




# Government's Coordination of Aid to Education: the case of Namibia

*Peter Williams*



**Government's Coordination of External  
Aid to Education**

**The Case of Namibia**

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Association for the Development of African Education

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## List of Acronyms

ARCI	Italian Agency for Assisting Culture and Development
APSO	Agency for Personnel Service Overseas
CASS	Center for Applied Social Studies
CDM	Consolidated Diamond Mines
CFTC	Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIIR	Catholic Institute of International Relations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAE	Association for the Development of African Education
DNED	German-Namibian Development Service
DNEG	German-Namibian Development Society
ELT	English Language Training
ERA	Emergency and Relief Assistance
EU	European Union
EPP	Educational Project Planning
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FOA	Food Aid
FINNIDA	Finnish International Development Agency
FSU	Florida State University
FTC	Free-Standing Technical Cooperation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRD	Human Resource Development
ICD	International Cooperation Department (CIIR)
IDRC	International Development Research Center
ILO	International Labor Organization
ITC	Investment-Related Technical Cooperation
IPA	Investment Project Assistance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INSTANT	In-Service Training and Assistance for Namibian Teachers

## Executive Summary

1. This study was commissioned by the Association for the Development of African Education (DAE) in cooperation with the Government of Namibia. The primary objective of the study is to document the process that a government can use to coordinate external assistance to the national education system. This is intended as a case study that may be useful to other African countries as they explore approaches to improved management of external support for their education systems. In a rapidly evolving situation this is an analysis of the situation in Namibia as it stood at the end of 1994. Although there has since been some reorganization of structures for educational administration and management of external aid in Namibia, many of the basic principles explored in the study remain valid despite changes in government organization.

2. In Africa, to an even greater extent than in other parts of the developing world, the need for aid coordination is a matter of highest priority, given the acute shortage of domestic resources and the fact that the volume of external assistance measured in real terms has not been increasing. The principal driving force behind efforts to achieve better coordination of external assistance is the desire to achieve a more effective application of resources, both domestic and foreign, in the service of development. It is no accident that the debate about aid coordination has been part and parcel of the wider exploration of the theme of greater cost-effectiveness.

3. Aid coordination is so self-evidently A Good Thing – on a par with “mother’s milk” – that people are prone to use the term loosely and imprecisely. In one sense, coordination focusses on the goal of articulating aid with the development plans and priorities of recipient countries, in such a way that it enhances the capacity of the receivers to pursue successfully their own freely chosen goals. Unfortunately, it is too often the case that aid substitutes externally originated goals and projects for ones that the host country would

have chosen to implement if it had received a gift of additional resources with no strings attached. Because aid is supplied by a partner country or agency that has its own priorities and imperatives, and its own constituency to satisfy back home, it is inevitable that the recipient's plans will be at least partially compromised by the receipt of aid and it would be idle to expect otherwise.

4. In a second sense, coordination of aid may involve a measure of standardization among donors of specifications, and an attempt to minimize the complications of excessive differentiation. This would apply to the supply of both real resources like vehicles or computers, as well as of information and documentary requirements. To the extent that these things can be standardized, the burdens of receiving aid will be minimized for the host country.

5. Third, coordination involves the development of complementarity and division of labor among donors, avoiding as far as possible duplication and competition, or excessive "bunching" of donors in currently fashionable areas of activity.

6. In terms of the dynamics of aid coordination, there is a variety of different mechanisms ranging from "weak" forms simply involving consultation and the exchange of information, to "strong" ones where there is cooperation in project and program execution. Whilst it is important to get the mechanics of donors' meetings right, one has to be careful to ensure that preoccupation with this does not involve substitution of form for substance – it may be more important to avoid proliferation of small independent projects, to ensure that aid is not putting an excessive burden on the recipient, and to work with the host government to strengthen its own machinery for planning and using assistance. It is necessary to recognize throughout these processes that there are many forces of understandable and legitimate political and economic self-interest, on both the donor and on the recipient side, which render coordination more of a guiding star rather than a destination that can be reached with certainty.

7. Certain features of the education sector are noted in the context of aid coordination. For a variety of reasons education tends to attract a large number of donors, often supporting quite small projects. This multiplicity of donors, both governmental and non-governmental, makes coordination a particular challenge. Moreover education is not very capital-goods intensive and so its

requirements of foreign aid are often weighted on the side of technical assistance; this tends to be heterogeneous in its nature and conditions, to be earmarked for specific services, and often administered by the supplying agency. All these considerations make recipient-government management of technical assistance problematic.

8. The Namibian case illustrates many of these features of aid coordination. Namibia is a physically large but demographically small country with about 1.5 million people. It achieved independence, after a protracted struggle, from South Africa in 1990. GDP per capita amounts to over US\$1,000 – however, distribution is badly skewed and large numbers of people are on low incomes derived from subsistence agriculture. Namibia was particularly attractive to donors at independence, at a time when donor agencies wanted to demonstrate their commitment to the struggle against apartheid in neighboring South Africa. Within Namibia, education was especially popular as a target for aid because it was the independent government's highest priority and was perceived to have a crucial role to play in building an integrated multiracial society and in overcoming the disadvantages from which the African population suffered as a result of past discrimination.

9. External aid flows to Namibia grew rapidly between 1990 (when they amounted to US\$64 million) and 1992 (when they appear to have peaked at \$140 million). In the subsequent two years up to 1994, according to provisional figures, they apparently declined by about 40% in real terms from the 1992 level. External aid in 1992 was calculated as being equivalent to about 6% of GDP and roughly 15% of government revenue. The proportion of public expenditure on education accounted for by aid, however, is closer to 7%. Much the largest part of aid to Namibia in the early post-independence period has consisted of free-standing (i.e. not linked to specific investment projects) technical assistance which accounted for over half the assistance received between 1990 and 1992. In sectoral terms, human resource development (education and training, but in this instance excluding health) was the largest sectoral recipient with over a third of the total.

10. The coordination of aid to education has to be understood within the broader context of Namibia's overall system for aid management which is considered in some detail. Namibia had to develop its administrative systems for handling foreign aid from scratch at independence and within the context

of existing budgetary structures. Some progress has been made but the policy framework is still not fully developed and there has been some difficulty in establishing a comprehensive data base. A particular set of difficult issues concerns the extent to which external assistance should pass through the State Revenue Fund where it would be more completely at the disposal of the Namibian government, and the extent to which “by-pass” parallel mechanisms are acceptable. The practice of foreign donors in keeping control over the disbursement of their assistance is quite widespread. More than donor self-interest is at stake in this – for local systems for tracking the disbursement of aid have not yet been sufficiently developed to satisfy the accountability requirements of some donors. Moreover, the direct administration of technical assistance personnel would put a great deal of strain on the local administration. Even so, greater transparency and more participation in decisions by the receiving government would be more in tune with the proclaimed perception of the aid relationship as one of partnership.

11. The system for coordination with and among the donors is, at least in terms of its formal structure, quite well developed. Coordination is in the hands of the National Planning Commission (NPC) on the Namibian side and is led by the UNDP on the side of donors, with the local representative of the European Commission playing a significant role also in respect of European Union member countries. Namibia is atypical in Africa in not having a permanent World Bank aid program and, hence, permanent representative. In practice, meetings between Namibian government officials and donor representatives collectively are sporadic at NPC and sectoral ministry levels – they take place, but on a rather *ad hoc* basis, with long intervals between meetings.

12. Aid to education has come from a large number of different agencies. The study lists 37 different countries which have agreements on education or cultural cooperation with Namibia, or which are on record as having given assistance. There are a further 11 multilateral organizations and 21 non-government organizations, although some of these NGOs are operating on behalf of their national governments. The largest donors have been Germany, Sweden and the United States. Much the greatest share of aid has been accounted for by projects for curriculum development and institutional support, in which technical assistance has been the major component. Some agencies have contributed to construction of buildings and several have

supplied teaching personnel for secondary schools and teacher training colleges.

13. To manage the flow of external assistance the Ministry of Education and Culture has established a small Educational Project Planning Sub-Division with responsibilities for aid coordination in its Directorate of Planning and Development. The Sub-Division has responsibility for: liaising with donors and providing preparatory and support services for aid negotiations and reviews; reporting on, and serving as the information center on, external aid records and flows; and performing facilitative functions *vis-à-vis* the executive branches of the Ministry that actually implement programs and projects.

14. The experience of Namibia in coordinating education aid has in many respects been positive and donors have generally been satisfied that their assistance has been put to good use. Among the favorable factors have been: strong political leadership and a continuity of policies and personnel (in some cases on the donor side as well as among Namibians) stretching back well before independence; a series of well worked-out policy statements providing a framework for support; clear evidence of developmental need and of the priority of this sector, with ample space for donors making important contributions to avoid "tripping over" each other. On the whole, a fairly effective system of donor division of labor has operated.

15. On the other hand there has been a sense among some in Namibia that if the same sums as donors claim to have spent on behalf of Namibian education had been placed freely at the disposal of the Namibian authorities, much more value could have been obtained. There have also been many instances where Namibia has received unwanted gifts from smaller donors, though it is recognized that lack of discipline by Namibian representatives at different levels has sometimes been partly responsible.

16. Among the operational challenges that Namibia will face in the future are three that deserve particular mention: the need for donors and recipients alike to give greater attention to the long-term financial and administrative sustainability of projects started with foreign aid; the need to develop more rigorous project appraisal procedures, which would also involve a better appreciation of the costs to Namibia of receiving external assistance; and the improvement of the system for recording and tracking assistance, as a prerequisite for improving aid utilization. This last point requires agreement

among donors about what shall be counted as assistance; full transparency on the part of donors about the components and unit costs of their assistance; arrangements for the recipient to participate to a greater extent in the aid allocation process; and on the recipient side, an efficient recording and tracking system.

17. In the conclusions of the study, it is acknowledged that the Namibian case, just like any other that might have been chosen, has certain special characteristics. The smallness of the country, the recency of independence, the urgency of educational development to serve the majority of the population in the post-apartheid period, the need to build a new set of institutions stressing democracy and integration, and the strategic importance of Namibia at a time when South Africa was still in the grip of apartheid, were all positive factors from the point of view of donors. The absence of the World Bank from the scene, and the lack hitherto of a serious foreign debt problem also distinguish Namibia from many other African countries. The shortage of qualified and experienced local personnel is more typical of other African countries at the time of their independence in the 1960s and 1970s than of their contemporary situation.

18. What the Namibian experience does emphasize is the importance of stable and open government and the relative absence of corruption as creating the right kind of climate to attract aid, and the key role of strong political leadership. A well worked out development plan, or in the case of Namibia a cogent set of policy documents, is particularly conducive to the attraction of aid. The style of management of educational aid, with a degree of decentralization of decision making to the Ministry of Education and Culture and within the Ministry to individual implementing units, has made for comparative speedy and effective aid management in Namibia's case.

19. At the heart of aid coordination is the articulation of aid flows and the resources they represent with a country's own development program. The recipient country must take the lead in coordinating educational aid within the framework of its own strategy and plan for educational development. It is particularly important to systematize the management of external resources and to codify information and procedures. These measures should primarily be regarded as means to ensure cost-effective implementation of programs, but can also be seen as insurance against the turnover of personnel which is so characteristic of the public service in many developing countries. As part of

this process, systems for the registration of expenditures – both those incurred in-country and those incurred in the donor country or elsewhere under aid programs – is a necessary condition for improved resource use. It is incumbent on donors to be more transparent in relation to the content of their aid expenditure.

20. More attention on the part of the aid community to systems of disbursement is surely required. On the one hand there are often good, pragmatic reasons for not passing assistance funds through the recipient country's own budget, because of bureaucratic delays and problems of ensuring accountability for the funds expended. On the other hand, it can happen all too frequently that funds spent by the donor on goods and services, procured at donor-country prices, do not in the eyes of the recipient represent good value in the context of local needs and local price structures. The development and adoption of systems of aid disbursement which would cater for the proper concerns of both parties to the transaction would do much to remove possible misunderstandings and resentments arising when donors rather than recipients account for aid expenditures.

# **Part 1: Background**

## **Introduction**

1. In the decades since they achieved independence, African countries have rapidly expanded their education systems. The great bulk of the cost has been met from their own resources but external assistance has been used: (i) to increase the resources available domestically and make possible a faster rate of expansion; (ii) to secure specialist inputs that might not have been available in the market but were obtainable through aid; and, (iii) to help introduce innovative practices and improvements to the system.

2. Since 1980, the economic situation of many African countries has deteriorated. The productive base of the economy has grown hardly, if at all, while the population has continued to increase at a rapid rate. The demands on public services have outstripped the capacity of public finances to satisfy them. Deficits have been met by inflationary public borrowing at home and by incurring overseas debt. The resultant pressure on public resources has been greatly exacerbated by the declining availability of publicly provided aid from abroad, reflecting in part a growing weariness with provision of international assistance on the part of rich-country governments and in part the new demands on available aid from the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Indeed, a combination of rising debt payments to overseas countries, falling official assistance and private investment, and in most of the period a decline in the terms of trade for Africa's exports, have caused a sharp deterioration in the external payments position and a fall in value of African currencies relative to those of their main creditors.

3. All this has made it even more important than before to use resources at maximum efficiency. It has prompted many countries to embark on programs of structural adjustment with the support of bilateral donors and international agencies. There has been a new recognition of the dangers of

misdirecting external aid and of the fact that assistance from abroad must be properly managed if it is not to result in the diversion of domestic resources and administrative effort to unproductive activities, and in worsening the long-term debt situation of the receiving country. Any idea that aid is a cost-free transaction to the recipient has had to be put to one side.

4. At the same time, the two or three decades since independence have seen a sharp increase in the number of donors. With the rising prosperity of industrialized countries, many more of them have grafted cooperation programs on to the diplomatic and commercial links that they have established with African countries. Countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland have become relatively important donors for selected recipients, while Japan has entered the foremost ranks of major aid-givers. In parallel with this, the range of multilateral agencies has increased and a number of non-governmental organizations have become significant sources of both humanitarian and development assistance. The proliferation of donors has made the task of managing external aid much more complex, and its coordination an urgent undertaking.

5. A major landmark in the assessment of education development in Africa, and the role of external assistance therein, was the publication in 1988 of the World Bank policy study, *Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies for Adjustment, Revitalization, and Expansion*. Amongst other things, the study examined the role that external assistance could usefully play in promoting revitalization and selective expansion of education in Africa, and in a concluding Call to Action, the study suggested that:

Donors and African governments need now to come together to determine what concrete steps should be taken to support the adjustment, revitalization and selective expansion of African education. This study will have served its purpose if it stimulates African governments to rethink policies for educational development, encourages international agencies to improve and enlarge their aid, and helps all parties form a new partnership to provide Africa with the stock of human skills indispensable for development in the next decades and beyond.

6. In response to this study, a consultative meeting between representatives of African countries and the major bilateral and multilateral donors was held in Paris at the end of 1988, and resulted in the creation of the Association for

the Development of African Education (DAE), initially known as Donors to African Education. The DAE is a forum for the exchange of views and experience and for the concentration of international action to address the challenges of educational development in Africa. The DAE operates through working groups composed of African and donor representatives which address issues at the sub-sectoral level (e.g. higher education, concerns of the teaching profession, education of women and girls) and through a Biennial Plenary Meeting, composed of African education ministers and senior donor representatives, held every two years. There is a small secretariat in Paris whose role is essentially facilitation, but which also has a modest program budget to advance the activities of the working groups and to promote studies on key issues. The present study is commissioned by DAE and falls under that rubric.

7. In many of the deliberations of DAE, at the level both of the Biennial Plenary and of the working groups, the issue of education aid coordination has been a recurring theme – naturally enough given that the *raison d'être* of the DAE itself is to provide an element of concertation and coordination of assistance to African education. This continuing interest on the part of the DAE coincided with the concern of individual African countries to attract multi-donor support for their forward education plans. One of these countries was Namibia which was expecting to hold a major Donor Round Table meeting in 1995 to review the country's needs for external assistance in the light of the new development plan which was expected to be launched in that year, and where there was an interest on the part of sectoral ministries in having more detailed consideration of the role that external support could play in advancing and supporting their own forward programs. One of these ministries was Namibia's Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC), and in the course of a visit to Windhoek by the DAE Executive Secretary, Christopher Shaw, agreement was reached that the DAE would commission a case study of the coordination of educational aid. This would serve the dual purpose of drawing the attention of other African countries to the Namibian experience – so informing their own efforts to mobilize external aid – and at the same time of helping to make more explicit Namibia's own experience in anticipation of its forthcoming dialogue with the aid donors.

8. Terms of reference were agreed between the DAE and the Ministry of Education and Culture for the case study (see Appendix 4). These made it

clear that the primary objective of the study was to document the process that a government can use to coordinate external assistance to the national education system, concentrating on the environment within which the coordination of external support has taken place and on analysis of the process that the Namibian government has used to coordinate donors to the education sector. It was emphasized that the study was not to make specific recommendations either to the Namibian government or to the DAE and its members. Rather, it was hoped that the study would be useful to other countries in Africa by illustrating possible approaches they could use to manage external support. The Namibian case would thus be used to identify generic features of the coordination of assistance and the basic principles involved when a country sought to coordinate and manage external assistance to education.

9. The parties jointly selected Peter Williams, recently-retired Director of the Human Resource Development Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat and former Professor of Education in Developing Countries at the University of London Institute of Education, to undertake the consultancy. Mr. Williams had also served on the Commission on Higher Education in Namibia in 1991.

10. The Ministry of Education and Culture made available background documentation which the consultant reviewed along with relevant international writings about aid coordination, at his home base prior to a three-week mission to Namibia from 5-26 October 1994. During the mission, he consulted extensively with the Minister and officials in the Ministry of Education and Culture and other ministries, interviewed those engaged in managing externally supported projects, and held discussions with representatives of donor agencies. His program of visits and discussions is set out in full at Appendix 6. During the course of his stay he collected much further documentation from Namibian and external sources.

11. The period from November 1994 to May 1995 was devoted to analysis and write-up of the material, to dialogue with the Namibian authorities and the DAE about the findings, and to the revision of the text in the light of such consultations. During the period subsequent to the consultant's visit, some major changes took place in the Namibian government, affecting both the Ministry of Education's organization and the management of aid. These developments are by no means atypical of occurrences in Africa. They illustrate the continuing evolution of organizational forms and emphasize the

importance of developing flexible and sustainable systems of aid coordination and management that can adapt to changing circumstances and survive personnel changes.

## **The Quest for Aid Coordination**

### *Aid Effectiveness through Coordination:*

1. Better coordination has been seen as a key component for nations to improve aid effectiveness, which has been a particular concern of the international cooperation community in the last decade. The object of such coordination has been defined as helping the recipient government make more effective use of external resources and ensuring that such resources are used in an integrated way with domestic resources in support of appropriate development priorities.
2. The context of the recent international attention has been scarcity of resources. In donor countries there has been a focus on reduction of public expenditure, including that available for aid programs. Developing countries have been facing economic crisis and in a large number of cases have engaged in programs of structural adjustment. Better aid coordination has been seen as a key component of actions to improve aid effectiveness.
3. A number of important recent documents bear witness to this link between aid effectiveness and aid coordination. Thus the OECD statement on "Guiding Principles on Aid Coordination with Developing Countries" appears within OECD's 1992 manual, *DAC Principles for Effective Aid*. In addition, an OECD Development Center paper by Alan Barry (1988) is entitled *Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness*. A 1991 UN study (for its Second Conference on the Least Developed Countries) by Devendra Rajpanday and Maurice Williams appears under the rubric *Aid Coordination and Effectiveness: Least Developed Countries 1981-1989* and the most recent (August 1994) UNDP policy division paper is entitled *Aid Coordination and Aid Management by Government: a Role for UNDP*.
4. There is a long earlier history of aid consortia created to mobilize resources from a large number of donors for especially large infrastructure

projects, or in support of a developing country's development program. Likewise, the device of forming consultative groups of donors in relation to a particular recipient country goes back many years. But it is probably the grave financial situation and in particular the high levels of external indebtedness of so many developing countries in the 1980s and after that have underlined the need both for donors to act in concert if the difficulties are to be overcome, and for all parties to ensure that the diminishing resources available for international cooperation are used to maximum effect. The donor community has not been slow to hold up to developing countries exemplars of successful coordination to support well-conceived plans either for structural adjustment programs (such as Ghana) or for the development of particular sectors. In education, for example, the Master Plan prepared by Mauritius with international help, and the subsequent mobilization of funds in support of it, have been given a good deal of publicity in education cooperation circles.

5. The growth in coordination activity has been made more necessary by the increasing number and range of official and unofficial donor agencies. It has been made more attainable by the increasing skill and sophistication of developing country administrations and by the growing pre-eminence of the World Bank and IMF as lead agencies in development politics and operations. It has been made more credible by an expanded corpus of experience and literature about coordination in theory and practice.

6. Most would readily subscribe to the idea of coordination as a general principle. Its connotations in terms of orderly patterns, consistency, coherence and relevance commend themselves to all except the perverse. But coordination is a term that is used with a great deal of imprecision – on closer inspection it can mean many different things and its practice is a good deal more difficult than the theory.

7. Perfect coordination is unattainable. Compromises are necessary all along the line because there are too many independent actors at play with interests, perceptions and procedures that are not harmonized. Sheer lack of information and inefficiencies of communication make some frictions and inefficiencies inevitable. If coordination within a single ministry is difficult, then simultaneous coordination across ministries is extraordinarily challenging; and the goal of meshing such internal coordination mechanisms with the timely and efficient application of resources from perhaps thirty or forty different donors – each with its own policies, priorities and reporting

procedures – may well appear something of a mirage. It would be difficult enough even if all those concerned were ready to put their resources and policy goals at the disposal of the coordinator. But as Whittington and Calhoun (1988) have observed “all donors want to coordinate, but no one wants to be coordinated” (p. 307). Where donor agencies have their own political and commercial interests to pursue, or where donor aid officials are constrained by the system of incentives to produce measurable results in a short time-frame, it becomes clear that coordination is more likely to be a guiding star for the journey than a specific destination.

*Conceptual questions:*

8. What exactly is involved in coordination of aid? It is not difficult perhaps to understand this in negative terms, as the malfunctioning that clearly occurs in the absence of coordination. Cases can be cited of duplication of projects, mistimed aid missions through failure to consult developing country hosts, programs unrelated to local plans, application of aid to low priority projects, wasted project identification work through ignorance of what others have done, and excessive burdens on recipients of responding to unstandardized documentary requirements of different donors.

9. By contrast, well coordinated arrangements for the application of aid resources to education development will exhibit the characteristics of integration of assistance in local education development plans and programs, clearly understood roles and relationships between different donors in relation to particular projects, transparency as to activities and costs, active and full exchange of information between government and donors and within the donor community, and readiness when appropriate of donors to join forces in support of government's projects.

10. One aspect of coordination focuses on the articulation of aid with the development plans and priorities of the recipient country. If assistance is genuinely to help countries pursue their own freely chosen goals, it ought to represent resources fully at the disposal of the recipient. From that point of view as Rajpanday and Williams (1991) have pointed out:

Aid coordination also has to embrace the use of domestic as well as aid resources. One potential benefit of aid coordination is that it can eventually influence all parties concerned into understanding that there is no economic

difference between domestic resources and external assistance. Many participants in the process, including LDC governments, have yet to realize that the opportunity cost of domestic and external resources is the same. Without such realization aid coordination cannot be effective. (p.14)

11. What this would in effect mean is that aid is only “additional” in the sense of enabling the recipient government to undertake the program or project which was at the top of its reserve list before the aid was received. Its additionality should not make possible the execution of a project further down the list or off the list altogether, which the donor for its own reasons likes and in which the recipient is prepared to acquiesce because it regards the project as a free extra (“we might as well accept it as it won't cost us anything”). There may, in fact, be a twofold cost: the benefit forgone of what the same financial resource would have funded had it been available without strings; and, the cost in all aid programs of administering the receipt of assistance.

12. A great deal of contemporary aid, and a high proportion of that covered by this study of education assistance to Namibia, is not at the free disposal of the recipient. Rather, it is tied to goods and services provided by the donor and these may or may not represent the best value for money on the international market. To the extent that aid is for projects which either do not appear at all in the government's plans or which constitute severe modifications of the education ministry's own proposed programs, they would score low on any coordination test.

13. A second sense of coordination involves introducing standardization (of equipment specifications, documentation, procedures, etc.) so that the recipient can economize on servicing and spares in the case of equipment and vehicles, and can obtain economies of effort in meeting donor requirements for information and reports.

14. Linking these first two points – the emphasis on fit with the local plan and the idea of standardization – is Sack's (1993) identification of activities and instruments with a “coordinating effect”. He refers here primarily to policy documents, strategic plans, analytical studies and data sets and statistics which can, by providing an overview and perspective on the education system, help to create some consensus about what needs to be done and how. The existence of such materials may help to obviate the problems that arise when statistics and papers are produced in an *ad hoc* way to meet

the needs of particular donors or for particular meetings. In such circumstances, a variety of different data sets and accounts of education developments may be simultaneously in circulation, with little consistency among them. In such circumstances, published plans, policy statements, statistical digests, manuals of operational procedures can exert a valuable coordination effect in their own right.

15. Coordination in a third sense might involve some attempt to develop complementarity and division of labor between the different sources of assistance, with each donor encouraged to specialize in areas of comparative advantage. This comparative advantage might consist in similarity of administrative and legal structures or shared language between donor and recipient. A particular donor may have long experience of working in the host country, or of operating a similar program in another developing country facing comparable problems. Likewise, a donor may possess a well-developed and internationally renowned pool of expertise in a field such as adult or technical education. Or, again it may be that the agency's comparative advantage would reside in characteristics like flexibility to transfer resources between technical assistance and construction, a willingness to fund certain types of expenditure that others consider out of bounds, or simply more favorable repayment and interest schedules for educational loans. It is also likely, as Sack (1993, p.26) has argued, that the "weight and complexity of administrative procedures" attaching to particular donors' aid will be an important consideration for the recipient in choosing where to turn for assistance.

*The Dynamics of Aid Coordination:*

16. Much has been written about organization for aid coordination. Barry makes useful distinctions between:

- *consultation* – seeking the perspective of others or a broader base of information;
- *concentration* – efforts to reach a common understanding of policy and program objectives and priorities; and,
- *operational coordination* – trying to reach agreement on a common program or project to be undertaken or supported jointly.

Barry also reviews the different mechanisms that have been tried at regional and sub-regional levels, at country level, and at sector and project levels. At country aid-group level are the various consultative groups and aid consortia frequently convened by the World Bank and the round tables convened by UNDP. Local level coordination includes joint meetings of donors with government and donors-only meetings.

17. Some argue that it is dangerous to put too much emphasis on the mechanics of coordination and that while the formal mechanisms may be useful for arriving at common understandings and for sharing information, "the effectiveness of these meetings is strictly limited unless there is a means of integrating them with the planning and budgeting process of the recipient. ... Donor emphasis on the expansion of Consultative Groups, Round Tables and sector-level meetings can divert recipient attention and the time and energy of senior officials away from the central task of setting up and making operational the 'strong central unit' which is the first priority". (Clift, 1993, p. 126). Furthermore, "while these [mechanisms] have a certain utility in providing a forum for the discussion of general issues and priorities, they are severely constrained by the formality of procedures, by the generality of the discussion and by the focus on recipient rather than donor agencies, in getting to the heart of the problem" (p. 136).

18. There is a wide measure of agreement today that the lead in aid coordination must be taken by the recipient government. A prime task in that regard is the formulation by the recipient of appropriate strategies and plans and programs into which external aid can fit, and to devise administrative machinery and procedures which will facilitate the integration of external resources into the development program. This requires particular attention to such matters as the structure of the budget, coordination between the ministry of finance and the planning authorities, and the procedures involved in the use of aid. Some developing countries may require assistance, sensitively and unobtrusively given, to help them strengthen their capacity in these areas and it has been suggested that one of the best sources of advice lies in other developing countries that have already tackled problems of aid mobilization and management in an effective way.

19. "Overstrain" of recipient country capacity is one of the most serious problems in aid management. Clift has put his finger on the problem in his

assessment that it is not so much getting rid of “white elephants” that is the prime task of aid coordination. Rather:

... it is the multiplicity of projects, however worthy in their own right, which have separate management systems, separate financing arrangements and collectively rely too heavily on technical assistance that constitute the core of the problem. It is these projects which have undermined the recipient’s ability to exercise overall control, have fragmented responsibility into a multitude of overlapping and autonomous project bodies and have failed to develop indigenous capabilities for technical management and control (p. 120).

*Benefits and Costs of Coordination of Aid:*

20. The principal benefit of aid coordination should lie in a greater effectiveness of resource use, enabling the recipient government to construct a fuller inventory of resources available so as to direct the various inputs to where they will yield most return. Overlap and duplication should be reduced and the increase in information should assist all parties to use resources more rationally. Donors value access to information about partners’ projects, and may see the coordination process as a way to promote burden sharing and to attract new donors. The hope of the recipient country is that a demonstration of improved aid management will also generate larger aid flows.

21. Against these benefits must be set the costs of coordination to the recipient. It can be a time-consuming process to gather and communicate information to different parts of the local bureaucracy and to numerous donors. Servicing donor coordination machinery – calling meetings, preparing papers and recording the proceedings – also has its costs. If a recipient government begins to suspect that the donor community is using the coordination and consultation process as a substitute for resource commitment and for any willingness to change course, it will soon lose confidence in the process. This will be all the more true if donors use the coordination process to lean on the receiving government authorities – it is tempting for donors to exert collective pressure on the recipient government in cases where, if they acted singly, they would be liable to the charge of blatant interference.

22. Some donors undoubtedly have their own hesitations about forms of coordination which require them to eschew the temptation to steal a commercial or political march on their rivals by appropriating the most

glamorous projects and to come clean with recipients and donor partners about the components and terms of their own assistance. Coordination inevitably reduces donor freedom of action and challenges them to be more disciplined in confining themselves to support of government priorities. More "virtuous" donors welcome coordination as a way of shaming those who engage in the tying of aid into renouncing such practices. At staff level, it is not surprising that individual agency officials are lukewarm about investing much time in aid coordination. It is a distraction from the tasks that earn brownie points from headquarters, primarily increasing the rate of disbursements. Unfortunately, for all their public rhetoric, donor agencies generally assign little recognition and few personal rewards to their own personnel who undertake the time-consuming work of communicating with donor partners.

*The Special Case of Education:*

23. The education sector presents its own special challenges to coordination of efforts. Education by its nature tends to attract many donors, particularly for newly independent countries or for those like Namibia which are embarking on a new social path. Where needs are great and the way forward seems relatively uncontroversial, there will be many ready to help.

24. Moreover since education is a social good of the "mother's milk" variety, it is especially liable to form the major component of any cooperation agreement that a small bilateral donor wishes to have with the recipient country. Many donors think of education projects, even small-scale ones, as ideal vehicles for infusing the cooperative relationship with elements of the values and cultural outlook of the donor. Small-scale education aid projects thus often have a "cultural appreciation" component. However, the close link between education, culture and language raises the issue of whether expatriates in general can sufficiently empathize with local cultural values to make a meaningful contribution in the local context. Where technical assistance personnel are drawn from many different societies and cultures with mutually incompatible approaches to pedagogy, curriculum development or education management, there is the further challenge to those coming from different backgrounds to develop a common approach.

25. It is also clear that the education sector offers scope to donors for making very small inputs of a mini-project variety. Schools are discrete identifiable communities that attract well-wishers. A small donor, sometimes

an individual or a church group in an industrialized country, may send a crate of books or a piece of laboratory equipment, or donate a scholarship. It can all be very “bitty” as Namibia itself has found. Furthermore, because of the unexpectedness of some of the gifts, and the virtual impossibility of prior communication with donors, it can involve unforeseen costs for the recipient.

26. In international educational (as in health) cooperation, an added dimension of complexity results from having two specialized UN agencies – UNESCO and UNICEF – with mandates in education, each with its own particular message and global strategy. In technical education and vocational training, the interests of UNESCO and ILO seem to overlap at some points.

27. The nature of education projects as small-scale human development activities makes them attractive to NGOs. Sectors concentrating on physical infrastructure attract few donors from the NGO sector, and so have more manageable coordination problems. The wider range of sources of assistance for education has advantages, but ease of coordination is not one of them.

28. The prevalence of technical assistance in education aid is one factor making its coordination more difficult. The terms and conditions applying to experts vary widely among different categories of personnel and different donors. The backgrounds, skills and experience of technical assistants are diverse so that many a mismatch occurs between job specification and expert recruited to the post. The fact that many technical cooperation personnel are recruited through an intermediary organization like a university or charitable agency adds a further dimension of complexity by increasing the number of decision points.

29. In many countries universities enjoy autonomy or semi-autonomy and may themselves assume the major responsibility for attracting the donor support they need. Where this situation prevails, arrangements have to be put in place for specifying the respective responsibilities of the different actors in relation to external agencies, given the probable impact of assistance on reducing, but occasionally even increasing, the demand of the university on national budgetary resources.

## Part 2: The Namibian Case Study

### Namibia Since Independence

#### *Polity:*

1. Namibia is a country of 824,000 square kilometers in south-west Africa, having as its neighbors South Africa to the south, Botswana to the east and Zambia and Angola to the north. On the west is the southern Atlantic Ocean, with its rich fishing grounds. It is sparsely populated with a population density of only about 2.5 persons per square kilometer. Total population was recorded as 1.4 million in the census of 1991 and with growth of approximately 3% p.a. has now climbed to about 1.6 million, about 45% of whom are under 15 years of age. The population is composed of about 88% black, 5% white and 7% mixed or other race. Over 60% of the population lives in the extreme north of the country in the areas bordering Angola and Zambia. Just under half of the population, mostly living in the north, are Ovambo-speaking.

2. Politically the country achieved its independence on 21 March 1990, following a protracted liberation struggle against the occupying power, South Africa. The country had been annexed by Germany in 1884 and was known as South-West Africa; following the First World War, it had been mandated by the League of Nations to South Africa. This mandate was terminated by the UN in 1966, a decision that the apartheid South African regime did not accept. It was only after a lengthy independence struggle, spearheaded by the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) from its guerilla bases in Angola and Zambia and Namibia itself, that international negotiations resulted in agreement on multi-party elections and independence. The elections were won by SWAPO which received some 57% of the votes cast and their leader Dr. Sam Nujoma became the first president of the independent state. In elections at the end of 1994, SWAPO was returned to power with an enhanced majority and President Nujoma received a further term of office.

3. Namibia is a member of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the Southern African Development Community and the Commonwealth. Relations with South Africa – which were strained in the period following Namibia's independence when the apartheid regime was still in control in Pretoria – have become cordial since the attainment by South Africa of majority rule and have recently resulted in the integration of Walvis Bay on the western seaboard into Namibia.

4. The capital of the country is Windhoek. The official language is English, although for historical reasons Afrikaans is also a widely used *lingua franca*. Very few Namibians have either of these languages as their mother tongue. The currency is the Namibian dollar which stands at par with the South African rand and is thus worth (in 1994) approximately 28 US cents.

*Economy:*

5. Most of Namibia's population is dependent for its livelihood on agriculture (even though in 1994 this accounted for only 10% of Namibia's N\$7.6 billion GDP). Although this gives an average income for Namibians of over US\$1,000 per head, the income distribution is extremely skewed and much of the population lives in relative poverty. Mining and quarrying represent 17% of GDP and generate a high proportion of the country's exports and foreign exchange receipts. The manufacturing sector accounts for another 10% of GDP. The remaining 62% comes from services, mainly in the government sector.

6. Overall, the GDP has grown at an average of a little over 2% between 1990 and 1993, according to the Economic Review for 1994 (Ministry of Finance, 1994a). This is less than population growth and so implies a drop in income per capita. Minerals production has been particularly depressed over this period with both the main minerals, diamonds and uranium, in decline. Preliminary figures suggest that minerals might have accounted for just under half of exports in 1994 compared with around 80% in 1986. Processed fish, by contrast, accounted for 7% of exports in 1986 but 22% in 1994.

7. Namibia is in the unusual position for a developing country in having experienced sizeable surpluses on its external current account. The trade balance has been fairly substantially in surplus and earnings abroad by

Namibian individuals and companies have in many years exceeded payments of interest and dividends. Net transfers from abroad (mainly receipts of foreign aid) are quite considerable though interestingly their significance is declining. In 1993, they represented 10% of GDP compared with 23% in the mid-1980s, due largely to South Africa's provision of budgetary assistance (Economic Review for 1994, p. 9). On the external capital account there have been heavy outflows to the extent that Namibia has been a net exporter of capital to the rest of the world. Namibia is thus in the somewhat odd, but not unique, situation of seeking foreign capital and aid while the country is making substantial capital transfers abroad.

8. Public expenditure stands at about 40% of GDP and government is anxious to reduce the proportion, especially since the excess of government expenditure over government income is over 4% of GDP in 1993/94. To bridge the gap in its finances, government has been borrowing on the domestic market, attempting to improve tax collection and looking for ways to reduce public expenditure. The budget for 1994/95 provided for N\$3.7 billion of expenditure with the largest shares being taken by education (27% or N\$986 million) and health with N\$580 million (16%).

*Education:*

9. It is only over the course of the most recent years that it has been possible to speak of a Namibian education system. At independence in 1990, the country had several different parallel systems defined mainly in terms of ethnic origin. The integration of these systems into a single national system with a national curriculum grounded in Namibian realities and culture has been one of the main tasks of the Ministry of Education and Culture. A major effort has been made to widen access to school for the majority and to bring about a fairer distribution of resources. Adult literacy and other provision of non-formal education also have high priority. There is a particular focus on English as the new national language and the medium of instruction from grade 4 onwards.

10. The structure of the system provides for twelve grades of school education. The first seven years of this are primary education and these are followed by three years of junior secondary education at which stage a national examination determines pupils' entry to a two-year senior secondary school. The senior secondary certificate – which from 1996 onwards will be the

(Higher) International General Certificate of Secondary Education – is the jumping off ground for entry to higher academic studies or to vocational preparation of various kinds. The University of Namibia in Windhoek is the leading higher education institution. The twelve-year pre-tertiary structure of education accords with the southern and central African model, based on South Africa's system.

11. In 1993, the system had 450,000 pupils. The vast majority of students, 352,000, were at primary level with a further 74,000 at junior secondary and just 19,000 at senior secondary. Windhoek has much better provision relative to its size at secondary level than the other regions, and also has a smaller proportion of unqualified teachers. In the system as a whole in 1993, about a third of the 15,000 teachers did not have professional training. Of the professionally qualified teachers, many had less than grade 12 education. Reform of teacher education is central to the government's strategy to reshape education.

12. The Government of Namibia's education strategy is set out in a document published in 1993, *Toward Education for All: a Development Brief for Education, Culture and Training*, which has become a kind of blueprint for government policy. This identifies the major goals for the system as access, equity, quality and democracy and outlines the two major policy initiatives as being the development of basic education – within which an important place is assigned to adult education – and the new language policy. A critical role in this process is assigned to the new National Institute of Educational Development (NIED), created after independence and based in its first years in the MEC headquarters, but in early 1995 relocated to Okahandja.

13. *Toward Education for All* represented a synthesis of government thinking that had developed through several earlier studies and policy statements appearing in the period 1990 to 1992. These in turn built on the intensive preparatory work that SWAPO had undertaken during the years of exile assisted in part by sympathetic development assistance agencies. Prior to the appearance of *Toward Education for All* there was a series of consultations and seminars among MEC personnel and wider interest groups in Namibia (including NGOs, the private sector, political representatives and donor agencies) who generated ideas and reacted to drafts of the policy statement. Whilst this was very much a local effort, it was supported by the

Swedish International Development Authority, who arranged for Professor Samoff of Stanford University to coordinate the drafting, helped by a team consisting of M.J. Mukendwa and Ulla Kann of the Ministry's Planning and Development Directorate.

14. In its basic nature *Toward Education for All* is both a policy statement and itself a document intend to educate and inform the public, analyzing and explaining the issues that policy has to address and outlining government's proposed approach. It is not itself a costed program of the kind one might find elaborated in a development plan or annual budget statement.

15. Before independence, education administration in Namibia was fragmented, reflecting the racially segregated nature of educational provision in the country. Soon after its assumption of office the government established a national Ministry of Education and Culture with Hon. Nahas Angula as Minister. The Ministry was internally reorganized in 1993/94 – in response to a government thrust to rationalize and streamline the public service – with the help of a consultancy report funded by the Overseas Development Administration. As described in more detail below, a Directorate of Planning and Development was established in this reorganized Ministry with responsibility among other things for management and coordination of external assistance to education. In March 1995, however, the Ministry was subdivided into a continuing Ministry of Basic Education and Culture with responsibilities for basic education, and a new Ministry of Higher Education, Vocational Training, Science and Technology of which Hon. Nahas Angula has been appointed the political head. The new Minister of Basic Education and Culture is Hon. John Mutorwa.

## **Aid and Aid Management**

1. Human resource development in Namibia receives more external aid than any other sector. Despite its size, and certain distinctive characteristics, assistance to human resource development (which in the UNDP reports is more or less synonymous with the education sector) can only be properly understood when viewed in the overall context of aid to Namibia and its management. Before addressing the specific issues of educational aid and its

coordination, the prime subject of this study, it is appropriate first to review the system of which educational aid forms a part.

*Profile of external assistance to Namibia:*

2. Many donors made their initial commitments to independent Namibia's development programs at a donor pledging conference in New York in 1990. At that time, the Namibian government presented its development proposals and gave the main priority areas as education, health, agriculture and water, and housing. Informal agreements were reached about which donors would focus on which sectors in an attempt to avoid over-concentration on some areas and neglect of others. Many donors, then and subsequently, announced forward commitments to Namibia's development programs in the framework of their aid agreements with Namibia. Most operate within a country frame – meaning that their aid for projects and programs supported in Namibia is coming from a “pot” of money earmarked for Namibia, usually committed well in advance, rather than having to compete with projects in other recipient countries for a share of aid under a global or regional frame.

3. Overall aid to Namibia has been estimated by UNDP (*Development Cooperation: Namibia 1991-92*) as US\$64 million in 1990, rising to US\$109 million in 1991 and US\$140 million in 1992. The data available for the period since 1992 is less detailed, and later UNDP data was not available as the present report was being completed. It would appear however that external assistance to Namibia has declined quite markedly. According to the Bank of Namibia's balance of payments data, foreign development assistance to the Namibian government totalled N\$413 million in 1992, N\$365 million in 1993 and N\$321 million in 1994 (all in current Namibian dollars). The fall is even more substantial in terms of US dollars (on average the Namibian dollar was worth 39 US cents in 1990, 36 cents in 1991, 35 cents in 1992, 31 cents in 1993 and 27.5 cents in mid-1994). The decline is thus almost 40% from US\$144.6 million to US\$88.3 million between 1992 and 1994.

4. For the periods in respect of which it is available the UNDP report is generally agreed to be the most authoritative source for a composite view, although data is also compiled by the Bank of Namibia and some is collected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Bank of Namibia acknowledges the incompleteness of its own coverage and in some cases supplements its data

from UNDP. A number of informants suggested to the author that UNDP data may itself be subject to some under-reporting in so far as some countries' mechanisms for aid disbursement may result in the local embassy itself having an incomplete picture of what has been spent in the donor country for the benefit of Namibia. It is likely, too, that a number of small donations (such as books and equipment) and some sums channelled through NGOs are not fully recorded.

5. Beyond that there are various difficulties in assembling a composite picture arising from the fact that donors do not have identical financial years, and that currency exchange rates are liable to fluctuate both within any single twelve-month period and from year to year. Moreover, there are many inconsistencies in the way donors report their expenditures. Practices vary on whether the donor's administrative personnel managing aid projects in Windhoek are charged up to the aid budget and on treatment of expenditure in the home country related to projects in Namibia. Until there is more standardization of definitions, strict comparability will be impossible to achieve.

6. According to the draft report (September 1994) of the Public Expenditure Review, annual government income in Namibia is about N\$3.2 billion (approximately US\$900 million). As discussed below, it would appear that only about a tenth of external assistance (approximately US\$15 million), actually passes through the central State Revenue Fund, and is therefore within the N\$3.2 billion budget figure. One can calculate, therefore, that foreign aid increases the resources at the disposal of the Namibian state by something like US\$130 million to US\$1,025 million. UNDP has calculated foreign aid as 14.3% of government expenditure, 15.2% of government revenue and 5.8% of Namibia's gross domestic product in 1992 (See Table 1).

7. In its *Development Cooperation* report, UNDP classifies external aid under six major headings as follows:

- *Free-Standing Technical Cooperation (FTC)*: this is designated as "free-standing" because it is not linked to the implementation of specific investment projects. This technical cooperation involves provision of resources aimed at the transfer of technical and managerial skills and know how or technology, mainly through provision of expert personnel, training and equipment.

**Table 1: Macro-Economic Importance of External Assistance to Namibia, 1990-1992**

	1990	1991	1992
Total External Assistance (US\$) (Per Capita)	\$64 million (\$47)	\$109 million (\$78)	\$140 million (\$97)
External Assistance as a Share of Government Expenditure	8.3%	14.4%	14.3%
External Assistance as a Share of Government Revenue	7.0%	13.7%	15.2%
External Assistance as a Share of GDP	3.1%	4.9%	5.8%

(Source: UNDP, *Development Cooperation: Namibia 1991/92*)

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- *Investment-Related Technical Cooperation (ITC)*: this is technical assistance of the same kind as FTC, but specifically linked to investment projects.
  - *Investment Project Assistance (IPA) or Capital Assistance*: this involves provision of resources for specific investment projects, the actual funding being in cash or in kind.
  - *Program/Budgetary Aid or Balance of Payments Support (PBB)*: this consists of grants and loans to pay for commodity imports, debt forgiveness or non-food commodity aid.
  - *Food Aid (FOA)*: food for human consumption, supplied for development purposes.

- *Emergency and Relief Assistance (ERA)*: resources provided to relieve distress, including food supplied for humanitarian purposes.

8. Table 2 shows the amounts and shares of the six categories in overall assistance to Namibia, for 1990, 1991 and 1992. Free-standing technical cooperation is much the largest component, accounting for over half of all assistance in 1992 (and having grown in amount by 150% over a two-year period). Next largest was IPA which grew steadily over the period 1990-1992. Third largest in 1992 was FOA which dramatically escalated as a result of sudden drought. PBB dropped dramatically in 1992 after two years in which it had formed the second biggest category. In part this reflected the fact that in the immediate aftermath of independence, Namibia had few projects ready for implementation and donors were therefore inclined to pass their assistance through the State Revenue Fund. Until the end of 1992, external aid to Namibia was all in grant form but since then a small number of loans have been negotiated.

9. In terms of sectoral distribution, human resources development (education) is the largest component, accounting for 26% in 1992 and even larger percentages in the preceding two years. In 1992, humanitarian relief was an important component of assistance at 13.6%, with a further 13.1% going to agriculture, fisheries and forestry. Because aid commitments and disbursements are uneven, a more balanced appraisal of beneficiary sectors is obtained by looking at flows over a period longer than one year. Thus, taking the three years 1990 to 1992 together, out of the total assistance of US\$313 million recorded by UNDP, education at US\$105 million accounted for just over one-third, followed far behind by economic administration at US\$34 million (11%), development administration at US\$31 million (10%), humanitarian aid relief at US\$29 million (9%), social development at US\$25 million (8%), and agriculture, forestry and fisheries at US\$24 million (8%).

10. The share of bilateral agencies has been just over three-quarters of the total in 1991 (78.2%) and 1992 (76.5%), although it was smaller (at only 46.5%) in the first year of independence. In 1992, another 23% came from multilateral agencies and the remaining amount (0.5%) from NGOs. Of the multilateral assistance approximately two-thirds comes through UN agencies, with a further one-third coming from other multilateral agencies, such as the European Development Fund of the European Union and the Commonwealth

Table 2: Total External Assistance to Namibia by Type, 1990-1992

Type of Assistance	1990		1991		1992	
	Amount (US\$)	%	Amount (US\$)	%	Amount (US\$)	%
FTC	30,260,000	47.0	56,140,000	51.5	75,199,000	53.8
ITC	449,000	0.7	5,756,000	5.3	12,480,000	9.2
IPA	7,735,000	12.0	15,715,000	14.4	23,260,000	16.6
PBB	17,707,000	27.5	27,197,000	24.9	6,862,000	4.9
FOA	106,000	0.2	0	0	17,319,000	12.4
ERA	8,070,000	12.6	4,223,000	3.9	4,369,000	3.1
TOTAL	\$64,327,000	100%	\$109,031,000	100%	\$139,849,000	100%

Key: FTC: Free-Standing Technical Cooperation; ITC: Investment-Related Technical Cooperation; IPA: Investment Project Assistance; PBB: Program/Budget Assistance; FOA: Food Aid; ERA: Emergency and Relief Assistance

(Source: UNDP, *Development Cooperation: Namibia 1991/92*)

Fund for Technical Cooperation. Namibia is atypical among African countries in not having applied to the World Bank for loans. Among the bilateral donors, the largest shares of the 1992 total of US\$106 million were provided by Germany (21%), Sweden (16%), Norway (11%), Finland (9%), France (7%), USA (7%), Denmark (6%), United Kingdom (5%) and Japan (5%).

Once again a longer time span would modify the picture. For example, the USA was much more prominent in 1990 and 1991, but in 1992 payments under the major USAID loan for basic education were suspended on the grounds that Namibia had not met all the conditionalities.

*Management of External Aid by Government – Machinery and Instruments:*

11. Within the Namibian government, the responsibility for negotiating and managing external assistance is shared among a number of different agencies. Subject to the overall authority of Parliament and executive direction by the President's and Prime Minister's offices, responsibility for overall coordination in this area has lain with the National Planning Commission (NPC). Under the National Planning Commission Act of 17 September 1994, the Commission is charged with, *inter alia*, "the management and coordination of international aid resources, including for non-governmental activities". Under the Act, the Director-General (who, though not a Minister, attends meetings of Cabinet), in his or her capacity as head of the Commission, is assigned the function of "promoting and sustaining externally assisted development programs through the negotiation, appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of such programs in consultation with the development cooperation institutions concerned". These powers have been exercised by the NPC in relation to external grant assistance, constituting the great bulk of what Namibia receives (loan assistance has been handled by the Ministry of Finance which negotiates and administers the agreements). In carrying out these functions, the NPC works mainly through its Development Cooperation Directorate – one of four Divisions into which the Commission's staff is divided.

12. Since March 1995, the National Planning Commission has been brought under the Ministry of Finance and is no longer under two separate jurisdictions. It is expected that this will make for more streamlined operations and promote better communication and coordination within government. The

present study presents a picture of aid coordination reflecting the position as it was in late 1994 and early 1995.

13. Most assistance is governed by a cooperation agreement between the Government of Namibia and an overseas country or donor agency. The broad framework agreement, being a function of the diplomatic relations between Namibia and friendly overseas countries, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with necessary advice from the Attorney-General's Office on the legal aspects. When it comes to more specific project agreements within that overall framework, however, there are less clear guidelines about who should be involved and where the donor's "point of entry" to the Namibian government should be. Attempts to resolve this between the National Planning Commission, Attorney-General's Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have not yet yielded positive results, and the system works on a somewhat *ad hoc* basis. Most project agreements are for grant assistance, and thus fall within the purview of the National Planning Commission (NPC). The draft agreement would normally be submitted by the National Planning Commission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney-General's Office for comment, but if none is forthcoming, then – always providing that the line ministry responsible for the project has agreed – the NPC goes ahead and signs. In cases where an overall country cooperation agreement already exists, with approval of NPC, a departmental minister may sometimes sign a project agreement. This is usually only when his or her ministry is the only one affected. If more than one ministry is involved, signature must be by the NPC.

14. Typically under many agreements there are two or more meetings per year between the Namibian government and donor representatives to review progress. It is customary for one of the meetings to include negotiations on the forward program in the coming year. This system operates especially in the case of the Scandinavians whose share of education aid to Namibia is comparatively large.

15. In so far as aid comes from many different sources and under different terms and conditions for each donor, its management presents special challenges to a recipient government. Ideally, the recipient country lays down priorities in the context of its overall economic strategy and development plans and sets out the terms on which it will accept assistance from other countries. In Namibia, a transitional development plan framed in 1991 as a two-year plan

was followed by something of a hiatus, and the first Five-Year National Development Plan will only be completed and published in 1995.

16. Namibia has as yet made only modest progress in the direction of developing a framework of policies and procedures on the receipt of external assistance. There is little explicit guidance on procedures to be followed, on the need to conform with Namibian priorities, on the channelling of assistance and payment arrangements, on responsibilities for local contributions to projects, or on reporting requirements. A first attempt was made by NPC to codify procedures for processing international agreements and a fairly substantial and detailed set of guidelines is in draft. This has so far not seen the light of day, largely because of lack of agreement among individual ministries and agencies about their own preserves. There is also in draft a potentially useful project preparation manual drawn up by the NPC in 1993/94; however, it still unfortunately lacks the important section of Volume II dealing with foreign aid. The material in Volume I of the manual on Principles and Techniques appears to be conceptually sound but it does not constitute an operational manual for Namibia's own institutional context prescribing the specific procedures to be followed in negotiating and applying foreign assistance to Namibia's development.

17. A first prerequisite for the effective management of aid is a comprehensive and authoritative reporting system. In Namibia, however, different national and external bodies have each independently sent out aid-recording *pro formae* to donors. The problem arises partly from the multiplicity of Namibian agencies with a legitimate concern to obtain information. The Auditor-General's Office needs information for financial management reasons, NPC because of the important role of aid in moving development programs and projects forward, Foreign Affairs must watch the international relations repercussions, and the Bank of Namibia carries responsibility for the value of the currency and the financial flows which impact on it as manifested in balance of payments data.

18. Clearly a common information base to serve all these interests is desirable and efforts are also now under way to find a solution to coordinating the tracking and recording of external assistance to Namibia. Steps are being taken, through the convening of a working group of the parties concerned, to try to achieve rationalization and standardization of reporting instruments,

eliminating the separate reporting requests from the UNDP, Bank of Namibia and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

19. A second problem stems from the semi-autonomy of powerful ministers and ministries who often inadvertently, but on occasion more deliberately, engage in negotiations with foreign donors for support for their ministry's programs without keeping NPC at the center fully informed either about what is intended or about the outcome. This can have unfortunate repercussions in terms of distorting government's own priorities. The line ministry may perhaps be unaware of the total context of aid disbursement, and that funding for its latest project is actually being charged by the donor against an account with a ceiling on it. The ministry may thus unwittingly "hijack" funds which the center had pencilled in as being for another ministry or sector. A recent case in point was cited to the author of a minister obtaining what he thought was additional aid for a project from a European aid agency, only to learn later that the foreign ambassador had assumed that in acceding to a cabinet minister's request for financial support, both sides knew he was doing so within an agreed aid ceiling and for a purpose that would have the support of the Namibian government as a whole. The temptation for both donors and recipient ministries to do their own thing independent of the center is great. They often become impatient of the slowness of bureaucratic procedures and clearances which are brought into play when the proper channels are used.

*Management of External Aid by Government – Disbursement Channels:*

20. Disbursement of foreign aid to Namibia flows through various channels. Some donors, particularly the Swedes and the Dutch, prefer that if possible aid should pass through the government budget, which in effect means through the State Revenue Fund. There are indeed many advantages in such a course. It emphasizes that the Namibian authorities are in control of the process and that aid constitutes an enhancement of the Namibian state's resources for socio-economic development. It makes it more possible for the government to have a clear picture of overall resource availability and to weigh priorities for their allocation. It is also a means of making the aid process more transparent and subject to the due processes of democratic government.

21. In spite of these apparent advantages, only a small part of external aid to Namibia is channelled this way, much of it being expended directly by donors who themselves pay contractors or suppliers of goods and services, or directly hire technical cooperation personnel. There are many reasons for this and they mostly reflect the preference of donors. They have the following reservations about channelling funds through the SRF:

- lack of confidence that their assistance represents true additionality when it is mixed with all other government revenue;
- difficulties hitherto in tracing expenditure by donor source because of Namibia's own inadequate recording systems;
- lack of close identification between the grant of assistance and project benefits, thus potentially limiting the amount of publicity and credit received by the donor;
- lateness of the Auditor-General in producing reports confirming the proper application of funds;
- government regulations on such matters as competitive tendering which have often seemed cumbersome to donors, involving both complexity and delay;
- the potential political sensitivity involved in making payments from the government budget, and so subject to parliamentary scrutiny and approval to donor country suppliers and technical assistance personnel at international rather than Namibian rates; and,
- lack of provision under the SRF for carry-over of funds at the end of the financial year, a major disadvantage in relation to development projects.

22. Not all of these drawbacks are necessarily insurmountable within the framework of the State Revenue Fund. Steps are already being taken to introduce more detailed source of funds codes against each project which would in future make it possible to identify expenditures against each aid donation. Then again, alternatives to reliance on the government Auditor-General for auditing aid-supported project expenditures could surely be contemplated.

23. Some donors using the SRF channel make payments to the SRF against invoices after the expenditure has been incurred rather than transferring funds in advance to the SRF. For both the donor and for the Namibian Treasury this

obviously works better, provided that verification of expenditure is speedy. It is less problematical in a case like Water Affairs, when the accountable ministry carries out projects with its own engineers, but more so in the case of a ministry like Education and Culture which does not have its own executive capacity for undertaking school building projects.

24. Even with all these provisos and mitigation devices, it nevertheless remains true that many donors find Namibia's budget structure very difficult to cope with, more particularly the problem of passing funds out of their own accounts into a Namibian fund that is subject to acceptable procedures and checks. There has been some discussion as to whether special suspense accounts could be operated within the main financial system. Another device finding increasing favor is the creation of special funds attached to various ministries for specified purposes. MEC itself has a Cultural Development Fund and in 1993 received cabinet authorization to establish an Educational Development Fund (a Road Fund and a Vocational Training Fund already exist). Yet another device recently adopted by some donors is resort to a trustworthy NGO like the Rossing Foundation, to hold and administer funds on the donors' behalf. This arrangement has been used to some effect in education particularly.

25. It was suggested to the author in some quarters (but denied by others) that government itself saw advantage in reducing the size of the visible government budget in relation to the overall national product, since a large public sector can excite criticism in the current climate of international opinion. For this reason, it was suggested, government itself may not be averse to a system incorporating parallel budgets, or to parastatals operating outside the state budget framework, and so on. The attractions to individual line ministries of a system with looser treasury supervision are obvious, even where they acknowledge the theoretical benefits from treasury coordination.

26. The Ministry of Finance is understandably concerned about the proliferation of such funds beyond its own direct control. Compartmentalization of surpluses and deficits, preventing them being easily offset against each other, can increase the overall cost to government of financial management. Also, these funds are regarded by some as a way of evading government financial regulations and civil service procedures.

27. The above discussion has concentrated on technical and administrative arguments for and against using regular budgetary mechanisms for channelling external aid to national development purposes. In Namibia around the time of independence, however, there were unique considerations relating to the process of political transition that prompted the new regime to encourage the use of "off-budget" parallel channels for the delivery of aid. Immediately prior to independence, the regime-in-waiting viewed external assistance as an important element in its plans for effecting rapid change. It was recognized that the profile of the administration following independence would not be radically different from what it had been previously. This gave rise to the expectation that reactionary forces within the administration would attempt either to slow down reforms or, if the reforms succeeded, to take credit for their success and gain legitimacy in the process. Hence, the post-independence government encouraged external agencies to use parallel "off-budget" procedures in order to forestall the twin dangers of potential derailment of reforms and the legitimization of reactionary forces. It saw the use of these parallel channels as a temporary expedient in the unique circumstances of Namibia's political transition. Given the current situation in which the profile of the administration better reflects Namibia's national make-up, the use of such parallel channels is no longer encouraged.

*Coordination with and among Donors:*

28. Coordination among donors takes place at several levels and in various fora. At the apex are the high-level inter-governmental meetings such as the New York Donors' Conference in 1990 which was in effect a pledging conference in support of the newly independent Namibia. A similar high-level meeting, but this time without the explicit intention of holding a formal pledging session, is a planned Round Table in 1995 to review Namibia's development achievements and prospects in the context of the new Five-Year Plan which may by that time be complete. The event has been described by Dr. Ngavirue, the Director-General of Planning, as in essence "much more an on-going economic policy dialogue than a fund-raising event". Consideration is presently being given to whether the 1995 meeting should be in Geneva or in Windhoek. The joint conveners would be the Government of Namibia and UNDP.

29. The Government of Namibia has machinery for regular consultation with donor agencies. The NPC has its own framework of quarterly meetings

with donors to acquaint them with new policy developments and plans and to learn something of donors' own perceptions and intentions. In practice, these meetings have been more sporadic, as NPC does not always have items of importance to form a sufficient agenda, so what in theory is an event at regular intervals is, in practice, much more *ad hoc*. Line ministries may themselves from time to time hold briefing meetings with the donor community to review overall progress in their sector or to canvass views on specific new initiatives. Examples from education were the general briefing meeting for donors held in September 1993 and a more targeted session in April 1994 to review the future USAID program on basic education. Such events serve to elicit views and ensure that donors working in the same area are acquainted with major new initiatives. The Department of Adult and Continuing Education in MEC holds its own regular consultations with a group of donors on literacy programs.

30. Donor agencies working in Namibia have their own separate fora for consultation and coordination. UNDP convenes meetings of donors in principle every two months but in practice more like every four months, chaired by the UN Resident Representative. These are primarily "meetings of donors" but may at times include government representation. About 50 donor representatives are invited and normally about half that number attend. No minutes are kept. Some bilateral donors make the criticism that the UN agencies tend to dominate the proceedings and that representatives of the Namibia government should play a larger role.

31. The representatives from European Union states also hold their own meetings both at Heads of Mission level (where issues across the board, spanning wider international relations concerns and not just cooperation, are discussed) and at the level of development cooperation officers. The latter meetings occur every six or eight weeks. They provide the opportunity to EU donor agencies to report new proposals for assistance and responses to them, and enable the European Commission to mobilize support among member countries for its own proposed assistance to Namibia (thus making it more likely that the necessary political support will be forthcoming in European Development Fund project committees in Brussels, charged with screening and approving proposals from the field). Until recently, the Nordic countries also had their own separate coordination meetings, but following the application

by several member states to join the EU these Nordic consultations have in large part been superseded by ones in the wider EU framework.

32. There are in addition occasional international consultations organized by individual agencies. A case in point is UNICEF which in August 1994 convened a seminar open to other donors on its work in basic education as part of its overall program mid-term review.

## **Aid to the Education Sector: Profile and Structures**

### *Profile of External Assistance to Education:*

1. The current profile of education assistance to Namibia, especially its sources and forms, can be partly explained by reference to historical factors, particularly the external support to SWAPO before independence and the aid that newly independent Namibia received immediately afterwards. During the independence struggle, considerable external support was available to Namibians outside the country. It took the form of scholarships for individuals studying in the industrialized countries and of other support for the programs and projects, mainly in Southern Africa, run by SWAPO and others for Namibians in exile. Several of the larger assistance projects now in operation began with the same partners in the pre-independence period but at that time working outside Namibia. The projects and activities were later repatriated to Namibia and built upon or developed in the five years that have elapsed since independence. This has been truest of education assistance from the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) but also applies to an extent to certain activities and projects in which Germany and the UK have participated.

2. A number of individuals from these countries have been closely associated with educational development efforts over an eight- or ten-year period spanning the achievement of independence. In some cases, the NGOs which were instrumental in delivering official assistance before independence have continued their role afterwards – prominent examples are the Namibian Association of Norway (NAMAS), WUS Denmark (IBIS), the University of Bremen, and the University of Umea in Sweden. Some projects and institutions which started outside the country for Namibians in exile (e.g. the

Loudima School in the Congo or the Namibian Extension College in Lusaka) have continued in one form or another, and quite often with the same overseas partners, in the post-independence period. The significance of personal relationships in this cannot be overstated, given that so many of the overseas personnel have continued to serve Namibia and that the SWAPO Education Secretary in Exile, Comrade Nahas Angula, was appointed Minister of Education and Culture in the Government of Namibia after independence, held that portfolio for five years up to March 1995, and continues up to the present date in education with responsibilities as Minister of Higher Education, Vocational Training, Science and Technology.

3. Nevertheless, independence triggered a vast array of new contacts and cooperative relationships as countries abroad extended the hand of friendship to Namibia and entered into partnerships with her. A host of countries, international agencies and NGOs concluded agreements with Namibia for educational and cultural cooperation. Some of the new partners were very major players in terms of the size of their assistance to education, particularly the United States (USAID) and the European Community (now the European Union).

4. In October 1994, the list of agreements registered with the MEC involved 35 separate countries of which, interestingly enough, almost half (17) were developing countries including ten in Africa, four in Asia and three in Latin America. The industrialized countries included nine members of the EU, four other West European countries, Australia, Canada, USA, Czechoslovakia and Russia. There were also agreements with UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, World Food Program, Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth of Learning, Ford Foundation, Peace Corps and World Teach. A full list is given in Appendix 2.

5. The agreements referred to above are framework agreements in principle. Some might best be described as “solidarity agreements” and have not been accompanied by the substance of resource flows. But very many of them have in fact been made operational. This even applies to some of the developing country agreements – thus the UNDP Development Cooperation report for 1991/92 shows Nigeria as the sixth largest, and Cuba as tenth largest, source of assistance for human resource development, and the

Egyptian government has also been a significant supplier of teaching personnel in recent years.

6. In the years following independence, education took the lion's share of external assistance to Namibia. This situation reflects the fact that education development was government's highest priority at independence. Education of the majority of the population had been neglected in the pre-independence period and there was a large backlog to be made up, for both socio-political and economic reasons. The previously fragmented system of education provision required unification and a new curriculum, with English as the new national language, had to be established.

7. Human resource development – which in this context is more or less synonymous with education – was calculated by UNDP to benefit from a third of aid receipts (US\$105 million out of US\$313 million) in the three-year period between 1990 and 1992. According to the UNDP report on Development Cooperation 1991-1992, it accounted for over 40% of aid received in 1990. Even when the proportion of aid to education had fallen to 26% by 1992, it was twice as high as for any other sector. In absolute terms, the assistance to the human resource development sector was estimated at US\$28 million in 1990, US\$40 million in 1991, and US\$36 million in 1992.

8. The share of the Ministry of Education in government receipts of aid can be reckoned at a little less than 20% by 1993/94, if the MEC estimate of the education assistance it received of about N\$58 million for 1993/94 (and about N\$60 million in 1992/93) is correct. On this same basis, the total volume of aid received annually by MEC would represent in the region of 7% of the annual budgetary resources of the ministry, which are estimated at N\$809 million for 1993/94 and N\$952 million for 1995/96. In purely quantitative terms, therefore, aid receipts cannot be described as dominant in the overall resources available to MEC.

9. It must once again be stressed that assistance to education through the MEC does not represent the whole of assistance to human resource development (education and training) recorded by the UNDP report (see Table 3) since:

- some assistance passes through NGOs – the Bank of Namibia balance of payments data appear to indicate that between one

quarter and one-fifth of all assistance to Namibia flows to agencies other than government;

- assistance to technical and vocational education and training has hitherto been the responsibility of the Ministry of Labor and Human Resources Development – more completely so since MEC in April 1994 transferred four vocational training institutes;
- MEC may be responsible for administration of overseas bursaries, possibly accounting for much of the human resource development assistance received from some agencies, but the bulk of overseas bursaries are not strictly speaking aid to the education sector;
- although MEC is the ministry responsible for channelling government funding to the University of Namibia, it is only partially aware of assistance flowing direct from donor agencies to the university; and,
- a good deal of the technical assistance furnished to Namibia by external donors may never have been recorded in Namibia's balance of payments data at all; much is passed direct from the donor agency to bank accounts of suppliers and technical assistance personnel in the donor's own country, even though for the ostensible benefit of Namibia.

10. The MEC's record of donors (drawn either from the projects list of the Project Planning Section or from the schedule of foreign aid, pledges, donations gifts and assistance to the government provided by the MEC's Finance Department to the Ministry of Finance) has listed about 30 foreign donors, the composition of the list varying from year to year, and with significant variations in the rank order of the different contributors.

11. Analysis of foreign aid with its different definitions and sources of assistance, and rather sketchy registers of money actually spent is complex. It is not easy to reconcile the different data sets, as Appendix 1 confirms. The sources used are the UNDP Development Cooperation Report for 1991-92,

the Ministry of Education and Culture's submissions to the Ministry of Finance for 1992/93 and 1993/94, and MEC's project list as at July 1994.

12. One obvious point to emerge from an analysis of Appendix 1 is that data derived from a rather synoptic record prepared by UNDP and covering NGOs will produce larger totals than the Ministry of Education's own account of what MEC itself has received. In any case, as noted above, human resource development is broader than the Ministry's own administrative responsibilities. Moreover, it may well be that donor reporting of assistance expenditures will always tend to exceed what is recorded by a receiving ministry, especially where donors know that their submissions are going to be put alongside others' contributions in a kind of "league table" format. In fact, many donors do not involve MEC in the selection of consultants or technical assistance personnel and do not divulge the terms on which such people are hired. Such lack of openness and transparency, where it occurs, greatly complicates the task of local officials charged with managing external assistance with maximum cost-effectiveness. For all these reasons, it is hardly surprising that in Appendix 1 the column of figures derived from UNDP should show (for 1992) a very much higher total than the subsequent columns, which are based on the Ministry of Education reports and cover somewhat later twelve-months periods.

13. A second point to emerge from an analysis of the different data sets is that there are important discrepancies between them. For example, the Development Cooperation report produced by UNDP shows Germany (US\$8 million) as the largest donor in 1992, followed by the United States (US\$6.8 million) and Sweden (US\$6.1 million). These three countries together provided more than half the US\$36.4 million shown for 1992. However, MEC's Finance Department submission to the Treasury for 1992/93 lists only about US\$18 million (N\$59.3 million) of aid and assigns minor significance to the German government contribution; it shows the United States and Sweden contributing nearly 60% of the total (about N\$35 million between them). Possible explanations are that German assistance to human resource development may have been largely for technical and vocational education outside MEC's jurisdiction, or passed directly from the German authorities to German schools, such as the German-language International School in Windhoek.

Table 3: Assistance to Human Resource Development in Namibia, 1990-1992, by Sub-Sector

	1990		1991		1992	
	US\$ (m)	%	US\$ (m)	%	US\$ (m)	%
Sector Policy and Planning	5.1	18	7.9	20	6.8	19
Primary Schooling	0.9	3	10.1	25	6.6	18
Secondary Schooling	2.1	7	4.6	12	2.7	7
Tertiary Education	0.4	1	2.1	5	1.3	3
Technical and Managerial Education and Training	17.6	62	11.7	29	16.3	45
Non-Formal Education	2.4	8	3.7	9	2.8	8
<b>TOTAL ASSISTANCE TO HRD</b>	<b>\$28.5m</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>\$40.1m</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>\$36.4m</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>TOTAL EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE</b>	<b>\$64.3m</b>		<b>\$109m</b>		<b>\$140m</b>	

Table 3b: Sources of Assistance to Human Resource Development in Namibia, 1992 (US\$)

**Table 3b: Sources of Assistance to Human Resource Development in Namibia, 1992 (US\$)**

Germany	7,954,000	Belgium	208,000
United States	6,761,000	Norway	202,000
Sweden	6,078,000	European Union	141,000
Denmark	3,590,000	Austria	115,000
United Kingdom	3,228,000	Italy	115,000
Nigeria	1,461,000	China	97,000
CFTC	1,159,000	Russia	74,000
Finland	1,065,000	Food and Agriculture	
Australia	1,031,000	Organization	70,000
Cuba	986,000	SIEDC	35,000
UNDP	553,000	Overseas Service Bur.	24,000
World Food Program	502,000	Flemish Assoc. Dev.Coop.	10,000
France	471,000	Korea	10,000
UNICEF	411,000		

(Source: *UNDP Development Cooperation: Namibia 1991/92*)

14. In the Ministry's 1993/94 list, the United States does not appear at all, even though a large Florida State University team was working in the Ministry of Education and Culture and was being paid for on the MEC budget. USAID had in previous years paid monies into the State Revenue Fund notionally linked to MEC contracts with US institutions for basic education development. But the assistance agreement also stipulated very many conditionalities and the US withheld the third tranche of the funds on the grounds that these had not yet been met. As a result, there was not in fact any inflow of aid to be registered in MEC's list. For 1993/94, the Ministry shows the main donors to be Sweden (SIDA) at N\$16.3 million, Denmark (IBIS/WUS) at \$10.0 million, the European Union at \$4.7 million, CASS (University of Bremen) at \$3.3 million, Norway (NAMAS) at \$2.8 million, and the World Food Program at \$2.2 million. From these figures it is apparent that SIDA and Danish IBIS/WUS accounted for over half of MEC recorded aid receipts in 1993/94, even though they represent only two out of more than 30 donors.

15. It is not immediately clear why there should be discrepancies between the list prepared by the Education Project Planning Sub-Division (EPP) and that submitted by the Ministry's Finance Division to the Ministry of Finance. The EPP list totals N\$6 million more, a large part of this being accounted for

by infrastructural support to the NIED (of nearly \$5 million) and other SIDA items. The EPP list also shows an extra N\$1.7 million for World Food Program aid, N\$1 million more ODA assistance and an extra N\$760,000 for the UNDP/UNESCO basic education teacher development project. Offset against these increases are items appearing on the Finance Division's submission but not on the EPP list including N\$1.6 million through DNEG (German-Namibian Development Society), N\$1 million of assistance through WUS-Denmark (IBIS) for classrooms at deprived schools, and miscellaneous donations from a spectrum of small donors of books, materials and equipment and vehicles.

16. It can also be seen from Appendix 1 that a number of large curriculum projects, as well as some major construction projects, figure prominently in the overall total. In 1993/94 for example, when the giant Florida State University project is somehow omitted from the reckoning, a quarter of all other assistance (N\$13 million) received by MEC was accounted for by the Danish Life Science project, the EU's INSTANT project in maths and science, the social science development work of CASS, the Swedish teacher education reform project and FINNIDA's cross-curriculum culture project. Classroom construction by Sweden, Denmark and the European Union accounted for at least another \$7.5 million, about 15%. There was in addition to a major literacy project funded by Sweden.

17. The donor-funded projects registered with the Ministry of Education and Culture have been separately analyzed in Table 4 by donors under twelve different areas of education activity. From this table it will be noted that, as one would expect, the largest donors have the widest spread of support by program areas, with SIDA active in seven of the twelve areas listed. UNICEF and the United States are each engaged in four areas, and Britain (ODA), Denmark, Norway (NAMAS) and UNESCO in three each. Seen from the standpoint of areas of activity, curriculum development based on the National Institute for Education Development (NIED) attracts support from eleven donors, with nine donors providing teaching personnel including volunteers for schools. Six donors are engaged in assisting each of administration, management and planning; adult and community education and literacy; and, support for teachers colleges. Five assist school construction. Clearly these specialized areas with several active donors are ones where particular attention must be paid to coordination.

*Government's Coordination of External Aid to Education:  
the Case of Namibia*

18. An analysis by the Ministry of Education showed that in 1992/93, three-quarters of all aid (by value) received by the Ministry of Education was for projects (mainly for curriculum development and institutional support); 8% was for non-project personnel assistance (which consisted for the most part of seconded and volunteer teachers from Egypt, Nigeria, Peace Corps, Africa Groups of Sweden, World Teach, VSO, etc.); 8% for construction; 3% for equipment (and a further 1% divided between computers and vehicles); 2% for books; and, 2% for short training programs.

19. During the three-year period 1990-92, aggregate assistance for human resource development was US\$105 million. Of this amount \$45.6 million (43%) went to technical and managerial education and training; \$19.8 million (19%) to sector policy and planning; \$17.6 million (17%) to primary schooling; \$9.4 million (9%) to secondary schooling; \$3.7 million (4%) to tertiary education; and, \$8.9 million (9%) to non-formal education. The basis for categorization, however, is not completely clear. It would appear, for example, that the substantial curriculum development projects at NIED are counted by UNDP as "technical and managerial education and training" rather than "sector policy and planning" or alternatively, they are allocated to the level of schooling for which curricula were being drawn.

20. Analysis of a Ministry of Education aid project list by receiving agency shows 24 out of 67 projects being directed towards NIED and a further 15 to other ministry units (5 to the Division of Adult and Continuing Education; 3 to Education Program Implementation; 2 to Education Planning; and, 5 to "Headquarters"). The Ondangwa region had seven projects and Katima Mulilo/Rundu five. Two each were allocated to special education and to examinations, and the remaining twelve were for more miscellaneous programs.

*Aid Management in the Ministry of Education and Culture:*

21. Although external aid represents only about 7% of resources available to MEC, its management is extremely time consuming and, in administrative terms, occupies a higher proportion of ministerial time and that of senior officials. Visiting delegations and negotiating/review teams can be very demanding in terms of requests for access to policy makers, and are often tempted to try to circumvent local bureaucracy and procedures by going straight to the Minister's office. In particular because of the continuity of

service of Hon. Nahas Angula as Minister, Hon. J. Wentworth as Assistant Minister, and Mr Vitalis Ankama as Principal Secretary, an important element of coordination and continuity has resided in the offices of the most senior personnel, who have been personally familiar with the salient features of the external assistance to Namibian education and well acquainted with many of the individual actors. It now remains to be seen whether, following the division of the Ministry of Education and Culture into two ministries, and the recent sad loss of the late Director of Planning Mr. M.J. Mukendwa, the system and procedures for coordination can retain their effectiveness. The following discussion is largely in terms of the arrangements that were in place before the Ministry of Education and Culture was split in two.

22. Soon after independence, Namibia established an External Resources Division in the Planning Directorate of the then Department of Formal Education in MEC. Later, in 1993 when the ministry was rationalized to reduce the size and complexity of the structure (instead of 16 Headquarters Directorates, the Ministry now had 10), responsibility for aid management and coordination was vested in the Education Project Planning Sub-Division of the Directorate of Planning and Development. This Sub-Division is responsible for assisting ministry divisions to formulate projects in education and culture for incorporation into the ministry and national development plans and for subsequent implementation. It is the coordinating secretariat in the ministry for external aid and this involves it (under its supervising Director) with responsibility for: liaising with the National Planning Commission and external donors in providing preparatory and support services in connection with aid negotiations and reviews with donor representatives; reporting on external aid to the Ministry of Finance, NPC and other bodies; and, liaising with other divisions of the Ministry in the matter of aid requirements and procedures. This Sub-Division is the central intelligence point in the Ministry on external assistance. In early 1995, the Sub-Division had just two professional officers in established posts, the senior of whom, a Senior Education Planner, reported directly to the Director of Planning and Development who in turn reported direct to the Permanent Secretary. This meant that although the head of the Sub-Division was not particularly senior in terms of the overall service hierarchy, the lines of communication through

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Table 4: Donor Funded Projects with the Ministry of Education and Culture, Namibia - July 1994

Donor	Mangmnt., Admin. & Planning	Adult and Comm. Ed. & Literacy	Primary Edn.	School Feeding	School Constructn.	Teachers & Volunteers in Schools	Teacher Education (Constructn.)	Teacher Education (Other Sppt.)	Curriculum Development - NIED	Exams & Assess- ment	Special Edn.	Tech. Edn.
Afr. Development Bank							X					
Afr. Groups of Sweden						X						
APSO (Italy)								XX				
Bremen University								X	X			
Consol. Diamond Mines									X*			
CFTC (Commonwealth)	X											
CIDA (Canada)									X			
Catholic Inst. Int. Relat.		X									X	
Deutsche-Nam. Gesell.					XXX							
Deutsche-Nam. Dienst												X
Dienst in Uhersee		X				X						
Egypt						X						
European Union					X				X			
FINNIDA (Finland)									X			
Germany						X						
IRIS (WUS-Denmark)					X			X	XX			
Japan	X											
Luxemburg							X					
NAMAS (Norway)						X		X	X			
Nambrick					X							
Nigeria						X						
ODA (UK)	X								XXX	XX		
Peace Corps						X						
SIDA (Sweden)	XX	X			X	X	X	XXX	XX			
UNDP/UNESCO		X						XX			X	
UNFPA									X			
UNICEF	X	X	X								X	
USAID (USA)	X	X	X						X			
Voluntary Service Overs						X						
World Food Program				X								

One X denotes one project; two Xs denote two projects; three Xs denote three projects.

\* Support for the construction of the NIED building at Okahandja.

(Source: Ministry of Education and Culture, *Donor-Supported Projects*, 1994)

to the highest ranks of the Ministry were much shorter than for her equivalents in other divisions. Because the Sub-Division was also responsible for the UNESCO National Commission as well, it was seriously overworked at some periods of the year, particularly in the September-December period when many bilateral aid reviews take place and the UNESCO General Conference is in session (in alternate years) in Paris.

23. The Sub-Division has been reinforced in the last three years by the presence of an Aid Coordination Adviser, part-funded by Sweden under its program of assistance to the ministry. The Adviser's job description (on appointment) have been appended to this study as Appendix 3 given that it conveniently summarizes the functions which the aid coordination unit (the Education Project Planning Sub-Division) of the Ministry has been expected to perform in relation to external assistance. The incumbent of this advisory post, now in the third year of her assignment, has been reporting to the Director of Planning and Development and working very closely with the staff of the EPP Sub-Division. To an increasing extent, her work has focused as much on education planning and policy advice as on aid coordination and management.

24. As indicated above, the Director of Planning and Development and the EPP Sub-Division are the Ministry's link-point with the NPC in relation both to project planning and to external aid. They have to keep the NPC informed of aid requirements and progress on existing aid projects and to ensure the center is briefed about any direct discussions or negotiations with external donors by MEC. They are responsible for keeping ministry divisions informed of national requirements and policy on the terms and uses of external aid, and for ensuring compliance with national policies. In a very small country like Namibia this would seem at first sight to be a straightforward task.

25. In practice things are more complicated, and while NPC and the Ministry generally work harmoniously, there is room for misunderstanding. The fact that the offices are physically nearly two kilometers apart does not conduce to easy working contact. Namibia does not, unlike some countries, have a system of cross-posting of planners from a central pool to sectoral ministries so there is not at present a built-in arrangement for ensuring the MEC and NPC are each fully attuned to the culture of the other. NPC has not so far been able to fulfil a commitment to MEC to attach a staff member to the

Ministry for a few months. In NPC there is a feeling that education often goes its own way in discussions with external aid donors without keeping the NPC fully informed at the appropriate time, and that it too readily resorts to technical assistance from abroad. In MEC *per contra* one hears the criticism that NPC has a tendency too readily to equate development expenditure with physical capital, despite the fact that in education much of the investment is in the form of curriculum development, staff training and setting up management information systems. There is also an awareness of the problem that agreements signed between the Ministry of Finance (for loans) or NPC (grants) with external donors may have serious implications for ministry budgets if they entail obligations for Namibian expenditure as a local contribution to projects. Office accommodation, housing, transport, secretarial services, administrative support and health services may all be agreed at the center as a Namibian obligation, but the cost of providing them falls to the budgets of ministries that may not have been consulted.

26. The introduction of a national development plan, and of stronger central mechanisms for coordinating external assistance will undoubtedly be contributory factors producing in future the closer meshing of MEC and NPC activities. In part the current situation has reflected the relatively recent creation of the NPC and the comparative novelty of external aid as an area of policy and management in Namibia.

27. One field where relatively well defined procedures are in place is the receipt of donations, and this particularly affects MEC because of the large number of gifts of equipment and books to school laboratories and libraries, and also to the national libraries and museums that fall under the Ministry. The proliferation of relatively small gifts can be inferred from scrutiny of Appendix I. They tend to be unsolicited (a characteristic distinguishing such donations from equipment and books provided as part of a project under an aid agreement) which in itself can cause difficulties for the recipient ministry. The goods supplied may not accord with local needs, and the very business of receiving them may be expensive in terms of customs clearance and duties, transport, storage and the like. Cases can be cited where useless goods have been given to Namibia, or where the gifts have been useful but the costs involved in receiving them exceed the market price of such goods in the country!

28. Namibia's Treasury instructions contain detailed regulations on "Donations to the State and Grants-in-Aid". They require permission to be obtained before any cash, movable or immovable items are accepted. It is necessary to state the purpose, value, identity of donor, motive for donations, full particulars of the donation (including in the case of books the names of authors, publishers and years of printing!) and any financial implications. Any donation in the form of money has to be paid into revenue – as was noted with reference to the State Revenue Fund, agencies are not generally allowed to operate their own bank accounts. Each ministry has to submit at the end of the financial year a consolidated list of all donations and grants. It is these lists that constitute an inventory of aid received by MEC in the course of a financial year and which have been one source used in compiling some of the tables in this report.

29. In practice, the system of authorizations works more as a records system and for stock control than as a qualitative control over the acceptance or rejection of gifts. It is exceedingly rare for the Treasury to insist on a gift being rejected – approval of acceptance is given almost automatically. The system then serves mainly to record the acquisition by the state of items from donors and serves as a check against gifts intended for the state being disposed of privately. Although the machinery exists in theory therefore to scrutinise donations in advance and regulate their acceptance according to the interest of the state, the limited capacity of the bureaucracy prevents such powers being exercised effectively. In practice, too, since many donations materialize through state visits or encounters between Namibian ministers and foreign ambassadors or delegations, there are strong diplomatic obstacles to hardheaded rejection of unwanted gifts.

30. One initiative taken to systematize the receipt of book donations was the drafting of a manual *Draft Guidelines for Book Donation to Namibia* by Jennifer Linden (1993), a visiting American student. This attempted to provide guidance to would-be donors about Namibia's needs and the correct channels for making donations, and reminded donors and recipients alike of the procedures in force. Although MEC has had the draft for 18 months, it has not yet seen the light of day as a published document. In a suitably revised format, documents of this kind can serve a useful purpose for donor and recipient alike.

*Government's Coordination of External Aid to Education:  
the Case of Namibia*

31. On matters such as book donations referred to above, the EPP Sub-Division has the responsibility of ensuring that other divisions and units in the Ministry conform with the requirements of policy. For EPP is not itself generally the recipient of donations of aid – it is the recorder/registrar and the coordinator. Donations of books are received by the Directorate of Library and Archives Services, or in the case of schools by the regional offices via MEC's Directorate of General Services and Directorate of Educational Program Implementation. The Director of NIED is in charge of implementing the curriculum development projects supported by external aid, and the Chief Education Officer for the Secondary Education Area for coordinating much of the supply of teaching personnel from half a dozen or more overseas agencies. The Directorate of Adult and Continuing Education Programs manages several important literacy and adult education programs that are externally funded.

32. It follows from this that the involvement with external agencies is quite widely spread throughout the Ministry and that there are many senior actors having their own contacts with donors. It is a challenge for EPP to keep itself informed of informal discussions and agreements between units in the Ministry and donors, and to induce colleagues to conform with standard procedures. In some senses, the problems of coordination and communication between the Ministry of Finance, NPC and MEC are mirrored within MEC itself.

*Coordination of the Aid Donors in Education:*

33. MEC pursues some purposeful approaches to coordinate the assistance that comes from assistance agencies. One form this takes is encouragement of a certain division of labor among the different donors, with specific areas being nationally allocated to particular foreign partners to take the lead. Thus Sweden (SIDA) plays a leading part in literacy and teacher education, USAID in basic education, Britain in English language teaching and examinations reform. In particular subject areas, the EU is supporting science and mathematics, the Danes in life sciences, the Germans (through the CASS project) in social sciences and the Finns in cultural areas of the curriculum.

34. Obviously such a division of labor approach could have both an upside and a downside. The positive aspect is to minimize duplication and overlap and any confusion that might flow from that. Negative results could take the form of fragmentation and lack of cohesion between programs. To avoid such

outcomes, MEC adopts a number of strategies. One is to convene consultative meetings from time to time for an exchange of views. In late 1993, a briefing meeting was held for all donors to education, and in May 1994 a consultation was held on the American-led basic education project when different donors reported on their own programs and plans. A second device is the use in NIED of curriculum panels in different subject areas on which the different donor-supported projects are represented. These panels serve both to ensure donor coordination in the various areas and to exercise Ministry supervision of projects, though the shortage of senior qualified Namibians in some subject areas does make this difficult. Although one might be apprehensive that donor concentration could lead to lack of harmony between curriculum approaches from widely different national traditions in different subjects; in fact many of the project teams are international in personnel even though funded by a single national donor.

35. Sometimes as part of its aid management procedures, MEC will deliberately steer overseas donors towards or away from certain sub-sectors or forms of assistance. Swedish assistance in particular has in the past been very flexible whereas some other donors have been rather rigid. In those circumstances, it is better to use the Swedish resources for more difficult areas where there are fewer donors or as flexible reserves and to encourage each donor to undertake those projects where it has comparative advantage.

36. Possible as a result of this division of labor among donors, cases of direct cooperation and concentration by external agencies do not appear to be as numerous as one might expect in a small country. There are few projects where donors actively work together as partners on a single activity. Thus, although for example many of them are supporting aspects of NIED activity, it is generally the case that each donor is getting on with its "own thing". One project where there has been fairly successful cooperation is in biological sciences where the INSTANT and WUS-Denmark (IBIS) projects have been amicably dovetailed by the EU and the Danes. Yet WUS-Denmark (IBIS) and Swedish SIDA were less easily able to cooperate on community school building in the North when an attempt was made to frame collaborative programs there between them.

37. As may be inferred from Table 3 and Appendix 1, the heaviest concentration of activity is in teacher education – both the colleges and

resource centers – in certain areas of northern Namibia. Many different donors are involved in the development of the colleges in Ongwediva, Katima Mulilo and Rundu. On the face of it, the coordination and management of all the different national inputs must be a formidable task, but there were no suggestions made in Windhoek that the problems were in anyway insuperable or that uncomfortable tensions were felt.

*University of Namibia:*

38. The University of Namibia (UNAM) was established by an Act of Parliament in August 1992 and is financed principally by government. Since March 1995, this funding has flowed through the Ministry of Higher Education, Vocational Training, Science and Technology. As regards external aid, government has been content for the university to conduct its own negotiations with donors, in line with its autonomous status. The outcome of these negotiations, however, have not always been well known to government. This is clear from the listing of educational aid projects in Appendix 1 (based on official sources) where only the ODA financial support of the Pro-Vice Chancellor's post is shown, despite the fact that UNAM receives considerable assistance from a variety of other sources (see paragraph 2.3.40 below). At the time of the consultancy visit to Windhoek, it was not possible to obtain a comprehensive list of projects undertaken at UNAM, analogous to the listings drawn up by the authorities for other parts of the education system. Proper lines of communication, to ensure that NPC, MEC and UNDP are all kept fully informed about aid to the university, are still being established.

39. From the point of view of government, there is a two-fold interest in UNAM's external relationships. First, government has to ensure that national education priorities as between projects and educational levels are respected by donors and that external funds are not somehow channelled, without government's full cognizance, to tertiary education when they are need more urgently elsewhere. A second consideration is how any aid transfer impacts on UNAM's requirements for government funds. The key question is whether the assistance is for a national priority to which government would otherwise have committed its own resources. If so, external receipts can relieve government of the need to provide domestic funds for the purposes served by aid. On the other hand, where an externally funded project is one of which government has not taken prior account in its plans and financial estimates, and counterpart resources have to be provided from national resources to complement external

contributions, the effect of the university entering into an aid agreement could be to increase its requirement of public funds.

40. UNDP's *Development Cooperation Report 1991-92* suggests that UNAM was the recipient of US\$1.2 million in free-standing technical cooperation in 1992. Among the agencies supporting UNAM but not listed in the report are the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, the first of which has provided help on quite a large scale for the Law Faculty and Justice Training Center, in addition to university planning and staff development. The World Health Organization has contributed to the development of the Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences; the University of Warwick has provided a consultant to the Language Center; and, the African-American Institute (through its Atlas Program) and the Ecumenical Church are currently supporting staff development. There are many faculty and departmental links which have received support under UNESCO's UNITWIN Program, which links UNAM and the Universities of Western Cape, Zimbabwe and Eduardo Mondlane with the Universities of Bochum, Lund and Utrecht. Other assistance to the university has included: USAID and the US Information Agency have provided training awards; Egypt has provided professors; Germany has provided personnel, scholarships and supported a number of capacity-building initiatives; NORAD has provided SADC fisheries planning and management courses in addition to supporting research in renewable energy and related activities; ODA and the British Council have provided books and equipment to the library; France has provided staff development and capacity-building in the subjects of humanities, social science, economics and management science; the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries has supported the Multi-Disciplinary Research Center and the Faculty of Science; UNESCO has supported a broad range of activities; and, the European Union is considering providing support a science education project.

41. Strategies and priorities for UNAM's development have recently been outlined in its first Five-Year Development Plan, approved by Senate and Council in early 1995. Reflecting the need to have procedures in place to ensure that faculties and departments in their discussions with external agencies conform with such overall policies, UNAM has embarked on efforts to coordinate assistance to the university by setting up an International Relations Office. The Netherlands recently funded a needs identification

consultancy examining the feasibility of such an office, which was also the subject of an earlier exploratory exchange of views and experience with UNAM's partners in the UNITWIN network. Until 1994, a short-term assistant in the Vice Chancellor's office carried out international liaison responsibilities. There is also a university foundation charged with mobilizing national support through initiatives such as linking with industry.

## **Operational Issues in Educational Assistance**

1. Having reviewed the formal structures and procedures determining the coordination of educational aid to Namibia, it is appropriate to examine how these various mechanisms operate in practice. As before, the following review is mainly in terms of the situation at the end of 1994 and early 1995 before the Ministry of Education and Culture was split into two ministries.

### *Negotiation and Initiation of Assisted Projects:*

2. Procedures regarding the generation of projects vary, and differ most notably between foreign governments and NGOs. In the case of governments, as already described, the normal arrangement is for some kind of framework agreement to be signed between the overseas government and the Government of Namibia. On the Namibian side, this would normally be the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after consultation with the Attorney-General's Office and the National Planning Commission (or, for a loan, with the Ministry of Finance). Within such an overall agreement, the identification of educational programs and projects for external support would be conducted with the professional and technical specialists in the Ministry of Education and Culture, subject of course to policy direction by the Minister. The NPC would become involved when the negotiations reached the point of entering into commitments.

3. In a few cases, the Namibia government has itself taken the initiative in actively canvassing the prospects for aid to education with potential donors who have not previously assisted Namibia. The African Development Bank loan and one or two agreements with smaller bilateral donors are cases in point.

4. Namibia is only now reaching the stage of having a comprehensive development plan with a schedule of priority projects requiring external assistance. In the absence of such guidance, a variety of approaches has been used by donors to identify areas for support. Some donors have conducted their own sector analysis of education, or have used a project identification mission, to pinpoint priority areas for help, reflecting the government's known priorities. Following such exercises, the MEC has been sounded out about its wishes for cooperation in the areas in question and in cases of a positive response, projects have then been developed. In other cases, MEC, normally through its divisions responsible for implementation, has carried its own proposals and requests to donors likely to be interested.

5. Over the course of time, it naturally happens with increasing frequency that new projects emerge from old ones, being extensions of existing activity or outcomes of the contacts and insights gained by project personnel working in the field.

6. In the case of NGOs, the project initiation process may be conducted through an altogether more informal series of encounters, though it should be noted that some of the larger NGOs such as the Peace Corps or Voluntary Service Overseas have formal agreements with government as do official agencies. Moreover, some of the NGOs, NAMAS for example, are in a sense the primary instruments in their country's national effort to assist Namibian education. Undoubtedly NGOs, universities and consultants in industrialized countries who hope to be contractors for delivery of services to Namibia paid for by their governments will often be active in advancing suggestions and developing proposals, motivated no doubt by a mixture of altruism, professional concern and material self-interest.

7. In the case of some very small NGOs, support may be channelled to Namibia without the government having any prior notice of it. As discussed elsewhere, this can cause embarrassments to the ministry if complementary local resources, financial or material, have to be found at short notice and without proper advance provision in the budget.

8. Until now Namibia has not been confronted with many difficult choices arising out of competition between donors advancing rival proposals. Where dangers of potential overlap have loomed – such as in science curriculum,

where both WUS-Denmark (IBIS) and the European Union's INSTANT project are involved – it has been possible to resolve matters amicably and to work out a mutually acceptable division of labor. No doubt it is easier to avoid unconstructive rivalries in a small country where the needs are so many. Another contributory factor may be the concentration of government on basic education. This offers more limited opportunities for lucrative export sales from the industrialized countries, so discouraging commercial rivalry in funding aid projects in education.

9. None of this implies that Namibia takes a passive role in relation to proposals put to it by donors. At times MEC has insisted on steering overseas aid to areas of the country or sub-sectors of the system that are most in need of resources. It has in at least one case refused to go along with USAID's attempts to impose onerous conditions on its aid package, and it has decided on financial grounds not to borrow for education from the World Bank despite the evident readiness of that body to offer loans.

*Criteria for Project Selection and Evaluation:*

10. Up to now, Namibia has not had a comprehensive plan with a schedule of investment projects. Even so, it has been able to give clear indications of the priority needs for external assistance through the issue of policy documents, of which the most notable has been *Toward Education for All: a Development Brief for Education, Culture and Training* issued in 1993. There have also been a series of important conferences with full donor participation, including that on teacher education in Lusaka six months before independence, the Conference at Etosha in 1992 on Basic Education and a gathering in 1992 on language policy. The University of Namibia has also held its own consultations with donors, most notably in November 1994. These events have assisted donors to better acquaint themselves with Namibia's own priorities and to frame their assistance proposals accordingly.

11. Donors do not always come with completely open minds to aid discussions as they often carry a certain amount of "intellectual baggage" with them. The fads and fancies of the moment have often to be accommodated by the recipient government if aid is to flow. MEC has sometimes had to acquiesce in the inclusion in projects of elements particularly attractive to donors – a gender dimension, a concern for disadvantaged minorities, a ritual bow in the direction of the environment – in order to get an overall package

agreed. It is not disapproval of these objectives that makes donor insistence on them tiresome to the recipients – indeed, the self-same objectives are encapsulated in Namibia’s national policies. Rather, it is the “tokenism” that is so often involved, distracting attention from the main purpose of a program or project. Nevertheless, it is a price that often has to be paid and the canny local negotiator learns how far it is necessary to go to meet the predilections of particular donors. Skill in packaging and presentation can make the difference between success and failure in attracting donor help. Often, it is a case of trying to help the local aid representative, who may be only too aware of Namibian realities, successfully win over his or her superiors at aid agency headquarters.

12. There has probably been insufficient attention paid to date to the management and financial implications of aided projects, including their sustainability. In education, a feature of assistance programs has been the adoption of a model of self-contained projects with their own administration and budgets and teams of international advisers – the SIDA/University of Umea Teacher Education Reform Project, the EU INSTANT project on science and maths curriculum, the USAID/Florida State University project on basic education reform, the CASS project on social science curriculum are all important examples – but not the only ones by any means. In the short term, this has economized on Namibia’s scarce managerial resources and has probably allowed faster progress to be made on the technical aspects of the tasks in hand. Such short-term gains may, however, be at the cost of smooth long-term assimilation of such project activities in curriculum development or examination reform into the mainstream of ongoing operations, since the project office can easily become a separate enclave not fully answerable to senior managers.

13. The goals of some projects are not necessarily in a form that will assist future sustainability, since they emphasize the completion of particular tasks and often play down the all-important need to involve Namibian personnel in the work and decision-making. Undue emphasis on meeting performance targets may well be at the expense of building experience and institutional memory, and hence in the longer term, of the very survival of a project. That said, many expatriate project managers have shown a keen awareness of the need to train Namibians for the long-term, though they have often encountered great difficulties in finding, and then holding, suitable counterparts in

Namibia's manpower shortage situation. In the MEC, too, real efforts have been made to avoid the creation of expatriate "enclaves" through the operation of national curriculum panels with the responsibility of overseeing the work of individual units.

14. Attempts are being made to apply more rigorous financial appraisal by the introduction by NPC of Project Identification Forms which ask about revenues and recurrent expenditures to be generated by the project, rates of return expected, future sustainability and so on. The forms also ask about effects on employment generation and gender and environmental impact. The use of these forms is still at a pilot stage and it is not clear yet how far they will assist MEC officials in appraising project proposals involving foreign aid. As hinted above, there is a tendency for officials in economic ministries to think more in terms of capital-intensive revenue-generating development projects of a kind that are not typical in the education sector.

15. One particular feature of education projects is that capital expenditure quite often follows rather than precedes recurrent spending – schools open before premises have been completed for them and much of the physical construction is therefore to rehouse classes started in temporary accommodation. It is the original authorization of a new class or school that is decisive in increasing recurrent expenditure, and not so much the erection of buildings. The new Project Identification Forms may therefore prove more useful to ministries preparing projects in the productive sectors than those in the social sectors.

*The Costs of Receiving Aid:*

16. Any attempt to estimate recurrent cost "fall-out" from external aid needs to look to the short-term as well as the long-term future. For receipt of external assistance can involve the intended beneficiary in considerable expense, sometimes exceeding the value of what has been given. Three main examples can be provided in the Namibian context:

- Donations of books and equipment are liable to be made without sufficient consideration on the part of donor as to the associated costs of clearing through customs, transporting and storing of items donated. Even where the gifts are fully appropriate to Namibia's needs – and this is by no means always the case – the

associated costs may negate the gift's usefulness to Namibia. Instances can be cited of furniture being shipped from Europe at a cost exceeding the Namibian production cost, of high storage costs being met for clothing or science equipment from Asia and books from North America. Such events cannot be completely avoided but some evasive action is possible through the issue of guidelines about donations, and discipline by politicians in accepting gifts made during overseas visits.

- Technical assistance costs. There is need for clear rules on what costs Namibia is prepared to meet in connection with technical assistance personnel and these should be applied to agreements with foreign donors. Explicit guidelines are needed on office expenses (secretarial help, office accommodation, etc.) transport, housing and medical services/insurance. Uncertainties about responsibilities for meeting these has caused a number of misunderstandings and unanticipated expense for Namibia.
- Missions and documentation. Visiting missions for review and evaluation purposes are demanding of time on a stretched Namibian bureaucracy and seemingly expect to be received even when short notice is given. That and the extensive documentary requirements of aid donors add up to a major cost of receiving assistance from abroad. Some standardization of formats for supplying needed information or reporting on projects would bring welcome economies in time outlay for Namibian planners and administrators.

17. There can be no hard and fast rules for solving these problems. Obviously it would help for the government to draw up its own regulations for the receipt of assistance from abroad, which would include the information that a donor would have to furnish in advance and would lay down the division of responsibilities for expenses arising out of the receipt of assistance. These guidelines could be circulated to donors and discussed with them before finalization and any new project or gift would then have to conform with them. Of course this is easier said than done, for some donors will retort that they have global policies on the matters in hand and cannot depart from their own international rules on recipient country responsibilities. It would probably be

worthwhile for a developing country to stand its ground in these circumstances and be willing to forgo the assistance in the interest of introducing known and standardized terms for all donors. Similarly, in the case of visiting missions, the recipient government will ideally prepare, in consultation with donors, a forward schedule for a period of six months ahead and decline to receive major missions outside its own advertised timetable. It is more difficult for a small country like Namibia to insist on this unilaterally, because aid missions from the capital city of the donor tend to want to take in three or four countries in the SADC region in the course of a single visit.

18. It is unrealistic to think such changes could be introduced all at once, but they are the direction in which governments should try to move.

*Tracking Aid Flows:*

19. An effective system for tracking and recording assistance is in the interests of both Namibia and the donors. Unless there is a full inventory of the resources being made available under aid programs, it is impossible to speak of using them effectively and to be sure that duplication and waste is being avoided. This calls for some agreement in the international community about what shall be counted as assistance, full transparency on the part of donors about the components and unit costs of their assistance, arrangements for the recipient to participate in the allocation process, and an efficient recording and tracking system in place on the Namibian side.

20. There would appear to be a lack of uniformity of practice among donors about what expenditures can be attributed to aid and on the matter of transparency. Some donors of education aid to Namibia charge up the cost of their own aid management in their embassy or high commission in Windhoek to the aid program which helps to explain why donors consistently claim to have spent more on aid than the recipient is conscious of receiving. To compound the problem, there is not always full information available to Namibia about what the charges are and whether they may be considered reasonable. This goes for technical assistance as well as aid representation and management. Particularly contentious is the issue of project overheads charged by contracting consultancy firms or universities which may amount to several million Namibian dollars in the case of a big project, and may be for central expenditure in the donor's home country. It is clearly desirable to have more standardization of treatment of items of expenditure for inclusion in the

amounts reported by donors to the Namibian authorities and to UNDP in order to bring about a better basis for comparison between donors and improved means of incorporating aid flows into the national accounts.

21. Full transparency makes evident some basic truths about external aid over which a veil is often politely drawn. Much assistance, and particularly technical assistance, involves supplying services at donor country prices with a supplement representing inducements to serve abroad and a further overhead. In terms of remuneration patterns in the local economy, the resulting sums may seem disproportionately high. One function of non-transparency is to prevent these issues becoming unduly contentious. What can happen otherwise was well illustrated in Namibia by the US assistance for basic education which was passed through the State Revenue Fund so that the Namibian government and not USAID was the contractor with Florida State University. It was then necessary for the large amounts payable to FSU and FSU personnel to appear in the Ministry of Education estimates and to be debated in parliament. They seemed to the legislators and the public to be disproportionately high in relation to the services Namibia was receiving, and in terms of the local cost norms used in Namibia's own capital and recurrent projects. This was uncomfortable and embarrassing for all concerned. However, in these days when the industrialized countries are preaching the virtues of the open market economy, it is surely a necessary mechanism for ensuring the efficient allocation of resources.

22. Nor does transparency extend in the case of many donors to involvement of Namibians in the process of hiring personnel or choosing between competing contractors for services intended to benefit Namibia. Desirably, the Namibian authorities would participate in all awards of contracts for services to be supplied to them. The Scandinavian donors appear to share information on these matters more freely and to encourage Namibian involvement more readily than the Anglo-Saxons – although the most recent US curriculum project, successor to the FSU operation, has been exemplary in terms of full Namibian participation in evaluation of bids and award of contracts.

23. Of course, were the State Revenue Fund mechanism to be used, thus passing assistance funds through the state budget, some of the problems identified above would have to be addressed. It would be necessary in particular to find ways of "tagging" expenditures under different projects so

that a full accounting to donor agencies could be made. The problem is now being addressed by the Accountant-General's department of the Ministry of Finance. There were many problems caused for SIDA by the inability of the Ministry of Finance to do this in the early years after independence. MEC's efforts to keep an inventory of aid funds take the form of compiling and updating on a biennial basis a database into which all agreements and new projects are entered. Regular reports are made to the Ministry of Finance of all donations received. Where technical assistance is supplied by donors who are directly contracting for the provision of services, it is more difficult for MEC to monitor expenditures and keep track of balances.

*Compatibility and Cohesion among the Donors:*

24. How far on the one hand do donors collectively "gang up" on Namibia or, by contrast, each do their own thing in an uncoordinated manner? The first thing to be said about this is that donors in Namibia are only rather loosely coordinated among themselves. The World Bank which gives a lead in some countries is not present as an aid donor in Namibia and UNDP is not fully accepted as a spokesperson for donor interests in spite of its role in coordinating aid reporting and convening dialogues with government.

25. In general, donors appear to be in harmony on their overall objectives of support for basic education, curriculum development and teacher education. There have been few "territorial disputes" between them and on the whole not much duplication and overlap. The Namibian authorities have managed to avoid this through a policy of encouraging a kind of division of labor by sub-sector or curriculum area among donors to education: with EU concentrating on school buildings and science and mathematics at secondary level; the British on examination reform, English language and management issues; the Swedes on literacy; the Danes on life sciences; the Americans on basic education and so on. In some areas, such as management information systems and teacher education, several donors have been active but on the whole their contributions have been complementary. However, because the lines of communication in Namibia have traditionally been vertical ones from Windhoek to regions, districts and schools, and authority at local level has been weaker, there has been a tendency for donors to "crowd" certain districts like Rundu or Oshakati/Ongwediva, and individual institutions in those areas, to the possible neglect of others.

26. The main divisions among donors have been less in terms of priorities or competition for projects and more over instrumentalities. Some donors have been very much more insistent than others on Namibian ownership of projects and the cooperation process. They have fought to get assistance passed through the Namibian budget, for there to be greater transparency in information about expenditures and for donors to avoid tying their assistance (one or two cases of supply of most inappropriate vehicles and other inputs under donor procurement policies are well known in Namibia). Clearly there is no agreement among donors on this and Namibia is reluctant to press matters too far for fear of discouraging aid flows and out of a desire for good relations with the assisting countries. Another source of some disagreement between donors has been over the possibility of a round table meeting on aid to Namibia and whether this should be in Windhoek or Europe. In this case, the difference of opinion has appeared to be mainly between bilateral donors on the one side and UNDP on the other.

## Part 3: Conclusions

### Some Lessons from the Namibian Experience

#### *How Typical is Namibia?:*

1. Any case study must confront the question as to how generalizable is the experience it attempts to illuminate. In the present instance, is the Namibian case in respect of education aid coordination totally special, or can valid conclusions be drawn of relevance to other developing countries?
2. A most obvious characteristic of Namibia is that it is a small country. Nonetheless, that is something it shares with half the countries of the Commonwealth and very many other members of the United Nations. The country's small size has not prevented it from attracting a substantial number of donors to assist its education programs – several much more populous countries could probably not boast any wider range of sources of assistance, from both governments and NGOs. Of course, there is a certain intimacy and ease of communication in the capital of a small country that does not obtain in larger ones. To that extent, more formalization of procedures would be needed in countries like, say, Kenya or Nigeria than are called for in Namibia, where offices in Windhoek are close and personal contacts in a smallish diplomatic community can be close and frequent.
3. The recency of independence in Namibia – on 20 March 1990 – is another important aspect of the country's experience. This has both advantages and disadvantages for Namibia and for its attempts to attract and coordinate aid. On the one hand, flexibility is more likely in a country that has not been in the habit previously of receiving aid, since there are likely to be fewer entrenched interests. In Namibia this is probably true of the situation in the narrow context of aid administration, but less valid in the wider context of Namibia's government machinery which has inherited some distinctly conservative tendencies from pre-independence days. In consequence, Namibia exhibits a mixture of flexibility in some matters and rigidity in others, reflecting the fact that a new public service has had to be created out of one group with long traditions and a newer one, drawn from the majority ethnic groups, with more limited experience of administration but with the concomitant advantage of less entrenched attitudes to change.
4. A "new" country tends to be more interesting to donors who have an interest in establishing their own influential stake in the new country's

development. There is also incidentally a danger that they will see such a country as some kind of *tabula rasa* on which can be inscribed a number of new development theories and approaches. Some donors to Namibia have suffered from the delusion that this is virgin territory with nothing already in place, and that whatever is achieved with assistance from abroad is exclusively the product of that assistance.

5. It was certainly the case that a country which had recently freed itself from racial segregation and launched a new social and political order was especially attractive to aid donors. This was all the more so in 1990 when South Africa was still in the grip of apartheid, the sudden crumbling of which could then hardly be foreseen. In some senses, aiding Namibia was tantamount to making a political statement of solidarity with the oppressed African majority in neighboring South Africa. It is reasonable to assume that as a direct by-product of such sentiments, Namibia benefited more from foreign assistance in the first five years of independence than might otherwise have been the case. By the same token, to maintain that interest and commitment now that South Africa has attained majority rule will be a special challenge for Namibia. Her window of opportunity remained open for a far shorter time than seemed likely. In these respects at least, Namibia is obviously something of a special case.

6. A feature of Namibia's political history has been such an outrageous neglect of the education of the African population that needs have been self-evident and no very sophisticated justifications for interventions to expand opportunity and rectify various kinds of disadvantage have been required. Few if any other countries have faced such an overwhelming education deficit. One might infer from this that Namibia has therefore been freed from the disciplines faced by other countries in preparing and justifying requests from assistance. In actuality, however, there has been no rash of huge expansion projects without proper preparation.

7. It could have been expected that in these circumstances Namibia would have benefited from receipt of considerable assistance in the form of finance for buildings, of teachers, and of books and materials. Indeed she has so benefited, but the proportion of educational aid for these purposes is reduced by the heavy use of expatriate technical assistance in the form of foreign advisers and their support costs. Because the number of trained Africans is so

few in Namibia, the foreign expert is a more expected, and more obtrusive, phenomenon in the Namibian education system than is currently true in many other African countries. The more valid comparison is of course with other African countries' situations soon after their own independence thirty years ago.

8. A factor attracting education assistance to Namibia has been the extent to which her education priorities in basic education and literacy have corresponded with those of the donor community in its post-Jomtien period. The emphasis on primary education infrastructure, curriculum development and teacher training has chimed well with current donor philosophies. Those are, of course, most obviously the priority needs given the poor quality of education provision for the majority and so Namibia's situation very clearly calls for assistance at the levels donors most favor. It will be interesting to see whether the dominance of basic education will be maintained when more and better qualified leavers emerge from junior secondary schools to seek places in senior secondary and tertiary education and whether the recent translation of the influential Minister of Education and Culture to responsibilities for technical and higher education will produce any switch of priorities for external aid.

9. Coming late on the international scene, Namibia has been able to profit from the experience of others and particularly that of its neighbor Botswana, with a not dissimilar mineral-led economic structure in South Africa's sphere of influence, and a pragmatic non-ideological approach to development issues. A good deal of experience, both generally and in dealing with aid donors, has been tapped from that source and similarly from Zimbabwe which gained its independence ten years earlier than Namibia and faced many similar problems of dismantling racial structures in society at large and in the education system in particular.

10. A last very special feature of Namibia's education development is that the country has so far opted not to borrow from the World Bank, judging that it is cheaper and more satisfactory to borrow on the domestic capital market. As a result, Namibia has been free from the sometimes all-pervasive influence of the World Bank as lead donor, which is the situation in many other countries. This almost certainly leaves her freer from the kind of concerted pressure that the donor community sometimes exerts under Bank/IMF leadership in other countries and protects Namibia to some extent from being

confronted with a “received wisdom” from abroad. This characteristic of the Namibian situation adds a great deal of interest to it from a comparative perspective, even if countries elsewhere on the continent of Africa in the throes of structural adjustment programs are hardly free to adopt the model.

11. Enough perhaps has been said to confirm the truism that each country’s situation and experience is unique, but at the same time, it can be said that much in Namibia’s experience is illuminating and indicative of directions and strategies that each country should consider in its management of educational assistance.

*Some Positive Aspects of Namibia’s Experience of Managing Aid:*

12. Namibia’s relative success in attracting external assistance is in part a testimonial to the country’s stability and pragmatic approach to managing its affairs. Although the economic record since independence has not been in any way outstanding, the difficulties encountered have been due more to the vagaries of international markets for minerals and to adverse weather conditions in some years, than to errors of economic management on the part of government. The openness and comparative absence of corruption in the conduct of government business have created the right kind of climate to attract aid.

13. Reference has been made to the lack until now of any development plan and detailed project list. This may have constituted an impediment, but more in the sense of depriving the government officials and donor partners of a convenient yardstick or checklist than as a major roadblock obstructing aid flows. For the abundance of evident urgent needs, and the kind of strategy paper represented by *Toward Education for All*, have served to give an adequate sense of direction to development strategy.

14. Surely a major factor in Namibia’s ability to enlist support for education has been continuity of direction at the top – an experience that mirrors that of both Botswana and Zimbabwe – where Hon. K.P. Morake and Hon. D. Mutumbuka respectively held the education portfolios for many years following the independence of their countries. In Namibia, the long tenure of the education portfolio by Hon. Nahas Angula, and the support of his long-serving Deputy Minister and of the Permanent Secretary, both also

unchanged since independence, have provided a stability and institutional memory that have been important. More than in some countries, one could speak of the Minister's office itself being the directing and coordinating point for external aid, reflecting the overall supervision of education policy exercised by the Minister and his long personal acquaintance with many of the actors.

15. Such a situation is not without dangers, of three possible kinds. An unscrupulous incumbent might abuse for personal advantage a situation where the minister was in a position to operate without normal civil service checks. Second, there is a danger of disorganization where donors feel that the way to quick agreement is to bypass the bureaucracy and head for the minister's waiting room whenever a decision is needed. Third is the problem of continuity that can arise when ministers move on, should less than full records of discussions and undertakings be in place. Fortunately, the experience of Namibia has to every appearance been benign in these respects and the presence of a strong minister has brought clear advantages. These include helping to make it possible for the Government of Namibia to take a tougher line with external donors than might otherwise have been the case. One example is the decision not to seek World Bank assistance. Another is the rejection of USAID's attempts to attach excessive conditions to its aid to Namibia – the Minister let it be known that on those terms he would prefer not to accept aid, and a more acceptable package has subsequently been offered.

16. The Minister has been supported by a reasonably effective bureaucracy, which has included a specially created unit handling educational assistance. This has been strategically placed as a staff unit serving the Ministry and without direct line responsibilities. In this way, its role has been one of service and facilitation to the Ministry's implementation divisions, thus largely avoiding the tensions and jealousies that can arise if the external aid unit is given extensive executive powers to back its coordinating role. A reasonably good records and information system in the Ministry, with regularly produced statistics and annual reports, has enabled MEC to respond quickly and in a businesslike way to donor requests for information.

17. A particular feature of Namibia's handling of external aid has been the encouragement of a division of labor among donors. It can be argued that with such a wide range of needs, it was easier for Namibia to make room for donors to "specialize" in this way than would be the case in some other countries. The

government has deliberately encouraged this role allocation which minimizes confusion and overlap. There has been a conscious effort to steer new offers of help into projects that complement, rather than duplicate, what is available from elsewhere, and to keep pools of “free” money in reserve. It has to be said that such a policy is much more easily operated when, as in Namibia, there are one or two donors with large and flexible programs who are willing to use their assistance to plug holes. Assistance that is tightly programmed to very specific objectives is not the most helpful in situations of rapid change.

*Matters for Reflection and Further Examination:*

18. This study of the coordination of educational aid to Namibia confirms that what is at issue is the coordination of aid rather than the coordination of aid donors. As Clift and others have pointed out, the questions of machinery for donors meetings and round tables which often occupy the foreground of discussions of aid coordination are not actually the real substance of it. The articulation of aid flows and the resources they represent is at the heart of the problem, rather than avoidance of nonsenses and scandals arising from ill-thought or uncoordinated donor action. To be sure, Namibia has had its horror stories in educational aid of inappropriate donations and burdensome donor demands, but more important is whether external aid is adequately integrated with a country’s development program.

19. If the “real substance” of aid coordination is supplying and applying needed resources to national programs for educational development and improvement, then the necessity for the recipient government to bear the lead responsibility for coordinating educational aid is underlined. This requires, ideally, some kind of forward plan. This need not necessarily take the form of a comprehensive single document detailing everything government wants to bring about in the next five years, but at least there should be a comprehensible strategy and accompanying set of policies and programs, with a convincing set of financial forecasts and targets. In education, Namibia has had a fair degree of planning even if it has not had a plan as such until recently.

20. It is particularly important that there should be a system for managing external resources and that policies and procedures be codified. In developing countries, changes are rapid and situations are fluid. The Namibian situation

exemplifies this as well as any. Here a good deal of the successful mobilization and application of resources for educational development has revolved around a harmonious working partnership between a handful of individuals in MEC. If arrangements are informal and highly dependent on personal acquaintance and long memory, what will happen when key individuals depart the scene. Say the minister is moved, a key official dies or is transferred, and an expatriate adviser's contract comes to an end? In Namibia, these three eventualities have become imminent realities in 1995 and it will be the test of the system to see how well it survives the departure of some of the key players.

21. To guard against these dangers, it is important to codify information and procedures in the form of systematic records, procedure manuals and reporting systems which can be maintained and continued irrespective of the individual incumbents of particular offices. These instruments should be available to donors as well as to executing officials in the government ministries, for a smoothly running system depends on shared expectations and understandings of how the system should work. The instruments should cover responsibilities and procedures for negotiating and reviewing assistance, implementation procedures, communication and information requirements, registers of assisted projects and donors, records and reporting. Some of this is sector specific, but much is inter-sectoral and requires a lead from the agency responsible for coordinating planning and aid mobilization across all sectors.

22. This bureaucratic infrastructure for aid management is a necessary but not sufficient condition of effectiveness. The system also needs creative leadership and individual imagination to make it work or it will become mindless formalism. But without the institutionalization of procedures it is difficult to develop the discipline and self-discipline needed. This requirement obtains at all levels up to the highest in the land. There have been several cases in Namibia where offers of assistance have been accepted in the course of outward and inward state and official visits without the terms being scrutinised against a checklist of Namibian priorities and practices. The dangers that arise from this for any country are that waste occurs, or worse still that scarce host country resources have unexpectedly to be diverted to support external projects. Namibian experience suggests that a priority area for codification is government policy on the counterpart cost obligations it is prepared to meet in respect of financial transfers, physical supplies (customs dues exemptions, clearance, storage, transport and so on), and technical assistance (counterparts,

release of locals for training and terms of such release, costs of expatriates advisers that will fall to host government and those to met by the donor).

23. Another priority is to improve the systems for registration of expenditures under foreign assistance, both in-country and at international level. There is need for clear agreement between all the parties on what expenditures can properly be charged by the donor to a country assistance program so that both donor and recipient use exactly the same information base on expenditures incurred against any particular tranche of aid. It should not be the case that a donor engages in self-reporting to the UNDP locally, or to OECD internationally, on its aid expenditures without confirmation by the recipient. A countersigning procedure should be followed even where the expenditures incurred are ones in the donor country, perhaps by way of top-up payments to an expatriate adviser or overheads for a contracting organization. If donors desire – as they claim – greater rationality in resource allocation, they must be completely transparent in relation to the content of their aid expenditure, and nothing should be attributed to the aid program to country X without country X publicly agreeing that it has benefited by the stated amount.

24. Although the above may seem an uncomfortable doctrine, it is surely a necessary one if the use of assistance is to be rationally planned. The perceived wide discrepancy between donor outlay and recipient benefit will only be reconciled by such means. Only thus will come improved understanding of the fact that resource deficits denoted in recipient country cost norms are in many cases only partially addressed by the resource transfers in kind costed out at donor country prices. A man whose family is starving for the want of \$5 a week to spend on food does not have his resource needs for a month met by the gift from his rich uncle of a silk tie actually bought in the airport duty-free shop for \$15 (and claimed to be worth \$25)! A little more realism on the part of the donors concerning the scale of their contribution to education development is desirable. Even when donor costings are accepted, the total value of external aid to education does not amount to more than 7% of Namibia's expenditure on education, and if "bodies on the ground in post" were the unit of reckoning it might come to less than 1%. When calculations of this kind are done, the true worth of the contribution in teacher supply to Namibian schools and colleges from countries like Egypt and Nigeria becomes better appreciated.

25. An area for study and investigation is disbursement channels for aid and the respective merits, in practical as well as theoretical terms, of passing resources through the receiving country's budget. It is an issue that applies not just to aid to education but across the board, and it is closely tied up with the previous discussion as to whether the locus of control over aid expenditure is with donor or recipient. The arguments for and against passing funding through the state budget have been set out in paragraphs 2.2.20-2.2.27 above. They are certainly not one-sided and donors have many valid reasons for arguing of speed, administrative simplicity and accountability for preferring direct disbursement. At the same time, the case that aid is meeting recipient country priority needs will only become fully convincing when the recipient is seen to be writing its own cheques to foreign experts for annual salaries of US\$100,000 instead of using the funds to repair school roofs or to give district education advisers a bigger fuel budget to enable them to spend three more days a month in rural schools.

26. Finally, we should spare a thought for the donors and their representatives! They are not a homogeneous group. They come to educational aid with different backgrounds, possibilities and understandings. The field representative may be a specialist, but is quite often a diplomat holding the job on a temporary and part-time basis. The local donor office is often constrained by the agency's global policies and does not have the authority to modify these, as it might well wish, to meet the local situation and requirements. The man or woman on the spot may be quite as exasperated as the local government at headquarters policy, and this may in turn be dictated by not-too-sympathetic ministries of finance and political leadership at home. The ultimate reality of aid transactions is a very human reality and the successful operator on both donor and recipient sides will be someone who knows there is a time to compromise as well as a time to stand firm. In the very final resort, aid pundits forget at their peril that aid is part of the larger scene of diplomacy and international relations, on which the peace and stability of the world order depend.

**External Assistance to  
Human Resource Development in Namibia**

Donor	Project/Program	UNDP report - <i>Development Co-operation</i>	Ministry of Education and Culture			
			Report to Ministry of Finance		Project List	
			1992	1992/93	1993/94	1993/94
			(All figures given in '000s of N\$)			
African Development Bank	Const. teachers' colleges*	--	--	--	--	
Africa Groups of Sweden	Volunteers	160	--	360	360	
Agency for Personnel Service Overseas (Ireland)	Technical assistance for teacher education	--	320	300	300	
ARCS (Italy)	Non-formal education	--	475	--	--	
Australian Overseas Service Bureau	Technical assistance for secondary education	68	113	--	--	
Australia	--	2,938	--	--	--	
Austria	--	328	--	--	--	
Belgium	--	593	--	--	--	
Bremen University - Center for Applied Social Studies	Social studies advisor Dev. soc. science material Resource centers - Katima	-- (--) (--) (--)	1,200 (600) (600) (-)	3,250 (2,640) (-) (610)	3,251 (2,640) (-) (611)	

Britain - ODA		9,199	4,601	1,571	2,597
	National language conf.	(--)	(308)	(-)	(-)
	ELT (with Brit. Council)	(-)	(325)	(-)	(-)
	ELT advisor in NIED	(--)	(--)	(167)	(167)
	NIED reference books	(-)	(500)	(-)	(-)
	Pre-primary education	(-)	(33)	(-)	(-)
	Primary ed. - Molteno	(--)	(268)	(693)	(693)
	Secondary ed. books	(--)	(500)	(-)	(-)
	Vocational ed. consultancy.	(-)	(118)	(-)	(-)
	UNAM Pro-Vice Chancr.	(--)	(-)	(154)	(315)
	Distance education	(--)	(53)	(-)	(-)
	Examinations - NEAA	(-)	(31)	(-)	(-)
	Reform of examinations	(--)	(-)	(132)	(549)
	School exams training	(-)	(530)	(-)	(-)
	Exams - computerization	(-)	(125)	(-)	(-)
	Univ. entrance consultancy.	(--)	(53)	(-)	(-)
	Planning link UNECIA	(--)	(1406)	(290)	(738)
	Draft education bill	(-)	(51)	(-)	(-)
	Advisor to Minister	(-)	(300)	(135)	(135)
Canada - CIDA	Train. teacher educators	--	187	74	74
Catholic Institute of International Relations - International Co-operation Department	Adult edn. advisor	(--)	(30)	(15)	(15)
	Special edn. advisor	(--)	(-)	(20)	(20)
China	--	276	--	--	--

Commonwealth Secretariat - CFTC		3,303	325	162	162
	School mangmnt. review Ed. qualifications advisor	(--) (--)	(163) (162)	(--) (162)	(--) (162)
Commonwealth of Learning	Broadcasting	(--)	48	(--)	(--)
Cuba	--	2,810	--	--	--
Denmark-WUS (IBIS)		10,231	4,415	9,965	8,964
	Teacher resource centers	(--)	(415)	(535)	(535)
	Life science project	(--)	(4,000)	(4,500)	(4,500)
	Classroom construction	(--)	(--)	(785)	(784)
	Clsrooms - deprived schl.	(--)	(--)	(1,000)	(--)
	Operating costs - Mwesh.	(--)	(--)	(145)	(145)
	Technic. assist. structures	(--)	(--)	(3,000)	(3,000)
Dienst in Ubersee	Adult education advisor	--	--	60	60
DNED (Germany-Namibia Development Service)	--	--	39	--	--
DNEG (Germany-Namibia Development Society)		--	--	1,602	--
	Hostel Nabasib	(--)	(--)	(1,356)	(--)
	Classroom renovation	(--)	(--)	(70)	(--)
	Furniture - Gam	(--)	(--)	(276)	(--)
Egypt	Volunteer teachers	--	650	1,188	1,188

European Union		402	2,700	4,703	4,703
	INSTANT	(--)	(2,700)	(2,143)	(2,143)
	Special edn. classroom	(--)	(--)	(60)	(60)
	Classroom construction	(--)	(--)	(2,500)	(2,500)
Food & Agriculture Orgzn.	--	199	--	--	--
Finland (FINNIDA)		3,035	793	1,327	1,327
	Cross-curric. culture proj.	(--)	(676)	(1,327)	(1,327)
	Book boxes - prim. edn.	(--)	(117)	(--)	(--)
France	--	1,324	--	--	--
Flemish Association for Development Co-operation	--	28	--	--	--
Germany		22,667	162	100	--
	Archives computerization	(--)	(162)	(--)	(--)
	Vocat. training institute	(--)	(--)	(100)	(--)
Iceland	Adult literacy - Luderitz	--	91	--	--
India	School laboratory equip.	--	1,400	--	--
Italy	--	328	--	--	--
Japan	Edn. expenditure review*	--	--	--	--
Korea	--	28	--	--	--

Luxemburg	Teach. ed. college equip.*	--	--	--	--
Nigeria	Volunt. second. teachers	4,164	1,097	660	660
Norway (NAMAS)		576	2,821	2,804	2,804
	Equip. & advirs.-Ruacana	(--)	(136)	(543)	(543)
	Curriculum reform advsr.	(--)	(272)	(321)	(321)
	Mweshipandeka school	(--)	(2,369)	(1,557)	(1,557)
	Textbook project (IGCSE)	(--)	(44)	(383)	(383)
Peace Corps (USA)	--	--	--	3,402	3,402
Russia	--	211	--	--	--
Swedish Int. Enterprise Dev. Co-operation	--	100	--	--	--
Sweden (SIDA)		17,321	15,622	16,308	21,917
	Community schools	(--)	(1,919)	(3,357)	(3,357)
	NIED infrastucture	(--)	(3,260)	(--)	(4,956)
	NIED furniture	(--)	(--)	(435)	(435)
	Teacher ed. reform prog.	(--)	(2,256)	(2,563)	(2,563)
	Classroom construction	(--)	(1,508)	(2,935)	(3,538)
	Planning and adminst.	(--)	(745)	(309)	(309)
	Education innovations	(--)	(625)	(--)	(--)
	Enviroteach	(--)	(--)	(--)	(877)
	National literacy program	(--)	(5,309)	(6,709)	(5,942)
UNDP/UNESCO	Basic edn. teacher devel.	1,576	770	566	1,327

UNESCO		--	135	50	50
	Self-help rural classrooms	(--)	(30)	(--)	(--)
	In-service facil. training	(--)	(30)	(33)	(33)
	Edn. leadership training	(--)	(45)	(--)	(--)
	Pre-voc. equipment	(--)	(30)	(--)	(--)
	Counselling testing	(--)	(--)	(17)	(17)
UNFPA	Population education	(--)	(--)	142	142
UNICEF		--	773	1,650	1,650
	Illiteracy reduction	(--)	(374)	(1,191)	(1,191)
	Improving primary edn.	(--)	(252)	(266)	(266)
	Improving info. systems	(--)	(147)	(46)	(46)
	ECPD resource person	(--)	(--)	(147)	(147)
United States (USAID)		19,268	19,159	--	--
	Basic edn. reform prog.	(19,268)	(19,159)	(--)	(--)
	National Lit. Prog.*	(--)	(--)	(--)	(--)
	Edn. Manag. Info. System*	(--)	(--)	(--)	(--)
Volntry. Services Overseas	Volunteer teachers	--	--	--	--
World Food Program	School feeding	1,431	1,380	2,435	4,115
World Intell. Prop. Org.	--	85	--	--	--

Various other donors		--	741	89	--
	Book donations - edn.	(--)	(125)	(11)	(--)
	Book don. - libr., archives	(--)	(44)	(30)	(--)
	Vehicles	(--)	(348)	(--)	(--)
	Computer equipment	(--)	(103)	(8)	(--)
	Other materials	(--)	(90)	(40)	(--)
	Overseas workshops	(--)	(31)	(--)	(--)
GRAND TOTAL	--	N\$103.8m	N\$59.3m	N\$52.9m	N\$59.1m

\*These projects are shown on MEC schedule of donor-assisted projects July-August 1994, however, two local donor companies, Nambrick and Consolidated Diamond Mines, which appear on that schedule have been excluded from this list.

## Appendix 2

### Sources of External Assistance for Education and Culture in Namibia

The countries and agencies given below are listed by the Ministry of Education and Culture as cooperating with Namibia in the field of education and culture in the period 1992-1994.

Countries and agencies marked with a cross (†) had a formal agreement with MEC but are *not* recorded by either MEC or UNDP as having supplied assistance to Namibia for education and culture during the period 1992-94.

Countries and agencies marked with an asterisk (\*) are recorded as having supplied assistance, but do *not* appear on the list prepared by MEC in November 1994 of Agreements within the Ministry of Education and Culture. It appears that their assistance was outside of the framework of an official ministry agreement.

#### Countries

Algeria†	Italy
Australia	Japan*
Austria	Kenya†
Belgium	Korea - Democratic People's Republic
Botswana†	Luxembourg
Brazil†	Malaysia†
Britain	Mozambique†
Canada	Netherlands
China	Nigeria
Cuba	Norway
Czechoslovakia†	Russian Federation†
Denmark	South Africa†
Egypt	Sweden
Finland	Switzerland†
France	USA
Germany	Venezuela†
Ghana†	Zambia†
Iceland *	Zimbabwe†
India	

International Agencies

African Development Bank*	UNFPA (Fund for Population Assistance)*
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation	UNICEF (Children's Fund)
Commonwealth of Learning	UNDP (Development Program)
European Development Fund	UNESCO (Education, Science & Culture)
Food and Agriculture Organization*	World Food Program
	World Intellectual Property Organization*

Non-Governmental Organizations

Africa Groups of Sweden  
Agency for Personnel Service Overseas (Ireland)  
ARCI Culture e Sviluppo (Italian Agency for Assisting Culture and Development)  
Catholic Institute of International Relations - International Cooperation Department  
Deutsche-Namibia Entwicklungs Dienst (German-Namibian Development Service)  
Deutsche-Namibia Entwicklungs Gesellschaft (German-Namibian Development Society)\*  
Dienst in Ubersee (Service Abroad-Germany)  
Dienst over Grenzen (Service Abroad-Netherlands)  
Flemish Association for Development Cooperation  
Ford Foundation  
Holland Committee on Southern Africa†  
International Development Research Center (Canada)  
Namibian Association of Norway  
Operation Raleigh (Britain)†  
Overseas Service Bureau (Australia)  
Peace Corps (USA)  
SOS International Children's Village Association†  
Swedish International Enterprise Development Cooperation\*  
Voluntary Service Overseas (Britain)\*  
World Teach (USA)  
World University Service Denmark (IBIS)

## **Terms of Reference for the Aid Coordination Advisor in the Ministry of Education and Culture**

### **Background and Objectives**

Upon attaining independence, Namibia found itself with an inferior and fragmented system of education, inherited from the South African administration. The Ministry of Education has as urgent tasks to reform the whole education system to make education available to all Namibians, generally and equally. As the new Government of Namibia, for the next few years, will have to operate under financial constraints set by the previous administration and by the constitution of independent Namibia, far from adequate funds will be available for the necessary reforms in education. For this reason, the Ministry of Education and Culture will rely, in the foreseeable future on funding from international donor agencies, as well as NGOs.

The international donor community has responded very favorably to the requests by the Ministry for support in the sector. However, every donor agency has its own sets of rules and regulations, when it comes to requests and project follow-ups and reports. With a large number of donor input, both from governmental agencies and NGOs, there is a clear need to coordinate all these efforts, as to avoid duplication and waste of limited resources. Due to the isolation of Namibia in the past, the knowledge and experience of the international donor community is very limited within the Ministry.

The Ministry is currently negotiating with a number of Cooperating Partners with the view of developing mutually reinforcing inputs into the development of the education sector. Though the Ministry is establishing Technical Committees to coordinate input into specific areas and levels of education, there is still a need to enhance the Ministry's absorptive capacity of various inputs.

Against this background, the Ministry of Education and Culture is requesting SIDA to procure the services of an *Aid Coordination Advisor*, to work in the Ministry and coordinate the donor input in the sector and train in Namibian national in these functions.

## **Tasks**

The functions of an Aid Coordination Advisor will include:

- (a) follow-up on Agreements with the view of coordination with Sectors of the Ministry in Projects and Activities development;
- (b) ensure coordination and proper interfacing of inputs in a particular area and among the various sectors of education and training;
- (c) advise the Minister and the Director of Planning on the coordination of national education plans and programs with international cooperation activities;
- (d) participate in monitoring activities of various inputs and implementation activities;
- (e) initiate and participate in evaluation of obtained results in internationally supported projects and programs;
- (f) assist with the preparation of reports of resource utilization;
- (g) prepare for and assist in donor delegation visits to Namibia;
- (h) take parts in discussions with donors, and support the Ministry in its negotiations with different donors;
- (i) take part in planning and projects identification on short and long term basis in relation to specific inputs;
- (j) train and transfer knowledge and experience to other officials at the Ministry, especially its Directorate of Planning, and more specific the counterpart;
- (k) make proposals for training courses in project preparation for all staff working with international cooperation on national and provincial level, and participate in the implementation of the courses;

- (l) to liaise closely with the Directorate of Planning and upon request of the Directorate carry out education planning duties in order to facilitate the integration of international cooperation projects and programs in the national plans for the development of the education sector;
- (m) liaise with the National Planning Commission, as to get acceptance for the Ministry's priorities on the governmental level, in relation to support from international donors;
- (n) otherwise advise on organizational matters in order to support the effective use of incoming assistance.

### **The Advisor**

The Advisor should be well versed in the procedures in international donor agencies, governmental as well as non-governmental. A long-time experience in educational planning, administration, management and organization is a prerequisite. The advisor should have previous experience from similar work in the Third World, especially in Africa. The advisor shall be loyal to the Ministry's priorities and act independently from and without bias to any specific donor agency.

The Advisor must be of open mind and spirit, and easily establish good working and personal relationships with his/her colleagues, and be able to take initiatives. He/she must also accept the policies of the Namibian government, and more specifically, that of the Ministry of Education and Culture. He/she must have a good knowledge and understanding of the political situation in Africa, and the region of Southern Africa.

The Advisor shall be working with a counterpart in the offices of the Directorate of Planning, Ministry of Education and Culture.

### **Time Schedule**

The Advisor shall commence his/her work in September, 1991, or as soon as possible thereafter, and work for a minimum period of two years.

**Study Terms of Reference  
Government's Coordination of External Aid  
To Education: the Case Study of Namibia**

**A. Background to the Study**

1. This study will document the process that a government uses to coordinate external aid to its education sector. Namibia will be used as a case study to illustrate the government's coordination of external assistance to the education sector.
2. Namibia is a complex example of the aid coordination process. This complexity arises from a combination of factors that characterize the period immediately prior to, and following independence. These factors include: the large number of donors offering their support to Namibia -- some with close ties with the new government going back to the regime-in-exile before independence, others just arrived and eager to help this newly independent Africa state; a large number of donor representatives positioned within the Ministry of Education and Culture with one donor's large project placing substantial demands upon the administrative capacity of that ministry; the legacy of a highly distorted education system built around apartheid; a young bureaucracy with a limited background in decision-making and lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities between the sector ministry and the central economic and planning organs of government regarding the coordination of aid.
3. Following independence, the Minister of Education and Culture prepared a comprehensive and clear vision statement for the education sector which laid out the State's desired education policy, including coordination of donor assistance by the Ministry of Education and Culture. However, the necessary statistical and financial baseline measurement of the country's education system was incomplete, and there was no explicit articulation of the costs of the proposed education policy nor how it would be financed. The education sector's relationship to the national macro-economic environment was not clearly described and, while there was a clear vision of what was desired, the strategy and series of concrete actions of how Namibia would translate its policy into reality was not made explicit.

4. The Namibian Ministry of Education and Culture is presently preparing detailed plans at both the national and regional level for the implementation of a comprehensive education development program. At the same time, the central economic organs of government are in the process of undertaking a comprehensive review of all public expenditures, and the National Planning Commission has asked all sectoral ministries to prepare their detailed development plans for incorporation into the Government's comprehensive program. The Ministry of Education and Culture wishes to take advantage of these actions and plans to invite the donor community to a donor consultation at which it will present details of the education program and solicit external support for its implementation.

## **B. Objectives and Purpose of the Study**

5. The main objective of this study is *to document the process that a government can use to coordinate external assistance to the national education system*. This study does **not** aim to provide a coordination framework for donors, nor to compile a comprehensive inventory of the donors or their programs in Namibia. Consequently, this study will not make specific recommendations to the Namibian government, nor to the Donors to African Education and its members. The study will document the environment in which the coordination of external support has taken place and analyze the process that the Namibian government has used to coordinate donors to the education sector. This case study will thus be based upon government policy and actions to coordinate external assistance.

6. The case study will be useful as a model to illustrate to other African countries possible approaches for their own management of external support. Thus, it should use the Namibian example to identify the generic features of the coordination of external assistance and the basic principles surrounding a country's coordination and management of external support to education. It should underline the lessons to be learnt from the strengths and weaknesses inherent in government's coordination of donors in the Namibian case.

### **C. Study Output**

7. The output of this study will be a documented case study of one country's experience coordinating the aid process. This study will describe and categorize the strengths and weaknesses of the coordination process. This product will therefore not be targeted uniquely at Namibia but at the larger community.

8. This study should demonstrate the primacy of the statement that government must play the lead role in coordinating donors. This will require a clear definition of government, and will need a description of government which differentiates between the education sector and the central economic and planning organs of government. The analysis should also document the different roles attributed to central government, regional/provincial government, local government and individual education institutions. Similarly, the complexities of coordination must be addressed -- coordination viewed narrowly as the sector ministry's coordination of external donor support for a project or program, or coordination viewed broadly as the links between sector-specific external support and the larger macroeconomic framework.

### **D. Study Methodology**

9. This case study of Namibia should use the above backdrop to illustrate the process used by government to prepare and carry out its consultation and coordination of the external support to the education sector. It will document the essential linkages between: education sector policy formulation, the translation of such policy into a sector strategy, programming of specific sector activities -- especially the coordination of external support to education, and the linkage of all of this to the government's macro-economic framework. The focus should be predominantly on the role of the ministry of education.

10. The consultant will adopt the methodology that is felt most appropriate for undertaking this study. The methodology, which will involve consulting existing policy documents and interviewing the relevant policy makers, must be able to provide answers to the following questions:

- ▶ Who are the key players in the coordination of external donor support?
- ▶ What is the process of negotiation for such external support? Can individual units within the education system negotiate directly with donors, or is there a central body within the sector ministry or government responsible for all negotiation?
- ▶ What tools does the sector ministry have to make an inventory of all externally-assisted projects and how are these projects evaluated vis-à-vis their coherence with national policies?
- ▶ Does the Ministry of Education and Culture have a single set of cost norms or does each externally supported project/program use its own set of cost norms?
- ▶ Is each externally funded project assessed in terms of its impact on both capital and recurrent costs?
- ▶ Is each externally funded project assessed for the feasibility of its implementation, both in terms of financial and managerial concerns?
- ▶ What criteria does the Ministry of Education and Culture use for choosing between competing projects?
- ▶ Does government actively “coordinate” external donors? and if so, how? Are there regular meetings between donors and if so, are these held by/with government, or among donors alone?
- ▶ What difficulties have surfaced with respect to coordinating external support from donors whose own policies are incompatible?
- ▶ How did the Namibian government arrive at an education sector policy document? What role did donors play in creating this policy document?
- ▶ Does ‘coordination’ mean complementarity, i.e. borrowing someone else’s analysis and philosophy or following a policy lead from donor agencies?
- ▶ Who initiates donor-assisted projects?
- ▶ In what sense may projects be ‘competing’ with one another?
- ▶ How problematic is the process of ‘reporting back’ to different donors?

**E. Responsibilities of Partners**

11. The consultant will be responsible for undertaking the research and preparing the final report.

12. The Government of Namibia, specifically through the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Commission, will be responsible for providing the consultant with access to the relevant files, introducing the consultant to the responsible officers and assisting the consultant with the research as required.

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*Appendix 6*

**Itinerary of the consultant  
Peter C. Williams in Namibia, October 1994**

WEDNESDAY 5

18:15 Depart from London Heathrow for Windhoek via  
Frankfurt

THURSDAY 6

12:00 Arrive Windhoek and proceed to Hotel Pension Uhland

16:30 Joseph Mukendwa, Director Educational Planning, MEC

FRIDAY 7

08:00 Vitalis Ankama, Permanent Secretary, MEC

09:00 Gordon Elliott, Director, General Services, MEC  
W. Greeff, Director, Finance, MEC

11:00 Christoph Schumann, Head, Bilateral Development, National  
Planning Commission

13:00 Lunch with Ulla Kann

14:30 Hon. Nahas Angula, Minister of Education and Culture (with J.  
Mukendwa and Ulla Kann)

15:45 Program planning with J. Mukendwa and U. Kann

SATURDAY 8 / SUNDAY 9

Private reading

91-95 6730003  
-006 91-99

MONDAY 10

- 09:00 Greg Miles, Field Coordinator, Basic Education Project, MEC (Florida State University)
- 10:30 Ms. Tuli Nghiyoonanye, Head Educational Project Planning Sub-Division, MEC
- 12:00 Ms. Helgard Patemann, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, MEC
- 14:30 Dr. Louis Burger, Under Secretary (Formal Education), MEC

TUESDAY 11

- 08:00 Greg Miles (continuation)
- 09:00 Mrs. Nancy Terreri, Representative UNICEF  
Mr. Hannu Shipena, Education Officer UNICEF
- 10:30 Mrs. Ingrid Lofström-Berg, Counsellor (Development Cooperation), Swedish Embassy
- 14:00 Mr. Michael Morris, Representative, Voluntary Service Overseas
- 14:45 Ms. Maj-Brill Ohlson, Representative, Africa Groups of Sweden

WEDNESDAY 12

- 10:00 Mr. Gaoseb, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance
- 11:30 Hon. Buddy Wentworth, Deputy Minister, MEC (with Mrs. Hovelmann)
- 12:15 Prof. Peter Katjavivi, Vice-Chancellor, University of Namibia
- 15:15 Ms. Constance Netha and Mr. T. Tjipe, Balance of Payments Division, Bank of Namibia

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19:30 Dinner at Ulla Kann's house

THURSDAY 13

08:30 Meeting with Librarians on Book Donations  
Dr. Frikkie Muller, Director  
Margaret Taylor, MEC Resource Centre  
Johan Loubser, National Library of Namibia  
Penny Watson, Public Library Service  
Emmerentia de Kok, Public Library Service  
Alet Marais, Education (School) Library Service  
Brigitte Lau, National Archives

10:00 Lars Dahlstrom, Project Coordinator, Teacher Education Reform  
Project, MEC

11:15 Patrick Simataa, Chief Education Officer, Tertiary Education

12:00 Jasper Utley, Representative, The British Council

14:30 David Godfrey (Director) and Len Leroux (Assistant Director),  
Rossing Foundation

16:00 Jasper Utley, Representative, The British Council (continued  
from 12:00)

19:30 Janet Leno, The World Bank

FRIDAY 14

08:30 Juhani Tovoinen, Counsellor (Development Cooperation),  
Embassy of Finland

09:30 Ms. Dawson, World Food Program

10:30 Mrs. Artivor, Director, Development Cooperation, National  
Planning Commission

15:00 Tuli Nghiyoonanye, Head Educational Project Planning Sub-Division, MEC

SATURDAY 15

No appointments. Reading reports

SUNDAY 16

08:30-15:00 Discussions with Ulla Kann

MONDAY 17

10:00 Patty Schwarz, Acting Director, NIED

11:30 Elizabeth Michie, Education Aid Coordinator ODA  
First Secretary, British High Commission

12:45 Lunch with Dr. Terry Davis, Pro-Vice Chancellor, UNAM

14:00 J. Koekemoer, Deputy Bursar  
Mr. Joubert, Staff Development  
Prof. T. Davis, Pro-Vice Chancellor  
Donovan Weimers, Chief Executive Officer, University of  
Namibia Foundation

TUESDAY 18

08:00 Mr. Theo Kamupingere, Director Education Program  
Implementation, MEC  
Mr. Gert Fourie, Chief Education Officer, Tertiary (Teacher,  
Further and Higher Education)

09:00 Mr. Strauss, Acting Accountant-General, Ministry of Finance  
Mr. H. J. Feris, Mrs. Klaaste, Accountant-General's Department

11:00 Dr. Hinrich Thölken, Press and Cultural Affairs, German  
Embassy

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- 11:45 Alexander Aboagye, Senior Economist, United Nations  
Development Program
- 12:30 Prof. Walter Kamba, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of  
Namibia
- 15:00 Justin Ellis, Under Secretary (Adult, Non-Formal Education and  
Culture), MEC
- 18:00 British Council Reception for Southern African regional  
representatives of the Council

WEDNESDAY 19

- 09:00 Lars Gulden, Project Coordinator and Esther Andima (Finance  
Officer), Namibia Association of Norway (NAMAS)
- 11:00 Khaled A. Shehata, Minister Counsellor, Egyptian Embassy
- 12:00 Ms. Ingrid Lofström-Berg, Counsellor for Development  
Cooperation, Swedish Embassy
- 13:00 Lunch with Messrs Radwan and Mountfield, National Planning  
Commission
- 14:15 Mr. Moyo, Representative UNESCO  
Mr. Vitali, Associate Staff Member UNESCO
- 16:00 Dr. Robert West, Chief Education Officer (Secondary), MEC
- 18:00 Reception by Dr. Ian Macfarlane and colleagues on the Instant  
Project
- 20:00 Dinner with Prof. Terence Davis, Pro-Vice-Chancellor, UNAM  
and Mrs. Rosemary Davis, Adviser, Florida State University  
Project on Basic Education, MEC

THURSDAY 20

- 07:30 Ms. Judy Diers, formerly assisting Vice-Chancellor on External Relations, University of Namibia
- 08:30 Lis A. Doane, Associate Director for Programming, US Peace Corps  
Michael C. Armstrong, Programme Coordinator, World Teach
- 10:00 Hon. Nahas Angula, Minister of Education & Culture with Joseph Mukendwa and Ulla Kann
- 11:15 Carsten Norgaard, Representative IBIS (WUS-Denmark)
- 13:00 Richard Trewby, Adviser on Languages, MEC (lunch)
- 14:00 Jan Isaksen, Adviser, National Planning Commission
- 14:30 Mr. Christoph Schumann, Head, Bilateral Cooperation, National Planning Commission
- 16:15 Dr. Zedekia Ngavirue, Director-General, National Planning Commission
- 18:15 Dr. Ian Macfarlane, Project Coordinator, Instant Project (In-Service Training and Assistance for Namibia Teachers)
- 19:30 Dinner with Joseph Mukendwa and Ulla Kann, MEC

FRIDAY 21

- 08:15 Friedhelm Voigts, Head, and John Mendelsohn, EMIS Division, Directorate of Planning and Development, MEC
- 09:30 Paul W. Hartmann, Chief, Economic Policy Advisory Services, Ministry of Finance

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- 12:00 Dr. Elizabeth Amukugo, Chief, Multilateral Cooperation,  
National Planning Commission
- 13:00 Lunch with Richard Moorsom, Visiting Research Fellow, Social  
Sciences Division, Multidisciplinary Research Centre, University  
of Namibia
- 14:00 (Mr. Aluko, Nigeria High Commission unable to keep  
appointment)
- 14:45 Wendy Hövelmann, Education Officer, Project Planning Sub-  
Division, MEC
- 17:00 Joseph Mukendwa, Director Educational Planning, MEC
- 18:15 To Johannesburg

SATURDAY 22 / SUNDAY 23

Reading and writing in Johannesburg

MONDAY 24 (Johannesburg and Pretoria)

- 10:00 John Gerhart, Representative, Stephen Lawry, Assistant  
Representative, Richard Fehnel, Education Program Officer,  
South Africa and Namibia, Ford Foundation
- 11:00 Leslie Phillips, British Council Representative - South Africa
- 15:00 Satoshi Nakamura, Specialist Assistant (Technical Assistance),  
Japanese Embassy
- (Myra Harrison, ODA Development Division unable to keep  
appointment as she was detained in Cape Town)
- Evening Return to Windhoek

TUESDAY 25

- 07:45 W. Greeff, Director, Finance, MEC
- 08:30 Jan de Kok, Counsellor Economics, Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities
- 10:00 Mrs. Joan Johnson, Program Officer, USAID
- 11:15 Mr. Eric Gauseb, Deputy Director, Treasury, Ministry of Finance
- 12:00 Mr. John G. Rice, British Deputy High Commissioner
- 12:00 Dr. Frikkie Muller, Director Libraries (Lunch)
- 14:00 Mrs. Nancy Terreri, Representative, UNICEF
- 14:30 Mr. Horst Gebauer, Counsellor, German Embassy
- 15:30 Farewells in Ministry of Education and Culture
- 16:30 Department Windhoek for Airport and flight home

WEDNESDAY 26

- 08:00 Arrive Heathrow