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Russia
State Duma Election
Observation Report

December 17, 1995

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Republican Institute has sponsored three observation missions in Russia. The first mission observed the April 1993 constitutional referendum and issued a report detailing weaknesses in technical aspects of the voting process. IRI observers found no evidence of systematic fraud or intimidation. However, they did note that the production, distribution, and security of ballots was lax, and that various Russian regions differed in methods of tabulation. IRI's delegation further concluded that these weaknesses could be exploited easily if the stakes of elections were higher and if there were a greater incentive to cheat. The observer team's recommendations were published in *Izvestiya* and later introduced on the floor of the parliament by its democratic members. A number of IRI's suggested improvements had been adopted by the December 12, 1993 parliamentary elections, including: clearer guidelines on validation of ballots and procedures for replacing spoiled ballots by local election officials; increased security for mobile ballot boxes; revisions in the absentee voting system; and provisions for an orderly process of accrediting domestic and international observers. These changes demonstrated a willingness to reexamine the election process and make modifications where weaknesses were found.

IRI's second Russian observation delegation, which observed the December 1993 parliamentary elections, issued a number of recommendations that were partly or substantially adopted into the new parliamentary election law signed by President Boris Yeltsin in June 1995. The Vice Chairman of Russia's Central Election Commission in a meeting on Capitol Hill in spring 1995 said that IRI's report "served as the road map for the CEC in making improvements in the election law." Eighteen of the 20 recommendations related directly to election law were partially or substantially adopted. These included: providing an adequate campaign period; establishing a well-defined and well-publicized process for reporting results; initiating procedures to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot for voters using the portable ballot box; and encouraging the recruitment of new people into the election administration process along with thorough training programs. (See Appendix VI)

IRI's third mission observed the Russian Duma elections, December 17, 1995. IRI observers did not witness systematic or deliberate misconduct that would call into question the basic integrity of the process. However, IRI observers did find areas of the electoral process that hold potential for abuse, such as a persistent lack of appreciation for the secret ballot, a disorganized counting process that provided ample opportunity for vote manipulation, and several actual abuses and potential problems concerning military voting.

The recommendations contained in this report will be forwarded to the appropriate Russian officials in an effort to assist Russia in developing its electoral process. Copies will also be provided to Russian media, political parties, U.S. government officials and U.S. media. In addition to the specific recommendations, this report also contains a survey of the major political parties, delegate observations on electoral environment and administration, delegate reports from the 10 cities monitored, exit poll results, and lists of new State Duma deputies.

The Russian people deserve recognition for their participation in a process that continues the country's transition to democracy. Russia's elected officials now have a responsibility to fulfill voter expectations that a stable democratic political system can meet the challenges facing the country. Chief among these are the imposition of the rule of law and the continued development of a market economy. Solutions to these and other matters can be rendered only by democratic institutions. Fully developed democratic institutions cannot be put into place instantly, and will take time to mature.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The International Republican Institute's observer delegation found the December 17, 1995, Duma elections to be a technical step forward in Russia's democratic transition, as demonstrated by continued refinements in the election law and practices, the range of views offered by political parties, and the level of interest displayed by Russian voters in the election.

The atmosphere of these elections was vastly different from those held in 1993. The December 1993 parliamentary elections were held only two months after President Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of People's Deputies, the federal legislature, with the storming of the White House. The election law was issued by presidential decree. Parties had little time to prepare, and few new parties were able to collect the signatures necessary to be placed on the ballot. Contrary to popular expectations, pro-reform parties performed poorly. Together they received only 116 of the 450 seats.

IRI believes that democratic and free market reform is the basis for security and prosperity of the Russian people. There were positive aspects of the 1995 election that encouraged this movement to reform. Political parties, representing the full range of opinion, were able to register and campaign, getting their message out to the voter much more effectively than in 1993. Parties and candidates campaigned under an improved election law, and they had adequate time to campaign. These elections point to a determination by Russians to exercise their right to make choices. Voters turned out in higher numbers than expected -- 65 percent nationwide.

While the election results released by the Central Election Commission reflect voter preference, a number of steps must be taken to assure greater confidence in the integrity of the system for the future. In general, IRI delegates did not witness systematic voter fraud or abuse, but they did observe several aspects of the 1995 electoral process that could have created an opportunity for vote manipulation. Open voting (that is, voting outside the booth) was very common, with little regard for the sanctity of the secret ballot. While open voting is customary for Russians, the practice could, at some point in the future, lead to questions regarding free voter choice. In general, the counting process was conducted in a somewhat arbitrary manner. This appeared to be due to lack of training; nevertheless, failure to follow procedure could create opportunities for deliberate vote manipulation. Military involvement at certain polling sites raised concerns of military control over voting.

The outcome of the election is also a source of serious concern. Although reformers were able to sustain their presence in the Duma with a net gain of three seats (119), the strong showing of political parties whose dedication to democratic institutions and continued reform is scant is especially troubling. Of course, any imperfection in the system undercuts confidence in democratic institutions and lends credibility to those opposed to reform; thus, a cycle of cynicism could replace one of confidence.

The following are recommendations that could increase transparency, streamline the election process and, most important, add to Russian voter confidence in future elections.

ELECTION LAW

Issue: Since 1993, political parties have proliferated, and low signature requirements resulted in a three-fold increase in parties on the ballot, thus increasing the expense of the election and diluting support for political parties. This resulted in a large, cumbersome paper ballot listing 43 parties, which in many cases was confusing to voters.

Recommendation 1: It is important for the electorate to have the ability to make educated choices. If political views are to be channeled through fewer parties that enjoy greater support from the electorate, signature requirements for registration of political parties and candidates should be increased. Consideration should also be given to absolving parties of the signature requirement if they passed the 5 percent threshold in the two most recent elections. In addition, the 5 percent threshold should be continued as it has the beneficial effect of encouraging consolidation of political parties.

Issue: Campaign finance continued to be an issue in the campaign period as there was not an effective mechanism to evaluate accusations of illegal financing prior to the election. The current State Duma law does not require disclosure until 30 days after the publication of election results.¹ With campaign expenditure reports not due until after the final election returns are announced, possible violators may be sworn into office before violations are discovered. Because of the complexities of Russian law, it is unlikely that State Duma deputies, once sworn in, would be prosecuted.

Recommendation 2: The campaign financial disclosure portion of the State Duma election law should be strengthened by requiring periodic disclosure prior to election day, a process for checking the accuracy of the reports, and enforcement of sanctions under the election law for non-compliance by political parties, candidates, businesses and other entities involved in an election.

¹ The Basic Guarantees Law of Electoral Rights, passed in 1994, suggests periodic reporting prior to election day. The CEC's campaign finance commissioner was diligent in requiring electoral blocs to file reports but did not conduct thorough review of the reports' accuracy. The campaign finance section of the State Duma election law should be expanded to give the CEC clear jurisdiction and investigative and enforcement authority not spelled out under the Basic Guarantees Law.

Issue: The passage of the new State Duma election law is an accomplishment for President Yeltsin and the parliament. However, the process of reexamination and amendment should continue in order to strengthen areas that demonstrated weaknesses in the December election. As it is, Russian voters are cynical about democracy. Consistent review of the law and efforts to strengthen it will boost Russians' confidence in the process.

Recommendation 3: The new State Duma should reassess the election law in light of the 1995 parliamentary election to determine areas that need to be improved or clarified.

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Issue: A number of Russian political parties and the media questioned the Central Election Commission's independence from influence by the government and its ability to implement the election law. With the commission largely made up of commissioners appointed by the President and the Federation Council, many question its impartiality.

Recommendation 4: The Central Election Commission should be a truly independent, autonomous agency with clearly defined enforcement powers and budget authority. It should be independent from both executive and legislative branches in its decisionmaking.

Issue: Several problems arose during the election registration process. Creative entrepreneurs exploited the signature collection process by collecting pages of signatures and selling them to candidates and parties (a process that appears already to have already begun for the presidential election). Many of the signatures were legitimate but others were of dead or non-existent people. Parties and candidates accused each other of fraud during the signature collection process; but generally only candidates in single mandate districts were disqualified for such violations.

Most electoral blocs that turned in signatures were approved by the CEC. However, the CEC rejected some blocs, including the popular pro-reform Yabloko and the nationalist Derzhava, for technical violations. Communists and pro-reform parties alike objected, particularly to Yabloko's rejection, accusing the CEC of manipulating the elections. The Supreme Court reversed the CEC's decision on Yabloko and Derzhava a week later. As a result of the court's decisions, the CEC became more lenient in its verification of signatures presented by parties to be put on the ballot.

Recommendation 5: The Central Election Commission should set out clearer guidelines for signature collection and ensure that political parties have an understanding of these requirements. The CEC should devise a better system for checking the authenticity of signatures. The CEC should ensure its enforcement of regulations are equitable. In addition, political parties have the responsibility for knowing what those regulations are and adhering to them.

Issue: IRI observed strong and apparently effective voter turnout efforts of Russia's military. Such an effort, as practiced in many other countries, is welcome, but must be done with great care to avoid the appearance of command influence on voter choices or compulsory participation. In a number of cities, IRI observers witnessed irregularities involving the military, including one instance of a military commander instructing his subordinates which party they should vote for.² Another IRI observer team was refused admittance to a polling site on a military reservation intended by the CEC to be open.³ In addition, observers reported military voting in the open or incidents of two or three recruits piling into one booth to vote.

Recommendation 6: Every effort should be made by the Central Election Commission and the military to ensure the process allows soldiers to exercise their right to vote, free of command influence on their participation or vote. Every care should be given to avoid any appearances that might call into question the integrity of the process. The presence of military officers at the polling station during voting, unless in the process of voting, or those serving as polling station commissioners should be prohibited.

Issue: The Central Election Commission's plan for releasing election results was an improvement over 1993. It had increased its computer capability, had set up an impressive election night center in the Federation Council's parliamentary center, and set forth procedures for providing protocols to the appropriate electoral commissions, observers, and media. However, it took 12 days to release final results. The provision of providing protocols to observers was not always followed according to procedure and the time taken to calculate and publish election results undermined confidence in the election's results.

² This took place at a military polling site in the city of Gorelovo, southwest of St. Petersburg and at a military base in Syertolovo, north of St. Petersburg.

³ The military reservation was located in Timonovo, northwest of Moscow.

Recommendation 7: The CEC and its auxiliary bodies should attempt to increase the speed in which results are announced, while not impairing accuracy, to increase the confidence and transparency of future elections. Additionally, the CEC should announce official results as they come in, as it did with the preliminary results. Continued efforts to automate the transfer of results should be pursued as well as civic education to reduce voter concerns of count manipulation through an automated system.

Issue: Throughout the campaign period and immediately prior to the election, IRI observers heard concerns that vote tabulations would be manipulated at the territorial commission level, on up. An integral component of IRI's mission was to track the protocols from a sample of the polling sites to the territorial commissions, then compare the final numbers to determine the integrity of the process. In several instances, IRI observers were not able to obtain official protocols; they were left to copy down numbers from the protocol without certification by the chairman. In addition, obtaining the final numbers from the district commissions has been difficult; to date, IRI has obtained final results from district commissions in only half of the cities monitored. Nevertheless, these results match those of the polling station protocols at the time of their submission to the territorial level.

Recommendation 8: The CEC should work with local election bodies to ensure they are more responsive to public or media requests for election information to improve the confidence and transparency of future elections.

Issue: The State Duma election law states: "Each voter shall vote personally. Voting for other persons is not allowed. Ballots are filled in the booth, specially equipped place or a room for voting by secret ballot, where the presence of anybody except for the voter, is not allowed." Nevertheless, in every city and polling station, IRI delegates observed voters marking ballots in the open. Some sites were too small and did not have enough voting booths to accommodate voters. In addition, observers reported incidents of family voting; that is, father, mother, and children gathering into one booth.

Recommendation 9: The CEC should make every effort to educate and encourage Russian voters of the importance of the secret ballot. The layout of the polling station should encourage voting to take place in the privacy of the voting booth and customary tables set out for voting removed. The sites should be larger to avoid overcrowding and more booths added to accommodate voters.

Issue: Last minute changes on the ballot were not communicated in a timely fashion by the CEC to the regions. This contributed to the disorderliness of some polling sites, as poll workers were making necessary changes to the ballot the day before, and sometimes even on election day. IRI observers also noted errors made in marking names off the ballots.

Recommendation 10:

The CEC should make every effort to communicate to the regions in a timely fashion to ensure proper adjustments are made without error and to reduce opportunities for error or abuse. Means of communication should be standardized and ballot corrections should be made at least a week in advance of the elections.

Issue: Polling site workers were thoroughly trained on voting procedures. When it came time for the count, polling station commissioners were not adequately trained. Clear guidelines in the law were completely disregarded. Counting procedures varied from station to station, left to the local election chairman's discretion. At nearly every site monitored, delegates observed no attempts to double check votes against the number of ballots provided to each station. In several cases, when the numbers did not balance, polling station workers were observed erasing and changing numbers. This also occurred at the territorial level where IRI delegates observed commissioners' erasing or "whiting out" numbers and making corrections so the numbers would balance.

Observers also heard consistent complaints about the length of the voting day. A voting day lasting from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. (14 hours) is too long. Voting was very light in the last several hours. Many of the poll workers were at the polling station the entire day, leaving them exhausted. This may have contributed to carelessness in the ballot tabulation process.

Recommendation 11:

This is an area IRI observers noted provided opportunity for fraud and abuse. Rather than being concerned about the sanctity of the vote, local and territorial commissioners' focus was on making the numbers come out right. The CEC should make every effort to thoroughly train election workers in counting procedures that are clearly set out in the law. In addition, consideration should be given to shortening the voting day to 12 hours rather than 14.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Issue: In 1993, IRI observers noted that parties devoted most of their efforts to candidate registration and the campaign period, ignoring the fact that parties have a crucial role to play on election day. IRI recommended that the parties make a concerted effort to train and have present on election day representatives of their parties at the poll. In 1995, IRI observers noted again the overall absence of reform or centrist party poll watchers. Only the Communist Party of the Russian Federation had pollwatchers present at nearly every polling station.

Recommendation 12:

Again, IRI encourages political parties to recruit and train domestic pollwatchers to monitor the process in order to provide a disincentive for abuse and to provide an external basis for judging the validity of the official count. In addition, pollwatchers should have a clear understanding of their responsibilities as monitors. Also, the CEC should ensure domestic pollwatchers have appropriate identification.

PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA

Issue: Numerous Russian journalists and print and broadcast editors voiced concerns about the clarity and limitations of the election law with regard to media activities. In addition, some IRI observers were told of incidents of influence by government officials and owners of media outlets on story angles and content. The creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations that provide an objective yet critical source of information to society is still lacking in Russian society. In addition, dependence by political parties on government-guaranteed media is not the best prescription for independent political parties.

Recommendation 13:

An electoral media environment that thrives on free enterprise and a free and open press improves the overall political climate and stabilizes democratic transition. National and local government authorities and media leaders should refrain from attempts to control news and take steps to strengthen the media's independence to ensure freedom of the press. Legislative and governmental bodies should resist temptations to promulgate rules, guidelines and laws in an attempt to level the playing field for all political parties within broadcast media.

III. ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

On December 17, 1995, Russian voters went to the polls to elect a new, 450 member State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly. The upper house of the parliament, the 178 member Federation Council, was not up for reelection. The first class of Duma deputies, elected in December 1993, served a two-year transition term. Deputies elected in December 1995 will serve for four years.

Voters received two ballots when they entered the polling station, a party list ballot and a single mandate ballot. On both ballots, voters indicated their choice by placing an "X" or any other mark in a box located to the right of the political party list, or the individual candidate, of their choice. Voters also had the option of voting against all parties and/or all candidates.

On the party ballot, half of the State Duma was elected from national political party lists based on a proportional system. Parties that won 5 percent or more of the vote divided up 225 seats proportionally.

The election law prescribed how the lists were to be constructed. The maximum number of names on any single party list was 270, and the first 12 names were from the national party leadership. The remaining 258 names represented specific regions, and no region could make up more than 30 percent of the entire list. Initially, the CEC wanted to design the party ballot to list the name of each party, the top three national candidates and candidates from a particular region. This proved impractical with the large numbers of parties. Instead, the names of the top three national candidates and top three regional candidates were listed on the party list ballot. Nevertheless, with 43 parties, the ballot was so large it was printed on a newspaper-size sheet of paper. The order on the ballot was decided by lottery. Because of the large number of parties, much speculation occurred over the influence of placement on the ballot; however, the Women of Russia bloc that won the first place on the ballot failed to make the 5 percent threshold.

Candidates were permitted to run both on a party list ballot and in a single mandate district, a tactic used by most party leaders to improve their chances of getting into parliament. Any candidate listed on a party list who won a single mandate seat would be removed from the party list seat freeing up that seat for the next candidate on the party list.

On the single mandate ballot, voters were asked to choose a single, individual candidate to represent their particular district. Contrasted to 1993, single-mandate candidates were identified by party affiliation or as independent. The balloting procedure in this case closely resembled that by which American voters elect their U.S. Representative. There are 225 single-

mandate constituencies. The number of voters within a single-mandate constituency range from a high of approximately 650,000 in the Amur Oblast on the Chinese border to a low of approximately 13,000 in Siberia's remote Evenkia tribal zone. The average number of voters per constituency is approximately 500,000. Provided that at least 25 percent of the eligible voters in a particular district participated in the election, and provided that there were at least two qualifying candidates on the single-mandate ballot in that district, the candidate receiving the largest number of votes would be declared the winner.

The election law set up a permanent Central Election Commission to oversee the elections, allocate funds for the election process, arbitrate complaints appealed from the lower commissions, and register parties and electoral coalitions on the national ballot. The CEC consists of a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and 12 commissioners who include representatives from different political parties that formed factions after the 1993 parliamentary election. Next in authority are the regional (subject) election commissions of the 89 administrative subjects (states) of the Russian Federation. The regional election commissions are responsible for coordinating activities within their region, printing ballots, arbitrating complaints and acting as a liaison between the CEC and the lower commissions.

District election commissions, formed along the boundaries of the single-mandate constituencies, constitute the next level of administrative authority. District election commissions coordinate election activities within the district, approve the text that appears on the single mandate ballots, and publish the results of the single mandate contests. Below the district election commissions are the territorial commissions, which function at the city or county level. The territorial commissions train poll workers, arbitrate complaints, deliver ballots to the polling stations and generally coordinate activities among the polling stations and forward the results of the national party list ballots to the CEC. The polling station commissions organize and update voter lists, prepare and oversee the voting process and tabulate and report the election results.

MISSION FRAMEWORK

IRI's 21-member mission received guidelines and other information in a meeting held December 4 and briefing books providing background information that included the election law, duties of observers, city profiles, and other important information. The delegation departed the U.S. December 11 and arrived in Moscow December 12. The next day, the delegation began a series of briefings and meetings with national authorities concerned with election administration, party leaders representing a range of political views, and U.S. embassy officials.

On December 14, observers divided into teams, and accompanied by IRI staff, deployed to the 10 cities in which the Institute conducts programs: Arkhangelsk, Moscow, Murmansk, Novosibirsk, Perm, Rostov-na-Donu, Volgograd, Voronezh, St. Petersburg, and Tomsk. The deployment cities represent the core regional centers where IRI training and consultations with party activists, elected officials, and women and youth groups have been carried out over the

past two years. In order to gain even deeper and more specific understanding of the environment in which they would be working, the observers participated in a second round of similar meetings with local election officials, party leaders, candidates, and members of the media.

Consistent with IRI policy, the election observers were not tasked with making simple findings as to whether the election could be categorized as free and fair. The observers' broader goal was to observe implemented improvements made in Russia's election law since December 1993 and to recommend further refinements to the law and the process.

Throughout election day, IRI observers visited more than 100 polling stations. They were present at the opening and closing of selected stations in their regions, and monitored ballot counts that often continued into the early morning of the following day. Observers sought to cover a diverse geographic cross-section, traveling to both rural and urban areas. The mandate of the observers was to observe, and not to interject themselves in the balloting process, even if they felt it was being compromised. Observers were permitted to question election officials, but not to suggest any immediate modifications in their behavior that could be construed as interference.

Members of the delegation identified both strengths and weaknesses of the system under two broad categories: electoral environment and election administration.

ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT

Delegation members were asked to observe the state of the electoral environment to determine whether there had been pervasive or systematic efforts to prevent open debate and fair competition among the political parties and/or individual candidates for office. How well organized were local election campaigns? Did voters appear adequately informed regarding who and what they were being asked to vote for? Did parties and candidates have fair and equal access to publicly provided campaign funds? Was the local broadcast media providing candidates with allotted time as required by law? Was there evidence of systematic media bias, or efforts to selectively deny parties or candidates access to the media? Were local election commissions providing the political parties and candidates with accurate and timely information? These issues characterize the pre-election environment and are of special concern in a country such as Russia where vestiges of a totalitarian, state-dominated past linger.

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

The equitable and consistent administration of the voting process is necessary to ensure a legitimate outcome. Observers were asked to evaluate activities that are the core of effective election administration: recruitment and training of polling station workers; the production and distribution of ballots and the legibility of those ballots; the availability and security of voting booths and ballot boxes; and the tabulation and tracking of ballots and reporting of results. This evaluation extends to an examination of the election law to determine whether it contains clear guidelines and procedures, or if vague and ambiguous language might allow wide administrative discretion and, consequently, inconsistent application of the law.

Observers examined the process with a critical eye toward opportunity or motive to commit ballot fraud and abuse. Observers performed random checks for fraudulent voting practices while providing a disincentive against such practices by their presence. In particular they looked for evidence of willful tampering with or destruction of ballots, multiple voting, efforts to influence voters at or around polling sites through bribery or intimidation, and manipulation of the ballot count.

IV. DELEGATE OBSERVATIONS

CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

In order to be placed on the party list ballot, parties had to collect 200,000 signatures with no more than 7 percent of the signatures coming from any one region. To qualify for a place on a party list, candidates had to be nominated by their respective parties. A total of 43 parties met the criteria and fielded party lists. This represented a threefold increase over the number of parties that appeared on the ballot in 1993. Three of the 43, (Yabloko, Derzhava, and the Union of Public Utilities Workers of Russia) required Supreme Court rulings to be accepted for the ballot. Others attempted to obtain a Supreme court exemption from being disqualified but failed. Yabloko, which initially benefitted from the free media that portrayed its leader, Grigory Yavlinsky, an opponent of the government, in the end, claimed it was disadvantaged by the delay in getting its campaign under way.

To qualify for a place on a single mandate ballot, candidates had to gather signatures from 1 percent of their districts' population. In most cases, this amounted to about 5,000 signatures. More than 2,600 candidates ran for the single-seat constituencies, an average of 12 per district, although some districts had as many as 20 candidates. Many of those listed on the party ballot also sought election in a single-mandate district.

POLITICAL PARTIES

In Moscow, IRI observers met with representatives of Yabloko, The Communist Party of the Russia Federation, Russia's Democratic Choice, Derzhava, and Ivan Rybkin's Bloc. In deployment cities, IRI observer teams met with party leaders and candidates from all of the major parties. The delegates monitoring in Moscow had additional meetings with political leaders including Yegor Gaidar, Russia's Democratic Choice; Victor L. Sheinis, Yabloko; and Gennadi Zyuganov, Communist Party of Russia. All parties were concerned with the CEC's ability to monitor spending limits, the high number of parties that ended up on the ballot and the expense of campaigns, and the slant of the national television network (ORT) toward the government's party, Our Home is Russia. Specifically, the parties questioned how Our Home is Russia could have printed an enormous volume of campaign materials and stayed within the spending limits. (In the regions, specifically in Perm and Arkhangelsk, observers reported Our Home is Russia display advertising overtook other display advertising.) Parties also were troubled by President Yeltsin's public service announcement the day before the election in which he made a veiled reference in support of the government's party.

While some CEC commissioners came from the major parties participating in the 1995 election, few parties felt they had an advocate on the commission. The CEC chairman responded that the parties were represented on the commission, and it should be through these commissioners that the parties could bring their grievances. However, some political parties criticized the CEC in the media, perhaps for political advantage, or in the belief this was their only avenue to influence the commission. They also criticized the CEC chairman for being too closely aligned to the government and not always open to the press.

The 43 parties that qualified for the party ballot represented the full range of Russia's political spectrum--reformist, centrist, communist, nationalist, and special interests. As in 1993, the pro-reform parties were unable to unite, thus splitting their vote. Russia's Democratic Choice (RDC), a descendent of 1993 Russia's Choice, and initially the political movement most closely allied with President Yeltsin, lost its perceived position of "party of power" by opposing the Chechnya war. It was replaced by Our Home is Russia, causing RDC to lose much of its regional structure and most of its financial backing. Other pro-reform leaders like Grigory Yavlinsky, a long-time opponent of Yeltsin, appeared to be more interested in using the parliamentary elections as a stepping stone to the June 1996 presidential election than uniting behind a common banner. As a result, only Our Home is Russia and Yabloko were able to pass the 5 percent threshold despite the overall performance of reformers and centrists gaining 27 percent and 13 percent of the vote, respectively.

Methods used in the campaign by parties that passed the 5 percent threshold were familiar campaign techniques -- television and display advertising, door-to-door campaigning, and mailings. Several party leaders kept active campaign schedules and travelled to the regions to meet voters. (In comparison, in early December, Gaidar cancelled campaign trips to the regions opting to focus on national media opportunities from Moscow.)

Compared to 1993, pro-reform candidates were better campaigners and the parties were more organized in campaign activities. Although their campaign messages often lacked focus, they did have platforms that addressed issues that are of grave concern to the Russian voter, e.g., the economy and crime. In 1993, the pro-reform parties pursued a Moscow-based top down approach that dictated candidate and election activities to regional parties. While Moscow parties still played powerful roles in their regional chapters' efforts, Yabloko and Russia's Democratic Choice took a more regional approach to their campaigns. (Although in St. Petersburg, the local Yabloko organization stated it had been forced to accept a candidate from the national party whom it did not support.) In some cases, this allowed the local parties the freedom to choose not to run a candidate and instead support another party's in the hopes of securing a democratic win. Examples of this were seen in Murmansk and Rostov.

MATERIAL RESOURCES

The election law that guided the 1995 Duma election dealt with campaign finance in terms of spending, contributions, and state-provided resources. The Central Election Commission provided 80 million rubles (\$17,780) to each of the 43 parties and 400,000 rubles (\$89) to candidates for single-member constituencies. In addition, parties and candidates could raise their own campaign funds. The maximum contribution to a single-mandate campaign are the following: from the candidate's personal funds, 43.7 million rubles (\$9,711); from the electoral bloc or party, 65.5 million rubles (\$14,555); and, from individuals and legal entities, 874,000 rubles (\$195). The maximum expenditures for an electoral bloc or party are 10.9 billion rubles (\$2.43 million).

Campaign funds were maintained in an account with the Russian Federation Savings Bank and its branches. Other than expenses for media that were reported by candidates, parties or television and radio stations, the conventional wisdom was most expenditures and amounts of money raised were under reported. Underreporting income and expenditures are common practices in commercial dealings in Russia. Because of the absence of debit checks, contributions had to be transferred by bank transfer, or in cash. This practice raises the possibility of unreported contributions and expenses, such as printing, salaries, or office rent, so campaigns could keep within spending limits, and vendors could pay less in taxes.

MEDIA ISSUES

The media environment of the 1995 election was filled with complaints by the political parties and candidates that media coverage was either biased or non-existent. The election law guaranteed 30 minutes free air time on state-run or partly state-run television and radio stations for all parties at the national level and 30 minutes free air time for all candidates at the regional level. The parties were assigned their time and position by lottery and the national television network held a series of debates in which all parties had an opportunity to debate issues. The law also provided guidelines for paid advertising. The state-run channel (ORT) limited the candidates to 4 minutes of paid media a day. The requirement that paid media time not exceed free time was confusing and left to individual state-run stations room to interpret their own understanding of the law.

Many voters received their information on the elections from national television news programs. Regional television, radio and newspapers carried political or election-related news but for the most part, parties, candidates, and even journalists complained about the balance of coverage. In Arkhangelsk, several newspapers admitted to not attempting investigative reporting, and the editor of Pravda Severa stated that he left it to the parties to dig up information on each other. Some Russian media sources do not view election coverage as a public service and a professional responsibility.

The newspaper and broadcast journalists interviewed universally agreed that the principal problem facing the media during the campaign season was the ambiguous nature of the electoral law and the unclear authority of the CEC in applying it. Some of their comments indicated conflicting views of objective reporting, saying the CEC in "its insistence of objectivity, had squelched good reporting and caused them to fail in their mission as a free press." These journalists did not feel they had the freedom to ask "provocative questions."

Government influence still plays a role in how the media operates. In Voronezh, three weeks before the election, three independent TV stations were shut down by the government on the grounds that all three were operating without proper licenses. While this apparently was true, the TV stations had been operating without licenses for a couple of years. IRI observers were told that many believed that the government's actions were politically motivated because one of the stations had aired a speech by Zhirinovskiy attacking a number of parties, including the Communist Party, which is well represented in Voronezh. In addition, the Voronezh oblast administration is run by communists. In the city of Volgograd, in a meeting with several journalists, one correspondent told IRI delegates daily meetings were held in the Volgograd governor's office with newspaper, television and radio editors to discuss political coverage of Our Home is Russia.

Aside from government influence, independent media outlets also were subject to control by their financial benefactors. Most independent stations are owned by one or two large commercial enterprises, which have leverage over their editorial policy. Very few independent media are financed solely by a diverse base of advertising revenue. In Voronezh, journalists noted that owners and editors of newspapers exerted considerable influence over what stories would run and the slant those stories should take. This admission also was made in Tomsk.

ELECTION LAW

The current Duma election law was signed by President Boris Yeltsin in June 1995 following much debate between the two bodies of the Federal Assembly and the president. The debate reached such proportions that for a time it appeared there would be no law and the Duma elections would have to be conducted under a presidential decree. The issues disputed were: the ratio of single mandate seats to party list seats, the percentage turnout required to validate the elections, the run off elections in single mandate constituencies and the provision requiring civil servants or mass media employees to take a leave of absence if they sought office.

The biggest stumbling block was the ratio of party list seats to single mandate seats. President Yeltsin and the Federation Council favored decreasing the number of party list seats from 225/450 to 150/450. Most factions in the Duma favored the 225/450 ratio, but conceded to the president that only the first 12 seats on the party list could be representatives of the national party and the remaining candidates must represent specific regions. This concession would keep the party lists from being dominated by people from Moscow, a major complaint from the 1993 elections. On other issues, Yeltsin removed the provision requiring a leave of

absence for civil servants and media employees running for office. (This enabled Viktor Chernomyrdin to lead Our Home is Russia while remaining prime minister).

Yeltsin's request to raise the voter turnout from 25 to 50 would not have had much of an effect as voter turnout was much higher (65 percent nationally) than was expected. Nonetheless, the president was persuaded to keep the required turnout at 25 percent to avoid the risk of invalidating the election at 50 percent turnout. Additionally, Yeltsin agreed that holding two rounds of voting in the single mandate districts, requiring a run-off and absolute majority, would be costly and difficult to do at the present time.

Late in the campaign, several of the smaller parties and some representatives from the president's staff disputed the constitutionality of requiring a 5 percent threshold for parties to be seated in the lower house of parliament. They argued that there would be a large number of voters who would vote for parties that would not pass the threshold, and therefore would not be represented in the Duma. Some argued that as many as 50 percent of the voters' choice would not be represented. Duma deputies from some of the parties suggested the Duma reexamine and amend the election law on this issue, to eliminate, or substantially lower the threshold. President Yeltsin feared that once the law went back to the Duma for amendment other issues would be reopened. Opponents to the 5 percent threshold pursued their case, asking the Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of this provision. The court declined.

CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION ACTIVITIES

During the campaign period, several parties (including communists, nationalists, and reformers) and interest groups voiced suspicions that the state automated computer system would be used to manipulate the vote. The computer system was used in about 75 percent of the territorial commissions to forward preliminary results to the CEC. The CEC made it clear that the state automated system was to be used for tabulating preliminary results and official results would come from the actual protocols couriered from the regional commissions to the CEC. This somewhat partly allayed the parties' fear of vote manipulation.

The CEC set up the two track system for tabulating the votes. First, the protocols from polling stations were taken to the territorial commission where the preliminary results were communicated to the CEC by computer, fax or telephone. Then the actual protocols were sent by courier from the territorial commission to the district commission to the CEC. The Central Election Commission set up an election night center to announce preliminary results to the public, media, political party monitors, and observers. Unfortunately, once the preliminary results were known and the protocols began arriving from the regions, the CEC became quiet, stating that no further announcement would be made until official results were finalized. The CEC phones went unanswered during the next few days following the election. This led some to question the transparency of the election process.

Campaign finance was an issue in the 1995 Duma elections. Several parties made accusations in the press and to the CEC suggesting Our Home is Russia and other parties had exceeded the spending limits. While the Duma election law does not require electoral blocs or candidates to report campaign expenditures until 30 days after the final results of the election are announced, the Basic Guarantees Law of Electoral Rights, passed in 1994, calls for reporting during the campaign period. The CEC's commissioner in charge of campaign finance was diligent in requiring the electoral blocs to submit periodic financial reports. However, a thorough review was not conducted to check on the accuracy of the reports. The absence of such activity by the CEC raises the issue of whether it is able to adequately investigate such issues in a timely fashion.

The Central Election Commission's funding of local commissions was a problem in the election cycle, as the money was either late or never arrived thus preventing local commissioners from fully implementing all types of programs from civic education to poll worker training.

POLLING STATIONS

IRI observers gave polling stations mixed reviews. While most were operated efficiently and the polling workers demonstrated knowledge of voting procedures, polling site commissioners were not at all prepared for the huge voter turnout and were at times overwhelmed by the large numbers of voters. The polling stations were in traditional locations of schools or administration buildings. IRI delegates observed the layout of the polling stations was not conducive to voting in private, free from influence or intimidation. Some more densely populated neighborhoods combined two or three polling stations into a single site. Also, vastly different means of tabulation were observed, demonstrating the broad discretionary power of the local election chairman.

The location of polling stations was not always publicized in advance of election day, or in some cases not at all. Such incidents were reported by observers in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Volgograd, and Perm.

MILITARY POLLING

IRI delegates visited several polling sites at which a large percentage of voters were members of the Russian military. This occurred in Arkhangelsk, Voronezh, Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Rostov. They also observed the voting process at one military base north of St. Petersburg, at a military school in Perm, and were turned away from a military polling station in Moscow. Overall, there was no evidence to suggest that the election law, as it applies specifically to military personnel, had been circumvented or violated in any systematic way. However, delegates did observe several irregularities by members of the military.

Both on and off military property, delegates reported evidence that some military recruits, if not actually coerced or instructed on how to vote, were at least subjected to inappropriate encouragement and group peer pressure.

The most egregious example of military control over voting was observed in St. Petersburg. At one polling site, voter lists were canvassed by officers and names were taken down of those who had not voted. Some 20 minutes later, the remainder of those on the list showed up to vote. At one military polling site, which also included civilian voters, the civilian election commissioner told the delegates she was unauthorized to look at the military portion of her polling site's list. The delegates witnessed a military officer instructing other military members how to vote. Military voters leaving the voting booth were directed to one particular ballot box among three. Delegates reported that recruits were actively encouraged or even instructed to vote at open tables where their ballot selections could be viewed openly by fellow recruits and officers standing nearby.

Recruits at a military school in Perm and at a base in Syertolovo, north of St. Petersburg, also appeared to have little opportunity to cast ballots out of the view of fellow recruits or officers. At the military base, delegates noted that recruits invariably entered voting booths in groups of two or three. At the military school, where about half the voters observed were civilians, IRI delegates noted a particularly high incidence of open voting.

Other evidence of inappropriate levels of military supervision involved the participation of recruits in the IRI exit poll. At the military school in Perm, IRI observers were asked not take pictures and to stop distributing the poll after they had handed out about 30 questionnaires. At the Syertolovo military base the situation was even worse, as recruits were not given the opportunity to respond to IRI exit polls without supervision and "advice" by superiors.

BALLOT SECURITY

The two ballots for the December election were produced and duplicated in the regions. It was the responsibility of the regional commission to deliver the ballots to the territorial commissions, who would then deliver the ballots to the polling sites. The number delivered was determined by the number of voters registered in that polling site. For a ballot to be valid, the polling site commissioner counts, signs and stamps the valid ballots for the election, then places them in a safe until the morning of the election. This practice was followed for the polling stations that IRI delegates observed.

There appears to have been no direct evidence, or strong reason to suspect, that systematic ballot fraud occurred in any of the regions where IRI delegates travelled. In almost all cases, delegates were able to confirm that ballots had been properly delivered to polling stations within the prescribed time frame, secured prior to election day, and properly validated.

However, a number of polling stations were disorganized in keeping track of the ballots on election day. Validated ballots were kept in different locations without the different commissioners or poll workers accounting for the ballots distributed. Not all polling stations had an adequate number of ballots; in Voronezh, the unexpected high number of voters caused several polling stations to run out of ballots. All of those stations were able to obtain more ballots, but for some not until evening. The military polling site visited in Arkhangelsk did not have enough ballots for the total number of registered voters.

Most polling stations had fairly accurate voting lists, with the exception of sites observed in Murmansk, Rostov, and Volgograd. This was supported by supplemental lists in most polling stations being relatively small and election commissioners being diligent in obtaining the appropriate identification from new voters. Still, delegates from Perm and Tomsk did question whether control of the supplemental list was adequate in some polling sites there.

By law, candidates' names must be withdrawn no later than 15 days prior to the election in order not to appear on the printed ballot; after that, changes must be made by hand. Due to this, changes to the party list ballot were being made up to and including election day. This resulted in ballots not being uniform in all locations within polling sites. Different polling sites had received different instructions regarding who to ad/strike, with some receiving telegrams, others receiving letters or telephone calls. At a rural polling site in Perm, the local chairman was stamping ballots on election day trying to keep up with the crowd of voters as they arrived at the polling station to vote. In Voronezh, polling station workers worked late on Friday and Saturday to cross off candidates from the ballots. At some polling sites there, and in Moscow, workers were even correcting the ballots on Sunday. Arkhangelsk delegates observed last minute changes being made on election day, and confusion over which names should be crossed off.

Delegates reported several sites where ballot boxes were not kept in sight of polling station commissioners during the voting day, either as a result of poor planning or unexpectedly large crowds. For example, at a St. Petersburg polling site, three ballot boxes were not in clear view of the proceedings, but were hidden behind the voting booths. Delegates returned to that site for the count and discovered where there had been three boxes earlier, at the end of the day four boxes were brought out to be emptied on the table. One box appeared to contain nothing but party list ballots. In a Perm polling site, it was discovered a few voters had mistakened a small cardboard box in a corner for the ballot box. In many of the sites observed in Arkhangelsk, Voronezh, Tomsk, Moscow, Murmansk and Rostov, the ballot boxes were placed in areas where polling station commissioners and party monitors could not see them. Delegates also reported seeing ballot boxes that were not properly sealed in some locations.

Others reported problems involving ballot security after the counting process. Several delegates reported that counted ballots were haphazardly bundled and insecurely stored at both the polling site level and the territorial level. Should a recount of the vote have been necessary, serious difficulties might have been encountered. For example, in Rostov, at the territorial level, ballots were taken to a storage room that was not well guarded and where people were

walking in and out without any official supervision. In Novosibirsk, there was no procedure for watching the ballots after they were dropped off. Moreover, there appeared to have been significant confusion among some polling station commissioners in Tomsk regarding what, precisely, they were supposed to do with their counted ballots. As in the other cities observed, some Tomsk polling stations took the ballots to the territorial commission along with protocols. However, other Tomsk stations had been told to hold the ballots for three days, others 10 days. Tomsk polling stations told to hold onto their ballots received such instructions December 16.

VOTING PROCEDURES

Due in large part to unexpectedly heavy voter turnout, IRI delegates reported that voting procedures at many polling stations were sometimes less than orderly or standard. On a positive note, there were few reports of serious problems or irregularities involving voter lists, procedures for maintaining special lists, or lists related to the use of mobile ballots. In addition, there appeared to have been generally uniform and adequate procedures for verifying the identity of voters.

Open voting was prevalent in all 10 cities IRI delegates observed. Most locations had an inadequate number of polling booths available to accommodate the voters. Tables and chairs set out in the polling stations only encouraged open voting, where discussion among voters, and especially between confused voters and the polling station workers and party pollwatchers occurred. In several instances, voters who had already cast their ballot consulted with others in the process of voting. Another practice was families voting in the booth together, a violation of the law. The election law specifically states that ballots should be marked in the voting booth with only the voter present. No attempt was made by the polling site commissioners to enforce the law in this matter.

Procedures regarding mobile ballot boxes appeared in almost all instances to have been followed. On occasion, IRI delegates noted mobile ballot box seals were not uniform. There appeared no significant evidence of unaccounted for ballots, or of any significant quantities of uncast, validated ballots. Unused ballots were properly destroyed at the close of polling stations where IRI observers were present.

DOMESTIC OBSERVERS

Throughout the election day, IRI delegates reported that pollwatchers were present at a very high percentage of all polling stations visited. They were associated either with political party organizations or single mandate candidates with representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation the most numerous and most consistently present. Representatives of reform and centrist parties were generally absent. In some cases, it appeared that the number of pollwatchers present - in one site nine were counted - may have contributed to the general level of confusion and disorderliness reported at many polling locations.

Based on interviews with the pollwatchers and election commissioners, pollwatchers were present during the critical opening and closing phases of the election day process at most voting stations. The pollwatchers with whom IRI delegates spoke throughout the day did not provide information that substantially contradicted what the delegates themselves were seeing; problems with organization and procedural uniformity in many locations, isolated instances where more serious breaches of procedure had taken place, but no evidence to suggest that the underlying integrity of the balloting was threatened.

In general, the delegates reported that the pollwatchers with whom they spoke were adequately informed and conscientious in their work. There were, however, several reported instances in which pollwatchers deviated from procedure and overstepped their bounds. For example, there were reports of pollwatchers wearing or otherwise carrying inappropriate political party or candidate insignia inside of polling stations. (St. Petersburg and Arkhangelsk) There were also numerous reports of pollwatchers assisting confused voters regarding the ballot or voting procedure. In almost all reported cases this came in response to inquiries from the voters themselves, suggesting that voters were not always able to distinguish pollwatchers from polling station workers. Pollwatchers' identification consisted of a letter signed by their party or candidate.

BALLOT COUNTING

Without question, the most negative reports which IRI election delegates issued during election day involved the ballot counting process. IRI delegates described the process in several locations as disorderly and confused. In part, this was attributed to the unexpected high voter turnout on election day. Several polling station chairmen or chairwomen were described as being overwhelmed by the sheer number of ballots to be arranged and counted. The fundamental problem, however, seems to have been rooted in poor preparation and/or ignorance of proper procedure. That the problems were so apparent and widespread is especially notable given the contrast with the generally orderly and procedurally correct counting process which was observed by IRI delegates during the last national election in December 1993.

The list of reported problems is long and touches on virtually every aspect of the counting process. The sorting of ballots was described in many places as confused and as leaving significant margin for error. Likewise for the ballot count itself, which seems to have proceeded according to no standard method and in many places without any double checking or other controls to ensure accuracy (Arkhangelsk, Moscow, Perm, St. Petersburg, Tomsk, Voronezh). A number of instances were reported in which protocols did not add up and were adjusted in a seemingly arbitrary manner (Arkhangelsk, Moscow, Tomsk, Voronezh). At the level of territorial commissions, to which protocols from individual polling sites were sent to be cumulatively totaled and reported, IRI delegates noted additional problems with incorrectly tabulated polling site protocols, which were again adjusted in ways deemed either arbitrary or otherwise inconsistent with proper procedure (Arkhangelsk, Novosibirsk, Rostov). Though the actual numbers involved were never great, the potential for abuse was evident.

In Arkhangelsk, delegates reported that party pollwatchers participated directly in the counting process, even to the extent of stepping in at one station to organize and assist in its supervision. A similar report came from St. Petersburg. While there was no evidence to suggest that this intervention resulted in manipulation or other malfeasance, or that it was intended for those purposes, it was clearly and highly inappropriate. Delegates from Moscow and Arkhangelsk also reported that counted ballots were carelessly bundled, in some case mixed with unmarked ballots, and insecurely stored. In the event that recounting had been necessary, it would have been difficult or impossible to do accurately, if at all.

The report of one IRI observer team summarized the situation in words that accurately convey the general tone of several team reports: "While there appeared to be no deliberate attempt to alter the results of the balloting, the counting process was ripe for exploitation and simple error."

In addition, there was confusion over the provision in the election law that allows observers to be provided with copies of protocols. Some polling sites had the official protocol for observers to fill in results; other polling stations simply told observers to copy the results down on a piece of paper. Some protocols were stamped and signed by the local election chairman, others were not.

V. ELECTION RESULTS

Of the 43 parties participating in the State Duma election, four passed the 5 percent threshold and represent choices across the political spectrum. The Communist Party, campaigning on a platform of nostalgia and promises of paying salaries unpaid for several months, benefitted from the electorate's frustration with difficulties brought on by economic restructuring. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation won 22 percent of the party list vote, securing 99 seats, and it won 58 single mandate seats, for a total of 157 deputies. The Communist faction has "loaned" some of its single mandate deputies from rural districts to the Agrarian Party to enable them to have the 35 needed to form a faction. This was done with the understanding the Agrarians would support the Communists' choice of Speaker, and other key votes.

Our Home is Russia won a total of 55 deputies and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, a total of 51. While the LDPR won a slightly higher percentage on the party list ballot, 11.8 percent, than Our Home is Russia, 10.13 percent, LDPR won only one single mandate seat to Our Home is Russia's 10. While LDPR did half as well in this election as in 1993, the election shows that Vladimir Zhirinovskiy continues to be a major figure in Russian politics.

The fourth party to clear 5 percent was Yabloko with 6.89 percent. Grigory Yavlinsky's party won a total of 45 deputies, 14 from victories in single mandate races. Yabloko benefitted from not being associated with Yeltsin or the government. Yavlinsky's unwillingness to form a larger pro-reform coalition with other parties, such as Russia's Democratic Choice, split the pro-reform vote among parties preventing them from making the 5 percent threshold.

A number of parties fell just below the 5 percent needed to share the deputy seats awarded proportionally. Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats, the largest faction when the last Duma convened in 1993, received just 3.9 percent of the vote. Yegor Gaidar, former Prime Minister and leader of Russia's Democratic Choice, could not overcome his unpopularity as the generator of the "shock therapy" reforms during his tenure in Yeltsin's early administration. Women of Russia, which received 8 percent of the vote in 1993 when no other party had adequate representation of women, had a more difficult time maintaining its voter base in 1995. In the 1995 December election, Women of Russia received only 4.6 percent of the vote largely because women were prominent participants in other parties' campaigns and listed on national party lists. In addition, the Communist Party's attacks on Women of Russia took its toll.

Three new parties fell below 5 percent, Congress of Russian Communities, Party of Workers Self-Government, and Communists-Working Russia-For the Soviet Union. After great anticipation, General Lebed's popularity in the media could not compensate for Congress of Russian Communities' lack of organization. The poor showing in the parliamentary election raised questions as to just how serious a candidate General Lebed will be in June's presidential election. The Party of Workers Self-Government, while not getting the votes needed to sit a faction, did surprisingly well for the amount of money spent by its leader Svyatoslav Fedorov.

The Communists-Working Russia-For the Soviet Union received 4.5 percent of the party list vote. These "true believers" view the Communist Party of the Russian Federation as not trying hard enough to restore the Soviet Union; they believe in mandatory restoration, whereas the Communist Party of the Russian Federation calls for voluntary restoration of the Soviet Union.

Table I: State Duma Results

Party	Proportional Vote	Party List Seats	Single-Seat Ballot	Total Seats
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)	22.30%	99	58	157
Our Home Is Russia (OHR)	10.13%	45	10	55
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)	11.18%	50	1	51
Yabloko	6.89%	31	14	45
Agrarian Party of Russia (APR)	3.78%	0	20	20
Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats (RDC-UD)	3.90%	0	9	9
Power to the People	1.61%	0	9	9
Congress of Russian Communities (KRO)	4.29%	0	5	5
Women of Russia	4.60%	0	3	3
Forward, Russia!	1.96%	0	3	3
Ivan Rybkin Bloc	1.12%	0	3	3
Communists-Working Russia-For the Soviet Union	4.52%	0	1	1
Party of the Self-Government of the Working People	4.01%	0	1	1
Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia-Union of Labor	1.63%	0	1	1

Pamfilova-Gurov Vladimir Lysenko (Republican Party of the Russian Federation)	1.61%	0	2	2
Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc	1.00%	0	1	1
Bloc 89	< 1.00%	0	1	1
Common Cause (CC)	< 1.00%	0	1	1
Independents' Bloc	< 1.00%	0	1	1
My Fatherland	< 1.00%	0	1	1
Party of Economic Freedom	< 1.00%	0	1	1
Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES)	< 1.00%	0	1	1
Transformation of the Fatherland	< 1.00%	0	1	1
Derzhava	2.59%	0	0	0
Duma '96	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Russian Nationwide Movement	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Russian Muslim Public Movement	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Federal Democratic Movement	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Election Bloc Comprising the Leaders of the Party for the Protection of Children (Peace, Good, and Happiness), the Russian Women Party, the Orthodox (Faith, Hope, and Charity) Party, the People's Christian Monarchy Party, the Party for the Union of Slav Peoples, the Mother Earth Party of Rural Laborers, the Party for the Defense of Invalids, and the Party of Victims of the Authorities and the Deprived	< 1.00%	0	0	

Interethnic Union	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Stable Russia	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Generation X	< 1.00%	0	0	0
For the Motherland	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Kedr' Ecological Party of Russia (Eco)	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Beer Lovers' Party (BLP)	< 1.00%	0	0	0
People's Union Party	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Utilities	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Association of Russian Attorneys	< 1.00%	0	0	0
National Republican Party of Russia	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Social Democratic Party	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Election Bloc Comprising the Leaders of the Party for the Defense of Pensioners and Veterans, the Party for Eradicating Crime - Law and Order, the Party for the Defense of Health Care, Education, Science, and Culture, the Party for the Protection of Youth, the Association of Free Trade Unions, the Party of Justice, and the Environmental Protection Party	< 1.00%	0	0	0
Independents	NA	0	77	77
Against All	2.79%	0	NA	0
TOTAL	--	225	225	450

APPENDIX I: IRI Exit Poll Results

IRI conducted regional voter exit surveys in conjunction with its 1995 observation mission. While the results of this self-administered survey are not scientific, they provide a quantitative complement to the findings of the report.

A total of 312 voters responded to the polling questionnaire, designed to be self administered by Russian respondents with minimum explanation by the observer teams. IRI collected responses in all regions in which it conducted election observation.

Broad observations can be made from a review of the survey's results. Clearly the Russian people are deeply divided about the course of political and economic reform. The survey found that those responding that they disapproved of reforms were equally divided as to whether reforms had gone too far or not far enough.

Overall, Russians believed there needed to be a change in government. When asked if their incumbent legislator deserved another term, a significant majority said a new person should be elected to the Duma. Yet, nearly one-third of those elected to the new Duma are incumbents.

Voters made their decisions about this race late in the election cycle, with 41 percent saying they decided in December who to vote for on the party list, and 58 percent deciding the single mandate races. Most stated that news programs on television and radio and news articles in periodicals helped them decide who to vote for. Twenty percent of respondents stated they used political advertisements to determine for whom to vote.

The pattern of decisionmaking by voters in these elections is clear: voters made decisions late in the election cycle, based primarily on economic messages outlined by political parties and candidates through news programs, news articles and television advertising.

David Hansen, a political consultant from Michigan, assisted in preparing the questions contained in this poll.

1. **Generally speaking, do you feel things in Russia are going in the right direction, or are they off on the wrong track?**

Right direction	50%
Wrong track	45%
No answer	5%

2. **Do you approve or disapprove of the economic reforms carried out in Russia since 1993? If you disapprove, is it because you think these reforms have gone too far or not far enough?**

Approve of reforms	21%
Disapprove because reforms have gone too far	38%
Disapprove because reforms have not gone far enough	40%
No answer	1%

3. **Do you approve or disapprove of the political reforms carried out in Russia since 1993? If you disapprove, is it because you think these reforms have gone too far or not far enough?**

Approve of reforms	19%
Disapprove because reforms have gone too far	40%
Disapprove because reforms have not gone far enough	36%
No answer	5%

4. **Do you think other countries...**

Respect Russia very much	7%
Respect Russia a little	31%
Neither respect nor disrespect	31%
Disrespect Russia a little	22%
Disrespect Russia very much	6%
No answer	4%

5. **Do you think the Duma has done its job well enough that most incumbents should be re-elected or do you think that it is time to give new people a chance to do better by replacing most incumbents?**

Most incumbents should be re-elected	17%
Most incumbents should be replaced	81%
No answer	2%

6. **Which party do you think can best handle the problems facing this country?**

Yabloko	17%
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)	13%
Democratic Choice of Russia - United Democrats (RDC-UD)	12%
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)	10%
Our Home Is Russia	8%
Party of Workers' Self-Government	8%
Congress of Russian Communities	4%
Women of Russia	4%
Other	13%
No answer	11%

7. **Thinking about your vote today, when did you make up your mind about which party you would vote for on the Party List ballot? Did you make up your mind...**

In the polling booth	5%
On election day before you voted	7%
Sometime during the last week of the campaign	18%
Sometime during the rest of December	11%
During November	12%
During October	6%
Before the campaign began on October 1	38%
No answer	3%

8. Thinking again of the Party List Ballot, which did you use to locate your candidate and party on the ballot?

Party symbol	8%
Party name	34%
Party leaders	52%
No answer	7%

9. When did you make up your mind about which candidate you would vote for on the Single Mandate Ballot? Did you make up your mind...

In the polling booth	15%
On election day before you voted	11%
Sometime during the last week of the campaign	21%
Sometime during the rest of December	11%
During November	13%
During October	5%
Before the campaign began on October 1	21%
No answer	3%

10. Was your vote on the Single Mandate Ballot more a vote for the candidate or more a vote for the party?

Candidate	47%
Party	37%
No answer	16%

11. Thinking about the Party List and the Single Mandate ballots together, how difficult was it to find the candidate and the party you voted for?

Very difficult	6%
Somewhat difficult	10%
Not very difficult	29%
Not at all difficult	42%
No answer	13%

12. Which comes closest to your opinion about the results of this election? How people like me vote...

Matters very much...the results will reflect the choices of those who have participated in the election	57%
Does not matter much...the results have basically already been determined by the authorities	28%
No answer	15%

13. Which of these were the most important sources for learning about the candidates and parties in this year's election?

Television news shows	38%
Newspaper articles	34%
Party advertisements on television	21%
Party debates	21%
Radio news shows	15%
Party advertisements on radio	2%
Party literature	1%

14. Here is a list of things people say are important to them in deciding which candidate to vote for on the Single Mandate ballot. Which are most important to you? Select two of the following:

Experience/Record of candidates	39%
Support/Endorsement of local political leaders	4%
Support of local economic leaders	2%
Advice from friends	7%
Candidates personalities	46%
Image of the candidates in the media	13%
Party identification/Endorsement	21%

15. Please write down the issues that were most important to you in deciding who to vote for. By this we mean a particular problem or condition that concerns you personally or your family.

Economic issues	25%
Candidate qualities/actions	15%
Stability	14%
Crime	6%
Revival of Russia	3%
Military Service	2%
Put women in the Duma	1%
Disagreement with reforms	1%
Don't Know/Refused	38%

16. How effective is the Duma at handling the issues that most concern you and your family?

Very effective	1%
Somewhat effective	5%
Not very effective	47%
Not at all effective	32%

17. Regardless of who you voted for, which party have you heard the most about in the last two months?

Our Home is Russia	25%
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)	23%
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)	8%
Yabloko	6%
Democratic Choice of Russia - United Democrats (RDC-UD)	4%
Other	7%
No answer	27%

18. What is your opinion of the job Boris Yeltsin is doing as President? Would you say...

Strongly approve	5%
Somewhat approve	16%
Somewhat disapprove	27%
Strongly disapprove	37%
No answer	15%

19. What is your age?

18-24	21%
25-29	6%
30-34	6%
35-39	11%
40-44	9%
45-54	15%
55-64	13%
65+	6%
No answer	13%

20. What is the last level of education you have completed?

Less than eight classes	3%
High school incomplete	4%
High school graduate	13%
Technical/Vocational school	16%
Incomplete higher education	11%
Complete higher education	39%
No answer	14%

21. What is your gender?

Male	49%
Female	36%
No answer	15%

APPENDIX II: Political Party Survey

The following is a summary of major parties, blocs and coalitions that participated in the December 1995 State Duma elections.

IRI has classified the parties using four main categories. Reformist parties are those that generally support market reforms, privatization of businesses and services, an end to most government subsidies of consumer goods and private property ownership. Centrist parties usually support some market reforms and privatization, though at a slower pace. In addition, most centrist parties advocate a stronger role for the government in maintaining social services, such as health care and child care. Communist political organizations generally support strong, centralized control of the economy, laws and other regulations; government control of the productions of goods, services and the agriculture industry; government price controls; and a return to the old Soviet Union. Nationalist groups advocate policies that discriminate against non-Russian citizens and support the restoration of the former Soviet Union.

Russia's Democratic Choice -- United Democrats

Affiliation:	Reformist
Performance in 1993/1995 elections:	40/0 party list seats; 26/9 single mandate seats.
Percentage Vote/1995:	3.9%
Leader:	Yegor Gaidar

In the two years since the parliamentary elections in 1993, Russia's Democratic Choice (RDC) went from being the coalition that won the most seats overall in the 1993 parliamentary elections (40 party list seats and 26 single mandate seats) to a party that failed, with only 3.9 percent of party list vote, to cross the 5 percent threshold on the party list ballot on December 17. By the time of the election, the party's membership in the Duma has fallen from a high of 96 to 54 as a result of defections by deputies who saw affiliation with the party as a political liability. RDC is led by economist Yegor Gaidar, former prime minister and architect of President Boris Yeltsin's controversial "shock therapy" economic program.

During the December 1993 elections, Russia's Choice (the RDC predecessor) was not a formally constituted political party, but rather a coalition of reformers who advocated the most radical economic changes. It was known as Yeltsin's unofficial party even though Yeltsin refused to publicly endorse it. (Yeltsin thought he should stay above the political contest.) Even though the coalition won more seats than any other party or movement (66 seats or 15 percent), its victory was seen as a failure because it was expected to obtain a majority. Russia's Choice, and Gaidar specifically, were blamed for the country's economic problems and the financial hardships faced by a majority of Russians. And, in a country where charisma is an essential ingredient for a successful politician, Gaidar appeared removed from the country's economic pains. Gaidar used his free TV time allotted to all parties to explain that under his reform

policies things would get worse before they get better. The party was unable to develop a message that could connect with the Russian electorate, or convince it that tough economic reform was worth the price.

In an attempted mid-course correction, Gaidar decided to take Russia's Choice into the next stage of development and in June 1994, created a formal party, named Russia's Democratic Choice. The party set out to create an extensive regional network, holding regional party congresses throughout the country. One of RDC's first tasks was an ambitious campaign to recruit members. Potential members were screened to ensure that all supported the RDC philosophy -- a procedure criticized for its similarity to the process used by the Communist Party to filter members in the Soviet days. The party claims a membership of between 300,000 to 400,000 members. A segment of Russia's Choice never joined the Russia's Democratic Choice party and has renamed itself Bloc 89 (for the 89 regions of Russia), so as to avoid confusion among voters between the two political organizations.

Despite intensive efforts to recreate its image and build a cohesive pro-reform party throughout Russia, RDC never really regained its popularity. Several factors contributed to the party's decline. First, RDC tried to create its image around the persona of Gaidar, viewed by many Russians as personally responsible for the economic reforms that lowered their living standard. Second, RDC gave up its status as the "party of power" and went into opposition over the Chechnya conflict. The title "party of power" went to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin when he created the Our Home is Russia bloc. Third, RDC suffered financially because of its anti-Chechnya stance. The party's position on Chechnya cost RDC the support of its wealthiest benefactor, Oleg Boiko, president of National Credit Bank and OLBI investment company. As a result, the party undertook a poorly received fundraising effort during last election cycle in which it attempted to solicit major contributions from government and private organizations of up to 500 million rubles (\$110,000).

The party's weakening position was further underscored by its inability to attract significant coalition partners in the pre-election period. Early in 1995, Gaidar sought to bring together pro-reform forces under one bloc. His main rival, Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko bloc, refused to form an alliance. Later, Gaidar rejected the idea of joining Our Home is Russia because of ideological disagreements with its leader, Chernomyrdin, over the Chechnya conflict. However, RDC leaders did leave the door open for cooperation among its regional leaders with Our Home is Russia, which did occur in such areas as St. Petersburg, Murmansk and Rostov. RDC also cooperated with Yabloko in these and other regions. When the election arrived, Gaidar had only managed to create a coalition of several small, mostly insignificant pro-reform movements under the name "Russia's Democratic Choice -- United Democrats." The bloc included the Peasant's Party, the Party of Social Democracy, Women for Solidarity and Soldiers for Democracy.

Yabloko

Affiliation:	Reformist
Performance in 1993/1995 elections:	20/31 party list seats; 7/14 single mandate seats.
Percentage Vote/1995:	6.89%
Leader:	Grigory Yavlinsky

Yabloko emerged as a leading pro-reform bloc and is led by economist Grigory Yavlinsky. The party's name is an acronym for its founders: Yavlinsky; former federal corruption investigator Yury Boldyrev; and, former Ambassador to the United States Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the State Duma International Relations Committee. Created as the main alternative to Russia's Choice in the 1993 elections, Yabloko greatly outpaced its rival, Russia's Democratic Choice, in the 1995 election. Yavlinsky refused to join forces with RDC because he blamed its leader, Yegor Gaidar, former prime minister and architect of Yeltsin's economic policies, for the country's economic problems. Yavlinsky further justified his refusal to cooperate with RDC by saying that democratic parties would garner a larger portion of the vote if voters had more parties to choose from.

Yavlinsky is among the most popular politicians in Russia and will likely be a competitive candidate in the June 1996 presidential election. Yavlinsky stands out among reformers as a consistent opponent to Yeltsin and as an outsider having never served in the Yeltsin administration (although he was an adviser to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev). Yavlinsky supports a more moderate approach to reform and opposes the voucher privatization program, which Gaidar helped to create. Yabloko claims to have 4,000 members throughout the regions and an additional 16 chapters in Moscow with an unspecified membership.

Yabloko has been more unified relative to other democratic coalitions. In the last State Duma, only six of 33 deputies defected from the bloc. In comparison, RDC's all-time high representation dropped from 96 to 54. However, one of Yabloko's founders, Yury Boldyrev, left the Yabloko leadership in September 1995 saying the bloc was not opposing the Yeltsin administration forcefully enough. In June, the bloc supported the first no-confidence vote against the president over the Chechnya conflict, but refused to support the second no-confidence vote. Yabloko's major disadvantage in the December election was its lack of regional organization and funding. Despite Yavlinsky's popularity, he has not been successful in building a strong grassroots party structure.

In his address to the bloc's second congress in September, Yavlinsky declared the bloc's slogan to be "Dignity, Order, Justice." He said these words stand for "private property, freedom of political views, protection against crime and protecting the weak against the strong." Yavlinsky wants to bring those who have been left behind by economic reforms -- teachers, engineers, researchers, skilled labor and peasants -- into the middle class.

Yabloko almost did not appear on the national party list ballot when the Central Election Commission ruled that the party made some technical mistakes in its registration. Some thought the move to be politically motivated because of the bloc's popularity, although that was never proved. The Communists and Our Home is Russia coalition criticized the CEC's decision, and Russia's Democratic Choice threatened to boycott the elections because of it. A week later it was overturned by the Supreme Court. The CEC delay gave Yabloko a lot of free media, but it cost the party donations at a critical time.

Forward, Russia!

Affiliation:	Reformist
Performance in 1995 elections:	0 party list seats; 3 single mandate seats.
Percentage Vote/1995:	1.96%
Leader:	Boris Fyodorov

Forward, Russia! was created in February 1995 by former Yeltsin official Boris Fyodorov. Fyodorov served as Finance Minister from 1992-1994 and helped Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar formulate the shock-therapy economic policy that became so unpopular, although he is not blamed for economic problems to the same extent as Gaidar. Fyodorov quit Yeltsin's cabinet in early 1994, frustrated with the democrats' poor showing in the 1993 parliamentary elections. He made several attempts to form movements that would address voters' concerns while continuing market reforms before creating Forward, Russia!

Forward, Russia's! agenda is market-reform oriented with a nationalist twist. One of the party's long-term goals is the voluntary reunification of the former Soviet republics. Forward, Russia! seeks a unified, strengthened Russia, a uniform status of the territories of Russia (including Chechnya -- Fyodorov was one of few democrats to initially support military intervention there), stronger efforts to combat crime and corruption, a raise in living standards, solutions to the housing shortages, reduction in the tax burden and an end to inflation.

In April 1995, Fyodorov advocated forming one democratic coalition among all reform movements. When that failed, he attempted to form an alliance with Yabloko and Russia's Democratic Choice. None of the three leaders could come to agreement. One of Russia's most prominent female politicians, Duma Deputy Irina Khakamada, left Forward, Russia! early in 1995 after a number of disputes with Fyodorov and established her own bloc, Common Cause. Aside from the philosophical differences, Khakamada also complained of Fyodorov's public chauvinistic outbursts toward her.

Despite Fyodorov's travels around the country, he was unable to establish a strong regional base. This fact, combined with the party's mixed campaign message, prevented it from crossing the 5 percent threshold.

Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES)

Affiliation:	Reformist
Performance in 1993/1995 elections:	18/0 party list seats; 1/1 single mandate seat.
Percentage Vote/1995:	< 1%
Leader:	Sergey Shakhrai

The Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) was established by Minister of Nationalities Sergey Shakhrai in October 1993. The party crossed the 5 percent threshold in the 1993 elections, but failed in 1995 from an inability to distinguish itself from other pro-reform parties. Shakhrai tried to stake out a delicate position of being pro-Yeltsin, but anti-government. Because of his loyalty to Yeltsin, he helped form Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's bloc, Our Home is Russia, but left in September when Chernomyrdin did not place him high enough on the party list ballot. Shakhrai took most of the PRES membership with him when he left.

PRES's agenda stressed a federalist policy that provides equal rights to all territories of Russia and a clearer definition of power between regional and federal governments. PRES supported having only single mandate seats in the parliament, eliminating all party list seats. In addition, the party supported land reform, a market economy, improved protection of human rights and a strong foreign policy.

As the Minister of Nationalities handling the regional ethnic problems, Shakhrai tried to capitalize on his relationships with regional leaders to build support for his party, a strategy which worked for him in 1993. His inability to turn that support and electoral success into a party-sustaining regional grassroots network accounts in large measure for his party's disappointing 1995 performance.

Our Home is Russia

Affiliation:	Centrist
Performance in 1995 elections:	45 party list seats; 10 single mandate seats.
Percentage Vote/1995:	10.13%
Leader:	Viktor Chernomyrdin

In April 1995, Yeltsin decided to construct a two-party system by creating two powerful electoral blocs -- one center-right and one center-left -- that would bring together coalitions of like-minded parties and dominate the 1995 Duma elections. In creating these parties under his direction, Yeltsin hoped to diminish the strength of extremist opponents among the national and communist parties. Our Home is Russia, led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, is the center-right party; Rybkin's bloc, led by then State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin is the center-left party.

Chernomyrdin officially founded the bloc in May and had greater success than Rybkin in establishing his coalition. Although Chernomyrdin did not gain support from all cabinet ministers as he initially promised, he did assemble a team of high-ranking government officials and powerful business and industrial groups. The major blocs that comprised Our Home is Russia in the former State Duma are Stability, Rossiya and some former members of Russia's Democratic Choice. Administrative leaders throughout the regions jumped onto the party's bandwagon, some observers suspect because the regions wanted to curry favor with the government. As the former chairman of Gazprom, the state gas corporation, the prime minister also had little trouble gaining financial backing from the country's oil and gas industry.

Despite his success at gaining support of national and regional government leaders, Chernomyrdin failed to bring major reform parties such as Yabloko, Russia's Democratic Choice, and PRES into a coalition. Despite the lack of reform-party support for Our Home is Russia, many regional leaders from those parties did cooperate with OHR during the campaign. Regional RDC leaders in St. Petersburg, Rostov and Murmansk, for example, coordinated candidates in the single mandate races with OHR to ensure that strong candidates did not run against each other.

The platform of Our Home is Russia was deliberately ambiguous in an effort to draw in broad support. In fact, Chernomyrdin rejected the label "center-right," preferring to have his bloc known as a "broad center coalition." The bloc's unofficial motto was stability and order, promising a slower forward movement of reforms. At its founding congress in May 1995, coalition members adopted a platform to please everybody, promising among other things: more foreign investment and protection of Russian manufacturers; continued agrarian reforms and regulation of land ownership. At the party's second congress in September, Chernomyrdin outlined the bloc's three main objectives: "First, to stimulate national capital accumulation as the basis for economic growth. Second, to expand cooperation between the government and national entrepreneurs. Third, to establish a socially-oriented economic system based on market principles."

Western observers' expectations for the party at the time of the December election had dropped considerably since its formation. Labeled the "party of power" by opponents and supporters alike, Our Home is Russia was viewed by many as the party of the old Soviet *nomenklatura*. Opponents claimed that the coalition was formed only to help its leaders retain their power. Even Chernomyrdin predicted that OHR would take fourth place, with 12-15 percent of the vote, behind the Communists, Yabloko and the Liberal Democratic Party. Though the party won only 10.13 percent of the vote, below Chernomyrdin's prediction, that was enough to place it third among the four parties that cleared the 5 percent threshold for Duma representation.

Women of Russia

Affiliation:	Centrist
Performance in 1993/1995 elections:	21/0 party list seats; 2/3 single mandate seats.
Percentage Vote/1995:	4.6%
Leaders:	Yekaterina Lakhova and Alevtina Fedulova

Women of Russia was founded in October 1993 to address issues affecting women and was one of the surprising political success stories in that election, winning 8 percent of the party list vote. The party was founded as a coalition of three women's organizations: the Association of Women Entrepreneurs, the Union of Navy Women and the Union of Russia's Women (the latter two were former communist organizations). The original goal of the bloc was to increase the presence of women in politics. In 1993, they single-handedly raised the number of women in Russia's lower chamber to 13.5 percent, up from 5.4 percent in the Congress of People's Deputies.

The party's failure, by so close a margin, to clear the 5 percent in December 1995 was a disappointment to many. Women of Russia was among the first parties to register for a place on the national ballot and was expected to maintain its status as a State Duma party faction.

Despite the fact that Women of Russia inherited the infrastructure from two communist organizations with strong presence in the regions, its disappointing performance in the recent election can probably be attributed to its failure to redevelop that infrastructure and create a strong regional network. The bloc was unable, when asked, to provide an estimate of members or regional branches.

The bloc's appeal among women, moreover, has been mixed, with major support coming from educated, but economically disadvantaged women. Those who opposed the bloc disapproved of its labeling some issues as women's issues and propagating certain gender stereotypes. The movement may have also suffered from its reputation for taking oftentimes contradictory, if moderate, positions in the Parliament.

A centrist bloc, Women of Russia's campaign focused on social issues, advocating more government involvement and financial support in health care, child care and education. Although it often voted with the Agrarian and Communist parties, Women of Russia did not take a hard opposition line to the government. The party's leaders resisted offers to join other coalitions fearing that adequate attention would not be given to women's issues. In addition, they believed their candidates would be placed far down on other parties' candidate lists, preventing many women from being elected to the Duma.

Rybkin's Bloc

Affiliation:	Centrist
Performance in 1995 elections:	0 party list seats; 3 single mandate seats.
Percentage Vote/1995:	1.12%
Leader:	Ivan Rybkin

Rybkin's bloc, named after its founder, Ivan Rybkin, speaker of the State Duma, was unofficially created in April 1995 at the same time as Our Home is Russia, a pro-government coalition led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Both electoral coalitions were formed at the direction of President Boris Yeltsin, who hoped two strong center-left and center-right parties would help foster a two-party system.

Chernomyrdin's organization came together much more easily than did Rybkin's, and it became evident very early on that Rybkin's Bloc would find it difficult to cross the 5 percent threshold in a crowded political field. Rybkin did manage to build a coalition of 50 small parties and associations (including agrarian, union, industrialist and entrepreneurial groups), that was among the first eight groups to be registered by the Central Election Commission on the party list ballot. The bloc's platform was based on five principles: social justice, law, order, creation and realism. The bloc never went beyond general proclamations of support for those suffering economic hardship in its campaign, and did not stake out clear positions on most issues.

The underlying and ultimately insurmountable problem for Rybkin, it seems, was in the premise behind his bloc's creation. Yeltsin recognized that if he attempted to create one pro-reform coalition among existing pro-reform parties, it would be an easy target for opposition groups. So, in addition to a pro-reform coalition, Yeltsin decided to create an "opposition" group among forces that were somewhat cooperative with his government. This, he hoped, would prevent the creation of a powerful extremist movement. However, the so-called opposition bloc led by Rybkin was viewed by many opposition groups as being pro-government because it was formed with Yeltsin's blessing.

Rybkin and Yeltsin have had a stormy relationship. While serving in the Supreme Soviet in the early 1990s, Rybkin led forces opposed to Yeltsin. In the State Duma, after being elected speaker of the 1993 parliament by a coalition of communist, socialist and nationalist parties, Rybkin received high marks for his cooperation with the government and pro-reform parties. Ironically, before agreeing to create Yeltsin's opposition party, Rybkin actually had a stronger base than Chernomyrdin because his cooperative style allowed him to patch together an alliance of smaller socialist parties. But after Yeltsin's announcement that Rybkin would form a bloc, Rybkin's natural allies either refused outright to join the bloc, or joined and later quit. Even the Agrarian Party, of which Rybkin was a member, would not join because it didn't believe its interests would be adequately represented. Rybkin tried to stem the damage in the fall with press conferences denouncing the government, but it was too little too late.

Workers' Self-Government Party

Affiliation:	Centrist
Performance in 1995 elections:	0 party list seats; 1 party list seat.
Percentage Vote/1995:	4.01%
Leader:	Svyatoslav Fedorov

Prior to election day, the Workers Self-Organization Party was considered a possible surprise party to clear the 5 percent threshold for party list representation in the Duma. With 4.1 percent of the actual party list vote that was cast, WSOP came close, and finished eighth overall among the 43 parties that contested the election. The party's relative strength had mostly to do with the charismatic personality of the party founder, eye surgeon Svyatoslav Fyodorov (not to be confused with the economist, Boris Fyodorov, leader of Forward, Russia!). Labeled the Ross Perot of Russia's 1995 elections, Svyatoslav Fyodorov is a self-made millionaire who advocates giving ownership of every enterprise to its workers, which he says would increase productivity and better protect workers rights. He bases his philosophy on the success of his own eye surgery practice. He was the sole WSGP member to win a State Duma seat.

Fyodorov's party supported limited economic reform. He is an advocate of fixed prices, salaries and pensions. In addition, he would prohibit the export of Russia's raw materials, instead having them sold to producers at artificially low prices.

Communist Party of the Russian Federation

Affiliation:	Communist
Performance in 1993/1995 elections:	32/99 party list seats; 5/58 single mandate seats.
Percentage Vote/1995:	22.30%
Leader:	Gennadi Zyuganov

Russian President Boris Yeltsin banned the Communist Party in late 1991 in response to the August coup attempt of that same year against former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1992, Russia's Constitutional Court partially overturned Yeltsin's decision, allowing for the revival of the party. As predicted, the party emerged from the December election as the clearly dominant single party faction in the State Duma.

The rebirth of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) was slow at first because many communists found homes among communist offshoots movements like the Agrarian bloc. The KPRF held its founding congress in February 1993, establishing as its leader Gennadi Zyuganov, the former ideology chief of the Russian Communist Party under the Soviet regime. The party claims to have 500,000 members and 20,000 regional organizations.

Reports suggest that the KPRF underwent an internal revolution between younger communists, who wanted to moderate the party's image, and hard-line old-timers who resisted change. While not as reformed as the new communist parties of Eastern Europe, the KPRF has changed its position on certain issues since its existence under Soviet rule. Unlike other more radical communist organizations in Russia, like the Russian Communist Workers' Party, the KPRF supports private ownership of some businesses, indicating that only energy, agriculture, transportation, communications and strategically important industries should be state controlled. The KPRF has also distanced itself from nationalistic policies and advocates a peaceful transition to power. Zyuganov has discreetly tried to distance the party from its old image: a New York Times journalist has noted that Zyuganov never uses the word "communist" in his speeches.

The KPRF is still unquestionably communist, however. At its third national congress in January 1995, the KPRF adopted a platform that opposes the private ownership of land and natural resources, supports the reversal of the privatization of certain industries, advocates a return to a state-regulated economy, calls for the adoption of a new Russian Constitution (that presumably would increase the Parliament's power at the expense of the Executive branch) and supports the restoration of the Soviet Union on a voluntary basis.

Support for the party grew steadily since the 1993 elections, according to public opinion polling. In 1993, the Communists won 12.4 percent of the vote; in April 1995, 25 percent of voters said they supported the Communist Party. The Party benefitted from the loyalty of its members. The same poll showed that 93 percent of those who voted Communist in 1993 intended to, and apparently did so again in December 1995. In contrast, only 54 percent of those who supported the pro-reform Russia's Democratic Choice said they would vote for it again.

The party's strong performance came as no great surprise. Transition in the former Soviet Union has been economically and socially trying for the great majority of Russian citizens, and the KPRF found support among pensioners, teachers, engineers, and other highly educated but still poor and economically insecure. It came as no surprise that these people would find comfort in the Communists' promise to turn back the country's economic and social clock and to at least restore the stability of the Soviet era.

The Communists also benefitted from their strong regional networks, inherited from the Soviet Communist party. The local party organizations were, as expected, effective at mobilizing voters. Candidates, moreover, ran grassroots, door-to-door campaigns that did not depend on advertising.

Agrarian Party of Russia

Affiliation:	Communist
Performance in 1993/1995 elections:	21/0 party list seats; 12/20 single mandate seats.
Percentage Vote/1995:	3.78%
Leader:	Mikhail Lapshin

A close relative to the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) is a powerful party and legislative lobby with strong support across rural Russia. The APR is an electoral bloc that includes the Agrarian Union and the Agro-Industrial Trade Union. The bloc claims to have a membership of 250,000 and more than 4,000 regional organizations. The party's failure to clear the 5 percent election threshold came as a surprise to some, but it did perform strongly in single mandate races, where its candidates won more elections than all others except the KPRF candidates. Together, the two communist parties captured the one-third of State Duma seats which analysts had predicted they would.

Over the past five years, there have been several attempts to reform the agriculture industry. In 1990, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies adopted a law that allowed farmers to leave the *kolkhozi* with a share of land and equipment, but individuals often did not receive enough quality land to run a viable farm. A 1992 presidential decree released all state farms from central control, forcing farmers to find their own markets and handle their own accounting. About 90 percent of farms, however, remain collectives, housing 30 million people. Since 1993, agriculture subsidies have been substantially decreased, but the APR has been successful at preventing a complete end to the subsidies.

Unlike most Russian parties, the APR has a defined constituency and a focused agenda. The driving force behind the APR is the managers of the collective farms (*kolkhozi*), who still control almost 90 percent of Russian farmland. These farm managers want to stop market reforms in the agriculture sector in order to prevent the loss of their jobs, power and perks. Farm workers also generally support the APR, most likely because their bosses tell them to do so. Farm managers control everything in their employees' lives from their salaries to the housing they receive.

APR's goal is to reverse market reforms. The party's platform opposes the sale and private ownership of farmland and the privatization of agricultural industries, and supports an increase in government agricultural subsidies. In addition to its agrarian agenda, the APR supports many of the tenets of the Communist Party, including restoring the Soviet Union and recreating a strong centralized government. Unlike the Communist Party, however, the APR has supported Yeltsin in some major policy issues. The APR did not support the no-confidence vote this summer reprimanding Yeltsin and his administration for the handling of the hostage situation by Chechen rebels.

Congress of Russian Communities

Affiliation:	Nationalist
Performance in 1995 elections:	0 party list seats; 5 single mandate seats.
Percentage Vote/1995:	4.29%
Leaders:	Yury Skokov and General Alexander Lebed

Founded in March 1993 by a coalition of Russian organizations to defend the interests of Russians living in former Soviet republics, the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) emerged as a significant player in Russian politics based largely on the strong appeal of its co-leader, General Alexander Lebed, former commander of the Russian 14th Army in Moldova. Although the party failed to gain State Duma representation, its relatively strong showing - seventh among 43 parties registered for the election - is an indication of the breadth of Russian nationalist sentiment and of Lebed's potential appeal as a presidential candidate later this year.

General Lebed consistently ranks as one of the most popular politicians in Russia, edging out the pro-reform leader Grigory Yavlinsky, chairman of the Yabloko bloc. The 44-year-old former military commander possesses the qualities of a strong, authoritarian leader that Russians traditionally support. Lebed is charismatic and speaks about issues the average person can relate to rather than abstract economic policies, in contrast to some pro-reform politicians. His two main issues are restoring the dignity of Russia and cracking down on crime. He is almost certain to run for president in 1996 and be a leading contender, with a possible coalition between KRO and the KPRF. Lebed's reputation rose in Moldova after he held back the army during the 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. He gained national prominence in early 1995 with his public criticisms of Yeltsin's military move against Chechnya. After intensive media speculation that he might enter the political arena, Lebed resigned from the army in May 1995.

The KRO's original focus was providing support to Russian entrepreneurs in the former Soviet republics. Although more moderate than the LDPR, the KRO is considered a nationalist party because of its strong pro-Russian policies and calls to return to the past. It did not field candidates in 1993 because it was unable to collect enough signatures to be listed on the ballot. In April 1995, the KRO elected its chairman Yury Skokov, a professional politician and former Yeltsin ally during the 1991 coup. Skokov has since become an opponent of Yeltsin and his economic policies. One of Skokov's main tasks was to establish a strong network in the regions. He systematically travelled to regions where potential support was deemed high and made some progress in developing the party's network.

Another prominent addition to the movement was State Duma deputy Sergey Glazyev, former chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia and chairman of the Duma Committee on Economic Policy. Glazyev served in Yeltsin's administration in 1992-93 as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations. He is considered an economic centrist -- he supports market reforms, but at a slower pace and with a more social democratic bent.

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

Affiliation:	Nationalist
Performance in 1993/1995 elections:	50 party list seats; 1 single mandate seat.
Percentage Vote/1995:	11.18%
Leader:	Vladimir Zhirinovskiy

Although the LDPR won a far smaller percentage of the vote in December than it did in 1993, when it won 23 percent of the party list vote, the party did manage to maintain most of its representation in the State Duma and remain among the largest party factions.

A public opinion poll taken shortly before the December 17 election, the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VCIOM) accurately predicted the decline in Zhirinovskiy's electoral support. The LDPR undoubtedly lost some of its support simply because of the presence of other strong nationalist parties on the December party list ballot. Alexander Lebed's Congress of Russian Communities party is primary among them. Perhaps more important, however, was the disgruntlement of voters who supported LDPR in 1993, wooed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's charisma and boundless, but ultimately absurd and empty promises.

Zhirinovskiy's xenophobic, chauvinistic and anti-Semitic rhetoric very rightly caused serious concern among western leaders in 1993, as they feared he would be a serious contender for the Russian presidency in 1996. Those concerns now appear to have been exaggerated. Zhirinovskiy's buffoonish and oftentimes violently erratic behavior in the two years since his rise to global prominence have all but assured him a place on the margins of Russian national politics - for the time being at least.

The fact that LDPR still showed so strongly in the December elections can be attributed to the underlying strength of the nationalist message throughout Russia, and to the underlying organizational strength of the party which Zhirinovskiy built. In 1989, LDPR was the first officially registered alternative party to the Communist Party. The LDPR claims to have 170,000 members and branches in all 89 regions and republics of Russia. Zhirinovskiy did establish a relatively active regional network for the December 1993 elections, which he managed to maintain through the recent election despite the decline of his personal popularity. The LDPR was among the first parties to make a targeted appeal to youth, even establishing youth auxiliary groups in early 1994. The party publishes two newspapers, *Pravda Zhirinovskovo* (Zhirinovskiy's Truth) and *Sokol Zhirinovskovo* (Zhirinovskiy's Falcon), which the LDPR claims have a combined circulation of 500,000.

Despite the LDPR's drop in support, it was still among the first parties to be registered on the December 1995, national party ballot. The party's platform continues to emphasize strong centralized control and pro-Russian policies. Zhirinovskiy wants to forbid citizens from the Caucasus from entering Russia (Russians often associate them with the mafia), suspend civil rights of all citizens to control crime, restore the borders of the former Soviet Union and return the Russian military to parts of Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

APPENDIX III: Deployment Regions

Moscow

Moscow is the sixth largest city in the world, and its seven million eligible voters allow it to claim 35 single mandate seats in the State Duma. Moscow, along with St. Petersburg, has been a stronghold for the political and economic reform movement, and the results of the December 17 balloting confirmed Moscow's position as the country's critical center of support for the reform parties.

The spotlight throughout the pre-election period in Moscow focused on the national party leaders and their party list campaigns. The expense of campaigning and buying advertising time and space in Moscow resulted in a higher degree of coordination among the reform parties and their leading candidates than was evident in most other parts of Russia. In party list balloting, the three major reform parties captured nearly 50 percent of the total Moscow City vote. And while the communists showed some signs of strength with 14.7 percent, the extreme nationalist Liberal Democratic Party appealed to less than 2.5 percent of Moscow voters.

IRI deployed two observer delegations to Moscow that included delegation leader former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Taft, IRI Board Vice-Chairman Michael Kostiw, former Ambassador to Morocco Michael Ussery, IRI President Lorne Craner, IRI Vice President Grace Moe, CIS Program Director Judy Van Rest and IRI's Moscow-based Russia Program Director David Merkel. Prior to election day, the observers met with leaders of the major national parties, Central Election Commission officials, and visited the Central Election Commission's Election Center '95. Through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Moscow delegates were briefed by Yegor Gaidar, Russia's Democratic Choice; Gennadi Zyuganov, Communist Party of the Russian Federation; Victor L. Sheinis, Yabloko; A.P. Yurkov, editor-in-chief of Rossiskaya Gazeta; and representatives of Our Home is Russia.

While the opposing party leaders each claimed that their counterparts had bent or broken the rules governing the campaign - particularly in the area of campaign finance - none had direct evidence to support their allegations. The delegates reported no evidence that the pre-election environment had been prejudicial to one party or group of parties, or that the parties had been hampered in any significant way in the conduct of their campaigns. Indeed, it appeared that the campaign had been dynamic and energetically engaged.

Sunday, December 17, began with the two delegations each observing the opening of a polling station. Both local election commissioners were organized and welcomed observers, although one was confused about observer credentials and placed a phone call to verify IRI delegates were indeed different from that of domestic observers. By 5:00 p.m. the delegation, accompanied during part of the day by U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, had visited 12 polling stations. One team attempted to observe a polling station at a military base outside of Moscow city limits, that was supposed to be open to observers, but was turned away. On the

whole, however, IRI delegates did not see systematic or deliberate violations of law or administrative procedures which would have signaled efforts to manipulate or alter the final vote count. They did not see efforts to intimidate or improperly influence voters at the polling stations, nor was there evidence that the security of the election ballots or the integrity of the registration lists had been compromised in any fundamental way. Domestic pollwatchers, who appeared in general to be adequately trained and conscientious in the conduct of their task, provided no information that contradicted IRI's general conclusion.

However, the delegates did report several irregularities, especially with regard to the count. The level of training and experience of election commissioners was uneven, as was their ability to maintain order at the polling stations on a day when voter turnout was heavier than expected. As in almost all other regions where IRI delegates were present, the Moscow teams reported a significant incidence of open voting, people discussing the ballots with each other, and a general reluctance to use designated voting booths. Sample ballots or biographical data were not consistently displayed. At some polling sites, voters were allowed to crowd around registration tables rather than forming a line. At one polling station delegates observed unused ballots which had been carelessly left on open tables around which voters were crowded. Ballot boxes were not always in a location that could be easily seen by the commissioners.

The counts witnessed by the teams received mixed reviews. One IRI team was able to witness counts in two polling stations located in the same building. The delegates observed two completely different modes of counting, demonstrating the discretionary power of the local election chairmen. One chairman was very organized in conducting the count; the commissioners of his station had clear instructions and finished the count in a short amount of time. IRI delegates did observe, however, that there was no attempt to double check the numbers. The count of the polling station down the hall was less organized, the ballots were all sealed in one bag before the tallying was completed, and when the numbers failed to balance, the local chairman had to erase and juggle the figures before setting off for the territorial commission.

Novosibirsk (Western Siberia)

The region of Novosibirsk, or Novosibirskaya Oblast is considered the geographic center of Russia as measured from the eastern to the western border. Located in the south-eastern portion of Western Siberia, Novosibirsk's land mass spans one time zone and is approximately one-half the size of Germany. The region shares its northern border with the Tomsk region, its southern border with the republic of Altai and Kazakhstan, the east with the Kemerovo region and the west with the Omsk region. Ranked the seventeenth most populous oblast in Russia, Novosibirsk is populated by 2.8 million people, 92 percent of whom are ethnic Russians. An estimated 1.5 million inhabitants populate the capital city of the region, which is also named Novosibirsk.

In the 1993 elections, six deputies were elected to the State Duma, four representing single mandate districts and two selected from party lists. These elections produced a politically split delegation composed of two members of communist orientation (KPRF and AP), two reformers (RDC), and two independents. The 1995 election results suggest that political sentiment in the Oblast remains divided. Centrists, reformists, and nationalists could all claim at least partial victory. The KPRF and LDPR received the largest percentages of party list votes; however, two of the five party list seats went to candidates representing OHR and Yabloko. The four single mandate seats were divided among the KPRF, LDPR, an independent candidate and a candidate of the reform-oriented Economic Freedom Party. The victory of a KPRF candidate in the race for Oblast governor, however, along with the party's strong showing in party list balloting, suggests that KPRF has substantial strength and will be a strong force in regional politics.

The IRI observation team deployed to Novosibirsk was composed of delegates Maria Cino and Blake Hall and IRI resident program officer Philip Griffin. Prior to election day, they met with representatives of political parties, local election and other government officials, and media organizations. They perceived nothing in the campaign period that would cause concern that the campaign period was unfair or biased toward any candidates or parties. On election day, the team visited 11 polling sites in three cities - Novosibirsk, Akademgorodok, and Berdsk, including one military/civilian polling site. The delegation reported no evidence of systematic or intentional violations on the part of election administrators either in the pre-election period or on election day. The delegation observed no evidence of persons entering or exiting voting stations with ballots, voting more than once, or campaigning or attempting in other ways to influence voters at the polling stations.

Observers reported that proper procedures for transporting and securing ballots prior to election day appear to have been followed, as did procedures for early voting and at home voting via the mobile ballot box. With the exception of a single polling station, which was reported to have been poorly arranged and incapable of handling the unexpectedly heavy voter turnout, the election commissioners and chairmen present at the polling stations visited appeared to the delegation to have been well trained and competent to manage the vote. The procedures for

confirming the identity of eligible voters are reported to have been uniform, and both domestic and international pollwatchers were appropriately accommodated. Pollwatchers from the KPRF were reported to have been present at all polling stations; almost all other parties were unrepresented.

As in other regions, the observers reported a significant incidence of open voting, that is, voters discussing and marking ballots in the open, rather than using voting booths. Delegates did not, however, see evidence of coercion in any case. Observers also noted a potential for multiple voting by individuals who were outside of their home voting district on election day. In one polling station, an individual, upon presentation of his domestic passport, was permitted to cast a party list ballot even though his name was not on the registration list at the polling site and his residency stamp showed he was not a resident of that polling site area. If a similar practice were followed at other sites, individuals could, hypothetically, have cast several ballots. Procedures for early voting are in the law and allow individuals to vote in the polling station of their residence.

The observers reported some lack of uniformity as well as the appearance of procedural uncertainty in the ballot counting process, although it was described as "relatively" well organized. Procedures for marking unused ballots, and for tabulating and transferring marked ballots and protocols from the polling site to the territorial commission appear to have been proper, although it was remarked that the procedure for storing and safeguarding the ballots after their delivery to the territorial commission was haphazard and inadequate, thus creating the potential for illegal tampering. Specifically, ballots were stored haphazardly in a room that almost anyone could access.

The observers also reported that territorial commissioners discovered problems with some of the protocols - numbers that didn't add up correctly. Commissioners were seen redoing protocols in the hallways. They then had to return to their polling sites to have the other commissioners sign off on the amendments before the territorial results could be forwarded.

St. Petersburg

St. Petersburg is one of Russia's two federal cities, the other being Moscow. Construction of the city began in 1703 during the reign of Peter the Great, whose purpose in establishing a great western center was to anchor Russia's position as a principal and recognized Great Power in Europe. The city is strategically located at the junction of the Neva River and the Gulf of Finland in Russia's furthest northwestern corner.

For nearly 300 years, St. Petersburg has been a center of new ideas and change in Russia, as well as an economic center. It came as no surprise that the city quickly established itself as a stronghold of reform thinking and democratic political party organization in the post-communist era. The political complexion of St. Petersburg has perhaps been most strongly influenced by its dynamic and forward looking mayor, Anatoli Sobchak. Though officially an independent, Sobchak openly supported Our Home is Russia, and its leader, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. St. Petersburg's 19-member delegation elected to the State Duma in 1993 reflected the city's character. This was powerfully reconfirmed in the December 1995 elections, in which all eight races for single mandate seats went to candidates who were either members of, or affiliated with, reform party organizations. Yabloko claimed five of the eight seats, with Russia's Choice and two independents (one formerly affiliated with the Democratic Russia movement) claiming the other three. Moreover, in a field crowded with 43 parties, three parties supporting reform - OHR, RDC, and Yabloko - won more than 40 percent of the party list vote between them. Seven party list seats went to St. Petersburg.

IRI sent two observation teams to St. Petersburg. Team I was composed of delegates Alec Poitevint and Cindy McCain and IRI Regional Program Director for Eastern Europe Claire Sechler. Team II was composed of delegates Evelyn McPhail and Armstrong Williams and IRI resident program officer Elizabeth Dugan. The two teams conducted an extensive series of meetings with candidates, political party officials, election administrators, and media representatives. They came away from these meetings without any indication that the pre-election environment had been prejudiced or hostile to the conduct of a fair election campaign. The only concerns expressed were in regard to voting that would take place at military bases and installations. It would turn out that these concerns were not unfounded.

On election day, Teams I and II visited a total of 26 polling stations. The observers, though they reported numerous irregularities and expressed concern regarding the potential for serious abuses at a number of polling stations, did not report evidence of systematic or deliberate misconduct which would have led them to conclude that the basic integrity of the voting process had been violated. They reported that election commissioners were generally well trained and informed with regard to law and administrative procedure, experienced, and cooperative with members of the observer delegation. The observers reported no direct evidence of improper tampering with ballots before or during the voting procedure, although instances in which ballots were still being marked and stamped late in the election day were reported. Pollwatchers representing the various political parties were reported present at all the sites visited with the exception of one, at a military site.

At the same time, there was a troubling number of irregularities observed and a potential, in some cases, for serious abuse. Open discussion over ballots and voting outside of designated voting booths were prevalent and tolerated without comment by election commissioners at virtually all stations visited. Several stations, moreover, appeared unprepared for the heavy voter turnout on election day, which contributed to a chaotic environment which the observers noted. Observers also reported a number of instances in which a candidate or party-sponsored pollwatchers were either wearing or carrying prohibited political party insignia or other identifying materials inside of polling stations.

IRI observers reported some of the most serious irregularities in St. Petersburg as compared to any of IRI's 10 monitored cities. At a site in Gorelovo, southwest of St. Petersburg, Team I reported evidence that soldiers were being inappropriately instructed or influenced in voting. Officers scanned lists and wrote down names of those who had not voted--within minutes those soldiers came to vote. At that site, which accommodated both military and civilian voters, the civilian election commissioner told observers she was unauthorized to look at the military portion of the voter list. It was also noted that military voters leaving the voting booth were directed to one particular ballot box among three. One of the team noted that a pollwatcher had to specifically request that an officer give a soldier privacy as he was attempting to vote. At a military base north of St. Petersburg, in Syertolovo, Team II witnessed soldiers being instructed who to vote for. It appeared the normal procedure was for two to three soldiers to enter the voting booth together, and those who chose to mark their ballots at an open table were not given any privacy in which to do so. One soldier who agreed to answer an IRI exit poll survey was conspicuously instructed by an officer on how to answer.

Potentially serious problems involving ballot security were noted by IRI observers. At one station, observers noted problems with the mobile ballot boxes, which were improperly sealed, and the station's three general ballot boxes, which were generally not within view of the station commissioners during the time that voting was taking place. Confusion at the registration desk, open and tolerated display of political insignia by pollwatchers, and instruction of voters by party affiliated pollwatchers contributed to the overall impression of an especially poorly organized and managed polling station. This prompted IRI Team II observers to return to this station later in the evening to observe the vote count, where irregularities persisted. Observers reported the appearance of a previously unseen ballot box, one box which appeared to contain nothing but party list ballots. In addition, observers reported that the actual counting procedure was haphazard and left substantial room for unchecked error. Team I observed a more organized count but witnessed confusion over numbers at the territorial commission.

Arkhangelsk

The Arkhangelsk Oblast is located in the northern portion of European Russia, 618 miles north of Moscow and adjacent to the Arctic Ocean. It is populated with 1,577,000 people who live in one of the region's 13 cities or 38 towns. The region is divided into 20 rayons or administrative districts. The capital, which is also named Arkhangelsk, is situated on the Dvina River about 25 miles from the White Sea. Almost a third of the region's population lives in Arkhangelsk city (population 428,200). Arkhangelsk regional politics is dominated by centrist and, to a lesser degree, anti-reform parties. The Oblast Duma, or regional legislature, is dominated by independents.

Results from the December 1995 elections suggest that the communists (KPRF) and nationalists (LDPR), who finished first and third in the party list voting, respectively, surpassed the centrist OHR, which finished in fifth place, as the dominant political forces in the region. The communists also won one of two single mandate seats, the second seat going to an independent. The news for Yabloko was not uniformly bad, however, as it did significantly better in Arkhangelsk party list balloting than the party did nationally. Yabloko was fourth in party list balloting with nearly 10 percent of the vote. The Worker's Self Government party finished second.

The IRI observation team in Arkhangelsk consisted of delegates Alison Fortier and Dr. John Dunlop and IRI resident program officer Mary Schwarz. The delegation participated in a full schedule of meetings on December 15 and 16, hosted by political party leaders and candidates, representatives of the local media, and local election administration officials. The delegation reported no pattern of major complaints that would have indicated intentional or systematic efforts to prejudice the pre-electoral political competition or the election outcome. However, observers did hear complaints from parties about the amount of display advertising Our Home is Russia was allowed, with the inevitable questions of whether campaign finance and other regulations were being followed or whether OHR was receiving special treatment.

On election day the delegates visited nine polling stations. Again, they did not report evidence of intentional or systematic violations of the election law, or of administrative procedure. They did, however, indicate a troubling laxity on the part of some election commissioners, for example, lax enforcement of restrictions against open discussion and voting outside designated voting booths. The delegates also reported irregularities in administrative procedures from one polling site to another. They found, for example, significant irregularities and inconsistencies in the procedure for amending the list of candidates on the party list ballots prior to election day. As a result, the party list ballots were not uniform at all polling stations in the region. Delegates noted that the sample ballots and candidate information available at many polling sites were inadequate and sometimes misleading or incorrect. Two polling stations in Arkhangelsk ran out of ballots according to the chairman of "For Free and Fair Elections," a local group that organized poll watching efforts.

Most disturbing were the delegates' comments pertaining to the procedure at the polling station where they observed the final vote count. The delegates described the polling site chairman as overwhelmed by the counting task and uncertain of procedure and that "chaos reigned." Regulations stating that only one pollwatcher from a party could be present in a polling station at one time were violated. The delegates further reported that the pollwatchers present during the count inappropriately advised and assisted the polling station workers during the count. One poll watcher actually counted ballots off in a corner by herself. In addition, marked ballots were sealed in a manner which would, according to the observers, render a recount difficult or impossible. In fact, the commissioners found discrepancy in the numbers and didn't know what to do since they had already sealed the bag. Worse, once the count was completed, the pollwatcher who took over the count called the numbers to the candidate before the polling site commissioner had filled out the protocol.

At the territorial commission, the observers witnessed commissioners erasing and changing numbers to make them add up. There was also uncertainty as to what to do with unused ballots. Piles of unused ballots were left at the territorial commissions in open and unguarded areas.

Voronezh

Voronezh Oblast is located in the central portion of European Russia approximately 580 kilometers south of Moscow. The Oblast borders Ukraine, and is part of the fertile Black Earth region. Covering a landmass of over 52,000 sq\km, the Oblast has a population of 2.5 million, 900,000 of whom live in the capital city of Voronezh.

Voronezh lies in what is frequently described as Russia's "Red Belt," the portion of the country where support for the Communist Party has remained strongest since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, in the 1993 parliamentary elections, three of the Oblast's four single mandate seats were won by candidates who became members of the centrist New Regional Policy faction in the Duma. The fourth was won by a candidate of pro-reform Russia's Choice. The December 1995 election appears to have confirmed the continuing strength of communist and nationalist appeals in the region. The Communist Party reclaimed its position of political dominance as KPRF candidates won 3 of the 4 single mandate seats. In party list voting, the KPRF, with nearly 27 percent of the vote, and the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, with 14.4 percent, were the clear winners in a field of 43 parties.

The IRI observation mission that travelled to Voronezh consisted of delegates Carlyle Gregory and Tony Malandra and IRI Russia program officer Jennifer Roda. On Friday and Saturday, December 15-16, the delegation met with local candidates, election administrators, and members of the press. The meetings did not lead the delegates to report evidence of systematic violations of the campaign law by parties or the authorities which could have greatly impacted on the results of the election, although an episode involving the temporary striking of a candidate's name from a single mandate ballot, and the brief closure of three independent television stations during the campaign period, did suggest the potential for problems.

Specifically, the delegation attended a court hearing for a candidate who was temporarily taken off the ballot because of alleged violations. The candidate had been accused of providing free legal advice. According to law, a candidate cannot offer free informational services and the territorial commission claimed legal advice was information service. The candidate appealed and won reinstatement. The candidate and his staff thought the incident was politically motivated. Also, three weeks prior to the election, the Oblast government, which is run mostly by communists, shut down three independent TV stations because they were operating on expired licenses. The stations were back on air in a few days, but party leaders, candidates, and even one government official thought this action was politically motivated because one of the station's had broadcast a speech by Zhirinovskiy in which he lambasted the Communist Party.

The delegation reported that the regional election commission appeared organized and in control of the process. The ballots were printed and distributed to the territorial election commissions two weeks prior to the election. Most of the territorial commissions distributed the ballots to the polling stations a week prior to the elections. The Oblast commission also conducted some public service announcements about the election.

On election day, the delegation visited 10 polling stations, one of which was located on a military compound. Delegates did not see evidence of systematic fraud or organized efforts to manipulate the results of the balloting. They reported that pollwatchers associated with several local political parties were present at all polling stations, and that they did not, when asked by the delegates, report incidents of serious wrongdoing which would have contradicted the delegates' own observations.

The delegates did, however, report numerous irregularities and procedural violations which led to the conclusion that while there appeared to be no deliberate attempt to alter the results, the process was ripe for exploitation and simple error.

The atmosphere at many of the polling stations visited was described as confused and disorganized, with a high incidence of open voting outside of designated voting booths. Much of this appears to have been related to a heavy voter turnout which polling station commissioners were clearly not prepared for. Several polling stations were reported to have run out of ballots. All of these polling stations were able to get more ballots, but not until much later in the evening for some stations.

In addition, delegates noted that changes were being made on the ballots up to and including election day. Polling station workers reported working late on Friday and Saturday to cross off candidates from the ballots. At some polling sites, workers were still correcting the ballots on election day. Delegates also reported that at several stations ballot boxes were not set in an area where polling station commissioners could see them. In some cases the ballot boxes were behind voting booths; in other cases, the boxes were in separate rooms. There was often a desk set up near the ballot box, where a commissioner could sit and monitor the box, but often no one sat at the desk.

Perhaps most disturbing were the delegates' observations regarding the ballot counting process. The delegation observed the count at the first polling station it visited Sunday morning. The tabulation process was conducted without regard to order stipulated in the law. Mobile ballots were not counted separately and the number was not verified against the voter registration list. When ballots were counted, they were only counted once. Nobody double checked anyone else's work. No attempt was made to verify that the ballots had even been sorted correctly. When the workers filled out the protocol, the numbers did not add up, so they took out an eraser and changed the numbers.

The delegation followed poll workers, who delivered the protocol and ballots to the territorial commission. Protocols had to go through several checkpoints before they were logged onto the next protocol sheet. Delegates observed the proper registration of the numbers at the territorial commission.

Murmansk

Murmansk, or the Kola Peninsula, was awarded the status of a separate Russian region in 1938. Of the region's 1 million residents, more than 900,000 live in urban centers and half the population lives in the capital city, also called Murmansk. The latter has the distinction of being the world's largest city located north of the Arctic Circle. During the Soviet era, the region was among the economically most prosperous in the USSR, benefitting from substantial state investment in development of its strategic resources. Ironically, Murmansk's success during the period of centrally planned economy and state ownership of capital have compounded the difficulties it confronts in making the transition to a market-based economy.

Despite the difficulties, the political profile of the region has remained, in general, reformist. This was confirmed in the December 1995 election, which saw reform deputies, including former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, elected to fill both Murmansk's single mandate district seats. Kozyrev was elected despite a year-long campaign of vilification by Russian nationalists and other anti-reformists, which ultimately contributed to his resignation as Russia's Foreign Minister. In party list balloting, the major reform parties captured a larger share of the vote than either the nationalists or the communists, although LDPR did win a narrow plurality of the vote, 12.3 percent.

The IRI observation team which travelled to Murmansk consisted of delegates Margaret H. Wilson and J. Barry Hutchison and IRI Bulgaria in-country director Scott Carpenter.

On the Saturday before election day, the delegates met with candidates, political party officers, the chairman of the district election commission, and representatives of the local media. During the course of these meetings the delegates found no evidence causing them to question the basic integrity of the pre-election administration process, or to conclude that the environment had been prejudicial to the campaign efforts of any party or group of parties. Both the oblast chairman and members of the press did, however, complain about ambiguities in the election law. The press complained that the Central Election Commission had squelched good reporting in the name of ensuring prescribed "objectivity." There was no indication that this had been done to the benefit of any single party or group.

The candidates and party leaders expressed concerns about possible manipulation of vote totals at the territorial level - i.e., where totals would be accumulated from individual polling sites. They also said they feared that their party pollwatchers would be harassed, a concern that proved unfounded.

On election day, the delegates visited seven polling stations. Though the delegates reported no direct observation or evidence of fraud, they did report a high incidence of irregularities in the balloting and counting process and concluded that the potential for fraud and manipulation was high. As in other regions, the delegates attributed a generally disorderly voting process, extremely high instances of open voting, and crowding around registration tables to an unexpectedly high voter turnout, which election commissioners were not prepared to

handle. Ballot boxes in many stations, according to the delegates report, were hidden from the view of station commissioners as well as prospective voters by the throng of other voters. The fact that pollwatchers were not present at several polling stations added to the delegates' concerns.

Delegates also reported supplemental lists were not used to record the names of unregistered voters. Instead the names were added directly to the regular registration list. In the case of one polling station, 75 names were recorded in this manner.

Rostov-na-Donu

The Rostov Oblast is located on the eastern Ukrainian border, northeast of the Sea of Azov in the southwestern region of European Russia, known as the Northern Caucasus. The region has a population of 4.3 million, 71 percent of which live in one of the region's six urban centers. Rostov-na-Donu, the capital of the Oblast, was founded in 1749 and is the most populated city in the region. The remainder lives in one of the region's 16 small cities or 35 mostly agricultural towns.

On December 17, 1995, the voters in Rostov-na-Donu elected seven deputies to represent Rostov in the State Duma, one seat more than in the 1993 Duma elections. They include: two from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, two independents (one who later claimed allegiance to the Agrarian Party), one Agrarian Party, one PRES, and one Yabloko. Compared to 1993, when four of the six deputies elected to single mandate seats were independents, Rostov voters expressed a preference for party candidates. In party list voting, the Communists claimed a clear plurality of the vote with 26.5 percent, with Yabloko and LDPR finishing with 14.1 percent and 10.2 percent of the vote, respectively.

IRI delegates Nancy Bocskor and David Hansen, and IRI Russia assistant program officer Ginta Draugelis were deployed to Rostov. The delegation attended briefings with local pro-reform leaders, government officials, the regional election commissioner, and journalists to learn about the pre-election climate, concerns about election day, and to determine which sites may be most vulnerable in the Rostov Oblast. As a result of these meetings, the delegates did not find cause to question the basic integrity of the process or any widespread problems with the campaign period. One journalist, however, did voice concern that technical errors would be made on protocols and that deliberate manipulations would be made in such a way to make it difficult to know which protocols had been altered. One candidate related how a journalist refused to write a story about him and his criticisms of the government rather than face the wrath of government officials.

On election day, the delegation observed nine polling sites in three cities. The delegation chose three cities that represented the general political forces in Russia. The first city, Rostov-na-Donu is considered to be more reform minded; the second, Novocherkassk, is a strong nationalist haven of Cossacks; and the last, Bataisk, is a communist stronghold.

The delegation did not witness any systematic fraudulent activity on election day, but reported repeated problems in the organization of the voting process. Every polling site was overcrowded and had an insufficient number of polling booths which resulted in widespread open voting. There were repeated incidents of people trying to vote for family members. One voter told the delegates that cemetery voting might occur because they knew of people whose family members who had been dead for over 20 years were still receiving voting cards. The delegation noticed that voter registration procedures, mainly the methods for adding names to supplemental lists to allow voters who were not registered in the district to vote, were not secure enough to

prevent manipulation of results. Finally, the delegation reported that election commissioners at several polling sites allowed campaign materials to be displayed within the polling site.

The delegation watched the final count at the polling site level and followed the protocol to the territorial level. The delegation did not witness any inaccuracies in the counting procedure at the site they observed, but when they arrived at the territorial commission it became evident the counting procedure was not being followed at many other sites throughout the district. Numerous sites had to recount their ballots several times before the protocol was filled out accurately. The territorial commission tried to verify the numbers, however if an inconsistency was noticed, the territorial commissioner required the polling site commissioner to adjust the numbers. The territorial commissioners did not call for a recount if there was an inaccuracy in the calculations. This led to numerous polling site election commissioners erasing numbers and using white out to change numbers on official polling site protocols.

The delegation also observed the territorial commission's storage room where ballots were stored was not well guarded. They observed people walking in and out of the room without any official supervision.

Perm

The Perm Oblast is located on the western slope of the Ural mountain range that separates Siberian Russia from European Russia. The region is populated by 3 million people of predominantly Russian ethnicity, who live in the Oblast's 25 cities and 57 towns. The region is divided into 37 rayons, or counties. The largest urban and industrial center in the Oblast is the city of Perm, which was founded in 1723 and became the Oblast's capital in 1789. Perm is located on the Kama River, has a population of 1 million and was a closed city during the Soviet era. Its prisons and labor camps were home to many dissident Russian writers and intellectuals.

Perm claims four single mandate seats in the State Duma, and in 1993, Perm voters sent to Moscow a delegation evenly split between communist and reform leaning candidates. In the 1995 elections, Perm voters again showed evidence of divided political sentiment, electing one deputy each from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Russia's Democratic Choice, and two independents, the vice governor of Perm Oblast and a wealthy businessman from the region. The Liberal Democratic Party, followed by KPRF, finished first and second in party list balloting.

IRI delegates Ed DeLaney and Jill Kent, accompanied by IRI CIS program assistant Lara McDougall, met with party representatives, candidates, election commission officials, and journalists prior to election day. Based on these discussions and their general observations, the delegates did not report any evidence of systematic or widespread problems in the administration of the pre-election campaign or in the campaign process itself. Delegates did note that Our Home is Russia display advertising was the most prevalent in Perm as its billboards and posters could be spotted on nearly every corner.

On election day, the delegates visited 11 polling stations, which included a hospital, a prison and a military academy. They reported no evidence of systematic fraud, or of widespread problems in the administration of the balloting. Overall, election commissioners were well trained. Pollwatchers were at every polling site the delegation visited except for the prison. (Several political parties -- Russia's Democratic Choice, Yabloko, Our Home is Russia, and the Social Democrats -- formed a group that shared pollwatching activities).

The delegation did, however, report irregularities related to overcrowding at the polling sites they visited. Open voting was commonly seen, and there was an insufficient number of voting booths. The delegates also reported insufficient attention to procedure in the maintenance of supplemental registration lists and of the mobile ballot box. At the military academy, the local election chairman was displeased at the delegates' presence, asked them not to take pictures and demanded they cease administering exit polls. At a rural polling site, the chairman was stamping ballots as the voters came in and was too distracted to keep groups of voters from going into the voting booths together. It was at that polling site a cardboard box in the back of the room had been mistaken for a ballot box.

The delegation did not report any irregularities during the ballot count at the polling site level; however they noted pollworkers did not follow any standard procedures of how to conduct the count. The delegates expressed concern that the methods used to calculate and record the results did not protect the integrity of the protocol. The delegates did not observe any irregularities at the territorial commission.

Volgograd

The Volgograd Oblast is located in the southern half of European Russia. Kazakhstan is on Volgograd's eastern border and Ukraine on its western border. The capital city, formerly Stalingrad, was renamed after Stalin's death, and is situated on the Volga river, close to one of the largest waterways west of the Ural mountains, the Volga-Don canal.

Given its heroic place in Soviet history it is no surprise that Volgograd remained, after 1991, a key part of the Russian "red belt." Nor does it come as a surprise that after five years of economically and socially painful transition, nostalgia for the political past is particularly strong among voters in the region. Three members of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), and a member of the Agrarian Party won the four single mandate district seats in Volgograd in the December 1995 elections. One of those seats had been held by a reform-oriented deputy since 1993. The KPRF also claimed a large plurality - 28 percent - in party list balloting. The three major reformist groups on the ballot did manage to capture a healthy 18 percent of the vote, indicating that they have maintained a political base in the region.

IRI's election observation mission delegation consisted of Bobby Burchfield, Bill Owens and IRI resident program officer David Denehy. To evaluate the election campaign period the delegates met with political party leaders, regional and district election commissioners, and correspondents with news agencies. There appeared to be widespread consensus by all political parties, news organizations and election officials that the election would be conducted fairly, although there were indications of some media bias and administrative irregularities.

Delegates were unable to obtain a list of polling sites. While delegates believe the unavailability of a central list of polling places was due to bureaucratic inefficiency, they found it troubling that only a partial listing was published in the press. In addition, delegates were told daily meetings were held in the governor's office with editor of Volgograd's largest daily newspaper (Volgogradskaya Pravda) and television and radio editors to discuss coverage of Our Home is Russia.

On election day, the delegation observed voting procedures at 14 polling sites, followed a mobile ballot box, witnessed a count and followed the polling site protocol to the territorial level. The delegates did not report any evidence of deliberate or systematic fraud. Election officials seemed to be well trained and ballot security seemed to be adequate, although in some cases ballots arrived late at polling sites, forcing early voters to go to the territorial election commission to cast ballots. The polling sites followed the prescribed procedure for adding names to the voting list, and the procedures used for the mobile ballot box followed the law.

The delegates did report, however, that many voters were confused by the complexity of the party list ballot, leading voters to question election commissioners, and sometimes pollwatchers who were mistakenly identified as commissioners, to help voters identify parties on the list. Despite heavy use of supplemental voting lists - nearly 20 percent of voters were

on the supplemental list at some polling stations - the delegates found no violations. The delegates reported that the counting procedure they observed was conducted in accordance with the Central Election Commission regulations.

Tomsk

The Tomsk region is located in the southeastern part of the western Siberian plain, four time zones east of Moscow. It is situated near the Ob River and the Tom tributary. The land is predominantly covered with forests and marsh lands, and is approximately the size of France. The region is divided into 16 rayons, or counties. Nearly 1 million people inhabited the region, of which half live in the administrative center and capital city, Tomsk. Tomsk was a closed city until 1991 because of its major nuclear power facilities.

On December 17, Tomsk residents cast ballots to elect one single mandate Duma member - the number of single mandate districts in Tomsk was reduced from two in the 1993 elections to one in 1995 - two party list deputies, and an Oblast governor. The results of the balloting were mixed. The single mandate seat and the governorship went to reform-oriented candidates associated with the Republican Party and Our Home is Russia, respectively. At the same time, the Communist Party - which called for a boycott of the gubernatorial voting - and the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democrats won clear pluralities in the party list balloting.

The IRI observer delegation that travelled to Tomsk included delegate Tom Herman and IRI assistant program officer Julie Brennan. On the Saturday before election day, they attended meetings on the pre-election environment with the director of the oblast election commission, the campaign director for the incumbent governor, and several political party representatives. While there were complaints from various party representatives about actions or decisions during the pre-election period which they believed were prejudicial to them, IRI's observers did not report evidence of any systematic effort to impede the campaign of any single party or group of parties. Based on the delegates' conversations with local reporters and media representatives it did appear, however, that there may have been efforts to deny the communist and nationalist parties, KPRF and LDPR, access to advertising space in local newspapers as well as on local television. Journalists did note that owners and editors of newspapers in Tomsk exercised influence on the subject and slant of stories.

On election day, the delegation visited 10 polling sites. The delegation did not observe evidence that suggested systematic violations of the election law or administrative procedure. Polling station personnel were reported to have been generally well trained and experienced, and the observers did not find polling stations disorganized, although a few were so overcrowded, people literally could not turn around. Though the delegation did not encounter pollwatchers at every station visited, all local election chairmen confirmed pollwatchers had visited their sites. The one pollwatcher with whom the observers met with said all voting appeared normal.

Minor irregularities were reported, however. Election officials expressed differing views, for example, as to whether sealed envelopes with early ballots should be opened into the ballot box or whether the sealed envelope should be put into the box and opened during the count. In several locations, commissioners did not maintain separate supplemental voting lists, but added names of unregistered voters who showed proper identification onto the regular

registration list. The number of such voters, in any case, was reported to be very small. A significant amount of open voting and family voting were also reported, and in some cases ballot boxes were not kept in plain view of the voting station commissioners.

The observers also reported that counting procedure at the polling site level did not ensure accuracy and left open the possibility for manipulation. They noted that ballots and protocols were only counted once, without any double checking or even spot checking. When numbers on the protocol did not add up at the polling site, no recount was called: rather, election commissioners struggled with the numbers until they checked out. There was also significant difference of opinion regarding the procedure for transporting ballots from the polling site to the territorial level. While some polling sites followed proper procedures and delivered the ballots to the territorial election commission immediately after the count, other polling site election commissioners understood that the ballots would be collected from the polling sites three days after election day.

APPENDIX IV: Sample Ballots

State Duma -- Party List Ballot

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ
 для выборов депутатов Государственной Думы
 Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации второго созыва
 по федеральному избирательному округу
 17 декабря 1995 года



ГОРОД МОСКВА






РАЗЪЯСНЕНИЯ ПОРЯДКА ЗАПОЛНЕНИЯ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОГО БЮЛЛЕТЕНЯ

- Поставьте любой знак в пустом квадрате справа от наименования только одного избирательного объединения, избирательного блока, за которое(ый) Вы голосуете, либо в квадрате справа от строки "Против всех федеральных списков кандидатов".
- Избирательный бюллетень, в котором любой знак проставлен более чем в одном квадрате, либо не проставлен ни в одном из них, считается недействительным.
- Избирательный бюллетень, не заверенный участковой избирательной комиссией, признается бюллетенем неустановленной формы и при подсчете голосов не учитывается.

1		"ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ "ЖЕНЩИНЫ РОССИИ" Федулова Алевтина Васильевна, Лахова Екатерина Филипповна, Климантова Галина Ивановна региональная группа: Маркина Людмила Николаевна, Абдурахманова Эльмира Гусейновна, Айвазова Светлана Григорьевна	<input type="checkbox"/>
2		"СОЦИАЛ-ПАТРИОТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ "ДЕРЖАВА" Русской Александр Владимирович, Кобелев Виктор Васильевич, Душенов Константин Юрьевич региональная группа: Макушок Иван Викторович, Федоров Андрей Владимирович, Телушок Александр Николаевич	<input type="checkbox"/>
3		"ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ "ДУМА-96" Буренин Владимир Арсеньевич, Симонов Михаил Петрович, Кондратьев Георгий Григорьевич региональная группа: Лаптев Николай Иванович, Зотов Александр Алексеевич, Лыршиков Петр Константинович	<input type="checkbox"/>
4		"ПРЕОБРАЖЕНИЕ ОТЕЧЕСТВА" (Общероссийская общественная организация "Преобразование Отечества". Свободная демократическая партия России. Всероссийская партия безопасности человека) Росель Эдуард Эргартович, Якимов Виктор Васильевич, Салье Марина Евгеньевна региональная группа: Капаев Сергей Федорович, Нуждин Владимир Николаевич, Шаркин Сергей Алексеевич	<input type="checkbox"/>
5		"ТИХОНОВ-ТУПОЛЕВ-ТИХОНОВ" (Партия консолидации. Лига кооператоров и предпринимателей) Тихонов Александр Анатольевич, Туполев Алексей Андреевич, Тихонов Виктор Васильевич региональная группа: Андрухович Анатолий Антонович, Дожин Анатолий Иванович, Василевич Николай Степанович	<input type="checkbox"/>
6		"РОССИЙСКОЕ ОБЩЕНАРОДНОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ" Баженов Александр Васильевич, Мошняков Валерий Владимирович, Платонов Владимир Константинович региональная группа: Морочкин Владимир Иванович, Нестеров Виктор Андреевич, Обидин Александр Александрович	<input type="checkbox"/>
7		"ОБЩЕРОССИЙСКОЕ МУСУЛЬМАНСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ "НУР" ("СВЕТ") Яхин Халил Ахметович, Яруллин Вафа Сейтбатталович, Шагидуллин Анвер Галлямович региональная группа: Агшиев Харис Анверович, Ибатуллина Гюльнара Ренатовна, Юсупов Сяид Рашидович	<input type="checkbox"/>
8		"ФЕДЕРАЛЬНО-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ" Новиков Олег Иванович, Калугин Олег Данилович, Казакова Римма Федоровна региональная группа: Иванов Александр Александрович, Усов Александр Арсентьевич, Михайлов Андрей Леонидович	<input type="checkbox"/>



9		<p>"ПРЕДВЫБОРНЫЙ БЛОК, ВКЛЮЧАЮЩИЙ РУКОВОДИТЕЛЕЙ ПАРТИИ ЗАЩИТЫ ДЕТЕЙ (МИРА, ДОБРА И СЧАСТЬЯ), ПАРТИИ "РУССКИЕ ЖЕНЩИНЫ", ПАРТИИ ПРАВОСЛАВНЫХ (ВЕРЫ, НАДЕЖДЫ, ЛЮБВИ), НАРОДНОЙ ХРИСТИАНСКО-МОНАРХИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ, ПАРТИИ ЗА СОЮЗ СЛАВЯНСКИХ НАРОДОВ, ПАРТИИ СЕЛЬСКИХ ТРУЖЕНИКОВ "ЗЕМЛЯ-МАТУШКА", ПАРТИИ ЗАЩИТЫ ИНВАЛИДОВ, ПАРТИИ ПОСТРАДАВШИХ ОТ ВЛАСТЕЙ И ОБЕЗДОЛЕННЫХ" (Туристско-спортивный союз России, Российский профессиональный союз работников телевидения и радиовещания, Общество потребителей электроники России) Дикунь Валентин Иванович, Воеводин Вадим Алексеевич, Колтунов Ян Иванович региональная группа: Родионова Валентина Николаевна, Заржицкий Георгий Юрьевич, Шевцова Елена Евгеньевна</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10		<p>"МЕЖНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ СОЮЗ" (Конгресс гражданского согласия России, Российская Христианско-Демократическая партия, Ассоциация корейцев России) Микитаев Абдулах Касбулатович, Гареев Махмут Ахметович, Зайцев Александр Николаевич региональная группа: Шанский Владимир Яковлевич, Сириев Михаил Андреевич, Прякин Георгий Владимирович</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11		<p>"ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ "СТАБИЛЬНАЯ РОССИЯ" Петров Олег Вадимович, Быстрицкая Элина Авраамовна, Горлов Александр Викторович региональная группа: Моисеев Владимир Константинович, Бондарев Борис Иванович, Кожанов Дмитрий Александрович</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12		<p>"ПОКОЛЕНИЯ РУБЕЖА" (Общественно-политическое движение молодежи (Союз), Общественное объединение Союз эмигрантов России (Союз МЖК России)) Соловников Дмитрий Владимирович, Филиппов Николай Анатольевич, Бариев Марат Мансурович региональная группа: Редько Сергей Витальевич, Иванова Елена Валерьевна, Монастырева Галли Германовна</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13		<p>"МОЕ ОТЕЧЕСТВО" Громов Борис Всеволодович, Шаталин Станислав Сергеевич, Кобзон Иосиф Давыдович региональная группа: Титов Юрий Александрович, Архипов Виктор Алексеевич, Киришин Владимир Васильевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14		<p>"ЗА РОДИНУ!" (Российский Союз ветеранов Афганистана, Народно-патриотическая партия, Общественно-политическое движение "Новая Россия") Полеванов Владимир Павлович, Подколзин Евгений Николаевич, Балтин Эдуард Дмитриевич региональная группа: Сухоруков Петр Петрович, Разумов Александр Николаевич, Макаров Сергей Васильевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15		<p>"ВНЕПАРТИЙНОЕ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЕЙ "ОБЩЕЕ ДЕЛО" (Объединение "Общее дело", Союз "Живое кольцо") Хакамада Ирина Муцуовна, Быков (Ролан Быков) Роланд Анатольевич, Джанибеков Владимир Александрович региональная группа: Маслюков Виктор Федорович, Динес Игорь Юрьевич, Дюрдинчук Александр Тимофеевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16		<p>"БЛОК НЕЗАВИСИМЫХ" (Объединенный демократический центр, Всероссийский татарский культурно-просветительский центр) региональная группа: Комчатов Владимир Федорович, Ключников Виталий Алексеевич, Ремигаило Александр Всеволодович</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17		<p>"ВСЕРОССИЙСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ "НАШ ДОМ - РОССИЯ" Черномырдин Виктор Степанович, Михалков Никита Сергеевич, Рохлин Лев Яковлевич региональная группа: Резин Владимир Иосифович, Шохин Александр Николаевич, Гребенников Валерий Васильевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18		<p>"ПАМФИЛОВА-ГУРОВ-ВЛАДИМИР ЛЫСЕНКО (РЕСПУБЛИКАНСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ)" (Республиканская партия Российской Федерации, Союз "Молодые Республиканцы") Памфилова Элла Александровна, Гуров Александр Иванович, Лысенко Владимир Николаевич региональная группа: Порфилов Александр Борисович, Гулимова Валерия Вячеславовна, Шаталов Юрий Михайлович</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19		<p>"ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЕ ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЕ "ЯБЛОКО" Явлинский Григорий Алексеевич, Лукин Владимир Петрович, Ярыгина Татьяна Владимировна региональная группа: Щекочихин Юрий Петрович, Аверчев Владимир Петрович, Боршев Валерий Васильевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20		<p>"ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ "ВПЕРЕД, РОССИЯ!" Федоров Борис Григорьевич, Денисенко Элла Анатольевна, Владиславлев Александр Павлович региональная группа: Ходжаев Андрей Закирович, Адарченко Игорь Михайлович, Нестеренко Андрей Николаевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>

21		"89" (89 РЕГИОНОВ РОССИИ)" (Общероссийское политическое движение "Выбор России". Всероссийское общественно-политическое движение "Ассоциация независимых профессионалов") региональная группа: Медведев Павел Алексеевич, Желнин Вадим Алексеевич, Пузырев Эдуард Игоревич	<input type="checkbox"/>
22		"ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ "КЕДР" Панфилов Анатолий Алексеевич, Якубович Леонид Аркадьевич, Тарасов Артем Михайлович региональная группа: Покровский Вадим Валентинович, Киселев Алексей Иванович, Пивоваров Олег Николаевич	<input type="checkbox"/>
23		"ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКИЙ ВЫБОР РОССИИ - ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫЕ ДЕМОКРАТЫ" (Партия "Демократический выбор России". Крестьянская партия России. Российская партия социальной демократии. Конгресс национальных объединений России) Гайдар Егор Тимурович, Ковалев Сергей Адамович, Шукшина (Федосеева-Шукшина) Лидия Николаевна региональная группа: Юшенков Сергей Николаевич, Улюкаев Алексей Валентинович, Радиковский Леонид Александрович	<input type="checkbox"/>
24		"ПАРТИЯ РОССИЙСКОГО ЕДИНСТВА И СОГЛАСИЯ" Шахрай Сергей Михайлович, Быков Валерий Алексеевич, Иванков Владимир Иванович региональная группа: Бурлацкий Федор Михайлович, Чернов Владимир Михайлович, Карпухин Виктор Васильевич	<input type="checkbox"/>
25		"КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ" Зюганов Геннадий Андреевич, Горычева Светлана Петровна, Тулеев Аман-гельды Молдагазыевич региональная группа: Губенко Николай Николаевич, Мельников Иван Иванович, Куваев Александр Александрович	<input type="checkbox"/>
26		"БЛОК СТАНИСЛАВА ГОВОРУКИНА" (Всероссийское объединение профсоюзов, Российское общественно-патриотическое движение "Народный альянс". Российское Христианское Демократическое Движение) Говорухин Станислав Сергеевич, Румянцев Олег Германович, Аксютин Виктор Владимирович региональная группа: Краснов Александр Викторович, Семенов Тимур Ермавович, Соломатина Тамара Борисовна	<input type="checkbox"/>
27		"АССОЦИАЦИЯ АДВОКАТОВ РОССИИ" Малаев Алексей Никифорович, Мирзоев Гасан Борисович, Федосеев Анатолий Михайлович региональная группа: Витин Сергей Ефимович, Шушаков Виктор Павлович, Руднев Олег Александрович	<input type="checkbox"/>
28		"НАЦИОНАЛЬНО-РЕСПУБЛИКАНСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ (НРП)" Лысенко Николай Николаевич, Павлов Николай Александрович, Овчинников Константин Николаевич региональная группа: Чижевский Владимир Сергеевич, Латышев Валерий Александрович, Бабенко Олег Георгиевич	<input type="checkbox"/>
29		"СОЦИАЛ-ДЕМОКРАТЫ" (Социал-демократический союз. Политическое движение "Молодые социал-демократы России". Российское Движение Демократических Реформ) Попов Гавриил Харитонович, Липицкий Василий Семенович, Богомолов Олег Тимофеевич региональная группа: Кудюкин Павел Михайлович, Рыбкин Альберт Анатольевич, Федосов Петр Анатольевич	<input type="checkbox"/>
		"ВЛАСТЬ - НАРОДУ!" (Российский общенародный союз (политическая партия). Движение матерей "За социальную справедливость") Рыжков Николай Иванович, Бабурин Сергей Николаевич, Шувалова Елена Анатольевна региональная группа: Коригина Татьяна Ивановна, Трушин Василий Петрович, Уваров Борис Иванович	<input type="checkbox"/>
31		"ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ "КОНГРЕСС РУССКИХ ОБЩИН" Скоков Юрий Владимирович, Лебедь Александр Иванович, Глазьев Сергей Юрьевич региональная группа: Дондуков Александр Николаевич, Кутафин Олег Емельянович, Щербина Андрей Владимирович	<input type="checkbox"/>
32		"ПРОФСОЮЗЫ И ПРОМЫШЛЕННИКИ РОССИИ - СОЮЗ ТРУДА" (Российская объединенная промышленная партия. Общероссийское общественное движение "Профсоюзы России - на выборы") Щербяков Владимир Иванович, Шмаков Михаил Викторович, Вольский Аркадий Иванович региональная группа: Пономарев Геннадий Семенович, Артюх Игорь Григорьевич, Шулунов Алексей Николаевич	<input type="checkbox"/>
33		"ЛИБЕРАЛЬНО-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ (ЛДПР)" Жириновский Владимир Вольфович, Абельева Сергей Николаевич, Венгеровский Александр Дмитриевич региональная группа: Жуковский Александр Иванович, Дунец Михаил Иванович, Лебедева Галина Александровна	<input type="checkbox"/>

34		<p>"ПРЕДВЫБОРНЫЙ БЛОК, ВКЛЮЧАЮЩИЙ РУКОВОДИТЕЛЕЙ ПАРТИИ ЗАЩИТЫ ПЕНСИОНЕРОВ И ВЕТЕРАНОВ, ПАРТИИ ИСКОРЕНЕНИЯ ПРЕСУДНОСТИ - ЗАКОННОСТИ И ПОРЯДКА, ПАРТИИ ЗАЩИТЫ ЗДРАВООХРАНЕНИЯ, ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ, НАУКИ И КУЛЬТУРЫ, ПАРТИИ ЗАЩИТЫ МОЛОДЕЖИ, ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЯ СВОБОДНЫХ ПРОФСОЮЗОВ, ПАРТИИ СПРАВЕДЛИВОСТИ, ПАРТИИ ОХРАНЫ ПРИРОДЫ" <small>(Ассоциация военных журналистов, Ассоциация формирования здоровья подрастающего поколения, Ассоциация духовного возрождения науки, Российская Конфедерация Свободных профсоюзов)</small> Давиташвили Евгения Ювашевна (Джуна), Волков Андрей Романович, Панкратов-Черный Александр Васильевич региональная группа : Лебедь Александр Иванович, Захаров Юрий Евгеньевич, Калочников Алексей Алексеевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
35		<p>"ПАРТИЯ САМОУПРАВЛЕНИЯ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ" Федоров Святослав Николаевич, Казанник Алексей Иванович, Пороховщиков Александр Шалвович региональная группа : Малыхин Владимир Павлович, Кузнецовский Владимир Дмитриевич, Мариночкин Виктор Павлович</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
36		<p>"КОММУНИСТЫ - ТРУДОВАЯ РОССИЯ - ЗА СОВЕТСКИЙ СОЮЗ" <small>(Российская коммунистическая рабочая партия, Российская партия коммунистов)</small> Толькин Виктор Аркадьевич, Крючков Анатолий Викторович, Анпилов Виктор Иванович региональная группа : Слободкин Юрий Максимович, Глаголева Наталья Олеговна, Хорев Борис Сергеевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
37		<p>"ПАРТИЯ ЛЮБИТЕЛЕЙ ПИВА" Калачев Константин Эдуардович, Шестаков Дмитрий Юрьевич, Пальчевский Андрей Иванович региональная группа : Сапуников Александр Анатольевич, Калашников Сергей Федорович, Полянский Эдуард Иванович</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
38		<p>"БЛОК ИВАНА РЫБКИНА" <small>(Общественно-политическое объединение "Народное движение - Россия" (Союз), Общественное объединение "Регионы России", "Российский Союз Молодежи", Общественно-политическое движение "Согласие", Общественно-политическое движение "Союз реалистов")</small> Рыбкин Иван Петрович, Петров Юрий Владимирович, Чилингаров Артур Николаевич региональная группа : Пальчиков Юрий Дмитриевич, Ильинский Игорь Михайлович, Печенев Вадим Алексеевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
39		<p>"ПАРТИЯ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ СВОБОДЫ" Боровой Константин Натанович, Некрасов Леонид Васильевич, Шпигель Леонид Теодорович региональная группа : Тарасенко Олег Алексеевич, Сороко-Цюпа Андрей Олегович, Федоров Евгений Аверьянович</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
40		<p>"ПАРТИЯ "НАРОДНЫЙ СОЮЗ" Лукьянов Владимир Николаевич, Галаган Дмитрий Андреевич, Мионов Геннадий Анатольевич региональная группа : Зайцева Екатерина Михайловна, Вялов Юрий Леонидович, Соколова Татьяна Сергеевна</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
41		<p>"АГРАРНАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ" Лапшин Михаил Иванович, Назарчук Александр Григорьевич, Стародубцев Василий Александрович региональная группа : Бошляков Владимир Никанорович, Лучко Клара Степановна, Аринбашев Александр Николаевич</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
42		<p>"ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ "ХРИСТИАНСКО-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКИЙ СОЮЗ - ХРИСТИАНЕ РОССИИ" Савицкий Виталий Викторович, Иванова Татьяна Борисовна, Киселев Александр Николаевич региональная группа : Семченко Александр Трофимович, Пчелинцев Анатолий Васильевич, Мишина Валентина Васильевна</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43		<p>"СОЮЗ РАБОТНИКОВ ЖИЛИЩНО-КОММУНАЛЬНОГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА РОССИИ" Чернышов Леонид Николаевич, Сузов Петр Сергеевич, Авдеев Валерий Валентинович региональная группа : Гончаров Владимир Борисович, Цветнов Андрей Викторович, Киселев Сергей Валерианович</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		<p>• ПРОТИВ ВСЕХ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНЫХ СПИСКОВ КАНДИДАТОВ</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Political Party Emblems

Увеличенные изображения символов
избирательных объединений, избирательных блоков,
помещааемых в избирательный бюллетень по
федеральному округу

	ФДД	 ОБЩЕЕ ЦЕЛО	ВЫБОР		
	ДЕЛО ПЕТРА I	 НАШ ДОМ РОССИЯ		КОНГРЕСС КО РУССКИХ ОБЩИН	ПЭС ✓
		ПАМФИЛОВА	ИТД. НАРОДОВАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИЯ	Г	
ОБРОБАЩЕН ОТСУТСТВА	 СТАРИННАЯ РОССИЯ	Яблоко	БЛОК СТАНИСЛАВА ГОВОРУХИНА	ЛДПР	АГРАРНАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ
	 МОЛОДЕЖНЫЙ БЛОК	 ВПЕРЕД. РОССИЯ	АДВОКАТ- ВАША ЗАЩИТА	АВУНА	
		БЛОК 89 РЕГИОНОВ РОССИИ			
	ЗА РОДИНУ!				

State Duma -- Single Mandate Ballot

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ

для выборов депутата Государственной Думы Федерального
Собрания Российской Федерации второго созыва
17 декабря 1995 года

по Центральному одномандатному избирательному округу № 71
Волгоградская область

РАЗЪЯСНЕНИЕ ПОРЯДКА ЗАПОЛНЕНИЯ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОГО БЮЛЛЕТЕНЯ:

- * Поставьте любой знак в пустом квадрате справа от фамилии только одного кандидата, за которого Вы голосуете, либо в квадрате справа от строки «Против всех кандидатов».
- * Избирательный бюллетень, в котором любой знак проставлен более, чем в одном квадрате, либо не проставлен ни в одном из них, считается недействительным.
- * Избирательный бюллетень, не заверенный участковой избирательной комиссией, признается бюллетенем не установленной формы и при подсчете голосов не учитывается.

АПАРИНА

Алевтина Викторовна

20 апреля 1941 года рождения, Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации, депутат, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинута избирательным объединением «Коммунистическая партия Российской Федерации». Член Коммунистической партии Российской Федерации.

АРЗАМАСЦЕВ

Александр Михайлович

15 августа 1950 года рождения, товарищество с ограниченной ответственностью магазин «Хопер», директор, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.

БОНДАРЕНКО

Александр Юрьевич

17 июня 1967 года рождения, акционерное общество открытого типа Инвестиционный фонд «Росинвест», член совета директоров, председатель ревизионной комиссии, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут непосредственно избирательным округом.

ВЕТОШКИН

Валентин Николаевич

18 сентября 1945 года рождения, акционерное общество открытого типа «Волгоградская ватная фабрика», генеральный директор, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным объединением «Российское общенародное движение». Член Российского общенародного движения.

ГРОМОВ

Александр Николаевич

31 июля 1961 года рождения, предприниматель, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут непосредственно избирательным округом.

ЕРОХИН

Анатолий Алексеевич

15 декабря 1954 года рождения, товарищество с ограниченной ответственностью «Антикорр», электромонтер, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.

ИГНАТЬЕВ

Владимир Александрович

6 декабря 1938 года рождения, Волгоградская Государственная архитектурно-строительная академия, ректор, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.

КАРПЕНКО

Олег Анатольевич

28 октября 1967 года рождения, Волгоградская областная организация Либерально-демократической партии России, руководитель, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным объединением «Либерально-демократическая партия России». Член Либерально-демократической партии России.

КОПЫЛОВ

Сергей Иванович

28 июня 1950 года рождения, акционерное общество открытого типа «Научно-исследовательский и проектный институт автоматизированных систем управления», помощник генерального директора, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.

КУПРИКОВ

Андрей Александрович

1 декабря 1967 года рождения, акционерное общество закрытого типа Корпорация «Информация и маркетинг», генеральный директор, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным блоком «Поколения рубежа». Член Общественно-политического движения молодежи (Союз).

КУТЯВИНА Зинаида Петровна	14 августа 1935 года рождения, завод «Ремстроймаш», помощник директора завода, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинута избирательным округом.	<input type="checkbox"/>
ЛУКАШЕВ Игорь Львович	23 февраля 1955 года рождения, Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации, депутат, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным объединением «Общественное объединение «Яблоко». Член Общественного объединения «Яблоко».	<input type="checkbox"/>
МИХАЙЛИН Николай Сергеевич	24 августа 1941 года рождения, товарищество с ограниченной ответственностью Фирма «Успех», директор, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным объединением «Общественно-политическое движение «Вперед, Россия!». Член Общественно-политического движения «Вперед, Россия!».	<input type="checkbox"/>
МОСКАЛЕВ Владимир Владимирович	22 февраля 1958 года рождения, акционерное общество закрытого типа Фирма «МикФ», президент, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.	<input type="checkbox"/>
МУРТАЗАЛИЕВА Людмила Макаровна	2 марта 1937 года рождения, пенсионерка, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинута избирательным округом.	<input type="checkbox"/>
НИКУЛИН Федор Герасимович	21 июня 1927 года рождения, Всероссийский Совет ветеранов-участников войны «Последний военный приз», председатель, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.	<input type="checkbox"/>
ПОЛИЩУК Александр Алексеевич	14 ноября 1957 года рождения, Администрация Волгоградской области, председатель комитета по делам молодежи, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным объединением «Всероссийское общественно-политическое движение «Наш дом — Россия». Член Всероссийского общественно-политического движения «Наш дом — Россия».	<input type="checkbox"/>
СТОЛБИН Сергей Витальевич	13 сентября 1949 года рождения, Государственное Унитарное предприятие «ТИСО», регулировщик, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.	<input type="checkbox"/>
СУБОТА Виталий Михайлович	7 сентября 1939 года рождения, Детская юношеская спортивная школа № 20 отдела образования администрации Ворошиловского района города Волгограда, тренер-преподаватель, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.	<input type="checkbox"/>
ТЕРЕНТЬЕВ Станислав Викторович	30 марта 1947 года рождения, газета «Колокоть», главный редактор, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным блоком «Союз патриотов».	<input type="checkbox"/>
ТИТОВ Юрий Николаевич	28 декабря 1961 года рождения, Волгоградская областная коллегия адвокатов, адвокат, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.	<input type="checkbox"/>
ЧУВИЛЬСКИЙ Константин Васильевич	1 декабря 1955 года рождения, Индивидуальное частное предприятие «Аватар», исполнительный директор, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным округом.	<input type="checkbox"/>
ЮЩЕНКО Анатолий Александрович	30 января 1938 года рождения, Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации, депутат, проживает: город Волгоград. Выдвинут избирательным блоком «Демократический выбор России — Объединенные демократы». Член партии Демократический выбор России.	<input type="checkbox"/>
Против всех кандидатов		<input type="checkbox"/>

APPENDIX V: Deputies of the State Duma Elected from Party Lists in December 1995

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Zyuganov Gennady Andreevich	1944	Incumbent, CP	FP List #1	CPRF	CPRF
Chikin Valentin Vasileevich	1932	Incumbent, CP	FP List #4	CPRF	CPRF
Maslyukov Yury Dmitrievich	1937	General Director, Yugtransinvest Joint Stock Company	FP List #5	CPRF	CPRF
Kuptsov Valentin Alexandrovich	1937	CPRF State Duma Chief of Staff	FP List #6	CPRF	CPRF
Ionov Anatoly Vasileevich	1946	Incumbent, CP	FP List #7	CPRF	CPRF
Tarasov Valeri Mikhailovich	1942	Artist	FP List #8	CPRF	CPRF
Ivanov Yury Pavlovich	1944	Incumbent, CP	FP List #9	CPRF	CPRF
Podberyozkin Alexey Ivanovich	1953	Aid to the State Duma Deputy	FP List #10	CPRF	CPRF
Savelyev Nikolay Nikolaevich	1951	CPRF State Duma Faction Expert	FP List #11	CPRF	CPRF
Vorotnikov Valeri Pavlovich	1945	General Director, Vzor Economic Security Agency	FP List #12	CPRF	CPRF
Nigkoev Sergey Georgievich	1938	General Director, Mosagromontazh Company	RP List	CPRF	Agrarians
Smolyakov Vladimir Nikolaevich	1954	Department Head, Rayon Agricultural Department	RP List	CPRF	Agrarians
Budzhapov Sergey Purbuevich	1952	Director, Buryatsky Forestry School	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Surkov Mikhail Semenovich	1945	Pensioner	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Savchuk Vera Semenovna	1939	State Duma Deputy Assistant	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Peshkov Viktor Petrovich	1945	State Duma Deputy Assistant	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Grishkevich Oleg Petrovich	1940	Director, Elets High School # 23	RP List	CPRF	CPRF

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Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Gromov Vladimir Pavlovich	1940	Train Yard Engineer	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Saveliev Konstantin Sergeevich	1952	Engineer Assistant, Train Yard	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Sokolov Aelxander Sergeevich	1947	General Director, Trade Unions' Travel and Recreation Department	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Nikitin Vladimir Stepanovich	1948	Director, Pskovskoye Vozrozhdeniye Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Shevelukha Victor Stepanovich	1929	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Seleznev Gennady Nikolaevich	1947	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Reshulsky Sergey Nikolaevich	1951	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Sokol Svyatoslav Stepanovich	1946	General Director, Kadastr Service Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Korsakov Nikolay Nikolaevich	1956	Turner, Khrunichev Space Research and Production Center	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Gubenko Nikolay Nikolaevich	1941	Director, Taganka Theater	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Falaleev Sergey Nikolaevich	1959	Federation Council Deputy Assistant	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Arefiev Nikolay Vasilievich	1949	Deputy Director, 30-th Anniversary of October Revolution Shipyard	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Shvets Luibov Nikitichna	1943	Deputy Department Head, Novosibirsk Oblast Legislature	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Gudima Tamara Mikhailovna	1936	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kostin Georgi Vasilievich	1934	Deputy Director, Russian Space Agency Center	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Maksimov Evgeni Vasilievich	1936	Writer	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Popov Viktor Mikhailovich	1949	Chairman, Agricultural Collective	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Nikiforenko Yury Vasilievich	1941	Deputy, Orenburg Oblast Legislative Assembly	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Romanov Petr Vasilievich	1943	General Director, Yenisey Krasnoyarsk Chemical Works	RP List	CPRF	CPRF

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Romashkin Viktor Vasilievich	1959	Deputy, Altai Republic Legislative Assembly	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Svinin Sergey Vasilievich	1950	Senior Agricultural Specialist, Ministry of Agriculture, Mariy-el Republic	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Pomorov Alexander Adrianovich	1931	Director, Tomsk Plastics Works	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Lyzhin Yury Vasilievich	1950	Agricultural Department Head of Penza Oblast	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Benov Gennady Matveevich	1941	Deputy Chief of Staff, CPRF State Duma Faction	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kruglikov Alexander Leonidovich	1951	Docent, Ulyanovsk Teachers Training Institute	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Oleynik Lyubov Vasilievna	1949	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kalyagin Vladimir Alexandrovich	1947	Senior Fellow, Vladimir State Pedagogical University	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kazakovtsev Vladimir Alexandrovich	1950	Director, Agricultural Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kuvaev Alexander Alexandrovich	1951	Director, Russia's Municipal Association	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Leonchev Vladimir Alexandrovich	1946	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Potapov Sergey Alexandrovich	1951	Consultant, CPRF Faction in the State Duma	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Safronov Vitali Alexandrovich	1936	Deputy Chairman, Altai Krai Legislative Assembly	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Shabanov Alexander Alexandrovich	1935	Docent, Moscow State University	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Sokolov Vyacheslav Konstantinovich	1941	Deputy Director, Oryol Infortekhnika Commercial Bank Branch	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Smetankin Yevgeni Alexandrovich	1935	Train Engineer, Train Yard	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Sevenard Yury Konstantinovich	1935	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Totiyev Sergey Alexandrovich	1951	Consultant, North Osetia President and Government Administration	RP List	CPRF	CPRF

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Temirzhanov Vladimir Khasanbievich	1934	Department Head, Kabardino-Balkariya History / Economics Research Institute	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Stolyarova Nasima Kalimovna	1951	Deputy Editor-in-chief, Zvezda Newspaper	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kravets Alexander Alexeevich	1950	Deputy Chairman, Omsk City Council	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Stepanov Vladimir Alexeevich	1949	Deputy Director, Severokhot Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Korovnikov Alexander Venedictovich	1955	First Deputy Chairman, Spiritual Heritage Movement	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kulbaka Nina Ivanovna	1946	Committee Chairwoman, Voronezh City Municipal Council	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Petoshin Vladimir Anatolievich	1953	Assembly Line Foreman at Motor Plant	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Boiko Vyacheslav Andreevich	1938	Polisher, Kaluga Telegraph Devices Production Works	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Ivanchenko Leonid Andreevich	1942	FC Member	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kuevda Grigory Andreevich	1928	General Director, Construction Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Tsiku Kazbek Aslanbechevich	1935	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kosheva Violetta Konstantinovna	1940	Director, Astrakhan Technical School	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Varennikov Valentin Ivanovich	1923	August 1991 Coup Plotter - Pensioner	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Grishukov Vladimir Vitalievich	1956	Expert, CPRF Central Committee	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Slavny Vasily Dmitrievich	1940	Turner, Krasny Metallist Works	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Filimonov Vadim Donatovich	1931	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Ganeev Mullanur Fakhrazievich	1951	Professor, Naberezhnye Chelny Pedagogical Institute	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Filshin Mikhail Vladimirovich	1955	Chairman, Trade Union Committee of Locomotive Depot	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kosykh Mikhail Fedorovich	1949	State Duma Deputy Assistant	RP List	CPRF	CPRF

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Mikhailov Vyacheslav Fedorovich	1939	Director, Hoper-ates Branch Director	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Sapozhnikov Nikolay Ivanovich	1949	Senior Fellow, Udmurtski Institute of Regional Economics	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Salnikov Viktor Ivanovich	1938	Director, Agricultural Collective	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Knysh Valentin Phillipovich	1937	State Duma Deputy Assistant	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Bindyukov Nikolay Gavrilovich	1946	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Chekhoev Anatoli Georgievich	1950	Observer, Glasnost Newspaper	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Saliy Alexander Ivanovich	1952	1-st Secretary, Tatarstan CPRF	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Meremyanin Konstantin Georgievich	1946	General Director, North Caucasus Agricultural Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Gabidullin Rinat Gindullovich	1942	Deputy Editor-in-chief, Vechernaya Ufa Newspaper	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kibirev Boris Grigorievich	1937	Chairman, Trade Union Committee of Train Yard	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Poldnikov Yury Ivanovich	1947	State Duma Deputy Assistant	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Svechnikov Petr Grigorievich	1953	Senior Lecturer, Chelyabinsk Agricultural Engineering University	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Yurchik Vladislav Grigorievich	1938	Director, Medbioekonomika Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Yeliseev Alexander Igorevich	1947	Deputy Director, Radar Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Zorkaltsev Victor Ilyich	1936	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Berdov Gennady Ilyich	1933	Professor, Novosibirsk State Academy of Construction	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Semago Vladimir Vladimirovich	1947	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Panin Viktor Yevgenievich	1951	Foreman, Sibirenergomash Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Burlutski Yury Ivanovich	1937	State Duma Deputy Assistant	RP List	CPRF	CPRF

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Lodkin Yury Yevgenievich	1938	Federation Council Deputy, Social Politics Committee	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Gazeev Yevgeni Ivanovich	1950	Foreman, Electrovipryamitel Works	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Gamza Gennady Yefimovich	1944	Director, Aurora Construction Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Berdnikova Nina Vladimirovna	1955	TV Commentator and Moderator, Pomoskovie Tv Company	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Melnikov Ivan Ivanovich	1950	Senior Lecturer, Moscow State University	RP List	CPRF	CPRF
Kosterin Evgeny Alekseevich	1949	Incumbent, CP	RP List	CPRF	PP
Mitina Daria Alexandrovna	1973	Student, Moscow State University	RP List	CPRF	PP
Zhirinovskiy Vladimir Volfovich	1946	Incumbent, 114	FP List #1	LDPR	LDPR
Abeltsev Sergey Nikolaevich	1961	Incumbent, LDPR	FP List #2	LDPR	LDPR
Vengerovskiy Alexander Dmitrievich	1953	Incumbent, LDPR	FP List #3	LDPR	LDPR
Zhebrovskiy Stanislav Mikhailovich	1942	Incumbent, LDPR	FP List #4	LDPR	LDPR
Mitrofanov Aleksey Valentinovich	1962	Incumbent, LDPR	FP List #5	LDPR	LDPR
Gutseriev Mikhail Safarbekovich	1958	President, Commercial Bank	FP List #6	LDPR	LDPR
Monastyrskiy Mikhail Lvovich	1945	Director, St. Petersburg North-west Industrial Company	FP List #7	LDPR	LDPR
Musatov Mikhail Ivanovich	1950	Pensioner	FP List #8	LDPR	LDPR
Gusev Vladimir Kuzmich	1932	Incumbent, LDPR	FP List #9	LDPR	LDPR
Finko Oleg Alexandrovich	1941	Incumbent, LDPR	FP List #11	LDPR	LDPR
Kalashnikov Sergey Vyacheslavovich	1951	Incumbent, LDPR	FP List #12	LDPR	LDPR
Lisichkin Vladimir Alekseevich	1941	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Zuev Aleksey Alekseevich	1970	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Bolshakov Evgeny Alexandrovich	1949	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Shevchenko Vyacheslav Alexeevich	1953	General Director, Rosdesign Experimental Scientific/research Enterprise	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Shipov Alexander Borisovich	1955	Incumbent, LDPR, Artist	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Mikhailov Evgeny Eduardovich	1963	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Sigarev Sergey Fedorovich	1959	International Charity for Law-enforcement Agencies, President	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Davydov Vsevolod Gennadievich	1961	General Director, Development Institute, Keramzitstroy Joint-stock Company	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Vishnyakov Viktor Grigorievich	1931	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Markelov Leonid Igorevich	1963	Lawyer, Interrepublican Bar Association	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Davidenko Vladimir Ivanovich	1948	Laboratory Chief, Institute of Human General Pathology and Ecology	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Glushchenko Mikhail Ivanovich	1957	Box Veterans Association, Vice-president	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Kozyrev Alexander Ivanovich	1949	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Mityaev Ivan Ivanovich	1965	President, Ekipazh Construction Company	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Zhukovskiy Alexander Ivanovich	1949	Chairman of the Board, Voenny Commercial Bank	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Zarichanski Stanislav Konstantinovich	1962	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Kostutkin Vladimir Mikhailovich	1948	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Parshakov Yury Nikolaevich	1951	Coordinator, Ivanovskaya Oblast LDPR Organization	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Astafyev Nikolay Pavlovich	1940	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Kuznetsov Yury Pavlovich	1947	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Ischenko Yevgeni Petrovich	1972	Consultant to the Party Chairman on Economic Issues	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Vakulenko Mikhail Yureevich	1964	Incumbent, 93	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Semyonov Sergey Sergeevich	1973	Leading Specialist of LDPR Faction	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Kornienko Viktor Ulyanovich	1937	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Filatov Alexander Valentinovich	1967	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Kuznetsov Mikhail Varfolomeivich	1968	School Charity Director	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Skurikhin Sergey Vasilievich	1955	Specialist, State Duma Staff	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Zhurko Vasily Vasilievich	1963	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Zlobin Valeri Veniaminovich	1950	State Duma Deputy Assistant	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Churilov Alexei Viktorovich	1972	State Duma Deputy Assistant	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Kisielev Vyacheslav Viktorovich	1948	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Pchelkin Vladimir Viktorovich	1967	Incumbent, LDPR, LDPR Youth Sector Leader	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Krivelskaya Nina Viktorovna	1948	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Bogatov Vladimir Vladimirovich	1960	Coordinator, Chitinskaya Oblast LDPR Organization	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Kitz Alexander Vladimirovich	1956	Coordinator, Orenburg Oblast LDPR Organization	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Solomatin Yegor Yurievich	1964	Chairman of the Board, Finance Center Joint Stock Company	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Lemeshov Gennady Vladimirovich	1968	Deputy Editor-in-chief, Pravda Zhirinovskovo Newspaper	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Sychev Sergey Vladimirovich	1962	Incumbent, LDPR	RP List	LDPR	LDPR
Magomedov Stanislav Yunusovich	1965	Deputy Director, M-auto Company	RP List	LDPR	LDPR

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Rokhlin Lev Yakovlevich	1947	Commanding Officer, 8-th Army Corps	FP List #3	OHR	OHR
Belyaev Sergey Georgievich	1954	Chairman of the State Property Fund, Government of the RF	FP List #4	OHR	OHR
Karimova Daniya Yusufovna	1946	Professor, Kazan State Medical Academy	FP List #5	OHR	OHR
Alferov Zhores Ivanovich	1930	Vice President, Russian Academy of Sciences	FP List #6	OHR	OHR
Volchek Galina Borisovna	1933	Art Director, Sovremennik Moscow Theater	FP List #7	OHR	OHR
Travkin Nikolay Ilyich	1946	Incumbent, DPR	FP List #8	OHR	OHR
Bashmachnikov Vladimir Fedorovich	1937	President, Association of Farms and Agricultural Co-operatives of Russia	FP List #10	OHR	OHR
Martynov Alexander Gavrilovich	1942	General Director, Car Pool # 17, Moscow	FP List #11	OHR	OHR
Ryzhkov Vladimir Alexandrovich	1966	Incumbent, RC	FP List #12	OHR	OHR
Askerhanov Gamid Rashidovich	1958	Department Chair, Dagestan Medical Academy	RP List	OHR	OHR
Polyakov Andrei Alexandrovich	1951	1-st Deputy Head of Moscow Oblast Administration	RP List	OHR	OHR
Andreev Alexey Petrovich	1958	Chief of Department, Cuban State University	RP List	OHR	OHR
Luntovski Georgi Ivanovich	1950	General Director, Voronezh Commercial Bank	RP List	OHR	OHR
Almyashkin Vasili Petrovich	1966	Board Chairman, Tatar Republican Branch of the Russian Disabled Society	RP List	OHR	OHR
Tiagunov Alexander Alexandrovich	1940	Chairman of the Board, Tveragrostroi Joint Stock Company	RP List	OHR	OHR
Gonzharov Oleg Pavlovich	1954	Chief of Press-service, Novosibirsk Oblast Administration	RP List	OHR	OHR
Narusova Luidmila Borisovna	1951	Docent, St. Petersburg Academy of Culture	RP List	OHR	OHR

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Skvortsov Vyacheslav Nikolaievich	1947	Chairman, Chelyabinsk Oblast Duma	RP List	OHR	OHR
Shokhin Alexander Nikolaievich	1951	Incumbent, PRES	RP List	OHR	OHR
Bugera Mikhail Yevgenievich	1961	Plenipotentiary Presidential Representative in Bashkortostan	RP List	OHR	OHR
Goryunov Vladimir Dmitrievich	1949	President, Rotor Sports Club	RP List	OHR	OHR
Popkovich Roman Semenovich	1937	Head of Administration, Krasnogorski District	RP List	OHR	OHR
Bignov Ramil Imamagzamovich	1956	Chairman, Republican International Foundation Interprivatizatsiya	RP List	OHR	OHR
Saifullin Insaf Sharifulloevich	1945	Technical Director, Kazan Representative Office of Elaz Car Works	RP List	OHR	OHR
Podufalov Nikolay Dmitrievich	1949	President, Krasnoyarsk State University	RP List	OHR	OHR
Alexandrov Aleksey Ivanovich	1952	Incumbent, 209	RP List	OHR	OHR
Ulbashev Mukharbi Magomedovich	1960	Chairman of Committee, Parliament of Kabardino-balkariya Republic	RP List	OHR	OHR
Strakhov Alexey Leonidovich	1942	Temporarily Unemployed	RP List	OHR	OHR
Sirotkin Vladimir Dmitrievich	1947	Mordovia Republic Deputy Prime Minister	RP List	OHR	OHR
Grebennikov Valeri Vasilievich	1946	Deputy Chairman of Executive Committee of OHR Movement	RP List	OHR	OHR
Petrenko Sergey Vasilievich	1969	Chairman, Stavropol Association of Afganistan Veterans	RP List	OHR	OHR
Paradis Alexander Lazarevich	1949	Deputy Head of Administration, Saratov Oblast	RP List	OHR	OHR
Altinbaev Zhakslik Kuantaevich	1945	General Director for Agriculture, Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration	RP List	OHR	OHR
Sharapov Vladimir Fedorovich	1944	Executive Director, Samara Diagnostic Center	RP List	OHR	OHR

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Galaziy Grigory Ivanovich	1922	Academician, Consultant to the Russian Academy of Sciences	RP List	OHR	OHR
Linnik Vitali Viktorovich	1935	Director, Department of Social Protection, Rostov Oblast Administration	RP List	OHR	OHR
Kuvshinov Alexander Ivanovich	1951	Chairman, Kuzminskoye Joint Stock Company	RP List	OHR	OHR
Goryunov Yevgeni Vladimirovich	1963	Director, Aster Medical Insurance Company	RP List	OHR	OHR
Zorin Vladimir Yurievich	1948	Presidential Envoy in Chechnya	RP List	OHR	OHR
Volkov Gennady Konstantinovich	1947	1-st Deputy Head of Administration of the Vladimirskaya Oblast	RP List	OHR	OHR
Mitin Sergey Gerasimovich	1951	General Director, Thermal Joint Stock Company	RP List	OHR	OHR
Tikhomirov Valeri Viktorovich	1944	Omsk State University Rector	RP List	OHR	OHR
Kuznetsov Boris Yurievich	1935	Head of Administration, Administration of the Perm Oblast	RP List	OHR	OHR
Ovchenkov Vyacheslav Ivanovich	1941	General Director of Vologdaenergo Utility Company	RP List	OHR	OHR
Kuznetsov Vyacheslav Yurievich	1956	Tula Business Center, General Director	RP List	OHR	OHR
Yavlinsky Grigory Alekseevich	1952	Incumbent, Yabloko	FP List #1	Yabloko	Yabloko
Lukin Vladimir Petrovich	1937	Incumbent, 111	FP List #2	Yabloko	Yabloko
Yarygina Tatyana Vladimirovna	1953	Incumbent, Yabloko	FP List #3	Yabloko	Yabloko
Igrunov Vyacheslav Vladimirovich	1948	Incumbent, Yabloko	FP List #4	Yabloko	Yabloko
Melnikov Aleksey Yurievich	1964	Incumbent, Yabloko	FP List #5	Yabloko	Yabloko
Dmitriyeva Oksana Genrikhovna	1958	Incumbent, Yabloko	FP List #6	Yabloko	Yabloko
Arbatov Aleksei Georgievich	1951	Incumbent, Yabloko	FP List #7	Yabloko	Yabloko
Misnik Boris Grigorievich	1938	Trade Union of Metallurgical/Mine Workers, Chairman	FP List #8	Yabloko	Yabloko

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Sheinis Viktor Leonidovich	1931	Incumbent, Yabloko	FP List #9	Yabloko	Yabloko
Yuriev Mikhail Zinovievich	1959	President, Interprom Industrial Group	FP List #10	Yabloko	Yabloko
Grachev Ivan Dmitrievich	1952	Incumbent, Yabloko	FP List #11	Yabloko	Yabloko
Mitrokhin Sergey Sergeyvich	1963	Incumbent, Yabloko	FP List #12	Yabloko	Yabloko
Don Sergey Eduardovich	1963	Senior Researcher, Epicenter	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Babichev Igor Dmitrievich	1960	1-st Deputy, Head of Administration, Khimkinsky District	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Moiseev Boris Alexandrovich	1942	Expert on Social Problems, Nevsky Research Foundation	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Karapetyan Saak Albertovich	1960	Chief of Department, Rostov Oblast Procurator's Office	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Mikhailov Aleksey Yurievich	1963	Incumbent, Yabloko	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Gitin Viktor Vladimirovich	1961	Financial Director, Tim-group Corporation	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Duryagin Ivan Nikolaevich	1953	Deputy Chairman, Oblast Trade Union	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Ivanenko Sergey Viktorovich	1959	Incumbent, Yabloko	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Shishlov Alexander Vladimirovich	1955	Program Director, St. Petersburg Branch of Strategy Center	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Kuznetsov Alexander Vladimirovich	1958	Expert, Central Trade Union of Miners and Metallurgy	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Malkov Igor Olegovich	1953	State Duma Deputy Assistant	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Sultanov Rinat Ishbuldovich	1954	Maimonid State Academy, President	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Glubokovsky Mikhail Konstantinovich	1948	Incumbent, 51	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Gruschchak Sergey Vladimirovich	1965	1-st Deputy Head of District Administration,	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko

Name	Born	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Schekochikhin Yury Petrovich	1950	Editor of Investigations Department, Literaturnaya Gazeta	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Zakharov Alexey Konstantinovich	1948	Yabloko Faction Chief of Staff	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Lukashev Igor Lvovich	1955	Incumbent, 72	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Sadchikov Georgi Mikhailovich	1941	Instructor, Rybinsk Polygraphical College	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko
Averchev Vladimir Petrovich	1946	Incumbent, Yabloko	RP List	Yabloko	Yabloko

APPENDIX VI: State Duma Deputies Elected from Single Mandate Districts - December 1995

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Senin Grigory Nikolaevich	1957	Furniture Workshop Head	1	CPRF	CPRF
Zubakin Semen Ivanovich	1952	Chief Auditor for Altai Republic, Rf Ministry of Finances	2	DCR-UD	Independent
Saifullin Alzam Tuhvatullinovich	1941	Deputy Head of Administration, City of Durtuli and Durtuli District	3	Agrarians	Agrarians
Nikitin Valentin Ivanovich	1948	Incumbent, CP	4	CPRF	CPRF
Arinin Alexander Nikolaevich	1955	Incumbent, 4	5	Independent	OHR
Shugurov Rasul Igdisamovich	1950	Director of Ural Collective Farm	6	CPRF	Agrarians
Utkin Yury Vasilievich	1939	Incumbent, 6	7	Self nominated	Independent
Saetgaliev Zifkat Islamovich	1947	Incumbent, 7	8	Agrarians	Agrarians
Naichukova Svetlana Ivanovna	1942	Zaigrayevskaya Poultry Farm, General Director	9	Independent	Agrarians
Abdulatipov Ramazan Gadzhimuratovich	1946	FC Member, Deputy Chairman	10	Independent	R/Regions
Gamidov Gamid Mustafaeovich	1954	Incumbent, 10	11	Independent	R/Regions
Aushev Muharbek Izmailovich	1962	Vice-president of Lukoil	12	Independent	R/Regions
Sohov Vladimir Kazbulatovich	1939	Government of Cabardino-balkarskaya Republic, Deputy Prime-minister	13	OHR	OHR

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Kulik Gennady Vasilievich	1935	Incumbent, AP	14	Agrarians	Agrarians
Yakush Mikhail Mikhailovich	1947	Karachai-cherkess Republic Legislature, Committee Chairman	15	CPRF	CPRF
Zlobina Larisa Afanasievna	1945	Karelia State Tv and Radio Company, Tv Reporter	16	Independent	R/Regions
Chistohodova Rita Vasilievna	1939	City of Siktivkar, Procurator's Office, Chief Aid	17	Independent	CPRF
Polyakov Nikolay Ivanovich	1948	Chairman, First of May Collective Farm	18	Agrarians	Agrarians
Medvedev Nikolay Pavlovich	1952	Deputy Minister, Rf Ministry on Co-operation with CIS Countries	19	Independent	R/Regions
Kornilova Zoya Afanasievna	1939	Staff Consultant, FC	20	P to P	PP
Dzasokhov Alexander Sergeivich	1934	Incumbent, 22	21	Independent	PP
Khamaev Azat Kiyamovich	1956	Director, Naberezhniye Chelny Experimental Mechanical Works	22	Agrarians	Agrarians
Morozov Oleg Viktorovich	1953	Incumbent, 24	23	Independent	R/Regions
Altukhov Vladimir Nikolayevich	1954	Incumbent, 25	24	Independent	OHR
Bagautdinov Gabdulvakhid Gilmutdinovich	1939	Incumbent, 26	25	OHR	OHR
Shashurin Sergey Petrovich	1957	President, Tan Association	26	Independent	PP
Salchak Galina Alexeevna	1949	Minister of Finances, Republic of Tyva	27	OHR	OHR

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Soluyanov Andrei Vladimirovich	1959	Grad Finance and Construction Company	28	Independent	R/Regions
Koshkin Michael Petrovich	1954	Minister, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Republic of Udmurtiya	29	Independent	Agrarians
Lebed Alexey Ivanovich	1955	Commanding Officer, Military Unit 20730	30	Independent	R/Regions
Suleymenov Ibragim Abdurakhmanovich	1953	Military Commissar, Military Commissariat of Chechen Republic	31	Independent	OHR
Agafonov Valentin Aleksevich	1935	Incumbent, 33	32	Independent	CPRF
Fedorov Svyatoslav Nikolayevich	1927	General Director, Eye Microsurgery Clinic	33	WSGP	PP
Danilova Nina Petrovna	1947	Committee Deputy Chair, Altaisky Krai Legislative Assembly	34	CPRF	CPRF
Vorontsova Zoya Ivanovna	1947	Director, #1 Altai Secondary School	35	CPRF	CPRF
Gerasimenko Nikolay Fedorovich	1950	Chairman of Committee on Health Care of Altaisky Krai	36	Independent	R/Regions
Vernigora Vladimir Sergeevich	1937	General Director, Altaivodomeioratsiya Joint Stock Company	37	Agrarians	Agrarians
Pashuto Vladimir Rostislavovich	1941	Territorial Trade Union Committee of Local Industry Workers	38	Labor Union	CPRF
Petrik Alexander Grigorievich	1941	Deputy to the Legislative Assembly of Krasnodarski Krai	39	CPRF	CPRF
Glotov Sergey Alexandrovich	1959	Incumbent, 41	40	P to P	PP
Zatsepina Nina Andreyvna	1948	Incumbent, 42	41	P to P	PP
Polyakov Yury Alexandrovich	1936	Chairman, Oktyabrsky Collective Farm	42	P to P	PP

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Tkachev Alexander Nikolayevich	1960	General Director, Agrokomplex Joint Stock Company	43	Independent	Agrarians
Sevastyanov Vitaly Ivanovich	1935	Incumbent, CP	44	CPRF	CPRF
Sergienko Valery Ivanovich	1946	President, Association of Businessmen and Industrialists	45	KRO	PP
Zhukova Nellya Nikolaevna	1938	Lawyer, Legal Services Firm	46	Independent	PP
Yaroshenko Anatoly Ivanovich	1937	Incumbent, 48	47	Agrarians	Agrarians
Tetelmin Vladimir Vladimirovich	1944	Incumbent, RC	48	DCR-UD	R/Regions
Orlova Svetlana Yurievna	1954	Incumbent, WR	49	WR	R/Regions
Shakhov Vladimir Nikolayevich	1956	Dalrosso Insurance Company	50	Independent	R/Regions
Goryacheva Svetlana Petrovna	1947	Deputy Procurator of Vladivostok, Vladivostok Procurator's Office	51	CPRF (#2)	CPRF
Manzhosov Nikolay Ivanovich	1935	Chairman of Collective Farm	52	CPRF	Agrarians
Govorukhin Stanislav Sergeevich	1936	Incumbent, DPR	53	Govorukhin Bloc	PP
Chernogorov Alexander Leonidovich	1959	Senior Lecturer, Stavropol University	54	CPRF	CPRF
Iver Vasili Mikhailovich	1956	State Duma Deputy Assistant	55	CPRF	CPRF
Kamyshinski Nikolay Akimovich	1950	Head of District Administration	56	CPRF	CPRF
Tsoi Valentin Yevgenievich	1952	Chairman of the Foundation Board of Far East Consortium	57	Independent	R/Regions
Korotkov Leonid Viktorovich	1965	FC Member	58	Independent	CPRF

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Grishin Vasili Dmitrievich	1954	Deputy Director, Zvezdochka Company	59	Independent	CPRF
Guskov Yury Alexandrovich	1936	President, Severalmaz Joint Stock Company	60	CPRF	CPRF
Zvolinski Vyacheslav Petrovich	1947	General Director, Nizhn'aya Volga Production Company	61	Independent	PP
Ryzhkov Nikolay Ivanovich	1929	President, Eurasia International Association	62	P to P	PP
Kuleshov Oleg Stepanovich	1947	Docent, Belgorod Agricultural Academy	63	CPRF	CPRF
Shandybin Vasilii Ivanovich	1941	Turner, Bryanski Arsenal Joint Stock Company	64	CPRF	CPRF
Shenkarev Oleg Alexandrovich	1947	Incumbent, 66	65	CPRF	CPRF
Churkin Gennady Ivanovich	1937	Incumbent, 67	66	Agrarians	Agrarians
Bucherkov Evgeny Viktorovich	1938	Incumbent, 68	67	CPRF	Agrarians
Kulikov Alexander Dmitrievich	1950	First Secretary, Volzhsky City Committee of CPRF	68	CPRF	CPRF
Tarantsov Michael Alexandrovich	1962	Deputy to the Volgograd Oblast Duma	69	CPRF	CPRF
Plotnikov Vladimir Nikolayevich	1961	Incumbent, 71	70	Agrarians	Agrarians
Aparina Alevtina Viktorovna	1941	Incumbent, CP	71	CPRF	CPRF
Lopatin Vladimir Nikolayevich	1960	FC Consultant	72	Independent	R/Regions
Ponomarev Alexander Mihailovich	1945	Docent, Cherepovets State Pedagogical Institute	73	CPRF	CPRF
Rybkin Ivan Petrovich	1946	Incumbent, AP	74	Rybkin Bloc	Independent
Gostev Ruslan Georgievich	1945	Incumbent, CP	75	CPRF	CPRF

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Merkulov Alexander Fyodorovitch	1953	General Director, Voskozavod Joint Stock Company	76	CPRF	Agrarians
Kobylkin Vasili Fedorovich	1955	Committee Chairman, Voronezh Oblast Duma	77	CPRF	CPRF
Laritski Vladimir Yermolayevich	1938	General Director, Avtokran Joint Stock Company	78	Independent	R/Regions
Tikhonov Vladimir Ilyich	1947	General Director, Shuiskiye Sitsy Joint Stock Company	79	CPRF	CPRF
Mashinsky Viktor Leonidovich	1949	Incumbent, 81	80	Independent s Bloc	PP
Shuba Vitally Borisovich	1951	Incumbent, 82	81	Independent	R/Regions
Ten Yury Mikhailovich	1951	Incumbent, 83	82	OHR	OHR
Turusin Anatoly Afanasievich	1934	Incumbent, 84	83	Agrarians	Agrarians
Nikitin Vladimir Petrovich	1951	Chairman of Commission on Budget, Kaliningrad Oblast Duma	84	Independent	PP
Burdukov Pavel Timofeivich	1947	Incumbent, 86	85	Agrarians	Agrarians
Pamfilova Ella Alexandrovna	1953	Incumbent, 87	86	PGL-RP	R/Regions
Zadornov Mikhail Mikhailovich	1963	Incumbent, Yabloko	87	Yabloko	Yabloko
Chunkov Yury Ivanovich	1939	Chairman of Committee, Kemerovo Oblast Legislative Assembly	88	CPRF	CPRF
Avaliani Teimuraz Georgievich		Aid to State Duma Deputy	89	CPRF	PP
Medikov Viktor Yakovlevich	1950	Incumbent, 91	90	Independent	R/Regions
Ostanina Nina Alexandrovna	1955	Aid to Deputy to the Kemerovo Oblast Legislative Assembly	91	Independent	CPRF

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Sergeenkov Vladimir Nilovich	1938	FC Member	92	Independent	PP
Melkov Alexei Konstantinovich	1940	Director, Ardashevskoye Limited Liability Company	93	Agrarians	Agrarians
Puzanovsky Adrian Georgievich	1942	Incumbent, 95	94	Agrarians	Agrarians
Bezborodov Nikolay Maksimovich	1944	Incumbent, 96	95	Independent	PP
Mikhailov Alexander Nikolayevich	1951	Incumbent, 98	96	CPRF	CPRF
Potapenko Alexander Fedorovich	1958	Incumbent, 99	97	CPRF	CPRF
Belov Yury Pavlovich	1938	1-st Secretary of Leningrad Oblast CPRF Committee	98	CPRF	CPRF
Grigoriev Vladimir Fedorovich	1949	Chief of Shift, Leningrad Nuclear Power Station	99	Communist s for the USSR	Independent
Vorogushin Viktor Anatolievich	1943	Director of Kitchenware Works	100	Independent	CPRF
Toporkov Vladimir Fedorovich	1940	Reporter, Soviet Russia Newspaper	101	CPRF	CPRF
Minakov Viktor Mikhailovich	1945	Deputy Chef of Regional Center, Russia's Federal Service of Currency Control	102	CPRF	CPRF
Tsvetkov Valentin Ivanovich	1948	FC Member, Committee Chairman	103	Independent	R/Regions
Men Mikhail Alexandrovich	1960	Deputy to the Moscow Oblast Duma	104	Yabloko	Yabloko
Krasnikov Dmitry Fedorovich	1947	Chairman, Zavety Ilyicha Collective Farm	105	CPRF	Agrarians
Titiov German Stepanovich	1935	Incumbent, 107, Astronaut	106	CPRF	CPRF

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Popov Sergey Borisovich	1960	Chairman of the Managing Board, Pravoporyadok Security Association	107	Independent	PP
Yushenkov Sergey Nikolaevich	1950	Incumbent, RC	108	DCR-UD	Independent
Stolyarov Nikolay Sergeevich	1947	Incumbent, 110	109	Independent	Independent
Sobakin Evgeni Yurievich	1959	Manager of Yabloko Election Campaign	110	Yabloko	Yabloko
Bryntsalov Vladimir Alexeevich	1946	President, Fereyn Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company	111	Ivan Rybkin's Bloc	PP
Voronin Yury Mikhailovich	1939	Temporary Unemployed	112	CPRF	CPRF
Savitskaya Svetlana Yevgenievna	1948	Docent, Moscow State Aviation Institute	113	CPRF	CPRF
Tikhonov Georgi Ivanovich	1934	Chairman, Soyuz People's Movement	114	P to P	PP
Pobedinskaya Luidmila Vasilievna	1949	Chief of Staff, Murmansk Oblast Administration	115	OHR	OHR
Kozyrev Andrei Vladimirovich	1951	Incumbent, 116, Russia's Foreign Minister, State Duma Deputy	116	Independent	Independent
Veselkin Pavel Mikhailovich	1948	Deputy General Director, Gaz Joint Stock Company	117	OHR	OHR
Nikitchuk Ivan Ignatievich	1944	Senior Researcher, Scientific and Research Institute	118	CPRF	CPRF
Seslavinsky Mikhail Vadimovich	1964	Incumbent, 119	119	OHR	OHR
Beklemischeva Olga Alexeevna	1961	Deputy Chairperson, Commission on Social Policy of the City Duma	120	Yabloko	Yabloko
Khodyrev Gennady Maximovich	1942	Chairman, Trade and Industrial Chamber of Nizhegorodskaya Oblast	121	CPRF	CPRF

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Maltsev Alexander Nikolaevich	1952	Deputy Chairman of Novgorod City Duma	122	Independent	Agrarians
Zelenov Yevgeni Alexeevich	1951	Deputy Division Commanding Officer, Unit 55017	123	Independent	R/Regions
Kharitonov Nikolay Mikhailovich	1948	Incumbent, 124	124	Agrarians	Agrarians
Anichkin Ivan Stepanovich	1938	Incumbent, 125	125	Independent	PP
Yankovski Arkadi Eduardovich	1958	Chairman, Novosibirsk Branch of Party of Economic Freedom	126	Independent	Independent
Loginov Evgeny Yureevich	1965	Incumbent, LDPR	127	LDPR	LDPR
Manyakin Sergey Iosifovich	1923	Retired	128	P to P	PP
Smolin Oleg Nikolayevich	1952	Docent, Omsk State Pedagogical University	129	Independent	PP
Baburin Sergey Nikolaevich	1959	Incumbent, 130	130	P to P	PP
Chernyshev Aleksei Andreivich	1939	Incumbent, 131	131	Agrarians	Agrarians
Zlotnikova Tamara Vladimirovna	1951	Incumbent, 132	132	Yabloko	Yabloko
Volkov Vladimir Nikolaevich	1948	Incumbent, 133	133	CPRF	CPRF
Zotikov Alexei Alexeevich	1939	Chairman of Committee at the Oryol Oblast Duma	134	CPRF	CPRF
Rygalov Alexander Andreevich	1940	Head of Mokshansk District Administration	135	Agrarians	Agrarians
Ilyukhin Viktor Ivanovich	1949	Incumbent, 136	136	CPRF	CPRF
Stepankov Valentin Georgievich	1951	Deputy Governor of the Perm Oblast	137	Independent	R/Regions

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Shestakov Vladimir Afanasievich	1938	General Director, Permtransgaz Affiliate Company	138	Independent	R/Regions
Zelenin Vladimir Mikhailovich	1936	Incumbent, 139	139	Independent	Independent
Pokhmelkin Viktor Valereevich	1960	Incumbent, 140	140	DCR-UD	Independent
Nevzorov Alexander Glebovich	1958	Incumbent, 210	141	Independent	Independent
Bratishchev Igor Mikhailovich	1938	Incumbent, 145	142	CPRF	CPRF
Shubina Tatiana Ivanovna	1950	Head of Administration of Proletarski District, Rostov Oblast	143	Independent	Independent
Danchenko Boris Ivanovich	1947	Incumbent, 143	144	Agrarians	Agrarians
Shakhrai Sergey Mikhailovich	1956	Incumbent, PRES	145	PRES	R/Regions
Yemelianov Mikhail Vasilievich	1962	Docent, Rostov State University	146	Yabloko	Yabloko
Borisenko Nikolay Ivanovich	1949	Chief of Bureau, Vibropribor Joint Stock Company	147	CPRF	CPRF
Katalnikov Vladimir Dmitrievich	1951	Chairman, Trade Union of Coal-industry Workers	148	Independent	R/Regions
Kanayev Leonid Mikhailovich	1947	Deputy General Director, Sam Ryazan Production Association	149	CPRF	CPRF
Yenkov Sergey Aleksevich	1949	Incumbent, 149	150	Agrarians	Agrarians
Romanov Valentin Stepanovich		Department Head of Energy Supply System	151	CPRF	CPRF
Makashov Albert Mikhailovich	1938	Retired Colonel-General	152	CPRF	CPRF
Tarachev Vladimir Alexandrovich	1953	Deputy Committee Chairman, Samara Gubernatorial Duma	153	OHR	OHR

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Savitsky Oleg Vladimirovich	1950	Chairman of Rodina Collective Farm	154	Agrarians	Agrarians
Morozov Anatoli Timofeevich	1950	1-st Deputy of Head of Administration, City of Toglatti	155	OHR	OHR
Maksakov Alexander Ivanovich	1936	General Director, Saratovtesstroy Joint Stock Company	156	CPRF	PP
Oykina Zoya Nikolaevna	1951	Deputy Head of Administration of the Saratov Oblast	157	CPRF	Agrarians
Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich	1943	Chief Military Expert of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	158	My Fatherland	R/Regions
Mironov Oleg Orestovich	1939	Incumbent, CP	159	CPRF	CPRF
Zhdakaev Ivan Alexeevich	1957	Chairman, Permanent Credentials Commission of the Sakhalin Oblast Duma	160	CPRF	PP
Gvozdeva Svetlana Nikolaevna	1950	Committee Chairman, Sverdlovsk Duma	161	Yabloko	Yabloko
Zyablitsev Yevgeni Gennadievich	1965	General Director, Urals Representative Office of Interugol Company	162	Independent	OHR
Gaisin Malik Favzavievich	1959	General Director, Joint Stock Company	163	Independent	Independent
Kotkov Anatoil Stepanovich	1947	Deputy Chairman, Legislative Committee of the Sverdlovsk Duma	164	Transformation of Fatherland	R/Regions
Karelova Galina Nikolaevna	1950	FC Member, Chairman, Committee on Social Policy,	165	Independent	PP
Burbulis Gennady Eduardovich	1945	Incumbent, RC	166	Independent	Independent
Selivanov Andrei Vladimirovich	1967	Incumbent, 166	167	Russia Forward	OHR
Abramenkov Dmitri Nikolaevich	1947	Railway Technical School, Trainer	168	CPRF	CPRF

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Lukyanov Anatoly Ivanovich	1930	Incumbent, 168	169	CPRF	CPRF
Ponomarev Aleksei Aleksevich	1942	Incumbent, 169	170	CPRF	CPRF
Pletneva Tamara Vasilievna	1947	Incumbent, 170	171	CPRF	CPRF
Bayunov Vladimir Alexandrovich	1952	Incumbent, 171	172	Agrarians	Agrarians
Astrakhankina Tatiana Alexandrovna	1960	Incumbent, 172	173	CPRF	CPRF
Sulakshin Stepan Stepanovich	1954	Incumbent, 174	174	Independent	PP
Lozinskaya Zhanna Mikhailovna	1944	Incumbent, Wr	175	WR	PP
Lebed Alexander Ivanovich	1950	Deputy Chairman, National Kro Council	176	KRO	Independent
Panarin Nikolay Vasilievich	1936	Chief of Department of Internal Affairs of the Tula Oblast	177	Independent	PP
Rozhkov Viktor Dmitrievich	1950	Deputy Chief of Organized Crime Fighting Section of Urals Economic Region	178	Independent	R/Regions
Raikov Gennady Ivanovich	1939	Deputy General Director, Tyumenneftegazstroy Corporation	179	Independent	R/Regions
Lakhova Ekaterina Filippovna	1948	Incumbent, WR	180	WR	Independent
Kazarov Oleg Vladimirovich	1937	Chairman of the Board of Bank	181	Independent	PP
Grigoriady Vladimir Stillianovich	1949	Incumbent, 182	182	Kro	Independent
Golovlev Vladimir Ivanovich	1957	Incumbent, 183	183	DCR-UD	Independent
Sumin Petr Ivanovich	1946	Chairman of Expert Council, Economic Problems Research Center	184	KRO	PP

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Pochinok Alexander Petrovich	1958	Incumbent, 185	185	DCR-UD	Independent
Utkin Vladimir Petrovich	1950	Incumbent, 186	186	KRO	PP
Kolesnikov Viktor Ivanovich	1941	Chairman, Tselinny agricultural and Industrial Company	187	Agrarians	Agrarians
Kurochkin Viktor Vasilievich	1954	Newspaper Editor	188	Independent	Independent
Mizulina Elena Borisovna	1954	FC Member, Professor, Yaroslavl University	189	Yabloko	Yabloko
Greshnevikov Anatoly Nikolaevich	1956	Incumbent, 190	190	P to P	PP
Vorobyov Eduard Arkadievich	1938	Retired	191	DCR-UD	Independent
Gdlyan Telman Horenovich	1940	President, Russian Foundation of Progress, Human Rights Protection	192	Independent	R/Regions
Golovkov Aleksey Leonardovich	1955	Incumbent, RC	193	Independent	OHR
Lysenko Vladimir Nikolaevich	1956	Incumbent, Yabloko	194	Pgl-rp	R/Regions
Fedorov Boris Grigorevich	1958	Incumbent, 205	195	Russia Forward	R/Regions
Boos Georgi Valentionovich	1963	General Director, Joint Stock Company	196	Independent	OHR
Khakamada Irina Mutsumovna	1955	Incumbent, 194	197	Common Cause	R/Regions
Borshchev Valery Vasilievich	1943	Incumbent, Yabloko	198	Yabloko	Yabloko
Zhukov Alexander Dmitrievich	1956	Incumbent, 198	199	Russia Forward	R/Regions
Borovoi Konstantin Natanovich	1948	Chairman, Party of Economic Freedom	200	EFP	Independent

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Bunich Pavel Grigorevich	1925	Incumbent, RC	201	Independent	OHR
Gonchar Nikolay Nikolaevich	1946	FC Member	202	Independent	Independent
Medvedev Pavel Alekseivich	1940	Incumbent, 204	203	89	R/Regions
Kovalev Sergey Adamovich	1930	Incumbent, 192	204	DCR-UD	Independent
Makarov Andrei Mikhailovich	1954	Incumbent, 203	205	Independent	Independent
Rybakov Yuly Andreevich	1946	Incumbent, 208	206	DCR-UD	Independent
Nesterov Yury Mikhailovich	1945	Member of the Board, Interlegal International Charity Foundation	207	Yabloko	Yabloko
Nikiforov Sergey Mikhailovich	1950	Director, International Ecological Foundation ESAT	208	Yabloko	Yabloko
Starovoitova Galina Vasilievna	1946	Chief of Lab, Institute of Economic Problems	209	Independent	Independent
Golov Anatoly Grigorievich	1946	Incumbent, Yabloko, Sdp Chairman	210	Yabloko	Yabloko
Shchelishch Petr Borisovich	1945	Incumbent, Yabloko	211	Independent	Yabloko
Popov Sergey Alexeevich	1948	Lawyer, St. Petersburg International Bar Association	212	Yabloko	Yabloko
Mazur Alexander Alexeevich	1955	Director, Petrovski Commercial Bank's Legal Department	213	Yabloko	Yabloko
Shtogrin Sergey Ivanovich	1948	Chairman of the Board, Logos Insurance Company	214	CPRF	PP
Zhamsuev Bair Bayaskhalanovich	1959	Incumbent, 215	215	Independent	R/Regions

Name	DOB	Occupation	District	Party	Faction
Vlasova Anna Petrovna	1941	Incumbent, 216	216	Independent	Agrarians
Oinvid Grigory Mikhailovich	1960	FC Member	217	Independent	OHR
Chilingarov Artur Nikolaevich	1939	Incumbent, 218	218	Rybkin's Bloc	R/Regions
Piskun Nikolay Leonidovich	1944	First Deputy Head of Administration of the Taimyrsky Autonomous District	219	Independent	OHR
Boskholov Sergey Semyonovich	1950	Incumbent, 220	220	OHR	OHR
Medvedev Vladimir Senergeevich	1943	Incumbent, 221	221	Independent	R/Regions
Lotorev Alexander Nikolaevich	1948	First Deputy Head of Nevteyugansk City Administration	222	Independent	R/Regions
Nesterenko Tatiana Genadievna	1959	Incumbent, 223	223	Independent	R/Regions
Gayulsky Viktor Ivanovich	1957	Incumbent, 224	224	Self nominated	OHR
Goman Vladimir Vladimirovich	1952	Incumbent, 225	225	Self nominated	R/Regions

APPENDIX VII: IRI Recommendations for the 1993 Parliamentary Elections

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Republican Institute (IRI) sponsored a 24 member delegation to observe the parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum in Russia on December 12, 1993. Under the leadership of IRI Chairman, U.S. Senator John McCain, the delegates evaluated the electoral process, identified the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and made recommendations for future elections. As a matter of policy, IRI does not make simple findings as to whether an election can be categorized as free and fair.

IRI's observation mission to Russia's April 1993 referendum led to a report detailing weaknesses in technical aspects of the voting process. That observer team's recommendations were published in *Izvestiya* and later introduced on the floor of the parliament by its pro-democratic members. A number of improvements suggested by IRI monitors following the April referendum mission had been adopted by December, including clearer guidelines on validation of ballots and procedures for replacing spoiled ballots by local election officials; increased security for mobile ballot boxes; revisions in the absentee voting system; and provisions for an orderly process of accrediting domestic and international observers. These changes demonstrated a willingness to reexamine the process and make modifications where weaknesses were found.

The 25 recommendations contained in this report will be forwarded to the appropriate Russian and American officials in a constructive effort to help Russia improve the process in anticipation of the next step, local elections tentatively scheduled for March 1994. There are many traditions in the current system that, although their origins lie in the old Soviet-style elections, have positive benefits when reapplied to democratic elections; for example, the invitation to vote, universal registration, and the efficiency and dedication of polling station personnel. IRI observers, however, found other components of the electoral process that hold the potential for abuse, such as the portable ballot box, an under-appreciation of the secret ballot, and ill-defined elements of the election law. In addition to specific recommendations for improving the electoral process, this report also contains suggestions for the institutional development of political parties, a free and independent media, and a legislative branch that can serve as a genuine partner in governance. The long-term development of civil and political institutions that support and sustain a democracy will be critical to Russia's transition.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The IRI delegation found the December 12 elections to be a significant, positive step forward in Russia's democratic transition that affirmed a commitment to the democratic process. The competitive nature of the campaigns waged by the parties, the interest displayed by Russian voters in the election process, the media access afforded differing points of view, the efforts of election administrators to add uniformity to the process, and the creation of a new constitutional order -- all signaled a momentous departure from past Soviet practices and habits.

The IRI observers applauded the Russian people for their peaceful and serious conduct in a potentially volatile campaign period. The Russian people also deserve recognition for their endorsement of a post-communist constitutional order providing a clear division of power and establishing institutional relationships. In the face of the hardship and pain found in any economic transition, the Russian people chose a democratic framework to move them beyond the paralyzing effects of the recent power struggle.

IRI observers found the campaign environment to be diverse and dynamic. The IRI delegation commended Russia's 13 political parties for their success, given a brief campaign period, in obtaining the required signatures to compete in the elections, and in recruiting and fielding candidates. The short campaign period, however, led to the issuance of an incomplete election law, the hurried appointment of a Central Election Commission (CEC), and a rush to create new political parties. Additional steps must be taken in the two-year transitional period ahead to secure the positive benefits of the election, minimize the negative consequences, and build durable democratic institutions.

Election Law

Issue: Russia's new parliamentarians revising the election law or writing new laws ought to bear in mind that their counterparts in other countries, with the benefit of deeper democratic traditions and the accumulated experience of competitive elections, still seek and find ways to refine the process. Whether by applying innovative technologies, meeting new procedural challenges, or relearning old lessons, the development of electoral systems is a never-ending process.

Although the current election law contains serious shortcomings, it is nevertheless a significant step forward in encouraging the development of democratic institutions. The short period of preparation for the December 12 elections led to a hastily assembled and inadequate set of election regulations. Many directives from the CEC were, in effect, new laws rather than interpretations of existing law. While this timetable obviously was dictated by the unique set of circumstances surrounding the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, future elections will provide the opportunity for greater advanced planning.

Furthermore, the CEC's maneuvering on the issue of turnout had little effect in the final analysis except to erode its own credibility. It was reminiscent of past practices in which authorities manipulated the rules to achieve a pre-determined outcome. If Russians are to have faith in their new political institutions, the process must be fully defined and respected by those institutions.

Recommendation 1: All aspects of the electoral process should be clearly defined by law in advance of the campaign period, rather than on an ad hoc basis throughout the process. The new parliament should revise and consolidate the current election law to provide a more consistent framework for future elections. The process of reexamination and amendment should be continued with successive elections.

Recommendation 2: Results of individual polling stations should be published locally, or otherwise made available for public consumption and dissemination, by the constituency election commissions.

Recommendation 3: Sample ballots posted at polling stations for the purposes of voter education should be unmarked. There also should be a greater uniformity of civic education materials at polling stations.

Recommendation 4: There should be a uniform method of marking ballots to minimize voter confusion and make a clear distinction between old and new methods.

Recommendation 5: A well-defined process of appeal should be developed and clearly defined so that aggrieved parties may readily have a method of recourse.

Recommendation 6: Procedures should be put in place to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot for voters utilizing the portable ballot box.

Election Administration

Issue: IRI observers saw a genuine effort made by national, regional, and local election officials to guarantee a fair process. Particularly impressive was their detailed knowledge of the election procedures. IRI observers found that the majority of election officials at the regional and local level had worked in previous elections.

Recommendation 7: Effort should be made to recruit new people into the process of election administration. Better training programs are needed for new poll workers who lack experience and to educate experienced workers on departures from past practices.

Issue: The accreditation of pollwatchers was limited to representatives of political parties, thereby excluding a large pool of prospective pollwatchers from civic organizations.

Recommendation 8: Civic organizations should be allowed to sponsor domestic pollwatchers.

Issue: Civic education was compromised because of the shortness of the campaign period. In addition, the CEC and constituency commissions should not be the only institutions that play a role in civic education.

Recommendation 9: Other civil institutions such as unions, newspapers, political parties, universities and schools also have an interest in providing civic education and should be encouraged to do so.

Issue: The partial and incomplete release of results by the CEC implied an orchestrated and selective release of results, thereby fueling suspicion of vote tampering. Such suspicions were not immediately disproved because many of the activities of the CEC were not open to the public, the press, or observers.

Recommendation 10: The CEC should establish a well-defined and well-publicized process for reporting results based upon a realistic timetable given the level of technology. The CEC also should provide access to domestic and international observers in the aggregation of results as they are reported from the constituencies.

Recommendation 11: The CEC should become a permanent and fully accountable body, with pre-defined terms and conditions of office. Every effort should be taken to ensure that the CEC is independent and free from political influence.

Issue: Eligible voters were counted at the end of the process. When the CEC released the number of eligible voters after the December elections, the figure was approximately one million less than the eligible voters in the April 1993 referendum, further fueling speculation about vote tampering.

Recommendation 12: Local governments are responsible for updating the voter registries before the election. Those numbers should be forwarded to the CEC before the election, not after, to provide a nationwide total of eligible voters upon which to base voter turnout before voting begins.

Issue: IRI observers were troubled by the potential influence of military officers in military voting. IRI observers also concluded that many members of the military were disenfranchised from elections in their place of official residence because there was no method of absentee balloting.

Recommendation 13: Members of the military should vote at civilian polling stations whenever possible. The system of military voting when no civilian stations are available must be reevaluated and a new system devised, whether at civilian administered stations on military installations, absentee voting, or early voting. Military officers should be removed from civic education and all other aspects of the voting process to avoid concerns regarding influence, and political parties and candidates should be provided greater access to military personnel.

Recommendation 14: Russian election authorities should continue to explore and develop other methods of absentee voting to allow persons in the military, students, or other individuals away from their district of official residence for a prolonged period an opportunity to vote on regional and local ballots.

Political Party System

Issue: The presence of plurality on Russia's political landscape is no longer questionable. What remains questionable is the degree to which democratic institutions capable of adjudicating societal interests can consolidate and overcome the legacy of past practices. Democratic institutions cannot be created simply by legislation, presidential decree, or a single election. Democratic institutions gain strength as they organize over time, broaden their public acceptance, learn from practical experience, and adapt to changing circumstances. Russia's transition, therefore, is tied not only to democratic elections, but also to the long-term development and strengthening of institutions necessary to support and sustain a democracy. The continued and active role of political parties in governance and in future elections will be critical components of that process. While the elections were a vital catalyst for party development, many of those gains can be squandered in the post-election period if parties fail to make the organizational transition to governance. Given the level of voter turnout in December, it will be particularly important that members of various parties in the new Duma demonstrate they are capable of working together to solve Russia's problems.

Recommendation 15: Parties should form institutional structures in the Duma, hold regular meetings, form leadership offices, recruit staff with technical expertise, establish caucuses, and coordinate with extra-parliamentary party structures.

Issue: Russian democracy is coming to life in the age of television. Methods of mass communication allow candidates to appeal directly to the voter, and thereby bypass much of the need for party structures. Party institutions, however, have many important functions in Russian society at this stage of political development.

Recommendation 16: Parties must focus on building structures at the regional and local levels to help develop party platforms, recruit candidates, and mobilize popular support.

Issue: Parties devoted most of their effort to candidate registration and the campaign period that followed, neglecting the fact that political parties have an important role to play on election day. While effective legal mechanisms guaranteeing an equitable political process may be provided by an election law, it is the competitive nature of a multi-party system that brings those mechanisms to life. Abuses go unchallenged when one party begins to dominate political life.

Recommendation 17: Political parties should recruit and train domestic pollwatchers to monitor the process, provide a disincentive for abuse, and conduct a parallel vote count to provide an external basis for judging the validity of the official count.

Issue: Many political parties found it difficult to generate interest and recruit members without clearly defined election dates. Parties lacked an organizational impetus when elections seemed a distant and uncertain event. With the scheduling of elections for December 12, parties were faced with the opposite extreme: approximately 30 days to register their candidates and 30 days to campaign.

Recommendation 18: Provide an adequate campaign period with sufficient advanced notice to allow parties an opportunity to make organizational preparations before the start of the campaign period.

Issue: IRI observers found the emergence of a multi-party system within two years of the collapse of the Communist's single-party monopoly to be a truly remarkable development. Particularly notable was the identification of many voters with a specific party and the striking diversity of the parties. The provision for a proportional ballot was an important measure in encouraging the development of a multi-party system. The minimum requirement of two candidates on the single mandate ballot and three candidates on the double mandate ballot similarly were important provisions that ensured competition on the ballot. These benefits, however, were mitigated by the absence of party identification on the single and double mandate ballots. Voters unfamiliar with the candidates but wanting to support a specific party were unable to do so. In addition, deputies not elected under a party label may feel less compulsion to maintain party loyalty after the election, making it more difficult for parties to provide discipline and play an effective role in governance.

Recommendation 19: The party affiliation of all candidates should be indicated on all ballots. If a candidate has no official party affiliation, his or her status as an independent should be noted.

Issue: The funding of parties became an issue in the campaign period and thereby detracted from the debate of larger issues because there was no mechanism to evaluate accusations of illegal financing.

Recommendation 20: A campaign financial disclosure law that reveals amounts, sources, and recipients of campaign funds should be passed by the new legislature, with periodic reporting deadlines during the campaign period and stiff sanctions for non-compliance.

Issue: IRI observers were struck by the noticeable absence of young voters. Political parties have a vital interest in recruiting and developing the next generation of leaders that will help their organizations become durable institutions over the long term. Young people usually are the members of society most open to new ideas, and often the most enthusiastic participants of political life, because they have more at stake in the future.

Recommendation 21: Political parties should make a concerted effort to recruit young people to provide them an avenue to shape their own future while developing the next generation of political leaders. Parties, for example, should include a youth program in their platforms, develop organizational components specifically for young people, and include young people among their candidates.

Print and Broadcast Media

Issue: IRI observers noted the broad spectrum of political interests participating in the vigorous campaign debate. Observers believed that political parties enjoyed equal access to unpaid television and radio, adequate access to paid advertising, and that media restrictions or cases of censorship ultimately had little impact on the public's access to information. IRI observers noted, however, that several news outlets representing views opposed to the government were closed during the initial stage of the campaign, and temporarily operated under government-imposed editorial restrictions regarding the proposed constitution.

Recommendation 22: The creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations that provide an objective yet critical source of information are vital institutions in the development of a free society. National and local government authorities, therefore, should resist the temptation to assert media control and, whenever possible, play a positive role in moving media institutions toward greater freedom and independence. As a first step, the new Parliament should redefine the relationship between the government and the media in a manner that allows freedom of the press.

Government Role

Issue: Boris Yeltsin embarked upon a campaign to consolidate his power with the issuance of Presidential Decree no. 1400 on September 23, 1993, which disbanded the parliament. Although some of Yeltsin's actions in September and October could be considered undemocratic, the end result of those actions was to break his monopoly on power and create a legislative body with a new degree of democratic legitimacy.

Under the new constitution, Ministers must resign from their positions upon election to the State Duma. A two-year exception to this rule is provided for Ministers in the new constitution's transitional section. This provision, however, still allows for potential conflict of interest regarding the conduct of ministers in the campaign period. IRI observers heard widespread criticism regarding the unfair advantage many ministers enjoyed by virtue of their office, especially as it pertained to access to television.

Recommendation 23:

The new Russian constitution prohibits a minister from serving in the State Duma. IRI observers believe consideration should be given to extending that prohibition to the campaign period. Ministers running as candidates to the State Duma should consider taking a leave of absence, or resigning from their post, upon registration as a candidate to avoid the potential for conflict of interest or the misuse of state resources.

Issue: In addition, conflict of interest issues are likely to arise in future elections regarding officials who misuse the advantages and privileges of incumbency to win re-election, unless there is a legally proscribed process for regulating their activity.

Recommendation 24:

The new parliament should pass a law specifying the allowable activities of elected and appointed officials seeking elected office. In addition, the range of allowable political activities for government officials who support specific candidates or parties should be defined by law.

Issue: Many parties identified the "Mafia" as a source of campaign influence for their opponents. It was often unclear whether those identified as such were true organized crime figures or simply new capitalists who had made a lot of money. In a society where the ownership of private property was prohibited for over 70 years, the latter is perhaps understandable, but Russia now needs to define what it truly means by the "Mafia" - those genuinely involved in organized crime.

Recommendation 25:

A law akin to the *Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization* act (RICO) in the United States, coupled with a high-level investigative and prosecutive office within the Russian government to concentrate on organized crime, could aid a great deal in bringing the true "Mafia" to justice. In addition, a politically insulated criminal justice system, improved compensation for law enforcement officials, and a strengthened legal framework, providing prosecutors with the necessary tools, would aid Russia's fight against crime and encourage popular faith in the system.

**IRI RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED BY THE
RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAWS**

The following summary describes the status of IRI Election Recommendations relative to the Parliamentary and Presidential Election Laws passed in spring 1995 by the Russian State Duma, the lower house of parliament, and signed into law by President Yeltsin. After each IRI recommendation, its status is noted in *italics*.

Mr. Alexander Ivanchenko, Vice Chairman of Russian Central Election Commission, commented on March 29, 1995, in a meeting on Capitol Hill, that "The report provided by IRI's international observer delegation served as the road map for the CEC in making improvements to the election law."

IRI Recommendations:

- #1: All aspects of the electoral process should be clearly defined by law in advance of the campaign period...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law
- #2: Results of individual polling stations should be published locally, or otherwise made available for public consumption and dissemination, by the constituency election commissions...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law
Included in Presidential Election Law
- #3: Sample ballots posted at polling stations for the purposes of voter education should be unmarked...
Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law
Included in Presidential Election Law
- #4: There should be a uniform method of marking ballots to minimize voter confusion...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law
Included in Presidential Election Law
- #5: There should be a well-defined process of appeal so that aggrieved parties may readily have a method of recourse...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law
Included in Presidential Election Law

- #6: Procedures should be put in place to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot for voters utilizing the portable ballot box...
Substantially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law
- #7: Effort should be made to recruit new people into the process of election administration; better training programs are needed for new poll workers who lack experience and to educate experienced workers on departures from past practices...
Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law
- #8: Civic organizations should be allowed to sponsor domestic pollwatchers...
Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (law does permit observers by election associations and blocs, representatives of candidates, international observers, and the mass media)
- #9: Civil institutions such as unions, newspapers, political parties, universities and schools should be encouraged to provide civic education...
Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (but encouraged by CEC Vice Chairman in meeting on Hill)
- #10: The CEC should establish a well-defined and well-publicized process for reporting results; the CEC should provide access to domestic and international observers the aggregation of results as they are reported from the constituencies...
Substantially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law
Included in Presidential Election Law
- #11: The CEC should become a permanent and fully accountable body, with pre-defined terms and conditions of office...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law
Included in Presidential Election Law
- #12: Local governments should forward updated voter registries to the CEC before the election, not after, to provide a nationwide total of eligible voters upon which to base voter turnout before voting begins...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law
Included in Presidential Election Law
- #13: Members of the military should vote at civilian polling stations whenever possible...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law
Substantially addressed in Presidential Election Law

- #14: Russian election authorities should develop other methods of absentee voting to allow individuals away from their district of official residence for a prolonged period an opportunity to vote on regional and local ballots...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law (although questions remain about the efficacy of the methods prescribed)
Included in Presidential Election Law
- #15: Parties should form institutional structures in the Duma, hold regular meetings, form leadership offices, recruit staff with technical expertise, establish caucuses, and coordinate with extra-parliamentary party structures...
Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)
- #16: Parties must focus on building structures at the regional and local levels to help develop party platforms, recruit candidates, and mobilize popular support...
Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)
- #17: Political parties should recruit and train domestic pollwatchers...
Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)
- #18: Provide an adequate campaign period with sufficient advanced notice to allow parties an opportunity to make organizational preparations before the start of the campaign period...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law
- #19: The party affiliation of all candidates should be indicated on all ballots. If a candidate has no official party affiliation, his or her status as an independent should be noted...
Included in Parliamentary Election Law
- #20: A campaign financial disclosure law that reveals amounts, sources, and recipients of campaign funds should be enacted, with periodic reporting deadlines during the campaign period...
Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law (notably, there is no mention of reporting requirements during the campaign, only after)
- #21: Political parties should make a concerted effort to recruit young people to provide them an avenue to shape their own future while developing the next generation of political leaders...
Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)

#22: To promote and encourage the creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations that provide an objective yet critical source of information, national and local government authorities should resist the temptation to assert media control and, whenever possible, play a positive role in moving media institutions toward greater freedom and independence...

Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law

#23: Consideration should be given to extending the prohibition on government ministers serving in the State Duma to the campaign period...to avoid the potential for conflict of interest or the misuse of state resources...

Included in Parliamentary Election Law

#24: The new parliament should pass a law specifying the allowable activities of elected and appointed officials seeking elected office. In addition, the range of allowable political activities for government officials who support specific candidates or parties should be defined by law...

Substantially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law

#25: A law akin to the U.S. *Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization* act (RICO), coupled with a high-level investigative and prosecutive office within the Russian government to concentrate on organized crime, could aid a great deal in bringing the "Mafia" to justice. In addition, a politically insulated criminal justice system, improved compensation for law enforcement officials, and a strengthened legal framework, providing prosecutors with the necessary tools, would aid Russia's fight against crime and encourage popular faith in the system...

Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)

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