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USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE WORKSHOP ON PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
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

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Foreword

Rarely has history witnessed a time of such profound change in the lives of nations and peoples. A social, political, and economic metamorphosis is now under way throughout the world, and the United States has a unique opportunity to help shape the outcome. To help meet this challenge, the United States Agency for International Development has redefined its mission and charted a plan to achieve it.

The papers in this document present an integrated approach, define long-term objectives, specify their relevance to American interests, describe the ways in which those objectives will be pursued, and identify mechanisms to implement the plan and the standards to measure success. The United States and the people of the developing world have much at stake, and the challenges of development demand programs and methods that produce results.

Our work in the post-Cold War era will be guided by these papers. USAID is now drafting guidelines to implement each of the strategies in the field. We believe that the programs and projects that result will support development that is truly sustainable and will produce significant, measurable results.

These papers are the product of a great deal of work and wide consultations. We have conferred at length with Members of Congress and congressional staff, representatives of other U.S. Government agencies, members of the development community, and USAID's own development experts both here and abroad. This consultation process was another example of USAID's more open approach to its mission. I express my heartfelt thanks to all who participated.

As the Overview states: "Serious problems of development will yield to effective strategies." We remain convinced of the fundamental truth of this. We have entered an era fraught with difficulty and promise, and we hope these strategies will help the United States and the development community make the most of the opportunities before us.

J. Brian Atwood
Administrator
U.S. Agency for
International Development

USAID's Strategy for Sustainable Development: An Overview

THE CHALLENGE

The United States Agency for International Development was created in 1961 with two purposes in mind: to respond to the threat of communism and to help poorer nations develop and progress. Both were legitimate strategic roles for the Agency; both were grounded in the belief that it was possible to defend our national interests while promoting our national values.

In these capacities, USAID helped the United States achieve critical objectives. It advanced a foreign policy that embodied a commitment to justice and liberty, a desire to bring the benefits of democracy to people throughout the world, a willingness to be a helpful neighbor, a humanitarian response to people in need, and a determination to lead. Over three decades, USAID achieved considerable success fulfilling these strategic mandates.

With the end of the Cold War, the international community can now view the challenge of development directly, free from the demands of superpower competition. The international community in general and the United States in particular have an historic opportunity: to serve our long-term national interests by applying our ideals, our sense of decency, and our humanitarian impulse to the repair of the world.

It is not wishful thinking to believe that we can constructively address the pollution of the seas and the air, overburdened cities, rural poverty, economic migration, oppression of minorities and women, and ethnic and religious hostilities. On the contrary, the cost of not acting, of having to deal with the global impact of imploding societies and failed states, will be far greater than the cost of effective action. Investment in development is an investment in prevention.

Serious problems of development will yield to effective strategies: This is a lesson of the last 30 years. Many poor nations have experienced unparalleled economic growth during this time. Some have become predominantly middle-class societies; others are well along in similar transformations. In many nations, poverty has declined significantly. Foreign assistance has accomplished much: Vast resources and expertise have been invested to help poor countries develop, and millions of lives have been made better as a result.

Why then is the issue of development so urgent now? It is no exaggeration to suggest that the challenges we face constitute potential global threats to peace, stability, and the well-being of Americans and people throughout the world.

The threats come from a multitude of sources:

- The continuing poverty of a quarter of the world's people, leading to the hunger and malnutrition of millions and their desperate search for jobs and economic security.

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- Population growth and rapid urbanization that outstrip the ability of nations to provide jobs, education, and other services to millions of new citizens.

- The widespread inability to read, write, and acquire the technical skills necessary to participate in modern society.

- New diseases and endemic ailments that overwhelm the health facilities of developing countries, disrupt societies, rob economies of their growth potential, and absorb scarce resources.

- Environmental damage, often arising from population pressures, that destroys land, sickens populations, blocks growth, and manifests itself on a regional and global scale.

- And finally, the threat comes from the absence of democracy, from anarchy, from the persistence of autocracy and oppression, from human rights abuses, and from the failure of new and fragile democracies to take hold and endure.

Americans cannot insulate themselves from these conditions. Pollution elsewhere poisons our atmosphere and our coastal waters and threatens the health of our people. Unsustainable population growth and spreading poverty can lead to mass migrations and social dislocations, feeding terrorism, crime, and conflict as desperate people with little to lose attempt to take what they want by force.

These threats pose a *strategic* challenge to the United States. If we do not address them now, we shall have to pay dearly to deal with them later.

To respond in a meaningful way, the United States must articulate a strategy for sustainable development. It must forge a partnership with the nations and the people it assists. It must focus on countries where its help is most needed and where it can make the most difference. It must make the most of limited financial resources and employ methods that promise the greatest impact. And the United States must bring all its resources to bear — not only its money, but its expertise, its values, its technology, and most of all, the involvement of ordinary Americans.

Effectively delivered, development assistance provides a powerful means to address, ameliorate, and even eliminate the problems of rapid population growth, environmental degradation, endemic poverty, debilitating hunger, mass migration, and anarchy. We cannot "develop" nations, but we can help them unleash their productive potential and deal effectively with the challenges of development. As President Clinton has affirmed, foreign assistance is a central component of effective foreign policy. Development cooperation is not just a tactic, but an integral part of our vision of how a community of nations, some rich and some poor, should function.

Because development assistance is designed to help other nations deal with the problems of national life peacefully and productively, our work is both altruistic and self-interested. Successful development creates new markets for our exports and promotes economic growth in the United States. America's poor increasingly benefit from development methods pioneered abroad, such as microenterprise and childhood nutrition interventions. Moreover, foreign assistance facilitates international cooperation on issues of global concern.

USAID lacks the resources to implement all the programs outlined in these papers, and budgetary pressures are forcing our nation to make hard choices among worthy investments. Yet we believe that those choices cannot be made unless the full extent of the threat is understood. These papers are both battle plans and advocacy docu-

ments. They articulate a strategic vision that will guide our work. They also are designed to focus attention within the Executive Branch, in Congress, among the American people, and within the donor community on the crucial role that promoting sustainable development must play in our foreign policy.

The current situation demands nothing less. It is unrealistic to expect that international conflict, oppression, and disorder can be eradicated. But it is not unrealistic to try to address those problems by providing nations, communities, and individuals with opportunities for development. The ultimate dividend should be nothing less than a more peaceful, more prosperous world.

OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

USAID recognizes that its success will be determined by the way it approaches its development mission and responds to urgent humanitarian needs. To meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world, USAID will employ certain operational methods in all its endeavors: support for sustainable and participatory development; an emphasis on partnerships; and the use of integrated approaches to promoting development.

Sustainable development is characterized by economic and social growth that does not exhaust the resources of a host country; that respects and safeguards the economic, cultural, and natural environment; that creates many incomes and chains of enterprises; that is nurtured by an enabling policy environment; and that builds indigenous institutions that involve and empower the citizenry. Development is "sustainable" when it permanently enhances the capacity of a society to improve its quality of life. Sustainable development enlarges the range of freedom and opportunity, not only day to day but generation to generation.

When sustainable development is the goal, the focus moves from projects to the web of human relations changed by those projects. Sustainable development requires investments in human capital — in the education, health, food security, and well-being of the population. Sustainable development sparks changes within society, from the distribution of power to the dissemination of technology. It continually challenges the status quo.

Sustainable development mandates **participation.** It must be based on the aspirations and experience of ordinary people, their notion of what problems should be addressed, and their consultations with government, development agencies, and among themselves. It must involve, respond to, and be accountable to the people who will live with the results of the development effort. It must help them build institutions of free discourse and inclusive decision-making.

Thus, the fundamental thrust of USAID's programs, whether in democracy building, environment, economic growth, or population and health, will aim at building indigenous capacity, enhancing participation, and encouraging accountability, transparency, decentralization, and the empowerment of communities and individuals. Our projects will involve and strengthen the elements of a self-sustaining, civic society: indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including private voluntary organizations (PVOs), productive associations, educational institutions, community groups, and local political institutions. This approach will make empowerment an integral part of the development process, and not just an end result.

Partnerships begin with collaboration between donors and host nations. Donors must recognize that development, in every sense, depends on the developing country itself. Donors *assist.* They can help, facilitate, even accelerate, but the major task must be carried out by the host nation, not

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the donor. Sustainable development is built upon a sense of ownership and participation. It is not something that donors do for developing countries; it is something that donors help the people of developing countries do for themselves.

The notion of partnership imposes certain responsibilities on host governments. In determining where it will invest its resources, USAID will consider whether the host government permits development agencies and NGOs full access to the people; whether it invests its own resources in development; whether it encourages development through an enabling environment that comprises sound policies and responsive institutions; and whether it fosters local empowerment, particularly of women and members of minorities, as part of the development process.

An increasing portion of development work is being carried out by NGOs, including U.S.-based PVOs, indigenous NGOs, institutions of higher learning, and professional and academic groups. These organizations possess unique skills and contacts; they are USAID's natural partners in development and their work is reinforced by the private sector. Improved coordination with these agencies will permit USAID to do the things it does best and concentrate the skills of its employees where they are most needed.

USAID recognizes that the effectiveness of these organizations depends in large measure on their institutional autonomy. USAID cannot and should not micromanage these organizations. However, to ensure that programs achieve their objectives, USAID will insist upon a critical evaluation of project design, implementation capabilities, and past field performance. It will maintain oversight and communicate regularly once projects have commenced.

Donors must reinforce each other and coordinate at every stage of the development process. USAID can improve its own effectiveness by cooperating with other donors in a multitude of ways, including: joint assessment of development problems and the threats they represent; cooperative planning and division of responsibility; allocation of resources to reinforce other development efforts; pooling of financial resources where possible and appropriate; sharing of technical resources and expertise; rapid transfer of information about methods and results; and collaboration and communication in the field and collectively with host governments.

Partnership also includes leveraging. In its narrowest sense, leveraging involves the pursuit of matching funds. Much of our leveraging work will continue to be done in coordination with multilateral development banks (MDBs). USAID also will encourage other donors to contribute to worthy projects and to become involved in areas that deserve support but where we lack funds to operate. The Agency will also encourage the active participation of private enterprise. A strategy for development should seek to increase the number and kind of participants in the development process, and efforts to this end are a legitimate part of USAID's mission.

Finally, USAID will use **integrated approaches and methods.**

Integration begins with policy. USAID conducts its programs under the direction and guidance of the Secretary of State and attaches the highest priority to coordinating its work with the needs and objectives of the Department of State and the U.S. Ambassador and the country team, wherever its missions operate.

The fundamental building block of USAID's programs will be integrated country strategies. These strategies will take into account the totality of development problems confronting the society. They will be developed in close cooperation with

host governments, local communities, and other donors and will consider how social, economic, political, and cultural factors combine to impede development. They will seek to identify root causes and the remedies that can address them. We intend to minimize so-called "stovepipe" projects and programs that operate without regard for other development efforts or larger objectives.

USAID will pay special attention to the role of women. In much of the world, women and girls are disproportionately poor, ill, and exploited. Of necessity, the development process must focus on their social, political, and economic empowerment. We will integrate the needs and participation of women into development programs and into the societal changes those programs are designed to achieve. Women represent an enormous source of untapped talent, especially in developing nations. The success of women — as workers, food producers, health providers and teachers of their children, as managers of natural resources, and as participants in a democratic society — is essential to successful development. A development process that fails to involve half of society is inherently unsustainable.

Development assistance must address the specific needs of women in developing nations: health, housing, education, equal access to productive resources and employment, participation in society, and empowerment. In their design and implementation, programs must take gender issues into account and pay particular attention to the needs of women in poverty. The ultimate success of our work will be determined by the impact it has upon the lives of the women and men it is designed to assist.

AREAS OF CONCENTRATION

The United States must commit itself to act, must act in concert with other donors, must act where it can have maximum effect, and must draw on its strengths. These strengths determine where USAID will concentrate its resources.

USAID's programs will be undertaken in three types of countries:

- Countries where USAID will provide an integrated package of assistance — these will be termed sustainable development countries. Assistance to these countries will be based on an integrated country strategy that includes clearly defined program objectives and performance targets.

- Countries that have recently experienced a national crisis, a significant political transition, or a natural disaster, where timely assistance is needed to reinforce institutions and national order. These are classified as transitional countries.

- Countries where USAID's presence is limited, but where aid to non-governmental sectors may facilitate the emergence of a civic society, help alleviate repression, meet basic humanitarian needs, enhance food security, or influence a problem with regional or global implications. In such countries, USAID may operate from a central or regional base, may focus on policy and institutional changes in the public sector, or may support the work of U.S. or indigenous NGOs or institutions of higher education.

Within these nations, USAID will support programs in four areas that are fundamental to sustainable development: Population and Health, Broad-Based Economic Growth, Environment, and Democracy. Progress in any of these areas is beneficial to the others. This is especially true with rapid and unsustainable population growth, which consumes economic gains, deepens environmental destruction, and spreads poverty.

Problems of the environment, population, health, economic growth, and democracy also have a transnational impact. They require approaches that consider the global impact and that are not confined to individual states. Investments in these areas thus must be seen as primary prevention of the crises, deep-seated poverty, and despair that fuel civil unrest and international turmoil.

The United States in general and USAID in particular have extensive skills in each of these key areas. Moreover, USAID's partners in development — American PVOs, universities, and training organizations, and the American private sector — are particularly experienced in these areas.

Finally, solutions to these problems will help create self-sustaining, civic societies. Such solutions are characterized by local empowerment, the involvement of the recipients of aid in their own development, decentralization of decision-making, and the establishment of institutions of consensus-building and conflict resolution. They mandate the creation and involvement of indigenous NGOs — intermediary organizations that enhance popular participation, that deepen the benefits to society, and whose very existence can promote peaceful change. Such solutions are the essence of sustainable development.

USAID will continue to carry out its other traditional mandate: providing emergency humanitarian assistance and disaster relief with dollars, technical expertise, and food assistance. Emergency humanitarian assistance and disaster aid are integral to the process of promoting sustainable development. Emergency humanitarian assistance relieves suffering and stabilizes nations that have experienced natural disaster or famine. Typical humanitarian crises such as famine, civil conflict, and the inability to respond to natural disaster increasingly owe directly to failures of development. Emergency humanitarian assistance is a necessary, stop-gap response that helps nations recover to the point where they can address the larger issues of development.

As part of its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief function, USAID will acquire the capability to respond rapidly to the needs of countries in crisis. This is particularly critical to USAID's long-term development mission. A gap in development assistance currently exists: Emergency relief helps nations that have suffered acute crisis or natural disaster; programs of sustainable development address the long-term needs of developing societies. But nations that are trying to emerge from crisis or make a transition from authoritarianism to democracy often have urgent, short-term political requirements that are not addressed by either traditional relief programs or programs of sustainable development.

USAID can help mitigate these problems in two ways:

First, by helping countries reestablish a degree of food self-reliance through the distribution of such things as tools, seeds, and other agricultural supplies essential to begin planting and to reinvigorate the agricultural sector.

Second, by helping to reinforce and rebuild institutions. The transition from disaster or civil conflict is itself a crisis. From the political point of view, it is best to address such crises early, before famine and social disorder perpetuate and the momentum of civil conflict becomes irresistible, and before the cost of reconstruction grows geometrically. From the developmental point of view, it is best to arrest conflict and buttress institutions before the social structure collapses and takes with it the coherent pieces of an economy and a civic society that could grow and modernize.

MEASURING RESULTS

The success of foreign assistance is determined by its impact upon developing nations. Inputs are meaningless without reference to effects.

With this in mind, USAID will measure its results by asking how projects and programs achieve discrete, agreed objectives. This is a demanding approach that forces everyone involved in the foreign assistance process to focus on how projects actually affect the way people live and to distinguish self-sustaining accomplishments from ephemeral ones.

This approach also forces people within USAID to work as a team in designing, implementing, and evaluating projects and programs. It obligates them to cooperate with contractors and grantees; with NGOs, universities, and colleges; with the private sector; with other donors; with multilateral institutions; with host governments; with local authorities; and most important of all, with the citizens of developing countries, the intended beneficiaries of these programs.

While no program can touch every aspect of life within a society, individual programs in each of USAID's areas of concentration need to be structured and implemented to produce affirmative answers to these kinds of questions:

Is the program consistent with the interests and values of the American people?

Does the program or project produce measurable, positive effects? Does it lower population growth rates, create jobs and incomes, augment food security, enhance public health, improve air and water purity, slow the loss of soil and soil fertility, arrest the loss of biodiversity, create indigenous democratic institutions?

Does it address the actual needs of the local people as they themselves define them? Does it consult local people to identify related problems and opportunities?

Does the program build indigenous capacities and permanently enhance the capacity of the society to improve the quality of life?

Does the program involve and empower the people who are supposed to benefit from it? Do they participate in planning, allocation of resources, selection of methods, management, oversight, and assessment of accomplishments? Does the program help create the institutions of a civic society? By its design and operation, does the program help establish and strengthen indigenous NGOs?

Does the program avoid duplication and incorporate lessons learned by the development community? Are the specific ways in which the program affects global and transnational problems shared locally, nationally, and regionally?

Does the program create economic opportunities for different groups in society? Does it generate economic opportunities for American business? Are USAID mechanisms used to identify and disseminate these opportunities to the agencies, companies, and individuals in the country, in the region, and in the United States who might benefit from them?

By applying standards such as these, USAID can ensure that its development programs help the United States respond to the strategic threat of failed development. These standards will shape USAID's approach to each of the areas of strategic concern, as is evident in the five accompanying papers. The value of these standards will be evident in the attitudes they affect within the Agency and the development community, in the development effort that ensues, and in the global improvement in the quality of life.

Protecting the Environment: USAID's Strategy

THE CHALLENGE

Environmental problems increasingly threaten the economic and political interests of the United States and the world at large. Both industrialized and developing nations contribute to the threat.

Human activities are disrupting the Earth's global life support systems — the atmosphere and the planet's wealth of biological resources. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases continue to rise, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the global climate. The loss of untold numbers of plant and animal species and their habitats impoverishes the natural world for future generations and eliminates raw materials for advances in medicine, agriculture, and other fields.

At the local level, environmental degradation poses a growing threat to the physical health and economic and social well-being of people throughout the world. Explosive and poorly managed urbanization has contributed significantly to air, water, and soil pollution worldwide. The erosion and degradation of soils, loss of fertility, deforestation, and desertification beset rural communities and undermine food production, cause malnutrition, and impel migration. Water shortages cause conflicts among industrial, agricultural, and household users within countries and among nations.

The impact on developing nations can be measured in graphic human and economic terms. Widespread soil degradation is reducing the capacity of many countries, particularly in the tropics, to achieve food security. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, air-borne pollutants are the likely cause of high levels of morbidity and respiratory illnesses. Water pollution alone accounts for some 2 million preventable deaths and millions of illnesses each year. Environmental degradation can reduce national incomes by 5 percent or more.

America's own well-being is directly threatened by environmental degradation around the world. We cannot escape the effects of global climate change, biodiversity loss, and unsustainable resource depletion. The consequences of local environmental mismanagement — increasing poverty, social instability, wars over resources — endanger our political and economic interests. The quality of life for future generations of Americans will in no small measure be determined by the success or failure of our common stewardship of the planet's resources.

The scope of the problem is clear:

Environmental problems are caused by the way people use resources. Workable solutions must focus on how humans and their economic interests interact with the natural environment and its resources. They must address how people perceive the environment and how they utilize it; how they judge the costs of using resources; and how political, industrial, and agricultural processes either damage or protect the environment.

Environmental damage often is driven by poverty and food insecurity. These two factors deprive people of the possibility of making rational choices about how to use resources. They force individuals and communities to choose short-term exploitation over long-term management.

Environmental problems reflect the imperfections of private markets. Adam Smith's "invisible hand" is not always a "green" hand. Government policies often distort markets and encourage excessive exploitation of natural resources. Public interventions to correct market failures and eliminate market distortions often are necessary to protect the environment. Effective public institutions that create and monitor an environment favorable to sustainable resource use are critical. This, in turn, requires active public participation in the setting of standards, monitoring, and enforcement. Market-based approaches should be pursued wherever possible and appropriate; since solutions ultimately must make economic sense, regulatory institutions, the policy environment, and incentives must help define what is economically rational and what is not.

Environmental problems have systemic effects. The impact of most environmental problems is ultimately regional or global, so the solutions must transcend borders. Interventions produce the best results when they simultaneously address the problem locally, nationally, regionally, and globally.

Environmental damage often is irreversible. Thus, the need for action is urgent. Early intervention is critical to preventing the extinction of a species or limiting the impact of pollution on public health. Debates over ways to save biodiversity after the tropical forest is gone or how to clean up a river after children have been hurt are moot. Worse, the failure to act makes it more difficult to respond effectively to future environmental problems.

At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), both rich and poor nations agreed that economic growth and environmental stewardship must both be pursued to avoid a catastrophic overload of the Earth's carrying capacity in the next century. Economic growth cannot be sustained if the natural resources that fuel that growth are irresponsibly depleted. Conversely, protection of the environment and careful stewardship of natural resources will not be possible where poverty is pervasive. This is the conundrum and the opportunity of sustainable development.

STRATEGIC GOALS AND AREAS OF CONCENTRATION

USAID will pursue two strategic goals:

- Reducing long-term threats to the global environment, particularly loss of biodiversity and climate change.

- Promoting sustainable economic growth locally, nationally, and regionally by addressing environmental, economic, and developmental practices that impede development and are unsustainable.

USAID will concentrate on the following kinds of problems:

Globally, it will focus on the growing sources and diminishing sinks of greenhouse gas emissions and on impoverishment of the planet's biological diversity at the genetic, species, and ecosystem levels.

Locally, it will focus on the abiding impairment of human health due to air, water, and soil contamination from industrial, agricultural, and household activity; unsustainable exploitation of forests, wetlands, coastal zones, coral reefs, and other ecosystems that provide vital ecological services;

degradation and depletion of water resources; unsustainable agricultural practices; inefficient and environmentally unsound energy production and use; inadequate management of household and municipal wastes in growing urban areas; regulatory, statutory, enforcement, and policy issues; and social and economic patterns, including the lack of local participation and empowerment, that contribute to the aforementioned problems or impede solutions.

OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

USAID will pursue an integrated approach to environmental issues as outlined in Agenda 21 of the UNCED (Earth Summit) guidelines for ecologically sustainable development. The causes of environmental degradation often are the result of underlying pressures of poverty and rapid population growth. Programs in every sphere of development — environment, economic growth, population and health, democracy — must be designed with conscious regard for their impact on the natural environment and their potential for improving environmental stewardship locally, nationally, regionally, and globally.

USAID will strengthen its institutional capacity to ensure that all Agency-supported efforts, whether projects or program-related investments, are environmentally sound. Where necessary, it will require mitigating measures or project redesign.

Solutions begin at the local level, even for environmental problems with global implications. Lack of education, antiquated and inappropriate technologies, the local regulatory environment, economic policy distortions, and the absence of economic and social incentives to protect the environment all contribute to the continuation of damaging practices. USAID's environmental assistance programs thus must empower individuals and communities to act; they also must facilitate collaboration among government agencies, the private sector, and local groups. Such empowerment efforts must specifically reach out to include women and members of minority groups. Experience has shown, for example, that improving education for girls may be one of the most effective, long-term environmental policies in Africa and other parts of the developing world.

USAID will promote the involvement of citizens in identifying problem areas, suggesting and designing solutions, overseeing implementation, and evaluating results. USAID will actively support environmental initiatives by local governments, communities, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to help articulate local concerns and involve individuals and communities in decisions that affect the local and global environments.

Close coordination and communication with the host government are essential to all development work; they are especially critical here. Environmental projects invariably involve diverse political actors, economic forces, and social groups. USAID will work to create and strengthen consultative, management, review, regulatory, and monitoring capacities at the regional, national, and local levels, in order to avoid misunderstandings and build consensus about plans and action.

To sustain the environmental impact of its work, USAID will encourage the development of an institutional and policy capacity within recipient countries. This improved capacity will help facilitate the flow of information, encourage consultations in-country, support economically efficient and environmentally sound policies, and promote the development, transfer, and adoption of technologies that enhance environmentally sound growth. Since many environmental problems (and solutions) are regional in nature, USAID will encourage regional approaches, including ongoing

coordination, establishment of priorities, allocation of responsibilities, exchange of techniques, and sharing of technical resources.

USAID will coordinate its efforts with other members of the donor community. It will pursue partnerships with the U.S. and international environmental community of universities, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), professional and academic groups, scientific organizations, and the private sector to identify priority areas and appropriate methods, share responsibilities and technical resources, reinforce the efforts of other donors, and avoid duplication. Agency field missions will work to strengthen local markets for U.S. environmental technology services and equipment through capacity building, local environmental management, training, and dissemination of information.

PROGRAMS AND METHODS

USAID will focus on programs that address these issues and use these methods:

Global Issues: In the area of **climate change,** USAID will identify key developing and former Soviet bloc countries that are, or will become, significant contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions. USAID will work with these countries on a case-by-case basis to develop appropriate action plans to reduce sources and enhance sinks of greenhouse gas emissions, through activities consistent with local environmental and economic goals. As appropriate, efforts in this area will include energy efficiency improvements; expanded use of renewable energy technologies; limiting deforestation, the burning of forests and agricultural lands, and other carbon-emitting land-use changes; and introduction of new agricultural practices to reduce methane emissions.

USAID's approach to **biodiversity** will focus on promoting innovative approaches to the conservation and sustainable use of the planet's biological diversity at the genetic, species, and ecosystem levels. "Biodiversity" refers to the variability among living organisms from all sources, including terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic ecosystems, and among the ecological complexes of which they are part. This includes diversity within species, between species, and among ecosystems. We are only beginning to fully understand the economic value and biological underpinnings of biodiverse areas.

Protecting biodiversity is a complex and multifaceted challenge. It involves promoting sustainable economic uses of biological resources, strengthening systems of parks and protected areas, and supporting ex-situ efforts such as herbaria, gene banks, and zoos. Geographically, USAID will maintain a special focus on two types of areas: those richest in biodiversity and facing the greatest threat; and those that are least disturbed and present the greatest opportunity for long-term conservation. USAID also will support conservation and sustainable use of biological resources where this is judged to be a priority for sustainable development at the country level.

Substantively, USAID will focus on developing sustainable economic uses of biological resources; building local capacity for the management of biodiverse areas, including management of parks and protected areas; supporting innovative, non-governmental conservation and research programs; encouraging the involvement of indigenous peoples and local communities at every stage of decision-making; and facilitating the setting of conservation priorities that respect the rights of indigenous peoples at the local, national, and regional levels.

Country Issues: USAID's approach to national environmental problems will differ on a country-by-country basis, depending on a particular country's environmental priorities — as determined by the host government and local communities and citizens — and USAID's overall country program. All country strategies will include assessments of these elements:

Improving agricultural, industrial, and natural resource management practices that play a central role in environmental degradation. As appropriate, USAID-supported programs will target objectives such as:

- Conservation of soil and water through improved tilling practices, erosion planning and control, integrated pest management, reductions in the use of pesticides and in fertilizer and pesticide runoff, efficient design and management of irrigation systems, and protection of aquifers and integrated water resource planning and management.

- Reduction of industrial- and energy-related environmental degradation through the adoption of pollution prevention strategies and pollution control systems in industry, and through energy efficiency programs, renewable energy applications, fuel switching, and installation of environmental controls in the energy sector.

- Amelioration of rural and urban natural resource management problems and land-use problems through efforts to limit deforestation and promote reforestation; support for conservation and environmentally sustainable uses of forests, coastal zones, and other important ecosystems; and in urban areas, improved water resources management, land-use, sewage and waste disposal, and transportation planning.

Strengthening public policies and institutions to protect the environment. As appropriate, USAID will support such activities as:

- Reform of national economic policies, development strategies, and market mechanisms to end unintended or misguided environmental damage, promote conservation, and encourage sustainable resource management.

- Development of a comprehensive environmental policy framework, including laws, regulations, and standards at the national and local levels, as appropriate.

- Promotion of procedures for measuring, assessing, monitoring, and mitigating the environmental impact of economic growth.

- Improved enforcement of environmental laws and regulations through increased funding and technical training for regulatory agencies, enhanced public participation, and development of non-governmental advocacy groups.

- Creation or strengthening of competent environmental institutions within government, the private sector, the NGO community, and academia.

- Creation of environmental data bases and natural resource inventories.

Bilateral and multilateral interventions. USAID also will work bilaterally and multilaterally, pursuing dialogues with governments on environmental issues, such as environmental regulations, natural resource usage, and energy pricing policies; dialogues with international agencies, especially agencies of the United Nations and international financial institutions, on the environmental impact of lending practices in developing

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nations; and the design and implementation of innovative mechanisms to support environmental work, including the establishment of trust funds and endowments and the design and completion of debt swaps and debt forgiveness.

Environmental research and education. As resources permit, USAID will continue its support for applied research on key environmental issues; non-capital intensive elements of technology transfer, such as institutional cooperation, scientific exchanges, development of human resources, and policy development; and support for public education on issues affecting the environment.

MEASURING RESULTS

USAID will insist on measurable results from its programs. It is not enough to measure project inputs, funds spent, etc. The sole standard of success is the impact that programs have on host nations, their societies, and the lives of citizens. Detailed performance criteria for environmental activities will be developed in consultation with expert and interested outside parties. As appropriate, the following types of questions will be asked of environmental programs supported by USAID:

In the area of climate change: Are greenhouse gas emissions being reduced in countries that contribute most to the problem? Have these countries identified sources and sinks of emissions and implemented national action plans that address key sectors, e.g., energy, forestry, agriculture?

In the area of biodiversity: Have levels of biodiversity in key geographical areas been conserved? Have conservation plans and strategies been implemented for these areas, including provision for protection of parks and sensitive areas and support for sustainable economic activities for inhabitants of these areas and their buffer zones? Do these plans enjoy the support of local people, such that they can be maintained over time? Have national and regional biodiversity strategies that address underlying social and economic forces been implemented, including both in-situ and ex-situ approaches? Have economic policy distortions that encourage excessive exploitation of critical habitats been reformed?

In countries where the concern is environmentally harmful agricultural practices: Have agricultural activities in fragile lands been reduced? Has soil management improved, as demonstrated by better soil tilth and nutrient content and reduced soil erosion? Has the use of inappropriate pesticides been ended? Has pollution from chemical runoff been reduced? Have integrated pest management techniques been disseminated and adopted? Have government subsidies or other policies encouraging environmentally harmful agricultural practices been reformed? Has an indigenous research capacity committed to the development of environmentally sustainable agricultural technology been developed? Do local farmers, both male and female, benefit from this research and from permanent lines of communication with international agricultural experts and institutions?

In countries where the concern is environmentally harmful urbanization practices: Have urban land-use plans been developed in consultation with affected businesses and communities and implemented? Have local governments adopted, implemented, and enforced integrated solid and liquid waste management programs? Are the levels of primary, secondary, and tertiary sewage treatment before discharge increasing?

In countries where the concern is environmentally harmful industrial and energy practices: Have ambient levels of air and water pollution been reduced in target airsheds and water bodies? Have pollution-related public health conditions, including the incidence of lead- and

heavy metal-poisoning, improved? Have industries implemented pollution prevention and control strategies? Have government subsidies or other policies that encourage inefficient and environmentally harmful industrial practices or activities been reformed? Have policies for energy efficiency, renewable energy, and fuel switching been implemented? Have energy production facilities adopted appropriate environmental controls?

In countries where the concern is environmentally harmful natural resources management and land-use practices: Have rates of deforestation been reduced? Have subsidies or other policies that encourage deforestation been reformed? Have conservation strategies been implemented for watersheds, critical ecosystems, and habitats for rare, threatened, or endangered species? Have national forestry policies been reformed to discourage unsustainable forestry practices? Have rates of destruction for other critical ecosystems, e.g., wetlands, coral reefs, and coastal zones, been reduced?

In poorer countries where the concern is strengthening environmental policies and institutions: Have culturally appropriate incentives to encourage the conservation of resources been established? Has a comprehensive environmental policy framework been adopted? Have regulatory agencies been established and are they functioning effectively? Have local NGOs been created or strengthened and do they participate at all levels of environmental planning and monitoring? Has the environmental research capacity of indigenous institutions been enhanced?

In advanced developing countries and economies in transition where the concern is strengthening environmental policies and institutions: Are national economic development strategies consistent with environmental goals? Has a comprehensive environmental policy framework been established that is appropriate to changing economic and social circumstances? Are regulatory institutions well funded, staffed, and trained? Do NGOs, including PVOs, academic research institutions, and community groups participate in all levels of environmental planning and monitoring?

Building Democracy: USAID's Strategy

THE CHALLENGE

People throughout the world have demonstrated by their own actions that freedom is a universal concept. Men and women have risked their lives for the proposition that freedom, human rights, and accountable government are not just the province of a few industrialized states. The influence of democratic ideas has never been greater.

Political openings during the past decade came as a result of concerted, often courageous, indigenous efforts to build democracy. Some autocrats conceded their failure at the ballot box; some simply resigned; some embraced reform. A number of nations pursued democracy as an alternative to civil war.

The democratic transitions of the last few years create the possibility of a more peaceful, more rational, and more productive world. At the same time, nascent democratic institutions and processes are strained by unrealistic expectations of immediate socioeconomic progress, and by the rekindling of old enmities, including religious, regional, and ethnic passions. Moreover, many new democracies need to expand and deepen the transition process beyond a periodic vote for national leadership. They need to institutionalize community participation at the local level and an accountable, transparent style of governance that can ensure citizens a modicum of control over their own lives.

The absence of democratic change is also a matter of concern. Autocracy survives in many parts of the world. Violations of human rights remain a major problem in many countries. Every day — in fewer nations than a decade ago, but in too many nations nonetheless — people are victimized and denied any meaningful participation in decisions that affect their lives. As illegitimate governments crumble, violence and corruption by those acting under state authority frequently ensue.

Faltering democracies and persistent oppression pose serious threats to the security of the United States and other nations. Narco-terrorism, ethnic warfare, uncontrolled migration, and religious intolerance threaten the very notion of a world community and international peace.

Because democratic regimes contribute to peace and security in the world and because democracy and respect for human rights coincide with fundamental American values, the Clinton Administration has identified the promotion of democracy as a primary objective of U.S. foreign policy. Foreign assistance is a natural vehicle for achieving this goal.

In accordance with Administration policy and congressional mandate, USAID will decline to provide any form of assistance, except to meet humanitarian needs, to governments that engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Further, when allocating scarce development resources among countries, USAID will consider a government's human rights performance, including its willingness to permit the emergence and function-

ing of democratic institutions and independent political groups. At the same time, USAID will continue supporting human rights organizations and other groups that are struggling for political freedom in non-democratic societies.

Democratization is an essential part of sustainable development because it facilitates the protection of human rights, informed participation, and public sector accountability. USAID's success in the other core areas of sustainable development is inextricably related to democratization and good governance. Repression, exclusion of marginalized groups, human rights abuses, disregard for the rule of law, corruption, and autocracy are antithetical to development. Therefore, USAID has attached a high priority to strengthening democratic institutions and popular participation in decision-making.

Democracy's freedoms permit the formation of a wide range of non-governmental organizations throughout society, including community associations, service providers, unions, advocacy groups, and religious institutions. These private organizations often stimulate innovation in production and social services, confront corruption, advocate respect for human rights, and promote and defend democratic processes and institutions.

STRATEGIC GOALS AND AREAS OF CONCENTRATION

USAID's strategic objective is the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world — as an end in itself and because it is a critical element in promoting sustainable development. This objective is achieved through the establishment of democratic institutions, free and open markets, an informed and educated populace, a vibrant civic society, and a relationship between state and society that encourages pluralism, inclusion, and peaceful conflict resolution. The promotion of democracy is a long-term process that will require sustained commitment and timely and politically adept interventions.

Local involvement is important in any kind of foreign assistance, but it is essential in democracy building. Local forces must provide the principal impetus for creating, nurturing, and sustaining an environment in which democracy can thrive. USAID's role is to stimulate and reinforce democratic elements at the city and community level.

USAID faces a twofold task: to help people make the transition to democracy from authoritarian rule and to facilitate the empowerment of individuals and communities in non-democratic societies, in order to create a climate conducive to sustainable development. USAID aims to accomplish this task not only through democracy-building programs, but also through economic and social development programs that mandate participation, transparency, and accountability.

USAID recognizes that there are many paths to democracy and many variations of governmental mechanisms based on historical, social, and cultural realities. However, all sustainable democracies share certain fundamental characteristics: respect for human and civil rights, peaceful competition for political power, free and fair elections, respect for the rule of law, accountable government, and an environment that encourages participation by all sectors of the population. USAID will emphasize these universal elements in implementing programs.

USAID's programs will focus on some of the following types of problems:

- Human rights abuses, arbitrary action by civilian governments and security forces, and impunity of government officials from the rule of law.
- Misperceptions about democracy and free-market capitalism.

- Lack of experience with democratic institutions.
- The absence or weakness of intermediary organizations, such as labor unions, business associations, media outlets, educational institutions, and civic groups.
- Nonexistent, ineffectual, or undemocratic political parties.
- Disenfranchisement of women, indigenous peoples, and minorities; ethnic divisions; and the reemergence of politics based on ethnic, national, and religious chauvinism.
- Absence of or failure to implement national charter documents — a constitution, a bill of rights, citizenship laws — that promote democratic practices.
- Powerless or poorly defined democratic institutions, including politicized or corrupt judiciaries that deny due process, overly centralized government institutions, and ineffective or unaccountable institutions of local government.
- Elected positions for which there is no meaningful competition.
- Tainted elections.
- The inability to resolve conflicts peacefully.

OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

Democracy programs are often undertaken in a dynamic political environment. They can be subject to significant time pressures. They are intensely scrutinized locally and internationally — especially when the United States is involved.

Given these realities, USAID must pay considerable attention to the political situation within a country and must work closely with other U.S. Government agencies, especially the Department of State, to devise and implement democracy programs. In particular, USAID field missions, in collaboration with U.S. Embassy personnel operating as part of a country team, must continue to monitor the political situation once programs are under way and must be prepared to respond to changing circumstances.

This is a particular challenge when decisions must be made about whether to withdraw from a country or suspend programs — for example, in a situation where human rights abuses are steadily increasing. Difficult decisions to suspend programs may have to be made; the amount of money already invested should not preclude such decisions.

Timing can be critical. One-time events, such as a transition election or the formation of a constituent assembly, can jumpstart the democratization process, even where conditions in the country are not propitious. USAID will develop the capability to respond rapidly to these opportunities. This will enable the Agency to quickly provide start-up funds for democracy-building activities where events warrant. Such assistance will demonstrate a U.S. commitment to the democratization process and encourage other donors to act in a similar fashion.

The United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other intergovernmental organizations are committed to assisting member states in responding to requests for assistance in the democratization process. USAID will coordinate with these organizations on planning and programming. Many of these organizations are enhancing their ability to support democracy building, and USAID will assist them in that endeavor.

The potential damage caused by conflicting signals emanating from the international community and the waste caused by duplication demand a high level of coordination among bilateral and multilateral donors through such mechanisms as the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in-country consultation. Coordination may include joint assessments of priorities, needs, and donor strengths; harmonizing of financial allocations; sharing of technical resources and expertise; rapid transfer of relevant information; consultation on program effectiveness; and ongoing reassessments of a dynamic political situation.

USAID recognizes the dilemma posed by providing direct democracy program assistance to regimes in which the commitment to democracy is weak or absent. To implement programs effectively in such an environment, USAID officials must reconcile host government sensitivities with the interests of democratic forces outside government, whose views must be solicited before assistance is provided. Moreover, in no circumstances will USAID provide assistance that legitimizes an entrenched, non-democratic regime or that supports a government where human rights abuses continue or are increasing.

USAID will develop programs in full consultation with local groups. Their active participation in the design and implementation of specific programs is vital to promoting a sustainable democratic polity.

In implementing programs, USAID will work closely with U.S.-based private voluntary organizations (PVOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, professional and academic associations, and private organizations that are committed to supporting democratic development abroad and that have experience working in this field. Their ties to indigenous counterparts and their international credibility make these organizations valuable partners in democracy building.

USAID will ensure that its programs build upon, but do not duplicate, the important work undertaken by the National Endowment for Democracy. The Endowment provides early funding to support activities that stimulate momentum for democratic change in pre-transitional and emerging transitional environments. Its independence from the U.S. Government provides for flexibility in programming and in establishing partnerships.

USAID will encourage contractors, grantees, and other development partners to take an international approach to democracy promotion and enlist parliamentarians, local officials, judges, election administrators, and men and women with technical skills from throughout the world in program activities.

Internationalism conveys a fundamental lesson: Democracies support and assist each other. Experience has shown that nascent democrats are influenced by the insights and perspectives of people who have faced similar challenges, especially those from their own region.

USAID will concentrate on building local democratic capacities, rather than relying exclusively on the intermittent importation of outside experts. USAID programs should stress appropriate technologies that can be maintained locally without continuous international involvement.

USAID will conduct periodic, cross-regional reviews of democracy programs. These will help ensure that USAID, its contractors and grantees, other donors, and the international community share experiences and benefit from field experiences.

Finally, USAID recognizes that the lack of economic development impedes the consolidation of democratic institutions. Where governments commit themselves to democratization, USAID will endeavor to provide assistance to promote broad-based economic growth through direct USAID programs and will encourage other bilateral and multilateral donors to provide appropriate support.

PROGRAMS AND METHODS

The specific types of democracy programs undertaken or supported by USAID will depend upon the social, political, economic, and cultural realities of a country, including the initiatives taken by its citizens, and upon available resources. In sustainable development countries, and to a lesser extent, transition countries, democracy programs will form part of an integrated country plan, which will have both short-term and long-term objectives. In countries with limited USAID presence, democracy programs will focus on discrete objectives, e.g., supporting non-governmental organizations.

USAID's democracy programs will support:

Constitutional mechanisms, including technical and organizational assistance to constitutional conventions and constitution-makers.

Democratically elected legislatures, including programs to improve the material, technical, and decision-making capabilities of legislatures.

Legal systems, including independent judiciaries and civilian-controlled police, and alternative and informal mechanisms for resolving disputes.

Local government entities, particularly those that have recently acquired additional institutional authority and responsibilities.

Credible and effective elections, where voters have confidence in the process.

Local, national, regional, and international organizations that protect human rights, including the rights of workers, indigenous peoples, minorities, and women.

Trade unions, professional associations, women's groups, educational entities, and a wide range of indigenous NGOs, particularly those that are partners in development programs.

Political parties and other national mechanisms of political expression in a strictly nonpartisan manner and, consistent with statutory limitations, in a manner that does not influence the outcome of an election.

Independent media outlets and groups formed to promote and protect freedom of expression.

Improved civil-military relations, including effective civilian control of the military establishment.

Institutions and organizations that increase government responsiveness and accountability at the national, state, and local levels.

Educational efforts for children and adults that reflect community participation, promote the development of local NGOs, and encourage tolerance within society.

Finally, as a natural complement to longer-term democracy-building efforts, USAID, in consultation with other U.S. Government agencies and with adequate human rights safeguards, will support programs in transition situations for the establishment of democratic political institutions and for the demobilization and retraining of soldiers and insurgents.

MEASURING RESULTS

Democracy building is inherently a long-term, cumulative process. The fruits of a particular effort frequently are not discernable for a considerable period of time. Breakthroughs sometimes are followed by sudden reversals that are beyond the control of external actors. Moreover, democratic progress is a complex process, making it difficult to pinpoint precise cause-and-effect relationships. Democratic progress also is defined by changes in perceptions and attitudes that are difficult to measure.

Notwithstanding these hurdles, USAID will assess results, rather than just count inputs and outputs, in order to incorporate lessons learned from past work into future programs. USAID will review individual democracy programs to determine whether they have met their original specific objectives, whether they were carried out in an efficient and professional manner, and whether they had unanticipated positive or negative effects. Democracy programs concentrated on particular areas, e.g., rule of law or electoral assistance, will be reviewed on a cross-regional basis to identify effective program designs and mechanisms for overcoming specific political, social, and cultural obstacles. Finally, programs that address other development issues will be reviewed to assess their impact on democratization objectives, in order to facilitate the successful integration of our efforts.

USAID will consider discrete standards in evaluating the performance of democracy programs, including transformed attitudes and perceptions and changes in process and behavior. Detailed performance criteria will be developed in consultation with expert and interested outside parties. As appropriate, the following types of questions will be asked in the context of evaluating USAID's democracy programs:

Are basic laws relating to human rights being enforced? Has there been a significant reduction in the overall rate of human rights abuses in the country?

Is the electoral process honest, as judged by all parties or by experienced international observers? Are election laws the product of consensus? Are they fairly and universally enforced?

Do the institutions of a civic society take an increasingly active role in decision-making? Do they measurably influence policy outcomes? Do they involve broad sectors of society, including disenfranchised groups such as women, minorities, and indigenous peoples? Are mechanisms that mandate pluralism and protect minority opinions in place and functional?

Do institutions exist at both the national and local levels that are accountable, transparent, and accessible? Are institutions structured to provide individuals with access and recourse?

Is there evidence that the rule of law is increasingly respected and that disputes are resolved without violence? Are gender-inequitable laws being changed so that women share the same rights under the law as men? Do institutions and processes exist that provide democratic education?

USAID's emphasis on results should not discourage experimentation and innovation. International democracy is a laboratory in which individuals and nations are expected to both borrow ideas and apply new methods.

The political process, by definition, is never complete; even long-established democracies continuously reinvent themselves. However, democratization is ultimately an internally driven process. Sustainable democracy is a fact when indigenous forces within a society can maintain and strengthen democracy without external support. USAID's programs will aim at this outcome.

Stabilizing World Population Growth and Protecting Human Health: USAID's Strategy

THE CHALLENGE

Certain factors play a critical role in keeping nations poor: a lack of resources; limited educational opportunities; a dearth of skills; and economic, social, and political systems that impede broad-based growth. Rapid population growth and poor health are inextricably linked, and they make every one of these conditions worse.

Poor health conditions and rapid population growth are closely associated with low status and limited rights for women. Moreover, the lack of basic rights, high rates of unintended pregnancy, and lack of access to basic health and family planning services threaten the health of both women and children. Conversely, the expectation of infant and child mortality encourages people to have numerous children in order to ensure that a few survive. When access to information about nutrition and sanitation is poor and health care and family planning services are inadequate, the result is increased mortality that contributes to high rates of fertility.

Poor health conditions and rapid population growth obstruct rational planning by forcing the national discourse to focus on day-to-day survival. No other factors so limit the options and flexibility of developing nations. Rapid population growth renders inadequate any investment in schools, housing, food production capacity, and infrastructure. It challenges the ability of governments to provide even the most basic health and social services. When people are undernourished and disease-prone, they cannot contribute to their own development.

As expanding populations demand an ever greater number of jobs, a climate is created where workers, especially women and minorities, are oppressed. The educational and economic framework gradually collapses from supporting too many people with too few resources.

The problems of population and health in the developing world are being aggravated by the spread of HIV/AIDS. This health crisis threatens to overwhelm already limited health facilities and consume resources needed for long-term investments, both human and financial.

By their nature and consequences, population and health are global issues. Population pressure puts increasing stress on the Earth's already fragile environment. The world's population will grow by almost 1 billion people over the next 10 years, despite the fact that fertility and growth rates have begun to drop in many countries due to efforts made over the past three decades. This translates into a net increase of more than 270,000 people every day — 95 percent of them in the developing world.

Actions taken this decade — especially the expansion of reproductive choice — will determine when the world's population will stabilize.

What is done, or not done, in the next decade will determine the economic, social, and political prospects for much of the world for the next century.

The high fertility rates associated with poverty and rapid population growth have implications for the individual and the family. Very early, multiple, closely spaced pregnancies drastically increase the health risks to women and their children, limit opportunities for women, and diminish the ability of families to invest in their children's education and health. Millions of unwanted births and the prevalence of abortion are evidence that many women lack adequate access to reproductive health services.

More than 500,000 women die each year because of preventable complications from pregnancy, abortion, and childbirth; over 35,000 children die each day, mostly from preventable causes, and mostly in the developing world. The HIV/AIDS epidemic continues to spread at the rate of approximately 5,000 new infections per day. These conditions impede sustainable development and are tragedies for individuals, families, communities, and nations.

Yet the population and health problems in the developing world can be addressed. With better access to family planning and health services, individuals can enhance their ability to affect and improve their own lives and the lives of their children. Moreover, by slowing the rate of population increase, societies can give themselves more time and better options.

Progress has been made. The delivery of child survival technologies, notably immunizations and oral rehydration therapy, has led to markedly lower child mortality. At the same time, fertility rates in most countries have been brought down by the increased use of contraception, decreased child mortality, expanded education (especially among females), and economic growth. USAID-supported population and health programs, conducted in close cooperation with concerned national governments, local and international private voluntary organizations (PVOs), other donors, and indigenous non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, have contributed significantly to this progress.

STRATEGIC GOALS AND AREAS OF CONCENTRATION

USAID's population and health goals are mutually reinforcing. Specifically, USAID will contribute to a cooperative global effort to stabilize world population growth and support women's reproductive rights. Consistent with U.N. projections, this effort should result in a total world population between 8 billion and 9 billion by the year 2025, and less than 10 billion by the year 2050, with very low growth thereafter. Over this decade, USAID also will contribute to a global health goal of halving current maternal mortality rates, reducing child mortality rates by one-third, and decreasing the rate of new HIV infections by 15 percent.

To achieve this, USAID will concentrate its population and health programs on two types of countries:

Countries that contribute the most to global population and health problems. Such countries have the following characteristics: childbearing by large numbers of very young and older women; many closely spaced births; high numbers of infant, child, and maternal deaths; high female illiteracy; large numbers of women with an articulated but unmet need for family planning services; and large numbers of persons infected with HIV, or growing rates of HIV infection.

Countries where population and health conditions impede sustainable development. Relevant characteristics of these countries include fertility and population growth rates that outstrip the country's ability to provide adequate food and

social services; growth rates that threaten the environment; significant reproductive health problems due to heavy reliance on unsafe abortions; health conditions that impede the ability of children to learn and the ability of adults to produce and participate; growing rates of HIV infection; and significant gender gaps in education.

OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

At the program level, USAID's operational approach will be founded on these principles and objectives:

- Promoting the rights of couples and individuals to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children.
- Improving individual health, with special attention to the reproductive health needs of women and adolescents and the general health needs of infants and children.
- Reducing population growth rates to levels consistent with sustainable development.
- Making programs responsive and accountable to the end-user.

USAID will collaborate with other donors, host country governments, development agencies, universities and academic organizations, the private sector, PVOs, and NGOs. Where appropriate, USAID will pursue and practice joint planning and allocation of resources, sharing of methods, and pooling of technical resources. This will extend from the institutional level to the field.

Working closely with host country governments and local communities, USAID will construct country strategies that address the core elements of sustainable development. The population and health component of the country strategy will take into account the activities of other donors, development efforts in other sectors, and every element of USAID's population and health assistance in that country. These population and health strategy components will address how population growth problems can be solved in that country, how the country can acquire the independent ability to cope with its population and health problems, and how USAID's programs will help the country graduate from foreign assistance. These plans must take into account the quality and strength of the health infrastructure; the true access that citizens, especially women, have to health and family planning services; the situation regarding HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases; and the employment, education, and empowerment of women.

We will help the United States expand its leadership in the field of population and health. The United States already possesses an extensive network of specialized programs, institutions, and technical experts. USAID will rely on these resources and encourage their expanded use by the donor community and developing nations.

The Agency will operate both bilaterally and multilaterally. It will continue to work with and support the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF/London), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Bank and other international financial institutions and their global population, health, research, and information activities. This will enhance USAID's ability to deal with the transnational effect of population and health problems while enabling USAID to share its resources with virtually all developing countries.

Population and health programs will be responsive to needs and problems as they are defined locally.

They will actively involve women clients, providers, and indigenous experts in the conception, design, operation, evolution, and evaluation of population and health programs. To be effective, programs must encourage the development and involvement of indigenous PVOs and NGOs.

We will emphasize the use of integrated approaches to expand reproductive choice and rights, help slow population growth, decrease maternal and child mortality, and reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.

By "integrated approaches," USAID means that population programs should seek to provide individuals with access to a range of family planning methods; should integrate family planning programs, as appropriate, with services that enhance women's health and child well-being and survival, in order to enhance both the effectiveness and the acceptance of family planning services; should utilize family planning systems, as appropriate, to provide information and services that limit the spread of sexually transmitted diseases; and should emphasize the importance of providing education for girls and women. By addressing co-factors, and by implementing related programs at the same place and time, integrated approaches increase the impact and sustainability of population programs.

Integrated approaches can save resources. They also are important in addressing HIV/AIDS because this disease particularly afflicts the very people who are in their most economically productive years and who should be most active in the development process: the young, the well-educated, and people in urban centers. Care and treatment consume ever-larger portions of national resources. The progress of the disease destroys family structure and increases infant mortality and the failure of children to thrive. Limiting the spread of HIV/AIDS thus is an economical and essential investment in sustainable development.

Where appropriate, USAID will seek to integrate family planning programs with programs that enhance public health. For instance, barrier contraceptive methods, particularly condoms, are the most effective means of preventing the spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. Similarly, mothers taking their children for immunizations may also wish to take advantage of family planning services.

Finally, USAID will emphasize the quality, continuity, availability, and technical standards of services. We will build on existing health and family planning programs, assets, and investments.

PROGRAMS AND METHODS

The types of programs USAID supports will vary with the particular needs of the individual country and the kind of approaches that local communities initiate and support. However, most of USAID's resources will be directed to the following areas:

Support for voluntary family planning systems, including facilities and institutions that provide information on family planning methods and distribute contraceptives. Self-sustaining family planning systems and services will remain the core of USAID's population programs. Over 100 million women in the developing world have an articulated but unmet need for family planning. Moreover, millions of young people will reach reproductive age in the near future, creating even greater demand for family planning services and imposing additional burdens on existing family planning systems. Providing information about and access to a wide range of appropriate family planning methods not only remains the most effective means of reducing population growth rates to levels consistent with sustainable development but also significantly improves the health of women and children.

Building the local capacity of self-sustaining family planning systems and services also requires support for training (including clinical training), management, logistics, other support systems, and access to technical information and technology. Programs designed to affect popular attitudes toward family planning should address the needs and attitudes of men as well as women, emphasize free and informed choice, and assess the reasons why people participate or do not participate in programs. Targets or quotas for the recruitment of clients should not be imposed on family planning providers; over the long term, meeting the unmet need for information and services is the best way to achieve national demographic goals.

Reproductive health care, including prevention and control of sexually transmitted diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, and improved prenatal and delivery services. Contraception is but one element of reproductive health, and to be effective, population and health policies must address women's reproductive health needs throughout their lives.

The particular needs of adolescents and young adults, including easily accessible information, counseling, and services dealing with early sexual activity, the health and economic consequences of early childbearing and unsafe abortions, and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Enhancing the ability and freedom of adolescents and young adults to make informed choices about contraception and health is especially critical.

Infant and child health, particularly immunizations, diarrheal and respiratory disease control, and nutrition. Complete immunization coverage and good nutrition are among the most cost-effective preventive health strategies.

Education for girls and women, particularly at the primary and secondary school levels, and basic literacy for adolescents and young women. This also correlates strongly with lower birth rates, improved child survival, and smaller desired family size.

USAID, its indigenous partners, contractors, and grantees will design programs with certain critical standards in mind to maximize their impact and to ensure the greatest return from the development funds invested:

Does the program contribute to achieving population growth rates that are in balance with available resources as measured at the global and national levels?

Does the program contribute to measurable improvements in immunization coverage; reductions in infant, child, and maternal mortality; and reductions in new HIV infections at the global and country levels?

Does the program address the attitudes as well as practices of both men and women? Does it enhance the capacity of local institutions, communities, and individuals to identify and solve health and family planning problems? Do programs and projects address issues of sustainability, especially the technical and managerial aspects?

Does the program take into account links between population and environment, health, working conditions, social mobility, and democratic governance?

Does the program contribute to greater participation by women in the work force? Does it address issues of increased empowerment of women?

MEASURING RESULTS

To measure progress toward its goals and the effectiveness of its population and health programs, USAID will evaluate results in terms of the following measures: reduced fertility; reduced infant and child mortality; reduced high-risk births; reduced maternal mortality; and slower growth (and eventual reduction) in the number of new AIDS cases.

Measures of success at the country level will vary. There will be many intermediate signs of progress, such as expanded access to, increased use of, and improved quality of family planning and reproductive health services; increased contraceptive prevalence and continuation; improved women's reproductive health; expanded immunization coverage; decreases in the incidence and severity of communicable diseases among children; lower malnutrition rates; equal access to health care by gender; and higher school enrollment ratios for girls.

Ultimately, the success of USAID's population and health strategy will be measured in terms of its contribution to expanding reproductive choice and rights, improving the health of women and children, reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS, and stabilizing world population at a level consistent with sustainable development.

Encouraging Broad-Based Economic Growth: USAID's Strategy

THE CHALLENGE

The world economy has grown by an average of 3.5 percent per year during the last quarter century. However, the pattern of growth has been uneven among countries and within countries. A significant number of developing nations have achieved broad-based economic growth and thereby reduced poverty substantially, but many others have not. A quarter of the world's people remain on the margin of survival, struggling with malnutrition, poor housing, illness, and unemployment. Poverty on this scale is a global problem that makes other global problems worse.

Economic stagnation and persistent poverty in developing countries directly affect the interests of the United States and other industrial nations. Developing countries that have achieved sustained economic growth and substantial reductions in poverty are the fastest-growing market for U.S. exports. But opportunities to expand into new markets cannot materialize where growth does not occur and where poverty limits the demand for goods and services.

Slow or inequitable growth and widespread poverty feed political instability and civil strife. They can drive economic migrations, as people flee economic hardship and political conflict for safer, more prosperous countries. They cause unplanned, unmanageable urbanization, as economic refugees flee rural areas for the city. They figure prominently in environmental degradation. Moreover, privation, poor health, and illiteracy contribute to high fertility, rapid population growth, and food insecurity.

The keys to economic growth and reduced poverty are an appropriate policy environment, sound institutions, good governance, adequate investment and savings, the availability of appropriate productive technologies, and access by the population to adequate food, health care, education, and housing. But beyond these basic requirements, there is no single best way to promote economic growth. USAID believes that a strategy for economic growth should be shaped by strategic objectives, not specific methods. What then is USAID's vision of economic growth?

USAID will help developing nations permanently enhance their capacity to improve the quality of life. Our fundamental goal is to help individuals within those societies improve the quality of their own lives and share equitably in the benefits of economic growth. We will concentrate on helping nations remove the obstacles that interfere with their economic vitality. We will concentrate on helping people unleash their creative and productive energies. The inevitable result of these endeavors, we believe, will be broad-based and sustainable economic growth.

STRATEGIC GOALS AND AREAS OF CONCENTRATION

USAID aims at helping the people of developing nations become participants in the economic and political lives of their nations, thus creating markets and reducing global poverty. We believe we can measurably contribute to this by supporting policy reforms in key economic sectors; by strengthening economic and political institutions critical to good governance; by encouraging the effective functioning of markets; by investing in human resources, especially the education and health of people; and by aiding projects designed to promote sustainable growth.

USAID will promote broad-based, sustainable growth by addressing the factors that enhance the capacity for growth and by working to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of individual opportunity. In this context, USAID will concentrate its efforts in three areas:

Strengthening Markets: Healthy market economies offer the best prospects for sustained, broad-based growth, expanded individual opportunity, and reduced poverty. USAID will address policy and regulatory impediments to the development of local markets and exports. This would include the enabling environment of policies, regulations, and laws; this environment affects agriculture and commerce, especially small farms, microenterprises (including poverty lending), and small businesses. USAID will also address weak or absent institutions of a market economy; inadequate infrastructure (including markets, storage, and transport); and technical assistance for the privatization of state-owned enterprises.

Expanding Access and Opportunity: USAID will pay particular attention to expanding economic opportunities for the less-advantaged in developing countries by helping to promote microenterprises and small businesses; by focusing on the development and delivery of technology, including agricultural technologies appropriate to small farmers; by enhancing food security at the household and community level; by increasing the access of women to employment, land, capital, and technology; and by supporting social sector development intended to enhance the well-being of poor and disadvantaged peoples.

Investing in People: Building human skills and capacities throughout a society is essential for sustained growth, poverty reduction, and improved quality of life. USAID will support programs that address inadequate health services, particularly in the area of basic, preventive, and reproductive health care; education systems, especially primary education for girls and women; technical and business skills and access to technology; and other related social services and institutions that facilitate broad-based participation, especially by women, indigenous peoples, and other disadvantaged groups.

OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

USAID's efforts to promote broad-based economic growth will be shaped by these thematic approaches:

Participation. Fundamental to broad-based economic growth is the widespread involvement of individuals in the economy and society at large. USAID programs will foster participation in this broader sense, ensuring that efforts to promote economic growth involve and enhance the prosperity of people throughout the productive sector, especially microentrepreneurs, small business owners, smallholders, and members of cooperatives.

Institutional Development. Development must rely on local capacities. Foreign donors can assist, but the fundamental burden rests with the people and institutions of developing countries. USAID seeks to strengthen public and private

institutions in developing countries, so that they can manage their own development process, consistent with the wishes and needs of their citizens. The objective should not simply be more institutions, but better institutions — legal codes that are more coherent; courts that can enforce their decisions; and bureaucracies that are more effective and more responsive to the individual.

Sustainability. USAID has an interest only in economic growth that is sustainable. Growth that occurs without regard for degradation of the natural resource base impoverishes future generations. Growth that depends on constant infusions of grants or subsidized financing from abroad is inherently unsustainable.

Sustainability entails transformations. It requires the transformation of the work force so that it is healthier, better educated, and more inclusive. Concomitantly, sustainability entails increases in productivity that do not rely on the increased exploitation of workers. Sustainability requires an indigenous capacity to generate technology appropriate to local needs, as well as policies and institutions that facilitate the transfer and adaptation of technology from abroad. In predominantly agrarian societies, sustainability entails the transformation of subsistence farming into an agriculture that can create surpluses and increase rural incomes. It depends upon a viable urban sector that can generate jobs, provide essential services, accommodate migration, and boost productivity. Most important of all, sustainability mandates the greater involvement of individuals and communities in the decisions that affect their well-being.

PROGRAMS AND METHODS

In planning and supporting programs, USAID will ask: What is needed to unleash the productive capacity of this society? To strengthen markets, invest in people, and expand access and opportunity, especially for the less advantaged, USAID will support the following kinds of programs and methods:

In the Area of Strengthening Markets: The foundation of economic growth is a favorable policy and institutional environment. This creates and strengthens markets, which, in turn, increase efficiency, encourage broader participation, and reduce poverty. Few foreign assistance projects can achieve their goals in an unfavorable environment.

Our objective is to work with host country governments, local authorities, communities, individuals, and other donors to create an enabling environment, comprising policies and institutions, that systematically and consciously encourages both individual initiative and choice in the private sector. USAID's programs to strengthen markets will pay close attention to improved governance and local empowerment, because these factors, more than anything else, determine the success or failure of policy reforms and institutional investments.

USAID will assist host nations in building indigenous institutions and developing policies that promote openness to trade and investment, support agriculture and rural enterprise, strengthen infrastructure and delivery of services in cities, provide adequate incentives for exports, reinforce the effectiveness and transparency of fiscal and monetary policy and regulations, avoid inefficient import substitution and unwarranted protection, and strengthen the enabling environment for development of the private sector.

USAID's programs for policy, regulatory, and legal reforms will help governments address such areas as tariffs and other trade restrictions; tax codes; investment; privatization; pricing mechanisms; the informal sector in both rural and urban economies; financial markets and services; agricultural production, marketing, subsidies, and land tenure arrangements; labor laws and policies; formalized property rights, including intellectual property

rights and patents; contract and property law; and business regulations. Particularly at the macroeconomic level, USAID will coordinate closely with the reform programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. USAID will assist recipient governments in their efforts to formulate and implement adjustment policies that are consistent with the country's development and can be supported by its people.

The Agency will help to build institutions by addressing the restructuring and development of local, provincial, urban, and regional markets; reform of the education and health sectors; and reforms that encourage efficient private and public investments in infrastructure, especially capital projects such as roads, ports, housing, water supplies, sewage and waste systems, and electrical grids.

USAID will encourage the establishment of flourishing agricultural sectors by addressing policy issues, marketing factors, and technologies. Programs will focus on factors that are pivotal to agricultural success: market-oriented pricing and trading policies; access to inputs, such as seeds, fertilizer, credits, technologies, information, and land; access to domestic and export markets; and crop production and marketing choice. USAID will continue to support agricultural research — work that has had a global impact and is indispensable to developing new methods and technologies that enhance growth and productive employment opportunities.

In the Area of Expanding Access and Opportunity: Local groups and individuals must take part in identifying problem areas, suggesting solutions, planning and designing projects, organizing intermediary institutions, overseeing implementation, and evaluating successes and failures. This, in turn, requires a commitment to leveling the playing field and empowering individuals so that they can fully participate in the development of their nation.

This is especially true for people who are mired in extreme poverty. Their primary need is the wherewithal to acquire sufficient food, a modicum of assets, and access to markets so that they can join the productive economy. Microenterprise development, including poverty lending, can be an effective way to address this need— the overriding, daily concern of more than a billion people.

USAID's programs thus will emphasize microenterprise and small business development. Our microenterprise programs will address three elements that are critical to broad-based economic growth and participation: removing obstacles that impede the creation of new businesses that provide incomes; helping existing enterprises to expand; and supporting the transition of small businesses and microenterprises to the formal sector.

To help microenterprises and small businesses become established and grow, and to assist the poorest men and women to become economic participants, USAID will support programs to simplify regulatory procedures and increase access to markets and technology. We will work with national and local authorities and private groups to enhance access to capital through cooperatives, village and neighborhood banks, and other poverty lending institutions. To help poor individuals and communities accumulate assets, finance their own development, and lessen their dependence on external sources of capital, USAID will support the development of banks and other self-sustaining financial institutions, including credit unions, that service small savers and borrowers.

Finally, because the protection of human rights, including the rights of workers, is fundamental to sustainability, USAID will support programs that seek to expand and safeguard these basic rights. USAID programs to promote economic growth will take into account labor conditions and worker rights, especially those of women, the poor,

indigenous peoples, economic and political migrants, and those vulnerable to debt servitude and indentured labor.

In the Area of Investing in People: USAID believes that sustainable, broad-based development requires investing in people to improve their health and productivity, enhance their skills, protect their rights, and help them be full participants in society.

The acquisition of economically valuable skills plays a central role in the empowerment of individuals. Education increases social mobility and thus serves as a formidable mechanism of conflict resolution. Moreover, rising education levels are critical to democratic governance and peaceful political discourse. USAID's education programs will give particular emphasis to the quality and availability of primary education, especially for the poor, women and girls, and minorities. The Agency will also support targeted, market-oriented interventions, aimed at technical and vocational training; the freer flow of technology and technical information; and training in business skills.

Recent World Bank findings show that a package of basic health care services can dramatically enhance societal productivity, especially among the poor. Such services alleviate many curable but endemic and debilitating illnesses that prevent people from earning a living or participating in society. Thus, USAID will support the creation and improvement of systems that provide basic, reproductive, and preventive health care. USAID will also focus on maternal health; child survival, including nutrition, immunizations, and treatment of diarrheal diseases and acute respiratory infections; access to clean water; control and elimination of endemic tropical and infectious diseases; prevention of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases; and the training of professionals and technicians in basic, reproductive, and preventive health care.

MEASURING RESULTS

Programs will be designed to produce results that demonstrably affect and enhance the way people live. In their conception and implementation, programs to stimulate economic growth must benefit local populations. In evaluating the impact of programs, the overarching concern should be whether standards of living have improved and whether improvements have been manifested broadly within society. While no program can touch every aspect of economic life within a society, individual programs in each of the three areas of concentration need to be structured to produce affirmative answers to these kinds of questions:

Has the incidence of poverty declined? Have incomes and employment risen for the key groups that comprise the poor? Are countries better able to address poverty using their own resources?

Are employment, incomes, and productivity in the informal sector rising? Have a significant number of microenterprises expanded their scale of operations or made the transition to the formal sector? Have women, minorities, and indigenous peoples participated in this expansion?

Have agricultural incomes and disposable rural incomes improved? Have increases in agricultural incomes been spread broadly among the rural population? Do small farmers have increased access to improved seeds, farming methods, purchasing and marketing structures, technology that allows them to increase their productivity, and export markets? Have these improvements increased farm income?

Are markets working more efficiently, with increased levels of activity and broader participation?

Have governments implemented and maintained agreed sectoral reforms? Have those reforms had

the positive economic effects intended? Do the reforms enjoy sufficient public support so as to make them sustainable?

Has the quality of primary education improved? Has the number of children with access to primary education risen? Is the proportion of girls in primary schools increasing? Is the proportion of children of indigenous peoples in primary schools increasing?

Has the availability of capital to the poor increased? Are more community-based lending institutions operating? Has the number of small savings institutions, such as credit unions, increased? Has the ability of these institutions to attract deposits increased? Are they viable and sustainable?

Do indigenous non-governmental organizations, including labor unions, private voluntary organizations, cooperatives, and consultative planning councils, function in ways that empower the poorest people in society and enable them to participate in national economic and political life?

Has agricultural productivity increased? Have market prices for food remained stable or decreased? Do individuals and communities have greater access to food, either through increased production or easier acquisition through markets?

Have the flow and availability of technical and support services to small businesses and microenterprises improved, and have they had a measurable effect on productivity, job creation, and profitability?

Has public health improved? Are improvements evident among all sectors of society? Have these indicators improved: the rate of infant mortality? access to family planning services, including programs for prenatal care and maternal health? number of cases of communicable diseases? rate of childhood inoculation? the rate of malnutrition among children? access to basic health care services? equal access to health care by gender? access to clean water?

By supporting programs that produce positive answers to questions like these, USAID can enhance the political and economic interests of the United States and materially assist the emergence of a more peaceful, more prosperous world.

Providing Humanitarian Assistance and Aiding Post-Crisis Transitions: USAID's Strategy

THE CHALLENGE

The United States has a long and generous tradition of providing assistance to the victims of man-made and natural disasters. Our nation has traditionally viewed humanitarian assistance as both an act of national conscience and an investment in the future. USAID thus was established as both a development agency and America's primary means of providing emergency relief overseas.

For Americans, humanitarian assistance is not an act of charity, but an integral part of our vision of how a community of nations, some fortunate and some troubled, should operate. USAID has earned a reputation for delivering relief to people in need quickly and effectively. The Agency has embodied the conviction that with time and a helping hand, even the most afflicted nation can become stable again and turn to the future with hope.

The end of the Cold War has created new challenges that test the capacity of USAID and the international community to provide relief. Even as superpower tensions have eased, religious and ethnic rivalries have sharpened. The sudden demise of the Soviet bloc left many fragile, internally conflicted states. A number of profoundly weak nations, particularly in Africa, have reached the point of terminal collapse. Other countries are struggling to implement fragile settlements to protracted internal wars.

Increasingly, tensions are exploding into armed conflict. Civilians have become primary targets, and thousands have been killed. Entire societies have been devastated. Millions of people have been internally displaced or turned into refugees, with scant means of earning a living, and little hope of repatriation.

Traditional disaster relief has been affected by these events. Societal breakdowns increasingly impede the integrated responses that work best against drought and famine. In a nation divided by civil war, every act of charity may be politicized by one faction or another.

The disintegration of civil society, in and of itself, invites disaster: Rising disorder devastates the economy and skews the distribution of food, water, and essential goods and services. It destroys local institutions that people normally rely upon to organize a response. It makes small calamities more severe, and thus foments catastrophe.

The end of the Cold War has also created more so-called transitional situations — circumstances in which countries try to emerge from a national conflict, a significant political transition, or a natural disaster — where the timely provision of assistance can help revitalize society, reinforce institutions, and preserve national order. These countries have special needs that are not addressed by traditional disaster relief or long-term programs of sustainable development: the reintegration of dislocated populations, including demobilized soldiers; the restoration of elementary security and infrastructure; and the creation of political institutions. Transitional nations often are poised simulta-

neously for either growth or chaos. Given the opportunity and the risks — especially from the failure to act quickly and effectively — the donor community must try to respond.

USAID has learned four lessons in recent years that will guide our programs of humanitarian assistance:

Humanitarian relief and disaster planning are integral to sustainable development. Manmade and natural disasters can wipe out years of development in a matter of minutes. The costs of clean-up, reconstruction, and adjustment associated with large-scale natural disasters can impose burdens on a national economy that persist for years. War, famine, and environmental damage can undermine development for decades to come.

Annual losses from natural disasters now equal the total of official development assistance, so investments in prevention and mitigation promise a significant financial and strategic return. By enhancing local capacities to deal with disasters, we can help developing nations strengthen their technical resources, their ability to plan for the future, and ultimately, their resilience.

Increasing attention must be given to preparation for manmade and natural disasters and to prevention or mitigation of their effects. Local politics and government policies are the hidden components of all disasters, even natural ones, for they can ease the impact of calamity or make it worse. Prevention, especially of manmade disasters, requires attention to policy, planning, and strengthening local capacities. Disaster preparation also demands careful examination of relief efforts and recovery plans and the assumptions on which they are based — before disaster strikes.

The United States cannot bear the burden alone. It must collaborate with other donors and encourage them to contribute their share of the spiraling costs of relief. Multilateral leadership, especially from the United Nations, is essential to resolve underlying conflicts peacefully and to prevent discord from turning into crisis and societal breakdown.

USAID's humanitarian activities mandate cooperation at home and abroad. The United States must use its resources carefully and forge partnerships with every potential provider and contributor of humanitarian assistance in the United States, in the international donor community, and in developing nations. USAID believes that indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the local private sector are critical partners in formulating and implementing participatory, community-level programs for disaster prevention, mitigation, and reconstruction. In the aftermath of disaster, their involvement is essential to the restoration of infrastructure, social services, food security, and local political institutions. Moreover, longer-term rehabilitation and recovery programs to achieve sustainable growth at the national level must build upon grassroots activities that involve and empower local communities and individuals.

Humanitarian assistance is not an end in itself, but an integral part of an overall strategy for sustainable development. By helping nations acquire the means to plan for and respond to disasters, and by helping them return to the path of economic and social development, USAID can measurably contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous world.

STRATEGIC GOALS AND AREAS OF CONCENTRATION

USAID will provide humanitarian assistance that saves lives, reduces suffering, helps victims return to self-sufficiency, and reinforces democracy. We will aid people in need without regard to the politics of their government.

We will focus on these types of challenges:

- Disaster prevention, preparedness, and mitigation.
- Timely delivery of disaster relief and short-term rehabilitation supplies and services.
- Preservation of basic institutions of civil governance during disaster and crisis and support for new democratic institutions during periods of national transition.
- Building and reinforcement of local capacity to anticipate and deal with disasters and their aftermath.

OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

USAID will emphasize certain methodologies and operating styles as it provides humanitarian aid:

Coordination: The President has designated the USAID Administrator as his Special Coordinator for Disaster Assistance. As Special Coordinator, the Administrator organizes and oversees the response by agencies and departments of the U.S. Government to foreign disasters. He also coordinates American relief efforts with those of other nations and donors.

The humanitarian, political, and military responses undertaken by the United States must be cohesive and mutually reinforcing. USAID will attach the highest priority to ensuring that its activities contribute to the U.S. Government's policy objectives in the nation and region seeking assistance. USAID will work closely with the Department of State and the Department of Defense to plan and implement relief operations, particularly the allocation of resources and the coordination of diplomatic and relief efforts.

The effectiveness of humanitarian assistance will be determined by the workings of an international relief system. USAID will help to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to provide humanitarian relief and will coordinate closely with U.N. peacekeeping operations when they are involved in nations receiving humanitarian aid.

USAID will work with other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; the United Nations and its agencies; multilateral development banks; other bilateral donors; international relief organizations; private voluntary organizations (PVOs), particularly those based in the United States and in recipient countries; cooperative development organizations; U.S. and foreign corporations; universities, colleges, and academic associations; business and trade associations, professional groups and groups whose members possess specific technical skills; and individual volunteers and activists to coordinate disaster planning, allocate resources and technical services, determine prepositioning of supplies, establish systems of transportation and delivery, and make in-situ assessments.

Coordination should include such things as enhanced cooperation with technical agencies of the U.S. Government that are skilled in the environmental and energy aspects of disaster management; closer ties to technical, medical, industrial, academic, and professional associations to facilitate donations of cash, supplies, and skilled labor; relationships with local and international businesses to utilize their facilities and community ties to plan for and coordinate responses to disasters; ties with academic institutions, in the United States and abroad, to train individuals and communities in disaster prevention, mitigation, and management; programs to develop local and national disaster plans; and establishment of advanced communication networks and the sharing of technical resources and information.

USAID has extensive experience providing humanitarian assistance and the expertise necessary to manage large, complex relief programs. USAID's field missions possess an understanding of the local environment that is essential to the success of these programs. Our capabilities will be further strengthened by close coordination with international and indigenous NGOs, our natural partners in development.

Rapid Response: USAID has developed and will maintain the capacity to begin delivering relief supplies and services within hours after the occurrence of a natural disaster. Working with PVOs and the U.N.'s World Food Program, USAID has also developed and will continue to maintain the ability to operate large-scale emergency feeding programs.

USAID is now developing the wherewithal to respond rapidly in countries undergoing crises and transition to new political and economic systems. These include failed and "teetering" states, those subject to internationally negotiated settlements of protracted wars, and newly independent and newly democratizing states.

Certain crises and transitions have urgent requirements that traditional programs of disaster relief, peacekeeping, and long-term development do not address. In many cases, intrinsically manageable crises have spiraled out of control, at great cost and suffering, because of the inability of the international system to fill this "gap" quickly. Our rapid response capability will enable us to assist governments in planning and assessing how to maintain basic governmental services and civil authority, restore essential infrastructure, and introduce political development programs in time to encourage democracy.

Integrated Approaches: Too often, the need for humanitarian assistance is the byproduct of poverty-related degradation of natural resources, such as desertification or flooding due to deforestation, or the disintegration of food production systems and communal security nets. It is much cheaper to conserve existing economic assets and systems than it is to rebuild them.

Effective development programs provide an important buffer against natural disasters. USAID will assess all of its programs to ensure that they do not directly or indirectly contribute to manmade disasters or exacerbate natural disasters. USAID will encourage host governments and local participants to examine whether current economic practices contribute to cycles of crisis. USAID will support programs, especially those dealing with the environment and economic development, to strengthen the ability of society to weather disasters, respond effectively, and recuperate quickly. By emphasizing participatory development, the building of local capacity, and the acquisition of disaster management skills, USAID will enhance the ability of host countries to pursue sustainable development and to sustain that development even in the most difficult circumstances.

PROGRAMS AND METHODS

The types of humanitarian assistance USAID will provide will depend on the circumstances of each specific situation and each country. To ensure that the United States can respond effectively, USAID's resources will be allocated to the following programs:

Disaster preparedness, mitigation, and prevention. Preparedness activities will be concentrated in disaster-prone countries. These may include such programs as cyclone warning systems; volcano monitoring and evacuation plans; earthquake risk management; famine mitigation, including early warning, vulnerability mapping, and coping strategies; and professional training in disaster management. These programs will focus

on preventing and mitigating disasters through improved construction and siting practices; enhanced policies, regulation, and enforcement; modern industrial and environmental planning and safety procedures; and planned emergency responses and improved crisis coordination. USAID also will preposition relief stocks in strategic locations around the world.

Assessment of requirements. USAID will maintain its practice of assessing emergency conditions in order to identify relief needs and establish U.S. relief priorities. Such assessments may be performed by field missions or by USAID/Washington in close coordination with indigenous and international NGOs and international disaster experts. In some cases, specific assessments of food needs may be necessary.

Delivery of disaster relief, supplies, and services. Major disasters will normally require close coordination with other donors, especially the United Nations and its agencies, and other agencies of the U.S. Government. Indigenous, U.S., and international PVOs frequently will participate in the delivery of assistance. Early disaster relief may include feeding programs; disease control and emergency medical services, including immunizations, child survival interventions, and maternal and reproductive health care; emergency shelter; and restoration of communications, basic transportation, and financial services.

Disaster Assistance Response Teams. In selected cases involving especially serious emergencies, or situations where there is no on-site field presence, Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) will be used to assess needs. DARTs may also be used to coordinate USAID's response with other donors and the host government, to direct USAID relief efforts, and to strengthen communication and coordination among other agencies of the U.S. Government, such as the Department of Defense, as well as NGOs and other donors.

Crisis and transition assistance. USAID will concentrate on planning and coordinating programs that help nations return to the path of sustainable development. Specific actions will depend on the needs of the country and the contributions of other donors.

USAID will evaluate potential crises and transitions and may dispatch evaluation teams to provide on-site assessments of transition needs, resources, and capabilities. Other transition activities may include planning and assessing the need for aid for demobilization, training, and the social and economic reintegration of dislocated populations, especially women, children, internally displaced people, refugees, and former combatants; supporting the processes of political reconciliation; technical and logistical support for the drafting of new national charter documents; training to improve civil-military relations; assistance with judicial reform, the administration of justice, and the protection of human rights; help in organizing, conducting, and monitoring elections; reinforcement of national and communal institutions; providing short-term support to strengthen local NGOs; assisting other relief and development agencies in locating and utilizing services and resources; seeking matching funds and donations to leverage limited resources; and working closely with the Department of State and multilateral organizations to help ensure the safety of aid and relief workers.

Since the reestablishment of a degree of food security is an important step in the return to normality, USAID will assist nations that have just emerged from the most acute crisis phase to revive their agricultural production by providing seed, fertilizer, tools, and technical expertise. This will permit first- and second-year planting and help farmers and people returning to the farm to end their dependence on relief. Food aid itself can be an effective transition tool where, by use of monetization through the private sector, it is specifically targeted at restoring food markets that have been disrupted by crisis.

Finally, the development of enhanced technical capacities by PVOs and multilateral partners is critical to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The increased capability of these organizations can only assist USAID's mission.

MEASURING RESULTS

The impact of humanitarian assistance cannot be measured only in terms of supplies shipped; the ultimate test comes from judging whether lives have been saved and communities revived. This is a complex and long-term process, and to find answers, four areas for assessing performance must be addressed:

First, the structure for responding to disasters and to the needs of countries in crisis and transition must be in place. Before crises occur, USAID, in close coordination with other agencies of the U.S. Government, multilateral agencies, PVOs, and local authorities, will ask:

Have supplies been stockpiled and service providers identified? Are supplies secure from loss and theft? When USAID moves to deliver goods and services, will they go to the right place in the right amount with the intended effect?

Have the prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities of USAID anticipated needs and are they effective? Have local communities and businesses been enlisted for planning, prevention, and response? Do proposed shipments of supplies match and maximize local skills and capacities? In view of past disasters locally and regionally, are preparations commensurate with likely needs?

Are the partnerships and relations with the United Nations (including the World Food Program) and the PVOs understood by all? Are mechanisms in place to coordinate supplies, donations, and offers of skilled labor and ensure that they are delivered where and when they are needed?

Second, actual delivery of supplies and services must be timely and effective. During crises, USAID and its partners will ask:

Do disaster relief supplies and services reach their intended destination in time to make a difference? Are all forms of emergency relief supplies readily available and accessible to the intended beneficiaries, including women, children, the elderly, indigenous peoples, refugees, and members of minorities?

Do specific programs intended to save lives or reduce malnutrition, such as emergency feeding programs, have the intended impact?

Are profiteering and misuse effectively controlled? Are food and other relief supplies distributed so as not to discourage local production or distort local prices and markets?

Do programs of disease control and emergency medical services, including immunizations, child survival interventions, and maternal and reproductive health care, have access to necessary supplies and are they coordinated with food and nutrition interventions?

Third, in transitional and crisis situations, assistance must target the institutions and needs critical to the resumption of sustained development, civil life, and democratic governance. USAID and its partners will ask:

Has the response to countries in crisis and transition been appropriate to their needs, political situation, and indigenous capacities?

Have national and local political institutions been strengthened? Have key elements of the infrastructure, such as housing, communications, basic transportation, and financial services, been reinforced? Are the specific needs of internally displaced people and refugees being addressed?

Has food security increased throughout the country? Do farmers have greater access to seed, fertilizer, and appropriate technology? Has local food production increased significantly and/or are more people able to acquire the income needed to purchase food?

Has there been measurable progress toward national reconciliation and invigoration of the mechanisms of conflict resolution, as indicated by fair and open elections, constitutional conventions, new legal codes, reintegration of combatants, etc.? Is there evidence of decreased disorder in cities and in the countryside? Is there increased respect for human rights?

Fourth, follow-on mechanisms, after relief and rehabilitation, must be in place to help prevent cycles of crisis and to permit countries to cope with their own natural disasters and political crises. After the crisis stage has passed, USAID and its partners will ask:

Is USAID, in coordination with local authorities and communities, PVOs, and multilateral institutions, developing and implementing long-term development programs that measurably enhance the ability of countries to anticipate and manage natural disasters? Are the economic, political, environmental, social, and institutional causes of manmade disasters being addressed?

Have countries in crisis and transition made measurable progress toward a political and economic transformation?

Humanitarian assistance activities ultimately must be measured by simple, yet profound standards: Do these activities prevent human misery that is avoidable? Do they provide relief for human misery that is not? Does this assistance help countries that have suffered natural or manmade disasters and crises return to the path of sustainable development?

TECHNICAL ANNEX C:
DEMOCRACY

I. INTRODUCTION

This guidance is designed to assist USAID personnel in identifying democracy-sector strategic objectives and in formulating action plans that incorporate democracy sector projects in sustainable development countries. In addition, the guidance should assist in the development and implementation of democracy sector activities in nonpresence countries, notwithstanding the lack of formal assessments undertaken and the different standards for measuring results in such situations.[1]

Use of the term "democracy promotion" in this guidance covers a broad range of activities, but establishes as priorities those aimed at initiating or enhancing:

- unresricted political competition at the national and local levels;
- respect for the rule of law and fundamental human rights;
- effective, transparent and accountable governance structures; and
- popular participation in decision making by all sectors of civil society.

In this context, the macro-institutional and the micro-grassroots aspects of democracy promotion are two sides of the same coin and must be addressed in tandem.

Programs in other sectors where USAID provides assistance also should be evaluated for their potential impact on democracy and governance concerns. Specifically, every USAID program should:

- expand the participation, initiative and empowerment of the population, particularly women and minorities;
- improve access to and information about policy and regulatory decisions among all sectors of the population;
- enhance reliability and responsiveness of governance institutions; and

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[1] This guidance elaborates on the USAID strategy "Building Democracy," issued in January 1994, and the earlier 1991 Democracy and Governance Paper. The earlier documents provide the broad philosophical framework for agency efforts to promote the strengthening of democratic institutions worldwide. This guidance is desinged to help USAID personnel choose from among programmatic alternatives.

- help open policy dialogues.

USAID appreciates the special political sensitivities involved in democracy promotion work, the wide variation of potential project designs, the time pressures that often dictate the nature of specific programs and the difficulties in measuring results in a meaningful manner. Consequently, the guidance does not prescribe the type or sequence of democracy promoting activities for every country. **On the contrary, experimentation in this sector is encouraged.**

At the same time, USAID experiences in democracy promotion activities, while less extensive than in other fields, are not inconsequential. Prior USAID activities provide the foundation for an understanding of what constitute best practices in democracy and governance. This experience underscores the need for the following:

- integrating democratic approaches in other sectors, and other sectoral concerns in democracy, to address jointly the principal constraints to sustainable development;
- enhancing partnerships with NGOs, host country institutions, other USG agencies, and other donors;
- anchoring these relationships in coherent programs, rather than limited projects;
- tailoring programs to the local context;
- responding to and building upon local commitment;
- securing the support of local leadership and ensuring that groups within the host country initiate political developments; and
- improving systems for measuring results and impact through democracy programs, rather than merely monitoring inputs and outputs.

Nothwithstanding the increased agency involvement in this sector since 1990, review of USAID experience highlights several shortcomings in the delivery of democracy programs. Political and bureaucratic constraints have deterred the agency from working directly with local NGOs, although this has been less true in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Protracted implementation delays, often due to contracting backlogs and clearance requirements, have reduced the impact of the assistance provided, particularly in transition

situations. Also, US domestic considerations have driven programs that overestimate the potential impact of the US government contribution and ignore the local dynamics of political change. Lastly, the difficulty with measuring success occasionally has resulted in the premature abandonment of democracy programs or sustaining them in circumstances where they have not proven effective.

II. DEVELOPING A COUNTRY'S DEMOCRACY PROGRAM

Democracy programs should be integrated with and contribute to USAID's general development goals. This will require overcoming long-standing political constraints to sustainable development. Identifying these constraints orients the Agency toward a more clear set of democracy objectives. Specifically, USAID will work to achieve the following:

Liberating individual and community initiative. The expansion of vibrant self-governing associations in civil society is both desirable as an end and critical as a means for achieving broader development objectives. Moreover, local action is most effective when demands are aggregated vertically and horizontally so that local interests and communities can influence national policy.

Increasing political participation. In many countries, large segments of the population are politically and economically excluded. These individuals or groups are easily exploited by officials and elites who control them by patronage and coercion. Democratization must be defined as creating the means through which the political mobilization and empowerment of such individuals and groups is possible.

Enhancing government legitimacy. A narrow political base often combines with poor economic conditions and social divisiveness to limit the legitimacy of governments. Authoritarian traditions and the experience of nationalist movements has provided little understanding of or sympathy for the concept of political checks and balances. Opposition and treason are easily confused, especially by politically weak governments. A constitutional order must emerge that allows for dissent, but also for effective government action. Indeed, particularly in transition situations, a government must produce effective, broad-based growth to retain legitimacy.

Ensuring greater accountability among government officials. Corruption and abuse of human rights, and the constraints alluded to above, destroy the potential for sustainable development by violating the freedom and undermining the initiative of those outside government. To avoid the inevitability of such abuses, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that powerful government actors serve the broad public interest rather than their own concerns. Honest, fair and efficient implementation

of laws, regulations, and public investments is possible, however, only where civil servants, police, and the military are held accountable by independent judiciaries, elected representatives and informed, educated constituents.

Creating the means for public deliberation of issues. In nearly all societies, distinct consensus building models form an important part of traditional political processes. However, authoritarian regimes and economic decline seriously undermine these mechanisms. When solutions are imposed from above, opposition forces are not consulted and the sustainability of development progress often proves elusive because citizens have failed to forge a durable agreement on difficult problems. Increasing the capacity and representativeness of democratic forums facilitates agreement on important policy and implementation issues.

Promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts. Intra-societal conflict -- political, economic, cultural, or religious -- destroys the stability on which sustainable development depends. Repression has proven an ineffective means for containing conflict, since when the repression is reduced, highly destabilizing, often violent confrontations result. To the extent feasible, mechanisms for managing and resolving conflicts must be sought through improved mediation and arbitration mechanisms, as well as by creating and maintaining formal rule structures that are broadly accepted in society.

The listing of these objectives highlights the multitude of existing constraints in the political arena, and suggests that no single need may be paramount. Rather the list provides a starting point for building democracy programs at the country and regional level. *Focusing on a manageable number of objectives, however, is critical, and limiting assistance to those activities that are most likely to accomplish the broad development objectives is fundamental.*

Decisions on priorities for democracy and governance programs will be specific to each country; however, some common themes and considerations are suggested by USAID's overall level of involvement in a country. Specifically, USAID will conduct democracy programs in the following three settings:

- *sustainable development countries*, where USAID will provide an integrated package of assistance - these countries will be designated by USAID/W based, in part, on democracy and human rights performance considerations;

- *countries emerging from dire humanitarian crisis or protracted conflict*, where the short-term emphasis will be on developing or safeguarding the basic elements of a democratic political culture, including respect for human rights, the existence of independent groups, and setting the stage for political institution building; and

- *other countries*, where US foreign policy interests or other global concerns -- such as refugee flows, gross human rights abuses and the demonstration effect of democratic progress -- warrant small scale programs, notwithstanding the lack of a USAID field presence.

Considerations for developing programs in each of the these settings are detailed in the following three sections.

A. Sustainable Development Countries

The sustainable development category includes countries at very different levels of political development. Some are ruled by autocratic regimes, but will permit the occurrence of some independent political activity. Other countries have begun a transition process, with the pace varying from countries on the verge of multi-party elections to countries where a phased transition will take several years. A third category includes countries that have completed the initial transition phase, usually with a fairly conducted election, and are beginning the phase of institutional consolidation. Finally, a few countries may have established democratic institutions, but these institutions are threatened by other constraints on sustainable development.

Once a country is designated for sustainable development support, the mission should *review or develop* the country strategy. In circumstances where only review of an existing strategy is required, action plans for democracy programs should be formulated, to the extent feasible, in accordance with this guidance.

Traditionally, mission strategies have relied on field assessments performed on a sectoral basis. In the democracy sector, assessments have ranged from lengthy, multi-person field assessments analyzing all aspects of political development in a country to simpler assessments conducted by mission staff or a contractor in response to a discrete political development. The imperative of conducting an assessment, however, should not preclude missions from responding to immediate democracy needs once initial approval has been received from USAID/W.

As part of or as a follow-up to the initial assessment process, missions may consider establishing ad hoc, local consultative groups, comprising individuals with diverse backgrounds and relevant expertise, to help formulate the strategy for democracy promotion and to identify priority areas for USAID support. Where appropriate, the group's status can be formalized and expanded to include reviewing proposals and evaluating programs.

In identifying strategic objectives in the democracy sector, the following elements should be considered:

First, define the political context of the country in question and identify the type and impact of previous democracy sector programs (if any) initiated by USAID or other donors.[2] Relevant information can be derived from interviews with government and NGO representatives, diplomats, scholars and journalists, including those outside the capital area and those not normally recipients of USAID assistance. Since successful democracy programs build upon local commitment, particular attention should be paid to evaluating nascent local institutions and indigenous demand for USAID support.

Second, review the activities of other organizations involved in democracy programming. Potential actors may include international organizations (*e.g.*, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the World Bank, and the CSCE), bilateral donors, other U.S. Government agencies (*e.g.*, the U.S. Information Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice), international NGOs (particularly US-based), and local NGOs. The objective is to avoid duplication of efforts and to present consistent and mutually reinforcing messages within the host country. In this context, USAID personnel should actively participate in the USG Country Team responsible for democracy and human rights.

Third, generate a list of potential opportunities in democracy programming and assess the probable impact of each in promoting democratic change and achieving sustainable development goals. This should influence types of activities selected and the amounts budgeted for them. Table 1 lists a series of questions to consider in evaluating specific program activities.

In establishing priorities and determining the sequencing of USAID support, the following analytic framework should be considered:

- Are the basic elements of a democratic political culture -- including respect for fundamental human rights, political space for independent groups, freedom of the press and the emergence of broad comprehension regarding the rules of political competition -- established? If not, support might appropriately be directed toward

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[2] Variables to consider might include: the stage of democratic evolution; the basis of government; economic conditions; the security situation; the role of the military in the government; the level of engagement of civil society; the country human rights performance; the role of women; the government's attitude towards political reform; government transparency, accountability, and effectiveness; and other cultural and social factors determined to be relevant.

human rights groups and other NGO organizations promoting democratic change, including labor unions and the independent media;

- Are the basic institutions necessary for democratic governance in place? If not, support might be targetted at developing a constitutional framework, a competitive and meaningful electoral process, and legislative and judicial institutions necessary for the adoption and enforcement of laws and policies;

- Is there a system of effective and transparent public institutions and are public officials accountable to the citizenry? If not, assistance might be provided to help reform the governance infrastructure in accordance with democratic norms; and

- Does the nongovernmental sector have the capacity to engage in meaningful public policy review and to monitor effectively the activities of government institutions? If not, support might be provided to the independent media and civic action groups, and to promote the establishment of cross-border and cross-sectoral networks of NGOs.

The framework suggests, but does not prescribe, the appropriate mix and succession of potential program interventions. For example, a determination that the major obstacle to democratization is the absence of a viable democratic political culture does not preclude program interventions in the other areas. *However, deviations from the presumptions established by the framework should be explained.*

Once the overall strategy or action plan is approved by AID/W and budget allocations set, program activities should begin as soon as possible. Because democracy promotion activities are particularly time sensitive, USAID/W will be favorably disposed to requests for expedited treatment of new democracy programs.

B. Specially Designated Transition Countries

As suggested above, many democratic transitions occur in countries where USAID missions already exist. In addition, a select number of countries will be designated for handling by USAID's newly-formed Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), which is sited alongside the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance in the Bureau of Humanitarian Response.

Given the foreign policy implications involved, designation of focus countries for OTI will follow inter-agency discussions. Situations entailing negotiated settlements of protracted conflicts and where political transformation ranks particularly high among US foreign policy

goals are prime candidates for OTI involvement. Frequently, such transitions share common elements, including:

- humanitarian concerns;
- disrupted economies and damaged infrastructures;
- heavily militarized societies;
- an imperative to return home dislocated populations, including demobilized soldiers;
- ambitious plans for swiftly erecting democratic institutions; and
- urgent appeals for international support.

OTI's principal efforts will include: rapid assessments of a transition situation; implementation of programs in response to urgent short term needs; and facilitation of a coordinated US government and international donor response. Initial OTI services will be concentrated in the following areas:

- reestablishment of the rule of law, including local security and mechanisms for resolving disputes peacefully;
- restoration of political and social infrastructure, including local government bodies responible for providing social services; and
- demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including employment, housing and retraining programs.

OTI involvement in a country will generally be short-term. In some instances, specific political developments -- such as constitution drafting, a national referendum or an election-- may signal the end of OTI's role. In instances where the political institution building that OTI initiates carries forward into the future, OTI will strive to transfer full responsibility for programs to a mission or regional bureau within a fixed time period.

C. Non-Presence Countries

In recognition of moral and political imperatives associated with expanding and consolidating democratic governments, USAID will continue to offer limited support for

modest democracy programs in countries where no USAID mission is present. The U.S. country team may request such assistance or a request may be made directly by a local NGO to USAID/W or to an international NGO operating with USAID support.

Programs in nonpresence countries will include support for transition elections and for local organizations promoting or monitoring respect for human rights, conducting civic education programs and encouraging broader participation in political affairs. Generally, these programs will be implemented by NGO partners through core grants or through Global Bureau projects to support small scale democracy activities in non-presence countries.

Planned democracy activities in a non-presence country must meet general requirements for all democracy programs (*e.g.*, high impacts, high benefit/cost ratio, USAID technical capabilities, etc.). Those proposing the program must demonstrate that other donors, including the National Endowment for Democracy and private foundations, are unable to provide necessary funds. Additional criteria that might justify such activity include: unique opportunity; substantial multiplier or demonstration effect (including in other sectors and other countries); broad-based interest in addressing issue of particular importance to the US (e.g., narcotics or immigration); and USAID comparative advantage in the particular program area. Finally, implementation of the program must be possible in a manner that guarantees financial accountability and provides mechanisms for measuring results.

III. PROGRAM PRIORITIES

USAID democracy promotion activities are not limited to a narrowly prescribed activity list. Democracy promotion is too context specific for such an approach to work. Moreover, circumstances may require that a mission take advantage of emerging opportunities or respond to specific exigencies (including extreme poverty and other unmet human needs). Table 2 identifies the different types of potential USAID program interventions.

With the above caveats in mind, USAID democracy programs will focus on the following four areas:

- promoting meaningful political competition through free and fair electoral processes;
- enhancing respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- encouraging the development of a politically active civil society; and

- fostering transparent and accountable governance.[3]

These focal areas represent strategic sub-objectives in the democracy sector. Project interventions should be designed to meet a particular sub-strategic objective in a reasonable timeframe. Focus on a specific sub-strategic objective, however, does not imply that the four areas are not inter-related and that projects will have impact in only one area. Indeed, in many cases, properly designed projects will contribute to progress in all four areas and should be measured accordingly.

Moreover, countries plans should consider programs that simultaneously bolster more than one core element of sustainable development. Some of the more obvious opportunities for synergies include:

- working on specific local concerns (*e.g.,* land and water distribution, pest control, forestry) in an integrated manner that assures participation by all affected sectors and that creates a sustainable institutional framework;

- supporting legal reform in the regulatory, financial and economic fields;

- developing mechanisms for informed political debate on economic, environmental, education and health issues;

- pursuing curriculum and pedagogic reforms that instill democratic values and improve the quality of education;

- assisting new advocacy NGOs working in environment, education, and health policy; and

- empowering local organizations to participate in local politics and to enter the national policy dialogue.

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[3] In program areas where USAID has considerable experience, a growing body of knowledge exists regarding how best to support democratic political development. For example, USAID efforts in the areas of rule of law and election support have been evaluated, lessons have been learned, and guidance has emerged that can assist in implementing these types of programs. *See, e.g.,* H. Blair and G. Hansen, *Weighing In On The Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor Supported Rule of Law Programs*, USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, USAID 1994; D. Hirschmann and J. Mendelson, *Managing Democratic Electoral Assistance: A Practical Guide For USAID*, USAID 1993.

In many instances, these projects should **not** be attributed to the democracy sector for budgetary allocation purposes, but their impact on democracy performance should be measured throughout the life of the project.

A. Electoral Processes

The initiation or conduct of an electoral process provides an opportunity for democratic forces to organize and compete for political power. Thus, requests for assistance in support of an electoral process deserve special consideration. Moreover, the critical role that elections play in the democratization process justify USAID support even when fraud or administratively improprieties are deemed possible. In such circumstances, an *a priori* determination must be made, in consultation with the democratic forces within a country, whether the assistance in question will benefit the democratic cause or will merely legitimize a corrupt process. These issues should be the subject of constant review with the country team and USAID/W in the period preceding the election.

Given USAID's emphasis on sustainability, electoral support should be directed at enhancing local capacity. *With this in mind, training and technical assistance is preferred over commodity transfers, and development of domestic monitoring capabilities should take precedence over support for international observer efforts.* Also, establishment of a respected, permanent national electoral commission and encouraging meaningful participation among all sectors of the population merits particular USAID backing.

In designing electoral assistance programs, the following points should be kept in mind:

- USAID should not provide *unconditional* assistance where electoral processes appear flawed or where segments of the population are denied participation;

- electoral assistance should be provided at an early stage in the process to ensure effective usage;

- requests for high priced, state of the art electoral commodities are often nonsustainable and technologically inappropriate, and raise the specter of large scale corruption;

- effective participation by political parties are critical to the success of an electoral process, although USAID must be particularly scrupulous in avoiding even the perception that it is favoring a particular candidate or party through the provision of financial or technical assistance;

- campaign periods provide an excellent opportunity for developing nongovernmental organizational capacity through civic education and election monitoring programs; and

- a programming commitment to a successful election should not skew resource allocations to the extent that funds are unavailable for post-election activities.

B. Rule of Law[4]

A democratic society requires a legal framework that guarantees respect for citizen rights and ensures a degree of regularity in public and private affairs. Corruption and abuse of authority have an obvious impact both on economic development and democratic institutions. Finally, effective public administration is essential to enhancing popular support for democracy.

Rule of law programs form an integral part of a democracy strengthening strategy. USAID experience with rule of law programs suggests the importance of promoting *demand* for effective administration of justice (*i.e.,* coalition building to support legal reform, guaranteeing access to the legal system, assisting human rights groups that monitor government performance and represent victims of abuse, and encouraging development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms), as well as the more conventional *supply* side activities, (*i.e.,* legal reform and institution building). Supply side programs are however much more dependant on a government demonstrating the requisite political will.

While the breakdown of law and order is a real threat to democracy, USAID must exercise considerable care in developing programs that support police forces. Specifically, the government must demonstrate a commitment to discipline those responsible for human rights abuses and to take other appropriate steps to ensure that the police forces are accountable to the democratic government. At the same time, a holistic rule of law program may, and often should, include a police assistance component, in addition to the more traditional support for judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, human rights groups and an independent media.

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[4] In addition to the guidance contained in this document, those developing rule of law programs should refer to the USAID Rule of Law Policy Guidance Paper issued in November 1994 and to H. Blair and G. Hansen, *Weighing In On The Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor Supported Rule of Law Programs*, USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, USAID 1994.

C. Civil Society

A vibrant civil society is an essential component of a democratic polity and contributes to the overall agency goal of promoting sustainable development. The concept of civil society, however, covers a broad swath. Thus, USAID democracy programs designed to strengthen civil society generally should focus on support for organizations (established or in formation) that:

- engage in civic action to promote, protect and refine participatory democracy;
- encourage deliberation of public policy issues;
- monitor government activities; and
- educate citizens about their rights and responsibilities.

This formulation includes public advocacy groups, labor unions, independent media institutions, politically active professional associations, human rights and good governance organizations, and local level associations and institutions that tend to aggregate and articulate their constituents needs. At the same time, the formulation discourages democracy sector attribution of USAID assistance for service organizations and local associations -- including health care providers, producer cooperatives, water-user and community based forest management associations, and similarly oriented groups -- unless the support is designed to accomplish one of the specific goals listed above. Instead, USAID assistance to these organizations should be justified as contributing to the achievement of other agency strategic objectives, while recognizing the important spill-over consequences for the democracy sector.

USAID civil society programs incorporate training components, other forms of technical assistance and, in appropriate circumstances, financial support to the types of organizations listed above. *Because the concern is the development of a democratic polity, USAID assistance should also be directed towards reform of laws that prevent or deter the formation of independent groups.*

The potential long-term viability of local organizations is an important criteria for USAID assistance. However, given the dynamics of a transition situation, this emphasis should not preclude support for organizations that emerge in response to particular political development needs and that may disappear after the principal political goals of the organization have been achieved.

D. Governance

The promotion of good governance has become a major theme among all donors. In large measure, this reflects recognition of the fact that corruption, mismanagement and government inefficiency are inextricably linked with poor development performance. The challenge for USAID is to design good governance programs that are consistent with the broader goal of promoting true political liberalization.

For USAID, the emphasis in good governance is on promoting transparency and accountability of governments in policy making and resource use. Projects and nonproject assistance may involve:

- support for executive branch ministries to plan, execute and monitor budgets in a more transparent manner;

- strengthening legislative policy making, budget and oversight capabilities;

- decentralizing policy making by working directly with accountable local government units; and

- supporting independent media and nongovernmental organizations.

Because of the programming emphasis of other donors, most notably the multilateral development banks, USAID will give less emphasis to public sector management and civil service reform.

IV. IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMS

Successful programs in the democracy sector require not only a clear understanding of the political, social and economic circumstances in the host country, but also an implementation plan that utilizes the following principles:

- ensuring participation of local groups in strategic planning and program development, design, implementation and evaluation;

- incorporating the concerns of women and other minorities from the strategic planning through the evaluation phases;

- pursuing program implementation in a consciously nonpartisan manner;

- relying on trainers and resource persons from different countries, representing varying democratic practices, rather than relying exclusively on U.S. nationals and models of U.S. government structures and practices; and

- utilizing approaches that emphasize sustainability and local empowerment over attainment of short-term performance targets.

USAID recognizes adherence to these principles is labor intensive and that adequate and appropriate personnel must be assigned by both USAID and the missions to ensure they are carried through.

A. Timeframes

Most democracy programs require patient, long-term commitment. In some instances, however, democracy activities need not have a long life span. Some programs will be completed in less than a year, either because objectives have been achieved (*e.g.*, registering voters, conducting an election, developing a civic education program), another donor has assumed responsibility for the activity, or the supported organization has used the assistance to develop a sustainable capacity (*e.g.*, labor unions, political parties and NGOs). In other instances, multi-year programs are required to ensure an initiative continues through a turbulent period (*e.g.* promoting legal reform) or because an objective can not be accomplished quickly (*e.g.*, institutional strengthening of a new legislature, a new court system or local governments).

Because the political situation in a country may shift suddenly, democracy programs should be monitored and evaluated throughout their duration. The PRISM framework and country team reviews provide a basis for conducting such on-going evaluations. Where necessary, missions should consider reorienting or closing down a program. Eliminating specific projects should not be avoided simply because of sunk investments, as maintaining a project may legitimize a corrupt or human rights abusing regime or may involve wasting scarce resources.

B. Partners

Democracy programs may be implemented through contracts, cooperative agreements or grants with host governments, intergovernmental organizations, other U.S. government agencies, U.S. based and local NGOs, and private sector organizations. USAID policy encourages partnerships with the full range of nongovernmental entities, both U.S. based and local. *This is particularly important in the democracy area, where strengthening nongovernmental entities directly serves the goal of democratization.*

Development success will not be possible without the active participation of local individuals and communities. To achieve this objective, missions should maintain open and constructive dialogues with local groups (USAID grantees and others). Formal mechanisms for joint analysis of development problems with the local NGO community should be established.

USAID's relationship with US and local **NGO partners** reflects a dynamic, complex collaboration. To ensure implementation of integrated country strategies, USAID often requires the services of NGOs with technical expertise and periodic consultations once program activities are underway. At the same time, USAID should not micro-manage or exert excessive control over program implementation, as this may compromise the independence of the NGO and might identify US government policy too closely with the viewpoint of the NGO.

Special attention should be paid to creating cross-border and cross-sectoral networks of NGOs as a means to strengthen civil society. Contacts will allow indigenous NGOs to transcend local arenas and avoid "reinventions of the wheel." One way to encourage contacts is to promote electronic networking via telephones, electronic mail and conferencing. Such networking is well advanced within the U.S. NGO community and is growing rapidly in Latin America.

Where appropriate, USAID should implement democracy programs through direct partnerships with **local NGOs**. In selecting partners, USAID should seek to identify those groups whose programs will contribute toward long-term sustainable democracy and whose internal makeup reflect basic equity criteria. In working with partners, USAID should recognize their institutional limitations and develop mechanisms for enhancing their capacity, including the ability to meet accountability requirements imposed by USAID. In some cases, USAID's partner may be a consortium of NGOs, allowing groups to build on economies of scale. USAID should avoid exclusive reliance on NGOs that have become the focus of all donor activities, unless circumstances dictate otherwise.

Several **U.S. based NGOs** have developed particular expertise in democracy promotion activities and thus should be considered as potential partners for specific interventions. In selecting U.S. based NGO partners, bureaus and missions should consider the following factors:

- prior experience with similar programs, including past successes in leaving behind a sustainable component;

- ties to local counterparts and potential impact upon strengthening local civil society;

- knowledge of the country - people, history, groups in civil society and public institutions;

- dedication to local capacity building;

- in-house expertise in specific subject areas;

- willingness to place field representatives on the ground for extended period and past experience supervising work of field representatives;

- previous record in implementing USAID programs, including achievement of objectives and meeting reporting requirements; and

- projected cost involved in implementing a specific project.

Host governments are normally the direct beneficiaries of democracy funding where the objective is to strengthen government institutions. In providing direct assistance to governments, the mission must ascertain that the requisite political will exists to ensure project objectives can be achieved. Local NGOs may prove useful partners in monitoring such programs and in explaining programs to the public.

USAID will provide funds to **international organizations** directly involved in democracy promotion activities, where their objectives coincide with those of USAID and proposed activities cannot be easily replicated by NGOs. This includes efforts to coordinate donor or nongovernmental activities, for example, during election periods. International organizations receiving USAID funds must be held to reasonable accountability and performance standards.

Subject to existing law establishing a preference for the private sector and NGOs in implenting programs utilizing development assistance, USAID will transfer funds to **other U.S. government agencies** for democracy initiatives. Their proposed work must be consistent with USAID's approved strategy and welcomed by the host country partner. The agency also must be uniquely qualified to achieve the identified objectives and must have the capability to manage the program and exercise appropriate financial oversight.

C. USAID Capacity

The establishment of a Democracy Center in the Global Bureau will allow USAID to better service field missions in implementing democracy programs. In particular, Global Bureau personnel with relevant expertise will conduct assessments, help with project design, provide technical backstopping and assist with evaluations. The Democracy Center also will manage a limited number of programs in "nonpresence" countries.

To facilitate program implementation and the development of partnerships, the Center will enter formal relationships with several NGOs and/or contractors. These relationships will allow missions to solicit involvement of one or more groups in response to a request for specific services. Once an agreement is reached between the mission and the group regarding the nature of the services required -- which might include the development of a democracy strategy, implementation of a particular project or evaluation of a project in progress -- program activities can begin immediately.

The Democracy Center will be responsible for disseminating information on democracy programs across the agency. A newsletter will highlight effective program activities, evaluation reports and lessons learned. The Center also will arrange training programs on specific subjects relevant to the development of agency technical capability in the democracy sector.

D. Donor Coordination

In December 1993, the Development Assistance Committee adopted an oreintations paper on Popular Participation and Good Governance, which reflects a consensus among donors on specific principles relating democracy, human rights, good governance, participation and excess military expenditures. The paper provides a basis for bureaus and missions to seek broad donor agreement on democratization principles, priorities and programs. The objective is to maintain consistent pressure for reform, to assure adequate levels of donor support and to encourage complementarity and economies of scale among programs. Where significant policy differences among donors constrain cooperation at the country level, missions should inform USAID/W so that these matters can be addressed in headquarter-level discussions.

During a pre-transition phase, USAID missions should strive for consensus among donors on the levels and types of economic assistance, through bilateral discussions or the convening of existing or ad hoc groups. As a political transition gets underway, donor coordination becomes increasingly more important, both in ensuring consistent signals are sent and in guaranteeing the provision of appropriate assistance to support the transition.

Regular consultations are invaluable for agreeing upon a division of labor and avoiding duplication. Ad hoc working groups that meet regularly and are chaired by a lead bilateral donor or by UNDP provide useful fora for discussion of critical issues pertaining to the transition.

Successful transitions often depend on donor agreement on the level, character, and timing of economic assistance triggered by the political reform. As the transition evolves, USAID should work with other donors, including multilateral institutions, to develop an appropriate package for the immediate post-transition period and to set the conditions that permit grants and loans to begin. Where bilateral donors are in agreement on democracy and governance goals, the World Bank can act as an effective agent of the Consultative Group process in urging policy reforms.

During the post-transition or consolidation phase, donor coordination remains critical. Inevitably USAID assessments will identify many more needs than USAID resources can meet. The guidance that missions focus their activities on a small number of projects in the democracy sector also highlights the critical importance of donor coordination. Given these constraints, missions should share information and analysis with other donors as a matter of course.

V. MEASURING RESULTS

Lessons of the past clearly point to the importance of developing strategically focused democracy programs to avoid spending scarce resources on ad hoc activities that fail to achieve discernable impacts. Though measuring the results of assistance is a widely accepted principle, concrete guidance on how to carry this out in the democracy area is both scarce and complex. This is an important priority for the Agency's research agenda.

Development analysts and practitioners highlight the conceptual and methodological difficulties in measuring democracy promotion and good governance programs. There is no generally-accepted, comprehensive theory of democratic development that is helpful for building tightly-constructed strategies and successfully predicting results. Furthermore, existing tools of measurement are imperfect, particularly for evaluating such a country-specific, multifaceted and complex process. It is impossible to capture change by simply examining one or two variables. Moreover, political change is a long term proposition and setbacks in the short-run are inevitable, creating potential problems for demonstrating success in five-eight year strategies.

At present, limited data have been collected in the democracy and governance area, even for programs that have been in place for a few years. This is because strategies and

indicators have been continually refined as USAID has become more specific about identifying objectives. Despite difficulties in measuring results, a compelling need now exists to ensure that data are collected for performance indicators. This information is crucial to improving the performance of USAID's programs, permitting informed decision making by USAID, refining strategies, testing assumptions, learning from experience and building confidence among USAID constituencies.

This guidance recognizes problems and important gaps in our knowledge; however, our efforts to learn more will be greatly enhanced through examining cumulative experience. Measuring results can be greatly simplified if managers aim for a hierarchy of objectives, make explicit a strategy that links lower- and higher-level objectives, distinguish short-, medium-, and long-term indicators of progress, and disaggregate indicators by region, gender, ethnicity and other measurable groupings. The logic underpinning this approach is outlined in the following three sections through the example of electoral assistance.

A. Short-Term Impact

In the short-term (one to five years), indicators are needed to measure performance in attaining program outcomes. To use the example of elections, if the objective of the program is "impartial and effective electoral administration," some illustrative indicators of program outcomes could include:

- percentage of errors corrected in voter registration lists;
- increased percentage of the population with reasonable access to polling places; and/or
- decrease in the time needed to tally results and publish them simultaneously.

This information then would be used to monitor and evaluate the use of resources.

B. Medium-term Impact

In the medium-term (five to eight years), indicators are needed to measure achievement of anticipated strategic objectives. To continue using the example of elections described above, the objective statement in the medium term might be "free, fair, and routinely held elections at the national and local levels." Some illustrative indicators of performance for this strategic objective might include:

- increase in the percent of registered voters voting or the percent of eligible population registered (disaggregated by sex, ethnic group, etc.) if USAID supported a voter registration effort;

- reduction in the number of parties protesting or denying the election results if USAID sponsored a parallel vote tabulation or a verification mission; and

- decrease in the number of incidents of violence following the elections if USAID supported programs to discourage violence.

Information at this level enables managers to refine strategies and reallocate resources into the most effective programs. Often, the data on strategic objectives can be built into the program strategy itself, for example, through the establishment or strengthening of an election commission, a human rights monitoring organization, a court-watch campaign, or a citizens advocacy group.

C. Long-term Impact

In the long-term (more than eight years), managers aim for achieving yet a higher objective. At the goal level, indicators are needed to determine whether the strategy had an impact on the country's democracy performance. Indicators of whether a country is performing democratically would include whether political power has been transferred through free and fair elections, whether the country has achieved freedom from foreign or military control, and whether citizens have greater freedoms to peacefully organize, express themselves, and produce or use alternative sources of information.

For goals, managers (usually based in Washington) can now rely upon composite indicators developed by groups such as Freedom House, Charles Humana in the Humana Index, the UNDP, or bring together qualitative materials from a variety of sources (State Department, human rights organizations, opinion polls and election observation team reports). Indicators of impact are used to measure progress toward democracy, and assess changes in democratic conditions. Therefore, the information that they provide enables managers to make decisions about the commitment of host country leadership to democracy, and the types of programs, strategies, and interventions that might make the most meaningful contributions.

To complete the election example used above, the objective statement at the goal level might be "free and fair elections serve as the forum for mediating major political disputes." Some illustrative indicators of performance for this goal might include:

- the transfer of power via elections; and

- the percentage of the population confident that elections are free and fair.

At all levels of assessment and strategy development, it is essential that Missions consider the participation of women and marginalized groups. Performance measurement plans should capture the benefits that accrue to these groups through carefully-thought out strategies.

Finally, it is essential to strive for sustainability in democracy programming. Democracies are sustainable when indigenous forces within society can maintain and strengthen the democratic foundations without external support, and government institutions and officials remain firmly committed to democratic practices and the rule of law. When monitoring and evaluating progress, therefore, USAID must assess the likelihood democracy activities will continue absent international funds.

Table 1
Considerations in evaluating specific program activities

- the potential impact of a specific intervention
  - o are there immediate short-term benefits (or costs) likely to flow from the intervention?
  - o does the intervention have a sustainable component?
  - o who will the intervention most directly affect - elite or non-elite sectors of society?
  - o what is the impact upon women and minorities?
  - o what effect will the intervention have on specific USG interests?
  - o is there a multiplier effect or synergy in terms of linkages with other aspects of USAID programming or, conversely, are there trade-offs and conflicts with other USAID programming?

- the existence of the requisite political will in the host country to ensure that the intervention will contribute to the designated objective - this consideration is particularly important where a program is directed at a government entity
  - o what financial, personnel or organizational resources is the recipient contributing to the process?
  - o what specific legal or institutional changes (including, in the case of governments, accession to international human rights instruments) is the recipient willing to undertake in furthering the goals of the project?
  - o how open is the government to allowing and promoting participation by the nongovernmental sectors?

- the amount of resources required for a particular intervention
  - o how much will the intervention cost in dollars, including local currency costs?
  - o what are the personnel requirements for the intervention and are they available without causing dislocations in other critical areas?
  - o how does a particular intervention compare with alternative interventions in terms of cost and potential impact?
  - o how much will a particular intervention leverage other contributions?

- USAID technical capabilities available to assist with a particular intervention
  - o does USAID have the requisite skills to manage and evaluate project in efficient and timely manner?
  - o does USAID have pre-existing arrangements with reliable NGOs which could implement the project?

- collateral effects of intervention
    - will the project promote political interests and involvement of women and minorities? and has project been designed in manner to ensure that women and minorities suffer no untoward consequences as a result of project implementation?
    - can the project be designed to ensure that different groups, even those not directly involved with the project implementation, have a role in project review and evaluation?
    - will the project affect activities in other sectors by ensuring broader participation in policy debate, by providing legitimacy for policy or by increasing accountability?

Table 2
Democracy Program Options

A. Electoral processes
- election law reform
- independent and credible election administration
- election commodities
- voter education
- training of local pollwatchers
- international election observing

B. Rule of law
- legal reform
- judicial infrastructure (*e.g.*, courts, libraries, etc.)
- training of judges
- criminal investigation techniques
- training of lawyers
- alternative dispute resolution
- citizen awareness of legal rights

C. Education for democracy
- school age programs
- adult education
- teacher training
- assistance in developing education materials
- support for organizations implementing programs

D. Good governance
- promotion of government accountability to the public
- improvement of government budget processes and policy development procedures
- techniques for monitoring corruption
- support for good governance groups
- promotion of decentralization efforts
- technical assistance on decentralization plans
- training local leaders in management and outreach techniques
- developing local government capabilities
- public administration

E. Labor unions
- support for democratic labor unions
- training programs for workers

F. Civil society organizations, including human rights monitoring groups, professional associations engaging in political activities, local NGOs engaging in political activities, women's organizations
- support organizational development
- training in management and technical issues
- develop and promote cross-border and cross-sectoral networking

G. Legislative assistance
- technical assistance
- infrastructural support

H. Political parties
- organizational training
- election preparation training
- role of political parties in government and opposition
- training local leaders for competitive electoral politics

I. Reducing ethnic and religious conflicts through democratic processes

J. Civil-military relations

K. Free flow of information
- independent media
- investigative journalism
- alternative information sources

L. Diplomatic efforts in establishing political order

USAID Evaluation News

A Newsletter on Recent Evaluation Findings and Methods

1994 - Vol. 6 - No. 1

Focus on Performance Measurement

Overview

In a recent readership survey of USAID Evaluation News more readers suggested performance measurement for a focus issue than any other topic (see page 28). Their response coincides with the recent selection of the Agency as a pilot project under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, making the theme of this issue particularly timely.

The issue begins with some governmentwide perspectives and reviews of performance measurement systems, then focuses on what USAID is currently doing, from the perspectives of the Agency's central and regional bureaus and the Missions.

The first article, *Performance Measurement: Public Pressures and Legislative Mandates*, discusses the growth of performance measurement and managing for results in the U.S. public sector. After explaining what performance measurement is and what is different about a managing-for-results approach, the author reviews recent initiatives of the Clinton Administration and legislative mandates behind the new push for performance measurement and accountability for results in Government.

The second article, *Performance Measurement: Lessons Learned from Other Agencies*, highlights findings from a review of more than 20 U.S. Government offices and other international donor agencies. The article summarizes key factors found to promote the effective use of performance measurement and draws lessons from this experience applicable to USAID.

Inside this issue

Performance Measurement in USAID: The PRISM System describes in detail USAID's Program Performance Information for Strategic Management System and how it is being implemented and used by the Missions and by USAID/Washington. The authors highlight a new Agency directive issued in May 1994 that establishes an Agencywide PRISM framework applicable to all operating units and relates it to the Agency's programming and budget processes.

In the article *Challenges and Opportunities for Performance Measurement in USAID,* the author examines several features of USAID and international development work that constrain the Agency from getting and using performance information. He then looks at several strengths operating to offset these constraints. The article ends with a discussion of some of the key challenges ahead in establishing an effective system of performance measurement in USAID. In *PRISM: Lessons Learned, A CDIE Perspective,* the authors provide another perspective of PRISM's strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned.

Next are a series of special articles that offer reviews of performance measurement efforts from the perspectives of several of USAID's regional bureaus (Africa, Asia and Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean) and Missions (Ghana, Kenya, Guatemala, Egypt). These articles provide valuable insights from practitioners' points of view. The article *What USAID Missions Have Learned About Managing for Results* highlights key lessons drawn from Missions' experiences about what is important for effectively implementing and using performance measurement systems.

The law [GPRA]...requires that we chart a course for every endeavor...see how well we are progressing, tell the public how we are doing, stop the things that don't work, and never stop improving....

—President Bill Clinton
August 3, 1993

Performance Measurement: Public Pressures and Legislative Mandates

by Steven Gale
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Managers in U.S. Government agencies are increasingly discussing—and applying—concepts such as *managing for results, results-oriented operations, customer satisfaction surveys,* and *performance measurement.* These concepts are not entirely new. In fact, many have been borrowed from the private sector, where profit has long been the bottom line and "customer satisfaction" the key to survival.

State and local governments also have used performance measurement successfully in several well-known experiments. At the Federal level, the General Accounting Office—for years a strong advocate of performance measurement—issued one of the first performance measurement guides for Congress and executive-level agencies more than 10 years ago.

What is new is that Federal agencies are emphasizing these ideas more now as pressures mount for

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Annette Binnendijk—Editor in Chief
Steven Gale—Guest Editor
Farah Ebrahimi—Managing Editor
Ursula Paquette and Ross Bankson—Copy Editors
Pamela McDade and Charles Wilkinson—Production Editors

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better accountability and since passage of the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act made performance measurement law.

What is Performance Measurement?

Performance measurement, in short, is the process organizations follow to objectively measure how well they are meeting their stated objectives. It involves clarifying and agreeing on organizational goals, developing performance indicators to track progress, establishing baseline data and setting targets for future performance, and then periodically gathering actual data for comparison against those targets. Organizations actively manage for results when they use performance information to make budgeting and programming decisions (see Box 1).

How is Managing for Results Different?

Traditional ways of doing business focus on program *inputs* (for example, expenditures, number of full-time employees). By contrast, the new managing-for-results approach focuses on program *impacts*. An emphasis on process gives way to a focus on results. While old ways of operating made compliance with rules and regulations an end in itself, a managing-for-results approach makes performance the bottom line. In addition, while in the past activities (usually projects) were the primary focus, now higher order strategic objectives are what one tries to achieve.

The new approach also differs with respect to data acquisition. In the traditional approach data were often collected retrospectively; now the focus is more on built-in data collection and ongoing monitoring. Whereas the role of management in the old system was "command and control" oriented, under the new managing-for-results approach it becomes "improvement and empowerment." Finally, the focus has shifted from using data primarily for reporting on progress to using data for decision-making, which is what really counts (see Box 2).

The New Push for Results in Government

Initiatives from the Clinton Administration, legislative mandates, and public pressure have combined to put renewed emphasis on performance measurement and managing for results in government. Scarce tax revenues, an expanding Federal deficit, and growing headline claims of government waste, fraud, and abuse also move the government to change the way it does business. Performance measurement has now caught the attention of the general public. They want to know not only where their tax dollars went and how they were used, but also what was ultimately achieved.

Recent public interest in performance measurement is highlighted by the popularity of a 1993 book entitled *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector*. Written by government efficiency consultants David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government* looks at best practices of high-performing public agencies and presents 10 principles for creating effective government. One key principle is that effective agencies are results oriented. That is, they emphasize measuring and achieving results. In effective agencies, performance measurement is viewed as a management tool for allocating funds and improving operations.

> ***Public entrepeneurs know that when institutions are funded according to inputs, they have little reason to strive for better performance. But when they are funded according to outcomes, they become obsessive about performance.***
>
> **—Reinventing Government**

Vice President Al Gore's widely publicized National Performance Review (NPR) has also caught the attention of the public. A high-level government study team composed of experienced Federal workers, NPR has been charged with finding ways to improve government operations.

NPR has published its recommendations in *From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better & Costs Less* (1993). The NPR suggests the following broad steps to accelerate performance in government and improve government efficiency overall:

- Cut Federal red tape by streamlining the budget and procurement process.
- Deliver better customer services by giving clients a voice and creating market dynamics.
- Empower Federal employees to get results by decentralizing decision-making, holding managers accountable, and upgrading training.
- Return to basics by consolidating functions, charging fees for services, and increasing efficiency.

Box 1. Phases of Performance Measurement

The performance measurement process typically involves several phases:

I. *Defining objectives.* In this initial phase an organization must articulate its objectives and identify strategies to meet those objectives. The objectives should be meaningful and significant, and the organization should be willing to be held accountable for reaching them. Sometimes a hierarchy of objectives are articulated, with longer term objectives causally linked to shorter term, intermediate outcomes. The process of defining objectives should be as participatory as possible to generate consensus.

II. *Developing indicators and baselines, and setting targets.* Next, the agency identifies or develops indicators to use in measuring progress toward meeting the objectives. It collects baseline data to establish a starting point, then sets future targets or benchmarks it expects to reach. The targets are based on critical assumptions about existing trends, available agency resources, and external factors likely to influence the outcome.



III. *Collecting data.* The agency may collect actual performance data directly or through secondary sources if quality can be ensured. Depending on the rapidity of expected change, data collection on performance may be undertaken monthly, annually, or every few years, as appropriate. It is important that data be collected regularly and systematically.

IV. *Analyzing performance.* Performance data are analyzed against previously established targets or benchmarks. The performance measurement data often raise a "red flag" for program managers when something is amiss but rarely provides any specific details about why progress fell short. Performance measurement typically tracks rather than explains results. Thus, if an agency needs more information about "why" a target has not been met, or if recommendations about program improvement are wanted, it can decide at this point to conduct a more in-depth evaluation.

V. *Using performance data for decision-making.* Performance data are typically analyzed to report on program performance to agency managers, decision-makers, and external audiences interested in an agency's progress. However, the ultimate aim of performance measurement information is achieved only when its use influences management actions and thus feeds back to improve the agency's programs. This stage is known as "managing for results."

Many of NPR's detailed recommendations for improving government stress results-oriented management approaches. Among them are employee accountability standards, agency performance agreements, customer satisfaction surveys, development of strategic plans with clear measures of intended results (targets), and monitoring and reporting on actual results against those targets. USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood volunteered the Agency as an NPR "reinvention laboratory" last summer. Since then we have been actively reengineering how the Agency will do business in the future.

The Clinton Administration is also moving ahead by establishing service delivery standards. Having such standards and getting feedback from clients on the quality of services provided is considered to be an essential phase in the performance measurement process. Consistent with the recommendation of NPR, President Clinton has signed an executive order requiring all Federal agencies to post service standards, measure results against them, and benchmark customer service performance against the "best in the business." USAID is in the early stages of planning such a survey.

Congress too is taking performance measurement seriously. Several recent legislative initiatives have advanced performance measurement governmentwide. For example, under the 1990 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act, Federal agencies must start submitting *audited* financial statements that describe how they spent their appropriations or any other funds received. The CFO Act requires agencies to clearly define their mission, measure efficiency and effectiveness, and improve performance where deficient.

In short, an agency's traditional balance sheet alone will no longer be acceptable under the CFO Act. It must include how well funds were spent to achieve stated goals and what was accomplished by the agency with those expenditures.

The most significant legislation to influence performance measurement is the recently enacted Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). In brief, GPRA requires agencies to develop strategic plans in consultation with their "customers," establish performance targets that are outcome oriented, produce performance measurement plans that track actual results against those targets, and report on performance.

Under GPRA, agencies can no longer measure just inputs and outputs. No longer is it sufficient to measure just what is needed for implementing a specific project—personnel, funds, equipment, and facilities (inputs). Nor is it sufficient to record only what the project directly produced, such as the number of people trained (outputs). What is now required is a measure of the project's outcome or impact. For example, did the training project achieve a change in the trainees' skills, practices, or behaviors as intended? Under GPRA, all Federal agencies must prepare and submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

- *Five-year strategic plans* that define their mission and long-term goals
- *Annual performance plans* that link the long-term goals to shorter term objectives, which can be measured and tracked annually and which identify the resources necessary to achieve them
- *Annual program performance reports* that provide feedback to managers, policymakers, and the public concerning what was actually accomplished for the resources expended and how well the original objectives were met

Under GPRA, OMB will be allowed to grant waivers of nonstatutory administrative requirements to agencies seeking greater managerial flexibility on personnel levels, salaries, and budget constraints. In exchange, agencies will be expected to provide greater accountability for improved program results.

The timetable for governmentwide implementation of GPRA calls for agencies' 5-year strategic plans to be submitted to OMB by September 1997. In FY 99, the first annual performance plans are to be prepared by agencies and their first annual performance reports submitted by March 2000. A pilot phase (FYs 94–96) is under way to provide an opportunity to learn lessons and resolve problems, with pilot agencies working under an accelerated timetable. USAID's proposal to be considered a pilot agency was recently approved by OMB.

Box 2. What's Different About Managing for Results?

In the old way of doing business, the focus was on	In managing for results, the focus is on
Inputs	Outcomes
Process	Results
Activities	Strategic objectives
Retrospective data analysis	Ongoing monitoring
Compliance	Performance
Management control	Management improvement
Reporting data	Using data

In addition to these governmentwide legislative mandates, the latest version of the Administration's proposed foreign assistance legislation, the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act (PPDA), makes a strong case for performance measurement. For example, it states that the United States will establish open and transparent systems to monitor results of its assistance, and will be prepared to shift scarce resources from unproductive programs.

USAID has not been caught off guard by these performance-oriented trends. To the contrary, USAID has been out front, more than most other Federal agencies, in developing and installing performance measurement into its way of doing business in Washington and in field Missions. With USAID's leadership committed to managing for results, that trend is likely to continue.

Performance Measurement: Lessons Learned From Other Agencies

by Thomas J. Cook, Jerry VanSant, Leslie Stewart, and Jamie Adrian
Research Triangle Institute

In 1993 the Center for Development Information and Evaluation contracted with Resources Triangle Institute (RTI) to explore how other U.S. public and international organizations have managed the use of performance information to manage for results. The intent was to learn from the "best practices" of other agencies to improve USAID's own strategic management approach.

In conducting the study, RTI interviewed representatives of more than 20 international development agencies and U.S. Government offices. It also reviewed evaluation research literature and agency reports and articles. RTI ultimately examined performance measurement systems established by these agencies and analyzed how the systems are being used to manage and evaluate programs. This article summarizes key factors found to promote the effective use of performance measurement in the agencies reviewed. It then draws lessons from this experience applicable to USAID.

Promoting the Effective Use of Performance Measurement

Performance measurement systems are used to formulate budgets, allocate resources, motivate employees, improve services, and facilitate the exchange of information between the government and the public. Performance measurement can also help improve credibility and secure resources necessary to maintain and enhance programs. Performance measurement should be used for self-assessment and improvement, not just for auditing and monitoring. It should focus on how to make programs better, not dwell on individual job performance.

Here are some of RTI's suggestions on how to promote the use of performance data in development management:

- *Managers must view performance measurement as an integral part of the agency's mission and strategic plan.* Unfortunately, performance measurement is often viewed as an adjunct to the plan, in the same way that evaluation is often viewed as a requirement to be satisfied after the program is completed. This requirement presumes that the plan's strategic objectives (1) are meaningful relative to what the agency is actually trying to accomplish and (2) are expressed with sufficient precision to allow assessment of their achievement.
- *Performance measurement also requires senior management support at the program design stage and onward.* Performance measurement should be built into the program and project design so that questions about performance measures are linked to questions about program content. Senior program managers must be actively involved in designing the performance measurement system to show support. They should not delegate this task to others.
- *Senior managers must make sure there is a clear understanding throughout the agency of the purpose of performance measurement.* The reasons it is critical to the agency's mission and strategic objectives, and the planned uses of data for management decisionmaking at all levels must also be clarified.
- *A direct connection must exist between data and decisions.* The emphasis on agencywide use of data can be strengthened by creating a demand for performance data, rather than by assuming that if the data are available, they will be used. Managers throughout the agency must believe in the value of routinely using performance data to manage their programs and projects; moreover, managers must accept that their performance as managers will be evaluated in large part on this basis.
- *Another way to promote performance measurement is to have an "information broker" in the agency.* The broker could act as a repository of agency information on performance data, ensuring that the data are readily available to managers when needed. The broker can also promote feedback of performance

results to program staff, especially those who may have been involved in generating the data. The information broker could document the use of performance data and communicate back to the data producers to strengthen their commitment to providing good data.

• *Successful installation of a performance measurement system is, at minimum, a 3- to 5-year process entailing considerable group facilitation, negotiation, and training.* One of the weakest assumptions of performance measurement is that development managers know how to use performance data to manage their programs. Insufficient experience, training, and resources (time and budget, for example) of managers often constrain their effective use of performance data. Many managers need training and other technical assistance (such as software) to make good use of the data. Others do not have the time or staff to analyze the information.

• *Performance measurement should be keyed to different levels of the agency to give managers access to information directly relevant to their immediate responsibilities.* Managers may have more incentive to deal with matters in which they have direct control. The manager of a water purification project, for example, is likely to be more interested in the gallons of water treated per day than in how the project is part of an "infrastructure development" program that, in theory, contributes to country-wide economic development.

A direct connection must exist between data and decisions... Managers throughout the agency must believe in the value of routinely using performance data to manage their programs and projects.

• *Positive incentives are important and should focus on reinforcing good management practices.* Managers should be evaluated on whether and how they use performance data to manage their programs, not necessarily on the actual results of the programs. Managers may have little direct control over results. They can develop and use performance data to document how well a program is progressing toward its objectives.

• *The total agency – all affected managers – need to be involved in generating performance data.* Senior managers should not just bureaucratically delegate the responsibility to some lower level. Private sector respondents strongly recommend that the Federal Government not create a "measurement bureaucracy." Moreover, if senior managers have no contact with those producing the data, communication problems can result reducing the effective use of performance data. This can especially be a problem if senior management has no direct contact with the staff who are both defining performance indicators and generating data for management. The data users may not fully understand what is behind the numbers they are given, and data producers may have little appreciation for the issues facing senior managers who need the performance data.

• *Given tight budgets, managers must view the production of performance data as a cost-effective process.* They must perceive that the direct benefits they receive from using performance data equal or surpass the cost of collecting the data. Benefits can be realized through better program management. Costs can be limited by using existing data whenever appropriate and by employing creative sampling strategies.

• *Every performance measurement system should have built-in quality-control checks for data and routine audits to safeguard the reliability and accuracy of the data.* Confidence in the quality of information is critical. It will promote use of the performance measurement system.

• *Focus on measuring results, not just processes.* This suggestion reflects the *Reinventing Government* argument that performance measurement should focus on what programs are accomplishing, especially the "people impacts." In other words, we know what programs are doing; we simply do not know if they are doing any *good*.

• *Limit the performance analysis to a few areas directly relevant to the agency's mission and strategic objectives.* USAID's admonition to "focus and concentrate" captures the point made by several sources. Otherwise, the agency risks overloading managers with numbers that they may not have the resources or the background to use effectively.

• *Use a nonthreatening approach.* Managers are bound to feel threatened if they are told to report data on their programs without being involved in the performance measurement process or without explaining how and by whom data are and are not going to be used. A strict compliance mode of measurement will not only lessen the possibility of manager "ownership" but will also likely produce bureaucratic resistance and, worse, lead to data corruption.

Key Lessons Learned for USAID

From the suggestions mentioned above, lessons can be drawn for effective promotion and use of performance measurement systems in USAID. These lessons are as follows:

- Leadership support is essential. Key USAID officials must give backing to performance measurement and provide a mandate and resources for its implementation.
- Ownership should be elicited at all management levels; performance measurement "champions" are needed in Washington as well as the field Missions.
- Don't overload expectations. The purpose is not to measure linkages or to draw cause-and-effect conclusions. The performance measurement system is a complement to, not a substitute for, program evaluations.
- Involve program managers in developing plans for analysis and actions based on monitoring information.
- Train Agency staff and managers to use performance measures.
- Focus on a few key areas for results at each point of management responsibility.
- Report frequently on aspects of performance that can easily be manipulated in the short run; report less often on those less sensitive to program changes.
- It will take several years to implement a performance measurement system. Give it time.
- Use a small number of indicators and keep the system as simple as possible. Not all potentially relevant information improves decisions or is eventually worth knowing.
- Resist creating a measurement bureaucracy.

For more information see "Performance Measurement: Lessons Learned," by Thomas J. Cook, Jerry VanSant, Leslie Stewart, and Jamie Adrian, USAID Managing for Results Working Paper No. 2, May 1994 (PN-AAX-285). This study was funded under the CDIE/PRISM contract with Management Systems International, with support from Labat–Anderson and Research Triangle Institute.





Performance Measurement in USAID: The PRISM System

by Annette Binnendijk and Steven Gale
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

USAID leaders have placed renewed emphasis during 1993–1994 on strengthening the Agency's commitment and capacity to manage for results. In 1993, USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood volunteered the Agency as a "reinvention laboratory" for Vice President Al Gore's National Performance Review (NPR) initiative. And more recently, in July 1994, USAID was accepted as a pilot agency to help implement the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).

Fundamental to a strategic management approach is the establishment and implementation of strategic planning and program performance measurement systems and complementary program evaluations to produce information needed for decision-making on resource allocations, programs, and policies. The Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE), within the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC), has a lead role in supporting and strengthening program performance monitoring and evaluation throughout the Agency.

USAID signaled the adoption of a more strategic and results-oriented management approach when it tasked CDIE with creating the Agency's overall Program Performance Information for Strategic Management System—PRISM. Initiated in April 1991, and building on experience under the Development Fund for Africa in the Africa Bureau, PRISM provides a comprehensive approach to strategic planning, program performance monitoring, and

reporting. Although it preceded NPR and GPRA, PRISM is surprisingly consistent with the requirements set forth in these initiatives. The system serves the information needs of both senior managers in Washington and program managers in field Missions around the world. Its key characteristics are as follows:

- PRISM focuses on achievement of higher level strategic objectives and program outcomes rather than on the inputs and outputs of individual project activities.
- PRISM is built on the strategic plans and performance measurement systems of its operating units—the country Missions and central offices—and is thus a "system of systems."
- PRISM is not imposed from the "top down" but is built from the "bottom up," reflecting the real differences among country circumstances and Mission programs.

PRISM's first-line application is in the field Missions, which have primary responsibility for implementing U.S. assistance programs in developing countries. PRISM helps Missions clarify their development objectives, focus activities and resources on those objectives, decide on appropriate performance indicators, measure actual performance against expected performance targets, and use this information for making management decisions at the Mission level and for reporting to USAID/Washington. Similar approaches are now being extended to central offices responsible for providing field support to Missions, conducting research, and implementing special centrally managed programs.

PRISM's second-line application is as a central, Agencywide program performance monitoring system and database. As such, it is built on the performance measurement systems of the operating units—with data from each Mission and office entered into the Agencywide database and used for reporting annually to senior managers on the Agency's overall program performance. CDIE has responsibility for maintaining the PRISM database and for annually analyzing and reporting on the Agency's program performance.

The success of foreign assistance is determined by its impact upon developing nations. Inputs are meaningless without reference to effects. With this in mind, USAID will measure its results by asking how projects and programs achieve discrete, agreed objectives.

—Strategies for Sustainable Development
USAID, March 1994

PRISM in the Missions

Missions typically go through several phases, described below, to fully implement PRISM. The process should be highly participatory and include Mission staff, project implementation staff, and host country counterparts.

Strategic planning. In this phase, Missions identify and clarify their strategic objectives and program outcomes, arranged in an "objective tree" hierarchy. Strategic objectives are defined as long-term objectives that are developmentally significant for which the Mission is willing to be held accountable for achieving within 5 to 8 years. Program outcomes, the next lowest objectives, are interim results achievable in 2 to 5 years. The third level of objectives are the outputs of the assistance activities contributing to the program strategy.



Performance measurement. The next PRISM phase is to define strategic objectives and program outcomes in measurable terms (indicators), determine adequate data sources and establish baseline data for each indicator, set targets (expected results), undertake data collection routinely on actual results, and analyze progress. When actual results fall seriously short of expected results, Missions will often undertake evaluations to investigate explanations and recommend solutions to problems.

Missions are currently at different levels of installing performance measurement systems. To assess progress, CDIE, in collaboration with other bureaus, has defined several progressive levels of

development for tracking implementation. CDIE uses this information to develop a joint understanding with bureaus and Missions on where they are in implementing PRISM and for planning next steps. The levels are "progressive" in the sense that a Mission cannot advance to a higher level without first having attained the lower levels. For example, a Mission cannot advance to level 3 without having attained levels 1 and 2. Definitions of the levels are as follows:

- *Level 1.* Mission has identified strategic objectives and program outcomes, most or all of which meet PRISM standards.
- *Level 2.* Mission has defined indicators that meet PRISM standards for most or all of its strategic objectives and program outcomes.
- *Level 3.* Mission has set targets for expected results, has gathered relevant baseline data, and has identified likely sources for future performance data for most or all of its strategic objectives and program outcomes.
- *Level 4.* Mission's annual program performance reports provide data on actual results for most or all of its strategic objectives and program outcomes.

Of USAID's 43 "sustainable development" countries, three have not yet achieved level 1; they have identified strategic objectives but not program outcomes. The remaining 40 Missions have all achieved level 2 or above. Of these 40, 16 Missions are at level 2, 15 are at level 3, and 9 are at level 4.

Missions can begin using program performance information systematically for management decisions even while in the early PRISM levels. That is, managing for results is not necessarily a final stage of PRISM implementation but may begin even as Missions collect baseline data.

USAID/Washington is now intensively reviewing Missions' progress in implementing PRISM and is committed to helping "sustainable development" country Missions reach level 3 by October 1994 and level 4 (collecting actual results data) by October 1995. A variety of support services are being offered by CDIE to assist Missions and offices (see Box 1). Some USAID country programs, for reasons of their size; their political, emergency, or transitional nature; or other factors, are not immediate targets for PRISM coverage.

Evaluation. Historically, Missions rarely carried out evaluations that focused on multiple project activities. Most focused only on individual project implementation. New evaluation guidance, currently being drafted, will attempt to change this. The guidance will encourage Missions to focus more of their evaluations on groups of related activities that together aim to achieve a given program outcome or strategic objective. To complement the program performance measurement system (PRISM), which tracks performance of program outcomes and strategic objectives, the new "program evaluations" (sometimes called "strategic evaluations" or "linkage studies") will examine cause and effect between USAID activities, program outcomes, and strategic objectives; explain why performance was successful or not; and recommend management actions to improve program performance (see Box 2). Evaluations that focus above the individual project level should be more useful for advising Missions of "strategic" or program-level management decisions.

Managing for results. A fully operational PRISM system is reached when Mission management routinely uses information from the performance meas-



Box 1. CDIE'S PRISM Support Services

Effective implementation of PRISM by the Agency's operating units has been supported by a variety of CDIE services, including technical assistance, training and workshops, guidance papers, and a PRISM hotline. For example, during FY 94, CDIE has so far participated in 20 technical assistance teams to help Missions in developing strategic plans and performance measurement systems. Missions and offices can tap into a central PRISM contract for a variety of relevant services and skills. CDIE also holds customized, Mission-based workshops covering all aspects of strategic planning, performance measurement and evaluation, and strategic management. Numerous CDIE working papers are available on performance measurement and evaluation topics, and recently CDIE has established an E-mail hotline to answer PRISM queries. The hotline services can be accessed through E-mail to PRISM HOTLINE@CDIE.SDS@AIDW. Alternatively, queries can be mailed or pouched to PRISM HotLine, PPC/CDIE, Room 311, SA-18. Washington, D.C. 20523.

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urement system and complementary evaluations to make effective decisions that support successful program strategies and projects, while revising or phasing out those that are not performing well.

Missions in the forefront of installing PRISM report many benefits. Among them:

- Using strategic planning to focus their assistance programs on a smaller number of more meaningful and ambitious objectives.
- Using strategic plans as a reference point for assessing their project portfolios and revising or phasing out activities that do not contribute to objectives.
- Using strategic plans as vehicles for dialog and collaboration with host-country counterparts and with other donors to explain USAID's objectives.
- Using strategic plans and program performance information for reporting to USAID/Washington. Missions are now required to submit their strategic plans, annual action plans (relating resource needs to intended results), and annual program performance reports (providing actual results).
- Organizing Missions in new ways to better achieve strategic objectives. These new ways include the creation of "strategic objective teams" that cross traditional office lines.
- Using program performance information to serve as warnings that programs are facing problems and that further evaluation is needed to find out why and to recommend solutions.
- Comparing data on actual results with expected results and using these findings, often supplemented with evaluations, to make management decisions that will improve performance.

PRISM in USAID/Washington

In addition to its uses in field Missions and offices, PRISM is expected to serve information needs of senior managers in USAID/Washington. To help meet these needs, CDIE maintains a central, automated PRISM database. It contains strategic planning and performance data of individual operating units, gleaned from various reports (for example, strategic plans, action plans, various performance reports). Key uses of PRISM information by USAID/Washington include:

- Reporting convincingly to Congress and various oversight agencies on overall performance and results of USAID programs
- Fulfilling legislative requirements for performance measurement and reporting under the GPRA

Box 2. Complementary Roles of Program Performance Measurement and Evaluation

Program Performance Measurement	Program Evaluation
✔ Clarifies program objectives.	✔ Analyzes why and how intended results were or were not achieved.
✔ Links project activities and their resources to objectives.	✔ Assesses specific contributions of activities to the results (for example, addresses cause-effect, linkage, or attribution issues).
✔ Translates objectives into measurable, usually quantitative, performance indicators and sets targets (intended results).	✔ Examines other desired results not easily measured or quantified.
✔ Routinely collects data on these indicators, compares actual results with targets.	✔ Explores unintended results.
✔ Reports on progress to managers and alerts them to problems requiring attention and action.	✔ Provides lessons and recommendations for adjustments in programs or policies to improve results.

- Reviewing Mission and office objectives for consistency with new Agencywide strategic goals and guidelines
- Reviewing Mission and office progress toward expected results to keep a central watch on problematic programs requiring special attention, diagnosis, and corrective actions
- Using programming performance information to identify or flag particularly problematic or successful program strategies for greater in-depth evaluations by CDIE
- Improving program strategies and guidance
- Improving easy access to strategic planning and performance data by USAID/Washington managers

Until recently, these Agencywide PRISM efforts and uses were complicated by the somewhat different approaches and reporting formats and cycles of the different regional bureaus in USAID. However, the new "Agency Directive on Setting and Monitoring Program Strategies" (May 1994) now establishes

Box 3. Agency Directive on Setting and Monitoring Program Strategies

In May 1994, USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination issued a new directive establishing an Agencywide PRISM framework for the strategic plans and performance measurement systems of USAID Missions and offices. This directive, for the first time, clearly relates the Agency's overall programming and budget process to the systematic review of operating units' strategic plans, annual action plans, and annual performance reports. The intent is to develop a process that does a better job of putting the Agency's resources behind those programs that promise meaningful development results and that demonstrate progress in achieving those results.

Agencywide resource allocation decisions will be based on such factors as the contribution a USAID country program can make toward meeting strategic objectives, the incremental progress the program is making toward those objectives, and the suitability of the country environment to making a positive development impact. Thus, a flexible type of performance-based budgeting system will be put in place beginning with the FY 96 budget cycle that initially relates a Mission's resources to intended results (action plan), whereas ultimately resource allocation decisions will be influenced by how well actual results are achieved (performance report).

USAID/Washington review of the strategic plans of the operating units will ensure that their strategic objectives are consistent with Agencywide (as well as region-specific) strategic directions and priorities and that their plans to measure performance are adequate and meet Agency PRISM standards.

USAID/Washington reviews of program performance reports will provide a forum for the Agency's senior managers to review jointly with operational units progress being made to achieve strategic objectives and to identify any emerging issues that may warrant senior management attention. In addition, program performance reviews will provide senior managers with a broad understanding of the impact to date of the Agency's operational programs and thus contribute to (1) informing Agency decisions about overall program planning and resource allocation and (2) meeting accountability requirements to report on the effectiveness of Agency programs.

USAID/Washington annual reviews of strategic plans, action plans, and performance reports of the operating units will form the basis for the Agency's annual budget submissions and for annual program performance reporting to Congress and to the Office of Management and Budget. This new strategic planning, monitoring, and reporting framework is consistent with, and thus should fulfill Agency requirements under, the 1993 GPRA legislation.

a consistent Agencywide PRISM framework and requirements for the strategic plans and performance measurement systems of operating units (Missions and offices). The Directive also outlines procedures whereby the operating units will report to USAID/Washington and undergo periodic reviews (see Box 3).

Greater Agencywide access and use of program performance information by Agency managers is being facilitated by plans to include the PRISM database, objective trees, and related performance reports on USAID's on-line File Access System. Sharing USAID performance information with selected outside audiences (such as other donors) via the Internet or other automated mechanisms is a possibility, but one that has not yet been fully explored.

CDIE has responsibility for reporting annually on program performance Agencywide. Two such annual reports have been completed, covering 1992 and 1993. These reports describe the objectives and program strategies of the Missions. They use an analytical "clustering" technique to group similar objectives and program strategies into common or Agencywide "analytical frameworks." What Missions are actually doing is then compared for consistency with Agency directives on strategic goals, policies, and priorities. Actual data on the progress that programs are making toward their objectives are provided where available. The reports usually draw not only on PRISM data but also on Agencywide program evaluation findings, especially those conducted by CDIE. Summaries of PRISM implementation progress and next steps are also typically included in the annual reports (see page 28).

As PRISM begins to provide more actual performance data, it should become possible through cross-country analysis to identify program strategies that are particularly successful or problematic in varying country conditions. This, in turn, should flag specific Agency program strategies in need of greater in-depth evaluation by CDIE—to better understand cause-and-effect relationships underlying performance, to explain common factors, or "lessons," behind their success or failure, and to recommend management actions. Thus, program performance monitoring and program evaluations are distinct yet complementary functions. Both are important management tools. The results of these cross-country PRISM analyses and CDIE evaluations of program strategies Agencywide should be used to influence and improve the Agency's program strategy guidance.

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Challenges and Opportunities For Performance Measurement In USAID

by Lawrence S. Cooley
Management Systems International

With the passage of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the Government committed itself to monitoring its strategic objectives as an integral part of the way it does business.

USAID's efforts to introduce a monitoring system of this type preceded the legislation by 2 years. Those efforts, now in midstream, make USAID one of the most advanced agencies of the Federal Government to implement a comprehensive system for measuring program performance. The Agency's Program Performance Information System for Strategic Management—PRISM—also represents one of the first efforts to install a strategic management and results-based performance monitoring system in a major international development agency. A review of USAID's experience to date thus has relevance both to the continued implementation of performance measurement in USAID and to the broader effort to implement such systems in other public agencies. This article reviews the constraints to further use of performance measurement and then assesses USAID's existing strengths and the challenges to be faced down the road.

Constraints

At least seven features of USAID complicate the Agency's ability to get and use performance information to manage for results. Some of these features are unique to USAID; others are inherent in the nature of international development.

1. USAID's operation has long been and continues to be a decentralized, project-centered and Mission-centered enterprise. That makes it difficult for the Agency to achieve consistency in program activities and, consequently, aggregation of results across those activities.

2. As USAID is operating in different country contexts, there is no single standard or set of indicators, or single national source of data, for any given substantive area.

3. Performance monitoring has most commonly been used to assess the quantity and quality of service delivery to beneficiaries. Direct service delivery of this type has become increasingly uncommon in USAID projects. There is little domestic or international experience with monitoring performance in what USAID is increasingly involved in—namely, activities that are structural in nature, such as institutional development or policy reform.

4. USAID is being called upon to monitor the performance of programs in which it plays only a supporting role. In such programs the information systems and ultimate responsibility for results typically do not reside with USAID.

5. The substantive range of activities in which the Agency is involved is broad. Consequently, the resources needed for effective performance monitoring are more extensive than would normally be needed by an organization of USAID's size.

6. Development results are generally long-term propositions. Therefore, it is generally not feasible to monitor the results of current program activities for quite some time, at least with respect to significant development outcomes. Conversely, current-year performance is likely the result of program decisions and activities put in place years ago.

7. Because of the unavailability of performance information for so long in USAID, an antiempirical bias has developed among Agency personnel. They are not accustomed to using data in decision-making.

Strengths

Several features of the USAID system offset these challenges to some extent. They operate in favor of collecting and using performance information:

1. The Agency has highly qualified and motivated professional staff able to work through the difficulties of developing and implementing an effective system. (USAID has the highest proportion of people with advanced degrees in social sciences of any agency in the U.S. Government.)

2. It is easier to monitor results and attribute impact under a convergent planning model like USAID's (in which multiple interventions are aimed at producing particular results) than with a divergent planning model (in which a particular program or set of activities is seen as possibly having several broad-gauge effects.)

3. USAID already has a good start in performance monitoring.

4. Helping to develop monitoring and evaluation systems in USAID-assisted countries is an important development objective in its own right.

The Challenges Ahead

In establishing an effective system of performance monitoring in USAID, the following issues have required special attention. They continue to pose challenges to the full implementation and utilization of the system:

The question of attribution of specific development impacts to specific USAID assistance. Performance monitoring can tell us whether we have reason to believe that our activities are contributing to important development objectives, but it cannot answer the cause-effect questions of attribution. About the best one can do is apply the concept of "plausible association," under which we ask whether a reasonable person might conclude from what USAID did at the assistance level and what happened at the impact level that the assistance probably did or did not contribute to the impact. If that impact has not occurred, such data would lead one to question the value of continuing the existing strategy.

It is possible to increase confidence in the assistance-impact relationship by doing one or more of the following: (1) picking objectives that are not far removed from USAID's level of responsibility; (2) focusing attention on the logic of the strategy, particularly on identifying, achieving, and monitoring intermediate objectives as critical linkages between assistance and impact; (3) monitoring critical assumptions that govern the assistance-impact relationship; (4) supplementing quantitative monitoring data with other evidence, such as case studies and narrative information; (5) using peer-review mechanisms to assess the plausibility of the assistance-impact relationship.

The difficulty of defining results. USAID's options for defining results seem to lie on a continuum between two extremes. There is the "PVO (private volunteer organization) model," in which accomplishments are counted one by one, and only the numerator matters (the number of jobs created, for example). And there is the "World Bank model," in which accomplishments are judged in terms of progress toward the solution of national problems, and both numerator and denominator matter (for example, a decrease in the national unemployment rate). For USAID, the trick is to find objectives that are high enough to be consequential in the eyes of Congress and the American people, yet low enough that USAID can feel—and demonstrate—a strong association between its efforts and those objectives.

USAID's efforts to define objectives that are both significant and credible are enhanced by "focusing and concentrating"—that is, by doing fewer things but doing them well so that the Agency can achieve significant impact. But even if a given USAID Mission were to do only one thing in a country (particularly with a small budget in a large country), it would still face the question of how high it should legitimately set its sights. It would have to balance what is doable with what is meaningful to those outside the Agency.

Experience suggests that the nature of the intended results specified in the strategic objectives of many Missions frequently exceeds what would appear reasonable given their available resources. The most prevalent cause of this "aspiration inflation" is the resort to broad, high-level objectives to encompass within a given program strategy many relatively unfocused, wide-ranging activities already under way.

For USAID, the trick is to find objectives that are high enough to be consequential in the eyes of Congress and the American people, yet low enough that USAID can feel—and demonstrate—a strong association between its efforts and those objectives.

The difficulty of measuring program performance in the areas of democracy, environment, and economic growth. Measuring significant results from assistance given to support democratic initiatives is difficult, principally because of the difficulty of identifying exactly what such programs are expected to produce as ultimate, observable consequences. This may not be as great a problem as it would be in other parts of USAID's portfolio, however, since the expected results of many of the lower level interventions (such as the participation of nongovernmental organizations in the political process, or free elections) are considered valuable in their own right. Perhaps measurement of results need not go beyond that level.

There is also a summation problem in the environmental area—namely, what do we mean by an improved environment? A further complication is that changes in the environment take time. If strategic objectives are intended to be medium term (i.e., 5 to 8 years), then one ends up using intermediate

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results (e.g., the rate of adoption of new conservation practices) as strategic objectives and performance indicators. To the extent that these intermediate objectives are considered meaningful by those outside the Agency—and they appear to be—then perhaps measurement of results at the intermediate levels is also sufficient here.

In economic development, it is likely that nothing short of improvement in people's incomes, their physical welfare, or some other high-level economic result is meaningful to those who want to be assured that USAID's programming efforts are achieving desirable results. Yet the interventions USAID is implementing are, at best, partial, additive solutions to the problem of low incomes or low gross domestic product. Framing appropriate objectives and measuring performance for USAID's activities in economic growth thus continues to be a significant challenge.

Taken together, the special features of performance measurement in USAID make the Agency's experience of special interest within both the international development community and the context of the overall U.S. Government effort to introduce performance measurement and management for results.

This paper was originally prepared for, and presented at, a Workshop on Performance Information Use conducted by USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation in July 1993. PRISM is being supported through a CDIE contract with Management Systems International, with support from Labat–Anderson and Research Triangle Institute.

Using Performance Information: Proceedings of a 1993 Workshop, can be ordered from the Development Information Services Clearinghouse, ATTN: Document Distribution Unit, 1500 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1010, Arlington, VA 22209 Phone (703) 351-4006; fax (703) 351-4039.



PRISM: Lessons Learned, A CDIE Perspective

by Steven Gale, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, and Robert Baker, Labat–Anderson Inc.

USAID's Program Performance Information for Strategic Management (PRISM) system, initiated in April 1991, was built on the pioneering experience of the Development Fund for Africa. While PRISM came in advance of the recent movement to "reinvent" the Federal Government and make it more results oriented, it is nevertheless highly consistent with these recent trends. Over the past 3 years, CDIE has achieved a number of its PRISM goals, such as providing technical assistance on strategic planning and performance measurement to field Missions and other operating units, developing Agencywide guidance on performance measurement, and building the database component. At the same time, we have experienced several constraints, especially in starting up the system. The following provides selected views on some areas of progress and continuing challenges and concludes with lessons from CDIE's recent experience.

Progress

- *Appropriate information.* PRISM reports on the performance and results of development assistance efforts—not on procedures, compliance, or administrative actions. This focuses attention on, and tends to clarify, the key objectives USAID seeks to accomplish with its assistance and forms a basis for taking regular readings on progress made toward those objectives.
- *Ownership.* PRISM was built from the "bottom up" by experienced field officers and seasoned practitioners of development assistance. Each Mission (and office) develops its own strategic plan, identifying the development objectives, program outcomes, indicators, and targets most appropriate to their specific country context. This Mission-oriented nature of PRISM results in a high degree of ownership of performance measurement systems by the Missions and enhances their use by Mission management.
- *Agencywide usage.* USAID envisioned that PRISM's information would be useful at all organizational levels, from front-line managers in Missions to senior decision-makers in Washington. Having an Agencywide system has several advantages. It allows a management tool designed and appropriate

for use at the country level to also be used to aggregate information about USAID's accomplishments at regional or worldwide levels. It allows Agency operational units to learn from one another's experiences, in terms of selection of indicators and data collection techniques and of strategic management "best practices." Finally, an Agencywide performance measurement system permits a common language and expertise to develop, as officers move from one country to another or between the field and Washington.

• *Clear policy.* In January 1994, Administrator Brian Atwood sent a worldwide cable endorsing a strategic management framework for USAID that builds on PRISM. In May, an Agency core directive was issued detailing the responsibilities of the operating units for strategic planning, performance measurement, and reporting under this new framework and relating it to the Agency's programming and budget process. These initiatives by the Agency's senior management team support PRISM implementation and use for decision-making and commit the Agency to a managing-for-results framework.

Continuing Challenges

Burden level. Especially in the early startup phases, PRISM has placed considerable burdens on field staff. Time and staff available for PRISM activities in the field have been limited, reflecting overall increasing and competing demands on USAID developmental specialists and managers.

• *System linkage.* PRISM and other Agency systems are not yet linked in real terms. Conceptually, there is widespread agreement that PRISM should be linked to budget and other USAID systems; however, there is still a gap between concept and practice—but the gap is closing.

• *Automation and access.* Automating PRISM has been slower than planned, especially at the Mission system level. For example, information on Mission strategic objectives, indicators, targets, and such is still abstracted and coded by hand from various published documents, delaying data entry, analysis, and reporting on program performance Agencywide. Also, access to the PRISM database is at present still quite limited to those in CDIE, although wider access within USAID should soon become a reality as PRISM data are entered into the Agency's File Access System.

• *Selecting indicators and setting targets.* Identifying and agreeing on key PRISM indicators is proving difficult and taking considerable time and effort—especially in some new priority areas, such as environment and natural resource management and democracy. Moreover, because PRISM is a "bottom up" system lacking uniform indicators, its ability to aggregate performance information across USAID countries may be less precise than some would prefer. Similarly, developing appropriate and stable performance targets—ones that are ambitious but still within the operating units' manageable interest—remains a very imprecise science.

• *Limited flexibility for using performance information for programming decisions.* While the Government Performance and Results Act may eventually release agencies from some administrative restrictions and budget controls in exchange for adopting performance measurement systems and managing for results, this is not yet a reality for USAID. Furthermore, as long as earmarks and other restrictions seriously limit USAID management's flexibility to allocate resources on the basis of performance, some managers will continue to doubt whether time invested in PRISM is well spent and worthwhile.

Lessons Learned

Looking back on CDIE's experiences, several valuable lessons emerge identifying key factors needed to effectively manage for results using a performance measurement system such as PRISM.

• *Sustained leadership is needed.* Strong, consistent, and unified support by Agency leadership is necessary to keep PRISM moving ahead. Bottom-up support is not enough. Leadership and sustained commitment for performance measurement systems and their use from senior-level USAID officials is even more important than technology advances in software, hardware, and systems integration.

• *Empowerment and accountability must be stressed.* Early Mission successes with PRISM show that once managers (or teams) are empowered to plan and manage strategically and are held accountable for results, they respond positively. Implementing PRISM successfully depends, in part, on how responsibility is defined at all levels for results-oriented management. Adopting the PRISM system must go hand in hand with dropping older accountability "systems." Staff empowerment must accompany increased accountability.

• *Agencywide support and teamwork are crucial.* To operate as an Agencywide tool, PRISM must receive support from all functional/technical areas within USAID. To be effective, the system must be sold (and bought into) at the very "top" and "bottom" so that decision-makers at all levels can use and depend on the information. Support from USAID decisionmakers and technical experts is necessary. Teamwork is essential for sustained PRISM progress.

Field Perspectives

Performance Measurement Experience of Three Regional Bureaus

Africa

by Kathie Keel
Bureau for Africa

Five years ago, the Africa Bureau put into place program management systems that emphasized using strategic planning and performance measurement to manage for results. The investment in time and resources to establish both a philosophy and practice within the Bureau has yielded rich returns—the most important of which is the ability to demonstrate significant and measurable impact associated with USAID's action on the lives of ordinary Africans.

The *Development Fund for Africa (DFA)* was the catalyst that led the Bureau to revamp its programming process to ensure that results were not only achieved but also accurately measured and reported. Passed in 1987, the DFA legislation served as a compact between Congress and USAID. The DFA provided USAID with a mandate to look anew at African problems and solutions and to decide how and where resources could best be used to improve the lives of Africans. In exchange for enhanced flexibility, USAID committed itself to managing for results and accepting greater accountability in reporting to Congress on the impact of those resources. Consequently, in addition to the annual reports and periodic consultations, a 5-year retrospective report on the performance of the DFA was recently presented to Congress. The report is entitled *Africa: Growth Renewed, Hope Rekindled.*

The DFA legislation has ensured funding for Africa, provided the flexibility to respond to the winds of change that have swept the continent since the late 1980s, and both enabled and forced the Bureau to do business differently. To enhance the impact of its assistance programs, the Bureau has emphasized four themes:

- *Focus* resources on strategic priorities—do fewer things and do them better.
- *Concentrate* resources in fewer countries.
- *Facilitate* participation of the host country, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations.
- *Improve* donor coordination.

Underlying the Bureau's efforts is a strong conviction that African leadership and ownership in development planning and implementation are central to sustainable development.

The DFA's emphasis on having a measurable impact on economic and social development in Africa also led the Bureau to develop innovative programming, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation systems. The DFA Action Plan laid out a development strategy aimed at broad-based, sustainable economic growth directly linked to bringing about positive changes in people's lives. The DFA Action Plan provides the framework for country-level programming.

The *Performance-based Budget Allocation System* enables USAID to concentrate staff and financial resources in countries where the prospects for sustainable economic growth and positive people-level impact are greatest. The budget allocation system incorporates a number of criteria, such as host country democracy/governance and economic performance, social and environmental policies, and need and population size. Country assessments resulting in country categorization and respective budget levels are conducted annually. Adjustments are made throughout the year as standards and principles are applied to changing situations.

Each Mission prepares the *Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP)*, which lays out a Mission's 5- to 7-year plan for achieving results in a few focused strategic areas. This plan reflects a concentration of resources on a chosen, limited, and achievable set of objectives. It outlines programming specifics and defines the level and scope of projected impact. The document constitutes the Mission's "contract" with USAID/Washington to obtain specific measurable results within a set time period in return for human and financial resources. Missions are tasked with articulating strategic objectives that make sense in light of critical development problems within the particular country context and that are achievable, given USAID comparative advantage, level of resources, host country priorities, and other donor activities. Missions are responsible for demonstrating significant people-level results for which there is a

plausible association with USAID program activities.

The *Assessment of Program Impact (API)* is the Mission's annual report on progress in achieving impact in the strategic areas laid out in the CPSP. The API focuses on *program-level results* rather than on project outputs. Progress is measured against key performance indicators (selected by the Mission), which are linked to the Mission's investment and reflect people-level impact. The API is prepared annually by all major country programs and provides a rich source of data for the Bureau to use in internal and external reporting on the impact of USAID programs in Africa.

Intensive Bureau reviews of the APIs yield both sectoral and cross-sectoral analysis from country, subregional, and continentwide perspectives. Steady improvement in the quality of APIs over 4 years is seen as evidence of progress by Missions in establishing monitoring and evaluation systems that permeate Mission thinking and are seen within Missions as providing useful information for program managers to better manage USAID resources. For both Missions and the Bureau, the API provides an opportunity once a year to step back, see the "big picture," and ask whether we are on the right track.

The work of the Analysis, Research, and Technical Support Office of the Bureau complements the overall systems. It helps us better understand development problems by suggesting the most effective approaches and identifying the most appropriate performance indicators in various sectors and the rate of change that can be expected under different conditions.

The Bureau continues to grapple with performance measurement issues. Still, the systems developed to achieve results under the DFA have served us well over the past 5 years in enabling us to better understand the impact of USAID efforts.

For more information, please contact Kathie Keel in AFR/DP/POSE, Room 2495 NS.

USAID/Kenya: Using Program Performance Information for Strategic Management

Since the mid-1980s, USAID/Kenya has given increased emphasis to managing for results. Program performance monitoring and evaluation are central to the way the Mission does business with other donors, the Government of Kenya, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Evaluation findings and other data on program performance have influenced Mission investment decisions, other donor support, government policy and priorities, and NGO management and practice in all development sectors.

In population and health, a 1979 USAID-financed survey, which documented one of the highest fertility rates ever recorded, contributed to the decision by the Government of Kenya to intervene actively in the population sector and to increase emphasis on service quality and coverage. Subsequent surveys and program performance data documented the dramatic decline in fertility . USAID-sponsored studies on consumer willingness to pay for health services led to the initial government decision to institute user fees at public facilities and to the subsequent decision to maintain these fees in the face of initial opposition. This policy is credited with increasing the availability of essential drugs for clients at government health facilities and increasing financial resources in support of primary/preventive health care services.

In agriculture, special studies, performance data, and evaluation findings have documented the positive impact of agricultural research on agricultural productivity and farm income. These findings have also influenced government policy decisions on fertilizer marketing, private sector roles, and controls on maize movements and prices. USAID support of an evaluation unit at the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) has contributed to Kenyan ability to use data on results to influence policy and program priorities. For example, a recent KARI study of the people-level impact of adoption of high yield varieties of maize showed that female-headed households benefited less than male-headed households. This finding led to a decision to give more attention to socioeconomic barriers of increased agricultural production.

Similarly in private enterprise, program performance data have influenced USAID and other donor support and government policy. For example, findings from the Mission's evaluation of the Kenya Trust for Private Enterprise Development led to the decision to discontinue USAID support for equity capital in subsequent programs. On the other hand, USAID-supported monitoring data that documented results from the Rural Private Enterprise project generated additional support from European donors for these activities. Similarly, USAID-supported studies on the impact of government regulations on exports led to additional tax incentives for exporters, abolition of import licenses, and foreign exchange liberalization.

Stephan Ndele, program specialist (evaluation economist), Program Office, USAID/Kenya

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The Near East

by Lynn Carter
Bureau for Asia and the Near East

In the winter of 1992, the Near East component of the Asia and Near East Bureau (ANE/NE) began actively supporting Missions in the development of monitoring plans to measure the performance of Mission strategies. The main purpose of performance measurement is to give Missions timely information on progress so they can adjust their strategy or implementation methods to reach their performance targets. Performance measurement also helps Missions learn from one another's experiences.

The indicators developed as part of the performance measurement plan cannot tell Missions why or how a strategy is succeeding or failing, but they can give some evidence of progress. They can also help Missions formulate the right questions. However, performance measurement does not mitigate the need for evaluation.

How does performance measurement work in the ANE/NE Bureau? The Bureau approves Mission strategy and monitoring plans. It carefully reviews existing plans and provides feedback to Missions on the extent to which the indicators selected and the timing of data collection meet criteria established by the Bureau. The Bureau requests documentation concerning why particular indicators have been chosen (their relevance to the objective), how the actual measurement is being done, and how the data will be collected. This information allows the Bureau to understand the relationship between the objectives and the indicators and also to give more informed comment. Targets or benchmarks are also reviewed. Bureau performance measurement criteria and requirements are laid out in the *Near East Bureau Manual for Program Planning and Performance Measurement and Reporting* (April 1993).

Missions have gone through a long process of improving and refining their performance measurement plans—clarifying objectives, becoming more accustomed to working with indicators, and learning more about how host country data are configured. Acquiring baseline data for many indicators has taken considerable time. Most performance monitoring plans rely at least in part on data that the Mission must generate itself. The Bureau has been both tolerant and encouraging of this process, recognizing that good indicators and good data are more likely to be useful to the Mission and are also more likely to contribute to the institutionalization of performance measurement.

The Bureau has provided direct assistance for performance measurement through two mechanisms: (1) a buy-in to the Center for Development Information and Evaluation PRISM contract, which gives Missions and bureaus technical assistance in a range of performance measurement methodologies, such as "objective tree" analysis and indicator specification; and (2) an intergovernmental agreement with the Bureau of the Census to support reviews of data sources, acquisition of baseline data, setting of performance targets, and development of techniques for data collection and analysis.

Missions must report annually on progress toward meeting their objectives. The requirements for the annual report or the Country Program Review are laid out in the manual mentioned earlier. The format is standardized. Missions are asked to analyze progress, report on critical assumptions by exception, and explain any other external elements that have changed and are expected to have an impact on the strategy. The Bureau does not expect reporting on strategic objectives annually, particularly in the early years of the strategy when progress against strategic objective indicators may be slight. Also, the Bureau requests annual reporting on program outcome indicators—measures at a level just under strategic objective indicators.

When annual reporting is not possible for particular indicators, the Bureau asks Missions to accompany these particular indicators with proxy indicators that will at least show a partial picture of progress. If the strategic objective is a new area for the Mission, with projects just being designed, then the Bureau finds it unrealistic to expect any reporting on *outcomes* at the close of the first year, and possibly even the second. Missions are instead asked to report on inputs and outputs and on the process of getting a series of interventions under way.

The Bureau is just receiving the first annual performance reports and holding reviews, so the uses to which performance data will be put are not yet clear. The Bureau is looking carefully at how Missions interpret the data and whether Missions are recommending changes based on progress. In one instance in which Mission funds had been cut, the Bureau and the Mission used the Country Program Review to jointly explore the future of the Mission and its strategy. As a result, elements of the Mission strategy are likely to change.

Finally, ANE/NE requirements for strategic planning and performance measurement and reporting may need to change, to better reflect recently issued

Agencywide guidance on performance measurement and new monitoring and evaluation directives. The Near East component must also work with its Asia counterparts to determine new joint review procedures.

For further information, please contact Lynn Carter in ANE/SEA/IRM, SA-2, Room 103. Copies of the handbook are available.

Latin America and The Caribbean

by Jean Meadowcroft
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean

The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Bureau began to develop a system for assessing program performance in 1991. LAC Bureau objectives formed the basis for establishing Mission strategic objectives and performance indicators. Initially these were organized into three themes: achievement of broadly based sustainable economic growth, evolution of stable participatory democratic societies, and response to specific challenges in the hemisphere, such as epidemics and narcotics trafficking. The LAC Bureau provided most Missions with technical assistance to help them develop Action Plans.

With USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation, as well as other bureau offices, LAC developed a rough scale for classifying Missions at stages of strategic planning and performance measurement. Comparison of 1992 reviews of 19 LAC Action Plans with 1993 reviews of 23 Action Plans showed considerable progress. By 1993, more Missions were preparing improved Action Plans with more focused strategies and programs to support them—now with limited technical assistance from the Bureau. Of 23 LAC country plans, 10 had met the Bureau's basic performance measurement standards, with indicators specified for most strategic objectives and program outcomes (level 2); 5 had achieved the next level with baseline data, expected results, and data sources (level 3); while 9 had provided data on actual results (level 4). Several of these Missions were using program performance information for strategic management.

A review of the Action Plans submitted for 1994 shows that most Missions are presenting well-focused plans with performance results and narratives providing a wider perspective on program performance and progress.

In 1993, enough information was available for an initial assessment of program impact in the region. Summary reviews were carried out of strategic objectives from all FY 94–95 Action Plans and results presented in 1993.

- *Twenty-two Missions pursued sustainable, equitable economic growth objectives.* Programs focused on economic policy reforms and activities, including liberalizing exchange rates, encouraging fiscal responsibility through tax reform and privatization, and promoting private investment, exports, and microenterprise.
- *Twelve Missions reported health, population, and education objectives.* Health programs worked to increase access to primary health care and improve health system management; population programs attempted to strengthen organizations and service delivery through nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations (NGOs and PVOs) and the public sector; and education programs were designed to improve primary education.
- *Another 12 LAC Missions reported environment objectives* and included programs in policy reform, institutional strengthening, and natural resources management. Environment programs were more recent initiatives, expected to show results in the longer term, with more immediate focus on policy and legal changes and strengthening NGO involvement in environmental programs.
- *Democracy programs were under way in 18 Missions,* supporting institutional strengthening for legislatures, judicial systems, public sector financial and audit activities, and electoral/voter registration systems. Other activities support nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations in encouraging greater citizen participation to address public sector accountability and human rights and mechanisms to increase participation of the citizenry in local government.

The LAC Bureau also assessed progress for Women in Development efforts. Comparison of performance reported in the 1992 and 1993 Action Plans showed progress had been made. For the 23 Action Plans reviewed in 1993, the proportion demonstrating some degree of attention to gender increased to 67 percent, above the 57 percent for Action Plans reviewed in 1992. Twenty-nine percent of the plans reviewed in 1993 showed reasonably consistent, comprehensive attention to gender, compared with 24 percent the year before. Interestingly enough, two of these Mission Action Plans did not adequately reflect the known attention to gender in the Mission programs, suggesting the importance of

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ensuring that performance indicators and narratives incorporate the issue.

A review in 1993 of the performance data suggested several difficulties in interpretation of the Action Plan results:

- Most of the data were reported for 2-year spans (a few for 4 years)—too short a time period to establish significant trends.
- Data from centralized sources may be available for longer time periods but are not disaggregated sufficiently to be indicators for more focused Mission programs.
- External events often unduly influence performance, rendering program performance overly positive or negative. Indicators viewed in isolation from these external factors may be misleading.

Preliminary review of 1994 plans for the several sustainable development Missions indicate that they are responding well to new Agency priorities and to adjusted budgets for the region. One Mission made a major reduction in strategic objectives and others have restricted new activities. Many Missions have modified program outcomes to respond to new priorities, particularly increased equity and participation. Reporting of people-level impact needs more improvement but without creating a data collection burden. At the same time, Missions are trying to reduce the total number of indicators to lessen the data collection and reporting load and are providing a wider perspective on program performance through discussions in the narrative sections of reports. Finally, Missions are using the strategic objective framework for Annual Budget Submissions as well as for Semi-Annual Portfolio Reviews.

Overall, the 3 years of experience with Action Plans are bearing fruit, as Mission staff now have the capability to modify their strategic plans and identify and report performance using both data and descriptive narrative. Reporting on people-level impact and ensuring consistency in indicators still need more work, but the 3 years of performance data now are showing positive development trends.

For more information, please contact Jean Meadowcroft, LAC/SPM, 2252 NS.

What USAID Missions Have Learned About Managing For Results

by Annette Binnendijk
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

A CDIE-sponsored 1993 Workshop entitled Using Performance Information yielded important lessons for implementing effective approaches to strategic planning, performance measurement, and managing for results. The lessons were drawn from the experience of Missions in Nepal, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Ghana. CDIE followed up by conducting three in-depth case studies of Mission experiences in Guatemala, Kenya, and Ecuador. Some of the key lessons follow:

- *Leadership support is critical.* Perhaps the most important factor for ensuring the success of a managing for results approach is having strong, determined, and consistent senior management support at Mission and Washington levels.
- *Strive for country program focus and continuity.* Strategic planning and performance measurement assume stable, long-term objectives and reliable access to resources. To achieve significant development impacts, Missions need to concentrate on a few critical objectives and then stick with them long enough to make a difference. Major shifts in policies, priorities, earmarks, and funding levels will inevitably set back Mission efforts. Once strategic objectives have been established by Missions and approved by USAID/Washington, every effort should be made to maintain the integrity of those objectives and the resources budgeted for their accomplishment.
- *Build ownership through participation.* Participation brings everyone on board, develops consensus around key objectives, and gives the big picture. Thus participatory approaches to strategic planning and measurement that include all levels of Mission staff, host-country counterparts, nongovernmental organizations, and even other donors

build ownership, fostering sustainability and long-term effectiveness.

- *Allow adequate time and staff resources.* It can take several years before a strategic planning and performance measurement system takes hold. The process requires patience. Also, staff need enough time (and possibly training) and relief from some of their other duties to adequately implement these new responsibilities. Some Missions have found it useful to devote a full-time position to coordinating performance measurement and evaluation functions.
- *Keep the performance measurement system simple.* The focus of performance measurement systems should be on a few key results at each level of the objective tree. Similarly, the number of indicators should be kept to a minimum for each strategic objective, program outcome, and activity output to keep it simple. Only information considered essential at each management level should be collected. Not everything collected at the Mission level needs to be reported to USAID/Washington.
- *Conduct complementary evaluations.* Performance measurement systems can track program performance over time but cannot necessarily explain that performance, draw cause-and-effect conclusions, or make recommendations for program improvements. Expectations for what performance measurement systems can provide should be realistic; they are not substitutes for evaluations. But if performance measurement systems are appropriately complemented by evaluations, together they can be powerful management tools for decision-making.
- *Experiment with new ways of doing business.* Managing for results requires new ways of operating and new organizational roles and responsibilities centered around strategic planning, performance measurement, and using performance information. Some key elements include empowering managers by delegating program decision-making authority along with accountability for results, building teamwork and participatory approaches, clarifying new institutional roles and responsibilities, and rewarding results-oriented behavior.
- *Clarify institutional roles, responsibilities, and processes.* Organizational structures, roles, and responsibilities must be clear for conducting strategic planning, for installing program performance measurement systems, and for institutionalizing procedures for feedback and use of performance information in decisions. Many Missions now integrate these responsibilities in personnel work plans and appraisals. Some Missions have successfully established and used interoffice strategic objective teams to fulfill these responsibilities, whereas other Missions have undertaken more formal reorganizations to align management units with new strategic objectives.
- *Ensure system use.* The use of program performance information by managers at all levels for decision-making and for reporting requirements is essential for success. This requires that managers clearly identify specific uses, the kinds of information needed, and time frames. A "learning culture" that encourages experimentation and avoids placing blame will foster a willingness to use performance information to modify programs accordingly.
- *Provide incentives for honest reporting and use.* Use of performance information can be reinforced through recognition and rewards to individuals and organizational units who base program decisions on performance information. Both a managing-for-results approach and better achievement of results can be fostered through such positive incentives. The incentives must favor honest and objective reporting and use of performance data and avoid blaming managers for problems beyond their control, or system distortions may result.
- *Get help.* Timely training and technical assistance from USAID/Washington can be very helpful in establishing effective strategic plans and performance measurement systems. PRISM teams bring technical expertise, conceptual tools, and training/guidance materials, as well as facilitation skills to ensure a participatory process. USAID's management training workshops can assist Missions with building teams and dealing with other organizational changes required to effectively manage for results.

For more information, ask for the following CDIE documents: "Using Performance Information: Proceedings of a 1993 Workshop," USAID Managing for Results Working Paper No. 3, May 1994 (PN-AAX-286); "Managing for Results: Experience From Two USAID Missions (Guatemala and Kenya)," USAID Managing for Results Working Paper No. 1, April 1994 (PN-AAX-284); and "Managing for Results: A Case Study of the Ecuador Experiment," CDIE Working Paper No. 160, 1994.



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Performance Measurement: Three Mission Perspectives

USAID/Ghana

by Dawn M. Liberi
USAID/Ghana

The program at USAID/Ghana is young and highly focused. After a hiatus in the bilateral program during the mid-1980s, a renewed program was initiated in 1990. A year later, we conducted our first comprehensive review, called the Assessment of Program Impact (API), in the Africa Bureau, marking a move toward focusing on quantifiable program impact measurement. Managing the process was easier with a newly designed program. We were able to develop quantifiable performance indicators at the time of project design instead of trying to fit an old project into performance requirements.

Performance Measurement System Management

USAID/Ghana expended much staff time and many financial resources ensuring that our program performance system was user-friendly, cost-effective, and logical. Each Mission technical office, and all of the host-country ministries involved in Mission programs, designated a staff member for project-level monitoring and evaluation. In practice, however, these staff were often detailed elsewhere, and monitoring and evaluation activities were put on hold. Therefore, USAID/Ghana assigned a full-time manager to coordinate the monitoring and evaluation system—a critical step toward success.

Mission Strategies

USAID/Ghana has carefully selected three strategic objectives: (1) increasing nontraditional exports, (2) reducing fertility, and (3) improving the quality of primary education. These objectives are linked directly to larger subgoals and goals. Determining the appropriate level of indicators for the strategic objectives, program outcomes, and the individual projects was difficult. We struggled as well with determining how much and at what level data gathering was sufficient to ensure cost effectiveness.

In March 1993, the Mission invited a four-member team from the Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) to review and update our overall performance assessment system. The team worked closely with the Mission's technical offices to help refine specific indicators for each strategic objective. For example, a new subgoal—to increase nontraditional export sector income and employment—was added to capture the people-level impact of the Mission's program in this area and an additional target—increasing the use of more effective contraceptive methods, such as IUDs or injections—was added to the strategic objective of reducing fertility.

Measuring Program Impact: Multiple Sources

The CDIE review and the team's recommendations on future actions helped USAID/Ghana to devise coherent and realistic mechanisms for measuring program impact. One such mechanism, the Performance Information Management Plan, provides detailed information on each indicator the Mission tracks. It includes, for example, the indicator definition, names of contacts and sources for data, a brief assessment of data quality including reliability, and information on current and projected figures.

Primary and secondary sources of data also provide useful information. These include such sources as the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) completed in 1993; a consumer baseline study completed in late 1993 on family planning and AIDS-related knowledge, attitudes, and practices; the Criterion Referenced Test (CRT), a Ghana-specific achievement test administered to 5 percent of 6th grade students (more than 12,000 students) in 1992 and again in 1993; a baseline study on employment levels and real per capita income of nontraditional export workers, completed in late 1993; and annual studies to measure the impact of feeder road rehabilitation—that is, whether rehabilitation is reducing transport costs and making access to markets easier.

USAID/Ghana incorporates information from these sources into the APIs and Semi-Annual Portfolio Reviews (SPRs). Missions are also responsible for writing Project Evaluation Summaries, which list actions planned in response to suggestions made in project evaluations. No formal mechanism had existed for tracking whether these actions were in fact taken, so USAID/Ghana integrated this information into the annual evaluation schedule. The schedules now outline actions recommended from the last

evaluation and show whether they have been carried out. The SPRs also provide an opportunity to follow up on these recommendations. The Mission can thus easily track follow-up by the technical offices.

These mechanisms provide USAID/Ghana with the information it needs to make management decisions, revise targets, and examine alternatives in project implementation. The Mission also draws much information from data that ministries collect. This in turn helps build the monitoring and evaluation and the program planning capacity of the Government of Ghana.

Performance Measurement for Decision-Making

One example of how the Mission uses performance measurement data to make decisions is illustrated with the results of the CRTs. Both Ghanaians and the Mission were shocked when the first test found that fewer than 2 percent of Ghanaian children were meeting the predetermined criterion for English and Math, a standard most Ghanaians considered reasonable. This served as an impetus within the Mission for discussing whether the proj-ect goal of 80 percent numeracy and literacy by 1995 was realistic. The low scores, together with local media commentary, sparked concern within the Ministry of Education about the general state of primary education—particularly about curriculum and teachers' performance. As a result, the Ministry of Education initiated an ambitious program of curriculum revision—streamlining the curriculum from nine to five subjects, increasing the length of the school day by 1 hour, and choosing more appropriate textbooks—areas previously not open to donor agency intervention.

Although establishing a system to better assess program performance may seem a daunting task, it is well worth the investment of time and finances...USAID/Ghana has a good record of getting the funding it requests mainly because it is able to show impact.

The baseline study on employment and income for nontraditional export workers provided information about the constraints to export activities. For example, a significant number of respondents considered that the time it took to clear export shipments was unacceptably long. Poor road conditions for moving export crops to market was found to be another constraint. Once these problems were identified, the Mission was able to find innovative ways of working with the Ghanaian Government to reduce these barriers and achieve the Mission objective more quickly. In the case of feeder roads, this was accomplished mainly by encouraging the Department of Feeder Roads to make timely reports to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning—a condition necessary for the release of nonproject assistance funds.

A measure of the success the Mission has experienced in increasing nontraditional exports is found in a recent annual report by a nongovernmental organization (NGO) working in private sector development. This NGO's work to improve processing and marketing capability of small-scale palm oil operations in rural communities resulted in several significant achievements, including the following: the reduction of postharvest losses, the enhancement of local manufacturing capacity, a national foreign exchange savings of $780,000 because more palm oil processing machinery is now assembled locally, and an increase in annual real income by 20 percent for farmers served by this project.

Using performance data also supports USAID/Ghana in making decisions about how to reduce fertility—the Mission's third strategic objective. Under the Family Planning and Health Project, for example, a recently launched advertising campaign for condoms, vaginal foaming tablets, and birth-control pills drew on results from an earlier consumer baseline study. Data on contraceptive use, awareness of modern methods, and types of methods chosen analyzed by region, age, and gender proved useful in tailoring the advertising messages to specific market segments. This campaign built on previous social marketing efforts aimed at reducing the total fertility rate. Results from the 1993 DHS show that since 1988 the total fertility rate has dropped from 6.4 to 5.5.

Next Steps

For the future the Mission plans to refine its program performance tracking, possibly by centralizing the computer database. Currently each technical office maintains its own database for the indicators it tracks. Centralizing this information could make tracking activities easier and retrieving information faster. The Mission is taking a closer look at cost-

effectiveness in data collection as well. We need to consider how much more of our data collection activities could be contracted through the Ghanaian private sector instead of bringing in contractors from outside. Is it necessary to schedule studies on an annual basis? Are we really picking up significant changes with annual studies in some sectors? The Mission also plans to continue working toward ensuring that government counterparts and local institutional contractors play a more prominent role in monitoring and evaluation activities.

This last point is particularly important given the shifting priorities in development activities. The focus in both bilateral and multilateral aid programs is narrowing to fewer, more tightly managed and controlled sectoral programs. With shrinking flows of aid to the developing world, it is becoming imperative that governments learn to manage and allocate resources more efficiently.

Lessons Learned

Although establishing a system to better assess program performance may seem a daunting task, it is well worth the investment of time and finances. USAID/Ghana also found that several key ingredients constitute a successful program.

- *Support from top management is crucial.* Program and project implementation are generally a Mission's first priority. Monitoring and evaluation are easy to postpone and then to forget.
- *Document.* USAID/Ghana collects some data quarterly, some annually, and some only every 3 years. With rapid staff turnover and rare overlap of assignments, loss of institutional memory becomes a risk. Good documentation helps avoid duplication of effort.
- *Fight a tendency to measure inputs.* USAID/Ghana has a good record of getting the funding it requests mainly because it is able to show impact. The bottom line is not whether your program has distributed the number of textbooks planned but whether students in the host country meet an accepted basic standard of competency for reading and math. Inputs, although perhaps easier to measure, do not show results.
- *Focus and concentrate management units for impact.* We have three strategic objectives and five major projects. This structure evolved from thinking carefully about available financial and human resources. A highly focused Mission portfolio translates into a monitoring and evaluation system that does not require a large share of Mission resources in order to run effectively.

USAID/Guatemala

by Margaret Krombout
USAID/Guatemala

USAID/Guatemala has invested substantial resources in establishing and revising its system for measuring program performance; currently the system contains data on the impact of programs at the strategic objective and program outcome levels. The Mission's goal is to expand the system into an integrated performance measurement tool that includes data on project outputs as well as on objectives and outcomes. The aim is to develop a system that allows analysis and reporting of program impact by general and specific variables, such as population and gender.

Purpose: Description and Reporting

USAID/Guatemala designed its performance measurement system initially to aid decision-making and to improve reporting on the impact of Mission programs. But because the Mission's scope for making program and budget decisions has been becoming more limited, the performance measurement system has emerged as a way of viewing programs in snapshots and reporting on assistance more fully. Moreover, the system has become a tool for building consensus among Mission staff and host country counterparts on current and future program priorities and directions.

System Organization

USAID/Guatemala's program performance system organizes data at several levels of aggregation and significance. Building on information from individual project monitoring and evaluations, the system arrives at program performance level indicators. Cross-office strategic objective teams in the Mission, develop the strategic objective tree, set the policy agenda, implement performance measurement plans for the objective, and decide on indicators. Although the process may sound complicated, USAID/Guatemala has actually simplified and lessened the performance measurement burden by reducing the number of indicators it tracks. This was done to avoid wasting too many resources collecting data, to ensure greater clarity of analysis, and to draw management's attention to questions of increasing order of significance.

System Specifics and Access

The Mission compiles data in its Core Data Base in a simple FOXPRO format, which exports data to Harvard Graphics and Atlas GIS for graphic presentation. The Core Data Base is accessible through a read-only file to all staff on the Mission's local area network system and is managed by the Office of Program Development and Management. Each strategic objective team designates one person to be responsible for ensuring the flow of data to the Core Data Base manager.

System Use

This year for the first time the performance measurement system will be ready, with all higher level program indicators incorporated into the Core Data Base, for the Mission's Action Plan presentation. Although it has not yet been tested fully, the performance measurement system has shown its effectiveness in providing a strong logical framework for making strategic choices and allocating resources.

The system has also proved its practical worth in communicating strategic priorities to the host government, nongovernmental organizations, USAID/Washington, and other U.S. Government agencies and donors, as well as the general public. The performance measurement system has significantly reduced staff time spent on acquiring data and responding to requests for information. The savings thus achieved far outweigh the substantial initial investment in developing the strategic objective trees and corresponding indicators.

Future Challenge

USAID/Guatemala has gained much experience in strategic planning and performance measurement experience over the last 2 years. A strong and committed leadership at the Mission senior management level combined with a managing-for-results orientation has moved us forward. The outcome is a Mission that thinks and manages strategically, with a staff willing to be held accountable for specific outcomes, and where collaborative, results-oriented behavior is rewarded. Our challenge for the future is to ensure even greater participation from host-country counterparts and recipients of our developmental assistance to set the strategic framework, provide continuous feedback during implementation, and monitor and evaluate for results.

USAID/Egypt

by Randal Parks
USAID/Egypt

USAID/Cairo's experience in measuring program performance has involved more than just establishing a set of indicators; it has meant creating a Mission mindset. The Mission management and staff have dealt with several important challenges—the challenges of commitment, measurement, prediction, and formalization—from which they have learned that performance measurement involves a new way of thinking that is much more than just filling in the blanks for a set of indicators or targets.

USAID/Cairo comprises more than 350 Mission personnel, including direct hires, foreign service nationals, and contractors. Its portfolio includes 59 projects and programs with a $1.75 billion pipeline. The Mission's leadership has supported development and use of performance measurement, which it began to establish in the Mission a little more than 2 years ago with the help of three USAID/Washington technical assistance teams. In large part because of the size of the portfolio, the Mission needed more than a year to develop a final set of strategic objectives and program outcomes and their corresponding performance indicators.

Commitment

The Mission's greatest challenge in establishing a performance measurement system was obtaining the staff's full commitment. This remains a challenge still. Many USAID officers seem inclined to view strategic planning and performance measurement as separate "program office" exercises not involving them directly. Such detachment is understandable; the individuals most closely involved in project implementation are often overwhelmed by the day-to-day workload of ensuring that projects are being successfully implemented, by the administrative paperwork, and by dealing with auditors. They are also busy explaining USAID programming requirements to counterparts, which at the beginning makes project implementation time consuming. Faced with these immediate tasks, individuals simply do not view long-term measurement concerns as a priority.

Some personnel are also inherently wary of measurement. They worry, for example, about establishing performance targets and then not being able to meet them. The fact that Mission personnel

change also affects commitment. New personnel rotating in have little understanding of or sense of ownership in the performance measurement system.

How does a Mission deal with such detachment? The most effective way has been for Mission senior management to consistently reinforce the importance of strategic planning and performance measurement for decision-making. Such reinforcement requires persistence and patience as everyone in the Mission learns to adopt managing for results.

Measurement

The Mission used data from the program performance measurement system as the basis for the Portfolio Reviews for the first time in the fall of 1993. During the review, it came upon an unexpected discovery: a number of the indicators the Mission had initially selected either did not accurately reflect the objectives and actions they were supposed to measure or could not actually be measured. In other words, indicators must be both meaningful and measurable.

Prediction

Another unexpected challenge surfaced during the fall 1993 Portfolio Review of USAID/Cairo. Under the best circumstances, prediction of future results—setting targets and benchmarks—is difficult in any field, and results do not always match the best projections. Everyone is acquainted with the scramble to reconcile poor results with rosy predictions. Occasionally, however, a project or a program will perform better than expected. Targets must then be adjusted to remain valid. For example, reforms made in certain segments of the Egyptian agricultural sector as a result of the Mission's Agricultural Production and Credit Project have outpaced original expectations. As the Mission's assumptions changed, staff took it upon themselves to adjust their targets accordingly.

Formalization

Every Mission must face the challenges of commitment and prediction before formalizing its performance measurement system. Formalization occurs when a strategic plan is in place and the performance measurement indicators are established and in use. But a formal system is only as good as the quality of the people who implement it, the data collected, and the analyses conducted. Performance measurement systems cannot substitute for competent staff. Circumstances change, information has to be synthesized, and management approaches are altered. An effective system incorporates new information and adapts to new situations.

The Mission has adopted such an approach modeled after the PRISM system. The Mission treats its strategic and performance indicators as tools, which it continues to refine and make more specific as experience is gained. Some strategies are being seriously questioned because little progress has been made in reaching certain targets. USAID/Cairo uses PRISM for managing for results and communicating these results to different stakeholders.

Strategic Management: System Versus Mindset?

Strategic management involves using data from multiple sources to successfully manage for results. Managers often cannot wait for information to be captured in "hard" quantitative indicators and must rely on "softer," more qualitative information sources. Specific indicators, however, can reinforce other impressions and serve as reality checks to Mission management. As USAID/Cairo's experience confirms, establishing a performance measurement system with a new set of indicators is an important element and catalyst in the Mission's efforts to manage efficiently and successfully. Such management also depends on a more important factor: a mindset that is concerned not only with inputs and outputs but also with impacts that make a difference.

Recent PRISM Publications

Managing for Results: Experience in Two USAID Missions, Working Paper No. 1, May 1994, PN-AAX-284.

Program Performance Measurement: Lessons Learned, Working Paper No. 2, May 1994, PN-AAX-285.

Using Performance Information: Proceedings of a 1993 Workshop, Working Paper No. 3, May 1994, PN-AAX-286.

An Assessment of the Quality of Strategic Objectives: 1993, Working Paper No. 4, June 1994, PN-ABG-292.

These documents can be ordered from the Development Information Services Clearinghouse, ATTN: Document Distribution Unit, 1500 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1010, Arlington, VA 22209 Phone (703) 351-4006; Fax (703) 351-4039.

Evaluation News

Our Readers Respond

We recently completed a readership survey of *USAID Evaluation News* to determine what our subscribers think of the newsletter. The results were highly encouraging. We mailed 2,633 survey letters of which 982 were sent to USAID staff. The number of responses far exceeded our expectations. Fully 32 percent of our readers responded, and 95 percent of those responding wanted to continue receiving *USAID Evaluation News*.

The survey information was also revealing. Ninety-three percent of our readers rated the overall quality of the newsletter as good or excellent, and nearly 70 percent found information from the articles very useful in their work. We asked our readers to rate each section of the newsletter. While each section had a following, the Development Experience Reviews was the most popular. Given that this section reports on findings from recently completed CDIE evaluations, the positive response is particularly noteworthy. It tells us that the newsletter is achieving one of its key goals: helping to disseminate findings and lessons from USAID experience inside the Agency and to the broader development community.

Finally, we received more than 50 suggestions for Focus Issues. Of these Performance Measurement had the greatest number of requests. Other popular topics were (1) agriculture and the environment; (2) public health, food, and nutrition; (3) economic growth; (4) democracy and governance; and (5) natural resource management.

We are grateful to our readers for taking the time to return their survey letters and will work hard to respond to their many useful suggestions. This issue, Focus on Performance Measurement, is a start. Also during the last 2 years, we have had to reduce the number of issues we produce from four per year to one because of shortage of resources. We hope that with your encouraging responses, we will be able to increase the number of issues without jeopardizing the quality of each issue. As always, we welcome articles and news reports on evaluation findings, lessons, and methodology from our readers.

Second Annual Report on Program Performance

In April 1994, CDIE published its Second Annual Report to the Administrator on Program Performance. The report describes the status of the Agency's programs as recorded by the Missions in their strategic plans and annual performance reports and entered into the PRISM database as of June 30, 1993. A summary presents the report's major findings and conclusions. Chapter 1 provides background on PRISM and Managing for Results in USAID. Chapter 2 describes the Agency's four development themes and presents "analytical frameworks" developed and used to link Mission objectives and activities to the themes through a hierarchy of causal relationships. Chapters 3 to 6 provide more detail on the objectives and program strategies of USAID Missions in each of the development themes: economic growth, human development, democracy, and environment. Selected results from countries where performance has been measured for several years are discussed. The final chapter discusses the additional steps the Agency will take in 1994 to advance performance measurement and managing for results. Copies of the report can be obtained from the DISC, 1500 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1010, Arlington, VA 22209-2404, Tel: (703) 351-4006, Fax (703) 351-4039.



GOVERNMENT

PERFORMANCE

&

RESULTS ACT

OF 1993

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Background and Summary of Main Provisions

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT OF 1993

BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

- 10/03/90 - S.3154 introduced by Sen. William V. Roth as the "Federal Standards and Goals Act of 1990."
- 01/14/91 - S.20 reintroduced by Sen. Roth as the "Federal Program Performance Standards and Goals Act of 1991."
- 08/05/92 - S.20 (retitled the "Government performance and Results Act of 1992") amended by Sen. John Glenn to make the bill more "management friendly" via requirements for strategic planning and limited piloting of (1) performance planning and reporting, (2) certain management flexibility waivers, and (3) performance budgeting.
- 01/21/93 - S.20 reintroduced by Roth and Glenn. According to Sen. Roth, S.20 "could be thought of as the first reinventing government legislation moving through the Congress."
- 02/04/93 - H.R. 826 introduced by Reps. Conyers, Clinger and McDade. Strong administration support from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Performance Review. Supported by the General Accounting Office (GAO).
- 05/25/93 - Passed the House
- 06/23/93 - Passed the Senate
- 08/03/93 - Signed by the President

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

- Improve public confidence in Federal agency performance by holding agencies accountable for achieving program results.
- Initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in setting program goals, measuring program performance against those goals, and reporting on progress.
- Improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction.
- Improve congressional decision making by clarifying and stating performance expectations "up front."
- Improve the internal management of the Federal government.

MAJOR LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

- Strategic Plans - By 09/30/97 all agencies are required to develop a 5-year strategic plan that will be submitted to OMB and the Congress (and every three years thereafter). Agencies will be expected to consult with the Congress and to provide for public input. Each strategic plan will include:

  - A comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and operations of the agency.

  - The general goals and objectives of the agency, including output-related and/or outcome-related (performance) goals and objectives, for major functions and operations.

  - A description of how the performance goals and objectives relate to the general goals and objectives in the plan.

  - A description of how all of the goals and objectives in the plan will be achieved and what resources will be required.

  - An identification of critical external factors that have the potential to affect the achievement of the general and specific performance goals and objectives.

  - A description of any program evaluations used in establishing or revising the goals and objectives (including plans for future evaluations).

- Performance Plans - By 09/30/97 all agencies are required to submit to OMB an annual performance plan covering each program activity set forth in the agency's budget; these plans are to be consistent with the agency's strategic plan and are to include the following features:

  - The establishment of performance goals to define the level of performance to be achieved by a given program activity.

  - The use of goal statements that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable (unless authorized by OMB to use language of a qualitative nature to establish an acceptable measure).

  - The use of performance indicators to measure or assess the relevant outputs, outcomes and/or service levels for each program activity.

  - A description of the operational processes and resources required to meet the performance goals.

- The establishment of a procedure for comparing actual program results with the established performance goals.

- The means used to verify and validate measured values.

◆ Program Performance Reports - By 03/31/00 (not later than March 31 of each year thereafter) each agency will be required to issue public reports on program performance for the previous fiscal year (Note: This information may be contained in an annual financial statement if it is submitted to the Congress no later than March 31 of the applicable fiscal year). Each report will include:

- An evaluation of program performance for each of the performance indicators established in the agency performance plan.

- An assessment of the agency performance vis-a-vis the performance goals established in the performance plan for that fiscal year.

- An analysis of progress toward goals and an explanation of any deviations experienced and/or impediments encountered.

- A discussion of the effectiveness of any of the waiver provisions relative to program performance.

- A summary of the findings of program evaluations completed during each fiscal year covered by the report.

◆ Managerial Accountability and Flexibility - Beginning in fiscal year 1999, waivers may be granted to agencies seeking certain managerial and budget flexibility; in turn, agencies will be expected to demonstrate improved performance.

- Agencies will be permitted to propose waivers of certain non-statutory administrative procedural requirements and controls; OMB and the appropriate originating agency (e.g., the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) will renew and approve the requested waivers.

- Waivers can include specification of personnel staffing levels, limitations on compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions or restrictions on funding transfers among budget object classification 20 (contractual services and supplies) and subclassifications 11 (personnel compensation), 12 (personnel benefits), 31 (equipment) and 32 (land and structures) may be negotiated.

- Waivers may be in effect for one or two years and may be renewed for a subsequent year. After three consecutive years the agency may propose that the waiver become permanent (waivers of limitations on compensation or remuneration excepted).

SUMMARY OF SENATE BILL.20 "GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT OF 1993"

PURPOSE

- Improve the confidence of the American people.
- Initiate program performance reform.
- Improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability.
- Help Federal managers improve service delivery.
- Improve congressional decision-making.
- Improve internal management of the Federal government.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

By Fiscal Year (FY) 1998, each agency head would prepare and submit to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a strategic plan. The strategic plan would consist of:

- a comprehensive mission statement;
- general goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives;
- a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved;
- a description of how the performance goals relate to the general goals and objectives in the strategic plan;
- an identification of those key factors external to the agency and beyond its control in achieving the goals and objectives; and
- a description of the program evaluations used in establishing or revising general goals and objectives, including a schedule for future program evaluation.

The strategic plan would cover a period of not less than 5 years. The performance plan should be consistent with the strategic plan. The agency should consult with the Congress to solicit views and suggestions when developing their strategic plan.

ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLANS AND REPORTS

Performance Plans

By FY 1999, agencies would provide a performance plan for their overall budget. The performance plan should:

- be prepared annually and cover each program activity set forth in the budget;
- establish performance goals and define the level of performance to be achieved;
- express the goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form;
- describe the operational processes, skills and technology, and the human, capital, information, and other resource requirements needed to meet performance goals;
- establish performance indicators that will be used in measuring or assessing the relevant outputs;
- provide a basis for comparing actual program results with the established performance goals; and
- describe the means by which measured values are verified and validated.

If an agency determines that it is not feasible to express the performance goals, OMB may authorize an alternative form. The alternative form may include separate descriptive statements of a minimally effective program, and a successful program:

- that allows for an accurate, independent determination for whether the program activity's performance meets the criteria of either description, or
- state why it is infeasible or impractical to express a performance goal in any form for the program activity.

Program Performance Reports

By March 31, 2000, and each year thereafter, on March 31, an agency head should prepare and submit a report on program performance for the previous year to the President and the Congress. Each program performance report should set forth performance indicators in the agency's performance plan, along with the actual program performance achieved compared with the performance goals expressed in the plan for that fiscal year.

Beginning in FY 2000, each report would contain the actual results of each preceding year, the report for FY 2001 would include actual results for the two preceding fiscal years, and the report for fiscal year 2002 and all subsequent reports would contain the actual results of three preceding fiscal years.

Each report would:

- review the success of achieving the performance goals of the fiscal year;

- evaluate the performance plan for the current fiscal year relative to the performance achieved toward the performance goals in the fiscal year covered by the report;
- explain and describe why a performance goal was not met, including when a program activity's performance is determined to lack the criteria of a successful program activity;
- describe the use and assess the effectiveness in achieving performance goals of any waiver; and
- include the summary findings of those program evaluations completed during the fiscal year covered by the report.

MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY WAIVER

By FY 1999, the performance plans would include proposals to waive administrative procedural requirements and controls. A waiver would take effect at the beginning of the fiscal year for which the waiver is approved. Any such waiver should describe the anticipated effects of performance resulting from greater managerial or organizational flexibility, discretion, and authority, and should quantify the expected improvements in performance resulting from any waiver.

PILOT PROJECTS

Performance Goals

The Director of OMB will designate not less than ten agencies as pilot projects, in performance measurement for FYs 1994, 1995, and 1996. Pilot agencies should prepare performance plans and program performance reports for one or more of the major functions and operations of the agency. A strategic plan would be used when preparing performance plans during one or more years of the pilot period.

By May 1, 1997, the Director of OMB will submit a report to the President and the Congress:

- assessing the benefits, costs, and usefulness of the plans and reports prepared by the pilot agencies;
- identifying any significant difficulties experienced by the pilot agencies in preparing plans and reports; and
- recommending changes in the requirements of the provisions of the "Government Performance and Results Act of 1993."

Managerial Accountability and Flexibility

The Director of OMB will designate not less that five agencies as pilot projects in managerial accountability and flexibility for FY 1995 and 1996. Pilot agencies should include proposed waivers for one or more of the major functions and

operations of the agency. The Director of OMB will include in the report to the President and the Congress:

- assessing the benefits, costs, and usefulness of increasing managerial and organizational flexibility, discretion, and authority in exchange for improved performance through a waiver; and
- identifying any significant difficulties experienced by the pilot agencies in preparing proposed waivers.

Performance Budgeting

The Director of OMB will designate not less than five agencies as pilot projects in performance budgeting for FYs 1998 and 1999. At least three of the pilot agencies will be the same agencies reporting under the pilot project for managerial accountability and flexibility. The pilot projects should cover the preparation of performance budgets. The performance budget should present one or more of the major functions and operations of the agency, including outcome-related performance, that will result from different budgeted amounts. OMB should include as an alternative budget presentation in the budget for FY 1999, the performance budgets of the designated agencies for this FY. By March 31, 2001, the Director of OMB will submit a report to the President and the Congress on performance budgeting pilots:

- assessing the feasibility and advisability of including a performance budget as part of the annual budget;
- describing any difficulties encountered by pilot agencies in preparing a performance budget;
- recommending whether legislation requiring performance budgets should be proposed and the general provision of any legislation; and
- recommending changes in other requirements of "Government Performance and Results Act of 1993".

IMPLEMENTATION

The legislation outlines the following schedule for pilot and final implementation of the proposed initiatives.

S.20
Schedule for Implementation

Initiative	Pilot Implementation	Final Implementation
Strategic Plans	FY 1994 - 1996	FY 1997
Annual Performance Plans and Reports	FY 1994 - 1996	FY 1997

S.20 Schedule for Implementation		
Managerial Accountability and Flexibility	FY 1995 - 1996	FY 1999
Performance Based Budgeting	FY 1998 - 1999	To be determined

EXEMPTION

The Director of OMB may exempt any agency with annual outlays of $20 million or less.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS ACT OF 1990

The proposed legislation in both spirit and form is closely related to the Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO) of 1990. Both Acts strive to improve the efficiency and efficacy of the Federal Government by introducing traditionally private-sector approaches to encourage intelligent resource allocation decisions and managerial accountability for the consequences of those decisions. Specifically, both pieces of legislation:

- originate out of a desire to improve the efficiency of the administration of Federal Government;
- strive to improve Federal decision making by providing Congress and Federal managers with a reliable and consistent stream of accurate programmatic and financial data;
- propose the use of programmatic and financial performance measurement as a method for gauging the progress toward specific agency and government-wide goals.

Many of the activities initiated under the CFO Act, will ultimately merge with the requirements imposed by the proposed performance measurement legislation. Clearly, the mandate from Congress to Federal managers will be for the coordinated integration of the requirements of the two pieces of legislation into one seamless process. This process must encompass the following: long and short-range planning; performance measures and reporting; the incorporation of performance information into the budget process; and the final reconciliation of expenditures with objective measure of program performance. Government-wide this process will be managed by OMB's Office of Federal Financial Management.

For example, the overview to the annual audited financial statements required of all Federal departments and some agencies under the CFO Act will serve as the forum for the annual performance report required under the proposed legislation. Similarly, the 5-year financial management plans of the CFO Act will, by necessity, be developed in coordination with the larger strategic planning efforts required by S.20.

With regard to the implementation requirements of the 2 pieces of legislation, one area of convergence is particularly noteworthy; the need for integrated financial/programmatic management information systems (mixed systems). The CFO Act explicitly addresses the need for the Federal Government to develop reliable integrated systems for the collection and management of critical financial and programmatic data. This data is not just the fundamental resource of the management decision process, but ultimately the source of accountability for those decisions. Similarly, under the proposed performance measurement legislation these systems, while not explicitly addressed, will be essential. Agency CFO's, in working to meet the requirements of the CFO Act, will be laying the foundation for the successful implementation of S.20.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEGISLATION

Passage of S.20 has three primary implications: (1) the need to establish an Agency strategic planning process; (2) the need to identify objective outcome measures of performance for each of the agency's programs; and (3) the need to establish a process for the routine, on-going collection of the programmatic and financial data necessary to support the performance measures.

Strategic Planning: To meet the requirements of S.20, the agency now must begin to establish a strategic planning process that encompasses all aspects of agency operations. In particular, consensus need to achieved on a set of specific, measurable objectives for each of the agency's major activities. Once this is done, procedures should be established for the regular review and revision of these goals.

Identification and Development of Program Outcome Measures: The legislation contains explicit requirements for use of outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of agency programs. Outcome measures are defined as "an assessment of the results of program activity compared to its intended purpose...". It is generally accepted that the agency, at this time, cannot produce these types of measures for many, if not all, of its programs. Consideration needs to be given in the agency's research and evaluation plan for the development of these types of measures for all programs. Specifically, the effort should be directed at:

- clarification of the explicit objectives of each of the agency's programs (in conjunction with strategic planning efforts):

- identification of aspects of those objectives that can be measured in an quantitative manner;

- development of specific sets of outcome measures for programs administered by the agency; and

- identification of the data necessary to support the use of the proposed outcome measures.

Data Collection: As noted earlier, the requirements for the improvement of financial and mixed financial/programmatic data systems imposed by the CFO Act will ultimately enable the agency to better implement the requirements of S.20. It will be important for the agency to review modifications and improvements being made to agency information systems in the context of not just current requirements of the CFO Act, but also in the context of future performance reporting requirements as outlined in the proposed legislation.

In addition, new types of data will have to be collected. The requirements in S.20 for the use of outcome measures will generate the need for data collection beyond the standard financial and programmatic information currently collected by the agency. As measures are identified, agency data administrators will need to develop systems and procedures for the regular collection of this information.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

THE DIRECTOR

APPENDIX 5

August 5, 1994

M-94-26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

FROM: Alice M. Rivlin
Acting Director

SUBJECT: FY 1996 Budget Planning Guidance and the Use of Performance Information in the FY 1996 Budget Process

Planning Guidance

In his memorandum of April 21st providing preliminary planning guidance for the FY 1996 Budget for your agency, Leon Panetta stated that revised guidance may be issued to reflect further Congressional action and other factors. After reviewing the status of Congressional action on FY 1995 appropriations to date, we have decided that the April planning guidance will not be revised. The final outcome of the FY 1995 appropriations bills is still too uncertain to forecast accurately the impact of these bills on the FY 1996 guidance levels.

As a result, agencies should submit by September 9th, FY 1996 Budget requests for discretionary budget authority and FTE employment that do not exceed the levels specified in the April 21st guidance. Agency plans for FY 1995 buyouts should also be submitted on September 9th. As Congress completes action on the FY 1995 appropriations bills, we will work with you to ensure that your submissions and our analysis of them accurately reflect Congressional action.

We expect rapid Congressional action on the pending Crime Bill. As you know, the Crime Bill contains funding for a "Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund." While most of this funding will be designated for Department of Justice programs, some will also be designated for programs in other departments. Your FY 1996 Budget requests should clearly indicate requested funding from this source; however, only programs authorized in the Crime Bill will be considered for funding from the Crime Fund.

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We are committed to formulating a budget that funds the President's priorities. To do so while remaining within the Budget Enforcement Act discretionary spending limits will require extra effort. I look forward to working with you on this task.

Performance Information

OMB recently revised Circular A-11, which provides guidance to agencies on their submissions for the FY 1996 Budget. This year's A-11 gives special emphasis to the goal of increasing the use of information on program performance, or what programs are actually achieving. Although performance measurement is not a new subject for the government's budget and program analysts, we at OMB will be giving it much more attention than in the past in part because of the following:

- The Government Performance and Results Act requires expanded use of performance measurement information. Specifically, strategic planning and performance targeting is required from all agencies by FY 1999.

- The tough resource constraints in the Budget Enforcement Act, and the urgent need to reduce the budget deficit to increase national savings while simultaneously increasing public investment, puts a premium on finding effective government programs and improving or terminating programs that are ineffective.

For this year's review of agency budget requests, I am instructing OMB analysts to use performance information to inform or influence decisions whenever possible. With regards to one particular A-11 requirement, that agencies identify performance goals and indicators that are useful in making decisions for key programs, I believe it is important enough to warrant a meeting between OMB staff and agency budget officers. OMB staff will set up this meeting soon to discuss this and other topics related to performance information for the FY 1996 budget.

Effective government is important to all Americans, and especially important to this Administration. Building on the start that is made this year, future budgets will give increasing attention to program performance measurement. With your participation and encouragement, the use of program performance measurement can help us get more out of each program dollar.

Source: Appendix 4 to Alice Rivlin's memo of September 23, 1994 to OMB staff.

APPENDIX 4

PRIMER ON PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

This "primer" defines several performance measurement terms, outlines areas or functions where performance measurement may be difficult, and provides examples of different types of performance measures.

I. Definition of Terms

No standard definitions currently exist. In this primer, the definitions of output and outcome measures are those set out in GPRA. Input measures and impact measures are not defined in GPRA. As GPRA is directed at establishing performance goals and targets, the definitions are prospective in nature. Variations or divisions of these definitions can be found in other Federal programs as well as non-Federal measurement taxonomies. For example, a measurement effort which retrospectively reports on performance might define "input" as resources consumed, rather than resources available. The nomenclature of measures cannot be rigidly applied; one agency's output measure (e.g., products produced) could be another agency's input measure (e.g., products received).

OUTCOME MEASURE

GPRA Definition: An assessment of the results of a program compared to its intended purpose.

Characteristics

- Outcome measurement cannot be done until the results expected from a program or activity have been first defined. As such, an outcome is a statement of basic expectations, often grounded in a statute, directive, or other document. (In GPRA, the required strategic plan would be a primary means of defining or identifying expected outcomes.)

- Outcome measurement also cannot be done until a program (of fixed duration) is completed, or until a program (which is continuing indefinitely) has reached a point of maturity or steady state operations.

- While the preferred measure, outcomes are often not susceptible to annual measurement. (For example, an outcome goal setting a target of by 2005, collecting 94 percent of all income taxes annually owed cannot be measured, as an outcome, until that year.) Also, managers are more likely to primarily manage against outputs rather than outcomes.

OUTPUT MEASURE

GPRA Definition: A tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort that can be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner.

Characteristics:

- The GPRA definition of output measure is very broad, covering all performance measures except input, outcome or impact measures. Thus it covers output, per se, as well as other measures.
  - Strictly defined, output is the goods and services produced by a program or organization and provided to the public or to other programs or organizations.
  - Other measures include process measures (e.g., paperflow, consultation), attribute measures (e.g., timeliness, accuracy, customer satisfaction), and measures of efficiency or effectiveness.
  - Output may be measured either as the total quantity of a good or service produced, or may be limited to those goods or services with certain attributes (e.g., number of timely and accurate benefit payments).

- Some output measures are developed and used independent of any outcome measure.

- All outputs can be measured annually or more frequently. The number of output measures will generally exceed the number of outcome measures.

- In GPRA, both outcome and output measures are set out as performance goals or performance indicators.
  - GPRA defines a ***performance goal*** as a target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual performance can be compared, including a goal expressed as a quantitative standard, value, or rate.
    e.g., A goal might be stated as "Improve maternal and child health on tribal reservations to meet 95 percent of the national standards for healthy mothers and children by 1998". (Note that this goal would rely on performance indicators (see below) to be measured effectively.)

  - GPRA defines a ***performance indicator*** as a particular value or characteristic used to measure output or outcome.
    e.g., Indicators for the maternal and child health goal above might include morbidity and mortality rates for this population cohort, median infant birth weights, percentages of tribal children receiving full immunization shot series, frequency of pediatric checkups, etc.

  - Performance goals that are self-measuring do not require separate indicators.
    e.g., A performance goal stating that the FAA would staff 300 airport control towers on a 24 hour basis in FY 1996.

IMPACT MEASURE

Definition: These are measures of the direct or indirect effects or consequences resulting from achieving program goals. An example of an impact is the comparison of actual program outcomes with estimates of the outcomes that would have occurred in the absence of the program.

Characteristics:

- Measuring program impact often is done by comparing program outcomes with estimates of the outcomes that would have occurred in the absence of the program.
  - One example of measuring direct impact is to compare the outcome for a randomly assigned group receiving a service with the outcome for a randomly assigned group not receiving the service.

- If the impacts are central to the purpose of a program, these effects may be stated or included in the outcome measure itself.
  - Impacts can be indirect, and some impacts are often factored into cost-benefit analyses. An outcome goal might be to complete construction of a large dam; the impact of the completed dam might be reduced incidence of damaging floods, additional acreage converted to agricultural use, and increased storage of clean water supplies, etc.

- The measurement of impact is generally done through special comparison-type studies, and not simply by using data regularly collected through program information systems.

INPUT MEASURE

Definition: Measures of what an agency or manager has available to carry out the program or activity: i.e., achieve an outcome or output. These can include: employees (FTE), funding, equipment or facilities, supplies on hand, goods or services received, work processes or rules. When calculating efficiency, input is defined as the resources ***used***.

Characteristics:

- Inputs used to produce particular outputs may be identified through cost accounting. In a less detailed correlation, significant input costs can be associated with outputs by charging them to the appropriate program budget account.

- Often, a physical or human resource base (e.g., land acreage, square footage of owned buildings, number of enrollees) at the start of the measurement period is characterized as an input.
  - Changes to the resource base (e.g., purchase of additional land) or actions taken with respect to the resource base (e.g., modernize x square footage, convert y enrollees to a different plan) are classified as outputs or outcomes.

AN EXAMPLE OF OUTCOME, OUTPUT, IMPACT, AND INPUT MEASURES FOR A HYPOTHETICAL DISEASE ERADICATION PROGRAM:

Outcome: Completely eradicate tropical spastic paraparesis (which is a real disease transmitted by human-to-human contact) by 2005

Outputs: 1.) Confine incidence in 1996 to only three countries in South America, and no more than 5,000 reported cases. (Some would characterize this step toward eradication as an intermediate outcome.)
2.) Complete vaccination against this retrovirus in 84 percent of the Western hemispheric population by December 1995.

Inputs: 1.) 17 million doses of vaccine
2.) 150 health professionals
3.) $30 million in FY 1996 appropriations

Impact: Eliminate a disease that affects 1 in every 1,000 people living in infested areas, which is progressively and completing disabling, and with annual treatment costs of $1,600 per case.

AN EXAMPLE OF OUTCOME, OUTPUT, IMPACT, AND INPUT MEASURES FOR A JOB TRAINING PROGRAM:

Outcome: 40 percent of welfare recipients receiving job training are employed three months after receiving job training.

Output: Annually provide job training and job search assistance to 1 million welfare recipients within two months of their initial receipt of welfare assistance.

Input: $300 million in appropriations

Impact: Job training increases the employment rate of welfare recipients from 30 percent (the employment level of comparable welfare recipients who did not receive job training) to 40 percent (the employment rate of those welfare recipients who did receive job training).

II. Complexities of Measurement

FUNCTIONAL AREAS. Some types of programs or activities are particularly difficult to measure.

- Basic Research, because often:
  - likely outcomes are not calculable (can't be quantified) in advance;
  - knowledge gained is not always of immediate value or application
  - results are more serendipitous than predictable;
  - there is a high percentage of negative determinations or findings;
  - the unknown cannot be measured.
  - (Applied research, applied technology, or the "D" in R&D is more readily measurable because it usually is directed toward a specific goal or end.)

- Foreign Affairs, especially for outcomes, to the extent that:
  - the leaders and electorate of other nations properly act in their own national interest, which may differ from those of the United States (e.g., Free Territory of Memel does not agree with US policy goal of reducing US annual trade deficit with Memel to $1 billion);

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- US objectives are stated as policy principles, recognizing the impracticality of their universal achievement;
- goal achievement relies mainly on actions by other countries (e.g., by 1999, Mayaland will reduce the volume of illegal opiates being transhipped through Mayaland to the US by 65 percent from current levels of 1250 metric tons).

- Policy Advice, because often:
  - it is difficult to calculate the quality or value of the advice;
  - advice consists of presenting competing views by different parties with different perspectives;
  - policy advice may be at odds with the practicalities of political advice.

- Block Grants, to the extent that:
  - funds are not targeted to particular programs or purposes;
  - the recipient has great latitude or choice in how the money will be spent;
  - there is little reporting on what the funds were used for or what was accomplished.

BY TYPE OF MEASURE. Some measures are harder to measure than others. Some of the difficulties include:

- For outcome, output, and impact measures
  - Direct Federal accountability is lessened because non-Federal parties (other than those under a procurement contract) are responsible for the administration or operation of the program.
  - The magnitude and/or intrusiveness of performance reporting burden.
  - The nature and extent of performance validation or verification requires a substantial effort.
  - Individual accountability or responsibility is diffuse.

- For outcome measures
  - Timetable or dates for achievement may be sporadic.
  - Achievement often lags by several years or more after the funds are spent.
  - Results frequently are not immediately evident, and can be determined only through a formal program evaluation.
  - Accomplishment is interrupted because of intervening factors, changes in priorities, etc.
  - Changing basepoints can impede achievement (e.g., recalculation of eligible beneficiaries).
  - Achievement depends on a major change in public behavior.
  - The outcome is for a cross-agency program or policy, and assigning relative contributions or responsibilities to individual agencies is a complex undertaking.

- **For output measures**
  - Equal-appearing outputs are not always equal (e.g., the time and cost of overhauling one type of jet engine can be very different from another type of jet engine).
  - It may be difficult to weight outputs to allow different (but similar appearing) outputs to be combined in a larger aggregate.
  - Many efficiency and effectiveness measures depend on agencies having cost accounting systems and capability to allocate and cumulate costs on a unit basis.

- **For impact measures**
  - Impacts are often difficult to measure.
  - A large number of other variables or factors contribute to or affect the impact, and which can be difficult to separate out when determining causality.
  - Federal funding or Federal program efforts are of secondary or even more marginal significance to the achieved outcome.
  - Determining the impact can be very expensive, and not commensurate with the value received from a policy or political standpoint.
  - Holding a manager accountable for impacts can be a formidable challenge.

- **For input measures**
  - The measurement itself should not be complicated, but the alignment of inputs with outputs can be difficult.

III. Emphasized Measures in GPRA

A. GPRA emphasizes the use and reporting of performance measures that managers use to manage. There are several reasons for this emphasis:

- GPRA increases the accountability of managers for producing results.

- Underscoring that these measures are central to an agency's capacity and approach for administering programs and conducting operations, and, because of this, the amount of additional resources to develop and improve performance measurement and reporting systems should be rather limited.
  - -- The conundrum is that agencies requesting large amounts of additional resources would be conceding either that their programs were not being managed, or were being managed using an inappropriate or poor set of measures.

B. As output measures are more readily and easily developed than outcome measures, more of these are expected initially in the GPRA-required performance plans, but agencies should move toward increasing the number and quality of outcome measures.

IV. Selected Examples of Various Types of Performance Measures

Please Note: For the purpose of these examples:

- Some of the outcome measures are much more narrowly defined than would otherwise be appropriate or expected.
- Some of the outcome measures are not inherently measurable, and would require use of supplementary performance indicators to set specific performance targets and determine whether these were achieved.
- Some measures include several aspects of performance. Italics are used to feature the particular characteristic of that example.
- Many of the examples of output measures are process or attribute measures.

Workload (Not otherwise categorized)

Output: Annually *inspect* 3200 grain elevators.

Outcome: Through *periodic* grain elevator *inspection*, reduce the incidence of grain dust explosions resulting in catastrophic loss or fatalities to zero.

Production

Output: *Manufacture and deliver* 35,000 rounds of armor-piercing 120mm projectiles shells in FY 1997.

Outcome: *Produce sufficient* 120 mm armor-piercing *projectiles* to achieve a 60 day combat use supply level by 1999 for all Army and Marine Corps tank battalions.

Transactions

Output: *Process* 3.75 million payment *vouchers* in FY 1995.

Outcome: *Ensure* that 99.25 percent of *payment vouchers are paid* within 30 days of receipt.

Records

Output: *Update* earnings *records* for 45 million employee contributors to Social Security Trust Fund.

Outcome: *Ensure* that all earnings *records are posted and current* within 60 days of the end of the previous quarter.

Utilization rates

Output: *Operate* all tactical fighter aircraft simulator training *facilities at not less than 85 percent of rated capacity.*

Outcome: *Ensure* that all active duty tactical fighter aircraft *pilots* are fully qualified having *received a minimum of 32 hours of simulator training* and flown 400 hours in the previous 12 months.

Frequency rates

Output: *Issue* 90 day national temperature and precipitation forecasts *every six weeks*.

Outcome: *Provide* users of meteorological forecasts with *advance information sufficiently updated to be useful* for agricultural, utility, and transportation planning.

Timeliness

Response times

Output: Adjudicative *decision* on all claim disallowances will be *made within 120 days* of appeal hearings.

Outcome: *Provide* every claimant with *timely* dispositive *determination* on claims filed.

Adherence to schedule

Output: *Operate* 95 percent of all passenger trains *within 10 minutes of scheduled arrival times.*

Outcome: *Provide* rail *passengers* with reliable and *predictable* train *service.*

Out-of-service conditions

Output: All Corps of Engineer *locks* on river basin x shall be *operational during at least 22 of every consecutive 24 hours.*

Outcome: *Ensure no significant delays* in traffic transiting through river basin x.

Defect rates

Output: *Not more than 1.25 percent* of 120 mm armorpiercing projectiles shall be *rejected as defective.*

Outcome: *No armor-piercing ammunition projectiles* fired in combat *shall fail to explode* on impact.

Mean Failure rates

Output: *Premature* space Shuttle main engine *shutdown shall not occur more than once in every 200 flight cycles.*

Outcome: Space Shuttle shall be maintained and operated so that *99.95 percent of all flights safely reach orbit.*

Accuracy

Output: The *position of 300,000 navigational buoys shall be checked monthly.*

Outcome: *All navigational buoys shall be maintained within 5 meters of the charted position.*

Inventory fill

Output: *Store* a minimum of 3.5 million barrels of *petroleum* stock.

Outcome: Petroleum *stocks* shall be maintained at a level sufficient to *provide a 60 day supply* at normal daily drawdown.

Complaints

Output: Not more than *2.5 percent* of individuals seeking information *will subsequently re-request* the same information *because the initial response was unsatisfactory.*

Outcome: *99 percent* of all requests for information *will be satisfactorily handled with the initial response.*

Customer Satisfaction Levels (Output and outcome measures may often be indistinguishable.)

Output: *In 1998,* at least *75 percent* of individuals receiving a service *will rate the service delivery as good to excellent.*

Outcome: At least *90 percent* of recipients will *rate the service delivery* as good to excellent.

Efficiency

Output: Annual transaction costs/production costs/delivery of service costs projected on a per unit basis. *Produce* 35,000 rounds of armor-piercing *ammunition at a cost of $17.75 per round.*

Outcome: (Not commonly measured as an outcome.)

Milestone and activity schedules

Output: *Complete 85 percent of required flight-worthiness testing* for Z-2000 bomber *by July 30, 1999.*

Outcome: The Z-2000 *bomber* will be flight-certified and *operational by December 1, 2000.*

Design Specifications

Output: Imaging *cameras* on Generation X observational satellite will have *resolution of 0.1 arc second.*

Outcome: Generation X observational satellite will successfully map 100 percent terrain of six Jovian moons to a resolution of 100 meters.

Status of conditions

Output: In 1995, *repair and maintain 1,400 pavement miles* of Federally-owned highways *to a rating of "good".*

Outcome: By 2000, *35 percent of all Federally-owned highway pavement miles* shall be *rated as* being in *good condition.*

Percentage coverage

Output: Provide *doses of vaccine to 27,000 pre-school children* living on tribal reservations.

Outcome: *100 percent* of children living on tribal reservations will be *fully immunized* before beginning school.

Effectiveness

Output: *Not more than 7,000 in-patients* in military hospitals will be readmitted, post discharge, for further treatment of the same diagnosed illness at the time of initial admission.

Outcome: *Initial treatment* will be therapeutically *successful for 85 percent* of all hospital admissions.

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Performance Measurement

Lessons Learned



prepared for AID/CDIE and MSI
under the PRISM contract

Research Triangle Institute

Thomas J. Cook **Jerry VanSant**

Leslie Stewart **Jamie Adrian**

May 10, 1993

RTI

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INTRODUCTION

This report represents a continuation of work begun by RTI to help A.I.D.'s Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) review major program themes and associated indicator selection. That review was designed to support meaningful reporting of A.I.D. program performance to the Administrator and, through the Administrator, to Congress.[1]

Initially, the purpose of this task was to develop materials for a CDIE/PRISM Performance Indicators Conference. The materials were to include a compendium of performance indicators used by international development agencies other than A.I.D. and an analysis of the uses of performance indicators for program management and evaluation.

Subsequently, the scopes of both the Indicators Conference and this task were broadened by CDIE to embrace an *Information Use* focus. The purpose of the Conference now is "to develop a shared understanding of actual and intended use of program performance information throughout A.I.D., and the implications of these uses for data collection and analysis."

Among the Conference emphases to which we intend this paper to contribute is "exploring efficient and effective ways to increase the ability and likelihood of using performance information to manage for results throughout the agency." Our particular intent is to explore how other organizations in the U.S. domestic public sector as well as other international organizations manage the use of performance information and the data collection and analysis needed to support that use. Understanding "best practices" in the actual and potential use of program performance information by other organizations may offer practical ideas of benefit to A.I.D. in its effort to "manage for results." A companion study in preparation by Joy Larson of CDIE is looking at how various offices *within* A.I.D. are developing and using performance information.

In this report, we have organized our findings into three major sections. Section I addresses the mandate for performance measurement and its potential role in development management.

Section II looks at the uses and limits of a performance measurement system and at factors that constrain or promote effective use. This section also examines key steps in implementing a performance measurement system at A.I.D.

Section III summarizes key lessons from performance measurement and actions that A.I.D. might take to implement a performance measurement system.

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[1] This paper and the previous work have been funded by the A.I.D. project, Program Information for Strategic Management (PRISM), for which RTI is a subcontractor to Management Systems International (MSI). The views expressed, however, are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of A.I.D. or of MSI.

I. THE NEED FOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

A. The Performance Management Mandate

There is increasing recognition that, at all levels of government, effective, performance-oriented program management is needed—management that focuses on program quality and on the results achieved using public resources (Wholey & Hatry, 1992, p. 604).

Current legislation before Congress (S.20, *the Government Performance and Results Act of 1992*, introduced by Senator Roth; see U.S. Congress, 1991) would require each federal agency to establish a performance standards and goals plan and report for each major budget expenditure category. In support of this legislation, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) proposed several actions (a) to support the Congressional intent and (b) to pursue the GAO's own Federal Sector Management objective to develop better measures of agency performance (Britan, 1991).

Considerable investigation and activity has followed, undertaken by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), GAO, the Department of the Treasury, and other federal government agencies, some of which have begun to develop performance monitoring systems. Meanwhile, innovations at the state and local government level have triggered a number of enthusiastic reports, including the widely noted *Reinventing Government.* The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), a Congressionally chartered nonprofit organization, has created the Alliance for Redesigning Government to tie together efforts at the federal, state, and local levels. NAPA is also conducting pilot projects with federal agencies to develop performance measures at both the program and agency level. Annex 1 to this report summarizes the recent history of performance measurement in the U.S. federal government. Suffice it to say here that performance measurement is a timely topic for A.I.D. to consider and that there is a limited, but substantial, body of evidence from other agencies to draw on in making application to A.I.D.'s needs.

In recent years, A.I.D. has come under GAO criticism for "serious and longstanding accountability and control problems." The President's Commission on the Management of A.I.D. Programs (the Ferris Commission) recommended that A.I.D. "install a performance management system that links Agency objectives, annual employee work plans or 'contracts' and employee evaluations." Senior A.I.D. management is committed to addressing these and related concerns. The PRISM initiative is a major avenue of progress in this regard. Setting goals and defining program outcomes, identifying indicators to measure goal and outcome achievement, and documenting progress represent appropriate steps toward "managing for results." Continued application of performance measurement requires even greater emphasis on having managers ensure that results are measured and monitored, and that this information is *used.*

This direction has been affirmed by A.I.D. Administrator-designate J. Brian Atwood who, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 1993 stated:

> It will not be business as usual for A.I.D. if I am confirmed. The changes I will be proposing will be radical departures from past practices....I want the people of A.I.D. to take risks in an effort to produce results....I want them to be recognized and rewarded for

the results they produce; and I want them to know they will have a role in defining the way we will measure "results." I am going to propose the entire Agency for International Development as a reinvention lab.

There are particular challenges to successful performance management at A.I.D. Compared to the private sector or even to most public sector agencies, A.I.D. is characterized both by extraordinary program breadth and by the difficulty of measuring client satisfaction. Indeed, it is an enigmatic task even to define who A.I.D.'s clients are—taxpayers, Congress, host country governments, or program beneficiaries.

This report supports A.I.D.'s commitment to performance measurement by exploring lessons learned in other agencies and their potential application to A.I.D.

B. Summary Description of a Performance Measurement System

1. Structure and Uses

Designing the System

Planners must consider carefully how to design a performance measurement system for any given agency or unit. They should keep in mind that it cannot be put in place overnight, and it cannot just be a replica of another organization's performance measurement system. Instead, it must evolve through continuous refinement. Other points to consider: (a) If the information generated is to be useful and pertinent, the objectives of the program must be carefully defined at the outset. (b) Each system should be user-oriented, but the users and the uses will vary, even within a single organizational unit. (c) The system should be capable of measuring quality and results periodically over time.

Specific Uses

Effective performance measurement systems have a number of specific applications. They are used to formulate budgets, allocate resources, motivate employees, improve services, and facilitate information exchange between citizens and government. Performance measurement can also help improve credibility and secure resources necessary to maintain and enhance programs. It should be used for self-assessment and improvement, not simply auditing and monitoring. Similarly, it should focus on how to improve the program, not dwell excessively on individual job performance.

Performance measurement does **not** effectively estimate the extent to which programs cause observed outcomes. It does not help evaluate the effectiveness of policies or programs, measure linkages, or draw conclusions about cause and effect. On the other hand, performance measurement does realistically estimate expected program outcomes and generally should compare the performance of different units, compare current performance with prior performance, or compare actual results to targeted performance levels (Wholey & Hatry, 1992, p. 605).

Performance measurement enables an organization to judge its own effectiveness in achieving goals and objectives, managing products and services, and obtaining product/service results (customer satisfaction). It is closely linked to efforts to make strategic plans, clarify organizational goals and objectives, characterize decision-making needs, and analyze managers' needs for information.

Focus on Results

Development programs require timely and quality information on their performance and impact. Most reports on development program performance, however, continue to focus on the amount of resources expended and the quantity of services delivered rather than the quality of services provided and the results achieved. As a counterbalance, performance measurement "focuses on program quality and on the results achieved through the use of tax dollars and other public resources" (Wholey & Hatry, 1992, p. 604). Performance measurement asks "What happened?" and "Are outcomes equal to desired results?" It is mainly limited to "end points"—that is, results. It does not answer "Why?" or "What can I do to bring about the results I desire?"

2. Users of the System

Program Managers

The major beneficiaries of performance measurement information should be program managers. Performance measurement should help them understand why their programs are succeeding or failing so that they can modify aspects that will improve program performance. It should enable them to monitor ongoing program performance so that they can learn, improvise, and modify (as necessary) the implementation. Performance measurement flags potential management problems when the indicators do not track in the desired direction. It also can encourage managers to take initiative and to be accountable, and can help clarify for them the expectations and requirements of policy makers.

If the system is to help managers in these ways, however, it requires the participation of decision makers at all levels of the organization. Performance measurement is not "micro-management" but a method for focusing the efforts of managers at all levels on the factors critical to implementing programs successfully. Performance measurement therefore must be consistently defined across all levels of management if it is to be used effectively.

Policy and Decision Makers

Key stakeholders in a program's performance measurement system are the people who decide whether the program can be improved, or even whether it has value and should continue. In this context, performance measurement may best be defined as "the periodic measurement of progress toward explicit short- and long-run objectives and the reporting of the results to decision makers in an attempt to improve program performance" (Poister, 1983, p. 3). Performance measurement provides quality information to decision makers so that they can determine whether their efforts are

on course; it also can inform elected officials and citizens who are entitled to regular reports on the performance and value of programs.

3. Interaction Between Performance Measurement and Evaluation

Evaluation alone measures impacts and tells what produced them. It tells "why" and focuses on "net impacts," the impacts remaining after the influence of other variables is controlled for. Thus, it seeks to point out causal relationships.

Performance measurement includes complementary systems for both measuring performance and analyzing impact. It focuses on effectiveness and efficiency, providing feedback to decision makers. It is concerned primarily with the implementation and ongoing administration of programs, in the realm of management control and management information systems (MIS).

Joining the two in this way is a powerful management approach. In a system that uses both, performance measurement takes routine soundings on the efficacy of the program at multiple levels of management; evaluation is ready to probe deeper to explain causality, to inform policy making, and to adjust programs or to replicate them in other locations.

Key roles of and distinctions between these two complementary elements of performance management in the A.I.D. context are summarized below:

Performance Measurement	Impact Evaluation
Is implementation-oriented	Is policy-oriented
Tracks results	Explains results
Assesses intermediate (manageable) outcomes	Assesses attribution
Focuses on timeliness	Focuses on rigor
Emphasizes multiple-level results	Emphasizes final results
Strengthens accountability for managing for results	Strengthens accountability for results themselves
Informs budgeting	Informs broad resource allocation
Is essential for program implementation and improvement	Is essential for strategy development
Can use disaggregated data	May need aggregated data

The roles of performance measurement are elaborated in the discussion that follows.

C. The Role of Performance Measurement in Development Management

In a particularly uncertain and changing environment, learning from implementation activities through performance measurement is a *management* necessity if ultimate development objectives are to be achieved.

For purposes of this discussion, a *manager* is someone in a position to make key decisions or take direct action with regard to the activity under investigation. The manager's decisions or actions may affect the current project or program or related future activities. These managers need to base important judgments on good information.

Systems for monitoring and evaluation, therefore, should consider the decision requirements of the managers who must make and implement policy and achieve results through development programs and projects; the results for which they are responsible; what information they need; and when they need it. This information should, of course, be accurate but also must be timely, relevant, and, above all, usable. Unfortunately, concerns for accuracy, independence, attribution, and rigor render much development evaluation irrelevant, ill-timed, or otherwise unusable by those who are in a position to act on it (VanSant, November 1991).

A major lesson from successful experiences with performance measurement is that the link between evaluative information and project or program management should be strengthened. The most important audience for monitoring and evaluation consists of those who have the opportunity to learn from the information and apply that learning to their continuing planning or management tasks. Only in this way can the investment really make a difference for program effectiveness. Forging this linkage also ensures the ready availability of quality monitoring data to support future impact evaluations, because the data needs of the evaluation will be considered from the beginning of program design and be linked to clearly stated goals. Early linkage also forces program designers to be more explicit about what the program is going to accomplish and the role of each management level in achieving appropriate results.

As noted by Britan,

> Different programs, different objectives, different managers, and different audiences all require different kinds of performance information. Measuring program performance is, in other words, closely linked to processes of strategic planning, the clarification of organizational goals and objectives, the character of decision making needs, and the needs of managers for information (Britan, 1991, p. 3).

In this context, the most important benefits of a performance measurement system for a development agency such as A.I.D. can be the following:

- ✓ to strengthen accountability for results at project, program, field Mission, and agency levels;
- ✓ to improve the basis, quality, and relevance of Congressional oversight;
- ✓ to target limited resources to the most effective programs;
- ✓ to focus staff attention on factors critical to the success of the agency and its goals;
- ✓ to stimulate improved managerial performance at all levels;
- ✓ to introduce the discipline of relevant benchmarking at all management levels;
- ✓ to provide performance information to A.I.D. senior management and program managers so that they can gauge the success of their efforts and adjust policies and programs when needed; and
- ✓ to communicate the value of public programs to elected officials and the public and to gain resources needed to maintain and enhance program operations.

To achieve these benefits, a performance measurement plan should be derived from strategic plans, primarily at the Mission level, where the A.I.D. strategic program planning process is focused. Thus, performance measurement is closely related to the existing PRISM process, which emphasizes the clear definition of Mission goals and objectives, clearly linked program outcomes, and a systematic plan for generating program information. PRISM is especially valuable as a catalyst for overall planning and the concept of a hierarchy of objectives (objective trees). PRISM is less well-focused on measurement of results below the level of strategic objectives and broad program outcomes. It is designed to illuminate progress toward results more than progress toward managing for results. A complete performance management system for A.I.D. will need to build on PRISM but take some additional steps.

In other words, performance measures are more likely to be usable (and, therefore, used) if linked directly to A.I.D. Mission goals and objectives *as well as* the particular management results expected at each level. Moreover, an effective performance measurement system requires real managerial accountability, including real decision-making authority, the human and financial resources needed to support decisions and plans, and an adequate degree of control over contextual factors that affect achievement.

In summary, a performance management system is directly related to a "Managing for Results" approach at A.I.D. An example of the kind of focus toward which a results orientation may lead is provided in the attached text box.

What Results?

Suppose A.I.D. managers had as their immediate objective to help host governments "reinvent" themselves—in health, in family planning, in education, in agriculture, in public policy, in their own productivity. The ultimate aim would, of course, still be to affect the quality of life; but the immediate aim, for which A.I.D managers could be held accountable, would be to help establish host government agencies that work. This approach focuses management attention on the implementing organization and its policy environment, not on an entire sector that is affected by a myriad of factors that the A.I.D. manager and his or her counterpart cannot begin to control.

In a time of declining resource levels, reinvented government may be A.I.D.'s highest-leverage strategy if it really wishes to have an impact.

A.I.D. has many competing missions and objectives, internally and externally imposed. An advantage of a core "good governance" mission is that there is likely to be less contradiction between this mission and more political ones imposed by external stakeholders. A large part of A.I.D.'s impact measurement problem comes from confusion of missions; a good-governance mission not only is likely to make attribution easier but also is likely to result in less contradiction between the "substantive" missions and the political missions.

In this context, an A.I.D. manager would, for example:

- engage in entrepreneurial activities such as establishing collaboration among public, private, and third-sector entities to deliver services and create value;
- analyze, with counterparts, the question of how they can solve problems and achieve results;
- establish process analysis activities to specify what processes are critical for results;
- gather benchmark information, such as the time required to accomplish certain administrative procedures;
- use performance information to manage programs and be evaluated on that use (and not necessarily on the impact of the programs); and
- gather cost information on relevant processes.

(Adapted from internal discussion among RTI staff Maureen Norton, Luis Crouch, and Jerry VanSant. These ideas will be expanded in a forthcoming RTI Center for International Development Staff Working Paper, A.I.D. as an Entrepreneurial Agency that Manages for Results.)

II. THE USE OF A PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM

A. Users and Stakeholders of a Performance Measurement System

Exhibit 1 shows examples of stakeholders at various levels of a hierarchy in both the public and private sectors, along with the kinds of performance information they might need. Note that each level requires the next level down to provide the information it seeks, and that each requires data on outcomes for its own area of responsibility.

The ***"public"*** is at both the top and the bottom of the hierarchy. Clients and citizens may overlap somewhat but not completely. The private sector has conflicting constituencies in serving both stockholders and consumers; the public sector similarly answers to both taxpayers and service recipients. Citizens are the ones with a voice in driving performance measurement, and clients are the ones who would benefit directly from service improvement or expansion. Clients may also include recipients of other related services that may be affected by changes in the program in question. Information as well as perceptions about program performance inform clients' choices about type and level of service utilization.

Oversight agencies such as Congress and OMB want to know whether the goals of each agency have been achieved and at what cost. They are answering to the taxpayers, who want to be assured that the programs they pay for are effective in doing what they were designed to do.

Top management's critical role is in communicating agency strategy to all stakeholders and actively supporting performance measurement consistent with that strategy. In addition, top management is the key interface with oversight bodies such as Congress and therefore needs to have and report information on overall program performance.

The role of the ***department head*** in a performance management system is to set and communicate policy on the performance monitoring process, as well as to review and comment on performance reports from each program. A good performance measurement system enables top and unit-level administrators to spot trends, target evaluation resources effectively, and plot long-term strategy.

The four main uses department heads have for performance data are as follows (Hatry et al., 1990):

- to help develop and improve division and development programs and policies, such as which types of clients in which sectors are being served;
- to hold program managers accountable for using performance information;
- to motivate program managers to improve program performance; and
- to help design policies and budgets and justify them to oversight bodies.

Exhibit 1

Hierarchy of Stakeholders for Performance Measurement Information

Stakeholder Type	Public Sector/Private Sector Examples	Performance Data Needed
Citizens	Taxpayers, advocacy groups, political leaders, media Consumers, stockholders	Evidence that overall program works and is cost-effective
Oversight agencies	OMB, GAO, Inspectors General, Congressional Committees, Boards of Directors	Overall program impacts and costs
Top management	Cabinet Secretaries, Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), CFOs	Agencywide outcomes/results, costs, efficiency, unit comparisons
Unit management	Bureau Chiefs, Division Directors Vice-Presidents, Headquarters Executives	Unit performance: outcome and financial, efficiency
Program management	Program Managers, Mission Directors Product Managers, Field Operations Managers	Program performance: outcome and process, efficiency, quality
Project management	Project Managers and/or Contractors Field and Line Staff Managers	Project implementation (strategic) Service quality, timeliness, client satisfaction
Project staff	Teachers, health care workers, roadbuilders, planners Assemblers, packagers, drivers, customer service representatives	Project implementation (tactical) Client needs/satisfaction, timeliness
Clients	People in need of food, shelter, employment, education, health care, transportation, safety, etc. Consumers of private goods and services	Information to guide choice and utilization of services

The *program manager* is the primary user of performance information and, therefore, the person with the most critical role in (a) determining what the performance measures should be and (b) setting program targets, ideally by communicating with clients and project staff about their needs and preferences. Each program should also devise data collection procedures, analysis parameters, and report formats. As the persons with the most at stake in performance management, program managers must be directly involved in designing the accountability system as well, including the dissemination plan for reports.

As performance data are reported, program managers are involved in using them in the following ways (Hatry et al., 1990):

- identifying program aspects that have and have not produced satisfactory results, and then in allocating resources;
- examining trends over time and adjusting programs or policies as needed;
- motivating program employees by meeting with them to discuss what each performance report shows (and what it does not show);
- developing and then justifying program plans and budget requests;
- setting program targets for performance indicators for future periods; and
- identifying areas of activity that need more detailed analysis or evaluation.

Especially if performance data are broadly reported and/or used in making resource decisions, ***service providers*** at the project level have an incentive to improve performance (or at least to manage the selected indicators) and should be involved in setting performance measures for—and interpreting them to—others in the organization.

The potentially adversarial relationships among stakeholders at various levels within a hierarchy, and therefore their different roles in performance measurement use are well-known. In addition, managers at similar levels with different functional or professional orientations may have different interests for performance measurement. Several of the officials we interviewed mentioned such other divisions as executive branch vs. legislative branch, "program people" vs. "financial people," agency staff vs. "performance measurers," and evaluation/policy analysis people vs. management information system people. Specific insights about the roles for performance measurement included: "Program people should be responsible for the design of performance measures, with financial people only facilitating the dialogue and reporting"; and "MIS people don't do analysis. You need policy analysis/evaluation people to do that; MIS folks just get the data and put it in the computer."

Although private sector officials advised against creating a measurement bureaucracy, some public organizations have benefitted from having a ***central analysis office*** whose role is to establish a schedule for the process, collect data, prepare tabulations for program managers, and ensure data quality and confidentiality.

B. Uses of Performance Measurement: What It Can Do

There is no dearth of arguments for the importance of performance measurement in strategic management. As Cannon and Fry of the National Accounting Office of the United Kingdom quip: "what gets measured gets managed" (Cannon & Fry, 1992, p.3). It is simply good management practice to find out how well you are doing and to use this information for program planning, implementation, and improvement. A key assumption of this argument, of course, is that performance measurement makes such good sense that if the tools to do it are available, they will be used: "If you build it, they will come."

Our survey of non-A.I.D. agencies, however, found that the documented use of performance information in development management is rare. We found several examples of performance measurement systems in the process of being developed, such as at the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme, but few concrete examples of managers routinely using performance information—especially information on program results—to manage programs. This finding agrees with a recent assessment from the National Accounting Office of the United Kingdom:

> ...it is clear from research that public sector performance measurement is still very much in an evolutionary state. Thus, there are few countries that could justly claim to use performance measurement consistently as a tool for making policy and operating decisions and for improving public sector management practice" (Cannon & Fry, 1992, p.1).

In fact, getting managers to actually use performance data to manage their programs was cited by virtually everyone interviewed as the major challenge—or weakness—of the performance measurement process. As one seasoned analyst observed, "developing performance indicators is a sideshow to the main issue—how do you get good people in positions who really want to manage and will use performance data?"

This finding may reflect the general pattern of utilization found in evaluation research. Contrary to earlier indictments of program evaluation that it was at best ignored, current thinking has broadened considerably:

> Today, the concept of use encompasses evaluations constituting decisions, playing a joint role in constituting decisions, being cited in debates, being used in in-service training of professionals, being used in educating future practitioners, and being used to reconceptualize social programs and problems. The agent of influence is no longer a single evaluation report presented to formal decision makers (Shadish, Cook, and Leviton, 1991, pp. 450-451).

Perhaps the use of performance measurement in development management is similarly diffused and indirect. This would not be surprising given the fact that managers at different levels of an agency have different responsibilities, information needs, and capacities to use performance information. Moreover, since one agency-wide set of performance indicators is unlikely to be equally useful to all managers (Britan, 1991, p. 3), other influences and information will compete for attention in the decision process.

While Harry Hatry may be right in asserting in our interview with him that there is "no clear pattern of use," our review of agency reports, published articles, and conversations with a variety of managers uncovered a plethora of recommended uses for performance data. Most of these suggestions come from U.S. domestic agency experience, but there were also several examples from development agencies located in the U.S. and overseas. The various categories of use are listed in Exhibit 2.

Exhibit 2

Potential Uses of Performance Information for Development Management

✓ Strategic Planning	✓ Program Improvement
✓ Performance Accounting	✓ Program Marketing
✓ Performance Forecasting	✓ Benchmarking
✓ Early Warning	✓ Performance Incentives
✓ Program Implementation	✓ Quality Management
✓ Program Results	✓ Performance Contracting
✓ Program Accountability	

The use for ***strategic planning*** emphasized clarification of program goals and objectives and the "logic" of the program. The process of thinking about performance measurement as part of the strategic planning process forces greater specificity and attention to critical program assumptions about relationships and causal paths. There was also an emphasis on building performance measurement into program design rather than having it added later as a compliance requirement that engenders little enthusiasm.

Performance data can inform resource allocation decisions. Several of those interviewed stressed the importance of making ***performance accounting*** an integral part of the budget process. Managers would have to account for expected program results in their budget requests and justifications. One popular notion is to use performance data as a means to shift scarce budget resources to more "productive" (i.e., greater payoff) areas. The danger of this strategy, as we point out in the next section of this report, is to shift prematurely before a program has had sufficient time to reach its promise.

Performance forecasting and ***early warning*** complement each other. Performance forecasting looks for trends in performance indicators promising future performance that could be used for planning. For example, a strong increasing trend in immunizations may suggest a decreased future need for primary care services. The early warning is a signal that something either needs to be looked at

more closely or requires immediate action. The early warning signal may also suggest a way to improve a program, as when it reveals a breakdown in service delivery operations.

Performance data can guide ***program implementation***. Timely data on the organization and efficiency of service delivery processes is critical for keeping the program moving forward in the right direction and for making needed in-course corrections. Service coverage data, for example, may reveal that program services are missing the intended target population (e.g., low-income families). This would be an example, as well, of the use of performance data for ***program improvement***. The data can be an effective tool both for identifying areas needing improvement and for suggesting what should be done. In the example of low-income families, the data showing them being overlooked by the program may also argue for (a) more extensive outreach to get them into services and (b) potent incentives (e.g., food coupons) to keep them returning.

Program results stress measuring what a program has achieved, not just what it has done. Program impacts can be compared to performance in other units, prior performance, or targeted performance levels. The results data may also be used for ***accountability*** purposes, to discover if the program is accomplishing its mandated goals and objectives. The accountability analysis may be extended to program coverage, service delivery, fiscal integrity, and legal compliance.

Program marketing is an extension of "program results" to satisfy external audiences. The performance data can be used to communicate the value of a program to elected officials and the public, in search of support. In addition to gaining resources for the program, some cite this tactic as an effective way to strengthen public confidence in government programs. The obvious danger here is "overselling" a program by claiming results stretched far beyond the data.

Benchmarking was cited as a way to improve programs by "learning from success." Comparative performance data from different units delivering the same services (e.g., schools, sanitation crews) can be used to identify good performers and learn from their experience to improve the performance of the other units.

Several sources noted the potential for performance measurement to create ***performance incentives*** for managers by tying their use of performance measurement for program management to their pay raises. Managers would be held accountable for obtaining and using performance data to understand why their programs are succeeding or failing. A manager may not be penalized for a breakdown in program implementation; on the other hand, she or he could legitimately be cited for failing to anticipate implementation failures through the routine use of performance data that tracked progress and flagged serious problems.

The incentives idea has been extended by some to include service delivery competition. Under this scheme, comparative performance measures could be used to determine which units were more efficient or effective and the units could then be rewarded accordingly. The perils of this approach are discussed in the next section, under potential misuses of performance measurement.

Quality management stresses customer satisfaction as a key performance indicator. Several interviewees suggested collecting information from intended program beneficiaries both as a way to

find out if and how the program is improving their lives and to obtain clues for program improvement.

Finally, it was suggested that performance measures could be used in ***performance contracting,*** serving as "performance standards" for agency contractors. These standards would be built into contracts for services and contractors would be held to agreed-upon performance levels. This type of arrangement would have to be carefully monitored to avoid the threat of corrupted data.

C. Misuses of Performance Measurement: What It Can't Do

Our survey of performance measurement practice also turned up some potential misuses of performance measurement data that could weaken their utility as a means to strengthen development management and improve public sector programs. These issues are presented in Exhibit 3.

Exhibit 3

Potential Misuses of Performance Information

- ✓ Reaching for Causal Relationships
- ✓ Rushing to Measure
- ✓ Reliance on the Easy-to-Measure
- ✓ Mega-Indicators
- ✓ Naive Comparisons
- ✓ Big Stick Approach

Performance measurement is not a substitute for a rigorous evaluation designed to estimate program impacts and tell why they occurred. As Wholey and Hatry point out, "Performance monitoring systems generally do not provide information on 'causality,' nor are they intended to" (Wholey & Hatry, 1992, p. 608). Users of performance data need to be alert to their inherent limitations, such as the lack of valid comparison conditions and mis-specification of other influencing variables in the program setting. They need to resist ***reaching for causal relationships*** with performance data alone. On the other hand, when it is coupled with a strong evaluation design, performance monitoring is a powerful means to track and understand program results.

Development projects generally have a maturation period before they can produce results. The program "theory" should pinpoint the length of that period, and help calibrate the performance measurement process so that information can be collected at the appropriate time. ***Rushing to***

measure through premature data collection and interpretation will only mislead by undervaluing the program's accomplishments.

There is always the temptation to use data that is the least costly to collect. But cost-effective data collection is not synonymous with cheap data collection. Cost-effective data are the best data at the lowest cost. One person we interviewed said that his agency was only using data they could collect without any staff burden; he perceived that agency staff simply would not provide any data for performance measurement. But are these data worth collecting, regardless of the cost? As several sources point out, cost is only one criterion. Many others are equally important, such as reliability, accuracy, timeliness, and security. Obsession with cost alone may produce data that no one will believe or pay attention to.

The ***mega-indicator*** problem follows from the "one size fits all" approach to performance measurement. Several people cautioned against assuming that a whole agency could be characterized by a handful of highly aggregated indicators. Yorke (1991) cautions persuasively that the performance measurement system has to take into account the information needs of managers at different levels of the agency. The managers will be most sensitive to measures that directly relate to their level and likely pay little attention to those measures more distant from their management responsibilities. Similarly, one agency cannot simply adopt the performance measures of another agency; the measures appropriate for an agency must reflect directly that agency's unique mission, objectives, and organizational structure.

The ***naive comparison*** problem is fairly obvious. It results from the weak, generally unsupported assumption that all programs bearing the same label (e.g., child survival, policy reform, democratic initiatives) are the same and, therefore, can be readily compared to one another. A variant of this belief is that all countries in the same region can be compared directly. The problem, of course, is that the uncritical comparisons completely ignore the contextual factors that make countries unique and different and that influence program effectiveness.

One of the most common criticisms of performance measurement is its use to punish programs or staff for sub-par results. Many claim that this ***"big stick"*** approach is the main cause of resistance to performance measurement. In this approach, the whole exercise is cast in the negative, as a search for evidence to downgrade the program and staff; rather like a surprise visit from *60 Minutes*. No wonder there is so much legitimate concern for the corruptibility of performance data under conditions where these data may determine program survival. One way to offset potential negativity in the process is to encourage managers to provide detailed explanatory information along with the performance data. This will enable them to place the data within the context of the program's unique operating environment and offer reasons for the observed results.

D. Factors Promoting the Effective Use of Performance Measurement

As suggested earlier, we found plenty of guidance for how to promote the use of performance data in development management. In addition to our interviews and reviews of agency reports and articles, we found several helpful suggestions in the evaluation research literature, including empirical studies on utilization of evaluation research.

For presentation here, we organized these suggestions into four categories of influences that could affect the eventual use of performance data: the agency environment, the characteristics of the potential data users, the data production process, and the characteristics of the data. These four categories are displayed in Exhibit 4.

Exhibit 4

Categories of Influence Affecting the Use of Performance Data

Agency Environment

- Integration into agency strategic plan
- Early, visible senior management support
- Demand-driven performance measurement
- Understanding of the purpose of performance measurement
- Link between data and decisions (budget, program)
- Performance information broker
- Performance feedback

Data Users

- Skills and resources (time, staff, budget)
- Management responsibilities
- Positive incentives

Data Production

- Total agency involvement
- No measurement bureaucracy
- Standard definitions
- Cost-effectiveness
- Data quality control (data audits)
- Routine review and improvement

Data Characteristics

Results focus
Limitation to a few key areas
Relevance
Timeliness (on time, enough time)
Credibility
Minimal data burden
Absence of threat

It is critical that the performance measurement be viewed by managers as an integral part of the agency's mission and strategic plan. Often it is not; instead, it is seen as an adjunct to the plan, in the same way that evaluation is seen as a requirement to be satisfied after the more important work of running the program is done. This requirement presumes, of course, that the plan's strategic objectives (a) are meaningful relative to what the agency is actually trying to accomplish and (b) are expressed with sufficient precision to allow assessment of whether they are being achieved.

Performance measurement should be built into program and project design so that questions about performance measures will be asked along with questions about program content. It also requires senior agency management support, at the program design stage and forward. The most visible way for this support to occur is for senior managers to be actively involved in the design of the performance measurement system instead of passing this task off to lower levels of the agency and then remaining aloof from the process.

Senior managers can also make sure there is a clear understanding throughout the agency of the purpose of performance measurement, the reasons it is critical to the agency mission and strategic objectives, and the planned uses of the data for management decisionmaking at all levels of the agency.

The emphasis on agency-wide use can be strengthened by creating a demand for performance data rather than simply assuming that if they are available, they will be used. Not so, say the experts: there has to be a direct link between data and decisions. Managers throughout the agency have to believe in the value of routinely using performance data to manage their programs and projects and, moreover, accept that their performance as managers will be evaluated in large part on this basis.

Another potentially important way to promote use is by having an *information broker* in the agency. The broker would be a repository of agency information on performance data and would make sure that the data are readily available to managers when they need them. The broker can also promote feedback of performance results to program staff, especially those that may have been involved in generating the data. One of the most frequent complaints from staff is that "we send off the data we are told to collect and never hear what happened to it." The information broker could document the use of performance data and communicate back to the data producers to strengthen their commitment to providing good data.

One of the weakest assumptions of performance measurement is that development managers know how to use performance data to manage their programs. Various sources pointed out that insufficient experience, training, and resources (e.g., time, budget) of managers often greatly constrain their effective use of performance data. Many need intensive training and other technical assistance (e.g., software) to make good use of the data. Others simply do not have the time or staff resources to use the information. That is why several of the people interviewed cautioned that successful installation of a performance measurement system in an agency is, at minimum, a 3- to 5-year process that entails considerable group facilitation, negotiation, and training.

As we pointed out in the previous section, performance measurement should be keyed to the different levels of the agency so that managers have access to information directly relevant to their immediate management responsibilities. This advice presumes that a manager has more incentive to deal with matters over which he or she has some degree of direct control. The manager of a water purification project, for example, is likely to be more interested in the "gallons of water treated per day" than with how this project is part of an "infrastructure development" program that, in theory, contributes to country-wide economic development.

We also noted earlier the importance of positive incentives. It was frequently mentioned that *managers should be evaluated for their use of performance information to manage their programs, and not necessarily for the actual results of the programs.* This argument assumes that they may have little direct control over results, but surely can develop and use performance data to document what the program is doing and how well it is progressing toward its objectives. These positive incentives can focus on reinforcing the use of good management practices.

Many of the points in Exhibit 4 relevant to data production stress the need to involve the total agency instead of having upper levels of management delegate the responsibility to some lower level, merely as a bureaucratic home for it. For example, the private sector's strongest recommendation to the federal government was "don't create a measurement bureaucracy." All affected managers must be involved.

A concern was expressed by some respondants that those responsible for producing the data may have little contact with those responsible for using the data. This situation is more serious the higher up the agency one goes, where senior management may have no direct contact with staff who are both defining performance indicators and generating the data for them. This disconnection results in data users who do not fully understand what is behind the numbers they are given to use, and data producers who have little appreciation for the management issues facing senior managers for which performance data would be useful.

With tightened agency budgets, it is important that managers view the data production process as cost-effective, providing the best information for the least cost. As examples, costs can be limited by using existing data whenever appropriate and by employing creative sampling strategies. A complementary incentive is the managers' perception that the direct benefits to them in using performance data equal or surpass the cost of collection. They have to experience the benefits in better management of their programs.

Finally, a critical part of the production process that will promote use is confidence in the quality of the information. This is why every performance measurement system should have built-in data quality control checks to safeguard the reliability and accuracy of the data through routine data audits. As one senior manager cautioned, "when you create a situation where performance measures drive the system, watch out. Especially in a decentralized system, there is less direct accountability, and more room to work the numbers."

In Exhibit 4 under data characteristics, the emphasis on measuring results, not just processes, reflects the popular *Reinventing Government* argument that performance measurement should focus on what programs are accomplishing, especially the "people impacts." In other words, we know a lot about what programs are doing; we just do not know if they are doing any good. The A.I.D. admonition to "focus and concentrate" captures the point made by several sources to limit the performance analysis to a few areas that are directly relevant to the agency mission and strategic objectives. Otherwise (as noted earlier), the agency risks overloading managers with numbers that they may not have the resources or the background to use effectively.

A final, frequent recommendation is to use nonthreatening data. Simply telling managers to report data on their programs without actively involving them in the performance measurement process from the start, without explaining how and by whom the data are going to be used, and without assuring them that the data are not going to be used to evaluate them personally, is bound to be threatening. This compliance mode of measurement not only will minimize the possibility of manager "ownership," but also very likely will produce bureaucratic resistance and, worse still, lead to data corruption.

Of all of the above suggestions for promoting the use of performance measurement in development management, the two most important are (a) highly visible senior management support for the process and (b) total agency involvement in the design and implementation of the performance measurement system. These may seem like rather obvious points, but they were routinely cited as essential but missing from current A.I.D. initiatives.

E. Examples of Effective Use of Performance Measurement

Although regular, effective use of performance measurement is rare in the development management context, there are several good examples of its use in the management of U.S. local, state, and federal governments, as well as in the private sector. Exhibit 5 shows examples of how performance measurement has been applied in each of these settings. The text below describes these and other examples in further detail.

1. Local Government

U.S. local governments have used outcome-oriented performance monitoring systems for decades, especially in large urban areas. Poister and Streib (1989) note that in 1988, two-thirds of jurisdictions surveyed reported having performance monitoring systems, especially in police, fire,

Exhibit 5

Examples of the Use of Performance Measurement

Organization	Sunnyvale, California	Minnesota Trade Office	Internal Revenue Service	Ireland Social Welfare Services	General Electric Corp.
Setting	Local Government	State Government Agency	U.S. Federal Government	U.K. Federal Government	Private Corporation
Sector	All	Economic Development	Finance	Social Services	Private
Performance Users	Program managers Department heads City council	Program managers Department heads State officials Local officials	Program staff Bureau chiefs	Program staff Branch managers Senior managers	Dept. managers Top managers
Types of Use	Perf. accounting Perf. forecasting Perf. incentives Perf. contracting	Pgm. marketing Perf. forecasting Program results	Pgm. improvement Quality mgmt.	Program results and improvement Early warning Accountability	Pgm. marketing Quality mgmt. Strategic planning
Types of Data Collected	Costs Outputs Citizen satisfaction	Service quality Interim outcomes End outcomes	Service quality Outcomes	Results vs. targets Timeliness Client satisfaction	Customer satisfaction Timeliness
Results of Use	Program changes Productivity gains	Redirection of funds	Program changes	Productivity gains	Program focus

solid waste, public transportation, health, and social services. Workload or output measures were most commonly used, followed by citizen satisfaction measures; efficiency measures were less prevalent. About 30 percent of the 283 reporting jurisdictions found their monitoring systems very effective. In addition, over two-thirds of U.S. cities of 100,000 or more used financial trend monitoring and/or strategic planning (Poister & Streib, 1989).

The leader among local governments in the use of performance measurement is Sunnyvale, California. Each program area has goals, community condition indicators, objectives, and performance indicators. For example, the landscaping department might have the following measures:

Goal:	Provide and maintain attractive, healthy trees, shrubs and natural ground cover in public areas throughout the city.
Community condition indicator:	Ten percent of trees and shrubs are lost each year to drought, storms, or neglect.
Objective:	Maintain trees and shrubs in a healthy state with a loss factor of no more than 5 percent.
Performance indicator:	The percentage of trees needing replacement that are replaced within two months.

According to City Manager Tom Lewcock, Sunnyvale's city council sets policy, such as what level of service, how many units will be produced, at what unit cost. "[They do] not know how many people work for the city, nor do they really care....There is no approval process for hiring people around here; management does it" (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 145). Sunnyvale also has a bonus system for managers of units that exceed their service objectives for quality and productivity. Finally, the city has developed a four-part Municipal Performance Index that measures its effectiveness and efficiency each year and that allows it to track productivity changes over time. Between 1985 and 1990, productivity increased about 4 percent per year, and in 1990, Sunnyvale was using 35 to 45 percent fewer employees to deliver services than other cities of similar size.

2. State Government

Using performance measurement in ***state economic development programs*** was pilot-tested by the Urban Institute in Minnesota and Maryland. The system was designed to provide regular feedback on service quality and outcomes for six major program areas: business attraction, business assistance, financial assistance, tourism promotion, export promotion, and community development assistance. Each program developed a description of its scope and objectives, then determined quality, intermediate, and long-term outcome measures of progress toward these objectives. The performance measures were constructed from multiple sources of data, including program records, client surveys, state unemployment insurance data, and other explanatory data. Each program also specified how the data would be reported and disaggregated in analyses of program performance, such as by community characteristics.

Two specific examples of how performance measurement data have been used in improved management of Minnesota's economic development programs follow (Hatry et al., 1990, p. 186).

- After performance reports showed that export promotion programs were serving low numbers of nonmetropolitan businesses relative to their demand for services, the Minnesota Trade Office initiated a strategy to meet these clients' needs better.

- The Star Cities program, which provides technical assistance to local economic development agencies, used performance data to revise its program manual and to develop its annual work plan.

The *Illinois Department of Public Aid* has developed performance measures for nursing home reimbursement. It uses measures of patient satisfaction, community and family participation, and the quality of the nursing home environment in nursing homes to set ratings, which it then uses to set reimbursement levels: "a six-star rating is worth $100,000 a year more than a one-star rating" (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 139). This department used to reimburse nursing homes for Medicaid patients according to the intensity of care provided, which served as an incentive for nursing homes to keep bedridden patients rather than fostering independence as state policy intended. The new measures focus on outcomes rather than inputs. In addition, the ratings are published to allow consumers to choose nursing homes based on quality of care.

The *State of Louisiana* began in 1989 to implement a comprehensive strategic management process that integrates policy development, strategic and operational planning, budgeting, and accountability. This effort has involved redesigning systems and procedures to support the state's strategic plan as well as extensive training of agency managers. Missions, goals, objectives, and performance measures are developed in the context of a 4-year strategic planning horizon. Budgets are developed out of annual operating plans based on the strategic plan. Managers are held accountable for annual performance plans through progress review meetings with the commissioner of administration (held before agency budget requests are submitted). In 1990, the state passed a law formalizing the participation of both legislative and executive branch managers in developing performance measures. Conferences of staff from both houses of the legislature, the governor's office, the administration department, and the relevant department meet to develop indicators and measures for use in planning and budgeting (U.S. GAO, 1993).

3. U.S. Federal Government

All federal agencies under the proposed new law (the Government Performance and Results Act) will establish a performance standards and goals plan. Each agency will submit to the President and Congress a report detailing program performance for the previous year and three prior years, relative to previously established measurable goals, broken out by department and major expenditure category. If goals are not quantifiable, the agency must describe a "minimally effective program" and a "successful program" with sufficient precision that would allow for an accurate independent determination of whether the program's performance meet the criteria of either description. Moreover, Congress will not be allowed to consider any authorization or appropriations bill unless it first specifies measurable performance goals for the agency or program in question.

Many federal agencies have begun to develop various types of performance measures as part of the reporting required under the CFOs Act (see Annex 1 for further discussion of this Act). Exhibit 6 displays the numbers and types of performance measures that 21 federal agencies, including A.I.D., have provided in their FY 1992 financial statements to OMB. Output and outcome measures are the most commonly reported types of measures; effectiveness measures are the least prevalent among these agencies.

The ***Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)*** is among the most experienced users of performance measurement systems. Prior to 1974, the FBI used measures such as the number of arrests, convictions, fines, and recoveries to allocate resources and evaluate employees. However, management recognized that not incorporating quality or complexity into these indicators sometimes resulted in perverse allocations of manpower; e.g, "the arrest and conviction of two petty car thieves appeared to represent performance superior to the arrest and conviction of a major criminal figure" (Sonnichsen, 1987).

After a successful one-year pilot project (1974-1975) in four field offices to emphasize quality over quantity in investigations, the FBI formally introduced a policy change instructing all field offices to focus their efforts on the "major criminal and security problems within their respective territories." With overall guidance from headquarters about national priorities, each office now establishes priorities and a limited number of targets. The intent (and result) has been to focus on operations that have the greatest impact on the American public.

Reacting to internal and external criticism that the new approach made overall performance difficult to evaluate, the FBI implemented a Resource Management Information System (RMIS) in 1978. RMIS monitors time expended by agents in each investigative category. Some of these categories are designated as priority cases according to their magnitude (e.g., lives or dollars at stake) and significance (e.g., organized crime and white collar crime are more critical than employee security or fugitives). The RMIS is used agencywide to assist in setting resource priorities to coincide with major crime problems (particularly those not addressed by state and local forces) and to ensure that agents are productively employed.

Department of the Treasury strategic goals are set at the highest level. Then about three strategies are developed for each goal. Strategies are disseminated to the bureaus, which then develop action plans and milestones to achieve each strategy. Each bureau develops its own long-range plan, budget initiatives, and performance measures. The measurement system is developed at the staff level, and top-level bureau managers review progress toward the goals. Sometimes the bureaus turn to the Department in setting priorities, especially when they have conflicting missions.

For instance, in measuring both efficiency and accuracy of customer service, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) used to count the number of customer service calls that got through as one performance measure, the number of correct answers as another. After using them both for a while and seeing no increase in the percentage of correct answers, the Department decided to eliminate the first measure. It decided that a call that got through but resulted in giving the caller the wrong answer was not a desirable objective to work towards (U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 1992).

Exhibit 6

U.S. Federal Agency Performance Measures to Be Included with Fiscal Year 1992 Financial Statements

Agency	Types of Measures Used							Total All Measures
	Descriptive	Input	Output	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Financial	Outcome	
Dept of Agriculture	6	11	49	15	10	8	13	112
Dept of Commerce	29	5	47	2		7	18	108
Dept of Defense	19	41	32	56		30	20	198
Dept of Education	8		6				1	15
Dept of Energy	9	3	9	8		37	20	86
Health and Human Services	10	3	39	14		8	53	127
Housing and Urban Development	25	6	13	1		7	1	53
Dept of Justice	30	3	26	5		12	13	89
Dept of Labor	12		28	11	1	2	43	97
Dept of State	21	4	14	9		5	5	58
Dept of Transportation	30	2	22	7		2	21	84
Dept of Treasury	21	12	37	22		72	15	179
Veterans Administration	22	3	16	6	1		20	68
Environmental Protection Agency	2		11				4	17
National Aeronautics & Space Admin			9	1			9	19
Agency for International Development	13	1	15			1	19	49
Federal Emergency Management Agency						2	10	12
General Services Administration	3		17	6	1	3	15	45
Nuclear Regulatory Commission			4	4	1	1	11	21
Office of Personnel Management	8	1	13	1			23	46
Small Business Administration	7	1	2	4		8	1	23
TOTAL MEASURES OF EACH TYPE	275	96	409	172	14	205	335	1506
% OF ALL MEASURES USED	*18%*	*6%*	*27%*	*11%*	*1%*	*14%*	*22%*	
AGENCIES USING EACH TYPE	18	14	20	17	5	16	21	21
% OF AGENCIES SURVEYED	*86%*	*67%*	*95%*	*81%*	*24%*	*76%*	*100%*	

Source: Agency Chief Financial Officers, via D. Zavada, OMB.

Note: Quantities of measures vary due to the nature of financial statement coverage under the CFOs Act. For example, some agencies prepare one statement for the entire agency, whereas others prepare a statement for each activity within their agency.

The IRS is farthest along of the 12 Treasury bureaus in the process of performance measurement. It has developed a 5-year strategic plan and a 1-year operating plan that ties into it, with actions and milestones to monitor progress toward strategic goals. For example, the IRS's objectives are to: increase voluntary compliance, reduce taxpayer burden, and improve quality-driven productivity. The bureau has five strategies tied into these objectives: Compliance 2000, Total Quality, Tax Systems Modernization, Diversity, and Ethics. Finally, it has 12 corporate actions planned for 1993 that map to these strategies.

The Department of Labor, ***Employment and Training Administration (ETA)***, has linked performance monitoring to program evaluation. They use performance monitoring data to plot trends in the operation and impact of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) program, and they use evaluation to help interpret the performance data. For instance, they use data from randomized evaluations showing the impact of the program on different population groups to verify and round out the picture provided by performance data at the state and local levels. In addition, process analysis is coupled with performance data to examine organizational arrangements and the dynamics of state/local program implementation. ETA's approach recognizes the manipulability of performance data to make a program look good, and uses evaluation to investigate program operations more thoroughly and selectively. Combining performance measurement into the same office as program evaluation has helped promote the use of the data.

The JTPA program also uses performance contracts to determine reimbursement levels. The number of people placed in jobs (not the number of people enrolled in the program) determines the level of payment to each training vendor (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 141). When first introduced in the early 1980s, these contracts led to accelerated placement, or "creaming," of the most job-ready; however, current performance measures reward attention to the more needy populations.

The FBI, IRS, and JTPA cases are three of many examples that illustrate how the development of performance measures is an evolutionary process involving periodic reexamination and refinement:

> This pattern—adoption of crude performance measures, followed by protest and pressure to improve the measures, followed by the development of more sophisticated measures—is common wherever performance is measured....All organizations make mistakes at first. But, over time, they are usually forced to correct them (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 156).

4. Private Sector

Based on 41 respondents to a Treasury survey, the ***U.S. private sector*** enjoys widespread use of performance measurement. Respondents reported generally high satisfaction with the use of performance measures for the following four purposes: (a) to make budget decisions, (b) to manage products and services, (c) to assure accountability, and (d) to measure results.

The corporations surveyed recommended using financial and efficiency measures to make budget decisions and ensure accountability; using quality, customer needs/satisfaction, and timeliness measures to gauge service effectiveness; and using all types of measures in managing services. Satisfaction with performance measurement systems was especially high among companies that

disseminated their measures throughout the organization and among those that linked measures to the execution of their strategic plans.

5. Other Countries

A recent GAO study of the experience of other countries with performance management notes that the U.S. is not alone in attempting to address major management problems. The study notes that "Governments in countries such as Australia, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden began in the mid-1980s to rethink how their public sectors operated and to create a more results-oriented environment" (GAO, December, 1992, p. 15).

The results of initiatives in these and other countries do not lend themselves to comprehensive assessment because most are still in their early stages. However, the GAO notes, early results are encouraging. The public service in several countries governments has been energized to act and government operations have changed substantially. Furthermore, the GAO notes, the creation of results-oriented government has been directed "primarily from the top by a committed cadre of managers" (GAO, December, 1992, pp. 19-22).

Cannon and Fry (1992) offer two specific examples of the use of performance measurement in the United Kingdom.

Northern Ireland's Social Welfare Services Office has a performance information system that serves information needs at multiple levels. The development process started with a one-day seminar in which managers met with top management to establish a set of six key objectives. These are to: deliver services with minimum delay; foster client-oriented services and attitudes; provide adequate information to clients; develop appropriate management systems; develop adaptable, cost-effective systems; and control abuse of services.

At the branch level, managers develop their own annual plans and targets under each of the six objectives. Managers' flexibility is limited only by the requirements that targets be action-oriented, reasonably quantifiable, and specific about time frame. Most managers also involve staff in target setting. Some emphasize existing initiatives; others use targets as an impetus for new developments. The managers have found that "putting down targets in print makes them think more about what they are doing and increases their commitment to meeting those targets" (Cannon and Fry, 1992, p. A-9). Each branch produces and uses its own statistical reports that allow managers to monitor progress toward these targets.

In addition, the central office's Management Services Unit compiles monthly data on several timeliness indicators for all branches, including: the average length of time to clear new claims; the length of time taken to clear 90 percent of new claims (assuming the final 10 percent are the the most difficult cases); the number of parliamentary questions and representations received, and the length of time taken to answer them. This information, all computerized, is used to compare performance over time and across branches, is readily accessible by all managers, and is used regularly by branch levels as well as senior management. The system has led to increased productivity: claims processing time has decreased by as much as 25 percent in some branches.

Target achievement and timeliness statistics are brought together to produce a quarterly report on branch achievement that is widely circulated. The quarterly report is the primary feedback mechanism for performance information office-wide, although top management usually only gets involved when a report indicates a pattern of poor performance.

The *United Kingdom Customs and Excise Department's* performance measurement systems links its planning, budgeting, and accounting systems. Each system compiles data on resources, workloads, results, outputs, and performance indicators, by activity, and compares outputs against plans and targets. The performance indicators include economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and quality-of-service measures. Targets are set in terms of national aggregate results, previous years' results, input reductions, and calendar deadlines. The department's overall plan is translated into collection management plans, operational unit plans, and district plans for use by field offices. These reflect the board's priorities and objectives as well as local objectives and concerns.

The computerized system allows the direct input of data via remote terminals, allowing quick-turnaround reporting of consistent measures across all offices. The reports that the system generates are geared to each management level. For instance, the board receives a monthly report with high-level, aggregated output and performance data, which it uses to compare national results against targets and key indicators. Top management receives "exception reports," which highlight areas of concern and unusual results. Program managers in each office receive detailed information on manpower utilization, resource costs against budgets, workloads, activity levels, outputs, and performance measures by activity.

F. Implementing a Performance Measurement System for Development Management

Unfortunately, there is little empirical information available from international development agencies about the results of implementing performance measurement systems of the sort discussed in this paper. Many, however, are *talking* about performance measurement, accept its potential value, and are beginning to implement it to one degree or another.

For A.I.D. field Missions, ongoing use of a performance measurement system should be incorporated into Mission procedures for program and project planning and review, contractor management, and reporting. If the Missions prepare Action Plans or their equivalent, these plans should be results-oriented documents rather than annual operational work plans. The process of selecting or refining program objectives, defining management results, selecting indicators, analyzing progress against these indicators, and determining necessary management actions to implement effective performance measurement, could, in fact, serve as the basis for an Action Plan.

This procedure should involve host government counterparts and contractors to build understanding, consensus, and commitment to common goals. To the extent possible, needed data collection should be built into the information systems of projects and managed by project implementation teams, preferably with the involvement of host country agencies. Project monitoring and evaluation plans and scopes of work should explicitly address the information needs of performance measurement (as well as broader PRISM program information requirements).

Project reporting and review procedures should be used to document and discuss the results of performance measurement. Quarterly project implementation reports to A.I.D. also could discuss progress toward performance targets. As with annual work plans, project managers should be required to document how implementation is achieving performance targets.

Routine reporting should be supplemented by a semiannual review devoted specifically to performance measurement. At this review, the assigned managers for each level of results can review progress against the established indicators and recommend any necessary management actions to be taken within related projects. Contract team Chiefs-of-Party and government counterparts should be encouraged to participate.

A product of this review meeting should be a specific list of decisions made, actions required, person responsible for each action, and the expected result of each action.

Periodic program or policy reviews with government officials should be used as an occasion to build local commitment to needed actions and to solicit local views on how to improve program performance. This process can be seen as part of the Mission's institutional strengthening agenda with counterparts.

An Implementation Sequence

I. Secure top management support (to gain needed resources and time)

II. Obtain mission (or other unit)-wide agreement on and commitment to program goals and objectives and outline the program design

III. Establish organizational structure with clear responsibilities to develop the system; assign individuals to manage performance measurement for each objective

IV. Allocate resources based on strategic plan

V. Identify program users and customers and discern their needs (Congress, executive branch policy makers, A.I.D. policy and evaluation staff, program managers, press and public)

VI. Given objectives, define results and determine most suitable performance measures

VII. Identify data sources and assess their availability, quality, and appropriateness

VIII. Select appropriate performance indicators and measures and set targets (input, output, process, outcome, impact)

IX. Establish the performance measurement system (establish responsibility for each program; assign responsibilities for establishing performance indicators, data collection, and report formats)

Reviews and discussions of formal project evaluations provide another opportunity for discussion and analysis keyed to the Mission's overall strategic agenda. Such interactions will help transform evaluations from a required exercise (whose findings often come too late to use) into an opportunity for management to expand the degree of analysis available to inform issues significant to the Mission's future programming.

To facilitate performance measurement and reporting, data collection, data management, and analytical reporting should be written into project contracts and included in annual work plans prepared by implementation teams. Contract staff usually have the most direct access to data sources, know what is available, understand data reliability problems, and can carry out routine information management tasks as part of their assignments (VanSant, February 1991).

1. Linking the Information Hierarchy to the Management Hierarchy

Just as organizations are structured hierarchically to manage people and resources, organizational objectives also tend to be structured hierarchically, reflecting the cause- and-effect logic necessary to achieve broader program goals. The kind of performance information needed, the type of performance being assessed, and the character of useful performance indicators also vary dramatically for different objectives at different organizational levels (Britan, 1991).

Activities conducted and results achieved at lower organizational levels are necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, inputs to achieving higher-level goals. The relationships among program objectives (and the need for performance information) can often be clarified by depicting performance objectives in a hierarchical "objective tree" as supported by the PRISM process. The objective tree graphically describes the overall program logic.

Linking the concept of managing for results to the objective tree suggests the importance of developing performance contracts between management levels that define program objectives and expected results, and for which managers can be held responsible. Good performance standards are realistic estimates of expected outcomes. They should be easily understood and agreed to by both those who will judge the success of policies and programs and those who will be held accountable.

Decentralization of program management can be based on these performance contracts, avoiding micro-management and freeing executives for strategic decision making, as well as clarifying responsibilities and decision authority of subordinates. The results can be more rational decision making based on clearer program objectives, comparative program performance data, and better understanding of program alternatives. There also is a better basis for performance-based budgeting, rewarding programs that achieve results.

Managers should be held accountable for obtaining and using program performance data, for understanding why their programs are succeeding or failing, and for making appropriate changes to help their programs work better. *They are responsible for managing for results but are not necessarily responsible for the results themselves* (Britan, 1991).

2. Indicators

PRISM staff as well as a wide range of evaluation and performance measurement experts have examined the question of appropriate indicators. A summary of lessons learned suggests that indicators should:

Indicators should:

- ✓ be grounded in both acceptable practice and substantive theory (a balance between what *can* be measured and what *should* be measured);
- ✓ be policy sensitive, so that analysis yields transparent policy implications;
- ✓ be specific and sensitive enough to reveal those changes being measured that are attributable to management action;
- ✓ directly measure the relevant performance target;
- ✓ enable cost-effective measurement, preferably using data from Mission project or performance measurement or secondary data collected regularly by a host government or donor agency);
- ✓ promote *timely* measurement of management results;
- ✓ have significance for a wide range of relevant audiences, including local managers and external stakeholders; and
- ✓ be open to revision, if appropriate.

Indicators can be used to measure discrete activities, categories of activities, or all program activities. At higher management levels, emphasis is on program impact in achieving broader objectives, with senior managers relying primarily on aggregated and summarized data on program inputs, outputs, and outcomes across discrete activities and sites (Britan, 1991).

Management Levels and Responsibilities

Mission Managers: use tactics of implementing particular program component.
- resources available
- planned outputs produced
- financial accountability assured
- efficiency

Mission leadership or Bureau managers: implement entire program or major component—a range of activities, number of sites, etc., aimed at achieving a larger strategic objective.
- summary information on program inputs, comparative information across sites and on achievement of outcomes
- information on program impact to validate significance of their program strategy

Senior A.I.D. management: concerned with strategic management; must articulate agency mission and values and communicate them internally and externally, clarify policy presumptions underlying mission, identify strategic objectives and program initiatives through which the mission will be achieved.
- summary information on program efficiency and effectiveness
- outcome information
- identification of emerging implementation problems and how to address them
- comparative information on program outcomes and impact
- information on context and trends

CDIE: concerned with leading and managing an overall information management stategy for A.I.D.
- technical assistance to information management initiatives in missions and, by extension, to host country counterparts
- development or adaptation of improved technologies for automated information access and management.

Establishing relevant comparisons or benchmarks for each indicator is, of course, an important part of the process. The simplest comparisons are to measure improvement (or lack of improvement) from an earlier period. Decision makers are less well informed by absolute values than by trends and should be most interested in *why* the trend is as it is. That is the basis for management action.

III. SUMMARY: WHAT SHOULD A.I.D. DO

A. Key Lessons from Performance Measurement

Drawing from the findings of our inquiry reported in preceding portions of this report, some key lessons applicable to A.I.D. include:

- ✓ Leadership support is essential; key A.I.D. officials must give visible and credible backing to performance measurement and provide a mandate and resources for its implementation.
- ✓ Ownership should be elicited at all management levels; "champions" are needed at the Washington and field Mission levels.[2]
- ✓ Don't overload expectations; the purpose is not to measure linkages or to draw cause-and-effect conclusions. The performance measurement system is a complement to, not substitute for, impact evaluations.
- ✓ Involve program managers in developing plans for analysis and actions based on monitoring information.
- ✓ Train Agency staff in using performance measures; managers not accustomed to using performance data will need to be educated.
- ✓ Focus on a few key-results areas at each point of management responsibility.
- ✓ Aspects of performance that can be easily manipulated in the short run should be reported frequently; those less sensitive to program changes should be reported less often.
- ✓ Give it time. It will take several years to implement a performance measurement system.
- ✓ Use a small number of indicators and keep the system as simple as possible. Not all potentially relevant information contributes to improving a decision; not all information is eventually even worth knowing (Chambers, 1981).
- ✓ Do not create a measurement bureaucracy!

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[2] The system needs *information entrepreneurs*—persons who can instill enduring enthusiasm for effective use of performance measurement information and who possess the technical and organizational skills to support the installation and maintenance of effective field capabilities in performance measurement (Betts and VanSant, 1985).

B. Action Steps for A.I.D.

Our review of performance measurement practice outside A.I.D. has suggested several recommendations as next steps the agency should seriously consider. In this section we briefly present each recommendation, along with a suggested action item to implement the recommendation. Both are listed in Exhibit 7.

Exhibit 7

Recommendations and Action Items for A.I.D.

Recommendation	Action Item
Develop A.I.D.-relevant performance indicators	✓ Determine "results" that fit A.I.D.
Encourage total leadership involvement	✓ Establish Performance Management Steering Committee
Recruit and promote managers who manage for results	✓ Look for direct evidence in recruitment and personnel reviews
Train managers to use performance data	✓ Initiate a knowledge-attitudes-practices (KAP) performance management training program
Employ a performance manager	✓ Make position a direct hire with time allocated specifically to performance measurement
Maintain data quality control	✓ Institute routine data audits
Identify A.I.D. bureaucratic barriers to performance management	✓ Conduct a barrier study

Does it make sense to hold A.I.D. as an agency *directly* accountable for producing people-level impacts, such as reduced infant mortality in recipient countries? It would, if A.I.D. staff were directly involved in designing and implementing family planning program interventions in these countries. But that is not what they do; instead, they work with counterpart agency staff who themselves have the direct responsibility for service delivery. A.I.D. can, on the other hand, be held directly accountable for managing for results: for routinely using performance data to monitor and evaluate counterpart performance to ensure that foreign assistance is used in a cost-effective way.

- Action: Develop result indicators that fit more closely what A.I.D. management and staff do, that reflect their responsibility to manage for results.

Performance management will take hold in A.I.D. in direct proportion to the degree to which there is total management involvement. This means that managers at all levels of the agency—but especially at the senior levels—have to be involved actively in the design and implementation of the system, rather than assigning full responsibility to some lower-level, low-visibility office.

- Action: Create a Performance Management Steering Committee of high-level A.I.D. managers to *champion* the performance measurement process and make sure that it is taken seriously and used.

One sure way to promote the cause is to recruit and promote managers based on hard evidence of a capability for and commitment to performance management, to using performance data to manage. As part of their annual review, for example, managers would be asked to document examples of their having used performance data (and the data used) to run their operations.

- Action: Require direct evidence from job candidates and managers in annual reviews of their using performance data to carry out their management responsibilities.

One of the most striking findings of the survey was the need for manager training in the use of performance data; managers need data for decisions, but equally important, they need to know how to use these data. The evidence suggests that many do not. The training needs to focus on three interrelated concerns: managers' *knowledge* about the uses of performance data to manage; managers' *attitudes* towards the use of performance data; and the *practice* of routinely using performance data as a management tool.

- Action: Design and field test a knowledge-attitudes-practices training program for managers in the use of performance management data.

We noted previous research suggesting the potential value of having an information broker in an agency to link people with the information they need to do their jobs. In the context of performance management within A.I.D., we recommend creation of the role of ***performance manager*** within each of the various parts of the agency (e.g., CDIE, program bureaus, Missions) responsible for programmatic or performance measurement and evaluation activities. This person would be responsible for maintaining a performance management (i.e., performance monitoring and impact evaluation) data base and, more importantly, bringing people in contact with, and helping them use, the data in it to manage for results.

- Action: Use specific time allocation of a direct-hire position for role of the performance manager.

A key role for the performance manager would be to maintain data quality control within the performance management data. We noted above the potential corruptibility of performance data. The quality control procedures would seek to ensure the timeliness, reliability, relevance, and cost-effectiveness of data collection and data use procedures. In practice, this will entail periodic data

checks on counterpart data supplied to the Mission, because these data are relied upon so heavily by Mission staff to manage their programs.

- Action: Develop data quality control procedures, such as periodic data audits, to be applied by outside experts to promote objectivity in and credibility for the process.

Initiating change in a large organization, such as a mandate to manage for results, is bound to generate a certain amount of resistance from the established bureaucracy. Change can be threatening. Advance information on the key potential bureaucratic barriers, such as recruitment policies or program oversight regulations, can reveal problem areas and suggest ways to effectively deal with them proactively.

- Action: Conduct a *Barriers to Managing for Results in A.I.D.* study, and use it to develop an implementation strategy for moving to performance management within the agency.

ANNEXES

Annex 1

Recent History of Performance Measurement in the U.S. Federal Government

Several ongoing and recent U.S. Government initiatives were designed to encourage the use of various kinds of performance indicators and measures by federal agencies.

Since 1973, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has collected productivity data from all federal agencies under the ***Federal Productivity Measurement System.*** BLS calculates an aggregate output per employee per year, for each federal bureau. Data are published approximately one year after the end of the fiscal year and thus are more useful for examining long-term trends in agency performance than for evaluating specific programs.

In addition, annual bureau budget requests to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress must contain historical and projected workload data in support of budgeted activities. The data are used to justify funding requests based on increases in workload (but don't necessarily measure effectiveness or productivity).

The ***Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act*** of 1982 requires federal agencies to evaluate their internal control and financial management systems—relative to standards set by the General Accounting Office (GAO)—in an annual report to the President. The standards address the accuracy, timeliness, and reliability of data.

The ***Productivity Improvement Program*** was initiated in 1986 with the goal of increasing productivity by 20 percent between 1986 and 1992 (3 percent per year) in selected federal agency activities. Focus was on improving efficiency, measuring outputs and related costs, and improving governmental functions.

The ***Total Quality Management (TQM)*** initiative, which is an integrated management system for achieving customer satisfaction, expanded the focus to include quality improvement. TQM efforts began in 1987 as federal leaders consulted with private sector officials. The Federal Quality Institute was created as a source of quality awareness training and consultation and a clearinghouse and referral source for TQM information. The Government has promoted the voluntary adoption of TQM through awards programs and an annual conference on Federal Quality and Productivity Improvement. Many agencies are now tying in their performance measurement initiatives to their existing TQM efforts.

The ***Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act*** of 1990 requires selected agencies to provide annual audited financial reports that emphasize financial and program performance measures. The Act recognizes the need for reliable and consistent financial information as the basis for sound indicators. It also requires a government-wide, 5-year financial management plan.

The CFO Act does not mandate specific measures but requires each agency to develop its own financial and program-specific measures and to submit these in its audited financial statements to the agency's Inspector General and then to OMB and Congress. It puts each agency's CFO in

charge of selecting the performance indicators and measures. In the first year of CFO implementation, agencies must use indicators supported by existing data bases, but these can be replaced as new data are collected.

The *Interagency Committee on Performance Measurement* was formed in December 1991 to address the requirements of the CFO Act. It includes representatives from the largest federal agencies, including Agriculture, the Department of Health and Human Services, and Energy. It meets monthly to exchange information on developing performance indicators. It has developed "model" performance indicators and identified obstacles to the development of indicators.

OMB initiated another interagency group in February 1992 to identify program and financial performance indicators and measures that will be responsive to the CFO Act. This committee is developing agency-specific indicators as well as crosscutting measures common to several agencies for the 14 "substantially commercial" concerns that the CFO Act covers.

Congress is currently considering legislation originally introduced by Senator Roth as S.20, the *Government Performance and Results Act* of 1992. The Act has already been passed by the Senate and is expected to pass the House and be signed into law by summer of 1993.

According to Senator Roth, this legislation would institute several "major reforms in the way the federal government does business" (Roth, 1992, p. 102):

- *Results-based legislation:* All authorization, reauthorization. and appropriations bills introduced by Congress must specify measurable, objective, quantifiable goals and standards expected to be achieved.

- *Performance planning:* Each agency must develop a detailed performance plan that shows the hierarchy of outcome-oriented goals for each major activity needed to achieve the congressionally mandated results.

- *Performance reporting:* Each agency must publish an annual performance report that compares actual results with original goals, for the past year and three prior years. As with financial reports, these performance reports will be audited by each agency's Inspector General and reviewed by Congressional oversight committees, GAO, OMB, and other interested groups.

- *Performance-based budgeting:* Each agency must incorporate performance goals directly into its federal budget for all major expenditure categories. These indicators should be used not simply for planning but for managing at every level of operation.

In support of this legislation soon after it was introduced, Congress directed the GAO to survey the largest 104 federal agencies to determine the kinds of performance measures currently in use. The *GAO Survey of Agency Use of Program Performance Measures* found that although most agencies measure some performance, officials were not satisfied with the data especially as they related to making budget decisions, managing programs, or assessing accountability. GAO testified before Congress in May 1992 that changing the government's focus from ensuring that funds are

spent properly to managing dollars to produce agreed-upon results will be difficult and gradual, and will require a strong commitment from those involved.

OMB, GAO, and Treasury officials have visited state, local, and foreign governments to review their performance measurement systems and to determine the elements necessary for successful performance measurement, such as using strategic plans to define goals and objectives, and holding managers accountable for program performance.

OMB has also participated in an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) experts group on a study of performance measurement in OECD member countries that resulted in comparative case studies of performance measurement systems in other countries.

The Treasury's Financial Management Service, through its Project USA, has worked closely with the Private Sector Council (PSC) to develop models of excellent management practices, including performance measurement, for the financial improvement of the federal government. Project USA conducted a ***Survey of Private Sector Council Performance Measures*** in 1992 to discover some of the best practices in performance measurement in corporations and to solicit suggestions for applying performance measurement to the federal government.

The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), a nonprofit group chartered by Congress to improve all levels of government, has created the ***Alliance for Redesigning Government*** to tie together reform efforts at the federal, state, and local levels. David Osborne, author of *Reinventing Government*, chairs this alliance. NAPA also conducts pilot projects with federal agencies (such as the Department of Education, currently) to develop performance measures at both the program level and the agency level. NAPA has coordinated monthly performance measurement lunchtime sessions for the past year.

In addition, the Clinton Administration has a "reinventing government" task force headed by the Vice-President. Mr. Gore's ***Performance Review Team*** consists of representatives from each federal department, as well as foundation officials and academic experts, including NAPA. The task force members are committed full-time for 4 to 6 months to serve on this project. They are looking at "best practices" of excellence in government and at barriers to efficient service delivery. The goal is to streamline the federal government to make it more responsive to citizens, in part by increasing direct citizen contact and cutting out middle management. The team will produce a report by fall of 1993.

Annex 2

Interview Framework and Protocol

PREAMBLE: *A.I.D. is in the process of developing a performance measurement system to support its strategic management initiative under the PRISM project. PRISM stands for "Performance Information for Strategic Management." A key part of this process is understanding the actual and potential use of program performance information—who is most likely to use the information, and how will they use it? The clear intention is to maximize the use of performance data to promote strategic management. To that end, we are talking to people outside of A.I.D., in domestic U.S. agencies and overseas, to learn about effective ways to achieve widespread use of performance information on program processes and results. We are particularly interested in specific examples of where performance data was used to improve program management. We'll start by discussing how your agency defines performance measurement.*

I. **Action Component (Information to Use)**

A. Performance Measurement Context

1. *Is your organization utilizing performance measurement systems to monitor programs/projects? If not, why not?*

2. *How do you define Performance Measurement?*

B. Matching Information to Decision-Making Needs

1. *Are decision makers involved with deciding what kinds of data to gather and monitor?*

2. *How do you serve the needs of both managers and persons with oversight or monitoring responsibility with the same evaluative information?*

3. *What facilitates effective information use? What constrains effective use?*

4. *Give examples of effective information use. What promoted its use?*

C. Reward Systems and Link to Performance

1. *What incentives are there for program/project managers to make use of the data information system?*

2. *Give specific examples of how your information system has improved program/project performance.*

D. Addressing Stakeholder Interests

1. *What kinds of stakeholders have an interest in the findings of your performance evaluation system?*

2. *Is the performance evaluation system designed to meet the needs of these stakeholders?*

E. Aggregation of Data from Different Locations and Approaches

1. *How do you compare and/or aggregate information from different field locations or programs?*

2. *How do you compare and/or aggregate information deriving from different indicators or evaluation approaches?*

II. Analysis Component (Data to Information)

A. Developing Benchmarks

1. *What standards/targets do you use to measure whether a program/project is achieving its goals and objectives?*

2. *Describe the process for developing these standards/targets.*

B. Methodology

1. *Is your performance evaluation system relatively easy to use?*

2. *Can it be adapted to monitor programs/projects across different sectors?*

D. Measuring People Impact

1. *How do you measure project/program impact at the people-level?*

2. *Please give specific examples.*

E. Communication and Presentation

1. *How is the data translated into information that can be effectively utilized by project managers?*

2. *What reporting/presentation formats do you find most effective?*

III. Data Component (Measurement to Data)

A. Indicators

1. *What are the general criteria you use to select performance indicators?*

2. *Please give examples of sectors in which you apply performance measures (these examples could be organized according to PRISM clusters).*

B. Data

1. *Briefly describe some of the more innovative approaches you have developed to collect data.*

2. *How do you ensure that the data gathered are of high quality (e.g., relevant, accurate, timely, objective, and usable)?*

Annex 3

Persons Contacted

Name	Organization
Bamberger, Michael	World Bank
Bonerjee, Mr.	UNDP
Borton, Nan	Interaction
Britan, Gerry	USAID-CDIE-SDS
Brownstein, Charles	National Science Foundation
Caiden, Gerald	University of Southern California
Cailloux, Michele	Canada-CIDA
Campbell, Michael	Council of Government Policy Advisors
Cannon, Paul	United Kingdom-National Accounting Office
Corbeil, Ron	Canada-CIDA-Office of the Comptroller General
Davies, Graham	United Kingdom-Cabinet Office (OMCS)
DiGiavanno, Frank	Ford Foundation
Fantone, Denise	U.S. General Accounting Office
Gatto, Bob	Canada-Office of Statistics
Green, Karen	U.S. Department of Labor
Groszyk, Walter	U.S. Office of Management and Budget
Guererro, Pablo	World Bank
Hatry, Harry	Urban Institute
Hoffman, Susan	U.S. Department of Education
Joyce, Phil	U.S. Congressional Budget Office
Kamensky, John	U.S. General Accounting Office
Lawrence, John	UNDP
Long, Carolyn	Interaction
Morris, John	United Kingdom-ODA
Pedone, Karen	U.S. Department of Treasury
Powers, Terry	Inter-American Development Bank
Reid, Gary	World Bank
Salop, Joanne	World Bank
Schroeder, Larry	Syracuse University
Scioli, Frank	National Science Foundation
Sonnichsen, Richard	FBI
Svenaeus, Lena	Sweden-Embassy in Ottawa, Canada
Tessauro, Julie	U.S. General Accounting Office
Tuck, Nancy	U.S. Department of Treasury
Vreeland, Nena	USAID-CDIE
Weinberg, Emil	Inter-American Development Bank
Wholey, Joseph	University of Southern California
Wilson, Gale	Fairfield, CA (former City Manager)
Winkler, Don	World Bank

Wye, Chris	National Academy of Public Administration
Zaleski, Gary	U.S. Department of Treasury
Zavada, David	U.S. Office of Management and Budget

Annex 4

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Annual Report on Program Performance 1994

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Center for Development Information and Evaluation
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Core Report

Center for Development Information and Evaluation
Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination
U.S. Agency for International Development

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This Core Report is the first of a two-volume set. The second volume is the full 132-page Annual Report. For order information, see inside front cover.

Executive Summary

THE PROGRESS of other nations matters to the United States. Growth of democracy facilitates more peaceful resolution of disputes and greater acceptance of values and principles we embrace. Economic growth benefits both poor people overseas and U.S. companies and workers who produce the goods they buy. Improved health and lower population growth reduce the spread of diseases and pressures for migration. Sound uses of local environments sustain the world's resource base and enhance the quality of life for all the Earth's inhabitants. And smooth transitions away from communism, conflict, or ethnic domination lead to greater regional and worldwide stability and prosperity.

USAID's programs address the four principal, inter-related threats to sustainable development: poverty and food insecurity, lack of democratic institutions and processes, rapid population growth and poor health, and environmental degradation. USAID also responds to disasters that create human suffering. In addition, the Agency supports the transition of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to more democratic, free-market societies.

Although it draws on experience and examples from all of USAID's programs, this report focuses on programs in 41 countries in Africa, Asia, the Near East, and Latin America and the Caribbean where USAID has decided to concentrate its sustainable development resources. It also describes accomplishments of humanitarian and post-crisis assistance programs worldwide and results to date from significant investments in the ENI region.

Encouraging Broad-Based Economic Growth

Economic growth is the foundation of sustainable development. It helps reduce poverty and provides essential resources for stabilizing population growth and protecting human health and the environment. USAID's economic growth strategy has three elements: strengthening markets, investing in people, and expanding access and opportunity. Forty sustainable development Missions have economic growth objectives.

Performance highlights include:

- In Central America, U.S. assistance for market strengthening helped reverse sharp economic declines in the 1980s. With reforms, the region is now achieving positive economic growth, and USAID has phased down its assistance.

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- In countries assisted by seven Missions, non-traditional exports increased by over 35 percent in the last 2 to 4 years, totaling $1.75 billion.
- A USAID evaluation of several of the world's most effective microenterprise finance institutions identified management strategies that allow them to be financially viable and to rapidly increase their outreach. The best institutions are able to expand the number of loans by at least 25 percent each year, providing thousands of poor clients with their first access to loans and safe places to hold savings. Conclusions from this report are being integrated into USAID's Microenterprise Initiative.

Building Democracy

USAID's democracy strategy has five broad objectives: strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, increasing citizen participation in elections and political processes, expanding an active civil society, developing more accountable governance, and increasing the flow and diversity of information to citizens. Twenty-nine sustainable development Missions have significant democracy programs.

Results from these programs include:

- USAID played an important role in six of eight countries that made significant democratic gains in 1994, according to the most recent Freedom House survey.
- As a result of rule-of-law programs in Latin America, access to legal advice and redress through legal aid and alternative dispute resolution has increased significantly for poor and marginal populations.
- USAID assistance to electoral tribunals in Bolivia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Panama, and South Africa helped ensure elections that were accepted as legitimate. In Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Ukraine, USAID assistance played an important role in voter registration, and turnout exceeded expectations for elections held during 1994.
- In Central America, USAID trained 50 percent of the region's journalists and media managers in journalistic ethics. In 1989, citizens of the region had little faith in the media; by 1994, a public opinion poll found the media ranked second only to the Catholic Church in credibility.

Stabilizing World Population and Protecting Health

USAID's strategy to stabilize population growth and protect human health has five priorities: preventing unwanted pregnancies and abortions, reducing deaths of children from preventable diseases, decreasing pregnancy-related deaths, preventing transmission of sexually related diseases such as HIV/AIDS, and increasing the basic education of girls and women. Ninety percent of USAID's sustainable development Missions are pursuing objectives in population or health.

Highlights include:

- In the 28 countries that have received the largest amount of USAID population assistance, average family size has decreased from 6.1 children in the 1960s to 4.2 in 1992.
- From 1985 through 1992, infant mortality declined by 10 percent in USAID-assisted countries. In some countries the decline was even greater, ranging from 17 percent in Bolivia to almost 50 percent in Honduras. During the same period, mortality rates for children under 5 in USAID-assisted countries dropped by 10 percent to 40 percent.
- In 1994, polio was eradicated in the Western Hemisphere by a multinational effort in which the United States was the lead donor.
- With USAID assistance, use of oral rehydration therapy during diarrheal episodes among children continued to increase, from 12 percent in 1984 to 46 percent in 1992. This treatment saves children's lives in the United States as well as in developing countries. It prevents an estimated one million childhood deaths worldwide each year.

Protecting the Environment

USAID programs address long-term threats to the global environment, particularly loss of biodiversity and global climate change. They also seek to protect the environment locally, regionally, and nationally by protecting biological resources, promoting environmentally sound urban and industrial development, fostering efficient use of renewable and non-renewable energy, improving the availability and quality of water, and encouraging better stewardship of natural resources. Twenty-five sustainable development Missions have one or more environmental objectives.

Among the results are:

- Through the Parks in Peril program, USAID has helped create 26 protected areas covering 5.6 million hectares in 12 countries.
- Strategies that increase local stewardship by empowering and encouraging participation of local people are more effective than those that rely on government agencies alone.
- In Quito, Ecuador, USAID assistance transformed the Water Authority, lowering operating costs by 25 percent, enabling 35,000 household connections, and upgrading services to 180,000 people in marginal neighborhoods.
- Support for integrated pest management is reducing environmental damage and increasing yields. In Indonesia, a catalytic USAID investment in a multi-donor project helped to show how reducing pesticide use can boost farm incomes from rice cultivation. Pesticide use is down 65 percent nationwide. Integrated pest management reduced environmental damage and health risks to farmers and saved $120 million in insecticide subsidies.

Humanitarian and Postcrisis Assistance

USAID has four objectives for its humanitarian assistance: timely delivery of disaster relief and short-term rehabilitation, helping prevent disasters and reduce the vulnerability of populations at risk, preserving the basic institutions of civil governance during periods of crisis and transition, and protecting the food security and health of vulnerable groups during conflicts or periods of reform.

Some highlights:

- In 1994, humanitarian assistance was provided to more than 50 countries. Emergency food reached an estimated 58 million people in 18 countries.
- Timely delivery of food and other resources and U.S. leadership of the donor effort in response to the 1992 drought in southern Africa prevented mass migration and starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. It also fostered long-term sustainable development in the region.
- USAID's efforts to help prevent, prepare for, and mitigate disasters has paid big dividends. Early warning systems for famine and pestilence in Africa, and elsewhere for volcanoes, have saved lives, property and rehabilitation costs.

Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States

USAID's programs in this region have three principal priorities: economic restructuring, building democracy, and social sector restructuring.

Highlights include:

- Assistance in privatizing industry and in new business start-up has contributed substantially to private sector growth in many countries. Enterprise Funds have sustained 21,000 jobs, created 11,000 more, and generated more than $60 million in earnings. Twenty-three joint ventures with U.S. companies have been created, attracting $150 million in private foreign investment.
- Energy audits and demonstrations have improved efficiency by as much as 30 percent in urban heating systems in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Repub-

lic, Russia, and Ukraine. Use of U.S. equipment costing $1 million resulted in an estimated annual saving of $14 million in these systems.

- With USAID help, many parliaments in the region have enacted critical political reforms, including new election laws that help ensure fair and democratic elections.
- By helping to establish a legal basis for creating nongovernment organizations, USAID has enabled NGOs to flourish across the region.

Challenges for 1995

USAID has made significant progress in focusing on results, but more is required. Our agenda for 1995 includes:

- We will complete an Agencywide results framework, which will include performance indicators to assess the results of our work more uniformly and process indicators to track our internal progress in managing for results.
- We will complete development and begin installation of a corporate information system. When complete, it will reduce formal reporting requirements, increase USAID's ability to analyze and report on program performance, allow managers to make decisions better informed by the progress of their activities and lessons of experience, and permit broader, quicker dissemination of results.

Annual Report on USAID Program Performance

THE PROGRESS of other nations matters to the United States. Growth of democracy facilitates more peaceful resolution of disputes and greater acceptance of values and principles we embrace. Economic growth benefits both poor people overseas and U.S. companies and workers who produce the goods they buy. Improved health and lower population growth reduce the spread of diseases and pressures for migration. Sound uses of local environments sustain the world's resource base and enhance the quality of life for all the Earth's inhabitants. And smooth transitions away from communism, ethnic domination, or conflict lead to greater regional and worldwide stability and prosperity.

A focused, well-managed development assistance program is in the United States' interest, but only if it produces *results*. This report provides evidence from Mission reports, central evaluations, and other data collected during the past year that USAID is achieving measurable results through its programs.

To achieve results USAID must listen to and work closely with its partners and customers, learn from its experience, and improve its systems and incentives in response. In 1994, USAID published *Strategies for Sustainable Development* and developed guidelines for managers to follow in implementing them. Building on 3 years of experience, a directive was issued on strategic planning that underlines our commitment to performance measurement and requires all offices in the field and at headquarters to set clear program objectives, establish performance indicators and targets, and collect baseline information by April 1995. Operations and other support systems were re-engineered to focus them more clearly on results.

An Agency-level results framework will be developed in 1995 that will include common indicators of performance across all programs worldwide. The framework will also specify management performance indicators and targets to help track how well the Agency is managing for results.

The full benefit of this improved ability to identify, report, and use program performance results will be realized over the next 2 to 3 years. However, USAID is already able to identify many of the impacts its programs are having and profit from lessons it is learning.

USAID's mission is to promote sustainable development—economic and social growth that does not exhaust the resources of a country; that respects and safeguards the economic, cultural, and natural environment; that creates opportunities for enterprises and incomes to grow; and that builds effective institutions and empowers citizens. Its programs address the four principal, inter-related threats to sustainable development: poverty and food insecurity, lack of democratic institutions and processes, rapid population growth and poor health, and environmental degradation. But USAID alone does not—cannot—achieve sustainable development. It can help, facilitate, even accelerate development, but the major task must be carried out by the developing country itself. Sustainable development is built on a sense of ownership and participation. To be successful, this effort requires partnerships with government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other donors, and ordinary people in the countries where we work.

USAID also responds, on behalf of the American people, to disasters that create human suffering and diminish the prospects for sustainable development. Where possible, we help countries recover from violent conflicts and move toward sustainable development. In addition, the Agency plays a leading role in supporting the historic transition of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—and others such as South Africa, Ethiopia, Mozambique,

and Haiti—to more democratic, free-market societies.

During the past 3 years (FYs 1992-94), USAID funded programs totaling $16 billion (excluding cash transfers to Israel and Turkey). Of this amount, $11.7 billion in Development Assistance and Economic Support Funds were provided to countries in Africa, Asia, the Near East, and Latin America and the Caribbean—$6.9 billion (59 percent) to encourage economic growth, $2.9 billion (25 percent) to help stabilize population growth and protect human health, $1.2 billion (10 percent) to protect the environment, and $0.6 billion (5 percent) to build democracy.[1] In addition, USAID provided $1.3 billion for humanitarian assistance and aid to post-crisis transitions, and $3 billion to support the political and economic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union (ENI).

Although it draws on experience and examples from all of USAID's programs, this report focuses on programs in 41 countries in Africa, Asia, the Near East, and Latin America and the Caribbean where the Agency has decided to concentrate its sustainable development resources.[2] It also describes accomplishments of humanitarian and post-crisis assistance efforts worldwide and results to date from significant investments in the ENI region.

Since 1991 (earlier in Africa), USAID Missions have designed strategic plans that identify medium-term (5 to 8 years) objectives and intermediate outcomes for their programs.[3] During the past year, these plans were revised to reflect USAID's new sustainable development strategies. To some extent, progress in making these adjustments came at the expense of our ability to report on performance, since some objectives and indicators previously established were modified.

As of October 1994, all 41 sustainable development Missions—100 percent—have approved strategic plans, up from 75 percent in 1992. Figure 1 summarizes these strategies and the principal objectives that have been defined in these countries. Seventy percent of these Missions (compared with 40 percent in 1992) have set performance targets for half or more of their progress indicators. Results have been reported for 50 percent of the Missions' strategic objectives and 70 percent of their intermediate outcomes.

Information in this report is drawn from Mission reports that compare actual performance against their objectives. It is supplemented with material from project and program evaluations and other data collected during the past year. The report is organized by our main sustainable development themes (economic growth, democracy, population and health, and environment), followed by humanitarian assistance and ENI programs. Each section describes the strategy the Agency pursues, objectives defined as of September 1994, results these programs have achieved, and lessons we have learned from our experience. A final section outlines challenges that face the Agency's efforts to manage for results in 1995. This information is described in more detail in the full 1994 *Annual Report on Program Performance*, available from USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation.

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[1] The inclusion of ESF and PL-480 Title III biases these percentages toward economic growth objectives. If ESF and Title III are excluded, the proportion of DA/DFA funding among the four areas would be as follows: economic growth—40 percent; population and health—43 percent; environment—12 percent; and democracy—6 percent.

[2] Sustainable development countries are those which USAID has determined to have good potential for sustainable growth, respect internationally recognized human rights or are moving in a positive direction in this regard, need assistance and have shown they can and will use outside help effectively. Unless otherwise noted, performance in these 41 countries is the basis for analysis in this report relating to our sustainable development programs. USAID also supports programs in 51 other countries. These include the ENI nations, as well as countries that have a development problem of global significance, where our activities emphasize crisis response or humanitarian assistance, or where USAID bilateral assistance is being completed within the next 2 years.

[3] USAID's ENI programs have developed a separate but conceptually compatible system for monitoring and measuring results in response to their unique program and management setting.

Figure 1. Number of Sustainable Development Missions with Objectives by Development Priority



Encouraging Broad-Based Economic Growth

Strategy and Objectives

ECONOMIC GROWTH is the foundation of sustainable development. It helps reduce poverty and provides essential resources for stabilizing population growth and protecting human health and the environment. Significant economic growth has occurred in the developing world. According to data published by the World Bank, per capita incomes in developing countries as a whole grew faster than in the developed world from 1965 to 1990.

The region largely responsible for this record was Asia (which accounts for half of global poverty), where per capita incomes grew almost twice as fast as in the rich countries.[4] During 1980-92, the average annual growth rate of developing countries lagged behind that of industrial countries because of negative performance in other regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa. However, several individual countries outpaced the performance of rich countries, including Botswana, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the populous poor countries of China, India, and Pakistan.

To reduce poverty and food insecurity and contribute to lasting improvements in peoples' lives, economic growth must be *rapid*. It must be *broad-based*, leading to widespread increases in employment and incomes among both men and women. It must also be *sustainable* and based on efficient, responsible use of human, material, and natural resources. Finally, economic growth must be *participatory*, with open access by all to political and economic systems. Evidence from experience confirms the relationship between rapid economic growth and poverty reduction. Data published by the World Bank from 13 developing countries show a high correlation between the rate of growth of national per capita household income (consumption) and the rate at which poverty declined.

USAID's economic growth strategy has three elements: strengthening markets, investing in people, and expanding access and opportunity. This strategy reflects a consensus that has emerged among donors and developing countries alike about key measures governments must take to promote broad-based economic growth.

These measures fall into two broad categories. First, governments must ensure a sound policy and institutional framework for efficient operation of private markets. This is fundamental but does not always guarantee that the poor and disadvantaged benefit enough. Thus, governments often need to intervene directly in areas where private markets, even with a sound enabling environment, fail to provide investments essential for sustainable development. These include human resource investments (particularly basic education and health services), physical infrastructure, and environmental protection. USAID supports institutional and technological change that benefits poor people and policies that protect them from discrimination in the marketplace.

Results

Forty sustainable development Missions have economic growth objectives. In most nations our programs have been relatively

[4] Growth in China accounts for some of Asia's performance, but even when China is excluded, Asian per capita incomes grew almost 50 percent faster than those of developed countries. Even without China, there are more poor people in Asia than in any other region.

modest compared with investments by developing countries themselves and by multilateral development banks, particularly the World Bank. Nonetheless, USAID can take significant credit for progress in countries where economic growth has been a major element of its strategy. One reason is our professional field staff, larger than that of any other donor and able to engage host country counterparts regularly and directly on critical policy issues. In countries where assistance concentrates on a particular sub-sector or issue, such as privatization or microenterprise finance, an even larger share of results can be attributed to U.S. assistance.

Strengthening Markets

USAID programs in 35 sustainable development countries seek to strengthen the contribution of markets to economic growth by improving their efficiency and performance, mainly by reforming the enabling environment of policies and institutions. Economic research has shown that the enabling environment is critical to economic growth and analyses of USAID programs have confirmed this linkage. In Central America, large-scale U.S. assistance for market strengthening helped reverse sharp economic declines in the mid-1980s. With reforms, that region is now achieving positive economic growth, and USAID has been able to phase down its assistance. In Africa, an evaluation of USAID market-strengthening programs in six countries concluded that the main reforms (decontrol of prices and markets, relaxation of trade controls, reduced subsidies and elimination of government monopolies) all resulted in increased efficiency.

> ***"In Guatemala, small farmers benefited more from USAID support for improved policies and regulations affecting market performance than from assistance directly to them or to specific enterprises."***

The Agency is also helping privatize public enterprises and increase production in specific markets, especially non-traditional exports. In Honduras, USAID helped privatize 43 state-owned enterprises, earning $160 million for the Honduran Treasury and reducing external debt by $40 million. Where commitment to privatization by government authorities is lacking, however, as in Zambia, progress has been disappointing.

By 1993, non-traditional exports for countries assisted by seven Missions able to report results totaled $1.75 billion, an increase of over 35 percent in 2 to 4 years. Five Missions exceeded their 1993 targets. For example, with USAID support, El Salvador's non-traditional exports grew an average of 19 percent annually over the last 3 years, substantially more than the target.

Investing in People

USAID seeks to help countries establish self-sustaining basic education systems that will enable their people, particularly the poor, to lead socially and economically productive lives. By one common quantitative measure (the percentage of the population age group enrolled in primary education), there has been substantial progress in the developing world over the last two decades: from 79 percent in 1970 to 102 percent in 1991.[5]

Even more impressive is progress in female primary school enrollment, up from 63 percent to 94 percent. The latter is particularly significant, given the important positive

[5] Figures over 100 percent reflect the presence of under-age or over-age children enrolled in primary school.

effect that education of girls and women has on sustainable development. For example, even at modest levels, education empowers women to seek and use health and family planning services. In most countries, better educated women desire smaller families and a higher proportion of their children survive. Major regional disparities remain, however. In Africa, total and female primary enrollments in 1991 were 66 percent and 58 percent, respectively; in South Asia they were 89 percent and 76 percent.

A major deficiency of these enrollment ratios is that they tell us nothing about the *quality* of basic education. High drop-out rates and grade repetition by primary students in many countries reflect a judgment by parents about the poor quality of schooling relative to the need for children to work to supplement family income. Thus, 16 sustainable development Missions are pursuing improvements in the quality and efficiency of primary education. Most focus on girls' education and track female enrollment and grade completion rates.

Of nine Missions reporting results to date, eight are achieving or exceeding their targets. In Egypt, where USAID helped build more than 2,000 rural schools, girls' enrollment in first grade increased by 29 percent between 1981 and 1994. In Guinea, USAID-supported administrative and budgetary reforms of the primary education system led to an increase in first grade enrollment from 23 percent to 47 percent from 1990 to 1993. Enrollment by girls and rural children grew the fastest. In Guatemala, emphasis on expanding access to basic education through bilingual programs for the Mayan population increased enrollment of Mayan students by 7 percent from 1992 to 1993.

Expanding Access and Opportunity

Efforts to strengthen markets and invest in people significantly improve access and opportunity for the poor. But markets never work perfectly, even when the policy and institutional framework is sound. Competition is rarely complete, and high information and transaction costs (costs of assessing a good credit risk, for example, or of understanding and adopting new techniques) can justify selective government subsidies or even temporary direct support to poor and disadvantaged groups in new markets until they overcome these obstacles.

USAID programs in 23 sustainable development countries seek to expand economic access and opportunity. They do so primarily through policy and institutional reforms and other measures that help women and other disadvantaged groups secure basic rights, gain access to resources and improved technologies, and influence public policy and administration. Most USAID programs in this area stress support for microenterprise finance and improved technology for small farmers. Of 10 Missions reporting results to date, eight are achieving or exceeding their targets.

> ***"In Bangladesh....loans have helped build many women-owned microenterprises, and incomes of borrowers now exceed incomes from agricultural labor by up to 300 percent."***

In Egypt, where USAID has given significant support to microenterprise and small business development, the number of small businesses and microenterprises receiving credit increased from 600 in 1991 to almost 16,000 in 1993. Microenterprise programs increasingly target women, who tend to have higher repayment rates than men and are more likely to spend enterprise income to improve family welfare.

In Bangladesh, USAID has generated economic opportunities for rural women

through more than 27,000 loans. The loans have helped build many women-owned microenterprises, and incomes of borrowers now exceed incomes from agricultural labor by up to 300 percent. Such advances enable many women and their families to move beyond abject poverty.

USAID is also expanding access of small farmers and microentrepreneurs to improved technology, information, and related services in 10 countries. In Jamaica, for example, the number of small farmers adopting improved and environmentally sound practices grew from 9,200 to 14,200 from 1992 to 1993, an increase of more than 50 percent. New cocoa cultivation techniques tripled small farmer production from 1989 to 1992 in one area that now accounts for almost 60 percent of Jamaica's total harvest.

Learning from Experience

Our experience in supporting economic growth has yielded some basic lessons:

- The policy and institutional setting is a central determinant of economic growth. One example comes from a recent evaluation of USAID agribusiness programs. In Guatemala, small farmers benefited more from USAID support for improved policies and regulations affecting market performance than from assistance directly to them or to specific enterprises.
- Rapid, broad-based economic growth is critical for improving basic education, health, and nutrition because larger incomes allow families to invest more in these areas and because economic growth generates the revenue base for increased public services.
- A new evaluation study of several of the world's most effective microenterprise finance institutions concludes that carefully crafted management strategies allow such institutions to be financially viable and to rapidly increase their outreach. Financial viability requires charging interest rates that cover costs (including inflation and loan losses); this permits institutions to multiply donor contributions by tapping far greater funding from commercial sources. The best institutions are able to expand the number of loans by at least 25 percent each year, providing thousands of poor clients with their first access to loans and safe places to hold savings. Conclusions from this report are being integrated into USAID's Microenterprise Initiative.

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Building Democracy

Strategy and Objectives

IN RECENT years, the belief that democracy provides the most accepted method of governing has spread through Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union. According to the most recent Freedom House survey,[6] 114 countries can properly be categorized as democracies, the largest number ever. The same survey reports that 60 percent of the world's people live in free or partly free societies.

Countries categorized as "partly free" are among those targeted for U.S. assistance programs. These countries are still in need of some measure of external assistance and, above all, the chance to build on the tangible gains they have made. At the same time, progress toward self-sustaining democratic governance will not in all cases proceed in a linear direction. U.S. democracy assistance programs, therefore, must have the flexibility to respond to unforeseen political developments as well as adopt a long-term development perspective.

Notable democratic progress was made during 1994 in South Africa, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Malawi. Less in the news, but no less important, significant gains occurred in Ukraine, Panama, and Uganda. These transitions were the products of free and fair elections, a discernable expansion of political and civil liberties, and strengthened organizations that advocate on behalf of, and represent, the citizenry.

Major challenges to sustainable democratic governance, however, remain. Forty percent of the world's people continue to live in societies where basic rights are denied. In addition, countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, and much of the former Yugoslavia demonstrate that ethnic conflicts, if allowed to fester, can descend into the horror of genocide. In all regions of the world, insufficient economic growth, high levels of illiteracy, overreaching military bureaucracies, and corrupt civilian bureaucracies challenge new democratic governments.

USAID's democracy strategy has five broad objectives:

- strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights;
- increasing citizen participation in elections and political processes;
- expanding an active civil society;
- developing more accountable governance; and
- increasing the flow and diversity of information to citizens.

Specific programs are tailored to country circumstances and available resources. Twenty-nine sustainable development Missions have significant democracy programs. Sixteen of these countries are classified as "partly free" and seven as "free" in the most recent Freedom House survey. USAID considers these 23 countries as having the greatest potential for promoting and consolidating democratic rule.

In the remaining six, classified as "not free" by Freedom House, USAID looks to take advantage of specific opportunities for promoting democracy and respect for human rights, relying principally on work with both U.S.-based and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While operating within a slightly different framework, USAID also

[6] The Freedom House index is a seven-point scale grouping countries according to their degree of freedom. Using a checklist of nine indicators for political rights and a checklist for 13 indicators of civil rights, Freedom House determines two values for the respective group of rights. The average of these two values is used to group countries in three categories: "free," "partly free," and "not free."

has set significant democracy objectives in the ENI region and for other countries such as Cambodia, Haiti, and Gaza/West Bank.

Results

USAID played an important role in six of eight countries that made significant democratic gains, according to the most recent Freedom House survey.[7] But sustainable democratic change comes neither quickly nor easily. Investments must be made carefully and incrementally in educating citizens about democratic values, redefining government's role, and building key institutions inside and outside government to nurture the new political environment. Successful transitions often flower from seeds of reform planted much earlier.

Such was the case in South Africa and Mozambique. In South Africa, USAID began in the mid-1980s with support to NGOs and community groups. This led to more intensive work during recent elections on voter education, expanded political work by NGOs, training election observers, and strengthening the electoral commission. Post-election assistance is focused on building respect for the rule of law, supporting good governance, and strengthening civic organizations as a check against future abuses of power.

In Mozambique, USAID's help during civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s stressed humanitarian assistance for refugees. The October 1994 elections were a watershed. Before the elections, USAID activities shifted to voter education, electoral commission strengthening, and training local election monitors. These efforts played a key role in ensuring successful elections. After the elections, USAID is supporting new initiatives in decentralization, legal reform, and development of civil society.

In countries where the initial political transition phase has been completed, Missions concentrate on consolidating democratic development. In Bolivia, for example, USAID is working to improve the effectiveness and accountability of judicial systems and legislatures. In Namibia, one of Africa's newer democracies, USAID is encouraging more diverse representation in parliament and supporting civic education programs.

Not all efforts have led to unequivocal successes. The Dominican Republic's May 1994 elections were widely regarded as fraudulent, notwithstanding USAID support for the electoral commission and an international monitoring effort. In Zambia, corruption among top government officials led the United States and other donors to reduce assistance. (Since then, Zambia has enacted a new parliamentary and ministerial code and announced plans for a corrupt practices act.) In Indonesia, the government has proposed legislation that would limit the freedom and effectiveness of NGOs; if enacted and enforced, the entire USAID program would have to be reassessed.

Rule of Law and Human Rights

Citizens require a strong legal framework to ensure their fundamental rights, to establish procedures for redress, and to enforce contracts. More than 75 percent of USAID's sustainable development Missions with democracy programs support work in rule of law and human rights. Of the 11 countries reporting some results to date, nine are showing progress toward their objectives.

Rule of law programs began in Latin America in the 1960s and spread there and in other regions in the 1980s. As a result of these programs, access to legal advice and redress through legal aid and alternative dispute resolution has increased significantly for poor and marginal populations. In Bolivia, for example, the Inter-American Bar Foundation, with USAID support, has established three neighborhood reconciliation centers and plans to increase this number to 20 by 1997. USAID also helped eight Latin American countries adopt and implement re-

[7] Countries that changed from "not free" to "partly free" or "partly free" to "free". The six countries are Haiti, Malawi, Mozambique, Panama, South Africa, and Uganda.

vised criminal codes and move toward systems featuring public trials and clear limits on pretrial detention.

In Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States, advisors are helping reform judicial procedures, train judges, revamp law school curricula, and develop bar associations. Effective work in court reform requires strong political support. Where this is lacking, we have focused on building constituencies and local NGOs to push for judicial reform.

USAID is making human rights a more visible objective, working with local and international NGOs to increase support for human rights monitoring and education. For example, Latin American partners, including the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights and indigenous NGOs, actively spread awareness of citizen rights. Publications advocating human rights are now available in every country in the region.

Elections and Political Processes

Providing channels for citizens to negotiate conflicting interests peacefully and to participate actively in government decision-making is at the heart of the democratic process. To this end, USAID supports open, honest elections; vigorous, effective legislatures; and more competent, representative political parties. Seventeen Missions have established objectives in this area; of seven for which data are available, six are showing progress toward their targets.

USAID's election support emphasizes building local capacity to conduct and monitor elections and educating citizens about the elections process and their role in it. Assistance to electoral tribunals in Bolivia, El Salvador, Panama, Mozambique, and South Africa helped ensure elections that were accepted as legitimate. In Bolivia, USAID was successful in building electoral institutions and supporting registration of 1.4 million voters in 1993; attention has now shifted to local issues. In Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Ukraine, USAID assistance played an important role in voter registration, and turnout exceeded expectations for elections held during 1994.

As part of the effort to strengthen the political process, particularly following transition elections, USAID has sought to reinforce the role and capacity of legislatures. These efforts have helped legislatures in several countries obtain more and better information for decision-making. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, programs have built legislative research and information systems independent of those for the executive branch in eight countries.

"In Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Ukraine, USAID assistance played an important role in voter registration, and turnout exceeded expectations."

Civil Society

USAID supports a wide range of NGOs that champion reforms essential for democratic governance, including labor federations, business associations, policy think tanks, and human rights, pro-democracy and environmental groups. Many of these civil society organizations spearheaded pro-democracy reform movements in their countries. Twelve sustainable development Missions have identified this as a major focus of their democracy programs.

USAID support strengthened democratic reform in Chile and Thailand. In Thailand, labor unions and environmental organizations receiving USAID assistance for sector-specific activities played central roles in the national campaign to restore elected civilian government in 1992. The same groups are now promoting constitutional reforms to ensure greater accountability in public life, limit the political role of

the military, and build strong local government.

In Chile, seven elections from 1988 through 1993 were crucial to restoring democratic governance. During this period, two organizations received USAID assistance to organize massive voter education campaigns. Their efforts contributed significantly to Chile's peaceful transition to democracy.

Accountable Governance

Executive branches that are arbitrary, narrowly based, inept, and corrupt pose a primary obstacle to sustainable development. They erode public confidence, threaten political stability, stifle individual and group initiative, and create an unpredictable environment for social and economic investment. Fourteen sustainable development Missions are pursuing objectives in accountable governance. According to results reported to date for eight Missions, seven are showing progress toward their targets.

Much of USAID's assistance aims at decentralizing power and authority from strong central governments to local communities and broadening opportunities for direct citizen participation in political processes. In Honduras and Nicaragua, for example, USAID-supported programs have established a tradition of frequent town meetings and opened other decision-making bodies to citizens.

In El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mozambique, USAID has facilitated public dialogue about the role of the military in democratic governments and supported reintegration of soldiers into civilian life.

Increased Information Flow

Citizens must be well informed to participate effectively in democratic processes. This requires media that are unbiased, legitimate, able to investigate and analyze events, and free from government interference. In many developing countries, the media are fettered by government restrictions, their own ineptitude and irresponsibility, and a lack of public confidence in what they report.

In recent years, progress has been made in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and the New Independent States in improving the capacity and openness of the media. USAID support to The Asia Foundation helped develop journalistic skills in the press and mass media in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. In Madagascar, USAID trained journalists in economic reform and accountability. In Central America, USAID trained 50 percent of the region's journalists and media managers in journalistic ethics. In 1989, citizens of the region had little faith in the media; by 1994, a public opinion poll found the media ranked second to the Catholic Church in credibility.

Learning from Experience

Although USAID's major emphasis on building democracy is recent, we have already learned important lessons from experience:

- Democracy must be substantially homegrown and cannot be imposed on the basis of a preconceived model. For this reason, USAID programs are designed following an assessment of existing conditions within a country.
- Adoption of democratic rule comes most reliably when there are strong demands for reform from vigorous citizen groups. Once reforms are introduced, these groups also play a watchdog role in ensuring that politicians and officials adhere to new democratic rules.
- Although international monitoring plays an important role in the conduct of elections, sustainable democratic development requires local capacity to monitor elections.
- Ensuring fair and impartial judicial systems is a high-risk strategy in countries where political will is lacking. Thus, as articulated in a recent six-country evaluation of donor Rule of Law programs, USAID must often support constituency groups that advocate legal and judicial reform, in addition to programs helping revise legal codes and judicial administration.

Stabilizing World Population Growth and Protecting Human Health

Strategy and Objectives

RAPID POPULATION growth and poor health are inextricably linked to the factors that keep nations poor. They are also closely associated with low status and limited rights for women. USAID's strategy to stabilize population growth and protect human health has five priorities:

- preventing unwanted pregnancies and abortions;
- reducing deaths of children from preventable diseases;
- decreasing pregnancy-related deaths;
- preventing transmission of sexually related diseases such as HIV/AIDS; and
- increasing the basic education of girls and women.

USAID is a leading donor in this sector. Its technical leadership and support for country programs have contributed directly to dramatic results in lowered mortality and fertility and significant movement toward stabilizing world population. Annual world population growth dropped from 2 percent in the 1960s to 1.57 percent in the 1990s. This is the lowest growth rate since the 1940s and has happened while fewer children are dying and people in general are living longer. Improvements in infant and child survival and achievement of desired smaller family size have occurred particularly rapidly in countries where USAID has concentrated its assistance.

Results

Ninety percent (37) of USAID's sustainable development Missions are pursuing objectives in population or health. The impact of USAID assistance is particularly notable in family planning and child survival, where USAID has the longest track record. With our development partners, we have contributed to major changes in access to services, quality of care, individual health status, health and family planning options and practices, and average family size. These are among the best documented results in the field of development, a direct consequence of USAID's long-term investment in demographic and health surveys and research and training. There are also promising results in newer areas such as maternal health, on which USAID is beginning to focus.

Family Planning

In 34 sustainable development countries, the Agency is helping implement programs that enable families to achieve desired family size. Most programs are reaching or exceeding their objectives. In the 28 countries that have received the largest amount of population assistance, average family size has decreased from 6.1 children in the 1960s to 4.2 in 1992. In five USAID-assisted countries, the percentage of couples using modern contraceptive methods has increased by more than 2 percent a year since the late 1980s. In almost all other USAID-assisted countries for which we have recent data, average annual increases in the contraceptive prevalence rate have exceeded 1 percent. These results are especially impressive since the number of people to be served increases substantially every year. Just maintaining existing levels of contraceptive use requires expanded service delivery.

USAID's contribution to moderating population growth is shown in countries like Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, and Morocco where we have been the major provider of technical and financial assistance for years. In each country,

a clear pattern has emerged of increased family planning knowledge, expanded and improved service delivery, increased contraceptive use, and decreased desired and actual family size.

Tanzania provides a dramatic example of how our assistance contributes to national-level changes. In 1990, when USAID began its first population project, most family planning clinics lacked essential supplies and trained staff. Assistance focused on improving management and supply systems, providing better staff skills, and expanding client information and choices. Since 1991, modern contraceptive use has more than doubled, from 7 percent to 15 percent.

Child Survival

The death of a child from a preventable disease is still too common. A recent survey of 30 developing nations found that at least 25 percent of women of reproductive age have lost at least one child. USAID works with its partners to reach the international goal of reducing child mortality rates by one-third in this decade. Twenty-eight Missions have set child survival objectives. Of the eight Missions reporting results to date, six are achieving their targets.

> ***"From 1985 through 1992, infant mortality declined by 10 percent in USAID-assisted countries."***

Although the HIV/AIDS pandemic may be eroding previous gains in child survival in some African countries, overall there have been important improvements in child health in the past decade. From 1985 through 1992, infant mortality declined by 10 percent in USAID-assisted countries. In some countries the decline was even greater, ranging from 17 percent in Bolivia to almost 50 percent in Honduras. During the same period, mortality rates for children under 5 in USAID-assisted countries dropped by 10 percent to 40 percent. In Egypt, child deaths before the age of 5 dropped from 130 per 1,000 in 1985 to 85 per 1,000 in 1990.

USAID is contributing to increased immunization coverage. From 1980 to 1990, the percentage of children immunized against major preventable diseases increased from 20 percent to 80 percent. Worldwide, this increase saves the lives of an estimated 2.8 million children every year. In 1994, polio was eradicated in the Western Hemisphere by a multinational effort in which the United States was the lead donor.

In the 1970s, USAID was the chief supporter of research in Bangladesh that led to development of oral rehydration therapy to prevent deaths from diarrhea. With USAID assistance, use of the therapy during diarrheal episodes among children continued to increase, from 12 percent in 1984 to 46 percent in 1992. This treatment saves children's lives in the United States as well as in developing countries. It prevents an estimated one million child deaths worldwide each year.

By working with partners, we are able to leverage other resources. This is well illustrated by the vitamin A program in the Philippines. First, the Philippine Department of Health, Helen Keller International (a U.S. private voluntary organization), and Hoffman-LaRoche (a U.S. pharmaceutical company) joined forces with USAID in a campaign to prevent blindness by distributing vitamin A capsules to 90 percent of preschool children. Now, a longer-term solution—making low-cost vitamin A-fortified margarine available in local markets—has been developed by the Nutrition Center of the Philippines (a local NGO), Johns Hopkins University, and Procter and Gamble, all working in partnership with USAID.

Maternal Health

Of all health statistics, maternal mortality is the one that shows the greatest disparity between the developed and developing world. African, Asian, and Haitian women are up to 200 times more likely to die as a result of pregnancy than women from industrial countries.

With programs in 24 sustainable development countries, USAID is working toward the worldwide goal of reducing maternal mortality by half by the year 2000. While it is unlikely that this ambitious goal can be met, USAID-assisted demonstration projects in countries such as Bolivia and Indonesia are showing that better care during pregnancy and delivery can save women's and babies' lives. In Bolivia, for example, a pilot project in 50 rural communities, which focused on improved self-diagnosis of maternal and neonatal health problems and referral and improved care for those with complications, reduced the death rate of babies under 1 month of age from 117 per 1,000 live births to 44. Maternal deaths from pregnancy-related causes in the pilot communities decreased from 11 to 7 a year.

Preventing Transmission of Sexually Related Diseases, Including HIV/AIDS

USAID is the leading bilateral donor providing technical and other support for programs to prevent the transmission of sexually related diseases. Since 1986, we have provided more than $500 million for HIV/AIDS prevention. Seventeen Missions are pursuing objectives in this area through programs aimed at promoting safer sexual behavior through information, education and communication; increasing correct use of condoms; improving treatment services; and working with government and community leaders to develop policies that support effective prevention activities.

In Africa, where USAID has provided the most support, knowledge of HIV/AIDS has increased dramatically. The majority of adults can identify at least two effective methods of lessening the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS. In Thailand, USAID helped a national program slow the spread of the virus. We are helping other countries become familiar with the lessons learned in Thailand.

Basic Education for Girls and Women

Basic education, especially for women and girls, is also a focus of USAID's economic growth strategy. Results from our programs in this area were discussed in the economic growth section above.

Learning from Experience

Operations research, analysis, and information on program performance have helped us achieve our objectives in stabilizing population and protecting human health. Among the lessons learned are these:

- USAID's ability to combine effective management and collaborative programming with technical approaches has been an important element in our success. Technical interventions such as increased immunization, use of oral rehydration therapy, vitamin A supplementation, child spacing, and breastfeeding should be combined with management improvements such as better handling of vaccines and other critical supplies, decentralized administration, and close collaboration among host country and donor agencies.
- It is important to address the sustainability of family planning and health services at the early stages of program planning. Sustaining programs requires improved management, removing legal or regulatory barriers to efficient service delivery, stronger local institutions, better trained managers and service providers, and involving the private sector through innovative approaches such as social marketing.
- Providing a high quality of care and, where feasible, a range of services together is extremely important.

Protecting the Environment

Strategy and Objectives

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS increasingly threaten the economic and political interests of the United States and the world at large. Degradation of rural and urban environments has led to increases in human illness, loss of economic productivity, and a reduced standard of living for countless people in the developing world. Environmental degradation in these countries also affects Americans directly through the loss of economically important biological diversity and rising levels of greenhouse gases. These problems require international cooperation.

USAID is working with U.S. and host country partners to support the sustainable development objectives of Agenda 21—the recommendations from the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (1992 Rio Earth Summit). USAID programs address long-term threats to the global environment, particularly loss of biodiversity and global climate change. They also promote sustainable economic growth locally, nationally, and regionally by modifying policies and practices that have damaged the environment and by building local institutions to address environmental problems.

Programs to address global objectives concentrate on a limited number of countries where progress is likely to have the greatest impact worldwide.[8] Selected results of USAID's biological diversity programs are described below. USAID's impacts on global climate change are not yet well documented, as these initiatives are new to the Agency. USAID is engaged in major efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in key countries. Details on this effort can be found in our June 1994 report to Congress, *Global Climate Change: The USAID Response.*

Programs to protect the environment at national and local levels also figure prominently in a wide range of sustainable development countries. They seek to protect biological resources, promote environmentally sound urban and industrial development, foster efficient use of renewable and non-renewable energy, improve the availability and quality of water, and encourage better stewardship of natural resources.

Activities related to energy and water are important in many countries, but they have often been components of broader development activities. As a result, impacts have frequently been assessed more in terms of their economic and social consequences rather than on strictly environmental criteria. Also, the environmental impacts of certain water and energy activities are often reported under other environmental objectives. For example, assistance for wastewater treatment activities in Egypt are reported in the section on urban and industrial development, and coastal resource management pilot activities in Sri Lanka, Ecuador, and Thailand appear in the natural resource management discussion.

This document reports on the impacts of activities in the areas where USAID has had more long standing or focused programs—biodiversity protection, stewardship of the natural resource base, and urban and industrial pollution prevention—and where a more significant body of results is available.

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[8] The key countries for global warming are Brazil, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. While active in a number of countries with biodiversity concerns, USAID is in the process of identifying priority countries for its biodiversity investments. That list tentatively includes the following countries or regions: Bolivia, Brazil, the Central African region, Central America, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, and Thailand.

Results

Sixty percent (25) of the sustainable development Missions have one or more environmental objectives. These Missions are spread widely across Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Biodiversity

At current rates of destruction, it is estimated that 5 percent to 10 percent of all living plant and animal species will be extinct by 2025. Against this threat, significant human and financial resources have been mobilized to protect biologically rich habitats. The results are impressive. Between 1980 and 1990, the amount of land set aside by the nations of the world in protected areas increased 40 percent, from 4.5 million square kilometers to 6.5 million. Of these, 4.1 million square kilometers are in developing countries—an area about three times the size of Alaska.

> ***"USAID support has led to creation of 26 protected areas covering 5.6 million hectares in 12 countries."***

USAID is an active partner in this effort. In 1994, we supported more than 90 biodiversity activities in 40 countries. Thirteen sustainable development Missions have major programs in this area. Five have reported results to date and all are achieving or exceeding their objectives.

Through the Parks in Peril program, USAID support has led to creation of 26 protected areas covering 5.6 million hectares in 12 countries. Noel Kempff Mercado Park in Bolivia is one example. Lumber extraction within the park has declined, takings of river turtles and their eggs have decreased, confiscation of illegal products is down 66 percent, and responsible tourism visits increased by 400 percent from 1992 to 1994. In the Philippines, debt-for-nature swaps have endowed a $25 million environmental fund. Interest earned has financed more than 100 projects designed and implemented by grass-roots environmental NGOs.

Not all the news is positive, however. Many protected areas are too small, fragmented, or degraded to offer real sanctuary for embattled species. Disputes over land tenure conditions and inadequate enforcement activities result in ineffective protection of many other protected areas. Opportunities to generate revenues from sustainable use of protected habitats are still being missed. These lessons are being incorporated into the next generation of environmental activities.

Natural Resources Management

Maintaining the productivity of natural resources, particularly for agriculture, is an area in which USAID has built significant expertise. Eighteen Missions now have natural resource objectives. Of the nine reporting results, six are achieving or exceeding performance targets. Concern about negative environmental effects of agricultural practices led USAID to develop and promote new technologies to maintain or increase long-term productivity, and involve farmers—men and women—more actively in the process.

For example, in Honduras, we are helping transform destructive hillside agricultural practices and provide farm families with land-use technologies that decrease erosion and increase crop yields. The number of poor hillside-farming households adopting environmentally sound cultivation practices doubled to more than 21,000 between 1989 and 1993, reducing soil erosion by 70,000 tons. At the same time, 10,000 participating families increased their yields at least 30 percent. Extension training activities carried out by male and female community leaders is speeding the dissemination of improved technologies among neighboring farmers. USAID has decreased deforestation and promoted reforestation in several countries. In Pakistan, communities that suffer from fuelwood shortages are promoting tree farming after policy and economic reforms established a market for seedlings. More than 100

million trees have been planted on private farmlands, with good survival rates.

In the Philippines and Nepal, where forests are rapidly disappearing, new laws transfer management of public forests to local communities. In the Philippines, more than 12 million hectares are now communally managed and are beginning to show increased forest regeneration and improved soil and water retention, bringing economic benefits to local communities.

Support for integrated pest management is also reducing environmental damage and increasing yields. In Indonesia, a catalytic USAID investment in a multi-donor project helped to show how reducing pesticide use can boost farm incomes from rice cultivation. In 1986, the government began training farmers how to distinguish between pests and their natural predators and how to calculate whether the predators were doing a better job of keeping down pests than chemicals. As a result of this program, rice yields among farmers using IPM are approximately 15 percent higher compared to other farmers under similar conditions and pesticide use is down 65 percent nationwide. Integrated pest management reduced environmental damage and health risks to farmers and saved $120 million in insecticide subsidies.

"Strategies that increase local stewardship by empowering and encouraging participation of local people are more effective than those that rely on government agencies alone."

Pilot activities in coastal resources management have had major impacts through policy changes and participatory approaches in several countries. In Thailand a model strategy for local/national partnerships in managing the country's coral reefs has now been extended to mangrove wetlands and the coastal zone as a whole. This expanded program, financed by the Thai government, will lead to better management of shrimp farming and tourism, activities not previously managed sustainably.

In Sri Lanka, we helped create a new planning system to control coastal erosion through adoption of set-back regulations and environmental impact assessments for all activities that alter the coastal area. In Ecuador, 194 groups of fishermen, mollusc collectors, shrimp farmers, and tourism and residential developers now work with government agencies in five special management areas to set coastal policies.

Urban and Industrial Pollution

Benefits of urban and industrial development are being increasingly offset by the high social costs of environmental problems. This problem is a target of programs in eight sustainable development countries, as well as in the ENI region. USAID is working to transfer U.S. domestic experience to its work overseas, ranging from legal and policy changes at the national level to pollution audits for individual plants affecting particular neighborhoods.

USAID supports expanded wastewater treatment in Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, and Thailand. In Egypt, where we finance major wastewater infrastructure, the percent of wastewater treated in Cairo and Alexandria increased from 40 percent to 75 percent, reducing by 81,000 tons a year the pollutants entering the Nile, the sole source of water for most Egyptians.

Housing Guaranty programs have leveraged reforms that result in expanded provision of potable water, sewers, and solid waste disposal on a sustainable basis. Quito, Ecuador, provides a good example. There technical assistance and the promise of Housing Guaranty funds led to reform of the Municipal Water Authority. New accounting and information systems improved budgeting, service extensions, tariff collection, and leak detection, lowering operating costs by 25

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percent. Moreover, USAID advisors showed that construction codes were over-engineered, resulting in prohibitively high new-service costs. After revising the codes, new service costs became affordable for low-income families. In 3 years, the Water Authority has made 35,000 new household connections and upgraded services to Quito's marginal neighborhoods, benefiting 180,000 people. The Authority, now financially solid, has obtained private loans and is extending service to the remaining 10 percent of Quito's population currently lacking piped water.

Efforts to decrease industrial pollution are also having significant impacts. In Tunisia, a pollution audit at a lead battery plant led the owner to invest $8,000 in new equipment and change its operating procedures. Operating costs dropped by $770,000 a year and lead dust and lead-contaminated water emissions were cut by 60 percent. As news of this savings spread, other battery makers implemented the same changes without USAID assistance.

Learning from Experience

Two lessons stand out from efforts to protect the environment:

- Strategies that increase local stewardship by empowering and encouraging participation of local people are more effective than those that rely on government agencies alone. Whether for managing a nature reserve, cleaning up a polluted river, changing farming systems, or reforming environmental policies, local stewardship is essential to sustained success.
- Linking sound environmental practices to real economic benefits—"win-win" strategies—characterize our more effective programs. Evaluations show the environment will more likely be managed well when tangible economic benefit can be derived from doing so. Sustainable upland agriculture practices are adopted readily if they increase local farm incomes; parks are protected if communities share entry fees.

Providing Humanitarian Assistance and Aiding Post-Crisis Transitions

Strategy and Objectives

AS SUPERPOWER tensions ease in the 1990s, religious and ethnic rivalries are leading to armed conflict, widespread dislocation, and death and suffering on a massive scale, especially in Africa and the Balkans. These conflicts destroy social, political, and economic institutions and set the development process back by decades.

Natural disasters, too, can erase years of progress in minutes. USAID's humanitarian programs seek to save lives and reduce suffering in the face of disasters, return individuals to self-sufficiency, and establish conditions for countries to move toward sustainable development and democracy in the aftermath of crises. In these efforts, we work as partners with U.S. and local NGOs, other bilateral donors, U.N. organizations and the recipients themselves.

USAID has four objectives for its humanitarian assistance:

- timely delivery of disaster relief and short-term rehabilitation;
- preventing disasters and reducing the vulnerability of populations at risk;
- preserving the basic institutions of civil governance during periods of crisis and transition; and
- protecting the food security and health of vulnerable groups during conflicts or periods of reform.

In 1994, humanitarian assistance was provided to more than 50 countries; the majority of funds went to the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and 13 African countries. Emergency food assistance alone reached an estimated 58 million people in 18 countries with daily rations. USAID responded to 60 declared disasters, more than 40 percent of which were complex crises involving civil conflict.

Results

Timely Delivery of Disaster Relief

USAID assistance reduced suffering, saved thousands of lives, protected development progress, and hastened the return to sustainable development after crises. We responded quickly to an earthquake in India, a cyclone in Mozambique, flooding in Tajikistan, landslides in Colombia, volcanic mudflows in the Philippines, and 33 other natural disasters with food, medical supplies, temporary shelter, and other relief.

USAID and the rest of the international relief community have become more proficient at responding to rapid-onset disasters. The number of such disasters decreased 25 percent from 1992 to 1994, while USAID expenditures dropped by half, indicating improved efficiency. There is also a growing capability to respond to drought emergencies. Timely delivery of food and other resources and U.S. leadership of the donor effort in response to the 1992 drought in southern Africa prevented mass migration and starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. At the same time, it fostered long-term sustainable development in the region.

In 1994, the U.S. response to complex emergencies was controversial, but it achieved significant results. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, food and other assistance helped prevent widespread death from starvation and exposure in the winter of 1993-94. In Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire, the Department of Defense and USAID provided a potable-water system that broke the back of a cholera epidemic among the camp's 800,000 inhabitants. In Angola, Liberia, and Sudan, 25 million people dislocated by civil war were fed with PL-480 food aid delivered by NGOs and the World Food Program.

Preventing Disasters and Reducing the Vulnerability of Populations at Risk

USAID's efforts to help prevent, prepare for, and mitigate disasters has paid big dividends. Early-warning systems for famine and pestilence in Africa, and elsewhere for volcanoes, have become increasingly effective in saving lives, property and rehabilitation costs. Famine early-warning system data and reporting across Africa have allowed donors and governments to target food aid to affected people more quickly. In Malawi, for example, famine early-warning system staff helped the government develop an effective food distribution schedule based on crop estimates.

In West Africa, USAID's Emergency Locust/Grasshopper Assistance allowed Mauritania, Senegal, and The Gambia to avoid major crop losses during a locust outbreak in 1993. And in the Philippines, warnings from a local volcanology institute, using USAID-funded equipment and advisors, enabled early evacuation of at least 80,000 people and saved an estimated $1 billion in property when Mount Pinatubo erupted in 1991.

Training programs have also built the capacity of governments and NGOs in Latin America to respond to disasters. Governments there now need fewer U.S. resources in times of crisis. For example, in Colombia local authorities trained by USAID were able to respond to a 1994 earthquake with minimal outside assistance, in marked contrast to 1985, when $2.75 million was provided after an earthquake of similar scale.

Preserving Civil Governance During Crisis and Transition

Transition initiatives are extremely difficult owing to the environments in which they take place, frequently involving armed conflict. USAID efforts in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia have shown little progress. However, support to Mozambique helped that country emerge from 17 years of civil strife and the 1992 drought to hold free and fair multi-party elections in October 1994. Recent efforts to restore democracy in Haiti have also been promising.

Protecting Vulnerable Groups

In strife-torn Ethiopia and Mozambique, working through networks of PVOs and government-to-government food-aid programs, USAID provided safety nets for vulnerable groups, kept farmers on their land, and helped them keep tools and other assets until the crises passed. The number of emergency food-aid recipients has now dropped significantly in these countries. Emergency food provided a critical safety net for 26,000 people in Gaza-West Bank during the transition to autonomous rule, for more than 1.2 million vulnerable people in Haiti through its recent political crisis, and for 3,500 Guatemalan refugees who had fled to Mexico.

> ***"In 1994, humanitarian assistance was provided to more than 50 countries....Emergency food assistance alone reached an estimated 58 million people."***

Learning from Experience

From our experience in humanitarian and post-crisis transition, we have learned several key lessons. Among them:

- Regular attention to the transition from relief to development in program planning has high payoffs. To ignore disaster risks in planning sustainable development programs, or conversely, to ignore the development and transition implications of emergency conditions and of emergency assistance can be costly. This lesson is especially important for the countries of the Greater Horn of Africa, probably the most food-insecure in the world. USAID is

a key donor in the region. In our strategy there, the relief-to-development continuum is a major planning concept for addressing food insecurity.

- Early detection and warning of potential hazards or emergencies is the most important way to avert major disasters. USAID is expanding its early-warning systems into new regions and new sectors.
- Social safety net programs are most effective when designed to help beneficiaries participate actively in recovery and development activities. Governments must be genuinely committed to compensatory programs if they are to succeed.

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Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States

Strategy and Objectives

THE CHANGES that swept Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-91 were historic. They prompted a unique and innovative U.S. assistance program led by USAID. As these countries emerged from communist rule, economic activity was centrally controlled, private ownership was virtually non-existent in the former Soviet Union and some of its satellites, and little was known about how to establish free-market economies and democracy. Governments were not based on the will of the people nor accountable to them. Energy was used inefficiently, and pollution was widespread. Progress against these challenges has been impressive, but much remains to be done.

USAID's ENI programs have three priorities:

- *economic restructuring*, to foster competitive, market-oriented economies in which the majority of resources are privately owned and managed;
- *democracy*, to support transparent and accountable governance and empower citizens through political processes; and
- *social sector restructuring*, to strengthen the capacity of some countries to ease hardships of at-risk groups during the transition and restructure social benefits to make them sustainable.

Results

Economic Restructuring

USAID programs are helping transfer state-owned assets to the private sector, establish more stable business environments, facilitate expansion of private enterprise, promote fiscal and financial sector reform, and support sustainable uses of natural resources. Central to this effort are USAID-funded advisors who actively help draft policies, legislation, and regulatory procedures needed to break up monopolies, establish markets, and strengthen competition.

Assistance in privatizing industry and in new business start-up has contributed substantially to private sector growth in many countries. In Russia, USAID helped establish a nationwide voucher system, which enabled 70 percent of Russian industry to be privatized and 40 million Russians to become shareholders. As a result, more than 40 percent of industrial workers are now in the private sector, and 25 percent of Russian households own their homes. An estimated 65 percent of Czech Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is now produced in the private sector. New private sectors in eight countries—Albania, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia—each produce 50 percent to 55 percent of GDP. In the remaining countries, the private sector share of GDP in mid-1994 ranged between 20 percent and 40 percent. Land privatization, however, has been more complex, and progress considerably slower.

USAID-created Enterprise Funds in Central and Eastern Europe have sustained 21,000 jobs, created 11,000 more, and generated over $60 million in earnings. Twenty-three joint ventures with U.S. companies have been created, attracting $150 million in private foreign investment.

Appropriate energy pricing and the sustainable use of natural resources are also key to a market economy. Advisors are working to improve pricing policies and to introduce new energy-efficient technologies. They have trained more than 20 local private companies in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania in energy efficiency business development, while demonstrating U.S. energy efficiency equipment at more than 40 plants. These demonstrations generated immediate savings

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of $16 million in energy costs from investments of $1.2 million. Energy audits and demonstrations have improved efficiency by as much as 30 percent in urban heating systems in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, and Ukraine. Use of U.S. equipment costing $1 million resulted in an estimated annual savings of $14 million in these systems.

Savings from environmental assistance are also considerable. Through waste minimization programs, participating industries have saved more than $17 million from waste recycling, resource conservation, and reduction in payments for pollution fees and fines. Five cities in Poland have saved more than $2 million by redesigning new wastewater treatment plants. Private consultants trained by USAID are now being contracted by other cities to design similar solutions for their wastewater treatment plants. Plant managers who participated in the industrial waste minimization program are marketing new technologies to their peers throughout the region.

Lasting improvements in the region's environment will also be achieved from policy changes directly resulting from USAID assistance. To date, these include environmental impact assessment laws in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, an auto fuel tax to reduce carbon monoxide emissions in Budapest, and appropriate increases in environmental fees and user charges in Poland.

Democracy

USAID has helped countries hold credible and effective elections across the region. We have learned, however, that free elections by themselves do not guarantee that political reform will continue. Successful democratic change results from an array of reforms to strengthen democratic processes, including the rule of law, autonomous local government, and a strong civil society, including an independent media. Our ENI democracy programs have achieved significant results in each area.

With USAID help, many parliaments in the region have enacted critical political reforms, including new election laws that help ensure fair and democratic elections. Hungary, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Russia have adopted new constitutions, and elections and civil liberties laws. Advisors helped draft provisions of Russia's new civil code that guarantee freedom of contract and protection of private property, laying the foundation for development of new commercial laws needed for a market-based economy.

Pluralistic democratic non-governmental organizations were virtually non-existent under communism. By helping to establish a legal basis for creating non-governmental organizations, USAID has enabled NGOs to flourish across the region. Other activities that have increased the participation of citizens and NGOs in the life of their communities and nations include strengthening local NGO capacity, legal assistance, education reforms, and support to youth, human rights, environmental, business, media, civic, and charitable womens' groups.

> *"By helping to establish a legal basis for creating non-governmental organizations, USAID has enabled NGOs to flourish across the region."*

Judicial systems in Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, and most of Central and Eastern Europe, have become more professional, independent, and better equipped to resolve private property and criminal justice issues. U.S. assistance is also facilitating decentralization and increased accountability of governments. For example, municipal officials in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Russia received training in financial management and provision of urban services.

Social Sector Restructuring

The transition to market-based economies is threatened by legacies of the past.

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Bankruptcy and eventual collapse of the previous system have resulted in massive, unpredictable changes in people's lives because of high inflation, unemployment, and reduction of state-subsidized social services. Public support for reform requires that people believe their current hardships will be addressed by moving to a market economy. Thus, USAID has supported a mix of activities and policies in the social sector.

We have provided immediate help to ease hunger, winter cold, and other hardships in strife-torn republics. We have coordinated with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to supply essential food products to more than two million people. Epidemics of measles and other diseases have been prevented by vaccinating more than 500,000 children in Central Asia.

Thirty-one partnerships between U.S. hospitals and health facilities in ENI countries have transferred medical skills and Western management practices, improving productivity. Women's access to modern reproductive health services has been increased in the Central Asian republics. Environmental health threats at specific sites have been significantly reduced through USAID assistance.

USAID also is encouraging ENI governments to introduce private sector management practices to social services. Results of housing reforms in Russia and Hungary already show that increased revenues from higher rents more than cover the cost of increased housing allowances for the neediest.

Learning from Experience

Key lessons from our programs in the ENI region include:

- USAID learned early in the ENI program that the high costs of assisting with reforms made it important to use our funds to leverage financing available from other donors. This approach has been particularly successful in private sector development, environment, energy, and humanitarian assistance.
- If the quality of life of citizens improves in line with their expectations, political changes are more likely to be sustained.
- No single aspect of democracy programming can guarantee the success or sustainability of democratic transitions. Integrated approaches that simultaneously address the political, social, and economic dimensions of change are essential to sustaining progress toward vast systemic change. U.S. assistance must be shaped and sequenced to help build constituencies for sustaining economic and political reforms.
- Much of USAID's assistance to the private sector has been directed at individual firms. In order to increase the impact of this assistance, we need to extract the broader lessons from our activities and make them available more widely through training centers, business associations, and banks.
- In the environment and energy areas in particular, scarce assistance resources should target high-profile "hot spots" to ensure that results are seen and replicated.

Challenges for the Next Year

USAID has made significant progress, particularly in the last year, in focusing on results. Substantial effort and resources have already been invested, but more is required. USAID must be able to report its results more comprehensively and conclusively, to have a better idea of why and under what circumstances certain approaches work best, to make performance information available more quickly and easily to all managers, and to do this without major new expenditures on management systems. Our agenda for moving along this path in 1995 includes:

- Building on 4 years of experience with Mission strategic planning and the sustainable development strategies developed last year, we will prepare an Agency-wide results framework. It will include performance indicators to assess the results of our development work more uniformly and process indicators to track our internal progress in managing for results.
- Choosing accurate, inexpensive, and easily used performance indicators, at both the operating unit and Agency level, is a complex, analytically difficult task. It will undoubtedly require various iterations as we learn from experience. We will give increased attention to identifying good indicators in 1995, especially for democracy and environment programs.
- USAID will complete development and begin installation of a corporate information system. Among other things, it will include indicators and targets from all strategic plans and the most current information on progress toward these targets. When complete, the system will reduce formal reporting requirements, increase our ability to analyze and report on program performance, allow managers to make decisions better informed by the progress of their activities and lessons of experience, and permit broader, quicker dissemination of results.
- With another year of measuring progress toward strategic and intermediate objectives, and clear guidance from headquarters on performance indicators that are best for measuring Agency-wide success, USAID will be better able to identify programs and approaches that are more, and less, successful in achieving their targets. This will let us concentrate on the most effective programs and learn from experience with them. This will require Missions and bureaus to devote greater analytical and technical resources to performance measurement and evaluation.

Appendix: Countries included in the Annual Performance Report

Sustainable Development Countries

Africa

Benin
Burundi
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Asia and the Near East

Bangladesh
Egypt
India
Indonesia
Jordan
Morocco
Nepal
Philippines
Sri Lanka

Latin America & the Caribbean

Bolivia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Jamaica
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Peru

Europe & New Independent States

Europe

Albania
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia

NIS

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

3. Building Democracy

THE CONVICTION that democracy offers ordinary people unparalleled advantages and opportunities has spread throughout Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union. In 1995 the world holds 114 democracies, the largest number ever. Three fifths of the world's people now live in free or partly free societies. This transition has occurred through elections, expansion of political and civil liberties, and strengthened organizations that advocate for and represent citizens. Notable progress was made in 1994 in El Salvador, Malawi, Mozambique, and South Africa. Less in the news, but no less important, are significant gains in Ukraine, Panama, and Uganda.

Major challenges to sustainable democratic development remain. The remaining two fifths of the world's people live in societies where basic rights are denied. In the Dominican Republic, Kenya, and Mali, expansion of democratic freedom has been reversed. Burundi, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate that ethnic conflicts pose a real and growing threat. New democracies are fragile. Corruption, low literacy, weak economic growth, reluctant military and civil bureaucracies—these and other factors challenge new democratic governments around the world.

USAID Strategy

The international community plays an important role in encouraging democratization throughout the world. In many of the countries where democratic change has occurred, USAID and other donors have worked with host country governments and their people in preserving these changes.

USAID believes that democracy is not only an end in itself, but that it makes a vital contribution to sustainable development. Democratization facilitates the protection of human rights, informed participation, and public sector accountability. It frees individual initiative and promotes a predictable environment for economic and social development. In countries where nondemocractic traditions of repression, corruption, autocracy, human rights abuses, and disregard for rule of law exists, long-term development is hampered.

USAID programs are tailored to country circumstances and available resources. From

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FY 1992 through FY 1994, $820 million of USAID's development budget was invested in building democracy.[9] Twenty-nine sustainable development Missions have significant programs. Sixteen of the host countries are classified as "partly free" and seven as "free" in the most recent Freedom House survey. It is here where we see the greatest potential for promoting and consolidating democratic rule. In the remaining six, classified as "not free," USAID looks for specific opportunities to make progress. USAID has also set democracy objectives in Central and Eastern Europe and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and in places such as Cambodia, Gaza–West Bank, and Haiti.

USAID democratization assistance concentrates on six key areas:

(1) Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights. Citizens of democracies require a strong legal framework to ensure their fundamental rights, to establish procedures for regress, and to enforce contracts. USAID strategies reinforce recognition of the fundamental guarantees of equality, integrity of person, and political participation. The Agency has made human rights a more visible objective and has worked with local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to increase support for human rights monitoring and education. The Agency pays particular attention to human rights in nondemocratic societies. In its rule-of-law programs, USAID now puts more emphasis on independence and equity in application of the law. It puts less on efficiency concerns, which predominated in the early programs dealing with administration of justice. Recent evaluations have also led USAID to realize the importance of creating an active local constituency for reform, especially where host country commitment to judicial reform does not exist.

(2) Strengthening citizen participation and confidence in a more competitive political process. Providing channels for citizens to peacefully negotiate conflicting interests and participate in government decision-making is at the heart of the democratic process. To this end, USAID supports open and honest elections, more vigorous and effective legislatures, and more competent political parties. The Agency provides election assistance to countries that appear to have the political will to conduct honest elections. It places more emphasis now on citizen monitoring and on longer term efforts with electoral tribunals to build their capacity to conduct elections.

In addition, as the recent South African election attests, USAID has learned how useful civic-education efforts conducted by NGOs can be in promoting high levels of registration and voter turnout (see box 3.1). Further, USAID is working to help legislatures serve both as checks on the executive branch and as arenas in which citizens can negotiate and resolve conflicting interests. These legislatures vary in their authority and the extent to which they are representative.

(3) Developing a more pluralistic, competent, and politically active civil society. USAID believes the freedom of citizens to organize collectively is vital to democracy. Independent organizations provide citizens with information and help them formulate and represent their interests. In this way such organizations create strong pressure for government accountability. USAID supports a wide range of NGOs that champion reforms essential for democratic governance. Such NGOs include labor federations, business associations, human rights and prodemocracy groups, environmental organizations, and policy think tanks. Many of these civil society organizations have spearheaded prodemocracy reform movements in their countries. USAID is now completing a study of the development of civil society in five countries. Information from this study will help improve USAID strategies in the coming year.

(4) Developing more accountable governance. Executive branches that are inept,

[9] Includes about $200 million for programs in ENI countries.

Box 3.1. The End of Apartheid in South Africa

USAID began supporting community groups and NGOs working with the black South African population in the mid-1980s. In 1992 the emphasis changed and the Agency gave priority to groups, of whatever race, promoting tolerance. Efforts ranged from increased use of conflict resolution techniques to coping with the devastating effects of violence.

Working primarily through its NGO partners, the Agency mounted a major effort to ensure that the April 1994 election permitted a peaceful transition to democratic government. Efforts to minimize violence were stepped up. USAID-supported voter education activities, essential in preparing a population that had never cast a ballot, were carried out by more than a hundred groups. They reached an estimated 3.6 million people in the 4 months before the election. Through a consortium of private voluntary organizations, USAID helped inexperienced political parties identify constituent needs, develop party platforms, and campaign effectively. USAID also helped indigenous NGOs collect information about the conduct of the elections. These NGOs fielded several hundred election observers throughout the country.

The Agency contributed to a more capable electoral commission, one that could take on the task of running an election that was larger and more complex than any it had conducted before. The commission decided to use a two-ballot system, invalidating voter education materials produced previously. USAID then funded a massive effort to ensure that voters understood how to cast their votes with the new system.

The election went well, with high turnout. The results were accepted, and Nelson Mandela formed a government that for the first time represented the interests of the majority of South Africans.

corrupt, arbitrary, and narrowly based impede sustainable development. They erode public confidence, threaten political stability, stifle individual and group initiative, and create an unpredictable environment for social and economic investment. USAID helps governments decentralize authority and responsibility to the local level. Where military-led governments have given way to those led by civilians, the Agency works to promote a dialogue between these two parties.

(5) Increasing the flow and diversity of information to citizens. Citizens must be well informed to participate effectively in democratic processes. This requires media that are unbiased, legitimate, able to investigate and analyze events, and free from government interference. In many developing countries, the media are fettered by government restrictions, their own ineptitude and irresponsibility, and a lack of public confidence in what they report. Increasing the amount and type of information available to citizens is a component of some USAID country strategies.

The distribution and percentage of Missions with democracy objectives in sustainable development countries are given in table 3.1.

(6) Helping countries outside the sustainable development group make the transition to democracy. Former Soviet-bloc countries and countries emerging from man-made or natural disasters fall into this category.

Performance Results

According to the most recent Freedom House survey, USAID played an important role in six of the eight countries making significant democratic gains.[10] But significant, sustainable democratic change comes neither quickly nor easily. Investments must be made carefully and incrementally in educating citizens about democratic values, redefining government's role, and building key institutions inside and outside government to nur-

[10] Countries that changed from "not free to "partly free," or "partly free" to "free." These countries are Haiti, Malawi, Mozambique, Panama, South Africa, and Uganda.

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Table 3.1. USAID Missions Working in Democracy [a]		
Objective	Number of Missions	Percent of All Missions Working in Democracy[b]
Strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights	22	76
Strengthened citizen participation in more competitive politics	17	59
Development of a more politically active civil society	12	41
More accountable governance	14	48
Increased flow of information to citizens	5	17

[a] Defined as Missions with a strategic objective or other activity in this area; includes only the 41 sustainable development Missions.

[b] Calculated as the number of Missions identifying a particular objective, divided by the total number of Missions (29) identifying a strategic objective or other activity in democracy.

ture the new political environment. Successful transitions often flower from seeds of reform planted much earlier.

Such was the case in South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, and El Salvador. In South Africa, the Agency began in the mid-1980s with support to NGOs and community groups. This led to more intensive work during recent elections on voter education, expanding political work by NGOs, training election observers, and strengthening the electoral commission. USAID's postelection program emphasizes building respect for the rule of law, supporting good governance, and strengthening civic organizations as a check against future abuses of power.

In Mozambique, USAID's help during civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s stressed humanitarian assistance for refugees. The October 1994 elections were a watershed. USAID activities shifted to educating voters, strengthening electoral commissions, and training local election monitors. In this way the Agency played a key role in ensuring successful elections. After the elections, the Agency is supporting new initiatives in decentralization, legal reform, and development of civil society.

In countries where the transition to democracy appears firm, Missions concentrate on consolidating democratic development. In Bolivia, USAID is working to improve the effectiveness and accountability of judicial systems and legislatures. In Namibia, one of Africa's more progressive democracies, the Agency is encouraging more diverse representation in parliament and supporting civic education programs.

Not all efforts are successful. Despite USAID support, the Dominican Republic's May 1994 elections were widely regarded as fraudulent. In Zambia corruption among top government officials led the United States and other donors to reduce assistance. (Since then, Zambia has enacted a new parliamentary and ministerial code and announced plans for a corrupt practices act.) In Indonesia the National Assembly is considering regressive legislation that would limit the freedom and effectiveness of NGOs. In such cases, USAID has reoriented its programs and sought other ways to support democratic change.

The following subsections discuss each of USAID's primary objectives in democracy and the results achieved to date.

Strengthening Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Twenty-two of USAID's 41 sustainable development Missions support work in rule of law and human rights. USAID also works

in other countries to develop the rule of law and greater respect for human rights. These Missions focus on two primary strategies: improving the administration of justice and increasing support for human rights.

Improved Administration of Justice

USAID's Administration of Justice Program encourages cooperating countries to improve the performance of their judicial institutions and their contribution to strengthening and consolidating democratic rule.

USAID's investments in law programs date back to the 1960s. The current resurgence of support for these programs began in the 1980s with the Agency's initiation of the Administration of Justice Program in Latin America. Since then, these programs have spread to Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the new independent states.

The Agency strengthens administration of justice through five core activities. First is creating an active constituency for judicial reform. Second is improving access of all citizens to the judicial process. Third is increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the judiciary. Fourth is increasing the independence and accountability of the judicial system. And fifth is promoting the judiciary's equality, fairness, and integrity.

Addressing constraints in the judicial sector can be difficult, especially when host country commitment is not evident. In these cases, USAID has found that emphasis on building constituencies and local NGO capacity to advocate for reform in the judicial sector may be more effective than other donor interventions.

Judicial and legal reform can be brought about in several ways. The Agency has found that one effective approach is fostering vigorous public demand for change. This approach requires educating the public of its rights under the law and organizing groups that can influence appropriate government institutions (see box 3.2). USAID finds that strengthening legal systems is not necessarily the best strategy for beginning rule-of-law programs. Where there is an absence of political will or public pressure to demand and support improvement in judicial performance, strengthening legal systems is a high-risk strategy that, by itself, will almost certainly fail.

Box 3.2. Poster Power

In Ecuador, as a part of the Agency's consensus-building activities for judicial reform, a USAID-supported NGO (the Latin American Development Corporation) and the National Federation of Judicial Employees have begun an anticorruption campaign. A series of posters exhorting people to denounce judicial corruption has been distributed to all judicial districts; the posters have been prominently displayed.

Recently a letter appeared in *El Telégrafo* (Guayaquil) telling how one person was inspired by the message. The author, a lawyer, stated that as a result of seeing the posters, he had decided to complain about the poor service he had received—an unjustified 6-month delay in sending a case from one department to the next.

Although only a few Missions are now actively involved in building judicial reform constituencies, more plan to expand their efforts in this area. A major outcome of these efforts is the creation of judicial and sectorwide reform-planning bodies in Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Jamaica.

USAID also supports improving access to the judicial process. Many Missions have programs that make legal services available and affordable to poor and marginalized people. Working largely through NGOs, the Agency provides paralegal training, legal aid services, legal literacy campaigns, and training and technical assistance for alternative dispute resolution—ways to resolve legal disputes outside the courts.

Alternative dispute resolution has become a popular mechanism for legal redress in many developing countries. Results to date include the following:

- In Argentina, where mediation has become a mechanism for settling disputes, USAID has been working with an NGO, Fun-

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dación Libre, to develop four pilot legal-aid and mediation centers. In 1993, 612 cases were resolved by mediation, up from 576 in 1992 and 400 in 1991. Furthermore, the Government of Argentina has agreed to assume the program's costs once USAID's involvement phases out. That will increase the program's chances for sustainability.

- In Bolivia one of USAID's objectives is to improve the effectiveness and accessibility of democratic institutions. Through its support of the Inter-American Bar Foundation, USAID has contributed to establishing three neighborhood reconciliation centers. In 1992 there were none. The number is expected to reach 20 by 1997.

Increasing the efficiency of the legal process produces rapid and visible results and helps build confidence in and respect for the judicial system. Most Missions working in administration of justice have adopted this strategy for their host countries—for example, by training staff, automating case-tracking systems, introducing procedures for competitive hiring, and improving court management and budgeting systems. Such efforts resulted in modernizing court administration in Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay.

In Peru, for example, USAID is assisting in a transition from the country's current antiquated inquisitorial system of justice to a modern accusatorial one. Through technical assistance and training, USAID has implemented a fully automated case-tracking system. It has also worked on the design and operation of the new office of the court administrator. The improvements will relieve Peru's Supreme Court of the burden of administering the court system. As a result of such work, USAID hopes to decrease the average time it takes to obtain a ruling in the civilian courts from 26 months in 1992 to just 16 by 1998.

Experience has shown, however, that considerations of independence, equity, and fairness are at least as important to sustained democratic development as issues of efficiency. USAID supports judicial independence and accountability primarily through legal training, improvement of court administration, revision of the criminal code, and establishment of management information systems. In Uruguay, for example, USAID supports professional training programs for the judiciary through the Center for Judicial Studies. The Agency also assists Nicaragua in professionalizing its judicial system. Chile's program aims at training more women judges. In all, the Agency has created judicial training programs in 10 Latin American countries.

In addition to being independent and accountable, courts must adhere to all relevant laws, procedures, and policies. Trial courts must give individual attention to cases, deciding them on their legal merit rather than on other factors. With USAID assistance, Bolivia has modified its judicial appointment system and introduced other mechanisms to strengthen the judiciary and reduce political influence in the courts. Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras have taken similar steps. In Colombia, USAID supports the Judicial System Reform Program. It is designed to improve the effectiveness of investigative and prosecutorial functions, the efficiency of court administration, and access to and fairness of the judicial system. As a result of USAID initiatives, eight Latin American countries have adopted and implemented (or are in the process of implementing) revised criminal and criminal procedures codes and are moving toward systems featuring public trials and clear limits on pretrial detentions.

USAID's administration of justice programs have drawn attention to justice reform issues throughout Latin America and have led to the countries themselves initiating and funding reforms. The programs have also encouraged communication among the reformers, allowing them to benefit from one another's experience. Drawing on USAID's experience, other international donors have started programs to meet increasing demand for improved administration of justice. In many cases these build on efforts begun with USAID support—for example, the emphasis on "good governance" programs currently implemented by the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank.

USAID is now integrating successful components of its Latin American administration of justice efforts into its global democracy program. In Indonesia, for example, the Agency is supporting the National Law Development Agency, which will improve the average citizen's access to laws and regulations governing individual rights.

Increased Support for Human Rights

Missions working in this area pursue two basic strategies: (1) expanding knowledge about and belief in democratic principles and (2) strengthening the monitoring of and response to human rights violations. Along these lines, the Latin America/Caribbean Bureau has done much to support a greater understanding of human rights throughout the hemisphere. Nongovernmental organizations and regional organizations such as the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights have helped spread human rights education. Literature explaining and advocating rights can now be found in every country in the region, in contrast to 10 years ago. In Africa, USAID also supports human rights education. The Agency places heavy emphasis on women's rights.

More than half of USAID Missions with explicit human rights objectives are helping citizens develop a better understanding of their rights or a belief in democratic principles. Of these Missions, some emphasize an improved knowledge of legal rights, whereas others hope to reinforce broader democratic values (see box 3.3). In Indonesia, for example, the Mission supports NGOs that strive to inform either specific groups or the population at large about their civil rights.

USAID conducts its education programs mainly through NGOs. In Nicaragua, for example, the Agency is developing, with its partners, school curricula. It is noteworthy that, in Nicaragua's polarized society, people from across the political spectrum have come together and developed a consensus on what should be taught. Other examples of USAID-supported NGOs are Argentina's Conscienciа, which offers a weekly radio program on women in democracy, and a Chilean group, Participa, which sponsors a television program on democracy. The program was a driving force for including civic education in the schools.

Other Missions that do not have objectives explicitly targeting human rights are nonetheless working to increase understanding and respect for those rights. In the Central African Republic, for example, the Agency is working with the Ministry of Education on development of a human rights module for schools. In Zambia, USAID is helping an NGO launch a nationwide campaign on citizens' rights and responsibilities. Often, civic education carried out with USAID support is done in conjunction with elections. Some of this civic education is very practical—for example, how to vote. Other elements are more theoretical—for example, the reason for voting, the role elected legislatures should play, the advantages of democracy.

One difficulty with broad programs aimed at changing values is that USAID is not sure how effective those programs can be in new democracies whose economies are not improving the standard of living. Successful experience with democracy tends to reinforce values, allowing countries to cope with crises and periods of weak economic performance—but experience takes time. Almost all USAID Missions working to increase understanding of democracy and change values

Box 3.3. Working to Support Women's Legal Rights

In most countries, concerns about violence, sexual harassment, and individual and family rights distinguish women's status in the formal justice sector from that of men. USAID has been working in a number of countries to ensure that women's concerns are incorporated into programs and legal development.

In Nepal, the USAID-supported Women's Legal Services project has provided representation for more than 3,000 women, assisted 5,000 women in getting redress from semijudicial and administrative offices, and has provided legal literacy classes for 8,000 women. Through research, publications, and a legal-awareness radio program, the project has successfully encouraged drafting and passage of remedial legislation.

will have to measure the evolution of public opinion. Most Missions are now just in the process of establishing baseline data from which they will then be able to gauge progress.

Effective mechanisms to respond to human rights violations must be in place, even in those countries where respect for human rights is increasing. Building such mechanisms is a key part of USAID's strategy in democracy. Working in partnership with NGOs and PVOs, USAID not only supports the capacity to promote human rights reforms in developing countries but also assists host government institutions and others in monitoring and addressing violations of these rights.

Many USAID Missions have identified their work in human rights monitoring as an explicit part of their human rights objectives or outcomes. The Agency has achieved substantial results in this area. USAID-sponsored assistance to Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru has resulted in the establishment of systems to track human rights abuses (see box 3.4). In Nicaragua, USAID funds the International Committee for Support and Verification. An arm of the Organization of American States, it monitors human rights and undertakes mediation for all ex-combatants from the recent civil war, and their families. USAID also supports the country's Tripartite Commission's work in addressing human rights violations by the government. In El Salvador, the Agency supported the U.N. Truth Commission, whose investigations helped lead USAID and many other donors to initiate and support a $1 billion national reconstruction program.

Box 3.4. Addressing Human Rights in Paraguay

Since the overthrow of dictator Alfredo Stroessner in 1989, Paraguay's respect for human rights has increased. The Human Rights Documentation Center, funded by USAID/Paraguay and the Paraguayan Supreme Court, recently completed microfilming 2 tons of secret police and intelligence documents chronicling a generation of human rights abuse under Stroessner. The document archive was open to the public, jurists, historians, and families of the victims of torture, imprisonment, and murder. The archive has provided evidence in 29 official criminal investigations and has led to the conviction and imprisonment of Stroessner's former chief of investigative police and several others.

Strengthening Citizen Participation in More Competitive Politics

Seventeen of USAID's sustainable development Missions work to strengthen participation and competition in formal political processes. USAID is also working in Chile, Costa Rica, Lebanon, Mexico, and Panama. These Missions concentrate on two primary strategies: (1) promotion of free and fair elections and (2) strengthening of legislatures.

Promoting Free Elections

In recent years the Agency has made a significant contribution to election contests around the world. In several countries its assistance has produced high levels of voter registration and turnout, competent electoral commissions, and many active citizens' groups. The results of election assistance to eight sustainable development countries that recently held transition elections, two electing constituent assemblies, and four holding consolidation elections are reviewed here.[11] Ten of the 14 were conducted democratically.[12] Elections in El Salvador, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, Panama, Paraguay,

[11]The transition elections took place in the Dominican Republic, Guinea, Guinea–Bissau, Malawi, Mozambique, Panama, Paraguay, and South Africa. The assembly elections took place in Uganda and Ethiopia. The consolidation elections were held in Bolivia, El Salvador, Mexico, and Nicaragua. USAID also provided modest assistance to other countries holding elections in the last half of 1993 and in 1994, such as the Central African Republic and Gabon.

[12]The four problematic elections were the ones in the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea, and Guinea–Bissau.

and South Africa were considered generally successful (see box 3.5).

The Agency's involvement in these elections ranged from relatively minor assistance in support of other donor efforts[13] to extensive help in mounting elections. The most common strategies were improving the operations of the electoral tribunal; ensuring that citizens were better informed about the voting process, the issues, and the candidates; and strengthening internal and international monitoring of election preparations and the elections themselves.[14] In most of these elections, USAID's approach used elements of all three strategies.

National elections require sophisticated organization capabilities, but many of the electoral tribunals with which USAID worked were relatively new and inexperienced. The Agency worked closely with a number of tribunals to improve planning and implementation of elections. The effort began with voter registration:

- In Panama, USAID assistance led to 96 percent of the eligible population being registered to vote (see box 3.6).
- In Mozambique, despite inexperience and severe logistical obstacles, 6 million voters out of nearly 8 million were registered, with U.N. and USAID help. Early estimates had suggested that turnout would be predominantly urban, but polling booths were accessible in many rural areas. Citizens all over the country described officials at the voting tables as professional and well trained.
- In Bolivia, USAID was so successful in supporting the registration of 1.4 million voters in 1993 that little if any progress remains to be made.
- In South Africa the extensive assistance USAID gave to the electoral commission helped ensure that those elections reflected the will of the people and were accepted as such.

Box 3.5. High Stakes in El Salvador's General Elections

Lingering post–cease-fire tensions in El Salvador led to concerns that the 1994 elections could be destabilizing if they did not go well. The stakes were heightened because elections for president, the legislature, and all mayoral and municipal council seats were being held simultaneously.

USAID's strategy of election support included technical assistance to the electoral tribunal through the Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral, voter education through NGOs, and, ultimately, monitoring. Staffed as it was by members of the four political parties, the electoral tribunal did have problems—namely, it became difficult to separate political from other issues. Decision-making was slowed, but commitment to democracy seemed strong inasmuch as the main issues turned out to be logistical and technical.

Efforts to register voters were complicated by the fact that citizens in the war zones had been disenfranchised during the civil war. USAID supported the issuance of 133,000 birth certificates to people in the zones and helped replace the civil registries in more than 100 municipalities. Close to 95 percent of the eligible population was registered to vote by the time the elections took place. Unlike earlier elections, there were no violent incidents.

The elections led to greater diversity in the assembly and among mayors. As a result of this diversity, the assembly is now monitoring executive branch behavior more closely. Institutional improvements are still needed, though. The electoral tribunal needs a permanent, nonpolitical, professional staff. The voting registry still needs updating.

[13] For example, in Malawi, USAID gave relatively modest assistance, which was coordinated with the U.N.'s much larger package of aid.

[14] In a few instances, such as Ethiopia and Malawi, USAID helped improve electoral laws and regulations so that free and fair elections could be held.

Box 3.6. Elections Then and Now: In Panama, a Study in Contrasts

Even though the 1989 Panamanian elections were manipulated by the regime of Manuel Noriega, the strongman's candidate did not win. Consequently, Noriega annulled the election results, abolished the legislature, and declared himself head of state. In December 1989, the United States invaded Panama and ousted Noriega.

The May 1994 general elections, which USAID supported, provide a remarkable contrast to those of 1989. This was the first time in years that elections were held for local positions. Former President Jimmy Carter and his team of observers noted that the elections were the cleanest and most transparent they had witnessed in Latin America. There was no violence. Preparations, carried out with USAID assistance, were thorough. They began early enough that the electoral tribunal performed effectively on election day.

Ninety-six percent of the eligible population registered to vote. The voting lists contained less than a 1 percent error. Citizens generally understood the voting process. Nearly 75 percent of eligible voters turned out—double the number for the 1992 constitutional referendum. The first unofficial results were announced a few hours after the polls closed, and the results of the presidential race were announced in 72 hours. Confidence in the electoral tribunal swelled from 32 percent in 1992 to 75 percent in 1994—a result of the way in which the USAID-assisted tribunal conducted the elections.

A recent study by the United States Information Agency found that more than 8 out of 10 Panamanians now believe their elections to be regular and honest. This represents a dramatic change from November 1993, when a majority thought Panamanian elections were dishonest.

Information plays a critical role in helping citizens understand the mechanics of the electoral process and determine which candidates most reflect their views and interests. USAID has placed heavy emphasis on supporting activities that inform the electorate. In almost all cases, the Agency worked through NGOs. In Uganda 4,000 civic education trainers, themselves trained with USAID backing, conducted weekend workshops for citizens before the March 1994 constituent assembly election. In Guinea, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic, USAID trained political-party personnel in developing platforms and presenting them to the public. In the Dominican Republic this assistance emphasized incorporating women's issues into the various platforms.

In newer democracies in particular, international monitoring can reduce infractions and increase acceptance of the results. In Madagascar, to name one, USAID supported international observer groups in the 1993 presidential election. The observers' confidence in the election process helped deter the 18-year incumbent—who lost the election—from declaring fraud and overturning the results. There are, however, limitations to what international monitoring can achieve. The Gabon 1993 and Ghana 1992 elections taught that failure of international observers to come to a consensus on the scale and significance of irregularities can play into the hands of the so-called winners.

Development of such indigenous monitoring capacity may be one the most valuable contributions USAID has made in improving elections around the world. In Bolivia, for example, the Mission helped train 98,000 citizens who watched polls throughout the country during the June 1993 election. In Uganda, 16,000 local election monitors received training and observed the elections. In Paraguay and Uganda, NGO staff were trained to conduct parallel vote tabulation. The training, put to practical use, has helped increase citizen confidence in recent election results. In Mozambique, 40,000 largely USAID-supported pollwatchers helped ensure success of the 1994 transition election.

Strengthening Legislatures

USAID is working in 15 sustainable development countries and in Lebanon and Mongolia to strengthen legislatures. The Agency aims foremost at enhancing a legislature's role in government decision-making. It seeks to bring about this strengthened role by

increasing (1) legislative oversight of executive branch and military behavior, (2) the legislature's control over policymaking, and (3) the legislature's ability to shape appropriate legislation. To a lesser extent, USAID has targeted greater involvement by civil society in debating legislation.[15]

Access to reliable information and policy analysis is a problem for most of the legislatures with which USAID works. Without information, parliamentarians are poorly positioned to question government or military behavior, to understand national issues and constituencies, and to solve problems. The Agency is working with its development partners to establish libraries, automated information systems, and research and policy analysis services. These are some results to date:

- In Bangladesh, USAID helped draft legislation that established an autonomous parliamentary secretariat capable of providing drafting services and research support to members of Parliament, who previously received no such support. USAID also helped the Bangladeshi NGO community research and draft legislation for members of Parliament. In 1994 five private bills drafted by NGOs were introduced in Parliament, and two of them passed.

- In El Salvador, USAID helped create a policy research unit in the Assembly. As of March 1994 the new unit had put together 18 "packages" of information on selected topics. Several key laws were approved,[16] with the legislators relying in part on research analyses to frame the choices.

- The Bolivian Congressional Budget Office now provides on-line fiscal information and expert financial analysis to the finance committees of both houses, thereby enabling the legislature to draw its own conclusions and participate effectively in the annual budget review. The budget office also started producing more current economic information than the central bank and improved the annual budget presentation.

- As a result in part of USAID-sponsored improvements, the Costa Rican Congress now produces more draft legislation than the executive branch. It is currently negotiating for a larger role in the budget process.

USAID also seeks to increase citizen involvement in debating legislation in countries in which it has broader legislative support strategies. In Nepal the Agency has helped organize a bipartisan women's caucus. It consults on women's issues, analyzes policies, and drafts legislation to respond to women's concerns. Bills to rectify inequities in property, inheritance, marriage, divorce, and citizenship laws are now pending before Parliament. In Paraguay the number of civic and public interest groups lobbying the Congress has increased significantly.

Developing a More Politically Active Civil Society

In many countries making the transition to democracy, civil society organizations are weak. They lack the financial resources needed to mobilize support and advocate reform agendas. Donor assistance can be critical in building coalitions, planning strategy, providing program funds, and strengthening policy analysis and advocacy skills.

Under the Development Fund for Africa, for example, USAID has tried to counter the breakdown of the state by encouraging local citizens' groups to take on greater responsibility for self-governance. Such groups play an important role in meeting basic human needs in health, education, and marketing. As these organizations grow stronger, they are demanding more legal recognition and inde-

[15] This objective cuts across development sectors. As part of its environmental and economic growth strategy, for example, USAID works with NGOs to increase their ability to advocate change. Efforts under the civil society objective also support increased citizen involvement in considering legislation.

[16] These included a stock market law, an arms control law, reforms to the electoral law, and a national budget law.

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pendence. One example is Mali, where a USAID-supported private school movement has successfully fought to achieve greater freedom to operate.

Twelve Missions have explicit civil society objectives. Concentrating on citizens' groups involved in participation and democratization can be a key strategy in the pre- and post-transition stages of democratic development. USAID support strengthened democratic reform in Chile and Thailand. In Thailand, labor unions and environmental organizations that received USAID assistance for sector-specific activities played central roles in the national campaign to restore elected civilian government in 1992. The same groups are now promoting constitutional reforms to build strong local government, ensure greater accountability, and limit the political role of the military. In Chile, seven elections from 1988 through 1993 were crucial for restoring democratic governance. During this period, two key NGOs received USAID help in organizing massive voter education campaigns. Their efforts contributed significantly to Chile's peaceful transition to democracy.

Some USAID country strategies concentrate on involving more citizens' groups or NGOs in the development process. In El Salvador, for example, the Mission has involved NGOs in reconstruction activities in the former war zones. From 1992 through 1994 the number of NGOs involved in reconstruction increased from 82 to 115. NGO involvement is having a positive effect on the reintegration of more than 18,000 ex-combatants. In the Philippines, USAID supports 100 NGOs that involve communities in efforts to compensate for gaps in government services.

In Egypt, El Salvador, Guyana, Indonesia, the Philippines, Namibia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka, USAID Missions concentrate on strengthening the ability of NGOs to become involved in the policymaking process. In the latter four countries, USAID tries particularly to enhance participation of disadvantaged groups.

A strong and active civil society can work with the government to establish new patterns of public–private collaboration to address problems. In Thailand, USAID has played a significant role in strengthening civil society groups as they take on such issues as HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, and private sector development. USAID strategies for strengthening civil society include fostering state regulations that encourage free association, improving and making NGO management more democratic, and sponsoring new arenas for public policy debate.

In some countries NGOs are so heavily regulated and controlled by the state that their efforts remain seriously hampered. It can be risky for NGOs to take on a public advocacy role when government displeasure has many channels for making itself felt. In this regard, USAID has targeted the regulatory environment in a few countries. In El Salvador, for example, USAID was successful in supporting the submission to the Assembly of a revised labor code that gave unions more freedom. In Nepal a 1993 law removed several restrictions on NGO operations.

Many civil society organizations remain dependent on external donors for their survival. In the more advanced and rapidly developing economies, regulatory changes that encourage the establishment of foundations or tax write-offs for individual and corporate contributions can diminish dependency on donors. USAID is currently assessing ways of improving the regulatory environment in its five-country case study. Preliminary conclusions suggest when there is an unfavorable regulatory environment, what is needed to bring about improvement are coordinated dialogue between donors and the host country government and the placing of conditions on assistance.

Once citizens' groups achieve reasonable independence, efforts to improve advocacy, management, and policy formulation can increase the contribution they make to securing for citizens the benefits of collective action. Many Missions with civil society objectives concentrate on improving management. In others, such as the ones in Guyana and Indonesia, there is increasing interest in

strengthening advocacy and public relations. Creation of networks of NGOs is yet another way to expand influence, and USAID is supporting the development of such networks in the Philippines, Thailand, and other countries.

Creating arenas in which policy issues can be analyzed can play a large role in helping citizens define their interests and organize to promote particular solutions. To this end, USAID is funding think tanks and research centers. In South Africa, for example, the Agency has helped catalyze the establishment of think tanks and has sponsored conferences to give the disadvantaged community a stronger voice. Support to one economic policy think tank resulted in critical analyses that provided the foundation for strategies outlined in the government's reconstruction and development program.

In Chile, USAID support for NGOs and study groups led to the defeat of strongman Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and a return to democratic government. In Peru, USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy helped a local think tank conduct a participatory assessment of how to advance democracy in that country. The result was a uniquely Peruvian view of how to move the democratic process forward, a view that has helped USAID set its own programming priorities.

Developing More Accountable Governance

Fourteen of USAID's 41 sustainable development Missions are working with other donors, NGOs, and host country governments to improve the transparency and accountability of executive institutions. These Missions concentrate on three primary objectives: (1) increasing local government participation in basic government functions, (2) strengthening mechanisms to ensure transparency, and (3) reorienting the role of military and security forces in the domestic political process and the economy.

Increasing Local Government Participation in Basic Government Functions

In many countries in which USAID works, economic and political power has traditionally been concentrated in the capital cities. Powerful and autonomous central agencies are not often the most efficient providers of services, nor do they provide opportunities for citizens to participate in the decision-making process.

In recent years many governments have recognized that decentralization is part of accountable and efficient governance. By 1994 a number of countries with which USAID works had passed legislation delegating greater authority and responsibility to provinces, states, and municipalities. As a result, power has shifted away from central governments, enabling them to exercise oversight. Meanwhile, local public agencies—which are often the most knowledgeable—are able to make decisions about issues pertaining to their constituencies. Decentralization also gives people who historically have been disenfranchised the ability to participate in decisions that affect their lives.

Missions working to promote and support decentralization pursue three common strategies in this area: (1) increased devolution of authority and resources to the local level, (2) improved effectiveness of local government, and (3) increased community involvement in local government decision-making.

The first step in decentralization is for the central government to devolve authority and responsibility to the local level. Many USAID Missions working in decentralization are helping central governments establish such legislation and, once passed, working with them and local governments in the transition process.

In countries such as Nicaragua and El Salvador, USAID is providing technical assistance and training to the national government to address legal and political obstacles to decentralization and improve the ability of local governments to collect revenue and to

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budget responsibly. In Nepal a local-government law was passed in 1992. The Agency has been working through an NGO to assist locally elected officials, citizens, NGOs, and line ministries in implementing the law. In Indonesia, where previous efforts at decentralization were disappointing, the Agency is working with the central government to develop and implement a decentralization "checklist." With it, senior government officials are provided with an objective assessment of the decentralization process. The checklist has provided the central government with encouraging feedback on decentralization—feedback that previous efforts lacked.

Box 3.7. After the Fall, the Philippines Moves to Local Governance

The overthrow of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 brought 21 years of political corruption and abuse to an end in the Philippines. In 1991 the Philippine Congress took a major step in opening government by passing the Local Government Code. Before this time, decisions about public services anywhere in the country were made in Manila. Local governments could not themselves raise revenues. School and health services were located in Manila, at the expense of other cities and provinces.

The 1991 code transferred a wide range of authority and responsibility to the local governments—which now must deliver or face increasing pressure from citizens. USAID has been the lead donor in decentralization for the past decade and has supported the changes embodied in the code. It is now helping these local governments make a smooth transition to their new role.

USAID assistance was instrumental in helping the Philippine Government transfer 70,000 employees along with their programs and responsibilities to local governments and increase the local government share of national resources by more than $1 billion. The Agency is working with a few local governments to develop models in financial management, planning administration, and capital investment planning that can be replicated in other areas.

Successful decentralization does not, however, come from legislation alone. To be viable over the long term, local governments must respond to citizens' needs and effectively deliver services. Decentralization often means that local governments must deliver services previously provided by the central government: health, education, sanitation, water, roads. However, local governments often lack the expertise to do the job well.

The Agency plays a significant role in ensuring that local governments can act effectively. All USAID Missions working in decentralization are helping to build local capacity to administer and deliver services. By providing training and technical assistance to local government officials, the Agency ensures that they have the necessary skills to carry out essential managerial and public administration functions (see box 3.7). The Agency also establishes pilot activities in service delivery with the expectation that successful efforts will be replicated nationwide. These activities have yielded significant results. Among them:

(1) In Honduras, USAID has provided skill-building seminars and technical assistance to a select number of municipalities to improve their ability to analyze local constituent needs and improve their financial and managerial operations. As a result, USAID-assisted municipalities have increased their investment in capital projects in these areas to 31 percent in 1993 from 14.5 percent in 1991. Investment is expected to reach 60 percent by 1997 (covering more than 45 percent of the population). More than 26 percent of urban inhabitants in these municipalities now receive water, sewerage, and refuse collection services, up from 17 percent in 1991.

(2) In Nicaragua, USAID assistance to the government in decentralizing health service delivery is part of a strategy of improving the health of Nicaraguans and increasing sustainability of health services. Through technical assistance and training, USAID has helped the government establish 19 decentralized units for health services delivery; they control 20 percent of the national healthcare budget. The figure is expected to reach 35 percent by 1996.

USAID also supports networks of local governments in countries throughout the world. Fostering such networks, the Agency has found, helps municipalities save costs, collaborate on research, share problems and solutions, and combine training and technical assistance efforts.

In addition, USAID supports increased community involvement in the local government decision-making. A recent evaluation of USAID's program in El Salvador[17] highlights the importance of decentralization to citizen participation in and feelings about the democratic process. Many USAID Missions are working to increase community participation in identifying local government priorities. In most cases Missions are working with PVOs, NGOs, and neighborhood associations to boost citizen involvement. As a result of these activities, citizen participation has increased.

In Honduras, for example, USAID is working with NGOs to build "political bridges." This will enable citizens to participate more actively and effectively in decision-making. Already, the average number of attendees per town meeting has increased from 20 in 1991 to 116 in 1993. The increase results from the Mission's strategy of ensuring that projects developed at the municipal level reflect citizens' needs.

In El Salvador, USAID-supported town meetings serve as vehicles for citizens to express their needs and desires. In 1994, 71 percent of the cantons participated in project-sponsored open town meetings, up from 63 percent in 1992. Attendance is expected to increase to 90 percent in 1997.

Ensuring Transparency

To improve executive branch accountability, it is necessary to strengthen institutional mechanisms that encourage transparency and reduce corruption and abuse. One third of USAID sustainable development Missions working in accountable governance have identified an objective of creating and strengthening mechanisms for greater government accountability. USAID Missions have three strategies to achieve this: (1) strengthening internal procedures for enhanced oversight, (2) improving the management systems in government institutions where opportunities for corruption are greatest, and (3) building a public constituency against corruption.

Strengthening executive branch institutions that have oversight responsibilities is a main element in USAID's efforts to improve accountability. The Agency is establishing auditing procedures and systems and enhancing the auditing capacity of oversight organizations. In Nicaragua, for example, the recent long-awaited appointment of a controller general sets the stage for increasing the transparency of government financial operations. Working with the World Bank and other donors, the Agency will help the Nicaraguan Government institute a comprehensive financial management system and strengthen audit functions.

Missions also help executive institutions develop the capacity to function better, thereby increasing their accountability and reducing opportunities for corruption. In countries such as Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama, the Agency provides technical assistance and training to host government institutions to reform accounting, procurement, and other procedures. Such improvements make graft easier to discover.

These activities have resulted in some substantial changes in the way governments do business. In El Salvador, for example, USAID-supported technical assistance has enabled the Ministry of Finance to design new systems to budget, account for, and pay the costs of government. When the systems are completed, all government entities will be capable of managing their own finances. These systems will also allow them to interface smoothly with the central systems at the

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[17] *Evaluation of the Social Stabilization and Municipal Development Strengthening Project (MEA Project)*. 1994. Washington, D.C.: Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.

Box 3.8. Enhancing Government Accountability in Panama

USAID/Panama has been working with the national government to improve its stewardship of public resources and accountability to its citizens. USAID-sponsored activities in training and technical assistance have resulted in reforms at the grass-roots bookkeeping level and at the highest levels of public finance. A USAID-financed manual for national budget preparation and submission has been adopted. As a result of these efforts, all public agencies now operate with uniform budgets. None did in 1992.

USAID also helped draft and review the manual on generally accepted auditing standards. All government audits are now based on these standards. More than 6,000 Panamanians were trained in managing public debt and in budgeting, accounting, and auditing.

Two national universities are developing courses on the new Panamanian Government accounting system using manuals and systems that USAID has helped develop. All students planning to become CPAs will be required to take these courses.

ministry. In 1994 these efforts produced the first consolidated financial statements of the national government.

In Bolivia, passage of the System of Government Administration and Control Law provides a framework for ensuring fiscal responsibility and decentralized financial management. USAID and the World Bank are working with the Bolivian Government to restructure the public sector and reorient financial management standards to obviate incentives for corruption. Similar activities are under way in Panama (see box 3.8).

The Agency's assistance is not limited to working with national ministries of finance or those entities with auditing responsibilities. USAID assistance has also led to streamlined and more accountable processes in health and education ministries. Training and technical assistance in countries such as Benin, Guinea, and Lesotho have led to higher efficiency and quality of budget preparation and resource allocation for basic human services. In Guinea, for example, the Agency's work with the Education Ministry to refine its budget process and establish a central budget unit has enabled the ministry to produce a detailed line-item budget.

Reducing corruption requires building a strong and vocal constituency against it. USAID works with NGOs to help generate public support for accountability. In Argentina, for example, the Agency is working with Poder Ciudadano ("Citizen Power"), a civic organization, to educate the public about the effects of corruption. Evidence of Poder's work is highly visible in the Argentine media. The group's insights into corruption and the methodology to combat it have been recorded in a best-selling book, *In Self-Defense: How to Get Rid of Corruption,* by Poder principal Luis Moreno Ocampo. USAID and Poder's work have also resulted in an increase in the number of Argentine organizations active in anticorruption work. Thirty-four groups are now battling corruption, up from only one in 1992.

Building transparent public institutions is slow and difficult. Clearly, some individuals lose when institutions become more transparent and a system of accountability becomes institutionalized. But the public gains. Programs that seek to increase transparency and accountability need government commitment by the host country. Government ministries must be willing to change and relinquish traditional roles. In countries where such a commitment exists, USAID's programs are making progress. In countries where such commitment does not exist or is questionable, USAID interventions have not always met with success. In these cases, USAID has had to reorient its activities or end them altogether.

Changing the Role of Military and Security Forces

The military and state security forces have overturned or compromised democratic rule in many developing countries and often retain substantial power and resources during transition. Integrating these powerful players into the political process thus is crucial to

building long-term democratic roots in these countries. Downsizing the military also frees public resources for other public expenditures. To achieve this integration, USAID Missions concentrate on two strategies: improving the dialogue between civilians and the military, and demobilizing the military.

Defining an appropriate role for the military through a dialogue between civilians and the military is a part of these strategies. USAID provides training and technical assistance to mobilize networks of civilians and empower them to discuss common problems with the military and define the appropriate responsibilities and relationships for each in the political system. This strategy is a critical feature in Latin America and the Caribbean, where militaries continue to threaten long-term democratic stability.

USAID also works with host countries and NGOs to integrate the armed forces back into society. It has achieved some promising results. For example,

(1) In El Salvador reintegration of ex-combatants has helped the country make a transition from war to peace and build long-lasting democratic institutions. In fact, demobilization could not have been effected so smoothly without transition programs into which these men and women could directly move. Through credit, land transfer, training and technical assistance, and agriculture and household starter kits, USAID has helped the El Salvadoran Government demobilize, thereby reducing the threat of ex-combatants to the democratic process. With USAID's assistance, 10,000 ex-combatants received vocational or academic training in 1993.

(2) In Mozambique the October 1992 peace accord between the Mozambican Government and the insurgent group RENAMO ended 16 years of devastating civil war. However, the country is now faced with reintegrating the population, both civilian and military, into stable and productive economic and social activities. Through PVO support grants, USAID has financed health services, food aid, seeds and tools, and water and sanitation improvements. By August 1994, 70,000 soldiers had been demobilized and helped back into civilian life.

Increasing the Flow and Diversity of Information to Citizens

Five of USAID's sustainable development Missions have identified an objective or program outcome of improving the flow of information to citizens. In working to accomplish its results, USAID provides training and technical assistance to journalists to strengthen their ability to investigate and analyze events and operate more effectively, thereby enhancing their legitimacy.

The Agency has achieved notable results in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Across these regions, greater openness exists in the media, and there is increased capacity to report accurately and effectively. In Asia, USAID's partnership with the Asia Foundation has contributed to a stronger media voice. In Bangladesh, where the print and broadcast media have traditionally been captives of the central government, USAID and the Asia Foundation have been training journalists and providing technical support to the Dhaka Media Center to help it report accurately and fully on government actions, public needs, and opinions.

In Sri Lanka, USAID-sponsored activities through the Asia Foundation have assisted the Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center in developing and publishing a monograph on Sri Lankan media laws and regulations. The work has generated professional interest and participation in public education and debate on the free flow of information and exchange of ideas. Another grant has produced a degree course on development journalism at the University of Colombo. The course attracts students interested in press freedom and free-lance reporting. In Indonesia, the Asia Foundation, with assistance from USAID, is helping a local newspaper in East Timor procure its own printing press and strengthen the technical skills and professional insight of the newspaper's editors and staff.

Trends in Africa have also been encouraging. In Ethiopia, through training, workshops, and technical assistance to various NGOs, USAID expects to see an increase in the independence and capability of the media to present new ideas and opposing view-

points and promote dialogue on policy issues among citizens. In Zambia, the Agency has been training communications staff and establishing a Media Resources Center. In Madagascar, USAID provides a series of training workshops for improving the professionalism of journalists. The courses increase journalists' understanding of key topics such as accountability, economic reform, and the changed role of government in a market economy.

The past few years have also seen substantial gains in the activity and quality of the media in Latin America. Historically, journalists and media managers were poorly qualified. Journalists were often mouthpieces of governments—they rarely checked sources, and they accepted bribes. Managers rarely communicated with staff and lacked the skills necessary to ensure smooth-functioning media organizations. The Latin American Journalism Project has trained an estimated 50 percent of Central American journalists (except in Nicaragua, where journalists are trained in a Mission-sponsored program). In this project, journalists are developing writing skills and studying ethical issues in order to produce high-quality, unbiased reporting. Managers of news organizations receive training in management skills and administration.

The project has been a success. For one thing, project-sponsored meetings resulted in a declaration of journalistic ethics that has been publicly adopted by the majority of news organizations in Central America. The project is also responsible for the initiation of the Premios PROCEPER, a regional prize that has become the "Pulitzer" for excellence in journalism in Central America. One participant was recently awarded the Maria Moors Cabot Award by Columbia University for outstanding journalism in the Western Hemisphere. Participants of the Spanish-language master's program have advanced into positions of influence as press secretaries, editors of magazines and newspapers, and deans and faculty at schools of journalism.

Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the impact of this program is the influence it has had on people's perceptions of the media. A baseline public opinion survey of the Central American media conducted in 1989 found that people had little faith in the media. In 1994, when the Inter-American Committee on Human Rights conducted a similar poll, the news media were found to be second only to the Catholic Church in credibility.

Transition Programs

The end of the Cold War brought about significant changes in many regions of the world. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union saw the emergence of new states and a movement to democracy and market economies. Other, more negative, changes occurred as well. These included ethnic and religious strife (in Bosnia and Rwanda), mass migrations, and other social disruptions. Such new situations require USAID and other donors to develop new approaches to establishing democratic rule, stabilizing economies, and preventing internal strife.

The preceding subsections have discussed USAID's programs in sustainable development countries. But the Agency also sponsors democracy programs in other countries. These countries fall into two categories: *focus countries* and *countries in transition to democracy*. The former category includes countries emerging from protracted conflict (Angola and Bosnia, for example) or extraordinary humanitarian crisis (such as Haiti and Rwanda). Countries in transition include the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Support of democracy in the focus countries is achieved by exploiting targets of opportunity. These could include assistance for one-time events such as transition elections or the forming of constituent assemblies. The most important element of such assistance may be timing. The Agency must be prepared to move quickly to provide start-up funds and other assistance as situations warrant.

Countries in transition reflect a broader concept of democratic development. Programs aimed at this category address the multifaceted nature of the democratization

process. In Eastern Europe and the new independent states, the U.S. Government was called upon to respond immediately to social and economic revolutions. Among other donors, USAID helps these countries in the development of rule-of-law programs through grants to the American Bar Association and the United States Information Agency.

USAID also promotes transition to democracy in the Horn of Africa. Countries in this region suffer from a variety of disasters and reversals such as famine and civil war.

In Eritrea, USAID helped conduct a referendum that led to the country's independence. The Agency is also supporting a commission charged with drafting a constitution. Demobilization of combatants and resettlement of refugees are also a major part of democratization in Eritrea.

USAID-supported programs in Cambodia reinforce democratic gains by strengthening the capabilities of public-interest NGOs. They also seek to strengthen Cambodia's capacity to govern by helping to establish legislative, regulatory, and judicial systems. These goals are attained through a variety of activities including improved administration, strengthened civil society, increased citizen participation, and development of transparent government institutions.

The Agency is making a major effort to smooth Haiti's transition to democracy. It includes support for municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections as well as civic education programs and training for these elections. USAID and other donors are helping to establish an independent Ministry of Justice and strengthen other key institutions such as the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and selected ministries. Training and outplacement services are being provided for former members of the military and paramilitary forces. USAID is cooperating closely with other donors, including the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Canadian International Development Agency, the United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (see box 3.9).

Box 3.9. Helping Haiti Return to Democracy

Under the military regime of General Raoul Cedras, USAID supported NGOs that provided services to Haitians whose lot seemed to grow worse with each new day. Massive corruption, declining economic production, absence of nonextortionary government services, and pervasive violence carried out by the government against its own citizens—all these became the norm.

With the return of the government of Jean–Bertrand Aristide, USAID has established a strategy that will help facilitate a lasting return to democratic rule. One priority is to help the government and citizenry prepare for and take part in the March 1995 municipal and legislative elections. USAID is also working with the United Nations Development Programme and others to ensure rapid demobilization of military, police, and security forces. The aim is to reduce their manpower to a size commensurate with Haiti's need to address crime and external threats. Demobilization will succeed only if the personnel can find adequate jobs. USAID is addressing that task by offering vocational and other kinds of training.

The Agency will also support stronger local governments, partly to balance power at the center and partly to engage local citizens in working with local government on more effective solutions to problems. USAID is currently assessing municipal development needs and has begun working with the judicial system to create greater independence and impartiality. The Agency will continue to work with Haitian governmental and nongovernmental institutions and plans to provide more support to those that wish to encourage democracy.

Lessons Learned

Although USAID's major emphasis on building democracy is recent, the Agency has already learned important lessons from its transitional program activities:

(1) Democracy must be substantially home-grown; it cannot be imposed on the basis of a preconceived model.

(2) Adoption of democratic rule comes most reliably when there are strong demands for reform from vigorous citizens' groups. Once reforms are introduced, these groups also play a watchdog role in ensuring that politicians and officials adhere to new democratic rules.

(3) Although international monitoring plays an important role in the conduct of elections, sustainable democratic development requires local capacity to monitor elections. USAID will continue to emphasize development of this capacity. It is important to prepare local groups to take over the task of monitoring because they can watch for irregularities that might skew the election results earlier in the process. Local groups can also provide better coverage than international monitors and may notice problems that escape non-nationals.

(4) Ensuring fair and impartial judicial systems is a high-risk strategy in countries where political will is lacking. In these cases, USAID will focus on constituency and coalition building to push for legal and judicial reform.

(5) Some democracy programs are too sophisticated to be implemented in transitional situations. There appears to be a need for simpler programs with which indigenous populations can identify.

(6) Conflict resolution programs are useful for building confidence in democracy and can produce beneficial results in the short term. Though every conflict is different, some general guidelines apply to conflict resolution. First, early intervention is much more successful and much less costly in the long run. Second, citizen-based approaches tend to be more successful and longer lasting. And third, development agencies need to share information about the root causes of conflicts and how to deal with them.

(7) Behind-the-scenes diplomatic pressure and negotiation before, during, and after an election can help ensure that citizens' groups participate and that losers accept the results. Preelection diplomatic legwork in South Africa was critical to success. USAID is also working with electoral commissions on a more sustained basis[18] and is providing more significant support to indigenous citizens' groups. Such groups can help ensure high levels of voter participation and honest elections.

(8) Assistance should be initiated long before an election approaches. That assistance is often required after an election in order to create the institutional capability to carry out periodic elections.

USAID recently identified support for democracy as a pillar of its development strategy. As a consequence, the Agency is placing more emphasis on and devoting more resources to work in this area. The Democracy Center within USAID's Global Bureau has been formed to provide Agency leadership and technical assistance to Missions in developing and assessing democracy programs. Major evaluations of various components of democracy (rule of law, for example, and civil society) have been completed or are under way. USAID is also developing a results framework along with performance measures that can be applied to this sector. Finally, the Agency is working closely with the Development Assistance Council to improve coordination among donor countries in promoting democracy and assessing the results of these efforts.

[18] In Latin America, USAID is beginning to pay more attention to developing the capability to mount local and provincial elections.

The Comparative Survey of Freedom—1994-1995 Survey Methodology

Joseph E. Ryan

The purpose of the *Survey* remains what it has been since its inception in the 1970s: to provide an annual evaluation of political rights and civil liberties everywhere in the world.

The *Survey* attempts to judge all places by a single standard and to point out the importance of democracy and freedom. At a minimum, a democracy is a political system in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals who were not chosen by the government. Putting it broadly, freedom is the chance to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of government and other centers of potential domination.

For a long time, Westerners have associated the adherence to political rights and civil liberties with the liberal democracies, such as those in North America and the European Union. However, there has been a proliferation of democracies in developing countries in recent years, and the *Survey* reflects their growing numbers.

Freedom House does not view democracy as a static concept, and the *Survey* recognizes that a democratic country does not necessarily belong in our category of "free" states. A democracy can lose freedom and become merely "partly free." Sri Lanka and Colombia are examples of such "partly free" democracies. In other cases, countries that replaced military regimes with elected governments can have less than complete transitions to liberal democracy. El Salvador and Guatemala fit the description of this kind of "partly free" democracy. (See the section below on the designations "free," "partly free," and "not free" for an explanation of those terms.) Readers should note that some scholars would use the term "semi-democracy" or "formal democracy," instead of "partly free" democracy, to refer to countries that are democratic in form but less than free in substance.

What the *Survey* is not

The *Survey* does *not* rate governments *per se* but rather the rights and freedoms individuals have in each country and territory. Freedom House does *not* score countries and territories based on governmental intentions or constitutions but on the real world situations caused by governmental and non-governmental factors. The *Survey* does *not* quantify our sympathy for the situation a government finds itself in (e.g., war, terrorism, etc.) but rather what effect the situation itself has on freedom.

Definitions and categories of the *Survey*

The *Survey's* understanding of freedom is broad and encompasses two sets of characteristics grouped under political rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process. By the political process, we mean the system by which the polity chooses the authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional or local community. In a free society this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies. A system is genuinely free or democratic to the extent that the people have a choice in determining the nature of the system and its leaders.

Civil liberties are the freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state.

The *Survey* employs checklists for these rights and liberties to help determine the degree of freedom present in each country and related territory, and to help assign each entity to a comparative category.

Political Rights checklist

1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling and honest tabulation of ballots?

4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, *de facto* opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
7. Does the country have the right of self-determination, and are its citizens free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies or any other powerful group?
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?
9. Is political power decentralized, allowing for local, regional and/or provincial or state administrations led by their freely elected officials? (For entities such as tiny island nations, the absence of a decentralized system does not necessarily count as a negative in the *Survey*.)

Additional discretionary Political Rights questions

A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler?
B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?

When answering the political rights questions, Freedom House considers the extent to which the system offers the voter the chance to make a free choice among competing candidates, and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state. We recognize that formal electoral procedures are not the only factors that determine the real distribution of power. In many Latin American countries, for example, the military retains a significant political role, and in Morocco the king maintains significant power over the elected politicians. The more people suffer under such domination by unelected forces, the less chance the country has of getting credit for self-determination in our *Survey*.

Freedom House does not have a culture-bound view of democracy. The *Survey* team rejects the notion that only Europeans and those of European descent qualify as democratic. The *Survey* demonstrates that, in addition to those in Europe and the Americas, there are free countries with varying kinds of democracy functioning among people of all races and religions in Africa, the Pacific and Asia. In some Pacific islands, free countries can have competitive political systems based on competing family groups and personalities rather than on European or American-style parties.

The checklist for Civil Liberties

1. Are there free and independent media, literature and other cultural expressions? (Note: In cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the *Survey* gives the system credit.)
2. Is there open public discussion and free private discussion?
3. Is there freedom of assembly and demonstration?
4. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: This includes political parties, civic associations, ad hoc issue groups and so forth.)
5. Are citizens equal under the law, with access to an independent, nondiscriminatory judiciary, and are they respected by the security forces?
6. Is there protection from political terror, and from unjustified imprisonment, exile or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system, and freedom from war or insurgency situations? (Note: Freedom from war and insurgency situations enhances the liberties in a free society, but the absence of wars and insurgencies does not in itself make an unfree society free.)
7. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining?
8. Are there free professional and other private organizations?
9. Are there free businesses or cooperatives?
10. Are there free religious institutions and free private and public religious expressions?
11. Are there personal social freedoms, which include such aspects as gender equality, property rights, freedom of movement, choice of residence, and choice of marriage and size of family?

12. Is there equality of opportunity, which includes freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats or any other type of denigrating obstacle to a share of legitimate economic gains?
13. Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption?

When analyzing the civil liberties checklist, Freedom House does not mistake constitutional guarantees of human rights for those rights in practice. For tiny island countries and territories and other small entities with low populations, the absence of unions and other types of association does not necessarily count as a negative unless the government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking association. The question of equality of opportunity also implies a free choice of employment and education. Extreme inequality of opportunity prevents disadvantaged individuals from enjoying a full exercise of civil liberties. Typically, desperately poor countries and territories lack both opportunities for economic advancement and the other liberties on this checklist. We have a question on gross indifference and corruption, because when governments do not care about the social and economic welfare of large sectors of the population, the human rights of those people suffer. Government corruption can pervert the political process and hamper the development of a free economy.

How do we grade? Ratings, categories, and raw points

The *Survey* rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. A country is assigned to a particular category based on responses to the checklist and the judgments of the *Survey* team at Freedom House. The numbers are not purely mechanical; they also reflect judgment. Under the methodology, the team

The Tabulated Ratings

The accompanying Table of Independent Countries (pages 678-679) and Table of Related Territories (page 680) rate each country or territory on seven-category scales for political rights and civil liberties, and then place each entity into a broad category of "free," "partly free" or "not free." On each scale, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free.

Political rights

In political rights, generally speaking, places rated 1 come closest to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with free and fair elections. Those elected rule. There are competitive parties or other competitive political groupings, and the opposition has an important role and power. These entities have self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy (in the case of related territories). Usually, those rated 1 have self-determination for minority groups or their participation in government through informal consensus. With the exception of such entities as tiny island countries, these countries and territories have decentralized political power and free sub-national elections. Entities in Category 1 are not perfect. They can and do lose credit for their deficiencies.

Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are less free than those rated 1. Such factors as gross political corruption, violence, political discrimination against minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics may be present, and weaken the quality of democracy.

The same factors that weaken freedom in category 2 may also undermine political rights in categories 3, 4, and 5. Other damaging conditions may be at work as well, including civil war, very strong military involvement in politics, lingering royal power, unfair elections and one-party dominance. However, states and territories in these categories may still have some elements of political rights such as the freedom to organize nongovernmental parties and quasi-political groups, reasonably free referenda, or other significant means of popular influence on government.

Typically, states and territories with political rights rated 6 have systems ruled by military juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies and autocrats. These regimes may allow only some minimal manifestation of political rights such as competitive local elections or some degree of representation or autonomy for minorities. Category 6 also contains some countries in the early or aborted stages of democratic transition. A few states in Category 6 are traditional monarchies that mitigate their relative lack of political rights through the use of consultation with their subjects, toleration of political discussion, and acceptance of petitions from the ruled.

assigns initial ratings to countries by awarding from 0 to 4 raw points per checklist item, depending on the comparative rights or liberties present. (In the *Surveys* completed from 1989-90 through 1992-93, the methodology allowed for a less nuanced range of 0 to 2 raw points per question. Taking note of this modification, scholars should consider the 1993-94 scores the statistical benchmark.) The only exception to the addition of 0 to 4 raw points per checklist item is the discretionary question on cultural destruction and deliberate demographic change to tip the political balance. In that case, we subtract 1 to 4 raw points depending on the situation's severity. The highest possible score for political rights is 36 points, based on up to 4 points for each of nine questions. The highest possible score for civil liberties is 52 points, based on up to 4 points for each of thirteen questions. Under the methodology, raw points correspond to category numbers as follows:

Political Rights

Category Number	Raw points
1	31-36
2	26-30
3	21-25
4	16-20
5	11-15
6	6-10
7	0-5

The Tabulated Ratings

Category 7 includes places where political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent due to the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or extreme oppression in combination with civil war. A country or territory may also join this category when extreme violence and warlordism dominate the people in the absence of an authoritative, functioning central government. Places in Category 7 may get some minimal points for the checklist questions, but only a tiny fragment of available credit.

Civil liberties

Category 1 in civil liberties includes countries and territories that generally have the highest levels of freedoms and opportunities for the individual. Places in this category may still have problems in civil liberties, but they lose partial credit in only a limited number of areas.

The places in category 2 in civil liberties are not as free as those rated 1, but they are still relatively high on the scale. These countries and territories have deficiencies in several aspects of civil liberties, but still receive most available credit.

Independent countries and related territories with ratings of 3, 4 or 5 have progressively fewer civil liberties than those in category 2. Places in these categories range from ones that receive at least partial credit on virtually all checklist questions to those that have a mixture of good civil liberties scores in some areas and zero or partial credit in others. As one moves down the scale below category 2, the level of oppression increases, especially in the areas of censorship, political terror and the prevention of free association. There are also many cases in which groups opposed to the state carry out political terror that undermines other freedoms. That means that a poor rating for a country is not necessarily a comment on the intentions of the government. The rating may simply reflect the real restrictions on liberty which can be caused by non-governmental terror.

Typically, at category 6 in civil liberties, countries and territories have a few partial rights. For example, a country might have some religious freedom, some personal social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and relatively free private discussion. In general, people in these states and territories experience severely restricted expression and association. There are almost always political prisoners and other manifestations of political terror.

At category 7, countries and territories have virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and justified fear of repression characterizes the society.

The accompanying Tables of Combined Average Ratings average the two seven-category scales of political rights and civil liberties into an overall freedom rating for each country and territory.

Civil Liberties Category Number	Raw points
1	45-52
2	38-44
3	30-37
4	23-29
5	15-22
6	8-14
7	0-7

After placing countries in initial categories based on checklist points, the *Survey* team makes minor adjustments to account for factors such as extreme violence, whose intensity may not be reflected in answering the checklist questions. These exceptions aside, in the overwhelming number of cases, the checklist system reflects the real world situation and is adequate for placing countries and territories into the proper comparative categories. The Survey team determines ratings for countries and territories in consultation with outside experts and the Freedom House Board of Trustees. Particular scores do not necessarily reflect the views of individual Team members, consultants or trustees.

At its discretion, Freedom House assigns up or down arrows to countries and territories to indicate positive or negative trends, whether qualitative or quantitative, that may not be apparent from the ratings. Such trends may or may not be reflected in raw points, depending on the circumstances of each country or territory. Only places without ratings changes since last year warrant trend arrows. The charts on pp.15-16 also show up and down triangles. Distinct from the trend arrows, the triangles indicate changes in political rights and civil liberties caused by real world events since the last *Survey*.

Free, Partly Free, Not Free

The map on pages 40-41 divides the world into three large categories: "free," "partly free," and "not free." The *Survey* places countries and territories into this tripartite division by averaging the category numbers they received for political rights and civil liberties. Those whose category numbers average 1-2.5 are considered "free," 3-5.5 "partly free," and 5.5-7 "not free." The dividing line between "partly free" and "not free" falls within the group whose category numbers average 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either "partly free" or "not free." The total number of raw points is the factor which makes the difference between the two. Countries and territories with combined raw scores of 0-29 points are "not free," and those with combined raw scores of 30-59 points are "partly free." "Free" countries and territories have combined raw scores of 60-88 points.

The differences in raw points between countries in the three broad categories represent distinctions in the real world. There are obstacles which "partly free" countries must overcome before they can be called "free," just as there are impediments which prevent "not free" countries from being called "partly free." Countries at the lowest rung of the "free" category (category 2 in political rights with category 3 in civil liberties or category 3 in political rights with category 2 in civil liberties) differ from those at the upper end of the "partly free" group (e.g., category 3 in both). Typically, there is more violence and/or military influence on politics at 3,3 than at 2,3 and the differences become more striking as one compares 2,3 with worse categories of the "partly free" countries.

The distinction between the least bad "not free" countries and the least free "partly free" may be less obvious than the gap between "partly free" and "free," but at "partly free," there is at least one extra factor that keeps a country from being assigned to the "not free" category. For example, Lebanon (6,5) has at least some rudiments of pluralism (however perverted or fragmented) that separate this country from its "not free" neighbor, Iraq (7,7).

Freedom House wishes to point out that the designation "free" does not mean that a country has perfect freedom or lacks serious problems. As an institution which advocates human rights, Freedom House remains concerned about a variety of social problems and civil liberties questions in the U.S. and other countries that the *Survey* places in the "free" category. Similarly, in no way does an improvement in a country's rating mean that human rights campaigns should cease. On the contrary, we wish to use the *Survey* as a prod to improve the condition of all countries.

Readers should understand that the "free," "partly free," and "not free" labels are highly simplified terms that each cover a broad third of the available raw points. The labels do *not* imply that all countries in a category are the same any more than a bestseller list implies that all titles on it have sold the same number of books. Countries and territories can reach the same categories or even raw points by differing routes. We use the tripartite labels and tricolor maps to illustrate some broad comparisons. In theory, we could have eighty-eight categories and colors to match the range of raw points, but this would be highly impractical. Anyone wishing to see the distinctions within each category should look at the category numbers and combined average ratings on pages 683-684.

The approach of the *Survey*

The *Survey* attempts to measure conditions as they really are around the world. This approach is distinct from relying on intense coverage by the American media as a guide to which countries are the least free. The publicity given problems in some countries does not necessarily mean that unpublicized problems of other countries are not more severe. For example, while U.S. television networks are allowed into Israel and El Salvador to cover abuses of human rights, they are not allowed to report freely in North Korea, which has far less freedom than the other two countries. To reach such comparative conclusions, Freedom House evaluates the development of democratic governmental institutions, or lack thereof, and also examines the quality of civil society, life outside the state structure.

Without a well-developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have an atmosphere supportive of democracy. A society that does not have free individual and group expressions in nonpolitical matters is not likely to make an exception for political ones. As though to prove this, there is no country in the *Survey* that places in category 6 or 7 for civil liberties and, at the same time, in category 1 or 2 for political rights. In the overwhelming majority of cases in the *Survey*, countries and territories have ratings in political rights and civil liberties that are within two categories of each other.

The *Survey* rates both countries and related territories. For our purposes, countries are internationally recognized independent states whose governments are resident within their officially claimed territories. In the unusual case of Cyprus, we give two ratings, since there are two governments on that divided island. In no way does this imply that Freedom House endorses Cypriot division. We note only that neither the predominantly Greek Republic of Cyprus nor the Turkish-occupied, predominantly Turkish territory of the Republic of Northern Cyprus is the *de facto* government for the entire island. Related territories consist mostly of colonies, protectorates, occupied territories and island dependencies. However, the *Survey* also reserves the right to designate as related territories places within internationally recognized states that are disputed areas or that have a human rights problem or issue of self-determination deserving special attention. Northern Ireland, Tibet, and Kashmir are examples falling within this category. The *Survey* excludes uninhabited related territories and such entities as the U.S.-owned Johnston Atoll, which has only a transient military population and no native inhabitants. Since most related territories have a broad range of civil liberties and some form of self-government, a higher proportion of them have the "free" designation than do independent countries.

The 1994-95 *Survey* has reduced the number of related territories. The territories of Bophutatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda have dissolved into post-apartheid South Africa. Palau, the last remaining fragment of the Trust Territory of the Pacific, changed status from related territory to independent country.

When analyzing the civil liberties checklist, Freedom House does not mistake constitutional guarantees of human rights for those rights in practice. For tiny island countries and territories and other small entities with low populations, the absence of unions and other types of association does not necessarily count as a negative unless the government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking association. The question of equality of opportunity also implies a free choice of employment and education. Extreme inequality of opportunity prevents disadvantaged individuals from enjoying a full exercise of civil liberties. Typically, desperately poor countries and territories lack both opportunities for economic advancement and the other liberties on this checklist. We have a question on gross indifference and corruption, because when governments do not care about the social and economic welfare of large sectors of the population, the human rights of those people suffer. Government corruption can pervert the political process and hamper the development of a free economy.

Joseph E. Ryan is senior scholar at Freedom House in New York.

USAID/Mozambique

FY 1993 - 1995 War-To-Peace Transition Program

Assessment of Program Impact, FY 1993 - 1994

USAID/Mozambique
Assessment of Program Impact, FY 1993-94

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

USAID/Mozambique
Assessment of Program Impact, FY 1993-94

Since October 1992, Mozambique--the world's poorest country--has made important progress toward what many thought an impossible goal: a successful transition from 16 years of devastating civil war toward democratically elected government and social and economic recovery. USAID was instrumental in this unprecedented achievement, providing vigorous policy leadership and $230 million of assistance during FY 1993-94.

I. Special Factors Affecting the USAID/Mozambique Program

When the peace agreement was signed in October 1992, Mozambique was suffering the effects of one of the worst **droughts** of this century, and was uncertain whether the drought would continue for another year. Of a total population of about 16 million dispersed unevenly across a territory twice the size of California, 1.6 million were **refugees** in neighboring countries, nearly 4 million others were **internally displaced**, and millions more were severely affected by war and drought. Two-thirds of the population were living in **absolute poverty**. The potential for widespread famine and death was high. Economic activity was at a standstill except in a few safe pockets and corridors. Virtually all **rural infrastructure had been destroyed by war**, and **roads were impassable** either due to lack of maintenance or because suspected of being mined. Life was so uncertain that rural Mozambicans could not plant a field and expect to harvest it; they could not sleep in their own homes, but fled at sundown into the bush to escape brutal attack. Outside the few secure areas it was impossible for Mozambicans to take advantage of recent economic, political, and social liberalizations. The people of Mozambique survived, thanks to their own strengths and to humanitarian aid, but they lived in indescribable isolation and misery.

USAID's rapid, flexible, and targeted response to this desperate situation was both a humanitarian imperative and vital to stabilizing the political and military situation to enable the peace process to proceed. Massive drought-relief and other emergency assistance was well underway by late 1992, and USAID resources were both increased and redeployed to meet war-to-peace priorities. The Mission broke new ground in innovative programming, particularly in use of the Development Fund for Africa. Mozambique's previous significant political and economic liberalizations (decentralization, privatization, freeing of agricultural prices, and others), supported by USAID, provided a firm foundation for the success of the peace.

The significant effective international assistance was a crucial factor in the successful transition. The **U.N. role** in supervising the whole process--including the presence of 7,000 peacekeepers--ensured the terms of the peace agreement were met, and precluded a return to arms. Bilateral and multilateral donors provided massive assistance--about $800-million--

and, importantly, collaborated closely to set priorities and maximize effectiveness. USAID's strong, knowledgeable, policy-oriented, in-country presence gave the Mission a particularly influential voice in this donor coordination effort.

Success was also due to the 80 international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) already operating humanitarian aid and development programs in Mozambique at the time of the peace agreement. These were highly effective implementing partners during the transition period. Programming through PVOs/NGOs maximized impact and also reduced a high potential for political hijacking of aid dollars first as long-isolated zones opened up and later as the election campaign got underway.

An additional factor affecting USAID's contribution and influencing the overall process was the successful **USG inter-agency collaboration**. The convergence of interests and cooperation in programming among USAID, Embassy, DAO, and USIS strengthened all USG efforts and mobilized additional support for the transition (for example, from the Department of Defense for land mine clearance and from the Department of State Bureau of Refugee Programs for refugee repatriation activities).

Finally, the desire for peace of the Mozambican people themselves was perhaps the most important positive factor in the process. Their unwillingness to support a return to arms, their readiness to take risks in returning to their homes, and their hard work to reestablish the basic conditions for future recovery, contributed immeasurably to stabilization.

The war-to-peace transition proceeded successfully but not always smoothly. Massive population movements as people returned home complicated the delivery of emergency assistance under already extremely difficult logistics conditions. Natural disasters, such as localized droughts (for example in Gaza province) and Cyclone Nadia (in March 1994 in Nampula province), impeded post-war recovery. Political maneuvering by both parties to the peace agreement resulted in delays that extended the original timetable for demobilization and elections by a year.

Mozambique's successful war-to-peace transition is an example of what joint commitment can achieve. By October 1994, Mozambique was a different country.

II. Progress toward Overall Program Goals

The goal of USAID's Transition Program is a **successful war-to-peace transition**, during the period from the peace agreement (October 1992) through elections (October 1994) and one year more (October 1995). USAID has: (i) provided emergency food, nutrition, water, and medical assistance to the war-affected and drought-affected population; (ii) supported the implementation of the peace process through financing of demobilization and election support; and (iii) supported the reintegration of the population into stable and productive social and economic activities through financing of land mine clearance, road/bridge

rehabilitation, agricultural recovery, and other activities. This transition is a prerequisite for the perhaps generations-long process of social, economic, and political recovery and normalization that will follow--or, in other words, for Mozambique's development.

Important progress toward this goal was achieved during FY 1993-94:

WARRING ARMIES SUCCESSFULLY DEMOBILIZED: Over 91,000 soldiers, 88% of those under arms at the time of the peace agreement, were demobilized. The planned 30,000-strong new joint army mustered only about 12,000 volunteers. Although with many problems, the demilitarization of Mozambique has truly begun.

FIRST-EVER MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS FREE AND FAIR: 6.4 million Mozambicans--81% of the estimated voting-age population--registered to vote, and 85% of these actually voted for president and legislature. In a year that saw democratically elected governments installed also in neighboring South Africa and Malawi, Mozambique's elections were described by the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative as **"The best elections ever held in an African country."**

LARGEST VOLUNTARY POPULATION MOVEMENT IN THE WORLD: More than 1.5 million Mozambicans, virtually all of those chased into asylum countries by war and drought, returned to Mozambique, most of them spontaneously. More than 3 million others, about 82% of those internally displaced by war and drought, also have returned to their homes.

FAMINE AND DEATH AVERTED: Mobilization of massive food aid, improved access and mobility, increased commercial activity, and two normal agricultural cycles combined to improve food security. Famine-risk indicators such as malnutrition rates, which were at an alarming high in 1992 due to the combined effects of drought and war, fell dramatically during 1993, and then remained stable during 1994. The number of Mozambicans dependent on food aid for survival dropped 50% from 1993 to 1994.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY: Growth in GDP is continuing in the post-war period. During 1994, growth is estimated to have been 5.4%, comparing well with other southern Africa countries. This followed an initial unprecedented spurt of 19% in 1993, the first post-war year. Mozambique's growth was attributed to initial agricultural recovery, enabled by macroeconomic reforms made previously and spurred by improved stability, security, and access to markets, as well as good rainfall.

The statistics cited above are drawn from secondary sources (including U.N. agencies) which did not disaggregate their data by gender, so there is no statistical basis for discussing progress for women and girls separately from general progress in the war-to-peace transition. It is important to note, however, that women are particularly vulnerable to war and drought effects. Female-headed households not only comprised the majority of the refugees and displaced persons, but also form a high proportion of Mozambique's poorest in general. The

discussion below provides some insights about how women may have been particularly affected during this period.

III. Progress toward Strategic Objectives and Related Indicators

Determined to make the most of USG resources for peace in Mozambique, the Mission identified three objectives for the transition period: (i) Avoid drought-related and war-related famine and death; (ii) Contribute to successful implementation of the peace process; and (iii) Contribute to reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities.

USAID was an important player in achieving these objectives, although the Mission did not act alone. **However, it is no exaggeration to state that key activities, such as demobilization and elections, would not have been successfully completed if USAID and the U.S. Mission in Mozambique had not provided both significant financial support and vigorous leadership.**

USAID developed and used **innovative approaches to monitor progress and impact** of the peace process. These included systematic observations and a photographic archive which captured people's stories and opinions regarding the end of the war, the coming of peace, and the outlook for recovery. These were complemented by statistical information from secondary sources where available, and general information obtained through news reports, publications, and discussions.

III.A. Objective One: Avoid drought-related and war-related famine and death.

> Indicator: Global acute malnutrition rates among children less than five years old stable or decreasing in monitored populations.[1]

Famine was averted and thousands of lives saved during the post-drought, post-war period. USAID emergency food aid reached 1,200,000 people in FY 1993 and 680,000 in FY 1994, while therapeutic feeding and emergency health and water services ensured the survival of thousands.

The significant improvement in malnutrition rates during 1993 indicates the overall

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[1]This indicator is defined as the percent of children aged 6-59 months with low weight-for-height (below -2 standard deviations from the international NCHS reference). This rate is highly responsive to situations of severe food and medical deprivation, and is the most biologically and statistically correct of the nutrition indicators for which data are available in Mozambique. Data on this indicator are not comprehensive or nation-wide, but because they are drawn largely from PVO/NGO surveys they were expected to be available for locations and populations most at risk, i.e., those in drought-prone and/or highly war-affected areas. In selecting this indicator, the Mission realized that the widespread massive population movements expected to occur during the transition period would complicate and limit any analysis or interpretation of the data.

improvement in food security for the population in general. **Malnutrition rates stabilized or dropped** throughout the country in the first year of peace, despite population flows which brought drought-jeopardized families into feeding centers and refugees who had been relatively well-nourished while in asylum countries into areas inside Mozambique where access to food, including emergency distributions, was unreliable.

USAID's Target Population -- February 1993 This family fled their home two years ago due to war, and have lived since then in the bush. They came to Sena a week ago because they heard food was being distributed here, thanks to USAID-funded airlifts. The girl is permanently blind due to malnutrition and infections. The whole family, severely malnourished, went immediately into World Vision's therapeutic feeding program. More than 34,000 people in Sena are wholly dependent on USAID/World Vision food distribution for survival. [Photo: J.Born]

The food crisis situation facing Mozambique was **a two-stage crisis.** First, massive post-war relief in the wake of drought was needed simply to save lives. By 1994, however, the situation was more complex: some families (particularly those near population centers) had already become relatively self-reliant, while many others (especially those who left population centers to return to their widely dispersed rural villages) remained at extremely high risk of hunger.

By the end of 1993, the overall emergency situation had improved to the point that many of the therapeutic feeding centers set up by PVOs to deal with hundreds of severely malnourished children and adults carried caseloads of only a dozen or two; some began to close down. Distributions of food rations to the population in general were ending. Instead, distributions were targeted to recent returnees and the vulnerable (female-headed households, the elderly, the disabled). For other families, free rations gave way to food for work and, quite soon, as markets began to function, to small-scale cash for work activities such as road clearing or school and clinic rehabilitation.

The improved nutrition situation was maintained throughout most of 1994. In August-September 1994, the "second stage" described above was evident: as planting season approached and 1994-harvested household stocks became exhausted, malnutrition rates began to creep up again in areas with high numbers of recently returned refugees or where harvests had been poor or where access to both markets and food aid was difficult because populations were extremely dispersed.

The table below shows rates of global acute malnutrition in children under five years of age, in selected locations in the **Zambezi River Valley in central Mozambique.** This area was

extremely hard-hit by the 1991-92 drought and was also one of the most war-affected and -isolated areas in the country. During 1991 and 1992, these locations received airlifted food aid but nearby populations within the districts were not accessible. The huge increases in malnutrition rates which occurred in these sites in the immediate post-war months were due to: (i) the new ability of war-isolated people in very poor condition to reach locations where food and treatment were available once the shooting stopped, and of PVOs to reach formerly isolated populations; and (ii) the effects of the annual pre-harvest hungry season, amplified due to drought-reduced harvests in 1992, coinciding with the rainy season which impeded regular food aid delivery to these sites even by airlift. **That such a quick improvement followed the 1993 harvest, and that the improved rates were sustained over the course of 1994, when vast population movements occurred in these districts, demonstrate the impact of the food aid and other emergency assistance provided during this period.**

The situation in these districts at the end of 1994 illustrates the "second stage" of need described above. In Mutarara district, for example, while the rates in larger population centers remained low, in the dispersed rural villages where returnees were settling they rose. Malnutrition rates thus aggregated to 7.1% overall in the district based on 30 sites surveyed. While not yet alarming, the higher rates indicate the degree to which rural Mozambicans in the post-war period are still vulnerable to hunger and dependent upon food aid.

Prevalence of Global Acute Malnutrition
Selected Sites in the Zambezi River Valley, Nov 91 - Nov 94

	Nov 91	Apr 92	Nov 92	May 93	Nov 93	Aug 94	Nov 94
Mutarara District, Tete Province							7.1%*
Mutarara Town	5.4%	2.1%	8.6%	12.7%	2.4%		
Inhangoma	10.7%	5.3%	30.1%	19.2%	2.0%		
Caia District, Sofala Province							
Caia Town	10.3%	3.5%	10.3%	12.3%	1.1%	1.1%	
Murraca		4.9%	10.7%	9.9%	2.5%	2.5%	
Sena		2.0%	22.5%	18.8%	1.5%	1.5%	

*Aggregated rate from 30 locations in the district, of which 5 were in Inhangoma and 3 in Mutarara Town; this data from MSF-CIS (Medecins sans Frontieres).
Source: World Vision

USAID contributions, provided largely through PVOs, were crucial to the post-war improvement in nutritional status nationally. The impact of USAID activities was particularly important in the Zambezi River Valley districts reported on above:

- Reliable monthly distributions of basic rations stabilized **food consumption.**
- Seeds and hand tools enabled families to restart their own **food production.**

- Opening up road **access** to these long-isolated areas--by clearing land mines and rehabilitating key roads and bridges--led nearly immediately to new **markets** in small goods and foodstuffs.

- Availability of **clean water** sources, vaccination campaigns, therapeutic feeding for the malnourished, **essential medicines**, and basic health services improved health status. In particular, an expected **cholera epidemic was successfully averted:** in 1993, hundreds were hospitalized and dozens died of cholera in this area, while in 1994, not a single case of cholera was diagnosed. Other severe health risks, such as an outbreak of bubonic plague in 1994, were quickly resolved.

The war destroyed families. Death and displacement left women, especially those with small children, particularly vulnerable to starvation and disease. The improvements in food, water, and health described above have particularly benefited women, who are the principal farmers, water gatherers, and food preparers in rural Mozambican households.

In sum: In October 1992, Mozambicans were still at high risk of starvation due to drought, and this risk was exacerbated by population resettlements in the immediate post-war months. USAID assistance was critical in avoiding famine and death during this period, both nationally--as part of a massive multi-donor effort--and in specific high-risk locations and populations. The result is that **Mozambicans' household food security and health status has stabilized, and a base has been laid for further improvement as post-war recovery reduces food aid dependency.**

III.B. Objective Two: Contribute to successful implementation of the peace process.

USAID led in two activities whose failure--or even significant delay--would have jeopardized the whole peace process: demobilization of the armies, and free and fair national elections. Progress in both these areas proceeded successfully, profoundly influenced by USAID's direct project assistance, contributions to U.N. activities, and strong policy leadership on U.N.-led commissions.

III.B.1. Indicator: Perceptions of personal safety and security of property stable or improving among populations in monitored areas.[2]

The **successful massive demobilization** of the warring armies strengthened and deepened the

[2]Government policies before and after independence, and the rural orientation of the 16-year civil war, forced repeated displacements of millions of Mozambicans, and severely affected the normal social and economic activities even of those who were not displaced. The degree to which Mozambicans began to feel more secure was a very strong indication of a successful peace; the difficulty was how to understand, and then measure, such perceptions. USAID's impact monitoring includes: (i) tracking secondary data, such as demobilization progress and incidents of armed attack (banditry), to provide a backdrop to perceptions of personal security; and then (ii) through observations and interviews during site visits, finding evidence of people's returning confidence.

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climate of returning safety and trust among the population. The demobilization numbers are impressive:

Mozambique Demobilization Summary

	TOTAL	FAM	RENAMO
Registered by U.N.	103,931	79,750	24,181
Demobilized	91,478 (88%)	70,959	20,519
Joined New Army	12,453	8,791	3,662

Source: UNOHAC

The soldiers themselves, tired of war and poverty, became **eager to demobilize.** By mid-1994, with elections and planting season approaching, soldiers of both armies awaiting demobilization became fed up with delays and mutinied in dozens of locations to demand immediate demobilization and transport home. The process was accelerated and completed before the elections in October. USAID financed immediate transport for the demobilized and their families to destinations of their own choosing, thereby giving an early boost to their transformation from military to civilian life. Once demobilization was completed, and in particular during the electoral campaign and voting, remarkably few incidents of threatening behavior or armed attacks occurred.

As the post-war months passed without major incidents, and especially as demobilization proceeded, Mozambique witnessed a **massive and overwhelmingly spontaneous repatriation of refugees and return of internally displaced persons. Mozambicans conquered their doubts and voted with their feet.**

Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 1992-94

	Oct 1992	Oct 1993	Oct 1994
Total Estimated Population	14,285,000	14,600,000	15,989,241
Internally Displaced Persons	3,737,000	954,500*	684,000
Internally Displaced Persons as % of Population	26.2%	6.5%	4.3%
Refugees in Asylum Countries	1,603,000	1,158,052	100,000(est.)
Returned Refugees	0	444,948	1,579,785

*As of February 1994.
Sources: UNOHAC, IOM, UNHCR

The U.N. High Commission for Refugees estimates that the number of female-headed

returnee households is between 30% and 40%, considerably higher than the average (10-20%). Virtually all of the returnee female heads of household are illiterate, monolingual, and with little or no formal education or training, which makes them particularly vulnerable during the post-war recovery. The vast majority return to rural areas and farming. Confidence in the security situation was crucial in their decisions to return.

Returning home – April 1994 – near Sena
This family, long displaced by war and drought, head home to their village about 25 kilometers away, now accessible again thanks to USAID-financed land mine clearance and road rehabilitation in this area. She carries the door and her father and son carry the roof frame for their home. [Photo: J.Born]

Increasingly confident Mozambicans began to mobilize their own resources--cash and other capital, labor, and know-how--inside Mozambique:

- Makeshift cane and thatch shelters, constructed upon initial return, gave way to more stable structures, sometimes even clay brick houses, by the second year.

- Crowded encampments of the displaced depopulated and self-destructed rapidly during 1993, as families moved back to their homes.

- As months passed, chickens and ducks became common again in the villages; soon afterward, goats; and finally, cattle, as returning refugees began to bring back their small herds from asylum countries.

- The number of post-war births at health posts increased significantly in some of the districts monitored, raising serious issues for the future but implying renewed hope and reunited families.

- Households significantly increased the size or number of fields they cultivated, by returning to land long inaccessible or left fallow due to war.

- Quite aside from donor- or NGO-financed rehabilitation, Mozambicans themselves, in line with their means, increasingly established or rehabilitated enterprises such as roadside stalls and teahouses, shops, small mills, and churches.

These facts are evidence not just of **returning confidence but of first steps toward the more general and longer-term social and economic reintegration** discussed under Strategic

Objective III below. It is clear that even the most profoundly war-affected Mozambicans, those in rural areas, believe that the war has ended and that they and their property are safe. Nonetheless, people in Mozambique are still afraid of men with guns; while more than 100,000 guns and many other weapons were collected during the demobilization process, secret arms caches are still frequently rumored and informal estimates of automatic weapons in the countryside range as high as a million or more. Thus, while a significant degree of security has been achieved, there is much room for improved political and legal protections that will solidify the start that has been made.

III.B.2. Indicator: Perception that the electoral process, including voter registration, campaigning, and elections, was free and fair.

Mozambique, with U.N. supervision and more than $60 million in donor assistance, successfully and peacefully executed its first-ever multi-party national elections, which were deemed free and fair by the U.N., international observers, and virtually all Mozambicans. USAID, a major donor to the electoral process, took a lead role in multi-donor advisory commissions and financed civic education materials and activities; training of Mozambicans as elections officers and political party monitors; other support for party monitors; and logistics.

These elections were **a triumph over seemingly unsurmountable obstacles**: Mozambique's adult literacy rate is estimated at about 30%. The percentage of the population that even speak Portuguese, the national language, is roughly the same. Mozambicans had had little experience with formal election procedures, none with multi-party politics and electoral choices. At the time of the peace agreement, many thought the elections would be virtually an urban exercise due simply to logistical limitations. Furthermore, given the terrible difficulties of access and communications and Mozambique's political history, coercion by various parties to control individuals' participation in the election process was a real possibility.

By March 1994 even rural Mozambicans were increasingly aware and interested in the coming elections; when questioned whether they knew about elections and intended to participate, most responded with requests for more information. The importance of successful elections to stabilizing the peace was increasingly clear to the potential voters, who often stated that **the election would allow them to vote for peace**. Indeed, one media account reported that a village in southern Mozambique, repeatedly attacked by both sides during the war, held a meeting and jointly decided that half the villagers would vote for FRELIMO and the other half for RENAMO, thereby ensuring that peace would be elected and forestalling any post-election retribution.

Men and women walked long distances, up to 20 kilometers, and waited long hours when voter registration began in mid-1994. More than 1,600 registration brigades covered the

countryside. The **civic education** that preceded and accompanied the registration process effected a sea-change in voters' understanding and intentions to participate. By July-August 1994 people proudly showed their registration cards and declared that each had his or her own idea who to vote for (that is, the principle of a secret ballot had been conveyed). Political parties established offices in rural areas; RENAMO and FRELIMO flags flew side by side in some towns. It was clear that in most of Mozambique there was **increasing interest in participation, and little or no evidence of coercion or fear.**

The principles of open campaigning and free secret vote inspired office-seekers, voters, media, and the election authorities alike. Of course the process was not perfect. But where the rare incidents of constraint in civic education, registration, and campaigning occurred, they were reported by the press, investigated by the elections authorities or the U.N., and publicly condemned by all parties. This treatment certainly contributed to limiting the spread of such incidents, and as campaigning proceeded, fewer and fewer occurred.

Mozambique Elections: Summary of Voter Participation

7,894,850	Estimated eligible voters	All adults 18 and over, roughly 50% of total estimated population
6,396,061	Registered voters	About 81% of those eligible, ranging from less than 55%[3] in Gaza province to over 98% in Manica province
6,148,842	Verified registered voters	96% of those registered
5,405,836	Actual voters	88% of the verified registered voters, and 68% of the total estimated electorate

Source: National Elections Commission

The majority of eligible voters cast ballots, and the vast majority of those ballots were valid votes. These statistics are the nuts and bolts of free and fair participation. The real people-level proof was demonstrated on the voting days. The balloting occurred on October 27, 28, and 29, 1994, at 7,411 voting tables. About 2,200 U.N. international observers, 35,000 Mozambican political party monitors (more than 32,000 of them trained and supported by USAID), and hundreds of credentialed staff of Embassies, aid agencies (including USAID), and the international media observed the voting and the counting of the ballots.

The observers reported that there had been a **peaceful, orderly process with no evidence of**

[3]Speculation continues about why Gaza's registration rate was so much lower than all the other provinces. It has always been a FRELIMO stronghold; it has a long tradition of labor migration to South Africa and Zimbabwe; and the vast majority of an estimated 250-350,000 Mozambican war refugees who sought asylum in South Africa did not (and are not expected to) return. Thus, the most likely explanation for the low registration figure is that the base population estimates here were exaggerated.

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coercion or fear: the conduct of the voting table officials was correct and serious; political party monitors were in place taking notes; the voters themselves, dressed in their finest, waited many long hours in the hot sun with patience and good humor; there was no evidence of political affiliation anywhere--not a single RENAMO T-shirt, not a single FRELIMO button could be seen; balloting was slow but steady, and once the first few had voted, everyone else became even more eager to do so. **When asked what they were voting for, people typically replied, "Peace. To be left alone to farm our fields."**

The elderly, handicapped, and pregnant women were the first to vote, and after that it depended where one was in line. Voting table officials were careful to ensure no preference in who voted first; in locations where men and women formed themselves into separate lines in accordance with social tradition, the officials ensured that voters from the men's and women's lines were brought forward alternately. Observers reported from many locations, both urban and rural, an apparent dominance of women voters, in line with evidence that populations in some areas are highly skewed toward women due to male labor migration and war effects.

When the RENAMO presidential candidate temporarily withdrew from the election on the first day, people kept right on voting and RENAMO party monitors remained at their posts in all but a handful of locations. Indeed, there was a palpable effort--on the part of voting table officials as well as the voters--to protect the process despite the political crisis in Maputo, and more than one observer was told that people wanted to vote and would not go home without having done so.

The **extraordinary civic responsibility and sense of purpose demonstrated** during the balloting were even more evident during the counting of the ballots. This crucial task was performed at each voting table, beginning as soon as voting ended and continuing through the night and often well into the following day. The voting table officers and the political party monitors, hungry and exhausted and working through the night by flashlight, candlelight, and makeshift lanterns, worked without interference or interruption and by mid-morning on October 30th most polling stations had posted the results of their count.

Part of the Cost of a Free and Fair Election

The degree of dedication the vote counting required is illustrated by one group in an isolated area near the Malawi frontier in Niassa, in northern Mozambique. No one in this location had a radio, so the village had not heard there was to be a third day of voting. At six o'clock on October 28th, the voting table officials closed the poll and began the count. When USAID observers reached them at noon on the 29th, they were just packing up the counted ballots into sealed envelopes and posting the count on the wall of the school. This village was so poor that neither the officials nor the party monitors had found anything to eat in three days: they'd been gnawing on green mangoes and all were suffering cramps and diarrhea. They'd found no water for washing and little for drinking. They were exhausted, dehydrated, hungry, forgotten--yet they finished the job and expressed satisfaction: "Next time we'll do it better."

It was clear to observers that Mozambicans were eager and that most knew how to vote. **The orderliness of the elections, the relative peacefulness of the campaign, and the broad voluntary participation of Mozambicans throughout the process have set a good precedent for continuing democratization post-transition.**

Mozambique October 1994 Election Results Summary

	Presidential Vote			Legislative Vote* (Number of Legislators)				
Province	Chissano	Dhlakama	10 Other Candidates	FRELIMO	RENAMO	UD		
Maputo City	87.5%	8.8%	3.7%	78.7% (17)	9.0% (1)	2.8% (0)		
Maputo	90.0%	6.2%	3.7%	77.7% (12)	7.0% (1)	5.9% (0)		
Gaza	95.0%	1.8%	3.1%	81.6% (15)	2.7% (0)	6.9% (1)		
Inhambane	78.7%	10.4%	10.9%	59.6% (13)	13.0% (3)		11.8% (2)	
Sofala	17.3%	74.0%	8.7%	14.5% (3)	76.6% (18)		1.4% (0)	
Manica	33.9%	50.5%	15.6%	27.4% (4)	57.9% (9)			4.0% (0)
Zambezia	38.6%	47.6%	13.8%	31.5% (18)	52.5% (29)	4.5% (2)		
Tete	40.8%	42.4%	16.9%	31.3% (5)	49.1% (9)			5.9% (1)
Nampula	37.6%	43.1%	19.3%	31.1% (20)	48.8% (32)	4.5% (2)		
Cabo Delgado	68.0%	18.7%	13.2%	58.2% (15)	22.8% (6)		5.8% (1)	
Niassa	57.1%	27.3%	15.6%	47.5% (7)	33.5% (4)			6.0% (0)
National Total	53.3%	33.7%	13.0%	44.3% (129)	37.8% (112)	5.2% (9)		
			Women Legislators	48	13	1		

*The balance of the legislative votes were shared among the remaining 11 parties/coalitions, none of which received the minimum of 5% of the total vote.
Source: National Elections Commission (CNE), Mozambique.

III.C. Objective Three: Contribute to reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities.

Indicator: Supply of staple food (maize) available in local retail markets year-round.[4]

Mozambicans, with much assistance from donor agencies, have taken very big first steps in rebuilding their lives and nation during the war-to-peace transition period. More than 750 primary schools, 250 health facilities, and 2,000 water sources have been rehabilitated or constructed, along with numerous private homes and enterprises. More than 3,000 kilometers of road have been cleared of land mines, and thousands more re-opened, with bridges and ferries rebuilt. USAID contributions to these efforts during FY 1993-94 included $42.8 million for improved health, water, and nutrition and for agricultural recovery; $19 million for road and bridge rehabilitation; $9 million for land mine clearance; $1.75 million for reintegration of demobilized soldiers and their families; and $28 million in Title III corn for commercial sale.

[4]Consistent availability of maize would indicate that production and marketing activities of people in the areas monitored were normalizing; its absence might indicate production problems or marketing disruptions, and if enduring would indicate a risk of hunger and potential for new displacement. Using market availability of staple food was also a natural choice of indicator for USAID's program impact, given the huge role played during the drought recovery and transition period by U.S. commercial and emergency food aid (totaling $132 mn in FY 1992, $64 mn in FY 1993, and $47 mn in FY 1994) and the Mission's successful emphasis since 1989 on policy reform to liberalize and privatize marketing and thereby spur agriculture.

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The social effects of the war were huge--traditional relationships were disrupted; families and villages were broken, dispersed; violence and fear ruled; dependence and fatalism increased--and its economic effects were all-pervasive, as farms and enterprises in even relatively safe zones ceased to produce once they were cut off from their markets. These effects also had roots in certain pre-war, post-independence policies of the government (villagization, nationalization of resources and production, centralization of authority), making even more difficult the social and economic reintegration necessary to both secure the peace and permit future development.

To gauge progress in reintegration, the Mission monitored a range of qualitative indicators during site visits--mobility, market access, children in school, acquisition of clothing and household goods, and others--and also tracked market availability of staple food, for which data in selected sites was available. With improved access and security as the peace solidified, the Mission expected to find yellow (imported food aid) and/or white (domestically produced) maize increasingly and then reliably available to consumers in open retail markets.

The observations of maize availability in FY 1993-94 reflected the two stages of post-war vulnerability to hunger which were discussed under Objective One, above. Certainly **in larger markets the supply of maize became more regular**, although availability varied with the agricultural cycle once the dominant staple was no longer the yellow food aid corn (an indication of food aid dependency) but the domestically produced white maize (an indication of recovering self-reliance). It was clear that, when available, the domestic production literally chased the food aid out of the market. But in smaller towns and rural districts, the presence of maize in the market remained rare indeed, despite the enormous growth overall in small-scale marketing activity and despite the stabilizing nutritional status. The absence of maize in these markets was somewhat surprising, since harvests had been generally good in 1993 and average in 1994, and since observations indicated that women were increasingly bringing their own white maize to the mills and less often preparing the yellow food aid corn.

The reason maize and other food staples were not commonly being bought and sold in rural markets is the **continued extreme dependency of the rural populations throughout the 1993-94 period on food aid distributions.** Families in and near population centers, who were on site, had land cleared, and received seeds and tools in time for the first post-war, post-drought planting in late 1992, were beginning to reestablish household food stocks in 1993 and 1994 and some even produced small surpluses. But families who dispersed to home villages distant from the markets and food distributions in the population centers did not recover so quickly. For the millions of families who were relocating during 1993 and 1994, household production remained low and reliance on food aid remained high.

Markets grew dramatically as soon as access and mobility improved, with nearly weekly increases in number of buyers and sellers and array of goods, even in locations where poverty and isolation had been most extreme. What was bought and sold in the markets

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early in 1993 were small consumer goods: soap, sugar, used clothing, bicycle repair parts, cheap sneakers, batteries, and dried fish. Within a few months, cane-and-thatch "tea houses" appeared, and artisans such as radio and bicycle repairmen set up shop. A few months later, new cloth, clothing, and tailors appeared, although used clothing continued in importance. Seasonal fruits and vegetables such as squashes, papayas, tomatoes, and melons were marketed. Artisanal products such as baskets, tin lanterns, and wooden or clay bowls occasionally appeared. By mid-1994, expensive goods such as new bicycles and radios were for sale. In rural towns where a cash economy was emerging, such as where road rehabilitation or mine clearance crews were based, fresh bread--a luxury in rural areas--began to be available daily. While it is still rare to find staple food products such as maize, rice, or beans in many rural markets, there is evidence that buying and selling of food staples occurs among neighbors.

At the end of 1994, staple food availability in markets has not yet improved enough in rural areas to suggest that production and marketing have stabilized. Mozambicans are still highly dependent on food aid. For example, in late 1994 in Mutarara district (critically drought affected in 1992 and isolated for 10 years preceding the peace agreement): although 70% of households had no food reserves at all, 99% of them had eaten a staple food the day before being interviewed--of those who had eaten, 39.7% purchased their food, 15.3% ate food they had produced themselves, and 44.9% ate food aid rations. Changes in this situation will continue to be closely monitored during FY 1995.

To complement the market food supply indicator, the Mission's field observations provided evidence on a wide array of informal indicators of reintegration (some discussed already in Section II, above). **The single most profound factor in improving lives in the post-war period, once basic needs were met, was the new accessibility and mobility of the people as roads were cleared of land mines and reopened**, and as bridges and ferries were repaired. Near-immediate emergence of private commercial transport, for goods and passengers, worked to **reunite the country** geographically and economically again, as well to **reunite families** long-separated by war, poverty, and fear. Buses now linked major cities, and trucks linked the cities to rural districts. **Mobility was vital in spurring market activity, in supporting the electoral process, and in bringing small enterprise back to rural areas.**

IV. Other Progress in USAID Priority Areas

During their FY 1993-94 initial recovery from war and drought, Mozambicans benefited from past progress made in USAID priority areas of **economic growth** and **democracy and governance**. The economic liberalizations made since 1987, with substantial policy reform support from USAID, ended price and marketing controls and made possible the resurgence of informal markets serving local populations. Similar policy reform support relating to

USAID and Reintegration – A Family, A District, A Country Reunited

In Marromeu district in the Zambezi River Valley, a U.S. PVO used food for work in early 1993 to reopen a road not traveled in 15 years. The road was needed to gain access to still-isolated villages in RENAMO zones and unite this district with neighboring ones. Food for the Hungry International, with financing from USAID, provided food rations and seed packets to hundreds of women and men who cleared trees and brush that had overgrown the old road. FHI brokered the complex negotiations--between government authorities in the district capital, RENAMO officials from the nearby base, and local traditional authorities--that were needed as work progressed from government-held areas into the RENAMO zones. A key meeting occurred on May 10 on a bridge just 15 kilometers out of Marromeu Town, described by the FHI Director this way: "RENAMO communication officer met FHI monitor on bridge and they are brothers who have not seen each other for 14 years and both thought the other was dead. Many tears of joy shed." That reunion brought together the whole district. In the months since, the gravely war- and drought-affected people of Marromeu have been a prime example of how joint commitment to peace yielded early and rapid benefits to the people of Mozambique.

improved governance, and especially to decentralization of authority and the development of civil society, allowed the growth not only of political parties but of hundreds of voluntary associations arising from local initiatives.

The changes documented above in the lives of Mozambicans since the war ended in late 1992 are dramatic but still fragile; more time and investment are needed. The orientation of donor agencies and PVOs, and of Mozambicans themselves, is already rapidly changing: from the post-war provision of emergency assistance to highly dependent people, to development assistance to people who have demonstrated their own readiness and ability to build. This offers real hope for the future as Mozambique moves down the road **from war to peace to better lives.**

Roger D. Carlson
Mission Director
USAID/Mozambique

U.S. Agency for International Development

Guatemala - Central American Programs Mission
(USAID/G-CAP)

Action Plan 1995-1996

May 1994

B.1.A. BUILDING DEMOCRACY: STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE RULE OF LAW

I. Mission Strategic Framework and Linkage between the Mission S.O. and Agency Goal

This strategic objective relates directly to the Agency's goal of Building Democracy with a particular focus on strengthening key institutions and processes that are vital to the effective and sustainable functioning of a democratic society. Three indicators will measure progress against this strategic objective over time: improved **due process under the law**; a heightened degree of **individual free expression and participation**; and improved **public confidence in key democratic institutions and processes.** These indicators will be measured bi-annually through the Democratic Indicators Monitoring System (DIMS) which was designed last year as the first national survey to test public attitudes and values on democracy.

The rationale for using this type of a survey to judge progress in meeting our strategic objective is based on the realization that public opinion plays a critical role in maintaining a democratic order, as we witnessed last spring in the wake of former President Serrano's failed attempt at an "auto golpe". As the coup and the public reaction that led to the eventual restoration of democracy emphasized, an effective and sustainable democratic order needs to draw its strength from a population that supports democratic principles and the institutions of democratic government. Thus, a critical component of democratic development is the presence of an appropriate set of democratic values and attitudes, along with effective democratic institutions that represent and protect the interests of its citizens.

As the 1993 baseline survey suggests, Guatemala has a long way to go before it can claim democratic stability. The results of the analysis are that Guatemalans demonstrate only a modest level of support for their system of government in comparison to other Central Americans. They also demonstrate a low level of support for attitudes regarding both the right to participate and the right to dissent, basic liberties associated with a full-blown democratic order. A major implication of the analysis is that Guatemala's democracy is set on an extremely weak attitudinal base, given the dubious combination of low system support and low tolerance for democratic liberties shared by a large percentage of its citizens, which in turn translates into a propensity toward democratic breakdown.

This tenuous and superficial commitment to democratic values, as revealed by the DIMS, has led us to add a new component to our strategy which will allow for a more concerted effort to strengthen civil society in order to improve public knowledge, attitudes and behaviors necessary for a deepening of democratic norms. This initiative, to be implemented primarily through local NGOs, is designed to complement and expand ongoing efforts aimed at strengthening key public sector institutions. It is our hope that by placing equal emphasis on both the "supply" and the "demand" sides of the democracy equation, we will be able to accelerate Guatemala's transition toward a more open, accountable, and participatory form of government that can and will be sustained based on its ability to effectively serve the interests of the majority of its citizens.

Our strategy for democratic consolidation includes support linked to producing the following five program outputs: **Increased public and private sector leadership** (through civic and human rights education programs and leadership training); **Greater access to equitable criminal justice** (through reform of the criminal justice system); **Increased follow up and investigations of human rights abuses** (through an improved case tracking system in the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman -OHRO- and training in new investigative and prosecutorial techniques in the Attorney General's Office); **Improved public awareness of human rights and democratic values** (through education activities with the OHRO and local and international PVOs); and **Strengthened legislative capacity** (through support to the Guatemalan Congress).

II. Strategic Objective Performance

Success in meeting these program outputs over the past year has been mixed. The political turmoil which began with the "auto golpe" last May and continued through January's national referendum on constitutional reforms has left many government entities that were fragile to begin with, reeling from a lack of direction, dwindling popular support and a lost or confused sense of purpose. As a result, we have experienced an unanticipated slow down in the accomplishment of several key program outputs during this volatile period. At the same time, however, new opportunities have presented themselves, such as the opening up of civil society and a greater tolerance for free expression. We are responding to these opportunities through a new and concerted effort to provide support to the growing number of local NGOs that are becoming, or have the potential to become, important actors in the public policy arena. Responding to emerging opportunities such as this is in keeping with the flexible programming approach that has been the hallmark of this strategic objective.

Strengthened Legislative Capacity

- The Guatemalan Congress has been unanimously denounced by the executive branch, the media and the general public for its incompetence and corruption. USAID/G/CAP chose to put its technical assistance package to the legislature "on ice" in January 93 when it became clear that the change in congressional leadership was for the worse and that any assistance would be wasted until such time as a more effective, committed team of leaders emerged. The reforms embodied in the national referendum which passed earlier this year were aimed largely at addressing the problems associated with this discredited institution. The most pertinent reform related to this Program Output is the call for new Congressional elections which will be held in August of this year. Upon analysis of the outcome and implications of these elections, USAID, along with the Country Team Working Group on Democratic Development, will determine whether to reactivate or terminate our support to the legislative branch.

Increased Follow-up on Human Rights Cases and Improved Public Knowledge and Attitudes of Human Rights and Democratic Values

- The performance by the OHRO has been disappointing since the departure of Ramiro de Leon Carpio last year to become President. This has affected two of our five Program Outputs. Once the flagship project of our democratic development portfolio, this institution has not maintained the reputation for excellence that it enjoyed under the stewardship of its

former leader. Many key staff people left with de Leon and the new Ombudsman has been slow to focus on some of the critical management issues facing the institution. As a result, we have seen a dramatic deterioration of the quality and quantity of educational outreach efforts along with continuing delays in the establishment of a computerized case tracking system, both of which were the primary contributors to the above mentioned Program Outputs. These difficulties with the OHRO have led us to effect two temporary suspensions of assistance and to accelerate our plans to diversify support to non-governmental institutions for the purposes of civic education and outreach, particularly among the rural indigenous populations.

- A new initiative which will contribute to the Program Outputs listed above as well as the one below is the Street Children's Support Project (SCSP) which came on line last September.

Greater Access to Equitable Criminal Justice

- The new Justice Sector Reform Support Project will provide the training and technical assistance necessary to prepare key justice sector institutions for the sweeping reforms that will come on line when the new criminal procedures code goes into effect this July. A critical determinant of the ability of this project to produce the intended outcome (i.e. greater access to equitable justice) will be the lifting of the Congressional hold on the component that will provide funding to the Attorney General's Office. Two thirds of the reform package is contingent on the successful implementation of new and expanded functions within the Attorney General's office as prescribed by the new code. The reform process, and the project designed to support it, can only be expected to limp along until the AG's office is brought fully into this loop.

Increased Public and Private Sector Leadership

- Through the Guatemalan Peace Scholarship program, more than 600 mostly rural and disadvantaged, local leaders have returned to their communities after receiving intensive technical and democratic leadership training to design local projects that model participatory development techniques. Over 366 participants have been involved in designing and implementing local projects that will ultimately benefit more than 20,000 rural, indigenous community members.

- Another 70 leaders from a variety of sectors have been engaged in a nine month seminar run by the Center for National Stability (Centro ESTNA) which fosters democratic skill building through civilian-military dialogue. The highly qualified participants, upon graduation, provide a multiplier effect in their respective sectors by applying their newly developed democratic skills in their daily lives. Recent graduates from this seminar series include several key military officials named by President de Leon to important posts, including the Chief of the Air Force and several other top zonal commanders. The annual seminar now draws more than 70% of its resources from non-USAID sources, thus insuring continuity of this activity beyond the project close out date in 1997.

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Since 1990, USAID has provided support to the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (OHRO) to strengthen its role as guardian of human rights in accordance with the Guatemalan Constitution. Specific initiatives financed by USAID include development of a case tracking system, human rights education in the countryside, and decentralization of OHRO functions. Based largely on USAID and other donor assistance, the OHRO presence is now apparent in areas that have long been without the rule of law and abandoned by the civilian ministries of the Government of Guatemala. One such area, Aldea Baxutchil, Nebaj, was visited last year by a USAID Project Manager who was part of a fact-finding team looking at the status of communities on the fringe of conflictive zones. Señor Mejía, representing 46 families who had recently returned to the locality after 11 years in one of the *Comunidades Populares en Resistencia*, recounted the hardships that caused them to abandon life in the mountains. He also cited army efforts to force the families to live in a "model village." When they insisted that they wanted to resettle on their own land, their lives were threatened by local army authorities. Although the OHRO posters that the families had hung were ripped down by soldiers, the community's confidence in the ability of the OHRO to safeguard their basic rights led them to denounce the action. The OHRO intervened, and an army investigator recognized the abuse and assured the local OHRO representative that the lieutenant in charge would be discharged. The army has not returned to intimidate these families, and--with the knowledge that they have recourse to the OHRO--this community is committed to resettling and productively working their land.

Table 1: Strategic Objective Program "Tree"

USAID/G–CAP (520 Bilateral Program)
Agency Goal: Building Democracy
USAID STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 1: Strengthening Democratic Institutions, Civil Society and the Rule of Law

Program Outcome No. 1.1	Program Outcome No. 1.2	Program Outcome No. 1.3	Program Outcome No. 1.4	Program Outcome No. 1.5
Increased Public and Private Sector Leadership	Greater Access to Equitable Criminal Justice	Increased Follow–up and Investigation of Human Rights Abuses	Heightened Public Awareness and Respect for Human Rights and Civic Responsibilities	Strengthened Legislative Capacity

Projects (#\Title)	Projects (#\Title)	Projects (#\Title)	Projects (#\Title)	Projects (#\Title)
520–0145 Special Development Fund	520–0407 Justice Sector Reform	520–0398 Democratic Instituts.	520–0393 Guatemala Peace Scholarships	520–0398 Democ. Institutions
520–0393 Guatemala Peace Scholarships	597–0002 Regional Admin. of Justice	520–0412 Street Children Support	520–0398 Democratic Instituts.	
520–0398 Democrat. Institutions			520–0412 Street Children Support	

TABLE 2.1: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE

Guatemala				
USAID STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 1 Strengthening Democratic Institutions, Civil Society and the Rule of Law				
Indicator: Due process under the law				
Unit: Percentage of favorable ratings in DIMS on the following five items: 1. Defense of human rights by judges; 2. Treatment of public by judges and judicial employees 3. Judicial institution helps resolve the country's problems; 4. Courts favor rich and powerful; 5. Courts work rapidly		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Democratic Indicators Monitoring System (DIMS) to be carried out every two years. No targets are planned for interim years.	Baseline	1993	---	1. 9.8% 2. 30.3% 3. 59.0% 4. 7.5% 5. 7.2% *
Comments: *Item 1 - the % refers to those indicating that judges greatly assist, Item 2 - the % refers to those indicating that they are dealt with well or very well. Item 3 - the % refers to those replying yes. Item 4 - the % refers to those replying No. Item 5 - the % refers to those saying yes.	Target	1995	1. 15% 2. 35% 3. 64% 4. 12% 5. 12% *	
	Target	1997	TBD 1995	

Indicator: Individual free expression and participation				
Unit: Percentage of positive ratings in DIMS on the following items: 1. Democratic liberties Index; Component Indices-- A. Opposition to the Suppression of Democratic Liberties B. Extensive Participation C. Right to Dissent		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: DIMS to be carried out every two years. No targets are planned for interim years.	Baseline	1993		1. 62% A. 81% B. 66% C. 44% *
Comments: The Democratic Liberties Index is a compilation of ten different questions and is broken into the three component indices listed above. See the DIMS report for these questions. *Stability is predicted in this area for 1995. The planned numbers are stated as a range in order to take into account the 2% confidence interval (up or down).	Target	1995	1. 60-64% A. 79-83% B. 64-68% C. 42-46%	
	Target	1997	TBD 1995	

Indicator: Public confidence in key democratic institutions and processes				
Unit: Percentage of positive responses in DIMS on the System Support Index		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: DIMS to be carried out every two years. No targets are planned for interim years.	Baseline	1993	---	40%
Comments: Stability or only a very slight increase is predicted in this area. The System Support Index is composed of questions surrounding the following six items, which are a broad representation of the democratic order: - Courts - Elections Tribunal - Public Offices - Congress - Human Rights - Political parties See DIMS for a more detailed explanation of questions.	Target	1995	40-42%	
	Target	1997	TBD 1995	

PROGRAM OUTPUT NO. 1.1 Increased public and private sector leadership				
Indicator: Percentage of target groups (GPS, ESTNA, Congress) scoring higher on DIMS than general population				
Unit: Percentage		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: DIMS to be carried out every two years. No targets are planned for interim years.	Baseline	1993	------	TBD
Comments: Data analysis has been delayed and this information will not be available until June 1995.		1995	TBD	---
	Target	1997	TBD	---

PROGRAM OUTPUT NO. 1.2 Greater access to equitable criminal justice				
Indicator: Coverage oral trial proceedings				
Unit: Percentage		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Court MIS	Baseline	1993	------	0
Comments: The Supreme Court's MIS (CENALEX) is not currently operational. Thus, it is anticipated that the information source for this indicator will derive from the Information/Monitoring and Evaluation System to be devised by the Institutional Contractor, who will establish applicable baseline to track the project's goal of "50% coverage of oral trial proceedings nationwide" by 1997. The Institutional Contractor will come on line in July, 1994.		1994	TBD	
		1995	TBD	
		1996	TBD	
	Target	1997	TBD	

Indicator: Prosecutors/investigators using improved techniques				
Unit: Percentage		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Public Ministry	Baseline	1993	---	0
Comments: This component is currently subject to a Congressional Hold. Upon lifting of the hold, the information source for this indicator will derive from the Information/Monitoring and Evaluation System to be devised by the Institutional Contractor, who will establish appropriate baseline to track the project's goal of "50% of prosecutors/investigators using improved techniques in implementation of new Penal Procedures and Narcotics Legislation" by 1997. The Institutional Contractor will come on line in July, 1994.		1994	TBD	
		1995	TBD	
		1996	TBD	
	Target	1997	TBD	

Indicator: Coverage legal defenders program nationwide				
Unit: Percentage		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Court MIS	Baseline	1993	---	0
Comments: The Supreme Court's MIS (CENALEX) is not currently operational. Thus, it is anticipated that the information source for this indicator will derive from the Information/Monitoring and Evaluation System to be devised by the Institutional Contractor, who will establish applicable baseline to track the project's goal of "50% coverage of Public Defense program nationwide" by 1997. The Institutional Contractor will come on line in July, 1994.		1994	TBD	
		1995	TBD	
		1996	TBD	
	Target	1997	TBD	

PROGRAM OUTPUT NO. 1.3 Increased follow-up and investigation of human rights abuses				
Indicator: Reliable and efficient tracking system for human rights violations in place and operational.				
Unit: One tracking system established and functioning		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Office of Human Rights Ombudsman (OHRO) tracking system	Baseline	1993	---	0
Comments: Establishment of the system was delayed due to institutional and political problems. The system was established in 01/94. Technical problems are still being worked out although the initial cases have been entered. System should be fully operational in six months.	Target	1994	1	0 needs to be revised
		1995	1	
		1996	1	

PROGRAM OUTPUT NO. 1.3 Increased follow-up and investigation of human rights abuses

Indicator: Percentage of human rights cases reported that receive follow-up/investigation

Unit: Percentage

Source: Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (OHRO) tracking system

Comments: In previous years the Mission has used the absolute numbers of complaints as an indicator of both an opening in the political system (freedom/willingness to file a complaint) and the outreach capability of the OHRO, directly supported by USAID. An increase in actual numbers of complaints has been considered an indicator of progress to date, as an improved environment and the establishment of OHRO departmental offices allowed for greater confidence in reporting violations. However, these figures have become distorted overtime as the departmental offices have been used increasingly by citizens to file civil complaints as well as human rights abuses. Therefore, starting in 1993, with USAID assistance, the OHRO initiated design of a new, computerized system to categorize the nature of complaints and disaggregate the real human rights violations which will in turn receive follow-up/investigation. In the future, we will track the percentage of this sub-set of cases that receive appropriate follow-up through the legal system.

* This new system was to have been in place and operational by 1993. However, due to the change in Ombudsman, the loss of personnel, the temporary suspension of assistance due to the "auto-golpe" and technical problems with the system, this has been delayed. The system is now in place (as of 01/94) and the first cases have been entered. However is not yet fully operational, although it is expected that within 6 months all cases will be loaded up and OHRO personnel fully trained in the use of the system. At that time, up to date information can be added and a baseline established.

	Year	Planned	Actual
Baseline	1994	---	TBD*
Target	1995	TBD	
Target	1996	TBD	
Target	1997	TBD	

PROGRAM OUTPUT NO. 1.4 Heightened public awareness and respect for human rights and civic responsibilities				
Indicator: Education/public awareness activities nationwide.				
Unit: Number of outreach activities implemented.		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: OHRO reports/records. DIMS.	Baseline	1993	N/A	172 human rights seminars
Comments: This indicator originally was designed to measure indigenous participation in these activities (as the most disenfranchised and most affected by human rights violations). However, the OHRO has been unable to disaggregate statistics on indigenous participation. Problems in planning, reporting and quality of program have lead USAID to recently suspend assistance to these seminars. When problems are corrected, and planning documents complete, the Mission will be able to provide targets. In the interim, we have designed a new project to support civic education activities through local NGOs which will come on line in FY 95. As is the case with the OHRO, USAID's support is intended to strengthen the institutional ability of these organizations to design and deliver quality educational programs. Therefore, an increased number of such activities taking place over time provides a partial indicator of project success. The question of quality of such programs and the degree to which they will lead to the intended program output, will be evaluated through the second indicator, discussed below. * As of 1995, will also include targets of new NGO initiative, to be established once project is operational.		1994	TBD	
	Target	1995	*TBD	
	Target	1996	*TBD	
	Target	1997	*TBD	

PROGRAM OUTPUT NO. 1.4 Heightened public awareness and respect for human rights and civic responsibilities				
Indicator: Changes in knowledge and attitudes of selected civic education target groups.				
Unit: Percentage		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Monitoring and evaluation system of civic education umbrella PVO.	Baseline	1995	TBD	
Comments: Under the new NGO project to begin in 1995, an umbrella PVO will be selected to administer TA, training and seed grants to local NGOs engaged in civic education activities. The umbrella PVO will also design an evaluation system which will attempt to measure changes in knowledge, attitudes and behavior of participants in project-funded activities. The information collected by the PVO will be compatible with the DIMS in order to provide comparisons with national trends.	Target	1996	TBD	
	Target	1997	TBD	

PROGRAM OUTPUT NO. 1.5 Strengthened Legislative Capacity

Indicator: Percentage of laws presented to plenary with professional technical assistance in key areas through the technical assistance unit:

- Social Sectors
- Budget/Finance
- Legal/Constitutional
- Energy and Mining
- Natural Resources

Unit: Percentage		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Congress MIS	Baseline	1992	0	---
This element is currently suspended due to political problems in Guatemala that inhibit the Mission from working with the current Congress.		1993	10	---
		1994	15	
Baseline and targets will be set for the next Action Plan should the agreement with the Congress be reactivated. If not, this indicator will be eliminated.	Target	1995	20	
	Target	1996	25	
	Target	1997	30	

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Draft Democracy Results Framework With Supporting Objectives



DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
INVENTORY OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Explanatory Notes

The two tables attached here identify indicators used to assess performance in the Democracy and Governance sector. The **first table** provides an inventory of performance indicators currently used by USAID Missions to assess performance of their Democracy and Governance programs. As such, they represent the Agency's state-of -the-art of performance measurement in this sector. Over 300 unique performance indicators are included here. The **second table** is a refined list of indicators which includes those used by missions and those identified in literature and elsewhere as performance measures for Democracy and Governance objectives.

These tables are intended to provide a starting point and organizing framework for discussion during the break-out sessions at the Democracy Indicators Workshop.

The framework and methodology used to prepare these inventories are explained below.

The Democracy and Governance Framework Used to Categorize Objectives and Indicators

Recently, USAID has identified four Agency Objectives in its support for sustainable democracy. These four objectives are:

- Strengthening the Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights
- Free and Fair Elections
- Strengthened Civil Society
- More Accountable Governance

The tables of indicators are organized by Agency Democracy Objective. For the purposes of the workshop, each Agency Objective is further disaggregated into several Supporting Objectives. These supporting objectives serve to define more clearly the Agency's approach to promoting and consolidating democratic rule. A list of Agency and Supporting Objectives is included here.

BKowal: 5/5/95

Classifying and Coding USAID's Performance Indicators

In preparation for the Democracy Indicators workshop, Mission Democracy and Governance objectives and their corresponding performance indicators were coded against the Democracy and Governance Framework. Each Mission's Democracy and Governance objective was classified into one framework category along with its performance indicators. The result was a preliminary categorization of performance indicators.

Indicators in the initial categories were then reviewed for clarity, completeness, and duplication. Unclear indicators were, where possible, restated on the basis of their cognate objectives, or in a few cases, deleted. Incomplete indicators were treated in a similar manner. Duplicate indicators were deleted, but a count was kept of how many times they appeared in the inventory. The comprehensive inventory of unique performance indicators currently used by USAID Missions is a result of this second review (Tables 1a-1d).

As is the case with all classification schemes, a number of difficulties emerged during the process. The disaggregation of Democracy into four major categories presented some problems in classifying Mission objectives. For example, Mission objectives dealing with acceptance of democratic values could be categorized under both Civil Society and Rule of Law and Human Rights. Similarly greater citizen participating could fit both under Civil Society and More Accountable Governance. This inventory's categories serve as an initial step in the Agency's plans to develop a comprehensive performance measurement system.

Incorporating Other Indicator Information

The Workshop support staff also developed sets of 'possible' indicators for each of the four Agency objectives and their corresponding supporting objectives. The indicators included here are a refined list of strong mission-identified indicators as well as indicators identified in Agency and Mission evaluations, a limited number of outside sources and those identified by the Agency's experts in each substantive area.

In these tables (Tables 2a-2d), each objective is accompanied by the specific results anticipated. These are in no way comprehensive and are subject to revision. Their corresponding possible indicators should be seen in the same light

The possible indicators are just that, possible. They are not meant to be prescriptive in any way. Rather, they are starting points from which each Breakout group can begin its deliberations. In some cases, the breakout groups may indeed adopt some of the possible indicators as candidate measures (provided they meet the other selection criteria).

Table 1a: MISSION INDICATORS BY AGENCY DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVE

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 1: STRENGTHENED RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 1: STRENGTHENED RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS	
LAC/ANE	Level of public confidence in the Judicial System (percent of male/female; also experts) (8)
LAC	Public confidence: Courts favor rich and powerful (percent of people)
LAC	Public confidence: Defense of human rights by judges (percent of people)
LAC	Public confidence: Judicial institution helps resolve the country's problems (percent of people)
LAC	Public confidence: Treatment of public by judges and judicial employees (percent of people)
LAC	Public confidence: judicial system is more independent of vested political and economic interests (percent of female/male)
LAC	Public confidence: significant degrees of corruption by judges (percent)
AFR	Degree of protection of political and civil liberties
ANE	Enforcement of legal provisions aimed at eliminating gender discrimination (Quality Scale - Weak to Good)
AFR	Stated perceptions of personal safety and security of property
LAC	"Disappearances" and extrajudicial killings by forces of order (number)
LAC	Cases prosecuted by the Public Ministry and adjudicated by the Court (disaggregated by: corruption; crimes against women and ethnic minorities; others) (number)
LAC	Favorable sentences for the defendants assisted by public defenders in major crimes' indictments of total sentences for defendants assisted by public defenders (percent)
LAC	Decisions (dismissal or indictment) plus confirmations of the decisions (percent)
LAC	Narcotraffickers tried and convicted (number)
LAC	Citizen tolerance for political differences (disaggregated by female/male) (percent)

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AGENCY OBJECTIVE 1: STRENGTHENED RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS	
LAC	Favorable ratings in DIMS: Democratic liberties index (composite indices) (percent of people)
LAC	Favorable ratings in DIMS: Opposition to the suppression of democratic liberties (percent of people)
LAC	Favorable ratings in DIMS: Right to dissent (percent of people)
ANE	Union members benefitting from full application of labor laws (number)
LAC	Human Rights cases reported with follow-up/investigation (percent)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.1: INCREASED ACCESS TO A DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS	
AFR	Commercial adjudications: Adjudications via non-governmental proceedings
AFR	Commercial & Administrative courts in Bamako, Kayes and Mopti become fully operational successfully handling business and industrial litigations
ANE	Legal proceedings, initiated by grantee NGOs, that encourage the consistent enforcement of existing laws (disaggregated by those initiated by NGOs on behalf of marginalized groups and individuals/ those initiated on behalf of women) (number)
ANE/LAC	Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (number of mechanisms) (2 Missions)
ANE	Disputes in project areas successfully mediated through village councils (percent)
ANE	Mediation Board cases resolved (percent)
ANE	People using Mediation boards (number)
LAC	Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) centers established. (cum. number)
LAC	Cases resolved through mediation (number) (2)
LAC	Mediation and arbitration laws operational (number of laws)
ANE	People with access to legal services and information (percent)
LAC	Coverage legal defenders program nationwide (percent)
LAC	Defendants requiring defenders assistance who receive same (percent)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.1: INCREASED ACCESS TO A DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS	
LAC	Dispute resolution/legal aid centers functioning (number)
LAC	Indigent detainees receiving legal counsel from the public defender's office/legal aid program (number) (2 Missions)
LAC	Legal assistance backup center functioning (yes/no)
LAC	Courts presided by judges (cum. number)
LAC	Regional court administrators (number)
LAC	Resources for justice sector (millions of US dollars)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.2: IMPROVED TIMELINESS	
AFR	Case disposal rate (cases disposed to cases filed)
AFR/ANE/ LAC	Case backlog (percent or percent reduction of criminal, family, commercial or appeals cases) (8)
LAC	Cases completed within legally-prescribed time periods in first-level criminal Courts (disaggregated by city/national) (percent)
LAC	New cases resolved in criminal/family courts in under 1 year (percent)
ANE	Case processing time: average number of days record to record cases in the pilot courts (Proxy for case processing time)
ANE	Case processing time: average number of months from assignment to a judge to case disposition in the pilot courts
LAC	Case processing time: length of time for a case to be completed from the opening of the preliminary investigation to the court finding or to the finding confirmation by a higher court, if appeals are made (avg. number of months)
LAC	Case processing time: length of time from the initiation of a formal criminal case investigation to a final case (avg. number of months)
LAC	Case processing time: Median number of months required to obtain first-level decision in civil cases
LAC	Case processing time: Time from opening of a preliminary case investigation to the initiation of a formal investigation in the Regional and other selected prosecutorial units and criminal courts (avg. number of months)
LAC	Case processing time: Time from presentation of indictment to court finding (or confirmation if appeal) (avg. number of months) (2 Missions)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.2: IMPROVED TIMELINESS	
ANE	Improved procedures formally adopted by MJO for the pilot courts (Proxy) (yes/no)
AFR	Commercial & Administrative courts in Bamako, Kayes and Mopti become fully operational successfully handling business and industrial litigations
LAC	Resources for justice sector (millions of US dollars)
LAC	Adoption of delay reduction mechanisms in court system
LAC	Court and Public Ministry offices using a caseload tracking system (cum. number- 3 Missions; percent of courts - 1 Mission) (4)
LAC	Public confidence that the courts work rapidly (percent of people)
LAC	Prosecutors/investigators using improved techniques
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.3: MORE EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROCESS/LAWS ARE CONSISTENTLY APPLIED	
AFR	Improved consistency on sentencing
AFR	Reviews by the high court of constitutionally-related cases
LAC	Court findings plus confirmation of findings by the higher court
AFR	Judicial System: Commercial & Administrative courts in Bamako, Kayes and Mopti become fully operational successfully handling business and industrial litigations
ANE	Average number of times per month that judges in the pilot courts access legal research services and legal databases
ANE	Judges outside the pilot court apply their new knowledge in deciding cases (Proxy) (percent)
ANE	Pilot courts fully implementing all procedures; survey of all concerned courts (Proxy) (procedures: yes/no)
LAC	Courts presided by judges (cum. number)
LAC	Resources for justice sector (millions of US dollars)
LAC	Prosecutors/investigators using improved techniques (percent)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.3: MORE EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROCESS/LAWS ARE CONSISTENTLY APPLIED	
LAC	Investigative results (dismissal resolution or resolution to initiate investigation) resulting from the preliminary investigations of such crimes on the Regional and other selected pre (percent)
LAC	Improved investigations: Court findings on serious crimes(plus confirmation of the findings by a higher court-if appeals are made) resulting from the preliminary investigation of such crimes (percent)
ANE	Law professionals and students exposed to western legal concepts (number)
ANE	Judges more knowledgeable about civil and commercial law and procedures: judges in and out of the pilot courts trained who score 75% or higher on end-of-training exams (number)
ANE	Sitting judges exposed to market economy concepts necessary for adjudicating issues occurring in a market driven economy
ANE	In-service judicial training formally linked to judicial career (yes/no)
LAC	Judicial Education Center established or strengthened
LAC	Judges trained (disaggregated by female/male) (number)
LAC	Judicial employees trained (disaggregated by female/male) (number)
LAC	Demonstrable autonomy of judiciary and legislature from executive interference (qualitative)
LAC	Successful acts of violence against justice sector personnel in a six-month period (number)
LAC	Ethics code established (yes/no)
LAC	Judicial career positions competitively filled (disaggregated by female/male) (percent)
LAC	Judicial planning and budgetary capability instituted (yes/no)
LAC	Pre-trial release for those entitled to prison exemption while they await trial within Asuncion court system (number of persons)
LAC	Effective planning, budgeting and evaluation systems established within the Supreme Court and Superior Courts of project jurisdictions.(OI) (number of systems)
LAC	Supreme Court sessions devoted to administrative matters (percent)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.4: INCREASED OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS	
LAC	Coverage of oral trial proceedings (percent of trials)
LAC	Justice Sector Institutions which have designed and implemented an information system which provides regular performance data of the judicial system (percent)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.5: EXPANDED KNOWLEDGE OF LEGAL RIGHTS	
AFR	People who have taken legal action to right a wrong (disaggregated by female/male)
ANE	Opportunities for awareness of existing laws through institutions - Enquiries by the Representatives at the DPR Research & Information Center (number)
ANE	Opportunities for awareness of existing laws through institutions - Females attending seminars publicizing laws, organized by grantee NGOs, focussing on consumer env'tl, labor, land & civil rights (number)
ANE	Opportunities for awareness of existing laws through institutions - People attending seminars publicizing laws, organized by grantee NGOs, focussing on consumer env'tl, labor, land & civil rights (number)
ANE	Opportunities for awareness of existing laws through institutions - Publications of laws by NGOs in media available to the public or relevant professional associations (number)
ANE	Opportunities for awareness of existing laws through institutions - Laws published by governmental institutions available to the public or relevant professional associations (number)
AFR	NGOs providing civic education (number)
AFR	Primary school civics curriculum developed and introduced in standards 6-8
ANE	Civic education programs addressing women's concerns (number)
ANE	Civic education programs concerning citizen's rights (number)
ANE	Registered marriages in project areas (Annual Proxy) (number)
LAC	Citizens demonstrating knowledge of constitutional rights (disaggregated by female/male) (percent)
LAC	Changes in knowledge and attitudes of selected civic education target groups (percent of changes)
LAC	Population reached by civic education efforts (percent)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.5: EXPANDED KNOWLEDGE OF LEGAL RIGHTS	
LAC	Teachers trained in civic education curriculum & methods (number)
LAC	Union members receiving training (number)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.6: IMPROVED MONITORING AND ADVOCACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL REFORM	
LAC	Public education and information dissemination activities to promote the AOJ reform process conducted by NGOs (number)
AFR	Human rights and democracy groups (number)
LAC	Cases prosecuted by the Public Ministry: others (number)
LAC	Court officers investigated by the Court 's Inspector General of Tribunal's Office and sanctioned by the Court: complaints (number)
LAC	Court officers investigated by the Court's Inspector General of Tribunal's Office and sanctioned by the Court: Complaints Investigated
LAC	Court officers investigated by the Court's Inspector General of Tribunal's Office and sanctioned by the Court: Complaints Sanctioned
LAC	Court officers prosecuted by the Public Ministry: Referred by others (number)
LAC	Court officers prosecuted by the Public Ministry: Referred by IG (number)
LAC	Disciplinary actions by AGO against justice sector personnel involved in human rights violations, which result in criminal cases.(percent)
LAC	Reliable and efficient tracking system for human rights violations in place and operational (number of systems??)
ANE	Active and effective lobbying by NGOs to ensure that laws are evenly enforced across all sectors of society - Planned lobby campaigns organized by grantee NGOs (number)
ANE	Active and effective lobbying by NGOs to ensure that laws are evenly enforced across all sectors of society - Planned lobby campaigns regarding women's issues (number)
ANE	Legal proceedings, initiated by grantee NGOs, that encourage the consistent enforcement of existing laws - Initiated by NGOs on behalf of marginalized groups and individuals (number)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1.7: CITIZEN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS BETTER PROTECTED IN LAW	
AFR	Constitutional Reform (yes/no)
AFR	Rights adopted from International Declaration of Human Rights (number of rights)
ANE	Selected legal and administrative reforms researched, enacted and implemented to promote civic participation and women's rights - Reforms Enacted (number)
ANE	Selected legal and administrative reforms researched, enacted and implemented to promote civic participation and women's rights - Reforms implemented (number)
LAC	1993 Constitution is promulgated and implemented/amended, if necessary, to further conform to democratic norms (Qualitative)
LAC	New national policy statements and/or laws promulgated on drug production and trafficking (number)
LAC	Selected legal and administrative reforms enacted and implemented (number)

Table 1b: MISSION INDICATORS BY AGENCY DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVE

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2: FREE FAIR ELECTIONS

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2: FREE FAIR ELECTIONS	
AFR	At least two parties participating in elections (2) (local/national)
AFR	Degree of openness of elections
AFR	Voting patterns in 1999 are less regional-based than in 1994
AFR	Stated perceptions of electoral process, including voter registration, campaigning and elections
ANE	A majority of eligible voters cast ballots in local elections (local/national)
LAC	Confidence in fairness of electoral process
LAC	Free and fair elections (5) (local/national)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2.1: CREATION OF IMPARTIAL AND OPEN ELECTORAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS	
AFR	Electoral district boundaries reviewed and redrawn
AFR	Provision for regular elections
LAC	Negotiated agreements implemented: electoral reform and labor reform
LAC	Significant issues brought to formal negotiation
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2.2: MORE IMPARTIAL AND EFFECTIVE ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION	
AFR	USAID-supported organizations that are providing election services\activities
AFR	Provision for regular elections
AFR	Correctness of elections
AFR	Creation of independent secretariat for the electoral commission

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2.2: MORE IMPARTIAL AND EFFECTIVE ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION	
AFR	Level of technical capability of USAID-supported NGOs that are operating in the elections area
AFR	Levels of skills of specialists involved in the elections
AFR	Voter education trainers trained
AFR	Voting patterns in 1999 are less regional-based than in 1994
ANE	Election monitors' assessments of the quality of elections
ANE	Election protests filed by candidates
LAC	18 to 21 year olds who are registered to vote
LAC	Citizen participation in political institutions and/or processes: adults participating
LAC	Citizen-jurors trained for election day.
LAC	Confidence in fairness of electoral process
LAC	Electoral results published on time (within X hours) (2)
LAC	Eligible voters voting (4)
LAC	Eligible voters registered (6) (local/national/selected regions)
LAC	Municipal elections occur as scheduled
LAC	National elections occur as scheduled
LAC	Public confidence in the electoral tribunal
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2.3: BETTER INFORMED ELECTORATE	
AFR	Development and implementation of voter education program
AFR	People who received voter education from USAID-supported trainers and NGOs
ANE	Voters who describe themselves as well-informed on election issues

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2.3: BETTER INFORMED ELECTORATE	
LAC	Awareness by citizens of advantages of participatory democratic systems
LAC	Citizen participation in political institutions and/or processes: adults participating
LAC	Public political issue meetings held
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2.4: IMPROVED LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL MONITORING	
AFR	Level of technical capability of USAID-supported NGOs that are operating in the elections area
AFR	Levels of skills of specialists involved in the elections
AFR	USAID-supported organizations that are providing election services\activities
LAC	Confidence in fairness of electoral process
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2.5: POLITICAL PARTIES MORE RESPONSIVE TO CONSTITUENTS	
AFR	At least two parties participating in elections (2) (local/national)
AFR	Political parties have an administrative structure at district and local level with adequate top-down and bottom-up communication
ANE	Citizens participating in political organizations
ANE	Policy content of the parties' official campaign platforms and public statements
LAC	Female political candidates trained
LAC	Women holding political party office

Table 1c: MISSION INDICATORS BY DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVE

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 3: STRENGTHENED CIVIL SOCIETY

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 3: STRENGTHENED CIVIL SOCIETY	
ANE	5% annum increase in perceived responsiveness to needs
ANE	Citizens who believe there are organizations that are effectively representing their interests (percent)
ANE	USAID supported Egyptian NGOs which believe that they have more influence over government (percent)
LAC	Level of Civic activities (percent)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3.1: STATE LEGISLATION ENCOURAGES THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF CSOS	
AFR	NGOS legally permitted to form and function
LAC	Involvement\legitimacy of regional organizations
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3.2: MORE EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT OF CSOS	
ANE	Distribution of public policy publications by select CSOs (number of publications)
ANE	Grantee NGOs where USAID contribution is less than 25% of the actual annual revenue (number)
ANE	Grantee NGOs with at least five funding sources that contribute 10% or more each to the annual revenue (number)
ANE	NGOs with complete documented and operating management systems (number)
ANE	NGO staff trained, both internally and externally, in management and planning (disaggregated by male/female) (number)
ANE	Existing networks used by grantee NGOs at provincial, national or international level
ANE	New networks established by grantee NGOs linking 3 or more other NGOs
ANE	Quality of public policy analyses published by select CSOs (Quality Index - scale of low to high)

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SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3.2: MORE EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT OF CSOS	
ANE	Targeted NGOs achieving a defined rating (number)
ANE	USAID-supported NGOs which are more representative to their constituents (number/percent)
ANE	USAID-supported NGOs which play an advocacy role for their constituents in various ways to the government (number/percent)
LAC	Individuals trained in NGOs to promote democratic participation (number)
LAC	Institutional strengthening elements established in NGOs promoting project purpose. (number of elements)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3.3: INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DEBATE	
AFR	Functioning lobby groups (women's rights and other) (number)
AFR	NGOs act to assert/defend democratic values
AFR	New disadvantaged organizations established through USAID funding (number)
AFR/ANE	Share of population belonging to at least one organized, voluntary group (by gender and locale) (2)
AFR	Share of total assets in the banking system accounted for by CSOs
ANE	Public awareness of NGO activities through publication of independent articles reported in the media (number of articles)
ANE	Activities (including advocacy) implemented by USAID-supported NGOs
ANE	Activities initiated by municipal community action
ANE/LAC	Citizens participating in political organizations (number/percent) (2)
ANE	USAID supported Egyptian NGOs which believe that they have more influence over government (percent)
ANE	Calls on members of elected bodies by civil society organizations (CSOs) or NGOs (number of visits)
ANE	Active and effective lobbying by NGOs to ensure that laws are evenly enforced across all sectors of society (disaggregated by planned lobby campaigns organized by grantee NGOs; planned lobby campaigns regarding women's issues)

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SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3.3: INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DEBATE	
ANE	Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and usage (disaggregated by those initiated by grantee NGOs and those initiated by selected institutions)
ANE	Community participation in politically-sensitive areas - Membership of groups which are female (number of groups)
ANE	Community participation in politically-sensitive areas - Self-help groups (number)
ANE	Contribution of resources of participants
ANE	Development projects jointly-implemented by local governments and community groups/NGOs (number)
ANE	Dialogue between GOI and NGOs (number of meetings)
ANE	Effective NGO advocacy campaigns in the areas of human rights, environment, labor, women's issues and independent media (number)
ANE	Effective NGO advocacy campaigns in the areas of human rights, environment, labor, women's issues and independent media - Campaigns addressing women's issues (number)
ANE	Female garment workers who are members of an independent garment union (number)
ANE	Labor unions express and negotiate the interests of members in a public forum
ANE	Legal proceedings, initiated by grantee NGOs, that encourage the consistent enforcement of existing laws - Initiated by NGOs on behalf of marginalized groups and individuals (number)
ANE	Legal proceedings, initiated by grantee NGOs, that encourage the consistent enforcement of existing laws - Initiated on behalf of women
ANE	Members in sub-activities (number)
ANE	Membership of USAID-supported NGOs
ANE	Cases of corruption, abuse of power and collusion reported by NGOs to the public or appropriate government representative
ANE	Cases of corruption, abuse of power and collusion that are targeted against women reported by NGOs
ANE	Times that the activities of grantee NGOs have a measurable impact on the formulation of Government policy

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3.3: INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DEBATE	
ANE	NGO mobilization of public opinion through publications (number of publications)
ANE	NGO mobilization of public opinion through surveys (number of surveys)
ANE	People who believe they are able to participate in the decision-making process (percent)
ANE	Policies suggested by the Egyptian center for economic studies affect GOE decisions
ANE	Regularity of meetings
ANE	Think-tank influenced the positions and advocacy of selected private sector groups
ANE	Think-tank has influenced policy makers through its reports and seminars
ANE	Vertical network connections (number)
LAC	Average Community attendance in town meetings (disaggregated by male/female/total) (number)
LAC	Bar association members paying dues (percent)
LAC	Open town meetings in target areas promoted by LGs or citizens (avg. number of meetings)
LAC	Cantones participating in open town meetings (percent)
LAC	Citizens using civil society organizations to affect decision-making at local and national levels (disaggregated by male/female) (percent)
LAC	Civic and public interest organizations that lobby Congress on sustainable development issues (number)
LAC	Legally registered public interest organizations(NGOs) dedicated to increasing public participation in democratic processes (number)
LAC	Municipal, school and community projects undertaken through civic participation (number)
LAC	NGO interventions in public discussion (number)
LAC	Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) participating in reconstruction activities (cum. number)
LAC	Open town meetings held (number) (2)

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SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3.3: INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DEBATE	
LAC	Other NGOs related to the program carrying out civic participation activities (number)
LAC	Support for Civil Liberties (percent of people)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3.4: INCREASED ACCEPTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES	
AFR	NGOs providing civic education (number)
AFR	Primary school civics curriculum developed and introduced in standards 6-8
ANE	Civic education programs addressing women's concerns (number)
ANE	Civic education programs concerning citizen's rights (number)
LAC	Citizens demonstrating knowledge of constitutional responsibilities (disaggregated by male/female) (percent)
LAC	Citizens demonstrating knowledge of constitutional rights (disaggregated by male/female) (percent)
LAC	Education/public awareness activities nationwide: for human rights and civic responsibilities (number)
LAC	Belief in efficacy of democracy compared to alternatives (percent of people)
LAC	Changes in knowledge and attitudes of selected civic education target groups (percent)
LAC	People exposed to democratic values and activities in the US (number) (disaggregated by male/female/total) (3)
LAC	Population reached by civic education efforts (percent)
LAC	Public education and information dissemination activities to promote the AOJ reform process conducted by NGOs (number)
LAC	Public opinion on importance of political consensus (percent of people)
LAC	Strengthened judicial, legislative, civic education, etc.. NGOs in LAC
LAC	Support for competition between parties (percent of people)
LAC	Teachers trained in civic education curriculum & methods (number)
LAC	Union members receiving training (number)

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SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3.5: MORE INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTIVE MEDIA	
AFR	Degree of freedom of expression
AFR	Presentation by the media of a wide spectrum of views, opinions and news in an objective and professional manner
ANE	Citizens with information on national and local issues (percent)
ANE	Electronic media and publications with multisource reporting (number of publications)
ANE	Policy content of select newspapers and newsweeklies (quality scale - points)
ANE	Public awareness of NGO activities through publication of independent articles reported in the media (number of articles)
LAC	Media association membership (percent of people)

Table 1d: MISSION INDICATORS BY AGENCY DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVE

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 4: MORE ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 4: MORE ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE	
ANE	Community groups achieving a defined rating (disaggregated by different groups) (number)
ANE	Expert rating of extent to which selected democratic institutions and processes are more responsive
ANE	People who believe that institutions are responsive (percent)
AFR	Degree of openness/transparency of the constitutional process
LAC	Public with confidence in legislature (percent)
LAC	Public who believe that there are significant degrees of corruption by government employees (percent)
LAC	Public who believe that there are significant degrees of corruption by politicians (percent)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.1: INCREASED LOCAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN BASIC GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS	
AFR	Existence of adequate political infrastructure at regional levels
ANE	Development projects jointly-implemented by local governments and community groups/NGOs (number)
ANE	10% Annual increase in LGUs with NGO (number of LGUs)
ANE	Activities (including advocacy) implemented by USAID-supported NGOs
ANE	Activities initiated by municipal community action
ANE	Budget amount received by local government from central government or from taxes
ANE	Dialogue between GOI and communities (number of meetings)
ANE	LGUs nationwide accessing banks/bonds (number)
ANE	Newspaper articles covering central/local government debates or discussions (number)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.1: INCREASED LOCAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN BASIC GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS	
ANE	Percentage increase in expenditure by local governments (millions of US dollars)
ANE	Popular participation in municipal activities
ANE	Selected LGUs with actionable environmental plans (number of LGUs)
ANE	Selected LGUs net tax collection (millions of pesos)
ANE	Targeted local governments achieving a defined rating.s (number)
LAC	Average Community attendance in town meetings (disaggregated by female/male)
LAC	Municipal, school and community projects undertaken through civic participation (number of projects)
LAC	Regular use of municipal meetings in 39 municipalities (number of municipalities)
LAC	Average portion of municipal budget for capital projects in participating municipalities (percent)
LAC	Cantones participating in open town meetings (percent)
LAC	Citizens perceptions of responsiveness of selected municipal governments (disaggregated by feamle/male) (percent)
LAC	Functioning municipalities incorporating popular participation (number)
LAC	LGs' elected officials and staff trained in target areas (number per year)
LAC	LGs' budgets coming from target areas' resources (percent)
LAC	Legislation enacted to implement constitutionally-mandated decentralization of government (yes/no)
LAC	Locally-generated revenue in 39 pilot municipalities (percent change)
LAC	Municipal finance innovation demonstration projects completed (number)
LAC	Municipalities managing water systems and primary schools in 39 municipalities (number)
LAC	Municipalities with an improved budget system in operation (number)
LAC	National budget transfers to local government (percent of national budget)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.1: INCREASED LOCAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN BASIC GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS	
LAC	Nationally aggregated municipal income spent per year (pecrent)
LAC	Open town meetings in target areas promoted by LGs or citizens (avg. number per month)
LAC	Pilot projects in citizen municipal participation completed (number)
LAC	Population in target areas served with basic services provided by LGs (percent)
LAC	Public planning meetings held by municipal governments within Pilot areas
LAC/ANE	Public with confidence in local governments (LG) (2) (percent)
LAC	Urban inhabitants receiving all three services (water, sewage, refuse) in participating municipalities (percent)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.2: IMPROVED MECHANISMS TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY AND GUARD AGAINST CORRUPTION, INCLUDING INVOVLEMENT BY CSOS	
AFR	Degree of openness/transparency of the constitutional process
ANE	Dialogue between GOI and NGOs (number of meetings)
ANE	Dialogue between GOI and communities (number of meetings)
LAC	Municipalities with an improved budget system in operation (number)
ANE	Monitoring by NGOs of corruption, abuse of power and collusion - Cases reported by NGOs to the public or appropriate government representative (number)
ANE	Monitoring by NGOs of corruption, abuse of power and collusion - Cases reported that are targeted against women (number)
ANE	Accountability, transparency and efficiency of auditing techniques of the Parliament and Ministry of Finance
LAC	Audit findings corrected (as recommended by Controller General' Audit Reports), as a percent of total needing correction (percent)
LAC	Executive agencies implementing new accounting systems (percent)
LAC	GOA offices debureaucratized (number)
LAC	Groups actively participating in anti-curruption activities (number)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.2: IMPROVED MECHANISMS TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY AND GUARD AGAINST CORRUPTION, INCLUDING INVOVLEMENT BY CSOS	
LAC	National Budget reflecting cost/output relationship (percent)
LAC	National budget audited by the Controller General (percent)
LAC	National budget audited each year (disaggregated by investment/operational budget) (percent)
LAC	National budget audited each year that pertains to GOES entities whose financial statements receive unqualified audit opinions (percent)
LAC	Public agencies with uniform budget in operation (percent)
LAC	Public resources post-audited as a percent of total public resources expended (percent)
LAC	Reform proposals enacted and being implemented (number)
LAC	System established for merit-based selection and promotion of professionals (Index Score)
LAC	Victims of corruption surveyed who reported it to authorities (percent)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.3: INCREASED CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES	
LAC	Support for democracy over revolutionary or military government (percent of people)
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.4: MORE EFFECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT LEGISLATURES	
AFR	Committee oversight hearings (number)
AFR	Frequency of advocacy groups testifying before parliament (number)
AFR	Parliament modifications to budget (number)
AFR	Parliamentary debates of policy issues as covered by the media (number)
AFR	People (male and female) who report at least one contact with their MP during a specified recall period
AFR	Women elected MPs and appointed to cabinets (number)
ANE	Briefing papers produced for Assembly committees and members: Papers that meet quality criteria (Annual Proxy) (percent)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.4: MORE EFFECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT LEGISLATURES	
ANE	Draft laws that undergo a first reading before the parliament and are subject to the standing committee procedures (percent)
ANE	Elected parliamentarians exposed to the processes and procedures of other democratic states (percent)
ANE	Expert opinion that the legislature is better informed and is playing a stronger role
ANE	Expert rating of the extent to which parliament's capabilities and professionalism has been strengthened
ANE	Legislation which benefits from public debate and transparency of legislative process
ANE	Legislative challenges to the government
ANE	Members of Parliament who describe the committee process as effective (percent)
ANE	Members using briefing papers in debates (number)
ANE	People's Assembly proposes alternate allocation of funds during annual budget debates (and perhaps during five-year plan review)
ANE	Ratio of private to government bills tabled in Parliament
ANE	Requests to the library for information: requests per annum to the library from members or committees for information (Annual Proxy) (number)
ANE	Share of total bills passed that were initiated by the People's Assembly (percent)
ANE	System of publication and dissemination of laws established and implemented
LAC	Bills passed by legislature and approved by executive without executive changes or vetoes (percent)
LAC	Citizen confidence in the legislative process (2) (percent)
LAC	Citizens perceptions of responsiveness of legislature (disaggregated by female/male) (percent)
LAC	Congressional committees using new legislative support services (cum. number)
LAC	Congressional members and staff trained (number)
LAC	Consultative reports and expert testimony received by Congress (number of reports delivered)
LAC	Demonstrable autonomy of judiciary and legislature from executive interference (Qualitative)

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.4: *MORE EFFECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT LEGISLATURES*	
LAC	Fully-integrated Legislative information system installed and functioning
LAC	Internal capabilities developed in the legislature (number of training activities)
LAC	Parliamentary committee hearings (number)
LAC	Parliamentary committee system fully functioning (Yes/No)

Table 2a: POSSIBLE INDICATORS BY DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVE

AGENCY OBJECTIVE: STRENGTHENED RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights	Possible higher level aggregates: 1. Those guilty of crimes are punished and the innocent go free; 2. The law respects human rights and is consistently applied to all citizens; 3. The justice system responds adequately to military, executive and legislative branch infringements of rights; and 4. Citizens accept the importance and value of rights and extend rights to all fellow citizens.	1. % increase in cases brought by those previously excluded (minorities, women, private sector, etc)
		2. % of prosecuted human rights violators found guilty and sentenced (by type of violation)
		3. % of those in gov't prosecuted for corruption found guilty and sentenced
		4. % criminal defendants in jail pending disposition for longer than the maximum sentence they could receive if convicted (male/female, ethnic group)
		5. average length of time criminal defendants are in jail pending disposition; % in jail (male/female; ethnic group)
		6. % criminal defendants convicted (male/female; ethnic group)
		7. % public believing in democratic principles (male/female; ethnic group)
		8. % cases in which court orders are enforced
		9. % criminal/political cases involving non-military personnel decided in special courts/tribunals
		10. public trust (male/female, by ethnic group, etc) that no one is above the law; that judiciary is independent of vested pol. and econ. interests

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 1.1: Increased access to a dispute resolution process	Increased physical access	1. % population w/ geographic access (ethnic group)
		2. # judges/court rooms per 100,000 population
		3. population with access to ADR; # cases resolved through ADR (male/female; ethnic group)
	Increased affordability	1. % TOTAL defendants with legal counsel (male/female; ethnic group)
		2. % civil/commercial litigants who rank in the lowest income groups (male/female; ethnic group)
		3. % change in court fees; fee structure reformed
		4. % of indigents accused of crimes provided w/ public defender (male/female; by type of crime) (if baseline is very small because programs are new, could look at % requests for public defender and % requests met)
Supporting Objective 1.2: Improved timeliness (justice is prompt)	Cases are processed more quickly	1. Average case processing time (disaggregated by phase, if preferred)
		2. # pending cases; % in backlog or % (new cases) resolved in less than x amount of time
		3. ratio of cases disposed to cases filed
	Improved investigative techniques	1. average length of time for criminal investigations
		2. % cases postponed more than once or returned for further investigation
	Improved Procedures	1. Changes in procedures
		2. # lawyers sanctioned by judges for causing unnecessary delays or % cases in which lawyers are sanctioned
	Burden on the formal courts lifted	1. Percent of total cases resolved through ADR
		2. Case mix

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.3: More Effective Judicial Process/Laws Consistently Applied	Possible Aggregates (indicators could also perhaps serve as Agency Objective measures)	1. % cases in which appropriate laws and procedures applied (review by expert panel)
		2. % lower court decisions reversed upon appeal
		3. % verdicts which a review entity declares inappropriate; % with disciplinary action
	Judges, other court officials, and litigants/defendants know/have access to the law and procedures	1. Unified code of laws, decrees, procedures exists and is up to date on computer data base or via annual publication
		2. % of judges hired on merit
	Judges are independent	1. existence of judicial tenure law
		2. % judges hired on merit; % judicial appointments reviewed by independent board
		3. Justice system a) develops annual budget; and b) controls its budget
		4. Adequacy of compensation for judges and other court officials (yes/no or % salary for similar status positions)
		5. # attempts to intimidate the judiciary; % that are violent
	Judges respect ethical standards	1. Ethics code exists
		2. % judges about whom complaints are registered; % of complaints investigated; % prosecuted
	Judicial procedures are improved	1. coverage of oral trial proceedings (survey via a check list - i.e., defendants are present during all testimony, etc)
		2. existence of uniform set of procedures for 1) investigations; 2) trials
		3. % criminal cases in which trial procedures were followed (via a check list)
		4. % criminal defendants who obtain pre-trial release in return for bail (or existence of system of bail and pre- trial release)

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.3: More Effective Judicial Process/Laws Consistently Applied (con't)	Improved investigative techniques	1. % criminal cases that present forensic evidence
		2. % criminal defendants released due to lack of evidence
	Improved prosecution in criminal cases	1. % criminal trials in which prosecutors have performed satisfactorily
		2. % prosecutors who meet established standards (proxy)
	Court management is improved	1. % court records that are accurate & properly maintained
		2. % cases w/ verbatim transcripts (for oral proceedings)
		3. % judges following rules for case management
		4. Average time to obtain information on a case
Supporting Objective 1.4: Increased Openness and Transparency in the Judicial Process	The justice system is accountable for public resources	1. % budget audited; % of audit recommendations implemented
		2. Justice system participates in budget formulation (yes/no)
	Defendants can understand and participate in the proceedings	1. % criminal courts or jurisdictions making full use of oral trial proceedings (criteria to include defendant present during testimony, etc)
		2. average length of time to obtain information on one's case
		3. % defendants who do not speak the court's language provided with an interpreter
	The justice system keeps the public informed	1. court has public information program; % public understanding key points
Supporting Objective 1.5: Expanded Knowledge of Legal Rights		1. % population (male/female; by ethnic group) knowledgeable of rights (and know how to act on)

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 1.6: Improved Monitoring and Advocacy of Human Rights (including Justice Sector Reform)	Increased investigation and prosecution of human rights violations	1. # cases reported; % investigated; % prosecuted (disaggregated according to severity; gender; abuser, etc) (NB: if fear is widespread, cases may be under-reported)
		2. # cases judicial conduct investigated; % prosecuted (can also apply indicator to prosecutors and the police)
		3. # cases of alleged conduct among lawyers reported to Bar Association; % investigated; % sanctioned
	Increased advocacy/demand for reform of the justice system	1. % population agreeing with the need for reform (male/female; ethnic group)
		2. qualitative survey of NGO advocacy of reform
	Improved tracking and reporting of violations by NGOs and the media	1. # newspapers/journals devoting serious attention to human rights reporting; % adult population reached
		2. qualitative review of NGO monitoring, reporting, and engaging the gov't
Supporting Objective 1.7: Citizen Rights and Interests Better Protected in Law	Constitutional Reforms	1. Rights are adequately protected in the constitution
	Rights Adopted from International Declaration of Human Rights	1. Specific rights adopted by law
		2. Country is signatory to (yes/no)
	Enhancement of Rights for minorities and women	1. Legislation extending rights or providing additional protection
	Commercial/criminal/family law made more responsive to contemporary needs	1. Laws reformed

Table 2b: POSSIBLE INDICATORS BY DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVE

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2: FREE FAIR ELECTIONS

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
2: Free Fair Elections	Elections are deemed fair by citizens and politicians alike	1. Public opinion that elections are free, fair, and open. (disaggregated by gender, ethnicity, etc.)
		2. Public opinion that the electoral process was free and fair (registration, campaign, and elections), also disaggregated
		3. Rating of the elections by monitors (local and international) as free and fair
		4. % of votes garnered by the opposition
		5. # of opposition parties boycotting the elections
		6. # of election protests filed
		7. % of eligible voters voting
		8. % of women/minorities winning political office
Supporting Objective 2.1: Creation of Impartial and effective laws and regulations	Legal framework for democracy is in place	1. % of scheduled elections held as mandated by law
		2. Electoral reforms/laws passed
		3. % of population excluded from electoral system (minorities, women, etc.)
		4. (yes/no) Some/any parties are excluded from the political system

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 2.2: More impartial and effective electoral administration	Legal framework is actually operationalized and functioning	1. % of eligible voters registered (by age, gender, region, etc.)
		2. Time needed to report electoral results
		3. Frequency and accuracy at which electoral boundaries are reviewed and redrawn
		4. % of errors in the voter registration list
		5. % of the population with reasonable access to polling locations
		6. Secrecy of the ballot maintained
		7. %t of polls manned by trained workers
Supporting Objective 2.3: Better Informed electorate	Citizens are informed of importance of elections	1. % of voters with knowledge of constitutional rights and responsibilities
	Voters know how and when to vote	1. % voters knowledgeable about voting procedures
	Voters knowledgeable about campaign issues	1. % of voters knowledgeable of election issues
		2. Access to the media by opposition parties
		3. % coverage by media of opposition (percent of time or number of publications)
Supporting Objective 2.4: Improve local and international monitoring	There are checks and balances to the laws and administrators by the work of local and international election observer groups	1. % of polls covered by one international monitoring organization
		2. % of polls covered by local monitoring organization(s)
Supporting Objective 2.5: Political Parties more responsive to constituents	Political parties organize effective campaigns	TBD

Table 2c: POSSIBLE INDICATORS BY DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVE

AGENCY OBJECTIVE: STRENGTHENED CIVIL SOCIETY

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
3: Strengthened Civil Society	Better informed citizenry	1. # or % informed on major issues
		2. # or citizens completing civics training
		3. # of independent media outlets
	Civil Society Organizations are free to organize and operate	1. Laws permitting CSOs to organize and function
		2. # of CSOs restricted from organizing
		3. # CSOs active in country
	Government does not control CSOs	1. # or % of CSOs government controlled
		2. # or % of CSOs that are government funded
		3. # or % of CSOs opposing government policies
	CSOs influence decision-making	1. % of legislation passed with CSO lobbying
		2. # or % of legislative debates attended by CSOS
		3. New government/CSO consultative mechanisms established
	Free flow of information from independent and diverse sources	1. Degree of media censorship (qualitative indicator)
		2. % of media outlets privately owned
		3. Degree of opposing opinions expressed

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3. 1: State legislation encourages organization and operations of CSOs	Absence of legislation restricting formation of CSOs	1. # of laws restricting formation of CSOs
		2. Degree of severity of laws restricting CSOs
		3. # of laws restricting specific segments of papulation from forming CSOS
	Tax laws encourage formation and operation of CSOs	1. Laws exempting CSO from taxation (binary indicator)
		2. Laws reducing taxes on CSOs
		3. Laws exempting individual and corporate giving
	Laws protect CSOs from political interference	1. Degree of enforcement of laws prohibiting interference of CSO activities
		2. % of citizens who feel they can freely organize
		3. Level of violence during labor strikes or disputes
Supporting Objective 3.2: More effective and democratic management of CSOs	Transparent CSO management	1. Organizational records available
		2. Financial records audited regularly
		3. Completeness of meeting minutes
	Financial viability	1. % of funds from independent source
		2. % of funding from members
		3. % of funding from donors
	Representativeness of membership	1. Elections of CSO held at regular intervals
		2. Degree of turnover of CSO officers/board members
		3. Officers/management reflect composition of membership

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.3: Increased participation in public debate	Increased direct methods undertaken to influence public policy	1. # direct actions (e.g., petitions) taken in support or opposition to government policies
	Increased proportion of population involved in influencing public policy	1. % of population represented by CSOs
		3. # of CSOs taking formal positions on public issues
	More minority groups involved	1. # or % of CSOs representing women's interests
		2. # or % of CSOs representing ethnic or religious minorities
	CSOs join to promote/oppose specific policies or laws	1. # of coalitions formed to promote/oppose specific policies
		2. Diversity of coalitions formed
		3. Duration of coalitions
Supporting Objective 3. 4: Increased acceptance of democratic values	Citizens show more tolerance for minority groups	1. % of citizens polled expressing positive attitudes toward minorities
		2. # or % of anti-minority incidents reported
		3. Degree of participation of minorities in public life
	Women participate in all sectors of society	1. % of women in elected offices
		2. # of laws restricting women's employment opportunities
		3. % of population believing in equality of women
	Civic education actively pursued	1. # or % of population attending civic education classes
		2. Civic education included in school curriculum
		3. # of CSOs providing civic education
	Citizens' acceptance of Democracy increased	1. % of citizens who believe Democracy
		2. % of citizens who know their constitutional responsibilities

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.5: More independent and effective media	Media represents all segments of society	1. # or % of media outlets owned or operated by minority groups
		2. # or percent of women in media
		3. Degree media content reflects population
	Government control of media is limited	1. # or % of privately owned media outlets
		2. % of media outlets independent of government funding
		3. Degree to which supplies and facilities distributed equally
	Open access to different points of view	1. Degree of media censorship
		2. % of news coverage expressing opposing views
	Media adhere to professional standards	1. # or % of reporters professionally trained
		2. Libel laws enforced
		3. Degree of comprehensiveness of news coverage.

Table 2d: POSSIBLE INDICATORS BY DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVE

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 4: MORE ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE[1]

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
4: More Accountable Governance	Possible higher level aggregates	There may not indicators for a higher order result other than those identified for each of the supporting objectives.
Supporting Objective 4.1: Increased local government participation in basic government functions	Possible higher level aggregates	1. % of people who believe local government is responsive to their needs
4.1.1 Increased autonomy/authority for local governments (strengthen the role and increase the scope of responsibilities of local government)	Increased authority to provide services	1. #/type of services local governments have authority to provide
	Increased authority to generate and manage revenues locally	1. #/type of revenue generation instruments (i.e., user fees, taxes, etc.) local governments are authorized to use
		2. (yes/no) Local governments have authority to: set own rates; respond to local demands; raise/decrease rates and services
		3. (yes/no) Higher levels of government have authority to approve local government budgets

[1]Since the supporting objectives in the area of accountable governance are broad and diverse, some additional, lower-level objectives have been identified to assist in focusing the discussion.

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
4.2.1 Increased citizen participation in local decision-making	Increased citizen participation in local elections	1. (yes/no) All mayors for municipal jurisdiction are selected by direct election
		2. (yes/no) Elections for local offices held
		3. (yes/no) Local elections delinked from national elections
		4. # of elected political leaders/1000 residents
		5. % of eligible voters voting in local elections (male/female)
	Increased citizen participation in decision-making about local government activities/projects	1. % of local government projects initiated in response to citizens' needs and desires
		2. Average # of town meetings per annum
		3. #/nature of citizens' groups which actively work with local government
		4. Average # of participants in town meetings (male/female)
		5. %of municipalities with regular town meetings
		6. % of citizens registered to vote who participate in monthly municipal meeting.
4.1.3: Increased revenue generation	Increased local government share of national revenues	1. Central government transfers as a % of total local government budget
		2. % of national budget allocated for local government
		3. % of total revenues from own sources
	Increased local tax generation/user fees	1. % of own source revenues from property taxes
		2. % of own source revenues from user fees

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
4.1.4: Improved local government delivery of basic services	Local governments provide necessary public services	1. % of population with access to locally-provided public services (i.e., water, sanitation, electricity)
	Local governments provide necessary social services	1. % of population with access to locally-provided social services (i.e., health, education)
	Local governments better accountable for resources	1. 3 year average real capital expenditures per capita
		2. Personnel expenditures as a % of recurrent spending
		3. Total local government employees as a % of total local population
		4. Contracted recurrent expenditure as a % of total recurrent expenditure
		5. (yes/no) Local Government budget must be published prior to approval
		6. # of audits of local government budgets
4.1.5: Strengthened local government capacity to administer its own affairs	Increased capacity of local government personnel	1. % of local government staff with specialized skills in budget control, revenue collection, and fiscal planning
	Establishment/active participation of local and national institutions which strengthen local governments	1. Products of local government policy development and research institutions utilized
		2. Recommendations and acceptance of recommendations of national organizations supporting local government
	Active participation of local government associations in building capacity	1. Products and activities of municipal associations in support of local government
4.1.6: Increased intra-country or regional collaboration/support for decentralization	More effective networks of entities working with local governments	TBD

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
4.4: More effective and independent legislatures	Legislature plays an active role in determining the law	1. Expert opinion that legislature is better informed and is playing a stronger role
		2. Public confidence in the legislative process
		3. % of all laws passed which the legislature has amended in a significant fashion
		4. % of legislation drafted by the legislature rather than the executive branch
		5. % of bills passed by the legislature and approved by the executive branch without executive changes or vetoes
	Legislature acts as a check on other branches of government	1. # of public hearings held on the operation and effectiveness of executive branch
		2. # of public hearings and committee meetings held on controversial and contentious issues summons executive branch officials to those hearings.
		3. #/type of committee oversight hearings
		4. Degree of legislative control over executive budgets (ex: executive budgets for five programs were decreased by 25% and six new programs were added)
		5. Legislature approves or disapproves major executive decisions (ex: legislature disapproves four decrees, rejects two proposed cabinet appointments, and approves promotion list for flag officers)
		6. # of times legislature votes against executive branch proposals
4.4.1: Improved ability to shape, debate, and decide on legislation	Increased access to and use of information by the legislature	1. #/% of members using briefing papers in debates
		2. #/% of members using legislative services (library, etc.)
		3. # of requests to legislative library from members/committees
	Improved drafting skills/policy analysis capability	1. Policy and legal research produced by legislative reference office. (ex: land tenure research lays the basis for land tenure policy that is passed into law.)
	Improved investigative skills	1. Legislative investigative staff performing investigative functions. (ex: investigation of Ministry of Agriculture results in recommendations to streamline operations of the MOA.)

OBJECTIVE	SPECIFIC RESULTS ANTICIPATED	POSSIBLE INDICATORS
4.4.1: Improved ability to shape, debate, and decide on legislation (con't)	Increased transparency of operations	1. Transparency of legislative operation. (ex: Daily record published. 250 hearing records published.)
		2. (yes/no) Voting records are published
		3. (yes/no) Debates are published
		4. Average length of time to publish debates
4.4.2: Legislature represents and involves citizens in debate	A competitive, representative electoral selection process	1. % of legislators by major cleavage (i.e., male/female)
		2. # of political parties participating in legislative elections
		3. # of political parties permitted to compete in legislative elections
		4. # of political parties boycotting legislative elections
		5. % of legislators elected
	Legislation drafted/enacted with citizen involvement	1. Proposed/enacted legislation that is responsive to constituent's problems, preferences, and recommendations.
		2. # of public hearings held on legislation
		3. #/type of NGOs groups working with the legislature
		4. # of times advocacy groups/NGOs testify before the legislature
		5. Legislators have regular contact with constituents (ex: 100,000 newsletters sent 6 times a year to constituents)
4.4.4: Constitutional and other reforms to enhance the role of the legislature vis-a-vis the other branches of government		1. Provisions in the constitution clarifying and strengthening the role of the legislature: open and knowledgeable debate during drafting and ratification process; public opinion sought and taken into account; state actions limited, etc.
		2. Protective services for legislators and staff. (ex: Enactment of criminal penalty for threatening legislators. Four individuals convicted of making threats.)

Box 1.1. Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Reporting Results

During the writing of this report it became apparent that there is considerable uncertainty about the role of performance measurement and evaluation in reporting results.

Performance measurement is one of the tools managers use to improve their results. The system is built around a clearly defined hierarchy of objectives, which are derived from development theory and practical experience. For each objective one or a limited set of indicators are measured regularly to ascertain progress being made toward the objective. Performance measurement answers questions about *whether* results are being achieved on schedule.

Evaluations answer questions about *how* results are being achieved and *why*. They examine a program's sustainability and its intended and unintended results. They enable us to describe and understand the full impact of our activities and add to development theory. In this way they go far beyond performance measurement systems. Measures of performance indicators are useful in evaluations, but they provide only a portion of the information required for impact assessment.

USAID is increasingly able to determine the progress it is making toward a growing proportion of its objectives. The performance information system is providing a firmer foundation for reporting results that can be amplified and highlighted with information from strategically designed impact assessments and special sector studies.

Performance data and evaluation results must be used carefully, because there is a tendency to treat them as the same thing and draw inappropriate conclusions. Four issues need to be kept in mind as we further develop and use the system:

(1) Measuring the "right" thing. Ideally, USAID wants to measure changes in the quality of life of poor people in developing countries resulting from USAID programs. No direct measure of this exists, so the Agency is forced to use one or more proxy measures (for example, change in average incomes, numbers of children vaccinated, numbers of borrowers in microenterprise programs) that only partially reflect our efforts and their outcomes. Drawing conclusions about impact from proxies should be done only with caution.

(2) What is the USAID contribution? USAID faces a dilemma in choosing objectives. Objectives within the Agency's control tend to be relatively narrow, whereas those it wants to achieve are broad and susceptible to many other influences besides USAID. The problem is compounded if we use only indicators that are still narrower than their associated objectives. For example, the inflation rate is used by some Missions as an indicator of policy and regulatory reform. As domestic political factors, central bank policy, and other external influences (such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank) are also involved, the link between USAID activities and the desired outcome is tenuous and should be interpreted with care. Performances measures should not be used to answer this question. It should be addressed in a full evaluation study.

(3) Results are available from yesterday's, not today's, priorities. USAID Missions make strategic choices, and select performance indicators, on the basis of their assessment of current development problems and their ability to maximize their impact on those problems. A strategic plan is forward looking. Most of the planned expenditures, and consequently most of the results, still lie in the future. During 1994, performance data were available for only two thirds of Mission objectives. The areas for which data are available tended to be in areas where the Mission has been working for some time. As these may not be current priority concerns, the data do not always meet strategic needs. The problem will decline as strategies are implemented and results data related to those strategies become available.

(4) Aggregating results. Because of differing country situations, Missions have somewhat different objectives and often have different indicators for similar or closely related objectives. Country programs begin and end at different points in time, so that aggregate country performance data reflect some periods when USAID did not influence outcomes. This means that individual program results can seldom be added together to provide a broader picture of USAID impact. This concern will be lessened as Missions revise their objectives to fit more closely with those in the Agency's strategic plan and select performance indicators suggested in the Agency results frameworks.

Democracy Performance Workshop
SURVEY

1. Were the workshop objectives achieved?

(achieved) 1 2 3 4 5 (not achieved)

Comments: _____

2. Were the necessary and relevant issues covered in this workshop?

(covered) 1 2 3 4 5 (not covered)

Which discussions were most helpful? _____

Which discussions were least helpful? _____

3. How would you rate the supporting materials?

Quality: (best) 1 2 3 4 5 (worst)

Quantity: (best) 1 2 3 4 5 (worst)

What other materials would have been beneficial? _____

_____

4. What did you think of the workshop format?

Breakouts: (best) 1 2 3 4 5 (worst)

Presentations: (best) 1 2 3 4 5 (worst)

Facilities: (best) 1 2 3 4 5 (worst)

Logistics/support: (best) 1 2 3 4 5 (worst)

Scheduling: (best) 1 2 3 4 5 (worst)

Length: (too long) 1 2 3 4 5 (too short)

Comments: _____

_____

_____

_____

5. (For USAID/Mission representatives) How much will the results of this workshop contribute to mission-level activities and efforts?

(most) 1 2 3 4 5 (least)

Comments: _____

_____

6. What recommendations would you make for a future, similar conference/workshop? _____

_____

_____

7. What suggestions do you have to facilitate ongoing information exchanges among workshop pariticipants?.

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8. Other comments: _____

_____

_____