



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**New Leadership and
Democratic Governance in Africa**
The Role of the Executive Office



Networking Conference
USAID *Implementing Policy Change (IPC)*
Contract No. DHR-5451-Q-00-0110-00
Bamako, Mali
September 24 to 26, 1995

Abt Associates Inc.

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Africa Networking Conference Agenda

New Leadership and Democratic Governance in Africa
The Role of the Executive Office

Bamako, Mali

September 24-26, 1995

Sunday evening

18:30 Participants arrive
Conference registration
Reception

Monday morning

8:30 am

I. Official opening

- A. *New Leadership and Democratic Governance in Africa*
by President Konaré
- B. *Conference introduction* by Secretary General Diallo, Mali.

Presentation of issues to be addressed, with special reference to the Mali case, and agenda.

10:30 am Coffee or Tea Break

After the official opening, there will be four conference sessions. The first session will motivate the conference with a presentation on the objective of this IPC networking activity. The responsibilities of the Executive Office in the policy formulation and implementation process will be discussed in the second session. Building on these responsibilities and the values associated with the Executive Office identified in the first session, the third session will examine how the new qualities and profiles of Executive Office staff members can improve their capacity for governance. The last session will address how the Executive Office can enhance participation, in order to move toward greater transparency and accountability to the electorate.

II. Conference Objective, Motivation of Agenda, and Central Themes

This conference offers an opportunity for Executive Office officials to share their recent experiences with the challenge of managing a newly democratic Government. The objective of this exchange is to identify common problems and possible solutions that will strengthen the participants' capacity to serve the Executive Office in the democratic era. The central theme of the conference will be *Transparency and Efficiency as a means of reinforcing Capacity for Governance and Popular Participation*.

- A. *What are the most important changes that must take place in the Executive office when the Government becomes democratic? What are the key values (such as transparency, accountability) that facilitate the management of the Executive Office in a democracy? What are the most important constraints to integrating these values into the institutional culture of the Executive Office? How have these constraints to developing transparency and enhancing participation been addressed in different contexts (with special reference to the countries represented)?*

Dr. Catherine Rielly, Abt Associates
Dr. Chris Fomunyoh, NDI

- B. *Questions and plenary discussion*

12:30 Lunch

Monday Afternoon

14:00

Theme 1: Developing Transparency and Efficiency: Policy Coordination between the Executive Office and Line Ministries

Representatives from several of the participant countries will present papers on the relationship between the Executive and line ministries.

- A. *How should responsibility for policy formulation, implementation and monitoring be divided between the executive and line ministries? How can the relationship between the political leadership and the professional civil service be improved to better coordinate the policy-making process?*

- i. Mr. Gulftien Kaira, Permanent Secretary, Policy Analysis and Coordination Division, Cabinet Office, Zambia
- ii. Mr. Raimundo Pereira, Secretary of State for the Presidency
- iii. Mr. Moutari Moussa, General Secretary of the Government, Niger

- iv. Rapporteur: Mr. Fosseyne Samaké, Secrétaire Générale du Gouvernement, Mali
- v. Discussant: Dr. Catherine Rielly

15:30 *Pause cafe*

16:00 B. *Questions and plenary discussion*

20:00 Dinner, San Toro Restaurant

Tuesday, September 26, 1995

Morning

Theme 2: Improving Capacity for Governance: New Role of Executive Office Staff Members

A. Presentation of 3 papers on the New Role of Executive Office Staff Members.

What qualities are required of an adviser to the President or Prime Minister or Cabinet Office officials in a democratic system? What should be the profile of an adviser to a President or PM or Cabinet Office official in this period of decentralised governance? What is the method and rhythm of evaluation of performance of Executive Office staff members? Are there certain key sectors under the jurisdiction of line ministries (such as health, education) that the Executive Office should be concerned about? If so, what defines a key sector?

- i. Mr. Flavio Proenca, General Secretary of the Office of the Presidency, Member of Guinea Bissau Delegation
- ii. Mrs. Sylla Awa Diallo, Adviser, Commissariat of Administrative Reform, Mali
- iii. Dr. Yacouba Fassassi, Special Adviser to the President, Benin, Moderator
- iv. Dr. Yacouba Konate, Abt Associates

10:30 *Coffee or Tea Break*

11:00

Theme 3: Enhancing Participation in New Democracies

A. Panel Discussion of Country Case Studies: Enhancing participation

How and why should the Executive Offices broaden the range of players in the policy formulation and implementation process? How far should the deliberations of the Executive Office be opened up to other branches of the Government, civil organizations

and the opposition? How can a two-way channel of communication be established between the Government and the public?

- i. Mr. Adekambi Benoit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Benin
- ii. Mr. Adama Salaou, General Secretary of the Presidency, Niger
- iii. Mr. Pascale Coulibaly, Representative of President's Strategic Team
- iv. Discussant: Dr. Chris Fomunyoh, NDI

B. Questions and plenary discussion

12:30 Lunch

Tuesday afternoon

14:00

III. Summary of Lessons Learned and Conference Closing

- A. *Summary of Lessons Learned and Challenges ahead for the Executive Office in Democratic Africa*, Cheick Oumar Diarra, Prime Minister's Adviser (Ambassador-designe to Washington).
- B. *Closing Remarks*, Secretary General Diallo

IPC Networking Conference in Mali:
New Leadership and Democratic Governance in Africa
The Role of the Executive Office

Participant List

Mali:

Mr. Madani Diallo, General Secretary, Presidency
Cheik Oumar Diarra, Policy Advisor of the Prime Minister, designated Ambassador to the US.
Mme Sylla Awa Diallo, Technical Advisor, Commissariat de Reforme Administrative
Mr. Moussa Touré, Technical Advisor, Commissariat á la Reforme Administrative
Mr. Pascal Couloubaly, Advisor, Presidency, Member of the Strategic Team
Mr. Ibrahima Samba Traoré, Member of Strategic Team, Presidency
Mr. Fousseyni Samaké, General Secretary of Government
Mme. Dao, Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature
Mr. Brehima Diallo, Assistant Secretary General, Presidency
Mr. Zoumana Touré, Press Attaché, Présidence
Mr. Denis Traoré, Commissary, Commissariat au Plan

Bénin:

Mr. Yacoube Fassassi, Special Advisor to the President
Mr. Liberty E. Kuakuvi, Assistant to Director, Macro-Economic Unit, Presidency
Mr. Adekambi Benoit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afrique et Moyen Orient

Zambia:

Mr. Kaira, Permanent Secretary, PAC, Cabinet Office
Mr. Ray Chipoma, Chief Policy Analyst, PAC, Cabinet Office

Niger:

Mr. Adamo Salaou, General Secretary, Presidency
Mr. Moutary Moussa, General Secretary of the Government

Guinea Bissau:

Mr. Raimundo Pereira, Secretary of State of the Presidency and the Council of State
Mr. Octavio Inocencia Alves, Legal Advisor to the Prime Minister
Mr. Flavio Proença, Secretary General, Office of the President
Mr. Joao Gomes Lima Wahnnon, Media Adviser, Office of the President

USAID-Bamako

David Attebery
Anna Diallo

From Abt Associates Inc.

Catherine Rielly

John Raleigh

Yacoubé Konaté

Duncan Last

from National Democratic Institute

Chris Fomunyoh

Interpreter

Ousmane Minta

Mali Networking Conference, "New Leadership and Democratic Governance in Africa, The Role of the Executive Office"

Biographical Profiles

Zambia

Gulfteen Kenaan Kaira

Gulfteen Kenaan Kaira is a Permanent Secretary in the Policy Analysis and Co-ordination Division of the Cabinet Office. He joined the Civil Service in December, 1965 as Executive Assistant in the Ministry of Local Government and Housing after completing high school. He studied a one year course in Development Economics at the University of York in 1987/8. In 1969, he served as Private Secretary to the Vice President of Zambia for three years. Thereafter he worked in Various Ministries rising through the rank and file until his posting to Cabinet Office, where he has been for more than fifteen years.

Raymond Chipoma

Raymond Chipoma is a Chief Policy Analyst (Social and Human Development) in the Policy Analysis and Coordination Division of the Zambia Cabinet Office. A social science graduate of the University of Zambia, University of Ghana and the University of Wales, Mr. Chipoma worked in the Human Resources Planning Department of the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) for thirteen and half years before being appointed to his present job in March 1994. During his appointment at NCDP, he was involved with population and manpower policies as well as the development, coordination and monitoring of the associated programmes and projects in the country.

Benin

Yacouba Fassassi

Dr. Yacouba Fassassi, Special Adviser to the President, is Head of the Macro-Economic Unit in the Presidency. Dr. Fassassi is also Vice President of the National Committee for Development of Bénin. Dr. Fassassi has served as the President's Principal Economic Adviser and chargé de Mission of Finance. Dr. Fassassi has also served as Counselor of the Governor of the Banque Central des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO). He worked for 11 years with the International Monetary Fund. Dr. Fassassi received a doctorate in International Economics at Paris IX Dauphine and performed post-doctoral work at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. He is bilingual. Dr. Fassassi has published papers and newspaper articles on the Beninese economy, and devaluation of the CFA franc.

Liberty E. Kuakuvi

Mr. Liberty Kuakuvi is the Assistant to the Head of the Macroeconomic Unit in the Presidency. Previous to this post, he served as Civil Service Administrator to the MFPRA since 1986. In this

capacity he has been Chief of division, SACAD/DGPE, Chief of Service, SACCAD/DGPE and Chief of the National Commission Secretariat in charge of the Programme de Départ Volontaire. From 1992-1993 Mr. Kuakuvi performed an internship in the United States as the Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow. He is bi-lingual. Mr. Kuakuvi has a Masters Degree in Economics and a Diploma of Management Administration.

Mr. Adekambi Benoit

Mr. Adekambi is Head of Sub-Saharan Africa for the Office of African and Middle-Eastern Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previous to this position he served at the Europe Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and held several administrative positions at the National University of Benin including, chef du Cabinet of the Dean, head of the foreign affairs office. He is also a part-time conference interpreter. Mr. Benoit obtained his degree in Law from the University of Benin in 1975.

Guinea Bissau

Mr. Octavio L. Alves

Mr. Octavio Alves, Guinea-Bissau, Legal Adviser to the Prime Minister, holds a Master's Degree in Law from Portugal. He first worked as Legal Adviser, first in the Ministry of Cooperation and Foreign Office, and later at the Prime Minister's Office. He gives legal advice in law projects, legal agreements and contracts between the Government of Guinea-Bissau (GOGB) and its counterparts. He is a renowned private Lawyer in Guinea-Bissau. He is fluent in Portuguese and speaks and understands French fluently.

Mr. Raimundo Pereira

Mr. Raimundo Pereira, Secretary of State for the Presidency, holds a Law Degree from Portugal. On his return to Guinea-Bissau after his studies, he practiced as a private lawyer. Later, he was appointed as General Director of the National Broadcasting and Television Service. Presently, he is a part-time teacher at Bissau Faculty of Law. He speaks English and French.

Mr. Flavio Proenca

Mr. Flavio Proenca, General Secretary of the Office of President, is a senior political leader of the ruling party, PAIGC. He is fluent in French and English. Mr. Proenca was formerly Ambassador of Guinea Bissau in Dakar and Mayor of the city of Bissau.

Mr. João Gomes L. Wahnnon

Mr. João Gomes Wahnnon has been the President's Media adviser since October 1981. He studied in the former USSR, where he obtained a degree in Journalism. He is also a successful private businessman. He speaks French, Spanish and Russian.

FACILITATORS

Dr. Catherine Rielly

Together with the Government of Mali, Catherine Rielly, Associate at Abt Associates, is organizing this conference, under the auspices of the USAID Implementing Policy Change project. Dr. Rielly has over ten years experience working on development policy in Africa. As Manager of the Executive Policy Coordination component of the USAID Policy Reform for Economic Development (PRED) project, Dr. Rielly has been working with the Office of the President in Mali since May, 1994 to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. She recently began to work with the Office of the Prime Minister, as well, on enhancing management effectiveness and improving policy coordination. For two years, Catherine has been an Adviser to the Policy Analysis and Coordination Division (PAC) of the Zambian Cabinet Office. In this capacity, she has led several workshops for the Cabinet and PAC, conducted comparative political research on Cabinet Government in six Commonwealth countries for the Zambians to use in reforming their Cabinet procedures, and led a study tour of a Zambian delegation to the Australian Office of the Prime Minister. She has a BA from Stanford University, a Master's in Public Administration from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and a Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government at Harvard. While at Harvard, she taught economics and development policy.

Dr. Christopher Fomunyoh

Dr. Fomunyoh is the Regional Director of West Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).

Since joining NDI, Dr. Fomunyoh has focused on assisting emerging democracies in Africa to consolidate gains made during the transition to multi-party politics. He was the Program Director for NDI's regional legislative training program conducted in Niamey in January 1994 for deputies of the national assemblies of Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. In October 1994, Chris directed a similar program in Bangui for deputies from Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon and Madagascar. He has also conducted country-specific democratic development programs in Benin, Côte D'Ivoire, Togo, and The Gambia in 1995.

Before joining NDI as a full time staff member, Chris served as a consultant on a number of programs, advising NDI delegations to national elections in Ethiopia, Cameroon and Central Africa Republic and Madagascar.

Dr. Fomunyoh's academic degrees include a *Licence en Droit* from Yaoundé University in Cameroon, a Master's Degree (LL.M) in International Law from Harvard Law School; and a Ph.D in Political Science from Boston University.

Democracy Profiles
Catherine Rielly and Sytske Braat

Introduction

In the early 1990s, many Africanists were optimistic about the prospects for Africa's new democracies. Experts such as Makau wa Mutua, director of the Harvard human rights project, have expressed confidence in three countries, in particular:

"When you looked at Benin and Mali and Zambia . . . , it appeared at the beginning of the decade that what was happening in Africa would just overwhelm despotism," (New York Times, March 19, 1995).

But some of this optimism is beginning to wane, as Africa's new democracies grapple with how to solve grave economic and social crises with meager resources. Indeed, Mutua argues, the future of Africa's new democracies may be at stake.

To improve their prospects for democratic consolidation, it is critical for political leaders and public officials serving Africa's new democracies to share their experience with others facing similar challenges. Toward this end, the focus of this Networking Conference, sponsored by USAID's *Democracy Center*, is *New Leadership and Democratic Governance in Africa: The Role of the Executive Office*.

The objective of this exchange of ideas is to try to identify common problems and possible solutions that will strengthen the participants' capacity to serve the Executive Office in the democratic era. Representatives of the Executive Office of five new democracies will attend: Benin, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Zambia, as well as the host of the conference, Mali.

Enormous challenges confront these countries in developing political legitimacy and administrative effectiveness, the two necessary conditions of effective democratic governance. Democratic governance deals most importantly with the interaction between the Government and the citizens to address collective problems. All of the participating countries have made progress in establishing legitimacy, if the essence of legitimate democracy is the choosing of rulers in regular, fair, open, competitive elections in which the bulk of the population can vote.¹ The participating countries the world, such as institutions counterbalancing the Executive -- most importantly, independent legislative and judicial systems--, constitutionalism, and vibrant civil societies, including a free press.

However, a more legitimate political system does not guarantee Government responsiveness to citizens' needs. Even freely and fairly elected Governments, where citizens have begun to express their demands openly, often lack *effectiveness, government capacity to respond efficiently to the needs of citizens by solving -- or creating an enabling environment for solving -- economic and social problems*. Indeed, a more open, participatory government is not a sufficient condition for effective

¹See Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

democratic governance. Expression of citizen demands, whether for services, accountability, or transparency, is futile without a government willing able to listen and respond. A democracy without operational administrative capacity is an empty shell. This conference's focus on democratic governance, as opposed to democratization, acknowledges that democracy in practice must extend beyond the form and structure of particular political systems, to pay attention to the machinery of government that, in principle, gives effect to the choices made by citizens through a democratic political process.

All of the governments represented at this conference are under pressure to meet the high expectations of the citizens who elected them, by rapidly improving service delivery. This requires effective structures, systems, and attitudes for implementing Government policies. In the democratizing political environment of the countries represented at this conference, decision-makers must pay attention to credibility, transparency, and accountability while implementing reforms, rather than simply imposing reforms, like their non-democratic predecessors.² The dynamics of democracy are a major source of complexity and uncertainty, and require new skills, attitudes, and management systems for policy-makers. This means that decision-makers need to develop new ways of "doing business" that involve citizens and create opportunities for dialogue (better supply of democratic governance), and helping private sector and civil society groups engage more effectively in policy dialogue with government (better demand).

The central theme of this conference, *Transparency and Efficiency as a means of reinforcing Capacity for Governance and Popular Participation*, addresses both the need for political legitimacy and for effective administrative capacity at the level of the Executive Office. This conference offers an opportunity for Executive Office officials to share their recent experiences so far with developing transparent and efficient government. Several of the participating countries have recently restructured their Executive Office to improve performance. Two years ago the Zambians formed a Policy Analysis and Coordination Division in the Cabinet Office to strengthen policy coordination and implementation; last January the Malians created a *Strategic Team* to improve the effectiveness of the Office of the Presidency; and at the present time, the Beninois are streamlining their Presidency to enhance efficiency.

The Governments of Mali and Benin are also working closely with Transparency International, an international non-governmental organization, to eliminate corruption in their countries. The Governments of Mali and Zambia are also in the process of setting up Government-wide electronic mail systems to improve coordination between the Executive Offices and Line Ministries and to enhance transparency.

Abt staff prepared individual *Democracy Profiles* for each of the countries represented at this networking conference. The objective of these background materials is to inform conference participants about the structure of the different Executive Offices and their Governments, and to provide a brief history of their democratic transitions. All three major types of democratic Government are represented at the conference: Presidentialism, semi-Presidential systems, and Westminster-style Cabinet government. In spite of differences in government structure, all countries

²This issue has been at the center of the USAID *Implementing Policy Change (IPC)* project which is sponsoring this conference, together with the Government of Mali.

share a common pursuit of a free-market oriented development policy. All of them have moved away from their former socialist ideology in favor of economic liberalization, privatization of state-run enterprises, and encouragement of private sector development.

Interviews with conference participants and other government officials provided information for these profiles, as did research reports including the *Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports, Europe 1994*, and other written materials provided by the country delegations.

Bénin

Transition to Democracy

Benin gained its independence from France on August 1, 1960. Political instability marked the country's history until 1972, when the civilian leadership was deposed by a military leader, Maj. Mathieu Kerekou, Deputy Chief of Staff of the armed forces who pursued a policy of "scientific socialism," based on Marxism-Leninism. In 1975, the Parti de la révolution populaire du Bénin (PRPB) was established as the "highest expression of the political will of the people of Benin," and the single party of the Government. However, this one-party system of rule was marked by corruption and inefficiencies, including persistent economic difficulties. Growing dissatisfaction among students due to undisbursed grants and scholarships, delays in payment of public sector employees, and increasing opposition to the single PRPB gave way to general discontent with Kerekou's government. The demand for change was accentuated by an announcement made by Union nationale des syndicats des travailleurs du Bénin, the sole officially recognized trade union, of its severance of ties with the PRPB, due to the Kerekou administration's failure to fulfill its commitments to public sector employees.

Yielding to public pressures and demands by Benin's external creditors (notably France), the Government announced that Marxism-Leninism would no longer be the official State ideology. To satisfy political demands, a National Conference to draft a new constitution was held in February, 1990. More than 50 political organizations represented by 488 delegates attended and adopted several resolutions which were subsequently incorporated in a "national charter," the basis of a new constitution. Resolutions included the establishment of an interim Haut Conseil de la République (HCR) to assume functions of the Assemblée Nationale Révolutionnaire, and agreement to schedule multi-party elections by universal suffrage for President and Prime Minister for February 1991. Among the members of the HCR were former Presidents Ahomadegbé, Maga, and Zinsou, all of whom had recently returned to Benin as leader of opposition parties. Nicéphore Soglo, former World Bank officer, was designated interim prime minister.

Kerekou acceded to the decisions of the conference and relinquished his military portfolio to Soglo. In December 1990, 80% of voters approved the new constitution. It included a clause stipulating that the former presidents were excluded from the Presidency. In the February, 1991 election, Soglo secured 36% of the total votes cast and Kerekou took 27%. Soglo and Kerekou proceeded to the second round, which Soglo won, with 68% of the vote. President Soglo was inaugurated April 4, 1991.

The Executive Office

The president is elected for a 5-year term. In 1991, the position of Prime Minister was abolished in order to create greater harmony within the Executive Branch by putting an end to the "two-headed" system. At this time, the President assumed the role of Head of State and Head of the Government. The Presidential staff include a Cabinet Director and a Secretary General of the Presidency, who holds Ministerial rank.

Meetings of the Council of Ministers take place each Wednesday from approximately 9:00 am to 4:00 pm. There are 20 Ministers, including the recently appointed Minister of State for the Presidency. Citizens of Benin are informed of the outcome of these meetings each Wednesday evening on television. The Secretary General Government, who is responsible for Policy Coordination, including relations with the National Assembly, attends meetings of the Conseil de Ministres. The Secretary General of the Presidency does not attend these meetings.

Restructuring of the Presidency

A new design for the Presidency is currently being developed, and restructuring will take place in the near future. The newly restructured Office will include four to five departments, including the Economic Unit for Medium and Long-term Strategic Planning (*Department de l'Economie et de la Perspective*). The latter will replace the current Cellule Macro-Economique in the Presidency which was originally staffed with six economic and financial advisers, but has been reduced to two, after three advisers were promoted to Minister and one passed away. The new unit will focus on longer term strategic management and planning, and be removed from day to day operations. A new category of adviser, called *Conseiller de Chef de l'Etat* will head each new unit. The Benin delegation will provide more details about the restructuring at the conference.

New Economic Policy Unit

Another new Economic Policy Support Unit (*Cellule a l'Appui a la Politique Economique-CAPE*), which will provide the President and the principal economic ministries with quality economic analysis through applied research, is currently being established. ³The staff should be chosen and the unit should be up and running by January, 1996. The creation of this unit responds to the Government's need for a permanent institution responsible for identifying, training and increasing the skills of Beninese researchers who will define strategic economic, social, and financial options for the leaders of the country. The President and the key Ministries of the Presidium will approve and monitor the unit.

President Soglo's Administration

President Soglo, who previously stated his neutral political status, aligned himself with the Parti de la Renaissance du Bénin (PRB) in May 1993, an organization formed by his wife in 1992. Soglo is urging politicians to emulate the USA's two-party system rather than continue with the current fragmented structure which is the result of the formation of approximately 70 separate parties. There is strong resistance in some quarters towards copying a Western-style two party system, with many preferring to see the country's political system evolve organically to suit local needs. New parties continue to mushroom.

President Soglo's agenda includes improving economic conditions of the State through recovery of state funds allegedly embezzled by former members of the Kerekou regime, and devaluation of the CFA franc (by 50% in 1994). The Government is working closely with Transparency International, an international non-governmental organization, to eliminate corruption in Benin. President Soglo is

³The African Capacity-Building Foundation, is financing this project, together with other donors.

the Chairman of the Global Coalition for Africa's Sub-Committee on Democracy and Governance, which strongly supports the work of Transparency International. Paying public sector salaries in arrears, and selling state owned enterprises to foreign interests are priorities for the new Government. The Government is still unable to repay entire debt to public sector workers and unions, partly due to shortage of funds, but also out of concern not to swell money supply. One of the aims of the government as part of Bénin's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility with the IMF is to eliminate all internal public debt within five years.

Members of Soglo's administration have travelled extensively to foster good trade and diplomatic relations with other countries and diversify its trade relations. To cultivate closer links with Angophone countries, the government has recently introduced a national policy of bi-lingualism (English, as well as French). The President wants to use Benin as a "window to West Africa," as the bridge between Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire and Togo -- and for access to Niger. In July of this year, President Soglo visited Washington D.C. to, in the words of this African leader, "focus attention on Benin's pioneering transition to democracy in Africa and on our need for foreign investment in order to develop our society and improve the material life of our people." Benin is regarded by Western governments and aid agencies as a potential role model for Africa's successful transition from the one-party state, often under military control, to civilian rule and multi-party politics.

In addition to that role, Benin under Mr. Soglo is active in promoting stability in West Africa. The country has explored the possibility of playing a mediator's role in the conflict in Liberia, as well as in neighboring Togo's troubled transition from a one-party state to pluralism. In September 1994, Bénin announced its readiness to contribute to the multinational force in Haiti.

Guinea-Bissau

Transition to Democracy

The Republic of Guinea Bissau proclaimed its independence in September 1973 and was later officially recognized as independent by Portugal, on September 10, 1974. In the years following the Republic's independence, President of the State Council, Luiz Cabral, introduced measures to lay the foundations for a socialist state under a single party, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). At elections in 1976 and 1977, voters chose regional councils from which a new National People's Assembly was selected. In 1978, Commander João Bernardo Vieira became the Chief State Commissioner for the Armed Forces and President of the National People's Assembly. A successful coup d'état, with support from the armed forces, ousted President Luis Cabral in November 1980. The leader of the coup, Prime Minister Joao Bernardo Vieira, was awarded the Presidency and has ruled Guinea-Bissau ever since. After a coup that deposed Cabral and dissolved the National People's Assembly, Vieira became the Chairman of the Council of the Revolution. In late March 1984, President Vieira formally assumed the role of Head of Government and was later elected President of the Council of State and Head of State. The National People's Assembly was re-established with its members chosen from the regional councilors who were elected in May 1984. A 15-member Council of State replaced the Council of the Revolution. In 1989, the ruling PAIGC under the direction of President Vieira, began to outline a political liberalization program which the National Assembly approved in 1991.

By the mid-1980's, the paralysis of the statist economy led to broad economic reforms. President Vieira announced his approval of a multi-party political system in 1990. The Central Committee of the PAIGC decided in December of that year to adopt the multi-party system following a period of transition and scheduled a presidential election for 1993. The PAIGC ceased to be the dominant political force in May 1991 when The National People's Assembly approved the constitutional amendment that brought an end to the one-party rule. In addition to legalizing multiple political parties, freedom of the press was recognized and independent trade unions were given the right to strike. The regime severed all links between PAIGC and the armed forces and pledged a commitment to a free market economy. In November, the Frente Democrática (FD) became the first opposition party to be granted official status by the Supreme Court. Other opposition parties were legalized in late 1991 and early 1992. There are 13 recognized political parties.

The President and PAIGC were in favor of a more liberalized economy for Guinea Bissau and endorsed such proposals. To ensure that the party would continue to support economic liberalization, Vieira appointed Dr. Vasco Cabral, who was committed to economic reform, as Permanent Secretary of the Central Committee of the PAIGC. In addition, President Vieira announced a campaign against corruption in 1985 that resulted in dismissal or arrest of many senior officials.

The establishment of a "democratic forum" by four opposition parties moved the transition to democracy ahead. This forum demanded that the Government dissolve the political police and put an end to the use of state facilities for political purposes. It also demanded certain constitutional amendments, a revision of the press law, the creation of an electoral commission and an all-party

consultation on setting election dates. Opposition demonstrations and first mass meeting permitted by the Government took place in March 1992 in Bissau. Protests concerned alleged government corruption and violations of human rights by the security forces. In addition, a dissident "Group of 121" broke away from the PAIGC to form a new party, which advocated the establishment of a transitional government, pending elections, and the disbanding of the political police.

Presidential and legislative elections were scheduled and rescheduled several times due to disagreement over the sequence of elections, an attempted coup, and financial and technical difficulties. The National Assembly approved the proposed legislation to prepare the transition to a multi-party democracy in February, 1993. Voter registration was conducted in April 1994, followed by a 21-day campaign period beginning June 11, and presidential and legislative elections in July 3, 1994.

Election participants included six opposition parties which formed a coalition to jointly contest the forthcoming elections. Five other opposition parties established an informal alliance under which each party reserved the right to present its own candidate. In total, eight candidates contested the presidential election and 1,136 legislative candidates contested the 100 legislative seats. Vieira, the PAIGC candidate, received 46.29% of the votes while his biggest rival, Kouba Yalla, won 21.92% of the votes. The July 3 round did not provide an absolute majority for any of the 8 candidates, and thus the two leading candidates contested a second round August 7, which Vieira won by 52.03%. The PAIGC secured a majority, 62 seats, in the National People's Assembly. International UN-sponsored observers declared the elections to have been free and fair, with no indications of fraud.

Following delays due to divisions within the PAIGC, Vieira was inaugurated as President on the 29th of September 1994. He appointed Manuel Sturnino da Costa as Prime Minister in and the appointed the Council of Ministers in mid-November. The Council was comprised solely of members of the PAIGC.

Under the terms of the 1984 Constitution, the president is elected for a 5-year term by direct elections and must receive an absolute majority of the valid votes.

Presidential Powers

The President has the constitutional power to:

- ◆ Represent the state and defend the constitution;
- ◆ Direct messages to the National Assembly and the nation;
- ◆ Convoke extra-ordinary sessions of the National Assembly when the public interest justifies such action;
- ◆ Ratify international treaties;
- ◆ Fix dates for elections at all levels;
- ◆ Nominate, swear in, and remove the Prime Minister, taking into account the election results and consultation with the political forces represented in the National Assembly.
- ◆ Nominate and remove the other members of the government, at the recommendation of the Prime Minister;
- ◆ Create and eliminate ministries, at the recommendation of the Prime Minister;
- ◆ Preside over the Council of State, the political consulting body of the President;

- ◆ Preside over the Council of Ministers, "when he perceives the need";
- ◆ Swear in the judges of the Supreme Court of justice;
- ◆ Nominate and remove, at the proposal of the government, the chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces;
- ◆ Nominate and remove, after consulting the government, the Procurador General of the Republic and Guinean Ambassadors;
- ◆ Accredite foreign ambassadors;
- ◆ Promulgate laws, decree laws, and decrees;
- ◆ Grant pardons and commute sentences;
- ◆ Declare war and make peace, per terms of the constitution;
- ◆ Declare a state of siege and emergency, per the conditions in the constitution;
- ◆ Dissolve the National Assembly, in case of a serious political crisis, after consulting with the President of the National Assembly and the political parties represented in the National Assembly, per conditions in the constitution;
- ◆ Dismiss the government, per condition in the constitution;
- ◆ Promulgate or veto within 30 days legislative bills of the National Assembly or acts promulgated by the government;
- ◆ Issue Presidential decrees.

The National Assembly and Council of State

The National Assembly is the supreme legislative body and political representative of all Guinean citizens, deciding on fundamental issues of internal and external policy. Members serve for 4-year terms. In case of absence abroad or temporary incapacity, the President of the National Assembly will assume (limited) functions of the Presidency; in cases where the President commits crimes in exercising his functions, he must respond before the Supreme Court. The National Assembly, by proposal of a one third vote and the approval of a two-thirds vote, requires the Procurador General to bring criminal charges against the President. There are 16 members of the Council of Ministers.

The Council of State

The Council of State, the political consulting body of the President, is the executive agent of the National Assembly and is composed of:

- President of the National Assembly;
- Prime Minister;
- President of the Supreme Court;
- A representative of each of the political parties represented in the National Assembly, and;
- Five citizens designated by the President for the period of his mandate.

The Council of State offers counsel to the President at his request and can express itself ("pronunciar") concerning the dissolution of the National Assembly, a state of emergency, declaration

of war, and making peace. Before democratization, the Council of State, which could pass legislation, had more power constitutionally than the Council of Ministers. Now that the National Assembly has assumed responsibility for legislation, the Council of State has less power and meets much less frequently, mainly in emergency situations. The National Assembly plays a significant role in the democratic process in debating issues and criticizing the Government, but has not passed much legislation this year.

Prime Minister's Office

While the President appoints the Prime Minister, the selection is now a negotiated choice with the ruling Party. In fact, it took two months to settle on the current Prime Minister, who, incidentally was not the President's first choice. Since the democratic election, the Prime Minister's Office has assumed much greater responsibility. The Prime Minister is essentially acting as de facto Chief of Government. It is the Prime Minister who presides at most meetings of the Council of Ministers because the President usually does not attend. The Secretary of State for the Presidency spends the majority of his time working in the Prime Minister's Office. There are eight members of the Prime Minister's Staff:

- Secretary of State for the Presidency and the Council of Ministries;
- Economic and Finance Adviser;
- Legal Adviser;
- Administrative Adviser;
- Production Adviser;
- Social Affairs Adviser;
- Political Affairs Adviser;
- Press Adviser.

Mali

Transition to Democracy

The Republic of Mali was proclaimed an independent state on September 22, 1960. As the first Malian President, Mr. Modibo Keita pursued an authoritarian socialist policy. In accordance with this plan, Mali severed its ties with the French political and financial bloc, after which it developed close economic links with the USSR and other communist states for a period of approximately eight years. Due to rapid inflation and increasing incidence of smuggling, Mali returned to the Franc Zone, however, it did not become fully integrated with the Union monétaire ouest-africaine until 1984.

In 1968, a group of junior army officers, who assumed power as the Comité militaire pour la libération nationale (CMLN), dissolved Mali's elected Assemblée nationale and overthrew President Keita. The Comité banned all political activity and abrogated the Constitution. The government which included Lt. Moussa Traoré as Head of State and President of the CMLN and Captain Yoro Diakité as Prime Minister, provided reassurances to the public that political power would return to civilian rule when Mali's severe economic problems were overcome and new political institutions created.

The 1970's were marked by the single ruling party activities of the CMLN which was replaced by the Union démocratique du peuple malien (UDPM). Resistance to UDPM creation came from politicians who were active before the '68 coup and since barred from political activity. There was also said to be resistance to civilian rule from the armed forces. Several members of the CMLN and police and armed forces were accused of undermining state security, embezzlement, and corruption.

In April of 1974, the Government published a proposed constitution which was approved by referendum in June of the same year. Presidential and legislative elections took place in June 1979 and were won by UDPM's sole candidate, President Traoré, for a five-year term. He received a reported 99% of the votes. The single list of UDPM candidates won the 82-member Assemblée nationale for a four-year term. In September 1981, the Government extended the presidential terms of office to 6 years and reduced the legislature to three years. President Traoré was re-elected to the presidency in 1985, reportedly obtaining 99.9% of the votes. The office of Prime Minister was created in that same year and again abolished it in June 1988.

President Traoré took active steps toward democracy during the 1980's. He initiated a nation-wide series of conferences to consider the exercise of democracy within and by the UDPM. Although the role of the ruling party was generally upheld outside the capital, many speakers at the conference disclosed support for multi-party politics. Traoré stated that diverse political opinions must be expressed within the UDPM. The most influential opposition movements that began to emerge in the early 1990's were those of the Comité National d'Initiative Démocratique (CNID) and the Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali (ADEMA) which organized mass pro-democracy demonstrations in December. The UDPM-affiliated trade union also expressed support for the transition to multi-party politics.

Pro-democratic movements were halted when General Sékou Ly was appointed to the Ministry of the Interior and Basic Development. One of his first actions was to attempt to cease political activity by issuing warnings to CNID and ADEMA and the student organization, the Association des Élèves et Étudiants du Mali (AEEM). As a result, violent anti-government and pro-democratic demonstrations occurred in Bamako, as did calls for President Traoré's resignation. Traoré was arrested in March and the military Conseil National de Réconciliation (CNR) assumed power. The Constitution, the Government, and the legislature of the UDPM were dissolved. The CNR and representatives of groups opposing Traoré established a 25-member Comité de transition pour salut de peuple (CTSP) to oversee the transition to democracy. It also undertook the reform of Malian political life and sought to remove from positions of influence all those who were believed to have been associated with corruption under the Traoré regime. (Traoré, Ly and others in were convicted by Bamako's Criminal Court of premeditated murder, battery, and voluntary manslaughter.)

The CNR scheduled legislative, municipal, and presidential elections for late 1991 and the withdrawal of armed forces from political life in January 1992. It also accorded official status to political parties which attended the National Conference in July and August 1991. A significant outcome of the Conference is the adoption of a draft Constitution for the Third Republic of Mali, together with an electoral code and a charter governing the activities of political parties. The draft Constitution provided for the separation of the powers of the executive, legislative and judicial organs of state with the President and the legislative body, the Assemblée nationale, each elected for five years by universal suffrage, in the context of a multi-party political system.

Voters endorsed the Constitution in January 1992 by 99.76%. In the municipal elections a week later, 23 of 48 parties presented candidates. ADEMA won 214 of the 751 seats, followed by US-RDA securing 130 seats and CNID with 96. Only 35% of the electorate reportedly participated. In elections to the Assemblée nationale, ADEMA again enjoyed the most success, winning 76 of 129 seats. CNID took nine and the US-RDA eight. Nine candidates took part in elections on April 12, 1992. Alpha Oumar Konaré, president of ADEMA, won the largest share of votes 44.95%, however not an overall majority and thus a second round, contested by Konaré and his nearest rival Tiéyké Mamadou Konaté of US-RDA, followed two weeks later. Konaré secured 69% of the votes and became President of Mali in June 1992. President Konaré appointed Younoussi Touré Prime Minister.

The Constitution of the Third Republic, provides for the separation of the powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial organs of state. The Executive power is vested in the President of the Republic, who is elected for five years by universal suffrage. The President appoints a prime minister, who, in turn, appoints a council of ministers. Legislative power is vested in the unicameral, 129-member Assemblée nationale, elected for five years by universal suffrage (13 deputies are elected to represent Malians resident abroad). Elections take place in the context of a multi-party political system. Mali has eight administrative regions, and a district government in Bamako. The Constitution makes provision for the establishment of a High Council of Local Communities.

Organization of the Presidency

The Presidency of the Republic of Mali was restructured by presidential decree No. 94-339/PRM on November 3rd, 1994, in order to improve its performance. One of the essential results of the institutional reform was the establishment of a *Strategic Team* of nine high level technical advisors,

headed by the Secretary General. *Chargés de missions* and *chargés de régions* assist the Strategic Team. The role of this Strategic Team is to support the President in articulating his vision, elaborating medium and long term strategies, and setting policy priorities. The *Strategic Team* held its first meeting at the beginning of January, 1995.

Meetings with the Presidency of the Republic are held twice a week, each Monday and Thursday. A third meeting of the Strategic Team, attended by the *chargés de mission* and chaired by the Secretary General of the Presidency, is held every Friday. The Strategic Team meets every Monday from 11:00 AM to 1:00 PM, with the Head of State presiding. During this meeting, the President discusses with his strategic advisors the files to be examined at the next Council of Ministers' meeting. These files are considered first by the technical advisors and their *chargés de mission* during their Friday meeting, then given to the President on the same day in order to give him time to examine them on the weekend. Thus the Monday meeting offers an opportunity to the President and to his advisors to discuss their differences, try to harmonize their points of view and to improve the overall quality of their analysis of upgrade the files.

A second meeting of the Strategic Team is held every Thursday from 2:00 PM to 4:00 PM, with the President of the Republic presiding. This meeting has two parts. During the first part, the President debriefs the Team on Wednesday's meeting of the Council of Ministers, including different positions taken by various Ministers on the dossiers up for consideration. This meeting gives the President the opportunity to give instructions to implement the decisions taken by the council of ministers on the day after the Cabinet meeting. During the second part, each member is given the floor to update the Team on the progress of the particular projects entrusted to him/her. These presentations offer an opportunity for all the team members share with each other their views on how certain dossiers can be improved and promoted.

Sometimes, experts are invited to make presentations on critical problems of the day which the Presidential decision makers need to understand in depth, in order to formulate good policies. To date, experts have been invited to the Thursday meeting to give presentations on such important issues as decentralization, the future of telecommunications in Mali, fundamentalism and Islamic integration. have been made by individuals invited by the Secretary General of the Presidency.

In the weekly meetings, the Strategic Team members have the opportunity to discuss regularly the major national issues with the President. These meetings offer the team the opportunity to know the President better as a man and to better grasp his political objectives and priorities, fostering the emergence of *a team spirit and a sense of genuine solidarity*. Furthermore, each member of the team feels that he, personally, has a stake in the success of the President's Mission. Team members are more motivated to perform at their full capacity.

With the new system of two meetings a week, the President as well as the Secretary General of the Presidency have lighter work schedules, which allows them to take better care of their respective duties.

Niger

Transition to Democracy

Niger became a self-governing member of the French Community in December 1958 and was granted independence on August 3, 1960. Hamani Diori, leader of the Parti Progressiste Nigérien and Prime Minister since 1958, became Head of State. He was elected president in November 1960 and re-elected in 1965 and 1970. As a result of corrupt government practices, a military coup took power in 1974, arrested President Diori and dissolved the legislature. Seyni Kountché became president and the Conseil Militaire Suprême (CMS) headed the new administration. The new Government stated that its priorities were to eliminate corruption and foster economic recovery after the six year drought. It also obtained the withdrawal of French troops and reduced France's influence over the exploitation of Niger's deposits of uranium.

In the late 1970's, as the Government replaced the corrupt administration, civilian rule began to replace the high proportion of army officers. In 1983, Kountché appointed civilian Oumarou Mamane as Prime Minister, who was later replaced by Hamid Algabid. President Kountché died in 1987 and Brig. Ali Saïbou became Head of State. Pursuing a more open relationship with the Diori administration officials, Saïbou gave amnesty to all political prisoners and announced proposals for elections for villages, local and regional councils and for the establishment of a constitutional committee. He also reinstated Mamane as Prime Minister; however, he emphasized that the military would continue to occupy a major role in political life following a return to constitutional rule. Saïbou also stated his opposition to a multi-party system.

The formation of a ruling party, Mouvement National pour une Société de Développement (MNSD), was established in 1988. The Conseil Supérieur d'Orientation National (CSON) replaced the CMS and its president, Brig. Saïbou, was the sole candidate in the presidential elections. Saïbou was confirmed as president of the Second Republic of Niger for a seven-year term by 99.6% of the vote, and the 93 deputies to the new legislative body were endorsed. Niger's poor economic status caused the new administration to implement austerity measures which caused great dissatisfaction among students and members of the Union de Syndicats des Travailleurs du Niger (USTN). These groups called for the right to promised grants and remuneration for public sector services which have been granted to some extent; however, economic conditions have presented difficulties in meeting such demands.

Niger began to move toward political pluralism in 1990, when the CSON announced an amendment to the Constitution that would facilitate a multi-party system. The amendment was not adopted until 1991. However, interim procedures for the registration of political parties were implemented prior to this date. Opposition leaders demanded that their parties have access to official media and that military personnel withdraw from political life. Supporters of the opposition movement also denounced MNSD domination of the reform process and supported demands that opposition groups be accorded access to the official media. As a result, the Chief of State distanced the armed forces from the MNSD.

Niger held a National Conference to draft a new constitution in 1991, similar to that held in Benin the previous year. Approximately 1,200 delegates attended. The Conference declared itself sovereign and delegates agreed that Saibou would remain in office as Head of State on an interim basis, and that his powers would be exercised under the supervision of the National Conference. The Conference severed links with external creditors when delegates voted to suspend adherence to the country's IMF and World Bank sponsored program of economic adjustment. Control of the armed forces and the police was transferred to the Conference as well. The Conference's legislative body, the Haut Conseil de la République (HCR), a 15-member body, was given the task of ensuring the transitional Government's implementation of the resolutions adopted, overseeing drafting of the constitution, and supervising Head of State activities. To alleviate severe financing deficit, the transitional Government introduced austerity measures.

The process of transition to civilian rule, scheduled for completion by the end of January 1993, encountered numerous practical difficulties. A referendum for the new Constitution which was delayed until December, resulted in its approval by 89%. 56% of the electorate voted. Elections to the new legislative body, the Assemblée Nationale, which took place in February 1993, were contested by 12 of the country's 18 legal parties. The MNSD-Nassara won the greatest number of seats and an alliance of parties formed the Alliance de Force de Changement (AFC), a parliamentary majority. First-round presidential elections resulted in the greatest proportion of votes cast given to the MNSD-Nassara candidate Col. Tandja Mamadou and Mahamane Ousmane of the CDS-Rahama. Mr. Ousmane won the second round in March 1993 with 55% of the votes, and was inaugurated in April. He appointed one of the first round presidential candidates, Mahamadou Issoufou, as Prime Minister.

The new Government encountered acute economic difficulties. Sporadic industrial action by public sector employees was accompanied by a resurgence of unrest in the education sector. Students stormed the Prime Minister's office protesting reduction in grants and competitive entrance procedures for graduates wishing to enter civil service. Niger received economic assistance from France in mid-1993 which allowed for payment of outstanding wages to the public sector. The Government soon initiated efforts to curb public expenditure, in accordance with its restoration of dialogue with the international financial community in order to negotiate new credits and debt-relief measures.

Austerity measures again led to public dissatisfaction with the Government. The USTN and students had violent clashes with the police. The Government succeeded in normalizing relations with the labor union and it announced emergency policies to offset immediate adverse effects of the devaluation. The Assemblée Nationale voted to empower Ousmane to issue decrees regarding political, economic, and financial affairs. By the time of the first anniversary of Ousmane's inauguration as President, labor unrest had weakened his attempt at economic adjustment and a campaign of civil disobedience, orchestrated by MNSD-Nassara and its allies, was challenging his administration. The MNSD is comprised of members of the former ousted military regime which has offered order and discipline to voters during the difficult period of transition.

The USTN has been a very powerful force in Niger political life. This trade union umbrella organization was active in 1991, bringing democracy to Niger and now threatens to bring down the government it helped to create. One of its major weapons is its call for strikes two to three days per week, which it has done every week since mid-1994. This action causes a great loss in productivity

for the country. The Government has since settled with the unions. The agreement involves an across-the-board increase in salaries in the 39,000-member civil service to compensate for loss of purchasing power following devaluation. In the meantime, the Government hopes to receive funding from donors but will need to end social strife and cut back on public sector salaries to achieve this goal.

In late 1994, Prime Minister Mahamadou Issoufou resigned and took with him his party's deputies, resulting in the coalition party, the AFC, losing its Parliamentary majority. Using his constitutional prerogative, the President called for new legislative elections, rather than appointing a Prime Minister outside of his coalition party.

In the resulting election in January 1995, President Ousmane's coalition the majority of seats, with the MNSD and its partners winning 42 seats and President Ousmane's coalition winning 40. President Ousmane now cohabitates with the MNSD-led coalition government. This situation of "cohabitation," where a party other than the President's holds a majority in the National Assembly, puts Niger in a unique position compared to other new democracies in the region.

Structure of the Government

The Constitution of the Third Republic, approved by referendum in December 1992 and promulgated in January 1993, provides for a civilian, multi-party political system. The President, Head of State, is elected for five years by universal suffrage and may be re-elected only once. The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister, and, on the latter's recommendation, other government ministers. President Mahamane Ousmane is Head of State and the current Prime Minister, Amadou Hama, is Head of the Government. The Prime Minister's Cabinet is comprised of four Principal Advisors and 12 Technical Advisors.

Legislative power is vested in the Assemblée Nationale, whose 83 members are directly elected with a five-year mandate. The Council of Ministers is responsible to parliament.

Zambia

Transition to Democracy

Zambia became an independent republic within the British Commonwealth in October 1964. Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) who formed the Zambian Government, became the country's first President. Kaunda declared Zambia a one-party state in 1972, and was re-elected several times. He remained President until November 1991. Persistent corruption and inefficiencies within the Government and in industry marked the political environment of Zambia. In the 1980's, the Government responded to strikes by public sector employees for higher wages with adoption of emergency powers to prohibit industrial action. Austerity measures, including the removal of food subsidies, resulted in other activities that expressed dissatisfaction with the government, including rioting in the capital and the Copperbelt region.

In the late 1980's, movement toward a multi-party system began. Initially, President Kaunda dismissed several cabinet ministers who were supporters of such a system. However, in May 1990, Kaunda announced that a popular referendum on multi-party politics would take place and that its proponents would be permitted to campaign and hold public meetings. In July 1990, political opponents of the Government formed the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) which quickly gained wide-spread support. It was officially recognized in December 1990 when the Government formally adopted constitutional amendments that permitted the formation of political associations other than UNIP. The MMD was led by Arthur Wina, a former minister and Frederick Chiluba, Chairman of Zambian Congress of Trade Unions.

Dissatisfaction by MMD members over constitutional provisions led to the establishment of a UNIP/MMD joint commission to revise the Zambian constitution. Adopted revisions included a requirement that all ministers be appointed from the National Assembly, and the need for approval by the National Assembly to call a state of emergency of more than seven days. The revised constitution was formally adopted August 2, 1991.

The first multi-party Presidential elections took place in October 1991. MMD candidate Frederick Chiluba won 76% of the votes cast. In legislative elections contested the same day, the MMD secured 125 seats in the National Assembly and 25 for the UNIP. Only four members of the previous government were returned to the National Assembly. In his new presidency, President Chiluba appointed a vice president, Levi Mwanawasa, formed a new 22-member Cabinet, and appointed a minister to each of Zambia's nine provinces, previously administered by governors. President Chiluba has taken steps to reverse economic decline including restructuring of the civil service and other parastatal organizations. Subsequent resignations and dismissals of cabinet members due to corruption and drug trafficking allegations led to reorganization of the cabinet portfolio. However, opposition groups claimed that the changes were only cosmetic. Vice-president Mwanawasa resigned in July 1994, due to long-standing conflicts between him and President Chiluba. He was replaced by Mr. Godfrey Miyanda.

Approximately two million citizens voted in the 1991 elections and it is estimated that this number will increase by 30% in the 1996 presidential elections.

Currently, a power struggles exists within the MMD between the younger members of the party and the Government. Younger members are impatient for political and economic reform and claim that a forum for constructive criticism and debate does not exist. Political observers claim that the MMD is disorganized at the grassroots levels, lacks financing, and has serious differences at the senior level. Feuding within the three dominant parties, the MMD, UNIP, and the National Party (NP) is also rampant. One point of contention within the parties is party regulations and responsibilities of key members. Parties are now giving more serious thought to fund raising activities.

Structure of the Executive Office

Zambia is a multi-party state with executive power vested in the President who is the constitutional Head of State. The President's tenure of office is limited to two five-year terms. Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly which has 150 members elected simultaneously by universal suffrage for a five-year term. The President appoints a vice president from the National Assembly. The Constitution also provides for a 27-member body, the House of Chiefs, which represents traditional tribal authorities.

The President has a small staff of three advisers: his Chief of Staff, who is principal political advisor to the President; his Special Assistant for economic Development Affairs; and his Special Assistant for Public Relations and Press. A fourth post, Special Assistant to the President on political and legal affairs, is currently vacant.

Cabinet Office and Secretary to the Cabinet

Prior to the launching of the Public Service Reform Programme, the Government of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) decided to restructure the Cabinet Office. This was done in order to:

- (a) enable the Office of the Secretary to the Cabinet to perform its role of "*nerve centre*" of Government more effectively, particularly in coordinating the formulation, monitoring and implementation of Government policies;
- (b) attain a better understanding of the implications of Ministerial proposals made to Cabinet; and
- (c) act as an analytical screen for material coming from line Ministries to Cabinet.

Following the restructuring, the Office of the Secretary to the Cabinet now has:

- (a) one Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet instead of three; and
- (b) three Permanent Secretaries each heading a Division as follows:
 - (i) Policy Analysis and Co-ordination Division;
 - (ii) Management Development Division; and

(iii) Administration Division.

As in many other Commonwealth countries, the Zambian Secretary to the Cabinet, who also serves as Head of the Civil Service and principal adviser to the President, is a very influential figure in the Government. President Chiluba recalled Aldridge Adamson from retirement to lead the public service reform process as Secretary to the Cabinet. Adamson has a long history of government service: first under the colonial regime, and later, under the post-Independence governments of President Kaunda, rising to the post of Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet.

Policy Analysis and Coordination Division (PAC)

In 1993, the Zambian Government merged the two existing Cabinet divisions, Economics and Finance, and Cabinet Affairs, into a new Policy Analysis and Coordination Division (PAC) in 1993. The establishment of PAC in the Cabinet Office, supported by the USAID Democratic Governance Project, formed part of Government's Public Service Reform Programme.

PAC performs many of the same functions as Economic and Social Policy Secretariats supporting Cabinet Offices in other Commonwealth countries. Its purpose is to improve the quality of Cabinet decisions and their implementation. PAC's four principal tasks are to:

- (a) examine and analyze Cabinet Memoranda with the aim of:
 - (i) ensuring their consistency with existing Government policy;
 - (ii) determining policy implications for other Departments of Government;
 - (iii) providing an independent analytical assessment from a national as opposed to a Ministerial perspective to Cabinet;
- (b) convey decisions of Cabinet to line Ministries and assist them in developing plans for monitoring the implementation of the decisions; and
- (c) prepare Cabinet Minutes.

In order for the Division to assume a definitive role in the formulation and implementation of Government policies, it has a complement of a small but highly qualified professional staff comprising one (1) Permanent Secretary, three (3) Chief Policy Analysts, six (6) Principal Policy Analysts, one (1) Assistant Secretary and one (1) Administrative Officer.

Cabinet Meetings

The 25 members of the Cabinet, including the President, as well as PAC staff regularly attend Cabinet meetings which take place bi-weekly. The Permanent Secretary of PAC, two Chief Policy Analysts, a Principal Policy Analyst and an Administrative staff member usually represent PAC at Cabinet.

President Chiluba chairs all Cabinet meetings. The President usually opens the discussion of particular items on the agenda by asking the Minister responsible for the submission to speak to it.

Other Ministers then ask questions or express their points of view. The President's own personal style determines the extent to which he guides the discussion.

Cabinet meetings used to last nine hours from 9:00 am to 6:00 p.m. and sometimes continue even later into the night. PAC staff have tried to encourage shorter meetings in the future through: 1) improvement of the quality of Cabinet memoranda; 2) earlier distribution of Cabinet papers; 3) streamlining the process of ratifying the minutes.

In the past, approximately twenty CMs have been discussed at each meeting. PAC staff believe that limiting the agenda to a maximum of eight to ten would be a more effective use of the Cabinet members' time, however. In addition, "Matters Arising," when minutes are discussed, and "Any Other Business" (AOB) may prolong the meeting another few hours. In an effort to shorten the AOB section, PAC recommended at a March 1994 workshop that Ministers wishing to discuss a matter that is not on the agenda submit a request to the President 48 hours before the meeting.

Preparation of Cabinet Memoranda

In order to enhance the efficiency of Cabinet meetings, PAC staff is now tackling the problem of poor quality Cabinet Memoranda (CM). Staff in PAC have commented that the quality of incoming Cabinet memoranda is at an all-time low. Indeed, at a seminar on PAC for permanent secretaries held in 1993, the Secretary to the Cabinet described the current standard of CMs as appalling. "Rubbish," he exclaimed in reference to the state of the memos that his office received. Many are unclear, rambling, and illogical in their arguments.

Part of the problem is that in the past Ministries have felt pressure to produce a high quantity of Cabinet proposals rather than high quality memos. PAC is working to redress this problem by assisting line ministry staff in preparing thoughtful well-articulated first drafts of policy proposals; and in the future, PAC may also comment on subsequent drafts, as well. Toward the goal of higher quality memos, technical advisers recently put together a *Guide to Drafting Memoranda* for line ministry and PAC staff.

After reading the first draft of a CM, PAC may suggest that the memo not go to Cabinet until several further steps have been taken, such as consultation with other ministries and evaluation of other policy options. For example, PAC staff can help line ministry officials to decide what information is important enough to be put up front in the body of the memo, and what should be relegated to a background section in the appendix.

A clearly stated recommendation is an especially important part of the memo, because it often serves as the basis for implementing the policy and is quoted verbatim in the minutes. The recommendations always move from the general to the specific. The first recommendation may provide an overview of the proposed course of action, while successive recommendations address specifics. The final summary should always summarize the financial implications of the proposal. At present, a frequent reason for proposals being rejected is that they have poorly developed recommendations, such as those which are not properly justified in the body of the Cabinet Memorandum.

While PAC provides support to the line ministries in the mechanics of memo preparation, it does not usurp the line ministries' responsibility for performing the actual technical analysis for CMs, a

concern expressed at one of the 1993 workshops. To the contrary, analysts in the line ministries will continue to perform the analysis in their areas of substantive expertise. After PAC staff has been trained in policy analysis, memo writing, and management, PAC will assist in training line ministry analysts in these areas.

One major problem in the CM preparation process is that little consultation takes place before the memo is written. For example, the Ministry of Works and Supply drafted a memo on Civil Service Housing Policy without consulting with other ministries dealing with the issue, or the National Housing Authority, or the Building Society. In this case, a civil servant was given the nearly impossible task of preparing an important memo on a politically sensitive issue in two hours time, with little assistance. Apparently, this situation is typical of most ministries, whose officials have little time or incentive to coordinate with others.

At a recent workshop, PAC concluded that Cabinet papers dealing directly with two departments would be stronger technically if they were submitted jointly. Joint submissions would bring two different perspectives and a broader information base to the memo, and thus strengthen the quality of the submission.

PAC recently identified one other important source of difficulty in preparing clear policy memos: Government's lack of comprehensive national policies. For instance, the Government has not articulated a Zambian housing policy or a national agricultural policy. Cabinet may wish to encourage each line ministry to develop such a comprehensive policy in the near future.

PAC took an important step toward the improvement of CMs recently when it developed a new format for all memos, a hybrid of the Canadian and Australian Cabinet memoranda (See Appendix A). PAC will play an important role in the future in assisting line ministries in the transition to the new memo format, if the format is accepted by the Cabinet. A new section to the CM format has been recommended that addresses the implications of the policy proposal for certain groups in society, such as women, the unemployed, and the urban and rural poor. This important addition will ensure that line ministries integrate an assessment of the social, political, and economic impact — both positive and negative — of the policy into the memo preparation process.

PAC also added a *Financial Implications* section to the format which will encourage initiating ministries to attach a price tag to their proposed policy, including direct and indirect costs, as well as offsetting savings. PAC will urge line ministry officials to consult with the Ministry of Finance early in the drafting process about the proposed policy's budgetary implications. In the future, ministry analysts will identify the proposed source of funds, a necessary step they have often tried to avoid in the past.

The new format also requires that a *Draft Implementation Plan* be included with each memo which will explain how the proposal would be implemented, demonstrate to Cabinet that the proposal has been well thought through, and guide ministries in following through with the actual implementation of Cabinet decisions. This plan should outline *who* does *what* by *when* to implement the proposal and, in doing so, demonstrate to the Cabinet members the practicality of the proposal before them.

PAC staff believe that Ministers would form opinions on issues more quickly if CMs were more clearly argued and based upon more in-depth research. In particular, presentation of a number of

policy options considered by the initiating Ministry should satisfy Cabinet that the problem and its many possible solutions have been explored. This would then guide Cabinet members in analyzing the policy issue at hand and accelerate the decision-making process. PAC will play an important role in the future by assisting the line ministries in making clear presentations of the multiple policy options considered (Section 7, New Format for Cabinet Memoranda).

After the final draft CM has been developed, ministers are given 21 days to comment on it before it is put on the Cabinet agenda. In the future, if many Ministers disagree with the policy (by writing "no" on the memo), PAC would like to have the authority to say that the memo should not go to Cabinet.

Often ministers do not receive the final draft until the Saturday before the Monday Cabinet meeting, leaving them insufficient time to carefully review the memo before it is discussed. PAC hopes to receive and distribute the final drafts sooner in the near future so that the CMs reach Cabinet members in a more timely fashion.

Recording of Cabinet Decisions and Minutes

Like many other Commonwealth countries, the Cabinet Office prepares two types of documents after each meeting, *Cabinet Decision Conveyance Memoranda* and "Cabinet Minutes." In the past, the Cabinet Office has conveyed records of decision to only the initiating Ministry. However, at a Workshop in March 1994, PAC decided to convey Cabinet decisions to all Ministries (except in special cases concerning confidential matters), in order to build widespread understanding of government policies and facilitate coordination of policy implementation. The new Cabinet memoranda format created at the workshop gives originating ministries the option of requesting immediate conveyance of the decision. Such requesting Ministries must give an acceptable rationale for immediate conveyance (See **Appendix A**, Item No. 10).

Currently, several — and occasionally up to six — drafts of Cabinet minutes are prepared by PAC staff, but PAC hopes to reduce this number by improving the quality of the first drafts. PAC staff members are working to reduce the length and improve the quality of the minutes.⁴ PAC staff find minute preparation particularly challenging, because Ministers do not always make clear arguments. In some instances, PAC staff find that they are obliged to deduce the "general view" of the Cabinet on an issue, because it did not emerge clearly out of the discussion that took place in the Cabinet meeting. PAC staff find it much easier to prepare minutes when the Chairman summarizes the discussion and decision of each agenda item.

In addition, PAC staff believe that minutes would be easier to prepare if Cabinet memoranda were more clearly argued and written because the discussion of each item would be more sharply focussed. Thus PAC's efforts to improve the quality of memoranda should facilitate minute preparation in the future, as well.

In the past, minutes have tended to be a relatively long summary of the main points raised in the discussion as well as the decisions. In contrast, several other Cabinets offices around the world

⁴Technical advisers recently created a clear set of *Guidelines for Taking Minutes in Cabinet Meetings*.

record only the decisions taken. Recently, PAC staff agreed to reduce the length of the minutes' narrative, in response to the problem of overly lengthy minutes. Starting immediately, minutes will reflect only a summary of the discussion that led up to Cabinet's decision and the decision, itself, as agreed at the Cabinet Profiles workshop in March, 1994. From now on, references to specific points raised or comments made will not appear. PAC staff believe that this will reduce minutes' length, and in doing so, improve the efficiency of Cabinet meetings.

PAC staff complete the first draft of the minutes three days after the Cabinet meeting (by Friday), and finish the final revisions one week after the meeting. The minutes are then circulated exactly one week before the next meeting. The final draft is completed seven days before the next Cabinet meeting.

The Cabinet debates over the ratification of minutes at the next Cabinet meeting (fourteen days after PAC staff took the minutes). This discussion of the previous meeting's minutes (brought up during "Matters Arising") is one of the most time-consuming segments of the meeting. During this part of the meeting, Ministers sometimes disagree with the way their arguments from the previous meeting were represented in the minutes. Individual ministers usually recognize the points which they raised and, in some cases, deny that they actually said what has been written in the minutes. This lengthy ratification process — which takes up two to three hours of each Cabinet meeting — is highly unusual. It does not take place in any of the other Commonwealth countries studied, where pro forma approval of minutes usually takes place rapidly, without dissent.

As in all the other cases, the Secretary to the Cabinet is ultimately responsible for the minutes. Three or four PAC staff members who attended the meeting prepare the original drafts of the minutes, and the SC revises and edits them. Like the British Secretaries to the Cabinet, SC Adamson vets the minutes carefully, before they are submitted in final form.

Currently, PAC notetakers prepare notes on the full range of issues discussed in Cabinet, and do not specialize in certain topics. PAC agreed that once it is fully staffed, it would like its staff to become specialists on certain policy issues, such as agriculture or housing. In the future, PAC staff will be expected to inform themselves in advance about those items on which they are taking notes by reading the memos and, where appropriate, relevant earlier decisions.

Policy Coordination, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation

Implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of Cabinet decisions is one of PAC's most important — and challenging — tasks. One problem is that recommendations are often not clear cut, making them difficult to implement after the Cabinet approves them. Thus improvement of the quality of memos would greatly facilitate the implementation process. As mentioned above, PAC is working to assist the line ministries in writing clearer CM recommendations.

At the recent workshop on *Cabinet Profiles*, PAC discussed two other steps toward improvement of coordination and implementation. First, the Secretary to the Cabinet could hold quarterly meeting of all PSs who would discuss implementation of past Cabinet decisions and coordinate upcoming policy proposals. This should help to ensure that inter-ministerial coordination takes place both before Cabinet considers policy proposals and after the decision has been made. PAC agreed at a recent workshop that both of these types of coordination are important.

Second, PAC could prepare monthly or quarterly reports on implementation of Cabinet decisions and submit them to Cabinet. This is one mechanism PAC plans to use to monitor and report on implementation and impact of Cabinet policy decisions.

Third, PAC agreed that each line ministry should form a "mini-PAC" which would serve as a liaison with PAC, and thus facilitate inter-departmental coordination. While all ministries already have liaison officers, they do not currently play an active role in coordinating policy formulation with the Cabinet Office. Ideally, these mini-PACs would comprise a core group of technical specialists, who could help PAC decide which issues should go to Cabinet committee and which to the full Cabinet.

Cabinet Committees

After a thorough examination of the Committee System, it has become necessary to restructure and separate Committees into two categories. Cabinet Committees are created in accordance with Section 50 (1) of the Constitution which provides for the establishment of Cabinet and its functions. It is, therefore, necessary that only Committees which operate on behalf of Cabinet should report to Cabinet. Other Committees are not designated as Cabinet Committees because they are advisory to the President. Instead, they are designated as "Special Committees."

It was made clear during the Cabinet Workshop in January, 1995 that the seventeen (17) Committees inherited from the previous Government and drawn mostly along ministerial responsibilities did not reflect the priorities of the current Government. As a result, these Committees did not operate as expected and, in fact, some of them never met. This unacceptable state of affairs justified the need to reconstitute, restructure and reorganize the Committees to improve their effectiveness and operational efficiency in order to:

- (a) reduce the workload and the length of Meetings of Cabinet;
- (b) enhance the quality of decisions and delivery of services; and
- (c) enhance the concept of collective responsibility.

In tailoring the Committees in accordance with the priority areas of Government, special attention is devoted to economic recovery through the Structural Adjustment Programme. In order to effectively monitor not only the economic recovery programme but also the social consequences of this programme, three Cabinet Committees have been established to take charge of the economic and social restructuring and development concerns and the Government efforts to rehabilitate the run-down economic and social infrastructure. Since the present Government came to power, the country has been experiencing sporadic droughts resulting in the need to mobilize emergency food to distribute to deserving areas. In order to undertake this responsibility and monitor the effects of general disasters and mount other emergency operations, it has become necessary for the Government to classify this as another priority area. Other important areas in which it has been found necessary to have Cabinet Committees include Defence and Security, Foreign Affairs, International Relations and Legislation. The Cabinet Committees dealing with these matters have been maintained. In addition, it has been found necessary to formalize the operations of the Parliamentary Planning Committee under the Chairmanship of the Vice President as a "Special" Committee. This Committee will be responsible for planning Government Business in Parliament.

In order to improve the management of the business of Committees, it was decided to centralize both the servicing of Committees and the hosting of their meetings. In this connection, the Policy Analysis and Coordination Division will be responsible for serving all Cabinet Committees except the Legislation Committee which will be serviced by the Attorney-General's Chambers. Similarly, the Administration Division of Cabinet Office will service all the Special Committees except the Parliamentary Planning Committee which will be serviced by the Office of the Vice President.

The measures outlined in this Profile have been put in place to enable Cabinet to operate more efficiently in the formulation, implementation and in monitoring of policies. These measures will ensure the development of a unique Zambian System of Cabinet which should promote and accelerate the country's democratic governance and strengthen Cabinet collective responsibilities of improving and managing the running of Government.

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**Networking Conference in Mali
New Leadership and Democratic Governance,
The Role of the Executive Office**

Basic Indicators for Participating Countries

Country	Population	GNP/Per Capita	Type of Government	No. of Ministers	Institution Responsible for Policy Coordination
Bénin	3.3 million	\$410	<i>Presidential.</i> President Nicéphore Soglo: Head of State and Head of Government.	19	Secrétariat Générale du Gouvernement
Guinea Bissau	1 million	\$220	<i>Semi-Presidential.</i> President Joao Bernardo Vieira: Head of State Prime Minister Manuel Sturnino da Costa: Head of the Government.	24	Office of Prime Minister
Mali	9 million	\$310	<i>Semi-Presidential.</i> President Alpha Oumar Konaré: Head of State Prime Minister Ibrahima Keita: Head of the Government.		Secrétariat Générale du Gouvernement, Cabinet de Prime Ministre
Niger	8.2 million	\$280	<i>Semi-Presidential.</i> President Mahamane Ousmane: Head of State Prime Minister Amadou Hama: Head of the Government.	21	Secrétariat Générale du Gouvernement
Zambia	8 million	N/A	<i>West Minster Style Parliamentary.</i> President Frederick Chiluba: Head of State and Head of the Government.	25	Cabinet Office

PANELS -- SUMMARIES OF SPEECHES

**NEW LEADERSHIP
AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA**

Bamako, September 25-26, 1995

Policy Coordination in the Executive Branch: the Case of Mali

by Fousseyni SAMAKE, Secretary General of the Government

The firm commitment of African peoples to the establishment of democracy has led to the replacement of one-party authoritarian or totalitarian regimes by democratic pluralism in many African states during the last five years. However, the democratization process of African political regimes is unique in every case: its genesis, its duration, its forms, and its content have varied, for each country considered. Despite these diversities, all political transitions include the failure of African states to guarantee fundamental freedoms and further social and economic development. For this reason, the search for another way to run public affairs has been at the heart of democratic claims.

Revised institutional and legal frameworks of the state have been accompanied, in many cases, by a certain renewal of leaders, and may constitute the basis for better governance. Mali, the overthrow of the one-party dictatorship on March 26, 1991, was followed by a 14-month transition period, during which the Third Republic institutions were installed after free and transparent elections.

How do authorities, entrusted with the mission to make decisions on behalf of the nation, coordinate public policies for implementation? In the state, as in any organization, decisions appear to be responses to social needs coming from various actors who often have conflicting strategies. Making social mandates into formal public policies takes place through a process that involves actors within and outside the administrative and political system.

I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MALIAN EXECUTIVE BRANCH:

The constitutional evolution of Mali clearly shows two periods: an initial period of approximately 30 years marked by the monist character of the executive branch and a second period linked to the democratization movement which introduced dualism.

1) A "monist" executive tradition (1960-1991)

During the first 30 years of independence, Mali has known only regimes with a monist executive branch, with and without a single party. Under the First Republic (1960-1968), the executive branch called government was composed of the President of the Government and the ministers. The President of the Government was the President of the Republic and Head of the State. He was also the first person responsible for the de facto one-party. Under the exceptional regime following the November 1968 coup, the president of the military junta (Military Committee of National Liberation, CMLN) was at the same time Head of State and Head of the Government.

Under the Second Republic (1974-1991), which constitutionalized the single party, the President of the Republic was the Head of State and President of the Government. He was also head of the single party. The single-headed executive was amended in 1986 by the appointment of a prime minister charged with governmental coordination. This executive branch style lasted only one year.

In summary and as in many other African political regimes, the first three decades of independent Mali were characterized by the omnipotence of the president, "a real republican monarch." The democratization movement questioned this form of executive system assimilated to an autocratic dictatorship.

2) A dualist experience linked to democratization

The dualism of the executive branch appeared with the adoption of Fundamental Act No. 1 which served as the constitution during the transition period from March 1991 to June 1992. In addition to the President of the Transition Committee for the Salvation of the People, Head of State, and President of the Council of Ministers, a prime minister was appointed as head of the government, and charged with directing national policies.

It appears that the success of the Malian democratic transition was in large part due to a effective collaboration and/or the absence of open conflicts among the institutions and notably between the Head of State and the Head of the Government. The success of the dualist approach led to its adoption by the executive branch in the Constitution of the Third Republic. The Constitution of February 25, 1992, makes the President of the Republic Head of State and President of the Council of Ministers.

The Prime Minister, appointed by the President of the Republic, is the head of the Government. The Government is charged with determining and leading the policies of the nation and is responsible to the National Assembly.

The dualist executive branch introduces a new model of governance, especially since the "democratic game" does not necessarily facilitate a fruitful collaboration between the two power holders. Mali's experience in developing and coordinating the executive branch serves as a useful example for other countries.

II. GOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION

In order to facilitate coherence among governmental activities, various mechanisms of coordination have been implemented. These mechanisms result from a combination of institutional aspects and informal aspects which involve both hierarchy and the principle of consultation.

1) Vertical Coordination:

Vertical coordination involves the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and selected ministers.

The President of the Republic is elected on the basis of the program he has submitted to the electors. Once elected, he must implement this program. But the Constitution entrusts the Government with the task of "determining and leading the policies of the Nation" (art. 53). One must therefore consider the

question of coordinating the president's program with the policies of the Nation determined by the Government.

There are certain means of coordination such as the informal meetings between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers, and most recently the introduction of the mandate. The mandate is a political practice adopted by the Third Republic when the second Prime Minister was appointed in April 1993. The Government readopted it when the third Prime Minister was appointed in February 1994. The mandate appears as an element of definition of the relations between the President of the Republic and the head of the government. The President of the Republic must indeed instruct the Prime Minister appointed by him to implement the main political orientations he chose. The official formula is: "The President of the Republic entrusted the Prime Minister with a mandate, the main points of which are the following..."

As a result, the government's general policy declarations made before the National Assembly are to incorporate the concerns of the Head of State as expressed in the mandate. The President of the Republic instructs the Prime Minister to implement certain actions through memoranda. The Prime Minister ensures their application by giving direction to the Government based on the President's mandate or by personally overseeing their execution.

The Prime Minister, as Head of the Government, is the primary institution charged with governmental coordination. To this end, he "issues orders and any act to explain the contents of the governmental policies and to direct the action of the ministers" (art. 7 of decree 92-007/P-RM of June 18, 1992 pertaining to the responsibilities of the members of the Government).

The coordinating powers of the Prime Minister are also expressed through arbitration. Arbitration consists of settling questions about which there is no agreement among the ministries. Such is the case, in particular, with the Ministry of Finance which "coordinates the whole of the programs of economic reform and insures coherence of monetary, economic and budgetary policies" (art. 11 of decree no. 94-363/PM-RM of November 18, 1994, establishing the specific responsibilities of the members of the Government). The coordinating action of the Minister of Finance is exercised during the preparation of the budget during arbitration, and while evaluating the compatibility of actions with the commitments of the state towards its development partners within the framework of the structural adjustment program.

2) Horizontal Coordination:

Coordination by cooperation among different actors usually takes place through institutionalized mechanisms. From the start, ministerial departments initiate texts according to their specialties and in response to social requests addressed to them. In principle, a text is not submitted for decision if it has not been previously entered into the Government's current annual work program. The Government's work program takes the form of a table of actions developed by the departments. Once adopted by the Government, it is used as the basis for programming the dossiers to be examined by the Council of Ministers. It allows for a better organization of governmental work and of parliamentary work.

The texts originating at the Ministerial departmental level by the departments are transmitted to the Secretariat General of the Government. The Secretariat General then calls an interministerial meeting to which the representatives of the ministerial departments concerned, or the representatives of all the

departments as the case may be, are invited. Forty-six such interministerial meetings were held at the Secretariat General of the Government during 1994.

The texts considered at these interministerial meetings may be submitted directly to the Council of Ministers or, in certain cases, it may be filtered through the Coordination Committee of the Secretaries-General (CCSG) formerly called Coordination Committee of the Cabinet Directors (CCDC) before being examined by the Council of Ministers. The CCSG is chaired by the Secretariat General of the Government and includes the Cabinet Director of the Prime Minister and all the Secretaries-General of the ministries.

The Council of Ministers is the constitutional organ of coordination and decision-making. Chaired by the President of the Republic, it includes the Prime Minister and the ministers including the ministers-delegates and the state secretaries. The Secretary General of the Presidency and the Secretary General of the Government attend Council meetings in a consulting capacity.

Other coordination organs include:

- The Cabinet Council composed of the Prime Minister and all the ministers. It prepares the decisions of the government in certain areas such as public markets or urban planning. However, the cabinet council meets infrequently.
- The restricted interministerial committees which bring together, in addition to the Prime Minister assisted by the Secretary General of the Government, the ministers concerned, with their collaborators and one representative of the Secretariat General of the Presidency. In practice however, the interministerial committees are chaired by the President of the Republic and have the same composition as that of the Council of Ministers. They consider questions of sectoral policy. Seven interministerial committee meetings have been held so far in 1995 and five more are programmed for the months of September and October.
- Interministerial committees or commissions are created to coordinate the action of the government in a specific area. Their composition is limited to the departments concerned by the issue. They are chaired by a minister. For example, an Interministerial Committee of Health Promotion, which is composed of eight ministers, was created by the decree of November 2, 1993. Another example is the interministerial follow-up Committee of the Structural Adjustment unit, which was created by the decree of November 2, 1993. This committee is composed of six ministers, the Secretaries General of the Presidency and of the Government, and the Cabinet Director of the Prime Minister.

It should be noted that these institutionalized organs of coordination do not prevent the existence of various informal mechanisms which are sometimes more efficient. The members of the government have been invited to consult with each other about issues of concern to their departments before a file is introduced into the formal circuits of consultation.

III. COORDINATION WITHIN A MINISTRY:

Understanding the mechanisms of coordination within a ministerial department requires a knowledge of the organization of this structure. Until 1994, a ministerial department had, at the superstructural level,

a line cabinet composed of a cabinet director, a head of cabinet, technical advisors and a cabinet attaché. At the structural level, it included some central services called national directorships, annexed services, and personalized services.

The law 94-009 of March 22, 1994, introduced an important reform which included the creation of the Secretary Generals placed between the minister and the services, and of a staffed cabinet. The cabinet has an essentially political inclination while the Secretariat General animates, coordinates, and controls the services placed under the department. This reform was undertaken by the authorities of the Third Republic who wanted to distinguish between the political activities of a minister handled by the cabinet and the administrative activities which take place within the framework of the state and serve the general interest.

In a ministerial department, the coordination of the services' activities is undertaken by the minister who issues circular memos or orders. Under his authority, the Secretary General organizes meetings linked to the activities of the department, notably monthly coordination meetings, and supervises the department's service activities and personnel.

The Secretary General is the director of coordination within the ministry. Pursuant to the decree 94-202 of June 3, 1994, establishing the general rules of organization and functioning of the General Secretariats, the Secretary General:

- elaborates on the program and the annual reports of activities of the department. He evaluates this program and prepares the files for governmental meetings;
- organizes the coordination meetings with the directors of the services;
- ensures the continuity of the relations of the department with the other ministries and the Secretariat General of the Government.

At the service level, the coordination activities are undertaken by the director of the service.

**NEW LEADERSHIP
AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA**

Bamako, September 25-26, 1995

**Widening Participation
in the Formulation and Implementation of Political Choices**

Benoit Adekambi

1. The democratic experience initiated by African countries at the beginning of the 1990's is the expression of a collective awareness that good governance and good management of public affairs are essential conditions for the achievement of the objectives of development and of economic and social progress. The new institutions of a lawful state, respectful of fundamental freedoms and human dignity, contribute to the achievement of these objectives. Among these institutions, the executive branch can play a major role in helping national consensus around a new civil project or government activity to have lasting effects.

2. To conserve and consolidate the consensus, the teams in power during the democratization process must do everything possible to enlarge the base of popular participation. Enlarging and consolidating power may be accomplished by associating the different components of society with the choice of economic and social policies and their implementation and/or encouraging them to adhere to these choices and accept their **rightness**.

3. The first step in widening popular participation through the exercise of power is to effectively set up all the institutions established by the constitution: a constitutional court, a high audiovisual and communication authority, an economic and social council.

4. The executive branch must implement a genuine policy of decentralization of political power, decentralization being the only way through which the communities can make their development priorities known at the local level.

In Bénin, a territorial administration reform project is currently being examined in the National Assembly. The expected objective, which results from the preparatory work, is to "conciliate the desires of the people to organize themselves within the basic autonomous communities with the absolute necessity of the presence of the State as guarantor of unity and harmonious development of the nation."

5. More efforts must be undertaken to improve the level of democratic culture among the people. To this end, educating and informing the people are essential factors in helping them to better understand certain concept so that the democratic debate will not be limited to intellectuals.

In order to facilitate the emergence of a democratic culture, African intellectuals must create structures of reflection and political animation which take into consideration all the components of the society, including, for example, women.

6. The trade unions, political organizations, and civil organizations must be the key actors in this participation process. In many countries, these institutions are still very fragile. The executive branch must protect them and facilitate their growth and consolidation through adequate legal means.

7. The executive branch must have a permanent dialogue with these organizations, while respecting their own autonomy and abstaining from any attempt to interfere with their operations. This dialogue takes place within the National Assembly (round-table Government-Parliament commissions), and within the economic and social council. It also takes place through numerous seminars and workshops frequently organized around very diverse subjects.

In Bénin, unfortunately, the work accomplished during these meetings is often ignored and is neither implemented nor followed-up. For years, the trade unions and the political parties have vainly asked for a national economic and social conference. No agreement has been made with the executive branch on the use of the results. For the government, the meeting should be consultative only, while the other political actors insist that the results be implemented within the framework of the government's action program.

8. Free access by the institutions of the civil society and by the opposition parties to the private and state media as well as to any other means of expression (popular manifestation for example) must be guaranteed.

9. In many countries involved in the democratic process, the lack of trust between the executive branch and the opposition makes their participation in decision-making and implementation difficult. Instead of a consensus, one sees quite often that the party in power has exclusive management of the State.

For the democratic process to survive, all the actors must base their actions on the permanent search for a consensus, tolerance, and patriotism. The will of the executive branch to open itself up must correspond with a responsible opposition and civil society conscious of the necessity to respect the lawful state, the institutions, and the democratic alternative.

**NEW LEADERSHIP
AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA**

Bamako, September 25-26, 1995

**Summary of Contributions
to the Themes No. 1 and 3 of the Conference**

Adamou Salao, SGP, Niger

Theme No. 1A

Sharing of responsibility for policy formulation, implementation, and control between the top of the executive branch (President of the Republic and Prime Minister) and the line ministries can be resolved through official consultations as well as through less formal means.

1) **Official Stages of Collective Decision**

Meetings of the Council of Ministers are an ideal place for making major State decisions. Deputies' contributions to the meeting may be previously obtained (draft bills) or decisions may be directly executed (decrees).

This framework can be very effective for dividing tasks among the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the ministers. It is here that the final arbitration takes place between the upper and lower levels of the executive branch, as well as among the ministers themselves.

The second place for consultation in this category is in the cabinet council where all the ministers meet under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. In the cabinet council, discussions are more intensive to the extent that agreements reached at this level are rarely questioned by the Council of Ministers.

However, the effective performance of these organs assumes that interministerial meetings will be duplicated. Indeed, in order to coordinate the actions of the services of different departments, it is necessary to organize meetings of those responsible for these services. The agreements reached during these meetings are validated, of course, during meetings of the cabinet, while residual differences are resolved through arbitration by the Prime Minister.

Efficacy and efficiency can be obtained through the involvement of the advisors of the Prime Minister and of the President of the Republic in these phases of the work which eventually help to prepare the decisions of these two heads of the executive branch.

More effective results can be obtained when work in the official stages is coupled with less formal reports.

2) Consultation in Informal Frameworks

Lack of communication between administrations is the worst enemy of efficacy. Therefore, direct contact must be established as much as possible among those responsible, even if they do not belong to the same ministry. This mode of communication facilitates mutual understanding, eliminates preconceived notions, and enhances the ability to do team work.

The opportunities for informal meetings are numerous, including office meetings, telephone conversations, receptions, home visits, etc. These meetings are opportunities to examine issues of common interest to several administrations in a relaxed environment. As a result, difficulties at official meetings are more easily surmounted and the file preparation is improved.

Theme 3: Enhance Participation

In Niger, the democratization era has given many people the opportunity to participate in the making of important decisions. In this respect we can point to the national debates on:

- the national charter (1988);
- the constitution of 1989;
- the national conference (1991);
- the constitution of 1992;
- the rural code (1993);
- the family code (1994);
- the administrative reorganization (1994).

Associations, trade unions, political parties, and town and village citizens participated by way of ample media coverage.

The principle is simple: a multi-disciplinary commission is asked to prepare a preliminary project which will be approved by the government; the preliminary project is made known through radio, television, and through many meetings; then, the commission travels across the country, discusses the project with the people, and collects observations and comments. Taking these into consideration, the commission then prepares a project which is introduced in the formal circuit of adoption. In one instance, a particular preliminary project was rejected so globally that it was put on the back burner for a period of time. Such was the case of the family code project which no Nigerian political figure would dare support today because popular disapproval was so strong.

From a pedagogic point of view, these experiences can validly serve to formulate typical consultation circuits for the conception and the implementation of policies at the national level, as well as at the regional and local levels. It is important, however, to identify the groups of participants which are the most representative of public opinion (associations, trade unions, administrations, key-groups, political parties of the majority, and of the opposition), and submit to them the initial plans of government projects.

According to the methodology described above, all criticism must be faithfully recorded. It must be synthesized in a report which will accompany the reformulation of policies. The ultimate decision of the

government will take place when it is clear that the project has sufficiently taken into consideration the expectations of the people and is supported by them.

It seems that if the government operates in this manner, the people's receptivity to governmental initiatives will increase. Thus, the chances for successful policy implementation are greater.

However, in order to maintain this success, it is important to set up a system to communicate the results obtained in implementing the policies. It is also important to have a permanent dialogue between the government and the people since it is a source of enrichment for both sides.

In summary, it is through an interactive process of conception, consultation, discussion, reformulation, and decision that a real participation by the people in governmental action can be obtained. Of course, the quality of the trust established on this occasion will bear on the results to be expected. It is therefore important to choose carefully the men and the women who will make the system work.

**NEW LEADERSHIP
AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA**

Bamako, September 25-26, 1995

**On Popular Participation in Building The
New Democratic States**

The Case of Mali

by Pascal Baba Coulibaly - Presidency of the
Government of the Republic of Mali

Background

The first half of the 1990's will have been a true cultural mix for social scientists, because of the political stakes characterizing it. Because of a constantly deteriorating economic situation, and under the implementation of political options inspired by the IMF and the World Bank, African States, after ten years of structural adjustment, have ultimately found themselves blocked, in the face of their peoples.

The particular nature of such a process, in the History of the Continent, resides in the fact that it developed in reaction to a world situation, where the same effects have produced the same causes in that second half of the world (in the political and ideological sense, of course) which was represented by Eastern Europe.

Hence the failure of Government was noted everywhere, this massive and pressing claim of individuals to reform the grounds of this based on consensual agreement and popular participation, anti-theses of one party rule blamed for having led to economic, political and intellectual misery.

The destruction of the former state of things and of the previous order has not been peaceful everywhere. In Mali, March 26 symbolizes the end of one party rule happening against a background of national tragedy, the extent of which itself translates the determination of democratic forces to take over Government.

Three or four years after the beginning of the democratic process almost everywhere in Africa, the problem consists in asking about the nature and input of popular participation in the establishment of a new order of things and if, with time and Government consolidating its hold, such participation is not more and more rejected to the borderline, short of integrating it in the framework of decentralized power.

I. THE CONDITIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

In order to account for the gradual loss of momentum, then the fall of the one party system in Africa, there is a classical explanatory scheme, which is being credited, and which attributes the causes of the disruption entirely to the economic situation.

The methodology, although attractive, raises at least two major issues, one of those being of a scientific nature, and the other one of a political nature; an inadequate account of the two levels contributes to misinformation of the public, including the elites, and secondarily, to the making of major but untimely decisions, as a result of the confusion.

On a scientific ground, the remark opens on a controversy about the integration of the mechanism of the economy and the actors of that economy. In other words, is the economic power machine a cause or an effect of the social situation? More specifically, can there be a safe, competitive economic activity, in a society where the actors are traumatized psychologically and politically?

In the light of such a complex issue facing the scientific community, the Bretton Woods institutions had, in the early 1980's, reacted for Africa, in a unilateral manner by making the economic situation the alpha and omega of any development methodology.

Without any anthropological background of the state of the social forces in Africa (and therefore without taking those into account), structural adjustment has taken place, obsessed with the credo of rehabilitation of public finances, budgetary balance, cost-effectiveness, in spite of the social costs.

And this is where the apprehension of an equation of a scientific nature follows the contours of an option and of a political decision, in the strong sense. We know that such directions could not have been imposed on African countries in the 1960's, although the IMF and the World Bank have been in place for over half a century. So, for such impositions to happen, the African regimes had to be weak, up until they reached a dead-end, through contempt for, exclusion and over-exploitation of the popular masses who had brought them.

The african one party regimes had twenty years of existence at the beginning of the 1980's. In the course of those twenty years, military coups had wiped out the initiators of this model of political management, without their successors willing to associate the populations to the exercise of power. Hence, when the Bretton Woods institutions knocked at Africa's door, the States were all alone in front of them, while twenty years earlier, entire nations had stood up against colonialism.

The ten odd years (1980-1991) which mark the presence of the Bretton Woods institutions in Mali, prior to the fall of the one party system, we must say, have severely contributed to rotting an already degraded social situation: to the point that it contributed to raising an awareness to organize in associations, groups, and corporations, which is the only way to survive materially, morally and politically, in the face of a Government which exists only in and through its capacity of exclusion and repression.

So these, in fact, were ten years which actively prepared the March 1991 Revolution, because of the growing misery of four major forces: farmers, the Government administration, the new cities and youth.

As far as farmers are concerned, the publication, in 1981, of the book titled Mali, Farmers and the State signed by a group of Malian researchers, gives a precise idea of the advanced state of deterioration of food and industrial farming structures.

The stress is particularly placed on the gradual destruction since independence of the economic and psychological capital of the farming world, through bureaucratic decisions and massive Government

exploitation, all things which had placed producers in the margin a long time before the arrival of the IMF and the World Bank.

For example, "in 1978, in the words of Youssouf G.KEBE, one of the authors of the book, in order to maintain the value of his sugar consumption, the farmer had to produce:

- 92.3% more millet-sorghum than in 1962-63
- 88.5% more paddy than in 1962-63
- 93.2% more cotton than in 1962-63
- 89.6% more groundnuts than in 1962-63,

while at the same moment, the increase in the production of these crops was only:

- 12.5% for millet-sorghum
- 18.5% for paddy
- 10.9% for cotton
- 16.8% for groundnuts".

A still more illustrative case is found in the words of the same author, according to whom, always in 1978, "the rural world contributed (to the national budgets) 67% of the resources and received in return only 9% of regional expenditures planned in the budget"; "such extorted profits, added P.JACQUEMOT, were shared among the civil service employees, 40,000 in number, the army and the traders".

As far as Government Administration is concerned, it is certainly useful to specify (in order to demonstrate the complex nature of the question) that the social science specialists have not sufficiently studied its character and political weight. One could assume that the reason is some kind of intellectual dead-end, in relation to the fact that western administration has acquired, on utility, ethical and statutory grounds, the functions which are assigned to it by the State.

However, as is the case in all structures imported from the West, the African administration, in addition to similar texts and missions, has a specific culture related to the reinterpretation of its status and to the diversion, or even recuperation of its functions by the society which has adopted it.

In this sense, the sociological theory according to which the Government Administration is not the place from which political revolution could take place assumes that because of the heterogeneous convictions and alliances of its agents, this social category could not be held together by common interest.

But when the State itself contributes to the massive and brutal depreciation of its own administration by blocking or refusing to pay salaries and by lifting protection of employment security through massive lay-offs, such a policy may have and does have serious consequences at several levels:

- by producing a downcast administration without credit, the State has destroyed its own image, undermined its own authority.
- as the mainspring of the State, the fall of the administration has reduced to naught the capacities for initiative, control and social regulation to which can be resumed its principal mission.

- the government has particularly revived tensions and provoked domestic and community conflicts, by taking away from over one half of the Malian population, the substantial weight of their incomes and salaries, through alliances and kinships.

All this accounts for the massive response that the call for strike launched by the UNTM (National Federation of Labor Unions) was going to have within the administration; and such initiative was going to ultimately destroy an already jammed machine.

The sociological and political analysis of what we have called the "new city" goes to a large extent beyond the framework of this communication. But it is a fact that if most of the claims and expectations of populations go unheeded by African leaders, this is because there is no vigilance, hence they also fail to understand the very important phenomenon of the staggering over-urbanization of the African space.

However, the revolutions of the 1990's requiring multi-party states and democracy may be called "city and young people's revolutions", the two phenomena being in addition strongly related.

When population specialists claim that in the years 2020's, one half of the African population will reside in cities, one may have difficulty understanding that we are already experiencing this phenomenon at this very moment. As far as the figures are concerned, they simply remind us that toward the end of the 1980's, urbanization in Mali had increased at a staggering rate of 389% in 19 years!

However, what we must understand very well is the specific nature of the African city which departs from functions, so much so that a the classical definition of the city, such as this, has established itself in western space, above all since the Middle Ages.

In principle, the city is born from its manufacturing or industrial power, i.e., through its need and capacity to absorb a significant amount of manpower through which it lives and grows.

But the African city has been a commercial counter (secondary function of the city) only because it was an administrative headquarter, decided as such by the colonial administration for reasons which were not closely related to economic potential.

Hence, ultimately, the necessity to characterize anew the African city considered for good reasons by artists and scientists as a mirage where comes to stop, at an ever faster speed, a significant part of the national community.

Estimated at 388% in 1978, the pace of the evolution of this process has grown, steadily, until 1991, the year of the revolution, creating in its wake a very significant marginal society at the outskirts of the official city; marginal society characterized by promiscuity, unemployment, despair and consequently violence.

As for the role played by youth in the March 26 Revolution, it appears so evident in the eyes of my fellow-countrymen present in this room, that they may have had, like me, the impression that three years after this revolution, its history was the achievement of young people only, particularly the AEEM (the Malian Students' Union) whose warring actions cornered President Moussa Traoré to exasperation and to fatal excess.

The sociological weight of Malian youth is based on its static weight, because 48,3% of the Malian population are less than 14 years old.

Dr. ANTONIELLI's excellent thesis on the disruptions of the Malian educational system, since independence, on the significant marginal condition it has created, accounts as much for the reasons of the violent tactics of the AEEM in 1991 as it enlightens on the content of the Memorandum the conditions of implementation of which nearly wiped away the democratic regime of the Third Republic.

The interest, unbelievably derisory, granted by the military regime and the UDPM to the training and supervision of youth, through an efficient educational system, the loss of prestige of the academic degree caused by the suspension of the examination for entry into the public service over several years in a row, with all the individual and family traumas consecutive to such decision, the fact that most of these young desperate individuals came from this marginal society into the cities or that they are going to increase its size, all these factors explain the extreme violence which characterized the social upheaval of 1991.

The first part of our analysis, which we are concluding, denotes a shift in tone from the second which we are about to start and where, instead of the forces we have just listed, the associations and corporations will go on the assault of the reformed state, as if the Revolution had put an end to the historic mission of former alliances.

The collaboration-negotiation between the State and the new forces and social solidarities stemming from March 1991, is known under the notion of popular participation in the nascent democracy.

Structurally, can the regular State, even partially reformed, function in this form of contract other than face? Does the effective participation of the popular masses in the conduct of affairs not require another type of State?

II. THE STATE, THE PERIPHERAL POWERS AND THE DECENTRALIZED STATE

The quality of the political change operated in March 1991 does not make it an unprecedented event in the recent History of Mali, even if people seem to have forgotten today the huge emotional charge which came from the proclamation of independence on September 22, 1960 and the announcement of the successful military coup on November 18, 1968, against the 1st Republic.

These two events however, have been carriers of hope, in the strong sense, because they stemmed from a situation of social and political dead-end, relative to an ideological option having reached, in the context of Mali at the end of the 1960's, its objective limits.

The specific nature of the March 26, 1991 Revolution is that it fundamentally addressed the structures of the State and society, questioning, by this fact, the examination of power as something to be thought of in another way. This was truly speaking the meaning of the slogan "Multipartism and Democracy!".

In order to get there, an unprecedented experience, in our modern history, was attempted and succeeded. For the first time, in order to let all social forces express themselves in as freely a manner as possible, Mali, like many other African countries, has had, through a transitional government, a form of government where the State agreed to hibernate, for a while, its force and repressive powers.

Thus, through an original mode of representation resembling the social forces in the cities and in the countryside, the institutions have been established by the National Conference, while for a period of nearly 14 months, associations, corporations and socio-professional categories have been restructuring the civilian society through symposia, meetings and States General.

In sum, the legacy of the Third Republic, comparatively to that of those who preceded it, is extremely heavy, not from an ideological option, not from a military oath, but from the double negation of respect for acts established by the National Conference and promises made to subscribe to the claims of the States General.

Thus conceived, the Third Republic appears, from the onset, as the ideal model of a Democratic State whose political program would only be a reflection of the aspirations of the majority and the behavior, the exact measure of the moral will of citizens.

Of course, things have not happened that way and the will of the State to build, and above all, to perpetuate such an image of itself had nearly put an abrupt end to its existence.

Thus the question of popular participation to the building of new democracies raises the double political question of the possibility and the durability of such a scheme, as in any case the African peoples have conceived it in the 1990's, being led by the intellectual reformers.

For a long time, people will be wondering about what has ultimately sustained these new democracies where in almost all cases the States fell two years, at the most, after their establishment. The only hypothesis which is worth considering is that they did not have the military ambitions which had just died with the fall of one party systems, even though in Togo and Zaïre, for example, the forces in place had withstood the pressures of time against democratic projects whose wrong was that they were ruined by partisan behavior in the face of a state machinery still standing.

This means that in the case of Mali (as of many others) the National Conference which is the utmost translation of popular participation, was successful only thanks to the will of the consensus government which could exist only by accident, and which, in any case, is different than a Democratic State.

Does such a statement mean that popular participation, through the categorial and direct forms of expression which we had known it with in the Malian context, during the first two years of the existence of the Third Republic, as a type of popular participation is therefore inefficient, if not harmful in a State which enjoys all its prerogatives?

In order to answer this question, let's examine a few examples of this sort of political scheme.

The National Conference, we said, had inaugurated the tradition. For fifteen days, 1,200 delegates representing associations, corporations, interest groups, institutions, political parties; thus these 1,200 delegates had met, unrelentingly, with total freedom of tone and expression, and examined the founding documents of the Third Republic which were the Constitution, the Electoral Code and the Charter of Political Parties.

The efficiency of the work was due only to the fact that the reference documents had been carefully prepared by specialists, except for the passion and exaggeration in some words uttered in an assembly at the peak of revolutionary or reformist sensitivity.

Nevertheless, lawyers and politicians find today that these documents which had been thus voted, had numerous inadequacies which make them require revision by more authorized competencies, and in a more relaxed atmosphere.

In the same vein and during the same period were held the States General of numerous sectors of the social activity (Education, Trade, Transports, Artcraft, etc.) in order to bring back to the fore all the problems and require the future State to find a solution to it.

The National Conference and the cascade of States General were the most direct form of participation of popular masses to the construction of the State. If one should only hold on to the form, one can then affirm that there may exist, outside and above the administrative structures, an open and direct space for exchange making it possible for the State and citizens to handle common affairs together.

This is however only a pure form judgement, because as far as the bottom is concerned, and to take only the example of the States General, once the State has, through the Third Republic, established itself in its perennial functions, supported by all its administrative and legal accessories, it started early to work at its pace and dilute, in the process and the daily routine, the urgency and the impact of issues perceived as having priority at the level of frantic assemblies.

Also one can ask at this level of the debate, the motivations and end results of a consulting mode such as the regional concertations which, in 1994, had put to use the entire administrative and political staff and the civil society of the different regions of Mali.

Here again, the question was, because of a concern for profound reforms, to delegate the Nation (the State staying out for a while), the power to diagnose the most relevant stumbling blocs and propose remedies.

For nearly fifteen days, the Government listened to people from over the entire national territory and the benefit was telling. The national synthesis of the regional concertations has brought out a catalogue of major national questions the rapid handling of which was entrusted to Departments.

The second regional concertations which have just been put off, indefinitely, should have made it possible for us to check the schedule of implementation of such task which had been entrusted to the Government. For the public, however, for the press, this impression which reaches Ministerial Cabinets, the conclusions of the regional concertations do not seem to have been the object of special attention for the very simple reason that in reality, these issues are handled on a daily basis by the State, by any State, through administrative breaking ups.

The security and defense problems, the school problem, the problems related to the settlement of the tensions in the Northern part of the country or those relative to the authority of the State were, at the time, considered as cause for concern and their resolution was considered urgent.

It happens that, simply, the handling of each of these questions was devolved to a Ministry or to a particular structure with the obligation on the part of the State to produce a result, any time that the conflicts or stumbling blocks, at a particular level, reach an alarm threshold.

We are then coming to the conclusion that popular participation in a given type of State, is an illusion of power, a purely formal contributing force, and in addition, factual, because such participation diminishes as a convalescing State stands up.

The bottom line is that the classical State is a particular political entity responding to its historical context and its proper finalities.

Most, if not all current African States, replicate the model of the Medieval Western State, pyramidal at wish, with its suzerain reigning from the heights over the vassals. This State has developed, over the next centuries, thanks to law and the economy, its formidable capacity of centralization.

During the 18th century in France, after the failure of the constituent assembly which produced the only and unique experience of decentralization came the Jacobin State, then the empire where a concentric State was built and sustained by the powerful frame of an administrative pyramid, its completed form is well within these tightly sealed "classes" represented by the A, B, and C categories with as many echelons, a real fighter's path.

The centralized state, ours, has neither in its constitutive principles, nor in its final objective, the will to associate the people to its management. And besides, each space of expression conceded to its people whom it is allowed to direct in the strong sense is, for him, a confession of powerlessness.

This is the reason why the fundamental reform of the Republican State with respect to absolute government was the introduction of a parliamentary system representative of the people. The people express their will through the mediation of their representatives at the National Assembly and that's all.

I know that from 1960 to 1968, we experienced another type of State which, under the cover of democratic centralism which characterizes the dictatorship of the proletariat, claimed to fight against the Bourgeois State.

But on this question let's not go any further.

We should rather acknowledge that in the area of conception and exercise of power, the current Constitution of the Republic of Mali contains a provision whose revolutionary character has been unequalled so far: it is the institution of the Higher Council of Territorial Collectivities which confirms the decentralization of Government.

In order to judge the depth of the reform in a State which is only 35 years old, it is good to know that France, who served as our model, only had the texts of its decentralization adopted in 1983.

The bamanankan concept for decentralization indicates the mental decolonization it implies: "ka mara séki so", i.e., "bring governance back to the base", and not only administration.

Of course, and in order to clear any misunderstanding in that area, we have produced, in the 36th issue of *Jamana*, a substantive article on the subject, where we are voicing our concerns, in addition to the lively discussions which we organized on two occasions at the Presidency with Ousmane Sy, the head of decentralization.

These legitimate concerns do not diminish in any way, in our opinion, the commitment to decentralization, the only option about which one may validly refer to popular participation without it being necessary from that time on to specify the democratic nature of the State which will thus be engaged to loosen its grip considerably for the benefit of the populations.

However, such populations from the country and the new city whose underground action, ignored and often despised by the centralized State, are its greatest enemy; people have had an opportunity to see it in Africa in the course of the last thirty five years.

I am sorry to have been a bit long in introducing a debate but I do wish that the theoretical stance of this presentation should not prevent you from examining the practical examples which, here and there, have supported our different experiences.

Thank You.

**THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
CABINET DECISIONS IN ZAMBIA: RECENT REFORMS IN
POLICY COORDINATION**

(Paper prepared for the African Networking Conference on *New Leadership and Democratic Governance in Africa: The Role of the Executive Office*, to be held in Bamako, Mali on 24 - 26 September, 1995 under the auspices of the Implementing Policy Change (IPC) Project of the United States Agency for International Development)

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Introduction

1. This presentation outlines the policy coordination roles of the Policy Analysis and Coordination Division (PAC) of Cabinet Office and line Ministries in Zambia in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of Cabinet decisions. The presentation differentiates the many roles played by various stakeholders in the conduct of Cabinet business.
2. Before I discuss these issues in detail I would like to describe Zambia's form of Government. Until 1991, Zambia had a one-party socialist-oriented system of Government in which policy decisions were made in a closed system of insiders of the ruling Party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP).
3. Our system of Government is, like the British system, based on the Westminster-style of government. This means that major policy decisions are made by Cabinet under the principle of collective responsibility, hence decisions taken by Cabinet are considered to be "government policy". Zambia's Cabinet is headed by the President of the country, who is also the leader of the majority Party in Parliament. The members of the Cabinet include the President, the Vice-President and Cabinet Ministers. The Ministers are elected Members of Parliament who are appointed by the President to head the line Ministries which have the primary responsibility for developing policy proposals for consideration by Cabinet.

PAC in the Context of Cabinet Office

4. In carrying out its business, the Cabinet is serviced by Cabinet Office headed by the Secretary to the Cabinet who is the Chief Adviser to the Government and is head of the Civil Service. Zambia's Cabinet Office is composed of three Divisions following its restructuring in July 1993 as part of the Public Service Reform Programme. These Divisions are Policy Analysis and Coordination Division, Management Development Division and Administration Division.
5. The restructuring of Cabinet Office was undertaken in order to:
 - (a) enable the Office of the Secretary to the Cabinet to perform its role of "nerve centre" of Government more effectively, particularly in coordinating the formulation, monitoring and implementation of Government policies;
 - (b) attain a better understanding of the implications of Ministerial proposals made to Cabinet; and
 - (c) act as an analytical screen for material coming from line Ministries to Cabinet.
6. Prior to the restructuring, the wide-ranging array of Cabinet Office special central coordinating responsibilities led it to become too involved in the day-to-day operational activities of Ministries, Provinces and Government Agencies. This did not enhance direct ministerial, provincial and departmental planning responsibility and accountability for their actions. The creation of PAC at Cabinet Office was, therefore, intended to respond to the challenges of democratic governance, transparency and accountability.
7. The mission of PAC is to improve the effectiveness of Government by providing Cabinet with high-quality advice in the formulation of coordinated and effective policies. One of the main objectives of PAC is to examine and analyse Cabinet Memoranda with the aim of:

- (a) ensuring that they are consistent with existing government policy and the manifesto of the ruling Party;
 - (b) determining the policy impact on other departments of Government and the various sectors of the population, economy and society at large; and
 - (c) providing an independent analytical assessment to Cabinet from a national as opposed to a ministerial perspective.
8. The Division is also responsible for recording proceedings of Cabinet Meetings, preparing Minutes of Cabinet Meetings, conveying decisions of Cabinet to line Ministries and assisting them in developing plans for monitoring the implementation of the decisions.

The Old Policy Process

9. Before PAC was created, Cabinet Office played almost no role in the policy formulation process because it only received completed policy proposals from Ministries. Although a lot of work may have gone into such policy proposals, their quality were generally poor. The Memoranda were of little assistance to Cabinet in making informed decisions because they lacked important information, clear objectives and implementation considerations. PAC attempted to make suggestions on how to improve the submissions but most were so fundamentally flawed that they often had to be sent back to the originating Ministries for further refinement.

10. Some Memoranda, flawed as they were, received Cabinet consideration with the inevitable result that Cabinet debate first centred of figuring out what the intent of the proposal was before the debate could focus on the merits of the proposal itself. Consequently, Cabinet meetings took a long time and the decisions made could not stand the test of time as other information related to the proposal became available to Cabinet. Once a decision was made, it would normally take at least two weeks before the originating Ministry was informed because Cabinet decisions could only be conveyed after ratification of the minutes of a Meeting at a subsequent Meeting.

11. The numerous flaws in the policy process led to only about 25 per cent of Cabinet decisions being implemented. Worse even, there were no systems in place for monitoring the implementation of Cabinet decisions and evaluating their impact. This led to the Cabinet and the beneficiaries of such decisions to be considerably frustrated. It also meant that there was no basis for the reformulation of policy or the adaptation of successful implementation strategies to other policies.

The New Policy Process

12. When PAC set out to improve the policy process, it focussed on the decentralised and more participatory nature of effective policy development and implementation. This required the development of better systems for the technical experts in the Ministries to participate in policy development and to equip them with skills to work credibly in the new system. PAC recognised that the better the quality of analysis that went into the policy proposals, the easier it would be for Cabinet to make informed decisions. It also recognised the need for implementation to

receive the same attention as policy development. In both respects, political commitment at the highest level of Government was necessary. The following measures were, therefore, taken to streamline the operations of the Zambian Cabinet system:

(a) *The New Policy Formulation and Implementation Process*

The process of developing the new system, which is attached as Annexure 1, and obtaining support for it took several months. It involved discussing the matter with the stake holders, comparing our systems with selected Commonwealth countries, scrutinising the proposed solutions and submitting them to Cabinet for consideration and approval. The new policy process requires that at the conceptual stage, PAC is informed of the policy matter for which Cabinet consideration is required.

PAC takes care to ensure that at every stage, line Ministries retain the ownership of their policy proposals. Therefore, line Ministries play a leading role in identifying and prioritising the issues that require Cabinet attention. The main role of PAC is to help line Ministries to explore exhaustively all ways and means of resolving the problem at hand before seeking recourse to Cabinet.

At the policy implementation stage, the role of PAC is largely restricted to the conveyance of a Cabinet decision. If there are problems being experienced in implementation, PAC in consultation with the originating Ministry may seek the involvement of stake holders to accord them an opportunity to scrutinise the impediments to effective policy implementation and how to overcome them.

At the monitoring stage, the line Ministries play the role of monitoring the policy implementation process while the role of PAC is to ensure that Ministries undertake such monitoring and report regularly to Cabinet, through PAC. In order to achieve this, the new Cabinet Memoranda format requires that implementation and monitoring plans are included in Cabinet Memoranda.

(b) *Inter-Ministerial Committees of Officials (IMCOs)*

Inter-Ministerial Committees of Officials are *ad hoc* forums of civil servants which scrutinise complex policy proposals involving more than one Ministry. IMCOs are convened and chaired by PAC. They afford stake holders an opportunity to comment on the matter from different view points and interests before a submission is made to a Cabinet Committee or Cabinet. The composition and functions of IMCOs are attached as Annexure II.

(c) *Cabinet Liaison Officers (CLOs)*

All line Ministries have appointed Cabinet Liaison Officers (CLOs) who act as link persons between line Ministries and PAC on matters relating to Cabinet. As part of the policy coordination between PAC and Ministries, CLOs are required to give timely advice to PAC on all forthcoming Cabinet business from their

respective Ministries and ensure that PAC is informed of any special circumstances affecting forthcoming Memoranda. They are also required to submit quarterly reports on their Ministries' implementation of Cabinet decisions and their impacts.

Ministry officials play a major role in determining the content and focus of Cabinet Memoranda. Memoranda are issued in the name of the Minister a balance needs to be struck between the political leadership and the professional civil service. Since the legitimate goal of any policy proposal is to render a service to the people, it serves as the bench mark for such a balance. The new Cabinet system requires that Ministry officials comprehensively brief their Ministers to enable them to present policy proposals confidently to Cabinet or Cabinet Committees and contribute constructively to discussions on Memoranda from other Ministers. This is particularly important because officials do not attend Cabinet or Cabinet Committee Meetings, so that Ministers can debate freely and frankly amongst themselves.

(d) *Cabinet Committee System*

Cabinet Committees have been reorganised, restructured and reconstituted to improve their effectiveness and operational efficiency in order to: -

- (i) reduce the workload and the length of Meetings of Cabinet;
- (ii) enhance the quality of decisions and delivery of services; and
- (iii) enhance the concept of collective responsibility.

The Committees have been reduced in number from seventeen to seven focusing on the priority areas of Government, with special attention being devoted to economic recovery through the Structural Adjustment Programme. In order to effectively monitor not only the economic recovery programme but also the social consequences of this programme, three Cabinet Committees have been established to take charge of the economic and social restructuring and development concerns and the Government efforts to rehabilitate the run down economic and social infrastructure. Under the new system, all Memoranda except for the most urgent are to be tabled before Cabinet Committees for discussion before cabinet consideration of the matter at hand.

(e) *New Cabinet Memorandum Format*

The new Cabinet Memorandum format, a copy of which is attached as Annexure III, is intended to provide sufficient information to the Cabinet and includes an explicit indication of the resource requirements, projected impact and options considered.

(f) *Minutes of Cabinet Meetings*

Cabinet Minutes constitute only the decisions of Cabinet, unlike in the past when the actual deliberations were also included. This was intended to strengthen collective responsibility and shorten Cabinet Meetings.

Concluding Remarks

In Zambia, strong policy coordination is recognised as a key factor in the development of transparency, accountability and efficiency. It is for this reason that a lot of attention is being paid to the involvement of stakeholders in the policy formulation and implementation process. In doing so, the neutrality of PAC and its national rather than ministerial perspective places a heavy pivotal role on the Division. So far, it can be said that the framework for effectively managing policy formulation, implementation and monitoring has been put in place. All that remains is to make the system work fully. While PAC staff are highly trained in specialised fields, they need additional training which is responsive to the new policy process adopted by the Government. This will improve the efficiency of the Division and win the staff the confidence need to perform their coordination role effectively. The initial training of PAC staff and CLOs in the fundamentals of policy analysis, the new cabinet Memorandum format, and monitoring and evaluation has only set the stage for more comprehensive training which is critical to the effective implementation of the new policy process.

Last but not least, we recognise the contribution of the IPC team which has been tirelessly working with us. We are greatly indebted to them for their advice and assistance without which our reform of the Cabinet system would not have been possible.

Annexure II

COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE IMCOs

The composition of the IMCOs is as follows:

- (a) PAC Officials;
- (b) Cabinet Liaison Officer from the Originating Ministry;
- (c) Cabinet Liaison Officers from relevant Line Ministries;
- (d) Technical Representatives from Originating Ministry;
- (e) Technical Representatives from relevant Ministry; and
- (f) Secretariat (provided by the Originating Ministry).

Functions of IMCOs

The functions of the IMCOs include the following:

- (a) provide data to the Originating Ministry and other IMCO members for preliminary analysis of the problem;
- (b) discuss and develop alternative solution(s) to the problem;
- (c) determine whether implementation of solution (s) requires Cabinet decision or administrative measures;
- (d) assist originating Ministry by providing additional relevant data/information required to justify the desired Cabinet or Cabinet Committee decision;
- (e) review initial Cabinet memoranda drafts;
- (f) assess whether or not Ministers' comments should be incorporated in the initial or final draft Cabinet Memoranda;
- (g) plan implementation of Cabinet decisions in order to:
 - (i) develop rules, regulations, and guidelines for carrying out decisions;
 - (ii) modify decision to reflect operational constraints, including incentives and resources;
 - (iii) translate decision into operational terms;
 - (iv) set up programme goals and standards, including schedule of operations;
- (h) monitor and evaluate implementation in order to:
 - (i) assess whether each decision was carried out;
 - (ii) assess the impact of the decision;
 - (iii) assess the relevance, quality and usefulness of individual Cabinet decisions;
 - (iv) identify and analyse the factors associated with effectiveness and impact of each Cabinet decision;
 - (v) evaluate findings which should be communicated to Cabinet via PAC in order to facilitate reconsideration of existing policies and strategies;
 - (vi) regularly evaluate all Cabinet decisions;
 - (vii) compare expected and actual performance levels according to established criteria; and
- (viii) assign responsibility for discovered discrepancies in performance.

Annexure III

Standard Format for Cabinet Memoranda

1. **Heading and Title**
2. **Minister's Recommendation**
3. **Problem Statement (Purpose and issue to be resolved)**
4. **Rationale and Background**
 - a) **relation to present policy; and**
 - b) **arguments in support of the recommendation**
5. **Resource Requirements:**
 - a) **Financial; and**
 - b) **Human**
6. **Projected Impact of Propossal (both positive and negative):**
 - a) **social;**
 - b) **political;**
 - c) **economic;**
 - d) **environmental; and**
 - e) **effect on special groups;**
7. **Options Considered before Arriving at Recommendation**
8. **Consultation:**
 - a) **position of other Ministries;**
 - b) **expected support; and**
 - c) **anticipated criticism**
9. **Draft Implementation Plan**
10. **Urgency, Timing and Handling:**
 - a) **immediate conveyance of decision requested (yes or no);**
 - b) **if yes, rationale for immediate conveyance; and**
 - c) **if applicable, recommended method for announcing to the public**
11. **Request that Recommendation be Accepted by Cabinet**