

AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS PROJECT, PHASE III

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**POLICY REFORM
WORKSHOPS**

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Policy Reform Workshops

I. Introduction

In 1993, USAID/AFR/SD/PSGE contracted with the Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II (APAP II) held by Abt Associates Inc. and its partners, for a series of seven case studies to analyze policy reform programs that had a reputation for success. In choosing successful reform programs, the intent was to determine patterns within each reform process that may have contributed to their success, so that these learnings could be applied to future policy change activities. Useful findings and definite commonalities emerged from these studies, revealing much interesting information that policy reform programs -- whether initiated by donors or by governments -- could use to improve the likelihood of successful policy change.

Following these seven case studies, USAID/AFR/SD/PSGE determined that disseminating the studies and synthesis document (see Appendix A for a full listing of all documents produced under that contract) should be augmented by workshops in the field to more directly target potential users of these lessons, and particularly, to transfer tools that could be used in strategically managing policy change programs based on the findings of the studies. USAID then contracted with APAP III in 1994-95 to undertake a series of workshops that would provide a larger audience in specific regions of Africa with direct exposure to these ideas, results and practical tools. The workshops were originally scheduled for 1995, but numerous delays postponed implementation of the program until 1997. At this time, additional funds were added to the contract, enabling the expansion of the potential participant base. The workshops were scheduled to be held in East Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa. Three sets of workshops occurred in May and June of 1997. The following sections briefly describe the methodology, participants, scope of the workshops, and final outcomes.

II. Methodology

Preparation for the workshops consisted of the following steps:

- 1) Planning workshop content
- 2) Preparing workshop materials¹
- 3) Locating sites and facilities for the workshops, negotiating conference facilities
- 4) Coordinating with local Mission hosts for both country approval to hold workshops and participant identification
- 5) Identifying participants
- 6) Arranging other logistics as needed (i.e. participant sponsorship, pickups at airport, nametags, certificates, photocopying, etc.)

Dr. Catherine Reilly of Abt Associates prepared the foundation documents for the workshops,

¹Copies of all workshop materials used during the program are attached as Appendix B.

including trainer notes, notes on tools (policy diagnosis, political mapping, stakeholder analysis), the case study, and lessons learned. These items were reviewed by Charlie Stathacos and Carol Adoum, the two trainers, and also provided to Dr. George Gardner, USAID/AFR/SD/PSGE project manager, for comment and revision.

Workshops were scheduled as follows, and consisted of two two-day workshops at each location:

East Africa, site of workshop was ILRI in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Workshop 1: May 20-21

Workshop 2: May 22-23

Southern Africa, site of workshop was the Grand Palm Hotel in Gaborone, Botswana

Workshop 1: June 16-17

Workshop 2: June 18-19

West Africa, site of workshop was the Sofitel, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire

Workshop 1: June 24-25

Workshop 2: June 26-27

As had occurred in the earlier attempts to conduct the workshops, identification of participants proved difficult. The participants were to be sponsored by USAID missions and other interested organizations, and extensive personal contacts and persistent follow-up, initially by Mr. Stathacos and consultant Natalie Hanson, and later on the part of Ms. Deborah Leffert (Abt Associates logistics coordinator/environmental specialist) were needed to meet the minimum participant requirements of 8 per workshop.

III. Workshop Participants

The participants for each workshop were varied and came from many different institutional backgrounds, a fact that made for exciting discussion and useful cross-fertilization of experience.²

In Ethiopia, the two workshops both had a large representation from local NGOs, and also included USAID FSNs from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania, as well as a USAID direct-hire from Tanzania. One or two government officials also attended. No private sector representatives attended. A total of 20 participants attended these two workshops.

In the Southern Africa workshops, which turned out to be the most poorly attended although the original participant lists were relatively large, a mix of participants from NGOs, several local research institutes, and the local University attended. In addition, one individual representing a

²See Appendix C for participant lists for the six workshops.

private consulting firm and a representative from the Bank of Southern Africa also attended. A total of 23 participants attended the workshops held in Botswana.

The West Africa Workshops probably experienced the most well-mixed and dynamic sets of participants. Numerous representatives from the African Development Bank, the NGO community, USAID/REDSO/WCA, USAID/Guinea Conakry, USAID/Guinea Bissau and USAID/Mali attended, as well as government officials from Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Conakry (including two Ministers), and Benin. Local NGOs and research institutes were also well represented. A total of 32 participants attended the workshops in Abidjan.

As a side note, in spite of the information relative to the workshops that was sent out to announce them in which it was specified that the workshops would be conducted in English, four participants of the first West Africa workshop could only speak French. Fortunately, the trainers both speak French well, and so were able to accommodate this last-minute change (discovered only during registration, 15 minutes prior to the first session). They arranged to hold separate sessions for anglophones and francophones in the breakout rooms, coming together only for the case study group presentations and the final closure.³ In spite of this unforeseen situation, participants were happy with the workshop and conducted animated discussions and dialogue within their respective language groups.

Although participation and involvement in the sessions was high at all workshops, an interesting pattern emerged. If analyzed closely, it may reflect the issues facing various regions (or at least, representatives of the countries participating in the workshops). The workshops in Abidjan sparked the most intense and dynamic discussion, with those in Ethiopia experiencing slightly less discussion, and those in Botswana clearly less than the others. This pattern would appear to mirror the intensity of interest and dilemmas facing the different countries in those regions. The Botswana workshop participants, for example, seemed to project much less concern about how the government was handling policy change in their country, and were able to provide clear examples of stakeholder and consensus building already practiced by decision-makers. Discussion here was much less heated than in Ethiopia, where governance problems are evident, but where the participants seemed to be allowing the government some minimal "honeymoon" period. Finally, in Abidjan, discussion and conversation was extremely heated and controversial, seeming to reflect the feeling that stakeholder concerns and governance issues continue to be a key sore point in the region. It should be noted that the one participant from South Africa that attended the Botswana workshop had a very different attitude from the local participants; based on extrapolation from his participation, had the workshop had a larger proportion of participants from South Africa (and perhaps other countries in the region struggling more with these issues than Botswana seems to be), the dialogue would have been more commensurate with that in the other two sites.

³Translation of the documents, however, was not able to occur given the last-minute notice relative to this situation, as well as the fact that funds for translation (and interpretation) were not included in the contract.

IV. Scope of the Workshops

The workshops were prepared and conducted to lead in an orderly manner to the concept that policy reform cannot depend solely on economic analysis, but must also take many other factors into account, an approach captured by the label "*political considerations*." (see the workshop agenda, Appendix B)

The workshops opened with a broad overview of various theories of policy reform, and introduced the approach that Abt Associates created to analyze the policy reforms studied in the case studies in 1993 (see the Analytical Matrix, Appendix B). The first "tool" presented was entitled "policy diagnosis," an analytical tool based on partial equilibrium analysis using supply and demand curves to illustrate the impacts of policy changes. It emphasized the need for good economic analysis, but also demonstrated the limitations of a purely economic plan in identifying winners and losers of a policy reform program and taking into account their political interactions. Participants were then asked to prepare an economic analysis of the case study of the fictional country of "Zameroon" (Case Study of Zameroon, Part 1, see appendix B), present it, and discuss the various groups' analyses.

The second major tool presented was the "political map." Throughout the course of the workshop, the discussions of the case studies conducted in 1993, making particular reference to the Madagascar case, but also the personal experiences of the trainers and the participants, show that the leadership of a country responds to many different variables, pressure from different groups, and situations over which he or she may have little or no control. The political map exercise begins the process of helping participants to put some structure into this seeming hodge-podge of information, and they begin to see how paying attention to the *political considerations* of a reform program can be important factors in enhancing the probability of success. This section also introduces the important concept of the "policy champion," an individual or individuals, typically someone with high political access in the government, who can promote the policy change and influence other stakeholders, especially decision-makers. Introduction of the political map was followed by group work on the Zameroon case study, Part 1, to prepare a political map reflecting the situation described.

By this point, the participants in all six workshops were beginning to discuss beneficiaries, stakeholders, and the potential supporters and underminers of policy reforms with intensified vigor. In several of the workshops, participants had already begun to apply this to issues they were experiencing in their own "policy reform" situations, and discussions were becoming increasingly spontaneous and energetic.

The third tool presented, on Day 2, was the Stakeholder Analysis. This tool broadened both the participants' understanding of the influences of political considerations and other dynamics within a policy reform situation, but also provided them with the beginnings of information needed to actually *strategically plan for the policy reform initiation and implementation*. Later in the program, the participants prepared stakeholder analyses based on Part 2 of the Zameroon Case Study, as well as an "implementation plan" based on that information.

Stakeholder analysis builds upon the political map by assessing the position, intensity of interest, and degree of power and capacity of different political groups, organizations, and individuals to influence the success of the policy reform. It enables policy makers or beneficiaries to understand more clearly the results of not incorporating stakeholder perspectives into the planning process. It was also extremely useful to be able to use both local policy issues (often identified in reading of local newspapers or brought up by the participants themselves) to make these points more clearly applicable to their own environment, as in almost every case the case studies that were conducted in 1993 did not have representatives from those countries there who could relate to those situations.

During the stakeholder analysis presentation, group work on the case study, and final presentations, the discussions became extremely dynamic. In several cases, the trainer was able to draw out what seemed to be somewhat controversial policy reforms that different participants were involved in (either trying to initiate, or attempting to hinder), and use the stakeholder analysis to come to grips with the details of these "real-life" situations. The results were that participants went away already applying these tools and learnings to their own daily activities in ways that were clearly new to them, and with tools that could help them expand their ability to deal with the *political considerations* they were encountering.

The other major theme interspersed throughout the workshop included presenting the lessons learned and strategic recommendations from the Synthesis Report for the three phases of Initiation/Adoption, Implementation, and Sustainability.

Changes made from the first workshops held in Ethiopia in preparation for the workshops in Southern and West Africa deserve some mention. Several participants during the Ethiopia workshops mentioned that it might be helpful to have a case study that dealt specifically with environmental issues, as this was their area of interest. While for most of the participants this would not have been particularly meaningful, we were able to revise the existing case study to include environmental issues as part of the exercise. Therefore, for those individuals that wanted to deal with the environmental policy reforms as opposed to the agricultural policy reforms, the opportunity was available. Other changes included slight modifications to the agenda (given some timing considerations noted), and corrections to the various Technical Notes that, upon actual use, appeared to help clarify some elements. These changes were undertaken during the period between the workshops held in Ethiopia in May and the subsequent ones held in June.

V. Final Outcomes

The six workshops clearly met a need that was felt in the donor, government, and the NGO communities that participated.⁴ In the opinion of the trainers, more government official participation would have been extremely beneficial, as they are the ones most directly grappling

⁴See Appendix D for summary results of the evaluation questionnaire filled out at all workshops. Individual questionnaires are available through the Project Director of APAP III, Dr. Bill Levine, at Abt Associates Inc.

with policy reform and implementation, and the sets of tools and issues discussed appeared to be extremely relevant to issues each of these individuals was facing. In fact, the two Ministers from Guinea Conakry expressed extreme interest in having the workshops conducted individually for their Ministries, as they are struggling with policy reform issues and reorganization that would make good use of these concepts and techniques. More private sector participation would have also provided a slightly different flavor to the workshops, although in terms of usefulness the donors and government participants are probably the best placed to make immediate use of the sessions as presented.

An interesting sidenote is the way in which the NGO community felt this met their needs. In struggling to determine how these policy reform techniques could be transferred to their own situations, the applications for many of them were not immediately clear. However, the more the discussions were guided to center around the ways in which different stakeholder groups affect (positively or negatively) policy reform, and the latent power that they may wield with more understanding of their influence, the more the NGO participants appreciated these techniques. The trainers were also able to apply concepts such as stakeholder analysis to *programmatic* issues as well, giving them applications other than policy analysis that they were probably more attuned to. In pondering the likely application for NGOs for other, future possible workshops of this nature, targetted sessions related to how to use this information *from an NGO or other lobbying group* point of view would be useful. Although these issues were touched on during the program, time was not sufficient to go into any great depth.

One measure of the applicability of the content of a workshop is always the interest shown in taking the learnings back to a larger group and one's own institution, for potential application in a "real" situation, or to transfer the techniques to others with whom one works. In the case of these workshops, we found that there were very clear indications of the usefulness of this information based on inquiries for follow-on work or expanded workshops, or even targetted workshops requested to deal with specific issues in several governmental situations that government officials found themselves in. Interestingly enough, the individuals themselves recognized that if only one person in their organization is familiar with a technique, the critical mass needed to introduce new systems and ways of viewing problems is not enough. Several individuals representing donor organizations (notably USAID and the African Development Bank), and government officials from several countries noted to us informally that they would like to bring these findings back to larger audiences in their respective parent organizations.

The juxtaposition of referring to real-life policy reform situations and drawing on lessons learned from these cases, while simultaneously using the approach to address the actual policy reform concerns of the participants, was highly successful. Overall, therefore, the introduction of the policy reform approach of political considerations and particularly the tools of political mapping and stakeholder analysis were extremely timely and well-received by the participants.

Appendix A

List of Documents Produced under APAP II

1. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: A Synthesis of Lessons Learned*, by Nicolas Kulibaba and Catherine Rielly
2. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: A Manual for Agricultural Development Practitioners*, by Catherine Rielly, John Tilney, and Nicolas Kulibaba
3. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Training Module*, by Catherine Rielly and John Tilney
4. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Cocoa Marketing Reform in Ghana*, by Nicolas Kulibaba
5. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Marketing Reforms in Malawi*, by Nicolas Kulibaba
6. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Cereals Market Policy Reform in Mali*, by Ismael Ouedraogo and Carol M. Adoum
7. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Rice Market Liberalization in Madagascar*, by Catherine Rielly
8. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Fertilizer Reforms in Cameroon*, by Catherine Rielly
9. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: The Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform in Cote d'Ivoire*, by Jennifer A. Widner, with Atta Brou Noel
10. *Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Maize Marketing Reform in Zambia* by William Levine and Charles Stathacos

Appendix B

Workshop Materials

**2-DAY POLICY REFORM WORKSHOP
AGENDA**

DAY 1

- 8:30** **Registration**
- 9:00** **Morning Lecture 1: Introduction and Workshop Objectives**
- 9:45** **Discussion and Questions**
- 10:00** **Morning Lecture 2: Findings from Country Case Studies on Policy Reform**
- 10:30** *Coffee/Tea Break*
- 10:45** **Morning Lecture 3: Introduction of Policy Diagnosis Techniques**
- 11:15** **Discussion and Questions**
- 11:30** **Case Study Exercise: *The Political Economy of Reform in Zameroon***
- 12:30** *Lunch*
- 1:30** **Afternoon Lecture 1: Political Mapping Techniques**
- 2:15** **Discussion and Questions**
- 2:30** **Zameroon Case Study Work Session 1: Designing Policy Reforms
(Teams of 3-4 participants)**
- 3:30** *Coffee/Tea Break*
- 3:45** **Presentations of Case Study: Policy Reform Programs Designed by Teams**
- 4:30** **Discussion of Presentations**

Analytical Matrix

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa

| POLITICAL THEMES: LEVELS | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|---|
| PHASES OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM | <u>Coalitions & Mass Political Pressure</u> | <u>Donor-Government Relations</u> | <u>Political Elite, Factional</u> | <u>Bureaucratic Interaction</u> |
| <u>Initiation/Adoption</u> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consensus Building • Public Perception of Crisis • Previous Style of Adjustment Discredited | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perception of Need for Consensus • Donor Resources • Sense of Urgency to Act • Sequencing of Reforms • Conditionality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selling Reform to Politicians • Autonomy from Elites • Support of Elites • Clientelism • Political Management Skills | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy Champions • Critical Mass of Technocrats • Tactical Thinking • Autonomy • Parallel Markets |
| <u>Implementation</u> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protests • Winners/Losers: • Urban/Rural, Farmers, Military, Other Interest Groups • Compensatory Measures | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pace • Conditionality • Institutional Reform Strategies • Timing of Financing • Level of Financing • Tactical Thinking | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motivation: Ideas, Party, Donor Resources, Constituency, Ethnic Group, Diffuse Opposition • Duration of Regime, Legitimacy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity of Technocrats • Incentives • Effective Institutions • Technocrat Autonomy/Influence on Bureaucracy • Role of TA |
| <u>Sustainability</u> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compensatory Measures • Concentrated Benefits • Dispersed Costs • New Coalition | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply of Public Goods • Conditionality • Relations with Bank, Fund, USAID, Other External Relations • Resources | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutionalized Autonomy • Role of Ideas • New Consensus | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rules/Norms Reducing Discretionary Power of Bureaucracy • Reform Pace • Successful Institutional Change |


AFRICAN POLICY REFORM WORKSHOP
Training Notes on Policy Diagnosis

The first stage in assessing a policy reform problem is *Policy Diagnosis* which involves understanding the policies currently in place and recommending reforms, as appropriate. While this training course will focus on analysis of the political impact of these policies on different groups of the population, it is important to understand the mechanics of how these policies work. In Africa, the most common agricultural policies involve government interventions in pricing and marketing that affect the countries' trade patterns. Here we will examine specific pricing policies -- taxes, subsidies, or tariffs -- that create wedges between international prices and domestic parity prices. Policy diagnosis will enable you to understand why these policies cause the changes they do in the welfare of producers and consumers.

In conducting your agricultural policy diagnosis, select the two or three most important commodities, including the country's staple food and the key export crops. You can examine each of them in turn, using the simple supply and demand graph (See Figure 1). It is important to understand the relationship between the world price and the domestic pricing policy for the key commodities. In this example, we will use what is called "partial equilibrium analysis" to look at the market for just one good in the economy, the staple food, maize. If the country were self-sufficient in maize, meaning they were net exporters of the commodity, the price to both consumers and producers would be $P(s)$, at the market clearing price at the intersection of the supply and demand curves.

However, the country in question is a net importer of maize, since the domestic supply of the good is less than the demand for maize, in the absence of price policy. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of a consumer subsidy on maize imports. As you know, many African countries subsidize food prices for political reasons, such as the need to satisfy politically-powerful urban consumers, in addition to guaranteeing the nutritional status of their people. Let us look at the impact of this distortionary policy on consumers, producers, and the overall economy. These policies are considered price "distortions" because they always generate *efficiency losses*, where there is a loss (to consumers, producers, or Government revenues) that is not matched by a commensurate gain.

Figure 1: Effects of a Subsidy Policy on a Consumer Import, Maize



Impact on consumers: Subsidizing imports causes the domestic price for both consumers and producers to fall. Consumers benefit from lower prices. The demand curve represents the price consumers are willing to pay for each quantity; so a lower price produces benefits for consumers who were willing to pay a higher price but no longer have to. This consumer surplus is reflected by the area under the demand curve but above the consumer price. The increase in consumer surplus is measured by the quadrilateral, ADHF. However, there are significant budget subsidies needed to lower the domestic price from P_w to P_d , offsetting the gain in consumer surplus that comes from the lower prices. There is also an efficiency loss shown by the triangle DEH.

The impact of pricing policy changes on consumers is often a key political question. Food riots took place in Cairo, Khartoum, and Lusaka, after reforms lead to higher consumer prices for the staple foods. The ability of regimes to survive “IMF riots” is often cited as the key political question of adjustment.

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Concept of elasticity of demand: The responsiveness of consumers to the change in price will determine the cost of the subsidy to the government. If consumers are very price sensitive, the subsidy will be more costly. The responsiveness of consumers to price changes is measured by the elasticity of demand (the change in quantity demanded in response to the change in price).

Impact on producers: Domestic producers lose, as the quantity of domestic maize consumed drops from Q_2 to Q_1 . The farmers also pay implicitly for the subsidy because of the lower prices they receive. Farmers' income transfer to consumers is equal to the unit subsidy times total production, or rectangle ABGF, plus the profits lost by reducing output to Q_1 , as indicated by the triangle BCG.

There are efficiency losses in both the producing and consuming sectors. Because domestic resources can be used to produce maize more cheaply than the opportunity cost of imports as long as the domestic supply curve is below the world price, the triangle between the world price, the domestic price, and the domestic supply curve is an area of wasted resources. The production efficiency losses are measured by the dotted triangle BCG. The cost of the waste is paid by the budget, with no commensurate gains accruing to consumers.

Revenue implications for Government: The cost of the Government subsidy is indicated by the rectangle BEHG in the figure. The government must pay a budget subsidy on all imported maize, since the world price is higher than the domestic price. The total subsidy is equal to the per unit subsidy (difference between world and domestic prices, $PW-PD$) times total imports, Q_4-Q_1 .

Summary of Effects: In thinking about the importance of policy reform, it is important to have a sense of the inefficiencies of policy distortions, in addition to their benefits on different groups of the population. It is clear that the **total economic costs** of the subsidy policy are much larger than just the cost of the budget subsidy itself. Although consumers clearly benefit from this price subsidy on maize, their total gain is less than the sum of the budget subsidy and implicit transfer from farmers. The difference is due to the efficiency losses caused by the price distortions introduced by the wedge between domestic and international maize prices.

Impact on food Self-Sufficiency: In the above case of maize subsidies, by providing consumers with imported maize at prices lower than those in the international market, the country has reduced its degree of food self-sufficiency, relative to what would have occurred with free trade. With free trade, domestic farmers would have produced more of the maize consumed in the country. Of course the policy-makers were pursuing a different objective than self-sufficiency: that of lowering food prices for consumers. If the objective had been self-sufficiency, the country could have restricted imports and caused domestic maize prices to rise above world levels to the self-sufficiency price, P_s , shown on the diagram.

Trade Policies: In conducting Policy Diagnosis, we can also use diagrams similar to Figure 1 to show the impact of trade policy, such as limiting imports in the interest of food self-sufficiency, or export restrictions. Trade restrictions can be applied to either the price or the quantity of the commodity to reduce the amount traded internationally and to drive a wedge between the world price and the domestic price. For imports, the trade policy imposes either a per unit tariff (import tax) or a quantitative restriction (import quota) to limit the quantity imported and raise the domestic price above the world price. Likewise, trade policy for exports limits the quantity exported through imposition of either a per unit export tax or export quota. The result is to cause the domestic price to be lower than the real price.

If, for example, your policy diagnosis reveals that a trade policy is currently in place restricting imports of maize through imposition of a tariff, producers of maize gain because the domestic price rises above the world price. In response to higher local maize prices, production expands, consumption declines and the quantity of imports is reduced. Since the domestic price is raised, consumers transfer income to producers and to the government budget because of the duties paid on imports. As with the consumer subsidy on maize, efficiency losses occur in both production and consumption because the policy-adjusted price is higher than the world price, which represents the actual opportunity cost of imports.

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One key objective of policy diagnosis is to understand the welfare consequences of the current policy regime. The following summarizes who gains and who loses from restrictions on flows of imports or exports:

| Type of Trade Policy | Who Gains | Who Loses |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------|
| Import restrictions (tariffs or quotas) | Producers, Government Budget | Consumers |
| Export restrictions (tariffs or quotas) | Consumers, Government Budget | Producers |

Once you have a clear understanding of these distributional consequences, you are better prepared to assess the impact of removing the policy distortions and recommend changes in the current policy regime

AFRICAN POLICY REFORM WORKSHOP

Training Notes on Political Mapping

These notes focus on *Political Mapping*, one analytical technique that can be used to develop management skills for designing and implementing improved reform strategies. Host country policy makers and donors alike may find it useful to construct "political maps" or "policy network maps" to guide them through the often treacherous and confusing political terrain upon which they travel. Political mapping and other tools, such as stakeholder analysis, can be used most effectively when reformers view strategic management of reform as an iterative process. For instance, reform practitioners should not draw just one political map before reform is initiated, but should continuously update their analysis as new players enter the policy picture throughout the implementation and sustainability phases of the reform process.

While the work that has been done in the past on political mapping is useful in presenting the actors and institutions involved in reform, it has one major flaw: it fails to consider the *interactions* between the players. It may show that a particular political player supports or is opposed to reform, but it does not portray the interactions between different political groups or organizations in the process of the policy reform process. Interactive political mapping, a technique developed for this study of African policy reform, addresses this problem. A new type of "interactive policy map," which was designed for use in several of the case studies, is presented in this note. See Figure 1 which maps the dynamic forces influencing initiation of rice policy reform in Madagascar. What is original about this schematic is that it shows the dynamic relationship between different organizations and actors. One way for practitioners to clarify their understanding of the dynamic political forces influencing reform is to draw a policy map in three steps, as follows:

Step 1: Identify the Key Actors

The first step is for the analyst to decide who are the most important political actors on the path leading to reform. Key actors may include (but are not be restricted to) the following categories and sub-categories:

- Government
 - Office of the President or Prime Minister
 - Ministry of Finance (or Agriculture or any line Ministry)
 - Technocrats (may include policy champions)
 - Regional or local government officials
 - Political elites

- Social Sectors
 - Agricultural producers (Small or large farmers)
 - Urban population (Workers or Middle class)
 - Exporters, Importers

- Political Parties
 - Ruling party
 - Opposition parties

- Pressure Groups
 - Labor unions
 - Military
 - Farmers' associations
 - Chambers of Commerce
 - Ethnic groups

- External Sectors
 - Donors
 - Foreign technical advisers
 - Foreign companies and international investors

Step 2: Determine how the Key Actors Interact

The second step is to determine the pattern of interaction between policy actors. This can be done through field research, including interviews with the key political actors, and study of the country's political history, policy background, and current policy environment.

Step 3: Weight the Influence of Actors on Reform Process

Third, the analyst must weight each actor's influence on the reform process. The relative strength of the influence is indicated in Figure 1 by the weight of the arrows.

One method for identifying the key actors (Step 1), determining how they interact (Step 2), and weighting their influence on the reform process (Step 3) is to ask a series of questions grouped under four broad categories:

- (1) Coalitions and Mass Political Pressure
- (2) Donor-Government Relations
- (3) Political Elites and Factions
- (4) Bureaucratic Interaction

These categories describe the critical political interactions introduced in the overall analytical framework for the study of African policy reform upon which this course is based. Each category of political interactions deals with the political behavior of relevant actors as they conceive, design, and implement reforms. In the case of the first category, *coalitions and mass political pressure*, the analyst tries to determine the degree to which various stakeholders participate in the reform process. The analyst should first ask the following questions:

- ▶ Which groups -- from political parties, particular social classes, ethnic groups, or the public -- participated in the political process leading up to reform initiation?
- ▶ Which groups -- from political parties, particular social classes, ethnic groups, or the public -- had an interest in the outcome of reform initiation?

Donor-government relations, the second category, are especially important interactions when examining structural adjustment and other policy reform issues. Here, the analyst should seek answers to the following questions:

- ▶ Did foreign donors (or the government) take the lead in perceiving the need for reforms?
- ▶ Which donors were most involved in the reform effort?
- ▶ To what extent did donors support and participate in the design of the reform program?
- ▶ Did foreign commercial or government interests support or oppose the reform effort?

Examination of the third category, *political elites and factions*, focuses upon determining the degree to which political elites responded to the reform process as a unified group, and if not, how opposition expressed itself. Answers to the following questions should provide useful inputs into the policy map:

- ▶ What role did the Office of Head of State or Head of Government play in the reform process?
- ▶ Were there reform "champions" among the country's political elites?
- ▶ To what extent were political elites, including the ruling party, winners or losers from the reform?

- ▶ What role, if any, did the political opposition play in the reform effort?
- ▶ Did ideology play a role in elite perceptions of the reform ?

Bureaucratic interactions, the fourth category, focuses on the degree to which the bureaucracy plays an important role in conceiving, supporting and implementing the reforms in question. The following questions will assist with the appropriate positioning of this category on the policy map:

- ▶ What critical mass of support from technocrats is needed in order to successfully implement and monitor reforms?
- ▶ Are there a group of “policy champions” among the country’s technocrats?
- ▶ Are the bureaucrats and political actors mutually supportive of the reforms?
- ▶ What is the relationship between the bureaucrats and supporting donors?
- ▶ In which ways can officials exercise influence over the reform process?

These questions will assist the analyst in constructing policy network maps. The example below explains how answers to these questions formed the basis for the creation of a policy map for the initiation of rice market reforms in Madagascar.

Example: Initiation and Implementation of Policy Reform in Madagascar

Initiation Phase: The boxes in Figure 1 represent the most important actors at the initiation stage of rice reform in Madagascar. The thickness of the arrows illustrates the relative importance of each player on the outcome of reform. The role of the key actors and their importance in reform initiation are discussed below.

1) *The Presidency (consisting of the President and his top advisers):* It is clear from the policy map that in Madagascar, the Presidency is the hub of the policy making process (as illustrated by its position in the center of the map). In many other African countries, as well, where decision-making power is highly concentrated, the offices of the Head of State or Head of Government are absolutely central in the policy-making system. This map is useful in clarifying potential points of access to the Presidency which were necessary to have leverage over reform initiation. In the Madagascar case, the most important interactions take place between political actors and the Presidency, where policy reform is generated. The map indicates that economic crisis influenced the Presidency directly, and as well as pressure from policy champions and the urban population to initiate policy reform. The breakdown of the

state-based rice market system and the balance of payments crisis triggered an economic crisis that threatened the President's political legitimacy and thus put pressure on him to take reform action immediately.

2) *Policy Champions (a subset of both Technocrats and Political Elite)*: Policy champions, who understood the serious consequences of the economic crisis, put pressure on the President to reform, as illustrated in arrows 2 and 5 of the policy map.

3) *Foreign Technical Advisers and Donors*: Foreign technical advisers contributed to reform initiation by convincing policy champions of the need for liberalization of the rice market (see arrow 6). While the international financial institutions did make liberalization of the rice sector a condition for receiving the IMF stamp of approval and loans, the economic crisis and policy champions had a stronger influence on the Presidency's decision to reform than pressure from donors, as indicated by the strength of the arrows.

4) *Urban Population/Agricultural Producers*: Self-representation of the interests of urban consumers and rural producers through grassroots lobbying did not significantly influence initiation of rice liberalization, as indicated by the dotted arrow (4). Nonetheless, the President's perception that consumers might revolt in response to higher rice prices resulting from liberalization did influence his reform decision.

Implementation Phase: It is often much more complicated to draw a map of implementation than initiation. This was the case with rice reform in Madagascar, as the greater complexity of Figure 2, compared to Figure 1, indicates. Interest groups who did not play a role in initiation, but stood to lose from the policy changes, reacted to the reform in the implementation phase. Several new political actors appear on the policy map, including: 1) the ruling party; 2) parastatals; 3) traders; and 4) local government officials. These groups tried to subvert the reform process, as symbolized by arrows 10, 14, and 15 breaking the thick implementation arrow (9), the focal point of this policy map. Specifically, the President's party undermined the implementation of rice import strategies for leverage during elections; parastatals undermined the implementation of rice distribution systems; uncertainty about rice prices undermined participation of private traders in the distribution system; and local government officials undermined the implementation of rice transportation to avoid rice scarcity and exact rents in their area. Essentially, politically-based policy-making weakened the prospects for successful reform. Furthermore, anti-reformist ideology on the part of government leaders, other than policy champions, slowed implementation efforts (arrow 12). Donors and foreign technical advisers also participated in the implementation of the reforms (arrow 13) and concurrently monitored their outcome (arrow 16).

The analyst may also want to specify which groups *support* and which groups *oppose* the policy reform, rather than simply whether the group weakly influenced, influenced, or strongly influenced the reform, as the arrows indicate. However, this step could also be saved for stakeholder analysis, if the two are done sequentially (see below).

Combining Political Mapping with Stakeholder Analysis

Political mapping is particularly powerful when used in combination with stakeholder analysis. We recommend that you first make your political map which essentially involves identification of key stakeholders and their patterns of interaction. Once you have determined who the key players are, you are ready to complete stakeholder analysis by determining their *position*, *saliency* and *power/capacity* (See "Training Notes on Stakeholder Analysis"). When you assess each actor's power/capacity -- his/her political ability to influence the outcome -- you are essentially conducting the same exercise as dynamic political mapping, where you determine which actors influence the reform most strongly. Thus there is some overlap between these two techniques, when political mapping is used *dynamically*. However, conventional -- static -- political mapping often leaves out the important stage of stakeholder analysis that analyses the power of each political group. Political mapping and stakeholder analysis should be done, in tandem, for each phase of the reform process.

Summary of Usefulness of Dynamic Political Mapping

Dynamic political mapping is especially useful, because it illustrates the *interactions between* different political actors, organizations, and other forces influencing the reform process. For instance, in Figure 1, the diagram shows that the economic crisis caused policy champions to strongly influence the initiation of rice reform in Madagascar, through their impact on the Presidency. Most political maps simply present the different actors involved and indicate whether they supported or opposed the reform. In this training note, the addition of the interactive dimension to conventional methods of political mapping has made it a more powerful analytical technique.

AFRICAN POLICY REFORM WORKSHOP

Training Notes on Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder analysis is a tool for identifying the constellation of political, social and economic interests which may come into play in the policy reform process. It provides insight as to whose interests must be taken into account, the positions that they are likely to take on reform, their probable response to reform and its effects.

Political mapping and other tools, such as stakeholder analysis, can be used most effectively when reformers view strategic management of reform as an iterative process. The analyst should keep in mind that the stakeholder environment can be highly dynamic. Stakeholders change, and as a stakeholder's resources increase or decrease, so does its ability to influence the policy outcome. Thus, a group that at one moment is unimportant may (rapidly) come to have both the interest and the resources to influence the policy process. Therefore, stakeholder analysis should be repeated (a) during the early phases of the reform process, when policy decisions are being evaluated, deliberated and assessed for their probable effectiveness, and (b) periodically during implementation, when the effects of reform are being most closely monitored. Stakeholder analysis is also a useful tool for donors and host-country policy analysts during their preparations for negotiation of the timing, pace and financial support for the reform process.

To conduct a simple stakeholder analysis, the analyst must provide four types of information which can be easily arrayed in a matrix : 1) political actors, 2) position, 3) intensity of interest, and 4) power/capacity. The matrix summarizes the stakeholders' interests and position on the policy reform. Each is discussed, in turn, below:

Political Actors: This includes any social, political or economic constituency, party, institution or actor who may be seen to have an interest in the outcome of the policy or issue being analyzed. This information is essentially the same as the "key actors" identified in Step 1 of dynamic political mapping (See the list of the types of groups and institutions that could be included as political actors in *Training Notes on Political Mapping*). In selecting political actors, only those groups or actors who can mobilize resources for or against the policy change should be included. Overly inclusive approaches run the risk of making the stakeholder analysis tedious, without a great deal of added value.

Position: The position of key political actors towards the policy reform program requires an assessment of whether the actor or institution supports or opposes the program. As a first step, we can analyze positions using the best available information, using the symbols, "+", "neutral", or "-". This kind of information can be difficult to obtain because of political sensitivities and simple unwillingness of actors to reveal their true feelings on the issues. Positions may vary depending on how the proponents of policy reform present their program.

Intensity of Interest: This requires an assessment of the relevance or importance of the policy or issue to the actor's interests (High, Neutral, Low). Essentially, the intensity of the group's interest is noted here. The analyst should ask: how important does the group consider the issue? For instance, in cases of maize marketing liberalization, government-licensed buyers' interest in opposing the reform is often high, because they are the privileged beneficiaries of a protected economic activity. Another key stakeholder group, producer cooperatives, may also have a strong interest in supporting the reform which would result in higher prices for maize, their principal source of income.

Power/ Capacity: This requires an assessment of the political actor's ability to influence the outcome of the policy in question. This is similar to the third step of "Political Mapping" when the analyst weights the influence of actors on the reform process. This cell notes the resources that the stakeholder possesses that could be brought to bear on the outcome of the policy in question. The resources available to a given group may be classed into five types: 1) economic or material resources; 2) access to or control over vital or important information; 3) status of social position; 4) legitimacy; and 5) protest or threat of violence. In trying to determine economic resources, one might ask if the group has the financial resources to mount a lobbying or advocacy program either in favor of, or against the policy under consideration. Does the group control or have influence over some prominent sector of the economy?

With respect to information, can the group offer some special knowledge or information? Does the group possess special information that would be critical to the formulation of the policy or the decision-making process? The prestige or status that a particular stakeholder can offer may be critical to ensure that the policy receives adequate support. This was true with policy champions in a number of the country case studies. Finally, protest or coercive action is a resource that, if controlled and directed, can be an important asset to a stakeholder. A labor union will typically use the threat of a strike to achieve its demands, coercing the employer by shutting down operations of the organization. For instance, in the Ivory Coast case study, farmers belonging to the cocoa producers association blocked roads to protest the Government ceiling on cocoa prices.

Approach to Stakeholder Analysis: The matrix lists the interests that the stakeholder has in the issue or policy and the importance of those interests to the group. Analysts can obtain the information from a variety of sources, screened for their bias or authoritative integrity: interviews with the actors themselves, interviews with local and foreign political observers, media and secondary sources, public position statements of the actors themselves, etc. The approach is a systematic process that provides valuable insight for managing policy reforms.

To show how stakeholder analysis is applied, we can use the example of rice reform in Madagascar. In illustrating the political mapping technique, we identified key actors in the initiation stage of the reform process. The stakeholder matrix below represents a subset of those actors adding information on their position, intensity of interest, and power/capacity:

Stakeholder Analysis Matrix:
Initiation of Rice Marketing Reforms in Madagascar

| Political Actor | Position | Intensity of Interest | Power/ Capacity |
|----------------------------|-----------------|--|--|
| Policy Champions | Support (+) | High (future careers tied to outcome of reform) | High (direct access to Presidency) |
| Foreign Technical Advisers | Support (+) | High (professionally committed to technical aspects of reform) | Medium (direct influence on policy champions), but Presidency would not allow IMF/World Bank to impose reforms |

Policy Champions: The stakeholder analysis matrix indicates that policy champions, who had direct access to the Presidency, wielded considerable influence in support of rice reform. As the intensity of interest box indicates, rice reforms were highly relevant to policy champion technocrats whose future careers were tied to the reform outcome. The stakeholder analysis reinforces the important influence of the policy champions--who understood the serious consequences of the economic crisis--on the Presidency.

Foreign Technical Advisers: While not as powerful actors as policy champions, foreign technical advisers did exert some influence over reform initiation through their impact on local technocrats. As the matrix indicates, their ability to influence the outcome was medium, not high, because the Malagasy Presidency would not allow the representatives of the international financial institutions to impose reforms on them.

As mentioned above, it is important to repeat stakeholder analysis at different stages of the reform process. This was certainly the case in Madagascar where many different stakeholders who were not active in the initiation phase tried to subvert the rice reform process at the implementation phase, as illustrated in the implementation matrix below.

Stakeholder Analysis Matrix:
Implementation of Rice Marketing Reforms in Madagascar

| Political Actor | Position | Intensity of Interest | Power/ Capacity |
|----------------------------|------------|---|--|
| President's party | Oppose (-) | High (results of election tied to blocking implementation of rice import strategies) | High (direct access to the Presidency-center policy-making process) |
| Local government officials | Oppose (-) | High (rents earned from local taxation of rice financed local government, plus officials concerned about rice scarcity) | High (Presidential decree granted them authority to prevent shipments of rice out of their area during scarce periods) |

The matrix arrays the interests of a sub-set of the stakeholders who exerted their influence to subvert implementation of rice market reforms. Both the President's party and local government officials had intense interests in opposing the reform program. The President's party undermined the implementation of rice import strategies for leverage during elections; and local government officials undermined the implementation of rice transportation to avoid rice scarcity and exact rents which were used to finance local administration in their area. The stakeholder matrix supplements the political map on rice reform implementation by adding information on the stakeholders: their position, specific interest in the reform, and capacity to mobilize resources to influence its outcome.

Combining Stakeholder Analysis with Political Mapping


The case of rice reform in Madagascar illustrates the usefulness of doing both stakeholder analysis and political mapping. Political mapping essentially involves identification of key stakeholders and their patterns of interaction. Therefore, we recommend first doing political mapping, followed by stakeholder analysis. Stakeholder analysis fills in information on the intensity of the interests of the stakeholders and the resources at their disposal that enable them to influence the reform outcome. When used side by side with stakeholder matrices, political maps should be useful in helping to envision the relationships between the stakeholders described in the matrix. In turn, your stakeholder matrix should help you to understand the justification for the arrows on the political map indicating that a certain group weakly or strongly influenced reform. Used together, the two are powerful tools for analyzing the reform environment.

Using the Results of Stakeholder Analysis and Political Mapping

While these tools are useful for clarifying the political environment for reform and its potential effects, they do not prescribe a generic solution to political dilemmas surrounding policy change in Africa. After the analysis is done, the challenge is for reformers to craft the best strategy to fit the particular reform context. After these analyses have been conducted, the next step is to consider prospects for sustaining reform through the implementation stage. The premise behind this type of analysis is that all policy reforms will encounter antagonistic reactions which can be overcome more easily if policy elites develop a specific strategy for managing the reform process. The ten key findings of the African case studies suggest ways to strategically manage the reform process that will maximize effectiveness and sustainability

Figure 1

Political Economy of Rice Reform: Initiation Phase




Arrow Key:

- Strongly influenced reform
- Influenced reform
- Weakly influenced reform

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
Figure 2

Political Economy of Rice Reform in Madagascar: Implementation Phase



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Effects of a Subsidy Policy on a Consumer Import, Maize



Stakeholder Analysis Matrix

Initiation of Rice Marketing Reforms in Madagascar

| Political Actor | Position | Intensity of Interest | Power/Capacity |
|----------------------------|-------------|--|---|
| Policy Champions | Support (+) | High (future careers tied to outcome of reform) | High (direct access to Presidency) |
| Foreign Technical Advisers | Support (+) | High (professionally committed to technical aspects of reform) | Medium (direct influence on policy champions), but Presidency would not allow IMF/World Bank to impose reforms. |

Stakeholder Analysis Matrix

Implementation of Rice Marketing Reforms in Madagascar

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KEY LESSONS LEARNED ANALYSIS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS

- Political analysis is crucial to assessing the prospects of reform success and developing appropriate implementation strategies
- Seizing political opportunity can be crucial to the successful initiation of reforms.
- Risks of failure are heightened when policy reform will result in the displacement of entrenched political patronage systems and the suppression of politically-derived rents.
- “Sweeteners,” strategies designed to defuse opposition by compensating losers, raise the cost but lower the political risk of reform failure.

KEY LESSONS LEARNED INITIATION OF REFORM PROGRAM

- Political leaders' control over bureaucratic appointments and government structures gives them enormous power to mobilize elite support behind reform and distance reform opponents.
- "Policy champions" are instrumental in selling the reforms to the President, organizing reform constituencies, and brokering compromise.
- Build consensus among donors before negotiating with the government.
- Foreign technical advisers can play an important role in supporting policy champions.
- Close donor contact with host country technocrats leads to more successful implementation.

KEY LESSONS LEARNED IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM PROGRAM

- Policymakers' lack of understanding of market reform and weak intellectual commitment to liberalization may inhibit implementation.
- Reform is most likely to succeed when implemented by a strong and committed central authority.
- Donor conditionality is an imperfect strategic tool in reform implementation. Extent to which achievement of conditions is monitored (not to mention the impacts of reform programs) is limited.
- Complementary public policies that strengthen the environments in which the private sector and rural markets operate improve implementation capacity.
- Contingency planning should be a key element of implementation strategy.

KEY LESSONS LEARNED SUSTAINING A REFORM PROGRAM

- It is not sufficient to assume that political support will coalesce among the beneficiaries of reform.
- Policymakers and political leaders must work to mobilize stakeholders to defend the reform process.
- Commitment to supporting reform should extend to the medium-term. Commitment should take the form of:
 - Multi-year funding.
 - Support for monitoring and evaluation of reform implementation and impacts.
 - Support for training and capacity building in policy analysis through collaborative research, short courses, and technical assistance.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: DESIGN/INITIATION PHASE

- Craft best strategy to fit particular reform context
- Donor technical staff can present a variety of policy reform scenarios to governments as part of the analytical work conducted in support of reforms.
- Governments need to build consensus behind reforms and broaden support for reforms among decision makers early on. Donors can help implement this approach.
- Donors can sponsor public fora for building consensus among public officials at the beginning of the reform initiation process.
- Policy makers should strategize about stemming political opposition to reform by integrating "sweeteners" to compensate losers into program design.
- Crafting reforms in such a way that defuses opposition reduces the political risks of reform.
- Policy dialogue must become more genuinely two-way, in order to increase government commitment and ownership of adjustment programs.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: DESIGN/INITIATION PHASE

- Need for education of African policymakers, some technocrats and general public.
- Policy dialogue should be a mutual effort to define key programs and devise alternative solutions.
- Donors should reach consensus among themselves on reform and coordinate their reform programs.
- Identify potential policy champions who are well positioned in key institutions to lead the reform effort.
- Cultivate development of policy champions through training in policy and political economy analysis at the earliest stages of reform.
- Build local capacity to do good policy analysis to support reform programs. Need capable local technocrats to play a key role.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

- Maintain close donor contact with key technocrats. Effective donor support of implementation will be very management-intensive for donor staff.
- Worth investing in monitoring and evaluation of implementation and outcomes.
- Some unpredictability in reform path, which may require mid-course adjustments in strategy and implementation.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

- Government and donors (or other policy reform lobbying groups) should support high-level workshops in political, institutional, and economic policy analysis for those participating in reform programs.
- Strengthened potential reform beneficiaries, who have been politically weak in most African countries (farmers and traders), will assist policy reform implementation.
- Donors should promote the private sector's perspective, as it is typically underrepresented.
- Devise viable roles for scaled-back government agencies.
- Conduct publicity campaigns to clarify the content of reforms and the new "rules of the game."
- Governments need to defend publicly their reform agendas. Enhancing public understanding of economic issues can help sustain the economic reform process.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: SUSTAINING REFORM OUTCOMES

- Fundamental change in the role of government in Africa required.
 - Build capacity for effective implementation of reform programs (and monitoring of implementation progress).
 - Support efforts to reduce the autonomy and discretionary authority of politicians and bureaucrats, and shift to more rule-driven policies and regulations.
- Promote better governance in Africa by supporting measures which enhance civil society.
 - Support legal, institutional, and regulatory reform.
 - Promote civic organizations, business groups, and farm and trade associations (countervailing power).

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: SUSTAINING REFORM OUTCOMES

- Change from the “top down” pattern of policy reform that dominated donor efforts in the 1980s.
 - Increasingly participatory political and policy formulation process.
 - Broaden policy dialogue process by permitting a wider range of actors to put issues on the policy agenda.
 - Policy reform in the 1990s will demand far greater attention to coalition-building than in the 1980s.
- Sustainability of reform may be undercut by the inability to make policy changes in key macro or trade variables.
- African states must change from instruments of patrimonial political control to transparent, democratically based states.
- Continually upgrade and disseminate information on markets, policies, and regulations.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: SUSTAINING REFORM OUTCOMES

- Donors should be less narrowly focused on particulars of policy change, more on fostering the social and political consensus for sustainable efforts.
 - Promote economic literacy and help to shape thinking about policy reform.
 - Target educational and advocacy efforts to government officials, media, unions, consumers, farmers, agribusiness entrepreneurs, etc.
- African countries need to undergo transition from state-dominated to market-based, private sector-led economies. Government and donors can assist through:
 - Helping to develop a public sector capacity to support and facilitate agricultural market development.
 - Helping to craft a regulatory and legal framework that supports commercial agriculture.
 - Providing funds and TA for public goods, such as infrastructure, agricultural research, MIS, public sector capacity to monitor and evaluate reform.

AFRICAN POLICY REFORM WORKSHOP

Teaching Case Part 1: The Political Economy of Reform in Zameroon

The Reform Setting

Zameroon has just celebrated the 25th anniversary of its independence from France. President Appollinaire Coulibaly, the country's Dictator for a quarter of a century, used the lavish ceremonies as a platform for this year's Presidential election, the first multi-party campaign in the country's history. "1989 marks an important turning point in the history of Zameroon," he boomed to his Government, military officers and *sous-officiers*, the civil service, and Zameroonian National United Party (ZUNIP) faithfuls whom he had bussed in from his home province to attend the gala. His lengthy speech continued:

"This year, Zameroonians from urban Labidjala to the rural villages of the Zimumbashi province will choose freely and fairly the right leader to guide them into the new decade. As you know, I am one of the few leaders in the region to agree to open up the political process to all political parties during my tenure as Head of State. If elected, I will introduce policy reforms that will generate fast economic growth benefitting the majority of the people of Zameroon."

While the crowd applauded politely, European diplomats attending the festivities noted the skeptical faces of many Zameroonians who whispered in each others ears, as they clapped. No doubt, they wondered how their President could miraculously deliver on his promises to improve their standard of living, after decades of presiding over a command economy.

On the other side of town, the key opposition candidate, Zameroon Party for Change (ZPC) leader, Pascal Oumar Lonaré, presided over a parallel celebration with a much higher turnout. Crowds of fans sweltered in Labidjala's hot midday sun. Young ZPC supporters passed out local palm wine and *Lonaré pour un Changement* buttons, a sharp contrast to the official ceremonies at the *Palais du Congres*, where elite Zameroonians sipped Dom Perignon. The mood was upbeat and casual. Candidate Lonaré, a great orator, lambasted his opponent's management of the economy:

"The Zameroonian economy is in shambles, after 25 years of mismanagement by Coulibaly and his cronies. The state has dominated all aspects of the economy, especially our valuable agriculture sector. After over 2 decades of Government-fixed prices and wasteful subsidies, our country's debt is one of the highest in the region. Our foreign aid increases every year, when we should be minimizing our dependence on the West."¹

¹Assume that candidate Lonaré's portrait of the economy, including his statistics, are accurate.

Economic reform was the central theme of the ZPC. Candidate Lonaré relied heavily on his younger sister for economic advice, who had just completed a mid-career course on Agriculture and Macro-economic Adjustment at the Kennedy School of Government, at Harvard University. As an archeologist and founder of one of the country's most successful opposition newspapers, Lonaré preferred words to equations. His sharp mind and uncanny political sense enabled him to quickly grasp the essence of his country's economic problems and artfully use them to his political advantage. He debated with his sister over the impact of economic adjustment measures on the majority of the population. "What about the social costs of adjustment?" he would ask her, being particularly concerned about the welfare of small-holder cocoa farmers from his home province.

In a world that was rapidly eschewing one party states, Zameroonians began mounting growing pressure to end the ZUNIP monopoly on power. Given the country's economic state, the Party was in a poor position to resist this surge of sentiment. Supporters of the ZPC represented an eclectic collection of interests, unified more by their desire for change, than by a well-articulated party philosophy. The Labidjala population, from the poorest of townsmen, to the most prosperous of professionals and businessmen, rallied around Coulibaly's call for change in the status quo. Of the urban population, it was only the political elite and career civil servants who felt their jobs were at stake and thus resisted the appeal of the ZPC. Small cocoa farmers rallied behind their native son, Lonaré. Nearly each weekend, the candidate visited his family's modest cocoa plantation in their home village. His aging father had recently begun to play an important role in the Cocoa Producers Association which was demanding higher prices for their product and a more transparent marketing system.

Key Demographic and Economic Facts

Zameroon is quite diverse climatically, with three main agro-ecological zones, the rain forest in the south bordered by the Zamarian Sea, the savanna in the central provinces, and the dry Sahara desert in the North. According to the 1985 census, Zameroon's population is approximately 14 million, 50 % of whom are under 18 years old.

Lonaré was not exaggerating about the sorry state of the Zameroonian economy. Average economic growth was less than 1% between 1965 and 1989, and was negative for several years during the 1980s. Although the World Bank classifies Zameroon as a lower-middle income economy, with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of \$610, this doesn't change the fact that the majority of Zameroonians earn less than \$400 per year. It is the much higher incomes from mineral wealth of a tiny minority of the population which skew the average GDP figure upwards.

This unequal distribution of income has created a great deal of resentment among the population, especially the young unemployed population, who claim that the Government favoritism toward French diamond companies blocks them from participating in the mining sector.

Zameroon's currency, the FCFA, is tied to the value of the French franc which is widely believed to be overvalued. Average annual inflation between 1980-88 was relatively low, 3.6%.

In 1988, the Government spent 17% of its total expenditure on defense, a figure that candidate Lonaré has promised to slash, through trimming what he calls "unnecessary benefits" for the highest-ranking officers.

Agricultural Sector

Zameroon's principle export crop is cocoa. ZCMB, the state marketing board, has controlled cocoa pricing and marketing since colonial times, ostensibly for price stabilization purposes.² Essentially, ZCMB has acted as a fiscal arm of the Government. The cocoa tax is used both for input subsidies and other government expenditures on agriculture, especially subsidies to rice producers. The Government has argued that subsidized inputs, such as *pepinieres* (cocoa seedlings), pesticides, phyto-sanitary treatments, and tools (machetes, files, watering cans) offset low real producer prices. On the ground, farmers know that distribution of these inputs is done on an ad hoc preferential basis. Larger farmers who can afford to "reward" the ZCMB extension agents who distribute the goods for their services tend to receive the inputs first -- and more of them -- as do those farmers with political ties to local government officials.

Low cocoa prices have devastated cocoa production in Zameroon, once the world's third largest producer. Production has stagnated over the past decade (See Annex 2, "Cocoa Production"). The average age of cocoa plantations is 25 years, with many older farmers maintaining plantations over 30 years old. With few incentives to plant new trees, younger farmers have shifted instead into production of high-value garden crops (*cultures maraichères*) and staple food crops. The quality of Zameroonian cocoa has also deteriorated over the years, partly because state-licensed buying agents reportedly accept bribes in exchange for grading cocoa the highest or second highest grade, rather than *hors standard* (below standard), a grade for which the country receives lower than international market prices.

²The head of ZCMB is a member of ZUNIP's Central Committee.

Like many of his fellow long-standing Presidents in the region, President Coulibaly has mollified the urban population by subsidizing consumer prices of the staple food. City dwellers have come to expect cheap rice as the right of all Zameroonian citizens. The cost of the subsidy has been astronomical (see Annex 3, "Consumer Subsidies of Rice"). The President, who comes from the heart of the rice-producing zone, has also maintained the political support of food farmers by subsidizing producer prices, in the name of food self sufficiency. During the 1970s when Zameroon was closely allied with the former Soviet Union, the Coulibaly Government played up the food security argument.

Even with subsidies on prices, irrigation, and production inputs (i.e., fertilizer, pesticide, tools), Zameroonian farmers do not produce enough rice to feed the population, largely due to marketing constraints. As a result, Zameroon imports approximately one quarter of total rice consumed from Thailand. Even with the cost of transportation from Bangkok to the nearest port in neighboring Kozambique, plus the cost of trucking the rice from the port to Labidjala, it was cheaper for the Government to import rice than to buy it from local Zameroonian farmers. Transporting domestic rice on the nation's poor quality, poorly maintained roads contributes to the high cost. Marketing and distribution of domestically-produced rice is a logistical nightmare. The major rice producing region, Daroua, in the far north of the country, is over 1000 kilometers from the major consumption center, Labidjala.

In addition, Zameroon has a large mangrove zone off of its southern coast where rice is also produced. Zameroonian farmers living in the small surrounding villages have had great skill for centuries in managing water flow in the mangroves for rice cultivation. In addition, farmers have undertaken timbering activities, using the wood products of the mangrove for their daily firewood, tools, and craftsman needs. Even the traditional healers have utilized the plantlife and vegetation of the mangrove zone to make healing and ceremonial herbal concoctions. However, Zameroonian farmers are now overexploiting the mangrove zone, mostly due to an exorbitant demand for firewood, and the long-term sustainability of the mangrove zone is in danger.

Being the agricultural genius that she was, candidate Lonaré's sister had taught him about all the benefits of managing mangroves in a sustainable way. He was well aware of the benefits which conservation and sustainable management could provide to the environment, human welfare, and human health. The challenge ahead of him was to convince the village people that they would still be able to fully utilize the treasures of the mangrove (or wood), even if they were to change their cutting methods.

Mining

Zameroon produces diamonds and other precious stones. The French have been heavily involved in mining since colonial times. The Directeur-Général of the National Diamond Company (ZSPD) is French; exclusively French technology and equipment is used in exploration and production; and all ZSPD engineers are either French or trained in France. The French hold a majority share of ZSPB. Government critics allege that this preferential status rewards the French for supporting the Coulibaly regime.

Relationship with Donors

In the early 1980s when it was desperately in need of balance of payments support, the Government of Zameroon began to quietly negotiate a stand-by agreement with the IMF. The first structural adjustment loan was conditional upon the Government adopting policies which reflected greater autonomy and eventual decontrol of parastatals (including ZCMB, the national cocoa marketing board), decontrol of agricultural producer prices, and the end of consumer subsidies, while duly recognizing the need for food security among Zameroon's poor. When one frustrated ZUNIP member leaked news of the threat to rice subsidies to the press, riots erupted in the streets of Labidjala. Fearful of his shaky hold on political power, President Coulibaly immediately ended the negotiations, and shortly thereafter cut off relations with the IMF/World Bank.

Assignment: Assess the current state of the Zameroonian economy, especially the agricultural sector; write memo recommending policy reforms most likely to correct economic distortions, using policy diagnosis techniques; and propose strategy for initiating reforms.

ANNEXES

- 1. Level of Foreign Aid**
- 2. Cocoa Production in Zamaron**
- 3. Cost of Consumer Subsidies on Rice**
- 4. Impacts of a Mangrove Sustainable Management Plan**

ANNEX 1
LEVEL OF FOREIGN AID
(1988)

| Donor | Funding Levels (Million CFA) |
|----------------|---|
| USAID | 60,688 |
| CCCE France | 192,000 |
| Switzerland | 2,548 |
| Germany | 45,833 |
| Denmark | 8,189 |
| Canada | 60,620 |
| United Kingdom | 3250 |
| Belgium | 1760 |
| Japan | 7642 |
| Saudi Arabia | 5451 |
| IFAD | 8,860 |
| AFDB | 63,254 |
| FED | 20,016 |
| UNDP | 6,247 |

ANNEX 2
COCOA PRODUCTION IN ZAMEROON
(1970-1988)

| Year | (000 Metric Tons) |
|-------------|--------------------------|
| 1970 | 202 |
| 1975 | 163 |
| 1978 | 139 |
| 1979 | 136 |
| 1980 | 129 |
| 1981 | 133 |
| 1982 | 130 |
| 1983 | 135 |
| 1984 | 132 |
| 1985 | 128 |
| 1986 | 131 |
| 1987 | 129 |
| 1988 | 127 |

ANNEX 3
COST OF CONSUMER SUBSIDIES ON RICE

| Year | US Dollars (Millions) |
|-------------|------------------------------|
| 1979 | 78 |
| 1980 | 80 |
| 1981 | 84 |
| 1982 | 88 |
| 1983 | 92 |
| 1984 | 95 |
| 1985 | 98 |
| 1986 | 102 |
| 1987 | 107 |

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ANNEX 4

IMPACTS OF A MANGROVE SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT PLAN

Environmental Resource

- ▶ Preserved biodiversity of the mangroves, as well as the biodiversity of marine ecosystems for which the mangroves provide habitat, nutrients, and protection from sedimentation.
- ▶ Increased habitat for migratory birds.
- ▶ Beneficial source of medicinal plants.

Human Welfare

- ▶ Sustainable flow of forest products, including wood products such as roundwood, poles, fuelwood, and charcoal, and nonwood products, such as nipa pal shingles, bark for tannin, traditional foods, dyes and resins.
- ▶ Sustainable fisheries, both mangrove fisheries and nearby marine fisheries, for which the mangroves provide nutrients and serve as spawning grounds and nurseries (mangrove fisheries include finfish and crustaceans).
- ▶ Recreation (including ecotourism) for visitors to the mangroves. Mangroves also enhance recreation for snorkelers and scuba divers in offshore sea grasses and coral reefs by filtering out sedimentation.
- ▶ Protection of freshwater supplies (inland aquifers) from salinization, by serving as a groundwater pump and barrier between the aquifers and the sea.
- ▶ Nonuse benefits, including existence and bequest values related to the preservation of natural environments for locals and tourists.

Human Health

- ▶ Increased safety and protection from coastal storms and tidal waves due to the mangroves serving as a buffer.
- ▶ Improved health due to medicinal plants and foodstuffs in the mangrove areas.

AFRICAN POLICY REFORM WORKSHOP

Teaching Case Part 2 : Implementation of Policy Reform in Zameroon

Pascal Oumar Lonaré won the election by a relatively slim margin, carrying 51 % of the popular vote, compared to the incumbent's 47%. The remaining 2 % of Zameroonians voted for a third party candidate. According to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and other independent elections observers, the election was relatively free and fair.

Considering the groundswell of opposition to over two decades of corruption and nepotism under Coulibaly, many Zameroonians were surprised that Lonaré did not win the landslide that was predicted. Election analysts argued that many voters had turned against Lonaré at the last minute, fearful of the consequences of the economic reform program central to his campaign. Residents of the rice-producers zone voted overwhelmingly in favor of the incumbent, as did civil servants and cocoa buyers.

With economic reform as his central campaign theme, Lonaré felt pressure to deliver on his promises. In his inaugural address, he pledged to initiate reform of the rice sector in the first 90 days of his rule, including cutting subsidies to both consumers and producers. This promise earned him the favor of the IMF/World Bank technocrats who were delighted with Lonaré's victory. For years, liberalization of the rice sector and higher real producer prices for cocoa had been conditions for a major structural adjustment loan. In his campaign, Lonaré had pledged to renew relations with the international financial institutions. This was a risky stance to take with a population heavily weighted in favor of youth who had led criticism of the Government in the early 80s for capitulating to Western imperialists when it first entered into negotiations with the IMF.

Lonaré was delighted to announce to his constituency of cocoa farmers that he was liberalizing pricing and marketing of the nation's most important export crop. ZASBA, the Zameroonian Association for Licensed Buying agents, had already written a letter to the editor of the opposition paper condemning the cocoa reforms, and its leaders were trying to schedule a meeting with the newly-appointed Minister of Agriculture.

In addition, Lonaré was proud to announce his plan to initiate a national strategy and environmental action plan for mangrove conservation and management. He would oversee a program to develop a fund which would be used for mangrove conservation, forest planning and management, the development of forest product production and marketing facilities, and the development of tourism facilities. Big businesses from the capital city were already expressing great interest in investing in Lonaré's program; *Une Stratégie pour la Conservation et du Gestion du Palétuvier*. Environmental NGO's were beginning to form mangrove support units. These activities would be self-supporting in no time.

Another political highlight of Lonaré's inaugural speech was his promise to open up diamond mining to African, American, European, and other investors. The French Foreign Minister, who had been sent on a special Mission to attend the new President's inauguration, looked especially uncomfortable during this announcement.

One of Lonaré's greatest challenges was to maintain political stability while introducing reforms that many of his opponents were likely to resist -- and resist loudly. He could not forget the riots in the streets of Labidjala in 1982, when it was leaked to the press that President Coulibaly had met with the IMF/World Bank to discuss cutting rice subsidies. The urban protests were the catalyst for the President's decision to cut off relations with the international financial institutions, in spite of the dire consequences for the country's balance of payments crisis. Newly-elected President Lonaré's greatest fear was that quick liberalization of the economy would generate nostalgia for the old regime that would prevent the country from consolidating its recent political gains. He feared a re-creation of the situation next door in Biger, where a military officer had seized power illegally from the nation's first democratically elected President. Trying to justify the violent *coup d'état*, the Bigerian Lieutenant had claimed,

“You can't eat democracy. The Bigeriens are worse off today under democratic rule than they were under military power.”

Lonaré was afraid that the Zameroonian military, who were afraid they might lose their privileges under his rule, might incite other former Coulibaly supporters to protest against the new regime.

Assignment:

- (1) *Identify the key actors involved in policy reform;*
- (2) *Develop a stakeholder analysis matrix;*
- (3) *Prepare an implementation plan, listing steps you would take to ensure best implementation of your policy reform program.*

AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS PROJECT III (APAP III)
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
Workshop Date : _____

EVALUATION OF THE WORKSHOP

| | EXCELLENT ±4 | VERY GOOD ±3 | SATISFACTORY ±2 | POOR ±1 | COMMENTS |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|------------|----------|
| WORKSHOP ORGANIZATION | | | | | |
| QUALITY OF MATERIALS AND HANDOUTS | | | | | |
| QUALITY OF LECTURES | | | | | |
| CASE STUDY | | | | | |
| EXERCISES | | | | | |
| GROUP PRESENTATIONS | | | | | |
| OVERALL RELEVANCE & USEFULNESS OF WORKSHOP | | | | | |

OTHER COMMENTS

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




Certificate of Completion

Agricultural Policy Analysis Project III (APAP III)
Policy Reform Workshop

Conducted By Abt Associates Inc.
Sponsored By USAID/AFR/SD/PSGE

May 22-23
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



Appendix C

Participant Lists

East Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Workshop 1: May 20-21

Workshop 2: May 22-23

Southern Africa, Gaborone, Botswana

Workshop 1: June 16-17

Workshop 2: June 18-19

West Africa, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire

Workshop 1: June 24-25

Workshop 2: June 26-27

**AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS PROJECT III (APAP III)
POLICY REFORM WORKSHOP
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POLICY REFORM WORKSHOP
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June 26-27
Abidjan, Côte D'Ivoire**

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Appendix D

Summary of Evaluation Results by Workshop

Policy Reform Workshop Evaluation
Addis Ababa, May 20-21

| | Excellent (4.0) | Very Good (3.0) | Satisfactory (2.0) | Poor (1.0) | Weighted Average | Comments |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Workshop Organization | 4 | 6 | | | 3.4 | Time allocation was short; Well organized, Good training venue |
| Quality of Materials/Handouts | 4.5 | 5.5 | | | 3.45 | Relevant, selective materials |
| Quality of Lectures | 3.5 | 6.5 | | | 3.35 | Professional trainers with practical examples |
| Quality of Discussions | 2 | 7 | 1 | | 3.1 | Good discussion but not enough |
| Case Study | 4 | 4 | 2 | | 3.2 | Well documented case studies |
| Exercises | 4.5 | 2.5 | 2 | | 2.95 | Useful, but not enough |
| Group Presentations | 0.5 | 8.5 | 1 | | 2.95 | Very good |
| Overall Relevance/Usefulness | 2.5 | 6.5 | 1 | | 3.15 | Include top-notch politicians; Very good Include policy makers at high-level of Government; Relevance varies from country to country; Helped in understanding concepts; too few days to enable participants to grasp full knowledge |

ES

Policy Reform Workshop Evaluation
Addis Ababa, May 22-23

| | Excellent (4.0) | Very Good (3.0) | Satisfactory (2.0) | Poor (1.0) | Weighted Average | Comments |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|---------------|---------------------|---|
| Workshop Organization | 7 | 2 | 1 | | 3.6 | More diversity of participants could be useful. Location was excellent. Better with more participants. Location closer to city |
| Quality of Materials/Handouts | 5.5 | 4.5 | | | 3.55 | Very good materials, efforts to pre-deliver to participants would be useful. Too much in too short a time. |
| Quality of Lectures | 5 | 5 | | | 3.5 | More needed on sharing DETAILED experience |
| Quality of Discussions | 5 | 5 | | | 3.5 | Prompt participants to discuss more, and to the point. |
| Case Study | 4 | 4 | 2 | | 3 | A subjective topic can be understood better with LOTS of actual country experience. Rotate groups. Select one more relevant to participants. Not much time to read. |
| Exercises | 3 | 6 | 1 | | 3.2 | |
| Group Presentations | 1 | 7 | 2 | | 2.9 | Short presentations due to lack of time. Should follow each presentation with a Q&A. |
| Overall Relevance/Usefulness | 3.5 | 5.5 | 1 | | 3.15 | Political appointees and policy-makers could have been beneficial to the workshop. Should have been conducted earlier, when reform began. Very useful. |

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Policy Reform Workshop Evaluation
Gaborone, Botswana, June 16-17

| | Excellent 4 | Very Good 3 | Satisfactory 2 | Poor 1 | Weighted Average | Comments |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|--|
| Workshop Organization | 3 | | 2 | | 3.20 | |
| Quality of Materials/Handouts | 1 | 2 | 2 | | 2.80 | Computer graphic presentation could help; Materials did not arrive |
| Quality of Lectures | 2 | 3 | | | 3.40 | |
| Case Study | 2 | 1 | 2 | | 3.00 | Potential to be boring because of using the same example |
| Exercises | | 4 | | | 3.00 | Group too small |
| Group Presentations | 1 | 4 | | | 3.20 | |
| Overall Relevance/Usefulness | 1 | 4 | | | 3.20 | More participants would make this a worthwhile workshop; Made me realize that non-economic factors are also important in influencing the success of a project. |

JS

Policy Reform Workshop Evaluation
Gaborone, Botswana, June 18-19

| | Excellent 4 | Very Good 3 | Satisfactory 2 | Poor 1 | Weighted Average | Comments |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|---|
| Workshop Organization | 5 | 2 | | 1 | 3.38 | |
| Quality of Materials/Handouts | 4 | 3 | 1 | | 3.38 | |
| Quality of Lectures | 3 | 4 | 1 | | 3.25 | Very brief but to the point |
| Case Study | 5 | 2 | 1 | | 3.50 | |
| Exercises | 2 | 5 | 1 | | 3.13 | |
| Group Presentations | 4 | 2 | 2 | | 3.25 | |
| Overall Relevance/Usefulness | 5 | 3 | | | 3.63 | Length of workshop very short; the strategic analysis technique can assist greatly in our organization's current reform - towards quality control |

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Policy Reform Workshop Evaluation
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, June 24-25

| | Excellent 4 | Very Good 3 | Satisfactory 2 | Poor 1 | Weighted Average | Comments |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|--|
| Workshop Organization | 4 | 3 | 7 | | 2.79 | Logical, good progression; time was inadequate; Need more organization & information about language used; Confusion over french & english, materials should be sent in advance; Difficult to locate site on arrival day; there should have been some formal interpretation. |
| Quality of Materials/Handouts | 6 | 6 | 2 | | 3.29 | Getting them in advance would be helpful; well prepared; handouts could provide a bibliography for those who wish to study further; should be translated for French speakers |
| Quality of Lectures | 6 | 5 | 3 | | 3.21 | The shorter length kept everyone's interest; a lot of effort in french translation |
| Case Study | 4 | 9 | 1 | | 3.21 | Good application of materials; need more practical suggestions on how to proceed |
| Exercises | 4 | 8 | 2 | | 3.14 | |
| Group Presentations | 5 | 5 | 4 | | 3.07 | Good feedback; Organize a bigger workshop for the AFDB; |
| Overall Relevance/Usefulness | 9 | 4 | 1 | | 3.57 | Hope there are more with Government staff. Well done! Much more attention to these concerns is relevant! Gained new insight very useful; very good workshop, but for Francophone country, the materials must be translated in French for more benefit.; I'm not sure whether this workshop was of major significance to the bank's operations & programs New tools, new approaches, new consideration in policy analysis. |

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**Policy Reform Workshop Evaluation
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, June 26-27**

| | Excellent 4 | Very Good 3 | Satisfactory 2 | Poor 1 | Weighted Average | Comments |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|--|
| Workshop Organization | 4 | 8 | | | 3.33 | Could have sent materials earlier; OK but too tight, no rest period |
| Quality of Materials/Handouts | 5 | 8 | | | 3.67 | Good to make sure there are reports on the countries represented in the workshop; more useful if in french; excellent |
| Quality of Lectures | 5 | 8 | | | 3.67 | Refreshingly clear, direct and relevant; very good |
| Case Study | 4 | 8 | 1 | | 3.50 | Policy reform in an election period? Not the easiest scenario; shows good field experience on the part of facilitators; good but too theoretical, real work would have been better |
| Exercises | 4 | 8 | 1 | | 3.50 | Very relevant to course work. |
| Group Presentations | 1 | 9 | 3 | | 3.08 | Practical & enabled us to reinforce our knowledge; we need to go beyond discussion and do a certain synthesis; language problem for certain participants |
| Overall Relevance/Usefulness | 6 | 7 | | | 3.75 | I believe that the role of the media and communication strategy could've been incorporated with more effect particularly given the limitation of economic analysis & difficulties with implementation; Government and private sector representatives' participation in such workshops should be strongly promoted; refreshing to see these issues becoming part of policy analysis & dialogue; was much needed; if the workshop was in french, I would have participated more; the workshop should be organized for economists involved in the preparation & appraisal of policy-based loans |

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