 1995, the ruble is stabilizing, and most consumer goods are readily available.

The successes of the economic reforms have not been spread evenly, however. At least one-third of Russians struggle to make ends meet. The gap between rich and poor is increasing, and the contrast is readily visible on most big city streets. Mercedes, BMWs and Jeep Cherokees zoom past *babushkas* selling their possessions on the street to buy some food. The new Russian rich regularly spend \$1,000 on a night out on the town, while the majority of Russians must raise food at their summer dachas to feed their families through the winter.

The first economic restructuring plan was Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika*, which sought and failed to transform the Soviet economy within the parameters of communist ideology. Russians saw a secure social services system -- guaranteed housing, employment, and free health care -- start to crumble and turn corrupt, leaving the average Russian with no reasonable alternatives. Then in 1991 Yeltsin began his economic "shock therapy" program, which freed prices on most consumer goods. The economic situation became more tenuous for many Russians who lost lifetime savings because of run-away inflation. As the economy began to absorb the reforms, the cost of living and consumer goods increased dramatically, while incomes stagnated for most Russians.

Much of the electorate is fearful of continued reforms because every time it seems the Russian economy has turned the corner, another economic setback occurs. Russians are by nature pessimistic and many blame their financial hardships on economic reforms put forth by democratic leaders. These attitudes contributed to the poor performance of pro-reform candidates in the 1993 parliamentary elections and threaten the performance of reformers in the December 1995 parliamentary elections and presidential elections scheduled for 1996. Some political observers believe that the electorate's frustrations with economic reforms will push the country away from democracy toward a more authoritarian regime.

The crisis in the secessionist republic of Chechnya and the large military expenditures it entailed raised new concerns about the government's ability to control spending and

continue stabilizing the economy. The first three weeks of the offensive cost the Russian government 1 percent of its budget, while the projected cost of the entire operation is estimated to reach \$850 million. Moreover, the high costs caused the inflation rate to increase 11 percentage points in December 1994 upsetting a steady recovery that had started at the end of that summer.

### **Yeltsin's economic program**

Russia's economic reform has three dimensions. The first is price liberalization, under which price controls have been reduced by 80-90 percent on wholesale and retail goods. The second dimension is financial stabilization which seeks to stabilize the ruble, bring down rising prices and create a secure banking system. The third and the highlight of the transition, is privatization. Through the first phase of the privatization program, which was introduced in 1992, millions of Russians received vouchers that were used at special auctions to purchase shares of companies marked for privatization. Under the second phase of the privatization program, which started in July 1994, the government began selling the rest of its enterprises for cash. Although privatization had a slow start, by early 1994 the idea appeared to have caught on as fewer Russians were willing to sell their privatization vouchers or trade them for food and other necessities.

By August 1995, about 80 percent of state-owned enterprises were privatized. Each sector and region has encountered particular obstacles that has contributed to differing rates at which enterprises were privatized throughout Russia. For instance, not a single agro-industrial enterprise has been privatized in Arkhangelsk, while 13 percent of the industry has been privatized in the Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Irkutsk Oblasts.

Some western observers have noted that many factories that were privatized were simply paper transfers, with the same party bosses continuing to run their inefficient enterprises with large state subsidies. A 1994 *New York Times* report of 200 enterprises, however, revealed that at many of these enterprises, employees were the majority stockholders, outside investors had increasing influence and companies appeared to increase their efficiency.

### **The good news**

Despite the roller coaster ride, not all the economic news is bad. For example, one survey showed that production levels during the first six months of 1995 dropped only four percent compared to 17 percent during the same period in 1994. In fact, the industries that showed the greatest decline were the inefficient state-run enterprises producing goods that nobody wanted. Inflation averaged 10.1 percent during the first six months of 1995 and estimates made by the Russian Ministry of the Economy forecast inflation to fall to three percent next year. In addition, after years of losing value, the ruble is stabilizing at approximately 4500 rubles to the U. S. dollar. Western economic analysts are predicting growth in output after years of decline. The days of long lines and empty stores seem to be over, and more middle income Russians are able to buy the expensive imports that now fill the store shelves.

## Investment and Corruption

Foreign investment in Russia is relatively low in comparison to Eastern Europe, but relatively high to other former states of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the unstable economy, unpredictable government regulations, high import and export taxes, increasing levels of violence against entrepreneurs, and the influence of organized crime have deterred many potential investors. The United States leads in foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia. By the end of 1994, the U.S. cumulative FDI in Russia was estimated at \$2 billion. Germany's FDI placed in second place, while China followed at a distant third.

Local Russians who face similar difficulties as foreign investors, but have less capital, are taking steps to organize themselves and address corruption and governmental policies that hinder business development. The Congress of Russian Entrepreneurs convened on December 19, 1994 in Moscow. For the first time, representatives from 105 unions and various organizations proposed consolidating efforts to promote the interests of the business community. They proposed drafting uniform ethical standards for entrepreneurship in Russia, such as forbidding arms and narcotics sales. The group also criticized Russian foreign policy, which has caused entrepreneurs to lose access to markets in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and other CIS countries.

Aside from the instability, one of the greatest challenges the economy faces is stopping the corruption that has penetrated almost all aspects of Russian life. Various loosely-run "mafia" organizations or "speculators" influence almost everybody from the kiosk owner on the streets, to the taxicab driver at the airport, to the director of the local industry in town. Any entrepreneur wanting to open a business typically must bribe 30-40 people to sign all the documents required by the government. More troublesome than corrupt bureaucrats demanding bribes and thugs seeking protection money is the rising number of killings and car bombings against both foreign and Russian entrepreneurs. Even several State Duma members have been victims of this violence.

## The Future

The conventional wisdom is that Russia's economic changes have reached the point of no return -- there will be no going back to the economic theories of the Bolshevik revolutionaries. Whether its economy will ever reach the level of market capitalism achieved by many Western nations has yet to be determined. There is no precedent or model in modern economic development theory that Russia can follow for its conversion to a market economy. Its transition will likely be a unique synthesis of first- and third-world development patterns. With a highly educated population, Russia has the human and natural resources to make the transition to a capital-intensive, labor-productive system, allowing it to join the United States and the industrialized West in the technological revolution. Regardless of the intentions of the Russian government and international financial organizations to facilitate the transition to a market economy, the success of reform programs is beholden to generations of Russians raised in a command economy who still have difficulty grasping the concepts of a free market.

*November 1995*



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

## International Republican Institute

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

### **Background Memo on Media Issues in Russia** Prepared by the International Republican Institute

Since former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev freed the media under his policy of *glasnost*, newspapers and broadcast media of all political persuasions have sprung up throughout Russia. Liberal, conservative, nationalist and purely entertainment publications and broadcasts are now available to Russian audiences. There are hundreds of state-owned and independent television and radio stations across the country, and thousands of newspapers.

Four major television stations can be received throughout Russia and parts of the former Soviet Union. Channel 1 recently became Russian Public Television (ORT) having acquired the assets of the former network Ostankino. ORT is 51 percent state-owned and definitely takes a pro-government slant. It recently brought back the former Soviet propaganda news program, *Vremya*, which generally airs only positive stories about President Boris Yeltsin and his administration. Channel 2 is the completely state-owned station Russian Television (RTV). Although definitely pro-Yeltsin, RTV's bias has moderated somewhat.

Channel 4 is the largest private station, called Independent Television (NTV). Popular with viewers both for entertainment and news, NTV counterbalances the pro-government slant of state-owned stations with critical, sometimes sensational pieces about the government. The most accurate and unbiased news shows on TV are *Segodnya* and *Itogi* put out by NTV. Channel 6, called TV-6, was formerly a joint-venture with Ted Turner that still airs CNN news and classic American movies. TV-6 does not currently produce its own news program. In every region of Russia, there is at least one state-owned television station. In addition, there are more than 400 independent television stations. Many of the independent stations are creating their own news shows, based mostly on local events.

Even more pervasive than television in Russia is radio. Virtually every home, office and factory was wired for radio, thanks to a Stalin effort to implement a "cultural revolution." In the 1930s, the Soviet dictator confiscated all radio receivers and installed wired radio networks in every apartment and workplace. Two national, state-run stations now broadcast nationwide via wired radio, *Mayak* and *Radio Rossii*. These two stations are the most popular across Russia. Because they are state-owned, they have a tendency toward pro-government news stories. Most cities also have a local state-owned radio station that is carried on wired radio.

The latest competition to wired radio is ultra-short-wave broadcasting (USW), also known as European FM. Actual FM broadcasting has appeared in Russia as well. The most notable USW station is *Europa Plus*, an independent, contemporary station with a light music format that

appeals to a younger audience. It carries more music and less news than the state-owned stations, and is usually more unbiased in its news coverage. This station is heard in many cities across Russia.

Newspapers are proliferating in Russia, but many have trouble staying afloat financially for an extended period of time. Estimates indicate that more than 10,000 weekly and daily newspapers are printed throughout the country. Major cities usually have at least a dozen newspapers. Local newspapers are more widely read than national editions. The news carried in many newspapers is biased at best, non-existent at worst. Print journalists generally do not distinguish between news and editorials, believing that readers want reporters to interpret the facts for their audiences. Many newspapers have a political slant and will print only stories about candidates or politicians they favor. Objective reporting is increasing in some areas, but is still a fairly new concept. Some newspapers print almost no political stories at all, because reader interest in politics is so low. When political stories are printed, it is usually because the politician had to bribe the newspaper editor or reporter.

There are about 15 major national newspapers. The main government newspaper is *Rossiskaya Gazeta*, which is almost completely funded by the government. It publishes mostly official government notices. *Rossiskie Vesti* is Yeltsin's official newspaper and has a circulation of 130,000. *Segodnya* is published by the same group that owns NTV and is well regarded in high government circles. It is well funded, with an independent tone and a circulation of 100,000, mostly in Moscow. *Argumenti i Fakti* is the largest circulation Russian newspaper, with more than 3 million readers. It was known for its fact-based reporting and hard-hitting stories in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but has recently been criticized for running more entertainment stories rather than hard news. *Moskovskii Komsomolets* is one of the most popular newspapers, with a circulation of more than 1 million, and has a reputation of printing sensationalist stories. The major opposition papers are *Pravda*, an organ of the communist party, *Zavtra* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, two nationalist newspapers.

### Press Freedoms

Russian reporters liberally criticize the government and elected officials. They have learned, however, that press freedoms in Russia are not absolute. Unlike the mass media in the United States, which is governed mainly by interpretations of the First Amendment of the Constitution, the Russian media is governed by several complex laws, which outline a number of boundaries for the press. Beyond these legal restrictions the government uses intimidation tactics and disinformation to influence news stories. In Chechnya, Russian authorities forced state-owned media to read false reports about the atrocities being committed and the extent of Russian military successes. The largest independent television station, NTV, almost had its license revoked by the government because of its unbiased reporting on Chechnya. NTV and the government continue to carry on an antagonistic relationship. In November, NTV received a tip from a Chechen rebel about radioactive material buried in a Moscow park. Rather than report the information to the government, NTV dug up the material and did a sensationalist story on the nuclear threat in Moscow.

Aside from government influence, independent media outlets are also subject to the control of their financial benefactors. Most independent stations are owned by one or two large commercial enterprises, which have leverage over their editorial policy. Very few independent media are financed solely by a diverse base of advertising revenue. The last truly independent national newspaper closed earlier this year and reopened in the fall with some government support.

In addition to the legal and financial restrictions, news coverage is controlled by intimidation. Freedom of the press is guaranteed by law, but the state rarely intervenes to protect journalists who have been the victim of harassment or violent tactics. Journalists trying to cover events and expose corruption have been intimidated, wounded and even killed. The mafia has been blamed in a half dozen high profile murders against journalists including the murder of popular TV journalist Vladislav Listev. In some instances, it is the state that is responsible for the harassment. The federal Procurator General's office opened a criminal investigation against an NTV journalist for not reporting information about a crime to legal authorities. The journalist interviewed the Chechen field commander who took a hospital hostage in the town of Budennovsk. The reporter could receive up to five years in jail if convicted. In a more deadly case, the Russian army is widely believed responsible for the bombing death of a reporter two years ago. The reporter was investigating corruption in the military.

### **Politics and the Media**

If the 1993 parliamentary elections are any indication, there will be limited coverage of the 1995 elections. The election law guarantees 30 minutes free airtime on state-run television and radio stations for all parties at the national level and 30 minutes free airtime for all candidates at the regional level. In addition, parties and candidates will be allowed one free advertisement in newspapers. In 1993, few used their free airtime effectively with most choosing a "talking head" format. Three TV stations will provide free airtime, ORT, St. Petersburg TV and RTV. This year, ORT will conduct roundtable discussions with the parties during its free airtime.

Most voters will get their information on the elections from the national TV news programs. Regional television, radio and newspapers carry very little political or election-related news because readers and viewers aren't interested. The media does not see covering elections as a public service to which it is obligated. Most newspapers will only print stories if a candidate pays for it. Campaigns are more likely to pay for a news story than purchase an ad, believing that stories carry more weight with readers. With most of the election reports coming from the national level, voters will receive only limited information on single mandate races.

Media are required by law to publish their advertising rates for election campaigns. An ad placed during prime time on the national networks will cost about \$20,000; for early morning spots, national TV advertising can be purchased for under \$1,000. ORT announced that it will


only sell four minutes of political advertisements per day. Advertising rates at independent, regional television stations are much cheaper, but reach a limited audience. Campaigns are limited to the amount of airtime they can buy. Each is allowed to purchase up to the legal requirement of their free airtime.

Radio is the most effective medium for both high and low budget races because its costs are reasonable and it generally reaches a wide audience. Every home has a radio and most Russians spend some time every day listening to the radio. A one-minute ad on a Moscow radio station during drive time is about \$40. Aside from radio advertising, most candidates in single mandate races will likely rely on campaign literature and door-to-door campaigning to get out their message.


*December 1995*

EXCERPTS  
RUSSIA PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY  
INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS  
CONDUCTED JULY 1995


# *In your opinion, was there fraud or no fraud in the December 1993 parliamentary elections and referendum?*



*Which of the following people, if any, tried to pressure you to vote a certain way in any of the elections? (% of those responding yes)*




# Did you encounter or observe any of the following problems when you voted? (% of those responding yes)




# Do you intend to vote in the State Duma elections of 1995?



9/11




# *Do you have confidence that the 1995 Parliamentary elections will be free from election fraud or not?*




# *Where do you think fraud is most likely to occur? (Base=Those who say there will be election fraud)*



# Do you approve or disapprove of how the State Duma Is doing its job so far?



*Can a member of your family vote on your behalf if he or she presents your passport?*



# IRI Deployment Cities



## Russia's Campaign Trail, Where Rocking the Vote Takes On New Meaning

**M**OSCOW—A hand slides an envelope bulging with money across the top of a desk. A grim-faced bureaucrat sitting on the other side puts it into his pocket. Business as usual in the former Soviet Union.

But wait. Suddenly action on the television screen freezes. Prison bars appear accompanied by the sound of a cell door slamming shut. Cut to the uniformed figure of retired Gen. Alexander Lebed, Russia's version of Colin Powell and leader of one of the 43 parties taking part in upcoming parliamentary elections.

"My advice," he sternly warns, "is don't take bribes."

With Russian voters preparing to cast their ballots on Dec. 17, some 5,000 candidates vying for seats in the lower house of the federal legislature are bombarding the media with campaign ads, pledging everything from a crackdown on government corruption to a swift return to old-fashioned communism — which is suddenly sounding better and better to a growing segment of Russia's restless voting public.

"The Communists are capitalizing on people's fears of crime and inflation with the same slogans they've been using for 80 years," says Moscow political consultant Alexei Babachkin.

True, the message may not have changed, but the delivery certainly has. In fact, Communist Party leader Gennady Zuzanov could be the most effective campaigner in the race. Under the previous regime, party officials always ran unopposed. These days, with polls predicting a big win for the Communists, Zuzanov claims to welcome any and all competition.

If politics is the art of getting people to like you, the comeback Communists are courting voters as shrewdly as anyone.

Normally a tough-talking Marxist, Zuzanov has shown he can also turn on the charm. During a recent campaign swing through Belgorod in southern Russia, he met with an angry crowd of pensioners complaining about local bank failures.

"Comrades," he said, "we will solve all your problems. But first you have to vote for us." Then, just to make sure the senior citizens remembered his name on election day, Zuzanov passed around dozens of wallet-sized calendars with his smiling face on the front.

In the old days that would have earned him a one-way ticket to Siberia for fostering a personality cult. Now it's smart politics.

"Compared to what some of our opponents are doing, we're pretty conservative," admits Communist Party campaign director Valentin Kupstov, noting that his party's nationwide name recognition allows it to focus on the issues rather than election gimmicks.

That's not the case for most of the other parties with candidates in the race, groups with names like Transformation of the Fatherland, the Russian Lawyers Association, and the Beer Lovers' Party, which believes that beer drinkers, not vodka drinkers, should govern the country.

"Right now, a lot of people can't tell one party from the other," says Michael Caputo, former Russia program manager for the Washington-based International Foundation for Electoral Systems, which observes elections. Caputo, who once worked on the Hill as assistant director of the House Radio and TV Gallery, says that polls show that 40 percent of Russian voters see no difference among any of the parties in the race.

Which is one reason candidates need all the media exposure they can get. A \$2 million limit on campaign spending by parties — individual candidates have a \$200,000 cap — plus the high cost of air time forces everyone to be cost conscious when it comes to advertising. But for some political blocs, money appears to be no object.

Our Home is Russia, the well-heeled centrist party of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, has hired an American ad firm, DMB&B, to market its list of candidates. The problem is that foreign consultants don't always understand Russian psychology or the subtle nuances of the language.

At a press conference introducing the party's campaign poster, which shows Chernomyrdin making a roof with his hands, a company spokesman sent reporters into fits of laughter

### *Among the parties in the race: Transformation of the Fatherland, the Russian Lawyers Association, and the Beer Lovers' Party.*

when he said, "Every citizen, every organization, every enterprise in the country needs a roof." The word for "roof" in Russian has come to mean high-priced mafia protection.

This isn't the first time outside media advisers have helped Chernomyrdin look foolish. A campaign poster for a previous election showed him holding a rooster, the Russian slang term for homosexual.

In a play for Russia's youth vote that recalls Bill Clinton's use of Fleetwood Mac to woo aging yuppies in 1992, Our Home is Russia, assisted by Comspan Communications of Los Angeles, is staging a series of rock concerts in various Russian cities, featuring such talent as Kool and the Gang, MC Hammer, and Bad Company.

"Of course, we wouldn't get involved...with the Communists," Comspan vice president Natalia Scherbacova told the Moscow Times. "Our Home is obviously the most democratic and progressive party in Russia. That's the way we see."

Yet it may take more than rock 'n' roll to get young Russians to the voting booth. Opinion surveys consistently indicate that Russia's youth are the most politically apathetic segment of the population, with one poll showing that only 25 percent of all 18- to 24-year-olds plan to take part in the election.

In an effort to remedy the situation, several American companies doing business in Russia, including Mary Kay Cosmetics and Compaq Computers, are sponsoring a series of television specials modeled after MTV's Rock the Vote.

"The aim," a spokesman explains, "is to educate young people on political issues and draw them into the process."

The reason for voter turnout, most observers agree, is the widespread perception among Russians of all ages that democratic politics, once seen as the country's salvation, has become a smoke screen for high-level crime and corruption.

Adding fuel to those suspicions, Russia's Central Election Commission in October released the names of 87 parliamentary candidates who have either served time in prison or are currently under investigation for committing crimes. Leading the list was the Liberal Democratic Party of ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, which sports 12 candidates in trouble with law. Getting elected to a seat in Russia's legislature, it should be noted, guarantees automatic immunity from legal prosecution.

Chernomyrdin could have had this bunch in mind when he called on Russian television directors to bar "odious" and "sick" candidates from the nation's airwaves. Predictably, the suggestion has gone unheeded, and in the last weeks of the campaign, television ads, both slick and sleazy, have been common fare. Maybe the most straightforward campaign is being waged by incumbent member Vyacheslav Marychev from St. Petersburg, who candidly confesses in his appearances that he is "a buffoon and a jester."

Conspicuous by their lack of catchy advertising are the liberal reformers, whom most

Russian voters now blame for everything wrong in the country. In one particularly dull TV spot, Yegor Gaidar, head of Russia's Democratic Choice Party, is shown sitting, hands folded, behind a desk as he delivers a 30-second economics lecture. After using commercials that some considered too much like movies in the 1993 elections — one depicted Nazi-style storm troopers raiding a dis-cotheque — Gaidar, a politician with an iffy future, has taken the opposite approach this time with ads in which the only thing moving is his mouth.

At least he can still afford prime time. Because choice television slots — and the bribes that often go with them — are so expensive, most candidates can only make their pitch for votes in the print media. But there, too, space can be costly.

It's become standard practice in Russia for politicians to pay newspaper editors and reporters for running positive stories about them. The illegal fees are negotiable, with sums reportedly climbing as high as \$10,000.

"I am sad to say that's correct," conceded Anatoly Stepovoi of Izvestia during a recent meeting of Russian and American journalists at the US Embassy in Moscow. One reporter told her surprised American colleagues that two writers at the Moscow daily where she works were suspended for taking payoffs, but both are back on the job.

"You have to remember that the American concept of professional ethics is unheard of here," says consultant Alexei Babachkin. "The Russian journalist doesn't exist who won't sell out."

In a country where everything has its price, that comes as no surprise. Just the same, it does make many Russian voters wonder if the elections themselves are up for sale.

The watchdog Central Election Commission is pledging to do all it can to assure fair and honest results. Still, critics are charging that rules passed earlier this year by the Russian legislature will make it impossible for independent observers to check the counting of ballots, or to confirm that the 25 percent of eligible voters needed to validate the election actually appeared at the polls.

With the Democrats in departure mode and the Communists on the verge of a second coming, one television ad promoting Lebed's Party of Russian Communities seems to capture the desperation many here feel when they consider their uncertain political future.

It shows a simple Orthodox church in the middle of an empty field and underneath a message that reads: "Russia will get better."

"Right," says a doubtful Moscow voter as he watched TV in a downtown bar. "And pigs will fly."

# Russians are fed up with politics

## Apathy worse in younger generation

By Geoffrey York  
TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL

MOSCOW — Igor, a fast-talking young Moscow businessman, has a suggestion for Russia's electoral officials: Lottery tickets.

Offer a lottery ticket to every Russian voter, he says, and maybe that would entice them to the polls.

It's a cynical proposition, but it matches the cynical mood in this country today. Barely five years after acquiring democracy, Russians are fed up with politics.

"Our people aren't interested anymore," Igor said, pausing briefly as he conducted business at a Moscow bank. "Mostly it will be older people and middle-aged people who vote. The others are absolutely indifferent."

With fewer than 90 days remaining before the December parliamentary election, millions of apathetic Russians are still waiting for a good reason to vote. Unless something drastic happens, as many as 60 percent may not bother.

"Nobody sees the election as having anything to do with the truth," Igor said. "Nobody thinks that changing the authorities will change anything. It would just be a new division of property."

Russia's fledgling democracy, created after the optimistic days of perestroika and glasnost, is already slipping into poor health. Voters are frustrated and exhausted by the economic chaos

and political crises of recent years.

Most Russians have grown disillusioned with President Boris Yeltsin and his government. They're equally unhappy with the opposition leaders. Polls show that "none of the above" is the most popular answer to every question about the upcoming election.

"We don't really know whom to trust," said Vera Guskova, 64, a pensioner. "Nobody is fulfilling any promises. We had hopes for [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev, and then we had hopes for Yeltsin. There were so many promises, but nothing really happens for us."

Oleg Prudkov, another pensioner, is planning to vote. But from conversations with his friends, he expects that most of those eligible to do so will abstain.

"They're not even hoping for anything now," he said. "We've been waiting for the future for 70 years. We were probably idealizing democracy. It's impossible to turn a country upside down in such a short time. Even in the West, it couldn't be done in five years."

Among the younger generation of Russians, the apathy and cynicism are worse. Most younger Russians prefer to immerse themselves in business, ignoring all the

political wrangles.

"I'm not interested in politics at all," said Konstantin Dmitriyev, 25, a real estate broker. "Everything is so complicated. There is no clear leader anywhere. When the Communists were in power, it was bad. Now the democrats are here and the situation is no better."

In a recent national poll of 2,500 Russians, fewer than half said they were definitely planning to vote in December. Of the rest, 13 percent doubted they would vote, 17 percent did not know, 16 percent said they may vote and 12 percent found the question too difficult to answer.

Another poll in the Siberian republic of Khakassia found that only one-quarter showed any interest in political parties or movements. A survey in the city of Novosibirsk found that 60 percent of residents knew nothing about the December election.

Mr. Yeltsin wanted the parliamentary election laws to require a minimum turnout of 50 percent to validate the election, but most politicians were afraid such a threshold would be impossible to reach. So the minimum was lowered to 25 percent.

"People are fed up with elections," said Yuri Levada, a prominent Russian pollster. "Whenever

they are asked to evaluate the results of perestroika, most respondents react in the most negative way to multiparty elections. People believe that nothing good has come of them."

In recent parliamentary by-elections, only 30 percent to 40 percent of eligible voters have participated. Pollsters predict that voter turnout in December will be somewhere from 40 percent to 55 percent.

Mr. Yeltsin could be the ultimate beneficiary of voter apathy. For next June's presidential election, the minimum voter turnout level has been set at 50 percent, and some analysts are already predicting that the threshold will not be reached. That would invalidate the election, allowing Mr. Yeltsin to stay in office, regardless of the results of the voting.

Indeed, it could be his best chance of keeping his job, since his unpopularity has soared to unprecedented levels.

"If no new president is elected, owing to a low voter turnout, the old president will stay in office," Mr. Levada said. "This is his most effective means of staying for another term."

Analysts are divided on whether the widespread voter apathy is a sign of the demise of Russian democracy or merely a signal that

Russia is becoming a country like any other.

"It's not normal for everyone to vote in elections," said Sergei Markov, political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center. "Russia is becoming normal."

In Russia, there's also a generational split. Younger Russians, much quicker to adapt to the ruthless capitalism of the post-Soviet system, are increasingly self-sufficient and indifferent to the government.

Because of the rise of the private sector and the rapid deterioration of public services such as health and education, they're less likely to see politicians as the deliverers of solutions.

"The most active voters today are people who have a low educational level and are most critical of the regime," Mr. Levada said. "They are pensioners, workers and representatives of marginal groups. As for the educated, more democratic and politically knowledgeable people, they do not go to the polls because they consider all elections useless."

But while political apathy reflects the privatization of Russian society, it also threatens the young democracy, making it easier for a strongman to seize power.

"People don't believe in political institutions," said Mr. Markov of the Carnegie Center. "It's a dangerous thing."

• Distributed by Scripps Howard.

# Younger Russians: Open To Change, Bored by Vote

*Fewer Than 20% Cast Ballots 2 Years Ago*

By Lee Hockstader  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW—Anyone who is hopeful about Russia's chances of becoming a stable, prosperous democracy one day should take heart in the country's younger generation.

They are, according to polls and abundant anecdotal evidence, more favorable toward—if not exactly thrilled with—market economics, civil liberties, the West and the United States than their parents and, especially, their grandparents.

While ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy attracted a good number of young voters in 1993, that support has withered. In next month's parliamentary elections, the youth vote is up for grabs.

Trouble is, there may not be much of it to grab. Even by the standards of America's apathetic youth, Russia's young voters are woefully ignorant of and bored by all things political. Fewer than one in five voters aged 18 to 24 voted in parliamentary elections two years ago, and the turnout this time may not be any better.

"Before Russia became a democracy, the lowest level of youth involvement among the world's democratic voters was in the United States," said Michael Caputo, a media director for President Bush and now Russia program manager of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. "Now the United States looks good by comparison to Russia."

Only 4 percent of Russians under the age of 35 belong to any of the scores of political parties, according to a poll by the foundation. Three-quarters of Russians under 35 say they're not very interested in politics and government. Among young women, the figure is higher than 80 percent. About two in five voters over 45 say they are interested.

The reasons that young Russians have checked out of politics are various. In most Russian schools, there is virtually no civic education on the ABCs of democracy. To many young Russians, President Boris Yeltsin is a remote, uninspiring, somewhat enigmatic figure—and often the target of

ridicule. Few Russian politicians make much effort to appeal to the youth vote, and few younger Russians see any connection between politics and their lives. On top of all that, Russian politics is a daunting undertaking for any newcomer, laced with intrigue, corruption, rumors and a baffling array of parties and shifting alliances.

In the 1993 elections, the leading reformist party, Russia's Choice, made a conscious effort to lure young voters to the polls by warning them of the consequences of apathy. In one televised advertisement, Nazi-style storm troopers raided a discotheque where youngsters who hadn't bothered voting were bopping to modern music. But the message—that dangerous ultranationalists would win and roll back relatively new liberties unless enlightened youngsters voted against them—was a bomb.

Backed by U.S. government and private money, and inspired by America's Rock the Vote young-voter registration drive, the electoral foundation has launched an advertising campaign using rock and pop stars to encourage young Russians to vote. It is also organizing a few dozen youth voting centers around the country.

"Our main idea is to turn everything upside down," said Nadia Seriakova, the foundation's youth program director. "We wanted to do something that was not agitation and that would explain the right to vote—not that they are required to vote."

Seriakova has her work cut out. In random interviews, many young Russians were unaware that elections are scheduled next month, or for what.

"I don't think the vote will matter in the slightest," said Natasha, 20, a third-year student at the Foreign Languages Institute in Moscow. "I'm sure they'll rig the election somehow. None of the parties or candidates are worth much anyway. Besides, I'm planning to emigrate."

# To Russian Democrats: Don't Unite

By Grigory A. Yavlinsky

MOSCOW  
**F**ragmented and weakened, Russia's many democratic parties are being urged by Western advisers to unite into one front for the parliamentary elections in December. President Boris Yeltsin, stung by his party's defeat in an election in his home province last month, says such a bloc is the only alternative to authoritarianism from the left and right. But forging a coalition would be a mistake for democrats, who disagree with the Government over everything from the war in Chechnya to the direction of economic reforms.

The divisions in the democratic camp do not merely express conflicting ambitions among its leaders. They result from, among other things, the Government's failure to allow most citizens to acquire property and from its capitulation to a small business elite that is getting rich on its economic policies. As a result, democratic reforms have become associated in too many minds with robbing the people and imposing hardship on the many for the benefit of the few.

Despite widespread disapproval of its policies, the Government and some democratic parties say we democrats should stick together lest

*Grigory A. Yavlinsky, an economist, is a member of the Russian Parliament and leader of the liberal Yabloko Party. This was translated from the Russian by Ivan Ascher.*

Russia follow in the footsteps of the Weimar Republic. The implication is that only unity will prevent democracy from being supplanted by fascism. But the analogy is flawed.

For one thing, Russia's leaders have not behaved like democrats. The army's atrocities in Chechnya, for example, are not aberrations but integral to the policy of using force to solve internal political problems. The leaders also ignore government corruption, sustain monopolies in the crucial oil and gas sector and systematically violate the Constitution.

The Weimar analogy is useful in reminding Russia of the danger of not providing a sound alternative to disastrous economic policies. Reformers must give citizens a plausi-

## Differences must not be blurred for Yeltsin's sake.

ble democratic alternative to the Government if they are to keep extremism from taking root. The notion that only a united front can counter the dark forces is nonsense, for most Russians cannot be rallied under an anti-totalitarian banner. They are consumed not by a hypothetical Communist-fascist threat —

the so-called red-browns — but by problems like unpaid wages, declining living standards and increasing crime.

The proponents of unity and their Western advisers say that the division among Russian democrats is a sign of weakness and that a single banner would draw more votes than would isolated parties. But the success of the many parties of the extreme right and left in the last parliamentary elections, in 1993, shows the advantages of offering varying platforms in one political camp.

In 1993, the democratic parties would certainly have won fewer votes if they had campaigned as a bloc. They would also be suffering the same decline in popularity that has currently befallen Russia's Choice, the liberal coalition led by Yegor T. Gaidar, the former Prime Minister.

The Russian Parliament mirrors Russian society. Differences must not be blurred. It would be deceitful for movements like Mr. Gaidar's party and mine to unite. He believes the market will break up monopolies, create private property and allow individuals to start new businesses. My party disagrees: only real Government leadership can accomplish these goals.

In the presidential election next June, a democratic coalition will be in order, for the democrats will have to agree on one candidate for the sake of Russia's future. In the parliamentary election, the voters will choose economic reforms. For now, democratic pluralism is the only way to go. □

# Market reformer cites inconsistency for shortcomings

## Gaidar blames reverting to old ways

*Yegor Gaidar was the architect of President Boris Yeltsin's economic plans. He currently heads Russia's Choice, a liberal party.*

By Yegor Gaidar  
MOSCOW NEWS

MOSCOW — This month was the four-year anniversary of the reforms implemented by the government.

To this day, one hears conversations about how reform should be started and carried out in Russia, with every possible kind of "ideas" on softer, more gradual, evolutionary changes.

Honestly, to me these conversations seem either comic or unprofessional.

Of course, evolutionary reforms are always better than revolutionary ones. In general I am an advocate of evolution.

But such reforms would only have been possible in our country if we commenced them when the old administrative system was still working in at least some way. A free market could then have been created within the planned economy, instead of in place of it.

But in my first few days of working in the Russian government, I received documents that gave a very grave picture of our economy in the autumn of 1991. There were hardly enough grain reserves to last until February, currency and gold reserves had been squandered, and no one was willing to lend any more money to us.

The country was bankrupt. The old system had been completely paralyzed, with no workable new one in place. It was no time to talk of evolutionary changes.

We said at that time: "We need three years."

In the course of the first year we planned to end shortages, get rid of the long lines and make the ruble convertible. In the second, we planned to halt price increases and strengthen the national currency. The third year would see economic growth on the basis of private savings and private investments.

Regrettably, we did not have three years — only 11 months. During that time we did what we had promised. We still do not have lines or shortages, and the ruble is a convertible currency unit. But of course it was impossible in so short a time to build a durable market foundation for steady growth.

In December 1992, addressing the seventh session of the Su-

preme Soviet, I said that if we abandoned the road of steady economic reforms, the result would be not the growth of production, as my opponents claimed, but a combination of price rises, a continuing fall in production and a swift growth of social differentiation.

The following year, we saw exactly that.

We are not alone in our emergence from failed socialism.

Even our adversaries cannot dispute that all the countries that chose the road our government was fighting for, and that gave their reformist governments time to apply their ideas, have long since begun growing. Poland, Albania and the Czech Republic have seen steady growth, as have Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.

In all these countries the volume of production is increasing, the most intricate social problems are being addressed and the people's standard of living is rising.

Where have things gone wrong in emerging from socialism? Wherever the country's leadership has obstinately clung to the vestiges of the old system.

In 1994 a record-breaking 26 percent drop in production was registered in Belarus. The "moderate" reforms in Kazakhstan yielded a production fall of 25 percent, and in Ukraine a decrease of 23 percent.

Today, the roads leading out of socialism are no longer a question for theoretical discussion. The right paths have been verified by practice.

The trouble of the Russian reforms is not that they were too resolute or rigorous. Instead, our problems stem from the fact that Russian economic reforms were carried out sluggishly and inconsistently.

We have already traversed a very hard path from 1992 to 1995. Now we have reached a stage at which economic growth can be based on the stable ruble and the private money invested in our own domestic production.

In the long run, there is nothing miraculous in an "economic miracle." So-called miracles are based on a strong national currency, watertight guarantees of private ownership, political stability and private investments.

This road is not barred to Russia. If instead of fighting over shares of the constantly shrinking domestic-production pie we work to increase it, every sector of society will benefit.

128

# Russia's Political Miracle: A Red Comeback

By MICHAEL SPECTER

MOSCOW, Nov. 7 — As a man trained in philosophy, Gennadi A. Zyuganov loves to toss around the big words of the 20th century. He is forever talking about the social democrats of Britain and the egalitarianism of Sweden. And about how liberalism changes when it travels from Germany to Italy to Spain.

But there is one big word you almost never hear the balding, reflective Mr. Zyuganov say out loud: Communism. For some people, particularly in Russia these days, that would be completely understandable. For the active, voluble and extremely popular chairman of what is still called the Communist Party, it seems a little bit strange.

But it is hard to argue with success, and in five short years Mr. Zyuganov, 51, has succeeded in taking a moribund, dishonest and uniformly despised political movement and turning it into the most popular party in Russia.

As the Dec. 17 parliamentary elections draw near, there no longer seems any doubt that Communists will have a dominant role in a heavily divided legislature. The question is whether they will have the power to slow the reforms of President Boris N. Yeltsin.

"You know that they cannot rule in the traditional sense," said Masha Volkenshtein, a liberal sociologist and pollster. "The President rules Russia. But the Communists are the party that appeals to people who don't like the way things have turned out. And that's a lot of people."

As Mr. Zyuganov himself has said, sometimes the best thing one can say about the Communist Party is that it has terrific name recognition.

Although Nov. 7 is still celebrated throughout the country as Revolution Day, the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, most Russians — even Communists — now understand that the Soviet system the Bolsheviks created was a disaster. But many are just as appalled at the psychological and social turmoil caused by the free market.

Like many people elsewhere in the former Soviet empire — particularly

in Eastern Europe countries where voters have reacted to the pain of economic reform by returning Communists to power — Russians are trying to find a different path.

And the Communists are doing everything they can to make that path their own. Mr. Yeltsin has already been pushed away from the liberal reformers by nationalists and Communists in the last three years. A Communist victory next month would only increase the pressure to turn back the clock.

"We gathered two million signatures in 10 days," Mr. Zyuganov said, referring to the petitions from voters required of each party that seeks to run. "No party got half as many. Others paid for their support. We didn't spend a kopeck."

So it is hard to blame Mr. Zyuganov, as he sits in his enormous suite of oak-paneled legislative offices that seem more suited to Bob Dole than to the future leader of a future workers' state, if he goes easy on the terminology of Lenin and Marx and offers instead a vague new vision of social fraternity and love of labor that might well be called Communist Lite.

He says he believes in a multiparty system, private property, freedom of religion and lots of choice.

"Labels cause too many problems," Mr. Zyuganov said during an interview in which he did his best to sound more like a solid union man than a lifelong Communist and the political descendant of Stalin.

"Two basic ideas compete in the world today," he said. "Light and dark. Look at all the world's religions. The message is love your neighbor. We have the same goals. Communists never invented anything. Nobody said they did. They simply try to implement a vision of truth and justice that you can find in any fairy tale."

Fairy tales have their problems, though. And as all of Russia completes its two-day holiday honoring the Bolshevik Revolution, with Mr. Zyuganov laying the obligatory wreath on Lenin's Tomb, people are beginning to ponder questions they until recently preferred to ignore: After five years of faltering reforms, could Communism really return to the land it nearly destroyed? And what would happen if it did?

Mr. Zyuganov tries to portray a future Communist Russia that caters to the needs of the many without offending the dreams of the few.

But he also grew up within the unbending discipline of the party. When other party members broke off to support the reforms of the former Soviet President, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Mr. Zyuganov simply shook his head at their foolishness.

But he knows that the old party line is not acceptable now, and probably never will be again. So he has moved to the center, calling for orderly, restrained renationalization of some — not all — industries. He says the land ought to belong to the people, a platitude that is always good for votes in Russia.

Knowing that the crime epidemic worries almost everyone, he has promised law and order, but always carefully pointing out that his people are not the same ones who for seven decades deprived a nation of its civil liberties and its self-respect.

He says the Constitution — which makes the Parliament he may control virtually toothless — should be honored no matter what.

But he also says it is time for a new type of reform, by which he means that it is time to end the ability of a few well-placed people to loot the considerable resources of one of the world's largest nations. And he almost never makes a speech without reminding people how much he would do to welcome foreign investment.

The pitch, larded with the call for a strong Russia that even liberals now realize is required of all parties here, certainly seems to have hit a spot with the voters. In almost every poll taken in the last three months, Communists receive more support, spread evenly across the country, than any other group.

Much of that support comes from pensioners frustrated that the old world of cheap sausage, guaranteed employment and a comforting simplicity is gone for good. Some of it comes from people angry at the grabby, lawless state that the brazenly capitalist Russia has become. And the rest seems to come from people who just do not know what else to do.

"For better or worse, these people are new kinds of Communists, and they have a lot of support," said Igor Klyamkin, one of Russia's leading pollsters and the head of the Foundation for Public Opinion. "Zyuganov is flexible, modern and pragmatic. He understands his electorate and he understands Russia. He is a realist, and realistic Communists are new to this country. What he would be like as a leader, however, nobody can say."

Mr. Zyuganov is in fact so pragmatic that his success says as much about the failure of Communism as anything can in Russia.

He has vowed to work with liberals

— like Grigory Yavlinsky of the Yabloko party — and nationalists like Gen. Aleksandr Lebed of the Congress of Russian Communities. Last week he had a lengthy working meeting with Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, whom he vigorously opposes — up to a point.

In fact, this summer, when the nationalist-led opposition was on the verge of taking a no-confidence vote in Mr. Chernomyrdin's Government, the leader of the Communist Party was furiously working the back rooms of Parliament's lower house.

"You have to vote to support the Government," he told an astonished colleague in the leftist Agrarian Party, "because I have to vote against it."

To Mr. Zyuganov the path was clear: Russia could not afford to have Mr. Chernomyrdin fall just yet. But the Communists, who rely on old-time hard-liners for at least a quarter of their support, could not afford to be seen supporting the Government.

"The Communists will gain some power next month," said Aleksandr Prokhanov, editor of the newspaper *Zavtra* and a sophisticated, unofficial propaganda minister of the nationalist-led opposition. "But they will not be strong enough to wipe away what the democrats have done. Of course the pendulum is going to swing back. But the real question for Russia is how far will it go. In Russia, how far to go is always the question."

# ONCE UPON A RUBLE, AH, LIFE WAS GRAND

## *Nostalgia Feeding Communist Comeback*

By Lee Hockstader  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW—If Russian Communists, nationalists and forces hostile to current political and economic policies storm to victory in elections next month and take control of the parliament, as is widely projected, it will be largely because of voters like Yevgeny Korniyushin and the politics of nostalgia.

Don't talk to him about Moscow store shelves brimming with goods and choices; he can't afford them. Don't mention society's new liberties and the fresh ideas that fill the newspapers and airwaves; he's unimpressed.

Unshaven, slightly distracted and perfectly pleasant, Korniyushin, 67, a retired waiter, liked things well enough the way they were before the democrats started their tinkering.

"In the old days, if a wife gave her husband 1 ruble—just 1 ruble!—he could go buy a pack of cigarettes, a bottle of beer and a Metro ticket and still have something left for a snack or small lunch at the cafeteria," he said, smiling broadly at the memory. "These days prices are completely unpredictable. The cheapest sausage is 8,000 rubles a kilo," or 2.2 pounds.

Korniyushin said he's voting for the Communists next month because "somebody has to take real power." He wishes someone would turn back the clock to the times when prices never changed, when trade unions arranged super-cheap holidays and when the Soviet Union's might was feared throughout the world.

That spells trouble for the self-proclaimed forces of reform. While Russia's second free legislative elections are five weeks away, public opinion polls and political analysts suggest that parties hostile to free markets, civil liberties and the West will increase their already considerable strength in the 450-seat Duma, or lower house of parliament.



ASSOCIATED PRESS

Opponents of Russia's reformist government demonstrated on Aug. 20, 1993, the second anniversary of the failed coup by hard-line Communists.

With President Boris Yeltsin hospitalized for heart problems and the few remaining prominent reformists in the government already on the defensive, a new parliament dominated by Communists and nationalists could slow—and attempt to reverse—the changes made so far.

Former prime minister Yegor Gaidar, the early architect of Russia's transition to the free market, has warned that many of the changes indeed are reversible. There is no chance that even the most backward-looking forces could bring back the Soviet Union or a command economy. Yet the mere attempt to roll back or retard such moves as mass privatization or liberalized trade rules would be fraught with instability.

Although the economy is beginning to grow and there are plenty of signs of new wealth in the larger cities, not many Russians are happy with the course of events. Younger people, who tend to be more optimistic and adaptable, are also the least likely to vote, by far. And some of the most aggrieved people—retirees whose meager pensions barely

last them the month—are the most reliable voters.

"They'll vote for the Communists because they think they can restore the empire," said Vsyevolod Vilchek, a prominent sociologist. "They want to restore the old times even though their lives weren't so great then."

A Moscow teacher and translator recounts the reading habits of her elderly father, who, when he runs out of fresh copies of the Communist newspaper Pravda, plunges into yellowing, pre-Mikhail Gorbachev issues. In smaller towns and villages, where the benefits of the market have been slow to arrive, the "bright future" promised by Soviet communism is often remembered more vividly than the hardships, shortages and snaking lines for basic food, shoddy home appliances and poorly made clothes.

"People don't remember the lines and empty store shelves," Vilchek said. "But they remember that sausage used to cost 2 rubles and 20 kopecks. It's like a man who's gone on a camping vacation. He forgets the

See NOSTALGIA, A32, Col. 1

ants that climbed all over him and bit him and how cold he was lying there on the ground. But he remembers all the fish he caught. In the same way, the memory of repression has also faded."

The government has tried to maintain a guaranteed minimum standard of living by providing five increases in pensions so far this year, with another scheduled near election time. It is a strategy devised not only to provide the basics but with an eye to the Dec. 17 elections.

A third of Russia's rapidly aging population is older than 45 and nearly a fifth is older than 60. Roughly 35 million of Russia's 150 million people are receiving pensions, and 20 million of these pensioners are likely to vote. They make up a potent constituency in a country where apathy and disgust with politics reign.

But the average pension of about \$25 a month is less than half the government's official minimum living wage, a percentage that has dipped sharply in the last two years. As the living standards of pensioners flounder, many have directed their anger at Yeltsin and his pro-reform allies.

The government is also widely blamed for what many Russians take to be the country's diminished stature in world affairs, a blow to the pride of millions of people who were raised to believe that whatever their nation's shortcomings, there was no questioning its status as a great power.

"It's the fault of the people running the show," said Korniyushin. "The fish rots from the head."

In parliamentary elections two years ago, the chief beneficiaries of that anger included ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Dem-

ocratic Party, which won 64 seats in the Duma. The Communist Party and its country cousin, the Agrarian Party, together won 103 seats, partly on the strength of an advertising campaign that reminded elderly people that they had been shortchanged in pension and retirement benefits.

"The older you were, generally the more likely you were to vote Communist in 1993," said professor Timothy Colton, director of Harvard's Russian Research Center, who has done extensive political polling in Russia. He added: "The Communist voters were those who without question had the most clearly articulated sense of economic grievance. They're the ones who said, 'We're really hurting.'"

Since then, Zhirinovskiy's televised clowning and brawling seem to have cost him support. But the Communists' voters, more than half of whom were older than 55 in 1993, are a much more stable constituency. Polls suggest the Communists will do at least as well this year as in 1993.

In a poll conducted this summer by the Washington-based International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the Communists won the support of 14 percent of the electorate, leading all parties. Among Russians older than 65, respondents expressing favorable views of the Communists outnumbered those giving unfavorable views, two to one. The proportions were reversed among Russians under 35, fewer of whom vote.

That generation gap is a ticking time bomb for the Communist Party. In an attempt to broaden its appeal—and help its fund-raising—the party has suggested that it might accept the idea of private property while opposing the current program of privatization, which it likens to thievery. It has committed itself to

the resurrection of the Soviet Union over an unspecified period of time.

Nationalist parties, such as retired general Alexander Lebed's Congress of Russian Communities, are making similar pitches directed at Russians' yearning to recapture the best parts of what they remember as a simpler, more stable past.

Korniyushin, the retired waiter, scrapes out a living on his pension of about \$75 a month—much higher than average by virtue of his military service in World War II. He doesn't pretend to have been rich in the old days, just comfortable and certain that he knew the rules of the game.

He never went abroad, never ate caviar, never owned a car. But he was

content with the summer trips to rest homes in the Moscow suburbs, provided at cut rates by his union.

He had to pay for his uniforms, as well as bottles and glasses he broke accidentally. But credit terms were easy and his salary of 70 rubles a month covered what he needed.

"I don't need that much anymore," he said. "I've already got the hat on my head. I don't need all this variety."

"And I'm tired of all this stuff about freedom. Freedom should be restricted. If a person has freedom he'll park his car wherever he likes. Any people has to be restricted—Americans, blacks, you name it. People who get freedom just wave their flags and shout. We need work, not freedom."

# Ailing Czar, Fragile State

## Will Russian Reform Die With the Man?

By STEVEN ERLANGER

MOSCOW, Oct. 28 — The official secrecy and vagueness surrounding the condition of President Boris N. Yeltsin, hospitalized since Thursday with a second attack of heart disease, are beginning to have the usual counterproductive effects here. For all of Russia's semi-democratic trappings, Mr. Yeltsin has followed Russian history in keeping the presidency a regal office, and everyone knows the czar is very ill. No one suggests he is about to die, but his chances of running for, let alone winning, a second term in June are growing slimmer.

As his loyal acolytes and retainers are seeing their hero and meal ticket falter, nerves are jangling, and assurances that all is well sound increasingly hollow. Big decisions cannot be made, whether about Bosnia or political strategy before December's parliamentary elections.

In sharp contrast to the American reaction to presidential illness — charts and graphs and medical briefings — Russia preserves a monarchic secrecy. There has been no photograph of Mr. Yeltsin, no television, no statements from his doctors except through official spokesmen.

For the third day, Mr. Yeltsin was allowed no non-family visitors. But clumsy efforts at reassurance continue, with claims that Government work is unaffected. The official *Rossiskaya Gazeta* said today that "the President will recover soon." The President's official paper, *Roskiye Vesti*, asserted that "Boris Yeltsin's condition does not cause anxiety."

But a politician can survive only one heart attack, says Sergei Markov of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Who will vote for a sick man?" he asked. "Once, maybe, it could be explained away, but not twice."

Mr. Yeltsin's period of rule seems to be drawing to an end, with all its drama and accomplishment, but with the transition toward a new, democratic, market-oriented Russia inevitably incomplete. The system is still fragile, and moods about domestic and foreign policies are increasingly somber, defensive and isolationist. Even as the economy is finally stabilizing, Communists and ultranationalists who promise to undo some of Mr. Yeltsin's reforms are expected to do well in the elections scheduled for Dec. 17.

THE NEW YORK TIMES  
OCTOBER 29, 1995

Mr. Yeltsin vowed to protect the essence of Russia's reforms against any resurgence of Communists and ultranationalists. Under the current Constitution, with nearly undefeatable veto powers, he could. But a different President — Aleksandr Lebed, say, or Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin — would make different compromises with those unhappy about the pace and course of stop-and-go reforms.

Current opinion polls show that the Communists and the ultranationalist parties should do better in December. But they are still not likely to win a working majority in a new lower house, let alone command the two-thirds majority needed to override vetoes. And there is little expectation, judging from the last Parliament and other regional assemblies, that the Communists and ultranationalists can find common ground.

But the sense of Mr. Yeltsin as a bulwark against revisionism has been shaken. Questions are again being raised about whether he will allow himself the revolutionary act of voluntary retirement, or whether he will pursue the czarist and Communist model of trying to die in office, as the safest place to hide.

Some, like Mikhail Leontyev of the newspaper *Sevodnya*, think elections could be canceled and a state of emergency declared. Those around Mr. Yeltsin will seek to preserve him, and thus themselves, in power for as long as he draws breath. Mr. Leontyev suggests, saying: "Those in the executive branch are afraid of ending up in a jail cell."

As important, they are afraid of losing their offices, dachas, cars and business opportunities. That is why Mr. Yeltsin's aides had moved against Mr. Chernomyrdin, who appeared the natural, even anointed, successor after Mr. Yeltsin's first hospitalization in July.

But Mr. Yeltsin's new frailty casts the dice again. Russians afraid of instability may withhold their votes from Communists and ultranationalists in December and may look more favorably on the steady Mr. Chernomyrdin in June, rather than risk an untested figure as President.

Yeltsin aides, however, may move to Yuri Skokov, a quiet bureaucrat with good military and intelligence connections who nearly became Prime Minister in December 1992 instead of Mr. Chernomyrdin.

Now allied to Mr. Lebed, Mr. Skokov has promised Mr. Yeltsin and his aides security under a new presidency. Some Yeltsin aides suggested before his illness that Mr. Yeltsin might dump Mr. Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister for Mr. Skokov after December, in an effort to weaken the presidential bid of Mr. Lebed.

All these calculations are not idle. Whenever the czar weakens, everyone looks first to themselves.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

## The Structure Of Parliament

By STEVEN ERLANGER

MOSCOW, Nov. 23 — The Parliament of the Russian Federation consists of the lower house, or State Duma, for which elections are scheduled for Dec. 17, and the upper house, or Federation Council, intended to represent Russia's 89 regions, republics and territories.

Both houses were elected in December 1993 for a special two-year term after President Boris N. Yeltsin dissolved the Soviet-era Congress by shell-fire in October 1993 and installed a new Constitution, which mandates a four-year term for Parliament and President.

The 450 seats in the lower house are filled in two ways. Half are elected by proportional representation in votes for parties and blocs — 43 have qualified. As in Germany, a party must win at least 5 percent of the vote to get seats.

The other half are elected in head-to-head contests in 225 local constituencies, as in American elections.

Some 105 million eligible voters will elect a lower house with relatively weak powers. It must confirm the Prime Minister, but if it rejects the President's nominee three times, the President can dissolve it and call for new elections. The President may not dissolve the body in the first year of its term, though.

The two houses can also give the Government a no-confidence vote twice in a set time period, forcing the President to name a new Government or to call new elections.

Both houses must pass a bill, but if the Federation Council fails to agree to a Duma bill, the Duma can send it to the President anyway with 300 votes — a two-thirds majority.

How to form the new Federation Council is still being debated. It is made up of 178 people, 2 from each of Russia's 89 regions. The President is expected to accept a bill passed Friday that will make all regional governors and the speakers of all regional legislatures members of the Federation Council. The majority of governors have been appointed by the President, but they will increasingly be elected.

## Rising Prosperity

### More Russians Work Harder, Boost Income, Enter the Middle Class

#### They Buy Electronic Goods Instead of Houses, Cars: A Lift to Political Stability

#### Lost: Their Relaxed Idleness

By STEVE LIESMAN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

MOSCOW — Pavel Ayoshkin, an electronic-goods salesman here, can tell you why he can't keep \$1,000 camcorders in stock: "It's got to be the middle class. The rich bought theirs years ago."

This country's tumultuous transition to a market economy has left an indelible image: the super-rich careening in their Jeep Cherokees past grandmothers trying to sell sausages along the street. But the crucial change may be the surprising number of Russians who, despite high inflation and a weak currency, are working harder, earning more in dollar terms and living better. They are buying consumer goods ranging from television sets to automatic bread makers — and are bolstering Russia's political stability.

"People with money are not only Mafia and mistresses," says Edwin Dolan, president of the American Institute of Business and Economics in Moscow.

#### Buyers Headed Home

The tracks from Moscow's Kazan train station lead east and south to Russia's poorer regions. But the platforms are packed with people dragging TV sets and stereos, bought at lower prices here, into crowded cars for the trip home.

Waiting for a train, Magamed Magamedov, a 28-year-old farmer from the south, leans on his new \$300 Samsung color-TV set — "with remote control," he says proudly. "I sold three cows to pay for this." They weren't the first cows to pay a heavy price to keep his family entertained. Last year, he sold another to buy a stereo. And "if the tomato crop is good this year, the Levi's-outfitted farmer says, "I'll buy a videocassette recorder."

With millions of people still seeking their economic place in the new Russia, the middle class is hard to define in numbers or makeup. Economists such as Mr. Dolan are just beginning to trace its outlines from increases in consumer sales, air travel and savings rates. But in a country of 150 million, even a small percentage in the middle class constitutes a vast market. About 20% — a population larger than Australia's — may qualify, some guess.

#### Upbeat Statistics

Official statistics show real income surged 11% and consumer spending 14% last year, and the gains may be understated because of Russia's large gray market. With housing costs low and loans to buy homes or cars unavailable, Russians have little but consumer goods to spend their money on. And after their purchases, many still have money left over. Savings are running a respectable 30% of gross domestic product, according to estimates by the Center for Economic Reform, a government-funded research organization in Moscow; that's on a par with fast-growing Asian economies and higher than in the U.S. Russians hold two-thirds of their savings in dollars.

"Popular capitalism is beginning to catch on," says Liam Halligan, an economist here.

Although many Russians still look ahead with trepidation and surveys show most believe that the country is being undermined by crime and corruption, they view their own lives as stable. "They say, 'Me, I can secure the life of my children and my wife, but everything beyond the circle of my everyday life is a disaster,'" says Alexei Levinson, a researcher at the All-Russia Public Opinion Center.

#### Many People Suffering

Of course, there is real pain out there. One-third of poll respondents say they can't get by on their incomes. The old middle class — the intelligentsia and the elite of the military/industrial complex — is still in transition. Some have become middle class, but many, especially the elderly, have sunk into the ranks of the poor. Most industrial workers stuck in the state sector or in remote one-company towns haven't felt the growing prosperity, either.

But Yura Vashinkin, who worked in the Vorkhuta coal mines above the Arctic Circle five years ago, has found his way out and up. "From my childhood, I couldn't understand why we couldn't buy things," says Mr. Vashinkin, whose taut physique reflects his years in the army, in the mines and in construction. Back then, he calculated it would take him eight years of work to buy a new car.

In 1993, he moved to Moscow and started an apartment-renovation business. Last year, his family's monthly income was about \$1,200, including his wife's \$200 salary at a bank. Their income is far higher than their old earnings, which were in Soviet rubles and didn't buy much more than food. Mr. Vashinkin has purchased his own apartment and installed wall-to-wall carpeting and fancy trim moldings. A new 25-inch Sony television set sits in his bedroom. He drives a used Mitsubishi, bought for \$7,500.

If there is a cost to it all, it is the loss of the relaxed idleness that the Soviet middle class enjoyed. "I miss the days when I would sit around in useless discussions with my friends," Mr. Vashinkin says. "Now, I really value my time."

That, in a phrase, is the change that Mikhail Gorbachev sought unsuccessfully a decade ago. By opening the market to consumer goods, the former Soviet leader tried to reduce drinking and encourage work. But the Soviet bureaucracy never allowed in enough products or offered workers enough opportunities to improve their living standards.

At long last, however, the goods and the chance to buy them are coming together. Sony Corp. of Japan is one of several electronics companies that doubled Russian sales last year. Sony expects Russia to surpass Germany this year and become the company's largest European market, by volume, for color-TV sets. And most Russians aren't buying bottom-of-the-line models. The average set sold was a 21-inch Sony Trinitron retailing for about \$450, says Mikhail Fandeyev, Sony's director of television sales in Moscow.

Although demand was strongest in Moscow and St. Petersburg, much of the growth came from outlying regions. Without them, "we would not be able to survive," Mr. Fandeyev says. A Sony set can be fixed six time zones away from Moscow at an official service center in the Siberian city of Yakutsk, one of 49 such centers the company has opened.

Igor Yeremayev, an electronics salesman in the central Russian city of Ekaterinburg, remembers a shabbily dressed farmer coming into the store with his son. The farmer asked Mr. Yeremayev to show him the instructions for a \$700 video camera. "I asked them, 'You live in a village, what do you need this for?'" Mr. Yeremayev recalls. "They told me, 'Well, we have the television set and the videocassette recorder; we have to have one of these, too, don't we?'"

The market potential is driving Western investment in Russia. Coca-Cola Co. is investing \$100 million in Russian bottling plants. Toshiba Corp. and several other Japanese and Korean electronics companies assemble products at former defense factories in the Ural Mountains. Mars Inc. is spending \$100 million to build three factories south of Moscow to produce candy bars, pet foods and Uncle Ben's products. In fact, foreign investment in consumer-goods production trails only that in oil and gas, says Peter Charow, executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia.

Some political analysts see the consumer goods helping generate political stability. The West's worst fears center on the potential for widespread support for Communists and nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. But people who buy imported goods and remember the years of shortages "will never vote for bringing back old times," says Andrei Beryoskin, director of Analytic Ltd., a political-research firm in Moscow.

The higher a voter's income, the more likely he or she is to support a reformer or a center group, those urging reforms but at a slower pace. Since the 1993 parliamentary elections, the Communist, Agrarian and nationalist parties have lost some support, reformers have held their ground, and center groups have gained, a recent survey by the Moscow-based Fund for Public Opinion found.

At the core of the new middle class are Russia's young professionals and small-business owners in the big cities. Some professionals work in foreign companies, but a growing number are at Russian-owned banks, advertising agencies and insurance companies.

One Muscovite, Yuliana Slashchyova, earns about \$600 a month — six times the average wage — at Mikhaelov & Partners, a small public-relations company owned by a 25-year-old Russian entrepreneur. Ms. Slashchyova lives with her mother in one of Russia's 11 million privatized apartments. With few fixed expenses, the fashionably outfitted 20-year-old spends much of her salary on clothes. "I have to be well-dressed for work," she explains. She also gives money to her mother, who earns only \$300 a month as a top aerospace engineer, to build a country home. And she is saving up for a trip to Italy this summer.

"I'm trying to convince my friends it's not just luck," Ms. Slashchyova says. "It's my enthusiasm and my hard work."

Ms. Slashchyova is the prime target for Russia's new consumer magazines. Last year, Hearst Magazines International Corp. of the U.S., together with Independent Media BB of the Netherlands, launched the Russian version of Cosmopolitan. Though priced at a relatively high \$4, it still boasts a circulation of 300,000.

"People who read these magazines are aspirers," says Derk Sauer, Independent Media's publisher. Last month, Mr. Sauer launched a Russian edition of Good Housekeeping magazine and plans to start publishing Playboy this month. He expects the professional sector to continue to grow rapidly. Last year, employment increased 13% in the finance and insurance sector, where salaries were twice the average level. The industrial work force, meanwhile, declined 13.5%.

Yet even some state workers qualify as middle class. In Sergiev Posad, a small city 60 kilometers north of Moscow, Mikhail Pavlov, a 35-year-old truck driver for a state factory, earns \$400 a month and owns his own apartment and country home. Just before last month's V-E Day celebrations, a traditional gift-giving day here, he bought his 12-year-old son a \$130 video game. "My tactic is to buy goods as fast as possible or invest in construction of my country home," he says.

The video game now joins about \$2,000 of electronics equipment he owns, including a camcorder, two Japanese TV sets and a VCR. "The big difference now," Mr. Pavlov says, "is we have only to work hard and we can afford things."

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

135

# Capitalism exposes the poverty gap

Financial Times  
April 10, 1995

The deepening chasm between rich and poor is rapidly becoming the hottest political issue in post-Communist Russia, writes **Christia Freeland**

The annual convulsions which Russia has experienced since the collapse of communism – a gun-fight between parliament and president in 1993, the crash of the rouble in 1994, the war in Chechnya which inaugurated 1995 – should not be allowed to obscure the underlying fact that capitalism has arrived. Just as the old regime stamped its presence on the Moscow skyline with seven imposing Soviet skyscrapers, the invisible hand of the new order has already begun to erect its own monuments.

One of them is the refurbished Radisson Slavyanskaya Hotel, which trumpets Russia's plunge into the market economy with a fleet of cream-coloured Mercedes in its driveway and glittering boutiques selling \$2,000 dresses inside its marble arcade. But, less than 50 metres from the Radisson's heavily guarded, iron gates, the dark and fetid Kievsky Vokzal, one of Moscow's principal train stations, insistently announces the other face of the new Russia.

Among the station's denizens are hordes of thieving children, whose mugging technique – they swarm around their chosen victim, sometimes pushing him to the ground but almost invariably seizing his wallet – is most lucratively practised on hotel guests who have naively chosen to walk to their destination.

Western cities like New York are rich with their own versions of the contrast between the Radisson and the Kievsky Vokzal, but Russia has not experienced this sort of stark material contrast since the 1920s, when the Bolshevik regime briefly flirted with a

down-sized model of capitalism.

The growing distance between rich and poor is also more shocking to Russian eyes than western ones because it has replaced a communist order in which the currency of social status was political power rather than money and the elites were careful to mask their privilege with paeans to the virtues of the working class.

For these reasons, the increasingly deep divide between the winners and the losers created over the past three years by Russia's traumatic economic and political transformation is emerging as the most important underlying factor in the country's struggle to determine how to move forward.

It will determine the results of scheduled parliamentary and presidential elections, it is the subtext of the looming political struggle to push through an austere stabilisation programme and it is the catalyst of an intensifying battle among Russia's elites to emerge on the winning side of the country's second economic redistribution in this century.

The starting gun for the race to power in the new Russia was the far-reaching mass privatisation campaign launched in 1993 by Mr Anatoli Chubais, now the leading-standard-bearer of market reforms in the Russian cabinet.

The government's political opponents argue that Russia's fast and dirty privatisation, which has already transferred a dizzying 60 per cent of the economy into private hands, was unfair and failed to create effective new private manag-

ers. But members of the government reform team which spearheaded the privatisation drive are unrepentant.

"They say that property was sold off too cheaply in Russia and that as a result there has been no real investment in our industry," says Mr Alfred Koch, deputy head of the State Privatisation Agency, the state body which led the privatisation programme. "But in an impoverished country, how could we have sold assets off dearly? Had we set high prices, we would have had no western investments at all."

Mr Koch insists that, whatever defects there are in the details, mass privatisation has accomplished the broad task of bringing private property to Russia. "Today we have a different landscape in Russia and are ready for the next stage," he says.

That different landscape, where the contrast between the Radisson and the Kievsky Vokzal has replaced the drab superficial uniformity of communism, is the setting for a struggle of brutal intensity to decide who will come out on top in the new Russia.

One group of participants in that struggle is that section of the old elite which, together with a few particularly savvy arrivistes, managed to transform its old forms of privilege into new ones. But the new redistribution of resources is incomplete, and some sections of the old elite, weakened but not destroyed by the transformation, are fighting for a place in the new order.

As Evgeni Kisiliev, Russia's most prominent television pundit, puts it, some figures in the old regime have experienced a devastating "fall from Olym-

pus". That trauma, he says, has provoked "a battle between the oil and gas sector and the banking sector against the agrarian and defence lobbies". Mr Kisiliev describes this conflict between the winners and the losers of Russia's transformation as "an effort to exact revenge, led by the most conservative part of the old establishment, the military industrial complex".

Occasionally, this subterranean conflict bubbles to the surface with a violence which reminds bystanders just how high the stakes in the new Russia are. Gang-land style assassinations, of bankers, politicians, and most recently of one of Russia's most beloved television personalities, are bloody testimony to the fact that Russia is now absorbed in a strategic competition to determine which families will be rich and which families will be poor for a very long time to come.

This fundamental power struggle is likely to be the subtext of the two public contests Russia faces this year: the government's effort to push through its austere stabilisation programme and parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled to take place over the next 15 months.

In many respects this third government effort to stabilise the economy and bring down inflation from the dizzying rate of nearly 18 per cent a month reported in January by state statisticians appears to have brighter prospects than the two unsuccessful previous attempts.

"The general outlook in Russia is better than it has been at any time since the reform began," argues Mr Richard Layard, a professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. "We can indeed expect the beginning of an investment boom fairly soon."

There are some compelling reasons to believe that, as Russia's president and prime min-

ster passionately insist, 1995 will be the year of Russia's long-awaited economic turnaround. One is that all of the key government officials, including Russia's tough new central banker, whose predecessor bears much of the responsibility for the failure of last year's programme, have expressed a public and categorical commitment to the ambitious goal of bringing inflation down to 1 per cent a month by the end of this year.

Moreover, the International Monetary Fund has given Russia its seal of approval and is expected to come through this month with the first tranche of a \$6.4bn standby loan that should help the government to bridge its budget deficit. The fund, which is doling out the money in monthly allotments and has established a strict set of performance criteria, could act as an important source of external discipline.

A third factor favouring this year's stabilisation programme is the underlying economic transformation which the country has undergone over the past three years. More than half of the economy is in private hands, a capital market in both equities and debt has been created and industrial production, which has been falling with depressing predictability at an annual rate of at least 20 per cent, now appears to be stabilising.

But there is also cause for pessimism. After two failed attempts to bring down inflation by staunching the flow of roubles to agriculture and industry, the government suffers a serious credibility problem.

As Mr Sergei Aleksashenko, a leading reformer who resigned from his post as deputy minister of finance last month, points out "this is Mr Chernomyrdin's third attempt and each time we try to stabilise it becomes more and more difficult".

The widely held scepticism inspired by the government's flawed track record is captured in a Russian version of Murphy's Law: "We wanted things to turn out for the best, but instead they turned out as they always do." This phrase was coined by Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in an effort to explain the crash of the rouble last autumn and among Moscow bankers and civil servants it is now wryly recited as "The First Rule of Chernomyrdin".

The danger is that the Russian business community's lack of faith in the government will become a self-fulfilling prophecy by breeding inflationary expectations and renewed demands for state subsidies. The toughest test of the Kremlin's nerve is expected to come over the summer, when the agricultural lobby's already vocal demands for increased state support are likely to become even more strident.

Furthermore, just as in the dying days of the Soviet Union federal macro-economic policy was sabotaged when republics began to issue roubles without Moscow's authorisation, Russia's national stabilisation programme could be jeopardised by the increasingly popular practice of regional administrations to issue local promissory notes which act as surrogate roubles.

As Mr Aleksashenko observes, Russia is caught in a classic contradiction between the general interests of the country and the self-interest of regions, factories and farms. "Stabilisation is in everyone's interests," Mr Aleksashenko says. "The problem is that no one wants to pay for it."

But the greatest threat to the government's stabilisation programme could be posed by parliamentary elections scheduled for December, 1995 and a presidential vote, due to be held in June next year. Even Mr Chernomyrdin has admitted that the need to woo voters could push parliamentarians and politicians in the government off the tough fiscal and monetary course they have chosen.

Leading Russian bankers with close connections to the Kremlin have gone even further. Fearing, as do most observers, that widespread public disgruntlement with Russia's traumatic political and economic upheaval will produce a communist and nationalist landslide at the polls, many Muscovite bankers have begun to call for elections to be postponed.

As Mr Oleg Boyko, head of the Olbi banking and retail group, puts it, "it is a well known phenomenon that in emerging economies during the second year of reform you have popular disillusionment". For this reason, Mr Boyko believes that the scheduled elections will produce "a much worse parliament and a worse president" and should be put off for a couple of years.

The growing tension between continued market reforms and democracy has been disappointing for many of the pioneers of Russian reforms. When communism crumbled in late 1991, liberal reformers moved into the Kremlin confident that their twin goals of bringing democracy and a market economy to Russia were symbiotically connected. Three years later, the outlook is more pessimistic.

Mr Aleksashenko, whose own decision to leave the government is one of the many small signs that Russia's brief epoch of liberalism is drawing to a close, says: "When I came into the government we understood that democracy cannot exist without a market economy and so we tried to build both." But, he adds, "I have

### Some westerners predict the emergence of corporate fascism

now realised that a market economy can exist without democracy, that it is possible that that is what Russia will have."

As an open political opponent of the current government, Mr Grigory Yavlinsky, a leading liberal politician, is even more critical. "We are at a crossroads right now," he argues. "Either we move towards a monopolistic, oligarchic economy or towards western style capitalism."

For the short-term, many western observers are pessimistic about which of these two paths Russia will take. Dr Sarah Mendelson, a programme officer at the Moscow office of the National Democratic Institute which is advising Russian democrats on party building, worries that "we could be seeing the emergence of corporate fascism".

A senior official at a western financial institution in Moscow agrees. "Russia is likely to evolve into an authoritarian regime with economic policy pre-arranged in the back rooms," he says. "I see a system emerging in which you have a secret politburo with representatives of the energy sector, the defence sector and agriculture. Economically, this arrangement could work and politically it is compatible with the desire for formal democracy but tolerance in practice of an authoritarian style of governance."

The emergence of a mildly authoritarian Russia, in which big business and government are locked in a mutually beneficial and somewhat corrupt relationship and the state ruthlessly cracks down on dissenting voices, as it has done in Chechnya, must, in historical perspective, count as progress.

Mr Jonathan Hoffmann, international economist at Crédit Suisse First Boston, says: "Nobody promises an easy ride. Russia, unlike any nation this century, faces the collapse of empire, the collapse of ideology, the collapse of political institutions, and the collapse of the economy. But through it all, one is going to see the economy transformed and that's going to continue."

From a western perspective, Russia's enormous, and very nearly irreversible, economic transition is the most important feature of the new Russia, and a convincing counter-argument to the doomsday scenarios which Russia's sporadic political upheavals can inspire. But for many of Russia's long-suffering citizens, who lived for more than 70 years with the promise that a perfect communist society was "on the horizon," this long term view is less consoling.

"When people ask me what will happen, I always say that in 20 years it will be all right," says Mr Aleksashenko. "But, unfortunately for me, I live in this country and my family lives here, so I cannot be indifferent about what happens in the next year or two."

# Images of Lawlessness Twist Russian Reality

## After Sharp Rise, Crime Is Leveling Off

By STEVEN ERLANGER

MOSCOW, June 6 — The West has the impression that Russia is rancid with crime, that gangs rule the streets, that few people are safe from a post-Soviet horde of muggers, murderers, racketeers and thieves.

In Moscow, where gangland killings have a cinematic brutality, Russians have the same impression, and the perception of growing criminality, corruption and instability is associated in many minds with democracy and a market economy.

The reality, however, is less nightmarish than the perception.

But that doesn't stop Tatyana Fyodorovna, a 41-year-old businesswoman, from walking home from the subway at night with her keys between her fingers like brass knuckles. Or Viktor Klimenko or his wife from meeting their 17-year-old daughter at the subway station at dusk to walk her home. Or Irina Dezhina, a 32-year-old scientist, from bolting her new steel door with five locks.

"People have to protect themselves," said Oleg Brukhis, 30, who works at a Moscow barber shop. "The police occasionally round up a few hooligans and detain them overnight, but our police are lawless. Have you once heard of any big criminals being apprehended here?"

Attitudes like these have important political consequences for Russia's future, giving the old Communist days a retrospective soft focus of stability and order.

Although crime went up sharply after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as it did throughout the countries of Eastern Europe, it is now leveling off or falling here. The important exceptions are murders, new economic crimes like bank fraud and protection rackets, and official corruption — with officials often suspected of complicity in covering up major crimes.

Compared with New York, Mos-

## Spectacular gangland killings fuel perceptions of a crime tidal wave.

cow is not especially crime-ridden. But there have been more spectacularly violent crimes. The Russian murder rate has surged, largely because of gang shootouts and contract killings of prominent businessmen and criminal leaders, and there has been an increase in crimes committed with a firearm.

"Before we confiscated a handgun once a week," said Mikhail P. Andreyev, head of the Investigation Agency for Organized Crime of the Interior Ministry. "Now we confiscate arsenals."

Most of these big crimes involve businessmen fighting over territory or settling scores with one another in a legal system that is weak or a body of corporate law that is nonexistent, officials say.

The killing in March of a beloved television host and executive, Vladislav Listyev, brought thousands of Muscovites into the streets as a protest against crime. Three members of Parliament have died in business-related hits, in addition to 35 bankers and at least one prominent journalist, Dmitri Kholodov.

In April, in another especially horrible case, the 6-year-old daughter of a leading Russian stockbroker, Andrei Orekhov, was killed on her way to kindergarten when his car was riddled with machine-gun bullets by two gunmen in broad daylight. Mr. Orekhov, 29, the general director of a major brokerage house, was seriously wounded; his bodyguard and driver survived with minor injuries.

None of these prominent killings have yet been solved, even though the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service, formerly the domestic side of the K.G.B. and now renamed the Federal Security Service, with new powers, says it knows some of the culprits. Of the 47 contract killings last year in Moscow alone, the police say they have solved only 11.

But number of reported murders was the only category of crime in which this capital of some 10 million people outranked New York City, a city of more than 7 million, in 1994.

Last year, compared with Moscow, New York had 8.3 times the number of reported rapes and 13.1 times the number of reported assaults.

After having quadrupled between 1988 and 1992, the total of all crime in Russia went down 6 percent last year. By far the largest number of crimes involve property, but the police are making some inroads, helped by new precautions, like better locks, steel doors and car alarms. Thefts were down 17 percent, thefts from apartments were down 14 percent, robberies in general were down 19 percent.

In Moscow, incidents of rape, assaults, robberies and property crimes were all down last year.

Crime figures in general are viewed with skepticism throughout the world, and some experts on Russian crime, like Joseph D. Serio of Eurasian Business Services, suggest that Russian statistics are massaged to make them seem better.

Russian officials, like Aleksandr Y. Birin, director of the Inspection Section of the Interior Ministry, reject the notion, while acknowledging that figures were heavily doctored in Soviet days.

"Of course, this creates a problem of perception," Mr. Birin said. "The Soviet days were not as calm as they seemed, and by comparison, today is not as awful."

Yuri Levada, director of the Center for the Study of Public Opinion, said: "Of course people are concerned with crime, even more than in past years. But when we do our polls and ask people whether they or any family members have been victims of crime, they tell us, no more — sometimes even less — than in the past. The images of violent crime come mostly from the mass media."

Mr. Levada's polls show that while crime is an important issue, it usually comes after inflation and unemployment in a list of people's greatest concerns. People are shocked by the new types of crime, Mr. Levada said: "Murders tied to racketeering are on the rise, as well as economic crimes involving new economic structures — none of this existed a short time ago."

Aleksandr N. Kulikov, Deputy Interior Minister, also acknowledges that new kinds of economic crime are flourishing in the new market economy, giving the police significant difficulties. The police do not always understand the kinds of fraud, money laundering and other white-collar crimes that were impossible a few years ago and lack the training and computer equipment to pursue them.

Often there is no new law on the books that makes certain activities illegal. Anyone, for example, can register as a bank at any address, with little chance of official oversight.

The current criminal code is a much-revised and patched-together document based on a social system that considered private business criminal, and remains full of contradictory or ambiguous laws. To prove tax evasion, for instance, the police must prove "malicious intent."

Among the new kinds of crime in Moscow have been at least 70 cases of fake banks, which promise high interest but then disappear; fraud with credit cards, which are beginning to take hold among the new rich, and "apartment murders."

In an apartment murder old people are pressed into privatizing their apartments and signing them over to strangers, sometimes in return for a promised new apartment in the suburbs. Sometimes that new apartment exists; sometimes the old person simply disappears. With ordinary apartments now costing up to \$40,000, there are about five such cases a week in Moscow.

Lieut. Roman G. Fyodorov, 32, is an investigator at the militia station covering 130,000 people in the tough Kuzminky district in southeast Moscow. There is one computer for the whole station. Four investigators share three desks in a single room.

He described a recent case: a divorced woman of 45 who had been kidnapped for a month, tortured with a hot iron, raped and beaten to get her to sign over her apartment. "She finally signed, and as they took her to finish her, she got away," Lieutenant Fyodorov said.

The men were arrested. But meanwhile she has disappeared, and the police fear that she has been killed by the gang that sought her apartment in the first place.

"Sometimes old people disappear and we don't know it for a long time," Lieutenant Fyodorov said. "If the papers look proper, they get the apartment. And after someone is deregistered, nobody cares about them." After the new registration, the apartment is sold, "and then we can't track it."

He, like other police and Interior Ministry officials, believe that with the collapse of the Soviet Union — and the overriding fear of the totalitarian state — there is a vacuum of ethics and a new disproportion of resources between criminal gangs and the state law-enforcement bodies.


"It's all about the new economy," Lieutenant Fyodorov said. "The more people get rich, the more money you want. Before, no professional thief would kill; it was a kind of code. Now the cruelest crimes take place. The society is caught between values. The old ones are gone, and the new ones are not yet formed."

Pavel Lando, 48, is an urbane, well-traveled conductor at the Russian Music Academy. "Right now we're living through a very tough time," he said, sitting on a park bench in Moscow. "Before, there was less crime. But what's happening now is all temporary. It will pass once people get used to the new order of things."


### KEEPING TRACK

#### Crime, By the Numbers

##### Crime in Russia



##### Crime rate changes 1993 to 1994



Sources: Russian Interior Ministry, Moscow Police Department, New York Police Department



# Russia

---

**W**estern business people have learned how important restraint is when negotiating with the Japanese; never lose your temper when dealing with Japanese. The Russians are the exact opposite. Russian negotiations almost always involve temper tantrums, dire threats, and walkouts. Loss of temper during negotiations is expected by the Russians. Only in one crucial area are the Russians and Japanese alike: They both have tremendous patience. Both cultures prize endurance, which often puts impatient North Americans at a disadvantage.

## CULTURAL NOTE

## Country Background

**t**he breakup of the U.S.S.R. added fifteen new independent nations to the map of the world. Since Russia undeniably controlled the U.S.S.R., many nations that shared a border with the U.S.S.R. felt that they essentially shared a border with Russia. Since the breakup, this is no longer the case. Russia historically insulated itself from foreigners by creating client "buffer states" between Russia and the outside world. These buffer states are now independent. Thus, Russia today shares no borders with any former Warsaw Pact nation except Poland. Russia today shares no borders with Afghanistan, a nation in which thousands of Soviet troops fought during the 1980s. Russia today does not even share borders with six of the former republics of the U.S.S.R.!

## CULTURAL NOTE

However, territorial disputes are widespread throughout the former U.S.S.R. Border adjustments may continue for years to come.

## History

The U.S.S.R., also known as the Soviet Union, lasted from 1917 through 1991. Before 1917, most of the territory in the U.S.S.R. was part of the Russian Empire. The Russian Empire expanded outward from Moscow, the historic capital of the Russian Republic and of the Soviet Union itself. (Czar Peter the Great moved the capital in 1712 from Moscow to Saint Petersburg—Peter's "window on the West"—but the Communists moved the capital back to Moscow in 1918.)

Russia was the most powerful of the fifteen republics in the U.S.S.R. Indeed, it is not incorrect to say that the U.S.S.R. was ruled by Russia for Russia's benefit.

The authoritarian, one-party rule of the Communists collapsed with surprising speed. Theories for this collapse abound, ranging from impoverishment caused by

the arms race to the inability of any totalitarian government to control information in an era of computers, faxes, and modems. One thing is clear: The Communist leaders underestimated the bitterness the fourteen other republics felt toward Moscow's domination.

The precipitating event was the August 1991 coup attempt, when hard-line Communist leaders briefly imprisoned President Mikhail Gorbachev. Faced with resistance on all sides (from Gorbachev, who refused to acknowledge their authority; from Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who became a popular hero for facing down tanks in the streets; and from thousands of Russians who took to the streets in protest), the coup failed in less than a week. The coup attempt ended the careers of the coup leaders (the "gang of eight") and of Gorbachev as well; Gorbachev had appointed the very men who had plotted against him.

In disarray, Moscow was unable to prevent the non-Russian republics from leaving the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. ceased to exist on December 25, 1991. The Russian Federation is still the largest and most powerful of the former republics.

---

**CULTURAL NOTE**

*d*espite their mistrust of Moscow, most of the former republics have united in a vague alliance called the Commonwealth of Independent States. (The exceptions are the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which direct their attention toward Europe, not Moscow.) Thus, although Moscow no longer rules the U.S.S.R., it retains great influence (and responsibilities) in most of the former constituent republics.

The central Asian republics are particularly dependent upon Moscow for aid, both economic and military. Furthermore, the presence of ethnic Russians in every republic gives Moscow an excuse for intervention, as it did to "protect" ethnic Russians in Moldova.

### *Type of Government*

Russia is nominally a federal republic, but many areas of Russia itself are in revolt against Moscow. Non-Russian ethnic enclaves within the Russian Federation are agitating for autonomy and even independence. The Russian president is the chief of state. The Russian prime minister is the head of the government.

The laws and policies of Russia are currently in a state of flux.

### *Language*

Russian is the official language. Note that the use of Russian has become unpopular in those ethnically non-Russian areas of the Russian Federation that are clamoring for independence.

### *Education*

Education is compulsory and free between the ages of seven and seventeen; literacy is almost 100 percent. Instruction is conducted in many languages, and English is sometimes taught as early as the third grade. Students must pass rigorous exams to gain admittance to college.

### *Religion*

The U.S.S.R. was officially an atheist nation; religion was suppressed, and some 50 percent of the population considered themselves nonreligious or atheist. Religious worship is now permitted. Many religions are represented in Russia, including Russian Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Islam, and Judaism. Religious participation is increasing since the Communist system (which had several characteristics of a religious belief system) has been discredited.

### *Demographics*

Russia is not only the largest nation on earth, it is also one of the most populous, with some 150 million citizens. Its largest cities have populations exceeding those of some small European countries: 8.7 million in Moscow and 4.5 million in Saint Petersburg.

## *Cultural Orientation*

### *Cognitive Styles: How Russians Organize and Process Information*

Historically, Russians have not been open to outside information. With the breakup of the U.S.S.R. and the downfall of Communism, many Russians acknowledge that they must learn new ways. But it is a struggle, and they may once again close themselves off from outside information. Their tendency is to process information subjectively and associatively. Their experience teaches them to follow the universal rules and laws of the Communist Party line. Some Russians are able to transfer this allegiance to the abstract rules of science and technology.

### *Negotiation Strategies: What Russians Accept as Evidence*

The more educated managers will let objective facts dictate the truth. However, many will still look to faith in some ideology or their own personal feelings to guide them to the truth.

### *Value Systems: The Basis for Behavior*

Russia is currently going through a tremendous struggle to exchange the values of Communism for those of a free-market economy and democracy. The following three sections identify the Value Systems in the predominant culture—their methods of dividing right from wrong, good from evil, and so forth.

#### *Locus of Decision Making*

Although the Russians are by nature collectivistic, Communist Party rule put decision making in the hands of the party. Soviet executives made their decisions in line with party policy; as long as the party rules were followed, the decision could not be wrong. Now these individuals have to make decisions on their own—and even take responsibility for those decisions! In many instances, executives are delegating this authority to the group as a whole or to specialists within the group.

#### *Sources of Anxiety Reduction*

The demise of Communism has abolished many of the structures the people depended upon for stability. This stability is now being sought in the church, social groups, the family, or elsewhere. The transition to a free-market economy and democracy will not succeed unless the people can be shown that these changes provide increased security and stability.

#### *Issues of Equality/Inequality*

Despite the Communist premise of equality, there has always been a great deal of inequality in this culture. There is currently a power struggle between free-market economists and extremist nationalists in Russia. Since the nationalists are xenophobic and racist, the Russian people seem to have a choice of promoting equality or inequality.

Ethnic differences are also coming to the fore and threatening to disrupt social stability. And, while there is a semblance of legal equality of the sexes, Russian

women still struggle for equality with men. Sexual harrassment is rampant in business and government.

## *Business Practices*

### *Appointments*



#### **PUNCTUALITY**

- ◆ Always be punctual, but do not be surprised if the Russians are not. It is not unusual for Russians to be one or two hours late to an appointment.
- ◆ Punctuality was not considered essential under the Soviet system, since employment was guaranteed and no one could be fired for tardiness.
- ◆ Even today, patience, not punctuality, is considered a virtue in Russia.
- ◆ Allow plenty of time for each appointment. Not only may they start late, but they may run two to three times longer than originally planned.

- Remember that the date is written differently in many countries. In Russia and the CIS, the day is normally listed first, then the month, then the year. For example, 3.12.99 or 03.12.99 means December 3, 1999, not March 12, 1999.
- Obtaining an appointment can be laborious. Be patient and persistent. Once your appointment is scheduled, make every effort to avoid a cancellation.
- Business hours are generally from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., Monday through Friday.



### *Negotiating*

- It is said that Russians are great "sitters" during negotiations. Russians regard compromise as a sign of weakness; compromise is morally incorrect. Russians would rather out-sit the other negotiator—and gain more concessions from the other side.
- Be certain that all members of your negotiating team know and agree on exactly what you want out of the deal. Write this down (perhaps adding a few "nice to haves" that can be given away later) and bring it with you. Do not show the Russians anything other than unity among your team.
- Be factual and include all levels of technical detail.
- You may be asked to sign a *Protokol* after each meeting. This is a joint statement that delineates what was discussed. It is not a formal agreement.
- "Final offers" are never final during initial negotiations. Be prepared to wait; the offer will be made more attractive if you can hold out.
- If you or your negotiators have not walked out of the negotiating room in high dudgeon at least twice during the negotiations, you're being too easy. Russians expect walkouts and dire proclamations that the deal is off. Think of how often the Soviet delegation to the United Nations walked out in a huff but always came back. Play hardball; they will.
- Until you have a signed, formal agreement, do not get overconfident about the deal at hand. And never expect that you can renegotiate later for a better deal. This contract is as advantageous as you will ever get.

142

- The Russians may request that some funds be paid to them directly in cash, or to an account in a foreign bank. This is because of their concern over the oppressive Russian tax system and the rarity of being paid in cash. Be prepared to propose various options, since very few Russians will be familiar with Western trade, banking, and business regulations.
- One current Russian tactic is to allow (after long negotiation) the foreign partner to own 51 percent of a joint venture. However, contracts usually require unanimity among the partners for major decisions anyway, so 51 percent is not a controlling interest.
- Include a clause requiring the joint venture partners to submit to arbitration in a neutral country if they can't come to an agreement. Sweden is the most popular choice for third-country arbitration.
- Russian regulations represent the biggest liability to a successful joint venture. Since these regulations are in constant flux (reforms are being made all the time), don't count on your Russian partner to have a full grasp of the legal issues involved. Get your own expert in Russian law. Don't be surprised when something you did yesterday is disallowed tomorrow; many laws are nebulous, and their interpretation is subject to change.
- Appearances can be deceiving. Russian firms may try to make themselves look prosperous and full of potential. Select a partner based upon full knowledge of the assets it owns or controls.

**b** **CULTURAL NOTE**  
 e sure to take enough business cards. They are very important, especially since telephone books are not easily available; the phone book published in Moscow in 1990 issued only 250,000 copies—obviously not sufficient for a city of 9 million! Therefore, many people depend upon their business card files. There are now a variety of telephone books available, but their scope and circulation are narrow.

Do not be surprised if you do not receive a Russian's business card in exchange for yours. They may not have them.

- In many countries—such as Japan—people tend to respond to a question by saying “yes.” In the U.S.S.R. the tendency used to be just the opposite; managers and bureaucrats said “no” at every opportunity. However, Russian businessmen now often say “yes” to proposals—even if they lack the authority to arrange the project. They make promises in order to continue the contacts they want with foreigners.
- Historically, there were many reasons why Russians said “no” to business proposals. One was that innovation had been discouraged. People were afraid that if they gave the go-ahead and a project failed, they would be held responsible. Another reason had to do with the position of an individual in a rigid, hierarchical bureaucracy. You rarely met a Russian bureaucrat who had the power to push a project forward without the agreement of others. But one individual could cancel a project, all by himself or herself. The ability to say “no” was the only real power many bureaucrats possessed; not surprisingly, they used it frequently.

**CULTURAL NOTE**  
**P**ace, international relations, the changes in Russia, and difficult economic situations are all common topics of conversation.

People will ask what you think of Russia and what life is like in the United States. The questions may sound somewhat bizarre, but they are usually sincere: For example, visitors were asked to verify something that had been broadcast on Russian television: a documentary on U.S. farm life that showed a veterinarian inoculating pigs with disposable needles. This astonished the Russians, who don't have enough disposable needles to use for humans!



### *Business Entertaining*

- Always have a good supply of soft drinks, tea, coffee (not in plastic cups!), Danish, cookies, snacks, and so forth, on the meeting table. Russians try hard to provide a variety of refreshments when conducting business, and appreciate your reciprocating in kind.
- At Russian hotels and restaurants, the doormen must try to let in only certain people. Don't be surprised if they are not friendly.
- In restaurants, you may have a long wait for food. Ignore the menus; perhaps only a third of the items listed will actually be available. You must ask the waiter (if he or she speaks English) what is being served that day.
- Restaurants tend to have large tables set for many people. If your party consists of just two or three people, you may have to share a table with others.

**CULTURAL NOTE**  
**t**wo bottles will be on the table: one has water, the other vodka. Be aware that once you open a bottle of vodka, the concept is to drink it all at one sitting! Many vodka bottles do not have resealable caps.

Russians are very confident of their ability to drink heavily and still remain "clear." They may prefer conducting business when you are drunk. Mixed drinks are not popular.

- Dinners are held early (about 6:00 P.M.).
- It is a great honor to be invited to a Russian home. It is also a great burden for the host. Russian tradition demands that you be served a lunch or dinner that far exceeds everyone's appetite and, often, the financial capabilities of the hosts. For example, caviar might be served with huge spoons.
- It is good to know a few toasts. The most common is *Nah-zda-ROE-vee-ah*.
- In a restaurant or nightclub, Russians may invite you to dance or to come over to their table. It is best to accept graciously.

### *Time*

- Moscow and Saint Petersburg are both in the westernmost time zone, three hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (G.M.T + 3), or eight hours ahead of U.S. Eastern Standard Time (E.S.T. + 8).
- The huge Russian federation spans eleven time zones. Daylight saving time changes usually occur on a Saturday night at the end of March and October.

## Protocol

### **t** CULTURAL NOTE

he Russian word *nyekulturny* (literally, “uncultured” or “bad mannered”) signifies the wrong way to do something. Foreigners are often judged by the same standards Russians apply to themselves. Some *nyekulturny* behaviors are

- Wearing your coat (and heavy boots) when you enter a public building—particularly the theater. You are expected to leave your coat in the *garderob* (cloakroom). One does not sit on one’s coat at a concert, restaurant, and so forth. Many office buildings also have a *garderob*.
- Standing with your hands in your pockets, or generally lounging around. This is especially true in public buildings.
- Wearing business clothes that are less than conservative—for example, pastel shirts with white collars.
- Speaking or laughing loudly in public.
- Not only is whistling indoors considered *nyekulturny*, but there is a superstition that it will cause a loss of money.



### Greetings

- Only during greetings do Russians display affection in public. Relatives and good friends will engage in a noisy embrace and kiss each other on the cheeks.
- Except at formal or state occasions, Russians usually greet a stranger by shaking hands and stating their name, rather than uttering a polite phrase (such as “How do you do?”). Respond in the same way.



### Titles/Forms of Address

- Russian names are listed in the same order as in the West, but the Russian middle name is a patronymic (a name derived from the first name of one’s father). Thus, Fyodor Nikolaievich Medvedev’s first name is Fyodor (a Russian version of Theodore), his last name is Medvedev, and his middle name means “son of Nikolai.”
- Russian women add the letter “a” on the end of their surnames; Medvedev’s wife would be Mrs. Medvedeva.
- Unless invited to do so, do not use first names. If a Russian has a professional title, use the title followed by the surname. If he or she has no title, use Mr., Miss, Mrs., or Ms. plus the surname.
- Among themselves, Russians use a bewildering variety of diminutives and nicknames. They also address each other by first name and patronymic, which can be quite a mouthful. As you establish a relationship with them, you will be invited to call them by one of these. This is the time to invite them to call you by your first name.
- Despite the length of their names, there are relatively few variations of first names and surnames in Russia. Indeed, some names (e.g., Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov) are so common that you will need additional information to be able to refer to the correct one. In official circles, Russians use a person’s birth date to differentiate between identically named individuals.



### *Gestures*

- Russian is a language abundant in curses, and there are quite a number of obscene gestures as well. Both the American "O.K." sign (thumb and forefinger touching in a circle) and any shaken-fist gesture will be interpreted as vulgar.
- Whistling is not taken as a sign of approval in a concert hall; it means you did not like the performance.
- The "thumbs up" gesture indicates approval among Russians.
- Do not sit with the legs splayed apart or with one ankle resting upon the knee.

*a*

### **CULTURAL NOTE**

s a society historically subject to police surveillance, the Russians evolved gestures that would foil eavesdroppers. For example, to avoid saying the name of Brezhnev, Russians would touch a finger to an eyebrow (a reference to Brezhnev's hairy eyebrows). The free speech that has accompanied glasnost has reduced the need for such gestures, but they have not entirely disappeared. Nowadays, a gesture may be used to refer to a member of the Russian Mafia.

- Some common traditions or superstitions include sitting for a minute before leaving a home, knocking three times on wood to avoid bad luck, and spitting three times behind the shoulder to prevent bad news.



### *Gifts*

- Not surprisingly, items in demand make prized gifts; these often include baseball caps, rock or country and western cassettes, ballpoint pens, picture books or art books, perfume, good soaps, American cigarettes, lighters, plastic bags, and gum. Other good gifts include solar-powered calculators, well-made business card holders, VCR tapes, cameras, watches, and inexpensive jewelry.
- Take flowers, liquor, or a food item currently in scarce supply if invited to a Russian home.
- Feasting is also a part of religious holidays. Remember that the Russian Orthodox church follows the Julian calendar, not the Gregorian calendar in official use throughout the Western world. Currently, the Julian calendar is generally running thirteen days behind the Gregorian one.



### *Dress*

- If you go to Russia during the winter, bring very warm clothes or buy Russian-style hats and gloves upon arrival. In addition, bring a pair of shoes or boots with skid-resistant soles.
- Bring your own shoe polish, since Russian streets can be muddy all year round. Women in high heels will have a difficult time if they have to run around outside on many errands.
- When buying Russian clothes, keep in mind that it is generally advantageous to look like a foreigner, as foreigners get preferential treatment almost everywhere.
- Since Russian buildings are usually well heated, a layered approach is best in clothing, allowing you to take off clothes to be comfortable while inside.
- Business dress is conservative. Russian clothing styles tend to lag years behind the West.
- While shorts are frowned upon for casual wear, you will note that Russians strip down to as little as possible on those rare days when it is sunny enough to sunbathe.



Advancing Democracy Worldwide

**International  
Republican Institute**

Suite 900  
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3987  
(202) 408-9450  
(202) 408-9462 FAX  
Internet: iri@iri.org

**INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE  
RUSSIA'S 1995 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION**

1212 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Suite 900  
December 4, 1995  
2:00 p.m.

**OPENING REMARKS**

Lorne Craner, IRI President

**INTRODUCTION OF PARTICIPANTS**

Judy Van Rest  
IRI Regional Director, CIS Programs

**OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN ELECTIONS AND CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT**

Tom Lynch, Director, Office of Russian Affairs  
U.S. Department of State

John Rogers, Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
U.S. Department of State

Steve Biegun, Senior Professional Staff for European Affairs  
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

**OVERVIEW OF MISSION**

Judy Van Rest

**MEDIA OVERVIEW**

Grace Moe, IRI Vice President

**ELECTION DAY ACTIVITIES**

Jennifer Roda  
IRI Russia Program Officer

149

# Russia's Economic Colossus

The Washington Post  
December 3, 1995

*Natural Gas Monopoly, Nation's Largest Company,  
Is Also at the Center of Its Political Struggles*

By David Hoffman  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW—In the southwestern suburbs of Moscow, a dramatic new skyscraper juts into the sky, world headquarters of the giant Russian gas monopoly Gazprom. Atop the 34-story stone-and-glass tower is a hushed, glass-enclosed lounge and restaurant, adorned with fresh flowers, from which all of Russia seems to spread out below.

In the New Russia, this is a citadel of power. More than the politicians who sit in the Kremlin, more than the commanders of the Russian army, even more than the mafia chieftains and regional bosses who dot the landscape, the corporate executives of Gazprom stand tall over a society and economy still beset by chaos and uncertainty.

Gazprom is Russia's largest company, but it is much more. It has become a state within a state. The company's influence is felt across international frontiers, at the highest levels of authority in Moscow and out across the vast Siberian expanses. By some estimates, it ranks second in the world among companies in the amount of its profits, and supplies a quarter of Western Europe's natural gas.

Gazprom is at the heart of a struggle over Russia's political future. The historic transition to free markets and democracy, which began as a battle over ideas, has turned into a fierce contest among financial and economic interests.

Russia has become an unruly oligarchy—a power structure of rival clans made up of prominent politicians and their financial groups—in which none has yet gained the upper hand. In the next two elections, for parliament this month and for president next June, all of them are aiming to become the country's dominant power.

The most powerful and wealthy clan of all is centered on Gazprom. The company was formed in the early 1990s almost single-handedly by a former Soviet natural gas minister,

Viktor Chernomyrdin, who now is Russia's prime minister. Gazprom's chairman, Rem Vyakhirev, is a Chernomyrdin protege. The new chairman of Russia's Central Bank, Sergei Dubinin, previously worked on Gazprom's banking affairs.

Critics of Gazprom charge that it already has grown too powerful. They say Gazprom is holding back from the government billions of dollars earned from Russia's gas reserves just when the country desperately needs the revenues. Shrouded in secrecy, Gazprom is beyond the reach of Russia's government and beholden only to itself, the critics say.

Gazprom, hungry for investment capital to build a \$40 billion pipeline from the Yamal Peninsula in western Siberia to Europe, makes no secret of its outsize importance to Russia's economy. "What's good for Gazprom is good for Russia," says the company's publicity. Chairman Vyakhirev said recently, "Anybody who comes to power is going to have to manage to live with Gazprom, because without Gazprom they won't manage to live at all."

While the Soviet Union's monolithic oil industry was broken up into smaller pieces, the natural gas system was left virtually intact, in one mammoth monopoly. Gazprom controls a third of the world's gas reserves, accounts for nearly 5 percent of Russia's national economy and 95 percent of Russia's gas production and still satisfies a quarter of Western Europe's gas demands.

Based simply on estimates of its gas reserves, the company could be worth anywhere from \$400 billion to \$900 billion. In addition to dozens of subsidiaries, Gazprom has invested in more than 100 other companies, including banking, automobiles, shipping, furniture and agriculture. Whole farms are owned by Gazprom to supply fresh food to its 367,000 workers. While other Russian companies are shedding their Soviet-era social obligations, Gazprom retains a large social welfare system for its employees, building houses, schools and clinics.

The Russian government, which Chernomyrdin heads, owns 40 percent of Gazprom, but officials said the government does not actively exercise its right to vote on the company's affairs. Moreover, the government has given the huge monopoly special privileges and tax breaks worth billions of dollars.

For example, two years ago, President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree allowing Gazprom to create a special "stabilization fund" in which it could, in effect, deposit revenues tax-free, using them for investment. When Russia and the International Monetary Fund subsequently agreed on a \$6.5 billion loan, with strict criteria for Russia's performance, such special funds were to be terminated. However, according to Russian government sources, Gazprom kept its fund intact. The company later agreed to pay taxes on one-third of the fund, but left the rest of the tax break in place until some time in the first half of next year.

Unlike most companies in Russia, Gazprom must give permission for anyone to sell shares and has first rights to purchase any that come up for sale. The company has been only partially privatized under rules that made it difficult for foreigners to obtain shares. The shares in Gazprom were sold only to people who live in certain regions where gas is produced and transported, and to its workers, excluding a huge part of Russia's population from the bidding.

Another part of Gazprom's shares are being held by the company. They were supposed to be sold on world markets this year in an effort to raise capital for investment. But so far, nothing has happened. Vyakhirev has said the delay is due to problems in estimating the real value of the sprawling company.

Russia's reformist former finance minister, Boris Fyodorov, who now heads his own political party, suggested earlier this year that Chernomyrdin had received 1 percent of the stock in Gazprom. If true, such shares could eventually make Chernomyrdin one of the wealthiest men in Russia. When asked, Chernomyrdin's spokesman referred the question to Gazprom, which replied that neither Chernomyrdin nor members of his family are stockholders in Gazprom.

What has Russia gained in exchange for the special treatment? Gazprom has provided a steady supply of gas to Russia and its neighbors through the first turbulent years of market reforms. This has translated into reliable hard-currency earnings and budget revenues for Russia.

Jonathan P. Stern, vice president of Gas Strategies, a London consulting firm, said: "The great source of power of the gas industry is that virtually alone in the whole of the Russian industrial sector, it has maintained a successful track record through five years of economic mayhem. This gives it an enormous source of strength and power."

Gazprom's political and economic interests are to maintain that position and resist a breakup of the monopoly. As a result, Gazprom and its political clan, centered on Chernomyrdin, have emerged as a moderate force favoring Russian openness to the West, which provides a huge part of its earnings.

148

Gazprom also needs a stable, sympathetic political climate at home to continue reaping the profits of its monopoly position, and it is leery of radical free-market reformers who want to split up the company. At the same time, Gazprom would not want to see the return to power of Communists, who propose to re-nationalize all energy industries, or ultra-nationalists who would slam the door on the West.

Gazprom is an especially secretive company. Its 1994 annual report was its first, and offers little insight into the company's financial condition. The Washington Post made dozens of phone calls to Gazprom representatives, including spokesmen, board members and other officials, and submitted written questions. But they refused to grant interviews or discuss the company's finances, shares or governance.

However, Russian and Western sources provided fresh data about Gazprom, which they said were drawn largely from the company's books. Two Russian sources and a Western economist who has studied the company estimated that Gazprom has annual revenues somewhere between \$20 billion and \$27 billion this year. These sources said Gazprom's after-tax profits are about \$6 billion.

Thus, if it were to be included on the Fortune Magazine list of the world's 500 largest corporations, based on revenues alone Gazprom would rank somewhere between 100th and 135th. But if ranked by the amount of its profits, Gazprom would be second on the list, just behind the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, which had profits of \$6.2 billion.

According to the two Russian government sources, Gazprom's true profits may be even larger—and hidden. They said the costs reported by Gazprom are, inexplicably, far above what outsiders estimate the company should have spent. For example, a large amount of money is reported by the company to have been earmarked for goods that were not delivered, both sources said. One of the sources said this amounted to \$1.3 billion, and the government has not yet discovered what happened to the money. "We really won't know until next year," he said.

Gazprom has a mighty political weapon: Nearly half of its Russian customers, as well as countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic states, are indebted to Gazprom for failure to pay their bills. If Gazprom cut off their gas, economic and political upheaval would almost certainly follow. Many specialists say Gazprom has the Kremlin over a barrel and receives special treatment simply in exchange for keeping the gas flowing.

What is clear is that Gazprom's power and influence are at the core of one of the country's larger political clans. Russian politicians and Western diplomats say Gazprom is bankrolling a number of parliamentary campaigns as Russia heads toward the Dec. 17 elections for the lower house, or State Duma. It is supporting Chernomyrdin's new party, Our Home Is Russia, which has "Stability" as its slogan.

In the pre-election jockeying among political factions and clans, the cozy relationship between Gazprom and the government is coming under more criticism. Russians joke that the name of Chernomyrdin's party should be "Our Home—Gazprom." Yuri Skokov, a former top Yeltsin assistant, who now heads a competing party, recently told the newspaper *Kommersant Daily* that "Chernomyrdin uses Gazprom as a strong instrument of power."

The Gazprom clan is still locked in competition with the rival groups, however. They include a Moscow-based group led by Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, which is backed by banks, media and real estate interests in the capital; the troubled military-industrial complex and the security services, which have different leaders but overlapping interests; and the Agrarian and Communist parties, which have well-organized, grass-roots support and a clear agenda: more state subsidies to farms and factories.

The Communists are favored to win more votes than any other party in the upcoming parliamentary election, while Chernomyrdin's Gazprom-

backed party trails well behind. But the elections will not be the decisive test of strength for the Russian clans, because the legislature is weak and divided, and none of them is likely to win a dominant position. Much more significant and hard-fought will be the presidential election next June.

The free-market reformers who criticize Gazprom make up another clan, albeit with diminished clout. They would like the state to reap more revenues from Gazprom while loosening its grip on the Kremlin. Rather than let Gazprom keep the billions of dollars for investment, the reformers want to push the company to seek capital on world markets, which they believe would also force it to be more open.

"Gazprom is like Standard Oil," said economist Anders Aslund of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who has been a frequent critic of the gas monopoly. "The United States could not manage Standard Oil, and had to break it up. But Gazprom is worse. John D. Rockefeller was not president of the United States. Chernomyrdin is prime minister of Russia."